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
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




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THE

# DUBLIN REVIEW.

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JANUARY, 1873.

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ART. I.—IRELAND IN THE REIGN OF JAMES I.

*Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, of the reign of James I., 1603—1606; preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office and elsewhere.* Edited by the Rev. C. W. RUSSELL, D.D., and JOHN P. PRENDERGAST, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Longman & Co.

EVERY man, a great authority has told us, is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. That remarkable saying, like many other sayings of its author, is somewhat esoteric and requires translation. It means that one half mankind has a tendency to take things for granted, and the other half (which, being Irish, we may say is very much the smaller) has a tendency to restrict its beliefs to what it has proved. Plato, rightly or wrongly, is supposed to be the representative man of the first class,—that class of people who speak of the *depth of a man's consciousness* and the *reach of a man's intentions*. Aristotle is the ruler and leader of the second class, that class of people, who, no matter how splendid a stranger's appearance, suspect him at first of being a thief in disguise, and never think of offering him a seat in their house, till he has satisfied them of his honesty and told them the story of his life. Whether the Coleridgian principle holds with regard to all men, or whether, if it does, it is anything more than a dropsical truism, we shall not undertake to say. But it certainly holds with regard to all historians. Every historian is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. The methods of writing history are all reducible to two, the method creative and the method inductive. The former has been adopted by persons of such eminence as Titus Livius, Oliver Goldsmith, and James Anthony Froude. Writers of this class proceed as was the custom with those geographers who, says Swift,

In Afric maps  
With savage pictures fill their gaps,  
And o'er unhabitable downs  
Place elephants for want of towns.

When they cannot find facts or will not find facts, they make them; and they have a very natural and very amiable preference for their own progeny. The writers, on the contrary, who follow the inductive method, deal with fact only, and that not of subjective origin. Their number is not large, and their success has not been striking. Their productions are generally wanting in literary completeness and are rarely glorified by the vision and the faculty divine. But they are content with incompleteness as long as they retain certainty, and resign fancies without a murmur if they are permitted to possess truth.

If those who have undertaken to write the history of Ireland have generally adopted the creative method, we are not disposed to think them very much to blame. They could hardly help it. The most important of the real facts of Irish history were, till very lately, either altogether unknown, or known only under deceptive shapes. And it was next to impossible to know them, face to face, and in their natural form. They were hidden away in all manner of almost inaccessible corners and almost undecipherable parchments; and the unlucky wight who went in quest of them, was likely to retire discomfited at last, with, possibly, an exhausted purse, and probably an exhausted patience. But a better time has come. The thoughts of men have been much widened by the process of the suns. The liberality of contemporary statesmen has brought to exhume the materials of Irish history what alone was equal to the task—State interference. The history of Ireland since the time of Henry II. is little more than the history of its relations with England. The true condition of those relations would be most credibly described in the State documents of both countries; and, by the publication of those documents, the student would have an opportunity of getting a true glimpse of the Ireland of the past. These documents, as is known, are being published now, at the public expense, and with the best editorial aids which the country possesses. In the volume now before us we have all the procurable official papers referring to the first three and a half years of the reign of James I. And these supply us, we may say at once, with abundant materials for at least one chapter in the history of Ireland.

When we mention that the present collection has been made and edited by Dr. Russell, of Maynooth, and Mr. John P. Prendergast, the editors of the *Carte Papers*, we say enough to make the reader aware that, in so far as editorship is concerned, the volume is faultless. In this department of literature, as in many others, Dr. Russell's character stands so high



that his name as editor is a sufficient guarantee that the edition has had all the advantages which the most extensive learning and the best culture can impart. And the reader's highest expectations will be more than realized by the present volume. In the preface, which extends over more than a hundred pages, he will find an extent and minuteness of historical, biographical, and archæological knowledge which are truly wonderful; and in the general index he will find a completeness and conciseness and precision of reference which are not the less valuable because they are so rare. But it is not in the preface, nor in the general index, that the literary ability of the editors becomes most conspicuous: it is in the papers themselves. These, often the offspring of very roving and very irregular minds, are so excellently managed, everything worth keeping being undisturbed, nothing that would be impertinent being retained; the peculiar manner and phraseology of the original writers are so well preserved; and the selections for full verbal quotation are so judicious, that the documents possess, apart from their historical value, a large amount of dramatic interest. They have not lost in Dr. Russell's hands what they would have lost in the hands of less gifted editors, the pathetic marks which remind us that they are the utterances of men dead and buried and judged for more than two hundred years.

The labour of making and editing the collection must have been immense. Had the editors confined themselves to the papers in the Public Record Office, their work, though in itself sufficiently serious, would have been comparatively slight. But, with the sanction of the Master of the Rolls, they have resolved upon publishing "a complete Calendar of all the State Papers relating to Ireland under James I, wherever they are deposited"; and the present volume is the first instalment of the fulfilment of their undertaking. To give the reader a faint idea of the mere physical editorial toil of which this Calendar is the result, it is only necessary to name the sources from which the papers have been derived. These the editors in their preface modestly refer to under a few general heads,—“the Public Record Office, the Library of the British Museum, the Lambeth Library, the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, and other less accessible quarters.” But these are merely the localities where the documents are to be found; and in each of these localities there exist various separate collections every one of which had to be visited and examined. In the Public Record Office, London, there are the Conway Papers and the General Collection; in the British Museum, there are the Cottonian MSS.,

the Lansdowne MSS., the Harleian MSS., and the Sloane\* Collection; in the Lambeth Library there are the Carew Papers; in the Bodleian Library there is the Carte Collection; in the Public Record Office, Dublin, there are the Philadelphia Papers; in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, there are the Ussher MSS., the Stearne MSS., the Alexander MSS.; and, besides all these, there are numerous private collections, each with its fragment, more or less precious, of Ireland's past. The mere mention of these names will, as we have said, give some faint idea of the toil and ability which the Calendar represents. But, for the general reader, the idea must be only a faint one. It is the initiated alone who will be able to appreciate properly the work of the editors. None but they who have some time or other engaged in work of a similar kind can form anything like a just estimate of the vast knowledge, the solidity of judgment, and the delicacy of discrimination which that work required for its proper performance. It is very little certainly for the editors to say, in sketching their labours, that "the task of bringing together the materials of a work so comprehensive has involved considerable difficulty and research," and that "it is often a work of much difficulty to bring into harmony and assign to their proper chronological order documents so miscellaneous, so widely dispersed, and in some cases with so few extrinsic notes of date or authority." To do all that is indeed a difficulty, but to do it as it has been done by Dr. Russell is also a triumph.

Whatever we say we cannot exaggerate the historical importance of the documents themselves. It is true that they cover, as we have already remarked, only three and a half years of a single reign. But that reign is of such moment in Irish history, and its first years are so surrounded with historic suspense,—their ultimate aim remaining so long in such sustained uncertainty,—that perhaps there is no other period of the same duration in the annals of Ireland more curiously and variously interesting than those three and a half

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\* Sir Hans Sloane. It was of him that Young wrote:—

“But what in oddness can be more sublime  
Than Sloane, the foremost toyman of his time!  
How his eyes languish! how his thoughts adore  
The painted coat that Joseph never wore!  
He shows, on holidays, a sacred pin  
That touch'd the ruff that touch'd Queen Bess' chin.”

No one will be likely to doubt that most of the old collectors were little better than toy-men in intent. But, in effect, they were very frequently among the best servants of science. What their contemporaries looked on as toys, our contemporaries have often to look on as treasures.

years with which the present Calendar is concerned. The editors promise in their preface to point out on a future occasion the bearing of the documents before us on the whole reign of James I; and to the performance of that promise we look forward with much expectancy. Meanwhile, we shall, we think, be doing the reader a service if we prepare him to profit by the performance of the promise. We may do so by sketching for him the history of Ireland from 1603 to 1606, and by sketching it for him as it is told in the Calendar. We shall take especial care to adhere to our text. For the most part we shall set the Calendar to speak for itself. We ourselves shall say nothing which is not authorized by the papers published in the volume before us, we shall keep as far from irritating subjects as we find feasible; and, if we have to speak about them, we will take care to speak as temperately and respectfully as shall be permitted by human infirmity.

“James, the sixth of that name, King of Scotland” became “King of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland,”\* on the 24th of March, 1603, the day on which Queen Elizabeth died. On that day, six hours after the Queen was discrowned for ever, his Scottish Majesty’s accession to the throne was proclaimed in London. But the parallel proclamation in Ireland did not take place till the following 5th of April,† the delay, it is thought, being occasioned by the difficulties of communication between the two countries at the time. On the 5th of April, however, the Queen’s death, and the King’s succession, were publicly announced at the High Cross, in Dublin. Lord Mountjoy was Lord Deputy at the time of the Queen’s demise, and when news of that event arrived he was elected (9th of April) Justice and Governor of Ireland till such time as the will of the new sovereign should be made known. On the 17th of April it was announced in Dublin that Mountjoy had been reappointed Lord Deputy. Shortly after he was made Lord Lieutenant; and “on the 26th of May he was called over to England and continued to reside there assisting the Council with his great experience of the affairs of Ireland (as appears by his signature attached to the papers from the Council) until his death, on the 3rd of April, 1606.”‡ In his absence

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\* Calendar, p. 1. Our references, when they are not made to the date of the documents, will be made to the page of the Calendar.

† It is said in the preface (cx.) that “the Queen’s death does not seem to have been known in Ireland until the 5th of April. Father Meehan, on the authority of Fynes Morrison, maintains that Deputy Mountjoy knew it on the 27th March. (Fate and Fortunes, &c., p. 5.)

‡ Preface, p. cxi.

Sir George Carey and Sir Arthur Chichester were successively Lord Deputies, deputies, however, not of the Lieutenant, but of the King. Sir George Carey continued in office till the 24th of February, 1605, when he resigned the sword to Sir Arthur Chichester. Sir Arthur was Lord Deputy from that time till his retirement from public life in the end of 1615. But the papers in the present volume go no further than the end of October, 1606. The present volume, therefore, accounts for a little less than two years of Sir George Carey's rule,\* and a little more than a year and a half of Sir Arthur Chichester's.

Besides those three just mentioned, Chichester and Carey and Mountjoy, the most remarkable characters of whom the papers speak are Cecil (known also in the Calendar as Viscount Cranbourne and Earl of Salisbury), Sir John Davys, Sir Jeffrey Fenton, Sir George Carew, Sir Henry Brounker, Lord Clanrickarde, the Duke of Ormond, Sir Patrick Barnewell, the Earl of Tyrconnel, and the Earl of Tyrone. But these are only a few of the more prominent political actors. We have numberless others who, though politically of less importance, are often quite as interesting, and sometimes distinguished by a more admirable originality. In fact our drama, as is generally the case in real life, has many more characters than the stage can conveniently accommodate. But they are so beautifully diversified, that, in an artistic sense at least, we cannot wish one of them away. Even Lieutenant Downing, who hanged two poor idiots for pastime on a Sunday morning; Sir Toby Caulfield, who, in the service of his royal master, tempts Tyrone's wife to enter into a charming little conspiracy against her husband; and the Protestant Bishop of Limerick, who asks his Majesty to make him bishop of Dromore as well, because Limerick and Dromore are conveniently contiguous; even these, and others like these, have their artistic charms. Mr. Froude has lately told us that we never produced a single national drama, and he has advanced that fact as a crowning justification of his unconcealed contempt for the Irish race. We could, if we chose, assign special causes for our want of a worthy national drama, just as we could assign general causes for our want of a worthy national literature. But we do not choose to enter upon that subject here. We only ask permission to say that, if we have no great drama, it is not because of a dearth of characters, and

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\* Sir George was Deputy for two-and-twenty months. F. Meehan (p. 51) restricts the period of his deputyship to nine months. That is an obvious error, but perhaps it is a printer's error for "a year and nine months," which would be sufficiently accurate.

that, thanks to Mr. Froude's countrymen, an Irish dramatist will for the production of tragic incidents require no large amount of originality.\*

And, not only the characters introduced, but the documents themselves rejoice in a most interesting variety. We have a proclamation from the sacred pen of King James, in which his Majesty indignantly repels the atrocious suspicion that he would tolerate popery; and we have a connubial note from Lady Carew, in which she announces to her absent spouse that "ther hatheben gret shuting at the castel, and I amnot a frade." We have very learned but very lengthy legal arguments from Sir John Davys, in which he shows that the English kings had from the beginning an instinctive pre-determined antipathy to the popes; and we have an equally learned and far more lengthy argument from Chief Justice Saxey, in which, while his knowledge of Zorababel and Nehemias, and his anxiety for the reformation of the reformed Church in Ireland make one think him a saint fresh from the celestial mint, his intense malice against the Irish Catholics suggest the very opposite of a heavenly origin.† But, with all their variety, the documents are in one or two respects somewhat monotonous. We have a little too much mendicancy, and rather an over-supply of hounds and hawks. Most of the letters from the Irish side of the Channel are addressed to Cecil; most of them are begging letters; and most of them offer the sporting secretary a dog or a falcon. The communications of the city of Waterford and of Sir George Carey, are honourable exceptions. The city sends a present to Cecil, but, wisely remembering that nights of comfort are quite as necessary as days of sport, it elects to offer him, not a bird or beast, but "two coverings for his bed, and two rundells of aquavitæ." Sir George writes to Cecil very often,

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\* It has amused us not a little to meet in the Calendar a charge against the Irish analagous to that preferred by Mr. Froude. Sir Henry Brounker tells us (p. 545) that "there was never yet any Irish martyr." And yet, as we shall have to show hereafter, this same Sir Henry was daily hanging both priests and people because they would neither attend the Protestant service nor abandon the Catholic. Mr. Carlyle has said that of the two it is better to live an heroic poem than merely to write one. It might be added that people whose lives are heroic poems rarely think of writing heroic poetry. And it might be suggested that Ireland has written no tragedy because her own life is so terribly tragic. She may yet do something even in the literary way to satisfy Mr. Froude. But she may be excused from doing it till her sorrows are made nothing more than a memory.

† At a later period (Calendar, p. 482) Saxey sought to be Lord Chief Baron. Chichester opposed his appointment on the ground that he was "very corrupt and unfit."

and never that we remember asks Cecil "to carve for him."\* But Sir George, as we shall see, very wisely helped himself. All the other officials of Government are beggars. Nor is it the government officials alone who cringe, and wriggle; and whine, and look for the crumbs from their master's table. The same or similar conduct is patronized by even the Earl of Tyrone; and many of the other Irish chieftains excel their conquerors in meanness and servility. It must, however, be allowed in defence of these latter, that the wretched state to which they and their country were reduced, was enough to break any but the strongest spirit.

Indeed, when King James succeeded to the sovereignty of Ireland, he did not succeed to a prosperous or promising inheritance. Both the country and the people were reduced to the extreme of misery. All the woes that afflict humanity had gathered together in league against an unhappy land:—war, famine, pestilence, a brutal soldiery, a malignant executive, laws which the devil himself would be ashamed to sanction, and a king whose life is an everlasting argument of the vast extent of popular patience. From the beginning of the Calendar to its end, the tale it tells of the state of Ireland is a tale of lamentation and mourning and woe. In page 9 we read that the country lies waste in all parts, save where his Majesty is outwardly obeyed; and, in the very next page but one, we have a petition from the Council in Ireland to the King, asking his Majesty to send over at once victuals, munitions, and money. In page 26 the Deputy Mountjoy makes the pregnant remark that all the garrans in Ireland would not be able to draw a single cannon. Further on we learn that the soldiers—even they! have victuals for only a few days, and that the officials are unable to divine what will become of them for want of supplies. Connaught, we are told, is in such a condition of distress that the Government may, without a sin, allow the O'Rourkes to hold it, "for none but devils could live in such a hell."† When Sir John Davys comes to Ireland for the first time, he finds pestilence and famine raging around him, and he cannot call the kingdom a commonwealth, but is forced to call it a common misery. Sir John arrived in Ireland about the middle of November, 1603, and the plague was then only just beginning.‡ It became so serious after-

\* Vide Calendar : Sir Randall McDonnell to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 518.

† Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, p. 25.

‡ This same plague had already done much damage in England. It afterwards visited Scotland, and almost decimated that kingdom in 1606. "The printed histories of Scotland take no notice of a most dreadful pestilence that broke out there this year, which according to the Chancellor's letter to the

wards that through the whole of 1604, and the greater part of 1605, it scattered the Council of State, interrupted the course of public business, and at one time looked as if it meant to settle the Irish question for ever. On December 28th, 1603, just two months after it had made its first appearance, Sir George Carey is sorry to write that "the plague increaseth in the city, and is much dispersed in the country." In the same letter Sir George says that they are in great distress for want of victuals. There were at the time 5,000 soldiers in Leinster, 2,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and Sir George assures us that for three months there has been nothing to maintain these 5,000 men and 3,000 horses. We cannot, however, believe, even on the word of a Lord Deputy, that for three months they lived upon nothing. And we begin to have an idea that, with a famine in the land, and 5,000 soldiers quartered upon them, the people of Leinster were not likely to suffer from fulness of bread. Sir George goes on to tell us that the case of Leinster is not exceptional. "The kingdom," he says "is in famine and great scarcity, and victuals are not to be had here, but must be supplied from England." Chichester, writing shortly afterwards, compares Ireland to Pharaoh's lean kine; not only is it a skeleton itself, but it eats up the flesh and fatness of England.\* About the same time Sir John Davys informed Cecil that even the priests have to live in "a sluttish beggary"; and he expresses his decided conviction that the priests, if they had means, would run away from that miserable country, "for," says Sir John, "they get nothing but bacon and oatmeal, the people are so poor."† Nor do matters improve as our Calendar proceeds. On July 13th, 1604, Sir Theobald Dillon writes to Cecil that there is no news worth troubling him with except the great scarcity of food, and that the plague is very hot; that great quietness is enjoyed, and will be enjoyed, adds Sir Theobald, "until the race of thieves is able to live." In September of the same year the English Lord Chancellor, Ellesmere, writing to Sir John Davys, prays God to stay His hand from further afflicting that wasted kingdom of Ireland. "They have," he goes on, "already felt the scourge of war and oppression, and now are under the grievous scourge of famine and pestilence."‡ On August 8th, 1605, the country is, according to Chichester,

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King, infected all corners of the kingdom to such a degree that there was a suspension of all public business." And yet frequently in our Calendar we have the Irish plague represented as the God-sent punishment of Irish disloyalty.

\* Sir Arthur Chichester to Cecil, p. 149.

† Sir John Davys to Cecil, p. 162.

‡ Lord Chancellor Ellesmere to Sir John Davys, p. 195.

“waste and full of misery”; and on the last day of September of the same year, the same Chichester has to announce, after travelling through the whole of Ulster, that no composition or tax can be levied in that province in consequence of its “exceeding great waste and desolations.” And so does it continue throughout the whole sickening story. On January 16th, 1606, Sir Charles Wilmott writes that the Irish are just as stubborn and self-willed as ever, except that they are reduced to quiet by the most extreme poverty, and by their “utter weakness of body”; and on the 27th of July following, Sentleger sends a mewed goss-hawk to Cecil; intimates that “this poor kingdom” is quiet; but expresses his belief that it is quiet simply because it is hard for people dying of starvation to be anything else.

There is one little incident recorded in connection with the poverty of the people, which has appeared to us to be peculiarly moving. After a spice of his wonted irresoluteness and even after a refusal, the King gave his Irish subjects permission to serve in the foreign wars. Immediately, there ran from Ireland, as from a doomed land, not only the men that were fit for soldiers, but large numbers of those whose sex or age excluded them from military service. Many of these latter, for want of means to complete their journey, were obliged to abide awhile in London. But, such was their miserable appearance, so plain upon them the marks of persecution and pestilence and famine, that the King and Council, fearing perhaps that London might be kind and inquisitive, gave instant orders that the starving people should be shipped at once, not to the land of exile which they sought, but back to Ireland, where their nakedness could give no scandal, and their wayside deaths could evoke no revenge. A good deal has been written of the murderous way in which the poor are sometimes bandied about from parish to parish, till at last in pure pity Death takes them to his own. But not even in parochial annals is there anything so piteous as the story we have just told. A nation flying from starvation, driven back to starve! A nation flying from pestilence, driven back to die! God’s command to feed the hungry forbidden fulfilment! Irishmen brought down so low as not to be worthy of being even beggars! With this evidence before us we no longer wonder at the other ghastly tales told of that terrible time. Even such fearful cannibalism as that of mothers eating their children, and children devouring their dead mothers, however it might shock, would not surprise us in the Ireland of 1605. Before hunger kills man it kills his humanity.



Nor was the famine caused, as it might be thought to be caused by a failure of the crops. Several times both Davys and Chichester assure their correspondents, not only that the Irish soil is naturally fertile, but that, wherever they have seen specimens of the crops, they are unquestionably excellent. The fact is, there were hardly any crops sown. This must be admitted to be, in some measure, a consequence of the fearful war through which Ireland had just passed, and, in some measure, a consequence of the pestilence that followed the war. The rebellion of Hugh O'Neill which at one time gave such splendid promise, but which ended so disastrously at Kinsale, had taken the peasantry from their employment and deprived the farmers of the means of continuing to cultivate their lands. The men who could work were either dead or hiding. The men who had land had no money. Even Tyrone, whom the Government seems to have been desirous to oblige, and who, strangely enough, could and did lend the Government considerable sums of money, was never so poor, and was utterly unable, the Calendar tells us, to cultivate the one-twentieth part of his lands. We are not therefore surprised to find the Council of Dublin, when asked by the Council of London to put a stop to Irish emigration, replying that they promised to do their best; that they have no great hope of entirely succeeding; that the people are desperately bent on getting to the "regions abroad"; and yet that one of the greatest wants of Ireland was the want of men to "manure the ground." The men had mostly manured the ground already. But it was with their dead bodies.

Apart, however, from the want of labourers, we are not left without knowledge of very sufficient causes which made the famine a physical necessity. Throughout this Calendar each one of the officials of the Irish Government expresses his unalterable conviction that there is no efficient way of ruling Ireland except the way of stripes and starvation. Even Sir John Davys, whom we do not believe to have been as bad a man as Father Meehan tries to make him, appears, at least in his later letters, to be of the same opinion. Chichester's first principle is that the Irish will submit to English rule just as long as they are physically incapable of giving it opposition, and therefore they must by all means be kept on low diet.

To what would he on quail and pheasant swell  
Who even on tripe and carrion could rebel!

When poor Oliver Twist fought in defence of his dead mother's name, a course in which he had not James I. for an example, the starved little creature was quickly overpowered

by those brave big people, Mr. Noah Claypole, Miss Charlotte, and Mrs. Sowerberry. But Oliver was not submissive. Mr. Bumble was sent for. "Ain't you a trembling while I speak?" said Mr. Bumble. "No!" said Oliver, stoutly. Mr. Bumble stood aghast. Mrs. Sowerberry suggested that Oliver must be mad. "It's not madness, ma'am," replied Mr. Bumble, after a few moments of deep meditation; "it's not madness, ma'am, it's meat." Sir Arthur Chichester was only the Bumble of a bigger parish. His general policy was so to impoverish the country, and so to weaken the people as that the Irish would have died out before they had an opportunity for another rebellion. A similar policy, but with much more of manly candour about it, had been pursued by Carey and Mountjoy. That was the policy, too, sanctified by the approval of the Protestant clergy. For instance, at p. 58 there will be found a letter to the King from the reverend fathers in God, the bishops of Dublin and Meath. In this letter their lordships, among many other remarkable bits of information which they offer his Majesty, treat him to these two; that it was the intention of the Catholic party, if they had succeeded in the late rebellion, to put all his Majesty's loyal subjects to the sword; and that peace and posterity are two things which the Irish nation, of all others, cannot endure. We can guess the object in making such charges.

Father Meehan tells us, on the authority of an eye-witness, that the troops of Mountjoy, when off duty, were accustomed to uproot the growing crops with their swords, and to set fire for amusement to the haggards and barns.\* We do not read in the Calendar any statement precisely identical. But we read many statements extremely like that of F. Meehan's; and these go far to account for Irish starvation under James I. The soldiers are throughout described by their own commanders as murdering and robbing without mercy or remorse. One of the very first things we read is a spicy letter (p. 6) from Captain Thomas Boyd to Sir Charles Wilmott. The gallant captain reports to his chief that he has blocked up the castle of the O'Sullivans, at Ballingarry; that the inmates, mostly women and children, are not less than a hundred; that he has taken care not to leave them even water to live on; and that "not one creature that comes shall live except for intelligence." Now, up\* and down the country, in

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\* "Fate and Fortunes of Tyrone and Tyrconnel," pp. 14, 15. See also the note in page 17, where Fynes Morrison says that "Mountjoy spent five days in the neighbourhood (of Tullaghoge), 1602, and after spoiling the corn of the whole country, smashed the chair whereon the O'Neills were wont to be created."

all the provinces, and in most of the towns, were scattered bands of soldiers, filled with the same zeal as Captain Thomas Boyd. These we would not expect to be very nice in their notions of honesty. Their chiefs tell us how they acted. On November 23rd, 1603, Chichester writes to Cecil that the army is forced to range upon the country for want of victuals in the King's store. He does not blame the soldiers, but he cannot conceal that some stress must be laid upon them to reduce them to discipline and order. "Their carriage as it is now is," he says, "brings to the grief and discontent of the poor inhabitants."\* But three days before the letter of Chichester was written, Sir George Carey had furnished Cecil with more precise information.† He tells the Secretary plainly that, until the soldiers are brought to order, there is no hope of raising the tax from the people. The soldiers devour all. Even the Commissioners, he says, are guilty of wholesale robbery. They take up cattle at 15s. the head, a pork at 4s., and a mutton at 2s.; which Sir George pronounces to be so unjust, that neither he nor the Lord Lieutenant had ever ventured to do it. That last remark of the Deputy's is a fine proof of his modesty. He and Mountjoy did not indeed take up a "mutton" for 2s.; they took it for nothing, and we shall see hereafter that, however little the Commissioners paid for what they seized on, they were only a few months before their age, and were really only anticipating the law.

But the fullest and, as a matter of course, the most felicitous account of the conduct of the soldiery, comes to us from the pen of Sir John Davys. Sir John is writing to Cecil, February 20th, 1604; he has been describing the abuses in the Irish Church, in the Irish Law Courts, and, generally, in the Irish executive. He winds up the first part of his letter in this way:—"But the loss and misery of the subject grows in so many ways that he hears many of them say that hitherto the peace hath been more heavy and grievous to them than the wars, for, besides the famine and pestilence, they suffer the 'cesse' (as they call it) of the soldiers, which they think the worst plague of all; for the soldier will not be satisfied with such food as the country farmer hath in his house, but will kill his pig, his lamb, his calf, and so destroy (*spem gregis*) the hope that he hath to restore his flock again, or otherwise doth extort old sterling money from him to save what he hath from havoc and spoils." In "Old Mortality," Scott does his

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\* Sir Arthur Chichester to Cecil, p. 108.

† Carey to Cecil, p. 108.

very best to give his readers an idea of the manner in which the people of Scotland suffered from the "cessing" of Claverhouse's dragoons. But even the Wizard of the North never could conjure up in fancy such a scene as Sir John Davys knew to be a very vulgar matter of fact. And as things were when Sir John wrote the passage we have quoted, so they continued. Every day, Sir John himself assures Cecil, complaints of that kind came to the Lord Deputy. Further on, Lord Barry Buttevant tells the Chief Secretary, that the people are daily expecting some measure for the repression of the extortions of Government troops, soldiers, sheriffs, and cesses, "who impoverish this poor kingdom and commonwealth."\* But the people expected relief in vain. More than a year afterwards (March 12th, 1605), Chichester briefly tells Cecil that the soldiers render it impossible for him to raise the tax; they keep no garrison, but live as they please upon the people. And about the same time the King's Majesty is informed by Richard Hudson that, "the whole country is depopulated, wasted, and rent asunder by the daily extortion of the soldiers taking meat and money at their pleasure, whereas by the statute of that realm"—James care for statutes!†—"the soldiers should pay for their meat, whereby great numbers of the subjects perished."‡ After hearing all this we are prepared for what Chichester afterwards tells Cecil, that the very sight or name of a soldier is odious and hateful to all the country.§

But, perhaps, worse than the cessing of the English soldiers was the rapacity of the English commanders. On this matter we should not expect the Calendar to be very communicative, for the Irish officials would naturally not tell tales on themselves. But, fortunately, some of the most common passions of man expose bad causes as well as good causes to suffer from traitors. In the volume before us we have indications of squabbles among the thieves, and one of the ordinary consequences of such squabbles occurs. In p. 203 we have a letter to Cecil written by Sir Jeffrey Fenton. Fenton had been lately across

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\* Lord Barry Buttevant to Cecil, p. 153.

† The very first official act of James, after his accession to the throne of England, was a direct violation of English law. It happened on his journey from Edinburgh to London. A thief, caught in the act of stealing, was brought before his Majesty; his Majesty had him hanged at once, without any form of trial whatever. And in this he was, for once, self-consistent; for in his philosophy the King was the speaking law. See Guthrie's "History of Scotland," vol. ix. p. 7.

‡ "A Discourse presented to the King's Majesty touching Ireland," by Richard Hudson, p. 230.

§ Sir Arthur Chichester to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 279.

the Channel to see the Secretary, and the Secretary had roundly charged him with wholesale robbery in Ireland. Cecil appears, for once in a way, to have been seriously indignant. When Sir Jeffery pleaded his innocence, Cecil would give him no hearing; but, in so far as we can gather, ordered him peremptorily to the door. Sir Jeffrey's wife was then at Lichfield. Thither the worthy knight betook himself, and, with Lady Fenton's assistance, drew up, for Cecil to read, the defence which that minister was too disgusted to hear. It is no present concern of ours whether or not Sir Jeffrey's statement of his affairs is veracious. We are content to suppose that it is, for we do not like to doubt a man who speaks so finely of "God's justice, which sleepeth not," and who is so charitable to his adversaries that he leaves them utterly to the Divine will. But there is a part of Sir Jeffrey's plea which we ask the reader to look to. He knows, he says, that he has been informed upon by some of his fellow-officials. But he defies them all. He is the one clean-handed, white-souled seraph among them; "for," says he, proudly, "what I have got is mine by no unlawful or dishonest ways, *and there are not many of my informers who can in like safety of conscience avow the same for themselves.*" That we venture to consider a very suggestive remark, and Salisbury might be expected to regard it as calling for further inquiry. But the subtle Secretary did not so regard it. Fenton he believed to be a scandalous robber. Fenton's accusers he believed to be as bad as Fenton himself. But both were only doing their duty, for both were only acting as the policy of England taught them to act. And so the matter dropped. Sir Jeffrey Fenton returned to Ireland; his accusers held their places still; and both accused and accusers went on to rob and lie and quote Scripture as before.

But that the members of the Irish executive were guilty of the grossest embezzlement, and that if there was one honest man amongst them he had missed his vocation, rests on evidence much more definite and decisive than a general charge made by a known rogue. The Calendar leaves no room for doubt on the matter. No Englishman took service in Ireland except with the understanding that he might act both as a royal cruiser and as a privateer. Elizabeth had declared that office in Ireland was *per se* a preferment, and that when she gave a man an appointment in that country she expected that, no matter what had been his previous services, he would come to her for no further reward. The English officials of James remembered the hint of the Virgin Queen. They came to Ireland, as Mr. George Montgomery,

bishop, save the mark, tells us he came, to make a fortune. On the 12th of March, 1605, Sir Arthur Chichester tells Viscount Cranbourne that the Government surveyors are monstrously corrupt; that they give away the lands to their friends at the smallest assignable fraction of their real value; that these abuses, however, have been connived at so long that it is next to impossible to amend or prevent them; that, in fact, Chichester's Government is disgraced and nullified by the conduct of the other officials, "most men," says he, "applying their employments here to enable themselves after a few years spent in that service (as they unjustly term it) to live better elsewhere."\* More than half a year afterwards † he makes the same complaint in terms still stronger. He laments the unabated corruption of the under officers. He insinuates that the corruption extends even to the Council, and that the very men who have been appointed to advise and assist him in governing the country are occupied solely in receiving the pay and "sucking the sweets of Ireland." He is evidently disgusted with the conduct of his fellows; he evidently foresees that that conduct will ruin the country; his own position is hopeless; and being as yet, though a tyrant, something of an honest man, he tells the Chief Secretary that he would like to retire. But, unhappily for himself, he was left in office. And the corruption which annoyed him in the beginning annoys him even to the end. On the 14th of August, 1606, we have Sir Henry Brounker complaining to Cecil of the juggling of the treasurer and the corruption of the paymaster, "who enrich themselves," &c; ‡ but, one fortnight before, the unfortunate Chichester had to make a similar though far more serious complaint. The money, he says, which the English Council sends him is embezzled on the way. And that will be the case, he thinks, as long as it is left to the fingering of Sir George Carey & Co. "If," says he, "you were to send me £20,000 to-morrow, and to send it through that channel, I would never see the half thereof."§

The lofty opinion which Chichester entertained of his predecessor's powers of embezzlement was amply merited. Among the rogues who had ruled Ireland for James I., Sir George Carey is a giant among pigmies. Father Meehan speaks of him as a grinding money-lender and thorough adept in sordid speculation.|| That is all thoroughly true. But

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\* Calendar, p. 267.

† October 2nd, 1605. Chichester to Salisbury, p. 325.

‡ Sir H. Brounker to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 537.

§ Sir Arthur Chichester to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 533.

|| "Fate and Fortunes of Tyrone and Tyrconnel," p. 48.

F. Meehan does not do Sir 'George proper justice, and the tone he employs is not, as it ought to be, reverential and solemn. Sir George was a man of genius. It is one of the characteristics of genius to be exhaustive. Sir George was exhaustive. He robbed Ireland so well that when he retired to his native country he did not leave even a respectable greyhound behind him.\* And he had the reward of genius even in his own days. Officials who had won high honours in roguery looked up to him with boundless awe, and spoke of him with the hush of voice and indefiniteness of language with which the instincts of humanity do homage to the vast and sublime. We can produce only two testimonies to Sir George's eminence, and one of these has the disadvantage of being somewhat lengthy. But both will be found very interesting, and both will throw great light on these years of Irish history of which we are writing.

The Earl of Clanrickarde supplies our first testimony. The earl himself is one of those characters whom men now call "queer." For services rendered to the cause of loyalty he was made President of Connaught, with extensive emoluments and possession of the castle and crown lands of Athlone. He was also honoured with a place in the Irish Privy Council; and when the army in Ireland was reduced by the King's order to about one-tenth of its number, he was allowed to retain his troop entire. He himself is so moved by the King's bounty that in a letter of thanks which he sends to Cecil he protests that Cecil may do with him whatever he pleases. And yet in a few months after that gushing epistle was written, he complains that there is no man in Ireland treated half so badly as he. But his great desire is to get over to England. We may say here that Cecil was not very long in procuring for him the necessary permission—Clanrickarde's wife had been Countess of Essex—and that thenceforward we hear no complaints of ill-treatment. But in one of those letters which Clanrickarde wrote before his departure from Ireland the following passages occur:—

He is weary of this unhappy Ireland, that yields no contentment to any except such as take pleasure in corrupt actions and make a merchandise of justice. He (Clanrickarde) is none of these, and therefore desires to be in Ireland as little as he can. Deplores the conduct of the late Deputy (Carey),

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\* "Endeavours his best to get fair dogs for him, of which the country is very scarce, the Lord Deputy having already sent as many as he could get into England."—Sir A. Chichester to Viscount Cranbourne, 4th January, 1605. Cal. p. 243.

but will be silent till he comes over. Fully believes that this gentleman who now is Deputy (Chichester) will carry himself very worthily.\*

We shall not stop to remark on the instances in this letter of the Clanrickarde character. It was nothing extraordinary to be blind and dumb while Carey was doing the harm; nothing extraordinary to be suddenly alive to Carey's corruption when Carey was leaving office; and nothing extraordinary to predict that the rising sun would be a magnificent luminary. But let the reader observe the earl's unconscious admission of Sir George's excellence as a rogue. The very thought of that excellence overpowers Clanrickarde. It is so great, and has been shown in such multitudinous ways, that only over the wine and walnuts can Clanrickarde describe or Cranbourne understand it.

Our second testimony is a correspondent of the Earl of Northumberland, one of his Majesty's English Privy Council. The references which the writer makes to Carey cover a considerable space; but we do not think that the reader will be sorry if he reads them through. We give them as they are found in the Calendar, pp. 245, 246 :—

About three weeks past the Lord Deputy embarked the most part of his money, plate, jewels, and stuff, and sent them away for England. It is believed that the goods were of great value, and that his lordship made such a hand for enriching himself in this land as the like was never done by any other that supplied his place. Is well assured that he had all the means to enable him so to do; for, first, being treasurer and master of the exchange of both the realms, he and his paymaster made a great hand that way, especially in passing many bills of exchange in the names of divers (persons) that were never privy to them, and in paying the army and others in mixed moneys; and, secondly, himself being Deputy, disposed the money as pleased him, no one daring to question his doings, having both the sword and purse in his own hands. His lordship disbursed £1,000 or thereabouts, at the rate of the mixed moneys, to certain provost-marschals appointed for the five shires of the English Pale to weed out loose people and masterless men. This was to be borne by the inhabitants of the five shires; and the money is now levied by him, after three or four for one, upon the country—a very grievous matter; but yet the people know not to whom they may complain,

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\* Earl of Clanrickarde to Viscount Cranbourne, p. 262. In the same letter the noble earl gives us a touch of description, which, though he never meant it to be so, may be almost called tragic. Dr. Russell, with his wonted discrimination, gives us here the writer's exact words:—"Good, my lord," says Clanrickarde, "hasten my leave, for there is great difference between the sound of Cormac's harp and the tune and harsh sound of a cow or garran, as here is no other music." Alas, no; the heart of Ireland was in no mood for music just then; but "no music but the sound of a cow or garran"—for the "Land of Song" what a picture of desolation!



such is their small hope of redress. It is reported that a privy seal came for £26,000, but, as he understands, half of it came not hither, but was divided between the Lord Lieutenant and Lord Deputy in satisfaction of such entertainments as were due to them. . . . The Lord Deputy has sent his man Bingley over (to England). . . . This Bingley within these five years was but of mean estate, but is now deemed (having helped to serve the Lord Deputy's turn and his own) to be worth 20,000 marks ; he (Northumberland) may therefore easily guess what a hand the master made when the servant got so much in so short a space.

That passage neither needs nor permits a comment. One thing only let the reader consider. For the one Bingley and the one Carey who are here pilloried for ever, how many other rascals in their time were plundering Ireland, whose names, until the history of the world is published in Jehosaphat, men will have no chance of visiting with loathing and execration ?

The mention made above of Sir George Carey's turning to his personal profit the peculiar state of the coinage in Ireland, introduces another of the agencies which desolated Ireland in the time of James I. On this subject, however, which is a very wide and very curious one, we can touch but lightly here. In Ireland at the close of Elizabeth's reign, there was a species of coin current which was extremely base, the piece, for instance, that pretended to be 12d. worth of silver, containing, at most, no more silver than was value for 3d. This coin the people very generally refused to accept in exchange for their goods ; or, if they did accept it, they endeavoured, by selling at prices nominally higher, to procure prices which would not really be ruinously lower than what was just. A "pork," for example, was estimated by the Commissioners to be worth four shillings, and (whether the price was just or not) for four shillings the Irish farmer was obliged to give it. But the soldier who bought it offered in payment four coins, which he called shillings, but which were really not worth more than 3d. a piece. The farmer, either declined to take the coin at all, or insisted that in the bargain it should take four of the pieces to count for a shilling. Nothing could be more reasonable ; even the English officials admitted as much, and constantly expressed their opinion to their English correspondents that the coin should be changed. The people, perceiving that their demands were not entirely disapproved by their masters, grew loud in asking for a change of the coinage. All the cities of the south were in a ferment of popular excitement, and at Cork a Government proclamation was torn down by the populace. On the 25th of April, 1603, a month after the King's accession, Mountjoy apprises Cecil that the dis-

content of the people, because of the coinage, is infinite and insupportable. But Cecil need not be afraid. Mountjoy is equal to the occasion. There is no way, he thinks, of making the coin current but by the cannon, and that is a way which Mountjoy rather admires. "Rather," says he, "than let the King's service suffer, I will coin the cannon too, and make them take it."\* But the Lord Deputy was not destined to demonstrate his loyalty in such a remarkable manner. On the 27th of the following September the King communicated to Sir George Carey the royal resolution to accede in some measure to the popular will. The royal resolution embraced two points:—the base shilling which (as we have said) pretended to be value for 12d., was declared reduced to 4d.; and a new coin was introduced, also called a shilling, which pretended to be value for 12d., but was really value for 9d. only. On the 11th of October following, the Dublin Council issued a proclamation explaining and enforcing the royal decree. We select a few passages from the proclamation:—"They therefore (the Lord Deputy and Council) in his Majesty's name do hereby proclaim and publish his express will and pleasure to be that from the 11th day of this October, 1603, each piece of the new standard bearing the name of a shilling shall go current and be taken of all persons in this kingdom for 12d. sterling; . . . and that the said mixed moneys be now called down to a third part, the piece of 12d. to be now current for 4d. . . . And forasmuch as this his princely care of the welfare of his subjects deserveth on their part all dutiful obedience and thankfulness, this they can no way better express than by rating their commodities at such reasonable prices as, upon the alteration of the standard, and *reducing the mixed moneys to their true value*, is now expected; which they doubt not will be by the well-minded subjects willingly performed; and for others that shall show themselves obstinate, either in disobeying any part of this his Majesty's proclamation, or in holding such commodities as they have to sell at unreasonable prices, they hereby straitly command all mayors, sheriffs, justices of the peace, and all other his Majesty's public officers, to have a special care that this his Majesty's proclamation be in all points observed and kept, and to use their best diligence in setting of reasonable prices, as well upon all manner of victuals as all other commodities, and to apprehend all such as shall either impugn the same or shall keep these commodities at higher rates than they shall be reasonably prized at; and the party or parties

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\* Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, p. 26.

so apprehended to be committed to jail till their pleasure therein shall be further known."\* That is to say: a justice of the peace has power to determine the market prices in his own district; the butcher must sell his justiceship a leg of mutton at whatever price his justiceship is pleased to name!

Nevertheless, despite its threats and its pomposity, the proclamation did not achieve success. The people still refused to take the base money, even at its decreased value; and, when the Deputy committed some of them for their refusal, the consequence was that the people shut up their houses and refused to sell their wares at all. This we have on the authority of Sir John Davys. Sir John, moreover, lets it appear, that, in their proclamation, the Deputy and Council told an untruth. They put the true value of the base twelve-penny piece at 4d. But Sir John says that the piece contains at least three parts copper; that every man who is unfortunate enough to have it offers it for 2d.; and that it really contains not more silver than is value for 2½d. or 3d. Sir John immediately adds, with a scarcely explicable tinge of disloyal irreverence, that it would be "more *honourable*, as well as more profitable, for the King to resume the money at the same rate." Whether Davys' method of tendering his advice was worthy of his high literary character, is questionable; but it is unquestionable that his advice was taken. On the 22nd of January, 1604, a royal proclamation, published at Dublin, reduced to 3d. the base shilling which his Majesty had already reduced from 12d. to 4d. The proclamation, we must warn the reader, is not to be found in the Calendar before us; nor does any mention of it occur on or about the date which we have mentioned as the date of its publication. But a paper of much later date (June 12th, 1606) makes it certain that such a proclamation as we have mentioned was issued, and was issued on the day to which we assign it. In that paper there is a summary of the legislation with regard to Irish moneys during the reign of James I.; and in that summary the issue of the proclamation of which we have spoken is distinctly mentioned. But between that proclamation of January 22nd, 1604, and the Council's proclamation in October, 1603, King James had made another venture in the regions of Irish finance. His Majesty is full of paternal anxiety for the new coin introduced by himself, the coin namely, which, though it was value for only 9d. he rated at 12d. He is anxious also that all parts of his vast dominions should be thoroughly united. And because he

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\* "Ireland, the Moneys there," p. 93.

† Mr. Davis, solicitor of Ireland, to Cecil, p. 111.

wants his new coin to pass and his new subjects to be as brothers, he issues, on the 3rd of December, 1603, a proclamation to the following effect:—His kingdom of Ireland was in want of a new coin when he became king. He gave it a new one. This was of such a character that “in every 12d. by name” there was really 9d. His kingdom of Ireland has another want now: its new coinage should be current in all the kingdom. He hereby makes it so. And he makes it so in these words:—“We have therefore thought it fit hereby to publish that the said moneys being coined into pieces of 1s., 6d., 3d., and marks, being our lawful monies for our said realm of Ireland, are by us appointed and ordained to be lawful and current in others our dominions for the just value which they are worth in fine silver, that is to say, the piece of 12d. for 9d. sterling, and the pieces of 6d. and 3d. after the same rates.” Which comes to this:—King James, in his unspeakable love for his Irish subjects, and with that wisdom which so distinguished the modern Solomon, puts into the pockets of Englishmen and Scotchmen 3d. out of every Irishman’s shilling. An Irish trader has to give 12d. worth of commodity for a coin for which, when he has himself to buy in England, he will be able to get only 9d. worth of the same commodity! Such a piece of kingcraft was not likely to make the Irish contented. They were not contented. And so on May 29th, 1606, we have the Lord Deputy and Council, after allowing the injustice to continue unquestioned for two and a-half years, writing to the English Lords in this fashion:—“They suggest a reducing of the coin, namely, by decrying the new silver shilling to 9d. sterling, and so the other smaller parts of the new coin, proportionably according to that rate; whereby all degrees of subjects would receive great satisfaction when they should see the coin of both realms brought to an equality in value, the want of which had theretofore bred no small grudge in the hearts of many of them, especially when they considered that by that diversity in the coin his Majesty seemed to put a difference between his subjects of England and Ireland, they both being equally natural members of one crown.” How the English Privy Council must have stared! Put England and Ireland on an equality! As a matter of course the suggestion of the Irish Council was scouted. The swindling of Irishmen in 3d. out of every shilling, by the mere corruption of the coinage, proceeded right royally “as had been found convenient for so many ages before.”\*

We cannot leave the subject of Irish moneys in the reign

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\* Lords of the Council to Lord Deputy and Council, p. 547. .

of James I., without drawing the reader's attention to the miserable poverty of the then Anglo-Irish Government, as it is described by our Calendar. James was at once both a spendthrift and a screw. He wasted more money than would suffice to purchase a whole wilderness of Scotchmen; and yet, when money was really wanted for the fulfilment of his most obvious duties, he held it hard and fast with all his countrymen's proverbial tenacity. Elizabeth, in a glorious reign of nearly half a century, had gathered into the English treasury the sum—vast for the times—of £400,000; of this, James had in two years spent a little more than £350,000; and yet, he allowed his own daughter, the soi-disant Queen of Bohemia, to become a common beggar at the courts of the continent. He was brought up in penury, and was cursed with an inheritance of unmerited wealth; and, like every one in the same position, he, in one moment squandered a pound, and, in the next moment, higgled about a penny. But, except in ways that we shall touch on hereafter, he did not care to squander his pounds in Ireland. From the very beginning of his reign his Irish Deputy is calling for money, and from the very beginning of his reign, the King sends it in such dribblets that Chichester at last loses patience, and says that he had rather get no money at all. In June of 1605, Sir Arthur had not £20 in the treasury, and at that very time the King owed the soldiers, for arrears of pay, as much as £40,000. The soldiers are described as having lost all military seeming, their uniforms being worn out, and only beggarly rags being at hand to replace them. Further on Chichester is afraid that the warriors will have to go naked, and live upon nothing; and further on still the Lord Deputy, after receiving £12,000 from England has, in order to keep the soldiers *in life in some fashion*, to borrow £4,000 more. This recourse of Chichester to the raising of loans supplies a very entertaining comic touch to the Calendar. To keep up the army the Lord Deputy has, in fact, to become a rather fine specimen of a sponge. And his creditors are such unexpected people! In page 534, we have “a docquet of borrowed money for the army since the 1st of July, 1606;” and in the list of lenders we find the names of the Earl of Tyrone, one Francton a printer, and one Dromgold a haberdasher! But that is not the climax. Sir Arthur Chichester, Lord Deputy of Ireland, went to Ulster on a grand Government visitation. The inhabitants of the north looked upon the Vice-royal pageant with barbaric awe. How these same inhabitants would have winked and giggled had they been in possession of the truth! Before Sir Arthur could leave Dublin, he had to go around, borrowing sixpence

from his shoemaker, and twopence from his tailor, to enable him to pay his travelling expenses !\*

These hardships of the Lord Deputies have one beneficial effect. They make their excellencies angry, and in their anger their excellencies blab out how the Irish money is wasted. As early as November 20th, 1603, Carey tells Cecil that his Majesty is giving the money away so bountifully that, if a change does not take place, he, Sir George, will have very little trouble in collecting the revenue. On October 2nd, 1605, Chichester informs Salisbury that the "multitude of pensioners, patentees, and other extraordinary entertainments" is eating up his Majesty's money; and he adds grimly, that, if he gets authority to do so, he will not be long in putting a stop to the plunder. But he did not get the authority; and he himself on maturer consideration had to admit that the number of the pensioners was too great to make it politically safe to disturb them. He only asked that the number be not increased; but he asked in vain. On the 29th October, 1605, he writes to Cecil, with a disgust which he does not try to disguise, that "every passage that comes brings new letters from his Majesty for pensions or other gifts." It is, however, reserved for the King himself to supply us with the crowning revelation. On the 24th April, 1606, his Majesty writes to Sir Arthur Chichester. He gives the Lord Deputy various directions for lessening the royal expenses. Among other things, there is an ill custom in Ireland that he for the future prohibits. Henceforward when a pensioner dies, let his pension be given to some other deserving servitor. But the "ill custom" is now brought to an end. And what was the "ill custom"? "*Pensioners, when they grow old, dispose of their pensions to younger persons, whereby seldom any became void!*" Was there ever a man to deny that the Muse of History is, when one comes to know her, the funniest muse of all! The fierce fancy of Swift found nothing in Lilliput equal to that fact immortalized by the pen of King James; but no one who understood Gulliver can, even when laughing at the fun on the surface, help seeing and weeping as he sees, the fierce grim truth which the surface reveals. And no one who reads the royal words we have quoted can, even while laughing over the venerable pensioners, help seeing and weeping as he sees, the unhappy land that paid the pensions, and that paid along with them, as everlasting curses on them and their possessors, her blood and tears.

