


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THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.



THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

VOL. XIII. NEW SERIES.

JULY—OCTOBER,

MDCCCLXIX.

LONDON:

BURNS, OATES, & CO., 17 PORTMAN STREET,

AND 63 PATERNOSTER ROW.

DERBY: RICHARDSON & SONS.

DUBLIN: JAMES DUFFY; W. B. KELLY.

1869.

LONDON :
WYMAN AND SONS, PRINTERS, GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS, W.C.

THE
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JULY, 1869.

ART. I.—THE EARLY IRISH CHURCH.

Essays on the Origin, Doctrines, and Discipline of the Early Irish Church.
By the Rev. Dr. MORAN, Vice-Rector of the Irish College, Rome. Duffy,
1864.

THE British Parliament is not always a safe school of history. A statement in Hume apt for present debate is used without inquiry; whether since confirmed or confuted, it passes current in the House, and though its inaccuracy be afterwards proved, the misstatement has meanwhile travelled far and wide on the wings of the daily press to the newspaper readers of the kingdom, and truth in a pamphlet labours in vain to overtake it. The error floats in the superficial recollection of the many, whilst the authentic correction is stored but in the libraries and the memory of the few.

More than twenty years ago Lord John Manners, in a debate on "the Irish Arms Bill," stated "that the Roman Catholic Church was not the Church of the Irish people originally; that Church was for hundreds of years independent of Rome, and it was not till an English king conquered Ireland that the supremacy of the Pope was acknowledged by it."

Lord John Manners added, "This is no curious opinion, tortured out of obscure records, but is a received fact, stated in strong terms, among other historians, by Mr. O'Driscoll, a Roman Catholic himself." Dr. Rock, in his then letter to Lord John Manners, acknowledged that he did not know what might be the religious belief of Mr. O'Driscoll. It is a pity that Dr. Rock did not refer to Mr. O'Driscoll's "Views of Ireland," because he would at once have ascertained that Mr. O'Driscoll was an avowed and strong Protestant!

Yet Lord John Manners, upon the strength of Mr. O'Driscoll's Irish name (for nothing else in him or his book savours of Catholicity), quoted him as a Catholic authority, adequate to transmute a "curious opinion" into a "received fact." And such is the

parentage of many received facts in the British Parliament and in English society!

Last year this curious opinion was re-announced by the Archbishop of Armagh in his charge, and by the Bishop of Oxford in the House of Lords; its echo was heard on many hustings at the last election, and it has doubtless been received as a fact by most of the clergy and half the people of England.

Even if true it would be useless as an argument, since the length of ecclesiastical possession by Catholics in Ireland previous to the Reformation is admitted to have been at least equal to that of Protestants since; and whether, therefore, the Catholic Church had existed in Ireland for four hundred or for fourteen hundred years before the Reformation, its right by possession was then, even according to the Protestant view, more venerable than that of the Irish Established Church is now.

But the statement, though argumentatively useless if true, is positively untrue, nay, the very opposite to the fact; for, as Dr. Rock had proved before, Dr. Moran proves again, and more completely from the further evidence which has during the last twenty years come to light, and chiefly from Protestant sources, that S. Patrick was a Catholic, and a Roman Catholic, and that the Irish, his spiritual children, were and ever continued to be Catholics, in communion with the See of Rome, professing the distinctive doctrines and habituated to the distinctive practices of the Catholic Church, and that not a single Protestant doctrine or Protestant practice prevailed amongst them.

The Bishop of Oxford at the same time mentioned that S. Patrick himself informs us that his father and grandfather were, the one a priest, and the other a deacon; this and the extract from an old Irish canon, to which we shall next refer, form the most plausible grounds of inference on the Protestant side we have yet seen, though these relate to *discipline* only—and even these grounds disappear when they come to be examined. S. Patrick does mention the fact alluded to, but that it was the custom of priests and deacons then to marry by no means follows, any more than it would follow that, because the late Cardinal Weld had a daughter well known in English society, therefore it is the present custom for cardinals to marry. It is no very unfrequent circumstance for a layman left a widower with a child to become a priest; the only thing extraordinary is if it happened to have occurred with both father and son, and perhaps it was just because it was extraordinary that his father and grandfather should have been, the one a priest and the other a deacon, that S. Patrick mentioned it.

Dr. Todd writes thus:—"The following canon, the sixth of this synod, seems to have been enacted before the celibacy of the clergy was enforced in Ireland: 'What cleric soever . . . or if his

wife does not walk with her head veiled, let them (*i. e.*, the clerk and his wife) be despised by the laity, and also separated from the Church.' ”

That Dr. Todd has been misled by an erroneous copy of the language of the canon would appear from the following remarks of Dr. Moran :—

Dr. Todd supposes that the second part of the sixth canon above cited has relation to the *clerk's wife*; the original words, as quoted by him, of the text seem, indeed, to leave no doubt on this head: since, after speaking of *quicumque clericus*, it adds *et uxor ejus*. However, to say the least of it, Dr. Todd does not display his usual candour in this argument. When citing the original Latin text he refers to Martene's edition, and yet he forgets to mention that the word *ejus* (on which his own argument entirely rests) is omitted in Martene's text. If this word were supposed to form part of the original text it would supply an additional argument for the antiquity of these canons, as we should suppose these canons to have been enacted at a time when very many were assumed from the marriage state to the sacerdotal dignity, and when, consequently, a special enactment was required regarding the wives from whom the clergy should separate themselves, according to the disciplinary law of celibacy rigorously observed in our early Church. However this formula, *uxor ejus*, occurs only in the text of Spelman, from whose edition it was copied by Ware and some others. The MS. from which Spelman took this text seems to have been of the eleventh century; and he himself assures us that it was corrupt in many places, *pluries malesanum*, and standing in absolute need of critical correction, *et in locis quibusdam criticorum implorsus sagacitatem*. On the other hand, we have an accurate text of this ancient decree, *viz.*, as it is recorded in the “*Collectio Hibernensis Canonum*,” one of the most authentic of our ecclesiastical monuments, and dating from the year 700. Now, in this valuable record the canon of our apostle is thus quoted :—

“*Patricius : quicumque clericus ab ostiario usque ad sacerdotem, si non tunica usus fuerit, quæ turpitudinem ventris tegat et nuditatem, et si non more Romano capilli ejus tonsi sint : et uxor si non velato capite ambulaverit, pariter a laicis contemnentur et ab ecclesia separentur.*”

“Patrick decreed : Whatsoever cleric, from an ostiarius to a priest, who shall not wear a tunic to cover his nakedness, and whose hair is not shorn according to the custom of Rome; and a wife appearing in public with an unveiled head, shall be alike despised by the laity, and separated from the Church.”

Thus, then, there is nothing in the ancient canon of S. Patrick about the “clerk and his wife,” but whilst the first part of the canon presents an enactment regarding the clergy, the second part prescribes that married women, too, should adopt the law of Rome, and that only when veiled should they appear in public. In the Roman Church, as we learn from S. Jerome, the veil was worn by virgins consecrated to God, as a sign of their being espoused to Christ, and by married females, *in signum obedi-*

tie viro suo. Thus our apostle, whilst sanctioning the Roman usage, in regard to the ordinary dress of the clergy, wished, too, to introduce the veil as worn by the married females in Rome.

Dr. Moran's work displays much learning, industry, and critical power; he corrects many previous errors by access to later sources of information. His treatment of the subject is both exhaustive and conclusive; it is moderate in compass, good in style, close in argument, and contains much matter which cannot in so convenient a form, and perhaps not at all, be met with elsewhere, and we would strongly recommend its perusal to any of our readers who wish without very much trouble to obtain an accurate acquaintance with the subject.

We will endeavour, as far as space will admit, to show the outline and general purport of our author's remarks on the question whether S. Patrick and the early Irish were in communion with, and acknowledged the authority of the See of Rome, that being the most distinguishing test of their Catholicity, though the identity of the ancient Irish and of the present Catholic belief in other special doctrines is also satisfactorily established by Dr. Moran. And if we arrive at the conclusion that the Faith, then as now, of the Catholic Church was preached by S. Patrick, and adopted by his Irish disciples, and transmitted by them to their successors, and diffused by many of them throughout Europe, one other corroborative and consentient testimony would be furnished of that which stands secure upon other and independent grounds, and another illustration of what so frequently transpires in the pursuit of various branches of knowledge, that the facts of science and of history, and of all human knowledge, though sometimes at first, and when only partially known, they may seem to our limited faculties to conflict with Catholic Truth, yet when further investigated, and more carefully and fully comprehended, they are found singularly and uniformly to confirm it, and the more complete and accurate the knowledge the more exact and striking the confirmation.

S. Patrick, in his "Confessions," records that his family had a house near Bonavem Taberniæ, where we may presume he was born in 387. Ussher and others consider this place to have been Dumbarton, in Scotland, but it is now more generally believed to have been in Armorica, and near the present Boulogne.

During an invasion of that country by the Irish in 403, he was taken prisoner at the age of 16, and remained in servitude for six years in Ireland, until he escaped and returned to Gaul. He then determined to devote himself to the service of the Church, and to missionary labours in Ireland.

If we may venture from his actions to guess his character,

we should say that he was by nature strong both in body and mind, of a warm and enthusiastic temperament, which made him feel keenly for others, and inclined him to high and difficult enterprise; but with that peculiar instinct or genius which both leads and wins human nature, the shrewd good sense which grasps the practicable, and distinguishes it from the chimerical, and the firm and sustained determination which, combined with the previous qualities, enabled him to accomplish with apparent ease what few have ever accomplished in a manner equally complete, and with a result equally enduring. His early slavery (for such it was) for six years in Ireland made him sympathize with the sufferings, and acquainted with the language of the people; both inclined and enabled him to help them; he brooded over their condition, and how he might most effectually help them. He wished to serve both God and those who had been his fellows in suffering, and in order to this on his return home he devoted himself to the sacred ministry, and even then heard in a vision "the voice of the Hibernians" calling him to that great work which he afterwards undertook and accomplished, which would to many good men have been only a dream, or at most an abortive endeavour, but which his peculiar combination of the qualities of heart and mind, with the grace of God, enabled him to realize.

He studied four years in the celebrated monastery and college of St. Martin, near Tours, and afterwards placed himself under the direction of S. German of Auxerre. S. German and S. Lupus were in 429 sent by the Pope to Britain to eradicate from that country the errors of Pelagianism, and S. Patrick accompanied them as one of their disciples.

At the same time the attention of the Pope was called to the state of Christianity in Ireland, and he resolved to send a bishop there. S. Patrick was for this purpose sent by S. German with recommendations to the Holy Father, but before he arrived Palladius had departed for Ireland. Prosper, a contemporary writer, speaking of Palladius, says, "he was ordained by Pope Celestin, and sent the first bishop to the Scots (i.e. the Irish) believing in Christ," from which it is evident that there were previously Christians in Ireland, though without any bishop amongst them.

Palladius reached Ireland, remained there a few months, and founded three churches; but his success was not great, or equal to his hopes, and he retired dispirited to Britain, where he died.

Palladius, thus selected by the Pope to be bishop to the Irish, had been deacon of the Church of Rome, and left a distinguished position of honour and comfort to undertake an arduous duty. There is no reason to doubt that he was a good man, and he must have possessed many qualifications for the work for which he was

selected. His failure, therefore, only indicates the difficulties of the undertaking to a man of more than average aptitude, but who had not the extraordinary endowments, natural, such as those already mentioned, and acquired, such as the knowledge of the language, which were possessed by S. Patrick.

It would seem that news of the failure of Palladius had reached Rome, and that S. Patrick had been appointed his successor, or more probably, S. German, on hearing of the mission of Palladius to Ireland, had recommended to the Pope S. Patrick, from his knowledge of the Irish language and other qualifications, as coadjutor to Palladius; for when two or three of the disciples of Palladius set out to announce his appointment to his successor, they met S. Patrick in Gaul, on his way from Rome to Ireland. He then, after being consecrated bishop in Gaul, proceeded on his course, and arrived in Ireland in 432. His baptismal name was Succath: at the time of his ordination it was changed to Magonius, but Pope Celestin, to add dignity to his mission, had conferred upon him the Patrician order, which had been instituted by Constantine, the first Christian emperor, and he became afterwards generally known by the name of Patricius, which was originally a rank and not a name. The events in the life of S. Patrick thus briefly stated are one by one elaborately proved by Dr. Moran from contemporary or very early documents, the authenticity of which is admitted by Protestant authors.

There is not the slightest symptom apparent of any variance between the doctrines which he, fresh from Gaul, from Britain, and from Rome, taught, and those which the earlier Irish Christians had learned from their previous teachers, whoever they may have been. The doctrines of the Catholic faith, from whatever quarter derived, seem to have been uniformly identical; the very variances in discipline or practice, in the tonsure or in the time of observing Easter, and the importance which was attached to these and the pertinacity with which they were for a long time adhered to, serve only to prove that there could not have been any variances of doctrine or they would undoubtedly have appeared and have been made the most of, have been discussed with equal warmth and pertinacity, and have been either retained with obstinacy or abandoned with reluctance. Nothing of the sort appears, and the inference therefore is very strong, that nothing of the sort existed.

It is no part of our undertaking to give a detailed account of the piety, zeal, and wisdom of this Apostle of the Irish. He completed the great work of the conversion of Ireland, and he made it a solid and enduring work. The grace and blessing of God did this through him; but, as God usually effects His will by obvious human means, He in this instance also employed means peculiarly adapted to the end. The personal influence of S. Patrick must have been

very great, for he converted multitudes, the rich as well as the poor, and even induced kings whom he did not convert to appreciate his character and to tolerate his labours for the conversion of others ; and he penetrated to the most distant parts of the island. Indeed, the voice which he had heard in sleep had sounded to him from the woods fringing the western sea of Ireland, and the mountain which still bears his name—Croagh Patrick—and whither in later years he retired for the fast and prayer of Lent, towers in isolated grandeur over the far north-western coast of Clew Bay with its hundred islands. He was mild yet fearless, and with his strong discriminating sense and knowledge of mankind adapted himself to every rank and class of society. The poor, of course, were his readiest and most numerous hearers, but he made many converts among the sons and daughters of the chieftains. They admired and respected the man, though, like many persons in advanced life, they did not adopt the truth that was new to them ; and probably he was often a useful counsellor to them and a frequent mediator between them.

During the latter part of his life he wrote his “Confession,” for the purpose of informing foreigners of the redeeming change which God had through his ministry worked in the minds of the Irish. He died on 17th March, 465, being then seventy-eight years of age, though accounts vary as to his age and the period of his death.

What then was the faith taught by S. Patrick and his immediate successors ?

We confine ourselves to the acknowledgment of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, as without that all other agreement would be incomplete ; but our readers who refer to Dr. Moran’s *Essays* will find them equally conclusive as to the real presence and sacrifice of the altar, prayers for the dead, confession to and absolution by the priest, prayers to the Blessed Virgin and other saints for their intercession with God, and respect paid to relics, &c.

The doctrines taught by S. Patrick would naturally be, not only in conformity with those of the Pope who sent him, but also with those of the Church in Gaul where he had studied, and with those of S. Germanus of Auxerre, and S. Lupus of Troyes, with whom he had been intimate, the former of whom had recommended him to the Pope, and the disciple of both of whom he had been when they were sent by the Pope to oppose the Pelagian heresy in Britain. And it is not questioned that the doctrines then taught in Gaul and by S. Germanus and S. Lupus were identical with those of the Church of Rome.

The Protestant antiquary Petrie (*Essay on Tara*, p. 92) and Ussher (*Discourse, &c.* : Dub. 1815, p. 84) both admit the mission of S. Patrick from Rome. In the ancient tract preserved in the Book of Armagh, the first leaf, in which we would expect to

find the relations between S. Patrick and Pope Celestine mentioned, has disappeared within the last two hundred years. In Ussher's time the tract was complete, and Ussher records that the mission of S. Patrick from Rome was attested without a dissentient voice by the historians of his time.

S. Prosper, in his work against Cassian, written between the years 433 and 440, says, "Whilst that Pope (Celestine) laboured to keep the Roman island (Britain) Catholic, he caused also the barbarian island to be gathered to the fold of Christ, by ordaining a bishop for the Irish."

We may just mention here that the Protestant Dean of Ardagh, Dr. Murray, in his "Ireland and her Church," published in London 1845, and which is often now referred to by Protestants, suggests that "while the papal (*i. e.* foreign) writers make Palladius the first apostle, and take no notice of Patrick, the Irish make Patrick first, and take no notice of Palladius." (Moran, 43.)

The fact, however, is not as he states; S. Tirechan, the Scoliaist of S. Fiace, Miurchu-Maccu-Macthenus, the *Leabhar Breac*, the Annals of Ulster, and the various Irish lives of S. Patrick, expressly mention S. Palladius as well as S. Patrick; and Bede, in his "Martyrology," Alcuin, Eric of Auxerre, Sigebert of Gemblours, Giraldus Cambrensis, and Ricemarch also, all mention both Palladius and Patrick. Dr. Murray seems to have been misled by the silence of Prosper, and of Bede in his Chronicle; but Prosper, writing in 434, may not have had full information of the success of S. Patrick; and Bede, who omits to refer to S. Patrick in his Chronicle relating to the affairs of Britain, expressly mentions him in his "Martyrology."

Probus, in his "Life of S. Patrick," written in the eighth century, says that, on being nominated to the Irish mission, "S. Patrick poured forth to God the following prayer: 'O Lord Jesus Christ, lead me, I beseech thee, to the seat of the holy Roman Church, that receiving authority there to preach with confidence thy sacred truths, the Irish nation may, through my ministry, be gathered to the fold of Christ.' And soon after, being about to proceed to Ireland, this man of God, Patrick, went, as he had wished, to Rome, the head of all Churches, and having asked and received the apostolic blessing, he returned, pursuing the same road by which he had journeyed thither."

The "Via Quarta" of S. Patrick, supposed to have been written by S. Eileran, and which bears internal evidence of having been written previous to the year 774, says, "S. Germanus sent Patrick to Rome for the apostolic licence, for this was required by the ecclesiastical law; and Patrick having come to Rome was most honourably received by the holy Pope Celestine, and relics of saints being given to him, he was sent to Ireland by that Pontiff."

The "Vita Tripartita," of which a copy was found in the British Museum in 1849, and which was referred both by Colgan and Curry to the sixth century, is to the same effect.

These and other ancient lives of S. Patrick, all of which were written at a time when it is now asserted that Ireland was Protestant, vary in minor details, but they all concur in relating that he was sent upon his mission by the supreme authority of the Vicar of Christ.

One of those beautiful proverbs called *Dicta Sancti Patritii*, preserved in the Book of Armagh, which was transcribed in the year 807, is to the following effect: "Thanks be to God: you have passed from the kingdom of Satan to the city of God; the Church of the Irish is a Church of Romans; as you are children of Christ, so be you children of Rome." (*Liber Armacan*, fol. 9.)

S. Columbanus, who had conversed with the disciples of S. Patrick, dying in old age in 615, and who had acquired learning and piety in the great monastery of Bangor, in Ireland, declares that "the Irish are the scholars and disciples of Rome;" and addressing Pope Boniface IV. he wrote, "The Catholic faith is held unshaken by us as it was delivered to us by you, the successors of the holy Apostles."

We are indebted to the eminent German antiquarian Mone for two very ancient hymns of the Irish Church to S. Peter, which he discovered amongst the papers of the old Irish monastery of Reichenau, and which he published from Irish manuscripts of the eighth and ninth centuries in his work entitled "*Hymni Latini Medii Ævi*." Fribourg, 1855.

We regret that want of space does not allow us to copy from Dr. Moran's work these beautiful hymns and their equally beautiful translation. The 4th and 5th verses of one are as follows in original and translation:—

Dudum elegit dominus
Petrum ut optimum oleum,
Ut obitaret Dominum
Essetque pastor ovium.

In years long past, in bygone time,
As highest prince, to post sublime,
Was Peter chosen to succeed,
And Christ's ne'er-failing flock to
feed.

Elaboravit ubique,
Curæ datus historiæ,
Fundamentum dominicæ
Ecclesiæ Catholicæ.

Nor clime, nor space, might bound
his zeal,
And pages writ his deeds reveal;
On him, the rock so strong, so sure,
Christ's Church shall ever firm endure.

And the following are the 4th and 5th verses of the other hymn:—

Sancto Petro pro merito,
Christus regni cælestium,
Claves simul cum gratiâ,
Tradidit in perpetuum.

Animarum pontificem,
Apostolorum principem,
Petrum rogamus omnium,
Christi pastorem ovium.

The keys which ope the portals blest,
That lead the way to endless rest,
To him Christ gives, with grace to
tend
And guide his flock safe to the end.

Great Pontiff of Christ's chosen band,
Apostles round thee humbly stand!
O'er Christ's true flock strict watch
still keep,
Still guard his lambs, still guard his
sheep.

These hymns were written by an Irishman not later than the eighth or ninth century, possibly earlier, since they may have been composed some time before the manuscripts found were written. Was he a Catholic or a Protestant? They seem to us just such hymns as a devout and educated Catholic of the present day would delight to compose, whilst they could not have been written by a Protestant.

S. Cummian Fota (i.e. the tall) was born about 590, and died in 661. He was Bishop of Clonfert. A short hymn on the Apostles by this father of the early Irish Church has been preserved to us. One strophe relates to each Apostle, that respecting S. Peter being as follows:—"Rejoice, O New Jerusalem! solemnize the glad-some festivals of Christ, and exult in the commemoration of the Apostles—of Peter the keybearer—the first pastor—the mystic fisherman, who with the Gospel net draws in the spiritual fish of Christ." (Moran, 88.)

Ussher relies upon the hymn of S. Sechnall or Secundinus, a disciple and relative of S. Patrick, as asserting the Protestant tenet regarding S. Peter and the see of Rome. The passage in his hymn upon which Ussher relies he translates as follows:—"Patrick is constant in the fear of God and immovable in the faith; upon whom the church is built as upon S. Peter, whose apostleship also he has obtained from God, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against him." Even if this translation were correct it would only mean that S. Patrick was chosen to hold that post of honour and jurisdiction and privilege in the Irish Church which belonged to S. Peter in regard to the Universal Church. We are indebted to the Irish Archæological Society for an edition of this hymn. The passage on which Ussher relies forms the third strophe, and runs thus in the original text:—

Constans in Dei timore et fide immobilis
Super quem edificatur, ut Petrus, ecclesia:
Cujusque apostolatam a Deo sortitus est
In cujus porta adversus inferni non prevalent.

Of which the literal translation is—"He is constant in the service of God and immovable in the faith as Peter, upon whom the church is built, and whose apostolate he received from God; against whose bulwark the assaults of hell cannot prevail." Ussher's translation would require *Petrum* in the accusative, which indeed was the reading adopted by Ussher, but is no longer tenable, since the *Leabhar Breac* and the Dublin MS. of the book of hymns, and also the Roman MS., all read "*ut Petrus.*" So far therefore from depreciating, according to the Protestant view, the prerogatives of S. Peter, it serves to illustrate them.

S. Mochta, of Louth, was a disciple of S. Patrick. He went to Rome about the year 460, and, on account of the previous heresy of Celestius, who was of the Irish nation, he was required to present to Pope Leo the Great his profession of faith, of which a copy, written about 700, was discovered by Muratori in the famous Irish monastery of Bobbio. In this he writes, "If for the fault of one individual the inhabitants of the whole country are to be deemed accursed, let that most blessed disciple, too, be condemned; I mean Rome itself, from which hitherto not only one, but two or three, or even more heresies have gone forth; and nevertheless, none of them could get hold of or contaminate the Chair of Peter, that is to say, the see of faith."

The monastery of Bobbio furnishes a further proof, for thence to the Ambrosian Library at Milan was brought by Cardinal Frederick Borromeo the missal of S. Columbanus. Mabillon, who published it in 1724, says it was then more than a thousand years old. Different opinions have been maintained amongst the learned whether this missal was a specimen of the Gallic or of the Irish liturgy, but it seems to us to be proved by Dr. Moran that it is the latter, and was most probably the very Irish liturgy which a writer of the seventh century records was bequeathed by S. Columbanus to the monastery of Bobbio. Among its masses there is one specially assigned for the feast of the "*Cathedra Sancti Petri,*" and that apostle is said to have received *omne jus gentium Judæorumque*, and his are declared to be "the keys of heaven, the dignity of the pontifical chair; so great a power, that what he binds none can loosen, and what he loosens shall be loosed also in heaven; a throne of exalted dignity, where he will sit in judgment on all the nations of the earth." The first collect of the same Mass thus begins:—"O God! who on this day didst give to S. Peter, after Thyself, the headship of the whole Church, we humbly pray Thee, that as Thou didst constitute him pastor for the safety of Thy flock, and that Thy sheep might be preserved from error, so now Thou mayest save us through his intercession." In the Mass for Sundays it is said that the Divine Redeemer, stretching forth His hand to S. Peter when sinking in the waves, was an emblem of how

“the wavering faith of that apostle was consolidated and he himself confirmed as Head of the Church.” And again, on the feast-day of the apostles SS. Peter and Paul, it is declared that “from the whole body of the apostles the Redeemer chose S. Peter as the foundation of the Church, and confirmed his faith, to the great joy of all the disciples.” (Moran, 96.) Indeed, this missal corresponds in all essentials with the present Catholic missal, and in itself offers conclusive proof that the Holy Sacrifice of the body and blood of our Saviour was offered then as now. It contains two masses in honour of the Blessed Virgin, one for her general feasts and the other for the Assumption, masses for other Saint-days and masses for the dead; and is in itself a written testimony that the Catholic faith of Ireland, France, and Italy in the sixth century was identical with the Catholic faith of the present day.

The letter of Columbanus to Pope Boniface was written soon after the saint had settled in Italy, and deserves to be specially noticed, because some expressions from it have been quoted as implying a want of due respect to the Pope. It is addressed, “To the most beautiful Head of all the Churches of the whole of Europe, to the beloved Pope, the exalted prelate, the most reverend overseer, the pastor of pastors,” &c. Subsequently the popes are styled, “the masters, the steersmen, the mystic pilots of the ship spiritual, i.e. the Church.” Whilst of his countrymen he says, “We are the scholars of S. Peter and S. Paul and of all disciples subscribing by the Holy Ghost to the divine canon; all are Irish inhabitants of the remotest part of the whole world, receiving nothing save what is evangelic and apostolic doctrine. None of us has been a heretic, none a Jew, none a schismatic; but the faith just as it was at first delivered by you, the successors of the holy Apostles, is held unshaken.” And at the close of his letter he adds, “We are, as I said before, bound to the Church of S. Peter. For although Rome is great and illustrious, yet it is only through this Chair that she is great and renowned amongst us.”

As this letter of S. Columbanus is thought by some Protestants to favour their views, let us see how they endeavour to use it. Dean Murray may be considered as comprising their views.

1. In the first place, then, they appeal to the general language of the letter, which they say is “too strong to allow us to suppose that the Irish monk who used it considered Pope Boniface, whom he was addressing, to be the head of the Church.”

The language of S. Columbanus is often strong. Indeed the whole letter is written with frankness and liberty, and with all that energetic earnestness which we might expect in one who had grown old not only in the practice of virtue, but also in the apostolate of Gaul and Italy. He, however, reminds the Pontiff that he writes “not as a stranger but a friend—a disciple—a servant,” and

he adds, as if anticipating the difficulty which Dean Murray would one day seek to deduce from the freedom of his words, "therefore, freely will I speak, for I address our spiritual masters, the steersmen and pilots of the mystic ship."

2. The next difficulty they find is in the doctrine of S. Columbanus, by which they say he asserts that "it was possible for the See of Rome to forfeit apostolic honour by not preserving the apostolic faith." This is a corruption of the original text, which is, "Ut ergo honore Apostolico non careas, conserva fidem Apostolicam, confirma testimonio," &c., and is an exhortation to the Pope to preserve and confirm the apostolic faith by such means as became the Pastor of Pastors. What did S. Columbanus mean when he exhorted the Pontiff to preserve the faith? Did he look upon Pope Boniface as a simple bishop, whom he exhorted not to be dilatory in defending the cause of truth? No, he addresses him as the common father and pastor of the whole universe. He says, "The Catholics of the whole world, the sheep, are affrighted by the approach of wolves; wherefore use, O Pope, the whistlings and the well-known voice of the true shepherd, and stand betwixt the sheep and the wolves, so that, casting away their fear, the sheep may in everything find thee to be the first pastor." And again, he exhorts the holy Pontiff, "Set, in a manner, higher than all mortals, and exalted near unto the celestial beings, lift up thy voice as a trumpet, that thou mayest show their wicked doings to the people of thy Lord entrusted to thee by Him." Nor is even this sufficient; he adds, "I strive to stir up thee as the prince of the leaders; for unto thee belongeth the peril of the whole of the Lord's army." And then he again addresses him, "Thou hast the power of setting all things to order—of beginning the war—of arousing the leaders—of commanding arms to be taken up—of drawing forth the ranks into battle array, &c." "fearing, do I moan unto thee alone, who from among the princes art the only hope, having authority through the privileges of the apostle Peter." Surely nothing can be more unprotestant than this! S. Columbanus reminds the Pope that he is bound to be at his post, and he declares that that post is the office of the first pastor, who holds the care of the fold of Christ—the guardianship of the people of God. Surely few writers have more clearly than this asserted the privilege of S. Peter's See; and, reading these passages, the mind recognizes instinctively the same spirit that dictated the words of the alarmed apostles when the storm raged around them, and they cried out to the Redeemer, "Domine, non est tibi curæ quod perimus." It is with such sentiments, and with such sentiments only, that S. Columbanus appeals to the Roman Pontiff to watch and preserve the flock of Christ from impending danger.

3. S. Columbanus, however, according to Dean Murray, asserts "that the sword of Peter signifies not temporal power or spiritual jurisdiction, but a true confession of faith in a synod." From this passage it results (1) That the Roman Pontiff wields "the sword of Peter." (2) That it belongs to him to cut off schism from the Church with that spiritual sword. (3) That the opportune means of cutting off the schism of which S. Columbanus speaks was to synodically proclaim the faith of Peter, and then anathematize all who would not receive that faith. For which reason he had already lamented that the Pope, who was endowed with full authority, had not, on the first appearance of the schism, solemnly proclaimed his faith, and then condemned and excommunicated whosoever should even dare to slander the presiding see of the orthodox faith.

4. But at all events, says Dean Murray, S. Columbanus explicitly lays down "that the chair of Peter is capable of being defiled by doctrinal error, and that it is possible for the Catholic faith not to be held in the Apostolic See."

There is no such statement made by S. Columbanus. He speaks indeed of the mist of suspicion having gathered round the See of Peter, and of the Pope's being ranked among the patrons of heretics, but he takes good care to let the Holy Father and the readers of his letter know that such were not his own sentiments, but merely the sentiments of the schismatics who, like many nowadays, were maligners of Rome, and against whom S. Columbanus exhorts Pope Boniface to unsheath his spiritual sword. Hence, in one place he says that he had written this letter in order to arouse the Pontiff "against those men who blaspheme such as are thine, and clamour against them as the receivers of heretics." Subsequently he adds, "See that the mist of suspicion be drawn aside from the chair of S. Peter, for the reception of heretics is, I hear, imputed to you; but God forbid that I should believe it; it never has occurred, and never will occur to the end of time." And in concluding his letter he again exhorts the Pope to use courageously the spiritual sword, "that my glorying for you may not be in vain, and that your assailants may be confounded and not we; for, as befits disciples in regard to their Master, I declared in your name that the Roman Church admits to its communion none who impugn the Catholic faith." And the whole letter is evidently that of a zealous and plain-speaking man, anxious to exhort him with whom the spiritual authority lay to use it promptly and decisively in defence of the Faith. We are glad that this letter of S. Columbanus has been referred to by Dean Murray and others, since it serves to bring out in bolder relief the teaching of the early Irish Church regarding Rome, and to present that great Irish Saint as an illustrious champion of the prerogatives of the Holy See.

Claudius Clemens, an Irishman who was appointed to the See of Auxerre, and was famed especially for his Gospel Commentaries, is referred to by Archbishop Ussher as insinuating something not unlike Protestant tenets, and it may therefore be well to refer especially to him.

Ussher thus writes :—"The famous passage in Scripture (Matt. xvi. 18) where the Romanists lay the main foundation of the Papacy, Claudius explains in this manner—Upon this rock I will build my Church ; that is to say upon the Lord and Saviour, who granted to His faithful friend, lover, and confessor the participation of His own name, that from Petra (the rock) he should be called Peter."

We shall not readily pardon the Protestant Primate for implying that these words of Claudius are in opposition to the teaching and doctrine of the Catholic Church, for Catholics concur with Protestants that Christ is the true rock on which the Church of God is built ; Catholics, however, also maintain that S. Peter was divinely made a sharer and participator in our Blessed Redeemer's privilege, and this is precisely what Claudius here asserts when he declares that our Saviour granted to Peter "the participation of His own name."

There is another passage in Claudius's " Commentary " which is carefully passed over in silence by Ussher, but which serves to render clearer the words under consideration. He is commenting on the list of the Apostles, and he says—"The first was Simon, who is called Peter ; the name, therefore, which in Latin is Petrus and in Syriac Cepha, is derived from the rock—without doubt from that rock of which S. Paul speaks, 'and the rock was Christ' ; for as Christ, the true light, granted to the Apostles that they might be called the light of the world, so, too, to Simon, who believed in the rock Christ, was the name of Peter given ; to the meaning of which name Christ alludes in another place saying, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.'"
Thus does Claudius again repeat the Catholic doctrine, and employ moreover the very illustration of it used by Catholic theologians at the present day. Christ grants to Peter a participation of His own Headship of the Church ; precisely as He who was the true light of the universe granted to all the Apostles a participation of this prerogative, so that they, too, are styled "the light of the world."

2. Ussher continues : " Yet does this same Claudius * acknowledge that S. Peter received a kind of primacy for founding the Church, in reference to which he terms him the Prince of the Church, and the prince or chief of the Apostles, but he adds

* It is doubtful whether the Claudius here referred to was the Irish Claudius.

S. Paul also was chosen in the same manner to have the primacy in founding the Churches of the Gentiles." Claudius referring to S. Paul says, "He only names Peter, and compares him with himself because on Peter was conferred the primacy for the foundation of the Church: and in like manner he himself was chosen to hold the primacy in founding the Churches of the Gentiles." The natural conclusion from which is that to S. Peter was granted the universal primacy, comprising the whole Christian world, whilst to S. Paul a primacy, too, was granted, which, however, was limited to the Churches of the Gentiles. Could we wish for a clearer statement of Catholic doctrine?

3. Ussher writes: "It is also observed by Claudius that, as when our Saviour propounded the question generally to all the apostles, Peter answered as one for all; and therefore, however the power of loosing and binding might seem to be given by the Lord to Peter, yet, without doubt, it is to be known that it was given to the rest of the apostles also, as Himself witnesses, who, appearing to them after the triumph of His passion and resurrection, breathed on them and said to them all, 'Receive the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye remit,' &c." We may well understand that it was but little to Ussher's purpose to add the words which immediately follow those just cited by him, and in which Claudius declares that by the Redeemer's words was granted, not only to Peter and the other apostles, but to all bishops and priests to the end of time, the power of remitting sins. But what excuse could the archbishop plead for omitting two other passages—one of which immediately precedes, the other follows in the same page, the text now cited, and which alone afford a key to understand the commentary given by Claudius in regard to the dignity of S. Peter? The first passage, then, which Ussher omits is as follows: "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The word key, then, does not here refer to anything material formed by the hand of man, but it indicates the judiciary power. He who with a zeal greater than the rest acknowledged Christ, was deservedly in a special manner endowed with the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Thus, according to Claudius, all the apostles indeed received the judicatory power from Christ; but in a special manner, and *præ cæteris*, the power of the keys was granted to Peter.

The second passage which is omitted by Ussher is still more important; for, after stating that to all the apostles—nay, and to all bishops and priests—was given the power of binding and loosing, Claudius adds: "But blessed Peter, who had acknowledged Christ in the fulness of faith, and loved Him with a true love, received in a special manner the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the principality of judiciary authority, that thus all the faithful throughout the universe might understand that whosoever in any manner sepa-

rates himself from the unity of his faith and communion, such a one can neither be absolved from the bonds of sin nor enter the portals of the kingdom of heaven." Why did Ussher omit this passage? If he was desirous of illustrating the opinion of Claudius, surely this in the clearest manner presents his opinion to us; but probably the Protestant primate feared to let his readers see how explicitly our Irish commentator, as far back as the year 800, asserted the dignity and prerogatives of S. Peter, and how he expressly declared that the power and privileges granted to the Church by the Divine Redeemer, were all centred in that chosen apostle; and perhaps, too, he feared that some of his readers might meditate on the concluding words of Claudius, that whosoever, throughout the whole world, is not united with Peter in the bonds of communion and faith, can neither obtain the remission of his sins nor enter into the enjoyment of the heavenly kingdom. Claudius was, indeed, a curious witness to bring forward in favour of early Irish Protestantism. As the prophet of old, when brought to curse, pronounced blessings on the people of Israel, so do all early Irish writers who are cited by Protestants, invariably, when their full text is examined, proclaim the Catholic teaching of the early Irish Church.

Among the letters of early Irish writers published by Ussher in his "Sylloges Epistolarum," is one written in 634 on the Paschal question by another S. Cummian, who led the penitential life of a hermit, and at one period of his life ruled the famous monastery of Durrow, and who, by the way, enriched his monastery with relics of S. Peter and S. Paul. In this letter he speaks with all reverence of S. Columbkille and other saints who had followed the Irish computation as to the time of observing Easter, but he declares himself compelled, by the practice of the Universal Church, to abandon that ancient system and conform to the new computation. He states the time and study he had himself devoted to the subject, refers to various authorities, but adopts that of S. Jerome. "An old authority," says Jerome, "rises up against me. In the meanwhile I cry out, Whosoever is joined to the chair of S. Peter, with him I shall be." A chief point of S. Cummian's argument is the necessity of maintaining inviolable the unity of the Church. "I turn me," he says, "to the words of the Bishop of Rome, Pope Gregory, whose authority is acknowledged in common by us, and who is gifted with the appellation of the golden-mouth, and who, though writing last of all the Fathers, is deservedly preferred to all; and I find him, writing on the passage of Job, Gold hath a place wherein it is melted, that the gold is the great body of the saints, the place of melting is the unity of the Church, the fire is the suffering of martyrdom, and he who is tried by fire out of the unity of the Church may be melted, indeed, but cannot be cleansed."

After studying for a year the various matters connected with the Paschal controversy, he resolved "to interrogate his fathers that they might declare to him, and his elders that they might narrate to him." Those whom he interrogated were the neighbouring Bishops of Emly, Clonmacnois, Mungret, and Clonfertmolva; and these bishops "having met together in Maghlene, some being personally present, others sending their legates to represent them, they decreed and said, 'Our predecessors, as we know from meet witnesses, of whom some are still living, others now sleep in peace, enacted that we should humbly and without scruple receive whatever things were better and more to be esteemed, when they were sanctioned by the source of our baptism and faith, and brought to us from the successors of the Lord's Apostles.' Afterwards they in common set forth to us, as the custom is, a mandate upon this matter, to keep Easter the coming year along with the whole Church."

After this, in accordance with the commandment, "If a difference arise between cause and cause, and if judgment shall vary between leprosy and leprosy, they shall go up to the place where the Lord hath chosen (Deut. xvii. 8), and with the synodical decree that when causes were of great moment, they should be referred to the head of cities" (which we see was the maxim or decision of S. Patrick himself), "our seniors judged it proper to send wise and humble men, as children to their mother; and by God's will some of them, having had a prosperous journey, reached Rome in safety, and returned to us the third year, and saw that all things were done precisely as had been told to us, and they were the more convinced of these things, seeing them, than if they merely heard of them; for, abiding together with Greek and Oriental and Scythian and Egyptian, they found all celebrating together in S. Peter's Church at Easter; and before the Holy of Holies they attested to us, saying, throughout the whole earth, Easter is, as we know, thus kept. And in the relics and the Scriptures which they brought with them, we found that there was the blessing of God; for with our own eyes we saw a young girl who was blind restored to her sight at these relics, and we saw a paralytic walk, and many spirits cast out."

This testimony gives us a clear insight into the theological teaching of Ireland at this early period. The unity of the Church was the great central point of the whole theological system: this unity was preserved by clinging to Rome and remaining inseparably attached to her doctrines and practices, and if controversy arose, the last appeal was to the successors of S. Peter at Rome.

The well-known discussion at Whitby between the supporters of the Irish and Roman Paschal computation, may also be noticed, because a detailed account of it has reached us. Summoned by Oswin, king of Northumberland, in 664, on the one side appeared S.

Colman, who had been a monk of the Irish monastery of Hy or Iona, abbot of the other Irish monastery of Lindisfarne, and bishop of the province of York; on the other, S. Wilfrid, who had been educated at Lindisfarne, but had subsequently learned the correct Paschal computation at Rome, and who was at this time abbot of Ripon; and his associate was Agilbert, a native of France, who had been educated in Ireland, and was at this time bishop of the West Saxons.

S. Colman's argument was simple; he found no fault with others; he wished merely to be allowed to follow the customary computation of those who had taught him. His opponents replied almost in the very words of S. Cummian's letter: "The Easter computation which we follow we have seen adopted by every one at Rome, where the blessed apostles Peter and Paul lived, taught, suffered, and were buried. We have seen it also in every part of Italy and France that we have traversed. It is observed at one and the same time in Africa, Asia, Egypt, and Greece, and, in short, throughout the whole Christian world, except by the Irish monks and their associates, the Picts and Britons." To Colman's argument from the sanctity of S. Columba and other saints who had followed the Irish computation, Wilfrid well replied that they were indeed holy men; and "I believe, had they been rightly informed on the subject, they, too, would have conformed to the universal usage." And, addressing Colman, he added, that the defenders of the Irish usage could plead that ignorance no longer. "You and your associates certainly commit sin if, after hearing the decrees of the Apostolic See—nay, of the Universal Church—and these confirmed by the Holy Scriptures, you disdain to follow them. For although your fathers were saints, yet in their small number in the very extremity of the world, they must not be preferred to the whole Church; and however holy and illustrious performer of miracles your Columba was, is he to be preferred to the most blessed prince of the apostles, to whom the Lord has said, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; and I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven?'" This argument made a great impression on the English king, and turning to S. Colman, Oswin said, "Is it true that the Lord has thus spoken to Peter?" S. Colman replied in the affirmative. The king then asked, "Can you show that so great power was granted to your Colman?" The saint answered, "That he could not." Whereupon Oswin continued: "Do you, on both sides, agree in this, that the cited words of the Divine Redeemer were specially addressed to S. Peter, and that to him the keys of heaven were given by our Lord?" The disputants replied, "We are all agreed in this." "Well, then," concluded the king, "I will not oppose the heavenly gatekeeper," and decided in favour of Wilfrid's opinion.

This narrative is valuable in two respects:—1st. It is impossible that the disputants could have addressed each other merely in the terms in which they did if the Irish party had held religious doctrines similar to those of Protestants at present, or indeed if the religious opinions of both parties had not been identical; and, secondly, because, in the midst of their dispute, both parties were of one accord as to the prerogatives and supreme authority of S. Peter. The Protestant Dean of Armagh thus comments on the Whitby Conference:—"Colman, when he found his opinions rejected, resigned his See of Lindisfarne rather than submit to this decision of the king, thus furnishing us with a remarkable proof that the Irish bishops in the seventh century rejected the authority of the Pope." Singular reasoning this, for in truth there was no attempt to exercise the Pope's authority, but there was an exercise of the king's authority, which S. Colman, unlike the Anglican Church at present, did not admit to be decisive in a matter of ecclesiastical discipline.

A very ancient tract in the Irish language, "On Injury and Assaults to Ecclesiastics," is preserved in the *Leabhar Breac*,* forms part of the Brehon laws, and has been recently translated by Eugene Curry. In this curious tract occurs the following:—"Which is the highest dignity on earth?—The dignity of the Church. Which is the highest dignity in the Church?—The dignity of a bishop, and the highest of bishops is the bishop of S. Peter's Church, to whom the Roman kings are subject." After assigning the respective eric or fine for inflicting injury on the various grades of the ecclesiastical order, the tract thus continues:—"Where is this doctrine found?—It is found in the treatise which Augustine wrote upon the decrees of the Church, and upon the dres (that is, the fine paid for injury in person or property to each degree) and the reparation to be made; and it is thus, according to the rule of the Church of Peter, the empress of the whole world."

The ancient writer of the *Life of S. Furseus* introduces the following words as addressed by that great saint to the central See of the Catholic world:—"O Rome! exalted above all cities by the triumphs of the Apostles, decked with the roses of martyrdom, decorated with the lilies of confessors, adorned with the palms of virgins, strengthened by all their merits, enriched with the remains of so many and so renowned saints, we hail thee! May thy sacred authority never, never cease, which has been illustrated by the dignity and wisdom of the holy fathers: that authority by which

* Which Petrie calls, "The oldest and best MS. relating to Church history now preserved (in Ireland), or which perhaps the Irish ever possessed."

the body of Christ, that is to say our blessed Mother the Church, maintains its undying consistency and vigour."

Gillibert was appointed to the See of Lumneach (now Limerick) about the year 1090, as Ussher thinks, and therefore towards seventy years before the English landed on the Irish shores. He, at the request of the clergy, drew up a letter on ecclesiastical orders, in which occurs the following:—

The picture I have drawn showeth that all the Church's members are to be brought under one chief bishop, to wit, Christ and His Vicar, blessed Peter the Apostle, and the Pope presiding in his see to be governed by them. . . . As Noah was placed to rule the Ark amidst the waves of the flood, just so does the Roman Pontiff rule the Church amid the billows of the world. . . . The position held in the Eastern Church by the patriarchs is that which belongs to archbishops in the West; and both patriarchs and archbishops are subject in the first degree to the Roman Pontiff. As the patriarchs, however, govern the Apostolic Sees, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, it is their privilege to ordain archbishops, and in a manner are likened to the Bishop of Rome. To Peter alone, however, was it said, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church." Therefore the Pope alone is exalted in dignity above the whole Church, and he alone has the privilege of ordaining and judging all.

S. Malachy, Bishop of Down, repaired to Rome in 1139, and obtained from Pope Innocent II., by whom he was most honourably received, a conditional promise of the pallium for the four Archbishops of Armagh, Cashel, Dublin, and Tuam, and in 1152 was held the Synod of Kells, at which Cardinal Paparo, the legate of the Pope, distributed the palliums brought by him from Rome to those four archbishops.

We will proceed now to a few extracts from the canons of the Irish Church in regard to Rome. In the part of the ancient Book of Armagh, which is copied from that written by S. Patrick's own hand, occurs the following, which we give in the translation of Ussher:—

Whenever any cause that is very difficult and unknown unto all the judges of the Scottish nations shall arise, it is rightly to be referred to the See of the Archbishop of the Irish (that is to say, S. Patrick) and to the examination of the prelate thereof. But if there, by him and his wise men, a cause of this nature cannot easily be made up, we have decreed it shall be sent to the See Apostolic, that is to say, to the Chair of the Apostle Peter, who hath the authority of the city of Rome.

On which Ussher remarks:—

It is most likely that S. Patrick had a special regard for the Church of Rome, from whence he was sent for the conversion of the island; so as, if I myself had lived in his days, for the resolution of a doubtful question, I

would as willingly have listened to the judgment of the Church of Rome, as to the determination of any church in the whole world, so reverend an estimation have I of the integrity of that Church as it stood in those days.

But this was not an inclination of feeling or a recommendation, it was a decree, by which S. Patrick commanded all doubtful controversies to be referred to the See of Rome, and not to be referred there for advice, to enable the archbishop in Ireland to decide, with the aid of such advice as Ussher suggests, but to be sent there as to one who hath authority to decide. The genuineness of this canon is clear. Its being found in the Book of Armagh brings us back well nigh to the time of S. Patrick himself, that ancient MS. having been transcribed in the year 807, and then the original of this canon was believed to have been written by S. Patrick himself. It was acted upon by the bishops of Leinster and Munster at the Synod of Magh-lene, in 630, to which we have before referred, on the testimony of S. Cummian, who was present at it, and is thus referred to in a collection of canons for the use of the Irish Church, made about the year 700:—"S. Patrick defines, should any grave controversies arise in this island, they shall be referred to the Apostolic See."

And this is therein confirmed by reference to the decrees of Rome:—"The Roman canons decree that when the more difficult questions arise, they are to be referred to the head city." And again:—"The Roman Synod enacts, if in any province controversies arise which cannot be arranged amongst the contending parties, let the matter be referred to the chief See."

On these canons Dr. Murray, being unable to impugn their authority, remarks:—"Now, supposing for one moment that this canon and decree were genuine, were they ever acted upon before the twelfth century? The ancient Irish Church on no occasion ever appealed to the Bishop of Rome."

If this had been so it would only prove that they had not any occasion to appeal, since it is clear that their canons laid down the mode and order of appeal to the Court of Rome in case occasion should arise. But the fact is not as asserted by Dr. Murray. It does indeed happen that in the domestic annals of the Irish Church we meet with few matters of controversy which they were unable to determine in their own synods, or which required the intervention of the Roman See. Human nature was probably as lively and erratic then as since, but there would seem to have been a strong reverence for their own bishops, earned, we may believe, by the purity and earnest labours of their lives, and the feeling due to the Irish bishops themselves was probably intensified by regard for the memory of S. Patrick, which was extended to his successors.

The deputies sent from the synod of Magh-lene, in 630, as

before mentioned, returned from Rome with the tidings that the Irish usage as to the time of celebrating Easter was not in accordance with what they found practised at Rome, and thus was set at rest for ever in the southern division of Ireland the question of the Paschal solemnity. (Moran, 156.)

A few years after the Easter question had been thus happily settled in the south of Ireland, the bishops of the north endeavoured to establish a like harmony in Ulster. They also met, and they also decided to ask for the decision of Rome on the subject, and a letter to that effect was addressed to Pope Severinus in 640. Unfortunately the Pope had died ere that letter reached its destination. The Roman clergy indeed replied, but they misconceived the usage which prevailed in Ireland, and directed their reply against that which did not exist there. This epistle to the Pope proceeded, as we learn from the names of those to whom the reply was addressed, from Thomian, Archbishop of Armagh; Columban, Bishop of Clonard; Cronan, Bishop and Abbot of Nendrum; Dimma, Bishop of Connor; Baithan, Bishop of Togh-Baithan; Cronan, Abbot of Maghbile in Down; Ernian, Abbot of Torey Island; Laistran, Abbot of Ard-mac-Nasca, on the banks of the present Belfast Lough; Scallan, Abbot of Bangor; and Segienus, Abbot of Hy; and S. Saran O'Critain, a Doctor of the ancient Church of Ireland.

These names are of great importance, as proving that the petition to Rome for some decision regarding the Paschal computation was addressed to the Vicar of Christ by all the great monasteries as well as the chief bishops who adhered to the northern or Columban tradition. As a matter of discipline they clung to the practice of their fathers, and when that peculiar discipline gave scandal to their brethren, and was looked upon with suspicion by neighbouring Churches, they turned their eyes to the Common Father of all, to seek from him instruction and guidance.

The perfect communion between Ireland and Rome is also proved by the fact that Irish bishops assisted at councils of the Roman Church. Thus in 721, when Pope Gregory II. convened a council in Rome to anathematize the Iconoclast Emperor Leo, the Isaurian, amongst the names attached to the synodical decrees we find that of "Sedulius, an Irishman, Bishop in Britain." A few centuries later the third council of Lateran was held in Rome, when the Albigensian heretics were condemned, and many disciplinary laws were enacted for the Church. Several Irish bishops took part in this council.

Another fact which proves how strong was the attachment of the old Irish to Rome, is the number of pilgrimages to Rome which were then undertaken, not only by ecclesiastics, but by noblemen and even kings. This is a fact which it would be too tedious to

illustrate by particular instances, but the subject is dwelt upon in some detail in the 3rd and 4th chapters of Dr. Moran's Essays, from which we have throughout borrowed largely. And the records of their visits convince us that it was not mere curiosity which took them there, but the feeling of devotion and of filial attachment for the See and successor of S. Peter. Occasionally they went there to be consecrated; and usually visited Rome for the sanction and blessing of the Pope, before undertaking any mission. And even the expression became proverbial with reference to a person intending to set out on a pilgrimage to Rome, "*sicut mos est gentis illius*," as is the custom of that (the Irish) nation.

Believe that the ancient Irish regarded the Pope and the See of Rome as their descendants at the present day do, and this custom is the natural and spontaneous expression of devotional feeling, but attribute to the ancient Irish Protestant doctrines, or any doctrines in the slightest degree differing from those of Rome, and then this custom becomes incomprehensible.

Another corresponding fact tending to the same conclusion is the great number of persons who at that period resorted from all parts of Europe to Ireland; and this fact is irreconcilable with any other state of things than a perfect identity of religious belief in Ireland and on the Continent. In the life of S. Senanus, who was born in 488, and who had visited Rome, and on his return founded a church at Inniscarra, on the banks of the Lee, five miles from Cork, it is mentioned that "soon after the foundation of this church a vessel arrived there with many religious pilgrims; amongst these were fifty religious Romans, whom the desire of a penitential life, and of the study of the Scriptures, then flourishing amongst us, had attracted to our island. They desired to be placed under the guidance of the holy men who were famed for their sanctity of life, and their observance of religious discipline." Thus were reciprocally bound together the Churches of Ireland and Rome. Rome was famed in Ireland as being the Apostolic See; and hence the Irish went on pilgrimage to venerate the Vicar of Christ, and pay their vows at the shrine of the Apostles. Ireland, too, was famed in Rome; her religious perfection, sanctity, and skill in sacred science won the admiration of the faithful of the Holy City; and when their own monasteries were laid waste, and their sanctuaries pillaged by ruthless invaders, we find them seeking a sacred asylum in Ireland, in whose hallowed retreat they might pursue undisturbed the highest paths of spiritual perfection. The Protestant Dr. Petrie, when speaking of the Round Towers, makes mention of "the crowds of foreign ecclesiastics—Egyptian, Roman, Italian, French, British, and Saxon—who flocked to Ireland as a place of refuge in the 5th and 6th centuries. Of such immigra-

tion," he adds, "there cannot possibly be a doubt; for, not to speak of the great number of foreigners who were disciples of S. Patrick, and of whom the names are preserved in the most ancient lives of that saint, nor of the evidences of the same nature so abundantly supplied in the lives of many other saints of the primitive Irish Church, it will be sufficient to refer to that most curious ancient document, written in the year 799, the Litany of S. Aengus the Culdee, in which are invoked such a vast number of foreign saints buried in Ireland. Copies of this ancient litany are found in the 'Book of Leinster,' a MS. undoubtedly of the 12th century, preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin; and in the 'Leabhar Breac,' preserved in the Royal Irish Academy."

It is clear that if the pious pilgrims who then flocked to Ireland from all parts of the Continent and from Rome itself had found any variance whatever between the religious doctrines of Ireland and those of Rome, they would have returned home from the heretical or schismatic island, and the influx of foreign Catholics would soon have ceased. There is not the slightest indication of any such difference having been observed by those who visited Ireland, or by those who in Ireland received these visitors; and therefore the inference that there was perfect identity of doctrine becomes irresistible.

There is one other special circumstance which deserves to be noticed converging to the same conclusion, and that is, the great number of missionaries and other pious men who during those ages went from Ireland either to preach the Gospel to the wild and unbelieving barbarians in some part of Europe, or to become school-masters, or monks, or zealous priests amongst the believing but more troubled people of the Continent. Few who have not minutely examined into the subject can be aware to what an extent the continent of Europe was then indebted to Ireland for missionaries and teachers and clergy. The Irish missionaries usually visited Rome for the sanction and blessing of the Pope before they proceeded on their perilous journey; and it is a surprising fact, that there are few towns in France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, or Italy where, even to the present day, some Irish saint and benefactor is not held in peculiar veneration, as evinced by the popular feeling on the recurrence of his feast-day.

So great was the efflux of Irishmen in that direction that hospitalia were established by pious Irishmen in various towns in France, &c., for the hospitable reception of their countrymen.

S. Boniface, the martyr and apostle of Germany, in the early part of the eighth century, was a native of Ireland, and became Archbishop of Mentz and founder of the great monastery of Fulda. He received from Pope Gregory II. his commission to preach the Gospel

amongst the pagans, and the Holy Father in giving him that commission spoke "in the name of the indivisible Trinity, by the authority of the blessed Peter, the prince of the Apostles, whose office of teaching he held and whose holy see he administered." He more than once visited Rome, first to receive episcopal consecration and afterwards to consult the Holy See on the spiritual interests of his flock. In 742, towards the close of his missionary toils, S. Boniface solicited from Rome the appointment of another Irishman named Albuin (known in Germany by the name of Wittā) to the see of Buraburg near Fritslar in Hesse. The reply of Pope Zachary is happily preserved and is as follows:—"To our beloved Wittā of the church of Buraburg—Pope Zachary. We have lately heard that our most holy and most reverend brother Boniface, God having been pleased by His blessing and power to propagate the Christian law and the teaching of the orthodox faith, and the doctrine as preached in this holy Roman Church, in which, through God's will, we preside, decreed and directed that the territory in which you preach amongst the Germans should be divided into three dioceses. Having heard this, we raised our hands to God with ineffable joy, returning thanks to the Author and Giver of all good gifts, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who gathers all to His saving fold. The aforesaid most holy man solicited by his letters that, by our apostolic authority, we should confirm your sees. Wherefore, with sincere solicitude and with the divine aid, by the authority of the blessed Peter, prince of the Apostles, to whom was given by our Saviour Jesus Christ the power of loosing and binding in heaven and on earth the sins of men, we confirm and decree that your episcopal sees shall remain unchanged," &c.

Willibrod, born in Britain, was educated by the Irish monks at Ripon, and afterwards spent twelve years in theological studies in Ireland before he "hastened to Rome, the apostolical chair of which was then filled by Sergius (687 to 701), that by his sanction and blessing he might begin the wished-for work of announcing the Gospel to the heathen." This blessing was accorded to him, and being enriched with relics of the holy martyrs, he fearlessly announced the doctrines of the faith to the inhabitants of Friesland. After a few years we find him again journeying to Rome, where, at the request of Pepin, he was consecrated by the same Pope bishop of that territory.

Another Irishman, named Dichnill, a disciple and companion of S. Columbanus, founded a monastery in the diocese of Besançon. He set out to Rome, and thus addressed the Pontiff:—"I am a native of the island of Erin, and a pilgrim for Christ's sake. The oratories which I erected bear the names of the noble apostles Peter and Paul, to whom belongs this Roman citadel. They have been enriched with many gifts and possessions by the surrounding princes,

and I have now come to the chief Bishop to commit them to thy apostolic care." The charter of his monastery was confirmed by the seal of apostolical authority.

The record of S. Kilian and his companions, about the year 686, is thus written, with the beautiful simplicity of the ninth century:—
"There was in Ireland a holy man of princely birth, by name Kilian. Assembling some of his disciples, he exhorted them to despise the transitory goods of the world, and in the spirit of the Gospel to forsake country and kindred and to follow Christ. They yielded to his persuasions, . . . and having landed in Germany, their holy leader Kilian thus addressed them:—'Brethren, how beautiful is this country, how cheerful are its people; and still they are in the darkness of error. If it seem good to you, let us do as we said when we were in our own country; let us go to Rome to visit the threshold of the prince of the Apostles, and present ourselves before the blessed Pope John; and if it be the will of God, when we shall have received the sanction of the Apostolic See, we shall, under its guidance, return again to this people, and preach to them the name of our Lord Jesus.' Without delay, their deeds corresponded with these words, and they set out for the threshold of S. Peter, the prince of the Apostles. On arriving there the holy Pope John had already passed to his eternal rest; but they were lovingly and honourably welcomed by his successor, Pope Conon. And this holy pontiff, having heard whence and for what motive they had come, and to what country they were desirous to devote themselves with such zealous ardour, received their profession of our holy faith and then commissioned them in the name of God and S. Peter to teach and preach the Gospel of Christ."

S. Canice, whose life has lately been edited by the Marquis of Ormond, visited the Holy See, spending some time in various towns in Italy, which long cherished a remembrance of his virtues and miracles, and in one of them built a monastery on land given to him for the purpose by the prince of the country.

S. Foillan or Foelan is venerated as one of the chief patrons of Brabant. Lucca numbers among its patron saints two Irishmen, S. Frigidian and S. Syllas. S. Caidoc was the apostle from Ireland of the Morini in Gaul in the seventh century.

Another Irishman, Muiredhac Mac Robartaigh, known in Germany as S. Maridnus, set out with two companions on a pilgrimage to Rome in 1067. Arriving in Ratisbon, they met with an Irish recluse, who made known to them the will of Heaven that that city should be their permanent abode. They remained, and founded there the monastery of Weich-S.-Peter, which soon acquired a widespread fame and filled Germany with filiate foundations for Irish monks.

When the Abbey of Nivelles was founded in favour of S. Gertrude,

daughter of the illustrious Pepin, in the seventh century, her mother, whilst she sent to Rome for relics and copies of the Lives of the Saints, sent at the same time to Ireland for lettered men to instruct her community and for musicians and chanters to teach them psalm-singing. (2 O'Halloran, p. 196.)

A native of Ireland, of the genuine Irish name of Shiel, Latinized into Sedulius, wrote in Italy, about 490, poems in Latin (*Carmen Paschale*), of acknowledged merit, which Pope Gelasius commended to the use of the faithful.

S. Columba, an Irishman, founded in 563 the celebrated monastery in Ireland of Iona, and spread the knowledge amongst all the western islands and great part of the mainland of Scotland. His name holds a distinguished place in the Roman and other martyrologies, and he was held in peculiar veneration throughout the northern part of Britain.

S. Aidan, the great apostle of the Northumbrians, was an Irishman from the monastery of Iona. The Anglo-Saxon king Oswald had, whilst an exile in Ireland during the reign of his uncle Edwin, there been instructed in the doctrines of Christianity; and being afterwards desirous of extending that blessing to his subjects, he applied to the Irish for a bishop to be sent over to him, and on the arrival of S. Aidan, who was imperfectly acquainted with the English language, it is related by Bede, that the king himself often acted as his interpreter.

Amongst the numerous Irishmen who carried the learning and piety of their native island to various parts of the Continent may be named Caidoc, who founded the monastery of Centula, in Ponthieu; S. Fursa, who established a monastery at Lagny, near the river Marne; his brothers Ultan and Foillan, who founded what was long called the monastery of the Irish in Brabant; S. Bavo, at Ghent; S. Livin, who earned the crown of martyrdom in Flanders and Brabant; S. Fridolin, who was held in grateful recollection in Lorraine, Alsace, Germany, and Switzerland; S. Arbogast and S. Florentius, also in Alsace, and who each in succession became Bishop of Strasburg; Erard and Albert at Ratisbon; S. Wiro at Heristal; Cataldus, patron saint of Tarentum; S. Virgilius, whose real name was Feargal, Bishop of Saltzburg; Clement and Albinus, of whose services as teachers Charlemagne availed himself, the one in France and the other at Pavia; Dungal, consulted by Charlemagne as to solar eclipses, and placed by Lothaire I. at the head of a great public school he established at Pavia; another, Sedulius, the author of "Commentaries on the Epistles of S. Paul," was sent by the Pope with the dignity of Bishop of Oreto on a special mission to Spain; Donatus, another Irishman, of great repute both as theologian and poet, became Bishop of Fiesole.

It would be tedious, though easy, to enumerate more names. The Protestant Mosheim, in his "Ecclesiastical History" (p. 279), remarking on the eighth century, says, "Irishmen, who in that age were called Scots, cultivated and amassed learning beyond the other nations of Europe in those dark times; they travelled over various countries of Europe for the purpose of learning, but still more for that of teaching; and in this century and the following Irishmen or Scots were to be met with everywhere in France, Germany, and Italy discharging the functions of teachers with applause."

We have thus referred to the resort of students from all parts of Europe to the schools and monasteries of Ireland, to the pilgrimages of Irishmen to Rome, and to the labours of Irishmen as missionaries and schoolmasters in various parts of Europe, because these facts appear to us conclusively to demonstrate that the Irish were in religious communion with the See of Rome, and that the religious doctrines of Ireland, of Rome, and of Catholic Europe were identical. It is admitted that in France, Spain, Germany, and Italy the spiritual authority of the Pope was acknowledged, and is it possible that any difference between Ireland and the rest of Europe as to the authority of the Pope, or on any other doctrine, could have existed without some trace of it appearing? The errors of Pelagius and his disciple Cælestius, the former of British and the latter of Irish origin, caused for some time the religious opinions of Irish visitors to the Continent to be scrutinized narrowly, and some of them were even required on their arrival at Rome to address to the Pope a written statement of their creed. If there had been any variance whatever in religious belief, would Irish missionaries have been accepted, blessed, and sent by the Popes to preach the Gospel to the Pagans? would Irishmen have been not only admitted as monks in the monasteries, but enabled by the liberality of continental princes and nobles to found monasteries? would they have been received with joy as priests and bishops in the cities of the Continent, and as teachers in the great schools? or would the continentals have frequented Ireland for religious instruction or retirement if the religion of Ireland and of France, Germany, Spain, and Italy had not been found to be the same, and if they had not all found themselves united in one common faith by a common submission to the spiritual authority of the See of Rome? We cannot see how it is possible to resist this necessary conclusion that the faith taught previous to and by S. Patrick and his successors in Ireland was the same faith which was professed in every other part of the world by those who were in communion with the See of Rome.

A rapid summary of what we have mentioned leads to one

inevitable conclusion. When we see that bishops,—first Palladius and then S. Patrick,—were sent by the Pope to exercise episcopal functions amongst the Catholics in Ireland and to convert the other inhabitants who were not Catholics; when we find that they, the former partially and the latter completely, performed the mission on which they were thus sent without any known denial of or dispute respecting the authority of him who sent them; when we find that S. Patrick, after he had effected the conversion of Ireland, left the following injunction or canon for the guidance of his clergy and people in after times: “If any grave controversies arise in this island, they shall be referred to the Apostolic See”; when we find no trace of any dispute or question as to this being the solemn canonical rule of the Irish Church, but on the contrary express confirmation of it in Irish canons of the year 700, by reference to Roman canons to the same effect; when we find, upon the authority of S. Cummian, that Irish bishops in the seventh century acted upon this rule; when we find that Ireland, having become Catholic and having had not only churches and schools but also monasteries and convents established in the country, and being by insular and distant position further removed from the barbarian incursions which had overwhelmed the Roman empire, its clergy, its monks, its nuns, its schoolmasters and its saints, became renowned throughout Christendom, and Catholics, both young and old, both men and women, came from distant countries to learn or to practise religion with more security or with more fervour in Ireland, and that there is not the slightest indication that any of these found the doctrines or the practices of religion in Ireland different from what they were accustomed to in any other part of Christendom; when we find that Irish priests went out from Ireland as missionaries to every country in Europe, and that before proceeding on their mission they almost invariably went and knelt at the feet of the Pope and asked his apostolic blessing and sanction on their labours, that many of them were raised to the dignity of bishops by the Pope, that they built churches and founded religious houses throughout the Continent, and that there is scarcely a city on the Continent in which some Irishman who there lived as an apostle or died as a saint is not to this day held in grateful memory, and that neither Pope nor people ever discovered that they preached any other than the one Catholic faith, alike in Ireland, at Rome, and in every place where they lived or died, but that Popes and people alike regarded many of them as saints in heaven, and sought their intercession as such with God; when we find no trace that any one of these Irish missionaries took a wife with him, but on the contrary, that they went, as the Apostles before them had gone, and as Catholic missionaries have ever since gone, in the only mode in which any large conversion of the heathen has, with the blessing of God, ever been effected; when we find that continental sovereigns,

who wished to obtain the best masters for schools which they were establishing, sent to Ireland for them, that Irish schoolmasters therefore taught in many of the most celebrated schools of the Continent, delivered lectures and put forth books of instruction, but that no sovereign, or bishop, or priest, or rival schoolmaster, or any other human being ever made the discovery that they taught anything but the one true Catholic faith; when we find that these Irish, from the time of S. Patrick down to that of King Henry II., whenever they wrote or published anything in which they referred to the Pope, always spoke of him just as Catholics do at the present day, and as Catholics then did throughout Christendom, Ireland included,—we cannot escape, nor do we see how any one can escape, the necessary conclusion, that the Irish before and from the time of S. Patrick, to and through the time of Henry II., and to and through the time of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, and down to the present day, have acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Pope just as all Catholics have ever done and now do. Either this must be so, or if the Irish were Protestants, then must all the peoples of the various countries of Christendom with whom the ancient Irish were in constant religious communication, including the Popes themselves, have also been Protestants. And to those who reject this latter absurdity and adopt the rational conclusion which the historical evidence establishes, it involves and suggests the important reflection, that the religion of S. Patrick and of the ancient Irish and of all the peoples of Christendom with whom they were in religious communication, and of all Catholics, down to the present day, must be the religion taught by Christ our Saviour.

We have confined ourselves to the one test of Catholicity, the being in communion with the See of Rome. We might have shown, for the evidences are superabundant, that the ancient Irish believed the doctrines and followed the practices of the Catholic Church, but it appeared to us that there was no way in which we could so readily prove that the ancient Irish were Catholic as by proving that they were in communion with the See of Rome. We could easily have proved that they believed in the real presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Holy Sacrament of the altar, but so do some members of the Church of England; we could easily have proved that they honoured the saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, and asked them, and especially her, to pray to God for them, but so do some members of the Church of England; that they went to confession, but so do some members of the Church of England; and we might thus have identified the leading doctrines and the prominent practices of the ancient Irish and of the whole Catholic Church then, ever since, and at the present day, but many of such doctrines and practices might also have appeared very similar to, if not identical with,

those of *some* members of the Church of England ; and therefore we thought that the most ready and simple and certain way of determining whether the ancient Irish were Catholics or Protestants was to apply the test of their being in communion or not in communion with the See of Rome. That is the crucial test, alike with ancient Irish and modern Anglican, and to that test therefore we have confined ourselves in the present article.

When, indeed, it is said that the ancient Irish were Protestants, what is really meant? Is it meant that they were Church of England Protestants, or Calvinists, or Congregationalists, or Methodists, or Baptists, or Quakers, or any other of the various, nay multitudinous, forms of Protestantism? Is it meant that they believed in the Thirty-nine Articles, or in the Catechism of the assembly of divines, or in that which has been taught by Calvin, or by Wesley, or by Fox, for all these and many others come under the generic name of Protestants, though differing widely from each other? Is it meant that the ancient Irish believed that there is or that there is not regeneration in baptism, for both these opposite beliefs are tolerated in the Church of England? Is it meant that the ancient Irish believed or did not believe in the Real Presence, for this belief and its negative co-exist in the Established Church? Is it meant that they believed, or did not believe, in holy orders and apostolical succession, for both these beliefs, and both their negatives, also exist in the Established Church; and the difficulty is to know what is *the* belief of the Established Church of England, unless it be comprised in the very compendious and lawyer-like statement recently made by a learned Queen's counsel on the hustings, that "the Church must do whatever the State tells it to do," which obviously means that the creed of the Church of England is contained in the statute book, and may be altered by Act of Parliament next session.

It is an old saying that much dispute might be avoided by definition of terms, and when any one asserts that the ancient Irish were Protestants he would certainly lessen, and perhaps altogether avoid, the trouble of inquiry if he would first define the word "Protestants," and state the exact doctrines which they hold. We hope and believe that it is consistent with the respect and esteem and affection which we have for many Protestants, if we say that the religious doctrines of Protestants are so various and so indefinite, that we should not be far from the mark if we suggested that a Protestant may believe or disbelieve almost anything he likes, if only he refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Church of Rome; and if this be so, we have taken the most effectual way of proving that the ancient Irish were *not* Protestants, by showing that they *did* acknowledge the authority of the Church of Rome.

ART. II.—AUTHORITY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

La Filosofia antica esposta e difesa del P. GIUSEPPE KLEUTGEN, D.C., D.G.
Versione dal Tedesco. Roma.

*De l'Unité dans l'Enseignement de la Philosophie au sein des Ecoles Catho-
liques.* Par le P. H. RAMIÈRE. Paris.

Essay on first Principles. By the Very Rev. JOHN CANON WALKER.
London : Longman.

THE foundation by Descartes of what is called “the modern philosophy,” may fairly be accounted the severest *intellectual* calamity which ever befell the Church. However much she suffered in other ways from the various heresies of successive centuries, *intellectually* she gained by them. For she was led in each case to investigate more profoundly, to analyze more carefully, to express more precisely the dogma assailed; while its assailants were expelled from her territory, and had no power therefore to taint her atmosphere. But Descartes was no heretic: and the result of his career is, that for a very considerable period there has been mutual internecine war among Catholics, as to the very fundamentals of philosophy.* From the fact of living in the midst of this phenomenon, there is a tendency in contemporary Catholics greatly to underrate its disastrousness; and it may be worth while therefore, before going further, to point out one or two particulars under which it is especially deplorable.

Dogmatic Theology more properly so called—the exposition and analysis of dogmata in themselves and in their mutual relation—has its very life in the combination of

* “This great undeniable fact must never be lost sight of, that *up to the beginning of the last century* the scholastic philosophy kept itself in possession throughout the whole extent of the Catholic Church (Kleutgen, vol. i. p. 100). F. Kleutgen then would give some 150 years, as the period during which the calamity mentioned in the text has oppressed the Church. “Our domestic contentions . . . turn on the *most fundamental questions*; those on which depends the *certainty of all our rational convictions*; on the principles which should be opposed to sceptics and pantheists; on the legitimacy of the idea of God and of all absolute ideas; on the very value of reason; in one word on the *whole of philosophy*” (Ramière, pp. 4, 5).

truths known by revelation with truths known by reason. If the latter data therefore be wrongly supplied, the whole science is vitiated and worthless.* The disciples then of an unsound philosophy are ipso facto excluded from all full or trustworthy scientific knowledge of dogma. Since therefore nowadays all speculatively given Catholics regard a large number of their fellow Catholics as being in this very category—as being disciples of an unsound philosophy—the natural result is, that dogmatic theology goes very much to the wall. And indeed one very curious indication of this result may be observed; viz., that the very meaning of the phrase “dogmatic theology” has imperceptibly changed. Catholics do not like to admit that they neglect dogmatic theology; and so they give that name to other studies, which, however valuable in themselves, are of quite a different character: such as dogmatic *history*, and anti-Protestant *controversy*. Both these studies, it need not be said, have very great value; and the latter indeed has been for the last three centuries absolutely indispensable: but surely it is quite a misnomer to speak of either as “dogmatic theology.”

Now we should have to occupy a long article with the subject, if we attempted to set forth the deplorable disadvantage under which all Catholic speculation labours, from the comparative neglect into which dogmatical science has lately fallen in many parts of Christendom. Here we will but express briefly our own strong opinion, (1) that this is the one central science, which gives unity and due proportionate significance to all other sacred studies; (2) that where this is neglected, even those which are zealously cultivated produce far less good fruit than would otherwise be the case; and (3) that the one predominant cause of its neglect—the cause which has had much more influence than all the rest put together—has been the mutual divergence of Catholics in the field of philosophy. Canon Walker has spoken excellently on this; though in language studiously moderate:—

* “What is theology? The philosophy of revelation: in other words it is the result of applying to revealed dogmata the methods and principles of philosophy. Evidently therefore all hope of the theological union must be abandoned, so long as disputes continue on philosophical principles and on the intrinsic trustworthiness of reason. . . . If one of our students opens S. Thomas, Suarez, or some other of those great doctors whom the Church has proclaimed the luminaries of theology,—instead of light he finds therein but obscurity: their terms, their axioms, their formulæ, which used to be perfectly clear to those who had been philosophically educated, have now become even to teachers mere hieroglyphics” (Ramière, pp. 21, 22).

In this point of view the Church has suffered loss, when her writers and teachers turned more to the historic and authoritative foundations of truth, than to its intrinsic reasons, analogies, and aims; although she has undoubtedly gained in other and important respects. At first the younger methods, as with Petavius, inherited a rich stock of principles and dogmatic truth to support and vivify their elaborate and critical illustrations; but by degrees the substance began to subside, and the most meagre groundwork of reason served the purposes of varied erudition; nay, what has been very prejudicial to truth, a dangerous eclecticism of different principles of philosophy has been adopted for the uses of dogma, as if philosophy were an alien without any definite character, intended only to meet the accidental wants of the theological disputant; till at last new and foreign principles and processes of reasoning have on all sides forced an entrance into the domain of dogma; and the Church seemed, as some of late have too crudely and absolutely stated, to be left without a philosophy (pp. vi. vii).

A second evil has arisen from Catholic philosophical differences, almost as serious as that which we have just mentioned, but entirely distinct. Many thinkers have of late pointed out, that all the higher and more gifted non-Catholic intellects have entirely abandoned the old Protestant ruck; that they are either in some sense on their road to the Church, or else are rationalists, pantheists, atheists. As against this latter class—which among men of great intellectual power is very far larger than the former,—the old controversial formulæ—the old “*probatur ex Scripturâ*,” “*probatur ex Patribus*,”—have become simply antiquated and obsolete. It is no paradox to say, that the controversial theology now most peremptorily required is controversial *philosophy*. If then we would estimate the seriousness of our present calamity, let us make a very intelligible supposition. Let us suppose that in the palmy days of Protestantism—in the period of Bellarmine or Bossuet—Catholic controversialists had been as much at issue with each other on first principles, as Catholic *philosophers* are now. What would have been the certain result? Catholics would have wasted their intellectual energies in disputing with each other, and would moreover have been incapacitated from combining against the common enemy; while Protestants would have been under little danger from an army divided against itself. Such alas! is the attitude now forced upon the Church’s children, in confronting those portents of unbelief which are the great intellectual peril of our time. Catholics are simply impotent to contest *collectively* against the evil. Some doubtless do individually gird themselves for the conflict: but many more are simply cowed and dispirited; they fold their

hands and gaze on the monster with alarm and disgust ; or they compel themselves to forget his existence.

A third evil result, more or less closely connected with each of the two former, is exhibited in Catholic higher lay education. The "Pall Mall Gazette," in a very interesting and significant article issued last April 12th, alleges one characteristic and widely-extended calamity as having befallen the present age. It complains that Christians in general, and Catholics in particular, "have persuaded themselves to doubt whether it is necessary, or even desirable, that their religious belief should be true, in the plain common sense of that word. They have got into the way of thinking," it adds, "that there is an inferior article different from ordinary truth, which may perhaps be called spiritual truth, and which will for all religious purposes do quite as well, or rather much better. Their creed is . . . less a *doctrine* than a *resolution*, or . . . an *attempt* to believe. They are believers in a *general sense*." Now of course there is here very much exaggeration ; but we wish we could be sure that it does not rest on a certain basis of truth. Catholic thinkers have seen the coming danger. They have constantly pointed out that now, when there has long ceased to be a Christian atmosphere diffused throughout society imbuing the mind unconsciously with Catholic doctrine and principle—nay, when the prevalent atmosphere has long been in character most opposite—it has become far more necessary than it was in earlier times, to inculcate dogma in one or other shape, as an express study for every class. In proportion as this is not done, the phenomenon described in the "Pall Mall Gazette" will be ever of less and less rare occurrence. But dogma cannot possibly be taught in a shape which shall find access to highly-cultivated intellects, unless in most intimate connection with philosophy. And thus two most lamentable results at once follow in Catholic higher education, whenever some philosophy is not carefully inculcated as the one fundamentally true and certain system. (1) A Catholic youth cannot be duly protected against that poisonous habit of speculative thought, which infects the whole air he breathes ; nor (2) can he be trained in a due apprehension of those dogmata, which are given him by God for the very purpose, that he may direct his life by their constant contemplation.

Here then is the one pressing intellectual need of our time ; that Catholics be philosophically united : here is the first, second, and third thing intellectually necessary. In fact, this has been among our principal reasons for dwelling so unintermittently in this REVIEW on the Church's infallibility

and authority within ground not strictly dogmatical; since it is in the most complete interior submission to her various philosophical decrees, that the earliest remedy must be sought for so deplorable an evil. Other things will have to be added afterwards, no doubt; but this must come first, and without this the others are futile.

But now, if philosophical unity can be obtained at all,—among the various philosophies which have a footing within the Church, is there one in particular to which all eyes would turn as to the nucleus of such unity? Of course there is. The connection is most intimate, as we have seen, between theology and philosophy; and yet there is no philosophy with which the Church has ever had official relations, except only the scholastic. No Catholic who fairly gives his mind to the matter will be able to doubt, that in its essential and fundamental principles scholasticism must be infallibly a true philosophy. We have already pointed out that dogmatic theology is based throughout on philosophy; and that a dogmatic theology, which should take a false philosophy for its basis, must by necessity be preponderatingly false. If then it be admitted—as all Catholics will admit—that the Church's dogmatic theology has been in every age substantially and predominantly trustworthy;—it must be no less infallibly certain, that those philosophical doctrines, which everywhere pervade it and are its animating principles, are fundamentally true.

But there is another and counterbalancing statement of the case, which it is no less important to bear in mind. We say that those philosophical principles, which pervaded and animated the scholastic theology, are fundamentally true. But this is quite a different thing from saying that—even as exhibited by its best exponents, by S. Thomas or Suarez,—the scholastic is a perfect and fully satisfying philosophy. As the connection of *theology* with philosophy was the ground of our general proposition in favour of that system;—so the *degree* of such connection must limit the *extent* to which the proposition itself may reasonably be carried. Take one instance of what we mean. The number is by no means inconsiderable of vital philosophical questions, which now profoundly agitate the mind of thinkers, but which three centuries ago had never been raised. It is not to a scholastic philosopher of the past, that a Catholic of this day would naturally look for their explicit solution; though he *should* reject any proposed solution of them, which is at *variance* with the fundamental principles of scholastic philosophy. Again, even very eminent scholastics may have fallen into various philosophical errors, not fundamental indeed, but very far from unimportant; and yet these errors

may so little have worked their way into the fabric of *theology*, that the Church may have had no call to interfere. Our own opinion is that the fact *is* so: but until we have given reasons for this opinion, we have no right of course to say more, than that the fact *may* be so for anything which theology declares to the contrary. We would allege also with some confidence, that numerous and emphatic as have been the Church's testimonies to the value of scholastic philosophy, they have always stopped very far short of stamping with her authority each several portion of its doctrine.*

We speak on this whole subject with unfeigned diffidence, and with deep submission to better judgments than our own. But there is such pressing necessity for speech, that we felt it could not be right much longer to forbear, however keenly we might feel our own incompetence. And we speak now with far greater comfort than would be otherwise possible, because we are able to follow in the wake of so admirable a treatise, as that of F. Kleutgen which we have named at the head of our article. Indeed this great work appears to us by far the most valuable acquisition to Catholic philosophical literature (so far as we are acquainted with that literature), which has been made since the time of Suarez. Its two main theses are just those two on which we have been insisting: (1) the scholastic philosophy is infallibly true, in its essential and fundamental principles; but (2), to be made fully available for our time, it needs large additions and no inconsiderable corrections. In illustrating these theses, F. Kleutgen exhibits, not only the widest, the profoundest, apprehension of scholasticism, but also a surprisingly fair and large-minded appreciation of other philosophical schools; treating his whole theme moreover with an accuracy of thought and expression, which cannot be surpassed. We may add that not unfrequently he warms with his subject, and rises into real eloquence.

As to the former of the two theses we have ascribed to him—viz., that the scholastic philosophy is true in its essential and fundamental principles—this is the one staple, the one pervading argument, of his whole work. We will quote one passage in particular: because (to our mind) it places the matter on precisely its true ground; and because it dwells on that doctrine concerning the Church's unintermitting

* Take, for example, the well-known decree against Traditionalism. "Methodus, quâ usi sunt D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, et alii post ipsos scholastici, non ad rationalismum ducit; neque causa fuit, cur apud scholas hodiernas philosophia in naturalismum et pantheismum impingeret. Proinde non licet in crimen doctoribus et magistris illis vertere, quod methodum hanc, præsertim approbante vel saltem tacente Ecclesiâ, usurpaverint."

infallible magisterium, which we have ever so prominently advocated in this REVIEW. We italicise a few sentences.

That the Church's infallibility extends also to those sciences which, without being theological, are nevertheless closely bound up with theology, this is not questioned (so far as I know) even by our opponents.* Now the *Ecclesia Docens* maintains in the path of truth the *Ecclesia Discens*, not only by means of that extraordinary magisterium in virtue of which she pronounces from time to time her judgment on particular errors ; but also by means of *her ordinary and always active magisterium*, in virtue of which she manifests true doctrines over the whole earth. And therefore, if she has the Holy Ghost's assistance when promulgating her decisions against new dogmatical errors—she is not deprived of the same assistance when she adopts measures which are of decisive influence over her abiding (stable) magisterium. This magisterium consists in the manifestation and exposition of revealed truth, made by the Church's ministers under the guidance and supervision of their legitimate pastors. Now since we [the mass of the faithful] are to be led into all the truth through [the supervision of] these pastors, is it possible that in their office of guidance and superintendence they should be abandoned by the Holy Ghost? Again who can possibly deny, that this manifestation and exposition of the doctrines of the Faith, uttered by the Church's ministers, is greatly influenced by the theology which they study? And on the other hand who will deny, that this theology in its turn is notably affected by the philosophy which it uses for its purpose? The Church's pastors therefore principally accomplish this their work of guardianship, by means of watchfulness over schools and over their direction ; and on this is principally founded the Church's inalienable right of ordering the studies of schools. If then, in the exercise of this right, the Church is not without *infallible light from on high*, what inference may be drawn from her practice in the case we are treating? Here we are speaking of a certain philosophy, which for many centuries was taught in all the higher schools of Christendom ; and those precisely the centuries in which the Church exercised, incomparably more than in any other period, her right of directing education. And in spite of repeated allegations to the contrary, [I affirm that] she not only *tolerated* the use of this philosophy, but *promoted* it ; and indeed *prescribed* it to the most illustrious universities of the period, such as Paris, Rome, Bologna. This philosophy is bound up most unvaryingly and most intimately with the whole of scholastic theology : and scholastic theology in general—particularly that of S. Thomas,—has been most solemnly approved by the Church ; which urgently recommends it to us “in order to make us secure against all errors, and well equipped to contend against them.” [In this sense spoke the Pontiffs Sixtus V., Pius V., Alexander VII., Innocent XV., and others whom the author has elsewhere cited.]† Now is not this her practice a noteworthy exercise of her abiding magisterium

* We wish we could confirm this statement so far as regards *English Catholics*.

† Note of the Italian translator.

and one decisive [of the question before us]? Certainly this cannot be denied (vol. i., pp. 93-95).

This argument seems to us as irrefragable in its substance, as it is admirably expressed by the author. The Church is infallible in her abiding magisterium, and she cannot therefore sanction a theology which is wrong in principle: but her theology *would* be wrong in principle, if the scholastic philosophy, whereon it is based throughout, were fundamentally mistaken. Some readers indeed might doubt from the wording of the above extract, whether F. Kleutgen does not go even farther than this: they might doubt whether he can hold the second thesis which we have ascribed to him; viz., that this philosophy needs, for present purposes, large additions and no inconsiderable corrections. But the very words which next follow, importantly explain and qualify what has preceded.

We grant willingly that one may have quite just views concerning the Holy Ghost's assistance promised to the Church, and nevertheless hold that *certain particular doctrines of this philosophy are not correct*: even though the doctrines be *in some way connected with questions of theology*. One may hold that the scholastic philosophy, as a whole, is susceptible of *noteworthy improvements*, nay, and that from circumstances of the time it *needs them*: insomuch that, in this sense, it may with advantage be *superseded by a better philosophy*. But can one possibly grant that *a large part of its most characteristic doctrines is false*? that the *foundation and direction* of this philosophy is perverse? (p. 95.)

Such accusations are energetically alleged against scholastic philosophy by its assailants; and against such accusations our author persistently and emphatically defends it. In like manner he says elsewhere:—

We have never asserted that all the questions now raised were solved in times past; nor have we ever expressed a doubt that for their solution the ancient philosophy *might derive advantage from the modern*. That which we do deny is, that in order to perfect philosophical sciences it is necessary to deny the *fundamental principles* of antiquity and *abandon the road* which antiquity has constructed (vol. ii., p. 256).

Again:—

Considering the intimate connection between philosophy and theology, [Descartes and his followers] ought to have inferred that the speculative system, which had been received within the Church for centuries and indeed from the very origin of Christianity, could not be destitute of a *solid and true foundation*: that this system might well be *incomplete*; but not erroneous, *at least on the principal questions* (vol. i., pp. 114-5).

In vol. ii., p. 145, F. Kleutgen maintains that "a *foundation*" has been laid down by the scholastics "for the *beginning* of philosophical speculation; or at least that such foundation certainly *may* be laid down, *without abandoning their principles.*" He will not contend then, that they themselves even laid down a sufficient *foundation* for philosophy; but only, that they have laid down no principles *inconsistent* with such true and sufficient foundation. Indeed (vol. ii., p. 171), he regards "the principle of causality" or "of sufficient reason" as a principle indispensably necessary to be taken into account, for any adequate theory on the laws of thought; and at the same time admits that "it is a merit of the modern philosophy" to have first "considered" this principle. As to *some* of the scholastics, our author is prepared to go much further; and is of opinion (vol. i., pp. 312-3) that by their mode of exposition they may have given a handle to the fearful error of Lockian empiricism itself. Descartes indeed, according to F. Kleutgen, would have been quite warranted in assailing *this or that particular scholastic doctrine*; his fault was that—

He did not *content* himself with assailing this or that particular doctrine of the scholastics. He began with the persuasion, that down to his time neither was the fixed point understood from which philosophy could start, nor the path along which it could proceed in security; and that consequently the scholastics not only could not really prove the truths which they taught, but besides taught a large number of errors (vol. i., p. 102).

It was from being inoculated with this preposterous contempt of the past, our author presently adds (p. 112), that Lamennais, Bautain, Gioberti, Hermes, Gunther, fell into the deplorable errors for which they have been condemned. And he proceeds to draw an important illustration from the great theological work of Melchior Canus. When that theologian began to teach, no one had methodically treated, as a distinct theme, the various sources of theological science; the relation of those sources to the first principle of that science, God's infallible word; and the comparative weight which should accordingly be assigned to each. Canus then had to treat a new subject; but he refused to treat it in a revolutionary spirit. He searched the old approved writers, to discover what views upon this new subject were most consistent with ancient dicta; and he firmly resolved that his addition to the time-honoured edifice should be in completest harmony with the ancient fabric itself. Such, adds F. Kleutgen, is the course now incumbent on a true Catholic philosopher. A criticism, e. g., of the cognoscitive faculties is simply essential, he con-

siders, for the philosophical needs of our time; and yet will in vain be sought among the scholastic writers. It is the business of a true Catholic philosopher, to consider first of all what views on this matter are *implied* in the schools; or (if *none* are implied) what views are in greatest harmony with their general system. It is infallibly certain that this system is true in its main essentials; and any view therefore must be unsound, which is incompatible with those essentials.

F. Ramière's work, which we have also named at the head of this article and from which we have made one or two extracts in our previous notes, is devoted to the theme with which we began: the urgent necessity now existing for Catholic philosophical unity. His remarks on that theme are admirable, and he is entitled to much gratitude for so clearly seeing its importance. He does not however impress us as being quite equally successful, in his treatment of the traditionalistic and ontologicistic philosophies.

Against F. Kleutgen's and F. Ramière's whole argument—and indeed against the Church's whole claim of authority within the region of philosophy—an objection has repeatedly been made, both by Protestants and by rebellious Catholics. "Philosophy," say these men, "rests exclusively on reason; and ecclesiastical authority in such a matter is simply an impertinent intrusion. If reason establishes some truth, any one commits intellectual suicide, who doubts that truth in deference to an external monitor. If on the other hand there be any truth which *cannot* be established by reason, it has no right to be called a *philosophical* truth at all."

Now we have no space in this number for enlarging duly, on the relations which should be preserved between reason and faith in philosophical investigation; * but we must, at all events, give a brief answer to this plausible objection. Firstly then we will reply to its *latter* clause; and we will point out, that there is no cause whatever why a truth may not be of extreme philosophical moment, which cannot nevertheless be established by human reason. Take e. g. such an assertion as this: that theology teaches nothing *intrinsically repugnant*, in declaring the One Divine Essence to terminate Three Divine Persons; or again, in declaring the accidents of bread and wine to remain, after consecration of the Eucharist, without any substance in which they inhere. Human reason can neither prove nor disprove these truths; yet no one will doubt that they are philosophically most important. It is a mere question of

* We may perhaps refer, without impropriety, to Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction," pp. xxi-xxvii.

words whether you do or do not choose to call them *philosophical* truths; though we think they are properly so called. At all events there is every probability that some reason higher than the human—some angelic reason—can cognise them with certainty by its own light.

Next, as to the *former* part of the above-recited objection. One thing is plain at starting. To maintain that the dictates of any theology can conflict with the dictates of reason, is simply to maintain that such theology is so far false. He therefore who knows that the dictates of Catholic theology are infallibly true, will assume as a first principle that they can never impose on him an obligation of abandoning what his reason has established. It may well happen indeed, that you *think* you have established some tenet by reason, and that the Church may presently condemn that tenet. Just so schoolboys often think they have correctly performed a sum in addition or multiplication; yet they find their answer plucked.* Still they do not immediately cry out that their instructor is violating the sacred rights of reason, but rather take for granted that they have themselves made a mistake. In like manner the Catholic philosopher, if he finds some one of his conclusions condemned by the Church, is at once perfectly certain that either his premisses have been unsound or insufficient, or his inferences too hasty. He reviews therefore his past course of argument, fully expecting that he will make one or other of these discoveries. In most instances his assurance is speedily justified by the event. It may happen however that he is a long time in finding the flaw; nay, in some comparatively rare cases he may not be able to find it at all. Yet, even under such circumstances as these, a good Catholic remains confident that there *is* a flaw somewhere, and that his conclusion is really false and mischievous.

It is only in this last case, that any theoretical difficulty can be even alleged. If a Catholic philosopher however felt a moment's hesitation in submitting his judgment on the supposed hypothesis, we would thus argue with him in reply: You have long studied philosophy. It is quite a familiar fact to you therefore, that some of the world's greatest thinkers have held, as undeniably established by reason, various opinions, of which you see the utter baselessness and falsehood. Anyhow therefore it is *possible*, that this or that of your own philosophical opinions is similarly baseless; but

* This admirable illustration was used some years back in the "Tablet," on occasion (we think) of the Munich Brief.

that, from a certain narrowness or self-partiality, you are blind to the fact. Well, that which, under *any* circumstances, is abundantly *possible*, you are called on under *present* circumstances to accept as certainly *true*. Why are you called on so to accept it? Because your divinely given teacher has so decided. What can be more reasonable than this?

In fact we are confident it will be found, not only that the principle of authority is not *adverse* to the true interests of philosophy; but, on the contrary, that it is the only *conservator* of those interests. The one bane both of metaphysics and psychology has ever been, that philosophers have been so deplorably hasty in their philosophical processes; so deplorably careless, as to the sufficiency of their premisses and the correctness of their deductions. The Catholic philosopher enjoys a protection, to which externs are altogether strangers, against these fundamental and capital dangers. Nor in truth do we see how there is any hope of sufficient battle being given to the various forms of philosophical misbelief now prevalent, by any effort which can be put forth by individual philosophers following each his own light. The Church, and the Church alone, can secure that philosophical unity, which is so paramouly needed. A large number of her faithful children, through obedience to her voice, will themselves have learned to see under the light of reason the falsehood of this or that view, with which they may have originally started. Others, who have not yet come themselves to *see* this, will nevertheless firmly believe it, and will abstain from pressing their idiosyncrasies. And thus the army of truth, united in one compact phalanx, will have its due advantage against the disorganized and mutually divergent hosts of error.

There can be no more intensely practical question then, just now, than a consideration of the proper method for ascertaining the Church's voice, on this or that philosophical question. We will therefore conclude, by expressing our own humble suggestions on the subject. Even if our statements were found to be substantially incorrect, we should have done a very important work in inducing more competent thinkers to express themselves clearly on the matter. Our own impression however is, that every loyal Catholic will heartily agree with our principles as far as they go; though it is very probable that there may be others of almost equal importance, which have not occurred to our mind. We will not indeed here speak of the intellectual submission due to explicit ecclesiastical pronouncements, because we have so repeatedly enlarged on this. We will speak merely of the *other* means

which exist, for knowing the Church's judgment on things philosophical.

1. Every philosophical proposition is infallibly true, which is implied in the Church's dogmatic definitions. One example will sufficiently illustrate our meaning. It is infallibly true that the word "Transubstantiation" aptly and truly expresses that dogma to which the Church applies it. But the word would *not* truly and aptly express such dogma, unless certain philosophical propositions were correct concerning "substance," "accident," &c., &c. Such propositions therefore must be regarded as infallibly certain.

2. All philosophical principles are infallibly true, which pervade and animate the Church's one recognized dogmatic theology, the scholastic.

3. As to other scholastic philosophical propositions, the degree of ecclesiastical authority which they possess is proportioned to the degree of intimacy and pervasiveness with which they have inflowed into the scholastic theology.

4. Those scholastic philosophical propositions which have not so inflowed at all—however prominent and important they may be in a purely philosophical point of view—are to be judged exclusively by their own merits, and to be weighed impartially in the scale of reason. Yet there is the strongest reason for an *à priori* anticipation that, for the most part, they will be found far weightier in that scale, than the parallel propositions of conflicting philosophies.

Our readers will have seen, from the preceding remarks, that we are strongly disposed to one opinion, which we have not yet expressly mentioned. Undoubtedly the strictures on scholastic philosophy, uttered by a certain class of Catholics, are not only very superficial, but very disloyal to the Church; betraying indeed a most inadequate appreciation of her infallibility and her authority in teaching. But (speaking with great deference) we do think that some Catholics fall into an opposite extreme. Take e. g. Canon Walker's valuable and thoughtful pamphlet. Certainly we have not observed in it any direct expression on the subject to which we can take exception. Still its general *tone* almost seems to imply, that any one philosophical proposition, current among the scholastics, has pretty well as much authority as any other; and that the most intellectually dutiful sons of the Church are those, who accept every such proposition simply as a matter of course, without question or delay. Now it is abundantly possible, that there may be reasons for such a view of which we know nothing: we only say that we *do* know nothing of them; that we are not ourselves aware of any ground, on which such an

unquestioning and absolute acceptance of every scholastic philosophical detail can be defended. And the quotations, which we gave a few pages back, show at all events that in this we are following no less grave an authority than that of F. Kleutgen.

The sum of our whole argument may be thus stated :—(1) It is the normal condition of Catholics, that they be absolutely united on philosophical *essentials*; while there shall be a large amount among them of free discussion, on questions which are secondary indeed, but very far from unimportant. (2) For the last 150 years this normal condition has been suspended, and Catholics have been at mutual variance on the very foundations of philosophy. (3) From this calamity there has arisen, in many parts of the Church, a deplorable neglect of dogmatic theology properly so called; and also a very serious difficulty in the higher education of laymen. (4) From the same cause, it has become impossible to defend successfully on a large scale those fundamental truths of natural religion, which are now the main points of attack among many of the ablest and most cultivated non-Catholic thinkers. No successful war can be waged against the enemies of natural religion, unless there is a large and united phalanx of its upholders. (5) This unspeakably needed philosophical unity might without difficulty be obtained by Catholics (though not by other religionists), if Catholic thinkers would be but duly loyal to the Church's voice. (6) Lastly, such loyalty would be sufficiently secured by the acceptance of certain practical principles, which we have ventured (under correction) to indicate.

We submit these various opinions to the better judgment of Catholic philosophical inquirers. We have long been anxious to urge a Catholic crusade in behalf of natural religion, against the Mills and Bains and other its enemies, who in England are now so active and stirring. But no such crusade is possible, except in proportion as Catholics shall be philosophically united among themselves. We hope then that we may hereafter from time to time apply (as best we are able) the principles suggested in this article, to a treatment of the various vital questions now at issue between religion and its opponents. And the appearance of Canon Walker's pamphlet has suggested to us, that we should commence with that which is the most philosophically fundamental of all those questions; viz. the existence and authority of *philosophical axioms*. To this therefore we have devoted a separate article in our present number.

Meanwhile we cannot better conclude our present essay,

than by extracting a strong testimony to the scholastic philosophy from a very impartial quarter, the "Saturday Review." The passage terminates an able notice of Mr. Lecky's new work in the issue for May 1st. And this, be it remembered, is the testimony of a Protestant journalist; of one therefore, who is in all probability altogether unacquainted with what scholasticism has done, in the way of building up that unparalleled intellectual fabric the Church's dogmatic theology.

Mind is employed either in tracking out the knowledge of things outside it, or in examining its own thoughts and history. Its activity ought to take both directions: in the middle ages it long shrank, not without intelligible reasons, from the first; but surely the mind cannot be said to be idle when it puts forth its strength on the second. Now, though there was a vast deficiency in that hunting out and ascertaining the facts of nature and history which is so great a work in our days, there was no deficiency in that *which is more properly thought*—profound and patient and exact consideration of what goes on in the mind, of its efforts to know, of its materials and processes. The schoolmen have become a commonplace for sneers. But no one who ever studied any of the great ones among them could possibly say that mind in them was dormant. No one could ever say that men like Anselm or Aquinas did not treat the most difficult questions with a freedom and originality, which are ordinarily supposed incompatible with their religion. *In all that is of most essential consequence*, not only in the exhibition of what we know, but in grasping it firmly, clearly, comprehensively, in taking in all the sides of a question, in mapping out all its ramifications, in the sheer hard work of purely intellectual action on ideas and words, *they are still our unequalled masters*. Most surely, if they led, in their keen and subtle speculations, into many false and useless roads, they paved the way as nothing else did,—*as certainly neither ancient speculation nor Mahomedan science did*—for modern philosophy. They laid out the ground and prepared a language for Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant. Those ancient and unwearied pioneers of real thinking deserve more respect than they always meet, from all who know that real thinking is as necessary as the actual discovery of facts, for the true and solid advancement of knowledge.

ART. III.—THE RING AND THE BOOK.

The Ring and the Book. By ROBERT BROWNING, M.A., Honorary Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. In Four Volumes. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1868.

WE do not affect to approach our present task with the perfect calmness and temper of judicial indifference. Catholics, it is true, especially in these islands, have become by long habit somewhat callous to calumny; yet it is pitiful to find a man of genius, such as Mr. Browning undoubtedly is, himself the dupe of most fantastic prejudices, and helping to perpetuate and multiply them in the minds of others. Whatever may be the grounds of his contempt for the British public and his conviction that they "like him not," we are bound to say that he could not have taken a readier way of commending himself to their favour than by the construction of a tale in which, conformably to the venerable models of Mrs. Radcliffe's time, nearly all the scoundrels are priests; and though the hero is a priest too, he is so by an unhappy mistake; the author plainly indicating his opinion that being a priest is more of a hindrance than a help to being anything good. Perhaps it will be said that the character which he has drawn of the good Pope Innocent XII. is inconsistent with this view. We do not deny that Mr. Browning has meant to delineate him as, what he was, an eminently wise and holy Pontiff; but he has thought proper, in the execution of his design, to credit Innocent with sentiments and expressions which, however natural they would be in Mr. Browning, are highly improper, absurd, and ridiculous in the personage to whom they are attributed. We do not charge Mr. Browning with having entirely invented the anecdote given in vol. i., p. 17, but, as he tells it, it is not only incredible, but nonsensical. The Pope, we are told, was urged to condemn the errors of "those Jansenists, re-nicknamed Molinists," which he refused to do, on the ground that the world would not hate them so much if there was not some good in them. We are satisfied that even an "Honorary Fellow of Balliol"—by the way, what on earth is an "honorary fellow"?—would feel rather ashamed of himself, if so many errors could be detected in his relation of any incident of secular history as are obvious and glaring in this very curious little story. In

the first place, to say that the Molinists were only Jansenists under another name is almost equivalent with saying that the followers of Lord Cairns are identical with the friends of Mr. Bright. The circumstance of both having given attention to the doctrines of grace, is the sole circumstance in which the Jansenists and the Molinists were at one. The opinions of the Jansenists were as different from those of the Molinists, as the opinions of the late Sir Robert Inglis were from those of the late Mr. Feargus O'Connor. In fact, the very use of the name of "Molinist" by Mr. Browning, throws us into a state of confusion approaching that of his own mind on the point. For there were Molinists and Molinists; the former taking their name from the Jesuit, Louis Molina, whose *Concordia* was first published at Lisbon in 1588, and whose opinions were the cause of lively discussion under the reigns of Clement VIII. and Paul V.; that is, something like a century before the pontificate of Innocent XII. It cannot be to them that Mr. Browning refers; because they existed long before the Jansenists; they were never condemned by the Church; and perhaps at this moment their doctrine is more prevalent among Catholics, than any other on the subject. We will compassionate Mr. Browning's bewildered ignorance, so far as to assume* that the Molinists he speaks of—more properly Molinosists, belonging to one sect of Quietists—were the followers, not of Louis Molina, but of Michael Molinos; because Quietism was really a question much discussed in Innocent XII.'s reign. But it is highly improbable, to put it mildly, that Innocent, who did not ascend the Pontifical throne until the year 1691, was ignorant of the fact that Michael Molinos had abjured his errors in the year 1687. It is therefore also improbable that the Pope did not know what the "Molinists" were; and the whole story wears an air neither of truth nor of happy invention. It is known, however, that the Pope, out of his great respect for the character of Fénelon, proceeded with a slowness in his examination of the qualified Quietism of *Les Maximes des Saints*, with which the French court was much offended and affected to be much disedified; and we can only suppose that something Mr. Browning has heard or read somewhere in connection with that matter has grown, under the action of his imagination, into what he records. In the Pope's soliloquy (vol. iv.) there are far more monstrous perversions of history and reason, upon the exposure of which it is not our province now to enter. Those passages will be

* We may assert it. In vol. i. p. 162, he speaks of "Molinos' sect."

of great value to Dr. Cumming, whether or not he goes to the Ecumenical Council, and may perhaps eke out the eloquence of some "worthy peer" like Lord Westmeath, in the deliberations of the Lords on the Irish Church Bill. But, as a specimen of the manner in which the Pope is made to talk Browning, we may be permitted to give the following:—

"Call me knave and you get yourself called fool!
 I live for greed, ambition, lust, revenge;
 Attain these ends by force, guile: hypocrite
 To-day, perchance to-morrow recognized
 The rational man, the type of common sense."
 There's Loyola adapted to our time!

Considering the many years which Mr. Browning has spent in Italy, we are not competent to say that his use of "local colour" in his sketches is not generally appropriate and successful, but in the matter of Protestantism his mind seems as much untravelled as his heart. There was no English or Anglo-American colony in Rome at the end of the 17th century, and therefore no appreciable section of Roman society would have talked—as he makes "Half Rome" talk (vol. i. p. 140)—of "Thou shalt not kill" as the "sixth commandment," and "Thou shalt not commit adultery" as the "seventh." He has evidently read up several authorities, not all reliable, for the details of his work on ecclesiastical subjects, and it is strange how so simple a fact as the difference between the Catholic order of the Commandments and the Protestant should have escaped his notice, especially when we know that out of it has arisen the stale charge against us of suppressing one of the precepts of the Decalogue; but this mere toe-nail helps one to take the dimensions of the whole Hercules of misinformation which is his normal state of mind. It is still more discreditable to him to have reproduced (vol. i. p. 24) an extremely silly play upon the names of three remarkable English Catholic Churchmen of our times, which originally—if indeed originality can be predicated of something not more an effort of the brain than sneezing or snoring—came from some of the stupidest of the witlings who write in some of the dullest of the "comic" papers.

Passing now from the consideration of Mr. Browning's claims upon the gratitude of Exeter Hall, we will say a few words about the general character of his poetry before proceeding to examine its specific manifestation in his last work. Few English poets, worthy of the name, that ever lived seem to have cultivated so little the *art* of poetical composition. M.

Sainte-Beuve, speaking of the Duke de Broglie, says that "*Sa pensée lui naît toute rédigée;*" which is true of several other orators and prose writers, not only in France, but elsewhere. It is not true, however, of poets. Many mere rhymesters are gifted with a facile improvisation; but there has never been a great poet, we believe, at least of those controlled by the laws of rhythm and metre, whose spontaneous flow of thought did not require to be poured into a mould of carefully arranged expression. From the very structure of the highest kind of poetry we possess, it is evident that all the great masters of the lyre thought it of the utmost importance to cultivate the mechanism of their art, and thereby enhanced, to a degree that they only could estimate, but at which we can guess, the power and beauty of the thought as it first flashed upon them. Now, Mr. Browning seems to us to labour under either a great delusion or a great mistake. He is under a delusion if he thinks that every thought springs perfectly accoutred from his brain, like Pallas from the brain of Jove. He is under a mistake if he thinks it is of no consequence in what fashion his intellectual bantlings are presented to the world; whether washed or unwashed, dressed or undressed, with limbs decently composed or awkwardly sprawling. We are aware, and various examples indeed sufficiently show, that the highest functions of social or political life can be discharged, not discreditably, without the assistance of hands or feet. Mr. Browning seems to be of opinion that his lines get on equally well with or without the usual number of limbs, or with more than the usual number, and whether or not the limbs they have got are in the right places. What would be thought of the artist who should send a picture or statue to the Exhibition of the Royal Academy, in which picture the "portrait of a gentleman," otherwise painted to perfection, had been left destitute of a nose, or which statue, chiselled in all else with the grace of a Chantrey, had been parsimoniously furnished with but one arm, or too liberally endowed with three? If such a work escaped the rigorous exclusion of the Hanging Committee, could the public, *spectatum admissi*, refrain from ridiculing and denouncing so preposterous a deformity? It may be that Mr. Browning would haughtily assert himself, like the Emperor Sigismund, superior to the paltry laws to which humbler poets are fain to yield. It may be that he would contend that for him who utters the burden of song with which the divine afflatus fills his soul, no voice is possible but that of the divinity speaking through him. If such were his explanation, it would only remain for us, while acknowledging the great and godlike

presence of Apollo, to note with some wonder his sublime indifference to etymology, scorn of syntax, and persecution of prosody.

Seriously, it is to us a matter of surprise that, in whatever other respects Mr. Browning's last poem may be superior to those which have preceded it, many of them give proofs of much more care in composition, and contain passages, if not of greater power, certainly of greater finish. The faulty lines in "Paracelsus," for instance, are few; though one does occur now and then to mar the effect of an otherwise fine passage. In such lines as

You first collect how great a spirit he hid,
and

To find the nature of the spirit they boast,

one has to make "spirit" *spir't*, or read the whole as prose. Again, there are lines in which the phrases "envy and hate," and "early and late," must each be read as having only three syllables. It is hard to know what to do with such a line as

Regard me and the poet dead long ago,

unless we make "poet" *pote*; the only authority for which pronunciation, as far as we know, is an Irish ditty, in which it is averred that there was "no one," not even

Fitzjarald the pote,
That ever yet wrote
A fit rhyme for the Ram.

But these faults are accidental and venial in comparison with the deliberate offences, as we are compelled to regard them, against rhythm, good taste, and even the English language, committed in "The Ring and the Book." The tale of the "Book," as we shall explain more fully further on, is told in a great variety of ways. One of those is what the author calls the *Tertium Quid*, the way in which the story ran among the "superior social section," supposed to be told by some "man of quality" in "silvery and selectest phrase." Let us give a few samples of the distinguished *Tertium Quid's* exquisite phraseology:—

Go, brother, stand you rapt in the ante-room
Of her Efficacy my Cardinal
For an hour,—he likes to have lord-suitors lounge,—
While I betake myself to the grey mare,
The better horse,—how wise the people's word!—
And wait on Madame Violante. (Vol. ii. p. 21.)

Another :—

Why not have taken the butcher's son, the boy
O' the baker or candlestick-maker ? In all the rest
It was yourselves broke compact and played false,
And made a life in common impossible. (p. 27.)

Another :—

So Guido rushed against Violante, first
Author of all his wrongs, *fons et origo*
Malorum—increasingly drunk,—which justice done,
He finished with the rest. Do you blame a bull ?
In truth you look as puzzled as ere I preached. (p. 69.)

Very naturally. A few lines more :—

The Archbishop of the place knows and assists :
Here he has Cardinal This to vouch for the past,
Cardinal That to trust for the future,—match
And marriage were a cardinal's making—in short
What if a tragedy be acted here ? (p. 70.)

Or a farce ? Call'st thou this "poetry," good "Master" Browning ? To us it reads far more like "prose run mad." It is absurd to defend such writing on the ground of its "realism." Realism, if it means anything, means conformity to reality, and to say that it is in conformity with reality to make an accomplished gentleman, or for that matter any rational person, express himself in dislocated doggerel, is an insult to common sense. Shakespeare and the other great dramatists of the Elizabethan age far better understood how to reproduce the real as well as how to give form to the ideal by their art, when they relieved the measured and poetic language of their principal *dramatis personæ* by the homely but racy prose of the inferior characters.

Mr. Browning's genius is essentially dramatic, and many of his best efforts have naturally taken that form. The genuine and high inspiration of much of his poetry is indisputable. He has often great power of thought ; generally great vigour, and sometimes great felicity, of expression. In "insight and oversight," as he would say himself, the range and force of his imagination are transcendent. Properly disciplined and kept to his proper work, he might have been the Shakespeare of our century. As it is, he is not equal to Tennyson ; whom, nevertheless, he as far surpasses in power of conception as he is surpassed by

him in grace of execution. We doubt, indeed, if a more perfect "artist in words" than Tennyson ever lived. If it could be true, as it cannot be, that a great poet is made, not born, it would be true of him. But Browning is a born poet, and only lacks the sense or the modesty to see that something else is wanting to him to be among the greatest. For want of artistic cutting, his diamonds often show but dully beside the paste of other men. For want of artistic development, the thought that should have been starry is often simply nebulous.

Mr. Browning was strolling about Florence, as he tells us, one fine day in June, when he picked up from a stall in the Square of Lorenzo, and bought for "just eightpence,"* a small quarto volume—the "Book"; to wit, on which he has written four volumes—containing, partly in print and partly in manuscript, the account of a "Roman murder-case," for which crime a certain Count Guido Franceschini, of Arezzo, with four accomplices, was executed at Rome on the 22nd of February, in the year 1698. The documents comprised in the volume consisted of the depositions and pleadings in the cause, printed by proper authority, with some letters, explanatory of, and supplementary to them, from a Roman lawyer concerned in the case, to a friend at Florence. Thus we have the Book—"pure crude fact," as its purchaser calls it—but what of the "Ring"? That is a poetic illustration (with which this work commences) gracefully conceived and expressed:—

Do you see this Ring?

'Tis Rome-work, made to match

(By Castellani's imitative craft)

Etrurian circlets found, some happy morn,

After a dropping April; found alive

Spark-like 'mid unearthed slope-side fig-tree roots

That roof old tombs at Chiusi: soft, you see,

Yet crisp as jewel-cutting. There's one trick

(Craftsmen instruct me), one approved device,

And but one, fits such slivers of pure gold

As this was,—such mere oozings from the mine,

Virgin as oval tawny pendent tear

At bee-hive edge when ripened combs o'erflow,—

To bear the file's tooth and the hammer's tap:

* We had thought that a lira was of as much value as a franc—that is, about tenpence—but we take Mr. Browning's authority for the depreciation of the Italian currency.

Since hammer needs must widen out the round,
And file emboss it fine with lily-flowers,
Ere the stuff grow a ring-thing right to wear.
That trick is, the artificer melts up wax
With honey, so to speak ; he mingles gold
With gold's alloy, and, duly tempering both,
Effects a manageable mass, then works.
But his work ended, once the thing a ring,
Oh, there's repriming ! Just a spirt
O' the proper fiery acid o'er its face,
And forth the alloy unfastened flies in fume ;
While, self-sufficient now, the shape remains,
The rondure brave, the liliated loveliness,
Gold as it was, is, shall be evermore :
Prime nature with an added artistry—
No carat lost, and you have gained a ring.
What of it ? 'Tis a figure, a symbol, say ;
A thing's sign : now for the thing signified. (pp. 1-3)

The author does himself less than justice in implying, by this comparison, that his share in the workmanship of the tale constructed out of the materials with which the "Book" supplied him is merely that of "alloy." The original plot is sensational enough. So deeply did it impress Mr. Browning, so unceasingly haunt and irresistibly fascinate him for four long years, that it did not let his fancy rest until it had thrown off a poem much longer (as others have remarked) than the *Iliad*, and nearly twice the length of the *Æneid*. Reduced to the briefest outline, this is what it comes to.—Count Guido Franceschini, of a very old family but very reduced estate, finds himself about fifty years of age, with slender worldly prospects, having in vain haunted saloons and antechambers in Rome for thirty years. In this plight, he is minded to better his condition by marrying into a wealthy plebeian family, and is introduced by a clerical friend to Pietro Comparini and his wife Violante, in whose reputed daughter, Pompilia, the gifts of fortune are united with rare beauty of person and perfect innocence of soul. Pietro, discovering the fortune-hunter's sordid motive, would save Pompilia, whom he believes to be really his child, from such an ill-assorted union ; but the match-making instinct of womankind is too strong in his wife ; the marriage is hurried on, and then all parties set off for Arezzo, which is Guido's home. If Pompilia had been Pietro's child, she would be heiress to a large fortune in her own right, presuming upon which her husband, with the co-operation of his two rascally brothers (priests, of course—as the "Ring" makes them, if not the "Book") and a most

unamiable mother—treats his wife and her parents as badly as possible. The Comparinis fly from Arezzo and return to Rome, where Violante, whom revenge and conscience combine in stimulating to do an act of justice, reveals the fact that Pompilia is not her child, but the daughter of a woman of the worst repute, purchased in early infancy with the view of keeping in the family the inheritance that must otherwise have passed to collateral heirs. Litigation ensues, and Guido, getting the worst of it, treats his young wife more brutally than ever; until, at last, she flies from his house in company with Giuseppe Caponsacchi, a young and noble priest of Arezzo, and travels by forced journeys towards Rome, to take refuge with the guardians of her childhood. Not only is her husband quite aware of her flight, but he has even as far as possible contrived it, and follows in instant pursuit, hoping to find a justifiable pretext for proclaiming his wife to the world as an adulteress, and killing her and her protector. In this, however, he is disappointed; for, overtaking them at an inn where Pompilia had been forced to halt from sheer exhaustion, while Caponsacchi keeps watch and ward at the inn-door, the young Countess is found buried in deep and tranquil sleep, alone, upstairs. The inevitable scandal resulting from even so comparatively harmless a discovery, and the proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts connected with it, have the effect of sending Pompilia to a convent of Convertite Nuns, and Caponsacchi into banishment at Civita. Before long, however, the worthy Guido, still fretting at Arezzo for the inheritance of which he has been balked, hears from his brother, Abate Paolo, at Rome, that Pompilia has left the convent, has returned to the villa of the Comparinis, and has given birth to a son, who is consequently his heir. Thereupon he forms another plot to murder the Comparinis and his wife, and, having hired four peasants to aid him in its accomplishment, carries it out most truculently. But he fails to make his escape: he and his accomplices are seized red-handed, and, after many pleas of denial, exculpation, and abatement of punishment, are sentenced and executed.

Manifestly this is a complicated business enough as it stands, and Mr. Browning's mode of treatment certainly does not err on the side of simplicity. First, he gives a summary of the story, at very considerable length, by way of introduction. Secondly, assuming with great probability that public opinion at Rome was somewhat divided on the question whether the Count should be put to death or not, he gives the view of the whole case as taken by "Half-Rome." Thirdly, he gives a different view of the case, taken by the "other

Half-Rome." Fourthly, *Tertium Quid* (whose acquaintance we have already had the honour of making) puts in his distinguished appearance, and tells it all over again in his own way. Fifthly, Count Guido, after being put to the "vigil-torture," is brought before the judges, and goes over the whole affair in such a way as to make, without much regard for truth, the best defence of himself possible under all the circumstances. Sixthly, Canon Caponsacchi, recalled from banishment, begins by "blowing up" the Court for sending him there, and then favours them with passages of his autobiography, going fully into the history of his flight with Pompilia. Seventhly, poor Pompilia herself, surviving as if by miracle for four days the mortal wounds received at the villa, gives on her deathbed an account of the whole matter from her point of view. Eighthly, Dominus Hyacinthus de Archangelis, *Pauperum Procurator*, and advocate for the accused, after an interminable quantity of doting parental drivel about his son, Hyacinth junior, draws up his pleas for the defence. Ninthly, *Juris Doctor Johannes Baptista Bottinius*, Advocate of the Fisc and the Rev. Apostolic Chamber, replies for the prosecution. Tenthly, the Pope, appealed to for a remission of the sentence, maturely ponders the whole proceedings, analyzes the characters and motives of all the actors, and decides upon letting justice have its course. Eleventhly, Guido, being waited upon before execution by a cardinal and an abate, with the hope of moving him to repentance, makes a second defence of himself on necessitarian principles, and reveals with hideous frankness the diabolical features of his character. Then there are half a dozen distinct windings-up of the tale, on the part of as many different interlocutors. If all this be not enough to test Mr. Browning's dramatic power to the utmost, we, at least, cannot conceive any test more severe. We dare not say, however, that he stands it triumphantly. Of such a method of narration it would be flattery to say that repetition does not "stale its infinite variety." Why it has been adopted by the author, it is hard for us to decide. If we were to guess, the result of our conjectures would not be complimentary, and might possibly be unjust. In dealing with a modern public, British or otherwise, an author is obliged to bear in mind that the times are changed from those when an emperor's sister paid for a few touching lines with a pile of sesterces. No doubt we have some modern instances almost parallel, in the liberality of the public, or at least the publisher. These are exceptions, however, that only prove the rule; and, indeed, an author ought to be highly remunerated for standing "on a tower in the wet," seeing how likely it is that his reputation

will catch cold of such a rash exposure. But ordinarily the public likes to get the value of its money, and, being naturally a better judge of quantity than of quality, the bulk of what it buys goes a great way with it. Isocrates put into his Panegyric "just what rushed into his head." Doctor Johannes Baptista Bottinius (who makes the comparison) had "to prune and pare and print," because "it paid." Probably it pays Mr. Browning better to do as Isocrates did.

The "subjective-objectivity" of his characters is well brought out on the whole, but "the voice of Jacob" is too distinguishable everywhere. The irrepressible Browning cannot help obtruding himself into the utterances of the hot and impulsive Caponsacchi as well as of the aged and meditative Innocent; into the last speech of the atrocious Guido as well as the dying declaration of the gentle Pompilia. His best-drawn character is Guido. Villains are very abundant in Italian history, and the crop of them in actual Italian life must be almost inexhaustible. Mr. Browning has turned his studies and his experience to great account in delineating so powerfully a character such as no country, perhaps, but Italy could supply. The wolf is the best type of such a nature—stealthy, ferocious, crafty, cruel. We certainly get rather too much of him: partridge surfeits, and surely so should wolf's flesh; but in many things his part is perfect. Let us take the beginning of his speech to the judges, after he has suffered torture:—

Thanks, Sir, but should it please the reverend Court,
 I feel I can stand somehow, half sit down
 Without help, make shift to even speak, you see,
 Fortified by the sip of . . . why, 'tis wine,
 Velletri,—and not vinegar and gall,
 So changed and good the times grow! Thanks, kind sir!
 Oh, but one sip's enough! I want my head
 To save my neck, there's work awaits me still.
 How cautious and considerate . . . aie, aie, aie,
 Not your fault, sweet Sir! Come, you take to heart
 An ordinary matter. Law is law.
 Noblemen were exempt, the vulgar thought,
 From racking; but, since law thinks otherwise,
 I have been put to the rack: all's over now,
 And neither wrist—what men style—out of joint:
 If any harm be, 'tis the shoulder-blade,
 The left one, that seems wrong i' the socket,—Sirs,
 Much could not happen, I was quick to faint,
 Being past my prime of life, and out of health.
 In short I thank you,—yes, and mean the word.

Needs must the Court be slow to understand
How this quite novel form of taking pain,
This getting tortured merely in the flesh,
Amounts to almost an agreeable change
In my case, me fastidious, plied too much
With opposite treatment, used (forgive the joke)
To the rasp-tooth toying with this brain of mine,
And, in and out my heart, the play o' the probe.
Four years have I been operated on
I' the soul, do you see—its tense or tremulous part—
My self-respect, my care for a good name,
Pride in an old one, love of kindred—just
A mother, brother, sisters, and the like,
That looked up to my face when days were dim,
And fancied they found light there—no one spot,
Foppishly sensitive, but has paid its pang.
That, and not this you now oblige me with,
That was the Vigil-torment, if you please. (Vol. ii. pp. 73-75.)

There are many far more vigorous passages, but not quite such as propriety permits, if space allowed us, to quote here. In his second address, in which he makes a more unreserved declaration of his acts and motives, he thus justifies his treatment of his wife :—

You have some fifty servants, Cardinal,—
Which of them loves you? Which subordinate
But makes parade of such officiousness
That if there's no love prompts it,—love, the sham,
Does twice the service done by love, the true.
God bless us liars, where's one touch of truth
In what we tell the world, or the world tells us,
Of how we like each other? All the same,
We calculate on word and deed, nor err,—
Bid such a man do such a loving act,
Sure of effect and negligent of cause,
Just as we bid a horse, with cluck of tongue,
Stretch his legs arch-wise, crouch his saddled back
To foot-reach of the stirrup—all for love,
And some for memory of the smart of switch
On the inside of the fore-leg—what care we?
Yet where's the bond obliges horse to man
Like that which binds fast wife to husband? God
Laid down the law: gave man the brawny arm
And ball of fist—woman the beardless cheek
And proper place to suffer in the side:
Since it is he can strike, let her obey!

Can she feel no love ? Let her show the more,
Sham the worse, damn herself praiseworthy !

(Vol. iv. pp. 151-152.)

Further on, in his almost exulting cynicism, he says of the great ones of Rome who shall survive him a while :—

I see you all reel to the rock, yon waves—
Some forthright, some describe a sinuous track,
Some crested brilliantly, with heads above,
Some in a strangled swirl sunk who knows how,
But all bound whither the main-current sets,
Rockward, an end in foam for all of you !
What if I am o'ertaken, pushed to the front
By all you crowding smoother souls behind,
And reach, a minute sooner than was meant,
The boundary, whereon I break to mist ?
Go to ! the smoothest, safest of you all,
Most perfect and compact wave in my train,
Spite of the blue tranquillity above,
Spite of the breadth before of lapsing peace,
Where broods the halcyon and the fish leaps free,
Will presently begin to feel the prick
At lazy heart, the push at torpid brain,
Will rock vertiginously in turn, and reel,
And emulative, rush to death like me. (p. 192.)

The character of Pompilia is not only well contrasted with Guido's, but is itself an exquisite conception ; for which also, perhaps, Mr. Browning is more indebted to his Italian experiences than he would care to own. It is a type of simplicity, innocence, and purity. She can scarcely understand why scandal couples her name with Caponsacchi's as it has done. To her he is not only a priest, but a hero and a saint. He is the angel and the help from God that delivered her from her hateful, yet not hated, husband's power, when the first promise of maternity impelled her to dare and suffer everything for a young life not yet come forth to the day, yet dearer than her own. Her love for him is not that of woman : there is something of the supernatural in it. Her deepest human love is for her child ; but she has charity for all, even for her husband. Her excuse for him, however, that "he did not make himself," is so evidently out of keeping with her character, that Mr. Browning is driven to the awkward necessity of making Guido envy her for having hit upon it. Considering, also, that it was rather an ideal than the real and imperfect Caponsacchi, whom she worshipped, it seems unnatural to make her excuse her admiration in this way :—

If I call "saint" what saints call something else—
The saints must bear with me, impute the fault
To a soul i' the bud, so starved by ignorance,
Stinted of warmth, it will not blow this year,
Nor recognize the orb which spring-flowers know.
But if meanwhile some insect with a heart
Worth floods of lazy music, spendthrift joy—
Some fire-fly renounced spring for my dwarfed cup,
Crept close to me with lustre for the dark,
Comfort against the cold,—what though excess
Of comfort should miscall the creature—sun ?
What did the sun to hinder while harsh hands
Petal by petal, crude and colourless,
Tore me ? This one heart brought me all the spring !

(Vol. iii. pp. 73-4.)

Caponsacchi is a failure. If the author meant to make a hero of him, he ought to have been less like a young English parson. That is probably the highest type of the churchman—at least the young churchman—which Mr. Browning can conceive ; but a good young priest, such as one can imagine in Caponsacchi's place, though not less than a brave, true, and honourable gentleman, would also be something more. Possibly, however, Mr. Browning recognizes this, when he makes the Pope speak of Caponsacchi, though with affection, as a "scapegrace."

Nothing strikes us more forcibly in this very remarkable poem than the judicial retribution which seems to fall on genius rendered self-forgetful by too much self-contemplation, and, like Narcissus, falling souse into the water. The fatuity of Narcissus, too, however ridiculous, had this excuse, that the image he bent to gaze upon was really beautiful. But a wrinkled, and puffy, and blotched Narcissus, grinning with delight at the reflection of a countenance which he fancies still "as fair as Dian's visage," though to all but a set of silly sycophants it is simply hideous—that is a spectacle grotesque enough to tickle the very ribs of death with inextinguishable laughter. It is pitiful to see a great light of literature or art go out in a sputter and flare of noisome egotism. That was the end of Turner. It threatens to be the end of Dickens and Carlyle. It is very likely to be the end of Mr. Browning. Praise intoxicates them ; vanity blinds them ; the assurance of fame makes them heedless of how it should be legitimately retained. Then comes a reverse, if not a disillusion. Because King Nabucodonosor would inhale incense, therefore shall King Nabucodonosor eat grass. Just

when the pedestal is raised so high that the statue towers above every surrounding fabric, down topples the rickety idol and "shames its worshippers." Of what immense value would that humility which is only another name for self-knowledge have been to such men, were it but to make them obedient to those laws of art which are, after all, the only sure basis of their fame!

We must not omit to say, in conclusion, that this is not a book for all hands. The milk of babes is not at all the sort of fare that Mr. Browning sets before his readers, but very strong meat, sometimes horse-flesh indeed, and that of the coarsest, with nothing of a Francatelli's art to disguise it in the cooking. So far, perhaps, it is all the better.

ART. IV.—MILL ON LIBERTY.

On Liberty. By JOHN STUART MILL. Third edition. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

BY the common consent of mankind, liberty is the very noblest of all the subjects which can occupy the human mind. In one shape or other, consciously or unconsciously, almost, if not quite, every sane man is engaged either in the defence of what he has already, or in the search for a yet greater liberty than falls at present to his share. The pursuit of wealth from the day labour of the poor to the great pecuniary operations of the rich; the clamour of parties; wars civil and foreign; the acquirement of knowledge divine no less than human; the self-discipline of saints and saintly men; in short, all efforts in every direction, have for their object either to escape the bondage of poverty and weakness, imperfection and sin; or to retain the present means, or enlarge the scope of action, spiritual, mental, or bodily; individual, corporate, or national.

Yet what is this thing which, in all ages, poets have sung, orators have lauded, philosophers have claimed as a right; for which patriots have worked and suffered; soldiers fought and died; and on which saints and theologians have insisted? Poets have exhausted their store of metaphors, one vying with another in boldness; orators have exaggerated every figure in rhetoric, philosophers have propounded the wildest

theories, patriots and soldiers have worn out their lives in patient labour, or have fought at hopeless odds in its behalf; the air resounds with its praises. But what is it? The most despotic nations, referring back to ancient days, rest the traditions of their greatness upon struggles for this priceless blessing, without which it is held that life would not be worth the having. That we must have liberty at any cost is taken as too self-evident to need debate. The proposition is one to which direct appeal is seldom made; so obvious is it considered, that it is argued from by implication only. But yet once again we ask, in what does it consist? Some regard it as a political, some as a social good; if in one case the former be established, little is thought of the latter; or, again, unless the latter be secured, of what value is the former? Some think it is for one class alone; some, for civilized nations only; some demand it for themselves and not for others; some would affix to it no bounds whatever, and some, who regard the thralldom of sin as the only slavery worth combating, rejoice in the glorious liberty of the bondage of Christ—deeming such bondage the best security for the widest freedom. Ideas regarding it are vague and contradictory. Men speak of it and write about it, but they do not define it. Nor is Mr. Mill an exception to this remark. In an essay of 200 pages, in which he professes to examine “Civil and Social Liberty, the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society on the individual,” the reader looks in vain for a definition. This is the more astonishing because, in one of the early chapters of his book on Logic, Mr. Mill himself lays down what is tolerably self-evident that the first rule of logic is to see that terms be accurately defined. But, perhaps, like certain speakers in some well-known dialogues, Mr. Mill considers the word too plain to require defining. We propose here to review the Essay in question, for the purpose of seeing whether or no this be the case.

Like most other subjects in which men are interested, liberty has its two aspects. It may be looked at either in the abstract or in the concrete. A discussion on liberty may be taken either on its principles or on the practice of it. But it is clear there is no use in discussing its practical application without being first agreed on the principles by which we are to be guided. But in order to arrive at anything like a satisfactory notion of principles, we must first define the word itself. Now, as before remarked, this is precisely what Mr. Mill has failed to do. He leaves his reader at the disadvantage of having to pick out and join together the detached pieces of his puzzle; to learn the map of liberty as we used to learn

geography, with this difference, that under that system we knew when the whole map was complete, whereas Mr. Mill furnishes us with no means of such assurance. The only way open to us, therefore, is, to examine such principles as he asserts, either together or one by one, and so endeavour to make out his entire plan.

Now, after many pages he tells us the object of his Essay. "It* is," he says, "to assert one very simple principle as entitled to govern ABSOLUTELY the dealing of society with the individual, in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good is not a sufficient warrant to justify compulsion: his conduct must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. . . . over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Again, he claims for every man † "absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical and speculative, scientific, moral, and theological; and of expression, as practically inseparable from opinion."

Moreover he says ‡ that the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race. For if the opinion be right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth. If wrong, of what is almost as great a benefit, viz., the clearer perception of truth from its collision with error.

But in the next page he declares that we can never be sure that an opinion is false—and this he repeats in these words, § "An approach to truth is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being"; and this he again repeats || in almost the same words. Then ¶ he says that he regards utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. And in another place ** he tells the world that the truth of an opinion is part of its utility. And again, he says, †† "I altogether condemn the expressions 'the immorality and impiety of an opinion.'"

At page 22 he informs us that the principle laid down in the

* P. 21.

† P. 26.

‡ P. 33.

§ P. 41.

|| P. 95.

¶ P. 24.

** P. 43.

†† P. 45.

previous page is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. And that* “despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.”

Again, we are told† that “complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action.”

Moreover he elaborates the theory, that to silence any discussion is an assumption of infallibility. That is, it is not the being certain of the truth of an opinion, but the undertaking to decide a question for others, in which the assumption of infallibility consists. This agrees with the before quoted notion, that we can never be sure of the falsity of any opinion; and he argues that the assumption of infallibility is most fatal, precisely in those cases where the opinion is called immoral and impious, and he applies these remarks especially to the denial of the Being of God.

He declares further‡ that on any matter not self-evident there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it for one who is capable; and that the capacity of the hundredth is only comparative.

From all this it will appear that Mr. Mill does not commence with a principle, and on it erect his superstructure.

His plan is rather to do that for which he condemns others, whose arguments, he says, on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves; who narrow their thoughts and interests to things which can be spoken without venturing within the region of principles. We venture to think that had Mr. Mill's character depended on this essay alone, he would never have acquired the reputation of a “logical consistent intellect.” For it will be perceived, on carefully examining the foregoing passages, that all he does is to take several of the current popular notions, which pass with the multitude for principles, and to push them to extremes, which are no doubt logical enough up to a certain point, but which fail absolutely when surveyed from a new point of view. The method is one with which every one who has argued much with Protestants must be perfectly familiar.

Thus, when he tells us that the sole end for which men can interfere with the liberty of their fellows is to prevent harm to others, we seem to have got hold of a principle; and when he further claims for every man the right, on this ground,

* P. 23.

† P. 38.

‡ P. 38.

not only to the most absolute freedom of opinion, but of expression, we seem to be making some progress. But the ground is cut from under our feet by his dictum, that utility is the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions. For we are driven back to consider what utility is, and how we are to judge of it. But here we are stopped again, for in the next sentence he affirms that it must be utility founded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Now we have always supposed that an ultimate appeal must be to a first principle. But no; here we have an ultimate appeal based upon something as unsubstantial as itself, viz., upon "permanent interests," which are neither explained nor even alluded to any further, except to say that they are founded upon the progressive character of human nature. So that the "very simple principle," which is "absolutely to govern society" in its dealings with the individual, rests upon vague considerations of "utility," which rest again upon "permanent interests," which are vaguer still; and these upon a knowledge of human nature, which is still more vague; for, he says, we can never be sure that an opinion is false; an approach to truth being the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being. These remarks, let it be remembered, are made to refer to a future state. Now, if the immortality of the soul be a matter of doubt, how can one be said to know anything definite of human nature in its entirety? His simple principle, therefore, has for its only foundation the old, exploded Pyrrhonism, the absurdity of which is no new discovery. For it is obvious that we cannot establish the principle that there is no certain knowledge, without declaring it certain that no certainty exists, which is a palpable contradiction. But if Mr. Mill is so clear that no certain knowledge exists, by what right does he come forward, and in a cloud of words proceed to delude his readers, admirers, and worshippers with talk about principles and rights and truth and utility? Why did he not begin his Essay with the declaration that his whole system is a mere guess? that he *knows* nothing of what he is writing about; and that, as there must needs be many errors to one truth, the chances are a thousand to one that he is going to write absurdities?

One cannot understand how it is that Mr. Mill should be so sure that no certain knowledge is to be found, and yet that he should argue in a directly opposite sense. It cannot be denied that he has in no common degree a logical mind. He sees plainly enough where many of the weak points in his argument lie, and he stops up the holes through which an objection might enter with the greatest ingenuity, or rather

with the cleverness which continual discussion and a perfect familiarity with popular theories and popular objections are calculated to impart. Nevertheless, after an argument of seven pages, commencing with the sentence already quoted, and ending with these words, "the beliefs for which we have most warrant have no safeguard to rest on but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded," supplemented with the further declaration that "an approach to truth" is "the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being"; and after telling us that he "regards utility as the ultimate appeal in all ethical questions," it does seem singular to find,* "the truth of an opinion is part of its utility." So that the ultimate appeal depends again upon truth, which cannot possibly be ascertained for certain. Moreover† we find, that holding the truth without knowing the arguments by which it is maintained, is not knowing the truth. But how can one know without being sure that one knows? Real knowledge is real certainty, and if certainty be denied, to talk of knowing the truth is a contradiction in terms. An ignorant man fancies he knows; but one who does know cannot be in doubt as to his knowledge, still less can he hold that all knowledge is doubtful. Acquaintance with the arguments by which an uncertain theory is maintained does not add one jot to the certainty of the theory itself, by the very condition of the case supposed. But Mr. Mill's actual words are, "We can never be sure that an opinion is false." We do not see that a quibble can be raised on this, for if we cannot know what is false, neither can we know what is true; and if we know a thing to be true, we know its opposite to be false, and this is the possibility which Mr. Mill denies. This will sufficiently guard us against any charge of misrepresentation.

Here it might seem advisable to stop. It might fairly be said that any edifice built on such shifting sands will soon fall; and no doubt this is true. Another age will review with wonder this return to the hopeless Eleatic scepticism. It will search for some moral cause as alone sufficient to lead a man like Mr. Mill into that very world of universal doubt from which the old philosophers struggled with such melancholy impotence to get free. Some future biographer may perhaps draw a parallel between Mr. Mill rejected from the British Senate, and the founder of the New Academy banished from Rome on the demand of Cato. But in the mean time his books are read; and with all the more avidity, because he says many

* P. 43.

† P. 65.

plausible things, and much that is true, and all in an attractive style; but chiefly because he brings into definite shape, and defends with more constructive power than others, the notions on which Protestantism is founded, and which have not hitherto been placed before the multitude upon a quasi-philosophical basis. Many of his remarks are, no doubt, what it is the fashion to call *suggestive*, and for these he is entitled to our thanks: they contain a foundation of truth, though, to be sure, like certain dishes in a celebrated banquet—

Longè dissimilem noto celantia succum,

they indicate a want of skill in the preparation. His attack upon authority, though more uncompromising, and though conducted with less reserve than usual, is but the legitimate result of common Protestantism, and he is quite justified in remarking how strange it is that men should admit the validity of arguments, yet object to their being pushed to an extreme; as if reasons could be good for any case which are not good for an extreme case. While, therefore, Mr. Mill holds a kind of intellectual supremacy over the minds of so many, and while, on the one hand, attacks upon authority are increasing in number and audacity, and while, on the other hand, the class of men is daily augmented, who, weary of their labyrinthine search after truth, are craving to be led back to authority by a process of intellectual conviction, it seems not unreasonable to give some sort of reply to his attack.

It is satisfactory to know that Mr. Mill deprecates* “the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic”—that which points out weaknesses in theory and errors in practice, without establishing positive truths,—“for as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot,” he says, “be valued too highly.” We will not stop to do more than to mention the difficulty of acquiring positive knowledge, since no certain truth is, according to himself, attainable. But we will recur at once to passages already quoted, and will allow the reader to judge how far they are consistent one with another. The negative logic will be found very useful here. For a system inconsistent with itself cannot but be false. If, therefore, we can show such inconsistency, Mr. Mill’s system falls to the ground; if not, the advantage will be with him.

As we have seen, he claims for every sane adult absolute freedom of opinion, and of expression as inseparable from opinion. He declares that to silence the expression of an opinion is

* P. 81.

to rob the human race; and also he condemns altogether the phrase "immorality or impiety of an opinion": and further, asserts that the assumption of infallibility, that is, the silencing of discussion, is most fatal in those cases where the opinion silenced is called immoral or impious.

It is evident, therefore, that should a schoolmaster open a school in which atheism is publicly taught, the State would have no right to put him to silence. To do so would be most fatal: his opinions being neither immoral nor impious, and being moreover possibly true, mankind would certainly be robbed, and might be deprived of the inestimable good of exchanging the false belief in God for the true belief in no God, should the latter be really true; for at present the world has not become prepared to receive so very recondite a doctrine. But, it may be said, though the State may not interfere with the schoolmaster, it may prohibit scholars from frequenting the school. This, however, would be to interfere directly with parents, and indirectly with the master too, and would be assuming the fatal gift of infallibility: whereas, we can never be sure that either the belief or the disbelief in God is true, for we are not sure of the falsity of any opinion.

But suppose the State to be profoundly convinced that its whole authority is derived from God, and that if the belief in God be destroyed, the proximate result will be anarchy, what course must it take? Provisionally it *may*, even according to Mr. Mill, and it *must*, by every reasonable consideration, act upon its belief, upon its strong conviction; that is, it may silence the schoolmaster or public lecturer, for the case is the same, upon condition of giving him complete liberty of contradicting and disproving the opinion of the State, which is the most palpable contradiction. But Mr. Mill is a logician. He recognizes the fact that "it is far from a frequent accomplishment even among thinkers to know both sides." He expressly mentions mathematical and physical speculations, and he maintains that on no subject except these does any opinion deserve the name of knowledge, unless after either an active controversy with opponents, or an equivalent mental process. Having this conviction, he must therefore have passed through such a process himself. He cannot have neglected to do so. He is enamoured of the Socratic dialectics. By them he will test every philosophical assertion, and he is no doubt equally willing to be so tested himself.

Let us, then, see how he would stand a dissection—we will not say after the Socratic method, but after such fashion as to a man of average clearness of perception is possible. Let us repeat two passages already quoted, and let us examine

them strictly. Mr. Mill is not the man to shrink from any proof, however strict. He courts trial. He is a hard hitter, and he does not expect any opponent to accept his challenge, which is offered to all comers, with the reverse of his lance: the combat is understood on both sides to be à l'outrance: ridicule and sarcasm are weapons which he does not disdain to use, and to which he does not object; and they are perfectly lawful. All that can be required is that the fighting be according to the rules of courtesy.

He says,—1st.* “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”

2nd.† “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application till men have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.”

Now every one who has ever read any of Plato's dialogues, either in the original or in a translation, knows that the first question which Socrates is always represented as putting has for its object on every occasion to get at a definition of common words used by the other interlocutors. The same may not be an inconvenient plan to adopt here, and as we have not Mr. Mill to interrogate, we must be content to assume, if possible, such meanings as he would not question. And first, as to the word “rightfully”; by this no doubt is meant justly, or according to justice; and justice, we may presume to be equally the right of all men; that could scarcely be denied: the words right and justice then are of universal application: they apply to all men, at all times, and under all circumstances, in one country as well as another: were they absent, the human race itself could not exist, for society would be impossible, because they are at the root and basis of all our mutual relations. This is an *abstract* idea of justice or right: in the *concrete*, in the practical application of justice, it will be admitted that as circumstances vary, so must the conduct change, which it is right or just to pursue under the circumstances. Thus, it is right to restore to a man his sword, but not if he be in a rage and likely to hurt himself or others with it; and so on in an infinite number of circumstances simple and intricate. So far then as to the word rightfully; and the meaning of legitimate, as used in the second passage quoted, appears to be synony-

* P. 22.

† P. 23.

mous with "rightfully." "Despotism," in the same passage, evidently means a government which actually interferes with the individual in a great degree, not merely in order to prevent harm to others, but for his own good.

