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Notes on Psychology

FROM

LECTURES GIVEN

BY

JAMES McCOSH, D. D., LL. D.

PRINTED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION ONLY.

PJNCETON, N. J.: 1880.

Printed by WJllIam S. Sharp, Trenton, N. J

PREFACE.

It is to be regretted that there ,is no stereotype edition of so valuable and necessary a set of printed notes ; that every Junior Class must needs go to the expense of reprinting them.

But such is the case, and this edition pretends to be nothing but a re- print of the former one. No changes have been made. None were thought necessary.

We only hope that this may give a fresh impulse and aid to the study of Psychology, in which Princeton has been so long pre-eminent.

EDITORS FROM THE CLASS OF '82.

Princeton College, Sept., 1880.

101248

INDEX.

PART I.— PROLEGOMENA.

Page. Introductory.— Method and Means of Psychological Study, - i

Chap. I.— Mind and Body, --"'■" ^

Chap. II.— The Mind and its Faculties, - - - - 21

PART II.— THE COGNITIVE POWERS.

Chap. III.— Simple Cognitive Powers, ... - 26

Chap. IV. — The Representative Powers, - - - - 57

Chap. V. — The Comparative Powers, - - . - - 81

PART III.— THE MOTIVE POWERS.

Chap. VI —The Moral Power, 95

Chap. VII.— The Emotional Power, io3

Chap. VIII.— The Will, - - ------ 113

Chap. IX. — Analysis of the Subject, 119

PART I-PROLEGOMENA.

I.— INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

Method and Means of Psychological Study.

Psyoliology, {ilnr/fi, Aoyo-,) is that science Ay liich ingnirf^sj j'" an inductive manner,) into the operations of the human minclj with a view to discovering: 0Ki» laws. - ,7t-^ /.r <= ,,^ c ^-^^ ^., ;

Method. - . , / ' - ■^("

As in all pliysical and metapliysical sciences, the method to be pursued is the Inductive Method {iruj.Ycoyrj).

There are two methods emi)loyed in science, the inductive and the deductive. The deductive method is employed in matheniatics and in logjc. It proceeds from general axioms whicli must apply to all particular cases ; in otiier words, from something given or granted to something derived therefrom by thought. In the physical sciences, the in- du(;tive method is pursued. It proceeds to collect and arrange facts ; to observe the laws running through these facts, and then completes the investigation by ascertaining, by experiment, whether similar fiicts ^vill occur under the same law. Galileo Avas the first to use this method, although Bacon perfected it. Tlie inductive method ])rocceds thus : ^ n,- .

1. It sets out in an orderly manner to collect and arrange (co-ordinate, subordinate) facts. -i- cUf '' / ^^W&J^Zt^.

2. To examine these facts. ^ h ,- -f ■-■ . ' '■ ^. To discover the laws or principles running through these

facts. **

In induction we have a means and an end. Means — Orderly collection and co-ordination of facts. . A

^■'

Ihid — I)iscoveiy of,Kxioms7X!aiises and Forms. Note. — Axioms — the laws of phenomena. ^^.-

Form:^ — the intrinsic properties of bodies, or that which makes them what they are, {slooc).

Bacon — born in London, ij^ InHI published his " Novum OrQanumr 1620, died 1626 — orio-inated the inductive method. , i,/-K It had, however, been partially in use in the time of Aristotle.O i.'v~^OVx!i^ Bacon says that we must gather and co-ordinate or separate . facts, then rise fo minor axioms (axiom — law, principle), from these to middle axioms, then to major axioms, and, lastly, to causes''^ forms ; (forms — properties of bodies which make them what they are). By the last expression, [sloo-), he means what we now more vaguely term laws, i. e., ^the principles of y t , , forces and order in nature. '^^"^tZ^.'Y;^,^^^^'^ ^dx^^c^

The whole difference between the great methods is, that in the inductive, we rise from singulars to uniN'ersals ; in the deductive, we descend from universals to singidars.

Newton's application of induction mixed with deduction can be seen from the following illustration :

He had a great many facts whence he drew a conclusion ; this conclusion then served as an_ axiom or law, whence, reasoning deductively, he found that this law or conclusion did not apply to different cases. So, altering his law until it suited all cases, he thus, by induction-deduction, arrived at the general law for gravitation, viz., that gravitation is proportioned to the weighty and, inversely, to the square of the distance.

It is evident that Bacon meant his method, mutatis mutandis, to apply to all branches of science, metaphysical as well as physi- cal. The process must certainly be somewhat different when applied to mind and when applied to matter. The knowledge we gain of mind is by internal inspection^ (/. e., self-conscious- ness;) that of matter, by external inspection, (i. e., sense- percejition.) Still, the nature of the human mind not being creative — not perceiving in the abstract, but in the concrete — intuition, therefore, giving us facts, not laws, and the nature of the phenomena themselves being so complicated, we are all but forced to make use of the inductive method in all sciences treat-

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ing of the phenomena of nature. It is a decided mark of the progress which science has made in modern times, to have left behind it the metliods ot^ a priori reasoning.

^ Means. '' /■ In studying the nature of the mind, we must have recourse to

1. Direct Observation. i--'-Hi ..^ - , — --^*i -^ ^^c-«= /f —.

-L>ii'ect observation, immediate introspection, observance j proper, are all one and the same work of one faculty of the

human mind, viz., consciousness. Self-consciousness is that fliculty of the mind by which we observe the operations of the mind. Man cannot observe the laws of the mind by mere consciousness : he can only observe facts and induct- ively draw conclusions.

2. Exj)eriment.

It has been questioned whether the mind can be experi- mented on. We certainly cannot speak of experiment in ;< metaphysics as we can in physics or anatomy. Still, we

^ can start some subject, and observe what changes and emo-

tions it creates ; i. c, we can, instead of letting the mind go on by itself, put it into a certain position and observe how it behaves.

3. The Words,, Writings and Deeds of other Men.

By the,^^thoughts and feelings expressed in them, we can look into the souls of the men themselves, and thus obtain the material for comparison. We cannot observe directly the minds of others, only the results of their thougrit's. Shakspeare's knowledge of human nature was so great, that what he says may almost be taken as a fact.

-IHi^ t'

CHAPTER I.

II.— MIND AND BODY.

A. Evidence of Existence of Mind.

These arguments are chiefly directed against a certain re- fined materialism which has been the reigning philosophy of France. It has gained considerable power in Germany,, and is the issue to which Mill's Association Theory, Bain's Identification of all thoughts and feelings with the body, Spencer's Development of all things out of an unknowable nothing, Huxley's Physical Basis of life and mind in mole- cular action, are conducting modern thinkers. It is that form of materialism which accounts for mental action and ideas by molecular action, or some form of material agency.

I. Man has means of knowing the existence of mind as im- mediate as the means of knowing the existence of matter.

It is often said that man can know directly only the objects ftdling under his senses, and that he can arrive at the knowledge of mind only by a ci rcu i tou s process , by inferences based upon the knowledge of the existence of the material world. Others go a step further and deny the le- gitimacy of this inference, trying vainly to account for men- tal action by material forces, chemical or electric.

In viewing a landscape, we are conscious not only of the objects in it, but of the mind viewing them. We have immediate and intuitive knowledge of objects on a land- scape from intuitive judgments in regard to these objects; we are as certain that there is a mind perceiving as that there is something perceived.

Suppose we are standing upon a bridge, looking down the river, and enjoying the scenery before us. But all the time we are conscious of doing so ; we are conscious of a

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^elf separate from the scene, and reasoning and judging about it. Suddenly a mother steps to the edge of the bridge and throws a cliild into tlie water; we are filled with hor- ror and indignation ; we feel ourselves reprobating the conduct of the woman ; and, feeling j)itj for the child who is sinking in the waters, we rush into the stream in the hope of rescuing it. But all the time we are as' certain that there is a soul reprobating; the unnatural mother, as that there is a mother to be reprobated. We have not more evidence that there is a child drowning; in the river than we have of the other fact that we are cherishing com- passion towards it; and we are not more assured that the child is in danger, than we are that we have resolved to rescue it.

II. (It follows that) we have a positive, th mi gh limitpd, knowl- ^^g® ofjaiind, even as we have a positive, though limited, knowledge of matter.

There are several doctrines to be met bj this position. First among them is that of the sj^irituaHst, who maintains that matter does not exist ; that it is simply a projectioiLiif mind^ which is so constituted that, under the same circum- stances, it will act in the same way.

The next doctrine is that of Kant. It refutes the pre- cediijg. It is that we have a knowledge of matter as exist- ing^ but not beyond that; that we perceive phenomena, not actual objects. But we do know matter as possessed of certain properties which we can define, although we do not pretend to know all the properties which may lie latent in matter. Now, "just as we define matter by positives as extended, as possessed of attraction and other^ properties, so we may define mind by positive qualities, all of them known to us because we have constant experience of them : " con- .sciougness, intelligence, emotion, conscience, will. When, for instance, by some bad news, sorrow is awakened in the mind, we are conscious, we know, that the mind is capable of being affected l)y sorrow. Still, we cannot be supposed to know exactly all the properties of mind.

III. As matter cannot be resolved into mind, on the one hand, so, on the other, mind cannot be resolved into matter.

Attempts have been made by Berkeley, Fichte, and others to refine matter^ so as to leave little but the name ; repre- senting it either as an idea create^I^_bY the .Diyjne Mind (Berkeley), or as an idea created by the human mind itself. With these men matter is only an exhibition of forces. Others, again, a school of Physicists of the present day, seek to spiritualize (dynamicalize) matter by stripping it of some of its distinguishing properties; such as exten- sion, occupation of space. But all these attempts stand in direct opposition to the intuitive convictions of man ; and as we would oppose attempts to resolve matter into mind, so we would set ourselves against the attempt to resolve mind into matter, because

1. The twaare made known to us by different organs.

The one, matter, we know by the senses ; the other, mind, by self-consciousness. "No man ever saw a thought, touched an emotion, heard a volition. Nor are we con- scious, within the thinking mind, of space occupied, or hardness, or color."

2. We know them possessed of essentially. ilifferent ^'opjr- ties. The burden of proof lies with those who deny this posi- tion.

We know the one as occuiwinar space, and " exercisino- certain attractive powers ; whereas we know the other as capable of judgment, purpose, andjiffection." No prouertv of mind can apulv to matter.

If we give proper consideration to these arguments, it will immediately appear how impossible it is to bring both matter and mind back to one common source ; that no modification of matter will give it mtelligence^ thought, discriminat:iorr._ Materialists who profess to explain mental action by material forces, never have so much as a clear idea of the thing to be demonstrated. The physiologist

3

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may, by the study of the nerves and brain, come to know what they are, "vvhat their chemical composition is. He may say that electricity explains all the j>roperties of nerves (which is a most unsuccessful theory) ; for electricity will travel along them in a certain manner, nervous action Avill not. But though he should be successful, all he could show is under whnt physiological conditions iutelject, voli- / tion, may arise : he would not thereby throw any light on the subject of intelTect and volitrorr He only shows that there are bodily organisms required by the mind, but he cannot thus account for thought and will. An aifection of the pulj)y substance, thf^brainj, is one thing ; and the deter- mination of the mind to do or not to do, is another thing. An electric force is one thing, and the ingenious thought of Faraday in speculating on that force is an entirely diiferent thing. No doubt, physical and mental action go hand in hand ; as the musical instrument sends forth sweet melodies oniv when touched by a skillful hand, so the actions of the mind can be harmonious only when the body is in a cor- respondingly healthful condition. ''Sit sana itiens in corpore sanoT

IV. The connection between mind and matter is a mystery.

A mystery is a truth which we are required to believe wjj^hout fully com preli eliding it ; i. e., it is a truth suffi- ciently evident to be believed, still incomprehensible. Some doctrines, for instance, are not easy to form a conception of, still we cannot but believe in them. Such are the doctrines of the Eternity__of the Divine Existence and the infinite expansion of space. Other doctrines are, to some measure, understood, but we are unable to see in what relation they stand to others. When two phenomena are presented to the mind, it naturally tries to discover some connection between them (life — death) ; and if we fail to discover this connection, it is not because we are ignorant, but because we have not the means of proi)erly conducting the investi- gation. It is highly unreasonable to reject such doctrines

because their connections are not apparent. It is the same in the present case. AVe know mind and matter separately ; but their connections may, perhaps, always remain a mys- tery. We know something of mind, something of body ; but how they act upon each other we have no means of dis- covering.

B. Influence of Mind on Body.

I. There is an influence exerted on the bodily organs by the will,

TJie seat of the will seems to be the cerebrum. An animal deprived of this part of the brain may, nevertheless, continue to live and move ; but it is incapable of voluntary motion. The will does not act directly upon the nerves, but on the ganglia, at the base of the brain, and thence the motion is carried to that part of the body which is to be moved. The former part of the brain contains the motor nerves. The back part contains the sensor nerves. Some- thing is transmitted down from the cerebrum to the base of the brain — to the motor nerve ; this passes on into action at the rate of one hundred and eight feet per second. OF these intermediate steps between the will and its effect, man is not directly conscious; we unll only tlie result, not the entire process.

II. There is an influence exerted on the bodily organs by tlie attention being directed to them.

1. If the attention is directed to different organs, the result is a different one. By directing attention to them the salivary glands secrete more saliva, and swallowing is obstructed, even stammering may be produced. Attention fixed upon the stomach produces a feeling of weight — of pressure in that region, and the digestion is disturbed.

Note. — Sir Henry Holland, in his chapters on Mental Physiology, has proven it. Deglutition and articu- lation may be im})eded by simply directing and con- centrating the attention upon them. A patient

frequently injures himself by occupying his mind £00 mucii with his ailment. Hence, cures may be effected, or at least helped, by having tiie attention directed elsewhere. Many people have been entirely cured of sea-sickness, when the ship was in danger of sinking, the attention of the mind being trans- ferred from the nausea to the necessity of j)reserva- tion. Dr. McCosh said that once he was called to address an audience from a very high and hastily constructed platform; he could look between the boards at his feet, and began to see the peril of his position ; immediately his knees began to shake, and he grew dizzy and faint; but as soon as he began to speak, his limbs grew firm and he forgot "all about it.

2. With the senses of sight, hearing, etc., the result is directly opposite— they are rendered more acute. In short, different parts of the body are differently affected, hajipily or otherwise, as it is the nature of the organ to act under or without the direction of the will.

Note. — Where we direct the attention voluntarily, the influ- ence is usually good. When attention is directed to the senses of sight, hearing, etc., the effect is always good. Thus a hunter, going thnnigh a wood, sees much more than we do. This frequent attention to a part, unless too excessive, always sends blood to it. Perniciousness is seen in close study and want of exercise. Hence, as above, many diseases are pro- duced by imagination, es|)ecially those of the heart. So, also, imagination frequently plays no mean part in their cure. An M. D. once prescribed a fly blis- ter, which was to be applied in a given time unless the symptoms improved ; the jdeasant prospect before him so worked upon the part affected, through the patient's mind, that he M^as very much better long before the time of ai)plying the blister came around.

B

10

So one with a severe toothache will start for the den- tist's, but, upon viewing the dread paraphernalia of the office, will immediately lose the pain and beg to be released. Dr. Beddoes tells of a paralytic, on whom he was about to exjjeriment with electricity; he placed a thermometer under the man's tongue to find the temperature of his body, and the man, imag- ina: it to contain and havinp- to do with electricitv, was forthwith cured.

3. Mesmerism, " powwowing," and, to a certain extent, homoeopathy, are based on this curious relation of mind and body ; but tliey tlrrow no light upon it.

Note. — Tiie mesmerist must first acquire control over the train of tliought of the person to be mesmerized, (which is due to the association of ideas), and then he can proceed to deprive him of the use of his limbs by directing his attention to the part in ques- tion. You can free yourself from the power of the mesmerist by concentrating your mind on something else and refusing to think of what he wishes you to. He then has lost your train of thought.

III. There is an influence exerted on the, bodily .frame ,by emotions, -•" ■■■' .^^ ""^ '6 -"^ ^'^m.J^

It is a well-known fact that certain mental feelings have great effect on certain organs of the body. Fear and joy affect the heart ; disappointment and grief, the stomach ; envy produces jaundice ; passions affect the respiratory organs. Sir Charles Bell maintains that the action of the respiratory organs gives the expressions to the countenance. On these facts, })hysiognomy bases its judgments.

IV. Mental action generally shows its influence on the body by wasting bodily energy.

Severe mental work, and especially stern exercise of the will, strong emotions, are usually followed by a loss of bodily energy, i. e., by a feeling of weariness. The strain

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of the will affects more immediately the nervous power cen- tered in the brain. A long night's exertion shows itself in a distnrbance of the digestive organs. There is one cure for all these injurious effects of mental activity, viz., abso- lute calmness. ./^

C. Influence of Body on 3Iind,

The parts most intimately connected with mental action are the cerebro-spinal mass, the ce|-ebri^pi. and the cerebel- lum.

Note. — The forces running through these parts are connected with mental action ; not, however, the physical parts constituting them.

All these parts acted upon by the mind carry out this action by means of two systems of nerves.

1. The Automatic or Reflex system (Dr. M. Hall).

2. The Sensori-motor system (Sir Cliarles Bell).

a. Axdomcdic or Reflex System.

The seat or centre is the cerebro-spinal mass, which is composed of \Yhite_andgray matter; the former being fibrous, the latter vesifiujar. Along the spinal C(n*d are ganglia, or centres from which the nerves proceed.

Note. — These ganglia are diminutive brains, the same in function as the brain ; they are inferior centres re- ferred to tiie brain.

The active power of the nervous system resides in these ganglia, and not in the fibres of the nerves. A reflex action takes place when an influence from without is sent T)acF15y those centres; the animal, however, having absolutely no sensation of it. Hence it is called automatic, inasniuch as there is no voluntary ])ower exerted^ Now, the nerves being either nerves of sensation or of motion, the former set answer to carry the sensation to the seat of sensation at the base of the brain.

Thus, an impression being produced on the branches of

12

the ganglion, i. e., on the afferent nerve, the sensation is car- ried back to the ganglion, and, by the aid of the efferent (motor) nerve, the sensation is again carried outward, and results in motion.

Examples of the action of this system are the circulation of the blood, digestion of the food.

The sensitive nerve is called P. S. (posterior sensor.) The motor nerve is called A. M. (anterior motor.) Afferent, P. S., carries sensation to the ganglion. Efferent, A. M., carries sensation from the ganglion, and re- sults in motion.

6. Sensori-motor System.

This system has its seat in the seiisorium. which is com- posed of .ganglia alon^ the^ base of the brain. This is the centre of motion independent of the will, is consensual and quite automatic.

Examples of the action of this system are the closing of tjie eye at alright light, vomiting, effect of an offensive smell, sneezing when tickled in the nose.

These differ from the true automatic motions in possess- ing sensation. They are actions with sensation.

c. Voluntary Action.

This action, seated in the gray matter of the brain, passes from the white in the ganglia at the base of the brain.

I. Fuller Discussion of Cerebro-Spixal Mass. — jSTobody imagines that the bones or muscles of the body can produce thought or feeling. It is the cerebro-spinal mass alone that can be supposed to have any psychological qualities. Let us examine it, beginning with the spinal column and mounting up to the cerebral hemispheres.

1. The Sjyinal Column is composed of white matter, which is fibrous, and of gray matter in the centre, which is cellular. It gives off along the backbone thirty one pairs of nerves, which are combined in knots or ganglia, which exhibit reflex action. The anterior in the [)airs are Motor (designated A. M.); the pos-

13

terior, Sensor (P. S.) The Sensor nerve, which is afferent, being stimulated, transmits an action to the centre, and there goes out in motion along the motor nerve, which is efferent. Now there is no evidence of there being mental action of any kind in the cord or in the nerves. Mr. Lewes, it is true, speaks of there being unconscious mental action. I doubt much whether there is such a thing as unconscious thinking or feeling. From its very nature, we cannot be conscious — that is, directly cognizant of it. It cannot explain anything which cannot be accounted for otherwise (supposed unconscious acts are simply acts Avhich have passed so rapidly that they are not remembered) by known and acknowledged principles. There is no proof of there being mnid in the motions of the ganglia. There is, no doubt, intel- ligence implied in the very delicate mechanism by which reflex action is produced, but it is that of the Being who ftishioned and arranged the whole. The movements are not directly under the control of the Mill. Professor Ferrier maintains that there is no sensation in the backbone or its apj>endages. All the parts above may be removed M'ithout destroying the proper action of the parts. So flir, then, we have no trace of mental y^^ action, of will, or judgment, or emotion, nor even of sensation. "" V 2. Going upward, the spinal cord expands into the Medulla ^^<^ Oblongata. Here we have a centre of co-ordination of a more complex character. It is concerned in the processes by which infants suck and swallow, and is supposed to be exercised in the production of articulate speech. The co-ordination of respira- tory movements is one of the chief functions of the org-ans.

"It is fartlier a centre of the reflex manifestation of facial expression, and some other forms of what are usually regarded as emotional expressions. Vul- pian has shown that if a young rat be deprived of all the encephalic centres above the medulla, and if then the toes are pinched, not only may reflex move- ments of the limbs be produced, but also a cry as of pain may be elicited. This is capable of frequent repetition. If now the medulla oblongata be destroyed, pinching of the toes will cause the reflex movements of the limbs as before; but no cry will be elicited. The cry in this case is a pure reflex phenomenon, and is easily accounted for, when it is remembered that a cry is only a modi- fied expiration, and that the medulla oblongata is the co-ordinating centre of the respiratory movements."

14

I call special attention to the circumstance that the ciy as of pain is no evidence of pain boing felt. Our author says :

"If all the centres above the medulla be removed, life may continue, the respiratory movements may go on with their accustomed rhythm, the heart may continue to beat, and the circulation be maintained; the animal may swallow if food be introduced into the mouth, may react to impressions made on its sensory nerves, withdrawing its limbs, or making an irregular spring if pinched, or even utter a cry as if in pain, and yet will be merely a non-sen- tient, non-intelligent, reflex mechanism."

3. Rising higher, we come to the Mesetieephalic Centres (Cor- pora Quadrigemiiia). These are the seat of more complex and special co-ordinations, involving very Avoiiderful adaptations, and the reflex expression of eiuotion produced by the action of the special senses. Carpenter regards the mesencephale as the sensorium commune, or seat of sensation, and the source of what is called sensori-motor, or consensual action — such as sneezing, which is not dependent on the will, and cannot be pro- duced directly by a volition ; but which is felt, and is so, our author maintains, because the act reaches a sensory centre in the brain. He does not allow that this action has in itself any sensation; and he asserts that the plaintive cry elicited by pinching the foot of a rabbit may be merely a reflex phenom- enon, not depending on any true sense of pain, and that the leap to the side which the brainless frog makes so as to avoid an obstacle may be merely the resultant of two simultaneous impressions, the one on its foot, and the other on its retina.

4. The Cerebellum was regarded by the phrenologists as the centre of sexual ai)petite, but this view is not confirmed by accurate research. Our author doubts whether, as is often asserted of late years, it is the special centre of co-ordinated action. Ferrier allots to it the function of equilibration, which is paralyzed when the organ is totally destroyed, and may issue in falling or rotary motion, according to the part affected when it is diseased. He maintains that neither sensation nor voluntary motion need be affected by disorder in the cerebellum.

This may be the proper place to call attention to a process which takes [)lace in the Pons Varolii and Crura Cerebri.

15

There is a decussation or crossing of the various seusorv (so-called) and motor parts. Above tliis, destruction of one side causes paralysis of motion and sensation, not on the same, but on the opposite side.

The Crura Cerebri pass into two great ganglia situated at base of the brain, where tliey are inclosed and concealed by the cerebral hemispheres. These are believed to perform very important offices in connecting the brain proper with the organs that lie farther down.

The Corpora Striata, it is agreed, have motor functions. Destructive lesions of this organ in man, in dogs, and other animals, produce hemiplegia of the opposite side, owing to the decussation just spoken of. Sensation, meanwhile remains unaifected.

There is a considerable diversity of opinion as to the func- tions of the Thalama Optici. Carpenter regards them as play- ing an important part in the sensori-motor tract, and speaks of fibres as ascending from the sensorium to the cortical layer of the cerebrum, which is thereby sensorially stimulated or affected. Ferrier writes somewhat hesitatingly. There are undoubtedly cases in which injuries of the optic thalamus have been associa- ted with diminution or abolition of sensation in touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell, in one form or other, on the opposite side of the body. He holds that the thalamus contains the sensory paths of all the nerves of sensation which take their origin below the crura cerebri. The sensor and motor paths seem to unite about this place, and lesions of different parts of the thalamus seem to produce somewhat different effects. The motor tract has become completely separated from the sensor in the corpora striata. He holds it to be physically impossible that sensation should continue after the total destruction of the optic thalami.

But our author insists once more on the fact that mere reac- tions to sensory, or rather afferent actions, are not indications of true sensations. He maintains that up to this place, up to the thalami optici and corpora striata, there is no evidence of will or even of sensation. This declaration, however, is to be taken

16

along with the very important doctrine, that movements at first requiring true voh'tional effort "tend to become automatic by repetition ; and the less varied and complex the movements, the more speedily does the automatic organization become estab- lished," He reaches the conclusion that "the corpora striata are the centres in which these habitual or automatic movements become organized," and that " the optic thalami play the same subordinate role to the sensory centres."

5. Cerebrum. — So far as we have yet gone, there is no proof of any mental act, nor even of sensation. Cut off the cerebral hemispheres from above, and there may be many movements as adaptive as if they had been done by the animal's will and intelligence, but there is, after all, no feeling and no purpose. Our author holds that " it has been conclusively demonstrated that in man the consciousness of sensory impressions, or true sensation, is a function of the cerebral hemispheres." I believe he has gone far to establish this most important truth in opposi- tion to those who, like Carpenter, find the tract of sensation at the base of the brain.

