THE NOTION OF THE AGENT INTELLECT

IN

SAINT ALBERT THE GREAT

by

Robert Grace Miller, M.A.



A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Toronto

May, 1938

The Notion of the Agent Intellect

in

Saint Albert the Great

The Notion of the Agent Intellect

in

Saint Albert the Great

by

Robert G. Miller, M. A.

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Toronto

May, 1938

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction..... i

Chapter One. The Sources of the Albertinian Definition of the Soul.
1. St. Albert and the Platonic and neo-Platonic definitions of the soul..... 1
2. St. Albert and the first and second Aristotelian definitions of the soul..... 8
3. The soul as substantial form
a. St. Albert and St. Augustine..... 36
b. St. Albert and St. Thomas Aquinas..... 44

Chapter Two. The Necessity of the Agent Intellect.
1. Because of intellectual knowledge..... 51
2. Because man is a microcosm..... 56

Chapter Three. Origin, Status and Definition of the Agent Intellect.
1. The *quo est* as the source of the Agent Intellect.
a. The doctrine of the *quo est* and the *quod est*..... 71
b. The plurality of forms..... 78
2. The Agent Intellect as a power of the soul. 87
3. The Agent Intellect as the active principle of intelligibles..... 89

Chapter Four. The Agent Intellect among the Powers of the Soul.
1. The soul and its powers..... 92
2. Exterior and interior senses..... 100
3. The communication of the agent Intellect with the body..... 106

Chapter Five. The Humanized *Dator Formarum*.
1. St. Albert's refutation of the Arabian doctrines..... 111
2. St. Albert's attitude towards Averroes..... 113
3. The bifurcated Activity of the Agent Intellect.....120

Page

Chapter Six. The Object of Intellectual Knowledge.
1. Alternative solutions..... 126
2. St. Albert's realism..... 127

Chapter Seven. Divine Illumination.
1. Abstraction-Illumination..... 142
2. The "Intellects" of St. Albert..... 152
3. The Radix Incorruptibilitatis..... 170

Conclusion..... 178

Notes..... 184

Bibliography..... 207

Index.....261

INTRODUCTION

The writings of Aristotle afforded St. Albert the Great wide scope for the exercise of his genius in research. He was not slow in availing himself of the wealth of knowledge stored up not only in the logical treatises of the Stagirite, which had been well known to his predecessors of an earlier age, but also in the strictly philosophical writings of Aristotle more recently introduced into the Latin West. In this work he was aided in no small measure by the numerous Greek and Arabian commentaries on Aristotle which were known to the scholars of the thirteenth century. St. Albert was familiar both with the works of Aristotle and with the commentaries almost from the beginning of his own philosophical and theological activity. He had likewise as much first hand knowledge of Plato as the incomplete state of the Platonic writings, in Latin translation, allowed him; but he possessed a textually grounded knowledge of the doctrine of St. Augustine as well as of the influence of the Platonic tradition on St. Augustine. Plato had come down through the tradition of Christian thought from St. Augustine, who "followed Plato as far as the Catholic Faith allowed." Aristotle, on the other hand, came into the Christian West

burdened with interpretations imposed by the Arabian commentators.

All of these influences are manifest in the manner in which St. Albert handled the problem of the agent intellect. He discovered the problem in Aristotle. It was not to be found in the writings either of Plato or of St. Augustine. However, the treatment which this doctrine had undergone at the hands of the commentators was by no means uniform and consistent. By the very diversity of their approach they indicated that the interpretation of Aristotle himself was not yet definitely settled. It was St. Albert's avowed purpose to render Aristotle intelligible to the Latin world and this doctrine offered a most favorable opportunity for the realization of that purpose.

Aristotle, it is true, had defined the human soul, but for St. Albert the question was whether his doctrine on the agent intellect was necessarily involved in his doctrine on the nature of the soul. Plato and St. Augustine, along with their many followers, had likewise defined the human soul. Their definitions centered around the independent substantiality of the soul, while that of Aristotle arose from a consideration of the soul as entelechy, or form. The problem for St. Albert was to reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions regarding the nature of the human soul with the doctrine of the agent

intellect. With the aid of the commentators St. Albert s of out to resolve this problem in such a manner as to retain at once the Aristotelian doctrine of the agent intellect and the Augustinian teaching regarding the independent substantiality of the soul. Thus he would succeed in providing a philosophical approach to the problem of the nature of the human soul and in establishing at the same time the basis of its immortality.

It is my purpose in this thesis to investigate this philosophical endeavor of St. Albert with reference to his interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine on the agent intellect. To date no special study of this aspect of the thought of St. Albert has been published. I, therefore, hold no brief for or against any particular interpretation of his doctrine. It has been my aim simply to present the doctrine of St. Albert as he himself presented and developed it from the sources which he used.

I might further add that there are few problems better suited than that of the agent intellect to situate St. Albert in the intellectual <u>milieu</u> of the thirteenth century. During the lifetime of St. Albert increased concessions were being made to Aristotle in the name of a strange Augustinianism. Forces and influences emanating both from the new Aristotelianism and

the traditional Augustinianism were at work in the formation of the thought of St. Albert. It is possible therefore to observe the measures of reconciliation adopted by St. Albert to uphold the weight of authorities on each side and to maintain his positive allegiance to both. In his handling of the doctrine of the agent intellect these tendencies are strikingly manifested.

My study, therefore, bears on this point of doctrine--the agent intellect. It will be conducted in close contact with the texts of St. Albert himself, interpreted in the strong light of the immediate sources of his thought. St. Albert's interpretation of the significance of this question and the methods which he adopted in attempting its solution are influenced throughout by the views of previous thinkers. It would, therefore, be not only improper but dubiously possible to explain what St. Albert says without referring constantly to the writings of those to whom he admittedly owed so much.

The plan I have adopted developed out of a study of the texts of St. Albert himself. The texts in which St. Albert deals with the existence of the agent intellect as well as those in which he discusses the possibility of reconciling that doctrine with the nature of the human soul are more or less obscure and unintelligible until they are clarified by an

investigation of his doctrine on the existence and definition of the soul. Consequently, I shall have to investigate this problem in so far as it has a bearing on the main topic of this thesis. In the light of these texts I shall establish the basis of St. Albert's proofs of the existence of an agent intellect. This being established the next problem is to discuss the compatability of the agent intellect with the intrinsic composition of the soul. It, therefore, becomes necessary to study the intrinsic constitution of the soul itself and to determine to what extent the nature of the soul demands that it possess an agent intellect. It is now possible to investigate the nature of the agent intellect itself and to define it. Further light will be thrown upon the question of the nature of the agent intellect by a study of the relation between the faculties of the soul (of which the agent intellect is one) and the substance of the soul itself. This will prepare the way for the exploration of the workings of the agent intellect, or with what we might call its mechanics, and lead us to a study of its contact with the materials upon which it operates. After a brief refutation of positions opposed to his own St. Albert determines the operation of the agent intellect as abstracting

the universal (the proper object of the possible intellect) and illumining the possible intellect. At this point the nature of that object demands investigation. Once this is accomplished I shall proceed to discuss the illumination of the agent intellect in its bifurcated activity and advance with St. Albert to a consideration of a higher type of illumination wherein the soul at once finds, its perfection and insures its immortality.(1)

CHAPTER [illegible]

In his treatise *De Homine*[1] St. Albert the Great quotes and interprets the first definition of the soul which Aristotle gives in his *De Anima*. This definition as quoted by St. Albert is as follows: *anima est primum actus corporis physici, potentia vitam habentis. Intellexit autem sic loquendo secundum*[2]

St. Albert's interpretation of this definition is preceded by a lengthy discussion of two important preliminary questions: first, does the soul exist; and second, what is the substance and nature of the soul?

His position on the first of these questions is stated in an article of the *Summa de Creaturis* entitled *Utrum sit anima*[3] Here St. Albert's demonstration proceeds *a posteriori* from the fact that we see in the world in which we live some bodies which can neither feed, grow, nor beget, along side of others which can feed, grow and beget other beings similar to themselves. We cannot say of the latter, namely the plants and the animals, that they have these powers from their corporeity. Yet they must have in themselves principles according to which they perform these activities. Since the reason is not to be found in the corporeity, it is to be maintained that these beings have in themselves, in their very essences, principles from which their

activities of growth and reproduction emanate. This principle is the soul.(4) In this account St. Albert literally adopts the Avicenna position to answer this initial question on the soul.

The principle, whose existence has thus been established, is called a soul. But the term anima designates this principle only in so far as it is necessary to account for such operations and constitution. Consequently when we determine a principle of all the operations of a living being and say it is a soul we use the word soul only to designate it according as it is a principle of these corporeal operations. This satisfies St. Albert--he calls the principle anima and wants it known that there is no dispute at all over the name, but only whether what is usually called by that name really exists.(5)

All St. Albert establishes at this point is that the name anima refers to the principle only as that which accounts for certain operations of different beings. In no sense has he yet determined any more than Avicenna did, what is the nature of that which is the principle of those operations.(6) To affirm the existence of a vital principle is not by any stretch of the imagination to determine the essence of that principle.

For St. Albert the resolution of this problem of the nature of the soul entails a discussion on its substantiality. This explains why St. Albert anxiously asks himself, Utrum anima sit

substantia?[7] It is noteworthy that even before considering the first Aristotelian definition of the soul St. Albert examines and approves various other definitions of the soul which have ordinarily been considered as opposed to the definition proposed by Aristotle. What is the conclusion he arrives at? Does that conclusion colour his interpretation of Aristotle? The former question we will now proceed to analyze; the answer to the latter will emerge as our study progresses.

Two significant questions are raised by St. Albert: one on the various definitions of the soul proposed by the saints and another on the definitions by the philosophers. In the order which St. Albert follows, there are definitions from the *De Spiritu et Anima* which St. Albert ascribes to Saint Augustine, from Hedgius of Auxerre, from St. John of Damascus and from St. Bernard. The definition attributed to St. Augustine by St. Albert is: *anima est substantia rationale participans rectum perpetui arbitrii*.[8] Hedgius of Auxerre is credited with being said: *Anima est substantia incorporea regens corpus*.[9] With St. John of Damascus there is a verbally different presentation: *anima est substantia viventa, simplex et incorporea, corporalibus oculis commodum perspicua non autem invisibilis, incorporalis, rationalis, intellectualis, indivisibilis, opposita atem mutari et bene vitae commutationis et causa et commutabile naturalis,*

non aliud quam vel non intellectum, sed ex parte sui perfectionem.[10] The last authority quoted by St. Albert in this spot is St. Bernard who is of the view that: Anima est res incorporea, rationis capax, vivificans corporis accessibilis.[11] Over and above these three definitions proposed by St. Albert in his Summa de Creaturis there are three others in his complementary article in the Opera Theologica: those of Alexander, Seneca, and Cassiodorus. St. Albert also adds another from St. Augustine. Commenting on the first of these St. Albert says: Alexander Nequam in libro de Rerum Certis sic: anima est substantia incorporea illuminationem sui sui a primo illius relationem percepitiva.[12] Seneca is credited with having said: Anima est spiritus intellectualis ad testimonium id de et in corpore animatus.[13] The definition given by Cassiodorus is cited by St. Albert as follows: anima est substantia spiritualis a deo creata, proprii sui corporis vivificatrix.[14] The fourth and last man quoted in this array of sayings is St. Augustine: Item Augustinus sic: Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper vivens, semper in esse, semper habiens voluntatis usum.[15]

In the context of this discussion there is one thing to be noticed about these definitions more than anything else. It is the fact that each of them contains a major element demanding the substantiality of the soul. Having set forth these definitions

after the manner of one who lays a solid foundation, with full knowledge of its elements, St. Albert introduces an argument in proof of the substantiality of the soul. It is taken from Avicenna and rightly ascribed by St. Albert to Avicenna. The argument runs as follows: it is impossible for the proper subject of the soul to be what it is except through the soul itself which is the constitutive cause in virtue of which the subject is actually that which it is. Since the soul gives perfection and specific being to the body, it is a substance.(16) It would be rather incongruous to introduce Avicenna to substantiate such a list of definitions unless St. Albert thought that the doctrine of the Arab was both similar to and reconcilable with the tradition influencing the saints.

Another indication of Avicennian inspiration is found in an argument which St. Albert adopts from Gellestanus. Here St. Albert argues that whatever exists is either a substance or an accident. Now nothing whose presence constitutes the species of substance, as its absence destroys it, can be called an accident. But each kind of soul by its presence constitutes the species in the plant, the animal or in man and by its absence destroys it. Therefore since it cannot be an accident it must be a substance.(17) At this stage it appears that through Avicenna and the so-called

points St. Albert establishes the substantiality of the soul by denying that it is an accident of the body. In effect, what he says is that the soul is a substance because it is not an accident. Even the method itself of Avicenna is adopted for the solidification of St. Albert's position both mediately and immediately.(18)

Finally, just before he takes up Aristotle's definition, St. Albert sets forth the definition of Plato that anima est substantia incorporea movens corpus.(19) While St. Albert accepts the definition itself he rejects the mode in which, according to Plato, motion is ascribed to the soul. For St. Albert the soul remains unmoved in itself but in reality does move the body. It is itself unmoved, yet moves per accidens with the motion of the body. As a matter of fact St. Augustine had the answer for this problem and it was simply this, that the soul is in the body as God is in the world. For, just as God is in the world and moves everything in the world without being moved essentially or even accidentally, so also does the soul move the body and yet remains unmoved in itself. However, we cannot go the whole way and deny to the soul the possibility of being moved accidentally for the simple reason that the power of motion of the soul is of a considerably lower order than that of God.(20)

St. Albert does not approach the definition of Aristotle

without having previously assented to the definition of Plato and the definitions inspired by St. Augustine. He is already in possession of the key with which he hopes to unlock the secrets of the Aristotelian definition. We have observed that St. Albert adopted the position of Avicenna in dealing with the problem of the existence of the soul. We have likewise seen how St. Albert uses Avicenna as an instrument for establishing the substantiality of the soul, noticeably in his treatment of the Platonic and neo-Platonic definitions of the soul. Although we have not yet seen the last of Avicenna there is no better time than the present to quote the unique and striking sentence which gives the clue to the understanding of St. Albert's interpretation of Aristotle.

That precise sentence runs as follows: Licendum, quod definitio Avicennae bona est, et omnes omnes illae non definitiones sunt omnis Aristotelis, sicut in sequentibus patet.(21) St. Albert expressed this revealing opinion in his discussion of the Avicennian definition of the soul. This definition is set forth by St. Albert as follows: Avicenna in VI de Naturalibus autem sic definit: Anima est perfectio prima corporis naturalis instrumentalis, habentis quasi vitae.(22) In consideration of the complete Scientia'XVII seeks to be convinced numerous passages in the writings of St. Albert which, without such aid,

would be most difficult to interpret. From that succinct statement and declaration of position we may emphasize three points:

(1) For St. Albert there is not the slightest difference between Aristotle and Avicenna on the definition of the soul.

(2) St. Albert presents us with this clue immediately <u>before</u> analyzing the Aristotelian definition and immediately <u>after</u> having used Avicenna to substantiate the definitions ordinarily opposed to that of Aristotle.

(3) St. Albert promises to substantiate this identification. We shall see that he does not break his promise. We are now led to the very heart of the issue. We are confronted with St. Albert's exposition of the Aristotelian definition of the soul. If the soul is a substance by definition and <u>per rationem</u> how are we to construe the definition of the Stagirite as compatible with the definitions advanced by Plato, St. Augustine, St. John Damascus and the rest?

II

We have set forth the statement which St. Albert gives of Aristotle's first definition and found it authentic.(24)

The discussion of the definition of Aristotle is divided into questions, each of which is composed of various articles explaining one or another element of the definition. The first

asks whether the soul is the actus corporis.[24] In this section, titularly devoted to Aristotle, St. Albert begins by quoting Avicenna to the effect that the soul is the perfectio of the body. To all intents and purposes actus and perfectio have the same signification.[25] However, it is further objected, if the soul is a perfectio it is in a subject perfected and does not enjoy the act of existence anywhere but in that subject. This would place the soul on the level of a pure material form. For this reason, and in this sense, perfectio is not an adequate term to apply to the rational soul.[26]

The sixth objection is also helpful in placing the problem in a clear light. The objector takes a text from the De Anima of Aristotle and wonders why, if Aristotle calls the soul a form, he defines the soul as the actus primus of the body rather than as the forma prima corporis.[27] We know now that St. Albert was aware that the terms forma and actus or perfectio applied to the actualizing principle. As we shall see, he was not unaware that vis and potentia also designate this principle. The influence of Avicenna becomes even more evident.

Now all these terms were used to signify the actualizing power of that principle customarily called anima. But each one has a different meaning. It is just as important for St. Albert to choose one of them as it was for Avicenna. Or rather, it is

most important for St. Albert to choose one of them because it was important for Avicenna. St. Albert gives two main reasons why it is better to call the soul an *actus* or a *perfectio* than a *forma*. First of all a *forma*, according to its proper meaning in natural philosophy, is that which has existence in this determinate matter and cannot exist apart from it. But a *perfectio* can exist, in virtue of its very substantiality, without the being it perfects; just as a sailor can exist without a ship. It is, therefore, true that, since a particular kind of soul can exist separately, it is more suitably called a *perfectio* or an *actus* than a *forma*. Secondly, *forma* designates a relation with that which is its most remote complementary principle, namely, the potency of matter. *Perfectio*, however, designates a comparison to the thing that is perfect not only in its matter but also in all respects necessary for the perfection of that thing. (38)

But what of *potentia*, *vis* and *virtus*? *Potentia*, says St. Albert, is either active or passive. *Potentia activa* is the principle of the change effected in another—the power to change the other—in as much as it is other. *Potentia passiva* is the principle of the change undergone through the influence of another—the power to be changed by the other—in so far as it is the other. As to the term *vis* or *virtus* St. Albert maintains that it can be taken the same two ways. Each way is suitable and fitting to the

soul in respect to different parts of the soul. Therefore neither is applicable to the whole soul at the same time and under the same aspect. St. Albert is not slow to see this conclusion. Take the senses and the possible intellect for example. Here we are on the level of the *potentia et vis activa*. But something prevents the application of anyone of these particular terms to the soul itself in such a way as to signify it adequately. For the necessary unity is lacking. These names do not fit the soul *per unum modum*. As a matter of fact, as we have just seen, they fit it only equivocally. Consequently the soul is not able to be defined by them but only by *perfectio*; [illegible] *Metaphysica*.[37]

Furthermore, whether the question revolves around *potentia* or *vis* or *virtus* the answer is always the same. Each of them has its peculiar being dependent on the being of that of which each happens to be the *potentia*, *vis* or *virtus*. Their being is not substantial; it is not *in se*. For this reason, when the soul is defined in as much as it is a proper *actus* constituting the species as such and making everything in that species to be what it is, the soul cannot be defined by the terms *potentia*, *vis* or *virtus*, but only by *actus* or *perfectio*.[38]

Why then does St. Albert choose perfectio rather than any of the other terms? For the same reason as Avicenna does and for no other: if the soul is defined as a form, it is essentially tied up with matter. Since Avicenna as a good neo-platonist wanted to avoid this, can we say that "St. Albert as a good Aristotelian" wanted to do the same? For St. Albert, as for Avicenna, to be the form of the body it is not of the essence of the soul. Rather its essence is to be a spiritual form, a perfectio, having only as one of its functions to be a form. From all this it is not difficult to see what St. Albert is driving at in choosing perfectio rather than forma for the definition of the soul. If the soul is not only a form but is by its very essence a form, then such a soul cannot possibly exist unless it inform some matter, in which matter it exists. But if St. Albert says that it is not essential to that substance to be the form of a body, if rather its essence is to be a spiritual form, a perfectio, he has given it the title which first and primarily belongs to it. It is an exclusive title, one which in its very statement, guarantees independence of the body, spirituality and consequently immortality. Such a position is pregnant with conclusions. As they are many times re-born in what is to follow the marks of their ancestry will not be obliterated.

Returning again to the texts we observe that in Aristotle's

E. G. Miller
St. Albert

definition St. Albert considers *actus* or *perfectio* as that principle which gives to the soul its essential denomination. It is essential because before all else the soul is a *perfectio*. At the same time, however, one of its properties is to be a form giving the body the power of carrying on certain truly human functions as well as the particular *vires* with which to do so.

Now when Aristotle calls the soul *actus primus*, what does St. Albert understand by *primus*? One does not have to read far in the texts of St. Albert to realize that there is for him a meaningful distinction of *actus primus* and *actus secundus*. He calls the first act or perfection that which bestows on any being of which it is the act its proper nature and which locates it in a certain species. On the other hand, *actus secundus* is not a principle of operations at all. It is the very operation itself, *actus secundus est ipsa operatio*, which flows from the first perfection and embraces any one of the many operations present because of the actual presence of the first perfection. If then the soul is an *actus*, is it the first or second act? St. Albert is compelled to say with Aristotle this time that the soul is the first act or perfection.

According to St. Albert Avicenna's exposition of this distinction suits him. This Arabian, we are told by St. Albert,

contends that the first perfection is that in virtue of which the species becomes actually a species. A second perfection follows from the first perfection or from the operations which a being, possessed of the first perfection, is able to perform. Thus, for example, a sword's aptness to cut is a second perfection. Likewise, in man to know, think and sense are second perfections. A man is not less essentially a man because he is not actually performing these activities. He is essentially a man when he has the perfectio primo primus modo est, non potest esse esse secundo secundo modo. Secundo modo non ponitur esse primo.[101]

At this juncture it appears fairly plain not only that Avicenna has helped St. Albert, but also how he has helped him. In establishing the soul as a substance Avicenna's 'substance or accident' formula influenced the arguments supporting the neo-Platonic and Augustinian definitions of the soul. But St. Albert was in a ticklish spot. How was he going to assent for Aristotle's definition and still hold his first love—the soul as substance, and, as we shall see, not merely as substance, but as substance separate per esse et operationem. St. Albert could neither disregard Aristotle, nor dismiss him. So, Aristotle had to be made to fit, and by defining the soul as a first perfectio in the Avicennian manner St. Albert could still hold the soul to be such a substance.

The independent substantiality of the soul is assured once it has been shown to be a perfectio and not a form. Such is the substantiality of the soul, however, that one of its properties is to be a form; it designates a form, however, only in respect to certain activities.(32) Let us go a little further with St. Albert.

He is remarkably lucid in his approach to a definitive stand on the soul. Two aspects are of prime importance for St. Albert. Firstly the soul can be considered as it is in itself. Secondly, the soul can be considered in its relation to the body, and not in view of the existence it has in itself. In this first case it is not to be defined in reference to the body but only according as it has existence in itself separate secundum esse from the body.

The immediate conclusion to be drawn from this is that we are confronted at once with a double definition of the soul. Why is this so--because a certain kind of soul can be considered to exist without a body; namely, that kind designated as a first perfection. This is the very crux of the present problem. In one strong, clear statement St. Albert aligns himself in this problem with the traditional scheme of thought from which he never seems to have cut himself adrift.

This pregnant statement is set forth as follows: "Some

souls can be considered to exist without bodies. That is why Avicenna can say in his *Liber Sextus de Naturalibus* that the name anima is not a name designating the essence of the thing to which it is referred. When the soul has been defined as Aristotle did it this definition of his does not look to the nature, to the *esse*, of the thing defined except in so far as it is the source or principle of certain activities of different sorts."

The definition of Aristotle is not concerned with the essence of the soul but only with those activities which are outside its very nature, as it were accidental to its nature. However we really should not consign the definition to a lesser place than it deserves, for although these activities are accidental to the very essence, still they serve as indications of the essence in itself. St. Albert goes on to give Avicenna's example and to interpret it. Merely because we state that whatever moves has a mover we do not remove ourselves ignorant of what the essence of the mover is in itself. That is to say, just as a mover has a double definition, namely first according to the property which makes it a mover, and second according to its essence, so also the human soul is to be reported definitively in two ways: first, in so far as it is a soul, as *motus corporis* and the *motor*

operatio, and *actus*, in so far as it is a certain *perfectio* situated by its very nature in the category of substance. Again we see, and still more clearly, that only through Avicenna can St. Albert interpret Aristotle's definition in a way which will not leave his own notions of the soul in itself as a substance. Such a position interprets the Aristotelian definition as a description but not an essential definition of the soul.

Other and later texts continue allegiance to Avicenna and the Avicennian interpretation in the sphere of this specific problem. We turn to the *Summa Theologiae*. If there is any approach to another mode of solution of the present problem it should appear here, in St. Albert's last known work. In this place St. Albert reports the first definition of Aristotle as defining the soul only in so far as it is the form, species and substance of an animated body in which the soul performs the various activities of life which are fitting, not only for the whole body, but also for its different parts. It does not grant us a knowledge of the soul in itself. For this reason, St. Albert tells us, Aristotle contends that in respect to those parts according to which it is the *actus corporis* and beyond which it performs no functions of life the soul is not separable. If in respect to these parts, as

well as *in se* it were separable from the body, how then could there be any vital functions at all? It simply would not be a soul.[34]

St. Albert quotes Aristotle to fortify his own Avicennian interpretation of the Greek's first definition. By a peculiar twist of fortune the manuscript from which St. Albert apparently quoted Aristotle read as Avicenna would interpret him. The quotation in question reads: *Amplissime sanitatem est hoc si sit corporis esse anima sicut esse (navis) navis.*[35]

Avicenna is re-introduced to shed his penetrating light on these points. Avicenna holds, as does St. Albert, that the sailor has a twofold definition. The first refers to the sailor in himself in so far as he is the ruler of the ship. In the second, the sailor is considered according as he performs the nautical activities through the instrumentality of the various tools of the boat. This example is valuable in the point under discussion since the soul enjoys a similar dual definition. The first considers the soul as capable of carrying on the functions of life in a body. This for St. Albert is all the Aristotelian definition means and that is the depth of its application. The second is of the soul *in se* as separable from the body, especially according to the particular part which is the perfection of no body. This for St. Albert is

the intellective part remain the same and perform the proper functions of its own life.(46)

Such demonstrations as these are solidly founded on the principles on which St. Albert's unified doctrine depends. Taking his doctrine as doctrine, abstracting for the moment from the spirit, inspiration and purpose of his thought, it rests on principles whose maintenance is requisite for the maintenance of the doctrine itself. In this peculiar problem there is a basic principle without which St. Albert would be unwilling and unable to proceed. In so far as doctrines of different men are differentiated not by their subjects, but by their principles, one must pay careful attention to the principles of St. Albert should he desire to compare or contrast the teachings of St. Albert with those of any other man or group of men. To see eye to eye with St. Albert is one thing; to understand what he is driving at is another. The first cannot be without the second but the second may be without the first. In any event the second must, by a naturally necessary priority, precede the first. That is why we must go still a little further with St. Albert.

With St. Albert the definition of Aristotle is adequate as far as it goes. It quite fulfills a necessary service for every soul which is the act of a body and nothing more than

the act of a body. But when you introduce the intellect--there you have another order, for the intellect is the act of no body. This involves us at once in the conclusion that the Aristotelian definition is not adequate to cover the essential needs of the intellect in the way of a definition--and consequently does not suffice for the rational soul. A natural power (here the intellect) flows from the very essence of the substance of that of which it is a power. This being so it is beyond the possible that a power which is the act of no body flow from a substance which is only the act of a body. (37)

On the contrary (and this is most important) from a separate substance which is a motor corporis it is quite possible that there flow powers joined to the body. (38)

This significant doctrine, containing the fundamental principle of St. Albert's teaching on the soul, does not appear for the first time in the Summa Theologica. It is set forth in a more complete, but not more essential manner, in the De Anima. Hence, before drawing any conclusions we must go to the De Anima. In that place St. Albert informs us that the soul has powers whose operations stand in no need of a body. That is to say, the soul considered in itself contains powers and operations which can be completely accounted for by the soul itself. This is so when we speak of the intellective

part of the soul and it is equally true of the complete intellective soul, wholly separable from the body. In showing why this is necessarily true St. Albert establishes his conclusion by offering a rational demonstration. Parts of the soul are natural powers flowing from the soul. Since this is so it is absolutely impossible that a separate power (that is, one whose operation is completed outside a corporeal organ) derive from a soul joined to a body. Now the converse is not at all impossible. In fact it is quite correct to say that there are powers flowing into the body from what is essentially separate from the body. And why is it quite correct? Simply because every superior power can perform whatever any inferior can perform, but, on the other hand, any inferior cannot do what every superior power can do. For example, the source of the motive power of the primum mobile is the prime mover, who is among all existents the most separate substance. But this power actually has no effect on its operation without a body for the reason that only bodies are locally mobile. Then, if the soul be essentially separate we shall have no trouble in explaining the powers operating in a body. The only way by which the soul can be defined as essentially dependent on the body is to maintain that each and every one of the powers flowing

from the essence of the soul functions through the body by means of some corporeal organ. Of course this is untenable for St. Albert, for whom any natural power and its operation depends on the essence. In effect, each power of the human soul is a property of the essence and manifestive of it. Consequently, the soul falls in the definition of the property. Now, then, St. Albert asks, can a soul joined essentially to the body cause a separate natural power? There is, from all that has gone before, just one avenue open and that is to say: if the intellect is a separate power then it is necessary that the whole intellectual soul be essentially separate. This then manifests the state of the intellectual soul moving the body and being its act as a pilot is the act and motor of his ship. The soul is not merely the actus corporis but it is actus et motor corporis et motor navis. Thus the whole soul is substantially and essentially actus corporis et distinctus ab ipso, nec [39] iunct ei et forma sive unitive essentialis.

From our study of these texts the following statements of St. Albert's basic philosophical principles emerge:

(1) The whole intellectual soul is separate secundum esse from the body. Anse (actus) separatur ab materialitate a corpore.

(2) The principle behind this significant conclusion as a necessary cause is the following: since a power of the soul

is a property of the essence, only a soul essentially separate can have a separate power.

(3) This, however, does not prohibit what is essentially separate from having powers operating in a body.

(4) The basis of this last statement is the neo-Platonic principle that: omnis potentia superior ordinat quoquid potest virtus inferior et non convertitur.

(5) There is no conflict between any of the chronologically diverse groups of texts we have studied.

But what about the potentia vitam habentis in the first Aristotelian definition of the soul? There is little change; the Avicennian tenets are not abandoned. Rather, they are even fortified by acceptance; St. Albert is consistent. Briefly, for St. Albert the phrase potentia vitam habentis simply means the relation of the matter to the actus of the soul which is to live. This part of the definition is put in it by Aristotle, St. Albert tells us, to show the difference between bodies having no potestas vivendi, and certain physical bodies such as plants and animals. Because the principle of this life is the soul St. Albert can say: vita est animae aliqui potentiae activae et corporis aliqui passivae. Thus the phrase potentia vitam habentis designates the source of the act of life as an exclusively characteristic mark of

certain physical bodies.(42)

The term organicum now comes up for consideration. In a succinct way St. Albert thinks, secundum Priscianum, that organicum has the same meaning as instrumentale when referred to the body. While the phrase potentia vitam habentis designates the relation of matter to form or the body to the soul, organicum refers to those powers of the soul operating in the organs of the body. Again, and finally, when we wish to denote the relation of the body to that soul which is its perfectio, that is to say to the soul itself as the principle of life and have no immediate reference to the organic body itself we employ in the definition potentia vitam habentis.(43)

Before arriving at a definitive stand on the soul it is necessary to propose the objection with which St. Albert prefaced his conclusive position. Nemesius objects strongly to Aristotle's definition of the soul. As we observed in the texts from Nemesius this definition is applicable to purely physical forms and we cannot therefore adopt it to the soul. Nemesius comes ultimately to the frame of mind where he can see only two possible solutions—one of them right. Either you are with Plato and call the soul a substance, a res aliquid, fit to rule the body while being essentially separate from it; or with Aristotle you hold the

soul to be the entelechy or perfection of the body and consigned totally to that body, enjoying no being outside the body.[40]

In the light of what St. Albert has earnestly propounded up to this point both in reference to the substantiality of the soul and his Avicennian interpretation of the definition of Aristotle there is but one answer possible. St. Albert sees it and does not falter in giving it. First, Gregory (Nemesius) would be right if the Aristotelian definition were applicable to the essence of the soul; *si anima in se considerata esset entelechia secundum essentiam*, but it is not. Second, the definition of Aristotle only refers to the soul *per animationem cum fuerit corpori per esse vitae*. Third, the Aristotelian definition of the soul is thus extrinsic to the essence of the soul and leaves St. Albert free to say: *In se autem spiritus est incorporeus, secundum vitam, ut dicit Plato*.[41] Thus appears the complete position at the base of St. Albert's unique formula by which he at once answers Nemesius and defines his stand: *Ad aliud dicendum quod anima considerata secundum se, secundum essentiam Platonis considerantis autem secundum formam animationis cum dat corpori, consentiunt Aristotelis*.[42]

St. Albert took one more step in this discussion on the definition of the soul. It was an important one. It would be historically unwise for us not to follow him in that step.

Now, St. Albert never thought that the first definition of Aristotle was sufficiently suited to express what he himself wanted to say about the soul by way of definition. In fact St. Albert never thought that Aristotle was satisfied with the first definition. That element of dissatisfaction which St. Albert seemed to feel was in Aristotle provoked him to comment on what is known as the second Aristotelian definition of the soul.

According to St. Albert Aristotle places that definition in [illegible] in this way: [illegible] vitae in mortalibus.[46] The definition is stated differently by St. Albert in his Summa Theologica. There it is worded as follows: [illegible] multiplicis organici potential.[47] Having set forth the definition we should ask how St. Albert interpreted it; what was its value for him and how did he use it. The answer to the first involves the premise that in every nature three causes coincide in one: efficient, final and the form.[48] The one in which they coincide is form. We are warned, however, not to conclude that the mode of causality is unique, that is, that the two unknown causes lose their respective modalities. St. Albert explicitly points out that the causes are resolved into one, because the one thing which is form is at one and the same time *forma*, *efficiens* and

finis. While that one thing, called *forma*, is these three at once, it is not these three in an identity of functions. This one nature in which the three causes coincide is *forma*, *efficiens* and *finalis*, when looked at from different points of view.

But what has this to do with the soul and with the second Aristotelian definition of the soul? For St. Albert the human soul can be looked at, in as much as it is *forma*, from the causality of an *efficiens*, a *forma* and a *finalis*. That one soul is all these in so far as it is form. Let us examine these causal aspects of the soul one by one. The soul in its efficient perspective is not *forma* for it is moving to a product which is other than itself. If the efficient were form it would effect itself, but since it moves to a product which is not itself, we have to look beyond the soul as *efficiens* to find that product. Of what is the soul *efficiens*? St. Albert answers that it is *efficiens* of the being of the composite, effecting not only the *esse compositi* but also the divers compositions following and dependent upon it. But how does the soul which is *forma* and *efficiens* effect the *esse compositi*? It does so through that which it also is, *per seipsum formam*, through the form itself whose business it is to give formal being to the thing of which

it is the form.(80)

This 'efficient-through-form' character of the soul, thereby the soul is form of the body, arises from the fact that it is the form which *dat esse* and whose act is to terminate the thing of which it is the form and to separate it from other things not enjoying that form. For St. Albert this form makes the thing to be one; in fact it is the unity of the thing.(80)

Now now are we going to explain the manner in which the soul as *form* and *efficiens* effects the *compositiones consequentes esse*? These are for St. Albert the *passiones* or *accidentia* which accrue to the human being in the vegetative and sensitive orders. The soul effects them through its powers and its virtues.(82)

St. Albert explains the definition in this way not only because he feels it is the way Aristotle did it, but also because it is the only possible way to do it. For St. Albert the soul is an effective principle because it is the act of all that acts in a subject disposed to undergo that action. This is only another way of saying that what is of the soul is active and that its act is in the animated body--in a body which but for the actualizing power of the soul would not be. This aspect can best be shown by recalling that the soul

as *efficiens* effects the *esse compositi* by means of the form; for the soul is the form of the body. In all living things the *esse* (or the *vivere* which in living things is the *esse*) is *secundum naturam* because there is the form as effective of life or being as actual or formal and the *organico corpore suscipiente* as potential or material. Then that by which we live, as the formal effective of life is the *ratio* and substance of the living being. It is wholly active in the body of which it is the *forma*. The soul is form in so far as it is in this particular matter.

But what about the other causality, namely *finalis*? The soul is *finis* in so far as it is intended by the first efficient, as terminating its operations on the matter. The soul as *causa finalis* is the end of the body; in relation to its body the soul stands as that on account of which the body is and operates as a body. The body is not the end of the soul, rather the body is present for the sake of and because of the soul. (58)

The *principium* in this second definition of the soul may be troublesome. Why must one say *principium* and *causa* in the definition? It seems that to be a formal cause is to be a principle. In the first definition of Aristotle the soul is defined as a form, and it seemed to be taken as a

principium vitae. That could hardly be from writing *per causam agentem principium et per principium causam*.

St. Albert's doctrine on this definition is not open to such interpretation. For St. Albert *principium* has the same meaning in the definition as would *primum*. Principle is that which is first, and consequently that which is related to all that comes after it as first. Not only then can it not mean the same as cause but it designates a condition of a cause. The condition of a cause designated by principle is simply to be principle, or first and immediate. So the soul as principle is definitely first and in this stands its condition as cause. The word cause in the definition designates an *efficiens*. Now the *ratio causalitatis* of an *efficiens* is such that if it is at all it can only be cause, not caused. This is fairly evident because the soul as *forma* is effective through the soul as *efficiens* and the *finis* is arrived at through the operations of the *efficiens*. Further the body, the matter, in so far as it is passive is changed through the motion from the *efficiens*. Observing the effectivity of this causality of the *efficiens* one can only say that it is higher than the others and prior in dignity. We have had to express this by calling it *principium*. It is the principle of the other causes. All

this allows us to conclude that it is rationally fitting to call the soul principle and cause of life. By so doing, the meaning is insured and there is then no doubt that what it really means is that the soul is a first (principium) efficient (causa) of the transmutation of the matter (per motum qui est ab efficiente) which is involved in the works of life. This, according to St. Albert, is what Aristotle meant by those terms in his second definition: et sic sumitur hic causa in diffinitione Aristotelis quando dicitur: anima est principium et causa vitae.[54]

So much for the definition itself. But what is the value of this second definition? In other words why did St. Albert feel that he needed another definition? The answer shows not only why St. Albert wanted it but also serves as a further explanation of the two Aristotelian definitions. St. Albert reminds us that in this discussion we are in the field of definitions. In this field it is necessary that what is commonly attributed to a thing be proved to be actually such by means of the proper cause. A thing is what it is because of something prior secundum se. That which is prior in the one point under consideration, the definition of the soul, is the proper cause explaining why the latter is true. Consequently, that the soul is actus corporis physici has to be conclusively

demonstrated through that cause which properly brings it about that the soul be *actus corporis physici*. In other words some definition of the soul should be found which will designate the cause and give the reason for saying that the soul is the act of a body. Once this is found and is satisfactory we will have a demonstration wherein the first definition (*actus corporis physici*) is demonstrated through another as through a cause. St. Albert believes he finds such a helpful definition in that one which designates the soul to be the principle and cause of life of this kind which is exercised in a physical body. (35)

As we are well aware St. Albert feels that this is the definition which Aristotle advances in *II De Anima* for reasons we now proceed to investigate. As St. Albert has it, Aristotle holds this to be a definition as a principle of a demonstration *propter quid*. It is the cause through which the first definition is demonstratively concluded. According to St. Albert Aristotle considers this first definition imperfect for two reasons: first, because it only says *quid est* the soul and not *propter quid* [illegible] *species* and secondly, because by it one cannot know the causes of the accidents *per se* and the operations which are *per se* suitable to the soul.

We ourselves do not have to construct a syllogism to exemplify St. Albert's point. He was a good teacher and as such knew the value of a strong demonstration which would clinch his own argument. St. Albert presents this syllogism in which one definition of the soul is concluded from the other:

I. Anne quod est principium et causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore in toto et in partibus, est actus et ratio et species ipsius.

II. Anima est per se principium et causa operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore secundum totum et secundum partes.

(56)

III. Ergo est actus et ratio et species.

In this syllogism we have what St. Albert has concluded after interpreting Aristotle. It is a strong statement of a position, a revealing statement, as we shall have occasion to see. But for the present we may just wonder whether Aristotle really would support St. Albert's interpretation. In point of fact it can be stated that Aristotle does not seem to maintain explicitly that the second definition is a principle of a proper quid demonstration of the first one. It is undeniably true that at the beginning of Chapter Two of Book II immediately after dealing with the primus actus definition Aristotle does say that we must reconsider the soul, for it is

not enough that the definitive *ratio* show only *quid sit* but it must show *causam inesse*.[87]

St. Albert takes over the example from geometry found at this point in Aristotle's text. It simply consists in two definitions; one stating the *causa rei*, the other having the *ratio conclusionis*. To the question, what is squaring, the answer is: the construction of an equilateral triangle equal to a given oblong rectangle. This is the definition having *ratio conclusionis*. For the second, saying *propter quid*: Squaring is the discovery of a line which is a mean proportional between the two unequal sides of a given rectangle.[88] For the present it is enough to say that it appears that these definitions of the soul would be related as principle and conclusion of a *propter quid* demonstration, else why would Aristotle give an example of a sort of relation between two definitions which was not the kind between the two definitions of the soul. I say it appears such and St. Albert adopted that appearance as an actuality. We shall see that it was his consistency which enabled him to do so, but we shall also see that another interpretation may be given and sustained.

Further, St. Albert maintains that such definitions as the first were considered dialectical and vain by Aristotle because they leave unknown the *per se accidentia* and their

causes. For St. Albert only the second definition makes clear what the thing is and why it is such. True, Aristotle does regard as dialectical and vain definitions which leave unknown the properties. But Aristotle does not actually say that the definition of the soul as act or form is one such because it does not make the *per se accidentia* known. Because Aristotle proceeds to discuss the soul in Chapter Two of Book II St. Albert feels he was dissatisfied with the first and crowns on then to apply what Aristotle had said of dialectical and vain definitions in Book One to the first definition. As a matter of fact Aristotle's second definition contains the properties and proper operations as *differentia* so that he does not have to hold that the properties are superiorly demonstrable from it. (29)

We have arrived at the point where it is fairly evident that the relation between soul, principle and act is a relation wherein principle is the middle term of a *propter quid* demonstration. By means of this application of principle St. Albert is able to be consistent with his explanation of Aristotle's first definition. The first was interpreted in the full light of Avicenna. While Avicenna is noticeably absent here in this second exposition, his influence has not dimmed for St. Albert, has not done violence to the work

accomplished in the first causes. The soul is seen to be actus corporis physici not in se but only in view of the relation it has to the body. From this relation it is denominated actus, for actus is in the body as if the foundation of that relation. This leaves the door open so that there can be a middle between soul and actus. This middle is the term stating the relation in its cause. The middle term: principle and cause of works of life and per se accidentia in such a body, performs this function. To call the soul such a principle states the reason why there is the relation permitting the soul to be called actus. And because the soul and the body enjoy the type of efficient causal relation we saw above (60) the actus of the soul, which is in the body, is the effect and follows because of that efficient causal activity of the soul. (61)

Other elements in the relation between the first and second definition are now observable. We noted that St. Albert mentions the body in each definition whereas Aristotle has no mention of it in the definitions cited there. It was stated that Aristotle enumerates the works of life, including in that inumeration intellection. St. Albert does not. It was not an oversight on his part. He has to exclude intellection in order to remain consistent with his dual definition. The rational soul according to certain of its parts is not the (62)

act of a body. Only in so far as the soul is causally responsible for acts in the body is it to be conclusively defined as actus. This allows St. Albert to hold that so far as the soul is principle of operations standing in need of no body or corporeal organ it is not actus. (55) Rather is it in this respect separate and separable. If the "new" definition as the middle showing why the soul is actus stated the works of life and included intellection among them, the whole structure would collapse. St. Albert would no longer be St. Albert but another and a younger man. Perhaps after all St. Albert strongly wanted to remain himself. I rather think he did; we shall see presently. If he did, it would have been imperative that St. Albert fashion his own middle term by introducing the body in it and willingly omitting intellection.