It is obvious, therefore, that different forms of government are allowable or legitimate under differing circumstances. Now, as a perfectly free government is, according to Mr. Mill, the only rightful one in a civilized community, and as a despotism is legitimate in dealing with barbarians; and as there are many shades of national characteristics between gross barbarism and high civilization, Mr. Mill will no doubt admit that corresponding degrees of despotism or freedom must be as legitimate in their respective places, as either complete freedom or complete despotism. But opinions on civilization differ; scarcely will two men agree on a definition of the word: the Greeks considered all other men barbarians; the Chinese take the same view at the present time; and Europeans hold Chinese civilization very cheap. Whether any nation has arrived at the enviable condition of being capable of improvement by free and equal discussion, is simply a matter of opinion. It cannot be otherwise, for the facts are disputable in every conceivable case. Now Mr. Mill says, the only nations with which we need concern ourselves in this discussion have long since reached that condition. But the whole controversy turns on this very point. Have any nations, and what nations, arrived as a matter of fact at the condition contemplated? and if they have, who knows the fact, and how is it known? But Mr. Mill is laying down a principle. He cannot confine himself to this nation or that; a principle is of universal application, and the present principle concerns justice, which is the right of all mankind equally. But if it be alleged that he is speaking of the application of the principle only, we reply, the very use of the word "rightfully" implies something universal, and to confine it within the limits of what any individual may be pleased to call civilization, is to make justice a mere matter of opinion. And this is in truth what Mr. Mill does: the word, as he applies it, means this only, that *in his opinion* a nation or nations have reached a point at which a certain amount of freedom is a real right. He has not advanced the argument a single step. He must mend his definition, or give up his principle: he argues like a very Thrasymachus; he muddles together the expedient and the just in the old old style. He makes himself, or some other individual, the judge of when and whether a right which he declares to be absolute can be insisted on at a given time, or

at all. We mean this: if interference be only just under certain conditions, it is because subjects have a right to reject interference under any other conditions; but who is the judge whether those circumstances exist or no? Whether the decision on that point depends upon rulers or people, Mr. Mill leaves undetermined, so that on this theory, justice (for these people) becomes, we repeat, a mere matter of opinion, which is absurd.

But more, "despotism is only legitimate provided the end be the improvement of barbarians, and the means justified by actually effecting that result." That is to say, a ruler is justified in his despotism to-day provided such despotism actually improves his subjects twenty or fifty years hence. But his experiment, made in perfect good faith it may be, is not justified if it be not successful. So that *he* can appeal *during* the experiment to Mr. Mill's dictum in support of his despotism, and his subjects can appeal equally to Mr. Mill's dictum against it *afterwards* in case his plan fails. In other words, what is just to-day is to-morrow proved by the event not to have been just, at the very moment when it was just. It seems positively astounding that a man of Mr. Mill's logical habit of mind should put his hand to such sentences as these. But perhaps the explanation is to be found in another remark quoted above,* where he says that ninety-nine men out of a hundred are incapable of judging of any matter not self-evident. He has, it would seem, a contemptible opinion of the human understanding as it exists at present. He takes it for granted, perhaps, that the ninety-nine cannot discover his sophisms, and that the hundredth will not expose them. His propositions are, to say the least, not axiomatic. They do not strike the mind as truths at first sight; they require much patient investigation; and, after all, they are not convincing: the unquestionable ingenuity with which they are worked out would be a greater proof of genius were they original. But after all, they are, we repeat, nothing but popular fallacies more skilfully stated than usual. And it is this which gives them their chief importance. There is no profound philosophy in them. At least, having no claim whatever to be the hundredth man; being only *unus multorum*, one who runs; we confess, we have no difficulty whatever in admitting our inability to understand this fabric without basis, this lever without fulcrum, this progress from no starting-place and towards no goal, this knowledge begotten of doubt, this logic without premisses and without

conclusion, or rather, let us say, this ocean of hypothetical propositions which yields before us and closes behind us, as though the whole intellectual life and activity of man were one infinite and eternal If.

So far as to Mr. Mill's principles. One or two other questions, however, suggest themselves for solution before we conclude. Does Mr. Mill really mean to say that the bulk of mankind, of whom, according to himself, so very large a proportion is utterly incapable of comprehending any question not self-evident, is to refuse to accept premisses on authority? Leaving aside altogether the practical contradiction of requiring the unintelligent ninety-nine, the very persons who cannot take in a proposition even when it is furnished them, to invent propositions for themselves, one would like to know from whence Mr. Mill got his own knowledge of the meaning of simple facts when playing around his mother's knee? Did he take no premiss on authority? Does he deny that the learner is under obligation to obey? Will he assert that in any conceivable condition of society any very considerable proportion of mankind can become teachers? It would lead one very much too far to prove the profound metaphysical truth conveyed in those few words, *nisi credatis non intelligetis*, unless you believe neither shall you understand. Suffice it to remark, that this saying is as philosophically sound, as it would be practically absurd to call upon the multitude even of educated men, in the midst of the struggle for life, to be for ever questioning first principles of metaphysics, of philosophy, or even of morals. For it is to first principles we ascend when we discuss the question of authority. Mr. Mill himself, in denying the claims of authority, does so only after a very profound investigation. Or, if he refuse to admit this, of what value are his conclusions? We are told that, before writing his book on politics, Aristotle studied the constitutions of many states; and we must presume that Mr. Mill has not only done likewise, but that he would require a similar course of study in those who are to discard authority; but to ninety-nine men out of every hundred such a study would be the most wearisome labour, not to say an utter impossibility. So that they must be slaves to Mr. Mill's intellectual discipline, in order that they may enjoy a liberty whose sweets they neither desire nor even understand.

Let us proceed now to make two or three remarks on the chapter on Individuality. In this chapter are many excellent ideas. But, unfortunately, even the pure metal often has not the true ring; it is like a cracked coin, which requires a searching test to prove its genuineness. Thus, when we are

told that “*even* opinions lose their immunity” when expressed under circumstances calculated to lead to some mischievous act, we at once admit the truth of the remark, however oddly the word *even* may sound. But when this principle comes to be applied, infallibility is at once assumed. For if it be true that private property is robbery, that* “interest on capital is a permanent source of injustice and inequality,” or that “machinery in the hands of capitalists is a powerful instrument of despotism and extortion,” and that therefore “machines and all the instruments of labour ought to be in the hands of productive labourers,” what justice can there be in suppressing the expression of those principles, however public, and what mischief in seizing property and destroying machinery belonging to the employers of labour? The object of this chapter, however, is to insist upon the necessity for the universal development of the faculties of the individual, and to protest against the tyranny of society and of custom over the individual. It is too true, as Mr. Mill says, that at present society weighs heavily upon individuality, and that from the highest class down to the lowest every one lives too much under the eye of a dreaded censorship. And Mr. Mill will, no doubt, agree that the only remedy for such a state of things is to cause true principles to predominate in the mind of society at large. As to the way in which this desirable result can be brought about, whether it be by the free expression of false principles, the encouragement of charlatantry, the diffusion of newspaper philosophy and the metaphysics of novels, or by a method of a diametrically opposite kind, he and we will not agree. Nor is this the place to enter into the discussion. In this paper we are only engaged in showing Mr. Mill’s inconsistencies. The establishment of our own theory is too long a task to be entered upon here; and we shall conclude with pointing out that his “applications” are quite at variance with, what seems to be, his fundamental proposition, if any such proposition can be said to exist. We shall give but two specimens, and let the reader judge for himself.

At page 169 the maxim is laid down, “that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected to legal punishment.” Now here again we are placed in the difficulty of not having a definition of the word used. What, for instance, does Mr. Mill mean by “actions”? Is the publication of opinions an “action”? If it be not, what is it? If it be, and if the

* Report of International Working Men’s Congress in Brussels, *Times*, September 14, 1868.

general sense of mankind in favour of religion be founded in the truth, then it follows that to publish atheistical opinions should render the publisher subject to legal punishment. But no punishment for the expression of opinion is allowable, since the opinion may be true. Most likely Mr. Mill would indignantly disclaim the imputation of atheism if applied to himself; but we take it, that the question of the existence or non-existence of God is one on which the mind cannot remain in suspense. To doubt the existence of God is precisely the same, both intellectually and practically, as to deny the fact. Doubt excludes worship and the idea of religious obligation, quite as effectually as denial. You can neither worship nor feel responsible to a Being who may possibly not exist. Certainty is of the very essence of the recognition of responsibility or duty. A government must therefore be either atheistical or the reverse. Now no government has ever yet tried the experiment of professing atheism. Some have gone a long way in this direction, but none of which we ever heard has made the open profession; and till one is discovered which does not regard religion as the foundation of social order, the right to punish the publication of atheistical opinions cannot be denied in practice, even according to Mr. Mill's own maxim.

Again, Mr. Mill is an advocate for divorce in certain cases. Now he cannot deny that to pass a law legalizing divorce, or any other practice, is a direct encouragement to such practice. If therefore divorce be contrary to the law of God, to pass a statute legalizing it is to grant and encourage a liberty which is contrary to true liberty; and this cannot be, even on Mr. Mill's own showing, for he says, "the principle of freedom cannot require that a man should be free not to be free"; and by the same rule, a liberty which is contrary to true liberty is freedom in name alone, and not in truth; in other words, it is slavery to error. But, says Mr. Mill, the law of God on this point, as on others, is uncertain; and therefore the State has no right to restrict the liberty of the subject in the matter. That is to say, the State is bound, in behalf of liberty, to permit, and therefore to encourage, a practice which may be contrary to liberty!

We have done with Mr. Mill on Liberty. It is plain the English public at large views his Essay very differently from ourselves, for it has run through several editions. We suppose the explanation to be, that the great name of the author lends a sanction and an authority to notions which are the foundations of Protestantism, and the logical results of which have been obscured by the mist with which educational prejudice clouds the intellects of so many Englishmen.

ART. V.—THE SUPPRESSION OF ITALIAN
MONASTERIES.

Convent Life in Italy. BY ALGERNON TAYLOR. London: Charles J. Skeet.

THE suppression of Italian Monasteries deserves more attention than has as yet, we think, been given to it. That God, in His all-wise Providence, should have permitted what was once regarded as the very salt of the land of Italy to be cast forth and literally “trodden on by men,”—and that so many of the Church’s children should have been thereby cut off from the means of embracing that higher life which all men cannot receive but “they to whom it is given,”—is surely worthy of our most anxious consideration and attention. In these days, when the idea of the kingdom of Christ upon earth is well-nigh banished from the minds of men,—when the little territory still subject to the Vicar of Jesus Christ is the one witness left among the nations to the great promise that all the kingdoms of the world are to become the kingdoms of God and His Christ,—when Christ’s religion is no longer regarded as the basis of European government and politics,—it is easy enough no doubt for the flippant, worldly-minded man, the shortsighted modern statesman, or the half-and-half Catholic, to speak glibly of monkish ignorance, idleness, and corruption, and to trace the suppression of Convent life in Italy either to its own inherent abuses and decay, or to urgent motives of state policy. It is easy enough to say that the salt has really “lost its savour, and that henceforth it is good for nothing but to be cast out and to be trodden on by men.” But such shallow, superficial views can never satisfy the minds of earnest Catholics, above all of those who know by their own experience what Convent life in Italy really was. We are living in an age of unanointed kings and uncrowned monarchs; when the framework of old royal Europe is breaking up, and men hardly know whether to look forward to a new order of things which the Church of God shall one day subdue and consecrate to herself, or whether the glory of Christendom is passing away for ever. Like France in the hour of her great Revolution, Italy, and perhaps even Spain, may have to sink to a yet lower depth of ruin and degradation; but like France

they may also live to see the resurrection of the Church. Or, on the other hand, it may be that the spirit of lawlessness, which broke out in rebellion against spiritual authority in the sixteenth, and civil authority in the eighteenth century, will gather fresh strength from year to year in those kingdoms which now occupy the seat of the old Roman Empire, until they culminate at last in the person of the great Antichrist, who is to be destroyed by the brightness of the second coming of our Lord. But be this as it may. Whatever the future which God may have in store for the Church and the world, the suppression of monastic life at any time in any country, but especially in Italy, must always be a subject of the deepest interest to every thoughtful Catholic.

Chosen in the Providence of God to be the special dwelling-place of the Vicar of His Son, and the resting-place of His Mother's House for so many ages of the world, the fulness of the Church's benediction had overflowed upon the face of that fair land; the blessings of grace had mingled with those of nature, and its olive- and vine-clad hills had become the homes and nurseries of well-nigh all the religious orders of the Church. It was to the heart of her highest mountains that S. Benedict, in the grace and beauty of his boyhood, fled away from the schools of the great city, and her Apennines became the cradle of Western Monastic life. It was on the gentle slope of her Umbrian hills that, when the world was growing cold in love, the blessed wounds of Christ were seen imprinted on the hands, and feet, and side of S. Francis of Assisi, who sent forth countless numbers of his children in their brown habits to cultivate his Master's vineyard amid her olive-trees and vines. Through her rich plains and crowded cities S. Dominic once passed on his mission of Apostolic love, and sent his white-clad sons to minister at her shrines, and hallow her universities. High up among the shady glens of Tuscany, or nestling amid the chestnut woods of the Alban hills, or overhanging the waters of the "sweet southern sea" and almost overlooking the ruins of an old Roman watering-place, the quiet cells of the hermits of S. Romuald have given sweet resting-places to the weary and the heavy-laden. Even wild Calabria became in her turn the joyful mother of religious children, and gave to the world, in the lives of the followers of the lowly S. Francis of Paula, the example of a perpetual Lent. But these are the glories which *have been*. Only to think of Italy at the present day, how sad it is! Where now is the hospitality of S. Benedict, or the contemplation of S. Romuald, or the poverty of S. Francis, or the learning of S. Dominic? Where now are the sons of S. Ignatius, whose lot

is ever bound up in His cause Whose name they bear? The dispersion of the Apostles was the salvation of the world; and it may be that they who are now scattered far away from their Italian homes in the green meadow lands of England, or the rapidly-growing cities of America, are silently but surely building up the walls of God's Church for generations that are yet unborn. But meanwhile their place knoweth them no more. The grass is growing in their silent cloisters, or, what is worse, the walls of their deserted convents are re-echoing the blasphemous oath or ribald jest of the soldiery of an excommunicated king; and the cells, which were once the happy dwelling-places of the captives of divine love, are now the gloomy prisons of the murderer and the felon.

Who that may have stood some twenty years ago upon the hills above Assisi,—say, for instance, in the little garden of the convent of the Carceri,—and looked down upon that wonderful Umbrian plain, so richly dowered with the choicest blessings of nature and of grace, can think of what it has now become without shame and sorrow? Even now, as you look down upon it, it still outwardly seems the same; perhaps for its rich beauty one of the fairest scenes which even Italy can show. A little to the right, beneath your feet, rise the battlements and towers and ruined citadel of the birthplace of S. Francis; forming as it were no unworthy setting for what may be called the glorious reliquary of S. Francis, the triple church built above his shrine. Its rose and lancet windows are filled with the richest colours of the fifteenth century. The roof of the upper church is painted by Cimabue, and in the vault of the middle church Giotto, inspired by Dante, has represented Christ giving Poverty in marriage to S. Francis. It is a sanctuary of Italian art, but its richest treasure is the shrine of him who loved to call himself the “little servant of Jesus Christ.” A little lower down, just as the hill sinks into the plain, rises the majestic dome of the church of Santa Maria degli Angeli, built over the little Gothic chapel in which S. Francis laid the foundation of his order and his rule. A little nearer may be seen the church of Santa Chiara, the first abbess of the Poor Clares, containing the body of the saint, whose hair S. Francis cut off with his own hands. And a little lower down again, the humble church and convent of San Damiano, rich in memories and relics of S. Francis and S. Clare, and from the walls of which S. Clare, woman though she was, drove back the Saracens: for she held in her hands the Body of Him who is strong to save. Somewhat to the left you may see the little village of Bevagna (the ancient Mevania), famous now, as of old, for its rich pastures and white cattle.

“Mevania’s bull,

The bull as white as snow ;”

but more happy now in its possession of the body of a white-robed saint of the Order of S. Dominic, S. Giacomo of Bevagna. On a hill just above the village may be seen the little town of Montefalco, with its Convent Church, in which is preserved the still uncorrupted body of another blessed Clare of the Order of the Nuns of S. Augustine. Her heart has been taken from her body, and stamped upon its flesh is an image of Christ crucified, together with the instruments of His blessed passion. Still further on, as far as the eye can reach, stretches the beautiful valley of the Clitumnus, upon whose banks in old Roman times, as Virgil tells us, the white sacrificial bull was sent to graze until the time came to lead it in triumph to the Capitol. What a wondrous scene ! Truly a land flowing with milk and honey ! And here we may remark, in passing, that they who were always ready to lay the barrenness of the Campagna and of the country adjoining Rome, to the charge of the bad government of the Vicar of Christ (forgetting that in some cases, where the soil is poor, pasturage may be more profitable than tillage), had always a strange way of forgetting the wonderful cultivation of Umbria, the Romagna, and the Marches, when subject to the happy rule of the Holy Father. Rich indeed it seemed with the richness of earthly beauty and careful cultivation, to the pilgrim of twenty years ago, as it lay before his gaze in the clear light of an Italian sky ; but richer far for the memory of S. Francis, which cast around it almost, as it were, the reflection of the glory of that unearthly paradise in which he is living now. Not a spot in all that lovely plain, but had been trodden by the blessed feet of him who bore the wounds of God ! Not a village but had been hallowed by his shadow as he went about doing good ! He even seemed to live again in his poor and humble followers, who with rough habit, and girdle of rope, and sandalled feet, kept watch around his tomb, and, poor themselves, preached the gospel to the poor in every hamlet of that happy plain. We have said that outwardly the scene still remains the same ; but its higher glory has passed away. The children of S. Francis are no longer there. Their convents are desecrated, and desolate is their Father’s shrine. Nay, we have even heard that the spouses of Christ, the nuns of an Umbrian convent, have been left almost to perish by starvation, from neglect of the payment of the wretched pension with which the Italian Government had undertaken to support them on their suppression ! “How has the gold become dim ! the finest colour changed ! the stones of the sanctuary scat-

tered in every street! Her Nazarites were whiter than the snow, purer than milk, more ruddy than the old ivory, fairer than the sapphire. Their face is now made blacker than the coal, and they are not known in the streets. It was better with them that were slain by the sword, than with them that died of hunger."

Or let us take another scene.—If there be one spot in Italy, after Rome itself, dearer than another to a Catholic heart, surely it must be the battlefield of Castel-Fidardo. On more than one account is it full of holy memories. It witnessed the martyrdom of a Christian army. The purple grapes were ripening for the vintage upon that September morning, on which, fortified by the bread of life, the crusaders of S. Peter girt themselves for battle: but a nobler vintage was in store. Nobly they fought, more nobly did they die; and the blood-stained earth of Castel-Fidardo bears within it, it may be, the seed of a harvest of glory for S. Peter's throne, which saints have foreseen in vision, and to which we are all looking forward with such longing hearts. They were sown in dishonour, they have been raised in glory; they were sown in weakness, they have been raised in power; and they are gathered now by the hands of the Great Reaper into the garner of God's choicest wheat.

But this is not all. The battlefield itself is girt around with holy places. It lies in a hollow formed by three high hills, Monte Camero, Osimo, and Loreto. On the first stands a monastery of Camaldelose hermits, on the second the shrine of S. Joseph of Cupertino, in the church of the Conventual Franciscans; while the third is the resting-place of the holy house of Nazareth, in which the Word was made Flesh and became Mary's son. Hardly ever, surely, could a spot of earth be found more suited to the calm contemplation of the religious life, than under the very shadow of those blessed walls, which had witnessed the hidden life of the Incarnate Wisdom and the Virgin Mother, and heard the words of Him who spake as never man spake. Yet the calm retreats of the hermits of S. Romuald and the Franciscan Friars are desolate and waste; and although the treasury of our Lady's house has not as yet been seized by the Government of Italy, yet we know that the hand of sacrilege is suspended over it, and that any day its fate may be the same as that of the orders of the Church. "God was the guide of its journey. He planted the roots thereof, and it filled the land. The shadow of it covered the hills, and the branches thereof the cedars of God. Why hast thou broken down the hedge thereof, so that they who pass by the way do pluck it?"

Well indeed may we ask ourselves what has been the cause of all this ruin. Great as is the evil before God and man and mighty the sin of the spoliation of the property of the religious houses, it fades into nothing in comparison with that far greater spiritual evil, which has befallen the Church in Italy by the suppression of the houses themselves. It is not, of course, possible to suppose that, with their suppression, all vocations to the higher religious life have at the same time ceased. And if not, it is impossible to exaggerate the extent to which the Church is crippled and the rights of Christian men and women interfered with and curtailed, by men who boast that they are acting in the fair name of Liberty. Countless must be the frustrated vocations which are crying to heaven for vengeance. Is, then, the life of interior prayer and contemplation to cease in Italy at the mere will of the State? To justify so tyrannical an exercise of power on the part of the Italian Government, we should naturally expect to hear of some flagrant abuses, or some well-known scandals, which might at least palliate—for they can never excuse—the crime and injustice of the suppression. When Henry VIII. suppressed the English monasteries, he at least put forward as a pretext their alleged dissoluteness and inefficiency. Yet, so far as we are aware, no such charge has ever been made against the religious houses of Italy. We have not now to do with the dissolution of the English monasteries, or the state of the English Church at the time of the Reformation. The evils and corruption of that period have doubtless been grossly exaggerated; we cannot, however, help thinking that the state of the monasteries and convents, and of the clergy generally, has been far higher in Italy during the last twenty years than it was in England previous to the Reformation. Take, for instance, the number of those Italian bishops and clergy, who have betrayed the Church and joined the Revolution; and contrast it both with the number and the corrupt lives of those who in England sided with Henry against the Church. Amongst the bishops, we have only heard of two or three; amongst the clergy (and we must always bear in mind how numerous it is) we can almost count them upon our fingers. We do not wish to be misunderstood. We do not, of course, mean, that out of so large a body of men there have not been many—perhaps very many—cases, where much of the true spirit of the religious vocation has been lost. Still less do we mean, that all the Italian religious houses were living up to the strictness of rule which they were bound to profess. But we do say that, speaking generally, the life led in Italian monasteries was blameless; and that even the worst-observed rule

of the most relaxed religious house offered to the eyes of men a far higher life than is led by those who have despoiled them of their property, and in doing so have robbed the widow, the orphan, and the poor. The very relaxations which had crept into some of the older orders, were fast passing away under the watchful eye of Pius IX., whose glorious Pontificate has been especially remarkable for the renewed life and vigour and increased efficiency it has given to more than one religious order of the Church. Upon the houses of religious women, we believe we may safely say, without fear of contradiction, that not even the shadow of suspicion has ever fallen. Yet many of these innocent virgins, who have consecrated their lives to Christ, have had to undergo such privations and hardships, as should send the blush of shame into the cheek of every true-hearted Italian.

Under these circumstances the little unpretending volume, which we have named at the head of this article, is of especial value. In his Preface the author, himself a Protestant, says:—

Recent political events in Italy may be expected to impart something of an historical character to these notes on Italian monasteries; for, owing to the suppression of many of the religious houses of Italy—and among them, it is to be presumed, some, at least, of those noticed in the present volume—the description of these here given may possibly constitute a record of their appearance, and of the manner of life led within their walls, during the last days of their monastic existence.

The author gives a list of more than *threescore* monasteries visited by him in different parts of Italy. Benedictines, Camaldolese, Carthusians, Regular Canons, Dominicans, Franciscans of all kinds, Minims, Trinitarians, Barnabites, Jesuits, Passionists, and Lazarists—at all these he has had a look. Nor was his visit merely superficial, for he is evidently a careful observer; and he was himself an inmate of some of the convents, and spent several weeks with the Barnabites at Genoa, and several months with the Capuchins at Rome. He is, as we have said, a Protestant; but he seems to have made a careful study of convent life. He has diligently inquired for himself, and has formed his own judgment of all he has seen. He is, besides, singularly accurate in his descriptions. We may, therefore, fairly take his evidence as that of an impartial witness. Speaking of the state of morality and discipline among the religious orders, he remarks:—

It will, perhaps, be expected that I should give some opinion with regard to the present state of discipline among the religious orders of Italy. On

this point I may observe, that if I have felt diffident in pronouncing an opinion founded on my own experience in respect of the state of education among the priesthood, much more must I hesitate in recording opinions upon a matter which is necessarily, to a great extent, removed from the opportunities of personal observation open to any traveller; especially as in this volume I endeavour to confine my remarks to what I have myself seen or ascertained, to the exclusion, as far as possible, of merely hearsay testimony. Of course, however, I cannot avoid having formed some opinion on the subject; for after spending many months in monasteries, and conversing with a great number and variety of clergy of all ranks and orders, as well as with numerous lay Roman Catholics, I could not fail to carry away some impression with regard to the state of morality, and the observance of monastic discipline generally, among the religious orders.

That impression, whatever it may be worth, is, that *discipline and regularity of life are, for the most part, strictly observed* in the convents of Italy; although, doubtless, there are many instances where individual members of a religious community lead a life little in accordance with the spirit of the monastic institution. . . . As my opinion is in part founded on the conversation of monks and friars themselves, it may be as well to observe that I did not find it to be true, as many Protestants suppose, that the Roman Catholic clergy are always anxious to keep in the background, and even to deny whatever facts may militate against their order, or the monastic state in particular. . . . So far as regards the religious communities, at least, it would seem that they do not care to ignore occasional irregularities, being apparently conscious that such are the exceptions among a large body of men of generally exemplary lives.

His estimate of the state of clerical education is somewhat lower than that which we have ourselves formed. But it must be remembered that the author, although he tells us that he has conversed with the clergy of every degree, seems to have been thrown, in accordance with his own taste, more among the regular than the secular clergy. Now these latter enjoy, perhaps, higher educational advantages than can always be met with in convents, although of course there may be individual cases of greater learning among the regular than among the secular clergy.

Speaking, then, from my personal knowledge and observation of the Italian clergy, I am of opinion that they are usually well versed in the several subjects of their professional studies; they are good Latin scholars, and well read in dogmatic theology. Their Latin scholarship, however, is for the most part based on modern and mediæval Latin; for the classical authors of antiquity, Roman as well as Greek, appear to be but little, if at all, studied by the Italian clergy generally. They also, as a body, unquestionably possess a full share of that sort of experience of men and things, which is implied in the expression, a knowledge of the world. But there appears to be with the mass of the clergy a want of that general reading on

subjects unconnected with their professional studies, which is essential to a high degree of mental culture. In this respect, however, the Italian clergy are not peculiar; for the same may be predicated of the bulk of the clergy of most, if not all, Christian sects. At the same time it is only just to add, that among the Italian priesthood are to be found many men of deep and extensive erudition, in addition to mere professional learning, in which latter, as above mentioned, the great bulk of the clergy are not deficient.

At Velletri he made the acquaintance of a young friar of more than average attainments:—

He had studied English, and had acquired considerable proficiency in the language, being able to speak it fairly as well as read it. He proved, moreover, to be a first-rate Latin scholar; and some Latin correspondence with which he subsequently favoured me may be called, without exaggeration, a model of composition. When I visited Rome in the following year, I found that this friar had been sent to the Capuchin Convent there, to study foreign languages in the College of the Propaganda; it being intended, I presume, to turn his linguistic talents to account for missionary purposes. Many an English traveller, on seeing this Franciscan—who, like the rest of his Order, wore a habit of coarse brown serge and sandals on his feet—would not hesitate to speak of him half contemptuously, half pityingly, as a poor, ignorant, begging friar; and yet Padre T—, mendicant though he be, is a highly educated gentleman, and fit to associate on terms of intellectual equality with scholars of any nation.

He seems fully to appreciate the value of the study of “*Sagra Eloquenza*,” or the Art of Preaching, which is certainly much neglected among Anglican clergymen. Thus he tells us that only such of the priests are “allowed to preach as have studied with a view of appearing in the pulpit, and have thus earned for themselves the title of ‘*Predicatore*,’ or preacher.”

The part of monastic life which seems to have most impressed him, is the meeting together of each community for silent meditation and self-examination; although, like most Protestants, he seems to be unaware that meditation forms part of the daily life, not of clerics only, but of very many laymen living in the world. A religious community engaged in silent mental prayer must certainly be a novelty to any one, who is only acquainted with Protestant devotions.

Of all the parts of monastic life, and of all the various striking effects associated with it, none was to my mind so impressive as the meeting together of the community at the close of the day for silent meditation; a practice which, though I first became acquainted with it at San Bartolomeo, I found to be common to most, if not to all religious orders. Around the choir, each in his separate stall in private prayer, sat or knelt the whole community; the flickering oil-lamp, by which alone the church was preserved from total darkness, adding by its “dim, religious light,” and the indistinctness of its

effect, to the impressive character of the scene. For impressive it could hardly fail to appear to most unprejudiced minds.

Serious self-communion, involving examination of the conscience generally and of the actions and feelings of the day in particular, must necessarily be a solemn act, whatever may be the doctrinal opinions of him who performs it. And this self-communion, while it lies at the root of the theory of monastic life, has been embodied in the rules laid down by all the founders of religious orders ; and so far as my opportunities of observation went, it seems to form an important part of the actual practice of the religious communities of Italy.

And again :—

This custom alone seemed to make a marked distinction between living in a monastery, or in the busy world. People engaged in the active duties of life seldom have the opportunity, even when there is the inclination, to make a habit of regular meditation, of daily self-communion at fixed hours and for a definite time, in whatever circumstances they may happen to be placed. Among the Capuchins, the impressiveness of this part of the devotional exercises of the day is increased by the meditation always taking place with the window-shutters or blinds closed, thus excluding the light of day . . . with the intention, doubtless, of giving a serious line to the train of thought, and by withdrawing sensible objects from the view, to lead the mind to concentrate itself more entirely on the interior state of the soul.

During his sojourn in Italian convents, our author had an opportunity of observing the “importance that is attached to the practice of auricular confession, as an essential part of religion, by both clergy and laity, and the safeguards by which it is sought to protect that practice from abuse.” He tells us that limitations, in regard to licenses given to hear confessions, are “especially frequent in convents, where the number of persons in priest’s orders is considerable, rendering it practicable to make a selection of those most suited for the duties of confession.”

We wish that our space allowed us to lay before our readers a few anecdotes of Italian convent life. We can only find room for the following description of an Easter Sunday “pranzo,” or dinner at the refectory of San Barnabà at Genoa.

I have often observed the general cheerfulness prevailing among members of religious communities. San Barnabà was an instance of this, although a more than usually rigid convent (being the novitiate house) of an unusually strict order. On Easter day, after the religious duties of the morning had been performed, and after the Paschal lamb had been blessed, as is customary in convents, the Superior dispensed with the public reading in honour of the festival of Easter, and the friars enjoyed the privilege of conversing whilst

taking their meal. There was a good deal of quiet conversation; and towards the end of dinner one of the friars—a stout, elderly lay brother of small stature and ruddy complexion, who had passed the greater part of his monastic life of thirty odd years in this convent—was asked by his Superior to improvise some lines for the amusement of the company. The lay brother requested to be furnished with a subject, to which the Superior replied by suggesting the name of their guest for the purpose. This was rather an unpromising subject for the good friar, who, however, made the most he could of it; for, rising at once and bowing respectfully to the Superior, he improvised several lines, which, whatever may have been their merit, served for the great amusement of his hearers, whose simple and hearty merriment on such slight grounds it was pleasant both to see and share in.

Our author seems to be perfectly fascinated by the charm of monastic life. He tells us that he has never enjoyed any invitation more thoroughly than to a convent dinner; and it is really amusing to see how the poor refectory and meagre fare, with their religious associations, become to him positive luxuries and pleasures. Nor must we forget to add, that while living in a convent he was careful to observe all its rules, and to conform in all things to its discipline, even when it included so severe a mortification as midnight rising. Thus he says:—

It was a pleasure to rise at midnight to matins, than which service, at such an hour, nothing makes you enter more intimately into the spirit of monastic life; and unless a person is competent to enter into that spirit, it is impossible to form a judgment approximating even to truth, in regard either to the favourable or unfavourable side of monastic institutions.

Since the publication of his “*Convent Life in Italy*,” our author has published another work upon “*French Monasteries*,” about which perhaps we may have something to say on a future occasion. It is true that he has hitherto regarded monastic life from an æsthetic point of view, apart from its theological bearing; but we would fain hope that so frequent a residence in the cloister, so familiar an acquaintance with unworldly men, may one day, by God’s blessing, raise his heart and mind to the full appreciation of that higher religious life, which can be found alone within the unity of the Holy Roman Church. Of one thing we are sure, that wherever he may be, he will carry with him the prayers of those “cheerful, hospitable men, whose guest for so many months (to use his own words) he had the good fortune to be”: and we know that the “continual prayer of a just man availeth much.”

Such then, in the opinion of an unprejudiced and unbiassed Protestant writer, were the Italian religious houses almost at

the moment of their suppression. In an æsthetical, literary, but above all in a spiritual point of view, the loss inflicted upon Italy by that cruel and unjust act is well nigh irreparable. Our author remarks that the conventual life must surely have some peculiar charm attaching to it, when we find that wherever no legal obstacles are thrown in the way of monastic establishments, they exist in numbers that could scarcely be credited by most English people, and that they are constantly on the increase. This is true: but the charm of which he speaks, although he knows it not, is the gift of God the Holy Ghost; and woe to that country, which does despite to the Spirit of Grace! In the Convent of Campi, near Genoa, our author met with a poor boy, who was in the habit of assisting the lay brethren in their household duties. The boy, it appears, had been showing him his rosaries and medals, and had spoken to him, "with a sympathizing expression of countenance which a painter would have delighted to seize," of Him who suffered so much for us upon Calvary. He went on to speak of the suppression of the monasteries, and exclaimed:—"Ma che devirebbe de noi peccatori, se i frati non pregavano per noi? Se non era per i Religiosi, il mondo caderebbe sotto il peccato. E stanno essi sempre in convento, e non fanno male a nessuno."* The simple words of that poor Italian boy sum up exactly our own thoughts upon the suppression of the religious houses. What will become of Italy? We know not, we cannot tell. But our thoughts wander back to that other people, who would not have the Lord to reign over them, or God to be their King; and we call to mind the terrible warning of their rejected Master:—"Therefore, I say to you, that the Kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and shall be given to a nation yielding the fruits thereof. And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder."

* "But what would become of us sinners, if the friars did not pray for us? Were it not for the Religious, the world would fall beneath the weight of sin. And these remain always in their convents, and do harm to nobody."

ART. VI.—MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON CATHOLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION.

The "Month" for July, 1868 ; October, 1868 ; May, 1869.

Letter to the "Tablet" of May 28th. By the Writer of the October article in the "Month."

WE published a short article last January on "the principles of Catholic Higher Education." We separated the question of principles from that of practice, thinking that there would be much greater probability of ultimate agreement among Catholics, if these two very distinct questions were treated apart; and we treated therefore exclusively the former. Our article produced a most valuable letter from Dr. Gillow, which we published in April; and this in its turn has brought one from Canon Oakeley, which our readers will find in our present number, and to which we beg their particular attention. The primary purpose indeed of Dr. Gillow's letter was to correct an error of fact, into which we had inadvertently fallen, and to which we shall presently refer; though the letter contained incidentally very much interesting and important matter, which will be of much service in our future argument. But Canon Oakeley's is precisely the kind of letter which we desired to obtain. Our article, we said in January (p. 87), "may possibly lead to discussion; and this again may result in the correction or enlargement of our views on this or that particular. In such a manner by degrees thoughtful Catholics, or the large majority of such, may arrive at such general agreement on the matter, as shall greatly facilitate the path of ecclesiastical superiors." We hope that other competent thinkers then may be induced to follow Canon Oakeley's example, and give our readers the benefit of their general view. Meanwhile for ourselves, we think we shall act more wisely if we abstain from speaking further on our own account, until we have had the opportunity of obtaining the utmost obtainable light from every quarter. It is in this way that we may best hope to be of service, in helping forward this urgent yet complicated question to a harmonious and successful issue.

Our only purpose then at present is a reply to some strictures on our January article, made in the "Month" of

last May. They are brought forward, partly by a correspondent who wrote the article of last October, and partly by the Editor himself in a comment on his correspondent's letter.

Now firstly we would point out, that our language towards the "Month" on this matter (and indeed on all others) has been most cordial. In the very article assailed, we refer twice (pp. 95-6) to the "able" arguments advanced by our contemporary; in the passage quoted from us by the correspondent, we comment on his "many admirable remarks," and on the real "service he has rendered" in the matter; and in April (p. 529) we express warm admiration of his excellent criticisms on the London philosophical examination. But there is one passage in our April number, which we may as well quote at length:—

Certain most orthodox persons have wished that young Catholics should undergo examination at Oxford and Cambridge: others, we trust not less orthodox, hold that nothing could be more disastrous than this; that it would be far better there should be no Catholic higher education at all. Undoubtedly in this instance one side has expressed its view with *exemplary gentleness and moderation of tone*; and we hope that the other side has not exhibited any faulty violence, &c. &c. (p. 380).

We have quoted this, for the sake of reminding our readers with what perfect courtesy we have conducted our argument; though undoubtedly we expressed strong dissent from one particular proposal, which we understood the "Month" to suggest. The first reference of the "Month" to this proposal was in its number for last July; and we here give the passage in full, without italics and precisely as it stood:—

On the whole then, the state of the question between the Catholic Colleges and the University of London is this. First, we are not brought into competition with the class of schools we desire to compete with. Secondly, the examinations are not such as suit our studies: classics are made too little of, and many other matters are made too much of. If there are schools which are suited by them, they are schools of a lower class, and with a lower style of education. Unfortunately, these are at present the only examinations open to us on terms that Catholics can admit. Cambridge and Oxford have indeed opened their gates wider than before, and they even invite the presence of Catholics. Degrees may be had there, but only on condition of long previous residence; and an invitation to residence at a Protestant University is one to which our only answer is "Non possumus." What we should like to see,—what we should agitate for, what, if we agitate, we shall be sure to get before long,—is the admission of non-resident candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations, and the throwing open of at least a part of the University emoluments to all comers, whether they have "kept

terms" or not. It has been already proposed to require only one year's residence before the degree: we have but to push the proposal one step further, and demand admission to their examinations after having educated ourselves in our own way. As for an English Catholic University, even if we could succeed first in founding and filling such an institution, and then in getting it chartered, it is quite conceivable that we might after all find we had got more than was good for us. We could not compare ourselves with others; and our numbers in England are so small, that without such competition we should stagnate. Our degrees, moreover, would carry no public value with them. What we want is, to educate ourselves entirely, and then to compete with the best-educated scholars in the kingdom (pp. 15, 16).

We understood the writer to be here describing that scheme, which (under the present circumstances of England) he thought more desirable than any other in the interests of Catholic higher education: it was the scheme which he "would like to see," and for which Catholics should even "agitate." And we understood this scheme to be, (1) that any non-resident Catholic should be admissible to "Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations" as they at present stand; (2) that he should study for those examinations at some Catholic college, which should educate him in its own way; but (3) that he should thus have every means of fully competing with non-Catholics at the end of his course, in the highest results of a good intellectual education.

Now we must enlarge a little on the second part of our statement, because of an explanation which has been subsequently given. It will be admitted by every one, that of all those studies which constitute a higher education, philosophy and history (if you put aside all reference to theology) are the most momentous; and that as regards "mathematics, pure classics, and the natural sciences," their value to youth of the leisured class, however great, is comparatively subordinate. Consider e.g. the various advantages so admirably described by F. Newman (in his work on the subject) as the most precious, nay the one characteristic, fruit of university education. Well: Mathematics, pure classics, and physics, hardly even *tend* to secure these advantages, except as preparing the student—which they do indeed invaluablely and even in some sense indispensably—for the more elevated discipline of philosophy and history. The very notion then never occurred to us, that philosophy and history were to be excluded from those examinations to which a Catholic should resort. Nothing short of a direct statement could have led any reader to imagine that so momentous an exception was intended; whereas there was not even the least *hint* of any such exception. Nay, the whole scope of the

article pointed just the opposite way. What advantage e.g. could possibly be gained by Catholic youths "measuring themselves with the best educated youths of the country" (p. 5 et passim), if the admeasurement only regarded proficiency in the lowest branches of study? Why you might almost as effectually measure a Catholic youth of two-and-twenty with non-Catholics by means of a *cricket match*, as by means of an examination confined to pure classics, mathematics, and physics. Then again the writer urged, that "without competition" with non-Catholics, Catholic education would "stagnate"; and it seemed therefore that on his view there could be no living education of Catholics in philosophy and history, unless they competed with non-Catholics on this ground. Moreover, in an earlier part of his article (p. 6) he had said in effect, that the final examination which he desired is one to which "*we can direct our curriculum with advantage to our education.*" His words therefore, in themselves and in their context, did irresistibly seem to mean, either that philosophy and history were not to be taught *at all*,—a view which did not occur to us as *possibly* intended, and which has since been heartily disclaimed—or else that they were to be included in the matter of a Catholic's examination at Oxford or Cambridge.

We took for granted, then—no other idea ever occurred to us—that the writer desired the competition of Catholic youths with non-Catholic on the field of philosophy and history, before an Oxford or Cambridge examining board. And we imagined an illustration. We supposed that in the palmy days of Protestantism, and in a country preponderatingly Calvinistic, a Catholic should suggest the competition of Catholics with non-Catholics in theology, before Calvinistic examiners. We had argued in the previous part of our article, that philosophy and history, far more than theology proper, constitute the present battle-ground between the Church and her most intellectually powerful assailants. We contended therefore, that the two cases are "perfectly parallel."

The "Month" of May however has explained, to our great gratification, that the whole of our comment proceeded on a complete misapprehension of the writers' language; and the explanation has been supplemented, by a letter which one of them has addressed to the "Tablet." Firstly the suggestion itself, it now appears, was originally made "simply as an alternative to the great evils of the London system" (p. 485); or, in other words, the scheme was never advocated as desirable, but only as less calamitous than the existing deplorable

arrangement. And secondly the writer intended, on the one hand that philosophy and history should be taught carefully in the Catholic colleges (Letter to the "Tablet"), but on the other hand that the examination of Catholic students at Oxford or Cambridge should be confined to "mathematics, pure classics, and the natural sciences" (p. 482).

We have no difficulty whatever in accepting this explanation. We are convinced that we entirely misapprehended the "Month" writers, and we retract unreservedly everything we said which was based on this misapprehension. We are only too glad to find fresh ground for recognizing what we have always maintained; viz. the complete agreement of principle between the "Month" and ourselves.

But unfortunately the Editor will not be content with this. He criticises (p. 485) our "*strange* misunderstanding of his contributors' *obvious* meaning." And he adds that "it is not easy to conceive a more complete instance of controversial unfairness" than is exhibited in our article; though he quite regards that unfairness as unintentional, and indeed as characteristically idiosyncratical. We must maintain on the contrary, that in every particular we interpreted the writers according to the legitimate objective sense of their language. We are sorry to inflict tedious details on our readers. But so much has recently been said by our contemporary about a certain "controversial unfairness" which is supposed to characterize this REVIEW in consequence of its Editor's incurable narrowness, that we think it really worth while to take this one particular case—which has been pressed as quite an extreme instance of such unfairness—and sift every item of the charge. It will be more convenient, if we begin with replying to the Editor, and then proceed to his correspondent.

The Editor's principal and fundamental censure is based on our total silence in January, as to the present connection of Catholics with London University. We are here, as military men would say, taken in flank; we are assailed from that quarter, from which assault was by us least expected. Our dislike of the whole Catholic connection with London University has ever been so intense, that our only fear was lest that dislike should be too apparent.

We may now however, we suppose, without impropriety express ourselves on the subject; as a writer in the May "Month"—identified by his signature with the correspondent who criticises our article—has thrown aside all reticence, and has apparently met with no censure for his plain speaking. If we are *permitted* to speak on the subject, we are only

too happy to do so; and we have the greatest possible gratification in giving whatever further publicity we can to his unanswerable argument. We will italicize one or two sentences, which impress us as especially telling:—

Is it not time that we should ask ourselves how long Catholics can submit to *have anything to do with educational bodies* to meet whose examinations our young men must, if they would secure success, [must] make themselves acquainted with and study the writings of the Mills, the Bains, the Huxleys of the day? These men are the prophets of modern progress. They have a name and a corresponding influence. They, at least some of them, write in a style which fascinates the young, now by its apparent clearness, now by its charming variety, its brilliant illustration, its poetic outbursts. The young are eager to learn, but naturally abhorrent of the labour of thought. Such teachers are pretty nearly sure to be popular with them—it is so pleasant to float along the stream of a lucid style without having to strain a muscle or being even once compelled to take to the oars! And so, dreaming placidly that they are becoming philosophical thinkers, and lulled into security by occasional vague panegyrics on the noble, the philanthropic, the useful, the inexperienced readers *drift unsuspectingly to the goal of atheism or scepticism*. Again, this new philosophy purports to bring mental philosophy into full harmony with physical science, and in a manner does so “by subjecting the elder to the younger and more vigorous brother, as modern thought demands.” There is a constant appeal made to sensible facts, to tangible discoveries, to practical achievements in the material universe. How tempting is the suggestion, that those who have helped us to more perfect dominion over external nature will, by the same process applied to immaterial substances, enable us, before many years have rolled by, “to exercise the same kind of control over the world of thought, as we already possess in respect of the material world,” to calculate the future course of the human race, or the actions of the individual will, with the same unerring precision with which we already foretell the occurrence of eclipses! *Not only is our poor fallen nature not insensible to such attractions, but there is a plausibility in sophisms of this kind against which it would be a wonder if any young man, not already versed in logic and in sound systems of philosophy, were proof.* The errors of our modern scientific writers *lie deep down in their fundamental principles*, which, if they be purely sceptical, as they often are, *no direct refutation can reach.*

Nor let it be supposed that the absurdity of scepticism is sufficient to ensure the unwary reader from being caught in the snare. Good care is taken to cover the pitfall with an exuberance of the most natural-looking and attractive herbage. Rhetoric goes a long way towards concealing the danger. Long trains of reasoning, or of clear and even truthful analysis, lure the already eager student on, till he is prepared to accept almost any conclusion which is confidently advanced. How can it be that a guide who has made so many hard problems easy, and led the way happily, with much science and skill, through so many entanglements, and triumphed over so many obstacles, should after all turn out to be a blind guide, ready in the

end to fall with his followers into the ditch? *Even those who unite natural acuteness with honesty of heart and sound faith find it difficult to resist first impressions or to detect the fatal errors which lurk under so much truth.* When at last they are startled by some proposition evidently at variance with Catholic belief, even if they have the grace to withhold assent, *they are not wholly saved from the influence long exercised over them.* Less patent fallacies have found acceptance with them; *the imagination is filled with delusive images;* they are staggered by objections which they fancy to be insoluble, because they know of no sufficient answer themselves.

It will be said, perhaps, that these dangers may be obviated if the student have a Catholic professor at his elbow to warn him against accepting falsehood, to expose fallacies, to answer objections for him, to inculcate and expound the truth. Well, let the experiment be fairly tried, but let us not make up our minds beforehand that it will be successful, and *let us not waste year after year of promising students in attempting what seems very difficult at the best, and may very likely turn out to be impossible.* We are ourselves not sanguine as to the result. That man knows little of philosophy or of the difficulties of teaching, who imagines that *two opposite systems of philosophy can be taught with any reasonable hope of our pupils entering fully into both.* Three years are not found too much to enable a student to master thoroughly one system. Let us remember what is involved in the endeavour *in shorter time to make him realize two.* For this *he must learn two sets of contradictory principles, he must retain in memory two distinct and intricate systems of terminology, he must bear constantly in mind the different senses in which the same words are often employed by either party, he must retain, with an accurate remembrance of the value of each, two sets of elaborate proofs.* Two brains instead of one ought to be at his service for two psychologies entirely distinct. Meanwhile, the unfortunate student is engaged upon half a dozen other subjects simultaneously. The examination he has to undergo at the end of his one or two years of preparation is conducted by men who are the leading advocates of the modern philosophy, who are not likely, therefore, to have mercy upon a candidate who advances views which they hold to have been exploded three centuries ago, and which they are constantly declaring to be too obsolete or too ridiculous to be refuted. Time presses, a multiplicity of subjects already nearly bewilders the student. *How will he regard the professor who loads him with so much additional labour to no practical purpose for his immediate end—a good place in the class list? What will be the result? At best, he will cram his poor head with a confused, undigested, and indigestible mass of matter. He will be a little further off from a genuine knowledge of philosophy at the end of his course than he was at the beginning. For it is better to know nothing than to be a sciolist in two conflicting systems.* He will run great risk of failure in his examination, without having acquired any sound knowledge to compensate by after usefulness for disgrace. Or, let us suppose he is happy and sensible enough to cleave to the truth, and prefer grounding himself in what will be of permanent service to him to securing immediate success by the sacrifice of truth. *Failure in this case is certain.* His resolve borders indeed on the heroic, but he has been put through a trial we had no right to subject him

to, and driven to submit to a punishment to which we had no right to expose him.

One only other alternative is possible. We ought not to disguise the fact that *it is by far the most probable*. Naturally eager to obtain academic success, impatient of any obstacle to its attainment, with or without conscientious misgivings as to the propriety of the plan, many, perhaps the majority, will apply themselves wholly to the acquisition of that philosophy which they will be expected at the University to know; *they will cram themselves with the poison to the exclusion of the antidote*; they will imbibe error, and neglect, if they do not reject, truth; and when the examination is over and success has justified their choice, they will go forth into the battle of life *not merely unarmed against the gross materialism of public thought, but laden with false principles and errors cognate to those which they will encounter in the books and newspapers and magazines which English Catholics too often think themselves at liberty to read*. They will stand in *proximate danger of losing the Faith* which their first essays in philosophy will have done much to weaken. The question will then be, with whom does the responsibility lie? Who put them into the occasion? (418-21).

In his letter (p. 484) the same writer expresses a hope, that Catholics "shall in time emancipate themselves from the thralldom of the ungodly University of London." And we would draw especial attention to another sentence; because it shows that the writer is not indulging in arbitrary speculation, but founding his view on "practical experience." "Every day," he says (p. 485), "of very practical experience *in preparing candidates for the London examination in this branch* convinces me more and more that this 'grievous hardship' will be found . . . quite fatal to any connection with the London University" (p. 485).

We have long held this opinion to the full; though we never could have hoped to express it so forcibly or defend it so tellingly. Our reason for having preserved profound silence on the matter up to last April, is extremely simple: viz., that various Catholic bishops have sanctioned the Catholic connection with London University; and that it did not therefore seem within the province of periodical writers, to argue publicly against its religious tendency. But since the "Month" has now spoken so openly and no rebuke has followed, we suppose it may be inferred that their lordships wish to see the whole question frankly and publicly discussed. One word however from them shall again close our lips on the subject.

We have been throughout greatly embarrassed by this conflict of duties; and we had at first indeed some difficulty, as to speaking at all on Catholic higher education. This was implied in the very first words the present writer put forth

on the subject, Oct. 1864, p. 372. Our opponent, we said, in advocating a Catholic college at Oxford,

implies throughout (*and this is the most important point of all in a Catholic controversialist*) that the question which he treats is one for the ecclesiastical authorities to decide *peremptorily and without appeal*. On our side we fully confess that these authorities have not yet spoken, and we infer that before doing so they are not unwilling to hear the whole question patiently and fairly argued out. We propose under such circumstances to take our own humble share in this momentous argument.

This has been our governing principle throughout: we have felt that the whole matter of education is one for the bishops; and that no private individual has a right to publish, except so far as their lordships may wish to hear discussion. We have thought ourselves accordingly precluded from publicly expressing any protest, on religious grounds, against what actually exists under ecclesiastical sanction; and we uniformly therefore limited our criticism to proposals concerning the future. We assure the Editor that we had various qualms of conscience, after our January article, as to whether we had not indicated too manifestly our hatred of the present Catholic connection with London University; and we were by no means without apprehension that we might be taken to task on the subject. But the particular rebuke which we have received, is precisely that which we least dreamed of anticipating.

The "Month" writer used in October incomparably less strong language than he uses now: indeed he expressly deprecated (p. 391) "abandoning the London University," before some connection with the older universities should be arranged. But when we found Dr. Gillow in April more or less speaking in the same direction with our own thoughts, we "supposed there could be no impropriety in our expressing cordial concurrence" (p. 529). We avowed therefore our hearty agreement with his opinion, that the change of studies involved in connecting Catholic Colleges with London, had been "in many respects the reverse of an improvement"; and that "the London philosophical examination in particular is a grievous hardship." And we would especially remind the Editor, that a whole month before he published his present comment, we had commemorated the "excellent service" done by his periodical "in drawing attention to the grossly tyrannical and intolerant character of this examination, and to the grievous religious injury which it is calculated to inflict." As Dr. Gillow spoke so strongly against the Catholic

connection with London University, we thought that at last we also had liberty to do the same.

Having made this explanation, we will take severally the various allegations made against our controversial fairness by the Editor and his correspondent.

1. The former gentleman considers, that our omission of all reference to London University originated in "willing or unconscious obliviousness"; and implies, unless we misunderstand him, that it arose from our conscious or unconscious tendency to judge unfavourably whatever appears in his pages. We assure him that nothing can be further from the fact than this last supposition, if indeed he implies it. We have always found a particular gratification in commenting on his services to the good cause. We are confident indeed that we have very far oftener expressed sympathy with the "Month," than he has expressed sympathy with the DUBLIN REVIEW.

2. The Editor says, that "we gave what purposes [purports?] to be an *exhaustive* list of *possible proposals* for supplying Catholic higher education, among which recourse to London does not figure." If he will look again at our article, he will find that his statement is incorrect in the very particular on which his whole criticism turns. Our words were these:—"Though Catholics are agreed on the great desirableness of a certain end, we hardly remember an instance on which so much difference of opinion *has existed* as to the appropriate means. In fact, no fewer than six different plans *have been from time to time proposed*" (p. 87). We did not profess to give "an exhaustive list of *possible proposals*," but a list of the proposals which *had in fact been made* during the recent controversy. Several writers have expressed great dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, and an earnest desire for some important change. Not one of these writers up to last January had proposed, as "the appropriate means" for this end, any longer or closer connection with London University. If this *had* been proposed, we should not have given any catalogue of proposals at all; because we thought ourselves precluded from speaking on the Catholic connection with London University, in such terms as would alone have expressed our conviction.

3. The Editor complains that we "employed against the suggestion made" in the "Month," "the very arguments which its contributors had already used to support their own conclusions." Some readers may have understood this to mean, that we appropriated such arguments without acknowledgment. But this is not what the Editor intends: for

what we did was, to quote (under inverted commas and with explicit reference) various sentences, in which the "Month" writer had argued powerfully on the evils of permitting Catholic students to be examined in philosophy by a non-Catholic board. Had we felt at liberty to express our full thought, we should have said that these excellent arguments tell indeed with irresistible force against London, but with force still *more* irresistible against Oxford and Cambridge. In fact our only doubt was, whether we had not given *too* broad a hint of our extreme aversion to the whole London arrangement. But we are quite unable to conjecture, how such a proceeding involves "controversial unfairness"; and still more, how it involves a controversial unfairness, than which "it is not easy to conceive" one more "complete."

4. The Editor considers that "the suggestion" of sending Catholics for examination at Oxford and Cambridge, "to whatever extent it had been made, had been made simply as an alternative to the great evils of the London system." Now we beg our readers to look back at that paragraph from the July "Month," which we have already quoted. The suggestion is put forth simply and unqualifiedly, as "what we should like to see," nay, "what we should *agitate* for." The Editor's present words imply, that there was some other plan which the contributor would have preferred to his own, but that this other plan was impracticable. What hint was there in July of any such preferable plan? What could that plan have been? Certainly not "an English Catholic University," for of this the writer spoke in disparagement. He considered it essential that Catholic students shall compete with non-Catholics; because "without such competition we should stagnate": and "what he would like to see" arranged as the means of such competition, would be "the admission of non-resident candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations." He advocated his proposal, not as the mere alternative from a worse evil, but on the contrary as being (under England's present circumstances) the best plan of all. We now indeed know that such was not his real intention; but we must contend confidently that this, and no other, is the obvious and legitimate objective sense of his words.

At this point we turn from the Editor to his correspondent.

5. This writer considers (p. 482) that the July contributor claimed for Catholics, in his proposal, "freedom to dictate the terms" of Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations. We cannot find in his article the remotest hint at anything of the kind. Let our readers judge.

6. The correspondent further considers the July con-

tributor to have advocated no more, than a competition of Catholics with non-Catholics, "in mathematics, pure classics, and the natural sciences." We have no doubt whatever that such was his subjective meaning; but we are more surprised than we can well say, that any one should account it the legitimate objective sense of his words, whether in themselves or in their context. On this however we enlarged sufficiently at the outset of our article.

7. We were the more desirous of doing justice to all that could be said for (what we understood to be) the July proposal, from the very fact of our feeling ourselves obliged to speak so vehemently in its disparagement. We supposed the writer therefore to argue, in its defence, that the examination at Oxford or Cambridge would turn entirely on the question of philosophical or historical ability and information, not at all on that of philosophical or historical *truth*. We certainly were not prepared to find our gratuitous candour turned against us as a proof of unfairness. Yet so it is by the correspondent (p. 483); who "finds nothing in the article which could by any possibility be twisted into the remotest resemblance to such" an argument. And so we are to be voted unfair, because in our desire of fully grappling with a subject, we credit an opponent's cause with a plausible argument, which he has not himself thought of bringing forward.

8. We now come to the October contributor, who is the present correspondent. He considers (p. 481) that he ought not to be held "responsible for the definite proposal" of July "signed by a different hand." But in the first place we would remind him, that he unequivocally identified himself with the July article. "In a recent," *i.e.*, the July "article," he says, "*we* discussed the question whether, &c. &c.," and "a similar inquiry into, &c. &c.," "is necessary to complete our task." He was professing to supplement the earlier article; to complete the task, of which a performance had commenced in July. Nor (apart from this) did we ever before understand, that articles in the "Month" written in the first person plural, from the mere fact of having a signature, are to be considered as expressing exclusively a contributor's private opinion, for which the "Month" itself is not responsible. Nothing indeed can be more intelligible than such an arrangement, when once it has been given out; and we will hereafter bear it in mind, whenever we may wish to comment on "the Month": but we had really no means of guessing the fact.

9. We observe with much surprise the correspondent's remark (p. 481), that "there is not a single word in his

article implying a desire for admission to Oxford and Cambridge, *or for any sort of connection with them.*" We wish he had refreshed his memory, before he thus peremptorily contradicted our statement. Here are his words of October, as they stand in p. 391 :—

We . . . are *desirous* in the *interests of our young men* to look out for better chances, and, without abandoning the London University, to *agitate* for admission as non-resident candidates to the *degree examinations of the older universities.*

10. The correspondent expresses in the "Tablet" a further complaint. He says : "The writers in the 'Month' objected altogether to the examination of Catholics in philosophy by non-Catholics. . . . The October article insisted on this point emphatically, and at considerable length ; yet it is represented as having recommended Catholics to subject our young men to such examination on this very ground." As to the July writer however, we can find in his article no opinion on the subject, beyond a very vague statement (p. 14) that "the department of mental philosophy affords by itself a whole budget of gravamina." It is exclusively therefore the October writer with whom we have here to do.

Now we certainly cannot concede the principle, that no writer should ever be understood to mean what his words obviously import, wherever such interpretation would involve him in self-contradiction : for the very large majority even of powerful thinkers fall occasionally into self-contradiction. But all this is really beside the present question ; because we maintain that our critic has by no means rightly described the drift of his article. His words of October, 1868, are incomparably less strong than his words of May, 1869. In no part of his October article does he represent the philosophical examination of Catholics by non-Catholics as being so great an evil, that it may not easily be counterbalanced by a preponderating good. He says emphatically (p. 391) that "great indeed must be the evils which could equal in gravity *the one terrible evil* of" non-competition with non-Catholics ;* nor does he give the slightest hint that, as regards the highest studies, he is urging his co-religionists again to undergo that "terrible evil." On the contrary, even as regards London University and its detestable philosophical examination, he exhorts Catholics *not to abandon it*, till they have secured a

* His words are, "of absolute isolation from the current of English mental life" ; but he represents this evil as necessarily involved in non-competition with non-Catholics.

footing at Oxford or Cambridge.* Moreover, for many years London University enforced an examination of Catholic students in three books of Paley's "Moral Philosophy," and in Butler's Three Sermons. Yet so far from considering this an intolerable grievance—we always thought it *utterly* intolerable—he says (p. 395) that "the matter was too insignificant to call for remonstrance on the part of Catholics." Now these treatises are exclusively occupied with what may perhaps be considered the most vital and fundamental of all the philosophical questions, which are at issue between the Church and her assailants. They are occupied with the nature and origin of moral obligation. If the writer thought it quite "insignificant" that children of the Church should be interrogated by heretics and infidels on such sacred ground as this, why should we have taken for granted that he regarded the Oxford and Cambridge philosophical examinations as absolutely and peremptorily inadmissible?

If the "Month" contributors wish to understand what was our impression (when we wrote) as to their respective positions, we have no difficulty at all in explaining ourselves on the subject. We thought that, in their just hatred of what exists, they surprisingly underrated the evil influence of Catholic connection with Oxford or Cambridge; and we thought that they no less surprisingly *overrated* the importance of competition with non-Catholics. We thought that the July contributor by no means laid sufficient stress on the vital necessity of very vigorous philosophical and historical studies, as an integral part of any higher education worthy the name. And we thought that the October contributor, while fully feeling this necessity, by no means considered the notion so intolerable as *we* have always considered it, of Catholics preparing for a philosophical or historical examination before any non-Catholic board whatever. We need hardly add, that his May article has indefinitely changed our view of his standpoint, and has brought us into far more unreserved sympathy with his whole position.

11. The correspondent speaks (p. 483) in language of irony—which seems to us misplaced, and which is certainly out of harmony with his general tone—about our unwillingness "to delay even for a quarter" our "earnest and emphatic protest" against that plan, which we understood as having been proposed in July and endorsed by him in October. "Why," he

* These are his words, p. 391: "We are desirous . . . *without abandoning the London University*, to agitate for admission as non-resident candidates to the degree examinations of the older universities."

asks, "did we not rush to the rescue three months sooner?" But we did speak "three months sooner." In October (p. 421) we expressed ourselves quite as strongly against the said plan as we did in the following January. Of course however, the project assumed a far more important shape than it had done before, when the "Month" after an interval again pressed it forward, as we understood it to do in October. And as we were writing in January on the very subject of Catholic higher education, we did not wish to wait for our promised *second* article on the subject, before repeating our protest against (what seemed to us) the repeated proposal.

However the correspondent, in his letter to the "Tablet," very handsomely expresses himself "exceedingly sorry" for his "forgetfulness," and retracts the whole remark on which we have just commented. Of course nothing more can possibly be desired.

12. But that statement of the correspondent's which has surprised us most of all, occurs in p. 484. "Still less did the 'Month' ever propose 'resorting,' as the *Dublin reviewer* represents, to Oxford and Cambridge, and consorting, by way of moral training, with other residents at the University." Our sentence, thus strangely misunderstood, ran as follows:—"His proposal is to agitate for the admission of *non-resident* candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations, with the view of Catholic students *thither resorting*." The word "thither" in this sentence referred, of course, to its immediate antecedent, "degree examinations": indeed, as our readers will have seen, the words "Oxford" and "Cambridge" had been used adjectively and not substantively at all. Moreover, by the very force of terms, those "thither resorting" were to be "*non-resident* candidates."* But secondly, even had the meaning of the sentence been doubtful, why should our critic take for granted that we intended it in a sense which would make it quite false, rather than in a sense which would make it quite true? Moreover, thirdly, the passage as a whole—quoted by our critic in p. 480—utterly refuses his interpretation; for its whole argument turns exclusively, not on *residence*, but on *examination*. And lastly, in the earlier part of our article (p. 87), we had described our understanding of the proposal with unexceptionable clearness; where we had spoken of "an agitation for the admission of non-resident students to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations."

* The correspondent, in his letter to the "Tablet," says that this phrase is ambiguous. What other meaning did any one ever give it, except that of "candidates who do not reside," or "who have not resided"?

The correspondent indeed implies (p. 484), and expressly says in his letter to the "Tablet," that Dr. Gillow had been misled by us into a similar misconception of the intended proposal. But it seems to us that instead of Dr. Gillow "not having read the article in the 'Month'" (p. 483), we might rather accuse his critic of not having read Dr. Gillow's letter. Dr. Gillow describes the "Month's" proposal most accurately in p. 527, as emanating from "a Catholic periodical of reputation and influence." His critic forgets that in p. 522 Dr. Gillow had protested against two different things: viz., (1) against the "Month's" proposal; and (2) against the practice of those unhappy Catholic parents, who under present circumstances send their sons to reside at Oxford.*

We have now answered all the charges without exception which have been brought against us, of "controversial unfairness"; and we must say in perfect good humour that, to our mind, all the controversial unfairness has been *on the other side*. We are as far from suspecting our critics of unfair *intention*, as they are from suspecting *us* of such a fault. Nor indeed should we have thought of discussing the matter at such length, had it not been for the repeated attacks to which we have been subjected from the same quarter on a similar theme. It now only remains, to answer various questions which our critics have proposed, as to our own view on one or two points which have been incidentally raised.

The correspondent (p. 482) claims to know our opinion, on the value of that proposal which he *in fact* intended. We have of course no room to *argue* for our opinion, but we are most ready to express it; and if there appears a certain peremptoriness in our *mode* of expressing it, we hope our readers will ascribe it to its true cause—the exigencies of brevity. Indubitably the best Catholics may most legitimately differ on such a theme; and we are but expressing our own humble convictions. We consider then that if university honours were confined to mathematics, pure classics, and physics, philosophy and history must in practice entirely go to the wall. As the correspondent himself excellently speaks in May (p. 421), all the more able students would be "eager to obtain academic success, and impatient of any obstacle to its attainment"; they would therefore bitterly grudge every minute directed to intellectual labours that have no bearing on that success. The so-called higher education of Catholics,

* These are Dr. Gillow's words: "I am . . . curious to know what advantages . . . would be expected from graduating at Oxford, *either as resident or non-resident members.*"

would therefore in fact become exclusively an education in pure classics, mathematics, and physics;* and we think that such a result would be far more calamitous, than if all connection of every kind were at once broken off with non-Catholic educational bodies. We think that such studies, if exclusively pursued to so late a period, would generate a dapper, pert, smart self-sufficiency, which, of all intellectual habits, is about the most disastrous; that a youth so trained would be led away in unresisting captivity by those plausible and unspeakably mischievous "sophisms," to which (as the correspondent admirably remarks, p. 419) "our poor fallen nature" is so easily attracted; and that he would thus be placed in profound antagonism to the Church's teaching and spirit. See our remarks in January, pp. 90, 91, 93, 94, 98, 99.

We were delighted to find the correspondent laying such stress, in his letter to the "Tablet," on "religious instruction," as a very important part of Catholic higher education. We ourselves also in January (pp. 101-103) dwelt earnestly on this. Here is to our mind another of the many reasons, which make it so vitally important to emancipate Catholic education as much as possible from every direct or indirect non-Catholic influence. Most certainly a Catholic student will never give his mind to religious instruction with the necessary keenness and prominence, so long as he studies for competitive examinations which do not include it in their sphere.

We will here make a brief digression, to express the great pleasure with which we have read certain remarks of Mgr. Woodlock, in the "Irish Ecclesiastical Record" for May, supporting our view of January. Mgr. Woodlock dwells on "the grievous intellectual loss sustained by those whose minds are submitted to a system of culture, from which is excluded a study of religion *proportionate to the other parts of their education.*" "The great men of the middle ages," laymen no less than clerics, "have left after them unmistakable signs that to the *deep study of religion* they were chiefly indebted for" "their mental culture" (pp. 360, 361). The great Catholic dogmata "exercise a wonderful influence in the development of the human intellect. Each one of them opens out a new field, on which the mind and its faculties may expatiate." "The study of religion," even in laymen, "should be *in proportion to the rest of the intellectual culture.*" "The knowledge of these

* The examination, we may add, must *in fact* be confined to mathematics and pure classics; for physical science is in these days made as ministrative as philosophy proper, to irreligion and atheism. See Professor Huxley *passim*.

divine truths disposes the educated mind, and sharpens the reasoning powers" (pp. 362-3).

The correspondent (in his letter to the "Tablet") requires us to explain our words of April (p. 529), that "any connection of English Catholic education with Oxford and Cambridge would produce immeasurably worse effects, than are generated by its present relations with London University." Certainly explanation is called for; but it is very easily forthcoming. We were writing in great hurry, at the end of the quarter, a short comment on Dr. Gillow's letter. When we spoke of "any" connection, we did not mean "any connection which the wit of man could devise"—as e.g. that Oxford and Cambridge converts should teach in Catholic colleges—but of any *such* connection, as had been proposed in that controversy to which Dr. Gillow's letter throughout referred. And we then were under the full impression, that all who advocated *any* resort to Oxford and Cambridge, advocated *at least* the full plan which was contained (we consider) in the legitimate objective sense of the "Month" articles. So understood, we entirely adhere to what we said in April; except, indeed, that the word "immeasurably" is somewhat too strong. But if it be asked, as to that particular plan which the "Month" *intended* to propose, whether we should regard it as an improvement upon what now exists, we are not prepared to answer. The present state of things is a "terrible evil"; and we think that what the "Month" proposes would also be a terrible evil.

Lastly, both the Editor and his correspondent desire us to speak expressly, as to that sentence of ours, rebuked by Dr. Gillow, in which we said that no education is as yet offered to English Catholic youths between the age of nineteen and twenty-two. We now of course know that this statement was incorrect; and that S. Cuthbert's College at all events (probably others also) do offer such an education. We will briefly explain the origin of our mistake. Our article, be it remembered, was exclusively on *principles*, and in no respect on *measures*: any mention of facts was quite incidental; and in referring to them, we proceeded merely on our current knowledge and impression.

The writer of the article had long been connected with a distinguished Catholic college: most certainly *there* no such lay education existed. He had never heard, there or elsewhere, in conversation or otherwise, that at other colleges things were different in that respect. In various conversational discussions which have taken place on the present urgent need, he never heard the fact mentioned. The two

sentences which he cited in January, and which had never been contradicted, confirmed him in his unsuspectingness. We must add however, in fairness, that the "Month" October article (p. 392, note) does imply the reverse; and that if we had duly pondered that note, we should have obtained a clue for discovering our mistake. To that extent therefore we plead guilty of carelessness; and at all events we greatly regret that, culpably or inculpably, we did English Catholic colleges such injustice.

The correspondent indeed says in his letter to the "Tablet," that Dr. Gillow considers us to "have been misled by the 'Month' into the belief that Catholics do feel the want of a higher education analogous to that given at Oxford and Cambridge." On the contrary, we understand Dr. Gillow himself to *admit* that Catholics consider themselves to feel this want. "The opinion," he says (p. 517), "seems now to *pass current*, as a thing quite indisputable," that "the education given in our Catholic colleges" is "extremely deficient." Nor is his own satisfaction with the present by any means unmixed; for he holds (p. 528) that the philosophical difficulty is "almost fatal" to the London connection.*

We have never ourselves expressed or implied any opinion of our own, as to the extent in which such a system as that now existing at St. Cuthbert's can be considered satisfactory; because we avowedly reserved all such questions for a future article. But as our critics are so desirous that we should speak plainly, we will willingly do so. Our convictions are, (1) that the whole desire of competing with non-Catholics is a fundamental mistake, and can lead to nothing but mischief; (2) that there can be no enduring solution of present difficulties, except by keeping Catholic education and examination as completely aloof as possible † alike from Oxford, Cambridge, and London; (3) that there can be no *satisfactory* solution of them, except by a Catholic University.

Here then we conclude; having confined ourselves strictly, as our readers must see, to the defensive and explanatory. But the Editor of the "Month," since the appearance of his May number, has written a courteous and even kindly letter to the "Tablet" concerning this REVIEW. We cannot do better than quote this letter at length.

* Since this article went to press, Dr. Gillow's letter has appeared as a separate publication with a Postscript. He explains himself in the Postscript on this very head. He "never intended any such purpose" as "to show that there is no reason for the cry among Catholics for a university education."

† We do not forget, that to a certain (we believe comparatively small) number of Catholic students, some degree acknowledged by the State is very important for the advancement of their worldly interests. But practical details are external to the scope of this article.

SIR,—The letter from the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, which you have printed in your last issue, may seem naturally to call for a few words from me in reply.

I may be allowed to say that I heartily acknowledge and reciprocate the cordial feeling of which the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW speaks, as animating him with regard to the periodical placed under my charge. If there were no questions but questions of feeling, there would never be any difference between us.

I fear, however, that cordial respect and good-will, and even a general correspondence of views, may not always suffice to prevent involuntary misconceptions and occasional misrepresentations. As far as any such mistakes can be brought home to us, we shall, I trust, act to others as we ask others to act to ourselves; that is, we shall acknowledge them candidly and categorically, and we shall always rejoice to find that what have appeared to us important differences of opinion are not such in reality. For our own part, we have lately had to complain of one or two instances of what I have called controversial unfairness, as to which, however, we have always expressed our conviction that they have been unintentional.

One of these is now before the Catholic public. I am very far from saying that the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW had not a perfectly satisfactory reason, as far as the main purpose of his article in last January was concerned, for not mentioning the connection between the Catholic colleges and the London University. But, as this connection was the main subject of the article in the "Month," on which he took occasion to remark, it appears to me that he concedes the whole case when he acknowledges that he omitted to allude to it while making his censure upon a proposal which he supposed to have been made in that article. I do not see how a fair account *could* be given of the suggestion made in the "Month," by a writer who made such an omission. I can only say, that I shall not prejudge this case, and shall read with interest the promised explanation, how it has come to pass that the DUBLIN REVIEW has attributed to the writer in the "Month" a proposal "perfectly parallel" to the suggestion that "in some country preponderatingly Calvinistic, Catholic theological students should compete in theology with Calvinists before Calvinist examiners." These are the writer's own words, and if he can prove that they contain a charge which fairly expresses the sense of the article on which he comments, we shall be most ready to withdraw our complaint as to his injustice.* If he is not able to prove this, we shall expect from him an equally plain and simple retraction. I think that no one can doubt the gravity of the charge in itself, nor think that in defending ourselves against it we are forcing the person who makes it

* We should add one word of annotation to this sentence. The "Month" writers have not denied, that the illustration which we suggested would really have been "perfectly parallel," had they proposed that Catholic students should compete with non-Catholics in philosophy and history, before an Oxford or Cambridge examining board. The charge against us therefore in this sentence is merely the having *ascribed* to them such a proposal. We have already replied to that charge. We believe that all ordinary readers will have understood the "Month's" language precisely as we understood it.

into a position of antagonism. And yet, as I have already said, we should have allowed it to pass unchallenged, but for the use made of the article in the DUBLIN REVIEW by Dr. Gillow.

Your obedient Servant,

THE EDITOR OF THE "MONTH."

We assure the Editor of the "Month," that we are quite as anxious not to misrepresent his periodical, as he can be not to misrepresent ours. We also "shall always rejoice to find that what have appeared to us important differences of opinion are not so in reality": though indeed, except as regards this general question of Catholic higher education, we do not know any difference of opinion between the "Month" and ourselves, which we have ever *thought* important. Whatever differences of opinion do exist, concern almost exclusively (we believe) the appreciation of given *individuals*; or the greater or less severity of *language* which is called for on some given occasion; or the expediency of starting some given theological discussion; or other matters of the same subordinate kind. We were referring to things of this class, when we said in January (p. 228) that our general differences with the "Month" "concern not ends but means." And as to those "misconceptions" of which the Editor speaks, if he will on any occasion draw our attention to them by a private communication, he will always find us even eager to retract erroneous statements; and to apologize for them also, so far as we can see our mistake to have been culpable.

While our sheets are passing through the press, the July "Month" has appeared: a number unusually rich, apparently, in valuable contents. It contains a thoughtful paper on Catholic education, with great part of which we heartily concur. The preceding remarks however will have shown that, on one or two points, we must demur to the writer's conclusions; and there are other particulars also on which in some future number we may probably express an opinion different from his. On the other hand, we cannot exaggerate the intensity of our concurrence with his statement (p. 20), that there must be "a resolute sacrifice of foregone conclusions, jealousies, and prejudices" on all hands, if Catholics really desire the accomplishment of so important a work.

We are very sorry to infer from a note at p. 107, that he has not read the article on Oxford which appeared in the

number of this REVIEW for October, 1868. Perhaps he will be more disposed to do so, when we inform him that an extremely small portion of it was contributed by the present writer. He will find that the facts stated in it bear very materially on his practical conclusion. And we would specially draw his attention to those in pp. 424-5; which were furnished by a very able and thoughtful convert, whose Oxford career is quite recent.

ART. VII.—THE LIFE OF F. FABER.

The Life and Letters of Frederick William Faber, D.D., Priest of the Oratory of S. Philip Neri. By JOHN EDWARD BOWDEN, of the same Congregation. Richardson: Derby. 1869.

ONE of many notes which mark the present Catholic revival in England as from God, not from man, is this,—that He has raised up, in a way so unlikely and unexpected, instruments so remarkable and admirable to labour in it. Future times, we cannot doubt, will most strongly feel this. In the present day we cannot speak freely upon it, because, thank God, several of them are still spared to us. But from time to time the thought is specially forced upon us; and it is so at this moment, when we once more look back upon the life, labours, and death of Frederick William Faber.

He was emphatically a man—one of a very small number—with whom it was quite impossible, at any period of his life, to have personal intercourse without feeling not only that one had never before met any man like him, but that there never can have been any such. Alas! how impossible must his own task have appeared to Father Faber's biographer when he sat down, pen in hand, to draw, as well as he could, the portrait of his beloved and departed father. Few things are more remarkable in the volume before us than Father Faber's descriptions of nature. It is impossible to read them without feeling how much more was seen in mountains, forests, lakes, seas, and cities by the gifted eye of the Christian poet than would have been visible to those of us ordinary mortals. But this is not all. What we feel still more deeply is that even his almost unrivalled gift of language is powerless to convey to others more than a very small portion of what he saw and felt. And yet any natural scene is much less

complex and varied than the outward shadow of the soul of a highly-gifted man as it is reflected in his countenance. To fix and record this gleam of the soul through the features is the constant labour and disappointment of high art. The painter best able to take a likeness often gives us, as we all feel, no shadow of the real man. Of all things a photograph is wont to be the most like, and the most disappointing. The man of genius, perhaps, succeeds in catching one of the expressions, in fixing one of those momentary rays with which the soul within lightens up the material features, as the sun kindles into glory a mist in itself dim and hazy, as well as damp and cold. And at best it is but one expression that is caught, and even that imperfectly; and the greatest master of his art, when he has lavished all his genius on the conception, and all his labour on the execution of a portrait of one whom he reveres not only for his powers of imagination and thought, but for his moral culture and discipline, is tempted to turn with disgust even from his noblest work, so imperfectly does it record the idea he is conscious of having received from the countenance he has represented.

And yet what is even this difficulty compared with that of painting in human words the life and character of one who was a poet, a genius, a Christian, a priest, and an eminent servant of God? The events of his life are easily related. But who shall describe his special gifts of nature; how his intellect, imagination, and affections vibrated under the touch of the material and moral world by which he was surrounded; the sweet notes of poetical melody which rang out from them under the touch; how his natural character and faculties were developed and matured; much more than this, how under the plastic touch of supernatural grace, his soul was gradually transformed into the image of his incarnate Lord, and (what would always be a part of such a portrait if it were possible that it should be complete) the infirmities and imperfections by which the work of the Divine Author of this new creation was interrupted, delayed, and distorted? Perhaps in the unseen state a power may be given to angels and saints to paint for the glory of their Lord the inner beauties of the souls of His servants, as earthly genius has painted their visible countenances. But here, on earth, assuredly any one who considers what has to be done will pronounce, "You have convinced me that it is impossible that any man should be a biographer."

After writing thus far, we have read for the first time F. Bowden's own expression of his feelings in the last page of his volume:—

No biographer can end his labours without feeling that they are incomplete. If he has been on terms of intimacy with his subject, he recalls many characteristic words and actions which he cannot permit himself to record. The very ties which bound him most closely to his friend, in which the dear memory is especially present, must be passed over in silence. Many a time,

when thinking of an incident which to him is full of eloquence, he must restrain his pen ; and at last he gives his work to the public almost with dissatisfaction. Facts may be stated clearly, and the course of events accurately traced, but the most faithful biography can only be an imperfect portrait, and those to whom the original has been familiar will ever miss the rich colour, the soft shading, and the thousand other nameless graces by which their love was won.

It would be unreasonable to hope that in the present instance it could be otherwise. There is scanty comfort in funeral honours ; a monument, *ære perennius* though it be, is a monument still ; a remembrance, but not so much as a shadow, of the living. Words cannot reproduce the gracious presence, the musical voice, the captivating smile—cannot give back to their earthly life the charm of person or the fascination of manner, any more than the fire of genius or the nobility of soul—and cannot therefore satisfy those whose labours were cheered and sorrows comforted, whose interior lives were formed and directed to God, whose brightest, happiest hours were blessed, by the wisdom, holiness, and love of Frederick William Faber (p. 519).

It is, however, but justice to say, that the work which it would have been impossible for any man to do perfectly, could hardly have been done more admirably than by Father Faber's biographer. The endeavour, of course, has been to make him, as much as possible, describe himself. This has been effected by giving large extracts from a journal kept during a tour on the Continent in 1841, and the whole or part of one hundred and thirty-eight letters. The journal gives a beautiful picture of his mind just when life was smiling upon him more than at any other period ; the letters probably are the best picture we could have of his gradual change from the age of twenty, when they begin, to just before his departure at forty-nine. As becomes a Christian, they shine ever more and more with a light from Heaven, and those towards the end of the volume, while as full as ever of his own most captivating natural qualities, as childlike, as brilliant, as affectionate, as thoughtful as ever, are in addition to all this, so manifestly pregnant with a supernatural wisdom and charity, that it is impossible not to feel that if any more of that class exist and could without breach of confidence have been given us, they would have been cheaply purchased even by the omission of any other part of this beautiful volume, sorry as we should have been to lose any of it. Our space will make it impossible that we should give any extracts from them, except such short quotations as may be necessary to illustrate different points upon which we have occasion to touch. But this we do not regret, for we cannot doubt that the volume itself will, without delay, be studied by all those, who, while Father Faber was yet spared to us, felt it to be a rare privilege given them by the Giver of all good gifts to have the opportunity of reading his books, perhaps now and then of hearing

him preach, and possibly once or twice of having a moment of conversation with him. And this we believe includes all English Catholics and even many Protestants, to say nothing of very many in foreign lands.

These letters seem to be the only materials which throw any light upon Father Faber's interior life. No doubt his sons and brothers in the Oratory are restrained from telling all that they could by the feeling of delicacy referred to in the passage we have already quoted; and if any religious journals exist, they are either too private to be published, or the time has not arrived when it could properly be done. We suspect, however (especially remembering a passage in his book on "The Blessed Sacrament"),* that nothing of the kind exists.

It could not be otherwise than it is, but the letters sometimes fail us just when we most desire farther information. For instance, it would have been most interesting to have known more details of the mental stages through which he passed in his undergraduate days. He seems first to have heartily accepted the movement of 1833; then to have had a strong feeling against it, under which he wrote to one of his earliest friends,—“I have been thinking a great deal on the merits and tendency of Newmanism, and I have become more and more convinced of its falsehood—observe, I believe [Newman himself] to be an eminently pious, humble-minded Christian, but I think he has sat at the feet of the early contemplative philosophers with an unscriptural humility—that he has imbibed their notions—and that his followers are likely to become a sort of Christian Essenes.” Lastly, about a year later he was one of its most earnest and convinced pupils, and so continued until it led him into the Catholic Church.

In most instances such a change in a man of one-and-twenty would be too natural to be very important or interesting. In his case it would be otherwise, because all that remains of his writing in those years is marked with a very unusual degree of power and thoughtfulness. It is, however, only to be expected that our information with regard to the younger years of a man who, like Father Faber, has been called by the grace of God, to “come out from among his own people and his fathers' house into a land” which it showed to him, will always be fragmentary. The friends

* “Never keep a spiritual journal, a record of pious thoughts, or any vestige of a religious autobiography. I do not mean to say that saints have not done so. But you must not do it. You will live in a land of dreams and conceits if you do; though perhaps you do not believe it now, you will actually come at last to say and do follies in order to write them down afterwards. If you would know how the infatuation of keeping a journal is entangled with every root and fibre of self-love, throw your journal into the

by whose affectionate reverence he was surrounded at the London Oratory during the years in which he was best known to the world had, with a single exception, made his acquaintance after he became a Catholic. One knew him only just before his change. The only Catholic friend who knew him in early days seems to have been the Rev. J. B. Morris. The letters addressed to him form a very valuable portion of the whole work. Those to another early friend, whose name is not given, but who is stated during the later years of his life to have been separated from him "by increasing divergence of religious opinions,"—to whom therefore we are so much the more obliged for what he has given—furnish most valuable materials which probably no one else could have supplied. But he seems to stand alone. Probably Father Faber's earlier correspondence is either lost, or in the hands of men who looked upon his becoming a Catholic as a defection, and have no wish to produce it. Be this as it may, the earliest scrap of a letter given in the volume before us was written when he was twenty.

The events of Father Faber's life were few; and perhaps the only thing worth special notice, except in connection with his character and works, is his almost constant suffering from ill health. His family were, as their name suggests, French Huguenot refugees. We have often been struck to observe how many of the English converts within the last five-and-twenty years have sprung from that stock. Probably every reader will be able at once to number several among his personal acquaintance. To mention no others, the list includes Father Faber by the father's side, and Father Newman by the mother's. We believe that no other class of English society equally limited has afforded anything at all approaching to the number.

He was born at the home of his grandfather, then Vicar of Calverley, in Yorkshire, June 28, 1814. When only fifteen he lost his mother, of whose memory his heart was ever full to the last day of his life, as having loved him with more than a double measure of a mother's tenderness. The references to his early loss of her, in his poems, are numerous and very touching. Four years later he lost his father. Till then his home had been at Bishop Auckland, his father being secretary to Dr. Barrington, the Protestant holder of the princely see of Durham. Afterwards his elder brother, a solicitor at Stockton-on-Tees, supplied the place of a parent. He was placed in the Lake country, in the house of a tutor who seems to have given him almost absolute freedom to wander where and as long as he

fire, and you will find out. Forget yourself and what you have gone through. God remembers. Surely that is enough."—("Blessed Sacrament," book ii., page 244, first ed.)

pleased; and his intense delight both in the natural beauties and historical associations of the district was one of the circumstances which developed the strongly poetical turn which was the most remarkable natural characteristic of his mind. Had Nature ever been allowed to have its way, Frederick Faber would have been a poet, and a poet only. Indeed it seemed as if his course in life was so distinctly marked out for him by his natural gifts and character, and by the circumstances in which he was thrown, that it was hardly possible he should be diverted into any other track. Nature and Providence seemed to have marked him beforehand to be the Anglican clerical poet of the nineteenth century, to combine the external circumstances of Keble with the genius of Wordsworth. To be an Anglican clergyman had been from his earliest youth both his destiny and his desire; and he had connections which would have secured him a comfortable benefice. An English parsonage amid mountains, woods, and lakes, with the schooling which, by God's gracious appointment, the heart and affections naturally undergo from the joys, anxieties, and sorrows of domestic life, would have been just enough to mature and call into the fullest exercise the great and unusual gifts with which Nature had so richly endowed her poetic son; and much has English literature lost by the constraining attraction of Almighty Grace which, when all was going on so smoothly and regularly, carried him away captive into an orbit wholly different, and, as men must have thought, of strange eccentricity.* To watch the operation of this Divine force, its gradually increasing power as he got more and more into its sphere, and, in the end, its complete victory, is one of the special interests of the reader of the volume before us.

In the preface to "Sir Lancelot" (edition 1857), he tells us: "It has always seemed to me that a love of natural objects, and the depth as well as exuberance and refinement of mind produced by an intelligent delight in scenery, are elements of the first importance in the education of the young."

"My perfect acquaintance with all the nooks and angles of the Westmoreland mountains, the scene of my first and very free school-days, and my familiarity with their changeful features, their biographies of light and shade by night as well as by day through all the four seasons, naturally decided me as to the scene of my poem." Then he goes on to say that he had restored "the physical features of the country to the state in which my boyhood always persisted in representing them to me during the many solitary afternoons and

* Wordsworth on one occasion, when staying at Elton, remarked that "if it was not for Frederick Faber devoting himself so much to his sacred calling, he would be the poet of his age." When Faber became a Catholic, the aged poet wrote to renounce his friendship.

lonely summer holidays spent among the ruined halls, castles, and moated houses which are so frequent on the eastern side of those mountains, the abbeys shrinking rather to the west. The forests were re-planted, the chases were filled again with deer, the ancestors of the red deer of the Duke of Norfolk, which still drank at the brink of Ulswater by Lyulph's Tower; the heronries slanted again over the edges of the lakes; the unpersecuted eagles woke the echoes of Helvellyn; spear-tops glistened in the sun on the steep paths that lay like pale green threads across the mountains; the castles rang with arms; the bright ivy had not mantled the ruddy sandstone beacons which warned men of the Scotch; the abbeys and chantries were haunted by church music; while the lesser cells in the secluded pastoral vales heard once more the nightly aspirations of wakeful prayer; and Cistercian shepherds could scarcely be distinguished in their white habits from the sheep they tended, as they moved across the fells high up above their moorland granges. As the warder on the battlements, or rather as the alchemist from his turret, saw that land of hills and woods and waters beneath the starlight long ago, so did I see it always in those ardent years. From earliest times it was to me the land of knightly days, and the spell has never been broken. When it became the dwelling-place of manhood, and the scene of earnest labour, the light upon it only grew more golden; and now, a year-long prisoner in the great capital, that region seems to me a home whence I have been exiled, but which only to speak of is tranquillity and joy" (p. 5).

On first reading this description, we could not help thinking how extraordinary must have been the boy who at fifteen or sixteen had an imagination so tuned to all the glories both of the scenery and the history of the Westmoreland mountains. But on looking more closely to the dates, we find that he was finally removed from that district (going, first, for a short time to Shrewsbury, and then to Harrow) in 1825, when he was, at the utmost, only eleven; and it does not appear that he revisited it till his manhood. A doubt may of course suggest itself whether he has not transferred to his early youth impressions, imaginations, and thoughts which, in fact, only came into his mind at a later period. But, apart from the minuteness of his own narrative, this would be quite contradicted by the fact that even during his undergraduate career at Oxford his mind was full of the poetic images suggested by his Westmoreland rambles. He wrote, in 1835, when only twenty-one, and when it appears he had never revisited the lakes since he left them ten years before: "Here, in Oxford, I literally live among the mountain scenes of my schoolboy days, and breathe the liberal air, and feel the mountain influences."

His next visit to the Lakes, so far as appears, was in the summer vacation of 1837, when he was exactly twenty-three. Then, following an Oxford custom, he took a party of undergraduates to read under his direction at Ambleside, and there it was that he made the acquaintance of Wordsworth,—

whose poetry had been the object of his earliest admiration, and had contributed largely to the formation of his own poetical spirit. In after years he used to describe the long rambles which they took together over the neighbouring mountains, the poet muttering verses to himself in the intervals of conversation.

The same summer he became an Anglican clergyman, and at once began to assist at the parish church of Ambleside. The summers of 1838 and 1839 he spent in the same way, returning to Oxford in October. In 1840 he became tutor in the family of a gentleman residing at Ambleside, undertaking at the same time the charge of the church and parish. In February, 1841, he made with his pupil a tour through France, Lombardy, Venice, Trieste, Greece, Constantinople, the Danube, Austria, and Prussia, returning to Ambleside in August. There he continued to reside until December, 1842, when he accepted the rectory of Elton, a college living with a rustic population of 800 souls, and an income of £500 *per annum*, besides a rectory house.

Hitherto his course had been externally nothing more than that of an unusually gifted and energetic man, who, taking advantage of good opportunities, had made for himself a very successful career in his profession as an Anglican clergyman. His prospects were brilliant. His university distinction gave him a start, and his talents and character, supported by his family connection with "golden Durham," gave promise that the rectory of Elton would be only the first step in his preferment. He was now eight-and-twenty, and his most prudent and natural step was to marry and settle in life. We need hardly say, therefore, that rumour was busy making matches for him. This always happens to every young clergyman of good prospects. In answer to Mr. Morris's inquiries as to the truth of these reports, he answered: "As one does not like foolish reports to go about, I may as well say that I have no prospect of it, however remote, and neither have nor have had any engagement on this subject. There is but one person in the world whom I should wish to marry—the person alluded to in my poem called 'First Love.' But I have not the least reason in the world for supposing she is in love with me; and I am quite sure she knows nothing of my affection for her; and there are few things less likely than my marrying her. . . . I shall not be surprised if I marry." This was just the tone which became his position. Meanwhile, he was adding to the distinction of his university career. In 1840 he published a volume of poems which "met with great success;" and in 1843 (on his return from his tour) a prose volume, under the title of "Sights and Thoughts in Foreign Churches and among Foreign Peoples," dedicated "to William Wordsworth, Esq., in affectionate remembrance of much personal kindness and many thoughtful conversations on the rites and pre-

rogative doctrines of the Holy Church." This book is full of his characteristic talents, and, together with his journal when abroad, gives the strongest proof of his powers of observation, as well as of the magic light in which his intensely poetical imagination clothed every object of beauty or grandeur which came before him.

We despair of giving by extracts any adequate notion of the power and beauty of this journal. Descriptions of natural scenes, which, to confess the truth, we are very apt to "skip" in reading most books, are in him as lifelike as pictures; and his peculiar temperament is strikingly illustrated by the touches of home associations which every now and then carry him away in a moment from the scenes that surround him, to Oxford or Ambleside. Thus, he writes to his brother from Pisa:—

You know the quiet meadow, from whose smooth turf rise the cathedral, the campanile, the baptistery, and the cloister of the Campo Santo, a group hardly equalled in the world. Of course I repaired there at once, pretty well knowing what to find. But it so happened that the turf is just now closely carpeted with white clover in full flower, and overpoweringly fragrant. The odour was of such a home kind, that away went buildings, art, history, Pisa, Italy, and the whole concern; my eyes saw, but reported not what they saw. I was in England; and yet the leaning tower fixed the exact spot in England, namely, the side window of the drawing-room at Auckland, looking out upon the Bishop's gateway, and wherein stood an old stained table, the drawer of which specially pertained to me. There I played the geographical game with my mother for hours; there I studied a fat duodecimo in red sheep, entitled the "Wonders of the World;" where the wall of China and the leaning tower of Pisa made an ineffaceable impression upon me. Oh! I cannot tell you how that tower brought my dear mother back to me. It was some time before I recovered this first mood and became alive to the real beauty of the wonderful scene before me (p. 179).

Externally, as we have said, Mr. Faber's course had hitherto seemed only that of a singularly gifted and successful member of the Anglican clerical profession. But it was only to a mere external observer that it could have seemed so. There is no doubt that, as his biographer says, from his earliest childhood, "the things of God had been his joy." In 1840, he mentions incidentally that God had hitherto preserved his virginal purity; and although at one part of his Harrow course he "had taken up infidel views," that seems rather to have been a temptation than a habit of mind. A hymn quoted by F. Bowden speaks of those earliest times, and "refers to the teaching of his mother, the sweet and wondrous things on which he loved to dwell"—

They bade me call Thee Father, Lord!
Sweet was the freedom deemed:
And yet more like a mother's ways
Thy quiet mercies seemed.

In such a boy infidel talk was likely to be the outbreak of a real internal temptation, to which he had sinfully given way, rather than of a mere desire of seeming clever. Dr. Longley, therefore, for the sake of his companions, required him to pledge his honour that he would never again say anything of the same kind before the boys; and then, taking upon himself the responsibility of keeping him, he gained so much influence over him by personal intercourse and prayers with him (we presume, in a word, "whining and sermonising"), that within a very short time, his efforts being seconded by the death of a school friend, the boy experienced the strongest religious impressions. Neither, so far as appears, did they ever afterwards fade away. They continued when he soon afterwards went up to Oxford. In a letter, written while still an undergraduate, he incidentally mentions that, before his "duties had called him to continuous study in books unconnected with religion," he had given "much time to reading devotional books, attending religious meetings, exhorting and praying in the cottages of the poor." Two years earlier, when only twenty, he wrote, in the very first letter we have, "Religious biography, which has ever been my favourite study, has this vacation occupied almost all my extra-classical hours." We need hardly say how little all this was like the ordinary tone either of public-school boys or of Oxford undergraduates.

Any one who knew Oxford a few years before young Faber entered it, must feel that if he had come into residence, thus prepared and thus minded, only five or six years earlier than he did—in other words, had he been the fourth or fifth of his parents' children instead of the seventh—he would have found the University in a wholly different state, and, humanly speaking, his whole course in life might have been very different. The so-called Evangelical school, which at that period had everything its own way at Cambridge, could hardly be said to be known at Oxford. The few graduates who decidedly belonged to it were men personally without distinction, and unfortunately placed for the purpose of exercising any influence on the University at large. How this matter may be now we cannot tell. Forty years ago, there was hardly less social intercourse between some of the four-and-twenty colleges and halls of which the University is made up, and some others, than between Grosvenor Square and Whitechapel, and those who considered themselves the representatives of the Evangelical school in Oxford chanced to reside in the Whitechapel quarter. The hero of "Loss and Gain," when puzzled between different views of religion, is represented as falling in with those of the Evangelical school. He is (chap. xvi.) invited to a tea party, in which he found himself in "another world; faces, manners, speeches, all were strange, and savoured neither of Eton, which

was his own school, nor of Oxford itself." This certainly would have been the case, had he chanced to fall in with the representatives of that school; but an Eton man was much more likely to have passed through his University career without ever hearing even so much as their names. The dominant school was that which was then known as "High Church," and has since been nicknamed "high and dry." So large a body of course contained in itself many smaller sections. It was strictly the representative of the "two-bottle orthodoxy" of a bygone age, in which the "monks of Magdalen" were so graphically, and we doubt not so correctly, described by Gibbon. "Decent, easy men, who supinely enjoyed the gifts of the founder: their days were filled by a series of uniform employments; the chapel and the hall, the coffee-house and the common room, till they retired, weary and well satisfied, to a long slumber. From the toil of reading, thinking, or writing they had absolved their conscience. Their conversation stagnated in a round of college business, Tory politics, personal anecdotes, and private scandal. Their dull and deep potations excused the brisk intemperance of youth." Forty years ago the outlines of the picture would have required considerable softening. Deep potations, however dull, had ceased to be characteristic of decent, easy clergymen of any school. The great increase of refinement which was unquestionably to be found in every class of English gentlemen was quite as great in the clergy and their families as in any other, and in Oxford more than elsewhere. Moreover, although the general standard among the Anglican clergy, of clerical demeanour, of professional diligence, and of theological knowledge has been wonderfully raised within the last forty years, so that the change between 1829 and 1869 is probably much greater than that between 1829 and 1789, still the change was already very great. Sydney Smith gave to Mr. Gladstone, "about the year 1835," the testimony of an acute observer, "the improvement in the clergy of my time has been astonishing. Wherever you meet a clergyman of my age you may be sure he is a bad clergyman." If Gibbon could suddenly have been placed in Oxford, his first impression, no doubt, would have been how greatly things were changed for the better. His second, that the new generation bore a strong family likeness to the old, such as we may trace in successive generations as we pass through the portrait gallery of some old family seat. If such was the rank and file of the party, there were, not to be separated from it, men of a much higher religious character. This was the school which was then connected with the names (now almost forgotten) of "D'Oyley and Mant," good men, desirous of doing their duty, and yet whose standard of labour, or of religious thought and teaching, would not satisfy earnest Anglicans of our day. Their ideal of excellence was

“the sober piety of the Church of England.” They disliked the Evangelicals quite as much because they thought them vulgar, as for any real fault of doctrine and practice which they could point out in them. They loved to speak of the “moderation of the Church of England,” and the censure of the Rev. Charles Simeon (so long the representative of the Evangelical school in Cambridge) was not quite unfounded when he said, “they are moderate men; who love God moderately and their neighbours moderately, and hate sin moderately, and desire heaven and fear hell moderately.” Their whole way of looking upon and speaking of Church offices and dignities savoured of the words with which a well-known writer in the *Quarterly Review*, the organ of the High Church party, not near so long ago, began an article on the life of a distinguished divine. “Dr. —, after filling with the greatest credit the responsible and laborious offices of tutor and head of a college, sat down, in the evening of life, in the *otium cum dignitate* of a bishopric.” It is only a very few years since that article was written, by a “friend of our admirable Church,” but it would already be impossible that this should be said except by an enemy.

Another school had already risen in Oxford, although as yet it was only in its infancy. It was that which has developed into the present Broad party. It was then represented chiefly by Whately and a small group of satellites, which revolved about him in a somewhat limited orbit, and, like those of the sky, kept their faces always bent upon their principal. This school is too well known to need describing, and our space does not allow it. Its coldness and its practical ignoring of the supernatural, its constant attempts to defend Christianity by cutting off from it anything which might put it above the reach of human reason, would have made it singularly repulsive to Mr. Faber’s whole disposition and character.

At the time of which we are speaking, however, the seed was already sown of a far different school, but, as becomes a work which came from God, it was as a grain of mustard seed, and as yet in the state in which it is “the least of all seeds.” It had been sown by one of whom Dr. Newman has written: “The true and primary author of [the Tractarian movement], as is usual with great motive powers, was out of sight. Having carried off as a mere boy the highest honours of the University, he had turned from the admiration which haunted his steps, and sought for a better and holier satisfaction in pastoral work in the country—need I say that I am speaking of John Keble?” Deeply and justly as he was revered by those who knew him and were worthy to appreciate him, he had left no perceptible mark upon the University—none certainly which would have been perceptible by a young man coming up, like Frederick Faber, to another college. The great work that Keble had then done for the movement was that, as Dr. Newman says,

he had "formed" Hurrell Froude; and Hurrell Froude himself was one of those who do a great work, not by their immediate action upon the world, but by their influence upon one who most momentously acts upon it. At the time of which we are now speaking, no one could have known that Keble's work in the University which he had left was not finished: a new comer to a different college might very probably never have heard his name.

It is, then, most probable that if Faber had entered Oxford five or six years earlier than he did, he would have left it with his religious views softened and refined perhaps, but not fundamentally altered, and would have become a clergyman of the Evangelical school: one of the most highly gifted and energetic he must ever have been, and very likely one of Lord Shaftesbury's bishops.

But little as he knew it, his circumstances and the circumstances of his time, the very hour and place of his birth, were being directed by infinite power and infallible wisdom, to bring him within the sphere of attraction of the Catholic Church. He came into residence in Lent Term, 1833. That summer the Oxford movement first publicly developed itself, and from its very commencement he earnestly followed the preaching of Dr. Newman at S. Mary's. As we have already mentioned, he was first delighted, then experienced a reaction in favour of the Calvinistic opinions which his family had inherited from their Huguenot ancestors, although, of course, softened by the "moderation" natural in men closely connected, either as clergymen or as managers of ecclesiastical property, with the Anglican Establishment. This reaction, however, did not last long, and before he took his degree he had become confirmed in his adherence to high Anglican views.

In this he might seem only to have swum with the stream, which then ran irresistibly in that direction. But no one who reads his letters, and makes the effort necessary to remember that they were really the productions of a young student of twenty or twenty-one (a very great effort we found it, to speak for ourselves), can have any notion of that sort. The letter of remonstrance and advice, written when he was only twenty-two (p. 63), to a friend, of whom he says that he loved him more than any one else on earth, is as full of thought and discrimination as if it had been the work of an experienced man. His remarks upon the religious movement going on in the University shows that he not only observed, but carefully meditated over, the whole tone of Oxford thought, and especially the varieties of theological schools and of the intellectual and religious character of the leading minds. And yet at that time he was not personally known to any of them. His introduction to Dr. Pusey and Mr. Newman he owed to his offering to undertake the translation of one of the works of the Fathers, for the series of which they were the editors. This was not till April, 1837. The

letter, written two months before, in which he argues that a man who holds the reality of grace, but rejects the doctrine of the sacraments, is inconsistent if he does not fall into Calvinism, was not therefore suggested by an older theologian, it was the result of his own thoughts. So, again, the contrast between the theological style of Keble and "the dignified gentleness and stately vehemence of Newman or Pusey." Throughout his early letters there is a power of intellect and a clearness and depth of thought which makes it a very serious matter of regret that there are so few of them. At that moment nothing could have been easier than to find in Oxford young men of his age by the score who adopted the prevalent views with the sincerity and facility of youth. There can have been very few indeed who rivalled him in the degree to which they had assimilated them to their own minds by serious laborious thought. It is the more important to insist on this, because one of men's most universal fallacies is their disbelief in the possibility of any man attaining high excellence in very different lines. No doubt it is *à priori* unlikely. Art is long and time is short; and moreover the gifts of God are so much apportioned between different men, that if a man has the natural qualities which specially qualify him for success in one art or study, there is, so far, less probability of his being equally qualified for a very different one. But over and above the instinctive sense of these improbabilities, there is a jealous feeling in most men which makes them reluctant to admit, that a man who very greatly exceeds them in any one gift or attainment is equally superior to them in others. Father Faber was so obviously and undeniably without a rival in brilliancy, both of imagination and expression, as a poet, an orator, and a converser, that it is not without an effort that any man can bring himself to give him credit for other gifts and attainments for which, as a matter of fact, he was distinguished—depth of thought, for instance, and accuracy of statement, the result of long and conscientious labour. This eminently applied to the severe study of theology, which was continued throughout his life. No man who ever had the honour or privilege of his intimacy can need to be assured that he, more than almost any other man, felt with S. Augustine: "*Tanta est Christianarum profunditas litterarum, ut in eis quotidie proficerem, si eas solas, ab ineunte pueritia usque ad decrepitam senectutem, maximo otio, summo studio, meliore ingenio conarer addiscere.*" We are confident that it needed only that he should have been a dry, iron, and somewhat rusty man to have impressed all who knew anything about him with a hearty admiration of his theological learning. Few people probably can even yet bring themselves to believe that one whose conversation, preaching, and writings were always sparkling so brilliantly with a lightning play of genius could really be a close thinker or an

accurate student. The feeling to which we have referred is, we think, the most probable, as it is certainly the least discreditable, explanation of the estimate of him as a superficial flashy preacher which appeared in a well-known Protestant paper immediately after his death. The writer was unable to bring himself to believe that anything so translucent could fail to be shallow. Those who know him only, or even first, through the volume before us, much as they will have lost in other respects, will at least be free from any temptation of that sort. No man can well read his earlier letters without being struck with the contrast between the thought shown in them and in those of almost any other man of the same age.

Happy indeed will be the reader who has not cause to be even more impressed with the contrast between another characteristic of these letters, and what he may remember of himself at the same age. It is impossible not to feel that God was throughout the object most at the writer's heart. In every stage of his mental progress, when he was inclining towards Calvinistic views, and when he became a decided follower of the Oxford school, he was evidently most earnestly set to serve and please God. Religion, from the first, was with him a most personal matter, not a mere exercise of the intellect, or, still less, a subject of party feeling.

Much, therefore, which the world little suspected, had already been going on in his inmost soul when, at eight-and-twenty, he became Rector of Elton. The letters are full of indications of it. For instance, while the reports of his immediate marriage were rife, he writes to Mr. Morris :—

Jan. 26th, 1841. A. S. I am getting case-hardened anent reports of my marriage. However, as I know you feel interested in the subject, I may as well say that I never felt so strongly determined by God's grace to "make a venture of a lonely life" as J. H. N. says [See Sermon xx., vol. iv., Edition 1868] as I do now. I have too little confidence in my own religious manliness to say more than that I am at present purposed to lead a single life, and that I have made it a subject of prayer that God would of His mercy corroborate that purpose in me. But enough, I am too weak a disciple to talk thus. I rather covet than enjoy the calm love of virginity. But it may be that God will reveal even that unto me (p. 81).

Great is the contrast between this and the common state of mind of a rising Protestant clergyman, who feels that as soon as he has obtained a benefice his next step ought to be to look out for a wife.

That there was something unusual in Mr. Faber's ministrations soon impressed itself upon those who knew him at Ambleside, where the congregation at the church was soon doubled, and where he published some religious tracts, which "had an extensive cir-

ulation." The poet Wordsworth, who had become intimate with him, so well understood that in him pastoral work was to be an engrossing employment, that when Faber announced to him his intention of accepting the cure of Elton, he replied—"I do not say you are wrong, but England loses a poet."

His acceptance of Elton, however, was the turning-point of his life. It was in itself no slight sacrifice. The lakes and mountains of Westmoreland had been from infancy the home of his imagination. Elton is in the flats of Huntingdonshire. But he believed he did right, because the spring before this living had "hovered about my head like a bird, uncertain where to light."

Then again I positively refused it ten days ago, consulting my own wilfulness [and the consideration of it was again forced on him]. And as Pusey says somewhere, "events not of our own seeking are mostly God's ordering." Further, I feel that my chief rock of offence is subduing the poet to the priest, and I have felt more strongly this Advent than ever, that I have very sinfully permitted the man of letters to overlay the priest. *Abstinence* from poetry I could, with some small difficulty, practise, but Keble thinks it would be wrong, being obviously my chief, if not my sole gift; and *temperance* in poetry is most difficult, yet a plain duty in a priest. Now the necessity of parish duty comes like a Divine interference with my wilfulness, and I do not think that I am so far worldly that I shall dare to neglect that duty. And indeed the whole *pastoral* office, which is very unacceptable to me, seems aptly remedial to the poetic temperament. I feel so happy and open, I know not why or how, that I think I must be doing right; and oh! how slight a sacrifice, after all, will it be to part with this sweet mountain land, and all my dear friends, for a man of such faults as mine. My books are gone, and now my mountains go. God be praised. Oh, pray for me that, buried in that village, I may endeavour to lead an Apostolical life in church, parsonage, and cottages. God being my helper, I solemnly purpose to do so. Twice, if not three times, has Advent had a special mission to me. May my sole care in life be now to rehearse for meeting the true Advent, and the merciful fire of that day! *Ora pro nobis* (p. 169).

In this spirit he accepted the cure. It implied the absolute sacrifice of all he had and was to the service of God, but his conduct and resolutions in accepting it, in a man of his character, implied almost as decisively, though as yet he knew it not, that the sacrifice was not to be consummated in the Protestant Church. Less than four years before he had visited Belgium, "from which [although he already considered himself a Catholic] he returned with a strong feeling of dislike of the ecclesiastical practices which he had witnessed, and with something like a contempt for the intellectual condition of the Catholic clergy." So much was he now convinced that this judgment had been erroneous, that he had no sooner made up his mind to take Elton, than he "deter-

mined to examine closely in Catholic countries, and especially in Rome, the methods pursued by the Church in dealing with the souls entrusted to her." He went not as a critic, but a learner, "to gather hints for the work" which his own situation imposed; and with this view obtained from Dr. Wiseman introductions to Cardinal Acton and Dr. Grant, now Bishop of Southwark. He left Elton the day after he had "read in;" and started for Rome, through France. Owing to the kindness of Dr. Grant he saw much more of the action of the Church than a Protestant traveller usually can.

It was at this time that he acquired his first devotion to S. Philip Neri, his future father. He has recorded in the "Spirit and Genius of S. Philip," preached and published in 1850, the impression made upon him by a visit to the Chiesa Nuova. Speaking of the room in which the saint used to say Mass, he writes: "How little did I, a Protestant stranger in that room years ago, dream that I should ever be of the saint's family, or that the Oratorian father who showed it me should in a few years be appointed by the Pope the novice master of the English Oratorians. I remember how, when he kissed the glass of the case in which S. Philip's little bed is kept as a relic, he apologized to me as a Protestant, lest I should be scandalized, and told me with a smile how tenderly S. Philip's children loved their father. I was not scandalized with their relic-worship then, but I can understand better now what he said about the love, the child-like love, wherewith S. Philip inspired his sons. If any one had told me that in seven short years I should wear the same habit and the same white collar in the streets of London, and be preaching a triduo in honour of Rome's apostle, I should have wondered how any one could dream so wild a dream (p. 184).

Interesting as are his letters from Rome, we have no space for them. In six months he returned to Elton, resolved to "model his pastoral operations on the system pursued by the Catholic Church, and to work his parish (as he expressed it) in the spirit of S. Philip and S. Alphonso." He had already been much shaken in his adherence to Anglicanism. He wrote to Mr. Morris, "I have been much altered since I came abroad this time; but I am very, very, very Roman. I have *learnt* an immense deal both inwardly and outwardly, and I hope it will lead to something more than feelings." And again: "It has pleased God to make my journey mainly one of great suffering, both of body and of mind; what I went through at Rome, I am sure my most forcible words could not explain; and I think I told you I twice took my hat to go to the Collegio Inglese to abjure." His biographer adds:—

On each occasion some trifling circumstance interfered to prevent him from carrying out his purpose; and this he attributed, at the time, to his guardian angel, whom he fervently and frequently invoked. His anxiety on the subject was the cause of physical injuries, from which he suffered during the remainder of his life.

It seems to have been by the authority of Mr. Newman that he was held back. Anglicans of our day write flippantly enough about the early converts as having acted from "impatience," "cowardice," and the like, having been imposed upon by the bold claims of Rome, &c. Little can they imagine the living death through which they really passed before they made up their minds that it was lawful to them to renounce what people called (absurdly) the Church of their baptism. Thank God, if like a death, the process was like a most blessed death; for no sooner was the dark river passed than they found themselves in "the Paradise of God." Life, doubtless, has brought and will bring many more trials, sufferings, and sorrows to all of them; but it can hardly bring another like that.

Mr. Faber's course at Elton was very different from that of the modern Ritualists:—

Without paying so much attention, as most Anglicans were accustomed to do, to ceremonies and decorations, he relied for the reformation of his people on preaching, and on what he believed to be the sacraments. His services were conducted with proper decency and reverence; but so little value did he set on what in many places were considered points of vital importance, that when the surplice controversy was agitating the Church of England, he told his congregation that he usually preached in a surplice because he preferred it, but that far from insisting on doing so, he would preach in his *shirt sleeves* if it would be any satisfaction to them.

He was at considerable pains to form a choir; and full cathedral service was performed in his church on Sundays and saints' days during the last year of his residence at Elton. He circulated among his people a history of the Sacred Heart, thinking that nobody would object to devotion to our Blessed Lord. He also published three tracts on examination of conscience (p. 213).

The parish was a difficult one. It had been much neglected, and half the 800 inhabitants were "rabid Dissenters." Irreligion and vice of all kinds were almost universal. Reports were circulated to his discredit. In spite of all these difficulties, wonderful effects were soon produced, partly, no doubt, by his rare natural gifts, which at all periods of his life gave him a power of fascination (it could be called no less), such as those who knew him never saw in any one else; but still more by his self-devotion, and by the effect, both natural and supernatural, of his preaching, in which natural eloquence the most unusual was but the instrument to bring home to the hearts of his beloved flock thoughts which flowed like the richest juice of the grape from the winepress in which was crushed a heart overcharged both with love and with suffering. Suffering, indeed, pressed hard upon him in various forms. He was utterly lonely; so that he mentions, in a letter to Mr. Newman, that he sometimes did not speak for days together, except a few words to his servants; and during the whole time he

was tormented by an internal conflict between doubts whether he was not guilty of sin and risking his salvation by remaining in the Church of England, and fears lest if he left it he should be acting from self-will. In this manner he spent two years at Elton. In them he formed his choir, restored the Church, and gathered around him a circle, many of whom had been Dissenters. Before he had been long in the parish—

A number of the parishioners, chiefly young men, began to go to confession to him, and to receive communion frequently. Out of the most promising of these penitents he formed a sort of community. They were accustomed to meet in the rectory every night at twelve o'clock, and to spend about an hour in prayer, chiefly in reciting portions of the Psalter. On the eves of great feasts the devotions were prolonged for three or four hours. The use of the discipline was also introduced on Fridays, eves of festivals, and every night in Lent, each taking his turn to receive it from the others. It would seem that these vigils excited the anger of the evil spirits: for mysterious noises used to be heard in the house at the time, often apparently just outside the door of the oratory, where the members were assembled. Sometimes on these occasions they took lights, and searched all over the house, but without finding anything which could account for the noises which had been heard. These disturbances did not avail to put a stop to their nightly meetings, which were persevered in up to the time of Mr. Faber's departure from Elton. Several of those who frequented the rectory were also members of a Society of St. Joseph, and employed in visiting the sick, as well as in other works of charity to the parishioners (p. 217).

A detailed account of Mr. Faber's life and labours during these two years at Elton would be most interesting. But it does not exist. He has left nothing of the kind; and nothing more than fragments can be collected from others. To the above account of the interruptions of the meetings in the rectory, the biographer adds the following footnote, which implies that upon this subject Mr. Faber was silent, even to his most intimate friends in future years, doubtless from humility:—"These particulars were collected by the late Father Hutchison from so many persons, who were present at different times, that he was quite satisfied of their truth."

In addition to his labours—

Mr. Faber's letters at this time spoke of his being engaged in frequent prayer; and the decline of his health told as clear a tale of abstinence and penance. In mental prayer he followed the system of S. Ignatius, and Rodriguez on "Spiritual Perfection" was constantly in his hands. He fasted rigorously, often taking for his dinner nothing but a herring and a few potatoes; and on more than one occasion during Lent he fainted while reading morning prayers. Sundays were the only days on which he could be said to take a meal; and his medical attendant ascribed many of his attacks

of illness to the want of proper nourishment. The details given by those who lived with him, in spite of the pains he took to conceal his austerities from observation, show the great extent to which he carried the practice of them. On this point he appears to have been his own director; and he was certainly most unsparing of himself, habitually wearing, among other penances, a thick horse-hair cord tied in knots round his waist. Yet he wrote (August 22, 1844): "It is very hard to keep alive the spirit of compunction where penance is in a great measure self-chosen, and has not the safeguard of being imposed from without, especially when one is effeminately inclined" (p. 220).

It was at this time that he published, in a series then appearing, "The Lives of S. Wilfrid, S. Paulinus, S. Edwin, S. Oswald, and others," besides two volumes of poetry. There are few, perhaps, who now remember the indignation which the publication of the life of S. Wilfrid occasioned. It was thought to be an act of wanton levity, needlessly outraging the feelings of English churchmen. Any one who so felt may be disposed to feel ashamed of the judgment (however natural) when he finds how serious, ascetic, and laborious was, at the very moment, the life of the author.

In Elton itself his life and labour seem to have put down all opposition. When he had been there little more than a year, he wrote to Mr. Morris:—

There are now seventeen persons strikingly converted, all *confitentes*; some really being led in extraordinary ways and perfectionwards; some confess weekly; five or six of them. Thirty-one persons came to the early Communion last [Passion] Sunday; and the sermons on examination of conscience seem to have moved the whole place. Numbers came almost daily in grief and distress, and I doubt not many of these will become *confitentes*. I can hardly open a book now, let alone write; for seeing people here *privately* occupies three or four hours daily, or averages that. (I have just been interrupted by a confession.) People are beginning to come beforehand when they wish to communicate; the little children in the school, by simple minute catechising on the Passion, open their little griefs and sins to me. The actual *face* of the village is changed obviously to worldly eyes, in sobriety and nocturnal quiet (p. 230).

On Sunday night . . . a very striking conversion and confession of a Methodist took place. [Another time.] . . . A great grown-up farmer, who had never shown any contrition, confessed; and though above six feet high, and very strong, he so nearly went into fits that I was obliged to fetch wine to restore him (p. 227).

These were what Anglicans delight to call "signs of life in the Anglican Church." Elton was so spoken of at the time by "a high authority in the Establishment." But Mr. Faber himself regarded it as "a place where Anglicanism had been fairly weighed in the balance and found wanting." He wrote to Mr. Newman;

“I cannot help fancying that the grace comes, always or mostly, through what, in my life, is borrowed from another system, not from what I have of my own; and so I feel as if I was living a dishonest life.” But Mr. Newman, by whom he had hitherto been held back, was himself received in October, 1845, and at once wrote to Mr. Faber that “he was out of the one true fold.” There were now only two things to detain him. He had borrowed from two members of his family a considerable sum, which had been spent on the house and glebe. If he gave up his living, he could never pay either principal or interest.

Feeling certain that if he consulted any Catholic on the subject, he would be advised to join the Church at all costs, he had recourse to an Anglican dignitary of his own party, who answered his question by saying,—“Depend upon it if God means you to be a Catholic, He will not let that stand in the way.” Mr. Faber accordingly determined that this obstacle should not prevent him from carrying out his purpose, and he had only just dispatched the letter announcing this decision, when he was relieved from his difficulties by the generous act of a friend, who, hearing of his perplexity, wrote to him expressing sorrow that such a man as he was should have his freedom thus impeded, and enclosing a cheque for the amount of his debt, begged him to accept it on the condition that the subject should never be mentioned between them. The fact that this friend had no drawings towards the Catholic Church, and regarded the converts with a certain degree of bitterness, makes his generosity more noble (p. 236).

And then came the wrench—to tear himself from his beloved parish was to tear his heart out of his body; but he did not long hesitate:—

On Sunday, November 16, he officiated for the last time as Rector of Elton. He did not administer the Communion in the morning, as was stated at the time by those who wished to cast a slur upon his good faith. At the evening service, after a few preliminary words, he told his people that the doctrines he had taught them, though true, were not those of the Church of England; that as far as the Church of England had a voice she had disavowed them, and that consequently he could not remain in her communion, but must go where truth was to be found. Then he hastily descended the pulpit stairs, threw off his surplice, which he left upon the ground, and made his way as quickly as possible through the vestry to the rectory. For a few moments the congregation remained in blank astonishment, and while the majority turned slowly homewards, some of the parishioners, among whom were the churchwardens, followed him to the rectory and implored him to reconsider his decision. He might preach whatever doctrine he pleased, they said, and they would never question it, if only he would remain with them; but finding him immovable they took a sorrowful farewell and left him.

So much was he worn by anxiety and illness, and so keenly did he feel the separation from his place and people, that he feared to fail in the

accomplishment of the sacrifice, and extorted a promise from those about him, that they would take him, if necessary by force, on the following day to be received. Arrangements had been previously made, and on Monday morning, November 17, 1845, Mr. Faber left Elton, accompanied by Mr. T. F. Knox, scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, whom he had invited to be received into the Church with him, his two servants, and seven of his parishioners, who had been members of his little community, and were resolved to become Catholics likewise. The party had hoped to escape notice by starting early, but the parishioners were on the look-out, and as they drove through the village every window was thrown open, and the poor people waved their handkerchiefs, and sobbed out, "God bless you, Mr. Faber, wherever you go." Their feelings will be understood by those who in later years felt the fascination of that sweet manner and musical voice, which with his sympathizing and loving heart attached so many to their father.

On the same evening he and his companions were admitted into the Church at Northampton, by Bishop Wareing; from that time Mr. Faber enjoyed the perfect peace of full Catholic communion, and he afterwards said, that when he was confirmed, he felt himself, like the Apostles at Pentecost, permeated by the sensible presence of the Holy Ghost. At the end of a letter to Mr. Morris, which, on account of illness, he dictated to one of his companions, he wrote with his own hand the words, "Peace, peace, peace!" In confirmation he took the name of his patron, S. Wilfrid, with whom he had been most connected through life (p. 329).

When his effects were sold at the Rectory after he left, numerous insignificant articles sold for many times their value, the poor parishioners vying with each other for the possession of some article that had once been his (p. 216).

We have heard that as long afterwards as when he was living at the Brompton Oratory, persons would come up from Elton on purpose to put themselves under his spiritual care.

Very soon after his conversion Mr. Faber, at the desire of the authorities, settled in a house at Birmingham with the young men who had accompanied him from Elton. This gradually developed into a congregation, called "Brothers of the Will of God," or Wilfridians, for S. Wilfrid was nominally, Brother Wilfrid really, the Superior. Circumstances compelled him almost immediately to make a short visit to Italy, in the course of which he wrote some very characteristic letters to some of the young men who had followed him from Elton. He was accompanied by Mr. Hutchison, who on their return joined the congregation. He had been an undergraduate at Cambridge, and was converted in great measure through Mr. Faber's influence. He was a man in many ways specially gifted, and besides other most important works specially his own, was Father Faber's right hand to the end, dying just before him. The community moved from Birmingham, receiving from John Earl of Shrewsbury the gift of Cotton Hall, near

Cheadle, to which they gave the name of S. Wilfrid's. A Gothic church was commenced, and Mr. Faber soon found himself living very nearly his old Elton life. Differences, however, there were, and right welcome ones; for he was now a Catholic priest, and he had the society of one or two educated members of his community, as well as the neighbourhood and kindness of Dr. Wiseman, Lord Shrewsbury, and others. The success of his work was even greater than before. He found a small Protestant village. In a few months "there remained but one Protestant family in the parish," and Mr. Hutchison wrote, "we have converted the pew-opener, leaving the parson only his clerk and two drunken men as his regular communicants." They had been at S. Wilfrid's only fifteen months when Father Newman returned from Rome to set up the Oratory in England. It was at once settled that the Brothers of the Will of God should be merged in the Oratory. By this change Father Faber sank from being Superior into a novice. This was what he felt least. The Oratory must, by its rule, be in a large town. He wrote to Mr. Morris:—

Giving up S. Wilfrid's seems to uproot one altogether from the earth, and the future is such a complete blank that one feels as if one was going to die. . . . Away goes home, church, flock, Eltonian children, and all. . . . In my first spoliation I kept my books and my Elton children; now I lose these two. Deo gratias et Beato Philippo. . . . You know what a desperate fellow I am for local affections, and S. Wilfrid's represents eighteen months of arduous and interesting struggle, besides its own excessive beauty. The trees I have planted, the walks I have planned, the streams I have turned, every one has got a shockingly tight hold upon me, and all the two hundred converts. Well, all that can be said is, that if I can dislocate myself with moderate indifference and *distaccamento*, I shall be a lucky fellow. God does not often give a man two opportunities of a holocaust (p. 336).

Next day, February 17th, 1848:—

Father Superior has now left us, all in our Philippine habits, with turn-down collars, like so many good boys brought in after dinner. On the solemn admission on Monday morning, he gave a most wonderful address, full of those marvellous pauses which you know of. He showed how wonderfully we had all been brought together from different parts, and how in his case and ours S. Philip seemed to have laid hands upon us, and taken us for his own whether we would or not. Since my admission I seem to have lost all attachment to everything except obedience. I could dance and sing all day, because I am so joyous. I hardly know what to do with myself for very happiness (p. 337).

His novitiate was cut short, by dispensation, after five months. Nine months later it was resolved to found an Oratory in London, and "as it was understood that Father Newman preferred to remain at Birmingham himself, and to send F. Faber at the head

of the London detachment," he took possession of the house in King William Street, Strand, on the 28th of April, 1849.

From this time the history of Father Faber's life is merged in that of the London Oratory, at the head of which he remained until his death. His chief interest was in his congregation, and to it his energies were almost exclusively devoted; its successes were his joy, its difficulties his heaviest cross; he sought to make no name or reputation for himself, but was content to spend his time, and health, and powers in the promotion of S. Philip's work (p. 363).

Compared with the life of most men, what had already passed would have been an unusually useful and brilliant career. But it was only in the summer of 1849 that what we may call the especial career of Father Faber began. All before was a sort of novitiate for it. The fourteen years, from his thirty-fifth to his forty-ninth, during which he was head of the London Oratory, were a life by themselves. They were a period of sufferings, severe, complicated, and almost incessant, in the midst of which, by labours to which it would be difficult to find a parallel, he achieved a work of which we must deliberately declare that its amount and importance will never be fully known until that day when the King returns to take account of His servants. That recollection is more than enough to satisfy those who love him, and who despair of explaining to others, nay, of fully realizing themselves, the amount of the return which will then be found to have been made for the many and precious talents committed to the charge of this "good and faithful servant" of God. Of external events there were few. He remained in King William Street till October, 1854, and then removed to the Oratory at Brompton, which was his home till he needed an earthly home no longer. In October, 1851, he started for the benefit of his health to the Holy Land, but was too ill to go further than Malta, whence he returned through Italy, reaching King William Street on the last day of the year. He paid one visit to Dublin, which was also cut short by severe illness. Once he took a lodging, for change of air, at Lewisham; one summer (through the liberality of a friend) at Lancing; and more than once he spent his holyday with one of his community at Ardencaple Castle, the Scotch seat of the Duchess of Argyll. With these exceptions his only change was between the Oratory in London and the country retreat which (like the religious communities at Rome) had been built for it on grounds belonging to one of the community, at S. Mary's, Sydenham. At first he was easily accessible. By degrees the pressure of so large a community compelled him to give up most of his penitents, and to see fewer visitors.

He was a very early riser, and had usually said his Mass in the private chapel of the house before the rest of the community were stirring. He

would take a cup of tea, and after making his meditation, wrote steadily till breakfast. The morning was principally spent in conversation and discussion with different Fathers, who reported to him the progress of the works entrusted to their care, and received from him the most necessary directions for their management. At all hours his room was the frequent resort of the Fathers, and there were few who would not have felt a blank in the day if they had not paid a visit to what seemed to renew, amid themselves, "the school of Christian mirth" of S. Philip's room at the Chiesa Nuova. Indeed, in all matters it was to "The Father," as in the affectionate parlance of the Oratory the Superior is always styled, that each was accustomed to turn—

"Secure, 'mid danger, wrongs, and grief,
Of sympathy, redress, relief."

On feast days especially he took pleasure in seeing all the Fathers as early as possible, and was particularly careful on such occasions that everything in his room should be more than commonly neat, so that his very aspect seemed to denote a festival. One Easter morning, when a Father noticed the orderly appearance of his room, he remarked that the napkin in the sepulchre was found *folded* at the Resurrection, showing that our Lord hated untidiness (p. 409).

There was nothing he liked better than to collect children about him. There was a highly-favoured set of boys who had the run of the house, and there are now men who look back upon the Oratory as the place where the happiest hours of their childhood were spent. It would be quite correct to say that Father Faber personally had an unequalled attraction for them, but in truth it was not for them more than for others. There was an indescribable charm in his private intercourse, a wonderful brilliancy in his conversation (in which we have often heard it remarked that, staying as he always did at home, and visiting no one, he was always, and without preparation, as much superior to those whose social power made them the idols of London society, as they were superior to ordinary men), a magic play of his voice and his countenance, an unequalled combination of tenderness of affection, unearthliness of aim, and worldly wisdom in all his opinions and advice, which gave him as much power in attracting learned men and men of business as he had over youths and little children. In this respect we believe it was the universal testimony of all who ever knew him that they had never met any one equal or second to him. The mystery to those who knew him was, how it was possible that a man so easily accessible and so much sought should do even a small fragment of the work which he actually got through. When asked how he managed it, he used to say it was no merit of his, for, not being able to sleep, he was obliged to leave his bed and work. As a matter of fact he had done a good day's work before other men who thought themselves hard workers had left their beds.

Still this alone would not have enabled him to effect what he did. He could not have done it if he had not had the special gift of doing work by the hands of others as well as by his own. This F. Bowden mentions in the passage we have just quoted; and in this sense we believe that the testimony in which all the fathers of the London Oratory were ever unanimous was no delusion of their partiality for him, but a sober estimate of fact, when they said that all the work done by the London Oratory was wholly his. A large community was at work, and what was actually done could have been done by no less effective machinery; but he himself was the mainspring of the whole. In this sense, as well as in his books, his work is still going on; and how great that work was we sincerely believe few persons even suspect. What the Oratory has done and is doing, directly, may partly be measured, by the continual thronging of the church and the confessionals, and by the Catholic population which has been gathered round it, in a district which, when it was begun, was among the most Protestant in the neighbourhood of London. Indirectly we deliberately believe it to have been one of the main instruments which, under the grace of God, has given to the Catholic Church in London, and even in England, a wholly new aspect. F. Bowden, of course, as being himself a priest of the Oratory, has felt it impossible to speak upon this subject with the plainness upon which we may venture. But even we should feel it unbecoming to express half that we feel upon it. The late Cardinal Wiseman—than whom no man had better opportunities of judging—used to say that he attributed chiefly to the Oratory the change which he observed in the whole tone and character of his diocese. How great that change was F. Bowden has given us some opportunity of judging by the startling statistics which he has collected in Chapter X. It is already difficult to realize the fact that only twenty years ago there was no public church in London or its neighbourhood served by any religious community. The change of feeling, even among good Catholics, may be indicated by the outcry raised against the “*Oratorian Lives of the Saints*” at their first publication, and by the repugnance to the popular services of the Oratory. F. Bowden says that the only image of our Blessed Lady in London was at S. Mary’s, Chelsea. We have been assured by a person very accurate and trustworthy, and who had lived all her life in London, and had attended the Catholic churches from a child, that until after the Oratory was opened, she had never in her life heard our Blessed Lady referred to in a sermon, except for the purpose of explaining that it was a mistake to suppose that Catholics worshipped her. Such a state of things is no imputation upon the holy men who kept the smouldering lamp of truth from total extinction by their faithful labours in the midst of persecution.

It was but the necessary consequence of that persecution—the most dangerous to the Church, we firmly believe, of any that was ever carried on in any land or any age. For the peculiar character of the English persecution, after it ceased to be bloody, was, that it made the public exercise of Catholic worship, the public administration of the sacraments, and the public preaching of the truth of God, practically impossible for whole generations of men. Twenty years ago the Catholic Church in London had not yet emerged from the pit in which that crafty persecution had plunged her. And when the time came that it pleased God to deliver her, He did it as it were in a moment. The suddenness of the change was like nothing in nature, except the transition from darkness to a blaze of light at the moment of a tropical sunrise. Nor can we imagine any instrument so well qualified to effect it as a man so winning that it was impossible to have intercourse with him without loving, admiring, and reverencing him; so eloquent and learned that his sermons drew to his church even those who most desired to oppose his way of conducting it, and his books were bought and read over and over again, even by those who, if they could, would have prevented their publication; so gifted with poetical talents that, almost against their will, those who disliked the very name of English hymns sang, and learned, and dwelt upon those which he had written, and at the same time not merely inflamed with zeal, but bent upon a particular object which, to many good and zealous men, seemed mistaken, that of laying aside all concealment, and carrying on Catholic worship, and developing Catholic customs and practices exactly as if he were in the midst of a Catholic city, in a Catholic country, and under a Catholic government. The principle on which he did this was most simple and intelligible. The one legitimate exhibition of Catholicity is that which it puts forth where the Church is perfectly free to choose; and Catholics have no right to expect God's blessing on their labours if they acquiesce without necessity in any less full and complete exhibition. But vitally important as was this work of F. Faber's, it was one which, under the circumstances, hardly any man would have been able to accomplish, except the one man to whom, in the providence of God, it seems to have been assigned.

We must take men for what they are; and if there are those who find in Father Faber's private letters as they are printed in this volume Italian forms of expression which grate against their English ears, not so much because they are foreign as because they resemble English expressions with which we have quite different associations, they must set against these the fact of what F. Faber did. He found our country e. g. in a state of feeling, in which such Catholic practices as the forty hours were regarded, not by the irre-

ligious world, but by religious men and devoted priests, as Italianisms not suited to England, and never likely to be introduced into it; and he has left these things as natural to English Catholics as to Neapolitans or Romans. When a man is blamed, not for pursuing wrong objects, but for pursuing them by imprudent means, no answer is more exactly to the point than this—that he has succeeded.

Whatever foreign expressions he might sometimes use in private letters (and it is to be remembered they are never found in works intended for the public), no man was more sensible of the beauty of pure English. He longed that the weapon which heresy borrows from the translation of Scripture commonly used by Protestants should be taken out of its hands, by having that version published in a corrected form by the authority of the Church:—

If the Arian heresy was propagated and rooted by means of beautiful vernacular hymns, so who will say that the uncommon beauty and marvellous English of the Protestant Bible is not one of the great strongholds of heresy in this country? It lives on the ear, like a music that can never be forgotten, like the sound of church-bells which the convert hardly knows how to forego. Its felicities seem often to be almost things rather than words. It is part of the national mind, and the anchor of the national seriousness. Nay, it is worshipped with a positive idolatry, in extenuation of whose grotesque fanaticism its intrinsic beauty pleads availingly with the man of letters and the scholar. The memory of the dead passes into it. The potent traditions of childhood are stereotyped in its verses. The power of all the griefs and trials of a man is hidden beneath its words. It is the representative of his best moments; and all that there has been about him of soft, and gentle, and pure, and penitent, and good, speaks to him for ever out of his English Bible. It is his sacred thing which doubt never dimmed, and controversy never soiled. It has been to him all along as the silent, but oh how intelligible, voice of his guardian angel; and in the length and breadth of the land there is not a Protestant with one spark of religiousness about him, whose spiritual biography is not in his Saxon Bible. And all this is an unhallowed power! The extinction of the Establishment would be a less step towards the conquest of the national mind, than if it were possible (but we are speaking humanly, and in our ignorance) to adopt that Bible, and correct it by the Vulgate. As it is, there is no blessing of the Church along with it; and who would dream that beauty was better than a blessing? (p. 395).

He worked, as we have said, by others; but his personal work was literally almost incredible. Long after he went to London he was still dealing with individual souls as he had done at Elton and S. Wilfrid's. He had not been many months in King William Street when he wrote to Mr. Morris,—

We are in the full swing of work: lawyers and medical students, &c., pouring pell-mell into the Church. I have received twelve quite lately.

But we keep them snug. I am worked off my legs, and, as Edward Bagshawe, who put on the habit to-day, will tell you, can hardly get through my controversial and spiritual correspondence. The success of the Oratory is most marvellous. We have nearly 500 communions a week now (p. 370).

The 1st February one of his fathers writes,—

Father Wilfrid is working like a steam-engine more than a man. Whether he is well or not I don't know. I hope he is, but his work is something quite prodigious. He has got up twenty-six sermons for Lent, is now giving a retreat, is getting up sermons against Transcendentalism, has written devotions for Jesus Risen, is to give the Tre Ore, and has poured out verses on Santo Padre by the mile (p. 372).

In the midst of the hubbub at the appointment of the hierarchy he wrote to Mr. Watts Russell at Rome:—

I go to bed like an animal every night, nearly worn out with fret and work, and I rise in the morning nearly as tired as I was when I went to bed. London is a frightful place for work. I dare say you see the English papers, and therefore know in what plight we are just now in England. We have the honour of bearing rather more than our share of the public indignation, which may be partly owing to the Bishop of London's honouring us with a charge. All over the walls you see, "Down with the Oratorians," "Beware of the Oratorians," "Don't go to the Oratory," "Banishment to the Oratorians." And in Leicester Square a triple placard of singular truthfulness: "No Popery! Down with the Oratorians! No religion at all!" We are cursed in the streets; even *gentlemen* shout from their carriage windows at us. All this is well. But the real anxiety is how our own people will conduct themselves (p. 377).

At this time they were still in King William Street, close to Leicester Square, and they wore their habits in the streets until Lord Derby's proclamation, a year later.

All this was not enough.

In addition to his work and anxiety as Superior, he also, after 1856, fulfilled the duties of novice-master, his favourite office, for which he often declared himself more fitted than for that of Superior, and he devoted to its discharge much time and attention. Moreover, as his name became better known by his books, he received applications for advice and assistance from all parts of the country. These were scrupulously answered, often at considerable length, so that his correspondence occupied a good deal of his time. One of his Fathers, finding in his room a large heap of letters ready for the post, expressed envy of his talent for answering letters. "Talent!" exclaimed Father Faber; "it's the fear of God" (p. 410).

Many of these letters, besides those of which we have quoted parts, are given in the volume before us. To give any idea of their value by extracts, would be like taking a brick as a sample of a

house. We are inclined to believe that no part of his works will be found more valuable. If there are any more such letters still unpublished, those who have them will incur a considerable responsibility if they are left in any danger of perishing.

Besides all this work for the moment, no man has yet done so much towards providing the Catholics of England with religious books.

For ourselves, we think that a man judging with eternity before his eyes, might choose to have been the author of Father Faber's hymns rather than of any other of the works written by him, or indeed by almost any man. Not merely did they so evidently flow from his own heart, but they have so exactly supplied a special want of English-speaking Catholics. We continually hear of travellers who light upon lonely congregations singing them in the backwoods of the United States and the wide pastures of Australia as they are sung several times every week in the congregations of every English town. How many solitary hearts they have stimulated, comforted, and consoled, can be known only to God. F. Bowden gives us some particulars as to their composition. The two first—"Mother of Mercy," and "Jesus my Lord, my God, my All"—were written on one evening at Scarborough, at the request of Father Hutchison.

The series of the "Lives of the Saints" was begun by him before he joined the Oratory. It consists of lives translated, without alteration or omission, from originals published in Catholic countries. The translations are by different hands, but he was editor. We need say nothing of a series which has been, and is, so extensively useful. Forty-two volumes of it have appeared.

Contemporaneously with the publication of the "Lives of the Saints" and the foundation of the London Oratory, Father Faber contributed much to the circulation in England of foreign spiritual books, such as those of Boudon, Surin, Rigoleuc, the two Lallemands, Courbon, Lombez, and Nouet. The spiritual doctrine of Louis Lallemand, and the octave of "Corpus Christi," by Nouet, were translated at his suggestion, and edited by him. He also published the School of S. Philip Neri as a supplement to the lives of that Saint and of his companions (p. 476).

How numerous his own works were all the world knows. They were far from being hastily or carelessly written. Those accustomed to attend the Oratory in those days will not need to be reminded that in substance at least most of them were preached long before they were published. No man was naturally more exposed to the temptation to carelessness which is induced by extraordinary facility of composition and delivery. But none could more conscientiously resist it. He says of his "conferences:"—

It has been my custom to have the notes of them, very full and detailed, prepared several weeks, often several months, before delivering them. They

were then revised before preaching, and very often annotated immediately after preaching, when necessary or desirable changes struck me in the act and fervour of delivery. There is nothing which brings out any want of logical sequence, or any disproportionate arrangement of thoughts, more vividly than the act of preaching; and I have repeatedly profited by this fact. The notes were then laid aside, some for two years, some for one year, some for a few months, before I finally revised them for writing, and at last wrote them out. I have long adopted this custom with what concerned the spiritual life, so as to secure myself from putting forth mere views struck out in a heat, and also that I might convert the opinions expressed, whatever their intrinsic value might be, into judgments ascertained with care, matured by experience, and revised with jealous repetition under various circumstances, and in different moods of mind (p. 477).

As an instance of his work the biographer gives a letter to Mr. Morris, dated July 17th, 1858, from Ardencaple:—

My volume of Conferences was ready for the press months ago, and "Bethlehem" nearly a year ago. But Christmas year is the earliest date at which I shall publish "Bethlehem," as it is a wild Faberian work. . . .

Remember in catalogue reading, that my "Calvary," preached in the Lent of 1857, after eight years' reading, is now awaiting the period of gestation before I write it, so mention to me any books you see on the Passion. I have got about a hundred, some very valuable, which Watts Russell got at an old place in Venice. My last work at "Calvary" was an analysis of all the stigmata and *passional* phenomena of the Saints, out of Görres and others.

I hope you'll be able to read Scotus; I can't. I am obliged to do him in Montefortino. Subtilis himself is a needle in a bottle of hay (p. 478).

In July, 1853, he commenced the publication of his spiritual works. F. Bowden gives a most interesting account, for which we have not space, of the particular circumstances of each of these. He remarks: "The amount of sufferings he had to endure, and his perseverance under them, will best be shown by extracts taken almost at random from his letters between 1857 and 1861." "His courage seldom failed him, and he would continue his work under a pressure of bodily pain which would have prostrated many stronger persons." The extracts given bear out more than this. He writes, March 20, 1859:—

I am but a wreck of a man—my brain quite wrought out with lecturing and writing, and constant pain and lameness, so that I can get no exercise. There will be no respite now till May is done.

A year later he wrote, on the Feast of the Purification, 1858, to Father Hutchison, then in Egypt for his health:—

First of all, a happy new year to you, and a safe return. Then what shall I say next, or where begin my egotistical gossip? I have nothing interesting to say, and no news to retail. Your letter from Thebes has just come, and is

very jolly. I wish I could wander, but I should be simply miserable. I can't give up writing. Since the 15th of October up to the Epiphany, no use of leg—horrid pain; consultations of Wilson and Teggart in my room; never in the refectory since S. Wilfrid's Day; nevertheless, thankful. Now mending—can walk.

Now look here. It was *five* years last Sunday fortnight since I began, after High Mass, SS. Nominis Jesu "All for Jesus." Since then, 1. All for Jesus; 2. Growth in Holiness; 3. Blessed Sacrament; 4. Creator and Creature; 5. Edition of Poems, with 3,000 new lines; 6. Sir Lancelot, immensely changed; 7. Foot of the Cross; 8. New Hymns, besides the thirty new ones now; 9. Bethlehem; 10. Conferences; 11. Ethel's Book; 12. Innumerable preachings; 13. Three books partially prepared, viz., Precious Blood, Holy Ghost, and the second volume of Conferences; 14. Confessing and directing; 15. Business as Superior; 16. Correspondence; 17. A certain amount of intercourse with God; 18. The bearing of pain when I could do nothing else. It is plain that life can't be lived at this rate. But my mind is now like a locomotive that has started with neither driver nor stoker. I can think of nothing but being seized, put on board one of Her Majesty's ships of war as compulsory chaplain, and carried round the world for two years. If I was on land I should jib and come home. . . . I envy you your quiet evenings on the Nile. I am never quiet now. What you say about the lake is very interesting. We shall never understand the Bible till we see that natural things and divine are one. The whole notion of miracles wants reforming, and nature wants reaugurating. You must write a book when you come home (p. 419).

And thus he went on year after year, the only alternations of his life being labour and suffering, suffering and labour. To friends who visited him on the New Year he used to say, "Wish me anything except more new years." To a penitent in deep sorrow he wrote in December, 1860:—

In sorrow there is a time when nothing but an increase of heavenly-mindedness will make it endurable. Earth, earth's interests, earth's occupations, become almost as insupportable as the sorrow itself. I feel in a measure what you are feeling. For some years past, even when not ill, my own life has been so joyous a burden, that every evening feels as if the past day were an enemy conquered, or a punishment inflicted and over, but that there was no strength left to bear another to-morrow. God lets me love Him just enough to hold on with (p. 450).

On August 12, 1862, he wrote from S. Mary's, Sydenham, to F. Bowden:—

The pain is now almost incessant, and the tedium of life almost more than I can bear. I am also greatly afflicted with those troubles, which generally choose this time of the year for their exhibition. However, silence is the best thing about them. At worst you can but drop under a burden which you can no longer bear. I do not, by advice, go in for the festa; and all members of the community are to be prohibited coming here,

except one a week to hear my confession, that I may keep my plenary indulgences. Thus I hope to struggle through some more miserable weeks of solitude without the ability either to read or take exercise (p. 500).

And yet it was not until the very last that the fear of death was removed from him, and even then he expressed uneasiness whether its removal might be a dangerous delusion. To Father Bowden he wrote, August 25, 1862 :—

The thought is growing upon me that I have an undiscovered disease, nephritic perhaps, and that in another twelve months I shall be gone. It sometimes depresses me—but it need not—only make me more pious. Pray for me (p. 500).

