


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
on Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb

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*Basil L. Fiederstein*







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# NOTES

ON

## STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB

BY

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE

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## I.—STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB.

### FIRST ARTICLE.

#### *Prolegomena.*

No one can appreciate the value of Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb so well as one who has worked on the same lines for as many years as Stahl has done and on the same general principle of direct study of the monuments of the language.<sup>1</sup> All honor to the untiring industry that has accumulated a mass of material which puts to shame many a specialist. All honor to the intellectual courage that undertakes to erect a new system on the basis of personal research. Special acknowledgments to his predecessors there are none and with a touch of national arrogance Stahl claims to have bettered his instructions everywhere. To verify this statement, to compare his treatment with that of the long list of syntacticians from Apollonios down to the latest file-closer of the psychological school, would be a task not unworthy of one who has the leisure for such a survey; and in a recent number of the Journal I made some such promise: but my time is short, and the best I can do under the circumstances is to summarize the book so far as that is possible in the compass of two or three articles. If, in the course of this summary, I refer to my own writings, it is not because I claim for my performances any startling originality but because these references will show that my previous studies have given me some right to an opinion on the points discussed.

<sup>1</sup>Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der klassischen Zeit von J. M. Stahl. Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1907.

In the preface we are told that this is the first thorough historical treatment of the subject, the first comprehensive study of the growth, or, 'wenn das hübscher lautet', the *Werdeprozess* of the syntax of the Greek verb. True, to use his own figure, the sphygmograph that registers the beating of the pulse of language does not everywhere present so consecutive and so satisfactory a record as in the moods, but wherever any movement can be felt, the sphygmograph must be applied. <Unfortunately the sphygmograph is itself a throbbing finger, and the observer is apt to confound the beat of his own heart with the pulse of that very tricky personification, language.>

Now here at the threshold one pauses to remark that the history of a growth like language is not to be followed like the growth of a chick. We are in a world of conventions from the very beginning (A. J. P. XXIII 128). Our earliest monument of the Greek language brings us face to face with just such a world, face to face with a language that is not speech (A. J. P. XXIV 353). Nothing can be more futile than the assumption that the first emergence of a construction in literature is conclusive evidence of its date in speech (A. J. P. III 197; IV 434, 443). And yet this assumption vitiates much of the work that has been done in the historical line. Our early literature is all poetical, all the product of the school. The pulses are carefully regulated by the beat of the metre. You have *ιδίρθαι* and you yearn for the participle. Yearn as much as you choose, *ιδόμενος* is withheld. 'Quod versu dicere non est' holds for Homer as for Horace. 'On saute dans un cercéau', to borrow a phrase from Barbey d'Aurevilly. Our first great prose writer is as artificial, or if you choose, as artistic, as our first great poet. Inscriptions are precious, but most of our inscriptions are under the ban of legal formulae, and when the Greek took the graver in hand, the native flow of his blood was checked. We cannot trust the sphygmograph. We may speculate but we must not dogmatize, and yet what would a grammarian be, if he were not dogmatic?

Next we are told that this supreme achievement of Stahl's differs from its predecessors by its critical point of view. Other scholars have grazed these questions, have actually studied the texts they were citing with some regard to their soundness, but Stahl has excelled them all in the thoroughness of his study, the fulness of his discussion and the magisterial maintenance of his opinions. Opponents he never mentions, for he abhors po-

lemics. On questions of textual criticism he turns his thumb at times and mentions the name as he turns it; but his condemnation as well as his acceptance of current views is impersonal, and the man he means must be content to bite his thumb in response. He is in debt to his predecessors. Who is not? He has appropriated Delbrück's view as to the original signification of subjunctive and optative, and Windisch's view of the relative as an anaphoric demonstrative. But these are disputed views and Stahl claims to have improved on the arguments of the originators and thus made their theories his own. The ordinary text-books have failed to satisfy him. What specialist have they ever satisfied? The various monographs have likewise come short so far as he has condescended to read them. To him they were largely unnecessary, for he has gone back to the sources. A shining example, doubtless, but for the honor of our craft let us cherish the belief that it is not a solitary one.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, working through all the authors, all the fragments, all the inscriptions over the whole range of syntax, over the whole extent of Greek literature was impossible even for the superhuman powers of a Stahl and so he has wisely limited himself to the verb and to the period that stops at Aristotle. Having done this independently, he felt himself able to renounce the study of all the monographic literature, though he believes that he has not overlooked anything of importance. To the Schanz series, however, he is indebted for much help, and he is very grateful for it. Of cis-Atlantic work he makes no special note though cis-Atlantic work has not altogether escaped the attention of the authors of the Schanz series, or of men like Brugmann and Delbrück. Not averse to statistics is Stahl but, as he gives no authorities, one is left to infer that he has done the whole work again for himself. To judge by the industry that has brought together an unparalleled wealth of illustrative material, he is perfectly capable of having done it and I, for one, will not dispute his claim to independence here also.

<sup>1</sup> Um Krüger's Gründlichkeit und Ausdauer bei dem Studium der einzelnen Schriftsteller behufs Ausarbeitung seiner Grammatik zu charakterisieren will ich nur aus seinem Handexemplar des Aristophanes die auf dem Vorblatte befindliche Notiz anführen: Sommer 1840 am 8. August den Ar. zum zweiten M. in diesem Jahre durchgelesen, 13. Aug. zum dritten, 21. Aug. zum vierten, 27. zum fünften Mal—Poekel, K. W. Krügers Lebensabriss, 1885, p. 21. Das war ein Mann, den möchte man mit den Nägeln aus der Erde kratzen, as was said of Fabricius (A. J. P. X 333).

In his Methodology Stahl takes up the different methods of syntactical study, the Empirical, which collects and sorts the facts and in this way arrives at mechanical rules that have no reasoned basis. This is the oldest form and is valuable so far as it goes, but is not scientific. The second is the Logical Method, which gives the logical content of the syntactical forms of expression. And there it stops or ought to stop. We are not to impose logical categories on language. Language and thought are not coëxtensive. We have to reckon with feeling and fancy, the sentimentality of concord between adjective and substantive, the absurdities and inconsistencies of grammatical gender <things discarded by our logical and practical English>. As a specimen of illogicality on the part of Greek, Stahl cites the use of the past tense to express unreality. 'If anything is real', he says, 'it is the past'. <But what we call unreality is past opportunity, the Tantalus suspense that becomes eternal. The imperfect needs no *äv* to make it unreal. The psychologists claim the past as well as the future for potentiality<sup>1</sup> and the phenomenon is one of perpetual recurrence, so that Stahl might have selected a better example for a specific Greek manifestation.>

Then he goes on to say that strict logical definitions of the functions of the forms are impossible. We can only speak of an *a potiori* use. The so-called parts of speech are not to be taken too seriously. Noun and verb, adjective and substantive, active and passive, mood and tense often behave in a scandalous way <that can only be fitly described in Biblical language. Aholahs and Aholibahs are they all. They are as inconsequent as a French cocotte (A. J. P. XXIII 130), and their choppings and changings are not to be regulated by categories. And yet *a potiori* has its rights, and we must be thankful to Stahl for allowing us to use the old terms; for much that we call style—and my chief interest in syntax is frankly stylistic—depends in large measure on these deviations from the accustomed track, these leapings over the wall (A. J. P. XXIII 6)>.

Logic does not suffice, but the logic-chopper blazes the way for the historian. Language does not stand still and we cannot stand still to amplify with Stahl what was a trite observation in the days of Horace. Language is a living organism and the rest of it. It develops, it evolves, and it is our business to follow the

<sup>1</sup> J. van Ginneken, *Principes de linguistique psychologique*, p. 97.

stages of its historical development, its organic evolution, which Stahl like the rest supposes to be absolutely coincident with chronological manifestation in literature. It lies in the nature of language that in the course of time it should tend to greater clearness and definiteness <and it is a thousand pities that writers on syntax do not avail themselves more freely of the facilities afforded by this evolution>. So long as language lived only in oral use and served the purpose of oral communication, much was left unexpressed, much had to be supplied by tone and gesture. Language lacking tone and gesture was forced to be more exact. The intellectual life became richer, the interpretation of thought finer and more complicated, until at the last we reach such a consummation as we have in Stahl. <But tone and gesture are still needed to interpret language. Else the actor's occupation were gone. Attic has lost subtleties that are no subtleties to Homer. 'Yea' and 'Nay' are slumped with 'Yes' and 'No' in modern English—a matter that roused the ire of Sir Thomas More,—and foreigners are apt to slump *oui* and *si*.> The language of the early time, Stahl goes on to say in no unfamiliar strain, puts the simple thoughts of that day side by side, the richer life of thought requires a more complex arrangement. Parataxis is followed by hypotaxis (A. J. P. XXIV 390, 391). 'All this is readily traced', says Stahl. But where? In the literature, which shows a decrease of parataxis, an increase of hypotaxis. <But where? Where the laws of style demand it. All this goes beyond our historical record. To reproduce the early conditions we have to study the language of the people, the language of children, our own consciousness of the process of thought (Nutting, *The Order of Conditional Thought*, A. J. P. XXIV 25 foll.; 149 foll.; 278 foll.), and the answers are very unsatisfactory. One recalls what Quintilian says, I. O. 3, 96: *Non ut quidque primum dicendum, ita primum cogitandum*. As our everyday speech is full of the fossils of dead philosophies, so we have inherited turns of expression that defy analysis. We accept the traditional totalities as totalities. The Roman did not analyze *quin* (A. J. P. XXIII 138). We do not analyze *but*.>

'With the development of the departments of literature', says Stahl, 'differences arise'. There is one kind of syntax for poetry, another kind of syntax for prose. Tragedy and comedy differ, oratory and history (A. J. P. XXIII 6). For the understanding of all this the empirico-logical method is impotent. It puts a

definite period of the language as a basis and counts as exceptions everything that varies from that. <And yet something is to be said in behalf of those who demand a *πῶς ὄντως* for any study of a language. The modern psychological study of language begins with the spoken language of to-day and sentences are made up—sentences which are sometimes ungrammatical—in order to illustrate the psychological processes of grammar. We have no such basis for the study of ancient Greek, and beginning with Homer has shown itself to be as unpractical as beginning with Chaucer would be for the acquisition of English. The best thing we can do is to take a point of reference, the conventional language (S. C. G. iv) which must have been understood by the people, even if it was not spoken by the people. Unless we have a standard there is no enjoyment in deviation. When Lindsay tells us that the rules of our grammars will not answer for Plautus throughout, we rejoice with exceeding joy, but we should not abandon our rules for all that, for we find after all that Plautus hews closer to the Ciceronian line than we should have supposed *a priori*. No one who has a right to an opinion about Greek syntax is a rigid uniformitarian, but we have each his own weakness, and as we shall see, Stahl is as relentless in some directions as he is liberal in others.>

The importance of the Comparative Method—really a part of the Historical Method—is recognized by Stahl, especially in the doctrine of the cases in which the comparison of kindred languages enables us to understand the syncretism of the dative with its triple element, of the genitive which carries the ablative in its bosom, so that we can separate and must separate the instrumental dative and the local dative from the personal dative and the ablative genitive from the genitive proper. <Can we? Must we? The doctrine of the syncretism of the cases goes back to Quintilian (A. J. P. XXIII 20) and what goes back to Quintilian goes much farther back, and I venture to say that the problem of assignment is one of the most puzzling that the student has to encounter, especially when that student has to face the ultimate question, which is not what analysis reveals to us but what synthesis has to say to those who used the language. It is the quest of the originals of the composite photograph, and, so far from being a mere matter of theory, the problem stares one in the face whenever we apply the practical test of translation (A. J. P. XXIII 21). Mr. Mackail has won great renown by his translations. I have



given up the practice of that difficult art, to which I was once addicted (cf. Pindar I. E. xxvii; A. J. P. XIII 517; XXI 108; XXII 104 al.); and I am happy to learn from those who are more gifted, for it is a gift. On the very first pages of his Anthology he renders (The Garland of Meleager, v. 10) *Νοσσιδος ἧς δέλτοις κηρὸν ἔτηξεν* \*Ερωσ 'Nossis, on whose tablets Love melted the wax'. The syntactician mindful of his Meisterhans,<sup>3</sup> p. 209, might have a word to say in favour of 'for whose tablets Love melted wax'. In poetry the local dative is never to be preferred if the personal dative will serve (A. J. P. XXIII 21). But to return to our Stahl.>

Among the conquests of the comparative method Stahl counts the formation and original signification of the passive, the meaning of the tense stems and the augment, the separation of the injunctive from the imperative, the formation and original signification of the infinitive. But *modus totus noster est*. Here we can snap our fingers at other languages. In the Vedas there are only flotsam and jetsam subjunctives. In Latin subjunctive and optative are fused (A. J. P. XXV 481), and in Germanic the optative has thrust the subjunctive to the wall. In Greek we can afford to be independent.

Empiric and historic study, controlled by critical method, can give us external rules. Logic presses on to the fundamental forms of thought, to the inner laws. But language cannot be exhausted by logical processes. Its inmost secret can only be disclosed by psychological study. In fact the logical method leads to psychology. <The trouble is that in psychology we cannot shake off logic. The sting is in the tail of the word.><sup>1</sup> 'The subjunctive', says Stahl, 'as the mood of the will, the subjunctive as the mood of a statement that is good for all time, the subjunctive as a prospective mood, all these subjunctives cannot be brought under the same category'. The indicatives of the real and the unreal exclude each other. The derived significations are not logical subdivisions, they are psychological ramifications. The optative, the mood of the will, passes over into a mood of assertion. 'It is a problem', says Stahl <but the problem is simplified for those who are born to the English language, who use our 'shall' and 'will', our 'would' and 'should' with the same shift, and think nothing of it. The wish which is father to the thought

<sup>1</sup> A Syntactician among the Psychologists. The Journal of Philosophy Vol. II, No. 4 (1905).

can hardly be told from its offspring and 'fancy' is now an optative, now an optative + *āv*>. As a specimen of the reverse process Stahl cites the future indicative used in the principal clause as a mood of assertion, in the subordinate clause as a mood of will. <But there are those who consider the future as originally modal, and maintain that the original signification survives as elsewhere in the dependent clause (S. C. G. 267). Translation is no test but the prevalence of the will future with the first person is worth noting.> Then, says Stahl, 'the mood becomes temporal when the subjunctive stands for a future' <a mere future, he should have said, for the subjunctive is necessarily future>. In the leading sentence the future is used as an imperative with the indicative negative, in the final relative clause with the imperative negative. The optative, which starts life as a wish of the speaker, becomes a notion of the speaker, then a notion of somebody else and so finally a gnomon of obliquity. <But there is a *salto mortale* between the potential and the *oratio obliqua* optative (A. J. P. XXVIII 206) in Greek, if not in German (A. J. P. XXVI 68) as there is a *salto mortale* between the negative of the optative with *āv* and the negative of the pure optative.>

Next we have to do with specializations. 'Die besonderen Arten des medialen Gebrauchs sind Spezialisierungen der allgemeinen Bedeutung des Mediums', says Stahl, blissfully unconscious that he is saying nothing more than 'Specialization is Specialization'. The process, he maintains, is from the general to the particular. <But the reverse view is tenable and not only tenable but fashionable. As Usener works up from the specialist gods, the transparent gods, to the opaque gods (A. J. P. XVII 361) so Morris and his school—a parallel suggested by Morris himself—are working up from specific manifestation to general principle. The specialist gods might be represented by the *πρώσεις ἰδίαί* and the opaque gods by the *πρώσεις κοιναί*. It is curious to watch the progress of doctrine and find that the progress is really refluxence. Take the cases. First comes chaos. Then the period of grand generalizations, of parisyllabic and imparisyllabic. Parisyllabic and imparisyllabic prove practically useless and the declensions multiply. There are ten in the Westminster Grammar of 1630. Then comes the era of the three declensions, doubtless hailed as a glorious advance, to be followed in our time by the further simplification into vowel and consonant declensions. But subdivisions become necessary so that the only scientific

method of handling the forms is to have as many declensions as there are stem-characteristics. And so in syntax the only scientific method of handling the accusative is to give all the nouns that are used in the accusative as Hübschmann has done for Zend (A. J. P. II 89). If this is not chaos from the teacher's point of view, it is a close approximation. And the same thing is true of the moods. There are as many subjunctives as there are frames of mind, and as many frames of mind as there are minds to frame.<sup>1</sup>>

But Stahl belongs to the period, not yet closed, of basic meanings and he goes on to illustrate his doctrine of specialization by the optative with *äv*. The optative with *äv*, it seems, starts life as a general affirmation. Then it becomes a potential by which the predicate is represented as something possible, and finally conditional by which something is conditioned. <But the optative + *äv* can never represent 'objective' possibility. Potential and possible are not identical (A. J. P. XX 231); there is such a thing as *δυναίμην äv*, such a thing as *possim*. There is a potentiality of possibility, and all optatives with *äv* are conditioned by personal conviction. The speaker sees an *äv* that others may not, cannot, will not see. The multiplication of categories gives a delightful exercise to the genetic grammarian, but it can hardly be called either a scientific advance or a practical advantage, and he who undertakes to translate Stahl into English will find that the distinguished grammarian has made classifications that can never mean anything except to a German.>

'Another thing to be considered', says Stahl, 'is the shifting of the sphere as when a verb of saying and thinking is used as a verb of will and *vice versa*'. Amen and amen. We all know that, and the grammars are all full of such things, but I will allow myself to remark that the categories are not always carefully delimited. So the verbs of reflection, such as *ἐνθυμείσθαι* and *λογίζεσθαι*, ought to have a place of their own and though practi-

<sup>1</sup> 'The frame of mind, the mental pulse, the state of digestion, the feeling that comes over one after a French *apéritif*, after an American cocktail, that feeling which suggests a stimulative subjunctive to match the stipulative subjunctive, the balancing between will and desire, the poor cat in the adage attitude,—all these subtle shades are subjective states that require a finer calculus than we have thus far at our disposal; and yet they all have their ample justification in the nature of things. Why should not the Greek and the Roman have as many moods as the Turk, and if these ancient languages fail to note by distinct forms all the various phases of emotion, why may we not supply them?' Oscillations and Nutations of Philological Studies, p. 10.

cally it is well to speak of a shift, the process is not simply a shift. Will is at the bottom of everything.<sup>1</sup> Call it *προαίρεσις* in the conscious stage, call it appetence in the unconscious stage. Absorption and appropriation, peristaltic movement and expulsion—that is the life of language as of everything else that lives.>

Then comes the question of the economics of language. Language has not a custom-made dress for every thought. <Sometimes she wears *ἀναξυρίδες*, sometimes *θύλακοι*.> *ὥς* is 'how', but it may serve as 'that' at a pinch (A. J. P. XIV 375). *εἰ εἶχε* is a logical or unreal condition. The context must decide. The utterance is colored by its surroundings. 'That is a wise economy', says Stahl. <The Greek was a thrifty soul and could not be expected to waste his oil and toil on framing this category and that, categories that are clearly recognized in languages commonly considered inferior to the Greek, and Stahl might have pointed out the shameful laziness that kept the Greek from giving gender to the persons of the verb as does the Hebrew. Stahl is no less anthropomorphic than the rest of us when we come to speak of language with a big L (A. J. P. XVIII 368). Language like the rest of us saves at one end and squanders at the other. In fact, Wunderlich makes 'Sparsamkeit' and 'Verschwendung' the basic principles of 'Umgangssprache', and it is a matter of notoriety that the Greek is perfectly lavish in his expenditure of the fairy money of the future (A. J. P. XXIII 128).>

And here Stahl insists, as we all insist, on the difference of the point of view, which is not to be confounded with the difference in the thing itself, and this is a matter to which he returns with wearisome iteration. The Galata tower is the same whether you look at it from the Pera side or the bridge side. The stick is the same whether you look at it endwise or otherwise. Future is future and past is past. 'There is even a great waste of acuteness', thinks Stahl, 'in manufacturing vital distinctions'. <Freedom shares the throne of law. *Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις*, sums up the whole thing—Justice, Divine Freedom, Ancient Use and Wont.> We know all that. But 'all that' only means that the grammarian is fully prepared to ignore differences made by other grammarians and to emphasize those which he has established for himself. Stahl refuses to distinguish between *ὅπως* and

<sup>1</sup> A Syntactician among the Psychologists, I. c.

