




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


# *The New Turks*









Celal Bayar in the 1950 election


# *The New Turks*

Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950

*By*

ELEANOR BISBEE

Former Professor of Philosophy, Robert College  
and the American College for Girls  
Istanbul, Turkey



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## Foreword

ONE of the most interesting and significant developments during the past thirty years is the fundamental transformation which has taken place in the life of the Turkish people. This transformation, under the guiding genius of President Atatürk, following eleven years of war and turmoil from 1911 to 1922, not only reduced Turkey from an empire to a national state, under a republican form of government, but wrought great changes in the life of the people.

Americans, of course, have long been interested in the highly important region of which Turkey is a part. The first treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the Ottoman Empire was signed at Constantinople on May 7, 1830, more than a century ago. Moreover, American missionaries and educators, for more than one hundred years, have worked in the Near Eastern area, with such institutions as Robert College and the American College for Girls in İstanbul, to mention only two as symbols of their constructive efforts.

But within recent years the interest of the American people in Turkey and the Turkish people has been greatly stimulated, especially since the beginning of World War II and the inauguration of the program of assistance to Turkey in the post-war years. Although the world has learned something of the dramatic changes which took place in Turkey during the lifetime of President Atatürk, less has been written about the more fundamental and less dramatic developments which have taken place during the years which followed under Presidents İnönü and Bayar.

The program of democratization under Turkey's second and third Presidents has been ably described by Miss Bisbee, whose first-hand knowledge of the Turkish people, their customs, their daily life, and their long history, makes this very timely book useful reading to all those who are interested in the better understanding and friendship of all peace-loving peoples of the world. Miss Bisbee's work is both popularly written and sound in its grasp of the essentials. Be-

cause it is primarily concerned with the way the Turkish people live and work, this book should prove especially interesting to all who read it.

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Member, American Historical Association, American Academy of Political and Social Science, American Society of International Law. Contributing Editor: *Bibliographie Balkanique* (Paris, France). Member, Board of Editors of *Journal of Modern History*. Author, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923*; *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935*; *A Study in the Recent History of the Balkan and Near Eastern Peoples, 1936*; *The Problem of the Turkish Straits, 1947*; *Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II, 1948*. Contributor to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, *Encyclopedia Americana*, and also to numerous journals.

# Preface

MANY books have been written about Turkey as a state, but very few books about the Turks as people. They are uniquely important people to know in this era of one-world hopes, because they live in a country which is in both Asia and Europe, and share the culture and problems of both Occident and Orient. Indeed, everybody interested in trends of civilization, the fate of nations, and the capacity of humans to change their own lives, will turn repeatedly to the story of the Turks between 1920 and 1950. In those thirty years they demonstrated remarkably what a people with a will to civilization can do for themselves during a world upheaval. After 1923, no longer burdened with empire, they came into their own as a homogeneous people in their bi-continental homeland. For the first time, the world could watch what they would make of themselves with only themselves to rule.

This book about the Turks in that period is written both as a human interest story of how completely people can change their ways in one generation, and as a report of the Turks' first cycle of achievement in their new republic. The book is the work of no fewer than twenty persons, more than half of them Turks, the rest Americans. Yet it is not a symposium, since the contributions of all but myself were suggestions and criticisms on the preliminary drafts which I prepared. The book could not have been written without this coöperation: hence all credit belongs to the group. But any errors must be attributed solely to me, since the final selection of material and the form of statement were mine alone.

When, however, a writer of one nationality tries to present the people of another nationality, it is only fair to make clear the nature of the writer's acquaintance with them. Before going to Turkey, I shared what I am sure were the average American's vague notions about "the infidel Turk," "Ottoman oppressors," and "starving minorities in Turkey," plus inklings of a new era of unveiled women, and a leader, named Atatürk, who was "Westernizing Turkey." I had no



special interest then in knowing more. A different angle, however, came to my attention when, as a newspaper reporter in the 1920's, I interviewed Alexander Powell, then an eminent travel lecturer, and also Professor A. H. Lybyer, Professor of History, University of Illinois. Each wished to discuss the Turks and each, in effect, said, "The Turks are unduly maligned in Western countries. They are people whom we should know better." Nevertheless, I did not know them better ten years later, when I was engaged in college teaching and was unexpectedly offered the professorship of philosophy at both Robert College and the American College for Girls in Istanbul, Turkey. A few weeks later I stepped on to Turkish soil, too uninformed to be biased either for or against the Turks, having been educated to nothing in their favor, but also having been forewarned not to be prejudiced against them.

The strongest common bond which I, as an American, discovered with the Turks, was the pioneer spirit. The year of my arrival, 1936, was at the peak of their pioneering confidence. Their great leader, Atatürk, was still alive and in office. I stayed for six years, including three years of World War II, the years of severest test for the new Turks' aims and efforts. My observations were made with the Turks as I met them, at first among students and colleagues in the American colleges, then in private homes and at Turkish functions, and eventually in travels in their country. Some Turks became very close friends; some, I unfortunately antagonized; and many others were between these extremes. To every Turk in either official or private life, who has answered my persistent questions, I am grateful, and I feel indebted even to those who resented my curiosity, for the nature of their resentment at times taught me more correct views. I owe most, I think, to those Turks who tried to teach me their language. The material we read and discussed inspired questions on hundreds of points which I would otherwise have missed.

My deepest gratitude in direct preparation of this book is to Turks in the United States. Nearly all of the notes I took in Turkey were in a shipment of goods lost at sea during the war. Had it not been for the gracious generosity of Turks in the United States in pooling their information and in writing to relatives and friends in Turkey for more information, that loss could not have been compensated. As it was, the new information pool became a far richer source than the lost notes.

This book, therefore, is a composite of views and impressions gathered from many Turks, through many forms of association with them and from non-Turks who have lived in Turkey, all channeled into lines of growing American interest in the Turks as people. Certain Turks will feel that no fair-minded visitor in their land would publicize some of their troubles mentioned herein. They may disclaim these faults—without claiming to be faultless—and attribute these to the writer's prejudiced personal opinion. Certain Western readers will feel equally strongly that so many virtues can be credited to the Turks only through bias. I have tried to introduce a great deal of evidence to speak for itself, but at times I have had to express purely personal opinions. My opinions are to be considered hypotheses which grew from close associations, and they are subject to test by all who enjoy similar or closer associations with the new Turks.

My deepest indebtedness for direct help and encouragement is to Mr. Kerim Kâmi Key, whom I first knew in Turkey, but who is now a staff member of the Research Division of the U.S. Department of State. His inexhaustible interest and his invariable promptness in sending published material from his private collection to make up for my lost notes and to add to my information, afforded a rare degree of coöperation and inspiration for any writer to enjoy.

Other help beyond measure was given by İsmail İşmen while at Stanford University and later in Turkey. He obtained data and illustrations; and aided me in making translations of all passages from Atatürk's *Six Day Speech*, which were closer to the original than in the only edition in English. Similarly I acknowledge the help of Şerif Mardin in carefully checking points and reading proof.

Dr. George A. Hedger, former professor of European history, University of Cincinnati, most helpfully advised on organization of material. Ali Bülent Çambel, a former student of mine in Turkey, and now assistant professor in engineering, University of Iowa, read the entire manuscript and never failed to make valuable comments. For reading the whole manuscript and making suggestions from the standpoint of American readers, previously unfamiliar with Turkey, I am indebted to Mrs. Marion Amelia Çambel, Mrs. Gordon Straka, Mrs. Barbara Thrasher Dittmann, and Dr. and Mrs. Harry G. Schrickel.

Among Turkish students who read various chapters and provided information, I want to thank first of all Sedad Sirmen, another former

student of mine, who, while at the University of California in Berkeley, gave most generous coöperation. Others at the same university who helped, are Reşat Aktan, Aydın Germen, and Baki Kasaplıgıl; and, at Stanford University, Hayati Balkanlı, Fikri Ertükel, Mithat Esmer, and Bilge Temel. An American to whom I owe thanks for similar aid is Miss Edith Parsons, former head of the American School for Girls at İzmir.

Finally, I owe much to Dr. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, former Director General of the Press, Broadcasting and Information in Ankara; Bay Ahmet Emin Yalman, İstanbul newspaper publisher; Bay Nizamettin Erenel, former Turkish Consul General in San Francisco, and to Mrs. Christina Phelps Harris, Curator of the Middle East Collections of Hoover Institute and Library, for helpful discussions. Others who, during my years in Turkey and since then, in letters and visits, have shed light on many points, I hope will accept my thanks here, although lack of space keeps them anonymous.

For valuable suggestions on manuscript preparation, I thank Mrs. Jessie Whittern. And for patient coöperation in typing, appreciation is due to Mrs. Ed Baird, Mrs. Lorena Philip, Miss Lois Sheffield, and Miss Madge Burt, who did the work in their spare time.

ELEANOR BISBEE

Palo Alto, California.

# Note on Spelling and Statistics

Western authors have used a multitude of spellings to convey in Latin letters the sounds denoted by the Arabic script, in which the Turkish language was formerly written. Therefore, the name of the holy book of Islam has been spelled by different Western writers, *Khoran*, *Qur'an*, *Qu'ran*, and *Koran*, while the prophet's name has appeared as *Mahomet*, *Mahommed*, *Muhammad*, and with still other variations. The Turks, in 1928, adopted the Latin script and established their own phonetic spellings in Latin letters. Since they are the first to do this with their native tongue, their spelling seems preferable to Western transliterations.

This will mean, for example, *Müslim* instead of *Moslem*, or the full Turkish form, *Müslüman*; and *Irak* instead of *Iraq*. When, however, unfamiliarity might cause confusion, concession is made to established international usage, such as *Turkey* instead of the correct *Türkiye*. The Turkish name for Asiatic Turkey, *Anadolu*, is as simple as the Anglicized *Anatolia*, but because of the strangeness of the Turkish word for its residents, *Anadolulular*, the more familiar *Anatolians* is used; hence, for consistency, also *Anatolia*. Again, because of the unfamiliarity of the Turkish plural endings, *lar* and *ler*, all pluralization is by the English "s," in Roman type, thus *halkevis*. Turkish letters which have no equivalent sounds in English, such as undotted "i" and "ğ," will be used where necessary.

Some readers may be helped by the reminder that *Islam* is the term comparable to *Christianity*, for it denotes the faith or the believers as a whole, whereas *Müslim*, like *Christian*, is either the noun for the individual believer or else the adjective. *Mohammedanism* is often used in the West for *Islam*, although Müslims themselves are opposed to this substitution because it implies deifying and worshipping Muhammed.

Statistics, although kept to a minimum, have been a problem. Turkish records, to date, have not been adequately systematized and government figures have commonly been published without indica-

tions of source or date. As a result, figures from different government bureaus, or even from the same source at different times, do not always agree. In such cases, I have used the figure most consistent with other data, or else the most conservative figure. Although, now and then, someone else can quote from other equally reliable sources figures different from mine, I believe the differences will not be sufficient to alter the points which those used here are meant to illustrate. In 1950, modern census and statistical methods were employed in Turkey for the first time.

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PART I  
TRANSITION



## *These Are the Turks*

An unusually small minority ruling an unusually intelligent and civilized subject population.—A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood in *Turkey*.<sup>1</sup>

THE first generation of Turks to have grown up entirely in the Turkish Republic, which was born of the wreck of an empire in 1923, are now coming into their heritage of responsibility for it. This turning point in the lives of the Turks after three decades of sheer pioneering, 1920-50, is somewhat comparable to the year 1812 in the history of the United States of America. The new Turks, like the American pioneers at that stage, are beginning to feel fully self-reliant, without monarchy, under their own constitution; they have won recognition for their Republic as a political equal with other nations; and they are starting to realize their own economic possibilities. But they are still gravely burdened by foreign pressures and by their own inexperience with the way of life they have chosen. One can hardly hope to understand Turkey and the Turks from now on, without knowing many details of their life in the pioneer years, while the first generation was growing up in the new republican atmosphere.

Naturally, that generation's attitudes have been shaped by their elders, who taught them the contrasts to the past, as well as the intention of their Republic's founders; then, also, by their own experiences in situations such as previous generations of Turks never knew. Turks are probably the only people in the world who, in hardly more than a decade, not only changed their government and their laws but turned their private lives practically topsy turvy. This made sensational news in the 1920's and early 1930's, but it comes into clearer focus viewed

now from one full generation's perspective. This story is of the Turks' adjustment to the modern world, as that world looks to them.

The Turks' eye view of the world at any time is unique. They are an ancient people outside of the familiar Occidental classifications of Anglo-Saxons, Slavs, Goths, or Latins; they came from the East but are not in the familiar Oriental classifications of Chinese or Mongols. They claim origin in an Asiatic region, between the Caspian Sea and the Mongolian desert, which is called "Turan," and where evidences of civilizations, believed by some historians to be older than those of the Mesopotamian Valley, have been discovered. They are an unconquered people who have suffered defeats and bowed to foreign demands in years of weakness, but have never had foreign rulers established over them. Their Ottoman dynasty, which was on the throne from 1299 to 1922, ruled, at the peak of its power, a huge empire, including what are now more than twenty separate states.

Turks are well seasoned in the ways of both the Orient and the Occident, because they formerly governed and partly inhabited all of eastern Europe south of Poland, the whole of Asia Minor and the Arab Middle East, and about half of North Africa. The most accessible stretch of boundary between Europe and Asia still runs through the land of the Turks, namely the famous Dardanelles-Bosphorus Straits. Turkey is a natural proving ground for a livable merger of Oriental and Occidental cultures.

The Turks' view of the world, therefore, is an unusual complex of angles. They view it with the aloofness of those not born to the Western civilization in which they live and yet far removed from their native Eastern civilization. They measure their neighbor nations with the intimate knowledge gained through having first ruled and then lost all of them. They look at the world from the opposite angles of those who have made enemies by their own aggressions and those who have been the victims of others' aggressions; and likewise from the angle of a once imperial power and from the angle of a nation now small. And, finally, they can always look in all directions with the confidence of those who have preserved their own independence. Such a comprehensive view is possible to few, if any, other people.

The time came after World War II when the U.S.A., a great power with a short history, and Turkey, a small power with a long history—the famous pioneering Americans and the newly pioneering

Turks, hemispheres apart—had so many common fears of aggression and common hopes of peace that it became imperative to know each other better. In mutual defense against the vastness of Soviet Russian power and ambitions, the United States in 1947, for the first time in history, officially aided Turkey financially and technically to strengthen her military defenses, and Turkey turned more to the U.S. than to Europe for political and economic coöperation and for training of Turkish experts in all lines.

The Turks whom Americans, therefore, want to know are those who have made themselves over to fit into the modern world. Their strange experiences in doing so were hardly stranger than their baby Republic's patrimony from the Ottoman Empire, which bequeathed to it mostly debt and decadence. At the end of World War I the Ottoman debt was the equivalent of more than \$500,000,000, and the possible revenue was well below \$20,000,000; so the Turks' Republic was like a baby born with a plugged penny in his fist instead of a silver spoon in his mouth. Moreover, nothing great save defeats had happened for nearly four centuries, and Czar Nicholas I of Russia, in 1853, had tagged the Ottoman Sultan, "The Sick Man of Europe."

The Turkey of 1948, the Republic's twenty-fifth anniversary year, was solvent and proud of its political health. It still is so, although both its solvency and its health have been in serious jeopardy from the burden of defense costs during and after World War II. Interestingly enough, in the Republic's prenatal days of debt and illness, the new Turks, preparing for the birth of a national Turkish government to replace the old imperial rule, had decided against the idea of an American mandate for Turkey under the League of Nations. Now that the Republic is of age, but again in a crisis, the Turks have welcomed American aid, but this time on terms of mutual concern for each nation's security and for world peace. The original burden of debt was removed from the Turkish Republic's worries promptly by prorating the Ottoman obligation to all the countries which were in the Empire when it was incurred. Then the Turks placed their share high on the Republic's budget and scrupulously met their agreed payments. The patrimony of decadence was a worse handicap.

In the Sick Man's empire the rudimentary necessities of community life were neglected, even in the capital itself, clear into the twentieth

century. The fire-fighting system of Constantinople (as the old capital was known to the West, although the Turks have always called it Istanbul) was just one example. Probably no other major city in Europe was more full of inflammable wood structures. For the city's "protection," firemen watched from towers by the shore, or from the tops of the city's seven hills. Whenever one sighted a blaze, he rushed through the streets shouting, "There's a fire" ("*Yangın var*") and yelling its location; thus he aroused everyone, while summoning the nearest handcart and hose. When that inadequate equipment arrived, a small fire had probably been extinguished or a large one was already too badly out of control for perhaps several blocks to be saved. Although no recent sultan was solicitous about his city's fire problem, the tale is told of one sultan, anxious enough about his birds in large flying cages on the palace grounds, to hire a foreign expert to supervise their care. The tale continues that the highly paid expert was kept waiting for months after his arrival without even seeing the birds. He was finally summoned at night to attend a sick lion. Petty as these points are, they typify the inconsistency, superficiality, and futility which Ottoman subjects had learned to expect from government.

No bright prospect of improvement appeared at the start of the present century, for the heir apparent to the Ottoman throne had already been imprisoned more than twenty years. "Imprisonment" is the word for princely life in Turkey between the very early era of good rulers and today's Republic. The demoralized sultans of that period who gave the empire its bad name, had sons by so many slave women in the royal harem that the half-brothers and their jealous mothers became murderous in their rivalry for the throne. One or another of them usually managed to pay a retainer in some palace post to strangle rival claimants. The "lucky" prince whom the sultan chose was therefore "imprisoned" for both his own safety and for the safety of the sultan whom he might otherwise try to depose. At best, he lived in a closely guarded palace; at worst he lived in the "cage." The cage was literally a locked and barred enclosure in which the prince spent all his years until he died, went mad, or ascended the throne. Even a prince who had books and tutors to prepare him for his future responsibilities felt the panic of murderous rivalry pursuing him to the throne. There he surrounded himself with spies until nobody, least of all himself, knew whom to trust. Rare indeed was the mind which,

under these conditions, could concentrate on anything but physical satisfactions, self-defense, and outward parades of power. Those sultans who sank to this level dragged with them the entire government.

No degree of desperation, however, led to relief from deadly traditions like the prince's cage, the ancient inadequate laws, and a despot's personal whims. Ottoman laws were the unchangeable laws of Islam in the shariat, which is the code of Koran law and of Muhammed's decisions during his lifetime. Each Turkish sultan since 1517 had also been Khalif of Islam, the "Defender of the Faith"; hence, sultans had been for the most part defending or breaking, but not making laws. A council of learned men, called the Ulema, searched in the Koran and shariat for a verse or law to fit each case which was not settled at once by familiar precedent. The chief of the Ulema, the Sheik-ul-Islam, issued this "legal opinion," or *fetva*. A latitude, which might have been heretical in other sects than the Hanafite branch of the Sunni Müslims, to which the Turks belonged, enabled a broad-minded Ulema to approve the adoption of laws from other codes, e.g., the Roman or the French, to meet situations beyond the scope of Islamic law or precedent. Such situations arose, for instance, from commerce with the West. To meet these, in the nineteenth century, the French commercial law code was adopted, but unfortunately not *adapted*. A corruptible Sheik-ul-Islam might even sell *fetvas* approving new laws at a Sultan-Khalif's whim. It would, therefore, be untrue to say that Ottoman sultans had not promulgated new laws, both good and bad, but doing so was a marked exception. And the Ulema claimed the right to depose the Sultan-Khalif, himself, if he defied ancient law as they quoted it. From start to finish of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, the chief functions of government had been, first, the use of force to conquer and then defend an empire, and thereafter, enforcement of inherited or borrowed codes, rather than initiative in legislation. Naturally, then, the Ottoman Empire was alarmingly out of step with the modern world.

Whenever an educated Turk dipped into Western histories of civilization or books on Turkey, he ran into unpleasant passages about his own people. He might read, "Wherever the Ottoman Government has had an opportunity to exercise authority, decay, destruction, and desolation have resulted. . . . The Turks have failed to respond to the progress of world civilization." (From *Modern Turkey*, an objective,



but friendly study in 1924 by Eliot Grinnell Mears, former American Trade Commissioner at Athens and Constantinople.<sup>2</sup>) Or, in a book less friendly, the Turk might read, "Today, experience has proven and demonstrated definitively that the Turk is a being who never will accept the laws of civilization." (From J. DeMorgan's preface to Bertrand Bareilles' *Les Turcs*.<sup>3</sup>)

Great empires, however, are not born of decadence, so the birth and youth of the Ottoman Empire must have had something better to offer, some valuable Turkish heritage, which later sultans dissipated. From Osman (or Othman), who gave his name to the dynasty in 1299, to Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, who died in 1566, the first ten sultans made a highly creditable record of rule, largely by armed force. Their reigns culminated in the tri-continental empire which contained nearly all of what are now Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, southern Russia (the Crimea and Transcaucasia), western Iran, Irak, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the adjoining minor states on the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Islands, and of course Turkey. Some of this expansion was for defense; most of it was for military glory; and part of it was for additional tax sources to fill the royal coffers.

Since the Turks were administrators and not producers, except for the Turkish peasants producing foodstuffs by antiquated methods, theirs was not the program of economic exploitation characteristic of the colonial empires of modern European states. Subject peoples of the Ottomans could solve their production problems in their own ways. The government's proper function was to defend their lands and use their tax money for the public good. Although many rulers did nothing for the public good, this pattern was the accepted one for "civilized" military rule everywhere until the current era of either democracy or totalitarianism. Unfortunately, only an occasional sultan during the three and a half centuries of decline was benevolent enough to provide inns, hospitals, libraries, or indeed any public benefits other than fortifications and military roads. As time went on, the more the subjects produced the more they were taxed and the fewer benefits they received; the more, also, the sultans and their favorites extorted taxes for extravagant palace life.

Turks today prefer to have their past judged by the criterion of

those earlier times—namely good and bad administration—rather than by more recent, decadent court morals, or by the modern criterion of economic productiveness. They appreciate a passage like this one in the *Cambridge Modern History*: “. . . it is probable that under the early Ottoman rulers the administration of justice was better in Turkey than in any European land. The Mohammedan subjects of the Sultans were more orderly than most Christian communities and crimes were rarer.”<sup>4</sup> Or this passage in Edson L. Clark’s *Turkey in Nations of the World Series*:

The Turks were far better men, and far abler rulers than the wretched tyrants whom they superseded. As a rule, they were grave, serious, honest, and straightforward, while their vigor and energy in the conduct of affairs made them the wonder of the world. . . . It seems to be conceded that for the first century following the fall of Constantinople, the Turkish dominions were better governed and more prosperous than most parts of Christian Europe; that the people, both Mohammedan and Christian, enjoyed a larger measure of private liberty and of the fruits of their labor than fell to the lot of their contemporaries under the confused and too often tyrannical governments of the West. . . . In education and intellectual culture the Turks were in advance, not of their Christian subjects alone, but of the greater part of Christian Europe.<sup>5</sup>

Sultan Süleyman’s reign, 1520-66, reached the peak of constructive achievement, for no subject nations revolted during his reign, yet it was one of his wives who set the precedent for murdering surplus heirs to the throne. Palace harems of slaves provided no Turkish mothers of princes since Turks could not be slaves. And, as decline set in, royal houses of subject countries became less anxious for their princesses to bear heirs to the Ottoman throne. The pedigrees of the caged princes in the next centuries were, therefore, not written in the blue blood of purely Turkish Osmanlı fathers and royal mothers who previously had carefully trained each heir to the throne.

Harem intrigue in the heyday of slave mothers replaced responsibility with favoritism as the key to appointments, promotions, and privileges. Palace doors and the Sublime Porte rarely opened to any but favorites. (The entire Ottoman government was known by the name of the Sublime Porte, Babiali, the gate to the walled inner city of government buildings in İstanbul.) Spy rings surrounding spy rings drove nearly everyone who was not in favor or totally inconspicuous to death or exile. Sultan Osman II, who wished to marry an educated

girl and attend to state business in his reign in the seventeenth century, tried to abolish the harem, whereupon the palace guards, who profited when harems distracted sultans from business, killed him.

Favoritism ruined the crack troops, the janissaries. Christians have always been shocked at the origin of these troops and the Turks are shocked at their ending. Their origin was an annual draft of Christian boys in childhood for the sultan's "slave household." These draftees received the finest physical care and moral and intellectual education possible in the empire. Merit ruled every step of their way from enrollment to final post, which, according to ability, might be palace gardener or grand vezir (prime minister), or else they comprised the picked troops of twelve thousand janissaries. None of these posts was hereditary. Moreover, Müslim boys were not eligible because their families considered themselves a privileged class of freeholders; only slaves could be trained and rise by pure merit, with no hint of privilege. Free Müslims became judges, soldiers, landowners, teachers, and religious dignitaries. Royal favorites among the Müslims envied the slaves' power and opportunities in government and, after Süleyman's day, free favorites were admitted to the corps, whereupon the high merit standards for the janissaries and for government officials came tumbling down.

Military defeats in Europe and growing power rivalry from the Hapsburgs and from the Russians after the sixteenth century seemed to enervate still more the Ottoman sense of responsibility. While the Reformation and Renaissance were emancipating Europe from religious stagnation and barren thinking, the Ottoman Turks were sinking into a morass of purposelessness and favoritism. When the Industrial Revolution mechanized Occidental life and provided new opportunities for production, the Ottomans under static Islamic authority and Sublime Porte despotism interrogated neither God nor nature, followed set laws, shunned experiment, and sapped the life out of the Oriental-Occidental caravan trade by tolls and commissions while Western explorers charted sea routes by-passing Turkey.

All in all, from the time that empire growth was checked, the majority of sultans dissipated the early Ottoman prestige. Rule by the Sublime Porte became unworthy of the name "authority" and was with good reason called "the Ottoman yoke." Western sympathy has been lavished on the non-Turkish subjects, especially on the Christian

Balkan peoples, bearing that yoke. What is usually overlooked is that the Turkish people themselves were under the yoke, and corrupt government was equally hard on them. To be sure, Turkish favorites of the Porte shared illicit gains from corruption and brute force. But so did Greek, Armenian, Egyptian, Slav, and other non-Turkish favorites who held office.

Of Greeks in high office, a Greek editor wrote:

The Ottoman Empire in the middle of the eighteenth century was daily giving a larger control of public affairs to the Greeks. . . . There might have developed a joint control of the fortunes of empire. This, however, could not be. The Greeks in the Turkish service outdid their masters in fanaticism; they were more Turkish than the Turks themselves; they worked against the most ardent desire of the Greek race . . . which was Hellenic independence and eventual redemption of Constantinople. . . .<sup>6</sup>

Turks have on their minds this and other cases of non-Turkish subjects enjoying a generous share in Ottoman government, who either misrepresented and betrayed to the Ottomans the rest of their own kind in the empire, or who secretly conspired with outside powers to betray the Turks. But whoever was guilty of betrayal, injustice, or brutality in the whole multinational Ottoman Empire was labelled "Turk" by the West.

These "terrible Turks" of all nationalities made the yoke so galling that revolt spread rapidly from the beginning of the nineteenth century. One subject nation after another, aided by Christian powers, threw off the yoke. First were the Serbs and the Greeks, early in the nineteenth century; next to the last were the Arabs, a century later. Last were the Turks, who freed themselves in the 1920's, not only without foreign troops to aid them, but in the face of opposition by the European Allies who sided with the Sublime Porte against them. The Turks themselves gave the Ottoman Empire the coup de grâce, and exiled the Osmanlı family. The sultans' mausoleums were closed to visitations which had become religious rites. (The Osmanlı exile was modified in 1949, however, to readmit certain fringe members of the family, e.g., widower husbands of deposed princesses. Osmanlı princesses, now married to foreigners or to members of the Turkish diplomatic corps, may return for three-month visits.)

During the whole century of final disintegration, Turkish individuals and groups had made attempts to reform the Ottoman govern-

ment and to recoup its strength by "Westernization." The Empire was by then desperately on the defensive. It fought eight or more full-fledged wars within a century. And, according to the German chief-of-staff in Turkey during World War I, the sultans sacrificed an average of seventy-five thousand Turkish soldiers annually in defending the Ottoman subject nations against each other, and in suppressing revolt. Turkish reformers, therefore, first aimed at revival of military power and governmental authority to enforce order.

Two appalling barriers hedged in the earlier reformers, namely military corruption and religious conservatism. Attempts in previous centuries to save the collapsing Empire by military reforms had invariably run into trouble with the demoralized janissaries. These troops, entrenched in privilege, had slipped so low that they were defending their own inertia and vices by slaying any of their officers who demanded better of them. Sultan Selim III in 1807 tried to reorganize them along lines of Napoleon's army and paid for it with his life. The janissaries in turn paid with their own lives when the next sultan, Mahmud II, another reformer, sent navy gunners to quell them, an action that forced them into their barracks which were then set on fire. For the Turks, the janissaries' decades of disgrace and their horrible end are a shocking memory after pride in their strict merit. The whole system was officially abolished in 1826, and Mahmud secured Prussian officers to train the army.

Most political and civil reforms had also run into religious barriers. The Empire's Islamic subjects had not wanted secular Western ideas foisted upon them. Nor, in fact, had the Ottoman Christians of Eastern sects, such as the Greek Orthodox, wanted Westernization for fear it would mean dominance by Rome. And naturally none of the Ottoman ruling classes would stand for reform which threatened their self-sufficiency. But the Ulema, at last, in the nineteenth century, began to seek successfully in the Koran and shariat for legal justifications for progress.

All of this final era was a weird mixture of reform and hope on one hand and injustice and violence on the other. A reform proclamation of 1839, called the *Tanzimat* (or "Hatt-i-şerif"—Charter of Liberties), another product of Mahmud's reforms, decreed equality between Müslim and non-Müslim subjects. Thereupon rebellions and massacres by fanatic Müslim subjects in the Syrian part of the Empire, who

would not hear of equality, were one of the ugliest parts of the explosive disintegration. Nevertheless, the *Tanzimat* was reaffirmed in 1856 under Russian and European pressure on the Sublime Porte, after France and Great Britain, in a war with Russia, had defended the "freedom" of the sick Ottoman Empire as a buffer state.

A Turk of whom the Turks are rightfully proud, by contrast to the evildoers, is Midhat Pasha. He was the governor of a lower Danube province and later of Mesopotamia (Iraq). Midhat Pasha tried to introduce the Western idea of constitutional parliamentary government with proportional representation, but without universal suffrage. Turks were a small minority in the provinces which he governed, so he secured coöperation from leaders of other national groups and founded schools in which he hoped young men of all nationalities would unite, at least in education. The empire constitution which he proposed, and which was adopted on paper in 1876, granted proportional representation in parliament for Turks, Armenians, Arabs, and all other distinct groups within the empire. The theory sounded generous, but the segregated groups already had visions of becoming independent nations, and the Sublime Porte was still enslaved to despotic personal rule, so none of them wanted it in practice.

The Porte simply put off applying the constitution. It was nevertheless an entering wedge for distributed authority so terrifying that Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), in his madness of fear, had Midhat Pasha exiled, and then tightened the spy system. England's Gladstone tagged this sultan, "The Unspeakable Turk," a name which smeared all the Turks. Abdülhamid's reputation is very mixed. He was credited with great ability and even with good will; he was also noted for panic fears of treachery by his own subjects and, at the same time, for masterful duplicity in dealing with foreign powers. Whatever the truth is, among various extreme views on this complex character, the Turk who was called unspeakable turned his thirty-two-year reign into a nightmare which included grim executions and massacres, total economic disruption, and hopeless political insecurity. The better Turks survived by exile or unobtrusiveness.

## The Turks' "Eternal Chief"

The fundamental quality of the Eastern soul, as it appears in Eastern history, has been always to accept a great genius.—Felix Valyi in *Revolutions in Islam*.<sup>1</sup>

WORLD-WIDE publicity originally spotlighted Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, so dazzlingly that it blinded most persons to the credit due to his fore-runners. In the background appear clearly the *Tanzimat* reforms and Midhat Pasha's constitution. From them developed the momentum of reform which Kemâl Atatürk eventually guided to success. In the meantime, by rallying pioneers for a completely new life, the Young Turks, young in ideas if not always in years, contributed powerful though sometimes ill-directed force to the movement. One group of them, in the medical school of the university in İstanbul, had established a Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası). No sooner done than they scattered in voluntary exile, because Sultan Abdülhamid II was having young agitators in İstanbul arrested in hordes.<sup>2</sup>

A more vigorous group of Young Turks, already in exile in France, formed The League for Personal Initiative and Administrative Decentralization. Young Turk journals appeared in Paris, London, Geneva, Cairo, and the Balkans and were smuggled into the Empire. Yet, on the whole, the Sultan's censorship successfully kept the Young Turks at home out of touch with those in exile. Badly scattered as reform forces were, a domestic Committee of Union and Progress, with headquarters at Salonika, in the part of Macedonia which was then Turkish, had spread secret military units clear across Turkey. They finally became bold enough to demand of the Sultan that he abide by the constitution. Incredible as it seemed to the exiles, this

committee secured from him, without bloodshed, the proclamation of a Constitutional Act on July 23, 1908.

The Young Turks' leaders, however, proved to be too young in experience. They had illusions. They might better have kept the name "New Ottomans," used for the *Tanzimat* reformers, because they tried more to save the Ottoman Empire than to emancipate Turkish subjects from the Ottoman yoke. Their main illusion seemed to be that a parliament with proportional representation for all "national," i.e., religious groups, would solve everything simply by coming into existence. They naïvely believed that these groups, once enfranchised and represented, would stop the separatist attempts, and everyone would be happy to be an Ottoman citizen, while the outside world would heartily support an empire which had such fine "equality and democracy." Alas, this was not what happened after Turks and non-Turks alike rested from their eager celebration of the proclamation and the flattering responses of foreign powers.

Non-Müslims, who had had to pay a head tax (*cizye*) but had been exempt from military service, were delighted by equality which exempted them from the discriminatory tax, but not many welcomed equality in compulsory military service. Under the new regime, incompetents in the army were demoted or discharged, to their open disgust. Superfluous civil officials, suddenly weeded out, were not satisfied by indemnity compensation. The Ottoman corruption which had rewarded favors with titles and salaries but with no real duties, had produced nearly ten times as many officials as offices, and no indemnity seemed adequate to loss of a salary for doing nothing. Furthermore, the secular character of the new laws proposed by the parliament aroused strict Müslims to defend the faith, and religious revolts developed in certain Arab and Balkan Müslim groups. The Committee of Union and Progress saw resignations, defaults, or revolt reduce its parliamentary majority of December to a small minority by the end of January.

A hectic five years followed during which Sultan Abdülhamid was deposed; parliaments were dissolved one after another; and elections with many sporadic parties competing were staged as much to keep certain persons out of office as to elect good candidates. Western powers sided with discontented Albanians, Bulgarians, Arabs, and Armenians in the Empire. Revolts and wars with Bulgaria, Italy, and



the Balkans soon cost the Empire the loss of important subject regions, including Macedonia, Tripoli in Africa, and Bulgaria. Division between various factions of the Young Turks widened. The strongest faction was still the Committee of Union and Progress which stood for centralized power, and invited German backing. The faction of lesser influence then, although later its members greatly influenced the Republic, was the Union for Freedom and Harmony (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*), which was led by Prince Sabahettin, and which favored decentralized autonomy for subject peoples in a federal union, and sought British and French support.

Still determined to run the country, the Committee of Union and Progress engineered a coup d'état at the Sublime Porte in 1913. They arrived, two hundred strong, during a meeting of the council of ministers. Assassinating the Minister of War who met them outside, they terrified the rest of the council into helpless surrender. Ringleaders of the Committee then were three young men: Enver, Talât, and Cemal. They made 26-year-old Enver Minister of War, and he was largely responsible later for taking Turkey into World War I on the German side. Talât, who became Minister of the Interior, was considered the ablest by the U. S. Ambassador at that time, Henry Morgenthau (father of the Henry Morgenthau who was later U.S. Secretary of the Treasury). Cemal became military governor of İstanbul, which gave him control of the police. The rest of the cabinet they filled with an Egyptian for vezir, an Arab, a Jew who had turned Müslim, an Armenian, a Circassian, and a Turk or two, all "Ottoman brothers" under Midhat's constitution. On the throne sat the exiled Sultan's gentlemanly and, under the circumstances, helpless brother, Mehmet V, who had by then been a princely "prisoner" for thirty-three years, and who had not a chance as ruler to be anything but a rubber stamp for the Committee. Relative calm prevailed under this regime until the crisis of World War I the next year.

Unfortunately the triumvirate, whose ideals were strong only verbally and whose inexperience revealed to them no way to rule except by bloodshed, too soon matched the notorious Abdülhamid in absolute despotism and self-protective brutality. Be it noted carefully here, however, that these were the Young Turks. Very different indeed were the new Turks who rose up next and counted among their

number former Young Turks who were dissatisfied with the triumvirate's leadership. Enver, Talât, and Cemal had wished to Ottomanize all subjects whatever their nationalities, and thus unite them to regain Ottoman military might. They had succeeded in making the name "Ottoman" more anathema than ever and were swept out of power in World War I defeat. The Young Turks had, however, ended (not merely on paper as in 1856, but actually) the head tax on non-Müslims; they had reorganized the army, built a number of schools and hospitals, and provided practical experience for future reform leaders.

One such leader startled not only the Turks but the world by his initiative. He was Mustafa Kemâl Pasha, "Atatürk" as the world knows him best, an army officer whose prestige rested on neither family fame nor favoritism. He had entered the military academy a mere unknown, just another Mustafa, which is to say "any Tom, Dick or Harry." A teacher, whose name was also Mustafa and who wanted to distinguish his unexpectedly brilliant pupil by a different name, called him "Kemâl" which means "perfection or worth." Under this name he led followers who have made history as the new, or Kemalist, Turks. Mustafa Kemâl had been among the Young Turks, but somewhat aloofly. He saw far beyond Ottoman horizons and military power. His vision was of a new world and new Turks in it; of a nation homogeneous in language and culture. The Turks' turn had come to throw off the Ottoman yoke and to rule themselves in a modern way.

At first he saw no objection to a worthy Turk continuing as Sultan of the Turks and Khalif of Islam. That was a minor technicality until he became aware that the old titles could not be shaken free from the Ottoman stigma which made them psychologically dangerous even after they had been rendered innocuous politically.

News of Atatürk spread around the world in the 1920's. A brilliant soldier, often proclaimed more brilliant than the hired German officers supposedly his superiors in Turkish military service, he had campaigned in Libya, stopped the British at Gallipoli (Gelibolu), and also engineered a retreat across Syria which saved the army but wrote "finis" to imperialism for the Turks. His self-reliant leadership was not wanted at the Sublime Porte, where the sick Ottoman government was bargaining to sell or mortgage the soul of the dying Empire. But,

in Anatolia, he might help to salvage enough of the Turks' waning strength to enable the nation to survive foreign domination. The Sultan sent him to the Black Sea provinces.


"Gentlemen, I landed at Samsun on the 19th of May, 1919. This was the position at that time: . . ." These were Atatürk's opening words in a speech which continued for six days—seven hours a day—and which he delivered to congress in the Republic's third year: it was his account of how Turkey became a republic. The position at that time was a country disarmed, bankrupt, and occupied by foreign powers. The facts, best publicized then by the world press, and well described now in many books, were the assembling at Ankara of a People's Congress which became the real government of Turkey; the rejection of the dictated Treaty of Sèvres for World War I, which a Sublime Porte representative had signed; the brilliant diplomacy of İsmet Pasha (later, the second President of Turkey) in negotiating the more favorable Treaty of Lausanne, which Turkey's new government did sign in July, 1923; and finally, the modernization of Turkey by spectacular reforms. Concurrently, Atatürk, with İsmet Pasha as his second in command in the people's army, had won the Turks' War of Liberation, 1919-22, by defeating a Greek invasion of Turkey and aborting British, French, and Italian plans to partition Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

Atatürk, the world said then, was a dictator—one of three dictators making history after World War I. The other two were Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. A thirty-year perspective clears the Turkish leader of such disreputable comparison. Similarities did exist. Each of the three made his start during a time of national despair by sheer force of personality in a secret group. Each wrenched power from the grip of a paralyzed government. Each defied the great powers. And each opened a torrent of national pride. From there on, the German and Italian dictators herded their people along paths which diverged far from the road along which Atatürk led the Turks.

Although all three employed violence, the nature and extent of it in Turkey was very different from that in Italy and Germany. Atatürk had dangerous opponents, including monarchists, ultra-conservative Müslims, certain army officers, and some powerful landlords, who distrusted his personal ambitions. At his behest, the new National Assembly passed a law for the "restoration of order," and created "tribunals of independence." Some ugly executions followed, but not



Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk



İsmet İnönü



The Bosphorus at the Towers

Citizens at the polls



by the thousands or even hundreds—by the tens at most.<sup>4</sup> When his government was secure, Atatürk did not expand these courts to rule more people more violently. In the face of the resentment which such extreme measures aroused he sent the law for the restoration of order back to the Assembly for reconsideration, and, today, Turkey has a judicial system which would be a credit to any Western Democracy. (For a description of this system, see Appendix D.)

In contrast to the Italian and German dictators' lavish military displays and imposing new palaces, Atatürk wore civilian clothes, sometimes even when, as President of the Republic, he reviewed military parades, and he converted gorgeous palaces into museums and convention halls. He rid the nation of useless display.

For all three the race-pride or nationalist motif was basic to their conceptions of the State, but in their directives on the proper role of their respective "races" or nations in the world, Atatürk stood at an opposite pole from the other two. The world knows Mussolini's charge to his Italians to "restore the empire that was Rome's" by conquests which started with Abyssinia; and the German Fuehrer's directive to his racially-proud Germans:

A state which in this age of racial poisoning, dedicates itself to the care of its best racial elements must some day become lord of the earth.<sup>5</sup>

Very few persons outside of Turkey know the directive which Atatürk issued to his proud Turks. Certain influential Turks had tried to perpetuate the Khalifate in Turkey in order to retain a semblance of imperial power, at least in the Müslim countries, but Atatürk would have the Turks through with empire. Later, he reviewed for the Grand National Assembly his arguments to those who had clung to imperial ambitions. He said:

The Turkish people cannot undertake such a heavy responsibility, such an illogical mission. For centuries our people were animated by this vain point of view. But what happened? Every place they went they gave up human lives by the millions. Do you know the number of sons of Anatolia [the Asiatic part of Turkey] who died, parched in the deserts of Yemen? Do you know how many human beings perished in order to hold Syria and Irak, to make it possible to live in Egypt, and to maintain a hold in Africa? And, I said, do you see what has come of it?

The new Turkey and the people of the new Turkey have nothing to consider but their own existence and well-being. . . . We are capable of

directing and governing ourselves . . . I warned the nation that heedless thinking of ourselves as masters of the world must cease. Enough of catastrophes into which we have dragged our nation by witless failure to recognize the world's situation and our true position. . . .<sup>6</sup>

This principle, previously established by the Turkish National Pact of 1920, was the basis of the Lausanne Treaty and of the true conversion of Turkey from an empire to a republic. It is still held sacred. Atatürk died in 1938, but he still lives in his record of civilized statesmanship. The immortal record of the other two has been stamped "uncivilized." Ernest Jackh, in Turkey on a political mission, once pointed out to Atatürk this contrast by saying, "Your dictatorship frees an enslaved people while Hitler's tyranny enslaves a free people."<sup>7</sup>

The Turks generally do not look on Atatürk as a dictator who imposed his will on them for vainglory of himself or false glory of the state. Rather they see in him the exponent of their own national will to which he gave the clearest expression and the strongest leadership. The extent to which he carried personal rule too far did not, on the whole, outweigh his sounder use of authority to convert a reprobate empire into a respected republic, and oppressed subjects into proud citizens. The path he charted, however, was a totally unfamiliar one, and like soldiers advancing in unfamiliar terrain with enemies near, the Turks apparently wanted a chief or commander who could make a wise plan and keep all forces in line, without stopping to debate every step to take. To them Atatürk was that kind of leader. They elected him *Ebedi Şefimiz* which means, in English, "Our Eternal Chief."

The new Turks who followed Atatürk and threw off the Ottoman yoke, became as different from the old Turks as the British pioneers in the Thirteen Colonies in America became different from the old British in England. Despite the same blood and tradition as their forebears, their long rebelliousness, culminating in independence, made a new people of the pioneers in America. The new Turks have been undergoing essentially the same experience, but in a different form.

The psychology of pioneering was very different in Turkey. Whereas the pioneers in the Thirteen Colonies had started all over in a new setting on a new continent, geographically far away from their own

past, the Turks have had both the advantages and disadvantages of pioneering in the very same setting where their troubles had grown. The Turks were not coerced into heroic measures by the physical dangers of a strange wilderness. Reforming themselves at home, they have struggled against the stifling atmosphere of old mental and social habits; they have been continually lulled by the familiarity of their physical surroundings into apathies which could mean easy reversion to old habits and easy surrender of new ambitions. Pioneering either way is a supreme test of vision and will power.

Atatürk, though no book scholar of psychology, had an uncommonly sound knowledge of human nature; he saw that the permanent changes he envisioned for the Turks would have to start with a sharp, even painful, break with fixed habits and a strenuous initiation into unfamiliar ways. Otherwise, new intentions would never stand up in old surroundings under the weight of old traditions and new strains. New Turks had to start *new*.

The outside world found it easy to chalk the amazing Turkish reforms up to an attempt to "ape the West"—to wear Western clothes, to emancipate their women for Western freedom, and to put on a modern front merely to impress the rest of the world. But for the Turks, it was no veneer; it was psychological transplanting of their cultural roots, not primarily from East to West, but from past to present.

Failure of Midhat Pasha and the Young Turks to invigorate Turkey by further Ottomanizing all subjects and by emphasizing military strength was well noted by Atatürk. His shrewder plan was de-Ottomanization and stress on civilian, not military, life. Basic change, he realized, must be felt simultaneously by all the Turks. This was one reason, besides security, for moving the nation's capital from Istanbul to Ankara, a village in the interior of the country, and for insisting that foreigners, too, use the old city's Turkish name, "Istanbul," instead of its Roman name, "Constantinople." Thereby, citizens and foreigners as well, were fully impressed that the seat of Turkish government was no longer the Sublime Porte, and that Constantinople was no longer the seat of empire but was simply the largest Turkish city. But changes had to penetrate into private life. The personal symbol of Ottoman citizenship, the red fez, must go. Ironically, to this



day, cartoons in the West still mark a Turk by the fez. The fez never was a distinctly Turkish headdress, and the people who continue to wear it are not Turks.

Greeks and Venetians had introduced the fez from Austria and had made it familiar wherever they traded. Sultan Mahmud II had borrowed it from them when he decreed at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the fez be worn, as the symbol of Ottoman citizenship, by all the races, religions, and nationalities in the Empire. For the Ottoman Christians it replaced the hat; for the Müslims it replaced the *kefiye*, a shawl headdress; the *kalpak*, a high, all-fur, brimless topper; and to some extent, the turbans. The West, eventually, popularly called everybody who wore the fez a "Turk." During the century that the fez was the Ottoman headdress, its significance had narrowed as the Empire shrank. It began to signify only Müslims. The Christians in nations which were freed from Ottoman rule first, again wore brimmed hats, except those in Ottoman official circles. Müslim subjects kept the fez, and Müslims outside of the Empire wore it too. Thereafter, to the Ottoman subjects, the fez more and more meant the difference between the Müslim and the Christian.

Changing a political and religious emblem in Islam was no superficial move; putting on a hat with a brim was no veneer. "A Müslim who wanted to wear a hat on his head had to change his faith." Thus a prominent Turk, Bay Tevfik Biyıkhođlu, explained it in a paper he read to a group at Robert College. Giving up the fez implied the Müslim Turks' abdication from empire, rather like a king giving up his crown. All Turks were to discard outer evidence that they were different from other civilized people, including their own former subjects.

Liberal Turks had long worn hats when traveling in Western countries. Nationalistic Turks, however, first brought back the *kalpak*, which had the advantage of being brimless so the worshipper could still bow his covered head in prayer, touching his brow to the ground. But wearing it was not the drastic change of habit which Atatürk saw was psychologically necessary. Hats with brims must be worn.

The way he undertook this total change was typical of his handling of people. Let Bay Biyıkhođlu, who knew him, tell it:

Atatürk did not think it would be easy to introduce the hat, and he proceeded very carefully. He had no desire to risk lightly the prestige which

victory already won had assured to him and to his nation. He was therefore cautious, but in any case the change had to be brought about. In 1925 in order to protect himself from the sun on his farm in Ankara, he wore a Panama hat. This was not, however, called a hat. He wanted in this way to try out public opinion. No complaint, however, resulted. Just at that time I returned from Switzerland where I had been attending the International Disarmament Conference. When I saw him with his Panama, I went to him with my felt hat on, and for the first time I greeted him by taking off my hat. He laughed and said, 'What you are wearing is not a Panama but a *hat*.' A few days later we set out for İnebolu. There in a great crowd of men and women he said, 'We have to resemble the civilized world in our costume also. What I have on my head is not a Panama but a hat.' Soon, thereafter, wearing the hat was made obligatory for officials and the common people, and the people followed him in this apparently impossible venture.

The order was appalling to carry out. After a specified date no man was to appear in public unless in a brimmed hat. There weren't that many hats in the whole country. Merchants in Christian countries rushed outmoded hats from their dustiest shelves to Turkey. In the meantime, laughable or not, a man who had to appear in public bought or borrowed any style of hat or cap, sometimes even a woman's hat with a brim. That first season, until proper hats were available, was a sore trial, yet it was endured successfully. The rest of the wardrobe was changed more easily. Men's wear, old style, was noticeable for pants gathered around the waist in voluminous folds but skin-tight from knee to shoe-top. By the 1940's in the large cities even the poorest laborer rarely appeared in any but Western-cut pants.

Meanwhile, women had their hat problems. Contrary to a common but false Western impression, Turkish women were not compelled by law to remove their veils. They were requested to do so. Consequently, according to report, quite a number in the cities who had already unveiled, perversely wore veils again! When, however, no compulsion annoyed them they reappeared in hats. For those who had never worn hats it was not long before they acquired the practiced assurance in wearing a hat at a becoming angle which makes a woman feel like a million dollars in the latest style.

Dress fashions of the West were no trouble because Turkish women, who liked them, had for a long time worn them at home. But in public, all women except those who daringly defied custom, had worn as an outer garment the *çarşaf*, which consisted of enough yard-

age of usually black material to wrap loosely around the wearer from head to foot, one corner being drawn over the head and across the face, revealing only the eyes. No matter how stylish a woman's dress, the *çarşaf* over it made her a shapeless bundle; yet some ladies managed to display an elegant grace, even in the *çarşaf*, and it always accentuated the expressiveness of their eyes. After the dress reform, Turks vied in public with Parisian and New York ladies in modishness. The government sent Turks to Paris, Berlin, and New York to learn dress and hat designing. For the past two decades, the modern Turkish girl in the larger cities and their suburbs has felt free and natural in shorts for sports, in scant bathing suits at the beach, and in the latest European and American styles for both street and formal wear.

Nevertheless, one generation has been too short a time to overcome completely the old feeling in this matter. Some women of the present older generation and some ultraconservative men and youths still prefer the old-fashioned girl who doesn't show her face and figure in public. Peasant women, who never had veiled unless in a town, are likely to continue for at least another generation their old custom of turning their backs or drawing kerchiefs across their faces at sight of a strange man. Also, they will probably continue to wear their traditional long bloomers or much-gathered skirts and gay colored tight bodices.

Political capital was made out of this conservatism in the 1950 election campaign when various candidates bid for conservative votes by wearing brimless hats (berets) when visiting their constituents. In some inland towns, a noticeable number of women are again wearing the *çarşaf* and having their daughters wear it, even as early as nine years old. Yet the fact is beyond doubt on the whole, and again in Bay Biyıklıoğlu's own words, that "wearing the hat broke forever the fanaticism of Islamic conservatism which had held sway over the Turks." Visible evidence on their own persons was a greater teacher than years of verbal persuasion. Other changes followed more easily.

Adoption of the Christian calendar in 1926 and the Sunday holiday in 1935 caused comparatively little trouble. The calendar of Islam dates from the Hegira in the seventh century A.D., when Muhammed moved from Medina to Mecca. Allowing for certain time discrepan-

cies, the Christian twentieth century counts as the Islamic fourteenth century. Friday is the holy day. Nearly all commercial activity during the Empire, however, had been in the hands of Christian citizens or Western business firms. Hence, public offices and Müslim schools closed on Fridays and dated records in the 1300's, while most commercial establishments closed on Sundays and kept records dated in the 1900's. Obviously, making the Christian week and calendar official would least disrupt economic life and the interchange with the West, so Atatürk ordered it done. Friday continues to be the Müslim holy day and those who wish to go to mosques do so, but general closing of stores, offices, and schools is on Sunday.

Gone, thus, were the outer symbols of Ottoman identity with neighboring countries in Islam. No danger, however, that the "Christian" hat and calendar would symbolize complete identity of Turkey with Christian countries. Religious and cultural differences would offset that, while the common outer appearances created a new community of feeling in modern civilization. At the same time, the religious and cultural factors should, in the long run, continue to be a sufficient bond of good-neighborliness with Islamic countries.

No matter how this may work out with Turkey's neighbors in the future, the "hat revolution" at home in Turkey uprooted the Turks from conventionalism and transplanted them into a new life as successfully as emigration had transplanted our British colonists into a new world. Yet, after a whole generation has grown up in Western dress, Turks in the United States are almost invariably asked, "What is your native costume?" Americans, even if justification for their ignorance of modern Turkey can be offered, seem perversely unconvinced when Turks point to their own Western-style clothes, and say, "These are Turkish clothes, made in Turkey." The American press, which has not stopped playing up pictures and cartoons of the Turk in the fez and usually also in baggy clothes, seems more convincing than the Turks themselves.

Such cartooning and the popular misconception it has caused are quite as if European cartoonists would not give up thinking of United States citizens as Englishmen and insisted upon picturing Americans wearing John Bull costumes. Turks have been surprised, puzzled, and even hurt when "the best educated people in the world" and "the best

informed press in the world"—the people and press of the United States—did not, in more than a quarter-century, see this incongruity. The new Turks know they have been so completely uprooted that they can never again be the same as the wearers of the fez. They would like the rest of the world to understand this too.

## How Turks Know Turks

The masses of people who talk the same language and who have been born of the same stock and whose feelings are the same are called a *nation*.—Turkish third grade text.<sup>1</sup>

U<sub>PROOTED</sub> from habits which formerly distinguished them the Turks needed to cultivate at least one unmistakable Turkish bond. Language had been their most readily recognized bond during their migrations, conquests, and empire, in spite of mixing of nationalities by intermarriages and dispersal of Turks throughout the Empire. Thus, the natural criterion for the new nationalistic Turks was their language. Atatürk's Republican People's Party, the only effective party for the first twenty-three years of the Republic, opened its membership to "all citizens who regularly speak Turkish and are Turks in their cultural behavior and support the principles of the party."

While in most countries it goes without saying that citizens speak the national language, in Turkey it had to be said. Too many who, by virtue of birth in Turkey, received citizenship in the new Republic, spoke nothing but Greek, Armenian, Italian, Kurdish, Spanish, or other tongues of their ancestors. If they knew Turkish, they used it for business or politics, but seldom for acquaintance with Turkish cultural interests. In the Turkish tongue, therefore, Atatürk saw not only the natural bond for the Turks but the means to channel the revolution to everyone in the land, including minorities and illiterates.

The Turks, however, needed a way to teach their language more easily, especially to citizens who were then about ninety per cent illiterate. Turkish writing throughout the Ottoman era was the Arabic script of the Koran, and the vocabulary was full of Arabic and Persian

words. The graceful right to left curves and swirls of Arabic writing had distinct Turkish variations, yet the script in any form was an excessive time-consumer in school, three years usually being necessary for a beginner to learn to read and write. Practical use of Latin letters can be learned in from six months to one year. While considering this, Atatürk conferred with the American philosopher and educator, John Dewey, who advocated the change. Atatürk, himself, prepared a new twenty-nine-letter Turkish alphabet in Latin letters. He omitted "q," "w," and "x," which are unneeded sounds in Turkish, and he introduced several variations such as an undotted "i" and a softened "g" (ğ), for unique Turkish sounds. Press photos of Atatürk with a blackboard in a village square teaching peasants to write their names in new letters appeared all over the world in 1928, when the change went into effect. Turks, from children to octogenarians who knew English, French, or any language in the Latin script, taught reading and writing to other Turks that year.

In retrospect, it staggers the imagination that every school child, newspaper reader, or office clerk, seeing the only writing most of them knew disappear in a matter of weeks, carried on in the new writing with hardly a pause. How long did it take? The new alphabet was decreed on May 24. Schools assigned it to pupils for summer homework. Reopening of schools was delayed that fall until October, when all textbooks were issued in the new letters. Then it was nothing but woe for pupils who had not thoroughly minded their ABC's during the summer. On December 15 every newspaper appeared in new type. Officially, the change was declared complete in one year. But a lag was unavoidable. Older Turks are sure to switch back and forth between new and old scripts as long as they live, usually reading in modern script and writing old style.

When his own language changed, a Turkish illiterate realized it as soon as anyone else by the different appearance of the newspapers wrapped around his bundles and the new lettering on signboards and government notices. After a while, the amazing change struck deeper into his consciousness when he heard Turkish instead of Arabic words in the call of the muezzin, whose voice sounded five times a day from a mosque minaret, summoning the faithful to prayer.

Atatürk next wished to make certain that every pupil in every school in Turkey would learn Turkish. Most non-Müslim pupils had

attended schools conducted by their own minority or foreign groups, who taught in their own languages—Greek, Armenian, French, as the case might be. Their pupils might also study Turkish but they were not required to do so, even though most of them were Turkish citizens. The Republic, therefore, passed a law stating that every child in Turkey shall receive his first five years' schooling in Turkish schools or in approved schools using the Turkish curriculum and teaching in Turkish. After the fifth grade, pupils are free to attend non-Turkish schools, but every pupil in every school is obliged to study in Turkish the "cultural subjects," such as history, geography, civics, sociology, and Turkish literature.

The new alphabet and new requirements were profitable. Although reliable statistics for a full 1920 to 1950 comparison do not exist, it seems safe from various estimates to say that the Republic, in one generation, has raised literacy from 10 per cent to approximately 35 per cent of the total population, in spite of the fact that the population is now nearly half as large again as at the start.<sup>2</sup> If literacy means those who can enjoy reading as a pastime, the percentage is lower; if it means those who can sign their own names and laboriously spell out a simple notice, it is higher.

At the same time that he Westernized the script, Atatürk's idea was to make the vocabulary "pure Turkish,"—to purge from it the countless Persian and Arabic words. Persian had been the "French" of the Middle East—the literary and diplomatic tongue—and literate Ottoman society had soaked up Persian words like a sponge. Arabic words had seeped in, as it were, by osmosis through the Arabic alphabet. Pure Turkish had to be rediscovered. Language commissions were appointed to hunt for it. One verbal mine in which they dug was the old native songs sung by Turkish shepherds. Another was a manuscript dictionary of about seven thousand words from some fifteen Turkic dialects explained in Arabic in about the year 1066. A third was a dictionary which defined in colloquial Turkish the Ottoman terms used by officials. Finally, community competitions were held to find Turkish words.

Children began to come home from the *okul* (school, in Turkish), which had been the *mektep* (in Arabic), where they had acquired *bilgi* (knowledge, in Turkish) instead of *malûmat* (Arabic), from an *öğretmen* (teacher, in Turkish) instead of from a *muallim* (Arabic).



Turks in conversation still frequently interrupt each other to ask, "What word is that?" A young Turk will appeal to old Turks, or even to non-Turks whose memories reach far back, for a word unfamiliar to the younger generation. In turn, the elders have to ask the youngsters for words used now. Newspapers, at first, ran footnotes giving both old and new words in order to make articles readable. A 1945 dictionary contained a supplement of new words used in the latest printing of the national constitution. *İl*, for example, had replaced *vilâyet*, meaning province. Imagine how conscious peasants became of strange changes when an official, perhaps a tax collector, arrived from the *il*. Inevitably, they would ask if another official from the *vilâyet* would also be along to collect his taxes. They would not forget such a combined lesson in language and civics.

A vocabulary of none but Turkish words proved impossible. Sources dated 1066 or songs sung by shepherds do not have words for the twentieth century mechanized world; for "automobile," "photograph," "statistics," and so on. The modern Turks appropriate these words, when they need them, from Western languages and spell them phonetically. They become *otomobil*, *fotograf*, and *istatistik*. (The initial "i" is because the Turks find it difficult to pronounce two consonants without a vowel to accompany each. For the same reason the French word, *station* becomes *istasyon* in Turkish. Gradually, foreign words are being adopted without this variation, for instance, *strateji*.)

A theory which deeply impressed Atatürk was that Western languages, indeed all languages, are full of Turkish words. This was the Sun Language theory (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*). Language, the theory ran, began with exclamations of awe, fear, delight, and other emotions aroused by the sun, and then spread by imitation. Words in any language similar in sound to Turkish were cited in evidence that Turkish might have been the earliest language of all. "Big" in English was said to reflect, by sound, its origin from the Turkish *büyük* with the same meaning, the English pronunciation being only a slight modification. This theory was an early product, and not at all the best one, of the new Turks' zeal to know about their own past.

An agency for delving into the Turkish past, which was enthusiastically promoted by Atatürk and some of his close followers, is the Turkish History Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*). Ottoman history books had omitted or barely mentioned events prior to the Ottoman

era. Western historians had published almost nothing about the Turks except during wars. These accounts were usually derogatory and frequently made no distinction between Turks and non-Turks in the Ottoman Empire. The History Society during the Turkish Republic's first quarter-century, according to a Turkish press report, translated into Turkish more than one hundred volumes of Arabic, Persian, Armenian, Latin, and Chinese literature pertaining to Turkish history, and has already published about seventy volumes of Turkish history. Turks have become enthusiastic over archeology and already have accumulated in museums, archives, and libraries quantities of data which, when properly sifted, can lead to a better balanced picture of the Turks' role in civilization than has yet appeared in the history books of any land. Exchange scholarships under the Fulbright Act agreement, signed by the U.S.A. and Turkey in January, 1950, will enable more scholars from the United States to do research in Turkey. Preparation for it is already possible in Turkish studies at Princeton, Chicago, Johns Hopkins, and Columbia Universities.

The new 'Turks' first textbooks on history contained some extravagant speculations. Pupils learned from them that the Turks, while migrating from "Turan, the homeland of civilization," many thousands of years ago, had carried civilization around the world. This view was soon modified to admit a more reasonable share by other contributors to civilization. Later pupils studied from revised texts.

Authentic Western historians, to date, have been most definite about the Turks after they settled in large numbers north, east, and south of the Black Sea, about the ninth century A.D. The clearest backdrop which they have painted for the present homeland of the Turks had been the Selçuk scene. The Selçuk Turks, migrating from the East, defeated the Byzantine emperor in 1071 and ruled for two centuries, extending their rule to Arab and Persian territory. Mongol invaders conquered them in the thirteenth century and then left Asia Minor, which was thereafter divided into small Turkish principalities. In the same century, a final wave of migrant Turks appeared, led by Ertuğrul, whose son Osman and his descendants invincibly spread the Turkish rule. Thus the Osmanlı, or Ottoman, era began. It ended when the Republic began in 1923. Turks themselves, rewriting the history of legendary migrations from "Turan," and tracing much of it by similarities in vocabularies of various peoples, linked the Turks

to their very early predecessors in Asia Minor, namely the Sumerians and Hittites. Turkish zealots speculated that these Biblical peoples might have been Turkish or "Turanian" migrants of as early as 1300 B.C., which differs from Western historians' conclusions that these same peoples were indigenous to Asia Minor.

Estimating the number of Turks in the world in 1930, one Turkish historian set the figure at 51,000,000 and others set it higher in various Turkic groups, more of them outside of Turkey than inside. The minimum Western estimate was about 30,000,000. More than half the total were said to be in Soviet lands. China, Afghanistan, and Iran were believed to have two to five million each, and the smallest number, about one million, were in the Balkans. Turks in Turkey, by official census in 1927, numbered nearly 14,000,000, including one million Kurds and a few hundred thousand other minority citizens. The total population in Turkey today is nearly 21,000,000. A recent estimate of Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union is 17,000,000, most of whom have never been in Turkey.