And if the money was given away lavishly, still more

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\* Sir Jeffrey Fenton to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 536.

lavishly were the lands given away. Upon this subject it is unnecessary to speak at any great length. It is notorious that James I. disposed of the lands of the Irish without a semblance or pretence to a semblance of shame. And if it were not notorious, it would be made so by this Calendar. The King's conduct in this matter was, the Calendar tells us, such as to scandalize even his Irish executive. Davys says the land is disposed of by his Majesty as prodigally and carelessly as if it were barren as Greenland, whereas, says Sir John, it is as fertile as Essex.\* Carey has conscientious scruples about remaining in Ireland; for, while he is there, his whole time is consumed in ministering to the King's mania for bestowing estates.† Chichester complains that as his Majesty gets older, he gets more bountiful in bestowing his lands; and that his Majesty does these things with such a majestic carelessness, that he sometimes, forgetting his former favours, bestows the same property on two different persons.‡ The King was certainly extremely generous. He gives a Mr. John Wakeman, "in regard of a sum of money to be paid by the King's order to an ancient servitor in Scotland," land to the clear yearly value of £100, without rent, duty, or service of any kind, except some titular acknowledgment such as a rose.§ With one stroke of his pen he bestows on his "cousin," the Earl of Ormond, the monasteries of Jeripoint and Kilcoole and Leix, and the friaries of Callan, Carrick, Thurles, and Tullaghphelim, and the temporal lands to them all belonging.|| Of course, however much they might object to the King's prodigality in disbursing what they supposed to belong to themselves, the King's officers could not avoid occasionally following the royal example. Chichester gives a whole townland in freehold for ever, at 12d. per annum rent, to Mr. Denis O'Mullan, "for spying and guiding in the late rebellion;"¶ a specimen of the kind of service by which the ancestors of many Irish landlords won the power of mounting on horseback and riding — home.

But famine, pestilence, the cessing of soldiers, the rapacity of the chiefs, the corruption of the coinage, the wholesale bestowal of lands and money on rogues and spies and panders, do not exhaust the list of items which stand in Ireland's account against James I. With all these there was abso-

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\* Mr. Davys, Solicitor General of Ireland, to Cecil, p. 112.

† Carey to Cranbourne, p. 202.

‡ Chichester to Salisbury, p. 295.

§ The King to the Earl of Devonshire, p. 104.

|| Sir G. Carey to any of his Majesty's Council, p. 210.

¶ Lord Deputy and Council to the Lords, p. 321.

lute insecurity of property and life. In the first year of the King's reign, orders were given to disband and discharge 4,000 soldiers at Michaelmas. Sir George Carey, writing on the subject in the September of that year, looks forward to Michaelmas with considerable alarm. He prays the King to find some foreign employment for the 4,000 warriors, and, at all events, the moment they are discharged, to take them out of Ireland. "For," says Sir George, "here will they live upon spoil and to do mischiefs; labour will they never and rob will they still."\* But James I. did not want soldiers; and, for any of his Majesty's subjects who happened to be robbers, there was no place so suitable as Ireland. The 4,000 were discharged and remained in the land of their adoption. Between them and the undischarged soldiers and the provost-marshals—of whom by and by—an Irishman found it a rather a nice thing to keep his life. He found it a much nicer thing to keep his lands. Here is something on the subject from Sir John Davys:—"It were too long to recite the particular mischiefs; but touching the escheator, he hath a deputy in almost every county. These deputies make a suggestion that they are able to find many titles for the King in their several counties; and thereupon, desire to have a general commission to inquire of all wards, marriages, escheats, concealments, and forfeitures, and the like. If this commission were well executed or returned, these were good servitors. But what do they? They retire themselves into some corner of the counties, and in some obscure village execute their commission; and there having a simple or suborned jury, find one man's land concealed, another man's lease forfeited for non-payment of rent, another man's land holden by the King, and no livery sued, and the like; this being done, they never return their commission, but send for the parties and compound with them, and so defraud the King and make a book and spoil upon the country; so that it may be conjectured by what means one that was lately an escheator clerk is now owner of as much land here as few of the lords of Ireland may compare with him."† Of course the reader sees that if the escheator's deputies were rogues the Irish who compounded with them were not much better than fools. They ought to have kept their money and let their land go. Pay as they would the land was sure to go sooner or later. This, after a little observation, was clearly perceived by Tyrone and Tyrconnel; and, acting upon that knowledge, if upon no other, the chiefs were wise in abandon-

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\* Carey to Cecil, p. 78.

† Sir John Davys to Cecil, from Castle Reban, p. 144.



ing, of their own will, what they were sure to have to abandon after a little by the will of some rogue with a turn for swearing. Their property, and the property of every Irishman in Ireland, was quite at the mercy of the escheator's clerk.

But perhaps the principal peril to life and property lay in that quarter whence they might reasonably expect protection—the law and its administration. We have already seen that against the injustices of Sir George Carey the people asked no relief, because they saw no utility in asking. Sir John Davys bears repeated testimony to their freedom from crime, to their love of justice, to their docility when justice speaks; but Sir John hints that up to his time justice had not troubled them with her speech very often. "If justice be well and roundly executed here for two or three years," he writes to Cecil, "the kingdom will grow rich and happy, and, in good faith, I think, loyal."\* Six weeks afterwards, Sir George Carey beseeches the Secretary that certain law officers be sent over, so that the people may *begin to taste of justice.*† It was nearly time to make a beginning. But when the people had tasted, it is pretty probable they did not violently like the flavour. As late as the middle of April, 1606, Chichester has to confess to Cecil that the Irish people regard the Irish executive with hate and abhorrence.‡ And even the best members of the Irish executive appear to have little merited kindlier feelings. During the Lent vacation of 1606, Sir John Davys and the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas made the tour of Munster as justices of assize; and on the 4th of the following May Sir John gives Cecil a charming account of his tour. Munster, he says, had its own judicial fixed stars—one of the stars was called Brounker, of whom anon—and Sir John and his colleague were only occasional auxiliary planets. The planets in the course of their orbit came to Waterford. Sir John naively tells us what manner of legal light they diffused there. We were obliged, he says, "sometimes to threaten them (the jurors) with the Star Chamber, in order to get a verdict for the King." After reading that statement, we begin to suspect that Sir John's idea of justice, "well and roundly executed," was somewhat peculiar. Some remarks made at a later period by Sir Henry Brounker, Lord President of Munster, tend to strengthen the suspicion. Sir Henry is recounting his wonderful exploits in the way of persecuting the Catholics. He has deposed mayors,

\* Sir J. Davys to Cecil, p. 155.

† Sir George Carey to Cecil, p. 163.

‡ Sir Arthur Chichester to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 451.

§ Observations made by Sir John Davys, Attorney of Ireland, after a journey made by him in Munster, p. 465.

forced lawyers to go to church, hunted priests, hanged many "fat ones" lately, and done numberless other things that prove him to be a man of very strong character. In fact, he says, winding up, "the judges are weary of my company, seeing I disappoint their harvest." The judges (one of whom was Davys) must certainly have been disgusted to find their sport so effectively spoiled. But then their lordships should remember that Sir Henry was practising on his own preserves.

Illustrative of the abstract principles of justice which guided the Irish lawyers of James I., the Calendar supplies us with several samples of the manner in which these principles were applied. We can refer only to two. One of these we have glanced at already. For the reader's sake we are glad that its chronicler is Sir John Davys; he shall speak of it in his own graceful way. The quotation is rather lengthy; but the sole unpleasantness about it is the burthen of its transcription, and that falls on ourselves. Sir John is continuing his narrative of the planetary tour in Munster referred to above; the story has got as far as Limerick. He then goes on to say:—

We began the session of the county of Limerick a day or two before my Lord President's arrival there. Among other malefactors, one Downing, who had been a lieutenant in the late wars, and dwelt not far from Limerick, was indicted for murder, on the procurement of my Lord of Thomond; and the case stood thus:—Downing having obtained a commission from my Lord President of Munster to execute by martial law vagabonds and masterless men,\* and such as had borne arms in the late war, it happened that an idiot fool belonging to my Lord of Thomond, with another of the same quality, that followed Sir John M'Nemara, a Knight of Thomond, came straggling into the village where Downing dwelt; he, meeting with them on a Sunday morning, took them and immediately hanged them both. My Lord of Thomond assuring himself that Downing knew the idiot, and knew he belonged to him (for he was a notorious fool known to all the country), and that therefore he did execute the poor creature maliciously, caused an indictment of wilful murder to be exhibited against him before my Lord President came to the town; upon this my Lord President conceived some unkindness, because, having received his authority from him, and the fact being done within his province, he expected that my Lord of Thomond should first have acquainted him with the matter before he had proceeded in this manner. Notwithstanding, the bill was found, and we proceeded to trial, but with this protestation—that we would not call the authority in question, but allow it him as a justification in law; but we would examine whether he had exceeded his authority maliciously or no, pronouncing this withal, that if he knew him to be a natural idiot, or knew him to belong to

\* That is to say, Downing was a provost-marshal. There were as many of these in Ireland as the executive desired. Chichester, however, wished to be systematic. February 26, 1606, he advises one for each shire. They are to be selected from among the discharged captains.

my Lord of Thomond, he had transgressed his commission maliciously, and consequently had committed murder. We chose the most indifferent jury we could to try the prisoner, who was found guilty upon some evidence that was given that he knew the idiot, and knew him to belong to my Lord of Thomond. Upon the giving up the verdict some few words of passion and heat passed between my Lord President and the Earl. . . . But, in the meantime, we for our parts, though the fact was foul, and though our provost-marshals are sometimes too nimble and too rash in executing their commissions, so that it were not amiss if one or two of them did smart for it and were made an example to all the rest, yet because we would not utterly discountenance the martial law, and because Downing had been a tall soldier, we thought good to reprieve him, to the end my Lord Deputy may grant him his Majesty's pardon if it so please his lordship.

When a story is well told we can pardon some want of truth in the teller. We shall not therefore make much of Sir John's suppression of two serious particulars, first, that the idiot at the very time he was seized by Downing had a pass, and, second, that the most of Downing's jury were English.\* But taking the story as it is told by Sir John, it is a pretty story and a suggestive one. The reader sees that Downing's authority to hang any one whom it could not be proved that he personally knew, was unquestioned; that if he merely hanged Peter in mistake for Paul it was no harm; and that, if he strung up every stranger that entered his district he was only fulfilling a sacred mission. And the reader sees, moreover, that his having been a tall soldier in the late wars not only got him a pension,† but covered any number of his sins. And, of course, the reader knows that Downing was pardoned. But perhaps there is an interesting fact which the reader either does not know or does not remember—the fact, namely, that this Lord President of Munster, who gave Downing his commission, and would not let Downing be punished, is that very same Sir Henry Brounker whom we found further back hanging the "fat ones," and interfering materially with the sport of the judges. We have already expressed our admiration of the intense earnestness with which Sir Henry pursues his pleasures. He would not lose a hanging for £1,000.‡ But it is a beautiful trait in his character, that for a fellow-sportsman in difficulties he can be so admirably heroic as when the blood-cup is at his lips to dash it away.

One other instance of the administration of justice in Ireland had not the good fortune of being reported by Davys. It is

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\* The Earl of Thomond to the Earl of Salisbury, p. 444.

† List of Pensioners, p. 427.

‡ A copy of a letter from my Lord President of Munster, p. 551.

the case of Mead, the recorder of Cork. In the beginning of James's reign there was some disturbance in the southern capital, which was supposed to have been caused by the conduct of Mead. Mead was forthwith charged with treason. He was indicted at Youghal, but we are told that, were it not for the industry of the Commissioners and others, the indictment would not have been found. The Lord Deputy and Council, fearing that they would not be able to procure a conviction by an Irish jury, advise that Mead be brought over for trial to England. Mead, however, was tried by a jury of the county of Cork. He was acquitted; and acquitted, though the prosecution used not only the most illegal but the most ruffianly means to ensure his conviction. Chief Justice Saxey tells the story in a letter to Cranbourne. He has been saying that the Irish ought never to be either councillors of state or ministers of justice; and he supports his view in the following fashion:—

“As appeareth,” says his lordship, “by an unjust acquittal of a notable Irish traitor, the recorder of Cork, notwithstanding such violent and unlawful courses were taken, as well upon his indictment as upon his arraignment, as no precedent of former times can warrant. For the grand jury were severally dealt with, every man by himself, giving his own verdict, not knowing the mind of his fellows. And upon his arraignment the evidence against the prisoner *was enforced to the jury by the deposition, vivâ voce, in open court, of them that were his judges upon his trial, wherein they were the more eager for that they had undertaken the conviction of the party.* But all would not serve.”\*

Further on we are told that the executive have resolved upon prosecuting the jury. But that course was not eventually taken. It would have entailed vast expense, which the King would not like, and would probably have made the previous disgrace worse by ending in failure. Besides, there was a better way of handling the jury. It was a way, too, which the then Lord Deputy, Sir George Carey, strongly advised. Accordingly, in April, 1604, he announces to Cecil that he is about to bring the recalcitrant jurors into the Star Chamber, there, he says (not to try them, but) to inflict upon them some “exemplary punishment.” Sir Patrick Barnewell tells us that the Star Chamber was a place where the Government made a good deal of money. From what we know of Sir George Carey's character, we can infer what inspired him to bring the Cork jurors to Dublin Castle.

Hitherto we have called upon this Calendar for informa-

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\* Chief-Justice Saxey to Viscount Cranbourne, p. 227.

tion with regard to the civil condition of Ireland. And that condition we have found to be sufficiently pitiable. But the religious condition of the country was worse. We do not think there is anywhere a more pathetic story than the story of the religious life of Ireland in the first years of James, as that story is told in the formal official documents which Dr. Russell and Mr. Prendergast have brought together. One rises from their perusal with a first idea that he has been wandering mid the ruins of an extinct Christianity and among the bones of a perished people. Dead and gone, he says, dead and gone, are that Irish religion, and that Irish race.

Adhering, as we have proposed to adhere, to the text before us, it is no part of our intention to say anything harsh of Queen Elizabeth. Nor is it necessary. It suffices to say that, whatever be our opinions of her Majesty, the opinion of her entertained by the Irish Catholics of her time was that she was a masterpiece of malignant evil. They came to regard her at last as the sphinx was regarded by the Thebans till *Œdipus* appeared and solved the riddle. And, as the Thebans rejoiced for the ruin of the great sea-monster, so the Irish rejoiced when the great she-dragon succumbed to death. We do not indeed lay much stress on the fact that James was "the son of a martyr," for, without saying a word to disparage the unfortunate Queen of Scots, we think it very clear that, whatever else she was, she was not much of a martyr; but we lay stress on the fact that he was the son of a mother certainly Catholic; for a good while even the Anglo-Irish officials doubted what religious policy James would favour; and that he had himself given certain indications that religion was not with him a serious subject for statesmanship, but a mere matter for amicable scholastic disputation.\* We find, accordingly, that immediately after the announcement of James's accession the Irish began to practise their religion in public, as if Elizabeth were but the ogre of a dreadful dream.

But they were soon undeceived. We do not, indeed, find the King himself formally speaking his mind to them till a much later period; but, from the very beginning, we find Mountjoy showing them that they have been premature in their rejoicings. Still neither Mountjoy nor his successor takes any course that may be termed decisive. Carey, writing to the Lords in July, 1603, tells the reason. "The Deputy and Council," he says,

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\* To clear himself of the suspicion that he was secretly coquetting with the Pope, James made Sir John Elphinstone (Lord Balmerino) perjure himself in the most flagitious manner.—See Guthrie's *Scotland*, vol. viii. p. 354, and vol. ix. p. 52.

“apply the authority of the State with as great discretion as they can, *not knowing as yet what will be his Majesty’s course on the point of religion.*” \* It is not till July 4th, 1605, that, after two and a half years’ cogitation, his Majesty speaks his mind. He does so in a document headed “Proclamation against Toleration in Ireland.” He has been informed that some Irish thought he would tolerate popery. He declares to his loving subjects that the idea never entered the royal brain. No religion will find favour in his eyes except that which is agreeable to God’s word and established by the laws of the realm. Therefore must his subjects, all and several, worship every Sunday in the Protestant temples. All priests must quit the realm before the 10th of next December; they must never return; and, after the aforesaid date, no one must give them support or shelter. But any priest who shall present himself before the Lord Deputy, conform, go to church duly and soberly, will be treated as a loyal subject, as long as he continues to give similar satisfaction. On November 13th a supplement to this proclamation appeared in the shape of a royal mandate to the citizens of Dublin. The citizens are ordered to attend on Sundays and holidays each in his own Protestant parish church; and whoever disobeys the order is to be fined and imprisoned. The order was disobeyed, and the law took its course. Before the month was ended some of the principal citizens of Dublin were mulcted in ruinous fines, and were committed to the jailers of Dublin Castle.

This conduct of the executive caused great confusion and alarm. The Catholics, however, did not as yet believe that James was serious. They made large allowances for the fright which Guy Faux’s plot had just given his Majesty; but they thought it incredible that the son of Queen Mary would walk in the red tracks of her murderer. In this faith the principal recusants of the Pale drew up a petition to the Lord Deputy, asking him to suspend the execution of the King’s mandate till the King, whom they believed moved by some sinister information, was better instructed. The petition was signed by 68 gentlemen of Meath, 42 of Kildare, 36 of Dublin, 36 of Louth, 26 of Westmeath, and 14 of the corporation of Naas. This petition was followed by another of a similar character, addressed to Cecil by the Lords of the Pale, Gormanstown, Trimletstone, Killene, and Howth. The immediate consequence of these petitions was that their principal authors were seized and imprisoned. Eventually, however, only Sir P. Barnewell was detained, and he was sent over to London.

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\* Deputy and Council of Ireland to the Lords, p. 66.

Chichester, and the rest of the Irish Council, insisted hotly that Sir Patrick should be signally punished. They omitted nothing which could blacken him in the eyes of the English Lords; and even Sir John Davys loads him with accusations which are little better than monstrous lies. But the English Lords were cautious; they were beginning to fear that the Irish officials went a little too fast, and that rapidity might lead to ruin. Accordingly, on 24th January, 1606, they address a private letter to Chichester. It is a letter entirely characteristic of their royal master; it breathes braggadocio coloured by cowardice. Catholicity is to be stamped out, but with prudence; priests are to be banished, but a too curious search after them is to be forborne. The principal recusants are to be arrested, but the multitude must not be startled by any general compulsion. Chichester did very well in imprisoning the merchants of Dublin, but for the present it is expedient that they be released. In replying to this letter the Lord Deputy does not attempt to conceal his chagrin; but he has to follow his English directions. Sir Patrick Barnewell was kept in London for over half a year; but he was at last, to Chichester's inexpressible annoyance, restored to liberty.

Such was the general policy pursued by the Government of James I. towards the Catholics of Ireland in the commencement of his Majesty's reign. But while they were trying to get rid of the old religion, what was the state of the new one? While the priests were hiding in the hills, what were the ministers doing? The answers which the Calendar gives to these questions are sad answers. The churches were all in ruins; the abbeys were turned into shops, session-houses, stables. The new clergy were brutally ignorant, and were often nothing better than jockeys and horseboys. Among the Protestant bishops not three could be found in anywise fitted, even in the easy Anglican way, to fill the episcopal office. The documents before us convict the "novel hierarchy" of containing in its ranks some of the most grasping and most lying of the English adventurers. The Bishop of Waterford has really four dioceses for his share of the plunder; he appropriates to his own personal profit the principal incumbencies of each; and yet he has not a scrap of learning or honesty.\* The Bishop of Limerick has the brazen effrontery to ask the King for the diocese of Dromore in addition, because, he says, these two dioceses are in convenient contiguity. But let the

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\* Sir Richard Morrison to Cranbourne, p. 197.

documents speak. On February 20th, 1604, Sir John Davys writes to Cecil:—

“First, touching the state of religion here, there are ten archbishops, and under them are, or should be, twenty bishops at least. Has perused the book of first-fruits, and finds the dowry of the church to be very great; but the Churchmen, for the most part throughout the kingdom, are mere idols and ciphers, and such as cannot read; and yet the most of those, whereof many be serving-men and horseboys, are not without two or three benefices a-piece. . . . But what is the effect of these abuses? The churches are ruined and fallen to the ground in all parts of the kingdom. There is no Divine service, no christening of children, no receiving of the sacrament, no Christian meeting or assembly—no, not once in a year; in a word, no more demonstration of religion than amongst Tartars or cannibals. Has heard of a commission appointed by the Lords of the English Council to report on the state of the Irish Church. Has heard that the bishops of the Pale are to form the Commission. Knows well that none can certify the abuses of the Church more truly than they, for some of them are party and privy to them; but doubts whether they will not deliver such a verdict as the county churchwardens are wont to do when they are visited by the archdeacon:—*omnia bene*, when the verdict should be *omnia pessime*.”

On December 30th of the same year, Saxey tells Cranbourne that the Protestant bishops of Ireland are not after Aaron, and that they are more fit to sacrifice to a calf than to intermeddle with the religion of God. They all enjoy pluralities, and retain in their hands great number of benefices without care. Of these benefices there are no incumbents, but only proctors, to take up the profits for the bishop, “leaving the poor parishioners to starve both in body and soul, because these prelates ‘*non curant de ovibus*.’” Later on, Chichester, writing to Salisbury, says that “the sluggish and blockish security and ignorance of our unworthy bishops hath been the cause that this people are so misled by the doctrine of Rome;” \* and he adds, that in all the kingdom there are not three bishops worthy of the name. The notorious George Montgomery, having been appointed Bishop of Dury, Clogher, and Raphoe, was two years in office before he thought of visiting his charge, all the while taking good care to receive his rents; and Chichester thinks it probable that, if his lordship be not found, he will continue to treat Ireland, rents excepted, as a place *in partibus* all his lifetime. Immediately before, Sir Arthur is unusually candid. The Protestant clergy, he says, have excited among the Irish disgust and contempt; and, in a special manner, the Protestant bishops are untrustworthy, self-seeking liars.† And it was

\* Chichester to Salisbury, p. 346.

† The same to the same, p. 510.



to make room for such men as these that Sir Arthur would brand and banish the poor priests against whom his bitter pen, and his friend Davy's, could write nought but praise.\*

We have now before us some small means of forming a judgment of the state of Ireland in the introductory portion of the reign of James the First. Famine and plague were carrying off the people in scores. What the famine and plague chanced to spare, the judge and the provost marshal did much to account for. The men remaining were unable to keep the land from being waste and desolate. They were too weak to work; and if, with infinite pain, they sowed a crop, or reared a lamb, the crop was burned and the lamb was eaten by the English soldiers. If they had anything to sell, they had to sell it at the buyer's own price, and to take bad money for it into the bargain. They had no hope of redress by law, for the law was so one-sided, and the judges were so corrupt, that for a wronged Irishman to seek his rights in an English law court would be just as wise as it was for Rabelais' young gentleman to go to the devil for religious instruction. Their lands and money were at the mercy of the English officials, and both were given away with a munificence in the givers and a worthlessness in the receivers of which we find no proper parallel nearer in history than Caligula and his famous steed. The grand old religious buildings, which a Catholicity of a thousand years had raised, were either torn down by the soldiers, or quite as effectually surrendered to ruin by being handed over to the new apostles. The priests of a faith that had made the land prosperous and happy had nowhere to lay their heads, and the ministers of a fiction that kindled hell's fires over all the earth sat in the chair of Moses, hardly caring to conceal that their sole God was themselves, and their sole whiteness the whiteness of leprosy. The people were forbidden to practise the religion for which nevertheless they were prepared to die—though they are not heroes in the Carlyle calendar; and they were forced to listen to some holy horseboy whom God had, in very mockery, pricked on to put himself in the Protestant pulpit. Denis O'Mullan, spy and priest-setter, had wealth and honours; while the great O'Neill had to lick the dust before Mountjoy.

Now in such a state of things the people, as a matter of course, simply because they were flesh and blood, were rebellious. That they were not more rebellious resulted from the fact that their stock of flesh and blood was exceedingly small. But they were discontented; and, when-

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\* The 2nd paragraph, p. 476, "Observations made by Sir J. Davys," &c.

ever they could, they manifested their discontent. Still, they manifested it very respectfully at first; and, only when hope was dead, did they resign themselves to the silent sullenness or fierce frenzy of despair. The Calendar makes it abundantly evident that kind treatment, even bare justice, would have made the Ireland of James the First contented and loyal. But it was not the scheme of her rulers to treat her kindly or to give her justice. From beginning to end of the Calendar the members of the Irish Government—Sir John Davys excepted—aver repeatedly that the one way of ruling Ireland is to put her beyond the necessity of rule. While Mountjoy lived he was the Irish dictator, and he gives us a specimen of his feeling in his notable declaration about coining his cannon. When Mountjoy is dead and Chichester is virtually in his vacant place, Sir Arthur tells us that the Irish are as nettles, which sting by being tenderly touched, but by hard griping will cause less annoyance. And lest there should be a doubt as to how he handles his nettles, Sir Arthur adds that before his time the Irish were dandled and pleased, but that he is no nurse-maid, and is Lord Deputy. Sir Arthur's notions of dandling and pleasure were a little peculiar. But since he considered that the treatment of Ireland in the time of Elizabeth was meant to give the Irish amusement, we are at no loss to divine what treatment they got when Sir Arthur meant their correction.

But had the modern Solomon himself no spare wisdom for his loving realm of Ireland? No one who knows that monarch's history will accuse him of consistency in anything but the prate of prerogative, the pomp of pedantry, and the pursuit of pleasure. One of his best panegyrists is found to say of him that he had "power without dignity, learning without utility, craft without wisdom, and religion without morality." Loud as he talked, and wise as he esteemed himself, he was nothing better than a coward and a dupe.\* He had no fixity of principle and no force of will; was at the mercy of every foreigner that talked to threaten, and every favourite that talked to praise. We have not, therefore, expected to find in this Calendar a royal policy for Ireland with signs about it of definite thought and sustained purpose. But we have tried hard to discover if his Majesty had any Irish idea at all,

\* M. de Rapin Thoyars (*Hist. d'Angleterre*, tom. vii.) quotes an epigaam current in France in the time of James. We give it with its translation:—

Tandis qu'Elizabeth fut roi  
L'Anglais fut d'Espagne l'effroi.  
Maintenant, devise et caquette  
Régé par la Reine Jacqueline.

While King Elizabeth did reign,  
At England's voice did shudder Spain.  
The sceptre now Queen Jemmy sways,  
And England cackles and obeys.

And we find that he had. The medicine which his Majesty prescribed for the ailments of Ireland was compounded of four ingredients. First, a learned ministry was to be sent to Ireland, of which a sample was Mr. George Montgomery. Second, all the priests were to be banished and all the people were to worship in the Protestant churches. Third, the Irish judges should get, in addition to their salaries, twenty marks a year to buy twelve yards of cloth and to pay their tailors for the construction of suitable judicial robes. Fourth, Ireland was to be planted or colonized by his Majesty's countrymen of the realm of Scotland. On the first two ingredients we have spoken at some length already, and the third requires no explanation. We shall, therefore, ask the Calendar to speak on the fourth alone.

The project of planting Ireland with aliens was not novel. Under another name it had been entertained and acted upon for years before. Every one has heard of the undertakers. We have a rather full account of them and of their defection given in the Calendar by Chief Justice Saxey. They received, he says, large tracts of land from Queen Elizabeth, with the obligation of peopling these lands with English tenants alone. These tenants, too, were to be of various classes, as farmers, freeholders, copyholders for life, and cottagers; and each was to have from the undertaker a quantity of land proportioned to his condition. Three main benefits were expected by her Majesty from this arrangement: the presence of the English tenants would force the Irish either to emigrate or die; the colonists would form an ever-ready and ever-willing permanent garrison; and a jury could be always found who, if the Government wanted a verdict, would patriotically sacrifice their conscience to their country. But Saxey tells us that the Queen's expectations were not realized. The undertakers did not stick to their bargain. Whether it was that they pitied the poor Irish, or whether it was that they distrusted their own countrymen, they preferred to have the natives for tenants. Saxey tells us that, whereas the undertakers of Munster ought to be able to supply 600 English foot and 300 English horse at a moment's notice, there were not, at the time he wrote, on all the estates of Munster, ten Englishmen fit for service. And we learn from a letter of Carey's,\* and from a letter of the Irish Council,† that the undertakers broke their compact in another way. Whereas they should reside

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\* Carey to Cecil, p. 108.

† Lord Deputy and Council of Ireland to the Lords of his Majesty's Privy Council, p. 114.

in Ireland, each in guardianship of his garrison, they lived in England and visited their Irish property only for the purpose of collecting their rents. They were in advance of their age. They were the absentees of an earlier spring.

But, notwithstanding its initial failure, the system of undertaking, under the name of planting, was a great favourite with the officials of James the First. The Irish were regarded either as the Canaanites were regarded by the children of Israel, or as the Choctaws were regarded by the early American settlers. It was agreed upon by all, that only in the extinction of the natives could the colonists find security. On the 26th Marth, 1603, two days after the King's accession, Sir Charles Wilmott thanks Carew for getting him the custodian of Dunboye, and gaily assures him that he will make "a very brave plantation there;" and on the 15th of April following, Sir Henry Docwra, writing to Cecil, thinks that one way, and probably the only way of rendering the condition of Ulster more satisfactory, would be his Majesty's sending over some Scots to people that province. On June 13th, 1605, we have Captain Edward Blayne inviting his "verie worthy frende," Mr. Thomas Wintoun, to see him in Ireland, and entreating him to "import some of his starling and Lowe Country naves;" and on September 30th of the same year the Deputy and Council recommend the planting of some Scots at Coleraine. In the following December, we have, among the State Papers, "An Advice concerning the Plantation of Upper and Lower Ormond," in the course of which advice the writer prays that the planting commission be extended to Limerick, for, there, he assures his correspondent, much escheated land may be found. On June 14th, 1606, Chichester, writing to Salisbury, recommends Mr. Hamilton, who has already a patent of the lands of Upper Clandeboy and Great Ardes, as a person worthy of especial countenance in his efforts to plant them. On July 27th, Sir Anthony Sentleger recommends the wisdom of Salisbury, to people Ireland with well-affected English persons; and on the following 22nd of August, the Earl of Thomond assures Cecil that he daily endeavours to make a plantation in his own county; and "would to God," he adds, with pious patriotism, "would to God that all my neighbours did the same."

These aspirations of his "Servitors" fall in nicely with his Majesty's views. We are not aware that he had as yet determined on that notable scheme which resulted in the "Plantation of Ulster;" but his thoughts were fast turning in that direction. Plantation, indeed, appears to have been an old favourite with his Majesty. He had tried it in the Western

Highlands, when he was only King of Scotland. That experiment, however, was not quite successful, most of the gentlemen adventurers whom he sent to supplant the Gael being disposed of by the claymore in very effective fashion; but it is with measures as it is with men, initial failure is wisely regarded as a prophetic sign of ultimate success. And so we find James hopefully applying his scheme to Ireland. On the 30th of last April, the royal resolve is intimated in a letter from the Lords of the Privy Council. The concluding paragraph of the letter as found in the Calendar stands thus:—“Lastly, whereas his Majesty, for the better quietness of the middle shires between England and Scotland, thinks it convenient to have some families, especially of the surname of Græmes, transported from thence into Ireland, they have thought it good to advertise his Lordship of it, and to require him to advise with the Council how the same families might be conveniently dispersed, and what Lords or persons would be willing to entertain them.”\* It will throw some light on the line of thought which the noble writers of that letter were really following, if we mention that the paragraph immediately preceding the one we have quoted, speaks of the starving Irish who, on their way to Spain or France or Flanders, were forced to stop awhile in London, to be what his Majesty calls an eyesore to his kingdom of England, and to disturb his English subjects by coming 'twixt the wind and their nobility.

The project so intimated by the London Council was not received by Chichester and his colleagues with the avidity which would be naturally expected. They reply that they will do their best, but that the matter is one for very grave consideration. Secretary Fenton, they hope, will find some place suitable to the Græmes; but they must guard against creating inconveniences in the body of the kingdom. We are at first surprised to find the Irish Executive so cold in welcoming his Majesty's order for the application of their own favourite scheme. But a little further on in the Calendar our surprise ceases. It turns out that the King's project was a project for turning Ireland into a convenient Botany Bay. The Græmes were every soul of them rogues and murderers, holding their lives only by the King's mercy. Mosstroopers euphemism styles them, but they were really the vulgarest of vulgar cowstealers, burglars, highwaymen, who, despite the varnishing that Scott has given them, were only an older species of the ruffian bush-rangers of New Holland. The men with whom James would favour Ireland were men whom the poor people of Cumberland

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\* Lords of the Council to Sir Arthur Chichester, &c., p. 462.

and Westmorland had good reason to abominate. And how they did abominate these Græmes! They subscribed large sums of money to have the clan transported; they went about congratulating one another, when news came, that the transportation was arranged; and they prayed King James not to let the robbing gang return to the borders any more. We can therefore easily understand Chichester's coolness. Such men as the Græmes were no very acceptable addition to the Lord Deputy's subjects. Men who had been brought up to reiving and raiding were not likely to prove eminent exemplars of obedience to the law. Men whose whole lives had been spent in the saddle were not likely to settle down suddenly and seriously to tilling of the soil. The Græmes, instead of forming a new garrison, were far more likely to require new gibbets. But Chichester was too much of a courtier to give any opposition to the will of his King. Accordingly we find that in a very short time he satisfactorily fulfilled the command of the Council. Under the date of September 12th, 1606, the Calendar gives us "Articles of Agreement touching the Transportation and Transplantation of the Græmes, &c., concluded upon between the Bishop of Carlisle, &c., on the one part, and Sir Ralph Sedley on the other." Of these articles we need only say, that they virtually give all Roscommon to the border rogues and pay them for taking it. The last the Calendar says of the Græmes is, that some of them have arrived in Dublin; that Sir Arthur Chichester has deputed Sir Oliver Lambert, Sir George Fullerton, and Sir Jeffrey Fenton to see that Sedley treats them well; and that as the Calendar closes the Græmes are attended to in the capital of Ireland with all the respect due to such distinguished strangers. And all the while from all quarters of the land the wails of the starving Irish, of whom even Chichester has to testify that they steal only from want of sustenance,\* were borne on every breeze!

The evidence which we proposed to ourselves to place before the reader in the present article closes here. It must be borne in mind, however, that we have referred only to the prominent subjects of which the Calendar speaks, and that it speaks of many other subjects not quite so prominent, but to the full as interesting. The writer of the *History of Ireland* will often find in these latter little lines of countenance and involuntary tricks of expression, signs of character elsewhere hidden under official immobility; and he will reckon it his duty not to leave these signs unknown to his readers. But

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\* Sir Arthur Chichester to Cecil, p. 178.

we have been tracing a sketch, and have not been writing a history. Besides, our limits necessitated selection; and we selected what we thought the reader would like best as bearing most directly on the leading historical controversy of our time. Mr. Froude has systematically tried to show that Ireland has been on the whole the author of her own misfortunes; that England has never treated Ireland cruelly except when cruelty was a political necessity; and that (which is true on Mr. Froude's principles) the great error of English policy towards Ireland was its not carrying cruelty out to the vanishing point of extermination. We have yet to deal with Mr. Froude; but we confess that in the selections we have made from the Calendar we had an eye to his last performances. We have tried to make the documents in the book before us explain two things with regard to the period in which they were written—(1) the causes of Ireland's misery at the time; and (2) the Irish policy which the then English Government followed. Upon the first point, after the evidence which we have adduced, we see no room for diversity of opinion. If the Calendar proves anything at all, it proves that the misery of Ireland in the early part of the reign of James the First was due to the English and the representatives of the English who were on her soil. Nor on the second point can opinion be very divided. The policy pursued by James I., if policy it can be called, was under the circumstances the worst and the absurdest possible.

When James succeeded to the sovereignty of Ireland he required no very deep reflection to discover how that country should thenceforth be ruled. He entered upon the government of it under circumstances which seem to us to have been peculiarly favourable. The ignorance of Ireland's character, which may be fairly advanced in defence of his predecessors' Irish policy, did not descend to James. Elizabeth had solved a problem for him whose solution would have been worth a thousand counsellors to a wise king. The problem was, "Can these Irish be made to embrace Protestantism?" and fifty years of experiment, unsparing and exhaustive, answered unmistakably, No! The dead Queen had proved for her successor that, in these Irish, life and Protestantism could not co-exist. And the Queen had done more for her loving cousin; she had broken down the sole barrier which could have restricted James's perfect freedom to select his own policy for Ireland. That barrier was the Irish nation. Elizabeth had simply rendered it helpless. It was once announced to her Majesty that now she had nothing to rule over in Ireland but carcasses and ashes. That was never quite true literally; but in the figure

it was true as Gospel after Kinsale. After Kinsale, therefore, two things were evident—that the Irish could be easily got rid of, and that they could not be got to embrace the Protestant religion. If James wished to banish the Irish or to murder them, the task was easy. If he wished to leave them where they were, and to make them conform, the task was impossible.

If, therefore, James sought a reasonable policy for Ireland, he had not far to seek. Two were at hand—Freedom, principally Religious Freedom, or Extermination. Which of these he would take obviously depended upon his own religious views. But one of these he should take if he wanted to rule Ireland peaceably. To try to convert the Irish was only a waste of time. It was ignoring the invaluable Elizabethan experiment. It was producing and perpetuating Irish disloyalty. A disobedient people is not a loyal people; people who disobey their King in religious matters are not likely to be very obedient to him in matters secular; and it was as certain as proof could make it that in religious matters the Irish people would not show King James the smallest iota of obedience. His course then, if he wanted Ireland to be inhabited by a loyal population; was either to let its present inhabitants practise their own selected religion, or to put its present inhabitants, all and several, out of it—the speedier the means the safer—and to fill their places with a more accommodating race. We believe that occasionally there is “falsehood” in political “extremes.” But we believe, too, that in politics the “golden mean,” as they call it, is very often the refuge of mediocrities. In James’s case, at all events, the matter was clear. He had his two courses, with never a third, before him. He should either give the Irish freedom in their own land or send them to seek it elsewhere. A man with a clear head, determined will, and with a fixed resolve to have the inhabitants of Ireland Protestant; a great, bad man, like Prince Bismarck, would have taken the second course. He would have done what Elizabeth would have done—in youth, had she known the Irish—in old age did not her dauntless courage begin to desert her as the facts of the future began to draw near. A man of parts, firm will, reliance on God, and too respectful of his own conscience to disrespect the conscience of another, would have bid justice be done though the skies should fall.

Now, that James was a lover of bloodshed we do not believe. He was mean, sensual, irreligious, dishonest; but that he had anything of Domitian about him is, we think, untrue. Neither can we regard James as a zealot for Protestantism. We even



think it probable, that he had a kind of sneaking secret regard for the faith of his mother; but that he was moved neither by any intense love for the Protestants, nor by any intense hate of the Catholics, is, we think, certain. The fact is, that, except in the matter of tobacco and witches, James had no strong conviction whatever. All the accounts that have come to us of his personal character represent him as one of those men who never can quite make up their minds, and never can quite get up the fixedness required for faith. We infer, that if Ireland were under the personal government of James, there would have been no serious persecution of the Catholics. Not from love of them, but from pure carelessness about their religion, assisted by love of his own ease, he would have let them alone. As long, at all events, as he had money enough to spend upon cock-fights and courtesans, they would not have much to fear. Probably he would, to air his prerogative, give them occasionally some little annoyance; and their bishops he would be sure to bore now and then with very lengthy but very harmless theological monologues. But that the poor fat fool would of himself be a persecutor is simply incredible.

But, speaking only of the years to which this Calendar refers (though the same is true of the entire reign), Ireland was not governed by James the First; it was governed by the English garrison that held it, not so much for James as for themselves. The King hardly thought of Ireland as a part, and, after all, not a very distant part, of his kingdom. It was to his mind a remote province where money could be raised, lands given away, and dangerous characters sent to develop at leisure. And his Majesty's idea of Ireland was not very unlike that entertained by his Majesty's Privy Council. Ireland, the Council thought, would never become a proper subject whereon to engage the hereditary wisdom of English legislators, until it was peopled by Englishmen alone; and for the accomplishment of that desirable issue they had to wait till the garrison had fulfilled its mission. To the English garrison, then, it may be said broadly, the government of Ireland was entirely committed. That garrison practically meant the Lord Deputy of the time; and, for three years of the three and a half with which we are concerned, it meant, our Calendar tells us, Lord Mountjoy. Mountjoy's policy we know already; Chichester's we know too. We have had some evidence as to Sir Henry Brouncker's, Sir George Carey's, and Sir Jeffrey Fenton's. In fact we are in a position to know what was the policy of the garrison in the first years of James's reign. And there can be no doubt about it, that the men

who formed that garrison were fully and fixedly resolved upon the policy, pure and simple, of extermination. Nor can we pay them the compliment of allowing that their motive was religious, that they wanted Ireland for the professors of a faith which they considered true. They wanted Ireland for themselves. The Irish were the owners of the soil, and as such were in the way; for that reason the Irish should go. Cato was not more intensely and persistently bent upon the destruction of Carthage than were the members of James's English garrison upon the utter expulsion or utter extinction of the Irish race. We should be sorry to say that the English policy in Ireland has always been directed to the same end. We should be still more sorry to say that the English people themselves have always prompted and patronized such a policy. Most of all should we be sorry to say that even now the English people would prefer such a policy to any other. We believe that for the one brutal blockhead who can chuckle over the yearly decrease of the population of Ireland, there are one hundred Englishmen who see in the necessitated emigration of the Irish people one of the greatest losses, as well as one of the greatest dangers to the British empire, and who deplore the causes, whether of the present or of the past, which make it only too likely that if the Irish are going with a vengeance they will try to return with abundance of the same commodity. Still, however just be the English people of these times, the Calendar makes it evident that the Englishmen who ruled Ireland for James the First made up their minds that in one way or other, by banishment, or by starvation, or by the sword, the Irish then in Ireland would have to disappear. We say nothing of the malicious delight with which they contemplated this extinction of a people. We only put down the fact that in their intent, determinate and fixed, the people was doomed.

But why was not the purpose realized? Of course it is to the providence of God that the result is in the first instance due. And though often in the events of history traces of the Divine interference are difficult to discover, they are not difficult to discover here. It was a clear mercy to both peoples to preserve the weaker in its ancient home. It was well for the Irish to be still possessors of the old isle, to whose very soil there clung the sacred and strengthening memories of a thousand years. It was well for the English to have beside them that strange, unselfish people whose whole life showed what England wanted so sadly to see—faith which was never conquered by sense or sensuality, loyalty which was never traitor to the cause of the absent King, courage which had

never succumbed to a little hunger or a little burning, and a grand contentedness of heart which made merry in the sunshine, and was not saddened in the storm. But, under the providence of God, the Irish Executive were deterred from realizing their purpose by two circumstances. One was that these men were mediocrities, and that, though mediocrities might resolve upon a policy of extermination, it requires, as long as public opinion lasts, something different from mediocrity to carry such a policy through. The influence of public opinion is often denied, but it is denied without reason. It often saves many an oppressed province, and it often saves many a collier's wife. The wastes of the province will be seen by the nations, and the black-eyes of the collier's wife will not escape neighbourly observation. But if either Sir Arthur Chichester or Bill the collier could only get his "impediment" out of the reach of restriction for a while—up, say, in a Ring of Saturn or a Field of Mars,—ah! how soon and silently, even to the satisfying of Mr. Carlyle, would the thing be done!

But the other cause which prevented Mountjoy and Mountjoy's successor from attempting directly (we have seen that indirectly they did their best) to rid Ireland of its native population was much more efficacious. Without it, too, we do not think that public opinion would have been equal or nearly equal to saving the Irish. This second cause was the state of affairs in England and on the Continent. In England the King's position was, even a year after his accession, extremely critical. On the Continent the English interests were not prospering. The Catholic powers, with the sanction of the Pope—we may say with his encouragement—were manifesting some soreness about the position of the Catholics of England. Great fear possessed all the kingdom that the Spaniards had not given up the idea of invading Britain; and it was, not unwisely, judged that there might not be always a hurricane at hand to win a victory for the British fleet. Our Calendar shows that this fear of a Spanish invasion was especially rife and strong among the members of the Irish Executive. They thought they had special reasons for being afraid. It was reported that the expected Spanish expedition would aim at the seizure of Ireland, and the servitors of Mountjoy could not expect much mercy from the soldiers of the orthodox King, the more especially as, under the Spanish banners and clad in Spanish mail, were many of those very Irish whose lands the garrison had wrenched away. In whatever way the garrison argued, this much our Calendar makes certain, that the state of affairs abroad saved the inhabitants of Ireland. We wish the reader to remember all along that these men were, like

the King, mediocrities, and that it was their mediocrity which made them so appreciative of danger. Had they been great bad men, they would, with Cromwell's dauntless impudence, have slaughtered the Irish, and if necessary flung Irish heads into the Catholic courts of Europe. But they were only bad men of the middling sort. They were certainly not after the heart of God; they were just as certainly not after the heart of the devil. They were selfish men to the backbone; and selfish men are invariably cowards. Their cowardice saved Ireland.

What a difference it would have made in the subsequent history of the Empire if James himself had tried to govern Ireland, and tried, in his mediocre way, to do a little good for the Irish people! He might, for instance, have convoked an Irish Parliament with full freedom of debate and full power of legislation. Sir John Davys, in his earliest Irish letter, written before his fellow-officials had taught him his lesson, looks to such a parliament as one of the first means of turning Ireland into a commonwealth from being a common misery. But James the First held parliaments useless, unless it was to hear himself speechify; and a sea-voyage, even across St. George's Channel, was as hateful to him as were sucking-pigs. Kindly treatment of the Irish, even on a small scale, would have done much to move them, with their memories of Queen Elizabeth; they were just then in a position to appreciate the smallest act of friendliness very keenly; but the infamous Somerset and his more infamous paramour had the royal treasures—blood-drops wrung from the heart of Ireland—lavished for their luxury; the King himself drank and dribbled,\* gabbled and gormandized, stuttered and swore and slept, and the famine-stricken people of Ireland were left to die! Religious freedom would have done most of all, depriving Irish disloyalty of its strongest sanction and its sharpest sting; but James the First, who knew little of any religion and valued none, yet sat among the doctors and solved doubts, ordered the burning of witches, and permitted the banning of priests as if he were, in his own ridiculous person, the latest and loftiest manifestation of the Divine!