ὄπως ἄν, a distinction on which one Gildersleeve insists (A. J. P. IV 422; XXIII 12) cf. XXIV 394; and Gildersleeve declines to accept Stahl's categories of opt. + ἄν, as has just been set forth. The use of the aorist with definite numbers, which I consider a natural function of the aorist (S. C. G. 243), Stahl considers a freedom or rather an economy. 'It is not necessary', he says, 'to put the durative element in the form of the verb when it is indicated in the numeral'. That is one phase of his dislike to the use of the word 'complexive', in connexion with the aorist, whereas I am as fond of 'complexive' as if I had originated it. A participle may be at the same time temporal, conditional and causal,—that is to a German who always has trouble with the participle as I have shown elsewhere (A. J. P. IX 136), Stahl himself being one of my exemplars (A. J. P. XIX 463; XX 352). It is curious how we allow necessities of translation to interfere with the direct vision of a foreign language, how we multiply categories based chiefly on the auxiliary verbs employed in turning Greek and Latin into English (A. J. P. XIX 231, 351).

One bit of arbitrariness is evidently too much for Stahl. It is too much for most of us, and that is the restriction of the oblique optative to the sequence of the preterites, apart, of course, from instances of assimilation so-called. 'This restriction cannot lie', he says, 'in the nature of the *modus obliquus*, as we see by Latin, so that the only reason must be a psychological one'. Psychology is a fine covert from a storm of questions. In my judgment there is no woe upon us to explain this phenomenon by comparative syntax. These oblique relations belong to the after-growths and the ethnic grammarian has the right to pursue the search for the explanation within the range of the special language. The post-Homeric vanishing of the futural subjunctive in the leading clause Stahl attributes to the competition of the future indicative, which rendered the futural subjunctive unnecessary. Now the futural subjunctive being largely aoristic gave a shade which the future indicative does not give, and I should say that the real competitor is the optative with ἄν which is largely used to make up for the indeterminateness of the future, when it ceased to be a mood as it has ceased to be in the leading clause. Unfortunately Stahl does not believe in the modal nature of the future as I do, and he would not say with me that the future indicative has not succeeded in ousting the more exact expressions of temporal relations such as ὄραν and ἐπειδὴν with present and

aorist subjunctive (A. J. P. XXIII 247), where the futural subjunctive holds its own. The subordinate sentence is the Ararat in the flood of change here as elsewhere.

The personification we call language being feminine picks and chooses. Being a woman she has often no other than a woman's reason and thinks it so because she thinks it so (A. J. P. XXIV 397; XXVIII 253), and Stahl sees a certain caprice in the restoration of the subordinate imperative to such phrases as *οἶσθ' ὁ δρᾶσον*. It is feminine caprice, if one may judge by school girls' English. 'Do you know what let's do' has been a pet illustration of mine for many a decennium. Then again give Dame Language an inch and she takes an ell like the rest of her sex. The original accusative and infinitive was simple enough. There was the accusative, there was the infinitive, a legitimate accusative, a legitimate infinitive. There is no more trouble about that than about the accusative with the dative. Then came the accusativus cum infinitivo. That is a different story, that is a *solus cum sola* story and the combination is so close that all manner of grammatical scandal is afloat and one is fain to cry out with Cicero: *quid tibi cum Caelio, quid cum homine adulescentulo?* The absolute participles were not absolute originally. What is absolute in one period is not absolute at another (Pindar I. E. cxii). The unreal imperfect had originally a smaller territory (Goodwin, M. and T., R. E. 435).

Another category is that of assimilation or levelling, comparable with matching ribbons, if we dare to linger longer in the feminine sphere. The most notorious example is that presented by the behaviour of the relative. In the syntax of the verb Stahl bids us distinguish between mere formal assimilation and logical assimilation. His examples of purely formal assimilation are the use of the optative after optative + *ἄν* or the pure optative and the participle after *ὥστε* under the influence of another participle (A. J. P. VII 172). Are they merely formal? His example of the logical assimilation is the use of the indicative in sentences dependent on an unreal indicative in which, as I set forth long ago, the first unreality is merely parenthetic to the second (A. J. P. IV 434). 'All which shows', says Stahl, 'the importance of combining psychology with logic'. <'All which shows', how easy it is to dress up familiar facts in fancy costume. Put the phenomena in other language and you seem to get something brand new. I have recently read that the queer French

genius to whom I referred in the beginning of this article (p. 258) had engraved on his seal the English words 'Too late'. Perhaps some English genius will engrave on his seal 'Trop tard'. One envies the virginal state of mind that can be impressed with such shifts from one language to another.>

I have spent some time on Stahl's 'Methodology': I shall make or try to make shorter work of his 'Grundbegriffe'. After these chapters are finished there will remain only 800 pages to be considered, but 'Fear not, little flock', most of these 800 can be despatched by simple references; for Stahl repeats a great deal, amplifies a great deal, and multiplies categories unnecessarily. It takes the courage of a syntactical specialist to make his way through this mass of material, I had well nigh said 'wade'. But 'wade' would imply that syntax is a morass (A. J. P. XXIII 106; XXVIII 487) and I do not wish to be disrespectful. Only one absurd distich comes up to my mind from Goethe's *Wahrheit und Dichtung*.

Ober Yssel. Viel Morast  
Macht das gute Land verhasst.

But after all there is 'gutes Land' in Stahl.

Under the head of 'Grundbegriffe' Stahl extends the definition of syntax. 'Syntax ist die Lehre von der Bedeutung der Wortformen und ihrer Verbindung im und zum Satze'. This definition may serve to save the face of the syntactician who usually employs syntax as a rag-bag for holding odds and ends of linguistic observations. But syntax as the theory 'of the formation and combination of sentences' (S. C. G. 1) involves the determination of the constituents of the sentence and of the connecting links of the sentence. A definition is not an inventory of contents. 'Im Anfang war der Satz', says a high authority and properly understood the theory of the sentence will serve, though Krüger rebelled against that definition. What is the verb? But here my English fails me and I must transfer to my seal Stahl's own language. The verb according to Stahl is 'der sprachliche Ausdruck für den Erscheinungsbegriff an sich' in contradistinction to the substantive. 'Das Substantivum', he says, 'bezeichnet einen Begriff als Substanz, das Verbum als Erscheinung an sich', whereas the adjective gives 'die konstante an der Substanz haftende Erscheinung <die wir> Eigenschaft nennen'. The 'Erscheinung' can present itself as a

'Substanz' and then we have the infinitive, the verbal substantive. It may present itself as a quality and then it becomes a verbal substantive. Then we have the story of adjectives used as substantives and substantives used as adjectives. Nothing is gained by all this would-be metaphysic from my point of view and if I should undertake to discuss Stahl, I might be accused of misrepresenting his theory. What I am concerned with is the registry of sensations, the analysis of sensations. Sensation is a current and the  $\rho\eta\mu\alpha$  is a  $\rho\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ . We are in the realm of the Herakleitean flux. Stahl is welcome to his Parmenidean  $\delta\nu$ . Fix the verb, it becomes a noun. Melt the noun, it becomes a verb. The verbal noun is a noun that deliquesces. The verbal adjective is a verb that clings, that deposits a film on the substantive. I have actually called it a skin (A. J. P. XX 352; XXIII 259), and I am not sorry that I have done so. I could not live without metaphor, nor can any one else (A. J. P. XXIX 239).

So I am not going to follow Stahl's criticism of current definitions and the defence of his own. One trouble is the incommensurability of German and English. Distinctions that may work perfectly well in German will not work in English. So under 'Erscheinung' he distinguishes 'Tätigkeit' and 'Zustand', 'activity' or 'action' and 'condition'. That might pass, but under 'Tätigkeit' he makes a distinction between 'Handlung und Tat'. 'Handlung' involves consciousness. 'Der Jäger erzählt von den Taten, aber nicht von den Handlungen seines Hundes; in der Fabel aber handelt der Fuchs klug'. We do not make the distinction in English, and forty years ago I thought it expedient to make special provision for animals considered as agents, 'a cane non magno saepe tenetur aper'. The rule was sorely needed as appears from a Latin Reader made up from Livy by one of the leading contributors to Harper's Latin Dictionary, in which the world was informed that 'Romulus et Remus lupa nutriti sunt'. Surely the taste that could distinguish between 'he-wolf' and 'she-wolf' as articles of diet must have been as subtle as the London alderman's with his 'callipash' and 'callipee'.

'Tätigkeit' and 'Handlung' defy the English language, but we can manage 'Ereignis' as 'event' and 'Vorgang' as 'process'. Against 'Zeitwort' for 'verb' Stahl contends valiantly, charges a paper screen and demolishes it utterly, as Mommsen says somewhere of Cicero. By 'Zeitwort' one would naturally understand



an adverb of time and the victory was won long ago. Apollonios Dyskolos finds no favor in Stahl's eyes. His definition is an inventory from which the participle is omitted, and moreover it applies only to Greek. Unsatisfactory to Stahl is 'Aussagewort.' The verb is not the only thing that predicates. Every word says something. Especially offensive to Stahl is the definition of the verb as a 'Tätigkeitsäusserung'. All these are contemptuously rejected in favor of 'Erscheinung', which I dare not translate phenomenon because of Aratos' Phaenomena, and what is to become of 'Erscheinung' in the dark? Shall we call it 'manifestation'? But there is *λανθάνω*, a most excellent verb. Is all this hopelessly frivolous? Not quite so frivolous as it seems. Definitions are much more easily dodged than metaphors. Is *σκιά* abstract or concrete? My answer would be. It is oxytone like *αίμασιά ἀλιά*, and the rest of the 'concrete' *ιά*'s which cast it.

Subject and predicate are necessary to every logical sentence. The so-called copula, the *verbum substantivum* is really a predicate. Every grammarian uses it and every grammarian abuses it. Stahl differs only in his vehemence and his claims to greater consistency. Touch not, taste not, handle not the unclean thing. It is a false, a fallacious expression. False it may be, but fallacious it is not. '*ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ* is an incomplete thing', says Stahl. Attribute cannot be predicate. True, a logical sentence may be involved in an expression. *αἰβοῖ* may suggest *ἀπέπτυσσα*, *ψύττα* may suggest *φθειρόν*, but that does not constitute a sentence any more than the expletive one indulges in when reading a tiresome grammatical treatise can be considered a judicial sentence. But the interjection is multisignificant. Everything depends on the tone, the gesture. *ἦ Ζανθία* is interpreted by *βάδιζε δεῦρο*. The vocative is not a sentence, and Stahl, though he names no names, is fighting against those who wish to extend the area of the sentence (A. J. P. XXIII 6). As to the omission of the forms of *εἶναι*, Stahl says that the frequent occurrence of the omission in the oldest language makes it not unlikely that it goes back to primeval time before *εἶναι* had lost its force, not to say had become a copula, and before there was any distinction between adjective as predicate and adjective as attribute.<sup>1</sup> <Then why insist so

<sup>1</sup> According to some scholars (see J. van Ginteren, l. c., p. 110), the primitive copula is a pronoun, nay, *εἰμί* itself has been claimed as a verbalised pronoun. The Hebrew omission of the copula and the reinforcement of the

rigidly as Stahl has done on the difference between attribute and predicate? If we are to go back to primeval times, the predicate might be considered as an accusative of the object effected as in Arabic, a significant fact which I gleaned from Ewald Lehrb<sup>6</sup>, § 279, 1855, many, many years ago.<sup>1</sup> In that case the concord of subject and adjective predicate would be a mere assimilation. After the familiar ellipsis of forms of εἶναι (A. J. P. XXIII 7) Stahl takes up the ellipsis of verbs of motion, of verbs of saying and doing, of verbs involved in the context. All this may be considered elementary, but supplying ellipses may be dangerous sport, as Stahl himself has shown, when he follows Kühner and Goodwin in paralleling οὐχ ὄπωρ (p. 780) and οὐχ ὄρι (A. J. P. XX 228; XXVII 234).

The great division of sentences is into 'Urteilssätze' and 'Begehrungssätze' and the 'Urteilssätze' are further divided into 'Aussagesätze' and 'Fragesätze'. 'Opinion' and 'Desire'. Why not the other way? It is the common way, the genetic way. And the question is not a sentence at all unless it borrows its answer. Word-questions and sentence-questions, simple and disjunctive questions, questions proper and questions rhetorical, principal sentence and dependent sentence, coördination and subordination, simple, expanded and compound sentences, require no comment. Subject sentences and object sentences are comprised under the name of the substantive sentence. They stand in the same relation to the leading verb as do the corresponding nominal forms, and include adverbial relative sentences, the adverb representing time, place, manner and cause.

To causality Stahl devotes especial attention, as well he may (A. J. P. XXVIII 353), and causal sentences are distinguished thus: 1. Hypothetical (des vorausgesetzten Grundes). 2. Causal proper (des vorhandenen Grundes). 3. Concessive (des nicht wirkenden Grundes). 4. Consecutive (des umgekehrten Grundes). 5. Final sentences (der erstrebten Folge oder Absicht). I keep the German because 'Grund' is susceptible of a varied translation into English and because Germans play tricks with technical Latin terms. So the first translation of 'Voraussetzung' is 'pre-

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identical relation by the pronoun (compare the use of οὐτος) are familiar facts. No one who has ever read can forget the ring of I Kings 18, 39.  
 יהוה הוא האלהים

<sup>1</sup> See now J. van Ginteren, p. 112.

sumption' and lo! we have a subdivision of the hypothetical sentence which we call conditional sentence into the 'presumptive' and 'conditional' sentence. Stahl is evidently proud of this distinction and he takes half a page to provide for the 'presumptive' group in which the leading verb involves the notion of will, the *ἀναμένειν ἰάν* group, the *expectare si* group, in which *ἀναμένειν* and *expectare* denote suspended action (*μέλλειν*). These sentences have been roughly classed by some as interrogative sentences. Against this Goodwin protested years ago (M. and T., R. E., §§ 493, 680), and on the corresponding Latin phenomenon Gaffiot has recently written a special treatise. The thing is plain enough and there is no need of Stahl's division. It is merely a matter of involved condition. At any rate 'presumptive' would not be a happy term in English, and I wish Stahl's English translator joy in rendering the German phrases 'in dem Fall' for the conditional and 'für den Fall' for the 'presumptive'. In idiomatic English we should use 'in case' for both and the German distinction, though comprehensible, seems to me more or less manufactured as 'in case' and 'against the case', 'in the event' and 'against the event' would be in English. 'Proviso' will not answer for 'presumptive', because 'proviso' carries with it an element of purpose. Compare the so-called conditional *ᾧστε (μή)*, *ἐφ' ᾧτε (μή)*. At all events, it seems to me a mistake to make such a category basic. Concessive sentences Stahl divides into those in which the inefficient cause is represented as real, and in those in which it is assumed as real. The distinction between concessive and adversative, to represent the two classes *καὶ εἰ* and *εἰ καί*, seems to me more practical. But no two grammarians will agree on these points and I will pass over Stahl's discussion of the difference between 'Nebensatz' and 'abhängiger Satz'. 'All dependent sentences', he says, 'are subordinate sentences, but all subordinate sentences are not dependent, such as relative clauses, the form of which does not depend on that of the leading verb.'

Important for Stahl's system is the division of subordinate sentences into Synthetic, those that have an inner nexus with the leading clause and Parathetic, those, the forms of which are not determined by the leading verb. To the former class belongs, f. i., *ᾧστε μή* with inf., to the latter *ᾧστ' οὐ* with ind.