It was exactly as he suspected. Long before, he used to express the same to friends who chanced to see him, even when expressing the utmost weariness of life, but he added he saw no reason to think he got better by living longer. He wrote, July 21, 1860 :—

My sons must shew their love of me by unintermitting prayer for me, that my heart may be altogether changed, that I may be quite turned to God, more full of prayer, more brave in mortification, and more *abissato* in the sense of my own vileness. This is what you must do. You must not trust *me*, but God's Will in me. If people knew the graces I have had, they would see I was simply the greatest sinner that has ever been upon earth ; yet I sometimes think myself good, and I feel pleasure at others thinking me good. This makes me fear I shall go to hell ; so do not talk of trusting to me, but only to God's grace in me (p. 456).

The members of his community, says F. Bowden, could hardly bring themselves to believe " that so precious a life was in real danger ; it seemed almost impossible that they should lose him who had been their centre and leader from the first." But really to those who read his narrative, and see pain and weariness and humiliation settling down in a cloud every day darker and darker upon one so dearly beloved and revered, it is impossible not to look forward with some feeling of relief to the deliverance which was now drawing so nigh.

The last scenes are described by F. Bowden with such exquisite simplicity, affection, and pathos, that we are reluctant to feel it necessary to omit them. The last of those thrilling sermons, the like of which we can never again hear, was preached on Passion Sunday, 1863, on " Our Blessed Lord bowing His head upon the Cross :"—

On the 16th of June, after the visit of the doctors, it was thought necessary to administer to him the last sacraments at once. About half-past eight in the evening the holy Viaticum was brought him by Father Dalgairns, the senior Father and confessor of the house, accompanied by all the members of the community. Father Faber received it with great devotion, sitting in an armchair, dressed in his habit. He said the *Confiteor* very clearly, and

made all the responses himself. When the Blessed Sacrament had been taken back to the chapel, the same procession returned to Father Faber's room with the Holy Oil. Before receiving extreme unction, he replied to the questions appointed by the English ritual. To some of the answers he made slight additions. When asked whether he believed all the articles of faith which the Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and teaches, he said, "Most firmly, most firmly." To the question, "Do you, for God's sake, forgive from your heart every one who has offended you, or been your enemy?" he answered, "Yes, I do; I never had any." The next was, "Do you now, from your heart, ask pardon of every one whom you have offended by word or deed?" To which he replied, "I do, especially of every member of the community; I have been proud, uncharitable, and unobservant, and I ask pardon of all." After the questions he said again, "I have been unkind and uncharitable; I wish I had been more kind." And as, after the administration of extreme unction, the Fathers left the room, he repeated, "Thank you all," two or three times. Then, turning to the one who happened to remain in attendance on him, he said, "Ah, John, it's a grand thing to die a Christian;" and, after a pause, "I have nothing to forgive anybody for, nothing against a single member of the community. I would give my life for any one of them" (p. 506).

In this dying state he remained until September 26th.

On the evening of June 28, his forty-ninth birthday, he saw the members of the community one by one, recommending himself to their prayers, and giving to each some parting gift. To one he said, speaking with frequent pauses, "God has been so good, and arranged it all so well. I like to have it settled to-day. This is my birthday, and the doctor says I am going fast, and probably without pain—no, not without pain, for that is impossible; but with as little pain as possible. I wish to die stripped of everything. One thing we must all go on doing—pray that I may save my soul. He that perseveres to the end" (p. 507).

We must refer our readers to Father Bowden's touching narrative for more particulars of these last scenes. We pass to the close:—

He received the Holy Communion daily up to the 24th of September inclusive. A considerable change was perceptible on the 25th. He became quite still, and his attendants were able to put him into bed, which had not been done since the month of June. Here he lay supported by pillows, not speaking, but gazing steadily at a large white crucifix before him, and moving his eyes sometimes from one of the Five Wounds to another. As evening came on it was clear that his end was approaching, and his confessor, Father Dalgairns, determined to watch with him through the night, as well as Father Cumberlege. When he was told that his death was near, he only repeated fervently his favourite exclamation, "God be praised!" Shortly after midnight the Community was summoned to assist at his last moments, and the commendation of his soul was made, but the crisis passed over, and the Fathers again retired.

When the writer entered his room at six o'clock on the morning of the 26th, it was plain that he was not likely to live more than an hour. The time passed almost in silence; the dying Father was lying on his bed breathing heavily, with his eyes closed, or when open, still fixed upon the crucifix. About half-past six, Father Rowe said that he would go and say mass for him, and an intelligent look showed that his intention was appreciated. Just after seven a sudden change came over the Father; his head turned a little to the right, his breathing seemed to stop; a few spasmodic gasps followed, and his spirit passed away. In those last moments his eyes opened, clear, bright, intelligent as ever, in spite of the look of agony on his face, but opened to the sight of nothing earthly, only with a touching expression, half of sweetness, and half of surprise. His own words came forcibly upon one who knelt before him, for it seemed the realization of the picture which he himself had drawn:—

“Only serve Jesus out of love, and while your eyes are yet unclosed, before the whiteness of death is yet settled upon your face, or those around you are sure that that last gentle breathing was indeed your last, what an unspeakable surprise will you have had at the judgment-seat of your dearest Love, while the songs of heaven are breaking on your ears, and the glory of God is dawning on your eyes, to fade away no more for ever!”*

For this was the end of a life which from first to last had been *religious*. In early childhood the things of God had been his joy; as he grew up he had sought painfully and anxiously the truth as it is in Christ, and then had given up all to find it. Every letter tells that it was his engrossing thought, every line of poetry bears the mark of heavenly aspiration; the golden words wherein his work will be still continued, and the sweet music of his hymns of praise, speak in language which cannot be mistaken the singleness of purpose with which he sought the interests of Jesus, and the chivalrous ardour with which he promoted the Church's cause. To this he devoted talents, energy, and health, only caring to labour where the Will of God had placed him, and thus, when he came to die, his history might have been written in the simple words—he served Jesus out of love.

There is nothing more to be added. Those who have loved him and so often hung upon his lips, can only rejoice in the confident assurance, that when Christ who is our life shall appear, then shall he also appear with Him in glory. Well then may we wait with patience.

* “All for Jesus,” c. ii.

ART. VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL AXIOMS.

La Filosofia antica esposta e difesa del P. GIUSEPPE KLEUTGEN, D.C. D.G.
Versione dal Tedesco. Roma.

Essay on first Principles. By the Very Rev. CANON WALKER. London : Longmans.

Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists. A Review. By Rev. C. MEYNELL, D.D., Professor of Philosophy and Literature at S. Mary's College, Oscott. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

IN a preceding article we express the great wish which we have long felt, of promoting in any way we could so happy a consummation, as that English Catholic thinkers should be united in a phalanx against the irreligious philosophies now so rampant. Take one or the other essential truth, which these philosophies deny : we are very anxious to do what we can towards placing it in that light, which may exhibit its perfect harmony (1) with theology and (2) with reason ; and which may at the same time help Catholics in doing battle against the evil school which denies it. Canon Walker's pamphlet comes opportunely, in deciding us to make our first essay on the question of philosophical axioms. Nor could there be (we think) a better beginning than this ; because, as F. Kleutgen observes, in these "infallible" axioms philosophy has its "base and foundation."* Moreover, as might be expected from this circumstance, there is no other point on which the characteristics of each rival school are so sharply contrasted and come into such lively mutual conflict. We will begin our exposition then by exhibiting this conflict. When our readers have seen the vast and impassable gulf which separates scholasticism on this head from every antagonist, they will more appreciate what we have said in our earlier article, on the necessity of adopting the *fundamental principles* of scholasticism as alone suitable for a Catholic philosophy.†

* All acquisition of truth "would be impossible to us, if there were not within us certain convictions (conoscenze) which require no others in order to become evident. In these convictions is found the commencement of all speculation : and to determine them ; to prove their infallibility ; to demonstrate their relation with every other conviction ;—this is what is meant by 'giving philosophy a base, a foundation'" (vol. i. p. 118).

† This expression must not be misunderstood. "If we would speak

There are four fundamentally erroneous systems, with which the English Catholic philosopher is nowadays brought principally into conflict. As a Catholic, he is brought principally across "traditionalism" and "ontologism"; for these are the two errors against which foreign orthodox philosophers chiefly direct their blows. Strangely enough, these two errors, which more than any others meet his eyes as a *Catholic*, he hardly encounters at all as an *Englishman*: for in England, whether among Catholics or Protestants, both traditionalism and ontologism proper are almost unheard of.* In their stead there meet us in England two violently anti-Catholic systems, to which foreign Catholic philosophers—at least in Italy and France—pay comparatively little attention. The first of these—and immeasurably the most irreligious of all four †—is the empirical or phænomenal school of Mill and Bain: the second, the Kantian or sceptical school, prominently represented by Dean Mansel. These are the four capital errors, from which in these days Christianity has most to fear whether in England or abroad: traditionalism, ontologism, scepticism, empiricism.‡ We must maintain that followers of these four schools are as simply external to the true way of philosophy, as Lutherans and Calvinists to that of theology; because in either case those truths which are accidentally held, are held on wrong grounds, and (if we may so speak) in a wrong relative position. We are for the moment merely considering each school broadly and on the whole, without taking into

properly," says F. Kleutgen (vol. i. p. 61), "there is no such thing as a *Christian* philosophy; but rather a true philosophy, which [as being true] is in accordance with Christianity."

* In our next number we shall criticise Dr. Meynell's ascription to himself of "ontologism." To our mind he is as much and as little an ontologist as F. Liberatore.

English philosophers, with their experience, will be quite startled by F. Liberatore's opinion ("Della Conoscenza intellettuale," vol. ii. n. 58) that ontologism "is the most threatening danger of modern science." Hardly less are we surprised, when we find Dr. Meynell to have hoped (p. 35) that "sensationalism as a philosophy has become obsolete." Are Messrs. Mill, Bain, and Huxley then obsolete writers, known only to antiquarians?

† "The most irreligious" *in itself*. We are not here considering this or that consequence, which legitimately *follows* indeed from other false systems, but which is disavowed by their upholders.

‡ *Pantheism* indeed may be perhaps considered a distinct philosophical system. It has not been mentioned in the text; because neither on the one hand is it prominently mentioned in Catholic philosophical books, nor on the other hand is it, as regards its *explicit* shape, at all common in England. Positivism, we need hardly say, is but one form of empiricism, unless indeed the two terms are synonymous. The "*Civiltà*," in 1867, published a course of articles against positivism: but very little notice is taken of that system in the ordinary Catholic philosophical courses.

account the shades of difference which exist among its upholders. And this being understood, we would, by way of introduction, briefly contrast their doctrine with the scholastic on this particular question of philosophical axioms. We will take an extremely simple instance, as being the better calculated to bring out the contrast. We will inquire then on what ground men are to hold, that "every trilateral rectilinear figure is triangular."

The traditionalist says: "I know this truth, because God originally taught it to mankind; and it has been handed down from generation to generation, till it reached my instructors who taught *me*."

The ontologist says: "I see God immediately, though not reflexly; and in seeing Him, I see the necessary truth that every trilateral figure is triangular."

The Kantist says: "My faculties are so constituted, that I cannot help regarding every trilateral figure as necessarily triangular. But whether *in real truth* every trilateral figure is necessarily triangular, I have no means of even guessing.*

The phenomenist says: "Every trilateral figure which I or anybody else has ever seen, has had three angles; and I have a right by the laws of induction to generalize this proposition within certain limits. But whether, if you went to the fixed stars, you would *there* find all trilateral figures triangular, I cannot tell."†

* We by no means intend to imply that Dean Mansel would express himself in this way; but we do maintain—and purpose in a future number to argue—that it is the only doctrine on the subject consistent with his principles. Take such passages of his as the following, which are but specimens of a large class. "It *may* be that the conditions of possible *thought* correspond to conditions of possible *being*; that that which is to us inconceivable, is in *fact* non-existing: but of this, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to have any evidence" ("Prolegomena Logica," p. 72). In other words it *may* be that a quadrangular trilateral figure is impossible: but we cannot *know* that it is. Presently the Dean adds (p. 74), that we cannot tell "how much of the result" of the laws of thought is true *in itself*, and how much is "relative and dependent on the particular *bodily or mental constitution of man*." Again (p. 84), the necessity of necessary truth is "a necessity of *thought* depending on the laws of *our mental constitution*"; and not therefore known to man as an *intrinsic* necessity, apart from human thought altogether.

† "We should probably be as well able to conceive a round square as a hard square or a heavy square, if it were not that, *in our uniform experience*, at the instant when a thing begins to be round it ceases to be square."—Mill on Hamilton, p. 85 of third edition. "Axioms are experimental truths; generalizations from observation. The proposition 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space' . . . is an induction from the evidence of our senses."—Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 260 of fourth edition. "In distant parts of the stellar regions . . . the phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted."—*Ib.* vol. ii. p. 104.

Such have been the incredible aberrations of many a thinker, in some respects able and even profound. Nay, such have been the incredible aberrations of many a thinker, who has looked down on the middle ages with self-complacent contempt as dark and unphilosophical.* Descartes himself, who set up as the apostle of philosophical reform, and who declared that no solid foundation had ever been laid for human knowledge until his own theories were given to the world;—Descartes himself, we say, on this primary question of axioms advocated doctrines which are portentously absurd: though his system as a whole is now so obsolete, that it is not worth while troubling our readers with its consideration.† And all this time, while rival philosophies have been vying with each other in extravagance and paradox, scholasticism has remained firm in its original common-sense and straightforward position. Scholasticism, we say, has taught consistently throughout, that those axioms, which underlie the whole fabric of speculative truth and without which that truth must collapse, are immediately known with self-evident certainty by the light of reason.

It is our object in this article, to draw out what appears to us the true theory concerning axioms; so far, at least, as is necessary for the refutation of those false philosophies which we have mentioned, and especially of empiricism, which is far the most actively anti-religious of all. We are throughout addressing Catholics, and assuming every principle on which all Catholics are agreed; for we defer to a future number the task of defending our doctrine by reason, against our opponents of the Mill and Bain following.

By “axioms” are meant “necessary first truths”; ‡ and

* We here speak of the other three systems. We would not call *ontologism* an “incredible aberration”; though we regard it as fundamentally false and pernicious.

† Yet it may be worth while in a note to give a few of the sentences, which F. Kleutgen has extracted from this philosophical reformer (vol. ii. p. 216, note). “God is the author of all necessary truth,” says Des Cartes; “it was as free to Him to appoint that the straight lines drawn from centre to circumference of circle should be unequal, as it was to create the world.” “Mathematical truths, which you call eternal, were made by God, and depend on Him just as other creatures do . . . These laws were ordained by God in nature, just as any king ordains laws in his realm; . . . and they are all implanted in our mind, just as any king would [if he could] engrave his laws in the heart of his subjects . . . If God’s will could change, then [like a king in the supposed case] He would change these laws.” Is it the scholastic philosophy then, or on the contrary its earliest opponent, which disparages necessary truth?

‡ “Axiomata vocantur ea iudicia quæ non modo per se evidentia sunt, verum etiam universalitatem habent atque ideo scientiarum principia constituunt. Atque hæc est ratio cur eo nomine, quod dignitatem significat, donata sunt: cum altissimum in cognitione locum obtineant.”—(F. Liberatore, *Logic*,

this definition will convey at once a sufficiently distinct notion for ordinary purposes. On the present occasion however, we must go somewhat deeper: we will consider firstly, what are "truths"; secondly, what are "*first truths*"; and thirdly, what are "*necessary truths*."

It is the more important to consider what is precisely meant by "truths"; because it appears to us that Canon Walker's valuable and thoughtful pamphlet betrays a certain confusion of thought on the subject, having its origin in a certain ambiguity of language. The author says excellently (p. 16), "that there are certain truths which are of necessary, universal, infinite import. Such are mathematical truths, arithmetical proportions, principles of immutable morality, and the like." He adds however (p. 17), that "so far as they are perceptible and discoverable by created intellects, they are indeed certain, necessary, immutable, but not with that certainty, necessity, and immutability which belongs to the divine knowledge. They are, in short, created finite verities." Similar language is found in p. 27, and indeed may almost be said to pervade Canon Walker's general course of argument. We think most of our readers will spontaneously feel that here is some entanglement; and in order to unravel it, we must consider the sense of this word "truths." We may add that no scholastic whom we have examined seems to us so clear and satisfactory on the whole matter of "*verum*," as Vasquez in his 76th and 77th disputations on S. Thomas's 1^a.

The word "truth" is, etymologically at least, derived from the notion of a cognizing mind and its true judgment. Now what is a judgment? What am I doing when I am said to form one? In an affirmative judgment, called "*compositio*," I am ascribing some attribute or attributes—represented in a proposition by the "*predicate*"—to certain *ens* or *entia*, real or imaginary, represented in a proposition by the "*subject*." In a negative judgment, called "*divisio*," I am judging that such attributes do *not* appertain to such *ens* or *entia*. We here, as is evident, use the word "*ens*" in its widest sense, as including both "*substance*" and "*quality*." And we will throughout, for the sake of obvious convenience, use the expressions "*term*," "*subject*," "*predicate*," when speaking of judgments, not less than when speaking of propositions.

Now a "truth" is neither more nor less than "the object of a true judgment." In other words, it is the "*convenientia*" or "*inconvenientia*" of a certain predicate with a certain sub-

n. 216.) And in n. 218 the author implies that axioms "*necessitatem et universalitatem includere*."

ject; the inherence of certain attributes in a certain ens or entia real or imaginary.

But Canon Walker seems to hold, that there are as many different *truths* as there are different cognizing *minds*; that the triangularity e. g. of every trilateral figure is a different truth, as cognized respectively by God and by man. Against this view we must maintain it to be indisputable, that the truth is one and indivisible however divers the intellects which apprehend it. Take a very simple case: the existence of Mr. Gladstone. Many different men know this existence, and God also knows it: moreover, each separate human cognition of it is entitatively different, and God's cognition of it is different *in kind* from man's. Yet surely the thing known—Mr. Gladstone's existence—is one indivisible truth. So the triangularity of every trilateral figure is known to God and known to man: yet the truth known is one and indivisible; and this truth is *in itself* "necessary" and "immutable," whether we think of it as known by God or as known by man. The attribute of triangularity "necessarily and immutably" appertains to all trilateral figures: and therefore the triangularity of all such figures is a "necessary and immutable" truth, whether that truth be contemplated by God or contemplated by man. What is precisely meant by these adjectives, "necessary" and "immutable," will be presently considered.

One final question may be asked on this head, and that a verbal one. There are certain propositions which are called "tautologies": those namely in which the predicate sets forth nothing, which has not been distinctly expressed in the subject. "A table is a table." "A tree is a tree." Or suppose I define a "pentagon" to be "a rectilinear figure with five sides"; and then gravely enunciate the proposition, that every pentagon has five sides. Should the objects of these propositions be called "truths"? In common parlance they are called, not "truths," but "truisms"; yet it will be convenient to include them under the general name of "truths."

Such then are "truths." But secondly, what are "*first* truths"? Whether or no the word "truth" contains any reference to a cognizing mind, the word "*first* truth" is simply unmeaning *without* such reference. Those are "*first* truths" to any given person; the knowledge of which need not in his case be obtained by reasoning from a knowledge of other truths. "I am in that state of bodily feeling which I call 'cold';" "I am in that state of mental feeling which I call 'out of spirits';" "all trilateral figures are triangular;" "it is wrong to disobey the command of an All-Holy Creator." Here are truths, varying indefinitely from each other in

character and in importance; but all agreeing in this, that a competent thinker can know them certainly, without inferring them from other truths previously known.

Lastly, to complete our definition of "axioms," we have to consider carefully what is meant by "necessary" truths. And this indeed is a question which must be treated with especial prominence in a time like this, when the very fundamental speculative error with which Catholics have to grapple, is the *denial* of necessary truth. Now it is a very strange circumstance; but we are not acquainted with any philosopher, either of the ancient or modern school, who has instituted a direct examination of this question. Nothing indeed is more probable, than that our very statement only shows the present writer's ignorance of philosophical literature; but at all events, under circumstances, we are obliged ourselves to make the best suggestion we can on the subject. We submit what we are going to say with much deference to philosophical students; and we hope at all events, that if our own explanation be not accounted correct or adequate, it may be the means of eliciting some other which may be fairly so considered.

As to the general import of the term indeed, there can be no difficulty whatever. The idea expressed by it is so pronounced and unmistakable, that every thinking person understands its meaning in a certain vague but practically sufficient way. Necessary truths, every one will say, are those truths, which God Himself had never any power of annulling; and such powerlessness is no derogation from His omnipotence. Still this will not suffice for a scientific explanation of the word. The idea "necessary"—as every one who rejects ontologism must admit—is anterior in our mind to the idea "God," and cannot therefore be explained by any *reference* to God. The question therefore must be precisely encountered, what is meant by a "necessary" truth?

Here a question at once suggests itself. F. Liberatore (*Logic*, n. 32) makes the important remark, that "if all things and ideas required definition, no definition of anything would be possible." There must be simple ideas incapable of further resolution, or else the resolution of complex ideas would be a process continuing *ad infinitum*. Shall we say then that "necessary" is a *simple idea*?

To begin, let us ask whether it is convertible with the idea "universal." Plainly not. Every necessary truth is indeed universal; but there may be many universal truths, which are not necessary. Take one instance out of a thousand. Let us suppose God to have determined, that He will never create any substance with some given combination of attributes; that

He will never e. g. create a flower, which shall unite the shape and colour of a violet with the smell of a rose. If this were the case, the proposition, "no flower looking like a violet smells like a rose," would be as absolutely universal as the proposition, "no two angles of a triangle together equal two right angles." And yet every one sees at once, that the latter proposition is "necessary," while the former would *not* be so.

Certainly then "necessary" is not synonymous with "universal." Are we obliged therefore to pronounce, that it is a simple idea and incapable of further analysis? We are disposed to answer in the negative; we are disposed to suggest that "necessary" means "*uncaused*." In order to explain this, we will begin with considering F. Kleutgen's statement (vol. ii. p. 179) that "cause," like "being" and "unity," is a simple idea.* This seems to us undeniable. The phenomenists indeed maintain, that the word "cause" expresses nothing but a certain universal and unconditional sequence of phenomena. But as no Catholic holds such a theory, the proper place to refute it will be in the article which we hope soon to publish, against that most pernicious school of thought which we have just mentioned. And we suppose that all who reject the particular analysis attempted by phenomenists, will agree with F. Kleutgen in considering the idea "cause" a perfectly simple one. We suggest then, that a "necessary" truth means "a truth of which there is no efficient cause." By a "truth" is understood, as we have seen, the inherence of certain attributes in a certain subject. In the case of "contingent" truths, this inherence is produced by some cause. In fact the lesson gradually learned from philosophy is, that the primary cause of all these truths, is either God's will, or else the free will with which He has endowed some creature. But consider e. g. the inherence in a triangle of the attribute, that "its three angles together equal two right angles." This inherence has no "efficient cause" whatever; its reason for existing is the intrinsic exigency (so to speak) of a triangle as such. In like manner, to pass from small things to great, consider the truth that "pride and envy are morally wrong in every creature"; or in other words consider the inherence of that attribute, which we call "morally wrong," in those acts which we call acts of pride and envy. This inherence has no "efficient cause." This inherence, we say, is not

* It can hardly be necessary to explain, that by "cause" we mean throughout "efficient cause."

produced by God's will, nor by any other "agency" whatever; its reason of existence is the intrinsic exigency (so to speak) of those acts in themselves.

If this be admitted as a just definition of the term "necessary," we can immediately lay down the proposition, that all necessary truths are eternal and immutable. If the inherence of a certain attribute in a certain subject be due to the intrinsic exigency of that subject, it must exist eternally and immutably wherever that subject is found.

By "necessary" truths then are meant "uncaused" truths; and these are eternal and immutable. On the other hand, as has continually been pointed out, all those necessary truths which have not God for their subject, are exclusively hypothetical and negative. It is no necessary truth e. g. that any triangle shall ever have existed in *rerum naturâ*: though it is a necessary truth that, *if* any triangle exist, its three angles must together equal two right angles. It is no necessary truth that God shall ever have created a rational being: but it is a necessary truth that, if rational beings *do* exist, in them pride and envy are morally evil. And so in every other case which can be named. F. Liberatore then infers with great justice (*Conoscenza intellettuale*, vol. ii. n. 103) that the eternity of abstract necessary truths is rather the eternity of a negation, than of an affirmation.

On the whole then, the most correct exposition will perhaps be as follows. By declaring a certain truth to be "necessary," I declare "the intrinsic impossibility of certain attributes being separated from"—or on the other hand "of certain attributes appertaining to"—"a certain subject, wherever and whenever—if ever or anywhere—that subject may be found." And by the phrase "intrinsic impossibility," in this exposition is meant, that this impossibility is not caused by any person or thing; nor by any agency of any kind whatever.

Here we see the meaning of various expressions, which are continually found in scholastic theology. Thus it is repeatedly declared, that God possesses "a knowledge of simple intelligence," whereby He cognizes all possible things. What is meant by "possible" things? Those things which can exist without contradicting necessary truths. A triangle with two of its angles together equalling two right angles—or a creature in whom pride and envy should be virtues—these would *not* be "possible" things. On the other hand, of any imaginary beings which would contradict necessary truths, it is said that they are "impossible"; that they are "chimeras"; that they "implicate a contradiction"; or, more briefly, "implicant" or "repugnant."

And now we are brought to an inquiry of very fundamental importance. The philosopher shows very early in his course, that there exists a large number of hypothetical and negative necessary truths. Passing onwards, he proceeds in due time to demonstrate the existence of God: and as soon as he has arrived at that conclusion, he is obliged to ask himself what is the *relation* between God and *other* necessary truth. This is the question which we are now to consider. And in treating every such matter, we must bear in mind what the scholastics ever inculcate; viz., that man has no immediate knowledge of God, and apprehends Him entirely through the analogy of creatures. It must be remembered therefore, that man's conceptions of Him—though true as far as they go and inappreciably momentous—yet are always most partial and inadequate; nor indeed are they ever so partial and inadequate, as when they are of His *Essence* rather than of His *attributes*. Any possible reply therefore to the question before us, must be at best vague and adumbratory. Our apprehension of God's Essence itself being so very incomplete, such also at best must be our apprehension of any doctrine which *concerns* that Essence. This being understood, we submit the following two propositions to our reader's judgment.

Firstly then, we say that God contemplates all necessary truths in gazing on His own Essence. This seems undeniably involved, in the scholastic doctrine concerning His knowledge of possible things. God, in gazing on His own Essence, comprehends it; *i. e.* sees in it all things which *can* therein be seen.* He thus contemplates therein all things which are intrinsically possible. But to do this, is to contemplate all those truths which limit the *number* of things intrinsically possible; and these are precisely all *necessary* truths. We affirm therefore, that God's cognition of necessary truth is intrinsic, and not extrinsic, to His vision of Himself.

Shall we say then that all necessary truths are *identical* with God? To mention no other difficulty, there seems an insuperable theological objection against such a view; because it would thence follow that every beatus, in seeing God, sees the whole mass of necessary truths. But in fact it seems unmeaning to speak of merely abstract truths, which are not even entia, nay which are merely *negative*, as identical with God.†

* See e. g. Suarez de Deo, l. 2, c. 29, n. 13.

† When Dr. Ward wrote his "Philosophical Introduction," he had not carefully looked into this question. He spoke in consequence very inaccurately from p. 44 to p. 47, and begs to retract the whole passage.

We say then secondly, that all necessary truths are "founded" and dependent on God's Essence; so that if, per impossibile, God's Essence were annihilated, all necessary truths would thereby cease to be. This does not seem the universal judgment of approved theologians: for Dr. Ward, in his "Philosophical Introduction" (p. 483), has quoted no less names than Lessius, Bellarmine, and Lugo, for the opinion that, even if God did not exist, there might be real sin. Our own suggestion is, that if God did not exist there would be no necessary truth at all; and no act therefore could be either virtuous or vicious.

Here one obvious difficulty may be raised. All necessary truths, we have seen, are "uncaused"; but if they are not "caused" by God, what can be meant by saying that they are "founded" on Him? The reply however is very easy. By "cause" we have meant throughout, as explained in a preceding note, "*efficient*" cause; and there may very easily be a "foundation," where there is no "efficient cause." It is most intelligible e. g. to say that some abstruse mathematical theorem is "founded" on certain axioms; in such sense, that if per impossibile the axioms were false, the theorem would lose its truth: yet it would be simply preposterous to call such axioms its "efficient causes." This then is what we would suggest concerning necessary truths: they are what they are, because God's Essence is what it is.

These are the two theses which we would express, in reply to the question started. For the first of them we have given, we think, sufficient grounds; but to vindicate the latter would here carry us much too far. Indeed, the more proper place for such a vindication would be in the philosophical argument for God's existence. Let us now see what is the language of modern Catholic philosophers; nor can we take better representatives of the class, than FF. Liberatore and Kleutgen.

In considering what is said by the former, our readers should call to mind that "possible things" with him, as with all the scholastic writers, means simply "things which can exist without contradiction of necessary truth." F. Liberatore then speaks as follows (*Metaphysica Generalis*, n. 103): "Since God has from eternity gazed on all possible things, it was necessary that in thinking them He should gaze on *some existing object* with which they are related. But such an object . . . could be nothing except *the Divine Essence*." And he proceeds to quote with perfect concurrence Leibnitz's statement, that "if there is any reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must be *founded*

on some existing and actual thing, and consequently on *the existence of the necessary Being.*" Again, in his treatise on "Natural Theology" (n. 43): "Possible things, as regards their intrinsic possibility, are perceived in their own rationes, or in the ideas which the divine mind has conceived, *in considering His own Essence* so far as it is imitable." Once more (Ethics, n. 94): "*As I have often said*, the nature of things and the relations which thence *necessarily* emerge are manifested (dictantur) by the divine wisdom *contemplating the Divine Essence.* . . . Wherefore the natural law so attends (consequitur) human nature that it *cannot be torn therefrom*; and while that nature exists, the natural law cannot cease to exist, nor can it be otherwise than it is."

Turn now to F. Kleutgen (vol. ii. p. 212):—

An objection is raised, "if divine *knowledge* presupposes the *conceivableness* of things, and divine *creation* their *possibility*, it thence follows that God's intellect and power have their laws in the conceivableness and possibility of things." *Certainly*: only that this is not a law *external to God*, but exists *in God Himself*, and is *even His own Essence.* . . . The divine Essence is *the ultimate reason* for anything being conceivable or possible: insomuch that the very divine Essence is the norm of what is conceivable or possible, and is accordingly the law of God's knowledge and power.

God's omniscience therefore consists in God's knowing all which is cognoscible, and not in His being able, by His knowledge, to make anything conceivable. Similarly He is omnipotent, because He can create everything creatable, and not because He can make anything [He pleases] possible. Nor in this can there be seen any limitation of the divine wisdom and power; since *God's infinite perfection is the very reason* why the inconceivable is inconceivable and the impossible impossible. . . . The inconceivable is that which, in consequence of the intrinsic contradiction which it involves, does not and cannot exist.

Again:—

The error of ontologists consists in this; that they are not content with regarding God as the *foundation* of necessary truths, but will have it that they are He Himself. (Ontologisme, p. 56.)

We have now sufficiently explained what are meant by those "necessary first truths," which are called axioms. But before proceeding further, there are reasons connected with the phænomenist controversy which make it desirable to engage very briefly in a supplemental inquiry. Truths are commonly divided by anti-empirical philosophers into "à priori" and "à posteriori" truths; the former being accounted "necessary," and the latter "empirical." We wish here to inquire whether this is quite an exhaustive division; whether

it can truly be said, that all non-empirical truths are necessary. We reply that this *cannot* truly be said. There is at all events one large and most important class of exceptions, whether or no there are others: we refer to truths testified by *memory*.

The only "empirical first truths" *strictly* so called are, we maintain, truths of present consciousness. "I experience that feeling which I call being 'cold,'" or "which I call being 'out of spirits,'" &c., &c. These truths are doubtless known to me immediately by experience. But take the following: "*a short time ago* I was cold," or "*a short time ago* I was out of spirits": these cannot with strict accuracy be called "empirical first truths," because they are *not* known to me immediately by experience. You will say perhaps, that they *are* immediately known to me by *past* experience. But consider. A truth evidently cannot now be known to me by past experience, unless I now know that I *had* that past experience. We ask therefore this very simple question: *How* do I now know that I had that past experience? Not by an act of *experience* most incontestably, but by an act of *memory*: by an act which, under the light of reason, carries with it its own evidence of truth, just as axiomatic judgments do; but which is essentially different in character from an act of experience.* Truths then, which are testified by clear memory, are "first truths" indeed, but not *empirical* first truths. Yet certainly they are not *necessary* truths; and it cannot therefore be sustained that all first truths are either necessary or empirical.

It seems to us that it will be found far more convenient in practice, to employ the phrase "empirical first truths" in a much wider sense than the strictest; in fact, so to extend its signification, that it shall include not those only which are known by present experience, but that far larger number which are known by clear memory of the past.

Are there any other first truths, which are neither necessary on one hand, nor yet empirical on the other? We are not aware that the question is of any importance; but we think that there *are* such. Suppose, e. g., I am near a house, or a tree, or a table. I immediately cognize the existence of certain "accidents," as so many empirical first truths. But

* Mr. Stuart Mill, in his essay on Hamilton (p. 203, note, third edition), admits it to have been proved on the anti-empirical side, that "the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate"; that "no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well founded." By this admission we consider that he lays the axe to the root of his whole system, as we hope to argue in our future article; but his admission is characteristically candid.

further I cognize a "substance" which underlies these accidents. The existence of this substance is undoubtedly no "empirical first truth": yet neither is it a "necessary" first truth; for it is evidently one of that class which, when God performs the Eucharistic miracle, cease to *be* truths. If God can by His power enable the accidents of bread and wine to remain without any supporting substratum, He must be able to do the same in regard to all other accidents whatever.

We have now therefore completed our idea of axioms: they are "truths"; they are "first truths"; and they are "necessary truths." We will next submit to our readers one or two propositions concerning them. We shall occasionally use the words "intuition" and "intue," to express that act whereby the mind cognizes an axiom.*

1. All axioms are intued in the individual before they are intued in the universal. This is one important truth admirably elucidated by Dr. M'Cosh, in his excellent work, "Intuitions inductively considered": a work which has been far less widely known (we think) than its intrinsic merit deserves. In a future article we hope to show, that the thesis which we here advocate is closely connected with the scholastic doctrine, about all knowledge commencing with *sense*; but on the present occasion we will do no more than exhibit its truth. When I hear the proposition e. g., that every trilateral figure has three angles,—I first imagine some *particular* trilateral figure, and verify so far the proposition: then a moment's consideration shows, that this property is by no means peculiar to the particular figure which I have summoned to my thoughts, but on the contrary that it extends to all trilateral figures as such. And a very brief introspection will suffice, we think, to convince our readers, that the case is similar with every axiom.

2. We have spoken of the affinity which exists, between this doctrine, and the scholastic doctrine that all knowledge begins with sense. It is of vital importance then to point out, that the scholastics never dreamed of representing experience as our informant on the *truth* of axioms. We may fairly here take F. Kleutgen as a specimen of the whole school. He protests vehemently (vol. ii. pp. 261, 262) against any such doctrine being attributed to them. "Although the mind does not form" axioms, he says (p. 262) "without preceding sensible representations,—nevertheless it knows their *truth*, not from

* The verb "intue" is not common; but the "Month" of last March used it in its criticism of Dr. Meynell, and we may be allowed to follow its example.

these representations, but in their own light (da loro stessi).” Again (p. 261): “The truth” of any intellectual conception, “in so far as it is universal and abstract, does not depend on the actuality of sensible representation.” To the same effect Suarez: “That self-evident knowledge of axioms (principiorum evidens cognitio), which is their special attribute (quæ propria illorum est), does not arise from any medium, but from *the light given by nature*, so soon as the signification of the extremes is understood.” Nor is there any approved scholastic writer who speaks differently.

Some Catholics fear, lest the desolating system of empiricism should be favoured by the scholastic doctrine, that knowledge begins with sense. But they should remember that those philosophers of the present day who most energetically *abhor* empiricism, fully agree with the scholastics in this particular. It is Mr. Stuart Mill’s own statement of his opponents’ view that, according to that view, “à priori perceptions are *not indeed innate*, nor could ever have been awakened in us *without experience*; but experience is only *the occasion* by which they are irresistibly suggested.” “Among the truths,” continues Mr. Mill, “which are thus known by *occasion of experience*, but not themselves *the subjects of experience*, Coleridge includes the fundamental doctrines of religion and morals, the principles of mathematics,” &c. &c.*

Dr. Meynell (p. 45) accuses Canon Walker of holding, that “the knowledge of first principles is due to sensible experience.” If by “due to sensible experience” Dr. Meynell only means “*occasioned* by sensible experience,” he does but ascribe to the Canon a view, which is held at this day by the strongest à priori philosophers. But if he speaks of sensible experience as the *ground of conviction*, surely he should not have brought forward so unfavourable an allegation without citing passages in support of it. If Canon Walker held such a view as this, he would be at the very level of Mill and Bain. But we cannot see the faintest sign of his holding it. On the contrary, he says frequently (see, e. g., pp. 31, 35) that “first principles are images or reflections *from the divine truth* ;” in p. 57 he says that *the light of reason* is able to show at once their truth; and in p. 60 he adds that “the intuition of first principles is the noblest power of man.”

3. Many axioms are *deducible*. In particular, it may often happen that some truth is demonstrable from truths more obvious than itself, and yet—even apart from such demonstration—is self-evident to more practised intellects, so

* “Dissertations and Discussions,” vol. i. pp. 404, 405.

soon as its terms are apprehended. This is, we believe, the universal doctrine of the scholastics; and it is illustrated with much force by Suarez in *Metaph.*, d. 3, s. 3. Again, in d. 1, s. 6, he enlarges on the greater or less effort which is necessary, according to the diversity of intellectual power, in order that this or that man may be brought to intue some axiom by sufficiently penetrating its terms.

This scholastic doctrine seems to us undeniably true. Let us give one out of the innumerable instances which at once suggest themselves. Every one, we suppose, who admits axioms at all, would consider it axiomatic that $7 \times 3 = 3 \times 7$; or, in other words, that $7 + 7 + 7 = 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3$. Yet there is a very large number of youths or less educated men, who could be brought indeed *by demonstration* to see this truth; but who could not at the same moment hold both subject and predicate so firmly in their mind, as to *intue* the truth expressed by this proposition. Nay, we may go further: for the *general* truth is axiomatic that $a \times b = b \times a$; while there are still fewer men than in the former case, who would be able to *intue* this truth.

But further. It may very often happen, that axiom A is in itself deducible from axioms B and C—or, again, from axiom A and empirical first-truth B—in cases where, to the mind of most men, axiom A is itself more obviously self-evident than axiom B or axiom C. Some Catholic philosophers say in this case, that A is not *demonstrable* from B and C; because the word “demonstration” implies, they consider, that the demonstrating premisses are more obvious than the demonstrated conclusion. In order therefore to avoid this purely verbal question, we have used the word “deducible” in our thesis instead of “demonstrable.”

4. We now come to a question, which to us seems far the most fundamental of all; nay, which we cannot but regard as the very point of divergence, between sound philosophy and empiristic unbelief. We are the more desirous that competent Catholic thinkers should give their mind to what we are here about to urge, because no upholder of the scholastic philosophy—not even F. Kleutgen—impresses us as being by any means alive to the extreme momentousness of the issue involved. We are to consider then, whether axioms may or may not be “synthetical.”

An “analytical” judgment is one, in which it is judged that the idea of one term is contained in the very idea of the other. To take a very obvious instance. Let it be supposed that “hard” is a complex idea, which includes the more simple ideas, “resisting muscular pressure.” Then to say that

“every hard substance resists muscular pressure” is to express a purely analytical judgment; for the predicate is obtained, by analyzing the very idea of the subject. All judgments which are not analytical are “synthetical.” This being understood, we will institute successively two distinct inquiries: viz. firstly are certain axioms synthetical? and secondly, *if* so, how large a portion? As to the first question then, we will begin with considering whether the scholastics give it a negative answer; and we will then examine it ourselves on grounds of reason.

On the surface it would appear that Catholic philosophers—those at all events who follow the scholastics—are unanimous for the negative. The phrase itself was originated by Kant; and since his time it appears to have been quite a commonplace with such Catholic philosophers, to denounce his “synthetical *à priori* judgments.” But such a view as to the meaning of these philosophers is a little premature, to say the least of it. It must be remembered in the first place, that Kant’s doctrine *as a whole* is, in the eye of every Catholic, most monstrous; for he denies that man has any ground for embracing axioms as *certainly true*. And the detestation of Catholic philosophers for the boundless scepticism of his general doctrine, may have indisposed them from carefully considering its particular details. We are confident it will be found, that these philosophers are in general very far from being opposed to Kant on the particular question of synthetical axioms; though we readily admit that most of them *think* themselves opposed to it very decidedly.

F. Kleutgen however does not even *think* himself opposed to it. On the contrary, he holds Kant to be entirely right in the matter of doctrine, and only ill-advised in his use of the term “analytical.” “It is sufficient to observe,” he says (vol. ii. p. 184), “that Kant defined an ‘analytical judgment’ in too literal, and therefore too rigorous, a sense.” All that is meant in calling a judgment “analytical,” he continues, is “that by simply considering the ideas of the subject and the predicate, one comes to see that there really exists between them that relation which the judgment expresses.” Now, according to F. Kleutgen’s use of language, it is most undeniable that every axiom is analytical; for it is the very *notion* of an axiom, that on simply considering the ideas of its subject and predicate, a competent thinker cognizes its truth. The only question at issue then between F. Kleutgen and Kant, on this particular matter, is most purely verbal: and for our own part indeed, we cannot but think Kant’s use of the term “analytical” the more appropriate and more service-

able of the two. But as to the question of doctrine, there is no difference at all. F. Kleutgen is as clear as Kant himself, that certain axioms are, in Kant's sense of the word, "synthetical."

No writer can be taken as a more representative specimen of modern Catholic philosophy, than F. Liberatore. Let us next therefore consider his view of the matter. It must be admitted that he expresses dissent from Kant's doctrine (Logic, n. 233); but we must nevertheless maintain, that when he proceeds to explain himself, there is no real difference whatever on the matter between him and Kant. We will take one instance. He fully admits it to be an axiom (n. 235) that "a straight line is the shortest of all lines which can be drawn between two given points." On what ground does he consider this axiomatic? Does he think that the idea, "shortest between two given points," is *contained* in the idea "straight," so that the former can be seen in the latter by means of *analysis*? He is as far from thinking this as Kant is himself. Here are F. Liberatore's words, the italics of course being our own:—

The notion of greatest shortness is evidently *derived* (elicitur) from the very idea of a straight line. For since a straight line is stretched out uniformly (æqualiter) between the extreme points, *every one sees* that it is shorter than all curves which have the same termination. For the straight line passes over just as much space as is intercepted between the given points; but curves pursue a winding direction, and diverge on one side or the other. Wherefore they are more extended, and pass over more points than those which intervene between the two given extremes. . . .

As to the other examples which [Kant] adduces, we think nothing of them; for it is very manifest that those judgments are obtained either by experience, or by *the immediate comparison of ideas*, or by reasoning.

F. Liberatore then considers any judgment to be "analytical," which is obtained by "the immediate comparison of ideas;" or again, of which the predicate is "evidently *derived* from the very idea" of its subject. But to be "evidently *derived* from" is surely quite different from being "evidently *contained* in." We hold quite as strongly as F. Liberatore does, that every axiom is obtained by "the immediate comparison of ideas"; and that in every axiom the notion of the predicate is evidently derived from the notion of the subject. But Kant entertains the same doctrine, so far as we can understand him, no less firmly than does F. Liberatore himself.

Then as to modern Catholic philosophers in general, there is no proposition more constantly quoted by them as axiomatic, than "parentes sunt honorandi." But no one in his senses

can say, that the idea "parent" *includes* the idea "one to whom honour is due"; that the latter idea can be obtained by a careful *analysis* of the former. Dmowski gives as axioms "Deus est amandus"; "nemo est lædendus": and says that there are many (plura) such (Phil. Mor., n. 33). But surely he could not have thought that these are "analytical" in Kant's sense of that term. When such philosophers then say that all axioms are analytical, they undoubtedly use the word in F. Kleutgen's meaning; they merely intend that "by considering the idea of the subject and predicate, one comes to see that there really exists between them that relation which the axiom expresses."

Passing from moderns to the scholastics, so far as we have been able to examine the matter, two facts are, in our view, abundantly evident. Firstly, they never considered the question explicitly at all, nor had any notion of its momentousness; but secondly, they constantly call some proposition axiomatic, of which no one could dream that it is "analytical" in Kant's sense of that term. It may be worth while however to mention, that in one place Suarez *is* accidentally led to mention that class of propositions, which Kant afterwards called "analytical"; and that no one who reads the passage will for a moment suppose him to account *all* axioms as such. The passage occurs in *Metaph.*, d. 3, s. 3, in the paragraph headed "varia placita." He first mentions what we have already called "tautologies" or truisms"; such as "ens mobile est ens mobile," "substantia est substantia," "accidens est accidens": and these he calls "identical" propositions. Next he mentions a different class of propositions: viz. those in which "a distinct idea is predicated of a confused one;" as e. g., where "the definition is predicated of the thing defined." Such a proposition, he says, "is not 'identical,' but 'doctrinal.'" An obvious instance of this would be one which we have more than once adduced: "all hard substances resist muscular pressure." This is just what Suarez would call a "doctrinal" proposition, and Kant an "analytical" one. And what we are now pointing out, is what will be evident to any one who reads the passage: viz. that Suarez never dreamed of regarding *all* axioms as possessing this "doctrinal" (i. e. "analytical") character, but on the contrary treated these "doctrinal" axioms as an exceptional class.

There is another point of view, from which synthetical axioms may be regarded. We have already pointed out that many axioms are *deducible*. Now some Catholic philosophers seem to hold, that "the principle of contradiction"

is the only axiom which *needs* to be assumed, and that all the rest are reducible to that principle. In other words, these writers hold, as we understand them, that all other axioms can be deduced from the principle of contradiction by help of empirical truths, without postulating any further axiom whatever. "The principle of contradiction," we need hardly say, is the principle: "it is impossible that the same thing can at the same time both exist and not exist." And to hold that no axiom except this principle is absolutely indispensable, is equivalent to the doctrine that all axioms are analytical. This is so important a proposition, that we will give some little time to its exposition. We maintain therefore firstly, that if all axioms were analytical, it would follow that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contradiction; * and we maintain secondly, that if certain axioms are synthetical, it follows that all other axioms are *not* reducible to the principle of contradiction. We will successively illustrate these two statements.

Firstly then, if all axioms were analytical, it would follow that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contradiction. This is clear; because the truth of an analytical proposition at once resolves itself into this principle of contradiction. Let us take our habitual instance, "all hard substances resist muscular pressure." We assume of course, as an empirical truth, that the idea "hard" includes the idea "resisting muscular pressure." If therefore the above-named proposition were false—viz., that all hard substances resist muscular pressure—it would follow that the same substances at the same time do, and do not, resist muscular pressure.

Secondly, if certain axioms are *not* analytical, it follows that all other axioms are not reducible to the principle of contradiction. The reason of this is equally obvious with the reason of our former statement. All synthetical propositions, however well established, can be denied without any violence whatever to the principle of contradiction. Take e. g. the synthetical proposition that the earth moves round the sun: if I denied this proposition,—whatever else could be said against me, no one could possibly allege that I violate the principle of contradiction.

Those philosophers then who hold that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contradiction, hold equivalently that all axioms are analytical; whereas those who deny that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contra-

* Dmowski, e. g., says: "Omnes veritates necessariae reducuntur ad principium contradictionis."

diction, hold equivalently that certain axioms are synthetical.* Or conversely. Those who regard all axioms as analytical, consider that no other axiom except the principle of contradiction *need* be postulated, in order to a sufficient basis for human science; whereas this proposition is emphatically *denied* by those, who regard various axioms as synthetical.

Now Suarez devotes a whole section (d. 3, s. 3) to debating what axioms are requisite for a demonstration of the "passiones de ente"; and he is led to this inquiry (as he begins with stating) by Aristotle's doctrine, that the principle of contradiction is the first and almost sole principle into which all scientific demonstrations should be resolved. He implies (we think) as his own opinion, that *many* different axioms are required. But at all events he lays it down as absolutely certain, that at least *two* are necessary in the strictest sense; and that the principle of contradiction therefore by itself will not suffice.† This is laid down under the head "*aliquot certiora pronunciata*"; and we may be very certain therefore (to say the least) that it was no unknown or rare opinion among the scholastics.

Finally it seems to us, that even if the scholastics had been unanimous in considering all axioms analytical—though such a circumstance would undoubtedly have carried with it considerable weight—yet this is not a question on which their concurrence should be accounted a final and decisive authority. We have spoken on this general subject in our second article; and we have expressed a humble suggestion, that scholastic philosophy is only authoritative so far as it is embedded in scholastic theology. But we do not believe any theological proposition was ever advocated, which would suffer the slightest detriment from admitting the syntheticalness of certain axioms. Indeed we believe we might go much further, though we will not insist on this. As to a declaration of *the Church* against the syntheticalness of axioms, no one has even alleged that any such thing exists.

We cannot see therefore any ground of authority which should prevent us from holding, if reason seems so to declare,

* We cannot for the life of us see how Dmowski would resolve into the principle of contradiction his axioms, "Deus est amandus," "Nemo est lædendus." But he is so accurate and thoughtful a writer, that we distrust our own criticism of him.

† "Necesse est ut [scientia] sistat in principiis seu propositionibus per se notis. Secundo ex hâc ratione concludi videtur, hæc principia non tantum unum sed *plura et ad minus duo* esse debere, saltem quoad hoc ut sint propositiones immediatæ et a priori indemonstrabiles . . . Sunt ergo *necessaria* plura principia prima etiam in hâc scientiâ [metaphysicâ]."

that certain axioms are synthetical. Nay we are confident that on the whole this is really the doctrine both of the scholastics and of their modern supporters. We pass therefore to the ground of reason; and *on* that ground, our difficulty is to understand how there can be a second opinion on the matter. "Every trilateral figure has three angles." Surely I may have taken in the whole idea expressed by the term "trilateral figure," before I have even asked myself any *question* about the number of its angles: and when I did ask myself the question, the answer elicited was a real addition to my stock of knowledge; nor had it constituted any part whatever of my idea "trilateral figure." Then take the particular instance debated between F. Liberatore and Kant. It is no exaggeration at all to say, that a thousand people understand all which is *meant* by a "straight line," for *one* who has ever formed the judgment that such a line is the shortest road between two given points. F. Liberatore, in the passage already quoted, carries his readers with him to this latter judgment, not surely by teaching them to *analyze*, but to *build upon*, their idea of a "straight line." Or going from the most trivial to the most weighty instances—consider the axiom which we have already so often cited: "the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally wrong." Plainly I may have imbibed the full knowledge of what is *meant* by "the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator," before I have thought about it being wrong at all. Doubtless I at once intue the truth that such disobedience is wrong: but in doing so for the first time, I arrive at a knowledge which I did not before possess; my judgment has been synthetical and not analytical.

This being admitted, the further question remains, *how large a proportion* of axioms are synthetical. We reply, all serviceable axioms without exception. "A table is a table," "a horse is a horse," "a tree is a tree,"—these are axioms, for they are "necessary first truths": but they are not *serviceable* axioms; they will never advance science one single step.* Now we maintain that all analytical axioms, so far as they are axioms, are of this tautologous and unserviceable character; and that their real value is entirely psychological and empirical. Take the instance which we have so often given: "all hard substances resist muscular pressure." So far as this is a *necessary* proposition—i. e. so far as it is an axiom—it merely declares that all hard substances are hard, and that all things without exception which resist muscular pres-

* "Illa propositio est identica et negatoria."—Suarez, *Metaph.*, d. 3, s. 3.

sure, resist muscular pressure. The value of the proposition is psychological; and consists in its declaration, that the idea "hard," *as conceived by the human mind*, includes the idea of "resisting muscular pressure."

We entreat Catholic thinkers to weigh the arguments which we have adduced for the syntheticalness of serviceable axioms: because (as at present minded) we cannot but think the question very fundamental indeed; and we are very desirous therefore of correcting our own view by that of more competent judges. So much at all events is certain: that neither Mill, nor Bain, nor any phænomenist in the world, would dream of denying the self-evident character of all *analytical* truths; and that consequently, if Catholics on their side *confined* self-evidence to such truths, *so far* at all events they would not rise above the phænomenist level. Our own impression is, that the whole controversy against empiricism will be found ultimately to turn on this very question of synthetical axioms.

There is more than one further proposition on axioms which seems to us of great importance: but we must not occupy too large a portion of our number with things philosophical, and must hasten therefore to a conclusion of this article. We will only here add that, according to our view of the case, the number of axioms is very large indeed; and that the number of axioms is very far from inconsiderable, which must *by absolute necessity* be postulated, as a foundation for human science in its full attainable extent. Nor are we aware that we at all contravene the ordinary doctrine of scholastic philosophers in expressing this judgment.

The necessary objective validity of logical reasoning is of course to be accepted as axiomatic. Science, in the widest signification which that word can bear exclusive of revelation, comprises that vast body of truths, theological,* metaphysical, ethical, psychological, social, physical, which is founded on first truths (whether empirical or non-empirical), and is elaborated by those logical processes, which possess (as we have just observed) necessary objective validity. Necessary truth then is the very back-bone of science, so that without it science cannot exist: while yet on the other hand if science handled *exclusively* necessary truths, it would be a kind of abstract and ideal structure, resembling a skeleton uncovered by flesh. All this is excellently set forth by F. Kleutgen. He points out e. g. (vol. ii. p. 202), that "thought" supplies "the necessary and universal," experience only "the contin-

* We refer, of course, to truths of *natural* theology.

gent and particular"; that by experience taken alone the mind can never be certain of objective truth; that whoever doubts the existence of the necessary and universal, must renounce all scientific knowledge. "By abstract thought," he presently says (p. 214), "we cannot indeed know the *existence* of things: but we *can* acquire a certainty, not only that certain things are intrinsically possible and others not, but also what would be the mutual *relations* of the former if they did exist, and according to what laws they would operate and live." Abstract thought, he says, cannot show e. g. that bodies exist; but it *can* show that, *if* they exist, in them is verified "all which mathematics teach concerning quantity, and physics concerning motion." We have no room here for illustrating and enlarging on these pregnant principles; but we have thought it desirable to point out—in opposition to some Catholics and to some non-Catholics—how violently opposed to the modern empirical school is the very fundamental notion of scholastic philosophy.

We have said in an earlier article that some modern upholders of the scholastic philosophy claim for it, if we understand their meaning rightly, a far more complete immunity than F. Kleutgen does, from omissions and even mistakes. We now further add, that the same writers, so far as we can form a judgment, put too much in the background (though of course they do not dream of denying) that very vital part of the scholastic philosophy, which dwells on necessary and universal truths. In both these respects F. Kleutgen seems to us quite a model: and we have endeavoured, under his guidance, to express one or two doctrines, which are thoroughly in accordance with the scholastic philosophy, while they are especially needed at this time. Of course we may have made various incidental mistakes; but, taking our position as a whole, we would ask whether it may not afford a common platform, on which both Canon Walker and Dr. Meynell may harmoniously stand. We would ask Canon Walker, whether we have said anything, which even tends to conflict with the fundamental principles of scholasticism; and we would ask Dr. Meynell, whether we have not admitted, as heartily as he admits it himself, the existence of "an *à priori* positive objective element of thought, distinct from the mind itself, and stamped with the characters of necessity and universality" (p. 5). If both writers answer our question in our favour, we may perhaps flatter ourselves that we have made one little step, towards the attainment of greater philosophical unity among Catholics. At all events, we heartily sympathize with Dr. Meynell in his utter repudiation of any philosophy, which

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shall not thoroughly secure the objective necessity of certain fundamental truths; though we must contend that this foundation is secured by the scholastic writers.

We are very much disappointed that we are obliged to break off our article almost abruptly, without entering on one or two important collateral points, and without any comment on Dr. Meynell's general argument. Especially we wished to dwell on that "light of reason," in which all axioms are self-evident, and on which the scholastics have excellently spoken. But we will insert in October what we are obliged here to omit; and we have evidently much more chance of being read, if we do not unduly tax our reader's patience. We must not however conclude, without one word of protest against Dr. Meynell's treatment of F. Liberatore. We certainly agree with Dr. Meynell's March critic of the "Month," in deprecating his *tone* towards so considerable a person and so loyal a son of the Church: for ourselves however, we rather wish to dwell on F. Liberatore's *doctrine*. We cannot profess anything like a thorough acquaintance with the "Conoscenza intellettuale," which we never even opened until we were induced to do so by Dr. Meynell's pamphlet. But wherever we have looked at it, we have found it to express a very different doctrine from what Dr. Meynell had led us to expect. Dr. Meynell considers that all thinkers are denounced by F. Liberatore as "virtually ontologists," who admit "an *à priori* objective element of thought stamped with the character of necessity and universality;" nay, and that "no reader" of the work "will call this in question." Well, we have not been *readers* of the work, but only *dippers* into it. Still we have lighted on many such passages as the following; and as we had been prepossessed by Dr. Meynell's statement, we observed them with extreme surprise.

It is no wonder that Locke's theory issues finally in destroying logically all *à priori* knowledge; in reducing science to mere *empiricism*; from whence germinate *materialism* and *scepticism* (vol ii. n. 213).

The opinion "that there is no knowledge except from the senses" *would destroy all science*; since science has for its object truth, *in so far as it is necessary and immutable* (n. 59).

But a far more important passage occurs in the preceding page, because it throws clear light on F. Liberatore's whole attitude towards the ontologists. He there professes his perfect agreement with them, in holding "*the absolute and immutable nature*" which "*the truth*" of first principles "*shows itself to us as objectively possessing.*" He agrees with

the ontologists also, in utterly rejecting any such notion, as that human convictions of necessary truth are but "subjective forms of the human mind." He calls this error a "fatal rock, by impinging on which the bark of science would make total shipwreck." He only condemns ontologists, so far as they fancy that there can be no security for the objective necessity of those truths, except by supposing man to see them here on earth in the very vision of God. Certainly, so far as this particular passage is concerned,—and it is a very critical and decisive one,—we can see no important difference between F. Liberatore and Dr. Meynell himself.

ART. IX.—THE REVOLUTION IN SPAIN.

Le Roi d'Espagne. Par APARISI Y GUIJARRO. Paris : Jouast.

THERE is hardly any more extraordinary instance of the political sagacity of the Duke of Wellington, than his conviction, repeatedly and emphatically expressed now nearly fifty years ago, that Spain was about to be ruined by a series of military revolutions. In the year 1820 occurred the first of those insurrections of the Spanish army, since so frequently known by the name of *Pronunciamentos*; and while it was yet uncertain how it should end—whether, in fact, the king would hold out, or succumb—the duke wrote to his old friend, General Alava, a long letter breathing the strong and almost native interest which he always took in Spanish affairs. "*Tenez, mon cher!*" he says towards its end. "I have read of many misfortunes which have befallen nations. I have seen much of public calamity in the course of my life. But no one has ever seen the like of that which will come to pass in Spain, if the king should be so unfortunate as to capitulate to, or even to treat with, the revolted troops. As you know, I do not love republics, and, above all, *la Constitucion Española*; but I would prefer a thousand times the success of the revolt and the establishment of the Constitution to the capitulation of the king." The Duke of Wellington was a soldier, but there never was a statesman, civilian, ecclesiastic, or juriconsult in any age or country who had such an utter horror of Prætorianism. He understood and he believed in the British Constitution, and soldier as he was—the very greatest and best of British soldiers—he yet felt that the secret of its supremacy

and duration was the strict subordination of the numbers and attributions of the standing army to the authority of Crown and Parliament. He knew if it was possible to suppose the case of a mutiny of the Guards, investing Buckingham Palace and deposing Ministers in Downing-street, that the end of the British Empire would have begun; and he applied those principles—true principles wherever civil society exists—to the case of Spain.

A few weeks afterwards, writing to the Duc de Richelieu, after some words as to the then state of affairs in France, which conclude with this remarkable sentence, "I only foresee chaos for the world, if that which is at present established cannot consolidate itself," he goes on to speak of the state of the Peninsula in these terms:—

Since I last wrote to you, I see that the King of Spain has yielded everything; and so far as I can see, the concession has been made to his perfidious generals and his revolted army; for it does not appear that the people, or even the Liberal party which undoubtedly exists in Spain, have come to the front at all. All has been done throughout by the officers and soldiers of the army; and lo! here is a revolution effected against the well-understood wishes, if I do not deceive myself, not only of the king but of a majority of the nation so great that it may well be called unanimous. . . . God knows where all this will end, even in Spain. It is a triumph for the party of disorder such as they have not had since the month of March, 1815. But it really is even more important. Then the revolted army had the excuse of attachment to their old chief; and that chief was Bonaparte, who knew how to restrain them and to moderate their excesses, and who knew the consequences of a revolution produced by a military revolt; but in Spain we have the pure unmitigated evil, and the example is terrible.

The same week, writing again to General Alava, in the course of a letter which exhibits a degree of emotion, almost foreign to his calm and contained character, he exclaims:—

Where is the Government that will know how to restrain, and that will be able henceforward to restrain this army which has overthrown the government of the King? Who can give assurance that it will not overthrow the "Constitution," and everything except itself, as easily as it has upset the King's government? If the Government of Spain must henceforth reside in the army, into the hands of what general or generals shall it fall? Who is to be the Bonaparte? All these questions are important questions to solve, and, from the depth of my soul, I pity those whose lot depends on their solution.

These words were written nearly fifty years ago, on the 30th of March, 1820; and it is not enough to say that they are as true to-day as they were then—because they are more

true—they were even more true in foresight than in fact. The duke saw the germ, and he knew what it would grow to—we see the deadly tree. Steadily, ever since the date of those letters, events have so worked that the sword has become the sole authority in Spain. It is a stratocracy in a much more strict sense than the first French empire ever was. “That empire,” as Mr. Grattan said, “is a stratocracy, elective, aggressive, and predatory; her armies live to fight, and fight to live.” But the Spanish stratocracy does not even fight—it lives only to cabal and plunder. Ever since it first took form, in 1820, each successive attack that it has made on the Constitution of its country has been accompanied by the disgraceful withdrawal of the Spanish flag from some renowned post or some opulent land. It has not even fought to maintain the empire which Spanish soldiers conquered and established. In his first letter to General Alava, the duke uses these memorable words:—“In any case, let this revolt end how it may, I believe that your colonies, except Mexico, of which you must take good care, are lost.” Within little more than a year afterwards, even Mexico had declared its independence; as now the days of the Spanish occupation of Cuba seem to be at last numbered; but, unfortunately for the separated Spanish colonies, the spirit of stratocracy had already infected their vitals. The government of Mexico, in particular, has been ever since transacted through a series of barrack-yard revolutions, amounting to two hundred and forty, according to the last computation; and public power has devolved in the Spanish colonies, as in the mother country, through a succession of generals, each rising for his turn of rapine. The present Spanish revolution differs from its predecessors mainly in this respect, that the generals having, as the Duke of Wellington predicted, at last subverted everything in Spain except the army itself, find that they must now share their spoil even with the sergeants. All the ranks of the army have been degraded by a universal promotion, the scandalous reward of the soldier’s breach of his oath of allegiance. The army estimates, lately laid before the Cortes, show that in the infantry alone, the revolution has added 1,635 commissioned officers to the retinue of General Prim. Last year there were 65 colonels, there are now 141. Last year, there were 176 lieutenant-colonels—the present number is 266. In the next rank, that of Chief of Battalion, a stroke of the pen has more than doubled the roll of officers; in 1868 the figure was 399, it is now 804. The captains have increased from 1,455 to 1,671; but the number of lieutenants, in consequence of the rush of promotion in the upper ranks, actually fell from

2,397 to 2,133. In the list of sub-lieutenants, however, we see an increase, which shows that in this revolution, at all events, the Spanish sergeant does not go unrewarded. When Queen Isabella left Spain, there were 1,888 officers holding the rank of ensign, many of them, it may be supposed, honourable and loyal young soldiers, commencing in ardour and good faith to discharge the duties of a noble profession. This first step has been won in a way which it will not be well to remember, even though it may yet fall to the lot of many among them to serve their country by years of loyal duty and deeds of worthy valour. At present, the rank which they held is almost swamped. General Prim has made, in the course of six or seven months, no less than 1,200 sub-lieutenants. There are 3,000 officers of that rank now. In the Spanish Infantry altogether, there are 8,015 commissioned officers of all grades, as against 6,380 who were borne on the Army List last September. Nor, we may feel sure, has less been done for the Cavalry, Artillery, Marines, and Navy. Thus the Spanish Revolution eventuates in a bloated brevet. Thus the Spanish army comes to be represented before Christendom as a greedy horde of Prætorians, false to military honour, covetous of rank which ceases to have value when given wholesale, the heaviest, the most exorbitant, and the most unmanageable burden on the finances of an insolvent country.

The history of Spain ever since the date at which the Duke of Wellington wrote the passages which we have quoted has amply proved his wonderful foresight. It is a history of military mutinies. Every country in Europe has suffered more or less from the action of the Revolution; but Spain is the only country in which the civil government has been regarded as the proper spoil of its military chiefs. Looking back over the space of time which separates us from the period at which Wellington wrote, it is safe to say that the fortunes of the Spanish monarchy were wrecked in that reign, in the first place by the submission of King Ferdinand to the military revolt of 1821, and in the second place by the promulgation of the Pragmatic Sanction, which, on the eve of the birth of the Princess Isabella, suddenly altered the order of succession to the throne. Whether that act was constitutional or unconstitutional, we are not now concerned to discuss. The old controversy of Carlist and Christino has come to a bitter end. The throne to which Don Carlos denied his niece's right no longer bears a Bourbon. It has remained for now nine months, and is likely to remain for some little time longer, vacant. But who can doubt that if a prince of a pious, vigorous, and patriotic character, such as Don

Carlos certainly was, had succeeded to the crown on the demise of King Ferdinand in 1833, that the whole history of Spain would have run in a different course? Who can doubt that the lot of Queen Isabella herself would have been happier and more dignified? If ever there was a prince who, in the finest qualities of his character—in his defects as well, it may be alleged,—was essentially Spanish, it was Don Carlos—a man then of mature age, of large experience, of a character grave and solid, and whom the Spanish nation had for many years regarded as its future sovereign. Instead was carried from her cradle to the throne a little girl not yet quite three years old; while when the King's will was opened, it was found that he had named his widow Regent, a Neapolitan princess, then lately married, and never much beloved by the Spanish nation. The civil war which followed, and which lasted for six years, was a great evil; but the worst part of it was the foreign intervention, which enabled the cause which was not the cause of the majority of the Spanish nation to triumph. Nor was it so great an evil as the system which became the settled order of Spanish government. As soon as the Queen's title had been made to prevail by force of arms, as soon as the civil war had come to an end, the rule of the Captains General began. First, Espartero deposed the Queen mother from the Regency, banished her from Spain, and had himself declared sole Regent in 1841. Before the end of that year was made the attempt of the Conchas, Diego Leon, and other generals, to force their way into the royal apartments and carry off the Queen—an attempt only defeated by force of arms at the very door of her Majesty's chamber. At the same time O'Donnell had gained the garrison and shelled the town of Pampeluna in the interest of the Queen Regent; but hearing of the failure of the Madrid conspiracy, was obliged to take refuge in France. In 1842, the General in command was obliged to bombard Barcelona on the score of its Republican sympathies; but in 1843 Barcelona "pronounced" much more effectually. Then for the first time the name of Prim appeared in Spanish history, as the desperate enemy of Espartero, whom he subsequently succeeded in the leadership of the Progressista party. Under Prim's influence—he was then a colonel and deputy—a revolutionary junta proclaimed the deposition of Espartero from the Regency; while the Provisional Government, composed of Serrano, Caballero, and others, declared him a traitor to Spain. At the same time, to avoid the struggle of so many rival ambitions for the office of Regent, the unfortunate young Queen, then only thirteen years of age, was declared to

have attained her majority. The first Regent had been banished to France; the second was now obliged to take refuge in England. Narvaez, who had commanded the principal body of troops which declared against Espartero, rose to the dictatorship, but not until Olozaga had been banished; and Prim, who had been one year made a count and a major-general, found himself in the next sentenced to six years' imprisonment for a conspiracy, coupled with an attempt on the life of Narvaez. The Queen mother was recalled to Spain. Her marriage with Munoz, which had taken place within two months after King Ferdinand's death, was recognized by Royal decree. But soon Narvaez was obliged to follow Espartero into exile. And then came the "Spanish marriages," the work of Louis Philippe's astute ambition, whose long revolved result we see in the relations which the Duc de Montpensier had and has with the cabal of officers who effected the late Revolution. In 1847, Prim and Serrano reappear, one as Captain-General of Porto Rico, the other of Andalusia, while Narvaez is once more gazetted Prime Minister. He held office then until 1851. A period of frequent ministerial crises followed, which was brought to an end in 1854 by the military insurrection of Vicalvaro, headed by Serrano, Dulce, Ros de Olano, but above all by O'Donnell, who then rose to supreme power, at first in conjunction with Espartero, but afterwards alone. It is impossible to justify the way in which General O'Donnell obtained the control of Spain, but it is equally impossible to deny that throughout the unusually long period during which he remained Prime Minister, he conducted the affairs of the country with dignity, energy, and wisdom. Within a few years the imports of the country rose from the value of seven millions sterling to upwards of thirteen; the exports from five millions to ten millions and a half; the revenue from £11,379,264 to £18,126,314. The war of Morocco showed that the Spanish army, however corrupt some of its superior officers, still possessed the undaunted valour and the solid discipline which, in distant days, when it was commanded by the Prince of Parma, placed it at the head of the armies of Europe, but which, during two centuries, it was commonly supposed, had utterly degenerated. It was generally believed that Spain, long almost excluded from the comity of nations, would soon reappear as one of the great Powers. The question of the cession of Gibraltar began to be seriously discussed in England. The people of the United States abandoned utterly the attempts to annex Cuba, which had been frequent during the previous ten years. In the Government of Spain itself, a

regular constitutional system appeared to have been inaugurated, for though O'Donnell was in power for the greater part of the twelve years which followed the *coup d'état* of Vicalvaro, yet he willingly went into opposition more than once, and always so conducted himself as to strengthen the system of Parliamentary Government and to elevate the credit and honour of Spain. But towards the close of his last ministry, the old evil spirit reappeared. Prim, who since he organized the *pronunciamiento* of 1843 against Espartero, had risen to all but the highest rank in the army, and had moreover been made a grandee and a marquis, grew weary of seeing the supreme power pass from the hands of O'Donnell to Narvaez, and from those of Narvaez to O'Donnell. He conspired, and rebelled. But O'Donnell crushed the attempt with hardly an effort. It was his last service to Spain. He soon afterwards resigned office. Within a year, both he and Narvaez died; and the conspiracy of Prim, which had proved such a fiasco in 1867, steadily spread through the army and navy, aided, it is well believed, by the gold of the Duc de Montpensier, until in October last it brought to an end the reign of the unfortunate Queen Isabella. Well may the writer, to whose excellent sketch of recent Spanish history we are indebted for the recapitulation of all those outrages on the honour of Spain by those who were its sworn defenders—well may he say,—

Ever since Queen Isabella's infancy, she has known nothing but civil war, insurrections, treasons, massacres, atrocities committed either in her name or against her. Her early education was unhappily neglected, and the little she ever received was during the regency of Espartero, when the Countess Mina, widow of the famous chief during the War of Independence, was her governess. When only ten years old, she was left without her mother's care—such as that care was—and with hardly one disinterested adviser, surrounded as she was by those whose principal object was to force their way into power. At the age of thirteen, she was declared competent to govern an unsettled nation. She was barely sixteen when, to promote the selfish policy of Louis Philippe, she was married.*

Nine months have now passed since the deposition of Queen Isabella, and the most monarchical of European countries is still without a king, unless in so far as the bayonet is king. Serrano is in the place from which he expelled Espartero a

* A paper in the *Times* of October 28th, 1868, on the Spanish succession, written, we presume, from its clear, energetic style, and its intimate knowledge of Spanish affairs, by the Paris correspondent of that journal, Mr. O'Meagher, who himself served with distinction, under Sir De Lacy Evans, during the civil war.

quarter of a century ago, Regent of Spain but without even an Infant to represent the ancient royalty of the twelve kingdoms, whose crowns had in the course of ages at last devolved on the Spanish Bourbons. The country which, ten years ago, showed such conditions of progress and prosperity, is fast falling into a state of utter anarchy and insolvency. It is not merely that the revolution has completed the ruin of the credit of the country—it has destroyed many of the chief sources of its revenue. The public offices swarm with new, ignorant, and corrupt officials. The finance minister himself complains that it is impossible to obtain an exact knowledge of the resources and revenues which are at his disposal. In many places, the people resist by force of arms the levy of taxes. In many places they believe and act on the belief that the revolution having abolished taxation should proceed to abolish property also. The mutual animosities of even the highest members of the government are so great, that no one who has real knowledge of Spanish affairs would be surprised to hear any day that Prim had effected a *coup d'état* against the Regency of Serrano, or that Serrano had outlawed Prim. Topete has in the Cortes publicly declared that there was danger of a *coup d'état* from one or the other, and though this gallant sailor could not keep the oath he had sworn to be faithful to his queen, on whose hand he pressed the kiss of Judas the day before he betrayed her, yet no one doubts his word on such a point as this. It is only according to precedent. It is according to the common course of the history of Spain ever since the death of King Ferdinand. It is precisely what the Duke of Wellington foresaw and predicted fifty years ago.

Meantime, however, the public press, almost without exception, disguises, denies, or misrepresents the state of the case. In regard to Spain, nothing is told as it is, everything as it is not. There is the conspiracy against the truth of certain well-known writers, who are as sure to be found wherever there is an outbreak of human calamity and impiety, exulting in their worst excesses, as the petrel joys to flutter in the van of storm. There is the conspiracy of silence. How many English journalists have ventured to say of these Spanish generals and admirals what they really feel? In the worst days of the worst sovereigns of England, what would be thought of officers who were continual conspirators against the Government, whose epaulettes they wore, whose pay they drew, whose titles they took? If an English admiral or general had acted even towards George the Fourth as Serrano, Prim, Topete have acted towards Isabella,

what would be his place in history? How is it, then, that the natural instincts of Englishmen, and their oldest political traditions, have become so perverted, that they seem to see with pleasure Spain in the hands of a band of vain, covetous, and dishonest officers? Is it because, after all, it is not merely the army but the Revolution that is enthroned in Spain?

We have read with the greater interest, because it is so difficult to understand how public opinion really tends in Spain, the very earnestly and eloquently written pamphlet, whose title we have prefixed to this article. It is, at all events, the frank and manly expression of faith of one loyal Spaniard, who believes that a restoration of Queen Isabella is impossible, that the election of the Duc de Montpensier would be an infamy that could not endure, that the Spanish nation will never consent to be ruled by a foreign king, and therefore that the true policy of all good Spaniards is to call to the throne of his ancestors Don Carlos de Bourbon et d'Este, the grandson of the Don Carlos of the civil war, who now bears the title of Duke of Madrid.

M. Aparisi's pamphlet derives much of its interest from the judicial tone of the writer's mind, and from the brief explanation which he gives of his personal position and antecedents. His style is quaint, simple, and convincing, and there is a considerable touch of humour in his declaration, that he is quite sure he shall not be suspected of falsehood, because all his compatriots know him, and are well aware that nothing would pay him for lying. This is an odd preamble. "I don't ask anything from anybody, neither from the King, nor from the people, except that justice which is everybody's due, liberty to do honourable work, and eight feet of earth in which to hide my corpse." He has not suffered in purse, person, or esteem by the revolution; he has had friends of all shades and grades of opinion, and he retains them; he has quarrelled with no man, but he has come to an irresistible conviction that Spain must be ruled by a man, by a king with the prestige and the right of a Bourbon, and the indispensable guarantee to Catholic Spain of being a good Catholic. He believes that the man for the position is Don Carlos. He has arrived at that conviction after a curiously elaborate investigation, undertaken in an entirely impartial spirit, subsequently to a painful and critical examination of the condition of things in the Cortes, and without any individual prejudice whatever. Of the revolution M. Agassiz writes with the utmost contempt. He says:—

This revolution was fruitful in evil, because it was a chastisement, and, as it was nothing more, God condemned it to a dishonourable sterility for good.

Hideous bankruptcy is not only at our doors, as Mirabeau said, it is in our house. . . . But a people does not die ; Spain cannot die. Recalling the words of Chateaubriand, I refuse to believe that I write on the tomb of Spain. I have consulted oracles which do not deceive, and she who was always the beloved of Almighty God and the right arm of Christianity shall not die. But, after these great troubles, who will re-establish order in Spain ? Who will give us a State government, the peace we sigh for, and real liberty ?

With frankness and simplicity M. Aparisi relates his entire ignorance of Don Carlos, and his hesitation to accept the accounts of him given by the enthusiastic admirers, who declared him perfection, and the pessimists, who said he was utterly insignificant. He made the Prince's acquaintance, cultivated that acquaintance into intimacy, and records the result in several highly interesting pages, from which the following is an extract :—

Now, I have seen him, known him, passed many long days with him ; and I, who, if I know anything in this world, know at least a little of the human heart, boldly salute Don Carlos de Bourbon and d'Este as the hope of Spain. I venture to tell the people of Spain that their king lives in an unpretending house in the Rue Chauveau Lagarde.

In that house everything is exemplary. The table is simple, dress is modest, the manner of receiving is cordial and unaffected. One seems to breathe an atmosphere of antique virtue under that roof. I have often said to others, when we left their house, " If it were possible for Don Carlos and Dona Margherita to live at Madrid as private gentlefolks, and if Madrid knew them as we know them, Madrid would turn Carlist for the love of them." As for me, I do not know a nobler or purer heart than that of Don Carlos. During many hours of calm and serious conversation, I have often tried to make his heart vibrate, and always found it had a ready echo for great things. He lives in Paris, where pleasure spreads her nets on every side for youth ; and he passes his days in study, and his evenings in the society of his beloved wife. What passion, what thought rules this young man ? Spain. I cannot with truth proclaim him a *savant*, but I have remarked his ready intelligence and his sound judgment. I have heard him make remarks which were not only just but profound ; and I have observed that, whenever great deeds or sublime sayings are quoted to him, he takes them as matters of course, quite natural, as though his intelligence and his heart harmonized with greatness. The principal attraction of the young prince is that he unites with the frankness of youth a certain reserve rarely found, except at a riper age, and that he appears to possess docility which seeks counsel, together with firmness which knows how to form immutable resolutions. When he bends down and speaks out of the expansion of his heart he is a young man whom we must love ; when he lifts up his forehead and throws his head back, the king appears, to command respect. I know that affection is not impartial, and I confess that I entertain devoted

affection for the young royal couple, but I hope my readers will admit that I must have seen some fine qualities in them to provoke that regard. If the noble character of Don Carlos does not belie itself, Don Carlos will be the most popular and beloved king that Spain has ever had. I trust in God that he will not change. His sureties are the Christian education he has received, the frankness of heart and intensity of judgment so happily united in his character, the prayers of his pious mother, and the constant example of his sweet, tender, and most exemplary wife. Dona Marguerite de Bourbon is enchanting. I have seen her often beside her child's cradle, occupied with household cares like Isabella the Catholic. Her universe consists of that cradle and her husband. How simple is her manner, how great her goodness to the poor, how unceasing her charity towards the sick! When she speaks with her lips, her heart speaks, and all she says is beautiful, for she possesses that rarest of gifts, exceptional intelligence, and is unconscious of it. Happy the man who calls her his wife. Happy the people who shall one day salute her as their queen.

There is something to our mind deeply touching in the enthusiasm with which this old and gifted Spaniard gives all the loyal devotion of his heart and soul to the cause of this prince and princess, whom he found in their modest mansion in a little street at the back of the Madeleine, but whom we hope he may soon salute at the Escorial as King and Queen of Spain. We have some reason to believe that his praise of them is by no means exaggerated—that Don Carlos is a young man of a serious, studious, and resolute character, internally impressed with a faith in his mission, and whose whole life is devoted to prepare himself for the task to which he believes God has called him—a king of men by natural gifts as well as hereditary right. Every one who has had the good fortune to know the Princess Marguerite must have been struck by her high intelligence, her brave spirit, and the charming dignity of her manner. Public opinion in this country certainly ignores their right, indeed almost ignores their existence. Some twenty-five years ago there was a somewhat similar case. There was a pretender to the crown of France, who had lived in this country for many years. He had not, however, contrived to make himself agreeable to the leading spirits of the class who manufacture public opinion. In those days, if he was ever spoken of at all, he was spoken of with supreme contempt, as a sort of addle-pated charlatan who kept a tame eagle, and talked in the turgid style of a bulletin. But one fine day he became President, and then Emperor; and in addition to his other distinctions there is one quite original, which may now be safely predicated of him. He has been the subject, or the object, of more leading articles than any human being born since Adam, written by the self-same writers in every strain,

from unbounded panegyric to unmitigated vituperation. The Prince who at present aspires to the crown of Spain at a moment when Spain is in quite as dangerous a condition, to say the least of it, as France was in 1848, is a very different character from the Prince Louis Napoleon; but he is like him in this respect, that he has a fixed faith in his right, that he is ready to risk his life for it, and that he has made the aspirations and interests of Spain the study of his life. The moment has not yet, perhaps, arrived, but we believe it is near at hand, when Don Carlos will only have to show himself to the Spanish people to be hailed as, in a very real sense, the saviour of society, and the worthiest king his country has had since the death of Charles III.

The topic of Spanish royalty is indeed one whose interest, vital to Spain itself, is one of deep moment to all Christendom. An ancient and illustrious kingdom, a noble and pious people, have now for nine months been the booty of a handful of military adventurers. Elsewhere the revolution has been able to build up as well as knock down; but in Spain, those who hold power know that its foundation must be Catholic; and all they can do is to maintain a precarious interregnum, in which every sort of opinion is tolerated except that which sustains one cause. That cause is the cause of Don Carlos. Occasionally Mr. Reuter informs Europe that a number of Carlist officers have been arrested, or that a band of peasants who shouted for Charles the Seventh has been fired upon. General Prim's instinct leads him to see that the great danger of the present Government, and of Prætorian Government in general, lies in the growing disposition of the mass of the Spanish people and clergy towards a Carlist restoration. Such a restoration would, we believe, be not merely the saving of Spain through the revival of what was once the freest and the most Catholic of monarchies, but a blow to the revolution throughout Europe hardly second in importance to that dealt to it at the battle of Mentana.

ART. X.—A GLANCE AT CATHOLIC HOME POLITICS.

THERE are two subjects of imperial importance now actively agitated, in which Catholics have an especial concern. Indeed, the interest and life of the Catholic Church enter, as the woof into the warp, into these critical and national questions. We refer of course to the Irish disestablishment and to popular

education. On the former of these questions, events are hurrying on with giant speed to their conclusion. Mr. Gladstone having had the good fortune to be in full harmony with the people of these realms, has, with a tact and decision surpassed by no former statesman, already steered the principle contended for through both houses of the Legislature. Amidst the rapid throng and pressure of events, it would be impossible to draw out theories or to exhibit arguments in this number of our REVIEW, which could in any way practically touch the question. The last throes and efforts of the dying Establishment party will have passed away, almost by the time these pages are in the hands of our readers.

The grand legislative enactment of this session will naturally form the subject of our study and estimate in its complete shape; and what very few comments we now can offer, must be considered by our readers subject to more or less modification, as possibly resulting from more mature reflection. But our present impression is that, so far from the House of Lords and the Conservative policy having stood in the way of the Catholic Church, it has, by a fortunate combination, promoted her interest. Had the Bill become law when it had passed the third reading of the Commons, the result would have been that the Protestants would have retained a large proportion of their property, and the Catholic Church would have had its large Maynooth endowment commuted for an insignificant sum. The Protestants would have been in possession of the enormous revenues of Trinity College, while the Catholics would have been almost entirely stripped of their educational fund. And more than this, though Irish Anglicanism would have been disestablished, it is by no means certain that the retention of houses and glebes and churches by the Protestants, while the Catholics continued on in their poverty, would not have left throughout the country the savour of a dominant spirit. The Lords, however, as we write, show themselves inclined to remedy this defect and injustice. Although they may make larger grants to the Protestant communion, yet if the effect of this is to give houses and glebes to the Catholic Church, they will, pro tanto, have improved the status of the Catholic clergy and their people. They will have taken away the stigma of inferiority, by giving equal rights in houses and lands to the Catholic Church with the Protestant communion. One point must be clearly borne in mind. The Catholic Church in Ireland will accept no stipendiary grant—nothing which can present even a superficial appearance of dependency upon the State. The grant of glebes and of houses will be nothing more than a very inadequate act of restitution; and yet the Church would certainly decline to receive even these, unless they were vested in the control and authority of the hierarchy. A cunning

game might be attempted by an astute politician, of placing rights in houses and lands in the hands of the priests, to be played off against the bishops; and such an effort may, very possibly, in fact be made in order to divide the clergy. This has been attempted more than once before, and has always failed. The priests themselves are as determined as the bishops, that nothing shall separate their interests from those of their hierarchy. They feel, as all must feel, that the only condition on which glebes and houses can be accepted is, that they be placed irrevocably in the hands of the Church, to be settled and regulated by proper authority; just as it is proposed that the Protestant communion shall exercise control over whatever may be eventually given to it for its share of the spoils.

We think also that Catholics have every reason to rejoice, in whatever may strengthen the House of Lords as a substantive and independent power in the state. The peers' recent resolve to be led by Lord Salisbury rather than Lord Derby, may have important results in this respect; nor could anything be more thoroughly satisfactory, than the former nobleman's exposition of the true legislative position of the Upper House. In this very session we have to thank that House heartily, for its important mitigation of the odious Scotch educational measure introduced by Government. And as time goes on, Catholics will more and more turn to that House and to the Conservative party, for protection against the bigotry and tyranny which liberalism so prominently displays, in all matters connected with education.

And this brings us to the second great question which we mentioned at starting—the question of Catholic popular education. During the winter a series of meetings were held all over London upon this subject. On the 24th of June a large and enthusiastic gathering of the Catholics of London assembled in St. James's Hall. It will be sufficient if we indicate in the briefest terms the advance made during the past three years in the diocese of Westminster.

The Archbishop who presided at the meeting began his speech by drawing the following contrast between the opening and closing of the first period of three years since the founding of the Diocesan Fund.

First:—

1. In the two years preceding the formation of the Diocesan Fund, the number of children attending our schools had diminished by 500.
2. In many of the most populous parts of London additional schools were urgently needed.
3. The number of pupil teachers had greatly decreased.
4. The Reformatory School at Brook Green was overcrowded, and insufficient for the number of boys constantly committed by the magistrates.
5. S. Nicholas's Industrial School at Walthamstow was still more over-

crowded, and a still larger number of boys were being committed by the magistrates to Protestant schools.

6. In the Middlesex Feltham School there were about eighty Catholic boys educated as Protestants.

7. S. Margaret's Industrial School (Queen's Square) for girls was in a very unsatisfactory state.

8. In the workhouse schools of the metropolitan district only there were from 1,200 to 1,500 Catholic children systematically educated as Protestants, and not one as yet had been rescued.

9. There was no fund for education in the diocese.

Second:—

1. At the close of these three years (*i. e.*, at the present date), 3,000 children have been added to our schools.

2. Thirty additional schools have been formed.

3. The pupil teachers have increased by nine in the last year.

4. A house and 11 acres of land have been purchased in Essex for the reformatory school, which will be enlarged by the outlay of £3,000, so as to hold at least 200 boys.

5. S. Nicholas's Industrial School has been removed to a large house with eight acres of land in Essex. The house has been enlarged so as to receive 250, and a chapel and refectory are about to be built.

6. Not a Catholic boy remains in the school at Feltham.

7. S. Margaret's School for girls has been removed to Finchley, and is in a most satisfactory state.

8. 230 children have been removed from the Poor Law Schools, and 170 more have been applied for.

9. The Diocesan Fund has received and is receiving such support, as to warrant our confidence that its work is not only permanent, but will extend itself every year.

Not the least remarkable and important feature that we have to note, is the perceptible increase in interest in, and the determination among all classes of Catholics to promote, the proper Christian development of popular education.

The meeting held in St. James's Hall was an indication of this feeling. It was largely attended, and a settled resolution seemed to have taken possession of all present to look upon the Christian education of the poor as among their paramount duties. If we have dwelt with some particularity upon the working of the Westminster diocesan system of education, it is because by so doing we conveniently register the efforts which Catholics are making throughout Great Britain in the cause of education.

We conclude with quoting some remarks from the "Tablet" on one especial feature of the St. James's Hall meeting:—

Two feelings seemed to run through every speech, and to animate the enthusiastic audience which crowded the hall. The one was a strong, quiet

determination to carry this inatter through, and to leave no stone unturned until there remains no Catholic child throughout the land who is robbed of his faith. The other feeling was that the English nation was not guilty of this thing, nor the English Government ; but the guardians only. England in the main, men felt, was just and fair ; the nation had not helped us, simply because the nation did not know ; and it was our work to keep the facts of workhouse bigotry and wrong before the minds of our countrymen. But for the guardians, the hour of peace and persuasion was over ; and if they would not yield because right is right, they must be taught to yield because law is law. The greatest hit, perhaps, was made by Mr. Maguire, when he contrasted with English oppression Irish fairness. In a large Irish union, of which he has for years been guardian, a Protestant clergyman and a Protestant teacher do what they like with the Protestant children. Tampering with the faith of children there is wholly impossible. Nay, when a short time ago a Presbyterian minister applied for all necessary powers to train up in their religion some twenty Presbyterian children, this also was freely accorded by the Catholic Board of Guardians. The meeting is the beginning of entire victory. It was a pledge, on the part of the richer and more influential members of the Catholic body, to carry on with firm, quiet determination the work pursued with such wonderful success during the past three years ; and determination and unity, in a cause which is right, never fail to win.

ROMAN DOCUMENTS.

WE are induced by Mr. Maskell's language on the Holy Father's temporal principedom (see p. 233 of our present number) to print at length the letter written on that subject by Cardinal Caterini and approved by Pius IX. We borrow the English translation which appeared in the "Month" of last February.

Confidential letter of His Eminence Cardinal Prosper Caterini, Prefect of the S. Congregation of the Council of Trent, addressed, by the command of His Holiness, to the Bishop of N., on 8th April, 1864, concerning a certain Canon Theologal who held wrong opinions as to the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff.

"MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND REVEREND LORD,—In a letter of your Lordship, which lately came to hand, I find a copy of your letter addressed to you by the Canon Theologal N., and you will easily imagine what an impression it made on me. Yet, from the tenor of this letter, I must own that it is sufficiently plain that the writer of it is sound at heart, and that his reluctance to sign a retraction proceeds not from malice, but from an imperfect knowledge of theology and history. He himself declares that *he is not obstinate*, and begs to be instructed in *the new doctrine*, which, as he believes, is of *recent introduction*.

"Might not your Lordship have directed him to the celebrated collection of documents relative to the Temporal Power, wherein not only the Allocutions and Encyclicals of our most Holy Father, but the letters of nearly all the Bishops of the world, are to be found? From what he may there gather he may easily construct the following argument: If the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops—in other words, if the whole Catholic Church—is of such a mind, wherefore should I not hearken to its voice? If I hear not the Church, am I not under the stroke of that dread sentence, 'Whoso hears not the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican?' When the Pope, the universal teacher, the representative of Jesus Christ, speaks, who shall dare to contradict him, and refuse 'to lead his understanding into captivity;' whether the reason of the doctrine or command be plain to him or otherwise? And, granting that the matter in question does not *directly* concern the Faith, are we, on that account, to refuse to hearken to the voice of the Supreme Pastor? Who does not know that, besides the articles strictly of Faith, there are others, closely connected therewith; as, again, with moral precepts, as, for instance, 'Thou shalt not steal?' If unwilling to give this theologal the instruction he has need of, you might commit this task to his Confessor, or to some other learned ecclesiastic, who might treat privately

with him, and, in the spirit of charity and meekness, might strive to bring him back to a better frame of mind, and to enlighten him, having beforehand called down help from on high. The Canon aforesaid, being old as he is, must doubtless remember the time when Napoleon I. invaded the dominions of the Roman Church, as well as the protestations of Pius VII., and the excommunication fulminated by him against the invaders. So that this is 'no new teaching of very recent introduction,' as he deems it, but of ancient date.

"Yes, and of very ancient date. He may read 'The Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes,' with notes by Cenni; Brunengo's 'Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes;' Steccanella's pamphlet on 'The Import and the Violation of the Pontifical Pronouncement on the Temporal Princedom of the Holy See;' Bellarmine's 'Treatise on the Roman Pontiff' (book v., c. 9); and especially Theiner, in his work entitled, 'The Two General Councils of Lyons and Constance on the Temporal Princedom of the Holy See.' He may also consult the recent publication of Roscovany, 'The Roman Pontiff,' tom. v., where he can find every document relating to this subject, from the fourth century till A.D. 1865. If, perchance, he have not at hand the above-mentioned work of Theiner, he should consult the Acts of the two Councils. He will find that in the first, that of Lyons, Innocent IV., wishing to put an end to the war which Frederic II. waged against the Church and its civil princedom, having discovered that the excommunication already fulminated against him was of no avail; that his crimes and usurpations had but increased, for he had seized upon certain cities within the territories of the Roman Church—[as is stated in the sentence pronounced against him, 'the domains of the Roman Church, to wit, the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Benevento . . . the patrimony of S. Peter]—he will find, I say, that Innocent IV., in presence of the assembled Fathers, of the ambassadors, and of the advocate of the accused Emperor, solemnly deprived him of his royal dignity. This solemn act of an Œcumenical Council, with the Roman Pontiff at its head, supplies evident proof of the lawfulness and antiquity of the civil princedom of the Holy See, and demonstrates its inviolability, its fitness, and necessity. He will further learn that, in the Council of Constance, the temporal power of the Holy See was no less solemnly affirmed and vindicated by the condemnation of the propositions of Wycliffe; the 33rd of which ran as follows: 'Pope Silvester and Constantine the Emperor did wrong in endowing the Church.' By this condemnation, the Council not only affirmed the lawfulness of the Church's holding temporal endowments, but insisted especially on that one which is the most noble of all, the most advantageous, and necessary to the free and unrestricted exercise of the spiritual power committed to the Roman Pontiff, namely, his civil princedom. But not only in words, but by its deeds did this Council bear witness to the lawfulness and necessity of the temporal power. It assumed the civil administration of the States of the Church during the interval which elapsed between the abdication of the pseudo-popes and the election of the legitimate Pontiff Martin V., at a time when, in the absence of a visible head, the Church was represented by this general Council of Constance. The fact here alleged is established by the documents Father Theiner has collected in

his work above mentioned. It may be thence inferred that, to assert that the doctrine as to the necessity and fitness of the civil principedom of the Holy See is *a novelty of but recent introduction*, is historically *false*, and doctrinally *erroneous*. It is equivalent to attributing error and usurpation to the Popes who have received and maintained their temporal sovereignty over the States of the Church, and to gainsaying the two celebrated Councils of Lyons and Constance, which both, by word and deed, have sanctioned this temporal principedom. To assert the contrary would be to renew the error of Arnold of Brescia, Calvin, and other heretics (see Natalis Alexander, Hist. Eccl., tom. vii., 11th cent., chap. iv., article 8, 'On the followers of Arnold;' and Bellarmine, loc. cit. chap. x.; Mamachi 'On the Church's Free Right, &c.' tom. i., book 1, chap. v.). These heretics, in their hostility to the Church and the See of Rome, taught that it was foreign to the spirit of the Gospel to conjoin spiritual jurisdiction with civil power—a proposition deservedly branded as heretical. But Canon N. may more profitably consult the Constitution of Nicolas III., given on 18th July, A.D. 1278. 'Fundamenta militantis Ecclesiæ,' which may be found in c. 17 de Electione in VI. and which would seem expressly written to meet the difficulties he opposes. He will find at the very beginning that *it is not without a miracle* that the sovereignty over Rome is joined to the Supreme Pastorate of the Roman Pontiff, he being the chief Teacher of the Christian people, to whom full power has been committed by Christ for the government, direction, and guidance of the Church Catholic. Now, in order to the free exercise of this high charge, and to the unfettered development of an activity reaching far and wide, his civil principedom is useful, and even necessary. Without it, the independence of his spiritual jurisdiction could not be maintained, for the supreme Law-giver of the Church would be under the control and at the mercy of the sovereign whose subject he would be. But, as the spiritual Father of all Christians, and the guide of the consciences of kings and subjects alike, he must needs be free to disregard the private advantage of any particular prince, and be independent of every one. This is impossible, except he be supreme in his own dominions, unrestrained by the will and command of any other. Without this temporal principedom, the Pope would neither be, nor be held to be, free from outward pressure. His judgments and pronouncements could not be duly promulgated, if, as might often happen, the prince to whom he was subject deemed them adverse to his own interests; and, in the contrary case, suspicions, quarrels, and excuses would arise amongst other princes, the consciences of the faithful could never be sufficiently assured, nor could he command due reverence and obedience. Hence, Nicolas II., treating, in this Constitution, of the civil sovereignty of the Popes, very properly alleges the freedom and independence of the Apostolic Ministry as the main reason for the temporal power. 'We do not deem it meet that the earthly emperor should rule where the Heavenly King has set the High Priest and chief of the Christian Religion; rather should the chair of Peter, now established on the throne of Rome, enjoy *full liberty* in its action, nor to be subject to *any*, since, by a Divine decree, it has been set over all.'

"The Pope then proceeds to further considerations in order to establish

more fully the advantage and necessity of the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiffs for the good of the Catholic Church. But if it be urged that as it was not needed in the early ages of the Church, it cannot be absolutely necessary in our time, we reply that this objection betrays ignorance of the ways of God. He Who pursues His end 'mightily yet sweetly,' works out His purposes in their appointed time, and in the manner which approves itself to His infinite wisdom. Listen to what Bellarmine says *loc. cit.* e.g. : 'Granting that, strictly speaking, it were better that the Popes should confine themselves to spiritual things, and leave temporal concerns to kings, yet on account of the evils of the times, experience proves that not only is it *useful*, but even *strictly necessary*, for Divine Providence to bestow temporal dominion on the Roman Pontiff and some other Bishops. If in Germany there had been no prince-Bishops, none would have kept their sees. Hence, as in the elder covenant, the High Priests were long without temporal principedom, yet in the time of the Machabees religion could not have been maintained unless they had been kings as well as Priests ; so also in the history of the Church, in its early days it needed not the temporal power to shield its majesty, but now this is absolutely necessary.' To the above-named constitution we may add the well-known and most ancient process, 'In Cœna Domini,' which decrees excommunication against all invaders of Papal cities and territories. Nor should we omit the Bull of that great and holy Pontiff S. Pius V., 'Admonet,' 29th March, A.D. 1567. This Pope, being fully convinced, not only of the fitness and advantages, but also of the necessity, of the Temporal Power, and wishing to safeguard it in every possible way, forbids every sale, exchange, and even enfeoffment, 'whether under pretence of *necessity or evident utility*,' and decrees, against Cardinals or any others, the most grievous penalties, even excommunication, to be incurred *ipso facto*, if they should counsel or attempt to persuade the Pope for the time being to do any of the things aforesaid. He further orders that all newly-created Cardinals should bind themselves by oath to observe this constitution, and, 'moreover, to withhold their consent from the Popes, who may contravene it, and not to seek to be absolved from this oath, or to accept such absolution, *even if offered* . . . all violators thereof to incur the penalties of perjury, and perpetual infamy in law and fact.' But he rests not here, for, after having said, 'What we deem unlawful for ourselves to do, we hereby point out to our successors, who, we trust, will not be unmindful that we shall have to give an account of our stewardship at the judgment bar of Jesus Christ, in the day of His coming,' he has, of set purpose and in an ingenious manner, striven to render it inviolable, even for his successors, by providing that the Cardinals, in conclave assembled, shall again bind themselves by oath to its observance ; so that, 'whosoever shall be elected Pope, after his accession to that dignity, shall make this promise, and, after his enthronement, shall reiterate the promise and oath aforesaid, by special letters confirming the same.' These quotations from authentic and ancient monuments, not to mention several others which we omit, if duly set forth by an intelligent man, must convince and persuade Canon N., if, as I am willing to believe, he be sincere and of sound judgment. He will surely confess and admire with what wisdom and justice the glorious Pontiff Pius IX. gave

expression to the following views in his Allocution of 20th June, A.D. 1859, and in his Encyclical of 19th January following:—‘By a special interposition of Divine Providence, it has come to pass that, amid the multitude and diversity of temporal rulers, the Roman Church also should possess a civil principedom, subject to none (*‘nemini obnoxium’*), whereby the Roman Pontiff, the Supreme Pastor of the whole Church, being subject to no potentate, may exercise, in fullest freedom, throughout the whole world, the power and authority committed to him by Christ our Lord, of feeding and ruling the whole flock of God; and may daily more easily extend our Divine Religion, as well as succour the divers wants of the faithful, and afford assistance to such as call for it, and do all other good works, in so far as he shall see that they befit the times and circumstances of the Christian commonwealth.’ It will further behove Canon N. to consider that our modern ‘Arnoldists,’ who vaunt the fervour of their attachment to the Catholic Faith and their ardent love for the people, are, in very deed, the most cruel enemies of the people, and still more so of the Church; to compass whose overthrow they assail, under the empty and specious pretext of love of country, the civil principedom of the Pope, which is of all the most ancient, the most legitimate, and the mildest; and this they do, because they are full well aware how much this principedom contributes to maintain the Supreme Ruler of the Church in that independence which is essential to the universal exercise of his Apostolic Ministry, hoping, after having got rid of the Temporal Power, to make short work of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Supreme Pontiff; or at least, so to weaken its influence over the world at large, that it may become their prey, and that they may drag mankind into schisms, heresies, and unbelief, and even more shameful crimes. Let Canon N. cast a glance over the wretched state of Italy since 1859, and I am sure he will not be able to refrain from tears. Let him behold the straits to which the Bishops are reduced; some imprisoned, others exiled from their dioceses, the rest molested, or forced at least to hold their peace, so as not to be able to suspend from the celebration of mass priests who transgress. Were the Roman Pontiff deprived of his civil principedom, would he be treated better than the other Bishops of Italy? Would it not be even worse with him? What was Pius VII. able to do when first imprisoned and then dragged into foreign lands, and deprived of all means of communicating with his subjects and the rest of the faithful throughout the world? And why was he so treated? Because his conscience forbade him to comply with the unjust demands of Napoleon I. The same would happen again and again, and even daily, were the King of Sardinia, or any other prince, to be the sovereign of Rome. Ought not this theologal to yield to such considerations as these, and to confess the fitness, the antiquity, the advantages, and necessity of the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff? I will wait until your Lordship inform me of the success of your pastoral solicitude, and of the efforts of the person to whom you shall have committed the task of instructing Canon N. Meanwhile, in token of profound respect, kissing your hand, I remain, &c.”

[We are informed of the success of this letter by the reply sent to Cardinal Caterini by the Bishop of N., wherein the Bishop says amongst other things :

"I have ordered your Eminence's letter to be read by the Archdeacon, the chief dignity of the chapter of my cathedral. The theologal N., having seriously considered the matter, came to me mourning, and sighing, and begging absolution for what he had done, which I imparted to him, in virtue of faculties received, in the presence of three ecclesiastics," &c.]—Note of the editor of the *Acta*.

The second document which we place before our readers this quarter, is in no respect official; but as we mentioned in our last number (p. 468, note) an attack on the "Civiltà" put forth by "Le Français," our readers will be pleased to see our Roman contemporary's reply. There appeared in the "Civiltà" of Feb. 6 a long letter from a French correspondent, from which we gave considerable extracts in our last number (pp. 468-471); and which mentions among other topics the expectations entertained concerning the coming Council by that large majority of French Catholics, with whom the writer is in sympathy. He designates these as "Catholics simply so-called;" in contradistinction to the "liberal Catholics" who hold, with greater or less distinctness, certain tenets which the Church has condemned, on liberty of worships and of the press.

Soon after this number of the "Civiltà" appeared, a letter was published in "Le Français"—which some persons (to our amazement) have actually ascribed to Mgr. Dupanloup—alleging that the "Civiltà," in publishing its French correspondent's communication, was in fact professing to publish a quasi-official programme of the Vatican Council. One would have thought so absurd a supposition would have been rendered impossible, were it only from the simple fact that the "Civiltà" communication professed to come (as of course it did come) from Paris; whereas evidently Rome itself would be the only source of any quasi-official information. To send news from Paris to Rome as to the future proceedings of a Roman Council, is very much the same thing with what would be called in England sending coals to Newcastle. Still this charge against the "Civiltà" was not only vigorously repeated among the French "liberal Catholics," but seems to have found acceptance in other portions also of Catholic Christendom.

The "Civiltà" speedily put forth a general reply, without specifying its individual assailants; and "Le Français" rejoined on that reply. What we now publish is the answer made by the "Civiltà" to this rejoinder. Our readers will observe that the Roman writers attach no credit whatever to the rumour of Mgr. Dupanloup being their opponent "Lein Français."

Among the various journals which have directed certain censures against us, already refuted by us in our 458th number, was the *Français*; which is determined to see in our *Reply*, not a confutation of the unjust charges brought against us, but a correction of the inaccuracy of one of our correspondents in France, discovered and brought into strong relief by the *Français*. Such a misrepresentation is no matter of surprise to us; for a writer who could represent our simple exposition of facts and our statement of the wishes cherished in France, as a *programme* to be followed by the Vatican Council,—might easily, with equal audacity, change a protest into a correction, and substitute a confession and reparation of faults committed by us, for a confutation of calumnious accusations brought against us. The first misrepresentation was unquestionably voluntary; the second has been no less so. To refute it once more seemed to us therefore lost time: both with regard to the journal which, by using such arms against us, shows that it seeks rather to obscure the truth than to throw light upon it; and, with regard to our readers, who were in a position to discover on which side the truth lay, by a simple comparison of the accusations with the reply made to them. We therefore took the course which seemed to us most fitting, by prolonging the controversy no farther; and, in our preceding number, we kept absolute silence on the subject.

This silence we should have continued to preserve, but for two circumstances, which have imposed upon us the painful duty of an explicit protest and a plain answer. The first is an interpretation put on the moderate tone of our first confutation, which we are bound expressly to contradict: the second is the effect produced by our silence, which we are bound now to destroy. Our endeavour, in repelling the accusations brought against us, to avoid all asperity of language, has been attributed, not to moderation, but to a deference supposed to be paid by us, as indispensably due to some high personage, who may have suggested, or at least approved, the two famous articles in the *Français*. Nothing could have been more remote from our intention; for nothing, in our judgment, could be more improbable than the supposition implied. The articles in the *Français* bear the name of a certain *Monsieur François Beslay*, said to be young in years, and an advocate by profession; and indeed the audacity of the attack, and the substance and force of the accusations, bear upon the face of them the impression of both these qualities of their author. Moreover, the manifest falsehood of the censures passed upon us, the discourteous tone of these censures, and the intention, if not manifest, at least slenderly veiled, with which these censures have been published, give us no kind of reason to fear that any personage worthy of respect has concealed himself under the name of the author of these articles. This we have never believed, or even suspected; and now, since others believe and suspect it, we formally disavow such a belief or suspicion as wholly foreign to our intention. We used courteous terms, because it was our purpose to refute the accusations, and not to vilify our accusers. Nor shall we account ourselves discourteous in this second reply; although, by its very nature, we shall be constrained to throw the whole blame, not upon the accusation, which ought to have vanished before the first confutation, but

upon the accuser, who has thought fit to return to the attack armed with such dishonourable weapons.

The second circumstance which has compelled us to break silence, is the effect which our silence has produced upon a certain number of journals, of no slight authority with many persons: such (as to mention two only) the *France* and the *Mémoriale Diplomatique*. They have given a relation to their readers of the controversy between the *Français* and the *Civiltà Cattolica*; while, like the *Français*, they have concluded by asserting, not that we have refuted by evident reasons the false accusations brought against us, but that we have made a satisfactory reparation for inaccuracies of which we had been guilty.

As long as this misrepresentation was confined to the *Français* alone, we might have held our peace; but we cannot possibly remain silent when others are induced, either by levity or partiality, to adopt its erroneous statements. We shall reply therefore (though sorely against our will) to the last article in the *Français*; and, to avoid any new subterfuge, we shall plainly show that from the first article to the last, it has falsified our idea; and artfully substituted that which it has been pleased to attribute to us, for that which was really expressed in our pages.

In the two first articles of the *Français* there was a manifest misrepresentation. What a French correspondent wrote to us concerning the wishes and expectations of the French nation, Monsieur Beslay made to appear as a *programme* of what was to be done in Rome by the Fathers assembled in Council. He could not otherwise have accused us of having divulged the secret of the Theological Commissioners for the Council; of having reduced, to two heads only, the end, the scope, and the immense materials for the definitions and decrees of the Council; and, lastly, of having reduced the authority of the Bishops in Council to a simple adhesion to the will of the Supreme Pontiff. In our reply we called attention to this substitution of one thing for another; and, without retracting anything which our French correspondent had asserted concerning France, we refuted all the malicious insinuations and offensive consequences which the author of this misrepresentation had drawn from it. Now what is the sum of his reply to our confutation? He returns to the charge; and in another article has recourse to new misrepresentations, directly contrary to our assertions. We said in reply, "Our correspondence is a chronicle, not a *programme*, as you assert; that chronicle is open to discussion; but until it is demonstrated to be untrue, we account it to be faithful. Your charges against it are unfounded, and the consequences which you draw from them to our disadvantage are illogical." Now what answer does our crafty antagonist make to this confutation of ours, in the twenty-fourth number of the *Français*, published in April? It is hard to believe, but so it is: he congratulates himself on the success of his efforts in bringing us to reason; and, full of this idea, he takes the following assumption as the theme of his new article:—"The editors of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, in an article published in their last number, have rectified in the most satisfactory manner the serious inaccuracies into which their correspondent had fallen. It is important to us to mark distinctly those

points which have been rectified." Having after his own fashion endeavoured diffusely to prove his point, he thus concludes the article and the argument. "We have said all that was to be said: an error was committed, we pointed it out, and it has been repaired." Who would not suppose, on reading this introduction and this conclusion, that our whole reply had been simply a confession of error and a retraction of false assertions? Now we defy our readers, whoever they may be, to find a syllable in our reply which is not, on the contrary, a defence, and a confirmation of what was written in this much-disputed correspondence. So complete is the opposition between the reality of the facts and the audacity of the assertion, that we cannot find any excuse to shelter the writer's good faith; and to call it a simple confusion or an innocent equivocation, would require a much larger dose of stupidity than we feel courage to attribute either to ourselves or to our opponent.

But this plan of reversing ideas appears still more wilful when we come to examine, point by point, all these *rectifications* which M. Beslay has enumerated. Let us consider them patiently one by one.

The first *rectification* attributed to us is very important: it would make us repudiate the responsibility of our French correspondent's letters; which ought not to have been admitted into our pages, without the *explanations, extenuations, and reservations* now appended to them. Now what are these *explanations, extenuations, and reservations* which we are supposed now to have made? There is not a syllable on the subject in our reply: but the whole depends on a slight change of expression, sufficient to enable Beslay to make his assertion, but not sufficient to induce any right-minded or judicious reader to believe him. Here are the two passages—i. e., our own words and Beslay's version of them:—

"Nor does it suffice to say that, having admitted the correspondence into our periodical, we are OURSELVES the authors of everything which is written therein. THIS WOULD BE TRUE were we treating of doctrines; not when we are treating of facts."

The fact of our having admitted the said correspondence into our review does not imply our RESPONSIBILITY for the contents of that correspondence. WE ACCEPT THIS RESPONSIBILITY when doctrines are treated of, not when facts are in question.

We never spoke of responsibility, we spoke only of appropriation. That which was said of the opinions of Frenchmen (whether of a whole or a part of the nation, is of little importance, as is also the truth or falsehood of the statement concerning those opinions) cannot be said to be either our correspondent's thought or our own. If we had printed a dissertation written by a correspondent upon a point of doctrine,—by simply printing it in our pages without protest of any kind, we should have made it our own. But when we print a correspondence in which it is said that such or such a person thinks such or such things, these thoughts are not to be attributed to *us*; they are no thoughts of *ours*. In fact, immediately afterwards we added this other sentence:—"A correspondent states the fact that in China such an opinion is held: does the person who prints that correspondence necessarily hold the opinions of the Chinese?" Why then

was the word *responsibility*, which has nothing to do with the matter, introduced into the sentence? The reason is plain: it was necessary to make us say that we refuse to answer for our correspondent. Now, far from refusing the responsibility of his assertions, we assumed it: with the simple reservation necessary in every question of fact—of *solid and evident proof* being brought to the contrary.

The second *rectification* attributed to us, has little weight in itself, but is very serious in the intention of our opponent. He glories and triumphs in the idea that we have at last recognized a right in the *Français* to correct, in the name of France, the notices received from our correspondent concerning views, opinions, and events in France. It is not a little strange that such a point should be brought forward; for we should not have supposed that anyone ever doubted or could possibly doubt it. The point liable to discussion is rather, which of the various relations which may have been written on this subject, best merits the belief of men of sense. Thus, for example, it may be a matter of discussion whether the contrary opinion of M. Beslay ought to prevail over that of our correspondent; who may possibly by age, experience, position, and political wisdom be a better informed and more trustworthy witness than himself. If we have made a passing mention of such a claim on the part of our correspondent; it has been only in order to exclude the calumnious insinuation that some political or pontifical secret has perhaps been violated by him. To what purpose, then, were our words wrested and made the subject of a separate number, as if we had at first denied or questioned what we afterwards acknowledged to be true and just? *Le besoin de la cause* is a phrase which advocates have introduced into the French language, and it may be perhaps the fittest reply to this question.

We have refuted, not without some indignation, the charge that, by means of this correspondence, we have endeavoured to narrow the wide action of the Vatican Council to the definition of two dogmas only. And in this refutation we appealed to the good faith of our readers; reminding them of all which, for a long time past, we have been publishing concerning the magnitude of the evils to be healed, and of the blessings to be derived by the Church from the work of this august assembly. It would seem that on this point M. Beslay had a visitation of remorse, and desired to make us honourable amends. But he soon returns to his ordinary style; congratulating himself in his fourth number on having brought us to acknowledge our French correspondent's information to be incomplete, and of having thus rendered it full and entire. And by what argument does he prove this? Because the silence of our correspondent destroyed all the hopes excited by so many other demonstrations and so many other testimonies. Unhappy logic, when it falls into the hand of a sophistical rhetorician! Hitherto it has not been held to be a law of inevitable necessity to say everything that can be said whenever we open our mouth; it has been simply considered necessary to speak to the purpose, and to say nothing irrelevant to the subject in hand. For the future, to avoid incurring the suspicion and wrath of the writers of the *Français*, we should be obliged, whenever we give any information or discuss any

point relating to the Council, always to begin from the beginning, and to repeat the same things over and over again. As we cannot make up our minds to do this, we must resign ourselves henceforward to incur their displeasure, without hope of reconciliation.

The fourth number is also devoted by Monsieur Beslay to a misrepresentation, of no great importance indeed in itself, but very cunningly devised. He had accused us of having assigned a very brief and insufficient time to the Council. We replied, that to assign to it a period, whether long or short, would be an audacity bordering upon insanity—an audacity of which assuredly we have not been guilty. Our French correspondent had spoken only of a persuasion rooted in the minds of many Frenchmen; not of any limit, fixed either by them or by him. Now what does our crafty opponent say in his fourth article? “See,” he says to us, “how much reason I had to make all this disturbance! As a Frenchman and a Catholic, I am bound to defend French Catholics from an accusation, which the *Civiltà Cattolica* itself calls a folly.” What a wonderful mind must this writer possess! He constitutes himself a champion; creates an imaginary adversary and imaginary blows; returns them in his own fashion, thus wounding himself; then exclaims, “I have conquered.”

In the fifth *rectification* attributed to us, Monsieur Beslay is still more ingenious than in the fourth. Speaking of the authority of the bishops in the Council, he does us the honour to say that we have “happily succeeded in rectifying the assertions of our correspondent by filling them up, extenuating, or modifying them.” Any one reading this sentence would suppose that, having destroyed a heavy mass of accusations, we had deserved the praise of skilful defenders. Nothing of the sort. Our correspondent had never dreamed of infringing the rights of the bishops in the slightest degree. This accusation had been gratuitously brought against us by Beslay himself, with what justice any of our readers may judge. In refutation of it, we quoted what we had amply said and proved upon this point; we had nothing to rectify, to modify, or to explain. Our own words, quoted literally by Beslay to prove his assertion, demonstrate the contrary. “A man must be without the most distant acquaintance with the elements of theology,” we said, “to be ignorant of this doctrine, and must be in some other place than Rome to be able to print it.” These words say plainly, “We never thought what you supposed us to think, because we know a little theology; and if we had thought it, we could not have printed it, because we are in Rome.” Is this to *retract*, to *rectify*, to *modify*, to *extenuate*? And could this be supposed simply by a mistake, or printed without an intention artfully to conceal the truth?

In the sixth number another *rectification*, or rather another blunder, is attributed to us. We ourselves, according to the *Français*, have given, in our own reply, the clearest proof of being ill-informed of what is passing in France. And why? Because we have adduced the testimony of M. Emile Ollivier as an authority, and claimed him as an ally. This is a little lesson for us as to M. Ollivier’s authority in religious matters, and a kind warning against claiming him as an ally. But did we really quote him in that character?

The following were our express words :—

“If our cautious observations concerning the observance of the canons in France have thus excited the bile of our accuser, and brought down so long a philippic on our heads, we wait with impatience for his reply in defence of the French Church to the recent work of M. Emile Ollivier. In the number of the 19th January he deploras in exaggerated terms the fact that the Church in France is governed as a city is governed in a state of siege.”

Now where in these words is a shadow of authority attributed to Ollivier? Where is his alliance sought against the *Français*? Where is his testimony quoted? Is not the drift of our words opposed to all this? We here invited the *Français* to contradict the facts and figures brought forward by Ollivier, which, though we might believe them *à priori* to be greatly exaggerated, we could not contradict point by point: to us he was neither an authority nor an ally. This quotation was made simply to show, that it was no imprudence on our part to print in Rome our correspondent's cautious observations, when such lamentations were heard from the mouths of Frenchmen in France itself; and that if such lamentations were worthy of indignation, that indignation ought assuredly to be reserved for him who had expressed them so bitterly in the very midst of the clergy of France.

In his seventh number M. Beslay demands justice of us, for having accused him of fighting against us with unfair weapons, in bringing against us the words of the French Bishops, printed in the course of last Lent. “We said, we could have said nothing of the kind,” says M. Beslay. We never asserted that he had professed to do this in explicit and formal words; we simply said that in placing, by a somewhat clumsy artifice, in juxtaposition with the calumnies attributed to us, certain passages of the Bishops' Pastorals,—he had endeavoured to make it appear that the reproofs, therein addressed to certain calumniators of the Bishops and applied to certain suggestions of mischievous journalists, were directed against us. This he cannot deny. The first article of the *Français* concludes thus: “In our next we shall confront the rash allegations of the anonymous correspondent of the *Civiltà* by the authentic declarations of our Bishops.” But this is not enough. The long article, which quotes several beautiful passages from the Bishops' Pastorals, opens by declaring the indiscretion of our correspondent in giving information concerning the feeling of France before the Bishops had spoken; and then proceeds as follows: “Therefore it is that Mgr. Chalandon, the Archbishop of Aix, has felt it necessary to put his flock on their guard against those indiscretions by these wise and well-weighed words.” Nor was this enough. For, besides printing certain phrases relating to his accusations against us in italics, he here and there intersperses his quotations with bitter and malignant reflections, as if he wished to keep alive in the mind of his reader the idea, that all these weighty episcopal words were either directed intentionally against us, or, at least, were in their application opposed to our opinion. This is what we call a clumsy artifice,—these are what we called unfair weapons. We may have been severe, but we were

not unjust ; and unfortunately the late reply addressed to us by the *Français* confirms us in our opinion.

On this occasion we have determined to speak our mind fully, that no one may be deceived by the artifices of a writer, who mingles blows with genuflexions, and, under the pretence of defending French Catholics, attacks the Catholics of Rome. The *Français* belongs to that category of liberal Catholics, who desire reconciliation, but are the first to declare war against others ; who claim the sweet gentleness of Evangelical charity for themselves, but reserve the gall and wormwood of party spleen for their adversaries ; who defend the authority of the Pope and the Church so long as it supports their teaching, but cast it aside whenever it is adverse to them ; who fear lest the Council should confirm doctrines distasteful to themselves, and exclaim against the indiscretion of those whose hope is different, because their belief is different, from theirs. It is no marvel therefore to us that they should exclaim so loudly against us, who know nothing of these base compromises between politics and faith ; and who have on our lips, because we have in our hearts, but this one sentence—*Catholics with the Pope now and for ever*. As such, we always have the honour to receive the first attacks, which, although they appear to be directed against us, are for the most part aimed at what is far above us—even against the Catholic doctrine itself. This has ever been our consolation and our reward—a consolation and a reward which we hope our poor labours will never fail to deserve. By God's help we shall follow courageously our accustomed path according to the principles of truth and justice, and the rules of charity and Christian prudence ; and if we meet with honest adversaries, we shall stretch forth our hands to them to draw them to that centre of truth to which we have the happiness to belong. As to adversaries who use weapons manifestly unfair, we shall simply unmask them, pointing them out to the simple, that they may be aware of their dangerous arts and avoid them without delay.

Notices of Books.

Life of Mother Margaret Hallahan. By her Religious Children ; with a Preface by his Lordship the Bishop of BIRMINGHAM. London : Longmans.

THIS is a most refreshing book. It would be so if it were only the life of a very remarkable woman. We are all of us so cut and dried, so run into moulds, and so thoroughly conventionalized, that a picture of a real, racy nature, which has developed itself without the help of education into something remarkable, would in itself be refreshing. The book ought to be read by all Englishmen and women, Catholic or otherwise, if it were only as a study of character. Protestant and Catholic alike have read with the deepest interest the lives of Madame Récamier, Madame Swetchine, Eugénie Guérin, and the sweet *Récit d'Une Sœur*. We can promise all that in this book they will find a life, to take the very lowest ground, as full of thrilling interest as any of these. Here is one, who up to the age of forty was a poor servant in Belgium, who came over to England friendless, penniless, unknown, and who, without a farthing to start with, in the course of twenty-three years had founded five convents, with public churches attached to them. This was done without bazaars, lotteries, or begging-letters. The finding of money, when it did not exist, some may be inclined to think a miracle, to be ranked at least with healing the sick. Yet not only did she raise the material building, but she did more. She did not found an order, for she adopted S. Catharine of Siena's rule ; yet she refounded it, for it had ceased to exist, certainly in England, and, we believe, at least in the same shape, everywhere. This she accomplished by a marvellous gift of attractiveness and a native nobleness of soul, felt by all, whether men or women, who approached her. All felt a power in the shy, yet frank and loving look of her eyes, in the perfectly natural dignity of her manner, and in the terse, and, not infrequently, humorous energy of her words. "How men love their kings!" is a dictum of a well-known writer. We may parody it, and say, "How men love their queens." This was a queen of God's own making. She collected around herself a hundred women, whose life she influenced as the sunbeams have power over nature. They were of all ranks, from her own lowly state to those who bore in the world the noblest names of England, old Catholics and converts of yesterday, those of the highest education, and those of the small culture of times of Catholic depression. There were no distinctions of grades amongst them ; all cooked, scrubbed, washed, and peeled potatoes in turn. All talents were employed, painting, music, historical writing, fine needlework for churches, the teaching b-a ba to pottery children, tending the poor

in the hospital, instructing the convert. If anyone could do a thing for God, she was bidden to do it in God's name without let or hindrance. Mother Margaret was one of those before whom all petty jealousies and every little passion vanished ; all smaller personalities were elevated by her presence. The ruling of a hundred women in perfect peace and harmony is no small thing. So firmly was this rule established, that it bids fair to last even after her death. In addition to this she was the friend of many, whose names, though they are Catholics, are well-known in Protestant England. Many a priest called her mother. Truly this is one whose life is worth reading. This is a "peep behind the grills" worth taking, especially as it is perfectly plain that the author is far too much occupied with the one central figure to aim in the least at making studied revelations. Mother Margaret has been very fortunate in her biographer. This book is written with an honest and honourable enthusiasm. The author knows that she has something worth saying, and she says it simply and heartily without caring a rush what the world will say. There is neither stiffness nor cant, neither tall English nor fine writing. Thank Heaven, there is no aim at the picturesque. Though the author never conceals a predilection for Gothic, utterly at variance with the audaciously eclectic taste of Mother Margaret, yet the grand figure which she brings out so beautifully, is never made to sit for her photograph under cathedral arches or long-drawn cloisters. Many of the opinions recorded were by no means those of her contemporaries, nor even (on open questions, such as that of government education) of many among those of her own faith ; but neither the nineteenth century nor even the views of Catholics are consulted. There is even in the author, as we shall notice presently, an occasional viciousness, which helps the impression of perfect honesty which the book conveys. She everywhere forgets herself in the object of her thoughts : she has produced a narrative written in excellent, vigorous English, while it is also full of the striking and pithy eloquence left us in the recorded sayings and letters of Mother Margaret. The author has written while her heart was hot and her memory fresh, and the result is that even those who did not know Mother Margaret will gain a considerable insight into the grand loving being over whom the grave has just closed.

It is already a great gain for the world to have before it the record of a most virtuous life, of a soul, we beg pardon for the expression, without humbug or meanness. To Catholics the book will have a pathetic and a deeper interest. The last years of the history of the Church in England since 1845 have been very memorable. Since then many have grown grey with work and thought ; many have gone to their rest. The pages before us are a most valuable contribution to this portion of the story of the fortunes of the Church. Mother Margaret was most closely connected with the Catholic movement in all its parts. Many will be touched to see the name of the dear and venerable old man, Bishop Walsh, who governed the central district at that time. The Cardinal and the present Archbishop of Westminster are often mentioned. She had ever a generous and affectionate respect for Father Newman, who was often the subject of her fervent prayers. Her relations with Father Faber and other members of the London Oratory were those of most intimate friendship. Above all, however, she herself is in a

marvellous way a connecting link between the present and the past. By no means the least interesting part of her life is the glimpse which it affords of the depressed state of the Catholic Church in her early days. Then comes the time when her soul expanded, and she learned to breathe freely and grow, in the thoroughly old Catholic atmosphere of Belgium. When fully matured in the Christian life, she comes over to England, and then she finds herself called to take a prominent part in a state of things, of which neither she nor anyone else had any anticipation. Inside and outside the Church there had been going on two movements perfectly independent of each other, which were now to be blended into one. Before a single one of the prominent Oxford converts had been received, the Catholic Church in England had been lifting herself up from long inaction, and the deep still waters had begun to be stirred up by the breath of a new life. We learn from these pages how a great work had been going on at Coventry under the auspices of Dr. Ullathorne, and how quiet Catholic missions had been re-invigorated by the preaching of Dr. Gentili. At the same time, at Oxford, the hearts of men, who knew no more of the state of the Catholic Church in England, than if it had been in another world, were being moved by God's Spirit to throw off the chains of heresy and to enter into the blessed freedom of God's Church. "The forty-five" was the year of Father Newman's reception and of Mother Margaret's profession.

Yet, after all, it is neither as a study of character, nor as a portion of history, that we must look at this life, but as a bit of hagiology. "Saint" is a great word, often most lightly used. To pronounce any one a Saint, belongs exclusively to the Church. Yet some lives are distinctly saintly. What we mean by this, it would take us too long at this moment to analyze, yet we are quite sure that any one reading the pages before us, will rise up with a feeling on his mind that this was a soul leading a supernatural life. There is a perfume of antique piety about Mother Margaret which is to be felt. To call it mediæval, or by any name which denotes an era, is absurd. It is simply the old original Gospel. It is the Imitation of Christ, that book of all times and of all ages, carried out *to the letter*. This is much to be dwelt upon; for even Catholics often speak as though the nineteenth century rendered the old style of Christian perfection impossible. The life of Mother Margaret is a better refutation of this fatal error than a thousand arguments. *Solvitur ambulando*. The thing has been done. A priest who knew her very intimately, and who loved her well, will never forget the look which she gave him—a *guisa di leon quando si posa*—when he once urged her to warm the new choir of the church. "No," she said; "no more dispensations!" This was the spirit of her whole life—the pure Gospel of Christ, without adaptations. This life of hers is sure to be read and admired. Far and wide in England, and even all over Christendom, men will read with delight the graphic story of this noble life. Those who know the life of St. Catherine of Siena, will recognize with ease how much the mother and daughter had in common. There are the same lowly details in early life: years spent in cooking, washing, and all the menial work of a poor family; vows of chastity taken, kneeling on kitchen chairs; hair cut off, and youthful beauty spoiled by an unworldly dress. Then there is the same miraculous power of attracting hearts—

human wills bowing before the simple majesty of Christian love in its strong tenderness—men as well as women calling Margaret mother, as once Catherine was called La Mamma; the same fearless intrepidity joined with womanly timidity. No one can doubt that, if occasion had called for it, Margaret would have behaved at Avignon and Florence with Catherine's courage, even though we smile at her superstitious cowardice before embarking on the sea. Many will be taken with the tranquil, almost idyllic beauty, of many parts of her monastic life, and all will praise her broad philanthropy and exhaustless charity. Here, all will say, is a wonderful woman, who did a grand work! But let us never forget that the moving spirit of the whole was the strict old Christianity which we are tempted to call that of other days. That it is still lived by many is, of course, a fact; yet the spirit of the age is against it. The world is a restless, troubled world, rushing about in railways, reading rapidly, and seldom thinking. Even our literature is one of sharp pamphlets and smart controversy. Our very religion is restless. The exigencies of work are so tremendous, that even religious persons often speak and act as though work could do instead of prayer. The worst feature of all is the attempt to unite religion with a plunge into the wild excitement of London life. Many speak as though England would be converted by the admission of Catholics into the highest circles, by the wearing of chignons and low dresses, and the reading of the *Saturday Review*. This was not Mother Margaret's view. She did a grand and a marvellous work, but its deep foundations were laid in prayer and the interior life. In the little parlour of Dr. Ullathorne's presbytery at Coventry, principles were laid down which certainly were not those of the nineteenth century. "The generous dispositions of the sisters were fostered by the direction under which they were trained. Two rules were given them in the beginning by their spiritual father, who desired to form them in a truly heroic spirit; they were to banish from their vocabulary the words 'uncomfortable' and 'impossible,' and his precepts on this head were enforced by example. Another of his maxims, which Mother Margaret often loved to recall, was, 'First put on the spirit of Christ, and then the spirit of the rule on that.'"

We need not say that the insular prejudices of our countrymen are as little spared by Mother Margaret as the long trains of ladies and the peculiarities of the girl of the period. She imported the devotions of Catholic countries without one jot of abatement. It is for this reason that we are anxious to point out one or two blemishes in the book before us, which are blots on what is otherwise so wonderfully well done. We really must protest against its being said that "though her visit to Rome in no way shook her preference for the Gothic style," she had "a sort of affection" for St. Peter's! Is affection for St. Peter's a thing not to be mentioned without an apology because, forsooth, it is not Gothic? Of course every one has a right to be Gothic if he likes; but it is too bad to say that the tomb of the Apostles is an object of patronizing affection, though it *has* the drawback of not being under pointed arches. Again, no one must suppose, from strong expressions used with reference to liturgical services, that Mother Margaret disliked English hymns. Her enjoyment of the popular services of the London Oratory, and the use of vernacular hymns at Stone, are sufficient to show

that the words used by her in her indignation at hearing that Father Faber's hymns were sung by Protestants do not represent her ordinary state of mind. Above all, there is a passage with respect to Father Newman's letter which might tend seriously to misrepresent her. It is said that "when, as it was read aloud to her, the reader came to that page in which he enumerates, in order to condemn, certain exaggerated and preposterous expressions, culled by a Protestant controversialist out of various foreign writers (some of them on the Index) she stopped her ears." This passage misrepresents not only Mother Margaret, but Father Newman. That she stopped her ears we have no doubt; as who would not on hearing that "in a literal and absolute sense;" "simply" and "unconditionally" "the Blessed Virgin is superior to God"? Of course Mother Margaret, with Father Newman and every man who had not taken leave of his senses, "would rather believe that there is no God at all, than that Mary is greater than God." But that is a very different thing from saying that these were "exaggerated and preposterous expressions culled out of foreign writers." This is implying that these expressions, as used by foreign writers, were exaggerated and preposterous; and siding with the "Protestant controversialist" who took them in their literal sense. This is what Father Newman expressly denies. He says that he is looking at them, not "as spoken by the tongues of angels, but according to that literal sense which they bear in the mouths of Englishmen and English women." Mother Margaret would have been the last person in the world to use the term "foreign" as a term of reproach to Catholic writers, least of all would she have thus applied the epithet to S. Alfonso Liguori. We trust that, in a second edition, these words, which were not in Mother Margaret's mouth or mind when she stopped her ears, may be omitted.

On the whole, however, the life before us satisfies even Mother Margaret's friends, and that is saying a great deal. It has wonderfully few faults, and marvellous excellencies. Even as a literary work it is beautiful. We sincerely congratulate Mother Margaret's religious children on their execution of a difficult and delicate work. They have erected to her a monument more permanent than brass. We trust that some day the letters mentioned by the Bishop of Birmingham in his most touching preface will see the light. There were depths in that great soul as yet unrevealed, marvellous ways of God, loving and painful crucifixions, supernatural sorrows, and pains heroically borne. The bed of fire of her last days was the finishing touch to her likeness to S. Catherine and her Lord. One who loved her very tenderly, and who has been privileged to know much of that great soul, may perhaps be permitted to finish this notice with some words of a letter just discovered, written by one of S. Catherine's disciples to another, a month after the Saint's death, in 1380: "Credo che tu sappi come la nostra Reverendissima e Carissima Mamma se n'andò in Paradiso Domenica, addì 29 d'Aprile. Lodato ne sia el Salvatore nostro Gesù Cristo crucifisso benedetto. A mene pare essere rimasto orfano. De la Mamma si vole fare alegrezza e festa, quanto ch'è per lei; ma di quelli suoi e di quelle che son rimasi in questa misera vita, ène da plangere e d'avere compassione grandissima. Prendo alcuno conforto perchè nel mio cuore ène rimasa e incarnata la Mamma nostra assai più che era in prima: e ora me la parebene conoscere."

History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne. By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. London: Longmans.

MR. LECKY has chosen for his subject one of the most interesting and practically important questions which can possibly be treated: and we must add in candour, that he shows himself throughout earnestly desirous of being thoroughly impartial; of holding the balance with a jealous fairness between Catholicity and heathenism. Moreover he is in some sense personally unbiassed: for whereas on the one hand he is not only a decided Theist but a determined opponent also of utilitarianism, on the other hand it is equally plain that he is no believer himself in revealed religion.

Yet a more grossly and monstrously unfair book never was written. There is no more prominent feature of his volumes—none which more gives them their characteristic aspect—than his sustained and bitter invective against the ascetic standard of morality: and yet he has never once set himself systematically to set forth what that standard is. Surely he had no right whatever to speak as he has spoken, unless he had not merely performed this task in sufficient detail, but also expressed accurately his own *antagonistic* doctrine on men's moral duty and legitimate attitude towards their Infinite Creator. This fact alone would be fatal to the credit of his volumes; that he has given no hint from first to last what that practical Theism *is*, which he would prefer to the Catholic.

The ascetic—or rather (as we should maintain) the Christian and only true—standard of morality seems to us based on two fundamental truths; the one ethical, the other psychological. It is an ethical truth, that every man is more virtuous, in proportion as the desire of pleasing God is in one shape or other the animating and pervading principle of all his actions. And it is a psychological fact, that God is a far more permanently satisfying object to the highest and deepest human affections, than any creature can possibly be. This therefore is a practicable and is the one true path of virtue; viz., living to God and resting the heart and affections predominantly on Him. He who directs the general course of his life on any other rule whatever, makes a vital mistake in that matter which, immeasurably more than any other, concerns his nearest and dearest interests.

But certain chosen and exalted souls have been endowed by God with a power of making Him, far more than others can, their one exclusive object. The great mass of men, according to God's merciful intention and provision, are involved in a thousand innocent interests and enjoyments, which are by no means directly religious, though they conduce (in the case of such men) to His more cheerful and effective service. But the more highly endowed person whom we are now considering, would be faithless to his vocation if he acquiesced in those interests and enjoyments: it becomes on the contrary one chief purpose of his life to mortify and repress them, in order that the whole of his complex nature, the whole current of his thoughts and affections, may be more unreservedly and undividedly concentrated on God. His life tends to become one protracted

prayer and meditation : and this, however various and complicated may be the duties of his worldly calling, and however assiduous he may be in the fulfilment of those duties. With him, worldly engagements are instruments and occasions of serving God, but they have in themselves no interest and attraction. It is in some sense his greatest delight, to live in poverty and sickness ; to mortify the flesh unintermittingly by every studied device ; to be despised and hated by men : because all these things so importantly and blessedly increase his power of making God the exclusive thought of his earthly existence.

But now further. Among saints and saintly men themselves—otherwise so singularly harmonious and homogeneous in their characteristics—there is one very broad distinction ; which affords, in fact, one of the most interesting possible studies in ascetical psychology. We have no space here to theorise on it ; rather we would refer our readers to the seventh and eighth of F. Newman's "Occasional Sermons," which have always impressed us as being among his most powerful and original essays. The distinction to which we refer is this : one large class of saints have always been drawn towards God by *mortifying*, the other by *sanctifying*, human personal affections—the love of parent, of brother, of friend. This distinction of course depends ultimately on a certain fundamental distinction of character ; a distinction, which may or may not be capable of analysis, but which, at all events, is intrinsic, and fixed by God. To use F. Newman's own instances, S. John could no more have walked perfectly along S. Paul's path, than S. Paul along S. John's. And our present purpose is to point out the obvious truth, that those favourite marks of Mr. Lecky's attack—the saints of the desert—are shown by the very fact of their eremitical life to rank in one category and not in the other.

Let us here pause for a moment to point out Mr. Lecky's deplorable shallowness and irreligiousness in such passages as the following. A saintly ascetic, living on the thought of God,—praying day and night with most fervent solicitude for his fellow-men,—living in constant promptitude (as will be immediately seen) to do them any kind of practical service,—is accounted by Mr. Lecky (vol. ii., p. 114) "a hideous, sordid, and emaciated maniac ; without knowledge, without patriotism, without natural affection ; passing his life in a long routine of useless and atrocious self-torture, and quailing before the ghastly phantoms of his delirious brain." To crucify the flesh, is to be "hideous and emaciated" ; to dwell in thought on the Infinite Creator, is to be "without knowledge" ; to desire passionately the highest good of his fellow-countrymen and fellow-men, is to be "without patriotism and natural affection" ; to think that spiritual blessings are the one legitimate end of man's aspirations, is to be a "maniac." Again (p. 120), "Tens of thousands of the most devoted men fled to the desert, to reduce themselves by maceration *nearly to the condition of the brute.*" We had thought it characteristic of a brute, that he knows nothing of God, and cares only for being sleek and comfortable ; but Mr. Lecky holds that brutality is most closely approached, by a life of prayer, meditation, and austerity.

We said incidentally, that a solitary was always most eagerly disposed to do his fellow-men any practicable service. Mr. Lecky's own pages abound in

instances of this. "S. Ephrem, in a time of pestilence, emerged from his solitude to found and superintend a hospital at Edessa" (p. 86); "when Antioch was threatened with destruction, the anchorites poured forth from the neighbouring deserts to intercede with the ministers of the emperor;" (p. 88) a "solitary hermit often planted himself with his little boat by a bridgeless stream, and the charity of his life was to ferry over the traveller;" (p. 89) "saints wandered through the world begging money, that they might give to beggars, or depriving themselves of their garments, that they might clothe the naked:" (p. 100), &c. &c. It is most honourable to Mr. Lecky that he always takes pains to place such facts before his readers; less honourable, that he does not see their bearing.

Two more considerations must be added, in order to complete our theoretical statement. We believe it will be found that the primary end of those bodily mortifications which so amaze and confound ordinary men, has been commonly what we have already mentioned; viz., a desire of fixing the heart more exclusively and caressingly on God. But a second very powerful motive is added, the resolve of doing penance for sin. Man's sinfulness is very deep, and his perception of it grows far more rapidly than his avoidance of it. Even putting aside therefore those comparatively few cases in which anchorites have in early life been profligates, in every instance they are profoundly penetrated with a sense of sin and with a desire of expiation.

Then further came the sacred duty of living purely and chastely. Many of them, in Mr. Lecky's opinion (p. 125), were "physically incapable of a life of celibacy;" yet he admits in the same breath that most of these very men did, in fact, lead it irreproachably. How were they enabled to do so? Of course, primarily by means of prayer and meditation; but secondly and indispensably, by means of those "macerations" and austerities, which Mr. Lecky considers a "brutal" (p. 120) exchange for marriage with "Syrian or African brides" (p. 125). It must be remembered too that, according to Catholic doctrine, in proportion as men rise in saintliness, God permits the evil spirit to assail them more violently and unintermittingly. Never does He place them in circumstances under which they have not the fullest moral power, through such help as He gives them, of avoiding mortal sin. But as their strength for resistance becomes greater, He rejoices to give them an occasion of approving themselves heroically, and thus of growing more rapidly in perfection.

There can be no doubt that the whole eremitical movement of those early centuries was specially ordained by God, as a salutary remedy for then prevalent evils. The "Spectator" of May 8 has some powerful and singularly candid remarks on this, in its review of Mr. Lecky.

"It was of the very essence of the revolution which Christianity was destined to effect, that an ample field of spiritual experience should be conquered from the family and the world and their occupations, and vindicated as a part of the higher life of man for ever. And this would hardly have been effected, without some lengthened period of what we may call *naked* spiritual life; spiritual life, in which the monopolizing influence of the human affections over the mind had been resisted and repelled. For this purpose the soul had to do battle, not merely against the body, but against

the family affections of the Western nations for centuries. That was no time when domestic life could have been spiritualized in the sense in which we now use the term, without first going through an internecine conflict, generations long, and leaving the ideal victory in the hands of the solitary religious spirit. Not only in the lives of the Greeks and Romans do we see how clinging and carnal were the natural ties of paganism . . . but even in the New Testament itself there is ample evidence that the relations of the family—certainly the relations of the sexes—had none of that play and depth and delicacy of tenderness, which makes them shade off so naturally, as it seems to us of the present day, into the religious affections themselves."

And though our readers are doubtless familiar with the masterly comment on Mr. Lecky which appeared in the June "Month," we cannot resist the temptation of reprinting one paragraph, which bears closely on much that we have been saying.

"Mr. Lecky has, indeed, read the lives of the Saints of the desert to little purpose, and to little purpose studied the character of those brutal forces against which Christianity was waging war, if he cannot see that a strong remedy was necessary to counteract a fearfully strong tendency to vice; that a protest of the most vehement kind was needed against the appalling immorality of the age; that these same rugged mystics were full of a strong common sense, of much wondrous kindness, of a spirit of courtesy and beautiful modesty, of sublime spiritual aspirations, of heroic courage, of a divine charity which softened the seeming asperity of their manners, and exercised an influence for good, altogether incompatible with the qualities he ascribes to them, and with the motives he assigns to their life of self-denial and self-sacrifice. He may be pardoned for not being able to take the measure of their sanctity: but the narratives he has read in Tillemont, Rosweyde, and the Bollandists, furnish a host of facts which ought to have shown him that the monks and hermits of the desert were neither without knowledge nor passions nor imagination; that their prayers were anything but a mechanical routine; and that as they grew in age and experience, they grew also in thorough humanity of spirit and a wisdom not without its touches of gentle irony and sweet compassionateness for the weaknesses of men" (p. 565).

Nor should we omit to remind our readers of that very striking selection from dicta of the desert saints, which appeared a year or two ago in successive numbers of the "Month," under the signature "J. H. N." Mr. Lecky would have been unspeakably amazed had he read those papers.

One justice is done to the solitaries by Mr. Lecky, which is by no means universally rendered them by non-Catholics. Read, by way of contrast, Tennyson's poem on S. Simeon Stylites. The orthodox Protestant doctrine is, that they were miracles of pride and self-complacency; and Mr. Lecky indeed most gratuitously (p. 129) speaks of this vice as "very common among" them: but he admits that it was in direct antagonism to their recognised ideal. He proceeds, in the very passage which we have just cited, to recount the legend of a solitary who was permitted to fall into impurity as a punishment for pride. In the note at p. 196 he refers to similar stories; and in p. 197 he expressly says that "the disposition of humility . . . has probably" nowhere "been so largely and so *successfully* inculcated as in a monastery." He cannot mean to *contrast* monks with hermits in this particular.

This concession however at last does not cost Mr. Lecky so much as it might seem. As the "Month" has pointed out (p. 561), he is by no means an unreserved opponent of pride and admirer of humility; and when he admits therefore, that the heathen ideal of virtue is mainly based on the former and the Christian on the latter, he by no means holds this consideration to be so decisive as an unwary Catholic would expect.*

There is no accusation more constantly brought by Mr. Lecky against the ascetical standard of morality, than its indifference to *patriotism*. What does this come to? If it is meant that a man, saintly according to the Catholic ideal of saintliness, is not keenly sensitive to the sins of his fellow-countrymen, and most disinterestedly desirous of promoting his country's religious interests,—such an accusation is on the surface false, and even preposterous. But if it be meant that he accounts national greatness and glory as very contemptible objects of pursuit, such an accusation is a high and (we are confident) richly-deserved eulogy.

Very much more remains to be said; but we have been already carried to so great a length, that for the present at least we must conclude.

Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Part the First.