His definition of sensation is approximately correct: "It is the consciousness of an impression.' I do not like the word "impression." I believe that "affection" would be better. But he is surely right in saying that iu sensation there is conscious- ness, or an immediate mental act, and this, I may add, a cognitive act ; it is the knowledge of an affection of the body. He maintains resolutely that "sensation is a function of the higher, that is, cerebral centres," and quotes Flourens, who was of opinion that "sensation proper was abolished by the removal of the cerebral hemispheres."

II. Localization. — Our author goes, farther than this : he thinks he can localize, in the gray matter which composes the cortex or periphery of the brain, the centres of the various senses. At this point he is opposed by many eminent physi- ologists. His experiments will require to be repeated, and his conclusions tested by competent men, before they can be regarded as fully established. But he seems to me to have

(9-eeupx.U Ai<^ ^ ^f^UsHs^ &r^ o^um^ Axaa. ~

17

proven his positions i)rovisionally and approximately. I use this guarded language becanse I believe that, while the senses have to do with the centres allocated to them, there may be need of more investigation to determine the {)recise function of the centres. It is surely quite conceivable that the sensa- tion which is so diffused in the lower animals may become diiferentiated and localized, in the higher animals and in man, in special cerebral organs, which, however, it may perhaps have to be added, are not so differentiated as not to be mixed up with other functions.

1. We may begin with the OrganiG Sensations or Visceral Sensations. The cerebral centres of these are supposed to be in the occipital lobes. Cut off these, and the animal continues to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell as before, and can walk, run, jump, and use its limbs with perfect power and co-ordination! But the relish and the appetite for food are gone. It has to be added that thirst, which is a tactile sensation, may remain. But place food before the animal, and it has no inclination to taste it. The occipital lobes are thus the centre of those visceral affec- tions, which, as healthy or morbid, do so affect our vague feelings of well or ill feeling, which are apt to constitute no inconsidera- ble portion of our happiness or unhappiness, and make our tem- perament and our tempers placid or irritable.

2. Touch is represented as having its centre in the hippocam- pal region. "Destructive lesions of this region abolish tactile sensation on the opposite side of the body. When the right hip- pocampal region is destroyed, sight and hearing are unimpaired, but cutaneous stimulation, by pricking, pinching, or pungent heat, sufficient to cause lively manifestations of sensation, when applied to the right side of the body, failed in general to elicit any reaction whatever on the left side, whether face, or hand or foot."

3. Smell and Taste are supposed to have their centres, not easily distinguishable, in the subiculum cornu ammonis. " Irri- tation of the subiculum, in the monkey, cat, dog, and rabbit, was attended l)y similar phenomena in all— viz., a peculiar torsion of the lip and partial closure of the nostril on the same side. This

c

18

is evidently tlie outward expression or reflex indication of tlie excitation of subjective olfactory sensations of an intense char- acter."

4. Sight lias its cerebral centre in the gyrus angularis. It seems that the eye, Math all its coats and hnrnors, and tlie retina and the optic nerve, might be all entire and in a healthy state, and yet there be no vision whatever. In order to sight, the action must go np to the cerebral centre. "Destruction of the angular gyrus on one side causes blindness in the opposite eye. The loss of vision is complete, but is not permanent, if the angular gyrus of the opposite hemisphere remains intact, com- pensation rapidly taking place so that vision is again possible with either eye as before. On destruction of the angular gyrus in both hemispheres, the loss of vision is complete and perma- nent."

5. Hearing has its centre in the superior temporo-sphenoidal convolution. In the experiments conducted, it was found that when these were not destroyed, the other senses, such as touch, taste, smell, and sight, were not impaired ; but in the experi- ments there was no response to the usual forms of auditory stimuli. The animal was perfectly awake, and looking around, but was quite unmoved by loud calling, whistling and knocking.

6. Our author speaks much more loosely and hesitatingly

about the Frontal Lobes of the brain. Their functions have not

been determined either by the method of electrical excitation or

that of destruction :

" Eemoval or destruction by the cautery of the anterior frontal lobes is not followed by any definite physiological results. The animals retain their appetites and instincts, and are capable of exhibiting emotional feeling. The sensory faculties— sight, hearing, touch, and smell— remain unimpaired. The powers of voluntary motion are retained in their integrity."

We know for certain that the frontal lobes have a connection with motor ganglia, as the corpus striatum and motor tracts. It is probable, he thinks, that they may be specially the seat or centre of higher intellectual acts, as phrenologists maintain ; but he gives no proof, and does not profess to have any. He is able, however, to allot to them a very important function, what he calls "inhibition:"

Or (HCuuj rjr-ririsu^\y' .

19

"Though not actually motor, they are inhibitory motor, and expend their energy in inducing internal changes in the centres of actual motor execution."

"The removal of the frontal lobes causes no motor paralysis or other physiological effects, but causes a form of menial degradation, which may be reduced in ultimate analysis to the loss of the faculty of attention. The powers of attention and concentration of thought are, further, small and imperfect in idiots, with defective development of the frontal lobes; and dis- ease of the frontal lobes is more especially characteristic of dementia, or gen- eral mental degradation. The frontal regions which correspond to the non- excitai)le regions of the brain of the monkey are small or rudimentary in the lower animals, and their intelligence and powers of reflective thought corres- pond. The development of the frontal lobes is greatest in man, with the highest intellectual powers; and taking one man with another, the greatest intellectual power is characteristic of the one with the greatest frontal devel- opment."—[For fuller discussion, see Princeton Review, March, 1878J.

Influence of Body on 31ind.

I. Dependence of mind on senses.

It is only through bodily substances that we can gain knowledge of the outer— the material— world. (Rate of sense-perception is one hundred and forty-three and thirty- two hundredths feet per second. Sight is the »ai<? n'wid, hearing next^'then touch)6a fM^la^^dJ-- ^^&&i^^^^y

II. Dependence of mind upon brain.

Mind has, unmistakably, some connection with the brain, the s|)inal marrow, the nerves. Aristotle already knew that the mind is spread " throughout the bodily frame." Sir Wm. Hamilton says that sensation may be considered either as in the mind or in the body, as it seems to be the connecting link. So, in thinking, it is not so much tiie body which is needed, and which is worn out, as the forces permeating the body. Mental forces are correlated with the physical.

III. The train of thought and feeling is affected by the bodily states. (Action and Re-action).

A disaffected spirit affects the stomach not a whit more than a disaffected stomach atfects the spirit. A certain

20

expression of face denotes the corresponding feeling, as a child in ill temper.

a. Every mental state and affection seems to have a corres- ponding bodily state and affection.

Every mental affection is followed by a corresponding change in the chemical matter of the bodily organism^ (transposition of cells).

b. By the law of action and re-action, it follows that every mental state has a bodily state which it tends to produce; and every bodily state again tends to produce its own mental stale.

There are innumerable instances which might be cited to illustrate this position. Sir Isaac Newton, c. g., by looking at the sun, produced such an afiection in his brain that he saw the sun w^henever he looked at a large object. The German poet, Goethe, closing his eyes, could see flowers of the most fantastic forms and colors, constantly undergoing changes. But he could dismiss the vision at will. Disordered organism is most fre- quently the cause of these visions, etc. Sounds are frequently heard, specters seen. One man got so far in this, that when he met a friend, he always must touch him in order to convince himself whether what was before him was a ghost or flesh and blood. "Second sight" is similar. When such a disorder reaches a very high degree, it is called insanity. The disorder may be brought on, not only by mechanical causes, but also by dominant ideas, favorite fancies, etc. Such, no doubt, was the cause of the apparition which Brutus had at Philippi. Weak persons are most liable to disorganizations of all kinds, and the farther they go in their unhealthful state, the more they lose all capability of distinguishing the true from the false. Often, also, in an apparently healthful state, the mind is still, as well as the body, in a curious condition, in consequence of some outward affection. Here, then, we have the explanation of clairvoyance, mesmerism, etc.; all which tend only to turn the twilight into complete darkness.

CHAPTER 11. THE MIND AND ITS FACULTIES. rJu^

III.— MiXD.

Introductory Remarks.

It is the natural tendency of man — a tendency it is which speaks of a wise Providence — that he meditates on things with- out before he turns to those within. The room is ready, fur- nished with the most costly furniture — an exquisite masterpiece of the all-knowing Workman — but before we can behold all the beauties which it contains, we must open the shutters and let the light from without enter. The infant first exercises the sense of perception in order to furnish the mind with that knowledge which is necessary for the most ordinary wants. There is as yet little reflection. When this begins — when, for the first time, the Ego mingles with the Non-Ego — is hard to determine. With some children, this process begins at the age of six or seven ; with others, not before ten. From twelve to twenty, however, there is generally a strong craving to learn something of the mind within, to know something of the power which has enabled the senses to do their work. Some instances there are when this desire began at an earlier age, but it is only when a man has gained a general knowledge of history, of the world surrounding him, that he has a right to ask after the agent which has made all these acquisitions for him. All prematurity in this respect results in one-sidedness.

There are several cautions to be observed in entering upon this new field of learning. Take care

1. To leave behind those views and impressions which have assisted us in prior observations.

We now deal, not with matter and its forces, but with perception, consciousness, will, affection, etc., and we must

22

be careful not to attempt to discuss the one by the same laws and rides as the other. 2. To beware of the influence of language, primarily applied to material objects, and then transferred to mental objects.

Tiie science of j)hysics was cultivated before that of meta- physics. Metaphysicians, therefore, were obliged either to coin a new language or to remodel the common language applied to physics and material objects. They did the lat- ter, ciianging merely the meaning of the word, leaving it its old form. Examples of such words are —

Spirit — dcv£/i07, wind.

Idea — eujuz, likeness of form. This word gave rise to a whole world of errors, such as that in thinking, we con- template an image, a likeness of some object, etc.

Feeling — an affection of the bodily organism.

Understanding — in the literal sense of the word.

Emotion — e and moveo, literally.

Impression — impression of a seal upon wax. This word, again, was taken up by philosophers, (Hume, etc.,) and applied in its most literal sense, giving rise to a great school of skeptics.

Association — connection of links.

Imagination — reflection of an object in the water.

Conception — grasping together.

Apprehension — ad and j)rehendo, literally.

These words, then, must now be strictly separated from the sense in which they are applied to material objects.

Faculties [duvaiMc^).

The first thing to do, when we proceed in an inductive method is the collecting and arranging of facts. Now, it is objected that the mind is a nnity, which cannot be parcelled out by any pro- cess of mechanism or chemistry. This is, no doubt, correct, but still we may distribute the attributes of the mind, the phenomena falling under its action. Suppose, for instance, a young man, who is supjjortiug an aged mother, is offered, by letter, a lucra-

23

tive position, where, however, he may be required to ])ractice equivocation, or to work on the Lord's day. Observe, now, the different mental acts which take place wiiile he is reading the letter.

1. Sense — perception — in seeing the manuscript.

2. Memory, in recognizing the characters, combinations, etc.

3. Understanding, in judging about the offer.

4. Reasoning, upon the required employment.

5. Imagination, in picturing to himself the position in which he would be placed.

6. Covetousness, in thinking of the wealth offered him.

7. Filial Affection, as he remembers his mother.

8. Volition, final resolution to accept the offer.

9. Conscience, rebuking him for engaging in a dishonorable work.

This is enough to show that we have —

1. A number of ficulties in the mind,

2. That we may classify or arrange them by observing their points of resemblance and difference.

We may therefore justly lay down the following positions :

(j/ \. That the mind is possessed of different powers is evident from the fact that different states are found in different indi- viduals, and in the same man at different times.

Different men have different tendencies, or talents, which may become hereditary. If it is objected that these so- called talents are but a different mode of consciousness, nothing whatever is objected. For how do they come? Cannot they be classified ?

\ N2. The mind is not always exercising the same or every faculty.

In every state of mind, there is more than one faculty at work. I can be gazing out upon some beautiful landscape, and at the same time thinking of some past event, of some absent person. But to prevent misunderstanding, we must add the following positions :

24

ij ^ These faculties are all powers of one undivided mind.

Imagination is nothing separate, but, as memory, the power of one and the same mind ; even as one substance unites chemical and physical powers.

^"^ X It is not to be understood that these faculties are always working separately, successively, and always at different times.

As in matter several properties may be operating at the same time, so in mind several faculties combine to work at the same instant.

^ J6. a. It is difficult to give a perfect arrangement of the facul- ties of the mind.

Like the classification of the material world (for in- stance, of the species of ])lants), which is made difficult by one division running into another, so of the faculties.

h. An arrangement may be made which is practical and sufficient, but not perfect. The faculties overlap.

The mind, it must be remembered, is one ; but it manifests itself in diverse ways. These different modes of manifestation may be satisfactorily, though not per- fectly, classified.

Classification of Faculties.

The want of a classification was felt by the earliest metaphy- sicians and they all strove to arrive at some satisfactory arrange- ment; an attempt which has been carried on ever since without an absolutely perfect result.

Sketch of Systems.

Aristotle (384 B. C.) distinguishes between Gnostic (cogni- tive) and Orectic (motive, appetent.)

The Eleatics (founder Xenophanes) held tliat mind was com- posed of (1) o6!^a (opinion); (2) acai^m^ (senses); (3) Ao^-oc (reason). Such, if any, was Plato's opinion.

The school-men of the Middle Ages drew between Under-

i

25

standing and Will a distinction which still exists in the minds of men when they speak of " head " and " heart."

The Scotch school divides the facailties into Intellectual and Active Powers. But since all powers of the mind may be called active, this division is not exact.

A fourth division, which is made use of by a number of modern metaphysicians, is that into Cognitive, Emotional, and Voluntary (Conative) Powers. But under none of these heads can we place that universally acknowledged power, the moral power. ,

The classification which is now most popular, and which we shall follow, is that into Cognitive and Motive Powers.

Cognitive.

I. Simple Cognitive or Presentative.

1. Sense-perception.

2. Self-consciousness. II. Reproductive or Representative.

III. Comparative.

Motive.

IV. Moral, (conscience). V. Emotional.

VI. Will.

Simple Cognitive. Gives us knowledge in its simplest form ;

i. e., immediate knowledge of objects now present. Reproductive. To this belong memory, imagination. Comparative. By which we compare, find the relation between

two thino^s. Moral. This is the feeling, found in every man, that something

is wrong;. Emotional. To this group belong grief, joy, etc. Will. The faculty which enables us to choose or reject. ^^ ^^ote. — Gnostic faculties give us knowledge and ideas.

U<^^A\Arv Orectic faculties raise desire and tend to action.

PART II-COGNITIVE POWERS.

CHAPTER III. I.— SIMPLE COGNITIVE POWERS.

They are called Presentative, because they give us knowledge in its simplest, i. e., concrete form, and because the objects are now present.

The Rej^roductive and Comparative make use of the simple coo-nitive and re-present the knowledge obtained by the latter.

Classification of Simple Cognitive Powees.

A. Sense-perception. Smell.

Taste.

Hearing.

Touch, a. Touch Proper.

b. Muscular Sense. Sight.

B. Self-consciousness.

Knowledge of our Mind. Knowledge of Self.

J^, Sense-perception is the external sense under the simple cognitive powers in opposition to the internal sense, or self- consciousness. Hamilton calls these two faculties the presen- tative, because the object is present— is presented to them.

The word "sense-perception" is chosen to avoid the ambiguity which arises from the use of the shorter" percep- tion)' as in the writings of Dr. Th. Reid. Sense-perception is to be treated as an act of the mind, the senses acting as instruments. The mind takes immediate cogniz-

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ance of something external; the self knows the nom-self; the ego, the non-ego. There is involved in this act a knowledge — a cognizance of nuitter by the mind. It is not an idea that is given, not an apprehension, iiot a notion, not a belief. There is primarily knowledge — cognition of things outside of and affecting the bodily organism. To fully express this, we lay down the following positions :

a. This knowledge is original.

It cannot be resolved into anything simpler than itself. No doubt we can conceive of such a power which can acquire knowledge without the aid of a bodily organism. But man, constituted as he is, must have the as.^stance of the organism, which, however incapable of thinking and knowing, is only a means of gaining knowledge. It is the mind itself Avhich has the faculty of knowing immediately, directly, the world without, the Avorld within. If this knowl- edge were not direct, if we were not possessed of an intuitive knowledge of extension, we should be unable to acquire it by any })rocess of ratiocination — by any reasoning from mere sensation ; if it were not in the premises, it could not be in the conclusion.

b. This knowledge is immediate or intuitive.

We gain knowledge immediately, and not through a me- dium. This does not mean that the affection of the organ- ism is not necessary to rouse the activity of the mind ; but by it, through no intervening medium [tertiam quid), we know the object presented. It cannot, therefore, be by a process of reasoning, of inference, of argument, that the mind comes to the knowledge of external objects presented. But as the knowledge is direct so it is positive.

c. This knowledge is positive, and not phenomenal or relative.

Emanuel Kant originated the theory of the Phenome- nality of knowledge. He held that the senses give merely an appearance or phenomenon (Greek sense) ; that we do not know things in themselves, but phenomena. But, we answer, appearances must be appearances of soraethingfl/io !i--- ^^^/,

28

It is held that knowledge is relative — that we can never know anything except in comparison with another. But we must know before we can compare and discover rela- tion ; knowledge precedes comparison ; we can know pain and then contrast it with pleasure.

Review of Theories.

The Ideal or Representative Theory. — According to this tiie- ory, the mind does not contemplate external objects directly, but merely an idea — a representation of them. It was introduced because it was deemed inconceivable that anything should act on something like, itself, and that a tertium quid, like both (floating atomic image), was necessary. The theory was origi- nated by Pemocritus and Leucippns (450 E. C.) by the doctrine that the mind looks, not upon the object, but upon an image {ecoioAoi') of the object. It was then taken up by the Epicureans, and most fully expounded by Lucretius, a follower of that school. The characterizing doctrine of the ideal theory is, that the mind looks upon an image and does not take immediate cognizance of _t he external^ world. It has taken two forms, a grosser and a more spiritual.

The Grosser Form. — This is the original form under which the doctrine first aj)j)ears. It was held by Democritus and Leucippns, of the Atomic school ; by Lucretius, of the Epicurean ; also, by some Aristotelians. The distinguish- ing feature of this doctrine is, that it represents the " idea," the representation upon which the mind is said to look, as being a material substance, a kind of effluvia given off b^ the object. Now, we could, perhaps, persuade ourselves to believe in a material representation of bodily objects ; but when we think of sound, of light, etc., insurmountable dif- ficulties must arise. The insuffi' iency of this theory, tliere- fore, was soon detected, and idealism, in the jjroper sense of the word, took its place.

The More Spiritual Form. — This form of the ideal theory had its ablest and most ardent defenders durino- the six-

29

teenth, seventeenth, and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. "The mind contempkites, not a material object, but a (spiritual) image."

Descar tes (1635) distinguishes

a. An affection of the brain. Then this affection is the occasion, not the cause, of an image's being created in the mind.

b. An idea in the mind.

c. The mind looks upon this image (idea). Malebranche expresses himself rather darkly when he

says that the mind looks upon objects through God.

L|9(!ke n690. " Human Understanding,") adhered to the ideal theory.

Berkeley (1709) carried Ijocke's ideas to their legitimate consequences. If the mind cannot perceive matter in any form ; if the knowledge at wliich we can ultimately arrive is only a knowledge of images in the brain^ what proof, then, have we of tiie existence of matter? What proof that anything in the external world corresponds to tliese

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images? in tact, we must be quite indifferent as to whether matter really does exist or does not : for if it does, we can- not perceive it; if it does not,^ we are just as well oflP as if it did. As a legitimate conclusion from these premises, Berkeley says that the mind cannot perceive the external world directly, but can only know its own ideas created by the Divine Mind, and not created to deceive us. This doctrine cannot but lead to the denial of the existence of matter.

Hume (1711-177fi)-the skeptic, was the first who ven- tured to assert as true all the inferences drawn from the doctrines of the theory. He makes a distinction between ideas and impressions. "All perceptions of the mind are either impressions or ideas ; the difference between them is in the degree of force and liveliness of these impressions on the soul." Impressions take place in sensation, ideas in thiidcing. Now, if the preceding be true, what right have

30

we to suppose the existence of anything but impressions and ideas ?

1. To suppose that there is anything between the mind perceiving and the object perceived, is, at the best, an hypothesis.

But, where is that third thing, that idea or sensation? It is not in the senses, nor in consciousness.

2. This hypothesis gives no explanation which cannot otherwise be made more satisfactorily.

3. Instead of making the subject clearer, it makes it more complex.

Inferentint Theory. — This is the theory followed by the meta- physicians of France during the last century. The school is also called the "sensation school." Dr. Thos. Brown, of Edinburgh, who died in 1820, was its most ardent ^lefender. According to his doctrine, the steps necessary to a cognition of matter are :

1. An impression on the bodily organism.

2. A sensation in the mind. (Thus far, we all agree).

3. An inference that there must be something:; outside of the mind, exerting its influence upon it, and corresponding to the impression.

This is but an old error under a new form. It tells us noth- ing more nor less than that the mind contemplates a sensation instead of the material object. But a sensation is one thing, and a knowledge of an external world is another thing. From the fact that there is an unextended sensation in the mind, we can never infer that there is something extended, outside of the mind, which creates this sensation. Furthermore, no connection whatever can be traced between a sensation and the object creat- ing the sensation. The conclusion, therefore, must contain more than is warranted by the premises, and we must either proceed intuitively or, like John Stuart Mill, confess that we know noth- ing.

Relative Theory. — Sir Wm. Hamilton and Bain hold that we have not a jjositive knowledge of things, but perceive them under a relation; we cannot know pleasure except by contrast with pain. But it is simpler to say that we know a thing, and

\JJj^ji^r\j^^ —

31

from this knowledge perceive relation. Contrast may add to knowledge.

Natural Realism. — Founded by Reid and defended by Sir Win. Hamilton. Claims its name because it holds that the mind perceives realities. Consciousness and the natural con- victions of man intuitively seem to be in its favor, and it cannot be jn'oven that this natural conviction is a belief acquired from an idea and habit.

Note. — We must be careful about employing the aid of

intuition for the confirmation of a truth. But in

the present case, we cannot be made to believe that

the object is not. The belief, therefore, has the

marks of («) universality and (h) necessity, which

are the conditions of intuitive knowledge.

The theory of Natural Realism is, no doubt, not free from

difficulties arising chiefly from the mysterious connection of mind

and body.

Natural Realism, therefore, tenches us that we have an ijjjjiir tive knowledge of objective realties, a knowledge of reality and not of relation.

On the side of Idealism, it is a favorite attempt to overthrow the belief in the validity of these doctrines, to refer to the secondaiy qualities of matter, and, by proving these to be void of material existence, to suppose the primary qualities also to be illusive. It will be necessary, in order to avoid misapprehension and confine skepticism to its proper limits, to draw certain dis- tinctions :

^ ( Sensation.

livrUAM^ -'■• I Perception.

r Original Perceptions. ^^ J (a) Extra-mental. * I (6) Extra-organic. (^Acquired Perceptions.

III.

Primary Qualities of Matter. Secondary Qualities of Matter.

32

I. Distinction between Sensation and Perception.

Sensation and perception are always united : sensation, how- ever, implies neither perception nor belief in something exter- nal ; perception involves sensation, and is necessarily associated with a conviction of the existence of the objects perceived. Perception is the knowledge of an object presenting itself; sen- sation "Is 'Tnen[^Ting_\\2t^^ o^;ganism, associated with this perception. In perception, we have knowledge of an object that W(Hild exist whether we p-rceived it or not ; in sensation, there is no external reality. Sensation and perception always appear in an inverse ratio to each other ; that is, when sensation prevails, as in smell, taste, hearing of music, the perception stands in the background; when perception prevails, as in sight, hearing of sermons, the sensation almost disappears. ^

When I smell a rose there is both sensation and percep- tion. The odor creates a sensation ; that is, it aifects me without ray thinking of it. Sense-perception implies (1) sensation of the bodily organism, (2) sensation of the mind, (3) thought. This may seem to disagree with " immediate perception ;" but every sensation is joined with an imme- diate perception, or belief in the existence of the external object.

II. Distinction between original and acquired perceptions.

The question arises, what does the mind perceive? The answers are many, and as vague as the question. Some main- tain that it is the nervous system, the sensorium. Still, this cannot be all that we are able to know. Others allow tiiat it may be those objects which come in contact with the bodily frame. This, however, is too narrow. The true answer to the question is, that it is either the bodily frame, or something, com- ing into contact with it or affecting it.

SinelL — In smell, we do not perceive the object itself, separate from our bodily organism. We perceive the object as in con- tact with our bodily frame ; or perhaps, and with a high degree of certainty, we may assert that we do not perceive the object itself, but only our bodily organism as affected. It is, there-

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fore, not the rose that we smell, but we perceive our olfactory- nerves as affected by the vapor diifused from the rose ; and it is only by a process of reasoning that we know that vapor, which is now affecting our organism, to proceed from a rose. This reasoning is based on experience. An object, in order to be per- ceptible to the sense of smell, must be in a gaseous state.

Taste. — In taste, again, it is not the object itself which we perceive, but our organism as affected. When I eat an apple, it is not the ai)ple which I taste, but the palate as affected; and only reasoning, based upon experience, can tell me that it is an apple, and not some other fruit, which I am eating. An object in order to be perceptible to the sense of taste, must be in a liquid state.

Hearing. — In hearing, as in the preceding senses, we imme- diately perceive only our organism as affected ; that is, we know directly something in the ear to be affected by something from witliout, which science explains as consisting of vibrations of the air. By reasoning and reflection, not by intuition, we know this sound proceeds from a trumpet, that from an organ. This very fact, that we perceive our organism as affected, enables us to calculate, by a reasoning based on experience, the distance by the sound, according as the ear is affected in a more or less lively manner.