Thus it appears that St. Albert's efforts in the second definition are conditioned by his desire to remain firm in the conclusions on the first Aristotelian definition. It was Avicenna whose extensive help solved the first definition and admitted Aristotle into that extensive fraternity of which we have seen Plato was a charter member. Further, it was the influence of Avicenna which carried over and conditioned the interpretation of the second Aristotelian definition.

After all there was a professional point of honour at stake—if St. Albert had not read Aristotle on the second definition in the way he did, Aristotle would have been inconsistent for St. Albert in relation to the first definition. However, a consideration surpassing this in importance loomed largest of all in St. Albert's mind. With this interpretation of Aristotle the independent substantiality of the soul was still intact. The guarantee of its immortality was still in force. The soul had been placed on that guarantee by St. Albert himself: "Si hic est intellectus definitionem Aristotelis."(64)

III

However, this does not settle the problem. True, St. Albert has stated his position; but there are a few questions he must be asked. These questions were not foreign to St. Albert. In fact we can be sure he was aware of them at each step in his development. St. Albert has said that the rational soul is the substantial form of man. He has maintained that the soul is the substantial form of a physical body potentia vitam habentis. This soul is the act of an organic body potentia vitam habentis. However, it is not such an act through its potencies alone but rather through its very essence, for unless the soul were the essentialis forma hominis man would not be man. Yet we have St. Albert's

complete development of his doctrine that it is not essential for the soul to be the form of the body; that the definition of the soul advanced by Aristotle does not affect the soul in itself. It refuses us a knowledge of the essence of the soul, for in defining the soul in itself we follow a different tradition: In se autem spiritus est incorporeus, semper vivens, ut dicit Plato. This brings us face to face with the question as to what St. Albert means by saying it is substantial for the soul to be the actus corporis. An answer to this question necessitates our asking St. Albert himself. He has the reply; he was never without it in all his writings.

The answer of St. Albert is to be found in the distinction between angels and souls as complete substances. The real reason St. Albert composed his article entitled De differentia angeli et animae (66) is, in effect, simply because it was a real problem in his philosophy. Approaching directly the answer which St. Albert gives we note that the substantial difference between the angels and rational souls is that the soul is naturally capable of joining the body, not as a form which has being only in matter but as a form and a substance moving and ruling the body after the fashion of a sailor moving and ruling his ship. (67) Receiving the same conclusion in a slightly different form, what St. Albert means is that the substantial,

specific difference between the soul and an angel lies in the fact that the human soul is inclined to the body as its act. The soul is a spiritual substance with a tendency to a body. And what does he mean then by saying that it is substantial for the soul to be the *actus corporis*? Nothing but this: it is substantial for the soul to be the act of the body on the ground of that natural inclination it has to the body. It is substantial because it is natural; this substantial character is present only in so far as it is perfectly natural for the soul to feel that inclination to the body. (68)

This inclination towards the body comprises the difference for St. Albert. To this are reduced the variations set forth in the *Summa Theologiae*. There St. Albert holds that they differ not only specifically but also generically. The generic distinction arises from the fact that the rational soul has a tendency to the delectable things of the body whereas the angel as a pure spirit is spared these pleasurable tendencies. The specific difference springs from the fact that the rational soul *secundum seipsum* and on the basis of its whole disposition or sympathy is naturally capable of joining a body. (69)

Even this is not the last word. So desperately eager is St. Albert to make his point that he surges on still further.

His rational soul is not an angel because of this natural inclination towards a body and more. Even after death, after the separation from the body the separated soul can be united with a body, and so here again St. Albert says that this is sufficient for a substantial difference. In fact the separated soul retains that <u>affection</u> and <u>intentiones</u> towards the body. This is so true that even the Beatific Vision cannot be perfect for that separated soul until the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the soul. St. Albert quotes St. Augustine to the effect that it is this very natural appetite of the soul for its body which retards a complete enjoyment of the Beatific Vision until such time as the resurrection of the body occurs. This reunion is all that is necessary for the separated soul to be as one then knows he is eternal bliss in contemplating God. (70)

Once more the independent substantiality of the soul has been safeguarded by reason of its fundamental independence of the body. The significant feature is that St. Albert has been accomplishing it while strongly insisting on the unity of the human composite. We have observed the mode and manner of his explanation. His answer cannot fail to send us back to the one whose position he most certainly had in mind. We can say 'most certainly' because St. Albert is not

loathe to acknowledge his debt. St. Augustine is directly behind this explanation St. Albert offers as the means whereby he can say that it is not essential to the soul to be form of the body while maintaining at the same time that the soul is the substantial form of the body.

In the doctrine of St. Augustine, as in St. Albert, we find a constant insistence on the unity of man. According to the definition of St. Augustine man is a rational animal, so it were, subsisting to death. In so far as he is rational he is distinguished from the beasts; in so far as mortale he is distinguished from the angels.(71) Since his essence is to be a rational animal, man is neither his body alone nor his rational soul alone but the composite of body and soul.(72) The manner in which he interprets his own formula is such that it will permit him to say that man is a soul who uses a body.(73) The understanding of that manner involves us in an exploration of some of his writings on the soul.

With St. Augustine the soul is in the body propria voluntate. The human soul comes down from God and is united to a body by a certain natural love. That is to say, there is a natural appetite for the body according to which the soul is united to the body. Once so united the unity of the human composite no longer troubles St. Augustine.(74) The soul has been created apart from the body which body has been

created at the same time, so to speak, under the form of a seminal reason. The soul thus created has a tendency to the body in so far as it was created apart with a view that it be united to the body. The union is effected when God develops the seminal reason thus created and the soul takes up its mastery over that body. (75) But supposing the soul refuses to go to the body. It is idle supposition for God has created the soul with a natural desire for a body. There is then no question; the soul will follow that by which it wills naturally towards that to which it tends naturally. This is so true that the soul is in the body solely by an act of its will and not as a consequence of any fall into iniquity. The soul is not in the body as in a prison; it is united to it by love as an ordering and conservative force which animates it and moves it from within. (76) For St. Augustine this inclination does not make part of the essence of the soul. It is essential for the soul to be a substance independent of the body, having its own life and giving life to the body. With St. Augustine the soul is naturally inclined to a body not because it is of the essence of the soul to be the form of a body, but because God so created the human soul to be in its essence a substance (and thereby insure its immortality) distinct from the body. (77) While we by no means intend to

maintain that the doctrine of St. Augustine is identical with that of St. Albert, we do maintain that these striking resemblances are undeniable indications that the Augustinian doctrine is directly behind that of St. Albert on this point. Whether that influence extends to other elements of St. Albert's thought remains to be seen.

We pass now to the most famous pupil St. Albert ever had—St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas agrees with St. Augustine and St. Albert that man is a rational animal. With them he maintains the unity of the human composite as well as a natural inclination on the part of the soul towards the body. Without the slightest intention of instituting a rigorous comparison between the teachings of these men it is nevertheless advisable to set forth three interrelated elements in St. Thomas' conception of the soul: first, the intellect as essential form of the body; second, St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's so-called "new" definition of the soul; third, the view of St. Thomas on a possible dual definition of the soul.

We followed St. Albert as he explained that since the intellect as a power of the soul was separate the whole intellectual soul must of necessity be separate and distinct from the body. This conclusion was vigorously attained in the text from De Anima.{70} We also saw his arguing in the Summa Theologiae

against someone who held that the intellect is the form of the body.(73) We may discover the man he had in mind in both works by turning to St. Thomas as he advances his conviction that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. This can be seen by observing that that whereby anything first acts is the form of that to which the act is attributed. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. So a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in the manifold degrees of living things that whereby we primarily perform each of these vital actions is the soul. For St. Thomas the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, feeling and local movement. It is as well the primary principle whereby we understand. Whether this primary principle be called the intellect or the intellectual soul it is the form of the body. As a matter of fact the only way you can explain how this or that man understands is to maintain that the intellective principle is his form. Consequently, from the operation of the intellect it appears that the intellective principle is united to the body as its form.(80)

In the philosophy of St. Thomas the soul is such a sub-

stance whose very essence demands that it be the form of a body. The natural inclination to the body is of the very essence of the soul itself. In point of fact there is this natural inclination to union with the body because it is the essence of the soul to be the form of the body. St. Thomas replies to an objection which might well have been borrowed from the De Anima of St. Albert by informing the objector that the human soul is not a form immersed in corporeal matter; not one which is totally dependent on matter for its every perfection. Hence nothing stands in the way of its having some power which is not the act of a body. Nevertheless, the soul is in itself, according to its very essence, the form of the body. (21)

Coming now to the second interrelated element in his conception of the soul we discover St. Thomas expounding Aristotle's purpose in advancing the geometrical example as we saw it in the De Anima. As far as St. Thomas can see the geometrical example which Aristotle introduces in Chapter Two of the second book of the De Anima is similar to that which he intends to do in connection with the soul in one respect and in only one respect. It is this: a definition of the soul is to be demonstrated. It is totally unlike it in as much as the definition of the soul will not be demonstrated by a demonstration saying propter quid.

According to the mind of St. Thomas Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate the definition of the soul designating it as actus primus corporis physici organici in this manner:

I. Illud quod est primum principium vivendi est viventium corporum actus et forma:

II. sed anima est primum principium vivendi his quae vivunt:

III. ergo est corporis viventis actus et forma.

For St. Thomas this demonstration is manifestly ex posteriori (per effectum) and by no means a priori, for because the soul is the form of a living body it is the principle of the works of life. This excludes the converse we are told by St. Thomas, namely that because of and by reason of the soul's being principle of the works of life it is act and form of a living body. (82) This converse position as we well know was advanced by St. Albert.

The third considerable element is the possibility of a dual definition of the soul. Some people would maintain a twofold definition of the soul; First, of the soul as it is in itself and second, of the soul as form of the body. For St. Thomas this is an impossible situation. In his philosophy one cannot maintain that the essence of the soul is one thing and the soul as form in so far as it plays the part of a form, is another. That would make the soul as form accidental to

the essence of the soul itself. However, it is legitimate to distinguish between the soul as substance and the soul as form under the sole condition that we remember that there is nothing more in it than a distinction between two points of view on the same identical essence.

Further, it is not because the soul is form *qua forma* that it is able to survive the body but because it is a subsistent substance, having its own substantial mode. However, that substance surviving the body is really and truly a form because it is the very essence of the soul to be form. For exemplification of this turn to a man who knows something. He understands not because he is an animal but because he is rational. But each of these, animal and rational, is essential to him. It seems safe to say that there is a real difference and a real opposition on this point between St. Albert and St. Thomas. [18] St. Albert and St. Thomas were members of the Dominican order. The Angelic Doctor was for a time the pupil of St. Albert and was in close contact with him both at Cologne and at Paris. It is scarcely conceivable that each did not know the position of the other on this precise problem. Such a state of affairs calls into legitimate doubt and points to easy denial of the traditional doctrinal lineage uniting St. Albert and St. Thomas.

The analysis of these fundamentally necessary elements in the philosophy of St. Albert shows us, up to this point in the discussion, that:

(1) For St. Albert the human soul, in contra-distinction to the forms which are only forms, is an essentially spiritual substance separate *secundum esse* from the body. However such a soul plays the part of a form in regard to the body in so far as it is the *perfectio* or *actus corporis*.

(2) St. Albert's interpretation of the two definitions of the soul according to Aristotle is of Avicennian inspiration. If Avicenna is Aristotle in point of fact in this question of the soul, as he is for St. Albert, then, and only then, is St. Albert an Aristotelian.

(3) The soul is the substantial form of the body and is united substantially to the body in this sense that it is natural for the soul to entertain its inclination towards the body. It is substantial only because the inclination is natural. However, and most important , the inclination is no part of the essence of the soul as a substance for St. Albert.

(4) St. Augustine is between St. Albert and St. Thomas. With St. Augustine and his radical Platonism and neo-Platonism in the picture, it becomes impossible to discover a connecting link in the realm of interpretation. But with St. Augustine

and his influences the disparity between master and pupil becomes explicable.

(5) All that has gone before is ample justification for saying that the survival of Platonism in Christian thought, especially through the dominant influence of St. Augustine is, in this precise problem, in St. Albert, aligned with Aristotle through the neo-Platonism of Avicenna. This should go a long way towards the discovery of a new mode of <u>augustinismo-avicennisant</u> as suggested by Professor Etienne Gilson, namely in the field of the definition of the soul, and towards placing St. Albert in that current of thought as one of its most prominent defenders. (64)

CHAPTER TWO

A liaison effected between the Platonic and Aristotelian definitions of the soul through the intervention of Avicenna has many repercussions on problems which involve these definitions. A most important consequence of St. Albert's fidelity to his definitive formula of the definitions of the soul is the rigid application that he makes of it to the problem of the agent intellect.

Neither Plato nor St. Augustine had kept for an agent intellect in the process of knowing. Aristotle however had done so. Avicenna too had maintained the need of an agent power but his was of an unusual sort. If we wonder whether an agent intellect was necessary for an intelligible explanation of human knowledge in St. Albert we are comforted by the realization that he himself was wondering the same thing. It was not long after he had established his position on the definitions of the soul that St. Albert asked himself the question: <u>An sit intellectus agens?</u>

One of his earliest <u>ex professo</u> discussions on this problem is to be found in the <u>Summa de Creaturis</u>. We may fittingly begin our historical investigation of his teaching on this point with an examination of the relevant passages that occur in this work.

St. Albert first deals with a familiar objection against the existence of an agent intellect based upon the parallel between the relation of the sensible to the sense and of the intelligible to the intellect. The sensible species according to the Aristotelian psychology is actively perfective of the sense. Likewise the objector contends, the intelligible species is actively perfective of the intellect. In other words the efficient activity of the sensible species is sufficient to explain the act of sensation. It therefore precludes all agencies other than itself from the role of informing the sense. The same must be said of the intelligible species in informing the possible intellect. To posit an agent intellect in such a case would only be to multiply unnecessarily the elements in nature. But nature does not contain useless principles. Hence there is no such principle as an agent intellect in nature.(1)

St. Albert however disagrees on this very point. For him some of the sensible species are active *per se* and some are not. The latter require an agent to make them active. But whether or not they are active *per se* does not enter into this question because in themselves they never act on the senses. They act in their objects, which objects are themselves the things first moving the senses. Consequently, it

is not true to say that the sensible species act *per seipsum* on the senses. The reason is that sensible species are not *esse* except in sensible objects and because of this they do not and cannot act when and if they are not in the sensible objects. Were we to say that they did act on the sense by bringing it from potency to act we would also have to say that they only so act if the sense itself is already in act. (2) Obviously this is quite impossible.

Thus the objection is invalidated both in itself and as an obstacle in the way of admitting an agent intellect; for each of the senses has an object proper to itself and to itself alone. Because of this there can be no one agent which is universally active in relation to all the sensibles. But this condition does not hold for the intellect where we encounter a power capable of receiving all intelligibles. Thus there can be in this realm a universal agent. We have seen that the agents acting on the senses are sensible objects and no one of these objects is an agent affecting each of the senses in the same way. However, in regard to the intellect the phantasm do not act sufficiently universally to serve in the capacity of an agent intellect because each phantasm is a particular *deter-inatum*. Now if the sensibles are unable to act universally enough to satisfy the demands of a possible

intellect which is potentially all things in knowledge, and if the phantasms in the imagination are also inadequate, it is necessary to posit a universal agent intellect in the intellectual soul.[3]

St. Albert knows that he is not alone in this position. In fact he is secured on the authority omnium philosophorum that there is an agent intellect. Aristotle of course was one of the first and it was he who said that in every nature there are several elements of which one is like to matter in as much as it is the potency while the other is the cause and efficiens which produces all things. This second element is related to what it makes, as art is related to nature. Since this is the case in every nature it is then necessary that there be these differences in the soul itself. Thus in the human soul one of the different elements is the intellect quo est omnia fieri whereas the other is that quo est omnia facere.[4] The latter then is the agent intellect.

This text from Aristotle's De Anima is the very one which perplexed the Greek, Arabian and Latin commentators on Aristotle for centuries. It is refreshing and yet disturbing to see St. Albert so blithely toss off this text as clinching his argument. It is refreshing because apparently St. Albert suffers no mental difficulties over it; it is disturbing be-

cause the radically diverse interpretations of it had no small part in fashioning the road on which many of the medieval philosophers were to walk in the thirteenth century. Moreover, such philosophers as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes had laboured over it, but had not reached the same results.(5) This is so true that we are surprised to discover St. Albert in the next breath maintaining that Averroes, secundum Aristoteles, is of the same view, namely that in anima there is an agent and a possible intellect. Furthermore, he says Alfarabi, Alkindi, Alexander and Avicenna, in fact all the philosophers, say the same thing.(6)

St. Albert proceeds to strengthen his position per rationem. It is a fact that certain things come into act once they are brought from potency. To account for this, something already in act is needed. The possible intellect comes into act when something is known; it has been caused from potency to act. Consequently, this actualizing development can only take place through the efficiency of some power which is not only in actu but which also exists as an agens. This is the reason behind our positing an agent intellect.(7)

The two line Solutio which follows is the most significant sentence in this article. In it St. Albert is neither answering objections nor appealing to authorities. He is concisely

stating his precise doctrine on the agent intellect: Consequens, quod intellectus agens universaliter est in anima.[3] This succinct text contains three major elements:

(1) The agreement with the "authorities" that there is an agent intellect.

(2) That the agent intellect is in the human soul.

(3) That the agent intellect is in the soul universaliter; or which is the same thing, there is a universal agent intellect in the soul.

The explanation of the third element requires our immediate attention. Once it has been clarified the first two elements will be of little or no trouble.

To designate the agent intellect as universal involves the notion of a universe of some sort. Thus if we are to determine what sort it is and what it means we have to turn to proofs for an agent intellect of a totally different nature. St. Albert voices the necessity he feels there is for placing an active principle and a possible principle in the human soul. The reason for this is that such principles are to be found in every nature, and since the soul is a certain substantial whole these principles must be in the soul. For example, look at the physical world; there one observes the celestial powers as active in reference to the passive elemental forms; see the

seed in all generated things—the virtus formativa is the faciens while the matter is the patiens. No one would think of reducing these principles to one principle secundum idem. Likewise no one should say that these two principles evident in the soul are there as one. Actually they differ in so far as the one soul exists in relation to the intelligibles both as agens and possibilis; but not of course in the same way.(9) The human soul, not unlike other spheres of the created universe is a totum perfectum enjoying the two elementary principles in itself. It is fitting that all separate intelligences have in themselves what is universaliter agens and what is possibile.(10) St. Albert, in this text, gives us the cue to the solution of the problem. The human soul, substantially separate from the body, has a universal agent intellect; what is most significant is that this human soul is here linked with the separate intelligences. We have not far to go before we see where this is leading us.

In any universe, says St. Albert, where there are certain things which are only acta and others which are acta as well as agentia, there must necessarily be one first being which is agens and nothing else. Such a necessity is imposed by the condition of things in the universe; one must go back to one first agens which is the primum agens sive intellectuale

or God.[11] Now while this return to a First Agent of Intellectual Being is true of the universe God has made, it is nonetheless true of any one order which may be a part of the whole created universe. In any one order it is imperative that there be a *primum* as a principle. Man himself is a universe on a small scale. Hence, there is in man a *primum agens* which is the agent intellect.

It is, therefore, necessary that in the human soul there be two different principles, one which is *universaliter agens quia est omnia facere* and the other *universaliter possibilis quia est omnia fieri*. The "universe" character of man requires that there be an agent intellect in the soul, proportioned, of course, to the type of universe to which this intellectual being called man belongs.[12]

Such a proof for the existence of an agent intellect is only valid because man is a *minor mundus*. It is solely in virtue of the fact that man is a *minor mundus* that he has an agent intellect.[13] This is so true that if the doctrine of man as a microcosm were taken from St. Albert his epistemology would be shorn of its intelligibility. It is not difficult to see what St. Albert is driving at for he tells us himself. Even in the universe of strictly corporeal beings there is one first agent which effects things generated there;

it is the light of the sun. To this light of the sun and upon it God's light shines, thereby rendering it effective in educing the corporeal forms. Unless the light of God were added to the light of the sun the latter could not effect the material forms.

In this respect there is no difference in any universe one can mention. Take the universe which man is for example; in the soul of man the manifold knowledges which he may have are effected by the light of an agent intellect. If the cases are the same this at once implies that the agent intellect is notable without the light of God to effect its part in the act of knowing. But that must remain to be seen. The point we make now is that there must be a universal agent intellect in the soul because man is a minor mundus. Just as the light of the sun shines universally on both active and passive beings in the world and as God's light embraces all He made, so in the minor mundus man the universal agent intellect pours forth its influence both as forma and actus on all things in the particular universe in which it is the primum agens universaliter. Any active power whose operation reaches from the top to the bottom of its sphere acts universally. Thus the agent principle of the intellectual soul is to the human universe that God is to the whole magnificent array of created

things.[14] The notion of a microcosm implies a relation to a universe of a larger scale--to a macrocosm; what takes place in the microcosm is only a small-scale copy of what happens in the universe as a whole. This means for us that the epistemology of St. Albert is only intelligible in the light of his cosmology. So if what is going on in man is not unlike what is going on in the whole universe we are required to go, with St. Albert as our guide, on a rapid sight-seeing tour of the universe of which we are only now a part.

Because St. Albert sees how suitable it is to begin from God from whom the universe proceeds and on whom it depends it is necessary for us to adopt the same starting point. God is the first principle and cause of all things. As such He is unum et necesse esse. This is an absolute necessity whereby God depends on nothing and has no relation or order to anything; there is in Him a complete lack of any possibility or contingency. Hence, we see His total independence both to create or not to create and in respect to things created.[15] Such a first principle of all things is one, incorporeal, indivisible and unmoved; having no efficient, formal, final or material cause He has nothing to detract from His necessity.[16] St. Albert conceives the production of the world by God who is, Himself, necessary and simple, as proceeding from the primus

intellectus universaliter agens,[17] which is God Himself. God is a pure act in whom all potency is remain. Creation is an emitus into existence of that which comes from nothing; which *nulla est propria prima potentia*.[18]

Things flowing from the first proceed according to an order of nature and not of time. The first *intellectus universaliter agens* only acts and constitutes things by actively understanding and emitting Intelligences. By knowing Himself, God constitutes the *primum creatum*. That first being produced is a pure Intelligence, one and simple, in this sense at least, that it has no material constituent.[19]

The first Intelligence enjoys a threefold relation: first, to God from Whom it comes; second, to itself *secundum id quod est*; and third, to itself in as much as it is in *potentia* as being *ex nihilo*. In so far as it knows itself as deriving from God it has *necessary esse*, but not absolutely as God. It can also know itself *secundum id quod est* and in so far as it is in potency and *ex nihilo*. The act by which it knows itself *secundum id quod est* engenders the soul of the highest sphere (or that which is in place of a soul); while the act by which it knows itself as *in potentia* and *ex nihilo* demands that something on the side of matter be constituted and this is the first heaven or the *primum mobile*, the highest celestial

body. Thus for St. Albert the first Intelligence knowing itself in the last two of its three relations completes its own minor universe, which, next to God, is the biggest part of the whole universe. (20)

Having observed how St. Albert conceives the establishment of the first order we realise that the first of the three relations in the first Intelligence has not yet come into play. The Act by which this first Intelligence knows the First Cause through whom it is itself necessary, knowing itself to be from that First Cause and hence knowing something of that First Cause, gives rise to an inferior Intelligence, the Intelligence of the second order. But this second intelligence enjoys the same three relations. Thus once the mechanics have been set up the most difficult part is done. Everything in the universe happens in the same way; these three relations dominate the explanation of all else in the world. So then, the act by which this second Intelligence knows itself <u>secundum id quod est</u> engenders the proximate motor of the second sphere; the act whereby it knows itself as it is <u>in potentia</u> constitutes the second mobile heaven. However, this second Intelligence still has to know itself in its first relation, namely as it is necessary through the First Cause whose efficient light flows directly through the whole order. Hence by knowing the First Cause by whom it is necessary

the second Intelligence engenders the third Intelligence which in its turn is possessed of the same three relations.(21)

So it goes on right down to the sphere of the moon; everything takes place just as it did in the first Intelligence. The Intelligence of the sphere of the moon engenders a last pure Intelligence in the act by which it knows itself as necessary in God. This last Intelligence instead of engendering the body and soul of a sphere shines on and influences the sub-lunar universe as well as the souls of men. In summary, St. Albert maintained that there were eleven Intelligences, ten of them with heavens of their own. The eleventh has as its dominion the terrestial world of active and passive generable and corruptible things.(22)

St. Albert was undecided whether the heavens are moved by a soul, a nature, or an intelligence. However, this much at least is certain: between the Intelligence and the heaven there is something as a principle of motion. What it is he is not prepared to say in the <u>Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis</u>.(23) St. Albert's solution to this difficulty is inseparable from his position on the Intelligences as Angels. Let us state the problem in these two ways: first, St. Albert is not inclined to believe that the Intelligences are angels for the reason that Revelation and Faith teach the Angels to be

intelligible substances distributed according to the mysteries of God's grace. On the other hand many of the Philosophers call the Intelligences Angels.[24] Secondly, the Saints, and especially St. John Damascene contend that the heavens have no souls,[25] whereas almost all the Philosophers maintain that the orbs have souls as well as Intelligences.[26]

The dispute at root concerns the reconcilability of philosophical and theological tenets. In a magnificently lucid text of the Summa de Creaturis St. Albert solves both aspects of the problem. He admits with the Saints that the heavens have no souls if by that is meant endelechia corporis organici physici potentia vitae habentis, which is the propria ratio of anima. St. Albert wants no contradiction between the Saints and the Philosophers; further, he does not feel there is any, at least in the sphere of this problem. In order to keep them on a harmonious basis it is true to say that there are certain intelligences in the orbs zealously devoted to serving God in the motion of those orbs. They may be called animae orbium; but this appelation is not univocal with the souls of men because they know not through abstraction from phantasms but by having sunt cognitiones nostrae as the liber de causis tells us.[27]

Since such Intelligences only have two powers, an intellect and an appetite, they are not related to the orbs as an [illegible]. But an intellectual substance whose intellect is the act of no body, since it may operate without a body or corporeal organs, is related *ad corpus* just as a pilot is related to a ship. That is to say, by moving and ruling it while remaining substantially distinct from it. (25) Thus it appears that the intelligence, in relation to its orb and the motion of that orb, is analogous to the human intellectual soul in its relation to the human body, in this sense at least, that each is essentially and *secundum esse* separate, although related in that way--as a pilot to his ship. At once we see how vital St. Albert's stand on the soul is to his explanation of even supra-human events. Truly man is a *minor mundus*. For this reason it is proper to call the Intelligence the soul and *motor orbis*, if we specify that we do not confuse thereby man and his soul. How odd it is that St. Albert was able to solve the problem for himself by adapting man the microcosm to any one celestial universe. It is odd because the application is made with the warning not to confuse what actually gave rise to the original confusion.

So it can be said that the heavens have souls if one

means what St. Albert means; and St. Albert feels that Avicenna and almost all the Philosophers permit just that interpretation which he himself gave. Peace is maintained between the Philosophers and the Saints; there is no contradiction. True, the latter denied souls to the heavens, but this was only a nominal dispute because the Saints had an abhorrence of the term anima applied to the heavens for the confusion and humanizing of the spheres which it would raise in the minds of the faithful. In point of fact however they do admit, and rightly so, that certain Intelligences or Angels move the heaven at the command of God and according to His plan. Hence, having solved the second phase of the problem the first is concurrently solved. The Intelligences are Angels and certain ones (quosdam) move certain heavens at God's command. It is of small moment which Angels perform these functions; certain it is that some of them do and they are what the Philosophers call Intelligences. (20) St. Albert has made his point.

St. Albert is fully aware that, according to Catholic theology certain Angels concurr in the laws of nature established according to the Divine Plan. He is not slow to inform us that as a Philosopher who is a Catholic he is not contradicting his faith by holding that Angels cooperate in moving and governing the spheres of the heavens. Nor is it

contradictory to say that these moving Intelligences, which for himself and the Saints are Angels, can be called *animae* by the philosophers. There is quite a happy harmony once we reach a common interpretation. St. Albert confides to us that when the saints decided *antqua antiqua sunt salvat* their fearful preoccupation was that the heavens be thought to be animate and animals in the sense in which man has a soul and a body. The word *anima* alone was on trial. Once, however, we understand their fear and his interpretation St. Albert is convinced of the peaceful sensibility between both camps on that points. (30)

It is well to remember however that St. Albert feels himself at one with the Philosophers on the relation of the Intelligence to its orb; he especially mentions Avicenna. It seems however that he failed to take into account the fact that Avicenna did hold for an Intelligence *and* a soul. Disregarding the soul and making the Intelligence perform that function, as a pilot in a ship, we have St. Albert's solution. St. Albert simply adversses Avicenna as an authority. For the sake of historical accuracy we should realize that Avicenna's texts will not support such an allegiance. (31) That the heaven has no soul beyond its Intelligence is a doctrine taught by Averroes; St. Albert knew this when he wrote his *Summa de Creaturis*. (32) According to Averroes the motive principle of the

heaven is not a form of the genus of natural, material forms; the principle is in the manner of a soul (anima): it is quodammodo anima. The Intelligence is in the last analysis for Averroes the moving principle.(33) It can be called a form, or even anima, by reason of its functioning as a form or anima. It was not Avicenna and Averroes who were the sources for St. Albert's doctrine on this point, but only Averroes.

Thus far the case is clear. It only remains to determine whether what goes on in man is but a particular case of what is the case in the whole universe. It is evident how man as a minor mundus aided St. Albert in solving the cosmological and theological question. Now the human soul as a substance separate secundum esse from the body has powers not operative in a body. These it has by reason of its likeness to the First Cause through whom it is and on whom it depends. However, some powers of that soul operate in a body in so far as it is the act of a body. The first aspect is essential to the soul, the second is outside its very essence. Meaning is thereby given by St. Albert to the expression: the soul stands on the horizon of eternity and time.(34) Such a comparison entails a relation both to what is eternal and to the mutable, corruptible world of sense.

Since this is so the human soul, remaining substantially one enjoys a threefold relation: first, to God and therein is its necessity; secondly, to itself [illegible] and there is an element of possibility; thirdly, to itself in so far as it is in potentia and therein is to be found a relation to matter. [35] How like an Intelligence our human soul is becoming!

But before we follow further along the path of investigation which these texts have opened let us recall:

(1) There is a universal agent intellect in the soul of man, necessitated by the fact of knowing.

(2) Such an agent intellect is the more necessary because man is a minor mundus.

(3) The doctrine of St. Albert on this point is solidly founded on his unique definition of the human soul.

(4) In order to render the proofs for the existence of the agent intellect intelligible it was necessary to investigate something of St. Albert's cosmology; we have not seen the last of it.

Whether the very notion and nature of an agent intellect is compatible with the true nature of the human soul is a further question. An if so it still remains to show how that com-

probability can be explained. It is to these questions we now turn our attention.

CHAPTER [illegible]

From the mere fact that St. Albert asked the question *Utrum intellectus agens sit pars animae* it is evident that he was already well aware of his own solution. St. Albert had always held these two propositions: first, that the agent intellect is a part of the rational soul; secondly, that a part of the soul is a natural power or faculty of the human soul. The variety of the powers of the soul is conditioned by the diversity of principles which go to make up that soul. At once we gather that the soul is not a simple but a composite substance and further, that there are in the human soul component principles which comprise the ontological structure of that entity.

But what are these principles of composition and how many of them are there? St. Albert terms the principles composing the soul *quod est* and *quo est*, or potency and act, if one wishes to take them in a wide sense. The agent intellect relates to these principles since St. Albert tells us it is a power of the soul flowing from the *quo est* or the act, while the possible intellect, likewise a power of the soul, flows from the *quod est* or potency.(1) It is necessary, therefore, to make a

careful study of his texts in order to discover the precise meaning and significance of the principles quod est and quo est.

Since the human soul cannot be defined as a mere form, but has to be defined essentially as a substance, there is considerable difference between designating the soul as a substance and the soul as a form of a body. Substances are made up of matter and form. Thus, to say that the soul is a substance because it too is made of matter and form would have been a traditionally simple matter. There was weighty precedent; St. Augustine admitted a spiritual matter. For him God created a spiritual as well as a corporeal matter.(2) Ibn Gebirol, or as St. Albert calls him most often Avicebron, had maintained a complete matter and form theory.(3) And the matter and form composition of all created substances was a characteristic doctrine of many of the medieval scholastics.(4)

St. Albert, however, always rejected such a position; in fact he seems to have been one of the first to oppose the composition of matter and form within the soul itself.(5) We know how insistent St. Albert is on the soul's being a subjectum perfectum complete by itself. There is no longer any restriction; the soul is not an incomplete substance, but, as we have observed so often, it is separate from the body per modum essentiae.(6)

Since such a soul is neither simple, nor composed of matter and form it becomes necessary to find another type of composition whereby the soul can be said to be a substance.

The most natural way to begin is with some concrete subject such as St. Albert's friend Socrates. As a res naturae Socrates is a composite of a matter and a form.[7] In Socrates there is at once both a matter and a form. The matter of Socrates is the body of Socrates, while perhaps the form of Socrates is the soul of Socrates. But it would be still more precise to say that the soul of the body of Socrates is the form of the body of Socrates for in point of fact the soul is not the form of Socrates. It is but the form of the body of Socrates. What we call the soul of Socrates is the form of one of the two parts of which Socrates himself is composed. This is not at all the form of the whole--Socrates. Actually Socrates is made up of his body, the form of his own body, and the form of the whole being who is Socrates.

But what are we to say of the whole? St. Albert would not leave his friend Socrates without a form because he is a substance and for that reason must have a form. If there is to be one it must be over and above the soul as form of the body of Socrates. It should be a form which is the form of Socrates

himself. And there is one such, because Socrates is a man. So St. Albert will say then that *homo* is the form of that composite substance he calls Socrates. That this has to be St. Albert tells us is clear from the simple fact that that *homo* can be predicated of Socrates as a whole. Socrates is a man. Hence the *forma totius* of Socrates is *homo*. (8)

For St. Albert the form of the composite, the *forma totius* of Socrates is the *quo est*, whereas the composite itself is the *quod est*. Thus it follows that the unity of matter and form is that which is or exists—*id quod est*. It is the *subjectum*. Then, the form of the whole is that principle whereby the substance exists. It is therefore its *quo est*. In other words the *quod est* is the concrete subject of the composite; it is that in which the form of the composite assumes its natural being. (9)

The *quod est* is for St. Albert the suppositi (*suppositum*). By designating a natural being a suppositi St. Albert understands that there is added to the *res naturae* a relation to the common nature to which it is supposited, rendering it incommunicable. The common nature rendered individual in this suppositi in union with which it forms an *unum quid* is no longer able (once this union has been effected) to be participated from this individual point of view by other suppositi. (10)

By the *quo est* or *esse* St. Albert means the form. (11) That form which the *quo est* is, is not the form which determines matter and which would therefore be a part of a material composite. (12) Rather this *quo est* is the form of the very composite itself. In effect, it is that which can be attributed to the subject. Thus as we have seen, *homo* is the *quo est* or *forma totius* of Socrates. However, St. Albert makes it clear that for him this is not the universal which is an abstract concept. Instead of being the general notion of man it is on the contrary that from which the intellect abstracts the universal. (13)

We cannot help but see that here we are confronted with more than a moderate realism. We are dealing in fact with a certain realism of the forms. In a doctrine of this kind the form as such is more than a general idea; it is that from which the general idea is taken. It is inevitable that in such an event there is possible a certain formalism. If this is true there will be no difficulty in finding the *forma totius* when a substance is made up of matter and form. Such a substance will have both a matter and a form and another form--a *forma totius*. A doctrine of the plurality of forms would then be unidentified. It is not our purpose immediately to pursue this line of St. Albert's thought. We will pick it up again

in a later discussion.

Now then if there is no matter, not even spiritual matter in such separate substances as Angels and intellectual souls considered in themselves there is no form of the part. Since there is no matter the form of the whole in such cases is the complete nature in act, equivalent now in a complete manner to the forma materiae. As we observed, this does not hold for material substances. The quod est is now the individual whole or the suppositum. It is that totum which has, but not which is, this form. In spiritual creatures the quod est occupies the position matter formerly had, in the sense at least, that it is the subject. Hence the only composition is that of the suppositum and the nature of which the former is the suppositum. (14)

Thus for example in an angel, let us say Raphael, there is no matter and form composition; but there is a subject complete in se. Consequently Raphael is a substance—id quod est. At the same time he is the angel Raphael. The fact of his being an angel we consider as the form—id-quo est ens angelicum. Likewise in regard to the human soul. Although from one point of view, and externally to its essence, it is the form of its body, it has in itself a form since essentially it is a substance separate secundum esse from the body. Now in the Angel there is no part and hence no form of the part; there

is no other form but the *forma totius*. So just as in the angel the form of that which he is is one with the form whereby he is or exists so also in the human soul there is no past and thus the intellectual soul is at one and the same time both this soul *id quod est* and a soul *id quo est*.(15) Lastly, how like an Angel does our intellectual soul become.

The *quo est* or *forma totius* confers formal being in as much as it is a formal principle placing the suppositum, in which it is or exists and to which it gives being, in a certain definite species. *Quod est* and *quo est* are really distinct principles of one *totum perfectum* but like matter and form neither can exist without the other. The subject is not able, without the *forma totius*, to be in act; comprising an *unum* the principles can exist only there in that which they comprise. It remains then that the *quo est* is the form according to the act which it has in the *quod est*, that is in the *hoc aliquid* or the suppositum. Thus the *quo est* or *esse*, designating the *forma totius*, thereby designates the complete being of the suppositum *per modum unius formalis*.(16) Now it is quite safe to conclude with St. Albert that the *quod est* and *quo est* are essential principles; that is they are quidditative, and hence intrinsic, constituent principles. So far the *quo est*

has a purely formal character locating it as the intrinsic formal principle giving specific being; it is that intrinsic active principle whereby a thing has being of a certain nature. (17)

There can be little doubt that St. Albert was maintaining this type of composition within the unity of the soul as substance to enable him to insure the substantial character of the soul and hence its personal immortality. And so he introduced into the soul a real metaphysical composition whereby it can be considered as a real metaphysical substance. But this is not all. The soul in itself is now more than ever like a separate substance of the Angelic order. Its independence from the body has been strengthened and hence the similarity of the soul and the body in the mode of being to an Angel and his sphere is more apparent. This being so, knowing, as one of the operations of this intellectual soul, will correspond to the mode of being of the soul.

We are now in a position to discuss further the hierarchical order of metaphysical forms in the human composite, man, and in the substantially independent soul of man. Let us begin at the lowest type of forms. At the very bottom we find a <u>forma naturalis</u> which is the physical principle by which an inanimate thing is what it is. Next a form rather

the thing of which it is the form to be endowed with this or that specific being and to be in a definite locus. In a word it is a corporeal or material form. These are of several types. Notably there are the forms of each of the four elements, earth, air, fire and water, or elemental forms; and too, the forms of stones and minerals. In fact the acts of all inanimate things are material forms.(18)

It is characteristic of a forma naturalis that it have just one operative determination; thus fire always rises, a stone always falls. The natural place of anything whose esse is a natural form is defined by its natural properties and it makes no effort to leave that place. Once a forma simplex (forma naturalis) has engendered a certain being and established it in a definite place it has done all it can. Its office is limited by its own matter and comes to an end with its own matter. Hence there is one essential operation and only one following naturally upon a material form.(19)

It is precisely for this reason that the term nature is limited in the teaching of St. Albert on this point to a principle having but one determination. Just as soon as the intrinsic principle appears as the principle of more than one relation we are beyond form as nature. This is also why all

forms beginning with vegetation are not called *natura* but *anima*. They cannot be called *natura* because nature *secundum se* is only determined to one thing and only does one thing whereas form as *anima* does many things. Hence form as form is only nature while *anima* is something else again, as we shall soon see. (30)

According to St. Albert the plane of simple forms is surpassed as soon as a body can move itself in space. Even spontaneous motion is denied to the natural form. Once it is observed we must posit a higher form. So that act and perfection which is *vivere* is in plants their *esse*--*vivere viventibus est esse*. Such an *actus*, instead of being the act of a natural form is now a principle called *anima*. Thus conditioned the body is moved by the soul *ut ut ad vitae operationes*, which are *vivere*, *nutrire* and *augeri*. (31)

Advancing to another and a higher order we observe that because animals are able to move about in space they must have a form higher still. To say an animal is animated by a form does not define it because *forma* excludes this ability to move locally. However it can not only beget, but can live as well as move the body of the animal in space. In such beings the form is not only a form but also a *motor*. Whether the soul be a substance or not it is more than a *forma simplex*. In as much as the animal can move in space we have already a

formal composition. In the irrational animal there is a *motor compositum* whose constituent elements are two: a determining element and a determined element. The determining element is cognitive, the determined, appetitive. The appetitive element, having been moved by the cognitive element, in its turn moves the body and extends its motive influence to the parts or organs of the body.(22) Consequently we can say that the animal is a substance made up of a determining element and a determined element. Let us say then that the *quo est* of an animal is animality. Beyond that *quo est* there is no higher determination to be found, at least within the limits of the animal itself. For that reason is it the *quo est*. At this stage we note that a plurality of operations demands a combination of several forms. Such a soul as we have just been discussing can be said to be already composed: there is a natural form, plus its *vivere*, plus its aptness to move locally or its *sentire*, the cognitive power (the phantasy or the aestimative) of which is the determining element or *quo est* in respect of which all under it is the *id quod est*.

It is well to mention in passing that if a natural form as such cannot account for any living operations certainly the human soul can never be defined as a natural form.(23) Even the

form of a plant or of an animal is superior to the realm of natural forms, for the simple reason that a natural form as such has not any living operations in its province. Without labouring the point it would appear that the first definition given of the soul by Aristotle would not even apply to an animal form in St. Albert's arrangement. In point of fact an animal form is also a mover--which motion is not in the first Aristotelian definition. It becomes more and more apparent that St. Albert was pre-occupied with establishing the human soul to be such that it would be unimpeachably immortal.

