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NOMINATION OF WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Y 4. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-29

Nomination of Warren M. Christopher...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 13 AND 14, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER OF CALIFORNIA TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Moynihan, Robb, Wofford, Feingold, Mathews, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, and Coverdell.

Also present: Senators Feinstein and Boxer

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

It is with great pleasure that we welcome Warren Christopher to our committee today as the nominee to be Secretary of State. I know Mr. Christopher to be a singularly intelligent, wise, honorable, and talented man. My own view is that our Nation is lucky to have a person of his caliber willing to serve at this critical position. We welcome you here, and I think first I would ask my colleagues to introduce you.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Pell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PELL

It is with great pleasure that I welcome Warren Christopher to the Committee today as President-elect Clinton's nominee to be Secretary of State.

Mr. Christopher served with distinction as Deputy Secretary of State from 1977-81, and we look forward to obtaining his views about a world that has changed greatly since he was last in government.

In many ways, we find ourselves in a situation similar to the one that existed in 1945. In the wake of a catastrophic world war, the old order had collapsed and new institutions and ways of thinking had to be devised. Now, after a Cold War lasting more than four decades, we face the task of devising or revising mechanisms to deal with new circumstances. In particular, we have an opportunity to reclaim the dream of the U.N. as an effective agent for world peace. We must also think in new ways about the dangers and challenges of today, which are different from those of the Cold War.

Our top priority must be dealing with the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. These include the implementation of arms control agreements to ensure that only Russia is a nuclear weapons state and to reduce drastically the number of nuclear weapons. Second, we must do what we can to ensure the success of democracy in Russia, the other countries of the former Soviet Union, and the other countries of the old Soviet bloc. This will require leadership and resources. But, I can think of no more critical expenditure on behalf of our national security.

We must also address more effectively the issues of ethnic conflict and striving for self-determination that are likely to dominate international relations in the Clinton era. Across the planet peoples seek self-rule, often through demands for new states. How we deal with these aspirations will decide how peaceful a world we will see in the 1990's. If our response to the breakdown of international law in Bosnia is any guide, I am not optimistic.

Finally, we must address a whole series of global problems that were too often ignored during the Cold War. These include the deterioration of the global environment, the continuation of massive global poverty, the proliferation of the technologies of mass destruction, and the burgeoning growth of human population.

Mr. Christopher, you will take office at a time when you can truly reshape the world. I envy your opportunities but not the burdens you will have to shoulder.

I will now ask the Ranking Minority Member to make a statement, and then other Members will have an opportunity to make opening statements as well. This is a divergence from our usual practice, but this is also a special occasion. I hope that we will not keep Mr. Christopher waiting too long to make his statement and respond to questions. So I urge everyone to be brief.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Feinstein has a statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am very pleased to be able to share with my colleague Barbara Boxer this very important introduction of Warren Christopher for a confirmation as Secretary of State. If you ask me, Mr. Chairman, to summarize the most outstanding characteristics of the person Warren Christopher, it would be that he is a man of high competence and intellect, strong character, with mature and reasoned judgment, all of which are packaged in an unassuming demeanor. I believe he has all the qualities required to be a fine Secretary of State.

These personal characteristics were recently put to the test in California when he led a challenging and politically sensitive commission to review the performance of the Los Angeles Police Department in the wake of the Rodney King incident known as the Christopher Commission. This body's findings led to comprehensive reform of the department, and the voters overwhelmingly approved the recommendations of the Christopher Commission at a general election.

His outstanding record of leadership has been achieved through a lifelong dedication to public service. Born in Scranton, ND, Warren Christopher first entered public service as a member of the Naval Reserve in World War II, with active duty as an ensign in the Pacific theater.

After earning his undergraduate degree from the University of Southern California and his law degree from Stanford University, Warren Christopher served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in 1949. He then joined the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers, becoming a partner within 8 years.

He served as vice chairman of the McCallum Commission that investigated the 1965 Watts riots. He was the special consultant to Under Secretary George Ball on foreign economic problems from 1965 to 1967. He served as Deputy Attorney General of the United States from 1967 to 1969. He served as Deputy Secretary of State from 1977 to 1981.

His crowning achievement was the safe release of 52 hostages from Iran to America in 1981. He received the Medal of Freedom,

our Nation's highest civilian award, for his achievement in bringing this terrible hostage incident to a successful conclusion.

In his spare time, Mr. Christopher has participated in many professional and civic activities: president of the Los Angeles County Bar Association; chairman of the Standing Committee of the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association, and member of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California reflect just a portion of his many professional activities.

His diverse civic and business activities include positions as a member of the Board of Trustees of Stanford University, director of Lockheed Corp., chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Carnegie Corp., and a Fellow of the American Academy of the Arts.

Warren Christopher, as you can see, has dedicated his life to serving the people of this country. No one knows for sure the challenges that we face during this tremendous time of change and potentially dangerous instability. But the people of our country must know that our leader on foreign affairs and national security issues is someone of the highest competence and character. I believe that we have that man before us today, and he is Warren Christopher.

Thank you, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much. Senator Boxer.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I want to add what a privilege it is for me to join with my colleague Senator Feinstein in introducing Warren Christopher to this very distinguished committee.

Many of you do not need an introduction to Warren Christopher because you remember him when he served in the Carter administration. But that was over a decade ago, when the great struggle between the superpowers dominated world affairs.

Now, we stand at the dawn of a new era. The possibilities of giving meaning to the term new world order are limitless. I believe that President-elect Bill Clinton was elected by the American people to restore this country's economic health. But I also believe he recognizes that our economic and political strength depend upon our leadership in world affairs. We need a stable and a peaceful world so that our energies and our resources can be directed and focused on important domestic priorities, and that is why I believe Bill Clinton chose Warren Christopher for this particular job.

Our economic well-being is certainly connected to the world economy. Our economic security is threatened by the proliferation of dangerous weapons. Our natural resources are threatened by global environmental conditions. Our inner cities are plagued by the scourge of drugs that flood our shores from abroad. In my view, no American is more prepared to help Bill Clinton face these and other challenges from Warren Christopher.

In numerous positions—Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Attorney General, chairman of the independent commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, Warren Christopher has demonstrated grace and good judgment under real pressure. During the Carter administration, Warren Christopher adeptly handled many impor-

tant assignments, and Senator Feinstein has gone through those. I will not repeat them.

At a time of great peril in one of our greatest cities, Los Angeles, in a State of 30 million people, Mayor Bradley turned to Warren Christopher to lead a bipartisan commission to get to the bottom of the problems of excessive force and bias within the Los Angeles Police Department. And although the commission was divided along sharply political lines, Mr. Christopher's courage and skill made it possible to produce unanimous bipartisan recommendations for sweeping changes in the Los Angeles Police Department.

I have served in the Congress for 10 years before being given this honor to be in the Senate, and I can tell you, I know how tough it is sometimes to move forward, with the two parties at the different ends of the spectrum sometimes. But this is a man who can bring us all together. It is no exaggeration to say that Warren Christopher has all the skills needed to be an excellent Secretary of State, a brilliant intellect, integrity, honesty, negotiating skills honed by years of legal practice and diplomacy. He is cool under fire, he is clear in his goals, and those goals are to ensure that the United States continues to be a strong world leader with vision and know-how.

So I am not going to repeat all the things that he has done in his life. I commend him to you. I strongly urge you to recommend his confirmation to the full Senate.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much, the Senators from California. You are good to be with us. You may stay or you are excused, whatever you wish.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. In many ways, I think today we find ourselves in a situation similar to that that was in 1945 in the wake—

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, would you forgive me for interrupting? I promised the President and the former President that I would be present this morning at the White House. I am going to run down there for the award, and I will be right back, and I would like for you to reserve my time for my opening statement, and of course, I will take my place in the questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. When you come back, you will be recognized.

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir. I thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, a 30-second interruption.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Before our colleagues leave, I want to point out to the Secretary-designee that this is truly a historic occasion. You are the first man in American history to be introduced by two women Senators, and I want to know that I understand that and understand the significance and impact of that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I was very conscious of that, Senator Biden. I think it is a very good omen.

Senator BIDEN. So do I.

The CHAIRMAN. In any case, we now have an opportunity to reclaim the dream of the U.N. as an effective agent for world peace. The U.N., people sometimes forget, was born in San Francisco, in the State from which all three of you at the table come from.

Our top priority must be dealing with the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, and these include the implementation of arms control agreements to ensure that only Russia is a nuclear weapons state, and to reduce dramatically the number of nuclear states.

And second, we must do what we can to ensure the success of democracy in Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union and the other countries of the old Soviet bloc. This is going to require leadership and resources.

Finally, we must address more effectively the issues of ethnic conflict and the striving for self-determination that are likely to dominate international affairs in the coming years. Across the planet, people seek self-rule, often with demands for new states. How we deal with these aspirations will decide how peaceful a world we will see in the 1990's. If our response to the breakdown of international law in Bosnia is any guide, I am not optimistic.

Finally, we have a whole series of global problems, often ignored during the cold war, the deterioration of the global environment, the continuation of massive global poverty, the proliferation of the technologies of mass destruction, the burgeoning growth of human population. You will be taking office, sir, at a time when you can truly help to reshape the world. Your opportunities are legion, but I do not envy you the burdens you have to shoulder.

The ranking minority member will come back to make his opening statement later. I have invited, because of the historic nature of this hearing, my colleagues, if they care to make a statement, to do so. The normal practice of our committee is for the ranking member and I to make a statement, and then other members' statements are deferred until their question period. I would also add that we will have a longer question period, 15 minutes instead of 10 minutes, which will give us more of a chance to go into depth.

So at this point, I would defer to any of my colleagues who would like to make a brief opening statement.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Christopher, I join the chairman, the ranking member, and other members of the committee, in welcoming you to this committee. President-elect Clinton has emphasized the need to redirect our national resources to shore up and strengthen our domestic infrastructure and to attend to many internal economic and social priorities.

But more than ever before, our domestic well-being is tied to the well-being of the world, whether this is measured in security, politics, trade, the environment, technology, or ideas. In determining our national priorities, the choice we face must not be posed as a choice between national security and domestic spending. We need to be as vigilant about our international well-being as we are about our domestic well-being, because they shape and condition each other comprehensively.

I believe that the foreign policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations provide a sound foundation for the foreign policy of the incoming administration. Although there were partisan differences and occasionally contentious disagreements, the foreign policy achievements of the Reagan and Bush administrations depended in

good part upon active consultation and cooperation between the White House and the Congress. I hope that this will continue.

Unfortunately, world events do not conform to our domestic timetable. Quite the contrary. There are international and regional crises the new administration will inherit, and new threats to our national security will arise. As a general principle, I believe the United States must stay actively involved abroad and for the foreseeable future must take the lead in managing the transition to the post-cold war era. There is no other country, international organization, or mechanism that can measure up to that task.

This does not mean that the United States must be the policeman of the world or that we must act or react to every challenge or that we must go it alone when and if we do not act.

It does mean that we must be prepared to act if and when we must, and success will depend upon the coupling of skillful diplomacy and the retention of a visible and credible military capability with the will to use military force when necessary.

The goal of the U.S. leadership should be, at a minimum, to manage a dangerous world with the assistance of other nations, the U.N., regional organizations, and our alliances. At the core, our objectives should be to support democracy and freedom where we can, to further human rights wherever possible, promote free market economic principals and practice in other countries, seek the free movement of goods and services between nations, and to punish aggression when it occurs.

Our ability to achieve success in these areas will depend on a strong military capability, acting with great diplomacy under national consensus on our national interests. There are a number of flashpoints around the world that await the new administration. The U.S. responses to some of them such as Somalia are proceeding well. Other situations such as Iraq, which require military action in response to repeated violations, provocations, and the flouting of U.N. resolutions. Still others, such as the Middle East peace process, will require a jump start to maintain momentum in that troubled part of the world.

The crises in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union, however, merit special attention. If either is allowed to deteriorate further we could face threats to our security, our prospects for economic growth, our ability to create jobs, and our capacity to rebuild our human and physical infrastructure here at home.

Bosnia could be a major national security crisis for the new administration. I believe we need to be much more bold in our efforts. I believe the future of Europe is at stake in Bosnia. Already, the problems in Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia are ricocheting around the Balkans and Europe. Expansion of the Bosnian conflict to Kosovo or the Sandzak region of Serbia and to Macedonia and beyond is a strong possibility. It is best to act now to contain the conflict and forestall further genocidal behavior. The moral imperative and the security imperative both cry out for action.

Regrettably, I do not believe it will be an acceptable or lasting resolution of the Bosnian crisis short of outside military intervention. As heroic as the peace efforts of Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen have been in Geneva, I am pessimistic their efforts would lead to a just settlement in Bosnia. For this reason, I support enforcement

of the no-fly zone over Bosnia, the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia, preparations for war-related trials for those responsible for genocide, the destruction of heavy weapons in Bosnia by airstrikes, and a NATO-led plan to deploy substantial ground forces in Bosnia for the purpose of imposing law and order and ensuring the safe return of refugees.

A failure to introduce sufficient military force into the Bosnian equation will, I fear, prolong the agony and allow the conflict there to grow and to threaten our national security interests. A great threat to the United States and our allies still exists in the thousands of nuclear warheads mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. They are still aimed at the United States, still capable of being launched without warning against our cities and our people. The threat of a surprise attack may be at a historic low point, but an unauthorized launch or nuclear accident is distinctly possible because of the decomposition of the former Soviet Union which resulted in four, not one, nuclear states.

Each of these states faces severe economic, political, and ethnic strains which can undermine effective centralized control over its nuclear weapons or the safety of the nuclear reactors. No less ominous is the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear technology and materials, and know-how. Many of the nations hostile toward the United States are also among the most aggressive in seeking nuclear technology or weapons themselves.

The current administration has been active in providing humanitarian and technical assistance and in establishing diplomatic missions in the former Soviet states. We need to integrate all aspects of our policy toward the former Soviet Union. We need to do so without delay. Integration would include, for example, the appointment of a high-level coordinator to pull together official and non-governmental efforts into a cohesive strategy for policy coordination and implementation.

Our main goals must be the safe dismantling and destruction of strategic nuclear weapons, ratification of START I, adherence to the nonproliferation treaty by all parties, and the prompt review by the Senate of the START II Treaty. But coupled with these priorities, we should assist in the building of democratic institutions and practices, the strengthening of civilian control over the military, and the promotion of economic stabilization and reform.

We should also provide direct assistance to such critical areas as energy, housing, and defense conversion. Wherever possible, we should use our moral authority to ease ethnic tensions and conflicts. Much of this will require beefed-up embassies in the new states of the former Soviet Union. We have a historic opportunity which requires a comparatively small investment to ensure that our children and grandchildren will not be confronted with a nuclear threat from the territory of the Soviet Union. This imperative lies at the core of our vital national security interests and should be placed at the top of our list of national priorities.

Finally, I predict that our domestic economic growth and prosperity will be enhanced substantially by the successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round and by the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]. Both will ensure great-

er wealth among nations and for ourselves. I would hope that a successful NAFTA agreement would be coupled with a free trade momentum already underway and the Central American Common Market and the MERCOSUR in the southern cone countries of South America.

I support retention of the fast track negotiating procedure, and I would be remiss if I did not also mention that greater emphasis should be given to our Pacific rim trade partners. We must work to open their markets as we address more vigorously the changing security environment of the region, with certainty of continued American presence. I hope that these thoughts correspond closely with those of the new administration.

Once again, Mr. Christopher, I welcome you to the committee. I look forward to your statement and your responses to our questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. You are going to be a bit surprised here today. For example, you are going to be surprised that Senator Lugar suggested that he hopes the administration's thoughts and concerns parallel his. It may hurt his reputation, but mine parallel his, and I think you will find some unholy political alliances here, but that is good.

You will also, I suspect, Mr. Secretary, hear a lot of questions about things that occurred 20 years ago, 30 years ago, and God only knows how many years ago. That is legitimate, but your recollection and my recollection coincide.

I was here on the Foreign Relations Committee and on the Intelligence Committee at the time when questions were raised about October Surprise and about your role as a deputy in the Attorney General's office back in the bad old days or the good old days, depending on one's perspective. And I am here to tell you, although I think these are legitimate questions to raise, I do not have any concern about them; my recollection has been refreshed by my staff and records.

But I do have serious concerns, as I expressed to you when you were kind enough to come by my office, about what the Clinton administration's foreign policy will be, what the so-called new world order will look like.

As you and I have discussed, I believe the new administration faces two overarching imperatives: to revitalize the American economy and to foster the creation of a new world order. Neither task can be neglected or postponed, but must be pursued with equal energy.

You know that my own concept for shaping a new world order has four components. The first—cementing the Democratic foundation—means promoting democracy everywhere we can, but especially among the major powers.

Our first priority must be the former members of the Warsaw Pact. American national security interests depend on the survival and success of Russian democracy. Investing wisely in Russian democracy is investing in American security. We should also, I believe, promote democracy in China through a powerful and proven

weapon: "freedom broadcasting," as mandated by the legislation this committee approved last fall.

The second leg is forging a new strategy of containment. It means empowering multilateral agencies and regimes to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must direct this containment strategy not against a particular nation or ideology, but against a pernicious technological threat. To pursue this strategy will require reorganizing our own Government to give proliferation a priority that this threat demands.

Third—organizing for collective security—means strengthening the U.N. by assigning to the Security Council certain predesignated military forces and facilities: a conception unanimously endorsed by this committee last October. It also means converting NATO into a military instrument for peacekeeping, and peacemaking, under U.N. or CSCE auspices.

Collective security, a multinational commitment to repel aggression and defend the peace, was the central precept of Woodrow Wilson's vision. Wilson recognized it as a principle so essential to world order that he would not yield it in the fight over the ratification of the Versailles Treaty. It is the principle that the Senate finally accepted in 1949 with the advent of NATO, though it took the carnage of the Second World War to prove Wilson right. And it is that principle we must now extend, by empowering the U.N. and transforming the Atlantic alliance.

Fourth, launching an economic-environmental revolution, means protecting and perfecting the free trade regime by completing the new GATT agreement, and then acting to reorient the world economy to environmentally sound methods of production and consumption. And I would point out that I think that Governor Clinton is off to a good start with his meeting with President Salinas by indicating that NAFTA must, in fact, better embody that environmentally sound notion than it currently does.

Today we stand at the threshold of this new world order. I believe the people and governments, in growing numbers worldwide, recognize what needs to be done. And I believe the American people are prepared to see the United States take the lead in engineering sweeping, visionary change.

Americans recognize their interest in supporting democracy in Russia and elsewhere, stopping proliferation, protecting the global environment, and preventing tragedies like Bosnia that offend American values and imperil world stability. Americans see the need to meet these challenges. Meeting them will be the historic foreign policy mission awaiting the Clinton administration and if confirmed, the monumental task with which you will be entrusted.

Mr. Secretary, the Clinton administration advances a compelling vision for a new world and begins the necessary transformation of our international institutions to meet the demands of that new world. I believe you can expect Congress to support you energetically and enthusiastically on both sides of the aisle. I sincerely urge you, as I did in our private meeting, to be bold. I sincerely urge you to suggest to the President of United States, when confirmed, that this is not a time for timidity, this is a time for bold vision.

Without U.S. world leadership, I think there is no real possibility of putting together a new world order that bodes well for our children and our grandchildren.

And I thank the chairman for his indulgence. I thank you and I thank you, Senator Boxer, for being here to introduce the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christopher, welcome and congratulations. You bring an impressive set of credentials, and there certainly is no one who better understands the responsibilities that you face. I have high regard for your integrity and your discretion, which I think are key essentials to negotiating and management skills. And your reputation that precedes you certainly has acknowledged your commitment to diplomacy, and I would also add a high respect and regard for our foreign service, which I share.

Foreign policy captured little attention during the campaign. In fact, everybody really tried to avoid it in some ways. And as a result, I think we are ever more perplexed about the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the continuing crisis in Russia.

The President-elect has promised to focus like a laser on the economy and our domestic problems. No one would dispute the importance of our domestic priorities, but we are also, I think, keenly aware of the close connection between our domestic concerns and world events. Whether it is the slowdown in the global economy, which certainly affects American jobs, or an upheaval abroad that could affect our security, I think we have an enormous stake in maintaining our role as a world leader, which has already been spoken to and which I know you well understand.

However, the challenge since the cold war to providing leadership becomes ever more difficult and intricate, and there are days, I think, that we must feel that the world has been made safe for mayhem, as we review the trouble spots around the world. But for 40-some years, the consensus that pulled the world together within a framework was, of course, the containment of communism.

And now in this new era, as we search for new markers, I guess that I would like to hear you address, as we go from trouble spot to trouble spot, whether we will have to just adjust to ad hoc policy or whether there is some single theme, some guiding principles that we can put before us. I believe that for us to benefit from the many changes taking place, that we as a Nation must have a strong sense of identity and direction, and I look forward to reviewing this with you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief because I am anxious to hear Mr. Christopher's statement to the committee and then to have the opportunity to engage in an exchange of views with him. But I do want to say I am very pleased to join my colleagues in welcoming Warren Christopher back before this committee.

Warren Christopher is well equipped by experience, by background, by personal disposition, to give direction and substance to our Nation's foreign policy. The world we face is not one in which public pronouncements will, like some magic wand, wave the prob-

lems away. It is a world that requires skillful diplomacy and negotiating skills to bring adversaries to the table of peace. It is a world that requires a new view and a broad understanding of the role of national and international institutions to deal with the world as it is now, and not with the world as it was.

You have demonstrated throughout your career great skill in dealing with seemingly intractable problems or crises. Time and again your determination, patience, and wise judgment have moved people to solutions. I have great confidence that the interests of this Nation will be well served by your leadership at the Department of State, and I look forward to working with you in the years ahead.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. I welcome you here and look forward to hearing from you. I am very interested in hearing your views on the U.N., which I think will play a key role in American foreign policy objectives. I am a strong supporter of the U.N., but I have been a critic of its organization. I think it needs an inspector general, which Boutros Boutros-Ghali has resisted, as well as some internal reforms.

Also, I think that the U.N. troops must fight and do their job. U.N. troops are afraid of getting shot at in some areas. In Cambodia they are staying in their barracks, 17,000 of them. In Somalia we had paid to train three battalions, one from Nigeria, one from Belgium, and one from Egypt, and they did not carry out the functions they are supposed to.

So the point I am making is I think that we have to have some burden sharing here. The United States cannot do everything. The American taxpayer cannot do everything. We already are paying the U.N. a good portion of the peacekeeping—about a third of that, to train soldiers and to have them available for deployment.

I also have questioned our involvement in Somalia in terms of the cost and in terms of priorities. Everybody wants to help people get food, but there are so many other priorities on our lists and we already had paid U.N. troops to do that, and I will be asking you specific questions about that.

Finally, I am very interested in the subject of agricultural trade as it affects GATT. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariff Treaties have been held up because of a dispute over agricultural subsidies in Europe. Europe has refused to lower those subsidies. We have lowered some of ours, and I have been one of those who supports fair play when it comes to agricultural trade, which is a key part of GATT.

The State Department plays a big role in agricultural trade, and I am always worried that some morning I am going to wake up and agriculture will be dropped quietly from the GATT negotiations and the American farmer will be left to compete unfairly. We all have to remember that agricultural products are our biggest export in this country, and it is something that the State Department plays a key role in. I know that the U.S. Trade Ambassador's Office does and the Agriculture Department does, but the State Department also plays a key role in that.

And this committee can play a role also, because all trade treaties come through this committee. If we ever have a major trade treaty during this 103d Congress, it will be before this committee. But I think that firmness on the part of the State Department and this administration to stick to a free and fair trade policy, as I feel Carla Hills did on agricultural trade, will be very important.

I welcome you here and I look forward to hearing your views.

[The prepared statement of Senator Pressler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRESSLER

Let me begin by thanking the Chairman for calling these hearings and for welcoming Mr. Christopher to the Committee this morning. With the collapse of Soviet-style communism, an end to the Cold War, and the opening of free market economies in many formerly state-run countries, a new global order has emerged with the United States as the preeminent power. In this dynamic, unfolding global drama, the role the United States plays in current international struggles will set a precedent for future U.S. actions. This is true whether the United States opts to play the lead role as the head of a global police force or to take a supporting role as an interested, morally-obliged deputy.

The current role chosen by the United States in providing aid to Somalia, for example, certainly will influence future U.S. involvement on the international stage. And if this role is continued by the Clinton Administration, it will be an international precedent with serious domestic implications. With a huge federal budget deficit, serious small city and urban problems, senior citizen concerns, and countless other domestic needs, our leaders should be cautious in their international commitments. Unless the United States strongly stand urges other capable nations to assist with global projects, the world stage will be set for the United States to continue taking primary, if not full economic responsibility in future world crises.

In recent letters to President Bush and President-Elect Clinton, I have urged them to call for a stronger European and Japanese presence in managing global conflicts. The United States, although it remains the world's sole superpower, no longer should be held responsible for providing the bulk of financial and military assistance to the world's war-torn regions. Japan, the rich oil producing countries, and the wealthy European nations also are fully capable of providing assistance for the troubled regions of the world. They, too, have a moral obligation to lead in a global war against hunger, disease, and tyranny.

In the days ahead, Mr. Christopher and President-Elect Clinton may establish new precedents for future efforts to alleviate the plagues of violence and famine. I would advise the Administration to establish two guidelines: First, remain cautious about making world commitments; and second, future commitments should be based on a multinational strategy. Can the United States really afford to accept far more than its proportionate share of world responsibilities? What is our fair share of these burdens? With an agenda focused heavily on our domestic affairs, the Clinton Administration must be ready to answer this question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me join, Mr. Christopher, in welcoming you to the committee this morning and congratulating you and President-elect Clinton for, in his case, the nomination and yours for accepting the nomination. It has been said, I know, by others here this morning. This is a unique opportunity.

I mentioned to you the other day, Dean Acheson in his autobiography entitled *Present at the Creation*, describing the events in the immediately postwar—World War II period. And I suspect at some future point you may decide to engage in that same activity of describing the events of your life, which have been momentous up to now, and certainly these next 4 years will offer you incredible new opportunities.

But in many ways we are all present at a new creation, and this is a tremendous opportunity for this country to help rewrite the

rules of international law. We are confronted as we speak here this morning with challenges to that in the Middle East and elsewhere.

So I am very excited about your nomination. I think the President chose wisely and I pledge to you, as I am sure my colleagues who are here this morning, if they have not already, to be cooperative and supportive in helping conduct the foreign policy of this country in the coming 4 years. So I welcome you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DODD

Mr. Christopher, I too would like to welcome you here this morning and to wish you well in your upcoming assignment. Your selection and the selection of the other cabinet appointments give me great confidence that the Clinton Presidency will be an outstanding one.

Like many of my colleagues, I had an opportunity to chat with you last week about some of my interests and concerns as we look to the coming year. As I indicated to you at that time, I think that President-elect Clinton takes office at a terribly propitious point in world history.

The old world order—that bipolar balancing act of two largely hostile superpowers that kept things more or less on a predictable course—has dissolved. And, its most well known icons—the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—have now all been relegated to museum displays or the pages of diplomatic history books.

What is not yet clear is what's to replace the old order. Things are clearly in flux * * * in Russia and the other former Soviet Republics * * * in what was once Yugoslavia. That state of flux is clearly a threat to international peace and order. Let's face it, there are some pretty terrible things going on around the world today—actions that defy the imagination—ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tribal warfare and outright looting in Somalia while an entire nation starves to death, Iraqi acts of genocide against its Kurdish minority.

We clearly need a new world order to deal with these unspeakable acts. The starting point for constructing that new order is for the new administration to restore confidence in U.S. adherence to internationally-accepted legal norms. Such confidence is absolutely essential if we and the community of nations are to build a more stable international order: one that is based upon the observance and enforcement of the rule of law, rather than the possibility of nuclear annihilation.

To make that happen will require, among other things, that the new administration work to strengthen international institutions that can then act as impartial guardians of this new world order. While I know that none of us wants to dwell upon past grievances against the last two administrations, the fact remains that U.S. policy during the 1980's gave short shrift to international legal standards. Be it the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, the abdication of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Iran-Contra, advocacy of international kidnapping as part of the law enforcement process, Iraq-gate, government negligence and/or complicity in the BCCI and BNL (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) scandals, or most recently the politicization of the State Department in the so called passport-gate scandal * * * each of these events robbed us of the moral authority to be the standard-bearer of the rule of law internationally.

With your leadership, the new administration is poised to change that unfortunate perception and to give some shape and coherence to the world in which we live.

As part of that * * * as I mentioned to you when we talked last week * * * despite opposition in the past by the Bush Administration, I am firmly convinced that the time is particularly auspicious for the United States to call for the establishment of a permanent international crimes tribunal. Such a body could act as the forum for bringing international criminals to justice * * * perpetrators of war crimes, international narcotics traffickers, international terrorists. Such an international court could provide a uniform mechanism to address such criminals whose crimes transcend borders or require the coordinated effort of more than one nation to prosecute. Recent events suggest that a crimes tribunal is a critical element to restoring and maintaining the international rule of law.

Establishing a new tribunal is only one component of the international foundation that will be needed to act as the strong underpinnings of this new world order. So too, the Clinton administration will need to continue the initiatives undertaken during the Bush administration to make international bodies such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States truly function as their founders envi-

sioned they would. This will entail working with friends and allies around the world to encourage their active participation in these organizations, as well as their commitment to provide adequate resources to them so that they can effectively carry out their mandates.

As we discussed the other day, Mr. Christopher, here is an opportunity to be "present at the creation" * * * present at the creation of a new world order * * *. I am confident that you and your colleagues in the Clinton Administration will make the most of this opportunity. If President Clinton can look back on his first term in office having accomplished these foreign policy objectives, he will have served our nation and other nations of the world well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. And now I would like to recognize Senator Coverdell and also welcome him to the committee and look forward to working with him. Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too welcome you, Mr. Christopher, to your appearance before the committee. As the former Director of the U.S. Peace Corps, I once sat in the chair you occupy for my confirmation hearing, and I must say I have great empathy for your task.

As others have noted, the world has changed dramatically since you last served the State Department. For over half a century our country has led the fight in the cold war. Presidents Reagan and Bush and their intensified efforts certainly helped bring the cold war to a close. We enter a period of redefinition, much of which will fall on your watch. Now it is your task to devise and carry out a foreign policy to keep America strong and protect our interests.

I cannot think of a more exciting change in the world than the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of the world, and the former Soviet Union. America fought hard to end Communist tyranny and we will have to work just as hard to ensure that the new democracies succeed. You are familiar with the obstacles to stability and prosperity in these new democracies. I urge you to be attentive to these countries and to be attentive to their struggles.

I also hope you will encourage our world allies to accept their fair share of the responsibility of nurturing the development of democracies and free markets in these countries. The days are gone when the United States could shoulder the burden alone. We simply do not have the money. Massive foreign aid programs may well become a thing of the past, and in any event the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are just too large and their problems are simply too difficult to solve with cash infusions.

We need to find creative ways to empower the people and their institutions. We need to help them learn how to run businesses and work efficiently. These are the keys to independence and self-sufficiency. The last thing we want is to cause these countries to become dependent upon grants, handouts, et cetera.

I know something about the way to empower people through my work at the Peace Corps. I look forward to assisting you in any way possible to help these countries become free and prosperous, but the American people expect the Clinton administration and the Congress to accomplish this in a cost-effective way.

President Kennedy established both the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development. The Peace Corps is based on the spirit of volunteerism and enjoys broad support across

America. Of course, it has, on this committee, a former distinguished volunteer in Senator Dodd and the original staff in Senator Wofford.

But I must tell you that few of my friends in Dalton, Waycross, Gainesville, and Atlanta support the kind of handouts that have characterized our foreign aid efforts for decades. I believe it is time to take a hard look at our foreign aid programs. The end of the cold war presents us with a golden opportunity to reexamine our foreign policy, including foreign aid.

Again, I am eager and I am sure this committee is ready to work with you. And I must mention in conclusion that, of course, the centennial Olympiad will occur in Atlanta in 1996, the summer games, and I am sure that that will bring about and cause considerable work and cooperation between this office and this committee and the State Department.

So, again, I welcome you today. I look forward to hearing how the administration plans to tackle these tough challenges that face us and your vision of America's place in the new world. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it occurs to me that enduring our opening statements is the first test of your diplomatic patience and presence. But in all seriousness, I think that, as you well recognize, this committee shares considerable power and license in the formation and implementation of our foreign policy. So I think it is an important tradition and also an important part of the dialog to lay down, if you will, some markers of our sense of the challenges that you face and also our view of these issues.

I would begin by joining colleagues in expressing my admiration for you personally, for your prior service, and my deep confidence in your capacity to meet the challenges that have been defined by other colleagues. As all of us know, you could well have been chosen to fill any one of several jobs in this administration, all at the highest level. I think most of us are pleased that you were chosen to fill this one, because in many ways I think we share a belief that this is the best match, that this is the right place for you and the appropriate time.

I would simply like to observe, Mr. Secretary, that you are accepting this job, and there is no question that you will be confirmed for it, at a time when this country is in many ways more inward looking than at any time in recent memory. There is a strong and growing vein of sentiment within this country, that you are well aware of, that simply does not want to see American dollars or American servicemen heading overseas for almost any reason, no matter how noble or urgent the cause may seem to appear.

And we have traditionally, in our history, recognized this tension as to involvement abroad. There is an increasing mood that says let us take care of our problems here at home, let us get our own house in order, let us leave the role of global samaritan or global risk taker to somebody else or at or least look for greater sharing in that process.

I do not think any of us have to spell out the reasons for this. The President-elect made it very clear with his sign in the course of the campaign: "it's the economy, stupid." And all of us under-

stand that the fear people feel about the loss of jobs, about the future, is exacerbating this. So there is this rightful expression, both rightful by virtue of the priority and the rationale for it, people want to face the problems here.

I think everyone on this committee, and you have heard it in the prior opening statements, feels very very strongly, as do many members of the U.S. Congress, that neither our history nor our character nor, most importantly, our self-interest will allow us to withdraw from the center stage of global, political, and economic life.

And I think that we are going to have a very special task—you, the administration, this committee, and the Congress and the media and others—to try to define to the American people accurately and compellingly why it is that it is not in our self-interest to turn our backs on the world and to try to overcome this enormous growing reluctance to look outwards.

In many ways it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, and I think you share this from the conversation that we had previously, that there is really no more immediate or local issue than whether or not the sons and daughters of this country may have to go abroad to stop a madman in the Middle East, or whether or not we are going to find ourselves in a couple of years making huge new expenditures because of a new arms race or because we did not respond adequately, as Senator Biden mentioned and Senator Lugar mentioned, to the challenges of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

In addition, it seems to me there is no greater local issue than whether or not our children are going to grow up in a world where there is a respect for the concept of nonviolence. Where there is a uniformity of nations standing up against anarchy and chaos, and one that is respectful of the law and not contemptuous of it.

So for these and other reasons, Mr. Secretary, the world is obviously watching what you are going to say today with great interest. But much more importantly, they will be watching the early days of the administration as we form this partnership and try to communicate these urgent needs to the country.

For my part, Mr. Secretary, I would just say very quickly, I am confident that you and the administration are going to show steadfastness where it is needed. I am confident you will be steadfast on Iraq. I am confident in Somalia, in arms control negotiations, and in the pursuit of Middle East peace.

But the question does loom large. Where will there be change with this new President and new administration? And I would like simply to say that it is my hope that you will respond to some places where there is an urgent need for change.

First of all, I think many of us would like to see a much higher priority placed on environmental protection, and a recognition of the growing relationship between development and economics and the need for world leadership in that area.

Second, a speedier, steadier, more principled commitment to democracy and human rights consistent with our own principles and our own record.

And third, and perhaps most critical in the implementation of both of those former priorities, and it has been mentioned by col-

leagues, but I reiterate it, an all-out effort to strengthen international institutions in ways that will render them truly effective.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is obvious that it is partly the failure of existing international institutions that has left us negotiating to reward, not punish, Serbian aggression, and atrocities, and has left a collection of thugs and drug runners exercising real power in Haiti, and that has left the peacekeeping effort in Cambodia at least partially hostage to the Khmer Rouge.

So the question of the future for this committee, and for you, and for the Nation is how amid this tumult and chaos and change we will be able to keep our bearings, and whether we will lead the international community in the effort to establish those priorities that at least this Senator believes must be at the top of the international agenda as we face this obvious moment of change and transition.

I welcome your nomination, and look forward to working with you, and look forward to your comments on these areas and others in the course of this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Simon?

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our new colleagues from Tennessee and Wisconsin and Georgia. I think you will find service on this committee stimulating.

The President has made a superb appointment in choosing Warren Christopher, and I am pleased that Warren Christopher made the decision to accept the President-elect's request. I have conveyed privately to the Secretary-designate my concerns. I will be getting into them in the question period. It will not be a great disappointment to him that I do not have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor to me. Thank you very much. [Laughter.] Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that precedent established, Mr. Secretary, you may be pleased to know at the conclusion of almost 1 hour, we are going to have an opportunity to hear from you.

I join my colleagues in welcoming you to this committee, welcoming you to the post. All of us have had an opportunity to visit with you personally, even in recent days prior to this appearance, and will have an opportunity to engage in a dialog to follow.

But I will conclude, yield any time remaining, in hopes that we might hear from you soon, and to continue the precedent established by my good friend from Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Wofford?

Senator WOFFORD. Mr. Chairman, last year Senator Lugar and I were asked to write articles on what the new Secretary of State should do, for Foreign Policy magazine. We were not too far apart, but it seems to me all you really have to do is read our two pieces and then do what we say. [Laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. Even when it is contradictory. [Laughter.]

Senator WOFFORD. A little while ago, a kindly newspaper said of me that I had a record of integrity for 30 years, which left 36 years in doubt. I realized, looking back, that I have known, respected,

and admired you for at least 30 years. And I cannot think of a better Secretary of State for this new era.

You have good judgment, unshakable steadfastness, foresight, farsightedness, which is to say vision, and I look forward to getting a little of all of these from you this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And I would like to welcome Senator Feingold and Senator Mathews to our committee, new members on the Democratic side. I look forward to working with you through the coming period of time. Senator Feingold?

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. As I am the first Wisconsin Senator for 30 years to serve on the Foreign Relations Committee, I am going to say a word or two, and welcome you, and say thank you to the chairman and members of the committee. I am delighted to be here today as a new member of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee. I join in welcoming Mr. Christopher, the distinguished nominee.

These hearings are providing me not only with an opportunity to pose questions to the nominee, but also to listen to my colleagues on the committee as they inquire into a broad range of issues of paramount importance to our country around the globe.

As I prepared for the hearing I, like everyone else, has been struck by the enormous challenges that lie ahead in the foreign policy field in a very changing world. For nearly 50 years, American foreign policy has had a single defining principle—to contain the Soviet Union's threat to world peace and America's vital interests.

This doctrine, which helped to separate the world quite simply into friend and foe, dominated our foreign policy, determined the development and deployment of weapons systems, and in some ways, most importantly to me, dictated to an inordinate degree our Federal spending priorities.

Today, the world has changed, as everyone has pointed out. We won the cold war but now we face a new set of challenges, new threats to world peace and stability. But these changes provide an extraordinary opportunity to find a new foreign policy and defense strategy; an opportunity to do some forward thinking about what America's international role should be in today's world, not yesterday's.

So, I look forward to working with the members of this committee and the new administration in developing new approaches to meet the new challenges.

The only other thing I would like to just briefly say is that I'm going to stress here a perspective that I intend to take in this committee and every opportunity that I have in my work in the Senate. There is a challenge to our way of life in this country that is as dangerous as armed conflict. It is the Federal deficit, the weaknesses in our educational system, and our economic deterioration.

America's strength abroad is measured by our strength at home. We have got to find ways to bring down the Federal deficit so that we can make the investments in this country that need to be done.

Reducing the Federal deficit is the issue that my constituents in Wisconsin raise with me most often. In order to reduce the deficit, we have got to look at the every line in the Federal budget to determine where savings or efficiencies can be achieved.

I know that foreign assistance in international programs and expenditures represent a relatively small portion of that budget. But we are going to have to do everything we can to identify places where savings can be achieved. That means eliminating waste and duplication wherever possible, and in some cases cutting back on otherwise worthy programs that we simply cannot afford at this time.

I, too, really look forward to working with you, and look forward to supporting your nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Welcome to Senator Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the risk of leaving the South without a voice in the opening statement, I too am going to choose to pass up the opportunity to make a statement this morning.

Rather, I would I like to take just a moment and congratulate the President on his choice of a person to fill this distinguished post. It appears to me, as a freshman, that over a period of time we have been rewriting the history in the world. Without question we are going to have new challenges, and we are going to have difficult tasks facing this country and this committee.

And it is for this reason that I am glad that at the time in history, at this time that we begin a new administration, that President Clinton has chosen a person—an individual with experience, with a steady hand, Warren Christopher, to lead us in this department.

I look forward, Mr. Secretary, to working with you and supporting you as you lead our Nation in this difficult time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mathews. And now, we would welcome the Secretary of State-designate, and look forward to hearing his statement. Secretary-designate, Mr. Christopher.

STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER OF CALIFORNIA, NOMINEE FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a great honor to appear before you today as President-elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room, I cannot help but feel, is a long ways from Scranton, ND, population 300, where I was born and raised. I must say I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances.

Looking at the members of the committee, I recall how much you have contributed by way of leadership and wisdom to the Nation's foreign policy over the past decade. And that makes me especially pleased and touched by your remarks here this morning which have been exceedingly generous.

Let me say at the outset that I look forward to establishing a close and cooperative relationship with each of you. I also look forward to your questions, and will answer them with the ruthless candor the diplomats are famous for. [Laughter.]

In the 3 weeks since I have been nominated by President-elect Clinton, I have received about as much commiseration as I have congratulations. Friends point to the new world's raw conflicts and

stress our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an important but unpleasant assignment. I appreciate their concern, but frankly I dispute their assessment.

I believe we have reached a uniquely promising moment in the history of our country. The signature of this era is change, and I believe that many of the changes are favorable ones. The cold war is over; 40 years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free.

The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of prosperity all over the world. The nuclear nightmare is receding. And in this connection, I particularly want to congratulate President Bush and President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II Treaty. We now have the opportunity to create a new strategy to direct America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation.

Neither President Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the cold war has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long simmering conflicts. The bloody results are evident in Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia, and many other places. Nor will this era lack for its ruthless and expansionist despots. Saddam Hussein confirms that fact almost every day.

And it is also true that we are now relatively more powerful, and physically more secure than before.

So, while we must be alert to the era's dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of considerable optimism.

Not since the late 1940's has our Nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed. Like our counterparts, we need to design a new strategy for protecting American interests around the world by laying the foundations for a more just and a more stable world.

That strategy must take into account and reflect the fundamental changes that have been made in the world in recent times. These include: the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc; the globalization of commerce and capital; a worldwide democratic revolution fueled by new information technologies that amplify the power of ideas; new and old human rights challenges including protecting ethnic minorities as well as political dissidents; the rise of new security threats, especially terrorism, and the spread of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and global challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees, AIDS, drug trafficking, and other threats to the world's environment.

To adapt our foreign policy and institutions to these changes, President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three pillars. First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges. And third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the spread of democracy and free markets abroad.

As we adapt to these new conditions, it's worth underscoring the essential continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change of administration, our policy in many instances will remain constant, and will be built on the accomplishments, considerable accomplishments of our predecessors.

Examples of this include the Middle East peace process, firm enforcement of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty, and the continuing need for U.S. power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the Pacific.

Mr. Chairman, if I could depart from my text for just a moment, with the committee's permission I would like to add a few words to my prepared testimony.

Iraq continues to violate U.N. security resolutions, and test the will and strength of the international community. I say with great determination Saddam Hussein should not doubt for a second that we, the incoming administration, will meet that test. President Clinton will insist upon the unconditional compliance with the U.N. resolutions. We have repeatedly made it clear that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the current administration in our determination to make sure that Saddam Hussein does not miscalculate America's resolve again.

I thought I would go outside my text this morning, Mr. Chairman, because of the determination that I have, and I know President Clinton has, on this issue.

Even though there is much continuity in our foreign policy, nevertheless, our administration, our new administration, inherits the task of defining a strategy for U.S. leadership after the cold war. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply manage them.

Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can help diffuse political conflicts, and our support for sustainable development and global environmental protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale that demanded our intervention, for example in Somalia. We cannot foresee every crisis in the world, but I strongly believe that preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort to facing problems here at home.

It is not enough, Mr. Chairman, to articulate a new strategy. We must justify it to the American people. Today, foreign policymakers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that then the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal of containing the Soviet Union's power will have to be replaced by more complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that in this new era, foreign policy is no longer foreign.

Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget that their ultimate purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume that foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a very costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-Contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies hatched by experts without proper candor, and without proper consultation with the public and their representatives.

More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have clientitis—a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I long thought the State Department needs an American desk, and this administration will have one, and I will be sitting right behind it.

I will not attempt, Mr. Chairman, to try to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the straitjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet America's actions must be dictated by consistent principles. And as I have noted before, there are three that should guide foreign policy in this new era.

First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy and resourcefulness that was devoted to waging the cold war. The new administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower American firms and workers to win in world trade markets, to reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and to increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments.

Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trading power, its largest market, and its largest exporter. That is why we must utilize all of the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT agreement and a new North American Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of American firms, workers, farmers, and communities.

In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for U.S. business to expanding global markets. This does not mean that commercial goals will trump our other important concerns like non-proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the Third World, but for too long we have made economics the poor cousin of our foreign policy, and we will stop doing that.

For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc, nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of great growth, we have for years assigned only one foreign service officer to assist U.S. companies. In the case of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million. Other economic powers, German and Japan for example, devote far more personnel to promoting their firms, their industries, and their economic concerns.

The Clinton administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be bashful about linking our high diplomatic goals with our economic goals. We will ask missions to do more to gather crucial information about market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad.

Second, Mr. Chairman, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late 1970's under President Carter and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our administration fortunately inherits the best fighting force in the world.

But the world is changed and we face a paradox. The collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our cold war military forces, but it also leaves American forces as the main ballast in an unstable and dangerous world.

Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of international relations will depend upon a tenacious diplomacy

backed by credible strength. President-elect Clinton and Secretary-designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed forces to new missions.

I agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win.

As you all know and some of you have acknowledged this morning, I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving, from the effort to secure the release of the hostages in Iran to responses to urban unrest and police brutality, to the practice of law over four decades.

I have argued and still believe that diplomacy is a neglected imperative. I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and forms of international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world.

Mr. Chairman, I also know from experience, that nations do not negotiate on the basis of goodwill alone. They negotiate on the basis of their interests, and therefore on the basis of the calculations of power.

As I reflect on our experience in the cold war, it is clear that our success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power together, both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for arms control, both the advocacy of human rights and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansion.

In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about the use of force, decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions and cases of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces; for purposes such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, evacuation of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism.

While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances, and its credible threat in general, will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy.

And although there will be differences at the margins, I believe we can and must craft a bipartisan consensus in which those questions concerning the use of force will no longer divide our Nation as they have in the past.

That being said, I also want to say that we cannot respond ourselves to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for the use of the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis around the globe become a choice between inaction or American intervention. It will be our administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the U.N., to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and to keep the peace. In that regard, we will work with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, and members of the Security Council of the U.N., to ensure that they have the means to carry out their tasks.

The U.N. has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security, in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the U.N. cannot be an

effective instrument for sharing global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. And I work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations at the U.N.

Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve our option to act alone. As President-elect Clinton has said, our motto in this era should be together where we can, on our own where we must.

One of the main security problems in this era that I know this committee has been very much aware of is the proliferation of very deadly weapons—nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weapons as well as their delivery systems. The Gulf war has highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or using weapons of mass destruction.

We must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall, this administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period.

Third, Mr. Chairman, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy that is transforming the world. Promoting democracy, of course, does not imply a crusade to make the world exactly in our own image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central tenet of our efforts to improve our own security.

Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also much more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a peaceful manner. And they are also much more likely to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection.

A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate all of our leverage. Such elements as trade, economic and security assistance, and debt relief, must all be used in the promotion of democracy. By enlisting international and regional institutions in the work of promoting democracy, the United States can leverage its own limited resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate others.

In the information age, we will support the creation of Radio Free Asia that Senator Biden spoke about, to ensure that the people of all Asian nations will have access to uncensored information about their societies and about the world.

Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down, but must be built from the bottom up. Our policies should be to encourage patient, sustained efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible—political parties, free media, laws that protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations that stand between the individual and the state.

As we look at Eastern Europe, we recognize how essential these institutions are. American, private and civic groups are particularly well-suited to help in this regard. We will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact with the grassroots democratic leaders in foreign countries, and to also strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy.

We simply must improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets. To that end, as has been noted by some Senators here this morning, we need to overhaul the Agency for International Development. That agency needs to take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bureaucratic.

As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we simply must extract from AID's past successes and failures, to make it stronger in the future.

In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out the Nation's foreign policies have the resources they need to do their job. I want to work with you, all members of the committee, to ensure that our foreign service officers and the people who serve the State Department have adequate training, facilities, information systems, and security.

We also need to take a new look at the way the State Department is organized in this area and the way our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks I would like to consult with you, and I've already begun this, about my intentions to streamline the State Department, to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries, and to improve international competitiveness of American business.

The Clinton administration will put America back in the forefront of global efforts to achieve sustainable development and in the process, leave our children a better world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a precondition to economic growth, not a brake on it. These three pillars of our foreign policy, economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy, are mutually reinforcing.

A vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad while permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs. And by helping others forge democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new markets for U.S. trade and investment.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me take just a few minutes to consider how this strategic approach applies to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990's. None of these challenges is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political institutions.

President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms stand as our very best hope of reducing the still formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, as has been referred to by some members of the committee.

These arms are in Russia and the other states of the Soviet Union and when we can reduce them, when we can feel secure that they have been reduced, this in turn permits reductions in our own defense spending.

A collapse of the Russian economy, which is in bad shape and contracted 20 percent last year, could fatally discredit democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians, but also in the eyes of their neighbors as well. Our administration will join with our G-7 part-

ners to increase support for Russia's economic reforms, support that must be conditioned on the willingness of Russia to continue the difficult, but essential steps necessary to move from a command economy to a market-oriented one.

We'll also place in our administration high priority on direct and technical assistance for Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized forces.

We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with them and that the world's experience in coping with similar problems is available to them. We should also orchestrate similar international action to help Ukraine, the other newly independent states, the Baltic, and the nations of East and Central Europe.

In Europe, we maintain our commitment to NATO, history's most successful military and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the East. Our administration will support the efforts by the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to promote human rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic reintegration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe.

I can also assure you that this administration will vigorously pursue concerted action with our allies and international bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia, a slaughter that's claimed tens of thousands of lives and threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and the world community must bring real pressure, economic and military, on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing.

In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as President Clinton stressed during the campaign, there is a complex blend of new and old forces in China that regards us to readjust our thinking.

On one hand there's a booming economy in China, based upon increasingly free markets which are giving hundreds or millions of Chinese an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic as well as political reform.

On the other hand, we simply can't ignore the continuing reports of Chinese exports, of sensitive military technology to troubled areas. We can't ignore their widespread violations of human rights. And we can't ignore their abusive practices that have contributed to a \$17 billion trade imbalance between our two nations.

Our policy will be to seek to facilitate a broad, peaceful revolution in China, from communism to democracy, by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great and highly important country.

Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific rim are becoming a global economic dynamo. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded \$316 billion, dwarfing the \$221 billion that we have with Western Europe. We must devote particular attention to Japan. Japan has recently taken important steps to begin to meet more of its international security responsibilities, examples being the assistance to our peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia and Somalia.

But now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as well, to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition. Together, Japan and the United States account for a third or more of the world's economy. That obligates both of us as nations to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and to avoid the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink the prospects for global growth.

We also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure that they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the American economy has helped Japan fuel its prosperity over many decades.

In South Korea we will continue to maintain our military presence as long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear proliferation in both Pakistan and India; restoring peace to Afghanistan; seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's democracy; and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere.

In the Middle East, we come to another very important region of great interest to all of us. We must maintain the momentum behind the current negotiations over peace and regional issues. President Bush and Secretary Baker deserve great credit for bringing the Arabs and the Israelis to the bargaining table. And the Clinton administration is committed to carrying on those negotiations, taking advantage of this historic breakthrough.

Our democracy-centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we're committed to maintain a strong and vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's unswerving commitment to Israel and Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace. We'll continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's challenges.

Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. We will maintain a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region as well, we will champion economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased respect to human right.

And following a decade in which over 1,000 Americans were killed, injured, or kidnapped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we'll give no quarter to terrorists or to the states that sponsor their crimes against humanity.

Nowhere has the march toward democracy and against dictators been more dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin America consolidate a decade of hard won progress. In the past several years, as democracy has spread and market economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend the trade agreements that have been reached with those two countries to other Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems.

At the same time, we expect to complete understandings of North America Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to make the Organization for American States [OAS] a more effective forum for addressing that region's problems.

In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the U.N. and the OAS to restore democracy in that very troubled country. In Cuba we will maintain the embargo to keep the pressure on the Castro regime. We fully support national recognition and full implementation of the peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people, and ours, from the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade.

In Africa, a new generation is demanding the opportunities from multiparty democracy and open economies. They deserve our understanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit from the continent's vast resources, to deal with its economic, social, and environmental problems, and to address its underlying causes of instability.

We will be equally committed to work with the Congress to redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable development and private enterprise in Africa. And in South Africa, we shall work actively with blacks and whites who are striving to dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with determination to build, at last, a multiracial society.

Mr. Chairman, as I said on the day that Governor Clinton nominated me to be Secretary of State, in the days when I was in law school, two of my heroes were Gen. George Marshall and Dean Acheson. I'm enormously honored, with your concurrence, to have an opportunity to occupy the post held by them and by many of the most revered names in our Nation's history.

Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized that at the dawn of the cold war America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. The triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests.

Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded on America's enduring interests. It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home.

The ultimate test of the security strategy that I've outlined will be in the benefits that it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured, not by its theoretical elegance, but by its results. If it makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if it expands the stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global environment for our children; if it achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation just as Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects discharged theirs.

They've given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the global requirements for U.S. leadership. I look forward to work-

ing with both parties in Congress and all the members of this committee to construct a new framework for that leadership, a framework within which healthy debate will occur, but within which we can build a strong bipartisan consensus that will help us cooperatively pursue the national interests at home and abroad.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christopher follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER

Mr. Chairman: It is a great honor to appear before you as President-elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room is a long way from Scranton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born and raised, and I am deeply moved by being here in these circumstances.

You and the Members of this Committee have contributed much leadership and wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade. Let me say at the outset that I look forward to a close and cooperative relationship with you. I also look forward to your questions and will try to answer them with the ruthless candor for which diplomats are famous.

In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his Secretary of State, I have received about as much commiseration as congratulation. Friends point to this new world's raw conflicts and stress our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an important but unpleasant assignment.

I appreciate their concern. But I dispute their assessment. I believe we have arrived at a uniquely promising moment. The signature of this era is change, and I believe many of the changes work in our favor. The Cold War is over. Forty years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free. The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of prosperity. The nuclear nightmare is receding—and I want to congratulate President Bush and President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II treaty. We now have the opportunity to create a new strategy that directs America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation.

Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the Cold War has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict. The bloody results are evident in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Nor will this era lack for ruthless and expansionist despots. Saddam Hussein confirmed that fact. Yet it is also true that we are now relatively more powerful and physically more secure. So while we are alert to this era's dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of optimism.

Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed. Like our counterparts then, we need to design a new strategy for protecting American interests by laying the foundations for a more just and stable world. That strategy must reflect the fundamental changes that characterize this era:

- the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc;
- the globalization of commerce and capital;
- a worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information technologies that amplify the power of ideas;
- new and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic minorities as well as political dissidents;
- the rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the spread of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction;
- and global challenges, including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees, AIDS, drug trafficking, and threats to the earth's environment.

To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes, President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three pillars: First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges. Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad.

As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change in administrations, our policy in many specific instances will remain constant and will seek to build upon the accomplishments of our predecessors. Examples include the Middle East peace process, firm enforcement of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, ratification and implementation of

the START II treaty, and the continuing need for U.S. power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the Pacific.

Nevertheless, our administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for U.S. leadership after the Cold War. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply to manage them. Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can help defuse political conflicts. And our support for sustainable development and global environmental protection can help prevent human suffering on a scale that demands our intervention. We cannot foresee every crisis. But preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort to problems facing us at home.

It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it to the American people. Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal of containing Soviet power will have to be replaced by more complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that, in this era, foreign policy is no longer foreign.

Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget their ultimate purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-Contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies, hatched by the experts, without proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in Congress.

More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have clientitis, a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I have long thought the State Department needs an "America Desk." This administration will have one—and I'll be sitting behind it.

I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the strait-jacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet America's actions in the world must be guided by consistent principles. As I have noted, I believe there are three that should guide foreign policy in this new era.

First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War. The new administration will shortly propose an economic program to empower American firms and workers to win in world markets, reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments. Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trading nation, its largest market, and its leading exporter. That is why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal including a new GATT agreement and a North American Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of American firms, workers, and communities.

In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for U.S. businesses to expanding global markets. This does not mean that our commercial goals will trump other important concerns, such as non-proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the third world. But for too long, we have made economics the poor cousin of our foreign policy. For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc—nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of growth—we have for years assigned only one foreign service officer to assist U.S. companies. In the case of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people. Other economic powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote far more personnel to promoting their firms, industries, and economic concerns.

The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be bashful about linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals. We will ask our foreign missions to do more to gather crucial information about market opportunities and barriers and actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad.

Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late 1970s by President Carter, and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our administration inherits the best fighting force in the world. But the world has changed.

We face a paradox: the collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our Cold War military forces. But it also leaves American power as the main ballast for an unstable world. Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of international relations will depend on tenacious diplomacy backed by credible strength. The President-elect and Secretary-designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed forces to new missions. And I agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that "we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win."

I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving, from the effort to secure the release of the American hostages in Iran, to responses to urban unrest and police brutality, to the practice of law over four decades. I have argued, and still believe, that diplomacy is a neglected imperative. I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and forms of international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world.

I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis of good will alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests, and therefore on calculations of power. As I reflect on our experience in the Cold War, it is clear that our success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power together—both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for arms control; both advocacy for human rights and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansionism.

In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about the use of force—decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions, and in cases of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces—purposes such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, evacuation of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terrorism. While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances—and its credible threat in general—will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy. Although there will always be differences at the margin, I believe we can—and must—craft a bipartisan consensus in which these questions concerning the use of force will no longer divide our nation as they once did.

However, we cannot respond to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention. It will be this administration's policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the peace. In that regard, we will work with Secretary General Boutros Ghali and the members of the Security Council to ensure the U.N. has the means to carry out such tasks.

The U.N. has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security—in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the U.N. cannot be an effective instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations.

Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve our option to act alone. As the President-elect has said, our motto in this era should be: "together where we can; on our own where we must."

One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation of very deadly weapons—nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weapons—as well as their delivery systems. The Gulf War highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or using weapons of mass destruction. We must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall, this administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period.

Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy that is transforming our world. Promoting democracy does not imply a crusade to remake the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic tenet in improving our own security. Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights; they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a peaceful manner, and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection.

A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate all of our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, and debt relief. By enlisting international and regional institutions in the work of promoting democracy, the U.S. can leverage our own limited resources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate others. In the information age, public diplomacy takes on special importance—and that is why we will support the creation of a Radio Free Asia to ensure that the people of all Asian nations have access to uncensored information about their societies, and about the world.

Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down, but must be built from the bottom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible: political parties, free media, laws

that protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and voluntary associations that stand between the individual and the state. American private and civic groups are particularly well suited to help. In this regard we will move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy.

We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets. To that end, we need to overhaul the Agency for International Development. The agency needs to take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract lessons from AID's past successes and failures, to make its future efforts stronger.

In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our nation's foreign policy have the resources they need to do the job. I want to work with you to ensure they have adequate facilities, training, information systems, and security. We also need to take a new look at the way our State Department is organized and our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks, I intend to streamline the Department of State to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national boundaries and to improve the international competitiveness of American business.

The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of global efforts to achieve sustainable development, and in the process, leave our children a better world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a pre-condition of economic growth, not a brake on it.

These three pillars for our foreign policy—economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy—are mutually re-enforcing. A vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad, while permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing domestic needs. And by helping others to forge democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new markets for U.S. trade and investment.

Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach applies to the principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990s. None is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political institutions. President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms stand as our best hope for reducing the still formidable arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, and this in turn permits reductions in our own defense spending. A collapse of the Russian economy, which contracted by 20 percent last year, could fatally discredit democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians, but in the eyes of their neighbors as well. Our administration will join with our G-7 partners to increase support for Russia's economic reforms. That aid must be conditioned on the willingness of Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move from a command economy to a more market-oriented one.

We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to provide civilian employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized forces. We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic nations stand with them and that the world's experience in coping with similar problems is available to them. We should also orchestrate similar international action to help Ukraine, the other Commonwealth states, the Baltics, and the nations of East and Central Europe.

In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful military and political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security arrangements that incorporate the emerging democracies to the east. Our administration will support efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic re-integration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. I can also assure you that this Administration will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies and international bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia—a slaughter that has claimed tens of thousands of lives—and that threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing.

In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as President-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend of new and old forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China. On the one hand, there is a booming economy based increasingly on free market principles, which is giving hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for economic as well as political reform. On the other hand, we cannot ig-

nore continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to troubled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have contributed to a \$17 billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great country.

Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a global center of economic dynamism. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded \$316 billion, dwarfing our \$221 billion trade with Western Europe. We must devote particular attention to Japan. Japan has recently taken important steps to meet more of its international security responsibilities, such as assisting in peacekeeping efforts from Cambodia to Somalia. Now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as well—to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition. Together, Japan and the U.S. account for a third or more of the global economy. That obligates us both to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink prospects for global growth. But we also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the U.S. economy has helped fuel Japan's prosperity over many decades.

In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear proliferation, restoring peace to Afghanistan, seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's democracy, and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere.

In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current negotiations over peace and regional issues. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker deserve great credit for bringing Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table, and the Clinton Administration is committed to building on that historic breakthrough. Our democracy-centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a strong and vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's unwavering commitment to Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace. We will continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's challenges.

Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new arms control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. We will assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region as well, we will champion economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased respect for human rights. And following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans were killed, injured, or kidnapped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we will give no quarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimes against humanity.

Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin America consolidate a decade of hard-won progress. In the past several years, as democracy has spread in the region and market economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems. At the same time, we expect to complete understandings regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to make the Organization of American States a more effective forum for addressing our region's problems. In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the U.N. and the O.A.S. to restore democracy. In Cuba, we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro regime. We will strongly support national reconciliation and the full implementation of peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people and ours from the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade.

In Africa as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that flow from multi-party democracy and open economies. They deserve our understanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build institutions that can empower Africa's people to husband, and benefit from, the continent's vast resources, deal with its economic, social, and environmental problems, and address its underlying causes of political instability. We will be equally committed to working with Congress to redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable development and private enterprise in Africa. In South Africa, we shall work actively to support

those, black and white, who are striving to dismantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with determination to build a multi-racial democracy.

As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be Secretary of State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were General George Marshall and Dean Acheson. And I am enormously honored by the opportunity to occupy the post held by them, and by many of the most revered names in our nation's history. Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the Cold War that America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. And the triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests.

Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded in America's enduring interests. It must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped by the democratic convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home.

The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be in the benefits it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured, not by its theoretical elegance, but by its results. If it makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety abroad; if it helps expand the stabilizing and ennobling reach of democratic institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global environment for our children—if it achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation as Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects of the post-war world discharged theirs.

They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the requirements of U.S. global leadership. I look forward to working with both parties in Congress to construct a new framework for that leadership, a framework within which healthy debate will occur, but within which we can also build a strong consensus that will help us cooperatively pursue the national interest at home and abroad. Thank you.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Before taking any questions, Mr. Chairman, I would like, with your indulgence, to respond very briefly to the question raised by the committee concerning my testimony before this committee during my confirmation hearings in 1977 for Deputy Attorney General.

During those hearings the question arose about my knowledge of covert intelligence operations conducted by the Army in 1967 and 1968 when I was Deputy Attorney General; operations such as infiltrating domestic organizations and stealing their documents. I told the committee then that while I was aware that the Army had been engaged in gathering information as part of its responsibility in dealing with domestic violence, I had no knowledge of the covert surveillance and infiltration that came to light after I left office.

Let me repeat: I had no knowledge of the covert surveillance and infiltration that came to light after I left office. I also told the committee that I condemned those kinds of activities and would have opposed them had I known about them. I wish to assure the committee that I stand by that testimony and I will not tolerate any such improper activities at the State Department or elsewhere, if I see it, in the Government.

The committee counsel has asked me to respond to several documents in my files as Deputy Attorney General which I had placed at the Lyndon Johnson Library many years ago and were found there. I have submitted a detailed response to the committee analyzing those documents and will summarize it here simply by saying that those documents have nothing in them that would lead me to modify my earlier testimony that I knew nothing at that time of the covert infiltration and surveillance that came to light after I left office.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the committee for its indulgence in a statement that might seem rather long, but since I am here for the first time I wanted to have a chance to lay out my vision, my concept of American foreign policy as I enter, I hope, this important office.

[The biographical summary of Mr. Christopher follows:]

Biographic Summary

Name	Warren Christopher
Position for which considered	Secretary of State
Present position	Chairman, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
Legal residence	California
Office address	O'Melveny & Myers, 400 South Hope St., Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899
Date/place of birth	October 27, 1925, Scranton, ND
Marital status	Married
Name of spouse	Former Marie J. Wyllis
Names of children	Scott, Thomas, Kristen, and Lynn
Education	B.A. (magna cum laude) University of Southern California, 1945 LL.B., Stanford University (Order of Coif), 1949
Language ability	None
Military experience	United States Naval Reserve, 1943-46
Work experience:	
1981 to present	Lawyer, then Chairman, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
1977 to 1981	Deputy Secretary of State, Washington, DC
1969 to 1976	Lawyer, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
1967 to 1969	Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Washington, DC
1950 to 1967	Lawyer, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
1949 to 1950	Law Clerk to United States Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, Washington, DC
Professional activities	President, Los Angeles County Bar Association (1974-75) Chairman, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association (1975-76) Chairman, Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American Bar Association (1966-67) Member, Board of Governors of the State Bar of California (1975-76) Special Counsel to the Governor of California (1959)
Civic activities	Member, Board of Trustees of Stanford University (1971-77, 1981-91, 1992-93) (President 1985-88) Director, Southern California Edison Co. (1971-77, 1981-93) Director, First Interstate Bancorp (1981-93) Director, Lockheed Corp. (1987-93) Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1988-93) Chairman, Carnegie Corp. of New York Board of Trustees (1990) Chairman, Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 Director and Vice Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations (1982-91)

Biographic Summary—Continued

Director, Los Angeles World Affairs Council (1987-93)

Member of the Triateral Commission (1975-77, 1981-88)

Member of the Executive Committee on the American Agenda (1988)

Member of the Board of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California (1966-67)

Member of the California Coordinating Council for Higher Education (1963-69), President (1963-65)

Vice Chairman of the Governor's Commission on Los Angeles Riots (1965-66)

Awards Jefferson Award, American Institute for Public Service for the Greatest Public Service Performed by an Elected or Appointed Official
The UCLA Medal
Harold Weill Medal, New York University
Thomas Jefferson Award in Law from the University of Virginia Law School
Louis Stein Award, Fordham Law School

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. I would say that I have received your five-page statement which, without objection, will be made a part of the record of this hearing.

