


ORMOND

PHILOSOPHY FROM  
DESCARTES TO KANT

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
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NOTES ON PROF. <sup>✓</sup>ORMOND'S  
Philosophy from DesCartes to Kant.

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LECTURES.

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
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# PHILOSOPHY

FROM

## Des Cartes to Kant.



*The Fall of Medievalism.*—Its fault was lack of freedom under the dominance of the ecclesiastical and political systems.

Three movements—(1) *Theologico-Religious*, following the Renaissance, was an unsuccessful attempt to reconstruct the modern consciousness on classic models. If modern thought would go back to Christianity, it would find inspiration for a greater life than the world has seen. (2) *Scientific*. The scientific spirit had not sufficient play under mediaevalism. A revolt began with the Arabs, but Francis Bacon was the great prototype and embodiment of the scientific movement. (3) *Philosophical*. Des Cartes initiated this movement. Motives (a) negatively, rebellion against the traditional ideas in philosophy and against the restrictions of the old regime. Men had tried to adapt their thought to the thinking of Aristotle. (b) Positive, independent inquiry. It is only as an age asserts its right to settle its own problems that it can understand old masters. Traditionalism had become so great an evil that they swept it away, and individualism became too marked. It was one-sided. The threads that bind the present with the past are necessary to perfect progress. The historic spirit has grown gradually until, in the nineteenth century, it dominates.

DES CARTES (1596–1654) was born at La Haye, France. At the College of La Fleche, under the Jesuits, until sixteen. He studied little except pure mathematics and loved that for its clear ideas and well-defined method. He early began applying these universally. Two years in Paris society. Two years of hard study. He thought philosophy should be reformed, but before making the attempt spent several years in war and travel. First in the army of Maurice of Nassau, and afterwards under the Elector of Bavaria. It was while on garrison duty in the winter of 1619–20 that he made his great discovery, viz., the application of the mathematical method to physics and to philosophy. He spent three years in Paris in the society of men of the world rather than of the learned. Then retired to a quiet place in Holland, used books little, experimented and thought patiently, entered into correspondence with eminent men in the same pursuits in Europe, and soon acquired a high reputation as an original and profound thinker. He is the inventor of analytical geometry, and the “father of

modern philosophy." His chief philosophical works are, "Discourse on Method," 1637; "Meditations," 1641; "Principles of Philosophy," 1644.

*The Cartesian Method.*—Three preliminary considerations: 1. *Method of Doubt*—He found nothing in philosophy which was not subject to dispute and resolved to test the entire sphere of his experience by doubt. 2. *The Starting Point of Knowledge.*—He denied the existence of all, and had left—nothing but the denial itself. That could not be doubted. Doubt is thought. Thought exists and with it the thinking subject, *Cogito ergo sum*. This reality of self is indubitable, and must constitute the starting point. 3. *Method of Evolution*—He applies the mathematical method to the starting point. He must distinguish between logical ideas or conceptions of things, and perceptions which are simply representations. The system rests on the former. *Four Resolutions*—1. To accept only the clear and distinct as true. 2. To resolve everything into its simplest conceptions—a mathematical idea. 3. To proceed from the simple to the complex in building up—the idea of mathematical deduction. 4. To review frequently in order to prove all work.

*Cartesian Doctrine.*—Its *basis* is the ideal content of consciousness which he assumes. *Classification* of the content.—1. *Innate* ideas. 2. *Fictitious* ideas, notions formed by abstraction and generalization. 3. *Adventitious* ideas of the material world, which have gotten into consciousness through the senses. The second class may be purely fictitious; the third may be illusory. Innate ideas alone are so clear and distinct as to banish all doubt. These are the primary data of science and philosophy—ideas of self, substance, cause, God, and axioms of mathematics. Philosophy involves ideas of substance, of self, of cause, and of God. Anselm had said that the idea of God proves his existence. Des Cartes brings all his resources, so far as he has gone, to prove God's existence, and this constitutes his theology. Evidence for God's existence from the idea of Him in consciousness may be founded: 1. On the content of the idea. The idea of God is that of the *Eus realissimum*—existence is a necessary part of the idea—hence God exists. 2. On the relation of the idea to the principle of causation. A relative, finite consciousness cannot produce the idea of an infinite absolute being—hence God must exist as its adequate cause. 3. On the relation between man's ideas of self and his idea of God. The idea of God is not simply the negative of his idea of self—but the ideas of the two, as the infinite and the finite, presuppose and involve each other. This is the germ of the profoundest idea in modern philosophy.

*Application of the theistic postulate* gives rise to three ideas of substance: 1. The divine uncreated substance. 2. Created thinking substance or mind. 3. Created extended substance or matter. The basis of his system is the thinking substance. He proceeds to the divine, and lastly to extended substance or matter. Development of the *idea of the world as extended substance*. He deduces its primary *attributes* and finds it infinitely divisible, continuous, quantitatively determined in bulk. This sphere of space which resists has *two modes*, rest and motion. The divine substance imparts motion to the inert world, a mechanical view of nature. Des Cartes, like Aristotle, looked upon God as *actus purus*, energizing all He touches. The earth's action is a contained motion, and hence orderly. He adopted the vortical theory of motion in all matter and the heliocentric theory of the sun's posi-

tion. Des Cartes vindicates the reality of matter by asserting the veracity of God. Thinking substance has the concept of extended substance. Whence? From God, and it must be true if God is to be trusted. But God is trustworthy, else He is not God. Hence, the world of matter exists.

*Relation of God to the Cartezian System.*—We may conceive God as the Creator, the unconscious principle of order in nature, the conscious principle of order in humanity, and have the principle on which the conscious mind may know unconscious matter—a principle running through the whole. This profound hint is developed by later thinkers into the relation between the sphere of the Absolute and that of the relative. In other respects God seems to be an afterthought.

Two movements from Des Cartes: 1. RATIONAL, a *Development of Cartezian Ideas and Methods in France, Holland and Germany.*—1. The idea of God, especially that of his relation to our knowledge of the world, led to a development in France and elsewhere. *Arnold Geulincx* (1625-1669), a disciple of Des Cartes, the first representative, framed the philosophy of *Occasionalism*. An affection of the body is the occasion of our knowledge of it, but the dualism prevents our mental contact with it. The bodily affection is the occasion and God causes the representation in the mind. Likewise, our will is simply the occasion of a divine interposition in moving the arm. Yet the will does not cause God to act as the servant of human choice. He has prearranged the universe (according to Schwegler) so that thought and matter always work harmoniously—like two clocks which run together because made to do so. *Nicholas Malebranche* (1638-1715), the second representative, adopts the starting point of Des Cartes and the occasionalism of Geulincx, but attempts to add to the latter by making the theory of knowledge more rational. How does God cause the ideas of extended substance? He is the place of all that exists—of both ideas and of their objects; the higher Mean between the *ego* and the world. In Him we behold ideas, we being so strictly united or one with Him that He may truly be called the place of minds. His one idea is that the mind sees all things in God. It is one step toward the pantheism of Spinoza.

2. The idea of *substance* led to the system of SPINOZA. *Benedict Spinoza* (1632-1677) was born at Amsterdam of Jewish parents, who, as wealthy tradespeople, had been banished from Portugal. He received a finished education, studying diligently the Bible and the Talmud. In his fifteenth year he broke with Judaism, was excommunicated, and took up the study of physics and the works of Des Cartes. He did not formally accept Christianity; but to escape persecution, which went so far as an attempt upon his life, he left Amsterdam and finally settled at the Hague. Four periods: The breach with Judaism, the discipleship of Des Cartes, the breach with Des Cartes, and the time of independent thought. Of his works the *Ethica*, a complete treatise on philosophy, was most important.

*Sources of His Philosophy.*—1. He had imbibed the lofty monotheism of Judaism. It is not to be wondered at that he presents this view of the world again, "this view of absolute identity;" for in a sense it is merely the voice of his national religion—the echo of the Orient. In the Old Testament God embraces the entire sphere of causality; there are no second causes. The Jewish cultus came into contact with the Greek philosophy in Alexandria, and its effect was so potent as to give rise to such sys-

tems as that of Philo. Out of this spring flowed a stream of speculative thought, modified by Platonism, and represented by such men as Maimonides and Gersonides, which continued throughout the middle ages. From this stream the young man drank the inspiration of his earliest speculative thought. 2. To Des Cartes he owes his independent impulse. His works were Spinoza's text-books.

*Spinoza's Method.*—This is the Cartezian method carried out logically—the rigid application of mathematical conceptions and processes to the problems of philosophy. It presupposes two orders—that of thought and that of nature—which are correlated and parallel to each other. The order of nature is conceived as flowing from God, a necessary system in which every part has its fixed nature and place. That being true, if thought pursues the order of necessity it will reach all things, the whole concept of the universe—the ideal side of reality or knowledge. He lays down certain axioms and propositions at the beginning of each book and proceeds to demonstrate everything. The finite is that which is limited by another like itself. The fundamental idea of his system is *omnis determinatio est negatio*. An *attribute* is that which mind perceives to be the essence of substance. All attributes are fundamentally two, viz., the two created substances of Des Cartes, mind and matter. These are the forms under which the one substance reveals itself. A *mode* is that through which something else is conceived. Considered under the attribute of thought, individual things are ideas; under the attribute of extension they are bodies. Each finite thing is a limited portion of absolute substance, possessing the two attributes, and is called a mode. Modes are related to the one substance as rippling waves to the water of the seas. These three notions lie at the basis of his system—substance, attribute and mode.

*Freedom.*—That is free which exists by the sole necessity of its nature and acts only as its own self-determining cause. That is necessary which owes its existence to another, and acts as the result of fixed and determined causes external to itself. Existence is eternal in so far as it is conceived to flow necessarily from its own essence.

*Axioms.*—1. Of identity: Everything which is, is either in itself or in some other thing *per se* or *in se*. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself. 2. Causality: A determinate cause being given, the effect necessarily follows and *per contra*. The knowledge of the effect depends on knowledge of the cause. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood by means of each other. 3. Correspondence between thinking and being. The true idea or representation must agree with the object represented. If anything can be conceived as not existing its essence does not involve existence. He then proceeds in strict mathematical form to state and demonstrate his system.

## OUTLINES OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.

*Questions: Is Spinoza a pantheist? He is a strict pantheist.* It is the finest and most logical of all pantheistic systems. *The relation of attributes and substance.* Attributes are the *essence* of substance; because if they be taken away there is no substance. Conceive the divine substance as a sphere within which are two spheres produced by divine energy and possessing a common centre. The two inner spheres are identical, yet to us different—



mind and matter. Substance has an infinite number of attributes, but only two are known to us—thought and extension.