Racially, Turkish blood has become as mixed by intermarriage during migrations and empire as the blood of United States citizens has been mixed by immigration and intermarriage. Turks clung long to the theory, which science has disproved, that only the male parent's heritage matters in the offspring. Consequently, children of Turkish fathers and foreign mothers had been considered "pure Turks." This also made it a practically unforgivable sin for a Turkish woman to marry a foreigner because all her children would be, so to speak, "pure foreign." The Republic, recognizing the mother's influence on heritage, has become more insistent that Turkish men choose Turkish wives, at least if they wish to advance to responsible positions in the government.

Some Turks are tall, some are short, but their average height may be slightly below that of the United States average; they are brunet, blond, or red-haired, have pink-and-white or olive complexions, and live either inside or outside of Turkey; but whatever their appearance or wherever they meet, Turks recognize each other by their language. Rarely does any non-Turk, though born and raised in Turkey, acquire the truly Turkish rhythm of speech and the Turkish idiom. In spite of the fact that a pure Turkish *vocabulary* did not turn out to be possible, the *language* can be pure Turkish forever to those who know

how it should sound, no matter how many words are borrowed from other languages. (Each new person who becomes interested in the Turks asks, "What sort of a language is Turkish?" Therefore a brief description of it is given in Appendix A.

After Turkish script and vocabulary had been modernized to keep pace with the world, the Turks' names had to be refitted to modern life. By inheritance from early nomadic custom when each tribe was essentially a family unit, peoples of the Near and Middle East have not generally used surnames as the West uses them. Various Mehmet's would be distinguished as respectively Adnanoğlu Mehmet (son of Adnan), Pamukçuoğlu Mehmet (son of the cotton worker), or Ankaralı Mehmet (Mehmet of Ankara). An occupational or place name sometimes became a permanent family name, and an ancestor's name occasionally persisted through generations, as did Osmanlı, the Ottoman family name. The many persons, especially in cities, who had no family names, became such a problem of identification in files of modern government and business, however, that the Grand National Assembly passed a law in 1934 that every citizen must register a family name not later than 1937.

The government set the example by giving the Republic's founder and first president the name "Atatürk," "Father of the Turks." Atatürk in turn bestowed on his then prime minister, İsmet Pasha, the name of the place where, as General İsmet, he had won the first decisive victories of the War of Liberation: the name of İnönü. Families commonly chose names of places or of characteristics. Certain names could simply be broken apart, as a Dr. Nureddin registered himself as Nuri Edin and became Dr. Edin. Families often changed their first choice because others had registered the same name or they preferred a more characteristic or shorter name. Discussions of individuals frequently ran something like this between 1934 and 1937:

"Nihal? Which Nihal?"

"Nihal Demir."

"Demir? Demir? What does she look like?"

Someone describes her and another asks, "Wasn't she Nihal Turan last year?"

"Maybe; anyway she's Fethi's daughter."

So, at last, all identify her.

Universal use of family names necessitated new courtesy titles. The

old Turkish equivalents for "Mr." and "Mrs.," *Bey* and *Hanım*, respectively, had followed the personal name. A man was *Ali Bey* (pronounced as we pronounce bay) or else he was *Ali Paşa* (Pasha, a title of higher dignity). A woman, married or unmarried, was *Fatma Hanım*. (No English spelling can indicate the proper pronunciation of *Hanım*, properly spelled with the undotted "i." In English it is usually corrupted to *Hanum*, or *Khanoum*.) American libraries, cataloguing books by Turkish authors' "last" names have often filed them under B or K for "Bey" or "Khanoum," or literally under "Mr." or "Mrs.," without any alphabetical listing under the letter for the name itself. The new Turkish titles, preceding family names, are *Bay* (pronounced bye) for men, and *Bayan* (pronounced bye-ahn) for women. *Ali Bey*, who chose *Demir* for his family name, became *Bay Demir*, and his wife, *Fatma Hanım*, became *Bayan Demir*.

It cannot be denied that so much change so rapidly was irritating to the Turks, and recently the government has yielded to the public will far enough to permit continued use of a reasonable number of the most practical and familiar Arabic words. It is even again permitting the muezzins to call the faithful to prayer in the original Arabic of the prophet, himself. Yet, on the whole, anything which needed to be changed in the Turks' personal lives in order to keep pace with modern life was changed within a decade and a half, and the Turks proved themselves to be highly adaptable by making one radical adjustment after another.

## Men, Women, and Marriage

. . . always and in all things, so far as they are able, women are to share with men.—Socrates.<sup>1</sup>

**A**TATÜRK, like Socrates in Plato's *Republic*, insisted that in the Turks' Republic, women must have the same opportunities as men in education and public life. Of the three fundamental reforms in personal life in Turkey—the hat, the language, and the emancipation of women—the last will take the longest time for full realization.

Understanding the emancipation of Turkish women is a strain upon the Western imagination inasmuch as imagination, at best, plays tricks in interpreting unfamiliar customs, and especially so in Turkey because of the aura of the Arabian Nights. In the United States, a common impression grew that a wave of Western feminism struck Turkey, releasing the women from harems and unveiling them "to see the world for the first time and to stand up for their rights." But this was not the Turkish women's first glimpse of the world and they never had to make a feminist stand for rights.

Indeed the harems from which they were released were rarely what Western imaginations, working on some shreds of truth, have depicted. Only a slight exaggeration of the usual misguided curiosity was that of the American woman who whispered to me after a lecture on Turkey, "I couldn't ask in public, but what about those fat men in Turkey with so many beautiful girls around them?" I whispered back, "What about those beautiful wives in Hollywood with so many ardent men around them?" Both are pictures from real life but not of normal home life in either the United States or Turkey. Fortunately for us, Hollywood, the center of publicized social excesses, is not the

nation's capital. Unfortunately for the Turks, the wildest Ottoman scandals were in their capital and in their rulers' palaces.

Although Turkey of the mid-twentieth century is no longer a land of harems, adult Turks clearly remember them in their youth, and harem notions still lie in the background of Turkish social conservatism and in the foreground of American misconceptions.

Harem, nevertheless, is not a genuine synonym for scandal. The most conservative Turkish husband of one wife had a harem, because *harem* literally means "wife." It is used, too, as an abbreviation for *haremlik*, an architectural term pertaining to the houses of the wealthy. Large houses were built in two parts, the *haremlik* for women and the *selâmlık* for men. A man and his wife would have in the *haremlik* her dressing room, parlors, cooking, housekeeping, and sleeping quarters, plus rooms for all other women, from a grandmother to the lowliest maid servants. Hence, a man who had only one wife and no slaves could have a perfectly respectable harem of ten or twenty women relatives and servants.

The *selâmlık* was a suite of rooms for the husband's entertaining of men guests. If he entertained a great deal he might have a separate kitchen; otherwise, men servants would serve the food passed to them from the *haremlik* kitchen. The *haremlik* was the place for the wife (*harem*) and the *selâmlık*, the place for the social greeting (*selâm*). A husband who could not afford a divided mansion was unlikely to have a large household of relatives and servants. His women simply withdrew to other rooms or appeared carefully veiled when he had men callers. In any case, he spent most of his time outside of the house about his business or in the coffeehouses, where men gathered for sociability.

Koranic law permits a maximum of four wives at a time if the husband can provide for all his wives equally well, and it permits a Müslim husband to have slave women, but if any bear him children he must provide for the children and their mothers. Quite a prohibitive expense for any but the very wealthy or for peasants who need additional help in the fields. In Ottoman days, certain sultans and wealthy pashas broke or evaded laws or bribed corrupt religious judges, and indulged in notorious harems of wives and slaves by the dozens. Among the people, polygamy had already declined to insignificance by the time the Republic made it illegal in 1926.

As long as harems lasted, the question of the men in whose presence a woman might unveil in harem parlors was a delicate issue. Strict custom said only before her father, husband, brother, or son. If her brother-in-law or uncle entered—quick, the veil! Many husbands were more liberal in permitting their women to unveil before close relatives and even before close friends. There could, however, be family squabbles about a man allowing his wife or daughter to be too free with her bare face.

For a correct impression of the modern Turkish woman's background, it is most important to imagine a life in which men and women never went out together. In harem days, never never could a Turkish woman go out publicly with a man, not even her own husband. If husband and wife left home for the same destination, she was bundled beyond recognition in her *çarşaf*, and she either walked with a feminine relative similarly bundled, or she was guarded by a man servant at a respectful distance; or else she rode in a carriage with blinds drawn. On arrival she sat in a separate section for women. No man meeting the husband would inquire, "How is your wife (or mother or daughter)?" Assuming another man's women were any of his concern was an improper intimacy. Imagine then, if you can, the unease and embarrassment when suddenly husbands and wives stepped out on the streets together or sat together in theaters and restaurants and went visiting together.

When their emancipation was announced, women had the advantage. Men had been unable to look through the veils at Müslim women's faces in public or to watch them behind their latticed sections of the mosques and theaters. Women, on the other side of their veils and lattices, had always been able to watch the men in public places. Thus the real change was for men to see Turkish women, and to be seen with them, in public. Once started—the pace being set by already liberal families—this reform whirled speedily along to mixed bathing at beaches; dancing in sport clubs, hotels, or casinos; and women working beside men in business and professions. After the first election in which they were eligible, seventeen women members sat in the Grand National Assembly with approximately four hundred men. Only three women are in the Assembly now, but many are active in provincial and district politics.

Whenever lightning-fast change succeeds so well, one wonders



which is more natural, the old way or the new. The truth in this case is that the idea of keeping women secluded was not a Turkish idea originally. The Ottomans are believed to have picked it up in Constantinople from medieval-minded Christian husbands and fathers who had European feudal ideas about locking up their wives and daughters, and they added it to Islamic notions about women's inferiority. From then on, the Turkish women hadn't had a chance until the Republic gave it back to them. Thereupon, they took to it not as if it were second nature but first nature, as indeed it was. Ziya Gökalp, one of the pre-Republic intellectual leaders, reminded the Turks that the early Turkish family had been monogamous, with the husband and wife on equal terms of mutual love and respect. The government reminds the Turks: ". . . The early Turkish empires were ruled 'by grace of the Han and Hatun' (king and queen), who together performed the duties of state and received foreign envoys. The birth of a daughter was a matter for rejoicing."<sup>2</sup>

Social attitudes of Ottoman days, nevertheless, still play a part. Modern Turkish girls often think that "in these free days," when they are married their husbands will take them everywhere. Oftentimes a Turkish bride has found her husband clinging to the old-fashioned idea that his social life is with other men at coffeehouses, in restaurants, or theaters. Except for taking his wife occasionally to weddings in the family or to an important public ball he expects her, as of old, to find all her recreation with other women, preferably with his or her own sisters, aunts, and cousins. From this old-fashioned husband's viewpoint a woman is a mother for his children and he gives her a home; why should she care about his outside interests? Companionship between Turkish husbands and wives, however, is growing rapidly now that no tabu exists against equal education and sharing interests, from sports to politics.

Property rights of Turkish women have always been respected. Turkish husbands receive no dowries. Wives retain control of their own property of every kind from cash to real estate, and can use or dispose of it with or without their husbands' consent. These have always been legal rights for women in Islam, who have therefore never been unsophisticated about business, except for those women who personally chose to leave business matters to a man in the family. On occasion, a veiled woman would appear in court to speak for her

rights, unveiling if need be to establish her identity. Women of poorer families, in which both husband and wife had to earn money, either worked as their husbands did in the private employ of the rich, and that meant, for the women, in the harem, or as peasants in the fields beside their husbands or other women, never side by side with strange men. Peasant and servant women appeared in public market places to do their own bargaining.

Turkish women were welcomed in activities outside of their homes in World War I. They entered hospitals to care for men not of their own kin, and women of prominent families unveiled to work there more efficiently. Women of the laboring classes daringly did their part with brooms and carts as street cleaners. The Young Turks' government established "The Society for Finding Employment for Women" both to make them useful and to give them a means of livelihood in the absence of their men, serving as soldiers. The army budgeted women's pay for work behind the combat areas at the same rate as for regular soldiers and officers. Under this momentum a department for women was started in the university in Istanbul, and commercial and vocational courses were opened to them, prior to the Republic's program of coeducation.

On the other hand, a suffragette campaign replete with feminist parades and public harangues on women's rights never entered into the Turkish picture. When their country needed its woman power, and one or two committees of women had pleaded for more opportunities, the men in government simply restored their rights to them as something they never should have lost; first, equal inheritance and divorce rights in 1926, then municipal political rights in 1930, and full national political equality in 1934. A gift can usually be received more gracefully than a battle triumph; hence, employed and career women in Turkey have displayed less aggressive competitiveness with men than did the early emancipated suffragettes of the West. Relatively few Turkish women have made themselves conspicuous by mannishness. Moreover, the recognition of equal opportunities for women and men as far as their respective abilities permit does not necessarily imply that their abilities are identical. Occasional women have done superlatively well as lawyers, doctors, aviators, or engineers. But, not being obligated by previous bitter contentions on relative merits of the sexes to prove superiority or equality between men and

women, each woman in Turkey seems to enjoy her chosen occupation simply for its own sake or for the pay it brings. On the whole the Turkish woman's entrance into "a man's world outside of the home" has upset either men or women relatively little. In domestic life, except for sharing a wider range of interests, a man and wife who had married before the emancipation of women, could live out their lives as much or as little in the new way as they chose.<sup>3</sup>

Turkish women have not been much inclined to join together in feminine organizations, though educated women have repeatedly started groups which rarely outlived the personal leadership of a zealous founder. Most of them were organized during wars for relief work, but several continued for a few years to do peacetime social work. A Turkish Woman's Club, started by Nezihe Muhittin the day the Republic was founded, became affiliated with the Women's International Alliance. It influenced legislation on education and on protection of women and children. Almost no such organizations existed outside of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara. Almost all of them were led by women who had lived abroad. In 1935, the Turkish women's organizations entertained in Istanbul the Twelfth Congress of the Women's International Alliance. Shortly after that such activities declined, except for one or two welfare organizations which will be mentioned in Chapter 11.<sup>4</sup>

The strongest impact of the new freedom for women and girls was really upon the young unmarried Turks. Theretofore boys and girls in urban communities had had literally no acquaintance with one another between childhood and marriage. Customarily, a youth never saw any maiden's face except his sister's until he lifted his bride's veil at the conclusion of their marriage ceremony. She, more often than not, had also never before set eyes on him. In spite of this code, liberal families did permit glimpses. "My father," one wife told me of her own engagement, "let me go to his office when everybody else was out at noon; he allowed me to peek through a crack in the shutters, and I saw my fiancé pass on his way to lunch. I thought he was very handsome," she concluded, with a reminiscent glow in her eyes. Today's children coax reminiscences like this from their parents and grandparents. They themselves, at the most susceptible age, meet openly in university classes, social affairs, or at work.

Do not, however, picture the Turks of the Republic's first genera-

tion entering into matrimony in United States style. Conversation about marriage among Turks is full of comments utterly foreign to us. Most noticeable is, "His parents have engaged him," or "Her parents have engaged her." Someone remarks, "Mehmet's parents have engaged him to Fatma," and eager inquiries follow: "Have they met?" "Are they in love?" And often also, "Are they related?" They may be cousins. Kinship is noted even to the eighth, tenth, or farther removed cousins, and many marriages are arranged inside of a large family circle. Now and then friends commiserate: "Ahmet's desperately unhappy; his parents have engaged him but . . ." The "but" can mean anything from "Ahmet doesn't want to marry yet," to "He's in love with another girl."

Arranged marriage has, so far, continued to be the usual marriage in the Republic as a whole, rural and urban. Among those who do not delay marriage for schooling, parents engage and marry their children in their early teens, formerly sometimes as early as fourteen but, by present law, not before sixteen, and this disposes of most adolescent problems of courtship. Children of the poor who secure an education, as many do, have the same problems as well-to-do young people who marry later.

Freedom has grown most rapidly among university students. They meet in classes and on campus and some go together to restaurants, sports events, movies, or dances. More go about in groups than in twosomes. Many never pair off, indeed never dally together outside of classes, perhaps because the girl fears the wrath of an old-fashioned father, brother, or uncle, who might hear about it, or dreads the criticism of the conservative community in which she happens to live. Each family has had to choose for itself between old and new.

In one generation of freedom the time has not come for Mehmet to call on Fatma at home. Nihal's ultra-modern family may permit it, but the only man who could see Fatma at home would be her fiancé. Yet, where else could it be safer for her to meet any men? I asked some parents this. "Let them meet at parties or in our friends' homes," they answered. "It is better so. Then neither the young man nor the relatives will feel that we are engaging them." A girl may give parties herself to approved friends and attend friends' parties or school parties. Girls with brothers have the advantage that boys can call on the brothers, or a girl friend of the sister could happen to be there, or

cousins can visit—all under sufficient chaperonage to avoid rumors or criticisms.

It has been truly hard for parents of the pioneer decades in new Turkey to advise their children. Most of them did not have the same adolescent problems, and the children have known that their parents could not speak from a comparable experience until it came to marriage. In marriage, parental experience still carries authority.

Midway in any transition period, an observer can only cite instances and not generalize. Old and new, in practice simultaneously, produce contrary examples and contradictory impressions. An unmarried army captain about thirty years old, who had lived in the United States, described his own feelings thus: "When I am what you call 'in love,' the girl is all 'dear, darling, sweetheart' to me. But my parents will see the homemaker and the mother and that is more important." A college senior in Turkey, apparently much in love with a girl student who was from the same town in Asiatic Turkey, one day told me his father wished him to marry. He seemed a very independent sort so I asked him, "Will you marry the girl at college?" "No," he said quickly, "my father will choose." "But," I persisted, "might he not choose her if you asked him?" "I wouldn't ask him," he replied, "he will judge well." He admitted the college girl attracted him strongly, but he also said, "Love before marriage doesn't last. I want my marriage to last."

One other story shows the full force of custom. A certain Ali (not his real name) had been too busy for social life but his family insisted it was time for him to marry. Finally, he agreed, "Let my mother and older sister choose." In the best old tradition they consulted relatives and friends and learned of an eligible daughter in a desirable family. Let her fictitious name be Sevim. Ali's father inquired into her family's standing and approved of it. His mother and sister arranged to call on Sevim's mother. Visiting ladies with matrimony their object used to be called "viewers" (*görücüler*), and literally they did call in order to "view" the prospective bride.

Upon arrival at Sevim's home the older women visited a while and, at the suitable moment, Sevim entered politely to serve coffee. Then she sat quietly waiting to be included in the conversation. After the visit, Ali's mother and sister reported to Ali which women in his own family Sevim most resembled in build, coloring, and manner, and told what they had been able to learn and observe of her disposition. Ali

offered no objections and decided to wait until the wedding to see her. Sevim's father met Ali and men of his family, and he also approved. Alas, before their parents could engage them, i.e., complete an exchange of promises between their families, another fact came to light. Sevim had been engaged once before and had broken the engagement. "Had she," I asked, "ever seen the first fiancé?" She had never seen him, so Ali, who in turn had not seen Sevim, could hardly be jealous; but he was distrustful and refused to accept her, very likely in his case glad of the excuse to extend his bachelorhood. Nobody, however, would blame him for looking upon a broken engagement as almost as serious as a divorce.

After an engagement announcement, a couple may be together socially as much as they wish. A wedding in the Republic is by civil contract called the *nikâh*, which is equivalent to our justice-of-the-peace ceremony and is performed after health examinations and a fifteen-day public notice. After the formalities, the couple and witnesses sign the register, receive the certificate, and give boxes of candy, usually Jordan almonds, to the official and guests. The *nikâh* is binding and nothing but divorce can break it. Many couples, by their own or their parents' wish, will have the *nikâh* but not live together until after a second ceremony, *düğün*, performed by a Muslim leader, a *hoca* or *imam*, who is more scribe than priest, as Islam does not have an equivalent to Christian priests. Or the *düğün* may be a reception to relatives and friends, in effect, announcing that the couple will thereafter make their home together. Often a young man studying or in military service is bound by the *nikâh* to a wife who is not yet his "wife" but is more than a fiancée. And were he to die, she would be his legal heir. The parents may insist on an early *nikâh* for protection against promises taken too lightly or else premature intimacies. Or the young man, who will be away, wishes to make sure his girl cannot change her mind during a long wait for him. In recent years some reactionary Muslims in the interior of the country have had only a religious ceremony performed by an *imam*, i.e., they have had the *düğün* but not the *nikâh*. But the latter, the civil ceremony, is the legal and necessary ceremony today. This violation of modern law is raising problems, unprecedented for the Turks, problems of illegitimacy of children and inheritances.

Divorces can now be obtained by either the husband or wife,

whereas of old only the husband could make a direct break and he needed merely to make his personal declaration of divorce before witnesses. If, however, a woman's marital plight was serious, men of her own family could usually obtain some sort of official order to free her. The Republic requires modern court procedure, and either husband or wife may sue for divorce. The legal grounds for divorce are adultery, desertion, insanity, cruelty, extreme incompatibility, and felony.

Naturally, experiment in matrimony is bewildering, and the secret of successful marriage does not, by present evidence, lie in aping the West. In the absence of adequate statistics, it appears that, in the long run, arranged marriages in the East have turned out well or ill in about the same proportion as voluntary marriages in the West. Nevertheless, certain psychological differences are patent. A number of our free young people who start "madly in love" end up just mad. Nearly always in such a case, one of the couple will say bitterly to the other, "You weren't like this before we were married," or "If I'd known how you'd change I never would have married you." Thus, they confess the unfortunate side of love's blindness against which open-eyed parents are supposed to protect their children in arranged marriages. This particular form of recrimination, this feeling on the part of one member of a couple of being cheated by the other, can hardly occur between a husband and a wife who never saw each other before marriage.

Since a mismatched pair in an arranged marriage have no real reason to blame one another for an unfortunate choice, they can more tolerantly face the bad situation for them both; they may even grow sympathetic in their mutual plight. Since, also, arranged marriage is not assumed to be synonymous with love-match, relatives and friends are not scandalized when an incompatible husband and wife openly resort to formal courtesy and independent interests, and even spend much time apart, as long as neither neglects responsibilities for the children or gives cause for divorce. Thus, through sympathetic tolerance at home, or by a husband and wife openly and amicably going semi-separate ways without being unduly criticized for it, some quite bad mismatings have turned out tolerably well for the couples and their children. On the other hand, when parents choose well, the

bride and groom fall in love in their own home and quite well fulfill the fairy-tale promise of living happily ever after their wedding.

Even if arranged marriage, universally practiced of old and partially practiced today, has had certain advantages for domestic peace, the Turks have their quarrelsome couples and divorces—plenty of them. Karagöz puppet shows, a favorite public amusement for generations, frequently caricature domestic bedlam as do Punch and Judy shows in the West, proving marital unhappiness to be much the same everywhere between incompatible couples who let their feelings go. Indeed, by 1948, the divorce rate in Turkey was increasing noticeably.

The Turks are hard put to it to decide how to compromise old and new ideas of engagements and marriage; how to gain new freedom without sacrificing old advantages. A group of Turkish youths discussing this at length decided it would be wise to see enough of a girl before an engagement to discover congenial tastes and habits. Then they promptly reversed their decision after pointing out that once a young man feels himself falling in love, anything his beloved likes seems congenial to him. After marriage, he may tire of her enthusiasms for sport or art or society which, in his first infatuation, seemed part of her charm. Their parents, they said, could judge more coolly the compatibility of their dispositions and permanent interests. Nevertheless, they unanimously agreed that the next generation ought to be much freer to visit each other in their homes. Amidst the pros and cons of new and old ways, the first generation of Republican Turks have protested relatively little against arranged marriages. They plainly welcome freedom of acquaintance at all ages and yet not always as an escape from parental choice. Actually, in congenial families, parents seldom force an unwelcome choice and children seldom oppose their parents' choice. The gain which is welcomed is the better basis for discussing choice with their parents than was possible when men and women could not go out together to become acquainted.

No clear-cut new code for courtship or marriage had crystallized for the Republic's first generation, nor had emancipated women intruded embarrassingly far into public life. Turks are no more likely than any other people to reach the ideal final solution of relations between men and women. Turkish experiments, influenced by Western customs and weighted by Eastern traditions, can produce one of the



most interesting blends of Oriental and Occidental cultures. The pioneer generation of new Turks will raise the next generation in a partnership of shared domestic, social, and political experiences unknown to their Ottoman ancestors and yet, from the new Turks' standpoint, more true to their original Turkish ancestry.

## Turkey for the Turks

The nation is neither race nor tribe, nor the whole of the people who live in the same country, nor all the Müslims together. The nation consists of the complex of individuals who have a common language, a common national loyalty, a common morality and esthetic feeling, that is to say, of those who derive their culture from these sources.—Ziya Gökalp.<sup>1</sup>

*N*EVER could a people have changed so completely and so rapidly as the Turks without an unusually powerful motive. The new Turks had it in the feeling that they were coming into their own as Turks; that they had a future in a land of their own under their own name. Well rid of empire illusions and responsibilities, they heartily pioneered under the slogan, "Turkey for the Turks."

In the Ottoman Empire, the very name "Turkey" had become ambiguous, because "Turkey" alternately meant the whole Empire of the Osmanlı Turkish dynasty, and that small part of the Empire where the Turks were the majority of the population. Turkish Turkey consisted of Anatolia (Asia Minor) and İstanbul, with its immediate hinterland in Europe. All territory, however, was the Ottomans' and subjects were grouped not by countries, but by religion and language.

They were divided into millets, i.e., religious segments of the population—the Greek (Rum) Orthodox Millet, the Armenian (Ermeni) Gregorian Millet, the Roman Catholic (Katolik) Millet, and so on. This manner of segregation reflects an ancient Sassanian Persian policy plus the principle of Islam that followers of any religion have a right to their own type of organization, inasmuch as Koran laws apply only to Müslims. As part of the Müslim population, the Turks of Turkey, unless they were in the Sublime Porte, were essentially

no different from any other Müslim subjects in Egypt or Albania. For non-Müslims, the sultans appointed a patriarch from the ecclesiastical leaders of each millet, who was responsible for the good political conduct of his people as Ottoman subjects. Beyond that, each patriarch directed his people's beliefs and morals according to their religion. Patriarchs could tax their own people in addition to empire taxes and each millet had courts to try civil cases between its members, and had its own schools, churches, or synagogues.

Foreigners who lived in Turkey for diplomatic, commercial, or cultural reasons, were even more completely laws unto themselves because of the capitulations which had been granted to all major powers, including the United States. By these agreements, which originated in the sixteenth century, foreigners from such privileged countries lived and worked in Turkey without paying taxes except certain limited customs duties; they established businesses and banks under their own laws instead of Turkey's, and had their own courts and post offices.

As this worked out under Ottoman rule, essentially all commercial life and exploitation of resources inside of Turkey fell to the religious minorities and foreigners. The Turks, who were themselves a very small minority in their empire's total population, gave their full time, if they were the ruling Turks, to soldiering and office holding in the subject countries; or, if they were the subject Turks, to agriculture in Turkey where everybody exploited them. The result was an anachronism: The Turkish empire for the Turks, but Turkey for the non-Turks. Turks in the Osmanlı government could rule and tax the whole Empire, but the people who enjoyed most of the profits and the freest life of their own inside of Turkey proper were non-Turks.

Turks did not run most of Turkey's commerce, manufactures, and banks; Greek, Armenian, and Jewish subjects of the Empire, and foreign concessionaires did this. The French, British, and Germans held most of the concessions to exploit Turkey's natural resources, while others, like the Russians, Italians, Belgians, and Americans profited sufficiently to keep their fingers in the pie. The Germans enjoyed the most notorious concession—the railroad concession granted by Abdülhamid's government in 1902. First, the Germans were guaranteed a fixed payment per kilometer, so the route serpentine through far more kilometers than necessary. Second, they were granted ex-

plotation rights for all mineral, forest, and water resources within twelve and one-half miles along either side of the right-of-way. This concession was to run ninety-nine years, through the whole twentieth century, but it ran into the Republic after the defeat of Germany and Turkey in World War I, and that ended it.

The millets and capitulations, which sultans of the powerful Ottoman Empire had granted as *largesse* to their non-Müslim subjects and foreigners, and which had been a mutual advantage, boomeranged on the sick Empire. The European powers whose nationals profited by the capitulations were only too glad to step in as “doctors” to bleed the Sick Man—of course “for his own good.” They found that in the patient’s own system, the Christian millets, which had originally been important to the Empire’s health, were building up unhealthy areas of demands multiplying like cancer cells. Rival powers bled the Empire’s strength through concessions and indebtedness for loans squandered on unhealthy extravagances of the sultans and Sublime Porte. The Armenian millet, encouraged by foreign powers, demanded what amounted to partition of Turkey in order to revive an ancient Armenian Empire. The Unspeakable Turk (Sultan Abdülhamid II) met this threat to unity by the Armenian massacres of 1894 and 1896.

No patient could recover from excessive bleeding and cancer; the Sick Man of Europe was doomed. Malpractice and cancer kill good and evil victims indiscriminately, so it does not follow from this ugly diagnosis that the later Ottoman government deserved to live. The extremists who prevailed among the Young Turks, and who earnestly, but blunderingly, tried to cure the evil and save the patient, saw no new way to cope with any of the population who resisted assimilation and welcomed foreign aid. Another but smaller massacre occurred a year after the New Turks took power. When the Russians and Turks became enemies at war in 1914, the Armenians sided with the Russians. As soon as word spread that the Armenians were massacring Müslim Turks and Kurds, and setting up an Armenian government at Van, the Young Turks passed a law to disarm all non-Müslims in military zones and deport them. This turned into the 1915-16 migrations and massacres of Armenians, and was followed by counter-massacres of Müslims by Russo-Armenian forces occupying eastern Turkey in 1917-18.<sup>2</sup>

Stopping separatist movements began to seem impossible, and as

the bond of power crumbled, worried Turks began to test the strength of alternative bonds, especially of religion and race. The religious bond of the Khalifate had more or less held the Müslim subjects together even through the Young Turk regime, in spite of the fact that the Young Turks' emphasis on "Turanist" bonds had tended to alienate the Arabs. Racial or "Turanist" lines could be developed beyond the old Ottoman boundaries along ancient migration routes in the Caucasus, certain Volga regions, Chinese Turkistan, Siberia, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, and Iran. These lands offered tempting fields in which to find replacements for the Christian populations which were so determined to separate from the Empire. These thoughts turned Ottoman attention seriously for the first time in many centuries to the Turkish population of Anatolia. The Turks there could be a nucleus for two possible bonds of closer unity—the religious bond in pan-Islamism, and the so-called racial or national bond in Turkism.

In the interval between World War I and the Republic, the rivalry between these views became dangerously tense. The very words, *Turanizm*, *Türkizm*, and for a while, *Nasyonalizm*, became fighting words.<sup>3</sup> The Turks eventually subdued their differences in order to take immediate steps toward the foremost goal, "Turkey for the TURKS." Thus accented, it is the fundamental nationalistic attitude of any nation. Bluntly, the idea is "Our country is ours, and others are here at their own risk."

In Turkey, as in any country, the measure of "others' " risk is the degree of their assimilation into national life. The risk is nil for those completely assimilated. The unassimilated stay at a risk which goes up when the nation is uneasy and down when it is calm. Turkey was not calm while the "Sick Man" was on his deathbed and foreign powers were closing in to partition his estate. Foreigners encouraged minority resistance to assimilation, and they channeled through their capitulation post offices and the millet organizations their schemes to exploit or dismember Turkey. Their usual excuse for interfering in Turkey was "protection" of minorities against Turkish abuse. The Turks' excuse for violent retaliation was "protection" of Turkey against foreign and minority use and abuse of capitulations and millets as agencies to spread revolt. Dangerous abuses and questionable methods of protection on both sides became a flaming vicious circle.

When Mustafa Kemâl Pasha took the lead in 1919, he and his followers had to break this vicious circle of abuses and protection before all Turks would be trapped in it, and simultaneously they had to establish the Turks in undisputed possession of Turkey and compel world recognition of Turkey as an independent nation. The Turkish people had become thoroughly disillusioned by more than a century of vain attempts to reform the Ottoman government and by the non-Turks' exploitation of Anatolia which, after all, is Turkey. The finishing touch was put on their disillusionment when the Greeks invaded Anatolia in 1919. Greeks, resident in Turkey as Ottoman citizens, numbered close to one and one-half million. Many Greek families had never left Turkey since their ancestors followed Alexander the Great there or migrated during the Byzantine Empire. A seafaring people, they had concentrated around harbors—Istanbul, Izmir (Smyrna), and Black Sea ports. At the close of World War I, while the Greek army of Greece and the British navy were still in fighting trim, the British government and the Greek government decided the time was right for Greeks to move back into a great deal more of Turkey.

The victorious Allies had it all mapped, and according to plan Greek army units landed at Izmir on May 14, 1919, and British navy units stood by in Izmir harbor. The rest of the plan was broadly as follows: The Greeks were to fight their way inland, with their final objective the Black Sea territory which had been controlled by the Greeks in Byzantine days. The British, already occupying Istanbul, would follow the Greek victory by consolidating their own position in Istanbul, or Constantinople, as they continued to call it, and then push the Turks (as a political entity) out of Europe. The French would take over permanently in southern Turkey, adjoining Syria where they were already in control. Italians were to move in at the southwest via the Dodecanese Islands, and the Armenians and Kurds were to divide eastern Turkey. All that would be left would be the barren central plateau. The ten to twelve million Turks, then in Anatolia, could have that although it could not possibly support them.

The Turks under Atatürk fought for their lives, i.e., to hold a country large enough to live in. They call it their War of Liberation, 1919-22.

Soon, the Allies noticed that the Sick Man of Europe, dying in

Istanbul, was only the Sultan and Sublime Porte, and not the nation. They awoke to the fact that there was plenty of life in the Turks yet. So the Italians backed out, and the French withdrew gracefully, leaving their ammunition dumps for the Turks, presumably to help blast British schemes. The British gave up their demands and left the Greeks to fend for themselves. The Greeks ran into too much fighting in the two battles at İnönü, and their offensive was finally thrown back at the Sakarya River battle in August, 1921. Just a year later, when the Turkish counteroffensive started, the Greeks retreated, destroying as they went. The Turks, pursuing along the path of destruction, forced their enemy into the sea at İzmir in September, 1922. The Turks had Turkey.

The League of Nations officially recognized this in 1923. It then appointed a commission to supervise compulsory exchange of populations. Greeks in Turkey who might resist assimilation were moved to Greece even though they had never lived there before. Similarly, Turks in Greece were moved into Turkey. The actual transfer was tragic because of suffering and disease due to ill-prepared camps at the ports and to delayed sailings. About 108,000 Greeks have stayed in European Turkey, and 80,000 or more Turks have been living in Greece, mostly in Thrace.

While Turkey's War of Liberation was being fought, the Kemalists broke the vicious circle of abuses and protection. When foreign powers seized the Ottoman post offices and telegraph system during the war, Atatürk sent this message to all provincial and district governors:

For the time being, our nation will not be in contact with the official world outside, either friendly or hostile. . . . The fact that Christian people who are not now under actual or apparent protection of any foreign government can live tranquilly and in complete freedom from anxiety, will constitute an absolute proof of the capacity for civilization which is a natural endowment of our race. . . . I request you to be compassionate and conciliatory towards those who comply with local authority and are not at fault in their duties as citizens.<sup>4</sup>

To be sure, this could be called locking the door after the horse was stolen; rather it was a symbol of what the minorities and the world should expect from the Turks once they too were free from the yoke of despotism and hopeless corruption. It bespoke recovery of their early traditions of just government, and it carried assurance of a humanitarian purpose.

Atatürk, at the same time, refused to submit to his new government any treaty with the European powers unless the latter agreed to abolition of the millets and capitulations. He rejected the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which the Western Allies had dictated, essentially mortgaging the soul of the dying Empire, and which the Sublime Porte delegates had signed but which the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies never ratified. Atatürk insisted on a new treaty on the basis of the Turkish National Pact, which had been drawn up in 1919 at a People's Congress in Amasya. It asserted the new nonimperialistic, purely nationalist intentions of a Turkey for the Turks. The Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, caught between the Sultan's government in İstanbul and the Nationalists in Anatolia, had adopted it on January 28, 1920, and the Grand National Assembly in Ankara had adopted it on April 23, 1920. The pact presented principles for "the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace." Those principles were to settle boundaries between Turkey and former empire lands by homogeneity of the populations and by vote of the inhabitants in dubious border areas; to establish rights for minorities alike for all countries; to insure security for İstanbul and the Straits, i.e., for the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus; and to guarantee Turkish sovereignty in Turkey.

Atatürk sent representatives of the Nationalist government to two more conferences with the Allied powers, at London in 1921 and at Paris in 1922. The Allied terms were still unacceptable to the Nationalist Turks. Finally, at Lausanne in 1923, İsmet Pasha's adamant stand as representative of the new Turks ended foreign dictation to Turkey. He negotiated terms consistent with the Turkish National Pact, and provisions were made for agreements to define the area which is Turkey. The Allies affixed their signatures to the Lausanne Treaty, and thus, officially recognized that Turkey belongs to the TURKS.

"The name Turk as a political term," according to Article 88 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, "shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, regardless of race or religion. Every child born of a Turkish father in Turkey or elsewhere; any person whose father is a foreigner established in Turkey, who resides in Turkey, and who chooses upon attaining majority to become a Turkish subject; and any individual who acquires Turkish



nationality by naturalization in conformity with the law, is a Turk."

What then has become of non-Turks in the Republic? There are those born in Turkey who chose at the age of twenty-one to retain their family's citizenship—English, Italian, Russian, or whatever it was. And there are minorities which had held Ottoman citizenship for generations but had formerly refused to be, so to speak, "Turkified," such as the Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. Today, most of these minority citizens, approximately two hundred thousand, live in European Turkey, while Anatolia's population is close to 96 per cent Müslim Turks. All minority citizens in the Republic of Turkey are legally in the same position as foreigners or unassimilated descendents of immigrants in any country, including the U.S.A. They live there at a risk commensurate with their own obedience to the laws of the land. This is the normal situation in any country. But abnormal situations are frequent in Turkey because her geographical, political, and psychological position is always overexposed to foreign threats. Consequently, although risks for unassimilated residents are normal in principle, they have repeatedly been abnormal in fact.

One abnormal situation has been with the Kurds, who live in south-eastern Turkey adjoining Kurdish territory in Iran and Irak. Heirs of the ancient Medes, they are a rugged mountain people whose strongest allegiance is to their clans and religion. They are Müslims, and when the new Turkish government went so far as to depose the head of their religion, the Khalif, and to promulgate secular Turkish laws, the Kurds rebelled. In 1925, they seized several cities and posted vigorous proclamations against the Kemalist government. That government, proclaiming foreign instigation of the revolt and aided in this crisis even by anti-Kemalist Turks, suppressed the Kurds so violently that reports of it to the League of Nations were used as one argument for assigning Turkey's Mosul province and its large Kurdish population to Irak under British mandate.

The Kurds in Turkey rebelled again in 1929-30 and in 1937, and each insurrection was not only a threat of civil war but of international trouble, inasmuch as the Kurds are one people in three countries—Turkey, Iran, and Irak—with a small overflow in Syria and the Soviet Union. The government forcibly crushed each rebellion. Yet a few Kurds were in the Grand National Assembly, and at least one in the nation's cabinet. The drastic treason laws of the early Republic (later

more as refugees. But when it came to aiding large numbers by temporary residence or escape through Turkey, the Turks' record was of official refusal in order to save their Republic from involvement in one of the most burning questions between the Great Powers. The situation was so abnormal that no consistent positive attitude toward Jewish refugees became apparent, and merciful and unmerciful acts can both be recounted. The nearly eighty thousand Jews normally resident in Turkey were in no way victimized. During the 1940's, by government report, Turkey admitted from Europe nearly ninety thousand refugees and displaced persons of various sects, including some Jews, but mostly Müslims. After World War II, when the new State of Israel came into existence, approximately one-quarter of the Jews of Turkish citizenship emigrated to Israel within one year, and many returned upon finding Israel overpopulated.

The only real calamity for minority citizens in the Republic in its pioneer years was the capital levy (*varlık vergisi*) of 1942-43, during World War II. The law itself, imposing this levy, did not discriminate in any way between Müslim Turks and other Turks; yet, in execution, far more of the non-Müslims were assessed beyond their ability to pay. Many biased reports of this levy spread through other countries. Antagonistic reports concentrated solely on the law's miscarriage and disregarded its intent; reports in its defense minimized, beyond the point of credulity, the effect of its miscarriage. Official reasons given for a capital levy were that costs of defense against German threats, in that critical year of the war, necessitated emergency collection of funds. The peasantry, the government felt, had already been taxed as heavily as was fair, so the burden of the emergency levy should fall on the urban population, and most heavily on war profiteers suspected of keeping double systems of books to evade taxation. Almost all of the non-Müslim and foreign businessmen lived in the largest urban centers, so any urban levy fell conspicuously heavily on them.

The extreme haste in making out assessment rolls by local assessment boards, without the right of appeal, enabled ruthless assessors to be partial and unjust in estimating what various citizens should pay. Inasmuch as each person was expected to pay his total assessment when notified, some of the most ruthlessly assessed had to cash in their total resources for what they could get, and then be sentenced

to labor (usually snow-shovelling in the mountains) to pay the balance. One Greek businessman, who had for years had a large store in Beyoğlu (or Pera, as foreigners call İstanbul's modern shopping district) could raise hardly more than half of his levy by a sacrifice sale of his store, and he was sentenced to a labor camp. An Armenian seamstress, who earned not more than three dollars a day, was expected to pay nearly two thousand dollars at once. Foreign hospitals and schools as well as foreign businesses were assessed, but very unevenly. A Müslim lawyer delivered all the paper collateral he possessed for a loan to meet his levy. And so it ran in enough cases to produce shocking publicity, while most Müslim citizens were hardly taxed at all. Certain of these took advantage of others' misfortune to buy their businesses cheaply. More Müslim Turks, as employers or co-workers of non-Müslims, did all they could to help the latter to meet unduly heavy levies.

Those of the local assessors who were unjust may have felt that they were currying favor higher up by placing the heaviest burden they could on minorities and foreigners, but as soon as the bad effects of failure to carry out the *varlık vergisi* impartially became patent, the government abruptly stopped all collections. Individuals, including many Müslim Turks, helped the unlucky ones who had already paid ruinous sums to get a fresh start, because no *varlık* money, already collected, was refunded. Nearly every thoughtful Turk has agreed since it ended that, in view of inequitable application and inadequate returns, the *varlık vergisi* was a tragic mistake.

The policies of the new Turks, pioneering in their Republic, have mostly been forged in the heat of experience with suddenly critical problems, and of efforts to cope with them equally suddenly. The main problem which the Müslim Turks have had with themselves, as a homogeneous population in a country of their own, has been their own inexperience in banking, commerce, and industry. Learning to do for themselves what minorities and foreigners had done before was a major pioneer task. As rapidly, however, as the pioneering Turks tackled internal problems, some new turn of events in the outside world has changed the setting of their foreign affairs. Nothing was stable around them during their first generation in a Republic. They still have to prove that a small homogeneous nation can stand securely where the once largest heterogeneous empire in the world fell apart.

## Accent on Turkey

This Assembly is the Assembly of the Turkish people; its powers and authority extend to and affect solely and exclusively the lives and destiny of the Turkish people and the Turkish nation.—Atatürk.<sup>1</sup>

THE Republic's slogan has a second meaning. A shift of emphasis brings it out, for it is "TURKEY for the Turks." Not an empire for the Turks, not subject lands to rule, not expansionism, but nationalism inside *Turkey*. Atatürk explained it:

In order that our nation shall be able to enjoy a strong, happy, stable existence, it is essential for the state to pursue a wholly national policy based upon and adequate to the structure of our society. When I say national policy, the meaning and sense which I intend is this: to strive within our national boundaries for the true happiness and prosperity of our nation and country . . . by reliance above all upon our own strength; . . . and to look forward to civilized, human dealing and reciprocal friendship from the civilized world.<sup>2</sup>

No chauvinism in such nationalism. Turks, however, did not all see eye to eye on this. Some still wanted more than Turkey for the Turks. They wanted to retain Turkish power and authority at least in Islam under a Turkish Khalif, as in the previous four hundred years. When they asked Atatürk to become Khalif himself, he gave the kind of answer which makes his statesmanship forever timely:

Their proposals placed at the disposal of this pan-Islamic supersovereign, for support of his power, only ten or fifteen million Turks out of the three hundred million Müslims. . . . Could it have been compatible with reason and reality to nominate a sovereign, called Khalif, for the nations and governments of Islam [from China to Morocco] which are now independent, or else almost wholly under foreign protectorates? . . . Gentlemen, I asked,

would Iran or Afghanistan, which are Islamic states, recognize in any respect the authority of a Khalif? Can they do so? Rightly, they cannot, because it would be contrary to a state's independence and to a nation's sovereignty.

Then the leader of the Turks put the whole matter of super-sovereignty into clear perspective, a model for one-world thinking:

Some day in the future the communities of Islam which dwell in Europe, Asia, Africa, and on other continents may be able to gain their independence and power to act according to their will and to follow their own desires. . . . The time may come when accredited representatives of these hypothetically independent states of Islam may form a congress and establish this or that bond between such and such Muslim states. For maintenance of this bond an assembly composed of delegates from all Muslim states may be formed. . . . At that time if they so desire they will confer the name 'Khalifate' on these 'Federated States of Islam,' and the title, 'Khalif,' on the person elected to the office of president of the common assembly. Otherwise, a situation in which any Islamic state whatsoever grants to one person the administrative authority and control of affairs for the whole Muslim world is one which reason and logic will never accept.<sup>3</sup>

Islam has had no generally recognized Khalif since 1924, when the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic abolished that office. Although a very few Turks might like to spread the contagion of pan-Islamism anew in Turkey, Atatürk's common sense is still the antidote.

Another expansionist potential is pan-Turanism. Why not have a Turkey for all the supposedly 51,000,000 "Turadians?" Why not expand Turkey to the Crimea, Transcaucasia, and Turkistan, which are considered the Turanian areas in the U.S.S.R., or why not at least make common cause with the Turadians there? One answer, of course, is that a small republic does not start trouble with a giant neighbor. A shadow of possibility, however, appeared during the Nazi sweep into Soviet lands in World War II. I overheard two Turkish civilians exchanging "what ifs." "What if Russia were to be shorn of power by Germany? What if Turkey were on Germany's side? What if Turkey could fight for the so-called Turanian parts of Russia for keeps?" One civilian registered genuine scorn, free of sour grapes: "Who wants it? We've got our own country." The other retorted: "Just offer us the chance. It would be like holding out candy to a baby."

Hitler did not offer that kind of candy, and the Turkish government was not taking fantastic chances. A number of pan-Turanist societies, presumably inspired by Nazi racism, were active in Turkey, off and on during World War II. They bespoke liberation of the Turks' "racial" brothers mostly in what are now Soviet Azerbaijan and Turkistan. They followed an anti-minority, anti-Jewish, slightly pro-Axis, and strongly anti-Soviet line, and drew into their membership certain of the intellectuals and historians of the earlier school, which had propounded in the first Republic textbooks exaggerated theories of Turanist influence in the world. The government arrested about twenty-five of them in May, 1944, and charged them with violating the constitution by engaging in racist propaganda and plotting in secret societies to overthrow the government. Three years of trials and appeals, amidst much publicity in Turkey, resulted in their convictions in martial law court, cancellation of that judgment in a higher court, re-trial, and finally release of all the defendants for lack of evidence. This outcome was vigorously criticized by the Soviet press and radio for being too lenient. More than twenty pan-Turanist periodicals continued to appear, mostly succumbing shortly to inadequate circulation or to a government ban, but some persistently reappeared under new names.

The Nazis, it is well known by now, did offer to the Turks the chance to regain Arab lands. Presumably the Nazi Fuehrer had picked the Turks to be his Müslim henchmen to run Islam for him. But a chance to govern Arabs again did not tempt the Turks. Kemalist Turks, at the wheel of state, steered steadfastly through the war on the chartered course, "TURKEY for the Turks." They heeded Atatürk's guidance: "This Assembly's power and authority can extend only to the Turkish people and the Turkish nation." But they kept in mind also, "Turkey for the TURKS," and yielded not one iota of authority inside Turkey to either enemy or ally.

A story, perhaps apocryphal but nevertheless meaningful, went the rounds of the embassies in Ankara in 1942. The Nazis were bearing down on the Turks, using the full weight of their pincers campaigns through Russia and Africa, besides argument and temptation, to bring them into Hitler's fold. Nevertheless, Nazi Ambassador von Papen had left Ankara for a brief holiday in Germany's old summer embassy near Istanbul on the Bosphorus. British Ambassador Knatchbull-

Hugessen and U.S. Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt stayed very much on the job in Ankara. An ambassador of a neutral country, meeting von Papen, inquired, "Are you not afraid to be away from Ankara and leave the Turks to the British and Americans?" The Nazi ambassador, it was said, ruefully replied, "I don't think the British and Americans will be any more successful than I have been in pushing the Turks around." Again heeding Atatürk's principles, the Turks were letting no outside powers push them around. They were not shirking the main responsibility he had placed upon them to rule the Turkish people in their own Turkish country.

Granted that the Turks' sole concern as rulers should be with the lives and destinies of Turks inside their own country; a very grave consideration was the lives and destinies of some millions of Turks who still lived in other countries of the former empire. Abundant precedent existed in Europe for Turkey to expand into Turkish-populated areas in adjoining countries over which it had once ruled. Turkey, however, had started a new precedent of her own in the Turkish-Greek exchange of populations mentioned in Chapter 5. This exchange, it cannot be denied, was unhappy for many of the million transplanted Greeks. They had not liked moving from Turkey, the land of their birth and property, into a motherland which, like the old lady in the shoe, had so many children that she didn't know what to do and hasn't found out yet. On the other hand, Turkey had had less trouble in absorbing 390,000 repatriated Turks, because Turkey's natural resources are adequate, according to recent estimates, for more than double her present population, i.e., for at least fifty million.

For more than two decades now the Turkish Republic has been repatriating Turks to parts of Turkey which need reclamation from swamps or desert. The general project has been popular, but the manner of carrying it out by compulsory resettlement in reclamation areas was publicly criticized in the 1946 political campaign, and the Land Settlement Law was modified the next year. Repatriations have added to Turkey's high birthrate (on which adequate statistics have not been kept but which may now be as high as forty-three per thousand) and have, by government estimates, increased Turkey's population from about 12,000,000 when the Republic began, to nearly 21,000,000 in 1950.

Boundaries of the Turks' Turkey were most troublesome on the south and east. The southern line had to be settled with Syria and Irak and their respective mentors, France and Great Britain; and the eastern line had to be settled with the Armenians and Georgians in Soviet Transcaucasia. The League of Nations engineered temporary compromises at the south. Later, Turkey negotiated directly with Britain for the present boundary, placing Mosul province and its oil fields and its Kurds in Irak under British mandate.

Noah's old refuge, Mt. Ararat, in eastern Turkey near the Turkish-Soviet boundary, became the center of the most peculiar dispute. At the inception of the Turkish nationalist state in 1921, the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara and the Soviet government in Moscow had signed a treaty committing the province of Kars, including Ardahan in the Ararat region, to Turkey, and exactly twenty-five years later, in 1946, the Soviet Union proposed its return to the U.S.S.R.

Once Ararat and Kars had been the heart of an Armenian empire, and the Ardahan section had been at one time in a Georgian kingdom. This whole area was swallowed by the Byzantine Empire, from which the Turks took it eleven centuries later. The Turks have held it for five centuries except for brief capture by the Russians during wars in 1828 and 1855, and for thirty-nine years (1878-1917), when the Ottoman Sultan granted it to Russia as war indemnity following the Russo-Turkish war.<sup>4</sup> Czarist Russia's collapse in World War I reopened the whole question of possession as a result of fighting and refugee migrations both ways across the Russian-Turkish boundary. British troops were also posted on the Russian side. For a while, the boundary writhed back and forth like a tortured snake, booted one way or the other as the local governments and the British, White Russian, and Russian Red armies shifted their troops. Eventually a plebiscite was agreed upon, and the population, then resident in the disputed area, cast 85,124 votes in favor of Turkey and 1,924 against Turkey.

On that basis, the new Kemalist government in Ankara and the new Soviet government in Moscow defined the present boundary in a treaty signed at Moscow, March 16, 1921. By its terms, Kars and Ardahan were assigned to Turkey, and the Turks withdrew from Armenian and Georgian territory on the Russian side of the border,



leaving the port of Batum to Russia. This same boundary line was mutually accepted in a treaty seven months later between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (the three Transcaucasian republics). Both Turkey and the Soviet Union confirmed it again after their respective new governments assumed their permanent form, and even reaffirmed it in later treaties such as the 1925 Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. Turkey has not violated these treaties; so, from the Turks' standpoint, all territory inside this boundary is unquestionably TURKEY for the Turks. Yet, spokesmen in the Soviet Union after World War II not only made brash claims to this area but went back to a sixteenth century Georgian-Turkish dispute to claim Trabzon also.

Doors of the Republic of Turkey have been kept swinging both ways. The Georgians and the Armenians in Turkey could move to their respective Soviet Republics across the border, as permanent settlers; and the Turks on the Soviet side of the border were free to settle in Turkey. About sixteen thousand Georgians are, reportedly, still in Turkey. In December, 1945, the Soviet Union invited Armenians from anywhere in the world to move to the Armenian Soviet Republic. At the same time the U.S.S.R. started its new claims on eastern Turkey. Speculations on the significance of an invitation to Armenians and a claim to once Armenian land, coming at the same time, as they did, were often contradictory. Armenians, according to one guess, were invited to Soviet Armenia preliminary to resettlement in eastern Turkey. Another guess was that the Soviet invitation was only a gesture in the war of nerves on Turkey; the real aim was Russian control of the Dardanelles, and claims to former Armenian territory in eastern Turkey might quickly be dropped in a trade for advantages at the Straits.

Anyway, Turkey announced that the door was open for all Turkish Armenians who wished to leave. Hundreds registered for the opportunity but none actually left under this program, according to reports in the Turkish press. Again, contrary guesses were in the air. The Armenians, some guessed, were better satisfied in Turkey than they would be in the Soviet Union. Others more cynically guessed that the Turkish-Armenians, believing that Soviet power would really obtain for them the province of Kars again, remained to work inside

Turkey to that end. A number of Armenians, repatriated to Soviet Armenia from other countries, are known to have escaped into Turkey in 1948, as if to a haven of refuge. Later, perhaps because of their own choice, and perhaps because it was unwise that they should remain in Turkey as an added issue between the Turks and the Soviets, most of them returned to the countries from whence they had moved to the U.S.S.R. This story, unfinished at this writing, is typical of problems of the founding generation of the Republic has had on its hands in Turkey for the Turks, and will soon pass on to the first all-Republican generation.

Turkey has expanded at only one point beyond the boundaries set by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Where the eastern Mediterranean starts south from Turkey past Syria there is an area about as large as Maryland, called by the Turks "Hatay." Its most important feature is the port of Iskenderun (Alexandretta, in English), which is the ideal port for transshipments between the Turkish railways and boats to and from the Suez Canal. Deciding whether this area belonged to Turkey or to Syria stumped the League of Nations. The League's mandate commission compromised by cutting it off from both Turkey and Syria, and then permitting the French, who received the Syrian mandate, to run it. When the French negotiated a treaty with Syria, in 1936, providing for Syrian independence in 1939, they considered no comparable terms for Hatay.

Atatürk indignantly objected to the French keeping any tighter hold on Hatay than on Syria; yet he equally objected to its being considered part of Syria. Hatay, he said in effect, under big headlines in the Turkish press, was part of the Hittite's Biblical kingdom in Anatolia and, therefore, was a part of modern Anatolia in Turkey. He also claimed a Turkish majority in the Hatay population, although outside observers had made a lower estimate. An agreement was reached in Geneva in 1937 to recognize Hatay as an autonomous republic. Thereupon, two years of dispute followed, involving Turkey, France, and a League of Nations commission, over population majorities, electoral laws, and registration of voters. The registration was 63 per cent Turkish. Martial law had to be invoked. Syria, though directly interested, was not directly represented in the conferences. In 1939, the Hatay assembly adopted the Turkish form of government, and shortly thereafter, Hatay was reincorporated into Turkey as a

Turkish province. Great Britain and France, acting independently of the League of Nations, under the lowering war clouds which burst in 1939 and which made Turkish support highly valuable, had agreed to the Turkish claim. British funds and British and American engineers, during World War II, helped the Turks to improve the Hatay port of Iskenderun. And through it the Turks received most of their American lend-lease and British supplies. But the Syrians have not formally recognized the Turkish sovereignty over Hatay.

Turkophobes are sure that the annexation of Hatay is a symptom of incurable imperialism in the Turks. They think the Turks will never miss a good chance to expand. I have even heard a very cynical expatriate Turk in the United States say, "If Turkey had Germany's former industrial strength and Italy's population needs, she too would be ruthlessly expansionist." Turks officially and, with rare exceptions, also unofficially deny this. The island of Cyprus is a case in point. A part of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries, it passed into British control by a grant from the Ottoman government in 1878. The British formally annexed it in World War I, an act which the new Turks ratified in 1924, in accordance with an agreement in the Treaty of Lausanne. After a rumor in 1948 that the British might give up Cyprus had produced a fairly strong public demonstration in Ankara in favor of reclaiming the island for Turkey, a Turk declared to me, "It's not that we would not like to regain certain territory, but the right way would be by plebiscite under the United Nations. The majority of us do not want to disturb the peace by reclaiming regions we formerly ruled, but if a region, formerly ours, is to be transferred to another power not designated in the treaty with us, we ought to demand a plebiscite."

This moderate view looked more difficult in practice than in theory to Turks who noted that the majority of voters in a plebiscite on Cyprus would be Greeks, who might or might not be Communists. If they were Communists, their victory in a plebiscite would presumably turn Cyprus into a base for the Soviet Union to strengthen its pressure on Turkey for the Dardanelles. From this standpoint, if the British were ever to give up the island so strategically close to Turkey's shore, Turkey might want to reclaim it for security reasons. As in this case, so it usually has been for the new Turks—a quandary

to decide whether hands off or hands on would best insure security and peace in their explosive zone.

Turkophiles believe official denials of imperialist aims in Turkey; they believe in the new Turks' Good Neighbor intentions and they cite evidence in World War II that land-grab opportunism was conspicuously absent from the Turkish maneuvers and diplomacy. The pattern of the Republic's policy throughout its first generation has appeared to be consistently "Turkey for the Turks," accented both ways.

**PART II**  
**LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC**



## Homeland

There is perhaps no country in the world with potentialities richer than those that are locked up in Turkey today, together with fundamental conditions more favorable for their release and initial development. Not the least important is the character, the courage, and the industry of the nineteen million Turks.—Max Weston Thornburg in *Fortune*.<sup>1</sup>

THE Asiatic part of Turkey, Anadolu, known in the West as Asia Minor, or Anatolia, has been the homeland of the Turks for nine centuries, three times as long as we of the United States have held even a beachhead in our part of the Americas. Yet the Ottomans in their European capital, “Constantinople,” who had stopped thinking of themselves as “Turks,” spoke contemptuously of the Anatolians. Who were those people in Anadolu, those “Turks?” To their rulers they were nobody special, just another subject people, another source of produce, taxes, and common soldiers. Let the minorities and foreigners exploit them so that the Ottomans could collect more goods and taxes.

“Just imagine it,” Anatolians say today, “to be called a Turk was an insult in Turkey!” A distinguished Turkish editor, Ahmet Emin Yalman, echoed this in his book, *Turkey in the World War* (World War I): “When Vambéry, the noted Hungarian Orientalist, visited Constantinople, he found that the educated Turks and dignitaries of the Empire . . . thought of themselves as Mohammedans and Ottomans and used the term Turk only in connection with low-class people, particularly peasants.”<sup>2</sup> Provincial New Yorkers who look upon Americans west of the Adirondack Mountains as “yokels from the sticks” have their counterparts in present-day Istanbul Turks who

take the same wry view of Turks on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles-Bosphorus Straits. But provincialism exists in Anatolia, too. An Anatolian peasant's province is his *memleket*, his "national home"; a person from another province is an *ecnebi*, a "foreigner." Today, however, the Turks, in both İstanbul and Anatolia, are taking a new measure of their homeland as a whole.

All of Turkey today has only four cities of more than one hundred thousand population—Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, and Adana—and fewer than a dozen in the more-than-50,000 class. Nearly 80 per cent of the Turks live in villages of fewer than two thousand inhabitants, most of them fewer than five hundred. Cities, towns, and the forty thousand villages comprise a total of some forty-five thousand communities, and all of the large cities are in the Western half of the country. Consequently travel confined to the cities misses most of Turkey, and tourist travel elsewhere has rarely been comfortable because of limited transportation and absence of hotels.

Good roads and hotels can, when the Turks wish it, draw tourists across continents to follow historic routes in Turkey from Constantinople to Mount Ararat, from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to ancient Troy; Biblical routes from Tarsus to Nicea; and scenic routes in all directions. Excellent hunting, fishing, and skiing will lure sportsmen. Already vacationists, by the thousands from neighboring desert countries, are taking advantage of the good summer climate in many parts of Turkey, east and west. And Mediterranean cruise tourists are becoming interested in seeing more of Turkey than a one-day stop in old Constantinople. Recent moves for *turizm* will undoubtedly attract the *tourist* in unprecedented numbers in the coming decade. Turkish newspaper publishers and editors founded the Turkish Tourism Society in 1949 to publicize tourist attractions, and to promote easier travel and better accommodations on tourist routes.

One can appreciate what pioneering meant to the new Turks only by understanding their transportation difficulties. The Republic could report in its twenty-fifth year, 1948, only 7,700 miles of brick, asphalt, or macadam road in good condition. Adding to this the ungraded dirt roads, and macadam and graded roads in need of repair, the total was 26,000 miles for 45,000 communities. Most of the roads were impassable in bad weather. Many villages have no better connection with the nearest town or another village than a foot path which even a



donkey cannot travel in any but good weather. Construction of motor highways in Turkey, however, had seemed impractical until the purchase price of both motor vehicles and oil might come within reason. Development of Anatolia's oil resources was just beginning in 1948.

Extension of railways has been more practical because of Turkey's abundant fuel coal. The Republic's first great transportation expense was to buy the railroads already built and operated in Turkey by German, French, Belgian, and British firms. Then without using foreign capital, the Republic practically doubled that mileage to 4,750 miles by 1948. These figures have more meaning when compared to the State of California, which has about half the area and half the population of Turkey, but, in 1948, had nearly two-thirds more rail mileage, besides its extensive motor highways. But the Turks have doubled the service on their rails, in the past ten years, by increasing rolling stock and efficiency.<sup>3</sup> A new ten-year construction program, worked out with advisers from the United States, calls for nearly two thousand miles of new railways by 1958.

When the United States, in 1947 and thereafter, extended Truman Plan and Marshall Plan aid to Turkey to strengthen her military and economic position, more and better transportation came first on the program. The United States supplied not only road construction machinery but complete asphalt plants, and laboratories to test gravel and rock. A four-lane asphalt highway soon replaced the former two-lane macadam road (282 miles) between Ankara and Istanbul. Turkey now has its first road maintenance stations, and an ultimate goal of nearly 125,000 miles of national and provincial highways and roads. In the past two years, shipping by truck has become common practice on newly improved main highways. Meanwhile the State Airways Administration, which has a safety record of no loss of life since it originated air service in 1938, is now flying more than a million miles a year inside Turkey. Yet, thousands of communities must wait from three to thirty years more before transportation will reach them and overcome their economic and social isolation.

Hotels and inns are an almost untouched problem in Anatolia. But transient accommodations will not become crucially important, outside of the main cities, until there are too many transients for private hospitality. Turkish travelers ordinarily go where they have relatives, friends, or business associates who will, as a matter of course, receive

them as guests in their own homes. Unexpected and unknown travelers, except in large cities, have been too few to support more than the crudest inn, if any at all. To any but the newest hotels, it has been best to carry an insecticide, and not be surprised if the washing facilities were a common basin in the public hallway. Every village has a Village Guest Room (*köy odası*), as clean or unclean as the village itself. The guest's daily needs are supplied by each family, in turn. He can repay them only by his conversation and, if he wishes, a contribution to the poor.

Communication is nearly as limited as transportation, for mail delivery depends on transportation. Telephones for the entire population of nearly 21,000,000, in 1950, were fewer than forty thousand, half of them in İstanbul alone, and the lion's share of the rest in İzmir and Ankara. The cost of telephone instruments and installation has, so far, been almost prohibitive to private individuals and small businesses. A telegraph network covers the country better, and long distance telephone lines are being extended for central exchanges in some of the more remote cities.