The primitive nature of parataxis is recognized by Stahl, as we have seen, and the later development of hypotaxis, but Stahl is

not parataxis mad. That peculiar form of *furore* is becoming obsolete (A. J. P. XXIII 253). But I am not quite satisfied with his statement. 'There is', he says, 'a widespread use of parataxis in Homer, and, though it gradually receded, it was never quite given up and even lent itself occasionally to rhetorical effect'. 'Never quite given up' and 'rhetorical effect' are not scientific expressions. One craves exact figures.

Transitive verb in the language of Apollonios is ῥῆμα ἀλλοπαθές, intransitive ῥῆμα αὐτοπαθές. The ordinary definition of transitive and intransitive Stahl finds as unsatisfactory as I do and have always done (cf. LG<sup>s</sup> 213 R.), but he bids us distinguish carefully between the accusative of the object after the transitive verb and the accusative of the content after the intransitive verb, so that he is evidently working a different theory of the accusative than that which makes the outer object only a different phase of the inner object. That is the theory to which I have been addicted for half a century (LG<sup>s</sup>, p. 208 Note). Whether I owe it to Bernhardt or not, I cannot tell at this distance of time. Some one, I forget who, gives the credit of it to Erdmann, who is relatively of yesterday (A. J. P. XIV 372). Stahl's leading example of the combination of the accusative as the nearer, and the dative as the more remote, object is κεφαλὴν τινι ἀποτέμνειν. The example is not well chosen. With such a verb as ἀποτέμνειν, we should almost inevitably have the genitive (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 232).

Impersonal verbs (ἀπρόσωπα) ought to be called, according to Stahl, unipersonal verbs and he considers it a contradiction in terms to speak of these verbs as subjectless after the manner of most recent grammarians. He agrees with Apollonios in maintaining that σωφρονεῖν προσήκει has a subject just as much as σωφροσύνη προσήκει or to use Priscian's illustration 'bonum est legere' is only another form of 'bona est lectio', LG<sup>s</sup> 422 Note 1, and compare Lodge, A. J. P. XVI 372. The whole controversy turns on the conscious or sub-conscious survival of the original dative sense of the infinitive which it is hard to maintain in view of Il. 2, 455: τοῖσι δ' ἄφαρ πόλεμος γλυκίων γένητ' ἢ νέεσθαι and IO, 174: ἄλεθρος ἢ βιῶναι in which the inf. could not have well been other to the Homeric singer than it was to Euripides, Eur. Med. 542: μήτε χρυσὸς μήτ' ὑμνήσαι. The articular infinitive is, of course, a flat surrender. We are now luckily out of the forecourt of the Syntax of the Greek Verb, where I always kick my heels impa-

tiently. There is so little to be gained by all this would-be profound discussion for the real appreciation of the things that interest me. In my day the German professor, no matter what the subject was, used to give in his preliminary lecture a specimen of his house-philosophy and present to the admiring novice his theory of the universe and said admiring novice used to wonder at the 'mossy heads', who failed to jot down these outgivings of a great thinker. Now I am an ancient of days myself, and ought to have known better than to spend so much time on these preliminaries. The real business will begin with The Tenses and Moods. But before attacking them, let me say a few words about Stahl's presentation of

#### THE VOICES.

Of course, what we call in English after the old French grammars the Voices, Stahl calls Genera—the Greek γένη—a term based on a fancied resemblance to the genders, a positively indecent nomenclature. Compare ἴπιος, *supīnus*, and in another sphere *pathicus*. Things that are nowadays the common property of all school grammars, it will not be necessary to mention; as, f. i., the fact that the passive is a matter of function rather than of form, that there is but one distinctively passive form and that of seemingly late origin—the -θησομαι future. To the lone example of a distinctly fut. pass. form in Homer μῆγῃσεσθαι Il. 10, 365 (S. C. G. 168) Stahl adds δαήσεαι, Od. 3, 187, 325.

The intransitive use of transitive verbs is illustrated by a long list of verbs of motion that belong to this category, arranged for the most part alphabetically, for which we may be thankful just as we are thankful for the glimmer of an alphabetic arrangement in the fragments of Theognis. In so many other chapters the only order is the Teutonic order of Kraut und Rüben. Indeed, the lack of a definite and uniform principle of arrangement is one of the marked defects of the book from my point of view; and if any one will be at the pains of ordering the examples according to the departments of literature, he will appreciate the difficulty of a stylistic syntax. It is only when Stahl happens to take an interest in a special quest that the historical or artistic side is considered in mustering the proof texts. The transitive use of the intransitive, the causative use of the active, have only short lists. The latter it might have been well to emphasize because some scholars have considered the use as belonging in a special manner to the middle

(Pindar I. E. ciii; S. C. G. 144). The evasion of responsibility in most of the verbs in which the active is used for the passive (S. C. G., 172) Stahl has not noticed or not thought worth noticing. On the use of the future middle form of active verbs he has not been able to throw any light (A. J. P. III 227). What earthly help is it to say that the reason is to be sought in the fact that in many verbs the distinction between active and middle has vanished and that *ἔσομαι* has set a bad example? '*βήσομαι*', he thinks, 'is due to differentiation from *βήσω*'. The problem remains where it was.

The middle with its general reflexiveness is subdivided by Stahl into various classes. What is usually called the direct reflexive, roughly equivalent to active + acc. Stahl calls the objective middle, which would not answer for English in which the objective case covers both acc. and dative, and in which there is a merging of forms. Whoever translates Stahl should be alive to these differences of idiom. English uses the reflexive more sparingly than German. The German reflexive is much lighter than the English which has practically discarded the simple personal pronouns for the cumbrous self-compounds, so that we use instead intransitives and passives much more than the German does, the passives, in fact, riotously in the face of heredity (A. J. P. XXIII 18). The Greek is, of course, still lighter than the German and the differences of idiom lead to analyses that may be superfluous for this and that idiom, but are after all not without interest. So in the long alphabetical list of 'objective middles' few will be found that do not involve a natural action (S. C. G. 146; cf. A. J. P. XXVIII 235), and the few that do not may be otherwise conceived. To Stahl and his fellow-Germans *ἀπόλλυσθαι* may be 'sich zu Grunde richten', but the first and most natural German rendering seems to be 'zu Grunde gehen'. To the Romans it was *perire* not *se perdere*. To us it is 'perish' not 'ruin one's self'. And so the other list of verbs of feeling, from *αἰσχύνεσθαι* to *τέρπεσθαι*, which are for the most part passively conceived in English. 'I am ashamed', 'I shame' (Shakespeare), 'I take shame to myself,' present different facets.

The indirect reflexive Stahl calls 'das Medium der Beteiligung'. The Latin is *sibi, in suum usum*; in German as in English the rendering is often the possessive pronoun. There is a long demonstration of *ἄρχειν* and *ἄρχεσθαι, ποιεῖν* and *ποιεῖσθαι*. Thuk. 6, 58, 2 he reads *πομπὰς ποιεῖσθαι* for *πομπὰς ποιεῖν* and Plat.

Legg. 865 A he drops τῶν ἀρχόντων in consonance with the general principle; for he is a uniformitarian, when it suits him.

The causative middle is treated at much greater length than the causative active for which Stahl had curtly referred us to the context. ἐστεφανώσατο Pind. O. 7, 81 and στεφανώσαίμενος O. 7, 15 are no more causative than O. 14, 24 ἐστεφάνωσε χαίταν.

There is no disputing the value of these lists, but the interpretation of the differences between active and middle is in many cases, if I may say so, not so much grammatical as lexical; that is to say, the grammatical definition does not determine the practical use, the conventional use. So γῆμαι of the man, γήμασθαι of the woman. We might insist on a uniform translation of 'marry' for the man, and 'get married' for the woman, but the antique bride did not rope in her husband as the modern bride does hers and the *in suum usum* formula does not help.

A further division is made for the local middle, the 'towards', 'from' and 'with' middle, illustrated by μεταπέμπεσθαι and ἐφέλκεσθαι, ἀποπέμπεσθαι and ἀποσείεσθαι, ἄγεσθαι and φέρεσθαι. To be sure, the middle in all these verbs is not compulsory and the use of the active where the middle would be customary produces what I have ventured to call an aristocratic disdain of effect (S. C. G. 148). With the ἄγεσθαι and φέρεσθαι verbs Stahl classes σκοπέεσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐνθυμείεσθαι. 'This conception', he thinks, 'is borne out by the Homeric ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν, φράζετο θυμῷ and the like'. He may be right, but a great deal of mischief has been wrought by the appeal to the fuller expression. The fuller expression does not necessarily give the conception of the briefer expression, just as in the theory of the cases it does not follow by any means that we have a whence-conception with the genitive wherever we can give a whence-turn by a preposition such as ἐξ or ἀπό.

The reciprocal middle comes to its rights in Stahl, but while he takes ἐρίζεσθαι as a reciprocal (see my note on Pind. O. 1, 58: ἐρίζεται rendered necessary by the remark in Fennell's first ed.), he excludes ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μάχεσθαι, μάρνασθαι, because 'mutuality' is not involved, as if it did not take two to make a quarrel.

And now we come to what I would fain call the drip-pan middle, the πανδέκτης middle, the middle that is put at the bottom to catch the drippings of the other uses as the ablative is put to catch the drippings of the other cases. It is called the intensive middle, the dynamic middle. We have five *chevaux de frise* pages on the subject and after all the catego-

rizing, individual authors baffle us. There is, f. i., παρέχειν and παρέχεται. If you read certain authors you are ready to formulate. ὁ παρέχων shirks responsibility for disagreeable things, ὁ παρεχόμενος takes the credit for agreeable things, but alas! Plato who after all writes Jove-like Greek sends the distinction ἐς κόρακας. In short the dynamic middle might as well be called the ethical middle and spelling it out with the help of 'out of one's own means' and the like is in many cases a mere concession to the mania for explaining the reflexive notion, which is often so faint that one forgives Curtius for his untenable explanation of -μαι, -σαι, -ται. After one has done one's best, one must needs fall back on the way of the language. λαβεῖν may be rendered to 'grip', and λαβέσθαι 'to get one's grip', the -εύειν and -εύεσθαι may be differentiated, πολιτεύειν 'to be a citizen', πολιτεύεσθαι 'to play one's part as a citizen', but ἔπεισθαι like *sequi* does not yield to us a reflexive sense without forcing, and after all is said and done we have to admit, as Stahl has done, that the language is capricious in such matters. We translate ἰδεῖν 'see', ἰδέσθαι 'to see with one's own eyes', an overtranslation as ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρᾶν shows, but if there is such virtue in ἰδέσθαι, why not in ἰδόμενος? Ah! the verse. Like the rest of us Stahl has to go into bankruptcy. Translation will not suffice. 'The middle may be quite appropriate', he says, 'and yet when there is no essential difference between the middle and the active the <frivolous> author may go to work <or rather to play> and use the active'. And the whole thing winds up with a chapter on the difference between the -κα and the strong perfects, the use of the aorist active (e. g., ἔδρακον) side by side with the present middle (e. g., δέркоμαι) and the tendency of the sigmatic aorist to the causative signification, ἔστησα)(ἔστην. All this is very disappointing in a work that was to have illuminated the whole track of our studies. The book will be a God-send to those who like to write about Greek syntax without reading Greek, and every Greek scholar will welcome the material, but the specialist in syntax who is really seeking light and who has worked through the whole period covered by Stahl will not be edified by the false points he has made and the ruthless way in which he breaks off those that he has not developed himself.

Then follows the chapter on the medio-passives, the future middle used as a passive and the small group of verbs in which the aor.-middle is used passively. Even in Attic ἐσχόμεν appears as a passive, ἐσχέθην being late. But I will spare myself and my



reader the trouble of going through these and other familiar categories which Stahl's wider definition of syntax has brought into the range of his study.

A word or two as to the passive. Theoretically the passive ought to be formed from transitive verbs only with an accusative object, and he might have added that the word 'transitive' itself suggests the limitation. A transitive verb is a verb that passes over to a passive rather than one that passes over to an object. But with a lordliness that reminds one of English, the passive can be used with a subject which with the active would appear as a genitive object rarely or a dative object not infrequently.

But Stahl's rule seems to me incautiously worded (p. 69): 'Tritt zu einem persönlichen Dativ dieser Art im Aktivum ein sachliches Objekt im Akkusativ hinzu so bleibt dieses bei der Verwandlung ins Passivum'. Strictly construed this would warrant us in saying, \**δίδονται πλοῦτον οἱ Ἕλληνες*. Even English rebels against such a liberty, or at least is uneasy under it (A. J. P. XXIII 18; cf. II 92). The few examples he can rake up outside of the famous *ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλὰς* group, which does not count (A. J. P. XXV 110) are to be subsumed under the accusative of the inner object and are nearly all Thukydidean and on the same lines as the famous or infamous *ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακὴν=ἐπιτροπήν* (S. C. G. 175).

The use of the passive aorist as the passive of the middle as well as the passive of the active (e. g., *ἤρέθην*), the use of the deponent middle and passive and the variations of prose and poetry in these respects—these are matters that seem to clog syntax proper, and the conclusion that Stahl reaches that there is no hard and fast rule about the use of the voices will not console the student who has religiously worked through the long lists that can only be mastered by a personal familiarity with the living and moving body of the language.



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WHOLE NO. 116.

## I.—STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB.

### SECOND ARTICLE.

#### *Tenses.*

Stahl's treatment of the tenses begins with a definition of 'Zeitart' and 'Zeitstufe', variously rendered into English. 'Kind of time' answers fairly well for the one, 'sphere of time' for the other (S. C. G. 184). 'Aktionsart', as might be expected, does not suit Stahl's definition of the verb. 'Every verb', he says, 'does not involve action'. But it may be said that every verb involves manifestation, and there is no manifestation without some kind of motion, emanation, if you choose to call it so. Stahl's 'Erscheinung' does not escape the eternal flux. 'Dauernde Erscheinung'—the flux keeps up. 'Vollendete Erscheinung'—the flux is frozen. 'Erscheinung an u. für sich'—that is the flux wherever you strike it. These are the 'Erscheinungen' known as present stem, perfect stem, aorist stem. Under the head of reduplication Stahl calls attention to a fact which he considers of significance; to wit, that certain compound verbs use only the simple perfect. So, for instance, τέθνηκα serves as perfect to ἀποθνήσκω. There is nothing new in the theory that in a number of compound verbs the prepositions have lost their local sense wholly and serve merely to intensify. But that is largely a matter of personal sensitiveness and much yet remains to be done in this whole domain. The main thing here is that in the perfect Stahl sees nothing more than a certain strengthening of the meaning, a certain intensity which he recognizes as the original force of reduplication. The suffixes that go to form the present stem

may have had to do with the kind of time originally, but the primal force does not work uniformly and what we attribute to the suffix may belong to the root and, of course, under this head he pays his respects to the *-σκω* verbs, those inchoatives that Latin taught us to regard as inchoatives (Curtius G. V.<sup>1</sup> 284; A. J. P. XIV 258). The important thing, it seems, is to consider whether the verbal notion has to do with a 'condition' or an 'event' (A. J. P. XXIX 270). The present stem turns an 'event' into a 'condition', the aorist a 'condition' into an 'event'. As for the aorist, Stahl objects as others have done to 'punktuell' (A. J. P. XXIX 238) as characteristic of the aorist, inasmuch as the use of the aorist in *μάλα πολλά πλάγχθη* and *μυρί' ἄλγε' ἔθηκεν*, the use of the aorist with high numbers, excludes the conception of concentration in a point. The only possibility is the 'an und für sich' formula, which, be it said, has the great advantage of being as empty as the traditional aorist. 'Momentary' fails to satisfy him as it has failed to satisfy others (S. C. G. 243). Nor are we to consider 'perfective' as the original signification. The imperfect is quite as 'perfective' as the aorist. 'The kind of time of the aorist is a negative one', says Stahl. That being so, he might have added, the much maligned aorist is really more to the purpose, not to say to the point, than 'an und für sich'. 'The aorist', he continues, 'though an original tense, shows some historical development especially in the passive forms which, as we have seen, were originally intransitive (S. C. G. 137) and the perfect grows under our eyes'. The *-κα* form originally confined to the vowel stems as in Homer, Hesiod and Pindar spreads visibly to dentals, liquids and nasals; and the use of the perfect extends more and more until the height is reached in Isokrates and Demosthenes (no figures). Isokrates and Demosthenes, it might have been remarked, are orators, of whom perfects are to be expected (A. J. P. XXIII 248), for oratory stands nearer to practical life. The drama, it is true, is handicapped by the verse but, for all that, Aristophanes does not shun the perfect, and the resurrected Menander has it. Many verbs, indeed, form no active perfect. Stahl gives a list. He ought to have added, 'none that can be proved' (A. J. P. XXIII 249). Literary evidence must be supplemented by linguistic imagination.

Under the sphere of time—the 'Zeitstufe'—with its past, present and future, Stahl distinguishes between relative sphere of time and absolute sphere of time—the absolute sphere of time

being that of the speaker. This is not pernicious nonsense like the Hoffmann distinction (A. J. P. XXVII 109), but one does not admire everything that is harmless. How can that be absolute which is relative to the speaker? The augment being the sign of the past sphere of time, the unaugmented forms were left in charge of the other spheres of time, and among these forms the future. If the Greeks had not been such adventurous spirits they might, like so many others, have been content with the present indicative, but a seafaring people, who were always yearning to pass the pillars of Herakles, they were not satisfied with the conative present and pressed forward to an indicative future form—a form that is not indicative, beyond dispute (A. J. P. XXIX 267). Why an indicative future form at all? That the future was originally a mood, a fellow of the other future moods, subjunctive and optative, that it retains its modality in the participle throughout (A. J. P. XXVIII 352), that it has not ousted the other infinitives from futural expressions (S. C. G. 326), that it has not ousted the other moods from temporal sentences (A. J. P. XXIII 246)—all this seems to be self-evident, and I do not think it necessary to argue against the way in which Stahl has adjusted the facts to his range of vision, especially as he admits grudgingly that the origin of the future form in Greek is too obscure to allow any certainty about it, so that he may be wrong—and he is wrong, as it seems to me, hopelessly so.