London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IN no particular perhaps is English Catholic literature so deficient as in published sermons; and we are particularly glad therefore that the Jesuit Fathers are projecting a continuous publication of the kind. They could not have begun more auspiciously. We confess indeed that we have not yet read F. Hathaway's course on our Blessed Lord's Temptation; but it is really difficult, without appearance of exaggeration, to express our sense of the value of F. Coleridge's on "the latter days." Its title may give some readers an impression of its being abstruse and technically theological; but no impression can be further from the truth. Nowhere have we seen the religious and moral characteristics of the present time so truthfully, vigorously, and profoundly set forth; a picture so vividly drawn, and yet not *overdrawn*.

F. Coleridge shows himself a true son of the Church, by the sacredness which he ascribes to civil government. It is "the principle of law and order and right and obedience, the rule of conscience and the national law, as represented in the fabric of human society," which, according to S. Paul's testimony, keeps back the manifestation of Antichrist (p. 14). "The supernatural society of the Church . . . in a certain sense rests upon the civil society" (p. 15); in such sense that "if any power of evil can

* The Church has infallibly defined: "Fortitudinem gentilium mundana cupiditas, fortitudinem Christianorum Dei caritas facit."—*Conc. Araus*, canon 17.

utterly subvert and undermine the latter, it will go far towards obtaining a momentary victory over the former." Consequently (pp. 18, 19) the present attacks of infidelity are directed, not against particular dogmata, nor even principally against the dogmatic principle, heartily though that be detested; but against "social order and right."

"Pius IX. has had to warn the world as to things which are the very foundation of Christian and even of natural society; the sanctity of marriage, the parental right of education, even the natural right of law and property and justice, which the secret sectarians of our own times are doing their best to undermine. And if in a year's time we are to see, what has not been seen for so many centuries, the Bishops of the Catholic Church assembled in a General Council around the Vicar of Jesus Christ, it is not only and not entirely for the needs of the Church and of religion as such, but for the needs of human society and civil order, the very foundations of which are being sapped by the enemies both of God and man" (p. 19).

The following most impressive account of Voltaire is given, for the purpose of illustrating man's tendency to venerate both "genius" even "of the lowest kind," and also "success" achieved even "by the most unprincipled means," if their hero's career has been directed against the Church of God, and in harmony with their own carnal "aims and desires and longings."

"You may have read, my brethren, in the history of the last century, how that miserable man whose name has become famous as the patriarch and apostle of modern infidelity, the man who began, or at all events carried to its height, that system of calumniating and scoffing and sneering at Christianity which has so many followers still—though his contemporaries knew him, as we also know him from his biographies, to have been eaten up by meanness, petty spite, vanity, jealousy, avarice, insatiable pride, ostentation, and love of applause, so that his character appears to us to have nothing in it that any one could heartily admire or love in any way—yet how, at the very close of his long drawn-out life, when the hand of death was already creeping upon him, he had himself transported once more to Paris, and how he there became the object of universal homage and, it may almost be said, of worship. Worship, for no other reason so much as that he had been a brilliant forerunner of Antichrist in his doctrine, in laughing at religion and encouraging men in infidelity! And then all ranks of that gay and thoughtless society, dancing, as it were, at that moment, its last fling over the half-wakened fires of the volcano beneath its feet, which was so soon to burst forth and engulf the revellers in destruction—all ranks, I grieve to say, from the partner of the throne of the successor of S. Louis down to the lowest hangers-on of the light literature and the theatres of the time—came or sent in succession to the ante-chamber of that dying infidel as if to burn incense before him" (pp. 35, 36).

And F. Coleridge dwells earnestly (p. 38) on the vast importance—an importance which even good Catholics do not always sufficiently realize—of refusing "homage to the world's idols—to *intellect*, to power, to success, to wealth"; and giving all our honour "where *alone* honour is due, to humility, and purity, and meekness, and self-sacrifice, and charity, and zeal for the glory of God."

The ablest of all seems to us the third sermon on "The Great Apostacy"; in which the author brings out a singularly powerful and (so far as we happen

to know) entirely original comparison, between the heathenism of Apostolic time on the one hand, and that moral corruption on the other hand, which S. Paul predicts as characterizing the reign of Antichrist, and to which society is now so rapidly hurrying. In the old heathenism, says F. Coleridge (p. 52) "there were three diverse and often conflicting elements." There was a simply good element, which came from God, and which was embodied in great part of Roman and Grecian laws, institutions, poetry, philosophy. Again, there was a simply diabolical element (p. 54) : for the heathen deities were no poetic creations ; they were, as S. Paul testifies, the evil spirits themselves, who were worshipped by rites of the foulest impurity and the most revolting cruelty. Lastly, there was a third element, which may be called paganism proper ; viz. (p. 53) the "system of human life and human society," as carried on "according to the impulses and unbridled lusts of the natural man."

Now—and this is the singularly original and pregnant remark of F. Coleridge's to which we referred—if you compare with each other S. Paul's respective descriptions of contemporary heathenism and of the future anti-Christian apostasy, you will find that the simply *diabolic* element is peculiar to the *former* ; but that the *pagan* is in the very same degree characteristic of *both*.

"I do not find, in any of the prophetic descriptions of the restored paganism of modern days, that the system of the worship of false gods is to revive, with its abominable rites of blood and its mysteries of licentiousness. Wherever the Cross has been once firmly planted, we may surely hope that the world has seen the last of the public worship of Satan. In S. Paul's description of the latter days, I find *the blasphemy of the true God substituted for the worship of devils*" (p. 56).

"And now, my brethren, what need have we of any subtlety of inquiry or refinement of speculation to tell us that this modern heathenism of which the prophecies speak is around us on every side? Mankind are in many senses far mightier, and the resources and enjoyments at their command are far ampler, than in the days of old. We are in possession of the glorious but intoxicating fruits of that advanced civilization and extended knowledge, which has sprung up from the seeds which the Church of God has, as it were, dropped on her way through the world. Society has been elevated and refined, but on that very account it has become capable of a *more penetrating degradation, of a more elegant and a more poisonous corruption*. Knowledge has been increased, but on the increase of knowledge has followed the increase of pride. Science has unravelled the laws of nature and the hidden treasures of the material universe ; and they place fresh combinations of power and new revelations of enjoyment in the hands of men, who have not seen in the discovery increased reasons for self-restraint or for reverence for the Giver of all good gifts" (p. 57).

"Or, again, my brethren, let us turn from public to private life. Look at social life ; look at domestic manners ; consider the men and women of the present day *in their amusements, their costumes, the amount of restraint they put upon the impulses of nature* ; compare them at their theatres and their recreations ; compare them *as to their treatment of the poor and the afflicted classes* ; compare them, again, as to the style of art which they affect, or the literature in which they delight, with the old heathen of the days of S. Paul. I do not say, God forbid ! that there is not a wide and impassable gulf between the two, for that would be to say that so many centuries of Christendom

had been utterly wasted, and that the Gospel law has not penetrated to the foundations of society, so that it is not true that our Lord rules, as the Psalmist says, 'in the midst of His enemies,'* even over the world, which would fain emancipate itself from His sway. But I do say, that if a Christian of the first ages were to rise from the dead, and examine our society, point by point, on the heads which I have intimated, and compare it, on the one hand, with the polished refined heathen whom he may have known at the courts of Nero or Domitian, and, on the other, with the pure strict holiness of his own brethren in the faith who worshipped with him in the catacombs, *he might find it difficult indeed to say that what he would see around him in London or Paris was derived by legitimate inheritance rather from the traditions of the martyr Church than from the customs of the persecuting heathen.* He would miss the violence, the cruelty, the riotous and ruffianly lust, the extraordinary disrespect for humanity and human life, which distinguished the later Roman civilization; but he would find much of its corruption, much of its licentiousness, much of its hardness of heart. The unregenerate instincts of human nature are surging up like a great sea all around us; society is fast losing all respect for those checks upon the innate heathenism of man, which have been thrown over the surface of the world by the Church" (pp. 58, 59).

Nor, on the other hand, should it be forgotten, how much deeper guilt is involved in living heathenishly after Christianity has been fully known, than was involved in so living during what may be called the world's religious twilight.

The preacher concludes his sermon (p. 62) by dwelling on the unspeakable importance of that struggle which is so close at hand—the struggle for vindicating, against the political efforts of liberalism, worldliness, and irreligion, the sacred principle of religious and doctrinal education.

If there be any of our readers who have not already mastered F. Coleridge's course, we are sure they will not repent of acting on our hearty recommendation, and giving to that course their most careful and studious attention.

The Formation of Christendom. Part Second. By T. W. ALLIES.
London: Longmans. 1869.

THE pleasant fellow who saluted the prostrate statue of Jupiter Capitolinus, begging the god to remember, if his turn should ever come again, the civility shown him in his adversity, would be much tempted to think that the time of his reward was coming if he lived in these days. A Pagan reaction has decidedly set in. Perhaps that *ver rongeur*, to which the Abbé Gaume called attention some years ago, has had something to do with it; but a still more efficacious cause has been that modern spirit which, sick of the false Christianity it has found insufficient in its mental and moral needs, yet refuses to turn for help to the true Christianity, against which it has conceived such strong though unreasonable prejudices. It is as

* Psalm cix. 2.

painful as it is wonderful, to see so many intellects of a high order working themselves back to the unhappy religious condition of, at best, a Socrates or a Cicero. It is sad to see a sober-minded Lecky become, not indeed the eulogist of Pagan corruption, but the apologist of Pagan morality; while, in another sphere of thought, the *not* sober-minded Swinburne urges his muse to take, not flights but plunges, into depths whither the foul fancy of a Catullus hardly dared to venture.

Almost the only work in our contemporary English literature calculated to supply an adequate corrective for such a perversion of the intellect and the heart, is that of which a second instalment is now before us. It is nearly four years since the first part of Mr. Allies' work was under notice in our pages, when its general plan and the author's method were examined in some detail. All that was then said as to the practical importance of studies which furnish us with a complete view of the change from heathenism to Christianity, has received repeated confirmation in the intervening years. The most active intellects of our time, outside the Church, have forced religious controversy past all the outposts and the lines of the old discussions of this great question, and have daringly raised the issue of a comparison between the world as it was before Christ and the world as it has been at its best under the Christian law. Upon the eye of the tired man of business, skimming over his evening paper as he rushes by express train to his suburban dinner, no less than on that of the student plodding leisurely through a solid volume in his quiet library, the question has obtruded itself, "How is mankind the better for its alleged redemption?" The interest of such an argument is certainly the reverse of speculative, and no higher or worthier labour can engage a thoughtful mind than to treat it comprehensively, and, as far as may be, exhaustively, in the cause of Christian truth.

The actual condition of society as affected by the prevailing polytheism among the greatest and most cultivated people of antiquity, is vividly set before us in the first chapter of the present volume. We are enabled to realize the state of men's minds when their religion was a complicated and oppressive chain of minute superstitious observances, by which, nevertheless, even the free-thinkers of the time were so acted upon, that Julius Cæsar himself "never mounted a chariot without uttering certain words for good luck and preservation against calamity." Still more powerfully have we presented to us the depravity of human morals under the influence of a course of teachings and examples which made virtue, as we know of it, not only in some sense impossible but almost inconceivable. Varro, quoted by S. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*), divides the Pagan theology into three branches,—the fabulous, the natural, and the civil. By the second he understands the theories of philosophers concerning the physical nature of the gods. By the third he means that which all members of civil communities, the priests especially, are bound to know and administer. But S. Augustine points out that this was inseparably connected with the first, which Varro calls the fabulous theology, and treats as only fit for the theatre; because it was the very same gods who, though ridiculed to a certain extent in the

theatres, were worshipped in the temples ; worshipped, too, by rites so foul that an exact reproduction of them on the public stage durst not have been attempted.

“Conceive, then (says our author) every revolting detail of adultery, prostitution, incest, or of dishonesty, or of violence, which the perverted invention of modern writers has ever dressed up for the theatres of great cities in this and other countries. They will perhaps yield in turpitude to that which the theatres of the Roman empire exhibited. But what these theatres represented in mimic action was the exact image, as reflected in a mirror, of what was transacted at the solemn service of the gods in unnumbered temples. The exact image, so far as it went, yet stopping short in some respects, for our eyewitness above cited declares that gratitude was due to the actors, inasmuch as they spared the eyes of men, and did not lay bare upon the theatre all that was hidden within the walls of temples. It was not enough, then, that all the many games and spectacles in which such things were represented were dedicated to the gods, acted under their especial sanction, even enjoined by them as means of gaining their favour or averting their wrath, which alone would have made them answerable for the immorality so portrayed ; not enough, even, that actions of this quality were in the theatres ascribed to the gods who presided over them ; but these acts of immorality were not the fictions of poets or the acting of players, but the very substance of the theology itself in which the worship of all these nations was embodied. Priapus appeared to make a laugh on the stage exactly in the costume in which he was worshipped in the temples, or in which he entered into the rites of marriage ; a costume of indescribable turpitude, the shame of our human nature. The players on the stage and the statues in the temples equally exhibited Jove bearded and Mercury beardless, Saturn in decrepitude, and Apollo in youthful beauty. In the rites of Juno, of Ceres, of Venus, of the mother of the gods, words were uttered and scenes acted such as no decent person would suffer to be spoken or acted before his own mother ; or rather they contained, as a portion of themselves, the worst crimes which the theatres represented ; nay, crimes which they stopped short of acting, and persons so infamous that they were not tolerated even on the stage, where yet to take part was a civil dishonour. What, then, was the nature of those rites wherein those were chosen to take part whom the utmost license of the stage banished from its boards ? Let us conceive—if such a conception can be adequately represented to the mind—that the vilest drama ever acted upon a modern theatre was being daily carried on in all the churches of Christendom by troops of priests and priestesses, with all the paraphernalia of costliest worship, with prayers, invocation, and sacrifices, as a service acceptable to the Ruler of man’s lot, and as an account of what that ruler had himself done, and of what he loved to be imitated by others. That would be a picture of heathen worship in the time of Augustus ; that would be the moral food on which was nurtured that crowd of nations which acknowledged Cæsar’s sway ; that the conception of divine things wrought into the minds of the hundred millions of men who formed the Roman empire. Was it surprising that all worshippers of the gods should look for their example rather in Jupiter’s actions than in Plato’s teaching or the moral judgments of Cato ?”

Before men could learn to serve the One true and living God, they had to renounce the service not merely of vice and error, but of the very spirits of evil, through whose perpetually-working inspirations their minds were perverted and their hearts depraved. This idea, without which one cannot at

all understand the character and magnitude of the change that had to be wrought, is developed in the following passage :—

“When we look upon this idolatry, occupying not one country or race, but all; not merely bewildering savage or uncivilized man, but throned in the chief seats of the world’s choicest civilization; when we look upon its endlessly divergent forms, its palpable contradictions, its cherished or commanded immoralities, its crowd of debasing, irrational, heterogeneous superstitions, its cruelty, sensuality, and fearfulness, all these being no less an insult to man’s reason than a derogation from God’s majesty, who is there that does not feel this to be the strangest and most astonishing sight which history presents to man? And yet there is a unity which runs through it all, and stamps it with a double mark. Not only is it a service due from man to God, which is paid by him to the creature rather than to the Creator, but more especially it is that service paid by man to God’s enemies, the fallen angels. These it is who have assumed the mask of dead men; these it is who, within the sculptured forms of Jupiter, Juno, Mars, and Venus, of Baal, and Derketo, and Mylitta, of Anubis and Serapis, of Thor and Woden, and so many more, receive man’s adoration, and rejoice above all things in possessing his heart. These it is who have seduced him by exhibitions of visible beauty, have lain in wait for him by fountain, forest, and field, and filled the groves and high places with the charms which best pleased him under the name of worship; or have promised to disclose future things to him; or, again, have harrowed his soul with phantoms and terrors of the unseen world. These incoherent systems; these deities, whose functions ran into and athwart each other; these investings of human passions, and even unnatural and monstrous vices, with immortality and terrible power; these rivals ever quarrelling with each other, and jealous for the possession of man’s homage, all serve the purpose of those behind the scenes, are puppets under their command, and have a common end and result in the captivity of their victim. More even than this; while they seem disunited and contradictory, they are really one, marshalled by the power, directed by the mind, held in the hand of him who is called ‘the Ruler of this world,’ ‘the power of darkness,’ ‘the might of the enemy,’ who ‘holds the power of death;’ ‘the ancient serpent, who leads into error the whole world,’ ‘that malignant one in whom the whole world is lying,’ ‘the prince of the power of the air, the spirit who now works in the children of disobedience,’ who musters ‘the principalities, the powers, the world-rulers of this life’s darkness, the spirits of wickedness in ethereal places,’ to serve him in his conflict with man’s flesh and blood; in fine, for S. Paul’s language goes one point beyond even that of his Master, and terms him not merely the ruler, but ‘the God of this world;’ that is to say, this manifold idolatry is the establishment of his kingdom, the enthronement of his godhead over men, the mark of their captivity and prostration before him.”

To prevent misconception, we must observe that, in most of our previous remarks, we have been pursuing a train of thought rather suggested than distinctly followed in the work before us. Mr. Allies does not, for example, in the present volume, draw out that strongly marked contrast between heathen and Christian society which we cannot help keeping before our minds: it is rather his purpose to show the energetic and progressive action of the Gospel, its verities and its virtues, upon the repulsive and resisting materials he has described. But, following up the subject from our own point of view, these pages present us with an important figure, a splendid fossil, a moral ichthyosaurus of the most respectable Gentile period, in

the person of Junius Rusticus, the model minister of a model emperor, Marcus Aurelius. How true it is that "there is nothing new under the sun!" Rusticus is really a representative man, not of his own time only but in some sense even of ours. With but the proper change of costume, it needs scarcely an effort of the imagination to call him up before our mind's eye on the shady side of Pall Mall or in the garden of the Luxembourg, talking, in the latter case, philosophic common-places with the congenial Rénan, or, in the former, recognized as the light of his journal and the life of his club, a great man and a great statesman, capable of "revising" an education code, of adding a fifth quarter to the year, or perhaps of undertaking the mighty mission of suppressing the *vir* to substitute the *virago*. If this be fancy, at least it is fact that he was "a perfect specimen of the Roman gentleman and noble, a blending of all that was best in Cicero, Lælius, and Cato;" that the Emperor made him Prefect of Rome, and honoured him with the still higher title of his "friend." Nor was he a debased idolater, this excellent Rusticus; his Deism was probably of a higher and more definite type than that of some of our most *geistlich* contemporaries. In the discharge of his official duties, however—which combined in some sort those of a Lord Chief Justice, a Lord Mayor, and a Bow Street magistrate with us—this philosophic friend of an exemplary emperor is a very heathen of heathens; coarsely reviles the "wretches" of Christians who are hauled before him, and makes the roughest corporal punishment his test of truth. It is a weakness with men who are neither cultured nor sanguinary enough, to look upon his persecution of the Christians as a blot upon the otherwise estimable character of Aurelius, and the conduct of Rusticus in his official capacity will necessarily lower him in the opinion of such persons. But we are not at all sure that this is not the very point in which our modern Junii Rustici most highly approve the example of the Emperor and his "friend."

We should have been glad, if space permitted, to make some extended reference to the chapters in which Mr. Allies traces the action of the Gnostic heresies and the Greek philosophy; but we have already said more than enough of a book that cannot fail to be in the hands of our readers.

Mary, Queen of Scots, and her Accusers. By JOHN HOSACK, Barrister-at-Law.
London and Edinburgh: Blackwood.

MR. HOSACK'S volume has reached us so close upon the eve of publication, that we are constrained, notwithstanding its exceeding interest and its especial claims on our pages, in which its subject has been so often discussed, to postpone our full review of it. The publication is most opportune, and will be welcomed by every conscientious student of history. The memory of the ill-fated Queen of Scots has been the theme of a long and still unexhausted controversy. The works of her assailants, from Buchanan to Froude, would make up no contemptible library in point of bulk; and although, as is too often the fate of the weak and unpopular, her defenders

have met with but scanty sympathy, they, too, beginning with Bishop Leslie, form a goodly series. The controversy which, from the date of the searching investigations of Goodall, Whitaker, and Tytler, had in some degree slumbered, was revived with much of its old acrimony by the publication of the new materials brought together by Prince Labanoff and other foreign collectors, and by the researches of Miss Strickland, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Burton, and others, in the state-paper offices of England and Scotland.

M. Mignet, Mr. Burton, and, still more recently, Mr. Froude, have undertaken to reconsider the case in the light of the new evidence thus collected. The judgment of these writers is decidedly adverse to the Queen; that of Mr. Froude, especially, to a degree which bespeaks passionate and almost vindictive antipathy.

Mr. Hosack, in the temperate and scholastic volume now before us, reviews the entire case, and carefully considers every portion of the evidence, ancient and modern. To this reviewal he appears to have brought all the qualifications for a calm and impartial judgment. As a Presbyterian in creed, he may be regarded as at the least free from all prepossession in favour of Queen Mary. He is a lawyer of long standing and high reputation, and his previous publications attest at once his eminently cautious and judicial temperament, and his familiarity with English and Scottish constitutional history.*

We must reserve for our review all the particulars of the investigation; here only premising, that the result is to demonstrate by every rule of judicial procedure the utterly worthless and unreliable nature of the evidence which the accusers of the Queen of Scots have urged against her, as well as, in most instances, its inconclusiveness, even if it were unexceptionable in weight and in character.

Roma Sotterranea: some account of the Roman Catacombs, especially of the Cemetery of San Callisto. Compiled from the works of Commendatore De Rossi, with the consent of the Author. By Rev. J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE, D.D., President of S. Mary's College, Oscott; and Rev. W. R. BROWNLOW, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1869.

IT had long been a subject of regret that the vast store of information on the origin, the history, and the present condition of the Roman catacombs, which the learned and indefatigable explorer, Commendatore De Rossi, had brought together in his various publications, remained practically closed against ordinary inquirers into a subject, towards which even the unlearned are attracted by the touching associations which surround it, and by the profound and important interests which it involves. To many the

* "A Treatise on the Conflict of the Laws of England and Scotland." Blackwood. 1857.

language proved an insuperable difficulty; and many even of those who were sufficiently familiar with the language, were shut out by the costliness, and still more by the unpopular form of the publications.

We can hardly imagine a more acceptable service, not merely to this unlearned class, but even to the most learned of our Christian archaeologists, than has been rendered by the reverend authors of the "Roma Sotterranea." Nor do we hesitate to say, that in describing their work as "compiled from the works of Commendatore De Rossi," they have conveyed to the reader quite too humble a representation, as well of the nature of their task as of the manner in which it has been executed. "Two courses," they write in their preface, "were open to us; either to bring out a translation from the Italian original, or to embody in a work of our own the most interesting and important facts which these volumes contain. The first would have been incomparably the easier, and in some respects the more satisfactory course. But the size and cost of such a work would have put it entirely beyond the reach of many whom we were most anxious to benefit. We therefore decided on the plan adopted in the volume which we now introduce to our readers, and which we believe will be found to contain as fair a summary as its dimensions would allow—not only of De Rossi's two volumes of 'Roma Sotterranea,' published in 1864 and 1867, but also of many articles in his bi-monthly 'Bullettino de Archæologia Christiana' of papers read by him before learned societies in Rome and elsewhere, and of his occasional contributions to works of others, such as the 'Spicilegium Slesmense' of Cardinal Pitra." All this undoubtedly the "Roma Sotterranea" of Messrs. Northcote and Brownlow fully realizes. How much of their own they have infused into their work, we hope to show by a careful review of the volume in October.

Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de France de 1682. Par CHARLES GÉRIN, Juge au Tribunal Civil de la Seine. One vol., pp. xviii.—571. 8vo. Paris: Lecoffre. 1868.

THIS unpretending volume has made a great impression in France. It could not fail to do so. The author modestly says:—

"I offer to my readers, in good faith, not a book, but the materials for a book, a collection of documents bearing upon the history of the assembly which drew up the famous propositions. It is possible that I may, some day, write the history. But I am already convinced that it will be impossible to give any complete and correct narrative of it without consulting the present volume. I do not profess to have had access to all the sources of information. One of the most precious has been closed to me, I mean the archives of the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. No one will be astonished at this. But I have done my best to supply its place, by giving the preference, in my selections from all the public collections of Paris, to documents written by the opponents of the Holy See; the papers and portfolios of the ministers of Louis XIV., of his magistrates, and of the Jansenists; and I feel certain that no one who comes after me will find anything to contradict my conclusions."

And it is not too much to say that these conclusions totally reverse the opinions hitherto prevalent upon this important historical subject, not only in England, where men were naturally led away by Protestant prejudices, but quite as much in France. People in general have seemed to think that the French clergy have always held views as to the power of the Pope contrary to those entertained by Italian divines and by the Court of Rome, that owing to the Popes pressing their claims farther and farther, the clergy of France met in 1682, and passed certain resolutions, of which the real author was the illustrious Bossuet, but which embody those ancient and consistently held opinions, and which were gladly and *ex animo* received by the whole French Church. For instance, Charles Butler, in his "Memoirs of English, Irish, and Scottish Catholics," vol. ii, p. 220, says :—

"Seventy-five years after the date of the last of the briefs of Paul V., the assembly of the Gallican clergy, in 1682, subscribed their celebrated declarations respecting the civil and temporal powers. These articles passed unanimously, and the monarch was desired to publish them throughout his kingdom. The declaration met with little opposition in France. Out of France the case was very different, and an interesting and instructive narrative might be framed of the contests to which it gave rise. It appears from [a manuscript of the celebrated Fleury] that Bossuet wisely moderated the too ardent spirit of some of the leading members of the assembly, who proposed much stronger terms for the language of the declaration than those afterwards adopted by the assembly. A good history of this interesting church document is wanting."

Charles Butler's impression is exactly what we conceive to have been general ; that the declaration expressed the general and unanimous feeling of the clergy of France ; that this was no temporary phase of opinion, but only what had always prevailed, and that what took place was an enthusiastic feeling, a popular movement such as might naturally be expected when a great nation, containing millions of able and cultivated minds, was eagerly vindicating against foreign usurpation liberties which it had always enjoyed. The king's part in the matter seems to have been only that he acceded to the unanimous request of the clergy, that he would give to their declarations the force of law, by publishing them in his kingdom. In particular it is clear that Butler considered the moving mind in the whole matter to have been that of the great Bossuet. And it was owing to his wisdom only that the feeling of the French Church and nation was not expressed in much stronger terms.

There is hardly a single detail in this picture which is not expressly contrary to facts which are attested by documents of unquestionable authority, hitherto unknown, and now discovered and published by M. Gérin. To begin with that upon which the whole in fact turns, the declaration was no spontaneous act of the French clergy, but reluctantly made under very strong pressure ; indeed, it would by no means be an exaggeration to say, under compulsion, from the king and his ministers. More than this, it was only part of that system of tyrannous injustice and oppression by which Louis XIV. made, not only his own name, but the name of France terrible to all Europe. His foreign policy and his treatment of the Church are the

only parts of his public life which can be said to be still living. Macaulay remarks, with great truth, that the peculiar character of English political history has had an injurious effect upon our historical writers. England (thank God) has never known any violent change, like the Revolution of 1789, sweeping away all that went before it, and laying new foundations of the whole social order. Our constitution and laws, although continually modified, remain, on the whole, the same; and, therefore, a constitutional act which took place at any period however remote, may be a precedent in our own day. His own example is that the proceedings of the Lords and Commons during the practical interregnum caused by the illness of Henry VI. was appealed to as a governing precedent, when the question had to be treated during that of George III. In France, on the contrary, the Great Revolution so completely swept away all the institutions of former ages, that no part of its past history is now interesting, except in a purely literary aspect, for no sane man would think of appealing to anything before 1789 as a precedent, still less as proving what is the present law. In its political bearing this has been a great blessing to England, for it has led to our uniting in a measure not known to any other society—"revolution with prescription, progress with stability, the energy of youth with the majesty of immemorial antiquity;" the drawback is, that "as there is no country where statesmen have been so much under the influence of the past, so there is none where historians have been so much under the influence of the present." The French historian as a general rule is free from this temptation. But there is one exception, and that is, when he treats of the relations of France to foreign countries, to rival sovereigns, and especially to the Vicar of Christ; Napoleon I., Louis Philippe, and Napoleon III., would never be tempted to quote the acts of Louis XIV. as a precedent for their internal administration; but in dealing with foreign nations they claim to be his heirs, and to have a right to everything conceded to him by England, Spain, and Germany, and most especially by the Popes. And hence it is exactly upon this one question that modern French writers are under a strong temptation to be unfair. We have little doubt that warm partizans of the Second Empire will consider M. Gérin's book as an attack upon the Napoleonic régime.*

In truth, there were few of the outrages by which Napoleon I. compelled every European power to feel that between him and them there must be a struggle for life and death, for which Louis XIV. had not given him more or less precedent. Towards the Pope, in particular, almost as soon as he took into his own hands the government of France, he went to the extreme of insolence. The saintly Innocent XI., both in his temporal sovereignty and his government of the Church, was subjected to insults and outrages at the hands of the most Christian king, only surpassed by those which Pius VII. suffered from Napoleon. And it was by no means as a voluntary expression of the sentiments of the clergy of France, but solely as one of the weapons in this unholy war, that the Assembly of 1682 was both forged and

* This notice was written before the admirable article of the June "Month" had appeared.

wielded by Louis XIV., and even more by his able and unscrupulous minister Colbert. This we are clear, no moderately candid man can ever doubt again after reading M. Gérin's book. But more than this—if he reads the two first chapters he will hardly deny that the dispute between the king and the Pope had its origin, not in any ambitious attempts of the Holy Father to extend his own power, but in his refusal to make himself a partner in the grossest possible abuses, which the king and his ministers were imposing upon the Church, and opposition to which was the unquestionable duty of his office.

It was for this purpose that the Assembly of 1682 was convened. But we doubt whether many persons in France, perhaps whether any in England, are aware that that Assembly was the second which Louis XIV. had called to aid him in this very work. One and twenty years before, when he had just taken the administration into his own hands after the death of Mazarin, Louis, with the most cynical shamelessness, and without any plausible excuse, had picked a quarrel on a subject connected with the temporal government of Rome, with the Sovereign Pontiff Alexander VII. He then sent an army into Italy, and compelled the Pope to accept terms of peace, which were intentionally insulting, but which were disgraceful, no doubt, rather to the Catholic Prince who dictated them, than to the Pontiff who was forced to submit to them.

At the same time, to increase the insult to the Pope, he summoned a meeting of clergy at Paris for the purpose of voting a declaration derogatory to the authority of the Holy See, and what most strongly marks the animus of this proceeding is that the shameless quarrel with the Pope then existing having been made up the next year, the subject of the declaration was allowed to sleep for one and twenty years, and only brought up again when Louis had by the most openly tyrannical attacks upon the legal and canonical rights of the French clergy, involved himself in a new dispute with Innocent XI. Many interesting particulars as to the former assembly will be found in the introduction to M. Gérin's volume.

We need hardly say that to Catholics the religious authority of the Assembly of 1682 (whatever else might be said about it) would be absolutely nothing, even if it had really possessed the character of a national council, because its declarations were immediately pronounced null and void by Innocent XI.; a sentence which has been deliberately confirmed by Pius VI., and again by our Holy Father Pius IX. But this does not deprive M. Gérin's work of a high interest and value. We regard the question as one which touches not the doctrine of the Catholic Church, but the honour of that noble French Church, the mother of so many saints and martyrs, whose children are at this moment the most noble and most successful missionaries of the Cross of Christ, which in every time of trial has been so glorious in her deeds and sufferings, and the resurrection of which, after she had been trodden down, apparently for ever, by the Great Revolution, has been the greatest ecclesiastical event of the present century, and the happiest omen of new victories awaiting the Catholic Church in other lands, in which she is, even now, sharing the passion of her Lord. It would be impossible to think without deep pain that so glorious a Church had indeed

identified herself with a system of which Benedict XIV. declared that it is contrary to the doctrine "received everywhere save in France," and which Pius IX. has pronounced to be "contrary to the mind of the Catholic Church."

From this disgrace M. Gérin effectually clears the French Catholic body. For the Assembly of 1682 had as little claim to represent the French Church as one of the packed assemblies under Cromwell to represent the English nation. A national council consists of all the bishops of a nation. The Assembly of 1682 contained only 34 out of the 130 bishops of whom the French episcopate then consisted; and even these, so far from representing the whole body, were selected, almost without the colour of free election, by the king and his ministers. The documents published by M. Gérin on this subject are exceedingly curious and important. Letters have been preserved showing that the ministers wrote in the name of the king to different archbishops, stating what bishop the king wished to be commissioned to represent the province.

In some cases, in spite of his instructions, the electors chose some other prelate. The ministers then wrote back to them that the king's service required that, in spite of the engagements they had entered into with him, they should select another in his place. Beyond this, it does not seem that opposition went.

But even the bishops thus nominated were not left free to act at the Assembly as their consciences directed. A form of procuration was drawn up by a creature of the government, the unworthy Archbishop of Paris, and forced upon the electors, who were obliged to charge their representatives to take side against the Pope, and in favour of the king and his ministers, in the matter in dispute, and to sign whatever should be agreed upon by the majority of the Assembly for that purpose.

Lastly, we have a curious testimony to the fact that the declaration did not represent the real feeling and wish, even of the packed assembly by which it was formally adopted. M. Gérin has found a paper drawn up by the Procureur-Général de Harlay, who had been the chief manager of the affair on behalf of the king's ministers, which declares that the majority of the bishops who subscribed the four articles put their signatures to them against their will, and that "they would gladly have given a contrary opinion the next day, if they had been allowed to do so."

The result unquestionably is: first, that the "declaration" of 1682 has now for ever lost whatever weight and importance it has ever been supposed to possess, as the spontaneous expression of the opinion of an important branch of the Catholic Church in the seventeenth century; next, that the French clergy of that period are henceforth freed from the disgrace and suspicion which has long attached to them among Catholics, as if they had been little better than half-Catholics. The name of "Gallican," as attached to certain opinions, has become so strongly fixed, that it would be vain to attempt to change its meaning. But, henceforth, candid and well-informed men must feel that it has been given under a mistaken estimate of facts. It is notorious that the opinions called Gallican are not those of the French Church at the present day—that no one would think of asserting. But the result of

M. Gérin's labours is to prove that they were not those of the French clergy, at what Frenchmen love to call "the great period" of France. In fact, we much doubt whether there has ever been a day at which they would not have been indignantly repudiated by the great majority of the French clergy.

Against this, we have only to set an unhappy fact—viz., that M. Gérin proves the existence of a miserable spirit of servility among a considerable number of French prelates under Louis XIV. It cannot be doubted. But we regard this as a disgrace, not so much to the French nation or the French Church, as to the system then prevailing, and which now bears the name of the *ancien régime*. We know no reason to believe that the result of the same system would have been better among Englishmen than it actually was among Frenchmen. We should not forget that, in the time of Henry II., S. Thomas of Canterbury stood alone—the other English bishops being, to a man, on the side of the king.

This leads to another question upon which we have not space to enter here, but of which we hope to speak in our next number. One man there was whom we might have hoped to see acting under Louis XIV. the part of S. Thomas. Why cannot we give that glory to the illustrious Bossuet? Of his conduct in the matter, and of that of the king himself, we would gladly say something, if our space did not oblige us to conclude for the present.

It is most natural Protestant writers should take for granted, that the Church is responsible for acts done by professedly Catholic sovereigns, with the professed object of bringing heretics into the fold. Hence the *dragonnades* of Louis XIV. have always been charged upon her. We have little doubt they will continue to be so charged. But after the publication of M. Gérin's book it will be most unreasonable; and in fact excusable only on the plea of ignorance, and that an ignorance which a little trouble would have removed. With this view we would call especial attention to a slight skirmish between the author of the article in the "Month," to which we have already referred, and the Editor of the "Spectator," that has taken place since our own notice was in type. The "Spectator" of June 5, remarking on the article in the "Month," said: "We cannot help expressing some surprise at reading that the fall of the Bourbons is owing to their oppression of the Holy See, and especially to the conduct of the great Bourbon, Louis XIV. Is not this ungrateful to the author of the *Dragonnades*?"

The writer in the "Month" addressed, in answer to this, a letter which the "Spectator," with its usual fairness (in which it is an honourable contrast to many other papers), published in its number of June 12. We have verified the references of this letter; and we may as well add (what the writer does not mention, although we think it a curious fact) that the answer to Talon, which is not known to exist elsewhere, has been preserved among the papers of M. Harlay, who (as all readers of M. Gérin's work know) was the chief agent of Louis XIV. in his attacks upon the Holy See: so carefully was all that issued from the Pope watched by Louis and his ministers. The letter says:—

“I believe it is uncertain how far Louis was himself aware of the cruel nature of the measures carried out in his name; but it is certain that the Dragonnades, like the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, formed part of a policy pursued by his Ministers at a time when he was at issue with the Holy See, the object of which policy was to gain credit for him as a good Catholic while he was behaving in the most overbearing manner to the Pope. It is certain also that Innocent XI. disapproved both of the Dragonnades and of the Revocation, as he disapproved also of the violent measures of James II. in England; and that he was abused in consequence by the French courtiers for not being a good Catholic. The feelings of the Pope are expressed in a *brochure* put forth by his order in reply to the invectives of Talon, the Advocate-General of Louis, from which I make the following translation:— ‘The reunion of all the Protestants of France to the Roman Church is doubtless a work which would have gained the king immortal glory, if the manner in which the execution of this great enterprise was undertaken had not spoilt it. The Pope could not have failed to acknowledge, not only in word, but in deed and by new favours, the great service which his Majesty would thus have rendered to the Roman Church. The Church and all her ministers would have shown him, by new marks of esteem and respect, how much she was obliged to a prince who had laboured so powerfully and so efficaciously to increase the number of her children, by causing those who had unjustly separated themselves from her to return to her bosom. But the Pope, the Church, and her most wise ministers know that an increase of people is not always an increase of joy, according to the words, “Thou hast multiplied the people, and not increased the joy” (Isaiah ix. 3). They have too much discernment to see any great cause for rejoicing in an external and apparent conversion of nearly two millions of persons, who, for the most part, have only re-entered the fold of that Church in order to stain it by an infinite number of sacrileges, and to profane all that is most holy in her by professing the Roman religion without real change of sentiments.’

“M. Gérin, from whose pages I take this quotation (320), quotes also correspondence of the time in which it is mentioned that the Pope did not like to hear of the conversions worked by the Dragonnades, saying, ‘Qu’on se relevait d’une erreur pour retomber dans un autre,’ and ‘Qu’il ne pouvait approuver ni le motif ni les moyens de ces conversions à million, dont aucune n’était volontaire.’—I am, Sir, &c.,

“THE WRITER IN THE ‘MONTH.’”

Tractatus de Sacramentis in Genere.

Tractatus de S.S. Eucharistiæ Sacramento et Sacrificio. } Auctore JOANNE

B. FRANZELIN, e Soc. Jesu in Collegio Romano S. Theologiæ Professore.
Romæ. 1868.

THESE are very remarkable books by the Professor of Theology at the Roman College. Their sobriety and dignity of tone, lucidity and piety, do honour to the school from which they proceed. We are particularly impressed with the large mindedness conspicuous throughout. There are great writers, like Petavius, who cannot draw due attention to the Fathers, without a hit at the scholastics; others again, who practically confine themselves to scholastic, and neglect patristic; a third class who, professing to treat dogma, are rather controversialists than dogmatic theologians. But

F. Franzelin appreciates equably and impartially every portion of the matter appropriate to his theme ; while he is perhaps unequalled in his constant reference at every turn to the Church's authoritative teaching. One part of the later volume will have special interest for *English* Catholics. The author's patristic side brings him across Dr. Pusey ; whose incredible misapprehensions are exposed with a merciless analysis, more withering though not more solid than that which Father Harper in England, quite independently, applied to the same remarkable subject.

In a notice like this, we must either confine ourselves to pointless generalities, or fix on some one particular for exclusive remark. For more than one reason, we are disposed to dwell a little on that portion of F. Franzelin's second treatise, which concerns the reality of the accidents remaining after the consecration. The author throughout his book is very sparing in his use of philosophical terms. He indeed rather employs theology to illustrate philosophy than philosophy to throw light on theology, though of course he does both. He quotes with approbation (p. 155, note) Father Newman's dictum in the *Apologia* :—"What do I know of substance or matter ? Just as much as the greatest philosophers, and that is nothing at all." What philosophy he usés is scholastic, and principally from Suarez. He even takes the view of the later schoolmen against S. Thomas, that a body keeping its extension might miraculously be extended in many places at once ; which, according to the school of S. Dominic, is impossible : "Etiam per miraculum fieri non potest ut idem corpus sit in pluribus locis presentia circumscriptiva et quantitativa." Goudin. *Physica*. Disp. 3. Qu. 4. Faithful, however, as is our author to the schoolmen, he is by no means a slave to the past, and he completes the scholastic theory by a hypothesis which, though original in him, he says that he subsequently found to be that of Leibnitz, in his "*Systema Theologicum*." "*Vidi postea totum hunc modum explicandi quoad rem ipsam esse eundem quo Leibnitzius voluit, 'succurrere morbo quorundam potissimum inter Reformatos' in Systemate theologico*" (p. 272, note).

This hypothesis is intended to explain the continued presence of the accidents of bread and wine after the consecration. The schoolmen had contented themselves with proving that there was no contradiction in the notion that quantity, colour, taste, and odour are really different from the substance, and therefore by the power of God may remain after the conversion of the substance into that of the Body of Christ. They had, however, not analysed in what consisted the natural connection between substance and accident, nor probed to the bottom the nature of the accidents themselves. The error of the Cartesians, who held that the accidents were mere effects on our organs, miraculously produced by God after the removal of the substance, and therefore merely subjective, obliged theologians to reconsider the matter. Our author first proves very lucidly, on theological grounds, the utter untenableness of the Cartesian view, and then proceeds to state his own hypothesis. The schoolmen had always held that the quantity of the bread remained after the consecration, and it was always a difficulty with modern views of matter to see how there could be any real distinction between matter and its quantity, so as to allow the latter to remain when the former was gone. What was this quantity apart from the substance, and consequently from the

matter, which in the scholastic view with the former makes up the substance? Our author answers that this quantity is a certain force or power of resistance, an *ἐνεργήμα*, radiating from the substance, which he calls *ἐνεργεία*. This is quite intelligible, just as it is easy to understand how the rays of light are distinct from the body of the sun. And as there is nothing inconceivable in God's maintaining miraculously the light after the destruction of the sun, so the quantity in this sense can easily be conceived to remain after the disappearance of the substance of the bread. This theory, though a development of the schoolmen, yet is a distinct move onward. It is a development out of the scholastic view of quantity; for we must banish modern quantity from our minds when we use scholastic language. Quantity is defined to be:—"Accidens extensivum seu distributivum substantiæ in varias partes integrantes." Goudin. *Logica Major*. Disp. 2. Qu. 3. In fact, scholastic quantity implies at least three modern notions, impenetrability, extension, and organization. S. Thomas, for instance, says, 4 Cont. Gentes:—"Positio quæ est ordo partium in toto, in ratione quantitatis includitur." Goudin adds: "Ista quinque, extensio, seu distributio in varias partes, occupatio loci, seu extensio ad certum locum, impenetrabilitas, divisibilitas, et mensurabilitas conveniunt substantiæ per quantitatem." Father Franzelin goes a step beyond this, and conceives it to be a positive force of resistance emanating from the substance. Again, while the schoolmen use, concerning the relation of substance to accident, such material terms as "inesse," "sustentari," our author considers the accident to be an active effect flowing from the activity of substance as a cause.

It is quite plain from this that Father Franzelin makes use of modern theories of force as an improvement and a complement of the scholastic. So high an authority as one holding his position is a model of the mode in which the schoolmen may be used. He keeps their main principles, yet he does not hesitate to improve upon and to complete them. In one sense even his theory is a correction as well as a completion. The scholastic account of *materia* was very confused. Our author, by making *quantitas* a real force, proceeding from it, gives a meaning to what seemed a mere negation.

Not content, however, with furnishing us in his own person with an instance of a legitimate development of the scholastic idea of substance, he also notices a theory which he considers as its perversion. A modern author whom he does not name propounds, in order to account for the presence of the accidents after the conversion of the substance, a new doctrine respecting substance. He makes it to consist simply in a negation. The object is a substance the moment that it is not sustained by something else; it ceases to be a substance as soon as it is so sustained, even though intrinsically it remains perfectly the same as before. The author of this hypothesis seems to have been led to adopt it by the application of Boscovich's theory to the explanation of the Blessed Sacrament. According to that view, matter being simply a collection of unextended points in space, related to each other by various combinations of mechanical movement, it becomes impossible to account for the presence of the accidents after the removal of the substance. Assuming the substance to be the points, and the accidents the result of their movement, it is inconceivable that this movement should remain, when the

thing moved is destroyed. He is, therefore, obliged to invent a theory of substance, which will allow it to be intrinsically unchanged after it has ceased to be a substance. This he effects by the negative view of substance above described. Father Franzelin objects strongly to this view, as opposed to the Council of Trent: "Sine ullo prorsus dubio Concilium docet, totum illud esse prius quod non est accidens seu species converti seu desinere per conversionem in corpus et sanguinem Domini. At juxta novam sententiam nihil entitatis desinit in pane, sed tota physica realitas manet eadem, solo modo existendi mutato; quod nunc ea realitas dicitur non esse in se, sed in altero scilicet in corpore Christi."

It is very valuable to the theologian to have in Father Franzelin's book an example at once of the right and the wrong mode of dealing with the philosophy of the schools. There is a development from it which is a lawful unfolding of its idea and a real progress. On the other hand, there is a corruption which disintegrates and destroys. On the one hand no purely mechanical or mathematical explanation of the laws of the universe is deep enough to be the basis of the doctrine of the Blessed Sacrament. On the other, we have the authority of F. Franzelin for the application of the dynamical view of matter, though under the correction of theology. Use has before been made of Leibnitz's views in a modified form, both by English and foreign writers, for the defence of the Blessed Sacrament. We are not aware however, that any authority as high as that of Father Franzelin has as yet given them his sanction.

Die Theologische Censuren. Katholik. 1869. I. 3 und 4 Heft.

THERE seems a very large concurrence of Catholic opinion, that the Vatican Council will probably put forth some definition on the Church's infallibility; and it can hardly be doubted that, if such be the fact, some important light will be thrown on that particular controversy in which this REVIEW has been especially engaged. Under these circumstances, we think it in every respect the preferable course to refrain from saying another word on the details of that controversy, until the Church may have either spoken, or else indicated her intention of not immediately speaking at all.

We are perhaps stretching a point when we apply this resolve to the particular case of Dr. Scheeben's treatise; because, whatever difference of opinion there may be on *other* kindred points, we suppose the number of English Catholics could almost be counted on one's fingers, who doubt the Church's infallibility in her various theological censures, "erroneous," "temerarious," and the like. Not to add, that the recent placing of Christmann's work on the Index may possibly have converted some even of these few. Still, though we must of course notice a treatise which the author has sent us from Germany for the express *purpose* of being noticed, it will

perhaps be better if we confine ourselves to a brief exposition of its general contents.

The treatise is made up of two articles, which have lately appeared in the *Katholik* of Mayence, of which Dr. Scheeben is the editor; and we will begin by noticing an important remark which he makes as to the authors to be consulted on the question. Among those he refers to are Montagne, "De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis," to be found in Migne's "Cursus Theol.," tom. i., and Gautier, "Prodromus ad Theol. Dogm.," in Zaccaria's "Thesaurus Theol.," vol. i. Of these he says, "The two last works are especially valuable, because their authors lived at a time when, in consequence of the acts of ecclesiastical authority,—and the warm discussions of the learned, resulting from the Jansenist controversies,—the subject appeared in a much clearer light, than at the time of the great theologians already named. This progress in the development of the doctrine is often overlooked; and the reputation of the great theologians of the classical Sæculum Tridentinum is indiscriminately alleged in support of views, which it was possible, indeed, to hold in their time, or rather which they had not as yet clearly and distinctly rejected, but which, in the light of later facts (especially the Bulls 'Unigenitus' and 'Pastoralis Officii' of Clement XV.), and the more sharply-defined action of the Church, remained hardly tenable any longer."

We will now give Dr. Scheeben's more important Theses:—

Thesis I. That judgment of the Church which pronounces any theological censure (supposing it to possess all the formal conditions) lays on every Catholic the obligation, in virtue of his obedience to the Church, of receiving it unconditionally; i.e., of inwardly and sincerely assenting to the censure itself, and firmly holding the censurableness and perverseness of the propositions denounced in the judgment.

Thesis II. These judgments, as regards that which they formally contain, i.e. the declaration of the censurableness, and of the particular species and manner or of the formal ground of the censurableness, are infallible; and hence the obedience above referred to demands the exclusion, not only of every practical and actual, but also of all theoretical and hypothetical doubt of the justice of the censure.

Dr. Scheeben adds that *this infallibility is so certain, that most theologians, in qualifying its denial, leave only the choice between "error" and "heresis."*

He adds in a note an important quotation from a decree of the Council of Embrun (1727) on the subject of the "Unigenitus," and the theological censures therein contained; the Council having been "plenissimè" approved by Benedict XIII.: a quotation which has already appeared in our pages, but which it may be as well to repeat.

"Constitutio 'Unigenitus' . . . est dogmaticum definitivum, et irretactabile iudicium illius Ecclesiæ, de quâ divino ore dictum est, 'portæ inferi non prevalebunt adversus eam.' Si quis igitur *eidem Constitutioni corde et animo non acquiescit*, aut veram et sinceram obedientiam non præstat, inter eos habeatur, qui *circa fidem naufragaverunt.*"

Thesis III. Furthermore these censures, not only in virtue of ecclesiastical obedience, but also because of the unquestionable certainty resulting from them, impose an obligation (under pain of mortal sin) actually to reject the condemned propositions as *untrue*.

Our readers may remember that we have always considered the question an open one, whether every censured proposition is quite certainly not censurable only, but *untrue*. Dr. Scheeben however holds, that the objective falsehood of all censured propositions must be received, under pain of mortal sin, as at least morally certain. It would be too long in a notice to give his reasons. We will only add therefore, that amongst them he states that Steyart, Montagne, Regnier, and, to the best of his knowledge, all the theologians without exception who have urged the Church's censures against the Jansenist evasions, have maintained this opinion.

Thesis IV. Censures once pronounced by the Church are irreversibly binding for all time, so far as they affect the *doctrine* (as distinguished from the expressions) contained in the propositions.

"I am well aware," so Dr. Scheeben concludes his second article, "that the theses I have here maintained have been in whole or in part decried in England and Germany as 'theological extravagances.' This, no longer unusual, sort of private censure will however only be effectual, when it is accompanied by a thorough refutation of my arguments, and also by an exact assignment of the limits within which one can move *without extravagance*."

Das Oekumenische Concil. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. Neue Folge. Unter Benützung römischer Mittheilungen und der Arbeiten der Civiltà.
Herausgegeben von FLORIAN RIESS und KARL VON WEBER, Priestern
der Gesellschaft Jesu. Freiburg in Brisaun, 1869.

THE children of the Church, as well as her enemies, are for once agreed ; both feel and know that the nineteenth general council—the first Council of the Vatican—will do a work which the former hail with joy, but which the latter hate and fear. Catholics are praying everywhere for the good issue of the Council, and learned theologians are busy teaching the unlearned what a council of Holy Church is. The present generation comes to the consideration of an old fact, as if that fact were new, because more than three centuries have passed away since the last general Council was dissolved. A very great service, therefore, is rendered to us when learned men, thoroughly saturated with the spirit of the Church, supply us with the results of their thoughts. No doubt much error has crept into many minds on this question, and many men have adopted very false notions about councils ; for it could hardly be otherwise in Europe, where anarchy has established itself as the normal state of intellect and morals. Secular law is a very potent instrument, but it is not to be trusted alone ; and that is the

only weapon which governments now recognize. It is not capable of doing the work offered it, and the consequence is either confusion, or a tyranny of the most debasing nature, called the will of the majority. For many years the men who have brought us into this condition were in the habit of saying that intellect and worth ought to reign; but as they meant nothing but their own intellect and their own worth, the end is what we see: every man is enlightened, and every man is worthy; therefore brute force has come to be the law of Europe, for no intellect will bow to another.

In these calamitous times, then, the Sovereign Pontiff has proclaimed the old doctrine that kings must reign by justice, and that the people must obey the law. He has called together from the four corners of the earth the true princes of the people of God, and He with them will send forth once more the law from out of Zion, and the word of God from Rome, the true Jerusalem. Some of the governments of this world have been startled by this act of supreme rule, and would gladly, if they dared, hinder its accomplishment. The spirit of Herod is still active; and though the godless governments of the day will not venture to slay, they will do their best to thwart, and, failing that, to worry and annoy.

The first general Council was held under the protection of the first Christian Emperor, but the nineteenth under the protection of no secular prince whatever. This is the progress of the nineteenth century. Every state in Europe has fallen away, as a state, from the profession of the faith of Christ. The world is gone back to the old paganism, and the Church has her work to do over again if the mercy of God allows the world to last long enough for her to do it.

In these days of multifarious reading and inaccurate thinking, it will do us all good, even the most faithful children of the Church, to be reminded of the truth from time to time. We shall have a keener interest in the Council if we have a clearer knowledge of its nature. It is our custom to pray, when asked, for the intentions of others; but we pray more earnestly when we know what those intentions are, and more earnestly still if we have any personal interest in them. His Holiness has summoned a General Council, and has commanded the faithful to pray for the good success of it; the faithful now, as always, obedient to the voice of the Chief Shepherd of the sheep, are doing what they have been commanded to do; and learned men, seconding the orders of the Pope, are helping us all to make those prayers more fervent by giving us the means to know what a general Council means. We are but imperfect Christians, however fervent, if we do not give up our understanding also to be guided and informed in the spirit of the Church; and the more accurate our knowledge of her powers and prerogatives, the keener will be our interest, and the more absorbing our love. There is a majesty about the house of God which captivates of itself, and the true esteem of that majesty comes ordinarily by cultivating the sense of it. Holy Church is not merely the treasury of grace from which we are daily and hourly supplied, but she is also the strong tower on earth where the Divine jurisdiction is lodged.

The summoning of a General Council is one of the highest jurisdictions conceivable; and brings out into clear light the unity of the Church, and

the sovereign authority of the Holy See. Bishops assemble diocesan, archbishops provincial synods, but a general synod can be assembled only by the Pope. His voice alone is heard in all lands. "No man," say the writers before us, No. 2, p. 15, "can have jurisdiction over another, if he is not his superior, and over the bishops of Christendom, the Pope alone is supreme." Thus it is an act of his sovereign rule this summoning of a Council, and the obedience yielded to that summoning is a witness in the highest degree to the unity of the Church. Those who do not obey are not within the fold, for "My sheep hear my voice."

The two Jesuit Fathers, to whom we owe the work before us, seem to have spared no labour, for they have begun as it were at the beginning, and mean to proceed on a definite principle to the end. They have published the Bill of Indiction with a translation, but we must express our regret that they have omitted the signatures of the cardinals. Their Eminences will be in the Council in virtue of their rank, and as they are not personally summoned themselves, their right and their high dignity would have been more evident to those unacquainted with the matter, if their share in the summons had been made clear to all. Then follows the Apostolic Letter, also translated, addressed to all those who live outside the city of God, and which many persons seem to have carelessly read, for they have said that the letter is an invitation to attend the Council. It is an invitation or a prayer to those it concerns to return into the unity of the Church; for none may sit in the Council but those whom the Pope acknowledges as his subjects.

The Fathers discuss next the nature of General Councils, of which they give the list, the objects thereof, and the probable matters which the next Council will have to entertain and determine under the guidance of the Pope. Then follows an account of the impression made on heretics and schismatics by the publication of the Bull of Indiction. This done, they enter on another matter, and treat of the theory of Councils as Canonists, and we have from them most interesting chapters on the summoning of convents—who may do so, who may be summoned, that is, who may sit therein, then the authority of the members of a Council, and who presides over them. All these questions are very lucidly yet briefly examined, and in the third number we have an essay on the relations of the Council to the Pope, and the use of them, though the Pope alone is infallible.

There is also another matter not unworthy of notice in these publications from Maria Laach; at the end of each number the Fathers give an account of books, pamphlets, and tracts which treat of the future Council, and which are almost daily appearing in some part or other of Europe. If any one who hitherto has not felt much interest in the Council soon to be held, will take the trouble to look at the Latin portions of the three numbers we are noticing, he will be surprised, certainly, at the interest other people take in it, and we hope, also, not a little ashamed of his own want of sympathy with the Church of which he is a member. The cross of the Pope is heavy, but God has spared him one cross, which was given to all of his predecessors, for at no previous time has there been so loyal and so united an Episcopate; and with the absence of this cross comes a fervent priesthood and a praying laity. It

must be a consolation to him, amidst the bitterness of his trials, to see the devotion of private persons when the powers of the world are either hostile or hold aloof. The anarchic doctrines which civil governments have encouraged for their own ends are like "crows coming home to roost," and the result is, that the Pope's supremacy shines forth daily more and more, that men, distrusting their own governments, look out for something stable and solid, and they can find nothing in the whole world to answer their expectations but the Rock of Peter.

Catholic Higher Education. A Letter to the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, Reprinted with a P.S. By JOHN GILLOW, D.D. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS letter appeared in our last number. On occasion of publishing it we expressed a few comments on it, and we have added a few more in a preceding article. Here, therefore, we will but heartily recommend it to our readers' most careful attention.

Brief Exposition of the Origin, Progress, and Marks of the True Religion. By HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL GERDIL. Translated by EDMOND W. O'MAHONY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Longmans.

THIS little work draws out clearly (as was to be expected from its distinguished writer) the ordinary historical arguments for the Church's divine authority. The author traces her origin up to the creation of the world; he speaks (p. 9) of those "just men" "who continued in regular succession," and "kept alive" "faith in God" and in the promised Redeemer; he recounts God's covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (pp. 10, 11); and continues the history of the Jews up to the appearance of our Blessed Lord (pp. 10-20). At this period, says the Cardinal, it was generally understood by the Jews that the appointed time had arrived for the Messiah; and a great number of impostors therefore successively appeared which had not before been the case. God the Son also became incarnate and founded the Church on S. Peter (p. 25).

This Church exists in our own days. It is one, Catholic, and Apostolic; and can be no other therefore than the Roman. Take e. g. the great Eastern schism (p. 69). The Eastern schismatics themselves admit, and must admit, that the Roman Church was orthodox before their separation from her: the question therefore is, which of the two societies has changed? No one can allege, that the Roman Church differed in any one respect immediately

after the schism, from what she had been immediately before that calamity ; whereas the Photians made a most vital change, by rejecting the Roman jure divino primacy from their creed. Hence it was their society, and not the other, which apostatized from the true Church.

The whole essay will repay perusal ; and English Catholics are indebted to Mr. O'Mahony, for making it accessible to those who are not familiar with Italian.

The Present Position of the High Church Party in the Established Church of England. By WILLIAM MASKELL, A.M. London : Longmans.

IT is Mr. Maskell's great merit, that he clings with firmest tenacity to his point, about the royal supremacy, and about the consequent absence from Anglicanism of all consistent dogmatic authoritative teaching. His present volume contains two essays, which he published nearly twenty years ago on those themes, and which (it may be almost said) no one has ever *professed* to answer ; and he has now added the review of a recent Anglican work—a review which will be found equally overwhelming in its refutation of error.

Yet it seems to us, that his Preface leaves Mr. Maskell open to a reply *ad hominem* ; that on two different subjects (if we rightly understand him) his own position is to the full as logically inconsistent, as is the very Anglican theory which he so successfully opposes. In one of these however, we cannot be at all sure that we rightly apprehend his meaning ; and as it is more vital even than the other, we will begin by quoting the whole paragraph to which we refer. It concerns, primarily, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

“ This, as a doctrine, always appeared to me to flow, naturally and as a most certain consequence, from a right acceptance of the tremendous mystery of the Incarnation. Nevertheless, in earlier days, men who rank amongst the highest and most saintly of Christian doctors did not so regard it. In our own time, the consent of all theologians had long been unanimous upon the question, and the demand everywhere for a definition of it had continually grown more and more urgent. So much so, that when the decree or bull of 1854 was published it seemed to add but little to the certainty of the doctrine. An Ecumenical Council has been summoned, and will soon meet at Rome. We cannot imagine that it will separate without a further testimony and witness—equal in authority with the voice of God Himself—to the truth of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception” (pp. 7, 8).

After the best consideration we can give this paragraph—and particularly taking it in connection with that which follows—we cannot but understand the author to lay down, that the Immaculate Conception is not yet taught infallibly by the Church as of faith, and will not be so taught until some

future Ecumenical Council shall have declared it. We proceed at once to give our reasons for so interpreting his words ; but it will give us the sincerest pleasure (we need not say) if he utterly repudiates our interpretation.

He says distinctly, that when a Council declares this dogma, such declaration will be a testimony equal in authority with the voice of God Himself.

But most assuredly, whenever a dogma first receives such a testimony as this, its "certainty" is indefinitely greater than it was before.

Yet the Bull of 1854, says Mr. Maskell, "seemed to *add but little* to the dogma's certainty." Indubitably therefore, he does not consider the Bull "*Ineffabilis*" as having given an infallible testimony.

Now as regards the strict logical wording of the passage, Mr. Maskell may hold that the *subsequent reception of this Bull by the Episcopate* did testify the dogma infallibly. If this is his meaning—and we sincerely hope it is—there is no cause of complaint ; for Gallicanism is undoubtedly as yet a tolerated opinion. But it will be observed, that the author has been profoundly silent on this episcopal reception of the Bull ; and every reader will admit that the paragraph, in its more obvious sense, points to the *Vatican Council* as to that authority, which will for the first time teach infallibly the Immaculate Conception. And this view of Mr. Maskell's meaning is made the more probable, because he at once goes on to say that "the whole question" of the Immaculate Conception "has been put" "most clearly" by a living theologian, when that theologian speaks of a *Council* as "the normal seat of infallibility." We shall presently defend the theologian cited ; but here we are saying, that we cannot see how the reference to his words has any meaning, unless Mr. Maskell intended to advocate that very opinion against which we protest.

Now every bishop and every priest throughout the Catholic Church teaches, that the Immaculate Conception is at this moment obligatory as of faith. If therefore we rightly understand Mr. Maskell, we cannot see how (on his view) the position of Anglicans would be logically bettered by their becoming Catholics. Mr. Maskell invites them into a communion, wherein (on his own showing) the whole body of teachers, without exception, impose a dogma as of faith, which has never been so declared by any competent authority. Surely if this were the case, Anglican converts to the Church would be placed under a spiritual yoke, even heavier than that by which they have before been oppressed.

We are most unwilling to suppose that Mr. Maskell can deliberately intend to deny the infallibility of the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* ; and we will for the present therefore say no more. We must at once however point out, that if he intends to credit *F. Newman* with this doctrine, he fundamentally mistakes the whole passage on which he relies. We confess indeed frankly, that we cannot quite accept *F. Newman's* words in calling "the Pope in Ecumenical Council" "the normal seat of infallibility": because it is only for some grave and exceptional crisis that a Council commonly meets, whereas the Church's infallibility is ever active and unintermittent. But it is most certain, that when *F. Newman* says "normal," he is as far as possible from meaning "exclusive." Take this very dogma itself, the Immaculate Conception. *F. Newman* throughout (of course) takes for

granted that it has been infallibly declared of faith. Then he speaks (p. 396) of "the various theses condemned by Popes, and their dogmatic decisions generally," as indubitably falling within the sphere of infallibility; while he admits them to be much more numerous than the canons of Councils. Moreover, in his second letter on Anglican ordinations, he says (we speak from memory) that the Pope, *ex cathedrâ*, can decide the question infallibly; and if *that* question, then of course, *à fortiori*, questions more strictly dogmatical.

The second particular on which we have to criticise Mr. Maskell, is his language about the Pope's temporal principedom.

"No one," he says, "can believe this to be essential, in the slightest degree, to the just authority, and some may doubt whether even to the well-being, of the Catholic Church. To myself it is almost a matter of indifference. I can find no claim which the Holy Father has to his earthly dominion other than, or beyond, that of any other sovereign of Europe. As it seems, he has the same right, neither more nor less than they: in other words, neither his nor theirs is a Divine right. It is for the people of the Roman States to decide whether they are content to remain under his government or not. No reason has yet been shown why they are not entitled to change it, if they think it well to do so, just as much as Frenchmen half a dozen times this century, or Englishmen in 1688" (p. 7).

On this point, at all events, Mr. Maskell has left no possibility of doubt as to his meaning. Yet even on this point there is room for doubt on *another* head; there is room for doubt whether he is aware what has been taught by ecclesiastical authority on the subject. And here also therefore, we cannot but hope that on maturer reflection he will heartily wish the paragraph unwritten.

1. We would first entreat his attention to the following passage, from the Allocution "*Maxima quidem*" delivered by Pius IX. on June 9th, 1862:—

"It is a pleasure on this subject to commemorate the truly marvellous agreement, with which you yourselves, together with the other our venerable brethren the bishops of the Catholic world, have never ceased both in letters to ourselves and in pastoral letters to the faithful, . . . from teaching, that this civil principedom of the Holy See was given to the Roman Pontiff by a singular counsel of Divine Providence; and that it is *necessary*, in order that the same Roman Pontiff, never subject to any prince or civil power, may be able to exercise with fullest liberty [his] supreme [spiritual] authority, . . . and provide for the greater good of Church and faithful."

It is truly significant, that from unacquaintance with this and similar documents, Mr. Maskell has been betrayed into saying that "*no one can believe*" what the Pope and whole Episcopate not only believe but *teach*. Surely indeed Mr. Maskell must know enough of what is commonly said by devout Catholics, to make it most surprising that he can have ventured on such a statement. We will pass on however to our general argument.

In the above recited sentence Pius IX. says by undeniable implication (1) that the question of this civil principedom is one on which it is within the competence of Pope and bishops to pronounce; (2) that the bishops of the

whole Church have on this head agreed with him ; and (3) that they have accordingly pronounced on it a very definite judgment. Moreover this judgment, as Mr. Maskell will be the first to confess, is directly contradictory to his own opinion. Now in his last essay, he urgently dwells on the absence of *dogmatic teaching* in the Establishment, as a reason for Anglicans leaving its communion. But what is his own argumentative position ? He entreats them to leave a body in which the united Episcopate teaches *no* doctrine, for one in which the united Episcopate teaches *false* doctrine.

2. But further, the Pontiff has not only testified that the whole Ecclesia Docens is united in teaching that doctrine which Mr. Maskell denies, but has also distinctly declared an *obligation* of holding it as incumbent on all Catholics. Cardinal Antonelli, acting avowedly as Pius IX.'s mouth-piece, sent to all bishops the well-known Syllabus ; in which it is declared, that "all Catholics are bound (debet) to *hold most firmly*" that "doctrine concerning the Roman Pontiff's civil principedom," which is "clearly laid down" in six Pontifical Acts there mentioned. In these Acts Pius IX. teaches, that this principedom was ordered by Divine Providence that the Pope might have that liberty which is "*required*" for his spiritual office ("Quibus quantisque") ; which is "so *necessary* for the flock's salvation" ("Si semper") : that the principedom "has a spiritual character from its relation to the Church's good" ("cum Catholica") : that all Catholics should unite against any effort to overthrow it (*ib.*) : that the aggressive acts of its assailants are de jure "plainly null and void" ("Novos et ante") : that Victor Emmanuel's "spoliation" of the Roman territory was "nefarious and sacrilegious" ("Jamdudum cernimus"). All this, Mr. Maskell will probably admit, is tantamount to declaring, that the Pope's right to the States of the Church is inviolable : a proposition against which Mr. Maskell however inveighs, as contradictory to the rights of "the people of the Roman States," or in other words as contradictory to true morality.

A very large number of bishops, as is well known, have expressed unreserved assent to the Pontiff's teaching in the Syllabus ; nor has any one bishop (we believe) publicly protested against it. According to Mr. Maskell therefore, Pope and bishops unite in declaring their subjects *obliged* to hold a certain doctrine, which is not only false, but contrary to sound morality.

Lastly, we would press on Mr. Maskell's attention the letter written on this subject by Card. Caterini, at Pius IX.'s command. This letter was translated in the "Month" of February ; and Mr. Maskell's preface induces us to give it what further publicity we can, by appending the translation to our present number. A certain priest, it appears, had denied "the necessity and fitness" of the Pope's civil principedom ; alleging this "doctrine" to be "new," and "of recent introduction." He had been enjoined by his bishop to sign a retraction of his error, but had hitherto refused. Cardinal Caterini, writing by Pius IX.'s command, enlarges on "the inviolability, fitness, and necessity," "the strict necessity," of this principedom. He urges that the doctrine, rejected by the priest in question, had been taught by "the Roman Pontiff and the bishops ; in other words, by the whole Catholic Church" : and that to reject it is to incur "the dread sentence pronounced on those who refuse to 'hear the Church.'" The priest was convinced by this letter ; and came to his

bishop, "mourning and sighing and begging absolution." May the same document in the present instance produce a similar effect !

We will not say more in our present number, as to the propositions which we have mentioned. It is quite probable that we may have mistaken Mr. Maskell's meaning on the first head, and that he is not himself fully aware of the Church's teaching on the second. We are most unwilling to suppose, that one who writes so ably and with so hearty a will against the Anglican imposture,—who shows himself (see pp. 10–17) so indignantly intolerant of domestic disaffection to the Church,—shall have deliberately and with full knowledge placed himself in a position, which is no less logically self-contradictory than ecclesiastically rebellious and disloyal.

The Month. May, 1869. London : Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

WE should much weary our readers, if we drained every controversy to its last dregs ; if we rejoined on every fresh reply, and replied to every fresh rejoinder. Although therefore we cannot profess to think that the "Month" writer has treated us at all justly,* in his remarks from p. 393 to p. 395, we will not pursue the matter in detail. But he asks two straightforward questions, which claim at our hands a distinct answer.

1. He wishes to know what doctrinal view we attributed to Mr. Liddon, which could justify the interpretation we thought imaginable of the "Month's" comment on that gentleman. We should say that Mr. Liddon's doctrinal view is quite obvious, both from his words and from his well-known agreement with Dr. Pusey. He considers that the Apostles taught the Church the whole body of dogma which they had received from God ; and that the Church of subsequent ages possesses no infallibility, except only in *testifying* that body of dogma. He protested accordingly against any "assumption, in the modern Church, of some power to discern and proclaim truths altogether unknown to the Church of the Apostles." To this the "Month" replied in August, that "The Church does not assume, and never has assumed, any power to 'discern and proclaim truths altogether unknown to the Church of the Apostles'": thus repeating Mr. Liddon's very words.† We still think that

* We do not doubt, of course, that his *intentions* have been perfectly just.

† The whole sentence runs thus :—"The very passage from the Bull, 'Ineffabilis Deus,' which he quotes, shows in the most distinct manner that the Church does not assume, &c., &c." We are now aware that the "Month" writer lays much stress on these earlier words, as interpreting the later ; and indeed, as we said in October (p. 547), they enabled us to *guess* that he intended the later in a restricted sense : but we cannot admit that this sense is the obvious or legitimate one, so far as regards language and context. Mr. Liddon denies, not only the Church's power of teaching such further truths as *de fide*, but quite as strongly her power of infallibly discerning, proclaiming, and enforcing them *at all*. Surely our contemporary's sentence in its obvious

“the obvious and grammatical sense” of these words, in themselves and still more in their context,—apart from the “Month’s” well-known character,—would imply agreement with Mr. Liddon, as to the extent of infallibility which the post-Apostolical Church possesses. We still think, as we said in January, that had it not been for the explanation which our criticism elicited from our contemporary in November, “his words would have been widely considered as a pointed declaration on what he himself accounts the unorthodox side.” And this the rather, because (as we proceeded to point out in January) he had up to that time felt it his duty, for reasons which he then assigned, to give no opinion on the recent infallibility controversy.

2. Our critic wishes to know the meaning of a note appended to p. 47 of our January number. This question also we can very easily answer. To say that all the Church’s post-Apostolic infallible determinations “are simply the unravelling of matter given by” the Apostles, would be to imply that these determinations are entirely confined to teaching either the Faith or deductions therefrom. But such a doctrine is most unsound and pernicious; because the Church—as the note points out—“often puts forth infallible determinations” of a different kind, “for the purpose of *protecting* the Deposit.” Take the very instance we have so often given; the thesis, that Jansenius’s book equivalently contained five certain propositions. Who could say that the infallible determination of this thesis is “simply the unravelling of matter given by” the Apostles? And so with numberless other cases.

The “Month” apparently draws some inference, from a purely gratuitous supposition as to the respective authorship of text and note in this article. Such a comment is certainly unusual, and does not seem to us quite legitimate. But if we rightly understand our contemporary’s meaning, his impression of fact is quite mistaken. The whole article—text and notes—was printed precisely as it finally left the writer’s hands; and the whole—we still include notes as well as text—expresses his deliberate judgment.

We have expressed on more than one occasion—last of all in a preceding article—our great unwillingness to appear in any kind of antagonism with the “Month”: for we thoroughly sympathize with its general principles, we are most grateful for the ability with which it supports them, and we have the sincerest respect for its conductors. But it still fastens on us a charge of (unintentional yet) idiosyncratic and habitual unfairness. We cannot consent, either by words or by silence, to be understood for a moment as admitting, that there are any solid grounds for an accusation which is certainly serious.

drift would be understood as declaring, (1) that Mr. Liddon is quite right in his doctrinal *principle*; but (2), that the definition of 1854—as is proved by the “*Ineffabilis*”—in no way *contravened* that principle.

The Carlow College Magazine. Nos. I. and II. Carlow : M. Fitzsimons.

THIS is one of those enterprises of which we may say that it is better to have dared and failed than never to have dared at all. We must not be understood, however, as playing the part of Calchas by this remark ; we really see no reason why the "Carlow College Magazine" should not have a long career of success. Relying for contributions not only on present but also on past Carlovians, it is likely to command the services of many writers of ability ; and the two numbers before us give very fair promise of literary excellence. Some of the subjects are evidently beyond the range of the schoolboy mind ; and, if they are to be placed to the credit of the present residents of the College, seem more likely to have come from those who "rear the tender thought" than from the tender thinkers themselves. Most of the papers bear marks of the immaturity which almost invariably characterizes the products of youthful minds : but they will not be read with the less interest on that account ; and they prove that the writers are capable, with time and culture, of distinguishing themselves highly in the field of intellectual endeavour. The verses are far above the average of fugitive pieces of that kind : those on "My Garden," in No. I., are not undeserving of the name of poetry. The very severe young gentleman, who gives us the contents of his "Satchel," is right in denouncing the faults of Cockney pronunciation, though they are not those into which his contributors are likely to fall. But how does he excuse himself, under the circumstances, for such an offence as this?—"Y. Z. No *wise head* would perpetrate such folly." Does the word "head" begin with an "h" *mute* ?

The first number contains a philosophical article, evincing no traces whatever of juvenility, but on the contrary displaying much maturity and power of thought. The great value and thoughtfulness of many remarks incidentally expressed in this article, make us the more regret that we are obliged to protest emphatically against its general thesis. In fact, we cannot understand the writer's words in p. 15 as expressing any other doctrine, than that which Dr. Meynell himself (p. 3) admits to have been "pronounced by the authorities at Rome unsafe to be taught ;" viz., that "man enjoys in this life a direct and immediate cognition of God."

The article however is most interesting ; and contains so many incidental remarks of great truth and importance, that we hope to consider it at greater length in October, in connection with Dr. Meynell's pamphlet. For the present we will only draw attention to a letter which appeared in the "Tablet" of June 19th, pointing out that the writer is mistaken as to what he says about the Jesuit Fathers in p. 13. The "Tablet" correspondent states that, whatever may have been formerly the case, at present no ontologic teaching is permitted in any college of the Society.

The Barnet Magazine. Vol. II. Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE "Barnet Magazine" has reached the completion of its second year, and is now before us, bound in one convenient little volume. We have, on a former occasion, called attention to the excellence of its aim, and to the effective manner in which it is conducted by its editor, the Rev. F. Bampfield, the priest of Barnet. We are glad to find that a recommendation which we gave in these pages last year has found acceptance; and that the substance of this interesting and instructive periodical is transferred to several local magazines which have been established in connection with it and with the Catholic Truth Society during the past year. We trust that it will become still more widely known and localized. We understand that arrangements can be made with the Catholic Truth Society, by any mission or district which is desirous of having its own local Catholic magazine; so that, at the least possible cost, and with great efficiency, even poor missions can secure to themselves their own Catholic local magazine.

First Letter to Very Rev. J. H. Newman, D.D. By Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. London: Rivingtons.

WE must do Dr. Pusey the justice to say, that in two respects this book is a great improvement on the original Eirenicon: for (1) it contains no one thing throughout, calculated to give Catholics unnecessary pain; and (2) it speaks strongly on the greatness of our Blessed Lady, and on the veneration with which Christians should regard her. The title-page mentions "the reverential love due to the ever blessed Theotokos"; and in p. 21 the author testifies that she is "raised above" angels, archangels, cherubim, and seraphim.

Otherwise the volume is most unsatisfactory. So far as regards our Blessed Lady, Dr. Pusey's former volume dwelt on two totally distinct matters: viz. (1) her Immaculate Conception; and (2) the devotion to her sanctioned by the Roman Catholic Church. Now F. Newman devoted his pamphlet almost exclusively to the latter of these two subjects; on the former he hardly spoke, beyond giving a singularly lucid exposition of the defined dogma: whereas *F. Harper* entered into the whole of Dr. Pusey's argument on the Immaculate Conception with such complete success, that his volume has been unanimously accepted by Catholics, as their reply to Dr. Pusey on that particular theme. One might have expected then that Dr. Pusey would reply, either to *F. Harper* on the Immaculate Conception, or to *F. Newman* on Marian Devotion: but no one except himself would have written a letter to *F. Newman*, turning almost exclusively on the question which was peculiarly in *F. Harper's* hands. The whole 518

pages, excepting only the first 50, concern the Immaculate Conception ; and yet we cannot find the most distant allusion in them to F. Harper's reply. At the end appears an advertisement of some work as "in the press," which is to contain "an appendix in answer to Rev. J. Harper's strictures." But then the very volume before us has been more than two years in the press ; and we cannot therefore accept such an advertisement as any proof, that Dr. Pusey has even *begun* his study of F. Harper. We shall not trouble ourselves then to examine Dr. Pusey's argument on this dogma—we shall not even trouble ourselves to find out what that argument *is*—until we receive his promised Appendix.

We will only note therefore, under this head, the author's continued bewilderment on the meaning of the Church's definition. We assure him—as he has been quite fruitlessly assured again and again—that there is literally no second opinion among Catholics as to what has been defined. F. Newman, F. Harper, Mgr. Dupanloup (p. 51) have in vain endeavoured to hammer this into Dr. Pusey's head ; and we shall make no further attempt to do so. Undoubtedly many Catholics hold (p. 51) that "the Blessed Virgin did not die in Adam ; that she did not come under the penalty of the fall." We ourselves argued for this opinion in October, 1866, pp. 476-489. But none of its advocates ever dreamed that the Church has *defined* any such doctrine ; though they may consider that the "Ineffabilis" has, in some respects, given it indirect confirmation. We should imagine there would be no difficulty whatever—if any important object were thereby gained—in obtaining from Rome an authentic declaration, of what it is which the Church has defined *de fide* under the name of the Immaculate Conception.

Dr. Pusey repeats (p. 14) his reference to the condemned writer Oswald. He again declares (p. 15) that the unsound doctrine of that writer had been maintained by Cornelius a Lapide and F. Faber, and that it is implied in an alleged "revelation to S. Ignatius Loyola." We pointed out in October, 1866, (pp. 491-494 : see also January, 1867, pp. 219, 220) that Dr. Pusey "confused Oswald's tenet with another, which differs from it in every relevant particular." But we might as well have spoken to the wind. It is Dr. Pusey's peculiar way of controversy (but no one else's) first to make a grossly inaccurate statement ; and, secondly, after some time has elapsed, to repeat it with an air of calm and unshaken confidence, which would give all readers the impression that no one in the interval has ventured to contradict it. We have no doubt, in fact, that Dr. Pusey was unaware of any one *having* contradicted it. But surely he has no right to engage in controversy without acquainting himself with what his opponents allege. Nor in this case was any recondite research needed ; for our very table of contents mentioned "the error of supposing" Mary "co-present in the Eucharist."

Similarly as to his comment on Marian practical devotion. We devoted a whole article to the subject in July, 1866, with special reference to his objections ; and he has so simply ignored our comments, that we might republish the whole without changing a word, as our reply under this head to his present letter.

It will assist indeed perhaps in bringing the matter to a point, if we do reprint a portion of our former article. F. Newman had made the excellent

remark, that there can be no more secure standard to a Catholic of the genuine Marian devotion recommended for all, than the language of those prayers which the Church has indulged. We gave therefore a few extracts from F. St. John's translation of the "Raccolta"; and we here reprint those extracts, italicizing the same words which we italicized before.

"When at length my hour is come, then do thou, Mary, *my hope*, be thyself my aid in those great troubles wherewith my soul will be encompassed. *Strengthen me*, that I may not despair when the enemy sets my sins before my face. Obtain for me at that moment grace to *invoke thee often*, so that I may breathe forth my spirit with *thine own sweet name and that of thy most holy Son upon my lips*" (p. 183).

"*In thee let the Holy Church find safe shelter*; protect it, and be its sweet asylum, its tower of strength, impregnable against every inroad of its enemies. Be thou *the road leading to Jesus*; be thou *the channel whereby we receive all graces needful for our salvation*. Be thou our help in need, our comfort in trouble, our strength in temptation, our refuge in persecution, our aid in all dangers; but especially in the last struggle of our life, at the moment of our death, when all hell shall be unchained against us to snatch away our souls,—in that dread moment, that hour so terrible, whereon our eternity depends, ah, yes, most tender Virgin, do thou, then, make us feel how great is the sweetness of thy Mother's Heart, and the power of thy might with the Heart of Jesus, by opening for us a safe refuge in the very fount of mercy itself, that so one day we too may join with thee in Paradise in praising that same Heart of Jesus for ever and for ever" (p. 179).

"Oh Mary. . . . *I shall assuredly be lost if I abandon thee*. . . . It is impossible for that man to perish who faithfully recommends himself to thee" (p. 184).

"I would I had a greater love, a more tender love: this thou must gain for me, since *to love thee is a great mark of predestination*, and a grace which God grants to those who shall be saved" (p. 185).

"Thou, Mary, art *the stewardess of every grace which God vouchsafes to give us sinners*, and therefore did He make thee so mighty, rich, and kind, that thou mightest succour us. I will that I may be saved: in thy hands I place my eternal salvation, to thee I consign my soul. I will be associated with those who are thy special servants; reject me not. *Thou goest up and down seeking the wretched to console them*. Cast not away, then, a wretched sinner who has recourse to thee. Speak for me, Mary; thy Son grants what thou askest" (pp. 186-7).

"My Queen! my Mother! *I give thee all myself*; and to show my devotion to thee, *I consecrate to thee this day my eyes, ears, mouth, heart, myself wholly, and without reserve*. Wherefore, O loving Mother, as I am thine own, keep me, defend me, *as thy property, and thy own possession*."

"Ejaculation in any Temptation.

"My Queen, my Mother! remember *I am thine own*.

"Keep me, defend me, *as thy property, thy own possession*" (p. 197).

"Accept what we offer, grant us what we ask, *pardon us what we fear*; for *thou art the sole hope of sinners*. Through thee we hope for the forgiveness of our faults; and in thee, most blessed one, is the hope of our reward. Holy Mary, succour the wretched, help the faint-hearted, comfort the sorrowful, pray for the people, shield the clergy, intercede for the devout female sex, let all feel thy help who celebrate thy holy commemoration.

Be thou at hand, ready to aid our prayers, when we pray ; and return to us laden with the answers we desire. Make it thy care, blessed one, to intercede ever for the people of God—thou who didst deserve to bear the Redeemer of the world, who liveth and reigneth for ever and ever” (p. 199).

“O Joseph, help us with thy prayers to be of the number of those who, *by the merits of Jesus and his Virgin Mother*, shall be partakers of the resurrection to glory” (pp. 274-5).

“O Joseph, obtain for us, that, *being entirely devoted to the service of Jesus and Mary*, we may live and die for them alone” (p. 275).

“O Joseph, obtain for us, that, having our hearts freed from idle fears, we may enjoy the peace of a tranquil conscience, *dwelling safely with Jesus and Mary, and dying at last in their arms*” (p. 275).

We argued in our former article—we venture to think incontrovertibly—that the use of such phrases as these is in no respect inconsistent with the most jealously exclusive devotion of heart to God and to Christ. Our purpose in citing them here, is merely to ask Dr. Pusey this simple question. Does he, or does he not, count such devotions as these—and the doctrines therein implied—among those against which he desires protection? If he does not, the whole controversy is at an end; for there is no one Catholic through the length and breadth of Christendom, who would desire to press on him any stronger Marian doctrine or devotion than these.

But let us suppose that Dr. Pusey does object to these devotions, on the grounds which he has given; and let us see what his position would be on such an hypothesis. The Church in communion with Rome has been appointed by God the one exclusive and the infallible guide of Christians to sanctification and salvation. Until Dr. Pusey admits this, he could not be received into the Church by any priest whomsoever. He is requiring then this infallible Church to confess, that she has energetically stimulated devotions, which are out of harmony with Scripture and tradition, and which tend to obscure men's remembrance of their Creator and Redeemer. And he is further requiring her to discountenance authoritatively, in certain portions of her domain, the use of prayers which she has thus earnestly recommended. Such a proposal is truly characteristic of its author: for he always seems unable so much as to apprehend what is *meant*, by Christians learning their religion from a Church, instead of deriving it from their own private examination of Scripture and Antiquity.

In one respect, and one alone, the author seems to us argumentatively successful. We never could ourselves understand the force of F. Newman's argument, that the Catholic authors whom Dr. Pusey principally cited were foreigners and not Englishmen. Except the condemned writer Oswald, Dr. Pusey's two chief authorities were S. Alphonsus and the Venerable Grignon de Montfort. Dr. Pusey warmly objected to the sanction which the writings of these holy men received from the Catholic Church. How were these objections met by the fact that one was an Italian and the other a Frenchman? At all events Dr. Pusey now points out, that English translations of both authors had appeared under grave English Catholic sanction. And we may add indeed, that an Irish translation of Montfort's treatise appeared quite independently, at the very time when F. Faber was

bringing out his own edition in England of that illustrious and saintly writer's work.

A Catholic has recently observed, that the original Eirenicon caused a temporary excitement; but that now it lives not in men's minds at all, except indirectly through the replies to which it gave birth. We augur a still less brilliant fate for the present volume. It is so colourless and feeble, that we cannot imagine there will be the smallest or most temporary excitement caused by its publication.

Some Aspects of the Reformation. By J. G. CAZENOVE, M.A. OXON.
London: Ridgway.

AS this volume has been sent to us, we suppose we ought to notice it, though we hardly know what to say. It leaves nothing to be desired in the way of temperance and charitableness; but as to its substance, Mr. Cazenove belongs to that school, which we have more difficulty in understanding than any other whatsoever, Protestant, Deistic, or atheistic. Protestant private judgment is most intelligible: every one is to arrive at his own religious or irreligious views, by his own philosophical, historical, and critical investigations. On the other hand, the Catholic doctrine of authority is most intelligible: the Church in communion with Rome is divinely guaranteed as teacher of Truth; and those who desire Truth, must embrace those doctrines which she explicitly or implicitly teaches. But what can we say to persons, who profess to repudiate private judgment, and yet make their own historical investigations as simply the one norm of their belief as does the wildest Protestant or rationalist? We can only rejoice at the amount of orthodox doctrine which they accidentally hold; observe with sympathy and respect the various indications which they present of sincere piety; and hope and pray that they may be brought by divine grace to a more humble and more reasonable way of thinking.

The Corean Martyrs. By Canon SHORTLAND.

The Life of Henry Doré, Martyr. By the Abbé FERDINAND BAUDRY.
Translated by Lady HERBERT. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT is difficult to say which is the more interesting of these two fascinating little narratives, possessing as they do so much of the romance of fiction, while in reality consisting of noble facts. The first is a sketch of the progress of Christianity in Corea, through the labours and deaths of its

martyr-missionaries ; the second is the separate life of one of these heroes, and we must say that, short as it is, we seldom remember a more stirring biography. The accounts of Corea, its natives and language, given in these two volumes are beyond anything curious. The Chinese nation—and we mean to include in it races so near and resembling it so closely as the Japanese and Corean—has always been a singular mystery, uniting as it does the extremes of luxurious civilization and idolatrous barbarism. The Coreans however appear to be decidedly less sophisticated than their neighbours of the Celestial Empire, and in consequence, present a better soil to receive the seed cast in by the missionary. Whether the moving spring was the tractability of the Corean character, the destitution of all spiritual assistance under which the natives suffered, or the martyr's crown ever hovering over that jealously exclusive peninsula, certain it is, that when Corea was in question, the enthusiasm of missionaries knew no bounds. Some waited patiently for years before they could effect an entrance into this longed-for field of labours.

“The Corea!” exclaimed Mgr. Berneux, when appointed its Vicar Apostolic, “that land of martyrs! The very name thrills through the heart of the missionary. Who would not rejoice to enter, now that the door is at last opened?” When Father Dorié had been appointed to this perilous mission, he wrote to his old vicar :—“Rejoice with me at the good news—the great news. My mission has been decided. I go to the Corea with three of my companions. Thank God for me for being allowed to undertake such a glorious work.”

Father Dorié's history, with its romantic incidents, and the simple gaiety of heart which he displayed in all circumstances, is singularly captivating. We have to thank Lady Herbert for so natural and flowing a translation, that it is difficult to believe in the French original. We cannot attempt to give our readers any true idea of this novel in real life—they must judge for themselves by its perusal. In a recent sermon for our English Foreign Missionary College, the Archbishop selected some stirring extracts from Father Dorié's life, which will have proved its best advertisement.

One practical hint, before closing this notice. We cannot help being struck by the *date* of these glorious martyrdoms. The year 1866 is no such very distant epoch. We can all remember the little commonplace joys and sorrows with which our minds were occupied in that year as in other previous and succeeding years. Does it not seem marvellous that while we were eating our breakfasts and dinners, taking our walks and our railway journeys, with hardly a thought bestowed out of our own country, these heroic missionaries were undergoing perils, finally tortures and death, which we are too apt to imagine were extinguished with the life of the last Pagan Emperor of Rome? It is certainly not to be expected that the ladies and gentlemen of England should take ship for the Corea in the hope of evangelizing it or dying in the attempt ; but even for our own satisfaction, would it not relieve us of a certain painful feeling of selfishness if we took our natural and legitimate part in this great work? Our own personal and bodily labours are not even called for, but our support of the labours of others

by prayers and alms, does seem but the natural result of professing Catholic Christianity.

Life of Sœur Marie, the Workwoman of Liège. By the Author of "Wild Times," "Nellie Netterville," &c. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

SUCH little books as the one before us cannot fail to be of great value in adding to the little collection of ascetical reading which is felt as so great a want amongst Catholics. The life is a peculiarly interesting one, and reminds us in some ways of a little biography put together a few years ago by the able pen of Lady Georgina Fullerton, a life rare from its simple and hidden but deep sanctity,—we mean the life of Elizabeth Twiddy. If we might be allowed to offer a criticism on Sœur Marie's biography, we could wish that this authoress, as well as others of great merit, though we would not include Lady G. Fullerton in our criticism, had copied the beautiful simplicity of some of our earlier writers of the lives of the saints. Who that has read the ancient life of S. Catherine of Sienna, by her confessor the blessed Raymond of Capua, can forget, amidst its quaint language, the exalted piety of the writer, who, entirely carried away by the contemplation of the seraphic beauty of the soul he describes, forgets himself and the style of his own language, until that very self-oblivion and enthusiasm creates a style and language unrivalled in its force, greatness, and simplicity. Did modern writers throw themselves heart and soul into the saintliness of the character they describe, they would need fewer metaphors, ornaments, and italics. But this little book is, as we have already said, so truly good, pious, and valuable in itself, and so really interesting, that we are unwilling to add words of criticism where praise is so well earned.

The Double Sacrifice: a Tale of Castelfidardo. Translated from the Flemish of the Rev. S. Daems. London: John Philp, 7, Orchard Street, Portman Square.

WE cannot well imagine anything better calculated than this effective little book to inspire Catholics with a real enthusiasm for that heroic body, the Pontifical Zouaves, who have been so aptly compared to the Crusaders of former days. Great truth and reality are given to the descriptions of camp life among these true members of the Church militant, by introducing the actual letters of a young Zouave, Henry Woodward, whose family is celebrated among English Catholics for having given the Holy Father two brave soldiers already. The account of the Battle of Castelfidardo is beyond anything stirring. It is given with the spirit and enthusiasm of a true son of the Church; while it is consoling to reflect, when reading it, that

the melancholy issue of that brave struggle has been more than cancelled by the glories of Mentana. The narrative is probably intended chiefly as a vehicle for loyal sentiments, and to enlist the reader's sympathy more warmly in the life of the Pontifical Zouaves than would be possible unless interest were in some degree centred in individual characters. It displays many graceful ideas, but is on the whole decidedly weak. Still, the delineation of the lives of two or three fictitious personages is of little moment compared with the real and deep interest which Catholics will feel in perusing so faithful and loyal a portraiture of the lives led and the dangers risked by these holy Papal volunteers.

Correspondence.

ON A LIBERAL EDUCATION IN ITS BEARING ON MENTAL DISCIPLINE AND CULTURE.

To the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

MY DEAR SIR,—The character and conditions of a sound liberal education are questions of such vital importance to our social welfare, and are, moreover, so closely connected with the best interests of Christian and Catholic faith and morality, that I shall make no other apology than such as is indicated by the nature of the subject itself for offering a few remarks in the way of supplement to the able letter of Dr. Gillow in the last number of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

It must be matter of satisfaction to all Catholics to hear, on the testimony of so competent a witness, that in our great colleges an education is imparted to the higher students which, in a mere literary point of view, may challenge advantageous comparison with that of Oxford itself; and imparted, as we all know, in the presence of those safeguards of religion and morality which are fast vanishing even from the theory of Protestant educational discipline. I for one feel no difficulty in believing that the examination of the London University, in which our Catholic students are so often distinguished, may be even a better criterion of a certain kind of information than the corresponding examination at Oxford. As respects that for the ordinary degree, or what is called the pass examination, there are *à priori* reasons, apart from the evidence of facts, why such should be the case. The view which used to prevail, and still I believe prevails at Oxford, assigns a great importance to a three years' residence in college, independently altogether of the examination to which it leads. Hence, whether rightly or wrongly, it is not, or at least used not to be thought desirable to place the B.A. degree beyond the reach of young men of very moderate intellectual capacity, who may avail themselves with average diligence of the opportunities of improvement which every good college supplies. This view of the case had its evil as well as its good tendencies, since it would occasionally give an undue advantage to young men of greater ability who, by dint of natural cleverness and previously acquired scholarship, might succeed in passing the examination after a college life of comparative idleness. It is, however, fair to add, that in every well regulated college young men of this latter class would be urged by all possible inducements to study for honours. Still, on the whole, the case which Dr. Gillow supposes to be common was certainly not rare, of the B.A.

degree being obtained with very little trouble and very moderate acquirements. In London, on the other hand, where no residence is required as a condition of the degree, the examination is not, as at Oxford, a mere feature, however important, in the academical course, but the beginning and end of what the University has to bestow upon those of its members who receive their education at a distance. An Oxford graduate means a man who has passed through Oxford with all those literary and social advantages which public opinion attributes to that University. A graduate of the London University, on the contrary, means a man who has passed the examination with credit and success. This distinction cannot, I think, fail to invest the mere examination with a greater importance than it possesses at Oxford, and to create a corresponding desire on the part of those who determine its character, that success in it shall never be otherwise than a certain badge of literary merit, according to that particular standard of merit which they propose to themselves. I am here all along speaking of the pass examination, for in that which is the qualification for honours, the distinction which I suppose to exist between Oxford and London does not hold good. In the former university, the award of literary honours is determined as strictly by the character of the examination as can possibly be the case in London. Whether, therefore, in this instance also the advantage be on the side of the latter or at any rate there be no clear advantage on the side of Oxford, is a point on which Dr. Gillow is likely to be a better judge than myself. For while I know but little of the present character of the examination for honours at Oxford, and have only a very imperfect idea of that of the corresponding examinations in London, he is at all events fully and experimentally acquainted with the latter, and very probably knows much more than I do of the former. I am quite prepared therefore to accept his testimony on this part of the subject also; more especially when I remember that the professors and examiners of the London University include in their number some of the most eminent men of the day, while those at Oxford are necessarily selected from a narrower circle.

But there is a far more important question than that of the variety and amount of the knowledge which these examinations presuppose, and that is, the character of the education which they tend to promote. On this part of the subject I own that I have my misgivings. It appears to me that the whole current of public opinion is at present in favour of a style of liberal education materially different from that which we were accustomed to prize in our old Oxford days. I do not by any means intend to apply this remark to the higher class education given in our great Catholic colleges. I know, for instance, that Stonyhurst possesses among its teachers more than one Oxford man of the old school, whose influence cannot fail to infuse somewhat of their own spirit into the classes they instruct. I know too that Ushaw, even in by-gone days, laid the foundation of the education of Cardinal Wiseman who, of all the hereditary Catholics I have happened to meet, seemed to me to come nearest to the old Oxford type in the character of his learning and accomplishments. On the other hand, the connexion which these colleges regard it as important to maintain with the London University must necessarily produce a certain influence on the character of

their higher education, though whether sufficient to assimilate it to the London type, I am unable to say. At any rate, the recent success of an Oscott student in obtaining the highest literary honours at Oxford is a proof that between the present Oxford system and that which prevails at our great colleges there can be no material diversity; and the college in question has the further guarantee of its solidarity with old Oxford in the circumstance of possessing one of the more distinguished of her sons as its president. But it is time for me to indicate my view of the difference in point of character which exists between what I have called the old Oxford type of liberal education and that which is favoured by the public opinion of the present day, which finds its correspondence in the kind of education encouraged by the examinations of the London University and towards which modern Oxford itself is apparently gravitating with great velocity. I shall content myself with calling to your remembrance the theory of a liberal education with which you and I were familiar in our Oxford days, and upon which the education we ourselves received, whatever its faults or flaws, and however, in my own case at least, unworthily represented, was avowedly based.

We were always taught to consider that the great end of a liberal education was not so much to store the mind with a certain amount of knowledge, as to form its character by subjecting it to a certain salutary discipline, and laying the foundation of those habits of accurate thought, adequate expression, discriminative judgment, and cultivated taste, which constitute the true difference between a more and less highly educated man. It was held that the period of academical education was too short to allow of doing more than laying the foundation and furnishing the materials of an edifice which a life is not long enough to construct and adorn; but that at the age when the mind is most pliant, and its energies most vigorous, great advances may be made in this work of preparation and promise. The alternative was considered to lie between teaching much imperfectly, or a little well, and no doubt was felt that the latter side of this alternative was the one which it was best to carry out. Hence the educational reformer strenuously contended that an Oxford education was narrow and illiberal, and was regularly met with the rejoinder that the one for which he pleaded was shallow and latitudinarian. It is quite possible, or rather very probable, that in our day what I have called the Oxford view was carried to excess, and I think that even we remained long enough in the university to witness some useful modifications of it. I began Oxford life some eight or ten years before you, and when I went up for my examination the "curriculum" of study was certainly very limited. A good examination in the Ethics and Rhetoric of Aristotle, with some minor philosophical treatise; in Herodotus, Thucydides, and part of Xenophon for Greek history; in Livy alone for Roman, with a prescribed number of Greek and Latin poets, with Aldrich's Logic, and scholarship enough for rendering a hardish passage of the *Spectator* into classical Latinity, and power of English composition enough to write an ingenious essay on some historical subject, was all that was required for an average first class in *Litteris Humanioribus*. The standard of the mathematical examination for honours was, I believe, equally restricted, but of this I cannot speak from experience. Ten or

fifteen years later such a list of books as the above would have been hardly sufficient for a good second class. The Politics of Aristotle had become almost a *sine qua non* for a first class, in addition to the Ethics and Rhetoric. Bishop Butler's "Analogy" and Sermons were added in the way of commentary on the Ethics. Several treatises of Plato were commonly taken up in addition. Roman history was supplemented by Tacitus. Aristophanes was considered almost essential as a repertory of idiomatic and colloquial Greek, as well as of information on Athenian manners and institutions. Whately's Logic followed on Aldrich, and the Organon of Aristotle on Whately, while the range of poetry was enlarged, and no man had a chance of a first class who could not render English prose into correct Greek as well as elegant Latin. This was undoubtedly a considerable expansion of books, though not of subjects, nor did it in any way affect the characteristic principles of Oxford education. It rendered the highest classical honours of the university difficult of attainment to all but men of a certain intellectual *calibre*, and impossible of attainment to those who did not work steadily during the whole of their undergraduate career, and vigorously towards its close. Still it did not enlarge the basis of the academical studies. It gave no entrance, excepting most incidentally, to modern languages, modern history, modern politics, or modern philosophy, all of which have, since our time, been brought within the reach of Oxford students, and some of them raised into essential conditions of honourable distinction.

It will thus be seen that an Oxford education in former days was confined to four subjects, or, strictly speaking, to three, for the fourth was almost involved in the rest. These were:—1. Ancient philosophy. 2. Ancient history. 3. Ancient poetry; and, 4. A knowledge of the ancient classical languages not only in their grammatical properties but in their idiomatic peculiarities.

If it be asked why the number of subjects was thus restricted, and why the ancient was preferred to the modern elucidation of them, the first of these questions has been already answered by observing that, according to what I have called the Oxford theory, such limitation was necessary to guard against the evils of a diffuse and superficial knowledge. To the second I will reply by reminding my reader that limitation implies selection, and that it is therefore no argument against the choice of subjects which Oxford actually made to urge that there are many of great value which she discarded as parts of her regular course. The question still remains as to the grounds on which she preferred the ancient to the modern representation of the subjects thus selected; since, as to those subjects in themselves, all will probably admit that the choice, since choice there must be, could hardly have been improved. One great inducement for preferring the ancient to the modern treatment no doubt was, that the acquisition of the two great languages of classical antiquity would proceed *pari passu* with the acquisition of knowledge on the subjects of which those languages formed the vehicle. It will hardly be contended, I will not say by any scholar, but by any philosopher, that as a discipline of the mind the mastery of any modern language is to be compared with that of the Greek; while, even as a key to the most popular of modern languages (to say nothing of

the language of the Church) the advantage of a thorough command of Latin can hardly be overrated. Again, if ethical philosophy is to form an important part of a liberal education, undoubtedly I should greatly prefer its being studied on the principles and in conformity with the dogmas of the Catholic religion to any other mode of inculcating it. But here I must remind you once for all that I am not defending the old Oxford theory of education as the best possible, but only as incomparably better than that which is popular in the present day, and, I will even add, as one which I think would rather need to be supplemented than supplanted by the ingredients of a really Catholic education. I mean that its essential character should, I think, be preserved, amid whatever changes in form and circumstance. Supposing then a course of strictly Catholic philosophy to be out of the question, as out of the question it plainly was at Oxford, I think it will be admitted that the university of our time showed its wisdom in preferring that of the Aristotelian School to some of those modern systems which in later times have gone far to take its place. The very fact of the Church having received that school as the best exponent of moral truth as far as it can be ascertained by the light of natural reason and conscience, and having constructed her own great fabric of moral theology upon the basis of its principles, is a sufficient proof in favour of the instinct which led the Oxford of a more religious age to make that philosophy the text of her ethical teaching. In fact, she regarded her philosophical as an auxiliary to her religious education, and would no more have thought of opening the door of youthful speculation to the influence of heretical systems on the one subject than on the other. In principle, though not of course in fact, her teaching was orthodox in both departments alike, and the questions which modern philosophers, in the flood of Christian light, have raised on such matters as human freedom and responsibility would no more have been allowed to enter as debateable ground into the systematic course of her teaching on philosophy, than would the student in divinity have been expected to acquaint himself with the views of infidels and sceptics on the miracles of the Old and New Testaments. It was in strict keeping with those principles of education which I have all along ascribed to the Oxford of twenty or thirty years ago, to teach even secular subjects on a certain system, and to confine speculation upon them as far as possible within a certain groove, though of course it was always impossible, and was never considered necessary, to restrict the range of extra academical reading by any other conditions than such as the conscience of the student, enlightened by the public opinion of the University, might impose. You will, I am sure, bear me out in testifying to the very high moral tone of this public opinion, as well as to the fact of its having been formed to a most material extent by the character of Oxford education. You will remember that this public opinion not merely prevailed among the men of older standing, but even pervaded the most influential classes of the undergraduate community, and this even in their most popular gatherings, and most unrestrained social intercourse.

I may refer especially to the uniformly high tone which distinguished that great Union Society in which so many of our present orators and statesmen

laid the foundation of their future success ; and I think you will also bear me out in saying that among the undergraduates with whom you and I were best acquainted at Balliol conversation of a sceptical or immoral character would have been immediately put down, or pointedly discouraged in any company in which their influence was felt.

The subject of history, like that of philosophy, was also in our time limited to the ancient branch of it. In the examination for open Fellowships questions in modern history were occasionally given, but never, as far as I remember, in the schools. It was of course competent to a candidate for honours to introduce references to modern history in the way of illustration in his paper work. But such reference to it was quite gratuitous, and in no way necessary to the attainment of honours. The reasons for confining the examination to ancient history were very much the same as those which led to the corresponding limitation in ethical and political science, with the exception of such as may have been founded on the dangerous character of free speculation on moral and semi-religious subjects. It was evidently thought undesirable to tempt the student into a field of research which, on account of the very interest belonging to it, might draw off his attention from subjects which the university chose to consider as a more healthful exercise of his intellectual energies. There was also, as you will recollect, a strong prejudice in the minds of many influential persons against encouraging a taste for modern politics, and hence the debates of the Union Society were for a long time connived at rather than openly sanctioned. I am not defending this view of the Oxford authorities, but merely referring to it as some explanation of their unwillingness to encourage as part of the academical course a study so intimately connected with modern politics as that of modern history. The dread of a diffuse and desultory kind of reading, however, was a better reason for the limitation ; especially as modern history, so far as it is a drama in which the principles of an unchanging human nature have their free play, is substantially a reproduction of its ancient counterpart. From the instructive pages of the thoughtful and far-sighted Thucydides the student might derive those maxims of political wisdom, many of which find their recognition in more modern theories of politics, and those exhibitions of human crime or human weakness which are illustrated alike by the history of all times.

In the department of Poetry, the third of those comprised in the Oxford education, there would have been still less excuse than in those of Philosophy and History, for deviating into modern pastures. Every Oxford man of sufficient capacity to try for honours would probably be familiar with the best specimens of English elegant literature, and especially of English poetry, and might fairly be left to himself for all reading of that kind without any other academical encouragement to it than such as was furnished by the Newdegate Prize. Moreover, in all the best colleges the tutors, or at least some of them (as, for instance, my kind friend, Dr. Bull), were men of accomplishment and general reading, and it was the admirable characteristic of the Oxford system, that it established a personal tie between the teacher and the pupil, which gave scope for a great deal of that private intercourse and influence which the mere lectures of a professor do not ordinarily allow.

As far, therefore, as related to the public examination, and to the course of instruction which it helped to form, the ancient poets were the great models upon which the taste of the student, as distinguished from his more exclusively intellectual faculties, was cultivated. The choice was surely a happy one, for there is no province of the sublime and beautiful which those models do not go to fill up. They also conferred the twofold benefit of teaching the ancient languages and forming the taste; and the great majority of them (though of course not without serious exceptions), could be read without the slightest danger to purity of morals.

Here I must throw in a few remarks on the much maligned exercise of Latin verse composition. I cannot but regard the opinions which prevail against it in the minds of many men of the present generation as evidence that between them and those whose view of a liberal education I greatly prefer there exists an essential contrariety which runs through every department of the subject to which it relates. It seems to be thought nowadays that no education is valuable which cannot be tested by direct results in kind.

The whole *instrumental* use, as I may call it, of a liberal education, its use, I mean, in relation to mental character and mental habits of thought and judgment, is apt to be overlooked, or at all events to be made of secondary, whereas I venture to regard it as of primary importance. A well-educated man, in my humble opinion, is one whose education not merely provides him with an abundance of rational resources, but enables him to set forth his knowledge to the best advantage, imparts to him the power of critical discernment and selection, the keen perception of the truly beautiful, and those especial qualities which, whether comprehended under the *αἰσθησις* of the Greeks, *judicium* of the Romans, or our English word "taste," is one of those fruits of education which no amount of mere knowledge can supply or secure. It is at this point that the intellectual province of education touches upon the ethical, and though I am of course as far as possible from saying that the education which tends to the formation of these mental habits, or the improvement of these mental faculties, is to be confounded with what we understand by moral training, yet I do think that the character of mind it goes to create is one which falls in far more readily with a higher kind of discipline than that which regards the intellect alone as that part of our nature with which education, properly so called, is exclusively concerned. I cannot better illustrate my sense of the value of the Oxford education of former times, than by adverting to some of its more prominent specimens among distinguished men of the present day. These specimens shall consist entirely of Oxonians of high academical distinction, but none of whom remained at the university as teachers or students for any length of time after taking their degrees; and I prefer to limit my selection to this number, because it answers an objection made by Dr. Gillow to the Oxford system, that it appears to advantage only or chiefly in those who have remained on as tutors or resident Fellows. My test of the typical Oxford education would be found in such men as the following—a motley class indeed, if judged by any other standard than that by which I here propose to try them, but all of them, though in very various degrees, men of that peculiar educational stamp which distinguishes them,

and, as I am inclined to think, with advantage, from the creations of a more modern school. Here then is my list, and I will arrange it, as far as may be, according to the academical standing of the distinguished men whom it includes : Sir John Taylor Coleridge, Dean Milman, Lord Derby, the late Lord Carlisle, Lord Devon, Mr. Gladstone, Archbishop Manning, Sir Roundell Palmer, the late Lords Elgin and Canning, Mr. Allies, Sir Stafford Northcote. I should of course add Dr. Faber, but that he remained in the university some time after he took his degree. Here then are some dozen Oxford men, chosen as representatives of a far larger class, who, amid whatever great diversities in other respects, agree in that peculiar character of mind which has enabled them to turn their talents, whether in the pulpit, in the senate, at the bar, or in the press, to the greatest practical advantage, and whose scholarship, although in particular instances probably its direct results have evaporated under the pressure of professional occupations, or lost their freshness by mere lapse of time, has left its indelible traces in those perceptive and discriminative faculties by means of which its power is extended to many a subject beyond itself. Many an Oxford man who would find it a hard matter in his later years to extricate the meaning of a crabbed passage in the "Agamemnon" or the eighth book of Thucydides from the meshes of a corrupted text, will yet give unquestionable proofs in his public appearances of the mental discipline which those early processes have contributed to form, as well as of the mental cultivation that has followed upon the academical studies in the retrospect of which those processes do not constitute one of the most attractive features.

And now to return to the subject of Latin verse composition. It is the best possible illustration of my argument, because, as the objectors to it truly remind us, not one man in a hundred, or perhaps a thousand, ever writes a copy of Latin verses after he leaves school or the university. There have no doubt been exceptions to this rule ; I think Mr. Canning and Lord Wellesley were among them, and, for aught I know, there may be many others. Still the exceptions are certainly not numerous enough to affect the rule. Now I will concede thus much to my opponents, that I think it just as great a mistake to persevere in teaching all the boys in a school to write Latin verses, as to make all the girls in a family learn music. I would do in the former case as the wisest parents do in the latter ; that is to say, practise the whole number up to a certain point, and then pick out those for further instruction who exhibit sufficient capacity or inclination for the work. Nothing certainly can be more absurd than trying to hammer uncongenial accomplishments into the minds of those who show no kind of aptitude for them. Still I do not see how, in the scholastic instance any more than in the domestic, you can get at your choice specimens without first trying all round. The question then is, whether the circumstance of Latin verse composition being generally barren of direct results in after life, is any argument against making it an element in a liberal education, and I humbly conceive that it is not. I hold that original composition of some sort is a *sine quâ non* towards acquiring a thorough knowledge of a language. By a thorough knowledge of a language I mean, not merely a correct grammatical acquaintance with it, but an acquaintance with its idiomatic characteristics, and what I may call its

genius. The genius of the Greek is as different from that of the Latin as that of the English from that of the French or Italian, and the mere fact of a person being able to render Greek and Latin into the corresponding English phrase is no necessary proof that he has mastered the spirit of each language. Now the poetry of all languages has a genius of its own as compared with their prose; and if, as I suppose, no one would pretend that a competent knowledge of the Latin language can be acquired without the exercise of original Latin prose composition, then it follows that composition in verse is also necessary towards acquiring a just appreciation of the beauties of Latin poetry. In fact, the habit of this exercise has a twofold advantage; both as it gives an especial interest and a peculiar zest to the study of the Latin poets, and as in turn it reflects a new light upon them, and adds a new charm to that study. I am old enough to remember the fame of Lord Derby's strikingly original Latin prize poem on "Syracuse" which he had recited a year or two before I went into residence at Christ Church. I remember also Lord Carlisle's (then Mr. Howard's) less able but equally classical poem on the Eleusinian Mysteries, and intermediate between them was poor W. Churton's exquisite prize poem on the Newtonian System, in which he describes the theory of gravitation and the mutual action of the centrifugal and centripetal forces in hexameters which are equal to anything in Lucretius. Here are some of them, and I shall be surprised if every scholar do not agree in this opinion. I have noted by italics the phrases which seem to me peculiarly felicitous:—

"Binæ adeo (duplex astris quæ causa movendis),
 Primitus impressæ vires: quarum altera recto;
 Quò ferat impulsus, perstat propellere motu,
 Altera, qua medium cupide connixa petissent.
Par ambas vigor, atque æque librata potestas
Inter se tenet oppositæ; ita mutua litem
Componunt adversæ, et opus miscentur in unum.
 Stellæ igitur primum dederat quam dextra Moventis
 Cuique viam, æternum tenuisset, et avia longe
 Raptasset sine lege fugam; at refrænât ab alto
Subtile imperium Solis, reprimitque coercens
 Multa renitentem. Hinc demum media inter utramque
 Curvatis via fit spatiis; *redit error in orbem,*
Et sua perpetuo relegunt vestigia gyro."

In quite a different style the following lines in the same poem, in which, from the subject of the Georgium Sidus, the poet apostrophizes the poor old blind and benighted king who gave his name to Herschel's discovery, and whose death was then fresh in the memory of the British public, are as beautiful as anything I can conceive in the way of tender and delicate sentiment cast in the mould of classical Latinity. Of course we are not to judge them too rigorously in the light of Catholic theology:—

"Tu nunc, sancta anima, et meritorum præmia nactus,
 Morborum ærumnis, *et mentis nocte sepultæ*
 Permutas cæli jubar immortale, tuorumque
 Alloquio frueri, et ruptos conjungis amores.

Parta tibi requies : nos portu distinet æquor
 Undosum, et fessos jactant hinc inde procellæ.
 Te vero devincti animis, te, dum tua lucet
 Stella polo, semper grato sub corde foventes,
 Ingenium moresque aureos, memorande, colemus."

Now your matter-of-fact men will never convince me that it was time thrown away to educate a boy in a practice which enabled him at the age of nineteen or twenty to produce such lines as these, in which are indicated not merely great clearness of thought and great delicacy of feeling, but an extraordinary power of transfusing those qualities into the idiomatic phrase of an ancient language, even under the limitations of metrical composition. It will of course be said that I am here illustrating a rule by a great exception. But I think that such an exception is enough to justify the rule when we remember that it is but one, though a striking one, out of many ; and that the necessity of the rule, under the restrictions I have already put upon it, is implied in every such exception.

But a classical education of the kind here supposed may serve even a higher purpose. Whatever tends to deepen and purify the love of the truly beautiful, may come to minister under proper guidance to the aid even of the religious affections. True religion and the highest kind of beauty are never otherwise than coincident, and work on one another by a power of mutual attraction. Those, for example, whose instincts have been educated according to the standard of the truly beautiful, will study the Holy Scriptures under the advantage of a new sense, akin to that which opens the treasures of music to such as possess a musical ear. I much doubt whether the "Christian Year" could have been written, except by a "typical Oxford man," to use an expression which Dr. Newman, in his "Apologia," applies most kindly, but less correctly, to another. But it is in the Catholic Church, even aliens to her communion being witnesses, that our natural attractions towards the beautiful find their most eloquent response. How many of her hymns, for example, though certainly not framed upon the strictly classical model, appeal by their intrinsic beauty to the cultivated perceptions, even of those who are drawn to them by no special religious prepossessions ! Even her complicated ceremonial, which to uneducated and vulgar minds presents no idea but that of unmeaning confusion, is full of beauty to observers trained by their education to understand the conditions on which true beauty depends. That which to the non-Catholic is often no more than a matter of esthetic pleasure, becomes with a Catholic a powerful aid to devotion. There is not a sentence in the Missal and Breviary, nor a provision, how minute soever in the Rubrics which regulate the outward development of the heaven-taught literature which those volumes comprise, that may not suggest some calming or elevating thought ; and I am convinced that an education such as Oxford once gave, had a tendency to dispose the mind in favour of such impressions. I am far from thinking that the same is true of that which she offers now. Not to speak of the change which a quarter of a century has wrought in the religious and moral tone of that University, the classical scholarship which, even before I ceased to be connected with Oxford, was coming into vogue, and which

I believe is now in the ascendant, tended to give a great preference to the merely critical, over what I may call the esthetical study of ancient literature. This kind of scholarship may, I conceive, be as injurious to the religious instincts of which I am here speaking, as the other is favourable to them, by stiffening the rule upon which our critical perceptions are formed, and thus subjecting what does not come up to the strict requirements of that rule to the squeamish contempt of a dainty and supercilious fastidiousness.

The three respects then in which the old theory of Oxford education seems to me to possess a great advantage over that which is now going far towards superseding it, are—1. That, in as much as a scholastic or academical education is necessarily limited in point of time, and can therefore do no more than start a man on a course of mental improvement, which must be carried to perfection in after life, it is right to make the depth of the teaching an object of greater importance than its breadth, and consequently to aim at teaching a few things well, rather than many things less well. 2. That the end of a liberal education is not merely to store the mind with knowledge, but to give it a certain tone and character by means of that knowledge. 3. That education, if it is to be anything better than a means of worldly distinction and a temptation to individual pride, should be conducted on what we understand, and what I think the Oxford of a former time also understood, by a kind of instinct which served it so far in the place of a more enlightened faith, as the *dogmatic* principle.

Under the two former heads I have little more to say. “Non omnia possumus omnes,” is a truth that suggests not only a humbling reflection, but an important rule of action. Nature, or rather its Divine Author, has suggested the fitness of concentrating our energies on those subjects which fall in with our special aptitudes, rather than of attempting to diffuse them over a wider range. The tendency of modern systems of education is in an opposite direction, and appears to presume that every one of a certain capacity and intelligence can do everything in the world, if he do but only make the attempt. A clever man now-a-days seems to think that he loses *caste* in intellectual society, by acknowledging his ignorance on matters to which he has no natural aptitude or attraction. It is a weakness of our nature, long ago noticed by Aristotle, that the qualities or attainments in which we do not shine, are precisely those which we most wish to have ascribed to us. The candid avowal of ignorance is one of the most indisputable tokens of true knowledge; whereas there are people in the world who scarcely like to confess that they could not compose an oratorio or navigate a ship across the Atlantic.

I should almost fear that I had exaggerated the tendencies of certain modern systems of education towards weakening and diluting the mental energies by diffusion, did I not find that my views on this subject are entirely shared by intelligent persons, whom public opinion will readily acquit of those prejudices which are thought to be inherent in the clerical character. On the subject to which I refer, I have said nothing which is not absolute milk and water, in comparison with an article in the “Saturday Review” of a week or two back, on which I have happened to light. This

article is headed, "The London University Matriculation Examination," and occurs in the impression of Saturday, April 3. I shall make use of it only so far as to quote from it the series of questions proposed to candidates for admission to the University in January, 1868. Here then they follow, or at least a sufficient number of them. "1st. Who were the *Ærarii*? What is the action and construction of the common pump? How do you distinguish between a gerund and a gerundive? How do you express 17lb. 10oz. 6dwts. 15grs. as a decimal of 1lb. troy? What is meant by frankpledge, escuage, danelagh, and escheats? How is it that a convex lens of short focal length enables one to see minute objects magnified? What is the Latin for 'He sent ambassadors to seek for peace'? How do you insert a given number of arithmetical means between two given quantities? What is the difference between the logical and the grammatical division of a proposition? How do you decline *bos* in the singular and plural? How do you (on certain data) calculate the percentage composition of ammonia? How do you inscribe a circle in a given triangle? Draw a map of Great Britain. What is the first person present indicative active of *ἔσθησα*? How do you write the feminine of *bon*? How much anhydrous phosphoric acid is formed by the combustion of one gramme of phosphorus?"

Now, that any body of men in their sober senses, and far more that such a body of men as those who govern the London University, should suppose that the power of answering questions like these is a test of education in any true sense of the word is one of those exceptional phenomena which baffle all calculation. Of course I do not mean to say that all these questions are equally grotesque, but taking them one with another, and especially taking such an aggregate of them as would be necessary for passing the ordeal of the examination, it is not too much to say of them that, while many a well-educated man in the kingdom could not have answered them, a youth who had been skilfully "coached" for the examination might have succeeded in passing it without anything more than such a smattering of knowledge as does not constitute true education at all. If such questions be taken, as I suppose they fairly may be taken, as a test of the kind of education which the London University wishes to encourage in young men of seventeen or eighteen, I certainly agree with the writer of the "Saturday Review" that the duties for which such a training is most fitted to prepare youth are those of the sub-editor of a second-rate newspaper, who is expected to possess knowledge enough on every conceivable subject to satisfy the inquiries of his various correspondents. One would really think that the highest object of education, so far as we may be allowed to interpret it by the light of such specimens, is not to fit men for the effective use of the talents with which Divine Providence has furnished them, but to erect them into a body of walking encyclopædias. Could I believe that the result of a connection with the London University would be that of assimilating our own liberal education to such a standard, I should deprecate it as one of the greatest calamities of the time. For the reasons, however, that I have given in an earlier part of this letter, I am willing to take a less unfavourable view of it. Still I cannot but think, with the Saturday Reviewer, that the effect of such examinations, even in a mere literary point of view, must be that of warping the education

imparted in all colleges which are affiliated to the London University, or prepare their students for entrance into it.

I come now to the last of the three specified characteristics of the old Oxford system, which I have called its dogmatic principle. In the London University, which avowedly holds itself aloof from all religious preferences, or in the language of the present day from all denominational distinctions, we shall of course look in vain for the recognition of any such principle. But I suppose that it is not yet avowedly set aside in many of those schools, whether of the Established Church or various Dissenting communions, which send up scholars as candidates for the advantages offered by that university, while it is superfluous to add that education on the basis of a definite creed is regarded as a first principle in every Catholic school and college. I cannot therefore help feeling anxious for some such representation of a liberal education among ourselves as may secure its professional and social benefits upon the only terms which Christians, not to say Catholics, can permanently sanction. If students be taught to aim as an object of ambition at success in examinations which are conducted not only without reference to religion but with an avowed exclusion of it, I cannot but fear that even the safeguards of a Catholic college will hardly avail, against the power of this habitual temptation, to impress them with the great truth, that religion is not a mere professional matter, but the informing principle of all conduct, and the ultimate test of all true knowledge. Still and far more do I fear the consequence of subjecting Christian students to examinations on a subject so closely bordering on religion itself as that of moral philosophy, which avowedly encourage, and even make essential to success, the study of that subject under heretical and even atheistical aspects. And here I will say in passing that I am quite at a loss to understand how those who object, and as I think rightly object, to Catholics taking advantage of the Oxford examination, although without the condition of residence, can yet see no corresponding evil in taking a similar advantage of the examinations in philosophy at the London University. I am aware that the language held both at Oxford and in London goes to justify the belief that the examinations in both places are perfectly impartial, and that it is not the preference of one system over another which the student might exhibit in his replies, but merely the evidence that he had studied all with profit, which would determine his success. This profession is I have no doubt sincere, though I feel considerable apprehension that the mind of an examiner would be imperceptibly biased, and in a certain sense even legitimately so, in favour of the system which he espouses, and that he would be apt to regard the opposite view not merely as philosophically untrue, but as intellectually feeble. Even, however, if the fact be quite otherwise, I consider that it does not meet the objection which lies against familiarizing youthful minds, at an age when religious principles are not formed but only in the course of formation, with speculations which are intrinsically false, no matter by what ability supported.

Here, however, I have been led for the moment to deviate from my proper subject, which is that of contrasting two rival systems of education not so much from a religious as from a practical point of view. My present objec-

tion to that which I have recently illustrated by a somewhat extreme instance, is not that it fails as a religious education, to which it does not pretend, but that it fails as tried by the standard of sound education, to which it professes to be conformed. It not only divorces the cultivation of the intellect from that of the moral faculties, and thus omits to deal with human nature in its complex character, but it fails also to cultivate even the intellect in any valuable way. It overloads the mind at a tender age with food beyond its powers of digestion, instead of contenting itself with providing such healthy and invigorating nutriment as may strengthen its powers and fit them for future use.

The same restriction of subject precludes me from entering at any length upon the great problem of our time, which is that of adjusting the conditions of a liberal education, adequate to the demands of the age, with those which are necessary to the paramount interests of Christian faith and morality. Is the study of the ancient languages in their idiomatic perfection still to form the basis of such an education, or is something in this department to be sacrificed, and if something, then how much, to the accurate study of those modern languages which now form the medium of communication between the different nations of Europe, and whose literary resources bear witness to the fruits of modern civilization, and the accretions of many centuries of experience? Is ancient history to be supplemented by modern, and to what, if any, restrictions is the study of all history, but especially of the more modern branch of it, to be subjected? To what extent is the principle of expurgation to be admitted in the reading of classical books injurious to morality, whether by incidental phrases, or in the texture of the subject and its hardly concealed implications? Are the Christian to be substituted for the heathen classics, or to be combined with them, and if so, how is the fine edge of Christian ethics to be preserved from the blunting influences of the heathen admixture, or the fine edge of classical scholarship from those of the patristic Greek or the scholastic Latin? These and many other questions, of which these are but specimens, will have to be confronted by the ablest men among us as time goes on, and they are so full of difficulty that one cannot help feeling selfishly pleased by the thought that their solution will rest with others rather than with oneself. "Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor," who may at once vindicate religion from the unhallowed encroachments of science falsely so called, and practically resolve how education may become her handmaid without needless limitation of its own freedom.

The balance has to be struck between two forces which, in the moral and spiritual world, are precisely akin in their several tendencies to those in the world of nature which are so beautifully illustrated in the Latin verses I quoted awhile ago. Of what may be called the centrifugal force of our evil nature, it may be said as truly as of its "physical counterpart,"—

"avia longe

Raptasset sine lege fugam ; at reirænat ab alto
Subtile imperium Solis, reprimitque coercens
Multa renitentem. Hinc denum media inter utramque

Curvatis via fit spatiis ; redit error in orbem,
Et sua perpetuo relegunt vestigia gyro."

So is it that the erratic spirit is recalled within its prescribed orbit by the attraction of the Centre of Unity ; that Sun of our ecclesiastical system, which poises the action of the various greater and lesser worlds that own its power, and provides them, as from a fountain alike incapable of failure and impervious to corruption, with perennial supplies of light and heat.

I am ever yours, &c.,

April 16.

FREDERICK OAKELEY.

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1869.

ART. I.—THE RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES OF INDIA.

Christian Missions. By T. W. M. MARSHALL. Second Edition. London : Longmans.

The Religious Prospects of India: A Discourse read before the Society of Theistic Friends. Calcutta. 1864.

Tracts entitled "Inquiry after True Religion." English Series. Calcutta. 1862.

OUR object in the present article is to invite attention to the relation between Catholicity and the phases of religious speculation which are now to be found in restless activity in all parts of India that have been most permeated with Western civilization and education. The duties of Catholics towards the chaos of religious thought with which they find themselves brought into contact in our Eastern empire, and the attitude which ought to be assumed towards it, are fully deserving of the most careful consideration ; it is perhaps hardly too much to say that in these questions is involved the prospect of making any further progress in converting by far the greater bulk of the population of that empire to the Catholic faith.

We have selected the book first named at the head of this article as being the best and most recent work which treats from a Catholic point of view of missions to India as a whole, the more recent work, by Messrs. Strickland and Marshall, being confined to a single Catholic mission in the south of India. Without admitting our entire acquiescence in all the criticisms of Mr. Marshall, we may fairly select his as a work which contains within a readable compass all that is necessary to convey a tolerably correct impression of what has hitherto been done, both by Catholic and Protestant missions, for the conversion of India, and of the results of those efforts up to the date of the publication of his last edition. The other two pamphlets named are average specimens, selected from among scores of the publications which

are annually sent forth from the Calcutta presses, by writers belonging to the only one among many schools of neology which has any cohesive force of its own, a school which is well deserving of the attention of all who are interested in missionary work in India.

The method of treatment which Mr. Marshall has adopted, viz., successive sketches of the lives of the principal missionaries, though useful for the contrast which it was his main object to exhibit in the most striking light, is not conducive to a clear idea of the varying circumstances of the widely differing divisions of India; but if his narrative of Catholic missions is carefully examined, the following inferences which may be drawn from it, are sufficient to furnish a fair general outline of the antecedents and present circumstances of these missions.

1. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and first half of the eighteenth century, a succession of most eminent Catholic missionaries made vital and sensible progress in the conversion of that part of India which is called the Deccan, that is, the Madras Presidency, and the French and Portuguese settlements of Pondicherry and Goa.

2. These successes had no counterpart in the North or Centre of India. With the exception of the "remarkable labours of the missionaries at the court of the Emperor Akbar,"* in Northern India,† which, though full of promise, led to no great results, we find no record of successful missions north of the Nerbudda. This part of the country is not indeed absolutely sterile of native Catholics. At Agra, Dacca, Kishnaghur, and notably at the Catholic village of Bettiah, many congregations of native Catholic Christians numbering a thousand and upwards are to be found, while the half-castes, as they are usually termed, that is, the descendants of Portuguese, French, or English fathers and native mothers, are more than half of them Catholics, and of course form considerable congregations at large cities, such as Calcutta, Bombay, Patna, or Delhi: but such congregations bear no appreciable proportion to the population around them, and exercise little or no local influence.

3. The progress of Catholic missions in India received a terrible check in the suppression of the Jesuits, and the decline of the French and Portuguese influence in that country, whereby, "for nearly sixty years, *i.e.* from 1760 to 1820,

* Marshall, p. 230.

† Mr. Marshall erroneously speaks of this as *Central India*, a term generally applied to the provinces round Nagpoor.

scarcely any care was taken of the Catholic missions, and of their numerous converts. The older missionaries gradually died out, while none arrived from Europe to fill their place."*

4. During the last thirty years or more, missionary efforts on the part of Catholics have been revived, and enormous congregations, amounting in the whole country to nearly a million souls, have been saved from the ruin which had overtaken the labours of the older missionaries, and in many quarters fresh conversions are becoming numerous, and new progress announced.

5. In spite of these partial successes, indications are not wanting of a new state of things, brought about by the combined agencies of the English Government and of Protestant missionaries, which threatens to paralyze all Christian efforts. In Calcutta, "every influence combines to thwart" the progress of the Gospel; † and

it would be difficult to conceive a combination of more formidable impediments than those which they [Catholic missionaries] now encounter during every hour of their Apostolic toils. Opposed by the secret or open hostility of powerful officials—destitute of temporal resources—no longer contending only with the prejudices of the heathen, but with the far more fatal scandal of a nominal and contentious Christianity, which presents itself to him under twenty different forms, and which he contemplates with mingled surprise and contempt, the conditions of their warfare are less favourable than in the happier days, when martyrdom so often crowned its labours and assured its triumph. It is the mission of England, as we shall see more and more clearly in every chapter of this work, to make the conversion of the heathen impossible. Even S. Paul, and the companions of S. Paul, would hardly have struggled with success against the obstacles, hitherto unknown in the world, which Protestantism creates in every pagan land. When England has no longer an agent or a representative in India, the missionaries of the Cross will once more contend on fair terms with the evil spirits who rule her. Until that hour, which is, perhaps, not far distant, they must be content to gain a few here and a few there, and to deserve the success which they will not always obtain.‡

And lastly, "In almost every part of India," says the Rev. Mr. Percival, "the spread of the English language and literature is rapidly altering the phases of the Hindoo mind, giving it a sceptical, infidel cast."§

This last subject, viz., the religious tendency and effects of English education, to which Mr. Marshall allots a separate section, is that to which we propose mainly to devote our attention: meanwhile we cannot too strongly insist on the

* Marshall, p. 246.

‡ *Id.*, p. 259.

† *Id.*, p. 258.

§ *Id.*, p. 353.

correctness of the description which we have quoted above of it, detailing the disadvantages under which Catholic missionaries at present labour. If, however, we were content to accept Mr. Marshall's conclusion, that until the English are driven out of India further success is practically hopeless, we would not waste any more time over this subject. But, while we admit that he faithfully echoes the common opinion which obtains as to Catholic missions in India, in the desponding tone which he adopts, it may be remembered that the Catholic Church is not unaccustomed to engage in a struggle with minds of a sceptical, infidel cast; on the contrary, she engages, and not without success, in many such contests, in most of the countries of Europe, and we cannot but think that a new field of operations is being opened to her in India, if only the opportunity, we might say the necessity, of entering upon it is not lost sight of: a field which, if not so promising as those in which S. Francis Xavier laboured in the sixteenth, and De Nobili in the seventeenth century, yet holds out a fair prospect of no niggard harvest, and of making an impression on the *intellect* of the country as formidable as that made by the latter of these illustrious missionaries, whose system alone, to our mind, presented any human probability of effecting the conversion of India.

If the possession of India has imposed on the English nation most important duties connected with the government and civilization of that country, it has no less imposed on the Catholics of England the duty of imparting, so far as in them lies, the blessings of faith to their fellow-subjects in the East; nor is the present time inopportune for looking around and examining the means by which this end may be best promoted. Our religion in this land has at length reached a point at which we feel it not merely possible but even incumbent on us to commence the work of organizing missions and sending out missionaries to other shores, and the Primate of England has openly testified his sense of the propriety of the efforts which are being made for this purpose. We do not pretend to select the field in which the earliest missionaries of S. Joseph's College are to be employed, but if we do not include *in partibus infidelium* such countries as Australia, North America, and the Cape, in which, to say the least, Catholics are proportionally as abundant as in the mother country, it may confidently be said that no place has such strong claims upon England as her possessions in India, where Catholicity is so ill provided with ministers and money, and where such as she does obtain, are almost entirely the gift of France and other foreign countries.

Before, however, we approach more closely the question to which we are specially directing attention, it is desirable to bestow a brief notice on one race, or rather collection of races, which, though included in our Eastern empire, has little or nothing in common with Hindoos or Mahomedans, and requires to be approached in a very different and far simpler manner. No one, we believe, now contests the conclusion that the Hindoos are not the aboriginal inhabitants of India: before their invasion or immigration more than a thousand years before the Christian era, other races and tribes were occupiers of the soil, who still, after the lapse of three thousand years, are unmistakably distinguished from the races which came in with the Aryan conquest. They alone are really deserving of the title of Aborigines, while Hindoos, Mahomedans, and English have only succeeded one another as conquerors.

The non-Aryan races, as they are commonly called, were driven by the Aryans into all the rugged and mountainous portions of the country. In the rugged regions of Central India they are found in great numbers under the names of Coles and Sonthals; they also hold almost all the spurs of the north-eastern Himalayas. They number, perhaps, in all from fifteen to thirty millions, and their religions, as numerous as their tribes, are all of the most primitive type: they are mostly, if not entirely, without any written language, and occupy the same rank in the human race as the New Zealander or North American Indian.

These tribes, though in many respects presenting so far more promising a field for missionary labour than the Hindoos and Mahomedans, being without the prejudices of caste, or the self-sufficiency derived from an ancient though decaying theology, have, we believe, till recently been entirely overlooked by Christian missionaries; and though we may be unintentionally unjust to some Catholic priest labouring usefully though obscurely in their midst, we believe that we are correct in saying that even now such missions as there are are exclusively Protestant, whether English, German, or American.

This is greatly to be regretted, for these tribes are in an intellectual and religious position which at present offers no obstacle whatsoever to the advance of Christianity properly taught. Few Protestants even will be hardy enough to maintain that a religion on the basis of private judgment, especially conjoined with the absence of ritual, is well adapted to primitive races, and this alone is sufficient to explain the fact that the missions we have just named have not been strikingly successful: indeed, had they not wisely portioned out the

ground among the rival sects, and abstained from encroaching on one another's preserves, probably no success at all would have been obtained. But, still, the missionaries having been thus practically saved from that which is the consequence but at the same time the nemesis of Protestantism, the babel of teachers, are, we believe, in many cases, really laying a very fair foundation for future successes among these races, though they may have obtained but few actual disciples; while one mission, that of the German Lutherans, in Chota Nagpore, has unquestionably been very productive of conversions. Till 1858 or 1859, it, like others, was almost entirely sterile; from that time, however, an impression was made, and from 12,000 to 15,000 native Christians have been collected together during the ten years which have since elapsed.

To say the least, there is no difficulty whatever in supposing that in some cases, especially where Catholicity is entirely out of the field, and where the teaching is mutilated and fragmentary truth, rather than the denial and rejection of the supplementary truths which are left untaught, Divine grace may really second the efforts of Protestant missionaries. Still more may this be so, when, as is certainly the case in the instance of the mission we are considering, the Catholic and not the Protestant rule of faith is in reality followed, and the disciples are practically required to believe without question whatever doctrines their teachers propose, and not to subject them to any independent criticism of their own. A theory of this kind is, however, by no means necessary to enable us to account for the success we have described. Lutheranism is naturally the best adapted of all forms of Protestantism to win savage races; and it is no matter of surprise that these missionaries, who have had the warm sympathy of Colonel Dalton, the chief Government official in the division, isolated from all rival teaching, coming as delegates of an avowedly superior form of civilization, and accidentally aided by an agitation regarding land tenures which has enabled them to take up the position of champions of oppressed agriculturists, should have reaped a considerable harvest in a field which was before practically fallow. In the future, however, it appears probable that this mission will have to continue the struggle amidst dissensions and schism. Recently its younger members complained to Germany of some alleged abuses on the part of their seniors: of the merits of the complaint we cannot speak, but the elder missionaries, dissatisfied with the treatment they received, tendered their services to the Church of England. The Anglican bishop of Calcutta, Dr. Milman, after a visit to Ranchee, the

head-quarters of the mission, decided on accepting the offer, while the younger missionaries have adhered to the parent society. Of the final result we have not yet heard; the law courts will, it may be presumed, uphold the right to the churches, schools, and mission-houses, of those who remain Lutherans; but the bulk of the converts will probably follow the seniors.

It is not our object, however, to dwell upon Protestant missions to the non-Aryan races, still less on one, though the most successful of them, that in Chota Nagpore. One great impediment in the way of Catholics undertaking such missions is the want of funds, and, perhaps we might add, want of men; Catholic missions are at present obliged to be far more self-supporting in India than Protestant; Dr. Wilson was able to boast in 1851, that the yearly expenditure on Protestant missions in India alone was about one-fifth more than is annually raised for Papal missions in all parts of the world:* and among wild tribes little or no pecuniary support can be anticipated, and external aid is absolutely indispensable. A still more cogent reason for this apparent neglect may also be found in the state of destitution in which already existing Catholic congregations were left, as already described, by the religious troubles of Europe in the eighteenth century: all the efforts which have been made during the present century have not yet sufficed to fill up the gaps which were thus created. This fact must never be lost sight of in estimating at its true value the work done by Catholic missionaries; it will readily be admitted that new enterprises can hardly be undertaken while old congregations are still insufficiently provided for; and hence we fear that for many years to come it will be impossible for Catholics to organize missions to the non-Aryan races of India: had they been able to do so before Protestantism entered the field, it can scarcely be doubted that their missionaries would have obtained even greater successes than S. F. Xavier and his successors did in Southern India. Even now a missionary who mastered the languages of the tribe to which he addressed himself, for each of these tribes has a separate dialect of its own, would probably reap no barren harvest, though the preoccupation of the field by Protestant missionaries has magnified the difficulties by confusing the claims of authority, and though official countenance, a matter of great importance in India, would be conceded most certainly to his rivals.

* Marshall, p. 327.

While, however, even the most cursory survey of the present state of India as a missionary field, requires that the numerous non-Aryan tribes, and the prospects which they afford to the missionary, should be carefully distinguished from the Hindoos who have driven them out of the plains, it is these latter who in the present instance mainly claim our attention. It is well known that among the Hindoos, caste has been one of the most insuperable barriers to conversion: the lower castes being already as degraded as they well could be in the social scale, have been far more willing to listen to the addresses of Christian missionaries, and to these belonged almost without exception the very numerous converts which were made by S. Francis Xavier and other Catholic missionaries before the time of De Nobili. There is good reason to believe that the lowest of the four great parent castes into which Hindoo society is divided, the Sudras, was originally composed in great part of the conquered aborigines who consented to remain in the plains and become the subjects of their invaders. The invasion coming from the north, it can readily be surmised, as indeed is confirmed by experience, that the influence of the conquerors or higher castes is far less supreme in the South than in the North of India; and this is one of the main reasons why the extreme south of the peninsula furnishes by far the most successful fields for Protestant as well as Catholic missionary labour. But even at the very outset of missionary enterprise, this progress of Christianity among the lower castes only, tended to augment tenfold the repugnance and hostility of the Brahmins and other high caste Hindoos. It cannot be too often insisted on, that caste is a social as well as a religious distinction; Christianity thus not only appeared in the eyes of Hindoos as a religious innovation, but as the creed of socialism and license, which allied itself with all that was lowest and most infamous in the country. In propagating opinions of any kind, it is always hazardous to ignore the natural leaders of a community, and attempt to win over the multitude without their co-operation: a well-educated ex-Pharisee was, humanly speaking, a necessary addition to the uneducated fishermen who formed the College of Apostles (and even they were supernaturally educated), and it has always been found in India, that unless some impression is made on the Brahmins, any success among the low castes is likely to prove abortive and transient. We need not wonder, therefore, that after the departure of S. Francis Xavier, a crisis came in the Catholic missions in the South of India, and "conversions were at an end. For

fourteen years, Father Gonsalvo Fernandez had laboured amongst the people of Madura without gaining so much as a single convert;”* and had not the problem which presented itself been faced and solved by one, whom, next to S. Francis Xavier, we consider the greatest missionary who has ever set foot in India, all further progress would probably have been for ever at an end. Robert De Nobili, also of the Society of Jesus, was the instrument under Divine Providence of overcoming the repugnance of the upper classes, which was so fatal to religion, an end which he accomplished in one word by naturalizing Christianity in India. Opposition on the score of *religion* remained of course as decided as ever, and involved him and his followers in frequent oppression and persecution; this could not be otherwise, and he would himself have been the first to deprecate any idea of coming to terms with idolatry, or of conciliating Brahminism as a worship; but the prejudices, if indeed they deserve that name, which are imbibed from a love of country, and respect for the station and position in society which one’s parents have handed down, are deserving of very different consideration; it may be that they ought to die down to the roots, among those who follow the counsels of perfection and embrace the religious life, but the Church has never deemed it right or necessary to set her face against these feelings among ordinary Christians, provided they be kept within moderate limits. If an English gentleman on becoming Catholic were required to drop the title of esquire, to dress like one of the working classes, and to exchange all his English manners and tastes for French or Italian, it would present but an incomplete parallel to the social and national sacrifices to which a high caste Hindoo had to submit as a necessary consequence of becoming Christian before the time of De Nobili. If, then, it was expedient for St. Paul to become to the Jews a Jew, that he might gain the Jews, to those that were under the law, as though he was under the law (though himself not under the law), that he might gain them that were under the law; to them that were without the law, as if he were without the law (though himself not without the law of God but in the law of Christ), that he might gain them that were without the law;† if the prejudices of Jews and Gentiles required such conciliation, that S. Paul felt himself bound to adopt Jewish or Gentile customs and rules (for he certainly does not mean to accept Jewish or Gentile errors), in order that he might gain Jews

* Marshall, p. 218.

† 1 Cor. ix. 20.

and Gentiles, still more necessary was it for the missionary to Hindoos to adopt Hindoo manners and customs in order that he might gain the Hindoos; and De Nobili showed himself the true successor of S. Paul in the sacrifices which he made for that purpose. Had it not been for the malicious and interested opposition which his successes evoked, and for the disastrous delay which necessarily elapsed before any decision could be arrived at, there is good reason to suppose that the whole of Southern India would have embraced Christianity in the course of half a century. But India is proverbially the land of panics and suspicions; the seeds of distrust once having been sown, and the fear instilled that after all the nationality and self-respect of the Hindoos were at stake, and the system introduced by the Jesuits likely to be discountenanced, confidence never could be thoroughly restored. "The general movement which had been excited amongst the Brahmins from 1606 to 1610, was arrested, and was only very imperfectly revived at a later period. So true it is, that it is difficult to recover an opportunity once lost."*

With this appreciative understanding of the requirements of the Hindoos, Father De Nobili and his co-labourers united a thorough acquaintance with the most sacred and most esteemed writings of that people; and our object in thus dwelling upon the characteristics of his much-abused and remarkable mission is twofold. First, to place in a clear light the difficulty which has hitherto proved the main obstacle to the conversion of the Hindoos: secondly, to show by example that India wants appreciative as well as pious, zealous, and devoted missionaries, and that the want of the former quality is liable to neutralize the benefits which would otherwise spring from the latter. But it is the spirit and not the letter of De Nobili's work which requires to be copied at the present day: caste, even when the Jesuits returned to India some thirty years ago, though still influential, was a less dangerous stumbling-block than it had been more than two centuries before, and the period which has since elapsed has dealt it a deadly blow, from which it will never recover. Where it still possesses vitality, it may be right to conciliate somewhat the prejudices which it inspires, and we believe that this is still done to a modified extent in the new Madura mission, which is probably the most successful in India; but its days are numbered, and it is time to prepare to cope with the evils which have succeeded it. To employ the language which we have already quoted, and which

* Marshall, p. 230, quoted from a French work on the "Madura Mission."

is far more true now than when it was written ;—“ the spread of the English language and literature is rapidly *altering* the phases of the Hindoo mind, giving it a sceptical infidel cast.” This alteration requires a corresponding change in missionary tactics.