Man, however, is much more than a simple animal. The soul in man is more than a simple mover. It is like a pilot; and this entails a higher degree of composition. In the rational animal acting as a rational animal and not purely as animal, St. Albert tells us that it is the practical intellect setting man in motion. Then comes the rest of the rational appetite determined by the knowledge of the practical intellect. Last of all comes the sensitive appetite and the motions in the body. In view of such a multiplicity of operations it is true to say that the form of man needs to be a composite form, more so than that of the animal. In man the same composition is found, of the sensitive appetite with the body but plus this there is the rational appetite with the

sensitive appetite and the practical intellect with the rational appetite. All of which means that the mode of the *anima* is different, higher, and more complex, in man. In man as a rational animal everything is determined from above by human reason. For St. Albert the determining factor in the case under discussion is the practical intellect; and it is such a one that everything under it is submitted to it and in relation to it is as *id quod est*. It is therefore the intellect itself which enjoys the role of the *id quo est*. Consequently in the case of the rational soul as the *actus corporis* there is a composition of the practical intellect as the *quo est* with all under it,—the *id quod est*. (24)

Up to this point there appears to be in man then a physical composition of soul and body added to which there is a formal composition of a form with its matter or what serves as the material element. This is what is meant by a formal composition, namely, the composition of some form with its correlative matter. In the present instance of man it is a formal composition of the moving soul with the bodily organs moved by that soul. Thus in man a new level is reached. The human soul is an intellectual soul which as such can function as a pilot. Actually the intellect is not the act of a body or of any organ; but in a system maintaining such a dual definition of

the soul as St. Albert does the ultimate determination of man as a rational animal in regard to his body will be the intellectual soul operating through the practical intellect. By means of it the body is ruled and determined.

However, the human intellectual soul is in itself a substance, a complete hoc aliquid with a formal but not a physical composition. So it too enjoys a formal composition whose constituents we already know as the quod est and the quo est. We are speaking with St. Albert now of the soul in its esse as a spiritual substance [25] separate per esse et essentiam. We have just passed from the other considerable aspect, namely the soul as a substance acting on exterior objects and in the body of which it is the nauta and pilot. [26] So then in the soul than considered the quod est is the suppositum, the subject or fundamentum in which this particular act of being the quo est, is rooted. The quo est is the formal, acting principle while the quod est is the possible, receptive principle. [27] Each is an essential principle and [28] neither is ab extra nor accidental. The quo est is consequently the formal intrinsic principle giving being to the suppositum and without which there would be no

suppositi. On the other hand it is the *quod est* which St. Albert considers as the first receptive principle, the first subject rendering incommunicable the formal being bestowed by the *quo est* or *forma totius*. Thus the *quod est* is receptive and determinable to this being at the same time as it is divisive of the *quo est*, serving as the principle of individuation in spiritual substances of this kind. (20) It can be said then that this soul, *id quod est*, has a *quo est* or *forma totius* which is *animus*. Further that the *animus* as the *quo est* is that whereby the intellectual soul actually is an intellectual substance.

We must not forget that St. Albert has been thinking throughout this descent of an hierarchical formal composition. He has been thinking in terms of formalities: of metaphysical compositions of higher and higher forms. That is why, as we have just observed, there is in the soul itself a form at the apex; the *quo est* of the intellectual soul *in se* is for St. Albert the ultimate form of the whole man as well as being the form of the soul considered in itself. In a certain sense it would be true to say that man is becoming a soul: *homo est forma totius*, and that is nought but *quo est*.

But it is impossible for us to stop here because St. Albert continues. For him the *quo est* itself has a form and that form is God Himself in whose image man has been created. The soul

is made to the image of God. Thus the most beautiful form it can have is for it to be in the image of God. (30) St. Albert hastens to assure us that the form of a form is not in the same genus as that of which it is the form and for this reason man is adequately distinct from God. But yet that form which is the *forma formans* is itself truly a form. And so it is true to say that the *quo est* of the soul both as substance *in se* and again as act of the body has itself a form. And what is it—he tells us that it is the Trinity. The Trinity is the form of that *quo est* which is the form of the soul. (31)

It remains that the ultimate form of the *quo est* of the human soul is the Trinity and nothing else. The question now is: is it a natural property of the soul to be in the image of the Trinity or is it supernatural? For St. Albert it is the image of creation and so it is natural. (32) That is to say the intellectual soul has been created by God as an image of the Blessed Trinity. The path is now open for a Divine Illumination which will explain both how the agent intellect is compatible with such a soul and what sufficiency it has in itself and in the Divine Light.

However, before advancing to that discussion we must say that according to St. Albert even in God whose unity is absolute our reason can grasp there a *quod est* (that which God is) and a *quo est* (the Deitas). God is God because of His Deitas.

But this formal composition in God is posited by our reason. It does not by any means entail any real distinction even of a formal order in God Himself.(33) In all created things however there are formally distinct and really distinct principles. Since we find a plurality of operations in man there must be a combination of several forms. The hierarchy of component forms culminates in the *quo est* of the soul considered *in se*, which *quo est* has a form itself; namely, the Trinity. This form however is infinitely distinct from the human *quo est* in being and operation.(34)

It is opportune to recall that the soul as an intellectual substance has in itself several relations. First of all, it has the necessity of its being in so far as it is from the first cause. Secondly, it is possible in itself since it might not have been, at least in so far as it is what it is--a created substance dependent on God.(35) In other words this intellectual soul has in its very essence its *esse* or *quo est* for which it depends on God who is its form; it also has in itself *secundum id quod est* a potency to that formal being of the *quo est*.(36) Thirdly, there is a relation, in so far as the soul is *in potentia*, to matter or something material.(37) Now then, what is the relation of this threefold relation to the *quod est-quo est* doctrine as a whole and to St. Albert's doctrine on

the relation of all beings to each other and to God? One principle of explanation is applicable to the resolution of all of these elements.

In so far as the soul is a certain intellectual nature having its necessity from the God and its possibility from itself it can be turned upon itself; it can know itself in its various relations. (38) In so far as the intellectual soul knows itself in its *quo est* it is intelligible as a necessary principle of intellection. Through its *quo est*, whose form is the Trinity, the soul knows itself in the illumination of its Cause and thereby shares in the necessity and intelligibility of its Cause. This act by which it knows itself as necessary in the light of the First Cause is the origin of its own light whereby it understands. That is to say, knowing itself in the light of the First Cause it understands itself in its *quo est* and that is the origin of its own light, called now the *intellectus agens universaliter*. Thus we have the necessity of an active principle of operation from the act by which the soul knows itself, through its *quo est*, as necessary in relation to God. Because thesoul is made in the image of God it has an agent intellect; by reason of its divine origin the soul is, in its formal principle, a substance which possesses in itself a natural agent intellect.

Then the intellectual soul not only knows the light it receives in its first relation but it also knows itself as susceptible of that light. But this is an inferior type of knowledge, namely, to know oneself according to *id quod est*. It is not to know oneself in one's necessity but in one's possibility or receptivity. The act by which the soul knows itself in this second relation gives rise to and is the origin of the receptive principle in knowledge—the *intellectus possibilis*. Lastly, the self-knowledge of the intellectual soul according as it is *in potentia* is the foundation for its aptness to move itself and to be the motor or pilot of the body through the powers of life. (39)

We are now in a position to conclude that the nature of the soul is such that a universal agent intellect is not only compatible with it; it is a necessity. Furthermore, since the *esse est* and *quod est* are intrinsic essential principles of the soul what derives from them must likewise be intrinsic parts of the soul. Thus the agent and the possible intellect are intrinsic, intellectual principles not now of being, but of knowledge. In respect to potency and act st. Albert insists that the act is reduced to the *id quo est*, the form or the agent principle while the potency is resolved to the *id quod est* or possible principle. (40) Hence the agent and possible intellect will differ

as the principles upon which they rest differ. However, the act of the agent intellect is concerned with intelligibles and not with the metaphysical being of the soul itself. Its potency is to the intellectual being of the intelligible and to that alone. And so since its principle is active and intrinsic and its act is to be within the soul, the agent intellect must of necessity be an active intrinsic power of the human soul, founded within the essence of the soul itself.(41) (42)

Now then should the agent intellect be defined? St. Albert gathered his findings into a definition which runs as follows: Intellectus agens secundum difficilioram est potentia et principium activum intelligibilium: et propter hoc dicit philosophus, quod est intellectus qui est omnia facere.(43)

The human soul thus is of such a nature that not only is an agent intellect reconcilable with it, it is demanded by it. This demand follows from the fact that man is a minor mundus and what goes on in him is but a particular case of what takes place in the universe as a whole. The three relations which an Intelligence exercises, rendering its own sphere intelligible, are no different from the productive relations in the rational soul. In our search for a principle of interpretation of this doctrine we found at hand a theory of the hierarchy of forms along with a certain realism of forms. These will be investigated

more directly farther on. At any rate, having seen the inevitable necessity and universal character of the agent intellect springing into prominence in a minor universe we were able to apprehend some of its natural properties. Obviously by placing the Trinity as the form of the soul's *quo est* St. Albert not only shows the soul its own necessity in the illumination from its Cause but he leaves the door open for a comprehensive theory of Divine Illumination. However, if such is the case why has St. Albert gone to all this trouble over an agent intellect? Let us turn now to see exactly what the universal agent intellect has at its disposal and what it is going to do.

CHAPTER TWO

The problem of the universal agent intellect, the proximate active and intrinsic principle of knowledge finds its setting against a variegated background. There is first and foremost the dual definition of the soul, then the *minor mundus* doctrine, supported by the doctrine of the plurality of forms, then the Aristotelian position on the empirical genesis of knowledge, overshadowed both by the *Pater Pomeran* doctrine and the illumination theory of St. Augustine. The various modifications which each of these doctrines undergoes at the hands of St. Albert still is our problem. St. Albert is about to confront the Augustinian noetic with a new theory borrowed from St. Augustine, Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes, but distinguishable from each of them. The activity of the agent intellect will be, for St. Albert, at once in the line of abstraction and illumination. But, a major difficulty presents itself, denying us the privilege of expounding that activity immediately. It concerns the relation of the substance of the soul and its faculties. Until any doubts in regard to this doctrine be dissipated the question of the activity of the Agent intellect cannot be adequately treated. In discussing St. Albert's doctrine on the nature of the soul and the

hierarchical composition, this difficulty has been touched upon in the previous section. There, however, it was discussed only in so as it was necessary to account for the intrinsic principles of intellectual operation. Our present problem is rather to furnish a basis of knowledge as a whole and to explain the function of the "artistic" agent intellect. We will, therefore, take up immediately the question of the soul and its faculties.

According to St. Albert certain powers flow from the substance of the soul.(1) Their diversification arises not from the various acts of the body but rather from the substantiality of the soul.(2)

What has been said of Avicenna, namely, that the most salient character of his doctrine is the separation of the idea of soul from the idea of form can equally well be applied to St. Albert on this point.(3) A plurality of forms is an established fact. A plurality of souls, however, is unthinkable. The soul for St. Albert is a unique principle; from it emanate the various powers which find unity only in the soul's substance. But how can the soul be a substance and still be divided into the rational, the sensitive, and vegetative powers?

From Boethius, the original source of the "quod est-quo est" distinction, St. Albert adopts the notion of the soul as a totum potestativum divided into its parts or particular powers.(4)

The soul as *totum potestativum* is a substance which is to its powers as the subject is to what is in it. The soul remains a *subjectum perfectum*.(5)

Now St. Albert tells us that the *esse* of the inferior powers is not their own, but the *esse* of the highest part—*rationalis*.(6) If the whole is the subject of all the powers, is the whole the highest part—*rationalis*? The unity of these three powers in man seems to be that of potency and act. For example, just as in every definition, which is truly a definition there is only one *esse* given, so, in every definition the relations of genus and difference obtains. The powers of the soul seem to be related as genus to difference and thereby to constitute the *totum potestativum* actually.(7)

The *Summa de Creaturis* provides a reliable resolution of the difficulty. The soul can be considered by the logician and by the natural philosopher or the metaphysician (*rationis* and *rei*). In the first way the soul is taken *ut universale vel particulare*. Here it enters into the logician's consideration for only he can consider things, apart from what they are *in se*, as universal and particular. In the second way, namely, *rei*, there are two modes: first, according to the being which the soul has in nature and here the Natural Philosopher enters; secondly, in so far as the soul is a

substance not compared to the generable and corruptible body (8) and this is the Metaphysician's case.

St. Albert in culling these three possible considerations eliminates that of the Physicist; for, the physicist does not look for genus and difference, nor is the soul a species in nature but only a part of a species. The individual is a part of the universal, rational animal. Next, he disposes of the consideration of the Logician about the universal and particular where the soul is considered either as a species (and hence improperly and vainly because actually it is not a species); or as a difference (in which case it is taken more properly). He may say there are three differences in the soul--vegetable, sensible and rational. Such is the soul taken logically.

The consideration which is left is that of the Metaphysician. It is not explicitly set forth here by St. Albert as Metaphysical but if the soul in the logician's consideration is more properly taken as differentia it appears that such consideration (as differentia) is closer to the substance and nature of the soul in itself. Now, the province of the Metaphysician as we saw above is the soul as a substance in se. The consideration then which is left refers to the soul as animatum esse; this is nothing other than the soul as perfection, represented universally (in its three phases) by its differentia. Animatum

esse may be predicated of soul, rational animal and man just as the logician may predicate it of species and difference. St. Albert seems to be trying to tell us how the Metaphysician, in logical terms, can predicate *animatum esse* of the soul, rational animal and man. It cannot be done in regard to the man, because the province of the Logician extends only to the universal and the particular and not to the singular—the man. (9) In respect to this last way of predicating, namely of the man, *quilibet homo*, we cannot proffer a Metaphysical explanation in logical terms.

If this is so then there appear three grades or levels in the soul. First, there is the soul itself which is simple like a difference, and superior to the genus which is contained in it *potestate*. We find here the *ratio* according to which the soul is designated rational. A consideration of this nature is the logician's de *universali*. Secondly, the powers, vegetation, sensation and rationality flow from the soul. The lower are to the higher as genus to difference. They are *esse et intellecta* in the higher. They are one as is the species, made one, from the relation of genus to difference. This is for the logician *de particulare*. Thirdly, and finally, in the singular man the lower powers, upon the information of the whole body by the whole soul, give a specific order and character to their proper organs. In this

final stage vegetative, sensitive and rational enjoy a greater diversity in the various works of life of the singular man.(10)

In explanation of this relation be it noted, says St. Albert, that the soul as *totum substativum* unites in itself the special powers. Thus it is as the form. Its parts or powers are as the material elements.(11) That is to say, the powers of the soul are such that they are related as genus to difference constituting the species.(12) The vegetable is in the sensible *actu et intellectu* while the vegetable and sensible are in the rational *actu et intellectu*. They are not separated *secundum esse*, which is what St. Albert means by *actus* nor can they be thought to be separate, which is the meaning of *intellectu*.(13) Does it not then seem difficult to maintain even a distinction of reason, much less a real distinction, of the faculties and the soul? How distinct can they be from the soul? It would appear that since these powers are in the soul not potentially or virtually but *actu et intellectu* that any distinction made between the soul and its faculties is negligible.

Through the vegetative and sensitive powers, joined to the organs of the body, the soul is the act of the body. However, these powers are really forms which are consequent upon the activity of the whole soul for they only act in man by the act of

the reason.[14] The reason, like the universal agent cause God, is universal in its activity; for, in the body of man the rational soul everywhere vegetates and senses.[15] Likewise it cooks food by the stomach and digests it by the liver. The reason is that the substance of the soul directs all its parts to the heart; for there all the organs are attached and through the heart the soul in its various forms performs the vegetative and sensitive functions. It is only in the heart *secundum esse essentiam*.[16]

The *totum potestativum* as used by St. Albert in explaining the powers is likened to the *totum* called definition, the unity of which is that of potency and act or of genus and difference. The vegetable and sensible are in the rational *actu et intellectu* in such a way that this *totum potestativum* is a mean between an integral whole (as a house containing its roof, walls, etc. where the whole cannot be predicated of its parts for it is not according to the plenitude of its powers in each part) and a universal whole (where the pure genus contains the species which in turn contain the individuals.)[17]

Since St. Albert is always faithful to this comparison of the *totum potestativum* to definition it would appear that the genus is in the difference *actu et intellectu* and can be predicated of it essentially. Thus the genus would be part of

the quiddity of the difference; it is not so distinct that there cannot be an essential predication.(18)

Further, since the genus is *actu et intellectu* in the difference the genus becomes more than the potency. It is an act already begun, hence as St. Albert says rather called *potestas* than *potentia*. For the *potentia* is indifferent to *esse* or *non esse*, but *potestas* is a *potentia* advanced to a reality of its own, *stans per actus inceptionem*.(19)

In his exposition of the *quo est* and *quod est* resulting in the hierarchy of forms and the more than moderate realism, St. Albert, we have seen, owed much to Boethius and more to Gilbert of Poitiers. In this related problem the same combination is operative. In Boethius we can discover the *partes*, *potestas* and *humitas* which play such an important part for St. Albert.(20) The rigidity with which St. Albert interposed Gilbert in the previous question is maintained so strenuously in the sphere of this precise problem. The formalities of Gilbert are effective in bringing to completion the doctrine of the *totum potestativum* as we have seen St. Albert expound it.(21)

Because the diversification of the powers of the soul does not arise from the various acts taking place in the body but rather from the substantiality of the soul St. Albert requires an explanation which will retain the unity of the soul and still

account for the partition of that soul into these three and no more or less: vegetative, sensitive and rational. He finds it in the similarity of the soul to an Intelligence. The soul remaining one in substance has its powers diversified by the three relations which are in it, namely, to know itself in so far as it is free act, to know itself secundum id quod est and to know itself as it is in potency. (22)

The operations to which these three relations give rise can be listed as follows: first, there is the operatio divina because the soul prepares the nature of the body in the sense of life and motion; secondly, there is the operatio intellectualis because the soul has intellectual knowledge of things. This is the simple soul, the rationalis; finally we come to the operatio animalis which is in the soul because it is the motor corporis. Thus the doctrine of the totus potentativus preserved, in the order of simple substantiality, the similarity which the soul enjoys with the Intelligence. Whether this doctrine allows the soul ample room for, and perhaps not a little need of, a Divine Illumination can only be seen by advancing, with St. Albert, to the explanation of the technical equipment required for the activity of the agent intellect.

In his De anima St. Albert speaks of four grades of apprehension, three of which are sensible and the highest of which is

intellectual. In general, apprehension, of any sort is simply the reception of the form of the object not according to its esse naturale but according to its esse intentionale. Through the form, become an intentio, some knowledge of the object is obtained. Any object has many intelligible aspects which are received by means of the forms of that object, be they accidental or substantial. (24)

The first grade is the lowest and the weakest; there the form is abstracted and separated from matter, but not from the marks of the potency of matter nor from its conditions. On this level are to be found the five exterior senses as the apprehensive powers. (25) It is notable that the abstraction spoken of here by St. Albert is not akin to that which is the business of the agent intellect. The abstraction at this point is a state of separation and distinction from certain marks of matter. It is merely the condition of the species received by this or that particular sense, interior or exterior, designating a greater or less closeness or removal from matter, and its marks. There remains then no question of anything but a state of distinction or separation.

The sense, being a passive power, stands in need of something other than itself to bring it to act. Whatever acts and moves is prior to the term of its operation. Hence, the sensible

naturally precedes the sense which, rendered in act, becomes intentionally the sensible object.[26] What actually is received by the sense and renders that passive potency in act is the sensible species of the sensible object, received without matter.[27] The alteration which takesplace in the power is not a change of the physical order but a transition from a privation to a habitus,[28] effected by the sensible object outside the soul.[29] The forms received arenaccidental forms which, while not in their material being, nonetheless are not free from the presence of matter in its constructing function.[30]

Speaking generally any type or grade of apprehension in these orders of knowledge is such that the recipient is not changed in substance, nor is the object known altered. The knower remains what he was before knowing this or that colored object; he fails fortunately to become a palette with the advent of many different colors and this is so for all the grades of apprehension. On the other hand, the object itself, whatever its place in the hierarchy of being, is amenable to all types of knowable aspects, yet remains not a whit different from what it was before it was known.[31]

That this is so can be seen from the fact that the things received are sensible species existing in the object *secundum esse materiale*, but now also existing in the soul *secundum esse*

intentionale sensibile.[32] The species is an intentio of the sense sensed through which the thing itself is known; it serves then as a principle of knowing the thing. The intention for St. Albert differs as we can see from the forma rei. It is the form which, properly speaking, gives esse actu to matter and to the thing composed of matter and form. But the form as intention is that through which the thing is signified, either individually as in sense knowledge, or universally as in intellectual knowledge. It is then a sign or concept of the thing; for example, through sight one not only obtains a knowledge of color, but a certain sensible knowledge of the colored object. The object is known as colored and any judgment on this realm pertains only to the colored object in as much as it is colored. This "sign quality" of the intention signifies or notifies the thing itself which is object in all grades of apprehending, including the highest.[33] The species as intention is that by which the soul in which it is tends out to the object to know it. It is then a sign by which the thing is known.

Once the sense has been completed through the apprehension of the sensible species it can judge and act. Thus each sense knows its own sensible and is true in regard to its own sensible, not being deceived when it has received what its nature permits it to receive.[34]

There remains to be accomplished a rapid survey of the interior senses. The first is the sensus communis, the interior faculty which receives all the impressions transmitted to it by the five senses.(35)

Next comes the imagination, a faculty distinct from the common sense in this that the latter receives impressions whereas the former conserves them. St. Albert needs a special faculty to explain the conservation of received impressions, because to receive is not to conserve. This is the imagination.(36)

It is distinct in turn from the following interior sense, called the phantasia, which becomes in man the cogitativa. Strictly considered the phantasia is a collative power whose function is the combining or dividing of the images conserved in the imagination.(37)

From Algazel, recounting Avicenna, St. Albert takes his knowledge of the virtus aestimativa. It apprehends intentions which for it are different from the apparent accidental forms perceived by the exterior senses and transmitted to the inner senses. They are qualities in bodies not perceived by the exterior senses, but only recognized by the inner sense, aestimative. It is by this sense for example that the sheep who sees a wolf feels at once that he must flee, through the 'intentions' apprehended by this interior sense.(38)

Finally the faculty of memory conserves the intentions perceived by the *aestimativa*, playing the same role in relation to the *aestimativa* as the imagination does in respect to the common sense.[39] Man has not only the *memoria* as other animals but also *reminiscentia*, by seeking, as it were syllogistically the memory of past things according to their individual intentions. Memory and *reminiscentia* are one power *in subiecto* but considered as two in mode and function.[40]

Important precisions take us back to the *aestimativa* and *phantasia*. According to St. Albert the phantasy can be considered *large* and *stricte*. Taken in a broad sense the term includes the imagination, phantasy and the aestimative powers. Strictly, however, it stands as defined above after the fashion of Avicenna and Algazel.[41] In the first consideration, namely, large, there is little difference between these three powers in respect to act, object and organ.[42] Keeping this shade of difference in mind we can understand St. Albert when he says that intentions received from and through the senses, but not apprehended by the sense are apprehended in two different ways. First, they may be *per rationem universalis* and with these the intellectual powers concern themselves; secondly, some are received through intentions which never can proceed beyond the singular. The first mode refers to those forms which are the

principles of intellectual knowledge and these find their residence in the phantasia. On the other hand the second mode regards the intentions of distasteful or suitable objects to be fled or sought; these pertain to the aestimativa. (45)

Hence to receive the species in so far as it is a principle of knowledge is the proper office of the phantasia while to receive a species per rationem agentibilis vel patientibilis is the business of the aestimativa. (46)

There remain the last three modes of apprehension. We are now able to say with St. Albert that the second grade is that of the imagination while the third includes, and is never without, the aestimativa and the collation of the phantasia. Coming now to the fourth and highest step in this hierarchy of apprehensions we observe that it is nothing other than that in which the quiddities of things, denuded from all conditions of matter is received. This apprehension is proper only to the intellect of man which has as its object the universal quiddity, common to all things in the same way; that is, to all things of which it serves as the form. Here, objects are universals and the definition of a universal could then rightly be, that which is predicable of many, as suitable and common to all things in that class. (48)

Having written these lines St. Albert was in a position

to answer the question which, by the stringent necessity of doctrinal ideas, must inevitably be resolved. In the preceding part of this chapter we have been preparing both to ask and to answer the question as St. Albert saw it. The problem then is this: if the soul is a substance separate secundum esse from the body how is knowledge of things possible? In other words, how can the intellectual soul be in communication with the body; and if so, how? This was precisely the point at which St. Albert found himself confronted with a task for which he cannot be said to have been unprepared.

Although the intellectual soul(and the intellect as a faculty of that soul) is separate, nevertheless the soul is joined to the body through its other powers, which are, as we have seen, acta et intellectu in the very substance of the soul itself. These powers are natural to it, in this sense, that by one part of its definition the soul is a perfectio corporis. Consequently, although the intellect secundum se is separate from the body, yet the intellect is in fact a power of the soul which, according to certain lower powers, is joined to the body. The intellect which is a power of that which is joined to the body does not itself communicate with the body (for it is not a part of that which is joined to the body in so far as it is joined) but it does communicate

with what communicates with the body. With this vital distinction made St. Albert can then say that the intellect communicates not to the body but to a power which in its turn does itself communicate to the body, namely, to the *phantasia* and through it to the imagination and the senses. Only by such means then does the soul remain body a substance or a *being potentiaire*, since through its natural powers it communicates to the body. Thus it is still true to say that the human soul is separate *per suum esse* on the one hand and, on the other, that it can acquire the quiddities of things.(46)

This answer to the problem is what St. Albert himself had made it to be in originally establishing a dual definition of the soul and remaining consistently faithful to it throughout his long life. The essence of the answer consists in the distinction St. Albert invents: it is one thing to communicate to the body in an action or passion of the soul and quite another thing to communicate to that which communicates to the body. We are well aware that the intellect is not a power in a bodily organ; but the process of knowing is not fully completed, nor does it even come about without a reception of a form sensible or imaginable *per phantasiam*. The *phantasia* quite properly does itself communicate to the body in this sense that its operation is never perfected without the motion or passion of

a corporeal member, which is the organ of the phantasia.(47)

The distinctly proper work of the intellect is to understand through the universal which has been intellectually visualized free from all conditions of the matter in which it exists singularly. Quite evidently then it is not by the motion of any form impressed on any corporeal power that the act of understanding is completed and perfected but rather it is by a simple concept of the mind which is, as we shall discover, ubique et semper. Hence, intelligere is an operation of the possible intellect once that possible intellect has been brought in act by the fruitful reception of the universal form abstracted by the agent intellect from the phantasms. That is why St. Albert feels it is true to say that the motion of the phantasia is terminated at the intellect.(48)

So then, the phantasia, that power of the soul and interior sense which receives the phantasms is the connection which allows St. Albert to avoid saying that the human soul in se communicates in all things immediately to the body. For, although the intellect is not a power in an organ yet it receives from those powers which are naturally in corporeal organs such as the senses and, lastly, the phantasy. The intellect is in contact with the powers which are in their turn affixed immediately to an organ.(49)

Lacking this connection the human intellect could in no way avail itself of the realities in the senses and phantasy; but the intellect stands in need of a body and corporeal powers in order to receive the forms or intelligible species, abstracted from their conditions in the phantasia. Furthermore, in this state in which man is, the rational soul has been placed in the body that it may be perfected in diverse knowledges by the intellectual and moral virtues, by the theological virtues infused by God's grace and by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in fact by all the benefits through which man is disposed and aided. (80)

Through this unique distinction, founded on his dual definition of the soul and its composite nature, St. Albert is still free to say that the soul, thus separate remains immortal. St. Albert's answer is the only one which he could give under the circumstances in which he had placed himself. But it will itself easily find its place as a part of the now still more comprehensive doctrinal whole in determining what St. Albert is to say regarding the limits to be ascribed to the workings of his agent intellect.

CHAPTER FIVE

The technical terminology with which the translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* provided St. Albert permitted him to maintain that the agent intellect is separate because it is not the act of any part of the body.(1) Furthermore, it is not only separate, but it is unmixed and entirely impossible as well as being a substance which is *actu*.(2) In so far as it is separate and unmixed the agent intellect is characteristically in agreement with the possible intellect, to which the same properties must be attributed. With respect to its impassibility, however, the agent intellect differs from the possible intellect in this sense that the possible intellect is a principle of the reception of intelligible species; it is a receptive power only, whereas the agent intellect is the active principle of the intelligibles. To say that the agent intellect is a substance which is *actu* merely means that through its substance or essence it is an agent power.(3)

Now St. Albert was fully aware of the fact that Avicenna and Algazel had taught a separate agent intelligence which was the last intelligence. He knew further that this separate agent intelligence irradiates on the possible intellects of men and that it was neither the act of any part of the body

nor was it receptive of anything from any phantasm. Moreover he seems to have been fond of recalling that besides being the Pater Momorum this separate Intelligence was the last end of man; it was that to which man was finally united and hence in a sense it was a principle of immortality.(4)

With full knowledge of these positions St. Albert proceeds to say that his human agent intellect agrees with the separate possible intelligence in two respects and differs from only one point of view. The points of similarity are: (1) the agent intellect is neither in a body as a power in an organ, (2) nor is it in a body as receiving from the phantasms of bodies as the possible intellect does. The difference consists only in the fact that the act of the agent intellect is exercised upon the phantasms by abstracting the universals from them.(5)

St. Albert certainly knew what he was doing when he introduced into his doctrine the notion of man as a microcosm. The agent intellect is in each man like unto a separate intelligence. The agent intellect had its origin in the soul, as we have seen, through the same type of knowledge of self as necessary in the light of God as had each Intelligence. And now as we learn more of its function the likeness becomes more unmistakable. The agent intellect is more separate than even the possible intellect and only because it is more like the agent intelligence

of Avicenna and Algazel. What St. Albert is doing is this: he is taking the last intelligence of the Arabians and placing it completely in each man so that each one has a personal agent intellect. Having adopted so much from Avicenna it is too late to stop now. Of course he undermines and disintegrates Avicenna by denying that the agent intellect is a separate Angelic Intelligence but then nothing prevents his optimistically transplanting and retaining the characteristics of that *Intor Formarum*. In point of fact St. Albert is politely destroying the Arabian doctrine of the unity of the agent intelligence and simultaneously conceiving the human agent intelligence, an intrinsic part of the soul, after the pattern of that same separate intelligence. The soul is in man as God is in the world, [7] and the agent intellect is in the soul as the last separate intelligence of the supra-mundane hierarchy is over the world and the souls of man. Thus the destruction of the *Intor Formarum* is the construction of the human agent intellect.

Having so adroitly removed himself from Avicenna and persisted in his claim that the agent intellect is indubitably a power within the soul itself St. Albert takes to himself Averroes for authoritative confirmation. St. Albert tells us that, as AVerroes says in his commentary on the *De Anima*, the human agent intellect is a part of the human soul; it is simple and has no

intelligibles, but rather makes the intelligibles exist in the possible intellect by abstracting them from the phantasms. (8) Among the many disturbances such a statement occasions, it certainly calls into question St. Albert's knowledge of the doctrine of Averroes.

It has been established that Averroes' commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle was among many of the works of Averroes translated into Latin about 1250. (9) We know that this was a good ten years before St. Albert wrote his Summa de Creaturis. Now Averroes actually taught that not only the possible intellect but also the agent intellect is separate and one for all men. The question at this juncture then is: did St. Albert read this Commentary of Averroes and if he did how could such a mistake occur?

Father Weisman has seen the problem and answers that such notions as Averroes really taught were too foreign to the conceptions of St. Albert that, after a first reading of the Commentator, they be explicitly known and neo-Platonized as they were meant to be. Since both the agent and the possible intellect were separate, Averroes drew many parallels between their properties. This parallelism, Fr. Weisman adds, probably attracted St. Albert who, not having dreamt of a separate possible intellect, could only conceive of the agent intellect in the

same state as the possible intellect and thus make of it a power of the soul on the possible intellect appeared to be.(10)

It would seem however that another solution, founded on the text of Averroes, furnishes a deeper explanation. First of all, St. Albert was acquainted with the writings of Averroes as early as the date at which he wrote his Summa de Creaturis. The wealth of information contained in this work as compared to the relative poverty of an anterior work, the Tractatus de Natura Boni(11) gives some idea of the literature St. Albert found on his arrival at Paris. In the first two parts of the Summa de Creaturis there are over seventy references to Averroes, many of them verbatim quotations.(12)

We may, therefore, say that even in the Summa de Creaturis St. Albert knew of the doctrine on the possible intellect as separate and unique for all men, and of course refused it.(13) In his later works St. Albert vigorously attacks the error that there is one possible intellect for all men.(14) But what is more important at present he does later show his knowledge of the true position of Averroes on the agent intellect and rejects that position.(15) But the surprising and eminently informative text comes after St. Albert has devoted a solutio and thirty replies to the doctrine of the unicity of the possible intellect. It is in fact in the very same question and only two masters

later that St. Albert informs us that Averroes states in *III De Anima*, and it is true, that in the soul there is an incorruptible agent intellect, an immortal and incorruptible possible intellect and an *intellectus adeptus* fashioned in the possible intellect by the agent intellect and it too is incorruptible. This illuminating passage occurs in the very last work St. Albert wrote, his *Summa Theologiae*, separated only by one scholar from his destructive article on the doctrine of the unicity of the possible intellect in Averroes and the Latin Averroists.(16)

In this state of affairs just where are we? St. Albert was performing on Averroes, though more apparently, the same culture transplanting which the other Arabians underwent at his hands. He had already refuted Averroes because it was his professional duty. We have not long to wait before we realize that it was but a nominal refutation and expulsion for we shall see that Averroes was quickly recalled into faithful service. However, this now springs from the last text of the *Summa Theologiae* just quoted. We still have the last part of our original question to consider, namely, how could St. Albert have felt that Averroes taught an agent intellect as *pars animae*?

There are many texts in Averroes which unequivocally state that the agent intellect is a part of the soul and in the soul. Averroes meant "in the soul" only by mode of operation, however,

for the agent intellect was a separate intelligence as was the possible intellect. St. Albert could very simply have read any one or all of these texts, as he probably did, and at the finish be honestly convinced that Averroes taught what his texts baldly said. Following is a list of some of the lines in the third book of Averroes' commentary on the De anima of Aristotle which substantiate this hypothesis:

(1) Et ideo dicit Aristoteles post, quod necesse est ponere in anima rationali hac duas differentias, scilicet virtutem actionis, et virtutem passionis, et dicit aperte quod utraque pars eius est neque generabilis, neque corruptibilis. (17)

(2) Et confirmaverunt hoc per hoc, quod propalavit Aristoteles quod quando intellectus noster acquisivit in anima nobiscum, videmur denudare universaliter formas a materia prima, deinde intelligere eas. (18)

(3) Et ideo opinandum est quod iam apparuit nobis ex sermone Aristotelis quod in anima sunt duae partes intellectus, quarum una est recipiens: cuius esse declaratum est hic, alia autem est agens: et est illud quod facit intentiones, quae sunt in virtute imaginativa, esse moventes intellectum materialem in actu. (19)

(4) Sed opinandum est quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus. Quarum una est intellectus recipiens. Secunda autem est officiosa.

(20)
Tertia autem factum:
(5) et cum necesse est inveniri in parte animae, quae dicitur intellectum, istas tres differentias, necesse est si in ea sit pars quae dicitur intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne modo similitudinis et receptionis: et quod in ea etiam secunda pars, quae dicitur intellectum secundum quod facit istum intellectum qui est in potentia, intelligere omnia in actu...et
(21)
quod in ea etiam sit tertia pars...
(6) ex quo oportuit ponere in anima intelligentiae agentem non enim possumus dicere quod proportio intellectus agentis in anima ad intellectum generatum est, sicut proportio artificii ad artificiatum omnibus modis.
(22)
(7) Dicemus igitur quoniam intellectus existens in nobis habet duas actiones, secundum quod attribuitur nobis: quarum una est de genere passionis et est intelligere: et alia in genere
(23)
actionis et est extrahere formam et denudare eas a materia,...
(8) Quoniam illud, per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem, est forma: nos autem, dum agimus per intellectum agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est ut intellectus agens sit
(24)
forma in nobis.

It is possible to quote at length other texts of a similar vein from Averroes but these should suffice to show us that St. Albert had no difficulty in finding in Averroes exactly what he

said was there. It is likewise true on the other hand, that there are texts which say that the agent intellect is one and eternal; (26) but this is not at all saying directly that there is one agent intellect for all men. Following the manner in which St. Albert was apparently reading Averroes at the time of the Summa de Creaturis, he could easily have read this to mean simple and unmixed.

Such then seems to be a more tenable solution to the question. However, our interest in this point is directed chiefly towards the future. For we know full well that St. Albert strongly maintained the intrinsic character of the agent intellect in the soul. Nevertheless we can say now that St. Albert never hesitates in looking at Aristotle through the eyes of Avicenna and Averroes. The influence of Avicenna has been preponderant up to now, but from this point onward they will each be utilized in a manner which will result in an unusual melange. So then we must realize that now we have the agent intellect of Avicenna, Algazel and Averroes, pulverized into as many human agent intellects as there are human persons. In order to realize that the activity of the human agent intellect remains strikingly similar to the "refused" separate agent intelligence of the Arabians we must immediately proceed to investigate St. Albert's description of it.

As we have already seen the possible intellect is an immaterial power whose object can only be the immaterial or the universal. St. Albert has said that the possible intellect is a passive power by which the soul may become all things in knowledge. Not only are there no intelligibles already in it, but it lacks, in itself, the power of making them. (27) It is changed by something other than itself then and we know this is the agent intellect which induces the change from the potency of understanding to the act of understanding. (28) This requires an object. So St. Albert will say that the proper object of the intellect is nothing other than the quiddities of things abstracted from particularity, materiality and its conditions, and impressed on the possible intellect. (29) It is an essence conceivable for the possible intellect, rendered so by the agent intellect. What then is the precise work of this agent intellect?

St. Albert has told us that the agent intellect is an intrinsic active power of the human soul, the active principle of the intelligibles. It is, in a word, the intellect <u>qua est omnia facere</u>. The proper operation of such an intellect is twofold. First of all, it abstracts the intelligible forms; and this is nothing else than making them simple and universal. Secondly, it illumines the possible intellect; for it is necessary that the

universal species, so long as it is universal, be always in the light of the agent intellect. Hence when the universal is received in the possible intellect it must be received there in the light of the agent intellect. From this point of view the possible intellect is said to have a twofold comparison: first, to the agent, as completed by its light and then, to the forms elicited from the phantasms, as being moved and formed by them. (30) Thus the act of the agent intellect is seen to take two directions. It abstracts the universal species and gives them the being of universals which is to be immaterial and dematerialized, while it simultaneously illuminates the possible intellect in order that the universal species may reside there. (31)

Neither the agent nor the possible intellect has any forms in itself by nature. (32) Hence it is necessary that the intellect turn to that part of the soul which is in communication with the body, namely, the <u>phantasia</u>. With it the intellect can itself communicate. With this power again in the picture St. Albert informs us that the agent intellect makes the universals in the possible intellect by abstracting them from the phantasms in which they are <u>in potentia</u>. (33) Thus the act of the agent intellect is upon the phantasms by abstracting theuniversal forms from them. (34) That which is abstracted and which informs the possible intellect is the universal species of the thing. (35)

This intelligible quiddity of the thing as object of the intellect is the universal and since this is so it is correct to say that the proper object of the intellect is the universal.(36) In the soul the form is separate and abstract, freed and denuded as it were from all constrictions of matter; the attainment of this condition must be laid at the door of the agent intellect.(37)

An interesting problem crops up at this point and it is this: if the object of the intellect is the universal then the universals angelus or anima may be objects of the intellect. But this requires St. Albert to provide for the reception by the possible intellect of universals of this type, which are in particulars and singulars but certainly are separate from matter per esse et essentiam. The way he will provide is simply by stating that not only can the agent intellect abstract a universal form from matter but it can also abstract the universal from the particular. This latter abstraction occurs by separating the intelligible form from those things which appropriate it to this or that particular. Thus, as we well remember, anima or angelus can be abstracted from the particular id quod est unum happens to be its principle of individuation.(38) So there is for St. Albert a twofold abstraction, but it is not our purpose at this time to inquire any more of it than he himself has told us here.

In the many places where St. Albert speaks of the agent intellect there are few where he is not wont to regard it under the simile of art and light. The agent intellect makes the forms which are universal in potency to be actually universal in the possible intellect. In this operation it is not unlike art which makes its forms and induces them into matter. However, the business of the agent intellect is not to make artificial forms and impress them into matter in the fashioning of an artificial thing, but only to make the forms actually universal; its factive power is not *ad rem* but *ad intellectum possibilem*. Hence it is possible to liken the agent intellect in the soul to art and the possible intellect to matter, receiving the forms from the agent. Just as art induces an artificial form into matter so the agent intellect through the universal it impresses on the possible intellect perfects and actuates the possible intellect.[39]

St. Albert admits many times that the simile of art is from Aristotle,[40] but his interpretation of it is another question. He tells us that Aristotle did not say the agent intellect is *simpliciter* like art and the reason why he did not is that art is a *habitus* and the agent intellect is certainly not, for a *habitus*, far from being an essential part of the soul

as is the agent intellect, is only an accident and thus not an essential part of the soul. But it has a likeness to a *habitus* in this sense at least, that through it the soul may act whenever it so wishes and to this end it does not need anything outside the soul for the perfecting and operating of that act. (41) Not only is this use of *habitus* in St. Albert from Averroes but his interpretation of the simile of art can be seen in almost the same fashion in the Arabian. (42)

St. Albert is loathe to have us forget that the intelligible form, rendered universal by the agent intellect, bears a relation to that of which it is the form, and to the possible intellect by moving to it and rendering it in act, in so far as it itself is in act. However, of itself the form is not in act a complete universal and this is one of the reasons why an agent intellect is needed. Such a need also gives rise to the comparison of the agent intellect to light. According to St. Albert light makes colors which are only in potency to be colors *in actu* so that they may effect and move the sight. In this way the agent intellect is like light, for it too makes what is intelligible actually universal both for and in the possible intellect. Just as light is the formal agent of color *secundum actum* so the agent intellect is the formal agent of intelligibles according to their actuality as universals

in the possible intellect.[43] But like all examples and similes this one, although more complete than that of art, still limps, for light is extrinsic to the visual power and is not of its very constitution whereas the agent intellect on the contrary, is an intrinsic power, within the very substance of the soul itself.[44]

There is no doubt that St. Albert read in Aristotle, as he tells us himself, that the agent intellect is like light, in that light makes colors existing in potency to be colors in act.[45] But again his exposition of that similarity bears a striking resemblance to the explanation of Averroes in the notion that the comparison to light is a better one than to art and in the very order of the exposition.[46]

It remains then that in the doctrine of St. Albert, where there is a universal agent intellect that it be the power which moves or brings and makes the forms in act and when it makes them through their universal intentions, then it is the principle of forms as art. Moreover, when the same agent intellect gives to these forms whence they may move the possible intellect, then it is making them, as light makes colors.[47]

In order to adjudge, as St. Albert himself did, the definite limits of the work of the agent intellect and its real value in that work we must search out the precise nature and meaning of what St. Albert calls the intelligible object of the intellect. To that end we now direct our attention.

CHAPTER SIX

In St. Albert's world everything real is individual. It is also, a fact that the human intellect knows reality by means of classes of various kinds in which particular things are contained. These classes are the universals. The universal is the proper object of the intellect. What then is the nature of the universal?

St. Albert is aware of two possible positions on the question. First of all, the universal can be regarded from the point of view of its logical universality alone. Thus considered the universal is predicable of many and defining it properly would simply be a matter of saying: the universal is that which is predicable of many.(1) Hence it appears that the universal as universal is only predicable of many and this obviously leaves one with pure logical predicability. Now this predicability of the concept is the work of the intellect. In this first way the universal is not in things but only in the mind.(2) But in such a scheme, if the proper object of the intellect is the universal, and if the universal is the work and product of the intellect alone, it would be impossible for our knowledge, through these universals, to bear on anything but general ideas themselves.