'The future, both active and middle', continues Stahl, 'is a manner of present future and has nothing to do with the kind of time.' The future perfect, it is true, brought with it the kind of time but it has a small range, though one does not see what the smallness of the range has to do with it, if the phenomenon itself is distinctive; but the latest development, by far the latest, the future passive, as distinguished from the form common to middle and passive, develops on the basis of the aorist and Stahl maintains that as there is no contrasting durative form, it is indifferent as to the kind of time. From this it appears that Stahl recalcitrates against the theory urged by Voemel long ago and maintained by Blass that when two passive futures are formed, the older form is durative, the younger aoristic (S. C. G. 168)—a theory which B. maintained so doggedly that he would not accept the slightest suspension of the rule. See his review of my S. C. G. in L. C. B. 1901, p. 897. Compare also A. J. P. XXIII 237, where I have suggested the aoristic ply of the fut. ind. as

a whole and the remarkable steadiness of the aor. part. with *φθίσομαι*. But Stahl maintains stoutly that no such distinction can be proved and such is his attitude towards *ἔξειν* and *σχήσειν* also, which I did not think fit to put in the same line with the passive future because of the oratorical usage. See A. J. P. XXII 228; XXVI 239. It is interesting to note that Wackernagel has also declared against the acceptance of the distinction. See IGF. XXII (1908), Anzeiger, S. 66. According to Stahl, the present sense of the present indicative is developed from the inherent durative sense; and the specialization of that sense is due to the absence of the augment and the presence of the futural form. But the present sense is just as conspicuous in languages that have no augment and the 'durative' sense comes from the prevalence of the long forms. A typical difference having set itself up between imperfect and aorist in certain forms, the present associates itself with the imperfect and becomes by preference durative, by preference progressive. Such, at least, seems to me a more reasonable explanation, for the present is both durative and aoristic. The universal present is aoristic, true at any point, and the aorist despite its augment is used for 'punctuate' action in the present (S. C. G. 260; cf. A. J. P. XXIII 245). It is unnecessary to go through the familiar categories of the specific present, the universal present, the present of unity of time, the *πδλαι*-group, the *praesens de conatu*, corresponding to *-urus sum*. See Ar., Th. 918: *κωλύεις*, where Cobet writes *κωλύσεις* unnecessarily. For Pindaric examples see I. E. cii. Then comes the present for perfect (perfektivisches Praesens), familiar enough in verbs that involve unity of character (S. C. G. 204), a category, which, as it seems to me, Stahl extends unduly. So I cannot feel with Stahl and others, Pind., O. 5, 23: *υἱῶν παρισταμένων* as *υἱῶν παρεστώτων*. Motion is not excluded. *ἵστασθαι* has not the stock-stillness of *ἑστάναι*. One can press forward, one can shift one's feet. Compare Plat., Euthyd. 274 B: *οἱ δὲ ἐτύγγανον ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιμσάμενοι*, 'clustering round us', with C: *οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκείνον ἰδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς*. In verbs of privation, which Stahl masses with the others, *στέρομαι* is not quite the same as *ἑστέρημα*. Verbs of privation connote feeling (Pindar, P. 6, 22).

The historical present Stahl calls preterital, psychological, rhetorical; and he finds no difficulty where Brugmann has found increasing difficulty. 'Anybody can see that the rhetorical emphasis of it unfits it for the equable flow of the epic narrative', and

if Stahl had known of my treatment of the subject, he would doubtless have seconded my statement that it was tabooed as vulgar by the epos and the higher lyric (A. J. P. XXIII 245). It is said that the historical present does not occur in the Nibelungenlied and a frivolous novelist of our day asks the question which Punch also asks, 'Why do women always write in the present tense? Is it because they have no past?' I have had to fight for the exclusion of the historical present from Pindar, so that I am not impressed by one of Stahl's rare references, 'Vgl. Christ.' As for Bakchylides compare A. J. P. XXVII 482. That the historical present is used by preference for the turning points of a narrative is another old story. Of the annalistic present he takes no notice (S. C. G. 200). In poetry he makes allowance for the pressure of the metre and the love of variety, and under the head of the present for the future he examines a number of passages in which in his judgment the present has been wrongly taken by the commentators as a future. <With the elaborate apparatus at the command of the Greek for the designation of future time, it is not strange that the folkspeech present for the future should have gone out of use, just as in English the present for the future has been crowded out of the principal sentence by *will* and *shall*, whereas it has all its rights in the subordinate sentence, so much so that Dr. Abbott declines to recognize 'if I shall—' as genuine English (A. J. P. XXVII 332)>.

Next comes the prophetic present and the *γίγνεσθαι* verbs, *γίγνομαι* being = *ἔσομαι*, better I should say = *μέλλω ἔσεσθαι*. *ἔσομαι*, he might have added but could not be expected to add, leans to the durative as *γενήσομαι* to the aoristic. In the critical discussion of various passages, the notorious *ἐρημοῦτε* of Th. III 58, 5 comes up, where Stahl reads *ἐρημοῦντες*. Stahl's emendations often remind me of Albert Wolff's famous criticism of a performance of Victor Hugo's *Le roi s'amuse*. *Il était tout seul*.

The imperfect—*ὁ παρατατικός*—is divided by Stahl into two classes—the absolute and the relative—a futile division, as I have intimated before; and absolute duration, into uninterrupted and interrupted, or, as it is called by others, intermittent action. But as every phenomenon has some duration, 'it is perfectly possible', he says, 'to represent a momentary action as a durative action'—a liberty, to which, it seems, Homer is much given,—and a durative action as a momentary one—a deplorable way of putting it from my point of view (S. C. G. 205). Duration is purely subjective.

'Longum' means 'tedious'. 'Il a des longueurs' as the French critic said of his friend's distich. The descriptive imperfect is divided by Stahl into 'das Imperfektum der Beschreibungen u. das Imperfektum der Schilderungen'. We too can distinguish between 'describing' and 'picturing', but I question the value of all this synonym-mongering. The multiplication of categories, which I have elsewhere compared to the manufacture of spectrum gratings may be a highly scientific process, must be a highly scientific process or else so many reputations would not have been made by it, but a joy it is not except to the multiplier, who 'counts the heads of his beloved ones' and proceeds to widen the circle of his family: and this brings us to Stahl's Imperfect of Propagation (des Fortwirkens), which is found in verbs that involve a reagent. In the first class the action is continued until the reaction sets in—a large class which is composed of verbs that fall into the category of Will and Endeavor, verbs of Entreaty and Command, Persuasion and Advice, Compelling and Confiding, Sending and Calling. Under this head we find registered the notorious *ἔπεμπον*, 'escorted' rather than 'sent' (S. C. G. 212) and the notorious *ἔλειπον*, which I have called the Imperfect of Reluctance (A. J. P. XXIII 250). 'This class of imperfects', says Stahl, 'is especially common when there is no response, when the endeavor is vain, when we have successful resistance to pressure.' The second class has reference to a subsequent citation or a subsequent exertion. The former provides for verbs of saying, the latter provides for preliminary action, to be followed by aoristic action. But no sooner have we settled down to this distinction than we are informed that after all the author is free to look at things as he chooses, and this vindication of the rights of the 'Anschauungsweise' recurs with wearisome iteration. At the same time it cannot be denied that this elaborate treatment may be of service to those who believe in aoristic imperfects, made up chiefly of verbs of saying (A. J. P. XXIV 180), which have a natural leaning to the imperfect (Kühner-Gerth II 1, 144). 'As I was saying' 'cum diceret', 'il disait'. 'So sagte sie, ich hör' sie ewig sprechen' is the clue. The familiar category of the *imperfectum de conatu* is unfolded at great length, and paralleled with the Latin periphrastic future—*ἔστέλλετο* = *profecturus erat*. Why the Latin only and not the Greek *ἔμελλον* also? (S. C. G. 272). The negative of the imperfect *de conatu*, is what I have called 'resistance to pressure'. Earle's 'frustrated effort' (A. J. P. XXII



227) is in my judgment no improvement on the phrase. 'Frustrated' connotes finality. Other categories recognized by Stahl are the imperfect of incomplete action, the 'perfective imperfect'—a most unhappy bit of nomenclature—of completed phenomena that hold their own in the past, both sparingly represented by examples, and the imperfect as the preterite of perfective and praeterital presents, as in *ἔτικτε, ἐνίκα, ἡδίκουν*. That he does not put *ἔπολε* and *ἔγραφε* in the same class shows the arbitrariness of the whole thing.

Under relative duration Stahl takes up contemporaneous and overlapping 'phenomena'. These are, of course, especially important in connexion with compound sentences; and the overlapping category has been too much neglected both in Greek and Latin, as I pointed out forty years ago. Among the imperfects of relative duration Stahl puts the so-called Philosophic Imperfect (S. C. G. 210) and what I have called in jest the Expergefacient Imperfect (S. C. G. 219)—the waking up to a state of things—a phenomenon common to a large range of languages, Spanish, as I have noticed, being conspicuous among them. Whatever may be thought of this perpetual categorizing, the large collection of examples is to be welcomed. Nothing, it is true, will serve as a substitute for the study of the tenses *in situ*, but there is a kind of parallel bars gymnastic that may help the beginner to a proper conception of the imperfect—no easy thing after all (A. J. P. XXIII 292). Finally, Stahl has something to say about the overlapping imperfect and the imperfect of a previous past (Vorvergangenheit) and then we are allowed to take up the perfect.

The perfect is a present perfect. The phenomenon is completed in the present. The present sense, it seems, comes from the absence of the augment and from the fact that a completed phenomenon cannot complete itself in the future, <and yet some augmentless languages have highly effective present perfects and imagination can transport the perfect into the future (S. C. G. 234), as Stahl does not fail to tell us>. There is an intensive perfect (S. C. G. 229) and what Stahl chooses to call an extensive perfect, a perfect extending between two points (S. C. G. 227). The intensive perfect is confined to a few words and the assignment to the category is not always certain (S. C. G. 231). The bulk of the uses falls under the extensive perfect which, as I have said, looks at both ends of an action or as Stahl expresses it, 'a con-

dition that has been evolved from a past phenomenon'. The German translation is not 'ist geworden' but 'ist'. *γράφται* = 'es ist geschrieben', 'es steht geschrieben' as in English 'stands written', *τάπαται* 'lies buried'. Everybody knows the trouble in English and the late evolution of a passive tense of continuance in order to prevent ambiguity and how 'is being' holds its own despite the conservatives (A. J. P. XXIII 125). 'The post-Homeric use of the perfect', says Stahl, 'agrees essentially with the Homeric use', and he takes no notice of Wackernagel's studies. Only, as a matter of course, the employment of the perfect active spread with the spread of the formation and besides that, we notice a gradual increase especially in the range of prose (cf. S. C. G. 248). Here again it becomes necessary to insist on the sphere. The nearness of any department of literature to practical life may readily be measured by the perfect. The perfect belongs to the drama, to the orators, to the dialogues of Plato. In history the perfect has no place outside of the speeches and the reflective passages in which the author has his say; and when we read in Stahl that the perfect is much more common in Xenophon than in Herodotos and Thukydides, we remember that the authorship of Xenophon is not wholly historical and that he affects *ναῖνέτε* (A. J. P. XXIX 244). Plato, we are told, holds the mean. Of the orators, Isokrates and Demosthenes are in the van, quite comprehensible, if true. Isokrates measures everything by the present, which is honoured by his existence, and Demosthenes is a practical soul. But I find that I am repeating myself. See above, p. 390. Well, if I were not repeating myself, I should fail to reproduce the repetitious character of my author.

This perfect or rather present perfect is divided and subdivided by Stahl in a wearisome way that reminds one of those who make a category of every possible translation of the moods and tenses (A. J. P. XIX 351), and there are unlimited possibilities of dispute. Take, f. i., *μέμνηε*. Stahl considers it an instance of the past in its present effect. *ὁ δ' ἔχων μέμνηεν*. 'He is beside himself', the result of *ἐμάνη*. Why not 'he is stark mad', as an emotional perfect like *δέδια*? And then after all we come back to the 'Anschauungsweise', and 'the open sense of the student is the only open sesame' (A. J. P. XXIII 252). But for one I should never go so far as to say that P. 1, 13 *πεφίληκε* = *φιλῶ*. If *νενόμικε* Plat., Soph. 217 B, which Stahl cites, corresponds to *ἡγείται*, it is because the settled acceptance of the perfect of *νομίζω* brings it

nearer to the deliberate judgment of *ἡγείται*. *πεφόβηται* is not *φοβοῦμαι* nor *ἀπεστυγήκασι ἀποστυγοῦσι*. They are verbs of emotion and the difference from the present is actually translatable, though that is a test on which we must never insist. The perfect for the future perfect Stahl calls the perfect of anticipation and distinguishes between present and future occurrence, both being immediate and certain, a sense that is imported into the form (S. C. G. 281). The perfect of anticipation is not Homeric, though Od. 20, 351-357 we have a perfect of vision, parallel with the prophetic present. With this perfect of anticipation, Stahl parallels the present of anticipation in order to prove that the present is not of itself a future. The empiric perfect he excludes from Homer. There is no conceivable theoretical reason for this and the Homeric examples I have given (S. C. G. 257) of the gnomic use of the perfect based on experience (= empiric perfect) still seem to be perfectly cogent.

Like the perfect the pluperfect is divided by Stahl into intensive and extensive. The extensive pluperfect is a blend of past and prae-terpast (Vorvergangenheit), this 'Vorvergangenheit' being the point most stoutly denied by Delbrück, Brugmann and others and set down as differentiating Latin and Greek pluperfect. 'Herodotos', says Stahl, 'has a certain preference for the tense' (compare A. J. P. XXIII 250; S. C. G. 264) and the increase of its use coincides with the increase in the use of the perfect (no figures). Next we have the pluperfect of the past state, of preceding result, 'which differs from the aorist only in the way one looks at it', the pluperfect of that which is 'over and gone', the pluperfect of 'rapid relative completion', and yet other subdivisions which are all illustrated with irritating departures from chronological sequence; e. g., Od., Xen., Il., Plato, Xen., Plato.

Everybody tries his hand on a new way of defining the aorist. I have tried several myself. 'Apobatic' seems to me better than 'aoristic'. The tense of culmination is not altogether bad. 'Consummation' which has been suggested associates itself too readily with the perfect—'consummatum est', *τετέλεσται*. Stahl, as we have seen, says that the aorist designates past time 'an und für sich'. But the English language rebels against 'an u. für sich', that famous German improvement on the old *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, the old *per se*. After all, the traditional designation 'aorist' answers as well as anything else. It has become a technical term and Stahl has to admit that Apollonios understood the aorist indica-

tive perfectly, though his mind was not clarified as to the 'kind of time'. Fifty years ago whose was? And yet Apollonios was capable of making a sharp distinction between present and aorist imperative (compare A. J. P. XXIII 241). Now, according to Stahl, the notion of duration having long been connected with the imperfect and pluperfect, the only thing left to denote the 'momentary phenomenon' was the aorist and so the aorist became the tense of momentary action, as a manner of residuary legatee. But this notion of momentary action has done no end of harm, to which Stahl himself has furnished the antidote by adding that the momentary tense may be used when the notion of duration is of no moment.

In Stahl's representation the aorist is the narrative tense by eminence, a statement that seems to require some modifications in the light of statistics (A. J. P. XXIX 243). "Of course", says Stahl, as he had said before, "an imperfect can be used of a rapid action because all 'phenomena' occupy some time". Still that does not exclude the expression of a greater or less stretch of time by the contrasted use of imperfect and aorist; as, Il. 23, 228: *πυρκαϊῆ ἔμαραινέτο, παύσατο δὲ φλόξ*; and yet there are passages in which we find a shift from one tense to the other without any observable difference in actual duration. But for all that Stahl is as unwilling as I am (S. C. G. 212; A. J. P. XXIII 243) to concede an actual interchange of tenses. The artist's *ἔποίησε* he explains by the creative act, *ἔποιε* by the duration of the artist's labour—an explanation which does not explain (compare S. C. G. 212 note; A. J. P. XXIII 251). Then comes the perfective aorist of which he makes two classes; one that sums up a previous statement, one that gives the historical result. This perfective aorist is the 'upshot aorist' of S. C. G. 238. Stahl objects to 'complexive' in which others have found comfort and will have naught to do with 'punktuell', which he dismisses curtly by reference to Stesich. II; Eur., Hec. 683; Hdt. I, 35. I do not feel the cogency. Much space is naturally given to the empirical aorist, for which gnomic aorist is to Stahl only another name. A detailed criticism of Stahl's presentation of this much discussed section of the aorist would require a special treatise. The essential points are anticipated in my syntax. This empiric aorist occurs frequently in Homer but chiefly in comparisons, and it is relatively more common in poetry than in prose. Gorgias abuses it in his Helena and I may add that Isokrates is not averse to it. The rare aorist

of an action that failed of accomplishment, in which the will appears as a deed, has a special chapter. It is necessarily short. The examples so far as they are cogent are all from the Ion of Euripides. No one will question the closeness of the meshes of Stahl's dragnet. I pass over the anticipatory aorist, the aoristic question in  $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\omicron}\acute{\upsilon}$ ; the dramatic aorist.