The whole of Turkey, superimposed on a map of the United States, would cover an area roughly from Chicago to the border of Tennessee, and from Baltimore to Kansas City (approximately 42 to 36 N. Lat., and 26 to 45 E. Long.). Climatically, however, its western and southern sections are more like northern and southern California. Two features which can be noted at once for the whole country are first, that none of Turkey's rivers are navigable for any but very small craft—mostly rowboats—even the famous Tigris (Dicle) and Euphrates (Fırat) Rivers being navigable only in their southern reaches beyond the Turkish border; and second, practically the only essential raw materials which Turkey cannot supply in ample quantities for her own needs are tin and rubber. The importance of the rivers is as possible sources of hydroelectric power.

One of the most delightful trips in Turkey is by comfortable modern ships along the nine hundred miles of the Black Sea's southern coast. Anyone going purely for pleasure, however, may well heed the old Turkish saying that the Black Sea has only three safe harbors, "July, August, and Sinop." Sinop is the only port, with naturally sheltered water, where ships can find haven during the Black Sea's notorious storms in other months. Today, breakwaters are under con-

struction or recently completed at six or more ports; and, at the main ports, quays are being built and channels dug so that ships no longer need to anchor far out. Cargoes and passengers are still carried between ship and shore in large lighters, propelled by long sweeping oars, at most of the twenty or more ports.

Prosperity has been the general rule for Black Sea communities ever since traders from the West discovered convenient ports of call there for goods from the Orient. The Greeks founded Sinop, midway on the coast, in 750 B.C. as the port city for camel caravans from Euphrates River ports. Farther east, Trabzon (also spelled Trebizon, Trebizond, Trabizond, and classically, Trapezus) was originally a colony of Sinop, which it far outgrew. Trabzon has been successively a thriving Greek colony, a Persian province, a Pontus state, a Roman and then a Byzantine metropolis, and since 1461, a Turkish city.

Large or small, each Black Sea port is unique in some respect. Industry and commerce are represented in the coal towns of Zonguldak and Ereğli, and in the tobacco city of Samsun. Local color is bright in the port of Of. Anyone curious enough to look for its name in the Turkish-English dictionary will find, "Of—Faugh! Enough! My God!" Nevertheless ships call for valuable cargoes of Of's dried fruits and filbert nuts. Or there's colorful Rize, close enough to the Russian Caucasus Mountains to be protected from the Siberian winds, and therefore to enjoy a climate remarkably like that of the tea-growing sections of Japan. So Rize has tea plantations, and the 1948 yield met approximately one-sixth of Turkey's needs.

A new highway from Trabzon across the Northern (Şimali) Mountains to eastern Turkey's largest city, Erzerum (population, 53,000), permits a comfortable ride through breathtaking scenery, amidst peaks rising above ten thousand feet. Three principal rivers cut through the Şimali and the Anadolu Mountains, which are farther west, but also parallel to the Black Sea coast. They are Turkey's longest river, the Red River (Kızılırmak), seven hundred fifteen miles long; the Green (Yeşil) River, and the Sakarya River.

South from the Şimali Mountains to the border of Irak is the most neglected part of Anatolia, and yet it may be not only the most spectacular from the scenic standpoint but the richest in oil and minerals. The altitude of perhaps as much as three-fourths of this part of Anatolia, over which Noah's Ark was carried on flood waters to Mount

Ararat (Ağrı dağı) is well over three thousand feet. If the ark landed on top of the famous mountain, the waters must have lifted the strange craft more than three miles above sea level. Another natural phenomenon of eastern Anatolia is Van Gölü, a salt lake to rival Utah's Great Salt Lake, although it is only two-thirds as large as Utah's wonder. Every military advance from the south, it is said, has been stopped by the mountains of eastern Anatolia since Xenophon's fabled "Ten Thousand" made a forced march from Mesopotamia to Trabzon more than two thousand years ago.

The northern part of this mountainous region is open to east-west travel on the first railroad which the Turks, themselves, built. This is the route of Turkish freedom, because it was to the People's Congresses in Erzerum, Sivas, and Amasya, all on this route, that army units, nationalistic landowners, some peasants, and other patriots wended their way to take their first steps in self-government. It is also the earthquake route along which fairly frequent tremors do great damage to adobe houses. To these mountains are exiled law-violators sentenced to road-work or snow shovelling. The permanent population in the easternmost provinces lives mostly by growing grain and livestock, but suffered from the drop in livestock exports to the Soviet Union after World War II. An American firm has recently built a meat packing plant there, and more employment will eventually be offered in mining developments.

The southeastern provinces where the Kurds live are the least developed. Although a minimum of 35 per cent of the land in this section is believed to be arable, less than 5 per cent has been reported under cultivation. Its mineral resources are even less developed. Foreign promoters have rarely penetrated eastern Anatolia. Out of two hundred eighty-two foreign mining concessions from the Sublime Porte in 1920, only three were in the eastern provinces. The Republic, in turn, hesitated to invite foreign exploitation partly because of the new Turks' determination to rely on themselves, and partly because so many of the best prospects are in the troublesome Kurdish areas.

Adequate road building alone may stimulate production in the whole eastern quarter to rival that of the Black Sea region. Since 1947, oil prospecting, by agreement with two United States firms, has resulted in initial development of an oil field on the edge of this region,

at Raman Dağ, near Siirt, which can produce many times the previous maximum annual consumption of imported oil. It seems certain that oil and new roads will change life in Anatolia immeasurably within another generation.

Tourists, lured by the fame of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, will find the city of Diyarbakır (Copper City) on the Tigris the one to visit. This ancient meeting place for Turks, Arabs, Kurds, and Armenians has stimulated thinkers. There, for example, Ziya Gökalp grew up to lead the nationalists in a revival of the ideals of the Turks' pre-Ottoman past. Seeking freedom for growth of national culture, he finally joined the Young Turks at Salonika, and eventually strongly influenced Atatürk. In his day, distinctions were conspicuously made between various nomadic and dialect groups in Anatolia, and books on Turkey usually tell of the Kurd, Laz, Türkmen, Yürük, Kızılbaz, and Çerkez peoples. The new Turks emphatically dismiss these labels; they are "all Turks."

Western Anatolia, the best developed part of Turkey, is almost everything which eastern Anatolia is not; it is well populated, well visited, and can compete with the Black Sea region in prosperity. Town names in western Anatolia are widely familiar to persons interested in oriental rugs, Biblical and historical sites, and art. They need but be listed as reminders of this region's importance to the outside world. Rug towns: Gördes, Bergama, Lâdik, Isparta, Uşak, Konya. Historical and Biblical sites: Nicea (İznik), Troy (Truva). Pergamum (Bergama), Miletus (Milet), the Menander Valley of the Big (Büyük) and Little (Küçük) Menderes Rivers, and others, including Grey Mountain (Boz Dağ), which was yellow with gold inside when King Croesus had his fortune dug from it, inspiring the cliché, "Rich as Croesus." Art towns: Konya, for Selçuk architecture; Kütahya, for ancient and modern ceramics; Beykoz, for antique decorated glass; and Bursa for architecture, tiles, and ornamental writing.

The changed fate of certain Anatolian towns in the Republic's pioneer years is typified by Kütahya and Konya. The Ottomans had considered Kütahya remote enough from the Sublime Porte to be a place of exile for political prisoners. The Republic recognizes it as a vital center of national life, originally for its reputation for ornamental tile work, and more recently because, in Kütahya province, at Dağardı (Behind the Mountain) is one of the greatest of Turkey's chrome

mines. The Ottomans had permitted foreigners to develop it. For the Republic, it is a Turkish state enterprise. All chrome mines became highly profitable to the Republic, when both sides in World War II demanded the chrome which then could be obtained in better quality and quantity from Turkey than anywhere else.

Konya, in a beautiful section of rich land and small lakes, nearly four hundred miles inland from the Mediterranean coast, was once called Iconium. It was important in turn to the Phrygians, the Romans, to St. Paul and the early Christians, the Arabs, and finally, the Turks. Its greatest splendor was as the Selçuk capital in the eleventh century. Konya literally decayed from Ottoman neglect and became just another muddy village, although eventually a foreign concession for a railroad through it was granted. Today with a population of nearly 60,000, it is one of Anatolia's larger cities, in a prosperous agricultural region, on a main rail-line and also connected with Ankara and İstanbul by a highway open the year round for fast motor traffic. Konya's revival is typical of the remarkable results wherever transportation and new hope have enabled communities to emerge from dust, mud, and depression, and to produce a surplus to exchange for things lacking locally.

The Ottoman's original pride was Bursa, their first capital in the fourteenth century, prior to their European conquests. The Republic, too, is proud of this city of 86,000 population, which has a rare combination of historic, economic, and human interest. Bursa, a short distance inland from the Sea of Marmara—the silk city, the fruit and vegetable city, the city of fine woolen goods. But also Bursa—the sportsmen's city for summer camping and winter skiing on nearby Uludağ (Mount Olympus); the health seekers' city of mineral baths; the children's city for the gayest holiday festival after the annual Ramazan fast; and the art lovers' city of mosques with incomparable tiles and decorative writing. Bursa—in the province of the same name, which produces chrome, iron, antimony, and precious opals. And Bursa—founded, it is said, by the Carthaginian general, Hannibal, some ten centuries before the Ottomans captured it. In truth, Bursa, which foreigners call Brusa, is a city to visit, and comfortably, too, in Anatolia's first modern tourist hotel.

No countryside is more alluring in scenery and human interest than the verdant mountains and valleys of western Turkey, where

the early Greeks built amphitheatres, health centers, and gymnasia; where now the Smyrna figs and raisins grow; and where villages along the much indented Aegean shore prosper on some of the best commercial fishing in the world. The outlet for its products is İzmir (formerly Smyrna).

Chapters could be written about İzmir and its great harbor in a deep semicircle of hills. İzmir, supporting a population of two hundred thousand, carries on world trade in at least one hundred different products of its Anatolian hinterland. Chief among these are Turkish tobacco, figs, and raisins. İzmir's permanent International Fair grounds are for exhibits, every August and September, by all nations which wish to cultivate trade with Turkey. Exhibitors, since the Fair began in 1933, have included the governments or private firms of nearly all European States, Great Britain, the U.S.A., and also of Near and Far Eastern states. One hundred fifty American firms participated in 1950. The Fair is an inspired use of the rubble area left from the fire which had destroyed much of the city in the War of Liberation, when the rout of the Greeks had ended on İzmir quay.

Southern Californians could feel at home in southern Anatolia insofar as its plains and valleys, from the Bay of Antalya on the Mediterranean to the Euphrates River, produce much the same crops. Its largest city, Adana, is the center of the citrus and cotton section. Its main port, İskenderun (Alexandretta) in Hatay was improved during World War II for entry of American and British supplies, shipped via the Suez Canal, while the Axis powers controlled the Mediterranean approaches. There is talk now of making İskenderun an international port. From Hatay's eucalyptus forests, the Turks expect to cut ample timber for shoring mines, and no longer be dependent on Rumania and Poland for suitable timber.

As usual in Anatolia, historical interest abounds in this section. St. Paul made his tents in southern Anatolia, at Tarsus; and Cleopatra had a rendezvous with Antony by the spectacular waterfall at the edge of that town. Through the Cilician Gates, a one hundred-mile gorge between perpendicular walls of the Toros Mountains, every Western army warring with the Arabs has fought its way, from Alexander the Great's conquering forces in the fourth century B.C. to Atatürk's divisions "retreating" in the twentieth century to a new and better future inside Turkey.

Southern Anatolia's main handicaps have been malaria and floods. One of the early and quite effective projects of the Republic was malaria control. One of its current projects is flood control and hydro-electric power plants; the plans for the Seyhan River project in this region are being drawn by United States contractors. Progress up to 1950, however, had not carried a railroad into Gaziantep, a southern city of 63,000, which because of poor roads has, to date, had hardly more than a dozen private autos. But the city has a modern airport and regular air service. American missionaries chose Gaziantep, beyond the Gavur (Infidel) Mountains more than a century ago, as a base for their work, because so many Armenians had migrated there from eastern Turkey that southern Turkey was called "Little Armenia." Today, the all-Turkish population has high hopes of prosperity if the Republic's development projects are carried out as planned.

The geographical heart of Anatolia is the central plateau, a sadly neglected region which, nevertheless, was chosen for the Republic's capital, Ankara. The plateau is about as large as the United States "dust bowl." This region's known history began with the Hittites about 3000 B.C., and archeologists continue to dig up evidences of their prosperity there. The early Greeks and then the Ottomans are believed to have stripped the plateau of its forests for shipbuilding, and hence of its fertility. For generations past it has been of little use except for grazing by the Turks' tens of thousands of sheep and goats. It is the home of Angora (Ankara) goats, and, incidentally, of Angora cats. The Republic is launching soil improvement projects.

The next largest plateau city after Ankara is Kayseri (population, 60,000), and it displays a typical modern Turkish mixture. "Cowboys" gallop in on horseback while trains unload passengers at a formally landscaped station at the end of a paved, double-lane, tree shaded boulevard. At one side of the city, machinery whirs in Turkey's first large modern textile mill; at another side airplanes are assembled in a plant on the road to Talas where American missionaries still conduct a health clinic and classes in secular subjects. On that road, too, the government proposes to build a million-dollar vocational school. Yet Kayseri has no modern hotel and the village atmosphere still clings to it. Craft factories thrive there, especially for handmade silk rugs, and *pastirma*, a garlic-seasoned dried beef. Overseeing all



from chimneytop nests are innumerable storks. Higher than their flight rises the solitary 13,000-foot snowcapped peak of Mount Argæus (Erciyas), an extinct volcano.

Within a few hours rough ride from Kayseri is a fantastic world of lava rock cones, one to several stories high, in which celibate Christian hermits carved cells and lived, some fifteen centuries ago. On some of the interior walls, Byzantine murals are still quite clear. This is part of Cappadocia of the Bible. At the entrance to some of the larger caves, the hermits carved pillars worthy of marble palaces, but the grandest of these are now occupied by pigeons. Pigeon fertilizer is shoveled from the porticos to enrich the present peasants' vineyards. A few cones, less desecrated, are used today for grain storage, and even for temporary dwellings. The central plateau in Anatolia may be nearly barren of forests and grass, but it is not barren of life and interest.

"Visit Ankara," Turks plead with every foreigner, and the capital is more representative of the Republic than any other city. It shows wonder contrasts. The little centuries-old Ankara village, high on a hill, looks down the vista of the Avenue of Embassies to the hotels, shops, clubs, and parks which meet the needs of a modern capital, housing more than a quarter million persons. The peasants on the hilltop shook their heads and predicted dire disaster for their new government's personnel, who built homes in its low suburbs where "everybody knows the ground gets wet and the people get sick." They soon saw what drainage and pavements and solid construction could do to make it livable. They and foreigners are all impressed by the great artificial lake created by a modern dam to supply a large population with water, and by Atatürk's model farm, almost part of the city, with its swimming pools, ice plants, brewery, and machine repair shops, all great innovations for Turkey when first installed.

Ankara's very newness and modernness, which is the natural pride of the Turks, actually makes it a more ordinary sight to Westerners than any other Turkish city. City planning and streamlined construction are apparent everywhere. The awe-inspiring feature, which can be grasped as well from photographs as from a visit, is that it was all done so rapidly and, on the whole, so well, on a site which offered nothing at the start but open space and quarries for building stone, with no construction firms or facilities within hundreds of miles.

The way to see Ankara is not on a one-day sightseeing tour but by staying at least a month to experience the life in this unique capital, the pivot around which revolves the very existence of the new Turkey. On its plateau location, as government spokesmen have pointed out, the government will always be close to the troubles which beset a homeland, neglected for centuries. Anatolia has probably not received so much constructive government attention since the Selçuk and Ottoman sultans first settled the Turks there nearly a thousand years ago, and then reduced it to a mere base of operations for military conquest and empire power over other nations. Today, Turks in Anatolia are again proud to be called Turks.

The European part of Turkey shrank to approximately the size of New Hampshire as a result of early twentieth-century wars in which the great ambition of the Ottoman Empire's Western enemies had been to push the Turks out of Europe into Anatolia, and to take away from them both the Dardanelles-Bosphorus Straits and Istanbul. Nevertheless all international treaties to date recognize that the Straits and part of Europe, including Istanbul, belong to the Turks.

Straits waters at the Aegean end lave the Gelibolu (Gallipoli) peninsula, where Turkish soldiers blocked the Allied invasion in World War I. This peninsula backs up into a rich agricultural area rather resembling the rolling land of Ohio in contour, fertility, and climate, but not yet in development. Edirne (old Adrianople of Roman fame), with a present population of thirty thousand, is Turkey's chief city on the European border, but most international activity has long since shifted to Istanbul. Speak of Edirne to a modern Turk and he will surely tell you of its Selimiye Mosque designed by the great Turkish architect, Sinan. He will probably tell you of its wonderful almost fondant (*badem ezmesi*) and another well-known candy, *helva*, and also of its excellent cheese. And he will remark that Edirne was the Ottoman capital from 1367 to the capture of Constantinople, eighty-six years later. The latter, Turkey's greatest city, stands where the waters of the Straits separate Europe and Asia by about a mile.

The Turks' bi-continental divide, approximately two hundred miles long, is in three parts. Strictly speaking, the Dardanelles are only the narrow Çanakkale Straits, which the West knows as the Hellespont. The other two parts are the Sea of Marmara, about fifty miles across at its widest, and the narrow Bosphorus, past Istanbul to the Black

Sea. News dispatches usually refer to the entire triple waterway as "the Turkish Straits" or "the Dardanelles." Although the Straits are an internal waterway, they have frontier importance because no part of Turkey's outer boundaries has to be more thoroughly fortified against attack. Fortifications, grim and bristling as need be, are well concealed, and the Asiatic and European shores present scenes of natural peace. (See inside of back cover for map of the Straits.)

From sea to sea along the Straits, Nature did her artistic best in harmonizing the curves of the shores and of the hills. Man added villages, mostly of dark wooden buildings, set in no precise patterns. They ramble on mountain slopes or snuggle into valleys. When the night sky is starless, village lights seem to be the stars bedded down in the protecting hills, twinkling as gently as drowsy children's voices murmuring in the dark before sleep overcomes them. In the season for night fishing, clusters of lights drift offshore on rowboats. Where homes are, there also are domed mosques with their tall, slender minarets. From the minarets the muezzins chant the call to prayer, a lovely sound in village quiet, a lost sound in city traffic.

The Bosphorus, extending for eighteen miles from Istanbul to the Black Sea, is a scene of never dull life. In normal times, large ships of all nations, arrogantly sail through "schools" of busy little boats as well as schools of cavorting porpoises. Ferries steadfastly ply the waters, making as good time from suburb to suburb as the tandem trams which twist and turn their double-jointed way over the cobbled, or very recently paved, streets along the shore. The white life preservers which festoon the ferries' deck rails like an edging of huge tatting, are more ornamental than useful, because it is said that the Bosphorus ferries have served several generations of passengers without a single major accident to anyone. Their pilots sidle them to quays, crabwise through the trickiest currents, by maneuvers which frequently fascinate visiting captains of ocean liners. Fishermen haul onto the quays great nets full of fish, from sardine to mackerel size, while cats, the Turks' favorite pets, swarm around for their share.

At short intervals along the quays are open-air coffeehouses, some under trellises gorgeous in spring with heavy wisteria blooms. Many once splendid, but now somewhat drab, mansions rest on retaining walls at the water's edge. Next to marble palaces of former royalty are modern beaches and casinos, crowded with people. Where the

European shore juts out to a third of a mile from Asia, stand the fortress towers of Mehmet II, the Conqueror, whose forces seized Constantinople. Behind the tower walls, they prepared for the night when they hauled eighty ships on rollers over the hills in back of the city and lowered them into the Golden Horn, a water inlet, where the enemy armada rode in supposedly impregnable security. The Bosphorus and the Golden Horn, at right angles to each other in İstanbul, mark the city's location too plainly for even the strictest blackout of buildings in war time to conceal it from air observation. Robert College, the oldest American school in continuous operation in Turkey, looks down from its hilltop above the towers onto the little homes and gardens now inside of Mehmet's walls. In the adjoining village, the pillared buildings of the American College for Girls, on an equally high hill, assume Grecian splendor when floodlighted on national holiday nights.

The grandest structure on the Bosphorus shores is Dolma Bahçe, Palas, the resplendent block-long former residence of sultans, and, now the official İstanbul residence of the President of the Republic. There, Atatürk died on November 10, 1938; there, the Turkish people, for four days, filed, four abreast, in homage, past his casket, around which generals and admirals stood at rigid attention. The press of people at the palace gates was so great that, on the third day, the sheer weight of the crowds broke them open and several persons were trampled to death. The crowds were absolutely controlled a few days later when the casket was formally escorted from the palace to the warship which bore it to the Asiatic shore. Thence the body of Atatürk was returned to Ankara, the capital which he had established for greater military security and greater national pride than would ever have been possible in the old Ottoman capital, İstanbul.

The name İstanbul (in Western spelling, it is "Stamboul") has long been used by Westerners for the old part of Constantinople, southwest of the Golden Horn, which began as Byzantium of the Greeks, became Constantinople of the Romans, and finally the Turks' İstanbul. That side and the more modern side, connected by the famous old Galata Bridge on pontoons, are all İstanbul city. Since 1940, a new link, the Atatürk Bridge, farther up the Golden Horn, has been open to traffic between the two sections. The city and its suburbs on both sides of the Bosphorus, i.e., İstanbul province, has a

current population of more than one million. Inasmuch as the other three European provinces together have barely half as much population, it is clear that fully two-thirds of the life and interest of this part of Turkey is concentrated in İstanbul. So many books have been published on the history and charm of the city, in the past, that space here is devoted to its environs and its future.

Had the Turks been interested in a vaneer job of Westernizing Turkey, they would hardly have made İstanbul—the home of the wealthy and the oldest lure for tourists—await its turn for major improvements. Education, railroads, industries, scattered through Anatolia (sometimes more widely than wisely), and the new streamlined capital, Ankara, had priority over the outward appearances of the largest, most famous city. İstanbul has had its share in over-all national improvements along lines of education, health, banking, and so on. Not until the 1940's, however, did modernization, other than new business and apartment buildings, erected by private enterprise, appear conspicuously in İstanbul.

Public improvements showed first in the paving of a few main streets, formerly cobbled, especially those of military importance. Next they appeared in demolition of old buildings in important public squares, such as Taksim, Eminönü, and Beyazit Squares. Beyazit Square now affords a fine vista between Beyazit Mosque and the University of İstanbul. A large open plaza at the end of Galata Bridge, before the carefully restored Eminönü Mosque, improves both the view and traffic circulation. The greatly enlarged Taksim Square, at the head of the main avenue of Beyoğlu, is often compared to Moscow's Red Square. It is not nearly as large, but behind it is a municipal park of several blocks where the paved square could be expanded for bigger parades if the Turks need bigger parades. At present, a well landscaped park and an excellent municipal casino serve the public far better. And at Taksim stands the Metropolitan Theater, with a seating capacity of twenty-six hundred, where performances by the Comédie Française were among the first presented.

Although still a city of handicraft shops for handmade pots and pans, suits and shoes, İstanbul is also becoming a city of modern industries. Its Beykoz Leather and Shoe Factory, for example, is the largest in Turkey, and American experts are coöperating in doubling its capacity to 1,600,000 pairs annually. Production in İstanbul's textile

industries amounts to nearly one hundred million dollars annually. Large glass, cord, water bottling, munitions, and other plants are also there. Though not streamlined, obviously Istanbul has not been standing still.

Were the Ottoman old guard of the turn of this century to return to life in the Istanbul of the mid-century they would blink their eyes at the European and American planes flying in and out, and at Turkish planes on regular service to Anatolia—of all places! These old Ottomans, who hid within palace walls and suspected natives and foreigners alike, might be appalled by these incredible new Turks' hospitality to strangers, revealed by their contract for a multi-million dollar tourist hotel. Incredible to them, too, would be the million-dollar radio station opened in Beyoğlu, with eight studios. Its 150 kilowatt transmitter, across the Bosphorus, is capable of reaching all of Europe.

Actual timing of Istanbul's major improvements, which the post-war crisis and internal economic strains may limit considerably, is with an eye to 1953, when the Turks will think back to May 29, 1453, and celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of their capture of Constantinople. Christian historians of the West have kept a black mark against that year as a year of disastrous loss for Europe when the "infidel" took the great continental border city, and from there later surged inland until stopped at Vienna. They acknowledged, however, an offsetting benefit when scholars "fleeing from the Turks in Constantinople" inaugurated the Renaissance in Italy and eventually in all the West. Today the West aids Turkey to keep its hold on Istanbul. The significance of the Turks' five-hundred-year possession, and of their tenacity in continuing to be "at home" in Europe as well as in Asia, will be an inviting subject for world review and revaluation in 1953.

## Education—At All Ages

The most productive and important duty of the state is public instruction.—Atatürk.

NINETY per cent of the population in the Turks' homeland was illiterate and nearly one-third of the population was under nine years of age, when the Republic began. The new Turks had to create an educational system to induct these illiterates and juveniles into an intellectual, economic, and social order unprecedented in their land.

Many characteristic attitudes of the Turks become clearer against the background of their childhood and education. The key to child care in Turkish homes is the simple universal motive of protection. No tiny Turk sleeps alone in a dark nursery. Children ordinarily sleep in the room with their parents, or another adult, until the age of eight or ten, or occasionally even older. By day, adult relatives, servants, or neighbors take turns watching over them incessantly. "I am sure," an older Turkish woman in the United States said, "that ours is the wise way when I read in your newspapers of children burned to death alone in a house, being kidnapped, finding guns and shooting someone, all because no adult is at their side to say, 'No.'" She was here during the tragic wave of juvenile disasters following World War II. An adult, constantly present, is of course not absolute insurance against harm, for even adults may be careless, sleepy, or easily distracted, but major accidents to children in Turkey are extremely rare.

Turkish families freely humor children, except when danger is involved. Yet when adult patience cracks, the child is scolded, cuffed, or otherwise suddenly disciplined. Round-the-clock association with

adults, however, undoubtedly explains why Turks, from their earliest youth, display extraordinarily mature understanding of adult moods and personalities. Indeed, in both personal and public life, Turks anticipate very realistically the reactions of others. Such experienced discretion in allowing for others' moods, while securing their own way is part of their political shrewdness and is sometimes hard to distinguish from sheer opportunism. When they go to school, adult attention to a whole class at a time seems diluted compared to the constant individual attention at home. Apparently partly in compensation, pupils develop extreme class solidarity; they quickly resent a slight to one of their members, feel hurt if teachers "fail" one of them, and eagerly accept the praise of one as the praise of all.

In a village which does not have a primary school—and nearly a million children of elementary school age are in communities still without schools—children usually go along with their parents to the fields, rug factory, or forge. They ride the drag to thresh grain; they pump light bellows at a forge; or they sit on a bench before a rug frame and knot bright wools around the warp strings. An American, watching these children at these tasks, recalls tales of poor little Near Eastern children "drudging their childhood away for a few pence." Actually watching it, he may find himself thinking instead of modern play centers and supervised handicrafts. A merry-go-round has more speed than the horse or ox-drawn drag circling on golden grain, but live horses and oxen, and family and neighbors, all threshing together can be fun. Rug knotting is a colorful game. These are not the dark underground or noisy, high-speed machine jobs, dangerous to limbs and nerves, which made child labor in mines and mills a crime in the progressive West. Very likely these children have no more interesting pastime; their families cannot afford toys; and there is no school in their village, so handicrafts pass the time and bring in money.

It would be wrong to leave the impression, however, that all child labor is play in Turkey. Overseers frequently drive children too hard at their tasks, but the fault is more often in the nature of the overseer, than in the nature of the work. Pitiable children at hand labor are the ones who pump crude bellows too close to charcoal fires of a forge, inhaling unhealthy heat, fumes, and metal dust. This is as likely to happen in a family shop as in a "factory," because families do not know the danger. On the other hand, new legal measures are intended



to stamp this out. The labor law of the Republic requires that children under sixteen shall be assigned no dangerous work. Yet Turkey's recent industrialization has taken children, some under ten, into factories, even into the overheated atmosphere of glass works, to do light work. Unfortunately, the time is not yet ripe in Turkey for a law prohibiting all child labor, and enough vigilance to prevent every violation or evasion of the present controls is almost impossible.

All Turkish children are equally entitled to protection and education by the state. The fundamental democracy of Islam, that to Allah all believers are equal, gives all Müslim children equality, and the new Turks' government extends that to all citizens. Even in the most corrupt days of the Ottoman Empire, origins mattered little in earning favor or fawning for it. Individual ability, personal favor, or sheer luck, far more than birth into wealth or poverty, or into an educated or uneducated family, have traditionally determined opportunity. Children of the rich and the poor, children of cabinet ministers and of gatekeepers are classmates in the schools. Children's importance to their country is emphasized on the annual Children's Holiday (Çocuk Bayramı) on April 23, the day and month when the Grand National Assembly first met officially. In many ways, children are kept aware of their government's concern for them.

The Republic's problem with children was novel. First, there were so disproportionately many of them of primary school age. This was due less to a high birth rate than to the high death rate of adults during Turkey's five wars in barely a dozen years, 1911-23.<sup>1</sup> Second, all little Turks were to grow up using a changing language in a new script, under a government new to their parents, and in preparation for unaccustomed economic and social life, in a scientific age also strange to most of their parents. And nearly all of these little Turks were from illiterate families whose adult members needed essentially the same education. Realistically, in this unusual situation, the Turks undertook unusual measures. Six lines of knowledge were imperative—their own language, the privileges and duties of citizenship in their new Republic, Turkish history and geography, mathematics, the basic natural laws, and the use of their hands for modern technical skills.

Education in Turkey could not be the same for city and country children, because so many of the latter would be hampered by lack of any room in a village with sufficient light or warmth for classes,

since rooms in houses often had inadequate windows, and the mosques, though light, were unheated. Moreover, the best systems of teacher training could offer nothing to make city-trained teachers willing to teach in remote, illiterate communities, away from their own educated friends. Yet 40,000 villages had to be served. Centralized schools were out of the question for villages far apart, where the fastest transportation on trails, even when passable, would very likely be donkeys. The Turks, therefore, started to educate villagers to educate each other. From the farms, the Ministry of Education called, and still calls, certain farmers who own their own land, have completed their military service, and can read and write. In groups of ten, they are assigned to selected farms for one year of instruction by certified teachers. Book learning occupies their mornings and their afternoons are devoted to manual skills and farming methods. Farmers who pass the final examinations return to their villages as instructors in reading, writing, arithmetic, citizenship, elementary nature study, and better farming. In ten years of the Republic, 6,307 villages were thus supplied with 7,000 farmer instructors, and the system has been profitably continued. Synchronized with this method are the People's Classes, which were originated to teach adults the new alphabet and which have been continued with courses in arithmetic, hygiene, and citizenship, wherever instructors can be found. These classes qualify more farmer-instructors.

Such temporary measures have made a significant dent in the overwhelming problem of primary education while permanent institutes to train village teachers are being established. By 1950, the Republic had twenty Village Institutes, an educational innovation of which the Turks are rightfully proud. Villagers who have completed their five-year primary schooling and are outstanding in farming, crafts, or housekeeping, may enroll in a Village Institute for a five-year course along those same lines plus more book learning. The ablest pupils receive special training as health officers or midwives. Graduates return to their villages to teach primary classes and to demonstrate improved ways to work and live. The government helps to supply qualified graduates with demonstration land, livestock, and tools.

Certified "teachers," in contrast to village "instructors," are graduates of the Republic's fifteen or more teacher-training schools, where more than three thousand teachers are in training annually. Certified

teachers, however, prefer city positions in which they have better equipment and more entertainment. So far, about one-third of the 40,000 villages have instructors, but relatively few have certified primary teachers.

Probably not more than 10 per cent of the primary school graduates can afford to continue their education, so practically 95 per cent of the total school enrollment is in the primary grades. Nevertheless, primary enrollment, urban and rural combined, had climbed during the Republic's first twenty-seven years from 337,000, in fewer than five thousand schools, to 1,600,000, in nearly seventeen thousand schools.<sup>2</sup> The government plan is to have a minimum five-year primary education within geographic reach of every child early in the 1950's.

By contrast to more than one and one-half million primary pupils, the enrollment of fewer than sixty-five thousand in the Middle Schools (*Orta Mekteps*) seems small, but that is a gain of 1,100 per cent since the Republic started. Primary and middle education is free for day pupils. Boarding pupils—public as well as private middle schools take boarders—pay their own living expenses unless they receive scholarships. About thirty private Turkish schools and nearly one hundred minority and foreign schools teach some six thousand more middle school pupils.

After three years in the Middle School, another three years in a *lycée (lise)* prepares its graduates for the comprehensive examination (*olgunluk*) which is set by the Ministry of Education. Success in the *olgunluk* makes a student eligible to take the entrance examinations to a professional school in the universities.

Almost none of the originality displayed at the primary level in devising methods to meet peculiar Turkish needs has appeared in lycée education. The French system is the model for all Turkish lycées, and the textbooks are often French texts in translation, too often without adaptation to Turkish needs. In the French fashion, the pupils carry schedules of twenty hours or more, and depend on class drill and textbooks far more than on homework and outside reading. From the American standpoint, this system, though very effective for storing the mind with data, does not sufficiently stimulate initiative in individual thinking or research. A few lycées offer Latin and Greek to meet the new Turks' interest in the historic Roman and Greek

periods in their present homeland. All of them have military training for one hour a week for boys and girls alike, except that the girls do not have as much drill and no field training.<sup>3</sup> The emphasis for the girls is on nursing, communications, radar, and other non-combat services. The first and most famous lycée in Turkey is Galata Saray, founded in 1868 to prepare young men to study in France.

Educational reforms in the Republic were aimed primarily at Turkish problems. Nevertheless they had a serious effect on all foreign schools. The purpose of a new requirement that all primary education must be in Turkish was to compel non-Müslim as well as Müslim citizens to know their national tongue, but it had the collateral effect of closing all foreign primary schools which had used their respective languages for all instruction. Another requirement that all professional training must be in Turkish universities, in order to fit Turkish needs, also restricted foreign schools to the middle school and lycée levels.

Separation of state and religion led to a ban against religious instruction in schools. This reform was aimed at the old Müslim education which had been almost exclusively in the mosque schools where a *hoca* or *imam* gave drill in memorizing the Koran to the exclusion of all other subjects, except for some pseudo-knowledge which too many of them imposed on illiterate pupils out of their own ignorance. The new law also banned the wearing of religious garb in public, and any religious observances outside of houses of worship and private homes. Under these circumstances, foreign missionary schools also had to become secular.<sup>4</sup>

Somewhat less change was necessary for the largest American colleges—Robert College for men and the American College for Girls (the latter originally named Constantinople College)—which are under secular boards of directors in the Near East College Association, with its head office in New York City. Because the Sultan-Khalif would not permit Müslim subjects to enroll in foreign schools, Robert College, for the first fifty years after it was opened in 1863, taught only Christian boys. For the same reason, Constantinople College, founded as a high school in 1871 but incorporated as a college in 1890, educated only Christian girls for more than two decades. The first Müslim Turk to graduate from Robert College is today vice-president of these two colleges, united now as the İstanbul American College. He is Hüseyin Pektaş, who was secretary for the Turkish

nationalist government's delegation at the Lausanne Treaty conference. The first Müslim Turk to graduate from Constantinople College, after attending in secret, was Halide Edib, who became a noncommissioned officer in the War of Liberation, and later became known in England, and the United States for her lectures and books in English. (For more information on her achievements, see p. 282.)

All American schools in Turkey were formerly very international, with students from the Balkan and Arab states, and from Russia, and also from British and American families living in Turkey, and finally Turkish students. This phase ended when the new Republic required all students to study the Turkish cultural subjects in Turkish, a language which few of the foreign students would need in their own countries. Loss of foreign students, thereafter, was rapidly offset by enrollment of Turks. Indeed, under the Republic's fresh stimulus to education, all foreign schools were soon as overcrowded as the Turkish schools. Today at least 85 per cent of the nine hundred fifty students at Robert College and the five hundred at the American College for Girls are Müslim Turks. Neither World War interrupted the operation of these schools, although they operated under great strain and uncertainty during World War I while Turkey was on the German side. During Turkey's non-belligerency in World War II, Turkish military engineering students in Germany were recalled to enroll in Robert College engineering school. There they learned enough English and technical prerequisites for admission to engineering schools in the U.S.A. Robert College is the one exception which the Turkish government has made to its rule restricting professional training to Turkish universities, but the rule was not relaxed enough to permit the Robert College plans for an adequate engineering building to go beyond the blueprint stage. The same rule closed the medical school at Constantinople College, after its building had been completed and the first girls had enrolled in it.

A medical school for men, opened in Istanbul in 1827, had been the first higher institute of modern learning established by the Ottoman government, but no other professional courses were offered until late in the century when faculties of science, letters, economics, and law were appointed, only to be suppressed by Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Young Turks reopened the university in 1908, still under Islamic religio-political authority. The university became wholly secular under


the Republic in 1933. In 1950, Turkey had three universities: the University of Istanbul, the University of Ankara, and the Istanbul Technical University with a combined attendance of some twenty thousand students.

Ankara University grew from a law school created by the Republic's Ministry of Justice to meet the unique crisis of changing the whole basis of law from religious to secular. To accomplish this at one stroke, the new government had borrowed the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code, and the German commercial code, and was adapting them to Turkish use. Lawyers versed in these codes were needed at once. This nucleus, formed for law students, was expanded, by 1935, into a full university which absorbed also the excellent college of agriculture (İnönü Tarım Üniversitesi). Istanbul Technical University is the outgrowth of an Ottoman school for civil engineers. The nucleus for a prospective fourth university is the school of commerce and economics opened in İzmir, in 1944, to teach finance, banking, accounting, internal and foreign trade, and the duties of the consular service.

Other professional schools to the credit of the Republic are, in briefest mention, the State Conservatory of Music with the School of Dramatic Art, in Ankara, which produces operas and plays; the School of Political Science (Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu) developed from the Ottoman Mülkiye Mektebi, founded in 1857, to train young people for government careers; and the Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts which offers courses in Western architecture, painting, and sculpture, and also in the Eastern decorative art, which was for a long time the only art permitted to Turks. A school of ballet was opened in an Istanbul suburb in 1948, with teachers from the Sadler's Wells Ballet and the Royal Academy of Dancing.

Not even the burdensome cost of continuous military mobilization through the Republic's whole third decade halted the Turks' educational program. If anything, the war and post-war crises accelerated it to overcome Turkey's lag in modern techniques. Military service is itself a form of adult education in Turkey because uneducated conscripts are taught reading, writing, arithmetic, citizenship, and hygiene, and through these studies may qualify for admission to the Village or Trade Institutes. (Statistical information on all educational institutions is in Appendix B.)

No impression of Turkish education is adequate without apprecia-



The tame stork

University students





Peasant women on parade



Students of modern dancing



tion of the *halkevi* (house of the people) or community center, which will be mentioned frequently hereafter. The heart of the *halkevi* is the auditorium for educational, political, and social meetings and events. The largest *halkevis* also have gymnasiums, swimming pools, exhibition and library rooms, classrooms, and medical clinics. The smallest have one all-purpose room called the *halkodası* (room of the people). Although the pattern of *halkevi* activities shows the influence of Western community centers and Soviet youth palaces, the movement originated in the *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth), a center for Turkish national cultural and political interests in the Young Turk period, which welcomed women also in its activities. The *Ocak's* Turkism and liberalism ran into opposition from foreign powers which were then high-pressuring the Sublime Porte, and on English insistence it was suppressed in 1910. Its spirit was quickly revived in the *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Home), which had twenty-five branches in Anatolia by 1913, and a membership of three thousand, including seven hundred doctors. (Medical men in Turkey have been notably progressive.) The Republican People's Party converted the *Yurds* into *halkevis* on February 23, 1932, and by 1949 had four hundred seventy-four *halkevis* and more than four thousand *halkodası's*. London, England, now has a *Türk hâlkevi*, a center for all Turkish interests, but the one planned for New York City has not yet materialized.

The *halkevi* goal is always a ninefold program and each house or room carries out as much of it as is practical locally. The Language and Literature Division combats illiteracy and encourages reading Turkish literature. In the History, Folklore, and Museum Division, "folklore" includes modern health propaganda, and its museums exhibit anything of interest from archeological finds to modern agricultural and household equipment with instructions on its use and maintenance. In a single year, 1941-42, the Libraries and Publications Division could boast of one and one-half million readers for the six hundred thousand books it distributed, compared to half as many readers in public libraries. A national newspaper, *Ülkü*, to which local writers contribute, serves all *halkevis*, and the *halkevi* in the capital of each province usually publishes a monthly cultural and news journal. Needy citizens can turn to the Social Assistance and Welfare Divisions, which also promote excursions and festivals and

provide information on crops and livestock. Wherever teachers are available, the Adult Classes and Courses Division organizes study groups in whatever the available teacher can teach, be it embroidery or care of farm machinery. Three very active divisions, where facilities permit, are those of Sports, Dramatics, and Fine Arts. Success of the *halkevi* movement, as a whole, is measuring up well to the original hopes for it.

All the educational programs in Turkey, keyed to catching up with the modern world, have had to take into account speed, quantity, and quality. The new Turks achieved a triumph in speed and quantity through their first three decades. Wishing to depend on themselves, they had to devise self-generating systems to produce trained leaders and a continuous supply of ambitious well-trained Turks. Let the facts speak for themselves in the ingenuity of short cuts to primary education; in statistical gains in school enrollments and literacy; and in the spectacular speed of adult education in Village Institutes, Trade Institutes, and the *halkevis*.

Quality is a more difficult problem. Fine quality is rarely generated from a basically quantitative system, a fact with which we constantly struggle in our mass education in the United States. For qualitative gains, the Turks rely on borrowing foreign "quality" standards, and on their own capacity to profit by experience. A single example of the qualitative problem must suffice here. The Republic started with no textbooks in its new script and new vocabulary, and almost none on any modern subject except in homes where private tutors used foreign textbooks. Various French, German, English, and other texts were translated in whole or in part. Because Turkey had not joined the International Copyright Union, she could reproduce contents of Western books without permission or fees. This is an advantage for a nation in a hurry. But discussion and examples, taken over bodily from foreign texts, often had no relevance to Turkish experience. While translators tried to omit irrelevant material and to substitute Turkish examples, alas, some of them, however accomplished as linguists, were not competent to translate the meaning of Western scientific and economic material. By contrast, however, the literature faculty of the University of Istanbul sets an example of high quality in translations.

Translation handicaps have also affected the quality of technical

material issued to Village Institutes and Trade Institutes. Some translators have been prone to take the easy way, and to process foreign words into Turkish before the average reader can understand them. A peasant is not immediately helped by spelling out from a leaflet that he should use a *termometre* to prepare food, when, if he could afford one, he would have to take the first thermometer to his village and teach the housewives to read the numbers on it, if indeed it would be any use in cooking over charcoal, often outdoors. Even in purely Turkish subjects like civics, texts had to be rushed into print while the print on the Republic's new constitution and laws was barely dry, and while the very vocabulary for them was still in the making. In the process of overcoming this and other serious handicaps, gains in quality have been somewhat sporadic, and, at times, short-lived because of the shortage of trained followers for leaders who personally set high standards.

To establish high scholarly and artistic standards, the Turks took prompt advantage of the Nazi situation in Europe, and secured eminent Jewish and anti-Nazi Aryan scholars. To name only two out of many, they chose Dr. Erwin Finlay Freundlich, former head of the Potsdam Astrophysical Observatory and director of the Potsdam Einstein Institute, to head the astronomy department of the University of Istanbul; and Carl Ebert, director of the Berlin Opera in 1933, to direct the opera and drama departments of the State Conservatory. Agricultural experts have been called from Texas and California where soil and climate closely resemble those of important areas in Turkey. The Turks are inviting experts from many countries in order to avoid sole dependence on any one country's influence.

Employment of foreign experts by the Republic of Turkey is different from the usual employment of them by the Ottoman government. Ottoman rulers too often employed foreigners, or granted them concessions, to exploit Turkey's resources largely to the ruler's and the foreigners' profit, and to the people's loss. The Republic generally employs them in a sort of pump priming scheme for national benefits. They are to pour their knowledge and skills into Turkish students and assistants until Turkish abilities well up and flow steadily into the necessary channels. Istanbul University has six times as many Turkish as foreign professors and specialists, and Turks in the lower faculty ranks are in training to succeed the foreigners or to work on

a par with them. Very likely this pump priming will have to be continued for several generations in order to educate enough Turks for a continual succession of leaders to maintain the highest standards of quality.

Government control of education is very detailed. The Ministry of Education allots all monies budgeted for education by the Grand National Assembly, determines policies, and administers them. The scope of its present responsibility is actually hardly more than that of New York City's Board of Superintendents which "controls" the education of nearly as many pupils. The Turkish system, however, is more elaborately bureaucratic as the ministry becomes involved in endless details even to textbook publication, and discipline of teachers and pupils. The Ministry of Education sets all final examination questions for public schools and for Turkish courses in foreign schools. Ministry inspectors may appear at any examination and change questions if they see fit. Teachers, with rare exceptions, must fill in daily reports not only on attendance but on the material covered in each lesson that day. Pupils may appeal to the Ministry on alleged injustices. The red tape for so much minutiae, at times, strangles efficiency. Delays in government permission for a slight variation in one school's curriculum, or for a student dramatic society to present a certain play, can and do frustrate ambition as well as effort. Nevertheless, the object of government control seems to be, in all sincerity, to maintain efficiency in teaching, uniform standards for promotions, and constructiveness in extracurricular activities.

Turkish education, by and large, is free from political propaganda. Odious comparisons with other systems and other cultures are not a feature of textbooks, nor generally encouraged in instruction. Patriotic propaganda is directed far more toward the Turks' own early culture and influence, and to pride in the new Turks' heroic revival in a homogeneous Turkey for the Turks. Study in basic subjects is concentrated on each one as an asset in living, rather than as a propaganda tool for state power. The guiding policy of Turkish education is the cultivation of every ability which will be useful to the Turkish people in peaceful pursuits.

In the long run, any nation's progress must be kept going by its people's experience and their ability to profit by it. The new Turks started their modern progress in the difficult situation of having no

fund of experience along the lines in which they most wish to progress now; namely, industry, trade, scientific agriculture, and secular education. They have to accumulate such experience before they can profit by it. The pioneer generation of the Republic is feeling its way toward competence and toward an adequate vocabulary to communicate to the next generation the technical, social, and economic experience which it has begun to accumulate.

In the field of international politics and diplomacy, the Turks are already one of the most mature of all peoples. A signal peculiarity of the Turks' situation is that, in general, they are a mature inexperienced people. Inexperience in their case does not imply juvenility. The Republic's pioneer generation, plunging into modern Western-type experiences, has made its first trial run through the whole gamut of education from basic literacy to atomic science, from a rediscovered past of its own to a strange new future in the making for the whole world. The present time is too early to offer confident predictions, or to pass final judgments, on the Turks' capacity for permanent self-generating progress along so many lines new to them. The impressive fact about the new Turks is that, up to this point, they have done so much so rapidly, and relatively so well.

## Occupations and Incomes

The substitution of the Turks for the Christians as the coming managers of commercial enterprises and as the "chief hewers of stone and drawers of water" is one of the great problems in Turkey's national economy.—Eliot Grinnell Mears in *Modern Turkey*.<sup>1</sup>

**A**N APPALLING number of literate Turks were out of jobs simultaneously when Turkey changed from Ottoman rule and its religio-political way of life to a secular Republic. This was one of many unique problems which the new Turks had to solve. Suddenly unemployed was that large proportion of the Müslim population formerly on administrative and military duty in all the subject countries, and in the armies of spies, as well as the petty "legal" lights who had advised clients on how to win royal favors and escape penalties. So were the *hocas* and *imams* who had been the Müslim educators. Useless, too, became nearly all of the amanuenses who had penned, in Arabic script, official records and legal documents, or copies of the Koran and other religious works. A small proportion would be absorbed in new government bureaus but they would have to adjust to different practices and a changing language. The rest would have to enter into occupations for which they were least prepared technically and psychologically.

The Müslim Turks' previous positions under a despotic regime had been in what might be called a vertical series of human relations: namely, subservience to those above and authority over those below. The authority exercised by the lowest government clerks was minute but, like the most inconspicuous army sentry, they had a semblance of it in enforcing upon the public the orders and red tape imposed by those above. The future would offer many of them places in a hori-

zontal series of human relations, in the side-by-side activity of factory workers or face-to-face dealings across counters in sales and service. Working without authority over anyone else, as a factory hand does—"serving" a customer even if he is an "inferior," as store clerks do—these were strange relations for literate Turks of Ottoman habits to enter into. The future held a less disturbing prospect for illiterate Turkish peasants, fishermen, miners, and manual laborers, because they had always been at the bottom, taking but never giving orders. Moreover, in those parts of Anatolia which had had quite a homogeneous Müslim Turkish population, local manufacture and trade had been in the Turks' hands, mostly in one-man or family shops. Wherever the population had been heterogeneous, or where enterprises were on a large scale, business had been, almost without exception, in the hands of non-Müslims. In truth, the Müslim Turks, prior to the 1920's, had no commercial or industrial classes of their own.

Alarmed at this inadequacy in Turkish life, the Young Turk regime had enacted a "Law for Encouraging Industry," in 1909, and had amended it in 1915, partly as a war security measure, to the effect that all factory employees must be Turkish citizens, with the exception of technical experts not to be found in the country; also, that foreign firms must gradually be excluded from many of the privileges accorded to Turkish firms. The Young Turks and the European advisers, whose aid they had enlisted, could not stem declines of as much as 50 per cent in production during World War I. The only reward for their efforts was an increase in economic consciousness as a result of discussions in the press, new economics courses in the university, new vocational schools, and the sending of apprentices to Germany—all in order to develop commercial and skilled artisan classes of Müslim Turks.

Then came the Republic and new roles for educated Turks, who were themselves a small minority of all the Turks in Turkey. They eagerly entered occupations which carried the authority of superior knowledge in lieu of superior political position. They flocked into the professions—medicine, law, teaching, architecture, archeology—and the mechanically minded into engineering and aviation. They outsped the country's readiness for highly trained experts, except in medicine and teaching. A distressing number of the Republic's first generation of doctors of philosophy or science were "rewarded" with

routine clerical jobs in government bureaus. The government, thereupon, temporarily discouraged study for doctoral degrees but sent more Turks abroad for masters' degrees. Lycée graduates in Turkey who did not continue their education became minor clerks, minor foremen, or translators in State offices and industries, unless their relatives could make better openings for them in private businesses. Primary school graduates and the abler illiterates, who did not have some private ladder to higher positions, and who were not farmers or independent craftsmen, formed the pool of semi-skilled factory and construction workers, gatekeepers, tram conductors, seamstresses, and the better-trained domestic servants.

The occupations longest shunned by educated Turks in the main cities, where minority populations are largest, were the so-called service occupations such as employment in restaurants, hotels, and stores. Housekeeping for the public and waiting on them in trade seemed to have the least appeal. Turks took well to chauffeuring, which was eventually restricted by law to Turkish citizens, but, in doing so, they ousted non-Turks, notably Russian refugees who had fled to Turkey during the Bolshevik revolution, and who had, in large numbers, chosen this occupation. So many Italians became jobless, as Turks entered industrial employment, that the Italian and Turkish governments had to arrange an amicable return of numbers of them to Italy.

Employers, Turkish as well as non-Turkish, soon missed the more experienced minority and alien employees, and displayed impatience with the inexperienced Turks. Even when reasonably capable, the Turks had to develop job morale and become dependable in group employment. Tardiness and absenteeism were two immediately apparent problems. The Turks of Anatolia, more of whom had had experience in manufacture and commerce, even though on a small scale, have evinced no inherent incapacity. And the new Turks' determination to be equal to anything which Turkey needs gives good promise of success in overcoming the handicaps of past habits.

Need dictated the new government's extensive program in technical, trade, and commercial institutes and schools for that most numerous of literate Turks—the primary school graduates. Space does not permit details on this training, but in adaptation to the Turks' needs the Trade Institutes are similar to the Village Institutes.

Large numbers of women and young men have entered the Re-



public's labor market; the women because of their new freedom, and the young men because of reduced military service. The Ottoman requirements for military service had taken five to seven years out of each young man's life. The Republic changed this requirement to eighteen months in the army, two years in specialized services, or three years in the navy, except when the requirement might be temporarily increased for a defense emergency. None but commissioned officers can be professional soldiers. All in the ranks are sent back to civilian life after training, and remain on call as reserves. These young men, raised entirely under the Republican system and ideals, are the ones who will give the first fully tested evidence of the adaptability of the Turks to the routine work of modern industrial and economic life.

Although Turkish women entered into employment easily, as explained in Chapter 4, they have handicaps to overcome, especially in professional careers. Patients and clients are slower to turn to women doctors and lawyers. Women bankers and engineers are apt to be less secure in their jobs than men of equal ability. An unmarried career woman, who could not live with relatives, has faced an unhappy living problem. Unless housed in an institution which provides quarters for its staff—for example, a school or a hospital—a woman living alone, or women sharing an apartment, would still be uncomfortably conspicuous in Turkey outside of the most cosmopolitan centers. The original "Society for Finding Employment for Women" in World War I had insisted that employed women in their twenties marry or lose their jobs. This indicated the Turks' expectation that employment and home keeping could, and should, go together.

Lowliest of all laborers are the *hamals* (porters) who, of old, carried incredible weights on saddles on their backs. Bent double under such a load as an overstuffed couch and chair, a *hamal* would pass through traffic, hardly able to see anything but the ground beneath him, crying warnings for others to clear the way. Such work had fallen to unskilled illiterate Turks, but the new Turks wanted to remove the stigma of it, since these human "beasts of burden" had invariably aroused Western visitors' criticism. This ended suddenly in 1938, when the Republic passed a law requiring that burdens be transported on wheels. *Hamals* acquired pushcarts which rattled heavily over cobbled streets. Carts were not as cheap to possess or keep up as the men's own backs, and new sets of muscles had to be trained to push

instead of lift. Consequently, the change did not improve their economic situation or their efficiency, although it can be hoped it will be better for their health in the long run. In places inaccessible to wheels, *hamals* are still permitted to use their backs.

Legislation to protect workers was quite a new thing in Turkey, although certain good-willed Sultans and provincial governors had tried from time to time to relieve the poor. The Kemalist Turks seized the government reins in a period of world-wide social unrest and labor strife, and they also aspired to world-wide recognition for modern initiative, so they immediately jumped on the bandwagon of labor legislation. This legislation was in the fields of their greatest inexperience—paternalistic government and industrial development. They were, therefore, not able in this respect to exercise their usual extreme realism based on experience, but had to undertake an idealistic experiment.

The programs first set up for labor in Turkey's new industries sounded more like socialism than capitalism. "Welfare rather than production was the prime consideration," Mr. Donald Webster, formerly on the faculty of International College, Izmir; later, Cultural Attaché to the Embassy of the United States at Ankara, reported after visiting a modernized sugar refinery in Turhal.

The Turks' plan was for state monopolies to set the example in labor welfare, but by 1936 the same Labor Code was adopted for private establishments employing more than ten workers. It specified an eight-hour day in a forty-eight hour week, and overtime pay. It granted portal-to-portal pay and pay for time spent in personal service for the managers, rewards for usable suggestions, and an automatic raise in wages every two years. These generous pay measures are by no means all, for equally generous provisions were made for disability compensation, workers' family benefits, recreational facilities, and complaints to joint management-worker committees. In spite of this many faceted ideal for employees, the millennium has not yet arrived in Turkey. If enforceable in every respect, labor unions in other countries could have envied Turkish labor, even before it had unions. The Grand National Assembly had passed a Law against Association, which had sweepingly excluded not only subversive organizations and rival political parties, but labor unions as well. An amendment to the law in June, 1946, permitting new political parties, opened the door

also to workers' associations. Although it is too early yet to gauge labor power, the unions will be able to press for fulfillment of the code wherever lapses from it occur.

What has actually happened under the code has been a mixture of good and bad, socially and economically. Large factories in small towns, in the decentralized plan which the Turks have chosen, have brought too many workers for the towns to absorb, and there have been inadequate roads and transportation for commuting from surrounding towns. Factories, therefore, provide living quarters for their workers. At a seasonal factory, like the Turhal sugar factory, Mr. Webster noted that workers' homes were equipped with baths, water heaters, and electric lights. The aim, he reported, was to return every worker to his community with an unshakeable desire for this higher living standard.

At the textile mill in Kayseri, which I visited about the same time that Mr. Webster went to Turhal, four thousand five hundred employees were housed the year-round in simpler quarters. Managers and foremen had apartments similar to those at Turhal, but the male employees lived in barracks with tiered bunks too close together for sitting up in them. A hook and a small wooden locker was sufficient for each man's clothes and possessions. Unshaded electric light bulbs dangled here and there, but the average worker did not need light at night because he could not read or write. If semi-literate, even now, the extent of his reading might be laboriously spelling out a notice or headline. They had shower baths and hot water. Women workers were then from Kayseri homes, or married employees found homes in Kayseri. The factory has abundant space for more elaborate living quarters whenever the workers' literacy and living standards improve to the point of needing them. In the meantime the men have several acres for informal outdoor recreation.

Production in Turkey's industries has been relatively good in view of inexperience, but the consumers have paid heavily for it. For example, the Turks paid twice as much for Turkish sugar as for imported sugar, prior to the protective tariff placed on it, in 1929. The advantages of domestic production seemed clear, however, when World War II cut off foreign sources. But, alas, the price went up and up, and fewer and fewer Turks could afford to buy sugar at all. In many cases either production or income, or both, have not measured up to the budgeted totals, and inflationary trends during the world crisis of

the mid-century have added to the financial unbalance. To this extent, economic reality has not meshed smoothly with social idealism.

Probably no other country in the world has a situation for industry and labor which exactly parallels that of the Turks. In spite of the lavish provisions for labor welfare, which sound like socialism, especially in state enterprises, private profit is as basic in Turkey's scheme as in any fully capitalistic country. Well-to-do Turks' incomes in the past have been mostly from rents, speculation in land, extensive farm share-cropping, or quick-profit business deals. The Müslim Turks have only begun to operate businesses or construction enterprises themselves instead of contracting with the more experienced minority citizens or foreigners to take the active responsibility. Their aim is still private profit, and trade associations exist to protect their interests.<sup>2</sup>

Plainly, in view of the Turkish workers' inexperience in industrial processes, the educated Turks' inexperience in industrial management, and the need for haste in getting wheels of new industries to turn at all, nothing short of State action could have produced the results essential immediately. No individual Turks or Turkish corporations, when the Republic started, were wealthy enough to finance the large-scale enterprises which the new Turkey needed at once. Ninety-six per cent of the factories then in operation employed fewer than ten workers apiece; only three factories employed as many as one hundred. The State wished also to gain national ownership at once of the large foreign-owned enterprises like railroads, port operations, and development of subsoil resources. The State, therefore, developed a compromise between state capitalism and private enterprise, called *devletçilik* or, in French, *étatisme*. The basis of it was a series of state banks to function as operating and holding companies for all kinds of enterprises essential to the national economy. The State banks would operate monopolies, and a non-controlling part of the bank stock could be purchased by private individuals. These banks would also take shares in private enterprises and extend credit to private enterprises which would benefit the nation. In addition, they were to finance the education of Turkish students, selected by competitive examinations, to study engineering and industrial techniques in foreign countries.

The Sümerbank is typical. Its first new state enterprise was the Kayseri textile mill, for which Russian machinery was purchased; and its largest, to date, the Karabük steel works, constructed by a British

firm, the first steel mills in the Asiatic Middle East. These, like several subsequent ventures, were admirable examples of daring initiative but revealed inexperience in planning, especially in choosing sites in relation to sources of supply, and also in respect to immediate market needs in Turkey. Among the smaller enterprises run by the same bank are retail stores to sell products of the state factories. State stores have thus been competing with privately-owned shops which carry native goods.

State bank operations outgrew all original intentions. In the 1940's, half of Turkey's factories were said to be state-owned or controlled, and over half of Turkey's industrial workers, from factory managers to janitors, were bank employees. *Étatisme* became an acute political issue. Workers were dissatisfied with fixed wage scales, and with advancement usually determined by the number of years they had been employed rather than by their ability. Citizens were not satisfied with service from many of the public utilities operated by municipalities, which were in turn largely controlled by the State Bank of Municipalities (*Belediye Bankası*). The public resented the high costs of state produced goods. As Turks acquired business experience, and saw a few independent businessmen profiting well from the high demand for Turkish products when World War II cut off foreign imports, more of them wanted freedom for private initiative and competition. Consequently, *étatisme* as a political issue contributed to the overthrow of the original Republican party government in the 1950 elections.<sup>3</sup>

Excellent goods are produced in small private factories and sold in small private shops all over Turkey. Many of these products can compete strongly with imported products as soon as a prejudice in Turkey in favor of foreign goods is overcome, especially among urban buyers. Proprietors of small businesses of this sort in Istanbul have usually been minority Turks, but in Anatolian towns businesses of the same kind are owned and run by *Müslim* Turks. The custom, however, is that an owner and whichever relatives he chooses run a business in a partnership to divide costs, labor, and profits, instead of in an employer-employee relationship. Income distributed in this fashion cannot be gauged by wage scales or comparative profits because the only basis for comparison is that income which satisfies those who own the businesses. A successful business is one which supports its owners in

the style to which they are accustomed, an extremely variable criterion. Another kind of small business is the handicraft factory, again operated in partnership. Or maybe it will employ two to ten persons to produce handmade shoes, rugs, or handturned agricultural tools.

Larger scale private enterprise in modern Turkey has gone heavily into building construction, builders' supplies, wholesale groceries, and manufacture of clothing, silk, towels, leather, and rubber articles, soap, and many other non-durable goods; and into export-import activities in lines not already handled by large foreign firms with international branches. Numerous new Turkish engineering firms are proving successful. Extensive enterprises on the order of hotel and theater chains, radio distribution, or auto-assembly plants, however, would have been premature until electricity and good highways covered more of the country, as they are now beginning to do.

A Turk worth \$75,000 has been considered a wealthy man. Yet, a few Turks, probably not even a half-dozen, became millionaires by American dollar measure prior to World War II. Some wealthy men may have gained illegitimate fortunes, but it is small wonder that legitimate fortunes were made in contracting during the Ankara "boom" to create, from the ground up, in fewer than twenty-five years, a city to house not only the national government but a quarter-million new residents.

Fluctuations in purchasing power make it difficult to fix on income figures suitable to record permanently in a book. But some idea of individual finances in Turkey in the mid-1900's can be clear from a few examples. In Istanbul, in 1950, a tram conductor received in cash and food the Turkish equivalent of twenty to thirty dollars a month; a chauffeur from sixty to one hundred dollars and meals or lodging or both; and a seamstress from thirty dollars up. Salaries of employees in government bureaus and state enterprises were within a range of forty to two hundred twenty dollars after deductions, with the majority below the middle of the scale. The common people's food staples—bread, olives, and cheese—in the same year and also in Istanbul, where prices were relatively high, were six and a third cents, twenty-six cents, and forty-three to sixty-eight cents a pound, respectively. Rents and most clothing cost slightly less than in the United States. Turkey's lack of labor-saving construction in houses, and of economical repair parts and conveniences, make it necessary to spend

more on upkeep and labor in order to approach the United States standard of living at comparable incomes. Deductions for taxes have averaged close to one-third of the incomes in more than half the classifications, and about one-sixth in the lowest ones. One-sixth of a thirty-dollar-a-month income represents a heavy sacrifice.

Wealth in Turkey is very relative. The Turks consider a provincial governor, paid perhaps \$4,500 a year in a small province, a "poor" man, while a store owner in the same province is "rich" on an income of \$2,500, because the latter has greater security and he need not spend as much on professional and social life as the man in politics. When the door to popular nominations of deputies to the Grand National Assembly was opened in 1950, applications for nomination ran as high as a hundred for a single seat. This rush aroused loud protests that the salary of a deputy (about \$425 a month and free travel) was too tempting a sinecure and should be lowered. At the same time, the relatively low fixed salaries of lesser government employees have not yet altered a quite general feeling that to clerk for the government is more dignified than to clerk for any private employer.