Touch. — The sense of touch, or feeling, is divided into a num- ber of senses, difficult to classify, but well to distinguish.

1. Touch Proper. The nerve of sensation was discovered by Dr. Chas. Bell. The nerves of touch proper set out from the base of the brain towards the periphery of the body; they reach the skin each at a determined point; there is a special aggregation of these points in the mid-finger, lips, and tongue. Wherever the nerve terminates, there sensation is felt ; thus, if we prick a nerve which reaches the mid-finger, the pain is localized at the point where the nerve terminates. If we stretch or pinch the ulnar nerve by pushing it from side to side or compressing with the fingers, the shock is felt in the parts to

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34

which its ultimate branchlets are distributed, viz., in the palm and back of the hand, and in tlie fourth and fifth fingers : and as different fibres are more pressed upon than others, the prick- ing sensation is felt by turns in the fourth finger, in tlie fifth, in the palm and back of the hand. A student named Schmitz, from Aix, had his arm amputated above the elbow, thirteen years ago ; he has never ceased to have sensations as if in his fingers. Pressure was applied to the nerves in the stump, and Mr. Schmitz immediately felt the whole arm, even the fingers, as if asleep.

' " In touch proper, there is a sensation of a particular part of the frame as affected by we know not what, but which we may discover by experimental observation." German scientists very appropriately call this sense the skin-sense, because it is pro- duced by a system of sensory nerves distributed throughout the body, and especially on the surface of the skin. These nerves seem to be most numerous in the middle finger, the lips, and the tongue.

N. B. — This increased sensitiveness may, perhaps, be the consequence of frequent use, causing more blood to flow to the place.

Moreover, when the nerve itself is touched, the sensation is felt in that part of the body which is reached by the extremities of the nerve. The case is recorded of the toll-keeper at Halle, who had lost one arm; twenty years after the loss of his arm, the man would, at times, feel rheumatic pains in the absent limb. Prof. Valentin has observed that individuals who are the subjects of congenital imperfections, or absence of the extremi- ties, have, nevertheless, the internal sensations of such limbs in their perfect state. A girl, aged nineteen, in whom the meta- carpal bones of the left hand were absent, assured M. Valentin that she had constantly the internal sensation of the palm of the hand on the left side as well on the right.

The disposition to localize is so deep that it cannot be eradi- cated ; it is instinctive, not acquired. When, furthermore, the peripheral extremities are changed, the sensations are referred to their original positions.

35

In some cases, when an artificial nose was covered with skin drawn from the foreliead, it was observed that the sensation was still felt at tiie place where the skin was originally situated. But when tiie communication of the nervous fibers of the new nose with those of the forehead is cut off by division of the isthmus of skin, the sensations are no longer referred to the forehead; the sensibility of the nose is at first absent, but is gradually developed. This implies that the old reference to the forehead has ceased, in spite of the old association, and that the new reference to the nose was occasioned by the sensibility of the nerve, ac- cording to the law which makes us ascribe the sensation to the extremity of the nerve. 2. Muscular Sense. The muscular sense was discovered by Dr. Thos. Brown, and is now universally acknowledged. When the mind wills t(j move a limb, the action is carried along the motor (efferent) nerve, which sets in motion a muscle with a set of bones attached. A sensor (afferent) nerve then carries back to the brain the knowledge, notion, of the motion produced. Hamilton distinguishes between locomotion and sensation car- ried back. But the two being inseparable and simultaneous, it is better to comprise both under one term, viz., muscular sense. It is by this sense that we first gain knowledge of the existence of some external object resisting our energy.

All the preceding senses give us the same knowledge, but they do so in an indirect manner, by furnishing us with the materials for inference — for a process of reasoning which results in the knowledge of external existence.

The immense use of the muscular sense is seen in the case of persons born blind, who are by it enabled to deter- mine the shape of an object.

The example of a woman is often quoted who had lost the sensor nerve, but whose motor nerve was perfect. She could nurse her child with perfect ease, but if her attention was called to some otiier object, she was apt to let it fall. Note. — Such senses as that of temperature, which we may call a sense, must be referred to the same category

36

as those of taste, smell, and touch proper ; they give us knowledge of a sensation within the organism. All outward knowledge gained by them is by inference. Urmdt, in " Defence of Fundamental Truth," page 173, says, " When we move our members, we come upon ex- ternal resistances. We observe that these resistances some- times give way to pressure, but we find, at the same time, that this takes place with very different degrees of facility, and that, in order to put different bodies in motion, we must apply very different degrees of muscular force ; but to every single degree of contraction force, there corresponds a determinate degree in the intensity of these muscular sen- sations. With these muscular sensations, the sensations of the skin, which covers our muscles of touch, so continually mingle, that the intensity of these touch sensations goes parallel to the intensity of the accompanying muscular sen- sations. We succeed in this way in connecting the degree of intensity of the muscular sensations in a necessary manner with the nature of the resistances which set themselves against our movement."

1st. We will to move an arm.

2d. This passes along an efferent nerve to the muscle. 3d. After the motion, an afferent nerve conveys the information back to the brain. \ Sight — Since the investigation of Berkeley (1709), it is uni- / versally acknowledged that by the sense of sight we instinctively \ know nothing but colored surface. The knowledge of distance is not an original endowment of sight, but the result of a reason- ing process. That distance is not intuitively determined by sight, is proved by several experiments, the records of which are still extant.

1. Chiseldens' Case. In 1728, Dr. Chiseldens operated upon a young man who had been born blind, and gave him his sight. When the person was first allowed to use his eyes, he thought the objects touched his eyes, as those which he felt touched his skin. He could not form an idea of form and magnitude, and

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would often forget and confound objects. Until he had caught the cat and felt her with his hand, he did not know which was the cat and which the dog. He put her down, saying, " So, puss; I shall know you in future." Again, he was perfectly deceived by a picture; finally, he went up and touched it, and, entirely mystified, asked which lied, his touch or his sight. — T~ 2. Franz's Case. Dr. Franz, of Leipsic, in IM^, operated upon a man of seventeen years, who had been blind from his birth. The sight of one eye was secured by the operation. Two black lines were drawn crossing each other ; he could distinguish them perfectly well. He could describe a square, a circle, a triangle, all in one figure. At a distance of three feet a cube and a sphere were placed, and he was told to describe them. He had some knowledge of niathematics. He thought the figures were a square and a d^ele ; ancl when these were substituted, he saw no diiference. A p^^Kamtd was then placed in an oblique position ; he looked at it for a while and finally gave it up. This proves that the eye takes in at once surface and superficial figure, but cannot immediately discern solidity. This inability of discerning solidity, however, ulti- mately consists in inability of determining distance.

3. Trenchinnetti Case. Mr. Abbott, in his work against the Berkeleyian theory of vision, quotes an operation performed by Dr. Trenchinnetti. '' He operated at the same time on two patients, brother and sister, eleven and ten years old respec- tively. The same day, having caused the boy to examine an orange, he placed it about one metre from him and bade him try to take it. The boy brought his hand close to his eyes, {'quasi a contatto del suo occhio,') and closing his fist, found it empty, to his great surprise. He then tried a few inches from his eyes, and at last, in this tentative way, succeeded in taking the orange. Wiien the same experiment was tried with the girl, she also at first attempted to grasp the orange with her hand very near her eye, {' colla mana assai vicina all occ/wo,') then, perceiving her error, stretciied out her fore-finger and pushed it in a straight line, slowly, until she reached the object." This experiment proves that by sight we have an immediate cogni-

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tion of direction, but not of distance. Bat the question arises whether color is the only thing which we intuitively perceive by the sense of sight. Berkeley maintains that we perceive color only, and that the idea of surface is identical with the time used. This is the opinion of J. S. Mill. But Hamilton has proved that we have intuitive knowledge of a colored surface, because

1. We perceive color.

2. If we perceive color, we perceive difference of colors.

3. Different colors may be placed side by side.

4. Contrasted colors will form a visible line, and thus consti- tute the outh'ne of a visible figure.

In regard to original perceptions, we may, then, lay down the following positions:

1. By all the senses we obtain knowledge of the bodily frame.

In taste, smell, hearing, we know the organism as affected ; in touch proper, direction ; by muscular sense, objects resist- ing ; in sight, a colored surface.

2. By all the senses we obtain knowledge of extension.

Locke (1690) maintained that we know extension by two senses only, sight and touch. Since the investigations of Miiller, however, it is acknowledged that since we, by all the senses, know our bodily frame, and since that bodily frame has extension, we therefore must, by all the senses, know extension. Direction, which we know by the muscular sense, implies space.

3. By two senses we know objects outside of our body.

The first of these senses, that by which we gain our first knowledge of external things, is the muscular sense. By moving the hand we meet with resistance, thus acquiring a sensus vagus of our bodily frame. Sight gives us a colored surface, not in, but as affecting the body. Before passing to Acquired Perceptions, it is necessary to insist on another distinction, viz., the distinction between extra- organic and extramental knowledge. A perception may be ex- ternal to the mind, or to the bodily organism, or to both. It is clear that, by all the senses, we know things external to the

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miiul ; but it is only by the senses, sight and touch, tliat we perceive things external to our bodily frame. An extraorganie, as well as an extramental, object must always be extended. We now take up Acquired Perceptions. Distance always belongs to acquired perceptions.

Animals are very liberally endowed with instincts, and distance seems to be one of them. It was observed that a fly-catcher, immediately after being hatched, began to catch. This could not be the case if the animal had not a knowl- edge of distance. By means of these instincts, animals are much sooner developed than man ; because, what man must earn by experience and observation, the animal seems to have instinctively. The nature of instincts is wrapped in mystery ; since indeed, as Beaume remarks, if we want to understand a dog, we must be dog and man together. It is evident, however, that with man, at least, many things must be earned by ancestors and transmitted as instincts. All acquired knowledge of man must rest, ultimately, on some intuitive cognition ; and in gaining that acquired knowledge, the vari6us senses aid each other. If animals were born with so little instinct as man has, and still deprived of reason, they would be unfit for existence. Similarly, if man were destitute of that intuitive knowl- edge which is given him by his senses, he could gain it by no mode of ratiocination. A man, born blind, was once asked what conception he had of scarlet. . He answered that he thought it must be something like the sound of a trumpet. He knew that the trumpet was used by the English soldiers, and had also heard that their coats were scarlet. In our primary sensations must be the elements of all our subsequent knowledge. In taste, all we originally perceive is the palate as affected ; whatever other knowledge it may give is experimental. In smell, we intuitively per- ceive only the olfactory nerves as affected. By a process of reasoning, based upon experience, we know from what the odor proceeds ; and by a similar process, according as the smell affects the nostrils more or less, we judge as to the

40

distance of the object from which it proceeds. By the sense of hearing, we judge the distance of the sounding object. But this knowledge is by no means instinctive ; it is based npon reasoning from the strength with which the vibrations in the air atfect our ear. Direction is also given by hear- ing, according to the manner in which the sound reaches the ear ; but it is based upon a process of reasoning from the law that, whenever we feel the nerve affected, we infer the objects to be in that direction. All these senses may be rendered more acute by practice and by the attention being fixed upon them. The cause of this un- deniable fact is probably a stronger flow of blood upon the par- ticular part.

Savages acquire more knowledge by hearing than do other men who are not accustomed to employ that faculty so extensively. A blind professor, Mr. Sanderson, could, by feeling, distinguish Roman coins, real and counterfeit. His sense of temperature was so acute that he could per- ceive every cloud passing over the sun. Two blind men proved to be excellent knowers of horses. The one pro- nounced a horse blind, judging from the cautious manner in which he stepped. The other discovered that a horse was blind in one eye ; he laid his hand, first on one, then on the other, and noticed a diiference of temperature. Another blind man could, by smell, distinguish those of his friends who were dressed in black and those who were not. Deaf persons often know what is said by observing the motion of the lips of the speaker. The most important of the senses in gaining outward knowl- edge is the sense of sight. As already observed, all we intui- tively know by the sense of sight is a colored surface. The same sense is, however, the most powerful means we have of judging the distance, relative and absolute, of objects. There are several conditions under which we are able to form such a judg- ment.

1. There is a change in the ball of the eye.

Helmholtz has demonstrated how the ball of the eye

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41

becomes more concave or more flattened, according as the object we look at is nearer or more distant. This mechani- cal process of elongating or shortening the long axis of the eye is carried on without an act of our will, simply by machinery obeying unknown laws. We are not even con- scious of the change in the muscle ; but still, somehow or other, this change furnishes us with the knowledge.

2. Parallelism of rays.

We judge of the distance of an object according to the degree of parallelism with which the rays proceeding from that object reach the eye. When we have to set our eyes inward, in order to distinctly perceive an object, we know that it is near ; when, however, the direction of both the eyes is comparatively parallel, we infer that the object is at a distance. The action of the organism, in changing the direction of the long axis of the eyeball, depends upon . muscular action, and the knowledge we thus gain is ulti- mately based upon the sensation created.

3. Binocular Vision.

That is, the observation whether closing the eyes alter- nately produced any perceptible change in the appearance of an object. For instance, hold a book at a short distance from the eye, the back of the book turned towards you ; if you close the right eye, with the left you will see the back and the left side, and vice versa. When an object is at a great distance, this change of appearance does not take place.

4. Variation of size.

If we look out upon a scene, we see in the distance innu- merable objects of quite considerable size; but if placed near enough to the eye, " a penny will cover the sun."

5. Distinctness of outline.

Owing to the density of the intervening atmosphere, the lines of objects seen at a distance grow indistinct ; i. e., color less vivid.

6. Number of intervening objects.

When we look at a tree at the end of a row, at whose beginning w^e stand, we judge, from the number of trees

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42

between ourselves and that particular tree, that it is at a considerable distance. But if we look at an object, betw^een which and ourselves Ave see no immediate object, we immediately say it is near. In this case, our experience, for on experience we must base all inferences from such appearances, is apt to fail us. Looking over a plain, over a lake, with nothing but air betw^een ourselves and the objects looked at, we often are deceived as to the distance of those objects; they seem uearer than they really are. The oppo- site kind of deception takes place when Ave look over a plain covered with snow. In such cases, we must not accuse our senses of deceitfulness ; it is our reasoning, accustomed as we are to different circumstances, which leads us to erro- neous conclusions. 7. Comparison.

In judging of the size of an object, we are aided by com- parison. Distance being size in horizontal position, we may make use of the same means of facilitating our inferences. Dr. Abercrombie said that persons standing in the door of St. Paul's Cathedral seemed like very small children, whereas they were full-grown people. The mistake arose from the fact that the doors were much larger than ordinary- doors. Artists, to distinguish size in their pictures, make use of this principle.

J^ote. — As to solidity or distance in three dimensions, we know by the eye, according to binocular vision, that there is a difference between a surface and a solid ; but, as was shown in the Franz case, what that difference is we learn by experience. Such acquired perceptions add greatly to our knowledge, and are necessary to the daily duties of life. The Idealist and the Skeptic plead the deceitfulness of our senses ; they say they deceive us in some things, and are not, therefore, to be trusted in all cases. As an example, it is often brought out that a countryman, on a vessel moving from the shore, is under the impres- sion that the shore is moving, away ; or that, when

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we are accustomed to live on land, we are often deceived as to distances on sea. To these and all similar objections, we may briefly answer, " that it is not the senses, that is, the natural and original perceptions of the senses, having the authority of God, which deceive us, but rules formed by ourselves and illegitimately applied. It may be observed that the same experience which leads to gather the rules, may enable us to ascertain the limits of the rules and the exceptions." Thus, the seaman is never deceived into believing that the shore is moving, or even into miscalculating a distance, because he has modified the rule, that when we are at rest, any object, whose image passes over the retina, must be moving.

/ Recapitulation. _

Thus far, we have gone over two of the three great distinctions :

I. Sensation and Perception: perception being defined as the knowledge of the object presenting itself to the senses, whether in the organism or beyond it ; sensation, as the feeling associated, the feeling of the organism.

II. Original and Acquired Perceptions : an original per- ception being knowledge given ns immediately, intuitively, by our senses ; an acquired perception, knowledge derived from these original perceptions by inference.

Under this second head, we have made a distinction between objects known, extramental and extraorganic. We may add to this the distinction between objects within and objects without the organism. But more important than this is the distinction between " objects immediately known as extraorganic and objects inferred as existing and affecting the organism, but themselves unknown."

Explanation. — The senses may be divided into two classes ; those w^hich give us a knowledge of the organism itself, and those which give us immediate knowledge of objects beyond the organism. In the first class, all that we know immediately is

44

the organism as affected : the intuitive conviction of causation constrains us to look for an agent that has produced the effect. But whetlier this agent is to be found in or outside the organ- ism, is a question not answered by intuition. Such is the case with smell, heat, taste, etc. In this searching after a cause, " the senses act as monitors, (and most important monitors they are) of powers working in our bodily frame and in the physical universe around us." " I believe that every one of our senses gives us intimation of powers ; such as floating particles, light and heat, which are among the most powerful agencies conduct- ing the processes of the material world." But what odors, sounds, heat, light, are, we can determine by scientific observation only ; and science has not yet settled the question as to their ultimate nature. Turning to the second class, we find but two senses, that of sight, and the muscular sense. By the latter we know an object as having three dimensions, and as resisting our effort. " We have thus a knowledge of objects extended and exercising dynamic energy beyond the little world of self." The sense of sight presents more difficulties. We know an object as in its nature extended ; but do we know it as in its very nature colored ? " The sense of color may be regarded as intermediate between those senses by which we perceive an extraorganic object, and those other senses which reveal merely the organism as affected, but whether by agents within or beyond the organ- ism, we know not." Of the nature of color, we know nothing by intuition. Thus it appears that the sense of color is different, on the one hand, from the knowledge of our sensation of heat or smell, since in these, as also in taste, we do not know whether the cause is within or without the organism, whilst in the former we know it to be external to the bodily frame ; and on the other hand, different from the knowledge of an extended surface, whose extension and impenetrability are revealed directly by muscular sense, whilst the nature of color is undiscernible to intuition. " The sense of color combines, in closest unison, the sensation and the perception, the organic perception and the ex- traorganic." We now turn to the last of the three great distinc-

45

tions, viz., that between Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter. /\ t l\ti

III. Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter.

Primary qualities of matter are such qualities as are common to all bodies, and involved in all our perceptions. Secondary qualities of matter are such qualities as are not properly to be considered qualities of matter, but affections of the organism. From this affection, we argue a cause ; the nature of this cause to be determined by physical, not by metapliysical science.

Revieio of Classifications of the Qualities of Hatter.

a. Aristotle gave rise to the distinction between Common and Proper perce[)tions. By common perceptions, he meant those perceptions which are common to all our senses, e. g., extension. By proper perceptions, he meant those perceptions which are peculiar to but a limited number, or only to one particular one, of our senses, e. g., color, odor, taste, form.

b. Locke, Reid, Hamilton, divided the qualities of matter into Primary and Secondary, but upon entirely different grounds. Locke calls those qualities of matter primary Avhich are insepa- rable from body, in whatever state it may exist. According to his theory, the primary qualities of matter are, 1. Solidity; 2. Extension ; 3. Figure ; 4. Hest or Motion ; 5. Number. To these he seems to add at another place, 6. Situation, and 7. Texture. The secondary qualities have no material existence in themselves, but are merely powers to produce various sensations in us by means of the primary qualities. To them belong color, taste, smell, etc.; they are the powers which one body has of affecting others. Primary qualities have reality, secondary qual- ities have not.

Reid gives a different foundation upon which to base the dis- tinctions. " The senses give us direct and distinct knowledge of the primary qualities of objects, and inform us what they are in themselves ; but of the secondary qualities, they give us but a relative and obscure notion." According to this distinction,

46

the primary qualities are, 1. Extension; 2. Divisibility; 3, Figure ; 4. Motion ; 5. Solidity ; 6. Hardness ; 7. Softness ; 8. Fluidity.

Hamilton adheres to this division in the main part ; he, how- ever, divides the primary qualities into Primary and Secundo- Primary. His division, therefore is — 1. Primary or Objective; 2. Secundo-primary or Subjective-objective. 3. Secondary or Subjective. Hamilton has so arranged the qualities upon two grounds, viz. — 1. On the ground of sense. The primary quali- ties of matter are objectively perceived. 2. On the ground of understanding. They are conceived in the mind as essential to the notion of bodies. Hamilton re])resents extension as a neces- sary constituent of our notion of matter, and evolves this from the two conditions of matter, viz., the occupying of space, and the being contained in space. Thus we have his classification :

I. Occupying space.' f Divisibility.

I Density. Extension, -l Size. < ^ .

I I Rarity.

^Figure. Ultimate Incompressibility.

II. Being contained in space.

Mobility. Situation. Neglecting subordination, we have eight proximate attributes : 1. Extension; 2. Divisibility; 3. Size; 4. Density or Rarity ; 5. Figure ; 6. Incompressibility absolute ; 7. Mobility ; 8. Situ- ation. These primary qualities develop themselves from the substances.

The secundo-primary qualities are modifications of the fore- going ; they suppose the primary. They are contained under the category of resistance to pressure got by mus<;ular sense. The sources of pressure are co-attraction, repulsion, inertia.

Note. — This enumeration is consistent with science, since it involves, out of view, force and dynamic energy. Secondary qualities are not qualities of matter, but only sub- jective affections, as color, heat, sound, etc.

47

The qualities of matter known by intuition may be divided into three classes :

1. Those which relate to space. Under tliis head come the qualities of occupying and being contained in space; the eight attributes given above.

2. Those which one body exercises in reference to another ; L €., the properties and forces of matter, such as gravitation and chemical powers. Here we must set aside two extreme, oppo- site views.

a. That matter is known as possessing no other quality than extension. This view originated with Descartes, and was followed by a number of metaphysicians of his school.

b. Tliat matter is nothing but a combination of forces. This so-called Dynamical Theory was introduced by Leib- nitz, " who supposed that the universe of matter (and of mind) was made up of monads having power, and to which the mind im{)arted the relation of space."

Both these views are contrary to our intuitive convictions : the former to that intuition which represents all matter as havino- and exercising energy ; the latter, to that fundamental convic- tion, which we can never lay aside, that the matter which has force must be extended.

3. Those which the body exercises in reference to the sensitive and perceiving mind. No light has been thrown, by any science, upon the manner of connection between mind and body ; whether it is immediate or mediate, whether it is based upon a power in the organism, or whether that power lies in some other agent. " Still, intuition seems to me to say that, connected with the organism, there is a power of some kind to call forth mental action."

Closing Kemarks. The Doctrine of J^atuml Realism. — This doctrine maintains that we have an intuitive knowledge of an objective reality. Now, in order to overthrow this doctrine, the spiritualist calls attention to the secondary qualities of matter, and, from their being void of material existence, supposes the primary qualities to be the same : if reality does not agree with other perceptions,

48

why with this one ? Berkeley proves that sound, color, are sub- jectiv^e affections, and infers that extension is also. Kant main- tains that, outside of what the mind imposes on matter, we cannot know what matter is. Fichte says, " The mind creates the universe." Dr. T. Reid (1764) cut the knot ; he says, '"We must brush these objections aside like cobwebs." This mode of procedure may be popular, but it is by no means scientific. The philosopher must prove that an error exists, and then show where it lies ; and tliis can only be done by a searching inquiry based upon distinctions. The objection that we cannot trust the senses, as in the case of the countryman on the vessel, etc., springs simj)ly from a non-distinction between intuition and experience. Another objection, that the doctrine of natural realism overlooks a number of intermediate processes, rests entirely upon a mis- understanding of the doctrine, which does not deny that such intermediate processes are necessary in order to rouse the energy of the mind ; but, when once roused, the mind looks immediately u))on the object, and not upon an image of the object. As to the objection that the image of an object on the retina of the eye is double and inverted, whilst we see it single and straight, we can only say that our organism is so constituted as to require a double, inverted image, in order to see the object single and straight.

B.

Self-consciousness. Sense perception and self-con- sciousness, the knowledge of the external world and the knowl- edge of the internal existence of self, are the two faculties of primitive cognition. Although we have considered sense-per- ception first, consciousness undoubtedly stands at the head of all the faculties of the mind, as an attribute of the very essence of the soul. We will be obliged to consider consciousness with two views, viz., first, of discovering what it is ; second, of observing what knowledge and ideas are acquired by it.

Even the materialist, inconsistent as he is, speaks of con- sciousness, and it is evident that he has a very imperfect idea of what he is speaking. We can explain a thing by reducing it to

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something more simple ; but what is more simple, more original, than consciousness? We must, therefore, follow the other method ; we must consider its actions, and from this, in an inductive manner, infer its nature. , ^4J^\i^

^ 1 . Consciousness takes cognizance of self in its present state. Consciousness belonging to the presentative faculties oFthe^ mind, the above statement is essential to its nature : and thus constantly having knowledge of the present state, and, succes- sively of all states of the mind, we may, by the aid of memory, be conscious of a past state ; that is, we are conscious of remem- bering that, at such a time, we were conscious of a certain state of our mind. As there may be different states of one mind at the same time, so consciousness can take cognizance, at the same moment, of several states.

The Scottish school generally maintain that we do not know mind and body, but only the qualities of them. Now, as regards consciousness, we are not conscious of mind as an abstract substance, independent of its qualities. Intuitively, we have knowledge merely of concretes ; so by intuition, by con- sciousness, we know the concrete existence of mind. A general idea of it we can only obtain after we hav6 learned by observa- tion that others have minds also. Nor have we an immediate knowledge of the qualities of mind, as abstractions ; but mind knows self as exercising particular qualities. It is this fact which Kant overlooks when he says, " we know the subject self as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself It is the mistake of Hume, that, when he maintains that mind is conscious of impres- sions and ideas, he forgets that it is conscious only of self as impressed, of self as entertaining an idea. As in perception, so in consciousness, our knowledge is limited.