Against the term 'ingressive' aorist Stahl protests as he generally protests against everything that he does not originate. 'Zwischen  $\eta\beta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$  und  $\eta\beta\eta\sigma\alpha\iota$  ist in Bezug auf das Stadium der bezeichneten Erscheinungen gar kein Unterschied, wenn man nicht einen solchen hineintüfteln will. Warum soll man nun das eine inchoativ und das andere ingressiv nennen?' The protest is rather amusing in view of the author's own 'Hineintüfteleien'. But the distinction between 'inchoative' and 'ingressive' is no 'Hineintüftelei'. Our English 'begin' is ambiguous. Sometimes it is antithetic to the end of an action. 'It began to rain' ('It ceased to rain'). Sometimes it refers to the entrance upon a state. 'He began to reign'. One is imperfect, inchoative, one is aoristic, ingressive. Under this head I would add that in view of S. C. G. 239, it is interesting to observe that all the typical examples cited by Stahl except  $\epsilon\sigma\chi\omicron\nu$  (S. C. G. 241) are first aorists, a point to which Stahl does not call attention any more than he calls attention to the affinity of the aorist for the negative (S. C. G. 245) or to the use of the aorist with definite numbers (S. C. G. 243), both of which categories would have saved special attitudinizing in the matter of 'Anschauung'.

The future is indifferent as to the kind of time (S. C. G. 265), indifferent also as to the sphere inasmuch as it can be employed as a *futurum exactum* which the Greek lacks (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 147). The future of the future ascertainment of a present action is not specifically Greek and the category is of more importance when we have to do with the temporal relations of the optative +  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ . Still it was well worth registering as was also the future of verbs of will. Compare Jebb on Soph., O. T. 1077. My note on Pindar, O. 7, 20 is  $\epsilon\theta\epsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\sigma\omega\ \delta\iota\omicron\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha\iota = \epsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\nu\ \delta\iota\omicron\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\sigma\omega$ . Stahl says that the will does not exert itself until the occasion arises or rather: wenn der Wille sich an ein vorhergehendes in der Zukunft Liegendes anschliesst, also mit diesem erst in Wirksamkeit tritt. With all my admiration for the German language, the study of Stahl's syntax has heightened my thankfulness that I was born to an idiom that does not lend itself readily to such roundaboutness, that my native tongue is one that has been styled 'the

pemmican of language'. The treatment of the future perfect follows the usual lines.

The periphrastic tenses, to which I have paid especial attention in my Syntax, Stahl divides into (1) the *in eo esse ut* class into which he puts the notorious Thukydidic *μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν* (3, 2, 2) 'which they were on the point of importing', whereas my translation would be 'of which they were (had been) regular importers'; (2) the class in which the notion of reality lying in the so-called copula is emphasized (cf. S. C. G. 247); (3) in which the participle assumes an adjective sense (S. C. G. 291; cf. 191); (4) as a mere periphrasis, *σχήμα Χαλκιδικόν*. I do not care to discuss the coincidences and differences of treatment. I will only say that Pind., N. 10, 18: *παρὰ μητέρι βαινοῖσ' ἔστι* is not the same as *π. μ. βαινεῖ*. It is = *μητρὶ παραβάτις ἐστί*. It is parallel with O. 2, 84: *ὄν πατήρ ἔχει πάρεδρον*. In one court we have an assessor, in the other an attendant (lady in waiting). The elevation of the periphrasis with *γίγνομαι* is recognized but not the source of it (S. C. G. 141). Under *ἔχω* with the participle Stahl does not commit himself to the doctrine which some consider the only sound one, *ἔχω* = *εἰμί* (A. J. P. XVIII 356). '*μέλλω*', he notes, 'is sometimes a mere periphrasis and so is *ἔθελω*'. This ought to have made him more tolerant of the original modal character of the future, which was afterwards more or less effaced.

The subject of the tenses of the moods is treated with characteristic prolixity. We are told over and over again that we have to deal with the kind of time and not the sphere of time, over and over again that, after all, the difference is the difference of the point of view, so that we become positively ungrateful to the tireless scholar who has heaped up example after example of constructions that no one will dispute. There is just enough historical sequence in some sections to fret the orderly soul at the confusion in others. Here a wall, there loose blocks of quarried stone. In the section where he shows that the *de conatu* use of the participle is especially common, there is a fair approach to something that might be called arrangement, Od., Pind., Aeschyl., Soph., Eur., Herod., Th., Plato, Isae., Dem. It is a rich section and I should have been glad to draw on it, when I was giving one of my critics an elementary lesson in Greek syntax (A. J. P. XXVIII 111, 352). To be sure, Stahl does not exercise his critical faculty on P. 4, 106, where some would read unnecessarily *κομίξων* (Pindar, I. E. cii) nor on Eur., Phoen. 81 where Valckenaer

read *λύσουσ'* against which my syntax entered a silent protest (S. C. G. 193; A. J. P. XXVIII 352), for I deliberately preferred to make a selection among my examples and sacrificed opulence to order. Not that my original collections could compare with the sweepings that Stahl has stowed away in his vast granary, but a universal usage loses its interest for one who is on the search for stylistic differences. See S. C. G., p. 138, footnote. And so Stahl goes on to show that all his categories of the kind of time reappear in the 'side moods'. The present imperative inf. is used in Attic decrees for durative or repeated action, the aorist for a special case. See Meisterhans, one of Stahl's few references. But Meisterhans will bear watching. If the mechanical regularity of Attic inscriptions is as great as M. makes it out to be, it presents an interesting point of contrast to the Attic orators, who are much freer in their ways and this is a subject which may possibly reward exploration. 'The Gortyn IS. is reckless in the matter of the kind of time', says Stahl. 'But the Gortyn IS. has troubled the syntactical Israel before (A. J. P. XVI 388). The perfect of the side moods is true to the kind of time, completion, intensity, overwhelming finality. The aorist of the side moods indicates a momentary 'phenomenon', but it can also be used of the durative, as we have seen, when momentariness is not momentous. For the frequent use of the aorist opt. in universal sentences (good at any point), S. cites Soph., Antig. 652 a negative sentence (S. C. G. 246) and Eur., Ion 380 where a definite number is given (S. C. G. 243). In the list of 'inchoative' aorists of the moods the only second aorist examples are *κάμῃ* (Hdt. 3, 99, where *ὄς ἂν κάμῃ* = *νοσήσῃ*), *σχέει*, *σχέειν* (*κατασχέειν*), *φανῆναι*, *στήναι*, but neither here nor in the corresponding section has Stahl called attention to this not unimportant predominance of the first aorist. As the empiric aor. and perfect get their meaning from the sphere of time, the side moods share in the signification only so far as they represent the indicative—not so self-evident after all. And then we have the inevitable chapter on the 'Freiheit der Anschauung', which reminds one of the recurrent Euripidean tag, *πολλὰ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων*. *γνώθι σαυτόν* is every whit as good as *γίγνωσκε σαυτόν*. You may translate the difference, as I have done (S. C. G. 302), but the difference does not amount to anything, and Stahl is quite right, as no one follows the advice, least of all, syntacticians. Of course, with this freedom of choice the poets are tempted to shift from aorist to present and present to aorist at the piping of the metre,

but Stahl forbears to dwell on that perilous point (A. J. P. XXIX 376), as well he may. Under this head of the shift from one tense to another Stahl gives an interesting series of examples, some of which he explains, while others are consigned to the 'Anschauung' washpot. Isocr. 3, 35 we have the negatived aor. followed by the positive perfect, an example cited together with others, S. C. G. 250.

Next we are assured with unnecessary prolixity that in simple sentences tenses of the subj. and imper. have only to do with the kind of time, *μαχώμεθα, ἐξέλθωμεν, πείθεσθε, μὴ δείσητε*, the sphere of time being necessarily future. The subj. after verbs of fear is only a seeming exception. <In both the classic languages, be it remarked, the failure to recognize the difference between the action itself and the ascertainment of the action has given grammarians much trouble. See LG<sup>s</sup> 257, 2, S. C. G. 435 and compare Gellius XVIII 2, 14.> So Od. 15, 13: *μή τοι κατὰ πάντα φάγωσιν . . . σὺ δὲ τηῦσίην ὁδὸν ἔλθης, φάγωσιν* refers to the future of the action, *ἔλθης* to the future of the ascertainment = *ἐλθὼν φανῆς* (S. C. G. 294).

Whilst the will has to do with the future, the opt. according to Stahl as the mood of the wish is not bound by the sphere of time. It may deal with the past, present or future, but the Greek does not live up to its privileges; and whereas the Latin aor. opt. is freely used of the past, there are only a few Greek aor. optatives that can be so construed and Stahl declares that he has corralled them all. They are a sorry lot. Od. 13, 229: *ἀντιβολήσαις* is an imperative opt. Od. 18, 79: *μήτ' εἴης μήτε γένοιο* in the mouth of high-tempered Antinoos reminds one of Sir Anthony Absolute's threat, 'I'll disown you, I'll disinherit you, I'll *unget* you'. Antinoos simply wishes Iros ungot. *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι* are combined to make up a totality, 'cease to be, be utterly extinct'. Aesch., Ag. 670: *γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἄριστα* is a wish for ascertainment. Four of the passages are from Euripides, who often forces the note. Andr. 766: *ἢ μὴ γένοιμαν* might be called a general wish. The personal *ἐγώ* is really an impersonal *τις* and the sentiment is *τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι—κρείσσον*. The three other passages, Hel. 215, Hipp. 406, Rh. 720, have all *ἄλοιτο*, a sweeping imprecation, which it is not necessary to analyze in Greek any more than one analyzes 'damn' in English. We are perfectly free in damning a man after he is damned already. Here is where the literary sense comes in. We are not to confound poetic freedom with linguistic survival. When Job cursed his day, he might have cursed it in the optative and in 'Woe worth the day that cost thy



life, my gallant gray', 'Woe worth' might be rendered by *ἄλοιο*. As for Plat., Phaedr. 227 C: *εἴθε γράψειεν*, there is no earthly need of making *γράφειεν* refer to the past. That the optative may have had this use in prehistoric times is possible but the survival is unlikely. The case is parallel with that of the Lat. present subj., where we expect the imperfect. Why may not overwrought feeling project the past into the future? The potential opt. with *ἄν* (*κεν*), on the other hand, is not to be explained away. Homer and the Ionians use it of the past. The solitary passage in Attic Ar., R. 413-14 Stahl does not explain as I do, S. C. G. 439, in point of fact does not explain it at all. He is quite right about Th. I, 9, 4: *οὐκ ἂν πολλαὶ εἶεν* and so are others. S. C. G., p. 174 footnote.

In synthetic subordinate clauses and dependent principal clauses the time of the moods is relative and we have to do with contemporaneity, priority, superiority. In most of them the action is necessarily posterior as in final sentences and sentences with *ζῶς* and *πρίν*, which Stahl calls, as I do, 'temporal sentences of limit'. In others the choice of the kind of time is influenced by relative past and relative present; so that we may say, though Stahl does not say so, that the moods simulate the indicative. All this, apart from the intolerable verbiage, is common property. There are a few final sentences in which the aor. subj. seems to refer to the present and Stahl cites Eur., Hipp. 1299: *ὡς ὑπ' εὐκλείας θάνη* and explains by 'Verschiebung der Modalität'. The real object lies in the modifier, and Stahl interprets *ἵνα θανῶν εὐκλείαν ἔχη*. The aorist as the shorthand of the periphrastic perfect gives a simpler statement and a readier classification. Then follows a list of examples of necessarily posterior 'phenomena', the pres. subj. being used when the 'phenomenon' is contemporaneous and when the 'phenomenon' is prior but durative—no provision being made for overlapping—the aorist subj. being used when the 'phenomenon' is prior *an sich*; and attention is directed again to what I should call the mechanical exactness of Attic ISS.—according to Meistershans, a point which deserves reëxamination. Coincidence of aor. with future—a conspicuous feature—is passed over lightly. The same rules apply to generic sentences. In posterior temporal sentences (temporal sentences of limit) the present subj. denotes that the 'phenomenon' is coming to pass, the aorist that it has come to pass. For all this, I would refer the curious reader, if such an one there be, to A. J. P. XXIV 388 foll. on the Temporal

Sentences of Limit. Again, but not for the last time, Stahl insists on the wide reach of 'freie Anschauung' and yet seems to be gravelled by the narrowing of the scope in the case of *πρίν*, which has a marked repugnance to the pres. subj. 'Wenn nicht ausdrücklich etwas Zuständliches bezeichnet wird ist die nachfolgende Erscheinung als eingetreten denkbar. Daher überwiegt hier bei weitem der Aorist'. Why this dreadful roundabout? The action in *ὄν—πρίν* is prior to the action of the leading clause, and unless there is overlapping the aorist is to be expected (A. J. P. II 481). The one exception in Stahl's beloved Thukydides 6, 38, 2 is solved by the principle of overlapping. 'We are slow to put ourselves on our guard = we do not put ourselves on our guard until we find ourselves, etc'. *κακοί* is clearly equivalent to a negative.

There is a *salto mortale* from the other uses of the optative to that of the optative for the indicative in *oratio obliqua*. The Germanic use has given no end of trouble. Even renunciation of responsibility does not meet all the conditions and to call the mood a sign of obliquity is a mere evasion. The only example that Stahl can cite from Homer is in an interrogative sentence (cf. S. C. G. 307), and he gives no explanation of the exclusion of the optative from other classes of sentences in Homer. Now this Homeric limitation of the optative may be explained either as suppression or as checked extension. I have had something to say in favor of checked extension (A. J. P. XXVII 205). Stahl is utterly non-committal. The familiar use of the infinitive in *oratio obliqua*, natural as it seems to us, is an extension. In fact, the use of *oratio obliqua*, at all, has been set down as more or less artificial; as, f. i., by Wilamowitz on the recently discovered fragments of Korinna (p. 54), though in English, if we consult our consciousness, there seems to be little difficulty about the shift. In Greek the 'Modusverschiebung' of the opt. for the subj. is an explicable thing, but optative for indic. came or seems to have come only through the interrogative sentence, in which the shift of subj. to opt. spreads to the indicative, by progressive analogy, as no one dares to say false analogy.

Under the infinitive we have the inevitable wearisome iteration of 'Zeitart' and 'Zeitstufe'. Of course he recognizes the fact that after *ὥστε* the fut. inf. must represent the fut. indic. in *oratio obliqua*, on which see A. J. P. VII 174. Consequently he reads Pindar, N. 5, 36: *πράσσειν* for *πράξειν*. To be sure, *ὥστε* is not

fully developed in Pindar (I. E. cviii), and an *oratio obliqua* twist is suggested by the passage, but it must be confessed that ὥστ' ἐν τάχει . . . . πράσσειν is seductive. Compare S. C. G. 206 and 405 on the use of durative tenses with adverbs and adverbial phrases denoting rapidity. Of the practical limitation of πρίν to the aor. inf. in the early times Stahl gives the following so-called explanation:

Da es in denjenigen Fällen, wo das relativ Zukünftige nicht an sich von längerer Dauer ist, der freien Auffassung anheimfällt, ob man es als eintretend oder eingetreten vorstellen will, so erklärt es sich, dass in Sätzen dieser Art der Inf. Aor. bei weitem überwiegt und bei Homer und Hesiod der Inf. Praes. nur an der einen oben angeführten Stelle (II. XVIII 245)<sup>1</sup> vorkommt.

The formula I have used for forty years and published more than thirty years ago puts the thing in a nutshell. πρίν is a negative. It is = οὔπω or μήπω. Its natural affinities are with the aorist, πρίν ἐλθεῖν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν = οὔπω ἐλθόντων Ἀχαιῶν (A. J. P. II 467). The πρίν of the grammars was once a hopeless mess and I venture to say that the first orderly exhibit of its use is to be found in the seventh edition of Liddell and Scott, whence it was promptly conveyed by Mr. Thompson without acknowledgment in his Syntax of Attic Greek published soon afterwards. τὰμὰ δ' ἐμά.

The articular infinitive is treated with Stahl's wonted tortuousness and prolixity—the tortuousness inexcusable, the prolixity perhaps justifiable in view of the confusion regnant in Madvig and Goodwin. I will simply state the matter in my own words and pass on. The articular infinitive as an abstract noun has only the kind of time, as an incorporation of the indicative it has all the tenses, future inclusive.

The infinitive after *verba volendi, valendi* and *faciendi*, which I call verbs of creation, is necessarily posterior to the leading verb and we have only the kind of time. But Stahl makes an exceptional class in which the notion of wish intrudes and he maintains that in these cases the aor. inf. can stand as the aor. opt. stands instead of the unreal. Every teacher knows that the translation of 'I wish I had seen' is a regular pitfall for the schoolboy, who tumbles into it with his βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. It is a pity that Stahl should have lent the sanction of his name to such a statement. In all the cogent passages that he cites, the unreality is transferred to the leading verb as in ἐβουλόμην ἄν.

<sup>1</sup> See A. J. P. II 467.