In the early days of the Republic, the curse of bribery in government bureaus had practically stopped. But in new crises when prices soared and government salaries lagged in time and sagged in value, government employees again succumbed in order to make both ends meet, in spite of some extra cost-of-living allowances by the government. Rarely does a Turk accept a bribe to betray his government, but in economic desperation, many will practice indifference to the public's business unless each applicant makes a "suitable gift" of cash or goods to gain attention. It is the same story in nearly every country. The important point is whether need or greed measures the extent of it.

Labor in Turkey was first organized in the late 1940's under the direction of a newly created Ministry of Labor. At the first meeting of the Turkish Workers Associations in 1948, speakers adhered to the line that labor would stay out of politics. In the 1950 elections, however, labor's right to strike, theretofore prohibited, was upheld by the Democratic Party which won the election. The immediate task of organized labor is to strive for fulfillment of the labor code.<sup>4</sup> That code which, as already indicated, appears to have put benefits to labor above high profits, seems clearly to have been dictated by three

motives. The first was the unique need to make industrial occupations appeal to the Turks and to build worker morale. The second was to inspire pride in production for a very paternal government. The third motive, which probably dictated the details of the code, one cannot help feeling was the previously indicated desire to ride the bandwagon in the social welfare parade of the 1930's. Both the Western Democracies and Turkey's huge Communist neighbor, the Soviet Union, were in that parade figuratively on floats depicting "benefits to labor." The Turks, therefore, preëdowed all their new industries with the full panoply of labor benefits.

However that may be, World War II slowed the conversion of the Turkish people from military and bureaucratic occupations and incomes to those of industry and commerce. Today the perspective has changed again. Turkey has entered into closer economic and political relations with the capitalist states of the West. And many Turks have returned from Western universities with degrees in economics and business administration. Moreover more Turks have capital to invest in modern enterprises. The new Turks have apparently challenged themselves to evolve an economic system stressing equally the benefits to the nation, to labor, and to investors.



## *The Peasant Majority*

The Anatolian Turk is a hard working farmer, a brave and generous fighter, endowed with fundamentally chivalrous instincts.—Professor W. L. Westerman, Columbia University.<sup>1</sup>

**S**HEER force of numbers, if nothing else, would give Turkish peasants paramount importance in modern Turkey. The population of the Republic of Turkey is at least 96 per cent Müslim Turks, and four out of five of them are peasants. What the world thinks of the Turkish nation in the long run will, therefore, depend a great deal upon the peasants, upon their capacity for education, economic productiveness, and political responsibility.

A peasant's outward appearance does not reveal his potentialities, least of all when poverty and ignorance are written all over him. Turkish peasant men undoubtedly look their worst during the annual induction into military service. Peasant prudence makes them wear nothing to camp which cannot be thrown away after donning uniforms. Consequently they report at concentration points garbed in unbelievable tatters. The noncommissioned officer in charge "drives" them wherever they should go, and forces strays back into line, by shouts or light blows until they learn military commands. Peasants, thus seen, are reminiscent of what one writer called "the soldier mines of Anatolia," because Ottoman conscription officers "dug" from Anatolian villages the crude material for an army. Village conscripts enter the Republican army in the same crude fashion, but they stay in service a shorter time and receive some education besides military drill.

Turkish peasants are seen at their best on gala days and in the Village Institutes. For celebrations of a harvest, or a wedding, or a patriotic anniversary, each peasant is on the scene in his best clothes

and gayest mood. Young peasants, arriving at Village Institutes, likewise wear their best clothes, as becomes men and women who are to be educated. Eager eyes in solemn faces bespeak their confidence that they are about to experience something good, though strange. In short order the strangeness disappears as they undertake the familiar tasks of digging in the ground, building walls, heating metal in a forge; or, in the girls' department, cooking and sewing—but in exciting competition with peasants from other villages, all using better tools than at home.

The life of Turkish peasants can rightly be described as almost idyllic in some places, and woefully depressing in others. The difference depends largely on Nature and transportation. Where Nature lets crops grow easily, and man contributes transportation, Turkish peasants live very comfortably. The nearest to idyllic life is on lush coastal plains or low foothills by the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas, and in a few inland districts where the railroad passes through fertile lands. Life is most cheerless in the vast area from the salt marshes of the west central region through the eastern mountains to the border of Iran. The majority of the peasants live depressing lives.

Men of the land, men of the forest, men of the mines, and men of the sea: a broad definition of peasant might include all of them, for a peasant is one who, by his own labor, draws directly upon natural resources for his living. More narrowly, the peasant is the man of the soil, or still more narrowly—as the Turks use the word—the peasant is the villager (*köylü*) who lives in a rural community below two thousand in population, and often below five hundred. In the Republic, men of the forest and of the mines differ economically from men of the soil because a majority of the first two are employees of the government, which to date controls most of the forests and the mines. A very large proportion of the men of the soil and the fishing men of the sea are self-employed or are in partnership with other peasants. On the whole, a description of life for men of the soil, who are the most numerous, will be sufficiently representative, because social conditions are much the same for all.

Turkish peasants live in villages, not on scattered farms. Some shepherds still live a nomadic life, notably the *Yürüks* (Walkers), a relatively primitive Turkic people who dwell in tents or huts of boughs, and migrate to the highlands in summer and to the lowlands

in winter with all their flocks and all their herds, their camels, and their donkeys. Peasants, who till the soil, go daily to their fields in planting and harvest seasons. A watchman in a lonely field shelter stays on guard with his Anatolian sheep dogs—huge, lion-coated, black nosed creatures, the size of a Great Dane. They are famous for their reliability as shepherd dogs and their ferocity as watchdogs. Although peasant families do not live on isolated farms, a village of forty or fifty families may itself be so isolated that the annual visit of the provincial official to collect taxes and conscript soldiers is their only dependable outside contact. The most extreme isolation in snow-bound mountains forbids winter visitors, and a rare summer wayfarer arrives only in the very short mudless season when it is possible to reach the village. The chance wayfarer brings the only outside news and often ignorantly garbles it. Once in a great while, dire necessity for legal or religious advice sends a peasant out of such isolation on foot or donkey-back to the nearest “big” town of perhaps a thousand population.

Land distribution in Turkey has been badly unbalanced. A million or more acres of good land have been deeded in perpetuity for pious purposes, such as mosques, religious schools, fountains, cemeteries, or income land to finance whatever pious purpose the donor indicated. These Pious Foundations (*evkaf*) can still be made, and non-Müslim donors can dedicate lands for purposes of their own faiths. Millions of other acres have been held by the “crown” or State.

At one time, vast holdings were acquired by *derebeyler*, usually translated into English as “Valley Lords.” They disappeared from the scene in Anatolia long ago. Thereafter, the bases of land ownership became a complex issue between the government and the large landholders. The peasant emerged from that period first as a sharecropper or renter, and eventually a small holder himself. Even to this day, occasional individuals inherit or acquire estates large enough for each to include one or several villages, on which the peasants either rent land or farm on shares. The average peasant now rents or owns five to sixty acres, but quite a number own less than one acre apiece, and not one in seven will own more than two hundred acres. Villagers, however, own in common very extensive pasture lands.<sup>2</sup>

The Republic’s Land Law of 1945 limited private holdings to approximately twelve hundred acres. The government, after com-

pensating the original owner for his acres in excess of twelve hundred, resells them in small tracts to peasants on extraordinarily easy terms, financed through the Agricultural (Ziraat) Bank. The peasant has nothing to pay until the sixth year after he has taken possession; then he starts paying twenty annual installments without interest; and he is granted 5 per cent discount on his debt for every child he raises to the school age of seven years. Former "crown" lands and unused lands are also available to peasants now, on better rental or ownership terms than heretofore, and the government assists peasants to reclaim poor lands. The distribution of fewer than one million acres, in the first three years of the law, brought the proportion of farmers owning land to 94.3 per cent, but often in pieces too small for profit. The government announced distribution of an additional 650,000 acres in 1950.

Actually, according to Ömer Celâl Sarc, Rector of the University of İstanbul, there were very few great rural properties left in Turkey, and dividing them is not a real remedy for the basic problem; namely, that only 17 per cent of the nation's land is under cultivation whereas nearly four-fifths of the population depends on land cultivation for a living. The situation, Dr. Sarc wrote, "can be remedied only by intensifying agriculture, by a drift towards industry and trade, and by extending the cultivable areas."<sup>3</sup> To these ends, swamp drainage and irrigation of drought lands are in progress. And hundreds of young peasants are now at more than a dozen state farms, as hired laborers or to receive free instruction in the use and maintenance of farm machinery. Besides the twenty Village Institutes, fourteen agricultural schools are open to qualified young people from the farms.

A peasant usually constructs for his family, animals, and crop storage, one to five small buildings, ordinarily of adobe, except in forest regions where wood can be cut cheaply. Stucco is a sign of unusual prosperity anywhere. An initial step toward luxury is a wooden instead of an earth floor. In the poorest houses, human and animal quarters in adjoining rooms will be identical except for the family's charcoal burner (*mangal*) and kettles. Household animals, distinct from large flocks and herds, will be a few goats and sheep; a donkey, water buffalo, or ox, poultry; and perhaps a cow, but not pigs, as pork is tabu in Islam.

The common peasant possesses hardly anything besides the clothes

he works in, a few homemade tools, and his livestock. His most elaborate tool may be a forked-stick plow or a wooden drag with pieces of flint set in the bottom to thresh grain; his best animal, a water buffalo. The ugly, low-headed, broad-horned, scraggly-haired buffalo is a durable beast for general farm work and slow hauling, and buffalo cow's milk makes a thick strong-flavored cream and cheese. The water buffalo is as fond of a mud wallow as a pig, but its tough black hide would be hard to scrub as clean as a pig's skin. Mud abounds between houses, separated only by space, not streets, where pedestrians may have to detour around manure heaps accumulated for fertilizer.

If a peasant gains a bit of extra money on a lucky deal and is the kind who wants to show his "wealth," he may, other than spending it on conviviality, buy a finer buffalo or ox and cart; he may install a windowpane; or, if he can afford it, add a second story to his house. It is unlikely that he will make any change inside his house or in his clothing or diet, unless he foresees a permanently better income. The provident peasant invests in gold coins to hoard, or in rugs which increase in value with age; or he buys more land. The Republic has encouraged savings bank accounts with notable success, partly through distributing "toy" banks for saving coins at home to be deposited later in district branch banks. (Savings accounts increased a hundredfold in the Republic's first quarter century, not quite four million Turkish liras in 1923 to four hundred million in 1948.) The Republic abolished the tithe on agricultural products in 1925, although it had been the Sublime Porte's chief source of income from the Anatolians. The Republic has shifted more of the tax burden to the urban population, and today relies more on income from state economic enterprises.

Rich peasants with large bank accounts frequently donate land or money to Pious Foundations, or nowadays to secular causes. One peasant, a grain farmer, gave ten thousand Turkish liras to the Turkish Aviation Society (Türk Hava Kurumu), and another spent fifty thousand liras for a hospital and school. A few peasants have become large scale farmers, thereby providing for many relatives. For example, a certain Gaziantep peasant who grew grain, vegetables, fruit, and wine-grapes, was aided by about thirty of his relatives and some seasonal employees, the proceeds supporting all the relatives and their families. The richest usually are those who specialize in the major

export crops like Smyrna figs and raisins, or in vegetables and fruits for large city markets; or those who combine farming with a seasonal job in the lumber mills or sugar refineries.<sup>4</sup>

The sunup to sundown life of the average peasant in Turkey is a full life but a slow one. On the road, the donkey sets the pace, and in the fields, the water buffalo or ox. Village life begins to turn into town life when peasants start to buy from smiths, saddlers, and other artisans, the necessities which they formerly made for themselves. Endless patience in genuinely slow work is exemplified by certain Turkish fishermen who stretch huge nets around tall poles in the water. On one pole they place a high crossbar barely wide enough for a man's feet. On that precarious perch a man stands for hours, rain or shine, with hardly enough footing to change his position, waiting to signal when fish are in the net. One cannot easily tell whether this capacity for inactive work is a fault or a virtue; a fault, in that the man does not use his wits to devise a better way, or a virtue in that, because it provides a living, he can do the job. Plainly, he endures drudgery as well as the modern assembly-line worker who repeats the same set of motions all day long.

When not sharing their husbands' outdoor work, or indeed working harder than their men outdoors, peasant women have an equally busy, slow life at the house. They spin their own yarn and thread from wool and cotton which they have carded and dyed. They launder at a stream or fountain. If they can afford more than the minimum diet, they spend hours preparing food and cooking it over charcoal. They dry fruits and vegetables for winter.

The minimum diet—and appalling numbers can afford no more than the minimum—is bread, olives, cheese, onions, molasses (*pekmez*) usually made from grapes, and finally, if available, fresh fruit and nuts. Fortunately, it is a well balanced diet. The bread is of a rich white flour and a much more substantial food than the soft white commercial breads in the United States, or else it is cornbread. The cheese is usually from sheep or buffalo milk. Another staple is the cultured milk, *yoğurt*. The next stage in a more elaborate diet is to add cracked wheat (*bulgur*) cooked in many ways. Rice often replaces *bulgur* wherever it is grown or a peasant can afford to buy it, and it is cooked as *pilav*, i.e., in butter, then slowly steamed to fluffy lightness with no kernels stuck together. *Bulgur*, or else rice, has much the

same place on the Turkish menu as potatoes on the American menu. Among the commonest vegetables and fruits are tomatoes, pumpkins, eggplant, squash, beans, melons, grapes, apples, peaches, apricots, and all kinds of berries. Meats, in the order of usual expense, beginning with those which are cheapest if obtained where they grow, are fish, wild game, poultry, lamb or mutton, and beef. Once a week is as often as many peasants have meat of any kind. The final luxury in the very well-to-do peasant's diet is pastry. The best country foods are, of course, the basic foods which city chefs imitate and to which they add fancier trimmings. Turks never mix salt and sweet in their food. Hence many common American foods are most unpalatable to them, e.g., sweet rolls, fruit salads, candied yams, and jelly or sweet sauces with meat. They like heavily sweet desserts, but Turkish coffee is sweetened or not, according to individual taste.

In the peasants' social life, the public fountain and the mosque are the Turkish village equivalents of the U.S.A.'s village post office and depot. The people meet daily at the fountain, and the faithful stroll regularly to the mosque when the muezzin calls them to sundown prayers. Other prayers are usually said wherever the worshipper happens to be at the moment, in his shop or fields. The muezzin's five prayer-calls a day, timed by the sun, serve also as the "town clock." Barn-raising, husking bees, and threshings on American farms have exact counterparts in the Turkish *imece*. And, always during the work, some sing or play the native stringed or wind instruments to make the work lighter.

A whole village can reach a high pitch of excitement in betting on a wrestling match; on horse races, if enough of the villagers own the tough, wiry Turkish horses; or on combats for the championship between the "fightingest" cocks or ganders in the many poultry flocks. In prosperous regions, a wedding often brings together practically the entire populations of two or three villages for several days of visiting and feasting. A spring picnic and barbecue is not uncommon on May 6 (Hidrellez), based on the same dragon legend as St. George's Day in Christian countries. Again, at harvest time, several families together take tents to the orchards where they enjoy a week or more of "vacation" while picking fruit. Except in the most isolated places, Turkish village life will be very little changed in spirit by Westernization, but it will be changed in sanitation and education. Village life

progresses toward new standards most rapidly where *halkodası* activities are carried on, but when this was written, more than thirty thousand villages were still awaiting such benefits.

Through the years of the Republic's first generation, a continuous battle has been waged against the lethargy ingrained in the peasants while they were under the weight of the Ottoman yoke. Let a Turk tell their plight. Ahmet Emin Yalman has recorded it as follows:

Along with military service the main burden of taxation also rested on the peasants. They had to pay to the State in kind one-eighth of all they produced. . . . Influential local notables who had made a specialty of such business did not stop at extracting only one-eighth. By a complicated system of exploitation, they obtained much more than that. In addition, they interfered arbitrarily in the details of farm work. Harvesting had to be postponed indefinitely because the tax collector or his representative had not arrived to keep check on it. Sometimes such delays caused crops to be ruined by unfavorable weather. The peasants abstained from raising vegetables and fruit, for the checking of these products gave the tax gatherers special opportunities to create difficulties. In addition to the above taxes, the country people had to pay property taxes, . . . taxes levied illegally, . . . and also they had to contribute to various national projects. Furthermore, they had lavishly to entertain notables, officials, and officers of the gendarmerie passing through their villages. They obtained no benefits of any kind from the State in return for these sacrifices.

Brigands in many areas, the writer explains, exacted additional tribute, but appeals to the courts against them foundered in the cumbersome legal system. Ahmet Emin Bey concludes, "The prospect of making any money by their work being a hopeless one . . . many peasants preferred to produce just enough for their own food and for the seed for the coming year."<sup>5</sup> (The Turkish farmer, who trusts only the seed which he personally selects from his own plants, normally takes great pride in improving his plants.)

Against such a harsh background, one can understand why an old peasant woman of Erzincan wept when she saw the President of the Republic, İsmet İnönü, and high army officials arrive in Erzincan almost immediately after the terrible earthquake in December, 1939, to talk personally with survivors about relief. The new government moved the homeless survivors to warmer provinces until summer, and promised assistance in rebuilding more 'quake-resistant houses than the old adobes with their overweight mud roofs. The southern



provinces which received these "foreigners" from northern provinces coöperated as well as people can with unexpected strangers as guests for several months.

By the time the refugees returned to their own communities, many other demands on the government prevented full realization of its rebuilding plans. After the war and more earthquakes, however, the government imported prefabricated two- to four-room houses from Austria, Finland, and the United States, and allotted thousands of them to earthquake areas. To the peasants this spelled the difference in values which the Ottoman and Republican governments placed on their life and security. Similar concern has been shown by the present government following floods, and large flood-control and hydroelectric projects are now under way. The Ministry of Agriculture also introduced a bill for interest-free loans to disaster victims.

Another and very different form of recognition of the peasant is the national celebration annually in honor of the peasant, Uzun Mehmet (Tall Mehmet), who discovered coal in Anatolia. He had seen coal used during his military service elsewhere, and had immediately recognized its importance when he dug up a lump on his own farm in the early 1800's. It is now known that Anatolia's coal resources are almost inexhaustible.

The two most important changes which have reached every peasant are relatively lower taxes and shorter military service, although the continuous mobilization since 1939 because of both war and post-war risks has discounted the latter advantage. Taxes of the Republic are levied on land and animals, but young and breeding animals are exempt. The Republican government's emergency levy on crops at the peak of the war crisis in 1942 was about one-tenth instead of the routine one-eighth of Ottoman days. The Republic also required that 12 per cent of the crop be sold at fixed government prices.

On the whole, peasants who grew a surplus over their own needs fared well enough throughout the emergency to be disturbed when prices on their products fell back nearer to normal after the war. The 10 per cent war levy, however, was abolished within a year from the end of the war, and in 1948 the government announced that it would buy enough of the grain crop to stabilize prices at a figure which reduced the discontent; and the government also offered graduated bonuses for better qualities of grain. The farmers, in that year, bor-

rowed from the Bank of Agriculture \$86,000,000, or six times as much as farmers had borrowed in 1938, before the war. Another of the Republic's boons has been efficient protection by the new gendarmerie. Formerly, peasants who grew surplus crops, and did not see them completely drained away by Ottoman tithe collectors or by great landowners, often lost them, or the cash from their sale, to brigands on the road to or from market. The Republic's gendarmerie ended general brigandage.

A remarkable innovation in peasant life after the Ottoman officials had disappeared was the new type of authority—authorities representing Turkey and the Turks instead of Istanbul and the Sublime Porte—authorities enforcing laws for the needs of Turkey instead of drafting men for the needs of an empire. Turkish peasants are often blindly obedient to authority. A command from a man whom they believe has rightful authority over them will be carried out with a literalness which may be startling. It has been so in war games in military training when officers have had to rescind commands very hastily in mock battle lest there be real casualties. Seemingly a *sine qua non* of any authority whom they will recognize as rightful is that he be a Muslim and a Turk. Part of every Turk's identification is the native fluency with which he speaks Turkish and, as indicated earlier, Turkish is one of the most difficult languages for non-Turks to speak like natives. This gives the peasants of Turkey considerable immunity to foreign ideologies. Since they are not receptive to dictation or even indoctrination by non-Muslims and non-Turks, foreign agents peddling strange ideologies would be almost compelled to start by converting—if possible—the Turks at the top, rather than by agitating the masses against them, unless there were some, now incredible, way to do so by religious authority.

No matter how much can be said optimistically about measures actually taken to benefit the peasants, the fact remains that most of the benefits have reached only a small part of them. There are many peasants yet who have heard only vague rumors of such advantages as roads, schools, Village Institutes, the *halkevi* program, health measures, branch banks, and coöperatives to buy stock and tools. When roads reach them these benefits should follow, for these programs are all at least past the paper stage and are in actual practice in a significant number of places. In the meantime, the peasants who have received

these benefits have new complaints. They resent being taxed for state industries as long as no increase in consumer goods but only increased prices reach them. They resent having refugee repatriates from Europe planted in their villages without a by-your-leave, but with orders for the villagers to provide housing, tools, and work for the newcomers; i.e., they must not only absorb them into their own weak economy but provide for them as well. Occasionally, by government specifications, the villagers have had to provide better housing and tools for repatriates than they had for themselves.

The Village Law which insures benefits also requires compulsory assessments and compulsory labor for compulsory improvements. When the government knows that it will have three thousand new teachers in a certain year, it notifies three thousand villages three years in advance to build a school according to government specifications. The village headman (*muhtar*) prorates the assessment for it according to his judgment of each family's resources. Materials, such as glass and pipe, must be bought where and at the price the government prescribes. Both men and women must give an allotted number of days annually to labor on public buildings, drainage, sanitation, and other public works. The peasants frequently resent the often over-costly and over-onerous specifications. Turkey's political transition in 1946 from one-party to multi-party elections worked somewhat to the peasants' advantage as rival party representatives actually visited them and vied for their votes. And wherever the Republic's benefits have reached them, they are better off than peasants in surrounding countries.

Turkish peasants have, unfortunately but naturally, the habit of doubt, born of life under despots. What a good sultan did, a bad one often undid. Who could predict what the next would do? Peasants had as little choice of good or bad governments as of sunshine or blizzards. But in the 1950 national election (to be discussed in Chapter 20), they discovered that, by ballots, they could choose the government of Turkey. Undoubtedly it will take more than one generation to persuade them that they, as citizens, can exert a continuous influence for good government. The next generation, when more of them will be literate, will be the first chance for the peasants—80 per cent of the population—to show which way their weight will tilt the scales in which the Turks' future is balanced.

## Health and Welfare

The function which the Turkish Republic has assumed, as one of the attributes of the State, is . . . to assure medical and social aid to the people.—*La Santé Publique et l'Assistance Sociale en Turquie*.<sup>1</sup>

THE Turkish Republic's leaders in medicine and social welfare are abreast with the world's progress. Alas, this cannot be said about the health and welfare standards in Turkey as a whole. Nevertheless, promising results from a change of emphasis in methods are already showing.

Certain Ottoman methods were good as far as they went but they never could reach enough people. The sick were cared for in hospitals, but patients who could not travel to city hospitals rarely received attention except from "herb doctors," or "experts in superstition," unless a foreign missionary doctor happened to reach them. The current emphasis is on sending doctors and health officers to every town and village. Ottoman aid to the poor was almost entirely local and personal, but the new emphasis is on organized and institutional care to reach more of the needy.

The early Turkish conquerors began building hospitals and medical schools in Anatolia in the thirteenth century, when French priests and nuns favorably impressed them with Western medical knowledge. French medical books were the first Western textbooks permitted in Turkey in the nineteenth century, when also American medical missionaries arrived in Anatolia, and Florence Nightingale went there to care for the wounded British soldiers evacuated to Turkey from the Crimean War. Upon the precedent she set in Turkey were founded the Müslim Red Crescent and the Christian Red Cross. Thus, the Turkish government has long admitted Western medical influences,

and today Turkish medical authorities are winning well-deserved recognition from Western nations.<sup>2</sup>

It is impressive to report that this relatively small country has 192 general hospitals, 25 maternity hospitals, and nearly 400 health dispensaries and health centers, besides military, municipal, private, and foreign hospitals and sanatoria—a truly remarkable record in comparison with the other small states adjoining Turkey. But counting the beds in proportion to the population discloses a formidable problem. The average number of beds is, at best, one to every twelve hundred persons. The standard in the United States is at least four or five beds for each thousand persons. The distribution in Turkey is so unbalanced that one-third of the total of eighteen thousand beds is in Istanbul. Thus Istanbul has at least seven beds for each thousand persons, whereas the country as a whole has only one bed for each seventeen hundred persons. Patients who travel to Istanbul hospitals often run out of funds while there, and depend on public aid. The current ten-year plan calls for double the present number of beds in approximately fifty new hospital and sanatoria, to be evenly distributed throughout the country, and to be supplemented in each region by an institute of hygiene, a health museum, disinfecting and delousing stations, and schools for nurses, midwives, and sanitary inspectors.

The new emphasis is upon reaching the sick outside of hospitals and in the homes. For this, it is fortunate that the common people's superstitions do not hamper modern medical methods as much in Turkey as in some other countries. Superstitious Turks believe in the "evil eye," sometimes invisible, sometimes a human eye. A mother, who suspected that this baleful glare was turned on her child, would snatch the child away, cry "*Maşallah*" ("May Allah save him"), spit in a fire, and pray. The permanent defense is to wear a sky-blue bead which the evil eye cannot face! This is no insurmountable barrier to modern care; a patient can take medicine or undergo an operation, and also wear a blue bead, spit in a fire and pray. Superstitiously tying cloth strips to a tree by a saint's tomb, as little "cradles" to induce pregnancy, does less harm than a midwife's ignorance of hygiene. Some peasants have faith in ritualistic words by an *imam* (a religious teacher) while he touches the patient with the spur from a camel's leg or with whatever else has "magic" properties. Fatalistic

acceptance of disease, as the will of Allah, has actually been a much greater obstacle than superstition or fear to modern medical care. "Allah has given the illness"; therefore it is Allah, not man, who must decide its outcome in recovery or death. Therefore, why not keep the patient comfortable in every way possible to await his fate? Why make him "suffer" injections, diets, operations, while waiting?

The Turks' greatest health need appears to be preventive hygiene. That practice in their homes would most directly demonstrate the advantage of human measures along with faith in Allah. The worst of all obstacles to hygiene are certain ingrained customs which magnify the twin menaces of direct contagion from sick persons and daily contamination of food. Good Müslims never forget a patient's emotional needs, but often ignore physical risks. They "encourage" the patient by surrounding him day and night with relatives and friends, who keep him cool or hot as he wishes, and tempt his appetite with anything he will eat. An extreme case like the following is not as exceptional as it should be for safety's sake: A young man who lived with well educated relatives, after the last of his immediate family had died of tuberculosis, was found to have the disease himself. When the relatives were asked about their precautions against further contagion, they replied, "We can't hurt his feelings by using separate dishes or treating him any differently from the rest of us." This family risked contagion knowingly, but more commonly the menace is from ignorance of how contagions occur and ignorance of disease symptoms.

A great health asset, as far as it goes, is the fact that cleanliness is a fetish in Islam. But the standard of cleanliness inherited from desert nomad life is, in some ways, shocking. Primitive nomads did not carry towels and paper, and in the desert they could not find leaves and grass to wipe filth from the body or other objects. So the bare hand was used, and "cleansed" afterwards in water or sand, and custom added perfume when available. In Islam, one improvement was commanded: Only the left hand could be so used; the right hand must be kept "clean" to place food in the mouth, to hold the Koran, or for ceremonial gestures. To the ignorant, who accept this as Allah's will, it is hard to prove, short of another divine revelation, that both hands should avoid contamination with filth, and that a rinse, even with perfume added, does not make either hand hygienically clean enough to handle food before it goes to the mouth.

The ritual cleaning of all exposed parts of the body (face, arms, and feet) five times a day before praying, and also the rule to wash in running water (poured from a pitcher, not standing in a basin or tub) because uncleanness stays in still water, is also good—as far as it goes. But it is not good enough when cleansing the body is ritual and cleansing clothes is not. Desert sun may be a good “dry cleaner” but neither sun nor ritual cleans bugs out of sheep’s wool overcoats any better than out of a dog’s coat. This is unwittingly acknowledged in the old saying, “To a dog, his fleas; to a brave man, his lice.”

On the other hand, where water has been abundant, the Turks have attained the acme of personal cleanliness. What other form of bathing produces such scrupulous cleanliness as a complete Turkish bath? Yet the wooden *hamam* (bath) in a poor village may be as unlike the marble *hamam* for the wealthy as the American wooden washtub in the old-style farmhouse is unlike the tiled bathrooms of luxury residences. Turkey has the same extremes of personal dirtiness and cleanliness as the U.S.A. has with its wonderful plumbing, but, also its lamentable citizens who have to be deloused. Turkey, however, has a larger proportion of its population ignorant of modern standards, so the new Turks’ government insists on lessons in hygiene through every possible channel of instruction.

Village leaders, schoolteachers, and military officers all indoctrinate their pupils with ideas of invisible disease carriers and how to combat them. Until literacy is general enough, however, for the average person to use printed health instructions, progress will depend on the number and persistence of leaders trained to give visual and oral instruction. The Red Crescent and the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance provide the leaders with such aids as posters, lantern slides, and radio programs on hygienic handling of food and home care of the sick.

To give at least a hint of the new Turks’ success in coping with prevalent diseases, it can be noted, in passing, that they cut the malaria death rate, by drainage and mosquito prevention, from 93.6 to 12.6 per 100,000 population in five years (1943-47). And, according to Dr. J. M. Vine, a representative of the United Nations World Health Organization who surveyed Turkey’s health facilities in 1949, the Turks’ deficiencies in disease control are not in knowledge, but in funds and in the number of nurses for an over-all plan.

In all Turkey, there are hardly more than one thousand registered nurses, including registered midwives, at this time. Some seven thousand girls, with only primary school education, have been trained as practical nurses, and another six thousand as hospital servants. Turkey needs twenty times as many nurses as at present, according to Dr. Vine's survey.<sup>3</sup> (He was, however, able to commend Turkey for its corps of trained hygienists and sanitary officers, who are reasonably well paid and hence alert to their duties.)

Educated Turkish women have always come forward eagerly to help nurse soldiers in war, but professional nursing is, unfortunately, looked upon as a menial task "unsuitable for educated girls," even for lycée graduates. Girls with only primary education, however, have not learned enough arithmetic and science to cope with the fractional dosages and the precision techniques necessary in modern medical care. The current compromise between the United States ideal of university graduates in nursing and popular Turkish prejudice, is to require schooling through the eighth grade before training to become a registered nurse.

The training of doctors, most of whom are a credit to their country and their profession, has probably been the most successful part of the Republic's whole health program. The number of practicing physicians was increased about 50 per cent in the 1940's. Yet the present total is only three thousand, or one physician to each seven thousand persons for the country as a whole, if they were evenly distributed. Most of them are in the largest cities. A comparison to the United States ratio of one physician to each seven hundred fifty persons, in 1950, reveals the extent of the problem which the Turks face undismayed.<sup>4</sup>

Wherever doctors, over-busy with private practice, will spare time for public service, clinics are opened in *halkevis*. All doctors who have been educated at government expense or who receive government salaries, and are practicing in outlying districts, return periodically for six-month refresher training in Ankara's Refik Saydam Central Institute of Hygiene, established in 1928 with some aid from the Rockefeller Foundation. This institute trains health officers, provides fellowships for foreign study of public health and preventive medicine, makes laboratory tests, and produces serums and vaccines.

When the Turks could not import drugs, during World War II,



they began to appreciate their own drug industry. While it was still fashionable to buy only imported drugs, one of the leading German doctors remarked that such Turkish products as insulin were frequently as good as imported preparations. When the Republic was four years old, Turkish manufacturers could display only seventeen medicinal products, but twenty years later, they displayed 1,409 at medical congresses in Ankara. In 1949, the government reported that more than half the quantity of medicinal preparations used in Turkey was produced in Turkey. Turkey also exports its medical specialties, and donates general supplies, too, to meet emergency needs in other lands.<sup>5</sup>

Stories which seem incredible for a country so far advanced in medical leadership can be told, all too truly, of care in Turkish hospitals. Two instances, brought directly to my attention and confirmed later as not unique, illustrate the worst extreme. In an over-crowded military hospital, sick recruits were assigned two to one bed before diagnosis, though one might have a contagious disease. After diagnosis, a night or two later, contagious cases were sent to quarantine wards, and their "non-contagious" bedmates went to the general wards. Again, a soldier, who was a university student but not a medical student, was assigned to assist in surgery. He told me that he received on-the-spot instructions in holding wounds open, inserting sponges, and dressing the wounds. He had seen the movie of Pasteur's life, and he said, "From that film I fortunately know that I must not touch anything unsterile after washing my hands." Many, perhaps most, hospitals have no night nurses; anxious relatives by the bedside attend to minor needs and call the doctor for emergencies.

One hopeful contrast to these risky methods can be seen in the oldest Müslim hospital in Istanbul, Guraba Hastanesi (Hospital for the Poor). Endowed as a Müslim charity, only Müslims can be bed-patients, though others may be out-patients. None may pay, but those who wish to do so may donate supplies. Internes there can profit by its example of maintenance of exacting standards even in an ancient building. Guraba Hastanesi is staffed by both Turkish and foreign members of Istanbul University's medical faculty, the latter mostly Germans.

Foreign medical men have contributed much by teaching in the Turkish medical schools, and by example in the foreign hospitals in

Turkey. Two of the present ten foreign hospitals are American. Many of the small missionary hospitals closed their doors when the Republic ruled that hospitals, like schools, must be strictly secular. In Gaziantep, the memorial hospital to Dr. Azariah Smith, the first American medical missionary in Turkey, celebrated its centenary in 1947. Dr. A. W. Dewey and his Turkish and American staff ably uphold the best standards and frequently introduce new treatments. At the Istanbul American Hospital, recently renamed the Admiral Bristol Hospital, Dr. Lorrin Shepard, the director, has been the first to introduce into Turkey many modern techniques of diagnosis and treatment, and much modern equipment. In connection with the U.S. military aid program for Turkey, a new American hospital for Ankara was announced. There, American physicians are to treat military patients and train Turkish medical students. While the new Turks invite foreign influence, instruction, and example, nevertheless in 1924 the government stopped granting permits for private practice to foreign doctors. Certain ones, already long in practice in Turkey, were permitted to continue, but others have been restricted to teaching, research, and consultation. This has protected Turkish physicians from foreign competition. In view of the shortage of doctors, it is hard to say whether such protection benefits the public.

Underlying all troubles which beset the Turkish health authorities in bringing general medical services up to their own highest standards are, again, illiteracy and lack of transportation. Prerequisites to more rapid progress are: first, transportation to carry medical men and equipment to tens of thousands instead of to only hundreds of communities; second, more Turks educated to read and follow instructions on medicine containers and in health pamphlets in the absence of a doctor; third, more local leaders competent to carry out hygienic and preventive measures; and fourth, more respect for nursing as a profession.

Philanthropy in Turkey had been, and still is, in the usual pattern in Islam, but the new Turks have added new ways. Every good Müslim gives a minimum of one-fortieth of his annual income for relief of the poor. Well-to-do families frequently support aged servants and needy relatives of servants. Or they accept children given to them by poverty-stricken parents. These children work for the family (and are sometimes mistakenly called slaves by foreigners), but they share

the family's prestige, not infrequently marrying into the family or participating in the family business. Müslim philanthropy on a larger scale finds its outlet through the *evkaf*, or Pious Foundations, mentioned in Chapter 10. Trustees distribute incomes from these foundations to relieve the poor, sick, or dependents, as directed by the donors. Any failure to carry out pious trusts in absolute honesty, especially the trust for an orphan, has always been heavily penalized by the religious courts. The Republic has placed the former *evkaf* responsibilities for health and welfare in the hands of its Ministry of Health and Social Assistance.

Seeing great need still untouched, Turkish women who had lived abroad began early to try to organize groups for welfare work. And, under both the Young Turk and Republican regimes, organizations of educated women, mostly in Istanbul, have done great good, but hardly any such organization has outlived the personal leadership of its founder or succeeded in establishing branches. The outstanding organization of women, active since the Republic's fifth year, is the *Yardım Sevenler Cemiyeti* (literally, the Society of Those Who Like to Help). It already has about one hundred branches in fifty provinces. It enjoys the privilege of publicizing its program through the movies and radio. (The only radio advertising yet permitted in Turkey is for government and charitable purposes.) The society operates dress shops and takes orders for dresses to be made by women who need work; it also provides free medical care for many in need, aids the aged, and conducts a boarding home for women students in Ankara.

The leading national welfare organizations today are the Red Crescent (*Kızılay*), and the Children's Protective Society (*Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu*). The most unusual feature of each is its mode of support. Each receives income from government grants of certain lands; the proceeds from sales of special holiday postage stamps and greeting forms of telegrams; and also the profits of monopoly sales of quinine and certain other drugs. The newspapers contribute more than publicity, for on one day annually, they designate a single paper in each city to issue a Red Crescent edition. This edition is delivered to subscribers of all papers, and it monopolizes street sales for that day. School chapters of these organizations raise money by sales and entertainments. The Red Crescent runs shops in all large cities to sell

donated articles and food. Annual Red Crescent balls, which are apt to be the finest public social event of the year in cities and towns of any size, bring in generous returns.

The work of the Red Crescent is essentially the same as that of the Red Cross, in emergency and safety work, but it also gives poor relief of the kind usually handled by other agencies in the United States. The Children's Protective Society provides health care, hot meals, clothing, and school supplies for needy children. The public has great confidence in both of these organizations. Persons in need can also seek aid from the *halkevi* Health and Social Assistance Division, and its volunteer workers; and, likewise, from the village headman (*muhhtar*), who has a very paternal responsibility for the people in his community.

This subject of social welfare calls for at least brief mention of the problem of crime. Turks point to prison reform as one of their finest welfare achievements, largely because of the conspicuous success of a single initial experiment in modern methods. To appreciate it, one must understand the nature of crime in Turkey. Organized rackets are unknown, except through U.S. gangster films, unless the brigand bands of old Turkey should be called racketeers. The main categories of crime are stealing and violent attack. Juvenile delinquency runs mostly to gambling and stealing. Much of the stealing, at any age, is prompted by sheer need. A cold, hungry wretch helps himself to food, fuel, and clothing wherever he can snatch it. Precautions against him are in plain sight everywhere—iron bars over windows and doors of residences, broken glass cemented on top of stone walls to prevent climbing over them, watchmen on duty day and night. Professional thieves do not hold up banks and risk daring getaways. They hold up individuals in dark places, and evade or bribe guards in order to gain entrance to shops or homes, and to steal rugs, jewelry, gold, and silver. They dispose of these in the bazaars where webs of concealment are rapidly woven. Nevertheless, the Turkish police average quite well in apprehending them.

In crimes of violence, blood feuds of vengeance formerly accounted for as much as a fifth of the criminal convictions, but these have been greatly reduced. Unpremeditated attacks are usually committed in a blind rage of jealousy or frustration. Jealousy is the same in all countries. Frustration in Turkey, bitter enough for violence, can often be

traced to the inarticulateness of the illiterate, who defend themselves with blows when their words fail. It can also be traced to the sense of the futility of reason ingrained by centuries of unreasonable oppression and favoritism by authorities. Where words and reason cannot prevail, an embittered individual resorts to violence to destroy the person who blocks his way.

Remarkably good results followed an experiment in penal reforms inaugurated by a young deputy inspector of prisons, Mutahhar Şerif Başoğlu, who took these facts into account. On the Island of İmralı, in the Sea of Marmara, four hundred convicts, including robbers and murderers, were chosen according to their former occupations, to form a complete community from laborers to lawyers. Three gendarmes took turns guarding them, and three were enough, because, given security and opportunity, the convicts assumed social responsibility. They went fishing alone in boats and returned with their catch; they planted trees, constructed buildings, opened shops, and, with rare exceptions, enjoyed living in security with outlets for their ambition. Another group of convicts did magnificent rescue work in the Erzincan earthquake which caused nearly 90 per cent loss of life and property. Their prison withstood the 'quake but they easily "escaped" to save as many other persons as they could, and then waited in their prison to aid officials upon their arrival. Although no magic has produced funds and leaders to carry this principle into effect for all reformable prisoners, and although the crudest, most unhealthy conditions still characterize nearly all Turkish prisons, these real-life demonstrations in Turkey, itself, are sure to color future programs for dealing with crime there. Meanwhile, as a partial step, vocational training has been started at Ankara, İsparta, and Kastamonu prisons; and Turkish penal officials have been sent to several other countries to study penal methods. Increasing literacy and a new system of courts with a high reputation for justice are reducing the number of criminal acts due to frustration.

All in all, the report on health and welfare for the pioneer years is of bright promise on a very dark background. The illiterate and semi-illiterate masses will continue, for another generation or more, to be too ignorant and too inarticulate to take effective steps for their own welfare. The Republic's first generation of university students, indoctrinated with its concern for the welfare of all the Turks in

Turkey, is now graduating from Turkish and foreign universities. A fair number of them plan to use their training to multiply the good works of the small number of leaders who performed wonders at the start. They have first to overcome the setbacks of the midcentury World War crises; then they will be challenged by the need for persistent, often unspectacular, local leadership to achieve uniform, lasting results. Since this is probably the first time the West has been aware of idealistic humanitarian programs by the Turks, their development will surely be of interest far beyond the borders of Turkey.

## Religion

The man who has love of Allah in his heart will also be a man of good morals and kind to everybody. Those who fear Allah will never trespass on the rights of others, will keep themselves from sin, and never live dishonestly and apart from justice.—Yusuf Ziya in *Islam Dini*.<sup>1</sup>

THE new Turks have assumed a seemingly impossible religious position by putting into practice what appears to be a contradiction. They have created a secular Müslim state. In Islam, believers have generally understood that the religion and the law are one; if a state were Müslim, it could not be secular—if it were secular, it could not be Müslim. Nevertheless, for the Turks, though their law is now secular, their faith is unquestionably Müslim. Other peoples of Islam, particularly the Arabs among whose ancestors Muhammed had propagated his faith, looked upon the new Turks as religious renegades.<sup>2</sup>

At first, Atatürk apparently had had no intention of any break with Islam, for Article 2 of the New Constitution Act read, "The State religion of Turkey is the Müslim religion." Later, however, after he had abolished the Khalifate, this article was rescinded. Atatürk gave his own explanation during his *Six-Day Speech* delivered to the Grand National Assembly in the Republic's fourth year. He first pointed out that if a state has subjects who profess different religions and if it expects to be equally just toward all of them, and also toward both subjects and foreigners in the country, "it is obliged to respect freedom of opinion and conscience," and it must do so "unambiguously."

"When we say," Atatürk explained, "The official language of the State is Turkish' everybody understands this; everyone finds it natural

that the Turkish language should be required for government affairs. But will the statement, 'The state religion of Turkey is the religion of Islam' be understood and accepted the same way? This certainly will have to be explained and interpreted." He, himself, clarified it by adding, "The Müslim religion includes freedom of thought." Therefore, he said, he wanted to express the State's obligation to respect freedom of conscience, but he had in mind two questions: 1. Shall not every grown person in the new Turkish State be free to select his own religion? 2. Would not any literal revival of the prescriptions of Islam again invoke the law of the *shariat* and the authority of the Ulema, in conflict with the new national sovereignty? In spite of these questions, Atatürk had permitted the declaration of a State religion in Article 2, and in Article 26, a statement that "the Grand National Assembly executes the holy law." These were to prevent the expression "secular government," from signifying hostility to religion. "The nation," Atatürk had concluded on this point, "must, at the first opportune time, eliminate this superfluity from our basic constitutional law."<sup>3</sup> The Grand National Assembly did so in 1928. It follows neither logically nor in fact that the Müslim faith was eliminated from the Turks' lives. Any such implication is as unsound as to call the main body of citizens in the U.S.A. irreligious or anti-Christian because the constitution of the United States does not specify a state religion, but does specify freedom of conscience.

If for no other reason, Turks would be self-consciously Müslim because of the old millet divisions, explained in Chapter 5, which had made religious distinctions more important than geographical or racial lines. Christian missions in Turkey had also emphasized religious differences by their very efforts to convert believers from one religion to another; from Islam to Christianity and from Gregorian or Orthodox Christianity to Roman Catholic or Protestant Christianity. Conversions of Müslim Turks were extremely rare. By strict Islamic law, the penalty for a change of faith is death. If a Turk changes his faith and is not among fanatics who would slay him, he is at least no longer considered a Turk—a price which very few have been willing to pay. Müslim Turks were long forbidden to attend Christian schools, so the Christian missionaries reached them, if at all, mainly through medical services and private conversations. Jesus, like the Old Testament prophets, is a prophet accepted in Islam. And numbers of Turks have



become deeply absorbed in his teachings, especially on morality. They can converse well on this subject without changing their religion. And whether sympathetic or unsympathetic toward other religions, all of them are always conscious of their geographical and political position on a bridge between Müslim and Christian states.

Religious opinions of the masses in Turkey, as anywhere else, reflect conceptions which have emerged from past experiences of their race or nation. Although the average person may not be clearly aware of these historical influences, his own attitudes can be explained best by reanalyzing his people's experience. Unfortunately, if Christian countries in earlier centuries saw the Turks at their worst, so did the Turks, of all Oriental peoples, know Christianity at its worst. "Onward, Christian Soldiers, marching as to war" has never been more literally true than in the land that is Turkey. The Crusaders were Christian soldiers marching to war not only on the Turks but on each other in Turkey. True too, Müslim fought Müslim, and in the course of the Crusades, Müslims and Christians in alliance with each other fought both Müslims and Christians. The Christians may preach "peace on earth, good will to men," and the good Müslim may be he who is "kind to everybody and will never trespass on the rights of others," but as Turks and Christians met in the Crusades, neither precept seemed to govern practice.

The Turks' own religion, when they emerged from what they call Turan, had been a simple nature-religion glorifying the sky which blankets the entire world. Blue is still a favorite color for the Turks, and the sky seems their favorite part of nature. Turkish histories tell of the Sky Turks (Gök Türkler), who came from high country near the sky, and who had created an empire which extended from the Caspian Sea to the Sea of Japan. What the conquering Turks first learned of Christianity, as they moved westward across Asia Minor and into Europe, makes a strange story seldom told in detachment from the rest of Christian history; yet it came to them as a unique experience, detached from any other knowledge of Christianity.

Crossing the mountains of Transcaucasia into the Ararat region, in successive migrations during the sixth to twelfth centuries A.D., they early met the Armenian Gregorian Christians. Nothing today indicates whether they paid enough attention to that faith to learn anything of it. They did soon learn, however, that the first Christians

they met were not the only Christians. And they soon judged that Christian sects must be kept separated from each other for the sake of peace. When they reached Nicea (İzник), they must have learned that Christians had assembled there long before (325 A.D.) to decide if their God was one God or a Trinity, and that, somehow or other, human debate at that meeting had settled the question in favor of the Trinity, an idea abhorrent to the Turks.<sup>4</sup> Subsequently, they probably heard of other mass meetings of Christian leaders to settle more disputes about the nature of Jesus, held at Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon (Kadiköy), in the land which the Turks were then conquering. When they reached Constantinople, they found themselves at the scene of the worst Christian schism of all, Byzantium vs. Rome. Who was the head of the Christian church, the Byzantine patriarch or the Roman pope? Neither the Byzantine nor the Roman Christians, at that juncture, demonstrated an exemplary spirit of peace and good will toward each other.

Before the Turks had reached this stage in their acquaintance with the Christian world, two other kinds of religious experience had changed their lives. First, they themselves had joined Islam, originally a few converts at a time, but by general acceptance in the tenth century. They knew full well the bloody wars of the sects in that religion. Eventually they stepped in to appropriate the Khalifate and to try to keep the many sects together under one government. Second, the Christian Crusaders had descended on them. Eventually, in 1453, the Turks took Constantinople and found the Byzantine or Greek Orthodox Church not only disputing Christian leadership with Rome but in trouble with mutually antagonistic orthodox sects as well. Both doctrine and good feeling were being ripped to shreds between Greek and Slavic Christians. They saw the Bulgarian and Serbian churches pitted against the Greek for primacy in Orthodox Christianity. The Sultans finally brought the Christian sects under control in the millets; and, as they had been doing between the Müslim sects, they maintained a military peace. Alas, gaining control had included the slaying of hundreds of innocent as well as warring Christians. Yet, in the same savage centuries, the Turks gave refuge to the Jews fleeing from massacre and persecution by Christians in the inquisitions in Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy. Subsequently, as long as the Turks ruled in Jerusalem, Müslim soldiers stood perpetual guard inside the Church

of the Holy Sepulchre to keep Christian sects from battling physically over priorities for hours of worship. All in all, sad as the Christians' view of the Turk had been in crises arising from Selçuk and Ottoman conquests and later misrule, the Turks' view of the Christians in crises arising from religio-political rivalries has likewise been sad.

The beginning of the Turks' modern experiences with Christian nations was when theirs was the first Müslim state invited into the affairs of Western civilization. Francis the First asked Süleyman the Magnificent to join the French against the Hapsburgs in the seventeenth century. In return, the French were granted a favored trade position in the Levant, the Müslim areas of the Ottoman Empire. The Western pattern to which the Turks were then introduced was the already familiar one of Christian soldiers marching as to war. France's newly privileged position led to her assumption of protectorship over the Roman Catholic Christians in the Levant, which served well for many years but became the entering wedge for the Great Power political rivalries, previously described in Chapter 5.

When Christian Protestant missionaries arrived in Anatolia they did not appear, as they frequently had in parts of the Far East and Africa, as the native people's first contact with Christian "civilization." The Turks were already acquainted with it. Although the majority knew next to nothing about Christian doctrine and history, the impression existed from echoes in their own land that Christianity in action is not much different from other religions; they all have good and bad individuals in them and, en masse, for glory or defense, they all resort to war and slaughter. The missionaries' work thrived as a civilized demonstration of Christians serving Christians, and Müslims, too, when the latter would accept it. In spite of limited finances, inconveniences of an undeveloped country, and official red tape, the mission work progressed, and outstanding missionaries won the confidence of their communities and the government's respect.

Secularization of Turkey replaced the old complications of rival autonomous sects by a single set of laws, uniform in principle, for all sects in Islam and in Christianity. This did not completely eliminate difficulties inasmuch as the secular law antagonized conservative Müslims, especially the Kurds; it lost to the country a large part of the benefits along with the undesired features of Christian missions, and it developed temporarily, at least, more animosity than sympathy

from other countries of Islam, except for Iran, which followed Turkey part way in secularization. Meanwhile, the new Turks, in closer contact than ever with Christian states, have retained much of their skepticism about the Christian religion, but also their interest in Jesus' moral teachings, while they admire the progressiveness of some Christian nations and oppose the aggressiveness of others.

The Turks are Sunni Müslims, which means, among other things, adherence to Muhammed's teachings recorded in the *hadis* (his contemporaries' records of his maxims). This sect, the largest in Islam, permits the use of analogy to his teachings, and also the universal consent of authorities, to decide what is right in cases beyond the scope of Muhammed's personal instructions. Through analogy and this right of consent, the Ulema had gained its power to dictate during the centuries of the Khalifate. Islam also has various orders, such as the dervishes, who follow special interpretations and rituals. Abolishing the Khalifate and the Ulema, and banning all the orders, did quite completely raze the structure of Islam in Turkey, and the question is how the spirit marches on.

Today, religion in the Turks' private lives seems to be closely comparable to religion in private lives in the United States. The wholly faithful still pray five times a day, fast once a month and for the holy month of Ramazan (spelled Ramazan in Turkish and Ramadan in Latinized Arabic), never taste alcoholic drinks, give at least one-fortieth of their property to the poor, and try to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Every Turk, unless he wants to proclaim himself irreligious, and few do that, believes in One God, Allah (or "Tanrı" in Turkish), and Muhammed as his prophet; moreover, he believes that Allah is good, wise, patient, kind, forgiving, and so on through ninety-nine virtues counted off on strings of ninety-nine beads. He believes in eternal hell-fire for failing to do Allah's will; yet he has faith in Allah's forgiveness, if he has done his best. Ziya Gökalp, the Turkish sociologist quoted before, maintained that the Arabs obey Allah as a God of rage, and the Turks follow him as a God of love. Only one's own conduct can save one from hell; a religious teacher can advise a believer, but cannot intercede with Allah for him.

Followers whose beliefs are most inflexible are strict in ritualistic conduct, although much of it was originally prescribed for Arab nomads in the desert and is merely symbolic in modern life. They

thoroughly observe ritual washing of feet, hands, arms, and face before praying. They never let a crumb of bread fall to the ground nor throw it away in garbage; they place it on a wall or shelf where no one can step on it but where birds or animals can eat it. They never taste wine or pork. They distinguish conscientiously between three kinds of conduct. *Sevap* is necessary pious acts such as saying prayers, giving to the poor, and caring for weak humans and animals. *Günah* is sin such as failure to pray, stepping on a piece of bread, lying, cruelty, stealing, and suicide. *Mekruh* is undesirable, but not sinful, behavior. For example, drinking wine is *günah*, smoking a cigarette is *mekruh*. Turks whose beliefs are more flexible ignore the ultra-detailed commands and observe the broad general principles. One of them, a young man who does not take such things literally, put it very simply: "As modern Müslims, we believe in Allah and that Muhammed is his prophet, and we feel that we must personally be clean, get nothing unfairly, and help the weak and poor."

All Turks, strict or liberal, quote favorite passages from the Koran and old familiar ritualistic phrases. As a Christian, who mostly ignores forms, will nevertheless say "God bless you" to anyone at the start of a new undertaking, so Turks, strict or indifferent, have the habit of saying an old Arabic phrase before a journey, a wedding, an examination, or a meal—at the start of anything. It is "*Bismillahir-rahman-irrahim*," which means "I am starting this in the name of merciful Allah." They also thoroughly enjoy the traditional Müslim holidays. The two great holidays are Şeker Bayramı (the Candy holiday) and Kurban Bayramı (the Sacrifice Feast Day). Everybody visits everybody else and gives and receives candy in the three-day Şeker Bayramı, at the end of the Ramazan fast. The fasting has been daily, from sunup to sundown. Strict Müslims do not touch even a drop of water, no matter how hot the day or even while working in the sun's full glare, until cannons boom the official hour of sunset. Then they eat and drink their fill. Drums rouse them from sleep for another meal before the sunrise cannons. Cannons boom and drums roll today as ever, but many fail to keep their fast. Kurban Bayramı celebrates, for four days, Allah's mercy in letting a ram appear for Abraham to sacrifice instead of his son, Isaac. Flocks of sheep with patches of dyed wool on their backs appear in the streets before this *bayram*. Each family that can afford it buys one or more. The family shares

the meat with relatives, and with the poor who come to the door knowing that they will not leave empty-handed. Schools and offices close for these holidays.

A formal observance still serious to Turks is the *Mevlûd*, which is the long chant of the poems of the nativity, death, and resurrection of Muhammed. It may be chanted as a requiem for the dead. For this ceremony in a private home, relatives, friends, and even strangers gather in memory of their dead. Musical members of the group eagerly share copies of the poems to follow as a libretto for the chant. One peculiarity of the Sunni sect is that it forbids the picturing of any human or angelic forms. In the modern Turkish home, during the *Mevlûd*, any such pictures or photographs are removed or draped. At the same time, however, camera fans may be snapping pictures of the ceremony and the people engaged in it. In the complete ceremony, and relatively seldom is it so complete, the final formality is to display a hair from the beard of the prophet. Brought from a mosque, many layers of priceless brocades are removed from the jewelled box in which rests the gold etched glass tube which contains the sacred hair. Worshippers kiss the tube or press it to their foreheads. The *Mevlûd* is frequently also chanted in a mosque on *Kadir Gecesi*, the night before Şeker Bayramı, which foreigners call the Night of Power and which celebrates the lunar date when the Koran was revealed to Muhammed.

Thus, almost exactly as in the United States, where any number of Christians fail to attend Church or to pray regularly, but still quote Biblical phrases, celebrate Christmas and Easter holidays, and observe religious rites for marriage and death, so liberal Turks of today cling to old Müslim habits, though they neglect regular worship. And in Turkey, as in the United States, the truly faithful persist in the old rituals and beliefs.

The younger generation in the Republic have been in a serious plight about their own religion. The literature of Islam is in Arabic, which most of the younger generation, trained in the Latin letters, cannot read. The Koran has been republished in Turkish, and it was called a terrible sacrilege by most conservatives to alter the prophet's own Arabic words and writing. The Koran, in any script, has also to be interpreted, and most of the commentaries are still in Arabic, although republication in the new alphabet in Turkish is proceeding

steadily. In addition, religious instruction was ruled out of the schools; and every *medrese* (school to train the *hoca* and *imam* who are the Muslim teachers) was closed. In spite of the fact that the new Turkey had no specifically anti-religious movement, secularization did generate great popular indifference to religion.

Peasants and other conservatives were known, however, to be dissatisfied with the growing irreligion although they cooperated in political changes. When new political parties came into being in 1946, the new Democratic Party campaigned for reintroduction of Muslim religious instruction in Turkish schools. Presumably, this was partly to win conservative votes, therefore certain members of the Republican People's Party did likewise.

Addressing the Grand National Assembly, in December, 1946, the Bursa deputy, Muhiddin Baha Pars, said apropos of the rather lax morals of the day, "Consciences are like countries. Leave them undefended and the enemy invades. . . . Our best defense against harmful beliefs is the diffusion of our own." He urged "violent punishment" for use of religion for political ends, but denied the right to deprive youth of its moral counsels. "In saying this," he added, "we are not attempting to overthrow Atatürk's work; we are asking to complete it." Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, İstanbul deputy and former Minister of Education, openly naming Communism as an immediate danger, took up the argument, saying, "Neither our police, nor our courts, are sufficient to defeat these foreign ideologies; religion is required to immunize the body politic against these diseases. If Turkish fathers are not one day to join Greece, Spain, and the Far East [all in civil turmoil over Communism in 1946] in mourning slain sons, we must take careful thought for the spiritual needs of the rising Turkish generation."

After excited discussion which momentarily broke up the session, Recep Peker, then prime minister, appeared and declared anew the Republic's respect for freedom of worship, but he pointed out the failure of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic religions to prevent Communist damage in Greece and Spain, respectively. Then he continued, "I would declare most earnestly that to think of restoring the religious law (*shariat*) as a check to Communism is to imagine that one deadly social poison can be treated by another scarcely less deadly."<sup>5</sup> At his request, further discussion was postponed. Soon there-

after, a number of religious periodicals appeared, with no official disapproval. The Ministry of Education, seven months later, in July, 1947, announced that Turkish schools might thereafter offer elective courses in the religion of Islam if, in each case, they first obtain government approval for the teacher selected. The call to prayer is again being given in the Prophet's Arabic words, instead of in modern Turkish; the rule forbidding the wearing of religious garb in public has been somewhat relaxed; and Christian groups have shared in this easing of restrictions.<sup>6</sup>

The enrollment of students of theology at the University of Istanbul had dwindled from two hundred eighty-seven to ten, between 1926 and 1932, when the department of theology was absorbed by the department of literature. New permission in 1948 for a four-year theological course, to be correlated with study of scientific law, induced an enrollment of nearly eighty students, including fifteen women. Graduates from this course, who do not wish to become *vaizler* (learned preachers) in mosques, will be employed in Islamic museums, and on the *evkaf* staff to administer Pious Foundations, or as religious teachers in public schools. A few religious schools have also been reopened to train elementary school graduates to be *imams*, who will pass along to pupils in mosques the simpler religious principles and also some secular teachings.

The new Turks are moving very slowly and cautiously in such matters. Non-Müslims, of necessity, must fall in line with measures which the Turks find necessary to prevent a retarding grip on secular affairs by their own religion. The new Turks are not granting privileges to one religious sect different from any other. Earlier Turks had had enough of special privileges to religious communities in the millets, which ended in fatal political involvement. The twenty-fourth year of the Republic was, however, the first year for a very tentative religious revival, which has since been cautiously continued. By holding steadfastly to the Müslim faith, while compromising on forms in both public and private life, the new Turks are attempting to work out a *de facto* solution for the long supposed impossibility of a secular state in Islam.



## Fun

The most superficial observer must be struck with the passion of the Turk for every branch of physical culture and sport on land and water.—Halim Baki Kuntner, Director of the *Evkaf* Administration.<sup>1</sup>

THE kind of fun any people enjoy is a key both to their own way of life and to the sort of friendliness possible between them and other people. The new Turks enjoy forms of amusement which previous generations in Turkey, as a whole, could not know. For the first time since the seclusion of women, Turkish men and women are able to share their recreation freely. And modern Western influences have introduced new forms of pleasure.

News photos, in the 1920's, proved to the world that Turkish girls had stepped out with smiles and energy in parades, mass calisthenic drills, and scout troops. In men's sports, Turkish Olympic teams have increasingly caught the notice of the outside world. Much of the new zest for organized sports, however, is because they bring men and women together as either participants or spectators.

Among themselves, Turkish men have always engaged in competition in individual skills—running, jumping, swimming, archery, stone and javelin throwing, and so on. And Turks needed no foreign stimulus to enjoy boating, horseback riding, picnics, and other informal outdoor recreation. Wrestling and hunting have been prime favorites as far back as memory and records reach.

Soccer (*futbol*) is the most popular team sport in Turkey, and *futbol* heroes are as idolized in Turkey as are professional baseball stars in the United States. Basketball and volleyball are popular for school and factory recess periods. Golf and tennis have barely begun to

attract players because fees on the very few links and courts are still prohibitively high.

In competition, the Turks' personal feelings run high. A suspected foul or a questionable decision is apt to provoke instant reprisal by insults or blows. By chain reaction, any players' row becomes their teams' row, and even the spectators' row. The game is not then the thing, for personal honor or a club's honor is at stake, and must be settled by apology or reprisal before play can continue.<sup>2</sup> Gradually, however, personal tensions are relaxing in easier enjoyment of sheer competition rather than combativeness in sports.

Turkish contestants have performed highly creditably in the World Olympics, where they have competed in wrestling, basketball, sailboat racing, bicycling, horsemanship, fencing, weight-lifting, and foot races. They have excelled in free-style wrestling. In the London Olympics Turkey stood first in wrestling, and twelfth among fifty nations in general competition, by the American point system.<sup>3</sup> The Turkish athletes' best practice has been in the Balkan Olympics, founded in 1930, but since Soviet expansion has divided the Balkans, an Eastern Mediterranean Athletics Congress has been launched instead.

Spectator enthusiasm by both men and women grew rapidly with the new freedom. Turks of means and leisure added the latest Western sports clothes to their wardrobes, and appeared frequently on bleachers and beaches. Mr. Webster noted, in 1938, "There is an element in the country which has become hysterical in its desire to construct great stadia in all cities."<sup>4</sup> He added the hope that the *halkevi* emphasis on general participation in sports on playing fields and in gymnasia might thwart this mania. It did. The *halkevi* also counterbalanced an early mushroom growth of sport clubs, mostly *futbol* players and fans, which the Ministry of Education decided were unsuitable places of recreation for schoolboys.

The United States has had more effect on the Turks' social than athletic recreation, above all in movies, dancing, and night clubs. Wherever there are movie theaters the Turks crowd them. At present the whole country has hardly more than two hundred fifty theaters. Nearly every *halkevi*, however, shows selected films. Some traveling units, with vaudeville performers and portable movie outfits, tour Anatolia. In Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, a good many school pupils

who can afford it, attend half a dozen shows each weekend. The Turks produce movies of their own, but after usually short runs in the larger theaters, they have longer runs in the smaller theaters, and some are exported to neighboring countries. Turkish young people who have the movie craze have learned from American films to crave autos, speed, and night clubs—movie style; they delight in Walt Disney fantasies, and they copy their screen favorites' dress and mannerisms, but they have not seemed much impressed by most of the home life on the screen.

American dance steps and music have held practically undisputed sway over the first generation of Turks who could dance together in public. The Charleston, the rhumba, and each American craze in turn, has spread like an epidemic in Turkish cities, when shown in the movies or introduced by Turks returning from the U.S.A. Nevertheless, social dancing is not the same matter in Turkey as in the United States because of differences in the name of propriety. The government would not permit boys and girls to dance together in schools or in public places during their school years below the university level until the late 1940's. Previously, even away from the school premises, no teacher might lend the approval of his or her presence at mixed dancing unless as a guest of a family at a private dance. The idea seems to have been that, while the Republic's first generation was growing up, responsibility for mixed dancing should rest entirely upon each student's own family.