We must devote a short space to the consideration of the manner in which this revolution is being brought about, and are thus led to comment on the action upon the Hindoo mind of, first, Protestant missions ; secondly, the English Government.

We are far from desiring to disparage Protestant missions in India. In regard to the present time, it is hardly too much to say that, humanly speaking, their failures are due to the radical errors of the system of which they have become exponents, while such successes as they have obtained have been won in spite of those errors by the meritorious and praiseworthy exertions of individuals. It is, no doubt, true that English Protestants were late in entering the field of missionary enterprise in India ; it may be that many of the missionaries have been self-seeking, greedy of gain, and have selected their occupation as being the best and most remunerative profession which was open to them. It may be that the Anglican Church is deserving of special reproach for employing agents who rejected the doctrines which she puts forth in her prayer-book and articles, and did her no credit by their ill-concealed hostility to her : but this cannot be taken as a fair picture of the state of these missions now. Protestant missionaries do not even aim at, far less reach, the highest type of Christian life : there may be here and there in England some Anglican clergyman sufficiently impregnated with Catholic aspirations to believe that he ought to give up wife and children for Christ's sake, or to understand the counsel of S. Paul, that “ he that is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife, and he is divided ” ;* but if so, we doubt if a solitary instance of such a person could be found among Anglican or other Protestant missionaries in India. The “ divided ” state which naturally, and indeed properly, results from marriage, is the highest which they can conceive, and in this respect an impassable gap is at once placed between any of them and the *élite* of Catholic missionaries ; but with this reservation we may fairly say that as a whole Protestant missionaries in India in the present day bring no dis-

* 1 Cor. vii. 32, 33.

credit on their profession, and when innocently in error, are often truly deserving of esteem and admiration. There are many men like Cotton, who, though a bishop on £5,000 a year, laboured heart and soul for the benefit of his adopted country, or Long, who has devoted himself in the truest spirit to improve the natives, and is at once the trusted adviser of Government and the intimate friend of hundreds of Hindoos who have no sympathy with his religious opinions, of whom we may truly say, "*talis cum sis, utinam noster esses.*" On the whole, the Protestant missionaries in India are fair representatives of the bodies which commission them in England and America: the Anglicans are respectable and gentlemanly; the Presbyterians and Free Church energetic and particularly active in education; the Dissenters men of an inferior stamp, but often making up for their inferiority by increased earnestness and zeal; almost all comparatively ignorant of theology, and (their one disgrace) knowing next to nothing of Catholicism, yet ready to traduce it and prejudice the natives against it in inverse proportion to their acquaintance with its real teaching.

Protestantism is essentially a negative religion, and this alone renders it naturally unadapted to the work of converting those who are not Christians. It is one thing to suggest and scatter abroad plausible objections to the truth of revealed religion, whether it be the sceptic who is using this method against Christianity in general, or the Protestant who is using it against the Catholic Church; but quite a different task to build up the fabric of religion *constructively*. Conviction is the work of Divine grace; but the motives which strike and arrest the attention of persons predisposed to conviction are in the main (1) an Authoritative claim on the part of the missionary, "That he should teach with power (or authority), and not as the Scribes."* (2) That he should testify to the truth of his mission by a life of self-denial and mortification, and perhaps also by miracles. (3) Most especially of all, that his teaching should have the mark of unity amidst universality. This is the evidence selected by our Saviour as pre-eminently the one required for the conversion of the heathen. "Teach all nations."† And I pray "for those also who through their word shall believe in me: that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us, *that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me.*"‡ (4) To

* S. Mark i. 22.

† S. Matthew xxviii. 19.

‡ S. John xvii. 20-21.

these may be added, as a most important addition, that the disciples should lead edifying and pious lives.

The last of these advantages has unfortunately never been possessed for long by any missions in India, Catholic or Protestant; in fact, in all ages the want of it has been the bane of Christianity. *Corruptio optimi est pessima*; those who reject the greatest graces sink lowest. S. Paul, in rebuking the Corinthians, complained that they practised such wickedness "as the like is not among the heathen."* "The city of Goa became a proverb and a scandal among the heathen."† And in the present century the vices of many of the Christians of English, Irish, and Portuguese descent, Catholics as well as Protestants, have but too often subjected missionaries to the retort which again and again occurs in the pages of Mr. Marshall, Why do you not Christianize your own countrymen before you try to convert us?

But with this exception the requisites above-named have all been found on the side of the Catholic, and none on that of the Protestant missionary: Protestant missionaries have often been glad enough to invest themselves with the semblance of authority, but such a claim is manifestly an imposture in the case of persons who reject the only possible authority, in any true sense of the word, which the Christian system furnishes; and, *unconsciously* detected often in the outset, is in constant danger of being *consciously* detected as the inquirer learns more of the religion which is proposed to him. As regards their lives, European missionaries are under any circumstances placed in great difficulty in a tropical climate: the standard of life, which is to them austere and self-denying, seems to an Asiatic comfortable and even luxurious. In such circumstances the advantage which celibacy, a self-sacrifice which almost any nation in the world can appreciate, confers, as a mark of the true missionary spirit, cannot be over-estimated. Miracles which followed the teaching of S. Francis Xavier, De Britto, and other of the leading Catholic missionaries, are not even claimed by Protestants. But it is the absence of unity which more than anything else has afflicted with sterility Protestant missions: this is admitted, or rather proclaimed, on all hands by Protestants themselves, as Mr. Marshall has clearly pointed out:—"The grand impediment which the Gospel has to contend with among idolaters arises from the multiplicity of shapes under which our visible religion presents itself to their notice. Their observation uniformly is, that they should think much better

* 1 Cor. v. 1.

† Marshall, p. 217.

of Christianity if there were not quite so many different kinds of it.”* And Dr. Grant, in his well-known Bampton lectures, says, “A large portion of the sterility of our missions may be attributed to that discord which Christianity exhibits in the very sight of the unbeliever.” “Must there not arise a strong presumption in the mind of the unbeliever against the Divine origin of that doctrine or system which cannot be clearly ascertained, or on which its upholders cannot unite?”† The need, and at the same time the absence, of this mark of unity is therefore admitted openly and candidly enough; but what Protestants, and often enough Hindoos also, do not perceive, is the irrefragable proof which this admission involves that Catholicity can be the only true form of Christianity. Dr. Grant openly talks of *Christianity* as exhibiting discord, and the too common idea is ‘we (or you) Christians, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Romanists, Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, &c., are deplorably divided and disunited: we are all equally guilty and responsible for this state of disunion, and all equally self-condemned by it.’ Whereas it is most evident that while this state reflects but discredit on all the other forms of Christendom, it, rightly speaking, only redounds all the more to the credit of Catholicity, by the triumphant vindication which it affords of her fundamental principle. This principle is one of unity; it is that all persons who wish to be true Christians must remain in communion with the Bishop of Rome, as the successor of S. Peter; from which it follows that they must confess such doctrines as he insists upon as a necessary condition to communion, and also that the Divine promises to teach the Church all truth, and to prevent the gates of hell from prevailing against it, are to be fulfilled by the Holy Ghost preserving the Pope from ever insisting on any doctrine of faith or morals as a *sine quâ non* of communion, which is not conformable with God’s truth. On the contrary, no principle of Christianity, no rule of faith put forth by any other Christian body, Anglican or Dissenter, Greek or Armenian, either logically should, or actually does, lead up to unity, and no other bishop in the world claims to be the especial successor and representative of S. Peter. The common Protestant principle does not even consistently provide the canon of the New Testament as a book of appeal, since it is both historically and logically true that this canon rests on the authority of the Catholic Church, and cannot be arrived at in the present day with any certainty by independent research, however learned

* Bishop Middleton’s Life, by Le Bas, c. v. p. 132.

† Bampton Lectures, App., p. 316.

and persevering the student may be. But, admitting the New Testament as being in some inconsistent manner the book of appeal among Protestants, it is still evident that there is no *à priori* reason why those who read it sincerely and learnedly should not radically differ in the religion which they deduce from it; and experience has now abundantly proved that they do thus differ, and as a consequence of the irreconcilable character of their disagreements separate into different sects, and employ different missionaries. These considerations, when properly understood, show clearly that Catholics have not, as it is often alleged they have, any position to establish: it is not incumbent on them to prove that Christ made Peter the origin of unity in His Church, easy though it is to furnish satisfactory evidence of this to any unprejudiced mind: they have not got to establish the fact that S. Peter ever was at Rome, or that he was bishop there, though few learned historians would now venture to deny the overwhelming force of the evidence for both these facts. But the Catholic argument is prior to, and independent of, any historical or scriptural evidence: it is simply this, that no other principle of unity can be found in the Christian economy except the constitution of the see of Peter as the necessary centre of unity; and no other bishop even claims to be the legitimate successor of S. Peter. If therefore it is conceded that Christianity comes from God, and if a unity which the world can see is the particular evidence of this divine mission, then it follows irresistibly that Christ must have instituted a centre of unity, that this centre of unity must be the see of Peter, and that Rome must be at the present moment the see of Peter, and Pius IX. its legitimate occupant. Given the premisses, as practically Dr. Grant, Le Bas, and so many others concede them, and no possible ingenuity can evade the cogency of the arguments which lead up to the conclusion. The unity, therefore, which the Catholic missionaries enjoyed, is the legitimate fruit of the Catholic principle; while the disunion which Protestants have had to contend against is equally the legitimate consequence of anti-Catholic principles in any form or shape. Thus while Protestants and Catholics both suffer at the present moment from missionary disunion, the former do so by their own fault, a fact which becomes the more apparent the more their principles are correctly explained and understood; while the Catholic missionary suffers innocently, and only because he cannot sufficiently obtain a hearing to explain to those in whose eyes he is prejudiced, that the schisms which injure him arise from the repudiation of his fundamental principle, and would be healed were it accepted.

Thus devoid of all the distinctive marks which are likely to

induce conviction in the minds of those who are not Christians, it might with all human certainty have been predicated beforehand that Protestant preaching and missionarizing in the ordinary manner, especially in the face of caste prejudices, would prove a total failure, even under the auspices of men such as Schwartz, Heber, and Martyn, for whom we gladly testify our admiration. And a failure they did prove. The missionaries were therefore compelled to have recourse to the internal evidences of the Scriptures, to the miracles and prophecies contained in them, and to such works as Paley's "Evidences," for inducing conviction; but arguments of this kind evidently necessitated a considerable preliminary acquaintance with Scripture and history to enable an inquirer to appreciate them. This, as well as the great ascendancy which the position of a teacher enables him to obtain over the minds of the youth confided to his teaching, coupled, too, in many cases with a sincere wish to introduce Western enlightenment into the East, led Protestant missionaries at an early period to give their attention to schools as the best channels to conversion. As Mr. Marshall says, the missionaries "resolved with characteristic energy of purpose to call into action a new system of *propaganda*, and to inaugurate a new and elaborate scheme by which they still hoped to convert defeat into victory. Having failed to convert the Hindoo by Bibles or preaching, they resolved to try the effect of education."*

This scheme, which has found its warmest and most energetic supporters in the missions of the Free Church and Church Missionary Society, has in one respect proved an entire success. The Hindoos welcomed the opportunity of learning English and European sciences with most commendable alacrity. Von Orlich may tell us that natives are induced to attend these schools "only in the prospect of obtaining a situation, and the majority belong to the lower classes;"† but unless by lower classes he means poorer members of the *upper castes*, we must entirely demur to his statement. The prospect of employment, especially employment under Government, has undoubtedly been the dominant motive which has led Hindoo youths to English schools, aided in a minor degree by a love of knowledge; but these schools have been filled by the children of the higher castes, mostly the poorer members of them, who have eagerly accepted the chance, thus afforded them, of redeeming their prospects by employments of that kind which custom and religion have both marked out as their proper sphere. Children of the lower castes have

* Marshall, p. 348.

* *Id.*, p. 350.

indeed been mixed with them, but in a minority, and, compared with their relative numbers, a vast *proportionate* minority. There may have been occasional reluctance in some instances, as well as alarm, when any actual conversion has taken place, but these are exceptional; the English schools opened by the missionaries have been, as a rule, well filled, and the teachers have been eminently successful in being brought face to face with the *élite* of Hindooism through the medium of the children of the higher classes. That the success of the movement as far as conversions are concerned has been quite out of proportion to its success as an educational movement, is too well known to need repetition; probably not one boy in a hundred who has passed through his course at a missionary school has been converted to Christianity: but to the results of this teaching we shall have again to revert, after we have described the effect upon missionary education of the parallel movement under the auspices of Government.

At the outset we are bound to admit that there is no necessary connection between the Protestant Government and the Protestant missionaries: as a matter of fact, Protestant missions are no more responsible for the delinquencies of the East India Company than the Catholic Church was for Josephism in Austria in the last century. In India, so far as there is political life at all, there may be said to be four parties, of which non-official Europeans and natives form the two extremes, and officials the mean, Protestant missionaries coming between the officials and natives. In social and political questions the missionaries and natives are generally in accord, Government and the official class holding the balance between them and the Europeans: in religious questions natives consider officials, as a rule, too partial to Christianity, while missionaries consider them not partial enough. Hence they are, as it were, in a position of standing opposition on such questions, not violent or outrageous, but persistent and resolute: they have never ceased to remonstrate with the powers that be, for insufficiently aiding their efforts and showing too much countenance to the religions of the country, and therefore they may fairly plead complete immunity from any blame which may justly attach to Government and its servants on this score. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that one must not attach by any means unreserved credence to complaints against the Government of complicity with idolatry, which may often be traced to missionary writings. Not that we mean to imply that there is no foundation for these charges, or that every act of Government can be defended; and in so far as it ever

repressed Christianity, or even threw the weight of its power against its propagation, we do not attempt to justify it; but in many cases the funds which it has been condemned for expending on temples or festivals were practically trust funds, of which it may have very intelligibly been thought that they could not honestly be alienated.

If "there is nothing, perhaps, in the annals of any Christian people which can even be compared for enormity of guilt with the conduct of England during the first two centuries of her dominion in India,"* it ought in fairness to be remembered that there is also no parallel in the history of the world to an empire acquired in a similarly marvellous manner. The tenure by which the Company held its dominion was certainly very different from that by which Governments ordinarily rule: it can neither be said to have been by hereditary right, or entirely by right of conquest, or by the popular voice, however expressed, that the East India Company rose to power: obtaining this as a privilege, and that as a concession, a third right as the recompense for an outrage, a fourth as the reward of a useful alliance, and a fifth after a military success, the Company may be said to have crept gradually into power before it knew what an empire it was forming. Its rule, to say the least, partook largely of the nature of a trust, and was exercised under obligations which, if not definitely expressed, were at least implied and understood. Moreover, at each successive stage of development, affairs wore an anxious and critical aspect, and the confidence of its subjects was of paramount importance; it exercised its sway by prestige, and ruled by dividing the interests and passions of its opponents: to this confidence a policy of strict non-interference with the religion of Hindoos or Mahomedans was deemed absolutely essential, and a departure from it instead of benefiting Christianity, would have not improbably led to the expulsion of its patrons and itself from the country. Under these circumstances the strict neutrality policy, which Mr. Marshall is surprised to see such men as Sir John Malcolm and Lord Macaulay vindicating,† seems to us far from indefensible; and we are inclined to think that at the present day the Government is more open to reproach for practically departing from its promises of neutrality and using its power unduly to advance Christianity, than for repressing or discouraging it. Bishops, archdeacons, and a considerable staff of Anglican and Presbyterian chaplains are maintained out of revenues almost exclusively raised from Hindoos and Ma-

* Marshall, pp. 267, 268.

† *Id.*, p. 263.

homedans: besides this, liberal rules are enacted for grants in aid of maintaining other clergy, and building or repairing churches wherever they are needed. Native converts, if not avowedly favoured, enjoy a greater share of official patronage than is their due; and the Senate of the Calcutta University, which is composed of Fellows appointed exclusively by Government, is filled with Protestant missionaries and clergy; so much so that on a recent occasion the missionary element defeated the educationalists and natives combined in regard to the retention of a particular work, patronized by the missionaries as the exclusive text-book on moral philosophy.

It must be remembered, too, that practically the rulers of India have seldom or never believed Christianity in any such sense as to justify them in imposing their opinions upon others. If English statesmen and administrators are as a rule in the habit of asking themselves, when any question arises, "Has the Christian revelation taught anything on this point? if so, I should unhesitatingly surrender my judgment to that teaching, and only rely on my own self in deducing and inferring from that teaching, and in following my own conclusions in matters which that teaching leaves open;" then they act as men who have a real and vital belief in Christianity. But if their tone is rather, "I am satisfied by my reason and experience that such and such a course is right, and should Christianity teach the contrary so much the worse *for it*, but I am glad to say that my style of Christianity is one which enables me practically to drive a coach and four through any proposition which is asserted to be derived from it, and therefore I do not feel apprehensive that I shall be reduced to the unpleasant alternative of being compelled to admit that any such contrariety exists;" if this latter is the more general form in which most Englishmen in authority reason with themselves (perhaps unconsciously), then may it not justly be said that their duty was to recommend their views to their Indian subjects on the same basis as that on which they really constructed them, viz., education, reason, and experience, rather than on that which was at best the apparent basis—the Christian revelation? And this is in effect what has really happened. Many of the governing body over India are and have been deists or sceptics; still more, rationalists and latitudinarians of the most comprehensive type: hence there has been very far from any accord as to the nature of the religious principles, if any, which should be taught, but there has been a very general agreement in the benefits to be anticipated from a wide-spread dissemination of the English language, and of the vast literature to which it forms the key, as well as of all the Western

sciences. The natives, on the other hand, have shown themselves as ready to be officially taught our sciences as they have been unwilling to be officially taught our religion: hence the participation by Government in the educational movement which promises so completely to revolutionize Hindooism.

From a very early period the Government had some schools and colleges, but the great change dates from the celebrated despatch of 1854. Since then universities, based on the model of that of London, have been established at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, having colleges affiliated to them, in all parts of the country. An English school under the control of government is now located at the head-quarters of almost every district, while liberal grant-in-aid rules have been drawn up, under which numerous schools both English and vernacular have been established. This movement is spreading throughout the entire peninsula, but it is far more active in Bengal than anywhere else; and as this province, which is the most wealthy, most populous, and most important perhaps in India, is also the most advanced in English education, we will confine ourselves more particularly to the state of religious parties in it—a state to which it may confidently be asserted that all other provinces are rapidly tending.

In Bengal, Anglo-vernacular schools have increased with wonderful rapidity, the bulk of them under the grant-in-aid rules, the vast majority of which are under native management. Annually some 1,500 candidates present themselves for matriculation at the Calcutta University, nine-tenths of whom come from Bengal: as these have to undergo an examination in English literature and language, Indian and general history and geography, four books of Euclid, and the elements of algebra, it may give some idea of the progress which English education has made. Mission schools suffer somewhat from the rivalry, and, as in the Government and native aided schools there is no religious training at all, the missionaries almost invariably condemn their influence.

The results of this wide extension of secular education are perhaps without parallel in the world: crowded as these schools have been by high-caste Hindoos, the superstitions, prejudices, and religious feelings of the upper classes are being rapidly dissipated. We believe we are not exaggerating in saying that Hindooism, as a religion, is dead: no one who has received an English education believes in it; and as this education is spreading so rapidly, and its influence is so penetrating, it may safely be said that the days of Hindooism are numbered, and that as a religious system it offers but a slender barrier to Christianity, and will offer still

less. One of the consequences of this has been to vindicate the conclusions of De Nobili, that caste was still stronger as a social than as a religious institution: many a man who has entirely lost his belief in his religion is zealous and tenacious of his position as a high-caste man, and scrupulously performs all customary rites and ceremonies. He argues as many a better man has argued before him in regard to a religion which has lost its vital hold upon him: "This is good for the reverential and superstitious feelings of the masses, it is part of a great national and social system intimately imbedded in the traditions and customs of the people; if senseless it is harmless, and why should I needlessly offend even the prejudices of my fellows?"

It might not be worth while to follow the educated Hindoos through their religious and irreligious phases, were it not that we are firmly convinced that in Bengal the conversion of the masses is out of the question unless the educated classes are taken in hand, and that Bengal only represents in this respect what all India is rapidly coming to. What with the multitudinous diversity of teachers, the obstacles arising from social ties, the ignorance of the masses, and the pressure of material want, it is hopeless to expect that the common people will be convinced if they see all their educated countrymen unbelievers. If a Catholic missionary could obtain a hearing sufficiently to make them acquainted with the marked difference in principle between his religion and the other claimants to their allegiance, he might do something; but he seems to them to be an enthusiastic dreamer like so many others, and even if they listen to him, they do not know enough of other religions to appreciate his *arguments*, and his *assertions* fall on deaf ears. True Christianity requires indeed a childlike disposition and a heart unabsorbed in the world, and as these are more commonly found among the poor and ignorant than among the rich and well-educated, it expects to number more of the former than of the latter in its ranks; but it does not submit to be silenced in the presence of educated men, nor is it incompetent to confront error however learned; and wherever it is in a healthy condition it does hold its own, and never fails to convince and win over some of the most eminent of its opponents. A missionary might in vain endeavour by himself to attract the attention of the masses, but if he made converts of a dozen educated natives, well qualified to confront their fellows and to answer objections, the influence of their example would often serve to convert numbers of the uneducated. We emphatically maintain that in India missionaries must not isolate themselves from the current of

Indian mental life, that they must address themselves to the educated,—indifferentists, sceptics, and deists as they are,—as an indispensable means of making any impression upon the masses; and we are confident that any experienced missionary in Bengal will corroborate this, and that in other parts of India, if they do not admit it now, they will find out the truth of it in a few years.

Any person who *à priori* considers the probable effect of an English secular education of the nineteenth century on a Hindoo polytheist and idolater, will be able to picture with tolerable accuracy the general character of the result: everything round him, every line he reads, every fact he learns, tends to discredit his religious ideas, and his weak and illogical belief soon totters before attacks which meet with no resistance from any other quarter. He has lost his old religion, but has gained nothing in place of it: a person who was taught nothing but classics and history would not be likely to have any profound veneration for mathematics, and as the Hindoo's religious feelings are never appealed to, it is no wonder that they lie too often dormant. His reason is being cultivated all day long, and he gets profoundly well satisfied with and self-confident in it: he reads of Christianity, it is true, and he knows well enough that scores of its missionaries are ready to convert him, but he also learns soon enough that even among Europeans it has many opponents, and his prejudices being all against it, he rather reads their works than those of its advocates. Hence Voltaire, Francis Newman, and Colenso furnish him with an armoury which enables him entirely to turn the tables upon his missionary opponents: so far from shunning the controversy, educated natives often eagerly invite it; they look down upon Christianity as superstitious, ignorant, and behind the age, are confident that it is tottering to its fall, and even believe that they are not unlikely to play an important part in effecting this result. "Europe," they are never tired of saying, "has blessed us with the gift of its science and material civilization, and we, in return, will repay it by assisting it to root out its own religious superstitions."

Still, it must not be supposed that the religious instincts of mankind can be totally obliterated; if it were so, there would be, indeed, little hope of benefiting the classes we are speaking of. A great many, it is true, having passed through the training of youth, (the proper time for forming religious convictions,) without any religion, such seed as is in them gets soon choked with the cares and pleasures of the world: these become open indifferentists, or else conform to Hindooism from motives of ease or interest. But many are too speculative,

and many others have too much good in them to acquiesce in such a numbing of all the higher aspirations and sentiments of their nature, and these, wandering hither and thither like sheep without a shepherd, incessantly beat the air in the vain pursuit after religious truth. A few become Protestants: as we have already said, not one in a hundred probably of those who are trained in Protestant schools, and still fewer among those who pass through Government schools, or aided schools under native management: a few become Atheists, a few sceptics; but, as a rule, Hindoos cannot get rid of their belief in a supreme God, and Theism decidedly prevails over Pantheism or Atheism. A gentleman in the service of Government, who is an enthusiastic disciple of Comte, not merely, as so many are, of the philosophy but also of the religion of that clear-sighted but eccentric Frenchman, has done his best to recommend Positivism to their attention, with a mixture of success and failure. Educated natives are too anxious to obtain any support in opposing Christianity, and too conscious of the necessity of some definite system of opposition, not to welcome any aid in that quarter: accordingly the *Bengallee*, one of the best papers in the English language published by the educated Hindoos of Calcutta, has been entirely placed at the service of this gentleman, who has used it to explain the Positive system in a series of elaborate articles. So much attention has the subject attracted, that a Scotch missionary has thought it necessary to take up the cudgels against this system specially, and to attack Positivism both in lectures and in a series of counter articles in the *National* paper, another Hindoo organ in the English language. But the result has shown that Positivism, as a system based on an avowed repudiation of God as any motive for human action, or as in any way known to us or knowable, is totally alien to the Hindoo constitution, and years of religious chaos must pass before it will obtain any hold of their mind.

There is, however, one religious system to which we have not yet adverted, which alone is deserving of more than a passing notice—we mean Brahmism, or the Brahma Somaj. Brahma is the supreme god of the Hindoos; Brahmism, therefore, means “Theism,” and, except in its history or natural features, has no connection whatsoever with Hindooism, which it now entirely repudiates. This alone, of all the religious opinions which European education has given rise to, possesses any organization; and though it numbers only some fifty to a hundred congregations and some two thousand members, many thousands who have not definitely joined it sympathize with it; and its adherents and sympathizers are on the whole the

most religious, most conscientious, and most sincere men to be found among educated Bengallees. It fully merits the most careful attention of the Catholic missionary. Its birthplace was Calcutta or its neighbourhood, but it is slowly extending to other provinces of India, even as remote as Madras; it was originally started as a society for reforming Hindooism, and its principle then was that all the later sacred books and commentaries were valueless, but that the original Vedas, supposed to have descended from heaven, were inspired Scripture. In reality, however, its followers held a kind of Christian morality combined with Theistic doctrine, and it was not long before a divergence appeared between their views and their authority, the Vedas. A deputation of four of their members was then sent to Benares to ascertain true Vedantic doctrine at its centre, and the result being unsatisfactory, that doctrine was entirely abandoned *as authoritative*, all revelation rejected, and pure reasoning declared to be the sole basis on which religious truth must be constructed. We need scarcely say that *their* pure reason was of a Theistic stamp, considerably moulded by old Hindoo traditions and evangelistic Christianity. Before many years had passed they began to find that, while they were very confident of their own doctrines, it was impossible to establish them by mere reasoning, and they now had recourse to intuition, or to intuition and reason combined, as the basis of theological truth. This was their last card, and before long they began to find that reason and so-called intuition led one set of men in a very different direction from that in which they led others, and some two years back a schism resulted. The one party wished to humour Hindooism as much as possible; it allowed its members to retain the Brahminical thread, and adhered to as many of the externals of the old religion as possible: the other and younger party regarded the retention of the thread as erroneous, condemned all caste distinctions, and was altogether more rationalizing. The leader of the conservatives is an old Brahmin of the well-known Tagore family, which lost caste some years ago, while that of the radicals is Keshub Chunder Sen, also of high caste, though not a Brahmin. This latter man, a most talented preacher, is the life of his party; he travels about the country lecturing generally in English, and attracts crowded audiences; for though, as we have said, the adherents of the Brahmo Somaj (or Church of God) are limited, its sympathizers are legion.

The foregoing description is sufficient, perhaps, to show that Brahmissm, like Protestantism, has logically worked itself out, and has no longer any tenable basis: for it emphatically repudiates the idea of being a mere mob of indi-

viduals, of persons who accidentally agree in certain opinions, and therefore, as long as they agree, consent to work together : it claims to be a religion, to have a doctrine to teach, and to unite its members together by some bond of union ; and yet, when examined, that bond of union is only reason and intuition, which may be appealed to with equal effect by opposite parties. The moment it became apparent that reason and intuition did not lead men to doctrinal unity, from that time forward it was clear that the ground had been cut from under the feet of Brahmists : it is now, therefore, like Protestantism, either a principle leading to no doctrine, or doctrines without principle. There are several features of it which, however, are likely to contribute to its partial success for some time ; it ministers to the national vanity of the Hindoos most effectively, for it is a religion of their own manufacture, influenced to some extent by the writings of Francis Newman, Theodore Parker, Emerson, and others ; and they are never tired of asserting that theirs is the first endeavour to organize Theism and form it into a Church, which they believe destined to spread over the whole world. An acquaintance with the religious history of France during the present century might teach them that they have been anticipated by Saint-Simon and others, and if no French scheme has shown such vitality as that in Bengal, it is only because in the presence of Catholicity the French have sooner found out the hopeless inconsistencies in which any such efforts become involved ; while the adherents of Brahmism, though often charged with these defects, have not been slow to recognize that their opponents, the Protestant missionaries, are equally chargeable with them, and they are not the first persons to whom a tu-quoque has done service for a defence on the merits. Of the true principles of Catholicity, educated natives are unfortunately almost to a man profoundly ignorant, their impressions of it having been derived almost exclusively from such misrepresentations of it as are commonly circulated by so-called evangelical Protestants ; and such being the case, they ordinarily speak or write of it with unconcealed contempt as an obsolete and exploded superstition.

The Brahmo Somaj has a weekly organ of its own in English and a press which constantly issues controversial publications ; a few extracts from the two which we have placed at the head of this article will serve to show the style of argument and illustration which is employed. The earlier publication of the two consists of a series of tracts with a preface somewhat resembling in style the

“Clifton Tracts.” The first tract explains what Brahminism is; it argues that of all things that which is incomparably of the most importance to man is religion, and that true religion must date from the commencement of the world, must be universal, and sufficient for its purpose. What, then, is this religion? After enumerating the principal religions of the day it continues—

Let us divest all these religions of their peculiar tenets, the so-called vital points in each, and see if they all agree. Let us divest Christianity of the divinity of Christ, the Koran of the inspiration of Mahomed, the Poorans [Hindoo Scriptures] of the extravagant tales of its numerous gods and goddesses—the particular tenets in each, the points of attack and defence, and see what remains. . . . After such a divestiture of the peculiar tenets of each religion, there remain some truths, which are universal, and which exist from the day the first man was created. These truths are that there is a God, whom we are to love, honour, obey, fear, adore, and pray—that we are to look after the good of the society we live in—that we are to speak the truth, never curse, swear, lie, steal, and many others of like nature and tendency. Here, then, is the object of our search. Here, then, is the religion that has come down to us direct from God, and exists from the beginning of the world in numerous forms given according to the whims of men. This form, divested of all peculiar tenets, requires a name to distinguish it from all others, and we have happily a very judicious name given—Brahminism. . . . Hence it is that Brahminism is the vital part of every religion under the sun. . . . Christianity, Mahomedanism, Hindooism, or any religion whatever can be proved Brahminism, alloyed with some particular opinions and tenets, the chief source of religious disagreement. . . . Furiously indeed is Brahminism attacked by some native converts [to Protestantism] of our days. They urge how can Brahminism, which is changing with the change of winds, be called the true religion? . . . If, then, we are satisfied with what Brahminism is, with its existence from creation-time, with its universality and its sufficiency, why, then, should we not be the sincere Brahmos of our age? why, then, should we stand aloof to decry against the Brahmos while admitting the truth of Brahminism?

The second tract is entitled “Biblical Proof for the Validity of Brahminism.” It consists of a somewhat weak attack on the Divinity of Christ, and argues much as Unitarians do, to show that Christ himself disclaimed any attribution of divinity. It is rather poor, and makes no attempt to handle the Trinitarian answers to these objections. The next tract is also anti-Christian, and is entitled “An Examination of the Prophecies in Matthew.” It is not worth analyzing, and is most remarkable as indicating that the writer seems to assume that the English Protestant version is that particular version, the *ipsissima verba* of which are supposed to be inspired. At the

sama time, he does not seem to know that there are many different readings of the passages which he quotes.

The next tract (No. III., excluding the preface), is styled "Exhortation." It is a sermon on the vanity of the world, the evil of worldly prosperity, the duty of knowing God and practising virtue, and the necessity of repentance. It is interlarded with Scriptural phrases, and talks of heaven and hell in the most orthodox fashion. Except for the conclusion, "the way, the only way to God is Brahmsism," it might easily pass muster for a Christian discourse.

Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are taken up with a defence against Atheism. They are a curious intermixture of the objections to the existence of God urged by European, Hindoo, and Bhoodist Atheists, all which objections are separately taken up and answered. The following extract from the answer to the Atheistic objection derived from the diversity and mutual opposition of religion is amusing and thoroughly characteristic. The drift of the reply is, that there are counterfeits in everything, but that the counterfeit rather proves than disproves the existence of the genuine article somewhere. If the Atheist

Enquires for a true religion amidst such counterfeits, then surely he will find one—one supremely bright, though followers few, as you see often the case with genuine things when their counterfeits are to be had—and that one is our heaven-born Brahmsism. Brahmsism, when viewed at a distance, appears like its counterfeits, just as a country-made knife looks like a Rogers when seen from two or three yards way off. But at each critical examination Brahmsism, like a genuine knife, shows us its marks of distinction. None but a sincere Brahmo has understood the hidden qualities of Brahmsism. He alone can speak from experience that Brahmsism ennobles our mind, sweetens society, purifies the heart, leads us to virtue, to holiness, to God. He alone can cry out how sweet it is to warm ourselves under the benign rays of Brahmsism, when all the tremendous and frightful affairs of this world chills every vein and silences the throbbing heart.

The series consists of eleven tracts, besides the preface, and the remaining four are devoted to "Brahmsism, what is it?" Brahmos, we are told,

Do not believe in paper revelation. They say revelation of God is in the heart of every man, and in the works of nature. They say no book revelation has brought forth a truth which we cannot expect to find in the revelation within and without us. They say book revelation is a second-hand revelation; that is, it is an embodiment of the truths which man gets from the original, the primary, the direct revelation of God. They say that Mahomed, or Christ-like mediator, is not required to reconcile man to God, but that the sons of God must at once go up to the Father with the account of their

journey in this world. They say intuition is the foundation on which the whole superstructure of Brahminism stands. They say their knowledge of the existence and attributes of God is known by intuition, and the rest depends on reflection and education. They say man is an accountable creature, and he is accountable for no other reason but because he has a knowledge of the truths the practice of which in this life is essential to his salvation.

The Brahminist doctrine of repentance and atonement, which is often attacked by Protestant missionaries, is thus stated :—

Brahmos believe that as soon as a man commits sin, and thereby breaks the laws of God, he is visited by punishment, first in the form of remorse, which of course we grant varies in degrees in individual cases, and then he is said to fall one step off from God. Somebody may ask what should be their punishment whose hearts have turned callous with sin, and are never visited with remorse. To them, we say, remorse is the beginning and not the end of punishment, which will extend to future life, not *ad infinitum* but adequate to the sin committed. Brahmos believe that repentance makes no amend for sins already committed, but so forms the mind as not to commit the same sin again, and thereby the vicious tendency of the mind is turned into virtuous. Hence true repentance is efficacious enough to procure atonement, that is, a turning to God again. Brahmos believe that after a sin has been committed adequate punishment must follow, whether that sin is repented or not. The efficacy of repentance is not in freeing the soul from punishment, but freeing it from sin.

The second pamphlet we are noticing discusses the so-called four principal religions of India—Mahomedanism, Hindooism, Christianity, and Brahminism, and ends by asserting Brahminism to be that which is destined to prevail. The writer is very savage with Mahomedanism.

Whenever the word Mosulman, with its religious associations, enters the ear, different emotions of terror and indignation strike the heart at once. . . . Mahometanism analyzed offers three elements, the spiritual, the martial, and the sentimental or sensual. The spiritual element is very scanty. It consists merely in rigorous repudiation of idolatry, in hearty response to the well-known formula "there is no God but God." And the idea of this God is romantic and hazy in the extreme. A close analogy is often found to exist between Judaism and the Mahometan religion ; . . . but the spiritual intensity and the emotional grandeur of the Old Testament are absent in the Koran. . . . The martial element, agreeably to national character, is more eminently upheld in Mahometanism. And its sentiment has degraded into sensuality. Here lies the centre of all enjoyment, earthly and unearthly, according to the Mahometan idea of religion.

Finally, Mahomedanism is credited with everything bad in India.

Hindooism is dealt with very tenderly.

Hallowed by time, confirmed by usage, and endeared by all the joyful associations of the world, it blends together the fondest hopes and interests of its followers, and is held in the heart of hearts. . . . Hindooism has a twofold nature—doctrinal and social. Puranic idolatry in its present form represents its doctrines, and caste represents its society . . . idolatry is nothing peculiar ; it has lived its day in every country. Have education, have a thorough, fearless education, and the nation will outgrow its prejudices, idolatry will be no more. . . . Caste is neither so beneficent nor so injurious as many imagine it to be. To estimate its nature, tendencies, and effects is difficult. It appears to possess two aspects : the one religious, the other social, but both inseparably blended together. Its religious tendencies must have arisen from its social importance. . . . In our days, unfortunately, it has become even worse than what they (the priests) intended to make it. Caste is the enemy of brotherhood in India, the curse of nationality, the mildew of Indian progress and enlightenment. The sooner it is destroyed the better.

Apparently, however, he means by destroyed “ modified,” for a little further on—

The existing system of caste cannot and must not be razed to the foundation, but it ought to be decomposed, sifted, modified, and reconstructed to suit the tendencies of the age . . . its entire absence is to be met with in no civilized community . . . its absolute destruction has too many attendant evils to be sanctioned. Destroy caste, and crimes of the deepest dye, which to this time have not ventured to appear in the light of day, will openly come out and sue their vindication. . . . Atheism, with its blasphemous taunts and sophistry, will come out in the teeth of all reformation to undermine the cause of truth.

Finally :—

No religion can effectually replace Hindooism which is not in keeping with Indian sociology, which is contradictory to Indian ideas and ways of action . . . bad as the religion of our country is, it also contains good incalculable. . . . With all its mischief, Hindooism, in a social and psychological point of view, represents the mind of India, and so long as it shall continue to do this, it is impossible to destroy its power altogether. . . . Hindooism's fate is doomed, but in its place must rise up some such religion which rejects all its evil and preserves all its good.

What strong confirmation all this affords of the tact and far-sighted wisdom of *De Nobili* !

Christianity—Christian missionaries are praised.

To them India owes much, and whether all they have taught her be right or wrong, she owns her debt of gratitude . . . with intelligence, honour, and liberty she [Christianity] has formed an inviolable sisterhood, and her name represents all that is good and great. . . . The affecting precepts of purity and love, sublime in their simplicity, which the blessed Jesus has left us

with his heavenly eloquence, have softened many an obdurate heart, and added to the merited triumph of Christianity. . . . Christianity carries besides this the prestige of being the religion of the Government, the religion of "Her Majesty"; and he who embraces it may think himself entitled to the privileges of the governing class. Thus, perhaps, you may to a certain extent account for the ridiculous mimicry and affectation prevalent among many of the native Christians of Bengal. It is, however, not to be denied, that a few are really charmed with the beauty of Christianity, and convinced of its truth. . . . If it is, indeed, true that your sorrowing soul thirsted after the water of righteousness, and that in Christianity you have found the peace which you wanted, I do not blame you. . . . But allow me to ask, do you not now and then stifle the demands of reason? . . . Christianity is, to a great extent, natural. It has juster views of human nature and of God's nature than many other systems of faith . . . [but] that very enlightenment which we have seen to be favourable to her triumph, has at last begun to outgrow her, and instead of hoping she has much to fear from it. The dreaded questions of the historic authenticity, the scientific infallibility, yea and of the very purity of all that is contained in the Bible—the dreaded questions, so often hushed and put down, have at last come to obtain, not the hearing only, but the attentive discussion of the civilized world. . . . To this we can confidently ascribe the remarkable scarcity of conversions to the Christian faith. The ebb of these conversions in this country is so very low, and the prospects of Christianity so feeble, that many Christians of eminent note openly express their fears.

In all this we can assure our readers positively that Christianity means Protestant Christianity; of Catholic Christianity, except as an historical phenomenon, these writers unfortunately know nothing and think nothing. The pamphlet now goes on to attack native converts, who are

"the outcasts of society . . . mimic the Europeans in all possible ways. . . . Why, blind to their true interests, do they hate nationality, the several innocent practices of the Hindoo society, and go to imitate foreigners, whose manners sit most awkwardly on them?"

The writer then proceeds to speak of the influence of free thought on Christianity, in which he says, "lies Christianity's danger." That is to say, he praises Christianity for admitting free thought to such an extent, but considers that this alliance, though honourable, will be fatal to it.

What do you mark in the noble era of the Reformation, but the footprints of independent thought in every direction? From the birthday of Martin Luther Europe dates her deliverance from the age of darkness, from the shackles of scholasticism, from the bulls of the Vatican, from the horrors of the feudal system, and the despotism of the Universities. From that day Christianity has received a new agency, the agency of independent thought and action.

The consequences of this agency have not been happy to Christian orthodoxy, though of immense benefit to mankind. Where does that active and intellectual liberty with which Luther started stop at last? It has passed through the infallibility of the Church of the Pope and his delegates (!); does it rest with the infallibility of the Bible? Christendom answers—No. As long as the principle of independent action could not be adopted in Christendom as at present in Hindooism, however heterodox certain individual theories might be, the unity and consistence of the Church remained entire. When it was once recognized, and recognized it must needs be with the growth of intelligence and moral perfection, its consequences could not be arrested. Through the opposing interpretations of the Bible, through the endless modifications of Christian sects, and through the endless differences of their opinion, through the diluted and equivocal forms of Bibliolatry, and through their ultimate development into pure spiritual theories, its “still small voice is heard.” The Catholic Church, morally and intellectually worthless as it is (!), and destined to perish altogether at no distant day, has, in wickedly checking the principle of free thought, preserved itself entire. The Protestant Church, representative as it is of the highest culture, intellectual and moral, has, in honestly advocating it, created the cause of its own downfall. Its effects, gradually found to be alarming and fatal, though not even yet appreciated in their true seriousness, have logically proceeded from the Lutheran reformation. They could not be stopped; they could not be avoided. . . . With what reason can the Protestant Church condemn me, when centuries after, and after a corresponding degree of the world’s enlightenment, I take an advance before the steps they trod, faithfully following their principles of moral independence and moral fearlessness?

Hence he concludes, that Christianity, though it dies hardest, is on the wane, and doomed to disappear.

Brahmism is, of course, the choice religion of the age. As is generally found in Brahmist controversy, criticism of Christianity is made to do service as an argument for Brahmism; but the writer is also very anxious to make out that his is no commonplace Theism.

With many it is the fashion to compare the efforts of the Brahmō Somaj to those which certain professed infidels to Christianity in former ages made to propagate their negative principles of religion and their abstract notions of the Deity. Between unbelievers in the Bible and Theists founding the principles of their faith upon the indestructible basis of man’s religious consciousness there is a great difference Have research or experience ever been able to mark a period in the religious history of mankind, where a nation, enlisting the sympathy of men from various others, joined together to form a Church like the Brahmō Somaj? . . . The Brahmō Somaj is a national movement, a developed national embodiment, an organized national Church, to spread faith and salvation such as the most enlightened of the world could desire. It is the desideratum of the age, a realized ideal of the religious wants of the civilized world, and as such com-

mands universal attention, sympathy, and respect. Such an association and alliance—such a Church is the first of its kind. . . .

Ask, again, this land of India whither she is drifting. Not to Hindooism or Islamism, of course, but to what then—to scepticism and unbelief? God forbid. In her heart she finds growing another religion, that very Theism which is Christendom's goal. We call it Brahmissm, but what's in a name? Thus Theism in Christendom—the harmony of philosophy and orthodox Christianity, the religion of nature—is Brahmissm in India. Upon the secure foundation of human nature, on the rock of consciousness, on the pedestal of true philosophy Brahmissm rests.

In the above extracts numerous faults of grammar and idiom may be detected, and the historical statements are often incorrect; still on the whole we think it will be conceded that such persons as these require to be instructed by missionaries of a high order—men well versed in the ramifications of modern unbelief, and in the methods of dealing with it. At the same time a very casual glance at the position assumed by Brahmissm is sufficient to show that it is full of inconsistencies and contradictions; and we may perhaps on another occasion be able to develop this more fully, and show its points of convergence with and divergence from true religion. It is evident, however, at a glance, that it is a mixed movement, partly conservative, moral, and religious, partly negative, rationalistic, and self-sufficient. Between these two forces, it is foundering, and must founder; and as this happens, many will go forward into scepticism, but many others, more predisposed for faith, will anxiously look around for some other refuge from infidelity. Catholicity, if properly explained to them, is precisely the system which such minds are in need of; and we venture to assert that if it were brought fairly face to face with them, and if the scarecrow which is at present before their eyes as its representative were demolished, the day is coming when it could secure many most sincere and excellent converts, whose services as pioneers to their less-educated countrymen would be invaluable.

Unfortunately, at present Catholicity makes no effort of any consequence to acquaint these classes with its true principles or to appeal to their intelligence. We do not condemn the missionaries for this, for their position is a very difficult one, and they have hardly the means of accomplishing more than they do. Calcutta, some ten years ago, was confided to the Belgian Province of Jesuits, and theirs and another of Italian priests in Central Bengal are the only missions of consequence in that province, which is the centre of intellectual activity in India. There are several priests, French, Portuguese, and Irish, scattered over the different stations in Bengal, who

minister to the Catholic half-castes, and to the fragments of old native congregations, the relics of Portuguese influence, which still show that Christianity was not always sterile in upper India: but these priests content themselves as a rule with ministering to their flocks, here and there, perhaps, making a convert, while the great intellectual and religious movements of the day pass on unknown and unnoticed as far as they are concerned. The Italian Fathers in Central Bengal support orphanages and schools, learn the language well, and often itinerate the country, preaching at the principal places in their mission. By great industry, zeal, and good management, they have, partly by education, partly by conversion, formed communities amounting to some 1,300 Christians, nearly all natives. But these also belong to the masses, and this mission, too, does not attempt to grapple with the religious problems of the day, or to influence educated natives.

The Jesuits in Calcutta have done so much that it seems ungenerous to expect that they should do more; but it must be confessed that they have hitherto not placed themselves *en rapport* with the religious workings of the Hindoo mind. They have had, it is true, many difficulties to contend against, and their failure to do so must not be hastily condemned. Calcutta contains a population of some 25,000 Christians, Europeans, half-castes, and a small number of pure natives; of these 35 to 40 per cent. are Catholics, most of whom the Jesuits found both intellectually and morally in a very degraded condition. They of course first turned their attention to the congregations thus ready to hand: the rising generation were being educated almost entirely at Protestant institutions, many of them, like the Free school or the Martinière, richly endowed; and they at once established the Collegiate School of S. F. Xavier's, which has been the head-quarters and main support of the mission ever since. This college has done wonders; in 1862 it contained about a hundred pupils, nearly all Catholic: since then, under its present rector, F. Depelchin, it has rapidly but steadily increased, till it now numbers 450 pupils, half of whom at least are Protestants, attracted by the superiority of its education. It has been affiliated to the Calcutta University, in whose examinations it has been very successful. Of the three rival colleges for European and East Indian boys, which entirely swamped it in 1861, one has been closed, and the other two have had to coalesce in their college departments. Had not one of them, the Martinière, been most richly endowed it must have collapsed, while the other, the Doveton (a Presbyterian college), is involved in great

financial difficulties, and some of the Presbyterian clergy have lately kept up a series of malicious and discreditable attacks upon the Jesuits, both in lectures and in the Calcutta daily press, in the main hope of weakening the well-deserved confidence which so many parents, Catholic and Protestant, place in them. At the same time, lower class education is well looked after by nuns and Christian brothers, and the Loretto convent school, the nuns' higher class school for European and East Indian (half-caste) girls, is even more conspicuously the first of its kind in Calcutta for girls, than that of S. F. Xavier's is for boys. Moreover the Jesuits have the charge of several churches and of the hospitals, as well as of three or four out stations, and as they are almost all Belgians, they have a great disadvantage to overcome in being obliged to master the English language before they can be of much use. Again they have been unfortunate in their want of episcopal direction: after the death of Bishop Olliffe, they were for two or three years without any bishop, and the first appointed, Dr. Van Heule, a man of great promise and energy, died a few months only after his arrival. This led to another interregnum, until Bishop Steins was transferred from Bombay and created an Archbishop *in partibus*, and Vicar Apostolic of Western Bengal (Calcutta), and his great popularity, tact in dealing with Government, and episcopal activity, promise a great accession of energy in every direction, if he is spared long enough to carry out his designs. We have, therefore, great hope for the future, but for the past it must be admitted that the Jesuits have done next to nothing to place Catholicity before the educated natives of the province in which they work: they hold almost the same relation to it which the Catholics of England did to the Tractarian movement before Dr. Wiseman drew attention to it, and pointed out how full of promise it was for the future of religion, and that at a time when numbers shook their heads and declared that it would end in nothing and produce no conversions.

On the other hand, the action of Protestantism in this matter presents a contrast, which if not discreditable, for the reasons we have pointed out, is still very mortifying. From year's end to year's end they keep themselves before the educated Hindoos in an unintermittent stream of lectures, sermons, pamphlets, and controversies. From among the converts they make the ablest are selected as ministers, catechists, or schoolmasters, and these again carry the controversies into the schools and village circles: it is tolerably correct to say that Protestantism is at least brought as much face to face with the

educated natives of India as Catholicity is with the educated population of England. And even this requires to be modified in favour of the former; for the large funds which are spent on Indian missions enable the missionaries to spread Protestant tracts, Bibles, and literature among the Hindoos to an extent which far exceeds any circulation of Catholic literature in England; and while English Protestants often shut their ears to Catholic controversy, educated Hindoos most rarely refuse to listen to missionary arguments. On the other hand, educated natives know perhaps less about Catholicity than educated Englishmen do about Mahomedanism.*

Protestantism,† in spite of a really useful and honourable conversion here and there, has failed, and is failing; but it fails, not because it is ill represented, not because it is kept in the background, not because it is misunderstood, but simply because, dressed out in the best colours, it must still remain Protestantism, a system illogical and supremely inconsistent. Flourishing a book as its colours, and not knowing why it adheres to it, condemning doubt, yet itself the entrance to a maze, a Babel teaching that truth is one, denouncing evidence in the nineteenth century, which it considers unimpeachable in the first, and defending some truths with the very same arguments which it declares to be fallacious when they establish others, it cannot but fail when its task is to engender instead of to destroy conviction.

Catholicism, consistent and unchanging, appealing to men by the use of their reason, to submit their reason to the reason of Omnipotence, building on Faith, yet full of argument,

* We have said nothing about Mahomedanism in this article, because the movement we have been describing is confined exclusively to Hindoos, and in a missionary point of view there is next to nothing to say of the religion of Islam. The Mahomedan influence in India is declining steadily, and the Mussulmans, as a body, stand aloof from English education. Hence the conditions of the missionary contest with them are not much altered from what they were three centuries ago. They are far less ready to listen to the missionary than Hindoos, but still in some places, notably in Kishnaghur, a good proportion of the converts, both Protestant and Catholic, are Mahomedans. A few educated Mahomedans also have become Protestants, and one of them, a recent convert, is publishing a series of controversial appeals to his late co-religionists. As the extracts we gave show, Mahomedanism, as a religion, is detested by the Hindoos.

† An article on the Brahmo Somaj from the Protestant missionary point of view appeared in the April number of the *British Quarterly Review*. It gives a fair account of the sect, but the writer totally fails to appreciate its real significance. It is a leap *beyond*, not *towards*, Protestantism, as the writer seems to hope. The extract we have given on the subject of the action of "free thought" in Christianity shows clearly that the Brahmoists have taken the measure of Protestantism, and will never be deluded by it.

Catholicism, we say confidently, is the one system which alone can satisfy the religious cravings of the Hindoos. There is much, no doubt, in the religious speculations, specimens of which we have given, which springs from the evil pride, self-sufficiency, and self-complacency of man, much that must be abandoned before any agreement with the spirit of Catholicity can be effected; has it not also been shown that there is in the Anglo-Catholic party much which is incompatible with the true spirit of the Church? But in spite of this there is also a yearning after rest, after belief based upon a consistent and reasonable foundation, a clear insight into the necessity for unity and universality in any religion that can claim to be true, a conviction that religion alone is the true end of man, and a sincerity in the search after it, which promise well if that religion, which is alone adapted to the most learned as well as the most ignorant, which can alone restrain the excesses of the intellect on a clear and intelligible principle, and at the same time strengthen it and stimulate it when weak and enfeebled, is only laid before such men in its true colours and its real teaching, principles and history intelligently explained. The rock of Catholicity has many aspects, and on all sides it affords a refuge from the billows of error. Different lines of argument, it is true, are needed to convert a High Church Anglican and a Hindoo Theist, but, nevertheless, it *does* meet the true wants of the one no less than of the other, and the better qualities of each can be enlisted in its favour. In a word, India wants a *De Nobili* of the nineteenth century, a missionary who will take the measure of its wants in the year 1869, as that great man took the measure of them in 1605. We have many such men in England, though the Anglican and Protestant controversies monopolize attention too much to bring them conspicuously to the front, and in France many illustrious examples show what may be achieved by Catholic priests who understand how to grapple with the errors of the age.

We hope, in a future article, to be able to enter more fully into the arguments and opinions current among educated Hindoos, and to make it more clear that Catholicity is the goal to which the religious element in their speculations legitimately leads.

ART. II.—PSYCHOLOGISM AND ONTOLOGISM.

L'Ontologisme jugé par le Saint Siège : par le R. P. Kleutgen. Paris : Gaume.

*La Philosophie scolastique exposée et défendue par le R. P. Kleutgen.**
Paris : Gaume.

Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists. By REV. C. MEYNELL, D.D. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

The Carlow College Magazine for May and August, 1869. Carlow : Fitzsimon.

WHEN the first number of the "Carlow College Magazine" reached us, we had not only finished our article on "Philosophical Axioms," but more than finished it: for the article, as we wrote it, extended to a greater length, than we thought desirable to inflict at one blow on our readers' patience. See p. 168 of our last number. On reading therefore the very interesting philosophical article presented in the new magazine, we found it impossible to do more in July than give it a brief notice. We expressed accordingly, on the one hand, our general sense of its many excellences; and we protested, on the other hand, against what we understood as "its general thesis" (p. 237). We necessarily reserved our more detailed comment on its contents to our present number, when we hoped to consider it in connection with our further treatment of Dr. Meynell's pamphlet.

We understood the writer to maintain, that "man enjoys in this life a direct and immediate cognition of God"; and we entirely concur with F. Kleutgen and Dr. Meynell, in considering this doctrine to be involved in the seven propositions condemned at Rome on September 18, 1861. We find however, with very great gratification, from the August number, that he wholly disavows any such thesis. It is with sincerest pleasure that we can hail unreservedly so thoughtful and telling a writer, as our ally and fellow-labourer, instead of our opponent, in the philosophical field.

He seems indeed to think that there was a certain want of courtesy in our ascribing to him a doctrine, which even Dr. Meynell accounts to have been "condemned by the Roman authorities as unsafe to be taught." And he asks (p. 192) whether "it would not be well if we gave credit to others for sincerity in their love of

* This French translation has appeared since our last article on F. Kleutgen was written.

truth, and in their honest but humble purpose of promoting Catholic interests." We never dreamed of questioning his possession of these qualities. . . But we have no knowledge, to this moment, who the writer is ; and we had no clue whatever therefore to guide us, except his paper. Now the opinion which we ascribed to him has never been condemned in so many words : and several Catholics—thoroughly loyal (we believe) in intention to the Church—hold honestly, that no doctrine was proscribed in the seven propositions except direct pantheism. How were we to guess that he is not one of their number ? Even our correspondent " Vindex " (see April, 1868, p. 569), whom we know to hold very strong doctrine on the extent of the Church's infallibility and teaching authority, considers it lawful to think, that man possesses a certain " perception " of God, which is given otherwise than " through intermediate ideas." We were as far as possible from imputing to the writer before us any intentional and formal disrespect to the Church's teaching authority ; though undoubtedly we understood him as upholding a tenet, which *in fact* no Catholic is at liberty to embrace.

And now we hope he will not think us ungracious, if we proceed to explain the ground on which we rested our apprehension of his words. It would be a great fault, if we credited any one wantonly with a doctrine which we represent as unsound ; and we think therefore that we are under an obligation, on every occasion like the present, of either apologizing and confessing ourselves to blame, or else of vindicating the *objective* correctness of our interpretation. We assure him that, in doing the latter, nothing can be further from our mind, than to doubt, ever so slightly, the perfect sincerity of his disavowal.

We referred, in support of our interpretation, to some words of his in p. 15. The following is the passage which we had in view :—

We cannot think the contingent without thinking the necessary ; we cannot think the particular without thinking the universal ; we cannot think the mutable without thinking the immutable. The creature depends as completely on God in the order of thought as in the order of existence.

Now firstly, how could we understand this last sentence ? It might *imaginably* mean no more, than that men cannot think at all, unless God preserves their power of thought. But it was quite impossible to suppose that the writer merely intended to express a proposition, which is held as quite elementary by all Theists throughout the world, and which is moreover utterly irrelevant to his whole argument. The only other interpretation which occurred to us as possible was, that men can think of no creature, except dependently on their thought of God ; that the creature can no

more be *thought* by men without their previous* *thought* of God, than it can *exist* without the previous *Existence* of God.† This opinion is well known to have been held by many ontologists. Herr Schütz e.g., whose assault on ontologism we noticed in January 1868 (pp. 235-237), mentions it as one of the three tenets which constitute their system, that "the order of knowledge must also be the order of existence": from which they infer, he says, that "God Himself is the first object known."‡ But if no creature can be thought until God has been thought previously, the "cognition of God" must be "direct and immediate." And this is the precise doctrine we ascribed to the Carlovian.

Secondly, take the *first* sentence in the above extract. It distinctly states, that men's thought of the contingent depends on their thought of the necessary. Now in the preceding page it had been laid down, that men's thought of the necessary depends on their thought of the Necessary Being. "We can have no abstract idea of necessity, which does not suppose a concrete necessary being." If therefore men's knowledge of the contingent depends on their knowledge of the necessary, and if their knowledge of the necessary depends on their knowledge of God,—it did seem irresistibly to follow, that men's knowledge both of the necessary and the contingent depends on their knowledge of God. But if so, their "cognition of God" is "direct and immediate."

Thirdly, there is a sentence in p. 17 which gave further strength to the impression received from p. 15. Is not God known *from His works*? it has been asked. "Certainly," replies the Carlovian, "*in the reflex order.*" Now this is a well-known phrase, continually used by the condemned ontologists. When they speak of God being known from creatures, they are in the habit of adding this qualification "*in the reflex order*": and they do so for the sole purpose of implying, that man possesses a *direct* non-reflex knowledge of God, *antecedently* to his knowledge of creatures. Since the writer before us considers that men possess *no know-*

* "Previous," not necessarily in order of time, but, at all events, in order of nature and causation.

† The writer explains his own meaning in August (p. 187). He intended to say that "what S. Thomas calls the 'participata similitudo veritatis æternæ' is no more the creation of the human mind by abstraction or generalization, than our own existence is derived from ourselves." We think few of our readers will be surprised that we failed to elicit this sense from the sentence; though we now of course know that such was its real subjective meaning.

‡ The Rev. Dr. Brann e.g., an American priest, in his work called "Curious Questions," thus speaks:—"The logical," he says, "should be the same as the ontological order. But in the ontological order God holds the first place. . . . Hence in the logical order, or order of thought, God must be first. Besides, unless we admit the immediate vision of God, we never can have an idea of God: &c. &c." (p. 118).

ledge at all of God antecedently to their knowledge of creatures, we do not understand why he should have added that very important qualification,—“in the reflex order,”—which could not but mislead.

We must really contend then, that we ascribed no doctrine to the writer, which is not conveyed in the legitimate objective sense of his words; though we are now well aware, that he intended no such tenet as we then supposed. It was in consequence of this misapprehension and for no other reason, that we felt bound to protest against what appeared to us “the general thesis” of a writer, with whom otherwise we had so many points of sympathy. Why we ascribed this view to him, not merely as *one* of his opinions but as his “general thesis,” we will explain in the course of our article.

He suggests (p. 185) that possibly we are wishing “a little row in re philosophicâ.” We assure him that, as it is, we are engaged in many more “rows” than is at all to our taste; and that the very last thing we desire is to increase their number. Our purposes, on the contrary, were most pacific. We consider empiricism to be far the most formidable error of our time. We are extremely anxious therefore to bring about a union of Catholics interested in philosophy, who shall oppose this desolating unbelief; or, in other words, who shall vindicate the certain and vital truth, that there exists, to use Dr. Meynell’s words, “an à priori positive objective element of thought, distinct from the mind itself, and possessing the characters of necessity and universality.” It seems to us that there are at this moment two great obstacles in the way of such union. On the one hand, those who alone are properly (we think) called ontologists, confuse this certain truth with a further doctrine, which is not only not certain truth but is condemned error; the doctrine, that God Himself is presented immediately to the human intellect as an Object of thought. On the other hand—partly by way of protest against, and reaction from, this error—some of the scholastic following (as we said in July, p. 167) put far too much in the background that very vital part of the scholastic philosophy, which dwells on necessary and universal verities. The one main end, both of our preceding and our present article, is to remove these two obstacles, and thus to forward the priceless benefit of Catholic philosophical unity. And in furtherance of this purpose, we now proceed to build on one or two principles which we advocated in July.

Both Dr. Meynell and the Carlovian—following in this respect the example of many other Catholic thinkers—use the words “psychologism” and “ontologism,”* as expressing two different

* The Carlovian indeed speaks of “psychology” and “ontology.” But we think that on reflection he will admit the convenience of retaining these

schools of thought into which Catholics are divided. It seems to us, on every ground, far more suitable to do the very reverse; and to use those two words as expressing two opposite errors, against which every well-instructed Catholic is carefully on his guard. We will begin with psychologism.

F. Kleutgen (Ont., pp. 3, 4) protests against the habit, adopted by the ontologists, of giving the name "psychologists" to their Catholic opponents. This is done by the former, for the very purpose of implying, that the latter regard necessary truth as a mere product of the human mind. But no well-instructed Catholic of any school holds this latter opinion; and no well-instructed Catholic therefore should be called a psychologist. On the other hand, as the Carlovian points out (p. 15), Mr. Stuart Mill by implication calls himself a psychologist; and there is no discourtesy therefore in giving him the name.

What then is that error, which may suitably be called "psychologism"? Those, it seems to us, may suitably be called psychologists, who deny to the human mind all immediate and certain knowledge, except of its own affections and operations; those who will not admit that it possesses the power of authenticating, with infallible self-evidence, various truths, which are simply external to itself. No error can be more subversive than this of all philosophy and of all religion. "We stand face to face," eloquently and most truly says the Carlovian, "with those eternal truths. We perceive them in our reason, we feel them in our hearts, and hear their solemn voice in the inmost recesses of conscience" (p. 17). Man's knowledge of eternal truths depends, as on its foundation, on his knowledge of those "philosophical axioms" which we considered in our last number. But psychologism at all events denies to him all right of accepting those axioms as objectively certain, whether or no it admits them to be subjectively self-evident*. Psychologism then includes the two different systems, (1) of empiricism and (2) of Kantism, which we mentioned in July (p. 145). Putting aside all reference to Mill and Bain, even Kant and Mansel ascribe to man no further knowledge of axioms as possible, than merely that he is so *constituted* as inevitably to regard certain truths as necessary. Here is psychologism pure and simple. On the contrary man knows, not merely that he *cannot help regarding* these truths as necessary, but that

two words in their ordinary sense, as merely expressing two different *classes of subjects*, which have to be treated in *every* philosophical system. We shall make no further apology therefore for making this change in our quotations from his papers.

* That no psychologists can consistently *carry out* their principle—not only we do not deny, but we most strongly affirm. It will be one principal argument which we hope to urge against them in a future article.

they *are* necessary. His knowledge is not merely of himself and of his own mental constitution, but of certain all-important verities entirely *external* to himself. Such is the doctrine of every orthodox Catholic; and it is a direct denial of psychologistic error. We are not here professing to draw out an argument against psychologism, for that is to be the theme of a future article. But it is of much importance for our present purposes, that our reader shall sufficiently understand its character and tendency; and especially that he shall see its direct antagonism to the scholastic philosophy.

Let us consider then, what would be the condition of human knowledge on the psychologistic hypothesis. And we cannot perhaps throw off better than by saying, that this hypothesis would prevent men from reasonably denying the possible truth of that famous theory, which so perplexed Descartes, concerning a mendacious creator. We will (1) exhibit the utter desolatingness of this theory; then (2) briefly criticise Descartes' attempt to refute it; and (3) point out the utter powerlessness of a psychologist, to give it even the most superficially plausible reply.

1. The hypothesis then which so exercised Descartes was this: that mankind are under the power of a malignant creator, who gives them deceptive faculties; and accordingly, that the laws of thought are fundamentally different from the laws of truth. Let us suppose for a moment, that I had no reasonable ground for confidently denying the truth of this hypothesis. What would follow on such a supposition? I *fancy* myself to have gone through a long and continued variety of experiences, which my memory recalls. But I have no means of *knowing* that I so much as existed a minute ago; and still less, that I have had that particular history which I suppose myself to remember: for I know not but that my memory is a purely delusive faculty, implanted for the very purpose of deceiving me. I have no power of knowing even such simple truths, as that two and two make four, or that every trilateral figure is triangular: for how can I know that the intellectual dictates, which point to those truths, are not the inspirations of a mendacious creator? I have no means of knowing any *personal* facts, except my own sensations and thoughts as they exist at this moment; while as to truths or facts *external* to myself, I have no means of knowing for certain anything whatever about them. I know nothing—I *can* know nothing—of my fellow-men, of God, of moral obligation.

2. How is it that Descartes professes to refute this desolating hypothesis of a mendacious creator? He bases all human certitude on knowledge of God the Holy Creator;* and he considers that

* His doctrine was appropriated with great expressness, in a very able and eulogistic review of Dean Mansel in the "Guardian." "We look,"

men know for certain the Existence of a Holy God, because they can form of Him a clear and distinct idea. Never surely otherwise was so singular a theory invented by so able a man. When my faculties declare that two and two make four, or that every trilateral figure is triangular, Descartes tells me I cannot trust them ; but when they form what he considers a clear idea of God, he declares that they thereby at once authenticate, both their own trustworthiness, and also the Existence of Him whom they contemplate.

3. Descartes however did give an answer of some kind to the difficulty which he raised ; though certainly not an answer which will satisfy any reasonable mind. But the psychologist can give it no answer whatever. It is his very tenet, that the intellect knows nothing except its own affections and operations ; and he cannot therefore, without self-contradiction, ascribe to it any cognizance whatever, as to the correspondence of those affections and operations with external and objective reality. We have already said, that no psychologist can carry out his principles with any consistency ; and the enlarging on this theme appertains, not to our present but to a future article. But we may relieve for a moment the gravity of our discussion, by assuring our readers that we are personally acquainted with one person—and one possessing considerable power of various kinds—who goes great lengths in the direction of psychologistic consistency. He frankly accepts the conclusion, that he has no means whatever of certainly knowing—A. B. being his most intimate friend—that he ever conversed with or saw A. B. during the whole course of his life. He knows, of course, that he has at this moment the most distinct *impression* of *many* past conversations with A. B. But he is (so far) true to his psychologism ; and he admits that he has really no means whatever of knowing—in consistency he should add, of ever so faintly guessing—how far these present *impressions* of the past correspond in any degree with the past itself.

We would now press on our readers' especial attention a remark, to which the preceding statements have been intended as introductory. We say then, that the one true answer to that difficulty which Descartes raised,—to that difficulty which baffles every theory of psychologism,—was supplied by scholastic and other Catholic thinkers, centuries before the difficulty itself ever entered (so far as we know) any man's imagination. God, Who gave us our faculties,

says the writer, "for the *foundation* as for the limit of our *belief in our own faculties*, to the *deep-seated instinct which tells us that God cannot deceive*. Reason cannot guarantee itself. . . . Surely the religious instinct, which bids us trust in God, is the *one primary premiss of all truths*. Neither reason nor sense can warrant themselves ; we believe them because we *believe that God gave them*."

gave us, as part of them, that most precious gift, called "the light of reason" or the "intellectual light." By means of this gift, men know, not only (in this or that individual case) *what their faculties declare*, but know also, with most certain and self-evident knowledge, that such declaration *corresponds with objective truth*. Our present purpose is not to prove (as may irrefragably be proved) that this doctrine is true, and is the one satisfactory solution of Descartes' difficulty: our present purpose is merely to point out, that such is indubitably the doctrine of traditional Catholic philosophy. And with this end in view, we will begin by drawing attention to two beautiful passages, which Dr. Meynell has cited from S. Buonaventura and S. Thomas.

Certainly it is difficult to name a more priceless blessing than this "light of reason." Well may it be called a "light." When actual light is away, men are shut up each in his own company, and debarred from all direct vision of the external world. And so, were it not for this light of reason, I should be shut up without possibility of escape in the dreary region of actually present consciousness. Thanks be to God, I possess this light: and in its bright effulgence, I know my own past history; I come to know my fellow-creatures; I come to know my Almighty Creator.

Now what is the characteristic of this gift? God's great and incommunicable prerogative is, that in His own strength He knows the Truth; He knows all facts, past, present, and future; He knows the eternal and immutable principles to which those facts are subject. To man, among earthly creatures, He has given beyond all possible comparison the largest participation of this prerogative. "A light is sealed upon us," which is "*the Light of Eternal Truth*, since our mind is immediately informed by the Truth itself." (S. Buonaventura, Meynell p. 9). "The human soul knows all things" (which it knows at all) "*in the rationes æternæ; through participation in which we know all things*" (S. Thomas, Meynell p. 19). S. Thomas adds, as Dr. Meynell reminds us (*ib.*), that the Psalmist refers to this great gift, when he says "The Light of Thy countenance is signed upon us."

Again. Take any given necessary truth. We showed in July (p. 149), that this is not one truth as cognized by A.; another as cognized by B.; and another, different in kind, as cognized by God. No: *one and the same truth* is cognized both by God and by creatures. There is one vast body of objective necessary truth, which has dominion (so to speak) over the human intellect: which is fully and exhaustively intued by God; which is partially cognized by man. What we would here point out is, that such is indubitably the doctrine both of S. Augustine and S. Thomas. S. Augustine thus argues, and S. Thomas most unreservedly accepts his argument (Meynell p. 17): "If we *both* see that to be true

which *thou* sayest, and if we *both* see that to be true which *I* say, *in what* (ubi), I ask, do we see this? Certainly not I in thee, nor yet thou in me; but both of us *in that immutable truth, which is [in authority] over our minds.*" We may put the same thing in other words. Take any axiom you please. It is not merely that I know myself to *think* it as self-evident, and *you* know yourself to *think* it as self-evident. Both you and I know, that what we thus think is objectively *true*; that it corresponds with *objective reality*. And we know this immediately, by the intellectual light which God has given us. Accordingly, S. Thomas declares, as Catholic philosophers have frequently pointed out (Contra Gentes, l. 3, c. 154), "that through the natural light, the intellect is rendered certain concerning those things which *it knows by that light*; as [e.g.] concerning first principles." And he elsewhere states (Summa I., q. 84, a. 5) that "the intellectual soul knows immaterial things in the rationes æternæ":* not because in this life it can directly see God, "in Whom the rationes æternæ are contained"; but because "*the intellectual light within us is nothing else than the participated similitude of the Uncreated Light.*"

F. Kleutgen (Phil. Scol., n. 57 et seq.) enters at some length on S. Thomas's doctrine in this and similar passages. Without following up such details, we do not see how any one can doubt—we are not aware of any one having ever doubted—that so much as this is taught by the Angelic Doctor. God sees all things in His Uncreated Light. He cognizes all truths, in themselves and in their mutual relation; He not only knows, but *knows* Himself to know. To man He has given a certain intellectual illumination, fashioned in its measure after the likeness of His Own. This gift is, in fact, a derived, partial, and potential enjoyment of the Divine Light itself; for it gives man the power of cognizing a large body of truths, in themselves and in their mutual relations;—a power not of knowing only, but of knowing that he knows. As F. Kleutgen urges again and again, there can be no true science, except so far as man *knows* that he knows.

It will not be denied, we suppose, that the great body of scholastics followed S. Thomas in his doctrine of man's intellectual light. We may as well however confirm our statement, by the entirely unsuspecting testimony of a very able Protestant philosopher, Dr. Noah Porter of New York:—

Many of the earlier philosophers and theologians of *modern* times (he says), *following the scholastics of the middle ages*, were accustomed to say that

* He includes *material* things also in his statement; but adds that our knowledge of material things is not derived *only* from "participatio rationum æternarum," but also from "species intelligibiles a rebus acceptæ."

these ideas and truths are discerned *by the light of reason and the light of nature*, or that they are evidenced and evinced *by their own light*. . . *The fact is undoubted*, that before the critical investigations were introduced by Descartes which led to the modern psychology, these primitive ideas and primitive truths were *generally* said to be discerned *by the light of nature*. --("The Human Intellect," p. 518.)

Now it will be seen at once, that this whole doctrine of the scholastics is precisely a denial of psychologism. Psychologists say, that the human intellect knows only its own affections and operations. Scholastics say on the contrary, that it possesses an intrinsic light of its own, with which God has gifted it; and that, under the illumination of that light, it cognizes its own dictates, as corresponding infallibly* with external and objective truth. In one word, scholastics ascribe to man's intellect that precise faculty, which psychologists deny to it. We are not here arguing (as we have already explained) that the scholastics teach truly on this matter, and the psychologists falsely; that is to be the theme of a future article. Our present point is only, that no doctrine can be more emphatically opposed to psychologism than the scholastic.

This will perhaps be the best place for answering a question, which the Carlovian presses most courteously but with much urgency on our attention. He asks (p. 190), "What is the precise nature of that objective existence which we give to necessary truth?" We explained this in July to the best of our power, from p. 148 to p. 154; and we do not know what is the particular point, on which our author desires further elucidation. He asks indeed, whether "necessary truth is *being*"; but we confess ourselves a little surprised at the inquiry. Surely there is but one Necessary Being, viz. Almighty God.

Our readers will have sufficiently understood the general drift of our argument; but at this point it will be better to pause and review our position. The second article of our July number was occupied, in vindicating to "the scholastic philosophy" what seems to us its due "authority." There have been one or two serious difficulties, in the way of this authority being universally recognized by Catholics. For (1) some thinkers, who feel strongly (it is impossible to feel *too* strongly) on the objective necessity of various truths and on the extreme momentousness of upholding that necessity,—are prejudiced against scholasticism, under the notion that it does not sufficiently enforce so vital a doctrine. Some other Catholics again (2), who see how singular is the authority ascribed

* Kleutgen does not hesitate to say (Phil. Scol., n. 277, et seq.) that human reason is, in some sense and within certain limits, infallible.

by the Church to scholasticism, are perhaps not sufficiently hearty in their denunciation of psychologism, from imagining that that error has some kind of affinity with scholastic doctrine; and are thus (according to our view of the matter) led, by their very zeal for scholasticism, to disparage the true scholastic teaching. For both these reasons—following humbly in the wake of F. Kleutgen—we are extremely desirous of exhibiting the fundamental and violent antagonism of the two philosophies.

This has to be done (1) positively, and (2) negatively. It is done *positively*, by dwelling (as we have now dwelt) on the scholastic doctrine concerning man's intellectual light: for (as we have already pointed out) that is the precise doctrine which psychologists as such deny. On the other hand, our *negative* work consists in *replying* to the main *objections*, which are raised against scholasticism by earnest upholders of necessary truth. Now these objections are two in number. Firstly it is objected that, according to the scholastics, philosophical axioms are mere generalizations from experience:* but this allegation we have already (we trust) abundantly refuted, both in our July article on axioms, and in various portions of what we have now written. The second objection is grounded on the scholastic doctrine concerning "abstraction"; and on this objection we will now say a few words. The objection is founded exclusively on the assumption—an assumption against which Fathers Kleutgen and Liberatore are never weary of protesting—that the scholastic doctrine concerning abstraction is substantially similar to the Lockian. Now what Locke and his followers mean by "abstraction," was never more clearly expressed than by F. Kleutgen in the following passage: a passage which was written (as our readers will see) for the simple purpose of emphatically disavowing Locke's doctrine. The italics are our own:—

This objection, like many others, is unintelligible, unless men confound the doctrine of the scholastics concerning abstraction with that other theory which, since Locke's time, has been in vogue among modern philosophers. According to Locke, the understanding obtains its concepts by fixing its attention on sensible representations. Eliminating differences (says Locke) it retains that wherein things agree with each other, and thus forms general representations by means of analysis and synthesis. It is commonly [and most truly] objected to this theory, that intellectual representations thus formed *would not be essentially distinguished from sensible representations*

* This objection is more than once applied by the Carlovian. "Aristotle's philosophy . . . professes . . . to evolve the first principles of our reason from empirical judgments" (p. 13). Again, we must not "receive first principles, which logically make the axioms of science the results of experience" (p. 17). God forbid we should receive such first principles!

either in their objects or their principle. If the concept is formed [merely] by [mutual] comparison of what falls under sense, it *can contain nothing not perceptible to the sense*; and consequently *it can express nothing else than the generalization of phenomena*. . . . According to Locke then, *the understanding would not differ from the sensitive faculty except in name*. It would simply be *the same* faculty of knowledge, which is called the sensitive faculty when it perceives the particular, but is called the understanding when by comparison it searches for and discovers the universal. But if, on the contrary, *it is certain* that the understanding not only perceives phenomena but *penetrates the intimate essence of things*, it must first *think that essence in the individual*. . . .

Such was the reasoning adopted against Locke . . . but men ought to have perceived . . . that *the abstraction of the scholastics is totally distinct from that of the modern empirists*. (Phil. Scol., n. 69.)

In fact the Lockian doctrine of abstraction is simply a philosophical portent to be denounced. On the other hand, to set forth and defend the scholastic doctrine* on that subject,—to descant on species sensibiles and intelligibiles, on sensus intimus and phantasy,—would require an entire article. At present therefore, we can do no more than cite various passages from Suarez and from F. Kleutgen, which will exhibit, with a clearness almost startling to many, the broad opposition between the two views. The italics throughout are our own.

A species [intelligibilis] is not said to be abstracted from phantasms as though the species *were first mixed up with phantasms* and separated from them by the intellectus agens . . . *for it would be puerile to suppose this*. . . . That the intellect abstracts a species, means nothing else, than that it forms *by its own power* a spiritual species, representing *the same nature* which the phantasm represents, but *after a spiritual fashion*. And it is this *elevation* from material to spiritual representation, *which is called abstraction*. (Suarez de Animâ, l. 4, c. 2, n. 18.)

The intellect, from cognition of the accidents, proceeds to contemplate those things which . . . *lie hid* under the accidents; and thence indeed is called intellectus, quasi intus legens. (Ib., c. 4, n. 1.)

The intellect *often* contemplates (intelligit) things, of which the phantasy *possesses no resemblances*. (Ib., c. 7, n. 1.)

Since the intellect is immaterial, it is in no respect subject to the materiality of its object; but *overcomes it* and (as far as possible) spiritualizes it. (Ib., c. 3, n. 20.)

* We think it cannot fairly be denied, that S. Thomas's expressions are occasionally ambiguous and liable to be interpreted in a Lockian sense. But very far less can it be denied, that his doctrine, as a whole, is correctly represented by F. Kleutgen in the passages which follow. Such is apparently, on both particulars, the Carlovian's view: see p. 191 of his August article.

As we perceive *phenomena* in the object by our senses, because these correspond to the nature of our senses ; so we know by our reason that which is exclusively within the sphere of that faculty. (Kleutgen, Phil. Scol., n. 63.)

Should we be able, at the sight of an individual action, to conceive a maxim of morality, unless we previously possessed [in some sense] certain notions relative to the moral order ? Assuredly no. (Ib.)

The scholastics say, when they explain abstraction, that as in a [given] object the eye seizes the colour, the ear the sound, &c. &c., so in the same object the intellect perceives what it is its province to cognize : viz. the nature and the essence. (n. 69.)

It is one thing to think nothing but the phenomena, and to regard that which is common to them as being the essence of things : it is [quite] another thing to perceive the essence through [the veil of] the phenomena. (n. 70.)

The reason . . . no doubt primitively . . . resembles a tabula rasa : but it is the reason itself, and not the sensitive faculty, which writes on that "tabula." (n. 72.)

Since it is the same soul, which knows respectively by the senses and the reason, the presence of the sensible representation suffices, in order that the reason should be excited to exercise its activity, and to direct that activity on the object which the senses perceive. According to Suarez, the sensible representation can have no other influence than this on the origin of intellectual representations. (n. 74.)

If, instead of dwelling on certain inexact expressions [incautiously adopted by certain modern scholastics], men would study the clear and precise expressions which were unanimously taught by the most celebrated doctors of the school, they would be obliged to admit that, according to the scholastics, the intellectual act which forms concepts is essentially different from [that which forms] sensible representations or images. It is because the mind is independent of matter in its being as in its operations, that (according to the scholastics) the intellect . . . is capable of those highest representations which they call the principia prima, &c. . . . And because the intellect can perceive, by these highest representations, all which is presented to it, it is also capable of separating essence from accidents, and penetrating through phenomena to being itself. (n. 97.)

By the knowledge of causation we quit the region of things sensible and enter into the supersensible. Now, who could maintain that scholasticism did not recognize this truth ? The scholastics unanimously taught that the existence and nature of the supersensible are known by means of things sensible : its existence, because we ought to think it as principle and cause of the sensible ; its nature, because we ought to think it as possessing all those qualities without which it could not be such cause. (n. 100.)

Thought from the first moment at once goes beyond phenomena. (Ib.)

The scholastics taught unanimously, that the intellectual representation is not impressed on the mind by the phantasy ; but engendered by the intellect as such, that is as distinct from the senses. (n. 109.)

According to the scholastics, the sensible representation does not excite the intellect to think, except in this sense, that it places before the mind an object which is capable of being known intellectually. Moreover . . . the presence

[of this sensible representation] could not have any effect on the intellect, were it not that it is the same mind which cognizes both by senses and by intellect. (Ib.)

Now let it be considered, how widely F. Kleutgen has been accepted by adherents of the scholastic philosophy, as quite a representative exponent of that philosophy. Canon Walker, for example, than whom it possesses no more enthusiastic devotee, calls him "the illustrious Kleutgen" ("First Principles," p. 37, note); and implies unreserved agreement with him. Although therefore we have no space in our present article to set forth and defend the scholastic doctrine of abstraction, surely, after such testimonies as the above, we are entitled to assume what will abundantly refute the objection before us. The objection alleges it to be the scholastic doctrine, that man's intellect cannot directly apprehend supersensible ideas; that man possesses no further intellectual power, than that of combining and generalizing phenomena. But we affirm confidently—though as yet we must be content to rest the matter on Kleutgen's testimony—that such a representation is a total perversion of scholasticism; that, according to that philosophy, man possesses the power of thinking various thoughts, which are neither directly nor indirectly derived from (though they may be first *occasioned* by) sensation and experience. All which has to be said on the other side, is merely that scholastic philosophers admit, what the strongest à priori philosophers of this day admit also. See our July number, p. 158. The scholastics, we say, admit, that the intellect is unable in this life to *exercise* its intrinsic power, except under a certain dependence (of which we need not here determine the precise extent) on the previous and concomitant operation of the senses.

Our argument then (so far) may be thus summed up. We think the word "psychologism" may be very suitably used to express that tenet, which teaches that the intellect can cognize no objects external to its own affections and operations. And our thesis has been, that there is a fundamental and violent antagonism, between this tenet and the scholastic philosophy. We have argued for this thesis positively, by referring to that scholastic doctrine of intellectual light, which is a point blank *denial* of psychologism. We have argued for the same thesis negatively, by considering the two principal particulars, which have been alleged as instances of an affinity between the two philosophies. It has been alleged, (1) that scholasticism represents axioms as mere generalizations from experience; and (2) that it denies to the intellect all power of directly apprehending supersensible ideas: but we have maintained confidently that its doctrines are the very reverse of these. We cannot but look on our point as one of very considerable importance. For considering the Church's repeated approbation of

scholasticism, it would indeed be a most serious fact, if that philosophy disparaged ever so remotely man's cognition of objective necessary truth.

We have just referred to the fact, that F. Kleutgen is so widely accepted as a most fair representative of the scholastic philosophy. We would entreat our readers then to ponder the following passage, written indeed by S. Augustine who lived before the scholastic period, but heartily and unreservedly accepted by Kleutgen in his great philosophical work:—

It is in this that we see the superiority of that mind which thinks, over that being [the brute] which perceives exclusively by its senses. The [rational] mind *judges* the sensible world, and *in some sort commands it*. If then there exists a being to which the [rational] mind *itself* is in turn subject—and if one can establish that this power, [thus] superior to the mind, must be eternal, immutable, and infinite,—the Existence of God will at once be demonstrated. What then is that thing which *reigns as superior* over all [rational] minds? It is *the eternal and immutable truth*, which contains in itself all that is immutably true. It is placed in authority over our mind; which *judges not the truth*, but judges [all things] *according to the truth*. For all our judgments, on external things and on ourselves, are formed *according to those truths which we know to be eternal and immutable*; and of which *we seek no proof external to ourselves*. And this truth *must be placed in authority over our mind*: inasmuch as the latter *obtains its perfection by approaching it*; obtains its beatitude by appropriating it; and becomes truly free by *submitting to its empire*. This truth exists indeed in every reasonable being, by his knowledge of it; but *it belongs exclusively to no one*. It is in some sort a common good: like the sun, which all eyes contemplate, and *in whose light they see all that they see*. If then some Being, superior to this truth, governs the entire world of minds, it is He Who is God: if nothing is superior to this truth, then this truth itself is God. (Phil. Scol., n. 249.)

It is not then S. Augustine's doctrine only but F. Kleutgen's also, that man knows certain "eternal immutable truths," of which "he seeks no proof external to himself": truths which are the common heritage of mankind: truths which in so strong a sense reign over man's intellect, that, if there were no Being above them, their aggregate might in some sense be called God. F. Kleutgen indeed holds, with S. Augustine, that *in fact* God is superior to (and therefore not identical with) these various truths. Still, as he expressly endorses the expression that they are "eternal and immutable," he can mean nothing else than what he himself says in so many other places: viz., that they are founded on God's Essence, and exist necessarily because *God necessarily exists*. See our July number, pp. 154-5. Of a writer who so speaks, the very last thing which can be said is, that he disparages the existence or legitimate claims of eternal, immutable, and necessary truth.

We now come to the second part of our argument : which, though certainly very far less momentous than the first, is by no means without a certain importance of its own. Whatever sense should be affixed to the word "psychologism"—at all events we must maintain confidently, that any Catholic places himself in a thoroughly false position, who appropriates to himself the word "ontologist." Both Dr. Meynell and the Carlovian call every man an ontologist, who upholds consistently the existence of necessary truth : but in that sense, Liberatore, Dmowski, and all well-instructed Catholics without exception (so far as intention goes at least), would be ontologists. As to Kleutgen himself, instead of being an enemy to ontologism, he would be simply one of the most pronounced ontologists in the whole world. We must allege however, that the true historical sense of the word is very different ; and that this conclusion has been unanswerably demonstrated by F. Kleutgen, in the work which we have named first at the head of our article. For ourselves of course, we can only place before our readers a very small part of F. Kleutgen's matter ; yet we hope we can say enough to give a sufficient specimen of his general argument. We contend then, that the term "ontologists" is properly applied only to those, who hold doctrines more or less closely resembling the seven condemned propositions ; doctrines therefore, which no Catholic has any business to hold at all. We quoted at length the seven propositions in January, 1868 (p. 231, note). Here we will translate the first and third.

1. "The immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect ; so that without it [the intellect] can know nothing, inasmuch as [this knowledge] is the intellectual light itself."

3. "Universals considered objectively (*à parte rei*) are not really distinguished from God."

Now for the name "ontologism." It never existed before the beginning of this century ; when it was invented by certain zealous Catholics, chiefly French, as denoting a certain philosophical system, which they zealously maintained, and which they were very desirous of substituting for the traditional views which had (more or less) possession of the schools.* Among the most prominent and accredited advocates of this system, have been Fabre, Brancherau, Hugonin, and Ubaghs. Fabre, one of the earliest, thus explains his own doctrine. The italics are ours :—

Ontologism is a system in which, after having proved the objective reality of general ideas, it is established that those ideas are no forms or modifications of our mind ; that they are nothing created ; that they are necessary,

* Tongiorgi mentions that it was Gioberti, who actually invented the name "ontologism."

immutable, eternal, absolute objects ; that they are concentrated in the Being simply so called ; and that *that Infinite Being is the first idea* seized by our mind, the *first intelligible*, the *light in which we see* all the eternal, universal, and absolute truths. Ontologists say then, that these eternal truths *can have no reality external to the Divine Essence* ; whence they conclude that [these truths] *do not exist except as united to the Divine Substance*, and that *therefore in that substance only can we see them*.—(Kleutgen, p. 3.)

It is surely impossible to read this passage, and not admit the identity of its doctrine with that of the two above cited propositions.

The other three writers whom we have named, and who held a high place among those calling themselves ontologists, are in still more indisputable solidarity with the condemned propositions. Branchereau, being a most loyal Catholic, himself drew up fifteen propositions from his philosophical course, and sent them to Rome, with an inquiry whether they were involved in the recent condemnation : to which inquiry an answer speedily came in the affirmative (Kleutgen, pp. 11, 12). Then Ubaghs was required by the Holy Father to retract certain of his doctrines, on the express ground that they were “altogether similar” to the seven. See our number for January, 1868, pp. 237-240 ; 279-290. And lastly Hugonin, on being appointed to the episcopate, put forth the following retractation of his ontologism :—

Whereas I the undersigned have been informed by the French Apostolic Nuncio, that the doctrine which I set forth *concerning ontologism* in my philosophical work *is disapproved by the Holy See*, particularly because of its *favouring*, explicitly or *implicitly*, those propositions whereof the holy Roman and universal congregation of the Inquisition decreed, in the year 1861, that they could not safely be taught ;—at once, without delay, I freely and spontaneously declare, that I account and disapprove the aforesaid doctrine, in the same manner in which the Holy See has decreed, as being more or less *aberrant from the principles of sound philosophy* : and I promise at the same time that, as far as in me lies, I will take measures against it being any longer taught in the schools (p. 13).

From these facts three important conclusions are immediately deducible. Firstly, the Holy Father disapproves the doctrine of Mgr. Hugonin, not merely as “unsafe,” but as “more or less aberrant from the principles of sound philosophy.” Secondly, it cannot possibly be that the condemned errors were pantheistic and not ontologistic : for no one ever dreamed that Branchereau, Hugonin, and Ubaghs had lapsed into pantheism ; and Mgr. Hugonin expressly specifies, as condemned, his doctrine concerning *ontologism*. Thirdly, it is not only the seven propositions themselves in their naked wording, which every Catholic is bound to reject : he is bound also to reject whatever “altogether resembles them” ; whatever “explicitly or implicitly favours them.”

What then is the doctrine of the ontologists? We cannot see any difficulty in answering this question. Their characteristic tenets are (1) that God is presented immediately to the human intellect as its Object; * and (2) (which would of course at once ensue from the first) that this presentation fulfils towards the soul the office of "intellectual light." It is admitted on all hands, by Kleutgen or Liberatore no less than by Fabre, that in man there is an "intellectual light," "without which the intellect can know nothing" in any true sense: but whereas Kleutgen and Liberatore regard this intellectual light as a created endowment of the soul, Fabre regarded it as consisting in a certain vision of God.

Here we can explain, why we understood this ontologistic doctrine to be the Carlovian's "general thesis." We have already (we hope) made clear how it came to pass, that we considered him to maintain it expressly and almost explicitly. But why, he may ask, instead of regarding it as *one* of his opinions, did we describe it as his *general thesis*? For this reason. The condemned ontologists used the term "psychologism" in pretty much the same sense that we have given to it throughout this article: and they always made it quite a fundamental part of their argument, that no one could consistently avoid psychologism except by help of their characteristic tenet. When therefore they inveighed against the evils of psychologism, their one end in doing so was to recommend this characteristic tenet: their one "general thesis" was the truth and necessity of this tenet. We ascribed to the Carlovian (not unnaturally, we think) a drift altogether similar. We understood his various attacks on psychologism—attacks with which, in themselves, we heartily sympathized—to be intended as ministrative to that ontologistic tenet, which we regarded therefore as his "general thesis." However, on looking back at his article as a whole, we are quite willing to admit that we arrived somewhat too hastily at this conclusion, and to express regret for our precipitance. We consider indeed, that his article gave us fully sufficient objective grounds, for considering him an ontologist in the sense now explained; and that our mistake therefore on that head was due to him and not to ourselves. But we admit that his article did *not* give us sufficient objective grounds for describing ontologism as its "general thesis."

At this point we must offer some comments on one or two of his other statements: comments which we submit to his better judgment with unfeigned respect, and with full confidence that he will appreciate our reasons for frankly expressing our view.

* Thus for instance Tongiorgi (*Psychologia*, n. 409), "Ontologi omnes in hoc conveniunt, Deum *immediate perceptum* omnis cognitionis fontem et originem esse: *sub quo autem respectu* videatur, varii varia sentiunt."

It is certain (he says, p. 13) that ontology [ontologism] is not condemned, as some would wish us to believe; the Church *does not condemn systems*, but propositions containing errors against the Faith. She does not teach any *system* of philosophy as orthodox, nor declare any unsound.

Why say ontology [ontologism] is condemned (he repeats in August, p. 192), if the condemnation has only reached propositions taught by some rash and inaccurate thinker who incorrectly expounded its principles?

Now we find some difficulty in expressing our precise point of dissent from these statements, because of the peculiar sense in which their author uses the word "ontology" or "ontologism." By this term he means to express that philosophical doctrine, which maintains the objective existence of necessary truth and man's power of cognizing such truth with certainty. It is very safe indeed to say that the Church has never condemned *this* doctrine; for most assuredly she *would* peremptorily condemn its *denial*.

But we do allege that she has condemned, not merely the seven particular propositions, but a certain philosophical system, called by its adherents "ontologism," which has affinity to those propositions, and which more or less explicitly favours them. Ubaghs was censured, not for holding any one of the seven, but for holding propositions "altogether similar"; Hugonin was required to retract all which "explicitly or implicitly favoured" them; Branchereau's case was precisely similar. This system, as we understand the matter, is based on the fundamental doctrine, that God is in this life directly presented to the intellect as an Object of cognition. The Carlovian has himself heartily repudiated this fundamental doctrine; and is beyond all doubt therefore entirely external to the sphere of the condemned error.

He objects however, that "the Church does not condemn systems but propositions." So far as *theology* at least is concerned, surely the opposite fact is notorious. Certain propositions c. g. have been condemned of Baius, of Quesnel, of Molinos, not simply for their own sake, but as expressions of a certain unsound *system*; and the precise sense in which the individual propositions have been censured, is understood by considering them in the *light* of that general system. If the Carlovian means that the Church never does within the sphere of philosophy, what she constantly does within the sphere of theology proper,—we think he should have given his grounds for an opinion, which on the surface is paradoxical. Surely some given philosophical *system* may be no less injurious to the Faith—indeed it may probably be much *more* injurious—than some given philosophical *proposition*. To us facts appear in quite a different light from that which they present to the Carlovian. We think, for reasons which we expressed in July, that the Church has given great sanction to the scholastic system *as a system*; and we think, for reasons which we have

here set forth, that the ontologistic system, *as a system*, has been absolutely condemned.

The Carlovian says (p. 192) that no propositions have been condemned, except certain ones "taught by some rash and inaccurate thinker." We agree with him that the condemned ontologists have been "rash and inaccurate thinkers"; but what other philosophers of the party can be mentioned, who have been more free from those faults than Ubahgs, Branchereau, and Hugonin?

We will next submit a word in passing to Dr. Meynell. He speaks (p. 16) of the seven as "somewhat silly-looking propositions." From Dr. Meynell this is a little more strange than it might be from another: for surely he thinks that the three philosophers whom we have just named are eminent thinkers; and yet they have been condemned for *favouring* those "silly-looking" seven. To us the seven do not "look" more "silly," than condemned propositions usually do; not nearly so "silly," as the condemned errors of Nestorius, Eutyches, and Luther. Whatever may have been Dr. Meynell's *intention*, the *tendency* of his remark is to disparage the significance of that condemnation which ontologism has undergone; and it is for this reason that we make a passing protest.

But the chief consideration, which we would earnestly submit both to Dr. Meynell and to the Carlovian, is that they have no business whatever to call themselves ontologists. As to the fundamental doctrine—that there exists a large body of objective necessary truth which can be certainly cognized by man—this has been the Church's undoubted teaching from her very commencement. It does seem a strange thought, when you wish to express a doctrine which the Church has enforced for more than eighteen centuries, to adopt a word so circumstanced as this: a word invented only the other day, for the purpose of expressing certain philosophical tenets, which promptly received ecclesiastical condemnation. The word may in itself be a very good word, but it has been dirtied.

Doubtless, at a time when this particular doctrine of the Church has in its turn become the main object of attack—when it is against the existence of necessary truth that the envenomed enemies of religion direct their deadliest poison—it may be very desirable to give the doctrine itself some intelligible name. But why need that name be "ontologism"? Can no other be thought of? In default of a better, we would suggest "objectivism": which is more uncouth perhaps than "ontologism," but at all events not longer. We think it might be said, with complete intelligibility and great advantage, that all well-instructed Catholic philosophers from the beginning have earnestly upholden that vital and fundamental doctrine of "objectivism,"

which the ontologists indeed have corrupted, but which the psychological philosophy, whether of Mill or of Mansel, would overthrow from its foundation.

Our contention has been, that by far the most appropriate use of the terms "psychologism" and "ontologism" is as expressing two opposite forms of error, which the Church peremptorily condemns. And if it be asked which of the two is the more pernicious, we do not see how there can be a moment's doubt as to the answer. Ontologism is a particular error, which does its own serious mischief, but which leaves a considerable body of dogma unharmed; whereas psychologism lays its axe at the very root of all philosophy, of all religion, and of all morality. It is the one chief speculative misery of our time.*

We expressed an opinion in July (p. 38), that F. Kleutgen's great work is "by far the most valuable acquisition to Catholic philosophical literature, so far as we are acquainted with that literature, since the time of Suarez." The discussions of this article will have illustrated one out of its very numerous excellences. The author may almost be called the Church's accepted champion against ontologism. It is surely then indicative of singular large-mindedness and mental balance, that so far from being driven by dislike of that error into rejecting or putting in the background the great doctrine of "objectivism," he expresses that doctrine (as our readers have seen) with perhaps greater emphasis, than any other Catholic writer who can be named.

Another of his excellences may be here mentioned, because of its accidental connection with our present subject. There is one particular argument—not indeed available for ontologism, but plausible as against the views ordinarily advocated in lieu of that system—which (we believe) no ontologist has ever mentioned, nor

* Our readers should study an admirable article published in the "Spectator" of August 28th, on "President Huxley." "*The one grand controversy* now raging among cultivated men," says the writer, "is whether the supernatural exists at all; or whether the theory of a sentient First Cause . . . is not a delusion. . . . We ask any one who knows English society at all, if we exaggerate when we say that *there are hundreds of able men in England* who, knowing nothing [themselves] of science, *disbelieve in God*, or rather in God's government, because (as they think) science has dispelled that ancient delusion."

There is a most curious similarity between portions of this article and some striking remarks in the "Month" of September, which was published on the very same day. "A lamentable sign of our present intellectual decrepitude," says this writer (p. 288), "is the way in which the so-called educated public is ready to fall down at the feet of any teacher of physical science, who has attained a certain degree of fame or even of notoriety." "Professors Huxley and Tyndall," says the "Spectator," "are regarded as *spiritual directors* are supposed to be regarded by faithful Ultramontanes."

any Catholic philosopher before Kleutgen ever touched. Kleutgen's reply to it involves a doctrine, which seems to us so profoundly important, that we devote a separate article in this number to its consideration.

The Carlovian's concluding paragraphs of May exhibit much thoughtfulness, yet (as we venture to think) a certain one-sidedness. Surely the purpose pursued in Catholic philosophical teaching should be, not merely refutation of existing philosophical error; but (quite as primarily) preservation of traditional Christian truth, and appreciation of the Church's great dogmatical expositors. So far therefore from its being desirable that recognized Catholic philosophical phrases should be dropped, it seems to us quite a sacred duty that they be carefully maintained. At the same time a supplementary task is also very needful, under the circumstances of the time. Students should be carefully taught to translate these phrases into terms of modern philosophy; and also to understand precisely, how the Catholic position bears on those various conflicting theories, which divide the non-Catholic philosophical world.

We cannot perhaps better close our article, than by the Carlovian's remarks which follow:—

We must be conservative, it is true, but our conservatism should be liberal and enlightened, lest we conserve error and repel truth. Extremes meet, and those who think they are most conservative, are sometimes most destructive. We live in an age of progress—an age, which at least calls itself enlightened. Modern thought pervades all ranks of society, and exempts nothing from its searching inquiry. Principles which had been received as axioms, things the most sacred, and names the most revered, must submit to its analysis and be tried by its laws. We cannot repress, if we would, this growing spirit of enlightenment. It is the spirit of the age, and will onward, despite every obstacle. If, then, we cannot check this torrent of thought which is flooding the world, would it not be true wisdom to endeavour to elevate, to purify, and to direct it?

To accomplish this great purpose, we must descend into the arena of strife, grapple with the enemy on his own grounds, and defeat him with his own weapons. *If we leave him the field of thought, his victory is certain.* Here the battle must be fought. *The great question of the age is—shall the Church of God or the enemies of truth guide the human intellect?* If we are to succeed, victory must be the fruit of an intellectual movement from within the Church. Where intellect, knowledge, and high mental culture lead, mankind will follow. The triumph of truth is certain, if the Church of God, which is the centre of authority, becomes also the centre of enlightenment. Let the movement begin in Catholic schools, and let the Catholic youth be thoroughly educated in literature, science, and philosophy, and sent into the world the equal in intelligence and knowledge, if not the superior, of those who are educated outside the Church's teaching.

ART. III.—THE LADDER OF PERFECTION.

The Scale (or Ladder) of Perfection. By WALTER HILTON. Edited with a Preface and Notes, by ROBERT E. GUY, B.A., Priest of the Holy Order of S. Benedict. London : Richardson. 1869.

WE greatly rejoice when we see sound ascetical works brought before the attention of the English public. We are profoundly convinced that a deeper study of the subject on which F. Hilton's book treats would open out wide visions of light and splendour in the direction of heaven, and of darkness and littleness in the direction of self, which would result in an immense advance in the love of God. We do not refer to Catholics exclusively. We have in our mind and heart the millions of this teeming land who, having lost nearly all the dogmatic teaching of the Church, have sunk in some sense out of the supernatural order in which their fathers dwelt : and who, with a rare aptitude for the spiritual life, never see, even through a chink in the door, into that splendid country in which, were they once admitted, they would be glad to find rest for ever.

Happily, there have been, ever since God stamped the soul of man with the image of the Blessed Trinity, men who, feeling the touch of the finger of God, have abandoned the world, and fixed their highest faculties on the contemplation of heaven. In the Old Testament we find tokens of the ascetic life in the Nazarenes, the Rechabites, and the Essenes ; and in that splendid and pure school of the prophets, where young men waited on God with prayer, and song, and holy expectations, lest perhaps His Spirit might visit them, and prophesy through their mouths. The prophets—those lights in days of obscurity—Elias the Thesbite, Eliseus, Jeremias, prepared their souls for divine visitations, and in frail flesh manifested the grandeur and glory of God the Father. These men, in all the perfection of their lives, were but as signs and warnings of the magnificent love and humility of the New Testament. They were "men of God," and this was the manifestation of God amongst the nations, especially amongst the Jews. But the figure, however beautiful and true, after all, is not the whole truth : Judaism is not Christianity. The Jews looked for the coming of Christ, but the men of the new dispensation have

seen Christ. This is the one characteristic note of the Christian as such, viz., hearing His voice, and looking on His face. Upon this splendid Man-God, bearing all the elements of human life, with His brightness, like the long beams of the morning, striking on the eyes and sinking to the heart, the Christian looks and is transformed. Jesus is light, He is life, He is joy of heart. This is mystical theology—this was Father Hilton's aim, to teach the true science of approaching, and possessing Him. Just as the sun looks in the morning no bigger than an orange, and is shorn of all his rays, and grows to his full splendour only by degrees, so this science leads men to look upon the Sun of Justice, which, small and insignificant at first, through man's darkness and incapacity, gradually grows upon him, till at length he begins to see with no other light, to live by no other warmth, and "is changed into the same image from glory to glory even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

Now, it is through the study of mystical theology that men get hold of the science by which the saints attained to the contemplation and possession of their Supreme Good. Denis, the Areopagite, whose influence all through the Church was very considerable, was one of the earliest writers on this science in the East. Erigena, whose mind was steeped in Neo-Platonism, and who had a dangerous rationalistic turn, introduced a knowledge of him to the West. Of course, the Fathers, whose vast and original labours were the result of the joint action of love and vision, though they did not professedly treat of the mystic life, still they identified it with all their writings, and all their highest science breathes with the freedom and the spirit of supernal love. S. Augustine, Boethius, and S. Gregory, standing on the edges, as it were, of the old Roman civilization, handed over to Isidore, Bede, and Raban, who stood looking on them from the confines of the new, the learning and traditions of the ancient Church. But the monks of old, with the Rule, with the writings of S. Basil, and with Cassian, who gained his experiences of Eastern monasticism during his travels with Germanus, busied themselves rather with silently living their lives away to God, than in writing treatises on theology. They bridged over the flood, and handing down their hidden treasures, opened the way, without knowing it, to the contentions of the schools. The study of Aristotle introduced clearer divisions into theology. The intellect can fix itself on God as True; the will can fix on Him as Good. The object is one, though the powers are not identical. It was the province of Scholastic Theology, on

the basis of faith, by means of an instrument constructed by the reason, to analyze the object matter of revelation, reduce it into system, and fix upon methods for its defence. It was the province of Mystic Theology, upon the basis of revelation, to look upon the object matter of theology as Good, and consequently to be sought after, and therefore to be possessed, according to those deep words of S. Augustine: "God created the rational creature to know the Supreme Good, that knowing it and loving it he might possess it, and possessing it, might enjoy it." Hence, just as intellect and will are two sides of the same coin, so scholastic and mystic theology, far from being antagonistic, as some have wished to make out, are complementary to each other. Without knowledge there is no love, and without love knowledge is in vain. Scholastic theology makes theologians, mystic theology makes men. It is not knowledge, after all, but love, that has done the great works of the world. Scholastic theology leads to science, and mystic theology leads to reverence and love. The former develops the dialectical qualities of the mind, order, system, and analysis; the latter the contemplative spirit, charity, humility, purity of heart, which issues in those keen instincts, which, with the spontaneity of love, at once detect germs of error and latent elements of misbelief. The mystic—possessing a character the reverse of that attributed to him, for he has nothing to do with the sleepy exaggerations of the East—was ever on the alert to defend the cause of theological truth, and through reverence and love to correct pride of intellect and audacity of reason, when these were tempted to forget that faith comes before science and lays down its conditions and its limits.* Hence it is evident, all through the history of theological activity, that the aberrations of the human mind, and the rationalism of pride, have been corrected by men whose constant study was purity, humility, and love; by men who kept their intellectual eye ever polished to see the Supreme Good, according to that canon which runs through the mystic teachings of the Church, viz. :—"Tergat ergo speculum suum, mundet spiritum, quisquis sitit videre Deum suum."† It was the clearness of this intellectual eye that made Lanfranc see his way against Berengarius,

* This principle runs through the Fathers, and from S. Augustine through all the orthodox scholastics. "Sicut rectus ordo," says S. Anselm, "exigit ut profunda Christianæ fidei credamus, priusquam ea præsumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere." (Cur Deus Homo.)

† Richard of S. Victor, De Præp. ad Contempl., cap. 72.

S. Anselm against Roscellin, S. Bernard against Abelard; and S. Thomas, who, with his vast intelligence and mighty heart, seems to unite in one the perfections of both Schools, against the terrible heresies of the East, which had eaten their way into the Paris Schools. Was it not the mystic School of S. Victor, following so closely the teachings of S. Benedict; Hugh with his contemplative life and beautiful death; Richard with his soaring mystic spirit; and the Lombard, who had been sent here by S. Bernard; was it not this School, with its love of union, and silence, and peace, and Peter with his reverence for authority and his lowly thinking of himself, that opposed and stifled the rationalistic and irreverent spirit which the brilliant fame of Abelard had introduced amongst the Schools? Would Paris have kept its balance in those boisterous days, had it not been for the influence of S. Anselm and S. Bernard, and then of S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas? Would not the withering teaching of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and that terrible Averröes, have effectively poisoned all the wells? And even later on, when the scholastics had sunk somewhat into subtleties and conceits, were they not mystics, and women too, S. Catherine of Sienna and S. Bridget, as well as Tauler and Suso, who did more than any others of their day to bring theology back to its former position?

Nor did the system depend upon Aristotle or Plato, upon nominalism or realism—nor did the mystic spirit exclude ability in the order of positive theology. Love, thank God, is above all systems, and transcends all Schools. In point of fact, the greatest mystics have been the most able scholastics. S. Anselm, the founder of scholastic theology, proves by his prayers and meditations, and above all by the history of his life, that he lived in the contemplation of Christ. S. Bernard, who is called the founder of the mystic School, was strong enough in theology to rid the Church of its greatest pests, and to rule kings, and statesmen. Hugh of S. Victor, who built on the foundation laid by S. Bernard, and who is a mystic *par excellence*, is called the second Augustine, and in his famous work “*De Sacramentis*” proves to the world his power in theology. Richard, with his rich, versatile mind, by his treatise on the Trinity, manifests metaphysical power of the highest kind. S. Bonaventure’s fame as a theologian is simply eclipsed by his deep vision into the hidden way of God; while S. Thomas of Aquin, who, as Raynald his confessor declares, learnt everything he knew through infusion from above, wrote the most lucid and profound treatise on perfection that has ever been thrown into the Latin tongue.

The work which F. Guy's industry has made accessible to the public, is entitled to a high place in the literature of the ascetic life. Yet it is difficult to know in what class to put F. Hilton's "Scale of Perfection." It certainly does not come within the range of the subtle mysticism and deep vision of S. Theresa, nor within the compass of the scientific and soaring speculations of S. John of the Cross. The allegorical yet severe treatment of Richard of S. Victor, and his firm grasp of the various stages of contemplation; the less rich imagination of Hugh, castigated by a powerful reasoning faculty; the illuminated piety of S. Anselm; and the splendid treatise on "Humility" of the mellifluous S. Bernard, belong to a more refined and elevated range of thought. Nor can we name it with the pure style and divine simplicity of S. Catherine of Sienna, or with the more vehement writings of S. Bridget. It does not possess the fulness or the logical pressure of Rodriguez, nor the clearness in conception and statement of principle of Lalle-mant. It can hardly be ranked with Père Grou, it is less spiritual and subtle than F. Baker—perhaps it may take a place between "The Hidden Ways of Divine Love," by Barbanson, and "The Confessions of a Loving Soul," by Gertrude More.

It seems to have been written for a holy nun, and to have flowed spontaneously, though not with the persuasive words of human wisdom, from the loving heart of the pious author. His great charm is his singleness of purpose, his unaffected simplicity, and his tender love for Christ, which burn forth brightly whenever he comes near Him in his writing, and give a warmth and an elevation, and at times an eloquence, to his words, which never manifests itself when he treats on any other subject. The book is studded with deep mystic sayings, and with apt, and sometimes quaint, comparisons, some of which lead us to imagine that the author was not altogether unacquainted at one time or other of his life with English rural sports. Though not always clearly stated, the work is rich in fundamental principles of the supernatural life. Had the writer pruned his sentences, stated his fundamental principles more emphatically, and given them a greater prominence, had the outline of the work been easier to seize, it would have gained greatly in precision, and, though it might have lost a little in unction, it would have made a more satisfactory impression on the student of theology. In this the author is decidedly inferior to F. Baker, and does not approach to Lalle-mant, whose work is full of science, lucidity, and condensed but not confused theology, bearing a fruit which

pleases us better, is riper, sounder, and more wholesome, than any other of the same date with which we have been made acquainted.

To our mind the great merit of F. Hilton is to have given Christ, and His ever-blessed Humanity, so prominent a position in his treatise. If he be not so scientific as some might wish, here at all events he knows how to inflame the heart. He did not merely write about our Lord, but we see, or rather we feel unmistakably, that the man *loved* Him. When he says in one place, "God knows I am teaching far more than I practise" (p. 117), and in another, "In truth, and without doubt, I myself am far from knowing all I should know upon this point, and further still from practising what I do know" (p. 119), we cannot help the feeling how all the while his tender heart was burning with the love of God.

The fundamental points of his teaching, as far as we are able to understand them, are as follows:—The foundation of the spiritual life consists in "humility, firm faith, and an entire and strong will and purpose;" or, as he more clearly states it elsewhere, "There is not any virtue, nor any good work, that can make thee like our Lord, without humility and charity" (p. 84); and here he agrees with all mystic writers. He explains himself very clearly in that beautiful comparison of a man travelling to Jerusalem, whose only thought is "I am nothing, I have nothing (humility), I covet nothing but One, and that is Jesus" (love). Now, in the soul there is the "image of sin." This image of sin must give place to the "image of Jesus." "Out of the image of Jesus, if it be reformed in thee with the beams of spiritual light, will spring forth and ascend up towards heaven burning desires, pure affections, wise thoughts, and all virtue in full comeliness" (p. 86; see also pp. 89, 110). Christ is to destroy the image of sin. "Who is to help thee to break down this image? Verily, it is the Lord Jesus" (p. 137; also pp. 141, 142, 203), according to the Apostle, "My little children, of whom I am in labour again, until Christ be formed in you"* (p. 145). How is this accomplished? We are to be "shapened to the image of Jesus by humility and charity" (p. 145). It is through Christ we arrive at the Father. "No man can come to the contemplation of the Godhead but he that is first of all reformed by perfection in humility and charity, to the likeness of Jesus in His Humanity" (p. 146). Again, "No man cometh to the Father but by Me." Under what aspect is

* Gal. iv. 19.

Christ principally to be looked upon in this reformation? "The Passion is the groundwork of all reformation" (p. 155). In fact, "as the soul is the life of the body, just so is Jesus the life of the soul by His gracious presence"* (p. 309). It is through the contemplation of the Humanity of Christ that the soul is led to a higher stage of contemplation in perceiving along with it the Divinity of our Lord. There are three stages of the spiritual life, which are compared to a man blind, a man with his eyes shut, and a man with his eyes open. The blind man does not see the sun, but believes in it: "this sufficeth for salvation." The man with shut lids "seeth through the lids of the eyes a glimmering of great light: he is a true contemplative." The man that has full sight of the sun "sees Jesus face to face in the bliss of heaven" (p. 263). Of the gift of love the author treats fully in Chap. vi., p. 278. These, humility and charity, are the two corner-stones of the spiritual fabric of F. Hilton.

We will now illustrate what we said about the position he gives our Lord. "Be thou turned wholly to our Lord Jesus Christ" (p. 1). "To the perfection of this high contemplation no man can come till he be first reformed in the soul to the likeness of Jesus" (p. 12). "This knitting or fastening of Jesus to a man's soul is wrought by a good will, and a great desire towards Him, that is towards having Him alone, and seeing Him in His bliss spiritually" (p. 17). "Remember this, that until thy heart be well cleansed by constant and diligent meditation on Christ's sacred Humanity, thou canst not have any perfect knowledge of God" (p. 21). "Christ is a spirit before our face" (p. 23). "Through steadfast thinking upon the humility of his precious Manhood shalt thou much abate the stirrings of pride" (p. 28). At p. 28 S. Gregory is quoted: "He that cannot perfectly despise himself hath never yet discovered the humble wisdom of our Lord Jesus Christ." "Thou mayest by devoutly and constantly beholding the humility of His sacred Humanity, feel the goodness and grace of His Godhead" (p. 38). Meditating on the Passion is "opening the spiritual eye upon the Humanity of Christ: and it may be called the carnal love of God, as S. Bernard saith, inasmuch as it is set upon the fleshly nature of Christ: and it is right and good and a great help towards the destruction of great sins, and so to the contemplation of the Godhead" (p. 55). "A man cannot come to the spiritual light in the contemplation of Christ's Godhead unless he be first exercised in his imagina-

* S. Austin says, "Deus tuus tibi vitæ vita est" (Confess. x. 6).
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tion with bitterness and compassion, and in steadfast thought upon His Humanity" (p. 56). "The name of Jesus is nothing else but spiritual health" (p. 73). "Follow Him by contemplating His Humanity and Divinity" (p. 67). "Jesus is a treasure hid in the soul" (p. 83). See how beautifully he speaks of Christ's tenderness with Judas (p. 112), and how well he explains (p. 114) how we live *in* and *for* God. "They are in a special manner His own children who bear the full shape and likeness of His Son Jesus" (p. 242).

The remarks of Hilton on humility are so deep, his sayings, some of them, are so full of wisdom, and his examples so well worth remembering, that we will touch on all three of these points.

Humility.—"The feeling of thy lowliness and humility will pour out of thy heart all imprudent looking into other men's actions, and drive thee wholly to behold thyself, as if there were no other being living but God and thyself" (p. 24). "The higher he may climb by bodily penance and other virtues, if he hath not this humility, the lower will he fall" (p. 28). "Him that is poor, and little, and of contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my words" (God will respect). "If therefore thou wilt have the spirit of God ruling in thy heart, have humility and reverence towards Him" (p. 32). "Men get wrong by a secret pride and an overweening idea of themselves" (pp. 41, 99). "Who can dare to be so bold as to say that he hath Christ, that he hath charity, but he alone who is perfectly and truly humble?" (p. 108). "No purity or chastity without it" (p. 123). "What is humility but truth? Verily nothing else" (p. 215).

Sayings.—"When thou art in darkness, thou art much nearer Jerusalem than when thou art in the midst of false light" (p. 227). He who really loves self "pretends to love God, and sometimes thanketh Him with his mouth, and sometimes he wringeth out a tear from his eye, and so thinketh that everything is safe enough" (p. 100). "He that remaineth in deadly sin cannot well withstand carnal pleasures when they come in his way, but descendeth willingly to them, as a bird of prey doth to carrion" (p. 120). "If thou wilt needs be a beggar, ask and crave within of thy Lord Jesus, for He is rich enough, and will more gladly give to thee than thou canst ask" (p. 130). "Where our love is, there is the eye of our soul" (p. 140). "A venial sin of thy own prevents thee more from feeling and perfectly loving Jesus Christ than other men's sins can do, be they ever so great" (p. 24). "If thou wilt find rest here and in heaven, do thou in accordance with the advice of one of the holy fathers: every day ask

thyself, 'Who am I?' and judge no man" (p. 25). "Hypocrites praise and thank God with their lips, but in their hearts, like thieves, they steal His worship and praise, and direct it towards themselves" (p. 29). "He that cometh home to his house and findeth nothing but dirt, and smoke, and a scolding wife, will quickly run out of it" (p. 88). "Truth will not show itself to enemies, but to friends who love it and desire it with an humble heart" (p. 318). "Humility presumeth on truth, and not at all upon itself, and truth esteemeth well humility" (p. 318). Jesus sometimes showeth Himself as an awful Master, and sometimes as a reverend Father, and sometimes as a lovely Spouse" (p. 225). "Truth cannot be seen by a pure soul without great delight" (p. 329). "Love and light go together in a pure soul" (p. 332).

Examples.—A man who has passed through trial to God "hath, as it were, so well gnawed the bitter bark or shell of the nut, that at length he hath broken it and now feeds on the kernel" (p. 20). "Cast all into the mortar of humility, break into pieces and pound it with the pestle of the fear of God, throw the powder of it into the fire of desire, and so offer it up to God" (p. 36). "Desire in prayer, when it is touched by spiritual fire, which is God, continues ever to aspire up towards Him, from Whom the fire that kindled it came" (p. 38). "A hound that runneth after the hare, only because he seeth the other hounds run, stayeth and resteth, or turneth home when it is weary; but if it runs because it seeth and is in view of the hare, it will not spare itself, weary though it be, till it hath caught it" (p. 63). So men who follow grace, and do not merely imitate others, persevere. "Jesus sleepeth in thy heart spiritually, as He once did bodily, when He was in the ship with His disciples, and they, from fear of perishing, awakened Him" (p. 83). "He is thy groat, thy piece of money, and all thy inheritance" (p. 82). "As long as Jesus findeth not His image in thee He is far from thee" (p. 84). Heartburnings "show clearly that there is much pride lying hid, as the fox in its den, in the ground of thy heart" (p. 103). "The inferior part [of the soul] is like unto woman, for it should be obedient to the other part of reason, as the woman is subject to the man" (p. 184).

"As no incense can rest upon the censer by reason of the fire within, even so no fleshly delights can rest upon a pure soul that is enveloped and warmed with the fire of love, as it glows and teems with its psalms and prayers to Jesus" (p. 313).

We might, of course, make many more extracts, and place them under the three headings above; but this is not neces-

sary. We have done enough to give the reader a fair notion of the style of F. Hilton's mystic *teaching*, and of the character of his thought. To acquire a fuller knowledge of his method, and to appreciate the whole bearing of his mind, the reader should consult the work itself. He will find it well got up, and printed in clear type, with a thoughtful preface, and a few useful notes.

All praise is due to F. Guy for the industry with which, in the midst of the missionary anxieties of a large commercial town, he has laboured in editing the work. The words of the Bishop of Birmingham, himself a Benedictine monk, bear with them, on such subjects as these, a special weight. We cannot, therefore, do better, in closing this short review, than give his Lordship's judgment on the book, and his estimate of the method adopted by its editor. He writes to F. Guy, "I am glad you have undertaken to edit some of our old ascetic works. You have certainly shown sound judgment in commencing with the 'Ladder of Perfection.' It is perhaps the clearest, best balanced, and best adapted for wide circulation of any of them. I have looked at the specimen of editing which you have sent me, and quite approve of its method. The reader is sufficiently eased, without the character and style of the book being interfered with" (xlvii.).

ART. IV.—THE GALLICAN ASSEMBLY OF 1682.

Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de France de 1682. Par CHARLES GÉRIN, Juge au tribunal civil de la Seine. Paris : Lecoffre. 1868.

WHO can despair of the vitality of truth, when the real history of the struggle between the Holy See and Gallicanism, under Lewis XIV., after lying buried for two centuries, under a vast mountain of falsehood, has at last come to light? And yet this is by no means an overstatement of the fact. The labours of M. Gérin have dealt a fatal blow to the traditions on this subject, which have hitherto been quietly received alike by Protestants and by Catholics. We have already pointed this out in a short notice in our last number, but the importance of the subject justifies, nay demands, our returning to it. For a long cherished tradition is not at once

dispelled from men's minds even by the publication of clear and unanswerable facts which disprove it. It would be a failure in duty, if Catholics should leave off insisting upon them until the truth has got itself so firmly implanted in men's minds that it will need the courage of a Cumming, a Newdegate, or a Whalley to enable any man to stand forward and talk gravely about Gallican principles; and if we may in any degree judge from experience this will not be until many a confident writer has been called to account for assuming as admitted facts all the monstrous fictions which M. Gérin has exposed. This may be a somewhat weary task, but we feel no doubt of ultimate success; nay, we have a good hope that after a few years the *Times* itself will not only take it for granted that what used to be called the "Liberties of the Gallican Church" were really nothing more than maxims forced upon reluctant, but time-serving Catholics, by shameless tyranny on the part of Lewis XIV. and his ministers; but also that such has always been the view taken of the matter by all educated men, and especially by the writers in the *Thunderer*.

It would not be easy, at any period, to exaggerate the importance of establishing the truth on this subject. But, if we are not mistaken, the present crisis of the history of the world, and most especially of England, gives it a new importance. The European world is still in the middle of that great series of earthquake shocks to which future ages will look back as "the revolution" which began with the overthrow of the throne of the Bourbons in France, and as to which no one can as yet form any conjecture when it is to end. In England, especially, it is impossible that the relation of the State to religion should not be seriously altered by the great change which Mr. Disraeli has introduced into our secular institutions. That change is not really less great and momentous, because, like other great changes in England, it was brought about by constitutional means, not, after the French custom, by force; and we may calculate on seeing it result in a total change of the maxims of our Government. For ourselves we strongly think that one of its effects is likely to be to diminish the strong feeling which has long prevailed among English Liberals in favour of religious liberty, and to bring future English Governments into collisions with the Catholic Church, different, perhaps, in form, but not less serious than those which it has experienced with rulers of very different sorts in centuries gone by, and from which it has risen triumphant. If this expectation is well-founded it is clearly important that, before those collisions are even threatened, the old illusion about the Gallican liberties should be effectually swept away: for the experience of Napoleon I. shows, what indeed common-sense would have sufficed to teach, that there is nothing so welcome to men who, under a new order of things, are setting themselves to assail the Church, as,

when they are able to attack it from behind the shelter of great Catholic names of former times.

No man was less tempted to appeal to precedents in the past history of France than Napoleon I., for it was his boast to be the founder of a new order of things. It was only against the Church that he ever thought of urging precedents drawn from the maxims and policy of Lewis XIV. But he was never tired of appealing to the "declaration of the clergy of France," in May, 1682; and to the great name of Bossuet. M. d'Haussonville shows that on March 6, 1810, when railing at the Belgian clergy who remained faithful to Pius VII., he said, "You idiots. If I had not found principles like my own in the teaching of Bossuet, and in the maxims of the Gallican Church, I would have turned Protestant!"

He was wont to repeat that "the second alone of the four articles contained in the declaration of 1682 would have been enough to enable him to get rid of the Pope." Accordingly, those articles were incorporated in the "organic articles," which, with almost incredible cynicism, he added to the Concordat with Pius VII. after it was signed, and after he had, in vain, used all means of fraud, as well as of force, to get them included in it. Nay, when he seized the States of the Church, his servile Senate passed, at his dictation, a new enactment, which he published as a law of the French empire, requiring all future Popes on taking possession of their office to swear to observe the four articles of 1682. M. Gérin tells us that this law was quoted by Count Montalembert in the French Chamber of Peers (May 20, 1847), and the Assembly received it with something of incredulous surprise. "Yes, gentlemen," said the Count, "so it stands in the *Bulletin des lois*. And it is well that these monuments of human folly should, from time to time, be brought forward that men may know how glory itself can be debased by passion." (P. vi. note.)

The same lesson unquestionably is taught by the volume before us. The glory of Lewis XIV. is disgraced by the tyranny and trickery which it records in so many instances: and, alas, the far higher glory of Bossuet himself is dimmed by his unworthy concessions.

As far as Bossuet has, in times past, been under suspicion as disaffected towards the Holy See, M. Gérin clears his reputation. Bossuet, beyond all doubt, was in heart as good a Ultramontane as any one else. So far as he is to blame, it is not for being hostile to the authority of the Holy See, but for unwillingly allowing himself to be made, to a certain extent, a tool in the hands of those who desired to assail it.

This, we think, no one can doubt, who has read the documents collected by M. Gérin. And it is a fact of great importance. The weight of any man's testimony is destroyed in the judgment of

all sober men, if it turns out to have been obtained either by torture, or by the dread of it. Much more is the value of a great man's opinion upon a theological question tainted, if he has delivered it under secular inducements. It becomes, in fact, not the sentence of a judge, but the pleading of a hired advocate. Bossuet, highly gifted as he ever was, used his gifts in 1682 merely as the advocate of Lewis XIV., or rather, it should be said, of Colbert.

Nothing throws more light upon this than his own conduct, when Lewis, on a former occasion, condescended to use the clergy of France as his tool against Alexander VII.

The outlines of this disgraceful history have been given by all historians. Life and property were in those times insecure in Rome, because the ambassadors of the Catholic powers claimed privileges utterly destructive of all government. Lord Macaulay says :—

“It had long been the rule at Rome, that no officer of justice or finance could enter the dwelling inhabited by the minister who represented a Catholic state. In process of time, not only the dwelling, but a large precinct round it, was held inviolable. It was a point of honour with every ambassador to extend as widely as possible the limits of the region which was under his protection. At length half the city consisted of privileged districts, within which the Papal government had no more power than within the Louvre or the Escurial. Every asylum was thronged with contra-brand traders, fraudulent bankrupts, thieves, and assassins. In every asylum were collected magazines of stolen or smuggled goods. From every asylum ruffians sallied forth nightly, to plunder and stab. In no town in Christendom, consequently, was law so impotent, and wickedness so atrocious, as in the ancient capital of religion and civilization.”

It is truly amazing to find that this monstrous abuse, when loudly complained of by the Popes, was supported through false principles of honour by the monarchs of Europe. At a later period it was put a stop to by Innocent XI., “who felt on the subject,” says Macaulay, “as became a Priest and a Prince.” The unequalled outrages which Lewis XIV. then committed, in the endeavour to maintain it, we shall have to mention. We now return to 1662. On the 20th of August in that year the troops, kept on foot by the Duke of Crequi, ambassador of France, attacked some Corsican soldiers in the service of the Pope, and in the fray which followed, two Frenchmen and five Italians were killed. The Pope ascertained that, although the French were the aggressors, his own soldiers afterwards had been to blame, and actually caused two, who were found guilty, to be executed. He also sent an extraordinary minister to Paris, to explain the unfortunate event to Lewis. The King

refused to give him an audience, and adopted a line of conduct so exactly similar to that of Napoleon I. towards Pius VII., and also towards the republic of Venice, when it suited his purpose to pick a quarrel with them, that it is difficult to read the narrative without imagining that, by some accident, a page of French history has got out of its place. He gave orders that Avignon should be seized, and sent an army into Italy. That nothing might be wanting to complete his disgrace (and we must add his resemblance to Napoleon), hearing that the Pope was obtaining troops for the defence of Rome from the Catholic Cantons of Switzerland, he sent to assure them that the French troops were marching into Italy only to defend, exalt, and protect the Holy See, "after the example of his glorious ancestors;" and that the "eldest son of the Church could never think of an action so culpable as that of employing his arms against her." The Pope continued to negotiate, but Lewis demanded that, before he would consider any terms, Alexander should give practical proof of his good intentions, by depriving of his hat Cardinal Imperiali, governor of Rome; by giving up to Lewis his own brother, Don Mario, to be dealt with at the King's discretion; and by causing no less than one hundred of his own soldiers and four officers to be hanged, half in the Piazza Farnese, half in the Piazza Navona. Beside all this, the Pope was to engage to send any person whom Lewis might be pleased to name as Legate, to apologize to the King. When the Pope, said the French Ambassador, shall have taken these preliminary steps, it will become possible to believe that he is in good faith desirous to place himself in a position to give satisfaction to the King, my master. "No account of this wretched affair," says M. Gérin, "is more miserable than those given by apologists of the Court of France—for instance, by the Abbé Régnier-Desmarais, attaché to the Duke of Crequi's embassy. These monstrous demands were of course rejected by the Pope, and Lewis continued his threats. After a dispute, the details of which we pass over, the affair was ended by a treaty studiously insulting to the Pope, who was compelled to erect in his capital a pyramid, on which were inscribed its conditions; one of which was, that the whole Corsican nation was disqualified from taking service under the Roman government. "What," says the writer in the "Month," "if some one had foretold to Lewis that a Corsican dynasty would one day occupy the throne of his descendants, and a Nuncio of the Chigi family," which was that of Alexander VII., "should be accredited by the Holy See to the representative of that dynasty?"

We have said more than enough to prove that the quarrel of Lewis XIV. with Alexander VII. in 1662 was merely one of those outrages by which it was his delight to insult the other European sovereigns, such, for instance, as that in which he

indulged himself towards Genoa, when, by the threat of bombarding the city, he compelled the Doge to come in person to Versailles to apologize for an imaginary wrong, selecting this particular reparation simply because it was notoriously a fundamental law, that the Doge, during the period of his reign, might never leave the Ducal Palace and its precincts, and therefore no other submission would be equally insulting to Genoa. As a Catholic of course his offence in directing these acts of insolent aggression against the Supreme Pontiff was far greater than any other. What his motive was may be doubted. In 1662 he was only four-and-twenty, and his arrogance may have been nothing more than the natural intoxication of so young a man who had been bred up from his very childhood* upon the grossest flattery as his daily food. But his continuance in the course of insolent aggression during his life suggests the question whether it was not adopted on calculation. His power really was irresistible, except by a combination of the European states, which was little likely to be maintained even if it were made. He might naturally believe it to be irresistible; and if he deliberately aspired to universal empire, it may have been his object both to accustom surrounding monarchs and states to regard him as set above all law, and entitled to demand from them a degree of submission which no other king would have exacted even from his own subjects, and to show to the world that to be avowedly the subject of the great king was the only condition which gave to any nation, province, or city the least chance of escaping from insult and oppression.

Be this as it may, it is certain that from the autumn of 1662 to the year 1664 it was the unconcealed object of Lewis to heap all conceivable insults upon the Pope and his government. With this view he assailed his spiritual power, exactly as with the same view he seized Avignon.

He selected as his weapon in this unholy war the faculty of theology at Paris, which before the revolution was a corporate body,† composed of the Doctors of theology in several colleges of secular and regular clergy, of which the world-famed Sorbonne was by far the most important; to which colleges "the Faculty" bore a relation analogous to that of the University

* The *Etudes* of the Paris Jesuits a few months ago published a curious paper in which it appeared that Lewis XIV., when learning to write, was set as a copy the words—

"Aux Rois hommage est due, ils font ce qu'il leur plait."

The paper has been preserved on which the little monarch of six or seven had copied this corrupting maxim six times, signing the whole at the bottom "Louis," as who should say "inspected and approved."

† There were four other Catholic "faculties" of theology in France; those of Aix, Bourdeaux, Lyons, and Rouen.

to the several colleges in Oxford. The liberties of this body had already been tampered with, but it was still possessed of greater privileges and, above all, animated by more of a spirit of liberty than any other institution left in France. Thus left a solitary monument of ancient freedom in the midst of the arrogance and servility bred by habitual despotism, the faculty of theology in some measure occupied the position which, as it is confessed even by the inveterate and bigoted hatred of Gibbon, was occupied by the Catholic Church in the Roman empire.

The faculty of theology then received orders from the king to make a declaration upon the same subjects upon which that of 1682 was afterwards made—those of the power of the Pope in temporal matters beyond his own dominions, and especially in France; and his infallibility.

It is important to observe that neither this declaration nor the much more celebrated one made in 1682 was the spontaneous expression of the sentiments of the French clergy. Neither again were they or any decree called forth, as modern writers have usually assumed, by any "Papal aggression" upon the liberty of the French Church and the independent authority of the king. There was no conceivable reason why a declaration against the "deposing power" should have been made by the faculty or demanded by the king in 1663 any more than at any moment in the last three centuries. The motive was transparent. The king had quarrelled with the Pope. There were two ways in which he could strike at him. He might attack his temporal dominions, and accordingly he seized Avignon and invaded Italy. He might shake his spiritual power, and to do this he turned to the Parliament of Paris and the faculty of theology as naturally as in the other case to his troops and their commanders.

Accordingly six articles, in their contents much the same as those of the declaration of 1682, were drawn up and presented to the king by the representatives of the faculty, headed by the Archbishop of Paris, as head of the Sorbonne. The secret history of this affair is disclosed by M. Gérin in his "Introduction."

It must not be supposed that the king was urged merely by his own pride and ambition; he was surrounded by dangerous counsellors, who, says M. Gérin, were deeply imbued with animosity against the Church, and especially against the Holy See, and who had their head-quarters in the Parliament of Paris, among that class of legists who, to use the expression of M. Guizot, were at all times "a terrible and fatal instrument of tyranny in France."

It is needless to say anything of the history of this famous body, its supreme judicial authority, the influence which it gradually assumed in legislation owing to the custom which required that the king's edicts should be registered on the books of the Parliament

before they became law, its struggles to extend its own power, in which it naturally failed, because a body, however respectable, can hardly be a true check upon the master of twenty legions unless it has behind it a real constituency, and the Parliament of Paris was merely a corporation of lawyers, not a representative body. One thing, however, is certain ; it was always steadily opposed to the liberty of the Church and the authority of the supreme Pontiff. Nothing else could have been expected, for of all things that which lawyers as such hate by the strongest instinct is an "imperium in imperio,"—any body exercising an authority not derived from the law of the land, nor revocable by it. No individual lawyer was ever really hearty in supporting the authority of the Church, unless he was a man personally religious, and viewing the subject in a supernatural light. And such men are little likely to be the rulers in any great legal corporation. We may, then, take it for granted that any body such as the Parliament of Paris will always be hostile to the independence of the Church.

On this occasion M. Gérin shows, from the manuscript journal of a contemporary, that the Procureur-Général (an officer in many respects answering to the Attorney-General in England) taking advantage of the quarrel between Lewis and the Pope, waited on the King and asked him "whether he wished that the Pope should have the power, whenever he pleased, of taking the crown from his head," and upon this read him the Bull, *Unam Sanctam*, the novelty of which made the King open his eyes wide. Upon this M. Gérin adds, "Now this same *Unam Sanctam* was published by Boniface VIII. (1302)."

The Advocate-General Talon then moved the Parliament, and obtained an order, addressed to the Faculty, forbidding it to allow any thesis to be defended similar to one which had been complained of, in which a bachelor had maintained, in very moderate terms, the authority of the Holy See. This decree the Parliament required should be read in the "general assembly, before the Doctors, and also the Bachelors who had received their first licence, and then formally entered on the Registers of the Faculty." Two great lawyers, Talon and de Harlay, then went to the meeting of the Faculty, and required obedience in a speech of much insolence towards the Church, but which declared of the King—

The favours which we daily receive from our incomparable king ought to bind us to our duty as strongly as the indispensable necessity which Jesus Christ has imposed upon all the faithful of honouring kings.

The Church, which has just received from his piety the important place of Dunkirk, which his prudence and the necessity of his affairs had obliged him to take from her for some time, reveres him, not only as the living image of the Godhead—as a man into whose hands God has committed absolute power, but as her benefactor, her support, and her protector.

For our part we have no words to express our gratitude for his continual labours for our good, but we redouble our prayers for his exaltation. We ask of God to give him everything he can wish for the glory of his government, and for his private and domestic satisfaction; if, indeed, his kingly soul is capable of feeling any in which his subjects do not bear a part. We shall regard him as a mighty conqueror in war—as a good and tender father to his people in peace, and shall ask of God to cut short our own years in order to add them to those of his life.

And that these his public and private wishes may not be frustrated, we require that the decree of the Court be now read aloud, and that the registers of the faculty be brought, that it may be transcribed and registered in them * (page 22).

Colbert, Controller of Finance and Secretary of State under Lewis, who was his own Prime Minister, had his tools among the members of the Faculty, and received from them reports of all that passed in the private meetings. These reports have been preserved, but their existence has not hitherto been known. M. Gérin gives them at full length. It appears that the Faculty refused the demand of the crown lawyers for the immediate registration of the decree of the Parliament, and only promised to discuss the matter. The discussion was private, and the report of it is now published for the first time. This report is followed by a list of the Doctors who "have acted amiss, or are liable to suspicion in the matter of the decree of the Parliament;" and another of "those who have done well, and who have specially distinguished themselves, on the same occasion." It is worth the notice of those who suppose that the opposition to the Pope came from the Gallican Church, that (notwithstanding the open and undisguised use of threats and promises by a despotic government) the former list contains six-and-twenty names, the last only eight. Another important fact, until now quite unknown, is that the name of Bossuet figures among the opponents of the so-called Gallican party. His character is also specially reported upon among those of its opponents. The private report also contains a list of "communities to be feared on this matter." It contains, among others, all houses of the regular clergy, and S. Sulpice, "in which ecclesiastics are trained in a spirit of perfect regularity; but it is confidently asserted that everything there is extreme for the authority of the Pope." Among the individuals who are reported against as "strong supporters of the work which all good Frenchmen and true subjects of the King are labouring to oppose," we find M. de la Motte Fénelon.

At last under open compulsion the decree was registered, April 4; but the same day a thesis, similar to that which it forbade, was

* This curious passage M. Gérin publishes from one of the manuscripts in the collection of the minister Colbert.

maintained with the approbation of the Syndic of the Faculty, M. Grandin. Talon was enraged; the Syndic and several others were called before the Parliament, and Talon having declared that the Syndic, "far from asking pardon and apologizing for his offence, made himself more guilty by the terms in which he defended it," the Parliament immediately suspended him.

A decree [says M. Gériu] no more legal than if the Council of State nowadays should pass a decree suspending a bishop as a president of the Court of Appeal. This act of violence alarmed the timid, and some days afterwards the Court obtained the passing of the ambiguous six articles, signed by only sixty-six doctors, which the Parliament caused to be solemnly registered in all the universities, while it was secretly admitted with disgust that the maxims of the Parliament were condemned by the faculty. In 1682, when it again became necessary to break the resistance of the Sorbonne which refused to register the Four Articles, De Harlay, the Procureur-General, with satisfaction, reminded the Chancellor, De Tellier, of the severities suffered in 1663 by the doctors, and advised him to employ the same means to subdue them again. His manuscript (now first published) says that "the example of these will make the doctors anxious to avoid the same by taking some step which may atone for their offence against the king, as they drew up their articles in 1663, in consequence of the trouble you took about it after the interdiction of M. Grandin" (page 33).

Obtained as they were, these six articles, whatever they might have been, could have had no weight. But it is worth while to observe that they bore evident marks of being reluctantly drawn up; for, instead of speaking clearly and definitely, as men do who are expressing their own cherished opinions, the writers made them as ambiguous as they could; and this was noticed by all parties, Parliamentary as well as ecclesiastical, at the time.

It is important to observe that the moment Lewis XIV. had made up his quarrel with Alexander VII., these demonstrations against the Pope suddenly ceased. Not that the lawyers would not willingly have carried them on; but in truth, as things then were, few men dared to do anything in France, unless they had good reason to know that what they did would be acceptable to the King; and, much as the lawyers of the Parliament hated the Pope, they loved their own interest far more than they hated him.

They had to wait near seventeen years, when the next quarrel between Lewis and the Pope became serious. That quarrel was even more disgraceful to Lewis than the former, for it originated not in the wanton insolence of a youth intoxicated with the early possession of absolute power, but in a gross act of rapacious tyranny on the part of a man already in middle age.

The Kings of France had long exercised a right called the *Regale*, with regard to the temporalities of certain French Sees. They

received the revenues and exercised the patronage of those sees during vacancies, and the vacancy was held to continue until the incoming Bishop had sworn the oath of allegiance, on taking possession. M. Gérin shows that officers of the crown, at different times, had attempted to extend the claim to other sees, and that this had been expressly prohibited, by royal edicts of Lewis XII. and Henry IV., which last had been registered by the Parliament. The extension of the claim to any diocese not already subject to it had been expressly forbidden by a general Council (the second of Lyons), in 1275. In 1673 and 1675, two declarations were published by Lewis XIV., extending the Regale to all the Archbishoprics and Bishoprics of France. This was an act of sheer tyranny, besides being avowedly sacrilegious; and the bishops might well scruple even in submitting to it, as they were forbidden to do so by a decree of a General Council.

It is to be remarked that, to say nothing more, it was clearly as much an illegal act of taxation, and a violation of private right, as anything complained of, for instance, under Charles I., yet writers and speakers both in France and England, who profess to be advocates of liberty as well as justice, have taken the side of the King, only because the Pope was against him. M. Gérin shows that even in our own day, in 1861, M. Jules Favre declared, unchecked, in the Legislative Assembly, that the contest on the Pope's side was for money. This is simply false. The Pope claimed nothing. He had nothing to gain. He was maintaining merely the unquestionable rights not of the Holy See, but of the French Bishops.

Not content with extending the Regale to every diocese in France, Lewis applied it to sees which had been long filled up, requiring their holders (some of whom had been in possession for thirty years and more) to "close the Regale" by a formal act, by which they would of course admit that their successors were liable to it. So general was the fear of the royal tyranny that resistance was made only by two bishops out of those in a large number of provinces unquestionably free from it. These were Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, and Pavillon, Bishop of Alet. Pavillon died a year later, so that Caulet was left alone. He had been bishop above thirty years; but not having "closed the Regale," the king treated him as never having taken possession, and proceeded to fill up all vacancies which he had filled in that long period. The Archbishop of Toulouse, his Metropolitan, was a creature of the Court, and took entirely against him. Caulet—a man revered for his piety and the strictness of his life—wrote to the king, and explained that it was impossible to apply the Regale to his see and chapter, because, by an ancient custom confirmed by the Pope and by Lewis XIV. himself, the cathedral was served by canons regular, who practised strict

poverty and community of goods, and the see had no property except tithes. The persons appointed to canonries under the Regale had submitted to no novitiate, and were in every way disqualified to hold the offices. The king made no answer; and the whole property of the bishop was seized by the Intendant of Montauban, a man afterwards conspicuous in the persecution of the Protestants, and a creature of Colbert's. So rigorously was the seizure executed, that the bishop lived only upon alms. He wrote a second letter to Lewis, complaining that "the bare necessaries of life which are always left to the greatest criminals, had in his case been seized."

Not content with depriving me of all, it has been made a crime in some persons to have assisted me in my necessity; and a man in good position at Paris has been forced to hide himself, in order to avoid prison or exile, because it was reported to M. de Chateauneux that he had sent alms to the Bishop of Pamiers, who, as well as the greater part of his curés, was at the time in absolute want of everything.

This statement is confirmed by another contemporary manuscript, which shows that Lewis XIV. was, as usual, more just and more merciful than his advisers. The king had been pressed by some persons to send a man of quality to the Bastille for having sent an alms of 2,000 crowns to the Bishop of Pamiers. He checked them by this good answer: "It shall never be said that I have put any man into the Bastille for giving alms."

The clergy of the diocese remained firm to their chief, and suffered with him (p. 46).

The bishop protected his authority by canonical proceedings, but these were annulled by the metropolitan and the Parliament. He wrote again to the king and to the procureur-général. As the last resource, obtaining no redress in France, not one of the 130 bishops moving in his defence, he wrote to the Pope, Innocent XI., since declared Venerable. The Pope showed great caution and moderation. He wrote to the king, March 12, 1678, and received no answer. In the January following he sent a second brief, written as early as September, probably because he wished the king before receiving it to have private knowledge of its contents. Receiving no answer, he formally annulled the acts of the Archbishop of Toulouse. He then waited another year, after which he wrote a third time to the king.