The infinitive representing the indicative and the indicative with  $\alpha\upsilon$  calls for no comment. Interesting is the observation that impersonal expressions which convey the sense of a verb of saying or thinking, such as, ἀληθείς, πιθανόν, ἄπιστον, occur very rarely, if at all. Either a personal turn is given or the articular infinitive is used. The transition of verbs of thinking into verbs of willing with the retention of the future construction is fully illustrated and with these verbs he classes μέλλω, in spite of its uncertain etymology. Of course, the Homeric 'likelihood' sense of μέλλω is noticed, but he does not go so far as those English scholars who acknowledge no other Homeric sense than that of 'likelihood' (Platt, E. J., Phil. XXI 40, Leaf on K 454) except with the future infinitive. This rule, accepted by so cautious a scholar as the late Mr. Monro (Od. 14, 133), requires, as so many rules require, changes in our traditional text. Stahl takes no notice of it whatever, but does not fail to call attention to the fact that the postponement μέλλω is not to be found in Homer nor in Hesiod either. The native hue of resolution has not been sicklied o'er by this pale cast of thought until it becomes 'delay'. The tendency is to use the future inf. of a more remote, the present of an immediate future (*in eo esse ut*), but there is the warning of the 'freie Auffassung'. Compare S. C. G. 272, and my review of Abbott's Johannine Grammar (A. J. P. XXVII 334). εἰκός, 'it is meet', passes over into εἰκόσ, 'it is probable', but its original force holds it to the construction of verbs of will. Herodotos uses the fut. inf. once (8, 68) and Xenophon sins, of course, and Isaios keeps him company once. But this conservatism of εἰκόσ is not a little remarkable, and may have a certain significance in connexion with the swing of τὰ εἰκότα in forensic oratory. Verbs of saying and thinking shift. ἐλπίζω as in English 'hope', προσδοκᾶν as in English 'expect', may be used of future ascertainment and the pres. inf. is in place. ἱπισχνεῖσθαι is not only 'promise' of the future but 'maintain' of the present and as a verb of will, it does not require the future infinitive. ὀμνύναι is another such verb. εὐχεσθαι is both 'praedicare' and 'precari'. Compare English 'vow'. All this is or ought to be familiar to the student of Greek, but it is true that ordinarily too little attention is paid to these shifts and Stahl embraces the opportunity to get in some critical remarks. When φάναι involves the will, it does not demand the future tense and the same thing is true of δοκεῖν, about which there has been a great deal of un-

necessary pother and so other verbs of believing and thinking, better believing than thinking, as believing is clearly voluntative. It is through this door, as I have maintained (A. J. P. XXVII 203) that *oratio obliqua* came in and the future infinitive is merely an accommodation, a view with which, I fancy, Stahl would have little sympathy. ἀναβάλλεσθαι, 'to postpone', with the fut. inf. Stahl questions and would substitute present or aorist where the future is found. But analogy is a subtle thing and the wholesale changing of -σαι into -σειν and *vice versa* at the bidding of grammatical 'rule' can hardly be deemed satisfactory. Verbal nouns like ἐλπίς may take the fut. inf. *qua* verb, the other infinitives *qua* noun; the latter with a preponderance of examples, matching preponderance of occurrences, by no means the same thing, for like the rest of us Stahl has his prejudices. Next Stahl makes war on the few passages in which verbs of will are combined with the future, for some of which Goodwin stands up stoutly. διανοεῖσθαι Stahl had already accepted as a verb of thinking—the only example of the shift I have given (S. C. G. 326). The others are remorselessly rooted up by a process in which he had been preceded by the uniformitarians. Much more common are the instances in which the present and aorist infinitive are used as future after verbs of saying. Many of these passages have been emended in our texts. -σαι has been replaced by -σειν, -σασθαι by -σεσθαι, -εσθαι by -σεσθαι, and ἄν has served as a ready handmaid to put the sentence into grammatical order. With most of these changes I am in sympathy and MS variants bear them out, but much depends on the period, the sphere and the author and wherever will intrudes we desiderate the ingressive aorist. But Stahl, who is nearly as old as I am, does not care for the ingressive aorist, and alters P. 4, 222: μείξαι into μείξειν against his own principles. See my note on the passage, 'A promise as a vow takes the aorist of the future', and compare P. 1, 44.

The present of the 'independent participle'<sup>1</sup> denotes contemporaneity or prior duration—'overlapping' is not distinctly mentioned, the perfect denotes completed condition whether contemporaneous or prior, the aorist denotes *per se* priority, the future posteriority as also the part. + ἄν = opt. with ἄν. Outside the

<sup>1</sup> 'Independent participle' is a contradiction in terms. One might as well speak of an independent skin. Stahl uses 'independent' in contrast to the participle that represents a finite verb (S. C. G. 354).

combination with verbs of motion and with the post-Homeric *ὡς* the future participle is very sparingly represented, as Od. 11, 608: *αἰεὶ βαλέοντι εἰοικώς* where, it might be remarked, the future participle is used in the full and original *μέλλω* sense and 17, 387: *τρύξοντα ἔ αὐτόν* where one is sorely tempted to read *τρύχοντα*. Thuk. 6, 78, 4: *ὁμόρους ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύουσας = μέλλοντας κινδυνεύειν*, the present participle carries with it the future, as elsewhere in Thukydides. The same temporal uses are found in the absolute participle and in the articular participle, are found and exemplified.

Then follows a chapter on the coincident aor. participle with aor. See S. C. G. 345. A few examples of the aor. partic. after verbs of hearing are given. It is a rare construction. Hearing and speaking do not coincide, in spite of Stahl. A causal nexus is possible. Coincident action with the future is represented by a few examples. Under this general head Stahl puts the participle with *φθάνω*, *λανθάνω*, *τυγχάνω*, but does not notice the steadiness of *φθάνω*, and the fickleness of *τυγχάνω*, as he might have done, if he had thought it worth while to read my article in A. J. P. XII 76. Yet another class is made up of aorist participles which follow the leading verb and being logically coördinate are absolutely and not relatively past; e. g., Od. 4, 56: *σῆτον δ' αἰδοίη ταμίη παρέθηκε φέρουσα | εἶδατα πόλλ' ἐπιθείσα*. Stahl does not say so in so many words but he implies that the action of the aor. part. is subsequent to the action of the leading verb. The translation by *καί = καὶ εἶδατα πόλλ' ἐπέθηκε* is not satisfactory. Coincidence or adverbiality will explain the tense. Pindar, O. 7, 5: *εἴ τις δωρήσεται = δωρήσεται . . . τιμάσαις*, the participle is not = *καὶ τιμάσῃ*. The *δῶρον* is the *τιμή*. See my note on the passage and also on P. 4, 130, where the aorist is due to the definite number. The example from the Gortyn IS. III 17: *αἱ ἀνὴρ ἀποθάνοι τέκνα καταλιπών* like the English 'died leaving' is a clear case of coincidence. Actual posteriority Stahl recognizes in participles that follow verbs of waiting; as, Il. 13, 37: *ἀμφὶ δὲ ποσσὶ πέδας βάλε . . . ὄφρ' ἔμπεδον ἀθλι μένοιεν νοστήσαντα ἀνακτα = εἰς ὃ κ' ἀναξ νοστήσειε* (cf. II, 666). And this is his explanation of the very common construction of *περιορῶν* with the aor. part. *περιυδεῖν* he considers = 'abwarten'. But *περιυδεῖν* cannot be divorced from *ἐπιυδεῖν* and the notion of will intrudes (A. J. P. XIV 103). The 'dependent' participle—the participle that represents the indicative—yields nothing novel and I am glad, and, doubtless, the reader, if I should

chance to capture one, will be glad, to have reached the end of a summary, which presents so little that is, at once, new and acceptable. The value of the material abides, and Stahl has earned the praise of primacy as a *condus, promus, procurator peni* of the Syntax of the Greek Verb. The troublesome problems of the Moods must be reserved for another number, if I find it in my heart to continue the analysis and the commentary.





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## I.—STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB.

### THIRD ARTICLE.

Moods and Tenses is the natural sequence in English. It is the sequence in Goodwin, the sequence in my Problems of Greek Syntax. But, of course, it is hard to separate them in detailed treatment. Moods are temporal and Tenses are modal (A. J. P. XXIII 127); and in my Greek Syntax I have followed the order Tenses and Moods as Aken has done in his *Tempora und Modi*, as Stahl has done in the *Syntax of the Greek Verb*, which I take up again for others. For myself as for all special students of the subject the book is an *ineluctabile fatum* and will hold me in its grip to the end.

Stahl begins, as we all begin, with Apollonios and finds himself forced to admit that the old grammarian's *ψυχική διάθεσις* (A. J. P. XXIII 126) is based on a correct view of the nature of the moods. Yet he contends that it cannot be called a definition because it does not give the *differentia specifica*, which means so much more to a German than 'specific difference' does to us, at least to judge by the way in which Stahl plays with German and Latin synonyms (A. J. P. XXIX 264). The Greek word for mood is *ἔγκλισις*—a poor word as it would seem, because it is also used for *accentus inclinatio*. But after all, 'tone' of utterance is not so bad a description of mood (S. C. G. 183). It seems a pity that *διάθεσις* has been appropriated for 'voice'—but Stahl cites Schol. Theod. II 5, 6 (=Gr. Gr. IV 2, p. 5, l. 2), which makes *ἔγκλισις* equivalent to *διάθεσις*: καθ' ὃ ἐγκλίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἡγουν εἰς ὃ ῥέπει ἡ ψυχὴ—a figure taken from scales and weights. How sad to find the sacrosanct realm of syntax invaded by a

naughty trope (A. J. P. XXIX 239) and a trope that has evidently been imported into the word, which means nothing more than *κλίσις* does in the noun.

Stahl now attacks the problem of the meaning of the several moods, the problem of the possibility of reaching a basic signification for the same. 'Basic significations' are not in good odor just now. 'Sphere of usage' is safer or 'types of application' (A. J. P. II 84). Indicative and Imperative he dismisses as too clear for discussion and spends all his energies on Subjunctive and Optative. 'The basic signification', says Stahl, 'must be sought in the simple sentences and in the oldest documents'. Then follows a long argument to prove that language began with simple sentences and that parataxis is earlier than hypotaxis. <Unfortunately, hypotaxis came in before our record. Simple sentences are not necessarily easier than compound, and in this whole discussion I am often reminded of the silliness of Swiss Family Robinsons in words of one syllable, as if one syllable were necessarily easier than two. But the great trouble is with the oldest documents and now classical scholars are asking one another 'with a wild surmise' whether the underground stream of language which has come to light of late may not be of more value than the oldest documents. The appeal is to Homer, as Paul's was to Caesar; but alas! for Paul's pseudo-poet on the throne and our real poet on the throne. The Homeric evidence must be accepted with great caution, as has been repeatedly urged, e. g., A. J. P. XXIV 353. The simplicity may be an artificial simplicity. The predominance of parataxis over hypotaxis is a matter of style as well as of period. Hypotaxis holds fast to constructions that parataxis has abandoned. The futural subjunctive abides defiantly in the dependent clause of temporal sentences and dares the future indicative to invade its domain. The modal nature of the future, obscured in the principal sentence, forces itself upon the most superficial observer in the dependent clause. A rude inscription of a late date may be more instructive than the artistic language of the epic (A. J. P. XXIII 253 foll.). That means, of course, that we have to restudy all our problems. But that necessity is one of the conditions of a progressive science like Syntax.>

It is an old story—we have many twice-told tales in Stahl—this advance from the simple structure of the sentence in Homer to the elaborate periods of Isokrates, from the *λέξις εἰρομένη* to the

λέξις κατεστραμμένη, both terms that, by the way, seem to have come from the Ionic home of the Epos. <But there are long sentences, balanced sentences in Homer, who does not hesitate to transcend the limit of the period as laid down by the rhetoricians. It is not a matter of advance in art merely; it is a matter of sphere.> This familiar theme of the growth of the hypotactic sentence Stahl proceeds to illustrate by the hypothetical sentence and by the relative sentence, both illustrations based on disputed assumptions. To him *εἰ* is 'da', 'so' (cf. L. G.<sup>3</sup> 590, N. 1), and the relative is originally an anaphoric demonstrative (A. J. P. XXIX 259). This leads him to discuss *ὃς τε*, in the *τε* of which he sees a copulative conjunction and not he alone. Those who, like Stahl, translate *ὃς τε* 'and he', are fooled by their own translation. 'He also' would probably be nearer the mark. Only the German 'also' and the English 'also' differ portentously, a significant lesson in semantics. Whatever the first meaning of *τε*, the doubling of it, *τε . . . τε*, which is the original use (according to Delbrück, S. F. IV 145), produces the effect of correlation, as much so as if *τε—τε* were *ὡς—οὕτως* (A. J. P. XXIII 256). *τε—καί* follows suit with the effect of *ὡς—οὕτω καί*. The business style of the ISS is averse to *τε—καί* and the less processional orators do not affect it, as Fuhr taught us a generation ago, just as they do not overdo *οὕτως—ὥστε*, of which Isokrates is so fond (A. J. P. XIV 241). Isokrates had time enough or took time enough for this artistic parade. This correlation helps to explain the connotation 'so' (Monro, H. G. § 331 n.), and 'who-so' readily becomes 'whoso', readily becomes generic, like *δοσῆς* which was originally not the generic but the characteristic relative. Monro considers *ὃς τε* generic,<sup>1</sup> H. G., § 266, and the fact that *δοσῆς* kills *ὃς τε* is not without meaning. The crowding out of *ὡς* by *ὡς τε* in the consecutive sentence can not be explained on the 'copulative conjunction' theory nor the curious difference between *οἶος* and *οἶός τε*, *οἶος* giving the character (disposition), *οἶός τε* the situation (position). See A. J. P. VII 165. The distinction, as I have put it, has been widely accepted. Stahl says that *οἶος* is 'Beschaffenheit', *οἶός τε* 'Vermögen' (p. 496), though he grants that the especial sense 'imstande sein' is prevalently expressed by *οἶός τε*. <An impertinent fellow is represented in Plato's Republic 329 C as asking Sophokles some home questions as to

<sup>1</sup> "ὃς τε", he says, 'lays stress on the general permanent element in facts.'

his standing in the Court of Love. The first question pertains to his state of mind, *πὼς ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια*; Comp. Conv. 176 C: *ἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν παρόντων προθύμως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πολὺν πίνειν οἶνον*. The state of mind (*οἶος*) is, of course, not unconnected with the state of body (*οἶός τε*), and that leads to the next question: *ἔτι οἶός τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι*; To this second question by a natural chiasmus Sophokles replies first with the usual formula in case of indecency *εὐφήμει* and proceeds to answer the other with more or less sincerity: *ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον* (*αὐτό* being = the d—d thing, A. J. P. XXVI 237). Cicero's translation (Cato Maior 47), which has helped to make the passage famous, is a poor and coarse affair. Quite apart from Cicero's lack of appreciation of the delicacies of Greek syntax—a matter that has been made evident, if that were needful, by special studies—it will be remembered that his recent experience with Publilia may not have been the most pleasant. The alliance was scarce contracted when it was dissolved.>

Stahl's method with the moods is this. Find the fixed usages that need no adminicles and separate them from the shifting usages, from the usages that are accompanied by a distinguishing tag. The fixed usages are those that are to be relied on as the original usages. The others are derivative. <But what are we to do in Latin? To me *velim* is *βουλοίμην ἄν*, to Professor Morris it is *βουλοίμην* (A. J. P. XVIII 139, XIX 231). Then something is to be said in favor of the clarification of language, of the survival of the essential. What does prose usage tell us? The pure subjunctive is an imperative everywhere. The tag *ἄν* turns the subjunctive into a more exact future, a future of assumption, which is limited to the dependent sentence. The optative is everywhere the mood of the wish, the dream, the fancy. *ἄν* turns it into a more exact future, a future of assertion, which is practically limited to the principal sentence. This is the sum of the whole matter, the result which Stahl reaches after pages and pages of disquisition. But it has the disadvantage of being crystalline and we must go back to the turbid genesis.>

The Homeric subjunctive appears in declarative sentences as well as in sentences of will, a subdivision of sentences of desire ('Begehren', *ἕμερος*). In declarative sentences it is used for the future. In sentences of 'desire', apart from prohibitive sentences and sentences of apprehension, the usage is confined to the first person both in the affirmative sentence and in the question.

In the former we have to do with the will of the subject, in the latter there is an appeal to the will of another. So we have (1) the voluntative (volitive) subjunctive which is limited to the first person and sways level with the positive imperative, in short, our old friend the 'geheischte Wirklichkeit' of Krüger, and (2) the futural subjunctive <also known as the prospective subjunctive> really a tense. In the deliberative question 'was will ich tun?' becomes 'was soll ich tun?' The English equivalents 'what will I do?—what shall I do?' may be paralleled in the English of Shakespeare's time and in the dialects (Scotch, Irish); but I dare not use the illustration for fear of being classed with those benighted people who, as Whitney says somewhere, confound their inclinations with their obligations—an epigrammatic remark intended for the southern tier of the United States, but linguistically applicable to a far wider range and ethically to everybody. The dubitative (deliberative) subjunctive needs no illustration. About some of the examples of the futural subjunctive one might quarrel. Indeed, it might be maintained that the parallel with the future is not conclusive as to the purely futural character. There is so to speak a *dei* shade about *τι πάθω* (S. C. G. 384); which *τι πέισομαι*; lacks. Nor does Stahl note the prevalence of the aorist tense which shows in my judgment a certain striving after a *futurum exactum*, in spite of recent theories, which minimize the aoristic character of the second aorist (A. J. P. XXIX 245). On its way to the *futurum exactum* the aor. subj. was checked by the development of the opt. and *äv* which crowded the subj. out of the principal sentence so that it had to be content with the domain of the subordinate clause, where it holds a court of its own as we have seen (A. J. P. XXIX 267).

But this use of the futural subjunctive in Homer, says Stahl, is not confined to the simple sentence. It is found in the dependent sentence as well and in like manner the voluntative of affirmative sentences appears in final clauses and in dependent deliberative questions. <To us who are born to the English tongue, who have to use 'will' and 'shall' for the future and shift them from person to person, from question to answer, to the provincial Frenchman who says: Il veut pleuvoir, this transfer from modal to temporal seems to be much ado about nothing. Why, the Greek himself occasionally used *ιθαλω* for the future.>

We now approach the delimitation of the realm of the will between subjunctive and imperative. The subjunctive has the prov-

ince of the first person, the imperative the provinces of the second and third except in aoristic prohibitions in which the subj. has sway though in Homer  $\mu\eta$  with aor. subj. is confined to the second person.<sup>1</sup> This whole question is complicated with the merging of an original I. E. injunctive form with the subjunctive,—a difficult question which confronts every student on the very threshold of Greek syntax and which does not seem to have been brought any nearer to a solution by Stahl, and as the matter has been treated with great fulness by Professor C. W. E. Miller in this Journal—XIII 418–423 (comp. also Delbrück, *Vgl. Syntax*, II, pp. 356 and 364), I pass on to Stahl's treatment of sentences involving fear. According to him we must distinguish between the prohibitive subjunctive of prohibition and the prohibitive subjunctive of apprehension. These negative sentences, he says, have been 'shoved on' to verbs of fear and have thus become dependent. <Do they ever become really dependent? Are the clauses ever reversible, as happened though comparatively late in final sentences? It is precisely in these sentences of fear that the underlying parataxis makes itself felt and is more important. Neither in Greek nor in Latin can the constructions be brought out didactically without a resort to parataxis (L. G.<sup>3</sup> 550)>.