[The information referred to follows:]

On January 11, 1993, counsel for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations sent me certain memoranda relating to domestic Army surveillance operations during 1968 and asked me to provide "a detailed statement addressing [my] knowledge of the memoranda and any clarification of [my] February 24, 1977 testimony which [I] may wish to make." I have examined these memoranda carefully. I have no present recollection of receiving or reading them, although one bears my initials and another appears to bear some markings by me. I thus believe that I must have read those two documents, which are the memoranda from Mr. Paul Bower to me. As to the other two documents, from Mr. Kevin Maroney to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, I was "cc'd" and neither document contains any initials or marks by me. I thus believe that I did not read either of the documents by Mr. Maroney, which would have been consistent with my general practice of not reviewing "cc's" that did not require action by me. Having now reviewed these four documents, moreover, I wish to make clear that I see no reason to amplify or amend my prior testimony before this Committee.

On February 24, 1977, I appeared before the Committee to testify in connection with my nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State. At that time, the Committee inquired into my knowledge about Army domestic intelligence activities conducted during 1967 and 1968, when I served as Deputy Attorney General of the United States. In particular, I was asked to respond to a report by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, which had been prepared for the Committee, regarding my role with respect to "covert surveillance activities" by the Army. (Hearing Record at p. 17) The covert activities at issue were described in the report as follows: "[T]he Army frequently established petty harassment groups which traveled around the country allegedly stealing petitions and handbills and heckling protesters. The Army also actively infiltrated such groups as SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference), the National Mobilization Committee, the Young Adults Project in Colorado and the Black Studies Program at NYU, among a long list of other peace and civil rights organizations." (Hearing Record at p. 19.)

I told the Committee in 1977 that, during the time I was Deputy Attorney General, I had no knowledge that the Army had engaged in such "covert surveillance or any other form of covert activity." (Hearing Record at p. 10.) I also told the Committee that I had been aware that the Army was involved in other kinds of intelligence activities, such as gathering information from local police departments.

Against that backdrop, I would like now to turn specifically to the four documents provided to me by the Committee. The first is a July 23, 1968, memorandum to me

from Paul G. Bower, who was a special assistant in my office. The memo bears my handwritten initials, along with the word "Noted," and, although I have no current recollection of the memo, those markings convey to me that I read it at the time. The memo details a meeting between Mr. Bower and the Deputy Mayor of the District of Columbia. According to the memo, "the problem that gave rise to the * * * meeting was not intelligence but rather the lack of adequate communication" during the riots after Dr. King's murder. (Emphasis added.) The memo notes that the Mayor's office received intelligence information from the 116th Military Intelligence Group, and reports that this Group received some information from local police departments, but also had "operatives" in the area.

Nothing in this memorandum states or implies that the 116th MI Group was engaging in covert activities such as those discussed in the Library of Congress report. The word "operatives," which was fastened upon in a recent press report, is fully consistent with my 1977 testimony indicating my awareness that the Army had engaged in non-covert intelligence efforts. Indeed, the memo itself states that "the only present need for intelligence collecting was the service of a helicopter. Evidently in the past the Army has furnished such service to the District government * * *." Far from suggesting covert activities or infiltration by the Army's "operatives," this type of intelligence gathering was not only open and obvious but, as the memo indicates, was used *during* a civil disturbance for disorder control.

The next document is an October 14, 1968, memorandum to me from Mr. Bower. It contains a check mark at the top and some markings in the margin, which appear to be my markings. I thus believe that, while I have no current recollection of the memo or its contents, I likely reviewed it at the time.

This memorandum describes a briefing given by a military officer at an October 10, 1968, meeting of the Civil Defense Steering Committee—an interagency group made up principally of military officers and civilian Defense Department officials. The memo describes the contents of the briefing, which involved a report on certain minor incidents of civil disorder; a brief "rundown of some of the principal figures" of the so-called "new left"; a report on the violence at the Chicago Convention; and a disagreement as to whether the District of Columbia police force responded adequately to the April 1968 riots. The memo also details "plans and costs for a new command center at the Pentagon." Nothing in this memorandum indicates in the slightest that the Army was engaging in infiltration or other covert action against dissident groups.

The third and fourth documents are memoranda from Kevin T. Maroney, to Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated August 21, 1968, and August 22, 1968, respectively. I was "cc'd" on both memoranda. I do not believe that I would have read either document in 1968. I say this for two reasons. First, I did not routinely review documents that I was "cc'd" on. Rather, they would have been looked at by my staff, who would have brought necessary information to my attention. Second, in clear contrast to the two memos from Paul Bower to me, these documents contain no markings or initials, which would normally be on a document that I had reviewed.

I should also add that, while both documents discuss information provided by Army intelligence concerning domestic activities, neither document indicates the source of this information. It is entirely possible therefore—and there is no reason to think that a reader of the memorandum in 1968 who had no knowledge of covert Army activities would have thought otherwise—that the information was supplied to the Army by third parties, such as a local police official or other sources. I indicated in my 1977 testimony that I was aware that the Army was engaged in non-covert intelligence gathering and nothing in these two memoranda demonstrate otherwise.

In summary, having reviewed the documents supplied to me, I see no reason to alter or amend my earlier testimony that I had no knowledge that the Army was engaged in covert intelligence operations, such as infiltrating civilian organizations or stealing their petitions or handbills. I also wish to reiterate that, as I told the Committee in 1977, I would have been strongly and firmly opposed to this kind of activity had I known about it.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your addressing the issue of the surveillance so directly and I have no questions at this time.

Before going into questions I would like to recognize the ranking minority member, who has returned for his opening statement. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Mr. Christopher. There is no question about all of us joining in welcoming you to the

hearing this morning. Now, there may be some penetrating questions or there may not, but my own questioning will be for the purpose of giving you an opportunity to explain a lot of things that are being said.

Now, most of us have known Mr. Christopher, and some of us have worked with him previously when he was at the State Department during the Carter administration, and it may be appropriate for me to comment that there were times back then when we had to agree to disagree agreeably on various matters. But I never doubted Mr. Christopher's sincerity and good intentions, and I do not know.

Having said that, it perhaps should be noted that Mr. Christopher and virtually all of President-elect Clinton's other foreign policy nominees are associated with a period in U.S. foreign policy history that not many, if any, Americans regard as our country's finest hour. It was the period that saw the giveaway of the Panama Canal, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the undermining of the Shah of Iran, and the consolidation of Soviet influence on our hemisphere's doorsteps in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the world.

It was a time when to much of the world the United States appeared to be in retreat. And as Deputy Secretary of State during that depressing period, Mr. Christopher played a key role in shaping U.S. foreign policy, and therefore I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge some reservations about his nomination. He knows that; we have talked previously.

Mr. Christopher, the world today is very different from the time when you last held a senior foreign policy position. Despite the historic changes of the past few years, I doubt that anybody does not anticipate that there will be a great deal of instability in the years ahead. Indeed, the decade ahead may well be a bloody one and it will be your responsibility to help define America's role in that very changed world.

As Secretary of State, you will be America's voice to almost 200 countries in this world, most of which are likely to be clamoring for money and attention. But the United States surely has now learned that we cannot solve every problem in every corner of the world, and I was gratified to notice your comment in that regard. The American taxpayers simply do not have the resources to provide handouts to every outstretched hand around the world.

But let me say this without any equivocation; before spending one cent of America's taxpayers' dollars on foreign program, whether it be sending American jobs overseas or building lavish homes and tennis courts for diplomats, the new administration, I hope, will ask will this expenditure further the interests of American citizens.

I am delighted to note that you called for an American desk at the State Department. That was not original with you, that was not original with me; Herman Talmadge said it over and over again on the Senate floor and I applauded every time he said it. Senator Talmadge many years ago raised that question because he was justifiably dismayed that too often foreign service officers seemed to be protecting foreign interests rather than American interests. So Herman Talmadge was right then, and sad to say, the situation continues to be a bipartisan folly today, a disease that has reached

epidemic proportions at Foggy Bottom, no matter which party is in charge.

I think there is a rather simple cure for this malady. Every single U.S. Embassy should be an outpost with the sole mission of protecting and promoting American interests. Also promoting and protecting ideals, and this demonstrably is not the case today, and I say that having disagreed very often with my own party and the Republican Secretaries of State.

For example—and let me give you an example and I want you to comment on it some time during your visit here—the Embassy staff, U.S. Embassy staff in Managua has done absolutely nothing—nothing to press the claims of 554 American citizens whose properties were stolen by the Sandinista and Chamorro governments. Now, one American citizen told me that when she sought help in the U.S. Embassy in Managua concerning her property claim she felt like she was visiting the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry.

Foreign aid is so unpopular with the American people and has been so ineffective in furthering American objectives overseas that there is growing support for the complete abolition of the Agency for International Development. Do not give the American people a vote if you want AID to survive. They will vote you down, and I say it is about time that somebody grabbed this question and worked on it sincerely and effectively.

What I am saying, I think, is that too often the foreign policy establishment is out of touch with mainstream America. And as I said earlier and as you said earlier, the world has changed. And it is time, I think, for the State Department to get with the program and decide what your priorities really are going to be. You cannot specifically escape questions like these being asked by more and more Americans every day.

One, does the State Department need embassies in virtually every country in the world in a time of enormous budgetary problems at home? Why cannot the staffing at many U.S. Embassies be reduced? I wonder how many Americans know that the tiny country of Sierra Leone has at least 220 people on the American payroll there or how about Kenya with 592 people on the American payroll or Uruguay with 120 people on the American payroll. And it is the same all over the world.

Another question, why does the U.S. Government provide more than \$1 billion every year to multilateral banks that lend millions of dollars to corrupt regimes. How many Americans know that, without exception, the terms of these loans are much more favorable than any loan the average American family can get down at the local bank?

Question, why do many senior foreign service officers live in luxurious conditions overseas that rival those of the wealthiest Americans? Why does the State Department insist on violating U.S. law which absolutely forbids, without any question, without any peradventure, sending any foreign aid to any government which refuses to return confiscated properties belonging to American citizens.

Question, why does the U.S. Government continue to give away millions of dollars in foreign aid to countries of no strategic importance?

Apart from these questions—and there are many others and I am going to ask some of them as we go along. But apart from these questions, we must not forget that if there is one thing that America stands for in this world, it should be, it had better be freedom. So can we put an end to this bipartisan folly that I mentioned a few moments ago and can we stand with the forces of liberty in Cuba, in Nicaragua, in China, in North Korea, in Syria, and Iraq. This is what the American people want and they want to know whether the State Department, under your stewardship, will stand with them.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me express the hope that—and I know that Mr. Christopher agrees with this—that we will not attempt to race through this nomination. I am going to have to have several rounds of questions, because the record should be, in fairness to Mr. Christopher, as complete as possible. So I may need 8 or 10 or 12 rounds, and if that means staying here until Saturday or next Monday, so be it. But in any event, I know that Mr. Christopher wants to be in a position to take care of any doubts any member may have, so I am giving fair notice, I hope, that I am prepared to stay here for as long as it takes.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms, and as chairman I am perfectly content to stay with you and preside, but I think that you may find yourself a little lonely as time goes on. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. It will not be a novelty, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In any case, I think we have reached a point now where questions start, and we obviously are not going to get through before lunch so I would suggest we go through questions and then break about 1 p.m., maybe take 1 hour and 15 minutes for lunch, and come back here at 2:15 p.m.

I will start out the questioning, and we are going to allow 15 minutes so that each Senator will have more of an opportunity to ask questions in depth. This little red light will go on after 15 minutes, as will a bell that will ring, which will remind us that the time has expired.

Just to start out with, I have a few questions here. First, bringing up the subject of Iraq which you brought in extemporaneously in your statement, as you may know, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee possesses 14 tons of captured Iraqi secret police documents. These documents are a record of torture and execution and are critical evidence in a possible genocide case against Iraq.

Is it your thought that the United States will bring or participate in a genocide case against Iraq in the ICJ, the International Court of Justice?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would support such a case very strongly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Should a case against individual Iraqis for crimes against humanity and genocide be brought in a specially constituted court, or even in a U.S. court? In other words, should it be a United States, a specially constituted court, or the ICJ?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a fixed view about the forum for such proceedings. I do think these war crimes, atrocities, genocide crimes ought to be pursued in the best possible forum, whether it be the ICJ or a new forum set up for that purpose. I do not have a fixed view on that. I do have a view that the matter ought to be pursued vigorously.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I would, obviously, concur with you. Last month I was in Somalia and I was impressed by the work the U.N. forces are doing in relieving the suffering, but I am concerned about whether, and if so, how soon, the U.N. forces will be sent in to replace U.S. forces to deal with the longer term.

Because, as you know as well as I do, there is a difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking. We have gone in there hopefully for famine relief and peacekeeping purposes. It looks as if we are getting into a peacemaking cycle, and I was curious as to how you felt we could extricate ourselves.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, first let me say how much I admire the work that our armed forces are doing in Somalia. It is another example of the high quality of the American servicepeople and the job they are doing all over this world.

When we entered Somalia, Governor Clinton and those of us around him were strongly supportive of the Bush administration's endeavor as a humanitarian effort, and we continue to be so. It seemed to me then, and it seems to me now, that the peacemaking efforts of the U.S. forces there will have to continue for a period of time that can only be judged by events on the ground. Artificial deadlines are really not suitable in that situation.

I hope that the U.S. forces can be removed in the near future, and there is some indication that we may have reached the ceiling, but I do not think that the conditions yet are ready to have the forces turned over—have the country turned over to peacekeeping forces, though I hope that will soon come.

I would also say, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that when we turn from peacemaking to peacekeeping, that probably the peacekeeping forces will have to be more robust, more muscular than they have been in some other instances. Because the transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping in that country will not be one where there is just a curtain that comes down that makes it clear that there is no longer a security danger. There will be some security danger, but it seems to me that a robust, muscular peacekeeping force provided by the U.N. can step in there and take charge in the near future, but that can only be determined by events on the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say I was very impressed there by the tough conditions that the Marines were under when they were there. It was not generally recognized that amongst the Marines, integrated with them, were women Marines and they were doing a fine job.

On another subject, not long ago during a speech at the U.N., President Bush has some positive things to say about closer cooperation with the Security Council and peacekeeping operations. He stopped short of the idea of putting the units at the disposal of the Security Council as provided for in article 43, but he didn't rule it out.

And in this regard, I guess the most exciting thing in my time in the Senate, has been seeing something that had been worked on very hard in 1945 in your native city of San Francisco, when some of us were working on Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, to see it go into cold storage all these years with the cold war and now finally the aspirations and hopes we had for the charter are coming to bear all these years later. I carry the charter around with me as much as possible ever since.

The lead in this has been taken by Senator Biden and Senator Boren, too, is very interested in this subject. I was just curious if you saw the possibility of security forces under article 43 during your tenure as Deputy Secretary being made available to the Security Council.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, I do. I think the emergence of article 43, just as you do, is a very promising and exciting event. I thought that the statement issued at midyear last year by Boutros-Ghali with respect to his overview of the U.N.'s composition and its potential for the future was a very promising charter for the future.

I think we have to find ways to make available to the U.N. a rapid response force so that the U.N. can go into situations and not leave it to the United States to be the action officer in the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I would just like to say, publicly, how much I look forward to supporting Senator Biden and his resolution which provides for exactly that.

In connection with Haiti, I was just curious what strategy you have devised to avoid Florida being invaded by a fleet of newly built boats on January 21.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You are certainly covering all the interesting places, Mr. Chairman. Our incoming administration has been working unusually closely with the outgoing administration in connection with Haitian problems, because they are so urgent in nature. In most instances, we simply have stood aside and tried to determine what the outgoing administration was doing and it followed very carefully the rule that there only can be one government at the time.

But in Haiti we've been working very closely together following a long breakfast meeting that I had with Secretary Eagleburger. We have been strongly supporting the efforts of the OAS and the United States to produce a democratic result in Haiti, to produce a situation which would cause the people of that country to want to remain there under conditions of peace and security.

And those efforts, I think, are quite promising this week, Mr. Chairman. They by no means have come to fruition, but the U.N. and the OAS, working with President Aristide and the statements he's been making in the last 2 or 3 days, I think give high promise that that situation within Haiti may be moving in the right direction.

At the same time, Governor Clinton has been making efforts to begin to carry out his commitment that the people of Haiti will have greater opportunity to have a process under which they can determine whether or not they are appropriate refugees for admission to the United States. This will take a number of forms and I

think that you can expect to see developments about this over the next several days.

As you know, his commitment during the campaign was to ensure that the people of Haiti would have an opportunity to pursue their right to asylum in the United States. They would have the right to pursue their determination to come to the United States under conditions that were more favorable than they've had in the past. And that's an ongoing effort as the new administration comes into office.

But that is a very grave problem, Mr. Chairman, and I think we can only watch developments over the next several days and weeks with, I think, quite high promise that the U.N. and the OAS endeavor, with our strong support—that is, both the outgoing and incoming administrations—may finally be moving in the right direction.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess the difference between an economic and a political refugee is like a glass of water. Is it half full or half empty? But I do hope that these Haitians will be given the opportunity to make their case.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, Governor Clinton has emphasized that the admission to the United States will depend upon their establishing their criteria under existing standards, that they will have to be able to show that they are the subject of persecution in Haiti. That is the reason why he has indicated a determination to find ways for them to establish whether or not they fall within that category under more satisfactory conditions than they have in the past, particularly within the island of Haiti.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Returning to another island, Cyprus, it was about 19 years ago that Turkey invaded Cyprus. She is still there. The spirit of Davos seems to have pretty well disintegrated. What will be the priority of the Cyprus situation in the new administration?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, that's a matter that I remember from my prior service in government. It goes back a long way. The U.N. has taken some positive action there and there seems to be some progress among the parties.

There's an election about to take place in Cyprus, I understand, with three competing candidates and no certain winner. And the matter is on hold temporarily until the outcome of that election. But I can tell you once again that our administration will be pursuing that as vigilantly as we can in an effort to encourage the parties to reach a conclusion.

As you know, it's a three-cornered negotiation, with the people of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and Turkey being importantly involved. But we hope to see a situation reached there where the occupation forces of Turkey would leave the island and there could be a free and independent Cyprus without the occupation and without the threats that have existed in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Turning to another situation, I refer to East Timor.

Last summer I tried to visit East Timor with Senator Boren. We were turned down by the Indonesian Government because of its concern about the human rights situation. I was curious as to what you thought could be done to be of help there, if anything?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That's one of the longstanding human rights problems. And I think the most we can do is to continue to exert diplomatic pressure on Indonesia to finally try to gain some recognition of the severe human rights problems that are there and have been there for a long time and have been recognized in human rights reports extending back at least to the time when I was last in government, between 1977 and 1981.

But I don't have any magic solution for that problem except to continue to put diplomatic pressure on parties there who might have the capacity to improve the conditions of the people in that very troubled area.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that I directly asked President Suharto of Indonesia whether Senator Boren and I could go and he very politely but very firmly said, no. I would hope that might change.

The law of the sea is a subject that has been of some interest, I think to you, in your previous incarnation in government. I know it has been for me for many years. It's languished under the previous administrations and as you know, we have the Prepcom meeting in Kingston, but we don't send an observer there. I was hoping that that might be in your thoughts as being dusted off and revived. What are your views about that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I do have a longstanding interest, Mr. Chairman, in the Law of the Sea Treaty and I hope we can do something to revive that. As I'm sure you know better than I, I'm just getting reacquainted in that area.

There's only one aspect of the Law of the Sea Treaty to which we have not been able to give approval, and that I believe is the deep sea bed regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Part 11, I think.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Your memory of those numbers is better than mine. But I do understand that there may be some movement in that deep sea bed regime and there is some hope that there may be a restatement or perhaps some revision of that article that would make it more acceptable to the United States and the interests here.

It's unfortunate with all of the positive things there are in the Law of the Sea Treaty, that we've been unable to adhere to that and without knowing about it in detail, Mr. Chairman, or wanting to pose as an expert of the character of Elliott Richardson on the subject, I will assure you that we will see if we can't reactivate interest in the Law of the Sea in a way that protects U.S. interests.

Of course, the reason that we have not adhered is because we feel that our interests are not adequately protected under the law, under the deep sea bed article.

The CHAIRMAN. I would agree with you. Except for the deep sea bed provisions, I would accept the rest of the provisions as they are written. The deep sea bed does, on reflection, contain elements in it adverse to the United States. And I would hope that that part could be handled by a protocol or a separate side arrangement.

Going back to Africa for a moment—excuse my jumping around this way—but the U.N. Secretary General recently suggested that a peacekeeping force should be organized and sent to Mozambique. Others have suggested that the U.N. should play a role in Liberia, even though there's already a multinational African force there.

That force is I believe, primarily Nigerian, but the Liberians do not like the Nigerians, so it is not able to do a very effective job.

What in your view can be done there, if anything?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I think Liberia is one of those instances where a regional group is addressing the problem, trying to do their best to deal with the problem and, in the complex world we live in, I think we ought to give every encouragement to regional organizations to deal with problems of that kind.

The U.N.'s plate is very full at the present time and I would not have any disposition, I think, to want to try to take over the Liberian problem or have the U.N. take over the Liberian problem.

It's a grave and difficult problem and very unsatisfactory in many respects, but I have long thought that a country's neighbors may be most able to help it through difficult times if they approach the matter with a sense of fairness and reason. And I hope that the regional organization is working effectively in Liberia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The yellow light is on. My time has expired.

I turn to the ranking minority member.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christopher, as you know, I went down to the White House this morning, ducked out of this meeting at the first of it. And there was sort of an emotional moment, certainly for me, when I saw Ronald Reagan receive the Medal of Freedom.

Now here's a guy that's kicked around by the left wing news media and the liberal politicians. They throw mud at him every time they get a chance and none of it sticks. The American people still love and trust Ronald Reagan. And I think that's appropriate.

But I thought on the way back how ironic it is that while that ceremony was happening at the White House, over in the House of Representatives Congressman Lee Hamilton and Henry Hyde released the House October Surprise report. Now some of us last year, along about this time, tried to say, look, this is just a political gambit. Do not waste the taxpayer's money because there is nothing to it.

But I heard all of these self-righteous comments about, how we have got to do this. The character of this government lies at stake. And I said, bullfeathers.

But anyway, the report was released this morning—and it is a Democrat report, I might stipulate, even though it is called bipartisan—nothing, I repeat, nothing was found to support the theory that was broadcast across the land time and time and time again that the 1980 Reagan campaign asked Iran to delay releasing our hostages until Reagan became President.

Speculation—sometimes it was broadcast and printed as an absolute fact—said that the Reagan campaign agreed to sell Iran arms to get the hostages released. Do you remember any of that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I know that charge was made.

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. And I believe that there are a good number of people out there across American land that owe Ronald Reagan and the taxpayers of America an apology, preferably on bended knee. But that will not happen.

What I am saying is that the various fishing expeditions which comprised the October Surprise witch hunt cost the American tax-

payers at least \$4 million. And what did they come up with? A water hole.

And let us lay aside for a moment that it was made as a political judgment this year, in 1992, to withhold the release of this report until after the November election. Oh, that is not politics. Oh, no, no, do not consider that. But it was held up. Now it was pretty well known at the time that decision was made that the report gave Reagan and Bush an absolute clean bill of health.

Now that is not your fault. I am not saying that it is. But I do want to ask you about your own views about the October Surprise. Because about a year ago, back in February—I believe it was along about February 8—Warren Christopher said, I believe there are enough suspicious circumstances to warrant a bipartisan investigation by Congress. Do you remember saying that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes.

Senator HELMS. And in light of the fact that even the Democrats in the House of Representatives now say that there were not any suspicious circumstances and it took them \$4 million and a year to reach that conclusion, you do not think now that it was a good idea to spend \$4 million, do you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Helms, I'm rather surprised you're asking me this question at this point. This committee, your committee, conducted an investigation—

Senator HELMS. Against my—over my objection, absolutely.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, sir, I was asked to cooperate with that committee and—

Senator HELMS. I do not question that, Mr. Christopher. I am talking about what you said, the contribution you made.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, the reason I was surprised, Mr. Helms, is that I spent many hours with that committee in Los Angeles and then I came back here and testified before the committee. The committee report documents what I said at that time. And if you want to see my views in detail, conducted in private session, it's there in the report of this very committee. So I'm a little surprised that that question is being addressed to me today, but I'll certainly try to answer it.

Senator HELMS. Very well. I am tempted to ask you if there is anything you would like to say in closed session that you would just as soon not talk about in open session.

But let me ask this, in 1980 or early 1981, did you warn the Iranian Government that, unlike Carter, Reagan might not be willing to swap Iran's frozen assets for the hostages?

Did you ever say anything like that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Helms, in December 1980, after President Reagan had been elected, I was using every argument at my command to try to get the release of our hostages, and one of the arguments I used was that the Reagan administration's viewpoint on this subject would be very unpredictable.

Senator HELMS. So the answer is yes to my question, you did say that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, but I did not say it in the terms that you mentioned, Senator. That is why I was trying to restate it. What I did was to urge them to settle the matter now, because President Reagan's handling of the matter was unpredictable. That

is a little different than you stated, but that is what I told the Iranians.

Senator HELMS. So this was, as you now say, a strategy on your part to rescue the hostages. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. You did not—it did not occur to you that it might be helpful to rescue the Carter administration from history's judgment on handling the hostage crisis as a whole. Nothing like that entered in your mind at all at any time.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Helms, every day that those hostages were kept was really a burden to me. I had selected a number of them to go to Iran to serve in our Embassy there. They had been there a long time, and as we got down toward the end of the administration, no one day was more important than the other. I kept working for their release.

Senator HELMS. Well, I guess that answer is relevant to something, but not to the question that I tried to ask, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, would you restate your question, Senator?

Senator HELMS. Oh, let me go on. I do not want to tilt at windmills with you.

Did not President Carter himself make an arms-for-hostage offer?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I am glad to have a chance to explain that, Senator Helms.

The hostages were taken in November 1979. A few days after the hostages were taken, President Carter froze all Iranian assets in this country. That was about \$12 billion worth of Iranian assets that included mostly cash but also some oil well equipment, various other kinds of commercial equipment, and a substantial amount of spare parts.

Senator BIDEN. Military spare parts.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Military spare parts, yes—thank you, Senator Biden—and other military equipment that had been on order and paid for by the Iranians. It belonged to the Iranians, and it was frozen just as their cash in the banks was frozen.

From the very first time that he froze those assets, President Carter said that after the hostages were returned, those frozen assets would be returned to Iran, and in the course of the negotiations it was my job to try to obtain the release and return of the hostages and to preserve as much of the U.S. interest, to prevent as many claims against the United States as possible.

When the matter was finally concluded, we returned \$8 billion of the \$12 billion that had been frozen. We returned a certain amount of commercial equipment, and we agreed to return the military spare parts, but subject, Senator Helms, right in the Algiers declarations, to a provision that they would not be returned unless U.S. munitions control—unless the laws of the United States—permitted them to be returned.

Now, this was the way President Carter began in the matter. That is, when he froze the assets, he said the assets will be unfrozen when the hostages come home, and that was the context of the negotiations. I can take you through it almost on a day-by-day basis.

Senator HELMS. No, no. I am trying to give you some latitude in answering, but do you remember what my question was?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. The question was whether President Carter traded arms for hostages, and the fact is—

Senator HELMS. Is it yes or no?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. The answer is no.

Senator HELMS. At no time.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. At no time did he trade arms for hostages. What he did was to release equipment that had been—including military spare parts—that had been frozen and paid for by the Iranians at the time the hostages were released, but that is far different from the trading of new arms, new military equipment, which was what President Reagan did. That is a vastly different situation, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Oh, here, now we are getting down to the brass tacks. You are comparing Reagan with Carter, and all of these things have been batted around and have been proved to be untrue.

During the entire period of the Reagan administration, the total value of U.S. arms shipped to Iran—and this was according to the official report on Iran-Contra—was \$48.1 million, less than one-third of what the Carter administration, whether it be you or others, offered in 1980. Do you disagree with that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, there was a large amount that was frozen at the time of the freeze, and what President Carter did from the moment they were frozen was to say: you took our hostages, we are going to freeze your resources; once the hostages are returned, your resources will be returned. That is certainly not the kind of a trade that you are describing.

Senator HELMS. Well, let us get—just as a matter of philosophy or policy, or whatever you want to call it, do you think there are any circumstances under which the United States should offer a quid pro quo to terrorists?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. No circumstances.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I am opposed to offering bribes or dealing with terrorists by making payments to them. That has been the longstanding policy of the State Department, and it was carried out—

Senator HELMS. Well, the point I am making is, you have changed your mind since those days, because you definitely—you said yourself that you offered—made an offer to the Iranians.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I did not say I made an offer to the Iranians. I said that President Carter agreed to unfreeze the frozen assets when the hostages came home.

Senator HELMS. Well, there may be a difference without a distinction.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. There is a difference to me, Senator.

Senator HELMS. So you are on record as saying that we should or should not negotiate with terrorists.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I am on record as saying that we should not pay ransom of any kind to terrorists. It may be necessary to talk to them to work out the modalities of getting our people back. I

would not rule out talking with them, but I would rule out paying any kind of ransom or treasure to them.

Senator HELMS. Have you ever had somebody on your staff hand you something in an embarrassing moment?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, it sometimes helps, does it not, Senator.

Senator HELMS. It sure does. Forgive me. I have got to ask her what she showed me. [Pause.]

The point she is making is that Brzezinski said that such an offer would be a quid pro quo, and that is not exactly the most important aspect of this thing, but you are not Mr. Brzezinski and you did not say it, but anyway, it is there.

Senator BIDEN. Could the Senator suggest what page in that report he is looking at?

Senator HELMS. Page 43.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Now, I am certain you remember the Wisconsin primaries in 1980. Do you have any recollection of that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No. I am not from Wisconsin, but I do recall that they took place sometime during the fall of 1980, yes, Senator.

Senator HELMS. It was at a time when Mr. Carter was pretty worried about losing those polls so soon after losing the New York and Connecticut primaries to a fellow named Ted Kennedy, but in the early hours on the morning of that primary President Carter made a surprise announcement that the Iranian militants would likely release the hostages to the Iranian Government, and you wrote a statement to that effect for President Carter, did you not?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I think I was the draftsman of the statement that was released that morning, Senator.

Senator HELMS. You wrote that hopeful statement—and I am not being particularly critical of you. I just want to get the record straight. You wrote that hopeful statement with Ted Kennedy looking, you know, down the barrel at you.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not think Ted Kennedy was there, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, he was looking across the country at you. There was a political primary, and that statement was written despite the fact that the Ayatollah Khomeini, whom all of you knew to be the real decisionmaker in Iran, had totally rejected the transfer of the hostages. Now, that is a matter of record.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I remember that event fairly well, and if you would just give me a minute I would like to tell you—to put it in a little bit more context.

Senator HELMS. I can give you the original memorandum, if you want it, but you go right ahead.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Let me try to explain.

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. First, let me challenge your premise with respect to the Ayatollah. Many people spoke for the Ayatollah in that period. Sometimes his relatives did, sometimes his Cabinet did, and quite often, what the Ayatollah said one day would prove to be inaccurate the next day.

Now, what triggered my statement on that morning was the fact that we had been working for days and days with the civilian leadership in Iran to try to get the transfer of the hostages into their

control, take them away from the students and put them in Government control, which was a big step, because we thought—no doubt wrongly, or at least it did not turn out to be right for some time—we thought that if they got into government control we would have a better chance of getting them back.

What happened on that morning was there was a statement by those in civilian control in Iran that they would return the hostages to government control within the next few days. That was a very encouraging event for us at that time, Senator.

Now, it is hard to put yourself back in that picture in 1980, when we were doing everything we could to try to get the release of those hostages. Frankly, I have never been deeply into politics, as I think you know, and that statement was written by me that morning because I thought there was an important change in Iranian governmental policy, and I wanted—at least I was the President's representative that morning—to confirm that and accept that proposal by saying, good, we see you have made an important statement and we want to endorse it, embrace it. That is the reason that statement was written that morning.

Senator HELMS. Well, my time is up. It was an important statement, perhaps, but it was not an accurate statement. We can continue this in the next round.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I had not planned on plumbing this issue. This report was released this morning, and I am looking at it for the first time. I do want to ask you questions in another area, but I suspect some of us will come back to this.

With regard to Brzezinski and his use of the phrase *quid pro quo*, I would like to read the entire quote. This is from page 43 of the Joint Report on the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations, et cetera.

It says, indeed, Brzezinski described to the task force the Carter administration's approach to the spare parts issues as:

Our position was, you have grabbed our people, we have grabbed your stuff in retaliation. You release our people, we will release your stuff.

Since some of that stuff was military equipment and they were now under duress with the Iraq invasion, our thinking was they may be more susceptible to entertaining the idea of a *quid pro quo*.

That is the context of the *quid pro quo* quote, and I might point out that I always thought the term ransom included giving somebody something that he did not already have, or was not entitled to. I did not realize that it was put in the context of frozen assets being released in response to releasing hostages, but I am sure we are going to hear a lot about this for the remainder of this hearing, or in the next day, and I will refrain from going any further.

Senator SARBANES. Would you just yield for one quick question?

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, am I correct, the Iranians had bought and paid for this equipment?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, it had been bought. Yes, Senator, it had been bought and paid for. Indeed, from time to time the United States would sell the equipment because it was becoming obsolete, and then they would put the money in an escrow fund which would

then become part of the frozen funds, so it had all been bought and paid for.

Senator SARBANES. So they had bought and paid for it. It simply had not been shipped, and President Carter froze it and prevented any shipment of it, is that right?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Exactly.

Senator Biden, I want to say to you that I have not seen the report either. Senator Helms seemed to be concerned that it was not released before the election. This is not the ideal day from my standpoint to have it released, but no doubt I will see it at some point. But I have not seen it, either.

Senator BIDEN. Let me now move on, if I may. First of all, thank you for a very good and thorough statement on this administration's attitude toward shaping the new world order, and I compliment you on your statement and thank you for making it here this morning.

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a gentleman with whom you dealt in this transition period, Secretary Eagleburger, and I just want to publicly pay tribute to him. I think Secretary Eagleburger is one of the most competent men with whom I have ever dealt in my 20 years in the U.S. Senate.

I think he was a fine Secretary of State, and I hope, and believe, that you will continue to take advantage of his expertise and his ideas. He need not have me say that, but I want to because I think so highly of him.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I join you in those comments, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Bosnia, and I was very encouraged by the intensity and strength of your statement and the characterization of the Serbian action in Bosnia, with your reference to the possible use of military force as well as diplomacy.

I am deeply concerned about what the West has allowed to occur, Mr. Secretary. We can all engage in hindsight as to how we and the Europeans might have done things differently with regard to recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Perhaps a wiser western diplomacy may have averted or impacted in some way the outbreak of the fighting, perhaps not. Historians will debate that for some time to come, but I think what is beyond debate is the lack of strength of the western response once this tragedy began to unfold in full horror.

With regard to the current talks in Geneva, I will be the first to applaud if these negotiations succeed, but I am not at all optimistic, Mr. Secretary, and I believe we cannot continue to place our faith in negotiations alone. I must say I find it a bit bizarre that we are continuing to negotiate with persons who have already been labeled war criminals and who should be subject to prosecution under international law. Now, I would like to discuss these negotiations.

I have two questions. First, are you concerned that the Geneva peace plan and the new ethnic map it creates would in effect ratify the atrocities of ethnic cleansing committed by the Bosnian Serbs?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I do have a personal concern along those lines, but we are not direct parties to those negotiations. The parties to those negotiations are the elements of Bosnia, and I think some deference has to be given to their point of view. They

are the ones that are continuing the negotiations, not the United States.

I hope the negotiations will succeed, and if they do succeed, if they can bring peace to Bosnia, it certainly will be a major step forward, but I do not think we can make those negotiations our sole reliance, Senator. I think we have to have an independent position with respect to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia countries, because the stakes are too large for us to rely solely on the negotiations taking place at Geneva, much as I hope they will succeed.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I suspect Senator Lugar and myself and a few others feel the need to make clear that part of this equation has to be a credible threat of the use of military force in order to bring about any successful negotiations.

You are a celebrated negotiator, Mr. Secretary, and we all know that negotiations require carrots and sticks. Is it appropriate for me to read into your statement today where you mention the military that we should be considering the coordinated use of military force if the negotiations fail?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, this is what you can read into my statement. Governor Clinton, since about last August in the campaign, has been urging that the United States take a stronger position with respect to the conduct that is going on in Bosnia. The conduct of the Serbians is outrageous, and every day, or almost every day, it seems to have a new form of outrage that is on the international scene.

In the context of Governor Clinton's desire that we take a strong position, as you know, he supports enforcement of the no-fly zone. There is a decision now to have a no-fly zone, but there is no enforcement of it, and Governor Clinton has been arguing for the enforcement of the no-fly zone.

When Governor Clinton becomes President Clinton on January 20, I can assure you that this problem will receive priority attention on his part. It is clearly a problem that calls out for multilateral attention.

As your comment indicated, the European countries are closer to the situation, have a very personal stake in it, but what I can assure you is, at least to the point of enforcing the no-fly zone, that Governor Clinton is committed to that, and I can also tell you that it is a problem that will receive priority attention from our administration when we take office, in considerable part prompted by the growing tragedy that we see almost every day in the news of slaughter, rapes, ethnic cleansing, of a kind that is just sickening.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your answer. I would like to pursue it just a little more, although I realize you are not in a position to lay out the entire administration's policy and all the diplomatic and other initiatives at your disposal to deal with the situation in Bosnia.

I do not believe it is going to be adequate to draw a line in Kosovo, to allow the rape of Bosnia to continue. It is all too similar to Hitler's annexation of Czech lands, in my view, hoping that rhetoric and sweet talk would stop him later in Poland.

In Bosnia, I think we have to act in several ways and without delay.

First, it seems to me we have to issue an ultimatum to the U.N. to act to sequester or destroy all weapons throughout Bosnia, and by this I mean primarily tanks and artillery.

Second, I believe the U.N. should identify all air power necessary not only to enforce the no-fly zone but to eliminate heavy weapons in Bosnia and military installations that are supporting the Serb militias.

Third, it seems to me we should act immediately to lift the arms embargo which would release the \$50 million in military equipment that the Congress authorized last October. If that occurs, and if guerrilla warfare is necessary, the Bosnians themselves appear ready and willing to carry that burden rather than unmilitary personnel.

Finally—U.S. personnel. It seems to me we have to do what is necessary with multilateral forces and American participation in multilateral ground forces if need be to break the siege in key Bosnian cities.

Mr. Secretary, I also would point out that today in the Washington Post—I think this is incredible, assuming it is even remotely true. On the first page, it says, a cry for help from Bosnia, a cry for help from a frozen hell, besieged Bosnian town loses radio link to express its agony.

This article goes on to point out that there are twice daily communications coming from Zepa—a town of some 28,000 people, where there is vivid description of the conditions, including the possibility of cannibalism, because there is no food, there is no water, there is no housing, there is no clothing, there is no medicine.

For the life of me, I cannot understand why President Bush at this moment—and I must ask you if the moment after you become Secretary of State and the new President is sworn in, would we not provide an airlift of food and clothing and medical supplies immediately to drop into that town?

I truly do not understand this at all. We are not asking to put in 500,000 ground troops or anything comparable to that. There is a threat of cannibalism, it is just incredible, and we are here just talking about it.

Now, this is not yet your responsibility, so my question is, first, if no action is taken between now and then to give relief to the town, assuming something is left, would you consider recommending to the President that we as part of a multilateral force or otherwise provide an airlift to try to get food in to these people?

Second, would you please comment on some of the specific recommendations that I have raised. I am not asking you to endorse them, but what you think of the general approach of us doing more?

I apologize for the rambling question, but I think it is just outrageous, what is happening.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I read that story this morning, too, and I was just horrified by it, and perhaps for the same reason as you, because relief in that situation is within existing policy.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. We have a multilateral commitment to provide that kind of humanitarian relief, so I was startled by the story, and I cannot imagine that that story will not produce some

action within existing policy, but if it does not, I can assure you that we will certainly take a look at it and see what is logistically possible.

On the broader question, Senator Biden, let me say this. Both when I met with you and when I met with Senator Lugar, I was greatly impressed by the depth of your knowledge and your interest in this subject. I think the most that I can do today is to assure you that we will want to consult with you and other members of the committee as we begin to develop the policy of the Clinton administration in this area.

We are not at the point now of being able to express our views on specific steps that might be taken, except I do, once again, emphasize the context that Governor Clinton has been emphasizing ever since last August, that the United States ought to be taking a stronger position with respect to Bosnia and with respect to the humanitarian problems that are created there by the Serbian activity.

Perhaps I could add that there are very few angels in that endeavor.

Senator BIDEN. That is clear.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No one party is blameless, but the Serbian activity seems to be the most outrageous and calls for some early attention. We will be giving it priority attention, but I am not able to comment on any specific—any one of the specific steps that you or Senator Lugar has proposed.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you. I understand the answer. I take some comfort in knowing from my very brief discussion with then-Governor, now President-elect Clinton, of his concern about the degree of our effort employed by both the United States and the Europeans.

My last question, Mr. Secretary, is this. I can see from your statement that you and I agree, as do many others, on the priority we must place in stopping proliferation, and I have two points. First, I urge you to obtain as soon as possible a full briefing on recent Chinese proliferation activities, if you have not done so already.

Second, I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts on how we should reorganize, if we should reorganize, our Government, to contain the weapons proliferation problem that we now face.

You may know that I, along with others have put forward some legislation, in an attempt to suggest the possibility of structurally reorganizing, from the administration side, a mechanism to deal with proliferation in the same way that we have so intently set up mechanisms that deal with the issue of parity—nuclear parity with the former Soviet empire. Do you have any comments on the need for that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. As I said in my statement, Senator Biden, I have various plans for streamlining and reorganizing the State Department to bring it more in tune with the problems we are facing today. It is still organized—and I am not criticizing anybody for this—more or less in the same mode it was when I was there in the late 1970's.

One of the things that I intend to do is to reorganize the office of the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs to add proliferation as a major component in that office. I have talked to the prospective appointee there about the high priority that I wish to give—that the President wishes to give to nonproliferation.

In addition to that, in the Politico-Military Bureau, I have emphasized the need to have that divided into basically two sections. One would be a nonproliferation area, and the other the military security area, which has been that, too, in the past.

Also, Senator Biden, I had a meeting recently with Congressman Aspin, Secretary of Defense-designate Aspin, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and one of the primary topics we had was the selection of our top nonproliferation personnel so that they would be people who work well together. I think the coordination between the Defense Department and the White House and the State Department in this arena is very important, and I think we are working very well and effectively together to that end.

Senator BIDEN. That is very encouraging, and I thank you. I did not mean to imply, Mr. Chairman, by my question, any criticism of the present administration. So much has happened so quickly that it would be very difficult for them to have simultaneously reorganized.

I will end on this. I am happy to see your approach, Mr. Secretary. I am fully confident that you understand how much has changed in the world and are capable of understanding the apparatus, as well, to deal with those changed conditions. I am excited about your nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I would add that there are some very experts who are not particularly partisan who are doing the work now that you may want to keep on.

I will now recognize Senator Lugar and then Senator Sarbanes, and then we will recess for lunch. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christopher, in March, Gen. William Burns, representing the Department of State, Defense, and Energy, accompanied Senator Nunn, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senators Warner, Bingaman, and me to the Ukraine and Russia.

As a part of the conversations during that trip, an idea was formulated which has been pursued, and is still being pursued by General Burns as our chief negotiator, to purchase on behalf of the Department of Energy all of the highly enriched uranium that comes from the destruction of the tactical nuclear weapons now collected from all of the republics and reposing in Russia, where they are being destroyed systematically.

The agreement will be to buy all of the highly enriched uranium that comes from that destruction as well as from the strategic weapons as they are destroyed and warheads are dismantled in Russia.

It is estimated 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and the sum of \$5 billion to \$6 billion might be involved over 20 years of time, and that it might involve revenue-sharing with the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, of the portions of the highly enriched

uranium that came from the weapons on their soil that have been reposed in Russia.

I know you are aware of these negotiations, so my question is simply this: Would it be the intent of you and the administration to continue to pursue avidly these negotiations if they should not be consummated before January 20? Specifically, would you do so on the basis that they are tremendously important in terms of the safety of Russia, of the United States, and the rest of the world that we have this highly enriched uranium in our possession, and that it be denatured in the United States and used for peaceful purposes in a commercial agreement with which the commercial energy resources of this country are supportive?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I hope that agreement is concluded even before we get into office, but if it is not, we will certainly join you in pursuing it.

Senator LUGAR. I would appreciate that, and as we have opportunities, if it is not consummated before January 20, I would appreciate the opportunity from time to time to query as to how things are going.

I feel, as do many Senators, that this is tremendously important to pursue and to finalize, given all of the interrelationships that are involved.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That whole set of problems are among the most important and dangerous in the world, as I said in my statement, so I certainly endorse your efforts.

Senator LUGAR. In another piece of unfinished business, Senator Bradley and I introduced in the 101st Congress, and we have tried to champion on various other occasions, resolutions in behalf of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the General Assembly adopted November 20, 1989.

For a variety of reasons, this administration did not send that treaty to the Senate for consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee. It would be my hope that you and the incoming administration would do so. Do you have any views on that deliberation?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Lugar, I will not be able to name them, but I think there are probably several treaties of that character that have not yet been sent up for confirmation or approval. As I looked over that list the other day, it seemed to me that the Treaty on the Rights of the Child, if I have named it correctly, would take a very high priority and without absolutely committing myself, I think it needs to be one of the very next ones to come.

As you know, there is a history of delay in the approval of such treaties after they have been negotiated. It is a matter of timing here in the Senate, whether your plate is empty enough to enable you to handle the matters, but that is one that did reach out to me, and I felt that we ought to do that as soon as we possibly could.

Senator LUGAR. I believe the treaty has a strong bipartisan support. I will certainly continue to be an advocate of it, and I appreciate your response.

Mr. Christopher, I had not intended to get into October Surprise, but let me just say for the sake of the record that the desire of this committee to pursue that particular inquest following publication of the book by Mr. Gary Sick and publicity attending that book es-

entially was, I think, an unfortunate turn of events in the committee.

There are few occasions in which I have expressed such anger in an open session, but that was one of them, in which I believe that the committee was impugning the integrity of Presidents Reagan and Bush, and indirectly accusing them of treason if the finding was that somehow or other either or both had been involved in keeping our hostages in Iran while they followed crass partisan purposes. It seemed to be an outrageous situation.

Now, having said that, the committee voted 9 to 8 to pursue it, with all Democrats supporting the resolution except for Senator Dodd, who voted no, and all Republicans opposing except for Senator Jeffords, who voted yes. On that basis, by a one-vote margin, the money for the investigation by the committee was sought.

Now, the Senate as a whole denied the money through a filibuster in the latter part of that Congress, and therefore no money was appropriated. You can imagine my surprise on coming back the next year to find out that the committee was still pursuing it, largely through a reallocation of money on the Democratic side.

I came into the situation reluctantly because Senator Helms was ill and had to have surgery and asked me to try to take charge on our side, and I appreciate the chairman accommodating my hopes that he and I might take a role to try to bring this thing to a successful conclusion.

We did so. I attended all of the hearings, including the one in which you testified, and I appreciated your testimony. I share the agony that you and others had in trying to get our hostages out of Iran. I would hope in a bipartisan way that feeling has been shared by all, with some compassion for President Reagan as he tried to think through that difficult proposition.

Whether the arms were new or old, or whether they had been bought and paid for by the Shah, not the Ayatollah Khomeini, seems to me to be immaterial to the fact that the American people wanted the hostages freed and in a bipartisan way many of them tried to do that. Without exonerating anybody, let me just say that, having heard all of the testimony, it was apparent to me that there was no more in the story in 1991 or 1992 than there had been in 1980 or 1981.

I regret that Mr. Sick found it necessary to publish the book and in a highly publicized way give some further credence to his reputation and to these rumors. But, nevertheless, that occurred. The Senate report was, in fact, filed in November. It was criticized for being truncated by lack of travel by the staff or lack of time when, in fact, no further travel all around the world, back and forth, or months would have made any difference in the conclusions.

The House, having spent however much money, \$1½ million, or \$4 million, as the press alleges today, and went thoroughly back and forth through the same issue, came to the same conclusions.

Let me just comment that I have no question of you with regard to this particular situation. You have given your testimony. It is an indication, however, of how bipartisanship in foreign policy can rapidly be disrupted when persons, for best reasons of their own, decide to pursue avidly a very partisan, and I think, nasty set of rumors throughout a political campaign when there was almost no

foundation for them, while operating under the idea that almost any rumor that comes up deserves the final disposition of this committee.

I hope that you and your administration will not generate further nonsense of this variety, and clearly I hope that by putting this issue to bed during this administration, we are done with it. But in any event, I would hope likewise that as you consider appointees to the State Department or to the administration, people such as Mr. Sick or others who have been involved in what I think are irresponsible activities will not come under high consideration for such posts.

And you will have to make your own judgment as to their competence otherwise, but it seems to me that finally people have to be responsible for things they write, for books they write, for articles they write, for letters to the editor that they write. There has to be some responsibility, and it seems to me that needs to be underlined as we come, hopefully, to the end of this unfortunate chapter.

Let me shift to a better subject, Mr. Secretary, just to say I agree entirely with your statement on page 6, that from Vietnam to Iran-Contra we have often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policy hatched by experts without proper candor or consultation with the public and the Congress.

Now, specifically, we are in a military situation in Somalia now. Questions have been raised by some Members, although we have been out of session and we have not had consultation on this issue, as to whether the administration should have asked for authorization from the Congress to put Americans in harm's way in Somalia. If our goals are changing in Somalia, and if it is probable they will have to change some more from securing the ports and humanitarian service to starving people to what amounts to a probably necessary but, far-ranging goal involving a struggle with elements in Somalia and to bring back a failed country to some vitality.

At what point would you favor coming to the Congress, setting forth what you believe are the U.S. vital interests in Somalia, and the potential extent of U.S. involvement over the course of weeks or months, or however it is likely to take, and asking for a degree of authorization so that you know you have on the board the votes of Members of Congress, and that there is no invocation of the War Powers Act at some arbitrary point? Or, on the other side, to be alert to the tendency of Congress to support the administration while things are going well and not when things are going poorly. What is your view on any of this?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I wonder if I could ask you whether the current administration has provided notifications to you under the War Powers Act? I am sorry to ask a question in response to a question to me, but I had understood that there had been consultation with the Congress with respect to the activities in Somalia, but that is just from reading the press on that subject. Am I wrong about that?

Senator LUGAR. That is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. We have not had consultation.

Senator LUGAR. Well, the leadership, I gather, of the Congress had some consultation.

The CHAIRMAN. At a higher level than we are.

Senator LUGAR. But not ourselves. We have not been involved as a committee. But in any event, Mr. Christopher, as you know even if the strict terms of the War Powers Act were followed through and a notification has come at a certain number of days the administration has to come back and ask for a declaration of war, or an authorization at least to continue what it was doing. And the clock is ticking, and the predictions are now, widely, that everything may not be resolved in Somalia in a reasonable measure of time.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Let me say several things about that, Senator. I would hope that whenever we undertook that kind of an action we would consult very broadly. It may be unfortunate timing with it being over a holiday period that there has not been adequate consultation. But one of my primary missions will be to ensure consultation with appropriate people in Congress.

I find that I learn something every time I meet with a Member of Congress. And I think we ought to meet with them regularly and learn from them because of their deep experience.

I would also say that our administration will, on a voluntary basis, provide the notifications that are required under the War Powers Act, and not put ourselves out of compliance with the law.

With respect to the point at which we come to the Congress and ask for specific authority, I really would like to ask for an opportunity to study that question further before responding.

Senator LUGAR. Well, please do because I think the question will reoccur, and probably very soon. And the question will be whether, having inherited the Somalian situation, what you will you do on Somalia which most of us believe should have occurred. I would support that; support the administration, and having the latitude to do the right thing with regard to the safety of Americans, and likewise the fulfillment of policy. But I can see things becoming stretched.

This afternoon, when we have more questioning, I will ask a similar line of questioning on Bosnia in Yugoslavia, where we really start in a different way. In essence, there the issue is the definition of our security goals and the reason why the American people would support substantial military intervention. Probably it has not been made by this administration. It will certainly be made by yours. And so I want to explore at that time, really, how we might progress in that situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Incidentally, there is a press flash from Reuters that the United States and its allies are now attacking Iraq.

I will turn at this point to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, this is tangential to Secretary Christopher.

While this is tangential to Secretary Christopher, I just want for a moment to address this Iran-Contra issue, and the October Surprise, which have come up in this hearing. I want to be very clear that it is tangential to the nominee. But since it has been raised, I would like to address the issue for just a moment.

There were a number of allegations that had been made, which if true, would be very serious. They were gaining considerable cov-

erage in the press, and speculation not only in this country but abroad. I think the question was whether to simply allow that situation to fester or try to address it in some thorough and responsible way.

Chairman Hamilton, who headed up the House study, which just concluded this morning, stated early on that to have left these allegations to fester would have been inexcusable if they were true, and terribly unfair if they were false. And, of course, he set out to undertake a thorough study in the House, along with Congressman Hyde who headed up the Republican side.

Apparently their study, which was much more complete than ours, was able to obtain previously classified and unavailable information, including CIA and NSA intelligence information. They were able to take the statements of many witnesses who had never been interviewed under oath, many of whom had not been interviewed at all. It seems to me that, having done this and having reached a conclusion, it really clears the air and puts that issues effectively behind us. And that ought to be welcomed by everyone.

The alternative would have been to simply let this matter hang out there, with the kind of coverage it was receiving which was not insubstantial, therefore spreading hypothesizing and speculation through the body politic, not only in this country, but overseas as well. And it seems to me the kind of study that was done served an important public purpose. I simply want to register that for the record.

Secretary Christopher, I want to thank you for your statement. I thought it was perceptive and wide ranging. I thought it was geared to guiding principles, which is important, and principles which reflect the nature of the changing international scene in which we find ourselves. At the same time, it reflected an understanding of the realities that we confront abroad as we concern ourselves with protecting our interests.

Listening to the statement and observing your responses to questions thus far, I have to say that one of your strongest features, which gives me a sense of confidence with your expected stewardship of the Department of State, is I think you will make wise judgments. You have the capacity to understand the complexities of situations, to think ahead as to where they might go, where they might lead, what the consequences will be, and reach a strong and prudent judgment as to what we ought to do.

Often you get people who say, "well, you know, make a quick decision, whatever it may be, even if it is wrong, just to make a quick decision." I have never understood that kind of thinking, particularly in the arena in which you are at work, because if you make the wrong decision it can have very serious consequences, including the needless death of American men and women.

I have a lot of confidence that you will make the right decisions, and that they will be made with the degree of prudence and careful thought that such weighty decisions require.

I have just a few questions I want to ask you before the lunch break. I want to pick up on your statement. First of all, you stated: "It is not enough to articulate a new strategy, we must also justify it to the American people." Today, foreign policymakers cannot af-

ford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy.

I think that is a very perceptive statement. And the question it leads me to ask you is, how much of a commitment do you think you might be able to make in traveling in this country—not abroad, in this country—to explain and articulate our policy?

Let me just make this point to you. According to the 1990 census profile, a third of the American people live in the 14 largest metropolitan statistical areas—a third. In other words, a speech a little better than once every 4 weeks in each of them would reach a third of our people. You would be present, on the scene, presenting an articulation of our foreign policy. And that encompasses 20 States, one way or another. A half of our people live in the 39 largest metropolitan areas. A half of the American people.

That encompasses 30 States, or parts of 30 States, because these statistical areas go across States. Many of these jurisdictions have their own local councils of foreign affairs or foreign relations which hold sessions. There are other sponsorship groups and universities that are available. I have a personal interest in this. We have one in Baltimore where we would like to have you appear as Secretary of State to articulate foreign policy.

In laying out this thinking and in talking about sitting behind a desk that is labeled "the America desk," have you thought about the need or the desirability of the Secretary of State to move out into our countryside more frequently than has been the case in order to make major presentations about U.S. foreign policy?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Senator, I have. Public diplomacy, I think, would be a high priority with me. I think it involves me, as well as other high officials in the State Department. I do not aspire to exceed Senator Baker's record of foreign travel. I admire so much what he achieved in the Middle East, but it seems to me that it would be quite desirable for me to stay here in the United States and to, so far as I can, try to explain American foreign policy to the people of the United States to engender support for that.

Now, I will work for the President if you confirm me, and I will go where he wants me to go, and that inevitably will involve a certain amount of foreign travel. But my own commitment to myself is when the President enunciates a new policy or when we are exploring a new policy, to get around the country and to find out what the people are thinking, as well as to try to explain to them what I am thinking.

So I very much hope to achieve that, Senator, and perhaps a year from now you and I can assess whether I have been able to live up to that role.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I certainly encourage you to do so. My recollection, as you went back to the Marshall-Acheson eras, is that the Secretaries of State used to get out. The demands for them to go abroad now have intensified. The introduction of the concept of shuttle diplomacy to be conducted personally by the Secretary of State in some region of the world has greatly increased. It used not to be expected or anticipated that a Secretary of State would be doing that sort of thing. It is tremendously time-consuming. Of course, what it means is the Secretary focuses on only one issue

as the head of a department that has a whole range of issues to cover.

But it seems to me that frequent and well-planned visits across America to make major foreign policy addresses certainly will get the exposure of the thinking, and at the same time, begin to involve the American people in a much more direct and intimate way with foreign policy—I encourage you to do that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I share that feeling very much, Senator, and my own concern is that there is a real danger in an over-preoccupation by the Secretary with a single issue. This is a big world with problems all over and if the Secretary is concentrating 80 or 90 percent of his time on a single issue, there is a real danger that other issues will go unattended or that other opportunities around the world will be missed.

Now, it is a very delicate balance because some problems demand the attention of the Secretary of State, but I would hope there would be understanding that one of the principal jobs of the Secretary of State is to look all over the globe nearly every day and try to determine what the main risks for the United States are and not to be so preoccupied with a single problem that the country is deprived of the benefit of his judgment as to new problems that may be springing up.

I would like very much to be known as someone who is involved in preventive diplomacy. Crisis management is, of course, important and I am sure there will have to be a lot of crisis management. But I would like very much to be a crisis preventer, if I possibly could be.

Senator SARBANES. Well, we certainly welcome that, and I want to note that in your statement you specifically made reference to the problems on the African Continent which are often neglected because we do not have the same kind of direct economic interests in Africa that we have in Europe and in Asia, and even in Latin America. I think that does reflect a breadth scope that I think is highly desirable.

I want to make just one comment. I welcome your statement on page 11 that the U.N. cannot be an effective instrument for sharing our global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations.

It is a matter of very deep concern to me that the United States is the major delinquent at the U.N. in meeting its dues obligations. We are on a timetable to try to close them out and we constantly are subjected to criticism at the U.N. by other nations who are current in paying their dues. I am not talking about assuming additional obligations. I am talking about meeting the obligations that we already undertook and failing to do so.

In other words, we are not meeting our requirements, and I think it undercuts our ability to exercise influence within the organization, particularly at a time when the U.N. has become a very effective instrument for achieving important objectives to which the United States subscribes. So I very much encourage you to try to deliver on that statement, if possible, and early on in the course of this administration.

In the total picture, the money is not large but I think it would have a dramatic impact on the perception of the United States in

the international scene and would enable us to come to the table, enabled there to articulate a much more strong and vigorous posture, preventing criticism that we have not even met our obligations.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I agree with that completely, Senator. I know it is a very large portion of the State Department's budget, and this gives me an opportunity to say that it seems to me that peacekeeping, peacemaking under the U.N., has reached the point where it ought to be drawn, at least in part, from the defense budget or from defense savings.

The U.N. has become such an important instrument of American foreign policy, or at least such an important aspect of American foreign policy, that it seems to me that the Department of Defense budget ought to be at least partly responsible for helping us make up that arrearage and for producing the necessary funds as we place more and more burdens on the U.N. You look through my statement and you will see a number of places where I, just echoing the words of this committee and many others, am asking the U.N. to do more and more things, and in that context, it seems to me that we ought to be paid up, as you said so eloquently, and within our own governmental structure I would argue for some sharing of the burden by the Department of Defense.

Senator SARBANES. Finally, the time for this round is drawing to a close so I want to address just briefly the question of ambassadorial nominations. This is an issue which, as my colleagues on the committee know, I have taken some interest in over the last 2 years. And I have been very concerned by the—well, let me express it in a couple of ways.

First of all, I think that a fairly high percentage of our Ambassadors should be drawn from the career service. We, after all, have a career service. These are people who spend a lifetime developing the skills and competence to handle those responsibilities. Many of the other leading countries draw all of their Ambassadors out of the career service, and are, in effect, staggered, if not shocked, at the American process.

I do not go that far. I think there are reasonable bases on which from time to time to nominate and confirm Ambassadors who are not out of the career service and are drawn more broadly from our society. I do not think that number should be large and, in fact, in the early part of the previous administration, it had very heavily tilted the nominations made to noncareer people, in sharp contrast with anything that had occurred prior, including both Democratic and Republican administrations. Later, in fairness to them, that imbalance was corrected.

That is the first point. The second point is that people drawn to be Ambassadors who are not in the career service, it seems to me, must bring to the table a record in terms of their competence, their experience, their abilities which leads one to see a justification for being named as an Ambassador. I do not want to work through, as I have done in past years, a résumé and wonder all the way through why this person is being nominated to be Ambassador to country x and find the answer in appendix B where they are required to list their campaign contributions.

Now, I do not preclude campaign contributions. In fact, I have told some witnesses at the table on their ambassadorial nominations that we welcome that kind of citizen involvement, but before you ever get to appendix B there ought to be a justification in that résumé for this person receiving this ambassadorial nomination. I think it is an important point.

Many people dismiss Ambassadors and say they are irrelevant in the world of fast communications. I disagree very strongly with that. Too often, the perspective is if someone who is sent does not have these abilities and they make it through their tenure without a major crisis happening, everyone says "you see, no harm done" because they are bailed out by the foreign service people all around them, the DCM and everybody else.

No one ever measures the opportunity costs that were lost in terms of the good that an able and skillful Ambassador, career or noncareer, could have achieved for the United States. And I strongly believe that a highly competent and skillful Ambassador in a country can make a difference, a positive difference, for American interests. I very strongly put this case to you to ensure that the Ambassadors that are going to be sent to this committee are people of very high competence. We are only talking about a limited number of positions, a significant number of them drawn from the career service. The balance who come from the outside should bring with them a basis that would warrant such an appointment.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I associate myself with all or virtually everything that you have said, and I assure you that Governor Clinton, in the conversations we have had about that, wants to maintain very high standards for the appointment of Ambassadors abroad. I do think that noncareer Ambassadors do bring a leavening to the process. We have had some outstanding noncareer Ambassadors, as you yourself indicated, but they have to bring something to the post, some piece of background, some language skill, or something else that gives assurance that they will make a real contribution, as well as having the right temperament and the right attitude about being an Ambassador.

An Ambassador is a very important person for the United States in the country where they have gone. They carry our flag, they represent us, the other country judges us by them, as well as being able to interpret for the President the attitudes and moods in that country.

I am not one that buys the idea that because somebody can parachute in for a negotiation we do not need an Ambassador. One example of that is the importance of our having Ambassadors in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union now. We have had to look hard to find people with even language skills to get through those tasks. Nevertheless, it is important for the United States to be represented there, and I will disagree with Senator Helms in his presence when he is here, I think it is very important for us to have Ambassadors, especially in such newly independent countries as those of the former Soviet Union.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much. Just to clear the record, I was out of the country at the time, we were notified about the

Somalia operation by the administration and the chairman of the African subcommittee, Senator Simon, was notified.

I congratulate the witness on the precision and stamina he has shown and suggest we recess now for a bite to eat. Be back here at half past 2.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Moynihan, Robb, Feingold, Mathews, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, and Coverdell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Today at 3 p.m., our President is going to make a statement concerning military action against Iraq. I would like personally to express my full support for his decision to strike military targets there.

Iraq had deployed missiles in violation of the Gulf War cease-fire and the two no-fly zones. The missiles were a threat to American planes and had to be removed. The no-fly zones were established to protect the Iraqi people, and in this regard the decision to hit the missiles is an action taken in defense of the Iraqi people against a brutal dictatorship. The necessity of this action underscores our failure to have supported the Iraqi people during the March 1991 uprising, and should lead us to redouble our efforts to assist the Iraqi people in the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime.

I welcome the witness back and congratulate him on his testimony so far in its succinctness and depth, and turn now to Senator Kassebaum, whose turn it is.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would join with you in your comments regarding the need to be vigilant and firm in our response to Saddam Hussein's efforts to continually move the goalposts and more or less thumb his nose at the rest of the world.

Mr. Christopher, I would like to start with Africa again for a moment. Since 1981 when I came on this committee, I have either chaired the African subcommittee or been the ranking member since 1986. And the dedicated work of the chairman, Senator Simon, of that subcommittee has been, I think, very important and we have worked well together. And through those years in the nations of sub-Saharan Africa there have been many peaks and valleys in both political and economic affairs, probably more valleys than peaks.

But I think it is important not to give up, and I would like to ask first about Sudan. I have been particularly concerned about the situation there under, I think, the excellent leadership of our Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Hank Cohen. He has provided, I think, fine leadership on African matters.

And our Government has expressed concern about the situation in Sudan where the government at Khartoum has really systematically wanted to try and, again, move out people that ethnically

were not agreeable with them from the south. And the people in the south in many ways are very vulnerable, the population there, between the SPLA rebels and the government.

And I do not know if you have had a chance to give any thought to that, but is there further pressure that can be brought to bear against the Sudanese Government to allow at least relief efforts to get through?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Kassebaum, I have done just a little reading on the Sudan since I have come back to government, and I tend to feel it is one of those serious problems that has not gotten as much international attention as it should. It is one of the tragedies of Africa that the tragedies of that continent compete for attention with one another.

And although its governmental structure is not as totally chaotic as Somalia, nevertheless, it is a government that is very coercive and very harsh on its people, and there is a certain amount of ethnic intolerance, to put it very, very mildly. One of the things that I am not sure of is the degree of our leverage in connection with Sudan; I think our aid programs have become very modest there.

And all I would be able to say at this time is that it seems to me that our African Bureau ought to continue to press the Sudan for more tolerance and understanding of the different ethnic groups. Of course, the history of that country, which I am sure you know many times better than I, is one of very strong tribal conflicts and inability of the north and the south to agree. But we will continue to try to pursue a policy of encouraging the government to tolerate the other minorities within the country.

More broadly speaking, of course, that is so dramatically necessary all around the world. Before I stop let me just salute you, Senator, for your service on that subcommittee. I think you and Senator Simon have rendered characteristically selfless service on that committee.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. Well, true, our leverage is not great there, but I wish that the Organization of African Unity, the OAU, would, in itself, step forward at least to make a demand that the relief agencies be able to get through with the delivery of their relief.