We are well aware that James's position was not without its difficulties. The anti-Catholic and anti-Irish parties in his kingdom were very strong. It would be hard for him to favour either Ireland or Catholicity without giving great

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\* "His tongue was too large for his mouth, which ever made him speak full in the mouth, and made him drink very uncomely, as if catching his drink which came out into the cup, on each side of his mouth."—Balfour's "Annals," ap. Guthrie, vol. ix. 142.

offence to many who would be only too ready to take him at a disadvantage. Still, this is no defence of James. Justice to Ireland, and freedom to the Catholic religion would have been, not only his honestest, but his safest policy. His Spanish troubles, and his Irish troubles would then, in all likelihood, have had no existence. Nor do we think he would have been in serious danger from England or Scotland. It has always appeared to our minds simply impossible for either one country or the other to have become really Protestant in fifty years. Putting aside the large number of the nobility and gentry who, both in England and Scotland, clung on in despite of all to the old Faith, and made no secret of their fidelity, it seems to us a certainty that, not only was the heart of the nation Catholic, even in the times of James the First, but that many of those noblemen who publicly professed Protestantism at that time, nay, many even of those who pricked on the King to persecute the Catholics, did so, in some cases to save the property which they had inherited from their fathers, in some cases to save the property which they had wrung from the monks. But if James had ensured to them the permanent peaceful possession of their lands; if he assured the nation that he himself desired the past to be passed and forgotten; and if he proclaimed that henceforth no man should, either in person or fortune, suffer for his religion, we have no doubt whatever that, after nine days of unusual clamour among the clergy, and unusual hesitation among the laity, James would have had to support him both the mass of the people and the mass of the nobility. In any case he would have gathered round him the hearts and hands of that gallant people—who, even when he slept with his sins about him, forgot his worthlessness, and fought still on for his worthless progeny; who, when they had a man like Montrose to lead them, alone brought victory to his worthless son, and who owe to the leadership of his worthless grandson the bitterest memory of their bitter past. And with all Ireland, strong and united, aiding the Cavaliers—if it came to that—there would have been no disgrace at Naseby, and no murder at Whitehall.

But "*quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.*" That lying, lustful line of Stuarts was doomed, and God Almighty marked it with utter imbecility. A Pretender, and the father of Pretenders, James the First lived and died. Verse is generally exaggerative, but there is no exaggeration in the lines of Churchill, descriptive of that "wisest fool in Europe," the "Modern Solomon"—

False friend, false son, false father, and false King,  
False wit, false statesman, and false everything.

It were very well if the evil that he did did not survive him ; but both to England and to Ireland he left a legacy of woes. For England, he left that disastrous civil strife which spilled the blood of his unhappy son, and which was never quite ended till duplicity and debauchery extinguished the Stuarts. In Ireland he fixed and established that fatal policy which has made the loyalest people of the earth disloyal, and the warmest-hearted people of the earth full of rancour and revenge. Better times, indeed, we live in ; and with the more genial season, the better products of the Irish nature begin to appear. But, whenever his ear is vexed by sounds that savour of Irish disaffection, the wise statesman, remembering Ireland's history, will not forget her patience in the past ; and if he finds her cold and unconfiding now, he will know well where to place the blame. And among the many foreigners who will have to bear it, there is no one on whom it will press more heavily than James the First.

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## ART. II.—THE LABOURERS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

*Reports of the Meeting held at Exeter Hall on Tuesday Evening, Dec. 10th, 1872.*

*Enigmas of Life.* By W. R. GREG. London : Trübner & Co.

ON a former occasion (April, 1872, p. 422) we expressed our agreement with Father O'Reilly "that the tendency, in our countries and in some others, is rather towards an excess of education, for the masses of the people : an excess of imperfect education, which serves to communicate to a great many knowledge not needed by their position, and at the same time incomplete and (in consequence) not unfrequently mischievous." But in making this general remark, we did not sufficiently bear in mind one circumstance ; viz., the political importance of such education under a constitutional government.

For more years than can easily be counted, the clergy and philanthropists of every denomination have admitted as undeniable, that the agricultural labourers of this country are in a physical condition, which is truly deplorable and heart-rending, whether one considers their temporal or their eternal interests. Yet these philanthropists have felt themselves obliged to be content with interfering to alleviate misery in this or that particular

case; and they have not so much as contemplated the notion of any large legislative movement, which shall benefit the class on a large scale. There was doubtless one special reason for this inertness, which we shall presently mention; but its main cause has been, that the labourers could not *agitate* in their own behalf. And so it has happened that,—while the keenest political interest has been felt, and political parties have stood or fallen on questions of immeasurably less real importance,—by tacit consent all care of the agricultural labourers has been left, either to literary disquisition or to private and isolated benevolence. The nearest approach to any organized movement in their behalf which has existed previously to the existing agitation—and this dates only a very few years back—has been the admirable and sustained exertion of a zealous Anglican clergyman, Canon Girdlestone, for the purpose of facilitating the migration of labourers, from those parts of England where wages are lower, to those parts where wages are higher. Even this was violently opposed by the farmers of his neighbourhood, and has been quite a solitary and exceptional enterprise. Now, however, what is called “education” has in some sense penetrated the lowest stratum of society; and the labourers are thus enabled to combine with each other, to agitate, and to become a political power. From this moment it has become possible to make political capital out of the question. Accordingly it seems as if scales had dropped from the eyes of some public men, and as though now for the first time they saw the real magnitude of the interests involved. Such is the practical working of modern constitutional government. “Never,” says Bentham, “except by making the ruling few uneasy, can the oppressed many expect to obtain relief.” Striking contrast to those centuries when *the Church* was able to exercise her divinely given authority in the political order!

We are convinced that the present movement is substantially just; and that the Legislature cannot, without great culpability, allow the lot of the agricultural labourer to remain what it now is. The Archbishop of Westminster, since his appointment, has rendered the Church service of quite a new kind and of singular importance, by his habit of politically co-operating with Protestants, in whatever may be common ground between him and them, against the enemies of religion and of social amelioration. And never in our judgment did he act more wisely, than when he identified himself with this labourers' movement, and attended their demonstration at Exeter Hall. We have no thought on the present occasion however of exhibiting their case in full; of attempting a photographic picture of the English labourer's life, throughout the day and throughout the year: for such an enterprise would be quite beyond the present writer's power. Far less have we any thought

of speculating on the political future ; of considering the effect which may probably be produced on the course of social and public events by this agitation, which as yet is, not so much beginning, as immediately proximate. We believe indeed that the most sagacious statesman would be at fault if he attempted any such augury ; unless indeed so far as he might safely pronounce, that its effects must be very momentous in one direction or another. In the present article we have no higher aim, than to throw a little light on one corner of the subject ; but then that corner has hitherto been very dark, while it may not improbably be the battle-ground on which the coming controversy will be chiefly waged.

There is one argument then in particular, which every one who dislikes this labourers' movement at once discharges against its supporters : he complains that they disregard the lessons of *political economy*. Accordingly the "Times," on the very day after the Exeter Hall meeting, represented Archbishop Manning as having exhorted his hearers to treat that science with contempt ; though a writer in the "Spectator," who had evidently been present, promptly corrected this mistaken impression of the Archbishop's meaning. Now there are two opposite reasons, which would lead us to regret extremely, if many persons came to think that such a movement as we are considering conflicts in any kind of way with the genuine lessons of political economy. On the one hand, many are led to resist the movement by unconscious promptings of mere cowardice or selfishness ; but they might easily disguise from themselves their true state of mind, if they had such a support to fall back upon as the utterances of an important science. On the other hand, Christian and other philanthropists would be led by such an opinion to hold political economy in light estimation : whereas it is certain that no amount of zealous philanthropy will enable them to effect the noble purpose on which they are bent, unless they guide their steps from first to last by the light of that science. Our purpose then, in the present brief article, is to defend two propositions. Firstly we wish to show, that those who think it possible that any objection drawn from political economy could be valid on such a matter, fundamentally misunderstand the true character and place of that science. Secondly we wish to show, that that particular *doctrine* of political economy, which is commonly alleged in objection, is no true doctrine at all, but altogether false.

Firstly then, we say that Archbishop Manning, or any other philanthropically disposed person, may have fullest grounds for demanding large legislative measures in the labourer's favour, though he may neither have studied political economy nor consulted those who do study it. Our reason is, that political economy is not



supreme, but subordinate to moral and social science. We will not attempt any methodical exposition of this statement, though in its place such exposition would be of great value ; but we will give a sufficient notion of our meaning by an obvious illustration.

We would point out then, as illustrating what is meant respectively by a "supreme" and a "subordinate" science, that the science of *cookery* is "subordinate" to that of *medicine*. The man skilled in medicine lays down, e.g., that food, possessing certain qualities A, B, C, is eminently wholesome to some particular person or to mankind in general ; while food possessing certain other qualities D, E, F, is universally prejudicial to health. Here the subordinate science steps in, accepting the dicta of the higher. The science of cookery, we say, investigates how, by means of accessible materials, food may be most easily and largely prepared, which shall possess qualities A, B, C, and shall be exempt from qualities D, E, F. But suppose some one were to lay down, that no practitioners, however learned in medicine, had a right to pronounce qualities D, E, F unwholesome till they had studied the science of cookery. All the world would be amused by the quaintness of such a notion ; and yet this is exactly a parallel case to the one before us.

Let us draw out, then, this parallel. Moral and social science,\* we will suppose, pronounces (1), that a certain condition of the labouring classes is an intolerable evil which the Legislature is bound to redress ; (2), that property by God's Law possesses certain indefeasible rights ; (3), that certain imaginable laws, on marriage and kindred subjects, are immoral and anti-Christian. We assume for our present purpose that these *are* genuine pronouncements of moral and social science ; for our argument is directed only to this, that *political economy* cannot sit in judgment on them at all. It is *after* these dicta have been sufficiently established by the supreme science, that the subordinate science is called in. The proper work of political economy, is to investigate certain fundamental laws which predominantly regulate the production and distribution of wealth. On the present occasion it accepts those three dicta of moral and social science which we have just recounted ; and it proceeds to consider how, by help of those laws with which it is itself conversant, the first of the said three dicta may be carried into practical effect, without opposition to the other two. The science, e.g., may imaginably decide, that no relief worth mentioning can be given the labouring classes except by some large and systematic scheme of emigration : or it may decide that large remedy (whether or no altogether sufficient) may be

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\* The Catholic, of course, considers moral and social science again subordinate to theological ; but we need not speak of this at length.

obtained, by better methods of cultivating the land at home; \* by some different adjustment of taxation; by some alteration in the legal attributes of property, which shall not interfere with its indefeasible rights. All these are questions entirely within the limits of the science, and which the political economist with great advantage may pursue; but he has no right whatever, *as* political economist, to call in question the determinations of the higher science.

We must by no means forget however, that one important supposition is *imaginable*, though we shall proceed to maintain that it is not *possible*. Imaginably, political economy, when legitimately consulted, may respond, that there is *no* means of practically harmonizing the three dicta of moral and social science; that there is no means of effectually relieving the labourer, without tampering either with the indefeasible rights of property or the divinely given laws and counsels as to marriage. But we contend, that in the judgment of every Theist such a supposition must be accounted impossible. If the three dicta mentioned above be genuine utterances of the higher science, it follows, in the Theist's judgment, that God commands legislators to redress the evils commemorated in the first dictum, without violating the principles declared in the other two. But God does not command impossibilities; and we know therefore with certainty, that He must have given man means for obeying His precept.

Here it may perhaps be worth while to repeat a remark, which we made in an earlier number. Several piously disposed persons are under an impression, that political economy is an anti-Christian science; and they think so, because its very purpose is to facilitate the increase of personal and national wealth, whereas wealth is regarded by the Christian religion as a snare and peril. Now we certainly think that a ruler, animated by the true Christian spirit, would aim so far as possible at adapting his legislation to the diminution at once of extreme private wealth and extreme poverty. But so far would this be from bringing him into conflict with political economy, that on the contrary he could not effect his pious purpose except by *help* of that science. Then as to *national* wealth in particular,—is there really any spiritual danger to be dreaded from its increase, if that wealth were distributed very far more equally than now it is? As things are now in England, the labouring class suffer grievous calamity even in spirituals, by their deplorable destitution. Is there really any opposite danger? Is there any danger lest the poorest class of any country—through any possible increase and distribution of national wealth—be so

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\* Here it uses again *another* science, subordinate to itself—the science of agriculture.

well off as to injure their religious interests? We shall be greatly surprised if this question can be answered in the affirmative.

So far as we have gone, our conclusions are these. On the one hand a person, who has neither studied political economy himself nor taken counsel with those who have, may nevertheless have amply sufficient ground for urging confidently, that the Legislature is under an obligation of amending the labourer's position. But on the other hand, as to the *means* of effecting this important purpose, he must put himself into the hands of genuine political economy; and should he fail to do so—however otherwise accomplished he may be, however zealous, however self-sacrificing—he will but injure those interests which he most desires to serve.

But now secondly, what *is* that particular teaching of political economy, of which any one can allege that it is contravened by those who plead for legislative relief to the labouring class? The doctrine commonly alleged in this point of view, is the Malthusian doctrine of *population*. It is with special reference to this doctrine, that we have named Mr. Greg's work at the head of our present article. It is a volume of unusual ability; but animated throughout by a spirit profoundly opposed to what Christians in general regard as Christian.\* Our present concern with it, however, relates only to Mr. Greg's treatment of Malthusianism; and this is to our mind the most complete and satisfactory with which we happen to be acquainted. We the more regret on that account, that the chapter, to which we refer, is as objectionable in its pervading tone and spirit as the rest of the volume; and that it is especially repulsive to a Catholic, where it treats of marriage and kindred themes. But it is on our points of agreement with Mr. Greg, not on our points of difference, that we propose here to dwell; and though we do not think he has *arranged* his matter quite so clearly as he might have done, the matter itself seems to us of extremely great value.

Mr. Greg sets forth with great effect (p. 54) the shock given to philanthropists by the first appearance of Mr. Malthus's famous Essay in 1798; and he adds (p. 57) that there is no substantial difference of doctrine, between that author's first and last publications on the subject. Mr. Malthus built his argument on an alleged tendency of population in every age to outrun its means of subsistence; and Mr. Greg states his doctrine with much clearness and precision, from p. 57 to p. 59. It will suffice for our present purpose, if we explain generally that, according to Malthus, the mass of population tends always and everywhere to endure constantly increasing pain and privation; and that

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\* We express ourselves thus circumlocutorily, because we find that Mr. Greg takes exception to our having called him in our last number (p. 282) an "anti-Christian writer."

this tendency is absolutely irresistible, unless the great mass of men will abstain from marrying and producing children, in a degree to which history does not present the remotest parallel: Those who are imbued with this persuasion, have of course an answer ready at hand to Christians and philanthropists. All other schemes for ameliorating the labourer's lot, they exclaim, are but shams and delusions, which at best can but produce temporary alleviation at the cost of much greater subsequent suffering; the one only true remedy is, to dissuade or prevent him from marrying and producing children.

We suppose that all other causes put together have done much less to discredit political economy with right-minded men, than has the frightful practical superstructure which political economists have built on the above foundation. The doctrine itself has been accepted, says Mr. Greg (p. 57), by "nearly all political economists of position and repute, as a fundamental and established maxim of the science." But this is not the worst. Very many of them have forgotten, that (as we have explained) theirs is not a supreme but a subordinate science; and on this Malthusian doctrine they have based certain practical counsels and rules of life, which no considerations of mere political economy could by possibility justify, and which genuine moral and social science peremptorily denounces.

Let us begin then with supposing, that Malthus had proved all which he had made the least *show* of proving; and let us inquire what would have been the duty of any Christian statesman, who should have accepted his reasoning. And, in the first place, it is most important to point out, that all which he even *appears* to prove falls very far short indeed of that theory of his which we just now set forth. His arguments, had they been valid, would have established a certain conclusion; but such conclusion, if rightly expressed, falls vastly short of that which his language conveys. Thus there is not a syllable in his arguments, which would even *tend* to invalidate the following statement of Mr. Greg's:—

Since a man can produce from the soil a great deal more than is needed for his own subsistence, and since, in consequence, food will and may increase faster than population,—*granted only an unlimited supply of available land*,—it is obvious that there can be no *necessary* pressure on the means of subsistence, until all the available surface of the globe is taken up and fully cultivated. Any pressure that occurs before that extreme point is reached, it is clear, can only be caused by impediments to expansion; and all these impediments are to civilized man artificial, not natural—of human, not of Providential origin. It is obvious that a single family or a single tribe, surrounded by an unlimited territory of uninhabited and productive soil, might go on multiplying indefinitely and without restraint, on the sole condition of *spreading as they multiplied*; and that, so long as they fulfilled this con-

dition, they would never have an idea of what pressure of population on subsistence meant, till they had reached the bounds and exhausted the resources of the habitable earth (pp. 76, 77).

And how many years would elapse before any such result would ensue? Mr. Greg gives various data, from which he draws the following most important inference. These data, he says—

Demonstrate that even the most densely populated countries in Europe are probably not peopled up to the full numbers they might comfortably maintain; that many of them fall vastly short of the maximum actually reached by others not more favoured by nature; and that as a whole there is every reason to believe that *the European continent could support three or four times its present numbers*. They show that a similar conclusion may be adopted with almost equal certainty in reference to a great part of Asia, and perhaps the whole of Africa; that probably in Africa, and certainly in the two Americas, there are vast tracts of fertile land, with fair, if not splendid climates, which are scarcely inhabited at all, and others which contain a mere sprinkling of human beings; and that in Australasia the case is even stronger. In fine, while Belgium and Lombardy, which are the best peopled districts in Europe, contain about 400 souls to the square mile, Paraguay contains only 4, Brazil only 3, and the Argentine Republic only 1. From the aggregate of these facts we are warranted in concluding that *an indefinite number of generations* and long periods of time must elapse before the world can be fully peopled,—that before that consummation shall be reached we have *cycles of years* to traverse, ample to afford space for all the influences which civilization may develop to operate to their uttermost extent.

But this is not all. Not only are few countries in the world adequately peopled, but none even of the most peopled countries are adequately cultivated. England has the best tilled soil in the world, though by no means the best climate; yet in England the average produce of the soil is not half—perhaps not a third—what it might be, and what in many districts it actually is. But the average yield of France, usually regarded as a very productive country, is only half that of England; nay, the average yield of the splendid grain-growing provinces in America, which ought greatly to exceed that of England, falls short of it by one-half. Without bringing a single additional acre under the plough, the production of the world, by decent cultivation, might be easily trebled or quadrupled. In addition to this hopeful prospect, we see ample ground for expanding still further our conception of the amount of human life that might be maintained in comfort on the earth's surface, in the wasted or neglected riches of the sea, in the utilization of lands now devoted to the production of needless or noxious superfluities, in the more skilful extraction from the materials of our food of the real nutriment they contain, and in the transfer of much land from pasture to cereals, and in other economies too numerous to mention (pp. 81, 83).

But further, as Mr. Greg points out (p. 64), Malthus himself admitted "that as long as good land was attainable, 'the rate at which food could be made to increase would far exceed what was

necessary to keep pace with the most rapid increase of population which the laws of nature in relation to human kind permit.” Mr. Greg adds (p. 63) that “there can be no question that a very moderate amount of regular industry, whether applied to the production of one article or of many, would secure to man an abundant supply of all the necessaries, and most of the comforts, of life—at least in all temperate or tropical climates.” And he very reasonably concludes, that “since, given the land and the labour, food can be made to increase incomparably faster than population, and would naturally do so,—all that is wanted to put man at his ease is a field whereon to bestow his industry. It is not that population has a natural tendency to increase faster than food, or as fast; but simply that the surface of the earth is limited, and portions of that surface not always nor easily accessible” (p. 64).

We will still suppose then, for argument’s sake, that Malthus’s reasoning was in itself valid; and in order that we may see the true Catholic way of dealing therewith, we will suppose that it has entirely convinced some pious and loyal Catholic statesman, who is able to influence as he pleases his country’s legislation. What will be his course of practical action? He has before him such data as the following: The Church teaches that God has laid down a certain assemblage of laws concerning marriage; and there are various counsels also, concerning that sacrament, which her experience in every age has taught her to urge as most conducive to her children’s spiritual welfare. The weight of such authority immeasurably preponderates over every possible number of antagonistic considerations; and our statesman would do everything in his power to promote the observance of those laws and counsels. At the same time he would regard it as among his most sacred duties, to organize a comprehensive and well-considered scheme—whether by means of emigration or otherwise—in order that the cultivation of land shall increase so much more rapidly than the growth of population, as to place the labouring class in a constantly improving position. As to what may happen after vast “cycles of years” shall have elapsed, and when at last that period shall arrive, which (he has learned from Malthus to think) will introduce inevitable conflict between population and its means of subsistence,—our Catholic statesman will rest secure in faith. He cannot even guess that God intends *the world to last* beyond this period: and even if God does intend this, he knows that the Divine resources are inexhaustible; that God can *change* the laws of nature as easily as He once *appointed* them.

We have spoken of a Catholic statesman: but a Protestant, who believes the inspiration of Scripture, should be led by its study to a similar practical conclusion. In fact, Dr. Arnold, many years ago, pointed to God’s command (Gen. i. 28) “*crescite et multiplica-*

mini et replete terram et subicite eam," as the stand-point of his opposition to the practical counsels of Malthusians.

We have been proceeding on the supposition, that Malthus really proved what his arguments on the surface appear to prove. But Mr. Greg, apparently with excellent reason, denies that there has been even an approximation to such a proof. Malthus's arguments have literally no force whatever, unless it be *assumed* (p. 60) that there are no physiological influences or laws, of which he was ignorant, which counteract and control those which he perceived so clearly." But he did not make the faintest *attempt* to prove this; and it is evident therefore, that his conclusion is a purely arbitrary and gratuitous hypothesis. But Mr. Greg goes further. He adduces various considerations, based on indubitable phenomena, which tend to make it *positively* and indeed very highly probable, that there *are* such laws; and that Malthus's doctrine therefore is in every sense absolutely false.

In the first place Malthus drew a highly coloured picture, as to the *inevitable* increase of population, wherever such increase should be unchecked, either by "vice or misery" on one hand, or by severest "moral restraint" in the matter of marriage on the other. But Mr. Greg points out, adding statistical facts in large corroboration:—

That the *actual* fecundity of the human race has never equalled, and scarcely ever even distantly approached [what Malthus regards as] its *possible* fecundity: and that this difference is observable, where there is neither vice, misery, nor moral restraint to account for it; that in the midst of the most ample supply of food, where there need and can be no anxiety as to the future, where parents are healthy, where the climate is good,—where, in a word, every circumstance is as favourable as possible to the unchecked multiplication of the species, where everybody marries, and where marriages are as early as is compatible with vigour,—the population does not increase nearly as fast as [according to Malthus] theoretically it might do (pp. 60, 61).

Mr. Greg quotes against Malthus the well-known political economist, Mr. Nassau Senior:—

It was pointed out by the late Mr. Senior, as another very suggestive fact, that, taking the world as a whole, and history so far as we are acquainted with it, food always *has* increased faster than population, in spite of the alleged *tendency* of population to increase faster than food. Famines, which used to be so frequent in earlier ages and in thickly-peopled countries, are now scarcely ever heard of, while, at the same time, the average condition of the mass of the people has on the whole improved, that is, that they have more of the necessaries of life than formerly. Probably the only cases in our days of scarcity of food amounting to actual famine are to be found where the staple crop of a whole country has been destroyed by locusts, as sometimes in Asia; or by drought, as occasionally in Hindostan; or by vegetable disease, as in the potato rot of Ireland. In sparsely-peopled Australia famine has often supervened; in densely-peopled Belgium, never. "I admit (says

Mr. Senior) the abstract *power* of population to increase so as to press upon the means of subsistence. I deny the habitual *tendency*. I believe the tendency to be just the reverse" (pp. 63, 64).

Mr. Greg thus continues :—

Another class of facts which I shall do no more than allude to, because, though often examined casually, they have, as far as I know, never been thoroughly sifted or brought into a focus, points even more distinctly to the existence of some cause operating, under certain circumstances, to limit human fertility, even beyond what is consistent with the multiplication or preservation of the race, or class, or type. I refer to cases in which a family or set of families, or a whole variety, dies out where no deficiency or difficulty of subsistence can be alleged as the explanation, and where, therefore, some other cause, almost certainly physiological, must be pre-supposed. Such is the case of baronets, whose titles are perpetually lapsing from the failure of male heirs—assuredly not from abstinence from marriage, nor from lack of food. Such, again, is the frequent extinction of peerage families, of whom plentiful sustenance may at least be predicated. I am aware of Mr. Galton's ingenious explanation, based upon the fact of peers so often marrying heiresses, who of course *ex vi termini* come from comparatively infertile families ;—but the explanation itself is a collateral confirmation of the fact I am pointing out,—for whence arise these many infertile but rich families ? If the wealthy, who have every facility for prolonging life, and no motive to abstain from marriage, are so often barren and liable to see their families die out, or dwindle down to one heiress, does not the circumstance point to the operation of some influence other than Malthus' "pressure on subsistence," almost antagonistic to it, and *especially potent in the most civilized and comfortable forms of life ?* (pp. 66, 67).

There are many other parts of Mr. Greg's Essay well worthy our readers' attentive consideration, but we have adduced enough for our purpose. The argument against Malthus comes to this. His reasoning was utterly worthless, unless he had either proved, or at least given probable grounds for supposing, that there are no natural laws at work to limit human fecundity, except those with which he was acquainted. But he never attempted to do anything of the kind ; and his Essay is, therefore, pervaded by a fallacy which stultifies the whole. Even had Mr. Greg left the matter here, he would have rendered most important service. But he has gone much further. He has given much positive reason for holding that there *are* such natural laws as those of which Malthus virtually denied the existence. Lastly, if Malthus had proved the whole which his arguments have any *appearance* of establishing,—they would not have afforded the very slightest reasonable basis for those practical counsels, which he and so many other political economists have pressed on mankind.

We are not aware of any other doctrine, even *alleged* or as apper-



taining to political economy, which has any appearance of telling against those, who press on legislators the labourer's cause. And our general conclusion is this. If Archbishop Manning or any other Catholic is invited to join such a movement as this in behalf of the labouring class, it is his business to measure the case proposed to him exclusively by the standard of Catholic doctrine and morality. Our Blessed Lord says, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His Justice, and all these things shall be added to you" in such degree as shall suffice for your spiritual needs. We may extend this principle to the speculative order. Let Catholics submit their intellect absolutely, in full confidence, without reserve, to the Church's teaching, whether explicit or implicit, throughout the whole sphere of moral action. So far as any alleged conclusions of secular science are really at variance with this teaching,—it is infallibly certain, that they are no genuine conclusions even of that science to which they are regarded as appertaining; and it is highly probable, that in due time this will be made manifest to all candid thinkers. Those only possess the true key to secular knowledge, who retain Divine doctrine in its position of simple supremacy.

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### ART. III.—A STUDY OF RELATIONS.

[COMMUNICATED.]

[This article is by the author of the paper on "Relativity," which appeared in our number for last July; and is intended as supplementary to that paper.]

WE all have had a father and a mother. We have received our several allotments of brothers, sisters, cousins, and connections by marriage. These facts afford a field for a study of relations. We may consider the mutual obligations of parents and children, husband and wife; how brothers and sisters ought to regard one another as they grow up; at what point in the fireside circle the cousin's chair should be placed: uncles and aunts—maiden and married,—stepfathers also and stepmothers, hold positions which it behoves us to scan. The question of primogeniture might be handled. Dowers, divorces, female inheritance, are possible subjects to discuss. Or if we shrink from sounding these horrid depths of law and conscience, we are invited to meditate the more homely theme of the advantages and disadvan-

tages of family parties. Calculating spirits may find work in determining relationships; as, for instance, supposing A's first cousin has married B's uncle, and B's great-grandfather was brother-in-law of A's grandfather, what relation is B to A? They who can solve such problems are eligible to have banns of marriage published in their hearing, provided they possess, over and above their faculty of calculation, sufficient acquaintance with history to tell who married the fifth daughter of Sir Launcelot Lapwing in the year 1828, and what became of their eldest girl, and what alliances the Dibsons have contracted with their neighbours the Vains since the commencement of this century. The present paper, however, is not concerned with genealogy, nor degrees of kindred, nor family ties. It treats, not of related persons, but of what it is to be related, by consanguinity, affinity, friendship, similarity, neighbourhood, or otherwise howsoever. It is an attempt to ascertain the metaphysical import of *relation*.

I conceive that this is a useful attempt. When exercised reasoners, masters in Israel at this day, publish for a demonstrated truth the announcement that

“The world, our sense, ourselves are nought  
But one long fitful dream;”—

that there is no mind, no matter, no body, no soul, no God, but only a weird dance of all these noneutities hand in hand with each other; when, as the principle of that demonstration, we hear the doctrine cited that relation alone is a possible object of knowledge: then surely it becomes a worthy enterprise to examine whether that doctrine be true, and, in the first place, accurately to adjust the definition of what a relation is. For as he would be incapable of observing whether the viper was the only venomous serpent in England, who did not know a viper when he saw one, so he to whom *relation* and *relativity* are obscure terms, must be removed from the bench when the case comes on for trial, of “the relativity of human knowledge.” This ignominy may readily be avoided by any man who, to average powers of understanding, unites a moderate store of patience. Metaphysics are, or should be, a methodization of common sense. The unpremeditated thought of the vulgar is the metaphysician's meditation. To speak a parable—the vulgar man plays billiards, while the metaphysician spies out the theory of impact: now it is not difficult to convey some notion of that theory to the mind of an intelligent player. The subsoil of metaphysics lies few feet deep below the surface of daily life. They are odious metaphysicians who make a mystery of their

craft. Turn we, then, hopefully to the search into the metaphysics of relation.

When the first Atlantic Cable was laid, people exclaimed,—“See the new relation between England and America.” What new relation? The facility of prompt interchange of messages. The fact that England could give and America receive, and America give and England receive, an immediate communication, was the new relation that sprang up between the two countries when the Cable was gloriously laid in the summer of 1866. Allow me to call that fact of mutual communicativeness a *being*, by which I mean simply a *real fact*. The fact is not a being, as a stone or a soul is a being; it is not a substance. It does not exist upon its own basis apart from other beings; it does not, in scholastic phrase, *exist in itself*. Were England sunk under the seas by an earthquake, were America blown to the skies by a volcanic eruption, or—a more natural supposition—were the Cable to snap, the relation of mutual communicativeness would be destroyed. As it is, however, that relation is an objective reality,\* not a mere figment of the mind. I call it a *being* accordingly.

I here feel my further progress barred by a prejudice. This is its cry:—“Your talk is all about abstractions, as is evident from your using the abstract name, *relation*. Now, abstractions have no existence in nature. Your whole discourse, therefore, conversant as it is with abstractions and not with things, is an unmeaning series of intellectual antics, barren of real instruction. Tell us, if you please, what the Atlantic Cable is made of, you will then have told us a fact; but, by the shade of Locke we conjure you, cease to prate of the relation that sprang out of the Cable, for that is a fiction.” I put it to these lovers of facts to consider, whether the relation be not just as much of a fact as “what the Cable is made of,” i.e. as the constitution of the Cable. For, observe, *constitution* is an abstract name; shall we therefore say that the Cable has no constitution in nature away from our minds? I am aware that philosophers are found who talk such nonsense; but nonsense, even when great men talk it, is nonsense still. All this folly of philosophers, and prejudice of the non-philosophical public, comes from not remarking two widely different senses in which abstract terms are used—sometimes standing

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\* I understand by “objective reality,” a reality which endures even when no created mind is contemplating it. There cannot be a reality that is not subject to the contemplation of some mind. Enough, however, that the Divine Mind contemplates anything as actually existing, for that thing actually to exist, an objective reality, *in rerum naturâ*.

for an attribute of a particular thing, and sometimes for an attribute in general, which is an attribute of no thing in particular. When I speak of "the constitution of the Atlantic Cable," I do not speak of an attribute in general. It is then vain to urge upon me that generalities do not exist. The remark is correct, but irrelevant. As well remind me that the thirteenth book of Euclid does not exist. When I speak of "the telegraphic relation between England and America," again my theme is something particular, not a generality; but if I entitle a book, "On the Constitution of Cables," or fix upon "Relation" as a subject for a philosophical dissertation, then I use the words *constitution* and *relation* as general expressions, to which there are no general things corresponding. Nowhere is there a constitution of a cable which is not the constitution of any cable in particular; nowhere is there a relation which does not lie between two particular related terms.

When we hear of "the strength of the current of the Mississippi threatening New Orleans," we think of a perfectly definite individual "strength," no mere generality, or form of the mind; but an attribute objectively existing in the Mississippi itself. The thing thought of in such an instance is termed by some philosophers a "direct universal." I prefer the term "metaphysical universal." But observe that—according to the definition of an *universal*, "one apt to be in many" (*unum aptum inesse multis*)—a "direct" or "metaphysical" universal is not formally an universal at all; but is the material by consideration of which the mind may form within itself an "universal idea" or "general concept." For "the strength of the current of the Mississippi" is not apt to be anywhere save only in the Mississippi. A similar strength is in the Missouri and Amazon; but not numerically the same strength. Each river has its own strength, one and indivisible, which no other river can share. Whereby we may judge of the absurd position of those physicists, who, confounding motion with force, its cause, teach that the force or motion of one body—say a stream of water—passes identically into another body—a waterwheel. As well speak of the height of Mount Blanc passing into the Matterhorn.

Sometimes the phrase "strength of current" is employed without any river being named in connection. It does not, however, follow that no particular river is thought of, because none is named. There are, I believe, inhabitants of London, all whose aquatic notions are founded on the Thames. That is their standard of comparison; every other body of water is a *mirage* of their civic stream. You gather this from their

Cockney remarks, "the lake is three times the breadth of the river at Blackfriars, and twice as deep; its water some shades clearer"; and so forth. However, just as men know their letters without thinking of the primer in which their childhood first learnt them, so it is possible to conceive a "strength of current" apart from Thames, Orontes, or Ohio. The "strength of current," thought of then, is what is styled a "logical universal," or better, a "metaphysical universal." In so far as it is not an individual thing, but a generality—not the strength of any one certain current, but "strength," no matter of what current—it is a true universal, "apt to be in many," and in that capacity not apt to exist anywhere out of the conceiving mind. There is no "strength of current" actually existing apart from all actually existent streams. But it must be added that "logical universals" have their foundation in actual existences—they have what the school of S. Thomas of Aquin denominate *fundamentum in re*. "Strength of current" in general, itself a bare concept, is founded upon the actually existent strength of the Missouri current, and that other actually existent strength of the Amazon current: upon these and the like "direct universals," upon these metaphysical entities, which have being *in rerum naturá*, is founded the "reflex universal," the logical entity, which has being in thought alone. Furthermore, take notice that these logical entities have yet another foundation in fact, in the Ideas, or rather in the Idea, of the Divine Mind, the Infinite and Omnipotent Creator's Archetypical Idea of Himself, and of all the being that He can work to the likeness of Himself. I should never, indeed, have conceived "strength of current," had I not had experience of actual rivers; but, now that I have had the experience, the concept thence extracted abides objectively true in my mind, though water should flow no more; for flowing water remains an eternal possibility before God.

This lengthy digression has not been thrown away, if the reader consents henceforth to avow that, when I speak of the relation of A, an actually existent thing, to B, another actual existence, the relation in question, being a "metaphysical universal," actually exists apart from my mind, and is worth study, even as a lump of rock-crystal is worth study, although the crystal is a substance, and the relation is not.

A and B, the two related things, are called the *terms* of the relation. When A and B are *physical* beings, the relation between them is *predicamental*; when A and B are *metaphysical* beings, their relation is *transcendental*. For the understanding of these names, it is needful to revert to one

of the earliest teachings of formal logic, how Aristotle, the inventor of that craft, sorted all things in ten large boxes; that is, he formed them into ten classes. These he called the ten *κατηγορίαι*, "categories," which word his Latin translators rendered *prædicamenta*, "predicaments." Hence the phrase, "to be in a predicament," meaning to be in one of Aristotle's boxes, especially the wrong one. The ten predicaments are, *Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Place, Time, Attitude, Dress*. There are two varieties of Relation. One variety the Aristotelian logicians regarded as coinciding with the fourth of the above predicaments; they called, therefore, that variety "predicamental" relation. The other *transcends* the bounds of any one predicament, and hence got the name of "transcendental" relation. The growth of philosophy has ruptured the ten boxes, and poured out their contents in a medley which awaits new arrangement. I shall not then again refer to the exploded "predicaments." Only keep this in view, that *predicamental* relation intercedes between *physical* beings, and *transcendental* between *metaphysical* ones.

But when is Being *physical*? when *metaphysical*? Physical Being is complete Being, metaphysical incomplete. Physical Being can exist by itself, metaphysical cannot. A physical being is naturally a substance; no metaphysical being is a substance. Physical Being is Matter or Spirit, Metaphysical Being is a belonging of either. Physical beings are such things as *this cart, this horse, this man, this angel, God*; metaphysical beings are, *the size of this cart, the age of this horse, the character of this man, the rank of this angel, the power of God*, and so forth. In a word, a metaphysical being is a partial aspect of a physical being. The aspect is no baseless fabric of the beholder's vision; the physical being as really presents it to him as a cathedral presents a view to a photographer.

We may either mentally break up a physical being into parts, or we may regard the whole being on different sides. The former process yields the *metaphysical constituents*, the latter the *attributes* of the being. Metaphysical entities are thus divided into *constituents* and *attributes*. Of attributes, such as *justice, value, candour*, I have little to say. When a relation is mentioned between an attribute of one subject and the attribute of another subject, physically distinct from the former—as between the *long-suffering* of God and the *impiety* of man; the proper terms of that relation are the two physical beings, *God* and *man*, and the relation is predicamental. If both attributes belong to the same subject,—as when we compare God's justice with His mercy,—the relation

is transcendental. But it is not a real relation, but one of thought only; for justice and mercy are identical in God, though we think of them as different. Real transcendental relations are those that intercede between the metaphysical constituents of a physical being. The terms of such relations are really opposed to one another by the fact that they are constituents of the same thing; whereas attributes of the same thing never bear a real mutual opposition. Things are made up of opposite constituents, not of opposite attributes. The diverse constituents blend into one light, whence the attributes radiate as one brightness.

The declaration of the metaphysical constituents of every physical being is the most important truth in philosophy: the proof thereof is subtle in proportion to the importance: the discovery was a grand effort of intellect, and needs some intellectual effort to appreciate it. I can only repeat the proof "as it was told to me." The first step is the assertion that everything that exists is knowable. Where scrutiny absolutely breaks down, there is absolutely nothing to scrutinize. A mystery which no mind can fathom is an unreality. Let us suppose for a moment that God is, what a preacher of Lay Sermons inculcates Him to be, "Unknowable and Unknown."\* In that case, God should never be the subject of any proposition that issues from human lips. It were rashness to predicate anything of the Unknown. Yet the Preacher † avoids a downright denial of God, for he admits the limitation of the human faculties. May be, then, this Being, unknowable in our regard, is known to Himself. So atheism is escaped. Suppose, however, we append to the lay text just quoted, a philosophical comment, written by an author of fashion: "Every opinion delivered by every man is true to that man himself. . . . Truth absolute there is none." ‡ That is, there is no truth for a man outside of what he knows. Comment and text together become the major and minor of a syllogism, thus: *God is nothing that I don't know of: but I know nothing of Him.* The conclusion follows, "by order of good consequence": *Therefore God is nothing.* An irrefragable conclusion, if we admit the premises.§ But,

\* "Lay Sermons," p. 16.

† Not Solomon.

‡ "According to Protagoras," and according to Mr. Grote. See Grote's "Plato," vol. ii. pp. 347-8 *seq.*; also Grote's "Aristotle," ii. p. 148, and his editor's "Emotions and Will," p. 265.

§ Besides the saying, "Man is the measure of all things," Protagoras had another, "Respecting the gods, I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist." If, then, the measure of Protagoras could not take in the

letting the minor pass, I find the major premise at fault. The reasoning of that fashionable philosopher establishes, not what he asserts, that there is for a man no truth—nothing which he ought to believe—outside of the knowledge of *his* mind, but that there is absolutely no truth out of the knowledge of a mind. Hence we immediately infer that the truth which no mind knows of, is no truth, and the being that is unknown to all mind, is non-existent, nay impossible. Everything, therefore, is knowable.

Now, a mind knows a thing when it knows *what the thing is* (*quid est*), and *that the thing is* (*quod est*). The former is the knowledge of the *essence* (*essentia*), the latter of the *being* (*esse*), of the thing. A thing is cognized *through essence and being* (*per essentiam et esse*). But a thing is, according as it is cognized. Therefore, *through essence and being*, the thing exists. We have thus found two metaphysical constituents of everything—*essence* and *being*. That they are metaphysical, and not physical constituents, is clear, for neither of them can stand apart from the other. *Essence* without *being* is not, and *being* of no definite character or *essence*, equally is not. Of the two questions—*Is it?* and *What is it?*—which may be asked with respect to everything, a positive answer to one involves the possibility of a positive answer to the other. But one answer will be simple, while the other answer will have two terms. “Is there a God?” “Yes,” you reply. There is no duality there—nothing twofold in the *being* of God. “What is God?” I continue. Here an answer in a single term will not do. You may of course reply with a synonym, saying that God is *Dieu*, or *Deus*, or *Jehovah*; but that is mere putting off of the question. You must analyze the *essence* of God, really to tell what He is; you must separate His *essentia* into two metaphysical constituents. How should you do that? Let me explain. One nut may be broken against another, and one difficulty may often be solved by starting a new one. God is called, in the language of theology, a *pure act*. If I can succeed in expounding what those two hard names mean, the metaphysical analysis of *essence* will give us no further trouble.

Active Power then is the first mark of Substantial Being. We know that we are, when we appreciate ourselves as active. The *I am* is never thundered forth with such intensity of conviction, as when it emanates from a strong man, a being of stout heart and vigorous understanding. *I am* and *I can* are

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gods, there were no gods for Protagoras; in other words, Protagoras was an atheist.



twin brothers. In weakness and inability we enter upon the ideas of sleep and death—"I am no more," we say. We know that other substantial beings besides our own exist, when we find effects produced upon ourselves that proceed not from our own power. A substance without activity cannot be. The name *activity* bears reference to possible things outside of the agent, subject to the agent's action. Now, for a thing to act upon another thing, it must have some principle within itself, by virtue of which it can act, and whereby it substantially is, according to the aphorism, "by what a thing is, by that it acts" (*quo aliquid est, eo agit*). That by which a substance is and can act, is called the *act* of that substance, and often the *substantial form*. Substances are divided into two kinds according to the difference of their substantial *acts*. If the *act* is one of motion, the substance is matter; if the *act* is one of understanding, the substance is spirit. But if the act eminently comprehends all manner of ability, pure of defect, it is styled a *pure act*; and the substance so actuated is divine. The object with which the substantial *act* is conversant, such, is called the *term*, or, in corporeal things, the *matter* of the substance. *Act* and *term* constitute the *essence*. Thus have we analyzed every physical thing into *essence* and *being*, and *essence* has undergone a further analysis at our hands into *act* and *term*.

Allow me, for example's sake, to endeavour to set forth the *act* and *term*, first of material substance, and then of that which is spiritual. I warn the reader that I make the attempt only for example's sake. If he refuses the account here rendered of the constitution of matter, let him state to himself, clearly and distinctly, how he believes matter to be constituted; then let him look for *act* and *term* there. I roundly assert my own view of the subject, because I believe that no honest and thorough-going metaphysical speculation can be conducted except upon the foundation of physical data definitely and decidedly laid down. Physicists will recognize, in the theory which I lay before them, the dynamism of Father Boscovich, modified by Father Bayma.\* We start from the negation of the continuity of matter. Every material body, we consider, consists of *elements*, which are inextended points. Let the reader look at the particles of dust floating in the air, with the sun on them; let him conceive each particle dwindling, dwindling, till it loses all magnitude, and approximating to

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\* For the connection of this doctrine on matter with Catholic theology, see F. Franzelin's treatise "De Eucharistia," and the notice of that treatise in the DUBLIN REVIEW for July, 1869.

each other particle, not into immediate contact—for then they would make but one point—but till the distance between them becomes insensible; let him further add that some of these elemental points are centres of attraction, and others are centres of repulsion, which attraction or repulsion varies inversely as the square of the distance between the attractive or repulsive point and the point which is attracted or repelled: he will then have a sample of what to our eyes is the physical constitution of a deal board, a marble slab, a nugget, a bone, or any other body, solid, liquid, or gaseous, which he chooses to particularize. Every one of these elements is a *substance*, in which it behoves us to inquire for *act* and *term*. For simplicity's sake, I will consider attractive elements only; but what I say applies equally to repulsive ones. The element may be emblemed by a sphere of infinite radius, decreasing in density inversely as the square of the distance from the centre outwards: this decrease signifies the decrease of the intensity of the attraction. The attraction of the element upon its own centre will be marked by  $\frac{1}{0}, = \infty$ ; the element is infinitely self-attractive. Here we have the *act* and the *term* of material substance plain before us. The element, so far as it attracts itself, is the *act*; so far as it is attracted by itself, it is the *term*.

My language betrays an apparent ignorance of the first law of motion—*corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus illud a viribus impressis cogitur statum suum mutare*.\* How should a body, composed of self-attractive elements, be determined to motion entirely by forces outside itself? how should matter be *inert*, when it is self-attractive? Naturally enough. I flatter myself that the system which I set forth is at once a grand extension of the Newtonian law of gravitation,† a grand justification of the Newtonian laws of motion, and a grand following up of the old maxim of the schoolmen,—*quo aliquid est, eo agit*. This is hardly the place to develop the first of these statements, but I will say a word on the other two. Let my last full stop represent an attractive point; call it A; and suppose there is no other material substance in creation. Call the intensity of the point's attraction, at one inch distance,  $a$ : at two inches it will be  $\frac{a}{4}$ ; at three inches,  $\frac{a}{9}$ ; and so on. But as, by hypothesis, there is no element at one inch distance from A, nor at two inches, nor at any other distance, there will be

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\* Newton, *Principia*.

† Newton, indeed, did not embrace under his law the cases of repulsion. But if elements are all attractive, how should a stone be hard?

nothing outside of A to be attracted, and all the attraction of A will lead to no motion. The infinite attraction of A upon itself is not exerted in any direction. There is no line of action, and never can be. Consequently no spontaneous motion on the part of A results from that point's infinite self-attraction. A point pulling itself along is as heroic an absurdity as Mr. Punch's wheeling himself on the tight-rope.