As the subjunctive is used in Homer in a futural sense, so the future, says Stahl, is used as an expression of will. In the one case we have a temporal use of the mood, in the other a modal use of the tense. <But what if the future was a mood to begin with?> The first person retains its modal force to a large extent. It is found, as we have seen, side by side with the subjunctive (see above, p. 5). The second and third persons in the simple sentence are purely indicative and the 'imperative' future with its negative  $\sigma\upsilon$  is a prediction and not a command; nor is it less effective for being a prediction (S. C. G. 269; A. J. P. XVIII 121, XXIII 246).

The evidence for the voluntative character of the subjunctive, the theory which a few years ago was considered dead and buried (A. J. P. XXIX 368), is summed up thus: (1) The voluntative meaning is the fixed meaning. The futural sense vanishes after Homer and is confined to synthetic sentences. (2) This volun-

<sup>1</sup> *Monro* § 278, (a) cites for the third person, *Il.* 4, 37, where perhaps the passage may be taken paratactically, and *Od.* 22, 213, which seems distinctly imperative. Cf. also A. J. P. XIII 423, note 3. C. W. E. M.

tative meaning needs no prop, whereas the futural subjunctive usually takes the adminicle of *κεν* and *ἄν*, and in the later development is absolutely dependent on *ἄν*. (3) The futural element is not of the essence of the subjunctive, since the necessity of a special futural form is felt even in Homer. If the futural element were of the essence of the subjunctive, the future indicative would have been superfluous. (4) As the futural meaning belongs to all the persons, why does the voluntative meaning limit itself to the first person—if indeed this meaning is a derivative from the futural sense? <If indeed!> (5) Remnants of futural presents show that the subjunctive was not the original expression of the future. (6) The voluntative meaning of the future is secondary <about which much has been said and more might be said>. (7) Analogies are not wanting for the use of expressions denoting 'will' to serve as futures. <But for that matter 'shall', which has an imperative significance, has also abundant analogies and in Earlier English 'shall' was so far deadened, not only in the first but also in the second and third persons, that the A. V. often produces a false impression on the reader of to-day, as all students of the English Bible know. (Cf. Moulton, Grammar of N. T. Greek, Prolegomena, p. 150 footn. See S. C. G. 370).

The optative in Homer represents not only desire but fancy ('Vorstellung'). As a mood of desire it conveys a wish of the speaker and either stands alone or is introduced by *εἴθε*, *εἰ γάρ* also by *εἰ* alone, more rarely by *ὥς*. Now, as a wish is not accompanied by an effort after realization, it belongs to the region of 'Vorstellung', of fancy (p. 236), and so in the declarative sentence the optative as the mood of fancy may serve to express the view or opinion of the speaker. Furthermore, the wish may become a mere concession of a thing to be done, of a statement that is to be accepted. <But the examples of this optative of opinion practically = optative and *ἄν* are very few and some of them by no means certain. As we exclude from certain spheres of Greek all aorists in which a flick of the pen will change *α* into *ε* and restore the normal future, so passages in which *γε* occurs cannot be considered cogent, and other explanations often lie near. See the list in S. C. G. 450. Od. 14, 123 is not cited in full by Stahl. Now 'garbling' is a hard word to use but I have lived to see so much 'proved' by fragments of sentences that in my S. C. G. I have insisted on indicating gaps. Od. 14, 122-3 runs thus:

οὗ τις κείνον ἀνὴρ ἀλαλήμενος ἐλθὼν | ἀγγέλλων πείσειε γυναῖκά τε καὶ φίλον

*υλόv*, with a double *äv* sound that might have seduced Sir Galahad. Not that I dispute the existence of a pure optative in the potential sense for the early period. There is no more theoretical difficulty about it than about the double sense of the opt. (subj.) in Latin (see above, p. 4), but we must insist on the close scrutiny of every alleged example or we shall be swamped with potentials in prose literature. See Wyse on Isaeus 3, 50, 1.

Stahl sums up for the optative as he has summed up for the subjunctive. (1) In sentences of desire the optative goes back to the wish. (2) The optative of fancy (*Vorstellung*) with overwhelming preponderance, indeed with comparatively greater preponderance than the subjunctive, takes to itself a modal particle. (3) In declarative sentences the optative loses its 'timelessness' and becomes futural. In Ionic Prose and Attic this futural signification of opt. + *äv* appears only in principal and 'parathetic' clauses (A. J. P. XXIX 273). <The trouble, as has been already pointed out,—for I must allow myself to repeat (A. J. P. XXIX 402), as Stahl has allowed himself to repeat—lies in the want of a clear recognition of the difference between the time of the action and the time of the ascertainment of the action, a difference recognized in sentences of fear, which are especially valuable because of their primitive character, but not emphasized elsewhere. The resolution of the aor. opt. with *äv* as a rough equivalent of the periphrastic perfect opt. with *äv* serves to simplify matters, and I have not scrupled to call the aorist a shorthand perfect (S. C. G. 439).> (4) The wishing sense of the optative is further supported by the analogy of the subjunctive.

In Stahl the heart of the matter is usually wrapped up in a mass of verbiage. But now and then there is a luminous sentence as where he says 'das Gewünschte erscheint zugleich als Erfordernis'—(p. 240)—but he does not seem to see that this statement disposes of one of his pet examples of the timelessness of the opt., *ἔλοιτο* (A. J. P. XXIX 402).

And now we are called on to survey the weary road over which we have travelled, to distinguish again between the 'Urteilssatz'—the declarative sentence—and the 'Begehrungssatz'—the sentence of desire, the one objective, the other subjective. The indicative (*ὀριστική*) represents the predicate as a reality. It is the reigning mood of the declarative sentence. In the sentence of desire there is a distinction between will and wish. The wish is represented by the optative. When it comes to will, we ask whether the will has



to do with the action of the speaker or that of another. For the former the subjunctive (*ὑποτακτική*) is employed, for the latter the imperative (*προστακτική*). But the subjunctive has transcended its sphere. It has annexed the negative injunctive in the aorist and invaded the realm of the aor. imperative. Both <these saucy varlets> subjunctive and optative have encroached on the province of the indicative. The Will begets a Future, the Wish becomes father of a Thought. The Future begotten of the Will was legitimate enough so long as the first person only was the conceived person, but the Will proceeded to take possession of the other persons and to bar the way of the venerable imperative into the declarative sentence.

Now this I call descriptive syntax, not genetic syntax. It certainly does not give the *rationale* of the process and Stahl has not advanced the theory a jot; but I am pleased to observe that after the waterspout of words has passed, the indicative still represents the predicate as a reality, that the subjunctive still anticipates as an act of the will or an act of the judgment, swayed by the will, that the optative is still the mood of the wish and that the wish is still the father of the thought—and that Stahl's fellow-workmen in the grammatical field are not wiped off the face of the earth.

*Repetitio est mater studiorum* is the familiar Jesuit motto inscribed on the walls of Stonyhurst, and he is not a true teacher who does not drive the truth home by reiterated blows of the pedagogical hammer. But what is necessary in the classroom becomes intolerable in a text-book. One asks in amazement what kind of public is to be reached by this book of 800 pages on the syntax of the Greek verb. It is an insult to the only possible readers of such a work to have the beggarly elements of syntax flaunted before the eye of the mind, to be told over and over again that the definitions must be taken in a Pickwickian sense, that there must be a certain elasticity of conception, that there must be different ways of looking at things, that the indicative is no guarantee of objective truth—and that liars can use the indicative as freely as George Washington. But courage! Perhaps we shall have something new when we come to 'the historical development of the moods'.

'The historical development of the moods fulfils itself chiefly in the domain and under the influence of the dependent sentence' (A. J. P. XXIII 128). That is one way of putting it; but is it the

best way? There is, there can be, nothing in the dependent clause that has not its legitimate explanation in the behaviour of the leading clause. There is no new heaven for the optative to aspire to, no new earth for the indicative to plant its feet on.

In Stahl's treatment of the moods we find ourselves confronted again with absolute and relative. As we have had absolute and relative time, so we have absolute and relative modality. By absolute time is meant time relative to the speaker (A. J. P. XXIX 391). By relative time, time relative to something else. Absolute modality deals with the conception of the speaker, relative modality deals with the modality attributed to the person spoken of—attributed by whom? By the speaker. It is all the speaker.

The oldest form of repeating the words or thoughts of another is *oratio recta*. Some languages never get beyond that stage, says Stahl. In other languages, as in English, it is hard to say whether *oratio recta* or *oratio obliqua* is the easier (A. J. P. XXVII 206; cf. XXIX 264). The 'time-forshoving' seems to give no trouble at all. But that may be personal impressionism. In Greek the dependency is indicated by infinitive and participle and also by a number of introductory relative and interrogatory conjunctions. The person-forshoving (precession) was a matter of course. The modal precession comes afterwards, theoretically, for as far back as we can go the optative represents the subjunctive after historical tenses. Against a special iterative optative as distinguished from an iterative subjunctive Stahl protests, as well he may. <Subjunctive and optative are not iterative. It is the leading verb that is iterative, and that makes the sentence iterative. It is thirty-six years (L. G.<sup>2</sup> 597 footn.; cf. L. G.<sup>3</sup> 594 n. 1; A. J. P. III 437) since I objected to the abuse of the terms general and particular—which Goodwin had brought into fashion. 'Whether a condition is particular or general depends simply on the character of the apodosis.' Generic subjunctive and generic optative are strictly speaking quite as much misnomers as iterative subjunctive and iterative optative, but nobody is or ought to be misled by the convenient phraseology. An iterative subjunctive is a subjunctive in an iterative sentence. The prevalence of the 'sidemoods' (S. C. G. 365) in sentences of this sort is due to the greater exactness of the temporal relation, as is shewn by the fact that the home of these constructions is the temporal sentence, in which priority and contemporaneity are of prime importance. Relative

and conditional follow suit. The genesis of this construction is illustrated by an old proverb which Stahl selects doubtless in order to show off his critical acumen. For *ἐγγυᾶ, πάρα δ' ἄρα*, he reads *ἐγγυᾶ = ἐγγυῶ*. But as the imperative is excluded from the dependent sentence, the subjunctive is used so that we have the series *εἰ ἐγγυᾶ, ὄτε ἐγγυᾶ, ὅστις ἐγγυᾶται*—<an unluckily example, because of the coincidence of indicative and subjunctive forms>. In other words the subjunctive is an imperative, for Stahl's 'postulierte Annahme' is little else than Krüger's 'geheischte Wirklichkeit'. The sense of the postulate grows weaker and weaker until the subjunctive becomes a mere means of comprehending all the individual cases of a series of phenomena 'individualisierende Zusammenfassung', as Stahl calls it. <But as we have just seen, it is the leading verb and not the subjunctive that does the 'Zusammenfassung'. The subjunctive merely punctuates. The generic character of the subjunctive is mere connotation.> Then follows a long discussion of the use of the subjunctive in comparisons. Comparisons may be made with recurrent actions, the subjunctive being usually employed, although the indicative may be used as in Latin; for, being a Grecian, Stahl is not capable of making the mistake that has actually been made in paralleling the Greek subjunctive with the Latin subjunctive-optative in this class of sentences (see A. J. P. XXV 481).

Now as the subjunctive contains in itself a tendency to realization <cf. Bäumlein's definition, Gr. Modi, p. 177: Tendenz zur Wirklichkeit> it cannot refer to the past, so that in the generic sentence the language <poor thing!> finds itself shut up to the optative which is not bound to any sphere <'Gedanken sind zollfrei'>. Hence the so-called frequentative optative.<sup>1</sup> Of course the original meaning of the optative is effaced here, as the original meaning of the subjunctive is effaced. But if the subjunctive is shut up to the future, the optative is not shut up to the past, and so we find the optative side by side with the generic subjunctive.

And now we proceed to the doctrine of *ἄν* (*κεν*). Attempts to establish a difference between *ἄν* and *κεν* are scornfully dismissed (S. C. G. 426; A. J. P. III 446, XXIII 139). The proportions of *κεν* to *ἄν* in Homer are 3, 3: 1. <Monro gives the figures for the Iliad as 4: 1, showing by comparison a decline in the Odyssey.

<sup>1</sup> By the way, it is an interesting fact, emphasized by Monro, that *εἰ* with the 'iterative opt.', a very familiar construction (A. J. P. XXIV 360) in prose, is non-Homeric (H. G. § 311). Cf. my Pindar, I. E. xcvi.

In Pindar the two particles nearly balance.> The expulsion of *ἄν* from Homer meets with no favor at the hands of Stahl. *ἄν* belongs to the Ionic element of the epos and both particles are found not only in the epos but in elegiac poetry; they are found in Simonides, Pindar and Bakchylides, manifestly after the Homeric pattern. The combination of *ἄν κεν* is significant. Re-writing the oldest part of Homer into Aeolic lacks Stahl's sanction. We do not know what the original Aeolic was, a sad conclusion for the restorationists.

Nothing is said of the etymology of *ἄν* and *κεν*, and it is as well. For the ascertainment of the force of these particles Stahl lays down his method of procedure. First comes Homer and first in Homer comes the principal sentence. Outside of the principal sentence the usage is still in process of development. The particles are not used with the infinitive <saving negligible examples, Pindar I. E. cv>. They are not used with the participle and the use with the preterite is restricted to the unreal past. As to the future indicative—which at any rate is a later formation—it takes the modal particles only by reason of its affinity with the subjunctive. This leaves us, according to Stahl, as the point of departure for the investigation only the subjunctive and the optative. <As the subjunctive and optative have to do mainly with the future this would seem to indicate an affinity of the particle *ἄν* with the futural idea just as the affinity of *ὁ ἄλλος χρόνος*, of 'another time' is with the future, but that is a heresy with which Stahl could not possibly have any sympathy, and so I return to my task.>

Commenting on the above statement Stahl remarks that there is no indicative unreal of the present <which recalls Goodwin's triumphant insistence on this point (M. T., Rev. Ed., §435)>. There is no habitual or 'intermittent' (S. C. G. 431) indicative with *ἄν* in Homer. Nothing but the black unreal of the past, as if that were not enough. <To be sure, in the absence of countervailing reality, the unreal of the past becomes a potential.> For the combination of the modal particle with the future Stahl contends stoutly, but the examples he adduces are all *κεν*'s and it requires a great deal of good will to see in Pindar, N. 7, 68: *μαθῶν δέ τις ἄν ἐρεῖ*, an imitation of Il. 4, 176: *καί κέ τις ᾧδ' ἐρεῖ*.<sup>1</sup> <The suggestion *ἀνερεῖ*, by whomsoever first made (Pindar, I. E. civ; cf.

<sup>1</sup> This suggestion of Stahl was anticipated by Leaf, Il. 22, 66.

Aeschin. 3, 155), has been accepted by Schroeder in his new edition and approved by Wilamowitz in his essay on the Seventh Nemean. The emendation is in the line of another, which Stahl accepts, Plat. Legg. 712, ἀνερωτηθείς, for which he gives Madvig the credit (S. C. G. 433). Cf. Goodwin M. T., Rev. Ed., § 195. Such trifles are not worth quarrelling about (A. J. P. XII 99, XXIII 348). The future with ἄν, a legitimate construction, was probably crowded out by the optative with ἄν and its two admirable tenses (see S. C. G. 444), just as the fut. indic. has been crowded out of the temporal clause by the subjunctive with ἄν and its two admirable tenses. > 'Two facts', says Stahl, 'emerge from the examination of the use of the two modal particles in the principal sentence'. (1) It is used in declarative sentences and not in sentences of 'desire', and (2) it does not affect in the least the meaning of the mood. There is no difference <I should prefer to say 'no translatable' difference> between εἴησι and κεν εἴησι, between Od. 6, 275: καὶ νύ τις ὄδ' εἴησι and Od. 4, 391: καὶ δέ κέ τοι εἴησι. There is no difference between εἴη in Il. 15, 197: βέλτερον εἴη and in Il. 14, 336: νεμεσσητὸν δέ κεν εἴη. What is the use of it then? Why, by the modal particle the speaker gives expression to his view or conviction that reality belongs to the utterance, and the essence of it is subjective affirmation, a subjective affirmation, we are told, which is to be distinguished from the objective affirmation of ἦ and the rest. <It is, in short, an indicative tag and is often used parallel with the indic. Hateful to me as the gates of Hades is this paltering with objective and subjective, and I honestly think that the old theory of Gottfried Hermann, which Stahl dismisses in a few words, has more substance in it than all this vague talk. The great trouble is that Hermann did not know how to apply his own theory and made ἄν with the subjunctive and the optative with ἄν farther from reality, whereas every ingenuous mind must feel that they are near to reality (comp. A. J. P. III 447). Against the conditional notion of ἄν, Stahl lifts up his heel, but where does his subjective affirmation come from? The acceptance of the condition.>

<Subjective and objective have clearly been overdone, and the frequent use of these terms gives an old-fashioned tone to Stahl's discussions. 'Impersonal' is better than 'objective', 'personal' than 'subjective'. 'Achromatic' and 'chromatic' perhaps still better. But as all affirmation is personal, it is hard to see how we can draw the line between Stahl's ἄν and such confirmatory particles as

ἦ 'verily', δῆ 'clearly', μήν, which outswears the other particles, τοι, which is an appeal to an ideal second person, an appeal to humanity, a cry of the heart for sympathy, whereas πον is an appeal to the heartless world, to the cruel *rerum natura*.  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ , as  $\sigma\upsilon$  the old conditional theory, point to the speaker's consciousness of limitation, *pro tanto* a guarded affirmation. Of course, this consciousness of limitation may be construed as subjectivity, if you choose. It gives a *quod sciam* reserve. Will and wish that have eventuality in them are nearer to reality than pure will and wish; and in the striving after a more exact future, the subjunctive with  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  and the optative with  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  furnish admirable substitutes, the one for the subordinate sentence, the other for the principal. The new future, a manner of desiderative to begin with, cannot make head against the fine old moods and has to yield the road to present and aorist subjunctive with  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ , to the present and aorist optative with  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ , wherever temporal exactness is required (A. J. P. XXIII 247).> Of course, says Stahl, this 'modalized' subjunctive has the same rights in the dependent sentence that it has in the independent sentence, but oddly enough it renounces all its rights excepting in the dependent interrogative sentence. Such a limitation as this must give us pause, and we ask with other grammarians whether these are really interrogative sentences or only 'in case' sentences, which are ultimately elliptical conditional sentences (A. J. P. XXIX 273).