Just to go back to Somalia a minute—and Senator Lugar, of course, raised some questions regarding that earlier—it seems to me that what could be most important, perhaps, about Somalia at this point is the handoff from the United States to the U.N. in their peacekeeping role. And I was struck with your comment about the need for it to be more—the forces in the U.N. peacekeeping be more robust and more muscular.

There was an editorial in the Hutchinson News in Hutchinson, KS, a couple of days ago about wondering if U.N. soldiers were mere potted plants. And I think that perhaps it stems from, one, all of us around the world expecting too much of the U.N. as we turn to it for a number of these troubled stops, and too soon. But as our expectations have been dashed a bit, how do we restore that muscle which I think needs to come if we can—if we hope to be able to see success under the U.N. jurisdiction.

And I guess I would like to ask specifically, do you support the establishment of a permanent standby force for peacekeeping operations and how aggressively should we be involved?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, my general feeling is to support that or least support the exploration of how that can be done. And I think, Senator Kassebaum, that a great deal has to do with the kind of expectations that are created when you bring people into such a force.

If you ask for volunteers from various countries and assure them that they are not going to be in harm's way, then you will get people who are very reluctant to carry out their duties aggressively. On the other hand, if you describe it as a noble but somewhat dangerous endeavor, then you are likely to get a different kind of person who is not so surprised by the need to be in a battle of one kind or another. And I have a strong conviction that the U.N. has got to begin to recruit some people for that endeavor who are prepared to take the risks, to undertake the agony of sometimes losing some members from their force in what I think is a very noble cause.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well I do too, but I think that if it is to succeed we and our other allies are going to have to invest a great deal of time and effort in helping, as you say, provide some of the muscle there to get that done.

And then if I may move from Somalia to Bosnia simply because some of the same issues are there, I tend to feel very comfortable with the U.N. mandate which enabled us to go into Somalia, and that was to secure an environment for the humanitarian relief. I think it was very well defined. I think that obviously it is going to take a long time to restore order in that country; there is nothing there. But our initial mission was well defined and as we move beyond that, I still think we can define it so that it does not leave us there in a quagmire.

But moving to Bosnia for a moment, if we are to become involved militarily, and certainly I tend to feel that our options and the world's options are about to run out, this is something that I think NATO must be aggressively involved in and the European countries should stand up and be counted far more than they have.

But how would you define our objective there? Would it be humanitarian? Would it be to stop the fighting or to evict the Serbs from territory that they gained by force, or something else? Have you given any thought to what objectives there should be there?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I have certainly pondered the difficulty of finding an objective. If one of the several tests for the use of force is to have a clear objective, although perhaps albeit a limited objective, that is one of the most difficult parts of the analysis in connection with Bosnia, especially if your second test is whether or not you can achieve the objective in reasonable terms.

And I think that is what will make our task, when we address this more aggressively after January 20, a very difficult task. The no-fly zone and enforcement of it is, once again, a nice, clearly defined task. But once you get into dealing with the situation on the ground or even especially, I guess, aerial bombings to try to remove various batteries, the question is what is the ultimate objective you are trying to seek.

And I do not want to appear by this conversation to indicate that Governor Clinton has traveled down any of these roads, but, as I think about it I think one of the hardest problems for us, and I am not prepared to answer it today, is what would our objective be if we go into Bosnia. You can look at the situation and see the horror of it, but the next part of the analysis is very difficult.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well as Senator Biden pointed out, of course, in the dramatic story this morning, I just think there are many people in this country who feel that we cannot turn our backs on that kind of tragedy either, but how do we work with it because it is a different situation than Somalia, even though the tragedy is just as great or greater, depending on one's ties to the peoples there.

But I have heard some who have expressed some concerns about any peace agreement that may be worked out—and that is a possibility although it seems like a fragile reed to me at this point. But that it will not work unless there is also a war crimes tribunal set up at the same time. It has been expressed that unless there is some means to answer revenge, that that will just continue on under any peace plan, and I wonder if there is a way, from just the legality of it, that a tribunal can be agreed to in any peace agreement and set up immediately?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think from the standpoint of international law, you know, the creation of the war crimes tribunal after World War II was simply an act of the victorious allies. But we do not have a great deal of precedent about that.

It is clear that under the ICJ—the International Court of Justice—it might be possible to set up a war crimes tribunal. But I think that a number of multilateral institutions have the capability to set up plausible war crimes tribunals. The European Community could possibly do it. I do not know whether it is foreign to the charter of CSCE; my guess is it probably is foreign to the charter of CSCE.

The political will to do something in Bosnia, though, I think is probably a more difficult question than the problem of the various techniques of establishing a war crimes tribunal. I think if you decided that you had the political will and were going to find the people and round them up, that you could develop in some way an adequate tribunal.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But it seems to me, as much as I think it is important and I can understand the importance of it, it is going to be very difficult, as you say. To set it up as a mechanism as part of any peace agreement would probably be almost impossible.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Peace agreements quite often produce amnesties, widespread amnesties, rather than war crimes trials, so that is part of the tension in the situation.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to move to the question of proliferation for a moment. In your statement you said regarding the proliferation of deadly weapons, we must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation, and so forth.

It has been reported that China may have exported M-11 missiles to Pakistan and M-9 missiles to Syria. This would be a violation of law which would call for sanctions on our part. If this is indeed the case, are we prepared to invoke sanctions?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well as I said in my statement, on the balance sheet with respect to China, we certainly have to put very strongly on the negative side their willingness to provide weapons of mass destruction, or at least very, very difficult weapons, to a number of countries where they just enhance the danger enormously by providing those weapons.

And I think any of our dealings with China are going to have to take that into account. I do not think we can have a relationship with China that does not recognize not only the human rights violations, but their strong tendency in recent months, at least in the reports I have received, to be willing to sell arms or weapons of mass destruction and missiles to places where it is most improper for them to do so.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Would it be useful—in regarding proliferation, our sort of informal arrangements have been the Australian group or the MTCR, the missile technology control regime. Would it lend any muscle to those efforts to institutionalize them, because they have been more or less an informal arrangement? Is there some way to get some muscle into this so when there is a violation, we have a group that is there?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. One of the things we will be looking for is ways to multilateralize this problem. As you know, the U.N., on a five-power basis, began to explore limitations on arms sales. That effort did not get very far because, among other things, the U.S. sale to Taiwan caused the Chinese to be very reluctant to go ahead with the five-power talks in the U.N.

This is a strange—maybe not strange but paradoxical—position for the Chinese to be taking if the reports of their widespread sales are true, but countries are quite capable of taking paradoxical positions where it serves their purpose.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is true, but it seems to me this is one of the most important issues for us now. Because obviously it really applies to Russia and they try and sell their arms. China has become ever more aggressive and we ourselves, of course, are selling arms as such. And it is not to say that those sales cannot or should not be accomplished, but when it is of deadly weapons, weapons of mass destruction, some means of putting muscle behind what we say or what a group would say such as any arrangement such as the Australian group, I think is terribly important.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. This is uniquely a situation where a country cannot act alone very effectively because if you act alone you are simply injuring the manufacturers within your country and it is picked up by another country immediately. So it cries out for a multilateral approach, and that was an encouraging start at the U.N. but it was—I think it has faltered because of sales that have been made by some of the five members, or at least promised.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. My time has run out.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Christopher, let me join my colleagues in commending you for a very thoughtful and concise opening statement, considering the magnitude of the issues that need to be addressed and will be addressed on your watch.

I just want to mention, if I could, briefly a couple of matters that have been raised already and to underscore them.

For one, I was somewhat surprised that the so-called October Surprise issue would be a subject for your confirmation. But there are those, I guess, who want to pursue whatever avenue they can.

Senator Lugar properly pointed out that, much to the disappointment I know of my colleagues on this side, I voted against the formation of a committee because of my concerns about whether or not anything worthwhile would come of it. I was particularly reluctant to have this committee, as a foreign policy committee, be engaging in something that I thought, while there may have been merit to look at it, did not necessarily belong under the auspices of this committee.

But my hope would be that just as there were those of us who expressed our opposition then to that issue, that this would not be the subject of prolonged discussion in terms of your confirmation hearing.

Second, I want to underscore what Senator Sarbanes raised with you about Ambassadors. And he has done an excellent job on behalf of this committee, indeed, on behalf of all of us in this country, in raising very legitimate concerns. I think Senator Sarbanes raised the issue of language ability. I think you did as well, and I want to underscore that point. There is little or no reason, with some obvious exceptions, why people who seek to represent our Nation in most parts of the world cannot be if not totally fluent at least conversant in the language of the nation in which they will be residing. That is extremely, extremely important.

Senator Sarbanes also picked up on what I thought was an excellent statement in your opening remarks, not only about the public supporting foreign policy, but that there is nothing foreign about foreign policy. And I think that is critically important.

I suspect that Senator Helms is correct that if there were a referendum this afternoon on whether or not we ought to have a foreign aid program, the American public would probably reject it.

But they would reject it in ignorance, in my view, for failure to understand how critically important it is for our economic well-being—even in strict fiscal terms, disregarding everything else. In strict fiscal terms, the economic well-being of this Nation, and certainly its economic well-being in the years to come, will be directly dependent on our ability to trade and to engage in the commerce of the world.

And so it is critically important that we try and reverse this trend. Out of ignorance, I believe, more than anything else, the American public fails to understand this direct linkage. As you have said, there is nothing foreign about foreign policy.

In that regard, I think beefing up commercial offices and trying to do what can be done to deal intelligently with export licensing makes a great deal of sense. And I will not ask you necessarily to comment on it. You have stated it, but I wanted to underscore it for my own perspective.

Now, most of my colleagues are asking, I think, very important questions regarding Bosnia and Somalia and Iraq, and the specifics. These are case specific. I would like to go beyond that.

Senator Kassebaum talked about holding a Nuremburg type of trials in the case of Saddam Hussein or even possibly Milosevic and others. It was exactly 51 years ago today, on January 13, 1942, that a group of representatives of the allied powers met at St. James Palace in London and announced that the crimes of the Nazi regime would not go unpunished. And as result of that statement, 51 years ago today, the Nuremburg trials emerged. A recent book by Telford Taylor and others have documented the value of those trials.

Certainly today the facts are entirely different. You do not have a vanquished nation, you do not have your hands on Saddam Hussein or Milosevic or others that you may decide deserve to be brought before an international court of justice. But I think Elie Weisel has said it well. It is not just a question that those who engage in the violation of human rights be apprehended, but that their crimes be exposed to the world. And that may mean, in some cases, you do not actually have your hands on the individuals.

You so appropriately talk about General Marshall and Dean Acheson, and even I was not aware of your own strong feelings about them, but I could not agree with you more about examples in recent history of individuals who understood the importance of a world order and trying to resolve matters through diplomacy.

I think this is a wonderful, unique opportunity, going beyond the particular situations of Bosnia and Iraq. There will be other Bosnias and other Iraqs as sure as we are all sitting here today. And the fact that we have not been able, successfully, to establish a permanent court of international criminal justice with teeth to it, this ought to be an opportunity to establish an era of law that many have tried over the years.

There is an opportunity. Just in the last few years, a U.N. Commission has adopted a draft international criminal code. That Commission is now ready to prepare a statute for an international criminal court. Many are hesitant about it, and should look at it carefully for obvious reasons, including our own country. But it is an idea we must pursue, in my view.

I wonder if you might take a few minutes and comment on the wisdom of taking advantage of this new opportunity presented to us, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, the degree of uncertainty that exists, and instead of dealing with this on an ad hoc basis, trying to establish some new set of Nuremburg trials as each situation warrants, whether or not we might take this opportunity to try and establish that permanent international court on criminal justice?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I have had some interest over the last couple of years in looking at the various elements of the U.N. system which might be engaged in dispute resolution. I came at it from that side of the picture. And one of the elements that was suggested for discussion at that time was the establishment of the criminal court.

And I think that it is a good time now, with leadership at the U.N. prepared to think new thoughts and develop new ideas, to see if we cannot find some permanent mechanism, rather than having to set up an ad hoc mechanism each time.

It ties in too, Senator, with my deep concern about the ethnocentrism of the world. The fact that in many countries there is a drive to a kind of an ethnic purity which creates impossible conditions for the minorities in those countries. If we do not find some way so that the different ethnic groups can live together in a country, we are going to have—how many countries will we have? We will have 5,000 countries in the world rather than the 100-plus that we now have.

Part of that is to have some enforcement machinery with teeth so that if people do take action well beyond civilized norms against their minorities, there is an international tribunal that they might be forced to respond to.

Now, you can see from the halting way that I have addressed this that these are very preliminary thoughts on my part. But I think it is the time to look at the U.N. structure, to look at the court structure. That is one of the opportunities we have in the post-cold war period. And I would be very interested, when we designate a legal adviser, to ask for work to be done in that area so that the United States can begin to formulate its own position.

Senator DODD. I appreciate that, and I did not expect for you to go beyond that because it is an issue that needs serious thought. But it will never happen, in my view, unless the United States takes the leadership role in this issue.

The great irony of ironies was that it was the United States, in a bipartisan way, that pursued the Genocide Convention at the end of World War II; tragically, in my view, we were one of the last nations of the world to ratify it some 40 years later. It was leadership in the late 1940's—it was the Marshalls and the Achesons and the Vandenberg and others that fought for those things so hard. And then it was the opponents fighting harder than the proponents for three decades that caused us to fall back.

And unless we fight for this and make it something we really believe is important, it just will not happen. And, again, I deferred, obviously, to the question of looking at this carefully. But I would hope that that would be the case if at all possible.

In that regard, I might add another convention that falls into that category, the American Convention on Human Rights. The ratification of that convention occurred in 1978 by President Carter, as I am sure you are aware of. Again, this is one that has some problems. I am not going to suggest to you that it is perfect. But human rights is an ongoing problem and will be.

It would send, in my view, a very important signal in this hemisphere about our commitment to those issues. Certainly, what occurs in Cuba and elsewhere today would warrant looking at under the Human Rights Convention. I would hope that we might pursue that. And I would ask you to comment, if you might, on it. Again, I believe you may have had some personal experience with that convention.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I have, and I think it is unfortunate that our record is not better. Indeed, our record across the board is fairly abysmal. In the International Court of Justice, our refusing to seat or grant jurisdiction and our retaining the right of unilateral withdrawal is one of the things that sets back the entire enterprise. If the leading nation in the world feels that when it does not want

to risk a bad outcome it simply picks up its marbles and goes home, that is a very unsatisfactory result.

We do have a tendency to agree to treaties and then leave them sitting there without ratification; without coming into effect. I would put your question in that category.

I have been away from here for a number of years. I know the realities of the crowded schedule here. And I guess there are also realities of entrenched opposition. But I think the United States, as the leading power in the world now, has special responsibilities that we ought to undertake to carry out.

Senator DODD. Well, I said ratify. It was signed, we did not ratify.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. It was signed. We did not ratify it.

Senator DODD. I understand that, and you are absolutely correct. Senator Helms and I actually worked out the Genocide Convention to the point where our consent to ratification was given here—and it was supported, not to the full satisfaction, I might add, to this Senator or to him, I presume. But nonetheless, we worked it out.

I think you might find that if the administration will show some real interest, there are those of us up here who are willing to do a lot of the work to try and help it to achieve ratification. And I would just mention to you, this afternoon, that certainly on this particular one I would be prepared to roll up my sleeves and go to work on it. But I would need to know that the administration cared about it as well.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. One of the things I have learned from testifying here before is the importance of going back over the transcript to make sure that when we get back downtown, we remember the things that—

Senator DODD. That were committed. You know the staff will go over the transcript very carefully up here.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Right. I have to try to keep one step ahead of them, but that is impossible.

Senator DODD. We all try to do that, I think. Let me move, if I can, to something you said in your statement, and I want to ask you a bit more about it. On page 14 of your prepared statement, you said: "We also need to take a new look at the way our State Department is organized. I intend to streamline the Department of State to enhance our capabilities to deal with the issues that transcend national boundaries, and to improve the international competitiveness of American business."

It seems to me that over the years, and again you have firsthand awareness of this, with all good intentions we have watched various appendages occur to the structure of the State Department. Someone has had a great idea on a commission or some new task force or cluster or whatever else they call them, and they end up sort of growing over the years. It seems to me, as I look at it, the structure is rather unwieldy. It would seem by your statement that you at least agree in part with that.

And I would like to ask if you might comment a bit more on that. I would like to strongly urge you to take a good, hard look at that structure and see if we cannot make it far more efficient than it presently is.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I certainly hope to do that, and I do have some preliminary thoughts, Senator. You know, there is always the danger in a forum like this which is so public, that if you put out a preliminary thought it suddenly becomes set in concrete, and people are dismayed if it is not carried through in precisely the same way.

With that caveat, and with a hope for understanding, I think I might mention that I am quite enthusiastic about the idea of creating another under secretaryship, this time for global affairs. It seems to me there are so many issues that cut across borders and across continents that it would be desirable for the State Department in the future to have an Under Secretary for Global Affairs which would have responsibility for the Oceans, Environment, and Science Bureau, the Human Rights Bureau, the Refugees Bureau, and perhaps the Antiterrorism and Narcotics Bureaus. It seems to me those are all issues that know no boundaries, and that it would be quite desirable to try to combine them into a group that can work effectively together.

I feel, with respect to the second point you made, reading from my statement, that we can greatly strengthen the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in his or her ability to deal effectively with encouraging American business abroad. Now, that signal is going to have to come from the President and from me if it is going to be carried out in the Embassies around the world.

Just one more comment, and without getting too organization conscious, the Secretary's span of control at the present time is enormous. There must be 25 and 30 direct reports to the Secretary of State. And that probably is an unhealthy situation. And without going much beyond that, I would like to look at that.

Now, that is one of those customary balances. You want to have people who are in important positions to have access to you. On the other hand, they frequently need the inspiration and leadership of a group, and we will try to balance those. I do think it is time to look at an important reorganization at the State Department and one that can be done without legislation in the large part.

Senator DODD. Well, I appreciate that. And I presume as you go through those thoughts that discussions with members of this committee who I know over the years have had a real interest would probably be valuable. And given your earlier comments about wanting to work closely with the committee it is something that we can expect to happen.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I have already had a preliminary discussion with Senator Kerry about that subject, and will certainly look forward to talking to the committee as a whole about it.

Senator DODD. I will come back to some other areas, but I want to hit on Haiti quickly, because I know this is a pressing, immediate issue and it falls within the concern of my subcommittee.

First of all, let me commend the Bush administration, and you, and President-elect Clinton, and others for working as closely as you have together on this as you have on other matters. I feel it is very, very important that the election of President Aristide not be retreated from. That we make it abundantly clear that we feel it is very important that President Aristide's election is something

that we appreciate. It was the overwhelming choice of the Haitian people. And to depart from that would be, I think, a travesty.

There has been an appointment of Dante Caputo, a former Foreign Minister of Argentina whom I know, and who has an excellent reputation as a diplomat as the Special Assistant to the Secretary General on Haiti. Anyway, I would like to ask whether or not you would agree that President Aristide's return to Haiti is an essential element, the solution of the current crisis, and what enhanced role you might see the U.N. play in concert with the OAS in dealing with this particular situation?

And, last, if you can comment on quickly the issue of visas and the potential tragedy of the boat people, people who are using whatever means to escape Haiti, and how we might process those people rather than have them run the risk of losing their lives?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, those are a lot of questions, and whenever you get a barrage you wonder whether you are going to remember them all.

First with respect to Mr. Caputo, I have made an exception in his case. I have not been meeting with Ambassadors because I thought it was inappropriate to do so until I had this hearing, but that situation seemed to be sufficiently urgent so that I ought to meet with him. I have met with him and urged him to pursue his diplomacy with just as much determination and haste as he could, and I think he is doing so.

With respect to President Aristide, there is no question in my mind that, because of the election, he has to be part of the solution to this. I do not have a precise system worked out in my mind as to how he would be part of the solution, but certainly he cannot be ignored in the matter.

With respect to the U.N. and OAS, I could foresee their having people in country to ensure that the procedures be carried out, or more fully and carefully carried out, there. For example, to ensure that people who are returned to Haiti are not subject to improper attitudes or improper treatment when they have returned.

On the last part of your question, Senator, if I am remembering them correctly, I do think there is a great deal that can be done to improve the in-country processing of these requests for asylum. As I understand it, right now the only processing is being done in Port au Prince, and it is very difficult for people living on the other parts of the island, for very poor people with difficulty of travel, they have virtually no chance, very little chance.

When you add to that the bureaucratic problems of seeking asylum, it seems to me that it would be strongly in the U.S. interest to improve the capacity of people to seek asylum there on the island of Haiti. That will require cooperation, but I am encouraged to think that cooperation might be forthcoming.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. Let me run through a series of issues. First of all, in 1985 the Congress passed an amendment barring aid to Pakistan if Pakistan had a nuclear bomb. It was determined that Pakistan had one; they subsequently admitted they have it. It was an amendment that I sponsored. Will you support keeping that law in place?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I am strongly in favor of antiproliferation legislation and legislation that imposes substantial sanctions if there is a violation. I have not studied that particular case in recent years, although my memory goes back to the problems with Pakistan and their obsession with getting a nuclear capability and what I read now indicates that they have probably crossed that threshold.

So I would be very supportive in general of legislation. I am not committing to the interpretation of any given piece of legislation; I know there is an issue there. But in an overall sense, I would be prepared to support the continuation of strong antiproliferation legislation with teeth for people who violate international standards and try to go nuclear.

Senator PRESSLER. Good, I am glad to hear that. Let me say that I am going to skip around here a little bit in some areas that have not been covered.

In regards to Somalia, it has been my strongest feelings, especially when I was at the U.N. this fall, that the U.N. is not using the troops that we helped them train. And it was my feeling that the Belgian battalion and the Nigerian and the Egyptian soldiers who were supposed to come from the U.N. should have done the job that the U.S. soldiers are doing. I oppose the degree of our involvement in Somalia, the way we did it in the sense that we took the whole burden, and the American taxpayer took the whole burden as a result.

Is there a way we can get the U.N., Europe, and Japan to assume more of these humanitarian operations in the future? How will Bill Clinton and you handle situations like that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, perhaps you were out of the room a few minutes ago when I said it seemed to me that the U.N. was going to have to recruit people for peacekeeping who would be prepared to take more risks than they have been in the past. And I think that has been part of the problem. People have been conditioned to feeling they were going into a very low-risk environment, whereas that is not likely to be true.

I think the best thing that we can do is to work with the Secretary General to try to carry out some of the very interesting ideas in the monograph that he produced last year with respect to changing directions at the U.N., to try to have the U.N. become much more effective in the field of peacemaking as well as peacekeeping.

Senator PRESSLER. Skipping to the issue of Kosovo, I am very concerned, as you are and we discussed this in my office the other evening, about the Serbs taking action there. I know that the Geneva peace talks are ongoing but I am curious to get your feelings about a strong stand against Serbian aggression in Kosovo. Do you support the establishment of a multinational preventative force in Kosovo to deter possible Serb aggression in that area? Indeed, I think we all know that if Kosovo were to explode, it could become a regional war.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I know you have been one of the leaders and one of those who has early on recognized the problems of the Albanians in Kosovo, and I commend you for that. Governor Clinton, I think, has not gotten to the point of taking a precise position with respect to Kosovo, but it is, I think, within the umbrella

of the need to take stronger action to prevent further incursions by the Serbs.

As I understand it, the current administration has drawn a line just to the north of Kosovo, and, if that is the fact, that would certainly be a precedent for a future position along those lines, but I am not able, until we are in office and study the whole situation, to give you any feeling with assurance as to what President-elect Clinton will do.

Senator PRESSLER. Last summer I was in Uzbekistan and on the day I was there a Mr. Pulitov, the head of their human rights association, was beaten up by the President's police, and I visited him in the hospital. And just today I have been handed news that he again has been imprisoned.

The President of Uzbekistan is seeking to visit the United States in an official capacity. I wrote letters to President Bush strongly opposing letting the President of Uzbekistan come here in an official capacity until this human rights matter has been resolved. Specifically an accounting for the actions taken against Mr. Pulitov, the head of Uzbekistan's human rights association, is needed. Will you oppose a visit of Uzbekistan's President until Mr. Pulitov's situation is resolved?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I hope you will not be too disappointed in me if I tell you I do not know that particular case. But we will look into it and, as you describe it, it certainly is an egregious case. But since I do not know the case, I would not like to make a firm commitment here as to what we would do. What we will make a commitment to is to look into the matter, and if the prior administration has taken that position that would, of course, be an important precedent for us.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, the U.S. Embassies in Russia and Armenia do not have Ambassadors. When do you expect the President will send nominations for these two posts to the Senate, and especially Armenia?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I hesitate to be too expert on matters of great detail, but as I understand it an Ambassador was nominated for Armenia, Mr. Gilmore, last year, and he was not confirmed by the Senate. I am not sure whether it was that his papers were not completed, but at least that is the information I have, Senator Pressler.

Senator SARBANES. If the Senator would yield, he was not confirmed simply because the nomination came at such a late date that there was not sufficient time to process the nomination. I do not think it represented any judgment about Mr. Gilmore. In fact, I think many people here have a high opinion of his abilities; he has rendered some very distinguished service in his career. But in any event, the fact that he was not moved out there was that the nominations came quite late, near the end of the session, and there was not time to do the job.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. That does confirm the information I had. Actually, I have been concerned about our ambassadorial representation in all the countries, the newly independent states, and had a memorandum prepared on that subject in the last few days and noticed his name. And we will try to move again on that, and I was certainly not suggesting anything

adverse about him, nor nothing adverse about the process, it was just a timing matter.

With respect to Russia, we are hard at work on finding an ambassadorial candidate for that country. It is perhaps our highest priority because we think it is highly important that we have an outstanding Ambassador there to work with President Yeltsin and to give him the support of the presence of a leading American.

That being said, I have the highest regard for our deputy chief of mission who is there manning the post while the ambassadorial slot is vacant, but there is no substitute for having a confirmed Ambassador there and we are going to move on that just as soon as we can.

Senator PRESSLER. I know you covered Cyprus to some extent, but if there is no forward movement in getting the Turkish troops out of Cyprus, would you join in supporting legislation or an effort to reduce aid to Turkey until such time as the troops start to come out?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is a very complicated subject. The ratio of aid between Greece and Turkey has been at a 7 to 10 ratio for a long time, and I think that probably from the standpoint of both parties it would take an important circumstance to change that, so I do not want to commit to making any change in that ratio. Turkey is an important NATO ally of ours, and you would have to balance that with what they have done in other places. I will say that it seems to me that the Government of Turkey ought to be using its good offices, and maybe more than that, to encourage Mr. Denktash to reach a settlement in Cyprus.

Senator PRESSLER. Will you have a special envoy to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You do have a number of hard questions, don't you, Senator. Well one thing I will commit to is to take very determined steps to reinvigorate that process, or to make sure that that process goes forward if it does not need a special push at the present time. I think there is some difference of view as to whether that is best done by a special envoy or by someone who is within the State Department at the present time perhaps, present company not excluded.

But without wanting to commit in this forum as to whether it will be a special envoy or be done in some other way, I will say that very high on my list is seeking ways to make sure that that momentum is not lost in the Middle East peace process.

Senator PRESSLER. Will you support the export-enhancement program for the sale of our agricultural products abroad?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I will.

Senator PRESSLER. Good, I am glad to hear that. Some of the Europeans have been saying that this program is a violation of GATT.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, of course, if that is true then that would have to be looked at, but I had understood that that program has gone forward and that it has been part of the negotiation. Maybe you can educate me about that, Senator Pressler. Has that been part of the GATT discussions?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, yes, very much so. The Europeans have their subsidized exports, which are far in excess of our enhanced sales, and we have tried to answer their subsidies a little bit. We

are going to have to get into an export subsidy war if they do not agree to reduce their export subsidies. I would rather not see us do that, but that is going to be the only alternative that we have and it is a very sad alternative.

Let me touch briefly on what specifically—I know that during his campaign Bill Clinton said that the administration would vigorously work to end the Arab parties boycott of Israel. Are you going to vigorously work to do that, and what is the administration specifically going to do?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I remember his campaign statements to that effect and I will do my best to carry them out. The main means for doing that will have to be diplomatic contacts with our Arab friends. I would expect that I will be meeting with them in the relatively near future, either in their capitals or our capital. One of the things I want to do is to begin to take soundings with my opposite numbers in other countries in view of the President's commitment, but also because I would like to see it happen. That is one of the things that will be on the list.

Senator PRESSLER. Now what specific steps can you take, either by Executive order or by some other action, to prevent our European allies, Russia, and the affected former Soviet Republics, from selling nuclear technology to governments like Iran, Iraq, and even rogue paramilitary organizations in that region?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Without being able to make a catalog of the various things that can be done, I think we need to use all of our leverage to keep that from happening. We have the customary tools: aid of various kinds, trade, votes in multilateral institutions. I think we ought to examine the full range of our options in order to accomplish those nonproliferation purposes. I would not make Russia exempt from our desire that proliferation be avoided any place.

Senator PRESSLER. During the last two administrations there was a lot of criticism of giving political appointees the best Embassies—in a sense the most comfortable places to live, maybe. And people who gave huge political contributions were criticized if they came up as Ambassadors. Is that practice going to be continued?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I would have to say that it is a bipartisan failing, I think, that that happened too often in the past.

And as I have said to Senator Sarbanes and others this morning, qualifications for those jobs ought to be very high, whether it is a career person or a noncareer person. And noncareer appointees ought to have some special qualification for the country to which they are going, and that has not always been the case. I will use all of my influence, and I know Governor Clinton is committed to this as well, to find fully qualified people, whether they be career or noncareer, to go to posts around the world.

Senator PRESSLER. Good. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I apologize for not being here earlier. We issued the POW/MIA report today at 1 p.m., so I feel like a newly liberated human being and have gained back maybe 50 percent of my life. Now the question is, what to do with it?

One of the things that we want to do is, Senator Kassebaum and I talked last year about this whole question of reorganization and the structure of the State Department in the post-cold war world, and I think it is long overdue that we took a look at that. We chatted about that when you were kind enough to come around, as you did with all the members of the committee, and I appreciate it.

We will begin that process shortly in our subcommittee which has jurisdiction over it, of looking at this question of structure, and I do want to ask you some questions about structure without trying to pin you down or anything, just get some general views on it, but I would like to ask about a couple of other areas first, if I may.

A number of us on the committee have followed closely, visited, and been deeply concerned about events in Cambodia. I have been personally sort of a reluctant bride to the peace process because of the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge. I felt some time ago that the alternative course of dealing more forthrightly with Hun Sen might have preserved the process and been a much better approach to the region.

That is now water under the bridge, but the issue remains, tragically. Experts tell us that the Khmer Rouge may well be in a position to literally control the country by the end of the year. I believe they have no interest in peace. I do not think they have any interest in elections, and very little interest in the current process.

The question therefore will loom quickly: One, would you assert that it would be U.S. policy to find unacceptable Khmer Rouge ascendancy through force to control the country, and two, would you think that in the interests of strengthening the peace process we might be well-advised to consider a change in U.N. rules of engagement so as to permit U.N. forces to react with greater strength to current Khmer Rouge provocations?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I believe the answer to both those questions is yes, Senator Kerry. I do think it is unacceptable to have the Khmer Rouge refuse to cooperate in the process that is going on there now, and lay back and in effect assert their power and take over the country, so I do think that would be most unfortunate and, as I say, unacceptable.

On the second half of your question, let me say that I view Cambodia as quite an important test for the U.N. I do not like to make it the sole test. I would not say the U.N. is fatally defective if it does not succeed there, but it would be an important failure if this process does not go forward after it has been laid out with such excruciating care and commitment of time as well as money.

As you can perhaps tell from the answers I gave to some other questions, I do think that we are going to have to have more risk-taking at the U.N. if it is going to carry out the duties that were prescribed for it by the Secretary General in his very interesting paper in the middle of last year.

Senator KERRY. With respect to the U.N. role, since you bring it up now—this is a little bit on the reorg effort, but have you had a chance at all to discuss with Secretary-designate Aspin the question of funding for peacekeeping efforts? Obviously, this committee believes very strongly that peacekeeping remains within the State Department's prerogatives, and that the best solution to the prob-

lem may be simply to shift the budget appropriately. Has that been discussed, because that is obviously a major problem today?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I have not discussed that with Secretary-designate Aspin. I did mention it earlier today here, in this committee room. I feel strongly that that burden ought to be borne, and when you look at the size of our respective budgets, it would not be difficult to find some money for support, one would think, in the savings in the defense budget.

Our budget is extremely small, really quite small, and burdened in so many different ways. I am going to find an early time to try to talk to Secretary Aspin about that and try to find him in a good mood. He is usually in a good mood. I do not want any inference to be made that his mood is not usually a good one.

Senator KERRY. To try to find him in his usual good mood.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.

Senator KERRY. With respect to Bosnia, you have discussed it somewhat, obviously. Would you help us to define what the moral imperative and perhaps political imperative, diplomatic imperative is, when 20,000 women are raped as a matter of war strategy and when people are openly viewed in images freezing, as they are today, in the cold?

What do you feel our responsibility is for that, and particularly in light, if you will, of the World War II experience, do you think that that is relevant to any moral imperatives we might feel?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I do, Senator. I think we ought to learn from the lessons of history. At least we ought to learn that much.

One of the fascinations about the period we are going through is that the definition of the acceptable reasons for the use of force is expanding very rapidly. Somalia expands the definition to include humanitarian causes, and desirably so, I think.

All of the other analysis has to go forward, all of the other questions you ask, and factors, will have to be put into the mix, but what is raised in Bosnia is whether or not genocide, or something very akin to genocide, is also a proper basis for the use of force where the other aspects of the test can be met.

I guess in my own thinking genocide would be if the other tests are met, but as I say, one of the fascinations of this period is the expansion of what the vital interests of the United States are. The use we thought of in the cold war period is almost exclusively military, or exclusively self-defensive. Clearly, the definition is expanding.

Senator KERRY. Do you anticipate—has President Clinton given you an indication, or do you anticipate based on your own knowledge of his position or your own gut that you would approach somewhat differently the question of leadership within Europe and the world, as to our response in that region?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I did not quite catch the end of that question. Would I approach differently—

Senator KERRY. The question of our current response to the predicament in that region. In other words, there are many people who think we may come to a greater confrontation with the question of enforcement of the no-fly zone, perhaps troops.

The issue is obviously ripe as to what happens. President Bush said that if the Serbs pressed into Kosovo, clearly if Macedonia and

Albania become embroiled, this raises the stakes, but the issue is also on the table as to how you might marshal the forces of Europe to respond to aggression against an ethnic minority in Kosovo which would not raise an issue of sovereignty, when some of these other countries—Britain, Spain, et cetera—have their own problems of separatist movements, ethnicity, and so forth.

Would you anticipate us approaching this question of enforcement of a response to the moral imperative you have defined in a different way from that which President Bush and Secretary Baker have?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Let me try this. I think that what Governor Clinton has said, Senator Kerry, is that he feels that our response to this whole host of problems should have been stronger. I say should have been stronger, and should be stronger. How many lost opportunities there have been only history will determine, and probably not with any great precision or accuracy.

If the other part of your question is whether the United States would act unilaterally in the former Yugoslavia area, I do not like to rule out anything. Governor Clinton's remark, together when we can, alone when we must, obviously has to be my guidepost, but it is very difficult for me to envision a situation in which we would take action to use force in Yugoslavia on a unilateral basis. It is so much a European problem that I think for us to array our forces that distance from home, in an area where the European countries have such a strong interest, for us to act unilaterally there, if I am picking up your question correctly, I think would be a most unusual situation, although, as I say, I do not want to rule anything out in view of the overall comments made by Governor Clinton.

Senator KERRY. Would you contemplate the United States pressing through the international institutions, particularly the U.N., for a multilateral response that might include force?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Absolutely. If we reached a conclusion here in our Government that we thought it was desirable to take some action, I cannot imagine that we would not go to multilateral institutions, and especially the U.N.

I do say about this, Senator, not wanting to be evasive, I want to get around and talk with some of my counterparts in Europe, do that either here or there, to try to understand better why it is that they have been so reluctant on this issue, whether they are not as much concerned about the near-genocidal conditions, or perhaps genocidal conditions, as it looks from a distance.

So I want to try to understand that issue better over the next month or so, but I am very deeply concerned about it.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege of traveling to Rio with now Vice President-elect Gore and Senator Wirth and others, and have shared with them a number of international efforts, the First Interparliamentary Conference, and so forth.

As you well know, the world population is at 5.3 billion. Next year it goes to 6.3 billion; 95 percent of that growth will be in less-developed countries. If Somalia is a problem today which requires American troops because people are fighting over food as a commodity of distribution and power, it seems as though that will only magnify itself in these next years.

The issue of sustainable development has been on the table, but frankly little advanced. You have mentioned the notion of a Global Affairs Secretary. I wonder if you could share with us perhaps a little more your vision of some of the options, or some of the initiatives, that you think we really ought to take to address what many of us believe is now—is the new paradigm of international politics, economics resource allocation and use, and the tensions brought about by them, and population growth tied to it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I will probably be better giving you for instances than giving you anything like a catalog.

Senator KERRY. I understand. I know you cannot deal with that whole issue in this timeframe, but just a sense, so that we would have it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do think that our policies on population have been antiquated and worse, and I would hope that one of the first things that is done is that we reverse our refusal to support sensible family planning efforts and other population efforts around the world.

Population is really an area where we can be effective. It is also closely tied to education, especially education of women. Now, that has to be given real weight as well.

In connection with sustainable development, my own feeling is that AID needs to be rethought, revamped, retooled, and done over again. Its purposes, which I think are now 32 or 33, ought to be narrowed, and our funds used far more effectively with much more targeted effort.

For myself, one of the principal efforts ought to be in the direction of sustainable development. We have an assistance program that is largely attuned to the cold war period, where most of the analysis was whether or not the aid would somehow advantage us vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union, and that is no longer a very relevant consideration, so I would certainly put a lot of emphasis on sustainable development there.

There are a number of new techniques that are being developed by nongovernmental organizations. Until—I guess until the 19th of this month—I have taken a very active interest in the Carter Center in Atlanta, GA, President Carter's Center, what they have done to help relieve famine in Africa through the use of new varieties of seed.

How much can be done in the agricultural area by nongovernmental organizations perhaps sponsored by governmental organizations is just breathtaking, when you see what a single country can do if the leader of that country is turned on to ideas like that, so I think we ought to press ahead on fronts like that.

The water shortages around the world are areas that I think deserve quite a high priority. In so many places you see desertification as areas are turned into deserts, and we are losing a great deal of the land mass that can contribute to the feeding of people.

That is just a few instances that come into my mind as I see this new Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and think what an exciting assignment he might have.

Senator KERRY. I think it is an extraordinary assignment with great potential, and I am glad to hear you talking along that line.

Just one last question. As the yellow light is on, I would like to ask a last question. In the course of my investigations into General Noriega and BCCI, it became patently clear to those of us who were engaged in it that there is really a disturbing increase in the power of criminal enterprises internationally to subvert whole governments, Nation-states, even, if you look at Colombia, you look at Syria and other places, Burma and so forth, and this can have a deeply destabilizing impact on foreign policy and on our national interest.

Moreover, we seem to be very badly organized to deal with it. If you go into the Embassies of our Government around the world, you have DEA agents, FBI, Customs, people stumbling over each other, and we are badly organized in this country. We have 13 different entities not really reporting, and we have this drug czar at a sub-Cabinet level, tragically, and I do not think it has worked.

Are you thinking in terms, perhaps, of a new concept of an entity for the administration of criminal justice and linking some of our aid programs to those nations that want to be serious about the efforts to have financial accountability and the transfer of funds, money laundering, drug enterprises, and so forth, because right now what is happening is really a joke. We are just wasting money, millions of dollars, in enterprises that are going to military regimes, people not engaged in it.

I think it is a very, very serious issue in terms of our policy and interest in the long run. Could you just comment generally?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, that is a problem for which I have no ready answer. As you were spelling out the issue, I wondered whether you thought perhaps I was here in my old incarnation as Deputy Attorney General, because in so many ways it is a problem for the Attorney General.

But since you are dealing with foreign entities, it is clearly a problem for the State Department. I have considered reorganizing the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Affairs to include terrorism and other comparable illegal acts abroad, but that probably does not get at your problem either, because this is going to take a combined effort of the intelligence services and the Department of Justice for prosecutions here in the United States together with the State Department, which has some resources, but woefully few resources in that field.

The best thing I can perhaps say to you is not to pretend to know the answer, but to take that problem with me as a serious one. I would like to talk to you about it further, because you are certainly right.

You know, when a criminal enterprise controls a foreign country, it changes our whole relationship with it. We cannot have a normal diplomacy with them.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Coverdell?

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The preliminary questions with regard to our Ambassadors seem to be suggesting that more and more frequently we ought to move toward an exclusivity to foreign service.

I have worked with and met, I would guess, about one-third of our Ambassadors. Nearly without exception, I found them to be extraordinary Americans, serving their country extremely well, and with enormous dedication. I believe that there is something to be said for an inclusion of mainstream America in the ambassadorial corp for two reasons.

One, I think it is useful for foreign governments and representatives of those governments to have the opportunity to meet Americans that perhaps have not been trained—this is an overstatement—to sterility. No. 2, I think it is good for the foreign service itself to be regularly exposed to Americans coming from the mainstream of life in our country.

So with all the admonishments you have heard here today, I would like to raise my voice that we should not move exclusively, or too exclusively, away from the process of utilizing Americans from multiple walks of life in this great endeavor of representing the United States around the world.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I misspoke if I indicated I was moving in the direction of entirely career Ambassadors. That percentage of noncareer Ambassadors has vacillated between sometimes in the low twenties and sometimes as high as the high thirties, perhaps even 40 percent.

And I think one can make judgments within that range, but I think it is very important we have a continuation of the tradition we have in the United States of noncareer Ambassadors leavening the process and adding something to the relationships, not only with the country but with the other Ambassadors.

That being said, Senator, you and I could perhaps have a friendly difference of view as to whether the person shouldn't have some special qualifications for the country that he's going to. I don't mean that he has to be an expert in the country that he is going to, but to send somebody whose only qualifications are campaign contributions, even if he brings a good main street quality about him, I think would not serve us especially well or would not be well-received by the country.

It doesn't take a great deal, language, longstanding interest or connection, academic studies, but just something to show that the person involved has had some real interest in being in that country other than in occupying the ambassadorial residence.

Senator COVERDELL. We do not disagree on that point, other than to say that I think there are many facets of the life experience that ought to be included. If it is only in appendix B, or whatever the appendix is that was referred to, I think that is fair enough.

But I do think we should continue to exercise considerable flexibility about what experience is required to represent the United States.

Mr. Christopher, I would like to, if I might, go back to your statement. Unlike Senator Pressler's question, these questions will be more open and tonal. But if I can, I am wondering if I might encourage you to expand upon some of the comments that you have made here.

On page 5, you said: "Our administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for the U.S. leadership after the cold war. I think

we have heard virtually a unanimous chorus that we are in a very definitional period. It will begin on your watch."

You go on to say, "we cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis." You say, "we must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent crisis."

This new diplomacy, does it envision a beefing of the intelligence systems and network within the State Department? What are the institutional devices that frame or put parameters around new diplomacy?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think that is a fair question. It's a good question. I think all of our intelligence efforts around the world should be geared more to crisis prevention. Naturally, our intelligence efforts, until the end of the cold war, had to be focused very heavily on the Soviet Union and its allies. And of course, we didn't want to drop our guard on that.

But I think that there can be a new direction toward intelligence efforts to determine when crises are likely to arise of a different character, a nonmilitary character.

The new diplomacy, in addition to the intelligence aspect of it, I think would just place a much greater emphasis on problem prevention rather than crisis management. Each one of the examples I mentioned there, I think if there had been more attention by our Government and particularly by the State Department, I think we might well have had an opportunity to head off those crises or at least to call them to the world's attention at an earlier time.

I think we just need, through the exercise of good leadership from me on down, to focus our foreign service officers and our desk officers and our Assistant Secretaries of State on not being complacent. If there isn't a conflict already broken out, to try to find how they can improve the lot of the people in the country and ensure that a conflict won't break out.

As I say, in each one of those instances, I think there's the prospect that something might have been done if the problem was addressed earlier.

Senator COVERDELL. Using the examples that you have cited here, do you think that it was a question of predetermination or earlier analysis? Or do you believe, as I do, that it might be more likely that it was a question of when to exercise force and when not to exercise force. Perhaps the fact that quicker action did not arise might deal with new definitions?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I certainly would not want to indicate that force was the exclusive or even the preferred course of action in dealing with those situations. In the Somalia situation, I can go back to the time 12 years ago when I was in government and it was clear that the leadership in Somalia was very flawed. You probably know that from your service as well.

But we continued to support a dictator there for too long a period of time and built up this situation that when he left, there was no governmental structure left at all. I'm not a certified expert on Somalia, but I have a very strong recollection of having deep reservations about the earlier leadership in Somalia. I'm not sure I could have done anything about it, but we certainly have tolerated and supported dictators too long in too many countries.

And I would say that that was certainly a problem in Iraq as well. The period leading up to the invasion of Kuwait was a time when we tried to do business with Saddam Hussein and it turned out to be a terrible mistake, a very serious mistake, as Senator Gore has outlined during the course of the campaign.

This is a bipartisan failing. I'm not saying that it was only the last administration. We consistently have stayed too long with dictators and then reaped the whirlwind later on. And whatever we can do to avoid that syndrome, we ought to.

Senator COVERDELL. On page 7, you refer to GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement. It says, "that is why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT agreement and a North American Trade Agreement that serves the interest of American firms, workers, and communities." In my region, they would have taken note that we are not talking—and I am sure that it is in consideration of the American farmer.

My request for elaboration refers somewhat to some of the comments which the other Senators have made. I think Senator Dodd referred to a lack of information on the part of many Americans about foreign policy. I have to tell you that when you raise the word GATT or NAFTA, in many communities that I represent, there is unbridled fear. There is a preponderance of a view that we consistently come up on the short end or that these treaties will indeed leave segments of manufacturing or segments of our farm community improperly represented in the treaty.

Would you want to comment on that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I know that there are many sectors of American society that are very reserved about these international arrangements and I think that they all have to be taken into account. That's why being special trade representative is such an important and difficult job.

For myself, though, I think on balance, both of these agreements are very desirable from the standpoint of the United States. In a sense, they are both at a similar stage. The NAFTA agreement is in a condition where—the position of Governor Clinton—of course my position is that it's a very good agreement, but it needs strengthening in several respects to protect American interests and American workers and environmental interests.

The GATT agreement is nearer to conclusion in some respects, because evidently the breakthrough in November on agricultural products was very significant. On the other hand, there are still areas that have not been decided. The intellectual property area, I think is one of them, which is a very important area to—a segment of our national life that I happen to hear something about when I'm in California, just as you hear from the farming segment in Georgia.

But I think the main goal here has to be to have a balanced protection of all elements of American life, so that we can encourage trade and prosperity. The lead up to that sentence, though, I think emphasizes, Senator, that because we are so powerful economically, because exports and imports are so important to us, we really can't afford to walk away from these international arrangements. They are essential to us as the biggest player and we have to find some

way to try to reassure various sectors of our society that they are not harmful to them.

But I would not be in favor of the isolating effect that would result if the United States tried to walk away from such agreements.

Senator COVERDELL. On the same page, you point out and give this example in the case of Russia; we had one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people. You point to the fact that other industrialized nations have invested far more on the commercial aspects of their foreign service.

A number of my colleagues have spoken on this issue. Do you envision—and you might elaborate on how you envision—building a force on the commercial side in business development. Will that occur by reordering of priorities within the State Department or do you envision adding yet a new section to deal with this activity?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. The budgetary situation being what it is, Senator, I'm sure that this is going to have to be a reallocation and reordering of priorities. I think this is, in many respects, a leadership problem. If I and my senior colleagues in the Department put emphasis on our Embassies assisting businessmen, they will do so. And if we fail to do it, they may go their way.

There's been this long tradition in American Embassies that they prefer dealing with political issues, not in the pejorative sense, but in the sense of international political issues, to assisting American businessmen. And I think we have to change that concept.

Senator COVERDELL. During the course of the hearing, there have been several questions relating to Bosnia, Somalia, and the work ahead with regard to redefinition of the use of American force. You have made several statements here today with regard to countries that have been taken over, for all practical purposes, by drug dealers and narcotic cartels.

And you have correctly stated that it completely alters our ability to engage in normal foreign policy. Do you envision that condition as being one of the new areas or arenas for measurement of force?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I wouldn't exclude it. The difficulty that you encounter there is that a whole country may be under the sway of a corrupt or criminal private organization and that may be so defused that it would hard to meet the tests for the use of force.

But as I said earlier, Senator, I think that one of the fascinations of this period is that the criteria for the use of force have been broadened by examples such as Somalia. At the same time, we have to be very careful not to respond to every alarm or, more importantly in my judgment, to think that force is the preferred antidote. Despite my comments that the discrete use of force is important and justified, I still think that by far, more problems are going to be solved by the effective use of diplomacy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Simon?

Senator SIMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we welcome you here. I was interested in the fact that you opened your statement by referring to growing up in Scranton, ND, population 300. I come from Makanda, IL, population 402. And in Scranton, ND, and Makanda, IL, most people understand that they are in this thing together, that there is a sense of community, that if someone gets hurt, ultimately everyone gets hurt. And in a very real sense, I think that is a pretty good background for a Secretary

of State to have. Because what is true of Scranton, ND, is true of the world.

Let me now get into some specifics. You refer in your statement to an unstable world, and I think that is what we really have shifted to—where the umbrella for foreign policy is no longer anticommunism, because communism, for all practical purposes, has collapsed, but it is instability.

And in that connection back in 1989 the then-Deputy Attorney General made a determination that it was legal for the FBI to go into Mexico and seize two citizens, notwithstanding our international agreements. And the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, and one I think was a terrible decision, said that was legal. Interestingly, last month the principle party was acquitted on all counts and repatriated to Mexico.

We had a barrage of protests from countries around the world to that action. I am curious what your reaction is to the Supreme Court decision and to the fundamental theory there?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, in my foreign policy capacity, I disagreed with the policy, and as a lawyer I disagreed with the decision.

Senator SIMON. That is an excellent answer, and I am pleased to hear it. I had a whole series of followup questions there, but I do not need to go any further. [Laughter.]

Senator Kassebaum asked about Africa, and let me just commend Senator Kassebaum, who has made a real contribution—

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. And you too, Senator.

Senator SIMON [continuing]. In this area. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to first, in connection with Somalia, disagree strongly with my colleague from South Dakota, Senator Pressler, who said the United States should not have been involved in leading on that. Had the United States not led, nothing would have happened. And the reality is 350,000 people starved to death, another 2 million were in peril of starvation. Had we not led, we would have had the largest massive starvation in the history of mankind since the Irish famine of the 1840's.

For The United States to sit back and not provide leadership, I think would have been absolutely irresponsible. I do think that—and you may want to consult with your colleagues—we may need some kind of resolution authorizing and approving what has taken place. I think there are even some technical questions about whether U.S. residual forces who may have to stay there to help with water and other things, whether they can, under the present statutes, stay there under non-U.S. command. I am just curious about your reaction to that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, there was a question that moved in that direction this morning, and I thought about it a little bit but have not had any time to inquire into it. But let me just say that I would welcome an opportunity to work with you and with the members of the committee on such a resolution. And let me broaden that to say that I know that Senator Biden has been a leader in analyzing when congressional action is necessary when force has been used or when our troops are in eminent danger, and I would be glad to work with him and this committee to see whether a

more pragmatic approach can be developed to that whole set of issues.

Senator SIMON. And let me just say I welcome that. I think time is an element here. We have to be moving fairly rapidly on that. I would simply underscore what Senator Kassebaum had to say on the Sudan.

On Liberia, I do not disagree with what you said, but I think we have to also underscore that the United States has special responsibilities there. We have spent more on a per capita basis in aid to Liberia, by far, than any other African country. Liberia is the only country, really, in Africa with long-term ties to the United States.

And Senator Robb and I were in Liberia—I do not remember exactly when, last year. Anyway, we met with Amos Sawyer on the one side and went through, literally, 12 checkpoints to meet with Charles Taylor on the other side. And after that there was a meeting in the Ivory Coast in Abidjan of the two parties. But I think it is essential that the United States continue—not to send troops, but that we continue to provide significant leadership and that there be a clear-cut sense of responsibility on our part.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I agree that the regional group needs to have constant stimulation and support, in at least rhetorical terms, and that they are not doing a fully adequate job at the present time. The other options are most difficult but, as you say, Senator, it is of particular concern because Liberia, in a way somewhat comparable to the Philippines, is a country for which we have a special responsibility, and it is not going very well.

Senator SIMON. Absolutely. And the Philippines analogy is a good one because Samuel Doe, just like Marcos, was helped by the United States a long time after he assumed dictatorial powers.

We are—Senator Kassebaum and I have been urging this administration, and we urge the new administration, to be more forthright in saying Mobutu is no longer on good terms with the United States, we need a change in government, and he should, for the sake of the people of Zaire, leave. The corruption is blatant. The abuse of his people is blatant. I think that we ought to be firm there. I would hope you would consider some forthright statement either by yourself or by the President once January 20 is here.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You have my support in that. I share your feelings and attitude toward Mobutu.

Senator SIMON. Great. You are doing very well on my scorecard so far. [Laughter.]

Angola has had an election. They have a freely elected government. We recognize—with the exception of three or four cases around the world, we recognize every dictator. It does seem to me the time is appropriate for us to formally recognize the Government of Angola. Any reaction?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I read a little bit about Angola in the last few days and do not know the degree to which the new government has control of the area. But subject to examining that, I am very sympathetic to the point you make.

As you know, one of the standards for recognition is whether the government is able to maintain control within the borders that it purports to control, and I just do not know whether that test is

met. But I suspect that it probably is. It is probably my own ignorance that keeps me from that.

Senator SIMON. I would say I think that test is not completely met, but part of meeting that test may be recognition. That by the recognition we, in fact, help to reinforce the government that exists.

If I can follow up on a question that Senator Sarbanes and Senator Kerry had on the costs of U.N. peacekeeping, I introduced a bill about a year ago to have these costs come out of the defense budget. What I did not realize is there are major jurisdictional concerns and you get into turf battles both in the executive branch and, as Senator Pell can tell you from my discussions with him and with Senator Nunn, also in the legislative branch.

We finally worked out—when I say we, Senator Levin worked on this also. Senator Levin and I worked out so that in the current fiscal year the Defense Department is authorized to take up to \$300 million of Defense Department money for U.N. peacekeeping purposes. Something along that line seems to me to be a desirable thing. You have already indicated that you favor that, but I just thought I would mention there are some problems as you go down that road, and I think there is a way of sharing that so that you are not stuck with the full bill, and I think we have set a precedent on that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think an organization with the initials OMB probably gets into this struggle as well. [Laughter.]

Senator SIMON. All of us appreciate the statement you made on Iraq this morning, and in view of what has happened since that time I think it is significant and we appreciate it.

One small thing, and it may not be small. The Prime Minister of Great Britain has said we would like to see a democracy in Iraq. The President of France has said we would like to see a democracy in Iraq. Even, believe it or not, the King of Jordan has said we would like to see a democracy in Iraq. The President of the United States has yet to say we would like to see a democracy in Iraq.

Now I am told by people in the Department you shall soon be heading that we do not want to discourage some other potential military dictator from taking over. I frankly do not—I want to get rid of Saddam Hussein, but if I am to replace Saddam Hussein with some other military dictator, I do not know that that is a huge victory. I would like to see the Secretary of State and the President of the United States join other leaders in saying we want to have a democracy in Iraq.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Considering our commitment to democracy, as I have reflected in my speech, that is very appealing to me. I would have to hear a very strong argument to the contrary.

Senator SIMON. You are still scoring well here. Senator Pressler mentioned the possibility of designating someone on the Middle East as a special Ambassador. I think you may have to look at that. Now maybe we can get by without it, but I think that may be necessary.

And my own instinct is that it should be someone of significant stature, that it ought to be a George Shultz or—I do not know who that person should be, but I do not think you can just take someone who is highly competent but is not a respected international

figure, and put that person into that slot. I just pass that along for whatever interest you may have on that.

Proliferation, one of the areas where I think personal leadership will be needed by you is to pull Pakistan, India, and China together. It is the one area of the world where I think there is the possibility of disaster in terms of the use of nuclear power, and there will not be any movement unless you get all three working together. And I think that probably involves getting Russia to help pull the thing together. Any reaction?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, you are probably right, but I would hesitate to rule out the possibility of Pakistan and India being able to come to some accord that would pull them back from the nuclear threshold without being able to achieve any comparable result in China. And I think you would have to have an agreement not to seek supplies from China and perhaps some forbearance on China's part in selling, because they seem to be a supplier of nuclear parts, especially to Pakistan.

But I guess I would like to approach it with a little less gloomy view than you. I have entertained for some time the hope that diplomacy might have some prospect of improving relations between Pakistan and India. I see Senator Moynihan moving up in his chair, and I think probably I am going to get a lecture on this subject in the near future as to the impossibility or possibility, and I am looking forward to it. [Laughter.]

Senator SIMON. I probably should defer to him at this point, but I will wait until his time comes. I have to say I am more pessimistic than you are on this. I do not believe unless China joins in this, that you are going to see any de-escalation on the nuclear front there.

You mentioned AID and reforming AID. One of the things I hope we will do—and I see this is my last question on this round—I hope we will keep in mind that there should be an emphasis on assistance to the poor. It becomes very easy for AID to sign consulting contracts and do all kinds of other things that really do not deliver the product.

Back when I was in the House I got an amendment adopted that 50 percent of AID effort has to go the poor. That was brought down in conference to 40 percent and the 40-percent rule is still used. I would like to see, frankly, the 40 percent lifted, but we at least ought to keep that. And so as you reorganize AID, and my assumption is you will have a voice in that, I hope that emphasis will be kept in mind. And I would just ask you for any reaction and then I will defer to the chairman.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think the emphasis on the poor, without committing to any particular percentage, is a wise and necessary one.

Senator SIMON. I thank you very very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed. And I would ask the witness to please pull the microphone a little bit closer.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I have been slipping back. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Moynihan?

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the question has arisen about Somalia. Could I simply record one observer's view that it clearly was necessary that something be

done there. And had it not been for Senator Simon leading a delegation of this committee to Somalia in November, I very much doubt it would have been done. I know that and I hope the world knows that.

Senator SIMON. Thank you.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I was leaning forward when Senator Simon spoke of the India-Pakistan confrontation only in response to the thought that the situation was unstable enough. But it has become profoundly, significantly more so as both of those countries dissolve into ethnic, communal conflict, which is a characteristic of this post-cold war world that you describe. You know, Bombay is "uninhabitable" today, although there are 12 million people inhabiting it, as it were.

We are seeing, as you put it, the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts. They have been less conspicuous than they are now but they have been there all along. And if I could make just one anecdote, in 1965 the U.N. held a "seminar," that was as much as they dared call it, on "the multinational state." The first the U.N. had ever done. And the Yugoslavs offered to be the host, and it was held at Ljubljana, and nobody in the Department of State wanted to go. It is a nice place to go, Ljubljana. It just did not seem worth anybody's attention.

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State—I was then Assistant Secretary of Labor—asked me if I would go. And when I came back I said, that country is not going to stay together. They are fair to pleading for help in anticipation of what might happen.

And so to that situation, on November 25, which is 8 weeks ago, perhaps, on behalf of this committee, I was in Sarajevo with Mr. Galbraith of our staff. I regret to say, our Government did everything it could do to prevent our getting in there. They did not want us to see what we saw.

We flew in. The Canadians flew us in one day, and the British flew us out the next day, and we spent the night at the headquarters of UNPROFOR. We met with General Morrillon. Maj. Pierce-Butler briefed us.

And what we saw was genocide. I mean, it is the real thing. The artillery, the heavy machineguns on the hills, all night, all day. They are not there mounting a siege effort intent on capturing the city. It is so evident if you are there. They just want the people in that city to die. If they are dead by spring, the purpose will have been achieved, and the ethnic balance will have been changed, and so forth.

Could I just ask you, do you not feel there was something inadequate in an American diplomacy that so completely failed to see the breakup of this whole enterprise? And now that we have it in front of us, how difficult it has been to do anything. Your distinguished predecessor George Shultz, at a dinner for the International Rescue Committee said, you know, we used to say after the Holocaust "never forget, never again." And then he said, "what is it we were not supposed to forget?"

And we have had a blockade there for 7 months. It has not done anything of consequence. And we are not just looking at ethnic strife, we are looking at the central horror of this century, geno-

cide. And I do not want to put any question to you, but would you want to comment?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I agree with you completely. It is the most horrifying situation in recent memory for me. This is not just unpleasantness, this is slaughter and murder for purposes of ethnic cleansing. This is rape being used as a tool of ethnic cleansing or as a tool of terror. It really the most uncivilized kind of conduct.

As I said earlier today, there are few angels in that situation, but the conduct of the Serbs overall I find, based upon the reading that I have done, to be absolutely outrageous.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I think there are some people that we should admire. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, a man named Jeremy Blade, and two people are feeding a third of a million people. There is no food left. What comes in today is eaten the next day. And surely it could be made more clear by the Europeans that they will not have this. How could they have been so snake bit on something that we thought a lesson had been learned? Or perhaps I ask you make gratuitous comments about people you will be dealing with. Maybe you can make them now. [Laughter.]

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, this has certainly not been a credit to anyone in the area. Yes, I would like to amend my remarks. There are some angels. The relief organizations. The people trying to accomplish the feeding. The U.N. What I meant, Senator, was that none of the ethnic groups there are without some blame. But you have to assess in that kind of situation comparative fault, and where the provocation comes from, and who the principal perpetrators are. And I think that is pretty clear.

It is a situation where Europe has performed in, I think, an abysmal way. I see the French now want to take a much stronger role, apparently having awakened to the situation. Some countries have taken a number of refugees, perhaps feeling that that is the principal contribution that they need to make. But it is a situation that cries out for multilateral attention.

I said, perhaps when you were out of the room, Senator, I doubt that this is a place where the United States should proceed unilaterally. But, in some way, we must evoke a stronger reaction, as Governor Clinton has been saying for months.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Sir, could I just point out something you know, which is that the U.N. Charter, chapter VII, deals with breaches of the peace. We have an international conflict there; Bosnia is a recognized country. Chapter VII has an intermediate stage between economic embargoes and all-out war, which is "demonstrations" of use of force. Article 42 refers specifically to "demonstrations" of force. I do not know why there is bridge left in Belgrade. I mean, it is possible and the charter anticipated some specific use of force.

I do not know how they will survive this winter, and it has only just begun. I did not want to press you. I know your own feelings on this, and George Shultz, I think, speaks for a lot of people.

If I could just say, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my personal gratitude to Peter Galbraith for getting me out of there. It is a lot easier to get in than get out. He did it. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, we are so proud of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Our congratulations to Peter Galbraith, too. We are very glad you are back.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Chairman, you should note that the motion to thank Peter Galbraith passed by an 8 to 7 vote here. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb?

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join in thanking Peter Galbraith in getting, I guess, every member of the committee out of someplace at one time or another; not quite as difficult perhaps as the circumstances that Senator Moynihan encountered.

Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for being with us this morning. I would like to focus pretty much on the area of the world that I am going to have the privilege of directing a subcommittee, in East Asia. And you and I talked about that pretty much exclusively during our visit, which I thank you for as well.

Before I do, let me add, as I think Senator Simon and others have said, thank you for amending or adding to your statement this morning to indicate that you do, indeed, stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the current administration with respect to what was actually being initiated in the Persian Gulf at the time that you were making that statement. All of us have since had at least some briefing both officially and unofficially on that topic. And I think that the degree of continuity and resolve on the part of the United States demonstrated by President Clinton serves all of us well.

Let me begin with a couple of general questions about the area of East Asia, if I may. There are a number of academics that have suggested from time-to-time that the Asian style democracies—the soft authoritarian-type that you find in Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore are the only way that countries in this particular region can be effectively governed. I wonder if you subscribe to that view, or if you believe that something more akin to a Western-style democracy is ultimately going to be necessary, or something in between?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I have a natural preference for our kind of democracy, without wanting to try to implant all of our institutions elsewhere. I think there are some transitional situations. But I cannot help but take a great deal of satisfaction, not pride but satisfaction, in what has happened in Korea, where they had an open, free election and it seems to have worked well there. And they have gone through, under the leadership of No Tae Woo, a real transition. And it seems to me that that is an example of a country that has moved a long ways in that direction, and I hope that others will as well.

I do not subscribe to the view that there are some ethnic characteristics that require a certain kind of governing. That goes against my grain to think that somehow the Asians are only fit for one kind of government. I am naive enough or idealistic enough to think that a representative form of government, not exactly like ours but in that direction, is the highest advance we have come to in governing. We have got lots of faults, but it does give people of the country an opportunity to participate from time to time in a peaceful change of government when they wish to do so. And so I would not be satisfied with the characterization that somehow Asians have to have only a soft form of democracy. I would like to think of that as being transitional.

Senator ROBB. One of the principal differences between the European area and the Asian area that we are discussing at the moment would be the lack in the latter of the kind of security agreement that Europe has in terms of NATO. And I wonder if you would comment on whether or not you think that kind of a security framework is something that ought to be approached, and how that would relate to our current forward basing strategy, and whether or not we ought to consider removing any of the troops as we are doing in Europe from, say, Korea or Japan?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is a large question, Senator. Let me try to take it in smaller bites. NATO was created for a particular purpose—to respond to the threat of the Soviet Union—and I think it served that purpose very well. I believe there is a role for NATO in the future, but it needs to be reorganized toward a different purpose.

But I do not think that we ought to try to see an exact counterpart in Asia. I would much rather see an Asia organized around economic units, and that is the direction that it is going. The ASEAN group has been a powerful economic force, and the new economic group in the Pacific is, I think, although brand new and a fledgling, is nevertheless very promising. So, I would not, I think, be advocating a replication of NATO in the Pacific Basin unless there is some major change in the force conditions there.

With respect to Korea, I think we need to keep troops in Korea so long as North Korea is a threat. And the threat has not diminished from North Korea, and hence, although I do not want to speak for all time, my own feeling is that we need to maintain a significant force posture in South Korea.

And with respect to Japan, it seems to me that we need to have forces arrayed there, especially now with our bases gone in the Philippine Islands. We are a Pacific power, and the arrangements with Japan are ones that are cooperative. The Japanese supply, I think, about half of the cost of our military bases there. Of course, they get a good deal in return in the way of enabling them to have a smaller defense structure.

But I would not be inclined to change either of those. At the same time, I would not be inclined to try to turn that into an alliance comparable to NATO. I hope that relations between the old ANZUS powers can be brought back to where they were before, although out of the context of the cold war there might not be quite as strong an impetus.

That is a pretty quick sweep of the issues that were generated by your question.

Senator ROBB. Well, I suspect there will be ample opportunity for refinement, especially after you get over to your offices in Foggy Bottom.

I did not mean that as a threat. I just meant that in terms of the evolution of policy and the opportunity to be more explicit in some of those areas.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Perhaps you are looking at some of my staff behind me. Were they wincing?