2. Consciousness is an attribute exercised whenever the mind is intelligently exercised. In this quality, consciousness differs from other faculties of the mind ; it is acting whenever intelli- gence is exercised. It has been disputed whether or not we are conscious whilst asleep. Hamilton tried to test the question by having his servant wake him at unusual hours of the night; he was always aware of a train of thought passing through his

50

mind. Arguing from this and similar observations, J. S. Mill maintains that there are no mental acts of which we are not conscious. With some modifications, this is doubtless correct. In eyery mental act there is consciousness, but we do not always remember it. If our attention is suddenly called to it, con- sciousness is never found missing. It is a similar thing to the ticking of a clock to which we are accustomed ; we do not hear it until our attention is called to it, whilst the clock, neverthe- less, goes on ticking. Unconscious mental cerebration is the term denoting an act of body dependent upon that of the mind as in the above case. Attention is necessary in order to exercise memory.

3. Consciousness, through its continuousness and by the aid of memory, gives the materials from which we form our judgment as to personal identity. Among all the changes going on in the mind, there is no break in self-consciousness. This makes it, in distinction from the other faculties, continuous ; and, having been conscious of self yesterday, being also conscious to-day, and comparing the two states, we find that we are the same to-day as we were yesterday. There is an act of memory in bringing up the past, and of judgment in forming the comparison.

Hume and Berkeley admitted that we are conscious of mere present impressions ; but denied that we can, from conscious- ness, gain an argument for personal identity. Fichte, denying all reality, maintains that the knowledge of consciousness con- sists only in knowledge of images without existence : " One dream, without a life to dream of, without a mind to dream." In opposition to this, we maintain that we know self as really existing. ,^^ ^^'^^ '^ ^-«' ^' ' ^ '

4. By consciousness, I may voluntarily take a more special cognizance of mind. In this operation the power of will_ is involved. It is impossible to entirely arrest the flow of thought; but, by an effort of the will, I can lay a restraint upon it, in order to let it pass more slowly before the internal eye, and view it more closely. No doubt this very effort impairs, to a certain extent, the distinctness of thought (absent-mindedness.) But, as Aristotle walked about lecturing to his scholars, so we all

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can follow two pursuits at once. It is absolutely necessary, however, that the mind should be perfectly calm. Conscious- ness, thus under the control of the mind, is called reflection. Locke defines this as the notice which the mind takes of its own operations. The correct account is that consciousness is the notice which the mind takes of itself in its own operations.

Is consciousness a separate faculty of the mind ? It is some- times stated that consciousness is simply generic of other facul- ties, and that sensation and the consciousness of it are one and the same. But theories of this nature can only lead to skeptic- ism, because we then have no means of knowing self; and if Brown says that intuition gives it to us, then we may justly ask what gives us the knowledge of this intuition. Hamilton speaks of consciousness as a general, generic name for all the faculties : but it is well to confine it to the idea of self-consciousness. We hold that consciousness is a separate faculty of the mind, and we do so upon two grounds :

1. In consciousness, the object contemplated is different from that contemplated by any other faculty. The knowledge given by consciousness is entirely different from knowledge obtained by processes of reasoning. In consciousness, the object is the Ego ; in the discoursive faculties, the Non-ego. We cannot say that consciousness is a conditional faculty.

2. Consciousness is to us a separate source of knowledge and ideas. It is the agent by which self, with all its workings, becomes known to us. It is the ultimate condition under which Mental Science is possible. It would be perfectly impossible for us to form any idea of a Deity, merely by the aid of the senses.

The positions are sufficient to prove that consciousness must be regarded as a separate faculty.

I. What knowledge is given by the Simple Cognitive Poivers, when combined f

A, By both the simple cognitive faculties, sense-perception and self-consciousness, we obtain original material of all knowl- edge.

In the first exercise of the mind, there is knowledge. In opposition to this doctrine, the Sensational School holds that the

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mind begins with sensations, and from these, by the aid of reflection, rises to actnal knowledge. But the vague expression, "reflection," is unexplained; the question is — 1. What is the nature of this faculty ? 2. How does it enable us to rise from sensations in the mind to knowledge of external objects? And it is evident that the very first reasoning must {)roceed upon sure and absolute knowledge ; for what is beyond the comprehension of the premises cannot be justly involved in the conclusion.

This primitive knowledge is certainly not of a determinate and distinct nature, such as it afterwards becomes ; it is not scientific, abstract, or general. It is what the schoolmen termed Cognitio Intuitiva, i~:(TTijixrj, in contradistinction to Cognitio Abstractlva, uor^crir, gained by higher faculties ; and it is a knowledge subsequently acted upon and enlarged by other powers than those of sense-perception and self-consciousness.

Locke compares sensation and perception to two windows through which light is let into the mind. Aristotle draws an analogy between the human soul and wax susceptible of impres- sions. But these comparisons are inadequate. If any is admis- sible, it would be the comparison of the mind to a mirror, since this contains in itself the power of reflecting even when there is no image to call forth the power. Thus, in the human mind, there is an active power, an active susceptibility, far superior to mere sensation or impression, or other passive conditions, which is as necessary in order to perception as the object upon which this power is exercised.

S. This knowledge is *>f /^bjeefi; singular ^^aseNwntjB^er

1. It is of the individual, ro v/.aazou, that we first gain any^ knowledge, and not of generalities, zb xad' oXov, nor of things as belonging to, or in their relation with, other more compre- hensive forms of existence, iv /jtec^oui. Thus we do not intui- tively look upon virtue or vice in their significance as abstrac- tions, but, primarily, we look upon this or that object or action as receiving the approbation or reproach of our moral sense. Any other mode of explanation must be directly opposed to what our consciousness constrains us to believe with regard to our primary perceptions.

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'Jjl' % -Concrete. [Derivation : («) concerno (subjective) ; (6) con- .^ oresco (objective.)] All intuitive knowledge is of objects as they are, not of objects under a certain aspect, with a view to certain of their attributes, iv juei^ouc. Thus we do not intuitively see the table as separate from its form, or conceive of form as abstracted from any object of material existence ; but the two are primarily combined, and can be separated only by a process of abstraction carried on by means of the higher faculties of the mind. The same as of matter by sense-perception, we know of mind by self-consciousness ; it is of the substance as exercising attributes that we gain iiU primary knowledge. This view must be diametrically opposed to the doctrine that the mind begins with impressions.

w. This knowledge is of objects as possessing being, to 6v.

1. AVe do not know being in the abstract by the simple cog- nitive powers ; this is the subject of speculation by the higher powers. Still, metaphysics, when thus speculating, must always recur to our primary perceptions. Little can be said about^^ being ; and, since the time of the Eleatics, 500' B. C., the mistake ' "^ of philosophers has been that they attempted to say too mucli about it. The reason lies, not in the complexity, but in the extreme simplicity of the matter, which admits of no reduction to something more simple and primary. As light darkens when we gaze upon it, so, if we too largely dwell upon these abstrac- tions, we land ourselves in confusion and contradiction. We cannot perceive being, as separate from some certain mode of

t^,^^xistence ; our knowledge here is limited, but positive. I^J^ We do know being as independent of our cognition. I -^look upon an object within or without the body : I know that it has being ; but not the fact that the mind looks upon it, makes the object to have real existence ; the knowledge of the object does not create the object. Oji the contrary, we know, and our intuitive convictions go to prove, that substance has existence independent of the contemplating mind.

This ground must be taken in opposition to certain errors which first arose in Greek philosophy, and which have been successively taken up by modern thinkers, especially of the

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skeptic school. Hume and Kant hold that all the mind can perceive is of relations and phenomena lacking real existence; in other words, they resolve all material existence into mere projections of the mind. But this theory is most emphatically denied by our intuitive knowledge of material objects, which the mind at once pronounces inde})endent in their existence. However, this pei-manence does not amount to indestructibility, whilst it precludes the possibility of conceiving of matter as a fleeting idea or impression, existing only when the mind attends to it. ^^^k^ We know mind and body as exercising potency.

We know everything as exercising power. In every condition of matter, in every mental state, potency is involved ; and this ■ notion of power is gathered in the primitive knowledge of self and not by subsequent experience. Resistance of matter and volition in mind come under our notice among the first things observed. But, while it is just to say that matter has potency, has extension, it is just as evidently false to say, with Leibnitz, that matter is force ; or with Descartes, that the essence of mat- ter is extension. Both attributes are essential to all matter ; and where one is wanting, matter cannot be.

Being, Permanence, Potency, then, are cognized in all matter and mind ; and it is this which constitutes substance. Two derivations are given to this word " substance," each character- izing a school of Philosophy. Substance is derived —

1. From sub-sto — id quod substat accidentibus, making it a^lrV^./' sort of substratum underlying all phenomenal existence. 1

2. From sid)-slsto — ens per se subsisteiis, that which has inde- pendent existence. In the latter sense, it is accepted by Natural Realism and characterized by the three marks of being, perma- nence, p(^tency. Where these are, there is substance, whether it be in mind or body : in the one case, the senses being our guide; in the other, self-consciousness.

II. What hioioledge is pjeculiar to each of the SimipAe Cognitive Powers f

A. Knowledge peculiar to Sense-perception.

1. By sense-perception we know externality; that is, things

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as external to the mine], the thinking Ego. If we admit that there is such a tiling as a perceiving mind, then it is but a logical consequence tliat there is such a thing as an external object perceived.

2. By all the senses we know direction, which implies exten- sion. By all the senses we have a knowledge of our own extended bodily frame, and this extension is implied in the direction in which we let our intuitive organs pass, and which itself is intuitively known.

Motion, also, is intuitively perceived ; but there is something more than mere sense-perception involved in this operation of the mind. Whilst the movement of our intuitively localized organs will be especially apt to give us the idea of motion, and whilst the passage of an image over tlie retina will also greatly contribute to the acquirement of this notion, there must still, additionally, be a brief exercise of the memory, in order to complete and perfect the perception.

B. Knowledge peculiar to Self-consciousness.

1. By self-consciousness we know personality. This is higher than the knowledge of mere being, which it implies. By self-consciousness we have a special aj^prehension of self as something distinct from the material objects surrounding us. Personality is something which cannot be strictly defined, but may be brought to our view by abstraction. It is, however, a conviction which makes man feel himself independent of all things outside of the mind ; a conviction which is essential to manhood.

2. By self-consciousness, we have direct knowledge of mind. Numerous philosophers, while freely admitting the existence of mind, deny the possibility of our knowing it by direct means. Many even disbelieve that we can arrive at a knowledge of mind by a circuitous process of investigation : a doctrine which, taken literally, is correct ; for our means of knowing the mind must be direct, and can be nothing else. It is the great merit of Descartes that he has taught meii to look at their own minds, and to believe in the possibility of doing so, by means of this instrument.

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The knowledge of personality, and of mind directly, is what we have from self-consciousness.

III. General Remarks condiid'mg the subject of the Simple Cognitive Powei'S.

In his " Essay on the Human Understanding," first published in 1690, Locke maintains that the mind derives all its knowl- edge from sensation, al'adr^acT, and reflection, two terms which are probably s^aionymous with sense-perception and self-con- sciousness. " External and internal sensation," he says, " are the only passages of knowledge to the understanding," He thus represents the soul as a dark closet, into which light is let by these two openings. His mistake evidently lies in his failing to have an accurate idea of the amount of knowledge given by the two faculties, to which he eagerly attributes all our knowledge ; and every such measurement, if rigidly carried out, must show the insuperable difficulties which everywhere beset the follower of the Lockeian theory. All our thoughts do not dwell on that alone from which we can receive a bodily sensation. Ideas of time, of the infinite, of moral good and evil, are derived from utterly different sources. When we study the faculties of the mind separately, we dare not be led to think that they also act separately or in any distinct order of arrangement. Many oper- ate simultaneously ; many operate before, which are here })laced after, others, and vice versa.

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CHAPTER IV.

THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS.

We now turn to the second group, the Reproductive, Re-pre- sentative Powers. They are called Reproductive because they produce again and again wiiat has been previously before the mind.

II. Reproductive Powers.

1. Retentive Power.

2. Recalling Power, phantasy. '3. Associate Power.

4. Recognitive Power.

5. Compositive Power. ^

6. Symbolic Power. General Remarks. This division is very similar to, thougli

not identical with, Hamilton's arrangement. The nature of each power is briefly this :

1. Retentive Power (Hamilton, conservative) enables me to retain the knowledge which I have gained by the senses or by reflection, — to keep what has been experienced.

2. Recalling Power (Aristotle, 0avra.<7to) enables me to recall, by means of an image, what I have thus retained in my mind.

3. Associate Power brings up the retained ideas or notions according to certain inviolable rules.

4. Recognitive Power (not stated by Hamilton) enables me to recognize an idea or notion as having been before the mind in time past.

5. Compositive Power places old things into new situations, gives old things new forms and relations.

6. Symbolic Power (to which language belongs) enables me to think or recognize things by means of signs.

1. Retentive Power. This is that power by which we are enabled to retain what has once been before the mind, so as to

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reproduce it under certain circumstances. It is not an original power ; it can produce nothing absolutely new. but it can bring before the mind that which once has passed before it. It is jn'operly a capacity, rather than a faculty. It is this property of the retentive power whichjlias suggested the idea of speaking of it as a store-house of notions and thoughts, and which has led many speculators to represent it as such, not merely in a meta- phorical way of speaking, but as being, in its very nature, a re- pository of sensations ; an idea which is purely inconceivable. It has often happened that physicists have thought they could find that " chamber of memory," and with microscopic investiga- tion analyze a notion. But while such metaphors can only tend to confuse the matter, it is evident that the mind has a power of this nature ; a jiower, however, which cannot be accounted for ; that is, which cannot be resolved into something simpler.

It has been asked, " what is the condition of an idea thus retained, but not recalled? Is it dead, or what is it?" The answer to this is simple enough. An idea exists as an idea only when it is before the consciousness. But then the question arises if that is so, how has the mind the power of retain- ing the idea? When the mind once has contemplated an idea, it retains it in this sense, that it is able henceforth to reproduce it under certain circumstances and upon certain conditions being supplied ; but the thought is not living in the mind as a thought, for such it becomes only when it comes before the consciousness.

This'poWf* depends-ittpwrcertain conditions, yiz^. :^ , ii. ^ ^^c^ ' ^n-Upon the amount of mental -eieereke in the original percep- tion.— rit has been asked whether the mind retains everything. Now, it is undeniable that often things which have apparently passed away forever, may suddenly be brought up by some con- dition of the body or some complication of external circum- stances. Upon this is founded the idea that the mind remem- bers everything ; but it does not seem to prove this absolutely. Without denying it, however, we maintain that it is evident that the facility of recollection largely depends upon the amount of mental energy spent in the original perception.

j§. Upon the state of the brain. — This calls our attention to a

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set of curious phenomena, illustrating the influence of mind on body and vice versa.

In all thinking, in every operation of the mind, there must be, according to Carpenter, some cellular disposition ; especially, and perhaps always, in the cells in the periphery of the brain. Tiiis process, which is totally removed from our consciousness, Carpenter calls Unconscious Cerebration ; a phrase which is admirable as indicating a fact, but worthless if intended to ex- plain something. Memory depends, to a certain degree, upon this cerebration ; this is not a concession to the materialist, but this cerebration is the result of mental action.

Dr. Abercrombie's " Mental Powers."

Note. — Review 1 ^^ -r. . , ,r n r • • v

Dr. Beattie s " Memory and Imagmation.

From these singular facts it appears to be evident that the reproductive powers, in order to act in the right manner, require the concurrence of the brain. The act of recalling, &c., is un- doubtedly a mental one ; but it exerts its influence even upon the material substance of the brain. The cause, however, and the ultimate nature of this necessary co-operation are wrapped in mystery, and we can only infer its existence from certain un- deniable facts. A man who liad not lost the use of his eyes, but had a diseased brain, was unable to recall any scenes. A preacher, by paralysis, lost all recollections of exactly four years. Some persons, whose brains were in an unhealthy condition, remem- bered objects quite well, but forgot their names. Dr. Gregory mentions a lady thus affected ; he also mentions cases where persons lost the recollection of certain things, distinctly remem- bering others. One of the most remarkable cases is that of a young man, who, having been for many years unable to speak the Welsh and French languages, was seized by a sickness which affected his brain ; a circumstance which at once gave him back the power of sj^eaking the long-forgotten tongues. Upon his recovery, however, he forgot them again. In this case it appears that the cerebration left something behind, which, when affected by the illness, called back the recollection of those languages. A clergyman with a diseased brain, spoke nothing but Hebrew, that being the last language he learned. A young girl,

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who repeated notliing but Hebrew, had lived a short time with a learned Hebrew Rabbi. (Carpenter's " Mental Physiology/' pg. 430. Baron St. Leonard's wards.) ]M. Brocat attribute^ this " aphasia " to an nnhealtiiy state of the left lobe of the brain' which he closely connects with the power of language.

,2. Recalling Power, Imagining Power, Piiantasy. — This is the power which enables us to call up, by means of a phan- tasm, that which has been before the mind in time past.

In sense-perception and self-consciousness, the objects to which our attention is called are present before us ; in the recalling power there is no actual, material object to look npon. What appears before the mind is an image, a iffv^zaaiw. ; hence, we call the power phantasy. This word phantasy, ifa.\^z(j.aia, was first employed to denote this faculty by Aristotle. It M^as then for a long time lost, until Bacon again took it up. Once more it dis- appeared, but was received by the German philosophers, and is now in general acknowledgment.

By means of this power we are enabled to bring up before us the scenes of our childhood ; the old school-house, <fcc. : but we can go beyond this and reproduce to our minds the feelings of pain or of pleasure with which we trod those "ancient paths," and we can again go tiirough our past lives with interest, as fresh almost as at the time of which we are now thinking. When- ever we recall a scene or object, it is by means of an image or ])hantasm ; and the liveliness of tlie latter de[)ends upon the same conditions as those noticed under " Retention," The poet, the novelist, and the historian, employ the aid of this faculty ; and it adds a little to the argument in favor of the immortality of the soul.

Distinction between fantnsm and conception. I think of a rose, and a single image appears before the mind ; this is a phantasm : I then think of the class roses, as a whole ; this is a conception. We can recall by phantasy (1) all we have by the senses, and (2) all we have by the consciousness. The image that the mind looks upon can be called so in a metaphorical way only ; it is without any sort of material existence, and does not appear as distinct from imagination itself. It is hence, because

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the mind is evidently able to look upon thoughts and emotions Avithout visible forms, that we derive an argument for the im- mortality of the soul.

3. Associative Power.— Tjiis is the power of following one train of thought in preference to desultory thinkino-. It

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seems as though our ideas, so quickly flashing through the mind, followed each other at random. But as, in the material world, the ])aths of wind and waves are ordered by the laws of nature, so la\v rides in these realms of invisible existence. That such a regular succession of ideas does really take place, may be proved in two ways :

1. If we follow a train of thought^we can invariably trace some connection between the single ideas.

Example. We think of the late Rebellion; a relative who was engaged in the struggle is recalled; some distinguished general occurs to us : we think of the close of the war, of the feelings about it then and now ; of the different aspects under which the various foreign powers viewed it ; the Alabama mat- ter, with all that was connected wdth it, the Geneva Arbitration, etc., occur ; we consider the difference between that case and the fate of the Virginius; we think of Cuba, its condition, and, perhaps, how we should like to visit it; then the obstacles Avhich oppose such an undertaking occur to us, bringing with them our relations and our duties to our home, (&c.

2. When a curious thought suddenly arises in the mind, it can often be discovered what gave rise to this phenomenon.

Example. Hobbes, of Malmesbury, tells us of a person who, while the conversation all around concerned the English Revo- lution, suddenly asked what was the value of a Roman denarius. Every body was puzzled how the person hapi)ened to hit on such an impertinent subject, when it occurred to Hobbes that, speaking of the English Revolution, the fate of Charles I. must have come to his mind, bringing with it a series of similar cases of treason, and especially that of Judas Iscariot. This sug- gested the bribe, thirty denarii, which had been given to the traitor, and this led the person to ask the value of the coin.

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There are two sets of laws by which certain trains of thought are conditioned, viz., the primary and the secondary.

A. Primary.

a. Contiguity.

1. Repetition (succession.)

2. Co-existence (redintegration.)

b. Correlation.

B. Secondary.

a. Native Tastes and Talents.

b. Energy, 1. Of feeling.

2. Of intellect.

3. Of will.

A. Primary Laws of Association. — The primary laws are those by which^jll^^thou^hte^^r^^ggulated in their succession.

a. Contiguity ; that is, things which have been associated in the mind tend to recall each other. // v c^ r

1. Rejietition or Succession ; that is, wlien ideas have been in the mind successively, when one comes uj), the others are apt to follow. It is by this law that the child commits poetry, &c., to memory ; namely, by repetition until the words fall in one after the other by the law of repetition. It is from this power, also, that we derive thd* faculty of learning the meaning of words. Hence, too, it is possi-i^e that certain ideas are often recalled by their very opposi^s ; as, tyranny suggests liberty: tiiat certain things associated with incidents in early life will ever afterwards cause us a feeling of horror : that the recollection of ghost stories makes people shrink from darkness, thongh they do not believe them. This tendency facilitates the formation of prejudices^ which can be avoided only by connecting things with more pleasant ideas. And this it is which gives strength to habit. ",

Habit is of a double nature : ^^ ^'L^r.y nTTu/^/ /^ 2-^^^^

I. It gives a tendency to repeat acts that have been often performed. Certain mental states have succeeded each other and are wont to return by the law of association. This is the force which lies in drunkenness and every other habit; powers which, after a while, gain a resistless sway over the mind. The acts thus get control of the will, as the man who commits himself

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to the Niagara, above the Falls, is borne down Avith the waters. Still this is no excuse for the unhappy indivicbial ; the crimi- nality lies in the levity with which he committed himself, seeing, as he must, the inevitable consequences. Like Coleridge, he goes from one step to another, thinking that he has still the power to return, until he tries and finds the difficulty ; then he again goes forward.

II. Thejendency gives faeiliti/ in performing acts often done. At first, we need an effort ; but, gradually, means are devised of overcoming the obstacles, and finally all things go smoothly and easily.

Still, habit has a good side. The law is good ; though when we violate it, it becomes a means of severe punishment. By habit we are enabled to read fluently what was once so hard to spell out ; and useful as acquired knowledge may be, habits of diligence are still more so. Youth is the time to form habits : and good habits are necessary to prevent the formation of bad ones ; just as the farmer must occupy a field with good seed, if he would prevent the growth of weeds.

2. Co-existence or Redintegration ; that is, things w^hich have been before the mind together, tend to recall each other.

The question arises, how many objects may be before the mind at the same time ? Hamilton thinks there may be six. J. S. Mill says there cannot be more than one. If the, latter be true, however, there could be no comparisoii^; for <ve tan'not compare two things if they are not both before us, however quickly they may succeed each other. Dr. McCosh thinks there may be five, or, more frequently, four. Thus I meet two per- sons ; wheu again seeing the one, the other occurs to me by law of co-existence. .,^. .V,

By the law of repetition, thoughts follow each other in a long train ; by the law of co-existence, they are gathered in a group. However, in order to any advantage from these laws, knowledg^ gained by observation is essential.

By virtue of the laws of contiguity, memory may be culti- vated by associating in the mind one object \\\i\\ another; as the boy makes a knot in his handkerchief to enable him to recall his

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mother's command. But a judicious arrangement of time, by the same law, is the best aid to memory. The sense of the beautiful mav be cultivated by attending to these laws.

h. Correlation ; that is, things which are related to each other suggest each other, -^^u '-'' O ^■'' ' '' •' < u • '^^^i v. i' ■■'-"^-.-' { U^-^^'TT^,

The law of correlation or reseml)lance is of several kinds; 1. Resemblance ; 2. Contrast ; 3. Cause and Eifect ; 4. Means and End. S', Vu'^;- a^^^( S~^/'-r6i^^< .

The first of these is by far tjie ^nostimiportant, correlation // ^' j^ci'' excellence. The law of resemblancejis that like recalls like. Thus it is that, when I see a portrait, I think of the original. {Note. — If I have seen the two together, it is by the law of contiguity that I think of the al)sent one.) The same q law lets us connect sunshine and prosperity, sin and pollution, light and truth, darkness and error, heat and passion, fickleness and fortune, the lily and purity, spring and childhood, the fading leaf and declining life. Poetry especially makes use of these comparisons and similes, and tiie most beautiful are de- rived from the ancients and orientalists. It is also this same fact, that poetry makes use of all these self suggesting phrases and descri])tions, that makes poetry so easily remembered. The law of resemblance is also of the greatest importance to the scientist, the cla^ificaticHLof the phenomena of nature being based solely upon the resemblances discovered between them.

Similar to the laAv of resemblance, similar in nature and in imj)ortance, is the law of cause and effect. It enters as an important factor in investigations in the departments of history and phvsics ; indeed, it is the foundation ui)on which philosophi- cal history, as well as natural philosophy, is based.

The law of correlation assists us in remembering discourses of a complex character, by means of analysis and discovering of the logical connection between the various parts. It is, there- fore, more advantageous to educate a mind by the system of correlation than by a method of contiguity. For, while the latter lets the mind forever run in the same old channel, the former adds new interest and creates a variety of conceptions which add greatly to the usefulness of the mental training. Upon this

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difference between ooiTelation and contignity is based the distinc- tion between memory by the one or by the other. Memory by contiguity is natural to undeveloped, childish capacities ; while the memory of strong men is that of correlation. The one grows like the blade of grass, unvarying and single; the other, like the tree, spreading its limbs and branches in unceasing variations.