Once more we entreat and conjure your Majesty that, remembering the words of our Lord addressed to the prelates of His Church, "He that heareth you heareth Me," you would rather hear me (me who have towards you the bowels of a father, and who give you true and salutary counsel), than those children of unbelief, whose views and affections are only of the earth, and who, by suggestions expedient in appearance, pernicious in fact, are shaking the foundations of your monarchy, which rests upon veneration for things holy, and on the defence of the rights and authority of the Church (p. 50).

He ended by expressing his fear that the judgment of God would light upon the king, and added that he should not again have recourse to letters, but should use the power which God had placed in his hands, fearing, if he omitted to do so, to be guilty of a criminal neglect in the administration of his apostolic office.

Lewis XIV. was keenly moved by language which no man on earth, except the Pope, had ever had the courage to address to him. The Gallican legists wished to go to farther measures, but they were held back by the king; and although resolved not to satisfy the desires of the Pope, he temporized (p. 51).

It was proposed to call a national council, but it was feared that if this was done some of the bishops would openly oppose the Regale; for some were known to speak publicly against it, and others to have protested privately. If nothing was done, it was feared that the king might be excommunicated. Another proposal was to enter into a negotiation, which might be spun out till the Pope should die. The deputies of the clergy met every fifth year to vote subsidies to the king. The king caused them to make "what is called in the jargon of our times" a *manifestation* against the Holy See, regretting the conduct of the Pope. Public opinion, however, was against them. Madame de Sévigné wrote to her daughter: "Is it possible that you have not seen the Pope's letter? I wish you could. You will see a strange Pope. Why, he speaks with authority. You would say that he is the father of Christians. He does not tremble, he does not flatter, he threatens. It would really seem that he implies some blame against the Archbishop of Paris. What a strange man! I cannot get Pope Sixtus out of my head." Madame de Grignan greatly amused her by comparing the French bishops to the wife in Molière, who "liked to be beaten." M. Gérin says he has found many contemporary writings condemning the French bishops, not one in their favour.

While things were in this state, a new cause of quarrel arose. Lewis had appointed a secular superior to a house of Augustinian nuns at Charonne, near Paris, in open violation of the Concordat. The archbishop, an unworthy creature of the king, took his side. The nuns appealed to the Pope; Innocent quashed the archbishop's proceedings, and ordered that a superior for three years should be elected out of the community. The king's council and the Parliament declared the Pope's proceedings null, and the legal authorities spoke with a tone of indignant virtue of the resistance they would always offer to the Court of Rome if it thus infringed "their liberties." On the very day on which this happened, the Bishop of Pamiers died. There was a formal schism. The canons in legal and ecclesiastical possession appointed vicars-general to administer

the diocese *sede vacante*; the canons appointed under the Regale appointed another. The vicars-general, legally appointed, were arrested and imprisoned. Another was elected in their place, who was condemned to death; he escaped, and was executed in effigy. "Religious men feared, not without reason," says M. Gérin, "that the chastisements of God would fall upon the state." The executioner fled, and was brought back by force, saying that, though poor and miserable, he was a Catholic, that he was sure the late bishop was a saint, and had always retained his charity towards himself.

At Paris the defenders of "liberty" took no notice of these things, but were proceeding against the Pope's briefs. At last it was resolved to try, not a national council, but what might look like it. It was from this state of things that the assemblies of the clergy in 1681 and 1682 originated. The first was called at the time the *petite assemblée*. It consisted of the bishops who happened to be in Paris. An epigram of Racine said that it made one thing, and one only, quite clear, that we have fifty-two prelates who are not residing in their dioceses. These prelates had before them, no doubt, a task of some difficulty. As to the affair of Pamiers, for instance, it was one about which it was plainly unsafe to say much. They contented themselves with complaining of the form of the Pope's briefs as inconsistent with the "Gallican liberties." Whether the proceedings of the Government were consistent with any liberties or any justice whatever they did not say. They seemed totally ignorant of all that had passed, except that certain briefs had arrived from Rome the form of which offended their sensitive feelings about liberty. In the same way as to the affair of the nuns of Charonne, nothing was said as to the rights of the case, only the form of the Pope's brief was complained of. The result was that the assembly petitioned the king to call "a national council, or general assembly of the clergy," to be composed of two deputies of the first order, and two of the second order, from each province; the latter to have only a consultative voice, that is, in fact not a national council, but an assembly which it would be easy to the king to pack. The acts of this *petite assemblée* were printed by the king's orders, and dispersed over France and Italy.

M. Gérin shows that upon all the points in dispute all the names held in the highest authority as Gallicans, especially Bossuet and Fleury, expressed the strongest sense that right was on the side of the Pope and against the king.

On June 16, 1681, the king addressed letters requiring the archbishops of all the provinces subject to His Majesty to hold provincial assemblies, for the purpose of deputing two of the first and two of the second order as deputies to the general assembly called at Paris for the 1st of October, 1681.

The elections took place ; how—M. Gérin tells us at length in his third chapter. It were needless and weary to go as he does through the provinces one after another, and show that in each the choice of the representatives was really with the king, or rather with Colbert. The object of the choice was to find unworthy men, and no doubt it too generally succeeded. If we desired to make any man a revolutionist, we can hardly imagine anything so likely to effect that object as a careful study of this chapter and of the two which follow, in which the members of the assembly are gone through one by one, and of that on the state of ecclesiastical property under Lewis XIV. But it would be a mistake, as well as wrong, to suppose that the state of things exposed in these chapters was a fair sample of the Church of France under Lewis XIV. In justice, it must be remembered that the king, all-powerful as he was, dared not call a national council of the French clergy. Whether if he had, he might have obtained a majority in it no one can now tell. But one thing is certain, that the opposition to his acts would have been so decided, and would have come from quarters so highly and so justly respected, that the moral victory would have been wholly against him. It was to avoid this that he had recourse to an assembly which he, as well as every one else, well knew could not by possibility have any real authority. Councils (as M. Gérin points out) are either general, national, provincial, or diocesan. The assembly of 1682 could have no pretension to be either diocesan, provincial, or general. Was it a national council ? Such a council consists of all the bishops of a nation, and among Catholics its decrees have no authority until they are confirmed by the Pope. Curiously enough, it was the want of this last qualification which has obtained for the assembly of 1682 whatever respect it has obtained. Protestants and disaffected Catholics have spoken of it with reverence, because it was assembled to oppose the Pope, and because its proceedings were declared by him null and void. Had it wanted this recommendation ; had it been gathered to condemn any heresy, Jansenism, for instance ; and had its decrees been approved by the Holy See, they would have protested, with great truth, that it was a mere packed assembly, and represented no one except the king.

Even as it actually was, the king by no means avoided opposition among the bishops. M. Gérin publishes a very curious report addressed by M. Morant, Intendant of Aix, detailing his interview with Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix. The Cardinal was a man near eighty, and except on business of an indispensable nature, had never left his diocese since his appointment to it. The Intendant's report is, at least in one respect, honourable to the Government of Lewis XIV. It shows that its agents were not afraid to let the real state of things be known to their employers. M. Morant

shows himself to have been by no means scrupulous about truth. But at least he did not fear to report to the minister the least pleasant things which the Cardinal said to him, "the miseries which had always fallen upon kingdoms in which the ecclesiastical authority had been confused with the temporal,"—"that most of the present difficulties must be attributed to the maxims of the Parliament of Paris,"—"that the council called for October the first would not be legitimate, and could not be so without the authority of the Pope,"—"that it would never be regarded as anything more than a *conciliabulum*, which the best bishops of France took good care not to attend; and that the deputies to be chosen in the different provinces had been nominated by *lettres de cachet*." "This," says the Intendant," he repeated several times in order to make out whether I had not received such a letter touching his own province." The Cardinal also pointed out that the "procuration (the instructions which each province was to give to its representatives) required them beforehand to condemn the Holy See without hearing what had been done." He particularly called attention to "the evils which had ensued in a neighbouring country, without expressly naming England," in which, the reader will remember, the Protestant king had thirty years before been brought to the scaffold by his Protestant subjects. The Intendant then gives his own answer at length; after which he says the Cardinal "returned to the fact that the deputies had been named beforehand as a thing utterly odious, and which showed plainly that what was really wanted was the election of men of a complacent character. I did not think that the time had come for me to be open as to the orders I had received upon this subject; for which I waited until the assembly of the province should meet." "At last he did me the honour to read me his letter to the Chancellor, at the end of which, observing that the Chancellor had told the Cardinal that his Holiness had expressed his wish that there should be an assembly of the clergy rather than a national council, I took advantage of this information (as to the truth of which I assured his Eminence that he must not doubt) to reply to what he said about the necessity of the Pope's authority for the calling of a national council." Considering that both the Intendant, and the minister to whom he was writing, knew equally well that the statement was wholly without foundation, the gravity of this last sentence is amusing. When this report reached Colbert, he wrote, in the king's name, to ask the advice of the Archbishop of Paris under the circumstances. The Archbishop's answer is not preserved, but any one acquainted with his abject character can imagine it. The result was, that on August 23 a letter in due form, beginning *Mon cousin*, and signed by the king himself, was dispatched by a special courier to Cardinal Grimaldi, ordering him in very imperious terms to convene the Provincial

Assembly for the election of deputies, who were to be empowered by a "valid commission" to represent the province. But neither the king nor his minister at all reckoned on the Cardinal's submission, and therefore the same day orders were sent to each of his suffragans, the Bishops of Riez, Sisteron, Gap, Apt, and Frejus, commanding them to meet, with the senior among them as their president, and to act without their archbishop. The same day orders were sent to the Intendant, directing him to go to the Cardinal and assure him of his Majesty's intention to leave to the Provincial Assembly "absolute liberty both as to the nomination of the deputies and as to powers and instructions to be given to them." In case the Cardinal Archbishop still refused to obey, the Intendant was to deliver the letters to the suffragans, and to command the Bishop of Riez, in his Majesty's name, to hold the assembly, sending further instructions as to the bishop's conduct in the matter, which the Intendant was to give "as from himself." The instructions end, "If Cardinal Grimaldi convokes the assembly you must say nothing *to him* either as to the nomination of the deputies nor as to the draft of the instructions and powers to be given to them. You must communicate on these subjects with the bishops of the province, and engage them to do what you know to be his Majesty's intentions on the subject."

The documents do not enable us fully to trace out all the steps which followed. At Carpentras, however, have been found the instructions given by the Provincial Assembly of Aix to their deputies. These direct them to adhere to the rule laid down by the General Council of Lyons, forbidding the further extension of the Regale; to protest that its extension to the Churches not hitherto subject to it would be "contrary to law natural, divine, and canonical;" to declare that the Regale, where it existed, was a spiritual right, conceded to the Crown by competent ecclesiastical authority, not a temporal right attached inseparably to the Crown; to declare that the charge against the Pope in the matter of Charonne was unreasonable; lastly, to defend the prerogatives of the Holy See in the matter of the excommunication issued against the Archbishop of Toulouse in case he should persist in interfering with the administration of the diocese of Pamiers.

But all these efforts were fruitless. In the name of the liberties of the Gallican Church the seal of slavery was once more placed upon the lips of the clergy. The Assembly of Aix was unable either to choose freely its own representatives or to give them its own instructions. On the refusal of Cardinal Grimaldi, the Intendant Morant took upon himself the management of the affair, in union with Valavoin, bishop of Riez, who had been pointed out for this office by Colbert in his despatch of August 23, and who caused himself to be named as representative of the first order,

together with Luke Daquin, bishop of Frejus, and brother to the king's physician.

In all the provinces the king showed the same resolution to make himself master of the elections. The candidates excluded by him were either set aside by their colleagues, or set themselves aside in order not to engage in a contest both unequal and useless. The rigours exhibited in the diocese of Pamiers proved that the ministers had made up their minds not to shrink from any violence in putting down all opposition to the orders of Lewis XIV. (page 150).

The proofs given of this by M. Gérin in one diocese and province after another, fully establish his statement, but would fill an article by themselves. He observes that Bossuet himself bears testimony to the fact that he himself was really deputed not by the province of Paris, by which he was nominally elected, but by the Court; nay, that long before the elections were held the ministers had settled that he was not only to be a member of the Assembly, but to preach the sermon at the opening. This appears from a letter written by him from the Court at Fontainebleau, before the Provincial Assembly met at Paris, in which he announces that both points were already settled.

So far, then, was the Assembly of 1682 from being a "National Council," that it in no sense represented any one except Lewis and his ministers, by whom its members were selected and chosen. In the province of Rouen Colbert wrote to say that the Bishop of Lisieux was to be elected with the archbishop. Elected he was. But an accident made it impossible for him to attend at Paris, on which Colbert wrote to the bishop of Avranches to say that in consequence of this accident "His Majesty has made choice of you to supply the place of M. de Lisieux, who had been named; and he has caused his intentions upon this subject to be signified to the archbishop of Rouen. I doubt not that he will do all that is in his power, and that the choice his Majesty has made of you will be carried out." Accordingly the bishop of Avranches sat in the Assembly. Whether any form of election beyond Lewis's nomination was thought necessary does not appear; M. Gérin supposes that it was not.

As to what was called the "procuration," i. e., the powers and instructions to be given by each Provincial Assembly to its representatives, to which, as we have seen, Cardinal Grimaldi so strongly objected (as it required the bishops elected to condemn the Pope's proceedings before hearing anything about them), this was so little left to the provincial bishops that it was drawn up beforehand by the king's creature, De Harlay, archbishop of Paris, and orders were sent in a circular to all the Intendants throughout the kingdom, that it was to be adopted in each province "without the least change." It is

given in full by M. Gérin. It required the deputies "to take measures to set right the contraventions of the provisions of the Concordat, as to frivolous appeals, which had been committed by the Court of Rome in the matters of Charonne, Pamiers, Toulouse, and others."

It had been settled by Lewis before the assembly was summoned, that this same de Harlay was to preside. Custom, however, if not any actual rule, required that the senior archbishop present should be president. It was, therefore, determined that he should be the senior, and accordingly, although as a general rule the archbishop and one of his suffragans were chosen to represent each province, yet in every case in which the archbishop was senior to the Archbishop of Paris he was excluded. In every instance what was thus determined beforehand was, either by force or influence, carried out.

It really seems impossible after this signal exposure, that any one should claim any ecclesiastical authority for this assembly. With Catholics of course it could have had none, even if it had been a free national council, inasmuch as its proceedings were at once declared null and void by the Sovereign Pontiff. It is, however, important to show that it was absolutely without any moral weight, and this M. Gérin's work has far more than proved. Henceforth no reasonable man can believe that the decisions decreed by this assembly proved anything, except the tyranny of Lewis XIV. and the abject servility of too many of the French prelates in his reign. Still, as we have already said, we do not expect that this exposure will prevent its being appealed to by men whose only notion of liberty is the absolute power of the State in things sacred. M. Gérin shows that M. Dupin breaks out into an access of admiration about Lewis's instructions to the provincial councils. They were to choose "men distinguished for piety, learning, and experience, and whose merit was most known throughout all the provinces." "*Quelle belle loi electorale!*" exclaims M. Dupin. Gérin shows that the real meaning of this was that the Provincial Assemblies should select as the priests to represent them, not men known to the clergy of the province, but strangers chiefly in Paris and mere tools of the Court, and that this was actually done.

In fact, there remains but one thing which can give any weight to the assembly of 1682—the great name of Bossuet, who is always represented as its soul (in Carlyle's language, its king), and who actually drew up the declaration and afterwards wrote a formal defence of what had been done, which he continued to retouch till his death, and which has since been published. But we are sure that any man who reads with tolerable fairness M. Gérin's seventh chapter, will feel that this event of his life, so far as it does

anything at all, only diminishes the credit of Bossuet instead of increasing that of the assembly. It is a necessity of human nature to long to be able to make a hero of a man we admire; and we quite understand many persons wishing to be able to believe that Bossuet was altogether a hero. But it is impossible to think so. Those who knew him best felt that his great qualities were tainted by a sad want of firmness and independence. In 1663, the keen-sighted spies of Colbert, while they mentioned him as taking warmly the ultramontane side in the discussions of the "Faculty," saw the weakness of his purpose, which they thought might yet make him a useful tool to the minister. One writes,—

M. Bossuet is beyond all question a man of high talent, learned for his years, as much so as a young man who devotes himself to preaching could be, but what has made him go wrong on this occasion is perhaps chiefly his consideration for M. Cornet (whose creature he is), and his example.

Another said,—

M. Bossuet is adroit, complacent, bent upon pleasing all with whom he is, and adopting their sentiments when he knows them. He has no mind to get himself into trouble [*ne veut point se faire des affaires*]; nor to risk the success of his own projects which he thinks sure to succeed. He thinks it impossible that this, [*i.e.* the quarrel between the king and the Pope] can last. Thus he steers with extraordinary caution, and in the Faculty looks out for some middle course, some shift, when he is not on the other side, and hence he has many followers. Besides, he speaks Latin elegantly and agreeably, and has, in fact, a considerable knowledge of these subjects, because he studied before he devoted himself to preaching, and hence he has weight in the Faculty. Attached to the Jesuits and to those who have the means of making his fortune, more from interest than from inclination, for by nature he is free, keen, satirical, and looks upon many matters quite as a superior [*se mettant fort au-dessus de beaucoup de choses*]. Hence, whenever he shall see a line which leads to fortune, he will throw himself into it, be it what it may, and will be able to make himself useful to it. He manages peaceably the Dean of S. Thomas and is followed very willingly by Le Plessis-Gesté and by Thomassin.

These life-like sketches have been till now quite unknown. But other contemporary judges, who knew nothing of them, arrived independently at the same conclusion. Forty years later, in 1703, when his fame already filled France and even Europe, the writer of a manuscript entitled "Characters of the Royal Family of France, the Ministers of State, and the Principal Persons of the Court," says of the great Bossuet, "He is one of the most learned ecclesiastics and one of the keenest courtiers. An indefatigable defender of the sentiments of the Court—this circumstance taints his works. He would be more esteemed if he were more impartial."

M. Gérin quotes from a manuscript in the Imperial Library some lines of Arnould's, which he supposes to have referred to Bossuet, in which he quotes the saying of S. Augustine about the hireling shepherd, who flies when the flock is in danger from the wolf, *fugisti quia tacuisti*. "The prelates were assembled, and none of them opened his mouth to undeceive the king" as to the severities which were going on at Pamiers. In another letter Arnould says—

The king would have done himself more honour if he had named M. Bossuet to the cardinalate. And yet there is a *verumtamen*, as to which I fear he will have to give much account to God, and that is, that he had not the courage to represent anything to the king. This is the temper of the times, even in those who in other respects have very great qualities—abundance of light but little nobleness. Of the same bishop M. de Treville said, "he had no bone."

Before, therefore, the great name of Bossuet can really be urged in favour of the Assembly of 1682 and its proceedings, we must at least ask whether or not he took it as an opportunity of expressing what he really felt, or whether he was reluctantly following the wishes of the Court. And this point he answers for himself. Ledieu records that he

asked Bossuet who had inspired him with the plan of the propositions of the clergy upon the power of the Church. He replied that M. Colbert, then Minister and Secretary of State, was the real author of them, and the only person who determined the king in the matter. M. Colbert maintained that the quarrel with Rome about the Regale was the best opportunity for renewing the doctrine of France on the use of the power of the Popes. . . . He brought the king over to his opinion against the advice of M. de Tellier, also Minister and Secretary of State. . . . Besides, M. de Paris (Harlay de Champvallon), did nothing else in the matter than flatter the Court, catch up the words of the Ministers, and blindly follow their will like a valet (p. 385).

This is by no means the language of a man who felt that the Assembly had given him an opportunity of bearing testimony to a truth for which he cared. It appears, indeed, that he was so far from feeling this, that he himself persuaded De Tellier and his son (Archbishop of Rheims) from doing what was afterwards done, and told them "you will have the glory of having brought to a conclusion the affair of the Regale, but that glory will be dimmed by *these odious propositions*." "Even when the king, pressed by Colbert, La Chaise, and Harlay, had given his express orders, Bossuet still proposed that an investigation of the tradition on the subject should be made, which was nothing more than a pretext for an endless discussion"—in fact, much like what leads, among our-

selves, to the appointment of a "committee" of inquiry, on many subjects upon which honourable members do not wish to come to a vote.

Those contemporaries who disliked what was done did not impute it to Bossuet. Fénelon "wrote in his celebrated letter to Lewis XIV. : ' Your Archbishop and your Confessor involved you in the difficulties of the affair of the Regale, and in the troubles with Rome ' " (p. 287).

The whole of M. Gérin's chapter on " Bossuet and the Assembly of 1682 " is well worth study. He clearly shows that whenever Bossuet ventured to express his real feelings and opinions, he spoke against the side of which he is generally supposed to have been the soul. He afterwards made an apology himself that Protestant kings might be more willing to become Catholics if they saw the power of the Pope limited. But M. Gérin shows that the Protestant Leibnitz took the side of the Pope, and that the strong Gallicans, so far from attracting Protestants, put difficulties in the way of reunion.

The flattery of Lewis XIV., by the Assembly, was, we presume, too gross for Bossuet's taste, but it passed without protest from him :—

The deputies of the clergy re-echoed what the contemporary legists were writing ; " in France it has always been held that kings are not purely laymen, but in a sort of mixed condition." From the first day to the last they vied with each other to paraphrase the language of the " Promoteur " Chéron, in the sitting of November 24, who having said that Lewis XIV. surpassed David in sweetness, Solomon in wisdom, Alexander in valour, in power all the Cæsars and all the kings of the earth, applied to him this Byzantine text :—" In the army more than king, in the field more than soldier, in the kingdom more than emperor, in civil justice more than prætor, in consistory more than judge, *in the Church more than bishop*" (*from the procès verbal of the Assembly*). The Pope in his brief of April 11 reproves this base flattery, and asks, " Which of you came into the arena to stand as a bulwark for the House of Israel? Who dared to expose himself to ill-will? Who uttered so much as one voice in memory of the ancient liberty?"

It is sad to write that Bossuet, who when speaking freely condemned the Archbishop of Paris as making himself " the valet " of the ministers, was the man who moved that he should be President of the Assembly. This was the same upon whose death Madame de Coulanges wrote to Madame de Sévigné that there were only two trifling difficulties in the way of the person who was to be selected to preach his funeral oration, one was " his life," the other " his death."

It is at least pleasing to see that Bossuet was aware of this great infirmity, and asked the superior of a convent to pray for him, " that I may not have complacence for the world " (p. 305).

We must not infer that the "declaration" expressed Bossuet's real feelings because it was by him that it was drawn up. It is proved that he took this upon himself only to prevent its sense being expressed with much greater violence by men who knew much less than he what they were doing. It is recorded by Fleury that the Bishop of Tournai had drawn it up "very ill."

His propositions maintained that the Holy See as well as the Pope could fall into heresy, and thus overthrew the indefectibility of the Holy See. M. Bossuet, shocked at this doctrine, strongly opposed it. The Bishop of Tournai warmly defended it. . . . The dispute lasted long. It finished by M. de Tournai refusing to draw up the articles, and on his refusal M. Bossuet was charged with it. This anecdote is attested and given in detail by M. de Fénelon, in a Latin treatise upon the infallibility of the Pope, still in manuscript. He received it from the mouth of M. Bossuet (p. 295).

Bossuet, long afterwards, declared that he undertook the office only to serve Rome by "preventing things from being pushed to a dangerous extreme."

There is no doubt that this really was his object, and that he managed it with great skill. His conduct was that of a man who was bent upon satisfying an imperious monarch, and exercising all his ingenuity to do so at the least possible sacrifice of principle. And this intention is evident on the face of the "declaration." The articles are full of ambiguities. They were evidently intended to look violent enough to satisfy the Court and yet to be capable of an innocent interpretation. But Bossuet ought to have remembered that his words were sure to be interpreted, not merely by theologians in the schools, but by kings, and the ministers of kings intent upon depriving the Church of her most necessary liberties, and anxious to oppress her under the specious cloak of his authority. The disgrace of having his great name perpetually invoked by Napoleon I. when perpetrating his worst outrages (outrages which Bossuet would have rejected with indignation) was but too just a retribution.

M. Gérin sums up his character—

Happily Bossuet united to this infirmity of character, besides the genius which shines forth in his "Funeral Orations," in his "Discourse on Universal History," in the "Variations," a gift more admirable and more precious still—the deep piety which breathes in his "Sermons," in "Letters to La Sœur Cornuau," and in the "Meditations upon the Gospel." But whatever homage is his due, an upright judge will ever repeat with Arnauld, "There is nevertheless a VERUMTAMEN, for which I fear that he had to render a great account to God" (page 331).

It is the fashion to say that the "declaration" was unopposed

in France. There would have been small cause for wonder if it had. It was voted by the Assembly, March 19th, 1682, and on March 20th a decree was issued by the king, commanding that the four articles of the declaration should be registered by every university of his kingdom, and taught by all their Professors. No man could have been surprised if such a decree from such a master had been immediately and universally obeyed. The fact, however, was far otherwise. A general opposition arose, and was only put down by sheer force. Upon this subject we would refer our readers to the very interesting chapter in M. Gérin's book entitled "Opposition to the Four Articles." It was most energetic immediately under the eye of the king and his ministers in Paris itself and in the Sorbonne. M. Gérin quotes Le Gendre, "an unsuspected witness," to prove that the opposition was almost general, and that de Harlay was specially attacked as the supposed author of the declaration. He adds, "the common and convenient assertion that it was generally received will have to be given up, and it must be admitted that the doctors opposed to the Gallican maxims were the most pious, the most learned, and the most numerous." The Gallican Fleury says they included—

Almost all the regular clergy, not only the religious orders but also the communities of priests, although without privileges and subject to the bishops. They leant to that side as most favourable to piety. The Regulars, almost the only persons who preserve the tradition of the practices of devotion, have united their opinion to this, and have promoted it by their writings, their conversation, and in the direction of consciences. The ancient [i.e. the Gallican] doctrine has remained among the doctors often less pious and less exemplary in their lives than those who teach the other. Sometimes those who have resisted the novelties (i. e., the doctrine opposed to Gallicanism) have been lawyers and politicians, profane and libertine, by whom the truths they teach have been exaggerated and made odious (page 340).

This is confirmed by the secret reports sent to Colbert. His agents gave him lists of theologians *for Rome* and *against Rome*. These lists were drawn up by declared Gallicans, and therefore the praises they give to the characters of those whom they class as "for Rome" are the less to be suspected. M. Gérin goes in detail through the different colleges of theology. We have not space to follow him at length. But he much more than makes good his assertion. The Sorbonne had 169 doctors, of whom "all but six or seven" were opposed to the declaration; at the college of Navarre all but one; at St. Sulpice and the Missions Etrangères "all but four or five;" among the orders all. As to learning and piety, he shows that the superiority of those opposed to the declaration was strongly and unanimously testified by Colbert's reports.

On the 1st of May, 1682, a deputation of the Parliament was

sent to the Sorbonne, where the "Faculty" had its meetings, to require the registration of the "declaration." So much opposition did this meet that it was not registered until after a long struggle. The feeling in the "Faculty" was so strong that the Procureur-General de Harlay reported to Colbert, June 15th, that the debate in the Faculty was adjourned till the next day, and that he judged it necessary to prevent the conclusion of this deliberation "by whatever means the king judged would be least mischievous," concluding by saying that he himself "was neither wise enough nor indiscreet enough to propose any means to be adopted, but awaited the king's commands." So great was the alarm produced at court by this report, that—

The king sent the Marquis de "Seignelay (Colbert's son) to Paris the same night, to arrange with the archbishop and the heads of the Parliament a *coup d'état* on a small scale, to be put in execution the next day." So early was the Parliament acting, that at six o'clock the next morning, June 16, an usher arrived from it, signifying to the dean of the faculty a decree already passed by the Parliament the same morning, which declared that as the doctors had presumed to debate upon the articles instead of registering the decree, their further meetings were absolutely forbidden, and the dean and six professors of the Sorbonne, the grand master, and four professors of the college of Navarre, and all others who should be indicated by the Procureur-Général, were required to attend at the bar of the Parliament at seven the same morning (page 357).

The declaration was then registered by force, the books having been sent for to the Parliament, and all future meetings of the faculty were forbidden. Eight doctors of theology were immediately sent into exile, by "lettres de cachet."

But violence of this kind was very reluctantly adopted by the Court because it was plain that if reported it would make known to all the world, and especially at Rome, that the "declaration" had been imposed upon the French clergy only by force.

It was just at this moment that the king suddenly dissolved the assembly in a manner which his creatures in it felt to be cruelly contemptuous. The Archbishop of Paris went so far as to remonstrate with Colbert, requesting that the letter dissolving it might be couched in more respectful language, and he received a very curt reply from the minister. The professed reason for this sudden step which M. Gérin finds in the memoirs of de Cosnac (a member of the assembly) was, that it was necessary that the bishops should return to their dioceses. The real reason, that matters were arranging themselves at Rome, and as the assembly had been from the beginning merely a weapon in the hands of the king to attack the Pope, it was contemptuously thrown away when no longer needed. The opposition of the clergy of Paris to the declaration no doubt

made the king more anxious to have done with it. It was on June 21 that the decree of exile was signed against the eight doctors, and on June 29 the assembly was suddenly dismissed. The king even refused to allow its proceedings to be entered on the archives of the clergy; nor were they entered until long afterwards, in 1710. The king and his ministers no doubt heartily despised the men who had degraded themselves to gain their favour. A month before, June 2, Colbert had written that the greater part of the assembly would willingly have changed their doctrine the next day if they had been allowed to do so (p. 355).

The Procureur-Général laboured to make use of this incident to get the Faculty of Theology more absolutely into the hands of the king. Its meetings were now suspended and could not be restored without royal permission. In order to save appearances it was resolved to get up among the doctors a petition to be allowed to hold their meetings. "If the petition had promised adhesion, obedience, submission to the four articles, it would have obtained no signatures. It spoke only of reverence for the king's edict and for the declaration of the clergy." M. Gérin details some curious instances of the intrigues used to obtain signatures. At last it only obtained those of 150 out of 750 doctors. The Procureur-Général de Harlay urged Colbert to use much greater severity, to deprive a very large number of their seats in the Faculty, to remove all the old professors of theology, and that instead of allowing their successors to be elected by the Faculty they should be nominated by the king, and to limit henceforth the number of the faculty to 100. Especially he desired to punish the Sorbonne, for which he proposes several measures. M. Gérin gives many interesting particulars on this subject, upon which we must not enter.

Meanwhile, it is pretty certain that the opposition of the other universities less immediately under the eye of the Government was even more energetic than it was at Paris. With regard to the University of Douai, which had been newly annexed to France, M. Gérin has found evidences of this fact. It addresses Lewis himself, expresses the strong and unanimous dislike of his new subjects in Flanders to the doctrine of the declaration, and declares "the great majority of us are ready to abandon our colleges and to renounce all promotion and dignity rather than submit to opinions repugnant to our consciences."

Nor was this a temporary opposition. M. Gérin shows that it continued and was general among the French clergy down to the time of the Revolution. As late as 1760, the Abbé Chauvelin spoke of those who were attached to what he called true [*i. e.* Gallican] maxims as "some bishops and some doctors," and the ultramontanes as "the great multitude," and declared it necessary to have recourse to authority to compel the Faculty of Theology to obedience.

In fact, after the publication of M. Gérin's invaluable labours, we do not see how any man can in future speak of the French Church in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as having been Gallican in opinion.

And yet it cannot be denied that there was at least one part thoroughly rotten in that great body. The assembly of 1682 was only too miserable a proof of it. The king was able to collect by his mere will a meeting of two and thirty bishops, the majority of whom, there is reason to fear, were ready to vote whatever he pleased. In this is most strongly marked the contrast with the existing French Church. "Out of the ashes of the ancient church of France has sprung a new hierarchy, worthy of the name and the history of that great nation, as fervent as their S. Bernard, as tender as their S. Francis, as enterprising as their S. Lewis, as loyal to the Holy See as their Charlemagne."* But in truth, when we look at the abuses which the French kings had introduced and established as to the disposal of church property, the real wonder is not that a portion of the French Church was corrupt, but that it had any part sound. Count Montalembert has expressed in language not more eloquent than true, the horrors of this system: "the most ancient abbeys, the most illustrious in the history of the Church and of our country, were made the appanage of the bastards of kings or of their still more unworthy favourites, sometimes the price of the foul favours of a royal favourite." Yet bad as this is, the real state of the case as laid bare by M. Gérin was worse still. For the corruption would have been much less fatal had it been confined to the circle immediately surrounding the monarch. In fact, the revenues of the Church were systematically employed as a means of bribing the whole of the upper classes. This was effected first by granting abbeys, both of men and women, *in commendam*, to persons who were not only not religious, but in very many cases were in no sense ecclesiastics, and had often not the least intention of ever being so. Henry IV. carried the matter even farther. Not content with the abbeys, he heaped bishoprics upon his lay favourites. Crillon, for instance, held the temporalities of two archbishoprics, three bishoprics, and an abbey. But we are not sure that the plan followed by Lewis XIV. was not even more mischievous. For he systematically granted large pensions, payable out of the revenues, both of bishoprics and abbeys. For instance, the Bishop of Mende wrote to Colbert, in 1668, that he had to pay one pension of 2,300 livres, three others of 1,500 each, two of 1,200, two of 1,000; altogether, 11,200 livres. His object was not to obtain relief from these payments, but to peti-

* Newman's Lectures on Anglican Difficulties.

tion the king to give him some additional preferment, to enable him to meet them. Thus a bishop was never really independent in his circumstances. His proper revenues were charged with enormous payments, and he was continually a suitor to the minister, either for abbeys *in commendam*, or for similar pensions payable out of some abbey or see held by some one else. No means could have been devised so sure to combine all the evils of an endowed and a disendowed church, of wealth and of poverty. For the property of the Church being known to be great, the people felt, of course, no obligation to support their pastors, and yet these in their turn could only obtain an income by perpetual petitions to the minister. We have no room to copy instances of this; the chapter to which we have referred is full of them, all in minute detail.

No wonder that courtiers, accustomed to consider rich abbeys and bishoprics merely as funds to be given by the king to whom he would, lost all sense of any thing sacred in the property of the Church. There were not wanting men logical enough to draw the legitimate conclusion from the recognized practice, and M. Gérin shows that several writers, who might fairly be taken as representatives of the Court, avowed the principle that the property of the Church belonged to the king, and that he might do with it whatever he pleased. This was the principle which Burke denounced with equal eloquence and logic.* But he was certainly mistaken in supposing that, in France at least, it was first introduced by the Revolution. Our author says:—

It is a common-place of our day to deplore, in the interests of royalty itself, that Lewis XIV. gave way so miserably to the spirit of his age by degrading all orders of the state under the feet of royalty. How comes it that our historians, so sensitive about the humiliation of the nobles, the parliaments, the communes, the provincial assemblies, are so little attentive to relate or blame, nay, so much disposed to praise, the incessant encroachments of the crown upon the power of the Church? Jansenistic and revolutionary prejudices, and the unpopularity with which they have surrounded the Church, are the only explanation of this injustice, against which, thank God, eloquent voices have before now protested.

* It can hardly be necessary to explain that Catholics, in supporting Mr. Gladstone's measure on the Irish Establishment, did not for a moment accept these principles. That body was merely a creation of the State, and the property it held had been taken by the State from its rightful owners, and given by it to its own creatures. The right of the Establishment could never rise higher than its source. That Mr. Gladstone and his Ministry felt that their measure was really defensible only on this ground is plain by the fact that they respected all private endowments. Had the same reserve been observed in France the whole property of the Church would have been secure.

The crown desired to make the Church a slave like everything else. The French clergy did not resist with sufficient courage. It belonged to the Holy See alone to recall them to their duties, and to defend their rights. . . .

According to the theories of the French legists the Church obtained the right of holding property only by the concession of the sovereign, who had the power to withdraw it, and the maxims applied to the property of the clergy by the Constituent Assembly, the Convention, and Napoleon, were known, accepted, and favoured by the counsellors of Lewis XIV.

In 1650 Antoine Estienne, first printer and bookseller in ordinary to the king, published, with privilege, at Paris, under the pseudonym of Francis Paumier, a Remonstrance to His Majesty as to his authority over the temporalities of the Church. He said :—"The kings of France have a supreme right over the temporalities of all the Churches in the realm, with full power to use them in the necessities of the State for the benefit of their subjects, as their Council may advise. . . . One of the principal reasons why the dispensation and permission to acquire property, contrary to the ancient statutes of the kingdom, has been given to the clergy by the piety of our kings, is that they and their successors may have a resource always at hand, ready and powerful at all times, in any measure that the public necessities may suggest."

At the very period of which we are treating, a very able legist of whom Colbert had made use to attack the prerogatives of the Church, the *maître des requêtes*, De Fayer de Boutigny, composed his famous treatise on "The Authority of Kings in the Administration of the Church," in which he attributes to the king of France a supremacy over the Church both temporal and even spiritual, which made both Popes and Councils superfluous. The absolute sovereignty of the monarch as political magistrate extends over everything which is done, and over everything which exists in his kingdom, over things as well as persons ecclesiastical ; and if it be objected that the objects of the Faith, dogmas and sacraments, are not subject to him, Le Vayer boldly replies that he has both the right and the duty of taking cognizance of them in his character of Most Christian King and Protector of the Canons.

This celebrated theory, which sums up in a learned and well-connected form all the pretensions of lay Gallicanism, does not sensibly differ from the Anglican doctrine—the religious supremacy of Henry VIII. or Queen Victoria. It may well be supposed that in taking such liberties with the spiritual, the legists, Colbert's hirelings, did not spare the temporal domain of the Church (p. 80).

He shows by several quotations that they claimed for the king the most absolute power to take whatever Church property he pleased, when, as, and for what purposes he pleased.

Our author remarks that Innocent XI. not only felt it his duty to defend the temporal possessions of the Church, but that living when he did, between the so-called Reformation and the French Revolution, history gave him no example of a revolution seizing the temporalities of the Church which did not also set up a new

religion, so that he felt that he was defending the teaching of the Church as well as its possessions.

As to Lewis himself, great as were his offences, we cannot but wonder that they were not more heinous when we calmly consider that he came to the throne at four years of age, and was trained to believe that kings might do whatever they pleased, that as to morals especially, the sixth commandment did not apply to them, and also, that while the lives and properties of all their subjects were absolutely at their disposal, the Church, and all it had, belonged to them by a special and peculiar right. Contemporaries said most truly that the Gallican view was to substitute the infallibility of the king of France for the infallibility of the Pope (p. 469). Feydeau, a doctor of the Sorbonne, has left among his private papers a memorandum dated January 27, 1688:—"I find that the infallibility of the Court is not to be traced to Mazarin, who was willing enough to change, but to Colbert, who suggested it to the king." It is greatly to the honour of Lewis XIV. that instead of requiring to be restrained by his advisers, he was, as M. Gérin (and indeed all other historians) has often occasion to point out, always less unjust, less tyrannical, less rapacious than they wished him to be. We cannot help bearing this in mind in reading the history of his later years, of the reformation of his moral life, and especially of the succession of severe sorrows and humiliations, both in his kingdom and in his family, with which it pleased Him who chastises all whom He loves, to visit him in his declining years.

It is the signal punishment of kings who pollute the sanctuary of God, by lavishing upon worthless minions the property and the sacred offices of the Church, that their own minds are of necessity degraded and corrupted by finding themselves always surrounded by men of the one class most hateful and contemptible in the sight not of man alone, but of God—servile, cringing, flattering, covetous, profligate ecclesiastics. Surely out of hell itself no man could possibly be surrounded by creatures more vile. Lewis was far too able and keen-sighted not to esteem his flatterers as they deserved. It is terrible to think of the contempt with which they must have been regarded by a politician such as Colbert, before whom they were never weary of ostentatiously exposing the foulest deformities of their base characters. Hideous, indeed, are the records of this sort which M. Gérin has found preserved among the ministers' papers—for instance the letters written by Bourlemont, Bishop of Castres, to Bonzy, Bishop of Beziers, and to Colbert himself, on the occasion of the quarrel of Lewis against Alexander VII. about the Corsicans,—letters which, as M. Gérin says, lay open to us the heart of a Gallican Bishop under Lewis XIV. In reading these letters one's first feeling is, that nothing could add to the baseness they make

a parade of. Yet, surely, it does add something even to it, to find that one of them, addressed by one bishop to his friend another bishop, must have been sent by him to Colbert. He no doubt felt that he was doing his friend good service. Colbert evidently felt that the French Church was useful only because its property enabled the king to make slaves of all the nobility of his kingdom, and because it provided magnificent appanages for all his own kindred—sons, brothers, nephews, cousins. He would probably have felt it an act of virtuous and patriotic disinterestedness to have swept away it and its possessions at a stroke.

What Alexander VIII. felt of these men, he expressed to Cardinal de Bouillon—

What the king wished was the only thing that signified ; what the bishops who were nominated might do, made no difference. He knew the system of France, and the extent to which the authority of the king had been carried, well enough to be sure that the bishops would have no other sentiments and no other religion than those of the king ; that if the king wished the bishops of France to make a schism with the Holy See they would hardly hesitate to obey him ; that if, on the contrary, the king's intention were that they should declare the Pope infallible in right and in fact, the same bishops would make whatever declaration was required of them on that subject. That was his opinion of the Church of France (p. 434).

Lewis himself said of his bishops, "no thanks to these gentlemen that I have not assumed the turban. I have only three bishops in my dominions" (page 260). These were exactly those who had refused to fall in with his plans—Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix ; Lavardin, Bishop of Rennes ; and the Bishop of Grenoble. Fénelon was not yet a bishop. When the Abbé de Polignac had been sent to him by Alexander VIII., and had had a long conversation with him, he said, "I have been talking with a man, and that a young man, who has always contradicted me without my ever being able to be angry with him for a single moment."

No doubt it is most likely that, if Lewis had thought fit to have made himself Head of the Church in France, he would have encountered no serious opposition from such men as de Harlay or Bourlemont. Yet we can hardly doubt that, even among the least promising of his ecclesiastics, some would have been found, who would have stopped short when they saw before them the abyss into which they were required to plunge. There were some among that noble army of martyrs and confessors who threw new glory upon the Church of France a century later, from whom little would have been expected beforehand. One, at least, of the Court Prelates of the Assembly of 1682, and at that time one of the least respected of them all, Chavigny, Bishop of Troyes, sixteen years later

resigned his bishopric to retire into a life of strict penance and solitude. One of our own most glorious martyrs under Henry VIII. had in earlier life expressed himself in a manner, to say the least, very unsatisfactory upon the supremacy of the Holy See, in defence of which he gained his crown. We by no means believe that Lewis XIV., despotic as he was, could have renewed the work of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, and have made France a Protestant nation. They were assisted by a combination of circumstances which had gone by before his time, and which, in the nature of things, can never return. Protestantism, in their day, was just rushing out from the open gate of hell (like the winds from the cavern of Æolus) a living energetic power of Satan. Such is the nature of all heresies. But not less is it their nature very soon to sink into indifference and languor, and from thence to utter death. Protestantism, which is now dead, and only dangerous by the pestilence engendered by its corrupting corpse, was already sick to death at the end of the seventeenth century. Lewis might have done much mischief, but it would have required power far greater than his, greater than all the power of earth and hell, to put new life into that dying heresy.

Neither are we to think that the wretched flatterers of Lewis XIV. were really what they called themselves, the Church of France. M. Gérin says, after going through the members of the Assembly one by one,—

Is there one among these priests and bishops whose name can be mentioned as that of a man who lived and saved souls like S. Francis of Sales, S. Charles Borromeo, S. Vincent of Paul, Berolle, Olier, Cæsar de Bus? Is there one whose name has been attached to any great Christian institution—to any important reform of discipline and manners? Which of them exercised a salutary influence on his contemporaries? Which of them whose memory is still blessed by generations who, kneeling before the altars, call him their spiritual father? (p. 259).

And then he mentions several men living at the time whose names are not to be found on the list. Lavardin, bishop of Rennes, to whom Lewis gave the testimony we have just quoted. The Abbé Aligre, and the great preachers and theologians of that age, Mascaron, Fléchier, Bourdaloue, Fénelon, Huet, Mabillon, Thomassin, Rancé, Tronson, Brisacier, Tiberge, La Salle, La Chetardie, and many more. There is but one man whose name we regret to see among the list of such a council, if it were to be held—that one is Bossuet.

We have left ourselves no room to dwell upon M. Gérin's two last chapters. The ninth details the contest between the king and the Pope. It is better known than other parts of this history, because its nature has attracted the attention of secular

historians. But upon this he has thrown much new light. Innocent XI. refused to accept any man who had taken part in the Assembly of 1682, when offered for a bishoprick. Lewis nominated two. Their Bulls were refused, and the king forbade any other of his nominees to receive his Bulls as long as theirs were refused. This went on for years, until there were more than thirty sees vacant in France. The king and his flatterers threw the blame on the Pope. The Pope published his declaration that he was ready to grant Bulls to any nominee of the king who had not been a member of the Assembly, or who, having been so, would make a fitting retractation. The dispute was further embittered by the question of the "franchises," which we have already mentioned. Innocent declared that he would receive no ambassador who did not engage to give up the claim which was destructive of the peace and moral order of Rome. Every other European king agreed to resign so odious a privilege. Lewis alone refused. The Pope sent an embassy to entreat him. The Nuncio mentioned that the emperor and all other monarchs in Europe had acceded to the desire of the Pope, but Lewis haughtily replied that God had placed him in a position to set the example to others, and to follow that of no man. He refused to surrender the franchise. Innocent declared that he would receive no ambassador by whom they were claimed. Lewis resolved to send an ambassador to Rome, in spite of the Pope's refusal, and to support him by an overwhelming military force. He selected expressly for the purpose the most haughty and overbearing man he could find, who entered Rome by force, attended with a military array. Upon this Innocent excommunicated him. The ambassador, in despite of the excommunication, went to the midnight mass at the Church of S. Lewis of France, and the Pope placed the Church under an interdict. There were not wanting men among the advisers of Lewis who urged him to make a direct schism by directing his nominations to bishoprics to the archbishop of the province, and those to archbishoprics to the provincial bishops. But unscrupulous as he was, Lewis refused to be guilty of a crime which would have placed him by the side of Henry VIII. To any length short of that he was prepared to go. He seized Avignon, and arrested a bishop living peaceably in the Pope's dominions, and by an act worthy of Napoleon himself, committed him to prison at Ré, giving instructions that he should be made uncomfortable on his journey, and should be told that he was to be transported to Canada—which in those days was not unlike being banished to another planet. He even instructed his ministers to appeal in his name to a future general council. This appeal was made in the presence of the archbishop of Paris and of the Père La Chaise.

But he would not quite take the step, which would have consummated the schism. The Pope was firm, and at last the king gave way. When Innocent XI. died he sent an ambassador to the new Pope, Alexander VIII., authorizing him to give up the claim to the "franchise." At last he allowed the men nominated to bishoprics to sue for their Bulls, and those who had been members of the Assembly made their recantation in the terms demanded by the Pope. Lewis XIV. himself wrote a letter to the Pope promising that his edict enforcing the four articles should be without force or effect. It is characteristic that care was taken to conceal this submission, and it was never known in France for a century. M. Gérin in fact gives many details about it never published until now.

We attach great importance to the publication of this work, and feel that M. Gérin has done the Church great service. Some men may be inclined to regard the question as merely historical. But in truth it is far more. It is important that the world should know that it is a mere error to suppose that Gallican principles ever were received by the Church of France; that they were merely put forward by a handful of the flatterers of Lewis XIV., not less to the disgust of the true church of France in their own days than in ours. And this M. Gérin has made so plain that nothing but ignorance or disingenuousness can in future deny it.

ART. V.—MR. TROLLOPE'S LAST IRISH NOVEL.

Phineas Finn, the Irish Member. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. London: Virtue & Co.

MR. ANTHONY TROLLOPE wishes to be a member of Parliament. It is difficult to understand why he of all men should be smitten by such a sore temptation. He possesses an enduring fountain of fame and fortune in his own imagination. He speaks to a constituency as wide as the limits of the English language, who are never weary of hearing him. He can hardly be supposed to have retained to this time of his life any illusions as to the magic value of the letters M.P. He knows by sad experience what a nauseous task it ordinarily is to canvass a British borough. He is evidently aware of what is "behind the scenes" of the House, as well as if he had sat through half a dozen Parliaments. Yet he still feels the mysterious longing to lounge with his hat on in the presence of Mr. Speaker, and to form the 365th unit in a great party division, as strongly as any youth who leads his

side with laurels in a college debating society. Why should not some Irish constituency do itself the honour of gratifying this harmless propensity? Alas, or rather *ochone!* the standard of the Irish member of the present day, and so far as can be seen of the coming time, is not a very elevated one. A sort of curious hybrid of lawyer and grazier seems to be the favourite type of candidate rising steadily in popular favour. The Irish member of the last generation was often dissipated, sometimes disreputable; but he had generally good manners and good education, was even occasionally an accomplished scholar, and, for the rest, he did what the great Dan bade him to do. Nowadays, with a dozen to a score of exceptions, nothing can be more dull, witless, commonplace—in a word, un-Irish—than the character of the Irish members on both sides of the House. If Mr. Trollope were to get the chance from some disgusted borough, we should begin to see our way to the end of this system, for he would be irresistibly tempted to write a book with portraits of some of his colleagues; and the effect, though caustic, would be salutary. Besides, Mr. Trollope would, if he were to succeed in the House at all, succeed far better, in our opinion, as an Irish than as an English or a Scotch member. His Irish sympathies are strangely deep, and true, and tender. He has half-avowed that he would even wish to be a Catholic if he only could; and he would find it so easy in Ireland. “I love their religion,” he says in his book on North America. “There is something beautiful and almost divine in the faith and obedience of a true son of the Holy Mother. I sometimes fancy that I would fain be a Roman Catholic if I could, as also I would often wish to be still a child, if that were possible.” But this is exactly the way our Lord put it, when, on a memorable occasion, he said, “Amen, I say to you, unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of Heaven.” Then Mr. Trollope would succeed admirably well, we have little doubt, in winning and in keeping the confidence of an Irish Catholic constituency, if only he were not out-bellied and out-bribed in the first instance by some fresh combination of Smithfield and the Four Courts. Meantime, his exact apprehension of the true difficulty to be settled in Ireland is significantly indicated in his last Irish novel. It is, after its fashion, a contribution to the literature of the Land Question, and has, we imagine, by its light but effective touches, helped to shape the growing conviction among English people, who read and think, that something large and liberal must be done to meet the wishes and the wants of the Irish in regard to the land on which they live.

The qualities of Mr. Trollope's Irish novels have never, in our opinion, been adequately acknowledged. He holds a place, not only unrivalled, but undisputed, as the realistic portrayer of the middle classes of English society, and as, what we may venture to call, the "champion" delineator of the Anglican clergy. He is not a satirist like Mr. Thackeray, but his quiet humour plays a part in his pictures of domestic life like that of light reading in serious study; it comes in, and brightens up things and persons, blending pleasantly with business. He is not a sentimentalist like Mr. Dickens, but he has and avows, though he does not parade, deep feelings, which run in legitimate and wholesome channels, and are never morbid or exaggerated. The young English lady, the Government official, and the genus "clergyman," divided into all its species, are to be found in his pages, depicted with realism as complete in its effect as it is ingenious in its processes. Mr. Trollope works by slight, delicate touches; he avoids glare, and while producing the strongest and truest contrasts, never proclaims them. No humourist or satirist has ever produced two more telling pictures than those of Mark Robarts and Mr. Crawley, and yet there is nothing of "look on that picture and on this" in his style of exhibiting them. He makes his readers feel the characteristics of the young clergyman, to whom his parish is a speculation, to be worked to the best profit—quite within the bounds of honesty, no doubt—but still entirely to his own advantage, in respect of its chances of promotion, and its opportunities of society, at once socially and pecuniarily profitable. Mark Robarts is a gentleman, not in the least tinged with hypocrisy, but he is entirely free from the idea of any spiritual relation between him and his parishioners, and transacts his business quite consistently, not being chargeable with violating an ideal which he never entertained. The effect of this character is almost entirely produced by the atmosphere of the story, one of busy, bustling worldliness, and full of futile vexations. The famous character of Archdeacon Grantley is perfectly sustained throughout this story of "Framley Parsonage," and offers a third side of clerical variety, totally different from that of Mark Robarts, and as unlike Mr. Crawley, in whom Mr. Trollope has depicted with great success an enthusiastic mind, a cultivated but eccentric intellect, a highly sensitive conscience, an altogether superior nature, depreciated by inharmonious surroundings, harassed by circumstances and relations inconsistent with its calling, unable to impress itself upon others except by its inequalities and eccentricities, and consumed by pride and self-isolation. In each and all his portraitures, even

in that one in which alone, tempted by the applause and amusement of the public, he has slightly degenerated into caricature—Dr. Proudie—he conveys, whether intentionally or not, the instability, the disunion, the earthliness, so to speak, of the Anglican system, in which every man is a law to himself, and finds it easier to break than to define his own enactments. In the good-humoured but acute truthfulness which constitutes the subtle attraction of Mr. Trollope's writings, even in the case of those readers who are not aware that what they are instinctively pleased with in fiction is its truth, there is an argument against the possibility of such a system as that so impartially illustrated, being a living, working, spiritual means of successfully combating the world, and saving men's souls. Mr. Crawley is a very good man, and does his work diligently; but his work no more meets the needs of human souls than does that of the hen-pecked bishop, the keen and covetous archdeacon, the cultivated, scholarly Dean Arabin, or the uncouth but earnest Mr. Saul. All these men, estimable in their way, and drawn with perfect fidelity to their types, are in the world and of it, cultivating its friendship, conforming to its ideal, and wholly devoid of any suspicion that they occupy a false position, or are the accredited servants of a mission with any other or higher purpose. In his first study of clerical life, "The Warden," Mr. Trollope presented a mere ideal character. There was an elevation of tone, a sweetness and simplicity about Mr. Harding quite different from the characteristics of any of his successors, but they were used to illustrate the alienation between the man and the system he lived under, and constituted him, in fact, an anachronism. Mr. Trollope's plain-spoken common sense recognizes and treats the Anglican system as the purely human institution it is, wise and beneficent in many respects, eminently respectable, and a conservative power in the state. But if the reader doubts that he has a comprehension—perhaps unconscious,—certainly not fully explained to himself or followed out to its utmost conclusions of something higher and truer, something which replies to the imperative demands of humanity in its uttermost needs, and apart from the constitution of the social polity,—let him turn from the series of admirable works which begins with "The Warden" and ends with "The Last Chronicle of Barset," to a comparatively unknown story of Irish life, called "The MacDermots of Ballycloran." Let him contrast the most serious passages in any of these novels, the most distinctly implicatory of the ties supposed to exist between Anglican clergymen and their parishioners (whoever thinks of using the terms "flock," or

“people,” or conceives of them apart from boundaries and assessments?)—to the interview between Thady MacDermot in the condemned cell and Father Tom. The Irish parish priest, not a gentlemanly person, by no means refined, whose manners would not have entitled him to wait at Archdeacon Grantley’s well-spread table, or to carry Mrs. Proudie’s prayer-book; who scrupulously watches over his people’s morals, settles their disputes, shares their festivities, and duns them for his “dues;” whose shrewdness is equal to his kindness, and whose language is as homely as his dress; this man, without the least inconsistency, without any variation of his plainness and simplicity of speech, rises to extreme grandeur in that supreme hour. Before his unspeakable tenderness, the dreadful solitude, the irresistible isolation of the condemned criminal disappears; in the presence of the awful consolations which he brings the bitterness of death to a young man in the fulness of his health and strength is subdued; in the fulness of his charity the agony of condemnation, of punishment is allayed—in the sure and certain hope—to whose truth the life of the priest, at once father and friend to the young man who has to die, has been a constant witness—the poor, trembling, puzzled creature rests, and gathers firmness for the end. The simple authority of the Divine Message, the combination with it of exquisite human tenderness,—the perfect trust and submission of the young man towards the priest, and the frank communion of a warm friendship between the two, elevate this scene far above any other achievement of the author, and bear witness to his power of treating the deeper things of the heart and the spirit with as much fidelity as those more common-place and surface aspects of human life with which he habitually deals. There is a significant satisfaction to the Catholic reader in studying the instinctive recognition by this master of the realistic school of his art, of the attitude towards suffering humanity held respectively by the priests of the Church of God, and the exponents of the infinite “perhaps” into which every form of revolt against that Church inevitably drifts. He sees and feels the truth without seeking for its origin, and he portrays it without defining its source. Father Tom in the condemned cell is the authorized bearer of the Sacramental graces which overcome “the last enemy, even death,” of the Divine pardon, and the Bread of Life. This, which can never belong to the minister, who, however pious and conscientious, is no more than a counsellor and consoler in the human sense of such ministrations, transfigures the humble, homely, village priest.

The beauty, the skill, and the variety of Mr. Trollope's delineations of Irish character, his good taste in resisting the temptation to caricature, the yielding to which has been the bane of native Irish novelists, his rendering of the innocent *malice* (in its French meaning) of the humour of the peasantry, and his capital pictures of the out-at-elbow condition of the impoverished gentry, in whose poverty there is nothing sordid, and everything improvident and inconvenient, can hardly be thoroughly appreciated except by readers who know Ireland well. The English public with whom he is so popular would probably feel, without exactly analyzing them, the truth and the cleverness, the quaintness, the humour, and the pathos of "the MacDermots," but we doubt whether they could appreciate "Castle Richmond," or realize the exact fidelity of the social relations set forth in "The Kellys and the O'Kellys." The difficulties and complications of the Fitzgeralds of Castle Richmond are totally unlike the difficulties and complications which sometimes beset English baronets, and are understood and discussed in a totally different spirit, and the small trading element in England has nothing in common with the proceedings of the widow Kelly, and her estimable but crafty and calculating son. The fun and ingenuity of the story every one can understand, but Anty Lynch and her brother, the young ladies at the widow's shop, and "the lord" who is not an absentee, and is consequently beloved, but who is very poor, and therefore more beloved, are best tasted in the land of their growth. And herein is one of Mr. Trollope's greatest triumphs. That he should have written Irish stories with which English readers are much pleased and amused is not surprising, but that his Irish stories should be thoroughly satisfactory to Irish readers, who know the country and the people, this is an achievement which is to be measured by its extreme rarity. The rollicking country gentlemen, the absurdly lavish and insanely quarrelsome western magnates, the preposterous priests, the impossible lawyers, the flirting, ignorant, hoydenish horsewomen, the all-conquering military puppies, who performed Irish characters under the direction of Mr. Lever, and still occasionally make a dreary re-appearance in the quavering diatribes of Cornelius O'Dowd, amused English and Irish readers alike, partly because they were genuinely though coarsely amusing, and partly because English readers believed they were really something like people who had an actual existence in Ireland; while Irish readers knew they were not. Nobody was offended by them, they were too impartially absurd. The drunken, profane, and scheming Irish priest was no more unlike reality than the drunken,

rollicking, loose-tongued English nobleman, whose vicerealty was merely a saturnalia of feasting, singing, good stories, and low company. Baby Blake was not more unlike an ordinary Irish girl of good birth than Lady Charlotte Hilton was unlike a highly-placed English matron, or than Mrs. Paul Rooney was unlike any one who ever existed in any country. But though all these grotesque creations passed muster very well and annoyed nobody, they made it a more difficult and thankless task than before for a novelist who was not Gerald Griffin, or John Banim, or William Carleton, to please and amuse English readers without depicting Irish character as it is not, and to satisfy Irish readers by exhibiting it as it is. This task Mr. Trollope has accomplished, and from its execution he has passed to one of equal difficulty, in which his success has been quite as complete, and much more generally recognized. We allude to the combination of English and Irish life and character in his late novel, "Phineas Finn."

The recognition of the great ability displayed in "Phineas Finn," of the perfection with which Mr. Trollope's well-known characteristics are reproduced, and the exhibition of some new facilities and qualities, has been sufficiently general to give this novel a marked and singular place among the author's numerous works; but the especial cleverness of it, the distinctive feature which renders it unlike its predecessors, and an advance upon them all, has not, in our opinion, been sufficiently examined. Here are phases of Irish life—types of Irish character as perfect, as true, as exhaustive as any which he has portrayed, transported into the social and political atmosphere of England, blended with those English "interiors," in the production of which he is unapproached. Apart from the hero of the story, the handsome young Irish M.P. for Loughshane, there are notable personages in this book who will be numbered with the most memorable of their predecessors. Phineas Finn is a representative man, as correctly and simply as any of the parsons, or as Adolphus Crosbie and Johnny Eames; while the only "girl" in modern fiction who can compare with Lily Dale of "The Small House" is Mary Flood Jones, of Killaloe. The two girls are entirely different, not only in the *signalement* which Mr. Trollope has the art to make so expressive that one feels as if his stories were illustrated by portraits of striking likeness, but in the development of themselves throughout, as in their tastes and their destiny; but they are both completely real, both charming, and Mary Flood Jones is as essentially an Irish as Lily Dale is thoroughly an English girl. The colloquies of Mary with Barbara Finn are as natural and spontaneous

as Lily's talks with her sister Bell, and much to the same purpose ; but the fun, the light satire, the *finesse* of the one are utterly different from the quiet wisdom, the acuteness, and the humour veiling itself from the simpler listener, and enjoying the trifling perplexities it creates, of the other. In delicacy of mind, in refinement of feeling, in all that constitutes the true gentlewoman, and which Mr. Trollope has such rare tact in conveying, the two girls are equal, but Mary Flood Jones would never have loved Adolphus Crosbie, but Lily Dale would never have forgiven Phineas Finn. The picture of the little household at Allington is as sweet, as sunny, and as true as any home picture that ever was painted, and the evenings in which Crosbie won Lily's heart are memorable. Just as minutely excellent is the entirely different picture of Dr. Malachi Finn's house at Killaloe in the county Clare, and the tea-parties at which Phineas Finn, aided assiduously by his sister Barbara, carries on his flirtation with that Mary who is "as pretty as ever she could be." This little bit of description is a match for the walk home from Uncle Dale's.

When the girls went down into the drawing-room Mary was careful to go to a part of the room quite apart from Phineas, so as to seat herself between Mrs. Finn and Dr. Finn's young partner, Mr. Elias Bodkin, from Ballinasloe. But Mrs. Finn, and the Misses Finn, and all Killaloe knew that Mary had no love for Mr. Bodkin, and when Mr. Bodkin handed her the hot cake she barely so much as smiled at him. But in two minutes Phineas was behind her chair, and then she smiled ; and in five minutes more she had got herself so twisted round that she was sitting in a corner with Phineas and his sister Barbara ; and in two more minutes Barbara had returned to Mr. Elias Bodkin, so that Phineas and Mary were uninterrupted. They manage these things very quickly and very cleverly in Killaloe.

"I shall be off to-morrow morning by the early train," said Phineas.

"So soon ; and when will you have to begin—in Parliament I mean ?"

"I shall have to take my seat on Friday. I'm going back just in time."

"But when shall we hear of your saying something ?"

"Never, probably. Not one in ten who go into Parliament ever do say anything."

"But, you will, won't you ? I hope you will. I do hope you will distinguish yourself, because of your sister, and for the sake of the town, you know."

"And is that all, Mary ?"

"Isn't that enough ?"

"You don't care a bit about myself, then ?"

"You know that I do. Haven't we been friends ever since we were

children? Of course it will be a great pride to me that a person whom I have ever known should come to be talked about as a great man."

"I shall never be talked about as a great man."

"You're a great man to me already, being in Parliament. Only think,—I never saw a member of Parliament before."

"You've seen the Bishop scores of times."

"Is he in Parliament? Ah, but not like you. He couldn't come to be a cabinet minister, and one never reads anything about him in the newspapers. I shall expect to see your name very often, and I shall always look for it. 'Mr. Phineas Finn paired off with Mr. Mildmay.' What is the meaning of pairing off?"

"I'll explain it all to you when I come back, after learning my lesson."

"Mind you do come back. But I don't suppose you ever will. You will be going somewhere to see Lady Laura Standish when you are not wanted in Parliament."

"Lady Laura Standish!"

"And why shouldn't you? Of course, with your prospects you should go as much as possible among people of that sort. Is Lady Laura very pretty?"

"She's about six feet high."

"Nonsense. I don't believe that."

"She would look as though she were, standing by you."

"Because I am so insignificant and small."

"Because your figure is perfect, and she is straggling. She is as unlike you as possible in everything. She has thick lumpy red hair, while yours is all silk and softness. She has large hands and feet, and——"

"Why Phineas, you are making her out to be an ogress, and yet I know that you admire her."

"So I do, because she possesses such an appearance of power. And after all, in spite of the lumpy hair, and in spite of large hands and straggling figure, she is handsome. One can't tell what it is. One sees that she is quite contented with herself, and intends to make others contented with her. And so she does."

"I see you are in love with her, Phineas."

"No, not in love,—not with her at least. Of all men in the world, I suppose I am the last that has a right to be in love. I daresay I shall marry some day."

"I am sure I hope you will."

"But not till I am forty or perhaps fifty years old. If I was not fool enough to have what men call a high ambition, I might venture to be in love now."

"I'm sure I'm very glad that you've got a high ambition. It is what every man ought to have, and I have no doubt that we shall hear of your marriage soon,—very soon. And then,—if she can help you in your ambition, we—shall—all—be—so—glad."

Mr. Trollope does not succeed in dialogue merely because he makes it natural and characteristic, but also because he

takes the trouble of writing in the small things which people really do say, even on momentous and exceptional occasions, and which the lower orders of novelists agree to leave out. Whatever be the subject on which he makes his people talk, whether it be the familiar, finessing dialogue of flirtation, the measured speech of political discussion, the hurried language of quarrel, the "high-polite" of conversation when a great lady who is also clever holds *salon*, or the unceremonious colloquy of men of business discussing matters of money, he makes them all natural. His lovers do not talk rhapsody, his politicians do not talk pamphlets.

The departure of Phineas Finn for London is a truly Irish scene, when everybody gets up to see him off, his father gives him an extra twenty-pound note, and begs him for God's sake to be careful about his money, his mother tells him always to have an orange in his hand when he intends to speak longer than usual, and Barbara begs him never to forget dear Mary Flood Jones. The whole of his history is symbolized in those three injunctions, and every one knows how he observed them, and into what company money, politics, and love-making (which Mr. Trollope knows how to distinguish with amazing subtlety from love), brought Phineas Finn, the Irish member, "whose nature was to be pleasant."

Mr. Trollope is the one existing English novelist who writes about great people without any affectation, and with easy acquaintance with their manners and ways of life. He does not affect to despise rank, or to regard social inequality as a stupid sham, in which the man who takes precedence is usually a fool, and in everything but his name the inferior of the man whom he precedes. His noblemen are gentlemen, and the persons whom he introduces to their society are at ease in it. The Irish member, who is the son of a doctor in a small country town, is quite in his place at an earl's dinner-table, and in the drawing-room of an earl's daughter. He is neither insolent, sarcastic, nor fawning, nor are the great people who like him guilty of the insolence of patronizing, or the vulgarity of lionizing him. Lady Laura Standish is not one of Mr. Trollope's best portraits. She fails to attract that perfect sympathy, which he usually commands for every one for whom he desires it, but she is an exact representation of a woman of rank, in a great social position, and her individuality is as marked as that of any of Mr. Trollope's more interesting female characters. The Brentford family is the antithesis of the De Courcy family, and Lord Chiltern is perhaps on the whole the most dramatic and picturesque personage to be found in the writer's books, winning a certain sympathy, notwithstand-

ing his fierce, impetuous nature, and his gloomy temper, by his inexorable truthfulness. While the reader is following the fortunes of Phineas Finn in Parliament, in the flowery but unsafe ways of "society," and in his complicated sentimental relations, he is also kept *en rapport* with that racy Irish life which Phineas abandons, and which furnishes so striking a contrast to and comment upon the dignified activity of Grosvenor-square, and the ponderous wealth and sullen misery of Loughlinter, the splendid residence of Lady Laura's husband. From Loughlinter to Killaloe one turns with keen pleasure, recognizing the skill and the truth with which the great lady's loveless marriage is made to bring its swift punishment, and the enduring, unselfish faith, hope, and charity of the humble Irish girl also bear their fruit in due season. This book contains an entire gallery of highly-finished portraits, which are striking instances of the minute care and pains with which Mr. Trollope does his work. His knowledge of the machinery of Parliamentary affairs is very remarkable; he displays it in numberless ways, evidently knowing exactly the technical nature of the business of every man officially connected with the working of the great system, and taking a keen interest in every detail. Nor are his political sketches one-sided or confined to the select ranks of "the House." No writer in England, except it be the author of "Felix Holt," could have produced such a picture as that of Mr. Bunce, in whose house in Great Marlborough-street Phineas Finn takes lodgings when he relinquishes his chambers and "goes in" for fashion and "place."

Mr. Bunce was a copying journeyman, who spent ten hours a day in Carey Street, with a pen between his fingers; and after that he would spend two or three hours of the night, with a pen between his fingers, in Marlborough Street. He was a thoroughly hard-working man, doing pretty well in the world, for he had a good house over his head, and always could find raiment and bread for his eight children; but nevertheless he was an unhappy man, because he suffered from political grievances, or, I should more correctly say, that his grievances were semi-political and semi-social. He had no vote, not being himself the tenant of the house in Great Marlborough Street. The tenant was a tailor, who occupied the shop, whereas Bunce occupied the whole of the remainder of the premises. He was a lodger, and lodgers were not yet trusted with the franchise. And he had ideas, which he himself admitted to be very sad, as to the injustice of the manner in which he was paid for his work. So much a folio, without reference to the way in which his work was done, without regard to the success of his work, with no questions asked of himself, was, as he thought, no proper way of remunerating a man for his labours. He had long since joined a trades' union, and for two years past had paid a subscription of a shilling a week towards its funds. He

longed to be doing some battle against his superiors ; not that he objected personally to his employers, who always made much of him as a useful man, but because some such antagonism would be manly, and the fighting of some battle would be the right thing to do. "If Labour don't want to go to the wall himself," Bunce would say to his wife, "labour must look alive and put somebody else there." Mrs. Bunce was a comfortable, motherly woman, who loved her husband, but hated politics. As he had an aversion to his superiors in this world because they were his superiors, so had she a liking for them for the same reason. She despised people poorer than herself, and thought it a fair subject for boasting that her children always had meat for dinner. If it was ever so small a morsel she took care they had it, that the boast might be maintained. The world had once or twice been almost too much for her ; when, for instance, her husband had been ill, and again, for the last three months of that long period in which Phineas had omitted to pay his bills ; but she had kept a fine, brave heart during those troubles, and could honestly swear that the children always had a bit of meat, though she herself had been without it for days together. At such times she would be more than ordinarily courteous to the old lady who lodged in her first-floor drawing-room, and she would excuse such servility by declaring there was no knowing how soon she might want assistance. But her husband, in such emergencies, would become furious and quarrelsome, and would declare that labour was going to the wall, and that something very strong must be done at once. That shilling which Bunce paid weekly to the union she regarded as being absolutely thrown away, as much as though he had put it weekly into the Thames. And she had told him so over and over again, making heart-piercing allusions to the eight children and to the bit of meat. He would always endeavour to explain to her that there was no other way under the sun of keeping labour from being sent to the wall ; but he would do so hopelessly, and altogether ineffectually, and she had come to regard him as a lunatic to the extent of that one weekly shilling. She had a woman's instinctive partiality for comeliness in a man, and was very fond of Phineas Finn because he was handsome. And now she was very proud of him because he was a member of Parliament. She had heard from her husband, who told her the fact with much disgust, that the sons of dukes and earls go into Parliament, and she liked to think that the fine journeyman to whom she talked more or less every day should sit with the sons of dukes and earls. When Phineas had really brought distress upon her by owing her some thirty or forty pounds, she could never bring herself to be angry with him, because he was handsome, and because he dined out with lords. And she had triumphed greatly over her husband, who had desired to be severe upon his aristocratic debtor, when the money had all been paid in a lump."

Throughout the whole of the Barchester series, including "Can You Forgive Her?" the Duke of Omnium is little more than an abstraction ; a great centre of rank and wealth ; a rallying-point for ambitious and interested scheming ; the object of homage, flattery, and apprehension ; neither so happy nor so really important a man as Plantagenet Palliser, his ex-

quisitely correct, cold-blooded heir. But in "Phineas Finn" the Duke of Omnium comes to the front, the hero of an adventure at once laughable and pathetic, and is more useful than, we suspect, Mr. Trollope had ever hitherto expected to make him. It is a smart stroke of humour to remove the Duke from the sphere of mysterious grandeur in which he had formerly dwelt, like the Dalai Lama, to render him accessory to the triumph of the Irish member, in whose favour his Grace is rejected by Madame Max Gœsler, one of the most incisively defined portraits in the author's gallery.

But the triumphs of Phineas, political and social, were not, perhaps happily for him, of long duration, and they ended in a way that is not always characteristic of Irish Parliamentary aspirants. Phineas, in a very simple, manly, and straightforward fashion, sacrifices the Under Secretaryship of the Colonies to his convictions in regard to the cause of Irish Tenant Right. Let us hope that Mr. Trollope has not effected that entirely original achievement, the writing of a historical novel in the paulopost future instead of the past tense, when he makes the crisis of his hero's fortunes concur with the disruption of a Liberal ministry on the Irish Land Question. There are at present, unfortunately, sufficient threatening symptoms of such an eventuality, though there were none when Mr. Trollope wrote his book, before even the Church question was settled. It shows Mr. Trollope's rare and thorough knowledge of the country that he was already able to state, in such a way as should not bore the readers of a novel, the conditions of that great problem of State, which is now undergoing such subtle and manifold discussion. It seems vain to inquire who are the exact originals of the leading statesmen portrayed in Phineas Finn. The figures change their shape as we observe them, blending various characteristics and precisely true to none. Mr. Turnbull has been supposed to be the pseudonym of Mr. Bright, but is not Mr. Monk much nearer to the character of the tribune turned minister?

"Come and see the country, and judge for yourself," said Phineas to Mr. Monk one day at dinner.

"I should like nothing better," said Mr. Monk.

"It has often seemed to me that men in Parliament know less about Ireland than they do of the interior of Africa," said Phineas.

"It is seldom that we know anything accurately on any subject that we have not made matter of careful study," said Mr. Monk, "and we very often do not do so even then."

Mr. Monk accordingly accepts the invitation of Phineas to

visit Ireland with him during the recess, in order to study the Irish Land Question.

This trip to Ireland had been proposed in consequence of certain ideas respecting tenant-right which Mr. Monk was beginning to adopt, and as to which the minds of politicians were becoming moved. It had been all very well to put down Fenianism, and Ribandism, and Repeal, and everything that had been put down in Ireland in the way of rebellion for the last seventy-five years. England and Ireland had been apparently joined together by laws of nature so fixed that even politicians liberal as was Mr. Monk, liberal as was Mr. Turnbull, could not trust themselves to think that disunion could be for the good of the Irish. They had taught themselves that it certainly could not be good for the English. But if it was incumbent on England to force upon Ireland the maintenance of the union for her own sake and for England's sake, because England could not afford independence established so close against her own ribs, it was at any rate necessary to England's character that the bride thus bound in a compulsory wedlock should be endowed with all the best privileges that a wife can enjoy. Let her at least not be a kept mistress. Let it be bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh if we are to live together in the married state. Between husband and wife a warm word now and then matters but little, if there be a thoroughly good understanding at bottom. But let there be that good understanding at bottom. What about this Protestant Church, and what about this tenant-right? Mr. Monk had been asking himself these questions for some time past. In regard to the Church, he had long made up his mind that the Establishment in Ireland was a crying sin. A man had married a woman whom he knew to be of a different religion from his own, and then insisted that his wife should say she believed those things which he knew very well that she did not believe. But, as Mr. Monk well knew, the subject of the Protestant Endowments in Ireland was so difficult that it would require almost more than human wisdom to adjust it. It was one of those matters which almost seemed to require the interposition of some higher power—the coming of some seemingly chance event—to clear away the evil; as a fire comes, and pestilential alleys are removed; as a famine comes, and men are driven from want, and ignorance, and dirt, to seek new homes and new thoughts across the broad waters; as a war comes, and slavery is banished from the face of the earth. But in regard to tenant-right, to some arrangement by which a tenant in Ireland might be at least encouraged to lay out what little capital he might have in labour or money without being at once called upon to pay for that outlay which was his own, as well as for the land which was not his own,—Mr. Monk thought that it was possible that if a man would look hard enough, he might perhaps see his way as far as that. He had spoken to two of his colleagues on the subject, the two men in the Cabinet whom he believed to be the most thoroughly honest in their ideas as public servants, the Duke and Mr. Gresham. There was so much to be done, and then so little was known upon the subject. “I will endeavour to study it,” said Mr. Monk. “If you can see your way, do,” said Mr. Gresham; “but of course we cannot bind ourselves.”

This is, we need hardly say, a very admirable statement of the case, and very probably a correct picture of the present situation which, however, we hope will not end in a break up of the Cabinet. Mr. Monk visits the County Clare with Phineas. Thence, he goes to Limerick, and thence to Dublin. At Limerick and in Dublin he makes speeches on the Tenant Right Question, which are not exactly to the same purpose as those which Lord Hartington and Lord Clarendon are just delivering, but on the contrary, of so popular a tendency as to involve the Minister's immediate resignation of his seat in the Cabinet.

Phineas went with Mr. Monk first to Limerick and then to Dublin ; and found himself at both places to be regarded as a hero only second to the great hero. At both places the one subject of debate was tenant-right ; could anything be done to make it profitable for men with capital to put their capital into Irish land ? The fertility of the soil was questioned by no one,—nor the sufficiency of external circumstances, such as railroads and the like ;—nor the abundance of labour—nor even security for the wealth to be produced. The only difficulty was in this, that the men who were to produce the wealth had no guarantee that it would be theirs when it was created. In England and elsewhere, such guarantees were in existence. Might it not be possible to introduce them into Ireland ? That was the question which Mr. Monk had in hand ; and in various speeches which he made both before and after the dinners given to him, he pledged himself to keep it well in hand when Parliament should meet. Of course Phineas spoke also. It was impossible that he should be silent when his friend and leader was pouring out his eloquence. Of course he spoke, and of course he pledged himself.

Mr. Monk having resigned, Phineas feels, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Monk himself, of the head of his department, Lord Cantrip, and of all his friends, private and official, that he is bound to resign too ; and resignation is to him, in a parliamentary sense, ruin. He has no income, except that derived from his office. For a seat in the House he depends on his party. Nothing remains for him except the quiet martyrdom of vacating both seat and office, and returning humbly to the practice of the bar, in order to make as much money as will enable him to marry Mary Flood Jones.

The last speech of Phineas in the House is well described :—

He spoke for about an hour, and while he was speaking he knew nothing about himself, whether he was doing it well or ill. Something of himself he did say soon after he had commenced, not quite beginning with it, as though his mind had been laden with the matter. He had, he said, found himself compelled to renounce his happy allegiance to the First Lord of the Treasury, and to quit the pleasant company in which, humble as had been his place, he

had been allowed to sit and act, by his unfortunate conviction on this great subject. He had been told, he said, that it was a misfortune in itself for one so young as he to have convictions. But his Irish birth and Irish connections had brought this misfortune of his country so closely home to him, that he had found the task of extricating himself from it to be impossible. Of what further he said, speaking on that terribly unintelligible subject, a tenant-right proposed for Irish farmers, no English reader will desire to know much.

The division on Mr. Monk's Tenant Right Bill results in the defeat of the Ministry by a majority of 23.

"And now," said Mr. Monk, as he walked home with Phineas, "the pity is that we are not a bit nearer tenant-right than we were before."

"But we are nearer to it."

"In one sense, yes. Such a debate and such a majority will make men think. But no;—think is too high a word: as a rule men don't think. But it will make them believe that there is something in it. Many who before regarded legislation on the subject as chimerical, will now fancy that it is only dangerous, or perhaps not more than difficult: and so in time it will come to be looked on as among the things possible, then among the things probable;—and so at last it will be ranged in the list of those few measures which the country requires as being absolutely needed. That is the way in which public opinion is made."

"It is no loss of time," said Phineas, "to have taken the first great step in making it."

"The first great step was taken long ago," said Mr. Monk; "taken by men who were looked upon as revolutionary demagogues, almost as traitors, because they took it. But it is a great thing to take any step that leads us onward."

It is evident that Mr. Trollope has studied the history of the Irish Tenant League, and that he understands the principles and difficulties of the land question in Ireland, in a way that not merely very few English or Scotchmen do apprehend them, but more clearly, perhaps, than the generality of Irishmen themselves. All good and sufficient reasons why, as we suggested at the opening of this article, some Irish constituency should do itself the honour of gratifying Mr. Trollope's unaccountable desire to enter Parliament. The extracts which we have given seem to us to have a curious, suggestive, we trust not prophetic pertinence to the present situation of the question. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that Mr. Monk will not feel bound to bring in a bill of his own, and defeat the ministry upon it next Easter; that the Under-Secretary for the Colonies will not feel constrained by a conscientious sense of his duty to the Irish farmers to resign the task of managing all those dependencies, one of which, far away in

the eastern ocean, bounds the ambition of the probable prototype of Phineas Finn; and, in fine, that whatever was wise and just in the plans of the forgotten "demagogues and almost traitors" of twenty years ago, may at last become the law of the homesteads of their people.

ART. VI.—CATHOLIC CONTROVERSY.

The "Month" for August, 1869: Art. I.—"Liberal Catholicism." London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

FOR more than two years past the "Month" has been in the habit of putting forth, from time to time, various reprehensive and somewhat sharply-expressed remarks, which many of its readers have understood as referring to this REVIEW. We have thought it on many grounds the best course consistently to ignore these. In the first place, the present are not suitable times—if, indeed, *any* times can be suitable—for defenders of orthodoxy to fall out with each other; and for no reason therefore, except some very urgent one, would we put ourselves in antagonism to the "Month." Then further, there is very great difficulty in knowing what remarks are directed against *ourselves*, and what are aimed at some totally different quarter; for in many cases the opinions censured are so utterly alien to any of which we have ever dreamed, that it was difficult to suppose we could possibly have been intended. And lastly, it seemed discourteous to treat the supposition as possible, that the "Month" writers could wish to convey to their readers' mind any serious charge against us, without indicating us so directly and unmistakably, as to give us full opportunity of making every necessary explanation. We have always assumed therefore—so far as regarded our practical course—that no remarks of that periodical can be intended as bearing on ourselves, unless we are named explicitly or equivalently.

In the first article however of the August "Month," we *are* equivalently named, though not explicitly. The facts are these. In November last the "Month" put forth a severe criticism on our conduct in the recent infallibility controversy. We stated therefore in January (p. 227), that we should "take an opportunity of indirectly replying to" this criti-

cism; and we did so accordingly, without making explicit mention of the "Month," in our article of last April on "Catholic controversies." Now it is one chief purpose of the "Month" paper just mentioned, to rejoin on this reply. And though the writer has been so courteous as to follow our example in not mentioning his opponent by name,—he does equivalently name us, by commenting on various ecclesiastical facts which we alleged in our defence. Nothing can be more legitimate than this; for the question raised is of much practical importance, and deserves a frank discussion. We find it impossible however to answer him indirectly; and we will therefore explicitly review as a whole his paper on Liberal Catholicism. And we are the rather disposed to do so, because the subject itself of Liberal Catholicism is one possessing peculiar interest and importance at this time.

The general drift of the article appears to us admirable; and we are greatly pleased to observe (p. 128, note) that its author has some thought of returning not unfrequently to the same field. In its main argument indeed, we have observed only one particular which we should be at all disposed to question; and even on this, our difficulty very probably arises from our misapprehending what is intended. We thoroughly concur with the statement—indeed (as the article observes) Pius IX. himself gives it much sanction—that the especial virus of Liberal Catholicism* lies in its intimate connection with Naturalism: but we are not sure that we should ourselves analyze that fundamental and most anti-Christian error, precisely as it is analyzed from p. 116 to 118. Still, however this may be, nothing can be more just than the following remarks on its character and tendency:—

The great danger of our day is the all-invading spirit of Naturalism, and the consequent limitation or denial of the supernatural order. Naturalism infects the views of our time as to religion, as to society, as to family and civil life, as to domestic relations, and as to individual practice. The course of the three last centuries has carried it on from one important position to another. It was introduced into Christendom by the Reformers, as a principle useful for their own immediate purpose; but it was very soon to be turned against the ill-cemented fabric, which they proposed to leave behind them in the place of the Catholic religion. It conquered a legal position in modern Europe by the issue of the Thirty Years' War. In the last century Rousseau and Voltaire dressed it up as a philosophy, made it the fashion of

* We use this phrase throughout in the same sense in which the "Month" uses it; viz., as expressing the opinions held by M. de Montalembert and his friends on such matters as liberty of worship, liberty of the press, &c., &c.

the most empty-headed society that ever professed to be intellectual, and imposed it as a law upon the literature of their own generation and the next. *Then it aimed at the throne of politics*, and was borne to the summit of power amid the howlings and the bloodshed of the great French Revolution. *Since that time it has become the principle of Governments* (p. 115).

The most subdued form of Naturalism allows the existence of [a divinely ordained spiritual] authority ; which however it limits entirely to spiritual and private matters, excluding it from all that is public and temporal, *separating the life of the soul from the life of the body, the life of the Christian from the life of the citizen*, and confining the effects of the Incarnation and the supernatural order to the former member of each comparison, and so withdrawing the latter from the rightful influence of the true Church (p. 118).

A far more extreme and dangerous form of the same error, is one under influence of which

the State assumes an authority and discharges duties parallel to those which belong to the Church in the Christian system. It leaves positive religion to the individual, and supplies him with the appliances of his worship, but it takes charge of its citizens on its own account, educates them in secular knowledge, teaches them a neutral or "common" philosophy, history, literature, and morality, and solves every problem of human life and public government on principles independent of all revealed truth or law (p. 119).

This is the doctrine advocated, with great ability and consistency, by the "Pall Mall Gazette"; and which is far more formidable than other forms of the error, from the very fact that it is far profounder than the rest, and not convincible (as they are) of intrinsic inconsistency and self-contradiction.

So much on Naturalism. Next as to Liberal Catholicism, which is so intimately connected therewith. And we must begin with saying, how entirely we concur with the "Month," that the leading French Liberal Catholics are "generous and devoted" men (p. 131); and "that one may well entertain a sanguine hope," of their "never committing themselves to any want of submission to the declarations of authority," acknowledged by them as such, "on the points on which they are mistaken" (ib.). We trust, with the "Month," that in France "Liberal Catholicism . . . will very soon be absorbed in the general movement of Catholic reaction against the Revolution" (ib.); and we agree that, even as things are, every well-advised Catholic should treat its more prominent advocates "with the greatest gentleness and respect, even when it has become necessary that their mistakes should be pointed out" (p. 116). The "Month" however has come across some Catholics, who take a most different view of the case. Some

denounce these excellent men "as rebels and *outcasts*" (p. 114), and speak of them with "angry bitterness" (p. 131). Nay, to some Catholics the error in question "is more hateful than *heresy or infidelity itself*; to which they can be decently courteous, while Liberal Catholicism stirs their bile, and makes them *wild and abusive*" (p. 113). Our natural comment on all this would be, to express our amazement that such strangely-minded Catholics can exist, and can exist without being more generally heard of. But some readers of the "Month" have thought, that *we* are aimed at in these passages; that *we* are supposed to be among those, who call in question what "ignorance and malevolence alone can dispute" (p. 116). It may be worth while therefore to point out that, even in that article which the "Month" had before its eyes, we put in a protest by anticipation; for we drew attention to the fact, that "we have always expressed hearty respect for the zeal which has been exhibited by" Liberal Catholics, "and a *profound sense* of the *great services* they have in various ways rendered to the Church" (p. 366). But as a writer's general tone and spirit are much more satisfactorily manifested by a continuous passage than by one brief sentence, we hope our readers will excuse us for inflicting on them a repetition of what we formerly said. The "Month's" remarks have led us to italicise one particular sentence:—

The French "Liberal Catholics," as a rule, are most pious and exemplary men; enthusiastic defenders of the Pope and his civil principedom; and men who have in time past done invaluable service to the Church. On the other hand, they cling to their prejudice concerning the "modern liberties" with a certain strange fanaticism, and allow that prejudice to colour their whole view of facts both past and present. Possibly enough God, Who Alone reads the heart, may see in some of these men that a greater or less degree of venial sin and imperfection has been the cause of their not rightly discerning the Church's guidance or not truly interpreting her voice. But as to their ignorance being *gravely* culpable, we may consider this presumably incredible in men who so zealously and piously frequent the sacraments.

How does the Church act towards them? Firstly, she repeats her doctrine on the subject again and again; hardly a year passes without some fresh condemnation of "liberalismus hodiernus." She takes for granted the truth of that doctrine in all her official acts; and bases on it the whole civil constitution of the Roman States. She earnestly encourages Catholics to write in its defence. . . . All that can be said on the other side is, that she does not take any step which would compel them peremptorily and at once to choose, between expressly rebelling against the Church on the one hand, or abandoning some of their most cherished and pervasive views on the other. These views, we again repeat, being regarded by no one as actually heretical.

The question then to be considered is this. Does such forbearance as we

describe imply any disparagement whatever of the doctrine taught in the "Mirari vos," and in numberless other Apostolic Letters? Does it afford any ground whatever for doubting that the Church accounts that doctrine infallibly true, and as in real truth obligatory on the conscience? To ask such a question is surely to answer it. The "Liberal Catholic" has made his false tenet the centre, round which he has gathered a multitude of settled, habitual, and powerful convictions. Let him be required in a moment to surrender these convictions on pain of breaking with the Church, he is plunged for certain in the extreme of bewilderment and perplexity, and exposed to real danger of apostasy. *It is immeasurably a more healthy and a more hopeful process, that the truth be brought before him—not peremptorily by the Church's abrupt action,—but gradually by means of argument and persuasion.* Thus, as he comes by degrees to understand more clearly both the infallible truth of her doctrine, its obligation, and its real purport, so by proportionate degrees he learns its reasonableness, its consistency with facts, its value in behalf of true liberty, its adaptation to man's highest interests. That the Church prefers such methods as these to others of a more stringent character, is surely no presumption that she regards liberalism as in any way reconcilable with her teaching: it only shows that she chooses these means rather than those, for the promotion and enforcement of that doctrine which she has infallibly declared.

We hope, accordingly, that our own method of procedure is that most in harmony with her wishes and counsels. Our desire throughout this discussion has been, to cast no shadow of suspicion on the thorough good faith of those with whom we are at issue; to put aside all notion of achieving any sudden or startling result; to aim exclusively at promoting, as best we may be able, the gradual but sure growth of individual conviction (DUBLIN REVIEW, Jan. 1868, pp. 129, 130).

In fact, there is one adverse comment which may imaginably be made, on the "Month's" concluding remarks concerning the Church's indulgent demeanour towards Liberal Catholics (p. 132); for it might plausibly be objected by a severe critic, that those remarks have been plagiarized without acknowledgment from our own pages.

We should add however here one explanation, to prevent possible mistake. There are various unsound and minimizing Catholics who, in our humble judgment, deserve very far greater severity of language, than could, with any kind of propriety, be applied to such devoted champions of the Church as Montalembert, Falloux, and Cochin.

So much in favour of the French Liberal Catholics. On the other hand the "Month" does not deny, that in fact Supreme Pontiffs have condemned *ex cathedrâ* the tenets of Liberal Catholicism, and that the Episcopate has endorsed their condemnation. In other words the "Month" does not deny, that Liberal Catholics are under a material obligation,

of renouncing their characteristic tenets under pain of mortal sin.

Next as to the nature of those dangers, with which the Church is threatened by this unsound doctrinal system. The following remarks are as true in substance as they are beautifully expressed:—

We are inclined to compare Liberal Catholicism to the, sometimes, considerable surges which rock the vessels riding in security within the shelter of a land-locked harbour, while a violent storm rages without, fraught with destruction to the rash or unfortunate mariners who are exposed to its full fury on the open sea. It is the echo within the walls of the Church—drowned, it may be, in the sonorous roll of the music on which her worship soars to Heaven—of the clamours of an angry populace outside, hounded on to her destruction, without knowing what they are at, by the crafty agents of Satan. Liberal Catholicism, in short, is the result of the partial, temporary, and unconscious *adoption, within the pale of the Church, of principles and maxims which are in reality not Catholic*, though their opposition to Catholicism is concealed from the eyes of those who are influenced by them. At certain times, and under certain conditions of society, these principles are more mischievous than at others; and in our time, the bad principles with which the form of opinion of which we speak is more or less distantly connected *have acquired a fatal prominence and threaten to be terribly influential*. These are days, therefore, in which it is of the highest importance that *opinions of this kind should be unmasked, and their tendencies should be plainly pointed out*, and that those who are affected by them should be won back by persuasion and conviction from the dangerous position to which they have unwittingly advanced (p. 114).

For such reasons, it is important that Catholics should precisely understand, *what* is that error which the Church has condemned. On this head again, the “Month” speaks just as we have often spoken:—

It is one thing to assert, as the maintainers of the Naturalistic errors assert, that the best and indeed the only legitimate and progressive form of government is that in which the State is practically indifferent to religion, placing all creeds on an equality before the law, or supporting or even controlling all equally. It is another thing to assert that *under the existing circumstances of a great number of Christian countries* it is necessary that all should be tolerated equally, without reference to their orthodoxy or heterodoxy. This last may be admitted as the practical principle on which even Catholic Governments may act, either wholly or in a measure, but *it may still be necessary for the Church to set her brand of authoritative condemnation on the theory which declares such a rule of action to be simply the best in itself*—a theory which involves the equal rights of truth and error, faith and heresy, in the Christian system of society. The Church *may accept a state of things and make the best of it*, and yet it may be contrary to

Christian truth, and subversive of the fundamental principles of the Kingdom of Christ, to consider such a state of things as *normal and legitimate*. This last is the error of Naturalism of which we are speaking ; but it is quite distinct from the opinion that the connection between Church and State has been so perverted by the civil power as to have often produced greater practical evils than any which are involved in the comparative independence of the two powers, or that when nations are actually largely divided as to religion, fair toleration becomes an absolute necessity (pp. 119, 120).

The "Month" then proceeds to set forth, with much clearness and force, those historical circumstances, which have in fact occasioned the error of Liberal Catholicism, and which have led "impetuous but not very well-grounded minds" to take up with that error (pp. 120, 121). And it then makes a remark, which is very obvious indeed, but not perhaps the less necessary to be put forth explicitly. There is no *intrinsic* connection whatever (1) between Jansenism and Gallicanism or minimism ; nor (2) perhaps between Liberal Catholicism and Gallicanism or minimism ; nor (3) between Jansenism and Liberal Catholicism. Yet extrinsically there is a certain connection between all four ; arising from the fact, that both Jansenists and Liberal Catholics have been naturally led to seek shelter, in Gallicanism or minimism, from the repeated blows of Pontifical condemnation with which they have been visited (p. 123).

We heartily concur with the opinion which follows next in order ; viz., that it is of very great importance to address unsound Catholics, not only on the ground of authority, but also of more general argument.

There may be times and places at which it may be useful or even imperative to argue against the semi-Naturalism of which we are speaking simply from authority, provided that the argument proceeds from principles acknowledged by both parties. A good Catholic, holding some of these opinions, may be peremptorily silenced by an argument which shows him first, that on whatever point, and within whatever sphere, the supreme authority of the Church speaks in a certain manner, its voice is to be listened to as the utterance of infallible truth ; and, secondly, that that authority has spoken in that particular manner as to the opinions in question. But the defenders of the truth have usually gone further than this in their explanations as to erroneous opinions The reason is obvious, especially in the case of Catholics moving in the midst of a Protestant community. The opinions in question are, in reality, caught by Catholics from the atmosphere in which they live, and these opinions leaven to an immense extent the whole of European thought and society. There can be no nobler employment for the industry of Catholic writers than to labour in tracing up to their sources the various streams of error, and in laying bare the evil principles on which the dangerous system

is based. If this is done patiently and thoroughly, Catholics may expect to see the process conciliate and win over to the full truth a large number of those who are now outside the Church, but who possess to some extent the Christian theory to which these opinions are so hostile. We should always remember that we have to save not only Catholic communities but Christian society in general from the effect of these opinions; and it would be idle and foolish to attempt to confute them by the one peremptory argument of authority. A blow of immense power is struck at them, even in the estimation of right-minded persons who are not children of the Church, by the solemn declarations of the Supreme Pontiff; but the blow itself does not so much convince and explain, as arrest attention and arouse reflection. On the other hand, a great good is to be done among Anglicans and Protestants in a country like our own, by grappling with the fundamental errors of Naturalism, and following them out into their development as to Church authority or as to Christian society. No one who knows anything at all of the state of thought among Anglicans, for instance—whatever inconsistencies their system may contain—can deny that there exist among them many elements which would be attracted by such a demonstration (pp. 124-126).

This citation brings us, from our points of agreement with the "Month," to those on which we have to defend ourselves against that periodical. In fact we have had to omit one sentence of the last passage, and also to terminate our extract somewhat abruptly, in order to avoid entering prematurely on the debated ground.

We are next then to prepare our way for vindicating our argument of April against our contemporary's assault. And with this end in view, we make two preliminary observations.

He implies throughout, that our zeal against French Liberal Catholicism was the chief—almost the sole—reason, which led us to speak so constantly and emphatically on the Church's infallibility in matters external to (though connected with) the Deposit of Faith. But this is very far from having been the case. So far back as in July, 1864 (pp. 93-95), we compared the errors condemned in the Munich Brief with those condemned in the "Mirari vos"; and we said (whether we judged rightly is not the point) that the former filled us "with immeasurably greater alarm and consternation" than the latter. In fact we have laid so much stress on the Church's extent of infallibility, far more from a wish to resist Dr. Dollinger than from a wish to resist M. de Montalembert. Undoubtedly from time to time general arguments against Liberal Catholicism have appeared in our pages; and we may mention as instances, two articles on "the Principles of '89," which we published respectively in October, 1864, and April, 1865. But it has happened on various occasions, that our

only concern with Liberal Catholicism has been, the availing ourselves of its history, for the purpose of illustrating and enforcing the Church's extent of infallibility. And though undoubtedly we desired to press that doctrine against the school of Montalembert, we were far *more* desirous of pressing it against the school of Dollinger. In fact, as regards the present writer personally, he will frankly admit, that his convictions on the deadly tendency of Liberal Catholicism have been founded a good deal more on the extraordinary emphasis with which the Church has condemned it, than on his own historical and political investigations.* His own studies and interests have lain far more in theology and philosophy, than in history and ecclesiastical politics.

This is our first preliminary comment. Our second is, that, to our great gratification, our critic upholds substantially the whole view of infallibility for which we have ever contended. He disavows (p. 123) "doctrines which confine the infallibility of the Church to matters strictly of faith and morals": and (ib.) repudiates those who "exact at all events certain stringent conditions as necessary, before a document proceeding from the Holy See can be deemed infallible." He says (p. 128) that the bishops have generally referred to "the infallible character" of the Syllabus,† as to "*an elementary portion of Christian doctrine*;" and we may assume therefore, that he himself regards this doctrine, not only as certain but even as *elementary*. Moreover, in his various criticisms on ourselves, he nowhere implies that our general doctrine on infallibility has been at all exaggerated. We anticipate very great benefit from this explicit doctrinal avowal.

We now come to our article of last April. One chief accusation for several years has been urged against our course: viz., that we sow divisions in the Church; that we draw an invidious and schismatically-savouring distinction between Catholic and Catholic; that we err against Catholic charity, in

* However forbearing successive Pontiffs may have been in their language towards individual Liberal Catholics, it must not be forgotten that their language against the doctrine itself has been quite amazing in its vehemence. The proposition "that liberty of conscience is to be asserted and vindicated to every man," is denounced by them, not merely as an "absurd and erroneous opinion," but rather as an "insanity." The existing liberty of the press is characterized as "most foul, and never sufficiently to be execrated and detested."

† He is speaking expressly indeed of the "*Quantâ curâ*." But he is evidently including the Syllabus in his statement; for in the preceding page he speaks of the great "*Pontifical declaration against the errors of our time*, which will rank among the glorious acts of Pius IX.":

stigmatizing persons, whom we admit to be members of the Church, with the charge of holding tenets, which are forbidden by the Church herself under pain of mortal sin. A second and very subordinate accusation against us has been, that we have gone out of our way to introduce theological discussions—especially this last infallibility discussion—into a periodical which is no fit vehicle for them. Our principal purpose then in April, was to answer the principal accusation; but we had also the subordinate purpose, of answering the subordinate accusation.

In reply then to the graver accusation, we urged firstly, that at all events the fact *is* as we have alleged it to be; that there *are* various opinions, which every Catholic is forbidden sub mortali to hold, which yet do not exclude him from the Visible Church; that if any one e. g. at the present day took up Fénelon's condemned doctrine of quietism, Catholics would be bound to speak of his views with extreme severity, and yet to admit that his doctrine has not been condemned as actually *heretical* (pp. 363-4). So far, of course, there is no divergence between the "Month" and ourselves.

But it may be rejoined (p. 364) that, though the fact *is* so, yet we had no business publicly to *allege* it; that the Catholic may appeal indeed against such unsound believers to his diocesan or to the Holy See; but that, when arguing against them *before the public*, he has no business to charge them with grave disobedience to the Church's teaching. We answered (pp. 365-9), that on the contrary this very thing had always been the habit of approved writers, in arguing against condemned non-heretical error; and that the particular error of Liberal Catholicism presents in its history some emphatic exhibitions of the fact. To this the "Month" now replies in effect (p. 125), that approved writers, in arguing against Liberal Catholics, have ordinarily devoted far more space to *other* arguments, than to that particular argument which is derived from the Church's condemnation of the error. But if our critic will consider for a moment, he will admit that such a reply is simply irrelevant to the issue. Take e. g. any given work of Bellarmine or other controversialist, against Luther and Calvin. Very little comparatively is said by such controversialist about the Church's *condemnation* of these heresiarchs, simply because the fact is so obvious and undisputed. The Catholic controversialist devotes himself almost exclusively, to arguing against Lutherans and Calvinists on more general ground. To say then that orthodox writers, in controversy with Liberal Catholicism, devote far more space to other arguments than to that particular argu-

ment which is derived from the Church's condemnation, is to say no more, than that they treat Liberal Catholicism just as they treat the Lutheran and Calvinistic heresies. The real point to be debated is, whether they do or do not make it most clear to their readers, that they regard Liberal Catholicism as a condemned error; as an error which all Catholics are under a divinely-imposed obligation of renouncing. Now we are quite sure our contemporary will not *deny*, that they make this most clear to their readers. We are quite sure indeed he will not deny, that they make it the professed basis of their whole argument.

For instance. He speaks with most just praise of the "*Civiltà Cattolica*"; and says with great truth (p. 129) that "it is hardly possible, in the range of mere literature, to have a more authoritative witness to the manner in which those champions of the Church who are most thoroughly imbued with her spirit, and who write under the eye of her supreme authority, think it best to deal with questions of the day in a periodical meant for general perusal." Now we will not take the trouble of looking for extracts through the pages of the "*Civiltà*"; because no better illustration of what we intend can be given, than the following, which we happened to have under our notice for a different reason. It is from the number for April 10, 1867 (pp. 149-151).

Listen to a [certain] Christian, *calling himself Catholic and Liberal*: you will doubt whether he has not gone out of his mind; and the doubt is well founded; for either he does not believe that modern constitutions contain those errors which we have above recited, or else he thinks that those various principles which we have assailed cannot be condemned as errors. If he believes the former, pray let him show us how modern constitutions have other foundations, ends, or means, than those above described; whereas, in fact, those who are their authors not only profess such principles, but make a boast of them. If, admitting these principles, he does not recognize them to be evil [iniqui], let him at least read the Encyclical and Syllabus, which the Vicar of Jesus Christ promulgated to the world not long since, and he will see what he has to think. Their formula of "Catholics with the Pope, Liberals with Italy," is simply founded on the doctrine of separation of Church and State, condemned in proposition 55. All the rights which they claim of overthrowing princes and monarchs are proscribed in prop. 67; *liberty of worships in prop. 77*; *liberty of the press in prop. 79*. All the evils connected with civil marriage are branded from prop. 65 to 74. All the secular usurpations over education are condemned from prop. 45 to 48. All the tyrannies exercised against the regular and secular clergy are denounced in prop. 49 and those succeeding. Finally, all the principles which constitute what is now called progress, liberalism, and modern civilization, are pronounced irreconcilable with the Roman Pontiff in prop. 80. If neither

one nor the other can be denied, *with what consistency can those who boast of their sincere Catholicity call themselves Liberals?* Do they haply think then that Catholicity is an empty name, the profession of which is an outward form entailing no obligations? Let them then understand once for all, that Catholic principles do not change; neither for the passing on of years, nor for difference of country, nor for novel discoveries, nor for reasons of utility. They are always those which Christ taught, which the Church proclaimed, which the Saints held, which Popes and councils defined, which doctors defended; and every one must either accept or reject them. He who accepts them in all their fulness—and let us add in all their rigour—is a Catholic; he who vacillates, hesitates, adapts himself to times, persons, and fashions, may give himself what name he likes, but *before God and the Church he cannot stand excused, unless on the ground of invincible ignorance.*

Our critic will certainly find it difficult to quote, from our own pages, any language approaching this, in its doctrinal condemnation of Liberal Catholicism: and all readers of the "Civiltà" will admit, that this passage is but a sample of a large number. So far from his having any right to invoke the "Civiltà" against us, that periodical is an authority which tells most strongly in our favour. Indeed it is this mode of controversy which has received the Church's especial sanction. The "Month" writer says most truly (p. 127) that "the Encyclical," and "other documents of a similar kind," may well be considered "as pointing out to Catholic apologists the wide field, in which their zeal against the errors of the day can best exercise itself." He adds, that the "direct object of these pronouncements is to meet and condemn certain pernicious errors." Precisely so. Their direct and primary object is, not to stimulate orthodox Catholics into *arguing* against error on a platform of equality, but to put down error directly by authoritatively condemning it. A "Catholic apologist" then puts these pronouncements to the very purpose for which they were primarily intended, when he cites them in order to put down the errors which they condemn. It seems almost impertinent indeed to argue further, for so obvious and common-sense a conclusion. But we may as well refer to Card. Caterini's letter, written by Pius IX.'s command, for the purpose of enforcing sound doctrine concerning the Pontiff's civil principedom; a letter, which the "Month" itself values so highly, that it published a translation of it last February. We borrowed that translation in our last number (pp. 185-190); and our readers will see, that the very first consideration pressed by the Cardinal, is the Church's authority. The Pope and bishops have spoken, argues the Cardinal; let the offender "hear the Church," lest he be to Catholics "as a heathen

and a publican." In like manner, as we pointed out in April (p. 368), Pius IX., in his commanded Letter* to M. de Beaulieu, commended that nobleman "*chiefly*," because he had derived his "arms" against M. de Montalembert from "the very chair of truth"; from the theological teaching of the Holy See. And the Holy Father added, that if only the "Mirari vos" "had been received as it should have been," there would have been no "dissension or reason for doubting."†

We conclude then,—not merely that we did well in urging explicitly the obligation, divinely imposed on unsound Catholics, of abandoning their condemned tenets,—but that we should have acted very wrongly and indefensibly if we had *not* urged this. If the "Month" however merely means to say, that, in dealing with Liberal Catholics, it is very important not *only* to dwell on their infallible condemnation, but *also* to exhibit in argument the anti-religious and anti-social tendency of their doctrine,—we heartily concur; and we never thought otherwise. If it further intends to allege that we have been remiss in this particular, let it only put forth its whole meaning categorically, and we will not fail to reply. But again and again it is very easy and most important to show, by reference to the Church's determinations, that some given proposition is unorthodox; while it would require much thought and labour to

* By the term "*commanded Letter*" we here mean, that though in that Letter the Pope did not express himself in the first person, yet Mgr. Mercurelli wrote it avowedly as his mere mouthpiece. The "Month" calls it "the letter of Mgr. Mercurelli" (p. 130, note); which certainly seems to us an inadequate expression. In April we called a Letter of the same kind simply "the Pope's Letter"; and this, on the other hand, is perhaps *too strong* an expression. So we say "the Pope's *commanded Letter*."

† In April we added (p. 368) an illustration from Pius IX.'s commanded Letter to M. Veillot. Now certainly (1) the Holy Father expressed himself concerning M. Veillot's writings in the strongest terms of approbation; so strong, that we doubt whether he has ever expressed himself so warmly concerning any other individual writer whomsoever. And certainly (2), as we showed in April, M. Veillot has been in the habit of condemning Liberal Catholicism severely on theological grounds. But we added (3) that Pius IX. expressly mentioned this circumstance, as one of M. Veillot's claims on his approbation. The "Month" however argues (p. 130, note), that the words we quoted refer, not to Liberal Catholicism, but to Naturalism simple. This interpretation had not occurred to us: but we cannot deny that there is great force in the "Month's" reasoning; and we willingly therefore withdraw the argument, which we had based on M. Veillot's case.

The "Month" expresses itself, as though we had quoted Pius IX.'s words concerning M. Veillot, for the purpose of justifying the use of severe expressions against the leading French Liberal Catholics. But if the writer will look again at our context, he will see that this is not at all the case.

encounter that proposition adequately on grounds of reason. In such cases it is the duty, we consider, of a Catholic periodical, to do at once what it *can* do at once; and to cite the Church's determinations, for the purpose of warning orthodox believers against the error. This is indeed (as we have already said) the primary purpose for which these determinations are intended.

So much then on the first and principal theme of our April article. But we said a few words incidentally and secondarily, on our reason for having introduced into this REVIEW various theological discussions on the extent of infallibility. We urged that, at all events, questions of philosophy and religious politics are peculiarly questions which concern *laymen*.

What could be more preposterous than to say, that it is a matter of indifference to Catholic laymen, whether they are or are not at liberty to advocate "liberty of conscience" as a positive good? as a positive advance in civilization? M. de Montalembert and M. de Falloux would protest against such an allegation as heartily as we should protest against it ourselves. So as to any philosophical tenet on which the Church has spoken: is it not a question which profoundly affects laymen, whether they are or are not bound to accept her decision on such tenet with interior assent? It is a matter for ever increasing amazement, how assertions of this kind can ever have been made. Certainly, if ever there were a matter on which a Catholic public writer is bound to speak—with which every educated Catholic layman is intimately concerned—it is the obligation of assenting to the Church's judgment on things primarily philosophical or political (pp. 380-81).

And we added this consideration—

It is quite imaginable, undoubtedly, that the Catholics of some given country fully recognize the obligation of accepting these judgments with firm interior assent, but that they do not care to inquire which of their number are strictly infallible. We have more than once expressly admitted, that had this been the case in England, it would have been quite indefensible on our part to intrude on their notice theological discussions about infallibility. We have expressly admitted that, on such a supposition, the controversy on the extent of infallibility should have been reserved for the theological schools. But facts were directly the other way. A constantly increasing number of educated Catholics took for granted, that those judgments (though they should not be spoken against) were altogether to be ignored; and that Catholic speculation was to proceed irrespectively of their instruction. Yet the Holy Father expressly declared in the *Quantâ curâ*, that he had condemned "the chief errors of our most unhappy age in many Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters"; and it was eminently to the teaching of such Allocutions and Apostolic Letters, that these thinkers disavowed all obligation of firm interior assent. It cannot be a small matter, that various "chief errors of this our most unhappy age" should be embraced

by children of the Church. And the evil would of course have become greater and greater, in proportion as higher education should make further advance among Catholics, without this particular mischief being corrected. If any one will explain to us, how we could have laboured with any success against the mischief in question, otherwise than by introducing these discussions about infallibility,—we will listen carefully to his suggestion. We will only say that we could not and cannot think of any other possible means. But our sole wish in the matter has been, that those various ecclesiastical judgments, which are not definitions of faith, and which pronounce on matters primarily philosophical or political, should receive that firm interior assent which is their due (*ib.*).

This is the situation of disadvantage, in which English Catholic controversialists find themselves, as compared with those of some other countries. The “*Civiltà*,” as we have seen, is able to *take for granted* the Church’s extent of infallibility; the French bishops, as the “*Month*” testifies (p. 128), could treat the Syllabus’s infallibility as “an elementary portion of Christian doctrine.” Were we able to do this in England? No one, acquainted with facts, will answer in the affirmative. Certainly it was from no uninfluential quarter,—from no quarter which we could afford to overlook,—that a criticism came forth, denying altogether,—not only the infallibility alike of “*Mirari vos*,” “*Quantâ curâ*,” and Syllabus,—but also the existence of any Catholic obligation, to accept the teaching of these pronouncements with firm interior assent. We were obliged therefore to do, what the “*Civiltà*” writers, what French Catholic writers, are *not* obliged to do; viz., give *reasons* for the doctrine which we pressed, concerning the extent of infallibility. To this moment we cannot imagine what other course is even *alleged* to have been open.

We see very plainly that the “*Month*” intends some reply to this reasoning; but we cannot for the life of us make out what that reply is. It says that “the question of infallibility has not yet been made the subject of a formal definition” (p. 126). Certainly the Church has never formally defined her own infallibility: but if this argument availed against *us*, it would equally avail against those who appeal to the Church’s infallibility, in order to denounce the Arian, or Nestorian, or Lutheran heresy. Men seem often to forget, that the Church has no more defined herself to be infallible in *definitions of faith*, than she has defined herself to be infallible in the Encyclical and Syllabus.

The “*Month*” further argues (p. 127), that the direct object of the “*Quantâ curâ*” was “to meet and condemn certain errors; not to assert the authority of the Supreme Pontiff to condemn

all errors whatever." Most true. In like manner, the direct object of the Nicene and Tridentine Councils was to condemn certain heresies, not to assert the authority of councils to condemn all heresies whatsoever. Yet it is the very office of a theologian, to draw out, from the various circumstances attendant on this or that council, the claim of infallibility therein implied. And in like manner surely, it is the office of a theologian to draw out, from the various circumstances attendant on this or that Pontifical Act, the claim of infallibility therein implied. Moreover, as the "Month" truly observes (*ib.*), such inference is thoroughly legitimate; for these Acts "witness distinctly enough to the doctrine" of infallibility, "on which their authority is founded."

We must say then, that we cannot accept this article of the "Month", as any valid reply to our arguments of last April; though we assure our contemporary that we will give our most careful attention, to whatever he may further urge in the same direction. We have had no other wish throughout, than to follow the teaching of the Church and the practice of approved writers; and nothing can be more legitimate, than that he should appeal to that teaching and practice, as indicating a different course from that which we have pursued. Arguments of this kind will be of substantial service to the cause alike of truth and of peace. On the other hand if (which we are very unwilling to believe) he intends to credit us with "ignorance and malevolence";—to allege that Liberal Catholicism "is more hateful" to us "than heresy or infidelity itself";—to brand our language towards Liberal Catholics as "wild and abusive," and filled with "angry bitterness";—we must protest, most respectfully but most emphatically, both against the accusation itself, and against the language in which he conveys it.

ART. VII.—SUBTERRANEAN ROME.

Roma Sotterranea; or, some Account of the Roman Catacombs, especially of the Cemetery of San Callisto, compiled from the Works of Commendatore de Rossi, with the Consent of the Author. By the Rev. J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE, D.D., President of S. Mary's College, Oscott, and Rev. W. A. BROWNLOW, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. Svo. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer. 1869.

Roma Sotterranea Cristiana, descritta ed illustrata dal Cav. G. B. de Rossi. Fol. Tom. I.-II. Roma. 1864-1867.

Bulletino di Archeologia Cristiana. Dal Cav. G. B. de Rossi. Anni 1863-1869. 4to. Roma. 1863-1869.

Inscriptiones Christianæ Urbis Romæ septimo Seculo antiquiores. Edidit JOANNES BAPT. de ROSSI, Romanus. Fol. Vol. primum. Romæ. 1857-1861.

AMONG many interesting literary projects which were born and died in the latter half of the eighteenth century, one was looked to for a time with especial expectation—a work with the attractive title, *Theologia Lapidaria*; or, “The Theology of Inscriptions,” undertaken by Danzetta, the friend and fellow labourer of the learned Jesuit, F. Zaccaria. Danzetta did not live to complete the work, and his unfinished manuscript is still preserved in the Vatican Library. Its general scope may be understood from the analogous essay of his friend Zaccaria, which is prefixed to the well known collection, *Thesaurus Theologicus*, and which the Abbé Migne has reprinted in the valuable volume of appendices to the treatise *De Ecclesiâ*, in his *Theologiæ Cursus Completus*,* under the title *De veterum Christianarum Inscriptionum in Rebus Theologicis Usu*.

The design of the “*Theologia Lapidaria*,” as well as that of Zaccaria’s essay, is judicious, and sufficiently comprehensive, although the materials of both are meagre, and the execution hasty and imperfect. If we refer to them now, it is chiefly because they present as fair a representative as can easily be found of the views on the subject of Christian archæology which had prevailed up to that period. By the learned world in general that subject was then regarded almost exclusively from the polemical point of view. Each new discovery was

* Tom. v., pp. 310-96.

curiously canvassed and eagerly pressed into the service of controversy; and men were content to argue from details, and to discuss the import of isolated facts or monuments rather than to consider them in their relations with one another, and to deal with all as parts of one great whole. The title of Danzetta's work too, as well as those of several contemporary publications, sufficiently indicates the direction of the studies of the period, and shows the ideas which prevailed as to the particular branch of Christian archæology from which doctrine was to be drawn. Inscriptions were mainly looked to as the proper monumental records of belief; and in projecting a "Theology of Inscriptions," Danzetta was but echoing a common spirit, which practically ignored all the other departments of archæology as sources of dogmatical teaching. Such was plainly the common sentiment of the time. What the Catholic advocates attempted upon their side—to reconstruct out of the inscriptions which the early explorations, and especially the recent discovery of the Roman catacombs, had brought to light, unarranged and unmethodized as they still were, the doctrinal and disciplinary system which had characterized the age to which these inscriptions belonged—was undertaken on a smaller scale, but with no less earnestness, and so far as regards assertion, with almost equal confidence, by Middleton, Poynder, and other similar writers upon the Protestant side. It has been attempted in a more ambitious form by Dr. Maitland, whose "Church in the Catacombs," if it have any polemical significance at all, must rest on the assumption that the inscriptions of the Roman catacombs, or rather of the Lapidarian Gallery in the Vatican, are to be regarded as presenting an epitome of the faith, the discipline, and the usages of the Church of the early centuries; and in Mr. Burgon's popular volume of "Letters from Rome," although the principle is by no means carried so far, there are many passages, the argument, and indeed the whole point and significance, of which are utterly lost if dissociated from the same theory.

If any one has taken up, with anticipations such as these, the handsome volume which stands first on our list, we fear he will be disappointed. The views of the writers to whom we refer, however plausible and attractive, were premature, and cannot safely be accepted even now without considerable modification. Inscriptions form but one, although an important one, among various classes of witnesses to the ancient faith and usages of the Church. Even in the class of inscriptions itself, moreover, there are many subdivisions—historical, sepulchral, liturgical, personal—each differing from the rest in import and in character; and it is only when all are fully

represented, and when they are taken in their logical connection with the various collateral records which are their natural complement, that they acquire their full significance, or at least that they receive their legitimate commentary.

The importance of inscriptions as historical records has always been acknowledged, and their value as illustrating the history of the primitive ages of Christianity was enhanced by the scantiness of the ordinary materials of history during these ages. From an early date scholars have busied themselves in forming collections of inscriptions of all kinds bearing upon the doctrine, the usages, and the history of the first ages of the Church. M. de Rossi mentions a MS. collection of inscriptions as early as the ninth century preserved in the Einsiedeln Library, and containing a section specially devoted to Christian inscriptions. A similar collection of the same date, but exclusively Christian, is among the Kloster-Neuburg MSS. Very early in the revival of letters the same project was entertained, and a collection formed by Pietro Sabini, and dedicated to Charles VIII., was discovered by M. de Rossi in the library of S. Mark's at Venice. A complete collection of ancient inscriptions, among which Christian inscriptions had their allotted place, was among the unrealized projects of Onofrio Panvini and of the younger Manuzio. Gruter devoted one of his titles to this branch of the general subject embraced by his great collection; and Doni enlarged and supplemented Gruter's collection, so as to leave little to be desired for its completeness up to the date of that publication. Every scholar of Christian antiquity since that time—Bosio, Montfaucon, Aringhi, Buonarrotti, Fabretti, Muratori, Boldetti, and Marangoni, has followed in the same track, although some of them have applied themselves to other special branches in addition. It was one of the many designs of Scipio Maffei, than whom few were better qualified for the undertaking, but it was unhappily frustrated by his lamented death; and towards the close of the last century, Padre Zaccaria, whose various studies in sacred literature prepared him to appreciate the great importance of a complete and careful revision of the entire subject of Christian inscriptions, which should bring into one whole the results of the labours of the many independent collectors from the earliest times, succeeded in engaging upon an exhaustive collection of this character, one of the most learned and judicious scholars of the age—the celebrated Gaetano Marini. Marini brought together a vast body of materials; but, unhappily, before he had made any progress in the publication of his work, he was interrupted by the troubles of the French Revolution; and at his death all his

papers, in various stages of preparation, were deposited in the Vatican Library. Untoward as the failure of these hopes was at the time felt to be, we cannot now regard it as other than a fortunate circumstance. Marini's papers came into the hands of Angelo Mai, who was engaged on the publication of his well-known *Scriptorum veterum Nova Collectio*. We are old enough to recollect the feeling of blank disappointment with which, after the high expectations created by the knowledge of Marini's scholarship, and the fame of the vast and various materials which he had collected for his work, the learned world received the slender instalment of this long-looked-for collection published by Mai in the fifth volume of his collection; and still more the confession which accompanied it, that the condition of the remaining portion of Marini's papers, as regarded immediate preparation for the press, was so unsatisfactory, that Mai considered it hopeless to attempt further to prosecute the publication. It is pleasant, on the other hand, to know that what was then regarded as an untoward event, was destined by a fortunate coincidence—by one of those happy combinations of “the man and the hour,” which sometimes occur in letters as in civil affairs—to be the turning-point of a great revolution in this most interesting branch of sacred knowledge. Had Cardinal Mai been in a position to complete the publication of Marini's papers, we should have had no doubt a very complete and comprehensive collection of all the Christian inscriptions which had been discovered up to that time, but nothing more. The commission which Mai himself was unable to execute, transferred to other hands, has resulted in a complete cyclopædia of the sacred antiquities of Rome, and, it may almost be said, of the whole science of Christian archæology. The friend whom Mai induced to undertake the task which had been a mere accident in the main scheme of his own studies, and the further prosecution of which his other engagements, official and literary, now rendered impossible, was a young scholar then known but to a small circle of friends, but who has since achieved a European reputation—Giovanni Battista, Commendatore de Rossi.

The great body of those who at various times concerned themselves with Christian inscriptions, had, with a few exceptions, confined their attention mainly or exclusively to that branch of the study of Christian antiquities. Of these exceptions, one stands pre-eminent—the celebrated Antonio Bosio—one of that distinguished company of scholars whom the munificent patronage of Cardinal Francis Barberini enlisted in a great scheme for the illustration of Christian

antiquities, which he projected, and to which he freely devoted his ample fortune, his vast personal influence, and the many official aids which were at his disposal. Bosio, although a foreigner and a member of a laborious profession, had been attracted almost from his first arrival in Rome to the subject of the catacombs, which at that time, in addition to its intrinsic interest, had all the charm of novelty. For him the interest of the subject had grown in intensity with every year which he devoted to it; and his vigorous and philosophic mind quickly perceived that, in order to the right understanding, whether of inscriptions or of any other class of monumental records, it is necessary to study them with all their surroundings, to discuss each in its relations to all the rest, and as far as possible to re-invest all with the various circumstances of age, place, purpose, and historical or personal associations, which originally belonged to them. In this view Bosio's first and lifelong object was, as far as might still be possible, to restore once again the Christian Rome which lay buried beneath the modern city; to map out through its several regions, many of them distinct and far apart from each other, its long lines of streets and galleries; to trace the sites and dimensions of its numerous halls and chapels; to make accurate copies, and carefully to note the positions, of all inscriptions, pictorial representations, and objects of piety or of art; to observe all peculiarities of construction, of architecture, or of economic arrangement; in one word to reproduce by every practicable device, that "Subterranean Rome," whose remains form the subject of the Christian archaeologist's research. It is impossible to read the record of his researches which this enthusiastic explorer has left, without being at once carried back to the period and impressed with the soundness of the principles on which these explorations were conducted. His account of the cemeteries which he visited was most complete, and the work was admirably arranged on a principle which was suggested by his earliest explorations, and the propriety of which all subsequent investigations have confirmed. Assuming that the primitive Christian places of burial followed the common usage of their age, he concluded that their sites must have lain, like the sites of those of their pagan contemporaries, along the lines of the great roads leading from the several gates of the city. Accordingly he took in order "all the great consular roads which led out of Rome, and collected every historical notice he could find concerning the Christian cemeteries on each of them; their precise position, their founders, and the martyrs or other persons of distinction who had been buried in

them. He then, by the light of this information, examined all the catacombs he had seen, and endeavoured to assign to each its proper name and history." Owing to the scantiness and the often uncritical character of the acts of martyrs and other records, which alone at that time were within Bosio's reach, he was often betrayed into erroneous or doubtful conclusions; but it is no small tribute to the clearness and justice of his views, that the system which he followed is now still recognized as "quite unexceptionable; indeed, the only one that can safely be followed in laying a solid foundation for a scientific treatment of the whole subject."*

Happily, too, the bold but philosophic views which guided this explorer of the seventeenth century, are so curiously in accordance with the critical spirit of our own age, or so happily anticipated it, that it has been found possible, even in these days of ours, with all their boasted superiority, to resume the researches of Bosio almost at the point at which they were interrupted by his lamented death, and to pursue them almost in the very same detail which he himself may be supposed likely to have followed. From the date of the posthumous publication of his work, and of its translation by Aringhi, little had been done to extend the knowledge of subterranean Rome. Fabretti published an account of two catacombs which were not known by Bosio, and Marangoni devoted many years to the preparation of a continuation of Bosio's work arranged according to the same or a similar topographical outline; but unfortunately the fruit of nearly seventeen years of such labour was accidentally destroyed by fire. Marangoni's learned work on the coincidences of Christian and Pagan ritual and ceremonial observance,† and his *Acta Sancti Victorini* amply attest his ability and his fitness to continue the work which Bosio has left undone, but they add little, if anything, to our detailed knowledge of the Catacombs; and after his time the work of systematic exploration may be said to have lain in abeyance until it was resumed in our own day with an enterprising ardour and a scientific discrimination not unworthy of the olden time, by the learned Jesuit, Padre Marchi, but unhappily only to be interrupted, and in the end rendered abortive, by the political vicissitudes of the times, and by the temporary dispersion of the Roman communities of his order.

It was just, however, while F. Marchi was most earnest in the prosecution of these researches that Cardinal Mai, as has

* *Roma Sotterranea*, p. 8.

† *Cose Gentilische Profana adoprato ad uso ed Ornamento delle Chiese*. 4to. Roma. 1744.

been already noticed, prevailed upon his young friend De Rossi to undertake the continuation of the publication of Marini's Christian Inscriptions. We have said that this transfer of the task was a fortunate one. For Mai it had been a mere accident in the main scheme of his studies: to De Rossi it has furnished the chosen work of an honoured and distinguished life. De Rossi found Roman archæology a scholarly, but desultory and unregulated pursuit: he has seen it raised to the rank of a science. He found the study broken up into a series of details, each no doubt interesting in itself, all more or less important for their individual bearing on doctrine or history; but without scientific sequence or connection, awaiting the light which might be gathered in from collateral sources, and the interpretation or illustration which it is the privilege of science to borrow from the analogies of kindred studies. In his hands light has poured in from the least anticipated quarters; facts have been carefully sifted; authorities rigorously tested; data have been collected, ascertained, classified, digested; investigation has taken the place of theory; and the severe results of careful inquiry have been substituted for hasty and often passionate assumptions, based upon preconceived ideas, and directing rather than following the investigation upon which they profess to be founded. And the result has been a practical success altogether unexampled. Dr. Northcote has happily observed of this distinguished scholar, that it was hard to say whether his talent, learning, and industry have done more for the work of discovery in subterranean Rome, or the discoveries he has made have done more for the increase of our knowledge of it. Up to the commencement of his researches, during two centuries of exploration, only three important historical monuments had been discovered, and these accidentally; whereas under De Rossi's direction the Commission of Sacred Archæology within a few years "brought to light six or seven historical monuments of the utmost value, and in every instance he had announced beforehand, with more or less accuracy, what was to be expected."*

For although De Rossi's first direct connection with the subject lay in the collection of inscriptions, which he had undertaken to edit in continuation of Mai's edition of Gaetano Marini he soon found that a complete and thorough acquaintance with the cemeteries from which these inscriptions were for the most part derived, was an indispensable preliminary for the satisfactory execution of his task. Accordingly, although his

* *Roma Satteranea*, p. 15.

intended collection of Inscriptions was without his own knowledge publicly announced and promised in his name as early as the year 1844, he did not hesitate to lay it aside and devote himself with all his energy to the work of practical exploration; nor was it till 1857 that he gave to the public the first instalment of his collection of Christian Inscriptions. The fruits of his explorations in all the intermediate years are contained in his great work *Roma Sotterranea*; and contemporaneously with that publication, he established in 1863, partly as a record of the new incidents of a subject which is of its own nature progressive, partly as a vehicle of information which would not properly find a place in the *Roma Sotterranea*, the periodical now well known throughout Europe, "Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana" written exclusively by himself, and devoted altogether to subjects directly connected with the study of Christian antiquity.

The direct subject of all these, and of several incidental publications, is the sacred archæology of Rome, and especially the Roman catacombs; but that subject is treated in a spirit so comprehensive, and is illustrated with such stores of erudition drawn from every department of sacred learning, that M. de Rossi's volumes may be truly said to form a complete cyclopædia of the science of Christian archæology. Nevertheless, valuable to scholars as is the learning which he has brought to bear upon the science, and easy of use as he has made it for the learned by the felicitous arrangement and the lucid order which he has followed, it must be felt that the general public are shut out from its advantages, as well by the vastness of the work, as by the strictly scientific and technical treatment which characterizes many of its details. It is pre-eminently a scholar's book.

The very elegant and attractive volume which is named at the head of these pages, is designed to place within the reach of ordinary readers in England the most important and striking results of M. de Rossi's researches, and especially as regards the Roman catacombs. It would be more just to say that such is the modest purpose professed by the authors of the *Roma Sotterranea*; for we are bound to state, that, in the execution of their task they have gone far beyond this modest and self-denying programme. Using De Rossi's overflowing materials unreservedly, but with such judgment and skill as to avoid all affectation of scholarship, they have freely interwoven with them facts and illustrations, partly derived from personal research, partly drawn from every writer of eminence upon the antiquities or the art of Christian Rome; and the form which the subject has taken in their hands, while it

preserves all that is best and most striking in M. de Rossi's method, is nevertheless, in some respects, entirely original, and especially in its adaptation to the necessities of popular use and to the condition of archæological science in England. To those who are acquainted with Dr. Northcote's admirable volume on the Roman catacombs, and his papers on the same subject, published at a time when it was still comparatively new, it is unnecessary to say a word as to his eminent fitness for the task; and we think it will be felt, in reading those portions of the *Roma Sotterranea* which are the especial work of his colleague, Mr. Brownlow, that Dr. Northcote could not easily have found an abler or more congenial fellow-labourer.

It will easily be felt that any attempt to present in a condensed form the contents of a single octavo volume which is designed as a popular summary of the voluminous publications already described, could be little more than a mere classified index of subjects. We must refer our readers to the *Roma Sotterranea* itself, as well for a comprehensive view of the general method, as for certain matters of detail especially bearing on the topography, construction, and local arrangements of the catacombs, which it would be hopeless to attempt to make intelligible without the aid of maps and diagrams. For these details we confidently refer to the admirably clear and precise descriptions, especially of the fifth book. After a careful comparative study of the text and the accompanying map and illustrations, we do not hesitate to say that a notion may be formed of the general character and appearance, and still more of the extent and local arrangement, of these venerable sanctuaries, more clear and more precise than is carried away by a large proportion of the ordinary sight-seers after a personal visit to the catacombs themselves.

The *Roma Sotterranea*, besides an Introduction devoted to the literature of the subject, is divided into five books, of which the first three, together with three chapters of the fourth and the Introduction, are by Dr. Northcote. The remaining chapters of the fourth and the whole of the fifth book are the work of Mr. Brownlow. Of a number of learned notes appended to the volume, one on St. Peter's Chair, which comprises the most recent information on this interesting subject, is by Mr. Brownlow: Dr. Northcote has contributed all the rest. Throughout the entire work the reader will be struck by the absence of everything approaching a polemical tone in the treatment of the subject, which contrasts very strongly with the older compilations of Catholic writers, and with the modern publications from the school of Maitland's "Church in the

Catacombs." The account is purely descriptive and explanatory; and if there be, from the very nature of the subject, occasional references to doctrine in connection with the objects described, these allusions are merely such as arise from the necessity of the description or narrative, and are indispensable to its proper understanding. The truth is, that in the view not merely of the authors of the *Roma Sotterranea*, but also of M. de Rossi himself, the time has only just arrived at which it has become possible to enter satisfactorily upon the polemical questions connected with the catacombs. The first necessity was to complete, as far as circumstances would permit, that scientific investigation of facts which alone can furnish a satisfactory basis for doctrinal discussion. And hence, in both branches of his subject—the *Roma Sotterranea* and the Collection of Inscriptions,—M. de Rossi has scrupulously abstained from theological controversy. To many readers, indeed, his great Collection of Inscriptions was in this respect a source of much disappointment, from its purely chronological arrangement, and from the absence of every attempt to turn even its most tempting materials to the uses of religious controversy. But no one can now doubt the wisdom of this course; and the rigorously philosophic method according to which, in laying the foundations of the science, he has discussed those questions of pure chronology and criticism on which the value of all monuments, and especially of inscriptions, must mainly depend, will go far with every impartial scholar, to place beyond the possibility of challenge the authority of the directly dogmatical work on Christian Inscriptions on which he is now engaged, as a sequel to the purely critical volume which he has already issued. The authors of the *Roma Sotterranea* have wisely maintained the same cautiously critical reserve.

The first three books, and also the fifth, are devoted to the origin, history, and descriptive topography of the catacombs, more particularly of that of S. Callixtus; the fifth to the history and characteristics of Christian Art, as exhibited in their decorations and monumental remains. The details of these discussions, of course, would carry us far beyond the limits of the space at our disposal. We must confine ourselves to a brief account of the results; especially in so far as they bear upon the authority of any conclusions which may be drawn from a consideration of the catacombs, regarded as depositories of monumental records, and as witnesses to the belief, the disciplinary usages, the religious and social observances, and in a word the general history of the Christians of Rome under the Cæsars,

Even for those who have not had the opportunity of a personal exploration of the Roman catacombs it may suffice, for the purpose of intelligible description, to say that they are "a vast labyrinth of galleries excavated in the bowels of the earth around the Eternal City"; that these galleries are "excavated on various levels, or *piani*, three, four, or even five, one above the other, crossing and recrossing each other on each of these levels, and so numerous that at the lowest estimated measurement their total length does not fall short of three hundred and fifty miles. They vary from two to four feet in width, and in height according to the nature of the rock in which they are dug. The walls on both sides are pierced with horizontal niches, like shelves in a book-case or berths in a steamer, and every niche once contained one or more dead bodies. At various intervals this succession of shelves is interrupted, that room may be made for a doorway opening into a small chamber; and the walls of these chambers are generally pierced with graves, in the same way as the galleries."

Such were the burial-places of the Christians of Rome from the apostolic times down to the capture of the city by Alaric, in the beginning of the fifth century. Their number was very considerable, no fewer than twenty-five principal cemeteries being known as in existence in the third century, besides about twenty of less importance. Originally they were formed in the villas or gardens of private individuals, or in sites expressly purchased for the purpose; and the titles of many are still preserved which were situated upon the several great roads, the Via Ostiensis, the Via Tiburtina, the Via Appia, the Via Ardeatina, the Via Labicana, the Via Portuensis, the Via Salaria Vetus, and the Via Salaria Nova.

One of the most important questions regarding the origin of the Roman catacombs is that as to their age; and there is no portion of our authors' subject which exhibits more pleasingly at once the ingenious learning of the original whom they follow, and the skill and fidelity with which they present in popular form every detail of the complicated argument upon which M. de Rossi's conclusions are founded.

The first difficulty which presents itself regarding the catacombs is the very problem of their formation. It is hard at first sight to realize how, in times of persecution such as those through which the early Christian Church in Rome struggled into existence, a small and oppressed community could have contrived to execute, under the eyes of a watchful and jealous adversary, a work so vast, so complicated, and

of its own nature so likely to create suspicion and alarm, as the network of subterranean chambers, galleries, and passages which are found encircling the entire of the ancient city, and which, in the hands of a race politically obnoxious as were the Christians, would seem by their very construction to constitute a source of danger to the State. Without stating this difficulty in explicit form, Dr. Northcote's masterly sketch of the condition of the Christian community in Rome, of the Roman laws as to burial, of the character of Roman burial-places, and of the usages of the Pagan Romans in regard to them, prepares the reader easily to understand, not only how all that we now see under our eyes might have grown up gradually during the centuries which preceded the Peace of the Church, but also how it naturally, and almost by necessity, resulted from the very circumstances and conditions under which the Christian community was living.

Perhaps the most novel part of the case is that which regards the social condition of the Christian community at Rome; and it is so interesting for its own sake that we think it right to transcribe the passage at length, as a specimen of the "easy learning" with which this admirable volume abounds:—

We are not unmindful of the Apostle's testimony relative to the Church at Corinth—viz., that "there were not amongst them many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble;" nevertheless everything combines to show that the spread of Christianity among the higher classes, and even among the imperial families at Rome, was more extensive, from the very earliest times, than either the records of ecclesiastical history or the pious legends of the Church would have led us to expect. Indeed, it is easy to see how scanty and imperfect these are. Thus no memorial has reached us of the names or condition of those "of Cæsar's household" to whom S. Paul sent a special salutation; of Flavius Clemens, the consul and relative of Domitian, we know little beyond the fact of his martyrdom; of Apollonius, the senator and martyr under Commodus, we only know that little which Eusebius has told us, writing so long after the event, and at so great a distance from the scene of it. Ancient metrical inscriptions have been found, celebrating the praises of another noble patrician, named Liberalis, holding the highest office in the State, and laying down his life for the faith, whose memory in all other respects is buried in oblivion. Other inscriptions also have been found, in more recent times, recording the burial, by their husbands, of noble Roman ladies of senatorial rank (*clarissimæ*), in the common graves of the galleries in the most ancient parts of the Roman cemeteries. It was only from the pages of a Pagan historian that we knew of the profession of Christianity, or at least of a great interest in it and partiality towards it, by Marcia, concubine of Commodus, until, in our own day, this intelligence has been confirmed and enlarged by the newly-discovered *Philosophumena*. Tertullian, again, writing at the beginning of

the third century, tells us that Septimius Severus protected Christian senators and their wives, but says nothing as to their names or number, excepting indeed that in another place he says boldly, before the whole Pagan world, that not only were the cities of the Roman empire full of Christian people, but even the senate and the palace.

One cause of the extreme scantiness of our information as to the early Christians in Rome is doubtless the destruction of all ecclesiastical records during the last terrible persecution by Diocletian ; and there was nothing in the temper or practices of Christianity to commend it as a special theme for Pagan writers. Nevertheless it was not altogether overlooked by them ; and we know, from the testimony of Eusebius, that some at least wrote about it whose histories have not reached us. Indeed it is to Pagan rather than to Christian writers that we are indebted for our knowledge of some of the most interesting and remarkable facts in the annals of the early Church. One of these it will be well for us to dwell upon at some length in this place, as the history of a catacomb depends upon it : we allude to the early conversion of some of the family of the Flavii Augusti, that is, of the family which gave Vespasian to the throne. His elder brother, Titus Flavius Sabinus, had been Prefect of the city in the year in which the Princes of the Apostles, SS. Peter and Paul, suffered martyrdom ; and it is certain, therefore, that he must have been brought into contact with them, and heard something of the Christian faith. He is described by the great historian of the empire as a man whose innocence and justice were unimpeachable ; a mild man, who had a horror of all unnecessary shedding of blood and violence. Towards the close of his life, he was accused by some of great inactivity and want of interest in public affairs ; others thought him only a man of moderation, anxious to spare the lives of his fellow-citizens ; others again spoke of his retiring habits as the natural result of the infirmities of old age. Whilst we listen to all these conjectures as to the cause of a certain change which seems to have come over him in his declining years, the question naturally occurs to us, whether it is possible that he can have had some leanings towards the Christian faith, or even been actually converted to it ? It is a question which cannot now be answered ; but at least it is certain that charges of this kind were commonly urged against Christians ; and the fact that some of his descendants in the next generation were undoubtedly of this faith, gives a certain degree of probability to the conjecture. Flavius Sabinus seems to have had four children, of whom the most conspicuous was Titus Flavius Clemens, the consul and martyr. He married the daughter of his cousin, who was sister to the Emperor Domitian, and called by the same name as her mother, Flavia Domitilla. Flavia Domitilla the younger bore her husband, the consul, two sons, who were named respectively Vespasian junior, and Domitian junior, having been intended to succeed to the throne ; and the famous Quinctilian was appointed by the Emperor himself to be their tutor. At what time their parents became Christians, and what was the history of their conversion, we do not know ; but the facts of Clement's martyrdom and Domitilla's banishment are attested by Dio Cassius (pp. 36-38).

Dr. Northcote truly observes, that had the facts which are thus obscurely but yet decisively indicated by Suetonius and Dio Cassius, that immediately after the death of the apostles, Christianity had thus made its way to the very steps of the imperial throne, been found in any Acts of Martyrs or similar record, "the pious legend would have been laughed to scorn by modern critics." Yet it is impossible to resist the inference which he draws from these facts, coupled with the further indications which we subjoin, that the number of converts from the higher and wealthier ranks to Christianity, almost from its very infancy in Rome, was far beyond what is popularly believed.

There was yet a third lady of the same noble family, bearing the same name of Flavia Domitilla, who was a granddaughter (on the mother's side) of Titus Flavius Sabinus, and consequently a niece of the consul. She, too, suffered banishment, like her aunt, and for the same cause—profession of the Christian faith. It is in speaking of this lady that Eusebius has that striking passage to which we have already referred, and which testifies so clearly to the marvellous spread of the Christian religion, even before the expiration of the first century. He has just had occasion to mention the latter part of Domitian's reign, and he says: "The teaching of our faith had by this time shone so far and wide, that even Pagan historians did not refuse to insert in their narratives some account of the persecution and the martyrdoms that were suffered in it. Some, too, have marked the time accurately, mentioning, amongst many others, in the fifteenth year of Domitian (A.D. 97), Flavia Domitilla, the daughter of a sister of Flavius Clemens, one of the Roman consuls of those days, who, for her testimony for Christ, was punished by exile to the island of Pontia." The same writer, in his "Chronicon," gives the name of one of the authors to whom he refers, and that name is Bruttius. It is worth remembering, for we shall meet it again in the cemetery of the very same S. Domitilla whose exile he had recorded. He was a friend the younger Pliny, and the grandfather of Crispina, wife of the Emperor Commodus.

It is generally supposed that there is another still more ancient notice, by a Pagan writer, of the conversion to Christianity of a Roman lady of rank, which ought not, therefore, to be altogether omitted; we mean that by Tacitus, of Pomponia Greцина, the wife of Plautius, who conquered Britain under Claudius. We read that, in the year 58, this lady was accused of having embraced the rites of "a foreign superstition;" that the matter was referred to the judgment of her husband, in the presence of a number of her relations, who pronounced her innocent; that she lived afterwards to a great age, but "in continual sadness;" no one, however, interfered with her in this matter any more, and in the end it was considered the glory of her character. It must be confessed that the language in which this history is recorded is not so precise as what we have read from Dio about the Flavii, neither has the history itself so intimate a connection with the catacombs;

nevertheless it has its point of contact with them, and the ordinary interpretation of the "foreign superstition," as having been intended for Christianity, has lately received considerable confirmation from an inscription found in the Catacomb of S. Callixtus, showing that a person of the same name and family was certainly a Christian in the next generation, and buried in that cemetery.

These glimpses at the social condition of the first Roman Christians, slight and imperfect as they are, are valuable; and when we come to study the first period in the history of the catacombs, they will be found to furnish some very interesting examples of "undesigned coincidences" (pp. 39-41).

The Roman law with regard to burial-places, which protected a spot once devoted to the purposes of burial, made it easy for a Christian possessing a certain social rank to secure permanently for himself, his family, and his poorer brethren, an area which might at least serve as the spot from which, without risk of discovery, subterranean excavations could be extended in any required direction; and M. de Rossi has ascertained by actual measurement that the crypt of S. Lucina, which now forms part of the catacomb of S. Callixtus, in which 700 *loculi* (grave-niches) are still to be seen and which must anciently have contained at least 2,000, was originally confined at the surface within an *area* of 100 ft. in front, and 180 in depth. Besides the *areae* thus acquired by private individuals, the provisions of the Roman law relating to *collegia* or fraternities, associated for the due performance of funeral rites, afforded a further cover for the legal occupation of burial-places by the Christian community, for their unsuspected extension beneath the surface of the earth to any degree which might be necessary, and for their being occupied for the other religious uses of the faithful without suspicion, or at least without molestation. And, in fact, it is not till the beginning of the third century that we have any historical notice of popular violence being directed against them; and this occurs not at Rome, but at Carthage, where the outcry of the populace, "*Areae, non sint!*" recorded by Tertullian, shows that they had at length attracted observation, and were marked out for destruction.

It would carry us quite beyond the prescribed limits to pursue the evidence by which M. de Rossi traces back the origin of the Roman catacombs to the time of the Apostles, or the immediately succeeding age. And yet this part of the subject is so peculiarly M. de Rossi's own, that we must at least transcribe Dr. Northcote's lucid summary, as well of the process of the investigation, as of the conclusions to which it has led.