1. *Philosophy of God or Theology.*—(1) God's nature: He is first, substance which is self-existent. God is *causa sui*, containing causality but uncaused by anything outside of Himself. His attributes are infinite in both quantity and quality.

(2). *God's Relation to Nature.*—Distinguishing between *natura Naturans* and *natura naturata*, the former is God; the latter is produced or generated nature, including the world and man. Hence a series of dualistic conceptions like infinite and finite, ground and manifestation, etc. In one sense the whole universe is extension; from the standpoint of the other attribute the whole universe is thought or thinking. Spinoza is both a materialist and a spiritualist. What is the nexus between God and nature? Spinoza places such great stress on causation that it is impossible to conceive that he teaches a static relation between God and the world. He brings into prominence the genetic or dynamic relation between the two and this is a great step; for if God is the origin of all, then it is necessary to conceive a dynamic connection between God and the world. His system ceases to be quite so pantheistic at this point, as the world comes to be a product.

2. *Philosophy of Nature.*—(1). *Cosmology.* The category of nature is extension. It is a manifestation of divine energy. Individual things are modes of the divine essence—in that essence, not external to it. The divine substance and its material manifestation are connected, the former as the *Causa prima* of the latter. Things are related to each other in a series as *causæ secunde*.

*The Limit and Reality of Nature.*—Time is not a limitation, but one of the manifestations of nature. Manifestation is as eternal as God; some manifestation must always exist. It possesses no reality independent of the divine. Being has two sides or aspects. From the side of reality it is God; from the side of the world or *natura naturata* or manifestation. Approaching from the side of the divine, God absorbs nature and we feel the pantheism; approaching from the side of nature, nature absorbs God—a two-sided system. God is immanent and this is Spinoza's Naturalism.

(2). *Anthropology.*—The differentia of this sphere is thinking. Spinoza always gives the universal manifestation and then defines its modes. The universal form of thought-manifestation is God's "infinite intellect," which is only generically analogous to the human intellect. It is human intellect divested of consciousness and personality—a universal substance whose function is to think. A. *Psychology.*—Finite intellects rise out of this as modes, the phenomena of thinking. The soul is dual—a synthesis of the ideal and the extended, both spiritual and physical—the most adequate expression of the divine. The mind is distinct from the soul as a pure and monal mode of thinking and substance. Mind is in the soul. *Relation of mind to body.*—Mind is defined as "the idea of the body." He means that there are two series, the bodily and the mental, which form a dual synthesis. The former is made up of affections of the body; the latter of ideas of these affections. *Relation of the body to the material world* is that of a medium through which the world enters the mind. *Relation between the bodily series and the mental.*—The former does not impress itself on the mind; there is no causal relation between them. Neither are they the occasions of each other

as Geulinx taught. The relation is one of complete and necessary parallelism, the root of which is in God. This is Spinoza's solution of the Cartesian dualism.

The *problem of Knowledge* is solved by carrying out the above parallelism. The idea is the exact expression of the world. There are three stages, viz.: Ordinary sense-perception; ratiocination, the discursive or logical processes of the mind; and intuition, direct contemplation of divine essence. These stages give a start or footing in the sphere of necessary ideation, and following the mathematical method we get knowledge, which is simply the accurate and adequate expression of ideas. The question arises, Is this knowledge of phenomena or of reality? What did Spinoza intend? was asked in connection with his definition of attribute as "that which the understanding perceives to constitute the essence of substance." This is the doctrine of subjectivity which later appeared in the philosophy of Kant, and Erdmann and Ueberweg say it reduces knowledge to the phenomenal aspect of the world. James Martineau and others take the other side, and the strongest evidence seems to lie here. Spinoza is as positive in speaking of knowledge of the divine essence as in speaking of the knowledge of nature.

*B. Ethics.—a. Theory of the passions.* This resembles the writings of Hobbes. Three original passions—*desire*, or cupiditas, *joy* and *sadness*. All other passions are produced by the addition of some factor, *e. g.*: Love is joy, taken together with the idea of its external cause; hate is sadness, together with the idea of its external cause, etc. Passions are either active or passive, the former resulting in action. The generic active passion, fortitude, is divided into animosity and generosity. Passive emotions are not actions in this sense. He identifies active passions with will. *What are passions?* Part of the necessary force of nature, by which man is controlled. By passion, he means concrete sentiment. It embraces both ideas and feelings, and with this definition Spinoza is right in saying that a man's passions determine his actions. Education should aim at sentiment, for there we strike the man himself.

*b. Ethics proper.*—Ethics is a function of reason and knowledge rather than of choice and will. His whole doctrine turns on his idea of the good as the useful and the bad as the hurtful. In his vast system of naturalism he embraces man, as well as nature. The self expression, *i. e.*, self-maintenance, of the nature of a thing is its good, and the useful contributes to this. The good of human nature is the realization of the perfection of its type. This is not ordinary utilitarianism, as the useful here embraces the means of realizing the good.

*Means of realizing the good.*—(a) *Human servitude* presents the view of man as dominated by his passions. Man's reason necessarily compels him to pursue whatever he conceives to be useful to him. Joy is the emotion felt whenever anything lifts the mind up from a less to a greater degree of perfection. Sadness is the opposite. Desire is conscious appetite, the essence of man so far as it contributes by its nature to the doing of things which tend to conserve a man's good. With these pantheistic conceptions of passion and its relation to reason, he could not but teach that man's will is controlled by passion. He will not desire more for himself than he desires for others, but will be just, honest, and honorable. But how is man to realize this ideal?

(b) *Human freedom*.—That thing is free which exists by the necessity of its nature, and whose actions are determined by itself alone. The life of virtue is the dominance of reason in life. A passion being a confused idea, to get to know a passion is to banish confusion from it and get it into an idea. As a man comes to know himself rationally, he gets control of himself and achieves freedom. His rational good and freedom consist in submission to the universal principle which is in all things. Virtue culminates when man gets to know God. Joy accompanies the realization of virtue, and joy causes love. On the theoretic side man's nature culminates in the knowledge of God; on its practical side, in love of God. Thus man's whole nature culminates and achieves its freedom ultimately by the love of God.

*Politics*.—*Basis* is in man's passionate nature. The individual is dominated by passion, and possesses the right to seek the good. With Hobbes, he regarded man's natural state as one of individual self-seeking to a supreme degree—an anarchic principle. As in Hobbes, the origin of the State is in the social contract, after men realize that self-interest defeats itself. He differs from Hobbes where the latter says that the natural right and natural state of man disappear in the civil organization. Spinoza taught that a man retains his natural right and is bound to exercise it, except where dangerous to the State or to his fellow-man. In a sense, Spinoza looked upon the State as realizing the natural right of the individual.

*Scope of State Control*.—Its right rests on its power to control individuals. It embraces nearly all outward organizations and power, control of the church as well as state. But in scientific and religious convictions, Spinoza held that the State has no right to interfere. Government is not absolute but the organized common will. If it ceases to exercise the common will, it ceases to exist. Three forms of government: Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchy. Erdmann thinks he chose a modified monarchy where part of the representatives come from the people. This compares well with the systems of Hobbes, Locke and Hume; but by historic accident it dropped out of sight and was unknown to Europe for one hundred years. When revived it did not serve as good a purpose as it would have done earlier.

*Criticisms of Spinozism*.—1. Its pantheism. Everything is deduced from the divine substance and going from the infinite to the finite, there is no place where the latter arises and no reason why it should exist. He does not realize the individual—the fault of all pantheism. Nature has only a quasi-existence. 2. Man's individual psychic existence is only an appearance. 3. He ignores the entire sphere of empirical knowledge. 4. In ethics, the system leaves no real freedom or responsibility.

*Fate of Spinozism* was peculiar and melancholy. Bitterly opposed before his death, the theological sentiment of these times instinctively recognized in him a foe. He sank into oblivion for a century, but a *reaction* came, due to his system of pantheism. A leader in which was GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ (1646–1716). Schwegler writes, "Next to Aristotle, Leibnitz was the most highly-gifted scholar that had ever lived; with the richest and most extensive learning he united the highest and most penetrating powers of mind." His fault was the gratification of his own versatility. *Historical Antecedents*.—1. Related directly to Des Cartes, in almost starting anew in the effort to reconcile the dualism of substances in a theory of knowledge. 2. He is related to Locke, his cotemporary. Locke rebelled against the

central doctrine of rationalism, viz., that there are innate ideas, and Leibnitz opposed Locke. He antagonized British Empiricism, holding that it presupposes something as its start. 3. His closest relation was to *Spinoza*, against whose pantheism he rebelled. He proposed to reform the idea of substance. 4. He is related also to the *spirit of his century* which was individualistic. Leibnitz philosophy is one of individualism as opposed to Spinoza's universalism. His "Monadology" (1714) contains his system.

OUTLINES OF LEIBNITZ'S PHILOSOPHY—*Its Ontological Basis.*—This is in his doctrine of substance, the theory of the monad. Des Cartes said substance is mere extension or magnitude, and rejected energy. Leibnitz conceived it as dynamic—some form of energy. He is in a sense the founder of this view in philosophy. In Spinoza substance was unitary without distinctions. Leibnitz conceived it as multiple. Monads are substances, and he postulated (1) *finite monads*. These are plural, each possessing an individuality complete in itself—an atom or microcosm. It differs from the atom of Leucetius and science in that its characteristics are internal and qualitative. Each monad has a two-fold nature. It is (a) entelechy in being a potential mind or spirit, a psychic atom. It goes on to develop a psyche. (b) It is *materia prima* in that the psyche of the atom exists only potentially. Matter dominates in *materia prima*, but spirit in entelechy. *Relation of Finite Monads (a)* to each other. Each is absolutely independent of the other. This corresponds to the Cartezian dualism. Instead of two substances, we have two in every pair. (b) Each is a microcosm, and hence has its function determined by something beyond itself. The demand for harmony drives him back to the infinite monad or God. (c) The evolution of the monad is the evolution of rationality into pure entelechy.

(2). *The Infinite Monad.*—He conceives the finite monad as created; the infinite as its underlying creator. Differences: (a) The infinite monad is *actus purus*, fully developed and containing no potentiality which is not actuality. (b) The infinite monad contains the universe eminenter (actually); the finite only virtualiter (potentially), signifying that the infinite monad not only conceives the universe, but also creates and upholds it.