I have demonstrated from first principles, upon our grounds, the fact which the first law of motion embodies, the *inertia* of matter. Next I turn—round, indeed, some people will think—from Newton to the schoolmen. They, too, were spokesmen of a truth, mighty in metaphysics as are the laws of motion in mechanics,—“by what a thing is, by that it acts.” The solitary element A, which we have just supposed, is by this, that it is attractive to an intensity varying as the inverse square of the distance between attractor and attracted. A is so attractive, independently of the being of any other element. While, however, no other element exists, A cannot be said to *act*, for *action* requires a *patient* physically distinct from the *agent*. Let then a second element B appear, one inch off A. A at once acts upon B, drawing that element towards itself with the intensity of action which we agreed to represent by *a*. By what, in this case, does A attract B? Surely by nothing else than by that by which A is attractive to the amount *a* at the distance of one inch; that is to say, by that by which A *is*, or by A's substantial act. Put B within the sphere of A's activity, and, without any change in A, that element, inactive before for want of an external object, hastens to perform an action. This is the proof of the scholastic dictum, *forma est id quo agens agit*, “the form (or act) is that whereby the agent acts.” The *act* is the principle of activity. Reciprocally, the *potential term* is the principle of passivity. The *term* of a material element is the element itself as attracted by itself. In consequence of that attraction, the element keeps to one point of space. There the *term* is chained by the *act*. But the *act* is not infinite. It does not chain the term to every point of space, but to one point only, and not immovably there. The act not being infinite, the term is not actuated so much as it might be; it is *potential*, open to an increase of actuation. The *terms* of all created substances are *potential*; they receive being from their *acts*, but not infinite being, and consequently not immutability. When a second element is set beside the first, forthwith the *potentiality of the term* of the first element, or the fact that the element is not self-attracted to all the extent possible, exposes it to suffer an ulterior attraction, according to the

saying, "Every patient suffers to the amount of its potentiality,"  
—*Omne patiens patitur in quantum est in potentia.*

I find myself doing what it is hard to avoid when one writes metaphysics, delving down at every step deeper into mysteries. That I may not get buried under the *débris*, I will rise towards the surface, and treat very lightly of that most profound subject, the constitution of spiritual substance. The *act* of a pure spirit is the spirit's understanding of itself. The *term* is the spirit's being understood by itself. The spirit understands other things by understanding itself, either because itself is the Archetype of all of them, or because they work changes upon it, and through those changes manifest their activity and being. None but Infinite Being is infinitely intelligible to itself. A created spirit, in understanding self, understands a finite object, a field of intellect not the greatest possible. In this way, the *term* of every angel is *potential*, and the angel is liable to suffer a change, which will be something new for it to understand in itself, over and above what it understood there before. Thus, in spiritual substance, our brief survey has found traces of *act*, *potential term*, *activity*, and *passivity*, answering to what we saw in material substance—a marvellous analogy.

Starting from a study of relations, we have arrived to deal with the constitution of matter and the nature of understanding. It is high time to return *à nos moutons*. We were led away by a desire to investigate the transcendental relation which obtains among the metaphysical constituents of a thing. We found those constituents to be at first *essence* and *being* (*essentia et esse*), and then *act*, *term*, and *being*. We have exemplified *act* and *term* both in matter and in spirit. It remains to seize upon their transcendental relation. Is not the relation this, that the *act* is in the *term* and the *term* in the *act*—the attractor in the attracted and the attracted in the attractor, the intelligent in the understood and the understood in the intelligent—together conspiring to form one physical thing. The union of the two is the relation between them. But the union of the *act* and *term* is the *being* of the thing. Therefore *being* (*esse*) is the transcendental relation between the *act* and *term*, the two parts of the *essence* of everything. Forasmuch as this *being*, the result of the *act* and *term* conspiring, is the completion of the thing, we name it the *complement*. Everything consists metaphysically of *act*, *term*, and *complement*; and the *complement* is the transcendental relation between the *act* and the *term*.\*

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\* The constituents *actus* and *terminus*, or *forma* and *materia*, are recognized in the schools. The third constituent is not expressly mentioned

This *complement* will be written down for an idle intruder, unless I vindicate in the concrete its claims to admission. They are most evident in spiritual substance. The *complement* there is the being of the spirit knowing (the *act*) in the spirit known (the *term*). The knower and the known in this case are mutually congruous and satisfactory; for they are one and the selfsame physical being, and no two things are so congruous and so satisfactory, one to another, as self is to self. True, we are often displeased with ourselves; but then it is some accidental mode of our being, not our substantial existence which provokes our displeasure. It is always satisfactory to exist—out of hell. Since the *act* of spiritual substance satisfies the *term*, and the *term* the *act*; the actual being of one in the other will be *that whereby the spirit is complacently enamoured of itself*. Such is the *complement* of spiritual substance. It is the root and origin of the spirit's affection for external things. Self-love embraces whatever the mind discovers in harmony with self. Self-love is of the essence of every person. It may grow up a noisome weed, it may bloom into the sweet flower of charity. That depends on how it is cultivated. In the heart where self is vilified, charity cannot dwell. They are philosophic proverbs—"Charity begins at home," and, *Qui sibi malus, cui bonus?*

Enough, for the present, of *transcendental* relations. Of the relations styled *predicamental*, which lie, not among the metaphysical constituents of the same physical being, but between distinct physical beings, I shall not speak at length. The *properties* of a thing spring out of the thing's *constituents*, as I have declared them; and out of the *properties* of co-existent things, the *relations* between thing and thing take their rise. Thus, from the constituent which is called the *act*, come the properties of *activity* and *position in time*: from the *term*, come the properties of *passivity* and *position in space*: from the *complement*, come *unity* and *position in number*. The properties of activity and passivity occasion the relation of *agent* and *patient*: the property of having position in time puts a thing in the way of relations to the *past*, *present*, and *future*: having position in space, a thing has relations of *distance*: and being one, a thing enters into relations of *number*. It is not opportune to evolve these heads.

Having thus far examined the Relative, I proceed to the

there. But you hear of *essentia* and *esse*; and *esse* is the *complementum*. I have a fancy that the much-canvassed distinction between the *ἐνέργεια* and the *ἐντελέχεια* of Aristotle is really this, that *ἐνέργεια* is the *actus*, and *ἐντελέχεια* the *complementum*.

examination of the Absolute. What is the Absolute? The non-Relative. *Is there, then, a non-Relative? Is it knowable?* I shall divide this question into three, and return a threefold answer.

I. *Does any substance exist devoid of predicamental relations?* No; none whatever. For existent substance is either created or uncreated. If it is a creature, it is predicamentally related to its Creator, as effect to cause. There is, moreover, a complexity of predicamental relations binding all parts of creation together. Consider, for example, a human soul. I say nothing of the supernatural affinities of that soul. Who, indeed, should describe the all but hypostatic union of a soul in grace with God, its Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier? Who should count the threads of that mystic web, the communion of saints? Who should follow those electric impulses of divine benediction, lighting on one head, and thrilling through to thousands? I set aside the supernatural and the divine, and address myself to the natural relations of a soul with creatures. And first with its own body. Have you marked the joints and fastenings which bind spirit and matter together, so close that one can neither act, nor suffer, nor be, in its present state, without its fellow? Then, look abroad, and see the soul in its attractions and repulsions, its loves and hates, among other souls: see how it grinds against them in daily intercourse, wearing off their angularities of character, and parting with its own. See it in its relations of likeness. It is like the angels, diminished a little less than they; it is like the animating principle of brutes, over whom it is queen. It is braver, wiser, more generous, truthful, and free than this human soul; and less brave, wise, generous, truthful, and free than that. The soul is like an element of matter; who has sufficiently explored that likeness? Moreover, it is a thing to number, counting one in the rank of substances. It has its past history, its work in the present, its destiny to come. It is localized after the manner of spirits, its place being marked by what it thinks of. If any life were long enough, I might stock a library describing the relations of one soul, and I should die ere the description was complete. Yes, so numerous are the streams of reciprocity flowing to and from the soul, not of an Augustus or a Charlemagne, but of the meanest negro, that, "if they were written one by one, I think the world itself could not contain the books that would be written."

Even God has not disdained to enter into predicamental relations. To eschew a verbal dispute, I explain the sense in which I understand that God is really related to His creatures.

He would be the selfsame Being, without diminution, or increase, or alteration, had He never stretched forth His hand to create. The relation with creatures is free on His part, and makes no difference in Him. Creatures, on the contrary, by the fact of their existence, must be related to God. They never could have come to be from any other source. All that is in them over and above negations, all that they positively are, is His work. But they do not react upon Him. In this sense I affirm that God has contracted predicamental relations. He essentially possesses the power of contracting them, though He might have abstained from exercising it.

II. *Does any substance exist devoid of transcendental relations?* No, again; none whatever. The denial here is stronger than in the former answer. Nothing can physically exist that does not contain a transcendental relation—the *complement*, which, as I have shown, everywhere results from the conspiring of the *act* and *term*. *Act*, *Term*, and *Complement* have place in God Himself. The argument which manifests their presence in an angel, applies to Deity. The difference is, that the divine *Term* is not *potential*—not open to any more actuation than it receives. An angel, learning the conversion of a sinner, understands in his own mind an impression which was not there before. His *term* is more fully *actuated*. But the fulness of God cannot increase, for He eternally fills the amplest compass of possible being. Whatever exists in creatures, exists in Him more perfectly. God is infinitely existent, infinitely intelligible, infinitely intelligent, and infinitely understood by Himself. So the *Term* in Him is not *potential*. He cannot be understood otherwise than as He is understood. He outdoes passivity. When the waters covered the earth, they could abate but not overflow. God fills heaven and earth. He can neither rise to a new perfection, nor fall from an old one.

My readers will not expect from me a dissertation on the Blessed Trinity. They are aware that, while the existence of God is a truth both of reason and revelation, the Trinity is a truth of revelation which reason is incompetent to discover. Apart from faith we never should have known that the *act*, *term*, and *complement*, which constitute created spirits, are in God represented by three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. But now that we do know it, we find therein a confirmation of our philosophy, and much cause to admire the triune impress of their Maker which all creatures wear.

Creatures are physical beings, metaphysically composed of *act*, *term*, and *complement*. The *physical being*, as such, is something *absolute*; the *act* and the *term* are *correlative*; while

the complement, that is, the *actuality* of the *act* in the *term*, is the *relation* between them. It follows that *metaphysical relativity* precedes the *physical absolute being*; inasmuch as the *act* and the *term* must be related for the thing to be. The Relative precedes the Absolute in that sense. Yet it is plain that we cannot think of the *act* as related to the *term*, unless we conceive first the *act* itself as the subject of its relativity; in other words we must conceive a metaphysical being as something absolute, before we can speak of its being related. This remark introduces my third and last and most important inquiry.

III. *Can any substance be known out of all relation, as well transcendental as predicamental?* A thoughtful person will not be in a hurry to answer *yes* or *no* to this question. If he answers *yes*, he fears the further demand: "Pray, what predicate does your knowledge attach to the Absolute?" If he takes refuge in a *no*, he stands face to face with the following difficulty:\*

"We will suppose your answer correct. A man then does not know things in themselves, or Absolutes, but only relations of things to one another, relations, that is to say, of Absolute to Absolute. The Absolutes may be likened to letters, the relations to syllables. The syllables, according to you, are known, while the letters are unknown. We ask whether any syllable, SO for instance, is the same as the letters S and O which compose it, or is it aught besides? If you say it is the same, then, since the letters S and O are unknown, the syllable SO is likewise unknown. If the syllable is aught besides the letters which compose it, call whatever it is besides *a*. Then *a* is some one entity, that is to say, an Absolute, equally unknowable with either of the two other Absolutes S and O. Therefore, on your showing, nothing is knowable."

That is the difficulty, and to me it appears very formidable. On the other hand, I am not insensible of the difficulty of the alternative, that of knowing an Absolute. For a man knows a thing, when he is able to make the thing which he knows the subject of assertions; and what we chiefly assert is relation; hence we can hardly know the Non-Relative. I think, however, I see a way of escaping both difficulties. My escape is this. A thing, I say, is known to us *inchoatively* as an Absolute; and that *inchoative knowledge* gets its development from subsequent study of the thing in relation. We know a thing *inchoatively* when we know that it is, in simple contradistinction to its not being. Let me borrow an example from the earliest

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\* Propounded by Plato, *Theætetus*, pp. 202—206.



cognition which man compasses, the cognition of self. *I am* is the utterance of the understanding, as soon as ever the understanding becomes available. At that moment, the child, an infant no longer, knows *self* as opposed to *not-self*, and it knows nothing further. As the light of reason gains in brightness, the young reasoner recognizes *not-self* in external things. This experience reacts upon the idea of *self*, and clarifies that. In like manner, *good, right, beautiful, white*, and all other positive qualities, are first known dimly in their own absolute being, as opposed to the absence of them, and then are brought into greater distinctness by the experience of things from which those qualities are conspicuously absent, things that are *bad, wrong, ugly, or black*. Without this *inchoative* grasp of the Absolute, I am at a loss, with Plato, to conceive how the human mind could take the first step on the road of learning.

Not only is an *inchoative* knowledge possible of the Absolute, but also a *precisive* knowledge. That is, having known a thing in relation, we can mentally *præscind* from the relation, and know the thing by itself. Having read of *Hannibal as the conqueror of Varro*, we may leave Varro out of thought, and regard his conqueror simply as *the victorious Hannibal*. To be sure, *victorious*, when we follow it up, means *victorious over some one*; still the *over some one* is a very nebulous appendage to the main body of the concept *victorious*. We may form other concepts more *precisive* still. When we sing with the Psalmist, "Confess to the Lord, for He is good," we do not mean *good to Israel*, but *good in Himself*, away from all creation. The Absolute then is cognizable *precisively*, by dropping relations out of mind.

So far I have treated of the Relativity of Knowledge with respect to created intelligence. The inquiry remains—*Is the Absolute known to God?* It cannot be known *inchoatively*, for God does not *begin* to know. It cannot be known *precisively*, for God never *drops out of sight* any fact that is. However, the *precisive* knowledge, obtainable by man of the Absolute, gives a clue to the manner in which God knows things. Consider what is accomplished for us by the processes of Precision and Abstraction. By Precision we take a partial view of a thing; we generalize that view by Abstraction. Precision, for instance, yields us the concept of *the weight of this fish*, and Abstraction, the concept of *weight* in general. By the aid of general concepts we erect propositions. One proposition signifies a multitude of facts. Thus, asserting that *weight results from one body attracting another*, we have pronounced why a teacup is heavy, and why a star is. The more we know, the fewer and the more pregnant do our

propositions become. In this sense the wise man speaks little, for words to him mean much. Without general names, and concepts thereto corresponding—that is, without Abstraction—we should have to describe every fact in terms of its own. Our knowledge would be crushed beneath that pile of unsorted details. Now, Abstraction is not a faculty of the Divine mind, and yet God knows all things. Has He then a separate idea of each? That would be needful, if no two things were anywise alike. But such utter dissimilitude in creatures would be inconsistent with the unity of the Creator. All things are made to His one image; how should not one pattern run through them all? The idea of Him, therefore, from whom the pattern is taken, virtually amounts to a separate view of each separate thing; it is one Idea equivalent to many. That is God's sole Idea, His Word, in which He beholds Himself. There He discerns what He is and can do, and what He will do. All science is founded upon the former discernment, all history upon the latter.\* Science and history—the one the story of the possible, the other, that of the actual—embrace all that is knowable. Therefore God knows all things in knowing Himself.

Does He then know the Absolute? I now hope to answer that question clearly under four different heads:—

1. If *Absolute* means *Being, devoid of predicamental relations*, God does not know the Absolute, for no such being is.

2. If *Absolute* means *Being, devoid of transcendental relations*, God does not know the Absolute, for no such being is or can be.

3. If *Absolute* means *Being, thought of out of all relation, as well transcendental as predicamental*, God does not know the Absolute, for He does not think of beings otherwise than as they are.

4. But if *Absolute* means *Being, competent to exist without aught else existing, containing all things possible within the compass of Its knowledge and power*, then God does know the Absolute, for He is the Absolute, and He knows Himself.

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\* I do not wish, at the tail-end of a recondite argument, to start another about *scientia media*.

## ART IV.—THE QUEEN'S COLLEGES IN IRELAND.

*Report of the Queen's Colleges Commission and Minutes of Evidence annexed,*  
1858.

*Report of the Endowed Schools Commission and Minutes of Evidence annexed,*  
1857.

*Annual Reports of the President of Queen's College, Belfast, and Appendices,*  
1850-72.

*Annual Reports of the President of Queen's College, Galway, and Appendices,*  
1850-72.

*Annual Reports of the President of Queen's College, Cork, and Appendices*  
*annexed, 1850-72.*

*Regulations of the Queen's University in Ireland. 1850-72.*

*Returns moved for and obtained by the O'CONNOR DON, M.P., June 24,*  
1870.

*Returns moved for and obtained by the Hon. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE,*  
*M.P., July 5, 1870.*

*Wayside Thoughts; a Series of Essays on Education, read at the Lowell*  
*Institute, Boston, U.S., in the Spring of 1868. By D'ARCY W.*  
*THOMPSON, Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Galway.*

*Competition, Endowment, and Trinity College, Dublin. By EDWARD HOWLEY,*  
*Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, 1872. Dublin: W. B.*  
*Kelly; London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.*

THERE can be no doubt that Parliament intended to establish a system of University education in Ireland, and that in conformity with this intent an Act was passed, which authorized the establishment of seats of University education in Belfast, Cork, and Galway. We have simply an inexhaustible supply of testimony upon this point. We have the original Act itself "Anno octavo et nono Victoriae Reginae," entitled, "An Act to enable Her Majesty to endow new Colleges for the advancement of learning in Ireland," and overflowing with all that potential eloquence about "lands, tenements, and hereditaments," which must remove every suspicion as to the good faith of the document. We have the speeches of distinguished statesmen, such as Sir James Graham and Lord Palmerston, who were plainly contemplating with perfect seriousness the execution of the design. We have Sir James Graham speaking quite fervently about "the common arena in which the youth of Ireland may assemble

and contend in honourable and honest rivalry for those exhibitions and prizes, and those honours which are consequent upon, and result from, superior intellect and superior attainment." We find Lord Palmerston soaring into the future, and seeing in the illustrious institutions which were to spring up from the fiat of the Legislature, the germs of a yet wider and greater University system. "I agree entirely," he said, "with those who consider this bill as only a foundation which requires a superstructure in order to make the plan complete. It will be found absolutely necessary to establish some central point, probably in connection with Trinity College, Dublin, which will combine these different colleges into one university, and will, if possible, connect Trinity College with it as a component part." We have letters patent expressly designating the proposed colleges as "the Queen's Colleges in Ireland," and somewhat later we have the Royal Charter purporting to combine and co-ordinate the said Queen's Colleges of Belfast, Cork, and Galway, into a "Queen's University in Ireland." Even if we had not the further and conclusive fact that under an obvious supposition Parliament annually votes large sums of public money for the support of the institutions in question, we believe that no impartial student of recent affairs can entertain a reasonable doubt that a quarter of a century ago, Parliament actually proposed to endow Ireland with a new university system, under the well-known title we have mentioned.

Nor are we without several indications that the project had some commencements of realization. Thus we have Queen's College Calendars and Queen's University Regulations, dating back to a time very shortly subsequent to the passing of the Act of Parliament referred to above; and in these documents there is, as far as paper goes, provision for substantially collegiate and university studies. There are the respectable titles of senators, and presidents and professors, registrars and bursars. There is a matriculation examination set down as comprising Greek, Latin, English, and mathematics. The undergraduate course for the degree of A.B. is, indeed, decidedly brief, not requiring an attendance of more than three sessions; but still, with fair pre-collegiate training, secured by an honest matriculation examination, a good deal can be done in three sessions. Of course, without a matriculation examination, or what amounts to the same thing, with a sham one, three times three sessions might be hardly adequate. It may, indeed, be said, that in university matters the matriculation examination is everything. Matriculation is the starting-point of university studies. According as you

lower the standard of matriculation you lower the standard of university studies, at least during the period which must be occupied in imparting, within the university halls, that secondary or primary instruction, which would have been secured by a good standard—a university standard, of matriculation. If you make the matriculation examination of a university a true university entrance-examination, you can forthwith set the freshman at true university work. If, so to speak, you make your university matriculation in reality an infant-school matriculation, you must only resign yourself to see your nominal university turned into an infant-school. Granted that you can make a graduate within three or four sessions out of a young fellow who has been required to get a good secondary education before you allowed him to enter your university halls, it does not at all follow that within three or four sessions you can make a graduate—at least it can be only a sham graduate—out of a lad or boy or bumpkin whom you let in before he was fit to enter a university, who does not really go to college but to school, when you allow him to go to you, and to whom, if you are to be anything, you must be a schoolmaster instead of a professor, for just as many sessions as may be necessary to supply the deficiencies your sham matriculation so culpably overlooked or so deliberately and dishonestly condoned. A university does not undertake the charge of boys or the first steps in education. It professes to continue, and in a certain sense to complete, the education of those who have already done with school, but are not yet fully prepared for the business of life and intercourse with the world. It must have the assurance, if it is conscientiously to fulfil its promise, that the students whom it takes in charge are already well grounded in the elements of the studies it professes to teach. Of course it may be considered politically expedient, in an unpopular institution, to imitate the conduct of some hard-pressed commanders of beleaguered citadels, who are reported to have made a show of soldiers with sentinel scarecrows and stuffed dummies. We are not talking at present, however, about such masqueradings, but about University education.

To return to the proposed Queen's University system in Ireland, and to the documentary indications we are considering, we find in calendars and such-like, the description of a moderate course of undergraduate studies, generally presenting the usual features of undergraduate studies in universities. There is also copious reference to the interesting incidents of prizes and scholarships of various kinds and values. There are sessional examinations prescribed for the termination of

each session, and, as we have intimated, there is a degree examination. There is indeed a considerable fault discernible in the scholarship regulations, which might, in certain circumstances, be productive of most grave and mischievous consequences. This is a certain bifurcation of studies encouraged from the very commencement of the first session of the undergraduate course by the separation of the scholarships proposed for competition at the commencement of each session into a literary division and a science division. We mean that from the very first day of entrance into the proposed university, the student was led to devote himself either to what we may generally call mathematical pursuits or to classical pursuits. The candidate for a science scholarship was apparently tempted to neglect the general studies, in order to devote himself exclusively to mathematics, and the literary student was subjected to similar pressure. Now, there is a time for all things, provided that all things are at their proper time. It is good for special literary genius to be encouraged; and it is good for special scientific genius to be encouraged, but the first object of university education is general education; and the one-sidedness which may be admirable in a senior Sophister or Wrangler, is by no means admirable in the junior freshman; and when rigorously maintained, as in the Queen's University prospectus, from the first day of matriculation to the last day of graduation, it might, as we have said, amount to something very pernicious indeed. We should, accordingly, have preferred to see the bifurcation of studies deferred for two or three sessions. Young fellows are not sent to a university to ride a particular hobby to death, but to acquire a broad groundwork of general information and knowledge, resting upon which, in riper years, their minds can turn to the indulgence of special tastes or the employment of special capacities. It may readily occur, besides, that premature onesidedness is not a mark of bent at all, but of mere deficiency. Not even an honest matriculation examination could at all counterbalance the mischievous results of a premature and undisciplined one-sidedness; for if an honest matriculation examination is a necessity of a university, a general education is the fundamental and essential object of a university. The University is the grand vestibule and ante-chamber of all the nobler professions or specialties of life, and if you enthrone specialization on its threshold, you practically abolish the University. Of course, with premature specialization superposed on a sham matriculation, it may happen that you practically abolish the School. But of this, more hereafter.

The great fault of the Queen's University prospectus of

undergraduate studies being already what we have said, it remains to consider the crowning of the original design in the degree examination. And it may be admitted that, in this respect as well, the original design continued to present those general features of University education which we have observed throughout. Following the curriculum, and omitting some indications that absolute uniformity was for some time prescribed, it appears that the Baccalaureate of the Queen's University was to have been solely obtainable by passing at the termination of the undergraduate course in some one aggregate of three aggregates of subjects. There was a considerable scope for selection, but at the same time there was much uniformity. The following were the optional aggregates of subjects:—

1.

The Greek and Latin Languages.  
A Modern Continental Language.  
Mathematics.  
English Philology and Criticism.  
Logic.  
Metaphysics, or Political Economy and Jurisprudence.

2.

The Greek and Latin Languages.  
A Modern Continental Language.  
Mathematics.  
Chemistry.  
Physics.

3.

The Greek and Latin Languages.  
A Modern Continental Language.  
Mathematics.  
Zoology and Botany.  
Physical Geography.

For our own part we freely confess that we would prefer absolute uniformity of graduation examination, even at the cost of extending an undergraduate curriculum from three sessions to four. We cannot say that we sympathize with three-session curricula. If there are to be graduates, let them be graduates; and if it takes four sessions to make a graduate, a three-session graduate is only a three-fourths graduate. If some young men must go to business or idleness sooner than others, why, let them, if it must be so. If they can only wait for half or three-fourths of a graduate's education, they will not lose their half or three-fourths by having to

content themselves with the title of sophister instead of graduate. The graduate will lose a great deal, however, by the mania for making out that the whole is not greater than its part. To be a graduate or not to be a graduate, that surely ought to appear to be the present question. If there must be four-penny bits, let there be four-penny bits; but there is no use debasing the sixpences to comfort the consequence of the four-penny bits. And we hardly love "optional" graduation better than piecemeal graduation, and, in good truth, what is "optional" graduation but piecemeal graduation? We are most strongly inclined to hold that for the A.B. examination at any rate, the system of option, root and branch, is intrinsically bad. It may be that whatever views are taken about the precise function and utility of the superior degrees, the Mastership, the Doctorate,—for the A.B. degree, which is the proper and peculiar test of that general education which is so indispensable to future culture of any kind, and which in respect to that future culture may be called the primary education of the man, the examination should not be optional, but should be absolutely and compulsorily uniform in all its details. If, however, we cannot have absolute uniformity, it is well to have considerable uniformity; and in this point of view the degree examination of the original Queen's University prospectus promised that there would not be more than three ambiguities, that there would not be more than three sorts of education included under the common term graduation. When, indeed, the ambiguities came to be interminable, when anything and everything was called a graduate—but again we must not anticipate. Our readers will observe that in this original prospectus of a degree examination there was no word of history. Physical geography was very well, but history was invisible. At that time, however, as President Pooley S. Henry, of Belfast, subsequently told a Queen's Colleges Commission, there were "some doubts as to the introduction of history into colleges established in Ireland!!" Still, on the whole, it cannot be gainsaid that the original plan of studies for the Queen's University fulfilled the general conditions of University studies, and if it had been fairly practised, though we might say that the Queen's University was a numerical failure and a grievance, at least it would not have been in our power to say something much more discreditable.

As soon as the A. B. examinations had been passed, there were proposed to the competition of the new graduates several prizes and medals in various specialties: the Greek and Latin Languages; English Language and Literature; Modern Continental Languages; Mathematics; Natural Philosophy;



Chemistry and Chemical Physics; Natural Sciences; Logic and Metaphysics; Jurisprudence and Political Economy; Keltic Languages; Sanscrit; and Arabic. Against these special prizes we have only to make our former objection, that we would prefer to see the era of specialization less close to the A. B. examination. Within a twelvemonth from the A. B. examination the A. M. examination awaited the progressive student. Of the A. M. examination it is unnecessary to say more than that its regulations were on the model of the A. B. examination. Such was the general outline of the curriculum in the original Queen's University in Ireland, which, as Sir James Graham hoped, was to be "the common arena in which the youth of Ireland were to assemble in honourable and honest rivalry, &c.," and which Lord Palmerston already saw in vision comprehending "Trinity College, Dublin," in the circle of its expansive utility.

As we have said, there are good grounds for the belief that there were some commencements of a realization of this University scheme, and as we desire above all things to fix with accuracy the exact condition of a subject of disquisition which has exercised the speculative abilities of so many ingenious persons, we shall endeavour to proceed with the utmost caution and circumspection. We are, besides, fully aware of the light which the fortunes of the Queen's University scheme are calculated to throw on the whole question of Irish education. Coming then to particulars we ask: What was the duration and development of this ambitious and comprehensive design? How long did it last? How wide did it extend?

In the first place, it is tolerably certain that at present, at any rate, the Queen's University has not absorbed or comprehended Trinity College, Dublin. And for one very sufficient reason. Although Trinity College, Dublin, be the reverse of an absolutely perfect institution, it is at least a University College, and for it to enter into line with the Queen's Colleges it would be necessary for the Queen's Colleges to be University Colleges also. Now, whatever the Queen's Colleges may have been designed to be, or whatever they may have been at some primeval stage of their creation, it is simply certain that they have ceased to be colleges—except in name of course—since some years, at any rate. Thus as far back as the year 1868 at least, we have the clearest and distinctest evidence that the so-called Queen's University had become an ordinary aggregation of mere secondary schools, or an extraordinary aggregation, if our readers see reason to prefer the expression. We shall afterwards inquire at what date beyond 1868 the transformation was completed.

The evidence which we call upon the state of the Queen's Colleges in 1868 is supplied by no less trustworthy a witness than an actual member of the Queen's University professoriate itself. We shall continue to use the words "College," "University," "Professor," &c.; but our readers need not be biassed by such epithets. In 1868 Mr. D'Arcy Thompson, Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Galway, had been invited to deliver a course of lectures before the Lowell Institute at Boston, in the United States. Mr. Thompson was the author of some entertaining sketches, entitled "Day-dreams of a Schoolmaster." He had been master of a grammar-school at Edinburgh previous to his appointment to a "professorial chair" in the Queen's University. He is an attached supporter of the secular system of education, and, conducting one of the very principal courses of liberal studies known to scholarship, he must be considered to be in every way qualified to interpret the nature of the institution he describes. We do not know the origin of Mr. Thompson's invitation to the United States, no more than we can explain the happy impulse which set him to gossip so pleasantly before the good folks of Boston about the sort of affair that was called a University in Ireland. It is sufficient for us to follow his interesting revelation. The reader will see in it a graphic description of school education, and nothing but school education, commencing with the most elementary stages, and ending, as might be expected—what more could be done in a curriculum of three sessions?—at a stage no higher than secondary. Indeed, Mr. Thompson compares the finished "graduate" of the Queen's University at the close of the three years' curriculum, not with the finished graduate of any university in the world, but merely with himself (Mr. Thompson) years and years before he became a graduate, and when he was only leaving school for the University of Cambridge. We are reminded of Vice-President Andrews, of Belfast, when telling the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, ten years before, the sort of degree that would fit the Queen's University to a nicety. "It is essential," he observed, "that you should have a university degree, or a degree," he sagaciously added, "*corresponding in name and appearance with the old title. Not that you must uphold the old Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College course.*" Oh! dear, no! "Not an Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College course, *but a course prescribed by a university, and which, being pursued in these colleges, leads to a university degree.*" Most candid Vice-President Andrews, of Belfast! We fear that you have thrown some light on the school—we beg pardon, the "University"—of

the Presbyterian ministry in Ireland. But really we are again anticipating, as well as delaying Mr. Thompson's revelations. We quote from the volume "Wayside Thoughts," in which Mr. Thompson published his Boston lectures on his return.

Once a priest, always a priest; once a schoolmaster, always a schoolmaster. Not so—at least nominally—with myself. *I have been kicked upstairs.* I have been one of the favoured few allowed to emerge from the routine duties and unworthy thralldom of scholastic life to the more congenial duties and almost perfect freedom of the life professorial. I have, furthermore, had the good fortune to be called to a chair in a university where the professoriate is in full (!), vital (!!), vivifying (!!!) action. *Have my duties been essentially altered? Not in the very slightest degree. I have been for the last three years fulfilling the identical duties performed for twelve previous years with my senior classes in Dunedin.*

Evidently Mr. Thompson thinks it extremely nice to be called a Professor in the Queen's University for what the canny Dunedin folk called him only a schoolmaster. However, it would appear from his own words that this pleasing effect of full, vital, vivifying action rather astonished himself until he got used to it. In proof of this, the reader will hear him describe his own emotions of agreeable surprise. His account of the development of his ideas upon the subject is marked at once by a gentle facetiousness and a charming candour, and we have much pleasure in reproducing it.

*When first elected to my present chair, I had stereotyped in my mind an ideal character of a professor. . . . I feared it would be requisite for me to give elaborate dissertations upon such unfamiliar and not very practical subjects as the "Architecture of the Parthenon"; the "Dikasteries of Athens"; the "Sophists of Antiquity"; the "Exports and Imports of Corinth"; the "Greek Particles"; the "Achæan League." I considered it would be incumbent upon me, at least once in three years, to annotate a Greek play in Latin, to wrangle about microscopic trivialities, and to make facetiously scurrilous remarks in my footnotes about all previous and contemporary annotators. . . . I was reassured to find that the chair I was called upon to fill was just such a chair as I had filled to my own comfort for twelve long years. In fact I was still—what I am to this day—a schoolmaster.*

Our readers will hardly be so "reassured." Mr. Thompson goes on to exhibit in detail the thorough parallelism between his present "professorial" and his past "scholastic" experiences. Nobody will assert that Mr. Thompson underrates his own capacity for producing the greatest possible amount of improvement in the shortest possible space of time. He goes so far as to say that after *three* years under his tuition a Queen's University pupil knows, if anything, a little more than

a pupil of any other school after *twelve* years under the tuition of anybody else. Our readers will join in hoping that this may be the case, since one thing appears certain at any rate, that at the *beginning* of their three years the pupils of Mr. Thompson are in as elementary a condition as the pupils of anybody else at the beginning of their twelve.

The youths I had now under my charge, were of the same age as those attending the two senior classes of my Dunedin school. *The majority of them had been very poorly prepared. . . .* I had only three hours a week severally with my new pupils, and only some twenty hours a year; and yet, *strange to say*, I have for the last year been reading with pupils *who learned their elements with me not three years ago* entire books from the best Greek authors, with a facility of understanding on their part that I had never myself experienced when, between nineteen and twenty, after twelve years of almost exclusively classical instruction, I left St. Edward's for the University of Cambridge, &c. &c. . . . *Many of my first year's students*

{we are almost ashamed to continue our quotations}

*come to me almost utterly innocent of Greek. . . . For a few weeks they are engaged in mastering declensions and conjugations. . . . As soon as the accidence is tolerably well mastered, I begin to read some such easy work, in vivâ voce translation, as the "Apology" of Plato. . . . By-and-by they will hear me read a book of Homer. . . . After a little while I exact, so far as I can exact, three carefully written exercises weekly. . . .* I have been enabled to achieve what many will think impossible results, &c. &c.

Good heavens! Is this what the Queen's Colleges have sunk to, and is this all that remains of the realization of the Queen's University scheme which was to thrust a despised and hostile secularism on an intellectual and Catholic nation?

Elsewhere, in "Wayside Thoughts," Mr. Thompson says:

*During the last three years I have had in the management of an Alpha-Beta class one-fourth part of my professorial duties.*

What a flood of explanation is poured upon the whole working and position of the so-called University by these astounding confessions, not more astounding, however, as our readers will shortly perceive, than the confession on other occasions of almost the entire body of Mr. Thompson's colleagues and associates. What must be the shifts, what must be the nature of the Matriculation examination which admitted all these "students, almost utterly innocent of Greek," all these "Alpha-Beta classes"? Our readers are aware of the all-important influence of a university upon the secondary education of a country. It is the University which sets the standard of the secondary education. Boys cannot be expected to remain at school much beyond the time

when they are fit for college; and what sort of schools can they be whose standard is set by Mr. Thompson's University? We have heard of university training-schools. What sort of training-schools can they be whose function is the preparation of students fit for the Queen's Colleges? Is this the manner in which the annual sums voted from the moneys of the taxpayers, the scholarships, and exhibitions of the Queen's University operate to develop the school system of Ireland? Ten years previously Professor Melville, of Queen's College, Galway, had confessed to the Queen's Colleges Commissioners in 1858, "I must honestly state that if we had no scholarships and no exhibitions we might as well shut the doors." And is it for this state of things that "the doors" are kept open?

How terribly in consonance with Mr. Thompson's narrative is the evidence which the Endowed Schools Commission in 1857 managed to get out of a teacher of the Galway Grammar-school of Erasmus Smith, upon the subject of the influence already exercised by the Queen's Colleges upon such of the secondary education of the country as came within their reach. When the Commissioners of Inquiry into the state of Endowed Schools in Ireland visited the Galway Grammar-school of Erasmus Smith, they found it their duty to describe it in their Report as "one of the most depressed and backward schools in the kingdom." And yet out of a total of *twenty-six* Galway Erasmus Smith pupils who matriculated in the local Queen's College from 1849 to 1857, no less than *twenty-four* were rewarded with scholarships *immediately on entrance*. How explain the apparent anomaly? The Rev. J. W. Hallowell, the head master, happened to be absent when the Endowed Schools Commissioners paid their visit. Mr. Thomas Killeen, the second master, was present, however, and the Commissioners proceeded to extract from him, in spite of the most evident reluctance and apprehension, an account of the reasons for the decline of the school. But let us follow the minutes of evidence, omitting nothing but the most absolutely extraneous matter.

MR. THOMAS KILLEEN *sworn and examined.*

THE CHAIRMAN.—What situation do you hold in the Grammar-school?

WITNESS.—Second Master.

THE CHAIRMAN.—Can you assign any reasons for the falling off in the number of pupils?

WITNESS.—I am placed in a critical situation. *If I get blame from the Governors, it is at my own risk; they can dismiss me when they like.* I could assign some reasons.

Mr. STEPHENS.—Will you be pleased to assign the reasons for the decline of the school ?

WITNESS.—In general, I think the terms are rather high.

Mr. STEPHENS.—Are those the only reasons you can assign for the decline of the school ?

WITNESS.—Roman Catholics, generally, when I solicited them to send their sons there, said, Why should we not give a preference to the Roman Catholic schools, where they would be taught their own religion. Another reason is, it is too far to go to the school, particularly for those who live at the other side of the town, for they would have a good mile to walk.

Mr. STEPHENS.—Can you assign any other reasons for the decline of the school ?

WITNESS.—I cannot at present.

Mr. STEPHENS.—*I think you said that if you were to assign the reason for the decline of the school you would offend the Governors ; did you not say so ?*

WITNESS.—*Yes.*

Mr. STEPHENS.—*Are the reasons you have assigned now for the decline of the school likely to offend the Governors ?*

WITNESS.—*I believe not.*

Mr. STEPHENS.—*Then you must have some other reasons ?*

WITNESS.—*Perhaps so.*

Mr. STEPHENS.—*State them.*

WITNESS.—When the Queen's Colleges opened, I consider the principal reason for our scholars falling off is, *they were admitted there before they knew their grammar at school.* I can say the professors themselves gave it as their opinion—and some of them are listening to me at present—that they had to teach the pupils grammar after being admitted as scholars of the Queen's College ; instead of being professors they had to teach them just as we do at school. *They got scholarships when they ought to have remained two or three years longer at school.*

Our readers will observe that Mr. Killeen and Mr. Thompson, the schoolmaster who has not “been kicked upstairs,” as well as the schoolmaster who has experienced that enjoyment, the dependent teacher who is half-divided between the obligations of his oath and the fear of the Governors, and the communicative lecturer to Transatlantic audiences, are found to be substantially in accordance with one another and, though separated by a distance of ten years, to strongly corroborate each other. We must allow Mr. Killeen to conclude, however. He has a little more to tell to the astonished Commissioners.

Mr. STEPHENS.—Did they get scholarships with emoluments ?

WITNESS.—*Yes.*

Rev. Doctor GRAVES.—When so imperfectly instructed as you say ?

WITNESS.—*Yes.*

Mr. STEPHENS.—What is the value of a scholarship ?

WITNESS.—£24 a year, and about £4 pays their fees ; so they generally have £20 a year, and a good many premiums. They leave our school before

they are finished. *I have a son myself at school that might get a scholarship at the Queen's College, perhaps a better scholar than some of those who have got scholarships, and I would not let him go in till he is better finished; for if a boy does not know his grammar, a professor cannot teach him these things.*

We do not expect that our readers will much longer hesitate to agree that for a good many years already it has been proved of Queen's College, Galway, at any rate, that the proposed Queen's University scheme, which was to have made such a figure in the world, has pretty well returned to grandmaternal chaos and congenial nothing. And Queen's College, Galway, be it remembered, in no way, except in numbers, falls below the kindred institutions at Cork and Belfast. As far as numbers go, it is usually trebled or quadrupled by the Belfast establishment; but considering that the superiority of Belfast is solely a superiority in the matter of tag-rag-and-bobtail, Galway equalling Belfast in culture—such culture!—and only yielding to Belfast in the exceeding horde of pass-men, Alpha-Beta students and such like, whom the Presbyterian atmosphere and nominal matriculation of the “Northern Athens” attract to its Calvinistic embraces, Galway must be taken as a remarkably favourable sample of the extraordinary Queen's University. Professor Craik, of Queen's College, Belfast, was anxious to impress upon the Queen's College Commissioners that “possibly I could hardly go the length of saying that if a person came entirely ignorant of the English language I should pass him.” Possibly, however, our readers may not consider this remarkable severity precisely satisfactory. We shall have occasion to speak of Belfast, however, at greater length further on. For the present we would only quote, in confirmation of our statement that Galway College is an extremely favourable sample of the Queen's University, the following pæan of triumph in which that respectable provincial journal the “Galway Vindicator” indulged at the special expense of Belfast College only the year after Mr. Thompson's revelations as to the abject plight of Galway College studies. “The result of the last annual inter-collegiate competition for the Peel Exhibitions,” writes the “Galway Vindicator” of December 11th, 1869, “has been announced. We are happy to state that Galway is *facile princeps*. In the Faculty of Arts the Galway candidate is first of the whole University, the Belfast champion coming in a very distant second, and Cork being absolutely nowhere. *This is the third time in four years that Belfast has been thoroughly well beaten by Galway.* The second Galway candidate equals the first of Belfast . . . In the Faculty of Engineering, a candidate from Galway College, *similarly following the uniform example of his Galway predecessors*, gains

the very first place in the whole University. In the Faculty of Medicine again, the candidate of Galway College likewise distances all competition. When we remember that another student of Galway College has recently carried off the gold medal of the Diploma of Elementary Law, it will be seen that *the local Queen's College has completed the round of all the prizes in all the Faculties, and has swept away everything in its course, we may say, with the most perfect nonchalance.* As we have said, Cork is nowhere. And Belfast is next to nowhere. *Remembering that these colleges probably quintuple in numbers Galway at the least, the state of Mixed Education, both north and south, may be better imagined than described."* Of a certainty, the state of Mixed Education, north and south and west, may be better imagined than described.

We are engaged upon a work of investigation, however, and it cannot content us to note the disappearance in practice of that Queen's University scheme, which in theory looked so imposing to parliamentary projectors. At what date can we decidedly fix the disappearance? What caused the failure? Has the theory disappeared along with the practice? that is to say, has the Queen's University ceased to exist not only as *fact* but as *plan*? Has, not alone the actual *matter* of studies, but the original *outline* of studies, fallen a victim to progressive Alpha-Betaism? Or, putting the question another way, supposing that the elements of numerical success were to be present to the Queen's University, supposing there were no longer the temptation to bribe schoolboys with scholarships before they had learned their grammar at school, would the Queen's University begin to be a university even then? *Does even the outline of studies remain, or has the original design itself been sacrificed to the miserable necessities of a losing struggle with appearances?* In a word, does the Queen's University in Ireland exist even on paper? We have seen that its courses of study existed on paper twenty years ago. Do they as much as exist on paper to-day? The documents of the Queen's University, its calendars and regulations, will supply the answer.

We know that the Queen's University has wandered widely in a good many things from the design of its founders. As Sir Robert Kane, of Queen's College, Cork, told the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, "the idea was in the first instance to develop the Faculty of Arts on a large scale." Naturally the professional schools were little thought of in comparison, since it was not professional training but University education that was required. Subsequently, "events made me sensible," continued Sir Robert Kane, "that it was necessary to the



success of the educational system and its favourable reception by the country that the Faculties of Medicine, &c., should be constituted." Subsequently also our readers are aware that the Professional Faculties have come even numerically almost to constitute the University. During the session 1868-69, and according to returns obtained by the O'Connor Don and Mr. Fortescue, there were in the Queen's Colleges, 465 Medical, Law, and Engineering students, to the 228 Arts or University students; and of these 228, be it observed, only 37 were Catholics. We do not, however, propose to dwell upon the transformation. It is sufficient to know that of the poor total of 600 or 700 students described to be in attendance at the Queen's University, hardly a third, and sometimes hardly a fourth, have an atom more to do with the Queen's University, except in the sense of local contiguity, than if they were articulated to a civil engineer or walking the hospitals of Dublin or Edinburgh. From the time the medical student enters the Queen's University to the time he leaves, he takes no part in even the Alpha-Beta classes of the Arts Faculty. He patronizes Mixed Education merely in the sense that he conducts his anatomical and other experiments in an annex of the Queen's College buildings; and when the advocates of the Mixed System count him to the credit of the system's success, they are simply guilty of a very discreditable juggle so far as they are acquainted with the real connection of the Professional Faculties with the so-called University. Leaving out of calculation, accordingly, the four or five hundred professional students whom the extreme lowness of the fees, and the entire freedom from any educational curriculum, attract within the annexes of the Queen's Colleges, we can only concern ourselves with the so-called Arts Faculty of the Queen's University. If the University is anywhere, it is in the Arts Faculty. If the University is not there, it is nowhere, and in the Queen's University the University is nowhere. But to our documents.

Our readers remember that Baccalaureate examination of the original Queen's University to which we directed attention at an early stage of our article. We were inclined to quarrel with its optional character, by which a candidate could elect to take his degree in any of three groups of subjects. At the same time, while expressing our preference for a more thorough uniformity in the recognized test of University education, we admitted that the original design of the Queen's University Baccalaureate, as of its general course of studies, was fairly consonant with a university character. We had likewise our doubts about the expediency of placing the prizes and medals

for distinction in specialties so close to the general examination. We should have preferred to have seen the prizes and medals awarded for distinction in the general or degree examination. Still our first impulse must be to see how the original design can have come to fare amid the exigencies created by Alpha-Beta undergraduates and scholarshipped schoolboys, who got scholarships before they had learned their grammars. Who knows but we may find that the optionality of the degree examination has been considerably increased, has perhaps been doubled. The difficulty of making graduates out of the sort of students admitted by a sham matriculation must be rather extreme when there is a curriculum of only three sessions for the performance of the operation. There may have been temptation at work to facilitate the manufacture of graduates by breaking up the degree examination more and more into optional bits and fragments. It would be so much easier, we can understand, for a hopeful Alpha-Betist to pick up a knowledge of a bit, rather than of the whole of any examination, and, as we know, the Queen's University was dreadfully embarrassed by the want of graduates. The Queen's University was, unfortunately for its projectors, neither in Borrioboola-Gha nor Fiji, and a supply of visible converts was indispensable. As the Rev. President Henry, of Queen's College, Belfast, had told the Queen's Colleges Commissioners: "*What I desire to see, and what the Council desire to see, is the number of our degrees increased; because it will become very painful, if the present state of things continue, to have our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and be able to present to the public no degrees.*" Or perhaps,—let us be charitable—the Queen's University will be found to have extended its original curriculum from three sessions to six or nine, in order to provide for the education, elementary, secondary, and university, of the sort of students its numerical exigencies drive it to admit at the most elementary stage. It is true that Mr Thompson's revelations hardly support this charitable view. But, at any rate, let us consult the existing regulations.

Consulting the Regulations of the Queen's University in Ireland for the present and recent years, we certainly find no trace of an extension in the duration of the curriculum, and our readers will be led to suspect that perhaps the desired facilitation of graduate manufacture has been achieved by some moderately mischievous *morcellement* of the degree examination. What if the degree examination be discovered to be broken up into five or six optional fragments or groups. The expedient would not have been very creditable; but still expedients will sometimes be tried notwithstanding. Consider

the "painfulness" of "having our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and being able to present the public with no degrees."

Let us consult the Regulations again for the exact condition of the Queen's University degree. But what on earth is this we discover? Broken up "into five or six fragments" did we say? A hundred fragments rather. Innumerable fragments rather. Alpha-Betaism has done its work. The sham matriculation has done its work. There is no longer a degree examination. The "Graduates" that must be presented to the public at "our assemblages in St. Patrick's Hall," have had to be manufactured by other means than degree examinations. Degree examinations are not for grammarless schoolboys after a course of three sessions. But let the Regulations of this monstrous institution speak for themselves.

There are "Honour" graduates and "Pass" graduates, and not even the handful of "Honour" graduates pass the old degree examination. Nowadays the "Honour" graduates of the Queen's "University get their degrees for less than the specialties which used to be the subjects of medals and prizes subsequent to the degree examination. There used to be a dozen of such specialties. There are *seventeen* varieties of "Honour degrees" Any one of *seventeen* bits of education, at the termination of a curriculum of three sessions, is the sufficient qualification of even the "Honour graduate" of the Queen's University. The schoolboy can become an "Honour graduate" in

1. The Greek and Latin Languages ; or
2. Mathematical Science ; or
3. Experimental Science ; or
4. Natural Science ; or
5. The French and German Languages ; or
6. The German and Italian Languages ; or
7. The French and Italian Languages ; or
8. English Language and Literature, Logic and Metaphysics ; or
9. English Language and Literature, Logic and History ; or
10. English Language and Literature, Logic and Political Economy ; or
11. English Language and Literature, Metaphysics and History ; or
12. English Language and Literature, Metaphysics and Political Economy ; or
13. English Language and Literature, History and Political Economy ; or
14. Logic, Metaphysics, and History ; or

15. Logic, Metaphysics, and Political Economy ; or

16. Logic, History, and Political Economy ; or

17. Metaphysics, History, and Political Economy.

The Ancient Classics of a Queen's University curriculum ! "I do not think," confessed upon oath Vice-President Ryall, of Queen's College, Cork, to the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, "we have sent out more than one man who would get honours in the English universities in classics." A couple of years ago a classical Master of Arts, and gold medallist of the Queen's University was only able to obtain, a few months after his Queen's University distinctions, a fourth or fifth *sizarship* in Trinity College, Dublin. The History of a Queen's University curriculum ! The Metaphysics of a Queen's University curriculum ! So much for general education and regular academic training among even the "Honour graduates" of the Queen's University in Ireland !