Senator ROBB. There was a sort of a wane smile evident on Mr. Donilon's face, I believe, among others.

But let me follow up, if I may, on the economic point. At this point, the United States actually has about a third more trade across the Pacific than across the Atlantic. And it sells more to Japan than it does to Germany, France, and Italy combined. Is economic diplomacy really, at this point, replacing political diplomacy in terms of the relative importance of the two?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes. I think now that the superpower confrontation has been eased, I think economic diplomacy becomes more and more important. The campaign certainly emphasized economics as a key ingredient in all, both national and international, decisions.

Senator ROBB. What kind of actions might you contemplate as Secretary of State to enhance the economic or commercial diplomacy in that region?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, as in other regions, I think our Embassies have to be inspired to do much more to help American business—to help American business find new markets, not to be shy or bashful about rolling up their sleeves and getting in and helping both industries and specific businesses obtain orders and new markets there.

I also think that our diplomacy ought to try to ensure that those markets are open to us, and that we have a full opportunity to participate in them. That is particularly true of a number of countries in the region that will soon be within your particular ambit. I speak of China and Japan, perhaps to a lesser extent, Korea. In China, I think the balance of trade is about \$18 billion in their favor at the present time, and that really cannot last. I think they have had some abusive trade practices that need to be examined with great care.

Senator ROBB. I would like to follow up. Let me just follow up one other aspect, or one other thing with respect to Korea, and then I would like to move to China specifically.

The Korean unification talks have been pretty much stymied for over a year because of the stalling on the inspection arrangements. With respect to the leadership on either side, Kim Il Sung or his potential successor, or the succession that you have just alluded to with No Te Woo and with Kim Yu ong Sam having just been elected to take his place, where do you see those particular talks going, and what should the U.S. role be in trying to influence or assist in anything that might develop, specifically with respect to unification?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I think the unification talks need to be encouraged, but the United States has to play a careful role there and remember that there are serious tensions, and that we cannot press too hard.

My own feeling about it—and this is instinctive, not well-schooled—is that until the leadership situation is clarified in North Korea, it will be very hard to reach a dependable agreement.

Senator ROBB. With respect to South Korea, let me digress for just a moment, because you made reference to a second democratic election. I happened to be over in Korea just before the first complete democratic election with the peaceful transfer of power that took place, and I still remember meeting separately with both Kim Dae Jung and Kim Yu ong Sam among others, who were each sug-

gesting at that point that they would resolve their differences before the election and one of them—and only one of them would stand for election—would come with an even more democratic force, as they saw it, but then they each privately assured me that they were the one that was going to represent that particular voting bloc, and we all know what happened.

With respect to that situation, Kim Yu ong Sam in his election did talk about a rice barrier. Are there things that we can do to try to discourage the creation of additional barriers in terms of our trade relationships with South Korea?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think it is a place for determined diplomacy. The South Koreans know that there are many advantageous relationships with the United States, and one of the things we do not need in this world is the creation of new barriers. Entrenched foreign interests are a problem in trading around the world. Not that farmers do not deserve great respect and concern, but I think that creating a new rice barrier would certainly be an unfortunate move, and my guess is that the new Korean President ought to be subjected to some quiet diplomacy.

Senator ROBB. We certainly learned the effect or the political strength of the agricultural community in the European situation, and I have marveled at their ability to continue to make their weight felt out of all proportion to their representation in society.

Let me move to China for just a minute. We have talked about it a little bit in a couple of questions, but I do not know whether you have addressed head on at this time, at least in your public testimony here today, the question specifically of whether or not you will be making a recommendation for MFN with or without conditions as things now stand.

I know you made reference in your opening statement to a number of things that were of concern, but of course, those come to focus when we confront as a Congress this issue—and indeed, Senator Mitchell said I think last Sunday on Meet the Press that he was going to reintroduce the legislation that he introduced on the Senate side, and that Congresswoman Pelosi introduced on the House side, and I would welcome any comment that you have with respect to the administration's position on that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think we need to work hard to try to achieve some improvement in the various problems we have with China: on the proliferation front—that is, their export of various nuclear materials; and their human rights approach both to their own citizens, to dissidents as well as to the problems with Tibet. But I do not think we need to think that MFN is our only tool. We ought to try creative diplomacy on these subjects, remembering the advantages of conditional MFN as we move through the year. I recall that comes up in June. Am I right about that?

Senator ROBB. June I believe is the month, yes.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. My own hope is that we do not, just as we sometimes do, just put everything over until June and make everything depend upon one piece of leverage. We have other, diplomatic leverage that I think we ought to try to use to see if we cannot get any improvement in some of the other conditions.

Senator ROBB. I can understand your desire not to be terribly specific on that question. I will not follow up at this particular moment.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

Senator ROBB. But let me ask you perhaps a more general question. Are you optimistic about the next generation of leadership? We continue to discuss the old men, if you will, it being a largely patriarchal society in that regard, but there is always the hope that the next generation of leadership will be more tuned to some of the things that the West considers important and that the international community is increasingly placing value on.

Do you have some sense of the quality of leadership that is going to emerge and our ability to work with that leadership?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I am a little sensitive, Senator, about the older generation's leadership. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBB. When we have an incoming 46-year-old President, I think everybody is concerned about being cast in terms of any particular chronological place in history.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You know, one of the endearing truths about China as far as I am concerned is that I do not understand the leadership situation there adequately. Maybe I will after I have been in this new position for a time, but there are so many layers of leadership, and I think the leadership is so pegged to us here in the United States that I would not want to offer a glib comment that the next generation of leadership is going to be substantially different. I have not been educated on that subject recently.

Maybe the agencies that will help educate me know more than I do, but I am pretty skeptical of our full ability to understand exactly what kind of leadership is likely to succeed there and when.

Senator ROBB. Well, skipping just a little bit west, you mentioned Tibet both in your opening statement and just a moment ago. About a year ago, I think it was, the Dalai Lama was here. He had probably as many representatives of the congressional leadership on both sides of the aisle here to welcome him, but he was not accorded the honor that we give many heads of state and world leaders of a joint session of Congress.

We met, I think it was, in Statuary Hall, if I remember correctly, and he addressed an overflow crowd. You expressed some optimism, but of course, the situation there is still a matter of ongoing concern. Would you be just a little bit more expansive, and I will save Japan for another round.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think that is one of the major human rights problems we have with China. We ought to be more effective with China with respect to Tibet, but I do not foresee the United States taking any action such as unilateral recognition, for example, of Tibet, because of the high costs that it would invoke in other areas. I do think we have to be as determined as we can be, because the violations of human rights there are very striking.

Senator ROBB. Were I sitting in your seat, Mr. Secretary, I do not think I would be any more specific in my answers than you were, but I look forward to working with you on those and a number of topics.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you very much.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Robb. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christopher, I have gained a great deal from just listening to you today, and I am going to follow with just a few questions relating to my brief remarks earlier having to do with deficit reduction.

I recognize, as you have, that your Department would not be the biggest spender in our Government by any means, but I am interested in pursuing a couple of items with you.

In the area of eliminating waste, I think you referred in your remarks to a need to overhaul the Agency for International Development. Senator Simon made some reference to that organization and its purposes. There has been a great deal of criticism regarding the operations of the AID programs. GAO identified some specific problem areas.

One that has been brought to my attention is one GAO study found that some \$300 million in a pipeline that was not programmed to be spent within 2 years, and another \$8 million for projects that had already been completed.

There have also been proposals, I am told, to abolish AID and bring their operations directly within the Department of State. Do you have any views on reforms that would correct some of these problems, and do you have any thoughts on this idea of abolishing AID and putting it directly within the Department of State?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, with respect to reforms, it is clear to me that the purposes are too diverse, that programs are too many, and thus it is not possible to maintain adequate controls over them. I would hope that a newly reorganized AID could not only be more effective but also more efficient.

I think also, Senator, it is time to reconsider some of our priorities. It may be that there are some countries that we can lower our aid amounts to now that we are out of the cold war period. On the other hand, I do believe in the overall concept of aid and would not like to see us abandon that concept, both for humanitarian, as well as enlightened self-interest.

If I was in a very aggrandizing mood, perhaps I would think that AID ought to be brought into the State Department, but that is a subject with a long history, and I think I would like to postpone any judgment on that until those who are considering the reorganization have a greater time to get into the matter. Operating at its best, there need be no hostility or inconsistency between AID and the State Department, which is somewhat analogous to that between State Department and USIA and the State Department and ACDA. You can make a case in each instance that they should be brought into the Department, but you can also make the other case.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. With regard to the programs we might classify as "otherwise," within the programs you have suggested are there some areas where we could cut foreign aid, or perhaps not necessarily specific countries but areas of foreign assistance in general. Can you help me at all with what some examples of those might be?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think where we have military supply relationships with countries through the multilateral programs, that some of those can almost certainly be cut back, now that we are

out of the cold war era. I ought to say, though, that a tremendous proportion—I am not sure how high the number is but it is very high—of our aid goes to Israel and Egypt. There is a very strong case for the maintenance of aid at those existing levels, a case that is usually strongly put and strongly felt here on Capitol Hill.

Senator FEINGOLD. With regard to the trade issue that has been brought up, obviously, this is not an area in which you have primary responsibility if you are Secretary of State, but there is some involvement. I share the comments of Senator Coverdell that back home in my State I have heard a fair amount of concern about NAFTA and GATT from dairy farmers, from working people who may not in every case understand all the implications of the proposed agreements, but we even have some specific examples of where we think the way these things are drafted may be harmful.

But I was pleased to hear your comments that it is time for the diplomacy that we have in this country to assure access of U.S. businesses to global markets. And in that regard, I would like to ask you about the concept which some have called trade for aid. That is a little more specific than the notion of economic diplomacy that Senator Robb was talking about, but what are your views on a greater linkage between our trade interests and foreign assistance activities, and to what extent can we actually link American trade interests to our foreign policy decisions?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think that there can be a close nexus between aid and trade. Frequently, grants of aid required a certain percentage of purchases from the United States, unless my memory is falling far short, and perhaps that can be increased. However, I do think that we need to take a long-term view of that, Senator. We give aid so that countries can improve their situation, become more successful, and thus become real customers of ours.

The same thing is true of democracy, generally speaking, and market economies. We promote market economy not just out of a sense of it being the right thing or the moral thing to do, but rather that market economies tend to be better customers of ours. And so it is with successful countries. And if you insist on a one-to-one linkage you may prevent a country from moving into a place where it becomes an important customer.

In my statement, I indicated that our sales to Latin America have about doubled in recent years. Well, part of that is because some of those countries are thriving and they become good customers of ours. So I would tell you there may be some direct linkage, but we ought to take a long-term view of that, as well as a short-term view.

Senator FEINGOLD. I certainly agree with that on the positive side of building relationships. Let us just take the example, though, of the China situation, the most-favored-nation status that Senator Robb was discussing with you. You mentioned proliferation and human rights, and of course, the Tibet issue. To what degree do you believe the issue specifically of trade imbalance should, along with these other concerns, be a factor in determining extension of MFN?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think it should be a very important factor. The trade imbalance at a \$18 billion level cries out for correction.

Senator FEINGOLD. That would be part of the decisionmaking on MFN?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me turn again, as many members of the committee have, to Bosnia. One of the most telling and disturbing comments today by Senators Biden, Lugar, Moynihan, had to do with that situation. And the situation not only in Bosnia but all of former Yugoslavia is of heightened concern in the State of Wisconsin. We have many people in the State who tie their roots to that area of the world. There are 70,000 people in Wisconsin of Croatian descent, 12,000 to 15,000 people in the Milwaukee area alone of that background, also that many of Serbian descent. It was perhaps the only real foreign policy issue that came up regularly during our election campaign in Wisconsin. So I am actually asked questions on almost a daily basis about what is going on over there and I could use a little help in trying to understand some of these terms that are thrown around because people back home want to know what they mean.

For example, what do you think would be the realistic impact of enforcement of a no-fly zone? What could that really do in that area?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, it would have limited utility, I would say, in terms of its compelling character in realistic terms. On the other hand, the people of Bosnia, the Bosnians clearly want it. They think it will give them freedom of maneuver to level the playing field.

There are perhaps not a great deal of activity by Serbian aircraft at the present time, but the threat of them is ever present, and I think an assurance that the Bosnians would be able to operate without fear of air interdiction would be a very positive factor.

I also think it would be a very significant psychological factor for the United States and our allies in Europe trying to move that additional step to level the playing field. So while I would not pretend that it is a cureall, it is one way to reflect our wanting to take a stronger role toward the solution of those problems.

Senator FEINGOLD. The second item that is asked of me about Bosnia has to do with the lifting of the arms embargo for Bosnia, and I guess—perhaps this would be a more dramatic thing than the no-fly zone? I do not know. But what—give us your feeling—would be the impact of lifting that embargo?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not have a specific comment on that, Senator. You can go down this list of things, and I am going to disappoint you I know because we are not yet in office and we have not had the chance to have the kind of disciplined discussion of those various alternatives that will be essential. The outgoing administration clearly has wanted to stand clear of options like that, and we need to understand what options are open to us, which can be most effectively carried out, which ones would justify action by the United States. So I am sorry to disappoint you, but I have gone about as far as I can go within the limits of our not yet being in office and not having the kind of disciplined discussion at the Cabinet level with recommendation to the President that will be necessary to address with finality that kind of a question.

Senator FEINGOLD. Of course, I respect that and recognize the complexity of the situation. Let me just finish with one other piece on Bosnia. Of greatest concern to people, of course, throughout the country is whether or not there would be ground troops, U.S. ground troops, committed to the situation, and I recall reading some of the editorials at the time of the Somalian action, people trying to define, as you and others are, what are the appropriate circumstances for American intervention in this new era.

One comment in the New York Times editorial is that you should consider just how difficult the situation would be for American troops in Somalia versus getting involved in former Yugoslavia, what the losses are likely to be. Is that a legitimate consideration as a part of an overall decision of whether ground troops would ever be committed?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Ground troops are not contemplated, not within the current range of options. Let me give you just some of the factors that I think would have to be involved in considering that kind of a question.

First, you would have to have a very specific objective, one that was tangible and could be stated in a way that it would be understood by the American people. And that would not be easy to do.

Second, you would have to have a strong likelihood that your objective could be achieved, that you would not want to go into that unless you could win.

Third, I think you would have to weigh whether or not the benefits of what you did outweighed the costs and the risks, the costs, both in terms of lives and dollars.

And, finally, you would have to ask whether or not you would have for the support of that kind of an endeavor—the support of the American people as well as our allies abroad.

Those are very stern tests to meet, and as I say, there is no present contemplation, as far as I know, of ground troops.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I want to assure you that my questions do not suggest that I am eager to see that happen. Of course, I am very eager to see that not happen, and that is the view that has been expressed by many people to me.

In the area of arms control, just a couple of questions. The Chemical Weapons Convention, I understand, will be open for signature in a few days and I think it should be a priority of the administration. When do you expect this to be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, and are there any major steps that have to be taken before it is submitted?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, the submission of that is going to have to be considered in light of our other submissions to Congress. We have Start II coming along, and we will just have to see how much the circuits will bear and do that in consultation with the members of this committee and also the leadership. So on that, I am just going to have to beg off by saying that is a very important issue, and the decisions as to exactly what legislative program President Clinton is going to have is a decision that I could not—or would not—want to unilaterally comment on.

Senator FEINGOLD. One other question on that. Are there any countries that are reluctant to join that convention? I have heard

that that may be the case. What steps can we take to persuade them to participate?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, my understanding is that generally speaking, and I do not want to make this too inclusive, but a number of Arab countries are not prepared to sign, and I do think that is a very unfortunate step on their part. We ought to use our diplomacy and our persuasion to try to get them to rule out that additional means of mass destruction.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, I appreciate your responses.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the hour is drawing late, so I will try not to be too overbearing here or to take up too much time, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MATHEWS. Let me start by saying that I applaud the strong commitment that you made to the linking of diplomacy, and the offering of opportunities for U.S. industry, and I think that for too long too many of our jobs and too many of our opportunities have gone elsewhere.

In this respect, I would like to read a statement that you made earlier and ask you to elaborate on it somewhat if you would.

You said this morning in your opening statement, we need to overhaul the Agency for International Development. The Agency needs to take on fewer missions and narrow the scope of its operations and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract a lesson from AID's past successes and failures to make its future efforts stronger.

Now, you may or may not be aware that during the course of the recent campaign—and I do not convey any partisan overtones to what I am going to say, but during the course of this campaign in the State of Tennessee we were the victims of the very reverse of what this statement says. The Agency for International Development exported the principal industry of one of our small towns to a Central American country, I believe, and the little community in Tennessee is continuing to suffer.

Does your statement here indicate to us that you will be looking at this type of situation and that you will be reallocating resources to a more useful purpose?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That was one of the failures of AID, Senator. I will be perfectly clear on that subject. There will be no repetition of that under our administration if it can possibly be avoided. I just think it was an improper use of aid, and I can understand why the people of Tennessee as well as the people of the country were upset by it.

Senator MATHEWS. Thank you. Just one other question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will relinquish the floor.

In this one, I want to talk a little bit about the situation related to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iraq. I am told that since 1990, when the original Persian Gulf crisis began to develop, that we have sold—our country has sold to these countries in the Middle East some \$36 billion worth of arms, and it appears that the amount of sales has been greater than what might have been need-

ed for defensive purposes, and I hear that some of it might have been for economic reasons and has no real basis other than economic reasons.

I have two questions along that line. First, do you feel that the administration will be more selective in this process, in the sale—will be a little more selective as to what amounts are sold, and second, as I understand it the Arms Export Control Act does convey that this body—that the Congress of the United States has some involvement in the arms sale. Do you anticipate that you will be conferring with the Congress under the aegis of this requirement or suggestion?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, there have been very considerable arms sales to the Middle East. The sales to Saudi Arabia, I believe, were supported by Governor Clinton during the campaign.

The regime that was begun in the U.N., the five-power regime to try to set standards for sales to the Middle East, has been somewhat set to one side particularly because of the Taiwan sale having upset the Chinese, but I think we have to get back to regimes like that if we are going to get some control, at least, of the sale of weapons that escalate the likely confrontation and conflagration in those areas.

Selling higher levels of weapons in an area where they are not yet present produces serious problems. I think you will find, Senator, that there is a very extensive need to confer with the committees of Congress. With respect to sales of that character, they have to be reported to Congress and there is a period of consultation that will provide a full opportunity for Congress to act. Whether Congress chooses to act, of course, will be a decision for Congress.

Frequently, there are explanations for the need to make such sales that do not appear right on the surface, and I think that Congress also recognizes that, in the exercise of foreign policy leadership, the President is entitled to a certain presumption that the sale makes some sense. Quite often, sales are balanced one against another, but I think the Congress will have a full opportunity to exercise its leadership in that regard.

Mr. Chairman, would you endorse what I have just said there?

The CHAIRMAN. I was not following you as closely as I should, but I am sure I would if I were.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask a question along those lines, but I would fully endorse what you said, Mr. Secretary, that we do have that responsibility, opportunity, and authority.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I was just afraid, Mr. Chairman, that my information was out of date, but I am glad to have Senator Biden confirm that I am not way out of date on that.

Senator BIDEN. No, you are not out of date. We have just usually been out of step.

The CHAIRMAN. And I would support your statement very much.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We have now finished the first round of questioning, and I think if the witness—the Secretary-designate is going to go on to continue for a while, would you like a break for 5 minutes?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. A 5-minute break would be fine, but I would just as soon the 5-minute break did not turn into a 15-minute break, because I would like to get out.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us agree to be back here in 5 minutes, and we will recess, and then after that we will have 10-minute questions, not 15, to try to make it roll along a little faster.

We will recess for 5 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. For the sake of expeditious movement I will forego my turn here at questions and will turn to the ranking minority member, who I believe may have some.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Where did the crowd go, Mr. Chairman? Did you drive them away?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I do not know.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Christopher, let me go back to where we left off when my time expired in the first round. You do not wear a hearing aid now, do you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. I hope you never do. As I recall, the upshot of what you said was that the Carter administration was going to give arms when the hostages were released.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. It was that we were going to release the arms that had been embargoed, or frozen. They were not going to give them. They had been sold and paid for.

Senator HELMS. Well, OK. I will buy that. I must say, it is a difference without a distinction.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir. The word "give" has a particular connotation, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, yes. You have it your way and I will have it mine.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. All right, sir.

Senator HELMS. Then, Dick Lugar, I am told when I was down at the White House, pointed out whether the arms were spare parts or not was not relevant, and he said, as I am told, that what is relevant is that you were willing to anti-up arms paid for by our ally the Shah to the Ayatollah. Am I on base so far with my understanding?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. All I can do is to repeat what I said before, that the arms paid for by the Government of Iran and in storage here and frozen could be returned after the hostages returned, but, Senator, subject to U.S. munitions control.

I was able to get into the agreement at the last minute a provision indicating that only those arms that U.S. munitions control permitted would be turned over to the Iranians. So there continued to be a check that the Reagan administration was entitled to use to prevent even those previously paid for arms from going forward, and if you look at the declarations of Algiers, you will see that written in.

Senator HELMS. OK, but in any case, you are talking about arms that were accumulated, if that is the word, by an ally of the United States and a friend of the United States, specifically the Shah of Iran, and you are going to turn them over to the Ayatollah now.

Anyway, I do not want to overburden the subject, but we have still got the \$48 million that the Reagan administration shipped in arms compared to three times that much of what the Carter administration—and what I am driving at, and it is perfectly clear, all of this stuff, the October Surprise, they were engaging and they were planting stories in the news media saying that Reagan did this and Reagan did that, and here comes a report, and it was held up until after the election, a report that completely exonerated Ronald Reagan and George Bush, and so if we are going to talk about politics, let us talk about it both ways.

Anyway, I think that sort of wraps up the question of who was willing to give arms for hostages.

Now, the other main allegation of the October Surprise crowd, if I could use that word, is that it was Reagan who used the hostages for political purposes, yet on the night of March 31 you agreed this morning, if I remember correctly, that you were with President Carter and that you wrote a speech for President Carter saying that the hostages were going to be transferred to Government control despite the fact that the Ayatollah said they would not.

Now, let us go back to the question of the Ayatollah. You agreed this morning that he was the main decisionmaker. A lot of other people were doing the talking, but he was the guy who called the shots.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, that is not what I said this morning. What I said this morning was, you could not depend upon views that were attributed to the Ayatollah. One of the things we learned during that period was to be highly skeptical.

When there would be a report that something had been said by the Ayatollah, it might have been said by a member of his family, it might have been misattributed to him, it might have been said by a member of his Cabinet and taken back the next day, so we had no basis for being certain about the accuracy of the Ayatollah's views because there were so many indications of inaccuracy.

The civilian Government officials who we were dealing with at that time purported to be acting in the name of the Government of Iran.

Senator HELMS. Well, Ham Jordan quoted President Carter as saying everybody is on board except the one person who can free the hostages—Khomeini.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. When did he say that?

Senator HELMS. March 25. Do you want to see the document?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir. I take your word for it.

Senator HELMS. OK.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, we thought it was an important step forward when—I believe it was Bani Sadr who indicated that the hostages would be moved into governmental custody.

Senator HELMS. Who indicated?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. The then civilian leader of Iran, who I believe was Bani Sadr, and I continue to feel, Senator, that it was important for the United States to acknowledge that, to try to give additional concreteness to that promise that was made by the head of the civilian Government of Iran.

Senator HELMS. Well, here again, I guess I am just sensitive because all year long, beginning when this Foreign Relations Com-

mittee met in S-116 of the Capitol and agreed to set up an October Surprise Committee and financed it and all the rest of it—I forget the details—there were some of us saying, look, this is a waste of money, a waste of time, and it is going to be a political thing, and that is what it turned out to be all year long.

Now, I am not charging you with that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Good.

Senator HELMS. But I am saying that you did write that statement, and Mr. Christopher, please forgive me, but if you say that you did not write that statement in Wisconsin for political purposes, I want to sell you some land down in North Carolina that is under water.

Of course it was political. Why did you choose that place to write that statement for Jimmy Carter? Of course it was political.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Why did I choose what place? I was called to the White House at 5 a.m., when we received a message from Iran indicating that Bani Sadr had promised to move the hostages into governmental custody.

Senator HELMS. Well, the President went on television and announced all that good news, right?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. What I did was to try to summarize the effect of this event. I did not write the statement that he read on television. What I did was to put in writing, in the most succinct terms that I could, the effect of those events. I was there at the White House that morning, but I was not a part of the political system. I think that it is very healthy, and I, if I become Secretary of State, will stay out of politics.

Senator HELMS. Dick Lugar meant Gary Sick. Do you know who I am talking about?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator HELMS. Was Gary Sick taking notes that late night at the White House meeting with Jimmy Carter?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I suppose Gary Sick might well have been in that meeting. I do not happen to remember.

Senator HELMS. Well, since Dick Lugar—Senator Lugar mentioned Gary Sick, I want to pursue that a little bit.

What has been specifically your relationship with him?

By the way, I guess we ought to identify for the record that he was the main proponent of the October Surprise theory.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I served in Government with Gary Sick between 1977 and 1980, and I may have seen him once or twice since then, but I do not have a continuing relationship with him. I thought he served with patriotism during that period, and I have looked at his book, although I do not think I read it all.

Senator, I would like to go back to the October Surprise Committee set up by this committee and just again express surprise that you are not aware of my extensive testimony before that committee. I met with the committee, devoted many hours to it in Los Angeles, and then came at my own expense because I thought it was my public duty, and testified here in Washington.

Senator HELMS. What committee specifically? Who were the members of the committee you met with in California?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That was the staff of the committee, sir.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. The staff of the committee.

Senator HELMS. I thought you said the committee.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. They were representatives of the committee. They were sent by the committee to interview me. The committee had a legal staff, and as I recall, there were three or four people present.

Senator HELMS. Oh, I am sure they spent a lot of money chasing the rabbit.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. If you had read the report of the committee and read my testimony, if you had been present in the hearing room, I think you might not be making some of the allegations you are making here with respect to my attitude about that.

I was very clear that I had no evidence of there being an October Surprise. I think Senator Lugar was there. I think perhaps he might confirm to you, but it is surprising to me you are pursuing this line of questions when there in the report of this very committee is a summary of my testimony and also a summary of the memorandum that was prepared after the extensive meeting in Los Angeles.

Senator HELMS. Well, just summarize for me what you said to the staff members who came out to California. What did you say about this investigation? How did you feel about it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I told them I had no position as to whether or not there was any validity to Gary Sick's thesis. I did not support it. I simply gave them a chronological account of my negotiations, which commenced with meetings in Germany on September 15 and 17.

I can go through that in some detail, those events happen to be etched in my memory, but I do not think that will be particularly relevant here. It was useful to them in their account and it was useful to them, I think, in showing that there was no October Surprise, or in their reaching the conclusion there was no October Surprise.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is not quite what you said to the New York Times, though. And I think what you said to the New York Times is why they sent these staff members from the Senate. I did not have anything to do with that. I was opposed to the damn committee.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, what I said to the New York Times is very close to what Senator Sarbanes said here. There was an important book that was being widely discussed. There were important changes that a negotiation that I had conducted had been somehow rigged, and I was quite interested in getting to the bottom of it. And, frankly, it seems to me that these two investigations have established that there was no October Surprise and I think that is quite a healthy thing to have happened in our society. I agree with Senator Sarbanes on that.

Senator HELMS. Well, I do not know if it is healthy to be accused for a whole year, but let me ask you one quick question, yes or no; have you recommended Mr. Sick to be given a role in the Clinton administration?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir, I have not.

Senator HELMS. Do you plan to do so?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir. I have no—it is not within my area of concern. I mean he was in the National Security Council and I do not know what his role is going to be, if any. That name has not come to my attention.

Senator HELMS. You do know him, though, don't you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I do know him. As I said, I worked with him for 4 years.

Senator HELMS. Yes. Was that when you were with Ramsey Clark?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir. It was when I was with President Carter. He was in the White House, in the National Security Council under Dr. Brzezinski between 1977 and 1980.

Senator HELMS. Well, we will revisit this a little later.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Biden.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could yield off my time just a moment to an addendum. And I do not like to weigh into this, but Gary Sick is a Kansan [laughter] so I have a certain parochial interest here. I did not support the October Surprise Commission. I think it was a mistake to weigh into that as we did. But I have always valued Gary Sick's understanding of the Middle East, and I think through the years he has offered some very valuable assessments of the Middle East, and I would just like to interject that at this point, rather than have it look as if he was sort of nobody.

Senator HELMS. He is from Kansas, you say.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes, he is.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Kassebaum, his book *All Fall Down*, I think is a very valuable account of the Iranian revolution. And as I said before, I think he served with patriotism during the years 1977 through 1980. I just do not regard him as an intimate friend. I do not see him.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I am a little confused here.

Senator HELMS. That is all right, you will get over it.

Senator BIDEN. The Senator from North Carolina says I will get over it, but not through his questioning, it confuses me more.

As I understand it, you just sat here and said that you at the time told this committee and its investigators that you had no evidence, no concrete evidence. You did not speculate for them that there was an October Surprise. You had no first hand evidence, or I assume second or third hand, that there was an October Surprise. And you have just said, sitting there under oath, you believe now, based on the investigation that has gone forward, that there was no October Surprise.

And so I am confused, and I ask my friend from North Carolina what other than making the point that Ronald Reagan did not engage in an October Surprise—what is the relevance of the questions to the Secretary?

Senator HELMS. Well, there is a great deal of relevance because—do you want to yield to me?

Senator BIDEN. Sure, I would be happy to.

Senator HELMS. OK.

Senator BIDEN. I do not want to have to sit through 2 more days engaged in this line of questioning.

Senator HELMS. I could say—and I am not charging this, I am just—we are getting all sorts of calls from credible people, and I said at the outset this morning that he ought to be given an opportunity to explain. But there are all sorts of ways of saying to staff members, well, you know, I have got no evidence of this, so and so and so and so, and it is a tone of voice.

I have not read that statement because it was not released until today.

Senator BIDEN. Got you.

Senator HELMS. And I intend to read—I have not read it yet, but I intend to read it. But in the meantime I think that he ought to be given an opportunity to explain in detail some of the things that are being said.

Senator BIDEN. If the Senator would yield, the one thing that I have never heard the Secretary-designate accused of is being loose-lipped or exceedingly forthcoming.

Senator HELMS. I did not say that.

Senator BIDEN. I have not heard anybody suggest that there was any—by body language, by indirect reference—indication that Warren Christopher at any time said, you know, I think there is an October Surprise and you should go investigate that. I do not hear anybody said that. Is somebody telling you he said that?

Senator HELMS. They are saying all sorts of things. You asked about the overall relevance.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Senator HELMS. OK. The overall relevance is that President Carter offered arms for hostages.

Senator BIDEN. No, that is not true, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Yes it is.

Senator BIDEN. No, it is not, Senator.

Senator HELMS. All right. And he used politics in this thing. And it is understandable to me because he was in bad shape politically and he was trying to recover. He was first in bad shape within his own party, and then he ran into a tractor-trailer truck in Ronald Reagan in the fall.

Senator BIDEN. George Bush can tell you about tractor-trailers.

Senator HELMS. And the point the people are making is that Mr. Christopher helped him do this, the playing politics and so forth.

Senator BIDEN. I see.

Senator HELMS. And I am giving him an opportunity to say it ain't so.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I think he has done it very effectively.

Senator BIDEN. Now that is a specific question. Can you say it ain't so? And I know that is hard, probably, for you to say, but can you say it is not so?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I can say it ain't so.

And the point I would like to make again, I think the Senator would be reassured if he would simply read the transcript of my testimony before the October Surprise Committee. I think those who were present felt that I had given a fair account and it helped them reach the conclusion that there was no October Surprise.

That is why I am just kind of dazzled by this set of questions, Senator. I went to a lot of trouble to produce facts that helped the

committee reach the conclusion that there was no October Surprise, and now I find you charging me with just the opposite.

Senator HELMS. I am not charging you. I have asked you questions.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I thank my colleague for answering my question. I thank him very much and I thank you.

Let me—in the few minutes that I have left—shift gears here. We talked about international institutions and the considerations that you have underway, at least in the conceptual stage on the international community's preparedness to use force.

It was discussed and, as usual, our chairman is exceedingly modest. I came here when Sam Ervin was still here, Mr. Secretary, and he carried a copy of the Constitution. From the time I have gotten here, the chairman of this committee has literally carried a copy of the U.N. Charter in his pocket. It is dogeared.

I will never forget, it must be 13, 14 years ago, this man suggested to me that article 43 was not used appropriately, we did not understand it, the world did not respond to it properly, and so on. And now he is sitting here giving me credit for initiating some congressional activity relating to article 43.

But having said that, and ending this mutual admiration society, I would like to discuss the need to fulfill the potential of article 43 of the U.N. Charter. And if you act to do so, you will clearly have the support of this committee based on our votes, notwithstanding the fact that I do not know how the three new members would vote, but the remainder of the committee has voted so.

This brings me to NATO. I think it is little recognized but profoundly important that the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance are now negotiating among themselves the precise terms under which NATO will be made available to implement decisions in the CSCE or the U.N. Security Council. And this will represent a new and broader application, if it occurs, of the principle of collective security.

The truth is that if collective security is to work, this transformation of NATO, in my view, must succeed. For in practical terms, NATO is the one organization in the world that unifies and coordinates the military power of the major Western democracies. As we are seeing, as the world community today, and in Desert Storm, responded to Saddam Hussein.

So what I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, is this. This NATO transformation has been slowed, among other things, by the foot dragging on the part of the French, who are reluctant, in my view to see NATO accorded a major role as compared to institutions like the EC and the WEU, the Western European Union, where they have a greater role.

And I want to make it clear I am distinguishing between the French attitude on NATO and the French attitude of whether the West should intervene in Bosnia; they are two separate issues. On transforming NATO to a role in the new world order, the French are dragging their feet and on Bosnia they are not.

But I would like to get—it is a long preamble to my question, which is, do you see an essential connection between NATO transforming its role and the ability to give any impetus to, or teeth to the implementation of article 43? Because it seems to me they go

hand-in-hand, and I wonder if you could just, without committing to any particular position, discuss with me that relationship.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think that the promise of article 43 can be fulfilled in a number of different ways. One of the most interesting options is to use organizations like NATO to fulfill it. NATO is really in search of a role. I don't mean that in any critical way, but NATO's principal role has been fulfilled, and we ought to all commend NATO and ourselves for that having been done. But as NATO searches for a new role, I would think assisting the U.N. through article 43 is one of the fascinating possibilities.

Senator BIDEN. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, if I could lobby for a moment, the Western world is unlikely to act collectively absent U.S. leadership and participation. And we have a 30-year-plus history of that cooperation, coordination, and participation in a 16-member organization. And so I would hope that as you flesh out the administration's policy in dealing with a fundamentally different world than you faced when you were Under Secretary in the Carter administration, and than we faced even 5 years ago, that we would think in terms of using that which works and has worked well as an integral part in the necessary transformation of the international community with regard to peacekeeping and peace-making initiatives.

And as you know better than I, the process of discussion, at least, is underway within NATO as we speak, but I am convinced that nothing is likely to happen absent the President of the United States and the Secretary of State suggesting that this is an important decision and consensus must be arrived at.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you. You are certainly right that this is an organization that works, and we ought not to discard it unless we have very good reason to do so.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that during my absence one of my colleagues, Senator Lugar, made reference to the War Powers Act.

I respectfully suggest that it is important. As Senator Lugar says, we are going to be confronted, whether he agrees with my approach or not. And in this, we are going to be confronted time and again in the near term with the question of the role under the constitution of the Congress and the President with regard to the use of force.

And I would respectfully suggest it would greatly enhance the President's capacity to lead in this area if we could establish better, clearer ground rules so that we had less—to use a phrase that has become very popular in Washington, unfortunately in the last 4 years, gridlock, and we can act with greater dispatch and less controversy.

Once you get situated, I would respectfully suggest that you might point me and others who have an interest in this to one of your subordinates so that we might work out a legislative accommodation, to make this a much smoother path.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think we ought to explore that because what we have now is maybe the best we can do, but it is not working very well.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I agree with Senator Biden that discussion in this area would be useful, and you have indicated an eagerness to do this. Let me carry it a step further, just to gain your own thinking. Clearly, you may still be in the process of thinking these things through with the President-elect and others in the administration.

The situation of Iraq is topical because of the airstrikes today. My own view, although it is still to be seen, I suppose, as to what the effectiveness of this activity was today, is that Saddam Hussein is likely to continue to test the U.N. alliance, and ourselves as a part of that alliance. That clearly the provocations that led to the U.N. resolution and our activity on that basis is apparently occurring in various other forms in Iraq and my view is that Saddam Hussein is a resilient leader, to say the least, who is likely to test the new President in the same way that he has been testing this one.

Now, it may be that the response of your administration will be to proceed to have airstrikes, to knock out a specific surface-to-air missile battery or even an airfield that threatens American aviators, but you might come to a conclusion that the termination of Saddam's leadership was really important, going well beyond the current U.N. resolutions, but you might want to take an initiative at the U.N. and say, this situation will not work. We are tired of being badgered week in and week out, waiting for the day, the month, the year that Saddam finally finds that the U.N. alliance has cracked or that our own will is gone, or that we are tired of the situation.

Now, if you decided to do that, that would be, of course, a very different course. I am just curious. What sort of consultation would you envision with the Congress, or would you believe that it would be useful for the Congress to pass resolutions of support, either authorizing a much more extensive military action in Iraq—I am simply curious as you plow into new ground, because I think that these are not boldly hypothetical situations. And the best case, Saddam will find after today's strike that he is simply tired of testing us and his will will collapse, but I do not think that is credible, nor do I suspect you believe that is the most likely scenario.

And, therefore, if the Clinton administration is to change the pace of things, what would be the course of your activity in dealing with the Congress, specifically in consultation or in seeking measures of legislative support?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. This is new for me, Senator, in this sense. We have been discussing the support that we want to give the current administration in its efforts to enforce the U.N. resolutions, and we have reached the firm conclusion, Governor Clinton has, that he wants to give fulsome support on that, and that there not be even a shadow of daylight between himself and President Bush. And we appreciate very much the degree of consultation. There was consultation between the two of them before today's events, as I am sure has been reported by now.

We will come into office determined to carry out the U.N. resolutions; determined to be just as firm, just as tough as President Bush's administration has been. And if we are tested, we will not

be found wanting, at least not deliberately. We intend to be firm and resolute about that.

Now, you are taking me to a new level, and that is suppose we find ourselves frustrated and want to go back for a new resolution. And you were speaking about a new congressional resolution as well. At this point, of course, we are following the U.N. resolutions, and I would think that we would want to continue to act on a multilateral basis.

So, I am really not quite ready to respond to that question, Senator. I think it is an interesting question. I think it is worth thinking about as to whether there are some things that cannot be done under the U.N. resolutions at the present time that might be useful in bringing this matter to a termination.

And that, I will just have to confess to you—we have been focused on lending all of the support we could and following with the same determination the matter of enforcing the U.N. resolutions. If we need new resolutions, clearly that would be a matter of consultation both here and at the U.N., but I would think we would want to come to Congress if we decided we wanted to dramatically change the rules of engagement.

Senator LUGAR. I understand your position, and I appreciate the final sense, which is important, that you would come here without defining who would be consulted or the form of the situation. I will just say that I just suspect the situation is one in which this agonizing testing and retesting eventually may find a situation in which some of our allies flake off, or we still are left with the U.N. resolution, but the United States is the only party that really wants to enforce it.

And in one resolution of this could be that we finally, just quietly decide that Saddam is not that bad. There are all sorts of other evils out there. But that would certainly be unsatisfying, I think, to most people in the country, and probably unsatisfying to President-elect Clinton as he takes a look at it.

I just see a need at some point to approach the Iraq situation in a new frame of reference, and that was the reason I requested your thoughts as to how you would do that, if you come to that conclusion.

In the case of Bosnia, I mentioned at the latter part of my questioning this morning, the United States already had committed itself to try and enforce the no-fly zone, and we have been held back by allies who are not inclined to do that without further warning, or some suggested they had troops in harms way, and other such problems. And you have indicated that you were in favor of moving ahead, and indicated that President Clinton would agree.

But I suspect in that area, and we have not seen the text of President Bush's letter to President Milosevic, he indicated that if activity of an aggressive character occurred in the Kosovo region, then you could expect the use of military force by the United States. Now, this is a letter from the President of the United States, one that is heading out. President Clinton may or may not subscribe to that point of view.

I am curious with regard to Bosnia as to how you will approach this. It could be one step at a time. Try out the no-fly zone, and that may or may not make any difference. Arming Bosnians might

or might not help, or incrementally it may help. Or tightening economic sanctions, or trying out for size various steps that short of massive intervention, but introduce substantial ground forces, which the world is reticent to get into, all countries, including this one.

But I get back to a point that Senator Biden and I have discussed privately as well as publicly, that this is a testing time for NATO, and for our ability as a member of NATO and as part of the European Community to try to bring some order into that area.

This may mean, leadership would have to be taken by President-elect Clinton and yourself to reenergize NATO, to refocus even the Germans, who have not had their constitutional debate, and perhaps don't want to have it, to do a number of things that finally make it possible, if this is a good idea, to make certain that substantial ground forces of NATO were available to secure cities or bases or roadways in Bosnia—in a much less elaborate way we have been securing them in Somalia. The two situations are not totally dissimilar, despite the geography.

And in order to get to that point, though, this requires considerable leadership on our part. I cannot imagine any other country, any other president or leader elsewhere is going to do this kind of thing.

If you were of a mind to do that, and you saw the world the way I see it or am trying to project today, that this could mean a kind of organization change in NATO's mission—change in our own presupposition because the United States, I presume, would have ground forces as a part of NATO. I presume we could be based in Sarajevo the same way we are now based in Germany. And it could very well be that we would be there for quite a while.

How would the administration approach the Congress on something that really is a massive change theoretically, as opposed to an incremental change, in our policy with the U.N. in Iraq, or with extension of our mission slightly in Somalia, to recognize the need for diplomacy?

What would be the process in the administration, and then vis-a-vis the Congress, and would it include, as I would hope it would, at the end of the trail a demand for a vote on the part of the Senate and the House to support the use of military force if that was required so that the whole country has had the debate, and we are all aboard. This, then, would not be a so-called elitist plan as you suggested sometimes has been the trouble in the past, but, rather, one based on an understanding of the way the world works, the security interests of the United States, and how our domestic interests are involved as well as our foreign ones?

As I say it is a full plate to try to take on, but I see this sort of thing coming along the tracks of this administration, and I would just like your discussion, if you would, of how you approach it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, to take the easy part first, Senator, within the administration, as I have said earlier today, this would be one of the priority issues after January 20. We will be considering the matter among those agencies that are responsible, the participants in the National Security Council process, both the statutory members and the advisory members I am sure, working

through the customary procedures. We will be considering this issue among many, but I am not giving away any secrets when I say that this will be one of the priority issues.

If we were to reach the kinds of conclusions you have mentioned, the sweeping suggestion, for example, that NATO should attempt to use ground forces which, as I say, has not been contemplated by us at the present time, it would clearly be an occasion for consultation at the highest levels of the Congress. It is hard for me to envisage that we would take that kind of a step without consultation with the key leaders of Congress. And that is a rather elastic concept. The more serious the step, I suppose in some ways, the larger the group that must be consulted.

Where we go from there is really more up to the Congress than it is up to the administration as to whether the Congress wants to continue the process, or whether it is prepared on the basis of consultation to have the administration go forward. The War Powers Act, obviously, comes into play here. As I said earlier, we would be prepared to make the notifications required by the War Powers Act on a voluntary basis, and that is part of the unsatisfactory character of that I suppose.

There is the residue of Presidential power that has always caused every President to drop back from full endorsement. That is about as far as I can go, that is to say that with that kind of significant change, I think the significance would require extensive consultation.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just add, if I may, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that I understand that and it may be, as you say, you throw the ball in the Congress' court. My only hope is drawn from the memoirs as well as the historical records of Lyndon Johnson's problems in the Vietnam War and Harry Truman's problems with the Korean War, which many of us reviewed prior to the vote on participation in Desert Storm, that both Presidents regretted that they did not really get the Congress to vote.

It was not just a question of consulting or whispering into the ear of a few at the high levels, but having the agonizing yeas and nays of every Member and the kind of debate that was on the floor of the Senate and the House in which almost every Senator spoke.

It was on that kind of commitment that there was a national unity and a focus that was very constructive, I think, in Desert Storm. I believe that would be important if we are in the Bosnia or Yugoslavian predicament down the trail or if we expand the focus in Iraq or in Somalia or wherever else. And this is why tediously I keep making this point, that I hope that that will always be a part of your options.

President Bush early on wanted that kind of a vote, but the Senate and the House tried to escape him for months, and they were determined not to have the vote, or after the election, claim that new members had come in and it could not occur.

It took a long time, 4 days before the January 15 deadline before things finally came to a point in the Senate and the House, and it may take some pushing on your side if that type of requirement is to be fulfilled.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, without—Senator, without knowing all the twists and turns of that, I thought the final debate and the vote was one of the finest hours of this great body.

Senator LUGAR. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief because I know we want to move along here on this round. I just wanted to make a couple of observations.

First of all, I do not have the NATO treaty before me, but I am struck by how loosely we seem to assume that whatever obligations are contained within the NATO treaty can simply be broadened out in a geographic sense. Now, maybe the NATO treaty was written that broadly, and I want to take a look at it, but it does not strike me just on the face of it that that would automatically follow.

I do want to make the observation on the Bosnian situation, as I understand it, both the British and French actually have ground troops in Bosnia now, is that not correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. Do you have any idea of the magnitude of those forces?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Several thousand each, I think.

Senator SARBANES. I think the French presence is even larger than that, if I am not mistaken. But they do have troops in there now, and I wanted to just get that observation on the record. It is of some note.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, it certainly gives a good deal of weight to their concern about the effect of the no-fly zone. There is a natural and appropriate concern on their part about the effect of the no-fly zone on their own troops.

Senator SARBANES. Well I think that is perfectly understandable, and may take one point of view, but we do not actually have our own forces in there at the moment, subject to those circumstances.

I wanted to observe on the trade imbalance with China, which came up in the discussion, because I think it is very important. The trade imbalance is a consequence of manipulative trade policies on the part of the People's Republic of China. It is not the natural outgrowth of the working of fair trade competition. In fact, the Bush administration's own Treasury Department reported that the Chinese were manipulating the currency, manipulating the licensing arrangements, all designed and ordered to give them an unfair advantage in the trade relationship. They have taken that trade relationship from a balanced position in 1986 to where it is now an almost \$15 billion trade deficit.

Mr. Chairman, the final observation I want to make is I do want to express my appreciation to Mr. Christopher for the very forthright and candid way in which he has responded to the questions that have been put to him today by the members of this committee, and I, for one, appreciate it very much. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Christopher, you have been so patient, I am almost embarrassed to have other questions. But we have touched very little on the former Soviet Union. Senator Lugar mentioned it in his opening statement and you made some strong com-

ments in your statement. I still, of course, feel, as I am sure we all do, that what happens in the evolution of the former Soviet Union is of great importance.

I was pleased to see your strong support, of course, to assisting in the demilitarization of Russia. That is something that Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn have both been real leaders on, and I think in a very constructive way.

But my question is as the reformers now in Russia are criticizing the West for what they view lack of support, the hardliners, on the other hand, are saying that President Yeltsin has embraced by far too much, the West. So there is that division that has evolved.

I guess I would ask you how much slack would the Clinton administration be prepared to give President Yeltsin as he takes steps to try and distance himself from the West in order to peel to the more hardline elements of his government? And the second part of that is should not we be also mindful of the importance of the other nations, states of the former Soviet Union, and also other leaders in Russia.

There is always, supposedly, a concern that sometimes we focus on just one or two leaders, and that we should be careful and not put all of our eggs in one basket. There are others that we should recognize in importance.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, taking them in order, Senator, if I recall, we think that President Yeltsin is by some margin the outstanding leader in that country, a strong force for democracy and market-oriented economy. We think that he is moving as skillfully as anybody could be under those circumstances, dealing with the many, many ethnic groups in Russia and the many elements of that society.

We think he is doing a commendable job and we will support him extensively. I am not exactly sure how to say how much slack we will give him—1 foot or 2 feet or 3 feet—but I think we understand he has got serious problems and are going to try to be appreciative of the tensions and pressures that he feels.

On the other newly independent states, clearly, it is very important that we maintain good contacts with all of those countries. Those states in the ring around Russia need to be carefully encouraged by us, cultivated in the best sense of the word. Ukraine is a powerful country, and of course you have Kazakhstan with very substantial nuclear assets at the present time, and the same with Belarus. We hope each of them will support START II and that they will move very quickly to return their nuclear arsenals.

On your other point, certainly, we need to keep in contact with all the leaders in Russia and the former Soviet Union, opposition as well as those in government. That is one of the reasons why you have such a high priority to getting an Ambassador back in residence.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Speaking of Ukraine, as you know, of course, one of the real stumbling blocks in the START II accord is that Ukraine needs to ratify START I.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Right.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And if that is not done within the next week, during the Bush administration, you will continue to press, of course, Ukraine in ratification of START I.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Absolutely. And we believe we promised to do so, and we hope they will move to keep their promise.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just a final comment. I was so pleased to hear your comments about streamlining the State Department and also for reforming AID. It is something I have long been interested in. I have introduced legislation through several Congresses, it seems, and I have never picked up a lot of support because I would end all earmarking. You have heard some comments about earmarking here, and obviously that causes problems. But I have always felt it took away from the flexibility that I thought was necessary at the State Department.

Just to comment, there is a GAO report that was addressing the need for reform at AID and notes that AID's traditional role as the lead agency for administration U.S. economic assistance is being eroded, and other agencies such as the Department of State, Treasury, Commerce, and EPA have begun to take the lead in implementing specific new programs. This report takes no—it says it withholds judgment on the recommendation to merge AID into the State Department, and I am not asking you really for any response other than to say I think what is done in reforming AID, it is—and we cannot just shift the chairs on the *Titanic*, so to speak. I think we really have to do careful thought about what initiatives are taken, and I would look forward to working with you on that effort because I think it is so important.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, thank you, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. I would like to just get your quick comment if you could on NAFTA.

Senator HELMS. Chris, would you forgive me for interrupting?

He and I were talking—the Chairman—and may I inquire, do you anticipate another round after this one?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to go on indefinitely. I think that is also the wishes of the witness.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But what is the will of the committee? I ask the ranking minority member.

Senator DODD. My view is we should probably just proceed as long as Mr. Christopher is comfortable, obviously. But my view is to try and get as much done. We have got a lot of people sticking around, and we are going to be here tomorrow, I gather. We will just try to keep going if we can.

Hopefully, these questions of mine will be in that 10-minute timeframe to get it along, just really some more comments so we can move the process along.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reaction from here?

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am through. I just say probably people would be grateful if some of us would leave.

Senator DODD. I notice you say that after you have finished your questions.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, that is right. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, why do we not complete this round, Senator Coverdell and Simon.

Senator SARBANES. Should we do another round?

Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Chairman, can we maybe get an agreement?

Senator HELMS. Well, the only thing, my doctors have advised me not to work exceptionally long days. But by golly, if that is what you all want to do, we will do it.

Senator DODD. Well, maybe, Mr. Chairman, I might suggest—I just think in terms of time—maybe if I could offer a suggestion, if we could get an agreement this evening about what time we might finish tomorrow, then the need to go on this evening becomes less of a concern. If it is going to go on for several days, then it seems to me we ought to try to get this done.

But I would make a suggestion that let us say we vote tomorrow at 1 p.m., or we complete the thing at 1 p.m.. I will make that as a proposal, if I may, that we complete the hearing at 1 p.m., 1 p.m. tomorrow, and if that is the case, then I would be prepared to forego some rounds this evening and pick up in the morning.

Senator HELMS. Well, look, Bud Nance just reminded me that we have just gotten the papers, and I do not know what the rush is because you took 5 days on Al Haig—5 days. Now, nobody has proposed to take that long a time on this.

Senator DODD. Well, I would just say to my colleague, both on the question of Shultz and Baker, we were about a day and a half each. On Al Haig there were some unique circumstances. I was here as a freshman Member that year. It took a little longer, but in the last two cases we moved quickly.

Senator HELMS. Well, there are a lot of unique circumstances with any nominee, Chris.

Senator DODD. But I think you know, Jesse, in the last two cases we were very quick.

Senator HELMS. Well, you will not punish me for having to ask a lot of questions. That is fine. I will stay here till midnight or 3 a.m. with you. But also, I will remember it because you may get sick some times.

Senator DODD. You are putting this on personal terms, Jesse.

Senator SARBANES. I thought Senator Dodd was trying to be considerate of your situation. As I understood his proposal, it was not that we would stay on indefinitely. I thought he was trying to respond to the concern that you expressed and showed, and sensitivity to it, and I really commend him for that. His suggestion was that we reach some sort of understanding now about when we would draw this to a conclusion for tomorrow. It seemed to me that that was an effort to try to respond to the very point that was made.

Senator SIMON. I agree with my colleague from Maryland. If I could ask, Jesse, do you have any suggestion in terms of 1 o'clock not being as acceptable as 2 or 3 o'clock?

Senator HELMS. Just that we not limit ourselves in asking questions but operate in good faith, which I am certainly going to do. We have been in session from 10 o'clock to what? 1:30 p.m.? All right. What is that, Mr. Chairman? That is 3½ hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Three and a half.

Senator HELMS. Then, that is another 3 hours. That is not much time. But I am saying you know the President has not even been inaugurated. We have got a bunch of papers coming in from the

LBJ facility down in Texas that are not even here yet that people have asked us to look at, and I am going to look at them.

Now, one way or another we are going to ask the questions, and I am going to do it as expeditiously as I can, but you are not going to ride roughshod over me. And I have heard some of the comments, well, how are we going to stop Helms? It is already been said. Well, the truth is you ain't going to stop Helms.

You need to get that through your head.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, let me just reclaim my time. There is no suggestion of trying to stop anybody. We have got—obviously, the Senator from North Carolina has every right in the world to be able to question as long as he wants.

Senator HELMS. I suggest we make an agreement, Chris.

Senator DODD. Jesse, my suggestion was to accommodate your concerns—and I appreciate the physical question, but we all have obligations we are trying to serve. We have got other confirmation hearings, and we are trying to figure out some means by which we have a framework within which to proceed.

My mere suggestion was to see if there was some way in which we could try and wrap this up in a reasonable time and conclude early enough this evening. Now, we could make it 6 o'clock tomorrow and vote. And I would, for my own part, finish up my rounds here in the next few minutes and leave all the time to you to raise the questions tomorrow. But that is the only purpose, Jesse, to try and move it along.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we agree that we would finish our questioning by tomorrow afternoon. That would give you ample time.

Senator SIMON. I cannot hear you over here.

The CHAIRMAN. I was saying could we agree that we would finish the questioning by tomorrow afternoon. That would give ample time to see if the mail service works; Mr. Christopher's papers are coming up from Texas.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have said many times that I have never known a finer gentleman than you in the operation of this committee. I will ask you a question in response to your question. What is the rush? I mean what is wrong with going into Friday if it becomes necessary?

I am not anxious to go into Friday. I want to get through as well. But I also want to satisfy the need, as I see it, for asking questions and getting this gentleman on the record, because a lot of people are apprehensive about this nomination. Now I know that there are very few, if any, on this committee, but I am concerned pending responses to questions. And as I say again, that at a very minimum the nominee is entitled to have for the record his responses to questions asked of him about various matters in which he has participated, or maybe that he has not participated in.

So that is the way I feel about it. I am not going to prolong it, but neither am I going to subject myself to a limitation which I believe to be unrealistic in view of the fact that the documents that we have coming are not even here yet.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Of course, the problem then is that some of us have made other arrangements for Friday. I mean you an-

nounced this hearing for today and tomorrow. That certainly seems more than adequate time, particularly in view of the fact that the two previous nominations for Secretary of State took significantly less time than that in their consideration by this committee.

Therefore I guess one, in thinking of cutting this thing off early now, is influenced by, the proposition that it may carry over yet another day. If that is the case, I would prefer to press on and try to complete as much of the work in the expectation that we would then be able to complete it tomorrow.

I am trying very hard to be sensitive to the concerns raised by my colleague from North Carolina which I thought Senator Dodd was trying very hard to do. It does add a new dimension if we are now talking about throwing it over yet another day in terms of other obligations that members may have undertaken.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms' questions are not going to be assuaged by how long we go this evening. The problem is the papers from Texas and other materials that the minority has called for.

I am wondering if it is not a reasonable course of action that tomorrow—and we would have a period from 10 a.m., to 1 p.m., for questions of members, those who still are interested, and from 2 p.m., to 5 p.m., in the afternoon. And that may conclude. Everybody may have had enough by that time; that is a long stretch.

But at the same time there would be the option that if that has not been sufficient, that the committee would then meet again on Friday from 10 a.m., to 1 p.m., and in the afternoon from 2 p.m., to 5 p.m. It might mean that you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member, Mr. Helms, would be here together for a portion of that time, and that is a burden upon both of you. Some of the rest of us might be available.

But since the purpose of this period is the raising of questions rather than debate among the members of the committee, it really does not require all of us to be present if members have had their fill of questions and answers, and it does offer an opportunity for additional evidence to come in, if that seems to be required, with the committee then having the vote on Tuesday, as was originally planned, as I understand, after the full collection has occurred in this time.

And I would hope that might be a reasonable period of time that members could anticipate, so that they can plan their schedules and the Chair and the ranking member can plan their schedule if necessary, and hopefully this would not be too onerous a burden upon our major witness.

Senator SARBANES. Could I make an inquiry? I am informed that the documents are here.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is correct.

Senator SARBANES. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. The records are here, and the majority and minority need—

Senator SARBANES. They have been here since 1 p.m., this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. And have been here since 1 p.m., this afternoon. So presumably they are being examined at this point. I think the suggestion of the Senator from Indiana is quite sensible. If we could reach an agreement to vote on Tuesday definitely and hopefully wrap up tomorrow.

Senator HELMS. Well, there never has been any question about that and I think his suggestion is good. But I think you would want to maintain some latitude yourself, Mr. Chairman, in the unlikely event that some of these documents yield information about which you have not been aware and I have not been aware, that maybe you would want to have some question period yourself.

I just do not feel that I want to be limited in my time, even though I want to get through with it. I want to say bye-bye, you know, let him go. But not before I ask all the questions that I feel it is my responsibility to ask.

Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I mean some of us have made other plans on the basis of the schedule you handed out.

Senator HELMS. Well, just go on.

Senator SARBANES. No, we want to be here for this hearing. It is an important hearing. I think if we are going to be here tomorrow, we ought to press on if questions remain at the end of the afternoon.

Senator HELMS. Well, you are going to be here tomorrow.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I understand that. But I think if we go to 5 p.m., tomorrow and there are still questions remaining, we ought to press on with the questions and try to complete the hearing tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us agree on that and complete this round. I am conscious of the ranking member's open heart surgery a few weeks ago.

Senator HELMS. Look, I don't want anybody to think I am an invalid. I am just operating on the advice of my doctors, and they tell this to everybody who has this operation, do not work too long a work day. They said that 12 hours was about enough, and I have been working since about 7 a.m., including in my office at home this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us wrap up this round now.

Senator HELMS. But I am not an invalid and I can take it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I am not saying you are.

Senator HELMS. And if you want to dish it out I can take it. I am not talking about you.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, let us wrap up this round now, but agree that tomorrow we will wrap up the questioning. And that if you cannot do it, you will deputize one of your members to ask the questions, and that will permit us to wrap up tomorrow night. Does that seem sensible?

Senator SIMON. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I heard over here. But if the attempt is to wrap up tomorrow, then I am all for that. I want to protect the rights of my colleague from North Carolina, but I do not want to give him the sole rights on Friday of having questions. If he is going to have questions, then the rest of us ought to have the option.

The CHAIRMAN. No, let us agree to wrap up the questioning tomorrow night.

Senator SIMON. I am not opposed to that.

The CHAIRMAN. And we can hopefully finish at 5 p.m., or 6 p.m., and agree on that and vote next week on Tuesday.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I am still not able to understand why there could not be an opportunity for Senators to ask questions, whoever wishes to do so, on Friday. I see no reason why that day ought not to be available to the committee in the event that the questions have not been finished tomorrow.

I cannot imagine, if we have 6 hours of questioning tomorrow, that there will be many Senators with many questions remaining, but at the same time it seems to me that we are not under great pressure to conclude this hearing tomorrow and we are not going to come to a vote, I would hope, until Tuesday. And it just seems to me to be reasonable to come to that accommodation.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, we are not going to resolve this now and we are wasting time, so why don't I just go on with my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think we are sort of at an impasse, but let us leave as an objective that we will hopefully wrap up tomorrow. And I would suggest to the ranking minority member that if he does not want to participate in all the questioning, that he has valiant members on his side who could fill in for him. We could do our best to wrap up that way. And for the sake of comity and health and agreeableness, let us all agree on that and just complete this cycle of questions.

Senator HELMS. Well, I thank the chairman but I will be here, whatever the hour.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Dodd, please would you pick it up at this time.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Christopher, on the issue of NAFTA, a lot of it will be dealt with by the Department of Treasury and you commented on it already here today and I agree with your comments on it. It is a very important agreement. There are a couple of concerns that need to be addressed, and the President-elect has stated those.

One of the concerns that is not being expressed as widely here, but is throughout the hemisphere and publicly was, I think, mentioned in an article of a few days ago about the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, is the concern that this will be the only agreement. That Mexico and Canada, but particularly Mexico, will be the recipient of a tremendous amount of investment and trade at the expense of other nations within the hemisphere. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, obviously, has been of some success.

I think I know the answer to this, but maybe you would just like to respond to it, about the idea of establishing with the North American Free Trade Agreement a solid enough set of principles and guidelines that it would be the hope, as soon as practicable, to be able to develop similar such agreements with other either nations or groups of nations, be it the Andean Pact, Southern Cone, or other nations in the hemisphere. We should indicate that it is not our intent to limit this particular proposal merely to the three participants who are part of the North American Free Trade Agreement, but to expand it throughout the hemisphere.

I would hope that would be the response. I think it is a very important message to send. There is a lot of concern throughout the hemisphere that this is not going to happen elsewhere, as I said at the outset. I wonder if you might comment on it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Dodd, that is correct. There may be differences in countries that require different or slightly modified approaches. I do not think you can lay a pattern down from the NAFTA agreement and impose it on or see it fit perfectly in every other country of South America. But our intention is certainly not to stop at the southern border of Mexico, but rather to explore the opportunities for comparable agreements in the remainder of Central and South America.

Senator DODD. I thank you, Mr. Christopher, for that answer. El Salvador, as you know, has been a tragic situation for the last 12 years. Thousands of people have lost their lives.

The good news is that those accords were reached in Mexico last January. Perez de Cuellar, the former Secretary General of the U.N., did a remarkably fine job, along with Alvaro de Soto, his principle negotiator, in those efforts. And I would suggest as well that the Bush administration made some constructive efforts on this issue along with others of us who were involved in the issue of El Salvador over a number of years.

What concerns me at this particular juncture is there has been some retreat on the last part of the implementation on the ad hoc committee dealing with the so-called purification of roughly 100 senior officers, that President Cristiani has backtracked a bit on that. There is a letter, which I would put in the record at this juncture, from the Secretary General of the U.N. expressing concerns about not living up to or meeting the full compliance in those accords.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From U.N. Security Council, 9 January 1993]

LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The purpose of this letter is to report to you and through you to the members of the Security Council on the latest developments relating to implementation of the provisions of the Peace Accords for El Salvador concerning the purification of the Armed Forces (S/23501, annex. chap I, sect. 3).

It will be recalled that in my letter to the President of the Security Council of 13 November 1992 (S/24805) I reported on arrangements which had been successfully concluded with the Government and the FMLN to bring the armed conflict in El Salvador formally to an end on 15 December 1992. Those arrangements included agreement by President Cristiani to complete implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification of the Armed Forces within a specified time frame. In particular, President Cristiani had agreed to inform me by 29 November 1992 of the administrative decisions he had taken on this matter. As I subsequently reported to the Security Council in paragraph 3(d) of my report of 23 December 1992 (S/25006), the administrative decisions were punctually communicated to me by President Cristiani. In his letter, President Cristiani informed me that he had adopted administrative decisions concerning all the officers included in the Ad Hoc Commission's report. These decisions would be made known in 31 December 1992 at the latest and would become effective as of 1 January 1993.

On 5 January 1993, in my absence in Africa, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations and my Senior Political Adviser received, by hand of Dr. Oscar Santamaria, Minister of the Presidency, and General Mauricio Vargas, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, a letter dated 1 January 1993 in which President Cristiani conveyed to me details of the measures adopted to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission.

The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission concerned 103 officers. One of these was no longer a serving member of the Armed Forces. Of the remaining 102 officers, it was recommended that 26 should be transferred to other functions and 76 should be discharged. President Cristiani informed me in his letter that the following measures had been adopted in relation to 94 of these 102 officers:

- (1) Twenty-five officers had been transferred to other functions;
- (2) Four officers had been discharged for disciplinary reasons (one of them being the 26th officer recommended for a transfer to other functions);
- (3) Nineteen officers had been discharged for administrative reasons;
- (4) Thirty-eight officers had been placed on leave with pay, pending completion of the procedures for their retirement which would take place within a period not exceeding six months;
- (5) Seven officers had been appointed as Military Attachés to Salvadorian embassies abroad;
- (6) One officer had, for personal reasons, been permitted to remain in active service until he retired on 1 March 1993.

President Cristiani's letter went on to say that administrative decisions relating to the other eight officers would be deferred during "the period of transition", which is understood to mean during the remainder of President Cristiani's mandate as President of the Republic.

Enclosed with President Cristiani's letter were copies of the administrative orders relating to categories (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) above. I have verified that the names correspond with those in the report of the Ad Hoc Commission.

Having carefully studied President Cristiani's letter and its enclosures, I have come to the following conclusions:

- (a) The measures adopted in relation to categories (1), (2) and (3) above comply fully with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission;
- (b) The measures adopted in relation to categories (4) and (6) also comply broadly with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission. The officers concerned will not perform any official functions with effect from 1 January 1993, but their discharge will not become effective until the legal formalities for their retirement are complete, which could in some cases take as long as six months. I nevertheless consider that these measures can be accepted as satisfactory in the circumstances;
- (c) The appointment of the seven officers in category (5) to Military Attaché posts does not comply with the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations which require these officers to be discharged;
- (d) The deferral of decisions relating to the remaining eight officers is similarly not in compliance with the Commission's recommendations.

I have from the outset been conscious of the particular difficulty and sensitivity of this aspect of the Peace Accords. As indicated above, I am ready to accept as satisfactory the measures adopted and implemented by the Government of El Salvador with respect to 87 of the 102 officers covered by the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations, even though a number of them do not conform in all respects with those recommendations. However, the measures adopted in respect of the other 15 officers do not comply with those recommendations and are thus not in conformity with the Peace Accords. The mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council requires me to seek full compliance by each side with all the commitments it has entered into in signing the Peace Accords. I have therefore asked President Cristiani to take early action to regularize the position of the 15 officers in respect of whom the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations have not yet been fully implemented.

I shall continue to report to the Security Council as appropriate on the implementation of this and other aspects of the Peace Accords.