Examples. A remarkable instance of memory by contiguity is told of a pei'son who, after hearing Ajyl^aiee read a poem of considerable length, which he had liinisalf- composed, repeated the whole verbatim, thus greatly amusing the audience and pro- portionately embarrassing the poet. Another instance is that of a boy who was asked by a minister to give the divisions of a compass-box. This he did backwards as well as forwards. He then asked the parson to say the Lord's Prayer backwards ; an impossibility for the old gentleman. The reason for this is that the boy's memory was one of contiguity, while the parson's was one of correlation.

It has been attempted to reduce these two primary laws to a single one ; but though probably this is possible, all endeavors have, as yet, failed. Aristotle, Hamilton, Mill, and Valentin have been unsuccessful. But this will be taken up at a later date and discussed more minutely.

B. Secondan/ Laws of Association. — The secondary laws are those which, when several ideas might come up according to primary laws, determine which do actually come up.

a. The law of native and hereditary tastes and talents ; that is the mind will often follow one train of thought rather than an- other, because it naturally inclines that Avay. Some minds are naturally inclined to seek for resemblances, others for contrasts. Some admire a thing for its beauty, others will despise it because . it is not useful. To one person a rugged mountain top will be suggestive of sublimity and grandeur; to another it will appear merely as a poor place to raise cattle. The discussion regarding . Darwinism will necessarily lead to a more accurate investigation into the hereditary laws, upon which little attention has as yet been bestowed.

6. The laio of mental energy; that is, the mind will most

66

readily briiiQ- up those ideas upon which it has bestOM'od most

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mental eneroy. This is perhaps the most important of tlie laws of association. It shows why, when a thing is brought before the mind over and oyer again, it at last becomes perfectly familiar. It arises from the fact that every mind is endowed with- a certain amount of power, according to the amount of which, when bestowed on a certain object, it is more apt to return to the consciousness of the j)Ower. This mental energy is of three kinds :

1. Energy of feeling or emotion. Those ideas, the conception of which is attended with most exertion of feeling, remain most distinctly before the mind. Thus the scenes of our youth, the places and moments where we experienced some remarkable and impressive event, are long remembered ; but the trivial and the mean pass away without detention. Hence, we can judge what a man takes interest in, by listening to the recollections to which he most fondly clings ; or, when traveling with him, by observ- ing -what is most a^^t to attract his attention.

2. Energy of intellect. Those things which come up most readily are those upon which we have bestowed most intellect of any kind. Children who easily acquire certain kinds of knowledge, most easily forget them. There is more harm than benefit to be derived from such things as " science made easy," or " science made popular," or " science by cards." What is rapidly acquired is rapidly lost, and thoughts are of no use but when made our own. From this standpoint, novels cannot be considered as more than a sort of pleasant idleness. A book should not be made to think for the reader, but should excite him to think ; then its precepts will remain.

3. Energy of will. Those tnmgs will most readily recur upon which we have bestowed most energy of will, especially of atten- tion. Attention is merely an act of the will. It is well provided that things pass from us, so as to prevent the remaining of all small trifles. Still, we dare not banish all things from our memory ; and we are well provided with the means of prevent- ing this, if we are willing to use the power of attention which our faculty of volition gives into our hands. Thus, when we

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listen to a discourse, or read a book which we wish to remember in substance, we are able to do so by concentrating our attention by means of taking notes and reviewing. Habits are thus acquired which are advantageous under all circumstances and in all conditions.

It is proper here, also, to observe a false impression which often exists, namely, that we have no more control over the flight of our thoughts than over the path of the winds and the waves. This is through misapprehension. There are persons who have a complete control, not only over their own ideas, but also over those of others. We certainly cannot command absent thoughts to appear, for as soon as we can command a thought to appear, it is present. But we can order it up in the due course of associations, by retaining a present thought. For example, you have forgotten the name of the capital of China ; retain the idea of China, and, by a number of associations, Pekin will come up in due time.

Association can be cultivated as well as any other power of the human mind. Painters visit places remarkable for their scenery ; poets go to the theaters of the scenes from wiiich they draw their inspiration ; historians travel to the spots where the subject of their studies dwelt, and picture to themselves their hero in his immediate surroundings as they are presented to their eyes. It is of the highest importance for the public speaker and debater to cultivate this faculty.

General Remarks Concluding the Association of

Ideas.

Plato was the first philosopher whose attention was attracted by the remarkable order and harmony observable in the manner in which the ideas passed through the mind of man. He accounted for this phenomenon by the doctrine of the pre- existence of tiie soul. Aristotle, his great disciple, not satisfied with this explanation, evolved tjie first philosophical theory. He attributed all that we place undjer the head of association to the operation of three laws: resemblance, contiguity aAcl contrast. Henceforth, philosophers constantly referred to this hypothesis;

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and Augustine, incidentally taking notice of it, expresses his opinion, the first to this effect, that the three laws might be reduced to one. In the Middle Ages, the association of idea^ was treated of as a black art, and Locke yet speaks of it as a "curious phenomenon." In the last century there arose two classes of philosophers, the Scottish school, and the English philosophers led by Hartley^ who connected it with a mechanical theory, the vibration of nerves. In this century, the attempt was made first by Dr. Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, and after- wards by Jas. Mill, Hamilton and J. S. Mill. Jas. Mill says both may be explained, because like things have often been in the mind before, but this explanation, it will be seen, is utterly insufficient. Hamilton reduces both laws to what he calls redin- tegration. Taking the law of contiguity, co-existence, " the same suggests the same," he reduces the law of correlation to it I>y saying; that "things, inasmuch as they are alike, are the same "

thus making tlie portrait, wliTeli I have never seen, identical with the person of my friend. Still, this explanation is not totally satisfactory, and the matter still stands sub judice.

There may be, however, and, indeed, there probably is, one general law including the two, but it certainly has not yet been enunciated. The following may serve as a suggestion of a method by which a conclusion may be arrived at. Walking through a forest, I am struck with a particular tree, reminding me of others, and of one at the old school-house. Now, here there is more than mere resemblance. The mere colored surface before me gives the occasion for a process in the mind. I see a tree ; it brings up, as contiguous, other trees, regarding which W(? have gone through the same process. Thus, there is involved a process of generalization which may be brought under the head of co-existence.

4. Recognitive Power. — Thisy^ the power by which we recognize an object as having been before us in time past. Three elements are here involved, viz. :

a. We mcognize an object or event.

h. We recognize an object as having been before us.

c. We recognize it as having been before us in time jicist'

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a. We 'ifHiYui^^P an object. There may he here more tlian a mere mental image or idea ; there may be a material object which is the subject of these powers ; an object, liowever, not now seen for the first time, but again seen and cognized, re-cognized. Now though tliis object of recognition may be material, it may just as well be a mental state, an occurrence occnpyiiig a long space of time, and accompanied with many details.

b. We recognize an object as having been be^fore us. In every recollection of objects and events, we iiave simultaneously a recollection of ourselves as having had those things under our notice and consciousness; that is, we recollect things as having been known by ourselves, previous to this recollection. In this operation of the mind we find involved a new element, which has not yet fallen under our notice, viz.,

^^ A The faith element ; that is, faith is the conviction of " the ;[Jl / \ existence of an object not now before us or under immediate inspectfon. A dTstinction has already been drawn between pre- sentative and representative knowledge. In the former, the faith element does not enter as a factor ; it would be totally inappropriate to say that I have a "belief" in touching this table, in experiencing this })ain ; but we may have faith as to some simihu- experience in the jmst. On the other hand, if you take memory, you find that the object is no longer present ; it is re-presented by an image in your mind, or some other object suitable to perform the function. Still the mind may have as absolute conviction of the real existence of the one as of the other ; and it is this that we call belief. " So far as I am con- vinced of the existence of an absent object, my state of mind is belief."

The faith element is a fticulty of the utmost importance, rank- ing next to cognition. It rises higher than reasoning, which ultimately rests upon intuitive beliefs, and it is more comprehen- sive than mere intuitive knowledge, though it is based upon the cognitions of our intuitive faculties. It gives authority to the testimony of memory ; and, joined as it always is, with an ap- prehension of some sort, becomes our guide to future hopes and

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happiness, and lends encouragement to the laborers in the fields of science and discovery.

c. The recognitions take place not irrespectively of time ; we rem embei^ things as having been before us in time past. Con- sciousness testifies that there is always an intuitive belief to that effect; and if the idea of time is not given by intuition, it is impossible to arrive at it in any other way. No kind of ratio- cination can furnish a conclusion, the premises of which are not ultimately based on a real and incontestable premise. Recogni- jtiou, therefore, gives us a second element, viz..

The Tde^ pf Tj|^ip. Dr. Tlios. Brown's theory is that the idea of time is "a conception accompanied with a feeling of a relation of priority." Now the first part, that it is a conception, is readily acknowledged; but how can we discover "a relation of priority," unless we have the intuitive means of discovering that the event has happened in time past? Locke maintains that we arrive at the idea of time by reflecting " on the succession of our ideas." But the very fact of our being able to reflect, to meditate upon such succession, nay, even to discover it, is condi- tioned by our prev^iously having an intuitive knowledge of time in the concrete. Besides, it is evident that a succession can give us merely the measure of time, not the idea. Locke, however^ gives the true way of arriving at the abstract notion of time, after it has been given in the concrete. He thinks we derive it by reflection ; by meditating upon it and se[)arating the absolute idea of time from the events happening in time, we arrive at the idea of time in the abstract. (We obtain the knowledge of all actual existence from sensation and reflection.) Locke's errone- ous idea, that all our knowledge is derived from sensa^n and reflection, was_niet-by Leibnitz and, later, by Kant. Leibnitz looked upon space and ' time as mere relations between objects given by the mind :' "je tenois Vespace pour quelque jiurement relafif, comme le temps ; pour un onlrc de co-existence, coimne le temps est un ordre de succession.^' This doctrine was but pre- paratory to that of Kant, who held that time was a "relation imposed u[)on objects by the mind." But, at the same time, it must be acknowledged that we have no more direct knowledge

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of the objects and events in time than we have of time itself; lience, the natural and logical consequence of this Kantian theory must be an absolute spiritualism which resolves all matter into a projection of the mind.

The idea of time, then, according to the doctrine of natural

realism and as suj)ported by our intuitive convictions, is primary

and instinctive. It is most intimately connected with memory.

Xote. — James Mill denies that memory is a faculty of the

mind ; whereas J. S. Mill, clearly seeing that it

gives us something which can be obtained by no

other faculty, is not prepared to sustain his father's

teaching on this point.

Memoey.

Memory, although a single faculty of the human mind, is composed of several elements, just as are the air we breathe and the water we drink. Memory has been used by Hamilton as synonymous with retention. For this use, however, he has no authority in the common acceptation of the word ; and , indeed, he fails to give the faculty its due position in the spiritual con- stitution of man.

There may be discovered four essential constituents of this complex faculty :

1. A power of retention.

2. A "power of recalling by phantasm.

3. An associative power. /

4. A recognitive |>ower. i^ / '-x " ' The latter is the chief element of memory, and, where it is

missing, memory cannot be said to exist. The subject of mem- ory is not a mere image, though a phantasm is necessary; but it is an imaoe of something; once before us, and connected with a belief and a notion of time. Memory, therefore, is defined as the power of recalling what has actually pas g^ jjftfc '.l^ - y^* - -^^^ tm^onnection tnere are five points to which our attention is called, and which demand consideration in order to determine accurately the precise natui-e of this important faculty.

I. Does the mind ever forget anything ? It is evident that.

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although we are possessed of a power of recalling, we are not always able to recall everything. jSTevertheless, it is maintained by many that the mind is incapable of forgetting anything whatever, and that those objects or events, which seem to be lost, require but the rousing influence of proper associations in order to be bronght forward with new strength. Now, it is difficult to deny this, and it is equally impossible to prove it. It seems most reasonable to say that " whatever has been asso- ciated with a waste of energy, be it of feeling, of intellect, or of will, that is able, it is prol)al)le, to return at some time and under some kind of association ; and if it lies hidden during life, it may, nevertheless, be brought to light in a future one."

II. Does it give unconscious mental operations ? It is a favorite doctrine of Leibnitz, Hamilton, and Fichte, that there are operations of the mind of which we are not conscious ; and it has been attempted thus to explain the genius of great men, so greatly resembling a powerful instinct. For instance, it is said Shakspeare was not conscious of what he was writing, what wonderful psychological phenomena he was describing, when he traced out the character of Hamlet. Now, in a certain sense, there is some truth in this ; it is not the poet's mission to analyze his characters in a strictly philosophical way and follow out their develoi)ment scientifically. Thus, Shakspeare may not have reflected and studied over Hamlet with the special view of placing before us a character of such wonderful depth and comjdexity; but while he was writing it out, he must cer- tainly have put himself in Hamlet's place and been conscious of the process in his own mind. The reason why it seems as if sometimes we were unconscious of what is going on in our minds, is simply the lack of attention which M'e exhibit towards ■ these proceedings of our soul, and which thus falls under the law of obliviscence ; that is, attention is necessary for observa- tion. One of the arguments of Hamilton is that we can sit in a room with a clock constantly ticking and never be conscious of hearing anything, while it is a physical necessity that we must hear. But this is a simple case of inattention ; as soon as our attention is directed to the ticking, we are conscious not

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only of liearing, but of having lieard. It appears, therefore, that all acts of the mind are before the consciousness when proper attention is paid to them. (This naturally has no reference to unconscious cerebration.)

III. Does memory ever deceive us ? A7e often, in our recol- lections, find that we make apparent mistakes ; and from this fact it is argued that the memory is deceitful. The fallacy in this reasoning will rapidly appear, if we draw a clear distinc- tion between our pure reminiscences and those mixed ones which we partially owe to processes. j}f- reason i n q;. It is not easy to determine the line of demai'kation between bare memory and memory around which hosts of constructions cluster. It is clear, however, that in every act of memory proper, there must be a recollection of self in a certain state ; and co-existing with it, will be the remembrance of the object : — we remember only ourselves and our experiences. Now, it often happens that the remembrance of the object perceived will fill the mind and " the co-existing reminiscence of self is scarcely attended to." Such is the memory of the child with its floating and uncertain character; such is our original memory. Gradually this memory gathers around it numerous associations and accumulating experiences : we fix dates and events, to which we refer to aid our memory, much in the same way as we take in the aid of comparison to calculate the distance with the eye. And thus tlie mistakes of the memory, like those attributed to the senses, are due not to the pure reminiscences, which, though often faint, are never fal- lacious, but to the faultiness of the associated^ ii^ferences.

IV. Memory of old people. The defective memory of old people is probably owing to two causes, viz. :

1. The state of the brain, the organ which seems connected with all mental activity.

2. The lack of interest they take in outside affairs; that is, the small amount of attention they bestow upon them. It will thus be noticed that old people invariably have a better recollec- tion of what happened and delighted them in the days of their youth, than of the occurrences happening in their immediate surroundings.

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V. Means of cultivating the memory. Since association is one of the elements of memory, attendance to its laws must necessarily prove an aid to the memory itself. The laws of as- sociation, to which such importance should be attributed, are —

a. The law of contiguity. Associate that which you wish to remember with something which will surety come under your notice, and this will bring up what you wished to be reminded of. It is upon this principle that a mother ties a string around her boy's finger to remind him of his errand. The string and the command liave been associated in the mind, and, when the one comes up, the other follows. Thus the old Hebrews wore a sign upon the frontlet to remind them of their duties.

h. The law of correlation. It is well nigh impossible to re- member loose, disconnected facts, and their importance is eer- tainly very slight. An appreciation of this fact led the ancient philosophers to lay down their maxims in the form of poetry. It is always better to have one's knowledge well systematized and at one's command by the laws of correlation. Hence, the value of a scientific education, which lays great 'stress on the develop- ment of the analytic powers of the mind.

c. The law of energy.

1. Energy of feeling. Scenes and events which have strongly excited our feelings, Avill long be remembered ; while uninterest- ing things are forgotten.

2. Energy of intellect. Those studies which have cost us most intellectual labor, are the most fruitful and the longest re- membered.

3. Energy of will, i. e., attention. This is by far the most important. If you wish to remember a book or .discourse, give it your whole and undivided attention ; that will be the most effectual way of accomplishing your purpose.

5. Compositive Power. — This is the power of putting things, "which have lieen before the mind, into new forms and ositions. Four elements are here involved, viz. : a^ A diminishing power ; that is, if I have seen a man, I may picture to myself a Liliputian. ■^- \. An enlarging power; that is, having seen a man, I can

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picture to myself a giant. This is a power most frequently exercised in childhood.

c. A separating power ; that is, having seen a church with a steeple, I can separate the steeple from the church. This is not yet abstraction, the function of a still higher faculty.

d. A compounding power ; that is, having seen a bird and a bull, I can combine the two and make a winged bull. This is the most important power of the four here enumerated, and is essential to imagination.

Note. — The power of composition is one of the highest powers of human genius. Still, while the talent is natural it must be subjected to cultivation, if it is not to run wild and be lost. So in science, discove- ries are the reward of such talent trained to accurate reasoning; they are not of accident. Suppose the story of Newton and his apple to be true : the mere falling of the a[)ple could not be sufficient to suggest the idea of gravitation and its laws, but it was the mind seeking, and, by long and attentive study, pre- pared to find truth ; it was this that needed but that slight hint to perfect its system and at once discover the law which had so long been the object of its meditations. The compounding power is the essential element, as has been intimated, of imagination. We now proceed to analyze this faculty, which ranks among the highest and most useful powers of the human mind.

Imagination.

I. Its Nature. — Imagination is one of._tlie repi'oductive facul- ties, but it reproduces the old objects in new forms, and, differing here widely from the memory, is not "accompanied with any belief as to past experience." If we compare memory with a • mirror, reflecting wiiat is before it in its proper form and color, we may liken imagination to the kaleidoscope, which reflects what is before it in an infinite variety of new forms and dispo- sitions; but, while imagination does not, like memory, disclose

76

to us realities, memory, on the other hand, cannot " enliven by the varied pictures which are presented by the sister power."

The power of imagination is always constructive, never crea- tive : a man born blind cannot, by any native power of his own mind, apprehend colors ; nor a deaf man, sound. But having once seen color, obtained a knowledge of soiuid, he can find unnumbered ways of disposing them. ■>

Imagination, like memory, has the powers of retention. ])han- tasy, association of ideas, composition. The last is the essential element. Looking at these under the two heads of the imaging power and the constructive power, we have —

1, The Imaging Power. — It is this necessary element of the faculty which gives it the name ipavxaaia^ employed by the ancient Greeks and by Bacon. An illustration will best explain what is here meant. A mother looks out of the window to take one other look of her son who is setting out to a distant land, where he will probably long remain before returning. She follows him until he turns the corner and is lost to her sight. But still she follows him, picturing iiim as he toils in the far-off country, as he rises from one step of aggrandizement to another, as he returns, at last, by that same road and around that same corner, to this same house. She will also picture to herself the scene of his return to her, and herself as receiving him.

2. The Constructive Power. — The mother, as has been seen, not only recalls and pictures to herself the past, but she puts the old forms into new shapes and combinations ; the highest and the essential power of imagination, the characteristic of genius, a constituent of every kind of invention.

The operations of imagination embrace not only the material, but also the mental and spiritual worlds. The poet, the drama- tist, and the novelist, take advantage of this fact in disposing into new shapes and collocations, not only men, bui; all the elements of human nature. Indeed, poetry and fiction generally should be confined to the representation of the motives, sentiments, and passions of mankind. True poetry must come welling up from a true heart. The ancient poets overlooked this; and, therefore, the more it is understood as it ought to be, the more

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the ancient apparatus of poetry is disappearing. It is becoming ridiculous to invoke the lyre, an instrument which few poets have ever beheld, or to call upon Apollo and the Muses, when to speak in earnest of such deities is absurd.

II. Its Use. — Imagination has a noble purpose to serve. It widens the horizon of the mental vision ; it elevates the senti- ment ; it affords variety and amusement ; it is, as D'Alembert remarks, no less essential to the scientist than to the poet ; it suggests hypotheses to explorers in physical science wherewith to explain phenomena; it snpplies devices to the general in the field, to the adventurer by sea or land, to the farmer tilling the soil, to the merchant seeking new openings in trade. It is the source and springing fountain of all that is most gratifying in art and literature; and it has the power of awakening senti- ment deep and fervent. It is not necessary that the object of these emotions should have a reaj existence ; the novel reader rejoices over the success of the hero of the tale, and weeps over the misfortune of the heroine. Dugald Stewart accounts for this by maintaining that there is a momentary belief, in the reality of these objects. But this is unnecessary ; the mere mental image is enough to create the emotions, although a disbelief caused by the unnaturalness of the description would destroy the effect. It follows that, according to the cherished imagination, will be the prevailing sentiment. When devoted to its proper use, the fancy helps to cheer, to elevate, to ennoble the soul ; while gloomy, vicious, or unmanly thoughts will ever depress the man below his intended level. XILTT" \ NlT'E

The new idea which imagination gives us is that of 'the infinite. The i)hilosophers of the Continent, especially Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant, give this idea a high place in their systems, while the British thinkers attribute it to an impotency of the human mind. But " a priori" methods cannot attain to any satisfactory result on this subject, and we must proceed to investigate it inductively. In this manner, we arrive at the followjng negative and positive propositions. . , >^jC Negative Propositions. , ^ _,,

. ( a. The mind can form no adequate apprehension of the infi-

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nite in the sense of image or phantasm. To image a thing in the mind is to give it an extent and a bonndary; and when we would imagine unlimited S|)ace, we swell out an immense sphere> an indefinite but not an infinite volume.

6. The mind can form no adequate logical notion of the infi- nite. Apprehension is an act of the understanding as well as of mere phantasy ; and the mind, as it can form no image, can form no conception of infinity ; it cannot by abstraction, for that diminishes ; it cannot by generalization, for that merely groups together various objects and if there is no infinity in the individual, then none in the mass ; nor can we reach infinity by multiplication, addition, or composition ; these will give the enlarged but not the unlimited. " A distance of a quintillion of quintillions of years or ages has as distinct a termination as an ell or an inch." — r:::===='^ "'^"■^^^17' ' .i. .r..^.....j:z:s^^^^

So much may be allowed to those who conceive of the idea of the infinite as a mere negation ; but, on the other hand, the natural disposition of the hum;ui mind constrains us to believe that it aiso has a positive reality : and if this is so, we must be able to discover what is its nature.

B. Positive Positions.

«. The mind apprehends and believes that there is and must be something beyond its widest image and concept. The fartliest stretch of imagination will never go beyond an expansion with a boundary. And this conviction has the nature and bears the test of intuition.

6. We apprehend and are constrained to believe in regard to the objects to which we attribute infinity, that they are incapable of increase. Here the imaging power fails us. We are unable to reach the infinite ; but we have an intuitive conviction that, when we have reached it, it will be perfect, i. e., nothing more can be added to it, whether it be in things material or sj^iritual, natural or moral. ^^-^ ^^^ /< <

III. Its Abuse. — While imagination is fitted to increase the enjoyment more than any other faculty, provided it is confined to its proper sphere of action, yet there is none which is so lia- ble to run into error and excess, and to land the possessor in

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misfortune. Genius is certainly a high gift, but it offers end- less opportunities for misdirection. Aware of this, Sir Walter Scott was thankful that his son did not possess the dangerous gift. Still, if men possess that high degree of genius and tal- ents, let them use them. But let the dangers connected with the habit of castle-building be known ; a danger which Sir Jas. Mackintosh alludes to when he tells about his early fancies that he was a Roman emperor, which ridiculous habit followed him through life. If such habits are indulged, they tend to weaken the native strength of the mind and create idleness and languor of thought. This is the danger arising from excessive novel reading. Besides the harmful influeuce exerted by the exhibi- tion of evil tendencies, it has been shown by Butler and Dugald Stewart that even the most proper novels can exert an evil in- fluence on the mind by exciting the feelings, without supplying an object upon which they may be left to operate, thus naturally blunting and hardening the tender sympathies of the heart by accustoming them to scenes of misery and unhappiness, even exceediug the reality which, now and then, appeals to these affections.

IV. Its Cultivation. — " The imagination may best be culti- vated by laying up a store of noble images, ready to present themselves when occasion requires, to enliven and instruct tlie mind." Man's beautiful works of art and industry and the still more wondrous works of nature especially as exhibited in the organic kingdoms, are well fitted to raise the mind above the low and common})lace, and store it with images ever after light- ing it with their resplendent beauty. The highest ])art of man's nature, however, is not the sentient, but the moral and spiritual ; and those who would give the highest training to the mind must introduce to it exami)les of excellence, tales of heroism, whether taken from inspired or uninspired biographies.

6. Symbolic Power. — This is the power we have of think- ing by means of symbols. In reflecting upon 'objects not within the immediate reach of our senses, we must have some means of representing them to the contemplating mind. Now, when we thiidv of an individual object, as a rose or a lily, we bring it

80

under our direct notice by means of a phantasm ; but when we are called upon to reflect on a whole class of objects, the diffi- culty becomes insuperable ; because it is both unnatural and untruthful to endeavor to combine a class of objects into one individual, either by making a union of their distinguishing qualities, or by neglecting these and considering only those common to them all. However, if we admit this, one of Locke's theories, in regard to classes, we must surely agree with Berkeley in saying that it is absurd to represent abstractions by phantasm. In the lower abstractions, this image may exist dimly ; but the higher we rise, the dimiAer it becomes, until, in the more recondite ratiocinations, it disappears altogether. Think of an image of chemical affinity!

The most important power of the symbolic faculty is that of language. It is superior to the imaging power, inasmuch as it is able to represent not merely concrete individuals, but also general notions ; thus observing and facilitating the distinction of Aristotle between (pavTo.afxa, image, and vbrjixa^ concept. It is superior to all other sorts of representation by signs, as danger by a red flag, because it is more convenient and accommodating.