*Relation of the Infinite Monad to the Finite Monad and the World.*—The relation between mechanism and teleology. If Leibnitz had asserted the finite monads to be manifestations of the infinite monads, it would have been pantheism. But he sees deeper and presents a peculiar doctrine of the relation of the infinite monad to the finite. Out of it grows his theory of "pre-established harmony." It is Malebranche's doctrine of the divine correlation of mind and matter, except that Leibnitz has an indefinite number of monads. God, the infinite monad, has created finite monads, has given them the same nature, has wound them up and set them in the same way, and they cannot do otherwise than evolve together harmoniously. This is teleology expressed peculiarly. In this idea of "pre-established harmony" Leibnitz served the world as Anaxagoras in the idea of *Nous*. Leibnitz did not construe teleology so as to eliminate mechanism. From the standpoint of the artist, proceeding from the whole to its parts, we get the teleologic idea; from the standpoint of science we get the mechanical view. It is possible to apply both to the same matter.

*Cosmology or the Philosophy of Nature.*—*The world substance is simply an*

aggregation of monads. They are not material substances, but rather rationalistic. It is a psychic rather than a material evolution.

*Development of the world* is the development of the individual atoms. This is a weak point. Universalism is needed as a principle of continuity. Two aspects of development—(1) that of individual monads, (2) that of lines of pre-established harmony. Conceived from the standpoint of nature simply, the system which the world realizes is rational but accidental. Two stages of development (1), the inorganic, where the potential psyche is in “dreamless sleep.” At the start the psyche has no knowledge of itself. This is the stage of motion and pure mechanism. (2) The organic stage embraces plants and animals. In the latter consciousness breaks through as feeling and the psyche dreams, has memory, and exists as a dream. Reflection ideation and spirit develop later.

*The harmonious unity of the world* arises from the fact that each monad is a microcosm. Each is the image of the universe, so that if it develop it will arrive at infinity and absolute knowledge. It is always finite, and the only causality is evolution, not interaction. Lotze’s idea of the latter is absent from Leibnitz’s system. Combining the microcosm idea with that of pre-established harmony, the harmony and unity of the world are explained.

*The phenomenal and the real world.*—The world in space and time is phenomenal; the real world is the sphere of those individualities which constitute substance. The phenomenal world is real, but the forms of extension and succession under which it appears are mere phenomena. The reals contain no time or space elements. They are subjective forms of the psyche.

**THEOLOGY—*God and Substance.***—God is *substantia prima* in being *actus purus*. At the foundation of existence we must presuppose the existence of the infinite. In another sense, God is *substantia secunda* or the world. Leibnitz (according to Schwegler) is in some difficulty here. At best he makes God little more than an idle witness of the universe He has created and set in motion. If he makes the monads material, he is in danger of rendering them entirely independent of God; while if he does not do so he is in danger of falling into the universalism of Spinoza.

*God’s Existence*, from one point of view, needs no proof and only admits of explanation, as Aquinas held. The system presupposes God. His so-called *argumentum a contingentibus mundi* simply means that the world is not self-explanatory and must be traced to some sufficient ground. The test he lays down is, “the principle of sufficient reason” which has two aspects. In the sphere of contingency and scientific explanation, everything must be explained by something else from which it has sprung. But if we conceive the series bound together by a chain of interconnection, the question arises, On what does the chain or series depend? And the “principle of sufficient reason” compels us to ground it in some self-existent principle which needs no explanation. Locke had already formulated the argument. Aristotle first expressed it in postulating God as the source of motion. Kant criticizes the argument. It is similar to reasoning from causality.

*God and the Monads.*—Leibnitz held the monads to be metaphysical reals, while God, the infinite monad, differs in degree but not in kind. God is necessary to explain two things—the existence and the order of the world. Schwegler finds a contradiction here. He thinks that, in one proposition, Leibnitz asserts a difference in degree only, and in another a difference of

kind. But it is possible to conceive a finite substance as substantially real without denying the reality of God, and this is Leibnitz's deep insight.

*God and the Problem of Evil.*—Is God the author of evil? Leibnitz does not say no, but this led to his optimistic theory. Out of an infinite number of world-schemes, God chose the best possible, but not the best conceivable. Evil is unavoidable; it inheres in the limitation of the finite in the form of want and negation. It is simply a negative and temporary defect.

*Anthropology.*—1. *Human body* is composed of an aggregate of monads in various stages of development, as in the case of the world in general. 2. *The human soul.* The soul is simply a monad which has arrived at consciousness. It is the centre round which the body is aggregated, with no difference from other monads except in degree. We might find here an explanation of multi-personality. *Relation of soul to the body.* In so far as Leibnitz's theory is valid, it dispenses with the dependence of the mind on the brain for existence. The reality of the soul is bound up in the monad and is unaffected by the dissolution of the body. It may be unconscious and go on organizing for itself another body. This theory is the most powerful of modern times and contains some vital truth. In Leibnitz's conception of finite being as substantially real, yet without contradicting the reality of infinite being, and in his conception of the soul as a developed monad are the most important additions to philosophy down to the time of Kant.

*Problem of Knowledge.*—Here we see his relation to the British Empiricists. He says that sensation was neglected by Spinoza and Des Cartes, who accepted only reason as an organ of knowledge. Leibnitz at last agrees with them, holding that sensation gives only confused representations, and failing to see what modern psychology teaches, viz., the possibility of developing confused into clear sensations. Knowledge is the function of reason. Two laws (1) of consistency and contradiction; (2) of sufficient reason. Some had tried to reduce all reasoning to formal logic on the law of contradiction. Leibnitz asserts that this is wrong. As to innate ideas, Locke had said, "*Nihil intellectu quod non sensu.*" Leibnitz simply adds, "*Nihil intellectu quod non sensu nisi intellectus ipse.*" Nothing is in the intellect which was not in the senses except the intellect itself. Intellect has an innate, rational constitution of principles which are its essence. He agrees with Des Cartes that the criteria of knowledge are clearness, distinctness and adequateness.

*Limits of Knowledge.*—Locke had fixed very modest limits, but Leibnitz recognizes no *a priori* limit. He says knowledge may extend beyond the sensory sphere, with no necessary limit except the fact of being finite.

*Questions of Providence and Immortality.*—He believed that God predetermined everything, and this is what is meant by Providence. Life is probation for the future. He believes in immortality and supplies the strongest foundation for a rational doctrine of it. We only need consider the monad after the analogy of the material atom to see the doctrine of immortality. Science is convinced of the indestructibility of the atom. As little can we conceive the destruction of a psychic centre. We should distinguish between the conditions of a thing's existence and modes of its existence.

*Criticism of Leibnitz.*—1. *Individualism* is the most conspicuous element of

the system, arising from a reaction from Spinoza's pantheism. Leibnitz goes to an extreme not in asserting metaphysical reals, but in asserting their mutual independence. It means ultimately atomism. Lotze denies the independence of monads and asserts the category of interaction. 2. *Relation of God to the World*—His relation is defined in the doctrine of pre-established harmony. God is conceived as "setting" the monads and leaving them to their own inherent constitution, a too mechanical conception. He regards the idea of immanence as identical with pantheism and avoids both by asserting a mechanical relation between God and the world. Again, there is an open question in Leibnitz. Is God creator or only first cause and originator? Some have tried to show that he reduces God to the harmony of the world (Schwegler). 3. *Optimism*.—Leibnitz takes a superficial view of evil. Evil is not merely negative and temporary, but rather real. We must recognize its reality. Good or evil is a question of the everlasting struggle of all finite being. Life is not always evolution, but sometimes dissolution. The two together constitute the whole category of the world.

*Post-Leibnitzian Development*.—This is between the sunset of Leibnitz and the sunrise of Kant—a discouraging time for philosophy. The motive of the movement had spent its force. On one side was pietism with religion and theology; on the other, philosophy which was fast becoming the formal organ of the abstract faculty. To this period belongs—

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679–1754). Leibnitz philosophy had two sides, on one of which the analytic method with the syllogism reigned supreme; on the other was the more vital principle of sufficient reason. Wolff accepted the former half of the system, its formal side, and developed it into a species of dogmatic formalism. Rationalism had gone to seed.

Wolff's great service was not in original ideas, but in classification, for which he had a genius. Leibnitz's philosophy was collected from many sources, and Wolff's division of metaphysics into rational cosmology, rational psychology, and rational theology constituted the starting point of Kant's criticism.

*Salient Points of Wolff*.—Definition of philosophy—"the science of the possible so far as it can be realized." By the possible, he means that which is free from contradiction. In his theory of knowledge, he shows that the principle of sufficient reason can be deduced from that of contradiction. Knowledge is a function of the logical faculty proceeding by the analytical or mathematical method. It is a system of abstract, individualistic rationalism. There is a syllogistic demonstration of the existence and nature of God, of the nature of immortality, etc.

GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MOVEMENT.—Applying Kuno Fischer's categories, we may say Des Cartes started the idea of the movement, Geulincx and Malebranche developed it, Spinoza partly transformed Cartezianism, and Leibnitz completely did so, turning it over to individualism.

*Cardinal Points of the Development*.—In Des Cartes we have as central ideas a correlation, in the objective sphere, of the finite and the infinite; in the subjective, of the ideas of self and of God. The relation of the two orders is stated in the ideas of a divine substance on one hand and created substance on the other, with no attempt at a rational reconciliation. Upon the correlation of the ideas of self and of God he bases his proof of God's existence and reaches a profounder view than that of the objective correlation.

Spinoza develops the idea of an infinite substance to a pantheistic conclusion.

Leibnitz takes up the same question, but reaches the opposite individualistic view. With Spinoza the question was, Does the individual exist? With Leibnitz this is the presupposition of philosophy, and the question is, Does God exist? We find no adequate solution of these questions in the movement. Is there not a point of view from which both the finite and the infinite exist? This is the fundamental issue of this movement and of all philosophy.

## II.—THE EMPIRICAL MOVEMENT.

The founder was JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704). Bacon preceded him and was in a sense a more universal thinker. Bacon tended to use observation in every sphere of thought, and Hobbes continued the tendency but substituted the mathematical for the inductive method. From one point of view their philosophy was sensationalism, but from the ethical and social standpoint it is rationalism. Locke gave the first well-defined system and the first which had a continuous development.

*Time of Locke* was extraordinary. He lived during three revolutions—that of the Restoration, that of 1688, and the initiation of the constitutional government which was his ideal. Educated at Oxford, he was by profession a physician. He was also a man of affairs and a statesman, during a part of his life an exile.