(Signed) BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

Senator DODD. And we have also, which I would put in the record, Mr. Chairman, a letter from Senator Leahy and myself to Secretary of State Eagleburger expressing some concerns about this as well.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
January 11, 1993.

The HONORABLE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington DC

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As strong supporters of the UN-brokered peace accords between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN which ended a dozen years of civil war, we are dismayed by President Cristiani's decision not to fully implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission by the December 31 UN deadline. We believe the implementation of the Commission's recommendations in a timely manner is crucial to El Salvador's future.

Ultimately, it is up to the United Nations Secretary General to determine that the peace accords, which every Salvadoran citizen has a stake in, are being complied with. However, until then, we urge you in the strongest terms to withhold obligation or delivery of any further military assistance for El Salvador. We believe the United States must take this step to make it clear to the Salvadoran armed forces that they cannot expect our support unless they fully comply with the peace accords.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

PATRICK LEAHY,
Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee
CHRIS DODD,
Chairman, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee

Senator DODD. I do not necessarily expect that you would be familiar with all of the details, Mr. Christopher, but I wonder if you might just comment briefly, if you feel as though you are comfortable enough with it, on those deadlines that have been called for under the U.N.-sponsored agreements.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator Dodd, I am sorry to say that I know only generally what you have just outlined. I have every reason to hope that that agreement can get back on track and that the slippage is only temporary, because that has been a very positive development in the hemisphere. I have to confess I am not up to speed on the precise U.N. deadlines, and all I can do is express the hope that we have not gotten off the track in any serious way.

Senator DODD. Well I appreciate that, and I will say that you have copies of a letter that Senator Leahy and I have sent, along with the Boutros-Ghali letter on those issues, and possibly in a week or so you could have a chance to take a look at it in a little more detail.

In a related matter, just very quickly, in Nicaragua, the Congress voted and authorized and the President signed into law assistance to the Chamorro Government. President Chamorro has had a difficult time trying to resolve the conflict that ranged in that country for more than 10 years, a small nation. Not to the satisfaction of everyone, including this Senator, but nonetheless she is making a Herculean effort to try and bring her country back together after 10 years of civil war.

Those funds have not been sent to her, despite the fact that they were authorized, appropriated, approved, and signed by the President. They are just sitting here. I would urge you, as soon as possible, to see that those dollars that have been appropriated are actually sent—it is a very important message that this country appreciates what she is going through.

There may be points that you want to express to her, or the President-elect may want to when he assumes office, on issues that concern him about the way things are going. But it seems to me

unwise to hold back on those funds that she desperately needs. If forces of the extreme right or left gain a dominant hand in that country, we may find ourselves back facing a civil conflict.

And I would urge you to look at that, if you could. Again, I am not expecting that you be familiar with all the details, but to me it has been a disgrace that we have allowed that to lie there for these many months and not send an important signal that I think needs to be sent.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, were part of the funds released recently?

Senator DODD. They were. Some of the funds were released, that is true.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You know I am just reading in, and I hope you will forgive me for the gaps in my knowledge of these matters. I have been involved in transition matters, as you know, in Little Rock that had little to do with the State Department.

But as I was reading in on Nicaragua I was very impressed with the amount of progress that had been made. The free election there is significant and the other forces of democracy are important now. You can always see these things, to use a very trite expression, as a glass that is half full or half empty, but I am quite anxious to look at this as being a glass half full and would certainly want to review the retention of those funds in that light.

I do not know what the mechanism has been under which those funds have been held up. From my prior incarnation here I have some memory of the way that happens, so I suppose that will all have to be taken into account. But about all I can say is I have been very impressed with the progress that has been made toward democracy. Not perfect, but some really good progress.

Senator DODD. Well Mrs. Chamorro is a valiant leader and she has taken on a tremendous responsibility and a tremendously difficult one, and I would hope we would be able to express our support for her efforts down there. But I appreciate your response to the question.

The Andean Drug Initiative is another matter that I would ask you to take a look at. It has been the source of some significant debate. President Fujimori has a lot of tremendous problems, many of them of his own making.

One of the things we have been trying to do is to get the Andean Pact countries to take more responsibility through their militaries to become better adept at dealing with the drug proliferation problem. And, again, I am afraid I am getting micro here with you, and I do not want to do that to you unless you have some ideas or comments you may want to share with us briefly, to the extent you have given some thought as to how we might improve that situation in terms of the interdiction and the antidrug efforts in those countries.

It is a critical issue to us, obviously, but a critical issue to the people who live in these countries, not the least of which is Peru and the problems that they face. It is a staggering problem that they face.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I have the time-honored response that I certainly look forward to working with you on that problem as chairman of that subcommittee.

I was really somewhat concerned, maybe even a little depressed, at some slippage in some of the countries where the drug lords seem to be maintaining their sway, and I am very worried about that. There is no use being comparative about this. It is very bad for us. It is very bad for those countries, too. As I said earlier, a country with that kind of leadership and management, or that kind of coercive control has lots of other problems other than just the drug problem. It is very unfortunate.

Senator DODD. That is correct.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. All of law and order is threatened by that. The justice system is in tatters when something like that happens. But you cannot wall off corruption, you cannot have just a little piece of corruption. We know that from our cities. It is a cancer, and it is a very terrible thing.

Senator DODD. Well, I appreciate that. And the other question I had Senator Simon has raised with you dealing with the extradition case in Mexico and I am, like he, very pleased with your response to that.

Let me jump last, if I can, very quickly to an area that has always provoked a great deal of concern in this country, but we have never really come to terms with it in terms of a public policy standpoint.

Let me begin the question by just saying to you that I cannot find the adequate words to express my horror and deplore as vociferously, as strongly as I could, the terrorism that has occurred in Great Britain recently and elsewhere at the hands of terrorists out of Northern Ireland.

I would also quickly point out to you, however, that every time that the United States has played a constructive role to try and help out in that situation, progress has been made. In recent times, we have sort of retreated from playing any kind of a constructive role because of the objections of our ally—arguably our closest ally in the world is reluctant to have us express any interest in the issue of Northern Ireland.

Speaker Foley, Senator Moynihan, Senator Kennedy, and others, we have formed a group, the Friends of Ireland, to try and play a constructive role over the years in this area. I would hope that, again, under the Clinton administration that we would try and find a way for us to play a constructive role, to try and bring the parties together. Negotiations among the political parties unfortunately broke off recently. And I can understand the sensitivities when your own people during the Christmas holidays are being subjected to bombings. But the problem of Northern Ireland is not going to go away.

And although it involves Europe, and this is traditionally an area where we feel sensitive about our involvement, I think we can play a constructive role. There are people here who want to help in that regard. And I would urge you take a look at that and see how we can possibly assist in trying to bring about an end to that violence; 3,000 people have lost their lives since 1969. And while it is in the backyard of an ally, it is something where I think we can play an important role. I just mention that to you.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Coverdell?

Senator COVERDELL. Well, I guess the quality of patience is already at work. Mr. Christopher, earlier in the day, repeatedly when we have talked about Bosnia we have categorized the Serbs. And when the President of Bosnia was here the other day, even he took considerable time to point out that there are many Serbs who are not engaged in these activities; many of them that are citizens of his own country, Bosnia. In fact, he went to considerable effort to point out that the reason a tribunal is so important is to not only adjudicate the guilty, but the innocent.

And I think, for the record, that we should at least acknowledge we cannot broadly categorize the Serbs in the cloak of atrocity. And I just wanted to mention that for the record.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think that is a very fair point, Senator, and I regret it if I were indiscriminate. It is the Serbian leadership and the policies that seem to be carried out pursuant to their will or what they are letting happen that I object to so strongly.

Senator COVERDELL. I mentioned to you yesterday during our discussion—

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. I had an opportunity, Senator—I am sorry to interrupt you, but I thought I might save a few seconds by saying that I have gotten the memorandum under which Secretary Eagleburger renewed or reconfirmed the earlier statements by Secretary Shultz with respect to the independence of the operation of the Peace Corps. And I will be glad to commit to you to send a comparable memorandum, which I think is the simplest way to make sure that the independence which you so prize is reinforced by the incoming administration.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, I appreciate that. If I had a score card like Senator Simon, I would have a good mark to make there. I think Senator Dodd would agree with me that that cable is very important to the relationship between the two agencies.

If I could just make one more comment, so that we might move on to tomorrow. About midway in my tenure at the Peace Corps I had a brief opportunity, a purposeful opportunity, to be in India. As you know, there was an extensive program there at one time, and it was interrupted by hostilities between the Government of India and the United States.

I have been struck by the low visibility of the relationship between these two great democracies. I understand extended and pointed problems that exist between us, but it seems to me that there is a lost opportunity. I was struck by the number of Americans in India—very, very few studying or otherwise, and the large number of Indians in the United States. And it seems to me that, considering the size of that democracy and its role in the region that perhaps it deserves some more attention that it has received today.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, there are many important relationships between the two countries. My own impression is that there has been a very strong improvement in the relationships between India and the United States following the end of the cold war. I think that removed a number of tensions that had overlaid the relationship and probably in some respects undercut it.

We have one of our most outstanding Ambassadors in residence there in Tom Pickering, and he tells me that there is a substantial improvement in the relationship between the United States and India. And, moreover, I think he is quite optimistic about trend lines there.

I think, perhaps, the size of their population coupled with tremendous economic success in this country is a major reason that there are so many Indians attending school here, and so many of them doing so well. But I really do look for an upturn in the relationship between the United States and India, and I hope they will not be set back in any way by the ethnic struggles that are going on in India at the present time.

Senator **SARBANES**. Would the Senator yield for just a moment?

Senator **COVERDELL**. Certainly.

Senator **SARBANES**. I want to say I share the reaction that Senator Coverdell had about our inability to develop a closer relationship with India, which would seem to go along with the fact that we were the two leading democracies. I do think that it is a very important question that he put to you, and I thank the Senator for it.

Senator **COVERDELL**. Thank you, Senator. And with that, Mr. Christopher, I am going to conclude in the name of the hour, and look forward to visiting with you further tomorrow.

Mr. **CHRISTOPHER**. Thank you, Senator.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much. Senator Simon?

Senator **SIMON**. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for asking questions this late, but the Attorney General-designate is before the Judiciary Committee after tomorrow, and I may not have a chance tomorrow.

Senator Helms does not need me to ask questions for him, but I think maybe the underlying question that he has is, is Warren Christopher going to use the office of Secretary of State for partisan purposes?

Mr. **CHRISTOPHER**. I assure you, Senator Simon, that I will not. I think it is one of the most important principles that has developed over the years, or traditions at least, that the Secretary of State does not engage in partisan politics. That will be easy, I think, for me to comply with because, not to be self-complimentary, but I have never been a very political person. And I think all of my instincts will be in the position, if I am confirmed, to be very careful to not be involved in partisan politics.

It is particularly important to be able to develop in this arena a bipartisanship. We will never reach the millennium there, but I think if the Secretary of State eschews involvement in partisan politics, he will be able to establish better relationships across the aisle. And I commit myself to doing so.

Senator **SIMON**. And that includes, obviously you have said by implication, you are going to work with Republican members of this committee as well as Democratic members.

Mr. **CHRISTOPHER**. Absolutely, Senator. I very much value my relationship with the Republican members of this committee, several of whom are at least more than acquaintances; people who I regard as friends. And I look forward to deepening the relationship with them because we need to, as I said in my statement, try to build

a real consensus on some of these vexing issues that face us. Issues like the use of force and other issues that are so fundamental.

Senator SIMON. And that means, also, you are not going to be speaking at a Democratic fundraising dinner for any of us, unfortunately?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, I really think that the Secretary of State ought to stay out of politics, and I guess I will save the comment for a private time, but I assure you that if I do go around the country as somebody suggested, and make speeches, they will be at world affairs councils or other public forums, and they will not be at political events.

I cannot promise not to go over to the White House from time to time. That is where meetings of the National Security Council are held and I, after all, do work for the President. But I tend to avoid partisan politics.

Senator SIMON. We understand, and I appreciate your answer. I just have this scatter shot series of things. No. 1, I believe both Senator Sarbanes and Senator Dodd, as well as Senator Biden mentioned this—the need for some kind of U.N. authorization for troops. Senator Biden introduced the bill. I have a bill that I drafted, not knowing that he was interested. And Senator Boren independently has drafted legislation.

Mine said that we would have 2,000 troops, volunteers from among our armed forces, who would be available at the request of the President. It is very interesting that to get 500 Pakistani troops in Mogadishu for the Secretary General, it took 6 weeks. Now, you simply cannot operate effectively that way. There has to be some kind of U.N. military, a small military, that is available for emergency situations upon the action of the Security Council and the approval of our President.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I agree.

Senator SIMON. Foreign language skills has been mentioned already. I simply want to underscore that you are going to be getting a memo from me of some very practical things that I think can be done in terms of promotions and other things, to emphasize that.

Bosnia, in addition to the no-fly enforcement I think we need—Senator Biden mentioned the food situation. I think we have to be able to deliver food, and if there are ground artillery tanks, other things, that are stopping the delivery of food, then it seems to me air power can be used against those installations.

No nation is more of an international bandit right now than Iraq, but we permit, in Iraq, food and medicine to go to Iraq. In your statement you say: In Cuba we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro regime. Fidel Castro is the greatest violator of human rights in this hemisphere, no question about it. But if it is OK to send food and medicine to Iraq, it seems to me that it is inconsistent to say we are not going to permit food and medicine to go to Cuba. I would be interested in your response.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, is it called the Cuban Freedom Act or the Cuban Democracy Act? It does have two sides to it. It does increase our contacts with Cuba from a standpoint of telecommunications and mail and so forth. The embargo is one side and the other side is the improved contacts. I think it is important to try to pursue both sides of that.

But I am not in a position to respond affirmatively with respect to any change in the embargo at the present time. I understand your point and appreciate it, and I will just have to say that that is one that I will take on board and give consideration to, but think the President has endorsed the Cuban Democracy Act, and I think we ought to try to explore both sides of that to see if that relationship cannot, over time, improve.

Senator DODD. Would my colleague yield?

Senator SIMON. I would be pleased to yield.

Senator DODD. And I am not going to ask you to necessarily comment on this, Mr. Christopher, but we had a heated debate here several months ago, just prior to the election in the fall, on this question. And no one argues with the embargo as originally established—it has lasted for some 30 years. The question I think that comes up is the secondary boycott which prohibits subsidiaries of American firms that are doing business in other countries from doing business. About 90 percent of that is in food and medicine.

We have received some rather hostile comments from allies who do not like having the U.S. Government tell them what businesses operating in their countries can do or not do. The Ford administration dropped the secondary boycott because, frankly, it was a self-inflicted wound. We were not doing anything to hurt Fidel Castro and doing significant damage to our own U.S. firms. That has been the subject of some debate. That is in addition to the traditional embargo that has existed, and I think making that distinction may be worth looking at.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you for educating me about that.

Senator SIMON. And I would agree with my colleague, and I remember his leading the debate on this issue on the floor of the Senate.

Senator DODD. Unsuccessfully. I was clobbered, is probably descriptive.

Senator SIMON. I recognize the political volatility of this, but foreign policy should reflect the national interest rather than the national passion. And I think this is one that ought to be reviewed.

Would it do any harm to our foreign policy if we could permit the U.S. Senate to have, and the U.S. House of Representatives, the American public, to have the figure on what the CIA spends? I know what that figure is, you know what that figure is. Those in this audience or anybody watching on television, or the American public right now is not entitled to know—not the details, obviously you cannot do that, but the gross figure. Is there any harm to U.S. foreign policy to have that gross figure be a matter of public record?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, that question has too many handles on it for me to want to grab one of them at this hour of the night. I really think that is a decision that the President has to make, and I have really not studied the question.

In this new era, and it certainly is a changed era, CIA activities are so much more transparent than they were before, but I would need to think about that and be briefed about that before I would really want to commit to a question that begins "does it do any harm to our foreign policy to do x?". I am worried about that, about responding without further study, I am sorry to say, Senator.

Senator SIMON. You started by saying you were reluctant to answer at this hour of the night. If I asked you tomorrow morning, am I going to get a different answer?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I might be better briefed by tomorrow morning.

Senator SIMON. The question of the moratorium on nuclear testing obviously involves foreign policy.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator SIMON. It involves defense policy. It seems to me that if we were to say we are not going to have any more nuclear tests as long as other nations do not have nuclear tests, it would be in our self-interest, as well as in the interests of other nations. I would be interested in your reaction.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. The President-elect's position on that, Senator, is that we should first move to a much smaller number of tests, probably smaller in size as well, as a first step. And then as a second step if that goes well, move to a moratorium. And I think the general inclination is in the direction that you suggest, but to do it in two steps.

Senator SIMON. There has been some discussion of Eastern Europe and the countries there. We face a specifically difficult problem in that Armenia is blocked from receiving a lot of supplies by Azerbaijan. I would hope that you could instruct someone to work on this problem and see what we can do diplomatically to improve that situation. It is a very difficult situation. It is an emotionally volatile one also.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes.

Senator SIMON. But I have to believe that with greater intention, it is one that probably can get resolved.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I will do as you ask, Senator.

Senator SIMON. If you could answer that on all my future questions, I would appreciate it. [Laughter.]

Vietnam, we are moving toward a normalization, in economic terms at least. It seems to me that is clearly in our national interest. Caterpillar in my State wants to do business. AT&T wants to do business. Oil exploration is desired by American firms. And it seems to me we are just hurting ourselves by the economic boycott there; any reaction?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, Vietnam has done a number of things to bring itself back into the community of nations. It seems to have performed well enough in Cambodia. The problem remains as to whether or not we have gotten full cooperation on the MIA issue, and I do not know what the result of Senator Kerry's announcement on finishing his work today was, but I think that we at least ought to proceed along the roadmap that was laid out by the Bush administration. Those steps are quite small, but at least we are moving. And perhaps it will be possible, if the MIA issue is further resolved, to move further down that road more rapidly.

It certainly is in the U.S. economic interest. We are missing a number of outstanding commercial opportunities. When I have traveled recently in Asia and have seen the amount, for example, of investment going from Taiwan to Vietnam, countries with quite different economic systems, you see the opportunities we are probably missing there, Senator.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one more question? I know my time is up.

We were able to get an amendment on the State Department authorization requiring that somebody be designated to look at the problems of water, and I was interested in your response to Senator Kerry. You talked about an Assistant Secretary for—I forget the title you had, but one of the responsibilities would be to look at the environment and specifically water. Water is going to play a greater and greater role in the future of world stability.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I share that feeling, Senator.

Senator SIMON. It is vital that we find less expensive ways to convert salt water to fresh water, and that we face some of these terms that are not in the headlines—problems that are not in the headlines tomorrow, but will be very very shortly.

And I hope you will designate someone quickly who can—even before you get that new Assistant Secretary, who can work on these water problems. And I would like to work with that person, whoever that designee is.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you. Thank you, Senator, we will do that.

Senator SIMON. I thank you. You have been a very patient witness today and I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And you have given wonderful testimony, precise and very excellent indeed. I think we should meet here at about 10 a.m., tomorrow morning, at exactly 10 a.m., and we will proceed as expeditiously as we can. Accordingly, the committee is recessed until 10 a.m., in this room tomorrow morning.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy of the day.

[Whereupon, at 7:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:03 a.m., January 14, 1993.]

NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER OF CALIFORNIA TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Robb, Mathews, Helms, Kassebaum, and Coverdell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

Yesterday, Secretary-designate Christopher submitted a 5-page statement to our committee reaffirming his testimony in 1977 when the committee approved his nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State.

At 1 p.m. yesterday afternoon, the committee received a number of classified documents from the LBJ Library in Austin pertaining to Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony before our committee. These documents have been reviewed by the committee's chief counsel and the chief counsel to the minority, and I have been informed that none of these documents is inconsistent with either Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony or his statement and testimony before our committee yesterday.

I have been further informed that these papers included one document—one document classified confidential, which is not only consistent with but totally supports Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony and his statement and testimony before our committee yesterday.

I have requested that this document be declassified. Without objection, upon declassification it will be made a part of the record of this confirmation hearing.

[The information referred to may be found in the afternoon session.]

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we are resuming the questioning that we did yesterday. We only got through two rounds in a good many hours yesterday, so I would hope my colleagues would be as brief with their questions as you were with your answers.

At the wish of some of the members we are going to the 10-minute rule, and I, before getting started, will ask the ranking member if he has a statement to make.

Senator HELMS. No, I do not, and I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The alarm clock should ring. I am starting my 10 minutes right now.

There are just two points I wanted to raise. One is, yesterday you discussed briefly Tibet. I had the good fortune to be in Tibet a few weeks ago, and was concerned at the way the Chinese influence, not violently, was permeating a great deal of the leadership positions. I was just curious what you saw as a way of preserving the integrity and—not the sovereignty, necessarily, but the independence and autonomy of Tibet.

I know in the legislation we have passed in the past, I have had legislation passed talking about Tibet and China, which did not please the Chinese. What other ways are there that we can help Tibet at this time, in your view?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to talking with you about your trip to Tibet. I am sure there is much I can learn from you about that.

I think in many ways this is a human rights situation, a situation in which the Chinese have not had respect for the Tibetan people and their rather unique lifestyle and their unique traditions. I think that when we meet with the Chinese we ought to make it a strong point that they need to have a good deal more respect for the rights and dignity of the Tibetan people, and to make that a high priority in our meetings with them.

I think it is one of several problems we have with the Chinese, but it is certainly one of the most urgent ones, so when I have an opportunity to meet with the Chinese, I would certainly intend to raise the Tibetan issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Now, I would hope that we could encourage the Chinese to negotiate with the Dalai Lama. As you know, Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, has said that he would talk with the Dalai Lama but would not include any question of independence to be discussed.

The other question I had concerned the relationship with Russia and START II. As you know, Mr. Yeltsin has come under huge pressure from opponents in the Russian Parliament. What do you think we should do to shore up Mr. Yeltsin? We touched on this yesterday, but I would be interested in any enlargement of your thoughts.

Also, how soon do you expect to be ready to begin the ratification process of the START II?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, as I said in my statement yesterday, I think Mr. Yeltsin is the best hope we have for reform in Russia both in terms of economic and political reform, so I think that we ought to do all that we can to support him within the limits of our own resources. We certainly ought to press our European allies to be supportive.

I also feel, though, that we ought to be very careful with the situation with Mr. Yeltsin, and that is to not overpromise and then disappoint his expectations, thus perhaps creating even more problems for him with his own people.

I think one thing we can do—and this picks up on the second part of your question—is to move, if this committee and Congress

is willing, to consider START II at a relatively early date. I cannot give you a specific time, but I think that it would be useful from the standpoint of indicating the seriousness of the United States for us to move briskly. I think that would enable him to move in a similar way.

Of course, circumstances are changing so rapidly in Russia. We did not used to think of a parliament that had an important say in the Soviet Union, but that is part of the democratization of the country, and I think we have to accept that, but I feel that President Yeltsin has reached a treaty that is very good for his people, as well as being very positive from the standpoint of the United States.

I think it helps him from a financial standpoint, enables him to turn from heavy defense expenditures to relief from those expenditures so he can concentrate more on an economy which everyone knows is in very serious difficulty. We will be moving on that as rapidly as the preparation can be done.

As you know well, the treaties are complex. The surface of them may be simple and easy to state, but underneath, there are complications and we need to be ready to present it to the Senate as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently, when you look back on Russian history, 1917 and what happened then when there was a democratic revolution the rest of the world did not help it along, and they waited for a man on a white horse who turned out to be Lenin. We do not want to see a similar—it will not be communism because that is being refuted, but some other kind of equally unpleasant man on a white horse coming down the pike.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, that is certainly true, Senator. The current evolution, or revolution, is not irreversible, and it certainly would be a serious setback if Yeltsin were to be removed in favor of a less Democratic choice. If the forces of repression were to move back in there, we could—in this new era that we have talked so confidently about—be very badly tarnished.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, and I have no further questions at this time, and I turn to the ranking minority member, Mr. Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, I very much appreciate your comment about the Dalai Lama. Senator Pell and I have worked for him and with him and visited with him, and I think we share a common affection, and I perceive that you do as well. It may require more than just talking to the Chinese. Some kind of law has got to be laid down with reference to what is going on. It is a travesty, the murder of those people and the subjugation of them, but I appreciate your comment.

Would you like a cup of coffee?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I am just fine with the water, thank you. I had my share earlier this morning.

Senator HELMS. You are welcome to this.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you. I am just fine. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. This always goes to the ranking minority member I think, the coffee.

Senator SARBANES. Would the Senator yield for just a moment?

Senator HELMS. Would you like to have the coffee?

Senator SARBANES. No, no. I am all right.

Because the question of Tibet has come up, I think we ought to—if it was not noted by the chairman in his prepared statement, Secretary Christopher in talking about human rights questions made specific reference to Tibet in his opening statement to the committee.

Senator HELMS. Are you ready for me to begin?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Christopher, I went over last night the text of a fairly lengthy speech that you made in 1977. You were very clear in what you said. I think we are going to put it on the board.

I believe you said, we hope to reestablish normal relations with Cuba. Thorny issues, including the trade embargo and compensation for our nationalized property remain to be resolved, but in a measured and reciprocal way we are moving toward normal relations. Disagreements over Africa—and that means the Cuban troops in Africa, I presume—may inhibit this process, but we believe that progress can be made.

Then I compared that with a statement made by Mr. Clinton, and I can tell you where he made it—in Victor's Cafe in Miami, FL, during the campaign. He said something to the effect that the Bush administration—have we got that on the board, too?—the Bush administration had missed a big opportunity to put the hammer down on Fidel Castro and Cuba.

Who is going to prevail in this, Mr. Clinton, or you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, in that kind of a choice, the President always prevails.

Senator HELMS. I understand.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You will notice from my statement yesterday I indicate that we intend to continue to enforce the embargo. We will continue to enforce the embargo against Cuba in accordance with congressional legislation.

I suppose diplomats always hope to be able to resume normal relations with countries. Looking back on my 1977 statement, I would have to say it was overly hopeful, perhaps even naive.

Senator HELMS. Well, did you—did you and do you think that any normalization should take place with Castro still in place in Cuba?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. It is very hard to envision it taking place with Castro still in place. He has such a long history of subjugation of his people, and the way he has treated them over the years, the way he has conducted himself in international affairs, I think it is hard to envisage.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me go down a list of things that I happen to think ought to happen, and I think 100 percent of the Cubans living in this country who are exiled from their own land would agree with what I am about to say.

Would you agree that at a minimum the following should be required before normalization? Just answer yes or no.

You have already referred—answered, I think, that Castro should be out.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. OK. Do you agree that all foreign military advisers and intelligence advisers be out? You know what I mean by that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Senator. It seems to me that there needs to be a major change in those relationships.

Now, I do not want to put myself in a position to say that we can never have normal relationships with a country that has military advisers from another country within its borders.

Senator HELMS. I am talking about the Soviet advisers, of course, who are advising or operating the equipment down there that I am going to refer to next.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not want to—I do not want to even commit myself with respect to Russian advisers. It is no longer the Soviet Union, but the United States has got advisers around in various countries of the world, and I would not like to have third countries of the world refuse to have normal relationships with them because we have advisers there.

I think we will have to judge the degree of independence of Cuba, whether it is a fully independent country, or whether it is still so much under the sway of the former Soviet Union that it would be undesirable for us to do so.

Certainly, the Russian relationship with Cuba seems to be changing very rapidly; the Russians cannot afford it any longer. But I do not want to box myself, or box our country, into a set of straitjackets as far as dealing with other countries around the world which might possibly have foreign advisers.

Senator HELMS. Well, we will put that in escrow, and I think you know what I mean.

As far as Mr. Yeltsin is concerned, I like the man. I have visited with him. I have sat with him, and by the way, when you deal with him, he understands more English than he puts on.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Many foreign leaders do.

Senator HELMS. He sits there while it is being translated, but he is waiting. That gives him time to think. But he is a smart cookie, and a nice man I think, and I think he is sincere about his wish to bring freedom and abundance to the former Soviet Union and certainly to Russia.

Well, you do agree that the nuclear reactor should be dismantled before we have any normalization.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I guess I do not know about it in that detail. Is it a peaceful nuclear reactor, Senator?

Senator HELMS. Pardon me?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Is it a peaceful nuclear reactor?

Senator HELMS. No, sir. Well, you know, they say it is, but we are getting into a sort of treacherous thing. If you need for me to explain it to you, we would have to do that in closed session.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. It is not simply a peaceful nuclear plant to generate electric power as we have here in the United States.

Senator HELMS. No. It is kind of like Chernobyl.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Kind of like Chernobyl.

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, Chernobyl was a plant generating power. We have a number of those in this country.

Senator HELMS. Well, it had a dual purpose. Surely we agree that before any normalization with Cuba takes place, that there be an absolute respect for human rights, including freedom of speech and religion, expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think they would have to make major changes in their human rights posture and in their governmental structure.

Senator HELMS. And you agree that all political prisoners should be released.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes. I would be strongly in favor of that kind of an amnesty, but I want to say again, Senator, that the United States needs to have relations with countries that have less than perfect governmental structures. I think that normalization with Cuba is a long ways down the line and very difficult, but I do not want to establish for them a totally different standard than we have for the rest of the world.

Senator HELMS. Well, you know, given the history of Cuba and Castro, I think perhaps it would be fair to set them aside and expect somewhat more rigid requirements than we do of others, because this Castro has been exporting a revolution throughout Latin America, and he has been a pronounced enemy of the United States. Do you think there ought to be legal guarantees for private property?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I would not say that that was an absolutely fundamental basis for normalization. We have good relations with a number of countries around the world who have different views with respect to private property than we do.

Fortunately, the trend is in the right direction all over the world, Senator. The trend toward privatization is a very marked one, even in places like Russia, but I do not want to build a structure in which we can have normal diplomatic relations only with countries that are exactly like we are.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me focus it a little more narrowly, then. This past October I think it was—yes, it had to be—the Congress passed legislation to strengthen the embargo against Castro and Cuba, and this was signed into law by George Bush and it is called the Cuban Democracy Act.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. I referred to that yesterday, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I know you did.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. And said I fully support it.

Senator HELMS. Now, OK, do you think that the Clinton administration or your own good self will have any intention of modifying or weakening that act?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I have no such present intention.

Senator HELMS. So in that light, I suppose you wholeheartedly support prohibiting U.S. foreign subsidiaries from trading with Cuba. Now this was provided by an amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Florida, Mr. Mack. Now, do you agree with the Mack amendment?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That was enacted into law, was it not, Senator?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I do not know about that in detail and I have heard that there have been objections to that from some of our principle allies. But, at the present time, I would say that I am fully supportive of the legislation that has been enacted and do not have any present intention to seek changes in it.

Senator HELMS. The Mack amendment specifically—you can look it up, have somebody provide it. I think you ought to take a look at it. It is section 1706A and it provides for civil penalties for violators of the embargo, which is section 1710C. Now these are the two key provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act.

So you have already said that you support the act but you have also said you are not familiar precisely with the Mack amendment. Would you have your staff some time today get you a copy of the Mack amendment.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, I will.

Senator HELMS. And you will let me know whether or not you intend to be enthusiastically in support of it, because you will be speaking for the Clinton administration.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I will try to have that available to me during the luncheon recess.

Senator HELMS. That would be great. And I see the red light is burning on me and I thank you very much.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I have just one question. Mr. Secretary, is it possible that Russian advisers in Cuba today may, in fact, be a restraining factor on Cuba?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, we have found that so historically, that the Russians may be more conservative in the advice that they are giving than the country would be itself. And if there are dangerous weapons there, it may be in our interests that there are advisers there. As I say, historically we have found, I think, that to be true elsewhere, and it is possible here. I do not have any information on that that would lead me to conclude that, but it is certainly possible based upon prior experience, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Well, my understanding of President Clinton's position and yours is that you support the Cuban Democracy Act, of which the Mack amendment is a part. And therefore your position, in effect, is in support of the entire legislation; is that not correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Christopher, I would like to ask a moment about the Haitian refugee policy. President-elect Clinton earlier on had indicated that Haitian refugees would be welcome. I think he has issued some statements since that clearly said he was reviewing the situation, and there is a story in this morning's paper about a number of Haitian refugees who are preparing to come.

I guess I would just like to ask you what your thoughts are on the situation and what in the next couple of weeks the Clinton ad-

ministration might be prepared to do if, early on, the administration finds that a number of refugees are attempting to come?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, if I could go back to what you said initially. I certainly do not want to contradict you, but my understanding of Governor Clinton's initial position was that he thought that an opportunity ought to be made available to Haitian refugees to have their claims or requests for entry processed in a timely way, that he wanted to make sure that requests for asylum were not choked off, and that the Haitians could pursue those desires in a timely and effective way.

Now, that is somewhat different than saying that they would be welcome in the United States. I think Governor Clinton continues to feel that it is quite important for them to have that kind of an opportunity, and thus he will be concentrating on trying to find additional processing centers within Haiti which, after all, is the best place for them to be processed. And also, as I said yesterday, not to have to go to Port-au-Prince in order to be processed. For many people in the country that is an almost impossible or very expensive trip.

Governor Clinton's approach to the problem is two-pronged at the present time. First, to devote a great deal of energy and effort to encouraging the OAS and the U.N. endeavor. If we both got the same newspaper story this morning, I think you can see in that story a considerable effort on our part to move that process forward. That clearly is the long-term solution to the problem.

But it is those two elements of the policy that Governor Clinton has been emphasizing. First, to provide for adequate processing of claims for asylum, and second, to try to resolve the underlying problems so that there can be a restoration of democracy in Haiti.

I do think, Senator, that the Governor will be making a statement on this subject within the next day or two, and so I am a little reluctant to go further, because certainly the President-elect is entitled to say it exactly the way he wants to say it. But I think you will find it within the same context of my remarks today.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well I would agree with that. My concern has been, to a certain extent, that it may be misinterpreted in Haiti by those who are feeling very oppressed and, of course, struggling there. And that their hopes maybe far exceed what anyone is able to do to assist at the moment. And trying to keep it all in context, it seems to me, is important, and trying to get the message out so it is clearly understood.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, it is a rather cruel situation if they try to exercise those hopes by getting in those boats.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. And trying to make that dangerous journey. I read in the paper the other day that a boat apparently had gone down with between 300 and 400 people on board, and I think some storms are predicted over the next couple of weeks in that channel. And so it really would be a cruel process for them to try to proceed outside of Haiti in the hope of achieving a better life.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I myself have thought the time has come, and several months back sent a letter to OAS urging that they review the sanctions—the embargo. Because it seems to me that in many ways it is hurting those that are most in need of some jobs

and employment and income, and it is perhaps working against the situation instead of helping with that. Have you given any thought to what your views might be regarding that embargo?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, that is really part of the first prong of the policy that we are trying to follow, and that is to try to seek a Democratic restoration there which would enable the lifting of the embargo, if not all at once at least in stages. And certainly if you had a return to democracy there, you would have the conditions under which the embargo could be lifted. And I think it may be possible to have a package of ideas go together that would produce a political solution which would involve the military in the discussions as well.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning Mr. Christopher.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Good morning, Senator.

Senator KERRY. If I could just say for the record that yesterday there was an effort made in the course of some questions to try to rewrite history. I would just like the record to be very clear that I thought the questions asserting that there was somehow a similarity in the policies of the Reagan administration with respect to arms and hostages and the policies of the administration that preceded it is just in error.

And I think the record should reflect clearly that there is a difference between withholding already-purchased and already-owned materials as a matter of negotiation versus engaging in a secret new initiative with subterfuge in the movement of money, for new and sophisticated arms. They are simply not one and the same thing. And I think that the record ought to reflect that the majority of the members of this committee are of that view.

In today's New York Times, Mr. Christopher, there is a banner headline and a significant story from the President-elect with respect to Saddam Hussein in which he says he is not obsessed with Hussein and in which he also says that if Saddam Hussein wants a different relationship with the United States, all he has to do is change his behavior.

The newspaper interprets that as an olive branch. I did not necessarily, but clearly I think some clarification would be important. If there is an assumption that if Saddam Hussein simply changes his behavior, he could have a normal relationship with the United States, I think there would be—certainly this Senator would have—some problems with that.

Saddam Hussein is a war criminal. He has murdered and tortured people all his life. I think most people would find it very hard to say that we could have a normal relationship with somebody who holds absolutely power and exercises it the way he does.

I did not interpret the President-elect's comments to mean what I think the newspaper may have suggested it meant, and it might even have created something of a problem. So I ask you if you could tell us today if there is any clarification to that? Is it, in fact, an olive branch? Would a different behavior gain Saddam Hussein

a normal relationship or would it simply stop the bombing and stop the response?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I agree with your characterization of it. I, of course, saw that story this morning and thought that the writer's interpretation, and particularly the headline, was a mischaracterization of what Governor Clinton had said.

Governor Clinton did emphasize several times in that interview that he would continue to judge the behavior and actions of Saddam Hussein. That the sanctions would be continued in full force, that he would carry out his duties as commander in chief, and that he was prepared to use force, indeed perhaps even greater force, to ensure that the U.N. resolutions were carried out.

I thought that the most that could be said was that Governor Clinton perhaps wanted to keep the feud from being personalized and it is probably always a good rule, which I try to follow, to impersonalize differences of opinion so that you are free, with coolness and abstractness, to make the best judgments.

I do not think it was anything beyond that, except perhaps there was a religious quality about it. He talked about his Baptist belief in redemption. I happen not to be a Baptist and I am not very optimistic about any redemption for Saddam Hussein. Indeed, when you read of his character and the things he has done over the years, not only just admitted but asserted that he has done over the years, I find it hard to share the Baptist belief in redemption.

But I do not want to get into a philosophical or a religious argument. I would simply say that I see no substantial change in the position, and a continuing total support for what the Bush administration has done. As you know, the Governor fully supported yesterday's action, and in the course of the story indicated that he would be prepared for other kinds of action, if necessary. So I welcome the opportunity to agree with your characterization of the story, Senator.

Senator KERRY. Well, I appreciate that, because I was immediately struck by the leap, if you will, from a statement that you can have a different relationship—which you certainly can have. I mean the relationship right now is one of test and counter-test and response, counter-response. You certainly can have a different relationship than that, but that is a far cry from asserting or assuming we can move suddenly to normal relations. And I thought it was a leap and I thought it was a troublesome leap, obviously.

On another subject, I applaud your response to the Senator from North Carolina with respect to not getting locked in, setting a rigid standard for diplomatic relations, generally. It is such a murky area.

If the Senator from North Carolina starts applying the standard he seemed to be proposing in his questions, we are going to have a lot of trouble with an awful lot of countries around the world where there are political prisoners, where there are not complete freedoms, where there are, in fact, dictators masquerading as Democrats. And many of these countries are very close to us, with whom we have major aid programs and so forth.

Related to this is the contradiction between our attitude toward Vietnam and our attitude toward China. The very policy that we espouse toward China, which is to keep it open, to keep talking to

its leaders in order to foster change and maximize reform is in its very neighboring country exactly the opposite policy; we shut them out, close the door, do not move forward.

One other area of concern, Mr. Secretary, is the tension between the Commerce Department and the State Department. You have, I think appropriately, espoused a desire to see the State Department become much more aggressive in promoting American business interests overseas. But clearly the Commerce Department has always and wants to increasingly exert what it views as its jurisdiction to promote American business abroad.

Personally, I think this is duplicative, wasteful, and potentially diminishes the ability of either Department to be effective. Have you, at this point, either had any discussions about clarifying the chain of command with respect to this and the priority of jurisdiction? And if not, do you share with me a sense that we need to clarify this in the near term?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I welcome that comment. I have only had, I guess, a brief conversation with Secretary-designate Brown about that, and we have agreed that this is a subject that we ought to talk about so that we can harmonize our approach and not be inefficient and duplicative. So we have not gotten substantive about it, but we have identified that there is an issue there. This is an area where there is no need to have a running battle; it is a place where we ought to harmonize the American approaches.

Senator KERRY. Well, I agree with you, and I just want to assert on behalf of many members of this committee and myself personally that not because of the jurisdiction of this committee, but because when you analyze the issue, each and every business interest that we may push is integrally linked to our larger relationships, both with that country and in the region. And I think this committee will press very, very hard to see that the primary jurisdiction ought to be within your Department. Many of the business interests we have might run exactly counter to negotiations on either treaties or other relationships within the region and other pressures that we are trying to bring to bear. And therefore, I think while there is a very simple, direct purpose and manner with which you carry out the business piece of it, yours is a far more complicated set of relationships, and I think you should hold the primary jurisdiction on it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Part of the problem I think, Senator, is that we have not done this very well in the past, so it has been some temptation or tendency for other departments to feel they need to get into the picture. If we can do a better job ourselves, then I think that need may lessen.

Senator KERRY. Oh, I understand.

Thank you very much. I have no further questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you. I am just going to take 2 minutes here, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow on on what Senator Kerry had to say. I think we get on very shaky ground when we start listing the criteria. I wish my friend and colleague Senator Helms were here. Saudi Arabia, for example, clearly does not have freedom of religion, freedom of the press. It does have what we

would regard as political prisoners. I do not think Senator Helms nor I nor Warren Christopher would suggest that we sever diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.

I am not suggesting that the King of Saudi Arabia is a Fidel Castro, but I think we have to be very, very cautious. We have to continue to push for human rights. But we cannot expect carbon copies of the United States everywhere in the world and sever relationships when we do not get them.

The second point I would simply like to underscore, and I forget who mentioned this yesterday, is the Cyprus situation. You mentioned that Turkey has been helpful to us. I heard Bill Clinton during the campaign mention our long-time ties with Greece. There is no question that the presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus is an irritant and that we do not have as happy a situation as we should there. And my own feeling there is that President Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash are two personalities who could mesh if they got a little nudging from Ankara and Athens, and I would hope that the Cyprus issue could come off the back burner to the front burner. I do not expect a comment from you, but I would hope that could be the case.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, since you have not encouraged my comment I probably should be wise enough to just sit moot, but President Vassiliou is in the midst of an election campaign, and his reelection, I guess, is far from assured. I have heard that there are three factions that are involved there, so in a sense the negotiations have to be on hold until there is a clarification. That is really the only reason I wanted to respond.

I do, as I have for a long time, hope that there would be more encouragement, both from Ankara and Athens, and I guess particularly from Ankara, to reach a settlement. Mr. Denktash has been there for a long time and seems to operate with a good deal of independence as far as these discussions go, and I hope that there will be a greater effort by all three parties to reach a conclusion.

If I could just go back to the first part of your question, Senator, I would want to emphasize the importance of not establishing impossible conditions for normalization of relations. China is, itself, a good example. If we had refused to normalize our relations with China until they had met this set of criteria along the lines that Senator Helms was outlining this morning, we certainly would not yet be in normal relations.

Indeed, when a country is coming back from outlaw status, they may need to be brought back into the family of nations. They have to do enough in order to justify recognition, but you probably cannot expect that they have gone all the way to our system or our form of government. Certainly, I would not.

Senator SIMON. I appreciate that.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much. Senator Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. Mr. Chairman, just one question or one comment. And with the committee's indulgence, I have asked my assistant to pass to Secretary-designate Christopher a cartoon that appeared in a paper from Nashville, TN, a couple of weeks ago alongside an article by Mary McGrory. She was talking about the role which this country is playing as a helpmate to others. I think

the cartoon is self-explanatory in terms of the situation it depicts. I would simply ask if you would make a comment on it, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think this cartoon is a reflection of the changing times, the new era that we are in as far as the obligations and particularly the use of force by the United States. It was clearly cartoons like this and television pictures comparable to this that caused the people of the United States to fully support our going into Somalia to create circumstances so that the humanitarian relief could get through. It is a very compelling picture, and it is one of those situations where the United States, despite all of our obligations here in the United States and despite our scarcity of resources, nevertheless were so moved that we could not fail to act.

Now, the Bosnian child at the bottom of the picture indicates another very great tug on our conscience and on our resources, if you will. At the present time, we do have a commitment to provide humanitarian relief under multilateral forces in Bosnia. That is probably not being done as well or as fully as it should be because of the pressure humanitarian organizations are under in Bosnia. The cartoon demonstrates the need to try to see if we cannot mitigate in one way or the other the tragedy of Bosnia which has so many different forms, including mass starvation this winter.

Senator MATHEWS. Do you see this as another and a further step that we need to make in terms of developing partnerships as we attempt to solve problems of this nature?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I certainly do, Senator. I think that Bosnia is the particular responsibility of the European Governments, and as I said yesterday, I do not think they have fulfilled it very well. But it is one, at the same time, that we cannot completely shrink from.

Senator MATHEWS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much.

No question at this time, except one comment: I agree with you, Mr. Christopher, on the importance of China coming in from an outlaw status. On the one hand we know the dreadful things she does in human rights and the occupation of Tibet. But we also have to recognize its 1.2 billion people and her economy—when you are there, as we were a few weeks ago—you see absolutely exploding and developing to a remarkable degree.

I have no questions at this time, and I would turn and ask the ranking minority member for his.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, the point that I was making when you were out of the room is that if we had established for China a set of criteria that you were outlining to me for Cuba, we would probably not have yet normalized relationships with China, because they fail to meet a number of the tests that you have outlined. So I think we have to be quite pragmatic in determining the time at which we normalize relations and not establish tests that might be artificial.

We need to do what is in the interest of the United States, and it certainly was in the interests of the United States to normalize relationships with China.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am not sure I agree with you about China, Mr. Secretary. But in any case, I had to leave to attend a hearing on Mr. Espy. I am a member of the Agriculture Committee. As a matter of fact, I am a former chairman of the Agriculture Committee. And the more I read about Mr. Espy the more I like him, and I told him that this morning. And I also told him, and there was a great throng there in the Dirksen theater on the ground floor, and I told them what you said yesterday about subscribing to Herman Talmadge and his wish that there be an American desk at the State Department. And you got a round of applause, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. I thought you might like to hear that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, very much, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Let us revisit the nuclear reactor at Cuba. I am not sure either one of us made ourselves clear. My problem with that nuclear reactor is that it is almost exactly like Chernobyl, with all of its dangers. And the reason that I worry about that kind of reactor is that it is 90 miles from our shore, and there could be a nuclear cloud over Miami if anything happened. It is easily within the reach of a large part of the United States.

Now, we also mentioned the intelligence-gathering capability by what is now a whole lot of countries, what used to be the Soviet Union. And I do hope that at the first opportunity you will talk to Mr. Yeltsin, and I believe that the members of this committee will also talk to Mr. Yeltsin—I will, if you wish for me to do so—about getting that stuff the heck out of Cuba.

Now, I think that a lot of Americans would be alarmed if they knew that the Russians—and I am talking about the Russians, not the Soviets—still have a significant presence just 90 miles off our shore. It is widely known, and I am sure you know it, that Russia is maintaining a center for intelligence gathering and espionage just outside of Havana at a submarine base at Cienfuegos. And they have military advisers who continue to work with Castro's army.

Now, I hope that you will take a look at this and make a judgment about whether you ought to talk to Yeltsin. I intend to, and I hope you will, as well.

The cold war is supposed to be over, and the United States is spending millions of dollars supporting the Russian Government, and I just wonder if you are prepared to state what you believe the position of the Clinton administration with respect to this intelligence presence in Cuba, which is clearly hostile to the United States?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I will do as you say and take an early look at it, but I am not prepared to state what our position is about it.

Senator HELMS. Well, when you establish a position, would you let the committee know?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, I will.

Senator HELMS. Good.

Now, for more than 30 years, Castro has been exporting terrorism in our hemisphere. That is well known. What is not so well known is that within weeks after the U.S. Senate approved the

Panama Canal Treaty, Mr. Castro held a meeting of like-minded people from various Latin American countries, principally Nicaragua and El Salvador, et cetera, because they sensed a weakness on the part of the United States.

But the thing that bothers me, and I hope it bothers you, are the reports that we are receiving from our intelligence sources—and from the media, for that matter—that the Castro brothers are up to their armpits in drug trafficking. Worst of all, Fidel Castro has taken Cuba away from the Cuban people. I think Mr. Clinton understood that when he made his appearance and made his statements in Miami and perhaps other places in Florida.

Fidel Castro, in short, is—what? Public enemy No. 1 in the Western Hemisphere, because he has been promoting so much of the violence and killing throughout the region. Now, if he is not removed, and I fervently pray that he will be removed one way or another, and I do not care which way it is, if he is not removed and if he continues the drug trafficking and all of the other stuff that he has been doing which is hostile to our country and all other countries that believe in freedom, can you envision any scenario or circumstances when you would recommend to your President that maybe we ought to consider the use of force to support the people who yearn for freedom in Cuba. Are we going to let it just sit there, or are we going to do something about it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, let me take this opportunity to tell you that I do support the Cuban Democracy Act in its entirety, including the Mack amendment, so that issue can be removed.

Senator HELMS. Good. Good.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I would say, Senator, that the use of force in Cuba would have to meet the same test as it would anyplace in the world. They are quite severe tests, but I do not think we ought to rule out any of our tools. We ought to keep all of our options open anyplace in the world.

Having said that, I do not think it is an immediate agenda item, but I do think it is one of those things that needs to be considered along with all the other options. But we have an embargo, we have an act that was passed here by the Congress, and I think those are the matters to be pursued at the present time. I come into this position, if you confirm me, wanting to have all the options available for possible recommendation to the President.

So I certainly would not say to you—I think it would be intellectually unwise to say to you that I have ruled out some option with respect to any country. But I do not think it is an immediate agenda item because we have other tools that are in play.

Senator HELMS. I think I understand what you said. You are not quite saying that you would ever consider the use of force, but you have not ruled it out. Is that fair?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is right. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am sorry to hear that.

Now, yesterday, I believe Senator Dodd asked the question, you said that there had been progress in Nicaragua. Did you say something like that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. I did.

Senator HELMS. Now, as soon as you have your staff in place, I hope you will let Bud Nance, Admiral Nance—do you know him, by the way?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir, I do not.

Senator HELMS. Well, you need to know him. Bud and I were born 2 blocks apart 2 months apart down in a little town called Monroe. And he had 38 years in the Navy, including he was skipper of the U.S.S. *Forestall*, and we say down there in Monroe that he is a Monroe boy who amounted to something. But he also was President Reagan's No. 2 National Security Advisor.

I hope you will let your staff and Bud Nance's staff—he is the chief of staff or staff director for the minority on this committee—I hope they can get together and talk about what has really been happening in Nicaragua, because there has been a paper curtain dropped over that. And I have been highly critical of, "my," administration. And Larry Eagleburger and I have been up and down the line, and he kind of agrees with me, but nobody does anything about it. I expect that if we can have that consultation between staffs that we are going to agree on a lot of things. And I hope so, and let us try it.

Now, I am going to talk a little bit about what it means to put American interests first. I am increasingly concerned about the problem of confiscation of the property of U.S. citizens overseas and the lack of attention paid to this problem by the State Department.

Right now we are working with literally hundreds of such cases in Nicaragua, Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Latin America in general. Now let me ask you first, and then we will get back it—but I see the warning light is on—are you familiar with the Hickenlooper amendment?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I do remember that from my prior incarnation, but I will not be able to follow you very far on it. Would you tell me the general terms of it if you would like to discuss it today?

Senator HELMS. Well, it simply says, and I am going to send it down to you, I did not expect you to remember it, because, you know, it is like a thousand ships passing at night, but it is a very important piece of legislation that was enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President. It simply says that the U.S. taxpayers are not going to be expected to furnish one penny to any country that allows the confiscation of property owned by U.S. citizens.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I remember running into it in connection with Ethiopia during my prior tour in Government.

Senator HELMS. Well, we have got the red light on. We can revisit that when I get back on the next round.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Meanwhile, I am going to ask staff to send down a copy of this so you can look at it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Christopher.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Good morning, Senator.

Senator COVERDELL. Good morning.

Yesterday, I think maybe the No. 1 question was the reorganization of AID. We talked a lot about it. I thought about that last evening and decided that I would rather be assigned to the solution in Bosnia than the solution of the reorganization of a very entrenched instrument.

Your commitment to the reorganization is obvious in your responses and opening statement. Where do you envision assigning that task? It has been talked about for a long time. It has continued to resist real attempts for reorganization. Where do you put the authority to actually have that response begin to occur in a timely manner?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, this is at least a preliminary answer. You may or may not know the man who has been designated as my deputy, Dr. Cliff Wharton.

Senator COVERDELL. I do not.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Dr. Wharton is a son of the famous diplomat. His father was the first African American to become an Ambassador of the United States. He became Ambassador to Norway after having been a counsel general in a number of countries in Europe.

Dr. Wharton has had a very distinguished career. He was president of Michigan State College, and he is a legend there for the reforms that he brought. And then he was president of the State University of New York System, and once again, with a marvelous record. Most recently, he has been the president, the reform head of a major pension organization called TIAA/CREF, a very hard name, but an organization that is very important to almost everybody who teaches in college because it is the pension organization for college professors. And he has once again done a wonderful job there.

As a matter of fact, someone once wrote about Dr. Wharton that he can do anything well.

Well, after he finished college, he told me that he was planning to follow his father into the diplomatic service. But the Marshall plan had just come into existence, and there was heavy interest in development. So he spent the first decade or so of his life in development.

With that background, I intend to rely quite heavily on Dr. Wharton because of his early expertise in that area and because he has had such success in reorganizing and reforming institutions. I intend to rely quite heavily on Dr. Wharton in connection with the AID organization. And he is very interested in doing that.

Now, of course, we will all take our directions from the President, as far as how this is to be done. But as a preliminary comment, I can tell you that in addition to taking a strong interest myself, Dr. Wharton will be actively involved in that area.

Senator COVERDELL. It is good to know that.

I think that the statement of your own interest throughout this hearing, and your continued interest as we pursue this reorganization, will be important. Because, as you know better than I, there are enormous resources there that can resist change.

Mr. Christopher, because of your background, I was given some numbers the other day, and I can directly relate to this problem. On the country of Belize, when I became Director of the Peace Corps we had over 100 volunteers in Belize. We almost had a volunteer per inhabitant. There are some 250,000 people there. We began the process of downsizing the volunteer force in Belize to be more relative.

Now, I cannot speak to this, but maybe you can. The size of the State Department and AID mission in Belize seems to be as disproportionate as what I found when I went to Peace Corps. It is not 100 but one 100-plus in our Embassy and AID mission there.

From your previous experience in the State Department, what factors would logically call for a contingent of that size in Belize, or for 204 people in the Bahamas, or any similar case? Is there a logical response to that, or is it just simply that over the course of time the bureaucracy has gotten out of synch with reality?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, it seems bloated to me, Senator. I have to confess, though, that although I tried fairly conscientiously, with some other things I have had, to do to get prepared for this hearing, Belize was not—

Senator COVERDELL. Not on the top of the list?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. It was not a priority.

Senator COVERDELL. I can understand that.

But I think that the point that I am making—

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator COVERDELL. You talked yesterday, and we had a series of questions about the need for new resources and a number of new priorities. This strikes me as part of the reallocation that might deserve some attention.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Senator. You know, it stands in sharp contrast, does it not, to the figures I mentioned: that we had only one commercial officer in Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. And it does sound to me as if those posts were certainly bloated, unless they were doing something in adjacent countries.

Senator COVERDELL. They may have had regional responsibilities, which is why I added that caveat.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Right.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Christopher, yesterday you made a comment—it was mentioned several times that you were in support of bringing the U.S. arrears payments at the U.N. up to date. I am not an expert on those deficiencies, although I am aware that they at least have some historical relationship to discontent in the Congress with regard to the U.N. and its specific support of certain programs that were thought to be deviant from our foreign policy. There have been allegations of mismanagement which have been rather well publicized.

Do you believe that those were legitimate reasons for withholding funds and that the process of using those resources as an incentive for change is fair or not fair? Should this practice be disregarded?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I am really sort of digging into my own thinking on this, rather than—this is not a very studied answer. I do think one wants to use carrots and sticks to improve be-

havior, and there is no doubt that the U.N. had very great inefficiencies. But I have some intellectual problem with belonging to an organization to which you give very large tasks, you depend upon it enormously, you say in every forum: "Well, we are going to look to the U.N., we are going to look to this organization to do a great deal for us, it is going to bear some of the burdens because this is a multilateral period," and then, despite all of those statements about how much you are going to rely on it and how important it is in the world, you do not pay your dues. I think there is really an inconsistency in that.

So, while I do not rule out using carrots and sticks—and certainly the U.N. organization does need to be made more efficient, there are many inefficiencies in it that we ought to address—at this particular stage, when we are relying so heavily on the U.N., putting so much emphasis on the need to use the U.N. as the vehicle to address international problems, I think we ought to pay up. And that is what I said in my statement.

I do not know enough about what has happened in prior years. I think, perhaps, Senator Kassebaum, for whom I have such great respect, may have been involved in efforts to encourage reform by withholding dues. I hope I am right in saying that.

Does anybody know, is that correct?

So I do not want to criticize something that has gone on in the past. I just say for myself right now, I think because of the importance we attach to the U.N., we ought to pay up.

Senator COVERDELL. Again, this is a tonal question reaching from the point which we have just discussed—but when the U.N. or divisions of it become embroiled in issues that are deviant from our foreign policy—perhaps dealing with the Palestinian movement or other—what would be your general attitude about how we should interlock with them if some division of the U.N. is insistent on pursuing a course of policy that seems to run squarely against what we are endeavoring to do?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think, Senator, that is what we have outstanding representation at the U.N. for. Certainly, the Secretary General knows of the importance of the United States, and I think our capacity to affect behavior there is very great.

If you go to the U.N., people will sometimes complain about the United States having too much influence. But I think we ought to exercise our influence in the most direct way through dealing with the Secretary General and other bodies there if there is something going on there that we think is against U.S. interests.

Senator COVERDELL. I want to return to the statement from yesterday. You talked about hoping that you could catch the new Secretary of Defense in a good mood—not to suggest that he only had those infrequently—to move funding from the Defense Department to U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Would you elaborate on that? Do you have a view of the size of what ought to be shifted and any parameters around your thinking on that statement?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think that would have to be a negotiation within the Government and the Office of Management and Budget; the White House would be a critical player in that.

One of the things you find out when you get into the bureaucracy is there are certain accounts, like the account number 150.

Senator COVERDELL. One-fifty, yes.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I see you are already very familiar with that, or you are from your days in the Peace Corps. It seems to me that the United States responsibilities to the U.N. ought to be borne by more than one account. And I do not have a particular formula in mind, but I think that you could certainly rationalize a very substantial fraction of the U.N. expenditures coming from an account that is over across the river, rather than one that is on this side.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you.

I understand that the bell is not working. My time has expired. I might say that I have trouble hearing anyway; I probably would not have heard the bell. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I have no questions.

Senator SARBANES. Would the Senator yield for just one comment?

Senator KERRY. I would yield to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, for the sake of the press and Belize, I am sure that we ought to recognize that you have crises on your agenda that have attracted your attention but that we do attach importance to our relationship with Belize, and we very much hope that we will continue to have a positive and constructive relationship with them. The fact that was not high on our agenda is that there are crises, with outbreaks of violence, elsewhere in the world, that drew your attention. But Belize, along with many other countries, certainly remain important in our view.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Senator. I certainly thank you for that. You know, any time one takes some refuge in even modest humor there is a risk. I simply meant to indicate that I did not know the AID or State levels in Belize. But I certainly do recognize the importance of it as a country. And I thank you for that correction.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Chairman, if I might, as a followup to the Senator. By using the numbers, I meant no suggestion of our relationship or the importance of the country. I simply was struck by the number and sought clarification. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Just one brief comment.

First, I agree with Secretary Christopher on our paying up on U.N. dues. I hope we will also pay up the U.N. Population Fund, which I think is important to our future. I would add, I think Boutros-Ghali is providing the kind of leadership we need at the U.N.

And I would finally say to my colleague from Georgia, whom we are pleased to welcome to this committee, the U.N. is not always going to do what we want, any more than the U.S. Senate is always going to do what you want.

I hope you do not walk out of the U.S. Senate when we pass a bill you do not like. And I hope we do not walk out of the U.N. if they take some action we do not like.

Senator COVERDELL. The point is registered.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. No questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I have no questions at this time, and I return to the ranking minority member, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. You have not had a chance to look at the Hickenlooper amendment?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. It has not come down.

Senator HELMS. Well, what it says, just for the record, and it is section 620(e)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. It requires that the Government take, "appropriate steps in returning properties, or aid shall be suspended."

There was quite a debate about the thing, but I think the vote was one-sided in favor of it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Are you reading at page 216?

Senator HELMS. Two-sixteen. It is (e).

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. (e)(1)?

Senator HELMS. Right before. Do you see it on page 216?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. And I see (e)(1).

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. My recollection is that it was precipitated by some of the Eastern European countries, whether they would get aid and what they had done at the time.

Senator HELMS. I think that is right. The President shall suspend assistance to the government of any country to which assistance is provided under this or any other act when the government of such country or any government agency or subdivision within such country on or after January 1, 1962, and then it goes and gives a number of conditions, which you will see on page 217.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Let me tell you where I am coming from on this, Mr. Secretary.

On a personal note, I hope that when you become Secretary, and you will become Secretary, that you will designate a specific number of people, including lawyers of competence, to listen to the American citizens whose property has been seized. Now, you do agree that protecting the interests of these citizens should be a primary objective of our foreign policy?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think we have an obligation to all of our citizens, and particularly the citizens who have had that kind of difficulty. I do not have any question about that.

Senator HELMS. So, you can see how they feel about their Government when they come to the State Department and tell them, look, these people down here in x country have seized my property, and so forth, and so on. There ought to be a sympathetic ear and a helpful set of hands in the State Department who just will not shunt them aside and say, we are too busy to do that.

Now, I am talking about, "my," own administration. But the Embassy in Managua has refused to take those steps. Now, we have heard—is it 554? We have 554 people or families who have contacted us and asked for help saying, in effect, that they have been turned away by the State Department. Not one, not one of those 554 U.S. citizens have regained possession of their properties or

been fairly compensated for them. Now, you would agree that, "appropriate steps," have not been taken?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I do not know that situation. I do know from other experiences that you have the question as to who the allegedly appropriating authority was, and whether the current government has responsibility.

Senator HELMS. I am going to give you that information. Now, I believe it is a fact that under the U.S. Constitution, the 14th amendment, Mr. Chairman, that native born citizens and naturalized citizens have the same rights. You agree with that, do you not?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I will take your word for that. That is one of those areas that could have some complexity.

Senator HELMS. What I am getting at—I want you to say, I am going to do something about this. Now, do we have a chart that might be helpful to the Secretary? I am going to show you what is happening in Nicaragua. And a lot of the press has been saying, oh, they are just sitting on that money and all that. Can you read it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir. [Laughter.]

I can come close to reading it.

Senator HELMS. Well, tell that photographer to move. [Pause.]

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you very much, Senator. I can now read this.

Senator HELMS. You need a telescope to read it, and it is unfair to ask you to read that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Not being an ophthalmologist—you can read the top line, and the next line, but you cannot read down below.

Senator HELMS. Well, I have nothing in the world against Mrs. Chamorro. I know she is a nice lady, and the rest of it, and she is in over her head, and her son-in-law is running the country, and you know—but for goodness sake, her press office is occupying seized property. Her Minister of Energy, he has one of the pieces of property. Her Minister of Agriculture has another one. The Cuban Ambassador has one.

And, by the way, he is currently under indictment in the United States on narcotics charges, but he is sitting there in property owned by U.S. citizens. The chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Sandinista Army, how do you like them apples, he sits on a piece of American citizens property seized by either/or the Sandinistas or the Chamorro Government.

The Libyan Government, if you can believe that, is occupying a piece of property owned by—seized from American citizens. Russian Embassy personnel, they have one. The Sandinista Army spokesman has one. The Managua police chief has one, and on and on and on.

And I hope that you will tell me that you are impressed with the situation. I am not going to ask you tell me exactly what you are going to do about it, but I want to help freedom return. But they do not have freedom in Nicaragua, they have got a sort of a hybrid government down there by a lady who means well. But it is worse, if anything, than it ever was.

And I hope you will make it tentative commitment that you are going to do everything in your power to recover the property of these American citizens, property that has been seized from them.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I appreciate your saying that you are not going to ask me to make any commitment other than the commitment to look into the matter, and I certainly will. I am sure I will.

Senator HELMS. Well, I know you are a man of good faith, and that is satisfactory to me for the time being. But we will revisit it from time to time, so do not forget it please, sir.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not suppose that this is my last appearance in this chair.

Senator HELMS. OK. Can I get an estimate of how much time I have remaining on this round? I do not want to start this if I do not have enough time.

Senator SARBANES. Why do we not yield? Who is next? Am I next?

The CHAIRMAN. You would be next, then Senator Dodd. [Pause.] I am informed that you have 6 minutes.

Senator HELMS. Six minutes? Well, maybe I could get into it.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the Senator 4 minutes of my time. I am next in the round. I have 10 minutes, so I will yield him 4 to give him 10.

Senator HELMS. I appreciate that. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Now, I would like for the Ortega bank account chart to be put up there, but we have got a problem because you cannot see that either, particularly if it is upside down. I do have a copy that you can give the Secretary.

Mr. Christopher, some time back, I think I had just returned from Washington after my little episode down in Raleigh. Some high level Nicaraguan Government officials from the Chamorro Government came to see me, if you could believe that, with first-hand information about General Ortega's secret bank accounts in Canada.

They are just so upset about what is going on down there. They are part of the Chamorro Government. Now, General Ortega, of course, remains head of the Sandinista Army in Nicaragua, which is part of the problem.

Now, these officials told me that General Ortega was diverting Nicaraguan Government funds, and they had documents supporting what they were telling me, that the general was diverting funds to an account in Toronto Dominion Bank. And the account number was 0690-7349-328. In approximately 2½ years, Ortega has funneled almost \$17 million into his personal bank account in Toronto Dominion Bank.

Now, do you understand, even if you do not agree with me? Do you understand why I said to hell with this? And I used every effort I could to block any further funds until that was taken care of. It has not been taken care of.

Now on October 5 and again on October 22 of last year, I wrote Bill Barr, the Attorney General, a nice guy, requesting an investigation into this matter. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would ask your

unanimous consent that the text of these two letters be included in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Senator HELMS. I thank you, sir.

[The information and charts referred to follow:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, DC,
October 5, 1992.

The Honorable WILLIAM P. BARR,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington, DC

DEAR BILL: In FY 1992, the United States, through the Agency for International Development (AID), provided \$125,000,000 in cash assistance to the Central Bank of Nicaragua for "balance of payment support for the [Nicaraguan] government's economic plan by providing financing for key imports, pending the recovery of exports in response to an improved economic environment" [AID Grant 524-0325, "Economic Stabilization and Recovery IV"]. AID argues that "disbursement will support continued progress on reduction of public sector expenditures to a level sustainable on a long term basis, further elimination of trading monopolies, privatization of key state-owned enterprises, and establishment and strengthening of privately-owned financial institutions".

The Agency for International Development attempts to justify this transfer of American taxpayer funds to the Central Bank of Nicaragua by claiming that "the program is designed to benefit the entire [Nicaraguan] population through its contribution to real economic growth".

However, reliable information has been given to me that a portion of these funds may have been converted to the personal use of high-level officials of the Nicaraguan Government, in violation of American laws governing the disbursement of foreign aid funds.