Families, at present, differ greatly on how far to encourage it. If Fatma's family is ultraconservative, she will hope that enough of her brothers, uncles, and cousins will be at the dance to give her a good time because she will not be allowed to dance with any man outside of her own family. Benan's more typical family will allow her to dance with a few men friends of whom they approve. An engaged girl's fiancé decides if she may dance with other men of his family and his friends, as well as with her own relatives. Only very liberal families have so far permitted more freedom. Wedding receptions are the most frequent occasions for private invitation dances in hotels, clubs, or casinos, and special benefit affairs such as the annual Red Crescent balls are the grandest public dances. Military Officers' Clubs also give frequent dances.

The most which can be said for night clubs and casinos is that a very few in Ankara and Istanbul have truly modern decor and good

floor shows by imported talent—often Rumanian or Hungarian. The cheaper imitations descend the scale rapidly to an ill-ventilated room, or an open-air platform in a park, with four or five weary-looking women who sit stiffly in a row of straight chairs awaiting their turns to sing or dance. Only a very small proportion of the population, however, has taken to night clubs as the way to spend their money.

All modern recreation is superimposed on old forms of amusement. Amusements for children have changed very little. Their toys, if not homemade, are either Turkish manufactured rattles, dolls, stuffed animals, drums, picture books, blocks, or imported toys if the family can afford them. Older children progress to kites, wagons, roller skates, and then to hobbies such as stamp collecting or photography, and finally to organized sports and social affairs. Quite an occasion for a boy between the ages of four and ten, is the party following circumcision, which originated in a religious ceremony, and is still held to honor a son. He wears a fine embroidered jacket and bright gold-braided hat, and is royally entertained for a day (formerly in wealthy families for several days). As many relatives and guests gather as for a wedding. The *Mevlûd* may be chanted before the operation, and afterwards there is feasting and entertainment, sometimes by professional dancers or magicians.

When children are together they play hide and seek, puss-in-the-corner, tag, jackstones, marbles, hopscotch, and they roll hoops and jump ropes. Details of the various games differ slightly from the Western versions but they are essentially the same games. A favorite outdoor game for small children is *komsuluk* (neighborliness): Large circles of inch-high pebble walls mark separate "houses," and the children, playing grown-up, visit each other. A winter night favorite is *fincan*, or the cup game, in which the object is to discover under which of many cups a ring is hidden. More strenuous games for older boys are *çelik çomak*, a form of tip-cat, and *birdirbir*, which is leapfrog with ingenious follow-the-leader variations.

Storytelling is the Eastern art par excellence. "Once upon a time," however, is only part of the way to begin. A fairy tale should start, "Once upon a time, the sieve in the straw . . ." ("*Evvel zaman içinde, kalbur saman içinde . . .*") The sieve being where it does not belong is the first suggestion of nonsense. The next is the line "When the flea was a porter and the camel a town crier . . ." ("*Pire hamal iken,*

*deve tellâl iken . . .*) or "When I was rocking my grandfather's cradle . . ." (*"Ben dedemin beşigim tıngır mungır sallarken . . ."*) Giants, fairies, and royalty people the stories. A fairy favorite is the fairy in human form who has many suitors; when she chooses one and is lawfully married she becomes human forever! In royalty tales the king always has three sons or three daughters—invariably three. Nurses and servants scheme successfully for the prince and princess to see each other in spite of harem precautions. Other stories are about animals or simple peasants. Every child knows Keloğlan, a bald little ragamuffin who has "no home, no family, no friends," but who always manages to know what no one else knows. In the end he wins admiring friends, acquires a fine head of hair, becomes very handsome, and marries a princess.

Adult recreation retains its old basis of talk, smoking, and games. The proverbial wine, women, and song are part of it as they are in every country, but not on an Arabian Nights scale; religious inhibitions, personal morals, or finances usually limit that line. Turkish men habitually congregate at coffeehouses, where they smoke cigarettes or the *nargile* (water pipe), talking politics, business, or gossip, or simply airing their woes. There, too, they play cards or *tavla*, which is backgammon played rapidly and skillfully. In good weather coffeehouse tables for two or four persons each, are set outdoors under spreading shade trees or trellises or on the sidewalk, where hour after hour can be whiled away in lazy ease. Pastimes at home are again *tavla*, and also card games. Many Turks equal persons of other nations as hard-working bridge players. Popular games in various circles, also, are bezique, poker, chess, and "66" (*Altmış Altı*), a card game for two, three, or four players, in which sixty-six points are the basis of scoring. Above all, Turks love their gardens and spend many daylight hours perfecting them and entertaining guests there.

The prime ingredients of the Turks' idea of fun and amusement seem to be relaxation, imagination, sociability, and humor. Sitting is almost, if not quite, the most popular recreation of all. Turks sit at windows, in gardens, at coffeehouses, on hillsides, in boats—anywhere and everywhere that they can see a pleasing view and relax in conversation or contemplation of nature. Houses are built at whatever levels or angles will afford the best views. Indoor life in the West, until the recent use of picture windows, has usually turned inward

around tables and fireplaces. Turkish indoor life has turned outwards through as many windows as the walls could accommodate. Divans all along the walls under the windows made chairs unnecessary. Modern furnishing in Turkish homes follows pictures in Western advertisements. Indoors or outdoors, once comfortably seated with a good view, Turks seldom need any activity to pass the time. Restless fingers play with strings of prayer beads, now often called conversation beads, which many Turks carry in their pockets and run through their fingers while conversing or meditating.

Imagination seeks outlets in literature and drama. The literature which delights the Turks is poetry, essays, and stories which carry them nostalgically back to such joys as the past has held or else forward to a world or life that might be but never is. Foreign literature carries many eager readers into strange and different lives. The Turks are enchanted also by good mimicry.

Satire and mimicry together account for the popularity of Karagöz puppet shows. Karagöz and his foil, Hacivat (Hacı Evat), and numerous minor characters, are puppets cut out of stiff leather or parchment, richly colored. Arms, legs, and heads can be moved up and down but cannot be turned, as these puppets are only profiles. Dating back many centuries, and perhaps of non-Turkish origin, the original characters have changed hardly at all since the seventeenth century. But new characters have been added, including Mickey Mouse, Tarzan, and Greta Garbo. Many of the plots, usually satirical, are still the same—the kidnapped woman, the raid on a *hamam* (Turkish bath), or on a public house, and the scribe who writes letters for the illiterate—but the performers often improvise to suit their audiences in the back streets or in the parlors of the wealthy. They take full advantage of minority and foreign dialects. Whatever the origin of these shows, Karagöz has become for the Turkish people a typically Turkish character in his outright opinions and laconic expressions.

Sociability enters every phase of Turkish life. The fun in business is in the social exchange, while coffee or tea is served, preliminary to or during sales talks and bargaining. By being more businesslike and less sociable, men probably could make more deals and more money in a day, but to spend it for what? Naturally, to buy more leisure to visit and talk. But why not visit and talk the easy way—part of every

day? Nevertheless, modernization is crowding this easygoing sociability out of business. Modern salesmanship injects its code of faster deals, more profits; modern life offers new forms of entertainment and new lines of possessions to purchase with the profits. A law finally was passed to set fixed prices on all wares and to end dickering. Wherever the set price is enforced, merchant and customer no longer need leisure to take each other's measure and to argue their way to a mutually acceptable price.

The best sociability is probably at meals and on holiday visits. The first courtesy to a guest on arrival is to serve coffee, tea, or a sweet fruit drink. A meal may consist of five to ten or more courses and a picnic feast may be just as elaborate as an indoor meal, because the open charcoal burner (*mangal*) is an excellent portable stove. Such feasts mean hours of preparation, and sociability reigns throughout the preparation. Visiting is the main joy of the religious holidays, Şeker and Kurban Bayramı. Crowds throng together for parades, night illuminations, and other spectacles on patriotic holidays. The principal patriotic holidays are National Sovereignty Day, celebrated as the Children's Holiday, on April 23; Atatürk's Day, May 19, the day in 1919 when he landed at Samsun on the Black Sea shore of Anatolia to stir the Turks to fight for liberation, now celebrated as the Youth and Sports Holiday; and the Holiday of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Bayramı), when the Republic was declared in 1923, on October 29.

The Turks' sense of humor is strong in cartoons, satirical essays, and clever turns of phrases. They richly enjoy cartoons interpreting national feelings on current events, a well-timed *double entendre*, or a significant pun in conversation, and they delight in quick, subtle satire. A type of humor entirely foreign to the Turks is that which disguises seriousness by levity. The wisecrack to cover embarrassment or sorrow is too incongruous for them, although they, too, can wisecrack with telling sarcasm when a person or occasion invites ridicule. Nor can they see humor in catching a person of dignified position in an undignified pose. If an unbecoming gesture or an inadvertently ridiculous error by an important person were to cause a spontaneous snicker, it would still not seem funny to publicize it as a good joke.

It would not be the Turks' idea of fun, but instead a deliberate insult, to photograph an eminent official or scholar awkwardly stuffing

food into his mouth at a banquet or wearing unbecoming clothes. A press photo of Calvin Coolidge, while President of the United States, appearing insignificant in a ten-gallon hat, would not be funny from the Turkish standpoint. As the official representative of the nation's dignity, he should not be personally belittled and laughed at. To be sure, a Turk in public office can be the butt of cartoons for hearty laughs. The difference is that cartoons express others' opinions of him, but a photograph convicts the official himself of assuming a role unworthy of the dignity of his office, and that would seem a matter for formal censure, not public levity. In general, however, Americans and Turks will find each other laughing at nearly all the same things.

The humorist who has been the pride of the Turks, ever since he supposedly lived in the thirteenth century, is Nasreddin Hoca. Every Near Eastern country claims him but the reports which are probably the most authentic make him a native of Anatolia who spent most of his life in Akşehir, at the western edge of the central plateau.<sup>5</sup> There, too, he is believed to be buried, although rumors place him in a tomb in Konya, which is famous for having a huge gate to the plot carefully locked but with no fence around it. Thus, in death, the Hoca allegedly continued his joking, and foiled expectations as he always had in every tale told about him. Certain jokes which appear periodically in the West, as originating there, are in the collections by this Turkish wit. One is of the day he addressed a mosque congregation, asking, "Do ye know that of which I have come to speak?" His hearers replied that they did not know, so he refused to address an audience which knew nothing of the subject. The next day he began with the same question, and they shouted, "We know." The Hoca said if they knew, he need not speak. The third day they smartly answered his question, "Some of us know, some of us do not know." He replied, "In that case, let those who know teach those who don't know." Again, he foiled their expectation of hearing him. Nasreddin Hoca invariably laid traps to make those who overestimated themselves trip themselves—the oversure wife, the pompous official, the too-smart trader, the conceited peasant—and he wittily extricated himself from every trap these same persons set for him. Rare indeed is the occasion when a Turk cannot find a Nasreddin Hoca quip to fit it.

Turkish humor can change its settings to fit any era or to Westernize its characters, but surely the same amusement at human foibles in



ordinary situations will always underlie it. Moreover, the natural enjoyments which provided the Turks with escape from their troubles in their days of oppression and insecurity have already survived a generation of modernization. These, too, are likely to last; the Turks seem to find them excellent balance for the competitive intensity of organized sports which Western ideas of fun are bringing into their lives.

## Culture

It was always the *world* and *mankind*—not the *West*—that Atatürk stressed.—Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent*.<sup>1</sup>

BY ESTABLISHING the Republic of Turkey, the Turks presented themselves to the world, for the first time, as a homogeneous nation. This enables them, also for the first time, to display a culture distinctly their own. ("Culture" is used here in its narrower meaning of the artistic and intellectual sides of life.) Three very dissimilar views on this subject exist today. A common Western view is that Turkish culture is more imitative than creative. The Turks, themselves, emphatically reject this view. They have two main views which can be tagged, for convenience, Turanist and Anatolian. The extreme Turanists, as explained in Chapter 3, purported to trace through language similarities the cultural influence of the Turks from their ancestral "Turan" around the world. On the other hand, the Anatolian view claims a unique culture indigenous to Turkey, a synthesis of the civilizations which have thrived in Anatolia.

The Anatolian view dominates current cultural trends in Turkey, and it is the most interesting. Turkish culture, it is said, has absorbed the compound heritage of the Assyrian, Hittite, Sumerian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Turkic cultures; and, for the past nine or ten centuries, the Turks have been synthesizing them. Foreign authorities in cultures ask, therefore, "In this succession of cultures, each of the first seven already being known for its distinct contribution, what is the Turks' unique contribution?"

Skeptical implications that the Turks have had nothing original to contribute to world culture are a very touchy point with them. They feel they are justified in resenting Western opinions typified by former

U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau's verdict: "Such graces of civilization as the Turk has acquired have practically all been taken from the subject peoples whom he so greatly despises."<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador remarked that the Turks' writing and religion were Arabic, their best literary style Persian, and their architecture Byzantine. The Turks answer that the Selçuk Turks made distinctive use of stalactite ornamentation of arches, seen especially well in Konya. They insist that their former use of the Arabic script and the Persian literary style no more indicates that the Turks are culturally incompetent than the English-speaking nations' use of Latin script and of the French language for diplomacy has indicated that those nations have no culture of their own.

One other typical Western charge was made by Georges Clemenceau, during the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, when he said, "There has been no case found in Europe or Asia or Africa in which the establishment of Turkish rule has not been followed . . . by a fall in the level of culture."<sup>3</sup> In this, the Turks acknowledge a half truth inasmuch as, under the later decadent Ottoman rule, they too suffered a fall in their level of culture. Prior to the fifteenth century, according to a number of Western authorities, their level of education and refinement had risen above the average of surrounding countries.<sup>4</sup> So the new Turks want the several centuries of cultural stalemate throughout the Empire blamed on Ottoman decadence and not on Turkish incapacity or disinclination for culture. (See Appendix C, for examples of Turkish cultural progress.)

Because Anatolia is now Turkey, cultural achievements in Anatolia prior to the Turks' migration there are sometimes called Turkish. So also, some achievements by non-Turkic peoples, living in Anatolia simultaneously with the Turks, have been called Turkish. The label is debatable. If the Hittites were the first people who smelted iron and did it in Anatolia, is that a part of Turkish culture? Is all Anatolian music Turkish, or must it be analyzed into separate Greek, Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkic elements? Answers should be on the same basis as for parallel questions about culture in the United States. Because the redskinned natives developed arts in our part of the Western Hemisphere prior to the arrival of the white settlers who named the country "America," are those Indian arts part of American culture? Should African Negro music and Spanish architecture, as they have

appeared on United States soil, be called American? This type of question should not be answered arbitrarily for one country alone. Certain Turkish scholars, among them Dr. A. Adnan-Adivar, are trying to do justice to them by study in broader perspectives.

In world histories of art the absence of Turkish painters and sculptors is conspicuous. The reasons are easy to see in a mere outline of their problem. Painting and sculpture, in the forms in which the West knows them best, were tabu for Müslim Turks until reforms began in the nineteenth century. First, their sect in Islam, the Sunni, forbade any representation of human and divine forms, whereas Western art works were full of human and holy figures. Second, in the early centuries, after the Turks' purely nomadic days, their role as a conquering minority governing subject countries afforded little opportunity to cultivate peaceful arts. Third, in the Empire's decadence, the Ottoman rulers and a reactionary Ulema rigidly forbade Western studies, including the fine arts. Müslim Turkish artists, therefore, concentrated on the Oriental decorative arts, but the number who did so, as long as artists received no encouragement, was insignificant.

The Turks say that Turkish artists have done superlative writing and illumination of copies of the Koran, and have designed exquisite patterns carved on mosques and tombs or for decoration of brass, copper, and silver, but their work was seldom signed. Miniature painting, tile decoration, wood and mother-of-pearl inlay, gold and silver embroidery, and tooled leather are all arts practiced skillfully by Turks. Yet the Turks are not famous for these arts, whereas the Persians, Arabs, and Armenians are famous for them. One task which the new Turks have set themselves, therefore, is to identify and exhibit work by Turkish decorative artists. In recent years, examples of it have been displayed continuously in exhibitions in England, the U.S.A., and Europe.

A brief interval of Ottoman tolerance, during pressure for reform in the nineteenth century, brought to the fore Osman Hamdi Bey, the first Turk to achieve success in painting in Western style. He had studied in France and had won recognition in European exhibits; he was, therefore, appointed Director of Art for the Sublime Porte in 1881. His most famous picture, noted for its lighting and technical perfection, is of a saber merchant and customers standing before a weapon-stacked booth in the covered bazaars. When the Young Turks,

during their brief ascendancy in the early twentieth century, encouraged Western studies, and Turkish art students followed in Hamdi Bey's footsteps to France, they brought back to Turkey the romantic and impressionist styles. Successive waves of influence, noticeable in Turkey, have been Dadaism, surrealism, and Western native genres, notably Mexican art.

The freeing of previously repressed abilities in painting and sculpture quickly filled newly-established art schools with students. Inevitably, their initial work has been characterized by direct copying of Western subjects and styles. Where opportunity has existed for such a short time, the supply of competent teachers of modern art cannot keep pace with the demand for instruction. The teachers are often beginners themselves, newly graduated from Turkish art schools, where they have been taught by other young artists just back from study in Europe and by a few of the older artists who started under Hamdi Bey. The twentieth-century Turks, having broken through all the barriers which had shut their forebears off from Western culture, are feeling their way into the whole free world of art.

The Young Turks had launched compulsory exhibits of Turkish artists' work; and government officials made large purchases at these exhibits to display in their offices, as they were expected to do. Although it might seem to us in the United States incongruous to have a fine arts division of a political party, Atatürk's Republican People's Party had one from the start. It carried on the Young Turks' policy of exhibits and officials' purchases; it added art courses to the curricula of nearly all schools; it now offers an annual art prize, and sponsors deserving Turkish artists. Since 1940, the government has sent a number of artists to widely scattered parts of Anatolia to paint Turkish scenes and people, but it has not tried to dictate what specific subjects the artists shall choose.

In exhibitions of Turkish art, one may look in vain for more than occasional evidence of originality, and it can hardly be expected so soon. Yet one is apt to find that the talent previously confined to decoration and rug design appears now and again in some modern Turkish painters' sensitivity to delicacy of line and unusual color harmonies. Water colors by Turkish rural school children, displayed in the United States in 1949, were photographed in full colors for future use by art teachers in Virginia, where the paintings had been

especially praised for finer detail than had been thought generally possible for such young pupils.

The situation for music has also been full of promise and of difficulties, both in ways unique to the Turks. Three decades ago, hardly any Turks except those who had lived in Europe had heard enough Western music to be able to enjoy it. Turkish music had completely escaped the influence of the Greek Pythagoreans' discovery of the octave. Instead, it had combined, in scales of infinite variety, features of Semitic music and of the native music of the Caspian region. The people's ears were not attuned to Western octave effects.

In order to show at once that Western music had a place in Turkey, Atatürk had the Presidential Philharmonic Orchestra organized in Ankara and engaged Dr. Ernst Praetorius from Germany as conductor. A Turkish conductor, Hasan Ferit Alnar, succeeded him after his death in 1946. The early concerts were almost exclusively of Western music. Indeed, for a while, Atatürk officially discouraged the teaching and public playing of Turkish music. Yet, he had one of the best Turkish vocalists, Münir Nüreddin Selcuk, sent to Paris to study, not Western music, but the techniques of voice and composition, so that he could adapt the true Anatolian music to concert use, with accompaniments on modern instruments. Later, musicians were sent through Anatolia to collect and make recordings of both classical and folk music.

A prohibitively heavy tax on professional entertainment in the 1930's caused Western musicians on tour to by-pass Turkey, and it nearly silenced native artists. In another year or two, however, the tax was lowered, and Turkish audiences again filled concert halls to hear Jacques Thibaud, Alfred Cortot, the Berlin Philharmonic, and others of the finest musicians of the West. Münir Nüreddin's concerts, also, drew large audiences, rivalled only by audiences for American jazz concerts. But, in the next decade, after popular music became literally painful through the ear-splitting, tinny renditions from loudspeakers in coffeehouses and casinos, a semi-official ban was placed on loud-speaker broadcasting of popular music, at least in Istanbul. The Ministry of Education, for some time, refused approval for any school or *halkevi* concert programs, containing popular numbers. Meanwhile progress in other directions was conspicuous, so that Istanbul, as well as Ankara, boasted of a Philharmonic Orchestra, also a three-hundred-voice City Chorus. The new State Opera House in Ankara was for-

mally opened in April, 1948, with the performance of a Turkish opera, *Kerem ile Aslı*; and the next performance was of *Carmen*. Music festivals followed, and at these the public heard prominent or promising Turkish, English, and other European composers, playing or conducting their own works.

Conditions are basically excellent for musical growth in Turkey because music is part of the Turks' everyday life. Wherever they work manually, they also sing. Their folk songs fall into five categories. First are the songs of love. A second type eulogizes a hero or public benefactor, and another glorifies a legendary character or event. Two other kinds are the narrative and vengeance songs, full of complaints. The former narrate the trials of a family snowed into a wretched hovel, or the loneliness of a trek to the district capital on a tragic or bitter errand; or they lament a death and its circumstances. Vengeance songs denounce, by name or unmistakable innuendo, an offender against love or justice. If the victim of a brutal husband or of a business cheat has the luck to have a good singer set his or her troubles to music, everybody will sing the song, and the victim will have revenge. Singers commonly improvise both words and music as they sing, and rarely write words or notes. An oratorio in Western harmony has been written around the narrative songs about *Köroğlu*, a famous brigand of Robin Hood spirit.

Foreign interest in Turkish music, until recently, has amounted to hardly more than occasional purchases of recordings for students interested in Eastern music in general. But now Western audiences promptly hear works by Turkish composers, as in the first performances of Ulvi Cemal Erkin's symphony at a music festival in Prague, and other compositions of his in other European capitals. Adnan Saygın's oratorio, *Yunus Emre*, was heard in Paris, and recently the works of three Turkish composers were broadcast by Switzerland's Radio Beromunster.

Progress in drama is just beginning to catch up with progress in other arts in Turkey. In the past, non-Müslim Turks—mostly Armenian, Greek, and Italian—were the actors for audiences, also largely non-Müslim. Müslim women had not had the right to appear on a public stage, and the Sultan-Khalif's displeasure with anything Western had discouraged most Müslim men from doing so. In order to provide excellent direction for all Turks who wished to become actors

or playwrights, the Turkish government, in 1939, engaged Carl Ebert, former director of the Berlin Opera, to head the drama and opera department of the Ankara State Conservatory. He expressed astonishment at the basic talent shown by the Turks. Nevertheless, in spite of talent and interest, most educated Turkish families are as reluctant to have their sons and daughters go on the stage professionally as were the families in the United States in the 1890's. But this is changing. Tunç Yalman, son of Ahmet Emin Yalman, eminent publisher and writer, while a graduate student at Yale University School of Drama in the 1940's, wrote three of the major productions of that school, and three other Turks participated in the performances.

Turkish playwrights of the Republic began with patriotic themes, partly to meet the need for amateur performances in schools on patriotic holidays, partly because nothing could possibly be more dramatic than the Turks' struggle to save Turkey for the Turks and to carry out Atatürk's social reforms. Unfortunately, however dramatic the theme, too little dramatic action was brought onto the stage; the actors, instead, recited excessively long speeches of narrative or pleading. The greatest Turkish actor and director during the Republic's youth, Muhsin Ertuğrul, kept well abreast of revolutionary innovations in staging and acting in modern France, Germany, and Russia. Time, however, has not been sufficient yet to develop a great number of performers of outstanding achievement, though many are competent. It is barely seven years ago that the conservatory graduated its first class in drama.

Two tremendous obstacles have blocked the Turks' literary growth. First, the sultans and the Ulema had banned printing presses for centuries after Europe had them, lest they jeopardize the art of writing in the script of the Koran, and for political reasons. Second, illiteracy. So few Turks could read that there was no real market for Turkish publications. Literate Turks, as a rule, could read several languages, and they satisfied their reading tastes with foreign literature. "Early Turkish writers," a youthful Turk of today remarked, "wrote not for an audience but as one sings to himself or his personal friends—mostly about palace life—on matters and in words incomprehensible to the new literates of today."

Rarely have sales of a Turkish book, fiction or non-fiction, exceeded two editions, or two to six thousand copies. About twenty thousand



copies of the outstanding best seller before 1950, Reşat Nuri Güntekin's *Çalığışu* (The Wren), were sold in about twenty-six years. Its unprecedented sales were due to the combination of a good story of a village schoolteacher, a very readable style, and increasing literacy. Publishers today produce small editions of a great many different books, commonly on pulp paper, loosely bound. The ease with which writers can find publishers for their books, or have them printed at their own expense, feeds the new craving for "Turkish literature," but it has not kept writers at their best. Thoughtful Turks, themselves, notice the unevenness of quality in the prolific works of even their ablest writers.

The novel, the short story, and the popular essay are so new in Turkey that relatively few of them can be found dated before the twentieth century. The forerunner of the novel in Turkey was the *hamise*, meaning "five," a fictional but ponderous narrative in precisely five parts, a form which eventually died of its own dullness. Conspicuous nineteenth-century attempts at novel writing were rather affected imitations of French writers, usually of Dumas *films*. Today's most popular Turkish fiction, when not romance, is vivid delineation of Turkish life of a certain period, perhaps of recent wars, or of a typical locality, urban or rural.

Poetry had always been the favorite literary form, and very high standards have been achieved. For a full appraisal of Turkish culture, and not a single-chapter sketch of trends in a specific period, as this is, a great deal more would have to be written about the Turkish poets. This chapter emphasizes prose writers at the expense of the poets because prose writing, especially fiction, was the chief innovation by the new Turks' literary pioneers between 1920 and 1950. To the poets of the twentieth-century transition, however, goes the credit for inspiring eager followers with a new social concern, and also with a desire for a Turkish literary form, free from classical Turkish bonds, yet not aping the West. (The roster of able Turkish writers of poetry and prose is too long to list here, but a few names are given in Appendix C.)

Newspapers provide the ever-growing number of literates with some of the best works by Turkish writers, and with serial translations of Western fiction. Almost any foreign story which has been shown in films in Turkey, is rushed into translation, with literary merit

seldom considered. But even good selections often suffer from careless translation. *Gone with the Wind*, the U.S. Civil War Story by Margaret Mitchell, had the misfortune to be translated by a man who, it is said, translated it from the French translation, since he did not know English. Through the translator's complete ignorance of life in the United States, he "orientalized" Scarlett O'Hara. Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth*, Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn*, and Eugene O'Neill's *The Great God Brown* are examples of careful translation. These few titles indicate the recent interest in American as well as European fiction.

Inasmuch as Turkey has not yet joined the International Copyright Union, the Turks have been able to appropriate freely foreign literature for translation; and, conversely, foreign nations can take Turkish writings to quote or translate without fee or formality. One Turkish novel, Payami Safa's *The Ninth Surgical Ward* (*Dokuzuncu Hariciye Koğuşu*), has reportedly been translated into eight languages. Today, both the United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization and the American Council of Learned Societies are having selected Turkish works translated.

The medium for essays in Turkey is also the newspapers, literary periodicals, or the weekly humor magazines, which closely reflect public opinion in satire and cartoons. Recently, the digest-size magazines have arrived, seemingly to stay. Journals in special fields are launched by private individuals or groups, and many survive only until the initial capital has been spent; but new ones appear.

Archeology and museums have caught the Turks' imagination. Many university students study archeology, for they have a wealth of opportunities to work on ancient cultures in their own land. The hundredth anniversary of Turkish museums was celebrated in 1948, but their finest development has taken place under the Republic. The new Turks have converted into museums the most famous mosque, Aya Sofia, originally the Byzantine church of Saint Sophia, and the most famous Ottoman palace, the Grand Seraglio. In Aya Sofia, the government permitted an American, Thomas Whittemore, to restore the Byzantine mosaics which had been painted over to conceal the figures of saints and angels. Some mosaics had also been covered by huge disks bearing the names of Müslim prophets in the artistic Arabic script. Seeing those disks, stacked unused against the wall during

restoration of the mosaics, has periodically aroused the press to make more or less of an issue on whether the Müslim disks or the Christian mosaics should be permanently displayed in the original locations. Throughout the whole land, the Republic had, in its first quarter century, restored more than one hundred mosques and other historical structures, such as Roman bridges and Greek theaters, and is continuing the work at the same pace.

The cultural interest for which the Turks seem to have been the least prepared is that of abstract reasoning in philosophy and pure science, with the exception of mathematics. The exigencies of life for a minority providing officials to rule a heterogeneous empire, or for oppressed peasants—and the Turks have for so long been one or the other—are conducive only to concentration on immediate concrete situations. Islam's mysticism stimulated relatively little abstract reasoning except by members of certain learned orders, like some of the dervishes. The Turks, in general, could gain almost nothing by deliberate philosophical discussion, for what was the use when Sultan Abdülhamid's government, even in the twentieth century, had gone to such extremes to suppress any sign of critical thinking that it ordered the word for philosophy (*hikmet*) taken out of the dictionary!

The first Turks to study philosophy in Europe in the nineteenth century returned to Turkey as quite dogmatic advocates of one or another particular philosophy. Ziya Gökalp made the views of the French sociologist, Émile Dürkheim, the synonym for Western philosophy for a decade or more. Later, a few Turkish scholars took up the cudgels for American pragmatism to counter Dürkheim's practical obliteration of the individual in the social mass. Other Turkish teachers and writers returned from France to place Bergson on a pedestal. Interest in the majority of Western philosophers, from Socrates on, has been chiefly incidental to outlines of history of philosophy, or else a short-lived enthusiasm for one or another, with one exception. Auguste Comte's teachings have held almost complete sway over the new Turks since the Young Turks' Ahmed Riza popularized them.

The Turks seem to have welcomed Comte's conclusions that the theological and metaphysical stages of human thought can, and should be, outgrown. They, too, have been in a mood to deem all-sufficient science's "positive" knowledge of "events-as-they-occur." They have joined in Comte's easy confidence that his oversimplification of scien-

tific method could solve moral and social as well as physical problems. Such unquestioning faith in inadequately comprehended methods was naïve in Comte, and it has been naïve in the Turks.<sup>5</sup> On the whole, the critical judgment of principles, assumptions, and implications, which comes through long study and discussion of many conflicting philosophies, has not been sufficiently cultivated in Turkish schools, although a few Turkish poets and religious writers of the past, and certain contemporary scholars, have achieved it.

The new Turks are very culture-conscious. And they are wary about it. They want honest, ungrudging recognition of their own literary and art forms and of their promise of future original achievements. They watch incessantly, however, lest new cultural channels into Turkey, like religious channels in the past, admit unwanted foreign political pressures. Every foreign cultural institution in Turkey, be it the American colleges or a German archeological expedition, must have a Turkish co-director or vice-president in its administration. His function is to be a helpful liaison officer between the institution and the government, and also to be alert to any indication of the institution's abuse of its privileges in Turkey.

No culture can be well-known until it is studied in its own language. Western studies of Turkish culture have, more often than not, been in the Arabic language, and incidental to more general studies of the whole Ottoman Empire and Islam. Although the direct sources on Turkish culture have been in Arabic script, they have been in the Turkish vocabulary, and too few researchers have known that vocabulary. The result has been roughly like a judgment of the Thirteen Colonies in America based almost wholly upon research in European Christian culture and British sources. It does give the necessary background but entirely misses the intrinsic character and meaning of the Turks' own cultural development. The twentieth century has seen a great deal more research in purely Turkish sources. The Turks anticipate becoming better known in their own right by publicizing more widely the art and literature which they produced, both before and after the Ottoman interlude of decadence. And they are determinedly trying to develop a distinctive culture of their own out of their mixed Oriental heritage and current Occidental trends.

## Character

The Turks' revolution threw a sudden light on the essentially human qualities of the people and their leaders.—Ernest Jackh, Carnegie Professor of International Relations, Columbia University.<sup>1</sup>

THE Müslim Turk at home in his own land makes the West's old stereotypes of "The Terrible Turk" appear untrue to life. When they were formed, the word "Turk" was ambiguous; it was applied rather indiscriminately to the sultan, to *any* subject of the Ottoman Empire, to the Müslim subjects, or exclusively to subjects whose native tongue was Turkish. Properly, only the last were true Turks; even the later sultans considering themselves "Ottomans" rather than "Turks." The rest of the population of the Turkish Empire—Christians and Arabs, Persians, Jews, and other smaller groups—contributed much to the character of the empire, but the character of the Turks, the Turkic people, is an independent theme. In order, however, to replace stereotypes by a more lifelike picture, it is not at all necessary to set the Turks on a pedestal and point out nothing but virtues; better understanding can be gained simply by observing characteristics conspicuous in them since they began voluntarily reshaping their lives.

A stranger quickly notices the formal courtesy of the Turks' Old World manners. Turkish formality forbids a younger man to stand with his hands in his pockets in the presence of an older person, even of his own elder brother if there is considerable difference in years. A younger person does not smoke in the presence of an elder unless asked to do so. Nor should anyone, seated on a chair instead of on the old-fashioned divan or cushions, cross his legs in the presence of anyone he respects. On receiving a gift from the hand of a giver, a Turk

does not open it and admire it effusively; he or she puts the gift aside unopened as long as the guest is there, and pays attention to the giver rather than the gift. Such courtesies are basically keyed to attentive consideration for others. Relaxation of formality goes with long intimate understanding, or, on occasion, it can indicate deliberate disrespect; and, in ill-poised individuals, it can deteriorate into extreme insolence.

Another unmistakable element in Turkish character is pride. The Turks' pride is not the exuberant bursting youthful pride of Americans in the United States; it is a mature and defensive pride. Americans, as a result of growing up nationally in practically uncontested enjoyment of a land of plenty, are confidently proud in the fashion of a family which has never suffered the worst effects of want and fear. Turkish pride, as a result of intense competition for power followed by losses, is more like that of a family which has experienced both wealth and bankruptcy, and which intends in spite of everything to perpetuate a proud name in the old home place—Anatolia and Istanbul. Theirs is a protective pride with studied resistance to ridicule and criticism, which sometimes leads them to exaggerated claims of achievements.

No non-Turk, associating with the new Turks, can fail to discover their supersensitivity, even though many Turks are quite frank in self-criticism. The barrage of unfavorable opinion which the West has levelled at them for centuries is a strong reason for it. The Turks' reaction now, however, is not to turn their backs on the critical unsympathetic West, but rather to demand attention to their current readiness for whatever Western civilization can offer. Let a foreigner start to photograph picturesque native boats or the beautifully carved Müslim tombstones, and more than likely some Turk will stop, shake his head and say, "*Eski, eski*" ("Old, old"); then indicate a "better" subject, a new ship acquired from the United States or a modern school building, about which he will proudly exclaim, "*Yeni*" ("New").

Inability to see the forest for the trees makes many Turks miss a forest of praise because a little clump of criticisms looms so disproportionately large in their minds. After reading an article generally favorable to the Turks but containing references to moot points such as polygamy and mass deportations, a Turk in a prominent position, wrote to the author, "The only paying proposition in bringing the

peoples of the world closer is not in the continuance of old established slanted and fixed ideas, but in trying to understand the problems which confront us." Thus he indicated that the time has come to stop even repeating the old stereotypes—to let them be forgotten—and this is the earnest wish of most Turks today. The foremost problems which the Turks want foreigners to understand are illiteracy, poverty, inadequate transportation, and foreign threats to their independence. They want harems, *opera bouffe* features of the Sublime Porte, massacres, and misrule relegated to the past. Yet, the stereotypes which arose from them were themselves a grave problem in the Republic's pioneer years because of the wide currency given to the Christians' troubles without comparable knowledge of the Turks' side of the same troubles.

A difficult phase of adjustment to Westernization has been the censorship of Western publications in school libraries and classrooms. The government, about 1940, ordered every word derogatory to the Turks to be cut out of any page, or the book or magazine removed from circulation. A pupil finding such a passage was expected to report it to government officials. In carrying out this order, it is amazing to a Westerner to discover how far discrediting of the Turks has gone even when wholly irrelevant to the writer's theme or intent. Western fiction is incredibly full of the clichés, "Terrible Turk" and "Unspeakable Turk," used in similes or metaphors. Both Webster's and Funk and Wagnall's dictionaries print among definitions of Turk: "Qualities attributed to Turks, such as duplicity, sensuality, and brutality."<sup>2</sup> Of all nationalities defined in the dictionaries, few, if any but the Turks, have "qualities" included in their definitions, and the Turks are singled out for scurrilous definition because of the stereotyped idea. Westerners are tempted to laugh off the order to cut these words and references out of books as childish resentment by the Turks "who must be trying to cover up their past, or who dare not face criticism." Certainly, the holes cut in the pages made the frequency of derogatory comments even more obvious. But holes do not engrave specific words of condemnation on pupils' minds by persistent repetition, and they do show that the government protests unfavorable opinions without, however, discouraging Western reading.

The seriousness of words to the Turks is in total contrast to our own attitude—a contrast which is extremely clear in two proverbs. In

the United States, we say, "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me." The Turks say, "The hurt of a stick dies away, but words hurt forever." Censorship of books, therefore, in addition to protecting pupils' minds, appears to be a symbolic defense of the Turkish people against the eternal hurt of words.

Cruelty by the Turks has been a byword in the West. The Turks themselves admit the gruesomeness of bowstring stranglings of rival, but sometimes innocent, claimants to the Ottoman throne, and of massacres of relatively defenseless people suspected of enmity, who were caught with others of indubitable hostility. But they wonder why, of all the peoples in the world who have resorted to cruelty, they have been singled out for the most unrelieved blame; why they have so seldom received offsetting credit for good traits. A simple partial explanation is that the cruelty of the worst Turkish rulers, in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, sent refugees scurrying to Western Christian countries, where priests, lecturers, and writers were the most articulate people in the world because of their universities and printing presses. The Turks could not have released their cruelty into channels where reports would spread faster or farther, or leave more permanent records. Furthermore, Müslim Turks, as a whole, also suffered from the same brutalities of Ottoman misgovernment, but the breach between Islam and the Christian West was far too wide in those centuries for any sympathetic recognition that suffering could be mutual.

The eminent British historian, Professor Arnold Toynbee, has reassessed the significance of Turkish cruelties, specifically those of the earlier part of the present century, in a fashion which relieves the Turks of sole blame. In his opinion, "The atrocities have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one nationality."<sup>3</sup> Another reassessment has been compelled by the shocking extremes of cruelty to which Christian peoples resorted in the 1930's and 1940's—when the power-drunk leader, Hitler, harangued the Germans into unspeakable brutalities, and when other civilized nations resorted to unprecedentedly cruel warfare in self-defense. The realistic approach to understanding the Turks' character is neither to deny nor to condone their cruel actions, but to balance the evil of abnormal crises with the good of normal times on the same scales used to weigh the character of other nationalities.



Three more traits not infrequently attributed to the Turks by tradition are fear, fanaticism, and fatalism. Former Ambassador Morgenthau wrote, "Essentially the Turk . . . is brave as a lion . . . when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him."<sup>4</sup> A year after he published this, the Turks, led by Atatürk, belied his view by having the nerve to fight back, practically unaided, against such overwhelming reverses as World War I defeat, the ignominious fall of the Young Turk triumvirate, and foreign occupation of key areas. Yet, from other angles come hints that, in some respects, fears do dominate Turks. I have heard Turks themselves remark apropos of officials who are indifferently uncoöperative, "These officials won't do a thing unless they are afraid." Underlings display fearful obsequiousness toward their superiors who, moreover, often expect it from them. As noted in Chapter 11, violence flares quickly from the fears engendered by frustrations. Exceptions to all this, however, must be made for the best-educated, cosmopolitan Turks, and for the more thoughtful of the uneducated Turks, who are accustomed to control by reason. Although tributes have been repeatedly paid to the Turks' physical courage, it seems credible that their fear of loss of advantage or prestige is disproportionately strong. This fear shows itself in the Turks' sensitivity to criticism, in legal measures taken to check ridicule, and sometimes in violent reaction to frustration.

The closer one's acquaintance with the Turks, the less fanaticism appears to be characteristic of them. Their realistic attitude, which considers alternatives, changes tactics, and sometimes objectives, as circumstances change, is the antithesis of fanaticism's single-track obsessions. Had the Turks been religious fanatics they could hardly have permitted the religious autonomy of the Christian millets, or have tolerated, under their Khalifate, the divergencies of Islamic sects for so many centuries. The Turks, of all Müslims, most consistently distinguished between political and religious compulsion. Nevertheless, they could not free themselves from the stamp of Müslim fanaticism as long as they upheld the power of a politico-religious Sultan-Khalif, who could call for a Holy War (*Cihad*). Only when relieved of that incubus could they make convincing claims to unfanatical, peaceful preferences in international relations.

If it be granted that the Turks are not religious fanatics, one may ask if they are fanatics of another sort—are they fanatical patriots? The

new Turks' patriotic fervor was tested in the World War II crisis and the ensuing "war of nerves" which the Soviet Union waged against them in fresh efforts to gain control of the Dardanelles. The pitch which their patriotism then reached was stated in a letter to an American editor by Hasan Cemil Çambel, formerly an army colonel and military attaché in diplomatic service, and for many years a deputy in the Grand National Assembly. He wrote, early in 1948:

Turkey is able to defend herself because, 1.—The Turks are a heroic nation—wrought by war—and they know how to handle the sword of Mars. Their whole national history bears testimony to this fact. 2.—The greatest honor which can be bestowed on a Turk is to die on the battlefield, for he will thus be entitled to the greatest reward in after life. The Turks prefer to die for their country, their liberty and their independence to a life in bondage. Their history, their natural tradition and their faith is based on this conception. [Bay Çambel added two other causes for being daring in defense, namely the terrain of Turkey and the certainty of allies in a major conflict, but the first two indicate the character traits.]

The new Turks transferred the maxim of reward for dying in battle in defense of the faith of Islam to death in defense of their country. On either basis, a bloodthirsty zest for battle is not a necessary concomitant. Something of the duelling spirit seems to be in this attitude; if honor is challenged, a man fights, and dying bravely for honor is a form of glory. But only a foolhardy man courts the chance, and most Turks are not foolhardy. Or there may be a parallel in the Christian text, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (St. John 15:13). Christians have not interpreted this to mean welcoming danger for friends in order to be able to make this "glorious" sacrifice. Neither have I discovered that Turks in general have a fanatic's craving for battle as the way to salvation, though this tenet may spur them to great heroism when battle is unavoidable.

Many Westerners assume that Turks are fatalists because of the Müslim doctrine of predestination (*kismet*). The Turks, as well as the Christians, are prone to attribute to God's will or to destiny whatever they cannot explain by natural causes. Atatürk had miraculous escapes when he exposed himself to enemy fire in World War I, and the Turks said, "*Kismet böyle imiş!*" ("Destiny made it so!") The Turk resigns himself by *kismet* to suffering and death, and, especially if he is uneducated, fears strange new ways to alter fate as in modern pre-

vention of disease. This proves no more inherent fatalism in the Turks than in Americans who, under parallel circumstances, say, "That's fate," or "It's God's will."

Turks are fatalists, however, to a degree unknown to Americans, and for a nonreligious reason explained by Ahmet Emin Yalman as follows: "Turkish fatalism was not a matter of choice, nor a result of religious, racial, or climatic conditions. It was the only possible reaction to misgovernment, and to the overwhelming obstacles and misfortunes encountered in everyday life."<sup>5</sup> This fatalism is a "What's the use?" fatalism. "What's the use?" constrained the most humane and forward looking Turks from displaying initiative during the worst of the Ottoman decline. "What's the use?" brought upon the Anatolian peasants a reputation for nearly hopeless backwardness, and it spread epidemic inefficiency through provincial and local governments. "What's the use?" destroyed cultural ambitions and scientific curiosity, and justified Professor Toynbee's classification of the Ottoman state among "arrested civilizations." It did all this until the nineteenth-century reform (*Tanzimat*) era was climaxed by the new Turks' successful determination to defy "fate" and to set a pattern of their own for the future. This fatalism still drags against progress, but no longer hard enough to stop it.

Turks are actually more realists than fatalists. Hardly anything seems more characteristic of them individually and nationally in the ordinary course of events than their word *bakalım*. The verb *bakmak*, of which it is a form, means "to see, investigate, and consult": hence, "Let us see, let us look into this; the time to act will be when many factors are clearer than they are now." Let the real facts determine action. *Bakalım* wards off many crises, from the domestic to the international level. But inevitably the Turks' skill in using real conditions as their guide makes their actions seem as unpredictable as the conditions. They are, therefore, repeatedly criticized as sheer opportunists, concerned solely with the most they can get for themselves out of every situation. From that standpoint, it is easy for a foreigner to jump to any conclusion he likes about what the Turks want for themselves.

Although any foreigner's comments on another people's character can be only personal opinion, several statements by influential Turks seem to me relevant to the question of what the Turks want. Certain representatives of Turkey at the charter conference of the United

Nations in San Francisco asserted, in informal discussion, that the United States and Turkey have in common a basic concern for humanity; that both wish to uphold the human right to life and opportunity, or as stated publicly in a Turkish editorial, "the right to peace and freedom."

Turkophobes will shout that the Turks have denied these very rights to their own subject peoples. To this the Turks' retort is sure to be that, prior to Ottoman deterioration, it was the Turks who had restored order, hence peace and freedom, to Christian and Müslim sects which had cheated themselves of these rights by their respective internecine wars. Furthermore, they will remind inquirers that the Turks gave to Christian subjects, far more than to Müslim Turks, opportunities for business profits and sometimes also for political power, until too many Christians, during the past century, made common cause with Turkey's enemies.

In Turkish newspaper files are the records of official and unofficial demands by the Turks, made while World War II was in progress, for international guarantees of freedom and peace for all neighboring states, including former Ottoman subject peoples. There are many official statements testifying that Turkey entered into the United Nations in prayerful hope for peace and freedom for all humanity. For example, former President İnönü declared to the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1946:

It is with firm determination that the Turkish people join in the efforts of nations who admire humanitarianism and civilization to ensure that the United Nations shall become an effective instrument of peace affording equality and justice for all peoples.

All this contradicts a harsh Western judgment echoed by Ambassador Morgenthau, who became a veritable sounding board for anti-Turkish sentiments when he was at the Sublime Porte during the Young Turk fiasco in World War I: "We must realize that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races . . . he [the Turk] actually looks upon his European neighbors as far less worthy of consideration than his own domestic animals."<sup>6</sup> This seems to be true of the government and officials of the Sublime Porte during the regimes of the worst sultans and of the Young Turk triumvirate; and also of certain arrogant Turks at any

time. Insofar then as there has been evidence of it, Professor Toynbee's explanation is that the Ottomans, in the fashion of nomadic conquerors, treated captive peoples as human cattle or sheep to be milked or shorn by their shepherds, but otherwise to live according to their natures. In his view, certain human captives, like certain animals, were not only tamed but were trained to special duties—for example, the janissaries trained to be the Ottoman "watchdogs." Though certain trained captives did far outrank Müslim Turks in military or political authority, the captives still remained inferior creatures to their "herdsmen," the Turks.<sup>7</sup>

A different explanation for a Turkish sense of superiority might be that the peoples whom the Turks mastered were not primitive natives of undeveloped continents, as were the subjects of the early European and British colonial empires. Indeed, the Turks had conquered the most civilized part of the world, and had made themselves masters over certain of the most advanced populations of that day. When civilized peoples, who prospered by economic and cultural ways unfamiliar to the Turks, yielded to the Ottoman Turks as "masters," it could be that this, more than an old nomadic fashion, gave the Turks a conviction of their own superiority.

Both of these explanations for a sense of ingrained difference between the Turk and the non-Turk are probably news to the Turks, who are not given to analyzing causes of their own attitudes. They undoubtedly would resent Professor Toynbee's implication of their native inhumanity to man, and they can easily point out that the later misruling Ottomans relegated not only non-Turk captives but their own Turkish peasants to a sort of "nonhuman" inferiority. In any case, they can well assert that the attitude described is no part of their present desire for equality and mutual respect throughout the human family. It all goes to show that past impressions of the Turks and present intentions avowed by the Turks do not fit together, and consequently that reappraisal of the Turks' character, distinct from that of their former ruling class, is in order.

Turks often mention conscience as the guarantor of principles. Outsiders cannot read another people's conscience. They can, at best, form judgments from overt manifestations of two elements in conscience which are basic criteria of character the world over—honor and sincerity. The Turk is extremely proud of his honor. The legally

binding oath in Turkey today is, "On my word of honor." When a Turk does agree to anything on his word of honor, its meaning is apt to be very literal but, in a certain sense, also flexible. It is essential to note that this is customarily the two-way-stretch kind of flexibility; strained hard in opposite directions by pulls of circumstances, it regains its original form when relaxed from strain. Whoever reads into a Turkish agreement wishful thinking beyond the literal word may feel "betrayed" when he sees that word stretched in some unwanted direction, in order to accommodate itself to circumstances; and be equally surprised when, later, he finds it recovering its original form, fitted to the original intent. The West learned a great deal about this in following the way the Turks made and kept agreements with both sides in World War II, through baffling changes of circumstances, but always with a pro-democratic intent (a matter to be discussed more fully in Chapter 17).

Sincerity, fundamentally, probably means the same thing in the United States and Turkey, but it is manifested in almost opposite ways. The typical attitude in the U.S.A. is, "Trust a person until he proves himself untrustworthy." In Turkey, as in most Eastern or very old countries, it usually is, "Distrust anyone until he proves himself trustworthy." Thus West and East are apt to consider each other insincere. The Turk often wonders if our quick cordiality and frankness can be sincere since, on closer acquaintance, our attitude may change. We often wonder if the Turks' approach is sincere because we cannot readily know whether their formal courtesy masks trust or distrust. No formula for sincerity, but only longer acquaintance, can show how far mutual trust is possible.

In the Turks' own lives, perhaps the strongest force is group solidarity—trust in one's own group and distrust of outsiders—so that no member acts outwardly independently of the group, although inside the group he may disagree with others and try to convert them to his way. Within it, the concern of one is the concern of all, and unstinted sharing of possessions and efforts is the evidence of sincerity. The group can be a family, a school class, a close circle of friends, or a *memleket* (the native community—one's own village, province, or country). Each individual's *memleket* expands as far as he can trustfully identify himself with others. As international understanding increases, the Turks' sense of trust and solidarity is likely to expand accordingly.

Five hundred years ago the Turk whirled into the West as a conqueror; today he proposes to stay as a good neighbor. It has become vitally important, therefore, to discover how far the Turks' character sets him off from Western people, or how well it enables him to be at home in Western, as well as Eastern, civilization. When the new Turks first announced certain Westernization projects, two estimates of their adaptability were quoted in the symposium on *Modern Turkey*, prepared by Eliot Grinnell Mears. These typically contrary views are:

Had the Turk been other than what he really was, he might have become a new nation, alongside the other southeastern (European) nations. Being what he was the Turk could not do this. . . . He could not assimilate the other nations or be assimilated to them. He could not sit down among the other nations as a constant neighbor and occasional enemy. If he came among them at all, he could come only as a ruler and, if as a ruler, then an oppressor. (Quoted from *The Ottoman Power in Europe* by E. A. Freeman.<sup>8</sup>)

The Turk . . . is very apt in assuming Western civilization. . . . Every Turk I have met who has dwelt for a considerable period in any foreign country, although never losing his patriotism and deep love for his land, has become in manners, thought and habits an Englishman, German or Frenchman. This leads one almost to suppose that Turks might be Europeanized by the educational process without any prejudicial result, for at present they have every quality of a ruling race except initiative, which is an essentially European quality. Their ardent patriotism is their only incentive; and their intelligence is scarcely sufficient to show them that serving their country as soldiers is not the only duty of citizens. (Quoted from *Dar-ul-Islam* by Sir Mark Sykes.<sup>9</sup>)

Since 1923 the Turks have been doing the very things which these authorities, while in some respects contradicting each other, respectively said were impossible to the Turkish character. The Turks have become "a new nation alongside of the other southeastern nations." Their Republic is already a twenty-seven-year-old monument to their initiative and to their intelligence in seeking ways other than soldiering to serve their country, even though many are still convinced that other ways are unbecoming to a people "born to rule." On the whole, however, their first appearance as a homogeneous nation—their first chance to be themselves in the eyes of the modern world—invalidates the West's old stereotypes of the Turks as destructive, inhumane, uncultured people. They have thrown their energies into constructive activity and have spurred those efforts by research into earlier con-

structive periods in Turkish history; they have put humanitarianism foremost in their own new social and economic life; they have concentrated on cultural opportunities from initial literacy to the fine arts; and they have joined promptly and actively in peaceful aims of the United Nations.

This is all being done in a series of unique experiments in education, employment, welfare, rural development, religion, recreation, and culture, described in preceding chapters. Many contradictory characteristics have appeared—the patience and control denoted by *bakalım*, but sudden violence; rigid discipline, but excessive fears; proud assurance, but supersensitivity; tense emotionalism, but restful placidity. Sometimes these are the contrasts between literate and illiterate Turks; sometimes between the city Turk (*şehirli*) and the villager (*köylü*); or between different situations for individual Turks. Many contradictory statements, therefore, can be made about the Turks and each may be a half-truth. Arriving at whole truths is very difficult while such radical human experiments are in progress. Though not yet at the point for final conclusions, these experiments are far enough along to give high probability to the following preliminary conclusions:

Turks are extraordinarily adaptable to sudden and extreme changes—a distinct asset for the rapid pace and new interdependence of the modern world.

The Turks' sensitive, defensive pride in self and nation, and their fear of ignominy and futility play a large part in anything they do, and this must be taken into account in coöperating with them in a world growing more intimate.

Above all, the Turks, more than any other people, are in psychological transition while pioneering a fusion of the once supposedly incompatible ways of the East and of the West; an unprecedented experience which all human society is apparently to be compelled to undergo, sooner or later, for the sake of world peace.



PART III  
AFFAIRS OF THE NATION



## *Aims and Achievements*

Those who effect conquests by the sword finish by being beaten by those who use the plow, and by ceding their place to them.—Atatürk.

THE pioneer generation in the Turkish Republic can never have the contrasts between its achievements and Ottoman conditions set forth in full statistical array, because Ottoman records were unsystematic and primarily military. Moreover, only recently did the Republic begin to systematize records. Therefore more significance at present can be found in the nature than in the measure of the new 'Turks' aims and achievements. In comparison to the outside world, Turkey is still far behind the most progressive modern nations, but already in many respects, far ahead of the Balkan and Arab states, which had thrown off the Ottoman yoke before the Turks freed themselves. Yet, the fairest comparison at this stage is between the 'Turks' own aims and their own results. The best intimation of what to expect in the future lies in how true their achievements, great or small, have been to the aims which they set for themselves.

Their original aim, born of the desperation of Ottoman collapse, was simply to save themselves—to save their homeland and their independence. This objective was sharply defined in the National Pact of 1920, prescribing the geographical and citizenship limits of Turkey for the Turks. Yet, some Turks, at that stage, could see no hope of achievement; they wanted to seek outside support in the form of a great power mandate over Turkey under the League of Nations. One opponent, Refet Bey, had argued, "In the twentieth century it is impossible to maintain without foreign aid the existence of a nation with a debt of 500,000,000 pounds, its state property ruined, its soil

barely productive and its revenues not exceeding at the utmost from ten to fifteen millions."<sup>1</sup> Another opponent, Vasif Bey, had carried on the argument:

Even if all the nations said they would leave us in complete independence, we would still need their help. Nobody at all will forgive this indebtedness; they will tell us to pay it, yet our income is not enough for even the interest on it. . . . Hence our financial situation does not permit us to live in independence. Moreover, close to us are nations whose desire is to partition us. . . . What can we do without money, without an army? They gyrate in the air in planes; we, in oxcarts, can hardly save ourselves. They use dreadnaughts, we cannot build sailing vessels. Under these circumstances, even though we preserve our independence today, then another day they will partition our country.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of such opposition and doubts, the achievement of the first aim has been complete. The new Turks raised an army in 1920, fought their War of Liberation and, in 1950, held their eighth national elections as an independent Republic. They saved themselves financially by meeting promptly every installment of their part (40 per cent) of the Ottoman debt, and by buying and absorbing foreign-held shares into their national debt. The Republic furthermore has maintained itself in complete solvency while increasing its annual budget from less than seventy million Turkish liras to two billion.<sup>3</sup>

From the start, another aim of the new Turks was to realize the long-delayed objectives of the early nineteenth-century *Tanzimat* era. This has been done. A constitutional government is functioning; the capitulations and millets have been abolished; the doors to Western relations and culture are wide open, and education is paramount in all planning and expenditures. Achievement of this aim has peculiar significance because it refutes too common impressions that Atatürk spun from his own mind alone the ideas which remade Turkey, and hence, that the Republic rose, stands, and may fall with the duration of his personal influence on his contemporaries. Actually he, wittingly, built upon the aims launched by many clear-thinking Turks before him, and he obviously anticipated that other Turks of equally clear vision would lead future generations. Atatürk's singular contribution was in engineering the transition from hopes to initial achievement.

In view of actual achievements which read like fairy tales, it is not surprising that the Republic's second decade was a period of growing

illusions of unprecedented security and cumulative prosperity. A few of the spectacular examples from the first decade and a half were: Eighteen times as much cotton land under cultivation in the first two years; 128 per cent increase in exports in the first three years; and ten times as great industrial production in 1940 as in 1924. One new opportunity after another to learn and earn was being offered to peasants and laborers, also to scholars and artists. Finally, friendly relations with other nations were growing friendlier. At that point, the aim seemed very simple—"Just keep going." Although this was a sound aim, only self-delusion could have made it seem to anyone an adequate one.

The remarkable pace set was itself creating new conditions which called for new aims. Greatly increased economic prosperity was in sight, but for whom? Was it again to be luxury for a ruling caste of high government and military officials, and now, also, of successful promoters in the economic field—or everybody's prosperity? The Turks were not accustomed to a strong middle class between those who prospered by sheer luck of position and those who served them by fate of ignorance and poverty. Yet, the rapidly developing universal education, and the welfare programs for peasants and laborers, would eventually destroy that pattern and produce unprecedented demands at new levels. General cultural aims also needed reclarification. Should it be taken for granted that Westernization *is* salvation? Or were Ottoman traditions to be cherished and cultivated above all else? The younger generation was then none too clear—or at least not all in agreement—on whether it would be to Turkey's best advantage to become wholly Western, to be steadfastly Eastern, or which to emphasize in a selective synthesis.

In any case, the mid-1930's constituted an interlude of easy riding of the tide, without the sharp charting of directions by which the new ship of state had started its daring voyage. Material gains continued to afford spectacular figures, although progress was very uneven. Then the world war crisis in 1939 abruptly ended this brief interlude of popular, easy optimism, and set the Turks once more to critical consideration of their course. Whereas the war situation, in some respects, speeded achievement—an 81 per cent increase in mineral production, 1939-48; a 53 per cent increase in ton-kilometers carried on Turkish

railroads, and so on—it also exposed many of the weaknesses in government planning and methods.

There is no doubt that Turkey, in spite of figures dazzling on paper, and actually amazing considering the handicaps at the start, could, in the same length of time, have been more completely modernized if—and this is a serious “if”: if the aim had been defined at the start to utilize Turkish resources and manpower to achieve the highest money-making efficiency, and if Western production and financial experts had been enlisted to blueprint such a plan, then more profitable and better coördinated wonders could have been achieved. Any foreigner, however, who thinks the Turks ought, from the first, to have depended more on foreign promotion and training, instead of groping along less practically by themselves, or with very restricted foreign aid, ignores certain psychological barriers and differences of aims in Turkey.


Dr. W. L. Wright, Jr., late professor of Turkish language and history, Princeton University, wrote significantly on this point in 1948: “Both government and public seem to be obsessed by fear lest foreigners make immense profits and take them out of Turkey, in the pattern of the old days.”<sup>4</sup> Independence, as much as or more than profits and material gains, has seemed to be at stake for the Turks. Atatürk had said at the start after pointing out, in contrast to the Great Powers’ interference, that Swedish and Belgian firms had constructed railroads in Turkey without interfering politically, “We will gladly accept investment of foreign capital which is offered for other of our construction projects, for more of our railroad lines, our highways, our ports. It will suffice if those who bring capital into our country do not secretly direct it against the inner or outer independence of our state and nation, or against the complete unity of our citizens.”<sup>5</sup>


Still in that spirit but feeling the need of strong defensive alliances with Great Powers and of better technical guidance, the Turks welcomed, in 1947, money and experts from the United States under the Truman Plan of military aid, and later in the Economic Recovery Program for Europe under the Marshall Plan. Some Turks grumbled lest the American investment should serve U.S. military strategy more than it aided Turkish development. But when results appeared, the Turks in general enthused over those which were important for peace as well as for war; for example, the acquisition of enough new



City of İzmir


Town of Bolu





Girls learning to spin and weave

The village craftsman





passenger and cargo ships for the Turkish flag to gain some importance in world ports; rapid gains in railroad facilities; and improved highways, with snowplows, too, to keep roads open to winter traffic.<sup>6</sup>

On the heels of progress through U.S. government aid, more representatives of foreign private businesses than ever before arrived in Turkey. They found Turkish government controls and taxes quite forbidding, and met also the psychological impediments of the Turks' fear of foreigners' ulterior intentions and the elaborate red tape which delayed fulfilling contracts properly. Excessive regimentation seemed to be the Turks' idea of the way to insure reliability, in foreign dealings as well as in their own industrial programs. By 1950, however, guarantees of rights to take profits out of Turkey and to recover investments, within a set limit, were encouraging more foreign firms.<sup>7</sup>

The ultimate aim of a country with as adequate natural resources as Turkey's might be assumed to be self-sufficiency. "The goal," according to a 1947 statement by official spokesmen, "is not so much self-sufficiency but rather building of essential industries in a way which will permit exchange of goods on a larger scale with other countries." Another basic aim, explained earlier, has been to provide markets in Turkey for Turkish raw materials. Had the goal been complete self-sufficiency, the Turks' economic revolution would have had to go more the way of the Soviet program. Any government, starting from a backward agricultural economy and aiming immediately at industrial self-sufficiency, must of necessity deprive one or two generations of its citizens of consumer goods, while all money and labor is devoted to establishing power plants and basic heavy industries. Not until these suffice to turn out machinery for intensive agriculture and mining, for transportation and light manufacturing, can there be consumer goods in variety and quantity to raise the standard of living. This was the way dictated in the Soviet republics. The Turks' leaders preferred prompt development of light industries, gradual development of heavy industries, and continuous trade with other countries. Today Turkey produces consumer goods at a rate never dreamed in years gone by, although not generally at the rate the best United States industries would turn them out with the same equipment.

Economic expansion in Turkey, however, has hardly kept up with the population increase of about 50 per cent since the Republic began.

The Republic has not sacrificed lives in wars, whereas four wars within fifteen years prior to the Republic had taken a terrible toll of lives. Moreover, the Republic has saved lives by new public health measures, and it has repatriated hundreds of thousands of Turks from foreign countries. A new repatriation wave rolled in during the 1940's when refugees of Turkish origin returned from such disturbed countries as Italy, Germany, and the Balkan and Danubian states. The most persistent aim of the Republic has been peace to develop Turkey for the Turks.

The unbalance in early economic development, however, created vicious circles. For one example, the road-building equipment needed to reduce the transportation bottlenecks which had been choking economic development, was itself stalled in another bottleneck at the inadequate ports. The first deliveries of heavy machinery congested the ports and the existing transportation facilities almost to the point of endangering, instead of relieving, the national economy. Well-directed hand labor on round-the-clock hours broke this bottleneck and moved the equipment to points where it could be used to speed the flow of all goods. Such gaps between hand labor at the supply end and modernization at the production end, according to Max Thornburg, who made an extensive economic survey about that time, cannot be filled by the kind of planning which scattered the first modern plants all over the country with little regard for transportation facilities. Nevertheless, this erratic order of development in uncorrelated locations has had a psychological advantage in convincing the populace that the Republic's interest is not centered exclusively in its already prosperous major cities.