Another possible position holds that the universal is in some way in things for the simple reason that if it is not in reality it could never be predicated of reality. The generality which belongs to the concepts of the mind must be in things.(3)

St. Albert feels that he is going to walk the middle road to a true solution. For him there are three distinguishable aspects of the universal. Considered in the first aspect the universal is prior to the thing in two ways; first, inasmuch as all things are in the intellect of God as in their first light; so the universal has a certain special being there. It is the *esse* of the Intellectual Cause, since the light of God is the form of things which flow from Him and inform things. This mode, however, is passed over quickly in order that St. Albert may tell of the second way in this first aspect. Here the universal is prior to things not in a priority of time but by nature and substance as well as by reason.(4) In this latter sense the universal is a certain essence which is absolute *in se*. That essence or nature, considered in its total separation from all relations is called an *essentia* or *natura*. For St. Albert that nature, taken in itself, apart from any existence, either in singular matter or in the intellect, is an intelligible reality in itself. It is, in effect, something which exists in itself, an *aliquid in se*

existence.[5]

In order to understand the ultimate answer given by St. Albert, it is imperative that we realize that he maintains the existence of an intelligible essence which is a something *in se*, existing in itself and having no other existence but that of such an essence as it is. It has an *esse essentiae*.[6] There is but one existence for that nature as such.

We said there are three distinguishable aspects of the universal. The second aspect now regards the *esse* in things. There the same nature is participated by many individuals either *actu* or *potentia*. It is considered not now *in se*, but from the point of view of its aptness to communicate itself to several different subjects, or to one subject (as in the case of the sun) which is going to receive it. In this realm it is an intelligible nature from the point of its aptitude to be received by several subjects. Hence it is communicable to many and has an aptitude to give formal *esse* to many. In this second way the nature can be called a universal. So then we have to say that in the first case, *in se existens* this same nature is not precisely and properly called a universal.[7]

In the third and last of these considerations the universal

is a form in *ante abstractionis*, in so far as the agent intellect comes into play by shining on the phantasm and abstracting the universal for the possible intellect. The property of communicability of the nature becomes universal, and such universality is a possibility which is only actualized by the agent intellect abstracting from the individuals what they have of the intelligible essence. This involves St. Albert in the happy conclusion that universality in an actual and complete mode of existence necessitates our turning to the intellect wherein the universal, most properly so called, can be found in its own existence. In this sense it is true to say with St. Albert that *universale non est nisi in intellectu*.(8)

In rapid review then what we have is this: (1) a nature or essence *in se existens*; (2) an aptitude to be communicated, by which the universal is in the thing outside the mind; (3) the actuality of this aptitude existing only in the intellect.(9)

However, we may ask ourselves, if the communicability of the essence exists *in re*, and yet if it becomes actual *in multis* only in the intellect what actuality is that aptitude of communicability to many which is the universal? If it is only in the intellect St. Albert has wandered from the middle road to the first of the two positions between which he was going to make his way. In point of fact, however, St. Albert

is still on the road of his choice. And he himself explains why: Metaphysics teaches us that act precedes potency and the precedence is one not of reason alone but also of substance.[10] Certain it is that the intelligible nature, realized in a certain singular, is the act of that substance and a formal cause constituting the *esse rei*.[11] For this reason the intelligible nature is anterior to the subsisting reality of which it is the formal cause.[12] Obviously the nature has to have a certain being of its own, for the existence of the nature is the cause of the substance of each of the individuals in which it is as nature; so it has the *esse* both of a cause and of an essence.[13]

St. Albert could not escape the problem of what kind of existence to ascribe to this nature *in se*. If it is a universal in a sense *in se* and yet if universality only exists in the intellect what is he going to say? St. Albert's answer is that there is a numerical unity which is proper to the individual, but there is also a type of unity which is characteristic of the nature *in se*. The first is incommunicable but the second is not repugnant to communicability; it is, in point of fact, even apt to be communicated to several different subjects and to be distributed among them. The real existence of the universal, whether it be genus or species or any of the others, is not that of the singular;

moreover, it implies the real existence of other kinds of unity than that of singular numerical unity. This unity of the universal *in se existens* is of such a unique and flexible kind that it does not preclude the possibility of distribution in many individuals.(14)

Such a unity as this implies that the essence *in se* is indifferent by a simple lack of difference or impossibility; but a certain intelligible nature can be in several distinct individuals at one and the same time. That is to say, the essence taken *in se* or *existens ante res* is nothing but the essence or intelligible nature considered as universal in the first way we have cited. From this point of view it is *indifferens* in all those things which are of the same species or genus *etc.* In this way it is not strictly regarded as predicable of many; nor is it, on the other hand, regarded as individualized. Rather, here it is considered in so far as of itself it is possessed of one undivided relation to all things or to many in that general class. It is a relation of indifference of which St. Albert is speaking. That precisely is the essence as having a certain nature and *ratio* of universality according to which it really exists *in se*, in its very indetermination as neither universal nor singular.(15)

Let us take for example the nature *homo*; strictly it is neither what makes this nature capable of being predicated of many singular men, nor is it what can be said of one singular man. It is simply the nature *homo* and that is all there is to it. To the question whether *homo*, just as the nature *homo*, is universal or proper, one or many St. Albert will reply that according as *homo* is *homo* it is none of these, since some of them define it and all of them follow its *esse* and depend on its being *in se* independent of them all.(16) In itself it is neither an *unum* which is contradictory and opposed to a multitude; nor is it *multa*, by which a multitude is opposed to a singular. So far as St. Albert was concerned this is exactly what Avicenna meant by saying that *universale sed est unum nec est multa*.(17)

The result of Avicenna's influence here is but a particular example of the whole tone of that Arabian's writings as reflected in St. Albert's own words. With Avicenna St. Albert can say that in this sense the universal is called nature or essence. Strictly speaking, however, we shall see that universal applies only to the result of the agent intellect's work, as residing in a known state in the possible intellect. That this is so is apparent from the texts saying that if, *in se*, the nature is neither universal, nor singular it has to be universalized

by the agent power of the soul—the agent intellect. Of course, if it can be universalized it must be precisely because it is of itself neither proper, nor universal, neither one nor many. In its own being then it is neither *ex intellectu* nor *in suppositio*, and, since it is not by definition either singular or universal, nor is it in a supposit nor in the intellect, this nature is not repugnant to universality.(18)

This lack of repugnance has many sides. It is fluid enough so that it may happen that this nature be proper, universal, one or many. In this sense it is not at all a logical universal but in itself an imperfect and incomplete, yet fundamental universal.(19)

It remains forus to approximate the activity required of an agent intellect in such a well prepared scheme of things. As the active intrinsic principle the agent intellect has to produce, we have been told, what the possible intellect is to receive; and it has to produce it in the possible intellect which is illumined by that agent intellect. Of that much we are textually certain. But what of the object on which the agent intellect functions? This much we can say with textual certainty: the agent intellect has before it an intelligible essence already in act with a reality of its own. What is there is already a universal, not perfectly in the sense in which

St. Albert defines a logical universal as that which is predicable of many, but rather in the sense of an undetermined, indifferent essence which, because of that very indifference can be universalized by the agent intellect. In order that the nature acquire this universality which is properly a logical universality there is but one thing needed and that is nothing other than the light of the agent intellect.

How true this is can be seen by recalling certain points already established. We have constantly to keep before us the realism of the form observed in the exposition of the doctrine of the quo est and quod est plus the pluralism consequent on the realism. For St. Albert there is what may be called a natural genus, which is the very essence of the thing. This is the nature in its existence; it is the principium essendi, or, if there is a hierarchy of such natures in any one being they are the principia essendi rei. There is also the logical genus which is added to the natural genus, conferring universality on it; it is the principium intelligendi. As St. Albert has so often said this latter is the logical universal; it is the sheer generality of the logical genus which, once applied to the nature in itself, or principium essendi, makes of it a proper and complete general idea. The simple nature then as a natural genus is a principle of the being of the thing; the same nature, with the addition of logical universality, becomes the principle of knowing the thing.(20)

What St. Albert is saying is, in effect, that the principles of being and the principles of the knowing of that being are the same. However, they are not principles in the same manner even though fundamentally and at root there is no difference between them. For convenience we will deal with these principles in the singular, realizing that the remarks are applicable to them all *in toto*. The indifferent nature is the principle of the being of the thing; but universality is added to it, and as it were, happens to it. While remaining the principle of the being it has become at the same time, by this added character of universality a *principium cognitionis*. In so far as universality happens to it there results a logical universal predicable of many.(21)

At long last we can clearly see what St. Albert meant by saying that the *forma totius* of Socrates, *homo*, is not the universal but rather is that on which the agent intellect itself makes the universal.(22) That form as principle of being has a reality of its own, even as have the other forms in Socrates. Consequently, the only thing necessary to bring this intelligible essence, principle of being, or natural genus into perfect universality as a principle of knowledge or logical universal is the activity of the agent intellect.(23) We have only to realize that the indetermination which founds

and precedes the universal in the intellect is really *in re*. That is why the agent intellect has merely to cooperate with the nature, which really is indifferent, in the production of the universal as object in the possible intellect. The operation of the agent intellect carries on the phantasm, for it contains this indeterminate nature as particularised in the singular. So the action of the agent intellect is exercised in two ways; there is a bifurcation by which (1) it acts on the nature itself and (2) illumines the possible intellect. In this way the intelligible essence becomes a logical universal in the illumined possible intellect. The *conceptus mentis* is the product of which St. Albert can say: this is the complete universal.

If this would lead one to say that for the agent intellect the job is not difficult, it frankly only has to observe and come upon the universal, St. Albert himself would not call the point into dispute. It is, in fact, what he says himself. The intellectual soul, through the agent intellect, makes the universal forms. But it is a feeble making, requiring little exertion; it might be called a making in the sense of making a discovery. For that is precisely what the agent intellect does: it finds its forms already there.[24] In order that this be possible the object must assuredly be there and we have seen

that and how it is there. Furthermore, it is always there. This one and single nature, which secundum se is neither in the intellect, nor in things, is in itself one unique et numero, and in so far as it is in the intellect it loses neither of these characters. For existing in the intellect it is not singular but entirely universal. (25) What it gains, over and above what it does not lose, is perfect universality. This the agent intellect does by actualizing the universal, already intelligible in act, and needing but to be universalized.

The agent intellect finds itself confronted, in the last analysis, with the nature in its indetermination and indifference presented in the phantasm. It sees it as being capable of universalization and of being received in that state by the possible intellect. Finding it thus is simultaneous with the logical universality which happens to it. Concurrently, the agent intellect illumines the possible intellect and fecundates it by impressing the universal on it. Hence we can say that this agent intellect, conceived after the fashion of the Arabians' separate agent intelligence has become, by virtue of the form being already in act, a dator formarum. Having seen that its origin and nature is similar we cannot now fail to see that its operation is little different from the separate agent intelligence of the Arabian philosophers.

Nor can we fail to see that the universal which is apprehended in the fourth degree of apprehension as a principle of knowing exists in reality as a principle of being. There really exists for each universal a metaphysical being in reality which is the same as the universal.(26) There is in reality a real quiddity of the existing object which is truly predicated of that thing once it has been universalized. This is no hidden realism; St. Albert says it with his hands un-gloved, his sleeves rolled up and his head high. The essence is not virtually intelligible, but actually so. It is an unum quid existens in its own right. And to know the universal is to know the essence of the thing in its aptness to be imparted to many. A true reality, this nature is neither universal in the logical sense, nor is it singular; it exists indepent of and indifferent to any knowledge we may have of it.(27)

What is the place of such a doctrine in the economy of St. Albert's thought? St. Albert answers that question by extricating himself from an apparent difficulty. If it seems from such a position as his that the universal is ante rem and not post rem St. Albert will say: that which is universal is beyond a doubt ante rem. This is the essence considered in se. But it must be patiently borne in mind that his eminently successful distinction in this question refuses to grant proper and

complete universality to this essence in me. That only consists in logical universality; the act of its universality is the business of the agent intellect. And this act of universality of the essence comes about, it is true, simply from the fact that there is in re quidditas rei existentis. This logical universal is indeed predicated of the thing itself because according to the act of its universality it is in the intellect alone, but founded on id quod est universale. In this perfect sense the universal is post res and abstracted, in the way with which we are now familiar, from id quod est universale. (28) By means of this position St. Albert remained in contact with things; for as he has just told us, if the essence were not really in reality we could not predicate our knowledge of things. Because the principles of being and the principles of knowing are one, in the sense we have seen, the knowing person remains in contact, through that knowledge, with the things from which he drew it.

These natures, with their possibility of becoming either universal in the intellect or singular in things are, when known, media by which the soul retains and never loses its grasp of reality. If it were not so our knowledge would bear only on pure artefacts of the mind's own construction. And that is why St. Albert can say that the universal in the mind

has an intentional character, in fact is an intention and a sign, by means of which the intellect knows the thing of which the intellected form is the nature. (29) In order that there be no flight from reality then St. Albert has said that each universal is real as a principle of being and that in each individual there actually exists a hierarchy of real forms, which being known become logical universals. Here is the metaphysical justification for the existence within the very individual of the imperfect universals, as natures; each remains an unum quid as ordered in the hierarchy by its peculiar degree of universality. And no one of these natures dissolves the proper unity of the individual subject.

We may in summary conclusion state that:

(1) St. Albert remains consistent with himself as we have seen him in the first five chapters of our work.

(2) The realism and plurality of forms in his doctrine is indisputable.

(3) He is still attempting to impose upon an Aristotelian terminology the task of bearing and rendering intelligible a radically neo-platonic and Arabian conception of reality. From Aristotle, we observed, he has certain general notions such as: the necessity of an object and its species, a sensible

origin of knowledge, the distinction of an agent and a possible intellect, production of the species by the agent intellect and vital residence in the possible intellect.

(4) However, from Avicenna, with whom he began, he still retains: the notion of the seal, the reality of the forms, (for which St. Albert is also indebted to Gilbert of Poitiers), the indifference of the nature, the notion of his agent intellect, similar in origin nature and operation, but humanized.

(5) The timely entrance of Averroes was noted; it will develop into a long and useful stay.

(6) As the human agent intellect becomes more like a <u>dator formarum</u> it has less and less to do.

(7) Owing to the realism of the universals in St. Albert the agent intellect, having little to do below itself mounts figuratively beyond the <u>dator formarum</u> to the principle of its own principle in a word to God in whose image it is. It will rest more frequently from its labours, for the Augustinian illumination, appreciably changed in company with Avicenna and Averroes, is about to enter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

St. Albert has proved that the principles of being and the principles of knowledge, while modally different, are radically indistinct. Those principles of being have been placed in their settings by the active and formative light of God. Once so established they are nevertheless never without that light. The light of God at no moment relinquishes its influence on those things formed under it; it is continually joined to them.(1)

Such a light is an intelligible light and the objects which stand in that light owe to it not only their existence but their very intelligibility as well. It is true to say, with St. Albert, that the intelligibility which things possess is given them by God and maintained in His light.(2) Thus things are not giving off this intelligibility without the light of God added to them. Hence these forms, thus considered as under the light of God act on the soul not only by virtue of the light or act of the human agent intellect, but also in their intelligibility under the light of God which is in them. That precisely is what happens on the side of the object.(3)

Evidently with a ready made nature which is capable of being logically universalized the agent intellect has not too

much to do. And it has still less to do when we see that those objects offer themselves in the intelligibility which the light of God has bestowed on, and continually and unceasingly maintains in them.

The question arises however as to whether God is maintaining all these objects in His light and yet making the agent intellect do its work without any more aid than it has already. Certainly it has been treated royally from the side of the object. But is it not a power of the soul made to the image of God? Is it not itself, in point of fact, the very image and likeness of God in that human soul? (4) And what of its origin;—it was as we well know founded on the <u>quo est</u> of the soul whose own form is the Trinity. As such it would seem to be more than any other part of the soul, luminously close to God, its cause. What can we say of it, is it to carry on unaided while all else in the world basks and operates in the light of its First Cause?

In order to answer that question we have to ask another. Exactly what is necessary that there be true knowledge in the soul? St. Albert suggests an answer in which there are four conditions. First, a possible intellect which is prepared to receive; secondly, an agent intellect by whose light the abstraction of the species in which there is truth, or that

true thing, takes place; thirdly, the res objecta as the actual subject of our knowledge, either in itself or intthe phantasia; it is the object concerning which there is that truth; fourthly, the principles and axioms which are as it were instruments proportionating possible, impossible and necessary compositions and divisions from which the verum is received; all these are conditions. Of these four we can say that the first is only receiving, the second is only giving its light, the third is receiving from the agent intellect as well as giving the light of distinct truth to the possible intellect and that the fourth is moved as an instrument and is moving the composition and division of that in which there is the true thing known or sought.

As they stand these four conditions are not sufficient, in St. Albert's eyes, to account for the knowledge of that truth which is graspable by reason. He means than natural truth and natural knowledge. But St. Albert offers additions only on one count; the other three may remain as established, they are themselves sufficient. That one count is the second --the agent intellect. In regard to it, and to make up the deficiency, we must say that the light of the agent intellect does not suffice per se for the abstraction of the species.

Now then is it sufficient? It is made sufficient only in virtue of the application to the light of the agent intellect of the light of an uncreated intellect which aids and strengthens it.

The application of this fortifying light of the uncreated intellect may happen in two ways. In the first way there is to be admitted a twofold light in knowledge. That state exists when the agent intellect has joined directly to it the uncreated light of God Himself. That light in that way is the Inner Master. There can likewise be a conjunction with the light of the Divine Intellect and of an angelic intellect. After all the soul is a tool or an instrument at the hands of the separate Intelligences and it is most natural that the Intelligence should aid our agent intellect by the power of its light. Ultimately, however, every light of the Intelligence comes from God and hence it is true to say that nothing whatsoever is known unless the light of God be added to the light of the agent intellect.(5) For St. Albert the illumination of the phantasm by the human agent intellect presupposes, an illumination of that same agent intellect by the light of the Divine Intellect. This is not the Illumination which St. Augustine understood; his was a truth illumination. St. Albert's is an abstraction illumination. There is no doubt he is indebted to St. Augustine for the idea but the reception,

even of the idea, was made possible by the influence of Avicenna. True, St. Albert makes the attempt to fit abstraction into illumination and the result is much less abstraction than illumination; but yet it is an abstraction illumination. That the result of the attempted fusion of so many divergent sources is we have been observing in its gradual development. We are now about to see that movement at its zenith.

If this is the way abstraction is described by St. Albert what is to be said of that light of the Divine Intellect, is it grace? If grace is any gift freely given by God then this light is a grace. Consequently the abstractive process comes about only by means of a grace super-added to the light of the agent intellect. This is so true that even if something is is habitually known the soul will only be actualised in respect to it by turning to that uncreated light. That is to say, even after we have acquired some knowledge it is necessary, in order that the soul know in act, that this uncreated light again be applied. So in this sense it is a special and a transient illumination by a new grace.(4)

Lest this doctrine be considered the work of St. Albert's youth, later to be revoked, let us look in the Summa Theologiae. There St.Albert evidences no change. Our possible intellect is perceptive of no cognitum without a light illuminating the agent

intellect. Through this light the possible intellect is made to know; without it there is no knowledge. And that light which aids in the process of knowing natural objects is not a supernatural illumination; it is a natural light. It is natural, even though freely given by God, because it enables us to know natural things. However, this light in matters of faith is gratuitous while in the Beatific Vision it is the light of glory. And yet the whole order is gratuitous in so far as grace is said to be all that which is super-added to nature. Now in as much as it is added to the created light of the agent intellect it is super-added to its nature. But in as much as that same agent intellect by very origin is submitted to the light of God and is in the image of God it is naturally standing in that same light to which it is indebted for its being. Consequently, in that sense it is correct to say that it is thedefinition of the very nature of the agent intellect as the image of God to be submitted to the light of the Divine Illumination. So that then, the agent intellect, in as much as it is founded on and flows from the gap ent of the soul whose form is the Trinity, is open naturally to the light of God. (7)

St. Albert does not want anyone to think that he teaches at this point an illumination which bears the very content of

our concepts. In order to avoid any such confusion he immediately adds that this light, so descending is not conferring something known that it be knowable by the mind but it is, rather, pouring its light on the one knowing so that he can actually know. Thus it appears beyond a doubt that our knowledge of material things is natural by object and, so far as freely given, grace by way of efficient origin.(8)

It is the teaching of St. Albert then that the knowledge of man, human knowledge, begins from the phantasm in which is sheltered the intelligible nature already in act. It is terminated, from the point of view of the product, at the possible intellect. In this process it is illuminated either by God or by the angels through the light received from God. And the reason for this illumination consists in the fact that the light of the agent intellect, in itself, is not sufficient for the abstraction of all the species by which it is the pleasure of the possible intellect to know all things. That abstraction can only take place by the addition to the light of the agent intellect of the Angelic or Divine light. Furthermore, just as the act of the agent intellect was said to be twofold, namely, the illumination of the possible intellect and the illumination of the phantasms so also must we say that this super-added illumination bifurcates in the same way through the act of the

agent intellect so illumined. (9)

There is ample evidence that St. Albert did not limit himself, in the discussion of this illumination, to the works we have just investigated. It suffices to point out a few instances in his strictly philosophical writings to convince ourselves of his constancy and fidelity to his own ideals. We resort at once to the simile of the light of the sun; its light is effective of the forms of corporeal things. However, the light of the First Agent Intellect, God, irradiates on the light of the sun and if it did not the efficiency of the light of the sun in respect to those corporeal forms would be totally annihilated. It is exactly the same in the universe which man is, in the human minor mundus. The light of God has to shine on the agent intellect of man and thereby aid it in the making of the manifold universals and in the illumination of the possible intellect. Were it not so the minor mundus would have no knowledge of anything whatsoever. (10) For this light of God is joined to the soul and to the forms in the soul and under the act of this uncreated light the forms move the soul just as under the act of exteriorly applied light colors move the sight. Joined thus, both to the forms and to the agent intellect, and thereby illumining both the

phantasm and the possible intellect through the agent intellect, God enters intimately into the process of knowing.(11) The conclusion then would have to be that the esse of the intelligible forms in the soul depends on the light of the Angels or God flowing into the soul, adding to the light of our own agent intellect and thereby generating the esse intellectuale or the forms in the soul. Ultimately of course, since the Angels illumine only in virtue of the Divine Light, it must be said that it is the light of the First Cause which is the efficient source of the act of the agent intellect.

Let us therefore conclude that there is a permanent, and hence general, illumination by which the agent intellect operates. The Divine Light is conjoined to the human soul and where St. Albert speaks of an agent intellect and its operation he means that the light of our own agent intellect is able to give universality to material forms owing to the light it receives either from God through a separate intelligence or from God directly. Of course, there is an agent intellect in man which can make these objects universal, for they are already intelligible in act, and thus in one sense universals; and further, God's light of intelligibility is always shining on them and on the intellect itself. Consequently, for St. Albert abstraction means that operation of the agent intellect

which renders the natures in the phantasm universal in the light radiated from the separate intelligences and from God. In this sense it is true to say that because our knowledge is due to the illumination of our agent intellect by God it has as its cause much more the uncreated light of God than either things themselves or the created light of the human agent intellect.

For this reason the fundamental origin of our knowledge is not in things, nor is it even in our own soul. It is in the Divine Light that man gathers his knowledge of material things. Thus it can truly be said that God is the First Mover in the order of knowledge because He is the First Mover in the order of being.

Nor is this the whole story. If the Divine Light is requisite for the efficient functioning of the agent intellect in respect to intelligible forms are we condemned to saying that our knowledge never rises above such objects as are given in the phantasms? There is no doubt but that our knowledge begins from sensibles. But while there is no reason it must remain there, excellent reasons can be adduced that it should not. More intelligible, less material and most intelligent beings still stand unknown. The whole realm of

intellectual existents as well as the First Cause, God, have as yet been unconsidered as objects of knowledge. As the human soul concerns itself about the quiddities of material things in its various operations it begins to wonder about itself, and when it has satisfied its possibilities in that line it finds that it still knows a very small portion of what it can know. There are the separate intelligences and the First Cause. However, for the honestly curious soul this all does not happen over-night. It begins to ask about itself; and the first step on the road to that noble knowledge is not far removed from the first step on the road to the state of intellectual perfection.(13)

Such a condition of course implies that only a certain type of knowledge arises from the phantasms. Some things depend on matter for their existence and, as well, the very understanding of them implies a relation to matter. Knowledge of things of this type comprise what is known as Natural Philosophy. However, some things depend on matter for their existence but not for the understanding of them; and this is the realm of Mathematics. In all these things it seems that our knowledge arises from phantasms.(14) The intellectual soul, however, and all things above it are separate per esse et

quantum from matter. They depend neither for their being nor for their being understood on matter; and that is the complete reason why the knowledge of them does not originate in the phantasm.

St. Albert tells us that the human intellect is the first image of the light of God which is joined in one way to space and time. It is necessary then that the human intellect be a receptacle, in an intentional manner, of physical and mathematical things simply because it is joined to space and time. But it is also necessary that, as an image of God, the human intellect, separate *secundum esse* from the body, be a container in so far as it is able, of those higher and more noble things which come about through the light of the First Cause and which depend in no essential or existential way on matter. Such are the soul itself and the separate intelligences; their cause, God, can then be added to this scheme as the highest and most noble of all things.(15) For the knowledge of these three orders phantasms are not only a detriment, but are wholly unnecessary.

From the very beginning St. Albert carefully prepared and planned for the final steps which we are now going to watch him take. He has wasted no words; each element of his thought so far discussed is but a harmonious part in the symphonic finale towards which he is now driving. The true purpose and

legitimate and for which St. Albert maintains the doctrine of an agent intellect is inseparably connected with, and unremittingly directed towards the perfection of the intellectual soul. In order to ascertain that purpose and end let us proceed as St. Albert himself does, with a rapid induction of his classification of intellects.

It is the teaching of St. Albert that the possible intellect and the universal existing in an intentional way in the intellect are formally the same. The possible intellect becomes the object known intentionally, in so far as the object known exists in an immaterial fashion in the intention which the intellect has of it. In fact St. Albert says that the union of the intellect and the thing known is so intimate that a third thing is not formed; they become one formally as in the union of potency and act.(16) Because they are thus one in intellectual being they can be said to be capable of receiving one and the same formal perfection. And this is but the light of the agent intellect; it makes completely universal what was improperly so by universalizing in the Divine Light the form of the thing known. Thus it brings the possible intellect to act.(17) The light of the agent intellect always aided by the Divine Light is their common perfection, serving as the <u>form</u> or act

both of the universal and of the possible intellect.

Hence the re-enforced light of the agent intellect, in as much as it is both in the possible intellect and within that which is known by the possible intellect, is to be regarded in two ways. It is, first of all, that by which something is known, and secondly, it is that by which something knows, namely, the soul through the possible and the agent intellect. (18) Out of this comes what St. Albert chooses to call the <u>intellectus formalis</u>. We might define it by saying that it is the light of the agent intellect in so far as it informs both the possible intellect and the intelligible form. It is simply the light of the agent intellect in the function of informing both the possible intellect and the intelligible. (19)

Under the light of the agent intellect the intelligible in act becomes a universal. Likewise under its light the possible intellect is illumined as by its act. Simultaneously the universal moves into its new home, the illumined possible intellect and the possible intellect by those receptions is thus brought from potency to act. It has become what is called by St. Albert the <u>intellectus in effectu</u>. It has initially thus dissipated part of its universal potency; it is in potency to all intelligibles. The more it is rendered in act the less it is in potency and the more perfect it becomes. (20) The <u>intellectus in effectu</u> then

is the intelligible in its actual universality in the intellect. For, *intellectus et intellectum sunt idem formaliter*; it is the possible intellect as actualized by both the agent intellect and the universal species.

When the intellect is rendered in act the *intellectus principiorum* arises. Once the terms involved in the principles are known the *intellectus principiorum* is present. Along with the principles are the instruments by which knowledge of things is derived from the principles. For St. Albert they are the modes of arguments.(21) The first principles are known naturally in so far as we know their terms. And we may say that these principles themselves are *quasi* instruments by which the illumined agent intellect continues to educe the possible intellect from potency to a more perfect degree of actuality.(22)

Because of the diverse influences which he allowed himself to undergo the next step is one of the most intricate in St. Albert's explanation of the march to intellectual perfection. The beginning is marked by a significant pledge of fidelity to Averroes, with whom St. Albert finds himself in happy agreement, but for a very few points. Averroes, along with almost all the other philosophers holds for an agent intellect which is separate and not joined to the soul. But he well knows that since the agent intelligence is joined to the possible

intellect formally in order that the soul may know separate substances, there must be a cause of that conjunction. (33)

St. Albert assures us that nothing in Averroes will be changed except where Aristotle is different. And that requires an immediate change, for Aristotle taught that there is both an agent and a possible intellect in the soul. Now St. Albert never doubted for one minute that the agent intellect is a part and power of the human soul. It is always joined as a part. But, and this is important, the light of the agent, which is its act, is not always joined <u>in actu</u> to the possible intellect for it is not always making the universals to be in the possible intellect. In this sense the agent intellect is separate. (34) This is a remarkably adroit twist, for now we have jockyed the agent intellect to a position where it is almost at the lofty par to which the agent intellect of Averroes is accustomed and about which that Arabian's words have been written. In point of fact, St. Albert has gone as far towards starting off on the same foot with Averroes as his doctrine will permit him to dare. He can say that the light of his agent intellect is not always joined in act; then the agent intellect is more separate than the possible intellect. It is precisely from this point on that it is no longer a question of what St. Albert is going to take from Averroes but only: at what point is he

going to stop taking?

St. Albert recognizes that in such a state of affairs he too had better look around for a cause of conjunction whereby the agent intellect is joined formally to the possible intellect. But what is it to be joined formally? In his answer St. Albert adopts two points from Alfarabi, which as we shall see, he could well have read, and no doubt did read, in Averroes. The intellect has two operations; first, to make the intellects by denuding them from matter, secondly, to understand those forms. The first is proper to the agent intellect alone, while the second the possible intellect enjoys in company with other passive powers. So far so good; but we should all know that the assurance and security of anyone philosophizing is not to be joined to the agent intellect only as to an efficient cause in the order of knowledge but also to be united to it as to a form. The explanation for this is simply that when the agent intellect produces the universals in the mind it does so without the help of the possible intellect; in this sense it is joined only as *efficiens*. However, the second operation, namely, *intelligere* is not so independent but requires the agent intellect joined *ut efficiens*. Now then if the security of the happy man philosophizing requires that his intellect be joined to the agent intellect also as to a

form, then it will be conjoined so that the happy man *in actu felicitatis* knows himself and the agent intellect. The form is that principle through which anything performs its proper actions; it is the perfection of that to which it is joined as a form. So it is the agent intellect as form through which man does that work which is his in so far as he is a man. And what is that work; it is by realising the potentialities of one's knowledge to know oneself and the things above oneself. (25)

It would be well, before we spend more time on such a teaching, to find out whether or not it is humanly possible for man to attain to a conjunction with his agent intellect, not as *efficiens* which is always the case, but as form which is not always so joined. All one has to do in order to convince himself that it is certainly possible is merely to look around. We see the souls of those happy ones whose souls are perfected according to the highest state of wisdom. In their state it is quite apparent that they taste and enjoy the knowledge of divine things which God Himself teaches. The effects are enough to prove that the conjunction of the possible intellect to the agent intellect as to a form is actually here in this life. Hence we are not reaching for the moon; it is possible in this life. (26)

Since it can be done, the question now is how is it done?

In the cause and mode of this conjunction Mr. Albert informs us that he agrees *in toto* with Averroes. It comes about through the acquisition of speculative knowledge in two ways. First of all, certain speculative knowledge happens in us as it were *per naturam*. We need no teacher, nor any inquisition. Such things are the first principles and proper axioms of demonstration, which we know immediately in so far as we know their terms. Secondly, other speculative knowledge arises pursuant to our own choosing; we strive after it by personal discovery and by listening to teachers. In as much as it is voluntary anyone, without physical or mental impediments, can do it if he so chooses. In both of these cases all this knowledge comes by reason of the illumined agent intellect pouring forth intellectuality and so making the universals completely in act. The agent intellect so joined is *efficiens*; but it is becoming joined as form. Throughout all these steps the possible intellect is continually receiving the light of the agent intellect and day by day is acquiring more knowledge by means of the agent intellect. Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes, in fact all the philosophers, say that this is to be moved to a continuation and conjunction with the agent intellect. Then when the possible intellect has received all knowledge possible to it on that realm it has become completely actu-

actualized. At that point it has the light of the agent intellect adhering to itself as a form, as its perfection. When the agent intellect is not only joined to it as *efficiens*, but when it is no longer outside it *in actu* it is no longer separate even in that way; the agent intellect is, at that precise moment, perfectly joined to the possible intellect as form. The result so produced and composed is called the *intellectus adeptus*.(27)

What St. Albert means is this: the possible intellect is capable of becoming all things by knowing them; the agent intellect can fashion all things so that the possible intellect may actually know them. When the agent intellect is joined to the possible intellect in act, that is, when it is actually producing the *intellecta*, it is efficient of that knowledge; and to the extent that it is efficient the possible intellect is having its potencies actualized: it is becoming an *intellectus formalis*, *intellectus in effectu* and *intellectus principiorum*. Day by day, as St. Albert says, its store of potency is diminishing and a store of actual knowledge is simultaneously being constructed. Once actualized it is *in effectu* only in respect to that particular store of knowledge; it still finds itself in potency to all the rest that it does not yet know. It is being perfected; it is still imperfect to

the degree of its remaining potency; it has not then yet reached its full perfection. The agent intellect, always an intrinsic part of the soul is joined actually to the possible intellect when it is *in actu* as *efficiens*. But it is still separate when it is not so *in actu*. However, as it continues to perfect the possible intellect there is less possibility of its being so separate, for it is more and more *in actu*. The degree of perfection of the possible intellect is, therefore, in direct proportion to the degree of separateness of the agent intellect. The more it is joined to the possible intellect in act, the less separate it is and the more closely does the possible intellect approach perfection. That perfection is to have all its potencies in that order of knowledges actualized. When there is nothing further in respect to which the agent intellect has not been *in actu* it can then no longer be separate. The possible intellect has then acquired all the *intelleta*; the agent intellect is no longer separate. It is the perfection of the possible intellect and has renounced its separate state. For the possible intellect has been joined to it as to its perfection or its form. Since the form is that principle through which anything achieves what it should achieve, and since the possible intellect has seen all its potencies actualized through the agent intellect, the possible intellect can rightly be said to be joined to the

agent intellect not only as to an *efficiens* but also as to its perfection or its form.

As has already been said, the not result of this process is termed the *intellectus adeptus*. It is a state of the intellect which has been acquired through zealous application; it is the acquisition of one's true and proper intellect, as it were, the utility and fruit of one's labours.(28) Then man is in a position to perform the operations which are proper to him as a man. And this is the work which God Himself does; namely, to know oneself and to understand objects separate from matter *per esse et essentiam*.(29)

In summary it can be said that the agent intellect is joined in three ways: naturally, in so far as it is a power of the soul; efficiently, in so far as it makes the *intellectus speculativus* and formally, inso far as man is now perfect to do the divine work which it is his perfection to do. The cause of its conjunction *ut forma* is the *Intellectus speculativus* and as the cause precedes the effect so this state of the intellect precedes the *intellectus adeptus*. The speculative intellect is not distinguished from the possible intellect on the side of the subject but from the side of potency and act. The possible is in potency, the speculative is in act; hence it is rather a grade or degree of the possible intellect than another intellect.(30) We may say simply

with St. Albert that the intellectus formalis is divided into the practical and speculative intellect, so that the speculative intellect is a part of the formal intellect, specified by knowledge purely for the sake of knowledge. (31) Thus when St. Albert says that the speculative intellect is the cause of the conjunction of the agent intellect as form he means that by the progressive acquisition of speculative knowledge in the light of the agent intellect the perfection is reached wherein the possible intellect is actualized fully and it is conjoined to the agent intellect as its perfection or form.

Before proceeding with the doctrine of St. Albert it is appropriate at this point to investigate the sources of such a doctrine. Alfarabi had said that the agent intellect was the last separate intelligence. By abstracting for us the material forms it places them in our intellect which passes from potency to act. When one has all or almost all of this type of forms then one can elevate oneself to the intellection of pure intelligible forms which were never in matter. They become forms for our intellect and as received from the agent intelligence our intellect is joined to it and it itself and the forms in it and our intellects are objects of our intellection. (32) This is the intellectus adeptus.

For Avicenna we could adapt our intellects to unite themselves to the agent intelligence in order the more easily and rapidly to receive forms from it and to enjoy it as an object of knowledge and ultimately of repose. This was his *intellectus adeptus*.(33)

Averroes taught, however, that not only was the agent intelligence separate but that the material (possible) intellect was also separate; further, each was eternal and one in all men. His problem was then to explain how he could say: *his homo intelligit*. His answer was that the material intellect is joined to each man through cogitation and conjunction with the *formis imaginalibus* in the soul of each man. That soul is the form of the body of each man as a principle of the sensative and vegetative life, and, as a material form, is individuated by matter so that each man has his own soul.(34) But how is the material intellect joined to the agent intelligence and thus the agent to us? Of this question Averroes says: *valde est difficile*. The material intellect is joined through the first principles and the remaining speculative knowledges. In made this or that man's material intellect by conjunction with his individual material form the material intellect is the subject of the speculative knowledges of this or that man, which know-

ledge is generable and corruptible for it vanishes when the contact of the material intellect with the form or seal is broken by the death of the man. Now then the agent intellect is efficient of material as well as abstract forms in the material intellect and it is joined to the material intellect through the intellectu speculativu. As the material intellect is brought more and more in act through the reception from the agent intellect of the speculative knowledges the agent intellect is joined as agent and increasingly as form. Thus we are moved to a continuation or conjunction to the agent intellect and the motion is only completed with the actualization of each man's peculiar potencies; at that point the material intellect is joined not only as to an agent but also as to a form, its perfection. In this state lies the fiducia or state of security and assurance.

So for Averroes the material intellect is the subject not only of the intellectu speculativu but also of the agent intellect. The intellect in act in any man is then composed from the speculative knowledges and the agent intellect. In this sense the agent intellect is conjoined with each man through the continuation of the intellectu speculativu. The agent intellect as the perfection is as the form of the speculative knowledges. Since we perform our proper actions through the agent intellect

it is necessary that it be a *form* in us. Thus we are likened to God in this that we are all beings, but in knowledge.[35]

Let us pause a moment, for we witness an occurrence so regular that it seems a commonplace to mention it. Here is a man for whom preceding thinkers had provided fertile material for a doctrine which was terminologically similar to all and yet structurally unlike each. St. Albert at this point knew full well that the agent intellect of Averroes was separate and one for all men; he knew the same of Alfarabi and Avicenna. He knew as well that the material intellect of Averroes was separate and unique and that it denied personal immortality. Further he was aware that St. Augustine had taught that the Inner Master was his Divine God. But by defining his soul as he did, by explaining its nature as he did, that soul became capable of supporting an agent intellect which was after the manner of a *Rator Normarum*, illumined by the Inner Master, in the process of abstraction and illumination.[36]

On the one hand there is an Arabian immortality in the union with the last separate intelligence and an *intellectus adeptus*; on the other hand here is a Christian capable of assimilating the very well-springs of such doctrines into a coherent teaching of his own moulding. But we have not reach-

ed the conclusion; we must go a little further with St. Albert.

While there can be little doubt but that Averroes is the direct inspiration of St. Albert on this point, especially since he tells us so himself, we must listen as he explains to us the first type of this divine knowledge, made possible in the *intellectus adeptus*. In this condition the soul knows itself and its agent intellect. It has become all things it knows; what it knows and itself are one. As it continues to operate intellectually about these things it knows itself as containing them and it begins to know itself in itself. Phantasms are unnecessary; in order that the intellect know itself it must be actualized and acquire itself. Then it is for itself an object of knowledge. If this is the *fiducia* for a philosopher it is also why Alfarabi said that the soul is put in a body that it may discover and know itself. [67]

The soul thus acquires and knows itself; its knowledge of self depends upon its union to the agent intellect as to its form. But there is still to be set forth its possible nobler knowledges. There is no more below it; it is knowing itself and by its self-contemplation the soul realizes its own beauty. It realizes its almost divine beauty and is aware that its beauty is not from itself. And too there are more beautiful

things and more divine things. Conscious of this the soul turns towards the Intelligences and extends itself to a union with the light of these separate intelligences ascending by degrees from union with the last intelligence to the highest until it ascends even to a union with the light of the Divine Intellect. (38)

It is the intellectus assimilativus in which man, in so far as is possible or conscious for him surges upwards to the Divine Intellect which is the light and cause of all things. Having acquired itself and the light of its agent intellect the soul can now extend itself, thus purified from its body, to the light of the Angels, ascending through them progressively to the simplicity of the Divine Intellect. From the light of its own agent intellect it proceeds to the light of the Intelligences and from there to the Intellect of God. (39)

What sort of act is going on here we may well ask St. Albert? And he has already answered that it is the act which God does, namely, to contemplate Himself and to know separate intelligences. The contemplation of self is laid in the intellectus adeptus. It is in the intellectus assimilativus that the soul receives, through its union with their light, a knowledge of the Intelligences. The reason for this stems in the fact that the human soul, by knowing the superior light

to which it is applied has been strengthened and is open to the reception of more noble knowledge. However, it is impossible for the soul to abstract this knowledge from the sensible world; neither can it construct such notions in itself. It remains then that to whatever one of the superior intelligences the soul happens to be joined at this or that moment it may be sure that as an intelligence it is bountifully replete with intelligible universal forms. For it is the very definition of an intelligence to be full of forms.(40) From the conjunction of the soul and that light of the Intelligence there flow into the human soul forms and species of that order to which the particular Intelligence belongs. There is however a condition of reception: the forms thus placed in the soul are received there according to the power of reception of the recipient. Not only are they received intentionally but they are received according to the individual aptitudes of those receiving them.(41)

St. Albert proceeds to explain this by determining that the intellect extending itself finds the light of the Intelligences everywhere present. By uniting itself to the light it is informed and imbued with it and clarified to heavenly beauty. In this way the souls of the more excellent can encompass far more than their own bodies. For their souls are in possession

of forms more universal in scope than those abstracted from phantasms. And in knowing these forms it knows something of the Intelligence by whom they were bestowed. The Intelligence knows itself *per suam essentiam* and since it is by definition full of forms, when these forms are known in the human soul it can be said that the soul has a certain cognition of the Intelligence itself.[42]

It is not St. Albert's intention to stop here. The intellect thus strengthened rises through the orders of the Intelligences to be united to the Divine Light. We can technically signify this stage by the phrase *intellectus sanctus* or *intellectus divinus*. It is not a new genus of the perfection of the intellect but only a certain mode of purity of that intellect. Should one desire to know the means of attaining this degree of purity St. Albert sets forth four principal requirements: the contemplation of beauty, the acquisition of greater and more profound illumination, separation from the objects of space and time, and the persistent application with the light of the superior orders of being. In the attainment of the fourth and last means, and in its continual possession, stands the highest perfection which can happen to man in this life. St. Albert insists that it comes about more and more as the soul is perceptive of the knowledge bearing illuminations which are more

(43)
and more from the First Cause.