Two things are necessarily implied in the use of language as a / means of representation, viz. :

1. A mental power and tendency to use symbols in order to think of objects or classes of objects.

2. An organic capacity for articulate speech and a complex apparatus serving that purpose. The former is often found where the latter is not exercised, as in the dumb man ; and the latter is often found where the former does not exist, as in animals of some kinds, e. g.^ the parrot, having the capacity for articulate speech, but no power of abstract thought.

According to M. Brocat, the organ which seems most inti- mately connected with the symbolic power, is the left lobe of the cerebrum.

A^ofe. — The great advantage of language over phantasm is its artificialness ; never pretending to an adequate representation of the thing expressed, and thus avoid- ing all misleading influence.

CHAPTER V. THE COMPARATIVE POWERS.

We now turn to the third group of Cognitive Powers.

III. Comparotive Poioers. — By these we discover the relations between objects, and form judgments.

^|»^ -Simple and unconnected ideas are perceived through the senses. The first group of powers, the presentative, gives us knowledge of material objects as external, colored, etc., and of self as perceiving, knowing, etc. ; ^. e., of the material world without and the spiritual world within ; the second group, the representative, reproduces these objects, either as they have been, or in new forms and dispositions.

But as yet we have met with no powers calculated to bring the various objects already known into any sort of juxtaposition, or to discover any existing relations between them. Our knowl- edge, then, is still meagre and insufficient; our ideas, indistinct, like the floating clouds. This third group, the comparative powers, supplies the evident deficiency of our primary knowledge by the aid of a process of sound abstraction and ratiocination ; they proceed on what is furnished by the simple cognitive powers, I and trace the relations existing between such objects ; and it / may here be said that the difference between the unhewn rock and the polished statue is not greater than that between our intuitive and discursive knowledge. M/i. Jl

t^ {b.) The mind does not begin with comparison. Many of the

metaphysicians of the present day assert that relations are in- volved in the operations of the senses. But the real and true statement is that we begin with things and then discover the rela- tions existing between tiiem.

^77~ 1^1^ These relations are as real as the objects between which they are found to exist. It is because tiie relations exist that we

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can discover them, not vice versa : — these relations are not creations of the brain.

For example, what constitutes the cause, effect, and the

power of the cause to produce the effect, have all an actual

existence.

The relations intuitively observed by the mind are, according

to the best extant, though by no means perfect, arrangement, the

following :

I. Identity and Difference. V. Time.

II. Whole and Parts. VI. Quantity.

III. Resemblance. VII. Active Property.

IV. Space. VIII. Cause and Effect. Note. — 1. Each proceeds on the knowledge of objects.

2. The mind can discover more than relations of

resemblance and difference, which is against the

theories of the positivists and sensationalists.

We may illustrate the existence of the various relations in a

concrete substance, thus : on seeing an apple-tree just in full

bloom, we discover or think of eight facts which in tlieir order

respectively illustrate the above-mentioned relations, viz. :

1. This is the same tree which we saw yesterday.

2. We think now of the tree, now of the se})arate blossoms, and acknowledge that there are blossoms on the tree.

3. We notice that this tree is similar to other trees.

4. We observe the shape and size of tree and blossoms.

5. We speculate how long the blossoms will last.

6. We try to count the blossoms.

7. We find that the blossoms emit an agreeable odor.

-8. We discover that some have been blown away by the wind. I. Identity and Difference. — It is the same power w^hich dis- covers identity and difference. This relation carries us back to the simple cognitive powers, for by both the external and inter- nal sense we know every object as possessing being ; that is, an existence separate and independent from the contemplating mind. This principle being continued in the objects, constitutes their identity ; and intuitively we look upon the objects as retaining

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that being as long as they exist. The memory may, however, sometimes fail in recognizing certain objects.

(a.) Personal Identity. — rWe have an immediate and direct means of knowing our personal identity.

(1.) In every act of self-consciousness we know self as having being. (2.) In every act of memory we liave a recognition of past-self. Comparing the two, we declare them to be the same j for although our mental states may be different on the two occa- sions, we have still all that is essential to self. We have the intuitive conviction of personal identity, because it has the three essential marks of intuition, viz. : (1.) self-evidence; (2.) neces- sity; (3.) universality.

(6.) We have no intuitive conviction of the identity of any external objects. Indeed since scientists tell us that our bodily frame may be entirely changed in seven years, we have no power to discover the identity of our own body. Much less is this the case with extra-organic objects, since resemblance may fre- quently be so great as to deceive us. In the recognition of our friends, there is a " moral certainty," or high probability, which leads us to do so. In no case, however, can we prove identity ; it is an idea too simple to be resolved, too necessary to be doubted.

The relation of identity may take three different forms :

1. The law of Identity proper, " which requires us to recognize the same to be the same, presented, it may be, at different times, or in different circumstances, or in different forms : {A is A)." This principle guides us in all affirmative judgments in logic, also in both immediate and mediate inference from them.

2. The law of Contradiction, " according to which it is impos- sible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time : (A is not Not-A") This principle applies both to things and their qualities : e. g., free will, extension ; it regulates all propositions which draw negatives by immediate inference ; is used largely in negative reasoning of all kinds.

3. The law of Excluded Middle or Third, " which requires that when two propositions are in the relation of contradiction, one or the other must be true, and yet both cannot be true : (A is either B or not 5)."

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In different terms : Affirmation and Negation of the same thing, in the same respect, have no conceivable meaning ; whilst anything actually may, and virtually must, be either affirmed or denied of anything. In other words : every predicate is true or false of everything; or contradictories are thought as impossible, but, at the same time, one or other as necessary."

The law of identity gives rise to the famous distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. It was first brought out by Kant in 1781, and has since received universal acknowledgment. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate is contained in the subject, and thus merely analyzes the ideas embodied in the subject. Synthetic judgments, or, according to Hamilton, ampliative judgments, are those in which the predicate affirms something more, or denies something more, than is embraced in the subject. Synthetic judgments are such as, gold is yellow, sin will be punished. These judgments may be a posteriori or a pri- ori, while analytic judgments are a priori.

Note. — A p>riori judgments are those pronounced imme- diately by the mere looking at things and without previous experience. A posteriori judgments are those that rest upon knowledge gained by expe- rience. Synthetic judgments of the a ^jriori kind are the mathematical axioms ; such as, " two straight lines cannot inclose a space :" and metaphysical principles, such as that every effect must have been produced by an adequate cause.

II. Whole and Parts. — The mind begins with the concrete, and, this being furnished, is capable of considering a part of the concrete whole separate from the other parts ; a process much aided by the fact that the concrete whole seldom appears in its entireness. The child sees a man with a hat to-day, and without it to-morrow, and is thus better enabled to form a notion of the hat by itself. Comparison enters as an element into all these abstracting operations, although in cases where absolute separa- tion is possible, the parts may be regarded without comparison ; as in separating the rider from the horse. The discovery of the relation of whole and parts is eminently an intellectual operation,

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involving a power of correlation. It is called comprehension, inasmuch as it contemplates the whole in relation to its parts ; or abstraction, since it contemplates the part as part of the whole ; or the faculty of analysis and si/nthesis, inasmuch as it resolves the whole into its parts, and shows that the parts make up the whole. Now, since our primary knowledge is of singular and concrete realities, we have the following positions, viz. :

1. The abstract implies the concrete. While we are able to distinguish between a whole and its parts, an object and its qualities, and between one (piality and another, we are not to suppose that these can exist separately and independently ; but every such abstraction implies a concrete which embraces it and others, and from which it has been separated in thought.

2. When the concrete is real, the abstract is also real. Abstrac- tion, if it proceeds on a reality, and is properly conducted, ever leads to realities, and is thus a most important factor in the dis- covery of the truth. However, while this abstract has real exist- ence, it does not necessarily have independent existence. Beauty is certainly reality, but it has no existence apart from a beautiful person or scene, of whom or of which it is an attribute.

The individual judgments which the mind pronounces, on looking at the whole and its parts, may, perhaps, be generalized into two principles: (1.) The parts make up the whole. (2.) The whole is equal to the sum of its parts. From the first, we may derive the rule, that the abstract part is involved in, and is less than, the concrete whole. From the second, is derived the maxim that the whole is greater than a part. Such maxims underlie many of our thoughts in all departments of investiga- tion.

In Natural History, it urges us to seek for a classification of any subdivision into all its members ; in Chemistry, to look out for all the constituent elements of the compound substances ; in Psychology and Metaphysics, to analyze a concrete mental state into parts, and insists that in the synthesis the parts are equal to the whole. In Logic, it appears in the rule that the members make up the class, in subalternation and disjunctive division.

In most of such cases, the prominent elements are got from

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experience ; in some of them, other intuitions act the more im- portant part ; but in all of them intuitions of whole and parts underlie the mental process.

III. Resemblance. — All our primary notions are of individuals. A child has a notion of a particular man, as his father, before he

"rises to the general notion of mankind. From the knowledge of previous or present objects, we have the means of declaring that they are alike or unlike. Generalization proceeds by discover- ing resemblances, and then putting these like things under some class. Hence we get concepts. Abstraction is necessary to gen- eralization.

[a.) Generalization proceeds on common properties supposed

to be in things. (6.) The mind is always tending to discover resemblances, and is thus furnished with means of arranging natural objects in a natural way. (c.) In Identity, w^e declare objects to be the same.

In Resemblance, we declare them to be possessed of like qualities.

In Equality, we declare that they resemble each other in point of quantity. There are three laws in regard to this faculty, viz. :

1. The universals imply the singular. There would be no generals if there were no individuals.

2. When the singulars are real the universal is also real. The class ruminant, has an existence quite as much as the indi- vidual animals.

3. Whatever is predicated of a class may be predicated of all the members ; and, vice versa, whatever is predicated of all the members of a class may be predicated of the class.

IV. Space. — We have a knowledge of objects as occupying space, and have thus a means of comparing them. In all cases we fix upon a unit of some sort. The faculty which discovers the relations of space is, like the others, dependent upon the powers which give us our primitive knowledge ; that is, upon the simple cognitive powers as giving us the knowledge of space, or extension, in the concrete ; and it is by separating this quality

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from the others that we arrive at the idea of space in the abstract. The faculty of discovering the relations of space gives us not only- many axiomatic principles of mathematics, as " the shortest dis- tance between any two points is a straight line," but also certain intuitive truths in regard to motion, as that it must be in space and through space ; in regard to the necessary relations existing between objects and space, as, " body occupies space and a certain portion of space," and thus has a definite figure. This faculty reveals also certain metaphysical truths as to space, as, " space is continuous," " space has no limits." It is a faculty which is exercised by all minds ; it is of the greatest use in practical life to discern forms and objects, as well as in science, so far as it re- lates to physical existence ; but it is especially necessary to the geometer and the naturalist, whose classifications are founded upon morphological distinctions.

V. Time. — The relation of time is discovered in thoughts, as well as in external events ; and the faculty which discovers the relation is one whose usefulness stretches beyond the sphere of visible existence. In memory we have time in the concrete ; and bv this faculty of discovering the relations of time — a faculty which, although it is based upon memory and proceeds upo*i it, is nevertheless perfectly distinct from it — w'e find what connec- tion, what relation, there is between the events in time and time in itself; a form of knowledge impossibly derived from memory alone, because memory is only of single objects, never of rela- tions.

We judge of time much in the same way as of space ; hours seem long when passed in anxiety, short when passed in pleas- ant excitement. Thus there is a chance of one's erring in his judgments in regard to time ; and hence arises the necessity of having certain marks by which, as in memory, to refresh and strengthen the faculty and render it more accurate. It is for this reason that we reckon from days or events which have caused changes in our lives or in our country's existence. We find this method prevailing in all lands and ages : the Jews reckoned from the Passover ; the Greeks, from the Olympian Games ; the Romans, from the foundation of the City ; the

Christians, from the birth of Christ. These are the historical landmarks about which to arrange events ; and the more accu- rately the system is followed by each individual, the more distinct and ready will be his memory.

The knowledge of the faculty of discovering the relations of time is all-important in the study of philosophy, algebra, arith- metic, and history ; and it is a power which it is one of the strongest desires of the human mind to use. Whenever an event is brought to our notice, we always endeavor to correlate it with respect to time. And here we find a beautiful correspondence between the external and internal worlds. Everywhere, through- out the great phenomena of nature, we find a prevailing perio- dicity. The lives of plants, of animals, of men, have their periods ; the currents of the air, the rising and falling of the ocean, the light of day and the darkness of night, all have their time marked out ; even the events of men, the lives of nations, the issues of political labors, have their periods, while in the dis- eases of man, in the variation of magnetic attraction, and in the movements of the constellations, the most perfect order, in regard to time, is everywhere observable.

VI. Quantity. — These relations are equivalent to the relations of proportion (Locke), or of proportion and degree (Brown), or of lessOTjuore (McCosh). This faculty proceeds to operate on the basis of knowledge forjnerly acquired and aided by other relations already discovered by the mind. Thus, having already the knowledge of the relations of time and space, we can dis- cover that this event or this body occupies more time or space than another event or body. Hence, the faculty for discovering the relations of quantity is essential to mathematics as being the science of quantities. The power of observing the relations of quantity is necessary in order to the exercising the subordinate power of observing the relations of number.

Number. — Dr. Whewell refers our conceptions of number to the "sense of successiveness;" that is, to the faculty by which we discover the relations of time. He admits " that we seem to apprehend number without an act of memory, without, also, any reference to time; but he maintains that this seeming

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instantaneousness of perception is merely an excessive rapidity and quick succession of perceptions, acts so familiar to us as to have become unconscious. Children and rude savages must use an effort to reckon even their five fingers, and they do it by the help of memory. On the other hand, there are persons who can count with dozens as rapidly as others can with units ; a profi- ciency wliich is but the result of a natural aptitude or habit. We may conclude, therefore, that when we appear to catch a small number, by a single glance of the eye, we do, in fact, count the units of it in a regular though very brief succession. Another proof of this theory is that, when counting very slowly, we are apt to forget, in the intervals, what was the last figure, and mis- count. Now, the nature of the process of counting is the same whether slow or fast, as there is no definite speed at which the faculties are changed ; and, therefore, memory, being required in some cases, will be required in all." This may all be admitted. There may be, in our perceptions of number, an act of memory and a perception of successiveness ; but there is something more ; tiiere must be a general power of discovering the relations of quantity. To the faculty of discovering the relations of quan- tity, must be referred all operations by which we discover equal- ity, difference, or proportions of any kind, in numbers.

VII. Aetive Property. — We cannot know objects, either men- tal or material, except as exercising properties. The mind is ever changing under the influence of the emotions or of the will, and always properties are exercised. It is of these pro- perties, in connection with one or more of which we must always see the mind, that we make pro|)er distinctions and classifications. As to matter, there is a diversity of opinions, some representing it as mere force or action, others denying it all active properties. Of these opinions, the one is as false as the other. By its properties of attraction, chemical affinity, etc. , matter manifests itself plainly as being active; but it also shows itself to have passive qualities, inasmuch as no particle of matter can exercise independent power. Its action is always upon an- other form of matter, and never self-acting.

VIII. Cause and Effect. — The principle of cause and effect is

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implied in all our knowledge of the past and also of the future. It is not the same with uniformity of nature ; for there may be some exceptions to the uniformity of nature : e. g., in the rising of the sun and changing of the seasons ; but there can be none to the law of cause and effect, and yet there cannot be uniformity in nature without the principle of causation.

Causation implies the idea of })0wer obtained originally from the will and muscular sense — the intuitive knowledge of substance exercising power. We never know of a causal influence being exercised, except by an object having being and substantial exist- ence. We decide and must decide that every eifect proceeds from one or more substances having potency. If a tree is felled to the ground, if the salt we saw dry a minute ago is now melted, we not only look for a cause, but for a cause in something that had being and property, say, in the wind blowing on the tree or in water mingling with the salt. If this world be an effect, we look for its cause in a Being possessed of power.

This doctrine of cause and effect may be considered object- ively, i. e., what it is in itself; or subjectively, i. e., what faculty perceives it.

A. Objective.

1. Causation implies substance (body and mind) with proper- ties, and we are therefore ahvays carried back to a substance.

2. All causation is dual or plural, implying two or more agents acting on one another. We say that a certain plant was killed by frost ; but when we spread out the full phenomenon, we find that the true cause was not the mere frost or cold, but the state of the plant and the state of the atmosphere combined, for it is only when these unite, that the plant is killed ; with a stronger plant, or with less cold, there might have been no such result.

But there is also a duality or plurality in the effect, which con- sists of a change both in the plant and atmosphere. A picture falls from a wall and breaks a table below ; the cause, the pro- ductive, efficient cause, consists both in the picture and table; but the effect consists also of the picture and the table in a new

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state, the picture having lost its momentum and the table being broken.

In most cases we call one the main cause, the other the condi- tion. (Malebranche makes them cause and occasion.) But the condition is a part of the cause which will invariably produce the effect in question. So, too, if we consider the whole effect, the incident effect must be taken account of, as well as the main effect.

B. Subjective.

Let us consider how we may discover the relation of cause and effect; look at the eye, which observes objective causation. Is it experiential, i. e., gathered from experience by induction, or is it intuitive ?

An effect is either a new substance or a change in an old one. Now in looking at the effect, are we sure that there is a cause ? J. S. Mill maintains that it is all the result of experience, that there may be no cause and effect beyond the limit of observation. But this is insufficient to explain the mental phenomenon, be- cause we believe not only that there is a cause, but there must be a cause ; but no possible length or uniformity of experience could give us a conviction of its necessity. I might have seen A and B, this star and that star together for a thousand or a million times ; but this would not, and it ought not, to compel me to believe that they have been, shall be and must forever be to- gether, though I Avould no doubt expect or think it possible.

We can believe that two things which have been united since creation began may never again be united ; but we can never be made to believe or decide that a change can take place without a cause. We can believe that night and day might henceforth be disconnected, and that from a certain day there would be perpetual day or perpetual night on the earth ; but we could never be made to decide, the causes which produced day and night being tlie same, that there ever could be any other effect than day and night.

The gap between experience and certainty is altogether over- looked by some ; tliere is a residuum in this phenomenon which cannot be explained by mere experience.

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Hence, we conclude that the causal judgment is intuitive; it is able to bear all the tests thereof:

1. It is self-evident ; It carries its evidence in itself. It is undeniable that the instinctive seeking for a cause is as strong in a child as in a man, as invariable in the rudest savage as in the most civilized being.

2. It is a necessary and fundamental belief. We are con- strained to believe it.

3. It is universal, bein»^, a belief among men brought up in such entirely different circumstances and influences.

We are not compelled to seek out an infinite series of causes. The proper statement of the causal judgment, is not that every- thing must have a cause (which would make the Creator an effect,) but that everything which begins to he must have a cause. (For full discussion of this matter, see McCosh's Intuitions, pp. 228-244.) Psychological Nature of the Discursive or Logical Faculties. In the discursive operations we proceed from something given or allowed to something derived therefrom. The steps by which all discursive operations of the mind are carried on are three, viz. :

I. Simple Apprehension. II. Judgment. III. Keasoning.

I. Simple Apprehension. By this, we apprehend objects or obtain notions. These notions are of three kinds, viz. :

/^ a. Singular Notions. They are obtained by sense-perception and self-consciousness, and are called up by these immediately, when the objects are present, and by memory when the objects are absent. No exercise of the comparative powers is involved.

6. Abstract Notions are'' froincoiii prehension. They are no- tions of attributes.

c. General Notions are formed by the faculties of-diwKBc- 4a|^resembla^»ices, whereby objects having common marks or characteristics are grouped together in one class.

II. Logical Judgment. We compare two conceptions, or an intuition and a conception, with a view of declaring their agree-

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ment, disagreement or identity. There are two kinds of judg-

ment-^g^JBdfiMM*Sife'*»^»j ■^^h^^'^^^^^^i^'J; ^ 9-^ "^ *^og barks, as a judgment in comprehension, means that the dog has the attribute of barking ; as a judgment in extension, means that he belongs to the class of barking animals.

III. Keasoning. Philosophical logicians say that reasoning is the same mental operation as judgment, the difference being that we have three terms instead of two ; we compare two terms by means of a third. Reasoning \n comprehension_.may be ex- changed for reasoning m extension and vice versa.

General Remarks Upon the Comparative Faculties.

1. These faculties are universally characteristic of humanity, being found in a rudimentary degree in children and madmen. Indeed, madmen can often reason excellently from premises ; but the premise is usually a dominant idea borne in upon them by lunacy.

2. They seek for their appropriate objects of operation.

3. They are admirably suited to the state in which we are placed. We can conceive of a world in which the relations in no way correspond to the faculties. But, as it is, there is a beau- tiful resemblance between the internal and external worlds ; be- tween the faculties and the phenomena revealed by the senses. Hence men are at home in the world.

4. There is a beautiful correspbndence between the mind and the object thought about. The Eleatics and Hegelians say that this arises from the unity of thought and being. This, however, is not true, nor as Spencer saysJ is it the result of a gradual ac- customing process. There must have been an original adapta- tion. It was so created ; things are so arranged that the mind contemplating is suited to the thing contemplated. The relation is only one of correspondence ; the eye suits the light which falls on it, and the light is so constituted as to affect the eye so as to produce a rational result; but the rays of light have not made the eye ; nor the mind, the laws of nature.

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5. These faculties differ widely in the ease of different indi- viduals. This may arise from the intensity of the primitive cognition or native taste and talent (talent is taste in exercise.)

6. All these eight relations, with one exception, are to be found both in mental and material objects. The exception is the relation of space. This is an argument against materialism. There are thus points of affinity between mind and body.

SUMMARY.

First, we have the simple cognitions ; then, ideas reproducing in old or in new forms; thirdly, relations are discovered among cognitions or ideas. We apprehend extension and energy by sense perception; mind and its properties hy self-consciousness ; the idea of time and the infinite by reproduction; the relations of events, quantity and causation, etc., by coriiparison.

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III -THE MOTIVE POWERS.

Cognitive poAvers give us knowledge and ideas. Motive poM^ers raise up desires and lead to action. The motive powers are /"i

I. Moral Power or Conscience. II. Emotional. ^i^^it^u ^ "

III. Will. ^i^ll^

CHAPTER VI.

I.— THE MORAL POWEE. ,

Of this power Ave think, when we speak of conscience. The first question which we must have settled in our minds is, whether there is such a thing as a moral power; that is, a separate faculty of the human mind devoted exclusively to the cognition of moral good and evil. There can be no doubt that we have this idea of good and evil. We see a son maltreating his father, and we at once rise in indignation against him and sympathize with the injured parent. But whence this irresist- ible impulse to reproacii the son and assist the father? Whence that sense of the impropriety which we observe in the conduct of the son ? In a word, whence this idea of good and evil ? It is impossible that this idea, which checks us in the wrong, haunts us with self-accusations, inspires us with awe in the Divine Presence, should be derived from a sensatjon of pain or pleasure, as Lod^e affirms, accompanying certain actions, and from the reflection upon this sensation ; nor can it be the result of a mere action of memory or a knowledge of causation : it is different, in both kind and degree, from all the ideas derived from this source. In short, it is evident that conscience is a

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separate faculty of the raiud ; differing, indeed, as do all other faculties of the mind, in strength and sensitiveness in different individuals, but never entirely absent. This opinion is upheld by the observations which have been made with regard to the universality of the faculty ; appearing, as it does, in the young- est child, the rudest savage, and even, in the form of instincts and tendencies, in the lower animals.

It was supposed that very low savages would have no sense as to right and wrong. The matter was put to the test by a missionary, who asked one of these degraded creatures what he would think if, going past his neighbor's cow when she had fallen and hurt herself, he would not help her. He said he would think he was doing something very Bad. Moreover, the feeling of gratitude and filial attachment are sentiments com- mon even to the lowest races.

It is this power which, beginning and continuing its action from earliest infancy, makes man, in whatever condition he may be, a responsible agent ; for where there is no law, there can be no transgression and no responsibility. Paul represents all men as being under a natural law, and as sinners because they have broken it. Tliere are only two classes of thinkers who deny the existence of a moral power of the human mind, viz. :

1. Those who take a low view of human nature, and account for all man's moral convictions by attributing them to a law of selfishness and utility. To these we would answer that man has, in his own nature, a principle which enables him to dis- cover what is right and what is wrong.

2. Those who maintain that man cannot appreciate moral distinctions separate from what they are taught by revealed religion. These persons should consider that revealed truth requires and implies, not only common-sense intelligence, but also a moral faculty to which to address itself.

Aided by the manifest weakness of these objections, we may safely look upon the moral power as a separate faculty of the human mind, and accept as true the suggestion it offers to the mind, viz., the idea of a divine existence, of our own accounta- bility, and of a judgment, nc^t discharged on earth, but awaiting

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ns in the life to come. The observation of these facts gave Kant the conviction of future existence and the divine being. Before entering upon an examination of the psychological nature of the moral faculty, it is necessary to state some neg-*- tive propositions in order to avoid embarrassing objections.

I. The decision of the conscience does not make an action good or bad. As the touch does not make the body solid, so conscience is merely the organ through which the impression of existing good or evil is conveyed to the mind. As the eye may become diseased and lose its clearness or convey an untrue image to the understanding, so the moral faculty may be perverted or depraved, and its judgments be misleading rather than guiding to the right. When such is the case the conscience is suscepti- ble of rectification ; but we must not forget that all correction in this matter proceeds upon the supposition that there really is an original power capable of taking in ideas of moral good and evil. The moral law makes the action good or evil.

II. The possession of conscience does not render any person virtuous. It is not by discovering the difference between good and evil, but by avoiding the wrong and choosing the right, by obedience to the laws of conscience, that a man becomes virtu- ous. Indeed, there is no responsible agent so fallen and debased that he is deprived of conscience in its essential form ; but as little as the admirer of heroism is necessarily a hero, so little is he w^ho discovers what is right — discovers, it may be, much against his inclination — a righteous man. The novelist, the poet, the tragedian, all appeal to this faculty ; and many a per- son weeps over a scene on the stage or a fictitious calamity in a novel, whose feelings are never reached by the real misfortunes of humanity : he admires the good and great, and goes out to sin.