Through past misfortunes, the Turks learned well how to protect themselves from foreign exploitation; and through present misfortunes, albeit amidst some successes, they are learning, the hard way, how to progress by Western techniques. Fortunately, as Mr. Thornburg also noted, "Little fault can be found in general with the ability of Turkish operating executives or technical men. Their intelligence is high, their education sound, and as a group they are as potentially capable of conducting industrial operations as the corresponding group in the U.S."<sup>8</sup>

The Turkish Republic has held fast to the aim of solvency, and many factors have contributed to achievement of this aim; first, liqui-

dation of the costs of Empire; second, increased income from exports; third, high returns from export of war material; and fourth, foreign loans, mostly from England and the United States. Income from all sources, however, has been absorbed at an alarming rate in the non-productive expense of continuous defensive military mobilization because of Turkey's insecure geographic position between the two worlds of Soviet Communism and Western Democracy. This mobilization burden can be appreciated in the United States by recalling that the mere proposal of universal military training to keep one in about ninety of the population under arms was painful to the citizens' hearts and pocketbooks. The Turks have had to stand the pain of actually keeping one in twenty or thirty of their population under arms for more than a decade.

The drain of war and post-war preparedness threw many Turks back into "What's the use?" apathy. "What's the use?" Turks asked each other when the war threatened to engulf all nations, "What's the use of even hoping for peace long enough to carry out our fine plans?" "What's the use," they asked later, "of dreaming of peace as long as our giant Russian neighbor makes threats against our free sovereignty over our own territory, along the Straits and on our eastern boundary?" Still, the leaders and the majority did not surrender to fate, if this was fate. They set their clock back to more militarism and controls than they had thought would be necessary again, and then they started forward once more, but very slowly, dragging their burden of mobilization and defense costs. This retrogression naturally gave a bad impression. Critical observers looked at fine buildings, at hospitals for example, standing partly finished for as much as ten years, and at some reversion to bribery in government bureaus, and other backsliding tendencies. A few foreigners, long resident in Turkey, sighed, "The reforms have been window dressing. At the first set-back it's the old story—apathy, bad planning, and corruption. Nothing has really changed."

It was to a large extent the old semblance, but it was not basically the old story. This was not the sort of crisis created by the later Ottoman government's own callous misrule; it was the misfortune of a young government prematurely tested by a world crisis. And, this time, when a strain on the government led to scarcities and inflation, and readmitted corruption through new loopholes, the citizens for

the first time could, and did, promptly make their protests felt in the press, in political agitation, and finally in new political parties. But before going into details on remarkable political developments, the perspective will be clearer with at least a partial summary of what actually has and has not been achieved during the new Turks' first three decades.

In that time, the Turks have not achieved industrial and agricultural efficiency proportionate to the mechanical capacity of their new equipment; they have not trained competent laborers and technicians at a pace commensurate with the projects launched; they have not raised the *average* of achievements very close to the high standards of their own best demonstrations.

To date, although influential leaders have been combating the old Ottoman inclination to seek results by pull with someone above or threats to those below, not enough Turks have overcome a tendency to count on favor and pressure more than on personal ability and diligence. At least as far as a foreigner can see they have not done these things to the degree which might have been possible even without expecting perfection, of which no nation is capable.

On the other hand, in these same years, the new Turks have, beyond question, saved themselves politically and financially from utter destruction. And they have met the century-old demand for fundamental reforms as described in previous chapters. They have arrived psychologically and politically at a level of understanding coöperation with Occidental nations. And they have demonstrated considerable individual political maturity in a free, fair national election, which will be described in Chapter 20.

The new Turks have pushed their industrial production so far in advance of the surrounding small nations, through means other than sheer exploitation by foreigners, that their neighbor states watch Turkey's precedent in economic methods. They have afforded their peasants opportunities unprecedented for peasants anywhere in the Middle East.

They have broken the hold of static religious forms and have begun cautiously to reopen avenues to constructive religious teaching. They have stimulated cultural progress to the point at which individual Turks are well recognized outside of Turkey in science, art, and literature, as well as in statesmanship.

These things the Turks have done for themselves, frequently with foreigners' advice, but not under foreign dictation or with experts from any one country alone. Yet the world crisis of the 1940's has been costly to Turkey, and has placed her again in a precarious situation. So the new Turks came a full cycle in one generation and again needed foreign aid. This time they have accepted a great deal of it from the United States. The Marshall Plan and International Bank loans have, in the past three years, afforded slightly more than half the foreign financing which the Turks had estimated for their immediate peace-time needs. Therefore, they have continued to seek business loans for more short- and long-term projects for hydroelectric power, and for agricultural and industrial equipment.

All evidence indicates that the Turks, so far, have remained in accord with an admonition which Atatürk gave two decades earlier: "It is not . . . by appeals to . . . pity that the affairs of state are promoted or that the dignity and independence of a nation is guaranteed."<sup>9</sup> The Turks in their post-World War II crisis petitioned no one for pity. They asked for loans as business propositions (even though potential investors deemed some of them impracticable), and they have tried to safeguard every acceptance of aid so that it would not compromise their completely independent sovereignty in their own land.

Today, Turkey and the United States have undertaken to cooperate as two sovereign Republics in common defense against threats to peace. The United States has the power, and Turkey has the strategic and dangerous geographic position where a daring will for independence is vital. The Turks have proved that they can contribute that will.

The new Turks' achievement in starting from incredibly precarious national existence and economic inexperience in an undeveloped country, and attaining, under a totally new system of government, initial prosperity and a vital place in world affairs, seems reasonably comparable in its promise of national stability, to that of our thirteen colonies in about the same length of time, between the American Constitutional Convention and the crisis of the War of 1812. At the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the Turks' inevitable immediate aims are to maintain foreign confidence in their government's intentions and promises and to satisfy a citizenship

awakening to its own political strength and cultural opportunities. What remains, therefore, to be recounted in this book are the Turkish Republic's role in its greatest international crisis to date, namely World War II; the new Turks' experiences with the eternal problem of the Dardanelles; their development of representative government; and the general relations they have established with the rest of the world.

## *In The Second World War*

We are convinced that there is no power on earth which can deprive a nation of its right to existence.—Atatürk.

The fruits and blessings of peace are more numerous and valuable than the most brilliant armed victories.  
—İsmet İnönü.

**W**ORLD WAR II presented to the Turks a totally unprecedented situation. For the first time in their history they had nothing to fight for outside of their own boundaries, and more than ever before to defend inside of them. They had made friends with every other country and objected to reviving enmities. They had the pride of creators in the new capital city, factories, railroads, schools, and hospitals which they had built for themselves and they were fiercely ready to guard them from destruction. Yet a widespread Western impression during the war was that the Turks did not know their own minds. It was said that they stayed indecisively on the fence between the two sides and planned to jump to the winner's side in time to share the spoils of victory.

When a fence runs between a poisonous swamp on one side and quicksands on the other, staying on the fence may be a very positive decision. The Turks saw themselves caught between the swamps of Nazi, Fascist, or Communist annexation and the quicksands which engulf small nations participating in the wars of giants. In this precarious position, shared with all the small eastern European and Balkan nations, Turkey had been urging them to unite on a broad security plateau of their own. Failing in this, she made up her mind, in the final crisis, to walk the fence until more secure footing should appear in the direction of assured independence for herself.

When World War II began, the Turks wondered if even their fence would be knocked out from under them. If it stood and they remained on it, they would have to turn their backs to one side while facing the other. They decided to face the totalitarian danger, and to trust to alliance with Great Britain and France for support at their backs. Before the war began Britain, France, and Turkey had been negotiating a treaty of "mutual assistance and resistance to aggression," and they signed it the month after World War II hostilities started. It contained a clause, however, that nothing in the pact compelled the Turks to become involved in armed conflict with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, then allied to Germany.<sup>1</sup>

At the start this treaty seemed a fine guarantee of Turkish security in the event of either Nazi or Soviet aggression. The initial probabilities all were that a new World War would be fought in the West, but if a Middle Eastern front were to develop, England's "vast resources" would back up Turkey's defense. At most, Turkish forces would join in a powerful English-French offensive in the Middle East. In other words, the assumption was that the alliance meant English and French aid for Turkey if Turkey were on the *defensive*, or Turkish aid to England and France if the latter were on the *offensive*. This assumption suddenly turned into an illusion. England's vast resources lost their vastness in the retreat from Dunkirk. France was blotted out. And small countries discovered that, on England's side, they were perforce expendable in military actions to delay Hitler, until England could launch an offensive.

In this light, the Turks reassessed their situation. At the slightest provocation, if Hitler blitzed the Balkans as he had the Low Countries, Nazi planes from Balkan bases could arrive over Turkey not in hours, but in minutes, and enemy troops could cross the border from Balkan bases before the newspapers could inform the Turks that war had reached their soil. (Nazi armies, from 1941 on, were at the Turkish border and within one hundred miles of Istanbul.) More than that, it must be remembered that the Turkish Republic was then only seventeen years old. If, on seeing other small nations with older, better-established governments mowed down, the Turks, quaking for their own safety, were to lose confidence in themselves, they could embarrass their government into an appeasement policy. The Turks in this predicament simply did not lose confidence in them-



selves. They were not ready to sell out to the Nazis or to commit suicide in a premature unaided battle against them. They decided their fence afforded the only safe footing.

Siding with the Nazis all too clearly would mean Hitlerian rule over the Turks. It is true that some of the Turks who had been trained in Germany for various professions, and some in the armed forces, intensely admired Nazi efficiency and anticipated a Nazi victory, but no true Turk wants foreign rule in Turkey. A great many Turks recalled unhappily the arrogance of their German allies in World War I, and did not hesitate to show their feelings. Two blonde Englishwomen, sitting in their car in Istanbul, were startled when a couple of bypassers taunted them loudly, "Germans! You are not wanted here!" And a Teutonic-looking American, seated quietly in a village coffeehouse, knew that a peasant who suddenly spat in his face had mistaken him for a Nazi.

Hitler shrewdly showed the Turks more respect than he showed to any other people. He never summoned Turkish leaders to Germany to threaten them into submission as he did to leaders of eastern European countries. Instead he sent to them his ace diplomat, Franz von Papen, and offered, in case of Nazi victory, to restore to them certain Arab states which they had lost while they were World War I allies of Germany, and also to transfer to them certain Greek islands at the Aegean entrance to the Dardanelles.<sup>2</sup> His courtesy flattered them but his offers did not tempt them. Nothing but guaranteed peace and independence could really tempt them, and they did not bargain for that with a Fuehrer who broke promises so freely.

Fighting for England just as clearly would mean the price of double martyrdom. The Turks' first gesture of belligerence on England's behalf would bring the terrific force of the Nazi war machine crashing into Turkey. The war then would sweep south across the British life-lines through Suez, and to Arabian oil. If, after that, the Turks engaged in guerilla warfare as other martyrs were doing, the time would come for a Nazi retreat back across Turkey, again fighting all the way. The Turks would see their new capital city and railroads and all they had created destroyed, and they would be reduced to the bankruptcy from which they had so recently saved themselves, and would become dependent on their saviors. Furthermore, the Turks could still hear the whir of wings of great powers,

especially Russia, which was nearest, in buzzard flight ready to pounce on Turkey as carrion at any instant of decay.

Another inevitable consideration for the Turks was that if they fought on either side they would turn valuable friends on the other side into enemies. The Germans and the Turks never have fought each other, and the Turks were outspokenly anxious not to break that record. Moreover, Germany and Turkey are logical economic partners who cater well and conveniently to each other's needs. The Turks earnestly wished to keep their bonds intact with this most practical and steadfast of their friends. If, however, they actively sided with Germany they would make enemies of the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The new Turks have fundamental sympathy for France, whose principles of liberty have inspired them, and for England, whose principle of parliamentary government has become their guide. They want staunch friendship with both these nations. Czarist Russia had been their most persistent enemy, but the infant Soviet Union, in the early 1920's, had been their only friend—the only country to contribute money and supplies for the Turks' War of Liberation. The Turks cherished their new friendship with their giant neighbor, but also, as subsequent events proved wise, they never closed their eyes to the risk that Russian demands on the Dardanelles and other Turkish territory would be revived, so they especially studiously avoided friction with the U.S.S.R. Above all, Turkish belligerence on either side would certainly bring Soviet troops onto Turkish soil. If they came as enemies, the Turks feared their destructiveness; if as friends, the Turks feared that they would remain in Turkey as much too possessive "friends" after the war. All in all, it is futile to debate the Turks' position in World War II as being "pro" or "anti" any other *nation*; their position was simply pro-Turkish and anti-war. They could best save themselves by staying on the fence, not through negative indecision but by positive decision.

Unprepared to defend their position very long by military force, the Turks employed the weapon of which they are past masters—diplomacy. They backed it by full mobilization lest they should miscalculate and fall or be pushed off their fence. Turkish diplomacy in World War II invites description as "defense by calculated uncertainty," resting on the one basic certainty that the Turks were acting in the interest of their own survival, with a preference for political

democracy, particularly a world democracy of equal rights for all sovereign states.

In retrospect, as time blurs memories of how the war was fought, certain stages and campaigns must be recalled in order to make Turkey's role clear. First, Turkey's initial chance to fulfill her treaty promise to "lend all aid and assistance within her power" to her allies, England and France, was when the war moved into the eastern Mediterranean, where all three were concerned. It seemed logical that Turkish belligerence on the Allied side then might have deterred Mussolini's brash moves into Africa and Greece and have created a diversion difficult for Hitler. The Turks, however, pointed out facts refuting this logic. One such fact was that the small Turkish air force then had only German planes. It also was said to have only two trained men in each ground crew, where the English had fourteen. Destroying or grounding the Turkish air force would have been a matter merely of hours by even a small fraction of the Nazi Luftwaffe. England, then undergoing the Nazi blitz following Dunkirk, could not spare a plane or a technician for Turkey. Facing several facts of this sort, the Turks chose to hold the Nazis back, not by military force, but by diplomatic suspense.

In order to control matters more completely, they sharply rebuked Nazi Ambassador von Papen's attempts to break the Turkish-English alliance; they gave the German U-boat experts in the Turkish shipyards at Istanbul short notice to leave Turkey; and they won agreement from England that Turkish belligerence at that stage would not aid the Allied cause. During this phase, an interesting entry was made in a diary by Ulrich von Hassel, former German ambassador to Rome, who closely followed from inside Germany every Nazi move, and whose opposition to Nazism eventually cost him his life. He wrote on August 10, 1940, ". . . it is remarkable how little inclination Turkey is showing to play ball with us."<sup>3</sup> At that time, Turkophobes among the Allies were accusing Turkey of flirting with the Nazis!

The next critical stage for Turkey was when Italy attacked England's brave little ally, Greece, in October, 1940. That seemed to place Turkey under double obligation to the Allies because of the Balkan Entente, as well as the British alliance. The Entente, however, had not committed its members to joint defense of external boundaries

against outside powers. Rumania joined the Axis; Bulgaria (not an Entente member) was on the verge of doing so; and Hitler was warning every other Balkan state to join or suffer the consequences. He did not scare the Turks into joining, but I think it is accurate to say that Hitler just then had the Turks themselves baffled by uncertainty. Yet it seemed incredible, from such a close-up view as the Turks had, that Hitler's basic plan could be anything but a march through Bulgaria, then Turkey, to strike at England's Suez route and Arabian oil.

At this juncture, when Nazi troops moved without military opposition into Bulgaria, the Turks signed a non-aggression agreement with the Bulgarians, which they had been negotiating for some time. This agreement looked to many like a green light for Nazi troops to pass unchallenged to Greece. The Turks seemed to consider it a warning to Hitler that he had no excuse to "protect Bulgaria" in what they suspected was a move to attack Turkey, with only a feint toward Greece. Wires were worse crossed when the Turks learned from the Bulgarian government that the Soviet Union (still Germany's ally) had proposed a joint Russian-Bulgarian attack on Turkey to seize the Dardanelles and Turkish Thrace. Fortunately for Turkey, Hitler's "intuition," his troubles with Mussolini who was losing to the Greeks, and his objections to Soviet gains, made him refrain from inciting Bulgaria against Turkey. In the meantime the impression was very strong in Turkey that the British had moved into Greece with sufficient strength to halt or long delay an Axis conquest there. Negotiations between Greece and Turkey on combined defense were in progress, but terms satisfactory to both had not been reached when the Axis struck, and Greece fell in less than three weeks from the weight of the attack, from treachery, and from exhaustion.

Only military experts, after thoroughly reviewing events, can ever tell if Turkey could, at that point, have aided her allies more by plunging into combat in the Balkans or, as she did, by conserving her strength in anticipation of a direct attack upon herself. The fact is that, from Hitler's first move toward the Balkans in 1940 until he was fully committed in Russia in the latter half of 1941, daily uncertainty prevailed among the Turks on how soon Turkey's turn to be blitzed would come. Entries in von Hassell's diary for this same period have revealed justification for such suspicion, because he noted on

March 16, 1941, that German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was urging a direct attack on Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

The Turks, in their own uncertainty about Hitler's intentions, blew up their main railroad bridge on their Balkan border, and hoarded their strength. And when the Nazis declared war on the Soviet Union, Turkey officially declared her own neutrality in it. But evidently Hitler felt uncertain about the Turks, for von Hassell wrote four days after the above entry, "He [Hitler] apparently feared secret coöperation between the Russians and Turks."<sup>5</sup> Later, he thought fear might bring the Turks into the German camp. But the Turkish government did not lose its courage, nor did the Turks lose faith in their government, though they inevitably speculated much on its judgment. Turkey's intelligence service must have had evidence of what was widely rumored in Turkey and what von Hassell later recorded for August, 1941, i.e., "Everybody in the know is reeling under the effect of Hitler's new orders . . . [Among other things] setting up of a colonial army of two million men for an attack through Turkey on Baku, Mosul, and Suez."<sup>6</sup>

Turkey was not then growing stronger. Imports to meet her military needs were practically cut off. Her own production was declining as money and manpower were diverted to defense. Civilians were feeling the pinch. Rations of war-time bread, not as nourishing as the usual bread, became half a pound a day, which was dangerously low for the main staple in a commonly meatless diet for laborers. No wheat flour had been on the market for home use for nearly a year. Fuel shortages were becoming serious for lack of imported replacements for coal mine equipment, and also because of floating explosive mines endangering cargo boats which carried fuel from Black Sea ports. Oculists' prescriptions helped nobody's eyes because imports of lens glass were cut off. No private autos circulated; taxis ran on rationed benzine and threadbare tires. Four good tires could be sold from an old car for more than the original cost of the car. As tram traffic increased, flanges wore off the wheels and could not be replaced. Only where donkey, oxen, and buffalo transportation could be used was traffic normal, but food for animals was running short. More than a million men were in military and security services, neither fighting nor able to return to farms and factories, and taxes were growing heavier.

The government had to consider carefully how much deprivation its citizens would stand and still trust it, and also how to keep from provoking Germany to attack, not any day, but any hour, from Bulgarian and Greek bases. Nevertheless, the Turks gave refuge to the British legation personnel from Bulgaria, and to their allies' refugees from Greece. Conferences then in Ankara with England's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, produced reports in both countries of "full agreement between England and Turkey on the Balkans." Undeniably, however, Allied defeats weakened the cause of the Turks' strong pro-democratic majority. But, at the same time, Hitler's merciless tactics in small countries which had "coöperated" with him silenced the pro-Nazi minority.

Another critical turn of the war for the Turks was the uninvited entry of the British into Irak and later into Iran, and likewise the short Syrian war on suspicion of Nazi seizure. The Turks became victims themselves of increasing uncertainty. Would the Nazis and British, suspiciously eyeing each other across Anatolia, try to beat each other to an uninvited entry into Turkey? The Turks announced more emphatically than ever that they would fight if attacked. Apparently, they meant no matter whether friend or foe "attacked." The Turks declined also to lend sea or air bases to their allies as certain other non-belligerent nations had done, notably Portugal in the Azores. Those others had been on the outer fringe of actual theaters of war, and Nazi retaliation against them would have meant a costly diversion of Hitler's forces, so they were relatively safe from retaliation, whereas Turkey was in the direct path of the war, and Nazi troops on Turkish soil would have helped Hitler. Even a single base for Allied offense from Turkey would provoke an Axis attack and, therewith, the Turks would be in the war in self-defense. Pressure on Turkey was temporarily relieved when Hitler's forces were wholly engaged in Russia and North Africa by 1942, but the Turks looked upon it as pseudo-relief as long as the British position in the Mediterranean was all too vulnerable, and Japan was beckoning to Hitler to cross Turkey into India. According to postwar disclosures, the Axis powers had prepared an ultimatum to send to Turkey late in 1942, but the Axis defeat at El Alamein forestalled it.

It was during this critical period of 1941-42 that Turkey began

throwing sops to Hitler. These provoked in the West the greatest doubts of Turkey's loyalty to her allies, and fitted into the Turkish policy of calculated uncertainty. Turkey's immediate intent seemed to be to save her own skin and to secure supplies for her own people from whichever side could deliver them. In June, 1941, she entered into a ten-year friendship and trade agreement with Germany but the conditions she compelled the Nazis to accept were that Turkey should loyally fulfill her treaty obligations to England, and that no German troops should pass through Turkey. The Turks agreed to supply Germany with certain foodstuffs and raw materials in barter for things she needed, including steel and war materials to strengthen her defenses against Germany!

Turkey's trade had been completely upset by the war. Fifty-eight per cent of total Turkish exports had gone to Germany in 1936. But in 1940, when the war was in full swing, Germany received only 8 per cent of Turkey's exports. England had diverted trade from Germany by buying up quantities of Turkish products and had loaned to Turkey £54,000,000 (about \$216,000,000) at 3 to 4 per cent interest. But England could not deliver the goods she promised. Shortly after the pact with Germany, much-needed drugs reappeared in Turkish pharmacies, some tram wheels were replaced, and work proceeded again on a number of essential government projects which supply shortages had halted. But copper to be traded to Germany for Messerschmitt planes remained in Turkey when the planes were not delivered. Eventually England supplied the Turkish air force with German airplane replacement parts, salvaged from Nazi planes shot down in Africa.

Carl Clodius, Hitler's star negotiator of trade pacts, had been amazed, after blustering demands in Ankara for Turkish chrome in 1941 while Nazi divisions clanked their weapons on the Turko-Bulgarian border, that the Turks had answered, "No." Great Britain held contracts for Turkey's entire chrome output until January, 1943, and Britain and the United States wanted to extend those contracts. When Clodius returned to Ankara a few months later, the Turks bargained with him shrewdly. They appeased Hitler by granting a deal for 90,000 tons of chrome in 1943 and a similar amount in 1944.<sup>7</sup> But Germany was not to receive it until she had delivered onto Turkish soil German locomotives, freight cars, railway coaches, tanks,

planes, supply parts, chemical and medical supplies. When the time for this exchange came after the Nazi's losses in Russia and Africa in 1942, and after allied bombings of armament plants and transportation in Germany, nothing could have been more difficult for Germany to deliver than railroad and military equipment. The Turks received so little that they had to deliver in return far less chrome than had been agreed. Each move in this matter was in literal accord with their "friendship" treaty with Germany and their "alliance" with England. As agreed in both documents, Turkey informed England of her trades with Germany. The English, having regained control of the Aegean Sea by the time Turkey was delivering chrome, were able to intercept a good deal of it after it left Turkish territorial waters. This chrome deal, so sharply criticized in the Allied press at the time, did more to strengthen the Turks' fence against a Nazi push southward than it ever did for the Axis war machine. In 1943 England began to deliver millions of pounds worth of long promised equipment and the United States began direct deliveries of lend-lease goods. (After the war, Turkey was the first nation to pay her lend-lease settlement in full.)

Meanwhile, in 1942, Turkey was caught deep in the Nazi pincers. If the upper jaw, extending through Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and the lower jaw, through Egypt, could be driven far enough east, Turkey would be crushed between them. Literally to keep the bite off themselves, the Turks continued to keep the Nazis and also the Allies uncertain as to the extent to which they intended to help either side. A peculiar feature of Turkey's situation that year was that, since their border neighbors the Bulgarians were not at war with the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria could serve as a jumping-off place for attack on Turkey by either Germany or the Soviets, even while those two were fighting each other. According to von Papen, as von Hassell recorded it, the Turks might, therefore, be willing to go along with Germany if this would guarantee them against attack from Bulgaria. But at the same time, also by von Hassell's record, King Boris of Bulgaria said that Bulgaria must keep its own army intact for fear of a Turkish attack.<sup>8</sup> This suggests that the Turks' policy of "calculated uncertainty" immobilized Bulgarian forces which might otherwise have given more aid to Hitler.



As great authorities as Winston Churchill and various Allied diplomats can be quoted to "prove" that the Turks did give "all aid and assistance within their power" to their allies, or that they did not do so; depending on the dates of the opinions. Ray Brock summed it up in the *New York Times*, on February 7, 1943:

. . . intense allied irritation and indignation [at the Turks about their deals with Germany]—"so great that we could not ever afford to admit it" in the words of one of the highest Allied diplomatic figures in Ankara—suddenly began to give way to the conviction that altered the whole attitude of Whitehall and Washington toward the Turks. . . . The Turks are not tweedledum third-rate people who will be fobbed off with vague promises of diplomatic phrases; the Turkish Republic has long since shorn off the sicknesses and weaknesses of the Ottomans and was indeed implementing the hardest and shrewdest foreign policy, which almost incredibly was still weighted upon the side of the Allies.

In other words, the Allies were beginning to see that the two-way-stretch flexibility of the Turks' agreement was not letting it lose its original pro-democratic form.


The final test of the Turks' sympathies took place early in 1944, when it was generally believed that they could speed the end of the war, both by Allied use of Turkish bases and by adding Turkey's fresh, well-trained troops to the battle-weary Allied armies. Again, however, the Turks looked at the situation differently. They had not been attacked, and no other ally except England and France, who went to the defense of Poland, had fought until attacked. They still feared devastation if Hitler invaded Turkey in a last hour frenzy. Moreover, Anglo-American war strategy and Soviet strategy were so disparate that the Turks would have to choose between them. Military alignment with the Soviets might end in Soviet occupation and subsequent separation of Turkey from her Western allies, but an Anglo-American-Turkish military alignment might antagonize the Soviet Union. In spite of this, had the Allies decided on an all-out offensive through the Balkans, and had the Allies also agreed to guarantee Turkey against Soviet occupation or territorial demands after the war, quite certainly the Turks would have joined the offensive. At one time they agreed to fight at a date to be set by the British, but the British never set the date, and, by various indications since then,

this was because the Soviet government did not then want Turkey in the war. As it was, the Turks could abide by their conviction that they were better out of it.

A view expressed by Burhan Belge, a writer, was echoed in common conversation in Turkey: "It is Turkey's attitude that even if the whole world has fallen in flames, there is yet peace in the world, because nowhere has any nation come forward to call Turkey her enemy." They apparently fancied themselves in the roles which their cartoonist, Ramiz, had pictured for them. In one of his series in *Karikatür*, a humor weekly which closely reflects public opinion, the Turkish soldier, always smiling, appeared as the "comrade" of the German soldier, the "ally" of John Bull, the "neighbor" of the Soviet soldier, the "sweetheart" of the girl wearing Uncle Sam's hat, the "defender" of Winged Peace, and the "friend" of the whole world.

The Turks, from 1942 on, had joined more and more in the war of nerves on Hitler. British Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham revealed later that the Turks, in 1943, had seriously endangered their own security by leasing ships to the United Kingdom to carry supplies to Africa, by assisting United States and British pilots to return to their units from internment camps, and by covertly aiding the Allied planes and submarines to clear the Aegean Sea of Axis forces. The Turks also publicized conferences with the Allies on military measures and, in August, 1944, broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, thereby depriving the Nazis of their listening post in Turkey. In May, 1944, the government suppressed the "Grey Wolf" group (Bozkurtcu), which was reviving pan-Turanist designs to proclaim as Turkish the Iranian and Soviet areas where the Turkic tongue is spoken. It was believed that the group was financed by Nazi funds.

In the end, the Turks declared war. They did so when they learned of the ironic decision of the United Nations planners that no nation would be invited to charter membership in an organization of peace-loving nations unless it had declared war! The Turks, waiting until only a few days before the deadline of March 1, 1945, perfunctorily declared war on Germany and Japan, and prepared to attend the San Francisco United Nations Conference. Their record there totally belies the view of cynics that they climbed on the bandwagon just to share the spoils. The Turks asked for nothing at San Francisco, but offered to do their share in all forms of constructive international co-



Almanyanın: Arkadaşı!




Amerikanın: Sevgilisi!



İngilterenin: Müttefikli!



Rusyanın: Komşusu!



Sulhun. Hämisi!



Dünyanın: Dostu!

## Turkey's Role in World War II

operation. As evidence of good will, they promptly contributed six million Turkish pounds (a large sum for them) to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and voted additional credits for commodity contributions.

Now that the war is over, hindsight seems to be confirming the Turks' foresight that the fence on which they stayed was the only safe place. Fortunately for their Allies, their self-interest coincided with Allied interest in preventing a sweep of Nazi forces southward. Since the war, the fruits of that policy have been a Turkish state strong enough to persist in her barrier role against a new threat of totalitarian aggression, this time from the Soviet Union. Soviet threats against Turkey are the ten-to-one threats of nearly 200,000,000 people to 20,000,000 (or more for the Soviets, counting 60,000,000 additional in satellite populations). But the Turks do not stand alone against this threat. The net effect of the Turks' role in World War II has been that they greatly aided the defense, but not the offense, of their allies. Since the war, their allies have been aiding the Turks' defense, while the latter have been again tormented by their oldest and gravest national problem—Russian pressure for control of their Dardanelles Straits.

## The Dardanelles

Arms and military might are powerful weapons, but the force of world opinion is far more potent. It may be defied for a time but it cannot be flouted always and forever.—Hüseyin R. Baydur, Representative of Turkey, First United Nations General Assembly.

**H**ISTORY has few, if any, more persistent problems than the Dardanelles Straits, nor one with more facets. No equally charming pretext for shedding blood over that narrow waterway has recurred since Helen of Troy was the legendary cause for epic battles of the Greeks across it in the twelfth century B.C. Nothing more fantastic could be predicted for it than the new possibility that atomic bombing could turn it into a radioactive barrier between Europe and Asia. In the past decade the problem has reached inter-hemispheric dimensions, for today both Turkey, in the Eastern Hemisphere, and the United States, in the Western Hemisphere, recognize the Straits as a mutual concern for national security and world peace.

No issue trailing, as it does, thirty centuries of intermittent troubles behind it, can be condensed into one chapter. Public and university libraries carry volumes on the subject, and nearly all the books and articles treat the Straits as an inanimate pawn played by governments in an intercontinental chess game. Relatively few discuss how the people whose homes are in the land of the Straits are affected by it. The limited purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to highlight the facets which make the Straits problem so different for the Turks than for anyone else.

The Turks start with one simple categorical assertion, "The Straits are ours." They do not say this as we would say, "The Panama Canal is ours," but as we would say, "The Mississippi River is ours." Where-

as the Panama Canal is ours by virtue of agreements and investments, the Mississippi River is ours by virtue of nature, being located in the part of the world which we have made our own. To the Turks, the Dardanelles-Bosphorus Straits—wholly inside of Turkey—are, similarly, a natural endowment of the part of the world which they have made their own.

Turks, since the eighteenth century, have been brought up on the conviction that the Russians will get their Straits if they don't watch out, and the rest of the world generally agrees that the fear is justified. But the rest of the world thinks of the Straits as so many miles of water between two seas, and useful to many nations. The Turks think of the Straits as a waterway between two shores in Turkey, and to them what is on the shores counts most. Some description of the valuable agricultural regions, the villages, resorts, and homes along those shores has been given in Chapter 7. Whereas Western writers focus interest on the Dardanelles, which are at their end, the Bosphorus has perhaps more critical importance to the Turks. The shores of the Bosphorus are more densely populated, and their largest and most persistently threatening neighbor—Russia—enters the Straits through the Bosphorus. The focal point is always Istanbul, and like New York City for the United States, Istanbul is Turkey's largest port and commercial city. Along the Golden Horn, the sea inlet to the heart of the city, are vital shipyards and munitions factories. Within easy reach in all directions are many light industries. Istanbul is also the terminus for the Simplon-Orient express trains from European capitals, the point for transshipping to Asia. Less than a mile across the water from the Istanbul quay is Haydarpaşa, the Asiatic railway terminal through which all rail traffic to or from Europe must pass. And around the bend in the Sea of Marmara is Gölcük, on the Bay of İzmit, Turkey's principal naval base, at a distance of approximately fifty miles as the crows and modern missiles fly, from the rail terminal.

Any proposals for joint control and fortification of the Straits raise the question of whether the foreign share in it would be exclusively at the Black Sea and Aegean Sea entrances or would extend to this focal point. Rumors about the Soviet demands were that they would mean an international defense post at Haydarpaşa. Certainly that would be the ideal vantage point to control not only the Straits, but also the city of Istanbul, all rail traffic for European and Asiatic desti-

nations, Turkey's naval base, and the largest concentration of business houses, cultural institutions, and homes in Turkey. At best, international installations at the Black Sea end would be only eighteen or twenty miles from this point. These things are always on the Turks' minds when the rest of the world thinks only of water rights.

This makes the Dardanelles a very different problem from the Panama and Suez canals, so often paired with the Turkish waterway in recommendations for internationalization. First, the Straits are different because, as a natural waterway, there can be no questions of priority rights based on investment in their construction or maintenance. Second, they are different because the Panama and Suez canals are not inside the United States or England, the countries which respectively control or have controlled one or the other. International control or enemy attacks on the canals would not place foreign soldiers and guns inside either of those countries. But foreign soldiers in Turkey to patrol the Bosphorus would be the equivalent of foreign patrols on Long Island Sound, and an enemy attack would be comparable to an attack on New York harbor. Very appropriately, the Turkish word for "strait" is *boğaz*, which means "throat." Had Turkey the strength and desire to monopolize the use of her Straits, she could strangle all other Black Sea nations; but internationalizing them would keep a rope around Turkey's throat. International planners do well to classify the Turkish Straits not with the Panama and Suez canals, but with the Danube River and with other natural waterways which pass through more than one country and must be kept open for international navigation. Yet the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are an exception even to this category because, although more than one nation is dependent on them for access to the Mediterranean Sea, these Straits are wholly within a single country.

The most widely-known facet of the Dardanelles problem is that three other countries on the Black Sea—the Soviet Union, Rumania, and Bulgaria—have no seaway to the Mediterranean except through the Turkish Straits. A closer look shows that inasmuch as the Danube River runs to the Black Sea, all the Danubian countries also need passage through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. So even if the Straits are geographically an exclusively Turkish waterway, every kind of right except possession makes them international. The new Turks agree to this absolutely. They assert,

also absolutely, that they, as owners, must be the custodians of this international trust.

Retracing briefly certain steps in Straits history will make the present complications of that trust clearer. The Turks became sole owners of the Straits by their conquest of Constantinople in 1453. A few years later, by occupying the Crimea, they held the lands all around the Black Sea, and kept it as a Turkish sea for three centuries. Foreign ships were, with rare exceptions, excluded, and Turkey monopolized the Black Sea trade. The Turks lost their monopoly when Russia conquered the Crimea in 1774. Then the Russian Empress, Catherine II, demanded the Ottoman capital, Constantinople, and with it, of course, control of the Straits. England objected to this. Thus in general, began the modern great power rivalry over control of the Turkish waterway. Reasonably free passage for commercial ships has usually been arranged without resort to war, but ships of war have always been a sore point even in peace-time, for who could tell in which direction any nation might "happen" to send its warships on a "peaceful" cruise just in time for a new war involving a Black Sea state? After Napoleon's campaigns had complicated matters by carrying the French flag more prominently into the eastern Mediterranean, where England and Russia were already rivals, Turkey and England signed "The Peace of the Dardanelles" in 1809. This document set a precedent by agreeing to the Ottoman sultan's right to close the Straits to foreign warships in both war and peace.

From then on until the new Turks deposed the sultan, one power would no sooner force him to open the Straits to its warships than another power would back him in his right, by the Peace of the Dardanelles, to close them again. No fewer than seven wars or armed uprisings and ten treaties and conventions, directly or indirectly, altered the status of the Straits in the course of the nineteenth century. Through this series of crises and agreements with outside powers the sultan lost all but nominal authority over the Straits. Yet no state would let another take that shred of authority away from him lest some rival power should gain full and permanent control. During that century of repeated shifts of policy, the United States had enjoyed favored-nation privileges for commercial shipping through the Straits by treaties with the Ottoman government in 1830 and 1862. (These privileges have been renewed in the twentieth century by the



U.S.-Turkish most-favored-nation treaty of 1929 and a reciprocal trade agreement in 1939.)

The twentieth century saw fewer new treaties on use of the Dardanelles, but disputes continued as the Ottoman Empire reached its last stages of disintegration. By then, also, Germany's Berlin to Baghdad Railway project across Turkey had complicated the international rivalries for transportation advantages in Turkey. Eventually World War I resulted in an entirely new phase, which started with an Allied attempt to dictate international control of the Straits to the defeated Turks. By the Allies' Treaty of Sèvres, an eight or ten nation Commission of the Straits was to be set up under the League of Nations, and the Great Powers on it were to have two votes apiece. The Straits regions were to be completely demilitarized, and all kinds of ships of any flag were to have free passage in peace or war unless the League of Nations sanctioned restrictions in war. This was definitely unacceptable to Atatürk and his followers. Finally, İsmet Pasha, as related in Chapter 6, negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne, which contained very different terms.

By the terms which Atatürk and İsmet Pasha, and finally the Republic's Grand National Assembly, accepted, the international Commission of the Straits would always have a Turk as its president and no member state would have more than one vote. Demilitarization for three to fifteen miles depth on both shores was agreed. Commercial ships of all nations were to pass through in peace or war, subject only to sanitary inspection and to international law for war-time merchant shipping. Restrictions on warships in peace were primarily that no non-Black Sea power could send into the Black Sea at any one time tonnage exceeding that of the most powerful Black Sea fleet. In war-time, blockades or hostilities involving this waterway would have to be sanctioned by the League of Nations.

Nothing upset the Lausanne convention on the Straits until the 1930's. Then Italy's war on Abyssinia and Germany's self-dictated remilitarization of the Rhine made small nations in the aggressors' orbits reconsider their own defenses, especially as the League of Nations had begun to look like a very weak reed to lean upon. The Turks did not ignore or defy the League as Italy and Germany had done; the Turks addressed to it a proper appeal for a new consultation of the Lausanne signatories on Straits terms, and also sought per-

mission to remilitarize their Straits themselves. The League of Nations granted consent promptly; the Turks started remilitarization; and another conference on the Dardanelles was called at Montreux, Switzerland, in 1936. Italy alone, of the original signers, was absent, presumably because she suspected, perhaps rightly, that Turkey's strength was to be built up as a check to Mussolini's plans for Italian expansion.

The changes made at Montreux, which proved most significant during World War II, abolished the international Dardanelles Commission, and recognized Turkey's sole sovereignty over the Straits and her right to refortify them. Turkey agreed to report annually to the Montreux signatories and the League of Nations on her regulation of Straits traffic. Merchant vessels of any flag were to have free passage in war as well as in peace, provided only that during a war they must enter the Straits by day and follow the route set by the Turkish authorities. Much more specific details than in any previous agreement were set forth on the kinds, tonnage, number, and the conditions of transit for warships of foreign flags.

The key to the Turks' policy in World War II is to be found in Articles 20 and 21. Article 21 reads, "Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, she shall have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the present Convention." Turkey did consider herself so threatened and applied Article 20 which reads: "In time of war, Turkey, being belligerent . . . , the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish government." The Turkish government, therefore, used its own discretion which did not in all respects please other governments. But another clause in Article 21 reads, "If the Council of the League of Nations decide by a majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified and if such should also be the opinion of the High Contracting Parties, signatories to the present Convention, the Turkish government undertakes to discontinue the measure in question . . ."<sup>1</sup>

Although World War II afforded reasons to debate what measures the Turkish government was justified in taking, the judgment procedure prescribed in Article 21 could not be carried out. The high contracting parties were Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy (which had belatedly signed the Montreux Convention in 1938),

Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia. By the time they might have been called upon to judge Turkey's measures, six of them were aligned with the Axis by choice or capture, leaving no majority of signatories to take action. And the League itself had ceased to function in such matters. The Turks, therefore, made their own decisions about passage of ships of war. Neither the Montreux terms nor the Turks blocked mercantile shipping during the war, but the belligerent nations' submarines and mines in the Black Sea at one end and the Aegean Sea at the other, reduced all Straits shipping to an absolute minimum. Even the luxury passenger ships of Rumania and the Soviet Union rode out most of the war at anchor in the Bosphorus rather than risk a run to home ports in the Black Sea.

Both the Soviet Union and Great Britain, on August 10, 1941, had expressed satisfaction with the Turks' administration of the Straits. But the war in Europe was barely ended when the Soviet Union claimed that the Montreux Convention had not provided adequately for Soviet security in the Black Sea in war-time, and that the Turks had allowed ships of the Soviets' enemies to use the Straits. So, in 1945, Turkey was once more in deep trouble over her celebrated waterway. The proper year for revision of the Montreux Convention was 1946, since it contained provision for amendments at five-year intervals. England, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed at a conference of heads of these states, at Potsdam in 1945, that each should enter into discussion with Turkey about Montreux amendments for the following year. Thus a round of diplomatic notes started. It was a surprise to the rest, however, when the Soviet Union demanded that only the four Black Sea powers should write a new convention and that joint Soviet-Turkish control should be established.

The Turks, in diplomatic reply, pointed out that by ignoring the interests of the six other Montreux signatories besides the Black Sea powers, the Soviets apparently intended not merely to amend the Montreux Convention but to set it aside altogether before its expiration date in 1956. Another unmentioned, but certainly not unnoted, aspect was that a conference limited to Black Sea nations would place the Turks, who own the Straits and live on them, in a voting minority of one to three (the U.S.S.R. and two of its satellites). The Turks declared also that Moscow's proposals for joint Soviet-Turkish control

of the Straits intruded upon Turkish sovereignty and, in effect, denied the existence and aims of the United Nations Charter.

The Turkish government set forth its own idea as follows:

The surest guarantee for the security of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Black Sea resides not in the search for a privileged position in the Straits, a position incompatible with the dignity and sovereign rights of an independent country, but in the restoration of friendly and trusting relations with a strong Turkey, which, as far as it is concerned, is determined to dedicate itself with all its strength to the inauguration of this happy era, but whose efforts in this direction must be seconded by an equal good will coming from its northern neighbor. Moreover beyond this important guarantee furnished by Turkey itself, the Turkish government, as co-signatory with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the San Francisco charter, believes that it has the right to think that, in the new concept of war, the security of each country is under the guarantee of international forces of the United Nations. . . .<sup>2</sup>

In reply, Moscow merely reiterated charges that Turkey had permitted Axis ships to use the Straits for military purposes against the U.S.S.R. during the Second World War, and even named and described the ships. The Turks replied, item by item, that each ship named or described had had none of the characteristics that would identify ships of war under Montreux terms. As to 140,000 tons of German auxiliary war vessels alleged by Moscow to have passed in the guise of merchant ships in 1942, no German merchant vessels had passed in 1942 at all, and only ten, totalling together 19,476 tons, had passed through in 1943. Moreover their passage had been stopped by the Turks when the British Embassy had protested that they were being used for military purposes. The "Tarvisio," an Italian tanker mentioned by Moscow, the Turks said had passed through as a commercial vessel. When the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been informed that she was fraudulently listed as commercial, and after the Italian Embassy in Turkey had been able to give only verbal assurance that this ship had been re-listed in the commercial class, the "Tarvisio" was refused passage at her second appearance. After twenty-five days at anchor with her radio sealed, while the Turks refused to recognize listings changed in war-time, she had sailed away. The Turks met all charges similarly and added that not once during the war had the Soviet Embassy in Turkey called attention to any ships in the Straits endangering Soviet security.

In the usual way of diplomacy in crises, the Turks may have used hair-splitting distinctions in the kinds of ships and extent of inspection (technically only for sanitary purposes), which were defined in the Montreux Convention. In any case, afterwards, the Turkish government, in diplomatic notes to the Soviet Union, acknowledged that "the above mentioned definitions and provisions, by-passed by events and weakened by experience, need to be adapted to technical progress and present conditions." The Turkish government, however, saw no need to throw out the entire convention, "on the whole a balanced instrument," in order to effect necessary changes. It denied responsibility for "the extremely limited number of fraudulent passages, rapidly corrected and too slight to put the security of the U.S.S.R. in danger." And the Turks were willing to open their war-time use of their Straits to review. "The Turkish government," the diplomatic note to Moscow said, "believes itself in a position to affirm before world opinion and, if such should be necessary to prove before an arbitral authority, the good faith and the high realization of international responsibilities with which it has not ceased, in the application of the regime of Montreux, to be guardian of the Straits."

Moscow added confusion unto confusion by recalling that certain 1921 agreements, signed before either the Republic of Turkey or the Montreux Convention existed, had entrusted exclusively to the Black Sea powers "the definitive drafting of the international statute of the Black Sea and the Straits. . . ." Moscow now revived superseded parts of these pacts as the reason that only Black Sea powers should decide the terms. Ironically enough, these 1921 agreements on the Dardanelles were companions to those which had definitely placed the district of Kars and Ardahan under Turkish sovereignty, as explained in Chapter 6. So, in 1946, Moscow reinvoked pre-Republic agreements with Turkey with respect to the Straits, and simultaneously rejected pre-Republic agreements with respect to Kars and Ardahan.

This diplomatic exchange ended for the time being when Turkey, in a note dated October 18, 1946, reiterated her willingness to submit each issue concerning Turkish administration of the Straits under the Montreux Convention to arbitration; and to consider amendment of the Convention by reconvening the signatories any fifth year, as provided in its terms. In addition, she expressed a desire to consult the United Nations in future conferences, and avowed Turkey's readi-

ness to base new discussions on proposals for the Straits made by the United States of America. These proposals, stated in a U.S. Embassy note of November 2, 1945, were to open the Straits to merchant vessels of all nations and to warships of Black Sea powers, at all times, but to deny passage to more than an agreed limited tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea powers at any time, except by specific consent of the Black Sea powers or by authority of the United Nations; and finally, to eliminate Japan as a signatory. The United States stood ready to replace Japan in a new Straits conference.<sup>3</sup>

No conference was called after this exchange of notes in 1946. Instead, Moscow called the Soviet Ambassador home from Ankara, and not until 1948 did the Soviet Union send a new Ambassador to Turkey, although diplomatic relations had remained unbroken.

The matter of the Straits, at this writing, is still resting uneasily in mid air. The stage is apparently reset for one of the grim dramas of the world—the Dardanelles tragedy. Traditionally, when the curtain goes up the Turks are squirming under Russian pressure. As the plot thickens, a couple of Western characters rush on stage to foil the villain, and in the last act they leash the Turks to themselves, financially or politically, in a new treaty. England, Germany, and France have been stock performers in the rescue role. Italy occasionally was a supporting actor. The first variation in the current version of the performance is that the Turks are no longer cast as decadent imperialists but as a young nation demanding unimpaired sovereignty over its own waterway. The second variation is that the cast includes two entirely new characters; one, the latest giant in world affairs—the United States; and the other, a newborn world force—the United Nations. Finally, the present script is different, in that Turkey is on stage throughout every act as a principal performer and, no longer as “the Sick Man of Europe,” to be merely wheeled on and off by the Great Powers.

The new Turks have consistently asked for international agreements on passage through the Straits in peace or war. In the words of former Premier Şükrü Saracoğlu, in 1946, “Turkey is entirely willing to participate in an international conference and accept any international decisions reached, provided Turkish independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are not infringed. This rules out any possibility of special concessions to any individual nation.”<sup>4</sup> Once the

terms are acceptable to her and she has signed the agreement she asks to be custodian of those rights, a custodian prepared to make annual reports and submit disputes to a world tribunal. World opinion based on ignorance of facts, however, is no help. The gross ignorance of anyone who reads into the slogan, "Russia has a right to a permanent warm water outlet"—the idea that Russia is so bottled up in the Black Sea that she cannot carry commerce into the Mediterranean at all—is very misleading. All Black Sea powers have enjoyed freedom of commercial traffic through the Dardanelles since 1774, and interruptions have been rare even in wars. The Straits have been open also to Russian warships except when Russia's own enemies have blockaded either end or when Russia has directly threatened Turkey's security and sovereignty.

Perfect administration of the Straits, beyond any possibility of dispute, is hardly to be expected from Turkish, or any other, authority over this troublesome waterway. In the Dardanelles drama of the past, when the climax of a dispute was reached, the powers most concerned argued or fought each other to a stalemate and then agreed on a sentence to pass on Turkey in the form of a new treaty. Thereupon they took curtain calls and were obviously ready to repeat the performance at a later date. The Turks have outspokenly hoped that the United Nations might change this by establishing impartial tribunals backed by international force, to support international agreements. Turkey is in a mood and in a position to lend herself to new and better ways to solve old conflicts. The Turks are plainly looking to the United Nations and the United States, the two newcomers, to engineer a sensible revision of the Montreux Convention and to contribute something new and democratic in supervisory techniques instead of the old war or appeasement routines. If world opinion sustains that hope, then the Dardanelles drama in the future may be an impressive performance by world statesmen for peace instead of a repetition of an old blood-and-thunder burlesque of civilization.

## Government of the People

All power emanates from the people.—Legend over the speaker's platform in the Turkish parliament.

**A**BRAM LINCOLN'S phrase, "Of the people, by the people, and for the people," is popularly used by citizens of the United States to measure all governments; yet it can be sheer chauvinism to judge another nation's merits or demerits by one's own yardstick. This yardstick, however, lends itself to pointing up likenesses and differences simply for clearer understanding, especially in Turkey, because prominent Turkish speakers and writers have made it familiar to politically minded Turks.

To use it properly in Turkey one must first decide who are "the people" there. Numerically, the peasants are the people, but Turkey does not have a peasant government. Military men have predominated among the leaders, yet Turkey does not have a military government. In England and Europe the people were the common citizens, distinguished from hereditary royalty and titled aristocracy. The Turkish Republic, having neither royalty nor titled aristocracy, cannot make this distinction. In United States history, the people and the taxpayers have been almost synonymous through the principle of no taxation without representation. When the Turkish Republic began, the great mass of Turkish taxpayers had also been embittered victims of taxation without representation; they had borne the yoke of government without any voice in government. All indications are that it was *of* and *for* these Turks that the Republic of Turkey came into being.

Atatürk, founder of the Republic, was himself of the people. His father was a minor civil servant, and his mother, who was probably the strongest individual influence in his life, was of too inconspicuous



a family for much to be known about them. Military achievement won for him the title "Pasha." As Mustafa Kemâl Pasha, he roused the rank and file of overtaxed and unrepresented Turks to form a new government. He found in Anatolia a number of popular regional defense organizations looking either to powerful landlords or to army officers for leadership. Giving up his own military title, he appeared as a civilian leader at a meeting of a "People's Congress" in Erzerum, which had been called by the Association for the Defense of the Eastern Provinces. Those provinces were under the military jurisdiction of General Kâzım Karabekir, who was ready to defend above all else the independence of the Turks. A later congress at Sivas expanded the organization to a Union for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli (i.e., Asiatic and European Turkey).

Finally, at Ankara, a congress of all the reform factions passed resolutions, on April 23, 1920, recognizing itself as the true representative of the Turkish people. "There is no power superior to the Grand National Assembly," its members resolved. They elected Mustafa Kemâl Pasha president of the Assembly but not yet of the state, for the sultan was still nominally at its head. They then elected him commander-in-chief of the army for the War of Liberation, which was in all truth a people's army.

Many units of the old Ottoman army, stationed in Anatolia, awaiting either demobilization or orders, followed Mustafa Kemâl Pasha. Peasants, not already in the army, joined them. So did Turks from İstanbul, including many of the intelligentsia, who sought reforms. The people who remained at home equipped this army. The new commander-in-chief ordered from every house in the country a parcel of linen, a pair of socks, and a pair of shoes; he ordered confiscation of 40 per cent of the goods in stores and houses, i.e., cloth, leather, iron shoe-nails, heavy thread, rope, grain, meat, sugar, soap, salt, oil, tea, candles, and other army necessities; 10 per cent of the four-wheeled spring carts and harnesses; and 20 per cent of the draft animals and beasts of burden. In addition, he ordered transportation of military supplies and personnel once a month free of charge by every family by whatever means they had left after the requisitions had been met.<sup>1</sup>

The means left were often only women's strength. Therefore, monuments stand today in the progressive new capital, Ankara, and the

oldest Anatolian Turkish capital, Konya, to the peasant women who trudged across mountains and plains with supplies on their shoulders. A single large shell would perhaps be all that one woman could carry, but one by one such desperately needed shells reached the army. Remembered, also, are yokes of women dragging wagons full of supplies, and men and women rowing small boats of ammunition and weapons from Russia to smuggle them onto the Black Sea beaches. Other matériel was seized from the Allies' depots for foreign occupation troops. Thus the people of Turkey themselves won the right to a government of their own, quite as the embattled farmers, fighting from behind stone walls in the American Revolution, won their right to found a new nation.

Turkey's new National Assembly, however, was full of cliques which did not easily agree on the new form of government. After months of debate, they adopted a fundamental Constitutional Act, committing themselves to the principle that "the people personally and effectively direct their own destinies." But the cliques went on debating details: how to fit the Sultan-Khalif into a system based on the new principle; whether to appoint or to elect cabinet ministers; and so on until a crisis in the provisional cabinet caused Atatürk suddenly to announce that Turkey would be a Republic. On October 29, 1923 the Assembly voted the Republic into legal existence. It elected him the first President.<sup>2</sup> Six months later, this Assembly adopted the permanent constitution of the Republic.

The oath taken by the first deputies included the clause: "I agree that the people shall have the sovereignty without any qualification, so help me Allah."<sup>3</sup> The membership of the first Grand National Assembly included more military men (56) than any other category except the forty-six called "notables." The other groups in descending numerical order were men of religion, provincial governors, and pashas; then doctors, businessmen, and journalists; and finally financiers, poets, ambassadors, and other smaller groups or single representatives.<sup>4</sup> The popular representation changed conspicuously as the Republic matured. The 1946 elections seated the same number of military men, but two other groups outnumbered them—the largest group (83) being political career men newly trained for government service in the Ankara School of Political Science; and the next group (64) being judges and lawyers, also newly trained in secular law. Greater

yet was the change in occupational categories as a result of the 1950 election. One hundred thirty-one members were in law, and eighty-seven in the relatively new categories of commerce, industry, banking, or finance. The number of medical men was still high, and was nearly matched by those in agriculture and manual labor, while the number of military men had dropped to half as many as in the original assembly. The rest were educators, writers, engineers, and civil service men.

All told the Turkish government can be said to be *of* the people on at least four counts: absence of hereditary positions and power legally vested in any class; popular response to a leader born of the people; sacrifices by the common people to give birth to the Republic; and a cross section of literate Turks in the Grand National Assembly.

Probably no other government was so oddly born. By dominant leadership one man, Mustafa Kemâl Pasha, presented a constitution reflecting his own ideas to an Assembly which approved it and elected him President of the Republic under its terms. So far this sounds like typical dictatorship, but it is strangely different when one reads the constitution, for that deprives the president of dictatorial powers, gives the elected assembly the right of final decision, and guarantees the people's rights in the courts and before the law. Indeed, by the constitution, the President of Turkey cannot act or continue in office except by the will of the people or their elected representatives. And, every Turkish citizen past twenty-one years of age, and not deprived of civil rights, has the right to vote in the elections.

The people's constitutional rights in Turkey parallel those familiar in Western democracies. "Every Turk is born free, and free he lives." So reads Article 68 of the Turkish constitution, and the next twenty articles guarantee equality before the law regardless of race or creed; freedom of conscience, thought, speech, press, association, and contract; inviolability of life, honor, residence, and property; privacy of telegraphic and telephonic communication; freedom of complaint to properly constituted authorities; prohibition of physical abuse, forced labor, or undue confiscation of property; tax levies only in accordance with law; and universal compulsory free primary education.

A loophole to restrict some of these, however, is found in Article 79, which reads, "The limits imposed on the liberty of making contracts, of labor, of ownership, of meeting and association, and of incorporating shall be determined by law." This made possible the Law

of Association, which prevented organization of labor and new political parties until it was amended in June, 1946. This loophole is perhaps the excuse also for Article 18 of the Law of the Powers and Duties of the Police, which proved more drastic than martial law during World War II. It authorized the highest civil authorities in a province or its subdivisions to arrest, without court warrants, and to detain for an unspecified period without trial, "those suspected of threatening the security of the state." The civil authorities could hold a suspect indefinitely or, during martial law, turn him over promptly to the military authorities. This arbitrariness aroused enough indignation so that in 1948 the government abrogated the offending article. Then also it ended martial law in the six out of sixty-three provinces where it had been invoked during the war emergency. Although practice so far has often been inconsistent with the liberal spirit of the constitution, that document is still a healthy instrument. New political parties, in Turkey's first multi-party election campaign in 1946, found it so when they used, as potent campaign weapons, demands for constitutional rights. (More complete analyses of the Turkish constitution, the structure of the government, and the functions of the courts and police are in Appendix D.)

Six arrows radiating outward and upward symbolize the directions of policy which Atatürk prescribed for the new Turkish Republic. They stand for *republicanism*, *nationalism*, *populism*, *étatisme*, *laicism*, and *reformism*. Originally the principles of the party which Atatürk headed, they were adopted as amendments to the national constitution in 1936. Their removal from the constitution was recommended in 1950 by former President İnönü, who quite properly considered them the special objectives of the People's Party.

Nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) is stated clearly in Article 3: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation." It means Turkey for the Turks, with the accent on both Turkey and Turks.

Populism is *halkçılık*, the Turkish word for "democracy." For the Turks, this is entirely consistent with their ancestral self-government still practised in the *köy* (village); with the equality of believers in Islam; and with their tradition of rising or falling in the social scale by effort or by fate rather than by privileges of birth. Turkish society has always been fluid. "Log cabin to White House" does not surprise

Turks. Ottoman royalty, even at its worst, never became an inbred class like French royalty at its worst, because the Ottomans never excluded fresh blood by marriage to commoners, or by appointments of commoners to high office. When Turks today laud a "classless society" they do not generally mean Communism, although the phrase may have been picked up from the Marxian vocabulary of the 1920's; they mean no class with superior privileges in the eyes of the law, no class closed to free admission from one to the other, and all classes sharing national responsibility.

Étatisme (*devletçilik*), briefly described in Chapter 9, has caused, more disputes than any other one policy in the Republic. In Atatürk's words, it means "to hold to the principle of the individual's private initiative, but to take into State hands the fatherland's economy, keeping in mind all the needs and unaccomplished tasks of a great nation."<sup>5</sup> When the state monopolies expanded their activities in competition with the private enterprises which also served the fatherland's economy, and when prices on state monopoly products became exorbitant, sharp criticism of étatisme began. After a second political party won seats in the Grand National Assembly in 1946, after campaigning against so much state enterprise, étatisme had to show both more and less results; more in production to meet national needs, and less in competition with private enterprise. Consequently, étatisme entered a phase of gradual surrender to private operation of more (but not all) production of consumer goods, and some utilities. The state continued to operate nationwide enterprises such as the heavy industries, railways, and postal and telegraph services. Gradual abolition of the Ministry of Monopolies was under consideration in 1950.<sup>6</sup>

All of this reflects a fundamental issue not only between two economic systems, the relative merits of which are currently being disputed in many countries, but between two conditions peculiar to Turkey. There, the issue lies between the State shaping plans, hiring experts, and paying the costs in new untried fields, on one hand; and, on the other hand, private citizens, eager for low prices as consumers, and for high profits as investors, but relatively inexperienced in economic enterprise. The issue in Turkey resolves itself into a triple question: how honest the banks that finance State enterprises are; how rapidly private individuals are becoming financially and technically competent to operate enterprises necessary in their young Republic;

and where to draw the line between State and private enterprise for the good of the nation.

Laicism (*laiklik*), the separation of state and religious authority, has been decisively achieved, and Turkish leaders are constantly watchful lest religio-political links, native or foreign, ever again imperil national sovereignty or progress.

Reformism (*devrimçilik* or *inkılapçılık*) means radical change. The Turks accept revolution, of a sort, as basic policy. It is not revolution against the government, but revolution by the government. The Turks apparently see no point to waiting for gradual evolution if a line of betterment is clearly apparent; much better to make the change by government fiat and realize results immediately. Their own extraordinary adaptability to new circumstances, and the successes and benefits of most of Atatürk's revolutionary decrees are conducive to confidence in this method. The secret of the method is inspired choice of reforms so that later unfavorable reactions will not cause new discontents. *Étatisme* is an example of a reform not well enough defined to avoid unfavorable reaction. Consequently, it is having to slow down to the pace of evolution through experience. On the whole, however, waiting until a need is extreme and then meeting it with action equally extreme seems to accord with the Turks' inclination. Just as the Turkish Republic was created suddenly, it will not be surprising if its progress is marked by lulls ending equally suddenly in long steps forward.

A government *of* the people could fail to be adequately and consistently *for* the people—the common taxpayers who support the government but do not hold office in it. Many acts by the Turkish government, described in preceding chapters, justify saying that in general it has been for the people. One need but recall the new educational facilities, land distribution, and agricultural coöperatives for the peasants; employment and welfare provisions for industrial workers plus emphasis on consumer goods; taxes by law more than by whim; and the many new measures for health and culture for all citizens. The severest criterion, however, is what proportion of the people actually receive these benefits.

Though the allotment of projects and funds on paper has been reasonably even, the rate of fulfillment has been far from even in different regions. The less accessible eastern regions were neglected while the building of the new capital city was rushed; and, to a de-

gree, this was practical. One can complain that there was too much lag in the former, and that premature construction of certain showy buildings went beyond absolute necessity in Ankara. Recently, however, to bring the relative timing into better line and to ward off criticism, the government has been developing neglected areas such as the Kurd provinces and the central plateau, and has curtailed spectacular building in Ankara. Provinces with the most readily solved health problems, like malaria, have had their needs met more fully and rapidly than those with such difficult problems as basic water supply. *Halkevis* have been built first where local coöperation has been greatest. New railroads and highways have been extended with primary consideration for national defense and only secondary consideration for popular travel and trade, until very recently. The truth is that, to date, *any* development inside Turkey has been so new and so welcome that local rivalries have only recently become a noteworthy factor.

Citizens have, nevertheless, found reasons to question whether some benefits are for the people or for the government officials. One instance is the following complaint about public utilities in İstanbul a few years ago: "The municipality charges 27 kuruş [100 kuruş in a lira] per kilowatt hour for electricity but it costs only four or five kuruş. The city government takes the profits." Without vouching for this citizen's figures, they are close enough to show the grounds for dissatisfaction. He would not commit himself to an opinion on how the city government used its excessive profits but he was convinced that it was not then for the people. Many individual citizens have asserted openly that more honest administration and better planning could and should do far more for the people than at present. Yet, the Çatalağzı hydroelectric plant to furnish power to the İstanbul area at an estimated annual saving of ten million dollars by using cheap coal mined nearby, was put in operation in 1948.<sup>7</sup> Other complaints of kinds common to most countries include such extravagances as a certain bureaucrat's forty-dollar ashtray; and one ministry's administrative costs which ran three times as high as those in a comparable ministry.

The important angle on these complaints is that the Turks, as a whole, had not realized the possibilities of democratic protest, until the citizens voted freely in the 1950 elections. Under their old despotic form of government, organized protests had been so drastically sup-

pressed that only when conditions became so desperate that men were ready to risk their lives would they band together to protest. The new Turks are the first to be able to appreciate fully the power of the press for public protests. And the 1946 removal of restrictions against association opened the way to popular demands through various organizations, including new political parties.

Probably no other country has had political parties come into existence quite as they have in Turkey. Atatürk personally launched the Republic's first full-fledged political party, in contrast to semi-organized political factions. He personally opened, then closed the door, to a second party. President İnönü half opened the same door and then finally set himself to open it wider. Atatürk formed his party originally to block the divisive cliques in the first National Assembly. As soon as the foreign powers acknowledged that Assembly as the *de facto* government of Turkey, Atatürk organized his personal followers into the People's Party (Halk Fırkası, later renamed Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, the People's Party of the Republic). He was president of this powerful majority party when the Assembly legalized the Republic, and at his instigation, also voted to have cabinet ministers appointed, instead of elected. Thus, holding the presidency of both the government and the party, Atatürk could control appointments of ministers and also nominations of deputies. Subsequently, the Assembly passed an election law giving all responsibility for elections to his party.