As might be expected, the vast majority of the Queen's University graduates are not even such honour men. And if the manufacture of the Honour graduates was astounding, the manufacture of the Pass graduates beggars description. It is no longer *seventeen* bits of education amongst which the Alpha-Betist can choose. Anything, literally anything, qualifies the Pass graduate of the Queen's University, the luminous Queen's University, whose radiance is too dazzling for the malevolent obscurantism of the Catholic Church. Thus there is a Pass degree to be got for

1. English Language and Literature, and Mathematics ; or
2. English Language and Literature, and Experimental Physics ; or
3. English Language and Literature, and Chemistry ; or
4. English Language and Literature, and Zoology and Botany ; or
5. English Language and Literature, and Zoology and Greek ; or
6. English Language and Literature, and Botany and Greek ; or
7. English Language and Literature, and Zoology and Latin ; or
8. English Language and Literature, and Botany and Latin ; or
9. Logic and Metaphysics, and History and Political Economy ; or
10. Chemistry, Political Economy, and French ; or
11. French, German, and Chemistry ; or
12. Chemistry, Political Economy, and French ; or
13. Chemistry, History, and Logic ; or

14. Logic and Metaphysics, and English Language and Literature; or
  15. Mathematical Science, Political Economy, and French; or
  16. German, Experimental Physics, and Botany; or
  17. Italian, Botany, and English Language and Literature; or
  18. French, German, Italian, and Zoology; or
  19. History, Italian, and Experimental Physics; or
  20. Political Economy, Italian, and Chemistry; or
  21. History, Logic, and French and German; or
  22. Logic, Mathematical Science, and French; or
  23. Botany, Zoology, Italian, and History; or—
- But it is better to transcribe the Regulation on the subject. Our readers may then construct "degrees" *ad libitum* for themselves.

EXAMINATION FOR THE DEGREE OF B.A. WITHOUT HONOURS.

Candidates who seek the Degree without Honours may *select* for their Examination *any group* of subjects from the following list, *provided the sum of the numbers attached in this list to the selected subjects be at least four* :—

English Language and Literature, 2	Latin, - - - - - 1
Mathematical Science, - - - 2	Each Modern Continental Lan-
Experimental Physics, - - - 2	guage, - - - - - 1
Chemistry, - - - - - 2	Logic, - - - - - 1
Zoology, - - - - - 1	Metaphysics, - - - - - 1
Botany, - - - - - 1	History, - - - - - 1
Greek, - - - - - 1	Political Economy, - - - - 1

There are Permutations and Combinations! Do our readers dimly comprehend how "a degree," as the Belfast Vice-President observed, "corresponding *in name and appearance* with the old title" can be managed in these days of enlightened secularism? It may be as well, however, to illustrate the sort of erudition which is required for these precious "degrees." Let us take the examinations in Ancient Classics, in Modern Languages, and in History, as easily understood specimens, and for the sake of uniformity we shall quote from the University Regulations of the session which saw Mr. Thompson's American confessions. For the cost of a shilling or thereabouts, our readers can supply themselves with the Regulations of any other year they may fancy. But to our quotations :—

The Examination in GREEK will comprise—

In 1868.

Xenophon—Cyropædeia, Books 1, 2.

Homer—Iliad, Book 9.

with prose composition in Greek.

The Examination in Latin will comprise—  
In 1868.

Sallust.

Horace—Satires and Epistles.

with prose composition in Latin.

In MODERN LANGUAGES the candidate will be required to translate an easy passage from an English author into the language or languages he selects. He will also be expected to possess an elementary knowledge of the literature of those languages.

The portion appointed for the examination in HISTORY is English History from 1603 to 1702.

Perhaps on another occasion we may describe other distinctions of the Queen's Colleges course. "Not an Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity Colleges course," as we have learned from the canny North, "but a course prescribed by a University, and which being pursued in these colleges leads to a University degree." *Voilà de l'esprit!*

We have promised, however, to state, at least approximately, when the Queen's University definitely ceased to exist, or, in other words, fell into its present condition. We had serious thoughts of commending this portion of our narrative to the attention of Mr. Bret Harte, Mr. Mark Twain, and similar gentlemen, whose vocation is to deal with humorous subjects. We felt that in a steady-going Quarterly Review it was hardly in keeping to venture on a topic which we knew to be so utterly hostile to all sedateness and gravity. Perhaps the recollection of what the Queen's University has meant to Ireland will aid us in an endeavour to describe with some sobriety the thing as it was in itself.

It was in the year 1857 that a commission, consisting of the Marquis of Kildare, the late Sir Thomas Redington, Messrs. James Gibson and Bonamy Price, inspected the three Queen's Colleges of Belfast, Galway, and Cork. A glance at the report which they prefixed to the Minutes of Evidence is sufficient to give a broad inkling of something excessively curious. Amid the usual cloud of sentimentalities about the incalculable advantages of education, and of auguries about the part which the Queen's Colleges, *if properly managed*—your *If* is a great save-all, as well as a great peacemaker—were calculated to play, &c. &c., it is evident the commissioners have seen and heard quite enough to astonish them out of their official optimism. With regard to the Queen's Colleges Matriculation, they write that "*nothing could, we conceive, be more injurious to the interests of education than a low standard of matriculation examination. . . . the tendency of such should always be to elevate, and never to depress, the general standard*

of school education throughout the country." Had, then, the Queen's Colleges Commissioners, like the Endowed School Commissioners, heard that the tendency of the Queen's Colleges Matriculation was to depress that general standard? With regard to the Queen's Colleges Scholarship system, the commissioners write—"On comparing the number of scholarships in the Faculty of Arts with the number of students attending in the same faculty in the colleges, we are of opinion that it is desirable to diminish their number." Had, then, the commissioners heard that the Queen's Colleges scholarships were not the rewards of ability but the bribes of attendance? With regard to the curriculum of studies, and especially with regard to the degree examination, the commissioners write that "there is presented to the authorities a constant temptation to excuse inattention to the general course," and that "a general education forms the soundest basis on which pre-eminent merit in particular branches of literature or science can rest." Had, then, the commissioners met with evidence that general education was being already silently sacrificed, as it has since been avowedly discarded, in order to make sham graduates within three sessions out of schoolboys who had not the time to graduate in a general course, who had been admitted to college before they had learned their grammar at school, who had been bribed with scholarships when they ought to have remained two or three years longer at school? We have seen the radical change which has since been effected in the original curriculum. Was it with the approval of the commissioners—although that would have been no excuse—that this destruction of the original scope and constitution of the Queen's University has taken place? On the contrary, the commissioners distinctly write that they "cannot think a radical alteration desirable"; and that, on reviewing the evidence, they had come to the conclusion that the "suggestions" of "the great majority of the presidents and professors in the three colleges" had "in a great degree been influenced by the deficient state of preparation in which the students enter the colleges." Had, then, "the great majority of the presidents and professors" the self-possession to adduce the sham matriculation as a reason for the legalization of a sham Baccalaureate?

In simple truth, this was the literal fact.

"It is essential," said Vice-President Andrews, of Queen's College, Belfast, "that you should have a University degree, or a degree corresponding in name and appearance with the old title. . . . Not an Oxford and Cambridge and Trinity College course, but a course prescribed by a University"—that

is, a Queen's University—"and which, being pursued in these colleges, leads to a University degree."

"What I desire to see, and what the Council desire to see," said President Pooley Henry, D.D., of Queen's College, Belfast, "is the number of our degrees increased, because it will become very painful, if the present state of things continue, to have our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and be able to present to the public no degrees. . . . I think conscientiously," continued the reverend President, "now as there is a commission sitting, and sitting for some purpose, it would be an Unfortunate Thing if the opportunity were allowed to pass without something being done to rectify the present system."

Ah, gentlemen of the General Assembly of the Presbyterians of Ulster, who affect to take so much interest in Catholic education, it was an Unfortunate Thing that you did not take more interest in your own. It was an Unfortunate Thing for your reputation, that resolution of yours of October, 1849.

Whereas one of our ministers, in whose capacity and paternal care we have entire confidence, has been appointed Dean of Residences, and whereas the qualifications and character of the persons appointed in Queen's College, Belfast, for those classes which the students of this Church have been hitherto required to attend, are such as to justify this Assembly in accepting certificates and degrees from that college, we now permit our students to attend the classes in the Queen's College, Belfast.

And it continues to be a very Unfortunate Thing for your reputation that your Divinity students continue to form the bulk of the attendance at Queen's College, Belfast, to-day as much as when Professor MacDouall deposed to the Queen's Colleges Commissioners that the bulk of his class consisted of "gentlemen contemplating Presbyterian Orders." Without the Presbyterian Divinity Students, Queen's College, Belfast, would, like the kindred institutions at Galway and Cork, be the most utter *numerical* failure. With the Presbyterian Divinity students, it is only an educational failure, the mass of the "gentlemen contemplating Presbyterian Orders" being everything the matriculation practices would lead the reader to expect. It is certainly an Unfortunate Thing, when only thirty years ago, their distinguished co-religionist Sir William Hamilton had to describe the churchmen of the Scottish Kirk as the "least learned" national clergy in the world, that the Irish branch of that kirk should have had no better means of improving their condition than the Queen's University in Ireland.

Mr. Nesbitt, Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Galway, and at present Professor of Latin in Queen's College, Belfast,



in reply to the Commissioners, felt "quite certain that many students are now deterred from going up for their degree, on account of the very limited nature of their classical attainments. The students come here knowing little or no classics, and when a strict examination stares them in the face," he touchingly continued, "you can easily see what a deterring influence it has." Mr. Nesbitt was accordingly prepared to advocate a scheme which would "merely allow the mathematical student, or the student for honours in *any other subject*, to get rid of subjects which he can never acquire any profound knowledge of, and which are merely a drag upon him." President Berwick, of Queen's College, Galway, showed himself quite worthy of his Northern colleagues. "There is a great hankering after Greek," he complained; "I should be glad to see the degree given without forcing this language on any one." President Berwick was asked by Sir Thomas Redington, "Am I to understand that you are favourable to admitting candidates to the degree of A.B., although they should not have that general education and information which the present course requires?" He answered, "The students only get a smattering in a great number of the subjects." And being pressed to explain himself openly, confessed that the students were smatterers for the simple reason that the matriculations were such shams that, "it would require twice the period" of the actual curriculum to enable them to master it. But we shall give this astounding avowal in President Berwick's own words. "It would require twice the period. . . . I believe in order to master the present curriculum, the student should enter college a good classical scholar, well-grounded in Greek and Latin, and have acquired a respectable knowledge of mathematics. *The fact is this, they come with nothing that can be called classical knowledge; they know nothing about classics in fact, but they come prepared in mathematics to a certain degree.*" And, accordingly, President Berwick would be glad to see a degree given without forcing Greek upon any one. As the Belfast president says, "it will become very painful to continue to have our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and to be able to present to the public no degrees."

"You conceive the information the students acquire," asked Mr. Price, "is what may be called '*smattering*'?" And President Berwick promptly replied, "that is inevitable, *because they have to begin with the rudiments.*" Exactly what the Erasmus Smith schoolmaster told us, "our school is destroyed because the Queen's College takes our scholars before they have learned their grammar." Another question put by Mr. Price to President Berwick relates to that transformation of

the so-called Professors into Schoolmasters of very humble pretensions, of which Mr. Thompson told his American friends. "Then the system," said Mr. Price, "as it now works, involves this practical drag to the teachers, that they are compelled to be elementary teachers to the mass of students?" And President Berwick in 1857, like Mr. Thompson in 1868, replies, "To the large majority they are." President Berwick is finally driven to confess that the "inevitable" consequence of all this "elementary" teaching, even in 1857, while the degree had not as yet been chopped up and degraded to what the reader has seen, was to make the pretended University a mere school—the Commissioner is good enough to say, a high school. We beg to give this piece of evidence at length. President Berwick has nothing better to say in defence of the practices of his college than that Belfast and Cork are behaving as badly.

Mr. GIBSON.—Do you think that a University which should confer the degrees for an amount of education which could be conferred in a high school, would be discharging its functions?

President BERWICK.—No.

Mr. GIBSON.—Do you not think it the province of the Professor to be something more than a mere schoolmaster?

President BERWICK.—Certainly.

Mr. GIBSON.—And in every college which forms part of a University the necessary range of a Professor should be of a much higher order than that adopted in a mere high school?

President BERWICK.—Yes.

How Mr. Berwick must have enjoyed this line of examination! He was not going to be let loose even at this point.

Mr. GIBSON.—You have stated that the preparation of the students who present themselves for matriculation is such that if you regarded their fitness to enter on the present curriculum, you would be obliged to reject eight out of ten.

President Berwick had admitted so much to Sir Thomas Redington: but to continue Mr. Gibson's question.

*Am I therefore to infer that the college under present circumstances can do little more than perform the part of a high school?*

President BERWICK.—That is the case with regard to classical subjects. Although what I say on this point is principally restricted to this college, I have heard that the students come very badly prepared in classics to all the colleges.

Though President Berwick, when fairly cornered, tries to confine his admissions to the case of classical studies—sufficiently important in themselves—as he had just confessed that "almost every professor" is an elementary teacher, the

attempted reservation comes too late. At any rate, we are not trusting to President Berwick's admissions. The evidence as to every department is simply overwhelming. In Belfast, considering the comparative success of the Queen's College in consequence of its adoption by the Presbyterian General Assembly, the evidence is frightful and scandalous. The most elementary studies, Geometry, English, are as neglected as Classics could be. Thus Mr. Tait, Professor of Mathematics, told the Commissioners that he had "to examine but a small portion of the students at the Matriculation examination, *in the very elements of Geometry and Algebra*," and that, nevertheless, "the average standard of preparation is very much lower than ought to be expected." At the same time he confessed that there were few rejections, "because," as he mildly put it, "*the average standard has been somewhat reduced.*" Doctor Frings, Professor of Modern Languages, pleaded that there might be a matriculation examination "*of ever so low a standard*, in one of the modern languages." The unfortunate "Professor" did not know what to do with the interesting *alumni* of the Presbyterian Alma Mater, inasmuch as "very few of them ever saw a French word in their lives." Mr. Craik, Professor of History and English Literature in the same favoured institution, began his revelations about the Belfast matriculation by acknowledging to Sir Thomas Redington that so far as his department was concerned the matriculation examination "merely involves a knowledge of the English language, and of the elements or outlines of Geography, a little Greek and Roman History and English History too." When interrogated about the extent to which the juvenile *pasteurs* satisfied the exigencies of this formidable test, Mr. Craik replied—our readers will hardly believe their eyes—"I could hardly insist on a student being rejected, *however great his deficiency in my department.*" "But," said Sir Thomas Redington—we may readily suppose, in blank amazement—"if the student proceed to Medicine, his knowledge of the English language is not tested in any subsequent year?" And Mr. Craik admitted that this was the case, and that in fact "a man may proceed through the whole course of this college and obtain a degree in Medicine without having any competent knowledge whatever of the English language." Our readers may judge from this avowal what the conditions were in 1857 of the education of the professional students which Queen's Collegism so desperately counts to its credit as a "University." Even though the knowledge of the Arts students was "tested" in subsequent years, it is plain that their entrance education in English was not fixed at a standard

which ought sensibly to thin the ranks of the Presbyterian Kirk in Ulster. "Possibly," said Mr. Craik, "possibly I could hardly go the length of saying that if a person came entirely ignorant of the English language I should pass him." It might have been better in the long run if the president, professors, and council of Belfast Queen's College had been less cannily alive to the "painfulness of having our assemblage in St. Patrick's Hall, and being able to present to the public no degrees." It might have been better, too, if the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Kirk in Ulster had been so good as to thrust less impertinent interference into the affairs of Catholic education and had devoted a little intelligent attention to the education that was being provided for its own Ministers and Ruling Elders *in futuro*. But this involves a supposition.

We do not believe it is necessary to trouble our readers with many more details of the plight to which the Queen's Colleges had been already reduced a whole decade of years before Mr. Thompson's American excursion. We would only add the evidence of Professor Bagley, of Queen's College, Galway, on the general question of the trustworthiness of the intra-collegiate examinations,—sessional examinations and like "tests"—which the happy Elect of the matriculation ordeal were supposed to undergo on their course to the degree.

MR. PRICE.—You do not appear to lay much stress on the *certificates* of the professors, *which are returned to the University*, that the subjects are fairly studied?

WITNESS.—My impression is, that in most cases where a man had been studying very hard at other subjects, the professors would be disposed to deal very leniently with him.

So much for the extent to which the intra-collegiate studies were allowed to correct the miserable deficiencies condoned at matriculation.

We had almost forgotten Queen's College, Cork. That institution of some two hundred medical and engineering students, together with about as many Arts students as disposable Arts scholarships and exhibitions, deserves a word, and we cannot do better, out of the mass of corroborative testimony of all kinds, than allow its Vice-President to say that word. It is perfectly graphic. This is the way in which, as far back as 1857, Queen's College, Cork, got its forty or fifty Arts students, on the oath of Vice-President Ryall.

MR. PRICE.—According to the system on which the matriculation examination is conducted here, it is perfectly possible for an examiner in any distinct

branch to report a man as a total failure, and yet that the Council shall admit him upon their own judgment, however arrived at.

WITNESS.—*Perfectly possible, and it is the constant practice!*

We daresay it will hardly be asserted that even in 1857 the proposed Queen's Colleges and Queen's University in Ireland had made much progress towards realization. And in 1857 it must at least be said that the outline of a university existed on paper, at any rate in calendars and regulations, if not in lecture-halls and at examinations. We do not pretend to know the designs of the Cabinet on the subject of Irish university reform. It is certain, however, that before Mr. Gladstone can either include or exclude the Queen's University under any system he may be maturing, it will be necessary for him to have a Queen's University of some sort in the first place. Considered as a Christmas pantomime, what is called the Queen's University might be unobjectionable, but real universities and true graduates will hardly feel a fraternal sentiment towards the travesty which Queen's College Councils have, unfortunately not in vain, "desired to see." We trust that, whatever may happen, the Cabinet will not forget either to close the so-called Queen's College at Belfast, or at least subject it to the requisite transformation at the hands of some university board. Best of all, perhaps, if for a generation or so, at any rate, the pupils of the General Assembly should be introduced to university teaching in Trinity College, Dublin. They could not become more intolerant, while, in respect to culture and education, the novelty would have much to recommend it. It is true that, as regards Trinity College, Dublin, the best possible reasons exist for the reluctance with which that protected establishment views the approach of any reforms which could expose its venerable *far niente* to the dreaded test of Catholic competition.\* The pampered monopoly would slumber in its Sleepy Hollow yet a while longer if it could. Were it never to wake, its inaction and inertia would be life and vigour compared to the stagnant superficiality of the Queen's University shams.

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\* While this article was going through the press, we received Mr. Howley's trenchant pamphlet on the abuses which a privileged security has naturally developed in the superannuated institution of the penal days, the rich but silent sister of Oxford and Cambridge. Trinity College, Dublin, presents, on an immense scale, an example of the results of enormous wealth when a public foundation has for generations been taught to consider itself safe from rivalry, and to despise exertion.

## ART. V.—ITALIAN CHURCH ARCHITECTURE.

(COMMUNICATED.)

THAT different ideas of the human mind are expressed by different styles of architecture will hardly, I suppose, be denied by any who has thought upon the subject. If this be granted, then it is difficult to see how any one style of architecture can be upheld to the exclusion of all others. One style may, indeed, be preferred by us to another, as more in harmony with our thoughts and feelings, or more in accordance with the wants of our own times; but to assert absolutely that either Gothic or Italian, or any other style, is the only architecture, betrays surely bigotry of the very narrowest type, and at the same time great ignorance of the beautiful, and even of the nature of man himself.

In the number of this Review for last April the cause of Gothic architecture was most ably, although at the same time modestly and temperately, defended in a communicated article. In his very opening words the writer declares that "most works which have been written upon the vexed question of the 'Revival of Gothic Architecture' are so narrow-minded, so bitter and acrimonious in their tone, and so obstinately insist upon regarding 'Gothic' as the *only* Christian architecture, that it is difficult to read them without the loss of one's temper." The writer, however, is of opinion that Gothic architecture is the best adapted for our modern English churches. He is also careful to state that he is not writing *against* Italian architecture, for he "can conceive no more glorious temple erected to the honour of Almighty God than a great Italian church, with its sublime dome reared high above a sumptuous *balduccino*, with its marble-faced walls and brilliantly reflective pavement, its splendid pictures and costly altars, its bronze capitals, and its gilded vault." It is therefore chiefly because he thinks that there is no chance of such a church ever being built in England that he advocates the use of Gothic as the *one existing* style suited to our wants, adding, at the same time, his hope that the future will invent or develop a style of its own.

It is the intention of the writer of the present article to take the opposite view, and to endeavour to defend the cause of Italian ecclesiastical architecture as quite as suitable, if not

more suitable, to the wants of the Church of our own days ; although he trusts that the same moderation will be found in his remarks as is to be met with in the article to which reference has been made.

First of all, it may be well to state that I believe *no* style of Church architecture is in itself anti-Roman ; nor do I think that Gothic churches need be so cut up with columns as to be wanting in spaciousness ; or that they are necessarily dark or cold ; or that the high altar *must* always be hidden in such churches from a great part of the congregation. In all this, therefore, I agree with the writer in the April number. To say that Gothic architecture is anti-Roman is simply absurd, for nothing is more striking, or offers a greater contrast to the narrow-mindedness of too many supporters of both the Gothic and Italian styles, than the liberality with which the Holy See has tolerated almost every kind of architecture. No doubt every ecclesiastical building—no matter in what style it is built—ought to be so constructed as to enable the Church's ritual to be carried out as perfectly as possible ; and although those who are best acquainted with the Italian style may think that of *existing* styles it offers greater facilities for this purpose than any other, yet not on this account ought they to consider the Gothic incapable of improvement. Every style of architecture can, I believe, in the hands of a gifted and conscientious architect, be brought into harmony with the requirements of the Church of our own day. As, however, to the choice of any particular style for ecclesiastical buildings, the Holy See may be said to be almost indifferent, leaving this to the feelings and tastes of different countries, and to the wants of different ages. When the Church rose from the Catacombs—where, by the way, she had not scrupled to decorate her secret hiding-places with Pagan designs, and sometimes even with representations borrowed from Pagan Mythology, if only they served to help forward the truth which had been committed unto her—she was content to avail herself of the form of the Basilicas as the best adapted of existing buildings for the worship of the triumphal Cross, without inventing any new style of her own. The Basilicas, therefore, of old Rome became the cradles of the Church's public worship—for her worship in the Catacombs could hardly have been called public—and they will be found, upon examination, to have profoundly influenced every succeeding style of ecclesiastical architecture, whether Byzantine, Gothic, or Renaissance. The church of *S. Agnese fuori le mure*, built by Constantine, may be taken as a specimen of the ancient halls of justice, from which the idea of the Christian basilica was borrowed.

Internally it consists of an oblong ; three sides of which are surrounded with columns ; the fourth side being a semicircle. The first order of columns supports a second, which forms a gallery, and on which a flat ceiling rests. In the upper columns, the rules laid down for a basilica by Vitruvius have, it is said, been carried out. In most cases, however, except with regard to plan and proportion, the rules of the ancient architecture were neglected, and when the treasures of the Pagan city were pressed into the service of Christianity, columns were erected at hazard, without any regard to the suitableness of their bases, capitals, or entablatures, utility no doubt being first thought of, rather than beauty of detail. But the Church can never for long make use of anything without stamping it with her own impress. Thus we find that even in the time of Constantine another aisle or transept was added at the end of the building, the semicircle or apse being still retained as its termination. In this way the sign of the Cross became distinctly visible ; and the faithful were enabled to realize more vividly the great symbol of their redemption. Then, too, the upper galleries of the ancient Pagan basilicas were suppressed, and in their place a wall pierced with windows was raised upon the columns of the nave.\* Sometimes, as was also the case in the decline of Classical architecture, this wall was supported by round arches resting upon the columns, thus leading the way for the substitution of the rounded vault for the flat roof. In the north of Europe the pointed arch—I have neither wish nor time to enter into the vexed question of its origin—was afterwards preferred to the round, while the intersection of transept and nave had already prepared the way for the dome and the lantern, according as either the round or the pointed arch was adopted. The sixteenth century brought with it the revival of classical tastes, yet although attended with very great evils, the Church, as a writer in the July number of this Review, who is evidently a warm admirer of Gothic architecture, has pointed out, threw herself to a certain extent into the movement, in order to confine its influence within its proper channel, and to prevent it from overflowing and destroying, instead of fertilizing Christendom. Nay, it was at this very period, that without wishing to exclude other styles of architecture, the Holy Roman

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\* As, for example, in the Basilica of S. Paul, *fuori le mure*, and in the old Basilica of S. Peter, which was superseded by the present church. In these churches the aisles were double, and nothing could be more beautiful than the effect of the insulated columns, as may still be seen at S. Paul's. So striking is it, that few, perhaps, have entered that basilica without supposing it to be longer even than S. Peter's.



Pontiff thought fit to raise over the tomb of the Apostles that mighty and glorious temple—the mightiest and most glorious, surely, which the world has ever seen, or will ever perhaps see again, and which few will deny is the noblest expression of the strength and majesty and harmony of proportion of the Church which our Lord has founded upon the Rock—the relics of B. Peter himself, resting beneath its mighty dome. From what has been said, therefore, it can, I think, hardly be denied that in every style of architecture which the Church has made use of, the leading idea of the Basilica, that is to say the “*nave*,” which the Holy Roman Church at once instinctively seized upon as typical of herself, the bark of Peter, ever tossed to and fro upon the troubled sea of this present wicked world, has been preserved, while the form of the Cross added to the nave clearly is an inspiration of her own. I said just now that the great Basilica of S. Peter’s—for notwithstanding all its deviations from the style of the early Basilica, it is still called by that name—is the noblest expression of the strength and majesty and harmony of proportion of the Church of God; and oh! surely no one who was present at the Council of the Vatican, or who even heard or read about it, could have failed to see how perfectly the very material building harmonized with the strong and majestic living Church of the living God, ever perfect in all its proportions, ever in harmony both with God Himself, and with the wants of men. Who could have looked up into that glorious dome, and read there the words: “*Tu es Petrus et super hanc Petram edificabo ecclesiam meam*,” without making such an act of faith, as he never had made before, that the gates of hell shall never prevail against the Church? Who could have seen the Vicar of Christ, the living Peter, seated with the Episcopate of the whole Christian world over Peter’s tomb, without feeling how wisely his predecessors had chosen the style of architecture for the great typical Church of Christendom? Now this thought naturally leads me to speak of the chief characteristics of Italian Church architecture, before turning to its suitability for our modern wants in this country.

That the Gothic style is beautiful, most beautiful, most majestic, most heaven-inspiring, I gladly allow. No one can love or admire Gothic more than I do. That it expresses some of the noblest thoughts of the mind of man, who was made in the image of God, I willingly concede; but that it combines in itself, as is the case with Italian church architecture, speaking generally, strength, grandeur, and harmony of proportion, in the latter of which, as it appears to me—although I must here confess that I am no architect—the

essence of the noblest architecture must be placed, I do not, cannot admit. Of course there is only one S. Peter's in the world—but the three characteristics, strength, grandeur, harmony of proportion, combined together, belong more or less to the Italian style in general, and, so far as I can see, in a greater degree to the Italian style than to any other. The architecture of old Egypt was mighty and sublime, but beauty was wanting. The temples of Greece were of perfect beauty and proportion, but strength and grandeur were wanting. The great mediæval cathedrals were beautiful and majestic, but neither strength nor unity were the leading features. Enter a Gothic cathedral or abbey, whether York, or Canterbury, or Westminster, or Amiens or Cologne, and say whether the unity of the mighty whole is the first impression made upon the mind. The eye rests upon the beauty of some pointed arch, or upon the glories of some painted window, or upon some exquisitely carved shrine or altar-piece, but the grandeur of the whole, the unity of the whole, is lost sight of amidst the multitude of details. Enter, on the other hand, some Italian church—I do not say S. Peter's, or any of the great basilicas of Rome, or even such a church as S. Andrea della Valle, or S. Carlo in Corso, or S. Ignazio—but say of the more ordinary churches, although unprovided perhaps with the dome—the grandest feature of the Italian style—and far from free from many faults of detail, and the mind is filled at once with the idea of strength and unity. The eye has no time to rest upon the details, nor does it ever occur to any one, I venture to say, to observe whether the windows are round or square, or even—at least for a long time—to notice whether the walls are of marble, or the pavement brilliantly reflective, or other features splendid, or the altars costly, or the capitals of one order or another, or the vault gilded. The perfect unity of the whole so fills and satisfies the mind as to cast a deep feeling of peace over the whole man, and thus to fit him in a very special way for the worship of his God. Add to this that the harmony of proportion and the unity resulting therefrom, are best adapted for modern Church architecture, because typifying the perfect unity of God's Church, which never perhaps was shown forth in so marked a way as in our days. If the Holy Roman Church, rising from the Catacombs, chose the nave of the Basilica as the most fitting type of the bark of Peter riding in safety over the waters of persecution; if the architecture of the Middle Ages may fairly be said to represent the heavenward aspirations of the earnest-minded Northern races, and of Christendom in its glory; not less fitly, at least in my poor judgment, does Italian architecture

typify the marvellous unity of God's Church in these latter days. But let us look a little deeper into the matter.

We are often told that one of the chief glories of Gothic architecture lies in its symbolism. The triple aisle, the five aisles, the cruciform design, the spire, and the arch which point to heaven, all these, it is said, are suggestive either of holy doctrines, or of heavenly thoughts. True, but neither the triple aisle, nor the five aisles, nor the cruciform design, are peculiar to the Gothic style; for as we have seen, they are but the result of the impression, which the Church has stamped upon almost every style of architecture which she has employed for her own service, and to the greater glory of God; while if the symbolism of the spire and pointed arch be wanting to Italian architecture, the want is more than compensated by the grandeur of the dome and rounded vault, so significant of heaven, which is to be the Church's everlasting home. It may be urged, perhaps, that not every Italian church can have a dome, for if the writer of the article on "Gothic Revival" be correct in his estimate, the cost of such a church will be from three to five times as great as a Gothic one; but then it may be answered that not every Gothic church can have a spire, as we know too well from our experience of the stunted towers which now in so many places disfigure England. As for the rounded vault, I can conceive no reason, although I speak with great diffidence, why its symbolism cannot be, to some extent at least, preserved by a rounded wooden roof, just as the open wooden roof of Gothic churches preserves the symbolism of pointed architecture. Or, again, if the early Basilica style be preferred—why, instead of a flat, expensive, highly decorated roof,—which after all is no necessary accompaniment of the Basilica—should not the open and even pointed roof still to be found in some of the existing examples both at Rome and Ravenna be adopted? But I shall afterwards again touch upon this point. What then is the chief characteristic of Gothic and Italian architecture? Of the former, I answer at once that it is "mystery," as shown forth not so much in its general design, for this, as we have seen, is common also to Italian architecture, as in minuteness of detail. In every true Gothic church there is always something more than we can take in at one glance of the eye, or by one grasp of the mind. Our minds therefore remain always searching after the hidden. Everything, no matter how minute, is symbolical. The images of our Lord and the Saints are not representations of our Lord who came in the flesh, or of the Saints, who were men of like passions with ourselves. They are as if "clothed with white samite, mystic, wonderful." So too the true painted glass of the

Middle Ages gives us gleams, as it were, many-coloured and mystical, of the heaven where our Lord and our Lady and the Saints are dwelling. The foliage of the sculpture is not the foliage of earth, the fleurs-de-lys are not the lilies which we love to place on our Lady's altar in the months of summer, nor are the animals introduced into the sculpture the animals of this world. The rood-screen, whether heavy or light, it matters not, or the metal grylle, which separates the nave of the church from the sanctuary, speaks to us at once of the hidden mysteries of the hidden God; for as the writer on Gothic revival remarks, "they impart a look of intricacy and sacredness to the sanctuary, without giving that isolated appearance which is so painful to some." All this is right and proper in such a style of architecture, because it represents *one* side, and that a most true one, of Christian thought and feeling. The sacraments are hidden mysteries, and God has called Himself a hidden God, and this is true, not only of the earlier dispensations, but also of Christian times. But there is another side of Christian thought and feeling, no less true, which is I think better expressed by Italian architecture, and to this I must now turn.

I come now to ask what is the chief characteristic of the Italian style. It is twofold—unity and openness of revelation. We will take the latter first. The mysteries of the Christian Church are no doubt hidden mysteries, for we can never realize the fulness of their efficacy in this world, and God too is a hidden God, for now we see through a glass darkly, and it will only be in Heaven that we shall see Him face to face; but it is no less true, that all the sacraments are open wells, from which all who thirst may drink, and that our Lord has rent in twain for ever the veil which separated the Holy of Holies from the Holy Place, and from the inner and outer courts having opened for us a new and living way into the Holies, so that even the least, and poorest, and lowliest of His children, as members of a Royal Priesthood, may enter in where He, our great High Priest, has gone before. See how beautifully all this is expressed in Italian architecture. The main features of Christian symbolism, which the Church has evidently wished to stamp upon all buildings consecrated to her worship, are preserved, and these are recognized with ease; but neither eye nor mind is attracted, or rather distracted, by the symbolism of minute detail. No screen of any sort separates us from the Holy place, so that the eye takes in at one glance the unity of the whole building, with its wide open sanctuary, and the altar, where the Son of Man is ever walking among the

golden candlesticks.\* So again, if there be one mark more distinctive than any other of the divinity of God's Church, it is her perfect *unity*. "I have prayed for you that the glory which I had with the Father before the world was, may be given to you, that you also may be one in Me, even as I and the Father are one. I in you, and you in Me, that the world may believe that I have sent you." Now, if this be so, then as we have seen—and it is useless therefore to repeat the argument at any length—no style of architecture so well expresses unity, combined with strength and majesty, as the Italian.

Let me try to make this still clearer. To my own mind it has always seemed—although, of course, the idea is by no means new—as if the Gothic style of architecture answered to what, for want of a better name, may be called the romantic school of literature, especially of poetry, and the Italian to the Classical, or again, the former may be compared to landscape painting, the latter to sculpture. A word or two upon each comparison:—If, for example, we take the plays of Calderon or Shakspeare, no one, I think, will say that unity is their distinguishing feature. There is in them so much intricacy of detail, so great a multiplicity and development of character, combined with constant change of scene, that their unity is materially interfered with, and the effect of the whole play, although not of particular characters and parts, considerably lessened. Hence it is that we rise from reading one of Shakspeare's dramas, or from witnessing its representation, with our minds full of some particular beauty, or struck by the energy of some particular character or passage, but not impressed, as it seems to me, with the grandeur and unity of the whole. On the other hand, in the old Greek plays, and in the best dramas of the French school, just because there is less intricacy of detail, less multiplicity of character, which is presented before us rather in bold outline, than in those more subtle touches and more hidden traits which are so distinctive of the romantic school, and less change of scene, we rise from reading them not so much perhaps impressed by particular characters and passages, but lost in admiration at the harmony and unity of the whole. Even in the Greek trilogies the unity must have been perfect. Are we, then, to depreciate

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\* The Sistine Chapel, it is true, has an open screen; but the practice and observances of the Pontifical chapels are peculiar to themselves. Thus, in these chapels the use of the organ is prohibited, and the choir is placed in a gallery, a position which would hardly be to the taste of the admirers of Gothic.

Shakespeare any more than Gothic architecture? By no means. I have already declared my warm admiration for the latter, and so, in like manner, I say that I yield to no man in paying homage to our great poet, who, as Carlyle has truly said, is the outcome of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages—those ages, be it remembered, which produced and perfected Gothic architecture, for without their Catholicism a Shakespeare would have been impossible.

Again, Gothic architecture may be very fitly compared to painting, especially landscape painting, and Italian to sculpture. In painting we may have groups of figures, which are seldom successful in sculpture; we may have trees and plants and flowers, or woodland or river, or sea or sky, and in landscape painting minute details on which I need not touch; but in painting, as in Gothic architecture, it will be found that the eye does not at once take in the picture as a whole, but requires time to master and realize all its several parts. Go, for instance, to the Vatican, and stand before the "Last Communion of S. Jerome," and see how long it will take to realize all that is pictured forth in that glorious masterpiece. Again and again you may go, and each time you will find fresh beauties and a deeper significance. The expression of the face of the priest, as he bends over the Saint to give him in the hour of death the Lord of life; the dying Saint, half leaning forward in adoration of his Lord, half falling back from the ever-growing weakness which is slowly creeping over him, evidently unconscious—because conscious alone of the great Presence—of the kiss of worship which the woman kneeling at his side is impressing upon his withered hand, as if he were already gathered to the company of the glorious Saints: all this, and much more that I could mention, requires time and study to observe; it cannot be taken in at once. So is it with Gothic architecture.

Now, it is otherwise with sculpture, to which I have compared the Italian style. The more perfect the work of art, the less we observe the details; it stands before us a glorious whole, at once filling and satisfying the mind. What is the secret of this except that we feel that although by further examination we may discover particular beauties, and even particular defects, yet the general harmony of proportion and the unity of the whole are such as to render particular beauties and particular faults—unless, of course, these stand forth too prominently, so as to interfere with unity—of less importance than they are in painting. We see at a glance the open revelation meant to be conveyed by the artist. Hence, too, as I said above, large groups in sculpture are seldom satis-

factory, simply for want of unity, sculpture being required to perform an office which belongs rather to the sister art of painting. Do not these remarks apply in very great measure to Italian architecture?

I conclude, then, that the latter has special beauties and advantages of its own, which are not so prominent or are even absent in the Gothic style. Neither style, therefore, ought of itself to be excluded from the service of the Church, and this, if for no other reason, because, as has been well said, "Nature, the great prototype of architecture, has many styles of beauty, and employs them all. The horizontal, arcuated, vertical, or pointed styles," Mr. Ruskin notwithstanding, "all find precedent in her domain; and though it could be proved that the Gothic was beyond all comparison superior to any other style in capability of the grander qualities, yet it would be opposed to all natural teaching to claim for it the sole and universal empire:"—

"Not oaks alone are trees, nor roses flowers."

But it is more than time for me to ask whether the Italian style is unsuited for our modern ecclesiastical requirements.

One of the more common objections to the use of Italian church architecture is that it is unpopular, as may be seen by the almost universal adoption of the Gothic style. Now, that for the last thirty years the latter has been generally preferred in the nations of the North cannot, of course, be denied, nor is it difficult to account for this preference. It is due partly to the revival of the "romantic" school literature, by means of which the Middle Ages, with their arts and chivalry and legends, have been placed in a truer light before the minds of men, and also in no small measure because, as it seems to me, our church architects have given far more time to the study of Gothic than to that of the Italian style. It will be objected, no doubt, to this last assertion, that architects are forced to fall in with the wishes of those who desire to have churches built for them, and that the demand at present is almost entirely for Gothic buildings. To this I answer, that granted that at the present time the tide of popular taste has set in favour of Gothic, architects are surely something more than mere builders and contractors, and that it is their highest duty, by mastering the different styles of architecture, to lead and guide the taste of the people. But can it be shown that the present taste is likely to be enduring? Even in the Middle Ages, nay, during the whole history of ecclesiastical architecture, has there not been a constant change from style to style? Thus, have we not seen the style of the Pagan pass

into that of the Christian Basilica, and this again into the Romanesque, which divided itself into the Byzantine and Lombardic? So, again, in our own country, did not the Saxon style, or, as it was called, "the Roman manner," introduced from Italy by such men as Paulinus and Wilfred, pass into the Norman, one of the chief features of which was the arcade, or series of small round arches, many of these intersecting each other, which, as Bishop Milner points out, appear in some part or other of all the churches built by the Normans in this country, and which sometimes cover the whole of them? So, once more, did not the Norman—whether from the beauty of the effect produced by the intersecting of the arches above alluded to, or from some other cause, we need not stop to inquire—pass into the "Pointed" style? Nay, during those centuries which witnessed the chief glories of what is called Gothic architecture, did not almost each generation change its style in accordance with its own taste, so that a church begun in one style was not unfrequently continued in another, and finished in a third? What reason, then, is there to suppose that in our own times, when we have no style of our own at all, but have to go back to that of the thirteenth, or fourteenth, or fifteenth centuries, a change of taste may not soon again take place amongst us, when we may perhaps witness a "revival" of the best features of the Italian style? If Gothic architecture itself so soon forgot its leading features, owing to the fickle taste of our forefathers, I at least, for one, can see no great strength in the argument that at the present moment the Gothic is the most popular, and well-nigh universally used. For my own part, I think I can perceive signs of a coming change. The greater intercourse with Rome, owing to cheap and rapid communication, will necessarily create a love for the style of Roman churches, and for the round arch, which is one of their distinctive features; for although, as I have said, the Holy See has ever left her children free to adopt any style they choose, and although also, to use the words of the writer in the April number, it may be "as absurd to say that attachment to the Holy See is shown by building churches in the Italian style as it would be to suppose that attachment would be shown by speaking Italian instead of one's own native language in ordinary discourse," yet "where the treasure is, there will our hearts be also," and as in the days of Paulinus and Wilfred, the architectural language of Rome can never be a strange tongue to us as long as children love to catch the tone of their mother's voice.

But more than this; whether a preference for Gothic architecture in ecclesiastical buildings be rooted or not in the educated



and artistic mind of England may be an open question, but for myself I have very great doubt whether Gothic churches are ever really popular amongst our poor, for whom chiefly, after God's honour—because the churches are the homes and schools of the poor—they ought to be built. The fact is, that Gothic churches are unsuited to the uneducated and the poor. Not for the reasons I gave at the outset; namely, that they are necessarily dark or cold, or that it is difficult to see the altar from all parts, but simply because the symbolism and mystery of such churches are above their grasp.\* To these, I find, the pointed roof, and the conventional form of the cross and the lily, and all the beautiful details of Gothic ornamentation, and the high altar, by no means the most conspicuous part of the building, are too often either unmeaning, or, perhaps a disappointment. They require the large plain Latin cross, the noble altar with majestic altar-piece, the church rich, if possible, in paintings and images. I am speaking here of course of the better kind of churches of either style; for if, as it is alleged, our ordinary so-called Italian churches are for the most part but long, ill-shaped, badly proportioned rooms, so on the other

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\* As for the objection that Gothic churches are cut up with columns, the same will apply to the best specimens of the Italian style. That Gothic buildings can be erected without aisles is, of course, undeniable. Thus we have, as the writer of the article in the April number has pointed out, the Cathedrals of Alby and Angers, Cahors and Angoulême. But it is to be doubted whether such churches would ever be generally as greatly admired as those supported by columns. Nor, should I think, could they be built except at a very great expense. There is a remark, however, of the above writer about the darkness of Italian churches which requires a word of notice. The windows of Italian churches, he says, "are features to be avoided as much as possible. They are kept out of sight whenever it can be managed." Now, I have said above, that on entering a good Italian church no one ever thinks about the windows; but to maintain that, as a rule, Italian churches are darker than Gothic ones, seems to me an opinion simply untenable. As an instance of an essentially dark church, he brings forward S. Peter's, Rome! I venture to say—and I have lived many years in Rome—that it is one of the brightest and lightest churches in the world; so it is also the coolest in summer and the warmest in winter; nor would it ever be a dark church, as S. Paul's undoubtedly is, even were it to be set down in the place of the latter, amidst all the smoke of London. Again, one of the chief reasons why complaints are made in England about the altar not being seen arises in no small measure from the use of fixed benches, which occupy a great deal of room, and which prevent the poor coming close to the altar at their pleasure, as they do in Catholic countries. It is useless, no doubt, to complain of benches as long as our clergy are ill provided for, and such a terrible separation exists as that between our very rich and very poor—a separation, however, which is directly contrary to the Apostolic warning of S. James (ii. 3), and which will probably only be put an end to by some fearful political convulsion. Still, we ought, I think, never to forget that to fill up the whole church with benches is an evil—a necessary one, perhaps, under present circumstances, but still an evil.

hand too many of our ordinary so-called Gothic churches are but slightly decorated barns devoid of symbolism or beauty. Again, the vast number of Catholics in England are Irish, yet the taste of the Irish people, although not a few Gothic churches have been built in Ireland of late years, has generally, I think, been shown in their preference of the classical or Italian style both in ecclesiastical and civil architecture. Now in which of the two styles, Gothic or Italian, is the altar more conspicuous,—in the former, where, for the sake of the surpliced choir it is now recommended to have a deep chancel, and where the altar is, therefore, comparatively hidden, or in the latter, where the altar may either be placed at the end of the wide open sanctuary, and yet leave ample room for choir as well, or be brought forward to the entrance of the sanctuary—a still more conspicuous position—the choir being then seated behind it, as is often the case in many of the French churches that have apsidal terminations? The grandeur of the effect will be also considerably heightened, if the sanctuary be raised several feet from the nave. In churches which have domes, even if the high altar cannot be placed under the dome, but is erected at the end of the church, still it will form a far more conspicuous object, and yet allow more room for the choir than any Gothic church. Further, which of the two styles is the better adapted for paintings and images, which are found to be of so much value for the instruction of the poor and as aids to devotion? Of the Gothic style it has been well said, “that in its purest, most characteristic and most thorough development, the paintings go into the windows, and the sculpture into the sides, where the one is transparent [this is assuredly true of the modern Munich glass] and the other in durance; and where, in consequence, instead of vital and individualized works, they become only secondary, not on a level with the architecture, but quaint, cramped, and conventional.” To me there seems a great deal of truth in these remarks, for certainly in buildings where painted glass, which forms one of the greatest charms of the Gothic style, is employed, paintings cannot be seen to advantage. So to with regard to images; if not, as is generally the case, constrained, archaic and unnatural, they are at any rate seldom welcomed by Gothic architecture—I am speaking of course of images for devotional purposes, not as mere ornaments—with the same freedom and cordiality as by the styles of Greece, or Rome, or Italy. Now, surely this is a drawback, for next to the Adorable Presence on the altar of the B. Sacrament, there is nothing which so contributes to the devotion of the faithful, as holy paintings and images of Our Lord, Our Lady and the Saints, paintings and images

introduced not as mere ornaments, but as objects of veneration.

I come now to what I confess is the most difficult part of my subject, the expense of Italian churches. The writer so often alluded to approves of a remark of Mr. Eastlake that, "since the Cardinal's death there has been a manifest existence of a desire amongst Roman Catholics to return to the Pointed architecture for their churches, schools, and convents; *but unfortunately the demand for cheap showy buildings has not abated*, and the consequence is that in this direction the artistic aspect of the Revival has not improved."\* The writer himself lays the blame more on the employers than on the architects, and adds, "a cheap church may be a good church, but if so, it must be a plain church." Nothing can be more true; but a question here arises, which offers the greater attraction to the eye and heart, a cheap and plain Gothic, or a cheap and plain Italian church? The chief charm of Gothic architecture consists, as we have seen, in the beauty and intricacy, and symbolism and mystery of its details; but of this there can be but very little in a cheap plain church. It may be said that at least there will be the pointed arch; be it so, but then to some minds the round arch is more majestic than the pointed one, and quite as expressive. Is then a cheap plain Italian church more attractive to eye and heart and mind than a Gothic church which is also cheap and plain? That a plain Italian church—for one moment I set aside the question of cheapness—may be made such, I believe; and few, surely, who are familiar with Italian villages can fail to have noticed many such. The reason we have already seen; it is because in good Italian churches, even when quite unadorned, the eye is satisfied with the perfect proportion of the building, and stands in no need of minute details to gratify it, while heart and mind can well afford to forget the necessity of adornment when penetrated with the simplicity and unity of the whole. Add to this that in an Italian church, although the architecture may be plain, altars will always occupy a more conspicuous position, and a few really good paintings and images will have a better effect

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\* It is, no doubt, only the latter part of the sentence which is here approved of, for it is hardly correct to say that the return of English Catholics to Pointed architecture dates from the Cardinal's death. It began long before. The opening words of the sentence are also calculated to leave a false impression, as if the Cardinal had been opposed to Gothic. Far from this being the case, every one who knew him will bear witness that he had too large a mind not to admire what was beautiful in every style, although it may well be that, towards the end of his life especially, he showed a preference for Italian architecture.

than in a Gothic church of the same kind. But what about the cheapness? Italian architecture may be divided into three styles: that of the Basilica, the Romanesque in its Lombardic form, and the Renaissance.