St. Albert was as confident that all men could attain this end in this life as he was that not many do attain it. Some are hindered by physical and mental ills which incapacitate them. Even those who achieve the *intellectus adeptus*, however, are staggered in the degree that they rise still higher. St. Albert is prepared to offer a calibration in the possession of the *intellectus assimilativus* which in a purer state is called the *intellectus sanctus*. Certain men are so gifted that they receive the aptitude to discover the middle term in syllogisms without any *doctrina*. In so easily discovering the middle term one has *learning* this aptitude can as well be termed *subtilitas*. *Solertia* is the perfect aptitude to acquire numerous middle terms immediately, in their infallible order and lacking any hesitation. Lastly, there remains the highest state of the human intellect wherein it is possessed of the aptitude to know future things from the present and thereby frequently to effect prophecies.(44) In any event we are here at the most elevated state of the intellect, called by Avicenna, St. Albert tells us, the *intellectus sanctus*. Here the intelligibles flow into the soul from the agent intelligences, the Angels, or from the First Agent Intelligence, God Himself.(45)

Now then what is the general effect of these types of knowledges? The perfection of the intellect in this life is the effect. When the human intellect is raised to the Divine Light, not now giving only abstractive illumination but the content of knowledge of things divine the illumination is so general that man is absolutely purified from his body. He participates somewhat of divinity by way of resemblance. (46) Being possessed of the knowledge of divine things he can contemplate these things and relate them to men less fortunate than himself. Consider how weak and futile are those whose intellects are not elevated St. Albert asks us; speak to them of divine contemplative things and they understand no more than the beasts of the field who always remain in the knowledge of singulars. (47) The proper operation of man in so far as he is man is to know and contemplate things that are separate. In so far as his intellect is a certain divine thing, an image of God, nothing belongs to his nature more than the consideration of these things. Through knowing ourselves we rise to a knowledge of the Angels and ultimately to a consideration of the things of God. This is why it is fitting that there be no joyous repose in any intelligible until it arrives at the knowledge it can have of the First Cause. (48)

Hence we can say that this is the end in which contemplative felicity is established, namely, to have not only the light of one's own illumined agent intellect joined to the soul as form, but further, to have the light of the Intelligences and of God joined to it not only as efficient in the case of abstraction from phantasms but also as form, as perfection, in the knowledge of divine things. In the former the illumination is for the production of the universal; in the latter it is the veritable bestowing of superior intelligible forms. In this sense it would be true to say that the separate agent intelligences and the First Agent Intelligence function for the soul of man as an agent intellect resplendent with forms and standing in no need of phantasms.

St. Albert is now progressing rapidly to the culminating point of his own position. The forms which have been given existence in matter exist in a far more perfect way in God and the Angels. But that the soul of man may be perfected it is necessary that these forms be removed from matter in knowledge and that they be given an existence more akin to their being in the Angels and in God. In this way the forms are reduced more to divine being through the soul of man. Such a reduction is proper to man alone; the Angels have these forms already

separate in a divine manner of being and they are interested, not in receiving intelligible forms from things, but in aiding in bestowing intelligibility on things. Consequently it occurs only through man to whom God has given powers and organs solely to that end. But these forms are not made sufficiently divine through the *intellectus in effectu* nor even by the *intellectus adeptus*; there is necessary a conjunction, through the *intellectus assimilativus* and the *intellectus divinus*, of the soul and these forms to the Angelic and Divine Light. Thus, through man there is accomplished the reduction of the world to God; by progressively deeper knowing man is returning both himself and the world to the First Cause. It would be better to say that the First Cause is reducing to Himself the world by reducing to Himself the soul of man. (49) We witness here the completion of the cycle which began from God. The cycle of being is closing upon itself; its end is in its beginning.

Here the soul receives its ultimate perfection in this life. It required the body at the beginning, but now it is purified completely from its body. The soul now led back to divine being and operation stands in no need of material objects or corporeal organic instruments, for a substance possessed of divine being and operation needs nothing but the Divine

light through which it has attained this perfect state.[50]

St. Albert is now prepared for his *coup d'état*. The achievement by the intellectual soul of this most perfect state is the proof of its immortality. By assimilating oneself in knowing to the light of the Angels and of God man makes himself immortal.[51] Approaching, through the knowledge of all things, to the First Cause on whom the soul depends according to the necessity of its very being that soul attains the root of its immortality and eternal felicity.[52]

Just as the being of the soul is from its *quo est* and from its *quo est* flows the agent intellect in the light of God, so too the *esse intellectuale* in the possible intellect is from the agent intellect in the light of God. For this reason St. Albert can correctly say that the principle of immortality of the possible intellect is from the agent intellect just as its intellectual being is from the agent intellect.[53] By acquiring itself and its agent intellect as a form the intellect becomes the *intellectum adeptus* and is enabled thereby to surpass even itself in its objects of knowledge. This demands the acquisition of the agent intellect as form, however, and thus St. Albert can place in such an intellect the root of immortality of the soul.[54] The principle of immortality of the human soul is from the agent

intellect in this sense, that through conjunction to the agent intellect as form the *intellectus adeptus* arises and the soul may surge upward to still more perfect knowledge. Without such union there can be no such assurance of immortality in this life; he who has not acquired his own agent intellects as form must receive it from God in the next life.

The *radix immortalitatis* is precisely the goal for which St. Albert was aiming. The Arabian immortality in the union with the last separate intelligence becomes personal immortality for St. Albert in the union with our own agent intellect and the light of the Angels and God. The Christianization of the Arabian thought reaches a lofty plane in the thought of St. Albert. Thus we observe that knowledge is necessary for immortality. Man immortalizes himself by becoming intelligent. Hence it is true to say that the problem of human knowledge and the problem of the *radix immortalitatis* are one and the same. Having achieved his objective it is highly appropriate for St. Albert to say: *Sic igitur concluditur ultima perfectio animae secundum intellectum.*[82]

CONCLUSION

In the interests of historical accuracy it is imperative to note the radical influence exerted by the Arabian philosophers on the formation of the thought of St. Albert. A delicate reserve, however, must be exercised. There is a strong temptation to unite the doctrine of St. Albert with that of the Arabians. To succumb to that temptation would be an error much more serious than the traditional ignoring of those relations. Certainly St. Albert took departure from the neo-Platonic philosophy of Avicenna. This, he thought, enabled him to harmonize fundamental tenets of St. Augustine with the doctrine of Aristotle in its diverse stages.

No examination of the nature and operation of the agent intellect in the writings of St. Albert can be divorced from his unique conception of the human soul. By separating the notion of soul from the notion of form (made possible through Avicenna) St. Albert fashioned a dual definition of the soul which embraced at once its substantially independent character in the Platonic-Augustinian definitions and its body actualizing character which marked the Aristotelian definitions.

In the soul so defined, standing as it does on the horizon of time and eternity, there is a necessary place for an agent

intellect. Moreover, because the soul stands in relation to the temporal material world, an agent intellect is required to render the forms in that world suitable for knowing. More important still, man is a *minor mundus* and what transpires in him is but a small-scale copy of what is transpiring in the whole universe, or in any order of that universe; for in every universe there is always one first universal agent. Further, the existence of an agent intellect, thus demonstrated to be necessary, is compatible with the very nature of the soul. For the human soul, composed of two intrinsic formal principles, *quod est* and *quoest*, is an image of God. St. Augustine had always maintained that the soul is made in the image of God. For St. Albert, the form of the form of the soul is the Trinity, and in such a doctrine the door is left open for Divine illumination.

It was St. Albert's personal stroke of genius to discover that the same three relations by which Avicenna had described the origin of the separate intelligences existed and operated in the human soul; for man is a *minor mundus*. Hence from the formal metaphysical principles of composition in the soul derive the agent and possible intellects as intrinsic principles of intellectual operation, and the *motor corporis* character of the

soul. No effort is made to disguise the resemblance of the soul to a separate intelligence, for in itself it is a substance separate secundum esse from the body.

As a unitary substance this soul is a totum potentativum, containing its powers esse et intellectu. Here the realism of forms and their plurality, doctri es adapted in part from Gilbert of Poitiers and in part from Avicenna, permit St. Albert to regard the powers somewhat as forms. Thus the soul remains unimpeachably immortal. On this conception St. Albert bases the Aristotelian-Avicennian grouping of the exterior and interior senses, preparatory to his treatment of the central problem of the communication between body and soul. By a subtle distinction he establishes that the intellect communicates, not directly with the body, but with a power of the soul, the phantasia, which communicates directly with the body, and thus furnishes a facile solution of the apparently insoluble problem of the substantial union of body and soul.

Such a master stroke enabled St. Albert to retain all he had previously adopted from the neo-Platonic tradition, and even to add more to it, without abandoning the abstraction theory of Aristotle. In order to explain the process of abstraction St. Albert first refuted the Arabian doctrine of the universal

agent intelligence and transplanted it by his own universal agent intellect whose function is both to illumine and to abstract. However, since the principles of being and the principles of knowing are indistinct the human *intellectus* operates only in the discovery of a nature which of itself is indifferent, but universalizable. Avicenna's indetermined nature *in se existens* becomes the object of St. Albert's agent intellect whose character is analogous to the Arabian *Intellectus Formarum* functioning now in a humanized fashion as a faculty of the soul.

In its operation the agent intellect receives assistance from every side. On the side of the object known it finds a world constantly submitted to the intelligible light of the First Cause in which it has but to discover natures capable of being completely universalized. On the side of the subject knowing the intellect is constantly receiving the effulgence of Divine Light in its function of abstraction and illumination. For St. Albert, as for St. Augustine, God is the Inner Master. For St. Augustine, however, the doctrine of illumination bears on the truth of judgments, not on the abstraction of the universal. For St. Albert, the divine and angelic light supplement the insufficiency of the human agent intellect by adding to the light of the agent intellect in its natural operation. This is

reasonable and appropriate since the quo est of the soul, the principle of the agent intellect, has as its form the Trinity; hence the agent intellect is naturally submitted to the Divine Light.

Where St. Augustine taught a truth-illumination St. Albert taught an abstraction-illumination; where St. Augustine allowed of no natures interposed in the illumination, St. Albert introduced the Angelic as well as the Divine Light with the admonition, however, that the complete illumination is principated only in the Divine Light. Here, as elsewhere, St. Albert has transformed the doctrine of St. Augustine through the influence of the Arabian interpretation of Aristotle which he found in Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. The abstraction-illumination theory of St. Albert results from transplanting the neo-Platonic Arabian doctrine of the separate agent intelligence into a soil fit for the authentic truth-illumination theory of St. Augustine. Thus St. Albert elaborated from the Augustinian theory of truth a solution to the Aristotelian problem of abstraction, by introducing Arabian thought into the Christian school.

In perfecting itself by the acquisition of physical and mathematical knowledge through abstraction-illumination, the soul acquires its own agent intellect as a form. This is the level at which Alfarabi and Avicenna had established immortality; but St. Albert, being a Christian, knew full well that the soul can

R. T. Miller
St. Albert

know not only itself, but also the separate intelligences and the First Cause. The mechanics of the gradual ascent through the light of the angels, to union with the Divine Light are provided for St. Albert by the explanation which the Arabians offered for the union of the soul to the last separate intelligence. The content of the soul's knowledge in this realm, St. Albert teaches, is directly received in its union to the angelic and Divine Light; thus it has its knowledge of the Angels and of God. This union completes the cycle of being, and restores to divine being the forms in matter, by returning these forms, in knowledge, to God. Thus does St. Albert not only make the soul a substance in itself, separate from the body and therefore immortal, but he finds in the Arabians another type of immortality. Man immortalizes himself by reaching the heights of knowledge. By passing his soul through the <u>intellectus adeptus</u>, the <u>intellectus assimilativus</u> and the <u>intellectus agentis</u> St. Albert emerges with a Christianized <u>radix immortalitatis</u>.

NOTE TO INTRODUCTION

(1) The texts of St. Albert to which all references, unless otherwise noted, are made: B. Alberti Magni Ratisbonensis Primaeni, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera Omnia, cura et labore Augusti Borgnet, Parisiis, Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 38 vols., 1890-1899.

Appendix IV (Chapter IV)

(1) The treatise *De Homine* is the second part of the *Summa de Creaturis* dealing with man who is the most noble among visible created things. Those things created prior to man are treated in the first part of the *Summa de Creaturis* which is entitled *de quatuor coaevaevis*, cf. [illegible] Geyer-mann O. P., *Introductio in Summa Contra G. Albertii* [illegible], [illegible], 1931, p. 107. In the note of this work cf. J. Lottin, *Saint Albert le premier auteur theologique* [illegible], in *Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale*, III, 1932, p. 77 and 80. Lottin establishes that the *Summa de Creaturis* was written between 1240 and 1241.

(2) *Summa de Creaturis*, I. II, tract 1, q. 4, introductio, vol. 35, p. [illegible]. It is most likely that St. Albert read his Aristotle in the Parvia Naturalia which is the Latin of Gerard's version. A printed edition of this translation is conveniently available in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis In Aristotelis Libros de Anima Commentarium*, Antonii Marietti, ed. Pirotta, Marietti Turin, 1959. The small, tasteless, cover Aristotle from this edition of the *Parvia Naturalia*. St. Albert is almost verbally correct in his statement of the definition vide Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, 1, 412b 25-412b 1: Quae autem est ratio animae corporis dicatur, potentia vitae habentis. Vale quam quod sit organicum.

(3) *Sum. de Creat.*, II, q. 1, a. 3, vol. 35, p. 5.

(4) *Op. cit.*, ad sentam 3, p. 76-6a: Ibid. per Avicennam: Sed videmus corpora quae non nutriuntur, nec augmentantur, nec generant: et videmus alia quae nutriuntur, et augmentantur, et generant sibi similia: sed non habent hoc ex sua corporeitate: restat igitur et sit in essentia eorum principium hujusmodi praeter corporeitatem, et principium illud a quo exeunt istae affectiones, dicitur Anima. This text is almost in the latter that advanced in such is actually his psychology by Avicenna, *Summa Omnis, Liber Sextus Naturalium*, Pars I, cap. 1, Venetiis, 1508, folio 1 recto, col. 2a: Et dicemus ergo videmus corpora quaedam quae non nutriuntur nec augmentantur nec generantur; et videmus alia corpora quae nutriuntur et augmentantur et generant sibi similia; et videmus alia corpora quae sentiunt et

movendum voluntarie. Sed non habent hoc ex sua corporeitate. Sunt igitur ut sic in quadam vera principium proprium motus corporeitatis. Et id a quo emanant istae actiones dicitur anima; et omnes quinque sunt principium emanandi a se actiones quae non sunt apetitus mobili et sunt voluntarie, imponimus et hoc nomen anima.... It is textually interesting to compare St. Albert's sed contra 4, ibid; p. 6a, with the last and underlined bit of Avicenna's text, with special reference to mitus mobi in Avicenna and habiamodi in St. Albert: Item; ad idem: Quidquid est omnis principium emanandi a se affectiones, quae non sunt habiamodi, et sunt voluntarie, imponimus ei hoc nomen, anima. As we shall see Avicenna realizes simple natural forms which are determined only to one thing by the emanandi; the term anima cannot properly be applied to such forms. St. Albert will concur in this position. cf. Chapter III, p. 78 sq.

(5) Ibid., sed contra 6, p. 6a: non enim disputamus de nomine, sed en hoc sit quod hoc nomine significare consevimus. The same thought in slightly different words is in Avicenna, op. cit., I. 5r, col. 2: ...primus qui antecedimus magis hoc quia vita sit omnes ejus quae valemus affirmare ex hoc prima perfectione. Tunc iam cognovimus nunc intellectum nominis, quo appellatur hoc res quae vocatur anima ex relatione quam habet.

(6) Avicenna, op. cit., I. 1 a col. 2a: et hoc nomen (anima) est nomen nulus rei non ex eius essentia, nec ex praedicamento in quo continetur posteu.

(7) Sum. de Creat., I. II, tr. 1, q. 2, m. 1, p. 1%.

(8) Sum. de Creat., I. II, tr. 1, q. 2, m. 1, p. 10.
A similar question is placed in the Summa Theologiae by St. Albert where the definition purported to be from St. Augustine reads: anima est substantia incorporea regendo corpori associata, cf. Sum. Theol., I. II, tr. 1, q. 3b, mem. 1; vol. 33, p. 7b. As far as researches on the chronology of St. Albert's works have revealed to date the Summa Theologiae was the last work to come from the pen of St. Albert. It is an uncompleted work, generally dated from 1270-1275 or 1278, cf. Ulrich Zahner, Die Urtextminiaturen des Albertus Magnus, Wetzel, Ulrich publ. 1954, p. 4-5. In these points Zahner follows Fr. Pelster,

Kritische Studien zum Leben und u der Schriften Alberts des Grossen, Münster and Lp. Aschendorff, 1909, p. 132 sq.

St. Albert was not aware of the opinion on the apocryphal character of the De Spiritu et Anima but ascribes it nevertheless to St. Augustine, cf. In I Sent., d. 8, F, a. 23, ad obj. 2, vol. 25, p. 257b. It is now usually ascribed to Alcher of Clairvaux, a Cistercian living about 1156. cf. Leopold Wadi, Alberts des Grossen Psychologie des Intellekts, in (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band XII, Heft 1), Münster i. W., 1910, p. 22, n. 4. Wadi employs a text from the Lacrymae in Libros de Anima, cap. 2, vol. 5, p. 500b, along with that from the Sentences, supra, to show St. Albert's knowledge of the authorship of the De Spiritu et Anima. The authorship of the Lacrymae in Libros de Anima is doubtful; cf. Lottermann, op. cit., p. 130-131. The definition which St. Albert quotes is in St. Augustine, De Quantitate Animae, XIII, 22, M. P. L. 32, col. 1040. It found its way into the De Spiritu et Anima, (M. P. L. 40, col. 781) and from there into the works of St. Albert.

(9) I have not been able to find any verification of this reference in the available works of Tertullian. My conclusion is that I share this disappointment with Arthur Schneider, Die psychologie Alberts des Grossen, II Teil, Münster, 1906, p. 286-287, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters) B. 4, H. 6, as well as with A. C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century, St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1934, pub. No. 18, cf. Grabmann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 11th edition, Berlin, 1928, p. 172-173. Ibn Badjja of Saragossa (1141-1206), a member of the ninth century realistic school. The similarity between this definition and that from the pseudo-Augustinian work is quite apparent. The source of such could easily be the section of St. Augustine cited in the preceding note.

(10) St. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa XI, cap. 12; Migne's Patrologia Graeca, vol. 94, col. 920b: Jam vero anima est vivens, simplex, et incorporea substantia, corporis oculorum scilicet natura sensum fugiens, immortalis, rationis et intelligentiae participes, organis instructa atque corpore, cui vitam, incrementum, sensum, et gignendi vim tribuat, sum aliam a se sejunctam mentem habens (nosse quippe nihil aliud est quam subtilissima Spiritus pars:

(11) St. Albert attributes this definition to what he calls Bernard's Epistola ad Cartusienses. However it is not St. Bernard's. It may be found in the Epistola seu tractatus ad fratres de Monte Dei, ii, [illegible] 1-, [illegible] 1-104, [illegible]. [illegible] these sermons with the legitimate Bernard writings, differentiated from them by the ascription as of one, Guigo, quinti prioris majoris Carthusiae: op. cit; col. 307-364. This epistola is attributed to William of Saint-Thierry by Mabillon (P. L., vol. 184, col. 307-308). cf. Schneider, op. cit., p. 370, n. 1.

(12) Sum. Theol. [illegible], tr. 14, p. 49, [illegible] 1, vol. [illegible], p. 70. This work, cited by St. Albert, and ascribed by him to Alexander was written by Alfredus Anglicus and dedicated to Alexander Neckam. cf. Liber Magistri Alvredi de [illegible] ad Magistrum [illegible] Alexandrum [illegible] de Motu Cordis, ed. C. [illegible], Salzburg-[illegible], [illegible] 1-2, Munster i. W. 1933, p. 1-96. In this work we have the complete De Motu Cordis with valuable critical remarks by the editor. To present the text of Alfredus we look now to the Munster ed. p. 2, l. 6-9. 3, l. 2: Rationalium etiam animarum potentiae quaedam corporis adapti connexa inventur in actum; harum igitur corpori tantum constituitur essentia. Et idem non ex eo quod est, sed ex eo quod ad corpus qualiter se habet anima et diffinitionem et nuncupationem a physicis accepit. In se enim considerata substantia est incorporea, intellectiva, illuminationum quae a primo sunt ultimae relationes perceptiva, ut Aristoteles in Metaphysica capitulo quod inscribitur; a qua diffinitione nec Ariopagita in Ierarchia sua dissentit. Relata vero anima perfectio est corporis physici organici. With an eye to what may follow in St. Albert's exposition on this matter we make special reference to the notion of a dual definition contained in this passage just cited. An earlier and less complete edition of the De Motu Cordis is that known as: Incipit e libro Magistri Alfredi Anglici ad Magistrum Alexandrum Neckam De Motu Cordis, ed. Barach, II, Innsbruck, 1878. For this particular section cf. ibid., p. 33.

(13) If this definition is in Seneca I have missed it, as has A. Sarmiento, op. cit., p. 300, note 5. Indications of similarity however can be found in Seneca, Epist., xcii, 1ff; ed. R. M. Gummere, vol. 2, (The Loeb Classical Library)

London, 1940, p. 440; and Opera, Merilli, ed. cit., vol. 3, p. 115: Solamente anima sensitiva est et in omnibus partem ipse res suas ducit bestiaque ac nascuntur vitae sibi causa est.

(14) M. Aurelii Cassiodori, De Anima, cap. 2, M. P. L., vol. 70, col. 1281: Anima autem hominis, ut veracium doctorum concentit auctoritas est a Deo creata, spiritalis proprietas substantia, sui corporis vivificatrix, rationabilis quidem et immortalis, sui in tenue mutuque convertibilis.

(15) This again is traceable to the De quantitate animae C. 13, n. 40, cap. 13, col. 700 exactly as St. Albert quotes it. Alcher of Clairvaux probably received this by way of Alcuin, Liber de Animae Ratione ad Eulalium Virginem, cap. 8, P. L. vol. 101, col. 640-641:

(16) Sum. de Creat. 11, q.2, a 3, sed contra 4, vol. 35, p. 12: Item, Avicenna: etc. This argument finds its place in Avicenna after the demonstration of the Flying Man showing that the soul is spiritual which is in Lib. vi Natur. part 1, cap. 3, f. 5r, col. 2; a more completely developed Flying Man argument is to be found in ibid., f. 9, cap. 7, f. 27r, col. 3-4, 27v, col. 1. St. Albert has reference to Avicenna, ibid., f. 1, cap. 3, f. 3va: Anima enim sine dubio est causa qua vegetabile et animale sunt illius complexionis quam habent; anima etenim est principium generationis et vegetationis sicut dicimus esse propriam subjectum animae impossibile est esse id in effectu nisi per animam, et anima est causa, unde est sic. Et impossibile est dici quod subjectum proprium habet esse in materia sua, et quod hoc fiat causa alterius rei quae non est anima. Sed potest advenisse anima, sicut pars aliqua quae non habet partem partes in sua diffinitione nec in sua destructione vel sua ordine, sicut dispositio complexionis quarum esse complexionis esse subiecti sui complexionem necessaria et non sunt constitutio subiecti in effectu. Further light is thrown on this text by reading Avicenna, ibid., f. 6r, col. 2: Anima ergo perfectio est substantia; quae est constitutum ab ea; est etiam constitutum species et perfectione ens. Nec enim habentes animas diversas fiunt propter ea diversarum specierum; et sic causa alterius speciei non singularitatis. Ergo anima non est de accidentibus quibus non specificantur species, nec recipiuntur in constitutione subiecti.

[illegible] est perfectio substantiae, non et accidens, nec
[illegible] ex hoc et sit separata, aut non separata.

(17) Sum. de Creat., II, 1, 2, ad sentc. 1. There is a
question as to whom Albert has in mind in quoting Collectanea. Jansen, (op. cit., reference--and IV, part 2,
Tractat 1. No. 1905, p. 14, note 2) feels that Collectanea,
alias Toletana, Arabicum, Arabicum is John of Spain,
a Toledo translator in the middle of the twelfth century
and a colleague of Gundissalinus who was also a translator
and compiler. In Sent. Sum. Th., p. 27, note 1, follows
the opinion of Jansen. However, there is nothing to
prevent the Collectanea of St. Albert from being Gundissalinus, De unitate, cap. II, Vatican Latin, 2186; f. 1[illegible]
"Ubi quidquid est, aut est substantia aut est accidens. Sed
unitas non est accidens. Nihil enim quod adveniens constituit
et receptum destruit praeiacens sui, sed unitas adveniens
constituit ipsum et praeiacens destruit; ergo unitas
non est accidens, ergo est [illegible] substantia. The
reference behind this argument may be found in Avicenna,
Lib. VI Met. Tr. I, Cap. 1, f. 2[illegible] cols. b. For the connection
of Gundissalinus and his relation to Avicenna, cf. Maurice
Alonso, Les Sources Arabo-Arabes de l'Ontologisme Avicennisant
de Gundissalvi, in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du
Moyen Age; IV, 1929, Paris, Vrin, pp. 75-92.

It is advantageous to point out here that St. Albert
finds Costa-ben-Luca doubly useful in bewing his position:
(1) With Costa-ben-Luca (St. Albert calls him Constabulinus)
St. Albert holds that Mutuorum oppositum and yet
continues to be one in number is a substance. The rational
soul receives virtues and vices and yet it is one in number.
Hence the soul is a substance; (2) and not parting company, St.
Albert adds that whatever moves a substance in reference to
different places is itself a substance. Since the soul
is one such, it is a substance. The first St. Albert accepts
wholly; of the second he says, quod est et semibilis,
cf. Sum. de Creat., op. cit., ad sentc. 1 and 2. He cite
these arguments to show that St. Albert read them in
Costa-ben-Luca and that he could have read the first in
Gundissalinus but not the second; further, to show that
St. Albert could not have read his argument from "Collectanea"
in Costa-ben-Luca, but from the order of arguments and
identities of persons the source is Gundissalinus who

borrows practically everything which concerns the definition of the soul by Plato and Aristotle in his De Anima from the De Differentia Animae et Spiritus of Costa-ben-Luca, translated from the Arabic by John of Spain, cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 53, note 1. We simply offer the two texts and underline the copied elements. Notice that both Costa-ben-Luca and Gundissalinus use the arguments St. Albert borrows from them to explain the definition of the soul secundum Platonis. First to the text of Costa-ben-Luca: Dum enim exponemus hanc definitionem et incipiemus a prima, quae est Platonis, et ostendemus, quod anima sit substantia, et dicemus: quicquid recipit opposita, cum sit unum et immutabile in sua essentia, est substantia. Sed anima recipit opposita, cum sit una numero et immutabilis in sua essentia, et ista est substantia. Item dicemus: quicquid novet substantiam, est substantia; sed anima novet corpus, corpus autem substantia est, anima ergo substantia est, cf. Costa-ben-Luca, De Differentia Animae et Spiritus Liber ex Arabico in Latinum translatus a Johanne Hispalensi, op. cit., ed. C. S. Barach, Innsbruck, 1878, p. 141. For the text of Gundissalinus, cf. Gundissalinus, op. cit., f. 105 r: Plato animam sic diffinit dicens: Anima est substantia incorporea corpus movens. Sed autem anima sit substantia sic probatur. Quicquid recipit contraria, cum sit unum et idem numero, substantia est. Sed anima manens una et eadem numero, recipit contraria quae sunt virtutes et vitia, et gaudium et tristitia, et scientia et ignorantia. Ergo anima substantia est. (A comparison of the three authors' texts shows St. Albert used Costa-ben-Luca, not Gundissalinus for this first argument.)

Item quicquid est, aut est substantia, aut est accidens. Sed anima non est accidens. Ergo anima quod movet[ur] constituit et regulans destruit accidens ergo sua anima advenienti constituit animal et regulans destruit, ergo anima non est accidens, ergo est (Liber L.) substantia.

(18) cf. preceding note.

(19) Op. de Creat., q. 3, introd., vol. 35, p. 20. This definition is not as such in Plato, although it is of a n secured Platonic twist. St. Albert borrowed it from Costa-ben-Luca, Liber de Differentia Animae et Spiritus, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 101: Dicunt ilegae quod Plato animam sic definit: Anima, inquit, est substantia

incorporea movens corpus. This definition re-appears in the De anima of Aquinas. cf. note 17. In fine the ultimate source of this definition we wish to set forth the following selections of Plato's thought as verification of the Platonic character of the definition as well as elemental sources of the definition:

(a) Laws, Bk. X, 896a, Eng. transl. by R. G. Bury (The Loeb Classical Library Series) vol. 2, Putnam's Sons, New York, 1926, p.337. "Let is the definition of that object which has for its name 'soul'? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?—self-movement is the definition—which has 'soul' as the name we universally apply to it?—That is what I assert."

(b) Phaedrus 245c, in The Dialogues of Plato, Eng. transl. Jowett, New York, Macmillan and Co. 1892, vol. 1, p. 401: The soul through all her being is immortal, but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move, ceases also to live.

(c) Laws X, 896c, op. cit., p.339: Then we are right when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler.

(d) Timaeus 36e; Eng. transl. by R. G. Bury, (The Loeb Classical Library) Putnam's Sons, New York, 1929, p. 65: Now as regards the soul, although we are enjoying to describe it after the body, God did not likewise plan it to be younger than the body; for, when uniting them, He would not have permitted the elder to be ruled by the younger.....

(e) Timaeus 69c, op. cit., p. 173: And they (God's own engendered sons), imitating Him, on receiving the immortal principle of soul, framed around it a mortal body, and gave it all the body to be its vehicle.....

(17) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 5, ad, vol. p. 88b: (ad6c) movet autem corpus ipse existens immobilis per se, per accidens autem mota mota corporis: quia, sicut dicit Philosophus, moventibus nobis moventur ea quae in nobis sunt. Et tamen dicit Augustinus, quod anima est in corpore sicut Deus est in mundo: quia sicut Deus in mundo existens omnem movet ita quod non movetur per se vel per accidens, ita anima movet corpus immobilis manens per se, mota tamen per accidens; quia sicut in omnibus deficit a Deo, ita virtus ejus motiva

defiait a virtute divina nativa. The text of Aristotle to which St. Albert refers is discoverable in De Anima, I, 4, 408b20-24, op. cit., p. 41: At per omnidiam potest movere, quemadmodum dictum est, ipse se ipsum movere—(quatenus vivificat seipsum). In qua (anima) est, potest movari et movari quidem ab anima? Alio tamen modo fluxi negatur, ut anima secundum locum movetur. Here Albert mentions Augustine here he has in mind St. Augustine's De Genesi ad Litteram, VIII, cap. 24; M. P. L. Vol. 34, col. 381-382.

(31) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 14, q. 69, m. 2, a. 1, solutio, vol. 33, p. 138. The above sentence comprises the entire solutio.

(32) op. cit., p. 114. For Avicenna cf. op. cit., l. 1, cap. 5, f. 4v col. 2a.

(33) cf. p. 1, n. 8.

(34) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 4, a. 1, p. 32. The complimentary section in the Summa Theologiae contains an interpretation of each element in one article, cf. Sum. Theol. II tr. 14, q. 79, m. 2, a. 2, vol. 33, p. 136-138.

(35) Sum. de Creat., op. cit., in obj., p. 32; cf. note 31 above.

(36) 1140: In obj., p. 32. Practically the same objection is advanced in Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 63, m. 2, a. 2, obj. 1, vol. 33, p. 13a where St. Albert quotes Gregory of Nyssa's De Homine. The author to whom St. Albert refers as Gregory, and against whom he later defends the definition of Aristotle is in reality, Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, who flourished towards the end of the fourth or the beginning of the fifth century. cf. Sahagun-Lopez, Grundriss--op. cit., p. 138-141. About the work of Gregory of Nyssa is found a De anima, cf. P. L. Vol. 45, col. 107-[illegible]. This is within other than the second chapter of the De Natura Hominis of Nemesius. At the time of St. Albert, the Middle Ages had the De Natura Hominis in two Latin translations. The first was done by Alfanus, archbishop of Salerno (1058-1085), in the eleventh century. The second came from the pen of Burgundio of Pisa (d. 1194) about 1150. The question as to which of the two translations St. Albert used is determined by Leopold Taul, op. cit., Beiträge, Band XII,

Left 1, Chapter 1, v. 1313, p. 70, note 1. Gaul employs a comparative table of the three sets of texts and concludes that St. Albert used the translation of Burgundius. The translation of Alfanus is to be found in Gemili Episcopi Premian Physicum R. Alfani Archiepiscopi Salerni in Latinum Translatum, edit. L. Burchard, Venice, Colpelli, 1537. For the translation of Burgundius, cf. Gregorii Syncelli (Gemili) Ecloge ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ Liber a Burgundione in Latinum Translatus, ed. A. L. Burchard, Vienna, 1907. In this latter translation of the De Natura Hominis of Nemesius there are three objections which St. Albert attributes to Gregory as directed against the Aristotelian definition of the soul:

(1) Dicunt enim illic genitum visus perficit oculum, ita hic genita anima in corpore perficit animae, ut neque sine corpore sit unquam anima neque corpus sine anima. (ed. cit., cap. 2, p. 36.)

(2) Sed potest igitur anima exercere aliquam opera entelechia corporis esse, sed substantia entelechia id est per se perfecta hominem. (ibid., p. 37)

(3) Aristotelem autem animam entelechiam dicens nullo minus consordat cum his, qui qualitatem eam dicunt. ibid., p. 35

(4) Non enim tenetur a corpore, sed ipsa tenet corpus, neque est in corpore ut in vase vel in utre, sed magis corpus est in ipsa. (ibid., cap. 3, p. 42.)

(27) Sum. de Creat., op. cit., obj. 4, p. 35b. This objection refers to the text of Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 412a6-10, ed. cit., p. 77. Dicimus itaque esse quidem quasi aliquid, esse autem, substantiam. Dupliciter autem, aliud quidem dicit materiam, quae secundum se quidem non est hoc aliquid: aliud autem dicit formam et speciem; secundum quam dicitur jam hoc aliquid, et tertium quae ex his. Est autem materia quidem potentia, species autem entelechia. This very Aristotelian division may be used in the same form in the De Natura Hominis of Nemesius, cf. ed. cit., cap. 2, p. 35.

(28) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 4, a 1, ad 6, p. 35a. St. Albert quotes Avicenna directly on these points. At this stage Avicenna is still very much to the fore, cf. Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., f. 1Va: Et quinquamque perfectionis esse essentia separata per se ipsa certe non est forma materiae, nec in materia; forma etenim quae est in materia est forma ingressa in illa et existens propter illam nisi forte consenserint et perfectio speciei vocetur forma speciei.

sed iam consenserunt in hoc: ut hoc res, scilicet, anima comparatione materiae sit forma; comparatione vero totius collectionis sit finis et perfectio; et comparatione movendi sit principium efficiens et via movens; et quadequidem sic est, tunc forma significat comparationem ad praeexistentiam ab essentia substantiae quae habet esse per illam et ad res propter quam substantia habet esse quod ipsa est, et ad res quae propter ipsam est in potentia, et ad res cui res comparantur actiones quae sunt materia. Anima enim forma est ex hoc respectu, scilicet, quod habet esse in materia. Perfectio autem significat comparationem ad res perfectas, ex qua quaedam quia perfectio est respectu specierum. Clarum igitur est quod ens in doctrine de anima dicitur quod ipsa est perfectio, non plus significant intellectum et etiam hoc plus comprehendit omnes species animae unique. For a more complete explanation of form and nature, cf. Chapter III, p. 78 sq.

(29) Sum. de Creat., op. cit., ad. 9, p. 378. The text that St. Albert uses in Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat. f. 1va: Quia si dicamus etiam quod anima est perfectio, hoc multo melius est quam si dicamus animam esse vim aut virtutem aut potentiam. Ea autem quae advenient ei anime, quaedam sunt quaedocum sentire, et apprehendere. Apprehendere autem habet non ex quod habet virtutem quae est principium efficiendi, nec principium recipiendi. Movere autem habet ex hoc quod habet in potentia principium recipiendi sed principium agendi. Nec dicet unus alii magis attribui quam aliud, id est, ut magis sit potentia unius quam alterius. Nam si cum dicitur potentia vel vis, volunt significare utrumque, habebit hoc hoc esse equivocationis nominis. Si autem cum dicitur potentia, voluerint significare unum tantum et non aliud, sciliet hoc quod diximus. Item etiam significantia huius nominis potentia vel vis vel virtus non apprehendit absolute essentiam animae ex hoc quod est anima nisi ex una tantum parte: et non ex alia. The distinction of active and passive potency is ascribed by St. Albert to Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book V. In reality it is in Book VIII, cf. Aristotle, VIII Metaphysica, cap. 1, 1046a13-24, in opera omnia Aristotelis, ed. Bekt, vol. 2, Paris, 1850, (Int. transl. col. 2) p. 1046b.

(30) Ibid.

(31) The above exposition follows the text of St. Albert, Sum.

de Crent., c. 4, a. 2, Sol., p. 90a. The same doctrine though in Latere fashion is found in Sum. Theol. II, tr. 12, c. 69, m. 2, a. 2, ad 6, vol. 33, p. 16b. The De Anima of St. Albert is equally concise and consistent on this distinction, cf. De Anima II, tr. 1, cap. 2, vol. 5, p. 1[illegible]: Hic autem actus dicitur dupliciter.... Alius quidem enim est forma dans esse simpliciter per modum habitus quiescentis in suo subjecto, et ille est sicut scientia quiescens in scientio. Alius autem est sicut operatio essentialis procedens ab hujusmodi actu, sicut actio vitae procedit ab anima: et ille est sicut considerare, quod est actio scientis in actu considerantis. Et manifestum est quod anima est actus primus, sicut scientia est actus scientis. The source of the major portion of the solution is Sum. de Creat., c. 4, a. 2, is Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., tr. I, cap. 1, f. 17 col. 2: Perfectio autem est duplex modis; perfectio prima et perfectio secunda: perfectio autem prima est propter quam species fit species in effectu sicut figura circuli: perfectio autem secunda est aliquid ex eis quae consequuntur speciem rei, aut ex actionibus, aut ex passionibus sicut insidere est circuli; et sicut currere et ambulare et scribere et actus hominis; haec enim sine dubio perfectiones sunt speciei, sed non primae. Non enim si homo et equus sit id quod sit in effectu habet opus habere hoc in effectu. Sed non habuerit principium horum in effectu ita ut haec fiant in potentia, quae ante non erant ei in potentia nisi in remota potentia quae erat ut aliqua alia res procedat cum quousque fiat ipsum ei certissima potentia; tunc animal fiet animal in effectu: ergo anima est perfectio prima....

(22) What Avicenna was driving at, and St. Albert was certainly happy to see it, was that a perfectio must be able to exist apart from matter even though it plays for a time the role of form. Consequently, all substances sending the same perfectio must also be able to exist by themselves. That is a form and nothing else but a form cannot possibly exist apart from the matter of which it is the form. This being so, the definition of the soul as a perfectio leaves room for the establishment of its independent substantiality. But while Avicenna says the designation, perfectio, does not give us knowledge as to whether it is a substance, it does function compatibly with substance whereas form does not. That in reality it is also a substance for Avicenna we see in the arguments textually

quoted above. cf. note 16. cf. Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., f. iv col. 1. Ex hoc autem quod res [illegible] cum perfectione, nondum intelligitur anima an sit substantia; also: ibid: Ideoque dicimus quod omnis forma est perfectio sed non omnis perfectio forma.

(33) Sum. de Creat., II, 1, q. 4, a 1, Celestin, p. [illegible] ...si tamen attendatur id quod est anima, tunc potest considerari duabus modis, scilicet secundum esse quod habet in se, et sic non affinitur in comparatione ad corpus; vel secundum comparationem ad corpus, et sic affinitur. Et hoc pro tanto dicitur si accidens, quia tamen ipsius animae potest considerari et esse sine corpore. Et ideo dicit Avicenna in vi de Naturalibus, quod hic [illegible], non est nomen hujus rei ex ejus essentia, nec ex praedicamento in quo continetur; et cum anima affinitur, sicut affinitur est ab Aristotele, non affirmatur esse ejus nisi secundum quod est principium eorumdi a se affectiones, quae non sunt unius modi et sunt voluntariae: et sic affirmatur esse ejus ex hoc quod habet aliquod accidens: quod tamen accidens valet ad certificandum ejus essentiam et ad cognoscendum quid sit. Et dat Avicenna simile dicens: "Fortassis enim jam dicimus, quod id quod movetur, motorem habet: tamen non scimus propter id essentiam hujus motoris quid sit." Et intendit Avicenna, quod sicut motor duplicitur dicitur, scilicet penes proprietatem hunc quae est movens, vel penes suam essentiam: ita anima duplicitur potest diffiniri, scilicet secundum quod est anima, id est, actus corporis contenti secundum seipsum in praedicamento substantiae. It is helpful and interesting to compare St. Albert's text with that of Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., f. 1, cap. 1, f. 1r, col. 2:...; et hoc nomen (anima) est nomen hujus rei non ex ejus essentia, nec ex praedicamento in quo continetur posita. Hunc autem non affirmamus nisi esse rei quae est principium eius quod [illegible] et affirmamus esse rei ex hoc quod habet aliquod accidens. Oportet autem ut per hoc accidens quod habet, accidamus ad certificandum eius essentiam et ad cognoscendum quid sit. Fortassis enim iam dicimus quod id quod movetur habet motorem; nos tamen propter hoc scimus essentiam hujus motoris quid sit.

(34) Sum. Theol., p. II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, col; vol. 3, p. 15b.

(35) Ibid; p. 15b. It is to be noticed that the manifestum in the above quotation is affirmative whereas in the present text of Aristotle it is a negative. cf. Aristotle De Anima, II, 1, 412a5-9; cf. op. cit. p. 5b: unitur autem immediatum si sit corporis actus anima, sicut nauta navis. Notice also that in the Borgnet edition the word nauta is accidentally replaced by natura. The Jossy edition reads correctly nauta, cf. Op. Cit. vol. 16, p. 240a. Jossy reads manifestum, ibid.

(36) In order to confirm the intuitions of the Neo-Aristotelic tenets in St. Albert's definition of the soul in as we cite the complete text employed in this manner: op. cit.; col: p. 15b-16a. Secundum quod definitio Aristotelis inducta, dicit quid est anima secundum quod anima est forma et species et substantia animati corporis, in qua secundum totam et secundum partes exercetur operationes vitae, et non est data de anima secundum quod est in seipsa: propter quod etiam Philosophus dicit ibidem sic ponit istam definitionem, quod secundum partes secundum quod sunt potae corporis, attamen, ipsae quae non exercent opera vitae, non est separabile; quia si separaretur a corpore et esset in se, secundum illas partes secundum quae est corporis, nullas haberet operationes vitae, et sic non esset anima. Substantiale est enim animae operationes vitae facere. Unde Philosophus ibidem dicit sic: "Quod quidem igitur non sit separabilis anima a corpore: aut et separabilis pars quaedam ipsius cum nata est separari, non immerito sit. Quaedam enim partium ipsius sed, secundum quam nullum non continuum est separari, propter id quod nullius sunt actione actus. Ambiguum manifestum est non si sit separatis actus anima sicut natura nauta navis." Quod tractans Avicenna in VI de Naturalibus, dicit, quod sicut nauta duplicem habet definitionem: unam secundum quam consideratur in seipso, secundum quam dicitur artifex arte regens navis: alium secundum quam operationes nauticae operatur instrumentis navis artemque scilicet malo, velo, remis: ita anima duplicem debet habere definitionem: unam secundum quod operatur opera vitae in corpore et in organis ejus. Et secundum hoc definitur ab Aristotele secundum quod est endelechia sive perfectio corporis physici organici, potentia vitam habentis.... Alia definitio est quae de anima secundum se, et secundum quod separabilis est a corpore, maxime secundum partem quae nullius corporis est

at vero ... persaepe ... nihil prohibet

actus, hoc est, intellectivus, [illegible] quam partem sensitivae operatur in corpore. Per hoc medium stulte in Avicenna, cf. Lib. de Int., 1, 3r col. [illegible] hoc est ut [illegible] aliquid greater aptitudinem [illegible] ex qua consent, sicut sacrificium quod est apta ad hoc ut pervoluant ex de secreto [illegible] ut hoc etiam indigent auctore qui perfiolatur ista aptitudo. Similar enim ut hoc aptitudo non sunt esse in subiecto.