III. The conscience may become perverted and be^^thg means of mjsleading us. This fact has been appealed to as a contra- diction to the doctrine that the conscience is a native faculty. But with numerous circumstances to prove the contrary, there is no reason to believe that a man's native faculty is incapable of perversion. The wickedness of a man may react upon his

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conscience, blunt its acuteness, and direct its judgments into false channels. Butler calls the conscience a reflex power; and as such it is dependent upon other faculties, apt to make unfair representations and obtain false judgments. The will may have gone astray and held facts before the moral faculty in a light calculated to convey a false impression ; the natural consequence is an erroneous decision from the tribunal of conscience. Thus it may be easily explained how certain savage tribes can con- vince themselves that they are doing right when they kill their old people; but the very fact that all men seek to justify their actions by some means or other, and to convince themselves that they have done as every sound-minded and well-principled man ought to have done, is a proof of the existence of a moral faculty in the mind.

We now proceed to discuss its

PSYCHOLOGICAT. NATURE.

I. The conscience is of the nature of a cognitive poiver.

In this respect, it is analogous to sense-perception and self- consciousness ; and it has been called the moral sense. Con- science makes known nothing new to the mind ; it merely dis- closes certain qualities of objects already known or certain voluntary states of self. However, this is only one side of the moral power, and that the most insignificant. Locke had ad- mitted the existence of an internal and external sense, and under these heads he had forced conscience. Shaftesbury and Francis Hutchinson, seeing the insufficiency of this classifica- tion and still unwilling to introduce a name which would be in- compatible with the entire Lockeian system, added the moral power under the name of moral sense. Degrading as this nomenclature is to the high nature of the conscience, it is still descriptive of one of its powers.

II. It implies obligation..

a. Authoritatively demands that certain actions be performed.

b. That certain actions ousht not to be done.

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c. That the performance of the first is approvable, coniinend- able, rewardable.

d. That the performance of the others is condemnable and punishable.

III. Involves the idea of Imc.

In pronouncing these judgments (see II.), the power takes the form of a law and prescribes. It is, indeed, in its nature a law, but not like gravitation or the law of chemical affinity ; like the edicts of a government, it commands " with pain."

IV. Gives the idea of sin.

Judgment takes place on tiie basis of our moral cognitions and beliefs. Tliese furnish us the material ; and, comparison having taken place, the judgment is pronounced by the moral faculty. Hence we distinguish between greater and less sins.

_3u— ■''-^^« It is a motive, moves to action as implying obligation.

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VI. It is attended with emotion.

Feels approbation and disapproval. This is the essential ele- ment in the conscience.

"^JT VII. Claims authority over the whole voluntary state of the mind.

It looks upon an action or a quality and judges them appeti- ble or inappetible. Judgment and emotion tluis go hand in hand, and to this fact Boussac traces the connection between man and virtue. It thus claims authority over all our volun- tary states, and every determination of the mind to do or undo falls under its jurisdiction.

^yl 1\- VIII. It is above the other powers as an arbiter and judge.

IX. There are beliefs involved in the e.vercise of the moral poioer. \

These beliefs refer to things not immediately under our notice. When our own acts fall under the observation of the conscience, this is merely cognition : but when actions or say-

ings of others, not before us, come before the conscience, their existence must be believed in ; so we believe that benevolence is good, etc. The first, however, is the basis of the second, and the distinction is of value for the sake of accuracy only.

The necessity arises of reviewing the names which have been given to this important faculty of the mind, each of which is intended to convey an idea of its nature and functions. Hutch- inson and Shaftesbury call it the "moral sense," so as to reduce it to a mere faculty of perception, a self-consciousness and sense perception. Mackintosh goes a step farther, and accounts for it by association of ideas, somewhat as Locke derives it from sen- sation and reflection. Buddington speaks of it under the name of " moral reason." Kant calls it " practical reason." (Cate- gorical Imperative.) Butler, 1726, discusses it in his usual thorough manner and calls it a "faculty of reflection." The best term undoubtedly, and one which attaches to it no particu- lar theory, is conscience, conscientia, auueioTjac^ ; a term which first appears in Antonine, and, singularly enough, in none of the great Greek philosophers.

The moral faculty, like all other })owers of the mind, gives us a separate idea, the idea of moral good and evil. If we glance at the various theories as to the source of our ideas, we at once perceive the insufficiency of Hobbes' doctrine of sensa- tion, and of Locke's theory of sensation and reflection. This idea cannot come from a sensation, for none of the six senses will give TO deov. Nor can it be derived from reflection ; for reflection can s^e only what is already acquired and stored away. The previous faculties have given us the true, this one gives us the good. These are not the same ; for there may be mistakes without sin, and sins without intellectual weakness. A chari- table action is far nobler than a mere intellectual one ; but there is no inconsistency between them.

CONSCIENCE IN ACTUAL EXERCISE.

Considering conscience, in actual exercise, it may take various forms.

I. Slumbei'ing (somnolent) conscience, which does not wish

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to be aroused. It does not discover the evil against which it ought to warn us; it is a sleeping watch-dog. II. Accusing conscience. This is apt to be felt even in slight restraints ; but when man goes out of his proper course, it is even more decisive. III. Excusing conscience, in whicli not only the Moral Sense but also the Heart and Will raise up exculpatory thoughts.

a. There is a Icmi Avritten on the heart.

b. The conscience {(T'juicor^m^) comes in with its joint witness.

c. Together with the thoughts {?.0Yc(Tiwi) eitlier excuses or accuses (Rom. 2 ; le5.)

These internal discussions may take a variety of sliapes. The conscience may attempt to drown them. The effort will be to exculpate, wiiich is accomplished by the tiioughts.

IV. Perverted conscience. The conscience may become con- fused in consequence of these internal disputes and see things wrongly ; as the eye looking obliquely. Fanatics and persecutors have often been conscientious, but wrongly so. So the Molly M^giiires may commit crimes in the interest of their societies ; so the trickeries of busi- ness men, in a good cause it may be. V. Troubled conscience. Here there is a warfare, in whicli neither side has gained the victory. The soul becomes sick and wasted ; the sins come back into the recollection with terrible power. yi. Blunted conscience. This is the enduring effect of long conflict. It loses all sensibility of touch. It is "seared as with a hot iron." VII. Pacified conscience which involves questions of Ethics. How, when sin has been committed, can the conscience become pacified ? Repentance, confession, reformation, reparation, when evil has been done, are all necessary. Men instinctively look about for expiation of some sort. But even then conscience may not be pacified. The law requires love and obedience ; that law being broken, expiation is necessary, yet it is not satisfactory. We are

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left in shadows, and it is then that the religion of Christ appears and makes all clear ; for natural religion can tell no way of pacifying conscience. VIII. Purified conscience. The conscience looking to the law becomes purified. Certain men are thus perfectly trustworthy. When a man has met evil and mastered it, no further struggle is necessary ; the temptation ceases. IX. Approving conscience. It may take the form of a self-righteous spirit. But a truly good man is kept from this by his humbleness. Every upright man will be more in fear of losing the approval of his con- science than that of his neighbor. This lies at the bottom of self-independence. An evil conscience makes the coward ; an approving conscience strengthens the martyr.

CHAPTER VII.

II. THE EMOTIONAL POWEE.

Suppose that four young men, apparently alike in all resi)ects, are sitting in a car. At a station, the death of a certain other man is announced ; all four hear the inteWrgeiice, but each is affected differently. One, a foreig»e1i^ remains stolid. One merely listens ; he has never kn^svti the deceased, but any death is something to him. The tmrd is struck by the words of the announcement and is evidently sorry ; he was acquainted with the person of Avhose death he here learns. The fourth is deeply affected by the news, and his countenance bears the ex- pression of sorrow and grief; he is a brother of the dead man. Whence arises this difference in the manner of receiving the intelligence, which, for one as for another, was the mere state- ment of a fact? We must evidently account for it by a native cherished affection, present in all the men, but in different de- grees of intensity. These powers, which, though separate from other faculties, are yet dependent upon them, are con- comitants of other states, and, pre-supposing the knowledge of other sources, reveal no new ideas. There are, however, several elements involved in the exercise of the emotional power, which have an important part in the internal history of man. There are (1) an appetence; (2) an idea; (3) conscious emotion — excite- ment, with attraction or repugnance ; (4) organic affection.

I. Appetence. — This is the motive principle or spring of action, and lies at the base of all emotions. In one case, it is the noble love of a friend or brother ; in another, it is a more material consideration, arising from principles of selfishness, revenge, &c.

II. Idea. — An essential condition of all emotion is the idea or apprehension of something as being appetible or inappetible^ as -piiobubk; to gratify or disappoint ^Si appetence. When a

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triend is taken from us, we grieve at his loss, because the native appentence, which drives us to associate with him, is disappointed. Tlie emotion arises as soon as we receive an idea of or realize the loss we have sustained.

III. Conscious emotion. — The excitement is that which comes most under the consciousness of the mind. It is, in fact, the "most present" thing. Nevertheless, it is dependent upon the two previously mentioned elements.

IV. Organic Affection is regulated by the nervous tempera- ment of the individual. In some, the grief bursts out in tears; in others, not the less sincere, it is re2)ressed.

We will now discuss and accurately classify these four ele- ments :

I. Ajypetences, appetentke. — In all emotion, there is an appe- tence of some kind, and, though it may not be constantly before the consciousness, it yet acts as a stimulating cause. These appentences may be divided into —

A. Original or Primary Appetences.

B. Acquired Appetences. — These we are constantly adding to the former.

A. Primary Appetences. — Those which act spontaneously, and which men, voluntarily or involuntarily, are inclined to exer- cise. These appetences are not selfish, but social ; and flow from one mind to another. It may be posited that whatever we contemplate as securing pleasure is appetible, and the con- trary seems to be such as ought to be avoided. It must not be thought, however, as the vulgar, sensational schools of philoso- phy are inclined to assume, that this is the only motive influ- encing the determinations of the human will ; but it is one which asserts its right. Moreover, there are certain appetences in man, partly bodily, partly mental, which crave for gratifica- tion independently of the pleasure to be derived from their own indulgence. Bodily appetences are appetites, as for food, drink, rest, sex. The mental appetences which appear to be original are those for knowledge, esteem, power, society, property.

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Primary Appetences.

1. Love of pleasure and aversion to pain.

2. For happiness and against unhappiness of felloAv-men.

3. Personal attachments.

4. Native tastes and talents.

5. Bodily appetites (originate in body, become mental.)

6. Love of society. This is an appetence which man may resist with the help of other tendencies. In the fact that this appetence is so universal and so effective, however, lay the sup- posed merit of the hermit ; he showed that he had conquered at least one of his worldly desires, that of congenial companv. The tendency to long for society is the result of other feelini^rs springing from the position in which man is placed ou earth,, and its effects, in private and in public, are universally benefi- cent and ennobling.

7. Love of esteem. This desire, which Ruskiii calls the "passion of genius,", is apparent in all men. There are few persons of mind and energy who do not wish to leave a name behind them : some, to leave it printed in tke rock ; some, in the less enduring bark of the tree ; some, in the uncertain sur- face of the sandj ^rvve, . Lw- Ov3^ H O-Ll

8. Love of power. This desire exists in all men, and is apt, upon favorable conditions, to become a deep, unruly passion. It increases with gratification ; so that every tyrant is tiie sub- ject of a more tyrannical power than any which he can exercise. The love of power, universal as it is, is the uniting element of the human race.

9. Acquisitiveness. Many philosophers have resolved this into the love of power. It is possible that the analysis is cor- rect ; at all events, this tendency itself wields a most powerful influence over the minds and actions of men. The eae-er accu- rnulation of wealth is not strictly the result of natural tenden- cies, but of long habits of economy; and though it may have many evil sides, it is certainly advantageous for the progress of civilization.

10. ^listhetic feeling, which grows as men grow in civilization.

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11. Moral sentiment. . j^

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B. Secondary Appetences ; that is, such as have grown upon and imply previous ones. While we regard the tendencies above enumerated, and we may add the love of the beautiful and of the good, as having power over all human minds and as existing from the very nature of man's condition, there are some tendencies which are but degenerations or corroborations of the primary ones and which, under certain associations of ideas (pleasure, etc.,) will at last become supreme, and triumph ^over all the rest by becoming the end, not the means, of life.

Such a secondary appetence is the love of money. It is not a natural tendency ; but, because money is a means of gratifying the love of property, which is a native appetence, money becomes an olyect whose acquirement and the love of whose possession are passions in some minds. A certain man is said to have died easy, after he had cheated the undertaker with whom he had been bargaining for his burial. Secondary appetences may be inherited and may become primary in effect.

II. Idea. — In all emotion, there must be an idea of the •object, either as being fitted to gratify or to disappoint an appetence. The mere existence of the appetence is not sufficient to call forth emotion ; there must be an idea which rouses the appetence to come forth, causing conscious emotion to follow. If the object be actually present, the idea is immediately given by perception; if absent, it is the result of re-presentation (phantasm). To prove that an idea is necessary in order to any emotion, let any man suddenly, while in such a state, arrest himself; he will find that there is an idea in his mind, which is no sooner banished than the emotion ceases. For example, I hear that my friend has fallen down a precipice and been killed. I am roused to the highest emotion by the idea of my unfortunate friend. While hurrying to the spot, I hear that it was not my friend who fell, but some person strange to me. My emotion

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rapidly decreases. Before reaching the place, I hear tliat the man is not injured; the idea entirely disappears, and I walk off coolly.

It is a curious fact that we are capable of grieving over a fictitious object. It is not necessary to explain this, as some have done, by saying that we have, for the time being, a belief in the real existence of what we are reading ; for as there can be no emotion without an idea, so a mere idea suffices to call forth emotion, and the mere image of a person in trouble is enough to call forth our sincerest compassion. But while actual belief is not required in order to emotion, it is nevertheless indispen- sable that the picture should not be such as to lose its ])lausi- bility; otherwise unbelief will be apt to distract the imagination and thus render emotion impossible.

It is a matter by no means satisfactorily settled, whether emotion caused by fictitious scenes or objects is beneficial to the soul ; or whether it does not act like bodily stimulant, which, not carrying substantial nourishment to the physical frame and forcibly producing the same result, at last undermines the con- stitution and eventually makes it unfit to assimilate strengthen- ing food. Will a person, who has been filled with exaggerated images and representations of romance, be sincerely affected when he meets with the more common-place realities of life?

Thus we see how feeling or emotion is to be aroused ; it can- not be compelled, by voluntary determination, in ourselves or others. But still, are the feelings of ourselves and others entirely beyond our control ? Are their laws so utterly uncom- mandable ? Man has no direct power over his emotions ; but, indirectly, they are always subject to his will : he can call up the idea or representation, which brings along with it the emotion. In the same way he is enabled to restrain his flow of feeling ; he may banish the idea which has opened the gates, and re})lace it with one more becoming and approi)riate. Thus, even in the thoughts of his brain, man becomes responsible for deficiency and excess.

As lias been seen, the idea may be of a fictitious object ; but it must always be of an object or objects contemplated in the

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concrete. Emotion is called forth by singulars only, never by abstractions or generalizations. The idea is always concrete, because the mind has no power to image abstractions. We speak of loving the good, or admiring the beautiful ; but taking these words as denoting abstractions, the expression is utterly false. We love individual goodness, i. e., a good person or deed ; we admire individual beauty, i. e., a beautiful painting or scene or person ; but no abstract idea of excellence or loveliness has ever been able to call forth true enthusiasm. Rhetoric, especially, ought to make use of this fact : showing no feeling, calls forth no feeling ; exclamations cannot make up for its deficiency. Herein lies the wonderful strength and force with which we are struck when we read the writings of the Evange- lists;, and the same law precludes the possibility of the existence of a religion without a personal deity.

Remaeks.

1. The Idea is singular, not abstract. — Compassion is called forth, not by abstract sorrow, but by the misfortune of sentient beings. This is expressed by Aristotle's phantasm ; he says that there is no feeling without phantasm, that all ideas do not rouse emotion, that we must appeal to our appetences.

2. Feeling is roused by the idea of individual objects. — The phantasm is always individual, the mental picture of man is always of some individual man ; yet abstractions and generali- zations may give rise to emotions, because derived from or associated with individuals.

3. Feeling is roused by the idea of the jiersonal God. — We cannot love the good apart from a good object. Emotion can only be .evoked by the idea of a living, personal, and benevolent God. The inspired writers are, therefore, more philosophical than those speculators, [e. g., pantheists) who set up an abstract standard.

4. In rhetoric, feeling is excited by the jyreseniation of an individual object. — We must convince the judgment and will, if we would excite feeling ; but it may be necessary to warm

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the heart. This is best accomplished by i)resenting some individual case.

5. By concrete language. — Language is first synthetic then more analytic; it is then more suited to philosophic accuracy, but less adapted to poetry and emotion.

6. Feeling is called forth by imaginary scenes.

III. Excitement. — This conscious emotion is always joined with a feeling of attachment or repugnance ; this is a state very different from the state of emotion, or rather motion, in which the mind always is when under the influence of feeling: it is the latter, with the former superadded. This excitement is that one of the four elements of emotion which most frequently comes under our notice, and it is the basis and ultimate condition of choice.

IV. Organic Affection. — Physiology throws little light upon the manner in which these affections are brought about, and upon the question whether there is a special organ of emotion, and, if so, where it is situated. It is probable that there is such an organ and that its seat is the cerebrum, but not in the gray matter. The base of the cerebrum is the seat of the organic sensation, and that of the emotions, according to Sir Ciias. Bell, is probably near by. Most emotions, however, affect the respiratory organs and the nerves, which spread over the face, and acted U})on by the passions, give expression to the countenance. It ap])ears, also, that a moderate degree of emo- tion is good for mind and l)ody ; but high sentiment or feeling, unless relieved by action must prove dangerous.

It is curious to observe the effect of emotion upon the bodily organism : fear and joy affect the heart ; disappointment and envy, the stomach and bowels; malice and envy, the liver. The passions manifest themselves, in their effects upon the bodily organs, thus :

Fear prevents the blood from flowing, and produces paleness. Joy quickens the circulation of the blood ; the heart beats loudly, the eyes glisten, smiles spread over the countenance, sometimes tears burst forth, sometimes the hands are involuntarily clapped. Sorrow produces violent agitation and restlessness of the body,

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passionate beating of the breast, tearing of the hair, and violent tears; lassitude and dejected countenance follow. Anger causes the body to assume a threatening attitude ; the face becomes red, the eyes flash, the muscles become strained. Wonder first takes away the power of utterance, then causes frequent exclamations ; the eyes are fixed upon the object, or roll around vaguely searching for information, and the mouth hangs open.

Note I. Recapitulation. — It must be remembered, with re- gard to the appetences, that as tliey can lie hidden in the breast for years and years, they are the agents which cause sentiments to continue from day to day, from year to year. Moreover, in regard to the idea, it must not be forgotten that it is always indispensable in order to call forth emotion. Thus we explain the indefinite longing in youth ; the pro- pensities have not yet found a suitable and well- defined object. In maturity, the appetences have found their spheres, and the waters, which once would flow this way and that way, have now found their stated channel. Furthermore, there must be consciously before the mind, accompanied with attachment or repugnance, an excitement. In this form, instinctive attachments proceed, but always subject to the will. Note II. Classifications. — The emotions are so numerous that, a classification becomes desirable, All our emo- tions go in pairs, so that to every emotion con- templating the good, in the sense of appetible, there corresponds an emotion contemplating the evil in the sense of inappetible : hence, well-defined as this line of division may be, there is is no ground here upon which to base a rational classification. A convenient fundamentum divisionis is atfoi'ded by considering whether the emotion concerns things animate or inanimate. Hence we derive the follow- ing division :

I. Emotions contemplating animate objects; that is, ourselves and other persons : for man is capable

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not only of interest in himself, but he may also regard as appetible what is advantageous to others. The highest of these outward emotions is undoubt- edly the love of God. There is a sub-division to this head according as the emotions, contemplating animate objects, look to the present, the past, or the future. (Dr. Brown's classification.)

1. Immediate Emotions; thai is, emotions aris- ing from present influences. Such are the affections of sympathy with others in their joy or sorrow, the latter being the stronger.

2. Retrospective Emotions ; that is, emotions arising from the contemplation of good or evil done in time past. When Ave think of the good as having passed away, the feeling is regret or dis- appointment. This is somewhat different from the regret, or rather remorse, which we feel when Ave see evil as having come upon us through our own faults. When we think of good having emanated from ourselves, we feel self-complacency ; this, if indulged, engenders self-righteousness and vanity. A remembrance of good from others causes in us a feeling of gratitude ; of evil, anger and revenge.

3. Prospective emotions ; that is, such as are pro- duced by a combination of good or evil about to come upon ourselves or upon others in whom Ave feel interested. These emotions are, anticipation, dread, fear, terror, apprehension, hope, expectation.

II. Emotions called forth by the contemplation of inanimate things ; that is, the beautiful, the pictur- esque, the ludicrous, the sublime.

a. Beauty. The science Avhich seeks to formal- ize these feelings, and, by the rules thus obtained, to judge of objects in nature or art, has been called aesthetics, acffdr^ac:. It is more appropriately called kalology or kalleosophy ; that is, the science of the lovely : for beauty is not merely the outgroAvth of a certain association of ideas, as Avas maintained by

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the Scottish school, but it is the really existng beauty which starts the association of ideas. Beauty is of two kinds :

1. Physical Beauty, which, whenever present, puts the mind in a state of emotion. It manifests itself in —

a. Sound — the harmony or discord of music.

/?. Forms, between whose symmetrical lines and the undulations of sound there is an analogy.

y. Colors, in whose composition the complementary ones are always beautiful beside each other. Red, yellow, blue, make a beautiful com- position, because green, which is the complement of red, is composed of blue and yellow.

Red. ■'

2. Intellectual Beauty in cei'tain harmonies and proportions as viewed by the mind.

6. The Picturesque. This, as it has been rightly defined, is everything which gratifies the phantasy.

c. The Sublime. This, as all philosophers agree, is whatever impresses one with the idea of the vast. " Two things," says Kant, " are sublime — the ocean and the law of God."

d. The Ludicrous. The essential requirement is that a thing, in order to be ludicrous, must follow another thing of such a nature that it was not ex- pected. Incongruity is implied in both witand humor.

The idea whicli we derive from the i)ower of emotion is that of the lovely and the hateful ; the one as desirable, the other as to be avoided. There are in nature certain objects to which we are attached ; these we call beautiful : others repel us, and we call them hateful. It is important that man should possess aifection in order rightly to understand the nature of God as a Divine Being, capable of aifection, as is expressed in the doctrine that " God is love."

CHAPTER VIII.

iii._WiLL. [^^'pJniAluM.ija^^

Note. — Wlien dwelling on consciousness, we saw that it was not generally admitted to be a faculty; yet we were obliged to pronounce it such. So with the power or faculty of volition, we are again obliged to oppose a certain class of ]>hilosopher& by maintaining that it is a separate faculty of the mind. But its relation to the other powers which we employ in all our mental exercises, is one of supremacy, as that of consciousness is one of constant co-operation; hence, will and consciousness are, indeed, the highest faculties of the human mind.

The common use of the language bears testimony to the con viction, which possesses all men, that the discursive and motj^v powers are sephimte from each other. We refer to the^ail^nt and still comraoiiM^tinction between head and hearj^r'adisti no- tion, however, whichXis difficult to draw witl^'-^ccuracy, since, in popular language, tli\heart includ^^Jfeculties, such as the imagination, which ought t^e attj>tnited to the head; while, on the other hand, it does not^Wln to embrace the emotions' Thus, when we ask whetli.er'religmhvis a matter of the head or heart, we must stoop-to'definitions.^^^he heart, in the scrip- tural sense, meu^ whatsoever passes on \^^u, and it embraces consciencej^^etliotions and will, besides the di^rsive reasoning faculti^><in this sense, religion is, undoubtedly^ matter of the heai*f: In the sense, however, in which we are wont to use the heart, religion is certainly not merely a matter of emotion and feeling.

I.— The Psy

1 . It cannot be resolvetl\into tion, he reduced to any otlu and will are all ^cloSelv com

^LOGICAL Nature of the Will.

iher poicer nor, by combina-

\Qwer. — While conscience, emotion

^heir difference is one of p

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kind as well as of degree ; and the ideas which they convey are peculiar to each one, respectively. Will associates itself with every faculty, but they are all inferior to it and cannot represent it ; they may institute but they cannot constitute it. 2. The essential element in will is choice ; that is, the power of choosing or rejecting (o})tative power.) When one or more objects are placed before us, the emotions give us a feeling of attachment or repugnance toward them ; but it is exclusively the operation of the will which makes us accept or reject them. When the eat- ing of the forbidden fruit was opposed to God's command, man looked at it and admired it without transgression ; for this was merely emotion. At last appeared the wish, and finally the determinatibn, to have it ; " and the voluntary faculty of the mind gave birth to sin. In all this, the will was associated with emotion ; but so distinct it is from this faculty, that the connection is by no means necessary : thus, the will required for study is utterly free from emotion. To express this truth, most philosophers distinguish between desire and volition. Desire is here synonymous with mere emotion, and can pertain to things which never were, nor can be, in existence. It proves a distinction between wish and volition : in the former there is merely a longing for the possession of a certain object; in the latter there is a well-defined determination to take a step toward gaining it. Both of these elements, however, belong to the constitution of the will — the operative faculty. Wishes and emotional attachments, moreover, seem to run into each other; for emotions ought naturally to produce wishes. While, there- fore, the distinction between emotions and will is one of kind, that between desire and volition is merely one of quantity and circumstances : hence, the former distinction is of greater im- portance than the latter; that is, the distinction is important which places, on one side, emotions, and, on the other, will, in- cluding desire and volition. As to the moral qualities of the one or the other, mere feeling is neither virtuous nor vicious ; but wishes and desires may be holy or blamable, according as they are exercises of the will.