That either a Renaissance or a Lombardic church with a dome would be most expensive, must, I suppose, be conceded at once. It is evident, therefore, that such a church can only be built in England when there are ample funds for the purpose; but as we are at present engaged in building up the living temples of children's souls, we naturally have not so much to spend on raising material temples to God's honour. I confess, however, that I see no reason why we should not build cheap and plain Basilicas, and if the dome be omitted, cheap and plain Lombardic and Renaissance churches, yet at the same time noble and majestic. Of course, when more money can be spent, the nobler and more majestic they will be, and more attention can be paid to decoration. We will take the Basilica and the Lombardic styles together. If instead of the flat or highly ornamented roof of these styles we adopt the open wooden roof—and instances of this, as I have said, are not wanting in Italy—there seems to me absolutely no reason why churches built in these styles should not be as cheap as the Gothic. In such buildings no massive supports are required either for dome or vault, while all the advantages attributed above to the Italian style would be secured. It may be said that neither a Basilica nor a Romanesque church is anything without either mosaics or paintings. That these add very much to their splendour and beauty cannot be denied, but still, until suitable decorations on a large scale can be added, churches built in these styles are not in any way more bare than cheap and plain Gothic churches.

With regard to churches built in the style of the Renaissance without domes, especially if they be without aisles, but only with side chapels, and with shallow transepts, the question of expense is more difficult to determine. We cannot argue from one or two instances, and further statistics are required. But even although more expensive, it may be safely said that not a few noble Renaissance buildings, even with domes and adorned with costly marbles, might have been built in England for the sums that have been expended over many of our Gothic churches.

Lastly, the broad open sanctuaries of Italian churches, of whatever style, seem best of all adapted for the solemn and due performance of the rites and ceremonies of the Church, above all in these times. In modern Italian churches,

especially, the sanctuary, in almost every instance, takes in the whole width of the nave, so that it can be seen by all. No small advantage, surely, for those who love to be present at the Church's more solemn services, above all at that most precious of modern privileges, Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, for they are thus better enabled to realize that between the Holy Place and them there is no longer any veil. In Gothic churches, on the other hand, except in a very few instances, the sanctuary is generally narrow even when it is not deep—and now apparently there is a question of making them deeper. I know, indeed, that in many modern Italian churches the sanctuary, although always wide, is not as long as it might be; but that is merely a fault of internal arrangement, not of external construction, for I can hardly remember an instance where the sanctuary could not be prolonged so as to satisfy every requirement of the ritual.

In conclusion, it only remains for me to say that if I have proved but a sorry defender of the cause I have been advocating—nay, even if I have failed to make good my position—I may at least have succeeded in pointing out that there is in the Italian style an appropriateness and a symbolism, a beauty, a majesty, and a glory, which they little dream of, who see nothing good except in the architecture of the Middle Ages.

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#### ART. VI.—IRISH PRIESTS AND LANDLORDS.\*

*Letters signed "C." in the "Tablet" of Nov. 30, Dec. 7, and Dec. 14.*

**I**N our two preceding numbers, we have examined the facts of the last Galway election; and at the same time have considered the due relation of Irish tenant voters, whether to their landlords on one hand or their priests on the other. Our excellent contemporary, the "Tablet," took the same view with ourselves on this grave question, and powerfully illustrated it in some leading articles. A reply to these however, as well as to our own, was published in its columns from a Catholic correspondent; and his three letters have induced us to say a few more words on the same theme.

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\* After this article had been sent to press, a supplementary letter from "C." appeared in the "Tablet" of Dec. 28th. We have added therefore at the end a few comments on that supplementary letter.

So far as the writer occupies himself with extenuating, or rather defending, the misdeeds of the landlords at the Galway election, his argument proceeds on a standard of political morality, which we must designate as simply deplorable; nor do his statements need any other refutation, than that of being stripped from their disguise and nakedly set forth. This was in fact done by the "Tablet," in its brilliant and crushing article of December 7th. In truth, how are you to treat a writer who calls it "absolute nonsense" to say that the elector should vote according to his genuine convictions, and not at the dictation of his landlord? \* If a man chose to characterize as "absolute nonsense" the axiom that two and two make four, you would be really puzzled how to answer him; for what premiss could be more undeniably self-evident, than is the conclusion which he calls on you to prove? And the parallel fully applies to the case before us. But "C.'s" third letter is chiefly concerned with a different theme altogether; with deprecating the political intervention of priests on open questions, such as those concerning tenant-right. His arguments on this head appear to us weak in the extreme; but at all events they may fairly claim a distinct reply. We begin however with his attempted defence of the inculpated Galway landlords.

His first letter starts with an apparent implication, that "such English Catholics as may have an elementary acquaintance with Irish affairs" will see us to have been importantly mistaken in our apprehension of the *facts*. Yet we have received communications from persons whose whole life has been passed in Ireland, singling out for special praise the knowledge of Irish facts exhibited in our article. Nay our critic himself—who has had "twenty-five years of intimate connection with Ireland," and has resided in the country for "from eighteen to twenty years,"—directly confirms our facts in every relevant particular. The allegation, which underlies the whole Keogh Judgment, and which is assumed as true by Englishmen in general, was, that the majority of Galway electors preferred Trench for their member, but were coerced into voting for Nolan by a ruthless and overbearing sacerdotal conspiracy. We replied by mentioning it as simply undeniable, that the tenant farmers—who constitute the vast majority of electors—were enthusiastic advocates of Nolan; and that the intervention of priests was exclusively for the purpose of stimulating them to defy landlord tyranny, and to vote according to their genuine convictions. This fact is

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\* "C.'s" expressions will be seen in the appendix to our article.

not only not denied, but is more fully developed and emphasized, by our present critic. There is a certain doctrine, he tells us (first letter), as to the rights of property, which was represented by Captain Nolan, and which Captain Trench stood for the very purpose of opposing. This doctrine, he adds, is held more firmly by the tenant farmers, than even by the priests;\* nay, he says that the former hold this doctrine "with a faith hardly exceeded, if exceeded, by their faith in God."† Accordingly he begins his second letter with declaring it to be "indubitable," "that if priests and landlords had equally stood aloof, Captain Nolan would now be the sitting member." Why, if Mr. Butt's opponents in the House of Commons had frankly made such an admission as this, there would have been no possibility, even in that densely prejudiced assembly, of attempting to defend Judge Keogh.

The vast majority then of the Galway electors held with firmest conviction, that the highest interests, religious and temporal, of their country, are involved in the return of such candidates as Nolan. Accordingly, to vote for him was alike their constitutional right and their religious duty. But vigorous attempts were made to prevent them from fulfilling this duty. Our statement was, that this that and the other landlord put every kind of pressure on his tenants, for the purpose of inducing them to abstain from voting for that candidate, who (in their most confident judgment) was identified with the highest religious and temporal interests of their country. "C." does not so much as hint that these landlords did not know the intensity of their tenants' adverse political convictions: and as to the facts of the case,—not only does he fully admit the truth of our whole allegation, but he entirely defends these landlords for doing all which we alleged them to have done. According to this intrepid advocate, Lord Westmeath's tenants were legitimately warned (see our October article, p. 262) that those who should even "try to avoid" voting against their conscience, "shall be deemed not to approve of or value the indulgence to tenants

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\* "The clergy believe" this doctrine "with so much less faith and universality" than the rest of the class from which they spring, "accordingly as education may have expanded their mind."

† We cannot avoid observing by the way, that there seems to us some offensiveness in a Catholic thus speaking of his co-religionists. If there is one fact more unquestioned than another about Irish Catholics, it is the firmness of their religious faith. Yet "C." says it is doubtful whether they believe in God more firmly, than they believe in a certain political doctrine, of which no one has ever alleged that it is a revealed truth.

ever practised on this estate"; and Sir T. Burke's (ib.), that they they must not "vote *against his will* for any candidate," however earnestly preferred by them; and Archdeacon Butson's (p. 264), that "their cattle might die, and things of that sort might happen," in which case woe betide them if they had preferred the interests of their country to their landlord's sovereign pleasure.

As regards all this, we must once more express our hearty agreement with the Archbishop of Tuam's admirable letter, which we printed at length in October (p. 273). So far as such landlord tyranny extended—and "C." apparently admits it to have been almost universal—the tenant farmers were coerced into "holding the franchise in exclusive trust for their enemies"; i.e. for those whose political creed is diametrically opposed to their own. Their "servitude" was so far "worse than that of the West Indian slave." For certainly on one hand their personal convictions were as simply ignored and disregarded, as could be those of any slave: and then on the other hand, "the negro was not amused or insulted with the show of freedom, which he was well aware he did not enjoy; whilst the Irish slave, wearing his mask of freedom, was worried to give his vote for the purpose of prolonging his servitude, and riveting more stringently his chains."

Our readers will testify, that we have shown no disposition to ignore such extenuating circumstances as these criminal landlords have to plead. In July (p. 111, note) we admitted very cordially "that many" of them "possess very estimable qualities." "The standard of political morality," we added, "is so disgracefully low in these islands, that many a man will be guilty in his political capacity of acts, from the parallels to which he would shrink with horror in private life." The whole of "C.'s" letters, to our mind, quite curiously corroborates this view. He avows himself a Catholic, and we willingly credit him with the possession of every private virtue. But on the other hand—as the "Tablet" pointed out in its article of Dec. 7—he abounds in statements and admissions, in regard to which he does not show the faintest consciousness that they are utterly fatal to his cause. How do we account for this? By the obvious fact, that he is blind to the very notion of electoral freedom, political justice, and personal responsibility for a vote given or withholden, where the parties concerned are of the tenant class. He does not betray the slightest suspicion, that tenants act virtuously by voting according to their conscience, and act culpably by doing the reverse; but treats of them as though they could honestly comport themselves as the



mere organs of their landlord's will. Above all, look at his astounding view of the relation between politics and religion. The priest, he says in his third letter, "has set himself to study, to teach, to *practise* the things of the next world; and the more he expands his mind and soul to the light and warmth of heaven, the less clearly will he see and appreciate the things of this world." In other words—would you find a trustworthy political leader, let him be one who does not "practise the things of the next world"; who does not "expand his mind and soul to the light and warmth of heaven"; who is in fact altogether worldly and irreligious: those only can guide us aright on things of this world, who prefer this world to the next. We will not do "C." the injustice of supposing, that he habitually or consciously holds this violently anti-Christian doctrine, which indeed may almost be said to involve the denial of Christianity itself. But we do cite the passage as illustrating principles, which unconsciously influence his mind, when he speculates on things political. And it is observable, how much the landlord party often tend to agree with their extreme opponents the anarchists, in desiring to sever politics from religion. Attention was indeed drawn to this by the Bishop of Clonfert and his clergy, in the "Sellars circular," which we quoted in October (p. 289, note). In Ireland, as in other countries, it is the priesthood who may be trusted on the whole, for pursuing the true and Catholic mean.

To return however. We were saying that we have shown ourselves anxious to do the landlords every possible justice; and that on a former occasion we spontaneously expressed our conviction, how often their standard of private morality vastly surpasses what might be inferred from their political conduct. In like manner we went out of our way (July, p. 108) to express our opinion, that the Irish landlords, like the corresponding class in Great Britain, are unjustly treated by the existing Constitution, in not having received a far larger amount of direct electoral power. No one indeed will say that this fact affords any defence for corruption and intimidation; but it does place these practices in a somewhat less disgraceful light. Yet it is difficult to suppose that those guilty of such misdeeds, if they possessed more electoral power, would use it creditably; it is difficult to suppose that those who view with so malignant an eye the public virtue of the humbler elector, can have much public virtue of their own.

In the same spirit we willingly accept "C.'s" testimony, as to the kindness and forbearance which Irish landlords frequently, even commonly, display toward their tenantry. "The Irish

landlord," he says (second letter) "is an example of good nature, patience, and forbearance, which the English landlord sees no necessity for following." But we must in fairness add, that "C." does his best to deprive his own testimony of all value. According to him, the landlord is throughout intending to exact a very sufficient quid pro quo; and does but accept the political immorality of his tenants, in part-payment of their rent. We think better of the landlords than this; but "C." shows how little *he* at least sympathizes with true liberality, by advising every landlord to raise his rents, if his tenants will not submit to his dictation in the votes they give.\* We do not for a moment believe that any Irish landlords are so lost to all sense of shame as to act on this proposal; and it is almost incredible that a Catholic can have made it.

"C." implies in his first letter, that if some of the Galway priests had belonged to the proprietary class, things would have gone very differently. But let us suppose there had been a due proportion of priests, whose private judgment on the land question agreed with that of the landlords;† what does "C." fancy such a priest could do? Doubtless he might (very properly) try to persuade the farmers, that their convictions are mistaken. But could he fail to inculcate on them the duty of voting *in accordance with* those convictions? Could he fail to rebuke such landlords, as should practise corruption and intimidation? Would his agreement with the landlords on one political question blind him to the elementary truths of morality?

Indubitably however, as a matter of fact, the priests are all of a different class; and they are all thoroughly satisfied, that the landlord view of the land question is profoundly injurious alike to their country's religious and temporal welfare. See the Bishop of Clonfert's forcible words, quoted by us in October (p. 270). Moreover, as "C." himself states in his first letter, the whole body of tenant farmers are more intensely possessed

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\* The passage deserves quoting, as an illustration of the writer's moral standard on things political. "I should advise" Lord Clanricarde "to hang up, framed and glazed, in the rent-office, that comparison between the influence of a landlord and of a tradesman so often quoted; and I should further advise his lordship to *have his estate revalued* [the author's italics], taking chance of the 'holy and patriotic indignation,' and to repeat these valuations periodically."

† The strong bias of our own opinion is, that no one acquainted with Ireland would agree with the landlords on this question, except through prejudice of birth or association. But we do not enter on this in the text: because indubitably the question is a perfectly open one; and we do not wish to build any part of our present argument on any premiss which a Catholic can fairly deny.

by this persuasion, than even are the priests. Now we fully admitted in our October article, that there were a very few priests, who, though engaged in a most just cause, "made very serious practical mistakes;" "used language of very indefensible violence;" and "otherwise let themselves down, from their position as priests of God, to the position of honest but intemperate partisans" (p. 258). We added (p. 265) that we should have urged this in greater detail, had it not been for the circumstance that certain Government prosecutions are imminent. We are as far as possible from wishing to defend these excesses. But none the less there were three different reasons, any one of which by itself should have decided every priest in the county to work, with due self-control indeed, but still with all his heart, for Nolan at the last election.

Firstly and chiefly it was his business to instruct his flock in their moral duties. But it was a moral duty, that they should vote according to their convictions; that, when firmly persuaded that a certain candidate is identified with their country's highest religious and temporal interests, they should not be diverted by selfish motives from giving him their suffrage. Just as it is the priest's business to enforce on his people the duties of chastity, sobriety, honesty,—so it is no less his business to urge on them the duty of political conscientiousness.

But secondly, as we have said, he is himself thoroughly confident, that their cause is most importantly the cause of religion and morality. By actively promoting it therefore, he is conferring a most valuable service on his country's religion, morality, and happiness. What valid reason could he give for holding back in so pious an enterprise? We urged this consideration at greater length in October, from p. 273 to p. 277; nor has "C." attempted any reply to what we there set forth.

Thirdly, "C." himself admits, if we rightly understand him, that the priest legitimately takes part in political agitation, wherever what we have called "sacred questions" are at issue; questions on which all good Catholics as such are necessarily unanimous. The priest for instance, according to "C." himself, should earnestly exhort his flock to vote for the candidate, who will support denominational education, or who will oppose any anti-Catholic divorce bill with which Ireland may possibly be threatened. But we ask how he can do this with any effect, except by enforcing the universal principle, that they should vote according to their genuine convictions. On what ground could any one maintain, that it is their duty indeed to vote according to their conscience on such

matters as denominational education, but that they need not do so on such matters as tenant right? By surrendering the principle of electoral conscientiousness in the latter case, a priest would preclude himself from appealing to it in the former. Landlord pressure in Ireland, as we observed in October (p. 272), is the one chief obstacle, which prevents Irish Catholics from having their due proportional weight in the political scale. In days like these particularly, when no one can tell what assaults on the Catholic Church may impend at any moment, it is of vital importance that Catholic electors be sensitively alive to the sacred duty of voting in accordance with their convictions.

And now let us view the same thing in its practical working, with special reference to the arguments adduced by "C." in his third letter. We are no enthusiasts for the existing British Constitution: see our remarks of last July, pp. 104, 105. But in fact both English and Irish *find* themselves under that Constitution; and it is their duty therefore to promote what they regard as their country's highest welfare, by every constitutional means in their power. Now throughout the United Kingdom there is no single class of voters, at once larger in point of numbers, and bound together by more definitely pronounced political doctrines, than that of the Irish Catholic tenant farmers. If there be any undoubted constitutional right therefore in these islands, it is the undoubted constitutional right of the Irish Catholic tenant farmers to be proportionally represented in Parliament. But the only recognized, nay the only possible way, in which they can obtain such representation, is by being organized under political leaders, in whom they shall heartily confide, and who shall at once stimulate and direct their political action. We set this forth at greater length in October (p. 275), and we need not repeat what we there said. We asked then, and we now ask again, the straightforward question,—who are to *be* their political leaders? If we rightly understand "C.'s" very obscure expressions, he would consider that the landlords should in some degree occupy this position. But we would urge—not that such a reply is *mistaken*—but that it is simply *unmeaning*. It is as though the free-traders had been recommended, to make the late Lord Derby their political leader. The landlord cannot possibly be his tenants' political

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\* As our article is passing through the press, a vigorous criticism of the British constitution is set forth (Dec. 31) in the very remarkable series of letters on "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," published by the "Pall Mall Gazette."

leader, because he is their political opponent. If they vote with him, it is not at all because they follow his political guidance, but because they have not firmness to resist his tyrannical intimidation. He does not so much as dream of indoctrinating them with his political views: no hint of the kind can be found throughout the whole Galway evidence.\* His appeals are of a very different kind. He reminds them that "their cattle may die, and things of that sort may happen"; † and proceeds to inquire where they will *then* be, if they shall have been true to their political principles.

Under these circumstances, to our mind the one fact in Irish politics which is immeasurably more cheering and hopeful than any other, is that so vast a majority of these electors follow the political leadership of their priesthood. Their political creed is undoubtedly such as every Catholic is at full liberty to hold: but it is nevertheless of a kind peculiarly liable to be most dangerously corrupted; to become anarchical, revolutionary, and irreligious. Notoriously on the continent of Europe such has been the phenomenon presented: whereas in Ireland, as "C." confesses (third letter), "the war between property and envy, between religion and irreligion, rages only partially"; we might say more truly, rages not at all. To what is the Empire indebted for this most happy circumstance? Precisely to the political influence of the priesthood. As we said in October (p. 274), we wish there existed some other class who could take in hand what we may call the rough work of political organization and manipulation; but it would be a miserable day for the Empire, when the substantial leadership should pass away from the priesthood.

"C." ascribes to us indeed the opinion (third letter), that "clerical political action" should be confined to "cases" in which the priesthood is "unanimous." But we said the exact reverse (pp. 277, 278); though we had no space to enlarge on this particular aspect of the general theme. Whatever political opinion be held in Ireland such that a good Catholic has full *liberty* to hold it,—we rejoice to see its advocates place themselves under the political guidance of those priests who hold it in common with themselves; because by that means it is pre-

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\* "C." himself represents his pattern landlord thus addressing his tenant: "Here is a candidate *especially obnoxious to me*: there is no reason why you as a Catholic should vote for him: *you may sympathize with his political ideas*, which nevertheless may be in error: *you hold your land from me at less than its value*: all I ask of you is *to withhold your vote*." The italics are ours.

† Archdeacon Butson's agent. See our October article, p. 264.

served from anti-religious and anti-social aberration, and confined within a Christian and Catholic channel.

We do not for a moment deny that, as things are, several serious evils are caused by the political action of the priesthood. As we said in October (p. 292), "the Irish Church would be unlike any other religious body which ever existed, if there were not defects, even serious defects, in its practical working; and the last thing we wish is that these should be concealed, if only the innumerable redeeming features of the picture be adequately exhibited." But we would urge, firstly, that (for the reasons just given) even the present state of things is immeasurably better, than that which would be caused by the abstention of priests from the political arena. Then secondly, these evils would be almost entirely remedied, in proportion as priests should more sedulously govern their conduct by those synodical decrees, enacted by the bishops and confirmed by the Holy See, which we translated in October (p. 269). "C." (third letter) accounts these decrees "an inadequate protection." But we are not aware of his reason for such an opinion; and it is certain that whatever sacerdotal scandal was to be found in the last Galway election, is entirely traceable to the neglect of those decrees. Finally we would add a third remark on this particular part of our theme, which brings us more directly into collision with "C." than even the preceding two. He considers that in proportion as a priest "practises the things of the next world," "expanding his mind and soul to the light and warmth of heaven,"—in that proportion he is a bad political leader. We maintain on the contrary, with the utmost confidence, that the more deeply imbued are priests with the pure and full ecclesiastical spirit,—the more simply detached from worldly motives and aims,—in that proportion the evils of their political leadership will be less, and its blessings still more inestimable.

"C." implies in his third letter that, as a matter of fact, bishops put spiritual pressure on priests, and priests on laymen, in behalf of "purely political" interests, such as tenant right and home rule. Most certainly, if this is so, it is in direct contravention of the synodical decrees; which expressly enact that "every one be permitted to think freely for himself on things doubtful." The most violent Protestant indeed would not go beyond ourselves, in accounting any such attempted pressure as among the most intolerable of abuses. But unless "C." means that he is himself cognisant of such cases—and we do not understand him to mean this—we entirely disbelieve in their existence: we entirely dis-

believe that either bishop or priest has ever represented it to be the religious duty of a Catholic as such, to vote for or against tenant right; for or against home rule. That bishops and priests indeed have most earnestly enforced on the people, as a sacred duty, the voting on such matters *in accordance with their genuine conviction*—this we freely confess and rejoice to believe. And in regard to what we called in October (pp. 266–273) “sacred questions,” the Church undoubtedly goes further. Undoubtedly a good priest would press his people, by every religious motive at his command, to vote against a Fenian candidate, or against one opposed to denominational education. But these are the very cases in which “C.,” if we rightly understand him, *approves* the political action of the priesthood. And even in these cases, be it observed, what the priest attempts to influence, is the voters’ *convictions*. He does not desire that they shall vote for A while they think B the preferable candidate; but that they shall come to consider B an unfit candidate, and shall vote against him accordingly.

The “Spectator,” in a very kind criticism of our October article, complains that we treated the Galway priests too leniently, because their language must have conveyed to their flock the impression, that to vote against tenant right was of itself blameable in a Catholic elector. But the writer, we think, has not laid due stress on the fact, how absolutely notorious it was throughout the whole county, that every single tenant-farmer regarded Nolan as on public grounds the preferable candidate. What the priests so justly censured on religious grounds, was not the voter’s opposing tenant-right, but his preferring his own private advantage to what he regarded with firmest conviction as his country’s highest good. “C.” piques himself on his intimate acquaintance with Ireland, and is indubitably anxious to say everything he can in behalf of the landlords: yet see what admissions he has to make. In his first letter he says that the tenant-farmers believe in those principles with which Nolan was identified, “with a faith only exceeded (if exceeded) by their faith in God.” And at the end of the same letter he introduces his pattern landlord as *admitting* that his tenants “sympathize with Nolan’s political ideas,” even when he endeavours to prevent them from *voting* for Nolan.\* Nor does “C.” so much as hint, from the beginning of his first letter to the end of his third, that any one of the tenant-farmers who voted for Trench did so on

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\* See the citation in a previous note.

any public grounds of any kind. On the other hand, take any Catholic elector who (as being of a higher rank) may have presumably been in favour of Trench on public grounds,—there is not the faintest trace throughout the Galway Evidence of such an elector being exposed to any pressure whatever from the priests, against voting in accordance with his convictions. All that the priests denounced, was his refusing to his tenants the same liberty of conscientious suffrage which he exercised himself.

We can see no ground for the opinion, apparently entertained by "C.," that Irish priests, as coming from the tenant class, must inevitably be more or less at variance with the landlords. He says in his first letter that the priest "would rather have nothing to do with" "the Irish proprietor, be" the latter "Catholic or Protestant." But there are very obvious reasons for this. So long as proprietors cleave to those unholy maxims on electoral dictation for which "C." makes his distressing apologies, what can a conscientious priest do? Such landlords come before him as at once tyrants and corruptors of public morality. Again, in the last paragraph of his third letter "C." expresses a wish, that "the clergy" would ally themselves with the "social strength and power" of the landlords, as a secure bulwark against irreligion. But how can any landlords effectively resist irreligion, so long as, by tyrannizing over their tenants' consciences, they violate alike the laws of God and man? Under existing circumstances, it seems to us that the priests deserve great praise for the singular moderation with which they speak of these oppressors. The most superficial reader of the Galway Evidence must be struck with the great anxiety shown by every priest who was examined, to do careful and punctilious justice to the good qualities of those landlords, with whom he had been most energetically at variance. We fully believe that where any landlord will frankly surrender, as immoral and antichristian, all claim to influence his tenants' votes otherwise than by influencing their convictions,—the priests with whom he may come in contact will even go out of their way to show him extreme respect and deference. But at all events "C." has no right to argue, from what priests often do now, to what priests *would* do towards a landlord, who should respect and admire his tenants' public virtue, instead of doing his utmost to corrupt or punish it.

On the whole, so totally do we differ from "C.'s" general view of true Irish interests, that we venture to think that one end, specially aimed at in Irish clerical education, should be the fitting priests to occupy, still more effectively and with still



more salutary results, that political leadership, which is now so healthily and happily theirs. Of course clerical education is a theme external to the proper sphere of a periodical like ours; and we will therefore pursue no further what we have here hinted. But we may refer our readers to a very interesting letter, contributed to the "Spectator" of Dec. 21 by Rev. Dr. Redmond, lately dogmatical professor at S. Thomas's, Hammersmith: though we are far from agreeing with every single opinion expressed by that able writer.

And now let us revert to the last Galway Election, and the various circumstances which have thence ensued. We said in October (p. 271), that "we are by no means sure that the Galway Judgment may not be the best thing which could possibly have happened; because of the indignation thereby excited against that inveterate tyranny and oppression, which the Judge has not merely absolved but rather canonized." We must not forget however, how very large a price it has been necessary to pay for this benefit; how grievously intensified has been the antipathy—already deplorably great—felt by the mass of Catholic Irishmen, towards England and towards that class of their countrymen whom they identify with England. We may consider this under three heads.

Firstly, there is no phenomenon more regretted by those who desire harmony between Ireland and England, than the sullen suspicion and dislike so often entertained by Irishmen towards English law. Well-wishers of union are earnestly desirous of removing this suspicion; whether on one hand by adapting the law more successfully to Irish needs, or on the other hand by removing misconceptions (which no doubt largely exist) of its true character. The Galway Judgment came as if on purpose to frustrate such well-meant endeavours. The enormous majority of the Galway constituency were earnestly in favour of those principles which were identified with Nolan, and were earnestly in favour of Nolan as *representing* those principles. If there be such a thing as constitutional right in these islands, it was their undoubted constitutional right to return him as their member. A landlord conspiracy was formed, and inaugurated at Loughrea, to deprive them of this constitutional right; and their natural protectors the priests came forward accordingly, to defend them against that conspiracy. Here steps in the English law, represented by Mr. Justice Keogh. It absolves the conspirators; while it singles out for punishment the people's cherished protectors, against whom the worst that can be said is, that some of them performed what was in itself their bounden duty with indefensible violence of act or language. It is as though Judge Keogh's very object were to confirm

Irishmen in their persuasion, that the English law is an instrument of oppression specially devised for their injury.

Then secondly consider the attitude assumed towards Ireland, by the English House of Commons and the English people. The iniquity of the Keogh Judgment is a matter on which no second opinion is possible, to those who know the most superficially obvious facts of Irish life.\* Even "C." does not attempt expressly to defend it. On the other hand, if there have been any question of our time on which the English people have been practically unanimous, it has been in their *admiration* of this Judgment. Irishmen feel that the Englishman's prejudice against them is so intense, as to incapacitate him from seeing what is before his very eyes. What would have been the outcry in England, if in an *English* county such intimidation had been proved as was established against many Galway landlords? But Irish Papists, it would seem, are worthy of no better treatment than intimidation. Such is the view which Irishmen take of the English sentiment; and surely with much truth, if with some exaggeration. Nor can there be any doubt that the whole thing has largely forwarded the agitation for home rule.

Now thirdly as to the landlords. Never was there a more monstrous—we may even say a more impudent—claim, than that made by the Irish landlords to be political leaders of their tenants. Political leaders forsooth of those, from whose political views they fundamentally and violently dissent! Observe "C.'s" tone in speaking of the small farmers' doctrine on the land question; and imagine such a person assuming to be a political leader of those who hold it. A claim of this kind must be felt by the whole tenant class, not merely as a standing injury, but, even more keenly, as a standing insult. And never was it put forth in a shape nearly so offensive, as at the last Galway Election. In that contest, the one point at issue was what had always been the central point of political difference between the landlord and his tenants. And what the former claimed as his due was simply, that the latter should co-operate positively, or at least negatively, to the defeat of that doctrine, which, of all political doctrines, they most

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\* We admitted in October (p. 265) that the Judge was technically right in declaring the election null and void, on the ground of the misconduct of certain of Captain Nolan's supporters, for whom he was legally responsible as his agents. Yet the Judgment was in two ways iniquitous. Firstly, in absolving the landlords, whose conduct was indefinitely more illegal and unconstitutional than that of the priests. Secondly in that it ignored, or rather by implication denied, the indubitable fact, that Nolan was the genuine choice of the electors. Irishmen found their priests' combination to protect them against tyranny stigmatized as itself tyranny.

specially cherished. Why, far more rankling irritation must have been left in the mind of many who were cajoled or frightened into acquiescence, than even of those who endured suffering for their courageous resistance.

The landlords' position is now no longer tenable; ousted as they have been by Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill and Ballot Bill of their usurped and unjust power. We sincerely trust then, that they will at last do justice to their own higher qualities, and surrender with a good grace. Let them express at once, by word and act, that they respect and admire the tenant who votes according to his convictions. So will harmony come to exist between the two classes; and there will be greater hopes of tenants recognizing that amount of truth, which may be contained in their landlords' political doctrine. But if the latter resolve still eagerly to clutch at a power which has in fact escaped their grasp, for obvious reasons the exasperation will be even greater than before. A great deal has been most truly said, on the grievous calamity involved in class being set against class. But who is *responsible* for this? Is it those who merely desire to give their personal vote according to their personal judgment? Or is it not rather those who seek to *deprive* them of that indefeasible right? Certainly, if there is one opinion more than another, the prevalence of which among one class would intensify all the worst evils of Irish society, it is that which "C." has not blushed by implication to maintain. We refer to his opinion, that the tenants' honest vote is an offence which may justly be visited by their landlord with raising their rent; or, in other words, with inflicting severe physical suffering on themselves and on their families.

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After the preceding article had been sent to press, "C." published a supplementary letter in the "Tablet" of Dec. 28th, which to our mind contains more curious matter than the other three put together. We may at once explain however, that our comment on that letter will contain nothing more of importance on the general subject; and that no reader therefore need trouble himself to look at what here follows, except so far as he is interested in the personal controversy between our critic and ourselves.

"C." was led to make his explanation, by a note which which we addressed to the "Tablet," mentioning our intention to answer his letters; and he seems to have been at

once struck with some misgiving, as to the possible effect of one or two things he had said. Observe e.g. the following sentence :—

I wish also to repudiate the idea (which it seems intended to fasten on me) that I consider the interference of landlords with their tenants' votes as defensible.

Now certainly, before this disavowal, we had very strong grounds indeed for "fastening" on him this "idea"; as a few citations will abundantly show. In our October number the following passage occurred :—

There is literally no more reason why tenants should vote for their landlord's candidate as such, than for their apothecary's or their baker's. Doubtless the landlord may most legitimately place before his tenants his political views, with their reasons; but so may the apothecary before his patients, and the baker before his customers. Doubtless, again, it may happen that some voters may have predominant confidence in the judgment of the particular person who is their landlord; but, then, others may have similar confidence in the judgment of the particular person who is their apothecary or their baker. Still, in all three cases, the ultimate decision, as to an elector's vote, rests with the elector himself; and he betrays the trust which God has placed in his hands, if he exercises it otherwise than according to his own sincere conviction, of what will promote his country's highest interests. (p. 271.)

This passage seems quite to have stung "C."; for in each of his letters he adverts to it. In his first letter, he promises to show that this "dictum of the DUBLIN REVIEW is absolute nonsense." In his second letter, he "considers himself entitled to repeat that such a dictum is absolute nonsense." In his third letter occurs the following, part of which we have already quoted :—

If I had the ear of Lord Clanricarde, I should advise him to hang up, framed and glazed, in the rent-office, that comparison between the influence of a landlord and a tradesman, so often quoted in this discussion; and I should further advise his lordship to *have his estate revalued* ["C.'s" italics], taking chance of the "holy and patriotic indignation,"\* and to repeat these

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\* This quotation is from the following passage of our October article. The priests, we said, "assume as a matter of course"—we had already argued that they were perfectly *justified* in assuming—"that those Catholics of the tenant class who thought of voting for Trench, were induced to such a course by preferring their landlords' favour or some other private interest to the public good. And though, even granting this, the language of a few individual priests was most indefensibly violent, a certain amount both of holy and of patriotic indignation was certainly in place" (p. 259). As "C." quotes this phrase once or twice with a certain irony, we suppose we rightly understand him as meaning, that "holy and patriotic indignation" is *not* in place, when persons, in giving a vote, prefer their private interest to their country's religious and temporal welfare.

valuations periodically. And I believe the Marquis would come to admire the principle involved in the comparison, even more than does the DUBLIN Reviewer.

Nothing can be plainer than this implication. If Lord Clanricarde's tenants refuse to vote for the candidate favoured by that nobleman, "C." advises him to raise their rent upon them. After such a statement, we have certainly reason to be surprised at "C.'s" "repudiating the idea"—nay, censuring those who try to "fasten" it on him—"that he considers the interference of landlords with their tenants' votes as defensible." But the paragraph in his supplementary letter, which follows the sentence we have quoted, is still more wonderful:—

What I do say is, I dislike the principle of this non-interference universally and invariably applied; I say that such an application is unwise in itself, and not invariably requisite, and must necessarily result in the application of strict commercial principles to the management of land. In other words, it must result in high rents and short credits; certainly an undesirable result to Irish tenants.

Our critic then "dislikes to see the principle universally and invariably applied," that what is not "defensible" shall not be done. "It is unwise in itself," he adds, "and not invariably requisite," never to do what is not "defensible." The tenants indeed should not even *wish* their landlord not to do against them what is not "defensible"; for otherwise (so resolved is he to hurt them somehow) he will be quite sure to do what they will like much worse.

So far as we can penetrate this dense fog of words, "C." seems to mean, that landlord pressure was rightly applied in such an extreme case as the last Galway election, but that it ought not to be applied on ordinary occasions. To this we reply in the first place, that in our view (for reasons we gave a few pages back) landlord corruption and intimidation at the last Galway election was a more offensively tyrannical procedure, than the interference put forth in any other case on record. Secondly we ask, is it or is it not in itself wrong, that the landlord should interfere with his tenants in the free exercise of their suffrage? If it is not, he ought to interfere *whenever* he considers he can thereby promote his country's welfare: but if it *is* in itself wrong, then it was wrong inclusively at the last Galway election. And thirdly, *the landlords* at all events, to do them justice, attempt no such illogical compromise as their advocate has invented in their behalf; as will be evident to any one who

reads the extracts from the Galway Evidence which we gave in October (pp. 262—265). It is put forth as *the recognized and established principle* that, in return for his many kindnesses, the landlord has full right to expect from his tenants that they shall not vote against his candidate.

“C.” then proceeds, if we rightly understand him, to deny the possibility of there *being* such a thing as landlord intimidation. These are his words:—

I say further, that the expression “landlord intimidation” is a convenient but loose and, as generally used, worthless expression. I say that no man is bound to let land at less than its value; and that if he insists on getting the fair letting value of his land, he is not thereby guilty of intimidation. That he is bound neither by law nor by custom to give, as many do, gates, slates, timber, &c.; and that if he refuses to do so, he is not thereby guilty of intimidation. Ingenuity itself can make nothing of what is usually called landlord intimidation, except that it is the withholding of certain favours, which no law, human or divine, prescribes the granting of.

Certainly the landlord cannot be said to practise intimidation, when he merely refuses to let land at less than its value, or to make presents of timber, gates, and slates. Who indeed in the world ever dreamed that this *does* constitute intimidation? But the landlord may very truly be said to practise intimidation, if (expressly or by implication) he *threatens* to withhold such benefits from tenants, who will not vote for his candidate in order to oblige him. Or, to speak more correctly, we should make a distinction. If the tenants hold their land on such terms, that by doing what he threatens he would inflict on them severe suffering,—then his threats are precisely “intimidation”: otherwise his procedure may more correctly be called “corruption”; because it is the offer of pecuniary largess for political dishonesty. Which of the two—intimidation or corruption—be the more morally disgraceful, we need not attempt to determine.

As a matter of fact however, every one knows that in Ireland the former alternative is the true one. Owing to the excessive competition for land, the whole body of tenants (generally speaking) accede to terms of contract, which they cannot fulfil in their integrity without severe suffering. Many a landlord has long taken advantage of this fact, to impose on his tenantry that intolerable political yoke against which we have inveighed. Thanks to the zeal of the priesthood, assisted by the Land Bill and the Ballot Bill, this yoke can no longer be maintained. “C.” implies that, as a matter of course, the landlord will be induced by this circumstance to raise his rents and inflict on his tenants the physical suffering therein

involved. We find however, from his supplementary letter, that he is not himself a landlord; and we entirely refuse to believe that, if he were himself under a landlord's responsibilities, he would act on the advice he is so prompt in giving to others. Nor do we expect that any of the landlords will so act. We believe that their misdeeds proceed far more from thoughtlessness, narrow-mindedness, and class-feeling, than from hard-heartedness or any pleasure felt by them in oppressing their tenancies. But let us suppose for a moment one were found to do as "C." suggests. Let us suppose that some one were found to raise his rents and inflict severe suffering on his tenants, from mere spite at having lost a power, which he ought to be ashamed of himself for having ever desired; the power of coercing them into a dishonest vote. We believe most of our readers will agree with ourselves in declaring without hesitation, that such a fellow would be unworthy of mixing in the society of upright and honourable men.

There is nothing else in "C.'s" supplementary letter, which calls on us for comment.

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## ART. VII.—REPLY TO MR. RENOUF BY F. BOTTALLA.

### No. III.

#### THE CONDEMNATION OF POPE HONORIUS I.

[In presenting our readers with F. Bottalla's concluding remarks on the great Honorius controversy, we would draw their special attention to one circumstance. After our own last article on Honorius had been written (April, 1870), F. Colombier introduced quite a new element into the discussion. He maintained in the "Études," that S. Agatho died one year earlier than is commonly supposed; and that no attempt was made in the Council to touch Honorius's memory, until the legates lost their full authority by the Pope's death. F. Bottalla, having carefully examined F. Colombier's proofs, has added the great weight of his own judgment in favour of the same opinion.]

**T**HE second proposition Mr. Renouf undertook to prove in his second pamphlet is that Pope Honorius was condemned for heresy by ecumenical councils and by Popes. We must not forget that the main purpose of Mr. Renouf's first pamphlet was to show from the condemnation of Pope Honorius that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was in conflict with incontrovertible facts. But he was fully aware that the simple fact of this

Pope being condemned as a heretic, however certain it might be, would not advance the main point he had in view, unless he proves firstly, that the ecumenical Council, in the full exercise of its authority, had condemned him for heresy, which he had taught *ex cathedra*; and secondly that Pope Leo II., when confirming the Council and its decree, acknowledged the sentence in the exact meaning intended by the majority of the Council, before the terms of the final definition of faith had been definitively settled. Mr. Renouf indeed undertook to prove in the last part of his second as well as of his first pamphlet, that the error of Honorius was an *ex cathedra* pronouncement. But this implies that Pope Honorius erred in a dogma of faith, a view which we have already refuted. Wherefore the last part of Mr. Renouf's pamphlet fails to bear out that which precedes it. That gentleman should have proved from the documents of the Sixth Council, that the assembled fathers condemned Honorius for an error taught *ex cathedra*; and moreover that Leo II. confirmed this sentence in that very sense. For unless the Sixth Synod condemned the Pope for an error taught *ex cathedra*, its sentence could by no means affect the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. And further, unless Pope Leo II. confirmed the sentence of condemnation in this very sense, it would be legally null, and in nowise entitled to our veneration.

These are the two capital points on which the whole controversy hinges. Hence any one may easily perceive how far Mr. Renouf has misunderstood and misrepresented the point in question in his two pamphlets. He seems surprised at Dr. Ward's insisting on these two essential points; and he believes that his critics have entirely misunderstood the drift and bearing of his arguments, since they adopt this view of the main point in question. But the mistake is wholly his own. That part of his pamphlet is directly calculated to mislead his readers, both as to the main issue of the controversy and as to the line of defence which I with others have pursued in order to Honorius's rehabilitation. He undertakes to prove that Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Council for no other offence than that of heresy. For this purpose he accumulates the names of the numerous Catholic theologians, who have admitted that the Synod really condemned Honorius for heresy. Among them we meet with all who believed that the Acts of the Council had been tampered with, and who, on that account, were led to exaggerate the import of the synodical judgment in order to establish thereby the spuriousness of the conciliar record. But all those quotations serve but to throw dust into the eyes of those who are not acquainted with the Honorian controversy. Mr. Renouf knew full well that even Dr. Ward, though so uncompro-



missing and indefatigable a champion of Papal Infallibility, thought it more probable that the Bishops of the Sixth Council intended to condemn Honorius expressly as a heretic. And he should also have remembered that F. Colombier, in his able articles in defence of Pope Honorius, likewise admits that this Pontiff was anathematized by the Synod as guilty of heresy.\* It was therefore needless for Mr. Renouf to give us a list of old names, since two of the greatest supporters of Papal Infallibility in our day are of that opinion. Mr. Renouf had better have drawn up, if he could, a catalogue of the Catholic (not Gallican) theologians, who may have maintained that Pope Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Council for heresy taught *ex cathedra*. Then his labour of collecting the names of divines of former ages would not have been utterly lost.

These preliminary remarks will suffice to show our readers the kind of controversy which we have in hand, and the plan which we have followed in our Apology of Pope Honorius. In the last part of our pamphlet we observed that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is in nowise concerned by the nature of the offence for which Pope Honorius was condemned.† Though we treated that question at length, and we still hold the opinion that the several passages of the Acts of the Council concerning Honorius's condemnation are susceptible of a milder interpretation, at least with respect to the mind of the majority of the Synod, nevertheless we are fully aware that both in past centuries and in our age learned theologians and zealous defenders of Papal Infallibility have upheld a contrary view. We therefore did not make it the main subject of our Apology; since we had principally in view to defend Papal Infallibility against an old objection. Our Apology then may be divided into two parts: the first is that the Synod did not intend to condemn Honorius for a dogmatical error taught *ex cathedra*; the second, that Pope Leo II. gave his sanction to the final condemnation of Honorius, only in as much as it implied that he had grievously failed in the discharge of his pastoral duty. We deem this point the most important in the controversy, since no sentence of a Council would gain currency in the Church unless stamped with the sanction of the Pope himself. Mr. Renouf took no account of our plan in the discussion; he misunderstood our views, and insisted only on proving what is readily admitted by many Catholics, without prejudice to their adhesion to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. Yet did he flatter himself that he had given the *coup-de-grâce* to this dogma, merely because he

\* "Études Rel. Hist.," Sér. iv. liv. de Mars, 1870, p. 390, seq.

† "Pope Honorius I. before the Tribunal of Reason and History," p. 95.

thought he had shown that Honorius was branded by the fathers of the sixth Council as guilty of heresy.

But, to return to our subject. In the first part of our discussion we laid the principal stress of our argument on the letters of Pope Agatho proclaiming Papal Infallibility, and on the unquestioning assent the Council, both before and after its condemnation of Honorius, indisputably gave to his claims. Mr. Renouf thought that this was the main argument we relied upon in order to show that Honorius was not condemned for heresy. Be it so. He went on to say that Pope Agatho's letter in nowise implied the doctrine of Papal Infallibility: in proof whereof he alleged arguments so flimsy, that they could serve only to entrap the ignorant. Dr. Döllinger himself, who, as all know, is by no means prejudiced in favour of Papal Infallibility, asserted that this very doctrine was cunningly inserted by Pope Agatho in his letters to the Emperor and to the Council.\* But whether cunningly inserted or not, certain it is that the assembled Bishops received these letters without the slightest protest or gainsaying, and made no reserve or exception in their submission. In our pamphlet we recalled some facts strongly bearing on this subject; but which need not to be repeated here.† As to the remarks of Mr. Renouf on the letters of Pope Agatho, having plainly shown in our book on Papal Infallibility how groundless and erroneous they are, we now dismiss the subject, and refer our readers to that part of our work.‡

We will here examine what Mr. Renouf brings forward against our second proposition as to the import of the confirmation given by Pope Leo II. to the condemnation of Honorius. But we have first to make the following observations on our opponent's assertions as to the necessity of the Papal sanction being appended to the decrees of a General Council. He acknowledges indeed that the Pope's approbation is requisite in order that a Council may be deemed Ecumenical; but he maintains that "when after its close, the Pope has once acknowledged it as Ecumenical . . . every Catholic looks upon its declarations, with reference to faith and morals as having been specially assisted by the Holy Ghost." § Mr. Renouf evidently misunderstands the Catholic doctrine, and thereby invalidates his whole argument, as Dr. Ward excellently observes in his review of Mr. Renouf's pamphlets. First he misunderstands the Catholic doctrine, in that he calls a doctrine, common to Catholic theolo-

\* "Die Papst Fabeln," p. 137.

† "Pope Honorius, &c.," p. 90, seq.

‡ "Papal Infallibility," sect. xi. p. 255, seq.

§ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 54.

gians of every school, a view peculiar to a certain section of Ultramontanes: whereas it is held by many Gallicans. Catholics maintain that every decree of an Ecumenical Council is passed by the assembled fathers, on the implied and necessary condition that it receives the sanction of the Roman Pontiff. This is the reason why all the Ecumenical Councils in their final address to the Pope beg of him to confirm their decrees by his Pontifical authority. But none of the synodical Acts could be regarded as an infallible tenet, or having force of ecclesiastical law, unless it have been promulgated as such by the Pope to the universal Church.\* This is the doctrine of all Catholic theologians, save a few Gallicans. Mr. Renouf and his friends should begin by refuting this doctrine and by convincing divines of the truth of its contradictory, before asking them to judge of the case of Honorius by different principles.