In Homer, says Stahl, the optative is used in ideal protases and in equivalent temporal and relative clauses and also in a futural sense. Against the old notion that the *ei* sentences of wish are ideal conditions without an apodosis <like so many bottomless cherubs> Stahl sets his face like a flint (comp. L. G.<sup>3</sup> 261, n. 1); and also against Lange's theory that the *ei*-condition develops from the wish. Against this latter view he argues at length. One of his objections is that the protasis of a conditional sentence may involve a wish against as well as a wish for. <Why not? The imagination conjures up shapes of ill as well as shapes of weal.> In synthetic sentences <non-detachable sentences I should call them in contrast to the detachable or 'parathetic' sentences>, the generic and oblique optatives cannot have  $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  ( $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ ). 'One cannot affirm and postulate at the same time'. <An ordinary Philistine might say that Stahl, like the rest of us, is performing the double feat at every turn.> Il. 9, 525, the only

passage of the kind, is corrupt, and Stahl suggests  $\delta\tau\epsilon\ \pi\epsilon\rho$  after the analogy of 4, 259. The optative as a *modus obliquus* is limited in Homer <as in Greek generally> to dependence on a past tense. This limitation, not being founded on the notion of indirect discourse <as we see from German (cf. Schlicher, A. J. P. XXVI 60-88; B. L. G., A. J. P. XXVII 205)>, must be explained psychologically. The check in the development is due to the liveliness of the Greek spirit which refused to <obliquify> the present and the future, which would not renounce the immediate representation of the past. <Sheer phrase-making.> The optative as the *modus obliquus* of the subjunctive *modus directus* has the same limitations as the optative as *modus obliquus* of the indicative. It must have a past tense to lean on and there is always the reserve of *repraesentatio*. There is no difference <except a difference of liveliness> between the original subjunctive and the oblique optative. <The increase of this *repraesentatio*, therefore, is an indication of the increasing liveliness of the Greek language. The Epos is slow, the New Testament is gay. In a recent number of the IGF. XXII, Anz. 26, Meltzer has reinforced what I have said (A. J. P. XXIII 130) and has cited Wackernagel's objection to these psychological and phraseological explanations>. Then follows the chapter of the 'assimilation' of subjunctive and optative, after pure optative and optative with  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ . The exceptional use of the opt. w.  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  ( $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ ) in synthetic dependent sentences is treated at great length. For  $\epsilon\pi\eta\nu$  with opt. Od. 4, 222; Il. 19, 208; 24, 227 Stahl would read  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota$ .  $\epsilon\grave{\iota}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu$  with the opt. after an optative must be taken potentially. 'There is no essential difference', says Stahl, 'between a conditional potential optative and a conditional ideal optative and, besides, the optative with  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  can be used as a future.' It is interesting to observe how Stahl insists on distinctions which he proceeds to wipe out again. In this whole nebulous region of the moods he reminds me of nothing so much as Shelley's Cloud:

I silently laugh  
At my own cenotaph,  
And out of the caverns of rain,  
Like a child from the womb, like a ghost from the tomb,  
I arise and unbuild it again.

But while he says that there is no essential difference between the conditional optative and the potential optative in protasis, he

bids us beware of the false doctrine, heresy and schism that there is a futural element in the optative itself, for one of Stahl's cardinal principles is the timelessness of the optative. In winding up this section Stahl wages war against the topsy-turvy and un-historical method of regarding the later usage of the language as a norm for the Homeric use, and protests against changing the Homeric use except in conformity with Homeric practice. Of course, he is beating the air here as he is walking on it elsewhere, for nobody will advocate such practices, and as he professes to be averse to polemics, he might spare the circumambient sphere.

And now we come back to  $\alpha\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ . The temporal indifference of the optative in declarative sentences <the same temporal indifference that we have recognized in the Latin perfect subjunctive, A. J. P. XXIX 402> has led to the introduction of  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  and  $\alpha\nu$  in Homer for potential and conditional affirmation, of which Stahl goes on to give a few examples (S. C. G. 430). The chief use of the modal particles with the indicative is to denote unreality. Most of the examples are negative (4: 1). Stahl thinks that the negative started the thing <as indeed one always suspects the 'Geist der stets verneint' of being at the bottom of all trouble>. In Homer unreality in the present is represented by the optative +  $\alpha\nu$  ( $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ ) <parallel with the wider reach of the present subjunctive in Earlier Latin, which ought not to be pushed to the front in elementary text books>. The unreal imperfect indicative always refers to the past in Homer. The modal particle is never lacking in real unreality. <The suspensive imperfect= $\xi\mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$  must be considered, I suppose, as unreal unreality. The fact is, the line between the ideal and the unreal is determined by the presence or the absence of an opposing reality; see L. G.<sup>3</sup> 258, note 2, 596, 2>. The unreal wish is expressed in Homer by  $\delta\phi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\nu$  with a particle (S. C. G. 367), as well as by the optative. We see then in Homer the prevalence of  $\alpha\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  with subj. and opt. in certain relations. As time goes on what was tendency in Homer becomes rule. The modal particle  $\alpha\nu$  associates itself more and more with subjunctive and opt., attaches itself to infinitive and participial sentences, serves to differentiate classes of sentences, serves to give sharper signification. There is a loss as well as a gain (A. J. P. XXIII 254). The futural subjunctive and the futural optative go different ways. The futural subjunctive reigns in the dependent, the futural optative in the principal sentence. There are traces of survival here and there as in Pindar



P. 9, 120 where, however,  $\alpha\upsilon$  may belong to  $\thetaορῶν$  and not to  $\psiάυσειε$  (see B. L. G. in loc. or Bakchyl. 5, 110; A. J. P. XXVII 482). Opt. with  $κεν$  ( $\alpha\upsilon$ ) disappears from the protasis of the conditional sentence <except where the writer is quoting actually or mentally>.  $\alpha\upsilon$  ( $κεν$ ) with the fut. inf. has a sworn foe in Stahl <as it has in me, for I have put it thus: ' $\alpha\upsilon$  with the fut. ind. is dead before  $\alpha\upsilon$  with the inf. comes in'. To be sure we have Il. 22, 110, which Stahl ignores, as well he may, and Il. 9, 684, which is an *oratio obliqua* echo of v. 417>. Then we have a long chapter devoted to the correction of the texts that exhibit the solecism and Stahl proceeds to batter down open doors and bravely slay the slain. Pindar P. 1, 109, he reads  $κλειζειν$  <which has MS warrant> where I say 'the construction is due to *anacoluthia* rather than to survival', and he quotes Bekk., Anecd. 127, 24, where I quote Lucian (Sol. III 555 R.)—a more interesting authority. <Cf. also [Just. Martyr] Ep. ad Diogn. 2, 4.> 'In Attic', says Stahl, 'the optative with  $\alpha\upsilon$  loses its temporal indifference and ceases to refer to the past (see S. C. G. 435). Inscriptional parallelisms between subj. +  $κεν$  and opt. in protasis are next discussed, and several passages elsewhere in which one might expect the subjunctive and finds the opt. (cf. P. O. 13, 101, I. E. cvii). The survival of the pure subjunctive in clauses where subjunctive with  $\alpha\upsilon$  might be expected is documented by a long array of passages from post-Homeric poets, especially in Attic tragedy <which not only loves epic touches but is often hyperepic>. The Pindaric passages are cited, but S. does not stop to notice the uniformity of Pindar's usage (I. E. cvii). At the omission of  $\alpha\upsilon$  in the dialogue of Attic tragedy, he balks; in Attic comedy, he proceeds to emend. In Ionic prose (Herodotos) he notes the omission in temporal sentences of limit <where the notion of finality helps to keep the construction alive, as the subjunctive is kept alive in English sentences of the same sort (A. J. P. XXIV 401)>, but he wages war against the omission in Attic prose except in Thukydides. The historian of the great tragedy of the Peloponnesian war may well be influenced by tragic usage, so that when he omits  $\alpha\upsilon$  in temporal sentences of limit and in generic subjunctive sentences we are not shocked beyond measure (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 140). However, Thuk. VI 21, 1:  $ει ξυστωσιν αι πολεις φοβηθεισαι$  he considers 'bedenklich'. But while S. is so merciless in damning the omission of  $\alpha\upsilon$  in subjunctive clauses outside a certain range, he

is extremely liberal in allowing the omission of the particle *ἄν* in opt. clauses. See my S. C. G. 450, where I have discussed the matter at some length. Pindar P. 10, 21: θεὸς εἴη | ἀπήμων κέαρ, where recent editors recognize a concessive opt., he pronounces nonsense.

In post-Homeric Greek Stahl recognizes a great advance in the use of the *ἄν* with the preterite that runs counter to reality, in the affirmative-potential use of *ἄν* of regular or occasional occurrence, but the limitation of the intermittent use is emphasized <which can readily be discerned from the range of examples in S. C. G. 431>. Another extension that Stahl notes is the unreal wish with εἶθε, εἰ γάρ, which according to him is conclusive against the origin of the unreal condition from the unreal wish. <It would be useless to urge the point that emergence in literature is not identical with emergence in language. This is the πρώτων ψεύδους of much that passes for historical syntax>, and Stahl goes on to shew that in contrast with this innovation the optative is used by preference for the realizable wish. But who knows, and who in a moment of excitement cares, what is realizable, what not? No wonder that passionate wishes for the unreal sometimes take the optative form. It is a pity that Stahl had not thought of that when he was enlarging on εἴλοιτο (A. J. P. XXIX 402).

At a point beyond the limits of this article Stahl (S. 369 fig.) distinguishes four kinds of optative with *ἄν*. 1) The affirmative. 2) The potential. 3) The conditional. 4) The desiderative. Needless to say I have no sympathy with this kind of analysis. There is no specific gravity to keep the rings apart as in some kinds of *pousse-café*; and moreover in what he calls here the desiderative form of the wish *βουλοίμην ἄν* (p. 274) he has to admit that with verbs of wishing and willing the optative with *ἄν* is pleonastic. Everybody knows that *βουλοίμην ἄν* is preferred in sober prose to the pure optative of wish, which is a rare form except in poetry (S. C. G. 398). The orators prefer the calmer statement to the passionate wish, just as we say 'I should like' rather than 'would that—' which one might live a life time without hearing in current conversation. According to Stahl *ἐβουλόμην (ἤθελον) ἄν* is a 'forshoving of modality' to match *βουλοίμην ἄν*. It is sadly illogical according to him. It is not the wish but the thing that is unreal. This is a deplorable inelasticity in Stahl. The indicative in final clauses after an unreal wish and the like is

explained in his own tortuous way. It is simply an organic part of the wish or condition, and for that matter the leading clause might be omitted (A. J. P. IV 434). The old-fashioned generic optative dies out more and more. <The survival with the infinitive, for the majority of the later examples belong under this head, is easily explained on the ground of the affinity between optative and infinitive (S. C. G. 400; A. J. P. XXIV 106).> In the post-Homeric stage generic subjunctive and generic optative (optative of indefinite frequency) become more sharply distinguished <a matter of connotation, as we have seen>. The parallel use of the indicative Stahl calls 'einheitliche Zusammenfassung' in contradistinction to the 'individualisierende Zusammenfassung' of the subjunctive and optative. This sounds very subtle, but as soon as Stahl begins to apply it and says that the present indicative in conditional sentences is used when a general assumption is made and there is no thought of the individual cases he runs counter to the feeling of the language. Elsewhere he sins chiefly by over-refining. Here he reverses the true state of things. εἴ τις, as I said long ago, is a two-edged sword (A. J. P. III 438). Pindar shifts according to the tense from pres. indic. to aor. subj. (I. E. cvii).

The treatment of the optative in oblique discourse presents nothing new, as f. i. the occasional use of the mood after the perfect of the farther end = aorist. Nor is it worth while to dwell on the examples of the optative as representatives of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua*. Causal sentences with optatives for indicatives belong to the rarities. The corresponding construction in Latin—*quod* with the subjunctive—is usually represented in Greek by ὡς with the participle. The O. O. examples of the opt. in causal sentences are nearly all from Xenophon <in conformity with his hyper-orthodox love of the mood>. Relative sentences in which the optative stands for the indicative are also infrequent. Notorious is Soph. O. R. 1247: ὕφ' ὧν θάνοι μὲν αὐτός. Sometimes the opt. is due to the merging of relative and interrogative, as Pindar O. 6, 49, where see my note, sometimes to the assimilative swing of other O. O. optatives. Nowhere does Stahl recognize the principle that the shift from εἰ with subj. to εἰ with opt. is a mechanical tradition from the time of an original εἰ with subj. (S. C. G. 399), and when he comes to Soph. Tr. 903: κρύψασ' ἐαυτήν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι, he is greatly guilty of a resolution like this: ἔνθα μή τις ἂν αὐτήν εἰσίδῃ, unless we treat Stahl's Greek as he himself has treated so

many passages and suppress  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  before  $\bar{\alpha}\nu$ .  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\alpha$  as catercousin to  $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ , which never quite lost its relative sense, might readily take the final construction of  $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ . The old question whether the opt. +  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  can be used in a clause representing  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  with subj. (cf. P. 9, 120) is decided by Stahl in the negative. Nearly all the passages are shaky. There are two cases. Either  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  holds over from the  $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ ,  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$  of the original form, a bit of sheer carelessness in the transfer, or, which Stahl will not allow, there is a notion of potentiality. <On  $\acute{\epsilon}\omega\acute{\varsigma}$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  + opt. see A. J. P. IV 418 footn.; XXIV 403.> Then follows a long list of passages in which subjunctive and opt. forms are used without any material difference.

The old form, the Homeric form of indirect discourse with merely a shift of the persons, does not die out <nay, it lives on, awaiting its restoration>, but the oblique opt. gains ground more and more. Herodotos and Thukydidēs favor the direct form; Xenophon the 'modus obliquus'; Plato not so much. This general statement is followed by statistics, the provenience of which is not given. Then come the consecutive sentences, practically post-Homeric (A. J. P. VII 166). Thence they spread. As for the inf. with  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  Stahl denies the genuineness of Il. 9, 684 (see above, p. 17). The earliest example is Sappho 68. <Lyric fragments must always be cited with extreme caution.> Next comes Pindar with  $\kappa\epsilon\nu$  <I. E. cv>. The participle begins to take  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  in the Attic drama. On P. 10, 62 'see Christ', see others. The orators use both constructions freely, the infinitive more freely than the participle, because there are more infinitive constructions than participial <a somewhat superfluous observation, if it were not for the nonsensical use so often made of statistics>. Then follows a long chapter on the position of  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  and the repetition of  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  <S. C. G. 459 foll.>.

$\text{Ὀῦπω τὰν μεσάταν ὁδὸν ἄννυμες.}$  Instead of absolving my task in two or three numbers, as I had hoped to do, I have thus far traversed much less than half of Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb. But I will no longer abuse the patience of the readers of the Journal and the contributors thereto. The American Journal of Philology is not the American Journal of Greek Syntax, and I must say good bye to Stahl, at least for a long time, and instead of discussing the rest of the portly volume, I will content myself with jotting down references to the various articles in which I have handled the subjects that remain. There are coincidences and differences enough to furnish forth another series of articles, but

I doubt whether it would be worth while to go over the well-trodden paths for the sake of illustrations to my own writings. I shudder as I recall the conditional sentence III 158 foll. and the temporal sentence II 465 foll.; XXIV 388 (where Fuchs has his hole), and the final sentence IV 416 foll.; VI 53 foll., and the consecutive sentences VII 16 foll., and the infinitive, both the articular, which I christened, and the anarthrous III 192-202; VIII 328-37; IX 254; XXVII 201, and the participle IX 137 foll., and the negatives I 45-47; III 202; X 124; and then think of the notes to my Justin Martyr, to my Pindar, and the recurrent syntactical spirits in *Brief Mention*. I might, it is true, have written a little article headed 'What I have learned from Stahl', but even then there would have been a running comment with indications as to what I did not need to learn from Stahl.

One word more, and that a word of apology to the eminent author and the benevolent reader. In going over by the fierce light of print what I have written about this monumental book, which reminds me by its massiveness of the Palais de Justice at Brussels, I am very sorry for my tone, which would have been unpardonable in a younger man, hardly to be forgiven even in a man who is Stahl's senior. Unfortunately the fragments of Solon are jumbled in my mind, as they are in the MSS, with the verses of Theognis,—Solon the sweet-tempered, Theognis the sour. The likeness of my old master, Boeckh, looks down upon me as I write. His Solonian motto at sixty-five was *γῆράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*, and I try to live up to that motto, but every now and then a musty piece of wisdom is offered to me for my digestion, and then I am fain to say with the Megarian: *μή με δίδασκ' οὔτοι τηλίκος εἰμὶ μαθεῖν* (A. J. P. XXVIII 107).

CORRIGENDA. A. J. P. XXIX 263, l. 35, read 'the mood of the wish'. 264, l. 18, read XXVII. On the same page I should have noted that *πτώσεις ἰδίαί* and *πτώσεις κοιναί* are terms that I adopted many years ago from Westphal, Gr. Formenl. XIV, *πτώσεις κοιναί* being the regular cases, *πτώσεις ἰδίαί* the case-like formations such as *-θι* and *-θεν*. XXIX 272, footn., read Ginneken.













Gildersleeve

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Notes on Stahl's syntax.G54  
of the Greek verb.