*Special Historical Relations.*—1. To Bacon and the Baconian movement. He assumes their general standpoint, founding his philosophy on experience, *i. e.*, facts which are open to observation and the use of the inductive method. 2. To British thinking. The spirit of scholasticism dominated his time, formal and uninviting to Locke. It was the period of Deism tending to natural religion, founded by Lord Herbert on the innate natural ideas which Kant taught. Locke is related to this religious thought in his hostility to the theory of innate ideas. 3. Locke is the British Des Cartes in opposing prevailing thought. This was the motive of his great work. He accepts Des Cartes' idealism uncriticised. The latter left no place in his system for the direct perception of objective reality, but there are representative elements called ideas. There are *points of radical difference*, however. 1. Des Cartes founded his system on ideas of reason; Locke, on ideas of sense, claiming to deduce ideas of reason from these. 2. Des Cartes' method is deduction in its mathematical form; Locke's, the inductive genetic. 3. Des Cartes regarded some ideas innate, a few being constitutional in their potency. Locke looked upon all principles and ideas as products of experience. Locke's great work is "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding."

## ELEMENTS OF LOCKE'S SYSTEM.

1. *Genesis of Ideas* (Books I.-III.) 1. *Condition of the understanding before experience begins.* This is his polemic against innate ideas, mainly of Deism, but also of Des Cartes. He defines an idea as "whatever is before the understanding when it thinks." This identifies all ideas with those things of which we are conscious. A principle is not some potentiality existing mysteriously in the mind, but a maxim which must be apprehended



before we can know that it is there at all. He says that there are no innate ideas or principles, because: *a.* If there were everyone would agree to them, and none such are to be found. *b.* Children and savages would have them, and it is absurd to suppose (*c. g.*) that an infant knows that every effect has a cause. In a sense, this is self-evident. But children look for antecedents and consequents so early that we can't explain it except by supposing principles and ideas to exist in consciousness and operate spontaneously before they are formed in the mind. This is valid against ideas reflectively apprehended, but it does not touch the theory that there are original tendencies in the mind acting spontaneously. He is on the whole correct, but he concludes that the understanding before experience possesses a negative character, with no ideas or tendencies, being simply receptive—a dark and empty room, a *tabula rasa*, or a sheet of white paper. This position is untrue and contradicted by the results of brain physiology. Each brain has a certain character. Heredity, of which Locke's time knew nothing definite, contradicts his theory. On the whole, we are forced to reject Locke's idea of a *tabula rasa*.

2. *Genesis of Simple Ideas.*—He starts out with certain presuppositions which Hume attacked.

Locke has refuted innate ideas as anything original and is committed to show how they develop. Nevertheless he assumes to start with—(*a*) a complete external world of things capable of impressing and stimulating the senses; (*b*) a completed understanding or consciousness, yet without content; (*c*) a mediating sense-apparatus which conveys photographs into the understanding. Then he asks, How do ideas originate? And answers, By two inlets, *sensation* and *reflection*. In the former external things impress the senses and these carry the sensations to the understanding where they exist as simple ideas, *e. g.*, colors, sounds, tastes, etc. Reflection corresponds to attention as used in modern psychology. The first condition of things is a state in which consciousness is diffused throughout an undifferentiated multitude of phenomena and reflection concentrates attention on some one of them. In psychology, however, the function is the perception of likeness and difference; with Locke, reflection is a synthetic process of discriminating and combining simple ideas into plexus. "The mind, receiving the ideas from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas," *e. g.*, thinking, perceiving, remembering, willing, etc. Simple ideas embrace also such as the two sources together yield, *e. g.*, power, unity, etc.; and such as arise from a number of senses combined, *e. g.*, space and motion which touch and sight together were supposed to produce. This heterogeneous mass is divided into primary ideas, representing objects, or secondary whose unknown causes in objects are properties of the latter. Two important positions are put forward here—(*a*) these ideas are representative in character, being founded on resemblance and on causation; (*b*) the atomistic nature of the simple ideas—a peculiarity which survived Locke.

3. *Formation of complex ideas* is a function of the understanding. The grouping process mentioned above, in which the operations of the mind are noted by reflection as one class of simple ideas, results in three groups of ideas—modes, substances and relations. *Modes* are qualities and properties of things, not substances but elements

which inhere, or are in them. They are (1) *simple*, made up of single elements, e. g. time and space; or (2), *mixed*, composed of heterogeneous elements, e. g. motion, containing space, time and energy.

*Substances.*—This idea contains two factors, one of which is in harmony with his genetic theory, and the other, not. It is, first, a plexus of simple ideas, of modes or representative elements, giving the perception of the object. Secondly, the idea of a substratum in which modes inhere to be supported and held together. This second factor is Locke's first point of difficulty. He tries to deduce substance empirically but fails, and says it is a necessary assumption. Hume and Berkeley saw the weakness of this position and attacked it. *Relations*—cause, identity, moral good. These arise from a comparison of modes. *Cause* asserts that relation of things by which they produce effects. His account is good for showing how we find causal relations in nature, but he leaves out all explanation of the universal principle of causation and its necessity. *Identity* is that of existence and of time and place. Applied to substance the relation means continuity in time. Applied to personality, the tendency is to connect identity with the substance of the soul; but Locke attacks this point, claiming that personality is an empirical term and that personal identity is simply continuity of consciousness. His position does not apprehend the whole truth. To break personality we need more than a breach of present consciousness. We may have a break of months or years but it goes on from where it left off. But a breach of the thread of memory would make us double in personality. Dr. James' *Psychology*, chap. X., pp. 373-401, gives several examples. Such a breach may not be permanent. *Moral Good.*—Locke is an egoistic hedonist. All moral good and evil are founded on pleasure and pain. He connects the law of pleasure with the theological conception of one who commands.

*Complex Ideas in General.*—Simple ideas form modes, substances and relations. This is a concrete sphere of cognition, containing nothing properly called abstract. Moreover, the simple ideas carry with them into the complex sphere their representative character. The theory is realistic up to the point where we pass from the concrete to the abstract.

4. *Abstract Ideas and General Propositions.*—(Book III.) This is a discussion of language. We have reached the point in complex ideas which constitutes the perceptual order of consciousness, where abstraction and generalization begin. This is Locke's contribution to elementary logic. The *point of vital interest* here is that while Locke points out how abstract ideas are formed upon the concrete by abstraction and generalization, he is unable to carry the abstract term back into reality so as to say how it represents anything real. Abstract ideas are generalizations, and he cannot conceive how a man should exist general and not of a certain height, weight, etc. He has a wrong conception of what abstract idea is. If a representative character cannot attach to abstract ideas, then knowledge is not of reality, but only of phenomena. Locke distinguishes between real and nominal essences. A piece of gold, as presented to the senses,

is a substance and real. But generalize it by letting it represent gold in general, and its connection with reality is broken, so that it has only a nominal essence. Out of these abstract ideas arise general propositions, which simply consist in a connection between two abstract ideas.

*Relation of General Propositions to Abstract Ideas and Nominal Essences.*—The general proposition is an assertion about both, but makes no assertion about reality, bearing the same relation to knowledge that the abstract idea bears to the concrete. With reference to any science of objective nature the logical conclusion is that we are entirely shut off from reality. He shrinks from the conclusion, but says it is probable that a science of nature is not possible. Of his successors, Berkeley universalizes subjectivity and both material and spiritual substances disappear. Hume hesitated but finally, upon the foundation which Locke had laid, drew his conclusion of absolute skepticism.

2. LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, or the Metaphysical Problem, (Book IV). This book was written before the other three, and this explains a certain inconsistency. *Basis*—He seeks to answer the question, What do we know? And answers, We perceive relations among ideas. So that knowledge is made up of ideas and of relations of agreement or disagreement among them. Knowable things concerning ideas come under one of the heads—Identity and Diversity, Relation, Co-existence, and Real Existence. The division is not logical and if he had carried out his conclusions as to abstract notions and propositions, he would have altered it. His classification comes from a distinction between the possibility of knowledge of the outside world and knowledge of the ideas of the understanding. Knowledge, he says, is concerned with ideas of the understanding. The theory is a purely nominalistic one.

*Instruments of Knowledge.*—Sensation gives knowledge of concrete individual essences, but of nothing general or abstract. *Intuition* is direct perception of certain relations among ideas. There is no question but what we have intuitions of realities. Resemblance, difference, and, to a certain extent, co-existence, are objects of intuition. Under intuition he classes the knowledge of the real existence of self, which is an inconsistency. *Demonstration*—Certain relations of agreement or disagreement are not directly apprehended, but are known through a discursive process. In so far as this leads to an apodictic conclusion, it is called demonstration.

*Objects of Knowledge*—are three, self, the world or nature, and God. He asks as an outcome what can be known of these. First, as to nature, the nearest approach to it is through simple, representative ideas which give us primary and secondary qualities. Through these and their syntheses into complex ideas we arrive at particular substances, like a pencil. Knowledge is confined chiefly to particular substances. We can assert such propositions as, This piece of gold is yellow, heavy, etc.—singular propositions—but beyond this knowledge of reality cannot go. When we abstract we break the nexus with objective reality. Our ideas constitute reality to us.

Knowledge of reality being general, is nominal. Secondly, as to self Locke maintained that we have knowledge by intuition, which is an inconsistency. If we know nothing but relations among ideas, we must somehow identify self either with ideas or relations. According to Locke, we have intuitions of nothing but relations among ideas. His real reasoning is much like Des Cartes'. But such statements as that we can doubt all but our own existence—when we think we assert self-existence, etc., are inconsistent with his theory. Locke places very moderate limits for our knowledge about self.

We know we exist, as spirits, but know little about matter and less about spirit, yet our knowledge is adequate to our practical needs. Thirdly, as to God, we know His existence by demonstration, and Locke developed a form of the cosmological argument, from the contingency of the world to its absolute ground. "I exist. Some necessary being must exist to explain my existence. Therefore, God exists." But if the logic of his system shuts us off from belief in self-existence; so, also, does it from belief in God's existence. Logically he provides no adequate basis for asserting either: and, as to nature, our knowledge is of but little value. Locke's broad common sense widens his views.

*Locke's Political Philosophy.*—He is almost as important here as in mental philosophy. Two treatises on civil government were occasioned by Robt. Filmore's Patriarchia, in which the latter tried to bolster up "the divine right of kings" by showing that the absolute sovereignty of princes had been inherited from Adam. Locke's first treatise refutes this elaborately. The second develops his own historically valuable view. Hobbes was 44 years old when Locke was born. The former was the political thinker of the old Stuart Dynasty. Locke represents a new order, the Revolution of 1688. He bears as close and vital a relation to the modern British constitution as any other thinker: in it are his ideas.

1. *Nature and Natural Right.*—He agrees with Hobbes and Spinoza as to a natural state out of which all forms of government and communities have sprung. In this state the rights of life, liberty, and possession; and the right of retribution were unlimited. No security was enjoyed and organization to protect person and property was necessary. Hobbes says the natural state is one of war; Locke that it is merely a state of uncertainty and instability, which give rise to conflict and impair the natural rights of man. In the mutual compact certain rights which belonged to individuals are resigned to the state.