(27) Sum. Theol., II, 12, a. 69, ad 2, 6, 6, ad. 10, vol. 35, p. 175: Sola impossibile est, quod a substantia quae tantum est actus corporis. Illud potentia quae nullius corporis est actus, cum potentia naturalis fluat de essentialibus substantiae illius cujus est potentia.

(28) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 69, a. 2, 6, 2, ad. 10, p. 176b: Those statements from the Summa Theologica, which we have seen are strong, like and unequivocal. They are from exceptionally clear and indisputable texts. Further, there is not one essential element where they differ from the texts we examined in the earlier writings. The words of P. Lottin seem a bit too decisive. Cf. O. Lottin, Psychologie [illegible], (Bulletin de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, Vous théologie, nos 113-[illegible], Centre de Théologie ancienne et Médiévale, Avril-Juillet 1947, Louvain, p. 108): La Somme théologique d'Albert le Grand, oeuvre d'une vieillesse [illegible] n'est pas faite pour révéler à l'historien l'Albert vraiment authentique et dans l'efflorescence de son génie.

(29) Here is the complete text substantiating this eminently direct statement on the soul: Liber II De Anima, tr. 1, cap. 4; vol. 5, p. 198-199: Quaecumque enim forma essentialiter est pars corporis sub esse, nullam vitae actionem agere nisi in parte corporis aliqua, non potest separari secundum esse a corpore... Si autem quidam animae et secundum quaedam partes nihil prohibet separari, praeter hoc quod illae nullius corporis sunt actus, in quo vitae exercent actiones, sicut in organo, sicut manifestum erit in sequentibus de intellectu tam agente quam possibili, et in parte in praedicis habitus est. Ipsius autem manifestatio est non solum de ipsa parte intellective, quod separatur, sed de ipsa ani a tota intellective, quod separatur est manifestum: cujus causa necessaria est, quia cum partes animae sint naturales potentiae ejus, ab ipsa fluentes, impossibile est quod ab essentia conjuncta cum corpore fluat

potestas separata. Sed e converso possibile est quod ab eo quo essentialiter est separatum, fluant potentiae operantes in corpore; quia omnis potestas superior potest quicquid potest virtus inferior et non convertitur: cujus probatio est, quod a primo simplici qui maxime substantia separata est inter essentias omnes, fluit virtus motiva primi mobilis, quae nullo modo explet operationem suam sine corpore, eo quod nihil est localiter mobile nisi corpus.... Patet igitur quod ab eo cujus essentia separata est, fluant potentiae operantes in corpore. Sed ab eo quod essentialiter admixtum corpori, et est virtus in corpore existens, nulla fluit potentia quae sit separata: sola potentia naturalis et quaestio sequitur essentiam: et fluit ipsa potentia extra corpori, magis erit virtus quam ipsa essentia a qua fluit. Alius autem naturalis potentia est proprietas essentiae. Sed autem subjectum principium passionis et est in diffinitione ejus. Qualiter igitur posset esse, quod essentia conjuncta corpori, conservet potentiam naturalem separatam? In hic igitur patet, quod si intellectus est potentia separata, tunc oportet quod natura et essentia intellectivae animae sit separata: et cum hoc habebit plurimas potentias corpori conjunctas. Amplius autem manifestatur hoc si dicatur anima intellectiva sive rationalis movere corpus et esse actum ejus, sicut nauta est actus et motor navis.... Et similiter si anima sic movet corpus totum intellectu gubernante aut imperante, ipsa separatur tota essentialiter a corpore, licet habeat multas vires et operationes sensus et vegetationis, quae non explentur sine instrumentis corporeis.

(40) cap. de Grent., II, q. 4, a. 4, ad. 1, vol. 35, p. 46ab: Et quod Aristoteles dicit, potentia vitam habentis, ly potentia non dicit nisi respectum materiae ad actum animae qui est vivere.... Potentia enim vitam habere pertinet in diffinitionem et differentiam quorumdam physicorum corporum, quae non habent potentiam vivendi, sicut mineralia et lapides. This is in answer to an objection expressed by Averroes on this phrase of Aristotle (Averroes for St. Albert) thus: the soul is the act of a body existing in potency to a soul. cf. Averroes of Cyrus (Averroes), In Libros Aristotelis, de Anim., cap. 4, p. 4b: Animae sit (Aristoteles) corpus potentiae vitam habere et antequam generata sit anima. Dicit enim corpus potentiae vitam habere in se ipsa. Oportet autem corpus, quod potentiae vitam habet,

prius actu esse corpus. Non potest autem actu esse corpus, antequam suscipiat speciem. Ipse enim est sine qualitate et non corpus. Impossibile ergo est quod non est actu potestatem habere ad hoc, ut fiat quid ex eo. Si autem et corpus potestate est, qualiter quod potestate est corpus potestate vitam habere in se ipso potest? This is the text which St. Albert reproduces, except for a few minor variations, in the objection he cites.

(41) op. cit., ed 3; p. 40b: ad aliud dicendum, quod vita est animae sicut potentiae activae, et corporis sicut passivae.

(42) op. cit., a. 5, Solutio and ad 1; p. 53a: Dicendum secundum Avicennam, quod anima est perfectio primi corporis naturalis instrumentalis habentis opera vitae. Et secundum hanc diffinitionem organicum est pars diffinitionis, et instrumentale et organicum sunt ipsa per anima.—Iterum ly potentia vitam habens aliter respectum materiae ad formam sive corporis ad animam dicit; ly organicum enim dicit respectum ad potentias animae, quae operantur in organis: sed ly potentia vitam habens dicit respectum corporis ad ipsam animam: quia vita est actus animae secundum se.... For evidence cf. Lib. vi Int., ed. cit., IV col. 3.

(43) Sum. Theol., tr. II, q. 69, m. 4, a. 2, obj. 2; vol. 38, p. 136-16a. This unhappy dilemma is to be found in Dionisius, op. cit., p. 88: Aut igitur mortalem esse dicet ut Aristotelis, qui dicit in corpore esse genitum esse.... qui dicens esse substantiam esse incorpoream nequit dicere in corpore oriri, ut non mortalis animae intelligentiam nobis repraesentet et omnino irrationabiles.

(44) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 10, q. 69, m. 3, a. 2, ad 1, p. 16a: Ale ita praesentia, dicendum est ad primum, quod Gregorius loquitur, si anima in se considerata quasi substantia separata. Sic autem non est forma: non enim est substantia nisi per subsistentiam quam habet supra per opera vitae. In se autem spiritus est incorporeus, semper, vivens, ut dicit Plato.

(45) Sum. Theol., loc. cit., ad 2, p. 16b:

(46) Sum. de Creat., II, tr. 1, q. 4, a. 7, vol. 35, p. 57a. The closest verbal model of this definition in Aristotle is in II De Anima, 2, 413b9: Est autem anima viventis

corporis causa et principium.

(47) Sum. Theol., II, Tr. 12, q. 70, m. 2, a. 2, vol. 33, p. 184. In this same place St. Albert gives two more statements of the definition in question: (a) unum est principium et causa operis vitae et per se accidentium in toti corpore, and (b) principium et causa per se operis vitae et accidentium in aliquo organico corpore in toto et in partibus, cf. p. 186. Although seemingly different, the correct verification Aristotle yields is to be found in De Anima II, 2, 413b11: Nunc autem intentum dictum sit solum, quod est anima horum quae dicta sunt, principium; et his determinata est, vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo, et motu; and Ibid., 414a14: Anima autem hoc quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo. Two facts are to be noted at this stage of the discussion.
(1) St. Albert mentions the body in each of his definitions. Aristotle has no mention of the body in these last two definitions cited.
(2) St. Albert cites, without enumerating, the "works of life". Aristotle, in each of these stated definitions, enumerates the faculties and the modes of living of which the soul is a principle. In comparison with Aristotle's mention of intellect St. Albert's disregard of it is thrown into high relief.

(48) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 4, a. 7, p. 53b. St. Albert adopts this distinction from Aristotle, cf. II Physicorum 198a 24-29.

(49) Op. cit., sol., p. 58b: Secundum, quod in omni natura tres causae coincidunt in unum, sicut dicit Aristoteles in II Physicorum, efficiens, finalis et forma. Hoc autem hic incidere in unum, non quod modus causalitatis sit unus, sed quia una res quae est forma, diversis rationibus et considerationibus sit forma efficiens et finalis: efficiens autem non est forma [formam]: quia sic efficeret seipsum, sed est efficiens esse compositi et compositionem consequentes esse: sed esse compositi efficit per seipsam formam.

(50) In I Sententiarum, Dist. XIII, a. 11, sol. 2, vol. [illegible], p. [illegible]: [illegible] forma substantialis uniuscuiusque cuius actus est rem in se terminare et separare ab aliis in quibus non est eadem forma numero per actum: ergo formae illius, scilicet actus qui est in se terminare et ab aliis dividere, facit

ipsam non esse unam, et est unitas ejus:

(51) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 4, a. 7, sol., vol. 35, p. 80b-
[illegible]: compositiones esse consequentes (esse) efficit
per potentiam et virtutem suam.

(52) op. cit., p. 90a. cf. Liber II De Anima, tr. 2, cap. 2,
vol. 5, p. 216-217 for a corresponding and expansive text on
this point. St. Albert's treatment brings to mind a
similar distinction in Avicenna. Cf. Avicenna, op. cit.,
f. va:

(53) op. cit., obj: 1 and 2, p. 97a.

(54) op. cit., ad 1 et 2, p. 98b:—primum et principium sunt
idem: et propter hoc principium non supponit hic causam,
sed conditionem causae quae omnibus est principium esse
et propium proximum sive immediatum, causa vero supponit
efficientem, efficiens vero secundum rationem suae causalitatis
solum sic causa est et non est causatum.

(55) Liber II De Anima, tr. 1, cap. 5, vol. 5, p. 201b: ex hoc non
potest fieri nisi tali diffinitione animae inventa, quae
dicat causam quare anima sit actus corporis: hoc autem
erit si accepérimus secundum, quamlibet partem animae,
quod ipsa est principium et causa hujus vitae quae exercetur
in corpore physico: tunc enim habebitur propositum.

(56) Sum. theol. II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 6, a. 9, vol. 3b, p. 18-19.
The celebrated text of this last discussion is as
follows: Et dicit quod istae definitiones non dicunt nisi
quid est anima, et non dicunt propter quid talis est sub-
stantia et species, et idee imperfecte sunt: quia per eas
non contingit cognoscere causas propriarum per se et
operationum quae per se conveniunt animae. Et de talibus
definitionibus generaliter dicit in primo de anima, quod
facile manifestum est de eis, quod dialecticae sunt et
vanae omnes: quia per eas non cognoscitur perfecte quid
est anima: nec per eas non manifestantur per se accidentia
quae animae partes conferunt ad cognoscendum quid quid est.
Dicit enim, quod sunt definitiones in accidentibus, et non
ut principium et causae, quae sunt medium in demonstrationibus.
....Ita est de anima: si enim dicam quod anima est actus
physici corporis potentia vitam habentis, dici quid est anima
et quod est talis substantia talis corporis et species et

ratio. Si autem dicere, quod anima est principium et causa operum vitae et per se accidentium in tali corpore, dici causam propter quam anima est species et ratio et actus talis corporis quod habet potentiam vitae secundum se et secundum partes: et tunc syllogizo primam definitionem ex secunda sic:

(57) Aristotle, De anima II, 2, 414a19; [illegible] certis quidem, sed tamen manifestioribus, certum fit id quod est secundum rationem entis tentandum est itaque sic aggredi de ipso.

Nam enim solum quod sit, oportet definitivam rationem ostendere, sicut plures terminorum dicunt, sed et causam inesse, et apparere.

(58) St. Albert, Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3, p. 18b. [illegible] Aristotle, cf. II De anima, 2, 414a19-30, op. cit., p. 25.

(59) St. Albert, op. cit., p. 18ab. The text is quoted in note [illegible]. For Aristotle on this point, cf. De anima I, 1, 402b4-9., op. cit., p. 3: [illegible] principium est, quod quid est. Quare secundum [illegible] definitiones non contingit accidentia cognoscere, sed neque conjecturari de ipsis facile, manifestum est quos dialectice dictae sunt et vanae omnes.

(60) cf. notes 49, 51, and 54.

(61) Liber II De anima tr. 1, cap. 3, vol. 3, p. 201b: et sic concludemus superius inductam diffinitionem per eam quae dicit causam ejus, sicut dicimus in exemplo geometrico jam inducto. Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3, p. 18b: dicit enim, quod sunt definitiones et conclusiones, et non ut principia et causae, quae sunt ratio in demonstrationes. Ibid., p. 19b: Si autem dicere, quod anima est principium et causa operum vitae per se accidentium in tali corpore, dici causam propter quam anima est species et ratio et actus talis corporis quod habet potentiam vitae secundum se et secundum partes.

(62) cf. note 47.

(63) Sum. Theol., tr. 12, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3, vol. 33, p. 19b: [illegible] rationalis secundum quosdam partes suas nec principium, nec causa est corpori operum vitae et accidentium

per se sicut secundum intellectum agentem et adeptum. Ergo secundum illos nec est actus, nec ratio, nec species alicujus corporis, sed separata et separabilis ab ipso.

(64) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 2, a. 4, vol. 35, p. 195b.

(65) cf. (1) In I Sent., dist. XIII, 1, a. 3, 1, vol. [illegible], p. 96a: Et forte dicatur, quod anima rationalis per accidens est in corpore, scilicet, et in ipso recipiat potentiam et virtutes. Hoc nihil est: quia accidens non est forma substantialis compositi: anima autem rationalis forma substantialis est hominis, cujus pars potentialis est corpus. (2) op. cit., dist. VIII, 1., art. 26, p. 259b: —ipse dicimus quod anima est forma substantialis talis corporis, scilicet physici potentia vitam habentis; (3) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 2, q. 9, sol., vol. 32, p. 140b: Per hoc patet, quod ipsa (anima) est actus corporis organici physici potentiam vitam habentis. Et hoc non est per potentiam tantum, ut quidam dixerunt, sed per essentiam suam, sic enim nisi essentialis forma esset hominis, homo non esset homo:

(66) Sum. de Creat., I, tr. 4, q. 30, a. 2, vol. 34, p. 300b-301b.

(67) op. cit., solutio, p. 301b: Et praeterea, substantialis differentia animae (ab angelis) est, quod ipsa est unibilis corpori, non ut forma tantum habens esse in materia, sed ut forma et substantia navem et regens corpus et navem navem.

(68) op. cit., II, q. 4, a. 1, sol., vol. 35, p. 34a: Solutio: Dicendum quod supra determinatum est de angelis (cf. note 67), quod substantialis differentia animae et angeli est in hoc quod anima inclinatur ad corpus ut actus, angelus autem non. Et ideo substantiale dici in anima esse, quod sit actus corporis. cf. Inl2Sent., p. 1, 1, a. 13, ad 5, vol. 27, p. 97b: ad aliud dicendum, quod unio [illegible] super naturam animae: quia ipsa naturaliter dependet ad corpus....

(69) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 5, q. 9, sol., vol. [illegible], p. 140a: Solutio. Dicendum, quod anima rationalis et angelus, et specie, et genere differunt. Nec enim animalia [illegible] intellectualia corporalia: et sic differt genere. Angelus autem spiritus, et ne delectabilis

carnis non respiciens.

Differunt etiam specie: anima enim rationalis secundum corpus et secundum totum affectum mutabilis corpori.

(70) Gen. Manl., II, 19. 5, c. 9, col., vol. 34, p. 1416b: Et si objicitur, quod secundum hoc anima separata non differt ab angelo.

Dicendum quod falsum est: quia etiam anima separata, propter hoc quod secundum esse mutabile est corpori, affectus et intentiones retinet ad corpus, in tantum quod etiam a contemplatione retrahitur. Dale Augustinus in libro XII super Genesim ad litteram, loquens de anima sancta a mendico corporis, et de statu post mortem sic dicit: "Tunc anima quidem naturalis appetitum in administrando corpus, quo appetitu retrahitur quamvis, ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum coelum, intellectualis utilitas contemplationis, quando non adest corpus, cujus administrationi appetitus ille quiescat." cf. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, Lib. XII, cap. 35, 36, 37, P. L. 34, col. 465. This chapter is titled: Requiratur corporum ad perfectam beatitudinem animae cur sit necessaria. cf. Gilson, Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin, Paris, Vrin, 1931, p. 70 and p. 78, note 2.

(71) Nam enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal est rationale, mortale....De Trinitate, VII, 4, 7; P. L. 42, col. 939. The reason for mortale may be seen here...sicut hanc rationem quidem est, sed inter pecora et angelos; et, quia pecus est animal irrationale atque mortale, quando autem rationale et immortale, ratione hanc secet, inferior angelis, superior pecoribus, habendo cum pecoribus mortalitatem, rationem cum angelis, animal rationale mortale. De Civitate Dei, XX, 10, 3, P. L. 41, col. 667.

(72) De Civitate Dei XIII, 24, 4, P. L. 41, col. 387: quoniam homo non est corpus solum, vel anima sola, sed qui ex anima constat et corpore. cf. De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, 4, 6, P. L. 32, col. 1313.

(73) De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, 27, 52, P. L. 32, col. 1332: Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est, mortale atque terreno utens corpore.

(74) De Genesi ad Litteram, VII, 25, 36, P. L. 34, col. 369:

ad illud dicendum est, quod ex corpus administrandum voluntate propria fuerit inclinata,...

(75) De Genesi ad litteram, vi, 9, 6, [illegible] 34, col. 340-341 and op. cit., vii, 24, 35, [illegible] 34, col. 358. For the explanation of St. Augustine's reconciliation of the creation of the soul and the body and interpretation of Genesis on this point cf. Etienne Gilson, Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Augustin, [illegible] de philosophie medievale, xi, Paris, Vrin, 1931, p. 56-[illegible].

(76) De Gen. ad litt., vii, 25, 36, [illegible] 34, col. 359: Illa culpae inclinatio voluntatis ad corpus, nemini est actio vel punitiva vel imputativa de qua public reddenda est in judicio Dei. Op. cit., sup. 27, nn. 38, col. 369: Sed ut ad hoc sit anima, ut rectator in corpus, quaeri potest utrum, si noluerit, compellatur. Sed melius creditur hoc naturaliter fieri, id est, in ea natura creari ut velit, sicut naturale notis est velle vivere. cf. Etienne Gilson, op. cit., p. 64-65 and p. 76.

(77) cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 55-59.

(78) cf. note 30.

(79) cf. note 38.

(80) St. Thomas, I Summa Theologica, q. 76, a. 1, c. St. Thomas wrote this after the De Anima of St. Albert and before the Summa Theologica of St. Albert. It is extremely significant that St. Thomas did not alter this doctrine (which was constant with him) because of St. Albert's De Anima nor did St. Albert change his views because of St. Thomas' Summa Theologica. We might even suggest that St. Albert remained consistent on this point because of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas. St. Thomas composed the first part of his Summa Theologica from 1267-1268. cf. Mandonnet and Destrez, Bibliographie Thomiste, (Bibliotheque Thomiste, 1) 1921, Paris, p. xv.

(81) St. Thomas, op. cit., ad 4:

(82) St. Thomas, Commentaria in Aristotelis libros De Anima, ii, n. 10, 380-385, ed. Pirotta, Marietti, 1959, p. 91: Intellectus vel anima, quod hoc exemplum quod hic intuetur,

[illegible]

(03) St. Thomas, In II Sent., D. 19, Q. 1, a. 2, ad 4: "Ad quartum dicendum, quod anima rationalis praeter alias formas dicitur esse substantia, et hoc aliquid, secundum quod habet esse absolutum, et quod distinguitur; quia anima potest duplicitor considerari, scilicet secundum quod est substantia, et secundum quod est forma, nec est intelligendum quantum ad diversas quas in ipsa sunt, quasi aliud sit essentia sua et aliud ipsum esse formam ut sic esse formae accidat sibi sicut color corpori: sed distinctio assignatur secundum alias diversas considerationes; non enim ex hoc quod est forma habet quod post corpus remaneat, sed ex hoc quod habet esse absolutum, et substantia subsistens: sicut etiam homo non habet quod intelligat ex hoc quod est animal, sed ex hoc quod est rationalis, quamvis alterum sit sibi essentialis." The Commentary on the Sentences dates from 1254-1256. cf. Manchmont and Centrum op. cit., p. xv. This was written some [illegible] years after the text in St. Albert's Summa de Creaturis (cf. note 22) and before his De anima text (cf. note 30).

(04) cf. Etienne Gilson, Saint Bonaventure: Le Sens d'Augustinisme Aristotélicien, in Archives d'Hist. Doctr. et Litt. du Moyen Age, viii/ 1933, p. 49. I am in complete agreement with A. C. Davis, (op. cit., p. 100) regarding his conclusion [illegible] Aristoto-Augustinian character of St. Albert's thought and on the disparity of St. Albert's doctrine with that of St. Thomas in this problem. In the light of our study of the doctrine of St. Albert and of the sources of that doctrine I feel that Father A. M. Fabian O. F. is much too aggressive in his statement: "Aliud,

si l'on cherche un accord dans les termes eux-mêmes et dans les conclusions litéralement prises, S. Albert se présente plutôt comme un réactionnaire--et peut-être le premier--vis-a-vis de ce qu'on pourrait appeler l'augustinisme-scotisant, cf. [illegible] Pthier O. P., La double définition de l'âme humaine chez saint Albert le Grand, [illegible], Philosophie, Cahier 1, Collège Dominicain, Ottawa, 1958, p. [illegible]. I feel, in effect, that he would not have written this had he attached the problem in the only manner which does no violence to the historical antecedents which shaped St. Albert's thought. In spite of the fact that Fr. Pthier has laid down an historical conclusion it is only after he has discovered any intention of investigating St. Albert's definition in relation to its historical background: Nous ne viserons pas a dénoler les courants doctrinaux qui ont inspiré la noétique Albertinienne ni a construire la genèse de cette pensée si abondante et si richement documentée, cf. op. cit., p. 61.

NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO

(1) Sent. de Creatura, II, q. 55, a. 1, obj. 1, vol. 35, p. 455a. While not strictly the same in terminology this objection sounds one of those Tillion of Auvergne alleges against an agent intellect. It is quite probable St. Albert had William of Auvergne's negation of an agent intellect in mind. Tillion of Auvergne was born at Aurillac, became professor of theology at Paris and was Bishop of Paris in 1228. He died in 1249, cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, Grundriss, (11th ed., Berlin, 1928,) p. 3[illegible]. The text of Tillion is as follows: Si igitur omnes et sensibilia non est necessario sensate sensibilia, quae potentia sunt in organis sensuum, entre in effectum, et en esse in effectu: sed ad hoc sufficiunt sensibilia quae extra sunt; quomodo non sufficient intelligibilia ad imprimendas similitudines suas intelligibiles in intellectum materialem? Et at clarius hoc dicatur: Sicut non est sensus agens, ut ita dicatur, inter sensibilia et sensum, medius, ita non est necesse ut sit intellectus agens inter intelligibilia et intellectum materialem. Et attende diligenter quod comparatio ista convenientissima est. Sensus enim, ad modum intellectus materialis, est potentia habens formas sensibiles sive similitudines earum, quemadmodum intellectus materialis potentia habet ut habens formas intelligibiles sive similitudines. Tillion of Auvergne, De anima, cap. 7, pars 4, opera omnia, in folio, t. 2, Paris, 1674, p. 207, quoted from Tillion, Versuch Saint Thomas a Critique Saint Augustine in (ARCHIVES - - - - - I,) p. 58, note 1. This work was not composed after 1235, cf. Tillion, op. cit., p.62.

(2) Sum. de Creat., ibid, ad 1, p. 455b.

(3) op. cit., ad 2, p. 455b-456a.

(4) op. cit., sed contra 1, p. 454b. The text of Aristotle which St. Albert is quoting is to be found in the De anima III, 5, 430a10-18, ed. cit., p. 239: Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem materia unicuique genari, hoc autem est potentia omnia, illa, alterum autem causa et factivum, quod in faciendo omnia, ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse et in anima hae esse differentias. Et est intellectus hic quidem talis in omnia fieri, ille vero in omnia facere, sicut habitus quidam, et sicut lumen.

(6) cf. Olivon, Les Sources Textes-Arbes de l'Averroïsme Scolastique in (Archives - IV, 1929), p. [illegible]. On this text of Aristotle cf. Ibid., p. 5.

(6) Sum. de Creat., Ibid., sed contra 3, p. 4[illegible]b. If St. Albert had written the phrase in which [illegible] his text he would not have this problem. Hardly, has ever St. Albert possibly have arranged so many divergent "authorities" in such a pseudo-harmony. Averroes presents the correct difficulty since his doctrine was so strikingly different. We propose to take up this problem in a later section of this thesis as a time were suitable to the exposition. cf. Chapter 5, p. 113 sq.

(7) op. cit., sed contra 3, p. 4[illegible]b.

(8) op. cit., Sol., p. 4[illegible]b.

(9) Liber III De Anim., tr. 3, cap. 10, vol. 5, p. 3[illegible]a: In hoc intellectum est, (quod intellectus agens non est pars animae), quia necessum hoc in natura animae non cernit nisi sua principia, agens colligit et potiens: et ex illis sint in omni natura et universali et particulari....et impossibili est ita ad eadem naturam reduci:...: sed differunt in hoc quod eadem forma accidens quod est separata, sit agens: et secundum quod est incorporata, sit patiens. The influence of Aristotle is noticeable in this section; cf. the text of Aristotle quoted in note 4 supra.

(10) op. cit., p. 3[illegible]b: Corporeum enim habent esse in formam, incorporeum autem omnes sunt formae, habent esse in se id quod est universaliter agens, et id quod est possibile: et hoc convenit intelligentiis separatis omnibus:

(11) De Intellectu et Intelligibili, II, 1, cap. 8, vol. 9, p. 3[illegible]-3[illegible]a: In omni enim universo in quo sunt quaedam sicut acta tantum, quaedam autem sicut acta et agentia, [illegible] est esse unus primus quod est agens tantum.... Oportet ergo quod in hoc ordine universi secundum ad quam agens primum quod est primum agens sunt intellectuales (intellectuale, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, ms. 14719 f. 107vb.—intelligibile Bonnet ed.) St. Albert is following an old tradition in writing his De Intellectu et Intelligibili. The object of this series is part of

Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu et Intellecto, ed. Théry in Autour du Décret de 1210: II Alexandre d'Aphrodise, (Bibliothèque Thomiste, VII). Paris, 1926, p. 74-75. Second is that of Alkindi, De Intellectu et Intellecto, ed. Albino Nagy in Die Philosophischen Abhandlungen des Jaqub ben Isaac al-Kindi (Beiträge - - - II, 5) Münster 1897, p.1-11. Next appeared Alfarabi's De Intellectu et Intellecto, ed. Gilson in Les sources Gréco-Arabes de l'augustinisme Avicennant, (Archives - - - IV) Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 115-126. St. Albert's De Intellectu et Intelligibili may be placed from 1257-1262, cf. Mahnert, op. cit., p. 5. For a description of the work and St. Albert's purpose in writing it cf. Hermesdorf, op. cit., p. 42-43.

(12) op. cit., p. 507a: non enim omnium in universitate ordinem reserritur ad primum, sed in quibus ordine non necesse est esse primum in quo est status illius ordinis: et hoc est omnis, quod in libro De anima dicimus in ipsa anima esse duas differentias universaliter agentis quo est omnia facere, et universalitas possibilis quo est omnia fieri:...nec tamen magnet in ipsis animabus esse intellectum agentem universitati esse intellectualiter proportionatum.

(13) op. cit., Either man has non perfecta esset minor mundo. ...: quae tamen inconvenientia nulla sunt omnia qui ponit philosophiam. According to Théry in La Connaissance de Maître Eckhart sur le Livre de la Sagesse, (Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, III), Paris, Vrin, 1928, p. 338, note 5, this doctrine of man as a microcosm seems to have arrived at the thirteenth century by three different sources:
(a) By the Glossa Ordinaria of Walafrid Strabo: homo qui convenientem habet cum omni creatura, P. L. L. 113, col. 1167b and ibid., P. L. 114, col. 47Ac.
(b) Directly through the text of Saint Gregory, Dialogi in Evangel, lib. II, Hom. 39, P. L. 76, col. 1214, no. 4: Sed omnis creaturae nomine significatur homo...omnis autem creatura aliquid habet homo. Habet namque commune esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum animalibus, intelligere cum angelis. Si ergo commune habet aliquid cum omni creatura homo, juxta aliquid omnis creatura est homo. This arises from the text of Saint Mark XVI, 15: Euntes in mundum universum, praedicate evangelium omni creaturae.

(c) It is to be read in the following text of Aristotle, Lib. VIII Naturalis Auscultationis cap. 2, 252b, 14, Aristotelis opera Omnia, Graece et Latine, vol. 2, Paris, Didot, 1860, p. 348b: Non si in parvo mundo fit, ubi in magno.... Saint John Damascene also expresses the notion in De Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 2, cap. 2, c. 4, 54, col. 849c: quo fit ut homo mundus minor appelletur. St. Albert could have come upon this doctrine in any one or in all of these men cited by Dr. Thery; he knew and quotes three of their writings. I think it is also possible that St. Albert read it in Macrobius who lived and wrote at the end of the fourth and the start of the fifth century. For the text of Macrobius, cf. Commentarium in somnium Scipionis, lib.II, sect. 12, no. 11, in Macrobius, ed. Eyssenhardt, Leipzig, Teubner, 1893, p. 608, l. 22-23: Idem igitur mundus magnus hominem et hominem brevem mundum esse dicunt per similitudines igitur octonarum proportionum quibus deum animi videtur initiari.... This text is discussed by Dr. E. H. Scholler, Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des Christlichen Mittelalters, (Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittel. Band XIII, Heft 1) Münster 1916, p. 44-48. That the notion is not original with Macrobius, Scholler shows by references to Aristotle, Plato, Philo, Plotinus, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Zeno. While we do say that St. Albert did not get this phrase from any one of the above (except perhaps the last four mentioned) so can any that he certainly seems to have Aristotle as his source. In his commentary on the very book where Aristotle states it is his Physics, St. Albert sets it forth. cf. St. Albert, Liber VIII Physicorum, tr. 1, cap. 9, vol. 3, p. 348b: Animal et praesertim homo dicitur mundus parvus: quia in se est omne primum, quod intellectum,...et hoc quod in parvo mundo fit, videtur etiam in magno deinde fieri:...Haec autem expositio quae continetur hic, ideo fideliter a nobis ponitur, ut quilibet noscat ad quid inducuntur verba Aristotelis, et quid et quantum concludere possunt.

(14) De Intellectu et Intelligibili, II, 1, cap. 2, vol. 9, p. 507ab:

(15) Lib. I de Caelo et Mundo Universitatis, tr. 1, cap. 2, vol. 10, p. 570b: Primum etiam solum necesse est esse genus et ordinem.... Verba nota dicitur necessaria re, quod sic necessarium est esse, quod in nulla parte

sui est possibile et contingens...: hoc autem solum est quod ad nihil extra se vel intra se habet dependentiam secundum esse. This work was written about 1270, cf. Dehnert, op. cit., p. 6. In composing it St. Albert followed a Latin translation of an Arabian work done by Gerard of Cremona between 1167-1187 at Toledo. cf. Liber de Causis, ed. Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882, p. 145-146. St. Albert ascribes it to a certain Jew by name David, (op. cit., II, 1, 1, p. 455b). The identity of this David has not been established. Bardenhewer rejects St. Albert's ascription to David as well as the late Arabian influences which St. Albert ascribes to the work, (ibid.). The Elements of Theology of Proclus (411-485) is the main source of the work says Bardenhewer, and he adds that a certain answer on the authorship is so far not possible. cf. op. cit., ed. Bardenhewer, p. 80.

(16) Sum. Theol., tr. 1, q.1, m.1, sol. vol. 32, p. 6b; cf. Lib. De Causis et Proc. Univer. tr. 1, cap. 9, p. 370b-371a.

(17) There is no doubt that this phrase means God for St. Albert at least in this present discussion; cf. Sum. Theol., I, 10, 84, vol. 31, p. 365b; op. cit., II, 1, q.1, ad obj. 2, vol. 32, p. 7b; Lib. XI Meth. tr. 4, cap. 7, vol. 4, p.[illegible].

(18) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 1, q. 2, sol. vol. 32, p. 10a.

(19) Lib. De Causis et Proc. Univer., tr. 4, cap. 5, p. [illegible]: Supponimus ergo quod intellectus universaliter agens non agit et constituit res nisi active intelligendo, et intelligentiae entitatem: et dum hoc modo intelligit, seipsum constituit, ad quem lumen sui intellectus terminatur. Sum ergo primus intellectus agens hoc modo intelligit se, lumen intelligentiae quod est ab ipso, prima forma est et prima substantia intellectum formam intelligentiae in esse.

(20) op. cit., p. [illegible]: Praeterea in ipso quod ab alio est, triplicem habet separationem, scilicet ad primum intellectum a quo est, et ad seipsum secundum id quod est et ad hoc quod in potentia est secundum hoc quod ex nihilo est: antequam enim esset, in potentia erat: quid enim quod ab alio est, factum est, et in potentia

[illegible] fiunt. Intelligentia enim prima non habet nexum cum aliquo secundum quod se intelligit a primo Intellectu omni. Secundum autem quod intelligit seipsum secundum id quod est, necessitatem habet ex hoc primo, qua intelligit se a primo Intellectu omni; et sic habet ex quod inferior constituitur sub ipso. Et hoc est secundum substantiam quae vel anima dicitur, vel si quod in caelis est hoc animal. Secundum autem quod intelligit se ex nihilo esse et in potentia fuisse, necessitatem est quod habeat quidam substantiam, quae hyleritia est; et hoc est materia subiecta formae, quae est materia corporis caelestis, quae vocatur mobile primum.

(21) Op. cit., p. 422a: Cum autem Primum Intellectum primi principii fluat in primam intelligentiam et emanavit quia constat quod ex emanatio luminis ipsum inferior ad primum; et dum sic intelligit se, per modum motionis constituit intelligentiam secundi caelidi. Hoc autem intelligit se secundum id quod est, et sic necessitatem habet ex primo principium. Intelligit etiam se secundum quod in potentia et sic constituit mobile secundum quod est secundum caelum. Intelligere enim se ratione intellectus, est Primum Intellectuale ratione ut sed constituitur; et sic habetur intelligentia secunda et secundum motor secundum mobile.

(22) Op. cit., p. 422ab: Et hoc modo non est difficile determinare intelligentias et motores et caelos usque ad nonum lunae,... Et decimum sphaera lunae, ita quod semper inferior per emanationem determinatur superioris per triplicem intellectum.... Quod intelligentiae omnes orbis lunae et ipsum orbem lunae—est intelligentia quae illuminat super sphaeram activam et passivam, cujus lunae difficile in actibus et passivis, quae super animae hominum illuminat, et cujus virtus concipitur in coniunctione generatorum et corruptorum. St. Albert's direct implications in proposing this sort of procession of the intelligences and their triple relation are Avicenna and Algazel. While he does not cite them in this text we have had to turn to the Sum. de Creat., II, q. 50, a. 4, obj. 6 and 7, vol. 35, p. 402a and to the Sum. theol., II, tr. 2, q. 10, sol., vol. 34, p. 126, where St. Albert sets forth this doctrine as of Avicenna and Algazel. The only difference is that there are ten intelligences and nine spheres in the Summa Theologiae St. Albert in his

Liber de Causis presentation concludes with eleven Intelligences and ten spheres. For our problem this addition is neither troublesome nor important. For the texts of Avicenna cf. Nicolas, Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin, in (Archives ---- I), 1966, p. 36, n. 2; 37, n. 1, 2; 38, n. 1, 2. cf. Nasr, Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium, (Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum) Roma, 1954, Lib., X, tr. 5, cap. 1, p. 193-196. This is a modern Latin translation from the Arabic; the Compendium was not known to the Middle Ages by translation but it serves us as faithfully reproducing the thought of Avicenna's more lengthy Metaphysics. For texts of Algazel cf. Algazel's Metaphysics, a Medieval Translation, ed. J. T. Muckle C. S. B., in (St. Michael's Mediaeval Studies) pp. Michael's College, Toronto, 1933, p. 120, l. 21; p. 121, l. 20. St. Albert always considered Avicenna and Algazel as 'philosophical twins'. cf. Sum. de Creat., II, q. 58, a. 3, obj. 7, vol. 35, p. 408a; IV Sent. d. 3, a. 3, obj. 1 and 2, vol. 27, p. 64b; Sum. de Creat., ibid., obj. 10, p. 409b; Op. cit., q. 39, a. 1, obj. 4, p. 305b; III De Anima, tr. 3, cap. 9, vol. 5, p. 365b; De Nat. et Orig. Animae, tr. 2, cap. 2, vol. 9, p. 402a. In a well documented article Fr. Salman O. P. seems to the conclusion that there existed in the Middle Ages documents, even Latin manuscripts making known the true nature of Algazel's Magnaid and that these documents were consulted by and known to Cardinal Nicolas, Roger Bacon, Andrew of Pontoise and Raymond Martin. cf. Salman, Algazel et les Latins, (Archives d'Hist. doctr. et litt. du M. A.) 1934, p. 119.

(25) Op. cit., p. 427b: Hoc habetur solum per constantiam, quod inter Intelligentiam et coelum aliquid est, sive est anima, sive ut natura.....

(26) Op. cit., lib. I, tr. IV, cap. 8, p. 451b and 452a., lib. II, tr. 5, p. 619b. As we have seen this philosophical work of St. Albert's written about 1270. However, one of his earlier works, one of a different nature, adopts the same position and feels that to hold the other position would be against the Catholic Faith, cf. In II Sent., d. 3, a. 8, sol., vol. 27, p. 60b. This work was written after the Sum de Creaturis having been composed about 1246, cf. Lottin, Le Traité des Vertus de Saint Thomas d'Albert le Grand, in (Recherches de Théologie

Ancienne et Medievale viii), 1936, p. 150.

(25) Sum. de Creat., I, tr. 3, q. 16, and centra 7, vol. 34, p. 4[illegible]. cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, cap. 6, P. G. 94, col. 886AB.

(26) cf. the texts of Avicenna and Algazel in note 22 supra.

(27) Sum. de Creat., I, tr. 3, q. 16, a. 3, sol. vol. 34, p. 4[illegible]: Sic nec Damascenus ponit non habere animam, nec esse animalia, si anima secundum propriam rationem sumitur. Sed si velimus philosophos et illos rationes eas mentis dicere quod quaedam intelligentiae sunt in ordine consequentes prima in toto orbis, et intelligentiae illae dicuntur animae orbium, et non universae quae intelligibile habuerunt, ex quo non oportet dicuntur in actum per abstractionem a phantasmatibus sed ipsae reverterunt super essentiam suam...complete. cf. Liber de Causis, op. cit., prop. 18, l. 31, p. 175 and 1518., prop. 18, l. 6-7, p. 177. St. Albert referred to this last as in prop. 18.

(28) op. cit., p. 4[illegible]: Si idea illae intelligentiae non haberent nisi duas potentias, scilicet intellectum et appetitum moventem secundum locum: non haberent comparationem ad orbes secundum istam rationem animae quae dicitur quod anima est entelechia corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis: quia ista ratio per prius et posterius convenit intellectui, et sensibili, et vegetabili: intellectus enim nullius corporis est actus: quia non utitur organo corporis, nec in se nec in suis operationibus: aliquin non haberent aliquas operationes extra corpus, et oporteret ipsum destrui destructo corpore sicut destruitur vegetabile et sensibile in brutis. Operatur autem ad corpus ut natura mundi movens, hoc est, secundum rationem movendi ipsum et regendi.

(29) op. cit., ad obj. 6, p. 4[illegible]: Iste omnia dixerunt sanctis, philosophus qui non contradicunt quibusdam sanctis naturalibus coelum animam habere, nisi in nomine solo, qui abhorrent nomen animae et tamen hoc concedunt quod intelligentiae quaedam sive angeli servent ordine Dominum Dei.

(30) op. cit., p. 442b: Sicut ponimus [illegible] intelligunt [illegible] fidem quibus angelus [illegible] fecerit. et [illegible] [illegible] ita non est contrarium fidei quod dam. angelos [illegible] esse in corpore et gubernando [illegible] sphaeras coelorum, quos [illegible] corporeos sive intelligentias philosophi dicunt animas. [illegible] fortè dicere corpora coelos esse animata, si consequent ipsos habere animas negant motores coelorum esse animas. [illegible] in its patet q. non est contrarium inter eos. At the end of this reply St. Albert shows by a text from St. Augustine how the Sacrista called angels and even God anima mundi, thereby admitting the need and existence of object beings but designating them improperly by animae. cf. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, II, cap. 21, p. L. 41, col. 1.30. St. Augustine is writing here on the opinions of Varro speaking in Cicero's De Natura Deorum, lib. I, cap. 8, in M. Tullii Ciceronis opuscula, t. I, ed. Oxford, Clarendon, p. 390.

(31) Bonaventura, Scholia, lib. II, cap. 6, op. cit., f. 1069-1071: Sub anaquque autem intelligentia est coelum, ens non materia, et sub forma quae est anima, et intelligentia, incuantum intelligit primum, aequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ceq et inquantum intelligit seipsum, aequitur ei in forma coeli ultimi, et ejus perfectio, et hoc est anima et...et etiam corporeitas coeli ultimi...; quoted from Gilson, op. cit., p. 30, n. 1.

(32) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 55, a. 3, sol., vol. 3b, p. 400b.

(33) Averroes, Comm. in Metaphysica Aristotelis, Venice, Iuntas, 1573, [illegible] f. [illegible]: Et conferetur est etiam quod forma, quae movetur, non est generis formarum quarum [illegible] ...[illegible] Ipsius et natura eius est [illegible] cf. f. [illegible]: videtur quod forma...sit quodammodo anima; cf. cap. 4, f. 1[illegible]: aequitur quod istud movens neque est corpus, neque potentia in corpore et quod est intelligentia abstracta.

(34) Lib. De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 71, vol. 9, p. [illegible]: Illae quae non sunt virtutes in corpore sunt in ea ex similitudine sui ad causam primam per quam est, et per quam stat esse ipsius. Illae autem quae sunt virtutes in corpore, sunt in ea secundum quod ipsa est anima, cujus proprium est esse actum corporis et [illegible]

in corpore et in natura: quid sit natura et naturales potentiae ejus sunt instrumenta, et idem dicitur a quibusdam esse in terrestris arboribus et temporis. St. Albert is indebted to Isaac Israeli, a Jewish philosopher living in Egypt between 845 and 940, for the notion of the soul as standing on the horizon of time and eternity. See his text of Isaac 47. Liber Isaac de Definitionibus Secundum a magistro A. Gramond in Lucca, ed. Hudelo, in Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge, XIII, 1940, p. 315, l. 22-27.