Nevertheless, Atatürk himself tried to establish a second political party in 1930 when the Republic seemed secure. Evidently he hoped for an equivalent to His Majesty's Loyal Opposition in England. He recalled from the ambassadorship in France Fethi Okyar, who had been his first prime minister while the new government was in the making, and assigned him to organize and lead a Liberal Party of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Serbest Fırka). This party promptly opposed Atatürk's étatiste ideas and sought freedom for private enterprise along many more lines. Unfortunately, so many reactionaries infiltrated it that fears arose that the Liberal Party seriously threatened not only Atatürk's leadership but the very continuance of the Republic.<sup>8</sup> It was compelled to disband after only four months in existence, whereupon an attempted revolt ended in a local riot in Menemen, fermented by reactionary religious fanatics.

Seemingly to compensate for this failure of a second party, Atatürk



opened a way for "Independent" candidates to file their candidacy with the People's Party and, unless the party disapproved, to run for election. Several Independents were seated, including some farmers and laborers. Women's national suffrage in 1934 further broadened the representation of the people. Then, contrary to these liberalizing steps, Atatürk knit the government and the one party still closer together. He had the Minister of the Interior become also the party's secretary-general, and the governor of each province become the provincial party chairman. He went even further and had the party's six "isms" incorporated into the national constitution by formal amendment. The six arrows appeared on flags flown side by side with the national star-and-crescent red flag, on lapel buttons, on magazine covers, and they were even woven into rugs. Many citizens were far from ready to accept them as beyond question and reinterpretation, though not much public protest was made during the remaining two years of Atatürk's life.

When the Republic was fifteen years old, the Grand National Assembly, at his advice, voted amnesty to all political exiles. Persons sentenced by the former Tribunals of Independence (p. 18), and former close associates of Atatürk's who had sought voluntary exile because of differences of opinion, also any of one hundred fifty persons who had been exiled by international agreement in the Lausanne Treaty, could live freely once more in their own land. Four months after this action, Atatürk's death put the Republic to the test of transition to new leadership. All special legal machinery against insurrection had been abolished, and Turks who had opposed Atatürk or the revolution were already returning. Could the succession be determined by constitutional procedure without uprisings by followers of rival contenders? Had the People's Party done enough for the people to hold their support without force?

İsmet İnönü, the outstanding national hero after Atatürk at the time of the Republic's birth, and its prime minister for nearly all but the last year of Atatürk's administration, was the logical candidate. But for a while before Atatürk's death, the two men had disagreed on foreign policy, İnönü being then more cautious than his chief about certain foreign entanglements. Reportedly also, some of Atatürk's drinking partners had talked against İnönü because of the latter's objections to the effect of their gatherings on the chief's health and in-

fluence. İnönü resigned his office in 1937, professedly for a needed rest, but he reappeared with Atatürk at army maneuvers in İzmir not long afterwards. The rest of the story, as it is generally accepted now, is that when Atatürk, in his final illness, asked to have İnönü brought to him, he was falsely informed by one of his own intimate associates that İnönü had died. This, at least, is the reason given for Atatürk's bequest of money, in his will, to educate İnönü's children. In the confusion of such reports, people argued whether İnönü's resignation from office had actually been due to Atatürk's disfavor or, on the contrary, due to genuine need of a rest in view of Atatürk's intention to name him as his successor. There was no written or verifiable spoken word by Atatürk to settle it, but the much respected marshal of the army, Fevzi Çakmak, who perhaps might have become president himself, and some other influential men favored the man who had served so long, second only to Atatürk. The Grand National Assembly met promptly and elected İnönü the second President of the Republic. The people accepted the decision. The heat of argument cooled quite as it does in the U.S.A. after a president is elected.

The presidency of the People's Party also fell to President İnönü. His method of inviting loyal opposition was to form an Independent Group (Müstakil Grup) within his party's framework. Members who registered as Independents held their own caucuses and nominated their own candidates for elections, subject however to party approval, which essentially meant approval by the president himself. This half-open door to opposition gave a nominal freedom between 1939 and 1945, but in a surge of political unrest after the second World War new parties seemed to spring into existence in Turkey without so much as a by-your-leave to the People's Party or the government. Instead of suppressing them, though somewhat embarrassed by them, the government conceded that the time had arrived to experiment on a broader scale. So the previously mentioned amendment to the Law of Associations was passed in June, 1946, legalizing new parties. They could represent various groups of the people—workers, peasants, socialists—but not religious, secret, separatist, or subversive groups. This banned Communist, racist, and religious parties.

More than a dozen parties took immediate advantage of the amendment, only to have three of them suppressed for extreme left-wing aims, and several more die quickly of their own inconsequence. The

three which won even so much as a village election were: The Turkish Workers and Farmers Party, which carried one village in the local elections; the National Resurgence Party, which won a few offices in the municipal elections; and the Democratic Party, which won a significant number of seats in the 1946 national elections after an initial victory for more than 1,200 of its candidates in the village elections.

The liveliest issues in public opinion, at last freed for expression outside of the channels of the People's Party, were stated in the new party platforms. The National Resurgence Party stood for direct election of the President of the Republic by the voters instead of by the Assembly, and against his reelection for two terms in succession. Moral responsibility and conscientiousness in public officials was one of its main points, and it vigorously opposed the speed and "unnaturalness" of changes in the language. It promised to seek prosperity through "scientific principles instead of legal restraints" but it proposed almost no specific ways to accomplish its aims. A businessman, a lawyer, and an editor, none politically experienced, were the charter members. Although it was the first new party in the field in September, 1945, it has, so far, been a very minor contender.

The Democratic Party, founded in January, 1946, started with a far more experienced and substantial membership. Its charter members were four men of great national eminence. Celâl Bayar, the leader, was a former prime minister and had been considered as a possible successor to Atatürk. His co-founders were Adnan Menderes, large landowner and deputy for Kütahya; Professor Fuad Köprülü, celebrated historian and deputy for İstanbul; and Refik Koraltan, a nationally known provincial governor before he became a deputy. All four had been members of the Republican People's Party, from which they had resigned to form their new party. The Democrats in their first campaigns also had the good fortune of active support from Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, who did not join the party but actively campaigned for it in Anatolia. The Democratic Party offered the first significant organized opposition to the government since the founding of the Republic. Within two years, however, it was under sharp criticism from its own followers for compromising with the government and the People's Party. Marshal Çakmak withdrew his support and became titular head of a new Party of the Nation (Millet Partisi),

taking with him a number of Democrats and Independents. Nevertheless, the Democratic Party continued with effective strength.

Its first program declared that it "recognized that democracy is the principle most consistent with national interest and human dignity and it places faith in the maturity of the Turkish State," a viewpoint well proved four years later when this party won a free, fair election after a dignified campaign. The Democrats called for decentralization of the national government by granting more authority and initiative to officials in the provinces and their subdivisions.<sup>9</sup> They advocated nonpolitical planning boards, and they set forth in great detail reforms for the nation's courts, commerce, agriculture, industry, forestry, and finances.

Inasmuch as the six arrows of policy of the People's Party had been made a part of the national constitution, the Democrats accepted them, but with reservations. They reinterpreted "reformism" to mean keeping the Turkish nation abreast with progressive nations in a dynamic world but more by evolution than revolution. For them "populism" meant "government of the people, with the people, and for the people" (*halktan, halkla beraber ve halk için*). Their conception of étatism, one of their major issues, was restriction of State-operated enterprises to those which fill actual deficiencies in the national economy and which private capital cannot conduct profitably. The party's original program was very specific on the proper bounds between state and private enterprise. On foreign policies the Democratic Party and the Republican People's Party were in complete agreement, as indeed were other parties.

"The whole destiny of the national will," according to the Democratic platform, "is bound up in elections carried out by secret ballot, free from every kind of intervention. This, in turn, depends on political parties endowed with equal rights." When the first multi-party national election was over in 1946 and the disputed count was settled by compromise, the Democratic Party had 63 deputies; the Independents, 6; and the Republican People's Party, 396, including a number of its deputies held over from previous elections.<sup>10</sup> In 1950, the Democratic Party unseated the People's Party. Thus, when the first citizens born in the Republic arrived at voting age, the new Turks had entered an era of vigorous new movements of the people to promote more achievements for the people.

## Government by the People

It is the common aim of all my countrymen as well as their present duty and privilege to be sure that, as the result of elections, the will of the nation becomes clearly evident.—İsmet İnönü, Election Address, 1946.

**O**BSERVATIONS on the people's power in the government of Turkey can well center around freedom of speech and of the press, majority rule, and secret balloting, which the Western democracies consider the *sine qua non* of government by the people. The outspoken intention of the new Turks' leaders, from the start, had been government by the people. The question was *when*, and it was answered between sunrise and sunset on May 14, 1950, in the Republic's eighth national election. On that day, 89 per cent of Turkey's nearly nine million registered voters fully used their power of self-government. They voted the "ins" out. The election returns left only sixty-nine seats out of four hundred eighty-seven in the Grand National Assembly to the People's Party of the Republic, after its twenty-seven years of full control. The Democratic ticket won all the rest except one seat, which went to the small Party of the Nation.

The 1950 election was conducted under a new electoral law, administered with impressive fairness while the control was still in the hands of the People's Party. The Turks thus gave, for the first time in history, proof that a new state which starts on a one-party basis in its formative years, need not become a totalitarian dictatorship, and that it can progress through gradual steps and self education to government by the people.

A close look at the political life of the Turks among themselves shows how they could, so dramatically, assert their freedom as voters

under a government which had many aspects of a dictatorship. A safe assertion to start with is that citizens of the Turkish Republic have not been living in fear of secret police checking on private conversations and radio programs tuned in at home. If one person unintentionally or maliciously aroused suspicions of subversive actions by another, and if the police heard of it, they might make an annoyingly unceremonious search of the latter's rooms. Police have been apt to make arrests on trifling complaints but, normally, an innocent person clears himself, if he unwinds enough red tape to present his case to the proper official. However, anyone in public life—a writer, professor, politician, or official—who criticized the government or diverged from policies of the People's Party did so at the risk of a severe fine, a jail sentence, or at least public indignity.

The form of free-speech called soap-box oratory has been non-existent in Turkey. Only in total revolution has an unofficial speaker been likely to address a public mass meeting. In the pre-Republic revolt against misused authority, Mutafa Kemâl Pasha and his spokesmen spoke in public squares all over Anatolia, and Halide Edib Hanum astounded Istanbul by being the first woman to address an open-air mass meeting. In normal times, meetings in public halls, whether political or cultural, have required permits from the proper national ministry. Turkey has very few auditoriums except in schools or *halkevis*, so most meetings have had to be approved by the Ministry of Education or the People's Party.

The People's Party had, all along, encouraged formation of youth, sports, and trade associations in sympathy with party principles. And, if consent of the Council of Ministers was obtained, associations "to create unity among nations" were legitimate. Private individuals have been free to buy standard source books on all political theories, from democracy to communism. Prior to the Republic, political societies had usually been underground or outside of the country among expatriates, as at first with the Young Turks. Other political discussion was sometimes in secret religious orders or else in small and rather transient philosophical, scientific, or literary societies. If these precedents had not kept most political discussion in private groups, the 1938 Law of Associations would have done so. This law, so often mentioned before, served the interest solely of the original political party until it was amended in 1946.

Freedom of the press in Turkey so far has fallen somewhat short of the broadest democratic ideal, but the Turkish press has been headstrong and has repeatedly taken the bit in its teeth. Periodicals in Ottoman Turkey had been published almost exclusively by non-Turks and usually in foreign or minority languages until the second half of the nineteenth century, when Turkish agitators for reform launched papers both inside and outside of Turkey. The heyday for these papers was from 1870 to 1876. Then Sultan Abdülhamid began his reign and wasted no time in presenting to the reform editors command-offers of governorships and ambassadorships at safe distances from Turkey proper and from each other. For a while he tolerated nonpolitical cultural publications, but gradually he restricted them to innocuous features on customs and incidents in foreign lands. Editors were truly free only to praise him, and every sheet of proof was read by two censors. To cap the climax, the Sultan finally interdicted even fiction because "it stimulated the imagination."

Young Turk publications, spawned abroad and underground, came across the borders and above ground as soon as the Young Turks gained control in 1908. Editors, intoxicated by sudden freedom, became slanderously outspoken. When the Young Turks' three leaders themselves became oppressors, the press turned on them. Therewith, three or four editors were mysteriously shot on the streets. The sobering effects of Ottoman defeats in the Italian and Balkan wars produced a more judicious attitude on the part of those editors who still had periodicals after 1912. Then came World War I, in which the Turkish press supported the German cause. It was ill repaid for this by suppression of cultural as well as military and political news. Through the confusion and resentments generated in World War I, the Turkish press finally came into its own as a safety valve for public indignation. When the Sultan connived with the victorious Allies to stifle the Istanbul press, new nationalistic papers sprang up in Anatolia. Thereafter an Ottoman Press Association, formed for all newspapers, served well to raise their standards and uphold their rights.<sup>1</sup>

The Republic gave to the press the constitutional guarantee of freedom promised in the nineteenth-century *Tanzimat* reforms: "The press shall enjoy freedom within the framework of the law and shall not be subject to any censorship or control prior to publication" (Art. 77 of the national Constitution). Unfortunately, within the

framework of the Press Law, until recent modifications, there was a clause from an Ottoman law, permitting cabinet ministers to suspend a newspaper for an indefinite period without any form of court judgment. In practice, the Directorate General of the Press in Ankara informs newspaper publishers of government policies or programs which may be published, and it screens news distributed by the Anadolu News Agency, Turkey's only nation-wide press service. If a paper then carries news or editorials contrary to national policy, at least in a degree deemed "harmful" by sometimes arbitrary interpretation of the law, the penalty is suspension from a single day to many months, or in the extreme cases, a fine and perhaps a prison sentence for the publisher or editor. This has not in the least meant that a newspaper never could criticize the government. Turkish periodicals, in editorials and cartoons, have protested low wages for government employees, delays in public works, and various failures of the government to live up to promises; they have taken sides on legislative proposals in the Grand National Assembly. But criticism of a law after its enactment, or denunciation of an established policy, has usually been penalized.

During the World War II crisis, between 1939 and 1947, the application of the Press Law was more rigid. But under pressures by newborn political parties, this law was modified on June 13, 1946, so that thenceforth suspension of a newspaper had to be decided in legal hearings before the regular courts of justice, instead of by the Ministers without a hearing.

Turkish publishers and editors have met restrictions somewhat as lawyers before a jury in the United States meet court restrictions. An American lawyer, knowing in advance that the judge will sustain objections to something he intends to say, will say it nevertheless to plant the impression of it in the jurors' minds. Turkish editors, on occasion, accepted the same risk of being penalized *after* printing what they wished their readers to know. Distributing agencies (newspapers in Turkey do not handle their own distribution) delivered another paper to a suspended paper's subscribers. At such a risk, certain Turkish dailies protested the unpopular capital levy (*varlık vergisi*, p. 56), which fell so disproportionately hard on non-Müslims.

When pictures from Charlie Chaplin's film, "The Dictator," appeared in *Vatan* during World War II, accompanied by sharp com-



ment on dictators, the German ambassador, von Papen, protested vigorously. The government, therefore, suspended *Vatan* for ninety days, leaving to the publisher, Ahmet Emin Yalman, the grave problem of meeting his payroll. This he did by writing in daily installments and selling on the newsstands a book on his own world travels. Another Istanbul daily was suspended for carrying a pro-Nazi editorial. These two instances were both ostensibly cases of disregarding the government's policy of strict neutrality.<sup>2</sup> The people generally learned a great deal through the Turkish press if they read several newspapers. No publisher, however, could afford too many suspensions, so it is understandable that an editor would be very daring for a while, then for another while be very circumspect.

Yet, the tight rein on the press in Turkey was not attached at the other end to an immovable object. As already indicated, the government holding the rein had itself been dragged ahead by the press straining at the bit. An American who had lived long in Turkey, wrote in a personal letter during the 1946 elections, "We were amazed, before the election, to see headlines in the Istanbul papers which made us think of American headlines during a political campaign, calling names and making charges against the party in power." After the second party's deputies were seated in the Assembly, several papers quoted a speech by Adnan Menderes of the Democratic Party, asserting that the Grand National Assembly was not legally constituted because of election irregularities. The government sued that group of journalists on the charge of attempting to defame the Assembly. In court, these journalists successfully defended themselves and were acquitted. Certainly freedom of speech and of the press in modern Turkey has dynamic possibilities, and in the 1950 legislative hopper appeared a freer press law. The new administration passed it, and the Turkish press today is conspicuously free.

Majority rule is basic to any government by the people. Majority decisions by acclamation in village meetings are an ancient Turkish tradition. More formal majority action by ballots began in Turkey, or rather in the Ottoman Empire, in 1839 in balloting for municipal and provincial councils under the *Tanzimat* reforms. The first national election in 1876 was hardly more than a gesture and was not repeated in Sultan Abdülhamid's long reign. Afterwards, the Young Turks held four elections between 1908 and 1920 for an Ottoman

parliament. Then, when Atatürk held elections for delegates to the People's Congresses, a tremendous majority supported him. From time to time thereafter his party nominated more than one party-approved candidate for a single seat, and the final choice was nominally with the voters, but the choice could be easily "fixed."

The Grand National Assembly has, from the start, suffered both foreign and domestic criticism for "rubber stamping" legislation proposed by the President and the party council. But deputies have told me that in committees and party caucuses, they have debated issues very freely and have settled them by majority rule. Yet, in the full Assembly sessions, it was long assumed that committee and party caucus decisions would be passed without discussion other than explanations of meaning in answer to questions. Gradually, however, committees have turned more and more important matters back to the Assembly to be threshed out in open debates on the floor. Bi-party politics, after 1946, gave floor debates a stronger impetus.

Free and secret voting in elections has been a problem. Not one voter in ten, in the Republic's first election, and hardly one in five more recently, has been literate enough to mark a ballot unaided. The custom, therefore, has been for party representatives to distribute ballots to all citizens a few days before an election. Voters marked them at home in consultation with whomsoever they pleased. On election day, each voter appeared at the polls with his ballot or, more often than not, received one there already marked for him. He dropped his ballot in the sealed box and signed his name or made his mark in the register, meanwhile having displayed his identification card. This formality was to prevent his voting more than once. Party officials and government employees counted the votes under police protection. From the United States' viewpoint of fair elections, the nominations were too restricted, the balloting was not secret, and the count was controlled only by the party in power. From the Turkish viewpoint their system seemed a practical steppingstone from relative inexperience in national elections by a largely illiterate electorate to eventual free elections by an educated citizenry.

Adjusting the system to additional parties for the seventh election, in 1946, was no simple matter. Moreover, this was the first direct election of deputies by the voters. Theretofore, voters had cast ballots for electors who, in turn, elected deputies from a party list. This elec-

tion afforded a new test of rival campaigning, freedom of the press, and freedom of voting. The newspapers took sides vigorously. The People's Party tried to have only its candidates permitted to speak in any *halkevi* auditorium, frequently the only meeting hall in the community. Although the *halkevi* was established by the People's Party, citizens contended that this "people's house" was for all the people, since all citizens had assisted in raising funds for it. Long after the election, the *halkevi* was recognized officially as a community house, not reserved for a single party.

Hindsight on the 1946 election day shows clearly what went wrong. "In our city," an American wrote from an Anatolian province, "the party in power began election day by giving each voter a ballot all nicely marked, telling him to take it to the polls and deposit it. They sent for voters, even including our American residents who, of course, declined. Before the day ended, however, protests of citizens who refused to be told how to vote reached the governor in sufficient numbers so that he apparently gave other orders. Anyway, one of our Turkish employees, who had refused to vote at all in the morning when he was allowed no choice of ballots, was taken back in the afternoon and allowed to vote as he wished. Quite a few citizens whom we know, who want to support the opposition, are afraid to associate themselves with it."

Local party officials and police, and indeed higher officials, accustomed, by centuries-old habits, to suppression of all opposition, rarely could conceive of impartiality toward opponents as being anything but disloyalty to their own superiors. Therefore, intimidation of opposition party spokesmen and voters, some of it violent, did occur, and the final count was bitterly challenged. Feelings ablaze led to several libel suits in court and to perhaps a dozen killings in personal quarrels. In a compromise on returns the Democrats settled for sixty-three seats.

No one in the country was in a more difficult position than President İnönü. His alternatives in trying to maintain unity and good feelings were either to play to the old psychology of confidence in a leader capable of suppressing opposition—by force if necessary—or else to venture farther along the democratic path of open competition for votes. In the background of local politics, a village headman had often been elected less because he represented a majority's views than

because he was believed most capable of making and enforcing personal decisions for the general good. Atatürk had this capacity to command acceptance of his own views. Such precedents make it difficult to establish equal confidence in a man who yields to majority opinions which are not his own, and still claims to be a leader. İsmet İnönü, however, committed himself to majority rule.

In addition to the statement quoted at the head of this chapter, he said in his 1946 election speeches, "It is both a legal obligation and a debt of conscience that voting shall take place freely. When this freely expressed will of the nation becomes known, any attempt at propaganda or resistance against it will be of no avail." And, addressing his own party, he also said, "The Republican People's Party's . . . aim is to ensure free and fair elections. If we win, we shall continue to carry out our duties, and if we lose, we shall constitute the opposition, at the same time remaining on friendly terms with the party in power." History almost never produces such a dramatic test of spoken ideals as İnönü and his party experienced in their own defeat in Turkey's remarkably free and fair election of 1950. They met it well at first.

Much happened, however, in the interim between the 1946 and 1950 elections. Right after the newly elected Democrats took their seats in the Assembly in 1946, they threatened to walk out in protest against the conduct of the election. President İnönü showed his determination to have an opposition party in the Assembly by persuading the Democrats to stay, and again later, he and moderates on both sides induced Democrats who walked out of a fiery budget debate to return. No need to detail here their boycotting of various local and by-elections which lost the Democrats some seats in the next two years; suffice it to say that by 1948 booths for secret voting were installed at polling places, and the Democrats began to gain a rural as well as urban following.

Nine major reforms became the immediate goal of the new opposition: (1) A change in the election law to insure free voting and fair counting. (2) Modification of the drastic police law. (3) Modification of the Press Law. (4) Lifting of martial law and removal of certain other restrictions. (5) Abrogation of all unconstitutional laws. (6) Greater autonomy for provincial governments. (7) More free private enterprise. (8) Less arbitrary relocation of families, notably

Kurds under the Land Settlement Law. (9) Reduction of the budget. The Democratic deputies and the moderate and forward-looking deputies in the People's Party, aided also by President İnönü's determination to admit opposition, mustered a majority to pass the first four of these reforms within the next two years. The others became lively issues in the various ministries and committees.

Always, however, İsmet İnönü was in the dilemma of wondering whether his conciliatory coöperation with the opposition would be interpreted as weakness or wisdom, and whether it would lose or win votes for himself, but he persisted in it. Simultaneously, the Democratic leader, Celâl Bayar, publicly proclaimed, "Complete success is possible for parties possessing equal rights and earning the nation's devotion."<sup>3</sup>

The new political atmosphere in the last half of the 1940's brought to life other organized movements representing scattered groups. A slight flurry of activity for revival of the Sultanate revolved around descendants of the former Osmanlı royalty who had returned to Turkey after the amnesty act. Royalist articles appeared in *Büyük Doğu* (The Great East), a publication of small circulation which was condemned by both major parties for belittling Atatürk. Communist movements came into the open far enough for articles in certain daily papers, sales of Communist propaganda literature in one or two bookstores, suspicion of Communist teaching by a few members of the faculty in the University of Ankara, and radical periodicals appearing under new names for almost every issue. Demonstrations, mostly by university students, against such publications, bookstores, and suspected faculty members, were close enough to riots to bring out the police. These propaganda channels were closed fairly tightly, and every supposedly Communist party organization was suppressed; the leaders were arrested and sentenced to one to five years imprisonment.

This first experience of bi-party government somewhat confused political thinking for awhile. The Democrats' prompt success in securing so many of its reforms gave many the impression that its job was done and it no longer had reason for existence. But extreme Democratic partisans looked upon concessions in reforms, engineered in the Assembly by forward-looking members of the People's Party majority, as confessions of the latter's weakness; they wanted to exploit

this advantage to weaken that party completely. Extreme partisans of the People's Party wished to resist conciliatory reforms in order to destroy the new opposition. In this sort of confusion, both parties lost a number of members, including some very prominent ones.

In mid-1948, some former Democrats and Independent deputies, led by Marshal Çakmak who, as an Independent himself, had supported the Democrats in 1946, formed the Party of the Nation (Millet Partisi), previously mentioned in Chapter 19. The much-admired marshal became titular head, and Hikmet Bayur, a former Minister of Education for a short time under Atatürk and more recently an Independent deputy, became president of the party. At first the chief bond in this party appeared to be the members' common antagonism to the two older parties, on grounds of the latter's alleged incompetency to solve the national problems and of their compromises with each other which some saw as merely moves to retain power.

The Party of the Nation, in a new journal, called *Türk İstanbul*, warned against accepting extensive foreign aid, lest it be a step toward dependence on a foreign power. It advocated a limited presidential tenure, a parliament of two houses, the right of labor to strike, at least a semi-revival of religious authority and, like the Democrats, more free enterprise. Some of the Democratic deputies formed a semi-autonomous group inside their party, and called themselves Free Democrats. More aggressive factions developed, also, inside the People's Party. After two years of multi-party elections, on the Republic's twenty-fifth anniversary, October 29, 1948, the composition of the Assembly was 405 People's Party deputies; 49 Democratic Party deputies, including 14 Free Democrats; 7 from the Party of the Nation; and 4 Independents.

Turkish statesmen and many common citizens seem well aware of the dangers of a democracy which so splits the vote that no party ever wins a majority. They have watched endless contests in the multiplicity of parties in Bulgaria and Rumania, and unstable government by inter-party plurality compromises instead of by clear majority in France. The Turks seem inclined toward a predominantly two-party system, with the doors open to minor protest parties.

The grand finale to four years of shifting and changing parties and shaping public opinion was the 1950 election, which left not one iota of doubt that the Turks want to try political democracy. They set up

their first full test of it in a very mature fashion. Nothing was clearer than that the top issue that year was to be neither candidates nor platforms but how to conduct an honest free election. At the start an open clash was imminent. The Democrats expressed their dissatisfaction with the old electoral law by proclaiming the voters' "constitutional right" to defy it. The People's Party tagged this a "national hostility oath." Then President İnönü, who had for a while chosen to be only titular head of his party, was in new difficulties. It became harder to tell whether he ran his party or it ran him. The complexity of distributing praise or blame in a democracy was making itself felt.

As confusion and tension began to seem too serious, statesmanlike advice in the major parties prevailed, and a commission of legal experts from the courts and the university law faculties was appointed to study electoral laws of all contemporary political democracies. Debate on its report to the Grand National Assembly was open and, at first, furious—especially on matters of registration procedure and election boards. Local officials would need new directives; election boards must insure not only free registration, secret voting, and honest counting, but absolutely impartial reporting of all violators of the law, regardless of party affiliation.

Premier Şemsettin Günaltay and Vice-Premier Nihat Erim, both People's Party members—the former a contemporary of Atatürk; the latter the first to rise to high office from those who were under teenage when Atatürk declared Turkey a Republic—displayed fine statesmanship in steering the new law through its revisions and finally its passage, by a vote of 341 to 10. Only the Party of the Nation rejected it, and the press conceded some justification for continued opposition to certain terms in it, but in general welcomed it as an adequate step forward for the present. The press of both parties and the neutral press coöperated to praise and explain it to the voters.

Supervision of elections, under this law, is taken out of the hands of any political party and away from the government administration which represents the party in power. The Supreme Election Board in Ankara is composed entirely of judges from the non-partisan Council of State and the highest court—the Court of Cassation. The highest ranking judge in each province (*il*) or county (*ilçe*) is chairman of its election board, and he draws the board members by lot equally from representatives named by the political parties and from the

popularly elected members of the provincial, or county, assembly. No police, or anyone in uniform or bearing arms, may be at the polls unless summoned by the civilian judge-chairman in an emergency. (For an abstract of the election law, see Appendix E.)

As soon as this law went into effect on February 21, 1950, attention focused on the question, "Will it work?" And, if it should work fairly, would the Turks be politically mature enough to accept the people's choice? Candidates flocked to their constituencies by plane, train, and jeep, making every gesture that might win votes, and even canvassing from door to door in villages. "Many deputies," C. Baban editorialized in *Son Saat* on February 23, "are now indeed busy acquainting themselves with the latest leanings of their constituents, because after the abolition of the system of pleasing-the-chief, these deputies seem to be at a loss what to do." It was a very new experience for the Turks to put a secular law and the will of the people above the wishes of a government chief. And it was even newer to have the chief of the government and the chiefs of opposition factions agree that it should be so.

The Turks astounded the rest of the world and amazed themselves by their 1950 election. The calmness surpassed all expectations and can be credited to the high plane of courtesy to opponents, on which the leaders of both parties campaigned; thoughtful discussions in the press; popular trust in the judiciary; and the new law's requirement of a three-day cooling-off period before election day without campaign speeches or printed propaganda. The American who reported trouble in an Anatolian province in 1946 (p. 227) reported this time that the change was "amazing." "Everyone took the new law very seriously, even so much so that some postmasters, during the cooling-off days, would not deliver out-of-town papers lest they be editions carrying propaganda. And it was practically impossible to find anyone who did not vote."

The electorate's intelligent acceptance of new responsibilities also exceeded expectations. One new responsibility was for provincial party councils to nominate 70 to 80 per cent of the candidates, leaving fewer than one-third to the choice of national councils which had previously nominated all candidates. Candidates could also be nominated by popular petition. Early fears that provincial and popular nominees would



be party hacks or else grossly ignorant politically, vanished in surprise at the high caliber of local selections.

Most incredible of all were the election returns. Apparently no one foresaw a greater division in the new Assembly than 60 to 40 per cent, and relatively few felt confident that the opposition would win. The actual division of total votes between the major parties, was 54 to 40 per cent in favor of the new Democratic party. Its victories in provinces with the largest number of seats, however, resulted in an 84 per cent Democratic majority in the Assembly.<sup>4</sup>

The voting seems to have been more for parties than for individual candidates. Many voters apparently wanted the novel sensation of freely voting against the men in power; hence only one of the People's Party cabinet members, namely Premier Günaltay, was returned to the Assembly, although certain other ministers also deserved seats there. The Democrats had the added advantage of attracting votes for any change which might bring lower costs of living. Businessmen in good numbers voted for the Democrats' promise of more private industry. The successful candidate, Celâl Bayar, had promised the voters sharper demarcation between the fields of state and private enterprise—greater efficiency in the former and more opportunity for the latter; more voice for farmers and laborers, including the latter's right to strike; a higher standard of living; and a freer press law. The sharpest clash had sprung from the Republican charges that the Democrats would exploit the nation for the benefit of private profiteers. The counter-charge by the Democrats had been that the Republicans would bankrupt the nation by bureaucratic waste and extravagance.<sup>5</sup>

Bayar, like İnönü, was born in 1884, and had shared in the revolution against Ottoman absolutism, and also had served in Atatürk's cabinet as premier. But, in contrast to İnönü, he was village born, the son of a schoolteacher, and had received little formal schooling. Largely self-educated, he is recognized as an economist. He proved his financial sagacity when he was a youthful employee in a German bank in Turkey; and later, in 1924, he resigned from the Ministry of Commerce, which he then held, to become the first director-general of the İş Bankası, founded as a private bank to finance industries. He knows first hand the reasons for Turkey's étatisme, with its state industries under the Sümer and Eti Banks, which he originally helped to pro-

mote.<sup>6</sup> Thus he is in an unusually good position to assay the possibilities of both state and private enterprise in Turkey.

The newly elected deputies took their seats in the Assembly with very pointed democratic gestures. One was the restoration to its place over the speaker's stand, of the sign which reads, "All power emanates from the people," and which had been missing for several years. Then, Bayar drove to the opening session in the jeep in which he had campaigned. When the Assembly elected him President of the Republic, the Democratic deputies broke all precedents by *not* rising but applauding him from their seats. This was prearranged in order to show that the elected representatives of the people are the highest power, and even the President is not higher than they. President Bayar is Turkey's first nonmilitary president. Three of the highest honors went to his co-founders of the party; the premiership to Adnan Menderes, the presidency of the Assembly to Refik Koraltan, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Fuat Köprülü.

The People's Party minority, led by İnönü, commanded respect by their dignity in bowing to the public will. The succeeding months, however, brought exposés of alleged extravagance and personal accumulation of property and wealth by high officials in the People's Party while they were in power and while the common people suffered grave economic hardships. Anger against İnönü for his abuses of power had lessened when he and his party fulfilled their promises of an honest election. But it revived, accompanied by a new fear that since he had lost in democratic competition, he and his party would revert to anti-democratic methods to regain power. Some alarm was felt at the size of the Democrats' majority in the Assembly. It seemed to hold the possibility of a new single party domination, as such a large majority could even change the constitution to increase its own power. But the Democrats promised to revise the constitution to make one-party control impossible. The people's new sense of *their* power provides a healthy brake to any overweening ambitions of the new government, which will have to be tried at the polls again in 1954.

Whenever one has heard a foreign commentator class Turkey with dictator and police states, familiarity with trends and events in Turkey since the Republic began made one wonder if multi-party politics and free voting could have developed in any really totalitarian state as they have in Turkey; and if any absolute dictator in a police state

would address his people as İsmet İnönü addressed the Turks on behalf of opposition in the Assembly and at the polls. A plausible argument is that the Turks went through increasingly democratic moves after World War II in order to woo the Western democracies' aid against threats to Turkey's independence, but the trend can be traced too far back, through the Republic and the nineteenth-century *Tanzimat* reforms, for this explanation to be adequate. Another reason could be that the best Turkish statesmen have always been masters of timing to achieve their own ends. The present statesmen may indeed have taken advantage of new sympathy and support from the Western democracies to carry their nation in a rapid swing through the second critical transition on the way from absolutism to democracy. The new Turks, thus, end their first three decades engaged in as significant pioneering as when they started. They began in transition from an absolutist empire to a nationalistic republic; they are now in transition from control by a single leader of a single party to government *by* the people. The Turks may never develop democratic government in exact replica of any Western democracy, because their needs and situation are different. Nevertheless, despite the tremendous obstacles of illiteracy and the crises in which they have been involved by their strategic place in world affairs, they have, in one generation, voluntarily gone this far toward government *by* the people.

## World Relations

We believe in the possibility of mutual understanding among the nations. . . . Let us, therefore, untiringly persevere in using all means available to make the nations of the world better acquainted with and appreciative of each other. Never before has the part entrusted to responsible men been more important and yet more difficult.—İsmet İnönü, February 26, 1939.

WHEN the new Turks relinquished empire aspirations they also surrendered dependence on aggressive force to maintain their place in the world. Thereafter, their reliance was to be on defensive force and friendly foreign relations. Historians may hunt, but probably in vain, for anything in Turkish relations inconsistent with this policy during the Turkish Republic's pioneer years.

One English historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, has already issued his verdict on the new Turks' plan for living: ". . . the Turkish legatees of the arrested Ottoman Civilization are today content . . . to live henceforth in comfortable banality as a welcome escape from the no longer tolerable status of being 'a peculiar people.'"<sup>1</sup> It would be difficult for anyone who knows them to imagine Turks who do not, as Professor Toynbee said, welcome escape from the stigma of being a peculiar people, especially in a sense objectionable to modern civilized nations. Yet, it would be equally difficult for anyone who has lived long with the new Turks to agree with him that banality, even if comfortable, will content them. The best years of their Selçuk and Osmanlı eras, and their own years in the Republic, have been anything but banal, or synonymously dull, insipid, and commonplace. They see no necessary banality in their future as a small state among other states, large and small, provided that their rights are equally

respected, and their achievements are equally recognized. The logic of the Turks' view is the same logic which makes a small state in the U.S.A., let us say Vermont, anticipate a quite different, but not necessarily more banal, future than that of a large state like Texas.

The Turks' chances for a sufficiently peaceful period in which to prove this point cannot be depicted through the haze of uncertainty covering the whole world in 1950. What can be permanently recorded at this stage is the background of foreign relations which the new Turks, themselves, designed between 1920 and 1950. It must be traced along the lines of their relations to the former Ottoman subject nations and the Great Powers in the Old World, with the United States in the New World, and with the United Nations in the whole world.

Relations with former subject nations in the Balkans, until World War II, had centered largely in the four-power Balkan Entente of Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Their prime motive was to guarantee their mutual boundaries against aggression by each other. It was not a commitment to joint defense against non-Balkan powers, although a uniform military system and defense policy had advocates in each country. Bulgaria would not join because her signature would amount to acceptance of her existing boundaries, which afforded her no access to the Aegean Sea and which had been narrowed along her Black Sea shore by the Allied award of Dobruja to Rumania in 1919. She was induced to coöperate in all activities irrelevant to boundary lines, and in 1938, signed a separate agreement with the Entente members binding all of them not to resort to force on issues between themselves. These small states anticipated, by at least a decade, many of the post-war aims for a united Europe. They arrived at a common rate of postage, held economic and agricultural conferences, formed a medical union, and agreed on mutual facilities for tourists. They were closely approaching a customs union and a simplified monetary exchange, and they had a commission studying the possibilities of unified law codes on mutual concerns, when World War II interrupted. Thereupon, each strove in her own way to save herself from extinction; and, when the war ended, Soviet expansion had the effect of keeping them apart.

Balkan-Turkish relations in 1950 cannot be separated from the critical tensions caused by the spread of Communism. Turkey and

Bulgaria, in spite of previous disagreements over Bulgaria's boundary claims, had managed to remain generally friendly even through World War II. But after Bulgaria was fully in the Soviet orbit, her relations with Turkey deteriorated rapidly, because Turkey, by choice of ideologies and traditional fears of Russia, had cast her lot with the Western Democracies. A serious aspect is that Bulgaria has had a Turkish minority of perhaps a million in her total population of seven million. Some Turks, whose families had lived in Bulgaria for generations during Ottoman rule, fled to Turkey bearing stories of persecution. Then Bulgaria precipitately deported a quarter million of them, after almost complete confiscation of their property in Bulgaria, in violation of a long-standing agreement for *voluntary* emigration with compensation for property. This created for Turkey the severe problems of absorbing these practically penniless refugees so rapidly while her own economy was badly strained, and also of screening out possible fifth columnists posing as refugees. Friction over Turkish minorities, and over incidents harassing to embassy and consular staffs, arose with Rumania, a satellite of Moscow, and also with Yugoslavia, then Communist though outside of Russian control. Prior to the spread of Communist totalitarianism, Turkey's relations with these former subject countries of her empire had been, on the whole, amicable because they had reached political agreement, and their economic interests did not overlap with Turkey's enough to cause friction.

Greece and Turkey had every apparent reason for bitter enmity after the Turks' War of Liberation. It forced the Greeks out of the Turks' homeland, which had, however, been even longer the homeland of Greek colonists. The actual adjustment of Turkish-Greek relations should be a classic example of how people of two nationalities can become friends after trying to destroy each other. The exchange of citizens to end the minority problem was unique, and it was unhappy for thousands of the uprooted families. But it did reduce friction between the populations by setting them apart on their respective sides of the boundary.

The Greeks, in the interest of future peace, passed a law prohibiting the use of anti-Turkish literature and songs in their schoolrooms and they even republished some textbooks to eliminate such matter. As at least a technical cancellation of the sad score, the Greeks formally recognized in Article 59 of the Treaty of Lausanne their

obligation to make full reparation to Turkey for damage done in Anatolia "contrary to the laws of war." But the same article also records that "Turkey, in consideration of the financial situation of Greece resulting from the war and its consequences, finally renounces all claims for reparation against the Greek government." Yet it would be senseless to deny that old resentments engendered after World War I are just under the surface. They flare up in odd incidents—a Greek speaker at a press banquet in Turkey chiding the Turks for giving so little aid to Greece in World War II; Turks showing such anger at a *futbol* match in Greece in 1949 when Greeks applauded an Italian victory which the Turks had attributed to a faulty decision, that both governments had to apply official salve to close the incident. But, on the whole, both Greeks and Turks recognize a special community of needs and interests.

The Turks and Greeks in the second decade of the Turkish Republic signed three successive pacts of ever closer friendship and conciliation. In one pact, in 1933, they agreed that whenever only one of them could have a delegate at an international conference, he should have "the mission of defending the interests of both."<sup>2</sup> Then World War II embarrassments came. The Turks gave no military aid to Greece, but when the Western Allies could not see their way clear to relay food to the Greeks, during Nazi occupation of Greece, the Turks took it upon themselves to deliver wheat. In this service they lost a ship which struck a mine in the Aegean Sea while returning. Apropos of this aid, former President Hoover of the United States said, "I wish that Belgium, Poland, and Norway and the others had a friend as compassionate as Turkey."<sup>3</sup>

After World War II, Greece regained from the Italians, sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands, closer to Turkey's shore than some of Turkey's own islands. The Turks produced no pretext for claiming any of the islands for their own defense; they appeared satisfied to have the Greeks move in again as close to their Aegean shore as to their common boundary in Thrace.<sup>4</sup> The two nations resolved, during the first session of the new Council of Europe in August, 1949, to set up a joint commission for closer understanding through publishing books and presenting radio programs in both languages about each other's cultural, political, and economic life; by translating each other's classics; by exchanging teachers and students, and by facilitating travel

in both countries. They also have been negotiating for mutual security, this time possibly in a pact of eastern Mediterranean states.

Relations between the Turks and Arabs after 1923 were at first coolly friendly. The Arab states, created since the Arabs' World War I emancipation from the Ottoman yoke, were apparently anxious to avoid friction with their former rulers, and the Turks, as Hitler discovered, were not even tempted by a chance to regain power over the Arabs. Neither side has had reason to fear the other; neither has wanted to provoke the other.

The Arabs, in general, had partly turned away from the Turks because of the new Turks' departure from religious law, but they have been casting somewhat envious glances over their shoulders at Turkey's industrial progress. Only the Syrian Arabs have a potential issue with Turkey, for Syria has not accorded recognition to Turkish sovereignty over Hatay (p. 64). Formation of the Arab League of seven states—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Transjordan (now Jordan), Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria—in 1945 produced no indication that the Turks either feared this union of their former subjects or were tempted to use it in any way for revival of pan-Islamism under Turkish domination. Arab royalty—the kings of Egypt and Jordan, the prince-regent of Iraq, and also the President of the Lebanese Republic—made friendly visits to Turkey, and some bilateral pacts of friendship were signed after World War II. The Turks, furthermore, did not take sides between the Arab states when their league split in 1948 over the issue of Palestine.

When the question of partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews came to vote in the United Nations Assembly, Turkey voted against it. As Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak explained, Turkey was convinced from her long experience with the Near Eastern populations that this decision would lead to violence and instability.<sup>5</sup> Violence did develop in Palestine; the United Nations sought for compromise, and appointed Turkey to the three-nation Palestine Conciliation Commission. Acquiescing in the United Nations majority decision for partition, Turkey was the first Müslim nation to recognize the new State of Israel. Inter-Arab issues, such as Palestine, are beyond the scope of this book, except to note that they have contributed to each state's jealous watchfulness of the others' relations to Turkey, and also



to Russia's critical observance of every Turkish-Arabic move, because Turkey is the strongest state in the Near East.<sup>6</sup>

The only Arab states which actually border on Turkey are Syria and Irak. Their common boundary for a considerable distance is along the railroad (perhaps the only international boundary on a man-made, instead of a natural, line). Families and neighbors, under their respective Syrian and Turkish sovereignties, talk across the track but need visas and permits to walk across. This would be dangerous proximity for unfriendly peoples. Another common concern of Turkey and Syria is the Euphrates River, which flows through both, and also through Irak, so that all three countries are affected by the plan of any one for irrigation and power developments. Irak shares with Turkey the Tigris as well as the Euphrates River, and also the nomadic Kurdish population. Turkey and Irak signed a detailed treaty of friendship in 1946 for joint control and development of the rivers, and for the closest cultural relations.

The oldest and strongest bond between the Turkish Republic and the other Müslim states had been the 1937 Saadabad Pact, still in effect, with Irak, Afghanistan, and Iran, the last two, however, not yet agreeing on terms for its renewal. Two years prior to this friendly pact, Turkey had arbitrated a boundary dispute between Iran and Afghanistan. The Turks and Persians share ambitions for secularization and modernization, and also the traditional threats to their sovereignty by Russia, and they signed a new friendship pact after World War II. The Turks affirm at least a sentimental attachment to Müslim Pakistan, since the older Turks recall gratefully the aid these Müslims sent to them in Turkey's War of Liberation, mostly in the form of medical supplies. Moreover, Pakistan seems likely to provide a growing market for Turkish exports. When, however, it comes to the idea of a general Müslim union, former Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak told newspaper correspondents, in mid-1949, that Turkey does not believe that twentieth-century international relations can be based on religion alone. But he added that whenever several Müslim countries unite on other common interests and aims, Turkey will cooperate with them. Thus, for military security, economic advantages, and secular progress, Turkey is forging links both east and west.

Turning west once more, the Turks' most logical partnership has

been with the Germans. The basis was economic, but it has always been strengthened by the psychological bonds which Germany has woven through conspicuous gestures made to Turkey as to an equal. While it was still very unusual for rulers to travel abroad, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Turkey in person. Hitler, in turn, singled out the Turks for his least dictatorial demands. His ambassador, von Papen, typified German diplomatic courtesy at its best after he escaped unharmed from a bomb tossed at him on the streets of Ankara, assertedly by Russian agents. His thanks for escape were expressed, in true Turkish fashion, by a generous gift for charity.

The Turks deeply appreciate courteous gestures to their government and to Turkish customs, but all that Germany has ever done in this respect has never blinded the Turks to unwelcome demands from German governments, nor to insults from the more arrogant German individuals on political, military, or economic missions in Turkey. The Turks have always been very friendly toward the German nation, and have frequently called German advisers to Turkey, but they have few illusions as to how far to go with the Germans in any direction incompatible with the Turkish way of life.

Turkey's relations with Italy have been variable. Abundant physical evidence of the one-time imperial power of Rome exists throughout Turkey in old Roman roads, fortresses, and bridges. Early commercial power is symbolized by the Genoese watchtower which still dominates the scene in Galata, the shipping district in Istanbul. Merchant vessels flying the flags of cities on the Italian peninsula have, for centuries, been among the most familiar sights in Turkish harbors. Political relations, however, fluctuated originally with the rivalries between the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church, which often threatened peace in Istanbul. In modern times, relations have varied with Italy's partisanship for other foreign powers, friendly or inimical to Turkey. The Turks of the Republic felt grave distrust of Italy when Mussolini arrogantly called for revival of the power that had been Rome's and the fascist government went to war for territorial expansion. When Italy attacked Abyssinia, the Turks joined in the League of Nations sanctions against Italy. From then, through World War II, Turkish-Italian relations, in the words of former President İnönü, "entered a phase of antagonism and insecurity ('... *zit ve emniyetsiz*')." Yet, the Turkish government studiously avoided a

formal diplomatic break with Italy even when it knew that Mussolini's aim was to crush Turkey by Axis campaigns through both Balkan and Arab lands. Turkish-Italian trade revived quickly after the war, and in 1947 Italy moved close to the top on Turkey's foreign trade list. Area defense matters drew them into closer diplomatic ties in 1950.

History records the Ottoman Turkish Empire's relations with France and Great Britain mainly through amicable trade relations alternated with military alliances or enmities in Great Power contests involving Turkey. The Turkish Republic's relations began after France and Great Britain had been convinced by the militant founders of the Republic that they should withdraw their occupation forces and recognize the Grand National Assembly instead of the Sultan and Sublime Porte as the government of Turkey. Thereafter, the only point at issue between France and Turkey was the French mandate over the province of Hatay, eventually settled to the Turks' satisfaction by reincorporation of Hatay in Turkey. The friendship for France, declared in the 1939 alliance between Turkey, England, and France, was not diminished in World War II. The Vichy French on the Axis side did not come into direct conflict with Turkey because the British defeated them in Syria before they could connive successfully with Italy and Germany against Turkey; and Turkish relations with the free French were undisturbed. Today, Turkey and France are renewing the cultural bonds which trace back to the French stimulus for the Turks' *Tanzimat* reforms and their intellectual aspirations of the nineteenth century.

Turkish coöperation with Great Britain through the war has already been presented in Chapter 17. Since the war, Turkish officials have been in London to acquaint themselves more thoroughly with the British parliamentary system. An increasing number of English professors have been engaged to teach in Turkish universities, and more Turkish students have gone to England to study; thus drawing closer the cultural as well as the political bonds between the Turks and the English.

The only insecure relations Turkey seems to have at this writing are with the Soviet Union, and the main points have been given in previous chapters (6, 17, and 18). Moscow currently maintains that it is the Turks who are unfriendly, and not vice versa. But the Turks, noting that Moscow has expected "friendliness" to be practi-

cally synonymous with rule from Moscow, have insisted upon testing friendship, as well as enmity, by the possible effect upon their own independence and territorial integrity. Soviet radio propaganda beamed to Turkey has been clearly intended to create distrust of the United States of America by interpreting American financial and military aid as a snare to trap the Turks into servitude to American capitalism, in turn "closing industries and leading to unemployment in Turkey." Radio Moscow also attacked Turkey's new Democratic Party for its unity with the original People's Party on foreign policy. The Turks, thoroughly familiar with Russia's age-old aggressive tactics, stay on the alert against her contemporary Communist underground methods.

At the height of the war, the Turks had congratulated themselves in speeches, editorials, and cartoons on the fact that in the direct path of the world conflagration Turkey remained one island of peace, suffering from the heat, but nonetheless spreading no spark of enmity herself. The new Turks seem to like themselves in that enviable role, and to be anxious to continue it. The three new forces to which they look for continued support in this policy are the United States of America, the United Nations, and the Council of Europe.

Relations with the United States in the past have been largely cultural, partly commercial, very slightly political, and not at all military. The market provided by fewer than twenty million Turks, most of them too poor to buy anything but locally produced necessities, had been relatively insignificant for the United States. The collapse of production in Europe during World War II suddenly made the United States Turkey's largest single customer and merchant.

Then mutual defense interests of the United States, Turkey, and Greece against Soviet expansion led, in May 1947, to the Truman Plan for U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey. The plan in Turkey was to modernize her defenses in order to improve the country's security and, by doing so, minimize the cost of continuous mobilization which was so severely draining the national economy. When the Marshall Plan for European recovery was proposed by the United States, Turkey promptly joined fifteen other nations in the agreement to balance their needs and resources with each other for a joint effort to reestablish European economic stability. A constant factor in U.S.-Turkish relations is the record of undemanding friendship in American educa-

tional, medical, and archeological institutions in Turkey. Since World War II the largest number of Turkish students studying abroad has been in the United States—at present more than seven hundred in one hundred twenty colleges and universities. Yet, Turkish hearts are not immune to fears that a partnership, even with a nation as undemanding in the past as the U.S.A., may cost the Turks some of their independence. So Turkey's new close relations with the United States can be described as cordial, hopeful, highly coöperative, but, as with all countries, cautious.

In casting their lot with the West, the Turks wholeheartedly joined with the Council of Europe at its inaugural meeting at Strasbourg, France, in August, 1949.<sup>7</sup> Turkish government spokesmen and the Turkish press upheld, with one accord, the member-nations' affirmation of "their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples; and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty, and the rule of law, the principles of which form the basis of all genuine democracy." The Turks' sad years under "The Sick Man of Europe," when they were weak and condemned, have been well compensated by the welcome for the vigorous, healthy, new Turks to a Council of Europe. The Council promptly elected and appointed Turks to several of its important positions.

No matter how gratified the Turks are by their widening contacts, they recoil suddenly at the slightest touch on sensitive points. They became instantly indignant when Italy, such a recent foe of Western democracy, and a country which does not border on the Atlantic, was taken into the North Atlantic Defense Pact, while Turkey was excluded in spite of her war-time alliances with the Western democracies. They were soon assured, by other forms of recognition, that the West realizes that it needs Turkey in its family—politically, economically, and culturally.

A very strong impression was given by public and private comment among the Turks, after the United Nations organization was born, that they were evaluating the United States and the United Nations together. They have been outspoken in their desire to make the most of the United Nations, although they are far too seasoned in the troubles of the world to be naive or starry-eyed about anything Utopian. Judging from their own published opinions, the Turks saw in the United Nations, at the start, the one possible promise of a

clearinghouse, other than battlefields, to cancel and adjust troubled nations' claims against each other. They saw in it the only promise of respect from Great Powers for small nations' rights. The Turks have seemed inclined to consider this promise a reflection of the United States of America's traditional ideals. Hence, they observe closely how consistently the United States upholds these ideals in the United Nations.

Şükrü Saracoğlu, Turkish prime minister at the time of the charter meeting of the United Nations, said, "The Turkish nation is depending on the United Nations to prevent international injustices. . . . If the United States adheres in peace to the stand which she took during the war, the U.N. will be able to assure peace and security in the world." This has been a persistent theme of Turkish leaders. Nevertheless, Turkish coöperation with the United States in the United Nations has not meant rubber-stamping every U.S. proposal, as United Nations records of voting clearly show.

Turkish leaders, themselves, stated as simply as possible, when the United Nations began, what Turkey expects from international relations and how she interprets her own role. The leadership in Turkey has changed since then, but the same principles are reiterated by the new leaders. At the start, Bay Saracoğlu explained, "Turkey is depending on world opinion in the event of a crisis, because Turkey will not provoke anyone and she refuses to be provoked." And former President İnönü declared in his 1945 annual address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, "We have no other political objective than to become one of the most civilized nations of the world so that Turkey achieves the rank of a useful and industrious member of the family of nations."

## Retrospect and Prospect

Turkey's experience in effecting a thoroughgoing internal transformation in an orderly way, without arousing the hostility of its neighbors or of the great powers, offers many valuable lessons. For what the Turks succeeded in accomplishing during the turbulent inter-war years might prove feasible for other nations, given similar determination and leadership in internal affairs, and similar self-restraint and moderation in foreign affairs.—John Kingsley Birge, representative of the American Board of Foreign Missions in Turkey since 1914.<sup>1</sup>

THE "New Turks" cannot be the permanent name for the people about whom this book is written, and the reason is not simply that nothing new remains new. The reason lies in future valuations of the Turks' self-transformation in the first half of the twentieth century. If the personal qualities and national aims which the Turks then displayed become their best known characteristics, the "new" Turks of the Republic will be recognized as the real Turks. The Turks of the centuries of the later Ottoman rulers, who brought them ill repute, will seem by contrast to have been badly out of character.

History so far records a triple succession of Turks in their present homeland: the Selçuk Turks, the Osmanlı or Ottoman Turks, who include the Young Turks since their aim was to save Ottoman power, and the Turks herein called new. The Turks of the Republic's pioneer years are indeed new—new to themselves and new to the world. They are non-imperialistic, nationalistic Turks in a secular Müslim state—entirely without precedent. Many persons, the world over, ask today which is truer to the Turks' character, their former imperialistic, mili-

taristic role which eventually made enemies for them, or their recent nationalistic, peacefully constructive role which has won friends. Many foreigners ask whether their efforts in the Republic have not been purely opportunistic, inasmuch as defeats in wars and final bankruptcy had left the Turks of the early 1920's no other choice. Has the new Turkish way of life been an inescapable surrender to fate or a natural aspiration toward a higher civilization? There is no simple direct answer for a foreigner to make at present, because the answer is still being written by the Turks themselves.

Two directly opposite approaches can be used in reviewing a people's achievements and prospects. One is to dwell on their crudities and inadequacies compared to the most progressive peoples, but also to point out redeeming and promising features. The other is to survey their positive qualities and ambitions as currently displayed, but to point out weaknesses and lags which handicap their progress. The latter approach has been used in this book. From this angle, three Turkeys can be distinguished as the Republic reaches the age when it can claim one generation wholly its own.

The first is the Turkey of Atatürk, of the Turks who are determined to persist along the lines of his vision. They are that "second Mustafa Kemâl," whom their chief meant in one of his most often quoted statements: "There are two Mustafa Kemâls. One is that sitting before you, the Mustafa Kemâl of flesh and blood, who will pass away. There is another whom I cannot call 'me.' It is not I that this Mustafa Kemâl personifies. It is you—all you who go into the farthest parts of the country to enlarge and defend a new ideal, a new mode of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours."

The second Turkey is the Turkey of the malcontents who still prefer an authoritarian state with privileged classes at the top. This is a small, though not an entirely powerless element, but the force of new ambitions and the trend of events have overwhelmed it so far.

The third Turkey is the Turkey of the first generation to grow up entirely under the Republic. These younger Turks are eager for new and greater successes wholly along modern lines, to be weighted, however, by enough tradition so that they need never feel lack of nourishment from roots of their own. The Turkey described in this book is largely the third Turkey. It is the Turkey of the youth of the land,



the Turkey of their hopes, and the Turkey of their responsibility in the future.

The most revealing remark I have ever heard about the young Turkish Republic is that it is sound at the top and at the bottom; but that its weakness lies in the middle, between the statesmen (those who display both political and cultural statesmanship) and the level of peasants and workers. The difficulty has been to find equally sound personnel for the in-between positions in every field—men and women who can keep pace with their best leaders in vision and industriousness, and who also can match the ordinary citizens, mostly peasants, in loyalty and courage. It would, however, be most unfair to let this statement stand as a sweeping condemnation of all Turks in “midlevel” positions. Certainly, many bureau chiefs and common clerks, many *kaymakams* and justices of the peace, many school-teachers and factory foremen, have been helping immeasurably, by sheer force of character and industry, to make the Republic a success. But at these levels, there has been also the greatest number who are the weak links in the chain of public responsibility.

This “midlevel” it was which inherited the hordes of intermediate Ottoman officials and employees who had been spoiled by the rapacious system of the Sublime Porte. Their sense of greed had been cultivated, their sense of responsibility paralyzed. An unfortunately large proportion of the new blood, which poured in at these levels as resignations and deaths created openings, has also been weak or handicapped in morale. Many new appointees have been favored relatives of men who still believed that favoritism more than qualifications entitled them to an assured income from the public exchequer, or to preference in private interests. Another influx at this level, especially in government clerical positions, has been the holders of master’s and doctor’s degrees, who were disgruntled because there were not enough openings in the lines for which they were specially trained.

The greatest number in “midlevel” positions in 1950 are also of the mid-way *age* group, between the founding elders and the aspiring youth of the Republic. Bred in Ottoman tradition, they were too young to participate in the revolution with full comprehension, and too old to be trained wholly in the new system. Many of them never recovered from the bafflement of the transition period during which they had

to plan their lives. The only prospect for solution of "midlevel" weakness is in the steadfastness of those at the top until time and experience enable the young citizens now working up from the bottom to replace present weak links.

In retrospect, through the Republic's years, the problem of militarism has also had an unusual aspect. Atatürk and his colleagues went far to demilitarize Turkey and to put all stress on civilian interests and authority. But the World War II crisis caused the rebirth of a large military class. Since 1939, thousands of Turkish men who, according to plan in the Republic, would have entered civilian occupations after their required year and a half of military training, have remained in military service for the duration of the crisis. Its duration has been so long that even though only Harbiye graduates can be career men in the army, a great many have chosen to devote the rest of their lives to it.

Large numbers of the ablest young men in all branches of the service, however, have been sent abroad for two to six years of foreign training, which is rarely military training. They return to Turkey as engineers, doctors, and experts in various fields, so that their military duty will often be to improve their country's transportation, communications, sanitation, power facilities, and other projects essential to both war and peace. Well-educated Turkish officers, with a high sense of national responsibility, frequently attain to the status of respected statesmen. But military men of lesser stature basking in reflected glory, are apt to assume that military rank of itself is the mark of a privileged class. This situation afforded grounds for a comment made by former President Wright, of the Istanbul American College, that "The first president [of the Turkish Republic] who lacks a military background may have a delicate task in maintaining civilian ascendancy without impairing the splendid *esprit de corps* of the army and navy."<sup>2</sup> Turkey's third president, Celâl Bayar, now has that task. İnönü, though a military man himself, always chose a civilian for prime minister—in succession, Celâl Bayar, a banker; Refik Saydam, a physician; Şükrü Saracoğlu, economist and political scientist; Recep Peker, formerly a professional soldier, but for more years engaged in civilian political service; Hasan Saka, a civil service career man; and Şemsettin Günaltay, a professor of history. Moreover, his last Minister of Defense was a civilian.

Retrospect, nevertheless, shows that time and conditions have not yet permitted the new Turks fully to offset one major pre-Republic liability—namely, considerable inertia and parasitism in “midlevel” positions; and one tendency, constructive at present but historically parasitical in Turkey, as in any country—namely, a privileged military class. Retrospect also shows that nothing could do more to liquidate these liabilities than a continuance of the basic purposes followed by the new Turks, since 1923. Yet any prophecy of the Turks’ future, if attempted, would deserve relatively little credence at present. If the experimental stage of the Republic were completely over, fairly reliable conclusions on what to expect in the future might be drawn, but the most that can be pointed out with reasonable confidence at this stage are certain features of the immediate prospect.

The whole experiment undertaken by the new Turks to reshape their own destiny cannot be culminated until the two most frequently mentioned handicaps, illiteracy and lack of transportation, can be overcome more fully. Not until then can the power of the greatest part instead of the smallest part of the population be continuously felt politically and culturally. Not until then can modern benefits be distributed widely enough for their effect on general public morale and ambitions to become manifest. The clear prospect is that a minimum of another generation will be required for such effects to reveal their true worth in the Turks’ lives.

The prospect that the new Turks’ experiment in self development will continue and not be undone or diverted to radically different aims rests, as far as one can see, on three conditions—peace, trade outlets, and leadership. Peace is as much the world’s problem as Turkey’s, and the Turks’ efforts for it have already been discussed. Much has been said about the new Turks’ remarkable progress in industrial and agricultural production in comparison to their original situation, but in considering their future an understanding eye must be kept on the problem of their trade outlets.

They are having to create from scratch a domestic market of any significance; first, by building roads for transportation of goods inside of Turkey, from village to village, and also between villages and cities, thereby raising the peasants’ income and buying power. In foreign trade, their currency, though sound, has heretofore been in little demand outside of Turkey. The Turks, therefore, have been mostly

limited to trade with the few nations anxious to buy or barter enough goods to balance what they sell to Turkey. The war created an unusual demand for Turkish goods. Consequently, the young Republic of Turkey saw five years of unfavorable balance of trade, and eighteen years of a favorable balance (as high as \$75,000,000 in 1946), but not another favorable balance until 1950. Her best prospect for exports is in mining and agriculture. By present anticipations, modern machinery and methods will bring coal production to the point of adequacy for domestic needs and a valuable surplus for export by 1960; and similar gains in agriculture by 1965 or 1970. In the meantime, Turkey must borrow foreign currencies with which to buy equipment, in order to increase production to sell abroad for more of the same currencies, in order to pay back what she borrowed! A familiar economic circle, indeed. Only very intelligent leadership in such an underdeveloped country can keep this circle from breaking under a strain of excessive foreign indebtedness; or, on the other hand, keep it from shrinking so badly for lack of foreign funds that not even the potential domestic trade outlets can be opened.

As much in peace as in war, Turkish reliance for policies and practice has been on personal leadership. National ideals and law have had slighter holds on the average Turk than has a personal leader. The Turks' progress up to the present time, has depended, as one youthful Turk expressed it, "on a man who feels himself a leader and can make others feel that he is one, and not merely a good coördinator of advisers." So far, top leadership has been retained by elder statesmen who formerly surrounded Atatürk. The two presidents who have succeeded him, every prime minister, and most of the cabinet ministers, had all worked directly with Atatürk. This predominance of founders still in office is not wholly surprising in a Republic's third decade; and their tenure is far from exhausted in Turkey. Their group's present age span, fifty-five to seventy-five, has proved in many nationalities to be the prime age for political leadership. But the future must depend on their successors, and the circumstances for succession are peculiar in Turkey.

Logically, successors should come first from those who are now forty to fifty-five years old. Let them be called the transitional generation, between the founding generation and the first all-Republican generation. The oldest in it were in their late twenties and the young-

est in their early teens when the Republic began. They could anticipate little but sheer experiment in their lifetime. Some of them, as already noted, have been and still are, weak links in the chain, either because they have failed to adjust themselves or because they have tried to live as parasites on the new system. Others, who really caught the spirit of the new movement, have constituted its bones and sinew in offices and jobs, while the founders were still at its head.