For example, I am informed that General Humberto Ortega, Commander-in-Chief of the Sandinista Popular Army of Nicaragua, has been regularly receiving large denomination transfers from the Central Bank of Nicaragua to an account in his name or his nominee in the Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada. It has been estimated by sources within the Government of Nicaragua that \$1 million was deposited monthly to this account in 1991 and \$500,000 per month in 1992. I am informed that the bank account number is 0690-7349-328 and that the checks have been signed by Emilio Pereira, head of the Central Bank of Nicaragua.

I will be enormously grateful if you and your associates will begin an investigation to determine if American foreign aid funds have, in fact, been converted illegally by high officials of the Nicaraguan government. It may be appropriate to seek the cooperation of the Government of Canada to place a freeze on any bank account suspected of containing misappropriated funds.

Sincerely,

JESSE HELMS,
U.S. Senator

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, DC,
October 28, 1992.

The Honorable WILLIAM P. BARR,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington, DC

DEAR BILL: With further reference to my October 5 letter to you I have now received additional information concerning the possible misuse of U.S. foreign assistance funds to Nicaragua.

Prior to October 5, 1992, it was reported to me that the Finance Minister, Emilio Pereira, would become the new President of the Central Bank succeeding Silvio de Franco. These reports proved false. Instead, Jose Evenor Taboada Arana was sworn into that position on October 12—the fourth President of the Central Bank to serve under Mrs. Chamorro. Mr. Taboada is a prominent Nicaraguan attorney who had extensive business dealings with the Sandinista regime. He is well connected with many powerful Sandinistas and high-ranking Nicaraguan Government officials.

I am informed that Mr. Toboada once worked directly for General Humberto Ortega. He was retained to establish an offshore company called MODERNE INTERCIONAL S.A. on Ortega's behalf in Panama. Until September of this year, account number 0690-7349-328, in the Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada, was under this name. I am further informed that \$250,000 was deposited into the account in September of this year.

I am deeply concerned that the new President of the Nicaraguan Central Bank—responsible for overseeing the use of tens of millions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid—was directly involved in establishing a front company which served as a vehicle for the transfer of U.S. foreign aid funds to General Humberto Ortega.

I am confident that this information is accurate and I hope it will facilitate the efforts of your office to determine whether U.S. foreign aid funds have been converted illegally by high ranking Nicaraguan Government officials.


Many thanks, my friend.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

JESSE HELMS,
U.S. Senator

U. S. CONTRIBUTION TO GENERAL ORTEGA'S RETIREMENT FUND



YEAR	AMOUNT
1990	\$4,900,000
1991	\$6,000,000
1992	<u>\$6,000,000</u>
TOTAL	\$16,900,000

ORTEGA'S BANK ACCOUNT NUMBER
0690-7349-328

WHO STOLE WHAT FROM U.S. CITIZENS IN NICARAGUA

CONFISCATOR OR OCCUPANT	TITLE	ORIGINAL OWNERS
Gen. Joaquín Cuadra Lacayo	Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sandinista Army	Indiana Lacayo Pereira/ Bruce Guthbertson
Emilio Rappaccioli	Minister of Energy	María Lourdes B. Terán
Roberto Rondón Sacasa	Minister of Agriculture	María Louisa Davis
Amb. Fernando Ravelo	Ambassador from Cuba - Indicted in the U.S. on narcotics charges	Nestor Terán
Cmdr. Lenin Cerna	Chief, Nicaraguan Intelligence	Iván Osonó/ Esperanza Tével/ Ulises Carrillo
Alvaro Guzmán Cuadra	Managua Police Chief	Fátima Lacayo Saenz
Col. Antenor Rosales	Chief of Intelligence, Sandinista Army	Michael Spencer
Lt. Col. Ricardo Wheelock	Spokesman, Sandinista Popular Army	Mangui Sengelmann
Col. Salvatierra	Chief Commander,	Ramón País

WHO STOLE WHAT FROM U.S. CITIZENS IN NICARAGUA

CONFISCATOR OR OCCUPANT	TITLE	ORIGINAL OWNERS
Chamorro Press Office		The Sengelmanns, Kettels and Spencers
Cmdr. Tomás Borge	One of nine original Sandinista Commanders	Leandro Marín
Cmdr. Bayardo Arce	One of nine original Sandinista Commanders	Roberto Argüello Tével
Cmdr. Alvaro Baltodano	General Ortega's Top Aide	Floyd Jones
Russian Embassy Personnel		Mathelda Muñoz Molina
Sandinista Army Guest House		Luis Mejía González
Sandinista Army Protocol House		Elga Vaca Hahn
Loyan Government		Haydee Marín
Panamanian Embassy		Armando and Yolanda Fernández
Ministry of Agriculture/ Ministry of the Interior		Carlos and Theima Knoepfler

Senator HELMS. Now, my information I consider to be impeccable in terms of its credibility. If I were not persuaded of that, I would not go public with this.

The account is top secret, according to these officials, and I can imagine why Mr. Ortega keeps it a top secret. And it is a slush fund for the exclusive use of General Ortega and his comrades, or whatever you call them. Now, the funds move from the Nicaraguan Central Bank to a classified Sandinista military account, do you see, to one of Ortega's front companies in Panama, and finally they move to Ortega's bank account in Canada, to which I already alluded.

Now, in 1991, two-thirds of all of Nicaragua's expenditures were bankrolled by the American taxpayers. Two-thirds. So, it stands to reason, at least to this Senator, that approximately two-thirds of Mr. Ortega's retirement fund is also bankrolled by the American taxpayers.

Now, this is the kind of disagreement I have had with some of my friends at the State Department. I say, why in heck do you not do something about it? And they said, well, you know Chamorro we have got to help. Otherwise it will go down. Hell, it is already down. If stuff like that is going on, you take the seized property, the confiscated property, you take this kind of stuff, embezzlement by Ortega—how much further down can you go? And I, for one, am not going to support in the U.S. Senate or elsewhere that kind of thing.

Now, here is what I would like for you to do, and I may have caught you unawares on this, and I am not going to expect you to say, I am going to do this or do that. But I do want you to look me in the eye and say, this disturbs me and we are going to work on it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. What you say does disturb me, and we will look into it, Senator. You know, I am here so you can ask me questions, but I cannot resist asking you what the reaction of Attorney General Barr was to this data?

Senator HELMS. I have not heard yet, except that he told me that an investigation has begun. But here we are, in the middle of—you know, an election occurred, and Bill Barr is not going to be around, and so forth. So, I am talking to a prime mover in the new team.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. There is a career bureaucracy at the Justice Department just as there is at the State Department. But this does disturb me, and I will look into it. I think it will be very interesting, the results of the Justice Department investigation, which was probably conducted by career officials there.

Senator HELMS. I thank you, sir. Moving on to another subject, do I have about 5 or 6 minutes left?

The CHAIRMAN. Two minutes, I am informed.

Senator HELMS. Oh, well, I think I had better pause then and let somebody else go. I do not want to start and have to stop.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say, based on what I know about the matter that my colleague and friend, Senator Helms, has raised regarding properties, that this is not unique. It has happened. We have had it in a number of other countries. And I guess back on your watch, these issues came up

from time to time. It is not a unique occurrence. At the same time, it is certainly not one we would like to see.

As I understand it, and maybe my colleague is aware of this, a process has been established now, I am told, in Nicaragua to begin to deal with the claims regarding these properties. I certainly would encourage that process to go forward. Clearly when people's properties have been illegally appropriated, they ought to be returned and compensation, whatever is appropriate, should be worked out. But that is underway, and I certainly would encourage that it come to a conclusion regarding these outstanding claims.

We have dealt with a number of cases like this just in my own experience. One with the Christiani Government in El Salvador just a few years ago involved a constituent of Jake Garn's. We were able to resolve that problem. In Panama, there were a number over the years that needed to be addressed. Those are just the ones with which I am immediately familiar or personally involved. But I am confident that progress in Nicaragua will go forward.

Again, I just want to say to you, Mr. Christopher, that this is a country of 3½ million people who went through several years of civil war and 40 years of a repressive dictatorship. Families, including Mrs. Chamorro's have been divided. These were children who supported the Contra movement very strongly, children who were working with the Sandinista Government, children who were neutral. Her family was not unique in that regard.

We know in this country the length of time it takes to recover from a 4 or 5 year civil war. It takes time. And leaders that try and engage in reconciliation often suffer. Witness recent attention to Abraham Lincoln and his efforts at reconciliation and the price he paid for it.

Mrs. Chamorro is trying desperately to bind up the wounds of her country. It is not an easy task, and there are problems associated with it. They are not insignificant problems or ones that ought to be treated lightly. But she is committed to bringing her country together again, and on that effort she ought to be supported, in my view.

So my hope is that we can resolve some of these issues, but not make her or the people of Nicaragua pay a price because every issue we would like resolved yesterday has not yet been resolved. The price we may pay if Mrs. Chamorro fails is far greater than whatever difficulties individuals may suffer as a result of those matters not being resolved to their satisfaction in the shortest amount of time.

Mr. Chairman, there are, obviously, many, many other issues we could discuss today, but I am very satisfied that our nominee has tremendous grasp of them. I was very impressed with his ability to respond to Senator Simon's questions regarding Africa, and questions involving the Far East, and my questions about Latin America. The issue here is whether or not our nominee is a person of integrity, an individual who understands these issues, is willing to listen, demonstrates patience, and thought. The reputation of Mr. Christopher certainly recommends him on every one of those matters. That ought to satisfy, in my view, each and every member of this committee.

He is not going to agree with each and every one of us as matters come up in the coming weeks and months and years. But the fact that he will listen, that he is willing to meet with key staff people or have his staff meet with staff people to talk about these matters is something that every member of this committee ought to take great satisfaction in. The American public ought to be, in my view, very pleased with President-elect Clinton's choice and with the willingness of this nominee to accept the job of Secretary of State. I intend to support this nomination strongly, and have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and amen to what you said. Senator Coverdell?

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Chairman, I only have a closing comment and question. It comes back to the point we both tangled on a moment ago on Belize. And the sense of priorities, if you read through the statements and comments, so much attention has been directed toward Eastern Europe, the troubles and possibilities there. But we have new democracies emerging everywhere.

In our hemisphere in particular, we have talked about some of them. We have just been engaged in discussion about Nicaragua. In Africa, we have new democracies emerging. I do not think that I need to say this, but I would hope that despite their size and location, we shall keep our attention on all new democracies—wherever they might be and no matter their size.

I can anticipate your answer, but I did want to underscore that point because the pressures of the day and time can divert your meaningful attention. I think that a new democracy, no matter where it is, deserves our attention and concern.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I agree with that. We need to nurture them all. I think that that means that I have to try to communicate that signal, to give that sense of determination to the Assistant Secretaries and the regional bureaus to make sure that we try to nurture and encourage democracy wherever it is. And it can be quite a fragile enterprise when it first begins, so it needs special nurturing.

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Christopher, I appreciate your cooperation and attention to my questions. Thank you very much and welcome again.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathews.

Senator MATHEWS. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

I will turn now to Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, sir.

I was deeply touched by Senator Dodd's statement just now about—he was laying down what he believed to be or should be the ground rules for interrogation of a nominee. I noticed no such statement a few years ago when it took 5 days for this committee to approve a Secretary of State nominee.

Now, as far as Mrs. Chamorro and her government working on it, they have spent 2½ years—we know of at least 554—we have got it as a matter of record—it is interesting that in 2½ years not

one of these American citizens has been compensated or had their property returned.

Now, you know, we had a civil war some hundred years ago, and all that. But the truth of the matter is, if you will look back at the chart that I had here and the sheet that I gave you, most of this property is occupied by the Sandinistas or the Chamorro Government, or foreign governments.

Now, as a matter of good faith, you would think that at least one of the claims would have been adjudicated. So I do not think they give a doodle about it. And that is the reason I have brought that up. And I think it is a proper line of questioning.

And I might say that I do appreciate the assurance that you have given me, Mr. Secretary, that you are going to look into it seriously. And I know that you are not saying, well, I am going to look into it, and that is the last I will hear of it. Because if that is the last I hear of it, I will be calling you on the telephone, and we will have that kind of relationship.

But, anyway, I do not know of a soul in the world who is not interested in human rights. During the past 2 years, in Nicaragua, more than 200 of the Contras, or freedom fighters, whichever way you want to describe them, and their leader, Enrique Bermudez, have been assassinated. And a 16-year-old boy, Jean Paul Genet, was gunned down by General Ortega's personal bodyguard. A 16-year-old boy.

And just recently, the head of all the agriculture producers and head of all the confiscated property owners in Nicaragua, Arges Sequiera, he was assassinated just outside his farms. And this was in the past 2 months. And, to date, you know, you cannot get anybody interested in it down there, over 200 assassinations.

Now, the human rights situation in Nicaragua today is far worse than it was when you were Deputy Secretary, and the Carter administration supported the overthrow of the Somoza Government. I guess the question I wanted to ask of you, Mr. Secretary, I do not quarrel about anything that was done with reference to the Somoza Government, but would it be fair to apply the same standards to the Chamorro Government that the Carter administration applied to the Somoza Government while you were Deputy Secretary?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I think the human rights standards are ones that prevail over time. They do not shift from time to time. Matters of emphasis may shift, but I think we ought to judge countries by their overall human rights record.

When I said yesterday, I think you were not here, that there had been progress in Nicaragua, I stand by that statement. I think the fact that there was an election held, that there is a freely elected government in place there, is an indication of progress, certainly over the days of the Somoza Government.

Senator HELMS. Please tell me what the progress is? Yes, they had an election. But you know who is running the government. Not the lady who was elected; her son-in-law. What do you define as progress made in Nicaragua?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I define as progress the fact that they were able to have an election. It was conducted under circumstances that were regarded as making it a valid election. And they apparently are going to be in the position to hold another election there.

I think that is a big step forward. Elections are not everything, but elections are a key step toward an improvement in human rights conditions.

Senator HELMS. Well, who runs the army down there, the same fellow who ran it before?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, countries have a right to choose their leaders as long as there is—

Senator HELMS. Do you have some objection to answering the question? Of course a country has a right to choose, and that is exactly the problem.

Now, what is the difference between who is running the army before the election and who is running the army now?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I do not know that factual issue. But I think if there is an election and there is a new President, that new President, just as he does in this country, has certain rights to establish who shall be in the key positions.

Senator HELMS. Well, I do not want to get into a debate with you.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I appreciate that.

Senator HELMS. But I assume that you are going to look into all this.

My daddy taught me a long time ago to look a man in the eye, and you can tell a lot about a fellow. And I think I see you, as you look me in the eye, that, by golly, I am going to look into this stuff. I am taking that on good faith.

Well, let me just say this to you. The Sandinistas still control the police, the army, the judiciary, and just about everything else. Elections do not bring freedom. And that is the issue.

I do not want to try to require you to commit that you are going to do any specific thing, but I do want you to tell me, and I think you have told me, that you are going to try.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I will look into it, yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. OK.

I have here an editorial from the Miami Herald, which is one of the Knight newspapers, as you know, maybe the flagship, which pleased me very much. It was January 10, this past Sunday. The Miami Herald came out in strong support of the Bush administration's freeze on aid to Nicaragua. The editorial said, in part, and I will send you a copy of it down—did you happen to see it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, sir, I did not.

Senator HELMS. I absolutely agree—I do not always agree with some of these newspaper editors, but this one I like. And that is the reason I want to talk about it.

The Miami Herald said aid should be held up until the Nicaraguan Government solves property claims and takes action against human rights violators.

Now, how do you feel about freezing the aid until there has been substantial visible, specific progress in the areas that the Miami Herald talked about?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, that will come under the same heading as the other questions you have asked about this. I gather from the story here that the outgoing administration released \$54 million of the appropriated aid. It would be useful for me to find out the reasons for that. Foreign policy is a continuum. I would like to

know what caused that release, what the justification for that was. And, generally speaking, I would not want to commit myself to any course of action on a specific item like that at this hearing.

Senator HELMS. Do you have a copy of this?

Ms. DEMOSS. He has it.

Senator HELMS. He has it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. She brought me a copy of the editorial.

Senator HELMS. It says, in part, the editorial: What should the Clinton administration's position be in the face of Nicaragua's byzantine politics? Then, it answered its own question: It ought to reaffirm the Bush administration's freeze on U.S. aid.

Now, you are exactly right. Larry Eagleburger said 2 or 3 months ago, he said, you are exactly right, they ought not to get a nickel, and so forth and so on. Then, all of a sudden, after the election, pop goes the weasel, you know, and they send \$54 million, or whatever it is, down there. But, in any case, I do hope you will look at the editorial and read the suggestion in the last paragraph that reads that the remaining \$50 million—the \$54 million is already gone—that is American taxpayers' money—the Miami Herald says the remaining \$50 million should be held until the Nicaraguan Government resolves property claims and takes action against human rights violators.

All right.

Now, we have been talking about Nicaragua. What do you want me to do, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I was going on to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I will yield 5 minutes of my time and let Senator Helms do his next line of questioning.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think probably we can cover this. We have been talking about Nicaragua, and I thank the Senator.

I am reminded that Mrs. Chamorro came to power with both overt and covert funding from the U.S. Government. A lot of people do not know that. It is also a matter of public record that in 1984 the U.S. Government covertly funded Mr. Duarte's campaign down in El Salvador. Nobody knew anything about that, and it was in a free election.

And I remember that I had a very interesting conversation with Bill Casey about that thing. He did not like the fact that this was funneled. He did not like the fact that I said publicly that this was funneled through the CIA. You know, interference in a free election.

Now, you have said—I believe you said, certainly by implication, that we ought to let the people in each country choose their own leaders without the U.S. Government tilting elections one way or another. Do you want to comment on this, what is the word, interference or participation in, maybe illegally, certainly I think it is sort of unethical, election buying that has occurred too many times with the CIA and others funneling money covertly to Duarte?

Now, Mr. Duarte was a very charming man, but he had an opponent who was very charming, and about whom there were many, many stories charging him with all sorts of mayhem. I remember pressing your predecessor, your friend and my friend, Jim Baker.

There were many utterances saying that he headed a death squad. I am talking about Roberto D'Aubuisson.

Now, I met D'Aubuisson two or three times. A very attractive fellow. He wrote the constitution down there. He was elected the head of the assembly. One of the most popular fellows in the country. But there was a persistent drumbeat that he was heading a death squad. And this bothered me because, you know, I had met the fellow. He did not look like somebody heading a death squad to me, but of course I do not know what a fellow looks like who heads a death squad.

But I asked Jim Baker, time and time again, I said: What evidence do you have to support this charge? Because I do not want anything to do with him if he is doing all these terrible things. Finally, Jim came back and said, we do not have any evidence. But, even till D'Aubuisson's death—in the obituary they referred to his heading a death squad, which I think was reprehensible, unless somebody has some evidence that I do not believe anybody has.

Now, do you think that the U.S. Government ought to use tax money to tilt elections in foreign countries?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, the covert action issue is one that I think needs to be addressed in a different committee than this. I am not in a position to take a categorical position on that subject. I am quite skeptical about covert action, but I think I would be going well beyond my proper domain, certainly in this session, to discuss the covert action policy of the United States.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me just ask Warren Christopher, American citizen, what do you think of it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, you know, I think I am no longer Warren Christopher, American citizen, attractive as that would be. When I sit here at this table and answer questions like that, I am here as Governor Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. And what I have given up, is the freedom to say in a public forum, with the press here, exactly what I think on certain subjects.

And if that sounds evasive, I am sorry for it. But, really, it is one of the things you surrender when you undertake this kind of an assignment.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am going to let that one lie.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. I know you appreciate that, too.

All right. I want to talk about drugs, in general. I think you know that I have a deep interest in, and I have held a number of hearings, I have chaired a number of hearings, on drug trafficking. I know you have an interest in it, too. So I am not saying, you know, I am holier than thou.

Now, I am going to submit to you in writing a number of questions relating to the drug issue. But there is one question I think I should ask you now. Do you agree that the U.S. Government should never turn over narcotics intelligence to a foreign official who we believe may be involved in drug trafficking activities?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, posed that way, I cannot imagine the circumstances in which we would turn over intelligence to somebody whom we had a well-founded belief was involved in drug trafficking. The question is almost rhetorical.

Senator HELMS. Well, I guess this is something that maybe we could talk about another time. It involves legislation which I strongly support, and which I will describe to you in a private session.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. I am a little nervous about getting into it, because it may involve some classified stuff that neither you nor I want to get into here right now at this hearing. But, having said that, you do know that high-level Panamanian Government officials were involved in illegal drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and money-laundering activities as early as the 1960's? You are aware of that, are you not?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. As early as the 1960's, you say?

Senator HELMS. As early as the 1960's.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not know with precision, but I know it goes back a long, long ways. And, moreover, I do not think it is much better now, Senator.

Senator HELMS. I agree with that.

What should I do now, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have another half-minute.

Senator SARBANES. How much more time do you need, Jesse, to finish this line?

Senator HELMS. I cannot estimate. We are moving along pretty rapidly. I am doing the best I can.

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is that we will go along and break for lunch. And, hopefully, at that point, there will just be one major subject that the ranking member wants to discuss. And we hope to wrap up this afternoon.

Is that correct?

Senator HELMS. Did you say we hope to wind up this afternoon?

The CHAIRMAN. We expect to wrap it up this afternoon.

Senator HELMS. Well, I will agree to the first and, further, we hope that the second will be the case. But I do not want to give up any rights.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us just roll along, and I will recognize the Senator from Maryland.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I yielded a good part of my time to Senator Helms, but I do want to take just a few minutes to pursue a couple of things, and I am sure we will be back to Senator Helms very shortly so he can continue his line of questioning.

I really wanted to make this observation, Secretary Christopher. I do not think that you are being evasive in the least when you take the position that now, as the nominee to be Secretary of State, and soon to be confirmed, that you no longer have the luxury of simply speaking as a private individual.

What you say is potentially front page news across the world, not only in this country, but across the world. And your views and opinions, therefore, are looked to very carefully, scrutinized very closely and, by the nature of things, are interpreted to reflect the position of the American Government or, in this particular instance, the position of the soon-to-be American Government, the incoming administration.

Therefore, I do not think you have the luxury any more to simply sit at the table and give your own personal view, divorced from

that responsibility. And, I frankly think it would be not meeting your responsibilities to start sounding off with, "this is what I, Warren Christopher, individual, think," unrelated to the context of speaking for the administration.

I also want to make one other observation. I know Senator Helms is concerned about the Chamorro Government and some problems he has had with them. I think some of the matters he has raised do need to be looked into. As you have indicated you are prepared to do and will undertake to do. But I do want to make the observation that the alternative in that election, had Mrs. Chamorro not won, would have been that we would still be confronted with Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas holding full power in Nicaragua.

Now, Mrs. Chamorro is under a lot of pressures, and I recognize that. They come from all sides. She has a very difficult task. The problem of economic reconstruction in that country is not an easy one. They have suffered natural disasters as well as manmade disasters, and they are trying to come out from under that. I know she is trying to deal with many difficult problems all at the same time.

So, while there are things about her administration that one might criticize, I think we ought to recognize that her election did supplant Ortega, which I regard as an important step forward. I think we have to keep that in mind even as we may focus on some of the problems that her own government is encountering.

Senator DODD. If the Senator would just yield. There is another alternative. Had there not been an election, we might have had a continuing civil war, with thousands of people losing their lives. Not only has there been an election, but military forces have been substantially reduced, freedom of the press is the case, La Prensa is open, and other papers are allowed to express their views.

Senator SARBANES. Am I not correct that the Nicaraguan underwriting of the rebellion in El Salvador terminated as well?

Senator DODD. Totally. And it is no longer a base of operations for others who are interested in the region. All of that has obviously come to a halt. I would point out as well, as another example, President Aylwin. There was a difficult period in Chile, and President Aylwin won an election. And he retained General Pinochet as the head of the military.

Now, there were many people who did not think that was a sign, necessarily, of great change but understood the difficulty of building a country after a period of turmoil. And, certainly, that is a step that people have taken from time to time.

So, considering the alternatives, the Senator from Maryland is absolutely correct. And Mr. Christopher is correct when he says an election is not an insignificant event, when you consider the history. But also consider what has occurred over the last several years, despite the very legitimate questions that have been raised by the Senator from North Carolina. That is progress, significant progress. And it needs to be nurtured and supported.

I just wanted to comment on that.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I hear from the same people, or some of the same people.

I hear from some of the same people that Senator Helms hears from on the expropriation issue, and obviously it needs to be looked into. The United States has traditionally concerned itself about the expropriation of the property of our citizens in other countries and has sought some redress. Of course, the Hickenlooper amendment was but one reflection of that.

But I do not think we should be as condemnatory, perhaps, of Mrs. Chamorro as one might otherwise be, because a number of things came out of that election, including the opportunity to restore a full range of, not fully done yet, of human rights in Nicaragua, the ending of the support that was being given from Nicaragua to the rebellion in El Salvador, which has contributed now to the Secretary General being able to negotiate what we hope will be a lasting solution in El Salvador, and help to contribute to stability and peace in the region.

Senator DODD. The Senator from Maryland is correct.

Senator SARBANES. I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. I would defer to Senator Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not hear you. Did you say you yielded?

Senator COVERDELL. I am sorry. I said I would yield my time to Senator Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. How about Senator Robb?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he comes next. If you yield to Senator Robb, he comes next.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions at this point. I am personally prepared to report the nomination to the floor of the Senate for confirmation. I am not indifferent to some of the concerns raised by our distinguished colleague from North Carolina.

I wonder if it might be possible, however, to submit some questions in writing that the Secretary-designate could respond to, so that there would be a record, so that any of us that had concerns about some of these areas might be able to look at it? But I would like to suggest that there might be some fixed time for the conclusion of this process.

As I say, I am personally prepared to do it now, but I certainly respect the right of the distinguished Senator from North Carolina to question to the nominees at whatever length he believes is appropriate. I am just, I guess, inquiring if it might be agreeable with the distinguished Senator to do some of the interrogation in writing so that we could report out the nomination whenever he is comfortable with it.

Senator HELMS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator ROBB. I would be pleased to yield.

Senator HELMS. I will do exactly that, but I still have discussions and questions that ought to be done here.

Now, I think we are moving on, so we can finish this thing this afternoon.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I suggest we allow Senator Helms to proceed with his next round.

The CHAIRMAN. I would agree. And I would also add in response to the Senator from Virginia, the record will stay open for questions until the questioning terminates.

Senator ROBB. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to yield back any time to the Senator from North Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I thank the Senator.

Now, Mr. Christopher, you were No. 2 man in the State Department during the Carter administration, is that not true?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. And I believe you must know that Moises, or Moses as some people call him, Torrijos, who was a brother of Omar Torrijos, and Director of Panama's Office of Treaty Information, I believe you know he was indicted by a grand jury in New York as a co-conspirator in a narcotics trafficking case in 1972. Is that not correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I do not know that, but I will take your word for it if you say it is true.

Senator HELMS. Well, he was.

Now, I think it is important to make it a matter of record, just as it was important and I had no disagreement with it about 8 years ago or 12 years ago, or whatever it was, when it took 5 days to confirm or report the nomination of a gentleman to be Secretary of State. And some of the people who were saying, let us go on, were participating in that, and I had no objection to it and voiced no objections.

Please believe me that I want to get this thing over with as much as they do, or you do. But I think it is important to establish, if possible, whether you and others in your administration did not know or did know, as the case may be, about the drug trafficking and other criminal activities of the Torrijos brothers.

Now, you did know, did you not?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I did not, Senator.

Senator HELMS. You did not?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I did not.

Senator HELMS. Well, you were negotiating with them at the time. Did you think they were pure as the driven snow? Now, you were the No. 2 man in the State Department.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. The only Torrijos I knew was the head of Panama at that time.

Senator HELMS. Omar?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Omar.

I did not know him intimately, but I had some professional contact with him.

Senator HELMS. Well, you did negotiate with him, as a matter of fact.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I did not negotiate with him.

Senator HELMS. Well, you met with him with respect, say, to the Panama Canal Treaty.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

But I do not believe I ever met with him alone. They were meetings of substantial size, where he was represented by his Foreign Affairs Minister and various other people. The direct negotiation was done between negotiators for the two countries.

Senator HELMS. And nobody in the State Department cabled to you and said, Mr. Secretary, you know about this guy? Do you know about these indictments? Do you know about these activities? Nobody ever said anything to you about it?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not recall that anybody said that General Torrijos was himself involved in the drug trade, no, sir, I do not.

Senator HELMS. Well, we keep pretty good records, and a number of officials of the administration of which you were a part have been quoted, time and time again, as saying that the administration did know about the drug trafficking, and so forth and so on.

Now, just because they said it does not make it so. I acknowledge that. But it is very interesting. I asked the staff to get up a list of some of the articles where statements were made to that effect. Seymour Hersh of the New York Times, on May 4, 1988; John McLean in 1979, the Chicago Tribune; the New York Times again, in 1986, the New York Times—two times in June 1986; the Washington Post, John McGee, in March 1988, and so forth.

That was after the fact of your serving as No. 2 man. But do you remember any of those articles?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I cannot say I remember any of the articles. I know there has been a long history of Panamanian leaders being involved in illegal conduct of one kind or another. And I would have to say that I think probably we have been, as a country, too lenient about that, considerably too lenient.

There is always a dilemma, though, when somebody is the leader of a country and there is an obligation to deal with that country, you deal with him in the best way that you can.

Senator HELMS. I am mystified. When you were negotiating—discussing, meeting, whatever characterization you want to give it, the Panama Canal Treaty, did you know about the murder of Father Gallegos, a Catholic priest who was thrown from Noriega's helicopter? Did you know nothing about that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I did not.

I might clarify for you, Senator, what my role was in that connection. I did not negotiate the Panama Canal Treaties. They were negotiated by—

Senator HELMS. Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. And my role in connection with the Panama Canal Treaties was in connection with the ratification of those treaties, or approval of those treaties. And I was only one of many who were involved in that endeavor to secure ratification.

I am not trying to move away from that, except to try to indicate to you that I did not go back and forth to Panama. The only time I was ever in Panama was for the signing ceremonies and I was one of dozens of American officials who happened to be there for the signing ceremony.

So I was not intimately involved until after the treaties had been negotiated and the matter was ready for approval here in the Senate. Then, I did get fairly deeply involved.

Senator HELMS. Well, you are identified as one of the two top advocates in the State Department of the treaties.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, I certainly was an advocate of the treaties here in the U.S. Senate.

Senator HELMS. And Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz were the negotiators?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. They were the negotiators, sir.

Senator HELMS. As a little sidebar, I remember—I think I may have mentioned it yesterday—I was designated by some other Senators, veterans in the Senate, to go down and meet with President Carter and deliver a letter signed by four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs.

We got up a cover letter, covering that letter, and I made an appointment, or the President graciously agreed to see me, unhesitatingly. I remember, when I got there, they took me right into the Oval Office and I sat down on a little, sort of like what you call a little love seat. He was not there. He was in a news conference of some sort.

I was going over my papers. I was the new boy on the block. I saw these two black shoes standing there in front of me and I looked up and there was the President of the United States.

I jumped up and I spilled my papers all over the floor. And he and I got on our knees to pick up my papers, which I appreciated very much, in total embarrassment.

And I was groping for something to say to him besides what I came for. And I think it must have been a Monday morning, because there had been a story in the paper that President and Mrs. Carter went to church on Sunday and she kicked off her shoes.

And I said, Mrs. Helms noticed that because she does the same thing in church because her feet hurt. She must have the hurtingest feet in the world.

He said, no, she may be No. 2, but Rosalyn has the hurtingest feet.

So I thought how that was my big moment, visiting with the President of the United States and we were talking. And what did we talk about? We talked about how bad our wife's feet hurt.

But anyway, these Senators who signed the letter covering the letters from the four chairmen of the Joint Chiefs instructed me to offer to the President that if instead of, "giving away the Panama Canal, he wanted to propose an enormous public work project—that is to work on the locks so that we could get larger vessels through—that we would support it strenuously in the Senate."

And the President was very cordial about it. And he said, well, I cannot give you an answer on that. He said, I am attracted to your idea and I want you to tell the other Senators that I said this. But, he said, Ellsworth and Sol will be in here this afternoon at 2 o'clock. And let me broach the subject to them.

And I remember driving back to the Capitol. I said, if I do nothing else, you are a freshman Senator and all the rest of it, if I have helped divert just giving away the Panama Canal, it will have all been worthwhile. Of course, I never heard again about it.

But I remember Jim Allen. You knew Senator Allen, did you not, from Alabama?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I remember him. I did not know him well, but I do remember him.

Senator HELMS. Well, he was one of the great Senators in terms of knowledge of the Senate and the Senate's rules and so forth.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. I remember hearing that.

Senator HELMS. He and Harry Byrd and John McClellan and so many people on both sides of the aisle, we talked about the character of the people that the canal was going to be turned over to.

And this worried us. And that's the reason there was great support for a big public works project that would benefit the United States. But this fellow Noriega, we later learned and some evidence existed then, that he was on the U.S. payroll. And I remember, I could not understand that because I guess I was naive about intelligence and how you assemble it and whom you keep.

But I just wonder, am I too naive when I say that we ought not to bankroll intelligence assets among people with criminal records?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, let me make a somewhat broader statement about that. I was aware that there were a number of people of unsavory reputation in Panama. I don't carry today a recollection as to who they were or what they had done.

I have heard since then about Noriega and there were suspicions about Noriega at that time and I think the longstanding relationship between the United States and Noriega is a blot on our historical record. And it's bipartisan blot because it wasn't just one party. It went back a long ways.

But I'm not in the intelligence business and I would not be prepared to lay down any absolute rules as to who we use as intelligence assets. It's a difficult, often dirty business. And you're not dealing with angels in the intelligence business. So as I say, I would not lay down any rules for them. But I do associate myself with the view that our longstanding relationship with Noriega was a serious mistake and a blot on our country's record.

Senator HELMS. Well, I appreciate that, because I feel—I am not a goody-goody two-shoes, but you know, dealing with skunks like that. It makes me ashamed.

But I will tell you what I am going to do. I am going to submit the rest of the questions on Panama in writing to you.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I appreciate it.

Senator HELMS. And we will not take up your time.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that leaves—I have got over written questions as well. But that leaves one more subject that is going to take a little time. And if we can get through with that, I will have—as they say in North Carolina—shot my wad. And I see you smiling and nodding your head.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, I do enjoy being here, but if it came to an end, I wouldn't be disappointed. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. I can understand that. Why do we not break for lunch now?

The CHAIRMAN. We will break for lunch and come back at about 2 o'clock—not about, at 2 o'clock—and then forge ahead.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That would be fine unless the Senator thought he could finish in due course. I'm obviously here. I'm at your service.

Senator HELMS. Well, I do not think I can, but we—you enjoy our lunch.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. All right, sir. I will be back promptly at 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Two o'clock promptly.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Mathews, Helms, and Coverdell.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate has come to order. During the lunch break, the staff of the Senate committee received a message relayed from the Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani, who expressed much appreciation, Mr. Secretary-designate, for your forthright answer on the pursuit of genocide charges against Saddam for what he has done to the Kurdish people.

They wanted, though, to draw attention to the dire conditions existing in Northern Iraq this winter. The Congress has appropriated \$43 million for winter relief in Kurdistan. A great deal more is needed and should be sent. I would emphasize that the situation is desperate. The money is here and available, but the question is how best to deliver the relief.

Finally, I am told the Iraq is blocking completely relief to the Shiites in the villages of Southern Iraq, and to the 500,000 people living in the marshes there. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you would look into that when you take over.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, sir. I surely will.

The CHAIRMAN. Also, I have one question. President-elect Clinton said that as President that he will continue American assistance programs to the Camp David countries, Israel and Egypt, at current levels. With regard to Israel, the President-elect has said the aid encourages long-term stability in the Middle East, and demonstrates the American commitment to Israeli security and sovereignty.

Do you share the President-elect's views on the importance of continuing aid to Israel and Egypt at the current levels?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, both because he is President and because those are my personal views.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir. I have no further questions. I turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I am tempted to ask the Secretary where he wants the Embassy to be placed in Israel, but no, I will not ask it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Yesterday, seriously, Mr. Christopher, I think it was Senator Simon who asked you whether you thought it was about time to recognize the MPLA Government of Angola, and you said, as I understand it, that you were sympathetic to Senator Simon's statement, but were not aware of all of the details of the situation there.

I thought it might be in order to offer a few details just for the record. The MPLA Government in recent weeks has launched a nationwide military offensive against UNITA and its civilian political supporters. And approximately 2,000 people have been killed just

in the past 2 weeks. The U.N. Security Council has urged a ceasefire to no avail.

The U.N. peacekeeping mandate in Angola expires at the end of this month, and unless there is significant progress toward talks, the peacekeeping U.N. crowd would like to pull out. And Angolan law calls for a runoff election between the leaders of the two factions, but none has been planned.

As a seasoned diplomat, and negotiator, I am sure you know how important expectation is in any negotiation. And it occurred to me that perhaps your comments yesterday will lead the hardliner in the MPLA Government to believe that no matter what it does, the Clinton administration will extend full diplomatic relations. That belief is unlikely to lead them to the negotiating table, and I anticipate the Angola is, once again, on the brink of civil war.

And I mention all of that thinking that perhaps you might want to clarify just a bit the statement that I understand you made to Senator Simon yesterday, but that is up to you.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think the best thing for me to say is that we will look at the full facts to try and understand the situation. And I certainly have not prejudged it. I was simply agreeing with Senator Simon's comment, I think, which was keyed to the relatively recent election in Angola, and to indicate that unless there was some difference in the facts, it would seem that we ought to be moving in that direction. But I have not prejudged the matter and I hope that will give reassurance.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think it probably will if you are saying in effect, and I think you just have, that you are going to wait, and look and see at what MPLA is doing, and UNITA and so forth, and that you have not really made a judgment.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is correct. That is absolutely correct.

Senator HELMS. OK. Now then, I believe you have been the chairman of the management committee of your law firm.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is correct, Senator.

Senator HELMS. O'Melveny & Myers, and as such I think you will be able to recognize the law firm's major clients. Now, I think you see behind you—and have they provided you a sheet as well?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, thank you.

Senator HELMS. Does the list of Japanese clients on this chart look reasonably complete to you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, Senator. It is by no means complete.

Senator HELMS. Are there more or fewer?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. There are many more.

Senator HELMS. Many more. Well, anyway, it is the best we could do. We took it from the latest issue of Martindale and Hubbell, and the list covers, as you will see, industries ranging from automobiles, airlines, oil, steel, banks, insurance, securities trading companies, advertising, television, broadcasting, and construction. And you indicated that there are a lot more than that.

And the question I would like to ask of you is which ones of these firms were your personal clients, assigned to you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. None of them.

Senator HELMS. None?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. None of them, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, did you have any personal assignments to you?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Did I personally have any personal assignments?

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I handled a number of matters.

Senator HELMS. But none of these?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. None of those, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, clients of your law firm, or your former law firm now, made their payments directly to the firm and not to individual partners. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That's correct.

Senator HELMS. That is a given. So, your annual compensation depended on payments made to the firm by all of the clients and not just your personal clients?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. All right. And, now, let us turn back to the law firm's client list. The American big three automakers and their union met with Governor Clinton recently, and made certain requests. If these requests come to the Cabinet level for decision, would you feel that you should recuse yourself, given that your law firm had Toyota as a client?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I would not see any basis for doing so, but if there was ever any question about it I would consult with counsel at the State Department.

If I might, Senator, could I put this in a somewhat broader context for you?

Senator HELMS. Sure.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, when I was asked by Governor Clinton to undertake this assignment and decided to come back here, I instructed my representatives to work out a very conservative approach to the ethics question. I tried to follow on ethics matters what I understand to be the Bob Jones rule of golf, and that is to call the close ones against yourself. And my instructions were to work out a very conservative package. At this stage in my career, I have very little interest in running any risk on ethical issues.

On the other hand, Senator, there is a responsibility to carry out your job once you are in government, and I think an excessively broad recusal policy or a foolishly broad recusal policy might be comfortable for the person involved, but not in the public interest, because you would be taking yourself out of so many important decisions. And I think that that would probably be true for the Secretary of State because so many things pass by him.

In accordance with my instructions, I have worked out a policy of recusal and other divestitures which has had the approval of the Office of Government Ethics and the approval of the ethics officer at the State Department. And it complies with existing regulations and the new set of regulations that are going to be put into effect, I think, some time early this year.

In the course of this I have, I think, worked out a recusal policy that seems to me to be consistent with my own sense of ethics, and it certainly meets all the tests of Office of Government Ethics and the State Department ethics officer.

For example, with respect to O'Melveny & Myers, in which I have some retirement rights, I will recuse myself for the entire time I am here. I do not think any of my partners would ever ask to see me on a business matter, but if they did I would turn them down. If there was any issue that I recognized where O'Melveny was representing them, I would take myself out.

I also have very modest retirement rights from South California Edison, and I would maintain also the same recusal policy with respect to Southern California Edison. The view was that that company had mainly domestic interests, and it was not necessary for me to divest completely.

With respect to the two other directorships I had, Lockheed and First Interstate Bank, I have cashed out. That is, I have sold whatever stock I had. They have turned into cash any retirement rights I had just to be on the safe side, because they obviously both have some possible international interests. That decision was not without its pain, but one I am very glad to undertake.

I have also divested myself from over 60 individual investments—not large ones but they were in various partnerships that might conceivably have involved some ethical problem. And as a result my assets, such as they are, will be in mutual funds or government securities.

In short, Senator, I have gone about as far as one can go to comply. One thing that I am not doing, though, and this really speaks to your question—I am not planning to disqualify myself from all of the clients of O'Melveny & Myers. One time we looked, and there were 10,000 open files. That probably would not mean 10,000 clients, but it would mean several thousand separate clients. And it would be, I think, imprudent for me and not in the public interest to try to discover which of those clients might have some matter before the State Department or be affected by it where I had no knowledge of the name of the client.

The reason that I said so quickly this was not the name of all of our Japanese clients, I happen to recognize most of these, and there are many others for whom we did a small amount of work whose names I did not recognize then and would not recognize now. And there is no way for me to disqualify myself with respect to them.

But I assure you that if anything comes by where I have some flicker of memory that this has something to do with the practice of law or I had something to do with this, I will seek counsel and I will take myself out, because I assure you I have no interests in running any risks in this area.

Senator HELMS. When you talked to the President about this nomination, did you describe your plans or what you had already decided? I guess I am asking, does he know about what you are doing and has he approved?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, the State Department, of course, is our lead negotiator on reciprocal airline access. Japan Airlines falls under the net of what you just said, is that correct? Japan Airlines is a client, and you do not anticipate any problem with respect to that one, is that right? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do not anticipate any problem, Senator. It happens that our law firm also represents most of the domestic airlines one way or another, and since I have not worked for them in recent years, there is no basis for my disqualification there that I can see, unless—and no one has taken this position that a lawyer should disqualify himself from all the clients of the law firm, even though he had not done any recent substantial work.

Senator HELMS. All right. Put up the other chart. I got interested in this, and the further we went, the more interest I had. Now, this chart shows the Japanese business connection with the incoming Clinton administration. For example, the NSC Advisor, Deputy Advisor Sandy Burger; and Robert Rubin, the National Economic Counsel Advisor; and Senator Bentsen and Roger Altman and Ron Brown and yourself and Mickey Kantor. I think the Japanese must have been doing handsprings with joy when they saw all of these selections, but maybe I am wrong about that.

Do you think this system of business ties to foreigners would be possible in any other country? How about in Japan itself?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I cannot speak to Japan, but I would suggest that if you bring into government anyone from any of the major investment banks or any of the major law firms, there would be some tie between that law firm or that investment bank and Japan. The Japanese have done a great deal of business in this country. They have made investments that are very useful for this country in various ways.

In any event, this chart does not surprise me because the Japanese have been very active in our country, and in some ways very constructively.

On the Japanese front, Senator, I apologize if this sounds somewhat self-serving, but the first experience I had in foreign policy was to negotiate trade treaties for the United States against Japan in the 1960's, when President Kennedy was in office. So, I am quite familiar with taking positions against the Japanese, and have never represented any Japanese companies here in the United States.

So, emotionally I do not have any sense that I will feel some special obligation to the Japanese arising out of the fact that they were O'Melveny & Meyers' clients. Quite to the contrary, my main contact, in a negotiating sense, goes back to the 1960's when I negotiated textile treaties. And they were tough negotiations.

Senator HELMS. Do you want me to stop now? What do you want me to do?

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to go on the 10-minute rule until we are exhausted on this side, and then you can go on.

Senator HELMS. Well, I can finish, I think, in the next few minutes.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Does my colleague seek recognition?

Senator SIMON. I would like to respond just for 2 minutes to the one comment about Angola.

The CHAIRMAN. But then would the rest of my colleagues care to question?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I will claim my time. I just have a question or two. Then I will yield to Senator Simon to do that. We may be able to go right back to Senator Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, sure.

Senator HELMS. Fine.

Senator SARBANES. First of all let me say, Mr. Christopher, I think this is a very broad recusal. I have spent a lot of time looking at these recusals as they come before the committee. It seems to me, as you have said, that you have been very careful and very prudent, very conservative in what you have taken in terms of moving out of areas which many other nominees who have simply stayed in and been approved accordingly.

Let me be very clear. You are terminating all relationship with your law firm as I understand it, except for the retirement plan, which is a defined benefit plan invested in government securities and mutual funds. Is that correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. No, not exactly. I am ending my relationship completely with my law firm except for the defined benefit plan, and retirement payments which have been in our partnership agreement for many years. And mine go back to my return to the firm in 1981. So, they are not in any way changed by my entry into government. This is just what I am entitled to under our partnership agreement.

Senator SARBANES. OK. And you are resigning from SCC Corp. and Southern California Edison, is that correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. You are also divesting yourself of an extensive list of holdings, much of which need not have been done, if I understand the rules and requirements, but you have done so in an abundance of caution?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I must say to you, and I looked over this material carefully overnight, it did seem to me that you were setting a very high standard here, certainly higher than is required under existing laws and regulations, and certainly higher than many if not most nominees who have come before us have done.

I assume some of this is at a financial loss, although I do not particularly want to belabor that point. But I thank you for being so careful. I yield to Senator Simon.

Senator KERRY. I would just like to interject, if I may, along the road downhill here.

Senator SARBANES. Fine. If I still have time, I yield to Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I want to join with Senator Sarbanes in recognizing the breadth of this recusal. I was, frankly, somewhat surprised by the breadth of it. Pleasantly so, but surprised, when measured against other nominees we have considered, and particularly recent times. I say this not to engage with my good friend from North Carolina in any kind of specific partisanship, but since the administration preceding is Republican and has been for 12 years, we have to measure it most recently by that experience.

When I look at either the Secretary of Commerce, most recently, or the Secretary of Treasury, or even close advisers to the President, one of whom was advising BCCI even while advising the

President, this recusal presented to us by the Secretary-designate is far, far, as he said, more conservative. It is more far reaching. And so I join with my colleague in saying that I think that, particularly given the fact that none of those firms were, in fact, directly represented by the Secretary-designate, it is even more so a conservative approach, and one that represents the new ethics that have been described. And I think the committee is pleased to see it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Senator Simon?

Senator SIMON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just first comment. I think you have done the proper thing, and I applaud you for it.

Let me just comment on Angola briefly. An election was held, and an election in which if either—any candidate received a majority of the vote, that candidate would become President of Angola. If no one received a majority, there would be a runoff.

President Dos Santos and Savimbi campaigned throughout Angola; a rather remarkable thing considering that they had had a civil war. President Dos Santos ended up with 49.3 percent of the vote, not the 50 percent that was necessary. Savimbi at first then claimed fraud, despite the fact that observers said it was a remarkably fine election for a country that had never had elections before. And then he has been back and forth about recognizing the government.

There clearly have been some abuses by UNITA, the Savimbi forces, as well as by the MPLA, but they are going to be coming together, as I understand, to try and work out something. But there is no question that there has been a genuine, free election; that the government there is moving in a constructive direction.

I hope things can get worked out. I hope Dr. Savimbi can be part of the government that emerges there, the coalition government, and that they can go ahead with the runoff that is required under their law.

I am not asking you, Mr. Secretary, to simply sign a blank check. I do believe that Angola comes much closer to the ideals that we profess than a great many countries that we do now recognize. And so I think it is in order for the new administration to take a good hard look. And I might add, this is the feeling, not just of Paul Simon, but of a great many people who in the past have been strong supporters of Dr. Savimbi.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Simon.

Senator Mathews?

Senator MATHEWS. No questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I would observe that I went through your recusal and I congratulate you on its conservative approach.

I guess we have all had a chance to speak. Now we turn it over to the ranking minority member until he is interrupted by one of us, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Well, before we go too far in a love-in, let us go a little bit further into what I was trying to discuss with the nominee.

Every time you have gone into government, you have implemented a recusal schedule. Is that right?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. I would say that the strictures are more extensive now than they were at an earlier time, but I have always declined to act in matters where O'Melveny & Myers was involved or where important prior clients of mine were involved.

Senator HELMS. Now, it was on December 9 when you announced Governor Clinton's new ethics package. I believe you referred to the revolving door, which of course links the public and private sectors. And you described that revolving door as a vice.

You know, that is another thing we agree on; because I have had to confront people who have been on the Republican side, who have been in and out of government, and you find yourself sort of shadowboxing. So we do not disagree on that, Mr. Secretary.

But I am bound to oblige—I mean, I am obliged to observe that counting your time as consultant to the State Department on textile negotiations in the 1960's, I count at least nine times that you have gone from the State Department or the Justice Department to your same law firm or back again. Is that approximately correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Nine certainly doesn't sound right to me, Senator. I was a consultant from 1961 to 1965, and then I was in the Justice Department in 1967 and 1968 and I was in the State Department for 4 years, from 1977 to 1981.

It is hard for me to get nine out of that.

Senator HELMS. Well, back and forth, each time, is two.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That would bring me up to six. But if you are saying that I've gone back and forth to O'Melveny & Myers in my career, I would have to plead guilty.

Senator HELMS. Yes, yes. I am not accusing you of a thing. I just want to get the record straight.

But it looks to me like even in your case, and you and I agree on this revolving door business, it has been sort of a permanent swinging job. And I believe that is precisely what Governor Clinton was complaining about during the campaign.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I'll be bound by all the strictures that were promulgated and which I announced when I leave government.

Senator HELMS. Now, this morning, in the New York Times—I guess you saw the story, it was on the front page—indicated that Mr. Clinton is considering whether he should impose more stringent ethics rules on Commerce Secretary-designate Brown.

Now I wonder how your recusal commitment, which you have just described, and Mr. Brown's commitment, how do they differ, if at all?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I am not a student of Mr. Brown's commitments, Senator. If some more stringent are promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics or by Governor Clinton or by the State Department, I'll be glad to live up to them. I don't intend to be outdone by somebody on this.

Senator HELMS. That is a good attitude. I had somebody who knows more about it than I do outside the Senate and outside the staff. And they say that your commitment and Mr. Brown's com-

mitment are also identical. But I cannot testify to that as of my own knowledge.

Now, your statement does parallel Mr. Brown's somewhat. First, you both pledge to recuse yourselves only in regards to particular matters. Is that correct?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Well, with respect to O'Melveny & Myers, I will recuse myself as to all matters that affect the firm and also will not meet with any client or be involved in any matter where a client is represented by O'Melveny if I recognize it.

Senator HELMS. And Brown's does not do that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. As I say, I am really not a student of his and not prepared to get into a comparative analysis.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am going to be interested in comparing the two, just as a matter of personal interest.

The New York Times had a right pointed comment about this thing. Understand, I do not get up every morning looking to the New York Times to establish my own opinion, because like Homer, they nod too.

But they talk about an attitude of greed.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, as you have noted, I have gone in and out of the Government now—it will be 3 times. And I don't think that anybody would say that after I came back out, I somehow misused the position I'd been in. I moved back to Los Angeles and practiced law as a litigation lawyer there, I did not stay around Washington.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, I did not imply such a thing, nor should you infer it.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. You made the analogy and I thought maybe I ought to clarify what I could.

Senator HELMS. That's fine. That's what hearings are all about. You made yourself very clear.

Now the New York Times—I have got so much paper here—I do not believe I have this morning's New York Times quote. But it is in the office.

Let me specify something that I absolutely agree with Governor Clinton about, just for your information. I have been fussing for years about the underpayment of taxes by foreign companies operating in the United States. I have been on that Senate floor—if you would like a bale of paper, I will give it to you.

It just irritates me beyond redemption that the Japanese Government makes a formal complaint to our Government. Based on what you already said, you will participate in the decisionmaking process on this issue and you will support President Clinton.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, I will.

Senator HELMS. And incidentally, Jesse Helms.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you. I will.

Senator HELMS. All right. Now, Mr. Christopher, I am going to be submitting in written form a few more technical questions regarding the recusal matter.

Now Mr. Chairman, if I may, Senator Mack asked me to ask questions of Mr. Christopher which I shall do with your permission.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator HELMS. In January—this is Senator Mack speaking—in January 1992, the United States supported a U.N. resolution which referred to, “occupied Palestinian territories including Jerusalem.”

This was the first time the United States has ever supported language referring to the territories in such a way. And U.S. policy has always held that the final status of the territories is to be determined by negotiations.

In a letter to Secretary Baker, which I am submitting for the record, record Al Gore protested the characterization of the territories as, “Palestinian,” and went on to say, “the United States should never again participate in the unfair condemnation of any nation, let alone an ally. Compromising the truths and our principles is wrong and diminishes us as a Nation and harms the peace.”

Then he says President Clinton also called for U.S. support for that resolution. He also called it a mistake.

So the question posed by Senator Mack, will you recommend that the United States oppose any resolution that refers to the disputed territories as, “occupied Palestinian territories?”

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
January 17, 1992.

The Honorable JAMES A. BAKER III,
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW., Washington, DC

DEAR SECRETARY BAKER: We are very concerned by U.S. support for the harsh, one-sided, and unprecedented condemnation of Israel by the United Nations Security Council on January 6th (UNSCR 726). Following the victory against the infamous Zionism-is-racism resolution, we are appalled that the Administration would work to strengthen, rather than veto, a resolution employing a blatant double standard towards Israel.

UNSCR 726 “strongly condemned” Israel’s deportation of 12 Palestinians—stronger language than the condemnation of Iraq for invading Kuwait. It also referred to the territories administered by Israel since 1967 as “occupied Palestinian territories * * * including Jerusalem.” The resolution made no mention of the Palestinian violence that prompted Israel’s actions.

Why should Israel’s non-violent response to the murder of four Israelis be condemned in harsher terms than Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait? How could the Security Council refer to territories that are under dispute according to its own resolutions as “Palestinian” territories? Why should the United States reward the Palestinians for conditioning their participation in the peace process on Israeli behavior, while Israel is expected to accept terrorism against her citizens without recourse?

It would be a sad day for the United States, for Israel, and for the cause of peace if the U.S. role in drafting this resolution marks an abrupt turnaround in U.S. policy—from opposing lopsided blatantly anti-Israel resolutions to drafting and supporting them.

UNSCR 726 will harm the cause of peace by encouraging Palestinian terrorism and by rewarding Palestinian intransigence. It will harm the integrity of the United Nations by again demonstrating an outrageous double standard towards Israel. And it will strengthen those in Israel who fear that the U.S. will eventually, through the UN Security Council, force Israel into concessions that threaten her security.

The United States should never again participate in the unfair condemnation of any nation, let alone an ally, let alone a small democracy trying to cope, however imperfectly, with terrorism and threats against her very existence. Compromising the truth and our principles is wrong, diminishes us as a nation, and harms the cause of peace.

In order to better understand the process by which U.S. policy was formulated in this case, we would like answers to the following questions:

(1) By what standard did the Administration determine that it was appropriate to “strongly condemn” Israel, while Iraq was “condemned” for invading Kuwait?

(2) How can the U.S. support (even with an explanation) UN resolutions that refer to the territories administered by Israel since 1967 as “occupied Palestinian terri-

teries" when U.S. policy is that the status of those territories is to be determined through direct negotiations between the parties?

(3) Has the U.S. abandoned its long-standing policy of opposing unbalanced resolutions that condemn Israel without consideration or mention of the context of Israel's actions? If not, by what criteria was the resolution determined to be "balanced?"

We look forward to receiving your answers to these questions, and hope that we will be able to work with you to ensure that United States policy promotes the values and goals we all share.

Sincerely,

CONNIE MACK AND AL GORE,
U.S. Senators.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
February 12, 1992.

DEAR SENATOR MACK: On behalf of Secretary Baker, thank you for your letter of January 17, 1992, concerning the United States' vote in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 726 condemning Israel's decision to expel twelve Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.

As you know, the United States has consistently opposed the expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Administration has urged Israel at very senior levels to discontinue expulsions since Israel began to resume this practice in late 1990. Our vote on Resolution 726 was based on this longstanding position, which has been taken by all administrations since 1967.

We are, at the same time, outraged by Palestinian acts of violence against Israelis. We have made this clear in the strongest terms publicly and privately to Palestinian representatives. In casting our vote at the United Nations, the U.S. condemned these attacks, and urged all other countries to condemn them. Such violence is unacceptable and inexcusable, and can do nothing to contribute to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the achievement of Palestinian rights.

We will continue to oppose gratuitous, one-sided, and wrongful criticism of Israel, while maintaining fundamental principles of U.S. policy regarding this conflict. We believe the Resolution was not unbalanced. It was not intended as a blanket condemnation of Israel as our ally and democratic partner; it was intended to address a practice we have continually found abhorrent.

The reference in Resolution 726 to "occupied Palestinian territories" is not new. It has appeared in other resolutions before United Nations bodies and other international organizations. We consider this language to be demographically and geographically descriptive only, and not indicative of sovereignty. As is well known, we believe that the final status of the occupied territories is a matter for direct negotiations between the parties concerned and we will not support any other alternative. The language of the Resolution does not prejudice the status of these territories. As to the word "Palestinian," this term is used for descriptive purposes only. Thus, we are willing to accept resolutions containing this formulation, if they are otherwise acceptable. We clearly stated this position in our explanation of vote.

I can assure you that the Administration remains firmly committed to Israel's security. No one should doubt this. That commitment is based on long and durable ties and friendship. We believe that a successful peace process will enhance Israel's security. The President has clearly stated that a settlement must provide for Israel's recognition and security. Nothing less will be acceptable to Israel, or to the United States.

The Department appreciates your views, and looks forward to continuing consultation with the Congress as we proceed with our efforts for peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

JANET G. MULLINS,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

[Other material submitted for the record by Senator Mack may be found in committee files.]

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, from what you've read and subject to analyzing it further, I certainly associate myself with the views of Governor Clinton and Senator Gore.

As you read it out, and there's always a certain risk, because this is a technical area, but as you read it out, it does seem to me to be the correct position.

Senator HELMS. And the second part of the question that Senator Mack asks of you is, will the new administration oppose U.N. resolutions that condemn Israel's response to violence without specifying or condemning the violence committed against Israel?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I've always thought those needed to be balanced. That is, if the actions of Israel were going to be condemned, it was very important to describe the provocation or describe what was being responded to.

So in general terms, I certainly endorse what I understand to be the request of Senator Mack.

Senator HELMS. Very well. And another question—no, this is all. This is just another copy.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be submitting, as I said earlier, questions in writing and for the record.

And I would say to Mr. Christopher, we would appreciate your responses before we are called upon to vote on your nomination.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. We will respond just as rapidly as we can. Over lunch today, I discussed with some of my staff the way to be a quick response team. We will do our very best to respond to the questions that we anticipate.

Senator HELMS. Since we do not have a majority of the Republicans present, let me speak for the Republicans that I assume that, as customary, you are going to leave the record open for them to submit questions, those Senators who are not here.

The CHAIRMAN. I said so earlier, yes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could I just inquire of Senator Helms? I assume these questions will be given to Mr. Christopher now or shortly after the termination of this hearing?

Senator HELMS. We are going to give them to him before the Sun sets. Any problem about that?

An agreement has been made between my folks and his folks that tomorrow, the cutoff is tomorrow noon.

The CHAIRMAN. I would only add that Monday is a holiday.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. And I would like to make some inquiry of, just as a matter of curiosity, how extensive is the task that is being given to the Secretary-designate? Are we talking about hundreds and hundreds of questions? Or are we talking about—

Senator HELMS. Well, I think it is about the same size as the questions you have filed with the Republican nominees.

The CHAIRMAN. How many was that? I do not recall.

Senator SARBANES. You mean that I filed with the Republican nominees? That is fine with me, Mr. Chairman, if that is the standard. In fact, I am prepared to be more generous if the standard is the number of questions I filed with Republican nominees. I would certainly accept that answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

Senator SARBANES. I think that puts it within a very manageable range.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I do hope that it will be limited to questions that are ones that you need answers to prior to confirmation.

You know, we are in a transition mode and we are dealing with a still relatively small staff of people who are on the transition. It isn't as if we had a whole bureaucracy to task these matters out to. This is simply a plea for restraint on your part for people who are going to have to be working to respond to these.

Senator HELMS. Well, we are not going to ask any questions just to be asking questions. And I do not think you are going to have any problem. I never have tried to pin down another Senator about his questions or the number of them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should bear in mind, though, that Monday is a holiday and it will be difficult—I would hope it would be a reasonable number.

Senator HELMS. Well, it will be reasonable. It depends on who defines reasonable.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Sarbanes—

Senator HELMS. I will bet you \$1, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Christopher, just like Jesse Helms and Claiborne Pell will be working Monday. Would that be a safe bet?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. That would be a safe bet from my standpoint? But obviously this involves other people. All I ask, Senator, is that you ask your people to show some restraint and ask questions that are—I know this will be your intention—questions that are relevant to the decision of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Coverdell wants to speak.

Senator HELMS. What did you say about relevant to the decision of the committee? What do you mean by that?

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Relevant to the decision as to whether or not to recommend my confirmation.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think it is going to work out. We have got a right to ask questions in any number that we want to. We were elected. You have not been elected and you cannot even be—your papers cannot even be considered until the President is sworn in.

But we are going to work with you. I mean, there is going to be no problem about that.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.

Senator HELMS. I mean, we ought not to nitpick with each other.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Coverdell wanted to say something.

Senator COVERDELL. I wanted to ask one closing question if it is appropriate. So that it does not have to be submitted as a written question, is that acceptable?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator COVERDELL. It deals once more with the history of this Peace Corps relationships, Mr. Christopher. During the outbreak of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, a very broad bipartisan support emerged for introducing American volunteers to all of these new democracies.

I think the Friday before I left that post, the Baltic agreements were announced and subsequently, three or four of the new republics have entered into agreements to receive new American volunteers. And there was enormous enthusiasm throughout the country for Americans participating in the empowerment program and the low-cost advantages of such a program.

I would hope that you and your administration would continue, as the sister agencies require and as I have alluded several times, to be attentive to those new Americans that are going to each of those new democracies.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I certainly will, Senator. Thank you.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator SIMON. I just want to comment, Mr. Chairman. I think Mr. Christopher has handled himself exceedingly well and gives me confidence about the next 4 years under his stewardship.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to observe that Secretary Christopher has been before our committee longer than Secretary Baker and just about the same amount of time that Secretary Schultz was before us, nowhere nearly as long as General Haig. But that involved other problems that led to lengthy questioning. So I do think he has had an extensive period of questioning by the committee and he will get some further questions in writing.

I want to express my appreciation to him for his forthright and candid responses to the questions. I share Senator Simon's view that his performance here before the committee has only deepened our confidence in his ability to discharge this important responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And I would like to reaffirm or affirm the same. The succinctness and the openness with which you answered are hugely appreciated and rarely have I heard a witness just say yes or no. That was always a singular delight.

This morning I indicated the committee had identified a document classified as confidential which is not only consistent, but totally supports Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony and his statement before our committee yesterday.

That document, which is a memorandum from Paul Bower to Warren Christopher, dated June 10, 1968, has been declassified. And I would note that this memorandum has Mr. Christopher's initials on the document.

Pursuant to my statement this morning, this memorandum will now be an official part of the record of this hearing as it has been declassified.

[The information referred to follows:]

DECLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FROM DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUNE 10, 1968

ARMY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

TO: Mr. Warren Christopher, Deputy Attorney General

FROM: Paul G. Bower, Special Assistant

This will summarize briefings on two of the Army's three civil disorder intelligence operations.

On April 25, 1968, I received a briefing on Army civil disorder intelligence operations conducted in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General William P. Yarborough). The briefing was in charge of Col. F.E. Van Tassell, Director of Security, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The primary analytic work concerning civil disorders is conducted by the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch of the Counterintelligence Division, under the command of Col. C.R. Horne, one of the three divisions under Col. Van Tassell. The Counterintelligence Analysis Branch (CIAB) is under the command of Lt. Col. R.J. Brown. (An organizational chart for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

is in my files.) The briefing took place at the Pentagon (where Col. Van Tassell and Horne have their offices) and at the Bailey's Crossroad's Office of the CIAB.

The main function of CIAB is production of furnished intelligence; it has no intelligence collecting functions. Instead it relies primarily on FBI reports and reports submitted by the Army Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird. Also used as sources of raw data are: local newspapers, newspapers of the new left and Afro-American movements, university and Government studies, information from the CIA and State Department, information from other elements of the Department of Defense, and information furnished by the G2's in various Army commands throughout the country. Including the worldwide operations of the CIAB, there are some 78 agencies that submit information—a total of some 35,000 reports per month. The FBI and Army Intelligence reports are by far the leading source of information on civil disorders.

The domestic operations of the CIAB date from July of 1967. As of the end of April there were some 15 people working in the Domestic Intelligence Section. The intelligence analysts are officers, enlisted men and some civilians, generally with college backgrounds in political science or the liberal arts.

Processing of the reports goes something like the following: An FBI report, for example, comes in, is preliminarily reviewed to see if it pertains to civil disorders. If so, it is then referred to an officer in the Domestic Section, who further determines whether it pertains to racial matters, civil rights, left or right wing groups, and some other breakdowns. The report is then sent to a desk officer of the particular section involved.

The desk officer or analyst then decides if the report is of permanent value and is to be kept. If so, a coding sheet is completed for the document. These sheets are basically the same as those used in our Intelligence Unit, and have spaces for names, organizations, geographic areas, and other pertinent information.

The code sheet and the original document itself are then sent to a special processing department where the information on the sheet is punched onto an IBM card for a computerized index system; the source document is microfilmed. By using the index derived from the punched cards, it is possible to refer back to the original document which is stored on microfilm. Hard copies can then be produced from the microfilm if needed.

The automatic data processing system for the punched cards is not yet in operation, but is expected to be in operation by August of 1968.

The finished "intelligence" produced by CIAB presently consists of: "yellow cover" notebooks on organizations and individuals, and special reports, as for example a report on SNCC.

The analysts also spend a good deal of their time answering questions from various Army offices, as, for example, a recent request to predict the next ten riots.

As far as I can see, the CIAB is presently attempting to do the same thing that our Information Unit is in the process of doing. That is, spending much of its effort on an attempt to develop a computerized index for various information obtained from FBI and Army Intelligence reports. (The CIAB is actually the source of the Army Intelligence reports used by our unit, even though the reports are prepared by the Army Military Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird. I understand there is some limited screening of the reports sent to us.