(35) op. cit., p. 403ab.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIXX

(1) Summa de Creaturis, II, q. 56, a. 4, sol. 1. 1, vol. 35, p. [illegible], quod intellectus agens est pars animae: supra enim dicimus, quod diversitas proprietatum et potentiarum animae fiunt a diversitate principiorum componentium ipsam, quae principia sunt quod est et quo est, vel actus et potentia, si diverso nomine appellentur. Et propter hoc dicimus, quod intellectus agens est pars animae fluens ab eo quo est, sive actus; possibilis autem pars animae est fluens ab eo quod est, sive potentia.

(2) St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, V, cap. 5, nb. 10, P. L. 34, col. 326. cf. Gilson, Introd. a l'étude de Saint Aug., ed. cit., p. [illegible].

(3) cf. Avicebrolis (Ibn Gebirol) fons Vitae ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino, ed. Baeumker, in (Beiträge, I, 2-4) Münster 1895, especially tr. IV, p. 375-378. cf. St. Albert, De intellectu et intelligibili, I, tr. 1, cap. 6, Part. 3, p. 480b.

(4) cf. Le Tête Ente et Essentiel de M. Thomas d'Aquin, ed. Salembier, in (Bibliotheque Thomiste, VIII) Lain, 1926, p. 64, Note 3, for citations of the texts of Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Roger Bacon and Robert Kilwardby.

(5) There has never been even spiritual matter in the soul or in the Angels for St. Albert. cf. In I Sent., d. 8, F, a. 25, sol. vol. 25, p. 257b: Concentio in hanc partem quod anima sit composita ex principiis essentialibus quae sunt quod est et esse, sed non ex materia et forma; In II Sent., d. 1, A, a. 4, sol., vol. 27, p. 14b; Sum. de Creat., II, q. 56 a. 1, ad. 1, vol. 35, p. 478b; De Int. et Intell., Lib. cit.; Sum. Theol., II, a. 70, a. 1, sol., vol. [illegible], p. 304; Sup. cit., II, q. 72, a. 2, sol., p. 308b.

(6) cf. De Int. et Intel. Intell., tr. 2, cap. 6, vol. 9, p. 478b.

(7) In I Sent. d. 26, a. 4, vol. 26, p. 8: Et non natura intelligibilis compositum ex materia et forma, vel quod est et quo est, in natura et sub natura consistit, et hoc est non aliquid in natura.

(8) Sum. de Creat., I, tr. 4, q. 20, ad 16 quod obj. de Creat. vol. 34, p. 3[illegible]: dicendum quod ratio animalis duplicitor sumitur, scilicet a forma totius et a forma partis. Si sumatur a forma totius tunc est corpus animatum sensibile.... Si autem sumatur a forma naturae partis, tunc est habens vim et esse animati,.... Dico autem forma totius formam illam quae est praedicabilis de toto composito sicut homo est forma Socratis: et dico formam partis formam materiae quae est anima; cf. Ibid., q. 71, sol., p. 4[illegible]: dicitur esse voce formam compositi quod praedicatur de ipso composito, sicut homo est esse Socratis.,....

(9) Sum. de Creat., I, tr. 2, q. 2, ad diff. 3, ad 1, vol. 34, p. 3[illegible]: Unde quod est idem quod nunc est apud naturam; Ibid., q. 21, a 1, sol., vol. 34, p. 4[illegible]: Id autem quod est intelligo esse id quod substat formae, et praecipue illud ratione cujus subsistit. Hoc autem est in que forma compositi habet esse secundum naturam. An extensive work, especially remarkable for the citations of almost all the major texts in St. Albert on the quod est and quo est is Roland Gosselin, op. cit., p. 175-184. There seems to be little evidence in the many difficult, but not discovered, texts on this point which would permit one to say with Roland-Gosselin, p. 178: La pensee d'Albert le Grand sur la composition de l'Etre cree a beaucoup varie.

(10) In. I Sent., D. 26, a. 4, vol. 26, p. 8a: Suppositum addit vel naturae respectum ad naturam communem, cui supponitur et incommunicabile. cf. In III Sent., D. VI, a, a. 2, vol. 28, p. 127b: ergo suppositum dicitur stans sub natura communi: cf. In I Sent. D. 26, a. 4, vol. 26, p. 8a: Et non naturae intelligi ac compositum ex materia et forma, vel quod est et quo est, in natura et sub natura communi, et hoc est hoc aliquid in natura.

(11) In I Sent. d. 3, 0, a. 33, sol. vol. 25, p. 1[illegible]b: Sed Doctores dicunt, quod est composita ex quod est et quo est: et tunc quod est differt a materia, sicut suppositum differt a potentia ad formam cui supponitur. Id quod est est hoc aliquid quod praedicabile est de eo quod est; quo est autem non invenitur positum ab auctore: sed Boetius ponit esse: The origin of this distinction is Boethius as St. Albert tells us. For the pertinent texts in Boethius cf. Thomas Aquinas In De Hebd. Lect. Boeth. Lect. 2, n. 24, vol. 1311b-d.

diversum est, esse et id quod est: at vero quod est, accepta essendi forma, est atque consistit.... Omne quod est, participat eo quod est esse, ut sit: alio vero participat ut aliquid sit.... Omne simplex, esse suum, et id quod est unum habet. Omne compositum aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est, and De Hebdomadibus, cap. 2, P. L. 64, col. 1250C: Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est, atque idcirco unum est, et id quod est. Deinque enim non sunt id quod sunt: cf. Roland-Gosselin, op. cit., p. 142-145 where shows that this distinction did not exist that of essence and existence in Boethius.

(12) Sum. de Creat., I, tr. 1, q. 2, a. 5, vol. 34, p. 35[illegible].

(13) op. cit., q. 21, a. 1, p. 464a: Nec intelligo forma totius sit idem cum universale cum habeat esse in composito: sed ipsa est illa qua aliquid est esse,...et ab illa per intentionem abstrahitur universale. For the complete discussion of this point cf. Chapter VI, p. 135-136.

(14) Sum. de Creat., I, q. 5, a. 3, sol. vol. 34, p. [illegible]: in quibusdam enim substantiis est compositio ex materia et forma, sicut in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quorum Boetius praedicator de substantia composita: compositum enim neque materia est, neque forma: unde in talibus universale quod praedicatur de composito, non accipitur a forma materiae, sed a forma totius conjuncti. In quibusdam autem nonest talis compositio, sed ex quo est et quod est, quemadmodum dicit Boethius: et quo est est forma totius, quod est autem dicit ipsum totum cujus est forma: et haec compositio est in incorruptibilibus et in ingenerabilibus, in quibus forma totius non differt a forma materiae: quia non habet materiam: ergo ipsum totum quod supponitur per quod est, non habet distinctionem a materia propter eamdem causam. Et hoc praecipue verum est in spiritualibus substantiis, in quibus non est accipere compositionem nisi suppositi et naturae cujus est suppositum illud.

(15) Ibid., p. 334a: quod non dico hoc esse, dico materiam, sed non dico esse, dico formam. Similiter cum dico hunc hominem, vel hanc animam, dico suppositum: si cum dico esse vel anima, dico naturam cujus est suppositum illud: et idem in talibus et quod est et quo est praedicantur de composito.

(16) In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 33, sol. vol. 35, p. 1[illegible]: esse: et hoc est essentia secundum actum quam habet in ipso quod est, id est, in

hos aliquis, vel in isto oppositio: sed quia est alve esse non separatur ab eo quod est, et est forma totius, sane totum esse dicit ipsum quod est per modum esse formalis,... cf. Sum. de Creat., I, 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad obj. 2, vol. 34, p. 46Ob: sed esse quod dicit actum ejus quod est, non significatur accidentis: quia non habet rationem substandi; sed potius ipsum determinatur per illud, licet alio modo quam accidens: accidens enim non est esse ejus in quo est; et hujusmodi ile est esse sine ipso, ut e converso possibile est esse illud sine accidente: sed esse inest quidem oppositi: sed oppositum non potest esse secundum esse sine ipso.

(17) In I Sent., d. 11, F, a. 4, sol., p. 79ab: in quibusdam enim differt hypostasis a natura, sive quod est a quo est; ibid., a. 19, sol., p. 77b: essentia enim est cujus actus est esse; ibid., a. 39, p. 1.2ab: quo est...est essentia secundum actum quem habet in ipso quod est; ibid., d. viii, 4, a. 3, p. 227b: essentia est qua formaliter res est; ibid., et esse est actus ejus quem habet in se quod est; Sum. de Creat., 1a. qlt., ad obj.4, p. 46Sb: et esse vocatur actus ipsius secundum substantiam. cf. Sum. de Creat., II, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1, vol. 35, p. 47Sb: quod licet anima intellectiva non sit ex materia, tamen principia sua essentiae sunt quod est et quo est: et sicut in quo est fundatur intellectus agens, ita in quod est fundatur intellectus possibilis. cf. In I Sent., d. 8, F, a. 3, sol., vol. 23, p. 237b, quoted in note 6, supra.

(18) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3, vol. 34, p. 65b: In forma substantialis unus modus est, quod est actus materiae simplicis non resolubilis in partes, quae virtute et potentia sint ipsa: et sic forma elementi est forma materialis. De Nat. et Orig. Animae, 1, tr. 1, cap. 3, vol. 9, p. 300b: In quibus primum est forma elementorum, quae sunt omnino materialia et primae, quod significant ipsum nomen elementi.

(19) Lib. II De Anim., tr. 1, cap. 8, vol. 6, p. 19Sb: et sicut forma materiae propria vocatur, et non ejus nisi unum...forma enim quae materiam simplicem est, cum ipsa tantum habent essentialem operationem agitur. cf. De Nat. et Orig. Animae, tr. 1, cap. 2, vol. 9, p. 280b; Lib. I De Caelo et Proc. Mun., tr. IV, cap. 7, vol. 10, p. 4Sbc: Sum. Theol., II, tr. 1, q. 6, a. 6, c 1, ad 1d quod obj. vol. 22, p. 1Sb;

ibid., tr. 2, c. 10, sol., p. 1439; *ibid.*, tr. 13, c. 70, a. 1, sol., vol. 28, p. 804. St. Albert is inclined to Avicenna for this element of his doctrine and makes use of it as Avicenna did. It is a necessary complement of the Avicennian conception of the soul. For the text of Avicenna cf. *Lib. Sextus Nat.*, *op. cit.*, p. 1, cap. 2, f. 2r col. 2: Item hic notandum quod cuiuslibet anime sunt ut sit secundum formam sunt secundum quantitatem sunt secundum qualitates sunt secundum situm. Si fuerit localis, necesse est ut sit secundum situs sunt vitalitatis sunt animalis. Si autem fuerit naturalis sine dubio erit tantum ad unam partem: erit ergo motio animae ad unam partem tantum.

(20) *De Nat. et Orig. Animae*, tr. 1, cap. 2, vol. 9, p. 388b: Secundum est, quod substantiali et naturali potentia operatur haec forma mihi, cum naturalis et corporea forma non operatur nisi unum: mihi autem quae per divinum respiratur, elementi uti, et pecuniae, hujus operationes multae in multis naturalibus quae corporeae tantum formae habent, invenimus... Et propter haec duo forma haec non natura, sed anima vocatur. cf. coroll. p. 388a.

(21) *De Nat. et Orig. Animae*, cap. 3, p. 392b: Hoc autem vivere autem et perfectionem quae viventibus est esse, quae absque dubio non est secundum aliquam materialis et corporeae formae potentiam, sed secundum eam potentiam quae est anima, secundum quam corpus ad animavetur ad vitae operationem...

(22) *Sum. Theol.*, II, q. 70, a. 1, sol., vol. 23, p. 216: In animalibus autem quae movetur in loco sui, necesse est esse potentiam cognitivam ad alium ex motivo cognitivo, et ex motivo appetitivo: quia appetitus motus movet corpus, ut ostendit Aristoteles, quae sunt partes ejus, ad requirendum id quod appetitum: et sic motivum cognitivum sunt in sensibili anima vel est phantasia vel aestimativa.

(23) *op. cit.*, q. 69, a. 1, ad 6, vol. 23, p. 184: Ad ultimum dicendum, quod licet forma naturalis sit perfectio materiae, tamen multae materiae perfectio est ad aliquem vitae. Sicut per hoc quod dicitur, *ad aliquem vitae* separatur anima a forma naturali.

(24) *loc. cit.*, In animali autem quando secundum rationem movetur, est intellectus practicus: quia non fit motus nisi fiat

[illegible] per phantasiam vel intellectum.... Cum enim vires rationalis animae, de necessitate subsistit, quod sit composita ex anima cognitiva et ex anima appetitiva; quod ulterius vis anima movet corpus et organum. St. Albert is as faithful to Avicenna in the explanation of the practical intellect as he was in the definition of the soul; or what is more proper, his fidelity to Avicenna in the doctrine of the practical intellect is conditioned by his fidelity in the definition of the soul. This practical intellect commands all powers under it. It leads to the body to rule it, its business is the use of knowledge in acting and making, that is, it rules in a general manner all the functions which arise from the union of the soul and the body. cf. Sum. de Creat., II, q. 65, a 1, sol., vol. 35, p. 537b-540a. Here St. Albert accepts as his definition of the practical intellect that which Avicenna proposed as his definition of the intellectus activus: intellectum practicus est vis activa quae est principium movens corpus hominis ad actiones civiles quae sunt propriae cogitationis, secundum quod intentionibus convenit quae ad plenitudinem perfectionis ei, et habet respectum in comparationem virtutis vitalis appetitivae, et respectum in comparationem virtutis vitalis imaginabilis et sensibilis, et respectum in comparationem ipsius ad se. In distinguishing the practical from the speculative intellect St. Albert continues to interpret Aristotle with Avicenna, cf. ibid., a. 4, p. 544-545. The practical and speculative intellects in St. Albert do not correspond any more exactly to the Aristotelian distinction of practical and theoretical intellects than do they in Avicenna. It is the rational soul in its practical functions and not the intellectus practicus of Aristotle to which St. Albert gives the name intellectus practicus. For Avicenna cf. Lib. VI Nat., ed. cit., P. 1, cap. 1, f. 6r, col. 2; f. 8v, col. 1, and ibid., P. V, cap. 1, f. 28vcol. 2. The texts of Aristotle in point are De Anima, III, 9, 432b26-30; 10, 433a 14-20, ed. cit., p. 429, 430. For a detailed discussion of this question in Avicenna, for the differences with Aristotle, as well as for the pertinent texts, too lengthy to quote here, cf. Gilson, Les sources gréco-latines de l'augustinisme avicennisant, in Archives IV, 1929, p. 89-90 and notes.

(25) Sum. Theol., II, 12, q. 60, in corp, vol. 40, p. 7a: in quantum est actus, oportet quod compositum sit quoddam esse distinctum habens a corpore actualiter et substantialiter.

(26) In I Sent., d. 3, q. 5, a. 3d, sol. vol. 23, p. 140a: Si enim anima considerentur in sua esse, essentia quod est quoddam spirituale substantia, sic consequentes (potentiae) sunt esse, et participantur ab ipso esse, et quod est, sicut ab ipso esse intellectus agens et ab ipso quod est intellectus possibilis. Si autem anima considerentur ut substantia agens in exteriora et in corpus....

(27) op. cit., ad 6, p. 140b: essentiale est quod est pars essentiae in qua res simpliciter est in prima compositione: sicut... quod est et quo est animae.

(28) loc. cit., Accidentale autem est quod advenit post completum esse, et non confert esse composito, cum sit possibile compositum esse sine illo.

(29) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 72, a. 1, ad 1, vol. 30, p. 22b: Si autem esset dicendum quod principium primum individuationis universale, non est materia; sed quod est per hoc quod est id quod est, dicentur in se et omnem discretionem habitus eliis quae sibi insunt: unde per ipsum quod est, quod sibi inest, efficitur discretum et ponitur in numero et hic et nunc:

(30) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 71, sol., vol. 30, p. 17b: Secundum, quod forma animae rationalis et pulchrior quam habere potest est, quod sit ad imaginem Dei...et sic ratio formatur ad optimum et pulcherrimum.

(31) op. cit., ad obj., p. 57a: Forma non est formae in eodem genere, sed in alio genere, hoc est in superiori potest esse forma formae: et illa est ratio vera formae, ut dicit Boetius in libro de Trinitate, sic: "Sed exemplar forma exempli, sum hanc utrique sit forma." Similiter autem rationalis quae dicta est et ratio generis, habet formam exemplar ratio essentiae divinae in tribus personis, ad quae facta est.... cf. Boetius, de Trinitate, M. P. L. 64, col.

(32) Sum. Theol., II, 12, q. 71, ex hoc patet, vol. 30, p. 36a:

Verum imago sit in anima secundum naturam vel gratiam? Et dicit, quod imago creationis est ratio quae dicit imaginem potentialiter intentam et indistinctam.... In qua anima est representatio Trinitatis? Sed anima patet, quod in memoria, intelligentia, et voluntate, et ordine naturae quo altera est ex altera inter eas....

(33) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, t. 8, ad quaest. 2, vol. IX, p. 37b: quemvis enim in Deo non sint diversae quae est et quo est, non sunt in ea per modum compositionis, sed simplicitatis; tamen vere sunt in ea quae sunt et quae est: Deus enim dicit quae est, et Verbum quo est; quorum utrumque vere in Deo est.

(34) St. Albert is indebted to Gilbert of Poitiers for the interpretation of the quod est and quo est doctrine which each found in Boethius. Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, was born in 1076 at Poitiers, taught at the School of Chartres and at Paris; he died in 1154. cf. De Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale, t. I, Paris, 1924, p. 324. Gilbert maintained that the hierarchy of being can be divided in a fourfold manner: (1) the essence of God is the first forms; (2) then a lower scale are the substantiae simplices, true substance as second forms, which are the exemplars of the forms joined to matter; (3) here are the forms as essences in which all beings of the same genus and species share; (4) lastly are the individual forms which properly are merely corporum figuras. cf. Gilberti Porretani Commentaria in Librum de Trinitate (of Boethius), c. 2, n. 64, col. 1268AB. Boethius had said omne nomen esse ex forma est, cf. De Trinitate, cap. II, c. 2, n. 4, 64, col. 1268B. Through these forms being passed from the first form, God, to all orders of being form to the order of natural things: quod formam divinam vocaverat esse omnium, ostendit non abhorrere a naturalibus, quorum omnium esse ex forma est, as Gilbert says. cf. op. cit., col. 1268C. In every created thing there is a real distinction between the form and the concrete subject: In naturalibus enim aliud est quod est, aliud quo est, (ibid., col. 1270B). This quo est or form is a principle of being, but it is not a simple form, for it can be broken up into really distinct genera and species, (ibid., col. 1270A-B). Actually only singular forms exist; the generic and specific forms are singular and in their

singularity they have an ontological reality. They are, in a word, principles of being as well as of knowing. (Ibid., col. 1254-D). In singular beings there is an hierarchy of these real forms evidencing a real formal composition. However, Gilbert did not stop there. Even in God Himself, there is a real distinction between Deus and divinitas, just as there is between an id quod est and an id quo est, (Ibid., col. 1255-C). This distinction, illustrating the realism of the teaching of Gilbert is only the extension to God Himself of the distinction which marks the concrete subject and its formal principle of being and being known. An unusually well documented work on this point is that of J. Geyer O. F., La Causalité de Dieu et l'Ordre Théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée, in (Archives d'Hist. Doctr.--) 1956, p. 43-100. We are permitted now to say that on the doctrine of the Generalitas St. Albert follows Gilbert; on the reality of the distinction in God St. Albert departs from Gilbert but carries away the terminology of that distinction and incorporates it into his own work as a distinction of reason.

(35) De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 7, ad 10, vol. 9, p. 460a: sed tamen substantia intellectualis habet duo, dicunt dicimus, quorum unum est, quia necessitatem sui esse habet secundum quod est ex causa prima. Aliud autem est, quia potentiam habet ad esse secundum quod est in se ipsa: et hoc potentia est fundamentum fundans esse,... cf. op. cit., ad 18, p. 469b and ad 30, p. 475b-476a.

(36) Sum. Theol. II, tr. 14, q. 77, m. 3, ad 10, vol. 33, p. 96b: Intellectualis autem natura.... Tamen duo habet in se, esse scilicet: et secundum hoc dependet ad causam primam, quae facit debere esse in omni ex quod est. Habet etiam in se secundum id quod est potentiam ad esse illud, secundum quam dependet ad ens necesse, a quo accipit esse, et in quo radicatur esse sicut in supposito: et illud non est unum in multis. Roland-Gosselin maintains that in this memorum St. Albert departs, on the probeln of the individuation of the soul, from the notion of potency to that of the id quod est. Cf. Roland-Gosselin O. P., Sur la double solution que Albert le Grand et St Thomas donnent du problème "De Unitate Intellectus" et Sum. Theologica, II, tr. xiii, q. 77, m. 3, in (Archives I), 1926, p. 310-311.
The "numerus" introduced into the Sum. Theologica however

are so different from St. Albert's doctrine in the Summa de Creaturis. As we have observed, the quod est and quo est, even in the Summa de Creaturis, considered in a broad sense are potency and act.

(37) cf. text in Chapter II, note 35.

(38) De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 6, vol. 9, p. 463-464a: quia omnis intellectualis natura necessitatem habens a prima causa, et possibilitatem a seipsa, potest converti supra seipsam et in conversione illa lux quae est a causa prima, penetrat possibilitatem quam habet in seipsa.

(39) De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 6, vol. 9, p. 464a-464b. Et quia haec natura intellectualis est motor naturalis corporis, secundum est motor, fluunt ab ipso potentiae vitae, quibus secundum opera vitae movet naturam corporis: et secundum quod stat per causam primam, fluunt ab ipsa potentiae quibus pendet ad causam primam... Cum autem per hoc quod pendet ad causam primam, nullo modo fit in potentia, sed actus purus, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus agens universaliter: et cum ipsa sit in potentia secundum seipsam, sicut et aliae substantiae intellectuales, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus possibilis: omnis enim intellectualis natura in seipsa considerata non est nisi in potentia, et similiter omne causatum in se non est nisi in potentia: sed quod est a causa prima, est in actu, et accipit sui esse necessitatem...: His ergo duobus accipimus intellectum agentem et intellectum possibilem: quia omnis intellectualis natura necessitatem habens a prima causa, et possibilitatem a seipsa, potest converti supra seipsam: et in conversione illa lux quae est a causa prima penetrat possibilitatem quam habet in seipsa.

(40) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 55, a. 4, c. 2, ad 3, vol. 35, p. 473a: Et est differentia secundum essentiam inter esse et posse, secundum quod esse reducitur ad id quod est et Deum et actum, et posse reducitur ad id quod est et possibile:

(41) op. cit., q. 55, a. 6, sol. p. 475b: unde sicut intellectus quo est qui est esse animae rationalis non est nisi in substanti, ita actio intellectus agentis non est nisi in possibili.

(42) op. cit., q. 55, a. 4, c. 1, ad 1, p. 470b: intellectus agens: sed ratio actio sua respectu intelligibilium et non respectu animae simpliciter. Similiter potentia est ad intellectiva, et

non ad esse. Et propter hoc intellectus agens et possibilis possunt esse intrinsecae partes animae rationalis.

(43) op. cit., p. 60, n. 8, vol. p. 473n. For the text in Aristotle to which St. Albert refers cf. De Anima, III, 5, 430a 15, ed.cit. p. 239.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

(1) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 68, 2, vol. 33, p. 3b. The line to Avicenna has not yet been out, cf. Avicenna, Lib. vi Met., P. V, 7, f. 27a: Ex his est etiam illis qui dicunt quod anima est una essentia, ex qua virtutes istae emanant, quarum unaquaque habet propriam actionem.... Haec sunt famosae sententiae de anima. Nulla autem harum vera est nisi ultima earum quam praediximus.

(2) Sum. Theol., II, 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 1, ad. 2, sol. 33, p. 4b: ex anima ad corpus non habet (anima) esse, sed ab ipso fluunt a substantia pura et simplici et non secundum conjunctionem ad corpus. St. Albert carefully refrains from saying that the acts of the soul precede its substance; because he distinguishes form and soul there would be to his mind, as many souls as particular powers. cf. Sum. de Creat., II, q. 7, a. 1, ad obj. 4, vol. 35, p. 94b:

(3) Gilson, Les Sources Greco-Latines (Archives--IV) 1929, p. 81. Cf. Supra Chapt. III, p. 79-80.

(4) Sum. Theol., II, 12, q. 70, m. 2, sol., vol. 33, p. 44b: Sed sicut dicit Boetius in libro Divisionum, est totius potestativi in suas partes potestativas, sive particulares potestas. cf. Boethius, Liber de Divisione, P. L. 64, col. 888a.

(5) op. cit., sol., p. 45a:

(6) Sum. Theol., loc. cit., ad. 5, p. 45a:

(7) Ibid.

(8) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 2, a. 1, sol., vol. 35, p. 13ab:

(9) Sum. Theol., II, 12, q. 70, m. 3, ad contra 2, vol. 33, p. 44ab: Perfectiones differunt secundum perfecta. Cujus probatio est, quod perfectiones non numerantur nec in esse individui, nec in esse generis nec in esse specici nisi numero perfectorum: ergo unus singularis perfecto una est singularis perfectio. Quilibet homo est in hoc homo, quod est unus singularis homo: ergo quilibet homo unam habet singularem perfectionem ergo

[illegible] animam: quia anima singularis est perfectio ejus.

(10) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 2, a. 1, sol., vol. 35, p. 12ab:

(11) op. cit., q. 3, a. 4, ad. 5, p. 17a:

(12) op. cit., q. 7, a. 1, ad. 2, p. 96ab:

(13) Sum. Theol., II, 12, q. 70, a. 3, sed contra 3, vol. 35, p. 24b: Quandoquidem unus est in altero actus et intellectus, illa nec secundum esse separantur, nec secundum intelligere possunt dici esse separata. Vegetabile est in sensibili actu et intellectu: et similiter vegetabile et sensibile in rationali. Ergo non secundum esse possunt separari, nec secundum intelligere cogitari potest, quod separata sint. Et hoc est necessarium et concedendum. cf. Sum. de Creat., II, q. 7, a. 1, ad. 2, vol. 35, p. 96ab.

(14) Sum. Theol., II, 12, 70, q. 2, m. 3, sol., p. 23a:

(15) op. cit., ad. 2, p. 26a:

(16) De anima, II, 1, cap. 3, vol. 3, p. 130b. Sum. de Creat., II, 1, q. 70, sol., vol. 35, p. 606-607. De anima, II, tract. 7, p. 203, sq. The philosopher from whom St. Albert obtained this doctrine of localization of the soul in the heart is Alfredus Anglicus, De Motu Cordis, cap. 2, 5-6 (ed. Neuburger, [illegible], N. [illegible], N. 1-2, Leipzig, 1922), p. 11-12, cap. 7, 5-6, p. 47-50; cap. 8, 8-9, p. 54-55.

(17) Sum. Theol., II, 12, 70, m. 6, sol. vol. 35, p. 24b: Et hoc totum medium est inter totum universale et totum integrale. Praedicatur enim de qualibet sua parte—convertitur.

(18) St. Albert relinquishes his Avicennian ties on this point. For Avicenna the distinction of the genus from the difference is so real that it cannot be predicated as part of its essence. The genus, while being a part of the species is not a part of the essence of the difference. Further, although not an accident of the genus the difference is nonetheless assimilated to the genus. cf. Avicenna, Metap. V, 6, ed. cit., f. 94r-3r: Dicamus ergo quod genus praedicatur de specie ita quod est pars quiditatis ejus et praedicatur de differentia ita quod est comitans eam non pars quiditatis

ejus....Dicemus ergo nunc quod differentia non convenit in quidditate cum genere quod de se praedicatur; differt igitur ab eo per seipsum.

(19) Liber de praedicabilibus, tr. 1, cap. 4, vol. 1, p. 96b-96a: Dicemus ergo, quod differentiam habet species a genere, et differentia est in generis potestate sicut distinctio in indistincto confusum....Ex hoc est evidenter determinatio.... Propter quod dicitur genus potestate habere differentias potius quam potentia: quia potentia ad esse et non esse indifferens est, potestas autem est potentia stans per actus inconstantem. In point of fact this is far more realistic than the Avicennan determinatio actually is. For Avicenna the potency which the genus is, is a potency, not in the res naturae, but in the order of the intellect. That is to say, man is from rational and animal as a third thing known from two other known things, not as a third thing from two things. cf. Avicenna, op. cit., f. 88ba; ibid., f. 89vbE, quoted at length in Roland-Gosselin, Le De Ente et Essentia, ed. cit., p. 16, note 4 and p. 19, note 1. Quite rightly does Roland-Gosselin say that St. Albert's thought does not appear totally divorced from all realistic conception of the genus. cf. Roland-Gosselin, op. cit., p. 14, notal, in fine p. 17.

(20) Aquinas, Liber de Divisione, tr. 2, l. 64, col. 5[illegible]-5[illegible]: Dicitur quoque totum quod ex quibusdam virtutibus constat, ut anima alia est potentia sentiendi, alia sentiendi, alia vegetandi: partes sunt, sed non species....Sed non entium horum genus, sed totum, partes enim hae animae sunt, sed non ut in quantitate, sed ut ita aliqua potestate et virtute. Ex his enim potentiis substantia animae jungitur; unde fit, ut quiddam simile habeat hujusmodi divisio, et generis, et totius divisionis....quod autem non omnis anima omnibus partibus jungitur, sed aliis alia, hoc ad totius naturam referri necesse est.

(21) The formalities of Gilbert of Poitiers and their definite application as influencing St. Albert's doctrine of the totum potestativum are to be seen in following the path of being in the case of man. Since all being is from form being descends from the First Form, God, through the formae divinae to the essences of things, then to the formae nativae which are the forms united to bodies. In so much as a man is a formal cause of being, the formal

cause which is nearer to the First Form is more universal in its causality. Hence in the order of the essences the universal is prior to the particular and bestows being on it. Thus from the genus or essence in the question of man, there is educed the first simple form, rationality; going then to the particular we find animality and rationality; finally we arrive at the order of the individual or singular which exists in the form, but not, in which the form exists. It can be said of the forms that they, substant aliqui or sicut subjecta aliqui. cf. In conjunction with the texts of Gilbert quoted above in Chapter III, p. 227, n 34 a particularly strong text in immediate point is Gilberti Porretani Commentaria in Librum de Trinitate, M. P. L. 64, col. 1270-1271A. But this is the order St. Albert followed can be seen by realizing that for Gilbert there is first, the universality and priority of the substantial soul itself, simple like a difference (rationality), and superior to the genus contained in it as an esse aliquid or potentia (op. cit., col. 1271a). Secondly, from this simple form derive animality and rationality; the vegetative, sensitive and rational are contained in the higher actually. There is the esse aliquid or Gilbert linked with the esse et intellecta of St. Albert. The soul remains a subsistens perfectum, subiecta omnibus potentiabus suis. Thirdly, and lastly, there is the individual man whose total being is from the form which is the soul, which soul is that to which is subjected in the various organs of his body the vegetative, sensitive and rational.

(22) Lib. I De Causis et Proc. Univ. tr. IV, cap. 8, vol. 10, p. [illegible]; cf. texts quoted supra Chapt. III, p. 228, n. 35, 36.

(23) op. cit., II, tr. 1, cap. 15, p. 453b-cap. 16, p. 460a.

(24) Lib. II De Anima, tr. 3, cap. 4, vol. 5, p. 237a: Ibidem igitur quod omne apprehendere est accipere formam apprehensi, non secundum esse quod habet in se quod apprehenditur, sed secundum est intentio ipsius et species, sub qua aliqua sensibilis vel intelligibilis notitia apprehensi habetur. Haec autem apprehensio, ut universaliter loquendo, quatuor habet gradus.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Meta., IV, tr. 3, cap. 6, vol. 6, p. 245a-b: cf. Sum. de

Creat., II, q. 21, a. 5, sol., vol. 35, p. 308b, and op. cit., q. 54, a. 1, sol., p. 295b. For the distinction of active and passive potency in St. Albert cf. Chapt. I, p. 10.

(27) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 54, a. 1, sol. p. 295b, and op. cit., q. 56, a. 3, sol., p. 308a: Dicendum ad primum, quod omnis sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia.

(28) op. cit., q. 21, a. 5, ad illud, p. 310a: alteratio vero sensuum et mediorum est de privatione in habitum.

(29) Lib. II De Anim., tr. 3, cap. 1, vol. 5, p. 201a: —sensus cum sit potentia passiva, non est actu sine potentia sensibilis extra:

(30) Sum. de Creat., q. 46, ad aliud, vol. 35, p. 422b:

(31) Sum. de Creat., q. 54, a. 1, sol. p. 295b: Sensus autem dicitur potentia passiva, non quod recipiat formam quae transmutat substantiam suam in substantiam secundum esse, sed potius transmutatur in species sensibiles secundum intentionem; cf. op. cit., q. 45, a. 2, ad 3, p. 414b: species coloris in oculo non habet esse coloris, sed intentionem et imaginationem per quae efficitur principium cognitionis sensibilis: et ideo remanet res sensata in suo colore, quia non obstruitur secundum suum esse.

(32) op. cit., ad obj. 2, 3, 4, p. 415a:

(33) Lib. II De Anim., tr. 3, cap. 4, vol. 5, p. 208a:

(34) Sum. de Creat., q. 54, a. 1, ad 1 et 2, vol. 35, p. 295a: cf. op. cit., q. 58, a. 1, ad. 3, p. 333b. For texts on the verity of each sense in regard to its proper sensible, cf. Sum. de Creat., II, q. 54, a. 2, sol., p. 299a:

(35) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 20, a. 4, ad diff. primum, vol. 35, p. 310b-311a. St. Albert is closely following the definition and description given by Avicenna, Lib. VI Nat., ed. cit., f. 87, col. 1. He also knows the definition of Algazel, found in Algazel's Data, Dublin ed., p. II, iv, 4, p. 109, l. 22-24. Cf. Sum. de Creat., Ibid., ad. 1, p. 310a, where St. Albert states his awareness of the term phantasia used at times by Avicenna for the sensus communis.

(36) Sum. de creat., II, q. 37, a. 1, sol., p. 324b-327b. The sources of St. Albert here are again Avicenna, loc. cit., and Algazel, loc. cit., p. 169, l. 1-5.

(37) op. cit., q. 38, a. 1, sol., p. 326a, and a. 4, sol., p. 330a. This same faculty is termed vis imaginativa, or cogitativa by Averroes, by Avicenna, cf. loc. cit. Algazel seems to be St. Albert's direct inspiration for calling it phantasia, cf. Algazel, loc. cit., l. 17-19. St. Albert also speaks of Constabulus [Costa-ben-Luca] as having used it then, cf. op. cit., q. 38, a. 3, sed contra 2, p. 333a. For Costa-ben-Luca, cf. De Differentia spiritus et animae, cap. 8, ed. cit., p. 130.

(38) Sum. de creat., II, q. 39, a. 1, sol., p. 337a. cf. Algazel, loc. cit., p. 170, l. 6-11. The development of Avicenna is to be found in op. cit., f. 5r, col. 2b. This interpretation of intentio relating to perception only by the inner sense St. Albert owes in the main to Avicenna, cf. op. cit., f. 5r, col. 1.

(39) Sum. de creat., II, q. 40, a. 1, sol., and ad 2, p. 340b-341a. cf. Avicenna, op. cit., f. 5r col. 2b; and Algazel, op. cit., p. 170, l. 11-14.

(40) op. cit., q. 41, a. 1, sol., and ad diffin. 2, p. 342a-343b. Thus, following Avicenna St. Albert has arrived at five interior senses. While St. Albert is inspired in this part of his psychology by Avicenna, he knows and quotes Aristotle many times on the inner senses. Avicenna's sensus is easily seen to be Aristotle himself. For the texts of Aristotle cf. De Anima, II, 6, 418a13-20, ed. cit., p. 134; II, 3, 415a10-13, p. 108; III, 3, 428a1-16, p. 215; on memoria and reminiscentia cf. Aristotle, on Memory and Recollection, 449b30 and 451a19-[illegible]. Rett. Brandl., Harv. Univ. Press, (Loeb Classical Library) 1955, p. 285, 297.

(41) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 40, a. 1, sol. vol. 20, p. 341a.

(42) op. cit., a. 4, sol., p. 344a, and op. cit., q. 39, a. 1, sol., p. 337a.

(43) op. cit., q. 38, a. 2, sol., p. 330a.

(44) op. cit., a. 1, ad. 1, p. 337a.

(45) *De anim.*, tr. III, cap. 4, vol. 5, p. 429ab. From this opinion Aquinas quite only a part on the fourth degree, cf. *ibid.*, p. 429b: "Quarta autem et ultima gradus est, qui apprehendit rerum quidditatem denudatam ab omnibus appendiciis materiae... et iste apprehensio solius est intellectus.... Hae autem sunt communia et ita uni sicut alii, et solus ordo convenientia, absque dubio sunt ipsa universalia, quae solus accipit intellectus.

(46) *De Anim.*, III, 1, cap. 11, vol. 5, p. 430ab: "et licet intellectus secundum se sit separatus, tamen intellectus est potentia conjuncti: quaedam est potestas animae quae secundum potentiam quaedam conjungitur corpori: non autem hoc quod est conjuncti et non est ejus secundum quod est conjunctum, licet non communicet corpori, tamen communicat communicanti corpori:--intellectus communicat non corpori sed potestati quae communicat corpori, scilicet phantasiae, et imaginationi et sensui:

(47) *op. cit.*, I, 1, cap. 6, vol. 5, p. 127b-128a.

(48) *ibid.*, p. 128ab.

(49) *Sum. de Creat.*, II, q. 61, a. 1, sol., vol. 25, p. 82b: "quia licet intellectus non sit virtus in organo sita tamen accipit ab illis quae sunt in organo, ut a sensibus, et phantasia." cf. *in I Sent.*, D. 8, P. a. 05, ad quaest. 2, vol. 25, p. 86b, and *De Anim.*, I, 2, 9, vol. 5, p. 166a.

(50) *Sum. Theol.*, II, tr. 18, q. 75, sol., vol. 22, p. 61a.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

(1) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 55, a. 3, ad. 1, vol. 35, p. 407a.

(2) De Anima III, 2, cap. 16, vol. 5, p. 364b.

(3) Ibid., For the text of Aristotel cf. De Anima III, 5, 430a 18-20, ed. cit., p. 239: Et hic intellectus separabilis, et impassibilis et immixtus, substantia actu ens.

(4) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 55, a. 3, objs. 3-7, vol. 35, p. 461b-462a; and ad 3-7, p. 466b. The doctrine of Avicenna is to be found in his Lib. vi Nat., P. 5, ed. cit., f. 32r, col. 1, and Ibid., cap. 6, f. 32r col. 2-32v col. 1. For Alpagel cf. Mota., ed. cit., P. II, tr. 4, 3, p. 187, l. 7-10, and Ibid., IV, 5, p. 175, l. 3-22 and p. 181, l. 16-17. The exposition of the doctrine of Ghent has problems on this precise point has been admirably done by J. Gilson, Les Sources Gréco-Arabes de l'Augustinisme Avicennisant, In Archives-(7), 1929, esp. p. 56-71.

(5) Note that St. Albert suffers no confusion on the point of the Angel being an Intelligence and vice-versa.

(6) Sum. de Creat., loc. cit., ad 3-7, p. 466b-467a: Et in his dictum convenit cum intelligentia omnibus communis, sed tamen differt in hoc quod actus intellectus specialis est esse phantasmatis abstrahendo universalia de phantasmatibus quod non facit intellectus angelicus: tamen propter hoc in quibus convenit cum eo, dicitur ab Algazele, quod non est in corpore: esse enim est in corpore et virtus sua in organo corporis, sicut virtus sensibilis: nec est in corpore et recipiens a phantasmatibus corporum sicut intellectus possibilis.

(7) cf. Ch. I, p. 6.

(8) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 55, sol. vol. 35, p. 466b.

(9) R. De Vaux, La Première Entrée d'Averroès Chez les Latins, In Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 22, 1933, p. 193-243, and the conclusions, p. 241-243.

(10) [illegible], Note sur la premiere influence d'Averroes, in [Revue Neoscholastique de Philosophie, 40] May 1937, p. [illegible]-418.

(11) A. Lotin, Notes sur les premiers Averroes Pseudo-Thomas d'Albert le Grand, in [Mélanges de Philosophie médiévale et Médiévale, 1950] p. 73-83.

(12) In an appendix table they may be listed as follows: commentary on the Metaphysics, 18; on the De Anima, 34, especially on questions on the agent intellect; on the De Caelo et Mundo, 4; paraphrases of the De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 1; extracts from the De Animalibus, 2; the De Substantia Orbis, 18. cf. De Vera, op. cit., p. 227.

(13) Op. Op. Grant., II, p. 27, no. 3, vol. 3b, p. 492b-494a, especially the med. contem. 1, p. 493b. cf. Nelson, op. cit., p. 200, for a contrary interpretation.

(14) De Anima III, 1, 7, vol. 5, p. 429a; De Unitate et Origine Animae, 1, 6, vol. 5, p. 293; De Unitate Intellectus, vol. 5, p. 297-474; De Intellectu et Intelligibili I, 1, 4, vol. 5, p. 407b-408a; Quaest. Disputatae, II, q. 77, ts. 17, a. 3, vol. 23, p. 75-102.

(15) De Anima III, 2, 11, vol. 5, p. 368-369; De Unitate et Origine Animae, 2, 4, vol. 5, p. 400b-404a.

(16) Op. Tract., 11, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 5, sol., vol. [illegible], p. 102a;

(17) Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri Omnes—cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis, vol. 4, Venice, Junten, 1550, f. 113vM-L.

(18) op. cit., f. 162rn50-61.

(19) op. cit., f. 165rn30-38.

(20) op. cit., f. 165rn47-50.

(21) op. cit., f. 169vB3-18.

(22) op. cit., f. 169vb35-38.

(23) op. cit., f. 170vn44-48.

(24) op. cit., f. 173va13-16.

(25) cf. op. cit., f. 167va6-7; f. 17[illegible]; 171va14-17; 170ra3-4.

(26) op. cit., f. 161ra35-37: cum enim recipiens fuerit actuatum, et agens fuerit actuatum, [illegible] est in fortio sit actuatum necessario; and, f. 173va17-21: Neque enim possumus dicere quod propositiones ipsae solae sint agentes cum iam declaratum est agens esse unum et aeternum et intendunt quidam antiquorum, et opinati sunt quod sos intendebat Aristoteles per intellectum agentem.

(27) De Anima III, 5, 1, p. [illegible].

(28) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 66, a. 1, sol., vol. 35, p. 470a.

(29) op. cit., q. 64, a. 4, ad. 2, 3, p. 545b.

(30) De Anima III, 2, 10, vol. [illegible], p. 350a.

(31) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 4, q. 14, a. 2, p. 1, ad 1, vol. 31, p. 180a.

(32) De Anima III, 2, 1, vol. 4, p. 337b.

(33) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 66, a. 5, ad. obj. 1, vol. 35, p. 473a; De Anima III, 2, 2, vol. 5, p. 3[illegible].