The local traditions of ancient Christian Rome have come down to us, partly embodied in the Acts of the Martyrs ; partly in the stories that were told to foreigners visiting the city in the seventh and eighth centuries, and by them committed to writing in itineraries ; partly in the "Books of Indulgences" and in the "Book of the Wonders of Rome," compiled both for the use of strangers and of citizens ; partly also, but more sparingly, in the scattered notices of a few mediæval writers. From a diligent comparison of all these various authorities, it is gathered that some five or six of the subterraneous cemeteries of Rome were believed to have had their origin in apostolic times ; and in every one of these instances, so far as we have an opportunity of examining them, something peculiar has been either noted by our predecessors, or seen by ourselves, which gives countenance to the tradition. When these peculiarities are brought together, they are found to be in perfect harmony, not only with one another, but also with what we should have been led to expect from a careful consideration of the period to which they are supposed to belong. The peculiarities are such as these:—paintings in the most classical style, and scarcely inferior in execution to the best specimens of cotemporary pagan art ; a system of ornamentation in fine stucco such as has not yet been found in any Christian subterranean work later than the second century ; crypts of considerable dimensions, not hewn out of the bare rock, but carefully, and even elegantly, built with pilasters and cornices of bricks or terra-cotta ; no narrow galleries with shelf-like graves thickly pierced in their walls, but spacious *ambulacra*, with painted walls, and recesses provided only for the reception of sarcophagi ; whole families of inscriptions, with classical names, and without any distinctly Christian forms of speech ; and lastly, actual dates of the first or second century. It is impossible that such a marvellous uniformity of phenomena, collected with most patient accuracy from different and distant cemeteries on all sides of the city, and from authors writing at so many different periods, should be the result of accident or of preconceived opinion. There never was any opinion preconceived on the subject ; or rather, the opinion that was in general vogue a few years ago was diametrically opposed to this. But the opinion which has now been enunciated by De Rossi, and is gaining universal acceptance among those who have an opportunity of examining the monuments for themselves, has been the result of careful observation ; it is the fruit of the phenomena, not their cause. Whereas, then, former writers have always taken it for granted that the first beginnings of *Roma Sotterranea* must have been poor, and mean, and insignificant, and that any appearance of subterranean works on a large scale, or richly decorated, must necessarily belong to a later and more peaceful age, it is now certain that this statement cannot be reconciled with the monuments and facts that modern discovery has brought to light. All who have any knowledge of the history of the fine arts are agreed that the decorations of the many remarkable crypts lately discovered are much more ancient than those which form the great bulk of the paintings in the catacombs with which we were familiar before, and which have been always justly regarded as the work of the third century. Nor can any thoughtful and impartial judge fail to recognise in the social and political condition of the first Roman Christians, and in the

laws and usages of Roman burial, an adequate cause for all that is thus thrown back on the first and second centuries (pp. 74-76).

The general account of De Rossi's investigations will best be illustrated by an example. Every visitor of the catacombs within the last dozen years has heard marvellous tales of the almost instinctive sagacity with which this enthusiastic scholar, seizing upon some faint and hitherto unsuspected indication, has pursued it with unwearied energy through a thousand difficulties, and, baffled at times, but again recovering the thread, has followed it up to results so clear and unquestionable as to command the assent of even the most sceptical. The story of the discovery of the crypt of S. Cornelius* has often been told, and is familiar to many readers. We prefer to take that of the catacomb of S. Prætextatus on the Via Appia, nearly opposite to that of S. Callixtus. Having been accidentally opened in the year 1848, this catacomb, from a picture with the legend *Sustus*, was concluded to be the cemetery of S. Sixtus : but De Rossi, arguing from purely topographical grounds, derived from the ancient itineraries, read, in 1852, a paper in the *Accademia di Archeologia*, in which he pronounced it to be the cemetery of S. Prætextatus, the burial place of S. Januarius (the eldest of the martyr sons of S. Felicitas, A.D. 162), and of S. Felicissimus and Agapetus, deacons of S. Sixtus. In 1857 a further discovery was made of a very large and beautiful crypt, which De Rossi lost no time in visiting.

The vault of the chapel is most elaborately painted, in a style by no means inferior to the best classical productions of the age. It is divided into four bands of wreaths, one of roses, another of corn-sheaves, a third of vine-leaves and grapes (and in all these birds are introduced visiting their young in nests), and the last or highest of leaves of laurel or the bay-tree. Of course these represent severally the seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. The last is a well-known figure or symbol of death ; and probably the laurel, as the token of victory, was intended to represent the new and Christian idea of the everlasting reward of a blessed immortality. Below these bands is another border, more indistinct, in which reapers are gathering in the corn ; and at the back of the arch is a rural scene, of which the central figure is the Good Shepherd carrying a sheep upon his shoulders. This, however, has been destroyed by graves pierced through the wall and the rock behind it, from that eager desire, of which we shall have occasion to speak elsewhere, to bury the dead of a later generation as near as possible to the tombs of the martyrs. As De Rossi proceeded to examine these graves in detail, he could hardly believe his eyes when he read around the edge of one

* P. 117.

of them these words and fragments of words:— . . . *mi Refrigeri Januarius Agatopus Felicissim martyres*—"Januarius, Agapetus, Felicissimus, martyrs, refresh the soul of . . ." The words had been scratched upon the mortar whilst yet it was fresh, fifteen centuries ago, as the prayer of some bereaved relative for the soul of him whom he was burying here; and now they revealed to the antiquarian of the nineteenth century the secret he was in quest of, viz., the place of burial of the saints whose aid is here invoked; for the numerous examples to be seen in other cemeteries warrant us in concluding that the bodies of the saints, to whose intercession the soul of the deceased is here recommended, were at the time of his burial lying at no great distance; and the reader will have observed that they are three of the very martyrs whose relics once rendered famous the cemetery of S. Prætextatus. De Rossi, therefore, really needed no further evidence in corroboration of the topographical outline which he had sketched five years before to the Roman archæologists; yet further evidence was in store for him, though it did not come to light until six years later, when the commission of Sacred Archæology were persuaded to take this cemetery as the special scene of their labours. Then, amid the soil which encumbered the entrance to this crypt, three or four fragments were discovered of a large marble slab, marked by a few letters of most certain Damasinæ form, but of unusual size. More fragments have been discovered since, so that we are able to say with certainty that the whole inscription once stood thus:—

BEATISSIMOMARTYRI

IANVARIO

DAMASVSEPICOP

FECIT

(pp. 78-80.)

Another curious, although perhaps not so plainly conclusive example of this happy sagacity, may be recorded in reference to the crypt of S. Lucina (in the catacomb of S. Callixtus, on the Via Appia), which, although called by the name of Lucina, stands beneath an area originally the property of the Gens Cæcilia. This family, as we know from Cicero, as well as from a columbarium and several inscriptions discovered in the beginning of this century, had their burial place on the Appian Road. In the chambers and galleries of this portion of the catacomb were discovered several epitaphs and other memorials bearing the names of Cæcili and Cæciliani, as well as of more than one Cæcilius Faustus, a Faustinus Atticus, Pompeia Attica, Attica Cæciliana, and other similar names. This juxtaposition of several family names seemed to point to a family in which these several families must have been united by alliance; and the further discovery of grave-stones, sawn in two or otherwise defaced, and used to close the tombs, upon which were found the names of members of the Gens Pomponia (to which family, as well as to the Gens Cæcilia, by adoption, Cicero's friend Atticus belonged), as Pomponius

Bassus, Lucius Pomponius, &c., seemed to suggest yet another member of the alliance, the Pomponii. From the union of all these names on the same spot, De Rossi conjectured that the Cæcili, to whom the area belonged, and who undoubtedly were Christians, must have had close relations, and probably of affinity or kindred, with the Pomponii, Attici, and Bassi. Now it may be remembered, from a former extract, that there is reason to reckon among the very earliest converts to Christianity in Rome a lady of high rank, Pomponia Græcina, mentioned by Tacitus as having embraced a foreign superstition; and as the name *Lucina* ("illuminated") is a not uncommon Christian epithet of converts from paganism, De Rossi hazarded the suspicion, "hardly even deserving the name of a conjecture," that this "Lucina," who gave the name to the crypt, might be the very Pomponia Græcina of the narrative of Tacitus. All this he had ventured without possessing positive evidence, whether of any relationship between the Pomponii Bassi and the Pomponii Græcini, or of the profession of Christianity by either family; but recent excavations in the cemetery have actually brought to light two Christian epitaphs with the name of Pomponius Bassus, and one with that of Pomponius Græcinus. We need not say that, even with this additional circumstance, the argument is still far from demonstrative; but it will be felt that the coincidences are exceedingly curious, and that the train of investigation exhibits a rare combination of sagacity, boldness, and perseverance.

Among the remains of the cemetery of S. Callixtus—the special scene of De Rossi's explorations and successes—the most interesting and important is the Papal Crypt, so called as being the burial-place of the Popes, with a few exceptions, down to S. Melchiades. The history of its exploration, and the description of its actual condition, are full of interest; but it would be hopeless to convey in a brief notice any just idea of this, the most venerable monument of Christian antiquity, to the illustration of which De Rossi and his English expositors have devoted all the resources of their historical and antiquarian learning. We must refer to the pages of the *Roma Sotterranea* for a full account of the evidence by which the crypt was identified, and of the historical conclusions which are derived from its monuments, many of them sadly mutilated, but nevertheless still bearing unquestionable marks of authenticity. We shall only allude to the curious and interesting class of writings called *Graffiti* ("scratched" inscriptions), which are found in greater abundance in this catacomb than in any other ancient Christian cemetery. With the *Graffiti* of Pompeii, and those of the Palace of the Cæsars and other ruins at Rome;

the reader is probably sufficiently familiar ; and much curious and valuable as well as amusing information as to the customs of social life in Rome has been collected from these light and trifling compositions. When the full significance of ancient Christian inscriptions shall come to be considered, after the body of extant inscriptions shall have been carefully collected and critically classified, the *Graffiti* of the catacombs and other buried Christian monuments will fill an important place. Even the slight sketch of the group which is found at the entrance and in the approaches of the Papal Crypt, although by no means framed with a view to controversy, cannot fail to make a profound impression. It is difficult to have under one's eyes the simple and unstudied addresses, displaying little care for grammar or orthography, rudely scribbled upon these venerable walls by the hand of the casual visitor long ages ago, evidently under some passing impulse of piety inspired by the solemnity and sacredness of the place, and not to feel that they indeed attest the spirit as well as the belief of those primitive times, with a firm assurance even more convincing than that which could attach to the polished epigram or the studied monumental verse. One pious brother has written, MARCIANUM SUCCESSUM SEVERUM SPIRITA * SANCTA (Spiritus Sancti) IN MENTE HAVETE, ET OMNES FRATRES NOSTROS. (Ye holy souls, have in remembrance Marcianus Successus Severus and all our brethren.) Another implores the same "holy souls" to pray for "a safe and successful voyage for Verecundus and his friends": PETITE SPIRITA SANCTA UT VERECUNDUS CUM SUIS BENE NAVIGET. A third, specially addressing the martyr Pope S. Sixtus II., who enjoys a peculiar pre-eminence in this catacomb, entreats him to "remember Aurelius Repentinus in his prayers": SANTE SUSTE IN MENTE HABEAS IN HORATIONES AURELIUM REPENTINUM. And a visitor of Greek race has left a similar memorial in his native language, equally at variance with grammar rule, but attesting with equal clearness the belief upon which the rest are founded, beseeching the martyrs to "have Dionysius in remembrance": ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΜΝΙΑΝ [μνητιαν] ΕΧΕΤΑΙ [εχερε]. Few, we think, will fail to recognize the justice of Dr. Northcote's graceful commentary:—

There is a simplicity and a warmth of affection about these brief petitions, which savours of the earliest ages ; they are very different from the dry and ver-

* The form *spiritum* for *spiritus* is frequently used in the epitaphs of the third century for the soul or spirit of a man.—*Inscriptiones Christianae*, I. cxli.

bose epitaphs of the fourth or fifth centuries; indeed, there is something almost classical about the third, reminding us, says De Rossi, of Horace's *Otium Divos rogat in patenti pressus Aegæo*; and the phrase, which is so frequently repeated in them, *in mente habere*, points to the same antiquity. It is found on an inscription in Pompeii, on two Christian epitaphs of the third and fourth centuries, and is used by S. Cyprian in one of his letters: "Have in mind," he says, "our brothers and sisters in your prayers;" *fratres nostros ac sorores in mente habeatis in orationibus vestris*. These nameless pilgrims made the same petition to the saints in heaven that S. Cyprian made to the saints on earth, and perhaps about the same time, or not much later. For it is to be observed that many of these *Graffiti* have been spoilt, cut off in the middle, or rendered otherwise illegible, by the enlargement of the doorway, the renewal of the stucco, and other changes which were made in this chapel by S. Fabian, perhaps about the year 245, or S. Damasus in 370. One of those that has been thus mutilated is undoubtedly the most ancient of all, for it was written whilst yet the plaster was wet, and it is an apostrophe to one Pontianus, whom De Rossi believes to have been the Pope of this name, brought back from Sardinia, where he had died in exile, and buried in this very chapel by S. Fabian.

There is yet one other inscription on the entrance of the first chapel, of a somewhat different kind, but too remarkable to be passed over. Unhappily the writer never finished it; but what he did write is easily legible, and abundantly sufficient to show the enthusiastic devotion with which his heart was warmed towards the sanctuary on whose threshold he stood. It runs thus: *Gerusalem civitas et ornamentum Martyrum Domini, cujus . . .* The idea present to the writer's mind was evidently the same as we find both in Holy Scripture and in some of the earliest uninspired Christian writers, who not unfrequently speak of the glory of the Church triumphant under the title of the Holy City, the New Jerusalem. He looked upon the chapel he was about to enter as a type or figure of the future Jerusalem. It was adorned and made venerable by the remains of many martyrs of the Lord, which should one day arise to receive new life and rejoice in his presence for ever (pp. 132-134).

The Art of the catacombs is a subject in many respects even more important than that of their origin and history, although both are closely interwoven, and each borrows much light from the other. The fourth book is entirely devoted to Christian art. The details of this most charming subject are quite too large for our space; and we can only refer briefly to those general considerations which have an important bearing upon it, whether in relation to the history of the time or to the doctrinal and disciplinary system out of which the art of the catacombs originated, or to which it bears its testimony.

The most important question connected with the artistic monuments of the catacombs, whether pictorial or sculptured, is that as to their age. Upon this question, next to that of

the age of the catacombs themselves, must turn especially all considerations regarding their authority as witnesses to dogmatical teaching. In the older post-reformation controversies on the subject of image-worship, it was quietly assumed upon one side and admitted on the other, that during the ages anterior to the Peace of the Church, pictorial representations of sacred things and destined for sacred use were entirely unknown; and their supposed absence from Christian use was urged on the Protestant side as an argument of their incompatibility with the system of the new "worship in spirit and truth," and on the Catholic side was explained away, as a necessary precaution of the infant Church, against those lingering idolatrous tendencies of the converts, which might easily be revived by the use of sensible symbols, even those of a purer religion. The discovery of the catacombs and of the pictorial representations with which their sanctuaries abound, ought, it might seem, to have set this question at rest for ever. But it was not so. Partly from the limited publicity which the discoveries of Bosio obtained, partly from the uncritical method pursued by the controversialists, but most of all from the settled prepossession of the public mind, the opposite view—the theory of the sixteenth century—remained, it may almost be said, practically undisturbed down to our own time. Even after the renewed exploration of the catacombs by Padre Marchi and the later archæologists, the old belief so far maintained its ground, that the pictorial remains, whose existence could no longer be ignored or denied, were obstinately maintained to be of mediæval origin, or at least of a date not older than the end of the fourth century.

Probably the most important service, in a polemical sense, which De Rossi has rendered to the Church, is his profound and masterly treatment of this question upon grounds of severe and rigorous criticism: and we cannot conceal our admiration of the skill and fidelity with which Mr. Brownlow has compressed into the space of a few chapters, everything of importance which has been elicited in the progress of the discussion.

It is no longer doubted by any art-critic of name, that some at least of the paintings of the catacombs belong to the days of the Apostles or the age immediately succeeding. Welcker, on seeing the paintings in the crypt of S. Lucina, unhesitatingly attributed them to the first century.* Le Normant pronounced those of S. Domitilla to be identical in style with

* De Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, Tom. i. p. 322.

those in the tomb of Caius Sextius which was erected B.C. 32. Kugler declares that they "approach very near to the wall-paintings of the best period of the empire," and that "the light arabesques remind us of the paintings at Pompeii and in the baths of Titus." We are satisfied that no visitor of the catacombs, fresh from the sight of the Pompeian frescoes, whether those in the Museum at Naples, or those which are still preserved *in situ* upon the walls, will hesitate to confirm this criticism; and the more correct and characteristic engravings of later artists, and still more the photographic reproductions which are beginning to make the subject popular, will bring home to every unbiassed mind with the certainty of conviction, the justice of the conclusions of De Rossi, who sets down some of the paintings (as those in the crypts of S. Lucina, in the cemetery of S. Domitilla and elsewhere), as of the first or the earliest part of the second century; others as belonging to the middle and end of the second, and others at latest to the third. Even Mr. Burgon, with all his reluctance to make any admission favourable to Catholic doctrine, equivalently acquiesces in this judgment as to the age of these pictorial decorations; and explains away its bearing upon the doctrinal questions, by alleging that "the early Christians ornamented their cemeteries, not because it was congenial to Christianity so to illustrate the Faith, but because it was the heathen custom so to honour the dead."*

Indeed, it was in the very necessity of the case that this similarity to the contemporary Pagan Art arose. Christian Art was not born full-grown. It was forced for a time to appear in the garb and to some extent in the proportions of the Pagan Art of the age. It is well observed by our authors that it was no more in the power of the early Christians to invent a new imitative language in painting than it was to produce at once a new idiom of Greek or Latin; and happily this very necessity of employing the imitative pictorial language of Pagan Rome in the first or second century, which is familiar to critics from Pagan remains of these ages of unquestionable authenticity, has proved in the hands of skilful comparative critics the means of establishing beyond question the synchronism of the analogous Christian monuments. The order of events in this curious progress from adaptation to independent invention in Christian Art is admirably described in the *Roma Sotterranea*, following in all substantial particulars the more elaborate view of De Rossi:—

* Letters from Rome, p. 250.

In its first beginnings, it was intent only on creating or selecting certain necessary types or figures that might stand for the religious truths it desired to represent. It did not concern itself to make a complete provision of appropriate accessory ornaments of its own, but borrowed these without scruple from the works of the Pagan school, from the midst of which it was springing forth. The principal figure in the composition, some biblical or, at least, symbolical subject, gave the religious and Christian character to the whole. The *entourage* was then completed by an abundance of merely decorative figures, freely imitated from the types of classical Roman art, such as birds, garlands, vases of fruits or flowers, fantastic heads, winged genii, personifications of the seasons, &c., and this is the leading characteristic of the first age of Christian painting. By and by the cycle of symbolical types grew more rich and complicated by the addition of the mystical interpretation of biblical stories, and was used with great skill and freedom under the direction, it would appear, of learned theological guides. By the end of the third century, this cycle had received a fixed traditional form, and was constantly reiterated. It had become, as it were, consecrated, and Christian art was almost hieratic in its character, as in ancient Egypt or modern Greece, so fixed and immovable were its types, "always like one another, and always unlike nature." But the biblical histories had now almost superseded the use of symbols. These had already begun to decline from the middle of the third century, when the formularies of Christian epigraphy were gradually developing; and in the next century, one might almost say that they disappeared altogether. Towards the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century, the radical revolution which the conversion of Constantine had effected in the social and political position of Christians had set an equally distinct mark upon Christian art. The age of symbolism has passed away. Scenes from real life are now introduced. Even the details of bloody martyrdoms are painted on the tombs or the walls of churches; and the liberty and publicity of Christian worship in the basilicas finds a pleasure in the contrast, suggested by these harrowing representations (pp. 196, 197).

We wish that space would permit us to follow out the curiously elaborate but yet intelligible rules, by which M. de Rossi, failing the aid of inscriptions and other direct chronological aids, determines the age of the several pictorial styles—the absence of the *nimbus*, the use of letters upon the garments, the Christian monogram, and above all the character and style of treatment. All this is full of the deepest interest, not merely for its doctrinal bearing, but also in its relation to the history of Christian Art. We shall best illustrate the method by showing it in its application to a particular picture—one of the several representations of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of which, notwithstanding the long unquestioned prevalence of the opposite belief, a considerable number (according to De Rossi upwards of twenty), exist in the catacombs. A very careful and beautifully-finished chromolithograph of this pic-

ture will be found among the illustrations of the *Roma Sotterranea*.* For this picture of our Blessed Lady De Rossi claims the very highest antiquity :—

He unhesitatingly says that he believes this to belong almost to the apostolic age. It is to be seen on the vaulted roof of a *loculus* in the cemetery of S. Priscilla, and represents the Blessed Virgin seated, her head partially covered by a short light veil, and with the Holy Child in her arms ; opposite to her stands a man, clothed in the pallium, holding a volume in one hand, and with the other pointing to a star which appears above and between the two figures. This star almost always accompanies our Blessed Lady, both in paintings and in sculptures, where there is an obvious historical excuse for it, *e. g.*, when she is represented with the Magi offering their gifts (Plate X. 2), or by the side of the manger with the ox and the ass ; but with a single figure, as in the present instance, it is unusual. There has been some difference of opinion, therefore, among archæologists as to the interpretation that ought to be given of this figure. The most obvious conjecture would be that it was meant for S. Joseph, or for one of the Magi. De Rossi, however, gives many reasons for preferring the prophet Isaias, whose prophecies concerning the Messias abound with imagery borrowed from light. This prophet is found on one of the glasses in the catacombs, standing in a similar attitude before our Blessed Lord, where his identity can hardly be disputed, since he appears in another compartment of the same glass in the act of being sawn asunder by the Jews (in accordance with the tradition mentioned by S. Jerome) ; and our Blessed Lady, as an *orante*, occupies the intervening compartment between these two figures of the prophet. Bosio has preserved to us another fresco from the cemetery of S. Callixtus, still more closely resembling that upon which we are commenting from S. Priscilla ; only there is no star, but in its stead the battlements, as of some town, appear behind the Woman and Child, by which it was probably intended to denote the town of Bethlehem, as was so commonly done in the sculptures, mosaics, and other works of later art. We have already said that De Rossi considers this painting, with which we are now concerned, to have been executed, if not in apostolic times, and, as it were, under the very eyes of the Apostles themselves, yet certainly within the first hundred and fifty years of the Christian era. He first bids us carefully to study the art displayed in the design and execution of the painting, and then to compare it with the decorations of the famous Pagan tombs discovered on the Via Latina in 1858, and which are unanimously referred to the times of the Antonines, or with the paintings of the *cubicula* near the Papal crypt in San Callisto, described in our next chapter, and known to belong to the very beginning of the third century ; and he justly argues that the more classical style of the painting now under examination *obliges* us to assign to it a still earlier date. Next, he shows that the catacomb in which it appears was one of the oldest, S. Priscilla, from whom it receives its name, having been the mother of Pudens, and a cotemporary of the

Apostles ; and, still further, that there is good reason for believing what Bosio and others have said, that the tombs of SS. Pudentiana and Praxedes, and therefore probably of their father, S. Pudens himself, were in the immediate neighbourhood of the chapel in which this Madonna is found ; finally, that the inscriptions which are found there form a class by themselves, bearing manifest tokens of the highest antiquity (pp. 258-259).

In the *Roma Sotterranea* the paintings of the catacombs are treated under six classes—symbolical paintings, or those representing religious ideas under pictorial emblems ; allegorical paintings, chiefly exhibiting the allegories of the Gospel ; paintings representing biblical scenes or incidents, pictures of our Lord, of His Blessed Mother and the saints, legendary paintings, and liturgical paintings. We cannot speak too highly of the advantages of this division of the subject, and we only regret our inability to bring it under the reader's own notice by even a few specimens. It collects at once under the student's eye almost every important characteristic of the art of the catacombs, gathered with infinite pains from the elaborate descriptions of the individual monuments of the various catacombs, which, in De Rossi's volumes, are only to be found by pursuing them in detail according to the complicated order of their topographical distribution ; and we venture to promise that, in the few pregnant chapters into which these classes have been compressed, will be found almost everything of real importance bearing upon this interesting branch of Christian archæology. The exposition of the true principles of early Christian symbolism, of the Christian use of symbols primitively pagan, of the rules for their interpretation, and of the light which may be thrown upon them by the judicious use of historical associations and allusions in the writings of the fathers or other contemporary authorities, is a masterpiece of sound scholarship and judicious criticism ; and the detailed treatment of particular symbols, as well the purely Christian symbols—the Anchor, the Dove, and the Fish, especially in its curious combination with the Eucharist,—as the adaptations from paganism of Orpheus and the *Syrinx* of Pan, is in the highest degree interesting and attractive. Indeed, the book can hardly fail to make its way with almost every class of readers. The chapters on the allegorical and biblical paintings of the catacombs—on the Good Shepherd, the Ark, Moses, Jonas, Daniel, and the Hebrew youths will supply to the art student a valuable supplement to the information on the more modern treatment of the same class of subjects in the popular treatises on Christian Art ; and the controversial reader will find much that is novel in the treatment

of the liturgical subjects, and those connected with the Blessed Virgin and the saints. We can only make room for a single example of the manner in which this class of subjects is treated:—

Another pair of subjects which seem in like manner to be studiously brought together from the two Testaments, are Moses striking the rock and the resurrection of Lazarus. Sometimes they are found in the same compartment of a painting; sometimes roughly sketched side by side on a gravestone; still more frequently they are together on a sarcophagus. Some antiquarians consider the point of connection between them to be the display of Divine power in bringing living water out of a dry rock, and a dead man to life out of his rocky grave; but this analogy hardly seems to be sufficiently close: any other of the miracles of our Blessed Lord might have been selected with almost equal propriety. Others, therefore, prefer to look upon these two subjects as intended to represent the beginning and the end of the Christian course; “the fountain of water springing up unto life everlasting”; God’s grace and the gift of faith being typified by the water flowing from the rock, “which was Christ,” and life everlasting by the victory over death and the second life vouchsafed to Lazarus. And this interpretation seems both more probable in itself and is more confirmed by ancient authority; since Tertullian distinctly identifies the water which flowed from the rock with the waters of Baptism, which is the beginning of the Christian life, as a resurrection is unquestionably the end. S. Cyprian also agrees with Tertullian, saying that it was foretold that if the Jews would thirst and seek after Christ, they should drink with us Christians, *i.e.* should obtain the grace of Baptism. “If they should thirst in the desert,” says Isaias (xlviii. 21), “He will lead them out: He will bring forth water out of the rock for them, and cleave the rock, and my people shall drink.” “And this was fulfilled in the gospels” (he continues) “when Christ, who is the rock, is cleft with the stroke of the lance in His Passion; Who, reminding them of what had been foretold by the prophet, cried aloud and said, ‘If any man thirst, let him come and drink; he that believeth in me, as the Scripture saith, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.’ And that it might be made still more clear that the Lord spoke here about Baptism, the Evangelist has added, ‘Now this He said of the Spirit, which they should receive who believed in Him;’ for the Holy Spirit is received by Baptism.”

Moses may sometimes also be seen in the act of taking off his shoes before approaching the burning bush; and this is treated by some of the Fathers as emblematical of those renunciations of the world, the flesh, and the devil, which all the faithful have made in Baptism; or it might typify that reverence which is required of all who approach the Christian mysteries.

In one instance, in a fresco of the cemetery of S. Calixtus, we find these two scenes in the life of Moses represented close together, almost as parts of the same picture; but the figure of Moses in the two scenes is manifestly different. In the first, where he takes off his shoes, having been called by the hand of God coming out of a cloud to go up into Mount Sinai to receive the law, he is young and without a beard; in the second, where he strikes the rock,

and the thirsty Jew is drinking, he is older and bearded ; and both the general look of his hair and beard, and the outline of his features, seem to present a certain marked resemblance to the traditional figure of S. Peter (pp. 247, 248).

In connection with the liturgical subjects, we had hoped to give some account of the excellent chapter on the Gilded Glasses of the Catacombs, which contains a valuable summary of all that is best in Padre Garrucci's classical works upon the subject. But for this, as well as for the chapter on Christian Sarcophagi, we must be content with referring to the text of the *Roma Sottterranea*. We regret this, particularly in the latter case, as it is only in this portion of the book that the important subject of early Christian sculpture is even incidentally discussed.

We take leave of this most attractive volume, however, with the less regret, because we trust that we shall have occasion before long to meet its authors once again in the same field. We began by expressing our belief that the time has only recently arrived in which it has become possible to discuss satisfactorily the many important questions of doctrine, discipline, and liturgy, which lend to the study of Christian archæology its gravest and most solemn interest. If we have now approached such a point in archæological knowledge, it is not too much to say, in bringing our observations to a close, that this has been effected mainly through the unexampled energy, perseverance, and calmly critical scholarship of Commendatore De Rossi. The rare degree in which he possesses these qualities is attested by his contributions to the study of Christian epigraphy and archæology ; and the authors of the *Roma Sottterranea* might well be content even if they could claim for themselves no higher merit than that of bringing before English readers in a popular form the main results of the researches which these works record. In doing this, they have scrupulously adhered to the method of their original. Their book is purely historical and critical ; the conclusions which it has established may henceforth be used as the starting-point for those more important doctrinal discussions which these conclusions will inevitably suggest to the mind of every inquirer ; and we confidently anticipate for the volume on Christian Epigraphy which they promise, as a sequel of *Roma Sottterranea*, and for which De Rossi's chronological collection of inscriptions has laid a sure and solid basis, a still more complete and ready acceptance. From the Catholic, fresh from the pleasing impression which the present volume

will have left, the Christian Epigraphy will receive a cordial and admiring welcome; and even those readers of the *Roma Sotterranea*, who sympathize least with its doctrinal views, will find it impossible to refuse its sequel an impartial study, if not a calm and respectful appreciation.

ART. VIII.—EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT THOUGHT.

La Philosophie Scolastique exposée et défendue. Par le R. P. KLEUTGEN. Paris : Gaume. 1869.

Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, B.D., Fellow of Oriel College. London : Rivingtons. 1843.

THOSE who have studied the elaborate arguments drawn out in Catholic philosophical works to prove the Existence of God, may not unfrequently perhaps have been perplexed by the following difficulty. No one of course can know certainly that God exists, except on grounds of reason; and no one can make any act of *faith*, until he knows for certain that God exists. It is necessary then for all men without exception who would be saved—and not merely for philosophers—to know certainly God's Existence on grounds of reason. Yet to the enormous majority of mankind, such grounds of reason seem on the surface inaccessible. It would be very ludicrous child's play, that some given labourer, or farmer, or tradesman, or even hunting country gentleman, should explore such arguments for God's Existence as are found in Catholic philosophical works: especially if you suppose him to explore them on the principle of judging, for himself and by the perspicacity of his own intellect, how far they can be vindicated against the objections of Mill, of Huxley, or of Comte.

Such is the difficulty which must have occurred to many. And considering its obviousness and plausibility, we have always been a good deal surprised that it has not received more express treatment. But F. Kleutgen, in his great philosophical work, has handled the whole subject with such surpassing power, that instead of needing any apology, we shall on the contrary obtain our readers' gratitude, for placing before them a very long extract from this illustrious writer.

We italicise a few sentences, to which we invite especial attention.

In many places Scripture declares in the most express manner, that even for those to whom God has not manifested Himself by His prophets or by His Son, there exists a revelation of God in His works, and even within the mind of man, whereby *they can without any difficulty cognize God* their Creator and Maker, as well as His sovereign Law. It is not necessary to point out that Scripture does not in this speak of *any* [supposable] first cause ; but of the Living and True God, Who has created heaven and earth, and inscribed His law in the heart of man : and that consequently it speaks also of the moral order. Now it says in the same passages, that men who do not thus cognize their God are without excuse ; that they are insensate ; that they deserve God's wrath and all His chastisements. It necessarily follows then, that this manifestation of God by His works is such that man cannot fail by this means to cognize God with certitude, unless he commit a grave fault

Assuredly this does not mean that it is *philosophical researches*, continued laboriously through obstacles and doubts, which can alone lead to knowledge of God. *Very few men in fact are capable of these laborious researches* : whereas Scripture speaks of all the heathens in general ; and in the Book of Wisdom it is said expressly (xiii. 1), "all men are vanity who do not possess the knowledge of God." The sacred writer even adds that this knowledge, to which he gives the name of "sight" to express *its clearness and certitude* ["cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri," v. 5], can be obtained *with as much ease (and even more) as knowledge of this world* : which certainly does not fail any one capable of the least reflection. ["Si tantum potuerunt scire ut possent æstimare sæculum, quomodo hujus Dominum non facilius inveniunt ?", v. 9] . . . *It is easier therefore to know God the Governor of the world, than to know enough of nature to admire its power and its beauty.*

It necessarily follows therefore, that *there is a knowledge of God different from philosophical knowledge* ; a knowledge so easy to acquire and so certain, that ignorance and doubt on that head cannot be explained, except either by *culpable carelessness or proud obstinacy*. Such is also . . . the common doctrine of the Holy Fathers. *They distinguished that knowledge of God which is obtained by philosophical research from that which springs up spontaneously in every man at the very sight of creation.* This latter kind of knowledge is called by them "a witness of Himself," which God gave to the soul at its creation ; "an endowment of nature" ; "an infused knowledge," *inherent in every man without preliminary instruction* ; a knowledge which springs up in some sense of itself in proportion as reason is developed ; and which cannot fail, except in a man either deprived of the use of reason or else given up to vices which have corrupted his nature. And when the Fathers of the Church declare unanimously on this head that this knowledge is really found and established in all men, the importance of their testimony is better understood by remembering that they lived in the midst of heathen populations.

God has implanted in our reasonable nature everything which is necessary,

that we may know Him, and know Him with facility.* Now He does not [after creation] withdraw Himself from creatures, but always remains near them, co-operating with them, exciting them to act, supporting and directing each one to its end conformably to its nature. If this is true of all creatures, *how could this concurrence be refused* to the most noble of all creatures, to those whom God has created *for the very purpose of their knowing and loving Him?* Man indeed does not arrive at his end, except by using the powers which God has given him; but the Author of those gifts lends to man his concurrence, in order that he may make due use of them. Since that moral and religious life *for which man was created* is founded on a knowledge of the truths whereof we speak, God *watches over man*, in order that reason, as it is developed, may come to know them with facility and certainty. Observe the question here is not of supernatural grace, but is [of the natural order]. . . .

What would not be the misery of man [if there were no reasonable certainty without philosophical argument]? It is easy to show those [ordinary] men who are capable of any reflection at all, that their knowledge of the truth *is not scientific*; that they do not deduce it [consciously and explicitly] from the first principles of thought, and consequently *they cannot defend it against the attacks of scepticism*. If then as soon as we come to know that our *knowledge is not scientific*, the *conviction of its truth* were at once shaken, what on that supposition would be the lot of man? . . .

The fact is indeed not so: that consciousness which every one can interrogate within himself attests its denial; and at every period the voice of mankind has confirmed that denial. As soon as we arrive at the use of reason, *the voice of conscience awakes within us*.† Whether we choose or no, *we must cognize the distinction between good and evil*. [Again] just as it is absolutely impossible for us to doubt our own existence, [in like manner] we are absolutely compelled to regard as real the external world; [to hold] that, further, there exists a Supreme Author of our being and of all other things; and that through Him there is a certain moral order.‡ These also are truths which we cannot refuse to admit. No doubt we can do violence to ourselves in order to produce in ourselves the contrary persuasion, just as we may use efforts to regard the moral conscience itself as an illusion. But *these efforts never succeed*, or, at least, never succeed perfectly; and we feel ourselves even under an obligation of *condemning the very attempt as immoral*. The

* F. Kleutgen quotes from an opusculum of S. Thomas: "*Dei cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse.*"

† It is observable that here, and still more strongly in a later passage, F. Kleutgen uses the word "conscience," not as moral theologians speak of "conscientia," but to express man's natural power or faculty of knowing right and wrong.

‡ F. Kleutgen has spoken immediately before, and also speaks immediately afterwards, of "the moral conscience," the "distinction between right and wrong," as covering a *distinct* ground from this. By the present phrase then, "a moral order," he plainly intends to express God's moral government of the world.

mind of man, in fact, is *under the influence of truth which has dominion over it*, and which gives [man] certainty *even against his own wish*. Truth manifests itself to our intelligence, and engenders therein the knowledge of its reality, *even before we [explicitly] know what that truth is*. Still truth [I say] reigns over man and reveals itself to him, *however great may be his resistance as a sacred and sovereign authority which commands him and summons him before its tribunal*. And [standing] before that tribunal, he is obliged to admit the immorality of even attempting to doubt. Just as he is bound to condemn the madness, I will not say of doubting, but of trying to doubt, the reality of the external world, *so he is obliged to regard as an impiety [all] doubt in God's Existence and Providence*. . . .

Nor can it be here objected that conscience (in the proper sense of that word, moral conscience) gives us no certainty so long as its existence within us and its pronouncements are purely spontaneous. Of the conscience, more than of anything else (surtout), it may be said that *it reveals to us its own truth*; that it compels us to acknowledge *an absolute good and a sovereign rule over our wills and actions* (even though we know not its innermost nature), not only as really existing, but as *an august and sacred power which is [in authority] over us*. Whatever efforts man may make to overthrow and destroy his own intimate persuasion on the truthfulness of conscience, he will never succeed in doing so. Even though he seek by every possible means to persuade himself that nothing obliges him to regard it as truthful, nevertheless he will always feel himself compelled to acknowledge its authority, and even to condemn his own resistance to it.

It is true indeed that, though conscience *often* speaks against a man's inclinations [so loudly] as to confound (by its manifestation of its own truthfulness) all pride and all the sophistical dreams by which he might wish to stifle it,—it does not *always* so speak and raise its voice as to take from man *the power of turning from it* and refusing to listen. If he enters into himself and chooses to observe what passes within him, he will obtain that reflex knowledge which, as we said above, is required for actual certainty; he will know that he cannot prevent himself from acknowledging the truth of what the voice of conscience dictates. But it is in his power, *if not always* at least often, to abstain from entering into himself and lending his ear to that voice. He has [often] the power of not hearing it, or of giving it so little attention that he withdraws himself from that influence which would make him certain. It is in this manner that, *for a certain time at least*, notwithstanding the habitual certainty* which nature gives him, he may remain undecided on the truthfulness of conscience, supposing that he has not yet acknowledged that truthfulness by philosophical reflection, or again that he does not seek to know it. But even though we were not able to demonstrate by the intimate experience of every man that the doubt whereof we speak is contrary to the principles of morality, we ought nevertheless to be persuaded of that truth by the judgment of all mankind.

* By "habitual certainty," as he has explained just before, F. Kleutgen means to express the *proximate power* of actual certainty.

Among civilized nations in every time the necessity of philosophical studies has been admitted, and those have been held in high esteem who devoted themselves thereto, and who were regarded as sages. Nevertheless, though the nations (it is true) accepted at the hands of philosophers the solution of many questions, they have never ascribed to these men a decisive judgment on all truth without exception. As to those first truths on which all our convictions rest, *humanity bears within itself the consciousness or intimate persuasion of knowing them with certainty.* Philosophers may make these truths the subject of their speculations; but they are not allowed the right of pronouncing a definitive judgment on these truths: and if their researches lead them to deny or doubt them, those very persons who would otherwise be the disciples of these philosophers, rise up against them as judges and condemn them. Was there ever a nation which did not regard it as madness to doubt an external world? a nation which did not hold in horror a man so perverted as to acknowledge no truth superior to the senses, and reject all distinction between virtue and vice? Has not atheism among all nations been accounted a crime? And by the very fact of seeing *culpability* in denial of these truths, does not the world declare that they cannot possibly be unknown to men of good will? (Phil. Schol., nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232.)

Now, in order to appreciate F. Kleutgen's meaning in this singularly impressive passage, it must be remembered that he consistently and peremptorily refuses to credit the human intellect with any direct and *immediate* knowledge of God. According to F. Kleutgen—indeed, according to all orthodox Catholics—God is known to man only through His works; only through creatures. The doctrine then, which F. Kleutgen lays down in the preceding passage, is to some extent represented by the two following theses.

Thesis I. A most real process of reasoning is constantly going on in the minds of men, quite distinct from any process of *philosophical* reasoning or *arguing*; and of a kind by no means available in *confutation of an opponent.* God watches with special care over mankind in their use of those intellectual faculties which He has given them, so as to assist them in arriving at the truth. Especially is this the case, as regards their arriving at a true knowledge of Himself. He created them for the very purpose that they should know and love Him. He therefore uniformly provides—except indeed where man's grave culpability interposes an obstacle to His gracious operations—that they shall be led from those true premisses which legitimately establish His Existence, to the true conclusion itself, that He does exist.

Thesis II. Among the premisses available to all mankind, which legitimately establish His existence, two in particular may be mentioned. The first, and far the most important, is

that moral voice within man's breast, which is ever testifying the necessary and eternal distinction between right and wrong, and which is ever summoning him to a virtuous life. This voice suffices by itself to prove with absolute certainty, that there exists a certain necessary Supreme Rule of morality which obliges all reasonable beings, whatever that Rule may precisely be. But there is a second premiss, or rather combination of premisses, also available for all mankind, which conspires with the former in leading them to a knowledge of God. For this visible world is within their immediate cognizance; the principle of causation is accepted by them as axiomatic; and the inference is obvious and ready, to the Great First Cause.

As to this last-named inference from the visible world, F. Kleutgen rather incidentally alludes to it than directly expresses it. And though he would doubtless say that there are various other premisses also which bear their part in the great process of conviction, we do not observe that he has expressly referred to any others. At all events, it is to the moral voice that he again and again recurs, as to the one immoveable foundation of Theism. In this respect many readers of F. Newman will be almost startled, by the singular resemblance to be found between these two great thinkers, whose philosophical history has been so entirely different. As an instance out of many which might be adduced, read F. Newman's "Occasional Sermons," from p. 84 to p. 87, and observe his profound agreement with what we have cited from F. Kleutgen.

Both these theses are of extreme importance; and it is perhaps almost difficult to know which is of the greater. Our present concern however will be exclusively with the first; and on this first thesis indeed, there is a more startling resemblance between F. Kleutgen and Newman, than even on the second. The latter half of that volume of F. Newman's which we have named at the head of this article, is occupied with a series of essays on the relation between faith and reason. These essays contain undoubtedly one or two incidental remarks, which F. Newman would not make now that he is a Catholic; and from which indeed he has carefully refrained since his conversion, when engaged on kindred topics. But F. Newman's fundamental thought is identical with F. Kleutgen's first thesis; and is expressed indeed in the very title of one essay, "Explicit and Implicit Reason." To exhibit this thought in its full light and its general bearing, would occupy at the very least a large volume: let us hope that either F. Kleutgen or F. Newman may hereafter be in-

duced so to exhibit it ! Our present purpose is hardly more than the very elementary one, of placing the truth before our readers in its simplest aspect, with the hope that Catholic philosophical thinkers may bear it in mind and ponder on its importance.

To reason, is nothing else than to be led, by means of certain premisses which one knows, to a certain conclusion which legitimately follows from those premisses. Now it is plain, from obvious and every-day instances, that great multitudes thus reason and with great accuracy, who never reflect on their premisses or put them into shape ; and who would in fact cut a very poor figure, if ever they attempted such a task.

Let a person only call to mind the clear impression he has about matters of every day's occurrence, that this man is bent on a certain object, or that that man was displeased, or another suspicious ; or that one is happy, and another unhappy ; and how much depends in such impressions on manner, voice, accent, words uttered, silence instead of words, and all the many subtle symptoms which are felt by the mind, but cannot be contemplated ; and let him consider how very poor an account he gives of his impression, if he avows it, and is called upon to justify it (Newman, pp. 270, 271).

Take some particular case. I am intimately acquainted with a certain relative : and some fine morning I have not been with him more than five minutes, before I am perfectly convinced, and on most conclusive grounds, that (for whatever reason) he is out of sorts with me. It is little to say that I could not so analyze my grounds of conviction, as to make *another* see the force of my reasoning ; I could not so analyze them, as that their exhibition shall be in the slightest degree satisfactory to *myself*. Especially in proportion as I am less philosophical and less clever in psychological analysis, all attempts at exhibiting my premisses in due form hopelessly break down. Yet none the less it remains true, both that my premisses are known to me with certainty, and that my conclusion follows from them irresistibly. There is an enormous number of past instances, in which these symptoms *have* co-existed with ill-humour ; there is no single known case in which they have existed *without* it ; they all admit of being referred to ill-humour as effects to their cause ; they are so heterogeneous, that any other cause except ill-humour which shall account for them all is quite incredible, while it is no less incredible that they co-exist fortuitously ; &c. &c. &c. Why, in all probability the very Newtonian theory of gravitation does not rest on firmer and more irrefragable grounds. Yet to *analyze* all this or any part of it—to explain what is

the peculiar character of these symptoms,—in what they precisely differ from others which superficially resemble them—*how* they are referrible to ill-humour as to a cause—or *why* it is incredible that they should co-exist fortuitously—to express all this, is utterly beyond the power of men who are not greatly versed in philosophy, and indeed of many who *are* so versed.

Another illustration :—

Consider the preternatural sagacity with which a great general knows what his friends and enemies are about, and what will be the final result, and where, of their combined movements,—and then say whether, if he were required to argue the matter in word or on paper, all his most brilliant conjectures might not be refuted, and all his producible reasons exposed as illogical (p. 210).

The *reasoning* on such matters of a really great general, would be almost infallible; while his *arguments* might be below contempt.

The whole matter is so important, that it is worth while to repeat illustrations even at the risk of wearying our readers. Take another case, then. A sharp-sighted and experienced seaman will tell you with the greatest confidence some fine evening, that there will be a violent storm before morning. It is often the case that the premisses on which he rests this conclusion are amply sufficient to bear it out; that his reasoning is absolutely faultless; that nothing short of a miracle can falsify his prediction. But ask him to argue the matter, to tell you what are the precise phenomena on which he builds, to express accurately his reason for thinking that such phenomena denote the imminence of a storm, he will be nowhere.

Then again there is a well-known story of the advice given by a sagacious judge, to magistrates possessing shrewd common sense, but an unpractised intellect. "Give your decisions confidently," he said, "but state no argument. Ten to one your decisions will be right, but a hundred to one your argument will be wrong." He did not mean, of course, that they would arrive at right decisions by guesswork or by inspiration. He meant that their reasoning would probably be sound, but their arguments almost certainly fallacious.

Once more. A singularly conscientious and upright man has a large family of sons, with whom he has lived from the first in habits of most familiar and affectionate intercourse. Hardly one of their convictions can be named which is so demonstratively established, which rests on reasoning so absolutely irresistible, as their conviction of his uprightness and conscientiousness. Though they were the best astronomers in Europe, it would not be one whit more absurd and irra-

tional that they should reject Kepler's laws, than that they should doubt their father's integrity of character. Yet, though first-rate astronomers, they may be very poor psychologists, and may be baffled in every attempt to draw out in shape their grounds for this latter conclusion. Those grounds are in fact of that vague, impalpable, indefinite character, which eludes their grasp.

It is certainly true then, of the enormous majority—we believe it to be true even of the most highly educated and philosophical—that for the most part they “advance forward” towards truth “on grounds which they cannot produce, and if they could, yet could not prove to be true; on latent grounds,” which they certainly know, but have no power of expressly assigning.

But we may take a step further. It happens again and again, not merely that men most reasonably hold this or that conviction without having analyzed its *grounds*; but that they hold it most reasonably, without even knowing (reflexly) of its *existence*. Here one single instance will suffice. There are certain persons—A, B, C, &c.—with whom I have had various intimate relations, and whom I have seen in great and critical variety of circumstances. I am asked my opinion of A's character. The very question had never occurred to me; yet on interrogating my own consciousness, I find there stored up a complete answer to the question. I may find great difficulty in *expressing* my views of A's character, and when I have done my best in that way may be very dissatisfied with my success. But that view none the less *exists*, though I may fail in its expression: and it existed, long before I had ever thought of its existence. It will at once be seen that there are numberless parallel instances to this.

Here another point is suggested, which deserves attention. How far more faithful is often the implicit representation of an object than the explicit! how far more correct and complete, e.g., is the view which I *observe within myself* of A's character, than any *expression* of that view which I find myself able to put forth! It will frequently happen indeed, that I am utterly dissatisfied with the latter; that I feel bitterly how coarse an instrument is language for the exhibition of thought. F. Newman points this moral in reference to theology in a forcible passage. We italicise a few clauses.

No analysis is subtle and delicate enough to represent adequately the state of mind under which we believe, or the subjects of belief, as they are presented to our thoughts. The end proposed is that of delineating, or, as it were, painting what the mind sees and feels; now let us consider what it is

to portray duly in form and colour things material, and we shall surely understand the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of representing the outline and character, the hues and shades in which any intellectual view really exists in the mind, or of giving it that substance and that exactness in detail in which consists its likeness to the original, or of sufficiently marking those minute differences which attach to the same general state of mind or tone of thought as found in this or that individual respectively. It is probable that *given opinions, as held by individuals*, even when of the most congenial views, are as distinct from each other as their faces. Now how minute is the defect in imitation which hinders the likeness of a portrait from being successful! how easy is it to recognize who is intended by it, without allowing that really he is represented! Is it not hopeless then, to expect that the most diligent and anxious investigation can end in more than in giving some very rude description of the living mind, and its feelings, thoughts, and reasonings. And if it be difficult to analyze fully any state, or frame, or opinion of *our own minds*, is it a less difficulty to delineate, as Theology professes to do, the works, dealings, providences, attributes, or nature of *Almighty God*? . . .

We are told, in human language, things concerning God Himself; concerning His Son and His Spirit; and concerning His Son's Incarnation, and the union of two natures in His One Person: truths which *even a peasant holds implicitly*, but which Almighty God, whether by His Apostles, or by His Church after them, has vouchsafed to bring together and methodize, and to commit to the keeping of science. . . .

Now all such statements are likely at first to strike coldly or harshly upon religious ears, when taken by themselves, for this reason if for no other, that they express heavenly things under earthly images, which are infinitely below the reality (pp. 264, 265).

Curiously enough, unbelievers are in the habit of urging, that the Church's dogmatic definitions imply a far more precise and accurate apprehension of Divine Objects, than men commonly possess. The fact—as F. Newman has argued in many places—is just the contrary. No amount of scientific statement can fully represent the distinct mental image, as implicitly possessed by an orthodox, well-instructed, and meditative believer.

On the whole then, it is not too much to say that men are constantly occupied—the more constantly as their mind is more living and active—in observing premisses and thence inferring conclusions; and that every one holds (on more or less sufficient grounds) a very large number of fixed convictions, which have never been placed explicitly before his mind. Even as regards those who are most given to argument and philosophy, it does not seem too much to say that a very large number, even of their most influential convictions, remain in this latent and unrecognized state.

By such considerations as these F. Newman is led to the following weighty judgment:—

It is hardly too much to say, that almost all reasons formally adduced in moral inquiries, *are rather specimens and symbols of the real grounds, than those grounds themselves.* They do but approximate to a representation of the general character of the proof, which the writer wishes to convey to another's mind. *They cannot, like mathematical proof, be passively followed,* with an attention confined to what is stated, and with the admission of nothing but what is urged. Rather, they are hints towards, and samples of, the true reasoning; and demand an active, ready, candid, and docile mind, which *can throw itself into what is said,* neglect verbal difficulties, and pursue and carry out principles. This is the true office of a writer, *to excite and direct trains of thought;* and this, on the other hand, is the too common practice of readers, to expect everything to be done for them,—to refuse to think,—to criticise the letter, instead of reaching forwards towards the sense,—and to account every argument as unsound which is illogically worded (pp. 271, 272).

Our readers then will have seen the essential distinction between *reasoning* and *argument*. To reason correctly (as we have already said) is to be led, through holding certain premisses, to hold a certain conclusion which legitimately follows from those premisses. But to *argue* quite correctly, involves a great deal more: it involves, that you shall *analyze* your process of reasoning; that you shall *reflect* on what has gone on in your mind; that you shall enumerate quite exhaustively, and express quite accurately, the various premisses on which you have relied. And nothing is more easily supposable—we imagine few things are in fact commoner—than that the better reasoner may be the worse arguer. To fall back on one of our previous illustrations. A and B may have been intimately acquainted with some third person, and have enjoyed full means of knowing his character. It may well happen that A shall have formed (by implicit observation and reasoning) a far juster view of it than B has; while B nevertheless, from being much more logically and intellectually disciplined than A, may so thoroughly out-argue him, as almost to make his view seem ridiculous.

On the other hand, it is argument, and not mere reasoning, which is the instrument of *philosophy*. Implicit thought, by the very fact of being implicit, not only remains (so to speak) each man's private property, but even in the individual mind may merely occupy its own isolated corner; it may fail grievously in influencing the judgment, on various important matters with which it is in fact connected. But it is the business of a philosopher, not only to *cognize* a truth, but to

recognise it; to know that he knows it; to contemplate it; to express it; to combine it with other truths; to refer truths back to their common cause and origin. Nor must it be supposed, from anything we have said, that we have any wish to disparage the paramount importance of philosophy. No one can suspect F. Kleutgen or F. Newman of any such intention; and for ourselves, we spoke in July most strongly on the very serious evils under which Catholics lie, for want of greater philosophical agreement. Putting aside the Church's influence, we incline to think Mr. Mill hardly goes too far, when he says that the course of philosophy has more influence than all other causes put together, on the course of human thought. Certainly however we do think that the course of philosophy would be more satisfactory,—that philosophy would be in a sounder and more healthy condition,—if philosophers considered, more prominently than is their habit, the value and authority of that implicit reasoning, which is in some sense external to their own sphere.

Nor again let it be supposed, that we have any doubt whatever of a Catholic's complete argumentative victory, under fair circumstances, over any opponent whomsoever. It may happen undoubtedly, in some given time and place, that there may be very few Catholics, who have received adequate philosophical training, and who have carefully studied the anti-Catholic theories. In such cases, the superiority of argument may possibly enough be on a different side from the superiority of reasoning. But where the combatants are intellectually on anything like equal terms, we are confident that on no field will the Church's triumph be more signal, than on that of controversy and philosophy. Intellectual power and accomplishments being equal or nearly equal, it must at last be truth which determines the victory. Indeed, those anti-Catholics who are most peremptory and supercilious in expressing their argumentative contempt for Catholicity, are those very men whose arguments are the weakest; and who simply collapse, when grappled with by some sounder thinker.

Still, after every such admission the fact remains, that the number of men is comparatively very small, whose arguments in any way represent their reasonings; that the enormous majority either do not argue at all, or argue quite hap-hazard and at random. The question therefore is well worthy the attention of speculative men, whether there can be drawn out any practical "logic of implicit reasoning"; whether any practical rules can be laid down, which shall help towards guiding in true opinions that immense mass, who must depend

for their conclusions upon something entirely distinct from argument. We will not here attempt to enter otherwise on this question; but one remark frequently occurs in F. Newman's essays, which is well worthy of consideration, because it leads (we think) to practical inferences of great importance. His opinion then is, that almost all men are good (implicit) reasoners, when they are really earnest in their desire of attaining truth on the matter in hand. This is what accomplished arguers and philosophers are sometimes unwilling to think, but which seems to us true nevertheless.

Nothing is more common among men of a reasoning turn, than to consider that no one reasons well but themselves. All men of course think that they themselves are right and others wrong who differ from them; and so far all men must find fault with the reasonings of others, since no one proposes to act without reasons of some kind. Accordingly, so far as men are accustomed to analyze the opinions of others and contemplate their processes of thought, they are tempted to despise them as illogical. If any one sets about examining why his neighbours are on one side in political questions, not on another; why for or against certain measures, of a social, economical, or civil nature; why they belong to this religious party, not to that; why they hold this or that doctrine; why they have certain tastes in literature; or why they hold certain views in matters of opinion; it is needless to say that *if he measures their grounds by the reasons which they produce, he will have no difficulty in holding them up to ridicule, or even to censure.* And so again as to the deductions made from facts which come before us. From the sight of the same sky one may augur fine weather, another bad; from the signs of the times one the coming in of good, another of evil; from the same actions of individuals one moral greatness, another depravity or perversity; one simplicity, another craft; upon the same evidence one justifies, another condemns. The miracles of Christianity were in early times imputed by some to magic, others they converted; the union of its professors was ascribed to seditious and traitorous aims by some, while others it moved to say, "See how these Christians love one another." The phenomena of the physical world have given rise to a variety of theories, that is, of alleged facts, at which they are supposed to point; theories of astronomy, chemistry, and physiology; theories religious and atheistical. The same events are considered to prove a particular providence, and not; to attest the divinity of one religion or another. The downfall of the Roman empire was to Pagans a refutation, to Christians an evidence of Christianity. . . .

Nor can it fairly be said that such varieties arise from deficiency of logical power in the multitude of men. . . . This is what men of clear intellects are not slow to imagine. Clear, strong, steady intellects, if they are not deep, will look on these differences in deduction chiefly as failures in the reasoning faculty, and will despise them or excuse them accordingly. . . .

But surely there is no greater mistake than this. For the experience of

life contains abundant evidence that *in practical matters, when their minds are really aroused, men commonly are not bad reasoners. Men do not mistake when their interest is concerned.* They have an instinctive sense in which direction their path lies towards it, and how they must act consistently with self-preservation or self-aggrandisement. And so in the case of questions in which party spirit, or political opinion, or ethical principle, or personal feeling, is concerned, *men have a surprising sagacity, often unknown to themselves, in finding their own place.* However remote the connection between the point in question and their own creed, or habits, or feelings, the principles which they profess guide them unerringly to their legitimate issues; and thus it often happens that in apparently different practices, or usages, or expressions, or in questions of science, or politics, or literature, we can almost prophesy beforehand, from their religious or moral views, where certain persons will stand, and *often can defend them far better than they defend themselves.* . . .

All this shows, that in spite of the inaccuracy of expression or (if you will) in thought which prevails in the world, *men on the whole do not reason incorrectly.* If their reason itself were in fault, they would reason each in his own way: whereas they *form into schools*; and that not merely from imitation and sympathy, but certainly from *internal compulsion*, from the *constraining influence* of their several principles. *They may argue badly, but they reason well*; that is, their professed grounds are no sufficient measures of their real ones (pp. 204-5).

Here then, in F. Newman's opinion, is one most principal security for good (implicit) reasoning: simplicity of intention. Let us give an instance.

Suppose then A and B are two merchants, equally well acquainted with matters of business. A however has far more "simplicity of intention" than B; or, in other words, his heart is far more unreservedly devoted to money-getting. B has many literary and social tastes, while A cares for nothing but the main chance. Few men doubt that, this being the case, A will be a far better (implicit) reasoner than B, on the best mode of adding to his fortune. A thousand occasions of turning a penny will suggest themselves to one, which would never occur to the other; or, in other words, a thousand relevant premisses will actively energize in A's mind, which do not enter B's at all. And moreover, when some particular question is raised of unusual commercial moment, B will be very far from bringing the same concentrated energy as A to its examination, and is much less likely, therefore, to arrive at a sound conclusion. In other words, two different phenomena present themselves. A's mind is far more constantly peopled than B's, with the implicit thought of relevant premisses; and (2) his implicit reasoning from those premisses will be far more accurate.

This principle may be very importantly applied in the sphere of morals and religion. We will assume F. Kleutgen's doctrine, that all men, who reach the age of reason, at once accept various moral truths as axiomatic; and that they are led quite inevitably—unless indeed through their own grave sin—to accept various further doctrines. They accept the doctrine, not only that there is an indefinitely large moral Rule of Life placed in authority over them;—but also that that Rule is enforced by the Living God, Who created heaven and earth: that to please Him is the most important end of life: that through prayer they may obtain from Him greater strength for that purpose. Now it is self-evident that, among all who admit this fundamental body of truths, those alone act reasonably, who build their whole course of life predominantly on its consideration; who ever seek moral and religious truth with earnestness and simplicity of intention. In other words, a man acts more reasonably—whether he be educated or uneducated, speculative or unspeculative, matters not at all—the more constantly these primary religious doctrines occupy his mind as actively energizing premisses, carrying him forward (implicitly) to a larger and larger assemblage of practical conclusions. These men are infallibly certain of their original premisses; and the validity of their reasoning is largely secured, by their purity and earnestness of intention. They may very possibly be the worst arguers, but they are quite certainly the best reasoners in the whole world. They fly towards moral and religious truth as on eagles' wings; they often discern with the precision of an instinct the path of duty under difficult circumstances; and are found to possess quite an extraordinary power of choosing rightly for themselves, among a multitude of conflicting religious teachers.*

The same truth is exemplified in the case of Catholic dogmata. These were revealed, not for the purpose of lying dormant in the mind, but on the contrary of motivating practical action. A Catholic then acts more reasonably and more acceptably to God, in proportion as he labours to view, by the light of these dogmata, every phenomenon of daily life with which they are in any way connected. Or in other words, in proportion as he lives more reasonably and virtuously, the

* *Adest in intellectu humano inclinatio quædam naturalis a Sapientissimo Auctore indita, quæ . . . ad judicia practica, quæ vitam regendam respiciunt, preferenda pollemus. At id non cæce et sine motivo, sed ex objecti perspicentiâ sive immediatâ ut in primis principiis moralibus, sive mediatâ ut in eorum deductionibus. Deductiones autem ejusmodi . . . a rudibus etiam fiunt.—Liberatore, Ethica, n. 34.*

more prominent among these verities will be actively energizing as (implicit) premisses in his mind, and will animate his whole view of society and of his fellow-men. This is equally so (just as in the former case) whether he be philosophically cultivated or otherwise; and it is in fact precisely these implicitly deduced conclusions, which are commonly called "Catholic instincts." Again and again it is not less startling than edifying, to find that some saintly Catholic sees his way (as if spontaneously) to complete harmony with the Church's mind on this or that momentous question, on which many Catholics, far abler than himself, still wrangle or rebel.

Old Catholics sometimes good-humouredly laugh at converts, for having introduced into English Catholic talk the word "realise" in a special sense of their own. It must be admitted however, that the idea intended is so important as to *need* a word for its expression; and this idea is greatly illustrated by what we have been just saying. One very important part of what a convert means when he speaks of "realising" certain truths, is the keeping those truths ever in one's mind as actively energizing premisses.

Again from what has been said, you may see the importance of Catholics being surrounded, especially during the period of their education, with what is called "a Catholic atmosphere." Non-Catholics erroneously profess a most opposite theory; and allege that moral and religious truth is normally attained, by a free and explicit comparison of conflicting arguments. We shall endeavour to expose this fundamental fallacy a few pages on; but our present concern is with a different objection. Liberals often ridicule this expression, "a Catholic atmosphere," as though it were a mere unfounded and unmeaning figure of speech, devised for the purpose of avoiding argument. We maintain, on the contrary, that never was there an expression more thoroughly philosophical. He is the best Catholic in his views and doctrines, in whom Catholic dogmata are most constantly energizing as active implicit premisses. But no other way can be named in which the mind can be kept so constantly under the control of such premisses, as by the unconscious influence of others, thoroughly possessed by them, with whom it is brought into efficacious contact. And this influence is most curiously parallel in character to those physical agencies, which constitute an "atmosphere." Even were it true—which most certainly it is *not*—that the very few who are highly educated can be sufficiently influenced by argument and explicit statements;—at all events for the vast majority, it is this contagious sympathy which alone has power to imbue them with sound reasoning.

In these later remarks we have been drawing various inferences, from one particular statement which we had made. But a very large number of practical results follow from the *whole theory* which we have so briefly sketched; and we will conclude our article by selecting a few out of their number.

1. F. Kleutgen's very pregnant remark will have been observed, that it is part of God's tender providence towards each individual soul, to watch carefully over its implicit advance from truth to truth; and moreover, that He exercises this office the more solicitously, in proportion as the truth is of more vital importance to sanctification and salvation. Unbelievers often sneer at the Catholic's *prayers*, that this or that person may be led to the Faith or to more orthodox views of doctrine. "Surely," they say, "truth is discovered by *argument*; and it will be much more to the purpose if you *argue* with him than if you *pray* for him." We reply, that moral and religious truth is indubitably obtained by *reasoning*, but to a very small extent by *argument*; and in order to solid and effective reasoning, it is necessary that the relevant premisses be duly suggested and efficaciously impressed on the mind. What more suitable office than this to that Living Creator, who is the God of Truth? And what will move him more powerfully to still wider and more gracious interpositions, than that sound so dear to His ears, the voice of prayer?

2. Another frequent gibe of unbelievers is founded on the fact, that the great mass of Catholics are so strictly forbidden to read atheistical books. "The Church," say these critics, "virtually confesses that Theism cannot bear the light of reason; for if reason were on the side of Theism, to reason Theists would eagerly appeal." There would undoubtedly be great force in this objection, if Catholics alleged that believers are commonly led to Theism by *argument*. And in the case indeed of philosophical *controversialists*, it is very important that they study atheistical works. But as to the great mass of men,—who are led to religious truth indeed by *reasoning* but who cannot *argue*,—how can you act more absurdly, than by calling on them to examine both sides? to read treatises? to study adverse arguments? They have no *arguments* on their own side; how can they do justice to arguments on the other? Take the various illustrations of implicit reasoning which we gave a few pages back, and the self-evident truth of our statement will be abundantly manifest.

To make our point clearer to all our readers, let us fix our thoughts on one case in particular: the case in which a large family of sons are firmly convinced,—and that on the most irre-

fragable ground, viz. a whole life's intimate experience,—of their father's uprightness and conscientiousness. He occupies, we will suppose, an important position (diplomatic or otherwise,) of which they know absolutely nothing beyond its existence. They are ignorant of its duties; of the circumstances under which those duties oblige; of the maxims of conduct which are appropriate to the situation: indeed, they are not sufficiently advanced in age and experience to understand these things if they tried. Their father meanwhile has certain bitter enemies, who bring against him a charge of unscrupulousness and dishonesty, based on his alleged malversation in this official sphere. What will be the duty of his sons in regard to these charges, and in regard to the arguments adduced in support thereof? Will they be bound to examine such arguments with scrupulous care and candour? How absurd! They are bound of course, in reason and common sense, utterly to disregard and disbelieve the whole. Their knowledge of his singular conscientiousness rests on demonstrative evidence; while the adverse arguments turn on considerations, entirely external to their power of apprehension.

Yet some one of them may by possibility be so contemptibly weak, as to lay stress on these allegations, and allow them to shake his firm confidence in his father. Evidently his conduct is unreasonable on the one hand, and immoral on the other hand: unreasonable, because he does not choose to keep the strength of his convictions on a level with the strength of evidence on which they rest; and immoral, because he fails egregiously and most inexcusably in filial duty. Those who have placed such arguments before him and pressed them on his attention, have simply tempted him to sin. When so tempted, his reasonable course would have been to pray for strength; that he might remain faithful to the legitimate conclusions of his reason, and that he might laugh to scorn these dangerous argumentative temptations.

The application of all this is so obvious as to need no exposition. It should only be added, that even Theistic controversialists, who examine atheistical arguments, do so purely with a view of understanding and answering them for the benefit of mankind, and in no degree whatever with a purpose of questioning their own convictions.*

* We should be very sorry if we were understood by this to disparage the extreme importance of a controversialist labouring to seize accurately his opponent's precise point of view. The value of a controversial work is to be tested, not by the praise it receives from those who are already convinced,

3. Remarks very similar may be made on what is called the Church's "evidence of credibility." It is an admitted Catholic doctrine, that no adult non-Catholic can reasonably enter the visible Church, until he has been convinced on sufficient grounds of reason that she is (as she professes to be) an infallible teacher. Now certainly a very extravagant and desolating paradox would be presented, if by this were meant what would indeed be monstrous; viz. that Hodge the Protestant carter cannot rightly be received, until he does justice to the various arguments contained in treatises "de verâ religione," and until he is prepared to vindicate those arguments against all exception. But a very large number of the most uneducated Protestants have access to this or that assemblage of implicit premisses, which abundantly suffice to establish the Church's credibility. And God on His side will never be wanting, to impress such premisses on the mind of this or that given individual, and conduct him to a true conclusion.*

Here also, as in the former case, nothing can be wilder than to maintain, that every ordinary believer is bound to be a controversialist; or that his grounds of belief cannot be sufficient in reason, unless he is able to display them advantageously in argument; or that he is at liberty to enter into temptation, by studying anti-Catholic controversial books.

4. Lastly, we will apply the doctrine which we have been setting forth, to illustrate the intense dislike (we might almost say, horror) felt by all good Catholics, for mixed education in every shape. There is hardly any Catholic instinct, which non-Catholics find it so difficult to understand as this. We were a good deal amused lately by reading two different letters on the subject, which appeared the same day in the "Times" and "Pall Mall Gazette" respectively. The latter writer maintained, that denominational education, as imparted to children *below the age of sixteen*; is a simple absurdity, however useful it may be *at a later age*. The "Times" correspondent said just the contrary. His object was to defend Mr. Fawcett's bill about Trinity College,

but by its efficaciousness in leading opponents to re-examine their grounds of conviction. But no opponents will ever be influenced by a controversialist, who does not appreciate the real strength of their position.

* Mgr. Dechamps, the present illustrious Archbishop of Malines, has written one or two very interesting works on the question, what is that evidence of credibility which, in fact, legitimately persuades uneducated persons. We cannot however enter episodically on a matter, which requires much careful adjustment and consideration,

Dublin: and his argument was, that denominational education is *necessary up to the age of sixteen or seventeen*, but that afterwards its evils preponderate over its advantages. We will consider then these two cases, which may be considered the *extremes*: viz. (1) popular education as imparted to children of the masses; and (2) higher education as imparted to youths of the leisured class. The principles, applicable to these, may easily be applied by our reader for himself to all intermediate instances.

The "Pall Mall Gazette" correspondent grounds his argument on the undoubted fact, that children can derive very little real knowledge, from merely learning by heart catechism or creed. Never was there an objection more curiously suicidal. It is precisely *because* the mere learning catechism by heart can teach so little religion, that a scheme of mixed popular education is of necessity so profoundly irreligious. We by no means undervalue the advantage of a child learning his Catechism by heart; for the knowledge of its text is most useful, as binding together and retaining in his memory the various doctrines he is taught. Still Catechism is very far indeed from being the *chief* way in which he learns doctrine. The Church testifies a large body of revealed verities, which are intended most powerfully to influence the Catholic's whole interior life. What she aims at then in her education of a Catholic child, is firstly, as a foundation,—not necessarily that he shall be able *explicitly to state* these verities—but that he shall implicitly and intimately *apprehend* them; that he shall have formed in his mind the one true impression, on Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; on our Blessed Lady; on prayer; on the Sacraments, &c. &c. Then, this foundation having been laid, the second great desideratum is, that he may learn the art (one may almost say the knack) of "living to" these great verities; of imbuing his interior life with them as with its animating principle; of ever preserving their thought in his mind, as of actively energizing implicit premisses. We are not here to consider all the various methods used by her for this great purpose. But it is important to point out, that the most important of all is the "surrounding him with a Catholic atmosphere"; the securing, that those under whose influence he is brought, shall think and feel those very thoughts and feelings, with which she desires *him* to be implicitly but most efficaciously imbued.

Even Protestants admit the truth of this principle; and therefore it would be strange indeed if Catholics were less

possessed by it. We may again adduce what has already appeared in our pages (April, 1868, p. 524); a citation made by Cardinal Cullen, from two great Protestant authorities. "It is necessary," says M. Guizot, "that national education should be given and received in the midst of a religious atmosphere, and that a religious impression should penetrate all its parts. Religion is not a study, or an exercise . . . it is a faith and a law which ought to be felt everywhere." And the Royal Commissioners of 1861 give it as the view of "the principal promoters of education" that "everything which is not mechanical ought to be made the occasion of giving religious instruction."

We now pass from one extreme to the other; from the education of poor children, to that of the leisured class during the concluding years of their course. It is these years, which give to what has gone before its full meaning and significance. Hitherto the student has acquired much explicit religious and much explicit secular knowledge: the characteristic work of the last period, is blending the two into one harmonious whole. He knows Christian doctrine in itself; he has to be trained in the habit of measuring, by its standard, the whole field of philosophy, history, and literature. Here then, just as in other cases, the verities taught by the Church are to fill his mind, as actively-energizing implicit premisses, colouring instinctively and spontaneously every detail of secular knowledge. As the soul in its indivisible integrity animates alike every separate part of the human frame, and (by thus animating it) blends it into one;—so the highly-educated Catholic welds the whole mass of his knowledge into one solid and consistent organism, by the implicit presence, throughout every separate portion, of the Church's unifying doctrinal system.

It is truly amazing—not that non-Catholics refuse to *concur* with this opinion—but that they so totally fail to *apprehend* it. Our readers must be acquainted with instances in which they gravely argue, that a Protestant university is no unfit place of education for Catholics, because the Catholics who go there do not in general actually apostatize. What the Church wishes in educating her children, is certainly something more than that they shall not actually cease to *be* her children. She desires, not merely that they shall remain her children, but that they shall be her *better and more serviceable* children; not merely that they shall not *lose* the Faith, but that they shall foster and cherish it. A system under which they do no more than avoid losing it, is no Catholic system at all. Let us suppose the case of a youth, who (1) on the one hand remains a Catholic, who does not cease to accept the Church's various definitions of faith; who (2) on the other

hand has mastered and appropriated large portions, from the field of philosophy, history, and literature; but (3) who has not in any way learnt the habit, of viewing the various parts of this latter field under the light of Catholic doctrine and principle. Such a youth is a Catholic, and is a highly educated *gentleman*: what he utterly fails to be, is a decently educated *Catholic*. It is only in proportion as the Church's doctrines have been actively energizing implicit premisses throughout his course of secular study, that he has been receiving a Catholic education at all. And whether any one is likely to learn such a habit, while living among Protestant companions and learning from Protestant teachers,—we may safely leave it for men of common sense to determine. It is precisely these uncatholicly-educated Catholics, who are the Church's most dangerous enemies. If they apostatized—it would be an immeasurably greater calamity to *themselves*,—but in many respects it would lessen or even destroy their power of injuring the Church. Instead of this, as we observed on a former occasion, they will grow up a noxious school of disloyal, minimising anti-Roman Catholics; Catholic in profession, but anti-Catholic in spirit; Catholics, who combine the Church's naked dogmata with the principles of her bitterest enemies, and place the priceless gem of the Faith in a setting of the very basest metal; a constant cause of anxiety to ecclesiastical authorities; a canker eating into the Catholic body; a standing nuisance and obstruction.

Here we conclude. There is a relevant inquiry of extreme moment, on which we have said little or nothing. Philosophers who admit (what seems to us undeniably sound) the general theory laid down by FF. Kleutgen and Newman, have to explain what criterion is open to individuals, that they may assure themselves on the legitimacy of their implicit reasoning; how they are to distinguish, between their well-grounded conclusions on the one hand, and the dictates of prejudice, passion, caprice, on the other. This inquiry must occupy a very prominent place, in any complete and methodical treatment of our theme: but nothing can have been further from our intention than to give that theme such a treatment. In fact, our purpose will have been answered, if we succeed in drawing the attention of speculative Catholics to a line of thought, which hardly any other throughout the whole range of philosophy exceeds in importance.

ART. IX.—THE LANDLORD AND TENANT QUESTION IN IRELAND.

Two Reports for the Irish Government on the History of the Landlord and Tenant Question in Ireland, with Suggestions for Legislation. By W. NEILSON HANCOCK, LL.D. Dublin: Thom. 1869.

The Land Difficulty in Ireland, with an Effort to solve it. By GERALD FITZ-GIBBON, Master in Chancery. London: Longmans. Dublin: M'Glashan & Gill. 1869.

The Irish People and the Irish Land: a Letter to Lord Lifford, with Comments on the Publications of Lord Dufferin and Lord Rosse. By ISAAC BUTT. Dublin: Falconer. London: Ridgway. 1867.

Land Tenure in Ireland: a Plea for the Celtic Race. By ISAAC BUTT. Third edition. Dublin: Falconer. London: Ridgway. 1868.

Irish Emigration and the Tenure of Land in Ireland. By the Right Hon. LORD DUFFERIN, K.P. London: Willis & Sotheran. 1867.

IT would be superfluous to adduce arguments to prove the necessity of legislative interference in order to effect an equitable adjustment of the relations between Irish landlords and Irish tenants. Successive Governments, Whig and Tory, and both Houses of Parliament, have repeatedly asserted the necessity of legislation on this subject; and the iniquity of the state of the law has recently been registered in deeds of blood in many parts of the country. No doubt, when a man has been murdered, or when an attempt has been made to murder him, such just public indignation is excited against the assassin, that the tyranny of the landlord or agent which the deed of blood brings to the notice of the public is palliated or forgotten. There is something revolting to a generous mind to recall the heartless tyranny of a man who has been basely and wickedly murdered. We do not even mean to assert that every landlord or agent who has been made the victim of agrarian outrage was a heartless and unjust man, although we happen to know that a late judge, after long experience in the Landed Estates Court, declared on hearing of one of these murders, in very strong but not very polite language, that he never knew an agrarian crime to be committed where the victim had not provoked his own doom. Of course, he did not mean to justify assassination, but simply to declare, from his experience, that such crimes were only committed when the people were provoked almost beyond endurance. The deed of assassination, with all its attendant circumstances of horror, is borne by the

magnetic wire to every portion of the empire, but the hearths which the victim and others often worse than he have desolated, the happy homesteads he in the wantonness of power has destroyed, the noble hearts he has doomed to exile, to beggary, or even to death, are never known or cared for. There can be no justification or palliation of murder, but neither can there be any excuse for perpetuating a system which leads a whole people to look for justice anywhere but from the laws of their country, and which occasionally leads the more passionate amongst them to seek redress where alone they expect to find it, in the wild justice (as it is called) of revenge.

One of the most recent and lamented victims of agrarian outrage was a Scotch gentleman, Mr. James Hunter, to whom a Mr. Smith had leased some four thousand acres of land, situated near Newfield, county Mayo. We abridge the account of the circumstances from the correspondence of the special commissioner of *The Echo*. "On a part of Mr. Smith's estate which was not leased to Mr. Hunter were a number of small holdings in the hands of poor people, who *from time immemorial had been allowed to cut turf* on that part of the estate which was leased to Mr. Hunter. *It was solely by an oversight of Mr. Smith's attorney in drawing up the lease, that what is called the right of 'turbary,' i. e., the permission spoken of above, was not in writing reserved to the tenants who had always enjoyed it.* It will be necessary here to remark that for these poor peasants, living as they do in a bleak and desolate region by the side of the sea, the right to cut turf is an indispensable one, for they could not live without fires, and there is nothing which will burn in the neighbourhood but turf. At all events, the right from mere usage was regarded by them as their property." As soon as Mr. Smith discovered his mistake he mentioned the matter to Mr. Hunter, and asked him to allow the poor people to cut turf as usual. This was no unreasonable request, considering that the right was not reserved simply by the attorney's mistake, "*and that cutting turf improves the soil by preparing it for culture.*" The extent of Mr. Hunter's leasehold on which turf can be cut is about 1,200 acres, and the rent is about £16 a year. Only 100 acres were used by the poor tenants. Mr. Hunter would not permit the poor people to cut their turf as they had done from time immemorial, unless he was paid for permitting them to do so, and in fact Mr. Smith had the humanity to pay him £3 per year to secure fuel for the poor people, until his estate was sold in the Landed Estates Court, in 1861. The estate was bought by Dr. Gibbings, of Trinity College, who was not aware of the charge on account of the turbary, but finding that Mr. Smith had paid £3 per year, he expressed his willingness to do the same. But Mr. Hunter now determined to extort £10 a year for the privilege of

turbary on 100 acres of a bog, consisting of 1,200 acres, for the whole of which he paid but £16 per year. Arbitration was tried in vain. Hunter "would have his bond. Dr. Gibbings should pay £10 per year, or the poor tenants, who were altogether blameless in the matter, should have no fires." Arbitration was again resorted to, but Hunter had raised his demand to £15 per year. At last an umpire was called in, who, for the sake of peace, decided that the sum should be £10 per year, and Dr. Gibbings paid £30 for three years then due; but, considering the demand unjust and extortionate, he refused to pay any more. The tenants, who had nothing to do with the quarrel between the landlord and middle man, continued to cut their turf as usual, as they were in fact in extreme necessity, and had no alternative but to procure their winter fuel or to die. Mr. Hunter determined to force the latter alternative on the tenants, and in order to effect his purpose took an action against one of them, called O'Neill, "who is by universal consent a respectable, hard-working man. The case came on at the spring assizes of the present year. There was some break-down in the legal preparation for O'Neill's defence, I believe from the man's poverty The result was that O'Neill was fined five shillings, and saddled with £48 costs! Of course O'Neill possessed nothing which could be taken in execution for so large an amount, so Mr. Hunter determined to wait until the man's crop had grown; meantime letting Dr. Gibbings know that he intended to levy. When Dr. Gibbings heard that Mr. Hunter was really about to seize O'Neill's crop, he so far departed from his previously declared determination to have nothing more to do with him, that he sent a gentleman to Mr. Hunter, asking him to open negotiations again, and offered £6 a year so as to meet him about half way." Hunter peremptorily refused; he seized, and as nobody could be got to act as sheriff's man, he stayed away from his kirk on Sunday to do the bailiff's duty, and in the evening he was murdered. Perhaps Mr. Hunter had a legal right to his pound of flesh, but in his mode of asserting it he undoubtedly outraged every feeling, not only of kindness but of humanity, which are as necessary to the peace and happiness of society as justice itself.

But much as the Commissioner is shocked by the cruelty with which the poor tenants were treated, he has not noticed one of the most harassing and oppressive consequences of an agrarian murder. It is this—that the very barbarity with which a tenant has been treated by the murdered man is of itself sufficient evidence to have him arrested and cast into prison on the accusation of murder. We illustrate this by Hunter's case. The murder occurred on the 29th of August last, and as if O'Neill had not suffered enough already, he was of course arrested on suspicion and

cast into prison. But, as happens in cases of this kind, the suspicion is as extensive as the oppression, and consequently a large portion of the male population of the families which claimed the right of turbary in Hunter's bog were arrested and sent to gaol on suspicion of being concerned in his murder. Before the 22nd of September, when the first magisterial investigation into the circumstances of the murder took place, no less than thirteen men had been sent to gaol on suspicion. Only nine of those who had been arrested very soon after the murder were brought before the magistrates on the day mentioned. Their names are John O'Neill, Martin Moran, James Moran, John Moran, Roderick Kean, Pat M'Goveran, John M'Goveran, Michael M'Goveran, and John Moran, jun.; the case against the other four prisoners was adjourned, for they had been put in gaol only during the week previous to the investigation, and we presume the police had not been able to rake up any evidence against them. Mr. Jordan, solicitor, prosecuted on the part of the Crown the nine prisoners who were brought forward, and Mr. O'Malley defended the prisoners. Mr. O'Malley asked Mr. Jordan against which of the prisoners he intended to proceed, to which Jordan replied *that he did not know, and if he did he would not tell.* And when Mr. O'Malley pressed the point, the chairman of the magistrates (Sir George O'Donel) said "It is the unanimous opinion of the Bench that you have no right to particularize the prisoners Mr. Jordan intends to proceed against." So that a large number of men may be arrested on a charge of murder, may be cast into gaol and arraigned before a bench of magistrates, without being told which of them is to be accused of the murder! As a matter of fact, not one tittle of evidence was adduced against four out of the nine persons brought before the magistrates, and they were accordingly discharged, after having been kept in gaol during the harvest season when their labour was most valuable, and to the great injury if not utter ruin of their families, for no other reason than that they had been threatened with persecution by a harsh and unfeeling man. No evidence was adduced against any of the others, except that some of them were accused of using threatening language against their oppressor, except O'Neill, whom Thomas Connor, the bailiff, *identified as the person on whom the execution was served.* No evidence sufficient to send any of the prisoners for trial was forthcoming, and O'Neill with four others was remanded. Thus including the four prisoners who were not brought forward, nine persons are still kept in gaol on a charge of murder, the chief evidence against them being the natural antipathy which they are supposed to have entertained against the murdered man on account of his harshness and inhumanity. Very possibly O'Neill, having been identified as the person on whom the execution was served, and two or three others who may be

identified as having cut turf on Hunter's bog, may be hanged, to satisfy public indignation on account of a brutal murder. But had this murder not been perpetrated, Hunter might have legally put perhaps a hundred human beings to a cruel, lingering death, by causing the miserably-clad wretches to pass the winter without even a fire on their hearths. The English public never hear of the cruelties which the poor Irish tenant endures until some grievous crime has been committed. Had Mr. Hunter not been murdered, a hundred poor wretches might have been subjected to an agonizing death, without any one beyond their own immediate neighbourhood hearing of their sufferings. Let the murderer be punished by all means, but let us not perpetuate laws by which hundreds of innocent persons may be legally put to death—laws, by taking advantage of which, one tyrannical man may drive a whole neighbourhood to desperation—laws which allow a man to act with so little humanity that if he be murdered every man who has been in any way subject to his power is, from the mere fact of having been so subjected to him, suspected of being his murderer. The bailiff has only to identify the tenant as the person on whom the execution was served, and he is forthwith cast into gaol on a charge of murder, and sometimes hanged, on a few other suspicious circumstances being proved against him.

The passing of the Irish Church Bill was not only an act of tardy justice,—it not only removed an evil so glaring and manifest that it scandalized all Europe,—but it has indirectly effected a far more important object by teaching the Irish people to look to Parliament for justice. This is the true way to root out Fenianism from the hearts of a naturally and traditionally loyal people. Prisons and gibbets may repress the display of disaffection, but they only increase and intensify the feeling in the hearts of the people. The circumstances of the world are now very different from what they were in 1798 or 1800. The power of steam has almost bridged over the ocean, and rendered it impossible for any nation with a large seaboard to guard its coasts effectually; the large English towns are filled with Irishmen, and millions of them dwell in the bosom of the great Transatlantic republic, and have a powerful influence in directing its councils. In the time of peace England can rule Ireland by the sword; if war should break out with America or even with France, she must conciliate or lose her. Very recently a vast number of the humbler class of the Irish people had enrolled themselves in the Fenian conspiracy, and a still larger number sympathized with the Fenians, and only abstained from joining their ranks on account of the hopelessness of contending with the gigantic power of the British Empire. Had any Lord-Lieutenant made a public progress through the south or west of Ireland at that time, he would have been received

in sullen silence, if not with groans and hisses. But the passing of one measure of justice and the confidence with which this act has inspired the people, that the minister is willing and able to deal with the land question in an equally just and comprehensive spirit—has changed the sentiments of the people as if by magic, and whilst we write, Lord Spencer is making a triumphant progress through the south and the west of Ireland, and is everywhere greeted with sentiments of the most enthusiastic loyalty. But there should be no delusion as to the cause of this sudden change in the feelings of the people. It is founded more on hope than on gratitude. The question of questions is the land question, and if Mr. Gladstone fails to satisfy the just demands of the people on this subject, the confidence with which he has inspired them will be lost as quickly as it was gained, and the distrust and hatred of English rule will be more intense than ever.

There is another lesson of very great importance to be learned from the manner in which the Act for disendowing and dis-establishing the State Church in Ireland has been received by all parties. Before the Act passed, we were assured that the Bill was nothing less than a Bill for confiscation and robbery; that if it were carried, the Protestants of Ulster would rise in rebellion and resist its execution by force of arms. Instead of this, the Act has been received with the utmost resignation by Protestants, and with great satisfaction, but without any insulting manifestations of triumph, on the part of the Catholics. Those who wish to obtain an equitable adjustment of the relations between landlord and tenant have to meet the very same cry of confiscation and robbery. The landlords shall all be ruined and the rights of property destroyed. Let a just measure become law, and we shall hear no more about robbery and confiscation. It will be received with as much resignation on one side and satisfaction on the other, as has followed the passing of the Irish Church Act.

No doubt there are a great many just and humane landlords in Ireland, who, so long as they shall live, will deal justly by their tenants. But who can tell what kind of men will succeed them? Moreover, it is not right to leave a man's *property*, his just property, the produce of his capital and labour, at the mercy of any man. The very intelligent correspondent whom the proprietor of *The Irish Times* has sent to investigate the relations between landlord and tenant in Ulster, writes as follows from Bangor, in the county of Down:—

I find that nearly all the great landlords of Ulster admit tenant right, and act upon it frankly and honourably. Let us, then, take the position of the tenants, as the most assured, under the best of landlords. What is their

feeling? A most intelligent gentleman connected with the farming interest, who has been travelling through the province in the course of his business for thirty years, and has probably been on every estate in it, and has, moreover, the friendliest feelings towards the aristocracy, has declared to me in the most emphatic terms, that he never met a *single farmer who did not earnestly wish for some security that would not leave him "at the mercy of the landlord."* I will illustrate this by a single case, for which I have the best authority. A farmer who is an excellent agriculturist, has so improved the quality of his land, that it is now worth a pound an acre more than when he got it. He said to a friend "See how I am at the mercy of the landlord. I have made this land a pound an acre better than it was. He knows that, and if he chooses he can increase my rent to that amount. It would take ten years to exhaust my improvements. During that time he could make me pay for them the sum of £700."

But the law does not simply leave the produce of the tenant's capital and industry at the mercy of the landlord; it actually hands it over to him, contrary to natural right and justice. Mr. Hancock, in his elaborate and accurate history of the Landlord and Tenant question (pp. 25, 28), proves this on the authority of some of the most eminent judges who have adorned the Irish Bench. The remarks were made on a case which will be found in the Irish Chancery Reports, vol. viii., pp. 225, 511. The plaintiff was the Rev. Dr. O'Fay, PP. Croughwell, county Galway, and the defendant the landlord on whose estate Dr. O'Fay resided. Dr. O'Fay took the farm from the father of the defendant, who promised him a lease for three lives, or thirty-one years. After Dr. O'Fay entered into possession, the landlord ascertained that he could not fulfil his promise under the terms of the estate-settlement, and he therefore offered Dr. O'Fay a lease for his own life, and £20 to aid in building a house. "The priest continued in possession of the farm and paid the rent agreed on; thus, as he alleged, accepting the arrangement proposed. He was on excellent terms with the landlord, and expended £70 in permanent improvements, and did not ask for the £20 which the landlord had promised. In 1854 the landlord died, and his son, the defendant, succeeded to the property. *He gave notice to all his yearly tenants of an intention to raise their rents.* The priest claimed to have a promise of a lease, and the agent of the property, during the landlord's absence abroad, admitted this claim, and did not raise the rent. The landlord said he had no notice of his father's promise; he, however, allowed the priest to remain in possession, and the priest expended £400 in buildings, in the belief that he would not be disturbed. A dispute subsequently arose about trespass, and the fences on the boundary between the priest's farm and some land in the possession of the landlord. The landlord served notice to

quit and brought an ejectment. After some delay judgment was given in his favour, subject to an application to the Court of Chancery to compel him to fulfil his father's promise of a lease." The Master of the Rolls, in delivering his judgment on this case, said:—"If the landlord, knowing that the tenant believes he holds under a valid lease, or a valid contract for a lease, looks on at the expenditure without warning the tenant that he intends to impeach the contract, such a proceeding is a fraud, and the tenant has a remedy in equity against the landlord, though he be a remainder man, if he seeks to turn the tenant out of possession without compensation." Dr. Hancock adds:—"This state of the law applies to *past* as well as future improvements; for it is the nature of judicial decisions to have always a retrospective operation; they declare not only what the law is, but that it always was so. Such being the very simple and righteous decision in the case of tenants under a lease, or contract for a lease, we now come to the case of yearly tenants, who form the bulk of the occupying tenantry of Ireland. On this point the Master of the Rolls is equally clear:—"If a tenant, holding from year to year, *makes permanent improvements on the lands which he holds, this raises no equity as against the landlord, though he may have looked on, and not have given any warning to the tenant.*" "When," says Dr. Hancock, "it is remembered that a tenancy from year to year is the ordinary tenure in Ireland under which tenants often hold for generations, the distinction between the two cases is not easy to be perceived, and on any view of the case it must be too narrow and refined a distinction to decide cases in which the feelings and interests of an entire population are involved. The distinction, at the best, rests on judicial decisions on subtle points of real property law; . . . and how can the law be maintained when it is condemned by the Master of the Rolls in such terms as these?—

'Even,' continues the Master of the Rolls, 'if the Rev. Dr. O'Fay had no claim, *except as a tenant from year to year*, I have no hesitation in stating that, although *in point of law*, on the authorities I have referred to, and particularly the case of *Pelling v. Armitage*, the petitioner's suit could not be sustained, yet *nothing can be more repugnant to the principles of natural justice than that a landlord should look on at a great expenditure, carried on by a tenant from year to year, without warning the tenant of his intention to turn him out of possession. The defendant's offer to allow Dr. O'Fay to remove the buildings was a mockery. I have no jurisdiction to administer equity in the natural sense of that term, or I should have no difficulty whatever in making a decree against the defendant. I am bound to administer an artificial system, established by the decisions of eminent judges, such as Lord Eldon and Sir W. Grant, and being so bound, I regret much that I must administer injustice in this case and dismiss the petition; but I shall dismiss*

it without costs. I should be very glad, for the sake of justice, that my decision should be reversed by the court of appeal."

The case being brought before the court of appeal, it was thrown out that it was a case for amicable settlement; but the defendant's counsel believed that his client "had resolved to spend his fortune in resisting the claim of Dr. O'Fay." Lord Justice Blackburn pronounced this to be a very *irrational* determination, although he had to decide that the claim could not be sustained in law or equity. Lord Chancellor Napier concluded his judgment as follows:—"I think I am not outstepping my duty in suggesting to the respondent that, under all the circumstances of this case, he will best maintain the *character and honour* of a British officer, *satisfy the exigencies of justice, and uphold the rights of property*, by making such an arrangement with Dr. O'Fay, as to the possession of this farm, *as may leave him the full benefit of an expenditure made in good faith, and with the reasonable expectation of having the full benefit of it sufficiently secured by an undisturbed possession.*" When the landlord's counsel asked for costs, the court of appeal refused, with the pertinent declaration that "*the landlord could pay himself out of the improvements he was getting possession of.*"

It is quite clear, therefore, that the law of equity as established by the decisions of Lord Eldon and other equity judges, not only leaves the tenant at the mercy of the landlord, but actually hands over to him every shilling which the tenant expends upon the land. This is legalizing injustice. The landlord has no more right to the produce of the tenant's capital and labour than he has to the money in his pocket. We would not defraud the landlord of one penny of his just rights. When the value of the land is increased, not by the capital and industry of the tenant, but by other causes, such as the increase in value of agricultural productions, and the decrease in the value of money, by improvements made by the landlord, &c., we would by all means give the landlord the benefit of these changes. But he must be content with these, and give the tenant the profits of his own labour and improvements. The cases and opinions already adduced, as well as those which we shall presently cite, prove that this equitable compensation must be retrospective as well as prospective. The classes of improvements for which compensation should be secured are quoted in Dr. Hancock's second report (pp. 61, 62) from a Tenant Bill prepared by some Irish members. They are: 1. Thorough drainage or main drainage of land; 2. Reclaiming bog-land, or reclaiming or enclosing waste land; 3. The making of farm-roads; 4. Irrigation; 5. Protection of land by embankment from inland waters; 6. The erection of a farmhouse or any building for agricultural purposes, suitable to the holding, or the enlarging, or the extending of any

such farmhouse or building erected or to be erected thereon, so as to render the same more suitable to the holding; 7. The renewal or reconstruction of any of the foregoing works, or such alterations therein, or additions thereto, as are not required for maintaining the same, and as increase durably their value; 8. Clearing land from rocks or stones; 9. Subsoiling; and 10. Unexhausted manuring. We do not mean that it would be possible or even just to legislate on the mere principle of compensation; but that these and other just rights of the tenant should form the basis on which legislation between landlord and tenant should proceed.

“The case of the purchasers under the Incumbered Estates Act,” says Dr. Hancock’s first report (p. 34), “affecting about one-fourteenth of Ireland, has sometimes been brought forward as conclusive against any possible recognition of past improvements.” But the truth is, that purchasers in the Incumbered Estates Court, or in the Landed Estates Court, have no right to buy from the landlord what, in natural justice and equity, is the property of the tenant; and the State, as we shall show presently, has a perfect right to secure to the tenant the value of his improvements, in spite of the landlord, no matter how he may have acquired the land. Indeed, the tenant often requires protection against the rapacity of a small purchaser in the Landed Estates Court much more than against the ancient proprietor. Dr. Hancock relates (p. 40) a case of this kind, which came under his own notice in March last:—

A hard-working man, of good character, and with a small family, held, as tenant from year to year, about eight acres (statute measure) of land, at £1. 5s. an acre. He had either purchased the preceding tenant’s improvements on the farm, according to custom, or succeeded his father as tenant. After being in occupation for some time, he proposed to leave the farm, to engage in some contracts elsewhere. He had been offered £8. 15s. an acre for his interest, or £70 in all; and the landlord for the time being would have allowed him to sell. He, unfortunately for himself, changed his mind, and stayed on. In the interim, the property—some small town-land, or half town-land—was sold in the Incumbered Estates Court, and purchased by a money-lender in the neighbourhood. He immediately gave the tenant notice to quit, and refused him the slightest compensation. The tenant at once lost £70 that he believed he possessed. He owed some £20 or £25. When ejected, he was sued for these debts, and cast into prison. He came up to be discharged as an insolvent. The Assistant-Barrister, like the Master of the Rolls, dwelt on the hardship of the case. He noticed the good character of the man, and refused to keep him one hour in custody. What good purpose was served by allowing the money-lender to get the poor man’s farm without compensating him, it is hard to see. If the law be not altered, the tendency will be for the unscrupulous to have an advantage over men of honour and principle in purchasing land where tenant-right prevails. A purchaser who

proposes to himself to confiscate the tenant's interests, and clear the land without allowing compensation, can afford to give a higher price for an estate than a gentleman of character and position, who would scorn to take advantage of a poor tenant. Such purchasers, if not restrained by legalizing the principles of natural equity, contemplated by the Master of the Rolls, will involve other landlords in quarrels and questions they little think of.

Now, concerning the relations between landlord and tenant, there are two things to be considered : I. How far can the State interfere without injustice, and without invading the rights of property ? and II. How far is it bound to interfere ? We are not in accordance with those who would give the State, as such, a paramount dominion of ownership in the landed property comprised within the boundaries of its territory. We believe that the property in land, when justly acquired by private individuals or by societies, is subject to their exclusive ownership, and that one of the chief objects of civil society is to secure to them the exclusive enjoyment of their property. Whenever the State claims as such the ownership of the lands of its subjects, it is guilty of a most unjust invasion of the rights of property, and subverts one of the chief ends for which civil society was instituted. On the other hand, it is self-evident that citizens, both in their persons and in their property, are subject to the just laws of the society of which they are members. Thus the State has a manifest right to impose taxes ; for otherwise it could have neither fleets, nor armies, nor police, nor judges ; and hence it could neither protect itself against foreign invasion, nor preserve peace, nor administer justice amongst its own subjects. This power is generally called the *altum dominium* of the State. It may be defined to be *the power which the State enjoys to dispose of the property of its subjects as far as public necessity or the public good requires*. The right of the State is not, therefore, founded on the *title of dominion of property*, but in the *title of what is required by the public necessities or the public good*. For instance, when the enemy approaches a city with the intention of besieging it, those who are invested with the authority of the State can pull down the houses of private individuals when this is necessary, either to repair the walls, or to deprive the enemy of the shelter which he might derive from them in making his approaches. But the title of the State is not founded in the dominion of property, but in the public necessity ; for if, after the enemy has been repelled, any of the houses should be still standing, being no longer necessary to the State, they would undoubtedly belong to their former proprietors. Again, when the State requires the lands or houses of individuals to construct harbours or fortifications, or to make roads, it compels the owner, however reluctantly, to part with his property. No doubt, in these

cases, it generally gives the owner adequate compensation ; but this is simply because the public good ordinarily requires that it should act in this manner ; and consequently, if the State took the property in such cases without making adequate compensation, it would commit an injustice, because it would take away the property of another without any just title. But if the road were required on account of the public good, and the State, as happens in times of war, and especially of civil strife, had not the means of compensating the owners of the houses and lands required for its construction, it could take these justly, because it could rely on the title of the public good or of the public necessity. In the present case, there can be no doubt the State could not, without gross injustice, deprive the Irish landlords of the whole or any portion of their property, if that were necessary to the settlement of the question, without giving them adequate and even ample compensation. Even Mr. Mill, who will not be suspected of being very tender towards the landlord interest, says explicitly on this point :—“ It is due to landowners, and to owners of any property whatever recognised as such by the State, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to that they derived from it.”

Let us take an instance, where it is ordained by a modern statute, 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27, that no person shall, after the 31st December, 1833, make an entry, or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within twenty years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or bring such action, shall first accrue either to the person himself, or to those through whom he claims, unless he should be under some legal disability. But no matter what disability he may have been under, even during the entire period, the Act declares (s. 34) that a lapse of forty years will not only bar his *remedy*, but will have the effect of *extinguishing his right*. Here the State makes no claim to the ownership of the property, but on account of the public good, and to prevent vexatious litigation, it transfers the land from the true owner to the person who, under ordinary circumstances, has been in peaceful possession of it for twenty years. We do not here speak of fraud on the part of the possessor, which may affect his own conscience, but when he has acted *bonâ fide* there is no doubt that the State, on account of the public good, can exercise this right of dominion and hand the property over to him. The same power is exercised by the State after periods of revolution, when rapacious men have seized by force and by the utmost injustice their neighbours' property. Certainly their fraud and injustice cannot give them a just title, any more than a just title can be conferred by highway robbery. But when the robbers are so numerous and powerful that the property cannot be restored to its rightful

owners without embroiling the country in a new and doubtful civil war, the State, as far as the property of the laity is concerned, can exercise its *altum dominium* on account of the public good, and can permit the possessors to retain their rapine. The same can and has been done by the Roman Pontiffs when the Church has been plundered in similar circumstances. Indeed, this *altum dominium* of the State is fully recognized by Lord Dufferin in the end of the passage which we shall just now quote from him, and in other parts of his work. He only argues on the principle that to pass a law for the protection of the tenant would not be for the public good. We shall therefore be obliged to combat his arguments. But in doing so we wish it to be understood that we look upon him as a good and humane landlord, as well as an able man. It is on this very account that we find it necessary to combat his arguments. But he fully admits that the State might *improve the landlords* out of the country if the public good required it.

Supposing, therefore, that the public good or public necessity requires that the State should regulate by law the relations between landlord and tenant, it has an evident right to do so. It may be useful to consider for a moment how far the State has actually, and still does actually, interfere in the regulation of the property in land. The land was not given by God to any individual. It was given by the Creator to all, and for the use of all mankind. Before its actual appropriation by communities or by individuals it was, and in the unappropriated parts of the world still is, in what is called *negative community*; that is, a condition in which the land belongs to no one in particular, and each person has a right to appropriate as much of it as he requires. But the moment he ceased actually to occupy it, the land would return into the state of *negative community*, and would belong to the first occupant. But when a man built a hut for his habitation, hedged round his field, and sowed his corn, no doubt he would have acquired a more permanent property in the land, nor could any other person, even though he were temporarily absent, seize his hut or reap his corn. This hut and field would belong to him so long as he intended to occupy them; and he could if he pleased transfer his own rights to another. Whilst therefore we admit that mere occupancy would give a man a title to the spot of earth he actually occupied, we deny that it would give him a claim beyond the time of actual occupation, unless he had made it his own by industry and labour, and thus had impressed the image of man's toil on the gift of the Creator. But the moment a man died without having disposed of his hut and field, it would return to the state of *negative community*, and would belong to the first occupant. He came naked into the world, and must leave it naked. He cannot take his property to the grave with him. Nearly all the owners of land in the country possess it by the

law of primogeniture. Who has given them a right to all those vast territorial possessions, to the exclusion of the actual occupiers, and of their own brothers and sisters? Was it not the State alone? And if the State can, without injustice, give the whole property to one member of a family, to the exclusion of all the rest, are we to be told that it cannot make regulations between the man to whom it has given the property, and the yeomanry who form the bone and sinew of the State? We might pursue the same argument as to the lands which have been transmitted by will or by the Statute of Distributions. And as to purchasers, surely they cannot expect to be endowed with a title superior to the title of a valid inheritance.

Again, the State has almost uniformly conferred the property on the original proprietors of the land. From the earliest periods when the human race separated on the plains of Sennaar, and acquired new territories by migration or the sword, the ruling powers amongst them assumed the dominion not only of jurisdiction but of property over all the lands of the territory they occupied. These were distributed in various ways, either in perpetuity, or for life, or for years, or at will, amongst the inferior members of the community. But the distribution was made in every instance, or at least was supposed to be made, for the purpose of making the whole community great and powerful. The feudal system, from which our modern tenures are derived, had for its paramount object the military power of the community, and the distribution of property amongst individuals was made entirely subservient to this end. The Government of the United States assumed the ownership of all its vast unappropriated territory, and the title of every citizen who occupies this land is derived from the State. The same plan is adopted in our own colonies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Will any one say that the State has divested itself of all power to interfere with the regulation of these lands as far as the public good may require? In Ireland this argument is irresistible, for, as Mr. Butt proves (*Land Tenure*, p. 73, *seq.*), "the whole title to landed property in Ireland rests on confiscations carried out entirely by English power." The undertakers have, moreover, violated the conditions on which the lands of nearly six whole counties of Ulster were given to them. Mr. Butt cites these conditions in his reply to Lord Lifford (p. 33). One of these is, "The said undertakers shall not devise any part of their lands at will, but shall make certain estates for years, for life, in tail, or in fee simple." "The English Government," as Mr. Butt truly observes, "that exercised the right of conquest, that created these estates, has surely a right now to interfere and insist that any measure shall be taken which is necessary" to reconcile the people of Ireland to these iniquitous confiscations, and to make them a

source of strength instead of weakness to the Imperial Government.

It may be asked, what are the limits to the interference of the State with private property? We answer, the limits are defined by what is required by public necessity and the public good. Take the case, for instance, of the Norman kings, who turned vast tracts of England into hunting forests. By this conduct they abused the rights of property, for the public weal requires that land in those places, where its cultivation is necessary for the support of mankind, should be devoted to the purposes for which the Creator intended it, and not merely to suit the caprice or to gratify the passions of an individual. Suppose the proprietors of six or eight counties should agree to eject all their tenantry, and to convert the lands into hunting-grounds, is it to be said that they have a right to do what they like with their own, and that it would be an invasion of the rights of property if the State interfered with them?

We maintain that the State has a perfect right to constrain the landlord by statute to give his tenant a secure tenure of his farm. We go farther, and say that it is the duty of the State to enact such a law without delay. That such a law would promote the public prosperity is proved by the flourishing condition of the tenantry who enjoy tenant-right in Ulster and in parts of England. Indeed, the thing is self-evident, and we hardly think any man would have the hardihood to assert that a tenantry would advance in prosperity and contentment by being made dependent on the caprice of the landlord both as to the possession of their land and as to the rents they pay for them.

Before quitting this part of the subject, we will notice an argument adduced by Lord Dufferin, which has been very extensively quoted:—

“A tenant,” he says, “is a person who does not possess land, but who hires the use of it. He embarks his capital in another man’s field, much in the same way as a trader embarks his merchandise in another man’s ship. In either case the amount of hire for the use of the ship or the use of the land will be determined by competition, and will affect the balance of gain or loss on both transactions. If ships are few and land is scarce, freight and rent will rise, and the rise of each will in a great measure be regulated by the disproportion of ships to goods, and of farmers to farms. It is hardly reasonable to deny the analogy because the ship is a manufactured article and the earth is the gift of God. The land I have bought is probably itself as much a manufactured article as a ship, and the iron or wood of which the ship is built is as much the gift of God as the land; the labour or enterprise by which the land has been rendered valuable is as clearly represented by the money I gave for it, as the industry and ingenuity exercised in its construction is represented by the price the owner has paid for the ship. *It is true*

the country of which my estate is part belongs to the nation, and consequently my property in that estate is overridden by the imperial rights of the commonwealth. But this fact cannot invest the individual who may happen to hire my land, when once his tenancy is terminated, either by lapse of time or by the violation of his contract, with any peculiar rights in excess of those which may be inherent in the community at large."

We are sorry to see the views expressed in the first part of this quotation, put forward by a member of the present ministry. But the argument is entirely founded on fallacies which can be very easily exposed. In the first place, it proceeds on the assumption that either the present possessor or one of those from whom he has derived his title has purchased the land, which, as far, at least, as Ireland is concerned, is quite untrue, for generally the lands were originally acquired by a most unjust confiscation. But confine the case to the small portion of the land which has been acquired by purchase, and even then the comparison utterly fails. Lord Dufferin's argument requires that the purchaser should have acquired not only the lands themselves, but the tenant's improvements also. Now, to make the cases analogous, Lord Dufferin should suppose that the owner of the goods had hired a ship which required great and extensive repairs before it could be put to sea, that the owner of the goods made the repairs at his own expense, on the force of an implied contract that he should be allowed to use the ship at the present rate of freightage, so long as she continued to be seaworthy. He should suppose that there is a law by which all the repairs made by the owner of the goods are made the absolute property of the shipowner. He should suppose that the purchaser has bought the ship with the perfect knowledge of all the facts, and that he takes possession of the ship and refuses to make any compensation to the owner of the goods, who has repaired her at his own expense. We ask Lord Dufferin, would this be just, or, if such a law existed, should it be permitted to remain on the statute-book a single month after the assembling of Parliament? On this head there is an essential difference between the English and Irish landlords, because the general rule in England is that all permanent necessary improvements are made by the landlord; whilst the Irish landlord throws the whole burthen on the tenant, without even affording him the security of a lease. Now, as in estimating the profit a man is entitled to for his capital, we must take into consideration the risk he runs, it is quite evident that if the landlord keeps his tenant at his mercy, he should, according to all economic principles, be made to pay for this luxury.

Lord Dufferin says: "In either case the amount of hire for the use of the ship and the use of the land will be determined by *competition*—if ships are few and land is scarce freight and rent will rise. The labour and enterprise by which the land has been made

valuable is as clearly represented by the money I gave for it, as the industry and ingenuity exercised in its construction is represented by the price the owner has paid for the ship." Again, we must protest against Lord Dufferin's assumption that every owner of an Irish estate has either purchased it or inherited it from ancestors who have purchased it. But passing this by, the comparison utterly fails, because there is no law by which the industry and ingenuity of the shipbuilders are confiscated to the owner of the raw material who has employed them to build or to repair his ship, whilst there is a law by which the labour and enterprise by which the land has been made valuable are confiscated to the landlord, who in Ireland simply supplies the raw material. Many tenants occupy farms which have been possessed by members of the same family for one or two hundred years. In many instances a large portion of this farm was mere waste which the tenant has reclaimed and made arable. In almost every instance he has made all the other improvements; he has built the farm-house and offices, manured, fenced, and drained the lands. The purchaser knows this perfectly well. The landlord had barely a legal right derived from a state of the law which the judges have denounced from the bench as unjust and inhuman. Will Lord Dufferin assert that because one man has bought what he knew another had no right to sell, the State can no longer vindicate the rights of justice and humanity?

Again, Lord Dufferin would apply the rigid laws of political economy to the relations of landlord and tenant. And here, we must observe his lordship's reasoning is not consecutive; for having first compared the price paid by the tenant for the *use* of the land, with the price paid by the merchant for the *use* of the ship, he illustrates this by stating that: "The labour and enterprise by which the land has been made valuable is as clearly represented by *the money I gave for it*, as the industry and ingenuity exercised in its construction is represented by the price *the owner has paid for the ship*." Now this is what logicians call a *transitus a genere ad genus*: if the landlord sold only what he had a right to sell, we admit the parallel. The purchaser of the land, as distinguished from the occupier, merely chooses the purchase of the land as a mode of investing his capital. Land is not a matter of necessity to him. If he cannot get land, there are innumerable other investments open to him. If farms were to be had when required by tenants as easily as investments, we would admit that they also should be regulated by the great economic principle of demand and supply, if it would satisfy even these. The small tillage farmer who has purchased his holding, or whose industry and capital, and the industry and capital of his ancestors for generations, have converted the barren waste into arable lands, would think he received but scant justice if no more compensation were granted to him than to

the rich grazier who occupies from three hundred to two and even three thousand acres on which he has never expended a shilling. It would be most desirable that all parties should take this to heart, that the landlord should not be permitted to plunder the tenant by appropriating the produce of his capital and labour, nor the tenant to turn plunderer in his turn by appropriating that which *justly* belongs to the lord of the soil. We would be very sorry to exchange the lord of the soil for the middle man,—the Smiths and the Gibbings for the Hunters. There must be an entirely different protection secured to the small tillage farmer who has made all the improvements on the lands, and to the gentlemen graziers, and such tillage farmers as the tenantry of Mr. Pollock, who has made all necessary improvements himself and has given his rich tenants who have not to spend anything on improvements, leases of nineteen years. On this matter we might refer to the special commissioners of nearly all the newspapers who have appointed gentlemen of intelligence to inquire into the Land Question in Ireland. Our space will only permit us to cite a passage from the Commissioner of the London *Times*. The letter is dated Mullingar, September 14th:—“The landlords, though too marked off from the people, *as a rule*, respect the social arrangements, the dealings and natural rights of their tenants; they neither attempt *by unjust evictions*, nor *by iniquitous raising of rents*, to appropriate what really belongs to others, nor do they disregard the tenant-right, arising from the sale of the goodwill of farms, which, in this country is a common practice. But—besides that in the years that succeeded the famine, society in Westmeath was much disturbed by extensive evictions from estates—even now, as always will be the case when social elements occasionally jar, *and when too much is left to arbitrary power*, wrongs in the relation of landlord and tenant occur too frequently in this country. Sometimes the zeal of a Protestant proprietor gets the better of his sense of fair dealing. Occasionally, too, the spirit of avarice will break through the barriers of mere usage, and I have been informed of more than one instance in which purchasers in the Landed Estates’ Court have set aside the equitable claims of their tenants. Now and then, moreover, *landlords will abuse the extraordinary power their position gives them*, and I write with a set of contracts before me of a singular and iniquitous kind, which a proprietor has lately endeavoured to compel his tenants at will to sign, in order evidently to deprive them of even the scanty protection of the common law, and to free himself from the implied obligations which local usage would impose on him, so long as they held by the tenure of the country. Westmeath presents in a marked form the contrasts of occupation and tenure which I adverted to in a previous letter. The greater part of its fine lands is now held by substantial farmers or by

graziers of a superior class ; many of these have of course the security of a lease, and in most instances the landlords have either put the lands in good order and built farmsteads before the commencement of a tenancy, or else the lands, being admirable pastures, require little or no outlay. The existing law of landlord and tenant applies therefore fairly enough to these cases. It either has no tendency to confiscate what belongs to the tenant on a change of possession, or else its harsh doctrines are excluded by contracts between independent persons. By far the largest portion of the country, however, is still occupied by small farmers, who legally are merely tenants at will, though they have added much to the value of the soil by building, enclosing, fencing, and tillage, and though they have purchased their interests in numerous instances, and it is probable that they will long maintain their ground, though the area they hold is being diminished. *The existing law is not a rule of right to this body of men in their actual position ; it exposes what is in truth their property, the benefits they have added to the land, to be confiscated by a summary process : it sets at naught the equitable right acquired by a transfer for value with the assent of the landlord.*"

The same correspondent writing from Trim, September 17, declares that though there has been a remarkable consolidation and consequent increase in the size of farms for some years past in Meath, it has made less progress than any of the neighbouring counties with which it can be compared. He saw here even more markedly than elsewhere, the rich grazier, the poor tillage farmer holding poor land at a high rent, with all his own improvements at the mercy of his landlord, and the wretched, ragged, starved labourer to whom the rich grazier gives no employment.

Now where there is an universal and manifest injustice of this kind there must be a remedy. This remedy must be found in legislation ; but before proceeding to discuss the remedy we wish to point out a mistake into which most of those who have spoken or written on the subject of tenant-right in Ireland seem to have fallen. They all proceed on the principle that the provisions of any Bill which may be brought into Parliament on this subject must be applied indiscriminately to all classes of farmers in Ireland. Now we protest against this assumption. We maintain that any retrospective legislation must be founded on the principle of giving the tenant what in natural justice should have been his own,—namely, the produce of his own labour and capital which he has invested in the land. We maintain, moreover, that legislation on the subject of the land must not only respect all just rights of property, but moreover that its benefits must not be confined to a class, but must be such as to promote the prosperity of the whole community.

We will divide the community into two classes,—1. those who have a direct interest in the land, and 2. those who have not. The first class comprises landlords, tenants, and agricultural labourers; the second, shopkeepers, artisans, and all other members of the community who are not comprised in the first class. The tenants must, however, be subdivided into two classes, namely, the graziers and large tillage farmers on whose holdings, as in the case of Mr. Pollock, the landlord has made all the improvements. We will now proceed to state what legislation would in our opinion be at once just and advantageous to the various classes we have enumerated. We will begin with the graziers and large tillage farmers on whose holdings the landlord has made all necessary permanent improvements. We would not, as regards the past, interfere between this class of farmers and the landlord except to make them perfectly free to use their farms as they pleased. Any covenants by which they may be restrained from cultivating their lands should be declared null and void. The productiveness of the land, when properly tilled, is about four times that of the same land when used as pasture. To till the land instead of using it as pasture would certainly promote the general good of the country, and it would advance the interests of the labouring classes by creating a demand for labour and thereby increasing its price. We have said we would not interfere between this class of tenants and their landlords as to the past. But we supposed that *all necessary permanent improvements* were made by the landlord. If any such improvements had been made by the tenant himself or by those to whose rights he succeeded during the past, whereby the value of the inheritance was increased, we would in case of his being evicted or of his quitting the lands on account of the rent being raised, or for any other cause created by the voluntary act of the landlord, grant him compensation for his improvements. As to the future, we would allow the tenant, without asking any consent from the landlord, to cultivate his land, and to make any of the improvements we have enumerated in the early part of this article, when necessary. Amongst the farm buildings which should be regarded as permanent improvements, we would especially enumerate comfortable residences for all agricultural labourers permanently employed on the farm, and for their families. We should also grant loans to the farmer for the purpose of making permanent improvements such as we have enumerated. We should oblige the landlord in case the tenancy were terminated as above, to compensate the tenant for these improvements. We would also protect the rights of the landlord, for if the tenant, in circumstances in which he may reasonably be supposed to have the intention of abandoning the land, was exhausting it by constant tillage without manuring, or was making an unnecessary outlay in buildings, or in other

improvements, we would grant the landlord a remedy by conceding to him the power of obtaining an injunction to restrain the tenant, either at the quarter sessions or from any court of law or equity. Nor as regards improvements would we, on the termination of the tenancy in the manner already specified, indemnify the farmer for any outlay by which the value of the inheritance should not be increased.

By legislation of this kind no injury would be done to the landlord, and the tenant would be stimulated to acquire an interest in the soil by making improvements which would give employment to the agricultural labourer. It would be contrary to every principle of economic science to grant perpetuity of tenure to the occupiers of large grazing farms, because if they were not prevented from subletting, a class of middlemen, who were so long the curse of Ireland, would be created, or if they were prevented from dividing their farms, vast tracts of the richest lands would be permanently bound up to one individual in their most unproductive form. The Conservative lord mayor elect of Dublin declared, in a speech made not long since in the corporation, that Ireland, when her population was nearly double what it is at present, was a corn-exporting, whereas it is now a corn-importing country. We must not be supposed to be hostile to the granting of leases to large agricultural farmers, or to graziers. On the contrary, we think landlords would act more wisely by granting them good long leases. Nor, in their present circumstances, do we blame the graziers for not tilling a part of their lands, or for not making improvements which would give employment to the agricultural labourer. We simply say that in our opinion they have not made out a case which would justify the legislature in interfering between them and their landlords beyond what we have pointed out. We reserve the consideration of the claims of the other classes we have enumerated for our next number.

But look at the present state of Ireland. The land has been torn by England's might and by England's wrong from the rightful owners. The old paternal system by which the lands were held was abolished, and the feudal system forced upon a people to whom it was quite unsuited. No free trade was permitted in the land, which was tied up by entails and family settlements.

"It might be thought," says Dr. Hancock (pp. 23-24), "that the sales in the Incumbered Estates Court had effected such a change in the landed property in Ireland, that the amount of property in settlement was no longer so considerable as to require a remedy. What, however, are the facts? Mr. Griffith's valuation of Ireland gives the annual value of the real property as about £12,000,000. This being generally 25 per cent. below the letting value, gives a gross rental of £16,000,000. Now the gross amount purchased in the

Incumbered Estates Court is £23,000,000. If the estates produced twenty years' purchase on an average, this would give a rental of £1,130,000 sold, or only one-fourteenth of the rental of Ireland. Of the other thirteen-fourteenths, it may still be said that in Ireland settlements of all estates prevail much more extensively than in England, and the class of proprietors *purely in fee simple is so small that it does not deserve to form an exception to the general rule, all proprietors being under disabilities.*"

No doubt some changes have been made since this report was written (1859), but it is still true that in Ireland especially the monopoly in land is preserved by marriage settlements. Is this then a state of things in which Lord Dufferin or any other man would ask to have land regulated by the principle of demand and supply? The very first condition requisite for the application of this principle is, that there should be perfect freedom to buy and sell. The prices of the very necessities of life were artificially increased by protective duties to swell the rentals of the landlords. Had there been perfect free trade in land for a century or two, perhaps it might now be safely left to be regulated by demand and supply; and perhaps if free-trade in it were now established, in a century hence the equilibrium between demand and supply would be restored. But we must not defer the remedy of a crying evil for a *century and a perhaps*. It is admitted by statesmen of all parties that the condition of the Irish tenantry requires immediate redress.

We say if free trade in land were fully established, the equilibrium between demand and supply might *perhaps* be restored in a century. But we are not by any means certain that the principle of supply and demand should ever be rigidly applied to the relations between landlord and tenant in a country where the whole of the land is possessed by a comparatively small number of proprietors. The reason is, that the truth of the economic principle whereby the price and possession of the articles of commerce should be regulated by demand and supply is only proved *by experience*, and whenever we attempt to stretch it further we are simply making a leap in the dark. We know by experience that the price of food, of clothes, of plate, of horses, of carriages, of labour, and perhaps of all personal chattels, as well as of house rent, is best regulated by demand and supply. But the reason is, that if the State tells the baker that he shall only charge a certain price for his bread when flour is dear, he cannot afford to sell it at that price, and will rather remain idle than do so. If to obviate this the miller is ordered to sell his flour at a cheap rate whilst wheat is dear, he cannot afford to do so, and will cease to grind. If the farmer be ordered to sell his wheat at a low price, whilst the commodity is scarce and the demand great, he will

refuse to do so, and will either fetch it to another market, or keep it in his haggard or barn. These attempts to lower the price will inevitably raise it by creating a greater scarcity than would have existed had no such attempt been made. Any efforts directly to raise prices by *mere* enactments would be equally unsuccessful. But these principles essentially require two things: 1. That buyers and sellers be perfectly free to choose their own market; and 2. That if the article be of prime necessity, it can be produced in sufficient quantity to supply the reasonable demands of all who desire to purchase it. If a man were forced in a season of scarcity to take his produce to a certain specified market and to sell it at a low stipulated price, or if, on the other hand, all foreign corn were excluded from our ports, prices would be artificially lowered in one case and raised in the other. Again, if the thing cannot be supplied in sufficient quantity to meet the demand of all those who reasonably desire it, it may be the imperative duty of the State to take care that a reasonable quantity shall be given to each one. Suppose a few individuals managed to get all the corn in a city during the time of a siege, and that they agreed not to sell one pound of flour under £50, whereby all but the enormously wealthy would be doomed to death by starvation, would it not be the duty of the governor to regulate the price so as to permit every one to live? We have an example in the very matter of the distribution of land in some parts of Australia. It is divided into lots which are not put up to public competition, but a fixed price is set upon each, and the applicants being quite too numerous for the supply, each one obtains his lands by lottery. Moreover, the man who has got one of these lots is not permitted to obtain another. Thus even in a country where the territory is almost boundless, the principle of demand and supply, in the matter of land, is not acted on.

Now in Ireland the land has never been freely and unrestrainedly in the market. It is a necessary of life for the poor farmer; the demand is far too great for the supply, and it can neither be imported from foreign countries like corn, nor multiplied according to the demand like ships and houses. To deprive a poor Irish farmer of his land is simply to condemn him to exile in a foreign land or to incarceration in the workhouse. The Irish farmer carries with him to the land of his exile the most bitter hatred of landlord tyranny and of British rule, and the most poignant sorrow for the home and the country of his fathers. *Nos patriæ fines et dulcia linquimus arva; nos patriam fugimus.* It is almost as great cruelty to apply the doctrines of supply and demand to this case, as it would be to tell the penniless pauper to go to market and buy his daily bread. There are higher laws than the laws of political economy, they are entirely subordinate

to the public good of the community, and it is unreasonable and absurd to try to press them into service in matters where their operation is pernicious. As the law now stands a landlord might clear his whole estates of human beings, no matter how numerous they may be, or to what ruin they would be reduced, by six months' notice to quit. No doubt, it is not likely that any landlord will at once exercise this power, but the power of eviction is exercised often enough to render it ruinous to many good and industrious families, and pernicious to the public weal of the empire.

There is an argument against the landlord being permitted to evict his tenants whenever it suits his fancy derived from the tenant right of Ulster, which must be quite familiar to Lord Dufferin:—

“The existing interest,” says Dr. Hancock (p. 39), “of tenants in Ulster would require to be dealt with in any legislation. It is hard to estimate the exact amount of property at stake on the question. But as the arable land of Ulster is 3,400,000 acres, and much more than half is held by yearly tenants, the tenant-right of those tenants, which usually brings at least £10 an acre, cannot be worth less in Ulster alone than £20,000,000. How, then, is this £20,000,000, to which the law at present affords no protection, to be secured? . . . It has sometimes been proposed, as a great favour, to exempt tenant-right from some proposed legislation. As it has been demonstrated that this £20,000,000 has no legal security, to exempt it from legislation is to leave it insecure; whatever opinion any one may hold as to tenant-right, or as to legislation upon it, it is absurd to represent the exempting it from any wise legislation as a favour. Again, it is said that, after all, the Ulster tenants are safe enough. This is true on many properties, but still there are cases occurring of total confiscation of improvements. These produce a feeling of insecurity; they lead every now and again to agitation, and in some cases to frightful outrages.”

The tenant-right of Ulster consists in the outgoing tenant being permitted to sell the “goodwill” of his farm. “The tenants,” says Dr. Hancock, “are nearly all yearly tenants; every change of tenancy takes place with the landlord’s knowledge and assent.” The farm cannot be divided without the landlord’s assent; but the possessor, either during his life or by his will, names the person who is to succeed to the farm, generally imposing some charges on it for the benefit of the other members of the family. These, as well as all other just charges against the farm, the landlord compels the new tenant to pay. If a tenant gets into arrears, or wishes to dispose of his farm for any other cause, he asks leave from the landlord or agent to sell his interest. Leave is given, subject to the new tenant being approved of by the landlord. This approval is never unreasonably refused, and the rent is scarcely ever raised on the occasion of the transfer of the farm. The reason is, that all the neighbouring tenants occupying lands of the same quality

hold them at the same rate, and to raise the land before the sale would be a confiscation of the tenant-right of the seller ; to raise it after the sale would be clearly unjust to the purchaser. It is thus that the delicate question of fixing the rent of farms which are held from year to year is regulated, and on the whole it works pretty well on the estates of great proprietors. They generally let their lands at a fair rent, on the principle of "live and let live"; and as the rents of lands of the same quality are uniform over the whole estate, the landlords who recognize tenant-right do not, as a general rule, take advantage of the sale or transfer of a farm to raise the rent. We say they do not as a general rule ; but if a misunderstanding, on account of politics or for any other cause, arises between landlord and tenant, or, as more frequently happens, between the agent and tenant, tenant-right is ignored, and the rent is raised, or the tenant even ejected out of his holding.

"In the course," says Dr. Hancock (p. 30), "of twenty or thirty years, nearly every farm changes hands from death or other causes, and on every change some money is paid to the preceding tenant, or to his creditors or representatives, by the new tenant, with the landlord's or agent's perfect knowledge or assent. I will give an illustration that came under my notice. At the last March Assizes, an action was brought by a creditor against the executor of a deceased tenant. It appeared as part of the proof of the executor having had assets, that the deceased had held as tenant from year to year a farm in the county of Down, of forty acres of land, with a good house, farm buildings, and other improvements upon it, erected by himself or preceding tenants. The estate on which the farm is situated had been purchased by the landlord or his father, and before permitting the land to be sold he had it valued, and raised the rent 5s. an acre. This land was certainly let at its full value, and yet the purchase-money amounted to £540, or £13. 10s. an acre. This money was paid into the agent's office, and the arrears of rent and some of the tenant's debts being paid out of it, the balance was handed to the executor. . . . The landlord who assented to the purchase I am referring to is an old man ; if he should die, ought his successor be allowed to take advantage of the tenant, if he were disposed to do so ?"

We will add, if this farm were sold in the Landed Estates or in any other court, can the purchaser say that because he has bought the landlord's interest in the land, this £540 belongs to him, and that he can turn the tenant out without injustice ? No doubt such is the law, but it is a law which every principle of justice requires to be changed. Surely when a landlord has thus made himself a party to the purchase of land, he has made himself a party to a contract, which should be enforced by law.

Now we fearlessly affirm that the area of the lands of Ulster, the tenant-right of which has been purchased by the occupying tenant, or by those from whom he has derived them, is double the

area of the lands the fee of which has been purchased by the landlord or his predecessors. Why therefore should not the law secure to the industrious farmer the tenant-right which he has purchased, and the improvements which he has made with the sweat of his brow? Or is it just to secure to the purchaser of the fee not only his own property, but the just property of the tenant farmer also? Nor can this reasoning be confined to the class of farmers whose tenant-right can be shown to have been purchased, any more than the property in the fee can be confined to the same class of landlords. For those tenants who have not purchased their tenant-right might have sold it. It is a property which they justly possess, and which should be legally secured to them. How far the extension of tenant-right and its legalization all over Ireland would be a remedy for the admitted evils of the present land tenure in Ireland we shall consider hereafter, but we do not think the true solution is to be found in handing over the whole land of the country in fee-farm to the present occupiers, and only allowing a rent-charge to the landlords. This would be confining the whole advantage of the measure to the actual occupiers of the land, many of whom hold very large tracts of pasturage, and give little or no employment to the labouring classes. It would, moreover, tend to confine the whole land of the country to the present occupiers, and to exclude all others from it, which would not be at all desirable. Such a measure would not satisfy the country. It would only satisfy the present tenant-farmers and their connections.

Notices of Books.

La Civiltà Cattolica. September 4, 1869. Roma.

THIS number contains a very important article, on the anti-Roman movement in Germany which has been evoked by anticipation of the Vatican Council. The apparent purpose of this movement is (1) to avert any definition of Pontifical infallibility and any reassertion of the Syllabus; (2) to effect an abrogation or fundamental modification of the various ecclesiastical laws, which concern the prohibition of books and the censure of doctrinal errors; (3) to obtain the admission of laymen to a certain share in ecclesiastical government; (4) to elicit some disavowal of the Church's power in temporals. In fact, its abettors occupy a position as precisely opposite to that of the "Civiltà," as it is possible to do without expressly abandoning their Catholic profession.

It is no longer a secret, says the "Civiltà" (p. 585), that Dr. Dollinger is the prime originator of this movement; and that Prince Hohenlohe's interrogations, of which more anon, were no less really prompted by him, than were the theological replies thereto. He is the head among a number of kindred spirits: "all the threads of the movement converge at Munich; from thence come the orders of attack; from thence the agitation receives its movement and its life" (p. 586).

First of all it was necessary, to stimulate as large a proportion as possible of German Catholics into sympathy and co-operation. With this view there appeared, beginning in September 1868, a series of twelve articles in the "Augsburg Gazette." Early in the present year various pamphlets were published in the same direction. Then some more articles in the Augsburg Gazette, occasioned by the "Civiltà" French correspondence. Then came the questions addressed by Prince Hohenlohe to the universities, for the purpose (says the "Civiltà") of obtaining a predetermined answer.*

* We take from the "Guardian" the answer to these questions, as given by the theological faculty of Munich itself. They are of high theological interest. The "Univers," however, of Sept. 23, mentions that this reply was by no means unanimous, and that the dissentients have published their reply separately. Dr. Dollinger and his friends answer as follows:—

"First Question—If the propositions contained in the Syllabus and the infallibility of the Pope are to be declared articles of faith by the coming Council, what changes will be caused in the doctrine of the relations of Church and State as it has hitherto been treated theoretically and practically in Germany?"

Lastly came the petitions of Coblenz and of Bonn, to which the signatures of laymen were invited. These addresses however, adds the "Civiltà," were perfect failures, whether you regard the number or the weight of those who signed. "In vain do you look for the name of men universally recognized in the Rhine countries as good Catholics. In many important towns the most active solicitations could not obtain a single signature. At Coblenz 45 only signed out of 120 to whom the address was offered. At

"Assuming that, in exact accordance with the wording of this question, the propositions of the Syllabus are to be laid before the approaching Council as decrees or decisions to be issued by it, and assuming that the Council will formally adopt these propositions *nude et pure* as they stand, and will condemn whatever the Pope has condemned in them, it is very possible that some not unimportant changes will be introduced into the present relations between Church and State. We do not say more than 'it is possible,' because as yet the purely negative wording of some of the propositions has not permitted the formation of any distinct scientific judgment as to their extent and bearing. Such a judgment would, however, be possible if an interpretation of these propositions, which has not been put forward in a distinctly authentic manner since 1864, was to be adopted. But we may certainly presume that the propositions of the Syllabus will be laid before the Council in a positive form, and will therefore be confined within more certain limits.

"It will then rest with the wisdom of the Council, and the work will be intrusted to it, to take such measures in reference to the existing laws and systems of those States and countries which have sent Bishops to the assembly as will prevent the growth of unnecessary and inevitable conflicts, between these its decrees and the conscience of Catholics on the one hand, and the rightful constitutions and laws of civil society on the other. Meanwhile we have before us an attempt, which, from the position of its author, is by no means without weight, to transpose the negations of the Syllabus into positive or affirmative propositions; and this may serve to some extent, reserving what has been said above, as a test or a rule by which we may judge of the serious effect that may be given to some of the propositions.

"The work to which we refer is written by the Jesuit Father Clemens Schrader, who is now in Rome, and prominently engaged in the preparations for the Council. It is called 'The Pope and Modern Ideas. Second Part. The Encyclical of December 8, 1864. Accompanied by a Letter of Recommendation from the Pope. Vienna, 1865.' In this work, among other things, the 44th Proposition of the Syllabus is thus stated:—'The civil authority cannot interfere in questions of religion and ecclesiastical law. It cannot therefore pronounce any judgment on the instructions which are issued by the rulers of the Church by virtue of their office as a guide for the conscience.' Again, the 30th Article is thus expressed by Father Schrader:—'The immunity of the Church and of ecclesiastical persons does not take its origin from civil law'; and it is added in a footnote—'but it takes its root in the rights belonging to the Church herself and given her by God.' The necessary consequence of this is further expressed in the 31st Article:—'The ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the temporal, civil, as well as the criminal concerns of the clergy, must not be wholly removed, even without inquiry and against the protest of the Apostolic See;' and the note which explains and completes it is—'for it is founded upon the personal rights of the Church, and can only be transferred to the civil tribunals with the express consent of the Pope.' Now,

Bonn a large number of laymen who in [knowledge of] doctrine, in learning and in zeal are inferior to none of the subscribers, formally refused their adhesion" (p. 590).

Now what are the merits of this movement? In the first place, conspicuously and almost avowedly its end is to prevent the assembled bishops from exercising a free judgment, and from acting freely on their convictions: to prevent this, partly by the pressure of lay public opinion, but far more

as this appears to admit that such a transfer can take place with the consent of the Pope, and is therefore opposed to the universal rule that the Pope cannot dispense with anything that is of Divine right, we must look for a clearer explanation of these two articles, which will perhaps be given by the Council.

"The 78th Article is thus expressed by Father Schrader:—'It was therefore not right for certain Catholic countries to guarantee immigrants the free exercise of their religion;' and this censure is confirmed by the wording of the 79th Article:—'For it is not false that the civil equality of all religions, and the permission accorded to all men to express all kinds of opinions freely and openly, lead to the more easy corruption of the minds and morals of nations and to the spread of the pest of indifferentism.' Now, in the face of such propositions, it cannot be denied that if such or similar conclusions are to be formed, they may lead to very great troubles. For principles of an exactly opposite tendency are so firmly established both in theory and practice in all European Constitutions, and it is hardly possible for any one of them to accept any other theory than those of the civil equality of all religious sects and the freedom of opinions: Assuming then that the condemnation of these is to be imposed, in the manner described above, on all who hold the Catholic belief, it is manifest that collisions which can scarcely be reconciled must arise, between their religious and their civil obligations; and that, under certain circumstances, the results, both for the individual members and for the whole body of the Church in some countries, will be difficult and disastrous. With regard to the exclusion of the civil authority from the whole province of morals, we may suspect that Father Schrader has not correctly expressed the proposition of the Syllabus; and, of course, even if other articles of the Syllabus are converted into decrees of the Council, this article will be rendered in such a form as not to expose it any longer to the misconceptions of Father Schrader. But it is more difficult to answer the question, how far the doctrine of the relations of Church and State will be changed by the elevation of the opinion about Papal infallibility into a dogma. The attempt to answer it leads us by the natural connection of the subject to the second question.

"Second Question.—In the case already put, would the public teachers of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical law feel themselves bound to establish, that the doctrine of the divinely ordained sovereignty of the Pope over monarchs and Governments, whether as *potestas directa* or *indirecta in temporalia*, was binding on the conscience of every Christian?

"As regards the declaration of the Pope's infallibility as an article of faith, that is necessarily most important for the internal and spiritual concerns of the Church, and has only an indirect bearing on the relations between Church and State. The first question therefore, as far as it asks what changes might be introduced in the legal relations between Church and State in the event of infallibility being raised into a dogma, cannot be answered in a moment, nor can such changes be enumerated or distinguished all at once. But when we come to examine more closely the con-

through the intervention of secular governments. For years disloyal and disaffected Catholics have been complaining about the absolutism of Rome : “ she will never dare ” they have said “ to summon a council.” She *has* summoned a Council ; and our liberal friends are aghast at the prospect. They have appealed from Pope to Council ; and now they appeal from Council to Cæsar.

Then secondly, as the “ *Civiltà* ” points out, these disloyal Germans are

sequences that will follow from the Pope’s infallibility as regards the doctrine of a divinely ordained sovereignty over monarchs and Governments, we must remember that certain theologians have endeavoured to prove that the infallibility of the Pope may be entirely confined to spiritual matters : as, for instance, the Benedictine Father Cartier. At the same time both the French theologians who make that their reason for attacking the doctrine of infallibility (such as Bossuet, De Marca, Cardinal de Luzerne, &c., and the Italian school of Jesuits which defends it, such as Bellarmine, Gretzer, Becanus, Rocaberti, Sfondrati, &c.) have stated that the doctrine of the divinely ordained sovereignty of the Pope over the civil authority—that is, States and their rulers—is so inseparably connected with the doctrine of Papal infallibility, that whoever maintains the last must also accept the first ; and they have based this on the fact, that the Popes themselves have proclaimed the doctrine in the most solemn manner, and have declared it to be binding on the whole Church. This, it is well known, was done by Popes Gregory VII. and X., Innocent III. and IV., by Boniface VIII. in the Bull ‘ *Unam Sanctam*, ’ by John XXII., by Leo X. at the Fifth Council of the Lateran, by Paul IV. and Pius V.

“ There can be no question therefore, that if the Council proclaims the doctrine of Papal infallibility absolutely and without any limitations, this Papal authority over the civil powers will also be introduced as a doctrine of the Church : which it has not been hitherto. How far however this will bring about a change in the relations of the Papal See to the several States, depends mainly on personal considerations, and cannot therefore be more closely discussed. All that can be said is, that the most eminent theologians, as Bellarmine and many others, who have maintained this political power of the Pope, have not prescribed any limits for its exercise ; but have left the use or abuse of it entirely dependent on the judgment of the Popes themselves. The position which would have to be taken up under these circumstances by the teachers of ecclesiastical law and dogmatic theology, cannot be reviewed completely and in all its bearings ; but so much may be stated with certainty, that when a general decree of the Council is issued, then will begin the work of ascertaining and explaining the consequences of its practical application to the various branches and concerns of ecclesiastical life. In this scientific work the teachers of ecclesiastical law and dogmatic theology will take that part which naturally belongs to them. Those among them who are members of the clerical order, will also have to act in this work in accordance with the instructions that may be given them by their bishops upon the basis of those doctrines of which the whole Church is thoroughly persuaded.

“ Third Question.—Would the teachers of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical law consider themselves bound to adopt in their lectures and writings the doctrine that the personal and real immunities of the clergy are of Divine right, and therefore belong to the sphere of dogma ?

“ If among the other propositions of the *Syllabus* those relating to the immunity of the clergy are adopted by the Council in a positive or affirmative manner, they must certainly oppose the doctrine of a purely civil

in avowed opposition to the teaching of the Syllabus. But there cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose, that the non-infallibility of the Pope implies the non-infallibility of the Syllabus. In fact, as the Bishop of Nimes states in his admirable Pastoral, on two different occasions the Syllabus has received the suffrage of the dispersed Episcopate. It received that suffrage firstly, when it was first published; and secondly, when the bishops, assembled at Rome in 1867, signed their

origin for those immunities by that of a Divine institution. This indeed has been constantly taught in the canon law, from Gratian down to the seventeenth century. The teachers of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical law would, on their part, while continuing to set forth what, according to the canonists, has always been held on the subject of the immunities,—most probably maintain that the Pope can permit or excuse the practical disuse of certain immunities, as the circumstances of the time may require.

“Fourth Question.—Is there any generally recognized criterion by which it can be ascertained with certainty whether any given dictum of the Pope is *ex cathedrâ*, and, therefore, according to the doctrine to be laid down by the Council, infallible and binding on the conscience of every Christian; and if there is such a criterion, where is it to be found?

“There is no generally recognized criterion, by which it can be ascertained with certainty whether any given Papal dictum has been pronounced *ex cathedrâ*, and whether, therefore, in case the Papal infallibility is declared by the Council, this prerogative will also attach. Some twenty different hypotheses are to be found among the theologians who have maintained the doctrine in question, as to the conditions which should be required of a decision *ex cathedrâ*. No one of these demands, some of which are extremely various and differ very much from each other, has attained any great importance. No one of them has ever been supported by any very considerable number of theologians; each one too has been much controverted; and it may be said of all of them, that they have been arbitrarily devised, as it is not possible in this matter to draw from tradition or the written word. It appears, therefore, that if a decree as to Papal infallibility is really passed by the assembly of the Church in Rome, there must also be a definition of what is a decision *ex cathedrâ*: as otherwise uncertainty and occasions for strife would always continue.

“Fifth Question.—How far must the new dogmas which are aimed at, and their necessary consequences, produce an alteration in popular education in church and school, and have a similar influence on popular school books and catechisms?

“It is certainly quite manifest that the popular books of religious instruction, and especially the catechisms, must be altered, if Papal infallibility is to be raised to the rank of a universal and divinely revealed article of faith. The catechisms which are chiefly used in the kingdom of Bavaria, or which were used till lately (we refer especially to the Catechism of the Diocese of Augsburg, 1858, of Bamberg, 1855, of Wurzburg, &c.), only refer to the infallibility of *the Church* as a teacher: and it is said that this function of teaching is exercised by the Pope and the Bishops in union with him, and that its decisions are principally given by the voice of General Councils. The catechism of the Jesuit Father de Harbe, which is now introduced in a good many dioceses, teaches indeed a very different doctrine. In this book it is stated that ‘the Church, in its capacity as a teacher, utters its decisions either through the medium of the Pope or through that of an ecclesiastical assembly under the Pope’s sanction.’ In direct antagonism to the German catechisms which were formerly in use,

very remarkable address to the Holy Father. The "Civiltà" (p. 587) lays especial stress on the latter; and speaks (p. 586) of the "adhesions" to that address "subsequently given in by the bishops who were not present." We may refer to our number for October, 1867 (pp. 530-532) where we considered in some detail the singular force and cogency of this beautiful address.

The present German movement then is simply disgraceful; and can be called by no milder name. So far as it aims at thwarting the Church's free action by appeal to the civil government, it is fundamentally anti-Catholic and in principle heretical. So far as it contravenes the Syllabus, it is nothing less than an organized rebellion against the teaching of the *Ecclesia Docens*.

The "Civiltà," in fact, while it regards this movement as the reverse of formidable, takes nevertheless a very grave view of its moral and religious character. Having described its main features, the Roman writer proceeds to say (p. 588) that "ecclesiastical history has frequently seen similar examples at the commencement of *schisms and heresies*."

Three events, more or less closely connected with this movement, have occurred, since the "Civiltà" article was published.

Firstly,—M. de Montalembert's unhappy adhesion to the Coblenz address; which he designates "a glorious manifesto of Catholic faith and reason." Our gratitude to M. de Montalembert is imperishable for noble services done in the past; and our comment on him therefore shall be much less emphatic, than it would otherwise be. His letter however unhappily contains no expression—does not even contain a hint—of that submission, with which he is prepared to receive all doctrinal decrees of the Vatican Council, whatever they may be; and we cannot refrain from drawing attention to the omission. In itself it is profoundly regrettable; and from a Frenchman in particular—for French Catholics have quite a special devotion to Ecumenical Councils—it is truly remarkable. Then further, if there is one principle more than another with which M. de Montalembert's whole career has been identified, it is his abhorrence of all secular usurpation over the Church: yet he is throwing himself into a movement, which depends exclusively, for any possibility of success, on the interference of civil governments with the free deliberations of a Council.

Secondly,—The admirable Pastoral of the German bishops. The first account of this Pastoral published in England alleged, that the bishops pledged themselves to strain every nerve against any conciliar definition of

this work clearly betrays an intention of vesting infallibility wholly and exclusively in the Pope. From this it becomes quite evident that an alteration of the catechism in this respect would be indispensable. In case the assembled Episcopate should accept the new dogma, it must be stated in the manuals of instruction, in a way that will be quite intelligible to the people, that all authority, all certainty in matters of faith, rests finally in the person of the Pope; and that whatever he says on this subject is infallible, whether he speaks of himself alone or with the assistance of a larger or smaller number of counsellors."