The second phase of the intelligence briefing took place on April 29, 1968, at the Headquarters of the Army Military Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird, Maryland. In the absence of the commander, the briefing was supervised by the Deputy Commander, Col. Cline J. Lampkin. The Army Intelligence Command is a command separate and apart from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

The Army Intelligence Command is primarily a data collecting organization; its main function is conducting security clearances for the Army and for a segment of the civilian contractors with the Department of Defense. (The remaining security clearances for the DOD are conducted by Navy and Air Force Intelligence.) Information relating to civil disorders or potential for civil disorders is collected mainly as an off-shoot of the collection of information for security clearances.

The Intelligence Command has intelligence agents stationed throughout the country. There is an Army intelligence agent in practically every city of significance in the United States. There is also a network of regional and local offices throughout the country.

The Army intelligence agents obtain their information primarily from local police departments. These agents maintain a day-to-day liaison with the local police department, and also with the office of the mayor or other city officials. The Army intelligence agents also maintain close liaison with the field agents of the FBI. The

primary purpose of these contacts is to obtain information on individuals for security clearances.

Information concerning a civil disorder or potential for civil disorder (this means primarily, if not exclusively, information on certain individuals and organizations) is obtained as a result of these liaisons. I gather that this information is often obtained on what is really a chance basis, that is, the police intelligence officer may simply mention in a conversation the recent activities of certain local militants.

When an Army intelligence agent receives information relating to a civil disorder, he first checks the source of the information with the police department to determine whether it is generally reliable. The agent will also relay the information to the FBI. The information is then sent in the form of a spot report back to the Army Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird. These reports are processed at Fort Holabird; they are also sent to Col. Van Tassell's group, and then at the discretion of Van Tassell's group, are relayed to our information unit.

During periods of disorder, the Intelligence Command shifts gears to assist the task force commander with his tactical intelligence operations. Also, during a disorder, military intelligence receives reports from the National Guard, including the National Guard in state status.

In summary, the main function of Army Intelligence Command is the collection of data; all data is obtained through overt sources, primarily local police departments and the FBI. Army Intelligence does not have any undercover operators, nor does it directly use the services of informants. If information from informants is obtained, it is through the local police department.

Although the Intelligence Command claims only to be a data collection agency, the processing of the intelligence reports at Fort Holabird is essentially what the Bailey's Crossroads operation refers to as "analyzing" the data. To a very large extent, the processing also duplicates the work in our information unit.

The process goes roughly as follows:

For each intelligence report, a data sheet is prepared (see the orange instruction book for preparation of ADP code sheets) which contains certain basic information extracted from the report, all arranged according to various headings set up in the instruction book. The code sheets are then sent to a keypuncher who punches the information onto an IBM card. The cards are then fed into the military intelligence data bank.

At the apparent discretion of the analysts, (Col. Dougherty's group) a so-called "Biographical Data Bank Code Sheet" is prepared according to instructions set out in another instruction book (gold cover). These cards are also keypunched and fed into the data bank.

Army intelligence thus has the capability to provide the type of data that our information unit is ultimately programmed to be able to produce. For example, Army intelligence has a printout sheet showing all of Stokey Carmichael's activities from the summer of 1967 to the middle of April 1968. That is, whenever a spot report has mentioned Carmichael, this information will appear on the printout sheet. The system has the capability of answering a number of questions; apparently the only restriction is the amount of data set out on the code sheet. There are either existing programs to obtain various combinations of data from the sheets (*e.g.*, all members of a particular group) or new programs can be quickly written to give various combinations of the data (*e.g.*, all members of a particular group that travel to a particular city on a particular date) I was unable to determine the exact parameter of the existing data retrieval system, but it apparently is almost completely open-ended, the only limitation being the amount of information that is coded onto the data sheets.

Perhaps the best description of the Army system is that it is highly sophisticated (at least by our standards) cross-referencing index for the spot reports submitted by the Army Military Intelligence agents.

In summary, it appears that the Intelligence Command presently has the capability that our system will only have after all the ADP programming is completed, which will probably be sometime this fall.

The Army Intelligence Command also prepares a summary of the information received on spot reports. These summaries are prepared for distribution to a number of military commanders, some Government agencies outside the military, and a copy also goes to Van Tassel's group. Van Tassel is to check to determine whether the Department of Justice also receives a copy of these summaries.

[*Note:* Harry Bratt, one of the DOD systems analysts detailed to Justice, recently visited Fort Holabird at my request to attempt to learn more details about the computerized indexing system. His report, which is presently being prepared, may mod-

ify some of my conclusions. I will send a copy of the report to you when completed, or will summarize it and modify, if necessary, any of the conclusions in this memo.]

cc: Mr. John R. McDonnough
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Room 4208

The CHAIRMAN. There are no more questions to be asked, I look forward to our meeting again at 10 o'clock on Tuesday morning, I hope in our newly redolled-up committee room, S-116, to vote on your nomination. I know you will be an excellent Secretary of State.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]



APPENDIX

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

AFRICA

Question. How should the U.S. help facilitate the process of the transition that many countries are making from one-party regimes to multi-party regimes?

Answer. In the 18 month period between January 1992 and June 1993, 22 African countries have or will go through a democratic process. Almost all of them have requested U.S. assistance. The Clinton Administration will place special emphasis on encouraging and supporting these countries during these transitions. For those countries in the early stages of the process, our support will primarily be directed toward conflict resolution and support for the electoral process. In the later stages, our focus will be on ensuring that the transition to democracy is sustainable. Accordingly, much more attention will be placed on strengthening regional organizations and coordination with the U.N. We will also support human resource development and the promotion of free market economies. In all phases of this transition, we will place heavy emphasis on education and training so that Africans can one day be the primary facilitators of this transition.

Question. Do you have any concerns over the continuing prospect of changing borders in Africa? What are they?

Answer. To the extent that changing borders are the result of force or disrespect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, we would have a concern.

Question. Do you believe that the intervention in Somalia is a precedent-setting event or an isolated situation?

Answer. I refer you to my prepared statement and oral testimony on this issue.

Question. Do you believe that cross-border relief operations are valid even when the government of the recipient country objects? What criteria should be used to determine whether a cross-border relief operation is justified?

Answer. There may be instances where it is appropriate to have cross border operations even when there are objections by the recipient country. The criteria for determining whether such action is justified would be based on the specific mandate and objectives of an the overall operation.

ERITREA

Question. Before any decision is made, it will be important for the U.S. to make an assessment of the charges of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing that has been made by many Eritreans and Ethiopians. We will then be in a position to determine how much support the U.S. should give to the upcoming Referendum on Eritrean independence.

Answer. We will be closely monitoring the vote, and will make a determination based on our assessments at that time.

SUDAN

Question. How will you approach relations with Sudan?

Answer. We are very aware of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan, and are sensitive to those aspects of fundamentalism that violate internationally accepted standards for human rights. We will make future decisions regarding our relationship with Sudan in light of that country's respect for human rights and the rule of law and its support for terrorism.

Question. Are you concerned that the Khartoum regime may destabilize the entire region?

Answer. We are concerned and will carefully monitor the situation as it unfolds.

Question. Under what circumstances would you advocate intervening in Sudan without the permission of that government?

Answer. While we are deeply concerned about the atrocities in Sudan, I think it is premature to speculate on circumstances requiring consideration of U.S. intervention in Sudan. Right now, we will continue to apply diplomatic pressure and provide humanitarian assistance to Sudan.

SUPPORT FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN AFRICA

Question. What is the proper role of the State Department and its embassies abroad in facilitating U.S. business efforts?

Answer. Africa offers tremendous opportunities and challenges for U.S. businesses. One of the most valuable roles that the State Department and the embassies can play is to promote and support the development of free market economies in Africa that would make those countries attractive for U.S. trade and investment. They can also play a valuable role by working with other Departments, agencies, and the U.S. private sector to create programs, incentives, and support mechanism for U.S. businesses abroad. Embassies, in particular, can provide immeasurable assistance on the ground to U.S. businesses.

Question. Would you seek an increase in the number of commercial attachés in Africa?

Answer. We are currently studying ways to reorganize our missions abroad so that they can more effectively implement U.S. foreign policy goals. Trade and investment is a top priority of the Clinton Administration. We will look closely at how to better promote trade and investment in Africa, including whether there is a need to increase the number of commercial attachés in Africa.

PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Question. To what extent and how should the U.S. Department of State promote good governance in African countries?

Answer. President-elect Clinton has repeatedly stated that the promotion of democracy including good governance will be a top priority for his Administration not only in African countries, but around the world. Given the democratic revolution currently sweeping Africa, it is clear that there is the political will among Africans to have good governance. What is often lacking is the know-how. Therefore, a major part of our effort will be in the area of education and training. We also believe that it is critically important that we encourage and support initiatives by African countries themselves, particularly in the areas of conflict resolution and democratic institution building.

ENERGY POLICY IN AFRICA

Question. Does the U.S. have a specific energy policy toward Africa? What is it?

Answer. I do not know whether the Bush Administration has such a policy. However, the Clinton Administration will pursue a policy of promoting sustainable and environmentally sound development which includes the prudent use of all resources, including energy.

AID

Question. Should the Agency for International Development be revamped? How?

Answer. Yes, there is a definite need to revamp the Agency for International Development. We are currently studying the organizational structure to AID and intend to make changes that will allow the Agency to be more effective and efficient in providing assistance abroad. We are also looking at how the Agency can best interface with State and other federal Departments and Agencies.

Question. What are the criteria for prioritizing U.S. assistance to African countries? What would they be in your opinion?

Answer. There will be a number of criteria that we will use to prioritize U.S. assistance to Africa. Top among these will be whether a particular country has an environment conducive to the effective and efficient use of U.S. resources. Certainly, whether a country is democratic or whether it has a free market economy will weigh heavily on that determination.

ANGOLA

Question. Under what circumstances will the U.S. extend diplomatic relations to Angola?

Answer. The Bush Administration had said that the U.S. would consider extending diplomatic relations to Angola once that country held free and fair elections. The U.N. determined and the U.S. concurred, that the first round of elections was "free and fair." Although it will be necessary for Angola to have a second round of presidential elections because President dos Santos received a plurality rather than a

majority, there is currently a Parliament and a cabinet. We should give serious consideration to our earlier commitment to recognize the Angolan government now that they have held "free and fair" elections.

Question. What do you believe the U.S. should do to facilitate a ceasefire and the completion of run-off elections?

Answer. The U.S. should certainly continue to support U.N. efforts in Angola. It might also be useful for the U.S. to send a special envoy to Angola to both assess the situation and offer U.S. assistance in moving the process forward.

Question. Do you believe the U.S. should play a mediating role in the conflict over the secession of Cabinda?

Answer. I believe that it is premature for us to consider whether we should play a mediating role. Our focus right now should only be encouraging and supporting efforts to get the Peace Process back on track and to have a second round of negotiations.

MOZAMBIQUE

Question. Will the State Department support the large demobilization effort in Mozambique?

Answer. We support current U.N. efforts in Mozambique. We have also been encouraged by the resolve of the warring parties to resolve the current conflict. We will continue to support the peace process and the U.N. participation in that process. We will work closely with the U.N. with respect to what further efforts are necessary to keep the process moving forward.

SOUTH AFRICA

Question. Do you favor a role for international observers in South Africa, even if the current government objects?

Answer. From all indications, the parties and the South African government have been receptive to the U.N. observers currently stationed in South Africa and, in fact, the number of observers was recently increased. There seems to be a general consensus that the presence of these observers has been a deterrent to increased violence in South Africa.

SOMALIA

Question. After the transition to a U.N. command occurs in Somalia, do you favor continued close U.S. involvement in the operation, including the continued use of U.S. troops? How long will U.S. troops be committed?

Answer. As I indicated in my testimony before the Committee, Governor Clinton and those of us around him are very supportive of the United States effort in Somalia. Clearly, we want to see U.S. troops out of Somalia as soon as possible, and to see the U.N. assume a leadership role in this operation. However, the events on the ground in Somalia will largely dictate when the U.S. will be able to complete our mission and to withdraw. As the Bush Administration can attest, it is almost impossible to establish a certain date for our withdrawal. The warring factions recently signed an agreement which we hope will make a swift and smooth transition to UNOSOM II much more likely, and will enable our troops to come home soon.

Question. Do you believe that the U.S. effort in Somalia should contribute to the U.N.'s financial assessment on the U.S. for peacekeeping operations? How does President-elect Clinton plan to finance Operation Restore Hope? Will he seek assistance from other wealthy countries? Can you estimate the costs of the Somali aid project? Have you considered asking the U.N. to design a more equitable cost-sharing proposal?

Answer. We have been very encouraged by the number of countries that have pledged either troops or financial assistance to Operation Restore Hope. Recently Japan pledged \$100 million for a fund which would support troops from countries who were unable to finance their own participation. Under UNITAF, the U.S. has spent approximately \$530 million. Once we move to UNOSOM II there should be a more equitable cost sharing because the U.S. contribution will be limited to our normal U.N. assessment for peacekeeping.

NIGERIA

Question. How do you think the U.S. can influence Nigeria in a more effective, positive manner as it relates to its being a major trafficker of heroin entering the U.S. and its doubtful transition to democratic rule?

Answer. Nigeria is moving forward toward democracy, albeit slowly. We must continue to encourage and support that process and, where necessary, apply diplomatic pressure to make sure that the process does not come to a standstill. In terms of

drug trafficking, it will be important that Nigeria is made a part of our overall U.S. efforts to halt the entry of drugs into the U.S.

NORTH AFRICA

Question. Do you support independence for Western Sahara?

Answer. The new Administration supports the U.N. position favoring a referendum on the question of whether Western Sahara should be an independent state.

Question. How would you characterize the FIS electoral victory in Algeria?

Answer. We are very concerned about Algeria. The new Administration must give serious consideration to the issue of how to deal with undemocratic forces when they are elected through democratic processes.

EAST ASIA

What do you intend to do to encourage other major Asian trading countries (including South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) to join us in taking steps to promote human rights and democratization, especially in countries such as Communist China, Burma and Vietnam?

Answer. President-elect Clinton has said that promoting democracy and human rights is not a job for America alone. Our democratic allies around the world have a common interest in this issue. I intend to work with them to ensure that they take steps to join us in this important task.

Question. In light of what promises to be a year of dramatic reductions and reallocations of overall defense spending, what are the most important policy considerations in the debate over funding of the U.S. military presence in the East Asian and Pacific region?

Answer. That is a question which should be answered after serious discussions among the President's national security advisers, particularly the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence community. Our allies in the region will also need to be a part of these discussions. But in principle, some of the considerations we should take into account include an assessment of China's military buildup and the threat posed by countries such as North Korea. These and other factors will be examined as the President-elect makes his decisions on defense spending.

Question. How would the U.S. respond to an outbreak of fighting in any of the islands in the South China Sea?

Answer. I am not prepared to answer a hypothetical question about how the United States might respond to a military incident in the South China Sea. I can tell you, however, that the United States would take such an incident very seriously and would work with the countries involved in the dispute to avoid a military confrontation.

THAILAND

Question. Last fall the U.S. Congress voted to suspend International Military Education and Training funding to the Indonesians in response to their handling of the affair. Do you support this decision? How much of a continuing impact will the East Timor situation have on U.S.-Indonesian relations?

Answer. I am aware of the Congress' decision to suspend IMET to Indonesia because of the serious situation in East Timor, and we will certainly take that into account as we develop our policy toward Indonesia. The situation in East Timor deserves a fresh look by the Clinton Administration.

BURMA

Question. Would you favor a U.S. ban on private investment in Burma until Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is released and a freely elected civilian government can take power?

Answer. Aung San Suu Kyi should be released immediately, and the military regime should honor the results of the elections that were held in 1990. I am not prepared to say that we should impose U.S. ban on private investment, since that is a policy decision that would have to be made after a review of our policy toward Burma.

Question. The military regime in Burma has recently carried out a limited number of moves intended to improve its image abroad including the release of some political prisoners, allowing Aung San Suu Kyi's family to visit her, and holding a constitutional convention last week (January 9). What should the U.S. attitude be towards these actions?

Answer. While we should welcome signs of political opening in Burma, most independent observers regard these steps as largely cosmetic. The Burmese regime

should take serious steps to improve the harsh conditions in Burma, and not merely engage in efforts to improve its image abroad.

Question. Since U.S. trade with Burma is negligible, what do you see as the most effective way the U.S. may influence the Burmese government's treatment of its own people?

Answer. To the extent that we have influence with the regime, we should use it. There may be more room for influencing the regime once its current leaders leave the scene. In the meantime, we should encourage our allies to distance themselves from Burma's rulers.

Question. Which will be your top priority in Southeast Asian countries like Burma, halting the flow of illegal drugs or human rights?

Answer. We intend to pursue both issues seriously in Southeast Asia, particularly in countries like Burma where human rights are routinely abused and drug trafficking has reached dangerous levels.

Question. Do you believe the United States should recognize the Burmese government in exile? If not, do you intend to send an Ambassador to Burma?

Answer. I understand that the government in exile contains some members of the democratic opposition in Burma, and we should offer appropriate support to their effort to bring democracy to Burma. We currently recognize the government in Rangoon, and, generally speaking, an Ambassador can speak with greater authority and articulate U.S. policy clearly to a regime such as the one in Burma. But we have no plans at this time to send an Ambassador to Burma, and we will consult with the Congress before making a final decision on any changes in the current policy.

CHINA

Question. Do you agree with the position taken by President-elect Clinton during the campaign on MFN for China (quote): "I comment the action taken by the Senate in passing the U.S.-China Act of 1992 * * * (conditioning) renewal of MFN on China's adherence to international norms of behavior regarding human rights, trading practices and proliferation * * * I believe this legislation will advance our interests in the region and hasten the dawn of freedom and democracy in China." Would you favor similar legislation this year?

Answer. Yes I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.

Question. What is your position on future nuclear cooperation with China?

Answer. According to U.S. law, China must provide certain assurances about its nuclear facilities and the opportunity for inspection where American materials and equipment are used. We intend to abide by this law.

Question. How is the news of Westinghouse's talks consistent with the requirements of Public Law 99-183, which for 7 years has blocked U.S. nuclear cooperation with China?

Answer. I have not been privy to these discussions. However, there is no presumption that the results of such reported cooperation will be approved by the government. We will review any agreement to ensure that it conforms with U.S. law.

Question. If we permit such discussions or cooperation to continue, how can we hope to persuade other nations not to sell China nuclear technology?

Answer. The fact that discussions may be taking place does not mean that we would approve whatever may be agreed to. We will continue our efforts with other countries to stem the proliferation of nuclear technology.

Question. The importation of convict-made goods into the United States is a violation of U.S. law (19 US Code 1307). As the number of convictions of these types of cases begins to multiply quickly, how do you expect the United States to respond diplomatically?

Answer. The Clinton Administration expects the Chinese government to meet its obligations under the MOU on exports of convict-made goods. We will work to ensure that U.S. law is enforced.

Question. What should be done to increase pressure on China to stop these exports and to fully comply with the MOU on prison labor?

Answer. We place particular importance on gaining access to prison facilities in China which are suspected of producing goods made by prison labor. We will vigorously seek such access to ensure that the Chinese are meeting their obligations.

Question. What is your position on military sales to China? How does this apply to dual use goods? Would you have advocated the sale of the Cray supercomputer to China, a computer 1,000 times more powerful than anything we have ever sold them before? Or the sale of Garret jet engines, the technology of which is necessary for the production of cruise missiles?

Answer. The Clinton Administration has no plans to resume arms sales to China. We will be particularly careful in examining the potential for dual use of those goods and technologies which we do sell to China. With respect to the Cray Computer and the Garret jet engines, these are issues that have rested with the Bush Administration. Since I have not had the opportunity to review these issues, I cannot comment on it.

HONG KONG

Question. Do you support the Hong Kong Relations Act?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What do you see as being the most effective way by which the United States can help Hong Kong's transition towards democracy?

Answer. The current debate about democratic reform in Hong Kong is a matter between Great Britain and China, although we should be naturally supportive of efforts to encourage greater political participation in Hong Kong, as we would in most countries around the world.

Question. What will be the U.S. reaction be to additional violations of the joint agreement between Britain and China?

Answer. Although we have important interests in Hong Kong, the joint agreement is a matter between Britain and China. We do expect, however, that Hong Kong will enjoy the high degree of autonomy that the joint agreement provides for after 1997.

TAIWAN

Question. In the case of sudden, decisive Chinese military aggression against Taiwan, what would be your response?

Answer. It would be our policy to make sure that such an attack does not occur. But I am not prepared to discuss how we might respond to a hypothetical situation of this nature.

Question. Since the sale and transfer of F-16's to Taiwan will not be complete before the end of the Bush Administration, is your plan to uphold the Bush Administration policy and allow the arrangement to run its full course?

Answer. The President-elect said at the time the Bush Administration reversed its previous policy and decided to sell F-16's to Taiwan that he supported the sale and would implement it if he were elected. I am confident, therefore, that the Clinton Administration will allow this arrangement to run its full course.

Question. What is your opinion of the Republic of China on Taiwan's admission to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade?

Answer. Although I will need to discuss this with other officials, such as the USTR, I believe we would welcome Taiwan's accession into GATT as a separate customs territory when it meets GATT's requirements. It would be in our own interests to have Taiwan, which is one of our major trading partners, under GATT discipline.

TIBET

Question. Do you believe the people of Tibet have the same right to self-determination as the people of the Baltic States and other nations of the former Soviet Union?

Answer. I refer you to my oral testimony on this subject.

Question. Do you agree with U.S. law that Tibet was "invaded and occupied" by the Chinese? If so, what specific steps do you plan to take with the Chinese to rectify the Tibetan dilemma?

Answer. Again, I refer you to the oral testimony on this subject I gave during the hearing.

Question. China's threat to Tibetan national and cultural identity is considered a violation of human rights by the United Nations as well as a violation of international law. How do you propose that the U.S. move to ensure that these violations have halted immediately?

Answer. I plan to raise the issue of human rights violations in Tibet at every available opportunity.

THAILAND

Question. In the face of U.N. sanctions, the Thais continue their cross-border trade in gems and timber with both the Khmer Rouge and the Burmese military regime, raping both countries of many of their natural resources. Do you support taking action against the Thai government until these atrocities are halted?

Answer. This is an important issue since this cross-border trading is not only creating environmental devastation in the region, it also provides the Khmer Rouge

and the Burmese regime with a source of income. Therefore, we intend to raise this issue with the government of Thailand and find ways to stop it or reduce it.

NORTH KOREA

Question. What should the U.S. role be in the reunification of Korea? Do you plan to encourage a move towards reunification? If so, how?

Answer. Reunification must be the result of negotiations between North and South Korea. We will work with our allies in South Korea to facilitate this process whenever possible.

Question. Over the last 2 years many people have been vigorously asserted that the North Koreans are building their own nuclear program. The North Korean government denies any such activity and Western countries have yet to find any evidence to the contrary. If and when concrete evidence does surface, what course of action do you plan to pursue? If North Korea does become a nuclear power, specifically how will that affect United States diplomatic relationships with the Koreans? With the rest of the region?

Answer. North Korea's nuclear program is an issue which the Clinton Administration will view with the utmost seriousness. A nuclear weapon in the hands of the North Koreans would be a threat to the entire region. The United States and our allies in the region should work together to ensure that this does not happen.

SINGAPORE

Question. As one of the world's largest shipping ports, Singapore is a primary target for the transshipment of weapons, including those involved in illegal international transfers. What role could the U.S. play in the move to eliminate this problem?

Answer. I am not sure that we can eliminate this problem entirely. We can, however, work with the government of Singapore and other allies in the region to stem the flow of illegal arms transfers.

PHILIPPINES

Question. After losing Subic Bay as a Pacific Basin foothold, do you foresee the United States negotiating a new military-strategic understanding with the Filipinos in the next few years?

Answer. The closure of Subic Bay has not adversely affected our overall strategic posture in the region, which remains strong. We rely on other forward deployed forces in Japan and South Korea. Moreover, we expect that the government of the Philippines will cooperate with us on ship visits, joint exercises, and sea and air transit. Although the Secretary of Defense's views should be heard on this issue, I am not aware of any need for a new military-strategic understanding with the Filipinos.

STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

Question. Do you believe that the current organization of initiatives under the Deputy Secretary for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has proven effective?

Answer. I believe the creation of these special offices, under the Deputy Secretary of State, to coordinate assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was an effort to provide a rapid and flexible response to the assistance needs of these countries and to support their transitions to democracy. At the same time, I am aware that concerns have been expressed about the actual delivery of assistance under these programs. Given the importance of this effort, it would be my intention to examine as a matter of highest priority how our assistance programs might be made more effective.

Question. Do you plan to reorganize the provision of assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union within the State Department?

Answer. In view of the great importance I attach to supporting the transitions to democracy in the former Soviet Union, I think there is merit in designating someone who can provide effective direction and coordination to these efforts. Although we have not yet worked out the details of how the job would be structured, I believe it is the President-elect's intention to name a person to handle this function.

Question. Do you agree that there should be a stark "firewall" in the budget between the funding of assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?

Answer. As I noted, we have not yet had a chance to discuss in detail how we should go about structuring our assistance programs to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. That includes the question of whether "firewalls" should be es-

tablished between the funding for these activities and other foreign assistance programs.

Question. How will you ensure flexibility and responsiveness to changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union within our aid programs?

Answer. I agree that one of our objectives should be to allow as much flexibility as possible in our programs in order to be able to respond to rapidly changing circumstances. I consider this one of the advantages of having a special coordinator who would be able to draw upon and make creative use of the resources and programs of different U.S. government agencies as well as private sector organizations. I would certainly welcome any suggestions that you or other members of the Committee may have in this regard.

Question. Do you support a "sunset clause" to end the provision of assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?

Answer. I would certainly agree with the proposition that our assistance effort should not be open-ended. The objective of these programs is to support the transition to democratic, free-market societies, and to help bring about that transition in the shortest time possible. If that effort is successful, I believe it is possible that we could begin to see, within the relatively near future, the dividends of that investment, as the people of Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States learn to mobilize the tremendous natural and human resources at their disposal.

Question. Will you seek additional funding for aid programs to Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union?

Answer. I am not in a position at this stage to provide a definitive answer to that question. That is something that the President will decide, taking into account our own resources as well as the contribution being made by others, including our European allies. I believe it is important, however, that we honor fully the commitments already made in this regard, and that we do whatever is needed to ensure that the funds we are providing are used effectively. I also think it is important to keep in mind that direct aid is not the only, or even the most significant, aspect of our effort to help these new republics create the conditions for sustained economic growth and development.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Question. Did you agree that the Bosnian President's visit interfered with the peace negotiations in Geneva?

Answer. No. The fact that what proved to be an important breakthrough in the talks came soon after his visit makes this clear.

Question. Did you follow Secretary Vance's suggestion on not allowing anyone on the Clinton transition team to meet with the Bosnian President?

Answer. Secretary Vance made no such suggestion. He has not tried to influence me in any way.

Question. Did you agree with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft's and Vice President elect Al Gore's decision to meet with the Bosnian President? Please explain your rationale.

Answer. Yes. President Izetbegovic represents a government we recognize and which is suffering foreign aggression that President Bush took the lead in condemning. It was important to hear first hand the Bosnian President's views of the situation in his country and the prospects for peace.

Question. In your opinion, will the Russians support U.N. efforts?

Answer. We hope very much that President Yeltsin, as well as our European allies, will support whatever action seems necessary and feasible to end Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Because of the large number of Russians who live in other republics and the many minorities in Russia itself, Russia's democratic forces have an especially strong reason to ensure that Belgrade's way of trying to "protect" the human rights of ethnic Serbs living in other former Yugoslav republics does not succeed.

Question. How would the Clinton Administration propose to end Russian and Ukrainian arms sales to Serbia?

Answer. How would the Clinton Administration propose to end the growing tide of Russian mercenary soldiers fighting with the Serbian army?

Answer. While there have been allegations of Russian and Ukrainian arms sales to Serbia and of Russian mercenaries fighting with the Serbian Army, so far as I know there are no credible reports of either.

Question. Cyrus Vance is seeking Bosnian, Serbian, and Croat agreement to divide Bosnia into loose ethnic regions. Do you believe this arrangement rewards Serbian aggression?

Answer. I do have a personal concern along those lines, but we're not direct parties to the negotiations. The parties to those negotiations are the elements of

Bosnia, and some deference has to be given to their point of view. They're the ones for whom the negotiations are a matter of life and death, not the United States. And I hope the negotiations will succeed. If they do, if they can bring peace to Bosnia, it certainly will be a major step forward.

But I don't think we can rely only on those negotiations. We have to have an independent position with respect to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia countries. The stakes are too large for us to rely solely on the negotiations taking place at Geneva, much as I hope they'll succeed.

Question. Should the United Nations negotiate with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, a man accused of war crimes?

Answer. Unfortunately, Karadzic's agreement is necessary to end the fighting unless the U.S. and others are willing to use large scale forces and risk large casualties to defeat Serbian forces and expel them from conquered territory.

Question. Should the United States seek implementation of Serbia's August agreement through the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia?

Answer. Yes, as President-elect Clinton long has advocated.

Question. Should the arms embargo on Bosnia be lifted?

Answer. As President-elect Clinton said during the campaign, that is one possibility which should be explored.

Question. Should a Nuremberg-type trial for alleged Serbian war crimes be convened?

Answer. Those suspected of war crimes should be tried and brought to justice.

Question. If aggressions begin in Kosova, how should the United States respond?

Should the United States military train Bosnian soldiers?

Should a U.N. peacekeeping force be sent to Kosova? Please explain.

Do you support the diplomatic recognition of the Albanian government of Kosova? Please explain.

In your opinion, should sanctions against the former Yugoslavia include educational exchanges for the innocent victims of Serbian aggression?

Would you support the issuance of J-1 visas to Albanians from Kosova?

Would the Clinton Administration support recognition of the Republic of Macedonia?

Answer. These like other specific issues stemming from the Yugoslav tragedy, require careful consideration. President-elect Clinton will want to explore all these issues fully with his advisors before making decisions.

Question. Did you support Lord Carrington and later Secretary Vance's recommendation to Western nations not to recognize the independence of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia until late last year?

Answer. Neither President-elect Clinton nor I took a position on this issue. While we always should try to learn from the past, the priority now is to address present and future issues for decision.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Question. Should the United States uphold Bosnia's right under Article 51? Should the international arms embargo against that country be lifted? Do you support enforcement of the "no-fly" zone? Do you intend to work to ensure that those responsible for war crimes are brought before an international tribunal? Would you work to seek an increase of the number of Bosnian refugees allowed into the U.S. and other European countries? Under what circumstances would you support the use of force in that war-torn country?

Answer. I entirely agree with everything you say about the horrors of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Bush was absolutely right to take the lead in having the United Nations Security Council call Serbia the prime aggressor in that tragic situation. Bosnia does have a right to self-defense and during the campaign President-elect Clinton said that lifting the arms embargo against it should be considered. We also support enforcement of the no-fly zone, and I believe that those suspected of war crimes should be tried and brought to justice.

I cannot at this time tell you whether we will increase the number of Bosnian refugees allowed into the U.S., or the plans of other European countries in this regard. Nor can I say under what circumstances we would use force in the region. I can assure you that the range of decisions President-elect Clinton will face about the former Yugoslavia are very much on his mind and the minds of his advisors. The new President will want to carefully consider all our views and those of career civilian and military officials before taking any decisions on these very difficult issues.

ROMANIA

Question. Should MFN status for Romania be conditioned upon improvement in this government's pitiful record supporting human rights and political pluralism?

Will you urge the President to send a trade agreement with Romania to the Senate?

Answer. While there have been some improvements in the Romanian political situation including on human rights, we have not yet had a chance to review all the factors that would enable us to take a decision on this specific issue. We will, of course, fully comply with the law that links freedom of emigration to the granting of most-favored-nation status and look forward to consulting with Congress on this matter.

UKRAINE

Question. What steps should the United States government take to assuage Ukrainian fears regarding its national security?

Answer. When Ukraine keeps its promise to President Bush to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state, it will be eligible for security assistances that the U.S., UK, and Russia have given other non-nuclear signatories.

Question. Do you agree with the Bush Administration's plan to partially compensate Ukraine for the destruction of its nuclear weapons?

Answer. We welcome the Nunn-Lugar initiative to help pay for the safety, security, and dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear weapons, including those in Ukraine.

AZERBAIJAN

Question. Does the Clinton Administration support the continuation of U.S. sanctions against the Government of Azerbaijan as contained in the "Freedom Support Act"?

Answer. We have not yet had a chance to review all the material relevant to the Azerbaijan issue, but I can assure you that we will comply with all existing laws. When and if we believe some law should be changed, we will consult with Congress and make recommendations to it.

RUSSIA

Question. Do you envision increased armed conflict within Russia itself, between former Soviet republics, and between Russia and the Baltic states? Please list the possible conflict zones in your opinion.

Answer. We are acutely aware of the many problems faced by republics of the former Soviet Union, some of which already have led to armed conflict. Future danger zones will change with time. I assure you we will be carefully monitoring the situation and will make a major contribution to international efforts at conflict prevention and, if necessary, crisis management.

Question. If the Russians back-track on substantive economic reform, would you support initiatives to terminate non-humanitarian assistance to Russia?

Answer. There have been and will be setbacks in Russia's political and economic transformation, but the important thing is that President Yeltsin's commitment to keeping the country on the right track remains firm and he has the support of the Russian people. Of course if a Russian government abandoned the reform effort we would reconsider our assistance program.

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MILITARY COOPERATION

Question. Do military contacts between the Communist Chinese and the Russian military pose a threat to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. Peaceful and cooperative relations between Russia and China are in our interests. If military contacts between them help lessen tension and prevent misunderstandings that could lead to conflict, we welcome them.

Question. Would you be prepared to issue a demarche to the Russian and Chinese governments that military sales and military contacts between these two nations will result in punitive U.S. actions?

Answer. We will raise any military sales we deem destabilizing at the highest levels of the Russian, Chinese, or other concerned governments.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR IN CHINA

Question. Would the Clinton Administration support legislation requiring that foreign assistance be suspended unless Russia discontinues this sale to China?

Answer. We will look into this sale and consider what means we have of influencing it, in the context of our overall goals with the former Soviet Union.

RUSSIAN-IRANIAN COOPERATION

Question. Will you oppose the sale of Russian nuclear technology to Iran?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If so, what sanctions would the Clinton Administration support against Russia if it builds this reactor?

Answer. This is an important question that we will have to consider in the light of both our overall efforts to stem nuclear proliferation, and the broad scope of our relations with Russia.

RUSSIAN ARMS SALES

Question. What will the Clinton Administration's policy be concerning the following Russian arms sales:

- a. diesel submarines and SU-24 and MIG-29 aircraft to Iran;
- b. aircraft spare parts to Iraq;
- c. T-72 tanks to Syria;
- d. rocket boosters to India;
- e. SU-27 Flanker aircraft and MIG-27 fighters to China?

Would the Clinton Administration support the retention of sanctions against the Russian company "Glavkosmos" for its export of rocket technology to India? Would the Clinton Administration support legislation requiring that foreign assistance be suspended unless Russia discontinues arms sales to countries supporting terrorism?

Answer. You will understand that each of these issues will require detailed consideration when we are able to draw on all the resources of the Executive Branch.

RUSSIAN DEBT RESCHEDULING

Question. Would the Clinton Administration support debt rescheduling for Russia?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If so, should the terms be based on Russian economic and political reforms?

Answer. Debt rescheduling traditionally had been based on economic considerations and conditions, and these should continue to be key factors. Obviously, our interest in contributing to a debt rescheduling package for Russia stems in part from our support of President Yeltsin's reform efforts.

ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Question. Do you agree that Russian troops must withdraw from Moldova?

Answer. We agree with the position taken in various CSCE documents, that troops should be on foreign soil only with the express permission of the host governments.

Question. How would the Clinton Administration urge the Russian government to withdraw its troops from the Dniester region?

Answer. We will urge the Russian government to comply with all its international commitments, including its CSCE commitment to have forces on foreign soil only with the express consent of the host government. We will look for ways to contribute to international efforts at conflict resolution and crisis management in CSCE, the U.N., and elsewhere.

Question. Do you support the use of the Russian army as a peacekeeping force in the countries of the former Soviet Union?

Answer. Yes, if it is desired by the host state and other concerned parties. I welcome the desire of the Yeltsin government for a CSCE or other international body to play a role in peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet Union. President Yeltsin obviously understands that it is not in Russia's interest, or good for stability on Russia's borders, to give the impression that new independent states of the former Soviet Union are a sphere of special Russian responsibility rather than part of the broader international community.

RUSSIAN MILITARY REPATRIATION

Question. In your opinion, is the question of the Russian inhabitants of the Baltic states a legitimate human rights issue?

Answer. How governments treat people under their authority is a legitimate human rights issue with regard to any country.

Question. Please assess Baltic laws governing citizenship and rights for the Russian inhabitants of their countries.

Answer. Estonia and Lithuania have passed citizenship laws comparable to those in several Western democracies. Latvia still is considering the details of its citizenship law. While all three states seem to be moving in the right direction, we will

of course remain interested in whether the laws are implemented in a non-discriminatory manner.

Question. Would the Clinton Administration support using United States technical assistance to Russia to help build adequate housing for departing Russian troops?

Answer. This is an interesting idea that we are willing to explore as part of our overall efforts to help Russia's economic and political transformation and its demilitarization. But it should not be linked to troop withdrawals. Russia has made commitments in the CSCE to have troops on foreign soil only with the permission of the host country. There is a real problem of finding housing, schools, and work for returning Russian soldiers, but I am pleased to note that the withdrawals are continuing—albeit not as rapidly as the Baltic States would like.

CONDITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA

Question. Do you agree that Russian and Commonwealth troops must be unconditionally removed from the Baltic states?

Answer. Yes, as noted above.

Question. If so, will Russian troop removal from the Baltic states be a priority for the Clinton Administration?

Answer. We will encourage Russia to continue the troop withdrawals, while showing reasonable understanding of the practical difficulties in removing them all immediately. The important thing is that the withdrawals continue.

Question. Do you believe that Russian overflights of the Baltic states constitute a threat to Baltic security?

Answer. To the best of my current knowledge, at present they do not. But this is a problem we obviously will keep under careful review.

Question. At what point would you advise President-elect Clinton to suspend assistance to Russia because of the continuation of the overflights and other violations of Baltic sovereignty?

Answer. It would not be useful to speculate on hypothetical situations that would have to be judged in light of a range of factors prevailing at the time.

POLITICAL ASYLUM

Question. In what cases should persons from the former Soviet Union be granted political asylum?

Answer. When they meet the statutory requirements, which are based on the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. That Protocol indicates that refugees are those persons who are outside their country of origin, and are unwilling or unable to return due to a "well founded fear of persecution."

Question. Do you know of any evidence that Russians repatriated to Russia by the U.S. have suffered persecution and reprisals?

Answer. I am personally unaware of such evidence.

Question. Are you willing to raise this issue with the Russian Government?

Answer. If I received information indicating mistreatment of a person returned to Russia after being denied asylum in the United States, I would be willing to raise this issue with the Russian Government.

Question. Will you keep me notified of progress on this case?

Answer. I will inquire about this case, and will keep you informed of what I learn.

LOAN GUARANTEES: RUSSIA, CENTRAL AND SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

Question. What is the current status of United States Government guaranteed loans to Russia?

Answer. The U.S. government has extended loan guarantees to Russia under USDA, EXIM and OPIC operated programs.

USDA extended \$3.7 billion in GSM-102 loan guarantees to the former Soviet Union (FSU) for the purchase of American agricultural products. With the demise of the FSU, USDA negotiated a GSM-102 credit guarantee program with the Russian Federation. The first guarantees were extended in May, 1992. Throughout 1992, USDA made available a total of \$1.1 billion in GSM-102 guaranteed credits to Russia. Until December 1, 1992 Russia met its GSM-102 payments as well as GSM-102 payments contracted earlier by the FSU. On that date, however, the Russian government informed the USG that it was no longer able to meet its agricultural guarantee payments; Russia was suspended from the GSM-102 program. Total Russian defaults as of January 15, 1993 have amounted to \$205 million. Because of its suspension from the guarantee program, Russia has not been able to draw on \$111 million in additional guarantees available in 1992 or \$275 million that was to have been made available in 1993.

EXIM Bank has extended some \$240 million to export loan guarantees and insurance to Russia, all in 1992. Russia is currently late in meeting a \$2.1 million payment on one of these guarantees. The Russian government has indicated that this payment will be met shortly and EXIM has agreed to treat this as a delayed payment for the time being.

In 1992 OPIC extended \$150 million in risk insurance to an investment project in Russia.

Question. What is the current status of United States Government guaranteed loans to all other former East Bloc countries, including the new countries of the former Soviet Union?

Answer. Apart from Russia, the only newly independent state of the former Soviet Union to receive USG guaranteed loans is Ukraine. Ukraine received \$178.8 million in GSM-102 agricultural credit guarantees in 1992. Ukraine is eligible to receive a further \$130 million in such guarantees after February 1, 1993.

Question. What is the status of U.S. guaranteed loans to Central and Southeastern Europe?

Answer. Albania: Eximbank had not opened in this market as of fiscal year end 1992.

Baltics: Eximbank opened for short term cover in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in April, 1992. Until the respective Baltic governments designate a bank or banks as full faith and credit agents, Eximbank requires the Minister of Finance to be the obligor/guarantor.

Bulgaria: Eximbank opened for short term cover in Bulgaria in September, 1991. The Bulgarian government has yet to designate a sovereign agent to work with Eximbank; no transactions will go forward until Eximbank identifies an acceptable sovereign obligor/guarantor.

Czechoslovakia: Eximbank opened for general cover in March, 1990. Eximbank plans to open in both the Czech and Slovak markets following partition. It anticipates that the lion's share of its FYE 92 \$196 million exposure will devolve to the Czech Republic following partition.

Hungary: Eximbank opened short and medium term programs in April, 1979. To date, Hungary has not been a significant user of official export credit support.

Poland: Eximbank re-opened its short term trade credit insurance programs for Poland in March, 1990. Its medium term insurance program and medium term loan and guarantee programs were re-opened in May, 1990. A framework agreement between Eximbank and the Government of Poland provides a Polish Government full faith and credit guarantee on medium and short term business conducted through specific Polish banks.

Former Yugoslav Republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia: All Eximbank programs, available in Yugoslavia since the early 1960s, were closed in June, 1991. Negotiations are currently underway to apportion Eximbank's \$640 million in Yugoslav exposure to its successor states.

Romania: Eximbank opened for short term cover in March, 1992. The Government of Romania has designated four banks to act as sovereign agents.

Question. Does the Clinton Administration intend to extend additional loans to former East Bloc countries, including the new countries of the former Soviet Union, which will be guaranteed by United States taxpayers?

Answer. We certainly want to continue helping American investors and others compete with Germans, Japanese and others for markets and investment opportunities in Europe's east. As is the case when considering U.S. guaranteed loans in any part of the world, prospects for repayment will be an important factor in any specific decisions.

CANADA

Question. What position have you taken on this U.S.-Canada trade dispute?

Answer. None.

Question. Have you handled, either directly or indirectly, your former firm's Canadian clients?

Answer. No.

Question. Do you plan to recuse yourself from decisions regarding U.S. trade with Canada?

Answer. Not unless it involves Pacific Gas and Electric on whose matters I have recused myself.

LATIN AMERICA

Question. Do the operations of the international financial institutions benefit United States interests in Latin America?

Answer. Yes, they do.

Question. Some critics have argued that the stabilization programs the IMF has mandated for Latin America have lowered local living standards, increased unemployment, and created recessionary economic conditions, do you agree?

Answer. Quite often it seems economic stabilization programs result in hardships of the nature that you have described. It is therefore important that they be accompanied by measures to temporarily alleviate such hardships until the basic economic reforms which usually are part of the overall program have had time to produce their beneficial results.

Question. Have these programs hindered growth in Latin America?

Answer. I believe that, over the longer term, such programs have usually resulted in increased economic growth for those countries that have seriously undertaken them and seen them through to full implementation.

Question. During the 1980s, did the constant infusions of soft money from the World Bank and the IMF to the statist governments in Latin America exacerbate the economic crises in these countries by allowing governments to live beyond their means and continue socialist policies?

Answer. Senator, I am not familiar with the history of that period regarding World Bank and IMF lending practices. But I can say that I believe history has demonstrated that free market economic policies and open and democratic political systems are the route to economic growth, development and prosperity, not only in Latin America but throughout the world.

Question. What is your attitude toward the Japanese penetration of Latin American markets?

Answer. Senator, I don't believe we have any objection to competing with the Japanese in Latin American markets, as long as that competition is free, open and fair.

Question. Some argue that Japan is moving into areas of investment that the United States has been driven out of in recent years. Do you see any merit in the charge that Japan is moving to take over markets that formerly belonged to American companies?

Answer. I would reiterate that I believe American companies are prepared to meet the Japanese competition in these markets as long as the playing field for such competition is level.

Question. Do you support prohibiting organizations in the United States from sending money and/or other support to terrorist organizations in Latin America?

Answer. I can assure you that it will be the policy of the Clinton Administration to not only oppose terrorism but to actively combat it. How that policy will translate into new measures, laws or regulations to deal with certain aspects of the problem is yet to be decided.

Question. How should the United States fight the linkage between narco-traffickers and terrorist organizations in Latin America?

Answer. One of the questions that we will be considering in our review of State Department operations is how we are organized to deal with countering narcotics trafficking and terrorism, particularly in Latin America, where the two are often linked. As we review our options we will be consulting with this Committee to obtain your views.

Question. Do you believe military and economic assistance to the Andean region will materially aid in combating drug production and trafficking. What funding levels, or increased U.S. involvement, or other approaches, are politically, diplomatically, and operationally feasible?

Answer. As I understand, Senator, the results of our counternarcotics efforts in the Andean region have been somewhat disappointing, at least in terms of the amount of drugs still entering the U.S. Given the large sums of money involved in this effort, we need to review our counternarcotics program there, and consider our full range of options for trying to increase its effectiveness. We will look forward to consulting with the Congress on this.

Question. In the wake of the Collor scandal and the frequent allegation of corruption against Carlos Andres Perez, what role should the United States play in attacking corruption in the region?

Answer. In my prepared statement, I recognized our interest in helping Latin America consolidate the remarkable progress made towards democracy in the past decade. Part of that process for some countries will be to deal with the corruption and governmental ineffectiveness which undermine democracy and foster instability. Thus as we work with our Hemisphere partners to consolidate democracy and promote economic growth, I hope we will be able to help them attack corruption.

Question. Would allegations about a high government official's corrupt practices affect your dealings with that official?

Answer. Such allegations, if proven true, would certainly raise serious questions in my mind as to the reliability and trustworthiness of that official and I would be extremely cautious in dealing with him or her.

Question. Will you ask U.S. ambassadors to keep you informed about allegations of corruption involving foreign dignitaries?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Does your definition of promoting democracy in the hemisphere include a commitment to strengthening independent branches of government?

Answer. Yes, it does.

Question. What will you do to improve reporting on human rights violations committed by terrorist organizations and drug cartels?

Answer. If our embassies are not already adequately doing so they will be advised to ensure full coverage of this aspect of human rights reporting. Given the nature of terrorist organizations and drug cartels, however, much of our reporting on them must come from other agency intelligence sources.

Question. Does the United States pay enough attention to the threats that terrorist groups and drug cartels pose to regional stability and economic development?

Answer. Yes, I believe we pay enough attention. The problem, however, is finding effective ways and means to cope with these threats.

Question. Would you encourage the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Affairs to place additional emphasis on the human rights violations of communist terrorist groups and drug cartels?

Answer. I would certainly encourage the Assistant Secretary to ensure that all due emphasis is placed on these aspects of the human rights problem.

HAITI

Question. Beyond preventing a mass exodus of Haitians to the United States, do we have any vital national security interests in Haiti?

Answer. We are concerned about Haiti in a security sense because of its relative proximity to the United States and the impact which developments there can have on peace and stability in the region. Our primary interest at present, as I noted in my statement, is to help restore democracy to that island.

Question. What percentage of Haitians who apply for refugee status in the United States have legitimate fears of persecution if they remain in Haiti?

Answer. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is in possession of that information, and I respectfully refer you there.

Question. Has there been any evidence that Haitians repatriated to Haiti by the United States have suffered persecution or reprisals after their repatriation?

Answer. The Haitian Government does not appear to target people for persecution simply for leaving by boat, and the vast majority of returnees do not seem to be subject to persecution upon return. However, some returnees have been subjected to human rights abuses that would constitute persecution.

Question. What was the "error" in the Bush Administration policy in Haitian refugees?

Answer. President-elect Clinton believes that additional efforts need to be made to protect those who fear persecution in Haiti and, in particular, intends to improve the opportunities for Haitians to seek asylum.

Question. What percentage of Haitians already in the U.S. have shown up for status hearings? How are they tracked in the U.S.?

Answer. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is in possession of that information, and I respectfully refer you there.

Question. Are you aware that Haitians have been cutting trees and ripping apart houses to build boats?

Answer. I have seen such reports.

Question. Will the Coast Guard cease to interdict and repatriate Haitians on January 20?

Answer. No.

Question. How many processing centers are you prepared to establish in Haiti?

Answer. No decisions have yet been made on that issue, but it is our intention to increase the number, and extend the locations, if possible.

Question. How many Haitians testing positive for HIV have been admitted into the United States or into U.S. custody since the coup?

Answer. The INS should be able to provide that information to you.

Question. Are all Haitians tested for HIV virus before being allowed onto United States soil or into United States custody?

Answer. The INS should be able to provide that information to you.

Question. Will Haitians infected with HIV be admitted into the United States under the Clinton Administration's new policy?

Answer. The issue of grounds for exclusion will be dealt with primarily by the Department of Justice, and policy decisions on the particular issue you raise have yet to be made.

Question. How much has Haitian immigration cost the USG?

Answer. I was not able to obtain such information from relevant USG agencies before close of business on Friday, January 15. I would be happy to provide you with an estimate of State Department costs if you wish.

Question. Which other members of the Organization of American States accept Haitian refugees?

Answer. I was not able to obtain such information from the State Department before close of business on Friday, January 15.

Question. Do you consider Aristide to be a true democrat?

Answer. President Aristide is the duly elected President of Haiti, and the Clinton Administration will support the reinstatement of his government.

Question. Is the Haitian parliament as legitimate a part of the Haitian Government as is President Aristide?

Answer. The Haitian parliament was democratically elected and we regard it as such.

Question. Do you believe the terms of Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as applied by the Refugee Protocol of 1967, apply to the actions of the United States outside the territorial boundaries of the United States?

Answer. There are several legal issues raised by this question, including the meaning of Article 33 itself as well as whether, by itself or pursuant to U.S. statute, the Article creates enforceable obligations on the part of U.S. officials. These issues will be carefully reviewed by the Clinton Administration, including the Justice and State Departments.

Question. What information do you have about Cuba's continuing links to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua?

Answer. None, but I assume the two are on good terms with one another.

Question. Do you believe that any agency of the U.S. Government should share intelligence or law enforcement information with the current government of Cuba?

Answer. I would like to review our current regulations, policies and practices on such sharing before answering that question.

Question. Do you consider Castro's dictatorship to be a criminal regime?

Answer. I agree fully with Governor Clinton that Fidel Castro remains one of the world's "most ruthless dictators" and his regime stands as "an island of tyranny."

Question. Will you provide this Committee with regular updates of violations of human rights committed by the Castro dictatorship?

Answer. As a matter of general policy, I believe we should always be as responsive as possible to the Committee's requests for information. And I can assure you that the Clinton Administration will vigorously be speaking out on the human rights violations of the Castro regime.

Question. Will the Clinton Administration press for new United Nations resolutions or actions to punish Cuba for its human rights abuses?

Answer. I expect that we will very actively pursue Cuba's human rights abuses within all appropriate international fora, beginning with the upcoming annual session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

Question. Will you notify this Committee how many Russian technical advisors and other personnel are still in Cuba working on the nuclear reactors?

Answer. To the extent that such information is available within the executive branch, it can and should be shared with the Committee if requested.

Question. If Cuba owes Russia \$25 billion, will you press Russia to demand Cuba's sugar as payment for the debt it is owed, and stop giving Cuba military technology to pay for the sugar?

Answer. I at present have no knowledge of the specific details of Russia's trade relations with Cuba but I can assure you that they will be carefully considered within the context of our overall bilateral relations with Russia.

Question. What specifically will the Clinton Administration do to halt all technical, financial, and military assistance by the countries of the former Soviet Union to Cuba?

Answer. This is an issue that will be considered as we formulate our policies with regard to these countries in the coming weeks and months.

Question. Can you provide this Committee with information about which countries, besides Russia, have sent military advisors and/or any other form of military assistance to Cuba?

Answer. No, because I am not at present in possession of such information.

Question. Will you provide information to Congress about which countries are either giving economic assistance to Cuba or whose nationals are engaged in business ventures in Cuba?

Answer. If such information is available to the administration and should the Congress request it, it would be provided.

Question. What is the Clinton Administration's position with regard to Mexican businessmen shipping Cuban clothing and textile goods to North America and other markets via Mexico?

Answer. We have taken no position on this specific issue, but, as I said in my prepared statement, the trade embargo on Cuba and Cuban goods will be maintained by the Clinton Administration.

Question. In the spirit of the Cuban Democracy Act, will the State Department under your stewardship pressure every country to end trade and aid to Fidel Castro's dictatorship?

Answer. Senator, as you know, Governor Clinton strongly supported enactment of the Cuba Democracy Act and we will certainly be implementing all of its provisions as well as seeking the support of all countries for the economic sanctions against Cuba.

EL SALVADOR

Question. What steps should be taken to ensure that the military purge does not encourage elements of the FMLN to continue to violate the peace accords?

Answer. I am not in a position at this time to speculate on such details regarding the situation in El Salvador but I have made clear in my opening statement that the peace accords should be fully implemented, and respected by all parties.

Question. Will you support continued military assistance to the Salvadoran Army?

Answer. We should continue to provide that assistance which furthers our goals and objectives in El Salvador, especially implementation of the peace accords.

Question. Will you grant FMLN members we believe to be violators of human rights visas to enter the United States?

Answer. I can assure you that visas to enter the U.S. will be issued in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations of the United States.

Question. What steps will be taken to ensure that AID monies are accounted for and do not wind up in the hands of guerrilla forces?

Answer. Senator, I believe that question should more appropriately be addressed to the new Administrator of AID when he or she appears before the Committee.

Question. Do you favor extending the temporary permits for Salvadorans in the United States?

Answer. That is a very complex question which I presume we will be addressing on an interagency basis and on which I would withhold comment until I have the opportunity to study it.

Question. Did you advocate the aid cut-off to El Salvador in 1979 during General Romero's presidency?

Answer. I frankly do not recall my specific position on that issue, if it came before me 13 years ago.

Question. Did Ambassador Robert White have a role in supporting the military coup against General Romero?

Answer. If my memory serves, I believe Ambassador White was our ambassador to Paraguay at the time of the military coup against General Romero in El Salvador.

Question. Did you support the military coup against General Romero in 1979?

Answer. No.

Question. What was the United States role in the coup against Romero?

Answer. None that I am aware of.

Question. Did the United States approve the coup in advance?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

MEXICO

Question. How do concerns about the status of political rights and civil liberties impact on the North American Free Trade Agreement?

Answer. As you know Governor Clinton has certain labor rights and environmental concerns relative to the NAFTA, which we will be addressing with the Government of Mexico.

Question. Should the United States Government push for political and other liberties in Mexico more vigorously?

Answer. As I made clear in my prepared statement, we should encourage efforts to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible and promote respect for human rights in our relations with all countries, including Mexico.

Question. Do you think the Mexican government has been cooperative in resolving the Camarena case?

Answer. As I understand there has been cooperation between our two governments in dealing with this case.

Question. What exactly do you disagree with in the Supreme Court decision on the Alvarez Machain case and do you believe the U.S. should have requested his extradition before the abduction?

Answer. Obviously, reasonable persons may differ, but I was more persuaded by the dissenting opinion. Clearly, in any such cases extradition in accordance with applicable laws and treaties is preferable to abduction.

Question. Are you aware of any trials of any Mexican national in Mexico for their role in the Camarena murder?

Answer. No.

Question. What steps will you take as Secretary of State to ensure that the killers of Enrique Camarena are brought to justice?

Answer. The Department of State is not a law enforcement agency of the U.S. government but we will play whatever role in helping to resolve this case that the President wishes us to play.

Question. Should the United States help finance an environmental clean-up in Mexico?

We will be addressing how the U.S. and Mexico can cooperate in dealing with our mutual environmental concerns within the context of our negotiations with Mexico related to NAFTA.

Question. Will you push for greater access for U.S. investors in Mexico and will you work to ensure U.S. companies access to the Mexican petroleum market?

Answer. As I clearly stated in my prepared statement, we intend to harness our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers and to actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad.

Question. Will the Clinton Administration discuss concerns with Mexico about drug trafficking during further discussions with the Mexican Government on the NAFTA?

Answer. As I understand we already have a very elaborate framework and mechanisms for consultation and cooperation with the Government of Mexico in the area of counternarcotics. I would foresee our relying on this to pursue with Mexico our concerns in this area.

Question. Will the Administration discuss concerns with Mexico about corruption and democracy during further discussions on NAFTA?

Answer. I would prefer to not comment on what we contemplate in the way of the agenda for our anticipated confidential diplomatic discussions with the Government of Mexico on the NAFTA. I can say that the promotion of democratic institutions, including accountable government, will be a high priority for the new Administration.

Question. If the NAFTA is a success do you think it should be expanded? And, if you favor expansion, which country would you consider next?

Answer. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems.

CHILE

Question. Do you support a free trade agreement with Chile?

Answer. Chile is certainly a serious candidate for possible inclusion in any extension of free trade agreements to Latin American nations.

NICARAGUA

Question. When U.S. citizens notify the Department of State that a foreign government has confiscated their properties, what specific steps should the Department take to assist those citizens in recovering their properties?

Answer. I am not familiar with the details of the exact procedures that we follow in such cases. However, I believe that our embassy in the country involved, among other things, would assist the citizen in finding legal representation, would provide information on the country's laws and procedures for pursuing property claims, and would approach appropriate officials of the government there to make clear to them our interest in the claim being promptly and equitably resolved.

Question. Do you think that governments who refuse to return properties or fairly compensate U.S. citizens for those properties should receive U.S. foreign aid?

Answer. As I recall, there are provisions in U.S. laws, the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amendments I believe, which link the question of compensation for American

citizens' property seized by a foreign government with the provision of foreign aid to that country. We would be guided by this legislation in dealing with cases of this nature.

Question. Do you think governments which make hundreds of millions of dollars in bad loans underwritten by U.S. taxpayers should continue to receive foreign aid?

Answer. In my view, the use which foreign governments make of our economic assistance is certainly a factor to be heavily weighed in deciding whether to continue such assistance to them.

Question. Were you aware of the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the Sandinistas before they came to power in Nicaragua?

Answer. As I recall, we did have some intelligence that there were powerful individuals within the Sandinista movement who were Marxist-Leninist in their orientation.

Question. How involved were you in formulating President Carter's policy toward Nicaragua?

Answer. As Deputy Secretary of State, I was actively involved with policy formulation toward Nicaragua, as I was with other areas of major concern to the United States at the time.

Question. What was your role and the role of the Carter Administration in the overthrow of President Somoza in Nicaragua?

Answer. The focus of our efforts in Nicaragua at the time was to work within the context of the Organization of American States to try to bring about a peaceful resolution of the civil conflict raging in Nicaragua. Pursuant to an OAS Resolution, we joined with the governments of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic to try to mediate an agreement between General Somoza and the political opposition. Unfortunately, despite long months of effort, this mediation failed and a mass popular uprising ensued which drove Somoza from the country.

Question. Why did the Carter Administration support the Sandinista regime and ask for economic assistance for the Sandinista Government?

Answer. Not wishing to simply abandon Nicaragua and the substantial private sector and democratic political forces there, the Carter Administration made a good faith effort to try to work with the new government, which itself initially included some prominent non-Sandinista figures. This policy and the provision of economic assistance to Nicaragua was supported by a bipartisan majority in the Congress.

Question. Do you believe the Sandinista Government would have succeeded if the U.S. had provided more assistance to it?

Answer. Because of the Sandinista Government's support for violence in neighboring countries, particularly El Salvador, the Carter Administration suspended disbursement of economic aid to it shortly before leaving office. Thus, the Sandinistas themselves made it impossible for us to assist them further, and it is also impossible to know if the Government would have succeeded with more assistance.

Question. Do you believe the Sandinistas are contributing to the democratization of Nicaragua today and that Nicaragua can become a genuine democracy if they maintain control of the army, police and judicial system?

Answer. Control of critical institutions of government such as the army, police and judiciary by democratically elected civilian leadership is essential to the functioning of a true democracy, in Nicaragua as elsewhere in the world.

Question. What steps is the Government of Nicaragua taking to recover misused U.S. aid funds; how much has been recovered; what has the U.S. Government done to assist such recovery; and what have we done to ensure that future foreign aid funds will not be misused by the Nicaraguan Central Bank?

Answer. I do not know Senator, but given the serious nature of these questions, I assure you I will look into them once I become Secretary of State and have the information at my disposal.

Question. Should the U.S. Government consider withholding an equivalent amount of foreign aid funds from the Government of Nicaragua until these loans are paid?

Answer. I believe that repayment of debts owed to the United States for previous loans as they become due is an important component of a continuing foreign assistance relationship.

PANAMA

Question. Did you or anyone else in the Carter Administration ever call the Torrijos Government on the carpet about human rights abuses and the lack of democracy in Panama? When? And to whom?

Answer. Senator, as you may recall, the Carter Administration was noted for being forthright and outspoken on human rights and democracy in its dealings with all governments. Our concerns about human rights abuses in Panama, as elsewhere

in the world, were on numerous occasions communicated to appropriate officials of that government.

Question. Were there any concerns by the Carter Administration about negotiating away United States territory with Torrijos inasmuch as he had illegally seized power from a legitimately elected government?

Answer. Our concerns in negotiating the Panama Canal treaty were to protect and ensure U.S. interests in its efficient operation and our use of the Canal over the longer term, which the treaty, as ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, accomplished.

Question. Did you consider the dictatorship of General Torrijos to be a genuine democracy?

Answer. No.

Question. Did the Carter Administration ever stop military or economic aid to the Torrijos dictatorship? If not, why not?

Answer. I frankly cannot recall what specific actions we took with regard to military and economic assistance to Panama during this period.

Question. Were you for or against the United States military action in Panama—called Operation Just Cause?

Answer. Senator, as I recall, I had some reservations about that action, particularly with regard to whether it met the very severe tests for use of U.S. military force abroad which I have described in my prepared statement. I am not certain that the military action has resulted in improvement of drug trafficking abuses in that country.

Question. Weren't 80 percent of all United States citizens against the giveaway Panama Canal Treaties?

Answer. No. Once the treaties were explained to the American people and they were able to see the facts through the fog of rhetoric, there was majority support for them. The treaties could hardly have been approved by two-thirds of the Senate if they had been rejected by 80 percent of our citizens.

Question. Could you explain why the United States Senate was never informed about Panama's three paragraphs of counterreservation which nullified the DeConcini Reservation?

Answer. As I recall, consultation between the Administration and the bipartisan Senate leaders involved with the treaties was very close and constant. To my knowledge, the Senate was kept fully and currently informed through its leadership of all matters relevant to the Senate's consideration of the treaties.

Question. When did you first know about or see these three paragraphs?

Answer. I have no present recollection.

Question. Did anybody in the United States Government see these three paragraphs before June 16, 1978, the day the protocols were exchanged in Panama?

Answer. I did not, but presumed that the negotiators may have.

Question. Should the Senate have had the opportunity to vote on these three paragraphs in order to discharge its Constitutional obligation to "advise and consent?"

Answer. I am not an authority on the treaty requirements of the U.S. Constitution, Senator, but I presume that, if there was a legal or constitutional requirement for the Senate to vote on these paragraphs, the Senate leadership would have insisted on it.

Question. It is true, then, that Panama and the United States exchanged non-identical instruments of ratification?

Answer. Senator, it is my understanding that the exchange was properly carried out in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States and Panama and in accordance with accepted international practices.

Question. Isn't it true that the Treaty never would have passed the United States Senate without the DeConcini Reservation?

Answer. I do not know. The situation was very fluid, and various considerations affected the voting.

Question. Does the United States today maintain the unilateral right to defend the Panama Canal by force?

Answer. Senator, I believe circumstances under which the United States may use force to defend the Canal are clearly set forth in the Treaty.

Question. Did you, or anyone else in the United States Government, ever tell Torrijos in Panama not to be "overly concerned" about the DeConcini Reservation?

Answer. I did not, but cannot speak for others.

Question. What did you tell the Panamanians about the DeConcini Reservation during your trip to Panama?

Answer. I did not discuss the issue, during my only trip to Panama during this period for the signing of the Treaties.

Question. Will you initiate talks with the Panamanian Government to discuss extending United States base rights in Panama?

Answer. The question of whether or not we maintain any U.S. military presence in Panama beyond the year 2000 is obviously not an immediate one. But, it is one that I would expect us to address as we review not only our relations with Panama but also our worldwide base requirements and military deployments.

Question. Do you believe that extending American base rights in Panama is in the interest of the United States?

Answer. Senator, as I have just indicated, that is something that we would address in conjunction with policy reviews that I expect we will be conducting in the months ahead.

Question. Did you know about General Omar Torrijos' and Noriega's ties to Fidel Castro in Cuba?

Answer. As I recall, it was generally acknowledged that contacts at least existed between them and Fidel Castro.

Question. Did Noriega supply intelligence to the Carter Administration on Cuba and did he ever pass intelligence information that he had received from the United States to Cuba?

Answer. Senator, even should I possess such knowledge, I would not be able to reveal such highly sensitive details of sources and methods of United States intelligence operations on this occasion.

Question. Isn't it a fact that Noriega and other members of the Panama National Guard had received military training and ideological indoctrination in Cuba dating from at least 1970?

Answer. Senator, I frankly do not know.

Question. Did you know that the Torrijos brothers and Manuel Noriega were suspected of drug trafficking or other illegal activities when the Carter Administration was negotiating the Panama Canal Treaties?

Answer. I recall that these individuals were being subjected to intense public scrutiny at the time and that such suspicions were being aired in the media.

SYRIA

Question. What actions does the Clinton Administration plan to take to investigate Syria's support for drug trafficking and terrorist havens in Lebanon, and what kinds of action will the Administration take to shut-down these alleged operations?

Answer. Under what specific circumstances do you envision Syria will be removed from the terrorism list?

Answer. Will you consult with Congress before acting to remove Syria from those lists?

Answer. I share your concern about Syria's support for terrorism and its involvement in narcotics activities. Syria will remain on the terrorism list—and terrorism will remain an important element of our high-level dialogue—so long as Syria gives support and safehaven to terrorist groups; U.S. export sanctions and prohibitions against U.S. aid or military sales to Syria thus will remain in effect. I intend to pursue these issues vigorously with Syrian authorities.

Question. What will you do, beyond the usual diplomatic niceties, to pressure Assad to allow Syria's remaining 1,400 Jews freedom of emigration?

Answer. What resources do you expect to bring to bear on the Assad government to redress its recent actions and to resume permitting Syria's Jews to travel?

Answer. I am deeply concerned that very few exit permits have been issued to Syrian Jews since mid-October, despite the policy decision taken in April to permit Syrian Jews the right to travel. I intend to pursue this issue vigorously with Syrian authorities.