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a. It may exercise influence over the senses. It has ah-eadj been made clear that distance by the eye and direction by the nose or ear are acquired ; but in order to this, there must be attention and exercise of the will.

b. Our self-consciousness. Its influence here is very marked. We are indeed conscious of all our states ; but to observe them more closely, we must use the will. We owe to the will the power of attention, by which, when a number of objects are brought before the mind by any one or by a combination of the senses or by self-consciousness, we may single out one and give it our entire observation.

c. Over the reproductive powers and the train of ideas. Here the power of the will manifests itself either directly, by keeping an idea or feeling before the mind, or indirectly, by summoning up a certain idea, which will bring with it a train of associations. And it can banish these by plunging into another train. Hence arises the distinction between dvd/xy/^mr, the voluntary recollection, and /Jti^rj/r/^, the spontaneously operat- ing and recalling memory.

d. Over the judging and comparative powers. "The heart sways the head" is an old saying, and it is true. In all judg- ment, there is comparison. Now, the apprehension may b§ erroneous and the representation may be a misrepresentation ; and the judgment, proceeding upon this false apprehension, will naturally be wrong. Here, then, the will can exert its influence by representing things, not as they are, per se, but as it would please us to have them be.

e. Over the conscience. This, according to Butler, is a reflex faculty, and the adequate or inadequate result of its reflections depends upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of the representation upon which the judgment is passed. Hence, the will, by its power to represent things in a favorable or unfavorable light, must have a great power over the workings of this faculty. This explains the frequent perversions of conscience.

/. Over the emotions. The influence of the will over the emotions is manifested in two ways, viz., by generating appe- tences, u{)on which the emotions depend, and by means of the power of regulating the train of thought.

7

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II. — The Functions of the Will.

TIL

"^ lL It is the seat of responsibility. — Man can be responsible only for those acts which are voluntary ; a mere exercise of the intelligence, according to natural laws, can be neither good nor sinful. Nor does virtuousness and sinfulness lie in the mere possession of conscience and the capability of emotion ; but only where choice enters as an element of the action.

This mode of looking at the subject has, however, the pecu- liarity that it gives the will an uncommonly wide range. When we confine responsibility to the voluntary element, itmust be understood that every action may be voluntary. The eyes are given us for sight, and there is no harm in their employment; but there is harm in it as soon as we open them to corrupt scenes and obstinately close them to our duties. " No man is so blind as he who will not see." So it is, also, in the opera- tions of the conscience and of the emotions. The will can misdirect any feeling, even against the dictates of reason. Sincerity and candor of spirit are, therefore, ever the surest security of virtuousness. It is thus by the inward purpose, the creature of the- M'ill, that certain actions, bad in themselves, can become virtuous, and vice versa. Furthermore, it is from the degree of voluntariness which enters into it that love becomes more or less meritorious. In all aifection, in love in the highest sense, there is more than a mere feeling of emotion. So far as love does not go beyond that, it is merely instinctive attachment; well-wishing must be combined with it, and this, a voluntary element, renders it meritorious. This is cliarity in the Scriptural sense. f^^J&L^ /o //i*^»

It giv^ freedoiji and the^idea of j'reedo'))i.p^Jt is the 'pos-

sessidn of /thle wil makes us /free\agents only so mr as they ar they ara subject ^o necessa^ freedom,\nnd (2) opnscio with us stands the choice

power oi!i exercisM oiher facumes/there^

It

vhich eedom by \he will ; W all other /respects laws. Al But in me will tlyere is (1) of /freedom, /beisause we kW>w that ir wayK To fe^ our/ superiority thus becomes a source of elevation to us, and, if we misuse it,

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117

a source^f anguish. It is important to recognize and bear in mind thisVact/egardiikr tl>/will. ^^t is/not enoVh t0^s^y tMt we have l\b^ty to doWliatever aV /choose, M t/is ma/be impossible iK^ natnral oA outward ciA?umstances ; But it ip\the essential free\lom of^olce which/ constitutes the^^ esseiSd of manhood. It\niust g/fso be\remem6ered that the idea of freedW isone^vliich nohe pf the niyfree/ faculties, with whichAve hav^ hitherto been occtipied, can give; it is the offspring of th( voluntary powers, and is one of the highest ideas of the human mind.

Concluding Remarks.

A. It is not to be understood that these faculties are separate existences, distinct as the limbs of the body. They all belong to one inseparable mind, and constitute its unity. When we speak of self-consciousness, we mean the mind as looking upon its own operations ; wiien we speak of conscience, we mean the mind, the same mind, as looking upon and judging about the good or the evil, etc.

B. It is not claimed that the foregoing arrangement of the faculties is a perfect one, but merely a tempor^arily good one.

The arrangements formerly in use are chiefly these :

a. The old, two-fold, Aristotelian division into gnostic and orectic. This has appeared in all ages ; its influence is seen in the writings of Cicero, and in the productions of modern litera- ture and philosophy. But it is insufficient, because it must assign conscience to both.

b. The three-fold Kantian system, to which that of Hamilton adheres, into cognitive, conative and feeling. But it is hard to make the first embrace imagination, and conscience must be again divided. Lastly, feeling must include sensation with emotion.

C. The faculties have been so unfolded as to give, in their suc- cession, a natural history of the mind.— We began with percep- tion and consciousness, which presuppose no other faculties and no former knowledge, and arranged after these the rest, each successive faculty presupposing the former.

118

T>. It has been shown that each faculty gives a new idea, which could not be derived from any other. In opposition to the old Lockeian theory, that all our ideas come from sensation and reflection, it has been shown how memory gives the idea of time ; imagiuation, of the infinite ; comparison, of the relations ; con- science, of good and evil ; emotion, of the lovely aud the hate- ful ; will, of freedom ; self-consciousness and sense-perception, the knowledge of existing objects.

E. In unfolding the faculties, it has been shown that they obey laics of immediate and ultimate perception. — The science which looks at these laws is metaphysics proper.

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CHAPTER IX.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT.

Beginning with the Faculties of the Mind.

Cognitive Powees.

I. Simple Cognitive or Presentative.

1. Sense-perception.

2. Self-consciousness. II. Reproductive.

III. Comparative.

Motive Powees. I. Moral. II. Emotional. III. Will.

Cognitive Powees. I, Simple Cognitive.

A. Sense-perceptioiu

Smell.

Taste.

Hearing:.

Touch, a. Touch Proper.

b. Muscular Sense. Sight.

B. Self-consciousness.

Knowledge of our mind. Knowledge of self.

Seme-perception; the external sense, an act of the mind, senses act as instruments :

a. This knowledge original.

^' " " immediate or intuitive.

C' " " positive.

120

Theories.

Ideal or Representative Theory :

1. Grosser Form. Idea a material substance, effluvia,

2er;*:'}Ato-c School, (400-361.)

Lucretius — Epicurean.

2. Spiritual Form. Mind contemplates a (spiritual) image, Descartes, 1635 :

1. An affection of the brain.

2. Idea in the mind.

3. Mind looks on idea. Malebranche, 1674.

Locke, 1690. Berkeley, 1709. Hume, 1750. Inferential (sensational) School : Dr. Thomas Brown's process, 1810.

1. Impression on organism.

2. Sensation in mind.

3. Inference as to external existence. Relative Theory. Hamilton, 1845, and Bain, 1860-1869.

No positive knowledge of things. Things perceived under a relation. Natural Realism: mind looks on objects immediately through instrumentality of the senses.

Positions : to suppose an intervening link between mind and object —

I. Is mere hypothesis. II. Gives no explanation not otherwise more satisfac- torily given.

III. Instead of simplifying, it makes the subject more com- plex. Questions :

1. How sensation comes?

2. How mind looks on it?

3. How inference comes ? Distinctions :

I. Between sensation and perception.

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P=know]edge of an object presenting itself. S=feeling, within organism, associated with P. II. Between original and acquired perception. 0=derived from no other source. A^obtained by aid of experience and reason.

Original Smell.

0=perceive our olfactory nerves as affected — by what? — is answered by A P. Taste.

0= palate as affected — by what ? — is answered by A P. Hearing.

0=Organs as affected. — The affecting object, distance, and direction known by A P. Touch.

a. Touch Proper. Dr. Chas. Bell.

O^organisni as affected. — Strong in lips ■ and middle finger. — Sensation felt in that part of the body to which extremity of nerve reaches. — Its localizing character. Case of Schmitz.

" " toll-keeper at Halle. " " Valentin's young girl without hand. h. Muscular Sense. Dr. Thos. Brown.

0=external objects as existing because resisting our energy.

N. B. — Sense of temperature to be referred to sense of touch in general. Sight.

0=co]ored surface (Hamilton's demon- stration) and direction (Trichinetti case.) Distance an A P is proved by —

1. Chiselden's case; young man, born blind, thought objects touched his eye.

2. Franz' case; young man, born blind, 27, could not distinguish a solid from a plane.

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3. Trichinetti case ; two children, born bliiul and afterwards cured, orange at a distance seemed to touch the eye, girl reached for it in straight line. N. B.— Refutes idea of Berkeley, (1709), and Mill, (I860,) that extension is derived from time used in glancing over it. Original perception :

By all senses, knowledge of bodily frame. By all senses, knowledge of things extended. By two senses, knowledge of things external. Acquired Perceptions. In hearing, smell, taste, touch proper, all acquired except knowledge of organs as aflFected. In sight,, distance is acquired by —

1. Change in eyeball.

2. Parallelism of rays.

3. Binocular vision.

4. Variation in size.

5. Distinctness of outline.

6. Number of intervening objects.

7. Comparison.

III. Between primary and secondary qualities of matter.

P=such qualities as are common to all bodies and in- volved in all perceptions.

S=such as are not properly qualities of matter, but affec- tions of the organism. Classifications :

Aristotle, common and proper.

Locke : primary, viz., solidity, extension, figure, rest or motion, number, and he seems to add situation and texture : and secondary, such which, having no real existence in themselves, are merely })Owers to produce sensation by means of the primary qualities.

Reid ; primary, viz., extension, divisil)ility, figure, mo- tion, solidity, hardness, softness, fluidity: and secondary. The ground of distinction is that the senses give direct and distinct knowledge of primary and obscure of secondary i

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Hamilton : primary :

I. Occupying space.

Divisibility.

Extension <

Size / I^ensity. ^'^n Rarity.

^ Figure. Ultimate Incompressibility. II. Being contained in space. Mobility. Situation. To these he adds secundo-primary and secondary. Hence, Dr. McCosh : primary :

1. Extension.

2. Divisibility.

3. Size.

4. Density and Rarity.

5. Figure.

6. Incompressibility absolute.

7. Mobility.

8. Situation.

Qualities of matter, known to intuition, are divided into three classes —

1. Those which relate to space.

2. Those which one body exercises in reference to another. Refutes — a. No quality known but extension.

h. Matter ^combination of forces. Those which body exercises with reference to mind.

B

Self-Gonsclousniess.

1. Takes cognizance of mind in its present state.

2. Is an attril)ute exercised whenever mind is intelligently exercised.

3. By continuity and memory, gives idea of identity.

4. May voluntarily take more special cognizance of mind. Self-consciousness is a separate faculty, because

1. Object contemplated is different from that contemplated by any other faculty.

Q

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2. It is a separate source of knowledge. Recapitulation.

I. Amount of knowledge obtained by simple cognitive powers.

A. Both faculties, S. P. and S. C, give knowledge. Re- futation of Locke.

B. Both faculties, S. P. and S. C, give knowledge of individuals, and knowledge in the concrete.

C. By both, we know objects as possessing being.

1. Do not know being in the abstract by simple cogni- tive powers.

2. Do know being as independent of cognition. Refuta- tion of Kant.

J). By both, Ave know mind and body as exercising potency.

Note. — Being, independence and potency=substance.

Two derivations; sub-sto and sub-sisto,

latter true.

II!"^^nowledge peculiar to each of the simple cognitive po\

A. By^ sense-perception, we know-

1. External ity.

2. Direction, (im])lying exte^gi^. tively perceived, bm^*§jj^*fl^s someti perception. jB. By self-consciousness,

1. Pefsonality.^^^ 2<'^xisteBee^ and qualities ot mi

II. Reproductive Powers:

1. Retentive. 4. Recognitive.

2. Recalling, (phantasy.) 5. Compositive.

3. Associative. 6. Symbolic.

1, Heteutive : by which we are able to retain what has once been before us. The possibility of this depends —

1. On state of brain.

2. (3n amount of attention in first perception.

2, Hecalling ; by which we call up, by means of a phantasm, what has been before us.

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Difference between phantasm and conception. We can recall —

(1.) By P. all we have by the senses, e. g., a single rose. (2.) By C. all we have by consciousness, e. g., the class roses as a whole.

3. Associative; by which we are able to follow one train of thought in preference to desultory thinking. The regular suc- cession of ideas is proved in two ways —

1. By following train of thought, we can trace connection between the ideas.

2. It can often be discovered what occasioned curious thought.

The laws of this power are :

A. Primary :

a. Contiguity.

1. Repetition, (snccession.)

2. Co-existence.

b. Correlation.

B. Secondary :

a. Native tastes and talents. 6. Energy of feeling, intellect and will. A. Primary ; those laws by which all thoughts are regulated in tiieir succession :

a. Contiguity ; that is, things which have beeu associated in the mind tend to recall each other.

1 . Repetition ; same follows the same. Note. — Here comes in habit, which —

1. Has a tendency to repeat acts.

2. Gives facility in their performance.

2. Co-existence (redintegration) ; things, having been in the mind togetlier, tend to recall each other.

6. Correlation ; that is, things which are related to each other tend to suggest each other. Law of several kinds. Note. — Memory is two-fold :

1. Contiguity.

2. Correlati(m. (This is the higher.)

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B. Secondary; those laws which, when several ideas might come up according to primary laws, determine which do actually come up. These are :

a. Law of native and hereditary tastes and talents.

6. Law of energy ; that is, things will be apt to come up,, according as much or little energy —

1. Of feeling.

2. Of intellect.

3. Of will — has been bestowed on them.

4. Hecogtiitwe ; those powers by which we — a. Recognize an object- — h. As having been before us —

{The Faith Element.)

c. In time past.

{The Idea of Time.)

Note. — Dr. Brown ; the idea of time is " a concep- tion accompanied with a feeling of a relation of priority." Refute this,

Locke; " we arrive at the idea of time by reflecting upon the succession of our ideas." Refute this.

Kant and Leibnitz ; " time is a relation imposed upon objects by the mind." Refute this. Note. — Memory, the power of recalling what has actu- ally passed before us, involves —

1. Retentive power.

2. Power of recalling by phantasm.

3. Associative power.

4. Recognitive power. (Main element.)

I. Is memory capable of recollecting everything? II. Are there unconscious mental operations ?

III. Does memory deceive?

IV. Memory of old people. Two reasons for defect. V. How to cultivate the memory. Three laws :

127

(1.) of contiguity ; (2.) of correlation ; (3.) of energy of feeling, intellect, will. 3. ConipositiV€f putting old things into new forms, in- volves—

a. Diminishing power. h. Enlarging "

c. Separating "

d. Compounding "

Genius.

. Here comes in Imagination.

I. Its nature. Reproduces old objects, in new forms ; ways constructive ; has powers of retention, phantasy, association of ideas, composition.

1. An imaging power.

2. A constructive power.

Imagination gives nothing new, but uses old cognitions.

II. Its uses. 1. In science.

2. To awaken sentiment — novels.

3. Gives idea of the infinite. With regard to the infinite :

A. Negative propositions.

a. Mind can form no adequate apprehension of it. 6. Mind can form no adequate logical notion of it. JB. Positive propositions.

a. Mind apprehends something beyond its widest image and concept.

b. Must look upon infinity as incapable of increase.

III. Its abuses.

IV. Cultivation of imagination. Lay np a store of noble images.

6*. Sijttiholic ; the power of thinking by means of symbols.

Mere (pavvdafxazo. not sufficient for all concepts, therefore we must have a vorjua.

Power of language conditioned by this —

1. A mental power and disposition to think in symbols.

2. An original capacity for articulate speech.

128

III. Comparative ; by these faculties we discover the relations between objects. Three propositions — a. Hitherto all ideas are singular and insufficient. 6. The mind does not begin with comparison ; but with things; then their relations are discovered, c. These relations are real. Primary judgments.

I. Identity and Diiference. II. Whole and Parts.

III. Resemblance.

IV. Space. V. Time.

VI. Quantity. VII. Active property. VIII. Cause and Effect. Note. — (1.) Each proceeds on the knowledge of objects. (2.) Mind can discover more than relations of resemblance and difference. I. Identity : Identity and Difference discovered by same power, — by simple cognition ; we know every object to have being; continuousness of being=identity. Memory some- times deceitful. Evidences of Identity :

a. Self; evidence of identity by consciousness, mem- ory and comparison ; three tests of intuitive conviction of personal identity.

h. External objects; no intuitive means of discover- ing identity ; only " moral certainty." Law takes three forms —

1. Identity proper: A is A ; the law requires us to recognize the same to be the same, in different times, forms and circumstances.

2. Contradiction : A is not A ; we must think it im- possible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time.

3. Excluded middle : A is either B or not B ; we are required, when two propositions are in the relation of contradictories, to think one must be true ; both cannot be.

129

Kant's Distinction of Analytic and Synthetic Judgments.

II. Whole and Parts ; Analysis and Synthesis ; Power of Comprehension. In this relation, we contemplate a part as a part of a whole, and the whole as made up of parts. Use in mathematics and other sciences of intuitions of whole and parts.

Propositions :

1. Abstract implies concrete.

2. When concrete is real, abstract is also real.

III. Resemblance : primary notions are of individuals. Then we rise to generals and begin to generalize and form concepts.

Three laws :

a. Generalization proceeds on common properties of objects.

b. Mind has tendency to discover resemblances and make classifications.

c. Difference between Identity, Resemblance and

1. Universals imply singulars.

2. When singulars are real, universals are real.

3. Whatever is predicated of class, may be of members. Equality.

IV. Space. This faculty, like others, depends on simple cognitive powers; some unit always fixed on.

V. Time ; gives us time in the concrete, and we perform the abstraction ; great events stai'ting points.

VI. Quantity. Locke's Proportion, Brown's Degree and Proportion, and McCosh's More and Less.

To this belongs Number.

Whewell ; number given by memory and succession.

McCosh ; number given by memory, succession, and a general power of discovering relations of quantity.

V^II. Active Property. We cannot know self, or body acting on self, except as possessing active properties. By virtue of them, we draw distinctions, by separating resem- blances between sense-perception and intelligence, will, emo- tion, etc.

130

VIII. Cause and Eifect. Causation implied in all knowl- edge, past and future; not the same with uniformity of nature to which there may be exceptions ; implies intuitive knowledge of substance exercising power. Relation of cause and effect considered :

A. Objectively, i. e., what it is in itself.

1. Causation implies substance with properties.

2. Duality or plurality,, both of cause and effect.

£. Subjectively ; i. e., what faculty perceives it. Caus- ation is not experiential. From experience we exjDect a certain effect, or believe it probable, but have thereby no conviction of its necessity or certainty. Hence, we con- clude causal judgment is intuitive ; (1) it is self-evident, (2) necessary, (3) universal. We are not compelled to seek for an infinite series of causes.

Psychological Nature of the Discursive or Logical Faculties.

I. Simple Apprehension ; we apprehend objects or obtain notions.

1. Simple notions or singular notions; that is, those obtained by sense-perception and self-consciousness.

2. Abstract notions, from comprehension ; are notions of attributes.

3. General notions, by faculty for resemblance.

II. Logical Judgment : compare two conceptions, or an intuition and a conception. Judgment in [a) comprehension, (6) extension.

III. Reasoning: same operation as judgment, except here we have three instead of two terms. Reasoning in compre- hension and extension may be interchanged.

General Remarks on Comparative Faculties.

1. These faculties are in all men.

2. They have a tendency to operate.

3. They are admirably suited to our situation.

4. Correspondence between subjective and objective worlds. Not result of unity of thought and being, nor of a gradual accustoming process, but of an original adaptation.

5. Differ widely in different individuals.

131

6. All these relations, except that of space, exist both in mental and material objects.

Summary of the Acquisition of Knowledge.

Motive Powers.

I. Moral: Concience, conscientia, aoi'sidr^ac^.

1. There is such a power. Man's natural pleasure in good and aversion to evil prove it. It cannot come from sensation and reflection, for it is in all men in all condi- tions.

Two classes deny —

a. Those who take a low view of human nature and attribute moral convictions to selfishness and utility. But man has a moral principle.

6. Those who maintain man cannot appreciate moral distinctions apart from religion. But revealed truth pre- supposes a conscience.

2. Its nature.

Negative Propositions.

I. Decision of conscience does not make an action good or bad.

II. Possession of conscience does not render one good. III. Conscience not incapable of perversion.

Positive Propositions.

I. Conscience is of the nature of a cognitive power. II. Implies obligation.

III. Involves idea of law.

IV. Gives idea of sin. V. Moves to action.

VI. Feels approbation and disapprobation. VII. Claims authority over whole voluntary state of the mind.

VIII. Is above other powers as an arbiter and judge. IX. Beliefs are involved in its exercise.

3. Names.

132

Hutchinson and Shaftesbury ; Moral Sense. (To con- form with Locke's external and internal sense.)

Buddington ; Moral Reason.

Kant; Practical Reason (Categorical Imperative.)

Butler ; Faculty of Reflection.

The best name is conscience, conscientia, auvddrjm^: ; this first occurs in Antonine.

4. The idea it gives; moral good and evil.

Criticism of Locke's doctrine of the source of all our ideas.

5. Conscience in actual exercise.

I. Slumbering, unwilling to be aroused. Sleeping watch-dog. II. Accusing, felt even in slight sins.

III. Excusing —

Discussion of Rom. 2:15. (a) there is a heart- written law ; (6) conscience a joint witness ; (c) and with thoughts either accuses or excuses.

IV. Perverted.

V. Troubled by recollection of sins. VI. Blunted by continued sin. VII. Pacified by repentance and expiation. VIII. Purified by the law.

IX. Approving ; may be in a self-righteous sense, lies at basis of independence.

II. Emotional.

Elements involved :

I. Appetence; at the basis of all emotion. II. Idea ; apprehension of something as apt to gratify or disappoint. Without it, no emotion.

III. Excitement ; with attraction or repugnance.

IV. Organic Affection ; result of nervous temperament of individual.

Psychological nature of these elements.

I. Appetence, appetentia, the stimulating cause.

133

N. B. — Error of sensational school in overrating its im- portance.

A. Primary Appetences ; that is, those acting spontane- ously. They are bodily and mental.

1. Love of pleasure and aversion to pain.

2. For happiness and against unhappiness of fellow-men.

3. Personal attachments.

4. Native tastes and talents.

5. Bodily appetites.

6. Love of society.

7. Love of esteem.

8. Love of power.

9. Acquisitiveness. 10» Esthetic feeling.

11. Moral sentiment.

12. Love of knowledge.

B. Secondary Appetences ; grow upon and imply the pri- mary and are mostly degenerations of them, thus becoming the object rather than the means of life.

II. Idea ; in all emotion there is an idea, apt to gratify or disappoint an appetence ; mere existence of the latter causes no emotion. Hence —

We can feel emotion at fictitious object, if idea is present. Feeling cannot be compelled ; will influences indirectly. Emotion is called forth by contemplating individual objects.

1. Idea is singular, not abstract.

2. Feeling is roused by idea of individual objects.

3. Feeling is roused by idea of personal God.

4. In rhetoric, present individual object.

5. By concrete language.

6. By imaginary scenes.

III. Excitement; with attraction or repugnance. This element most frequently under our notice.

IV. Organic Affection. Physiology gives little information. The seat of emotion at base of brain, but not in gray matter ; thence, acting on nerves which make im[)ression. Different effects of emotion.

134

Note I. — Recapitulation.

Appetences cause sentiments to continue. Idea indispensable to call forth emotion.

Note II. — Classifications.

I. Emotions concerning animate objects.

1. Immediate emotions.

2. Retrospective "

3. Prospective '^

II. Emotions concerning inanimate objects. a. Beauty ; not mere association of ideas.

1 . Physical ; sound, form, color.

2. Intellectual.

h. Picturesque ; whatever gratifies phantasy.

c. Sublime ; whatever gives idea of the vast.

d. Ludicrous ; implies incongruity. Idea is that of the hateful and the lovely.

Til, Will ; a separate faculty and cannot be resolved. I. Its psychological character.

1. Cannot be resolved or reduced to any other power.

2. Essential element is choice.

T\' i.- • I, f Emotion and Will. Distinguish < -pk • J -tr Ti-

*= \ Desire and Volition.

3. May associate with every other power of the mind. a. May influence senses.

6. " " consciousness,

c. " " reproductive powers.

Directly, by keeping idea present. Indirectly, by bringing up other ideas followed by hosts of associations. In the same way we can banish certain feelings. Difference between avapxi-qai^ and

cl. May influence judgment and comparison.

By misrepresentation. e. May influence conscience, by misrepresentation. J. May influence emotions.

By generating appetences.

135

By sway over train of thought. T^ Its psychological functions.

1. It is the seat of responsibility.

Man is responsible only for what he does voluntarily ; but will can make every action so.

2. It gives freedom and the idea of freedom.

This idea came from no other source, for it lies in no other ; all the other faculties necessary.

Concluding Remarks.

A. Faculties not separate existences ; belong to the mind.

B. Arrangement of faculties not perfect, but temporarily good.

C. Faculties so unfolded as to give natural history of the mind.

D. Each faculty gives a new idea. jE". Faculties obey laws.

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