*Points in Locke's Theory.*—The kernel of truth in his theory of nature and natural rights is, that the rise of social and civil order is not at the expense of the individual, but simply includes the individual so that he grows up into the state. Man is by nature a social creature and only in society can realize his complete individuality. This dispenses with the arbitrary idea of old theories of Hobbes that individual rights are sacrificed to the state. As to the social compact, there never was such a thing, except in a figurative and fictitious sense. The true idea of it is expressed in the declaration

in such phrases as "inalienable rights," "government rests on the consent of the governed," if we mean the community, etc. Hobbes was wrong when he said that the surrender of rights on the part of the individual to the state was ultimate and not to be recalled. Hobbes represents ultra conservatism; Locke is a political liberal in whom most of the principles of our own institutions are to be found.

*The Ontological and Psychological Aspects of Philosophy.*—Locke is the pioneer of modern empirical psychology; he starts with sensations. Contrast it with Cartezianism and we may say it gives the individual or psychological aspect, while Cartezianism gives the universal or ontological aspect of philosophy. On the one side are Locke, Berkeley and Hume, on the other Leibniz. Philosophy has these two aspects and both movements were necessary in order to bring to light the complete ground of a comprehensive system.

*Criticism of Locke from a Psychological Point of View.*—1. *Scholastic Pre-suppositions.* The developed machinery of the world and a developed understanding are assumptions from the past. This has been criticised before. 2. *Atomistic theory of sensations.*—A view which Dr. James calls "the mind stuff theory," representing sensations as sort of material atoms which simply combine to produce some kind of result. Psychology is coming to take the view which Des Cartes started, that sensations don't exist separately, but as diffused representations, in a confused and mixed-up way. The first process is one of differentiation. 3. *The extreme nominalistic tendency of the theory.*—The fault begins at the point of abstraction where the mind breaks away from reality and begins to separate and combine. In reality, we have at first a diffused representation, which becomes clear in perception. The generalizing process is one of mind, but its objective side is the mass of individual things. The general representation is not a representation of any individual, but of a class which has certain characteristics. Locke's difficulty is only imaginary. He did not get a correct view of abstraction and generalization, or he would have saved his view of knowledge, of God, and of the soul.

*Historical Developments.*—He is one of the most important thinkers in modern philosophy. His influence was in the direction of the dominant feature of his thought, sensation. Historical evolution from it has been in the direction mainly of sensationalism and empiricism. The two most important developments took place in France and in England. The first is relatively inferior. It is called the French Illumination.

**THE BRITISH DEVELOPMENT.**—This was a more purely intellectual movement than that in France, and was less disturbed from the outside. Together with the rational movement from Des Cartes to Wolff it constitutes the essence of the intellectual history of the two centuries during which it lasted.

**GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753)** was the immediate successor of Locke. He was born in Ireland, entered Trinity College, Dublin, 1700. Was appointed to a Fellowship in 1707. Studied for the min-

istry and was active. In 1724 he was made Dean of Derby, which he resigned to carry out a scheme of evangelization of the Americans. He proposed to found a college in the Bermudas and was in this country for some years, but failed to get appropriations and returned to England. He was made Bishop of Cloyne in 1734. Berkeley's character is one of the finest type. A cultivated gentleman, of fascinating appearance and manner, he was simple, noble, generous, and a Christian of great enthusiasm. He combined with these qualities a mind at once subtle and profound, and a style scarcely equaled in philosophy. Nothing, except the dialogues of Plato, equals his style in clearness, simplicity, and fullness of conviction.

*Historical Antecedents.*—1. Locke. In his psychological standpoint and genetic method, he belongs to the Lockian movement. 2. He opposed the materialistic atheism of his times. There was a tendency to look upon the world as a mechanism of material forces and laws, implying no necessity of an underlying cause outside of itself.

*Outline of His Philosophy by Headings.*—1. *Matter a Phenomenon of Spirit.* This was his great contention. He thought the doctrine of that matter is an external and independent entity lay at the foundation of Locke's errors and of materialistic atheism. He antagonized several points of Locke: (1) The doctrine of abstract ideas. Locke was a nominalist who had identified abstraction and generalization and laid this at the basis of his theory of knowledge. Abstract ideas are simply groups or plexus of particular ideas and we give a name which applies to each of the group. (2). The idea of materialistic substance. Locke postulated the idea of substance and only sought to show how things grow up genetically as groups of qualities. This group of qualities does not exhaust or satisfy the idea of substance which must be presupposed. Berkeley regarded this assumption not only as unnecessary, but also as pernicious. He leaves simply the idea of a group of qualities located in space. Berkeley next analyzes the idea of quality; points out that visual space and the space of touch are different. The third dimension is not original in visual space-perception, but is derived from tactual experience and inseparably associated with vision. Thus externality or depth and all visual qualities disappear. Visual experience eliminates the idea of an external world. Again, resistance gives rise merely to a sensation of touch accompanied by a feeling of strain in the muscles. Tactual experience is simply a set of subjective terms which have no validity outside of consciousness. He easily disposes then of the secondary qualities of objects, having thus accounted for the primary, viz., resistance and space-relations. The whole world, so far as its reality independent of consciousness is concerned, is an illusion—"csc est perciperi." Nothing is left if perception goes, and we thus have the complete collapse of the external world. Every man is his own world-builder. There are as many visions and external worlds as there are individual consciousnesses. In various places he tries to show how this world vision is constructed and anticipates many of the results of psychology. His

analysis of space-perception is a real anticipation of what a later century has developed. Experience also has something to do with the development of space-perception. Again, the process of constructing the external world is partly association, partly synthesis, and partly expectation or anticipation. We translate a sound and refer it to something which we do not apprehend directly and never apprehend through sound. If with Berkeley we distinguish between original and acquired elements, the developed perception of things located in space is largely a function of the judgment. But Berkeley would reduce the whole empirical process to judgment and intuition, and the whole external world to a vision.

2. *How Does He Escape Solipsism, i. e., the isolation of each individual consciousness so as to make it the only existence to that consciousness?* Berkeley has been and is criticised on this point. If we look upon what has preceded as incapable of modification by other elements of his philosophy, it is just.

3. *Metaphysics.*—(1). *God and the World*—The starting-point of his metaphysics is his conception of language as a symbol whose meaning is spiritual and lies back of it. Consciousness is simply a sounding board where we are getting symbols, muscular, tactual, visual, etc. Information of the universe is made up of symbols whose meaning is spiritual. The mistake of others is to take symbols for reality. The entire universe is the language of an infinite spirit manifesting itself through a species of symbolism. All things exist as ideas in the divine spirit; and here he is able to refute the psychological objection that if his theory is true, *c. g.*, books are mere ideas of the mind. They are objective also. This does not presuppose some lifeless material substance, but simply the infinite mind as the basis for objectivity. Things are not independent existences, but ideas of the divine mind. They do not depend on human but on divine intelligence, and in this way he escapes solipsism.

2. *His Assumptions.*—(a) *Individual consciousnesses* of other men. Through analogy man interprets symbolical evidence as indicating other existences like his own. Yet, on what grounds does our absolute assurance of other finite existences rest? Why are they not either phenomena of our own or else of the infinite spirit? Here is a difficulty which Berkeley does not meet. (b) *The Universal Spirit* is also assumed.

*Pantheistic Optimism.*—These two assumptions constitute the metaphysical basis of his system of radical spiritualism. He simply obeys necessity in postulating in addition to the individual or psychological standpoint, the universal point of view. The standpoint of the individual mind is fragmentary and at some point we must assume the existence of the metaphysical and universal, of other consciousnesses beside our own, of truth. Berkeley's doctrine of God recognizes this.

*Berkeley's Theism.*—He argues that we see God as actually as we see our fellowmen. He discusses the principle of both experiences, together, *viz.*, the principle of analogy. He notices proofs of God's existence, but it is all summarized in the idea of a system of lan-

guage. The world is a phenomenon of God: there is no reality apart from the divine energy.

*A Few Criticisms* (others to be given at the end of the movement.)—The system is most open in respect to its pantheistic tendency. If the world is divine, it is a phenomenon of God—a mode of the divine. The same criticism is to be made here against Spinoza. There are two orders of reality—the absolute and the relative. There is no logical obstacle in recognizing things universally as real and yet relative, and the followers of Berkeley have tended to this view. They recognize the reality of the atom, as Lotze did. While recognizing mechanism, the latter sees its limits and its dependence on an underlying sphere of spiritual causation. This is wanting in Berkeley's theory and an element of weakness. Suppose we conceive this amendment, made in the sphere of metaphysics, to be carried down to his theory of perception. Here psychology reaches a subjective process, realizing the vision of the world—a man constructs his world-vision—but this is not all. Another element is the objective character of the entire fact. There are objective conditions over which consciousness has no control. True analysis will show objective reality to be necessary. This is one method by which to travel from the simplest phenomena to a first cause. Another method begins with the absolute, and proceeds deductively to unfold the world. A complete philosophy will embrace both.

*Negative Tendencies of the Eighteenth Century*—mainly in France and England. The French Illumination culminated in the Revolution, and the English movement in a system of Deism which, though not wholly negative, yet illustrates the current thought. Distinguishing between the two faculties of understanding and higher reason, the former is an analytic, scientific, and dissolving principle. Taken abstractly, it is destructive. The latter is the principle of ideation and artistic conception. It is synthetic and constructive. Different ages of history have represented these, and the eighteenth century is par excellence the reign of the abstract understanding. Voltaire, in France, was the embodiment of the analytic and destructive principle. He lost his respect for his subject in the process by which he tore it to shreds and tatters, and, as a result, he scoffed. In England the same principle was even more thoroughly embodied in Hume. Yet Hume was no scoffer. He was simply the embodiment of the philosophic principle of negation.

DAVID HUME (1711-1766).—Born in Edinburgh. Devoted to the study of law in youth, then for some time a merchant under protest; he afterward took up literature in its philosophic and historic branches. He spent two or three years in France, and there published what was in some respects his masterpiece—"A Treatise on Human Nature" (1737-1740)—an attempt to introduce experiment into human nature. It was not recognized in England. He revised it, divided it into parts and named it "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" (1748). He went to Switzerland, and upon his return in 1752 was made librarian in the public library of Edinburgh. This was the occasion of his writing the history of England (1754



1762). In 1755 he published his "Theory of Natural Religion," which brought him into difficulty. He was secretary of legation in Paris, where Rousseau became his friend. In 1767 he became under-secretary of state, but only filled the office for a brief period. Died in Edinburgh.