Question. Will you reopen the investigation into Pan Am 103 and specifically address the role of Ahmed Jibril and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command?

Answer. While I intend to support fully efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103, I am unable to commit to any particular course of action at this time.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

Question. Given that the United States endorsed the Taif Accords, and is committed to Lebanese independence, what will you do to see the terms of the Accords fulfilled?

Answer. I am disappointed that Syrian redeployment, as called for in the Taif Accords, has not taken place. I intend to press the Syrians to meet their commitments by redeploying as soon as possible. We will also work with the Government of Leb-

anon to encourage economic reforms and further expansion of their authority within the territory of Lebanon.

Question. Does this Administration intend to continue granting to Lebanon a national interest waiver from sanctions imposed on countries in non-compliance with U.S. drug control policy?

Answer. I am unable to answer the question at this time. I can assure you that I intend to look into this matter once I have assumed the office of Secretary of State and would be glad to consider your views on the subject as we formulate our policy.

Question. Do you support the Syrian contention that they are not required to withdraw their troops from Lebanon until Israel complies with U.N. Resolution 425?

Answer. These issues are currently the subject of direct negotiations between the parties to the Middle East peace talks. I will seek to do all that I can to ensure the success of those negotiations and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.

ARAB LEAGUE

Question. Is the refusal of most Arab League members to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention on the grounds that Israel has not relinquished its nuclear weapons credible? Do you believe sanctions should be levied on nations that refuse to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Answer. I am disappointed that most Arab League member states chose not to sign the CWC despite the Bush Administration's diplomatic efforts to encourage them to do so. I will continue to urge members of the Arab League to sign the treaty and believe that parties to the convention should be held to the terms of it.

IRAN

Question. Do you believe that the United States should reevaluate its relationship with Tehran? Could we have more influence if we had diplomatic relations with Iran? What will you do to confront Iran's massive build-up of weapons of mass destruction?

Answer. In my opinion, improved relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are impossible as long as Iran supports terrorism, actively opposes the Middle East peace process (especially through its support for groups such as Hizballah), seeks weapons of mass destruction, and abuses the human rights of its citizens. I share your concern that the U.S. do all that it can to prevent Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. As I understand, the U.S. now controls and generally prohibits, in accordance with recent legislation, the export of dual-use equipment and technology that may be used in Iran's WMD or missiles programs. I intend to urge other potential suppliers, including our allies, to impose and enforce stringent controls as well.

FUNDAMENTALISM

Question. Could you define your general perceptions about the threat posed to the United States and its allies by Islamic fundamentalism?

Answer. In very general terms, Islam is one of the world's great religions and its practice poses no threat to the United States or our interests. The threat to United States interests is posed by extremism of any kind, be it of a religious or secular bent. We part company with governments or groups who preach intolerance, abuse human rights, oppress minorities or resort to terrorism or violent repression in pursuit of their political goals. We support those who seek to broaden political participation, strengthen democratic institutions, and ensure respect for the human rights of all. At the same time, we remain wary of those, whether in government or opposition, who would exploit the democratic process to come to power only to destroy that very process in order to maintain power.

JORDAN

Question. Will you support renewing aid to Jordan at original levels?

Answer. I understand that Jordan's participation in the Middle East peace process and its more rigorous enforcement of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq led the Bush Administration to restore a close bilateral relationship including the resumption of aid. I will have to review all the facts before making an informed decision on the level of assistance.

ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Question. What is your view of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza? What will be your policy toward the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights? What will be your policy toward Jerusalem? Do you believe that Israel should give up the

West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem? Is it your view that Israel must relinquish those territories? To whom? What is your view of Arab demands that Israel return to its pre-June 1967 borders? Would Israel be defensible from within such borders?

Answer. I support the resolution of these difficult issues through direct negotiations between the parties involved. Both interim arrangements, as well as the final status of the territories, need to be agreed to by Israel and the Arab states involved. President-elect Clinton and I are firmly committed to both the Middle East peace process and to secure and defensible borders for Israel.

Question. Will this Administration recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel? How will you implement the President-elect's wishes on Jerusalem?

Answer. President-elect Clinton has said he believes that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, that the city should remain undivided, and that access to the holy sites should be ensured for all. Since this is a subject of negotiations at the Middle East peace talks, no action on the part of the incoming Administration is anticipated at this time.

Question. Will you break with past precedent and support the creation of a Palestinian state?

Answer. No.

ISRAEL

Question. What will your policy be toward Israeli deportations of Palestinians?

Answer. At the time of the deportation of over 400 Palestinians to Lebanon, President-elect Clinton strongly condemned the acts of violence and terrorism directed against Israel that provoked the deportations but expressed his concern that this action had gone too far. I do not expect long-standing U.S. policy opposing deportations and other forms of collective punishment, which violate the Geneva Conventions, to change.

Question. Do you view the PLO as a terrorist group?

Answer. Yes. The PLO contains elements that have advocated, carried out, or accepted responsibility for acts of terrorism.

Question. Do you anticipate any change in U.S. policy toward the PLO?

Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe the PLO has a role to play in the peace process, and if so, what should that role be?

Answer. No.

Question. What will you do to reduce assistance to Israel?

Answer. I do not contemplate a change in aid levels at this time.

Question. What role do you envision for the United States (in the Middle East peace talks) and under what circumstances can we expect to see a higher U.S. profile at the talks?

Answer. I understand that the U.S. has already been very active outside the conference room—as honest broker, catalyst, and driving force. The Clinton Administration will also be willing to share ideas and propose solutions to problems and we will do our utmost to facilitate the success of the negotiations. However, the terms of reference for the peace process specify that a formal role for any third party inside the negotiating room would need the agreement of both sides in the bilateral negotiations. Should the parties decide to request the U.S. to play such a role in the negotiations, we will be willing and ready.

DECONCINI/ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT

Question. What is President-elect Clinton's position on the Arab League boycott?

Answer. What specific steps is he considering to get the Arab League to end the boycott? Does he feel that Israel must make a gesture to the Arab League concurrently with the League ending the boycott or should the boycott be ended without the need for any immediate reciprocity on the part of Israel?

Answer. It is longstanding U.S. policy to oppose the Arab League boycott of Israel. This policy will continue under the Clinton Administration.

Prospects for rolling back the boycott were enhanced by the start of the Madrid peace process, and U.S. efforts since then have been vigorous. Last fall, the U.S. urged Arab states to stop enforcing the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott against U.S. companies. The U.S. subsequently suggested to the Arabs an extensive list of specific steps which they could take to ease their enforcement of the boycott.

The U.S. initiative attracted wide interest among our trading partners. EC states have since delivered their own anti-boycott demarche to the Arabs, and the Japanese made their first-ever public call for an end to the boycott in December.

The Clinton Administration will continue to pursue vigorously steps to dismantle the boycott both with regional states and with our major trading partners.

INDIA

Question. Is India's possession of a nuclear device legitimate, and do you intend to impose sanctions? How will you address India's nuclear status? Do you believe the Pressler amendment should be expanded to include India? Should India sign the NPT? Should we link aid through the IFIs to nuclear non-proliferation?

Answer. The Clinton State Department will oppose nuclear proliferation on the Subcontinent, and seek to engage India in a serious process of dialogue on this issue. We will urge India to accede to the NPT. In pursuing diplomacy on this issue, we will review a wide range of incentives to encourage progress with the Indian Government on this issue.

Question. How will you address violations of human rights in India, and would you support linking aid (including IMET) to India?

Answer. Human rights issues will be an important issue in our relationship with India, as it will be throughout the world. I would hope that progress on human rights would obviate the need to consider measures to link aid to human rights, as assistance to India serves important U.S. foreign policy and humanitarian interests. We will, however, review the full range of options to encourage better observance of human rights in India.

Question. Do you intend to address the Kashmir question in the context of the Simla Accords or in the context of the U.N. resolutions? Has the Simla process been a success? Will you work to provide a role for Kashmiri groups in the resolution of the Kashmir problem? What is your view on the option of independence for Kashmir?

Answer. Both India and Pakistan agreed to the Simla Declaration, and I support the principles of peaceful dispute settlement that it contains. I believe that settlement of differences of this issue should be a product of discussions that include India and Pakistan, but also maintain a role for all communities in Kashmir. I do not believe that the USG should dictate the form or the outcome of a settlement. We will, however, be reviewing ways to facilitate dialogue on this issue leading toward normalization of the situation.

Question. How will you address India's continued military buildup?

Answer. In discussions with India (as well as with Pakistan) on regional security, we will encourage conventional arms restraint and will implement arms export control policies to further that goal.

Question. How will you deal with the so-called 80/20 rule governing U.S. procurement of licit narcotics?

Answer. No decisions have yet been made on this issue, but we will encourage India to take actions against illicit drug use, drug trafficking and diversion, and seek to ensure that programs involving licit opiates serve anti-narcotics goals.

Question. What role do you intend to play in promoting India's transition to a market economy, and what impact do you believe lack of progress in this area should have on bilateral and multilateral assistance?

Answer. I am encouraged by reforms that have taken place, but share the belief that reforms should go further. I believe that non-humanitarian assistance programs should be designed to facilitate the process of privatization and economic reform.

PAKISTAN

Question. How do you view Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, and do you believe there is any justification for Islamabad's nuclear program?

Answer. I am deeply concerned by reports about nuclear-weapons related developments in Pakistan, and believe that Pakistan should sign and ratify the NPT. I am aware of claims that a nuclear capability for Pakistan is necessary as a deterrent, but this justification does not change my position on this question.

Question. What is your position on the scope and purpose of the Pressler amendment?

Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to examine this complex legal question, but will certainly do so. I am, however, very much aware that some Senators claim the Pressler Amendment does not permit the licensing of commercial arms exports.

As a matter of policy, I understand that the Bush Administration has restricted licenses of commercial arms exports to preclude the acquisition by Pakistan of new military capabilities or technology upgrades to existing systems. Even if one interprets the Pressler amendment to permit commercial sales, a policy of prudent restrictions on sales seems appropriate, in view of the developments that prompted application of the Pressler Amendment in the first place, as well as our conventional arms proliferation concerns in the region.

All of these issues will receive careful examination in the Clinton Administration.

Question. How will this Administration work to ensure Pakistan that, were it to relinquish a nuclear weapon, it would be protected in the event of war with India? How do you view allegations that the aid cut-off is having the reverse of the effect intended i.e., pushing Pakistan to depend on a nuclear deterrent?

Answer. I believe that both India and Pakistan should be strongly discouraged from developing nuclear weapons, and that each state should have the capability to defend itself adequately with conventional weapons. However, I also recognize, as do supporters of continued application of the Pressler Amendment, that the U.S. must maintain the credibility of our commitment to nuclear non-proliferation issues. The issues you raise are serious ones that will be the subject of careful review in the Clinton Administration.

Question. How will you approach issues relating to prosecution of Christians under blasphemy laws?

Answer. While I understand that legal procedures in Pakistan may fairly divert from procedures we might find in a U.S. court, there are internationally recognized standards of human rights including freedoms of association and expression—that all states are obliged to uphold. The Clinton Administration will urge governments, including the Government of Pakistan, to ensure protection of such freedoms.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What did you propose to counter creeping Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in 1979? Did you believe that Soviet aggression would culminate in the invasion of Afghanistan? Would you agree with Brzezinski's characterization of your response?

Answer. Although I originally hoped that SALT talks could be kept on schedule, I soon realized that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had vastly changed the circumstances and nature of our relationship with the Soviet Union. At the time of the invasion, we made strong and vigorous protests to the Soviet Union about their illegal behavior.

GARY SICK

Question. Has Gary Sick written any foreign policy papers for the Clinton transition?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Will Sick be given any position in the U.S. foreign policy establishment?

Answer. It has been the policy of our Transition Team not to discuss any appointments until President-elect Clinton announces them. I have no plans to recommend that he join the State Department.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question. What standards will you use to formulate U.S. foreign policy if the national security interests or economic interests of the United States conflict with human rights concerns?

Answer. The United States has traditionally used the standards established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the measure to determine a country's respect for human rights. We will seek to apply those standards whenever possible, recognizing that there may be times, however, when our national security or economic interests conflict with those standards.

Question. Foreign assistance is prohibited to countries that violate the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Section 511 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991).

Is the current criteria adequate to decide whether a country is in violation of Section 511?

Does the Clinton Administration intend to modify the conditions?

Answer. I refer you to the answer I gave to the previous question. The Clinton Administration has no plans to modify these conditions.

UNITED NATIONS

Question. Reports by the U.N. Board of Auditors documented widespread waste, corruption and mismanagement at the United Nations. In fact, last September, The Washington Post ran a four-part series on that subject. What steps will you take to insure the creation of an independent inspector general who will be charged with monitoring the operations of the U.N. and investigating cases of waste and abuse?

Answer. The U.S. has been one of the strongest proponents of the proposal to create an independent U.N. Inspector General, modeled after the system that exists in

most U.S. federal agencies. It would be my intention to pursue vigorously the adoption and implementation of such a proposal.

Question. Do you support the current U.S. position of "no real growth" in the U.N. Secretariat and specialized agencies budget?

Answer. I believe the "zero-real-growth" principle has served a highly useful purpose in restraining U.N. expenditures and obliging the U.N. to redeploy resources from marginal activities to those deserving high priority. I would like to see us work closely with other concerned U.N. members to develop other, more effective mechanisms that will enable us to apply even greater budget restraint in some areas while allowing for expansion in areas of growing priority, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and support for democracy and human rights.

Question. Various U.N. reformers, including a commission composed of U.N. representatives from the Nordic nations, have proposed serious reforms for the economic and social arms of the U.N. Specifically, these reformers have supported the concept of a unitary U.N. wherein the various committees, commissions and agencies are merged into one entity—eliminating overlapping responsibilities. Do you support the unitary U.N. reform idea? If so, what steps will you take to bring it about?

Answer. I strongly support the "Unitary U.N." concept, which broadly speaking aims to address the serious problem of duplication and overlapping responsibility among the various agencies of the United Nations system. I know that a number of specific proposals have been put forward in this regard. I look forward to working with representatives of the Nordic nations and others in the vigorous pursuit of efforts to strengthen the effective direction and coordination of the full range of U.N. programs and activities.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING RECUSALS AND ETHICS

This statement will respond to the recusal and ethics questions that you requested I address. As you are aware, my recusal and disqualification undertakings, as set forth in my letter of January 11, 1993, to the Designated Agency Ethics Official at the Department of State, have been reviewed and approved by the State Department and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, after extensive consultation with my counsel. These officials have confirmed that my undertakings fully comply with all existing legal requirements, including regulations scheduled to go into effect next month. In the future, of course, I will continue to consult with appropriate ethics counsel in the State Department and the Office of Government Ethics to evaluate any specific issues that may arise.

Against this background, and cognizant of the fact that hypothetical questions often do not contain the full set of factual considerations that arise in the real world, I will attempt to respond to the questions that you have raised.

1. I am advised that the term "particular matter" is a legal term which is utilized in OGE regulations and in the basic federal conflict of interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208(a)), and that such term consistently has been used to define the scope of recusals for high-level officials in recent administrations. With respect to your understanding of the term "particular matter" as not including legislation, regulations, or general policy changes, I am advised that Office of Government Ethics regulations found at 5 C.F.R. Part 2635 (Federal Register, Friday, August 7, 1992) make clear that "particular matter" may cover matters that do not involve formal parties and may include government action such as legislation or policy making that is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable person or class of persons.

2. I believe that, under my proposed recusal agreement, I would be recused from participating in a matter in which I was aware that my former law firm was representing Cuba in an effort to lift the embargo against that country. It would follow, of course, that if anyone from the firm contacted me on the issue, I would recuse myself.

3. Because IRS regulations governing intra-company, international transfer pricing theoretically affect the interests of a broad range of companies, I am currently uncertain whether, under existing law, I could participate in Cabinet or Economic Policy Council deliberations on such issues in the event that my former law firm were retained by a group of Japanese manufacturers to represent them with respect to this issue. I suspect that the legal advice that I would receive would depend upon factual determination as to whether the issue, as formulated, is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable class of persons or conversely whether it is directed to the interests of a large and diverse group of persons. If this kind of issue were to arise, I would not participate in Cabinet or Economic Policy Council deliberations without consulting the appropriate ethics officials: and I would not

meet with representatives of O'Melveny & Myers regarding such an issue in any event. I would also fully adhere to the specific undertakings set out in my recusal letter.

4. I respectfully disagree that my recusal statement is limited, or that it presents any concerns over the appearance of a conflict of interest, or that it will in anyway undermine confidence in government and government officials. My recusal statement has been specifically approved, after substantial analysis, by the Department of State and the Office of Government Ethics. I have every confidence, moreover, that I will conduct myself in accordance with ethical standards that will bring credit to the Department and the administration that I have been asked to serve.

5. As is clear from my recusal letter, my recusals will not be limited to matters having a "direct and predictable" effect on my law firm's ability to pay future benefits due me. Beyond that, I would also note that "direct and predictable effect" is defined at 5 C.F.R. §2635.401(b)(1), which provides that a particular matter will have a "direct" effect on a financial interest if there is a close causal link between any decision or action to be taken in the matter and any expected effect of the matter on the financial interest of a person or entity. A particular matter will have a "predictable" effect if there is a real, as opposed to a speculative, possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest in question.

6. The definition of this term is set out in the regulations, 5 C.F.R. §2635.401(b)(1), to which I would respectfully refer you.

7. I am not certain what the thrust of this question is, but I generally agree that a law firm "benefits directly" from fees that it receives.

8. I am not sure of the context in which you are using the term "direct and predictable" here. My recusal decisions, however, will generally not be affected by the amount of fees received by my former law firm with respect to any matter.

9. In no instance would the fact that my former law firm's fees might vary based on the number of hours involved affect my recusal decision.

10. I am unable to answer this question beyond what I have already stated in my recusal letter, which has been filed with the Committee. As I have indicated throughout, I will apply the principles set forth in that letter, along with legal advice that I will secure on a case-by-case basis, to determine when recusal is appropriate.

11. My recusal letter states that I will not participate in any particular matter which in violation of applicable ethics rules would have a direct and predictable effect on my financial interests "or those of my spouse." I am advised that Office of Government Ethics regulations make clear that the financial interests of adult children who do not live in our home are not covered by the federal conflict of interest rules. All of our children are grown and live elsewhere. Nevertheless, as stated in my recusal letter, I will recuse myself on a case-by-case basis from any particular matter where it is desirable for me to do so in order to avoid the appearance or impropriety or impartiality, and that certainly would cover matters in which my children or other family members are or represent a party.

12. Yes, copy enclosed.

13. Yes, because my involvement will be unknown to my former agency and therefore there is no risk of "undue influence." The one exception to this general rule is that if I should become personally and substantially involved in trade negotiations during my tenure at the Department of State, I could not subsequently participate in any fashion with respect to matters affecting any foreign entity.

14. No, for a period of 5 years.

15. Yes, I could prepare such materials as long as I am not identified before the State Department as having been involved. In that way, the risk of any possible "undue influence" from my former government position is eliminated.

16. During the past 5 years at O'Melveny & Myers I have billed the following hours for legal work done for the following foreign companies:

Axa Midi Assurance—3 hrs.

DAI-ICI Mutual Life Insurance Co.—2 hrs.

TRANSFERS AND REPROGRAMMINGS OF 150 MONIES

Question. What is your position on the consultation and notification process with Congress on transfers and reprogrammings of 150 account monies?

a. Specifically, will you continue the historical practice of consulting with the majority and minority on reallocation of funds between and among accounts?

b. In addition, will you honor requests for information and consultation prior to obligation of funds? Specifically, when senator's concerns occasion a request to "hold" disbursement of already allocated, authorized or appropriated funds, will you honor such so-called "holds?"

Answer. a. As I have said on a number of occasions, I intend to consult and work closely with the Congress on matters affecting the conduct of our foreign relations. That certainly extends to matters involving the budgeting and allocating of resources. I am also prepared to respond to concerns that may be raised by members of Congress regarding a particular disbursement of already appropriated funds, although I believe this should not occasion indefinite delays in duly authorized actions that properly fall within the purview of the Executive Branch.

BIODIVERSITY

Question. Will you recommend that President Clinton sign the biodiversity convention?

Answer. The Clinton Administration supports the principles embodied in the biodiversity convention. We believe that the U.S. missed a golden opportunity to exert international leadership on environmental issues by failing to reach agreement on the convention. There are some troubling issues with respect to patent rights and intellectual property rights, particularly in terms of the relationship between the Convention and the Global Environment Facility, and the transfer of technology and sharing of benefits of genetic resources under the Convention. I will recommend to President-elect Clinton that we move expeditiously in trying to settle these issues so that we can find a basis on which the U.S. can join the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Question. What are your views on the international carbon tax?

Answer. The international community is deeply divided on the question of a carbon tax. Even the proposer of the tax, the EC, has not been able to reach a consensus on this issue. There are a number of questions which must be answered before we can determine the viability of such a tax. We are studying the issues and will assess whether it is in the U.S. interest to support the imposition of a carbon tax.

FAMILY PLANNING

Question. Will you support the continuation of the promotion and funding of "family planning" programs in developing countries?

Answer. The Clinton Administration believes strongly that family planning is critical in developing countries and, therefore, will fully support the promotion and funding of these programs.

Question. Are you familiar with the Chinese practice of forced abortions and sterilization and will you support the UNFPA which has programs in China?

Answer. We are aware of the Chinese government's practice of forced abortions and sterilization. We do not condone or support these coercive policies. However, we do support voluntary family planning programs around the world, including China. A recent report indicated that, although UNFPA has family planning programs in China, none of those programs contribute to or support any coercive family planning policies in that country. We see no reason why we cannot or should not support the excellent work that UNFPA is doing internationally.

ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS

Question. Should the United States deny certain U.S. technologies to countries such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, China, and Russia even if our allies do not take similar measures?

Answer. This issue must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. While as a general rule we do not want to penalize American exporters, we now deny certain sales to certain countries, for instance those that support terrorists, regardless of the policies of others and will continue to do so. Our preferred outcome will be to get other major exporting countries to join such denials.

Question. Do you see a continued need for a coordinated export policy under CoCom?

Answer. CoCom has been adjusting its regulations in response to the changing international situation and continues to do so. But procedures for coordinating the export policies of the major industrialized states remain valuable, and CoCom is one valuable way we have of doing so.

Question. How will you promote the strengthening of CoCom?

Answer. We will review all the nonproliferation instruments of the U.S. Government in keeping with the President-elect's commitment to give a high priority to this problem. That will include consideration of whether any specific additional changes to CoCom, or to other nonproliferation tools, would be helpful.

AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATIONS

Question. Will 85 percent of the Clinton Administration's State Department nominations be from the Career Foreign Service?

Answer. It is the President, of course, who has the authority to appoint ambassadors, with the advice and consent of the Senate. I have not yet had an opportunity to review this particular question with the President-elect. I know, however, that he has the highest regard for the Foreign Service and will draw upon the experience and ability of its career officers. At the same time, I believe the country can be well served by the appointment of men and women who can bring to the conduct of our country's foreign relations the perspectives and experience gained in other walks of life.

NARCOTICS ISSUES

The issues raised in the 40 questions on narcotics matters which I received separately from and later than the other questions submitted by Senator Helms were also addressed in questions submitted by Senator DeConcini. I have taken the liberty of enclosing my responses to those questions for your review.

I believe that the U.S. Government effort to stem the import of illicit drugs and to combat drug production and trafficking in foreign countries needs to be examined in light of the many legitimate concerns you have raised. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I intend to conduct such a review, in close cooperation with the many other departments and agencies of the U.S. government that are involved, and would value your views and suggestions.

Question. Do you see illegal drugs as a priority issue in U.S. foreign policy? Could you please outline what steps you plan to take to elevate the drug issue within the Department? Do you plan to elevate the top narcotics position at State to an Under Secretary level that carries greater weight within the Department?

Answer. Clearly, controlling the flow of illegal drugs into the United States is an issue that deserves to be an important part of our foreign policy. I will be looking at a number of proposals for restructuring the Department which could give international narcotics the attention it deserves. But at this time, I have no plans to create an Under Secretary for narcotics matters.

Question. In Bolivia, the U.S. has been paying coca growers \$2,000 per hectare to take them out of production. Production continues to increase and those growers who pocket the \$2,000 simply drive up the road, clear a new piece of jungle, and plant more coca.

This program is a loser and if the American taxpayer were better informed they would be outraged. Will you discontinue this program of paying growers to take their coca out of production?

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this program. But I appreciate your bringing your concerns and insights about it to my attention. I will certainly give it close scrutiny as we review our counternarcotics programs.

Question. In the last 20 years, the two most successful eradication programs (Turkey and Mexico) both relied on aerial spraying. Nowhere in Latin America is aerial spraying currently allowed. Will you attempt to institute aerial spraying in the big drug producer countries?

Answer. That is an important question that involves delicate diplomatic considerations and will require considerable discussion within the government before a decision is made. Since I have not had the opportunity to discuss this idea with the President-elect, I cannot make a such a policy decision today.

Question. If Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia will not allow aerial spraying, what steps would you recommend the U.S. take to send the message to these drug producers that we are serious about attacking drug production and we need cooperation?

Answer. As we evaluate our counternarcotics programs and work to strengthen our efforts to control the influx of drugs into this country, we will need greater cooperation from the governments of producing countries. Given the gravity of the threat some of those governments face from drug cartels, it does not promise to be an easy task. Nonetheless, their cooperation is critical to any success we might achieve. Therefore, we will work to obtain their maximum cooperation in combating this serious problem.

Question. In the past, the State Department has always found an excuse to do nothing when it comes to making corruption a foreign policy issue and demanding that governments take action. If the State Department has intelligence that senior government or military officials in a particular government are corrupt what steps do you plan to take in dealing with that government? Do you plan to address the

involvement of Syrian military officials in Lebanon with illicit drugs? What specific steps do you plan to take?

Answer. Again, these are sensitive and important issues that will require full discussion among the President's foreign policy and defense advisors. Since those discussions have not taken place, I cannot respond directly at this time. I can tell you, however, that the problem of corruption in drug producing countries is a very serious problem that we must address.

Question. How do you plan to maintain the leadership and the international momentum against drug trafficking that the United States has fostered over the past 4 years? Will President Clinton continue to meet with the Presidents of drug producing countries on an annual or semi-annual basis?

Answer. We would hope to maintain our leadership by giving this issue the high-level attention it deserves. Without committing him at this time, I am confident that President-elect Clinton will certainly consider meeting with the Presidents of drug producing countries as he sees fit.

Question. What will be the Administration's primary foreign policy emphasis in Latin America? And, how do you see the relationship between anti-narcotics programs, democracy, and human rights in this region?

Answer. President-elect Clinton has said that he intends to strengthen our economic ties with the countries of Latin America as part of his efforts to create new markets for American exports. He also wants to help strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights in these important countries. Since drug trafficking has a corrupting and corrosive impact on democratic institutions and human rights practices, counternarcotics programs can help a fragile democratic government withstand these pressures.

Question. The great majority of cocaine that is smuggled into the United States transits through Mexico. President Salinas has exhibited unprecedented cooperation on counternarcotics issues. How do you propose to maintain this level of cooperation? What specific steps will you take to ensure that this issue remains high on President Salinas' policy agenda? Were these issues discussed during the recent meeting with President Salinas? What can you tell me about these discussions?

Answer. We will work closely with President Salinas and the appropriate authorities in Mexico to continue the close cooperation we have enjoyed on this important issue. It is in the interest of both the United States and Mexico to reduce the amount of cocaine smuggled across our border. I believe this issue may have been raised during the meeting between President-elect Clinton and President Salinas. But since this was a private meeting between them, I cannot tell you anymore about these discussions than what President-elect Clinton and President Salinas said after their meeting.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY
SENATOR DOLE

ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN

Question. Last month the President of Armenia declared his country to be in a state of "national disaster" because of the severe shortages of food, fuel and medical supplies brought on by the 4 year long comprehensive blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan. What is the best policy for the U.S. to follow to end the blockade? Would you support the establishment of internationally supervised aid corridors through Turkey and Georgia to effect an end to the blockade?

Do you support the granting of Most Favored Nation status to Azerbaijan? Do you believe the 1992 Freedom Support Act restricts the granting of MFN because of the blockades? Would you support MFN status for Azerbaijan conditioned on lifting the blockades?

What more should the U.S. be doing with Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan to permit necessary food and fuel supplies to enter Armenia?

Answer. The situation in Armenia is indeed very serious as is the continuing Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. President-elect Clinton and his advisors will want to study all the information available to the U.S. government and consult with other interested parties before deciding how we might best contribute to resolving this tragic problem.

Question. A group of nuclear experts visited the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant in Armenia late last year. They concluded that a safe start up of the plant was possible if recommendation for plant improvements and personnel training were carried out. Would you support U.S. technical assistance to Armenia to reopen the plant?

Answer. We are very concerned about the safety of nuclear power plants throughout the former Soviet Union. Whether we should help reopen this particular plant will depend on a number of factors, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Question. On January 3 of this year, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin called for "an immediate end to the bloodshed" caused by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and a "drastic turn toward a political settlement" within the context of the CSCE conference. Since it appears that the CSCE process has produced no results so far, how do you suggest the U.S. reactivate these negotiations?

Answer. United States' participation has been critical in keeping these negotiations alive. I share your disappointment that no settlement has yet been reached, and assure you that we will remain alert to any opportunity to make progress.

Question. Do you favor greater U.N. participation in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

Answer. We will want to continually assess the situation and the state of the CSCE's efforts which, as you point out, have not yet borne fruit. If at any time greater U.N. involvement seems useful we will support it.

Question. Does the Clinton Administration support a guarantee of human rights for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh? How would that guarantee be enforced? Does the Administration support self-determination for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Answer. We support self-determination for all people. But I do not equate that with every ethnic group's having its own state, or indeed with the principle of states based on ethnicity. Often the better way, as your question suggests, is for all people to enjoy the full exercise of human rights in the states in which they live. As you know, all European governments, the U.S., and Canada have made quite sweeping commitments on human rights, including minority rights, in the CSCE, and the CSCE is acquiring new means for monitoring compliance and for moral suasion. We will want to do all we can to help ensure compliance.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY
SENATOR MURKOWSKI

CHINA/HONG KONG/TAIWAN

Question. As a lawyer, do you believe the renewal of MFN for China, as governed by the Jackson-Vanik provisions, can be subject to conditions other than free emigration?

Answer. Although President-elect Clinton has said that he supports conditional renewal of MFN for China, he has not determined when or how he will proceed on this issue since it will not confront him until later in the year. We will be examining this issue, particularly with respect to the Jackson-Vanik provisions, in the coming months.

Question. With the demise of the USSR, do you believe that the Jackson-Vanik provisions should be the determining factor for renewing MFN to non-market regimes?

Answer. This is a complicated question that would need to be discussed thoroughly among all of the President-elect's national security advisors. He has not decided at this point if Jackson-Vanik provisions should or should not be the determining factor in renewing MFN for non-market economies.

Question. What possible alternatives to conditioning MFN, if any, would you see as useful policies for deterring China from weapons proliferation or human rights abuses?

Answer. The President-elect will be considering his policy towards China in a careful and deliberate manner. We have not fully determined how to measure China's progress on these important issues or what alternatives to conditioning MFN might be available to encourage progress on proliferation and human rights. We will have more to say about this issue in the future.

Question. What characterization do you apply to Tibet in terms of a geographic/political entity?

Answer. U.S. policy for some time has been that Tibet is part of China. This is the position of all United Nations members. Otherwise, I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.

Question. What role do you feel the U.S. can or should play in the current argument over democracy in Hong Kong prior to 1997? Do you support the Hong Kong Policy Act passed by Congress and made into law last year?

Answer. The current dispute over Governor Patten's proposals for democratic reform in Hong Kong is a matter for Great Britain and China to settle in accordance with the Joint Declaration and in keeping with the views and aspirations of Hong Kong's people. The U.S. has important economic interests in Hong Kong, and we should be concerned about the welfare of its people. Governor Patten's proposals are constructive and deserve serious consideration, particularly since Hong Kong is promised under the Joint Declaration a high degree of autonomy after 1997.

The Clinton Administration will support the Hong Kong Policy Act.

Question. Do you believe that U.S. policy toward Taiwan is subjugated to our China policy, and if so, is that always in the U.S. interest? Can you foresee cases where it is not in U.S. interest?

Answer. U.S. policy is to recognize one China—mainland China—and the Clinton Administration will continue that policy. We will continue, however, to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the principles of the Taiwan Relations Act and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1978 and 1982. We believe these arrangements serve U.S. interests.

Question. Do you support Taiwan's membership in international organizations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? Should Taiwan's GATT accession be in any way linked to China's?

Answer. Although other officials will need to be consulted on this issue, I believe we would welcome Taiwan's accession into GATT as a separate customs territory when it meets GATT's requirements. It would be in our own interests to have Taiwan, which is one of our major trading partners, under GATT discipline.

The general view has been that China's and Taiwan's accession to GATT should move along simultaneously. But this is a subject that should be discussed further with our trading partners in GATT. It also should be part of our overall policy toward China, which we will consider in the coming months.

Question. Will you continue President Bush's recent policy change of allowing Cabinet level officials to visit Taiwan?

Answer. This is an issue that I have not discussed with the President and, therefore, cannot respond at this time.

JAPAN

Question. Do you believe the U.S. should encourage Japan to adopt a policy allowing it to send troops abroad?

Answer. Although this is ultimately a decision for the Japanese government to make, I believe Japan should be encouraged to adopt a policy that would allow it to send troops abroad as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

Question. What do you see as the role of the State Department in our trade dealings with Japan, specifically in our attempts to open their markets to American goods, and to lower the trade deficit?

Answer. President-elect Clinton has said that trade and economics should play a larger role in our foreign policy, and I agree with him. Therefore, we will take steps to enhance the Department's role in such matters as opening foreign markets to American products in Japan and other countries with which we maintain trade deficits.

Question. What effects, if any, do you see the current turmoil within the Liberal Democratic Party having on U.S.-Japan relations?

Answer. Any turmoil within the Liberal Democratic Party is a matter for the Japanese to settle. I am confident, however, that the United States and Japan will continue our strong friendship, and I look forward to working with the Japanese on issues of mutual concerns.

VIETNAM/CAMBODIA

Question. Do you believe the normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam should continue to be linked to either Cambodia or the MIA issue? Do you feel the same way about the U.S. trade embargo?

Answer. I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.

Question. Do you feel that President-elect Clinton's lack of military service in the Vietnam War will in any way impact on the normalization process?

Answer. No.

Question. Should the United States take a more leading role in the Cambodian peace process?

Answer. I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.

Question. If elections are held in Cambodia this spring without the participation of the Khmer Rouge, or people living in Khmer Rouge controlled territory, do you believe the U.S. can recognize the resulting government?

Answer. I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.

Question. Can you foresee any pressures being applied by the U.S. on Thailand, beyond the recent logging embargo, with relation to the Khmer Rouge and the peace process in Cambodia?

Answer. I refer you to the testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.

GENERAL

Question. Title III of the Freedom of Support Act, entitled Business and Commercial Development (Sec. 302), calls for a Business and Agriculture Advisory Council to advise the President regarding assistance programs and how they facilitate U.S. exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Do you expect to fulfill this authority and if so, what actions do you deem necessary to form the Council? Do you see this a role for State, AID, Commerce, or an interagency group?

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this legislation, and therefore cannot comment on it directly. I can tell you, however, that the President-elect is committed to facilitating exports not only to the CIS, but around the world. I intend to ensure that the State Department fulfills its responsibilities toward this important goal.

Question. As the Cold War era ends, do you foresee any shift within the State Department from a politico-military emphasis to a commercial and economic emphasis?

Answer. The President-elect has said that he believes economic and commercial considerations should play a larger role in our foreign policy. I agree with him and intend to ensure that the State Department fulfills its responsibilities on this issue.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR COVERDELL

TRADE

President-elect Clinton has sent mixed signals on trade issues. For example, he says he supports the Mexico Free Trade Agreement with the United States, but he has "some concerns."

Question. What specifically are these concerns?

Answer. The concerns which President-elect Clinton has are that the North American Free Trade Agreement must be fair to American farmers and workers, must protect the environment, and must require decent labor standards as well as adequate and full funding for worker retraining. We expect to shortly be addressing these concerns through negotiations with the other parties to the agreement.

Question. Will the Clinton Administration negotiate a free trade agreement with Chile? Argentina? When will negotiations begin?

Answer. As I indicated in my prepared statement, we hope, in close partnership with our hemispheric partners Canada and Mexico, to explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems. Argentina and Chile are two outstanding examples of countries which have successfully opened their economies and political systems.

EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

Question. In your statement this morning, you expressed your desire to make the Organization of American States more effective. How can the Organization of American States become more effective as an instrument to preserve and promote democracy in the hemisphere?

Answer. Senator, that is not a question I can answer at this time because we have not yet reviewed our options for increasing the effectiveness of the OAS. As we do we would expect to be consulting with the Committee on possible initiatives. I would note, however, that the present cooperative effort between the U.N. and OAS to restore democracy to Haiti, which we strongly support, offers an example of what the OAS can do to more effectively promote democracy in the hemisphere.

DRUGS

Question. What is your assessment of the importance of the political and national will of the drug producing and trafficking countries in the Andean Region—Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia?

Answer. I am not very encouraged by the political and national will of some of the drug producing and trafficking countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, in combating drug cartels and making counternarcotics a national priority. Part of this can be attributed to a lack of resources necessary to respond to the threat of drug cartels. But the problem is aggravated in some countries by the sheer size of

the cartels and their pervasive control over important sectors of society. It is a serious problem that will take years to overcome.

Question. What overall priority do you place on fighting drugs in Latin America in the Department of State agenda?

Answer. Narcotics control should be an important part of our foreign policy because it reflects the concern of the American people to take concrete steps to confront this serious threat. The Clinton Administration will give narcotics control the level of attention it deserves in our foreign policy.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Question. Given the services already provided by the United States military to the United Nations, for example, air lift, rations, etc., do you believe it is appropriate to impose additional burdens on the Department of Defense budget to pay directly for U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Answer. I believe this question deserves considered review and discussion. To the extent that the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts contribute to the achievement of U.S. security objectives, I believe it is reasonable to consider the use of DOD funds for those purposes. This is obviously a matter for discussion with the President-elect and Secretary of Defense-designate Aspin, as well as with concerned members of Congress.

Question. Given the size of the economies of the major European and Asian countries, do you believe it's appropriate for the United States to pay 31 percent of all U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Isn't the second largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping Japan at 12½ percent? Wouldn't it make more sense to make Japan pay more for U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia, and make European countries pay more for peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia?

Answer. I am aware that the current formula for calculating the rate according to which U.N. member states are assessed for the payment of U.N. peacekeeping costs is one that has been in existence for some time. I am also aware that, under that formula, the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council pay a larger proportion of peacekeeping costs than they do of regular U.N. expenses. I believe it would be appropriate to re-examine that formula to see whether it constitutes a fair and equitable basis for sharing the burden of these expenses.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PRESSLER

UNITED NATIONS

Question. There is no question that the United Nations is in desperate need of reform. The question is: How can meaningful reform be achieved?

Do you believe that reform should come from within the institution, with the charge led from the very top leadership?

As the primary source of U.N. support, what kind of role can the United States play to encourage, or insist upon U.N. reform?

Answer. There is an urgent need to press ahead with the process of reforming the United Nations and its various constituent agencies. That is the only way of ensuring that the U.N. is capable of assuming the greatly expanded role we and others would like to see it play, with respect to a wide range of issues. I believe that to succeed, the impetus for that reform effort must come both from within the organization and outside. I am encouraged by the steps that U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali has taken to date to streamline and rationalize the U.N., and to coordinate more effectively the activities of the various U.N. agencies. But more needs to be done, and the Clinton administration is prepared to play a lead role in working with other concerned member states of the U.N. to define and pursue an agenda for reform. I know that this will be one of the highest priorities of our next Representative to the U.N., Dr. Albright, if she is confirmed.

Question. In your estimation, Mr. Christopher, why aren't such blatant examples of abuse and fraud vigorously pursued? Is it because the U.N. lacks the will to change its character?

What would you recommend as a solution to discourage such fraudulent actions? What can be done? How active do you plan to be regarding U.N. reform?

Answer. I realize that there are serious problems in the way the United Nations is presently administered, but I believe it would be premature and a mistake to assume that these problems cannot be addressed and corrected. With respect to the issue of U.N. salaries, the U.S. has long been a proponent of a uniform pay scale

covering all U.N. agencies, as well as additional authorities to ensure compliance by all agencies. I do not expect that position to change.

Question. Why does the U.N. function in this matter? Would you support the creation of a tough, independent U.N. Inspector General? If so, do you believe that a U.N. Inspector General is likely to accomplish anything if the current U.N. system is not reformed?

Answer. I would certainly agree that a concerted effort must be made to dissuade the member states of the United Nations from viewing the U.N. as a kind of pork barrel for everyone's pet programs and projects. It seems to me that some progress was made in the 1987 when, in response to a U.S. initiative, the U.N. General Assembly agreed that the U.N. budget must be approved by consensus. That consensus procedure has allowed major contributors, like the U.S., considerably greater influence over budget decisions. I believe this procedure should be retained as an important base on which to build other budget restraint mechanisms.

Concerning a U.N. Inspector General, I am aware that the United States has been one of the strongest advocates of the creation of such a post, which would function in much the same way as the inspectors general found in most U.S. federal agencies. I understand that a proposal to this effect has been made and is receiving favorable consideration by Secretary General Boutros Ghali, as well as representatives of other nations. It would be my intention to work for the adoption of such a proposal.

JAPAN

Question. Are you willing to work with and encourage the Government of Japan to purchase additional U.S. agricultural products for humanitarian relief efforts, including programs in Somalia, in Bosnia/Herzegovina, and in the new republics of the former Soviet Union?

Answer. Increasing our agricultural exports should be an important part of our foreign policy. As a part of this effort, I would be very willing to work with and encourage our Japanese allies to purchase additional U.S. agricultural products for humanitarian relief efforts around the world.

UZBEKISTAN

Question. In light of their gross human rights conduct, should the United States continue non-humanitarian foreign aid to this country?

Will you urge a continuation of the Bush Administration policy not to invite President Islam Karimov to the United States?

Answer. Promoting democracy and human rights will be a major concern of the Clinton Administration. I cannot tell you now precisely how we will calibrate its efforts on this issue with regard to any particular country. We will need to consider the range of factors and assessments available within the Executive Branch and in many cases consult with Congress. But I assure you that we will make sustained use of all the political and economic instruments available to us.

KOSOVO

Question. Does President-elect Clinton intend to maintain a strong stand against Serbian aggression in Kosovo? Is he prepared to use military action? What other steps outside of U.S. military action can we take to deter Serb violence?

If the Geneva peace talks prove successful, would you support talks to establish an independent nation in Kosovo?

Do you support the establishment of a multi-national preventative force in Kosovo to deter possible Serb aggression in that region?

Do you support the establishment of a U.N. war crimes tribunal to try and convict those found guilty of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia?

Answer. The range of decisions relating to the Yugoslav tragedy are among the most difficult we face. President-elect Clinton will need to hear from all his advisors, as well as to draw on the expertise and assessments of the civilian and military experts in the career services before reaching a decision on any specific issue.

NON-PROLIFERATION

Question. Do you support continued suspension of U.S. assistance to Pakistan because of Pakistan's nuclear program?

What other actions can the U.S. pursue to exert influence on Pakistan's nuclear development?

Should we pursue the method of the Pressler Amendment to achieve non-proliferation and nuclear reduction goals in other regions? For example would you support withholding of financial assistance, international security guarantees, and

other aid to the Ukraine and other affected Russian Republics until they comply with the START, INF, and Non-Proliferation Treaties? If not, how does the President-elect intend to get these treaties ratified by all affected?

What specifically can the new Administration do to block attempts by Iran, Syria or Iraq to acquire advanced missile technology and weapons capability?

What specific steps will you take to get our European allies, Russia, and the affected former Soviet republics from selling nuclear technology to governments like Iran, Iraq, or even rogue paramilitary organizations in the region?

Do you believe that preserving Israel's qualitative military edge will deter the use of advanced missile or weapons technology by hostile regimes in the Middle East, or does our only hope rest with tough non-proliferation policies?

Answer. As I indicated in my testimony, stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will be a top priority of the Clinton Administration. One of the first things we want to do after taking office January 20th is to review all the policy tools we have available and assess both how best to use them and whether new tools would be useful. You will understand that I cannot now anticipate decision that have not yet reached the President's desk, or indeed mine. I can assure you that we will consult closely with the Congress on this critical problem. As I stated in answer to your question I am particularly concerned about the Pakistan case.

MIDDLE EAST

Question. What do you plan to do to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process? Will you be directly involved in this effort, or are you considering the appointment of a special envoy?

Answer. The President-elect and I are personally committed to doing whatever we can to ensure the success of the Middle East peace talks. The level and structure of U.S. involvement has not yet been decided although I can assure you that I will be directly involved in some way.

AGRICULTURE

Question. During your prior experience in the State Department, were you aware of Department efforts to utilize our Embassies to increase U.S. exports of agricultural products?

Would you be willing to utilize State Department resources, and particularly our embassies abroad, to increase U.S. agricultural exports? Would you be willing to encourage our embassies to promote agricultural trading missions between the U.S. and our trading partners?

Answer. Senator, when I spoke in my prepared statement of harnessing our diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers this clearly included American agriculture which is one of our most productive and important industries. And, when I committed to asking our foreign missions to do more to promote exports and actively assist American companies, I had in mind just the sort of efforts that you have suggested with reference to agricultural exports and trading missions.

Question. Do you support continuation of the Export Enhancement Program?

Answer. Yes. I refer you to my oral testimony for further clarification.

CUBA

Question. In your estimation, Mr. Christopher, what will be the Clinton Administration's policy regarding Cuba? What can the United States do to prevent a bloody revolution in Cuba, prevent human rights abuses, and promote free elections?

Answer. As I noted in my prepared statement, we will maintain the embargo to keep pressure on the Castro dictatorship. The Cuban Democracy Act which Governor Clinton supported gives us some new tools to both tighten the embargo and improve contacts with the Cuban people in humanitarian and communications areas. We hope we can use this act to help promote democratic change in Cuba.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BROWN

NARCOGUERRILLAS

Question. What efforts will you make as Secretary of State to aid governments threatened by narcoguerrillas?

Answer. Our current efforts to assist governments threatened by narcoguerrillas have had mixed success. While we should strengthen our efforts to control the ex-

port of narcotics from producing countries to the U.S., we should also expand our efforts to encourage productive economic activity and strengthen democratic institutions in these countries. This should include building independent and functioning judiciaries and rooting out corruption among the police forces.

DRUG SUMMITS

Question. Does the Clinton Administration plan to continue to foster the important dialogue which began with the Cartagena and San Antonio drug summits so that international anti-narcotics efforts are pursued in a coordinated and cooperative manner? Can we expect future international drug summits?

Answer. Without committing myself or the President to attend drug summits that may occur in the future, we would welcome the opportunity to foster international cooperation and dialogue on this important issue. If it becomes clear that a drug summit would strengthen our efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics, I suspect we would be pleased to participate.

COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Question. During the Carter administration, it was reported that you passed to the President of PBS a request from Saudi Arabia that PBS not air a film about the execution of a Saudi Arabian princess for committing adultery. In a cover letter to the President of PBS, you reportedly noted that the U.S. government could not attempt to censor PBS programming, but that the film deeply offended the Saudis and you were hopeful PBS would "give appropriate consideration to the sensitive religious and cultural issues involved." Apparently, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter stated at the time that the U.S. government had never before presented a television network with another nation's complaints about a program before it aired. Your move was criticized by Members of Congress, the *New York Times* and others.

Are these reports of your actions accurate?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If accurate, these actions seem to conflict with your stated commitment to human rights and democracy abroad. Could you please state for the record whether you have had any subsequent business dealings with the government of Saudi Arabia or with any of its members?

Answer. I have not.

Question. If these reports are correct, could you please share your views on this action and how you reconcile this action and your stated views on democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press?

Answer. When I sent the letter to PBS, I was merely transmitting the concerns of the Government of Saudi Arabia, concerns I did not endorse but certainly appreciated. I continue to maintain my strong support for the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press and I will pursue these noble objectives as Secretary of State.

INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT

Question. Does the Clinton Administration plan to continue these negotiations, or will the Administration, seeing the negative impact on coffee drinkers here at home, suspend them?

Answer. The President-elect and I have not had a chance to discuss this issue nor have I had the opportunity to look into this matter fully. I understand your concern about the potential for a negative impact on American coffee drinkers. Without committing myself, I can say that if the negotiations are resumed, we would certainly avoid entering an agreement that would adversely affect American consumers.

Question. Will the Clinton Administration enter into an agreement that would adversely impact the American consumer?

Answer. No. I refer you to the answer I just gave on this issue.

Question. Will the Clinton Administration commit to submitting any new coffee agreement to the Congress for formal ratification?

Answer. While being unable to commit myself at this time, I can assure you that I will fully consult with the Congress on this issue.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CHRISTOPHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY
SENATOR JEFFORDS

GUATEMALA

Question. Guatemala continues to suffer from vast social and economic inequalities and is still wracked by human rights violations. While President Serrano has indicated his commitment to civilian control of the military, to strengthening democracy and to reform of the judiciary system, he has not succeeded as well as we had hoped. The State Department has played a constructive role in encouraging reform but the situation continues to deteriorate. How do you propose to approach Guatemala in view of our limited economic aid and military ties with that nation?

Answer. I have not had the opportunity to examine the Guatemala situation in depth, Senator, and thus cannot at this juncture offer any prescriptions for new U.S. policies or strategies to deal with it. I am aware that the process of reform and democratization in Guatemala lags well behind that of many other countries in the region and that our influence there is limited. While exploring other options, I would expect that we will continue to target our economic assistance on the poorest sectors and on promoting judicial and economic reforms and will continue to firmly support the peace process and a negotiated settlement to the 30-year old civil conflict.

HONDURAS

Question. I would also like to draw your attention to a country that is often overlooked in foreign policy overviews—Honduras. As Vermont's partner in the Partners of the Americas program, I have had an interest in Honduras for some time. In spite of steady U.S. efforts to aid Honduras in its quest for development, it remains the second poorest country in the hemisphere. What changes would you propose in U.S. policy towards Honduras so that we can be more effective in promoting democracy, respect for human rights and economic development?

Answer. As with regard to Guatemala, Senator, I have not had the opportunity to seriously examine our relations with Honduras and therefore cannot at this juncture propose to you any policy changes. I appreciate your bringing to my attention your interest in Honduras. As we review our relations with that country in the months ahead we will be pleased to consult with you on how we can be more effective in promoting our interests there.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFFORDS

Mr. Chairman: I join my colleagues in welcoming Warren Christopher to this committee. I also join in congratulating him on his selection by President-elect Clinton for this critical and prestigious post. His experience in foreign policy matters and his ability to manage people have clearly earned the deep respect of Bill Clinton. And on those occasions when our paths have crossed over the years, Mr. Christopher has earned my respect as well.

As the Secretary-designate is well aware, this is a time of great opportunity in U.S. foreign policy—and also a time of great challenge. For almost half a century we have carried the burden of world leadership and successfully warded off the threat of nuclear war. And now that the rivalry of the superpowers no longer dominates our foreign policy, we are suddenly free to put our creative energies to work in new ways. And I believe we have an obligation to the American people to make world leadership a positive experience at home. And how do we do this? From my short conversations with him, I believe Mr. Christopher has some very good ideas about how we can do this, but let me just stress several aspects that I feel are important.

First, we have earned the right to concentrate on America. We badly need investment in our economy, our educational system, our infrastructure and our environment. Our future as a nation will be determined by how well we accomplish these tasks. For years I have argued that national security consists of more than just a strong defense, but also a sound economy and a hopeful citizenry.

Secondly, as the world becomes a smaller place, as the economy becomes more global and as grave injustices in far away places demand our involvement, it becomes clear that we cannot realize these hopes for America without interacting with the rest of the world. A sound U.S. economy depends on strong U.S. trade. And a positive environment for international trade requires greater equality in national standards of living, in respect for labor rights, in protection for the environment and investments in the future. The evolution of the former Soviet Union is a vivid example of the importance of a level playing field. We have a critical opportunity to en-

courage democracy and a free market, not just for them, but for us—to ensure that we are not undercut in the world economy by new countries whose businesses may have no obligation to respect the rights of their workers, to protect their environments or to allow free competition.

And lastly, I would urge that Congress and the State Department combine their considerable resources to investigate new ways of maintaining international security. Several of my colleagues have made reference to a possible new system of collective security. I also am interested in ways of using existing organizations such as the United Nations more effectively. We cannot take on sole responsibility for every Somalia, every Yugoslavia or every Iraq. But we can take the lead in developing creative new ways to deal with international disputes and national tragedies. I look forward to working with Mr. Christopher and my colleagues on these issues.

Before I enumerate a few specific questions, I feel obligated to comment on one area of my recent involvement with Mr. Christopher that has been discussed in the press of late. As the Ranking Member on the Near East and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee, I was a member of the Senate October Surprise investigation. In the course of our investigation of the actions of the 1980 Reagan presidential campaign and the Carter Administration relating to the release of the American hostages in Iran, we requested the cooperation of Mr. Christopher. Under oath, he shared with us his recollections of the events of 1980 and early 1981. Mr. Christopher clearly stated that he had no evidence of any attempt by members of the Reagan campaign to delay the release of the hostages, and does not now believe that this occurred. He summarized for the investigation his efforts as President Carter's chief negotiator to obtain the release of the hostages, and we found no reason to doubt the dedication of that effort. I firmly believe that the insinuations that Mr. Christopher may have played politics with the hostages situation or offered a quid pro quo of selling arms to Iran are unfair and unfounded. As far as I know, the House October Surprise task force shares this assessment. Enough said on this issue.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL OLSON, CHAIRMAN, STATE DEPARTMENT WATCH

State Department Watch is a nonpartisan public interest foreign policy watchdog group. It is our intention to present four issues continuing on from the Bush Administration which the nominee Warren Christopher should supply views on.

These issues are (I) the ongoing constitutional crisis and the policy questions surrounding the US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement; (II) the failure of the U.S. government to follow up on the Cold War victory to collect funds owed by the former Soviet Union to American citizens and to the U.S. government; (III) the problem of support for foreign slave labor by U.S. companies and the U.S. government; and (IV) the failure to exert maximum exclusive economic zone jurisdiction for all U.S. territory.

I. US-USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENT

This agreement was signed by Secretary of State James A. Baker III on June 1, 1990, approved by the U.S. Senate in September 1991, and ratified by President George Bush in December 1991. It, however, has not been entered into force due to the failure of the USSR to ratify it, and the dissolution of the USSR government. The ongoing constitutional and policy problems with it are as follows:

A. The agreement affects the boundary of Alaska and the land and seabed territory of Alaska. Nevertheless, the negotiations by the Department of State leading up to the agreement did not include any representative of the State of Alaska, and the State of Alaska has not been asked to give its consent to the terms. This exclusion of Alaska has created a constitutional crisis in our federal system of government, whereby the federal government is asserting the power to set a state's boundary and compromise a state's territory, seabeds, and property without the participation or consent of the state. A clear precedent of a state's right in this regard was set in the boundary between Maine and Canada, the negotiations for which required the participation and consent of both Maine and Massachusetts (which had residual interests in the area) and ended up as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. This principle was very strenuously argued by the state legislatures of Alaska (nearly unanimous) and California (unanimous) which both passed resolutions objecting to this arrogation of power (Alaska Senate Joint Resolution 12, May 1988; and California Senate Joint Resolution 20, September 1991).

B. At the same time of the signing of the US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement on June 1, 1990, Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed a side agreement as follows: " * * * pending the entry into force of that (US-USSR Maritime Boundary) Agreement, the two Governments agree

to abide by the terms of that Agreement as of June 15, 1990.* * * Two major constitutional problems are generated by this side agreement:

1. This side agreement was not made public at the time of its signing; it was not mentioned in either the President's transmittal of the agreement to Congress, the Department of State's testimony to the Senate on the agreement, the Committee report on the agreement, or on the floor debate on the agreement. It came to light only after the Senate vote. This omission leads one to question whether the Congress had been misled by the Department of State.

2. The validity of this side agreement is in question. It would seem that an agreement solely by the executive branch with a foreign government cannot result in exactly the same thing that a treaty would be needed for (as was the case with the US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement). Otherwise, what necessity would the treaty be? Was the debate and vote on the Maritime Boundary Agreement merely a pointless sham in the eyes of the Department of State, which appears to have been operating under its own side agreement to accomplish exactly the same terms and conditions as the Maritime Boundary Agreement would.

3. The Department of State appears to have been operating under its side agreement and implementing its terms and conditions from June 1990 to the present in the absence of a treaty being entered into force. This raises two major inquiries: (a) exactly what actions and directives have been done to implement the side agreement by the Department of State and other executive branch agencies?, and (b) in the event this side agreement is determined to be unlawful, what personal liability might there be for this misconduct, and what governmental liability might there be for takings of property of individuals and the State of Alaska?

C. The maritime boundary line is drawn in the agreement in such a way as to place eight islands that are arguably part of Alaska on the Soviet side of the line. These are Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta Islands in the Arctic Ocean, and Copper Island, Sea Lion Rock, and Sea Otter Rock at the westernmost end of the Aleutians. Not only does this call into question the wisdom of conceding so much of the exclusive economic zone to the Soviet side (i.e. the 200 nautical mile radius from each of those islands), but it also creates doubts about U.S. and Alaskan sovereignty over these islands and their seabeds. The areas involved are measured in the tens of thousands of square miles, and the seabeds could well contain vast resources of petroleum, fisheries, and other valuable assets.

D. The agreement has a unique provision in it which allows a foreign government to exercise its jurisdiction within the United States. In article 3, paragraph 2, it reads regarding a "western special area" on the U.S. side of the maritime boundary: "* * * the United States agrees that henceforth the Soviet Union may exercise the sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from the exclusive economic zone jurisdiction that the United States would otherwise be entitled to exercise under international law.* * *" Such a cession of U.S. sovereignty seems to be unwarranted and violating the principle that foreign government should have sovereign rights in the United States only on the grounds of their embassies. Moreover, inasmuch as the Maritime Boundary Agreement has not been entered into force, it bears investigating to determine how the Department of State has implemented this cession of sovereignty under its side agreement, what liability has arisen therefrom.

II. FAILURE TO COLLECT DEBTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Inasmuch as the Cold War was purportedly won for the benefit of the American public, this has not rung true for the American public with regard to collecting monies owed to it by the former Soviet Union.

A. *Debts to Individuals.*—Thousands of claims against the former Soviet Union have been processed through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, but the Department of State has not aggressively helped to collect them.

B. *Victims of Shootdown of KAL007.*—The Soviets freely admit to shooting down the civilian airliner, but have ignored any responsibility to compensate the victims' families for loss of life or the airline for the loss of the aircraft. One of the murdered passengers was a U.S. congressman Larry McDonald. The Department of State has not pressed for damages.

C. *World War II Lend-Lease Debt to U.S. Government.*—According to the 1972 agreement with the Soviet Union, the Lend-Lease debt was compromised by the Department of State down from approximately \$11.3 billion (with no interest from 1945) to approximately \$931 million. The Soviets paid \$275 million, and the balance was to be paid when the Soviets obtained most-favored-nation trading status. Sev-

eral parts of the former Soviet Union have been granted MFN, but the Department of State has not pressed for payment of this Lend-Lease debt.

D. *World War I Debt to the U.S. Government.*—The Russian government debt to the U.S. government during World War I was defaulted by the Soviets in 1918. In the 1930s the Johnson Anti-Default Act was passed to prohibit a foreign country from borrowing in the United States if it is in default to the U.S. government. The Department of State has refused to press for repayment of this World War I debt, which amounts to about \$1 billion with interest. Moreover, it lobbied hard to pass a special provision in the “FREEDOM Support Act of 1992” which specifically exempted the former Soviet Union (but no other country) from the Johnson Act.

These failures to collect monies for individuals and for the U.S. taxpayer from the former Soviet Union appear to be a conscious policy of the Department of State. It certainly does not reflect the ability of the former Soviet Union to pay its debts. The former Soviet Union has several billions of dollars in saved defense expenditures now. In addition, several billions of dollars have been sent out of the Soviet Union in recent years to foreign bank accounts and other investments. The Department of State ought to be helping to find those funds and attach them forthwith.

III. SUPPORT FOR SLAVE LABOR IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Widespread slave labor exists today in China (with about 15 million in the laogai facilities) and the former Soviet Union (with about 4 million in the gulags).

As we all know, the U.S. constitution outlaws slave labor in the United States, and the Tariff Act of 1930 outlawed the importation of goods made in whole or in part by slave labor.

However, overseas activities of the federal government are not covered by existing legislation. The Department of State (including the Agency for International Development) does not have a policy to avoid buying slave-made goods overseas for use overseas; nor does it recommend that other federal government agencies (such as the Department of Defense) implement an anti-slave labor buying policy for overseas purchasing; nor does it recommend that U.S. companies adopt anti-slave labor policies for overseas purchases for overseas use.

Moreover, the Department of State has been lax in regard to the human rights situation in China and the former Soviet Union to monitor the slave labor facilities there, and to assist the Customs Service in its role in enforcing the ban on slave-made goods. Its “agreement” with the Chinese government regarding the slave labor facilities there lacks any credibility and enforceability. It has no agreement on the subject with the former Soviet Union.

IV. FAILURE TO EXERT MAXIMUM EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE JURISDICTION

There are several American islands for which the exclusive economic zone has not been exerted. Failure to assert the EEZ means the United States is denied the utilization of the 200 nautical mile radius from the island, or approximately 125,000 square miles. These islands include the following:

- A. Navassa Island (in Caribbean)
- B. Washington Island, Fanning Island, Kingman Reef, and Baker Island (in Pacific)
- C. Nassau (in vicinity of Northern Territories of Cook)
- D. Peaked Island (west of Attu in Aleutians)
- E. Copper Island, Sea Lion Rock, and Sea Otter Rock (at western end of Aleutians, part of Alaska purchase)
- F. Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta (in Arctic Ocean)

WASHINGTON, DC,
January 14, 1993.

The Honorable CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I support the nomination of Warren Christopher to be Secretary of State.

As President Jimmy Carter's Deputy Assistant for Congressional Liaison (Senate), I was involved in a number of foreign policy and national security issues in which then-Deputy Secretary of State Christopher's analyses, decisions and actions had enormous domestic and international implications. He never faltered or wavered. In my view, superlatives cannot adequately describe the depth and breadth of Chris's intelligence, judgment, perseverance and, of course, his personal integrity and sense of propriety.

Finally, a personal note. I shall always treasure my Presidential commission because of the two signatures it bears—that of Jimmy Carter, whom I was honored to serve for 4 years, and that of Warren Christopher, the finest person and the most able public servant I know.

Sincerely,

DAN C. TATE

WOLF, BLOCK, SCHORR AND SOLIS-COHEN,
PHILADELPHIA, PA,
January 12, 1993.

The Honorable CLAIRBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

DEAR SENATOR PELL: I ask permission that the following comments be inserted in the record of hearings on the nomination of Warren M. Christopher for the Office of Secretary of State.

While I write this in a personal capacity, my own background includes the following: former Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under President Carter, Alternative Representative to the Third Committee of the United Nations, Senior U.S. Delegate to the CSCE Conference in Madrid (1980) and Public Member of the CSCE Conference in Moscow (1991).

I am currently a member of the United States Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, a Member of the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law, Chairman of the International League for Human Rights and Chairman of the International Bar Association Standing Committee on Human Rights and a Just Rule of Law. I am also on the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association with special responsibilities in the field of international practice, and am a former member of the ABA Standing Committee on the Judiciary.

I have been particularly active in the Jewish community having served as President of the Jewish Publication Committee of America, National Vice President of the American Jewish Committee and Chairman of its Foreign Affairs Commission, Senior Vice President of the American Jewish Congress, Chairman of the Blaustein Institute for Human Rights and past President of Har Zion Temple, Philadelphia and past President of the American Jewish League for Israel in Philadelphia. I am a Life member of the Board of Governors of Hebrew University and a member of the International Board of Governors of Tel Aviv University. I mention these affiliations as relevant to comments I will make shortly.

I have known Mr. Christopher since the 1960s, when he first served in the Department of Justice. During that time I was involved in the American Bar Association and headed its Section of Individual Rights.

Mr. Christopher was deeply committed to civil rights and civil liberties and exhibited his support time after time to those involved in the civil rights struggle then going on. At the time, I was on the executive committee of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which I helped found. The Civil Rights efforts of that Committee could not have had a stauncher friend than Warren Christopher.

During the late 1960s and early 1970, Mr. Christopher was on the Council of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights where he was a champion of pro bono services by lawyers, legal services for the poor and other endeavors furthering human rights. He would have become chairman of the ABA Section had not the other duties compelled him to refuse that post.

While I was the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and U.S. representative on the Third Committee of the General Assembly, issues arose regarding Israel, State Department reports on Israel and U.N. resolutions on the occupied territories. Based on my own knowledge and discussions with senior State Department officials, I can affirm that Mr. Christopher was always sensitive to Israel's security needs as well as its aspiration as a struggling democracy. He gave no comfort to resolutions lacking proportionality or unfairly condemning Israel, and was mindful of the fact that for so many years Israel has tried to bring about a just peace in the Near East and has struggled against bellicose Arab states.

I have been involved in working for the creation of the state of Israel and have supported Israel's democracy all of my life. I believe Mr. Christopher should be regarded as a warm supporter and champion of democracy and security for Israel. Any contrary implications are unfair and unfounded in reason or fact. As an active member of the Jewish community, I wholeheartedly welcome his appointment.

I should also mention Mr. Christopher's support of human rights during his tenure as Deputy Secretary of State. I was entrusted with the mission of obtaining con-

demnation by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights of Argentina's Junta and its role in thousands of disappearances. Part of that mission was to establish a Working Group to investigate disappearances. Within the State Department, some officials advocated a neutral, if not sympathetic stance respecting Argentina, and opposed these human rights initiatives. I am glad to report that Mr. Christopher vigorously supported the human rights endeavors I pursued in Geneva and at the United Nations and did not allow them to be subverted by any State Department official.

Mr. Christopher's exceptional judgment, his commitment to democracy, his service of our nation and his organizational and diplomatic skills have won the admiration of all who worked with him over the years. He will add luster to the office of Secretary of State.

President Clinton and this nation are to be congratulated on Mr. Christopher's selection as our next Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

JEROME J. SHESTACK

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH,
WASHINGTON, DC,
January 11, 1992.

The Honorable CLAIRBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

DEAR CHAIRMAN PELL: We are writing to commend the qualifications of Warren Christopher to serve as Secretary of State in the Clinton administration. In our opinion, Secretary-designate Christopher is a fine choice for this important Cabinet position.

Secretary-designate Christopher has impressive credentials for the job of Secretary of State, compiled during a distinguished career in public service and law. He has demonstrated a commitment to fairness and principle—coupled with a high degree of honesty and integrity in his work.

Mr. Christopher's background and involvements have prepared him well to implement the foreign policy positions of President-Elect Clinton. We look forward to working closely with him and urge the Committee and the full Senate to act expeditiously to confirm his nomination.

Sincerely,

MELVIN SALBERG,
National Chairman
ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN,
National Director

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