Now Mr. Renouf maintains that the Sixth Ecumenical Council has been simply confirmed by the Holy See.† In proof of that he alleges the three professions of faith contained in the *Liber Diurnus* of the Roman Pontiffs. In the first of them the Pope solemnly promises to observe the first five Ecumenical Councils “usque ad unum apicem immutata,” “et una cum eis pari honore et veneratione sanctum Sextum Concilium. . . . quæque prædicaverunt prædicare; quæque condemnaverunt ore et corde condemnare.” In the second and third profession of faith the like expressions are to be found, with this exception, that in the second mention is made of the condemnation of Honorius; but of this we will speak further on. As to the general expressions used in the three professions, they prove nothing in favour of the assertion of our adversary; because they refer only to the decrees of faith, since it is in them that the final definition of the revealed doctrine is pronounced, and the final condemnation of heretics and heresies. The Roman Pontiff proposes to the belief of the faithful only the dogmatical canons or the definitions of faith which have been definitively sanctioned by the Synod. But over and above this the doctrinal decisions of a general Council are of faith only so far forth as they receive the sanction of the Roman Pontiff, and according to the import and extent of that sanction. Now that Pope Leo II. did not intend to confirm the condemnation of Honorius, as implying that this Pope was a teacher of heresy, appears, as we maintained in our pamphlet, from his

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\* If the Pope has pronounced his doctrinal decision before the Council had been assembled, his decision should be regarded as infallible and definite, before the synodical decree had been published.

† “The Case of Pope Honorius,” p. 55.

letters themselves on the subject of the Sixth Council. Mr. Renouf has not attempted to prove that Pope Leo sanctioned every part of the Acts of the sixth general Synod, and every reason referred in them for the condemnation of those whose names are mentioned in the definition of faith. He asserts that Pope Leo II. not only accepted and confirmed the Synod, but also approved of and promulgated the edict of the Emperor Constantine Pogonatus with reference to the Council. He further adds that, "in the Pope's reply to the Emperor's letter there is not a word which indicates the slightest disapproval of anything either in the edict or in the proceedings of the Council."\* But his silence proves nothing, especially when in many a place he clearly states his views concerning the condemnation of Honorius. Nor can his approval and promulgation of the Emperor's Edict be construed against our assertion; because in the very passage referred to by Mr. Renouf as a striking proof of the contrary, he (the Pope) says nothing which can bear that meaning. In it he praises the Emperor for the support given to the Council, for the peace restored to the Church, and for his having contributed to spread throughout the world the truth of the Apostolic teaching by his imperial edict. He continues to eulogize the Ecumenical Council for having followed in everything the apostolical rule and the teaching of the Fathers. He moreover declares that he consents and confirms with his Apostolic authority those things which had been defined by the Council, because it had most fully preached the faith which the Apostolic See of Peter received with veneration. Finally, he ranks the Third Constantinopolitan Council with the Ecumenical Synods. Now in all this the Pope has in view only the last Definition of the Council, which put down the Monothelitic heresy and secured the triumph of the Catholic doctrine. In fact, as we remarked in our pamphlet, it was only to the Definition of faith that Pope Leo II. required the signature of all the bishops.† It is true that he sent to the Bishops the Edict of the Emperor and the prophanetic address to the same prince. But he acted thus in order to show, as he says, in his reply to the Emperor, that "by the sentence of the Synod, and by the decree of the imperial Edict, as by the two-edged sword of the spirit, all ancient and recent heresies are destroyed with all their blasphemies."‡ Thus not only there is no proof whatever for what our opponent asserts, but his opinion is also refuted by the very letter of Pope Leo himself.

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\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 57.

† See his Letters, ii. iv. v. (Labbe, t. vii. pp. 1456-57, 1460, 1462).

‡ "Relatio Leonis Papæ ad Imp. Constantinum" (Labbe, l. c. p. 1152).

But Mr. Renouf appeals now to the letters of Pope Leo, for the purpose of proving from them that the Pontiff intended to condemn Honorius as guilty of heresy. The first passage he refers to is from Leo's relation to the Emperor Constantine. We had remarked in our pamphlet that the words  $\tau\eta\ \beta\epsilon\beta\eta\lambda\omega\ \pi\rho\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\alpha$  can by no means be understood to apply to Honorius, but to the originators of the heresy,—Sergius, Cyrus, and their followers. We defended this view in some letters inserted in the *Tablet*; and we were glad to see that the learned Mr. Maunoury, in some articles in defence of Pope Honorius, published by the *Univers*, agreed with us. The learned Father Franzelin, in his treatise *De Incarnatione*, had already maintained the same opinion. Would Mr. Renouf charge them with want of scholarship? In our volume on Papal Infallibility we have again examined this controversy, and we believe we have made it evident from the very wording of the Greek text that the sentence quoted above refers to the Patriarchs of Constantinople, who originated the heresy of the Monothelites. We invite our readers to peruse from p. 277 to p. 281 of that volume, and they will be convinced of the exactness of our assertion. We must only here remark, as we did in that work, that even were the words in question to be explained as they have been by many Catholic writers, they would fail to fix on Honorius the guilt of heresy. This is why his apologists readily admitted the interpretation of their opponents. The task they had in hand was not that of clearing Pope Honorius from all fault whatsoever, but only from the charge of heresy. On the contrary, Gallican writers, who intended to convict the Pope of heresy, must by necessity admit Mr. Renouf's view of the sense of this passage. Consequently neither the authority of earlier writers, nor that of the others, can give the least countenance to Mr. Renouf's erroneous view.

But it is far stranger to see how this gentleman takes no notice of the remarks which we made in our pamphlet on the letter of Pope Leo II. to the bishops of Spain against the charges against Pope Honorius, which he grounded thereon in his pamphlet. He again quotes the passage of Leo's letter, where it is distinctly said of Honorius, "who did not extinguish at its outset the flame of the heretical dogma, as was required by the dignity of the apostolic authority, but by his negligence fostered it." These words are the antidote to the charge of heresy alleged against Pope Honorius. Pope Leo shows that he was not condemned because guilty of heresy, but because he was negligent in the discharge of his pastoral office. Mr. Renouf remarks only that the word *negligendo* can easily be harmonized with the charge of heresy. He says that *negli-*

gence may imply doing something without duly weighing the consequences; and that "the real neglect of Honorius consists in allowing the letters of the Abbot John to be written in his name and subscribed with his hand."\* But, to begin with the second remark, even were we to grant (what we absolutely deny) that the letters written by the Abbot John contain heretical tenets, Pope Honorius could never be proved formally guilty of heresy, because by a gross neglect he allowed the letters to be written in his name and subscribed by him. He would certainly be liable for that to great punishment, but he would never on that account be a formal heretic. Because it could be said in his favour either that he did not read the letters, trusting the learning and the orthodoxy of his secretary; or that he misunderstood the real drift and meaning of several propositions contained in them; and no one could prove the contrary. A real and formal heresy requires the interior assent to the error condemned by the Church, and the obstinacy in maintaining it against the true doctrine proposed by the competent ecclesiastical authority. Now we meet with none of this in the case of Pope Honorius: consequently he could not at all be condemned as a heretic, because by a most guilty neglect he allowed letters containing heresy to be written in his name and subscribed with his hand, either without reading or understanding them. But, on the other hand, we have already refuted this objection as absolutely groundless, because the letters in question contain no error whatever in matter of faith.

As to the other remark of Mr. Renouf, we confess that we are at loss to understand whether that gentleman intends anything definite, or is using words devoid of all intelligible sense. He says that there is more than one kind of negligence, and that they do not necessarily imply inactivity. But in this he is wrong, for negligence in every language means the omission of due vigilance. He who is guilty of negligence may act, and, commonly speaking, he acts in some way or the other; but his action does not properly constitute his negligence, when it is only its consequence and fruit. A prodigal may be called by Cicero "*negligens in sumptu*"; that is to say, making useless expenses, because he did not attend to the proper manner of spending his money. In the *Capitulare de Villis* it is said, "*fraus de latrocinio vel de alio neglecto*"; because negligence, culpable negligence, often causes harm to others; in fact, the full passage which Mr. Renouf copied from Du Cange is as follows: "*Si familia nostra partibus nostris aliquam facit fraudem de*

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\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 62.

latrocinio aut alio neglecto, illud in caput componat." And Du Cange himself explains the word *neglectum* by *negligentia*; and he adds: "sed maxime ea quæ culpæ proxima est." Therefore this instance, with the others brought forward by Mr. Renouf, prove only that *negligence* is often culpable and punishable. But this is beside the question, because we admit that the negligence of Pope Honorius was culpable, and deserving of the punishment which was decreed by the Sixth Council. What we deny is that his fault of negligence harmonizes with the charge of heresy made against him. As to Leo's letter to King Erwig, Mr. Renouf takes no notice of what we wrote in our Apology. We have already proved that Pope Honorius was by no means included by Leo II. among the "omnes, &c." who had held a heretical doctrine: because he had unquestionably excluded him from the class of those heretics who had defended with obstinacy the heretical dogma of the Monothelites. Pope Leo expressly distinguished the case of Honorius from that of the other heretics: "all these" preached one will and one operation in the Divinity and in the humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ; but Honorius only permitted the immaculate rule of the Apostolical Tradition to be polluted. As we remarked in our pamphlet, the word *παρεχώρησε* does not imply a complete surrender of faith, as if Leo had directly said that Honorius polluted the Church by his heresy. This assertion of Mr. Renouf should be proved before being accepted. The letter of Leo to the bishops of Spain, confronted with that to King Erwig, affords further evidence as to the Pontiff's real meaning. Let us then conclude that the sentence of condemnation against Pope Honorius, pronounced by the Sixth General Council, was sanctioned by Leo II. only in as much as it charged on Honorius a gross neglect in the discharge of his Pontifical duties.

Now, it were a sheer loss of time to repeat here what we observed in our pamphlet concerning the Seventh and Eighth Ecumenical Councils in the case of Pope Honorius. Our opponent has ignored what we wrote on the subject from p. 129 to 135 of our pamphlet; and we are not called on to defend what he has not thought fit to attack. What Mr. Renouf has said in the matter, in his second pamphlet, is only a *réchauffée* of what he asserts in his first; with this difference, that, speaking in the latter of the Seventh Synod, he quotes on his side names and passages which we had already, in our pamphlet, expressly shown to be irrelevant;\* and he further seems to

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\* "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal of History," p. 131. "The Case of Pope Honorius, p. 63.

forget what we have often remarked, that even if, not only private bishops, but the whole Seventh Council and the Eighth had condemned Pope Honorius for heresy, it would not follow from this that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is untenable, unless it be first shown that Honorius was anathematized for having taught heresy *ex cathedra*.\* That gentleman mixes together those two questions, which every Catholic theologian should carefully distinguish and separate.

With regard to the second profession of faith contained in the *Liber Diurnus*, Mr. Renouf believes that it has not even a word to qualify the acceptation of all its acts, whether as regards the definition of faith or the condemnation of the heretics.† First of all, we remark that it is not at all requisite that every profession of faith should explicitly express what is always implicitly supposed by every Catholic. But, moreover, in our case we believe that, at least with reference to the condemnation of Pope Honorius, a hint may be found in it of what Mr. Renouf requires. In fact the words, “*pravis eorum assertionibus fomentum impendit*” re-echo to us Leo’s words: “*flamnam hæretici dogmatis . . . negligendo confovit.*” It seems that the second profession of faith was moulded in this part on Leo’s declaration and limitation of Honorius’s condemnation. We, moreover, cannot understand how readily our opponent tries to underrate the importance of a document, on which De Marca himself had set great value for the defence of Honorius. The word *eorum*, says Mr. Renouf, after Honorius has most ungrammatically been referred to *auctores*, with the intention of excluding him from the list; but it manifestly refers to Constantinopolitanos.‡ I do not know what are the grammatical principles of Mr. Renouf; I know only that, according to the most elementary rules of grammar, the word “*eorum*” is to be referred to the names of the Patriarchs who had been mentioned,—Sergius and the others, who were qualified as the authors of the new heretical dogma.§ So that the obvious and necessary meaning of the text is that Honorius contributed fuel to the iniquitous assertions of the Constantinopolitanos, Sergius and Pyrrhus, &c., who had been the authors of the new heretical dogma: therefore, together with them and the others, he was condemned by the Sixth Council. That

\* “Pope Honorius,” p. 130, &c.

† “The Case of Pope Honorius,” p. 56.

‡ *Ibid.* l. c.

§ The words are as follows:—“*Auctores vero hæretici dogmatis Sergium, Pyrrhum, Paulum, Petrum Constantinopolitanos, una cum Honorio, qui pravis eorum assertionibus fomentum impendit,*” etc.—“*Liber Diurnus,*” c. ii. tit. ix. (Migne, PP. LL., t. cv. p. 52).



profession of faith draws clearly a line of demarcation between the fault of Honorius and that of the Patriarchs of Constantinople. If the fault of Honorius was that of having fostered and encouraged the evil assertions of the authors of the heresy, how can he have been one of the authors of the heresy itself?

Before taking in hand the other part of the controversy concerning the sense in which the Sixth Synod intended to condemn Pope Honorius, we must make a passing remark on what Mr. Renouf says at page 66 and following. He first expresses surprise at what I say at page 135, as to the meaning of a Council pronouncing an anathema against a Prelate after his death. He believes that Leo II. understood the anathema in a different sense when he told the Spanish bishops that Honorius and the other Monothelites "æterna damnatione mulctati sunt."\* Does Mr. Renouf believe that the synodical anathema, inflicted on persons after their death, implies their eternal damnation? If so, what would he think of the authors of the famous *Three Chapters* being anathematized by the fifth Council, though they had submitted to the profession of Chalcedon, and had been declared orthodox by that Council? Would he admit in that case that the conciliar sentence could in any wise influence the sentence already pronounced on them by the Eternal Judge? Would he admit that the authors of the *Three Chapters*, who had submitted to the confession of faith sanctioned at Chalcedon and had been declared orthodox by that Council, should be believed "æterna damnatione mulctati" because they were anathematized by the fifth Council, together with their writings? Does he think that the sentence of anathema inflicted by the Church after death gives any certainty of their having been condemned by Christ? If he holds these opinions, we have nothing to say to him. But no theologian and no Catholic, we believe, will agree with him in this view. The anathema pronounced by the Church against any of her children after their death has no other meaning, as we remarked elsewhere,† than to condemn the fault which they committed in their lifetime, as it appeared before her tribunal; she strikes their names out of the diptychs and erases their pictures from the churches, in order to repair the evil consequences of their faults, and to caution their successors against falling into the same crime. Therefore, in consequence of the anathema, the name of Honorius ought to be struck from the diptychs and his image erased from the churches. If that had been done, nothing would have been added to the import of the

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\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 66, note.

† "Pope Honorius, &c.," p. 135.

sentence of his condemnation. Nor would it be an argument against his orthodoxy, but a simple consequence of the anathema, whatever the reason which led the Synod to the act of condemnation.

But Anastasius, or the author of Pope Agatho's life, suppresses the name of Honorius in the list of those whose names were struck out of the diptychs, and whose ikons were erased in the Greek churches. Baronius, quoting that passage, argues that the name of Honorius must have been kept in the Oriental diptychs, because it is certain that it had been left in them at the time of the Monothelites. In our pamphlet on Pope Honorius we have adopted the remark of the learned annalist, without adding ought thereto. If Mr. Renouf had read *was* (as there should have been),\* instead of *is* (a blunder), he would have been in no need of wasting his ink on two pages of banter.

Moreover, Mr. Renouf evidently intended to make capital out of that argument, as if we had laid any great stress upon it for the defence of Pope Honorius, in order to be able to claim a rebutting victory. But this gentleman forgets that in historical matters we do not require that every argument should be apodictic, capable of standing by itself, and of affording by itself alone demonstrative evidence for the thesis in question.

It remains shortly to explain the last part of our controversy, that is to say, how and for what reason Pope Honorius was really condemned by the Fathers of the sixth Council. We again remind our readers that this part of our argument is not at all necessary for the defence of the dogma of Papal Infallibility, for which Pope Honorius's case has received so great celebrity. Nevertheless its further explanation may doubtless contribute to the full understanding of the whole controversy, and cast some light on the main question of Papal Infallibility. But a few remarks are necessary concerning the Sixth Council, before coming to the point in question. And first of all we must do justice to the accurate researches made on the subject by Father Colombier in the articles quoted above. He has fully proved that the process against Pope Honorius was only undertaken when the news of Agatho's death had arrived at Constantinople. On this account he shows to us that the death of the latter took place on the 10th January, 681, between the fifth and the sixth session (7 Dec. 680; 12 Feb. 681): that is to say, one year earlier than has been commonly fixed by historians and by Hefele himself. Nor could the news of his death reach Constantinople, in that age, before the month of March, between the ninth and the

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\* *Ibid.* l. c. line 26.

tenth session (8 and 18 March). I have carefully examined his proofs and confronted the documents which he alleges, and I am fully satisfied with his conclusions; but with a view to brevity I refer my readers to his articles and to No. V. of his learned letter, which he addressed to Mgr. Hefele. Unquestionably till the eleventh session, when, as we suppose, the Byzantine metropolis was informed of Pope Agatho's death, we find not even the slightest hint of any process in contemplation against Pope Honorius. In the eleventh session, the Emperor Constantine ordered that the papers intrusted to him the year before by Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, should be read and examined in public session. That was evidently a pretext. The papers contained documents collected by Macarius in defence of his error; but the Patriarch had already been deposed and condemned in the eighth session, and he had made no appeal whatever to the papers which he had put in the hands of the Emperor long before his condemnation. But among the documents gathered by the Monothelite Patriarch was the letter of Pope Honorius to Sergius. And we venture to say that this was the only reason for examining the whole documentary evidence, as a favourable occasion of indictment against the Sovereign Pontiff was wanted: but it was laid hold of as soon as it was known that the Holy See was vacant. We cannot possibly conceive that the imperial judges and the Patriarch of Constantinople, George, would have undertaken such an unexampled step against an illustrious Pope whilst the great Pontiff Agatho was living. Nor can we understand how the Papal Legates could have abstained from any protest against the attempted condemnation, which not only was not implied in the Papal instructions, but was manifestly against them. But with regard to the Papal Legates, the historian Eutychius records, in his Annals, that the Papal Legates were deprived of their presidency before the cause of Honorius was brought into the Council.\* This is the reason why Matthew Cariophylus, in his refutation of Nilus in the Council of Florence, maintained that Honorius was condemned by the faction of the Oriental Bishops.† And he argues as follows:—Either the Papal Legates consented to the act of the condemnation of Pope Honorius, or they did not: if they consented, they acted against the orders of Pope Agatho, who had enjoined on them to deal only with matters of faith: if they did not consent, the Synod, which condemned Honorius was only a faction.‡ But if Pope Agatho ceased to live before the

\* "Annales" (Migne, PP. LL., t. cxi. p. 1114).

† "Refutatio Nili" (Migne, PP. GG., t. cxlix. p. 766).

‡ *Ibid.* l. c.

eleventh Action of the Council, as F. Colombier has proved, it is plain that the Papal Legates, being without instructions, and deprived of their presidency in the Synod, preferred to abstain from any protest, till the matter had been referred to Rome.

But, moreover, how was the trial against Pope Honorius conducted? First of all we remark in it a great interference of the civil power in an affair which wholly devolved on the ecclesiastical authorities. The imperial judges assumed the initiative in the whole business; they imposed on the assembled bishops the obligation of examining the documents concerning Honorius, and to pronounce their sentence; they threatened them, that unless they acted accordingly, their decisions in the case of Macarius of Antioch would not be put into execution.\* In the opening of the thirteenth session, the Synod was reminded of the engagements undertaken in the preceding session, and that it was expected to fulfil its engagements.† These engagements were fulfilled without any examination whatever of the documents, without any discussion, without any cross-examination of those who were interested in the affair. A simple perusal of the letter of the Pope was held to be a sufficient justification of the most severe sentence which has ever been pronounced against a Pope! What authority has that sentence in the Catholic Church? The authority of the tribunal was at least doubtful, its procedure was quite illegal, its justice most problematic. An indictment was made, for the first time, against a great Pope who had worked much for the unity of the Church; but such an indictment was made only on account of the pressure of the civil power, without any initiation whatever from any ecclesiastical authority, without any authorization from the Apostolic See. On a cause of such importance, and of so delicate a nature, no discussion is allowed, no witnesses are called, no defence is admitted, no votes of the assembly are requested; a sentence is pronounced under the pressure of the imperial representatives, and it is conceived in terms of so great a bitterness, which betrays the existence of an imperial faction in the Council. Such is the document, which Mr. Renouf, and others, bring forward as an irrefragable refutation of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. Had not the name of Honorius been mentioned in the formula of faith among the condemned by the Council, had not Pope Leo II. approved the whole of that formula, and manifestly confirmed the condemnation of Pope Honorius, we would give to the

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\* Sess. XII. Conc. VI. (Harduini, t. iii. p. 1327).

† Sess. XIII. (l. c. p. 1331).

thirteenth session of the fourth Council of Constantinople the value which it deserves.

But Leo II., we say, sanctioned the formula of faith, and confirmed the condemnation of Pope Honorius; and, moreover, Pope Hadrian II. authentically declared that the Orientals had condemned Honorius with the consent of the Holy See. It is only on this account that Pope Honorius's condemnation becomes a subject worthy of consideration. How is it then that the Holy See authorized the Council to condemn Pope Honorius, whilst it seems evident that Agatho in his letter did not intend anything of the sort? Moreover, in what sense did the new Pope accept and sanction the condemnation of that Pontiff? F. Colombier has already remarked that the Council, after having hurriedly condemned Honorius in the thirteenth session, held two more sessions of no importance, and soon after it suspended its sittings for three full months, from the 26th of April to the 9th of August; and he thinks it certain that, during that time, ambassadors were sent to the newly elected Pope, and a consent obtained from him to the condemnation of Pope Honorius. Doubtless, Leo II. sent to Constantinople, as a new Legate, the sub-deacon Constantine, whom he mentioned in his letters of confirmation of the Synod.\* It is also certain that the condemnation of Honorius was in some way renewed in the sixteenth session, and afterwards inserted in the formula of faith, which was enacted in the eighteenth session.

We do not doubt that Leo II. consented to the condemnation of Pope Honorius. The Pontiff must have known that the wire-pullers of the faction against Honorius were the Emperor and the Court, supported by the Patriarch of Constantinople. A blunt refusal to adhere to the condemnation of his predecessor would have elicited a refusal on the side of the Emperor to ratify his election; and it would have occasioned a new schism. We feel sure that Pope Agatho, being in different circumstances, and in possession of more authority, would not have sanctioned an act which stamped one of his illustrious predecessors with ignominy. Leo II. ventured to consent to that act of supreme rigour against a Pope, in order to avoid a far more difficult position for the Apostolic See. But did he consent in the intention of that Synodical faction which wished to brand Pope Honorius with the charge of heresy? We have fully answered this question in another part of this article. Pope Leo condemned Honorius so far as that Pontiff's *acts* deserved condemnation, whatever his personal *intentions* may have been. But those acts amounted to nothing like the profession of *heresy*.

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\* Rescriptum Leonis Papæ ad Const. Imp. (*ibid.* p. 1471).

Again, how far did the Council agree with Pope Leo's view? Did the whole Council condemn Honorius for heresy, or rather for his having been grievously negligent in repressing the Monothelite error? We have said that, even if the whole Synod had condemned Pope Honorius for heresy, its decree would have been without authority in the Church, since Leo II. did not stamp that judgment with his authentic sanction. But we think that there are reasons to believe, that at least a large number of the Eastern Bishops in the Council did not hold that opinion. We are fully aware that several passages of the Council concerning Honorius, *prima facie* regarded, convey the idea that Honorius was in truth condemned by the Orientals for heresy; and we do not doubt that really this was the intention of a part of the Council, led by the Byzantine Patriarch and the Imperial Court. Nevertheless, we think that if we consider the same passages, divested of the hard language in which they are dressed up, we may be convinced that a large portion of the assembly, whilst yielding to the current, and affecting fully to submit to the rod of the imperial magistrates, did not intend to mix up Honorius with the rest of the heretics, though they were not able to frame their opinion and judgment in such form as might clearly express their idea. With this view, we examined in our pamphlet those passages in which the Pope was condemned, apart from the Monothelite heretics, as well as those in which he was condemned in *solidum* with the others.

But Mr. Renouf, in his usual style, ignores our view; he misapprehends our appreciations, and casts ridicule on our explanations. When examining the decree which was pronounced by the Synod against Honorius in the thirteenth session, we remarked that the Fathers had purposely drawn a line of distinction between the cause of the Monothelites and that of Honorius; that they said of the former: "These are the names of those whose impious doctrines we execrate"; but of Honorius they spoke apart from them, and declared that they anathematized him only because he followed in all things the mind of Sergius, and gave weight to his impious doctrines. We found that the same distinction has been kept in the prosphonic letter to Constantine, and in the Edict of the Emperor, wherein the Monothelites condemned by the Council are called "inventors of heretical novelties," whilst of Honorius it was said that he "eos in his sequutus est," and that he was "hujus hæreseos confirmator, qui etiam sui exitit oppugnator." We remarked that, if these expressions had been used in the case of persons who had professed heretical doctrines,

they might be understood as implying the crime of heresy. But since they were applied to Pope Honorius, whose letters, as we have proved, contained nothing heretical, they should be taken in a different sense. What is then their meaning? We have again and again shown that the fault, the grievous fault, of Pope Honorius before the Church was that of neglect in the discharge of his Pontifical duties. He abstained from examining and condemning the errors of Sergius and Cyrus, and he thought to quench the controversy between them and Sophronius by following the advice of Sergius, and by imposing the economy of silence on both the parties, with regard to the use of the terms "one or two operations"; that economy was truly an injury to the Catholic doctrine, and calculated to encourage heresy. This was the fault pointed out by Leo II. as a cause of the condemnation of Honorius. And without the least doubt, when Leo II. sanctioned his predecessor's condemnation, the whole Synod, or its majority, must have agreed in that essential point. A faction of Bishops may have remained obstinate in their determination to condemn Honorius as a heretic, but the majority must have been glad to find support to their own conviction of the view expressed by Pope Leo II., and they would have willingly agreed with him. If that was not the case, how is it that the Eastern Bishops did not utter any word of protest, or any remark whatever, when Leo II. published his view on the condemnation of Honorius, which would, in that hypothesis, have been opposed to their own view? But if that view was agreed upon by the majority of the Council, what meaning might they intend when they said of Honorius, in their own proserphonic letter to Constantine, that he "eos (Sergium et Cyrum) in his sequutus est"? They could surely not mean heresy; it would have been against their agreement with Leo's view; it must then refer to the fault with which Leo charged Honorius, who was in nowise guilty of the heresy of Sergius, but assented to his proposal concerning the economy of silence. But the words "qui eos in his sequutus est," do not differ from those of the sentence of the thirteenth session: "ejus (Sergii) mentem in omnibus sequutus est." Then we concluded that the Council, or its majority, really alluded to Honorius having consented to the economy of silence proposed by Sergius, which gave growth and strength to the erroneous dogmas of the Byzantine Patriarch. Likewise, when the Synod said of the letters of Honorius that they had *followed* the teachings of the heretics, we remarked that the fundamental signification of the verb *ἑπομαι* is not only "to follow," but also "to help" and "to support"; therefore, we intimated that the

Council meant by these words, in as much as they concern Pope Honorius,\* that his letters had favoured the teaching of the heretics; as the same Council says, lower down in the same decree, that Honorius had confirmed the impious dogmas of the heretics: "et impia dogmata confirmavit."

Now Mr. Renouf qualified our explanation as a comedy or farce. He argues that the letter of Honorius is declared by the Council altogether alien from the Apostolical teachings. But he does not see that the Council spoke there indiscriminately of the letter of Sergius together with that of Honorius, while the said Council in the second part of the decree, by qualifying apart the fault of Honorius, supplies an explanation to the words of the first part, concerning the letter of that Pope. Therefore, if from the second part it does not appear clearly proved that the Council condemned Honorius for heresy, the first part must be toned down so far forth as it concerns Honorius, and must be explained in harmony with the second. Now let us suppose for a moment that the second part, in which it is said that "Honorius Sergii mentem sequutus est et impia dogmata confirmavit" should yield the meaning mentioned above, why could not the words referring to the letters of Honorius, "alien from Apostolic teaching," mean alien from that Apostolical foresight against heretical doctrines in the Government of the Church, which has always been traditional in the Church? Why could not the word *ἔπομαι* be rendered by helping and supporting, implying that the letters of Honorius had given help and support to the false teaching of the heretics? I do not see with Mr. Renouf, why, if a soldier, who follows his commander, could be said to help and support him, the letter of a Pontiff, who wrongly approved an economy of silence, which gave strength to heresy, could not be said to give support to it.

But Mr. Renouf thinks in the second part of the decree the words *τῆ γνώμη ἐξακολουθήσαντα* could not be referred to the economy of silence, because *τῆ γνώμη* cannot philologically bear that meaning. It was certainly by no means necessary that Mr. Renouf should remark that *ἡ γνώμη* is not interpreted by lexicographers to mean "scheme," or still less, "economy" either of silence, or otherwise. But when we say that a person follows the mind of another, we mean that he follows his principles, his maxims, his designs, his plan, his scheme, according to the special circumstances to which we allude. Now we had

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\* Those words of the Decree refer to the letters of Sergius and to that of Honorius. But the Synod could not say them with reference to Honorius's letter, in the same meaning which they imply with regard to the letters of Sergius.



shown that Honorius approved in Sergius's letter only the proposal of the economy of silence, and that so far he plainly agreed with him and favoured his view. We therefore inferred therefrom that when the Council said that Honorius had followed Sergius's mind, it meant to allude to his having adhered to Sergius's proposal as to the economy of silence. What have the *philological curiosities* of Mr. Renouf to do with all this? Finally, neither from Stephanus, nor from Schleusner can Mr. Renouf prove to evidence that the words *περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἡμάρτηκότας* necessarily imply a formal error in faith, and not also any other sin, which may concern faith, since the fundamental meaning of *ἁμαρτάνω* is "to sin."\* Finally as to the term "heretic" of the eighteenth session, if Mr. Renouf would not attribute it to the synodical faction so embittered against Honorius, it should be understood in a secondary meaning. And F. Colombier supplies *several examples* of that meaning in his first article in defence of Pope Honorius.†

And of this we have said enough. If our reasoning will not satisfy Mr. Renouf or others, no matter. The cause, which we defend, cannot be in the least affected thereby. It would therefore be useless for Mr. Renouf to return to that subject with his lexicography, or to fill pages with passages of old theologians, without criticism, whose name has been long since forgotten, and whose authority in our age is nought.‡ In this fashion he will never gain the least ground as regards the main question at issue. Even should he prove to evidence that the whole Sixth Council condemned Pope Honorius for heresy (which many Catholics of our age admit), he would have proved nothing, as we have repeatedly said, against Papal Infallibility; nor even would he do much damage to the orthodox repute of that illustrious Pontiff; since the perusal of his letters would sufficiently clear him from that stain, and the style of the proceedings against him in the sixth Synod gives very little authority to the thirteenth session.

But what does Mr. Renouf think of a decision *ex cathedrâ*, of which he treats in the last part of his pamphlet? How can he believe that the supposed error of Honorius was an *ex cathedra* teaching? He argues as follows: The letters of Pope Honorius are called *decreta* and *decretales*, which have binding authority; but in order to have binding authority, they are

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\* Suarez said, "Omissive censetur favere hæresi qui omittit facere quod tenetur, &c." On this account Honorius could be said to be guilty against faith.

† "Études Relig. Hist.," Dec. 1869.

‡ We speak of a great part of those theologians who are alleged by Mr. Renouf in support of his opinion.

necessarily to be *ex cathedra*: ergo Honorius's letters are *ex cathedra*. From this he thinks that the *ex cathedra* character of his teaching may be legitimately inferred. Is not this amazing? Does Mr. Renouf believe that all the *decreta* and *decretales* of the Roman Pontiffs contain infallible decisions *ex cathedra*? If not, how can he argue that the letters of Honorius contain an infallible definition *ex cathedra*, because they were called *decreta* and *decretales* by Baronius, Lupus, and others? But the Pope, replies he, speaks *ex cathedra* when he speaks as Pope; and when he speaks with supreme authority he speaks as Pope. But does Mr. Renouf truly believe that the Pope pronounces always an infallible definition of faith whenever he speaks as Pope? When the Pope publishes some disciplinary law or economical disposition, and authoritatively imposes it on the Church, he speaks as Pope and with supreme authority; but he does not pronounce thereby a definition of faith. A definition of faith or *ex cathedra* requires a definitive judgment pronounced by the Pope as universal teacher on a dogmatical question, which is addressed to all Catholics, or intended to be communicated to all, and requiring their interior assent. Mr. Renouf is of opinion that the necessity of interior assent is extremely modern; and he remarks that my opponents may safely challenge me to mention in the early centuries of the Church a single instance in which the contents of any Papal document were held to be binding upon the internal assent of all Christians. After having written a large volume on Papal Infallibility, I do not believe it necessary to answer Mr. Renouf here in few lines on that subject; but I may remind him that we have fully met his challenge throughout that volume, and that we are quite ready to hold our ground against our opponents, whoever they be.

As to the letters of Honorius, they do not contain any definition whatever with regard to the point in question. The Pope purposely abstained from defining the point in dispute, being satisfied if the two opponents, Sergius and Sophronius, would avoid the term "one or two operations," which would (as Sergius insinuated in his letter) cause scandal to the simple. "Laudamus," he said, "novitatem vocabuli auferentem, quod posset scandalum simplicibus generare. . . . Hortantes vos ut unius vel geminæ novæ vocis inductum operationis vocabulum aufugientes. . . . Auferentes ergo, sicut diximus, scandalum novellæ adinventionis, non nos oportet, unam vel duas operationes definientes, prædicare, etc." By these and other words Honorius clearly declared what his mind was with reference to the question at issue; to wit, that he did not intend to condemn the doctrine of the two operations in Christ, but

only to discourage the use of certain terms. Meanwhile Mr. Renouf replies that the supposed economy of silence is a pure historical invention.\* And he accuses me of unfairness in the analysis given of Sergius's letter; especially because I asserted that Sergius asked the Pope to sanction the economy of silence, and I attributed to the Byzantine Patriarch motives which were alien to his principles.† But what did Sergius mean when he said that it would be harsh and cruel to drive millions of souls into heresy and perdition for the sake of one expression; that in similar contingencies the Fathers had often followed an economy pleasing to God (*Σεαρέστοις οἰκονομίαις*) for the salvation of many souls? Did he not assert that it would be a prudent economy to impose silence on both the contending parties; that either of the two opposite expressions would open the way to some error; and that Sophronius had already pledged his word to observe this economy of silence; and even the Emperor had adopted this advice? ‡ He concludes with the request that the Pope would read the account he had given, and let him know what should be done.§ As to the intentions attributed by us to Sergius, we said enough in our first article.

But Mr. Renouf insists, that the condemnation of the expression "one or two operations," was not economical, but dogmatical. Well, how can he prove that Pope Honorius condemned those expressions, because he forbade them economically? Our opponent should be reminded that the expression "two operations," was not at the age of Pope Honorius the technical term and the orthodox expression of Catholic doctrine, as it became after the Lateran Council, and still more after the Sixth Synod. But again, Mr. Renouf objects that, "even if the hypothesis of economy were allowed to be tenable as regards the prescription of silence, with reference to 'one or two operations,' there is not the shadow of a pretence for applying the hypothesis to the question of one or two wills."|| To this we reply:—1st. The question of one or two wills had not yet been explicitly mooted at the time of Sergius and Pope Honorius; nor had Sergius proposed

\* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 84.

† *Ibid.* p. 93.

‡ Epist. Sergii in Sess. XII. Conc. VI.

§ Mr. Renouf remarks that we translated τὰ περὶ τούτων δοκοῦντα σημάναι by "that he would let him know his thoughts upon the matter." But who told Mr. Renouf that we meant to give a verbal translation of those words? Moreover, who told him that δοκοῦντα should necessarily be translated by the verb "to decree"? He alleges the words from Act. xv. 28, ἔδοξε τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι καὶ ἡμῖν; but did he remember that the English version has "it seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us"?

|| "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 86.

anything in his letter with reference thereto. Pope Honorius had then no reason either to defend anything on that subject explicitly, or to apply to it the economy of silence, though having regard to the nature of the Monothelitic dogma, that economy ought to be implicitly applied to the controversy of the two wills, which became later so prominent among the Monothelites. 2nd. The reason why Pope Honorius spoke of the will of Christ in his letter to Sergius, was that the Patriarch had mentioned in his letter that the term "two operations" would convey to the minds of many the idea of two contrary and conflicting wills coexisting in Christ. On this account the Pontiff proved that in Christ there were no conflicting wills, because there was no lust, or will of the flesh: and for this reason he explained those passages of the Gospel which would seem to favour the error of two conflicting wills in Christ. In all this he gave no new definition; for such was neither asked for, nor wanted; but he repeatedly insists on the doctrine already set forth by Pope Leo, which so plainly implies the dogma of two wills and operations in Christ.

With regard to the ancient custom of the Popes publishing their dogmatical definitions in the Synod of the Bishops of Italy, or in the Assembly of the Clergy of the Roman Church, we will make but one remark. Mr. Renouf asserts, with his customary fairness, that I copied Orsi on this point. Now I find the following words in that part of my pamphlet:—"We do not now mean to spend time in demonstrating these points of ecclesiastical discipline; they will be found proved beyond all question in the learned works of Coustant, Thomassin, and Cardinal Orsi."\* Is that what Mr. Renouf calls copying from Orsi? I said no more than that on that historical subject. I have moreover expressly maintained that it was not necessary for a Papal utterance *ex cathedra* at that age that it should be promulgated in a synod.† Mr. Renouf has wasted two pages in refuting what I did not assert, and moreover in fancying that the holy men, who, according to Abbot Anastasius, wrote Honorius's letter to Sergius, meant "a synod in the sense of Thomassin"!!‡

And with this we conclude; because we do not think it worth while to go through other petty and merely grammatical remarks of our opponent, which bear very little or not at all on the subject, or to defend ourselves from other personal attacks, which have no reference to our Apology. We stop here, because we think we have fulfilled our promise.

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\* "Honorius before the Tribunal, &c.," p. 19.

† *Ibid.* p. 13.

‡ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 82, seq.

## ART. VIII.—THE VATICAN COUNCIL : ITS AUTHORITY : ITS WORK.

*Acta et Decreta Sacrosancti et Œcumenici Concilii Vaticani die 8 Decembris, 1869, a SS. D. N. Pio P. IX. inchoati. Cum permissione superiorum. Friburgi Brisgovie. 1871.*

*Documenta ad illustrandum Concilium Vaticanum anni 1870. Gesammelt und herausgegeben, von Dr. JOHANN FRIEDRICH, Professor der Theologie in München. Nördlingen. 1871.*

*Letters from Rome on the Council, by QUIRINUS. Reprinted from the "Allgemeine Zeitung." Authorized Translation. London. 1870.*

WE had intended to draw up a short concluding article on the Vatican Council, in which would be given at one view a summary sketch of that august assembly and of its work, together with the aim, the magnitude and the effect of that grand work,—grand, indeed, as we shall see, though as yet unfinished and but a part and instalment of a still grander whole. We are not sorry, we rather rejoice, that, up to the day of the present writing, certain impediments lay in the way of our executing this design. The great threatened schism, that was to sever half Germany and all the East from the Church,\* has had time to gather up and put forth all its strength. The great theological windbags of Munich have had time to exhaust all the resources of their "scientific history," their "liberal theology," their "higher criticism" and their "deeper views"—to shoot their last brittle sophism against the everlasting rock, to spit at it their last covenomed lie. What Bismarck, the Cavour of Prussia,† may yet do for their

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\* "All modern culture will separate itself in spirit from the Church." "Many Bishops . . . . know that the establishment of such doctrines [as Papal Infallibility] would drive the educated classes of the country, if not into open schism, to an internal and lamentable breach with the Church." "An internal split in the Church is more and more revealing itself." "The promulgation of the dogma will lead to the definitive separation of the Uniate Churches in the East." "It is known [July 16, 1870] that the new dogma will lead to the separation of the Orientals."—*Quirinus*, pp. 33, 40, 388, 774-5, 795.

† "M. de Bismarck's whole soul glowed with the passionate resolve to expel Austria from Germany. It was not in his character to hesitate as to means, and neither moral nor material obstacles diverted him from his object. In fact, he entered on the contest unencumbered by scruples of any kind. To raise Prussia to the political status which he thought his country ought

cause by means of penal legislation remains to be seen. But, in the line of theological assault, we may fairly assume that by this time they have left nothing substantially new to be yet advanced; that they have said their say, and can now only repeat the same thing in the same or in other words.

The Vatican Council opened on Wednesday, the eighth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine. On that day between seven and eight hundred Bishops, gathered from every region of the Christian world, met together before the throne of their supreme head. This the first was but the opening session. In it no business, whether of a doctrinal or disciplinary character, was entered on or even alluded to. It was all worship, prayer, exhortation—the fitting preliminaries of a work that was yet to be begun; many members, but one heart, one soul, one voice, one holocaust of praise and supplication. This is the simple fact, the brief but true history of that day.

But the parable of the two standards \* had not yet ceased—will indeed never cease—to have its living illustrations and verifications. On the morning of that same eighth of December, 1869, before the opening of the Council, probably before a single Bishop had begun to wend his way to the Vatican Hall, an essay appeared in the London “Times” under the title of “The Crisis in the Roman Church,” in which the following passage is contained:—

“The Council of the Vatican has revealed to the public gaze for the first time the internal divisions which rend asunder the unity of the Roman Catholic system from its summit to its base. . . . For once the distractions and variations of Protestantism shrink into insignificance before the wider chasms which now yawn between the contending sections of Roman Catholic Christendom.”

On reading these lines we could not trust the testimony of our eyes. We must surely, as often happens to readers as well as to copyists, have passed over some word, or phrase, or line, or even a whole sentence, which, if noticed, would entirely alter

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to hold, was his religion. He entered the path of action with the fervour of a Mahomet enforcing a novel faith, and, like Mahomet, he succeeded.”—*The Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in 1866*,” by Sir Alexander Malet. London. 1870, (p. 8). In a leading article of the *Times* of last September 7, the following passage occurs:—“The ascendancy of Germany rests on her own and on the world’s conceit of her strength—a strength which must not be merely preponderant, but absolutely irresistible. Strange to say, the real contest lies between the strong ‘Man of Blood and Iron’ [Bismarck] at Berlin and the feeble old man at the Vatican.”

\* *Exercitia Spiritualia S. Ignatii, Meditatio de Duobus Vexillis*: 2 Heb. 4 die.

or greatly modify the sense of the passage, as we at first understood that sense. So we read again and a third time leisurely and carefully. But no: there it was clearly and roundly affirmed, as clearly and roundly as words could affirm it, that a Council not yet in existence had displayed to the world a breaking up of Catholic unity of so stupendous a character that, compared with it, the variations of Protestantism through all its hundred sects shrank into insignificance! We then asked ourselves, Is it possible that this writer expects that even one intelligent Englishman will believe such a statement as this? But we had not long to wait for an answer from ourselves to ourselves. We had been too often and for too many years witnesses to the unbounded gullibility of the great mass of English Protestants in whatever tells against the claims of the Catholic religion. We had too often seen with what capacious, with what perfectly shark-like, voracity that mass swallowed down any kind of antipapal garbage flung to it. Did the writer expect? He knew, as surely as he held the pen in his hand, that thousands and tens of thousands of his countrymen would receive his monstrous lie without hesitation, and believe it more firmly than they believed the Apostles' Creed.

And what, our readers may well ask, are the evidences of this astounding fact? Who are the authors of this tremendous schism? The evidences are the diversities of opinion among Catholics as to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility; whether it be revealed, or, supposing it to be revealed, whether it would be expedient to define it as such. Diversities of opinion, as to the doctrine itself, which had notoriously existed, to some extent since the Council of Constance,\* but especially since near the end of the seventeenth century—the overwhelming majority of theologians, nay, the all but unanimous consensus of theologians of mark outside France, being on the side that is now affirmed definitively and for ever. If diversities of opinion on the doctrine, a few months before its solemn definition, were evidences of a disruption of unity, they were just as much evidences of that disruption a hundred and ninety years ago, when the Gallican Assembly issued its famous four articles.

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\* The following sentence from a work of the celebrated Gerson will be interesting to many of our readers. We take it from a small but excellent volume by the Archbishop of Edessa, published in Rome in 1870:—"Ante celebrationem Sacrosanctæ hujus Constantiensis Synodi, sic occupaverat mentes plurimorum litteratorum quam illiteratorum ista traditio [de infallibilitate R. Pontificis], ut oppositorum dogmatizator fuisset de hæretica pravitate vel notatus vel damnatus." On Gerson's bitterly hostile spirit against the Holy See, *vide* Bouix, de Parocho, pars 1, s. 1, c. 6, § 4.

They were just as much evidences for full one hundred years after the appearance of those articles. Nay, they were, during all that period and for many years after, much stronger evidences: inasmuch as, during all that period and for many years after, Gallicanism completely dominated through all France; whereas, for several years previous to the Vatican Council, it appeared to be completely extinct in France, and in reality was almost extinct. Yet this writer has the incredible hardihood to affirm that "the Council of the Vatican has revealed to the public gaze for the *first* time, &c. For *once* the distractions and variations of Protestantism, &c."

And who are the agents and primary witnesses, to whom the highest and most effective position is given in the thin ranks of the upheaving and disuniting opposition? An apostate friar, named Hyacinthe, and a German writer, we believe, a trio of German writers, who have published a catena of "inexorable logic and unanswered history," under the pseudonym of Janus. Of the logic, after assuring our readers that it is thoroughly of the Protestant stamp, we need say nothing more here. But the unanswered history has been answered\* in such a style, that, if a Catholic historian had been convicted of one tenth of the falsehoods of which they have been proven guilty, his name would be uttered among us only as a byword of shame and reproach. The writer concludes this section of his essay with the following sentence, one of the most astoundingly audacious utterances we ever met with in prose or rhyme:— "The unity of the Roman Church, whatever may be the result of the deliberations commenced this day, is now declared by Roman Catholics themselves to be at an end." What Roman Catholics? Are Hyacinthe and Janus Roman Catholics?

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\* By Father Keogh, of the Oratory, in his "Few Specimens of Scientific History from Janus," 1870; and by Dr. Hergenröther, in his "Anti-Janus," 1870. Professor Robertson has translated the latter work into English, and has prefixed to his translation a most valuable and interesting historical dissertation on Gallicanism. See also the articles in this Journal for January and April, 1870.

It is a curious fact that, in an article in the "Edinburgh Review" for July, 1871, on the Vatican Council, the main statements of the "Times" Essay are reproduced, sometimes in the very same words. Thus, in page 134 of the "Review" we have the following, the intermediate sentence, here omitted, being the same in both:—"In the record of facts which *no one doubts*, the story of the Vatican Council has revealed to the public gaze the internal divisions which rend asunder the unity of the Roman Catholic Church from its summit to its base . . . . For once the distractions and variations of Protestantism shrank into insignificance before the wider chasms which yawned between the contending sections of Roman Catholic Christendom." What an unlimited faith these purveyors must have in the unlimited voracity of their shark!



Was Luther a Roman Catholic, when he wrote his "Babylonian Captivity"; or Calvin, when he wrote his "Institutes"; or La Mennais, when he wrote his "Affaires de Rome"? But enough of this for the present. We now proceed to a brief review of the Council in its real and actual constitution and working.

Of the eighteen General Councils\* which preceded that of the Vatican, the four first have been always admitted by the High Church party, † by many of that party the six first, as of unquestionable authority. Now there are two characteristics of the Vatican Council which mark it out in a very striking manner from these four, and indeed from all that succeeded them, not even excepting the greatest of them all, the Council of Trent. The first is in its ecumenicity; the second is in the work it has actually done, to say nothing of that which it had proposed to do, and which, with God's blessing in God's good time, it *will* do.

A Council, as we shall see by and by, may be really general for all practical purposes, and yet not perfectly so. To constitute a Council perfectly and in every way general, there are certain conditions necessary, on which all Catholic theologians are agreed. These conditions are arranged under three heads—the summoning or convocation of the Council (*convocatio*); the constitution of the Council actually assembled, and its mode of proceeding in forming the decrees, whether of faith or discipline (*celebratio*); the final issue of the Council, in which it receives its supreme binding force (*exitus*).

Under the first head, the Council must be ecumenical in him who calls it, and in those who are called to it. In other words, it must be convoked by the ecumenical pastor, or with his consent, express or implied; and all Bishops exercising ordinary episcopal jurisdiction, and such other ecclesiastical personages, as by right or privilege are entitled to sit in General Councils, should be invited to it. Of the ecumenicity of the Vatican Council in reference to this first head, no doubt can be raised.