*Historical Relations.*—1. His general relation to the negative tendency of the time has been mentioned. 2. In philosophy his most important relation was to Locke. He developed the Lockian empiricism more critically than had been done. He eliminates Locke's presuppositions. Otherwise the Lockian problem was Hume's also, viz., having taken an atomic view of consciousness, to organize and combine the psychic atoms into the understanding. 3. He also related himself to Berkeley by accepting the elimination of abstract ideas, the suppression of material substance and the subjective idealism. Hume made a skeptical use of all the truths which Berkeley used in the interests of spiritual philosophy. Though Berkeley came between Locke and Hume, and is connected with this movement, he has original elements which make him distinctively the founder of idealism.

OUTLINES OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY.—1. INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 1. *Doctrine of Elements*—his starting-point. He starts with the sensory consciousness, what is left after eliminating all elements not reducible to sensation. (a) *What are the elements?* Locke said simple sense atoms, or ideas of sense. Hume accepts these with other names and investigates their origin. (b) *Their classification.* Sensations have the power of making impressions or copies which are ideas. Locke said that beside these sensations and ideas there was another class due to reflection which are also ultimate. Hume held that the processes called thinking, willing, etc., could be derivatively explained.

2. *Theory of Combining Principles.*—From this point his philosophy may be characterized as sensationalism. The transition from the elementary stage to the second is through *custom*. The disconnected atoms combine as if we throw up pebbles which come down in a certain order which happens to be repeated so often as to establish customs or habits. Habit is an expectation that things will continue to turn up as they have in the past. The combining principle is also called association.

3. *Two Views of the World.*—The *objective* view asserts both the objective and the subjective worlds to be real. The subjective view considers the so called objective as simply a phenomenon of subjectivity. The latter is Hume's position. The objective view asserts a real world which the mind cognizes, but does not create in the sense of imposing forms on it. It asserts an *ego* or self with powers of cognition to apprehend the world and of reflection to reason to some ground, which is the reality of things. Back of substance is the soul. This entire objective view Hume looked upon as false and delusive.

The *subjective*, phenomenal view denies the postulate of a spiritual ground. It first conceives consciousness as a mass of unorganized

sensations and feelings, and proposes to show genetically how our developed consciousness of the outer and inner worlds is built up. Hume and others find two elements—substances or things which are sensations and ideas; and relations between these in the outer and inner worlds, due to custom or habit. Following Hume we raise the question as to the reality, not of things, but of relations among things. A. In the *Outer World* are (a) space which is simply color and subjective. Time originates in the change or succession of ideas. (b) *Resemblance* is nothing at all apart from subjective impressions or ideas. (c) *Identity* is simply a close resemblance. (d) *Causality*, the supreme principle of connection in nature, lies at the foundation of the world. He analyzed it, into three elements—contiguity of cause and effect in space, succession in time, and a certain necessary connection between the two. In so far as causation is reducible to space and time relations, it must be considered subjective. But the necessary connection is yet to be explained. Two theories as to its nature—the rational theory asserts a native principle in the mind by which we affirm a necessary objective relation between antecedent and consequent. Hume disputed this and held the empirical theory that the necessary connection is a principle of experience. To get its genesis he goes back to elements which have no necessary connection. Causation is a relation between independent feelings or ideas. In the movements of consciousness which he conceives as chaotic at first, certain conjunctions between ideas come to be established. Some of these conjunctions repeat themselves and the association becomes inseparable. There is no power in the relation of cause and effect: anything may be the cause of anything. Nothing connects them but the bond of custom. Thus Hume has eliminated the entire structural form of externality. (d) *The Inner World*—Hume attacks the doctrine that at the centre of the subjective sphere stands a soul, a unitary substance preserving identity everywhere. His refutation follows the same course as in the case of the objective world. Introspection only gives us a multitude of sense-perceptions, with no connection, following each other with inconceivable rapidity. So we have the *collapse of the inner world*. For inner threads of connection there is no reason except their having taken place.

(4.) *Elimination of Substance*.—If the outer world collapses into a bundle of inner states, then *material* substance is to be rejected as a figment of the imagination. But his denial passes to the inner world also. If the unity and continuity of the inner self is the product of groundless custom, there is no ground for belief in *spiritual* substance. He is as radical in one sphere as in the other. We must see the world generated out of a plurality of disconnected, chaotic elements by custom.

(5.) *Hume's Skeptical Conclusion*.—We sometimes imagine that this reaches only religion, but not science or the conclusions of his own philosophy. The relations of custom do not seem to Hume to be real and he loses his faith. His theory does not seem to provide for any real connections between ideas, for scientific knowledge, or for

religious faith. Yet he sees no other explanation than his own, and simply gives up in despair. Not even Nihilism was left to him, as his philosophy started with something. It is one of the necessary stages of human thought. His system is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the sensational starting point of Locke.

2. *Ethical Theory.*—(1). *The motives* are discussed in the work on "The Passions." Hume follows a course analogous to that of Spinoza, of whom he yet speaks with great abhorrence as an atheist. The passions or motives are the springs of morality. It is a general name for the whole emotional side of man's nature. He is here a creature susceptible of pleasure and pain. Two categories, the agreeable and the disagreeable, are the motives of all acts. Passions are either pure feeling or feeling plus ideas, and this gives his basis for classifying them as primary and secondary. The primary passions which contain no intellectual element are joy and sorrow. The secondary arise by a combination of joy and sorrow with ideas of the imagination which thus become agreeable or disagreeable.

(2). *The Criterion of Morality* is usefulness in producing pleasure, and avoiding pain. He denies that right and wrong are original distinctions. Why does utility please? Two sets of moralists appear, the Egotists and the Altruists. The latter based morality on benevolence. Hume attacked and refuted the Egotists, and based good on the social instinct. "Whatever contributes to the happiness of mankind recommends itself to man's will." "Virtue is whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator a pleasing sensation of approbation." The feeling and judgment of a spectator is the criterion of rightness and wrongness.

3. HUME'S POLITICAL WRITINGS are not of great importance—a Liberal in writings, though a Tory in history. His economic works discuss, in a very enlightened and modern spirit, Commerce, Money, Interest and Balance of Trade. His work gave rise to Adam Smith's political views, and laid the foundation of political philosophy.

4. RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.—The entire question is as to the existence of the supernatural. (1). *Logical evidence of the supernatural*, the probability of God's existence. Three persons, representing a priori proof, a posteriori proof, and skepticism are presented to discuss the question. He plays off the first two against each other and brings in the last to complete the work of destruction. Hume regards the apriori position as weakest of all. He considers two proofs, the ontological and the cosmological, proposing the following refutation: "Nothing is demonstrable unless the opposite implies a contradiction. Nothing distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we can conceive as existent is also conceivable as non-existent. Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. His argument is not invulnerable.

Hume thinks the *a posteriori* proof most convincing. "He that made the eye shall he not see?" The order of the world is admitted to have some remote analogy to intelligence. *Difficulties.*—(a) In the application of analogy to the origin of the world, the

world is conceived as a huge machine with God as its architect ; but in reality the world may resemble an animal or vegetable. (b) Analogy stops with finite limits. (c) The argument leads to anthropomorphism. Hume is not an atheist, as he does not assert that there are no grounds for belief in God. There are reasons for believing him a Christian.

(2.) *Historical Evidence of the Supernatural.*—Is revelation necessary to explain human conduct? He argues as a naturalist. Religious belief originates in polytheism. This is anthropomorphism and suggests an origin in some principle of human nature. The transfer to monotheism is made by the gradual exaltation of one deity above another. He takes up also the difference between the philosophical and popular ideas of God, concluding that it is all involved in doubt and uncertainty.

(3.) *Miracles.*—Is the supernatural proven by revelation attested by miracles? He concedes that we cannot say a miracle is impossible. But is it probable? (a) What is a miracle? "A violation of or interference with a law of nature"—it is an unique event contrary to experience or the customary. Can (e. g.) the raising of a dead man be established by human testimony? It is more in accordance with experience that men should make false statements than that a miracle should occur. Back of his conclusion is his philosophy, built on custom. A miracle must of course conflict with custom.

*Outcome.*—Supernatural existence cannot be established by logic, history, or miracle. Hume is perfectly logical, though wrong in his conclusion.

*Relation to His System.*—Consciousness is purely sensory to start with, a mass of individual, disconnected sensations. The only principles of knowledge recognized are habit and associations. We cannot establish either the objective world of existence or the spiritual world of man. Evidently the philosophy has no logical foundation on which to rest miracles. There is no adequate ground for religion or for science, and this is the logical outcome of sensational empiricism. In personal belief Hume was a deist and professed belief in revelation, yet he is cut off from a rational basis of his belief.

*Criticism.*—1. He leaves it impossible for any idea to rise above the stream of sensations. 2. The question of individual freedom arises, and we see basis for a rational view of ethics. He leaves no ground for real subjective individuality. His theory misses the principle which constitutes man a unitary, self-conscious being. He denies self on the same basis as he denies objective principles of organization, viz., all that exists is the flowing stream of sensations, and his conclusion is logical. 3. His philosophy denies the basis of science and religion.

*As to Miracles.*—In a sense Hume lays down the customary attitude toward miracles and all unique occurrences. His mistake is in saying that custom is the only basis of knowledge. Each day science discovers things contrary to custom. Again, if we believe in a world which is spiritual and objective, we are led to a first cause

called God, and certain exigencies may arise which need the direct agency of divine power.

*The Pre-Kantian Movement as a whole* is a rebellion against the traditional restrictions and methods of mediævalism. In a sense the entire movement is psychological, as it starts with consciousness. From this point the problem of knowledge should be dual. On its objective side it is ontological, and discusses matter and spirit. The subjective side includes consciousness as a representation of the objective, the phenomenal aspect of self and of the world. This explains the two branches of the movement. They broke this dualistic synthesis, one taking the ontological, rational side; the other, the empirical sensational side.

*Characteristics (1) of Rationalism.*—It investigated the problem of matter and spirit in a one-sided, rational way, assuming that the method and sphere of experience might be ignored. It considered only the objective elements of the problem of knowledge, and naturally ended in Wolff's purely formal theory. 2. *Empirical Movement.*—It investigated the problem of reality, proceeding on the assumption that the entire rational or objective element might be ignored. It started with sensation, and necessarily ended in skepticism. The historic demand of the time was for a synthesis that would begin at the foundations of the problem. Such times usually find their savior. In a sense, experience is the starting point of every theory of knowledge, and the limit of knowledge is in some self-conscious principle. From this start, the function of knowledge is a dual act, and philosophy cannot select out certain elements to deal with.