(34) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 56, a. 3, ad. 5-7, p. 467a.

(35) op. cit., q. 61, a. 1, ad. obj. 1, 2, p. 511b.

(36) De int. et int., I, 2, 1, vol. 9, p. 491a: Relinquitur ergo proprium objectum intellectus esse universale.

(37) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 56, a. 3, ad 3, p. 467a: Sed id solum est [illegible] separata et abstracta:—et propter hoc aperiat, quod sit ut agente conjuncto, quae sunt universalia de particularibus.

(38) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 4, q. 14, a. 2, p. 1, sol., vol. 31, p. 179a: For the more complete discussion of this point cf. Ch. VII, p. 152 sq.

(39) De Anima, III, 2, 10, vol. 5, p. 3[illegible].

(40) cf. Arist., De Anima, III, 9, 432a11-12, ed. cit., p. [illegible].

(41) De Anima III, 2, 18, p. 364b: et illo est non quidem habitus qui sit accidens quod non est pars animae: sed habet similitudinem habitus: in hoc quod per ipsum agit anima quando vult, et non indiget aliquo per hoc extrinseco perficiente vel operante. cf. Sum. de Creat., q. 56, a. 2, ad 1, vol. 3b, p. 459b-460a.

(42) Averroes, op. cit., f. 189vM6-C9: Hoc enim est definitio [illegible] habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligat per ipsum illud, quod est sibi proprium ex se, et quando voluerit, absque eo quod indigeat in hoc aliquo extrinseco. cf. ibid., 36-41: non enim possumus dicere quod proportio intellectus agentis in anima ad artificiatas ordines modis, ars enim imponit formam in toto materia absque eo quod in materia sit aliquid existens de intentione formae, antequam artificium fecerit eam et non est ita in intellectu.

(43) De Anima III, 2, 18, p. 364a.

(44) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 56, a. 2, ad 1, p. 460a.

(45) cf. Aristotle, op. cit., 430a15-16: et sicut lumen. [illegible] modo, et lumen facit potentia existentes colores, anta colores.

(46) Averroes, op. cit., f. 165vm20-166rm2: Et ista proportio [illegible] invenitur perfecta inter subiectum visus, quod movet ipsum. Quemadmodum enim subiectum visus movens ipsum, quod est color, non movet ipsum nisi quando per praesentiam lucis efficitur color in actu, postquam erat in potentia, ita intentiones imaginatae non movent intellectum materialem nisi quando efficiuntur intellecta in actu, postquam erant in potentia. Et propter hoc fuit necesse Aristotelem ponere intellectum agentem. For other and similar strong texts cf. op. cit., f. 166m[illegible]-[illegible]; f. 169vl[illegible]-f.17[illegible]; f. 171m[illegible]-61; f. 179vm1-[illegible].

(47) De Anima, III, 2, 18, vol. 5, p. 364a.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

(1) De Int. et Intellig. I, 2, 1, vol. 9, p. 490b.

(2) Ibid., cf. Liber de Praedicabilibus, tr. 1, cap. 3, notis 1, 2, vol. 1, p. 21a. St. Albert knows and states this as the opinion of Avicenna with whom he will be affiliated even at the end. cf. Avicenna, Meta., tr. 5, cap. 2, f. 87vb: universalitas autem [illegible] ipse [illegible] non est nisi in anima, quoted from J. Milan, Avicenna et le Point de Départ de Duns Scot, in Archives d'Hist. [illegible], III 1928, p. 123, n. 1-12.

(3) De Int. et Intellig. loc. cit., cap. 1, p. 490b; and Lib. de Praed., tr. 1, cap. 3, p. 21b-22a, where more reasons supporting this view are to be found.

(4) Lib. V Meta, tr. 6, cap. 5, vol. 6, p. 361b-362a: ante rem autem dicitur universale dupliciter: nam enim omnia—sint in intellectu primae causae sicut in formali et primo lumine.... Alio autem modo dicunt universale ante rem, non tempore, sed substantia et natura:

(5) De Int. et Intellig., I, 2, 1, p. 490a: Uno quidem modo prout est essentia quaedam absoluta in esse, et sic vocatur essentia, et est unum quid in se existens, nec habet esse, nisi talis essentiae, et sic est una solus; cf. Meta., loc. cit., cap. 7, p. 362a: quod natura illa cui accidit universalitatis, in se est unum quid; cf. Lib. de Praed., II, 3, p. 24a: primo quidem modo etc.

(6) De Int. et Intellig., loc. cit., and Lib. de Praed., loc. cit., p. [illegible]: habet esse duae essentiae.

(7) De Int. et Intellig., I, 2, 1, p. 490a: Alio modo et si non vocatur accumulabilitas secundae intentionis: et hoc accidit ei ex hoc quod est essentia apta fieri multis esse, sicut unumquam dat illud, et sic proprie vocatur universale: cf. Meta., 7, 6, 8, p. 362a: Universale autem quod dicunt esse in re est eadem rem participata a multis secundum potentiam; cf. Lib. de Praed., tr. 2, 3, p. 22a.

(8) De Int. et Intellig., I, 2, 2, p. 480b: Res hoc igitur aptitudinem universale est in re extra, sed secundum naturam existendi in multis non est in intellectu: et ideo dicerunt peripatetici quod universale non est nisi in intellectu, referentes hoc ad esse sale quod est in multis et dividitur secundum naturam existendi, et non secundum aptitudinem solam. cf. Metap., loc. cit., Universale autem quod est post res, est forma in esse abstractionis—, cf. Lib. de praed., loc. cit., p. 24a.

(9) Lib. de praed., 3, 6, p. 30ab: Ex idea una et eadem est essentia in De et in anima et in stantiaris: sed in anima secundum esse spiritualis, in singulari secundum esse materiale et naturale, in se autem in esse simplici.

(10) De Int. et Intellig., II, 2, 3, p. 494a: Sed forte quaerat aliquis ex his...et sic iterum velit, quod universale et aptitudine et natu est in solo intellectu, et nullo modo in re ipsa...natur est ante potentiam, et non secundum rationem tantum...sed ipsa substantia et diffinitione....

(11) op. cit., 6, p. 496b; cf. Metap., V, 6, 5, p. 24b: et hoc est forma sed causa formalis semper constituens esse rei.

(12) De Int. et Intellig. I, 3, 8, p. 494a: aliud causa est ante causatum, et habet esse naturae et essentiae...licet non habent esse nisi in natura particulari; cf. Metap. V, 6, 7, p. 30b: hoc igitur modo accipit natura secundum ea vere est causa eorum quorum illa natura est: et hoc modo secundum naturam est ante rem ipsam.

(13) cf. preceding note.

(14) De Int. et Intellig., II, 2, 3, p. 494a.

(15) Metap., V, 4, 5, p. 22ab: Natur enim dicitur forma et proprius effectus est esse in omni quod est: hoc autem cum indifferens sit in omnibus quae sunt ejusdem speciei vel formae et quantum est de se sic individuum habet unum ad omnia vel multa relationem, et sic accipit universalitatis quandam naturam et rationem.

(16) op. cit., cap. 7, p.304ab: Si ergo quaeratur a nobis, cum homo secundum id quod est homo accipitur, utrum sit commune,

vel genera, vel species, vel saltem [illegible] quod necessitat quod hoc est hoc, nihil est horum; quia nihil horum difficit ipsum; sed sortis haec consequuntur esse ipsum.

(17) Metap., loc. cit., cap. 9, p. 3054b. How truly St. Albert spoke can be seen merely by turning to Avicenna himself for easy verification. In Avicenna there is a decided refusal to confuse the nature in itself either with the individual or with the concept. For he clearly distinguishes between the mode of a thing in the intellect and in se. And the case is the same in considering a genus or a species. Take for example the genus animal; the animality of the animal is rigidly only what it is whether it be in a material being or in the intellect. For in se it is neither universal nor particular. And so in the species. His famous example is of equinitas; in se the nature of horse is only that to which one can attribute the universal or the singular. It is neither in itself. That Avicenna is the source of St. Albert on this doctrine seems fairly evident in the light of the texts themselves. For Avicenna, cf. Logica, P. III, T. Dra: Sonnemus autem in hoc exemplum generis, dicentes quod animal est in se quoddam, et idem est aliquid sit sensibile, aut sit intellectum in actu. In se autem esse hujus non est universale; nec est singulare. Si enim in se esset universale ita quod animalitas, ex hoc quod quod est animalitas, esset universalis, oportaret aliud animal esse singulare, nisi esset animal esset universale. Si autem animal ex hoc quod est animal esset singulare, impossibile esset esse plus quam aliud singulare, scilicet, ipsum singulare cui debet animalitas, et esse impossibile aliud singulare esse animal. Animal autem in se est quoddam intellectum in actu quod sit animal, et secundum hoc quod intelligitur esse animal, non est nisi animal tantum. Si autem praeter hoc intelligitur esse universale, aut singulare, aut aliquid aliud, jam intelligitur praeter hoc quiddam, scilicet id quod est animal, quod auxilit animalitati. cf. Avic., Metap., tr. v, cap. 1, T. Dra: Differentia equinitatis est praeter differentiam universalitatis; sed universalitas continetur in differentiam equinitatis. Equinitas etiam habet differentiam quae non est universalitatis. Sed non est auxilit universalitas; ipsa ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum. Ipsa enim in se nec est multa nec una, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu,

ita ut hoc contingatur intra essentiam equinitatis. These texts are quoted from E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 180, 181, note 1.

(18) Meta., V, 4, 7, p. 366: Intuge autem (ita quia est universale simplex, natura est secundum aliquem existens, ex suis consequentibus differentibus: nat si ipse est primus differens, tunc ipse consistit absolute in sua quidditate, et non accipitur conjuncta aliqui proprietati vel accidenti vel respectui quae consequuntur esse suum: sicut si dicamus quod homo secundum ipsum quod homo est vel quod est homo: sic enim non pendet esse suum ex intellectu esse vel in opposito esse: quia secundum hoc nihil est de esse suo, quod non ingreditur in suam rationem differentivam: si ita hoc sola natura est propria, neque commune, neque unum, neque multa, quia nihil horum est in ratione differentiae, generis non exigunt quin qualibet istorum accrescat si per aliquid adjungatur natura sua sive substantiae.

(19) Ibid., p. 366a.

(20) Meta., III, L. 4, vol. 2, p. 180a; op. cit., XII, 2, 11, p. 747ab.

(21) Meta., loc. cit., p. 747b: quia universalia natura est particularis, non quidem secundum quod est universale, quia sic non est substantia, sed secundum quod est natura simplex cui accidit esse universale, et esse in intellectu.... Verum igitur quia si necesse est principia substantiae universalia esse, necesse est etiam ea quae sunt ex his esse universalia: sed haec sunt principia non ut in natura, sed ut in demonstrationibus accepta: et licet eadem sint secundum esse principia essendi et scienti, tamen non sunt eadem modo accepta.... A multiplication of texts on this point would be pointless; they are to be found frequently in all of St. Albert's works and each is in complete agreement with the other. The same may be said of the texts on the notion of universality occuring or happening to the intelligible nature, cf. Meta., V, 6, 7, p. 366a: In inductis autem quod propositum intentionem est hoc accipere, quod natura illa cui accidit universalitas, in se est unum quid.

(22) cf. Sh. III, p. 7; cf. Mein, loc. cit., p. 404b; see lib. de Praed., II, 8, p. 37b-38a.

(33) Lib. de Praed., II, 3, p. [illegible]: et in intellectu concipiente per abstractionem et per universalitatem agente et educente. The direct influence of Avicenna is unmistakable throughout this whole problem. cf. Avicenna, Logica, P. III, C. 9st: Similitas animal in intellectu quidem est, et ejus universalitas sive generalitas aliud quiddam, et hoc quod est animal generale aliud quiddam. Et generalitas vocatur genus logicum, de qua intelligitur quod predicetur de multis differentibus specie et interrogationem factam per quid, et non exprimit vel designat aliquid quod sit animal vel aliud aliquid, sicut album quod in se est aliquid intellectum. Sed quod sit homo aut lapis, esset praeter id quod intelligitur de illo, sed consequenter ad illud, et putatur esse unum, et genus logicum est hoc. Naturale enim genus est animal secundum quod est animal, quod est aptum ad hoc ut ei quod intelligitur de illo ponatur comparatio generalitatis. Quoted from E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 131, n. 4.

(34) Lib. de Praed., II, 3, p. [illegible]: Et anima intellectualis fruit et operatur et invenit formas suas sub specie et forma luminis....

(35) Meta., V, 6, 7, p. [illegible]: Set autem hic quidem adverterunt valde notabile: ex quo enim una et simplex est natura quae secundum se neque est in intellectu, neque in rebus, haec pro certo quantum est de se est una ubique et semper: et per hoc quod est in anima, nihil horum amittit:

(36) Lib. de Praed., II, 6, p. [illegible]b: Sed autem quaeritur, qualiter sit in anima et in se et in singulari, dico cum Aristotelos et Peripatetici, quod est in omnibus hic per suam praesentiam realem, et realiter acceptum:

(37) Lib. de Praed., II, 3, p. [illegible]b: dicimus quod universalia, hoc est, natura quae universalia ponitur, secundum se accepta sunt et verissime sunt ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia et invariabilia. Sunt etiam entia, vel praeter intellectum solum, nullum et purum....cf. op. cit., cap. 6, p. 38ab.

(38) De Int. et Intellig., I, 4, 2, p. 694a: Si autem quis objeciat, quod secundum dicto universale est ante rem et non post ipsam...dicat quod universale aut nihil est, aut

posterius sulo singularibus: dicimus, quod id quod est universale, absque dubio est ante res: sed utrum sane universalitatis quem facit agens intellectus, est ex eo quod est in re quidditas rei existentis, quae vere praeexistit de re ipsa: et quod hoc est consequens res statuatur ex re ipsa: cf. Lib. de Praed., II, 3, pt 3, p. [illegible] Meta., V, 6, 3, p. [illegible]: In universali quidem aliud est id quod est ipsum universale, et aliud est universalitas sive universitas ipsius, dicit in hoc universali, homo, aliud est ipse natura quae homo est: et aliud est communitas ipsius sive communio.... For texts supplementing those from Avicenna cited above and evidencing the doubtful course of St. Albert's position cf. Avicenna Metaphysica Compendium, Tr. I, Cr. VIII, cap. 1, ed. cit., p. [illegible].

(29) Sum. de Creat., II, 2, 68, a. 2, ad 2. 3, vol. 35, p. 503b: sicut omnis rationalitas referri habet ad rem intellectam: cf. op. cit., q. 49, a. 2, ad 1, p. 414b, and loc. cit., ad obj. 3, 4, 5, p. 416a; De Anima, III, 3, 4, vol. 5, p.[illegible]: different forms rei et intentio rei: forma enim est propria quae informando dat esse.... Intentio autem rei est id per quod significatur res individualiter sive universaliter, secundum diversos gradus abstractionis: et haec non dat esse, nec sensui quando est in ipso, nec etiam intellectui quando est in ipso, sed aliquam facit de re et notitiam: et idea intentio non est pura rei aliqua forma, sed potius est species totius notitiae rei.

NOTES ON CHAPTER [illegible]

(1) De int. et intellig., II, 1, 2, Vol. 9, p. 300b: virtus intelligentiae appellatur hic quae agit, et habit et, et inficit ale formas quae sunt hoc quod ipsa est et non acquisitae in ea, et dominat omnia in homine sup...Op. cit., II, p. 519b: est homo activus et formativus omnium rerum quae sunt ordinis inferioris: et idem magis extensis ad rerum naturae determinandas op. cit., p. 308a.

(2) op. cit., 3, p. 308b: hoc autem intellectuale est in omnibus quae sunt intellectus et ratio eorum quae intelligunt. Hoc ergo intellectuale est in omnibus intelligibilibus.

(3) op. cit., 3, p. 307b-308a: formae enim exteriores non agunt nisi prout sunt intellectae quidem, et agunt sub lumine intelligentiae agentis (Dei) quod est in ipsis, et sic agere possunt in possibilem intellectum.

(4) Op. Phil., II, tr. 15, c. 83, m. 2, sol., vol. 33, p. 308b: Intellectus agens...eo quod ille est imago et similitudo quaedam luminis primae causae sive Dei....

(5) In I Sent., D. II, 4, a. 3, sol., vol. 28, p. 93b-94a: dicitur quod in anima ad quod accipiat scientiam veritatis aliquantur quatuor: intellectus possibilis qui partus sit recipere: et secundo, intellectus agens cujus lumine fiat abstractio specierum in quibus est veritas, vel verum illud: et tertio, res objecta per lumen, vel deiformes de qua est veritas illa: et quarto, principia et dignitates quae sunt quasi quaedam instrumenta proportionantes compositiones et divisiones possibiles et impossibiles et necessarias ex quibus veram accipitur. Inter haec quatuor, primum est recipiens tantum: tertium est recipiens et agente intellecta et duae lumen veritatis distinctae possibili: quartum autem est actus et instrumentum, et omnes compositiones et divisiones ejus in que est verum scitum vel quaesitum. Ende quidam philosophi dixerunt quod ista sufficerent ad cognitionem veri quod est sub natura. Sed alitey dicendum arbitrat, quod lux intellectus agentis non sufficit per se, nisi per applicationem luminis increati, sicut applicatur radium solis ad radium stellae. Et hoc contingit duplicitae, scilicet, secundum lumen duplicatum tantum, vel etiam triplicatum:

duplicatum ut si fiat conjunctio ad lumen intellectus in creati, et illud lumen est interior magistro. Quandoque autem fit ad conjunctionem intellectus angelici et divini: quia Philosophi quidem aliqua paraverunt instrumentum intelligentiae, ex quod intelligentia lapsivit in eas vera illuminationem...nihil videtur nisi per lumen primum.

St. Albert takes this reference to God's illuminating as the inner master from St. Augustine for whom the technical structure was radically different. With St. Augustine the Divine Illumination functioned less for the formation of the concept than for the knowledge of the truth. It bore not on any abstraction by any agent intellect. The Divine Illumination intervenes not in the faculty of conceiving but of judging wherein it insures the characters of necessity, immutability and eternity of the present truth. For one of the pertinent texts in St. Augustine on the inner master cf. De Magistro XII, 39, P. L. 32, col. 1216. The complete treatment of this problem in St. Augustine is to be found in E. Gilson, Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Augustin, ed. cit., p. 67-126.

(6) op. cit., ed. cit., p. 608. Et hoc ergo quod quaeritur, Utrum existitur oppositio gratiae novae, Liceatum quod si gratia vocatur quodlibet donum a Deo gratis datum, hoc non fit hoc sine gratia: ita dicit quidem Philosophus, quod etiamsi aliquid maiatur in habitu, non fiet conversio ad actum nisi per conversionem ad lumen intellectus increati. It appears that Avicenna is behind this notion of the renewed application of a light, in this sense, that Avicenna taught the necessity of turning to the agent Intelligence for his re-apprehensions. However, St. Albert did not disavow an intellectual memory as did Avicenna; hence the cases are not precisely alike. cf. Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., c. I, 68, F. 8v col. E. For this notion of grace and its place in St. Augustine's thought cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 104.

(7) Sum. Theol. tr. 2, q. 10, m. 2, a. 2, sol. vol. 41, p. 110b-111a: Concedimus enim est, quod sine lumine illuminante intellectum pullius agentis intellectus naturae possibilis passivus est. Per hoc enim lumen efficitur intellectus possibilis oculus ad videndum: et hoc lumen ad naturalia recipienda, naturale est: ad credenda vero, gratuitus est: ad beatificandum autem, gloria est. Totum autem gratuitum est, secundum quod gratia dicitur omne illud, quod superadditum est naturae.

(8) ibid., Sed autem lumen sic descendens, non est aliquid conferens cognitio ut cognoscibile sit, sed est conferens cognoscenti ut cognoscere possit.

(9) In Coelesti Hierarchia, cap., 9, 4, sol. and ad 2, 3, vol. 14, p. [illegible]: Ad secundum dicendum, quod cognitio hominis incipit a phantasmate, et terminatur ad intellectum: et secundum hunc viam potest etiam illuminari ab Angelis, cum non sufficiat ad abstractionem omnium specierum lumen intellectus agentis, nisi adjungatur lumen angelicum vel divinum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod angelus non illuminat virtute propria, sed virtute divini luminis: et ideo ordinatur ad idem illuminatum.

(10) De Int. et Intelligi., II, 1, 3, Vol. 5, p. 507a: Sed hunc ergo modum quo universitas corporalium habet unum primum agens in his quae quae fiunt et fiunt unum ad ultimum factum, quod est lux solis, ex eo quod irradiat lux agentis primi intellectus: et nisi irradiaret ejus lumen, lux solis non esset effectiva formarum corporalium. Ita est in quolibet universo: oportet etiam ita in entibus inesse secundum multitudinem et universitatem intellectualis esse quod fit in ipso et in intellectu ipsius. Jam autem facile est ostendere, quod agens est in eo sicut lux: quia est universaliter agens:

(11) op. cit., 2, p. 505b.

(12) op. cit., p. 504b.

(13) De anima, I, 1, 1, vol. 5, p. 110b: Videt ergo sic omnis nostra cognitio a sensibilibus incipit, tamen profundata virtus ea quae sensibilibus quocunque modo attribuuntur, non semper stat et terminatur circa sensibilia, sed extollitur vehementer in intellectum ad ardua et remota a sensibilibus, sicut causam primam et intelligentias et seipsam: eo quod advertit circa sensibilia negotiando, ratiocinando, et intelligendo sensibilium quidditates: ne per hoc incipit quaerere de seipsa, et de seipsa habere scientiam nobilissimam.

(14) op. cit., III, 2, 2, p. 377b; op. cit., III, 2, 12, p. 389b-390a; Sum. Theol., II, Qu. 4, Q. 14, A. 5, p. 4, ad 1, vol. 30, p. 19[illegible]; De Int. et Intelligi., II, 1, 6, vol. 5, p. 513b.

(15) De Int. et Intelligi., II, 1, 6, vol. 9, p. 510a.

(16) De Anim., III, 4, 10, vol. 5, p. 267b: Sit ergo intellectus possibilis ipsum intellectum, sicut sit potentia actus, quarto ad actum mutatur: sed hoc potissimum est in intellectu ex quod intellectus et intellectum sunt idem re aliter.
cf. Aristotle, Meta., XI, 7, 1072b20-23, quoted from the Gillius of Moerbeke translation, as he found in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis--In Duodecim Libros Aristotelis Commentaria, Cathala, Marietti, Turin, 1950, p. 714. St. Albert could also have read this formula in the work with which he was highly familiar, Liber de Causis, P. 12, Bardenhewer ed. cit., p. 175: quod est quia intelligens et intellectum sunt simul.

(17) De Int. et Intelligi., II, 1, 5, vol. 9, p. 510b: Ita lumen quod est actus intellectus agentis, est forma et intellectus possibilis et ejus quod intelligitur: hoc enim duo quantum ad esse intellectuale unius sunt naturae et potentiae.... Et quia sunt unius potentiae, sunt enim unius perfectionem secundum formam: et idem una forma utrumque perficit: lumen ergo agentis est, quod formam rei quae intelligitur,ducit de potentia in actum, et quod possibile ducit in actum.

(18) loc. cit., p. 511a: In inductis etiam...intelligit:

(19) loc. cit., 510b: Igne sunt duae quae intellectus secundum esse quod habet intelligibiles species, II, 1, 3, vol. 9, p. 507a: Intellectus formalis est, qui induxerit possibili et intelligibilitas de actione agentis provenimus.... The source of the intellectus formalis in St. Albert is vague. St. Albert ascribes it to: philosophi peripateticorum. Neither Alexander of Aphrodisias, Isaac Israeli, the Liber de Causis, Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel nor Averroes seem to have employed the phrase. In any event he could have read the notion of the agent intellect as form of what Averroes calls the material intellect in Averroes. Averroes writes that Themistius held this doctrine and he himself teaches that the agent intellect serves as form. cf. Averroes, op. cit., f. 170va44-47; f. 170vb22-23; f. 180ra37-b1. That this meant for Averroes we shall see presently.

(20) De Int. et Intelligi., II, 1, 4, p. 511b: Sic enim dicitur intellectus in effectu efficitur potentia intellectus; cf. op. cit., 8, p. 515a: et per id quod in effectu efficitur,

In parte quidem recipitur, quod partem possibilitatis ejus penit in effectu, et plus et plus recipitur, quando plus et plus per esse penitur in effectu. The intellectus in effectu has common property among those in the De Intellectu et Intelligibili tradition; cf. Chapter XI, n. 11, p. 421; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, op. cit., p. 76-77; Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 114-115; cf. Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., op. cit., I. 5v col. 4; Averroes, op. cit., p. 17b, 15-18.

(21) De int. et intellig., II, 1, 7, p. 310b-314.

(22) De Anima, III, 5, 4, vol. 5, p. 377a: prior est intellectus agens et habitus primorum principiorum quae scimus per naturam in quantum terminus separationis. Haec enim principia sunt quasi instrumenta quibus intellectus agens educit possibilem de potentia ad actum.

(23) De Anima III, 5, 11, p. 300b: The notes discussions in parts ab Averroes...substantiam separatam.

(24) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 55, a. 6, ad q. 1, vol. 25, p. 475a: non enim separatur nisi in potentia, conjunctus autem actu: cf. De Anima, loc. cit., p. 300a: sed tamen ipse qui operatur intellectus, iterum hoc non semper sibi conjunctionem est intellectui possibili: quia etiam est separatus.

(25) De Anima, loc. cit., p. 300b. While St. Albert ascribes this to Alfarabi it is to be found in the same fashion, even to the quotations, from Alfarabi, in Averroes. Because of the rigid textual fidelity to Averroes here, and in the rest of this chapter of the De Anima, it seems safe to cite Averroes as the source, cf. Averroes, op. cit., text. com. 36, f. 170v40-50; f. 179v1-26; f. [illegible]-60. Alfarabi speaks of the agent intellect, the last separate intelligence, as being joined to the human intellect as a form and the development does not take the order we find in Averroes and in St. Albert; cf. Alfarabi, De Intellectu et Intelligibili, cf. 011000, in (Aristote d'Alex.--II) 1938, p. 111, l. [illegible]-[illegible].

(26) De Anima, loc. cit., p. 300b.

(27) op. cit., p. 386b-387a. cf. Sum. Theol., II, tr. 15, q. 58, m. 2, sol., vol. 3, p. 282b.

(28) De Int. et Intellig., II, 1, 8, vol. 9, p. 514b.

(29) De Anima, III, 3, 11, vol. 5, p. 387a.

(30) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 57, a. 1, sol., vol. 35, p. 488ab. cf. Sum. Theol. II, tr. 15, q. 85, m. 2, sol. vol. 33, p. [illegible].

(31) De Int. et Intellig. I, 3, 5, vol. 9, p. 501a. cf. supra Chapter III, p. 24, p. 224 and 225.

(32) cf. Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 130, l. 178- p. 131, l. 229; cf. Alkindi, op. cit., p. 27-28.

(33) Avicenna, Lib. vi Nat., P. 1, cap. 5, f. 5v col. 2; op. cit., P. 1, cap. 4, f. 20v col. 1.

(34) Averroes, op. cit., t. c. 36, f. 176Va16-36.

(35) Averroes, op. cit., t. c. 36, f. 179Va15-[illegible]. This text, too lengthy to be quoted, is a remarkably succinct statement of Averroes' own position on the problems under discussion.

(36) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 12, q. 79, m. 1, a. 4, sd. 11, vol. 31, p. 17b: Intellectus est aliquid animae, qui est ad modum intellectus qui est dator formarum et separatus:

(37) De Int. et Intellig., II, 1, 8, vol. 9, p. 510a-510b. cf. Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 131, l. 207-134, l. 314.

(38) De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 8, vol. 9, p. 454b, et sicut nisi quando convertit speculativam suam ad intelligentias unde venit primo ista speculativa: et sic per omnes devenimus ad causam primam unde dependet secundum esse suae necessitatis: cf. De Int. et Intellig. II, 1, 9, vol. 9, p. 516ab.

(39) De Int. et Intellig., loc. cit.: Sed autem intellectus assistativus, in quo homo quantum possibile sibi fuit est proportionabiliter surgit ad intellectum divinum, qui est lumen et causa omnium...extendit se in luminibus intelligentiarum ascendens gradatim ad intellectum et pleces divinum: devenit ergo ex lumine sui agentis in lumen intelligentiae, et ex illo extendit se ad intellectum Dei.

(40) De Int. et Intellig., II, 1, 2, p. 506b: Quaerent autem fortasse aliquis, unde habent intelligentia formae...? ...quaerere enim inde intelligentia alicujus animis habent horum quae sunt, idem est quaerere, unde habent intelligentia, et quid est intelligentia. cf. Liber de Causis, p. 3, 96. Hentschel, p. 170, l. 18: omnis intelligentia plena est formis. This was a notion common to all the Arabians as well.

(41) op. cit., cap. 9, p. 517b: Hic autem hoc notandum, quod cuilibet superiorum intellectuum intellectus applicatur humanus, qui est unus de formis mundi, a lumine istius influent in ipsum formae et species sui ordinis: et idem quodam modo illius ordinis efficitur in ipso per omnipotem sejus potest ille recipere. Et sicut quod fit in aliquo, fit in eo secundum potentiam suscipientis ipsum... cf. Liber de Causis, op. cit., p. 9, p. 174, l. 16-17: et similiter aliquis ex rebus non recipit quod est supra eos nisi per modum secundum quem potest recipere ipsum, non per modum secundum quem est res recepta; cf. Ibid., p. 11, p. 178 l. 9-10.

(42) op. cit., cap. 11, p. 519b: Thus the intellectus assimilativus of St. Albert is precisely the intellectus agentus of Alfarabi, Avicenna and his 'philosophical twin', Averroes. cf. p. 124-125, n. 32 and 33.

(43) De Int. et Intellig., II, 1, 10, p. 516ab: Hic autem non addit novam quam perfectionis et intellectus, sed solam quandam positio sicut circa intellectum.... Verum est quam perfectio quae in hoc vita consequi potest homini. Continet autem plus et plus secundum quod mens est perceptive illuminatione, quae sunt a prima causa lux et lumen.

(44) De Anima, III, 5, 11, vol. 5, p. 550ab; cf. De Int. et Intellig., II, 1, 11, p. 505b.

(45) Sup. de Quent., II, t. 60, ad 4, vol. 36, p. 310a: Et ab Avicenna vocatur intellectum genetus ex quod intelligibilia fluunt in ipsum virtute intelligentiae agentis, et non ab alio adminiculo. We find Avicenna calling this most sublime intellectual state virtus sancta, cf. Avicenna, op. cit., l. V, cap. 6, f. 100b. In the same chapter, f. 90va, we read: hoc autem dispositio intellectus materialis

debet vocare intellectus secundus. Evidently the manuscript which St. Albert used had intellectus mentis in this place. Let us say with Father G. de Vaux O. P. that the remote intellectus secundus is "une capacité des créatures", cf. G. de Vaux O. P., Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin, Paris, Vrin, 1934, p. 8. For the source of these speculations in St. Albert cf. Grignon, loc. cit., p. 66ff.

(46) De anima, III, 3, 11, vol. 5, p. 207b.

(47) loc. cit., p. 208a.

(48) Sum. Theol., I, Prol. vol. 31, p. 4: In nullo scibili quiescit animus, nisi deducat illud ad scibile primum.... Et ideo docent philosophi, quod aliquis per separationem a continuo et tempore, hoc est, ab imaginabilibus et sensibilibus, sunt adipiscitur intellectum, ut possumus intellectu applicando ad divina quiescat. cf. ibid. Albert is influenced not only by the Arabians on this point but by St. Augustine when he says he said: Fecisti nos ad te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te, (ibid.). For St. Augustine cf. Lib. I, Confessionum, cap. 1, M. P. L. 32, col. 661.

(49) De Int. et Intellig., II, 1, 1a, vol. 5, p. 240b: Sunt enim divinum et operationem non perficiunt nisi a materia separatum: ab anima quod non separatur nisi ab anima humana perfecta separatione. Quarto igitur, quod per separantem a materia intellectum et esse divinum pervenitur. Quinto autem reductio non fit per intellectum mentis: quia illorum intellectus habet esse separatum in esse et operatione divina. Fit ergo necessario per intellectum hominis qui ad hoc habet vires et organa, ut a materia accipiat formas divinas..., forma non est sufficiens facta divina per hoc quod efficitur intellectus qui dicitur in effectu vel adeptus: sed divina fit per intellectum assimilantem, et eum qui vocatur divinus: The soul of man enjoys an eminent position in the economy of the universe for, as joined to a body, it acts as a means of the return of the material world to God. This is St. Albert's expression of the same idea which is found in the Pseudo-Dionysius. For the Pseudo-Dionysius, cf. De Coelestia Hierarchia, cap. v, no. 6, M. P. G. vol. 3, col. 300, and in Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. iv, no. 3, M. P. G. 3, (Lat. transl.), col. 191a.

(50) loc. cit., substantia habens esse divinum et operationem, non indiget aliquo: ergo anima sic reducta de sensibilibus et materia corporea, non indigeat, ea quod materialia et instrumentalia praeter non sedulit secundum entitatem aliud ad hoc ut ad esse divinum reducatur: stat igitur substantia et remanet in esse divino in esse perfecto. This total independence of the body can be read in Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 134, l. 314-320.

(51) loc. cit., et hac necessaria philosophi ponunt alterius et immortalis vitae, per quam vere perfiatur animae beatitudo immortalitas.

(52) De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 4, vol. 5, p. 454b: et sic per omnes deveniens ad causam primam unde dependet secundum esse sano necessitatis: et sic continuabitur radici immortalitatis et felicitatis aeternae.

(53) Sum. de Creat., II, q. 65, a. 5, ad quaest. 4, vol. 22, p. 474a: dicendum quod principium immortalitatis possibilis intellectus est ab intellectu agente, sicut et esse suum est ab agente.

(54) Sum. Theol., II, tr. 15, q. 77, m. 3, Opera Vis., Vol. 33, p. 70: Et hoc est ratio est Alfarabi in libro de Intellectu et Intelligibili...utitur enim ea ad hoc, quod aeternam causam quare anima posita est in corpore, ut scilicet adipiscatur intellectum ex intelligibilibus per disciplinam, ex quo habent radicem immortalitatis. Et sic bona est ratio ab fortiori: cf. op. cit., tr. 18, q. 55, m. 2, p. 222b: Et idem Alfarabius in libro de Intellectu et Intelligibili quod intellectus in omnibus intellectis adipiscatur aeternam et generium lumen suum. Et idem dicit ibidem, quod omnes philosophi ponunt in tali intellectu radicem immortalitatis animae. The phrase radix immortalitatis does not appear in the De Intellectu et Intellecto of Alfarabi. However, the thought expressed by the phrase is developed there at length by Alfarabi. cf. Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 133, l. 307-p. 134, l. 328.

(55) De Intellectu et Intelligibili, II, 1, 13, p. 511a.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Principal Sources.

1. St. Albert the Great.—Opera Omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, 1890, 38 vols., 1890-1899.

2. Albertus.—De Intellectu et Intellecto, ed. E. Gilson, (Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen age, iv, 1929), p.

3. Alfred of Sarashel.—De Motu Cordis, ed. C. Baeumker, (Beiträge, xxiii, 1-2), Münster i. W., 1923.

4. Alexel.—Alexel's Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle, (St. Michael's Mediaeval Studies) Toronto, 1933.

5. Aristotle.—De Anima, (Sancti Thomae aquin. in Aristot. Lib. de Anim Comm.), ed. Pirotta, Marietti, Turin, 1938.

6. —Opera Omnia, vol. X, Didot, Paris, 1850.

7. St. Augustine.—Opera Omnia, in Migne, P. L. vol. 32-47.

8. Averroes.—Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri Omnes—cum Averrois Cordubensis Variis in eosdem Commentariis, vol. VI, Venetiis apud Junctas, 1562.

9. —Opera De Substantia Orbis, Venice, Junctae, 1573.

10. Avicenna.—Opera Omnia, Liber Sextus Naturalium, Venice, 1508.

11. —Liber Physicae Compendium ex Arabo in latinum reddidit et adnotationibus adornavit, N. Caraccio, Rome, 1986.

12. Boethius.—Opera Omnia, in Migne, P. L. vol. 63-64.

13. Albertus Magnus.—De Differentia Spiritus et Animae, ed. E. A. Scheck, Innsbruck, 1870.

14. Confessio Sadducaeorum.—De Anima, Vatican Latin 66, 3186.

15. Ibn Sabirol.—Fons Vitae, ed. C. Baumker (Beiträge, I, 2—, Münster, i. W., 1892-1897.

16. —Liber de Causis, ed. Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1892.

17. Damascius.—In Sciam Dominii, in Rigos, P. G. vol. 40.

18. —In Sciam Parmenid, in the tr. of Burgundius of Pisa, ed. G. Kurfiard, Vindobonae, 1902.

19. Plato.—The Loeb Classical Library Series, 1925.

20. St. Thomas Aquinas.—Opera Omnia, iussu Leonis XIII edita, Romae, 1882-(15 vols. have appeared).

II. References.

21. Geyer, B.—Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus, Münst, Leipzig, 1906.

22. Weber, J. J.—La double définition de l'âme humaine chez Saint Albert le Grand, (Études et Recherches, Phil. Cahier I, Coll. Soc., Ottawa, 1934).

23. Ueberweg, F.—Geschichte der Europäischen Philosophie, Fünfte, Auflage, Berlin, 1923.

24. Gilson, E.—Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin (Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen age, I, 1926).

25. —Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot (Archives d'hist. —, II, 1927).

26. —Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin (Études de Philosophie médiévale, XI), Paris, 1929.

27. —Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme médiévalisant (Archives d'hist.—, IV, 1929).

29. —L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, 2 vols. Paris, 1932.

30. —Pour mieux voir, un mot d'encouragement, (Archives d'hist.—viii, 1933)

31. Meyer, A.—Le Concile de Metz et l'œuvre théologique de Albert le Grand (Archives d'hist.—c, 1933).

32. Mottin, G.—Notes sur les premiers ouvrages théologiques d'Albert le Grand (Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale iv, 1932).

33. —Commentaire des Sentences et œuvre théologique d'Albert le Grand (Recherches de théol. anc. et méd. viii, 1936)

34. —Lexicon III, (Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale, iii, (Revue des Recherches de théol. anc. et méd., Avril-Juillet, 1937).

35. Pelzbrot aus Lesarten.—Philosophia Thomista (Bibliothecae Scholae, 17, Mainz, 1931.

36. Pennacchi, P. G.—Introduzione in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni O. P., Marietti, Roma, 1931.

37. Pouillon, J. M.—Sur l'usage de Bartholomaeus Brunelatus à l'œuvre de Albert le Grand in Ioann, (Archives d'hist.—xii, 1939.

38. Roy, J.—La Philosophie chrétienne des Docteurs des temps modernes (Québec—ii, Montréal, 1937).

39. Smith, L. D.—St. Thomas and the problem of the soul in the thirteenth century, St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1932.

40. Talamo-Cancelli, M. L.—Le fonti ed importanza de S. Thomas d'Aquin, (Philosophia Thomista, viii), Bain, 1934.

41. —Se la scolastica scientifica sia Albert le Grand che se ne liberò contro l'errore "de Unitate Intellectus" et sua Theologia, Il, xi, xii, n. 77, n. 1, (Archives d'hist. —i, 1933).

42. Vulpes, E.—Lessai et les Latins, (Archives d'hist.—c, 1934).

61. —Note sur la première influence d'Averroès, (Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie, 40, 1937).

62. Schneider, J.—Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen, (Beiträge—19-VI, Münster, 1906.

63. Schneider, J. H.—Die Philosophie des Thomas, und Ein Beitrag zur die Philosophie des christlichen Mittelalters, (Beiträge—XIII), Münster, 1914.

64. Thery,—Autour du procès de Siger II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, (Bibliotheca Thomista, VII) Kain, 1924.

65. —Le Commentaire de Maître Eckhart sur le Livre de la Sagesse, (Archives d'hist.—III, 1928)

66. De Vaux, R.—Le premier Averroès chez les latins, (Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques, XX, 1931).

67. —Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme latin, Vrin, Paris, 1934.

68. De Wulf, M.—Histoire de la philosophie, 6 vols., Vrin, Paris, 1934.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

Albert the Great, St.: *in toto*
Alcher of Clairvaux: 189.
Alcuin: 189.
Alexander Neckham: 4, 188.
Alexander of Aphrodisias: 88, 212, 251.
Alfanus of Salerno: 194.
Alfarabi: 88, 198, 199, 204, 207, 252, 312, 322, 323, 326.
Alfred of Sarashel (Alfredus Anglicus): 189, 322.
Algazel: 104, 108, 111, 119, 119, 210, 220, 230, 231, 234.
Alkindi: 55, 211.
Aristotle: i-iii, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 31, 39, 46, 51, 54, 92, 117, 119, 123, 138, 140, 157, 178, 180, 182, 193, 195, 198, 201, 202, 206, 213, 251.
Augustine, St.: i-iii, 3, 4, 8, 41-45, 49, 51, 72, 92, 145, 167, 178, 179, 181, 182, 188, 192, 206, 218, 230, 238, 236, 241, 249, 255.
Averroes: 6, 8-9, 13-14, 16-18, 40, 37, 49, 51, 56, 66, 67, 68, 92, 94, 104, 108, 111, 118, 119, 132, 141, 146, 160, 165, 167, 172, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 186, 189, 190, 193-197, 199, 201, 203, 215, 216, 224, 225, 231-236, 242, 246, 247, 249, 252-256.
Avertoes: 55, 67, 68, 113-119, 124, 125, 141, 156-158, 160, 165-180, 182, 218, 239-241, 251, 252, 253.

Bersch: 188, 191.
Bernard, St.: 3, 4, 188.
Boethius: 93, 99, 231, 236, 251.
Bonaventure of Fidanza: 194.
Burlaeus: 194.

Cassio: 216.
Cassiodorus: 4, 189.
Cellarius: 5, 190
Conte-de-Luna: 190, 191, 236.

Dabnert: 184, 212, 214.
Dominicus Gundissalinus: 190 *passim*.

Ethier: 206.

Saul: 187, 189, 193.
Gerard of Cremona: 214.
Geyer: 198, 210.
Gilbert of Poitiers: 99, 141, 188, 227, 253.
Gilson: 50, 198, 206-208, 211, 212, 216, 218, 223, 231, 238, 240, 244, 246, 247.
Gregory of Nissa: 193, 206, 212.

Hayen: 226.

Ibn Gebirol: 72, 230.
Isaac Israeli: 212, 251.

John of Damascus, St.: 5, 62, 187, 212, 217.
John of Spain: 189.

Kaerbling: 213.

Mandonnet: 207, 208.
Mark, St.: 212.
Meerssemann: 185, 187, 212.
Muckle: 216, 219, 233.

Nagy: 212.
Nemesius: 24, 25, 193, 194, 200, 201, 212.

Pegis: 187, 208.
Pelster: 186.
Plato: i-iii, 6-8, 37, 125, 191.
Pseudo-Dionysius: 255.

Remigius of Auxerre: 255.
Roland-Gosselin: 220, 221, 222, 228, 233.
Salman: 144, 216, 230.
Schedler: 213.
Schneider: 187, 188, 190.
Seneca: 4, 188.

Thery: 212, 213.
Thomas Aquinas, St.: 44,-48, 207.

De Vaux: 238, 239, 255.

William of Auvergne: 210.
De Wulf: 227.