Members of this transitional generation, as a matter of fact, have had relatively little opportunity, until very recently, to display qualities of leadership. Atatürk's generation, sufficient by itself, has had no real need to call on the next younger group to share responsibility. On the contrary, at the end of the Republic's second decade, when this younger group would normally have succeeded the earlier leaders, the second World War crisis renewed the national sense of dependence upon the founding elders, and prolonged their tenure. It also diverted much of the best talent of the transitional-age Turks into marking time in non-belligerent military service and swollen government bureaus. The odds that any but the youngest in this group would inherit the highest offices in government were not generally good, although since 1948 they have outnumbered the deputies of the older group in the Grand National Assembly. The 1950 election which brought a new party to power also brought more young men into the cabinet, and in some cases to the top of important ministries. The possibility exists, however, that Atatürk's generation will retain dominance in national affairs until those who were not yet in their teens when the Republic was born are competent to govern.

The all-Republican generation should be the most fertile for strong leadership. The oldest ones in it, now forty years old, were still children when the Republic began. They were young enough to catch the new spirit and adjust to the new ways before their adulthood. They are now advancing in public life not merely on the heels of the transitional-age group; they are, in many cases, passing the latter. The first of them to attain to cabinet rank was Nihat Erim who, in his thirties, became vice premier in İnönü's last cabinet.

The remarkable turn of events in the 1950 election bore all the earmarks of arrival at the stage where spectacular one-man leadership may no longer be necessary, and where "a good coördinator of advisers" can be a good administrator, with advisers from all age groups.

One keynote of the victorious party in the 1950 campaign was the warning against the old party's "leader principle," the principle of authority concentrated in a leader of a power hierarchy. The earliest press comments on the first cabinet of the newly-elected government called attention to the prospect of teamwork. A typical comment was made by Nadir Nadi, in the daily *Cumhuriyet*: ". . . personal qualifications have been balanced against, if not actually subordinated to, the ideal of a complete team . . . to share the responsibilities of government."

Good long-term prospects for intelligent popular government in Turkey shine bright in the caliber of both its leaders and its electorate. If the ablest, most progressive leaders of any state compare unfavorably in vision and administrative skill with leaders of the world's most progressive nations, then that state is likely to remain backward in world affairs. This is not the case with the Turks. Their first two presidents and pioneer leaders, Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, both proved themselves equal to the heads of the greatest nations in certain very specific respects. They fully held their own in diplomacy, in shrewdness on national defense, as exponents of civilized ideals, and as administrators whose terms in office were marked by remarkable, even if not always the maximum possible, progress toward the Republic's aims. Again, if the foremost leaders of any nation are so exceptional among their own people that their countrymen cannot follow them, then their example and abilities prove nothing about the caliber of their people as a whole. This also is not the case with the Turks. In spite of the handicaps of illiteracy and economic and political inexperience, the Turks as a whole have been able to follow their leaders and even have been sufficiently critical to demand more from them.

If present trends continue, the peasants and the present youth of Turkey will determine the real future of the Turkish Republic. The nation does not yet have a literate majority. That must come from the peasants. Vital leadership at levels below Ankara, and in nonpolitical as well as political lines, must come from Turkish youth born and raised under the constitutional aims and in the social and political atmosphere of the Republic. Turkey has ample peasantry and youth for this prospect. The peasants now constitute an 80 per cent majority, and the drain from them into industrial and urban occupations will not for a long time, if ever, reduce them to a minority. As for youth

born and raised in the young Republic, 56.2 per cent of the Turkish population was reported to be under twenty-five years of age in 1935, which means that a much larger proportion of the population than in many countries is still under forty years old. (The 1940 census in the United States of America showed only 38 per cent of the population under twenty-five.)

The younger adults in Turkey are developing critical as well as defensive pride in their nation. Conversations with Turks, now in their twenties and thirties, studying abroad, prove that they are gravely aware of difficulties ahead. When they seek inspiration in the wonders which a few determined young leaders with Atatürk accomplished, they realistically observe: "Atatürk led people united by desperation, eager to follow anyone who could arouse hope of a new government to save Turkey. Many more leaders will be needed in our generation and we shall meet more opposition from our elders. We are always told of our responsibility for the future. But what are to be our ideals? What will be our chance to lead while senior officials, without our training, remain in authority to change or cancel whatever we do?"

The impatience of youth nearly always produces this kind of pessimism when it faces the less spectacular tasks of stabilizing and expanding whatever the founding fathers began by a startling clean sweep. It is always depressing for a thoroughly educated young man to work alone in a backward community where he is reluctant to take his wife, also well-educated, and to raise his children. Nevertheless, the prospect is improving. İnönü's government was finally inspired, for example, to send to Mardin in southeastern Turkey (a town of 20,000 people and, until 1946, of one privately owned automobile), a complete staff of young officials and their wives and children. They were the experts in education, health, agriculture, and all else to put new life into that region. A new road between Mardin and Diyarbakır, a city twice as large, about sixty miles northwest, already justifies auto ownership for them all, or they can use the new regular bus service. From the Diyarbakır airport, they can fly to Ankara or Istanbul by frequent airways service. Truly Turkey bids fair to show material changes in the 1950's as amazing as her social changes in the 1920's. The all-Republic generation can take courage, too, from the number of really young adults now moving up in officialdom, the increasing

responsiveness of a more literate population, and clearer reception of the voice and will of the people in elections.

Retrospect, through the pioneer years of 1920-50 in the Turkish Republic, shows most clearly a people with a tremendous capacity for change, who have been fortunate in daring leadership in the direction of high civilization; a people with an overwhelming will to preserve the independence of Turkey and the right of the Turks to rule themselves; and a people strongly committed in spoken and written words, official and unofficial, to respecting the same right for all other nations. It shows them working to these ends against handicaps of old inhibitions, of extreme unpreparedness for many practical steps, and of the colossal uncertainties of a whole world in transition to a new atomic age.

Prospects for the Turks as they appear now, are for as great a struggle ahead of them as they had to make in the past thirty years, with the all-important differences of a generation of experience gained and of much new respect and good will from the rest of the world. The best conclusion for an account covering the pioneer years of the Republic, inaugurated by Atatürk, is the challenge with which he ended his Six Day Speech. It contains the fullest statement of the Turkish Republic's prospect to survive every imaginable difficulty. And it is addressed to all generations of Turks who will grow up in the Republic. The Turks of the first of these generations are about to receive their heritage of responsibility for the future of Turkey. Atatürk's challenge is:

Oh, ye Turkish youth! Your foremost duty is to preserve and defend forever Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic.

This is the only foundation for your existence and your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure. In the future, too, you will experience ill will, both inside of the country and abroad, which will seek to rob you of this treasure. If, one day, you find it necessary to defend your independence and the Republic, then, in order to fulfill your duty, you will not yield to anxiety about the circumstances and the odds in the situation in which you find yourselves. It may develop that those circumstances and odds are of a very unfavorable nature. The enemies who have designs against your Republic and your independence, may be agents of a victorious power, the equal of which has never been seen in the whole world. In addition, it may happen to your beloved fatherland that, by force and deceit, every fortress is captured, every arsenal is raided, all



armies are dispersed, and every corner of your country is completely occupied. More grave and deplorable than all these circumstances, there may be discovered, inside the country, neglect and corruption and even treachery on the part of those who possess power. It can even be that those who are in power identify their personal benefit with the political aims of invaders. Utterly demoralized, the nation can have fallen into ruin and exhaustion.

Even under those circumstances, Oh Turkish Generations of the Future, your duty is to save the independence and the Republic of the Turk. The strength you need flows in the noble blood in your veins.



## APPENDIX A

### THE TURKISH LANGUAGE

Turkish is Turkish, not for its words, but for its pronunciation, for the way its words can grow into phrases and sentences, and for its rhythm. Or, very technically speaking, the special features of Turkish are euphony and agglutination. Words grow, i.e., are agglutinated, by inserting syllables between the root and the regular ending in contrast to the inflected languages of the more familiar type in the Indo-European group. An example of extreme agglutination, which the Turks give, is the growth of the word "photographs" into a complete sentence. In English it is, "Are you among those who are in the photographs?" In Turkish it is, "*Fotograf-lar-dakiler-den-misiniz?*" The structure is this: *Fotograf*—photograph; *lar*—s (plural); *da*—in; *ki*—(in this position, the equivalent of "those who are"); *ler*—s; *den*—from (among); *mi*—(the interrogative suffix); *siniz*—you (plural). Complicated as it seems, the Turks need six fewer letters than we do to ask the same question in English.

The change above from *lar* to *ler* for the plural is typical of the way Turkish vowels change for euphony. *Lar* with "a" follows the so-called heavy vowel "a" in *fotograf* but *ler* with "e" follows the light vowel in *ki*. The interrogative ending *mi* can likewise change to *mu*, *mü*, or *mi* with the undotted "i," to harmonize with preceding vowels. Memorizing vowel changes for euphony would be difficult if it were not that the harmonized vowels appeal to the ear and are soon chosen subconsciously. The exceptions are harder to remember.

Quite dizzying to Americans and Englishmen is the way Turks can idiomatically say things which are impossible in English. They can use singular verbs with plural subjects; a plural noun with a singular modifier, and even double negatives. The following short sentence does all these things:

"*Bu 20 kitap hiç bir zaman okunmamıştı.*"

Word for word this means:

"This 20 book never once was not read," or, in better English, "Not one of these twenty books was ever read." For the Turks, twenty

books are a specific number and therefore require a singular verb as though they were a unit, and the "never-not" makes the negative more emphatic.

Foreigners usually say that Turkish words have no accent. This is almost, but not quite, true. A delicate stress, perhaps holding a vowel a wee bit longer in one syllable than in another, serves as well. Marked accent on a distinct syllable in each word, however, most surely gives away a non-Turk speaking Turkish. Clumsy agglutination, i.e., a clumsy order of suffixes, and insensitivity to euphony also give him away. Much as words grow, a Turkish sentence can grow by inserting clauses between the first word and the verb at the end. Phrasing, however, makes speech fall into a rhythm which, to a Turk, keeps the meaning clear through a sentence long enough to be a paragraph. The euphony, rhythm, and flowing continuity of Turkish make it a pleasing language to hear.

Turkish is not a hard language to learn usably well, although it is very difficult to speak it like a Turk. The Turks use idioms as difficult for a foreigner as the American idiom of sports, for which the meaning can never be discovered in dictionary definitions of the individual words. The greatest convenience of Turkish is that any word from any other language can be processed into pure Turkish by phonetic spelling, agglutination, and idiomatic use, for example: *telefon(lar)*—telephone(s); *politika(ci)*—politician; *politika(cılık)*—party politics; *kokteyl(dir)*—it is a cocktail.

## APPENDIX B

### THE TURKISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Institutions of learning, and enrollments for 1949-50  
(Statistics furnished by the Ministry of Education at the author's request.)

#### UNIVERSITIES

	Year Founded	Enrollment 1949-1950
University of Istanbul (Medical School founded in 1827)	1932	12,818 (20% women)
Ankara University (Law School founded in 1925)	1946	6,342 (10% women)
Istanbul Technical University (Civil Engineering School founded in 1883)	1944	1,482 (3% women)

#### OTHER HIGHER INSTITUTIONS

School of Political Science, Ankara	1857	492
State Conservatory of Music and School of Dramatic Art	1938	*
Istanbul Conservatory	1883	*
Reorganized in present form	1926	
Turkish School of Ballet	1949	25
Istanbul Higher Institute of Commerce	1883	1,293
Izmir Higher Institute of Commerce	1944	715

\* The combined enrollment in higher and also secondary conservatory classes in Ankara and Istanbul was one thousand.

Specialized higher training is given in the War College, the Naval Academy, the Maritime (merchant marine) School, and the teacher training institutes, and also in the nursing and health schools listed in connection with Chapter 11.

## PRIMARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOLS, AND LYCÉES

	Grades	No. of Schools	Enrollment in 1949-1950
Primary School ( <i>İlk Okul</i> )	1 through 5	16,892	1,611,248*
Middle School ( <i>Orta Okul</i> )	6 through 8	285	62,637†
Lycée ( <i>Lise</i> )	9 through 11	5,986	19,046

Additional enrollment in private and foreign schools: Primary, 12,693; Middle, 6,391; Lycée, 2,899.

\* Of the primary schools, 4,524 are only three-grade village schools, taught by special instructors (*eğitmenler*) from the Village Institutes.

† Enrollment in two secondary schools not reported.

Primary education is compulsory wherever there is a school. At present primary schools are in about one-third of Turkey's approximately 45,000 communities, many villages still having no schools, and many towns and cities with a school shortage. New schools are being opened at the rate of one or two thousand a year. Teachers in active service in 1948-49 numbered 42,260 (men—30,239; women—12,021).

## TEACHER TRAINING SCHOOLS

		Enrollment 1949-50
Istanbul Higher Normal School	Lycée teachers	66
Gazi Pedagogical Institute	Middle School teachers	373
Necati Pedagogical Institute	Middle School teachers	191
Higher Institute for Physical Culture	Physical Trainers	62
8 normal schools	Primary teachers	1,492
3 normal schools of technology	Technical teachers	990
20 Village Institutes	Primary instructors	11,750

Village Institutes, in special short courses, train *eğitmenler*, who teach in three-year primary schools, instead of the regular five-year schools, taught by "instructors." Between 1939 and 1949, the Institutes sent out 3,856 *eğitmenler*. (Other sources than the one used here have given as many as double this number.)

## VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS

	Enrollment
	1949-50
Fourteen vocational schools are for police, postoffice personnel, industrial foremen, tailors, chemists, cadaster and title deed officers, financial clerks, engineering technicians, and include also two schools for the deaf and dumb	1,908
Six construction Institutes for the building trades. (At Adana, Ankara, Erzurum, İstanbul, Kayseri, Rize.)	1,447
Fifteen agricultural schools for agriculture, forestry, animal care, gardening, and care of agricultural implements and machinery	2,043
One private school of journalism	22
Total	5,420

## CRAFT AND COMMERCIAL INSTITUTES

	Enrollment
	1949-50
161 Craft Schools, Institutes, and Evening Classes for boys	24,265
135 Craft Schools, Institutes, and Evening classes for girls	32,124
23 Commercial Schools, not including evening classes	4,322
Total	60,711

Admission to the Universities is by written and oral examination of applicants who have previously qualified in the *Olgunluk* (matriculation) examinations taken upon graduation from lycées. Upon passing eight semesters' courses, the student receives the title, "Licentiate." Thereafter he can work for his doctorate in courses and seminars, and by writing and defending a thesis. (The basic medical course is twelve, instead of eight, semesters.)

Turkish universities approximately parallel college upper classes and graduate schools in United States universities. Under Turkey's Autonomy of Universities Law of 1946, the combined faculties of each university elect one representative to join its rector and deans in an inter-university council. This council, of which the Minister of Education is the permanent chairman, is the final board of review for over-all university policies. For internal administration, each university's combined faculties elect their own rector and deans, and a secretary for two-year terms. These officials head the university's council of representatives from each faculty, which makes all appointments and promotions. Nevertheless, both university and inter-university councils can be controlled by ministries in Ankara, especially by means of budget control.

## APPENDIX C

### CULTURE

A fully representative list of the cultural achievements and leaders in which the Turks take pride is beyond the scope of this book. But a few examples, in evidence of trends cited in Chapter 14, are given herewith.

1. Original cultural contributions to world civilization, proclaimed by the Turks as their own: The philosophical and scientific works of İbni-Sina and İbni-Ruşşt, commonly known in the West as "the Arab scholars, Avicenna and Averroes"; the fifteenth-century astronomical and mathematical research by Ali Kuşçu; the writings of Mehmet Fuzulî and Ömer Nef'i in the seventeenth century, and the poems of Şair Nedim in the eighteenth century; more than four hundred structures noted for balance in massiveness and functional decorations by "the great Sinan" ("Koca Sinan") an architect born in Anatolia in 1490; also beautifully designed fountains, and carved or painted ceilings; various textile weaves from muslin to pongee; Anatolian rugs—the Gördes and Lâdik, to name only two of the most famous—and the original use of cobalt and fast colors in painting.

2. Cultural institutions operated by the government in 1948: 40 museums, 83 public libraries, 275 reading rooms, and various archives, besides local museums and reading facilities in about 600 *halkevis*. The Istanbul University Library of 113,000 volumes was the largest at that time.

3. Theater: The pre-Republic theater had seldom departed from a routine of French plays, especially those of Molière and Dumas fils. The theater of the Republic presents all kinds of Western classics, its best Shakesperian performances being of high merit. The first American play produced professionally by Turkish actors was Thornton Wilder's *Our Town*, produced in Ankara in 1945. In 1949, for the first time in Turkey, a play (*Paydos* by Cevat Fahmi Baskut), had an unbroken run of as many as one hundred fifty performances.

4. Literature: A few of the pioneer fiction writers whose work indicates current trends are: Halid Ziya Uşaklıgıl, usually considered



the first modern Turkish novelist; Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar, with some fifty novels of life in İstanbul; Ömer Seyfeddin, admired for rugged tales of military life and typical episodes of the transition period; Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar, Refik Halid Karay, Mahmut Esat Yesari, all noted for vivid local color stories and keen characterization of wide varieties of Turkish types; Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel, a brilliant satirist; Halide Edib Adıvar, who has written fiction in both English and Turkish; and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who has produced more than one hundred works—novels, criticism, essays, and translations.

Eminent poets of the transition include Ziya Gökalp, Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Ahmet Haşim, Tevfik Fikret, and Nâmik Kemal.

During the 1940's, the Turks translated into Turkish nearly six hundred classics from Greek, Latin, French, English, German, Italian, Russian, Chinese, and other languages.

(For a much fuller list of cultural material, the reader is referred to John Kingsley Birge, *A Guide to Turkish Area Study* (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1949).

## APPENDIX D

### GOVERNMENT, COURTS, POLICE

This is a summary of those aspects of the Turkish constitution, structure of government, courts, police, and *gendarmarie*, which are of most interest in comparison or contrast to their counterparts in the United States.

*Government.* National elections of deputies to the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey are held every four years. The GNA elects one of its own members to the presidency of the Republic (Article 31 of the constitution). Thus a Turk can become eligible for the presidency of the Republic only by popular election first as a deputy from some province. Although he may serve an unlimited number of terms, he must first be renominated and reelected every four years as a deputy.

When the Grand National Assembly passes a law (other than an organic or budget law), the President must sign it or return it within ten days, stating his reasons for rejection. The Assembly can pass the law over the President's disapproval by a majority vote. The President's own decrees are ineffective unless countersigned by the prime minister and the cabinet minister in whose jurisdiction the measure lies (Articles 35 and 39). These provisions presumably check dictatorship or such arbitrary orders as the *fermans* issued by the Sultans.

The burden of administrative responsibility in the Turkish government is intended to fall on the cabinet ministers. They, like the President, can become eligible only by popular election first as deputies. The President chooses one deputy to be prime minister (Article 44). The prime minister chooses other deputies for his cabinet, subject to approval by both the Assembly and the President (Article 44). The Assembly can and has passed votes of non-confidence which have led to cabinet changes.

Certain provisions for the cabinet differ markedly from the United States system. The Turkish cabinet can directly propose laws to the Assembly (Article 15). If a minister must absent himself from office, his duties must be turned over to another minister instead of to an

undersecretary in his own department, an indication of how closely the ministries are expected to work together (Article 49). But no minister may take charge of more than one ministry other than his own, thereby preventing the consolidation of excessive power in any one minister's hands.

The executive and legislative branches of the Turkish government are intended to check and balance each other somewhat as in the United States. But the Turks have no counterpart to the U.S. Supreme Court, with its function of judging, on appeal, constitutionality of acts of government and the lower courts. They do have a Council of State (Devlet Şurası) with extremely important advisory responsibility. The writers of the Turkish constitution felt that making administrative actions subject to a court of law would be tantamount to the judiciary controlling the executive, yet they recognized that the administration might wish authoritative opinions on its proposals, on government contracts and concessions, and also to try cases of alleged maladministration. Its opinions carry judicial weight.

This Council can and has annulled election results which it decided were illegal. Government employees appeal to it on non-payment of salaries or other presumed injustices. The *gendarmérie* once appealed to it because the gendarmes had not been granted the military privilege of examinations to qualify for engineering study abroad. The Council ordered this privilege extended to them thereafter. But when the Council acts on the appeal of a single individual, its decision does not constitute a legal precedent, for each case must be decided on its own merits. The Council of State, which consists of a president, five chamber presidents, and twenty-five members, is "chosen by the Grand National Assembly from such persons of distinction as have filled high administrative posts and who possess special knowledge and experience" (Article 51). The persons of distinction have been former ministers, undersecretaries of the most important ministries, ambassadors, generals, governors, and judges, who enjoy high public repute. Each one, when appointed, resigns his previous post because membership in this Council is for life, except in case of failure in duty.

A deputy in the Grand National Assembly does not have to reside in the province he or she represents. During Assembly recesses, all deputies are expected to visit their respective provinces, and also to acquaint themselves with as much more of their country as they can,

because "a deputy is the representative not only of his constituency but of the entire nation" (Article 13). One deputy for each 40,000 citizens makes a total of 487 seats, by reapportionment in 1950.

Americans are usually baffled by the Turkish political divisions below the province. The province, now called *il* (formerly *vilâyet*), is similar to a state in the United States, i.e., a geographical division with fixed boundaries. Each *il* has subdivisions called *ilçe* (formerly *kaza*), and *bucak* (formerly *nahiye*). The *ilçe* is roughly comparable to a county in the U.S.; and the *bucak* is a group of villages, for which perhaps "commune," or "borough," is the best word. Neither the *ilçe* nor the *bucak* has permanent boundaries, but each consists of a prescribed number of citizens. Therefore, the use of English names of geographical units for Turkish population units creates confusion. While it can be said quite clearly that the Turkish *ilçe* ("county") may contain several cities (*şehir*), the reverse statement—that a city may contain several counties—seems confusing, unless one remembers the population basis of the Turkish units. A *şehir* of a million population, e.g., Istanbul, contains several *ilçes*, and also several *bucaks*. These subdivisions, however, are politically linked, not to Istanbul city (*şehir*) but directly to Istanbul province (*il*). It is as though the boroughs of New York City were each responsible directly to the state capital at Albany, instead of to New York City Hall.

The Turkish political units are separated into those administered by the national government's appointees, and those administered by locally elected officials. The *il*, *ilçe*, and *bucak* are nationally administered. The cabinet of Ministers in Ankara appoints the *vali* (governor) of each *il*. The Ministry of the Interior appoints a *kaymakam* at the head of each *ilçe*. The *kaymakam* is responsible to the *vali*. The *vali* appoints a *müdür* (director or manager) for each *bucak*. Other *müdürs* are appointed, however, by every Ministry in Ankara, to each *il* and *ilçe*, as administrators for their respective ministries. All *müdürs* are responsible to the *kaymakams* and *valis*, except those from the Ministries of Defense and Justice, who are directly responsible to their respective ministries. Finally, the Minister of the Interior has the right to control anything in any *il*, *ilçe*, or *bucak*, if it seems to him necessary after a formal investigation.

This is a thoroughly centralized system. Yet, each *il* has an elected assembly to balance, at least partly, the appointed authorities. Every

four years, the citizens elect a representative for each 20,000 inhabitants to the General Assembly of their *il*. Serving without pay, as a civic duty, these representatives meet at regular intervals. They prepare the provincial budget and plan how to carry out the *il*'s share in national programs; and they may plan additional local projects. The *vali* reviews all assembly decisions. If he gives neither approval nor disapproval within twenty days, the decision automatically goes into effect; but if he disapproves, the assembly can appeal to the Council of State for a higher ruling. The *vali* can dissolve the provincial assembly if the Minister of the Interior consents, but he must hold an election for a new assembly within three months. Between sessions of the provincial assembly, an executive committee of four represents the people, while the *vali* represents the national government. The committee reviews the *vali*'s monthly expenditures for his office. Thus the Turkish system allows elected officials to check on nationally appointed officials' honesty and efficiency. Actually, the character of the men appointed from Ankara largely determines whether the government of any province is democratic or dictatorial. One other appointive office, that of Inspector General, which had carried considerable arbitrary authority in larger regional divisions, was abolished in 1948.

The political units self-governed by elected officials are the *belediye* (municipality) and the *köy* (village). Each city (*şehir*, more than 20,000 population within fixed boundaries), and each town (*kasaba*, 2,000 to 20,000 population), has its own *belediye* government, which is, in effect, an elected public utilities commission and welfare agency. The *belediye reisi* (mayor) is elected by the municipal assembly, which consists of at least twelve representatives, who are themselves elected every four years by the citizens. They serve without pay and meet at least three times a year, with the mayor as chairman. The assembly's duties are to draw up and administer the municipal budget, establish and operate public utilities, protect dwellings, regulate traffic, and in general be responsible for the safety and welfare of the residents. Although it cannot impose taxes, it can fix fines for petty law violations, and also collect fees for such services as garbage collection. Profits can accrue to it from public utilities, and sales of stamps on entertainment tickets; and it receives money from the National Bank of Municipalities (*Belediye Bankası*). Its total revenue, however, must stay within legal limits set in Ankara.

A *köy* (village—under 12,000 population) holds town meetings. All men and women, over eighteen years old and in good citizenship standing, meet on call, usually in the mosque. In elections every four years, they nominate two candidates for each position, and then elect a *muhtar* (headman); the *ihitiyarlar meclisi* (council of elders) of four members and four substitutes; and an *imam* to perform the duties of the mosque. The *imam* and schoolteacher, if there is one, are almost invariably elected to the council of elders, who need not be elderly. The *muhtar* and councilmen keep all records of births, deaths, conscription, and taxes; expend money and direct labor for public needs such as the village guest room, the school building, and the fountain, and have judicial power in debt cases up to about three dollars.\* They can levy a sort of tithe, but most of the public service is rendered by citizens' contributions of materials and labor, compulsory if necessary. The *muhtar* is the village's legal personality in court or business transactions. Over and above this local government now stands the national Village Law, administered by the *müdürs*.

*Courts.* Inasmuch as judges and lawyers in the Republic's pioneer years have been the first to learn and put into practice their nation's new constitution and law codes, they have been making, rather than drawing on, precedents. The Turks have no trials by jury. However, a defendant who does not wish to be questioned alone can legally refuse to answer questions in any court when his lawyer is not present. The constitution forbids ministers and deputies to interfere in court trials or in carrying out verdicts, so the judiciary has noteworthy freedom from political pressure. The Grand National Assembly can grant pardons, and the President, on advice from the cabinet, may suspend or reduce sentences for reason of a prisoner's infirmity or other vital necessity. The Ministry of Justice appoints public prosecutors for each province and its subdivisions.

Turkey's lowest court (*Sulh Mahkemesi*) is roughly similar to United States justice-of-the-peace courts in that a single justice renders final decisions on minor charges. These courts hear debit and credit cases up to about one hundred dollars, alimony cases, and disturbances of the peace.

\* Each precinct, literally "village" (*köy*), in a city (*şehir*) or town (*kasaba*), similarly has a *muhtar* and council to keep its records and see to its local interests.

The Courts of First Instance (Asliye Mahkemesi) hear all cases beyond the scope of the justice-of-the-peace but not assigned to the commercial or major criminal courts. They also are one-judge courts.

The Commercial Courts (Ticaret Mahkemesi) hear all lawsuits arising from commercial transactions, and they exist wherever warranted by the amount of such litigation. These are again one-judge courts, and the parties concerned bring their own actions and follow them through.

The Major Criminal Court (Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi) tries, before at least three judges, cases punishable by more than five years imprisonment or by sentences at hard labor. The public prosecutor brings the actions into these courts and participates in the trials.

Appeals from decisions of any of these courts can be made within seven days on grounds that the action was illegal or that it failed to restore peace. For any appeal, the lower court submits the complete file of the case to the proper chamber of the Court of Cassation or Appeals (Yargıtay or Temyiz Mahkemesi), which has civil, penal, commercial, enforcement, and bankruptcy chambers. If the chamber upholds the lower court, the original verdict becomes irrevocable. Otherwise the chamber returns the file to the original court with a statement of grounds for reconsidering the verdict. If the original court admits the grounds, it hears the case again. If the judge or judges stick to their original verdict, they again send the full file to the Court of Cassation but this time to its Quorum, which consists of all the chambers. Whatever the Quorum decides is final.

One other court is the Yüce Divan, often misleadingly translated into English as Supreme Court. It is better called High Tribunal to avoid confusing its functions with those of the United States Supreme Court. The Turkish High Tribunal is more a court of impeachment, summoned when necessary to try members of the cabinet, of the Court of Cassation, or of the Council of State, in case charges of misdeeds in performance of duty have been preferred. Its decision, whether impeachment or a lesser penalty, is irrevocable. The Yüce Divan is really a slate of twenty-one judges, eleven from the Court of Cassation and ten from the Council of State, elected in each by secret ballots. It is summoned only by vote of the Grand National Assembly, and it convenes with a presiding judge and fourteen other judges from the slate.

*Gendarmes and Police.* The Turkish *gendarmarie*, which has very effectively maintained order in areas outside of the regular police jurisdiction, is made up of men in army training, selected for special physical fitness, good personal qualities and a minimum of five years schooling. They receive three years of special school and field training, directed by the Army General Staff; they graduate with the rank of corporal (*onbaşı*) and can rise to higher army ranks in service. But they serve under the Ministry of the Interior either in the field to prevent brigandage and apprehend criminals or, in lieu of police, at central guard stations (*karakols*) for small communities. The *gendarmarie* commands are responsible to the highest government official of the *il*, *ilçe*, or *bucak* to which they are assigned.

The Security Police (*Emniyet Polis*) perform duties of crime prevention, accident prevention, and general maintenance of order under the Ministry of the Interior. They are stationed in the *karakol* in every well-populated center to apprehend law breakers and also to check identification cards and travel permits of aliens. Municipal officers of the law, called *memur* rather than *polis*, are responsible for traffic control, and local enforcement of commercial laws. Watchmen (*bekçis*) in the pay of local municipal and village governments, patrol the streets, whereas the police act on call. Each *bekçi* collects gratuities from persons on his beat.

In national emergencies, the cabinet can invoke martial law for six months, subject to the Grand National Assembly's approval. It cannot be arbitrarily extended by the cabinet, but only by vote of the Grand National Assembly, and for only six months at a time. During World War II, martial law was imposed in six out of Turkey's sixty-three provinces, and on the whole was moderately administered. Except for cases suspected of endangering the national safety, the peace-time courts and civilian police functioned as usual.

(The information in Appendix D was compiled from the Turkish Constitution, publications of the Turkish Information Office in New York City, and detailed answers to queries sent by the author to Dr. Esmer, former Director General of the Press, in Ankara.)



## APPENDIX E

### 1950 ELECTION LAW

In abstract, the principal terms of the 1950 election Law (No. 5545) are as follows:

*District and Precincts.* Each province (*il*) is an election district (*çevre*). A ballot box shall be provided for each precinct (*bölge*), namely a community of 150 to 500 citizens. Residents of smaller communities shall vote in the most accessible precinct (Arts. 2, 3, 83).

*Representation.* One deputy to the Grand National Assembly is elected for the first 55,000 of the population of any district, and an additional deputy for each succeeding 40,000 or portion thereof (Art. 4).

*Registration of Voters.* All citizens aged twenty-two years [by Eastern reckoning, twenty-one by Western reckoning] are eligible to register as voters, except police of all ranks, men in military service, and those under interdiction or debarred from public service (Arts. 8-9).

Qualified voters may register wherever residence of at least three months has been established (Art. 11). The provincial governors (*valis*) and chiefs (*kaymakams*) of the main provincial subdivisions (*ilçes*) may deputize local government officials and staff members to conduct the registration (Art. 15).

One representative of each political party established in that district may observe the work of registration (Art. 16). Official registration lists must be posted in a public place in each precinct for seven days, during which time protests can be made to the local government. If a decision is not rendered within two days, appeal can be made to the local civil court (*sulh mahkemesi*). Census officials are the custodians of registration records (Arts. 20-23). Each registered voter will receive an identification card bearing his name, residence, occupation, district, precinct, and registration number (Art. 31).

*Candidacy.* Any registered voter may be a candidate for deputy to the Grand National Assembly if he is past thirty years of age, and can read and write Turkish; if he is not under interdiction or sen-

tence for crime, in the employ of a foreign country, or debarred from public service for other reasons. If members of the courts, the Council of State, or the armed forces wish to run for election they must resign from their former posts at least a month before election day, and do no campaigning until their resignations are in effect (Arts. 34-35).

Candidates may be nominated by political parties or a voter may announce his own candidacy by presenting a statement of approval signed by fifty duly registered voters (Art. 35).

Any candidate may file in two election districts. If he wins in both, he chooses which district to represent, and a new election is held in the other district.\* The period for filing ends on the fifteenth day before election day, and appeals on alleged violations of rights can be made to the Supreme Election Board within forty-eight hours thereafter. Lists of candidates, in alphabetical order of their names, must be posted at least nine days before election day (Arts. 38-39).

*Campaigning.* The election period is the forty-five days between the announcement of the election date, which is determined by vote of the Grand National Assembly, and the day of election (Art. 6). Public meetings to hear candidates and their supporters can be held between sunrise and sunset in open air places designated by the local public officials. Assignment of hours and places for speakers is by public drawing of lots. A three-person committee, whose names are announced to the public security officers, will maintain order and limit speeches at each meeting, summoning police aid only in emergencies (Arts. 40-44).

Radio propaganda is limited to the week between the tenth and third day preceding election day, and to ten minutes a day for each party. If, however, a party presents candidates in more than twenty districts, it may have ten minutes twice a day. Time is similarly allotted to independent candidates. The order and hours at which applicants may broadcast is determined by lot (Art. 45-48).†

Campaign posters and handbills must not bear the Turkish flag, religious sayings, Arabic letters, or pictures. Posters must be removed

\* In the 1950 election, twelve reëlections were held under this article.

† Radio broadcasting is all nation-wide. There are, as yet, few, if any, stations for purely local broadcasts. Thus the candidate for any one district consumes radio time for the whole nation; hence the small time allotted to each candidate.

three days before election day and no printed campaign matter may be distributed in the two days preceding election day (Arts. 50-56).

*Election Boards.* The Supreme Election Board is to be elected every four years by the members of the Council of State (*Danıştay*) and the Court of Cassation (*Yargıtay*) from their own members and by blind ballot, five from the former and six from the latter. These elect their chairman and vice-chairman, and then draw lots for two of the others, who will be reserve members. The remaining six are the board members (Arts. 120-21).

The highest judge in the capital of each province serves as chairman of the provincial election board. For official recognition, a political party must have been established at least six months in at least twenty districts. The chairman draws by lot from the names of such parties, a maximum of seven. The first seven drawn appoint one representative each to serve on the election board. (If the qualified parties number fewer than seven, the law provides for proportionate representation.) The chairman also draws by lot the names of five members of municipal assemblies and three members of the provincial assemblies. Five from each drawing serve as election board members and the others as substitutes. The drawings are made in public.

Election boards for the next lower administrative divisions (*ilçes*) are similarly drawn under the chairmanship of the highest ranking judge of each *ilçe*. Each board consists of the chairman, eight active members, and four substitutes, half from political party representatives, half from the people's elected representatives in the *ilçe* assemblies.

Precinct boards are set up by each *ilçe* board, which makes a list in each of its precincts of persons of good reputation who can read and write, listing two names for each ballot box which will be used in that precinct. From this list the judge-chairman of the *ilçe* board draws the precinct board chairman by lot, and then draws the members first from the party representatives and then from local councils of elders, four in all for each board, and three substitutes (Arts. 63-73).

The oath taken by each election board member is: "I swear on my honor, my conscience, and all that I hold sacred that I will perform my duty uninfluenced and in fear of no one, faithfully, according to law" (Art. 62).

[Election board duties—Arts. 66, 69, 74—are essentially the same as in the United States.]

*The Polls.* The polling area shall be in a 100-meter radius from the place of balloting (Art. 77). The list of registered voters must be posted in plain sight. Booths for secret voting must be provided. No one carrying arms or in uniform may be in the polling area unless summoned by the board chairman (Art. 75).

*Voting.* Ballots for each party or independent candidate may be distinguished by color, a symbol, or a picture (Art. 88). Each voter may mark his ballot as he wishes. He may cross off any names and write in the names of other candidates instead (Art. 89).

Each voter, at the polls, presents his registration card to the election board, which checks his name on the list and hands him the official election envelope [distinct in form and color]. In the booth, he marks his ballot and seals it in the envelope. No one at the polls may offer advice or suggestions to a voter, but the blind or paralyzed may receive assistance. No person, however, may assist more than one voter. On leaving the booth, the voter deposits his sealed ballot in the box, signs or fingerprints the register, and receives again his registration card, newly stamped. Voters must vote in the order of their arrival at the polls, except that the sick, aged, pregnant, or disabled have precedence. None but the board and authorized observers may remain in the polling area (Arts. 95-99).

*The Count.* As soon as the polls close, the precinct board, in the presence of the observers, first counts how many voters signed the register, and the chairman announces the number aloud. Second, all unused envelopes are counted and the number is announced. These two numbers, added, should equal the total number of envelopes originally received by the election board of that precinct. Unused envelopes are sealed in a packet.

The ballot box is then emptied on the table. The envelopes from it are counted unopened, and the total should match the number of those who signed the register. In case of an excess number of envelopes, all envelopes are replaced in the box, and the board chairman draws at random a number of them equal to the excess; these are burned without being opened. This action must be entered in the record. When the number of envelopes tallies with the number of voters the count begins.

Two board members of opposite parties serve as recorders. They first show the observers that the tally sheets are blank. Then another member takes the envelopes, one by one, from the box and hands each one to the chairman who examines it to be sure that no mark identifies the voter. He then opens it and reads the vote aloud, and the recorders enter it on the tally sheets. Another member takes the ballot and drops it into an official bag. Authorized observers may, on request, examine any ballot.

As the count ends, the number of ballots in the bag must equal the number of envelopes opened. Then the bag is sealed and sent to the *ilçe* board, and the precinct results are posted. [Invalidity of ballots is for the usual reasons, such as illegibility, voting for two names for the same office, marks identifying the voter, and so on.] Protests against any step in the procedure, and the board's action on the protest, must be entered in the record to be reviewed by the higher election boards (Arts. 101-15).

The *ilçe* boards tally precinct results with equal precautions, and send their final complete reports of the count and of protests to their respective provincial election boards. They also furnish certified copies of the *ilçe* returns to candidates and party representatives (Art. 116).

The provincial boards, after similarly tallying *ilçe* results, send the whole cumulative records, with all documents and the dossiers on protests, to the Supreme Election Board in Ankara. This board of the highest judges in the land investigates the protests and decisions by lower boards, and submits a final report to the Grand National Assembly with full data on any protests and actions which alter the outcome of the voting. Protests can also be addressed directly to the Supreme Election Board instead of to the lower boards. The Supreme Board can requisition any transcripts or documents necessary for investigations, and must report its decisions to the president of the Grand National Assembly within a month of the date of the protest. In case the Grand National Assembly then cancels the election of any deputy, a new election for his seat in the Assembly shall be held (Arts. 123-26).

*Election Offenses.* On election day, the sale or use of intoxicants and any unauthorized bearing of firearms are forbidden (Art. 93).\*

\* On election day in 1950, all police and military men were ordered to their posts, to be on call if needed, but even more importantly, to make sure that none appeared in or near polling places unless officially summoned.

Offenses which interfere with free and secret voting, falsify registration cards or lists, hamper election boards, or illegally influence results, are variously punishable by prison sentences from one month up to seven years, and by fines up to 1,000 Turkish liras (Arts. 127-58).

*Appeals.* Election officials or civil officers who are dismissed for election misdemeanors have ample rights of appeal to the judiciary (Art. 160). In case statements in the Press about candidates, officials, or parties are proven false, the offending publication must print a correction on the same page, in the same position, and in the same size of type as the original erroneous statement (Art. 161).

*Expenses and Enforcement.* Registration expenses are provided in the budget of the Ministry of the Interior (Art. 15), and election expenses in the budget of the Ministry of Justice (Art. 166). Enforcement of this election law is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers (Art. 171).

(This law was passed on February 16, 1950. The abstract is from a translation by the author and Mithat Esmer.)

## NOTES TO CHAPTERS

(Since 1934, Turks have added surnames, as explained in Chapter 3, and their earlier publications appeared without them. Therefore, although each Turkish writer's full name is given here, an asterisk indicates that part of his name under which the work cited here appeared. Each reference to Atatürk's *Six Day Speech* is to the Turkish edition, *Kemâl Atatürk tarafından Nutuk*, but, for convenience in these notes, the references will be to the "Six Day Speech.")

### NOTES TO CHAPTER 1. *These Are the Turks*

<sup>1</sup> A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey*, The Modern World Series (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1926), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Bertrand Bareilles, *Les Turcs* (Paris: Librairie Académique, Perrin et Cie, 1917), Préface de J. De Morgan, p. xv. (Author's translation.)

<sup>4</sup> *Cambridge Modern History* (1907), I, 101.

<sup>5</sup> Edson L. Clark, *Turkey*, "Nations of the World" Series (New York: Peter Fenelon Collier & Son, 1900), pp. 84 and 87.

<sup>6</sup> Mears, *op. cit.*, chapter on "Greeks," by Adamantios Th. Polyzoides, p. 80.

### NOTES TO CHAPTER 2. *The Turks' "Eternal Chief"*

<sup>1</sup> Felix Valyi, *Revolutions in Islam* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1925), p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Azeri Turks, in the Russian Caucasus, saw in the Young Turk movement hope also of throwing off their "Russian yoke." Several fled to Turkey, and two were among the five leaders on the Committee of Union and Progress. (Noted by K. Key, in *Ottoman Intellectuals and the Reformation of 1908*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the American University, 1950.)

<sup>3</sup> The Turkish name for the war of 1919-22, *İstiklâl Harbi*, can be translated either War of Independence or War of Liberation. The former has been used by nearly all Western writers. But, as Turkey never actually lost its independence, "War of Liberation" is used in this book, as more accurately indicating the nature of the Turks' fight for liberation from interference and semi-occupation by foreign powers.

<sup>4</sup> Reported executions were thirteen for an attempt on Atatürk's life, twenty-eight in a Dervish uprising to restore the shariat law, and not more than ten others. There were, however, more deaths later in military suppression of Kurd uprisings near the eastern border of Turkey.

<sup>5</sup> Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Mannheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 688.

<sup>6</sup> Atatürk's *Six Day Speech* (*Kemâl Atatürk Tarafından Nutuk*), II, 200-201.

<sup>7</sup> Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1944), p. 184.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. *How Turks Know Turks*

<sup>1</sup> Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, quotation from Mithat Sadullah, "Yurt Bilgisi" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> In 1948, the estimated number of citizens above seven years of age was 14,622,000. Of these, it was reported that 5,469,000 could read and write.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 4. *Men, Women, and Marriage*

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republic*: Book V, 466D.

<sup>2</sup> *News from Turkey* (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1947), No. 17.

<sup>3</sup> A famous example of careers of distinction for both husband and wife are Dr. Abdülhak Adnan-Adıvar and his wife, Halide Edib. Together they joined the Kemalist movement, and when the Sultan placed a price on their heads, they escaped from Istanbul to Ankara. Dr. Adıvar, who had formerly held high office in health services for the Young Turks, became vice-president of the new Grand National Assembly. His wife, an outstanding leader of the educated women, became an army corporal and then sergeant, keeping front line records in the severest battles in the War of Liberation. She rode at Atatürk's side in the victorious re-entry of Turkish troops into Izmir. Subsequently disagreeing with certain dictatorial trends in the new government, Dr. and Bayan Adıvar went into voluntary exile in 1926. In the United States, France, and England, one or both of them became known as lecturer, writer, or teacher. In 1939, they returned to Turkey. Bayan Adıvar, currently, is Professor of English Literature in the University of Istanbul, and Dr. Adıvar is editor of the *Encyclopedia of Islam (İslâm Ansiklopedisi)*, for the Turkish Ministry of Education. Since their return, both have been elected to seats in the Grand National Assembly.

<sup>4</sup> Researchers can obtain more information on this subject from Nezihe Muhittin, *Türk Kadını* (Istanbul: Nümüne Matbaası, 1931).

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 5. *Turkey for the Turks*

<sup>1</sup> Ali Nuzhet Göksel, *Ziya Gökalp Kırk Yıl Önce Neler Söyledi?* (Istanbul: Vatan, October 25, 1949. Author's translation.)

<sup>2</sup> The King Crane Commission report on feasibility of an independent Armenia revealed that the Armenians could not maintain unaided the territory they demanded. Foreign aid did not materialize. Today, the Armenians outside of Turkey have their own Republic in the Soviet Union. Many are also in Iran, Syria, Europe, and America. Those inside of Turkey—an average estimate is 100,000—live mostly in or near Istanbul.

<sup>3</sup> A fourth bond, pan-Turkism, i.e., unity of all Turanians who speak Turkish and are Müslims, was proposed. Shorn of territorial ambitions it is identical, or at least compatible, with Turkism.

<sup>4</sup> *The Six Day Speech*, I, 296.

<sup>5</sup> The Kurds themselves have claimed a total population of 8,000,000. Objective estimates are, at most, 4,400,000. In either case, it is conceded that nearly half of them are in Turkey.



NOTES TO CHAPTER 6. *Accent on Turkey*

<sup>1</sup> *The Six Day Speech*, II, 192.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 190-203.

<sup>4</sup> Maps of Russo-Turkish boundary changes since 1875 have seemed to reflect a Western impulse to "drive the Turks out of Europe." When any territory in question has been held by Russia, Western cartographers have mapped it in Europe, but when the same territory has become Turkish, they have mapped it in Asia. Cf. Hammond, *New World Loose Leaf Atlas*, Sixth Edition, Maps A and 46 C.D.; and Hammond, *Modern Atlas*, 1909, p. 79.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7. *Homeland*

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the October, 1947, issue of *Fortune* magazine by special permission of the Editors; Copyright, *Time*, Inc.

<sup>2</sup> Ahmet Emin\* Yalman, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Division of Economics and History, 1930), p. 187.

<sup>3</sup> These Turkish highway and railway figures are approximations based on reports from Turkey which vary from 50 to 500 miles. The California railway figure of 7,300 miles, for this comparison, was obtained from the Railway Commission office in San Francisco.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8. *Education—At All Ages*

<sup>1</sup> Turko-Italian War for Tripoli-Benghazi; two Balkan Wars, 1912-13; World War I, 1914-18; War of Liberation, 1919-22.

<sup>2</sup> At the height of the Young Turk era, in 1913, education showed gains, but later half their schools were closed, and only one-quarter as many pupils were in school when the new Turks launched the Republic's educational program.

<sup>3</sup> Military training in lycées normally constitutes six months to a year of the boys' military training requirement. A new problem, as lycée enrollment increases, is that although male graduates of lycées have been automatically commissioned as officers, the number of graduates has begun to exceed the number of officers needed. Under a selective system, many families would protest against training in the ranks for their educated sons. The first bill for officer candidate selection, submitted by the Ministry of Defense in 1950, was voted down by the Grand National Assembly's Committee on Military Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> An exception, written into the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, permits non-Muslim Turkish citizens to continue to teach their respective religions in their own schools. The American Board of Foreign Missions has kept four of its former twenty-seven schools open for secular teaching, in compliance with the Republic's new laws. The Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. have each been secularized as a "Lesson House" (*Dershane*).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9. *Occupations and Incomes*

<sup>1</sup> Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), p. 329.

<sup>2</sup> Any mention, in the press, of Turkish Chambers of Commerce is somewhat misleading, because no organization in Turkey includes the community

"boosting" in any sense at all parallel to the Chambers of Commerce in the United States. The *Ticaret Odaları*, by literal translation, are "Chambers of Commerce" but in fact, are local trade or merchants' associations, formed almost wholly for their own trade problems. Turkey also has a semi-official Chamber of Commerce and Industry in which the law requires membership of all businessmen. The general secretary is appointed by the Minister of Commerce. In 1947, under the Law of Association's amendment for greater freedom of organization, İstanbul businessmen formed the İstanbul Merchants Association (İstanbul Tüccar Derneği), with voluntary membership and the announced purpose of safeguarding private enterprise and developing Turkish economic life. When foreign correspondents mention "Chamber of Commerce" in their dispatches from Turkey, it is difficult to know which of these organizations is meant.

<sup>3</sup> So much material on Turkish étatism and banking has appeared in print recently that interested readers are referred to the Turkish Information Office, New York City, for booklets and bulletins; to the files of the *Asiatic Review* and the *Middle East Journal* for articles by specialists; to the Twentieth Century Fund for the report by Max Weston Thornburg and Associates; and to reports of the Economic Cooperation Administration and the International Export-Import Bank.

<sup>4</sup> The Turkish government reported in 1948 that 4 per cent of the total population, or nearly 900,000 workers, were in industry, and that these workers provided more than half the national wealth. Out of a total of 300,000 employees working in some 4,000 business enterprises, 50 labor groups had a membership of approximately 44,000 workers in the first year of labor organization. Liberal laws on working hours, pensions, and special courts of arbitration in labor disputes are in effect, but the Ministry of Labor has not yet deemed the time right for putting into effect the Labor Code provision for minimum wages. Social insurance is administered by the Labor Insurance Administration (İşçi Sigortaları İdaresi), an autonomous government agency with branches in the larger cities. Employers and employees pay, as premiums, prescribed percentages of total annual wages. The government also runs an employment service (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu).

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 10. *The Peasant Majority*

<sup>1</sup> Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), p. 45, quoting W. L. Westermann, in *Asia*.

<sup>2</sup> An American engineering firm's report, in 1949, for a flood-control project in the rich Seyhan region, showed 11,000 out of 19,000 farmers had fewer than twelve acres each. Researchers on landownership in Turkey will find valuable early information compiled by Hüseyin Avni in *Reaya ve Köylü* (İstanbul, Tan Matbaası, 1941).

<sup>3</sup> Ömer Celâl Sarc, "Economic Policy of the New Turkey," the *Middle East Journal* (October, 1948), p. 441.

<sup>4</sup> The Turkish peasants' contribution to the national economy begins with approximately 55,000,000 head of livestock, four-fifths being sheep and goats. Eight times as much land is cultivated for cereal grains as for all other ground crops. Wheat comprises more than half the total, and is followed by barley, corn, rye, oats, and rice. Normally grain and tobacco are about 40 per cent of

Turkey's agricultural exports. Others are nuts, figs, raisins, citrus fruits, cotton, eggs, hides, mohair, and spring lambs. Mine, forest, and sea products are also exported. Modern food processing plants and storehouses, now under construction, will decrease the present great wastage. Cavit Oral, the Minister of Agriculture in 1949, estimated that at least one or two more decades will be needed to realize Turkey's true potential in agriculture.

<sup>5</sup> Ahmet Emin\* Yalman, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, 1930), pp. 80 and 83.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 11. *Health and Welfare*

<sup>1</sup> *La Santé Publique et L'Assistance Sociale en Turquie*, Ankara, 1941. Author's translation.

<sup>2</sup> A few recent instances of international recognition of Turkish medical authorities are: In the United Nations World Health Organization, election of Dr. Tevfik Ismail Gursan to the committee of experts on tuberculosis, and of Dr. Seyfettin Okan to the companion committee on malaria, in 1949; papers read by eight Turkish surgeons at the Sixth International Surgical Convention in Rome; a series of lectures by Dr. Kemal Saracoğlu at Cologne University, in 1948; and lectures on tropical diseases at medical institutes in Hamburg and London by Dr. Feridun Nafiz, in 1949. Various international medical congresses have designated Turkey as their meeting place within the next few years.

<sup>3</sup> The only Turkish nurses' training schools whose graduates are eligible for registration, and which were named in answer to a query to the Ministry of Education, are connected with the Istanbul Red Crescent, the Istanbul Children's Hospital, and the Istanbul Hydarpaşa Hospital. Together they have, at present, fewer than three hundred nurses in training. All foreign hospitals together may graduate twenty-five to fifty nurses annually.

<sup>4</sup> The U. S. figure is from a report issued early in 1949, by the Hospital Council of Greater New York, and quoted in the *New York Times*.

<sup>5</sup> Supplies sent from Turkey to meet emergencies abroad in 1948 included 703,000 cc. of anti-cholera vaccine to Egypt, Syria, and Transjordan; 36 tons of wheat, rye, and sugar to Rumania; 57 tons of rice, macaroni, sugar, and soap to England; 42 tons of olive oil, dried raisins, and toothpaste to India; and food and medical supplies for 18,000 refugee Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 12. *Religion*

<sup>1</sup> H. E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), p. 189, quoting in English translation *Islam Dini*, a text approved by the Turkish Ministry of Education, in 1929-30.

<sup>2</sup> One Egyptian judge in the Islamic courts, Ali Abd-al-Raziq, compiled historic and Koranic evidence that the Khalifate was not a sacred institution in Islam; that Islam is a religion, not a state; and that Müslims are free to found a constitutional state along modern lines. His volume containing such evidence, *al-Islâm-wa-Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of Government)*, published in Cairo, led to his dismissal from office. Nevertheless, the current trend to constitutionalism in the Arab states more and more reflects the justification he offered. For more information on this point, see Edward J. Jurji, *The Great*

*Religions of the Modern World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

<sup>3</sup> All directly or indirectly quoted passages in this paragraph are from *The Six Day Speech*, II, 204-5.

<sup>4</sup> The doctrine of the Trinity, and the holy figures in Christian Churches, conflict with the basic Müslim concept of "one God," not depictable in temporal form. A Turkish student in the United States in 1949 wrote in a graduate thesis: "There was nothing more revolting to a true Müslim mind than a religion which commanded the identification of a human being with the One God . . . and permitted its followers to worship images."

<sup>5</sup> Quotations from the Turkish Press, translated by Lyman McCallum, for the American Board of Foreign Missions.

<sup>6</sup> The Masonic Order, with six Turks listed as founders, and with a membership largely in Istanbul, resumed activities under a law stating that members must be Turkish citizens; that their names, as well as the place and times of all meetings, must be reported to the government; and that political activity must be avoided.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 13. *Fun*

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in the Turkish number of the *Times* (London), August 9, 1938.

<sup>2</sup> The referee's authority is rarely final in Turkey. The teams must agree on decisions. Cf. incident cited on p. 241.

<sup>3</sup> Turkey ranked ahead of twenty-eight other nations, and was seventh by the Turks' way of reckoning. Old-style wrestling (*yağlı güreş*) was with the upper body greased with oil, the lower body in leather pants. One bout might last three or four hours. The wealth of a village was sometimes indicated by the amount of gold for prizes. Nationally famous wrestlers gave exhibitions of this style in Europe and the United States late in the nineteenth century. Local committees have recently revived this sport. Another local revival in the *halkevi* is swordplay, a sport akin to fencing but performed with sabers.

<sup>4</sup> Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 189.

<sup>5</sup> Recent research indicates that Nasreddin Hoca may have been born a prince in the Kastamonu region, and that he may have moved to Akşehir to enjoy a simpler life than that possible on a throne or at court.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 14. *Culture*

<sup>1</sup> Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent* (New York, 1944), p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1918), p. 278.

<sup>3</sup> Cited by Harry N. Howard, in *Current History* (October, 1923), p. 76.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Chap. I, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> An even stronger opinion than the author's on this point can be quoted from Dr. A. Adnan-Adıvar's article on "Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey" in the *Middle East Journal* (July, 1947), p. 279, as follows: "The domination . . . of the positivism of the West at that time [when the Republic was founded], was so intense that one can hardly call it thought. . . . Turkey became a positivistic mausoleum. . . . The entire mechanism of the State, by common accord, has been trying to put into its different institutions the positivist formula. . . ."

NOTES TO CHAPTER 15. *Character*

<sup>1</sup> Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent* (New York, 1944), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Funk & Wagnalls, 1942. Webster, 1947.

<sup>3</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1922), Introduction.

<sup>4</sup> Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York, 1918), p. 275.

<sup>5</sup> Ahmet Emin\* Yalman, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, 1930), p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York, 1918), p. 276.

<sup>7</sup> This point is made in A. J. Toynbee and A. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (London, 1926), pp. 20-21, and repeated in Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1947), p. 172.

<sup>8</sup> Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), p. 494.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 16. *Aims and Achievements*

<sup>1</sup> *The Six Day Speech*, I, 77.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> The first deficit in the Republic's budget occurred in 1947, and was attributed to the post-war drain on gold and free currencies, the falling off of war-time demand for Turkish exports, the unsettled state of the world markets, and, in part, to the government's economic inexperience in such a situation. The continued deficit since then has been sufficiently offset, so far, by cuts in appropriations for high government offices, some transfers of expenditure funds through the European Economic Administration, domestic loans at 6 per cent, and increases in national income, rather than by heavier taxation.

<sup>4</sup> Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., "Truths About Turkey," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1948), p. 358.

<sup>5</sup> *The Six Day Speech*, I, 81.

<sup>6</sup> Projects in Turkey with U.S. aid are progressing so rapidly at this writing that figures become out of date almost as soon as they are set down. Since the object of this book is to characterize, rather than summarize, current developments, only examples, and not summaries, are offered. U.S. Government reports with more information are available, and progress reports on specific projects have appeared frequently in the weekly bulletin, *News from Turkey*, issued by the Turkish Information Office, New York.

<sup>7</sup> A decree by the Turkish Government in May, 1949, guaranteed exchange permits for partial or total transfer of the income, as well as the capital, of foreign funds invested in ventures economically desirable for Turkey. The maximum total of foreign guarantees, proposed in a legislative bill in 1950, was \$106,000,000.

<sup>8</sup> Max Weston Thornburg, "Turkey, Aid for What?" reprinted from the October, 1947, issue of *Fortune* magazine by special permission of the Editors, Copyright *Time, Inc.*, p. 171.

<sup>9</sup> *The Six Day Speech*, I, 255.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 17. *In the Second World War*

<sup>1</sup> Treaty of Mutual Assistance: United Kingdom, French Republic, and Turkey, October 19, 1939. The Turkish government tried to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union, including a comparable clause that it should not involve Turkey in armed conflict with her Western allies. The Soviet government, reportedly, refused.

<sup>2</sup> Another territorial "bribe," rejected by the Turks, was Moscow's offer of Bulgarian ports and lands in exchange for a neutrality pledge from Turkey to insure a buffer against a Nazi campaign to the Caucasus through Turkey. Turkey's neutrality did serve as a buffer, but to protect her own safety and sympathies, not to gain territory.

<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, *The von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944* (Zürich: Atlantis Verlag, under title, *Vom Andern Deutschland*, 1946. English edition—New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), p. 146. The author was in Turkey during these critical war years, and introduces passages from von Hassell's diaries as interesting confirmation, after the fact, of attitudes and suspicions which permeated the atmosphere in Turkey at the time.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.

<sup>7</sup> The annual output of chrome ore was then about 150,000 tons, and has since been increased to more than 200,000.

<sup>8</sup> von Hassell, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 18. *The Dardanelles*

<sup>1</sup> Text quotations from the League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 173, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup> In a diplomatic note, dated Ankara, August 22, 1946.

<sup>3</sup> Treaties, agreements, and notes on the Dardanelles, from which passages herein are quoted, have been conveniently compiled by Dr. Harry N. Howard in Department of State Bulletin 2752, Near Eastern Series 5; and Bulletin No. 472, Vol. XIX.

<sup>4</sup> As quoted by the Turkish Office of Information, New York.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 19. *Government of the People*

<sup>1</sup> Details from *The Six Day Speech*.

<sup>2</sup> Atatürk's election was announced as the unanimous vote of 158 members present, out of a total of 287 members.

<sup>3</sup> As translated in Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 429.

<sup>4</sup> Data published at the time in the weekly, *Yedi Gün*.

<sup>5</sup> Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 261.

<sup>6</sup> Due to space limitations of this book, readers desiring more details on Turkey's étatisme and banking are referred again to Note 2, Chapter 9, for source material.

<sup>7</sup> Today, extensive flood control, irrigation, and power projects are under way. Projects for the most famous rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, are in abeyance, pending international agreement with Syria and Iraq, which they also cross.

<sup>8</sup> The most thorough research on the factions in the original National Assem-

ably, of which this writer knows, is being done by Şerif Mardin (M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Washington) for a doctoral thesis at Stanford University.

<sup>9</sup> The Democratic Party permits all of its lower divisions to propose policies and nominate representatives for its upper divisions; also to nominate candidates for provincial and national elections. The other parties operated with nearly all appointments and nominations made at the top, and with relatively little local autonomy even inside the party. The changes effected in the 1950 elections are discussed in Chapter 20.

<sup>10</sup> Different sources give different results. These are the figures which were most consistently reported in the press when the Assembly convened after the 1946 elections.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 20. *Government by the People*

<sup>1</sup> Details from Ahmet Emin\* Yalman, "The Turkish Press" in Mears, *Modern Turkey*, Chapter 20.

<sup>2</sup> During the war, *Tan*, an Istanbul daily, boldly criticized the government for legislation, which allegedly reduced constitutional guarantees to nothing. Suspicion that this paper's editor was working for the Communists led, later, to the burning of his plant in an anti-Communist demonstration. *Tan* did not resume publication.

<sup>3</sup> Reported in *Ulus*, October 30, 1947.

<sup>4</sup> The first official figures were: 8,905,576 registered voters, 7,916,091 votes cast. Democrats, 4,242,831; Republican People's Party, 3,165,096. In the Assembly: Democratic Party, 408; Independents who ran on the Democratic ticket, 8; People's Party, 69; Party of the Nation, 1.

<sup>5</sup> İnönü had campaigned chiefly on promises of revision of the constitution for a two-chamber parliament and direct election of the president. He also ran on his party's record of achievements for Turkey in the past twenty-seven years. But the public had apparently become impatient with the pace and cost of these activities in recent years. The third contender, the Party of the Nation, running in twenty-two of the sixty-three provinces, won only one seat. Its leader, Marshal Çakmak, died early in the campaign. Unfortunate scenes at his funeral led to arrests of some of his followers for disturbing the peace and illegal recitation of prayers in Arabic instead of Turkish. The demonstrators claimed that İnönü's government made an inadequate display of mourning for the nation's beloved Marshal.

<sup>6</sup> The İş Bankası is classed as a private bank, but its original board of directors were deputies in the Grand National Assembly, acting as private citizens. Most of its original stock was purchased by public officials, also as private citizens. Indeed the controlling stock was said to be owned by Atatürk, who bequeathed it to the People's Party. This bank, founded in 1924, inaugurated the industrialization of Turkey, and laid the groundwork for the Sümer and Eti Bank promotions, when étatisme was established in the 1930's. Through its many branches, the İş Bankası has become perhaps the best-known bank in Turkey.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 21. *World Relations*

<sup>1</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, Abridgement of Vols. I-VI, 1947), p. 178. Persons who discussed this

point with Professor Toynbee report that he modified his suggestion of banality after further acquaintance with the new Turks.

<sup>2</sup> League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 156, No. 3600.

<sup>3</sup> In a radio broadcast, October 19, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. attitude on Cyprus, Chapter 6, p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> In an interview with Leo D. Hochstetter, of the North American Newspaper Alliance.

<sup>6</sup> The Turks handled the Jewish emigration somewhat confusingly. At times they granted exit visas from Turkey to a thousand or more at once, and again refused any visas at all. Whether this was uncertainty in their own policy; alternate appeasement of the Jews and the Arabs, and their respective Great Power backers; or deliberately maneuvered for Turkey's convenience in matters of the emigrés' property and permits, is one of those things which produce conflicting foreign judgments of the Turks' policies.

<sup>7</sup> Turkey, Greece, and Iceland were the first new members invited by the ten charter nations to participate in the opening sessions.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 22. *Retrospect and Prospect*

<sup>1</sup> John Kingsley Birge, "Turkey Between Two World Wars," *Foreign Policy Reports* (New York: Foreign Policy Assoc., Inc., November 1, 1944), II, No. 16, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., "Truths About Turkey," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1948), p. 357.

#### ADDITIONAL ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Parts of Chapters 19 and 20, and Appendix D appeared in the *Middle East Journal*, April, 1950, in an article by the same author on "Test of Democracy in Turkey," and are reproduced here by permission of the publishers.

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


BULGARIA

EDİRNE

GREECE

# Map of The TURKISH STRAITS



EGE DENİZİ  
(Aegean Sea)

GELIBOLU • CANAKKALE BÖĞAZI  
(Dardanelles)

CANAKKALE

BANDIRMA

KARA DENİZ  
(Black Sea)

Çalıtcao

Büyük Dereo

Beykoz

İSTANBUL

Haydarpaşa

MARMARA DENİZİ  
(Sea of Marmara)

İZMİT

Gölcük

İznik

BURSA



BOGAZICI (Bosphorus)

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