EMANUEL KANT (1724-1804).—Of Scottish and German descent, was born in Königsberg, North Prussia. He was never thirty miles from home, being educated at the university in his native town. He lived a century later than Locke. Graduated, tutored, entered the faculty as private docent, and in 1770, after fifteen years of apprenticeship, was made professor of logic and metaphysics, where he continued until old age compelled him to resign. He was interested in the social and political events of his time and singularly open to all new ideas. Of a very long list of works the three greatest are: "Critique of Pure Reason" (1781), "Critique of Practical Reason" (1788), and the "Critique of Judgment" (1790).

*Historical Relations.*—1. He was partly held in bondage by the intellectual tendency of the time to deify the middle axioms of the mind to the neglect of rational and ideal principles. 2. The reaction of this time against the hard rationalism of theology resulted in pietism, religious feeling combined with mysticism. Kant's parents were pietists and in this atmosphere his boyhood was spent. The tendency was for feeling to exclude intellectual elements, and Kant's rationalistic tendency was made stronger by a reaction. 3. Kant was educated in philosophy of Wolff, became dissatisfied with its shallowness and dogmatism, and was settling down to the empirical method when aroused by "the celebrated Hume" to a realization of the frightful gulf of empiricism.

*How He Realized the Situation.*—He saw that the two movements were fragmentary. Neither the rational-deductive method of Wolff nor the empirical-genetic of Hume could reveal the whole truth. The business of philosophy was to criticize experience so as to get its elements together with the nature and limits of the problem of knowledge.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE is discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason. The initial problem is as to how knowledge is possible at all. Only through a nexus between representation or representation and its object, such as to connect the two in synthesis. The generic function of cognition is that of judgment which is able to grasp an object. What, then, is the nature of judgment? Alternatives—1. The *a priori* theory vs. the *aposteriori*. Kant's reaction from Wolff was toward the latter, then from the empirical position toward the former. 2. Analytic or synthetic. He reacted from the former idea that judgment is simply a drawing out of what is contained in some original, more primitive judgments. The primitive judgment itself was a function of acquisition, *i. e.*, is synthetic. Hence, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? *i. e.*, judgments which stand as the conditions of experience and are yet synthetic. The question points to empiricism which reduces all judgments to a synthetic form and also to rationalism which asserts apodictic or *a priori* judgments as conditions of experience. Thus Kant seeks a mediating position.

Experience is divided into two parts or categories, (1) the scientific sphere, including perception, treated under the name of Transcendental Aesthetic, and cognition, treated in the Transcendental Analytic: (2) the metaphysical sphere, treated in the third part or Transcendental Dialectic. These make up the first, second and third parts of this Critique.

1. *Transcendental Aesthetic* deals with the world in space and time or the problem of mathematical knowledge. How is mathematical knowledge possible? (1) It is founded on ideally exact relations, *e. g.* points, planes, angles, etc. (2) It rests on certain necessary axioms or principles. (3) It is apodictic and exact. *Basis*—Aesthetic is from aisthesis, sense-perception. Transcendental means that which lies back of experience as its condition but enters into it. Transcendental is that which lies back of experience as its condition, but does not enter into it. Hence the Aesthetic deals with those principles which are the conditions of sense perceptions and yet enter into it. His method is critical analysis. Distinguishing between its matter and its form he discovers perception to contain sensations which, following Hume, he calls impressions, and time and space relations. The material element is simply given—man receives but does not produce it. It is, therefore, contingent, variable, and *a posteriori*. The formal element consists of space and time. The former is the *a priori*, universal and necessary form of outer sense: the latter, of the inner sense.

*Doctrine of Sense Perception.*—(1) Every object is composed of the material element, plus space, if it is external, and time, if it is

internal. (2) What is the relation of form to sensory experience? This considers not the object but the medium in which it is realized in the mind. Hume said the formal factors are the products of custom: Kant, that they are transcendental conditions of sensory experience, not products of it. (3) What is the relation of the object perceived to reality? The formal factors cannot be *a posteriori*, but must be original in the mind itself. The material element, Kant said, arises from some source not included in sense-perception, the *ding an-sich*. The thing perceived is simply a phenomenon. He here lays the foundation for the absolute divorce of knowledge from reality. Mathematical knowledge is possible because space and time are pure intuitions of the mind.

2. *Transcendental Analytic*.—How is physical science possible? (1) The whole structure is founded on the conception of an *objective* system of phenomena, called *nature*. (2) This resolves itself into certain dynamic relations—(a) *substance*, which is the ground and support of change; (b) *causation*, the relation of phenomena to each other as antecedents and consequents; (c) *inter-action*, or action and reaction.

There is a certain *logical machinery* through which consciousness reaches nature. Following abstraction and generalization we trace the same in difference. This gives rise to the quality of judgments; they are either affirmative, founded on the same, or negative, founded on difference. We reach the question, How much? And thus get the qualitative judgment applied quantitatively. This judgment has four forms, the universal affirmative, the universal negative, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative. This sort of judgment achieves the function of scientific investigation.

*Differentia of the Scientific View*.—Separate from its form and from its place in a time series, an object has a material element out of which two essential properties or dynamic categories emerge, viz., resistance and change. We have then a series of dynamic realities dynamically connected by the categories of substance, causation and interaction. To build up science the process is on the formal side logical, and partly material. A scientific judgment is one which asserts one of these dynamic relations about something. This is the *differentia* between physical science and mathematical. The former asserts qualitatively and quantitatively about one of these functions—substance, causation or interaction. The judgment is the principle in which to discover the categories. Kant asks, How are these judgments possible?

1. *Doctrine of Categories*.—What are they? Root functions which are inherent in the understanding, underlie it, and embody themselves in the judgments of knowledge. (a) *Their Discovery and Classification*.—He takes the four-fold classification of judgments as either of quantity, quality, relation or modality. Kant thinks the nature of knowledge is discoverable only by discovering these judgments and then tracing them back into the understanding to see what notions lie at their basis. For a complete list of these logical

tables and concepts, see Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 167. By his process of discovery he claims to have tabulated all the root notions of the understanding.

2. *Deduction of the Categories, i. e.*, their justification by proof of their necessity in experience. They are synthetic or combining principles of organization. He refutes the empirical idea that they are products of experience, indirectly, by pointing out that they are universal and necessary. If they were not so we could never arrive at nature and science. The dynamic relations are the formal elements of scientific cognition. He reaches the conclusion that, being *apriori*, these are pure subjective functions of all intelligences.

*How conceive space and time?* He regarded them as objective, but by this he means simply, something true to every human intelligence. By subjective, he means true for self alone. Space and time are subjective functions of all intelligences—the spacio-temporal faculty. He draws the same conclusion with reference to the ideas of nature and the categories. We cannot say there is an objective nature independent of us. He names this scientific function appreciation. As at the close of perception, the first act of the drama of knowledge, so here again, the dualism between knowledge and reality appears.

*Outcome of the Deduction of the Categories.*—In the faculty of discursive knowledge or apperception, we work over the perceptual world of time and space, under other concepts and dynamic relations to get our concrete vision of nature, or the world of science and the understanding. After the categories Kant takes up the

*Principles of Science* which are drawn out or deduced from the dynamic relations of substance, cause and inter-dependence. As substance the world is continuous and we get the idea of *energy*, its conservation, correlation, etc. From the constitution of the categories we get the idea of *dependence*. Founded on interaction is the *law of action and reaction*.

*Ultimate Principle of Knowledge* is self-consciousness. Why connect the idea of knowledge with self-consciousness? For the sake of attaining unity. The categories are plural and give many centres of unification, but nature and consciousness are one. The theory of knowledge must be grounded in unity. The unifying principle in consciousness is "the transcendental unity of apperception." At the source of this apperceiving function is the unity of self-consciousness.

*Kant's View of Self-Consciousness.*—He conceives it as dynamically performing its function of unification. This characteristic must spring from some transcendental source, yet he is unable to assert the reality of such a source as the soul or ego.

*Result of the Aesthetic and Analytic.*—We have the outline of the theory of knowledge. The category which comprehends all and proceeding from it the categories of the understanding, which cognize by virtue of their nature, are a system of dynamic relations. The supreme category has twelve categorical arms, which possess hands and fingers in the faculty of spacio-temporal relations. The



understanding reaches out and grasps the matter of the world into the unity of self-consciousness. In a sense, Kant's whole philosophy is a deduction from this foundation.

*The Kantian Dualism Between Knowledge and Reality.*—Two principles of the limit of knowledge. (1) The sense limit. He is not a sensationalist, as he recognizes other sources of knowledge than sensation. But through the senses we get the material factor of experience. (2) The rational limit. Reason supplies the structural basis of the phenomenal world. In itself the understanding is simply human. We may carry its principles as far as we like; they are psychological, not ontological, and we cannot know whether objective reality exists corresponding to them or not.

*The World as Phenomenon.*—We know it through our perceptual and apperceptual faculties. There are certain sense elements, constituting the material of the phenomenal world, with which Hume stopped. Kant's second element is that of combining principles which contribute form to the material element. The formal element is subjective in all intelligence. Kant corrects empiricism just where it is powerless to account for the formal element of things: corrects rationalism where it is unable to account for the material or empirical element of things.

*The World as Noumenon.*—The phenomenal world touches the noumenal first as a manifestation of the thing-in-itself. The impression is not ultimate, that which is so being unknown, yet necessary. Again, where self-consciousness terminates in the logical category of unity, the phenomenal touches the noumenal. This category is not ultimate, but points to a transcendent subject. Hence, the transcendent object and the transcendent subject are the two points where consciousness approaches the world of reality. This gives rise to the distinction between knowledge and reality.

*Theory of the Unknowable.*—The "law of the unconditioned" compels us to connect the phenomenal with the noumenal. There exists a rational necessity of affirming this reality, but it is unknowable.

3. *The Transcendental Dialectic.*—Is metaphysical knowledge possible? The final conclusion is that it is not. Reason is distinguished from the understanding and from sensibility, as the faculty of metaphysical principles and ideas. The primal category of reason is the law of the unconditioned, which binds together the phenomenal world and its noumenal ground.

*Kant's Conception of the Unconditioned.*—What is the sphere of reality which reason demands and the above law asserts? Three elements—the *soul*, or *ego*; the underlying reality of the world, or *world-ground*, and *God*. These give rise to—

1. *Rational Psychology.*—Kant has in mind Moses Mendelssohn's work on the soul and immortality. The latter conceived the soul quantitatively, as a substance; qualitatively, as simple; under the category of relation, as a spirit and dynamic; under that of modality, as necessary and immortal. Kant regards the reasoning as a

paralogism, which illustrates the fallacy of the Wolffian philosophy. It is the attempt of the subject to put itself before its own subjective categories as an object of knowledge. While the idea of the *ego*, or soul, is necessary as a rational postulate and regulative principle, yet the existence of a corresponding reality cannot be established.