Pontifical infallibility. It might quite as plausibly have been said, that they pledged themselves to strain every nerve for procuring a conciliar condemnation of Copernicus and Galileo. Even the "Saturday Review"—which has throughout preposterously exaggerated the significance and bearing of the anti-Roman movement in Germany—admits (Sept. 25th) that this Pastoral "contains no syllable really calculated to remove or lessen the anxiety of the Coblenz petitioners." We should think *not*; indeed it inflicts on those petitioners a severe rebuke. If disaffected Catholics are really as much pleased with this Pastoral as some profess to be, they are thankful for wonderfully small mercies. Yet to be sure persons who can persuade themselves that the "Mirari vos" and the Syllabus do not sharply condemn Liberal Catholicism, are only applying similar rules of interpretation to this Pastoral, when they regard it as favouring or encouraging that condemned system.

Thirdly,—F. Hyacinthe has broken his religious vows, left his convent, and published the following letter.* We take our translation almost entirely from the "Weekly Register."

"My Very Reverend Father,—During the five years of my ministry at Notre Dame de Paris, and notwithstanding the open attacks and secret accusations of which I have been the object, your esteem and your confidence have never failed me. I preserve numerous proofs of them, written in your own hand, which apply to my preaching quite as much as to my person. Whatever may happen I shall always retain a grateful recollection of them. Now however, by a sudden change, the cause of which I do not seek in your heart but in the intrigues of an all-powerful party at Rome, you accuse what you encouraged; you blame what you approved; and you command me to speak a language, or maintain a silence, which would no longer be the full and faithful expression of my conscience. I do not hesitate an instant. I could not re-ascend the pulpit of Notre Dame with language perverted by a command or mutilated by reticence. I express my regret to the intelligent and courageous Archbishop who opened the pulpit to me, and who has maintained me in it against the ill-will of the men of whom I have just spoken. I express my regret to the imposing auditory, which bestowed upon me its attention, its sympathy, I had almost said its friendship. I should not be worthy of that auditory, of the Bishop, of my conscience, or of God, could I consent to enact such a part before them. I withdraw at the same time from the monastery I live in, and which, under the new circumstances in which I am placed, is changed for me into a prison of the soul. In acting thus I am not unfaithful to my vows. I promised monastical obedience; but within the limits of the honesty of my conscience, and the dignity of my person and ministry. I promised it, subject to that higher law of justice and "royal liberty," which according to S. James the Apostle is the proper law of the Christian. It was the most perfect practice of that holy liberty which I went to ask in the cloister more than ten years ago in the ardour of an enthusiasm free from all human calculation;—I cannot add free from all the illusions of youth. If in exchange for my sacrifices I am now

* The "Guardian" French correspondent (September 29th) mentions that the first newspaper to which F. Hyacinthe sent his letter was the "Temps"; "a journal which typifies the most dangerous and seductive infidelity of the age."

offered chains, it is not merely my right, it is my duty to reject them. The present moment is a solemn one. The Church is passing through one of the most violent, the most anxious, and the most decisive crises of its existence here below. For the first time in 300 years an Œcumenical Council is not only convoked, but declared necessary. These are the expressions of the Holy Father. It is not at such a moment that a preacher of the Gospel, even the humblest, can consent to keep silence, like those mute dogs of Israel, faithless guardians, which the prophet reproaches because unable to bark: "canes muti, non valentes latrare." The saints never kept silent. I am not one of them, but nevertheless I am of their race—"filii sanctorum sumus"—and I have always longed to leave my footsteps, my tears, and if need be my blood, in the traces where they have left theirs. I raise therefore, before the Holy Father and the Council, my protest, as a Christian and a priest, against those doctrines and those practices which are called Roman, but which are not Christian; and which by their encroachments, always more audacious and more baneful, tend to change the constitution of the Church, the basis and the form of its teaching, and even the spirit of its piety. I protest against the divorce, as impious as it is insensate, sought to be effected between the Church which is our Eternal Mother, and the society of the nineteenth century, of which we are the temporal children, and towards which we have also duties and regards. I protest against that opposition, more radical and more frightful still, to human nature, attacked and outraged by these false doctors in its most indestructible and most holy aspirations. I protest above all against the sacrilegious perversion of the Gospel of the Son of God Himself, the spirit and the letter of which are alike trampled under foot by the Pharisaism of the new law. It is my most profound conviction that if France in particular, and the Latin races in general, are given up to social, moral, and religious anarchy, the principal cause is not indeed Catholicism itself, but the manner in which Catholicism has for a long time been understood and practised. I appeal to the Council which is about to assemble to seek remedies for the excess of our ills, and to apply them with as much force as gentleness. But if fears which I do not wish to share were to be realised—if the august assembly had no more liberty in its deliberations than it already has in its preparations; in a word, if it were to be deprived of the essential character of an Œcumenical Council;—I would cry aloud to God and man to claim another, really assembled in the Holy Spirit not in the spirit of party; really representing the Universal Church, not the silence of some and the oppression of others. "For the hurt of the daughter of my people am I hurt. I am black; astonishment hath taken hold of me. Is there no balm in Gilead—is there no physician there? Why then is not the health of the daughter of my people recovered?"—(Jeremiah viii.) And, finally, I appeal to your tribunal, Oh, Lord Jesus! "Ad tuum Domine Jesu tribunal appello." It is in your presence that I write these lines; it is at your feet, after much prayer, much reflection, much suffering, much waiting, it is at your feet that I sign them. I feel that if men condemn them upon the earth, you will approve them in Heaven. To live or to die—that is sufficient for me.

FR. HYACINTHE.

What a revelation of character! If, where all is revolting, one part is more revolting than another, it is his claim of affinity to the "race" of saints. As far as F. Hyacinthe is concerned, we can, of course, feel no other sentiments than those of indignation, pity, fear of the future. But

we are confident that his act will do very real and permanent service to the Church, in more ways than one.

We are glad to observe that the French Liberal Catholic press is quite unanimous in severely condemning his course. In England even the "Guardian" and the "Spectator" are very guarded as to their comments. The "Guardian," indeed, says that he preserves "unshaken faith in every article of his creed": but what, then, are those "Roman doctrines" against which he "raises his protest"? Are there any doctrines taught from Rome which the dispersed Episcopate has not confirmed?

L'Infaillibilité et le Concile-Général. Par Monseigneur DECHAMPS, Archevêque de Malines. Septième édition. Paris : Mangin.

THIS very important work not only is an indication that the definition of Pontifical infallibility is likely to be seriously considered in the Vatican Council, but will also, we suppose, have considerable influence (humanly speaking) towards the pronouncement of such a definition. The whole of it is more or less occupied with the general doctrine of infallibility; and though immediately addressed to laymen, it cannot but have great weight with theologians also.

The illustrious author lays his foundation in the doctrine of "natural infallibility" (chap. i.); of the certitude engendered by reason within its own sphere. Under this head his treatment of Lamennais's philosophical system is particularly happy. That writer held, that the individual's reason cannot guarantee its own truthfulness, and that there is no sufficient basis of certitude except the common agreement (*sensus communis*) of mankind. There is one small objection to this doctrine, replies the Archbishop: viz., that it is promptly condemned by the very authority to which it appeals; and that "the common agreement of mankind" clamorously rejects it (p. 8). Reason then is capable of knowing in its own light various truths as certain. In its own light it knows, as certain, the verities of natural theology; and in its own light it knows, as conclusive, the evidence given to man for the credibility of revealed religion.

The natural infallibility then of reason leads men to the supernatural infallibility of the Catholic Church (chap. iii.) This infallibility is involved in the very nature of a teaching authority instituted by God. Moral and spiritual life cannot be based except on firm and certain convictions: whereas then it is based in great part on supernatural dogmata—since the infallibility of reason does not extend to such dogmata—some other infallibility must take its place.

It must not be supposed then (chap. iv.) that supernatural infallibility extends over the whole field of thought; that the Church can teach men infallibly, on the respective superiority of coal and wood fires, or on the best mode of constructing yachts. The Church's infallibility is given for no other purpose, than that of faithfully guarding the Deposit: she is infallible only

in condemning those propositions (or directly teaching their contradictories) "which injure or imperil faith and morals" (p. 46).

So much on the *object* of infallibility: but the author's chief concern is with its *subject*. It resides (p. 64) at all events in the Ecclesia Docens; in the Catholic Episcopate (assembled or dispersed) united with its head: but does it reside in the Holy See, even apart from the Episcopate? This is the question which Mgr. Dechamps next proceeds to consider. He draws out with singular clearness (pp. 90-98) the ordinary testimonies from Scripture and tradition; but a still more important argument (pp. 98-104) is founded on the intimate connection of this dogma with the facts of Church history. Take e.g. the well known profession of faith, imposed by Pope S. Hormisdas on the repentant Acacians in the East (p. 99). Here are some extracts from that profession:—

"Religion has always been preserved pure and undefiled in the Apostolic See Therefore we receive and approve all the letters of Pope Leo which he wrote concerning the Christian religion. Wherefore, as already said, following in every respect the Apostolic See, and preaching all its decisions, I hope that I may be with you in that one communion which the Apostolic See preaches, in which is the full and truthful solidity of the Christian religion. Promising also that those who are severed from the communion of the Catholic Church, that is, who do not think with the Apostolic See, &c., &c." (Denz, n. 141).

This profession of faith was not only subscribed at the time by all the bishops of the East, but long afterwards by the Fathers, both Latin and Greek, of the Eighth Œcumenical Council. All these Fathers therefore, by implication, publicly accepted the dogma of Pontifical infallibility; all regarded those "who do not think with the Holy See" as "severed from the communion of the Catholic Church." Again, the well known confession of Michael Palæologus was on the one hand prescribed by a Pope, and on the other hand accepted by the Second Council of Lyons. This confession declares that "if any questions shall have arisen concerning the Faith, they ought to be defined by the judgment" of Rome (Denz, n. 389). Then the Council of Florence declares that the Supreme Pontiff has been appointed by God "teacher of all Christians" (Denz, n. 589); endowed by Jesus Christ with "full power of feeding" with true doctrine "the Universal Church." But these are mere occasional instances of a principle, which pervades the Church's whole history. This is what Mgr. Dechamps so strongly urges from Muzzarelli (pp. 108-110).

"That person claims and ought to be accounted personally infallible, who pronounces absolute dogmatic decisions; publishes them; addresses them to all the faithful and to the whole Episcopate, without requiring the consent of bishops, whether direct or indirect, express or tacit; commanding them to publish and execute his decisions, and forbidding them, under pain of excommunication, to oppose them; putting down those bishops who claim to discuss and judge his decisions, and protesting that he does not wait for their voices, but enjoins on them obedience. . . .

"Now this is just what the Sovereign Pontiff has done through all ages. . . . Therefore he claims to be, and ought to be accounted, infallible; for if he were not, his dogmatical constitutions would contain a tyrannical usurpation over

the rights of the Episcopate ; an error destructive of the Church's Faith. But God could not permit this without failing in the assistance which He has promised to His Church. Nor could the Church herself approve such an error, either by words or by obedience, as she *has* approved this claim ; for the Church never approves, even by silence, what is contrary to faith and morals."

Nothing, in fact, is to our mind more amazing, than the intrepidity with which Gallicans sustain their opinion, that Pontifical infallibility was a doctrine unknown to the early Church. On the contrary, we are quite confident that it is the only key which, even on the surface, has the slightest appearance of fitting in with the complicated facts of the past. As to Gallicanism proper—the doctrine that (1) a Pope by himself can define error *ex cathedrâ* ; but (2) that his definition of a doctrine is infallible when confirmed by the Episcopate ; and (3) that such was the view explicitly prevalent in early centuries ;—this is nothing less than the most wildly unhistorical ecclesiastical theory which was ever devised. Indeed, unsound and disloyal Catholics are beginning to see this themselves, and to take refuge in some other.

Mgr. Dechamps then regards it as absolutely indubitable, that the dogma of Pontifical infallibility was revealed by Christ, was taught by the Apostles, and is proximately definable as of faith. Whether the Vatican Council will account such definition opportune, is a very different question ; but the author strongly inclines to an affirmative answer (pp. 151—157). One reason, which he has been the first (we think) to bring forward, impresses us as extremely cogent (p. 153). The coming Council will be the first held since Gallicanism was first formulated ; to pass over therefore the four articles without condemnation, might almost seem like giving them some sanction.

It is often forgotten that the Church has never yet defined her own infallibility *at all*. If therefore the Vatican Council entertains the question, it will be the very first which has ever issued any definition on the subject ; the very first which has ever methodically considered the Church's infallibility ; the very first which has examined Scripture and Tradition, for the purpose of ascertaining over what extent of ground that infallibility extends, and in what person or body it is vested. To define that *an Ecumenical Council* is infallible, would be as simply a new definition, as to define that the Supreme Pontiff by himself possesses that privilege.

The singular value of this pamphlet, and the great weight which it is likely to carry, make us the more anxious to mention any little particular on which it may possibly do mischief. We are induced therefore to express three little criticisms, which we submit with diffidence to the judgment of theologians.

1. We think that the author (pp. 113, 4) is far from doing justice to the strength of S. Liberius's case. We would refer, for a fuller explanation of our meaning, to an article on that illustrious Pontiff in our number for last October.

2. In several places (e.g. pp. 37, 48, 81) Mgr. Dechamps says, that the Church's infallibility does not demand "any new inspiration properly so-called," but only "faithfulness to the grace promised the *Ecclesia Docens* for

preservation of the Deposit." We thoroughly understand this mode of speaking, so far as *definitions of faith* are concerned. But the author holds, of course, that the Church is also infallible in her declaration of dogmatical facts, and generally in her condemnation of any proposition, as injurious or perilous to the faith. When therefore the Church declares infallibly e.g. that the "Augustinus" contains five certain propositions in its legitimate objective sense—how can it be said that here is "no new inspiration"? She infallibly decides a thesis, which a century back no one had ever heard of. Surely in order to such infallibility she must receive "a new inspiration."

3. In various places (see e.g. p. 88) the author takes for granted that no Pontifical Act can be *ex cathedrâ*, which does not expressly *declare* an obligation of interior assent as imposed by itself on Catholics. Surely there are several undeniable instances to the contrary. For instance, he himself (p. 95) speaks of S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian as indubitably *ex cathedrâ*; indeed, it is plain that no other notion of that Letter ever entered his mind. Yet that Letter nowhere so much as hints at its own imposing any obligation of interior assent; as any one may see by reading it through. It was partly indeed for this reason, that we printed it at length in our number for April, 1868, pp. 402-407. See our argument on this very head in p. 401. Nor should it be forgotten, that the profession of faith prescribed by Pope S. Hormisdas, on which Mgr. Dechamps himself lays so much stress, speaks of *all* S. Leo's "Letters which he wrote concerning the Christian religion" as "decisions of the Apostolic See."

However, these are specks in the sun. We thank the illustrious Archbishop of Malines most heartily for his pamphlet; which has done, is doing, and will long continue to do, inestimable service throughout the Church.

Les Conciles Généraux. Instruction Pastorale de Mgr. l'Evêque de Nîmes.
Paris: Palmé.

THERE is certainly no one of the French bishops, more heartily devoted to the Holy See and more heartily in sympathy with the whole of Roman doctrine, than Mgr. Plantier, the illustrious Bishop of Nîmes; and our readers will be much interested by hearing what he anticipates from the Vatican Council. His Pastoral is divided into two parts; of which the former treats councils of the past, the latter that Council which is now so nearly looming in the future. It is to this second part that we shall confine our attention.

Firstly then, what does Mgr. Plantier regard as the chief evil of our times, the evil from which all others spring? "The universal rupture both of nations and their rulers from the public and social royalty of Jesus Christ" (p. 137). "Christian civilization is returning with gigantic steps to paganism* and atheism also" (p. 138). "In the present deplorable state of

* Such statements as these, however, should be taken with important reservation. See F. Coleridge's very important remarks, which we quoted in our last number, pp. 209, 210.

society, even kings who are Christians cannot be Christian kings (p. 152). Nay, anti-Catholic theories have been raised into a kind of dogmata, and consecrated as the principles of '89."

The Council's work will be doctrinal on one hand and disciplinary on the other. As to doctrine, the Syllabus will probably be adopted as the basis of its decrees (p. 187). Still (ib.) the assembled bishops will doubtless themselves handle the condemned errors "for the purpose of applying to them more precise and direct" censures; and again, "for the purpose of setting forth more didactically and rigorously the various articles of our holy Revelation which those errors deny or disfigure" or place in peril. "It will be permitted to affirm, that no doctrinal monument ever raised by the Church's hands will have presented vaster proportions and more brilliant illumination to the adoration and gratitude of posterity."

But the most difficult task of the Council will be (pp. 188, 9) "the re-adjustment of ecclesiastical discipline and canon law. . . . The revolutions which have occurred during a space of three centuries in laws, governments, the constitution of empires,—the wounds inflicted by these revolutions on canonical law,—the numerous concordats"—the rebellion of governments against the Church and her privileges,—"all these causes united have established in the world a state of things, for which the prescriptions of ancient discipline are insufficient; and which demands, for new necessities, new rules and modifications." At the same time, the greatest care will be taken (p. 200), that all fresh legislation shall be in harmony, to the greatest practicable extent, "with the laws and usages of different countries."

Every possible human preparation has been made for the Council's successful issue. The greatest thinkers in the Church have given their minds to the questions now imminent (pp. 190, 191); and the chief of them have been summoned to Rome by Pius IX. himself to give counsel (p. 193).

When the bishops meet, there will be the fullest liberty of discussion. "Notwithstanding the unfair insinuations which have been hazarded right and left, it will be no assemblage of puppets" (p. 200). Yet, on the other hand, it is quite possible that, in the very exercise of their freedom, the bishops may choose to define Pontifical infallibility by acclamation (p. 197). Since "all the bishops of the world hold convictions on this head which are fully enlightened and firmly established, why . . . should they not proclaim it without further controversy by a spontaneous cry of heart and of faith?" (p. 198). We are here, be it observed, exhibiting Mgr. Plantier's opinion, not venturing on any conjecture of our own.

Certain Catholics have a strange fear of some censure being passed on the modern "liberties." Why, they ask, should the Council concern itself with politics? (p. 208). The Bishop replies, that the "politics" here spoken of have the closest connection with dogma and with morals (p. 209). With dogma, because "liberty of worship", maintained as a *principle*, "rests on dogmatic indifference"; and with morals, because the whole question concerns the duties of a civil ruler. Moreover, these "liberties" have already been condemned by the Church again and again; and the only possible question therefore is, whether the bishops shall formally declare, when assembled, what they teach when dispersed (p. 205).

We conclude with the following quotation :—

“How many statesmen have combined with so-called liberals to hint that a multitude of prelates have groaned under the condemnations pronounced ; that in practising respectful silence towards that great Act [the Syllabus], interiorly they do not accept it otherwise than with serious reservations ; and that in a council, if they were called on to consecrate them by definitions or censures, they would not fail, either to raise serious objections or to manifest very significant hesitation. Let us await the event. These suppositions of perfidy and malevolence will be falsified. Then it will be victoriously demonstrated, even to the blind, that in the body of the Church head and hands have one only lip, one only thought.” “It will be shown that between the Holy See and the immense majority of the Episcopate there exists a full intimacy of heart, founded on an entire identity of views” (pp. 217, 8).

Theses dogmaticæ quas in Collegio Sancti Beuronis, Prov. Angl. Soc. Jesu propugnandas assumpsit F. Sylvester Joseph Hunter, ejusdem Societatis.

WE notice these theses chiefly, because of their strong language on our Blessed Lady's Assumption : xciii. xcvi. Thesis xcvi. declares that this doctrine is certain and proximately definable ; adding an earnest hope (toto corde expetimus), that it may be defined in the Vatican Council. We suppose F. Bottalla is the most learned (as certainly there is no more orthodox and loyal) theologian in England ; and it is a very remarkable fact therefore, that such a thesis has been adopted under his auspices. The “Civiltà” mentions, that two or three works have appeared in Rome on a similar theme.

We will add the two following theses, as bearing on a controversy which has been very prominently discussed in our pages.

XXXII.—Ecclesiæ magisterium directe et principaliter suâ amplitudine complectitur quæcunque a Deo revelata fuere : indirecte vero et secundario ad ea omnia porrigitur, quæ ad veritatem revelatam, sive asserendam, sive vindicandam, pertinent.

XXXIII.—Quum Ecclesia authentice Theologorum aliquam definit conclusionem, vel minoribus censuris aliquam, vel plures in globo, damnat doctrinas ; sive illas brevibus proponat propositionibus, sive easdem exponendo tradat ; suum semper infallibile exercet magisterium : cui nemo, nisi graviter peccando, assensum recusare potest.

Address of the Irish Bishops. August 18, 1869.

WE place this very important document before our readers without delay. Nothing can be more moderate, nothing more unanswerable. In our next number we hope to treat the whole subject of denominational education.

The Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, assembled at S. Patrick's College, Maynooth, on Wednesday, the 18th of August, 1869, His Eminence Cardinal Cullen presiding, deem it their duty to place on record at this important crisis the following resolutions respecting the Education and Land question :—

“ I.—They reiterate their condemnation of the mixed system of education, whether primary, intermediate, or university, as grievously and intrinsically dangerous to the faith and morals of Catholic youth ; and they declare that to Catholics only, and under the supreme control of the Church in all things appertaining to faith and morals, can the teaching of Catholics be safely intrusted. Fully relying on the love which the Catholics of Ireland have ever cherished for their ancient faith, and on the filial obedience they have uniformly manifested towards their pastors, the bishops call upon the clergy and the laity of their respective flocks to oppose by every constitutional means the extension or perpetuation of the mixed system, whether by the creation of new institutions, by the maintenance of old ones, or by changing Trinity College, Dublin, into a mixed college.

“ II.—At the same time they recognize the right, as well as the duty, of Catholic parents to procure as far as possible for their children the advantages of good secular education. Justice demands that Catholic youths should enjoy endowments and all other privileges on terms of perfect equality with the youth of other persuasions ; without which equality in the matter of education, religious equality cannot be said to have any real existence.

“ III.—The bishops, without any wish to interfere with the rights of persons of a different denomination, demand for Catholics Catholic education, which alone is consonant to their religious principles.

“ IV.—The assembled prelates, learning with pleasure that it is the intention of Her Majesty's present advisers to legislate for Ireland in accordance with the wishes of its people—and of this they have given good earnest—trust that the distinguished statesman now at the head of the Government will, with the aid of his able colleagues, give to Irish Catholics a complete system of secular education based upon religion ; for it alone can be in keeping with the feelings and requirements of the vast majority of the nation.

“ V.—As regards higher education, since the Protestants of this country have had a Protestant University for three hundred years, and have it still, the Catholic people of Ireland clearly have a right to a Catholic University.

“ VI.—But should Her Majesty's Government be unwilling to increase the number of Universities in this country, the bishops declare that religious equality cannot be realized unless the degrees, endowments, and other privileges enjoyed by their fellow-subjects of a different religion be placed within the reach of Catholics in the fullest sense of equality. The injustice of denying to them a participation in those advantages except at the cost of principle and conscience, is aggravated by the consideration that whilst they contribute their share to the public funds for the support of educational institutions from which conscience warns them away, they have moreover to tax themselves for the education of their children in their own colleges and university.

“ VII.—Should it please Her Majesty's Government, therefore, to remove the many grievances to which Catholics are subjected by existing university arrangements, and to establish one national university in this kingdom for examining candidates and conferring degrees, the Catholic people of Ireland are entitled in justice to demand that in such university, or annexed to it—

“ (a.) They shall have a distinct college, conducted upon purely Catholic principles, and at the same time fully participating in the privileges enjoyed by other colleges of whatsoever denomination or character.

“(b.) That the university honours and emoluments be accessible to Catholics equally with their Protestant fellow-subjects.

“(c.) That the examinations and all other details of university arrangement be free from every influence hostile to the religious sentiments of Catholics; and that with this view the Catholic element be adequately represented upon the senate, or other supreme university body, by persons enjoying the confidence of the Catholic bishops, priests, and people of Ireland.

“VIII.—The bishops also declare, that the Catholics of Ireland are justly entitled to their due proportion of the public funds hitherto set apart for education in the Royal and other endowed schools.

“IX.—The bishops furthermore declare, that a settlement of the university question, to be complete and at the same time in accordance with the wishes of the Catholic people of Ireland, must include the rearrangement of the Queen’s colleges on the denominational principle.

“X.—Finally, the bishops of Ireland, deeply sympathising with the sufferings of their faithful flocks, believe that the settlement of the Land Question is essential to the peace and welfare of the United Kingdom. They recognize the rights and the duties of landlords. They claim, in the same spirit, the rights, as they recognize the duties of tenants. They believe that the comparative destitution, the chronic discontent, and the depressing discouragement of the people of Ireland, are, at this period of her history, to be attributed more to the want of a settlement of this question on fair and equitable principles than to any other cause. Therefore, in the interest of all classes, they earnestly hope that the responsible advisers of the Crown will take this most important subject into immediate consideration, and propose to Parliament such measures as may restore confidence, stimulate industry, increase national wealth, and lead to a general union, contentment, and happiness.”

The above resolutions were unanimously adopted at a meeting of all the Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, held at Maynooth, on the 18th of August of the present year.—PAUL CARD. CULLEN, Chairman.

Acta ex iis decerpta quæ apud Sanctam Sedem geruntur. Jul.* 1869.
Roma: Mariotti.

WE have more than once heartily praised this most useful monthly compilation. We notice this particular number, because the Editor has paid Dr. Ward the very high compliment of reprinting his whole pamphlet, “*de Infallibilitatis Extensione*”, as an appendix. The Editor, in his introductory remarks, displays hearty sympathy with this REVIEW, and expresses a very kind opinion that it has really done service to the Church. God grant that the fact may be so!

We cannot but hope that the publication of Dr. Ward’s pamphlet, in so influential and widely-circulated a periodical, may bring it under the notice of many theologians, who have never heard the author’s name and who would never have otherwise have read his work.

* The word “Maio” is printed by mistake on the cover of this pamphlet, instead of “Julio.”

A Critique upon Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter. By H. I. D. RYDER, of the Oratory.
London: Longmans.*

IT is with very great gratification that we meet F. Ryder on the field of controversy, not as an opponent but as a fellow-labourer. And certainly his publication may be taken as a curious indication of the unanimity with which Catholics of every school repudiate Mr. Ffoulkes. For the two writers, who have hitherto most elaborately criticised that gentleman, have been two, who, little more than a year ago, were accidentally prominent as representing two antagonistic views—we must still consider vitally antagonistic—which exist among English Catholics. It gives us much pleasure however to remember, that on the last occasion when we had to criticise one of F. Ryder's works (July, 1868, p. 244),—in protesting (as we felt it our painful duty to protest) against his avowed *principles*,—we spoke emphatically on the consistent loyalty of his *tone* towards the Church: adding, that it is his tone which evidently exhibits his true mind, and that "our personal respect for him is most sincere and unqualified." And now for his very able and interesting critique on Mr. Ffoulkes.

F. Ryder does not waste time and space, by going again over ground which we had sufficiently covered: his remarks throughout are either supplementary or corrective of our own. It will be our natural course—and probably as convenient to our readers as any other—if we express our comments on the pamphlet from this point of view. It is divided into four sections: of which the first is naturally devoted to the main count of Mr. Ffoulkes's indictment.

"Mr. Ffoulkes's main charge against the Roman Church, if I understand him rightly, is this: that some 800 years ago she introduced a new doctrine, the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, into her 'materia fidei,' and inserted it, under the form of the *Filioque* clause, in the Nicene Creed, in direct opposition to the enactment of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon; that she did this against her conscience, in servile submission to the Emperor of the day; that by so doing she then and there exposed herself to the full penalty denounced upon any who shall substitute another Creed for that promulgated at Ephesus, which penalty, as Mr. Ffoulkes understands it, involves nothing less than the loss of their orders in the case of the clergy; in the case of lay persons, of their communion. Such being the lamentable condition to which the Church of Rome has reduced herself, her members, he concludes, cannot, in common modesty, reproach Anglicans with their thirty-nine articles, or throw doubt upon their orders" (p. 4).

* We had actually sent this notice to press before we had the least notion that F. Bottalla's reply to Mr. Ffoulkes would appear this quarter: otherwise it might have been more convenient to notice the trio conjointly. As things are, we have thought it better to publish the present notice as it originally stood, without founding any change on the later pamphlet. We should add also, that for obvious reasons we were particularly desirous of doing every possible justice to F. Ryder's admirable essay; and we have treated it therefore at greater length than could be necessary in noticing a theologian of such established and eminent name as F. Bottalla.

The first section comprehends many different particulars. And firstly, as to the Church's wording of the dogma. We had pointed out in April (pp. 283—285) that the two phrases,—(1) “proceeding from the Father and the Son,”—(2) “proceeding from the Father through the Son,”—are but different modes of expressing one identical verity. F. Ryder adds that—

“With the [very doubtful] exception of Theodoret, in his book against S. Cyril, which was condemned in the Fifth General Council, no father, Latin or Greek, until the time of Photius, can be found who teaches that the Holy Ghost proceeds exclusively from the Father. Almost all the post-Nicene Latin fathers, who have written on the subject, teach explicitly the Procession of the Holy Ghost ‘ab Utroque.’ S. Hilary, in the middle of the fourth century, speaks of the Procession from the Son as not admitting of a doubt: ‘non enim in incerto Dominum reliquisse.’ *Several of the Greek fathers teach explicitly the same doctrine*; amongst others, S. Epiphanius and S. Cyril of Alexandria, who say, in so many words, that the Holy Ghost proceeds *from* the Son as well as from the Father.

“Since the fifth century however, the Greeks have unanimously preferred the expression ‘per Filium,’ as excluding most perfectly the error of a double principle; whilst the Latins have persevered in their use of the form ‘ex Filio,’ as avoiding most completely the danger to which the ‘per Filium’ was exposed, of seeming to limit the relation between the Son and the Holy Ghost to that of temporal manifestation.

“Although each party clung firmly to its own formula, *each admitted the orthodoxy of the other*” (p. 5).

There is no fact more certain in all history, than that this verity—the Holy Ghost's Procession from the Son—had been taught by successive Popes both to East and West long before the time of Reccared. We quoted at length (p. 286, note) the words of Pope S. Hormisdas, addressed to an Eastern Emperor. But before S. Hormisdas, adds F. Ryder, a greater Pope than he, the illustrious S. Leo (p. 6), taught that the Holy Spirit “de Utroque processit”: and his “Letter” was published in a General Council of all Spain in 447. Further, excepting only the Monothelite heretics, no Easterns demurred in any way to the Procession from the Son before the time of the Iconoclasts; and this, though as early as the seventh century, the third Pontifical “Professio,” “containing the ‘Filioque,’ came into use, and was *sent round to all the churches by each Pope immediately after his election.*” This is a most important fact in the controversy; a fact not hinted at by ourselves, nor indeed known to our writer. *Before* the introduction of “Filioque” into the Nicene Symbol, the Easterns were just as strictly obliged as they were *after* that introduction, to hold with divine faith the dogma which those words express.

On the other hand, the schismatical Easterns have, to a greater or less extent, abandoned the Catholic dogma itself. The “per Filium,” says F. Ryder (p. 13), was insufficient to keep alive the true doctrine; and “Photius rejects the ‘per Filium’ itself in any sense but that of merely temporal manifestation.”

But now secondly, did the Popes transgress the seventh canon of Ephesus, either by imposing the dogma, or again by inserting “Filioque” into the Symbol? “Mr. Ffoulkes insists that plain Christians might, upon the

strength of this canon, traverse the world with no other passport to the sacraments of the Church than the Nicene Creed." F. Ryder's comment on this audacious allegation is most excellent; and ends with a charming characteristic touch, which we italicise.

"Nestorius took up precisely Mr. Ffoulkes's position; he insisted that, as a 'plain Christian,' he had a right to the communion of the Church upon the strength of his profession of the Nicene Creed. And he is thus met by S. Cyril: 'It will by no means suffice that your reverence should merely profess with us the symbol of faith put out by that great Council whilome assembled in the Holy Ghost, at the city of Nicæa. . . . But, over and above this, it is necessary that you declare in writing and on oath that you anathematise what you have hitherto wickedly and impiously held, and that you promise for the future to hold and teach as do we and the rest.'

"Does Mr. Ffoulkes seriously suppose that, if he were suspected of holding Monothelism, let us say, or the doctrine of the thirty-nine articles concerning the mass and holy images, the Greek Church would receive him into her communion upon his bare profession of the Nicene Creed? Nay, I will go further: I will venture to say that if once the Anglican High Church party, with all its dogmatic shortcomings, were separated from the State, it would not receive him as he is, with the manifold suspicions excited by his recent 'Letter,' upon that one profession. If I am not much mistaken, he would hardly find entrance into any one of the bodies of Christians which he accounts 'cities of Israel', unless he were *inserted, as he supposes the 'Filioque' to have been, by the secular arm*" (pp. 10—11).

There are two different opinions on the force of the Ephesine canon, both equally fatal to Mr. Ffoulkes. "The Latin view" of this canon holds that its simple purport was to anathematise all transgressors of the Nicene Faith. F. Ryder considers this view (p. 11) as "less open to difficulty than the Greek," and that in its favour there are "the very strongest arguments" (p. 7); but he considers that the Greek view also "has a tradition and real argument in its favour" (p. 11). Mr. Ffoulkes, at all events, derives no more benefit from the Greek view than from the Latin. The Greeks at Florence (Ryder, p. 11) did not "dream" of this canon "prohibiting the Church from imposing fresh obligatory definitions of faith"; they only alleged that it prohibited the insertion of such definitions in the Symbol. They regarded the canon therefore as purely disciplinary; and a disciplinary canon can of course be revoked at any moment by the Church's supreme ruler. The Greeks at Florence, before their conversion, did not *regard* the Pope as being such ruler; but as soon as they accepted the Florentine definition, they of course ascribed to him a power of repealing any disciplinary canon he might please. Supposing therefore the Greek view of this Ephesine canon could be maintained, that canon was repealed by the first Pope (whoever he might be) who sanctioned the insertion of "Filioque" into the Symbol.

As to this insertion, we would also draw attention to the following really very important parallel:—

"After all, the 'Filioque' got into the Creed very much as the Constantinopolitan additions did. These, it is now generally admitted, were no first-hand additions of the Second Council, but the gradual work

of Catholic Bishops, in the emergencies of heretical warfare, upon which the Second Council set its seal ; which additions were made, be it remembered, notwithstanding the express prohibition of the Council of Sardica, recorded by S. Athanasius and S. Eusebius of Vercellæ, to compose ‘another Creed beside that of Nicæa’” (pp. 13, 14).

So much on this ill-used Ephesine canon. But Mr. Ffoulkes assigns another and quite different reason, for thinking that the Church has no power to teach as of faith the Procession from the Son. He alleges for this purpose the Chalcedonian declaration, that the Constantinopolitan Symbol, which does not contain the “Filioque,” “teaches forth the perfect doctrine concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost” : if then its doctrine is *perfect*, argues Mr. Ffoulkes, it can admit no further development. We replied (p. 281) partly by a *reductio ad absurdum* ; for the Constantinopolitan Symbol does not even state that the Holy Ghost is God. And we further pointed out, that the Chalcedonian declaration not only does not say what Mr. Ffoulkes supposes, but does most distinctly say the precise contradictory. A very important question however still remained. In what sense did the Council of Chalcedon use this very remarkable word “*τέλειον*,” and how came it to use that word ? F. Ryder’s explanation of this seems to us worthy of such a theologian as Petavius : from its union of learning, sobriety, and at the same time brilliancy.

“S. Gregory Nazianzen, one of the Fathers of the Second Council, is continually speaking of the *perfect* Trinity, the *perfection* secured to the Trinity by the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, of the necessity of each of the Divine persons to the *perfection* of the others. [In one place] he has *Τριάδα τέλειαν ἐκ τελείων τριῶν*, and *τριάδος ὀρισθείσης διὰ τὸ τέλειον* ; and [elsewhere] he speaks of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, obscurely indicated before, being now, *i.e.* at the Second Council, clearly manifested to the Church. S. Gregory Nyssen, who is generally accounted the author of the Constantinopolitan Creed, speaks of a gradual development, perfecting at once the knowledge and the image of the *ἐντέλεις πληρωμα τριαδικόν*. Compare also Theodoret, where he speaks of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost as the *perfect doctrine of the baptized*, in contrast to that of catechumens, who knew only the Father and the Son. I interpret then the passage from the definition as simply meaning, that the Constantinopolitan Creed, by explicitly teaching the distinct personality and consubstantial Divinity of the Holy Ghost, completed the perfect doctrine of one Divinity, ‘in three perfect hypostases.’”

Mr. Ffoulkes alleged, as confirming his view of the Chalcedonian declaration, a long passage from Pope Adrian’s letter to Charlemagne. That monarch—so Mr. Ffoulkes set forth—made it “one of his principal charges” against the Seventh Council, that it did not expressly declare the Holy Ghost’s Procession from the Son ; and Adrian replied to that charge in certain words which Mr. Ffoulkes placed before his readers. We stated in reply (p. 289) the very certain fact, that “in Adrian’s whole reply concerning that dogma,” no syllable is to be found of what Mr. Ffoulkes alleges. F. Ryder has been more fortunate than ourselves : for we could not light on the passage in *any* part of Adrian’s letter ; whereas F. Ryder has at last found it (with a most important and significant exception however) though

in a totally different place from that indicated by Mr. Foulkes. F. Ryder's discovery makes Mr. Ffoulkes's case even worse than it was before. According to Mr. Ffoulkes, Charlemagne was complaining of too great *identity* between the new Council and the first Nicene; he was complaining that "Filioque" had not been inserted into the new definition: whereas what he was really complaining of, were the *discrepancies* between the two Councils. According to Mr. Ffoulkes, if "Filioque" had been found in the new definition, Charlemagne's objections would have vanished; whereas in real truth such insertion would only have *intensified* the particular ground of complaint to which Adrian is replying. See F. Ryder, p. 16.

F. Ryder concludes his first section (pp. 18-22) by handling admirably a theme, which we had left altogether untouched; by vigorously exhibiting the simple unmeaningness of Mr. Ffoulkes's marvellous parallel, between what was respectively done by Reccared of Spain and Henry VIII. of England.

His second section concerns the Pseudo-Decretals. Mr. Ffoulkes's indictment on this head consisted of two particulars. Firstly he alleged, that the Popes took occasion of these Decretals, to introduce into the Church not only a new discipline, but a new doctrine on the extent of their own prerogatives. We argued (pp. 296-301) that even had the change of discipline between the fourth and tenth centuries been as great as Mr. Ffoulkes supposes, such change would have been no more than a legitimate practical development of that doctrine, concerning Pontifical authority, which was revealed by Christ and held in every age of the Church. F. Ryder presses the same view. "The ancient disciplinary canons," he says very happily (p. 23), should be regarded, not "as the ligaments of the dead," but as "the swathing bands of infancy, which yield and give place to the child's growth." Nor have we even seen anywhere so vivid and life-like a description of the Pope's ecclesiastical position in history, as the following: we italicise a sentence or two.

"If, as Mr. Ffoulkes imagines, the Papal monarchy be a usurpation, and destructive of that economy which Christ meant should reign throughout His Church, at least it is undeniable that the Church, from the beginning, bore and fostered the germ within her. To the Bishop of Rome all may appeal, and from him none. *He is the judge of all, whom none may judge.* Every corner of the vineyard is open to him who is its guardian, whenever the faith or peace of the Church is in danger. No canon avails without his sanction; and it is for him to interpret the canons according to the exigencies of time and circumstance. What the ancient Church does not claim for the Pope *she allows him to claim for himself.* Restrictive laws seem to have been made *for others, not for him.*

"Patriarchs, the most ancient and the most august, are keenly criticised and sharply rebuked, if they speak proud things or interfere with even the humblest of their neighbours; the Bishop of Rome alone, it seems, *cannot exalt himself above his rightful place, or intrude where he is not due.* If he is rebuked, it is by heretics like the Eusebians, whom he detects and punishes; or *if a Saint says a sharp word, the Church lets it fall to the ground as though he knew not what he said.* What are so many of the epistles and addresses of the early Popes, but *very magnificats, in which they exhaust themselves upon the theme 'quia fecit mihi magna, Qui potens est?'* And the Church

listens, now in admiring silence, now with applause. True, the whole Church does not at once realize in its fulness the Pope's position and office, and from time to time a Bishop fails to understand the Pope's intervention, as it was with Honorius of Dalmatia, to whom Pope Gelasius thus writes, (Labbe, tom. v. p. 300)—'we are surprised, dearly beloved, that you are surprised that the solicitous care of the Apostolic See, due more majorum to all the Churches throughout the world, should be exercised in behalf of the orthodoxy of your faith.' But, is it conceivable that the Church would have consented to learn from the Popes the extent of their rights, if she were not conscious all along that *they were only recalling to her mind what Christ had taught her*, and were truly interpreting the privilege of Peter?

At the same time, F. Ryder considers that Mr. Ffoulkes has very greatly exaggerated the amount of disciplinary change which took place; and that he has very much *more* unwarrantably exaggerated the effect of the False Decretals in promoting what change did occur. This is another theme which we ourselves entirely omitted; and F. Ryder handles it with much power and learning, from p. 23 to p. 28.

The second count of that indictment which Mr. Ffoulkes based on the Decretals was, as F. Ryder expresses it, that "if the Pope be not the coiner, he is at least the issuer of false coin;" that "he had duplicates of all the genuine Letters of his predecessors in his portfolio, and if he did not actually discover that these were forgeries, it was because he felt they were, and would not look" (Ryder, p. 31). There was no part of our own article so unsatisfactory as our treatment of this objection (pp. 301-3); while, on the other hand, perhaps no part of F. Ryder's is so valuable as his reply to it (see pp. 31-39). The whole literature concerning ancient ecclesiastical archives is brought substantially before the reader's notice, and Mr. Ffoulkes's accusation is fairly faced in every particular. The two following extracts will explain sufficiently the conclusion at which F. Ryder arrives:—

"There was nothing, then, in these relics of the times of persecution in that age to awaken suspicion, whilst there was much to attract devotion. Men naturally welcomed their discovery with the same devotion, and certainly with no greater surprise, than they did the kindred discovery of the martyrs' bodies" (p. 35).

"This, then, is S. Nicholas's position. He is presented with portions of documents, for we have no proof that they were more, which accurately represent the ecclesiastical spirit of the day—a recommendation rather than a difficulty in an uncritical age. Their genuineness is attested by the Church of Gaul, a Church incomparably more learned than his own; and attested, moreover, even against that Church's interests. The genuineness of these documents was in no sense upon its trial; it was undisputed. The presumption was strongly in favour of the genuineness of documents containing doctrine so orthodox and so apposite; if any heresy had cropped up in them, then indeed it would have been another matter. But, more than this, the Pope, even if a doubt of them had crossed his mind, which is in the highest degree improbable, had not, in the Roman archives, any satisfactory test of their genuineness" (pp. 37-8).

We will pass over F. Ryder's third section (pp. 39-46). Our present bias is to dissent from its main thesis, and to regret that he introduced the

section into his pamphlet at all. But we unfeignedly distrust our own judgment on the matter, and should like time for consideration : possibly on some future occasion we may return to the subject. Here we will only say, to prevent possible misconception, that we are not aware of any reason why any Catholic is not at perfect liberty to hold that view, concerning church membership, which F. Ryder advocates ; and that this section does not yield to the other three in learning and ability.

The fourth section is of a somewhat miscellaneous character. Its most pervasive purpose is, to defend Popes, and the Western Church generally, against the curious assemblage of omnigenous imputations, with which Mr. Ffoulkes has assailed them. In particular (pp. 50—52) he exposes that gentleman's most extraordinary allegations from S. Bernard and S. Bridget.

Our limits have for some time warned us to conclude, but it was difficult to tear ourselves away from so attractive and interesting a book. It would do honour to a veteran theologian ; and is really not a little remarkable as coming from one who is as yet in his early prime. We believe that a distinguished career is open to its author ; and we are sure he will credit us with perfect sincerity when we say, that by no one will his course be watched with greater interest and sympathy, than by his recent antagonist.

The Papacy and Schism : Strictures on Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter. By Rev. PAUL BOTTALLA, S.J. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

ON reflection, we are disposed thoroughly to agree with F. Bottalla (p. 127), that the "real and practical scope" of Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter is far rather to express a view concerning the Church's constitution, than concerning the Holy Ghost's Procession. "If we seek to discover" its "leading idea, we shall not be able to gather it from the title-page. Mr. Ffoulkes wrote his pamphlet as an apology for his own real interior apostasy (be it material or formal) from the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church" (p. 125). If such be the case, as we think it is, F. Bottalla has addressed himself more directly to the main issue than F. Ryder and ourselves have done. At all events, it is an excellent thing that this particular side of the pamphlet shall have received careful attention, from a theologian who unites such unusual learning with so firm a grasp of orthodox principle as F. Bottalla.

It is quite an appropriate dispensation of Providence, that two writers like Mr. Ffoulkes and the Jesuit Professor are brought into immediate contrast. Mr. Ffoulkes's warmest admirers—we refer of course to non-Catholics, for he has no Catholic admirers—will not allege that *reasoning* is his forte ; but they lay stress on what they call his *learning*. In real truth however his learning is on a par with his reasoning. To constitute learning,—there must be critical power, which enables the student to appreciate the value and meaning of those things which he reads ; and there must be combinative power, to locate them in their true mutual position, and to view them in the light of those principles which are presupposed. One can hardly ask, without an

appearance of satire, whether Mr. Ffoulkes possesses combinative power : but F. Bottalla points out (p. 2) that he displays also "a really remarkable absence of critical spirit"; that he seems wholly unconscious of "any advance having been made in critical studies" since the sixteenth century. We heartily wish he would study F. Bottalla's pamphlet; not only for the theological instruction which he would thence derive, but also as a sample of the mode in which vast and multifarious knowledge may really be made serviceable—and serviceable indeed in the highest degree—towards acquisition of truth. We do not for a moment, of course, compare Mr. Ffoulkes's amount of mere *reading* with F. Bottalla's; for even in this respect the interval is most wide between the two writers: but we are dwelling on the circumstance, that Mr. Ffoulkes begins and ends with mere reading, while F. Bottalla has amassed *learning*.

F. Bottalla's pamphlet lays down what may be called the whole theology and history of decretals and canons: nor are we acquainted with any other book accessible to the general reader, which goes over ground at all similar. It bears—and in some sense requires—careful and repeated reading; and it will give those who have studied it a clear and accurate apprehension, to which they have perhaps hitherto been strangers, on the Church's doctrine concerning the Church's discipline.

The foundation of all accurate knowledge, on the authority of decretals and canons, must of course be laid in a clear intelligence of the Church's constitution. They necessarily derive their obligatory force from the Church's supreme authority; and the first question therefore to be asked is, in whom God has *vested* that supreme authority. This formed the subject of a previous work, on which F. Bottalla has founded the present, and to which he constantly refers throughout. The Roman Pontiff is ecclesiastically absolute; and all disciplinary authority therefore throughout the Church is derived exclusively from him. Such is the revealed doctrine; which has been defined more and more clearly, in proportion as misbelievers have called it in question (pp. 37-42). If Mr. Ffoulkes had applied himself to encounter the arguments by which theologians establish this proposition, he would have done something to promote his cause: but whereas it is the one matter really relevant to his theme, it is the one matter which he has totally omitted to consider.

From this fundamental doctrine, two consequences at once follow. Firstly, disciplinary decretals of Popes have precisely the same authority, with disciplinary canons of councils Pontifically confirmed: for in both cases Pontifical sanction is given. Such has ever been the Church's judgment: "the same weight was always ascribed to Papal decretals as to the canons of councils." "All the ancient collections of canons . . . carefully gathered together the decretals of the Roman Pontiffs, as a most important source of law, of authority no way inferior to that of the General Councils" (p. 45. See also pp. 11 and 18).

Secondly, it follows from the dogma of Papal Supremacy, that the Pontiff has power, whenever he may judge expedient, to modify or annul any disciplinarian decree he may please, whether of previous council or of previous Pope. Of this there are repeated instances. (See pp. 27, 33, 37.)

Let it be supposed then, for argument's sake, that at a certain period o

history there was a vast increase in the *classes* of cases, on which appeal to Rome was permitted. What would be the inference? Merely that at this particular period the Holy See judged it practicable and expedient, to exercise directly a large amount of jurisdiction, which it had hitherto exercised by delegation. Where is the difficulty in this?

But as a matter of fact, it is totally false that there was any such increase. Take the instance on which Mr. Ffoulkes lays his principal stress, episcopal causes. Episcopal appeals to Rome no doubt became much more *frequent* (most happily) as time went on; but these appeals were *received* by the Holy See from the very first. In the very canons of Sardica "it had been enacted, not (as Mr. Ffoulkes appears to believe) that only in extreme cases the bishops were authorized to appeal to the Pope, but that *every* bishop who should think himself to have a fair cause" might appeal (p. 27).

The great increase in *number* of such appeals is most easily explained, by the changed circumstances of the Church, and by men's constantly growing apprehension of all which is involved in Papal Supremacy. It is F. Bottalla's distinct opinion, that the False Decretals had simply nothing whatever to do with the matter. He gives one very curious illustration of this in p. 33: for these Decretals recognize no right of appeal whatever, as appertaining to simple priests; whereas, "in the middle of the ninth century," these appeals "were on the increase: the state of Europe absolutely requiring this modification" of ancient practice. As to the False Decretals, "with the exception of one or two quotations by Hadrian II. and Stephen IV., no one of the Roman Pontiffs before the middle of the eleventh century paid" them "any attention" (p. 22). Nay, so late as the year 1085 Cardinal Otto, afterwards Urban II., "spoke of them with contempt" (p. 57).

"And here," adds our author, "we must repeat what we have so often said, that no part of the doctrine or discipline of the Church in any manner rested on the False Decretals. . . . Doctrine and discipline were maintained for eight centuries without any aid from Isidore, and the last two centuries his assistance has been dispensed with and no change has ensued" (pp. 57-8).

F. Bottalla incidentally (p. 17) refers to a most unjustifiable attack of Dean Milman's on the great Pope Nicholas I.; in which that historian alleges that the Pope rested his case against Hincmar on the False Decretals. F. Bottalla points out, that on the one hand Hincmar himself believed their genuineness, and alleged them where they suited his purpose; and on the other hand that Nicholas in fact gave them no sanction whatever. The controversy between him and Hincmar "related exclusively to the question, whether Papal decretals, which had not found a place in the Collection of Hadrian, could be considered as having authority in the Church" (p. 19). In fact, "it is more apparent from the Letters of Nicholas the Great than from those of any other Pope," that he claimed to "derive his supreme authority simply and solely from the institution of Christ" (p. 20). As to the False Decretals, in a Letter written when "they were spreading and gaining acceptance in all directions," he makes no allusion to them; but "repeatedly quotes the genuine canons of early councils and the authentic decretals of his predecessors" (p. 16).

We have said enough to stimulate our readers' eagerness for reading this

invaluable work. We have never concealed our opinion—though we know many excellent Catholics think differently—that Mr. Ffoulkes's pamphlet has done far more good than harm. But if it had performed no other service than that of eliciting the present pamphlet of F. Bottalla, this service would far overbalance any mischief which Mr. Ffoulkes has it in his power to perpetrate. This is our deliberate and strong opinion.

F. Bottalla has dedicated his work to the Archbishop of Westminster "as a humble mark of respect and admiration."

Eight Sermon-Essays. By EDWARD REDMOND, D.D.
London : Washbourne.

THE Archbishop of Westminster possesses the enviable happiness of having been the first English bishop to found a purely theological seminary. S. Thomas's, Hammersmith, is now (thank God !) in full activity ; and S. Edmund's,—with which so many past memories of the London and Southwark dioceses are so intimately connected—is no longer more than a "petit séminaire."

Dr. Redmond's labours as dogmatical professor having been thus brought to an end in the natural course of things, he has published this little volume as a parting gift to his late pupils. We heartily wish he had had leisure and health, to treat those subjects which he mentions in his touching dedication : "The untheological temper of laymen in this age ; the necessity of high catechetical instruction ; the importance of accuracy of thought and expression in pastoral teaching." His friends however are well aware, and grieve over the circumstance, how impossible it would have been for him to make any such exertion ; and the present sermons are very interesting, though less so than the suggested essays would certainly have been.

The author exhibits himself throughout as a member of that school, which its opponents denounce as "extreme." He lays down (p. 4) that "the voice of Rome speaks with the certainty of a revelation from God." In God's ancient laws (p. 5) he "recognises the spirit and the sanction of such institutions as the Index and the Inquisition." He speaks with enthusiasm (p. 22) on the Pope's civil principedom. He teaches (p. 21) that "ordinarily speaking grace is not given except through Mary"; and (*ib.*) he vindicates to her that title of "Co-redemptress", resting as it does on the highest ecclesiastical authority, from which some Catholics have unhappily been disposed to shrink.

There are other doctrinal indications which have much interested us. He considers (p. 4) that "the New Testament and the Fathers . . . point to a kind of substantial presence of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the sanctified." He makes a remark (p. 37) on which we have not happened elsewhere to light, but which seems to us just. He thinks that "those who are designated as 'fools' in the Sapiential Books, are especially those who have received the word joyfully," but "have no deep-set roots of perfection." "Throughout

this part of Scripture," he adds, "inconstancy is the most striking characteristic of 'the fool.'"

In fact the last sermon, on corporate reunion, is the only one with which we do not thoroughly sympathise.

The sermons were all delivered to collegiate congregations, and are expressed in the style suitable to such congregations. What hearers of this kind require, is not impassioned rhetoric, but that doctrine shall be clearly and temperately placed before them in its practical and spiritual bearings. Accordingly no flash or tinsel will be found in these sermon-essays, but we are brought at every turn to appreciate their author's thoughtful and meditative habit of mind. They will be warmly admired by reflecting readers; not perhaps equally by superficial.

Discourses on some Parables of the New Testament. By C. B. GARSIDE, M.A. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE said in our last number, that in no particular perhaps is English Catholic literature so deficient as in published sermons. The remark was suggested by the sermons, of which the English Jesuit Fathers had just begun a continuous course, and on which we hope in our next number to report progress. In this last quarter however, we have, not only Dr. Redmond's little volume last noticed, but this good-sized work of Mr. Garside's. We much regret that we have had such a press of Review business, as to prevent us from reading Mr. Garside through. He illustrates three parables: but we have only been able as yet to study his illustration of one, the Prodigal Son.

Of course, as our Blessed Lord's parables were delivered for practical purposes, there can be no satisfactory comment on them which does not lay stress on such purposes. Still the expositor's is one office and the preacher's another. It is the expositor's office, to place in clearest light the various allusions and full meaning of the parable, and to point out distinctly its practical bearings. It is the preacher's office, to enforce its practical tendency, and place the parable before his hearers in exclusive reference to that tendency. The expositor's danger is, that he may be too exclusively literary and historical; the preacher's danger is, that his handling of Scripture may be too recklessly didactic. Even very effective preachers have been sometimes far from discriminating in their Scriptural quotations; and have been apt to seize at once on any text which has some superficial appearance of illustrating their point, without giving their mind at all to its context and critical meaning.

It seems to us that Mr. Garside has been signally successful, in doing the preacher's work without falling into the preacher's mistake. In every page of his sermons practical and spiritual lessons of the greatest value are enforced: enforced, we may add, at once vigorously, and yet without the slightest tinge of exaggeration. Yet these practical lessons are deduced most obviously and naturally from the text; and by the time you have finished the sermons, you find you have the whole parable engraven on your memory and imagination with singular vividness and completeness.

We will give one instance of what we mean, out of the many which readers will have observed. The Prodigal goes into "a far country."

"Why into a far country? Was it his intention from the outset, as he stood for the last time on the threshold, whilst he turned his face towards the open plain before him? Did he say to himself, 'I will not be content with going a short distance; I will go, if need be, over high mountains; I will cross swollen rivers; I will brave the fiery heats of the desert; I will go as far as I can, where no messenger from my father can find me, and no inquiries can reach me from friends'? Most probably he had no such idea. He wanted to enjoy himself, and to have plenty of liberty, but had no fixed plan besides. But somehow or other he went a long way, and found himself in another land altogether. I dare say he kept his youthful spirits up well with anticipations of what was in store for him; and as he passed along and saw new things, new persons, and new customs, he wandered on without at all measuring his distance. The present, the bright, sunny, merry present, was everything to him; and he altogether forgot that a time would come when to go back would be a long and wearisome journey.

"Behold a picture of the man who is bent on pleasing himself. Like the Prodigal, he cannot do this without leaving God" (pp. 30, 31).

"At first there seems no particular change in that man; his spirits are much as usual, perhaps higher than before, because of the excitement of the pleasure which he is following; nor has he any idea of going deep into the tangled forest which he has been beguiled into entering. He has no deliberate intention to stop; but he has also no deliberate intention not to stop. But one pleasure suggests another; one desertion of God's will paves the way for a fresh desertion. Onward he goes—onward and onward. To get out of one sin he commits another; the flesh pulls harder and harder, and the Spirit of God seems to draw with a force that grows weaker. At length his conscience grows dim and mystified, so that he loses his sense of distance from God. Landmarks that ought to startle him with their signs pass unmeaningly before his dreamy eye. He knows he is outside his Father's house, but he thinks he is only a little astray; when, behold, he is 'abroad in a far country'!

"We may liken the Prodigal going away from his home, but not having yet passed the boundaries of his father's territory, to those who are giving way to a continued course of venial sin. They are becoming more and more distant from God, but they are as yet within the enclosure of His friendship; the link of grace and charity which binds them and Him is being stretched hard, until at last the deed of darkness is done; mortal sin is committed" (pp. 32, 33).

We hope in our next number to notice Mr. Garside's treatment of the two remaining parables.

A Letter to the Editor of the Dublin Review upon the Temporal Power of the Pope, and his Personal Infallibility. By WILLIAM MASKELL, M.A.
London: Longmans.

OUR July notice of Mr. Maskell did not in any way turn on Pontifical infallibility: on the contrary, we said (p. 232) that if he intended merely to express the Gallican doctrine, "there is no cause of complaint." But we understood his words to imply in their more natural sense, though

“we could not be at all sure that we rightly apprehended his meaning” (p. 231), that the Immaculate Conception has not yet been infallibly taught as of faith, nor will be so taught until it has been defined by a council. In other words, we thought Mr. Maskell’s expressions might well be understood to imply, that the *Ecclesia Docens* is not infallible except when assembled in council. We are very glad to find, from p. 16 of the pamphlet now before us, that he intended nothing of the kind; nay, that “we have done him a great injustice unwittingly, in suspecting that he could possibly intend” it. Although therefore Mr. Maskell considers a council “the normal seat of infallibility,” he by no means considers it the *exclusive* seat of that privilege; for he holds that the Immaculate Conception is infallibly taught as of faith, though no council has ever defined it. In one word, he holds that God has promised infallibility to the *dispersed*, and not exclusively to the *assembled*, *Ecclesia Docens*.

Yet in p. 18 his words have quite an opposite sound: they run as though “the Pope in council” were the “exclusive seat of infallibility.” This rather perplexes us.

So much at all events is very plain; viz. that Mr. Maskell considers the definition of 1854 to have been quite an exceptional fact. There is “a very distinct difference between this article of the Christian Faith—that is, with regard to the foundation on which it rests—and every other article of the Creed” (p. 15). We cannot quite understand this language. Whenever the Church condemns any given proposition as heretical, she defines its contradictory as a dogma of the Faith. In the case of Jansenius then, the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* put forth five definitions of faith; in accepting the “*Auctorem Fidei*,” she put forth *more* than five. All these rest “on the same foundation” as the definition of 1854: having been issued by the Holy See, and accepted by the Episcopate.

But the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* has not only condemned various propositions as heretical; she has condemned a very far larger number as worthy of some lower censure. Are we to understand Mr. Maskell as denying her infallibility in these minor censures? There are some ominously-sounding words in p. 11, as though no determination of the Church were infallible except definitions of faith. Yet we will not rashly suppose that Mr. Maskell can intend to deny, e. g., the infallibility of the “*Unigenitus*.” As we pointed out in July (p. 226), a local council, “most fully approved” by Benedict XIII., declared that this Bull is “a dogmatic, definitive, and irreformable judgment of the Church”; and that “if any one does not accept it in heart and mind”, he is to be counted “among those who have made shipwreck concerning the Faith.”

Among those various doctrines, which the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* teaches infallibly and obligatorily yet not as “of faith,”—one, as we have ever alleged, concerns the Pope’s civil principedom: declaring that that principedom is necessary for the Church’s well-being. We quoted however in July (p. 233) a passage of Mr. Maskell’s, which would universally be understood as a denial of this doctrine. We must now consider in order his various replies to our statement.

He had said, that “no one can believe this” civil principedom “to be essen-

tial in the slightest degree to the just authority . . . of the Catholic Church." By this expression, as he now explains (p. 7), he meant no more than that the civil principedom is no part of the Church's essence ; that the Church indeed, by divine promise, will remain on earth to the Day of Judgment ; but that there is no such promise in favour of the Pontiff's temporal dominion. Since this was Mr. Maskell's meaning, our only unfavourable criticism (so far) is, that he expressed himself too mildly against his opponent's doctrine : for no Catholic, remaining such, can possibly hold the tenet which Mr. Maskell disclaims.

He proceeded to say, that " some may doubt whether " this principedom be " essential in the slightest degree " " even to the well-being of the Catholic Church " ; and that " to himself it is almost a matter of indifference." Such language however, he now explains (p. 6), is not inconsistent with his holding—and in fact he does hold—that (in the words of Pius IX.) " this civil principedom of the Holy See was given to the Roman Pontiff by a singular counsel of Divine Providence ; and that it is necessary in order that the same Roman Pontiff . . . * may be able to exercise with fullest liberty supreme authority . . . and provide for the greater good of Church and faithful."

Again, we " pressed on " Mr. Maskell's " attention " (p. 234) Card. Caterini's letter, written by the Pontiff's command, declaring, that to reject the above-mentioned doctrine on the civil principedom, is to " incur " the dread sentence pronounced on those who will not hear the Church." Mr. Maskell replies (p. 112), as we understand him, that he quite agrees with Card. Caterini's letter ; and he says explicitly, that we " cannot hold more strongly " than he does " the lawfulness and antiquity of the temporal power, its fitness and (under God's permission) *its necessity*." Mr. Maskell goes on to designate it as " monstrous ", that men " should deny the fitness, the antiquity, and probably the very many advantages of the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff." All this is very satisfactory so far as it goes : but why then did Mr. Maskell profess, that " to himself " this very principedom " is *almost a matter of indifference* " ?

We further argued in July (p. 234), that the Catholic Episcopate has endorsed the Syllabus ; and that the Syllabus declares an obligation to be incumbent on all Catholics, of holding that doctrine on the Pope's civil principedom, which is set forth in six specified Pontifical Acts. Mr. Maskell will neither affirm nor deny that he holds this doctrine ; though he " has no wish to volunteer an opinion contrary " thereto (p. 10). But he argues that, at all events, no interior assent is due to the doctrine of these Acts, because " the bishops have never placed it before their people as *of faith* " (p. 11). Now, in endorsing the Syllabus, they *have* placed it before their people, as

* We cannot understand Mr. Maskell's difficulty in the Pontiff's words which here follow—" never subject to any prince or civil power." Perhaps the following paraphrase may be intelligible to him ; which, we think, every one will admit to be faithful : " in order that the Roman Pontiff may not at any time, by being subject to any prince or civil power, be prevented from exercising with fullest liberty, &c. &c."

a doctrine which "all Catholics are bound (debent) to hold most firmly." And we should have been glad if Mr. Maskell had noticed this fact, to which we solicited his attention.

We never said (see Maskell, p. 10), that on Mr. Maskell's view, the Pope's "acts of sovereignty are contradictory to true morality." We said that, on Mr. Maskell's view, the *doctrine* taught by the Ecclesia Docens, on this subject, is contradictory to the rights of the Roman people, and therefore contradictory to true morality.

We have no wish to enter into controversy with Mr. Maskell on Pontifical infallibility. He is fully tolerated in holding as yet Gallican opinions; and he will of course yield a firm assent, to whatever dogma the Vatican Council may define. But he expresses so strongly his confidence in F. Newman as a theologian, that we may perhaps do some good, by pointing out how widely F. Newman differs from him on one important matter. Mr. Maskell (p. 22) regards it as displaying a somewhat uncatholic spirit, to contemplate with hopeful anticipation a new definition of faith. But F. Newman (see "Anglican Difficulties," p. 285) says that "whenever a new definition of doctrine is promulgated by the competent authority," "*a ready and easy acceptance of the apparent novelty and a cordial acquiescence in its promulgation is the very evidence*" of a "Catholicly-disposed" mind.

A Few Words on Reunion and the Coming Council at Rome. By GERARD F. COBB, M.A. London: Palmer.

IT is impossible to exaggerate the charitableness, forbearingsness, and truly Christian spirit exhibited in this pamphlet. We thank the author heartily for such an oasis in the desert; such a peaceful variety in these days of bitter and angry controversy. We cannot but confidently hope, that one who seems so deeply animated with piety and love of God, may be led nearer and nearer, by prayer and seeking after God's will, to the full measure of Catholic truth.

It gives us great pain then to say, that we really cannot see any argumentative purpose which the pamphlet will serve. We have taken great pains to understand Mr. Cobb, though we are far from confident that we have succeeded in the task; but so far as we do understand him, his ecclesiastical theory includes these two propositions:—

I. There is one only society on earth which, in the fullest sense, is the Church of Christ; viz., the society which submits herself to the Pope's spiritual jurisdiction. She is infallible in her definitions of faith; and moreover, the great mass of mankind are commanded by God to be in her communion, and so submit themselves to the Pope.

II. But there is an important exception to this obligation. Suppose a certain aggregate of bishops at some given period rebel against the Pope and form a separate society, without conspicuously exhibiting more unchristian qualities than their opponents. Centuries afterwards (to the end of the world?), those born of parents who are members of this society, are exempted

by God from the obligation, which He has imposed on all others, of submitting to the Holy See.

This second proposition is certainly remarkable ; and (we venture to think) not less heretical than any tenet of Arius or Nestorius. Strangeness however and heresy are no reasons—rather the contrary—why we should not carefully consider it. But the fact is—though our readers will hardly credit it—that Mr. Cobb has not adduced in its favour a single argument of any kind whatsoever, but has rather treated it as self-evident. We call on him then (1), either to accept our statement of his thesis or to correct that statement ; and (2) to adduce arguments for the said thesis, whether from ecclesiastical definitions on the one hand, or from Scripture and Tradition on the other. No possible good can be done by controverting on petty details, while this fundamental issue remains untried.

We would only correct one mistake into which he has fallen. He very naturally accepts the first of the four Gallician articles ; he holds (see our number for last April, p. 466) that “kings and princes are not by God’s ordinance subjected in temporals to any ecclesiastical power.” But it is rather too bad that he should suspect the “Civiltà” of sympathizing with such Gallicanism (p. 70) ; and that too in a passage, which expresses orthodox doctrine (one would have thought) with the most unmistakable clearness.

We should add, in conclusion, that Mr. Cobb is most honourably distinguished from many of his brother unionists, by his consistently candid and equitable judgment towards the Holy Father and the Roman Catholic Church.

In Spirit and in Truth ; an Essay on the Ritual of the New Testament.
London : Longmans & Co. 1869.

THIS is an attempt, by a Catholic writer who has chosen to remain anonymous, to prove to Protestants that ecclesiastical Ritualism and Symbolism are in conformity with the teaching of the New Testament. It has, at least, one distinctive merit—that of a very complete classification and examination of the passages both in the life of our Lord and in the writings of the Apostles which authorize the symbolical and ritualistic principle. The Gospels, when “searched” with an unprejudiced eye, yield some results that should startle Dr. Cumming and Dr. White. Their school is pleased to speak of our Lord as nearly always placed before us “under lights which are moral and spiritual, rarely ever in connection with anything simply of a ritual nature.” (Let us remark, in passing, the ingenious begging of the question contained in the word “simply” in this passage.) Now it would seem to be an undeniable fact that throughout the whole of our Lord’s life, from the stable of Bethlehem to the sepulchre in the garden, not only was He Himself the object of symbolical observance on the part of others, but He also used symbolism Himself in a multitude of those external actions which He saw fit to perform. The writer of the work before us brings this fairly out in one of his chapters ; we may quote his summing up and conclusion :—

Without going beyond the pages of the New Testament, we have found that God Himself made use of appeals to the senses and imagination far more striking, more splendid, more gorgeous than any which have been at the command of the Catholic Church, in the grandest function that ever was celebrated beneath the dome of S. Peter's. What, indeed, are silken vestments, jewelled mitres, peals of the organ, blaze of tapers, clouds of incense, or any other means used to impress the worshipper in the richest cathedral of Christendom, compared with the bright clouds, glistening raiment, heavenly voices, dazzling splendours, splitting of rocks, great earthquakes and mighty winds, which are some of the elements of God's own ritual in the New Testament? (p. 61).

Again, at the conclusion of chapter VI. of his first part, the author says :—

From all this it is abundantly evident that the religion which Jesus Christ taught by word and example is one replete with ceremonies,—to speak, to sing, to groan, to utter strong cries with the voice, to kneel or fall prostrate to the ground, to shed tears, to cast down the eyes to earth, to lift them to heaven, to strike the breast, to lift up the hands, to cover or uncover the head in prayer, to rise or sit, to wear unusual garments, to put on sack-cloth, to sprinkle ashes on the head, to stretch out the hand, to impose hands, to write upon the ground, to breathe, to anoint with oil or with clay, to use spittle, to pour water, to shake the dust from the feet,—these, and such as these, are the rites of the New Testament. Are those prescribed to the Catholic priest in the ritual of Paul V. either more numerous, more varied, or of a different character? (p. 106).

After thus showing, in his first part, that the character of Catholic ritual is in harmony with the New Testament, he proceeds, in a second section of the work, to prove that its origin is also justified by the New Testament; in other words, that we can demonstrate the apostolicity of ritual from the New Testament itself. His arguments may be thus epitomized: The New Testament cannot be proved unless we admit tradition. Its canon must have been formed by tradition, and unity in its interpretation is to be secured by tradition alone. Now tradition means ritual; at any rate, ritual is so interwoven with tradition, that the one implies the other. This argument leads the writer over the usual course of proof, but he has communicated a certain novelty to his treatment by considering tradition as equivalent to ritual, and using illustrations in accordance with this view.

But not only must ritualistic tradition have preceded the New Testament, it is also necessary as a key to its meaning, now that we have it. Scripture by itself is incomplete, unintelligible, fragmentary. The details of this argument are interesting. The writer illustrates his position by referring to the two sacred rites of Baptism and the Eucharist. The Scripture accounts of these are simply nugatory and useless for practical purposes, unless we suppose the existence of some other well-known code of regulations side by side with the written word; and the suggestion that, according to the Protestant view, the "washing of the feet" should be the chief rite of the Christian dispensation, is peculiarly happy, and may be recommended to Dr. Cumming.

The work will be useful to Catholic preachers, as a manual of reference to the New Testament when ritualistic matters are to be treated. It ought to be useful also to Protestants, for whom it has been written. But the real

truth is, that the objections of Protestants to Ritual, like their objections to Asceticism or to miracles, are so totally and serenely *à priori* that appeals to fact are most frequently thrown away. It is quite certain that if the New Testament were a profane book, say the remains of a school of Greek philosophers, or the first accessible writings of a new Eastern sect, there is not a scholar among us who would not prove, from the ellipses, the allusions, and the suggestions (not to say the assertions) of the text, the existence of a much larger body of laws and customs than was there set down. But Protestantism has got hold of a controversial position represented by the words "in spirit and in truth." "In spirit" must mean "no Ritual"; "in truth," it is equally clear, means "no Symbolism." It is a position so absurd that scarcely any concrete Protestant has ever been found so sternly consistent as to carry it out to its full extent. The English Reformers, as one may read in the remains of such men as Cranmer or Whitgift, admitted ceremonies in due measure. Cranmer considered they had their "end and utility." Even Bullinger and Swiss Calvinism did not cry them down altogether. The very Quakers are said to observe the rite of reading the Scripture with their hats on, and the Quaker costume has only just been abolished in time to prevent it from being as Ritualistic as a Chasuble or a Dalmatic, which are directly descended from everyday clothes. It has been reserved, it seems, for Dr. Cumming, at the present lamentably late period of the world's existence, to give to the Protestant canon its full development. "There ought," he says, "to be *nothing* symbolical in a Christian place of worship. Make the building as chaste, as beautiful, as perfect, as architectural taste can make it, but let there be nothing typical or symbolical in it" (p. 109). And it is this purely gratuitous, foolish, and unscriptural assumption that we are called upon to disprove by a few loud-voiced leaders of a small local sect! People sometimes express themselves shocked at S. Jerome's strong and scornful language when he had to meet Jovinian's very similar novelties about Asceticism. We are very much inclined to sympathize with S. Jerome when we come across Jovinian's anti-types in modern literature.

The concluding part of the work treats of the actual growth of Catholic Ritual, and the Scriptural principles of which it is a consequence. Its "Pattern on the Mount" is the Life of Jesus Christ. It is an attempt, on the part of man, to make some reparation or compensation for the abasements of the Incarnation. Above all, it is a consequence of the Real Presence of Christ our Lord on earth, in the sacrament of the Eucharist. The chapter in which this last subject is treated has pleased us much. Of course, its reasoning goes far further than the establishment of the propriety of Ritual. But it is always well, we think, in controversial dealings with our brethren outside the Church, to give them as often as possible a glimpse of the wealth and riches of the land they do not know. When the Blessed Sacrament is carried, hastily and stealthily, to a sick bed through the streets of a busy Protestant city, no pious heart can help hoping and suspecting that It "passes by doing good," unknown and unthought of as Its presence may be. Much more may we be sure that the same Divine Mystery, when reverently pointed out and explained to an unbeliever, will often make his heart burn within him, until at last his eyes are opened, and he sees Who it is.

The Hidden Life of Jesus : a Lesson and Model to Christians. Translated from the French of Henri Marie Boudon, Archdeacon of Evreux. By EDWARD HEALY THOMPSON, M.A. Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE have to thank Mr. Thompson for this translation of a valuable little work which has long been popular in France. It was selected, he tells us, by the late Father Faber, to form one of the volumes of a series of translations for spiritual reading ; of which only one volume, "The Spiritual Doctrine of Father Louis Lallemand," was actually published.

In an age and in a country where the temptation à *paraître* (to use an untranslatable expression) was at its strongest, Henri Marie Boudon seems to have been raised up to testify by his writings, and still more mightily by his example, to the blessedness and the power of the *hidden life*. "Those," says Mr. Thompson, "who are not acquainted with his history ought to be informed that for eight years he lay under an imputation of a most disgraceful character, which he bore not only with patience but in silence, although it was the occasion of his being deprived for a time of his ecclesiastical office, and being treated with general contempt." This circumstance gives a powerful and affecting interest to the simplicity of his words upon a subject of which his own experience enabled him to speak with such force and pathos. In some of Boudon's works certain inaccuracies of expression have been pointed out, which the author would certainly have corrected had he written after the condemnation of quietism. Nothing of the kind is, however, to be found in the present treatise ; and we are told that the divine appointed to examine it previous to its publication in the year 1673, not only declared it to contain nothing in any way opposed to faith or morals, but pronounced a high eulogium on its excellence.

The Hidden Life : being Extracts translated from Nepreu's "Pensées Chrétiennes." London : J. Masters, Aldersgate Street.

AN admirable little book, the original of which, from its singularly practical character and condensed thought, we can well believe to be a favourite, as the translator tells us it is, of Dr. Newman. We give an extract, taken at random, which illustrates both these characteristics :—

"'Tis a trifle, you say ; an unimportant rule ; a small grace ; what does it matter ? It matters a great deal to be faithful in little things ; it is a proof of great love to wish to please in everything, to displease in nothing, however trivial, Him we love.

"If you wait for great occasions for working on God's behalf, when will you work ? How rare these great occasions !

"The Son of God hath Himself declared, *He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much ; and he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much.*—(S. Luke, xvi. 10.)

"The greatest conflagrations often originate in a spark ; the deadliest sins, in some trifling fault ; a man's reprobation in some grace despised. Besides, if the thing be a trifle, your negligence is the less excusable, for there is some

excuse in failing to do that which is difficult ; none in failing to do that which is easy. Sanctity depends not so much on doing *extraordinary*, as on doing *common things*, but *not in a common way*. I say, *not in a common way*, for it is not enough to do a good action, we must do it *well*. *Self-renunciation in trifles is not a trifle.*—*Imit. Christi.*

The translator has not, we think, changed his title for the better. "Pensées Chrétiennes" is a better name for a series of reflections upon various religious subjects, than the "Hidden Life," which belongs to the highest stage of Christian ascetism.

The Life of Blessed Margaret Mary. By the REV. GEORGE TICKELL, S.J.
London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1869.

WHEN Margaret Mary Alæoque was solemnly beatified by Pius IX. in September, 1864, it was observed that the picture of her which was discovered on the *façade* of S. Peter's, represented not merely the beatified herself, as was usually the case, but also the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It is not difficult to see what the Church wished to signify by this departure from custom. The re-appearance of Margaret Mary, after nearly two centuries had elapsed from the time she was laid in the grave in her monastery of Paray-le-Monial, is in some way connected with that magnificent devotion that it was her privilege to introduce to the world. The admirable dispensations of Providence in the whole history of the devotion to the Sacred Heart must be familiar to every Catholic. In substance it has always existed in the Church, from the very days of the beloved disciple. But the Jansenist heresy first, as we may reverently think, moved God's mercy to reveal it in its present form. Jansenism has been the most subtle and shifting of all the heresies. Not even the disingenuousness of the hard-pressed Monothelites of the sixth and seventh centuries can compare with the revelations now made of Jansenist diplomacy and mental reservation. All heresies have lent themselves to be the tools of the State, and all have weakened the love of God among the populations they have affected. But Jansenism has been unique in its capability of transforming itself when necessary, and of putting on any garment, from the purple of an Austrian emperor to the red bonnet of a revolutionist, that was most fitted to help it to its end. It has an icy breath that freezes the fountains of Faith, silences the streams of Hope, and stills the beatings of Love. When the souls of men come under its power, there happens something like what might be expected if a warm and fair region of the earth were converted, by some great change in ocean-stream or mountain-level, to arctic desolation and wintry death. At its starting, Jansenism laid its touch on dogma. The five propositions of the *Augustinus* are the bare and rigid Calvinism of necessity and final reprobation. As it went on, it began to draw men into a fatal isolation from the Holy See. It laboured at withholding from sinners those Sacraments that alone could save them. It used brute force, crippled the Church in her relations with the faithful, and stood between her and the sheep of her fold. All the usual means of resistance that the Church of God has within her were brought

into play against Jansenism—the learning of her schools, the pastoral efforts of her bishops, the devotion of her clergy and religious men, and, beyond all, the monumental utterances of her chief pastors, from Urban VIII. to Pius VI., and the *Auctorem fidei*. But, as it now seems to us, the Providence of God reinforced his Church, in this critical struggle, by an assistance which was so much the more effective, as it was more immediately the work of God's own hand. The fire of the Sacred Heart was to rout the winter of Jansenism. B. Margaret Mary died in the year 1690. Jansenism at that time was silent, but full of deadly activity. It was twelve years before the famous Case of Conscience appeared. During those twelve years the devotion to the Sacred Heart had fixed its roots in the soil of France.

B. Margaret Mary has been dead nearly 200 years, but it was only the other day that the Church decreed her the public honours of the liturgy. Meanwhile, her holy deeds and words have not ceased to edify the faithful; and her *Life*, by Languet, Bishop of Soissons, almost a contemporary, has been a favourite book of spiritual reading. But there seems to be a great and touching fitness in the moment selected for investing her with the aureola of beatification. S. Gertrude, in a wonderful passage, speaks of the days “when the world should be old and tepidity should reign” as the time when the treasures of the Sacred Heart should be made known to men. B. Margaret Mary tells us herself that it was the ingratitude of men, and the little return they made for his love, that had most pained our Lord in his sacred Passion, and that most urged Him to propose his Sacred Heart to their devotion. Now it would not, perhaps, seem clear to all that tepidity is the sin of our times. But let us consider the facts. Rénan's miserable book appeared very shortly before the Beatification of B. Margaret Mary. Having all the conditions requisite for being a popular book, it has spread everywhere. It has been, so to speak, a blasphemy that every Catholic ear has had to listen to. And after all it is only a sample of a multitude of other books. A second fact of our times is an almost simultaneous attack of the secular power in every European state upon the freedom of the Church. In other words, it may be said that within the last ten years blasphemy and indifferentism have burst out into the most appalling activity. On the other side, it is infinitely consoling to know that faith and piety are as evident, as energetic, and, so to speak, as aggressive, as impiety and unbelief. Three great marks of orthodoxy are very distinct in these times we live in: devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, devotion to our Lady, and devotion to the Pope. Now in the presence of such an eruption of Satanic influence as has never before been known, and, at the same time, of a fervour of orthodoxy perhaps equally new, is it not an appalling truth that the great mass of professing Catholics in nearly every country of Europe are looking on with calm indifference? It is not, perhaps, that men are much worse absolutely than they have generally been; but the sadness of the thought lies in the circumstances of the times. When the powers of evil are in the field with new artillery and fiercer fury, and when the ranks of the truly faithful are arming, and watching, and attacking with a fervour and spirit that makes the world ring again, indifference and apathy become no longer negative states, but positive crimes. It is often said that in France, or in Italy, or in Spain, the

good are numerous enough to swamp the bad by merely asserting their existence. Yet over the greater part of the Continent, in every assembly where men meet together to regulate the course of the state or of the city, it is always the cry that the "Liberals" are the majority. In Italian cabinet councils, in French societies, in Spanish parliaments, even in the municipal assemblies of Catholic Belgium, it is always the same—the "Liberals" are the majority. It is not too much to say that cowardice and tepidity are crying evils in the Catholic masses at the present time. They love their trade, their social standing, their cheap press, their easy morality, their scoffing literature too much, and they love the interests of the Church too little. It is the very time for the preaching of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, for this is the very evil that drew our Blessed Saviour to reveal it.

We have been led into these reflections by the perusal of a new life of B. Margaret Mary, by Father George Tickell, a member of the same society that had the privilege of directing her and assisting her, in the persons of Father de la Columbière and Father Rolin. It is to be expected that the recent Beatification of the holy virgin will have the effect of sending the devout back to her life, to study more attentively her acts and words. Besides, the peculiar character of the revelation made to her is its great fulness, and the clearness with which it states the motives and the spirit of the devotion which she was charged to spread. Hitherto, her words have been venerated, indeed, but now they have a new kind of authority, for they have been approved by the judgment of the Church. Any one, therefore, who desires to enter thoroughly into the spirit of the devotion to the Sacred Heart should read and meditate very attentively the visions and revelations vouchsafed to B. Margaret Mary. We might suggest that it would be a useful thing to draw up a well-arranged compilation of her words and teachings; it would be a manual not only of her own "spirit," but of that of the Sacred Heart.

Of Father Tickell's labours we can say with pleasure that he has given us a real biography, in which the Saint is everything and the biographer keeps in the background. As far as we have verified it, the chronology and narrative are carefully given and trustworthy. Perhaps some attempt at a description of the present state of Paray-le-Monial and its treasures of piety by an eye-witness would have enhanced the value of the book. We must confess, also, that we find Father Tickell's style a little hard and dry for a life of a saint. Sermonizing and prosing is one thing, but unction is another. If a man is fit to write a biography he is fit to give us his own impressions of his hero, in that sort of commentary which is implied in chastened fervour of expression and unobtrusive moral instruction. The absence of this is calculated to injure the success of the work as spiritual reading. Many readers will still prefer the stately and rounded phrasing of Bishop Languet, as presented in the Oratorian translation. Moreover, in a work like the present, which comes before us with pretensions which we gladly allow, there is sometimes a certain slovenliness of language which should be noticed. It is to be hoped that it is not going to be the fashion to say "*the* Mother Greyfié," "*the* Mother de Saumaise," &c.; the use of the definite article is surely quite

as French as it is to say "the Father Lacordaire" or "the Sister Rosalie." And what are we to think of such expressions as, "In her manner of conducting her novices, her instructions . . . were likely to be of a solid character." "To supply them with fresh vigour in the practice of piety, she would vary the exercises of it." "All combined by giving up their hearts, as by one consent." "One whose character was a pernicious example." "A germ afterwards embodied." "She ambitioned to share." "An eventful incident." But works like this biography are too rare, to allow us to insist on such minor blemishes as these.

The Life of Madame Louise de France. By the Author of "Tales of Kirkbeck." Rivingtons: London, Oxford, and Cambridge.

IT is difficult to speak too highly on the interest of this book. The life of any member of an order so supernatural as S. Teresa's Carmelites must be attractive; there is a special interest in following the every-day incidents occurring to those, who have so unhesitatingly given themselves up to a life, so unearthly, and so impossible to any without a true vocation. One almost feels inclined to wonder that they should have any human tastes or inclinations left, after so readily giving up all that could make life supportable to an ordinary Christian; but to read of a real happiness, totally unlike anything that can be known in the world, and united with continual and cheerful self-sacrifice, is in itself so elevating and refreshing, that a habit of reading saints' lives alone must give Catholics quite a new power of comprehension. The ordinary pleasure of perusing a nun's life is of course greatly enhanced by the fact of her having been a princess. Undoubtedly, in the eyes of God, princess is an empty title, with no more meaning than any other name. But in the eyes of man—when not raised above such a feeling by extreme sanctity or sunk below it by fanatic revolutionarism—the idea of royalty will always possess a peculiar significance; and the ordinary actions of a Carmelite nun—such as sweeping rooms, performing penances, and conforming to rules,—when gone through by a princess of France, create a feeling of admiration proportionate to the appreciation of her exalted rank. And this admiration is by no means ungrounded; for, brought up as unhappy royalty always must be, surrounded by flattering attendants and dutiful homage, continually imbibing a consciousness of natal superiority to ordinary human beings, such an acknowledgment of sinfulness as is implied by retiring into an order of life-long penance, must be in a princess little short of miraculous. But the Princess Louise's vocation must doubtless have been much aided by the fact of her having spent her earlier years at the Benedictine Abbey of Fontevrault, where her pious mother had her educated till the age of thirteen; and the example of the good Queen Marie Leczinska's own life was calculated to inspire no ordinary religious impressions.

We believe this is not the first time that the royal Carmelite's life has been produced in English; but the present volume, if, as it professes to be, an abbreviation, has certainly fixed on the most telling points of the

Princess's history. We imagine that, could we see the French original, we should find details of devotion to our Lady, which are here totally omitted; and of which we do not, of course, for a moment suppose the holy Princess to have been destitute. Still it is much to find an authoress, who is as yet out of the Church, entering so readily into the religious spirit and life as in the present instance. And we may be permitted to hope that her truly good work, of producing in a captivating and readable form the life of this saintly daughter of France, may some future day meet with a reward at present neither expected nor wished for.

Joan of Arc. By Monseigneur FELIX, Bishop of Orleans. Translated by Emily Bowles. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

MONSEIGNEUR DUPANLOUP has a right, if any one has, to panegyrisé Joan of Arc. Next to his love of his Catholic profession comes his love for his country; and no eloquent Frenchman could live on the spot that the maid's heroism has rendered illustrious, without both himself and his countrymen feeling it to be only right and proper that he should celebrate her glory. The great French bishop walks almost daily along the banks of that Loire, that was crossed by the famous bridge, and that swept away the English men-at-arms; and his house is within a few yards of that cathedral (now rebuilt) to which her banner was borne. When the town of Orleans, on each recurring 8th of May, rings its bells and puts itself in gala train to keep its famous anniversary, the Bishop of Orleans naturally finds himself the chief actor in a *fête* which culminates in his own cathedral. To judge from the two published discourses which he has delivered on two or these occasions, he finds his own share in the historic ceremony as much a labour of love as of duty. There is no doubt that the opportunity, to a true orator and an earnest man, is a great one. He stands on a spot whose name is surrounded with a genuine historic halo; for Orleans, to a Frenchman, is as Marathon or Thermopylæ. There is the sound and the crowd of a festival. The grand façade of S. Croix towers over an excited multitude, and its imposing nave is filled with an unusual gathering. The banner of the maid, the same that was borne before her into Orleans, is hanging before their eyes; and the orator can point to it as he tells his tale. The auditory comprises, besides the faithful of the town and the country, men of mark in Church and State. In this, his latest oration, Mgr. Dupanloup pauses to salute "the officers of our glorious army, the administrators of this noble department and city, our magistrates so worthily honoured, and the whole city of Orleans so faithful in its reverence for the imperishable memory of its deliverer"; and, not least, he has to acknowledge the presence of no fewer than twelve bishops: among whom are the Bishop of Poitiers, where the maid was examined before the University; the Archbishop of Bourges, under the porch of whose cathedral the people pressed to touch her; the Bishop of S. Diè, among whose simple Picard people she had sighed to die and be buried; and, most touching of all, Cardinal Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen, the city that saw the flames of her martyrdom.

The discourse before us is not unworthy of its distinguished author. In his former oration, delivered sixteen years ago, he had dwelt chiefly on the external aspects of Joan's enterprise; on her inspired mission, her heroism, and her execution. On the present occasion he has chosen for his theme her personal holiness. The most remarkable feature of the discourse is its plain avowal that its author hopes to see Joan of Arc one day a canonized Saint. After quoting words which express the conviction that her name should be inscribed in the ranks of the Blessed, he adds,—“This act of veneration may some day be decreed by the Holy Roman Church to Joan of Arc; and I own that I look for that day myself and desire it with ardour” (p. 34). And the whole panegyric, which is elaborately wrought out and furnished with notes, is a plea for her admission to the honours of sanctity.

Mgr. Dupanloup may be sure that, if the case comes before the Roman authorities, no Englishman will trouble himself to appear as devil's advocate. We say this, because there seems to be a slight appearance of surprise on the part of the eminent preacher, to know that the English of the present day recognize the purity of Joan's life and her miraculous mission. Setting aside certain prejudices on the score of religious matters, it is pretty safe to say that Englishmen of every party and persuasion wish the Maid of Orleans all the honour her champions can win for her. It is impossible here to enter into the question of the *heroicity* of her virtue. But it is certain that her story is one which no Catholic or patriot can read without sympathy and something more.

Miss Bowles's translation is readable. But the task of translating the Bishop of Orleans, especially in his moments of inspiration, is a very hard one, and we cannot say that this translation gives us the aroma of the classical French of the original. Mgr. Dupanloup, in one place, quotes Shakespeare. His translator might have taken the trouble to give us Shakespeare's exact words. To be sure it is in a speech of bitter irony that the Bastard Falconbridge calls France “God's own soldier.” But we are thoroughly ashamed of Shakespeare in connection with “La Pucelle,” and it was almost cruel of the Bishop to introduce his name. We can only hope that the weak claptrap of the First Part of Henry the Sixth is not Shakespeare's at all.

The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated. By EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY, Colonel in the Army, C.B., &c. &c. Second edition. London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons.

WHEN the Swiss General Dufour, who, we believe, was Louis Napoleon's master in the art of war, published his excellent compendious *Cours de Tactique* some twenty-five years ago, he gave a list of the principal authorities which he had consulted, and to which he would advise students of military history and science to refer. There were some fifty names in all—the great majority French of course, but a good number German, a few Italian, one or two Spanish, several Greek and Latin. There was not the name of a single

English author among them however, nor, indeed, with the exception of Napier's "Peninsular War," was there at the time a work in English military literature which could be regarded as entitled to a place in a catalogue, the first book in which was the Archduke Charles's "Principles of Strategy," and the last Xenophon's "Retreat of the Ten Thousand." The military critic may nowadays boast with some justice that we have changed all that. A library, and a very valuable library, of military literature in the English tongue is rapidly accumulating. Napier's magnificent "History" may be compared, not to disadvantage, with any of Jomini's works; and it has since been illustrated in detail by the publication of all the despatches and correspondence of the Duke of Wellington while in the Peninsula. The despatches of his great predecessor, the Duke of Marlborough, during the war of the Succession, after having lain in a lumber-room at Blenheim Park for upwards of a century, have also at last seen the light. A later crop of treatises and commentaries, occasioned by the Crimean, Italian, American, and German wars, has added to these standard authorities several works, which are not unlikely to live. Colonel Chesney's studies of the American War and the Waterloo Campaign, Mr. Hooper's book on Waterloo, Captain Hozier's "Seven Weeks' War," which, though hurriedly written, contains passages worthy of Napier's pen, may be mentioned by way of example. But among the labours of the modern English military school Colonel Hamley's "Operations of War" stands alone. It is a work of merit as unique in its way as is Napier's History. It is the most profound, the most systematic, and the most simple treatise on the art of war, it would be little to say, in the English language, but so far as we are aware, in any language. Its method is as clear and connected as the method of Euclid in dealing with geometry. Its style is so simple and so fine that it can be read with comprehension and pleasure by any reader of ordinary education.

The first edition of Colonel Hamley's book was published at a trying time—immediately before the commencement of the Austrian and Prussian war; and by many of his disciples and comrades the war was studied by the light of the principles laid down in the book. It is a great testimony to its value that the book bore the test triumphantly. Captain Hozier, who then accompanied the army of Prince Frederick Charles as military correspondent of the *Times* again and again referred to the rapid success of the Prussian system of tactics as illustrating some of Colonel Hamley's favourite dogmas; and it is a very striking evidence to his foresight, that at a time when the needle-gun was so imperfectly appreciated throughout the armies of Europe, and in general rather disparaged as too complicated an instrument for the rough work of war, he so wrote of its probable future effect in battle, that in his second edition he has had nothing to add on that subject except a foot-note. "To discern and provide for the new conditions under which armies will engage may in the next European war be worth to a people, not merely armies and treasure, but liberty and national life." These were the words in which Colonel Hamley anticipated the effect of the needle-gun in March, 1866, and the battle of Konnigratz was fought on the 3rd of July following. The needle-gun did not indeed destroy the liberty and national life of Austria; but while it abolished her rank as a German Power, it kept at bay the

legions of France panting for the Rhine. The armament of all Europe has since been revolutionized—and still Prussia, if we may judge from the admirable sketches which have recently appeared in the *Times* of the Prussian army's conduct during the mock-campaign of this autumn, is in direction, efficiency, and mobility the first military power in Europe. One of the most remarkable passages, by the way, in that correspondence, which we presume is from the pen of Captain Hozier, is that relating to the tendency on the part of the present Prussian authorities to prefer the column to the line formation in action. One would have supposed that the now general use of breech-loading arms of precision would have had exactly the opposite tendency. The personal quality of the troops has little or nothing to do with it, though it may be remembered what stress was laid on the faculty of fighting in line as the special and exclusive glory of the British infantry in Mr. Kinglake's hysterical history of the Crimean war—how he maundered about the "thin red line," and the "slender red line," and the "scarlet arch," and the "scarlet string," and all the romance about Sir Arthur Wellesley's "pining sickness" in India, because the French were fighting in column and the English could fight in line, and how Mr. Kinglake consequently ventured to connect "the pining sickness with the mighty resolve which was destined to change the face of the world." But the "mighty resolve" was no novelty. Like the needle-gun and the steel ramrod, fighting in line was a Prussian method, and that before the great Duke was born. As Colonel Hamley says, "during great part of last century, a controversy was waged between the advocates of the line and the column formation . . . In Frederick's time, the Prussians generally attacked in line . . . In one instance, Frederick was obliged to attack the enemy in single line; for at Sohr he was so inferior in force, that in its usual formation his army would have been outflanked on both wings. In single line, then, he won the battle." Mr. Carlyle, whose study of Frederick's tactics is in general so wonderfully accurate and luminous, and whose description of this action is particularly spirited and picturesque, does not, nevertheless, adequately emphasize this very remarkable incident in it.

To the present edition of his book, Colonel Hamley has made considerable additions concerning the use of railroads and telegraphs in war; but we venture to think he has not yet mastered the problem to what extent railroads are destined to be used in war, and how far, apart from their actual use as roads for steam-engines, they are likely to affect the general conditions of war. This, we presume to predict, is the part of his work which he will specially need to revise and enlarge for his third edition.

Correspondence.

DR. MELIA ON OUR BLESSED LADY.

[The following letter originated thus. More than a year ago Dr. Melia's volume, "The Woman Blessed by all Generations," was forwarded to us for notice. The Editor was so fortunate as to induce a most competent critic to undertake the matter, and a notice accordingly appeared in our number for July, 1868, pp. 251-253. Within the last two months Dr. Melia has written to us a very courteous letter, complaining that this notice was unduly severe. We could not possibly do more in the matter, than give our readers the means of estimating for themselves the justice of our criticism. We promised therefore, that any pamphlet, which Dr. Melia might wish to write in defence of his work, should be bound up with our present number; and this, we believe, has been done. It was also the wish both of Dr. Melia and the Editor, that our contributor should see the proof of this pamphlet, in order to make any comment which might appear to him reasonable; and hence the following letter. We have only to add that the present case must not be taken as a precedent; and that we cannot undertake to make the same concession to every other writer who may think himself too severely criticized, which we have gladly made to Dr. Melia.]

DEAR MR. EDITOR,—When you did me the honour to ask me to write a Notice for the DUBLIN REVIEW, of Dr. Melia's book on the Blessed Virgin, I set myself conscientiously to the execution of the task. I read the book carefully, making notes as I went along, and then wrote such remarks upon its merits and defects as it seemed to me to deserve. I did not expect that *all* my remarks would be pleasing to the author; but I do not conceive that this is a legitimate object of literary criticism. I aimed at being kind to the author and just to the public; and I am very sorry to hear that Dr. Melia thinks I have so grievously failed with regard to the former.

You invite me to make some reply to the letter of remonstrance which he has addressed to you, the proof sheets of which you at the same time send me. I have gone through those sheets as carefully as the time you can allow me will permit, and proceed to make some remarks upon them. Where, however, Dr. Melia's objections only amount to a difference of opinion between the author and the critic, and Dr. Melia's observations have in no way changed or modified my opinion, I think it better on every account, as well as more in accordance with usual practice, to abstain from all further comment. For this reason Dr. Melia must excuse me, if I pass over in silence his 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th remarks.

His first, however, requires an answer. Dr. Melia, in his book, had

insisted on a distinction of sense between the words "image" and "likeness" in Genesis i. 26. Upon this we—you will allow me to relapse into the editorial plural, when justifying words written under cover of that high office—we in our notice observed that although we were well aware that some of the Fathers and theologians had made a similar distinction, we thought on the whole the weight of authority was against it, and we instanced S. Augustine; but without quoting any passage from his works. We now supply the omission. In his book *De Diversis Quæstionibus Octoginta Tribus* (tom. vi. p. 51. ed. Gaume), the 51st question is precisely "*de homine facto ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*"; and towards the end of it, he says, "*There are some who think that these two words have not been used without a reason, for they say that if they meant only one thing, one word would have sufficed.*" Then he explains the distinction these persons claimed to recognize; but he concludes, "*Sed cavendum in talibus ne quid nimis asseverandum putetur.*" We have read very carefully the 5th chapter of S. Augustine's work *contra Adimantum*, to which Dr. Melia refers, but fail to find there any distinction made between the two words; on the contrary, he seems to us more than once to imply their absolute identity. Certainly, he speaks of man having *lost the image* of God, which, according to the distinction insisted upon by Dr. Melia, is an impossibility, and is expressly declared to be such by S. Bernard, according to Dr. Melia's quotation from that Father.

Secondly, we said we were entirely incredulous as to Dr. Melia's assertion that "images of Mary under the symbol of the good shepherdess were repeated four times in various places of the Roman Catacombs." And here Dr. M. quotes against us passages from the works of Dr. Northcote and the Commendatore de Rossi: certainly, if we had written anything on this subject which could be shown to be contradicted by Dr. Northcote's late work on the Catacombs, we should have felt bound to reconsider our statement very carefully, and should probably have found ourselves compelled to retract; and if the authority of De Rossi could be fairly quoted against us, we should be disposed to retract without any consideration at all. We do not see, however, that either of these authors has really committed himself to the full extent of Dr. Melia's assertion, though we are bound to add that if we had seen the representation in De Rossi's second volume, or read the passage quoted from Dr. Northcote, when we wrote our notice, we should not have expressed ourselves so strongly as we did, probably we should not have made the criticism at all. We need hardly assure Dr. Melia that our incredulity was never directed against his veracity as a witness, but against his skill as an interpreter of what he saw. Symbolism is a delicate and difficult subject; and in a book intended for the instruction of Protestants, we should ourselves shrink from pressing any argument drawn from it, for which we could not adduce very convincing evidence indeed; and we are not yet satisfied, from anything we have either seen or read, that the idea of our Blessed Lady as the Good Shepherdess was ever present to the minds of the early Christians.

This brings us naturally to Dr. Melia's third ground of complaint. We had said that although he wrote chiefly for Protestants, "he had not yielded to the temptation, which was certainly incident to the position, of *minimizing*

upon so important a subject." Dr. Melia supposes that he is here rebuked for not minimizing. We had thought all readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW would have apprehended our meaning to be the exact contrary. We sincerely meant to praise him for *not* having minimized, and are not convinced by his present letter that he did so.

The 8th and longest section of Dr. Melia's letter is taken up with a defence of what we had ventured to call "the old exploded story as to the origin of the Catacombs, that the greater part of them was the work of the Roman Pagans." In answer to this, Dr. Melia quotes largely from Aringhi, Severanus, Pelliccia, Ficoroni, Boldetti, and many others, proving precisely what we said, that it was the *old* theory; and he also quotes from De Rossi and Dr. Northcote, with the view of showing that it is not yet *exploded*. We venture to express our conviction that nobody would be more astonished or more vexed to hear that it was considered to be not exploded than this same De Rossi, after all his labours to effect that end. Certainly, Messrs Northcote and Brownlow, his spokesmen in this country, have not hesitated to say in his name that "the Christian origin of the catacombs may now be regarded as *firmly established*;" and they have written a whole chapter (Book V., c. i.) to show how this is, and to explain how the opposite opinion ever came into vogue. The *Revue du Monde Catholique*, quoted by Dr. Melia, asserts the same thing; and so do all the French and German critics whose notices of De Rossi's work we have had an opportunity of seeing. Our own *Saturday Review* also, a few weeks since, said emphatically, "We quite agree with De Rossi that it is now *demonstrated* that the Roman Christians from the first excavated their own Catacombs in an orderly, systematic, and legal way"; in fact, Dr. Melia's is, as far as we know, the one solitary protest that has yet been raised against this theory; and we have only to add that we cannot recognize the strength of the arguments which he alleges in support of his protest. On the contrary, we are convinced that many of them are not relevant, and that in others he has mistaken the drift of the authors from whom he is quoting. But it would take a great deal too much time and space to follow him in detail through this part of his letter.

In conclusion, we beg to assure Dr. Melia of our sincere respect for himself personally, and our unfeigned regret if we have in any way done him an injustice. We hailed the publication of his book with great pleasure, as we hail every addition to our Catholic literature that promises to be of service in clearing away error and spreading a knowledge of the truth. If we ventured to point out flaws and imperfections in the execution of the work, this was only what we were bound to do, if criticism is to be anything more than a name amongst us; and we will add, it is only what we expect and what we hope we shall be always ready to receive, whenever we publish a book ourselves.

I remain,

Dear Mr. Editor,

Your obedient Servant,

THE WRITER OF THE NOTICE ON DR. MELIA.

OXFORD EDUCATION.

[We have nothing ourselves to say this quarter in reference to the controversy on Catholic higher education. But Dr. Gillow has been so severely and (it seems to us) so groundlessly criticized for various portions of his letter which appeared in our pages, that we cannot refuse to give his reply all the publicity in our power.]

To the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

SIR,—As you were so kind as to allow me space in your April number for a letter on Catholic higher education, I trust that the same kindness will now allow me to say a few words in vindication of certain points in which that letter has been made the object of unusually severe and persistent assaults. In the May number of the *Month*, and in three letters which appeared in the *Tablet*, the letter in question received more attention from the writers in the *Month* than seemed to me to be either called for or justifiable. Feeling, however, as great a repugnance to quarrel with a periodical which always writes *ad majorem Dei gloriam*, as to disedify the Church by unnecessary wrangling amongst its ministers, I resolved to bear in silence the smart remarks made at my expense, and so to allow them to die upon the wind. To this resolve I should still have adhered had my assailants kept within the bounds of merely pointless criticism. But they have not done so, for I find that in two places in the July number of the *Month*, and again in the number for August. I am made the subject of imputations of such a damaging character that, if allowed to pass as true, they must infallibly rob me of all claims to veracity and honour. I mean the charges of *misquoting* and *misrepresenting* Mr. Pattison, and of telling people that he has said what he has *not* said. Under such imputations, if it be in my power to justify myself by proving these charges to be groundless, it becomes an imperative duty to remove a stain which every one holds in abhorrence, and which has not, to my knowledge, been ever before cast upon me. Unfortunately a groundless charge is sooner made than refuted, and when prejudice has been excited by long and repeated returns upon the same object, the clearest evidence in vindication of honesty frequently fails to outbalance the weight of adverse impressions, no matter how groundless the imputations by which they have been produced may be proved to be. I promise, however, that my defence shall be as brief as the cause will permit, nor will I travel beyond the facts of the case into comments which intelligent men can make for themselves.

As regards the method which I purpose to follow in my defence, I shall first quote at length the words of the accusation; then I shall quote from my letter the passages accused; after that the statements on which I relied will be quoted from Mr. Pattison's words as they are quoted by the reviewer in the October number (1868) of the DUBLIN REVIEW, from which I professed to take all that I advanced on the subject; and, finally, I shall quote the conclusions drawn by the reviewer in the DUBLIN whom the *Month* expressly abstains from inculcating as an accomplice in my delinquencies.

By this method I hope to make perfectly clear,—

1st. What is the gravity of the charges brought against me.

2nd. What evidence my words furnish for the charges grounded upon them.

3rd. How far the words of Mr. Pattison justify what I have attributed to him. And

4th. How far my inferences are supported by the reviewer whose statements I professed to quote, and whom, in a spirit of *fairness*, the writer in the *Month*, in order to concentrate the whole momentum of his charge upon me alone, deliberately excludes from complicity, saying, "We think it fair to say that we refer to Dr. Gillow alone."—(July, p. 107.)

The charge of *misquoting* and *misrepresenting* Mr. Pattison is in the *Month* for July, p. 18. The passage is long and sufficiently obscure. When the reader has gone through it he will find his ears still tingling with the sounds of words of vague but grave and damaging meaning, such as "mistake as to the final examination at Oxford"—"based upon a curious misquotation"—

Dr. Gillow, the author, has omitted to quote—"quite misrepresent Mr. Pattison"—"Dr. Gillow leaves out the important words"—"Mr. Pattison does not say this," &c.

But he will find himself bewildered for answers if he ask himself such questions as these :—What is the mistake into which Dr. Gillow is here said to have fallen as to the final examination at Oxford? Is it that the requirements for the mere "pass" examination include philosophy dangerous to a Catholic's faith? or is it that honours cannot be obtained in mathematics, or in history and law, or in natural science, without having been first sought in classics? or is it that honours cannot be got at all except in one school only—the *Litteræ Humaniores*? Again :—What are the words of Mr. Pattison, which Dr. Gillow is accused of *misquoting*? In what consists the importance of the words which Dr. Gillow has *omitted to quote*? Into what error does the omission lead his readers? Is it shown that Dr. Gillow either asserts or implies that philosophy is necessary, in order to gain honours in other schools, except that of classics? What, in fine, is the precise charge that is here brought against Dr. Gillow's statements?

I invite the reader to search for answers to these questions while he reads the accusation set forth in the following passage :—

"A recent Catholic writer on the subject has also fallen into a mistake as to the final examination at Oxford, which is worth correcting all the more, as it is based upon a curious misquotation from the interesting work of Mr. Pattison, already mentioned. Putting aside, of course, the Divinity, the Thirty-nine Articles, and the like, there is nothing at all in the final pass examination, as Mr. Pattison tells us, to frighten either the 'Church party' or Catholics. 'I appeal,' he says, 'to any of the Catholic students who have taken the ordinary degree at Oxford since 1854, to say if anything has been taught them officially which has been calculated to interfere with their religious belief.' He goes on with a sentence which Dr. Gillow, the author to whom we allude, has omitted to quote, though its omission has made him quite misrepresent Mr. Pattison. Dr. Gillow does not seem to be aware that it is possible (and necessary) to 'pass' in Arts, *i. e.*, *Litteræ Humaniores*, and to take the B.A. honours in the three other schools of

Mathematics, History and Law, and National Sciences, *without seeking honours in the first-mentioned school.* Mr. Pattison's words are—'Nor even in the honour curriculum for the other schools is danger supposed to lurk. It is the school of classics (*Litteræ Humaniores*) only, and specifically the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school, which have alarmed the Church party. This the party must either conquer, or be content to see all the minds that come under the influences of that training—that is, all the minds of any promise that pass through Oxford—hopelessly lost to them' (p. 299). Dr. Gillow leaves out the important words which we have italicised, and he begins the last sentence thus:—'This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching]' And he goes on to comment on the passage thus:—'The Rector of Lincoln College here assumes as a certain fact, that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the *Honour Schools* in Oxford, without being hopelessly lost to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively' (*Higher Catholic Education*, p. 12). Mr. Pattison, however, does not say this, and he is only speaking of Tractarians. He is perfectly aware that honours can be gained in *three other schools*, or any one of them, besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*."

It is difficult to answer a charge when it cannot be found out in what it precisely consists. It is evident enough that I am here accused distinctly of *misquoting* Mr. Pattison, but it is equally evident that the *misquotation* is perpetrated only by *omitting to quote*. It is equally clear that by this omission to quote I am accused of having quite *misrepresented* Mr. Pattison. But in what I am supposed to have misrepresented him—what I have made him say which he has not said—is by no means so clear. I may be mistaken, but, to the best of my judgment, the alleged misrepresentation consists in my having made Mr. Pattison say that danger to the faith of Catholics is supposed to lurk in the honour curriculum of the Schools of Mathematics, of History and Law, and of the Natural Sciences. At all events, if this be not the sum of the accusation, I know not what it is. Let, then, the reader carefully peruse the following passage of my letter, and while he reads let him try to discover anything to indicate that I make Mr. Pattison ascribe danger to a Catholic's faith in any other school besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*:—

"Mr. Pattison fully admits the antagonism which subsists between this sort of philosophical training and the views of the 'Catholic party,' or, as he otherwise calls it, the 'Church party,' by which he means all those who still cling to any points of supernaturally revealed dogma. But his sympathies are not with this party, and, while he allows that their alarms are well founded, he coolly tells them that, unless they succeed in banishing this philosophy from the *curriculum* of the university, their day is gone; for that every mind of promise that comes under its influence must assuredly yield to the power of its fascination.

'For my part,' he says, 'I think the fears of the Catholic party, whether within or without the National establishment, are *substantially* well founded. . . . It is especially the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*] which alarm the Church party. This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching], or be content to see all the minds that come under the influence of that training—that is, *all the minds of any promise that pass through Oxford*—hopelessly lost to them' (p. 414).

The Rector of Lincoln College here assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the honour schools in Oxford without being *hopelessly lost* to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively."

This is the passage in which my critic finds a "curious misquotation," and on which he founds his charge against me of so far misrepresenting Mr. Pattison that, whereas Mr. Pattison said that danger to the faith of Catholics was supposed to lurk only in the honour curriculum for the school of *Litteræ Humaniores*, I have made him extend that danger to the honour curriculum for the schools of Mathematics, of History and Law, and of the Natural Sciences. Yet he cannot fail to see clearly enough that by making Mr. Pattison limit the danger to "the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*]" I have made the very limitation, the denial of which constitutes the whole ground of his charges against me! He has also seen that in two places on the previous page I have made the very same limitation, and in terms still more precise.

To the honour curriculum of the other schools there is no allusion whatever in any part of my letter.

But how has my critic thus contrived to make me appear to say not only what I did not say, but even the contrary to what I did say? To make this matter clear it will be necessary to quote from Mr. Pattison the "important words" which I omitted, and also to quote from my letter the form in which I quoted the passage from Mr. Pattison. From this it will be easily seen how my critic contrives to conceal from his readers that I had clearly particularized the very thing which he charges me with omitting.

In the above extract from Mr. Pattison where omission is indicated, six or seven sentences are passed over as not referring to the subject in hand, namely, Mr. Pattison's view of the *antagonism* between the Oxford philosophy and the Faith of Catholics. The omitted part contained the italicised words of the following passage:—

"Nor even in the honour curriculum for the other schools is danger supposed to lurk. It is the school of Classics (Litteræ Humaniores) only, and specifically the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school which alarm the Church party. This the party must either conquer or be content," &c.

Sensible that the introduction of irrelevant ideas would tend to distract the mind from the *antagonism* which it was my aim to make prominent, I omitted the italicised words, and quoted the passage thus:—

"It is especially the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [Litteræ Humaniores] which alarm the Church party. This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching] or be content to see all the minds that come under the influence of that training, that is, all the minds of any promise that pass through Oxford, hopelessly lost to them."

Now how does my critic represent this passage? He italicises the words *the school of Classics (Litteræ Humaniores)*, which occur in the first part of the

sentence, and then adds, "Dr. Gillow leaves out the important words which we have italicised, and begins the *last* sentence thus:—"This party must either conquer, &c.,'" but he fails to inform his readers that I imported those words [*Litteræ Humaniores*] into the latter part, which I did quote, of the very same sentence, and that by so doing I supplied the very omission which forms the sole foundation of his charges. He omits altogether to notice my quotation of this part of the same sentence, and steps on to the following sentence in these terms:—"And he begins the *last* sentence thus, 'This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy *from the course of teaching*].'" The italics in these last words are his, not mine; and thus, while he omits my qualifying words, *Litteræ Humaniores*, in the previous sentence, he calls attention to the words, *course of teaching*, insinuating thereby that, in some way or other, I suppose, that philosophy is found in the whole course of university teaching. This, however, proves rather too much, for he does not attribute to me more than the erroneous notion that philosophy is found in the *honour curriculum* of three other schools besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*. And he has a theory to account for the way by which I have fallen into this error. He says, "Dr. Gillow does not seem to be aware that it is possible (and necessary) to 'pass' in Arts, *i. e.*, *Litteræ Humaniores*, and to take the B.A. honours in the three other schools of Mathematics, History, and Law, and Natural Sciences, *without* seeking honours in the first-mentioned school."

To attribute to me such a notion as this on the sole ground of my using the words, *course of teaching*, and to give his argument no other development than this use of italics, is sufficiently gratuitous, even as *he* has represented my words. But if, instead of saying "Dr. Gillow begins the *last* sentence thus," he had said, Dr. Gillow quotes this very same sentence thus:—"It is especially the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*] that have alarmed the Church party," he would have shown clearly that the words *course of teaching*, which come in the very next sentence, mean the course of teaching in that school of Arts *Litteræ Humaniores*. And why did he not do this? Surely to one in search of mis-quotations there was a most inviting temptation to quote the above words, for they actually contain a veritable *mis-quotation*! Whether by my oversight or that of the printers I know not, but as a matter of fact the word *specifically* has been changed into *especially*! Some capital, it seems to me, might have been made out of this misquotation; but no, it is passed over unnoticed. If, however, it had been brought forward, it must have exposed to view the specifying words, *Litteræ Humaniores*, which come in this sentence to indicate the school of danger, and which it was therefore essential not to notice. For the appearance of these words would utterly demolish the whole foundation of the accusations, and thus this finely-inflated and highly-coloured bubble bursts and vanishes!

After this there is little cause to say much in reply to the following:—

"Dr. Gillow goes on to comment on the passage thus:—"The Rector of Lincoln College here assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the *Honour Schools* in Oxford without being hopelessly lost to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively."

Mr. Pattison, however, does not say this, and he is only speaking of Tractarians. He is perfectly aware that honours can be gained in *three other* schools, or any of them, besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*."

If there be any point at all in these last words, they imply that I imagine that honours cannot be gained except in *one* school only. But not many lines before this I was made to imagine that honours could be gained in three other schools, provided the candidate first sought honours in the school of Arts. Now to which of these two theories he alludes by italicising the words *Honour Schools* I cannot say. To argue by italics seems to be his favourite method—a method which makes his meaning very much a matter of conjecture. I conjecture, then, that he wishes to insinuate that under the general term *Honour Schools* I mean to include *all* the Honour Schools in Oxford, and therefore to distribute the teaching of philosophy among them all. He should not, however, have made this mistake, seeing that I nowhere allude to any other than the school of Arts, that my argument in all that part of the letter is exclusively engaged with the honour curriculum of that school, that I had specified that school a few lines above, and that I had done the same still more explicitly in two places on the previous page. After this he could surely understand my meaning without requiring a fourth specification of the same thing within the space of two pages! The Reviewer in the DUBLIN, from whom I borrowed this comment (p. 414), makes the very same use of the term *Honour Schools* as I have done, and no doubt with as little suspicion that such use of general terms could, by any process of hyper-criticism, be understood to mean *all* the honour schools. But if we apply the same rule of criticism to the terms used by Mr. Pattison himself, he gives a far wider range to unbelieving philosophy among the *Oxford schools*. For if we neglect his explanations in other places he makes *no limitations whatever*. He says—

"This position of the Roman Catholic body towards the universities of Great Britain and Ireland must be also the position of any other party which conceives itself to be in possession of any important moral, social, metaphysical, or physical truth which has been arrived at in any other way than by an exhaustive investigation of the pertinent facts. Such a party must necessarily be made uneasy *by the present state of the Oxford schools*."

If the general terms—Oxford schools—mean *all* the schools of Oxford, Mr. Pattison says much more than I have attributed to him when I say that "he assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the *Honour Schools* of Oxford without being *hopelessly lost* to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively."

The Dublin reviewer, though he goes further than I have done, is far within this interpretation of Mr. Pattison's words when he sums up his statements thus:—

"Every Oxford student either receives there no education at all, or receives there an education destructive of all belief in revealed dogma" (p. 417).

Even the *Month* admits that Mr. Pattison avows that all minds of any promise that pass through Oxford are hopelessly lost to the Church party.

Oh, but, says the *Month*, "he is speaking only of Tractarians." Indeed! Then "the Roman Catholic body" in the passage just quoted; also "the Catholic party," whether within or *without* the national establishment—"the Catholic students who have taken the ordinary degree since 1854"—"the Roman Catholic authorities"—are all Tractarians! For all these terms come within a few lines of each other in the very passage cited. Of these he is speaking, and expressing his avowal of the absolute antagonism that subsists between their religious belief and the present training of the honour curriculum for the school of arts.

In the *Month* for August there is inserted a letter from an "Oxford resident," who is described as a fellow and tutor of one of the colleges. This writer says (p. 214), "I am surprised to find Dr. Gillow classing together Catholics and Anglicans of Dr. Pusey's school as exposed to a similar danger at Oxford." He argues that the opinions of Catholics are exposed to much less danger from the Oxford training than are those of Anglicans, because when the latter are confronted with reason and light they are soon discovered to contain in themselves what is self-contradictory, whereas every Catholic knows that his faith is strengthened and not weakened by increased knowledge and scientific research. Upon this the editor of the *Month* remarks:—"The distinction pointed out therein is certainly a true one."

All that I said on this point was that "the *Rector of Lincoln College* assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the honour schools in Oxford without being hopelessly lost to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively." If this writer had been a lover of truth he could not have forced the meaning he has imagined upon my words, which reported only the views of Mr. Pattison, but expressed no opinion of my own upon the comparative dangers to Anglicans and Catholics. That the faith of Catholics possesses a security against the influence of the Oxford training, "because every Catholic knows that it is strengthened and not weakened by increased knowledge and scientific research," seems a strange sentiment to come from a Protestant, and one to which Mr. Pattison would certainly be the last to subscribe. He makes no exception in favour of Catholics when he says that all minds of any promise that pass through Oxford will be hopelessly lost to the Catholic party whether within or without the national establishment. I could well imagine Mr. Pattison or any other Protestant saying to a Catholic, in a spirit of irony, "Come by all means to Oxford that your faith may be strengthened by increased knowledge and scientific research in the fertile field of modern philosophical and religious thought."

If a Catholic assert that his faith is strengthened by scientific research, he supposes and includes an overruling spirit of faith and charity enlightening, guiding, and controlling his research; and if he have not this spirit, or if, allured by the force of bad example, he forfeit this spirit by dissipated indulgences, his research may soon make shipwreck of his faith. A Protestant is a stranger to the spirit of which I speak, and when he invites a Catholic to enter upon such research, he of necessity supposes him to do so in the spirit that animates himself.

But all this writing in commendation of Oxford as presenting advantages

which Catholics have reason to desire, and where their faith would be less exposed to danger than are the opinions of Anglicans (poor commendation, indeed!), as well as the fallacious plea put forth by this "Oxford resident," "that Catholics can now reside at Oxford without being exposed to the dangerous atmosphere of a Protestant college," and backed by his assumption "that Catholics are looking forward to a time when they will again take their place in those Universities which they still regard in some sense as their proper home, and as the proper school for their sons," seems too much like the voice of the tempter extolling the beauty and the flavour of that fatal fruit which the Vicar of Jesus Christ and the English bishops, acting in obedience to the express injunctions of their Supreme Pastor, have solemnly warned the Catholics of England not to touch lest they die the death; or rather it resembles much more the outspoken rebellion of the malicious serpent telling its victims that they shall not die the death, that they shall have their faith strengthened by increased knowledge and scientific research, and that they shall become like gods, knowing the difference between good and evil, as this is known and experienced in the unbelieving University of Oxford. That a Fellow and Tutor of Oxford, already enlisted under the banner that is professedly raised against the Church and Kingdom of God, should hold language like this, and so much in harmony with the instincts of his profession, can be a matter of surprise to no one. But the Catholic mode of enforcing the Gospel precept of plucking out the eye that scandalises us is not that of exciting concupiscence by describing the allurements of the objects on which it is sinful to look. When a parent is balancing the worldly advantages held in prospect to his son by an Oxford education against the spiritual dangers that threaten him, and against the duty which he owes to his ecclesiastical superiors, he may easily find in writing like this not only motives for an undue exaggeration of those advantages, but reasons also which his inclinations will too readily adopt, for undervaluing the gravity of the threatened danger, and for disregarding his own obligations to respect the warnings of his lawful superiors. By this additional weight on the side of the flesh, the unfortunate parent may be so far seduced as to turn the balance in opposition to the force of grace, to the utter ruin of the vital interests of his son. These, however, are principles upon which I cannot hope for agreement on the part of this "Oxford Resident."

I come now to the second passage of which I have just cause to complain, as it attacks my veracity in a manner still more pointed. It occurs in the *Month* for July, p. 107:—

"We cannot close these remarks without a few words as to Mr. Pattison, whose book has been somewhat unworthily treated in being made a sort of stock-piece, out of which sharp and hard sayings about his own University might be snipped for the benefit of the Catholic public. His candid and earnest confessions have been somewhat misunderstood. He has *not* said a good many of the things that people have been told that he has said. He has *not* said, for instance, that all mere graduates at Oxford are men of no education, but, which is a very different thing, that the degree itself does not prove them to be more. Still less has he said that all mere graduates are either 'foppish exquisites of the drawing-room,' or, 'in all probability barbarised athletes of the arena.'"

To this the following note is appended :—

“ We think it fair to say that we refer to Dr. Gillow alone. We have not read the article from which he quotes, except for the purpose of verifying his references to Mr. Pattison’s pages, which are not given in his letter.”

This writer, then, has verified the quotations given in the DUBLIN REVIEW from Mr. Pattison. This is highly satisfactory to me, as he knows very well that I have quoted at second hand, and referred, not to Mr. Pattison’s pages, but to those of the REVIEW.

I now give the words of my letter (p. 13) which are made the subject of these very intelligible strictures :—

“ It does indeed seem strange that, at the very time when a Catholic periodical of reputation and influence is advocating the affiliation of our Catholic colleges with the University of Oxford in preference to that of London, and is doing this on the ground that Catholics would thereby be brought into competition with men of a higher intellectual standard, and one more analogous to their own, a Protestant head of one of the Oxford colleges should come forward to inform us that the mere graduate is a man of no education which it is the function of a University to impart, and that if he be not a ‘ foppish exquisite of the drawing-room,’ he is, in all probability, a ‘ barbarised athlete of the arena,’ and that the highest outcome of the ‘ honour men’ is the ‘ able editor,’ trained in the art of writing ‘ leading articles,’ and of instructing the public on ‘ the results of modern thought’ on such subjects, possibly, as the *extinct virtues*, with an assurance equalled only by his ignorance.”

According to my critic I here affirm that Mr. Pattison informs us “ that *all mere graduates at Oxford are men of no education.*”

But why, in the first place, has he, at the very time when he charges his neighbour with misquoting, changed my words, “ the mere graduate,” into “ *all mere graduates at Oxford?*” Is there no difference in meaning between these two forms of expression? When Mr. Pattison says—“ the young aristocrat has lost the power of commanding the attention, and is not only indisposed for, but incapable of, work ; profound idleness and luxuriousness have corrupted his nature ;” does he wish us to understand him to mean that profound idleness and luxuriousness have corrupted the nature of *all* young aristocrats? I think not. The term *all* excludes exceptions which the form used by Mr. Pattison does not. It conveys in general the character of a class, but does not say, as the word “ all” does, that every individual member without exception in that class partakes of that character. If it would be an injury to Mr. Pattison to misquote his words in the above passage by changing “ the young aristocrat” into *all* young aristocrats, is it not also injurious to me to make the same change in the words which I used?

Why, in the next place, has he omitted my words—“ which it is the function of a university to impart”?

Surely it is a very different thing to say of all mere graduates that they are men of no education, and to say of the mere graduate that he is a man of no education *which it is the function of a university to impart.* The Month

says that I told people that Mr. Pattison said the former, and that he has *not* said so. I told them that he said the latter; and so he has, and even more, for thus he writes:—

“We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the honour-students are the *only* students who are undergoing *any* educational process which it can be considered as a function of the University either to impart or exact. . . . These receive an education which benefits them in intellect and character”; and “as this result represents the *total product of the University* as it is at present constituted,” &c.

Mr. Pattison here says much more than I have attributed to him; but he goes beyond even this, and says all that the *Month* asserts he does *not* say.

“There is no danger to principles or faith in a “pass” course, because such a course *is not education.*”—DUBLIN REVIEW, Oct., 1868, p. 414.

From this it strictly follows that those who have no course of education higher than a “pass” course have no course of education at all.

Thus, as regards the first point in this accusation, I have fully proved:—

1. That I have not said what the *Month* has attributed to me.
2. That Mr. Pattison has said all that I attributed to him.
3. That, beyond this, Mr. Pattison has said what the *Month* so pointedly denies that he has said.

The Reviewer in the DUBLIN, who is exempted from all share in my supposed falsifications, sums up the statements of Mr. Pattison and Mr. Goldwin Smith in these terms (p. 417):—

“Such, then, is the distinct testimony of both our authors. Under existing circumstances, *every Oxford student* either receives there *no education at all*, or receives there an education destructive of all belief in revealed dogma.”

The other point of accusation is thus set forth.

“Still less has he (Mr. Pattison) said that *all* mere graduates are either ‘foppish exquisites of the drawing-room, or, ‘in all probability, barbarised athletes of the arena.’

Neither did I say this, and in order to make me say it he has changed my less definite words—‘and if he’ (the mere graduate) ‘be not,’ &c., into—‘all mere graduates are.’” But what has Mr. Pattison really said?

1. That 70 per cent. of the so-called “students” are in no sense, even in profession, students at all.
2. That their degrees are an evidence that a youth has been able to afford, not only the money, but, what is impossible to so many, the time to live three years among gentlemen doing nothing as a gentleman should.
3. That the young aristocrat is either the foppish exquisite of the drawing-room or the barbarised athlete of the arena.
- 4th. That the young aristocrats lead the fashion, and are conscious of their right to do so in dress and manners.
- 5th. That *from this source* are propagated *through the place*, ideas of style and expenditure incompatible with the means and future position of the general body of the young men.

There are certainly elements here sufficient to elaborate out of the idlers of Oxford a fair number of fops : let us now see if Mr. Pattison's ideas of the number of athletes be such as to justify the inference, that if the mere graduate be not of the first class he will in all probability belong to the second. He says—

6th. That if any proof could convince the advocates of internural residence of the futility of "College discipline," such a proof might be found in the *mastery* which the *athlete furor* has established over *all minds in the place*.

7th. That so entirely are the *tutors* beaten by this *athlete furor*, that, to cover the disgrace of defeat, they are obliged to affect to patronize and encourage the evil.

According to this the "*athlete furor*" has possessed *every mind in the place*, nor are even the tutors themselves free from the infection. It is then absolutely certain of the mere "pass-men," that if they be not of the class of *fops*, they certainly belong to the class of *athletes*.

Mr. Pattison considers the athlete to be the better character of the two, and he thinks that the growth of the athletic furor in late years has effected an improvement by diminishing the prevalence of foppery among the young men of Oxford.

"Any one who compares," he says, "the Oxford of to-day with the Oxford of twenty years ago, will observe that one of the most offensive features of the place is at least less prominent than it was. The idlers who, after a morning spent over ponderous breakfasts and in billiard-rooms, made their elaborate toilette and lounged forth half tipsy 'to do the High,' have many of them found occupations more healthful, if not more congenial, to the objects of a university. Practising the 'long jump' or the 'quarter of a mile,' is not an academical pursuit; but it is at least better than ogling servant-maids or talking with ostlers. As long as the University consents to receive youths who are students only in name, who come to it corrupted by the associations of wealthy uncultured homes and aristocratic schools, she must be content to welcome any influence which will counteract the evils they introduce. The barbarized athlete of the arena is at least a more desirable inmate than the fop and the profligate" (DUBLIN REVIEW, p. 412).

The Dublin Reviewer is, therefore, perfectly justified in saying,—“It is to this state of things that Mr. Pattison refers when he says, as we have seen, that with regard to 70 per cent. of those who take degrees at Oxford, the *only alternative* is between being 'either the foppish exquisite of the drawing-room, or the barbarized athlete of the arena.'”

But from this it appears that I expressed Mr. Pattison's statements in extremely mitigated terms when I said of the mere graduate "that if he be not a foppish exquisite of the drawing-room, he is, *in all probability*, a barbarized athlete of the arena."

This expression seemed to me to be quite strong enough, and I expressed no small surprise at revelations which astonished my reason not less than they surpassed my imagination. Yet, in the face of this, the very veracious Tutor and Fellow of Oxford, whose letter is inserted in the August number of the *Month*, deliberately ignores Mr. Pattison's statements which I quoted

and ascribes my comparatively moderate statement to the creation of my own imagination or that of the DUBLIN REVIEW! He says—

“Dr. Gillow’s pupil . . . might come and measure himself from time to time against ‘the foppish exquisites’ and ‘barbarized athletes’ into whom *his* imagination, or that of his authority, the DUBLIN REVIEW, has led him to transform so large a portion as seventy per cent. of our young men.”

It cannot be a matter of much surprise that the *Month*, although it does take credit to itself for its own “controversial fairness,” should insert, without comment on this point, the letter of this “Oxford Resident”; for it does duty as a sort of second to sustain his positive assertion that Mr. Pattison has *not* said what I have attributed to him.

This Oxford writer does, indeed, do me the justice of allowing the DUBLIN REVIEW to share with me the alleged fabrication. The writer in the *Month*, on the contrary, not I presume moved to spare the DUBLIN REVIEW on account of any special affection for it, or for its editor, thinks it fair to say that “he refers to me alone when he affirms that Mr. Pattison has *not* said a great many of the things that people have been told that he has said.” But against this I have most conclusively proved that Mr. Pattison has said all that I have ascribed to him, and even much more; and that the DUBLIN REVIEW has reported his statements much more in accordance with the real extent of Mr. Pattison’s words than I have done. But the editor of the *Month* is not now intent upon damaging the DUBLIN REVIEW. He has already on former occasions tried abundantly to do this, and he can return to the task when he pleases. His present object, for reasons best known to himself, is to damage me, and, therefore, he carefully separates the DUBLIN from his aim in order that the assault, concentrated upon one point, may fall with more telling effect on the trustworthiness of my little defence of our Catholic Collegiate education.

But is this doing justice to the writer in the *Month* when he says that he has not read the article in the DUBLIN from which I quote? Well, if really he has not read that article, his plea of justification is one of *ignorantia affectata*, which is worse than no justification at all. For he knew full well that I took and professed to take all my statements exclusively from the article to which I invited particular attention. If, then, he really wished to judge honestly, and to report to others honestly whether I had dealt honestly with the materials, in my hands, he ought to have seen what those materials were. But, after all, is it certain that he has not read the article? What he says is, “We have not read the article from which he (Dr. Gillow) quotes, *except* for the purpose of verifying his references to Mr. Pattison’s pages . . .” to which he knows I never referred at all! But how much did he read for this purpose? As far as this information goes he may have read every line, or he may not have read a single line. It matters little, however, whether he has read it or not, for either horn of the dilemma is equally galling.

The only two points that these writers have really proved by their criticisms are—1st. Their own persevering determination to sift out from my letter

whatever they could find in any degree vulnerable ; and, 2nd, their utter inability to make a single point, except by the most palpable misrepresentation of the clearest statements. The motives that have stimulated such feelings and arts it is not for me to investigate. They must remain, therefore, a matter of conjecture for the minds of your intelligent readers.

I remain, Sir,

Faithfully yours,

J. GILLOW.

5th August, 1869.

DEAN STANLEY AND REV. MR. MILLS.

SIR,—You have been good enough to allow me a little space in which I may notice a reply to my last letter, put forth by the Dean of Westminster in the July number of “Macmillan’s Magazine.” The question between us is still the same, and has been considered already, at some length, in a late number of the DUBLIN REVIEW (see last April, pp. 512—517). The matter in debate is not regarding the various postures, in the reception of Holy Communion, allowed and in usage at different times. It is, on the contrary, just simply this ; whether the statement made in “Good Words,” that at the present day “at Communion, while others kneel, the Pope sits,” is a correct or an incorrect statement. At the time it appeared I ventured to assert that it was the latter, and I produced authorities in support of my counter-statement. The Dean of Westminster replied, quoting Durandus, Bona, and Gerbet. To this answer was made that Durandus* positively speaks for the standing posture ; that Bona† is merely quoting a work, whose authority he himself calls in question ; and that Gerbet states that the Pontiff receives “à demi assis,” which phrase the Protestant ritualist Bingham renders most correctly by the words “standing with inclination.”

Now in summing up this question in “Macmillan’s Magazine,” the Dean has repeated the above quotations, and has added some others ; and it is of these latter, and indeed of his remarks in general, that I have your permission to say a few words.

The fresh authorities adduced are Martene, Moroni, Eustace ; and among Protestant ritualists, Neale, Maskell, and Bingham ; not to mention the “English traveller who, on Easter-day 1868, was very forcibly struck, but cannot state on oath that the Pope remained sitting.” Let me endeavour in a few words to cross-question some of his witnesses.

* The Dean is surely incorrect in translating “consistens” “keeping his place sitting.” Is not its exact meaning “standing firmly” ? Does not “ad mensam consistere” signify “standing to wait upon others at table” ?

† It is not true (as it is re-stated) that Bona gives his own authority for the sitting posture ; he takes care to tell us that he does not. The passage quoted is not a law : it is a description of the spectacle of the Pontifical Mass.

Martene, whose work is in great measure an explanation of the rites of the very earliest Christian times, merely uses the phrase of Durandus, "in sede consistens." "The obvious meaning of this passage," says the Dean, "is, that the Pope remains in his place sitting." I have ventured to state that it means just the contrary. But then we have Moroni, who says, "In Roma il Papa comunicavasi sedendo nel suo trono"; "and these words," adds the Dean, "may be taken as a testimony to the practice of the late Pope, and to the usage of modern times." If so, how exceedingly strange that the same writer should have these words: "Ricavasi del Martene che in Roma il Papa comunicavasi sedendo nel suo trono *ma oggi non è più in uso tal rito.*" And again: "Accompanied by the Master of Ceremonies, he carries the Blessed Sacrament to the Pope, who, on his knees at his throne, adores, and at once rises (indi il Pontifice si alza, e resta in atto di adorare *fermandosi in piedi.*)" And again: "Il Cardinal diacono lo porta al Papa, il quale genuflesso l'adora, come l'ostia, *e si alza.*" Is not this testimony to "the usage of modern times"? "It is hardly necessary," continues the Dean, "to confirm these high Roman authorities by the testimony of Protestant ritualists. But that it was the received opinion amongst such writers that the Pope sits, appears from the unhesitating assertions to this effect by Bingham, Neale,* and Maskell." The recklessness of this sentence simply fills one with amazement, and creates a difficulty against proceeding further. The only possible explanation that occurs to me is, that the writer can never have seen the works about which he speaks so confidently. For what is the fact? Why, Maskell writes as follows:—"The Popes were accustomed to receive the Eucharist sitting, but it would seem that now they stand, as other bishops do, and do not resume their seats until after the rite is finished of washing the hands. It is not out of place to add briefly that Angelo Rocca appears to doubt that the bishops of Rome ever received sitting." And what does Bingham say? "Cardinal Perron labours hard to prove that the Apostles received sitting; but his vanity is abundantly chastised and exposed. . . . As to sitting, there is no example of it, nor any intimation leading toward it in any ancient writer. . . . This posture is wholly without example in the ancient Church." And then, having quoted our very passage from Bona, Bingham concludes thus:—"We are told it is the singular privilege of the Pope to communicate sitting. I go on with the practice of the ancient Church." And all this is what the Dean of Westminster has ventured to call "a mass of testimony sufficient to establish his fact."

But now, what can be said of his treatment of Benedict XIV.? In his work (*de Sacro MSS. Sac.*), this great Pontiff states that some of his predecessors sat to receive, but this practice was then no longer known, for that the attitude of the Pope at Communion was that of one "standing at his throne." And in a letter to his Master of Ceremonies, Benedict XIV. repeats this

* After a rather diligent search, I cannot find in Neale any mention of the rite at all. Of course it may have escaped my observation, and the Dean has given no reference.

statement:—"The Roman Pontiff receives standing, not sitting, as some have erroneously written." This, says the Dean, is a curious example of what may be "called the audacity which sometimes characterizes expressions of Pontifical opinion." Benedict XIV. says that formerly some of the Popes sat to receive, but that *now* they do not; and that, therefore, to say that they *do* is an error into which some have fallen. And this simple sentence is an example of "audacity," and the assertions it contains are "irreconcilable."

The whole scope of the letter of Pope Benedict, the meaning and arguments contained in which have been so singularly misunderstood and misapplied, is evident at a glance to the unprejudiced reader. It is a free communication to a dear friend (Reale), written during the holy Pontiff's illness, in which he states, that having lost the use of his limbs, he wishes to know whether he shall be obliged to content himself with receiving Holy Communion as any other invalid, or whether it may be allowed him, under the circumstances, to celebrate Mass sitting. He is not thinking in the least of our case, that of solemn Pontifical Communion, but merely whether he may be permitted to celebrate Mass every day in a sitting posture. In the letter itself, he uses these words, "agitur de integrâ Missâ sedendo celebrandâ cujus exemplum hæud extare dicitur." He is speaking of himself as an infirm priest, wishing to say Mass, and he sets to work to examine in this letter, whether he can be allowed to sit at part, or during the whole of it. What has this to do with our general question, as to whether, at the time of Holy Communion on the three great occasions when the Pontiff celebrates solemnly, he receives sitting?

But even in the concluding words of Pope Benedict's letter (than which nothing can be more natural and every-day), the Dean discovers a depth of design and subtlety:—"And since we have resolved to celebrate Mass sitting, it will be your duty to prepare the altar, &c. ; and confidently leaving everything to your singular dexterity, we very lovingly bestow upon you our Apostolical Benediction." This, and all such other matters of arrangement, however plain and simple, when in connection with the Pope, have, in the eyes of our author, but one intention. He is resolved to think that they are meant to deceive. That wise permission by which a sick Pontiff can still enjoy the grace and the consolations of the Holy Sacrifice, and that dexterous arrangement by means of which the Pope (generally of infirm age) can be supported on great festival days through the fatigues of a long ceremony, are all parts of a deep scheme. Successive Popes are "endeavouring to combine a prescribed attitude either with convenience or with change of sentiment." Their dicta are "characteristic specimens of that singular dexterity which Benedict XIV. attributes to his Master of Ceremonies, and which has so often marked the proceedings of the Roman Court—a minute example of the subtle genius of that institution which could produce a Syllabus," &c. No enthusiast of the Presbyterian school has ever surpassed this in his wildest imaginings.

Before concluding, I may advert to another singular mistake into which the Dean has fallen. "The Pope, in his chief cathedral, celebrates on a wooden plank or table." This is a repetition from his former article, in which (arguing against the Mass) the Dean had stated that the Pope cele-

brates on the table used by S. Peter in the house of Pudens. Had he looked into Aringhus or Martene, he would have found the following :—"Extat in ecclesiâ S. Praxidis altare in quo B. Petrus, ut pia fert traditio, immortalî Deo sacrificium offerebat, lignea autem altaris tabula, præ vetustate nimîâ consumpta, cernitur, et *sub altari lapideo* locata est."

Let me revert, however, to my main subject. "The variation in the statement of Martene and Gerbet," says the Dean, "is met by the silence, or by the express contradiction of other authorities, *not indeed so high*, but still of considerable weight." That is to say, the authority of the Roman "Ordo," and that of such writers as Patricio, Georgio, Marcello, Catelani, Rocca, Urban VIII., and Benedict XIV., is less than that of Martene, who is not a rubrician, but an archæologist,—less than that of Gerbet, who never wrote a word upon the rubrics in his life! This will be fresh knowledge for our students in rites and ceremonies.

But we will sum up this matter in short. The position of the Sovereign Pontiff at the time of Communion, even on the few great days when he receives at the throne, is the *standing* position. Such it has been, says Marcello, "ab antiquissimis temporibus." We have notice of this particular rubric more than a thousand years ago. That at the time of Communion some Popes in ancient days occasionally sat, we know from the statements of our own writers to this effect. In the absence of other motive, it is quite natural for us to suppose it to have been the same as would hold good at the present time; namely, infirmity. Dr. Baggs writes as follows: "Perhaps the most probable reason for the Pope's Communion at the throne, is, that he may more readily sit down, if the infirmity incidental to his advanced age should require it." But that the rule is that he shall *stand*, cannot for a moment be questioned. "The Pontiff receives standing in (or at) his throne." These are the words of one of the most illustrious of all the Popes. Who is the more likely to be correct, the Dean of Westminster or Benedict XIV.?

I am, Sir,

Yours very truly,

ALEXIUS MILLS.

CORRIGENDA IN OUR LAST NUMBER.

IN p. 42 we say that theology declares "the One Divine Essence to terminate Three Divine Persons." Theological students will have observed that this was an oversight; and that we should have spoken of theology as declaring "the Three Divine Persons to terminate One Divine Essence."

The two following letters will speak for themselves. They were addressed to the "Tablet" in the course of last July.

To the Editor of the Tablet.

SIR,—In a letter which appeared with my signature in the current DUBLIN REVIEW, I say at page 258 :—

"Still and far more do I fear the consequences of subjecting Christian students to examinations on a subject so closely bordering on religion itself as that of moral philosophy, which avowedly encourage and even make essential to success the study of that subject under heretical and even atheistical aspects. And here I will say in passing that I am quite at a loss to understand how those who object, and, as I think, rightly object, to Catholics taking advantage of the Oxford examination, although without the condition of residence, can yet see no corresponding evil in taking a similar advantage of the examinations in philosophy at the London University."

Here I imply that there are persons who desire to subject Catholic students to the Oxford examinations in moral philosophy as at present conducted. I find on further inquiry that I was mistaken in this supposition, and I hasten to express my regret for having omitted to inform myself more fully before giving it publicity. On the other hand, all that I have said as to the danger of allowing Catholics to take part in the examinations of the London University, on the same class of subjects, remains unqualified by this admission.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

July 19.

FREDERICK OAKELEY.

To the Editor of the Tablet.

SIR,—Some expressions in the article in the DUBLIN REVIEW, on "the Life of F. Faber," have been misunderstood; the words "whining and sermonizing" applied (p. 118) to the conduct of Dr. Longley towards him having been supposed (most naturally) to be the expression of my own feeling. Allow me therefore to explain, that if what I originally wrote could have been published entire, the effect would have been exactly the reverse. Unfortunately it was necessary that the article should be shortened; and for this purpose alone half a page immediately preceding these words was omitted, without any one observing the effect which its omission would have on what followed. The article originally ran thus :—

“Years afterwards, when Dr. Longley had reached the summit of his profession, F. Faber, looking back to his Harrow course, said that he believed he owed his soul to the kind and well-judged treatment he received at this time from the head master. Complaints were made to him, that, a violent thunderstorm having led to serious talk among the boys gathered in the churchyard, young Faber had made a public profession of Atheism. The character of the school was at stake, and there was danger that parents would remove their sons from it. Dr. Longley was advised to send him away. In such a case much would no doubt depend on the character of the boy. Coleridge used to tell how, when he was a schoolboy aged about thirteen, he tried to apprentice himself to a shoemaker; and when taken by him to the master, told him that he ‘hated the thought of being a clergyman. Because, sir, to tell you the truth, I am an infidel.’ ‘Whereupon, without more ado, Bowyer flogged me—wisely as I think, soundly as I know. Any whining or sermonizing would have gratified my vanity, and confirmed me in my absurdity; as it was, I was laughed at, and got heartily ashamed of my folly.’ This, most likely, was the best course that could have been taken with a boy without any special religious impressions, and whose profession of infidelity had been a matter of conceit rather than anything else. Whether Dr. Longley was guided by a penetrating estimate of young Faber’s character, or (as seems more likely) by natural kindness, he took exactly the opposite course, and that most likely to produce an effect on a boy of singularly strong affections, who had already felt earnestly, and (for his age) thought much upon religion.”

After this followed what appears in the article. Had this not been omitted, I think the words “whining and sermonizing” (the two obnoxious words being marked as a quotation), would have been understood as they were meant, as expressing merely what Coleridge in the above extract so described; but it could not have been supposed that I meant to speak disrespectfully of what Dr. Longley did.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

THE WRITER OF THE ARTICLE IN THE “DUBLIN” ON F. FABER.

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
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
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