2. *Rational Cosmology*.—Discussed in two parts: *a*. The idea of a phenomenal world as an objective total in time and space. *b*. The idea of this independent totality as related to and depending upon a world ground or noumenal reality. Kant held that four rational antinomies arise out of these views if asserted dogmatically. *a*. In view of space and time, that the world is limited, and that it is unlimited in space and time are equally demonstrable and refutable. *b*. In view of matter, conceived as an independent totality, that it is infinitely divisible, and not simple; and that it is not infinitely divisible and simple can both be proven and neither refuted on this basis. Again, in view a phenomenal world independent of its noumenal ground, the latter theory involves a sphere of free causation distinct from natural causation; and (*c*.) propositions asserting the universality of causation and propositions asserting the necessity of free causation outside of it can neither be refuted on this basis. *d*. It involves both the idea of contingency and that of a self-existent first cause; and propositions asserting an endless contingent series and that it must have a ground are equally demonstrable.

*Kant's Solution*.—The first two are founded on a simple mistake as to the nature of the phenomenal world. It is not a completely independent totality, but exists in and through the modes of knowing, which, being functions, are unlimited. The phenomenal world is indefinitely extensible, and time and space cannot be transcended by time and space. As to the second couple of antinomies, while recognizing free causation outside the sphere of contingency, he maintains that its reality cannot be proven. He distinguishes between an ideal and a real conception, and between an ideal conception and a real existence. He recognized the absolute validity of the law as an ideal conception, but denied its real existence. Yet he admitted the possibility of such a sphere of reality and of its real connection with relativity. If we conceive the noumenal world as one of origination which the mechanical sphere does not include, as it only implies a development, we can see how it is the ground of relativity.

(3) *Rational Theology*—(*a*) *The Idea of God*. Two methods of conceiving the world—First, we may strip off all attributes till we reach the idea of simple substance, conceived as the necessary ground of the world—a conception without power in religion or philosophy. Second, we may approach the idea by the opposite process of concretion under the categories of fullness, sufficiency and completeness. Kant took this method, holding that if God exist He is *Ens Realissimum*. There are grades of ideas and this is the absolute idea. The idea of God includes all categories—infinity, absoluteness, rationality, truth, beauty and goodness. It is the God of relig-

ion, satisfying every rational, æsthetic and moral demand. (b) *The existence of God.* (1) Ontological proof, introduced by Anselm and completed by Des Cartes. Three branches—(a) a *priori*, from the nature of the idea of God, (b) an argument based on the demand for an adequate cause of the divine idea, (c) anthropological, from the necessity of the idea of God to realize the idea of self. Kant concludes that this does not warrant our passing from the idea of God to His objective existence. (2) The Cosmological argument from the contingency of the world to its absolute ground. Kant says this proves the necessity of a world-ground, but not that this is God. This argument must fall back on (1) and as (1) is insufficient this is also. (3) The Physico-Theological argument from design. Kant says this could only prove a finite author of the world. We must connect the order of the world with its being, calling in the insufficient cosmological argument. *Conclusion*—While the ideas of a world-ground, of the soul, and of God are necessary to reason, for the sphere of theoretic reason does not present sufficient ground for asserting their reality as data of knowledge. A science of metaphysics is theoretically impossible, and a well-balanced uncertainty is the true position for a man to take.

PRACTICAL PROBLEM.—1. *Metaphysic of Morals—Basis.* Reason is not only thought but implies choice, and contains the principle of ethical legislation in its fundamental form, the categorical imperative. This principle is autonomous in being native to man's higher reason, but foreign to his lower, empirical nature. *Moral Principle*—1. *As a maxim.* "So act that the maxim of thy conduct may be fit for universal law." 2. *As a motive*, the moral principle is this maxim or law become immanent in a man's inner life so that he does his duty freely. *The Summum Bonum* includes perfect character and perfect conditions or happiness. When the moral motive has become inner and spontaneous a man's supreme satisfaction is in doing good, and he is in a position to realize a synthesis of character and conditions in the happiness of a virtuous life. *Postulates of morality.* 1. *Freedom.* In an'nomics (c) and (d), Kant concluded that while this is possible it cannot be proven. Here freedom is asserted as a necessity, as man can only enter the moral sphere by virtue of free ethical spirituality. 2. *Immortality*, also, is a moral postulate, though it could not be proven by pure reason. It arises as the condition of the realization of the soul's infinite end. 3. *God's existence or reality* is also a condition of the existence of the ideal moral sphere of spiritual law. God is a moral necessity. *Do we know these three things?* No. Theoretically man must remain in a condition of well-balanced uncertainty. These moral considerations of practical reason disturb the balance but do not extend man's theoretic knowledge.

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, OR ÆSTHETIC REASON.—*Place and Function of Judgment.* Kant was unable to correlate the two former critiques because of a cleft, which we have seen, between the categories of morality and those of the understanding or science,

Judgment is supposed to fill up this gap between them. Between the sphere of mechanism and the sphere of imperatives lies the category of judgment—viz., finality, ideation, or theology. It is the category of adaptation and artistic intelligence. This critique is divided into the *Æsthetic Judgment* and the *Teleologic Judgment*. 1. *The Æsthetic Judgment* takes up the subjective aspect of finality and is divided into, (1) *The Doctrine of Taste*. Taste is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the adaptation of the form or idea of a thing to our faculties. This pleasure is universal, disinterested—not arising from ulterior considerations—and necessary. (2) *The Doctrine of Beauty*. Beauty is the form of an object irrespective of its end. Beauty proper gives unqualified pleasure. The sublime is the absolutely great. (3) *The Teleologic Judgment* takes up the objective aspect of finality. Judgment is teleologic when we view the form as realizing some intelligent purpose or design. This gives rise to a causation different from that of mechanism and looks at a thing as a unity from the idea of the whole. The mechanical principle deals with a detail. *Is there design in nature* such as to pre-suppose a final cause? His conclusion is the same as before. It is necessary to conceive nature under the teleologic category of intelligence, but this does not justify the assertion of such an objective ground. Kant reduces finality to a subjective basis.

*Summary of the Movement.*--1. In what sense does Kant close the first period of modern philosophy? The rational movement, while containing some empirical elements, was dominated by rationalism, was directed away from experience and ended in dogmatic formalism. Moreover, it was profoundly affected by the spirit of the eighteenth century, the deification of the abstract syllogistic faculty of the understanding. The empirical movement was also affected in its later stages, but not dominated by it. This movement was likewise false to itself and one-sided in ignoring the entire sphere of objective reality and ended in complete skepticism. Kant saw that, contrary to the empirical doctrine, knowledge must have some sure foundation and, contrary to rationalism, that it must have some limit beyond which it cannot go. 2. Kant's relation to the nineteenth century. (a) He shaped the philosophical issues of the age. (b) He is directly related to two of the greatest movements of the time—Transcendentalism which tries to avoid his conclusions, and Agnosticism which accepts and seeks to harmonize them with life.

*Critical Observations.*—The Pre-Kantian movements have each a lesson. The empirical emphasized the fact that there is a sensational principle in consciousness; the rational, that there is a spiritual principle above sensation. Kant might have reached a more effective development if, instead of distinguishing, like the Scholastics, between the matter and the form of experience, he had admitted the dualism of the two spheres of sensation and reason or mechanism and spirit. In such a view man would possess knowledge not merely of phenomena, but also of the unified sensatio-rational reality. Kant's phenomenon stands between mind and knowledge. Phenomenon ought to apply merely to some aspect of reality itself.

*The Distinction Between Knowledge and Reality.*—Knowledge is the effort of consciousness to apprehend reality. Dividing knowledge or experience into the three spheres of Kant, the understanding unites the two spheres of sensation and reason. They give rise to three principles of knowledge, the sensatio-empirical, the sensatio-rational, and the ratio-spiritual. 1. The *sensatio-empirical principle* gives us our intuition of the spacio-temporal reality, our view of the world around us. 2. The *sensatio-rational principle* gives our world of science and the understanding by uniting the two spheres of sensation and reason. It is the locus of interaction between the principles of sense and those of higher reason. In this sphere we get two things—(a) our view of objective nature as a world of sensation modified by rational categories. We have not only a world of phenomena in space and time, but a world of space and time correlated by the dynamic principles of identity, cause, substance and interaction which Kant called categories. (b) We get here our view of the understanding itself as the process of knowing reality. This is the sphere of Kant's categories—of the powers of conception—of man's synthetic and analytic activities. Knowledge proper is a function of this middle sphere of the understanding. Kant's highest category, self, unifies all knowledge. Knowledge would not be knowledge if it were not possessed by some intelligence. It is a function of self. But this highest subjective principle does not belong to the understanding. It transcends the middle sphere, and Kant was right in saying that the understanding cannot circumscribe and know it. 3. The *ratio-spiritual principle* operates only in the sphere of the spiritual. The objective in this sphere is that which exists in some consciousness. Results are here worked out by the operation of the spiritual principle; and hence knowledge, which is the result of the interaction alone of sense and reason, is impossible in this sphere.

But this limitation grows out of the necessities of the Kantian system alone. To Kant the spiritual subject itself, as well as the world-ground, are transcendent, a position which grows out of his use of the distinction between form and matter. But by assuming the reality of the dual spheres of mechanism and teleology, or of sensation and reason in the world, we reach the position that knowledge in both the sphere of sensation and that of reason is knowledge of reality. (We should distinguish, however, between knowledge in the sphere of the understanding and knowledge in the spheres of sense and reason. In the former case reality has been entirely subdued and overcome by the categorical activity of consciousness. In the latter, reality is not yet subdued. It is the difference between knowledge *about* and acquaintance *with* an object, or that between second and first intentions, for which see Hodgson's "Time and Space," § 10). Knowledge in the sphere of perception is possible, and in the same way we may be sure of things coming under the spiritual principle.

Hence we reach our doctrine of the psyche itself, the *Concrete Reason and its Ideal*, in a three fold function of the ratio-spiritual

principle. (1) In the sphere of *theoretic truth*, the highest categories of pure reason, viz., unity, ground, and finality, give a knowledge of the soul as real, of the world as a system of phenomena, and of the first cause of all—the *Ens Realissimum*. (2) In the sphere of *moral truth*, or will, appears the conception of a moral end. Moral obligation gives ground for postulating freedom, immortality, and God. (3) In the sphere of *aesthetic truth*, or teleologic intelligence, we conceive things as a unity from the point of view of the whole. Finally, it cannot be too strongly insisted that the ratio spiritual principle is a source of knowledge which is as certain as knowledge reached by the sensatio-empirical principle. Kant failed to see that we know reality, and not mere phenomena, in both cases.



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