Under the second head, the conditions are—1st, that the Council be presided over by the Pope in person, or by one or more representing him; 2nd, that the number of Bishops present should be such as fairly to represent the majority of the ecclesiastical provinces; 3rd, that the questions to be

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\* Some writers draw a distinction between General and Ecumenical; but the words are, in common use, perfectly synonymous.

† "The four first General Councils are so entirely admitted by us, that they, together with the plain words of Scripture, are made the rule and measure of judging heresies amongst us."—Jeremy Taylor, "Dissuasive," c. i. s. i. For several other authorities (Calvin among them), see "Palmer on the Church," p. 4, c. ix.

settled should be previously submitted to a deliberation suited to their gravity and difficulty; 4th, that the Council should be free, both in its deliberations and decisions.

On the first of these conditions, as verified in the Vatican Council, nothing need be said: on the second, not many words, but these of weighty import. At the first General Council, Nice (A.D. 325), there were present 318 Bishops, all Eastern, except the Papal Legates; at the second, Constantinople\* (A.D. 381), 150 Bishops, all Eastern; at the third, Ephesus (A.D. 431), upwards of 200 Bishops, all Eastern, except the Papal Legates; at the fourth, Chalcedon (A.D. 451), 630 Bishops, all Eastern, except the Papal Legates. At the definition of the first dogmatic constitution of the Vatican Council (session third), there were present 664 Bishops, who all voted for that constitution. At the definition of the second dogmatic constitution (session fourth), there were present 535 Bishops, who all voted for that constitution, with the exception of two, who, immediately after the Papal confirmation, publicly gave in their adhesion. With the sole exception of the second Lateran, none of the Councils after that of Chalcedon comprised as many Bishops as were at either of the above-named Vatican sessions; while the number present at these two sessions was, we believe, in proportion to the whole existing episcopate, much larger than at *any* of the preceding eighteen Councils; as unquestionably the number of provinces represented was far more numerous and far more widely scattered over the face of the whole world.†

The length of time that elapsed, and the number of private sessions held, between the opening and suspension of the Council, are sufficient evidences of the amount of deliberation gone through previous to the solemn publication of each of the two dogmatic constitutions. But these deliberations were not free, and the votings at them and in the two public sessions were not free. This is the great charge, the main grievance, the head and front of all offence. In faint, foreboding wail, it is heard in Janus, who wrote several months before the opening

\* This Council was not strictly and in all things general; but it has been always and by all reckoned among the General Councils, after its dogmatic definition, the Creed of Nice amplified, had been confirmed by the Pope.

† It appears, from a synoptical table given in "the Vatican Council from its opening to its prorogation" ("Tablet" office, London), that about three-fourths of the bishops of the whole Church were present; and that every country, where a Catholic episcopate exists, was represented, with the exception of two—Russia, in which there are twelve Catholic bishops (prevented from going by the stringent prohibition of the Imperial Bear), and Norway and Sweden, in which there is but one.

of the Council, before a single bishop had set out on his journey to Rome. The letters of Quirinus from Rome, commence immediately after the opening of the Council: the wail of Janus is taken up in the very first paragraph of the first letter, and soon sharpens into a scream, that goes on, with its dismal monotony, splitting our ears to the very last page. These scientific historians chose their ground well—for their own purpose. Pretending to be Catholics and writing under a Catholic mask (thus might they have communed among themselves), we cannot deny that the Council was legitimately assembled, summoned by the proper authority and in the proper way. This is too evident to all. Equally evident is the fact that the bishops have come in abundant force and from all quarters. To deny this fact or to throw even a doubt upon it, would be simply to ruin our cause by betraying our real design: so, to make a show of impartiality and the better to conceal that design, we may as well announce the fact at once, and say, "The synod is unquestionably the most numerous ever held; never in the early or Mediæval Church have 767 persons entitled to vote by their episcopal rank been assembled. It is also the most various in its national representation. Men look with wonder at the number of missionary bishops from Asia, Africa, and Australia."\* The private or semi-private meetings of bishops, loose conversations, flying reports of things said or done or contemplated to be said or done, these, as not being patent to the eyes of the public at large, furnish materials which may be worked to account. Here there is ample room for exaggeration and distortion of every kind, even for pure invention. But this latter weapon we must use cautiously, and only where the success of our line of attack demands it. The lie which carries farthest and tells surest is that which has an element of truth in it.

We have read Quirinus from cover to cover, upwards of 800 pages; and in doing so we carefully marked every passage in which the freedom of the Council was called in question. Sarcasms, sneers, words of bitter hatred and scorn are thickly strewn over those long, dreary pages: but not a single authentic fact is produced to show that any undue influence was used, that any influence whatever was used, the pressure of which

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\* These are the words of Quirinus in his second letter, page 82. The paragraph which commences with these words ends with the following on the same page:—"The more the new dogma is combated, the more necessary is the consensus of five quarters of the world—of Negroes, Malays, Chinese, and Hottentots, as well as Italians and Spaniards." Was there a single Negro, Malay, Chinese, or Hottentot among the Bishops of the Council? Not one. Is this a specimen of scientific history.

would affect the freedom of any assembly of human beings outside a nursery or an infant school.

But, before proceeding farther, we must first give our readers some account of the character of this book, and of its title to be accepted as, what it distinctly claims to be, not only an authority, but "the *best* authority for the history of the Vatican Council" (p. vi.). The exposures of Janus have been, as already intimated, complete and decisive. No act of similar justice has yet been done to Quirinus, at least, so far as we know, in our language. We therefore the more readily undertake the task—which, however, as being but a part, an incidental part too, of our general design, must be executed within a much more limited compass.

The authors introduce themselves in their preface thus:—  
 "These letters on the Council originated in the following way. Three friends in Rome were in the habit of communicating to one another what they learnt from persons intimately acquainted with the proceedings of the Council. Belonging as they did to different nations and different classes of life, and having already become familiar, before the opening of the Council, through long residence in Rome, with the state of things and with persons there, and being in free and daily intercourse with some members of the Council, they were very favourably situated for giving a true report as well of the proceedings as of the views of those who took part in it. Their letters were addressed to a friend in Germany, who added now and then historical explanations to elucidate the course of events, and then forwarded them to the 'Allgemeine Zeitung'" (p. v.).

The writers and their German supplementer are from first to last anonymous; nor has any one of them up to the present day made an avowal of his name. This, of course, adds to the weight of their "best authority."\* They profess to be Catholics;

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\* Since the above was written, we lighted accidentally on the following passage in the eighth edition of "Men of the Time," published in the June or July of the present year:—"ACTON, LORD . . . was born at Naples in 1834. . . . For a few years he was a student in the Catholic College of St. Mary's, Oscott, at the time when Dr. (afterwards Cardinal) Wiseman was at the head of that institution; but his education was mainly due to the renowned ecclesiastical historian, Dr. Döllinger of Munich, *with whom he lived for a considerable time.* . . . In the latter year [1865] he stood as a candidate for the borough of Bridgnorth, when he announced, in a speech delivered to the electors, that he represented not the *body*, but the *spirit*, of the Catholic Church. . . . In 1869 he repaired to Rome, on the assembling of the Œcumenical Council, and while there rendered himself conspicuous by his hostility to the doctrine of Papal infallibility, and by the activity and

and the translator takes special care to admonish his readers that the contents of the volume "are exclusively the work of Catholics" (p. vii. note). For the sake of simplicity we shall henceforth speak of the book, as if it were, what the letters themselves uniformly represent it to be, the production of a single pen. We say then that Quirinus, whether formerly a Catholic and educated in the Catholic faith or not, exhibits from beginning to end a thoroughly anti-Catholic spirit—to a great extent Protestant, but Jansenist out and out, to the very backbone; with all that is worst and most odious in the worst and most odious form of that protean heresy. From beginning to end the letters breathe the spirit of that heresy, and reek with its noisome odour. Then, having taken his stand on the Döllinger stump, it is incredible, on one hand, with what persistent and unwearied malignity of vituperation he pursues every person and institution opposed to the stump ticket; and, on the other hand, with what almost indiscriminate uniformity of panegyric he exalts those who are, even to a degree, for that ticket.

We believe that, since the day when S. Peter first announced the gospel in Jerusalem, there never was a Pope whose name has been so often and so widely mentioned during his own lifetime as that of our present Holy Father; whose character and acts have been so often and so widely canvassed in the records of contemporary literature. Passing over volumes and isolated pamphlets, we doubt if there be a single newspaper in all Europe, we might say in the whole world, a single magazine or review of a miscellaneous character, which, during the last quarter of a century, has not had from time to time something to say, in praise or blame or simple narrative, of Pio Nono. In the anti-Catholic press he has been often assailed, sometimes with great bitterness, and not seldom for acts which all true Catholics would consider as deserving of pure eulogy. He has been represented in his official capacity as imprudent, rash; filled with an extravagant idea of his own authority; pushing that authority to the extreme limit, and without regard to the consequences ensuing from long-established prejudices and opinions; consumed with a passion for defining questions hitherto undefined. All this, and more of a similar import, has been said of him over and over again. But, until we opened Quirinus, we had never seen, not even in the most rabid invective

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secrecy with which he rallied, combined, and urged on those who appeared to be favourable to the views entertained by Dr. Döllinger. It is believed that he was in relation with the 'Allgemeine Zeitung,' and that much of the news published by that journal on the subject of the Council was communicated by his lordship. Lord Acton may be regarded as the leader of the self-styled 'liberal Catholics,' &c., &c."

tives, any representation of him, in his private and personal bearing, as other than a model of meekness and suavity. The hundreds upon hundreds of reports that have reached us directly or indirectly from those who had personal interviews with him, all, without a single exception, bear the same testimony. Of all men and women, Catholic and non-Catholic, to Quirinus and to Quirinus alone it has been reserved to exhibit him to the world with the manners of a churl, the temper of a hornet, and the tongue of a fishwoman. So violently incredible does this statement of ours appear at first sight, that, if any one of our readers would be disposed to believe it without proof, we can only say that we envy not his credulity. Here then are our proofs in Quirinus's own words. One of the bishops,\* on a certain occasion, "found the Pope in a state of violent excitement, trembling with passion" (p. 174).† What an unruly, mischievous lad the Pope must have been in his schoolboy days; what a terrible fellow as a grown-up, bearded man—how peppery and pugnacious, when, now in his extreme old age, with the awful weight of Sovereign Pontiff pressing on his shoulders, he indulges himself in "biting reproaches" (p. 420) and "outbreaks of bitterness" (p. 480) to such a degree, that at length "it is *certain* that his excitement has reached fever heat"! (p. 578). Nay his comments, says Quirinus, "if rightly reported here [that *if*], are so irritable and bitter that I *scruple* to mention them" (p. 737). Quirinus is so shocked by the language of the Pope on one occasion, that he says, "I should consider it a *sin* to publish it" (p. 743). Such snow-white purity of conscience! What a sweet, precious, blessed babe of grace Quirinus must be, compared with that hectoring, hoary old sinner of the Vatican!

A little story of long-past days rises in our memory, and, as we think it in point, we shall trouble our readers with it. In a small but flourishing town, in a certain quarter of the British empire, there lived many years ago a shopkeeper, whom we shall call J. It was universally supposed that he drove a very thriving business. Great therefore was the surprise of everybody, when one fine morning the rumour got abroad that he

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\* This bishop was the Chaldean Patriarch, who knew neither Latin nor any other language intelligible to the Pope. Only a third party was present at the interview, to act as interpreter. This third person Quirinus represents as "one of the most devoted courtiers of the Vatican." Did Quirinus get this bit of scientific history from the "devoted courtier," or from the patriarch, between whom and him there was no common language? Was it really three black crows, or only something as black as a crow?

† The figures subjoined to the extracts given in this and succeeding paragraphs indicate the pages of the book.

had closed his shop, and was about to compound with his merchant creditors. And he did compound with them, paying a few shillings in the pound. Not many years after, the same catastrophe, with the same finale, occurred a second time; and then, after a decent interval, a third time. Very ugly surmises were all along whispered about pretty freely; but the mystery was at length fully cleared up. Some time after the third composition J. purchased a fine estate in the country, built a superb mansion on it, retired from business, lived a pleasant life in that mansion, and died there in green old age, about twelve years ago. We forgot to say that he was throughout a strict Methodist, and, especially after his retirement from business, an assiduous frequenter of their meetings. Now, it so happened that in the same town there lived another shop-keeper, whom we shall call M., to whom J., while engaged in business, owed a few pounds. One Sunday morning the former sent his eldest son, then a mere child, for the sum. As the boy stammered out his message, J. listened with perfect composure; then, lifting up his hands and eyes, and immediately lowering them again, exclaimed in a low and slow tone, and with a solemn and pitying expression on his face, "My child, I never touch money on the Sabbath." This is a true story. The writer of this article was the tiny messenger on the occasion, and, though now more than fifty years have passed away since that Sunday morning, remembers the whole incident, the voice, the words, the gestures, as if they were but of yesterday. J. was a man of quite a delicate conscience: he *scrupled* even to touch money on the "Sabbath," and thought it a *sin* to do so. But there were certain other money-touchings which he did not scruple or think a sin. Quirinus's delicacy of conscience, which he so trumpets forth to the world, does it not marvellously resemble that of our sanctimonious Methodist?

Out on these whited sepulchres, that hold  
But dead men's bones in them, like those of old.  
Better be wolf in his own native skin,  
Than sheep outside—still ravenous wolf within.  
Better be seeming evil, being evil,  
Than steal the cloak of God to hide the devil.

But it is not only in moral qualities that the Pope is so grossly deficient; he is equally deficient in intellectual. He is not only a testy old bully, but he is also an ignorant old blockhead:—

It is merely repeating what is *notorious* in Rome to say that Pius IX. is *beneath comparison* with any one of his predecessors for the last 350 years in theological knowledge and intellectual cultivation generally. . . . . It is

*known* here that, small as are the intellectual requisites for ordination in the Roman States, it was *only* out of special regard to his family that Giovanni Maria Mastai could *get* ordained priest. His subsequent career offered no opportunity or means for supplying this *neglect*, and thus he became Pope with the *feeling* of his *entire* deficiency in the *necessary* acquirements. This unpleasant *consciousness* naturally produced the idea that the defect would be remedied *without effort on his part* by enlightenment from above, and divine inspiration would supply the absence of human knowledge (502).

We beg to direct the attention of our readers specially to the words which we have put in italics. We say a fact is notorious in any community, when its existence is known and manifest to the mass of that community. It may or may not be true that the Pope has not given any decisive proofs of profound theological knowledge or general intellectual cultivation; but how can it be *notorious* that he is in these respects *beneath comparison* with any one of his predecessors for three centuries and a half? Are the elements for such a comparison sufficiently copious and clear to justify so grave and sweeping a charge? It is certain that he speaks the Latin and French languages with as much ease and accuracy as he speaks his own Italian. This is, in itself, no slight amount of culture, and furnishes besides no slight presumption of something more. Why, the short discourses which he has addressed to the numerous deputations that have waited on him, of late years, are of themselves decisive evidences of high culture. To say nothing of the sacred wisdom and unction that pervade them, they are, in a purely literary view, quite gems in their way—so pregnant, so terse, so simple, and yet so pointed. Put beside them the leaden pages of Quirinus!

But worse, far worse, are the remaining sentences of the paragraph, as well in what they clearly imply as in what they clearly affirm. Let us see distinctly what they *affirm*. First, the Pope's intellectual qualifications for the priesthood were beneath even a low standard. Secondly, he nevertheless got ordained, and the Bishop who ordained him did so, not on account of his virtues or other qualities which might in a measure make up for his intellectual deficiencies, but *only* out of special regard to his family. Thirdly, from the day of his ordination as priest to the day of his elevation to the papacy, he had *no* opportunity or means of supplying the neglect of his early years, and therefore did not supply it, and therefore was as great an ignoramus on the latter day as on the former. Fourthly, on the day of his elevation to the papacy, he was truly conscious "of his entire deficiency in the necessary acquirements" for that office. He was conscious, not only of his deficiency, (who should not be?) but of his *entire* deficiency.



He was conscious of this entire deficiency not in mere accidental qualities, not in qualities, which, however desirable, are not essential, but in the *necessary* acquirements. Fifthly, notwithstanding this feeling and consciousness of his entire unfitness for an office of such tremendous responsibility, he, on that very day, freely accepted that office. Finally, he then was and still is so grossly ignorant of one of the most elementary lessons in the order of grace and of the spiritual life, as to expect not merely divine assistance aiding and guiding his own efforts, but divine inspiration without such efforts and supplying their place.

Let us now see what Quirinus's inculpatations clearly *imply*. First, it is not stated that Mastai Ferretti was, at the time of his ordination, conscious of his unfitness for the office he then took upon himself, as it is stated that he had such consciousness at the time of his acceptance of the Papacy. But undoubtedly the Bishop who ordained him, knowing his incompetence, and ordained him *solely* on account of his family connexions, was guilty of a mortal sin. Secondly, still more guilty was Pope Gregory XVI., when, with similar knowledge, promoting him to the office of Bishop, and afterwards to that of Cardinal. But most guilty, immeasurably most guilty of all, were the Cardinals who elected Pius to the Papacy and Pius in accepting the Papacy, they and he knowing "his entire deficiency in the necessary acquirements."

We leave these statements and inferences as they are. It is surely needless to add a single word of comment. The burning intensity of Quirinus's malice overmastered his caution. Gnashing with too much violence, he has shaken off the mask, and shown the budding horns; stamping with too much fury, he has betrayed the cloven hoof.

Next to the Pope, the *individual* whom Quirinus selects for his most frequent, most insolent and most vindictive comments, is Dr. Manning. The Archbishop of Westminster first appears on Quirinus's stage in the very first letter, and leaves it only at page 803, in the sixty-ninth and last letter. He has a "fanatical zeal for the new dogma" (p. 66). He is "the leader and oracle of the infallibilists" (p. 348). "Next to the Jesuits, Manning and Ward are the chief authors of the whole infallibilist agitation" (p. 359). "From the Pentecost of the blessed year 1870, as Manning has prophesied, dates the age of the Holy Ghost" (p. 531). He is "at the head of the extreme party" (p. 547). In a speech delivered in the public session of May 25, he "assured the Opposition that they were all heretics *en masse*" (p. 569). He is among "the fanatics" who "would prefer the Church being exposed to the danger of schism to

modifying" (p. 582), &c. &c. It is Manning here, Manning there, Manning everywhere. He is always in the saddle; and wherever you see a troop of the Pope's brigade scouring the dim horizon, in pursuit of scientific historians and high critics, "there, be sure, is Manning charging," with the bright steel in his firm grasp, and the *ακαμαντον πυρ* of ultramontaniam glowing on his burnished helm. Quirinus hints in one place (p. 136) something about a vacant Hat looming in the distance. But, if Dr Manning were raised to the dignity of Dean of the Sacred College of Cardinals, it would not be to him an honour equal to that which Quirinus has conferred on him, by thus singling him out among all the members of the Council as the one special object of continuous, scurrilous, and (as we have just seen) even blasphemous invective, from beginning to end.

But the marked contrast in the manner in which Quirinus uniformly speaks of the two opposing parties in the Council, indicates to us more strikingly than any thing else in his book, the blind, the downright infuriate spirit of partisanship with which he seems penetrated, saturated, possessed like a demoniac. We doubt if there ever has been, since the beginning of the world, an assembly of 700 men, certainly there never has been an assembly of 700 Bishops, composed of persons of such diversity of clime and tongue, with all the other diversities which these two imply. Yet the higher intellectual and moral qualities belong exclusively to the minority of under two hundred, the lower intellectual and moral qualities belong exclusively to the majority of over five hundred. The Bishops of the minority, no matter where they come from, are all white; the Bishops of the majority, no matter where they come from, are all black or tawny, or discoloured in some way.

The *Minority*. On this side are "all among the French, American and Irish Bishops who possess any culture and knowledge" (p. 74); "Ginoulihiac, of Grenoble, who is considered the best theologian among the French Bishops" (p. 125). This was before Maret turned up; then *he* becomes the most learned (pp. 513, 744). Of Mgr. Maret's theological powers Quirinus gives us no means of judging, except from a solitary specimen—his argument against the definition of Papal infallibility, as given by this writer. Of the argument we have to say, that (whether or no Mgr. Maret is responsible for it) it is one of the shallowest and most absurd pieces of theological reasoning we ever met with in any treatise. It is this. If the Council defined the infallibility of the Pope, then the lesser (on the principle of the majority) would give power to the greater. To which Cardinal Bilio, one of the presidents of the Council, replied, that the Council *gives* nothing to the Pope, and

can give nothing to him, but only *defines* what he has, the Pope, if it seems good to him, confirming the definition. The reply is clear and decisive (pp. 608, 663). Did the Vatican Council, in defining the simple supremacy of S. Peter and the Pope (sess. 4, c. 1, 2), give the supremacy to S. Peter or the Pope? Did the same Council, in defining that God is omnipotent, eternal, &c. (sess. 3, c. 1), give to God omnipotence, eternity, &c.? Did the Council of Nice, in defining the divinity of Christ, give divinity to him? Quirinus is surprised that the Cardinal should have addressed severe language "to one of the most learned and respected men of the French clergy, the president of the Paris Theological Faculty." If Mgr. Maret really spoke as Quirinus declares him to have spoken (which we are very slow to believe), we should say that he could not do better than enter some orthodox theological college, and there learn the first rudiments of the sacred science. And though we may not rely on this specimen as indicating *Mgr. Maret's* theological ignorance, at all events it very irrefragably demonstrates *Quirinus's*.

But to return to Quirinus's panegyrics. We have room only for a few more of the countless flowers showered on the heads of the minority. One "is a man of rare eloquence, rich experience and knowledge of mankind, and easily outweighs ten Italian Cardinals in culture and learning" (p. 146). Now, it so happens that the person on whom this extravagant encomium is passed, had already given proof of an amount, not only of gross ignorance, but of erroneous doctrine, especially on the subject-matter of the fourth session, such as we believe no other Bishop of the Church has exhibited since the synod of Pistoia. These errors are enumerated and condemned in a long brief addressed by the Pope to him in October, 1865, and published several months before the meeting of the Council. But Quirinus has himself furnished sufficient means for judging of the justness of his eulogy, for he gives in the appendix a full report of the speech delivered by this Bishop against the definition of the infallibility; and in that speech we have found no trace whatever of theological learning, while its theological reasoning is feeble indeed. Another member of the minority "lashed with incisive words and brilliant arguments" (p. 168). Another "is the best speaker in the Council after," &c. (p. 195). Three others are "three of the most influential prelates of the Church" (pp. 449-50). Another "is beyond question the most profound historical scholar among the members of the Council" (p. 455). Another "has spoken with great power and dignity" (p. 556). Another "cited clenching proofs" (p. 594). Another (an American, vide "Martin Chuzzlewit") delivered "*one of the most remarkable*" speeches made "since the opening of the Council" (p. 595).

Another "won great commendation, and his Biblical comments were also found to be well grounded and to the purpose" (p. 662). This, by the way, is the pure Evangelical and Methodist cant, and is stolen word for word from Brother Styles. Another made a "long and powerful speech" (p. 683). Another, the author of a condemned work, is "a man distinguished alike for intellect, eloquence, and learning" (p. 806). In short, the speeches of the minority were in the main "solid and thoughtful" (p. 755).

Now, we do not so much quarrel with this unbroken strain of praise, considered absolutely and in itself. It is from a comparison of it with the terms constantly applied to the members of the majority, that we can comprehend the full intensity of the writer's envenomed spirit—especially when we bear in mind how large both absolutely and relatively that majority was. The following are specimens of the language in which Quirinus characterises the qualities, intellectual and moral, of the 533 Bishops who voted for the definition of the Pope's infallibility. We may premise that, soon after the close of the Council, as well as quite recently, we learned from more than one source, of the very best authority, that the Bishops of the Council, who, as a body, displayed the most profound theological knowledge, united to the highest order of ability, were the Spanish and Neapolitan—both, as we were informed, preeminent over those of all other nations. They came from the countries of Suarez and S. Alphonsus Liguori.

*The Majority.* "Above a hundred Spaniards have come from both sides of the ocean to let themselves be used as instruments of the Italians at the Council. They have no thought, or will, or suggestion of their own for the good of the Church. It is difficult to form a notion of the ignorance of these Latins in all *historical* questions [scientific history, of course], and their *entire* want of that general cultivation which is assumed with us as a matter of course in a priest or a bishop. And up to this time *I have always found* here that the predilection for the Infallibility theory is in *precise proportion* to the ignorance of its advocates" (p. 143, Rome, Jan. 9, 1870). The petition for the definition of infallibility, signed by 400 Bishops of the Council, "is made up of gross and *palpable* untruths and falsifications"; and among the signatories "the Romance South Americans are even more ignorant than the Spaniards" (p. 173). Of the majority "Deschamps *alone* has won great applause as an eloquent speaker, though with sufficient poverty of thought" (p. 192). They are "fanatics," a "crowd of abject fanatics and sycophants" (pp. 389, 582, 586), "quite

incapable from their standard of cultivation of appreciating theological arguments," and many of them, "even if they were convinced, would not act on their convictions" (pp. 611-12). The Spanish Bishops utter "*merely* bombast and abject protestations of homage . . . . and among the *reptiles* here they are the most cringing after the Neapolitans" (p. 726). We had marked many other passages of a similar tendency; we think, however, we have quoted quite enough.

Observe, the first of these extracts was penned just a month after the opening of the Council. The Spanish people, as is well known, especially those in high position, whether in church or state, are exceedingly reserved. Notwithstanding this, and the hustle naturally consequent on the meeting together of so many hundreds of Bishops, theologians and others, the congregations, the Christmas ceremonies, &c.; notwithstanding all this, Quirinus succeeded, within the space of one month, in so effectively pumping above a hundred Spanish Bishops, as to be able to pronounce dogmatically on their dispositions, their theological and historical knowledge, and their general cultivation. Quirinus has again overshot himself. With the Bishops, as with the Pope, he has shown himself to have the venom of the serpent without its cunning. With the Bishops, as with the Pope, the truculence of his passion has overpowered him. The blows he aims at them, as at him, fall back on himself with crushing force. Did he not *scruple*, did he not think it a *sin* so rashly, so recklessly to exhibit to a godless and mocking world so many Bishops as stupid, imbecile, grossly wanting in the learning proper to their state, grossly careless of the highest interests of religion, of the Church, of God's own eternal and immaculate truth? Did he not think it a sin so rashly and so recklessly to call these Bishops foul names, to call them fanatics and sycophants and reptiles?

But profuse and acrimonious as are the assaults on the Pope and the Episcopal majority, immeasurably more profuse and acrimonious are the assaults on the Jesuits. *They* are among the very first objects that arrest the scorching glare of Quirinus's baleful eyes; and never, until he utters his last dying howl, do they for one moment recede out of the range of his vision. They are for ever flitting before him, like a prey he would seize, but which flies when he bounds at it, fascinating him, mocking him, maddening him. On others he deals his blows intermittingly: them he keeps pounding, pounding incessantly, as if his arm rose and fell under the influence of a resistless force, like the hammer of a great clock striking the hours. If he aims at the Pope upwards of twenty times and at the Bishops upwards of twenty times, he aims at the Jesuits

upwards of one hundred and twenty times. We will not bore our readers with specimens. It is the old story, familiar to every one conversant with the history of the Church for the last three centuries. During that long and stormy period has there been a single man, animated with a special hostility to the Holy See, especially under the mask of a Catholic name, who was not also animated with a special hostility towards them? Has there been a single writer who assailed the purity of Catholic doctrine, a single Janus or Quirinus, who did not also assail the purity of their characters? Has there been a single statesman who set about crushing the liberty of the Church in any Catholic nation, a single Pombal or Cavour, who did not commence the work of sacrilege by crushing, or trying to crush, them? "Quid plura?"\*

Having given these specimens of Quirinus's "best authority" on the Vatican Council, we have now a word to say on his "deeper views" as a theologian. He constantly sits in judgment on theology and theologians, and pronounces his decisions with that assured self-complacency which so often imposes on unsuspecting ignorance. His denunciation of the Spanish Bishops, given above, may be taken as a specimen. Does he anywhere exhibit evidence of his qualification for an office of such high censorship—evidence not of the justness of his actual criticisms, but of his capacity to criticise at all? Let us see. On the Pope, the Church, and General Councils, he has given a profusion of theological disquisition; but theology which is, as we have said, a mere compound of Protestantism and the most extreme Jansenism. In all the other numerous and vast departments of the sacred science he has given us, as far as we could notice, but one solitary opportunity of testing his theological acquirements.

In his sixth letter (dated Rome, December 24, 1869), commenting on one of the Schemata submitted to the Council, Quirinus says (p. 112): "It contains on its front the impress of the new Jesuit school. . . . Here is a characteristic specimen. At the Florentine Synod of 1439, which bequeathed such painful recollections both to East and West, Eugenius IV. had it defined 'that the souls of those who die only in original, or in actual mortal sin, descend into hell, but are unequally pun-

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\* Dr. Johnson, in his "Life of Paul Sarpi," near the end, has the following: "His detestation of the corruption of the Roman Church appears in all his writings, but particularly in this memorable passage of one of his letters: 'There is nothing more essential than to ruin the reputation of the Jesuits; by the ruin of the Jesuits Rome will be ruined.'" Sarpi was the Quirinus of the Council of Trent. How men, like events, reproduce themselves!

ished.\* This proposition has sadly tormented theologians, and they have devised all sorts of ways of softening or explaining it, even assuming the very doubtful authority of this Council, which was rejected by the whole Gallican Church. For even the most resolute faith recoils in horror from the logical inference that God has created the human race in order, from generation to generation, to plunge into hell far the larger portion of mankind, simply because they have not received the baptism which in most cases was never offered them. The vast gulf between this proposition and the Scriptural doctrine that God is Love, and wills all men to be saved, *no* theologian has undertaken to bridge over."

This is indeed a "characteristic specimen"—of Quirinus, and quite enough. It exhibits in a marked way, first, the gross dishonesty of the scientific historian; secondly, his equally gross ignorance of the commonest theological speculations and of the commonest theological books.

Quirinus's *scientific history*. First, from his words a reader unacquainted with the Acts of the Councils would at once infer, would take for granted, that the introduction of the above definition among the doctrines of the Church was due entirely to the Council of Florence, and that the definition is not to be found in any previous General Council. Is this true? It is false. The Council of Florence was held in the year 1439. In the profession of faith, made in the name of the whole Greek Church, in a General Council (second of Lyons) held nearly a hundred and seventy years before (1274), the very same definition is given with hardly the variation of even a single unimportant word: "We believe . . . . that the souls of those who die in mortal sin, or with only original, immediately descend into hell, to be punished with unequal penalties." †

Second. What does Quirinus mean by saying that the Council of Florence "*bequeathed* painful recollections both to

\* "Animas eorum qui in solo peccato originali, vel mortali actuali decedunt, in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendos."—*Note of Quirinus*.

† Πιστευομεν . . . . . εκειων, δε τας ψυχας των εν θανασιμω αμαρτηματι, η μετα μονης της προπατορικης αποχωρησαντων, παραντικα εις τον αδην καταβαινειν, ποιαις ανισοις τιμωρηθησομενας. (Harduin, vii. 696.) The exact words of the Council of Florence, as given by the same Harduin, ix. 986, are:—"Diffinimus . . . . . illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato, vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas." The Council did not define anything as to the nature of the punishments: the main force of the definition falls therefore on the word "immediately" (παραντικα, "mox"). Perrone, de Deo Creatore, n. 812, *note*. Quirinus, doubtless, being entirely ignorant of this, we do not attribute his omission of the word to bad faith.

East and West"? These words, if they mean anything, plainly signify that something was done in the Council or by the Council, which was the cause, or at least the occasion, of serious injury to the Church; something to be regretted; something that had been better left undone. Or they signify, what amounts to much the same thing, that it were better for the interests of the Eastern as well as the Western Church, if the Council had never met. Is this true? It is false. In the first place, we believe that, with the sole exception of that firebrand, Mark of Ephesus, all the Eastern Bishops who assisted at the Council remained firm till death in the faith there professed—Mark having been indeed opposed to reconciliation from first to last. It is beyond all question that the great majority of them did so remain, several of them under very trying hardships. The testimony to the truth of so many and such men, to say nothing of the salvation of their immortal souls, was of itself no slight gain. In the second place, if the rest of the Greeks remained in their schism and their errors, in what way or in what degree was the Council responsible for this? Did the Council of Nice bequeath painful recollections, because the Arians remained Arian, disturbing, afflicting, and in effort lacerating the Church for generations? Did the Council of Trent, because the Protestants remained Protestant? Did the Vatican Council, because Quirinus and a handful of Munich sciolists have turned Protestant? In the third place, that the profession of faith made in the last session of the Council, most especially that part of it which regards the Roman Pontiff, should have been assented to and subscribed by the Greeks—ah! this is a painful, *the* painful, recollection to Quirinus and the other New Protestants, as of course it has always been to the Old; but to all true Catholics a recollection pleasing indeed and most delightful.

Third. But the authority of the Council is "very doubtful," and why? Because the Council "was rejected by the whole Gallican Church." Of the theology here implied we shall speak presently. Is the historical statement true, namely, that the Council of Florence was rejected by the whole Gallican Church? It is a falsehood, but of that kind which we characterized above in commencing our strictures on Quirinus. It is a falsehood with an element of truth in it. His most Christian Majesty prohibited the French Bishops from attending the Council, and consequently (O blessed Gallican liberties!) not a single French Bishop was at it from beginning to end. (The very same thing happened to the French Bishops in reference to a previous General Council, the second of Nice.) In those days of slow and uncertain communication, reports of the most erroneous



kind regarding the proceedings of the Council were spread everywhere through France. In consequence of these reports, the French Bishops, having no means of coming at a sure knowledge of the real facts, did not at first receive the Council. Eventually, when they did arrive at that knowledge, they accepted the Council entirely, absolutely, cordially. Of the positive and absolute rejection of the Council by the Gallican Church, at any time, there is no authentic evidence whatever: while of the ultimate reception of it we have decisive evidence. We suppose that the testimony of distinguished French theologians, at least of those who held what used to be called the Gallican doctrines, would be admitted as sufficiently conclusive on the point. Of these Tournely, beyond all question, held the very highest place in the public estimation. So high, indeed, did his character stand, that, after his death in 1729, it was no uncommon thing for even able and learned theologians, such as Collet, La Fosse, Montagne, &c., to publish courses or particular treatises of theology under his name or as continuations of his work. Now, Tournely, after admitting that, for the reasons just stated, the Council was not at first received in France, distinctly affirms that, the grounds of doubt having been removed, there is no reason for excluding the Council from the list of General Councils:\* Natalis Alexander (ob. 1724), the famous historian, a very decided Gallican, not only maintains the full ecumenicity of the Council, but defends that ecumenicity at considerable length against the cavils of Mark of Ephesus and others.† We might refer to many other authorities of the same kind. We will name but one more, Cardinal de la Luzerne (ob. 1821). He was an open, uncompromising defender of Gallicanism; and was, we believe, the last of that class (Quirinus will pardon us) to whom even by courtesy the title of theologian could be extended. In a work written expressly and exclusively in defence of the declaration of 1682, Luzerne, towards the close of that work,‡ undertakes to reconcile two positions held by him with certain proceedings in the Council of Florence. Now, if he did not believe in the ecumenicity of the Council, his obvious course should have been to deny that ecumenicity at once. But so far from adopting such a course, he takes up an elaborate chain of reasoning, which he carries on for upwards of forty pages — whether successfully or not is beside the

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\* Tournely, de Ecclesia, vol. ii., p. 309-10.

† Dissertatio 10 in Hist. Ecclesiast., sec. 15 et 16.

‡ Sur la Déclaration de l'Assemblée du Clergé de France en 1682. Troisième partie, chap. 21.

present point—without dropping a single word to indicate that he entertained the smallest doubt on the subject; arguing all along just as if he were reconciling his positions with the Council of Nice or of Trent. So much for the specimens of Quirinus's scientific history given within so short a compass. Let us now glance at the specimens of—

Quirinus's *high theology*. First. The doctrine of Quirinus on general Councils is throughout so entirely erroneous, that we need barely point out the proposition, which is implied in the preceding extract, and which affirms that a Council approved of as General by the Pope possesses but doubtful authority, if rejected by a single national Church. This doctrine is opposed to the uniform practice and manifest belief of the Church: it is simply heretical.

Second. "This *proposition* [of the Council of Florence] has sadly tormented theologians." Whatever may be said of the doctrine set forth in the proposition (of which by-and-by), it is absolutely certain that the proposition itself, this new definition of that doctrine, threw no fresh difficulty in the way of theologians; created no new torment for them. As to the eternal lot of all who die without being in a state of grace, the Council defined merely what had not only been defined before, but had been always, as it is at this day, the universal, clear, explicit faith of the Church, and of every man, woman, and child in it, who understood the first rudiments of the faith. But the Council's definition about the Pope is the sore point with Quirinus, and for that he aims this blow at its authority, by insinuating that it framed a new theme of discord and distress for theologians. Is it true that the Council did this? It is false, utterly false.

Third. "This proposition has sadly *tormented* theologians, and they have devised all sorts of ways of softening or explaining it." The proposition of the Council, as we have seen, left theologians exactly in the same state in which it found them. But did the doctrine declared in the proposition create at any time, before or after the Council, a special torment, that is, a special difficulty for theologians in the solution of objections, in harmonizing the doctrine with other defined doctrines: a difficulty such as does not occur in almost every treatise of theology, dogmatic and moral, and in some treatises at every second step? Most certainly not. On the contrary, as we shall see immediately, the solution given by the overwhelming majority of theologians, both before and since the Council of Florence, to the only difficulty worth looking at, clears away that difficulty most satisfactorily, and dissolves it into empty air. While, on the other hand, there are theological difficulties,

for example, on the subject of the divine attributes, of grace, of sin, &c., which have "sadly tormented theologians" and divided theological schools for centuries; and whose cloud will probably not altogether melt away until the golden dawn of the eternal day arises, "and in thy light we shall see light." Has the definition of Florence near so sadly tormented theologians as have several definitions we could name of the Council of Trent? But we forgot: even Trent, as he more than once intimates, is far from pleasing Quirinus. For a person assuming the name of Catholic, he is hard to please. Trent does not please him,\* still less Florence, least of all and not at all the Vatican. What *would* please him? We think we can guess—a Council consisting of the "numerous theological High Schools and learned theologians" (141) of Germany.

Fourth. "The vast gulf between this proposition and the Scriptural doctrine that God is Love, and wills all men to be saved, *no* theologian has *undertaken* to bridge over." Is this true? It is, as every mere tyro in theology should know, false, monstrously false. The great mass of our dogmatic theologians, from the ponderous folio down to the duodecimo text-book, have undertaken the task, generally in the treatise "de Deo," or in the treatise "de Gratia," or in that "de Incarnatione." That eminent theologian Perrone, whose work had reached the thirty-first edition seven years ago, has done so in both of the two first of those treatises. Suarez did the same more than two hundred and fifty years ago, in his treatise "de Prædestinatione." S. Thomas did the same in his commentary on the Sentences, more than six hundred years ago, before the Council of Lyons,† and so long before the Council of Florence. These, and hundreds besides of our theologians, have undertaken to do that, which our "*best* authority for the history of the Vatican Council" so coolly affirms that "*no* theologian has undertaken." They *undertook*: that they have succeeded, the illustrious names of so many among them should be to us a sufficient guarantee. That their views are sufficiently "deep" to exhaust Quirinus's theological sounding-line, we have not the means of ascertaining: for, what he denies is not the success, but the fact of the undertaking.

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\* Hallam, a<sup>1</sup> staunch Protestant, has the following in his "Literature of Europe" (p. 2, c. 2, n. 18, note):—"No General Council ever contained so many persons of eminent learning and ability as that of Trent; nor is there ground for believing that any other ever investigated the questions before it with so much patience, acuteness, temper, and desire of truth."

† It was on his way to this very Council, to which he had been summoned by the Pope, that the holy Doctor was called to the better life.

As to the inference he insinuates by saying that God is Love, and that He wills the salvation of all men, this mode of reasoning might pass in a composition like Moore's "Loves of the Angels" (where it actually occurs), but it is not that which theologians are in the habit of using. God is infinite Love, but he is also infinite Justice. It is true, as Scripture and Holy Church so frequently proclaim,\* his works of Mercy are above all his works. It would be simple justice to plunge the sinner into hell after the commission of his first mortal sin (as was done to the angels), after the second and after each succeeding mortal sin. And yet how many millions on millions are there, and in every age of the Church have been, to whom God pardons mortal sin committed, not only seven times, but seventy times seven! How many are there whom God has pardoned after many long years, nay, after a life-long career of continuous sin! On the other hand, how many live in sin and die in sin, without repentance? To say nothing of the perpetual and manifest faith and teaching of the universal Church, if there be anything clearly affirmed in Scripture, it is that such are doomed absolutely to everlasting punishment. Does Quirinus deny this? If so, then he is an open heretic on this point, as he is on other points. Yet, notwithstanding this awful decree of Justice, God is none the less Love, infinite Love.

God is infinite in all His attributes, in his justice as in His mercy. But the exercise, if we may so speak, the outward manifestations, the works of these attributes are not infinite. God is free, with an absolute and perfect freedom, in the manifestation of each of His attributes; free to manifest them not at all, free to manifest them when He wills, and to what extent He wills. That will, we know, works with infinite wisdom, as well as with infinite power. How that will thus works in the natural order and in the visible creation, we see and know to some extent; because it manifests itself to our eyes and our understandings. But of its works and ways in the supernatural order and invisible world, we know no more than the senseless stone, except so far as he has deigned to reveal to us in His Sacred Word. From that Word alone can we know to whom and in what way He wills to exercise his pure justice, to exercise his pure mercy, to exercise his justice and mercy meeting each other. "For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor?"

It is idle therefore to argue as to the condition of infants dying in original sin from those general truths—God is Love,

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\* "Deus qui omnipotentiam tuam parcendo maxime et miserando manifestas," &c. Oratio, Dom. 10 post Pentec.

God is Justice, God is Omnipotence, and the like—especially as God *has* revealed, in part at least, how far He manifests to them His love and His justice.

In the future world there are two, and only two, permanent states, Heaven and Hell: for, after the day of General Judgment, there will no longer exist the intermediate or purgatorial state. The essential beatitude of heaven consists in the vision of God and the love of God, and the ecstatic joy resulting from these two. Now hell, in its primary and essential meaning, simply signifies the state of eternal exclusion from this beatitude. It commonly, but not necessarily and "*vi termini*," implies much more. From this beatitude all are absolutely and for ever excluded who die in original sin, or in actual mortal sin, with or without original. This is an article of Catholic faith. But, as Suarez, with his usual acuteness, remarks, the sentence of condemnation to everlasting fire to be pronounced on the reprobate at the general judgment (Matt. xxv. 41, &c.) is addressed only to those who could perform works, that is, who were capable of committing actual sin: hence of those who die with only original sin there is no mention made there. In the third chapter of the Gospel of S. John, our Lord announces to Nicodemus the doctrine of the new birth, the necessity of regeneration for all men alike, as all alike are born in sin. He announces this necessity twice over,—first, in a general form, the necessity of the thing itself; secondly, the necessity of the instrument or means whereby the thing is to be obtained—baptism. He is speaking merely of regeneration from the universal corruption, original sin; and it is very remarkable that on both occasions he simply says that the want of this regeneration excludes from the kingdom of Heaven:—"Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God . . . . Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Whereas, in the innumerable texts of Scripture in which mention is made of the punishment of actual sin, positive torment, the "*pœna sensûs*," is invariably, or almost invariably, alluded to.

But to return to the theologians. It is true that a few have held that infants dying in original sin, together with exclusion from heaven, suffer also some very light pain of sense. But this opinion is rejected by the overwhelming majority of theologians. The opposite opinion, says Vasquez, is "the common opinion of the schools." "All theologians teach it," according to Suarez. Bellarmine affirms that it is held by "the whole school of theologians."\* Nay, the majority of theo-

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\* "*Communis in schola*."—Vasquez in l. 2., d. 134, n. 6. "*Omnes theologii*

gians,\* with S. Thomas and Scotus at their head, maintain (Vasquez holds it as certain) that those lost ones, though knowing full well that there is an unspeakable happiness which they are never to enjoy, yet feel no sadness or pain of any kind from the knowledge of this privation—God's omnipotent hand so cradling their minds in this calm repose. Yet farther still, Suarez and others, still following the same Angelic Doctor, hold that they enjoy a permanent and undisturbed natural beatitude of the understanding and the will; knowing God as perfectly as He can be known through His creatures, and for all eternity loving Him and enjoying Him as thus known. A graphic and touching description of the sentiments and condition of those souls on the great Judgment Day, and for ever after, is given by Lessius, some extracts from which cannot be unacceptable to our general readers:—

They shall be gathered together in one place, but separated from the wicked as having a destiny different from theirs. They shall see the majesty of the Judge, and adore Him. They shall see the assembly of the saints and of the wicked, of whose good and bad works they shall have a knowledge. They shall hear the sentence of the Judge pronounced on both, and shall rejoice that they are not among the wicked. They will give thanks to God for having been snatched away before coming to the use of reason, inasmuch as the immense majority of them, especially the children of unbelievers, would otherwise have incurred the same damnation. They will therefore not murmur against God, but will feel themselves exceedingly indebted to Him for having delivered them from the peril of such great woes. They shall themselves receive a sentence from the Judge, but a gracious one; which, though it excludes them from the beatific vision and the kingdom of heaven, secures them in a state suited to the dignity of their nature, wherein, satisfied and rejoicing, they shall dwell in the praises of God for all eternity. . . . . All this is corroborated by the scholastic doctors. S. Thomas says that "they shall share largely in the divine goodness and in natural perfections, and shall be united to God in the communion of natural goods, and so shall rejoice in Him from their natural knowledge and love of Him." . . . . . Wherefore, although they are called *damned*, in as much as they are for ever deprived of the glory of heaven for which they were created, we may reasonably believe that their lot is *far happier and more joyful than that of any human being on this earth.* †

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docent."—Suarez, de *Mysteriis Vitæ Christi*, d. 50, s. 5. "Universa schola theologorum."—Bellarm. de *Amiss. Gratiæ*, l. 6, c. 5, ad object. 7.

\* Lessius (loco infra cit. n. 145) says of this opinion, "passim docent doctores."

† Lessius de *Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis*, l. 13, n. 143-5, c. 22. The whole of these paragraphs are well worth attentive perusal. We need hardly add that every statement contained in them rests on solid (to us un-

We have more to say, viewing the question about those souls from another stand-point. But we must stop here. We have given an outline of *one* bridge which theologians have constructed across that gulf, which Quirinus affirms that “no theologian has *undertaken* to bridge over,”—the stones that compose this theological structure seeming to us firm and transparent, as if quarried out of the crystal floor of the New Jerusalem.

But Quirinus has shown himself not only utterly ignorant of theology, but utterly ignorant, we will not say of its technical terms, but of ecclesiastical words and phrases in common use among Catholics of all classes, and to be found in the commonest books of devotion and instruction.

On Sunday last [January, 1870] the Pope gave audience to a great crowd of visitors, some 700 or 1,000, it is said. . . . [Among other things, he said that] in Church matters no attention was to be paid to the judgment of the *world*, as he himself despised it, for the Church’s kingdom is not of this world. It has hitherto, *of course*, been held in the Church that the judgment of the world—that is, of *their flocks*, who constitute their own immediate world—is exactly what the Bishops ought to attend to very much, &c. (p. 149.)

We are wrong. This is not ignorance, cannot be ignorance. It seems to us impossible that Quirinus did not see, what is at first sight so perfectly manifest, that the Pope here uses the word “world” in the sense in which it is invariably used in the New Testament when contrasted with our Lord, His Gospel, His Church; \* in the sense which, in such contrast, it has in the Fathers, in the theologians, in all Catholic writers whatsoever. It is in this sense we so often read, and hear, and speak of the maxims of the world, the spirit of the world, the ways of the world, as opposed to the maxims, the spirit, and the ways of God and His holy law. “Woe to the world because of scandals : If the world hate you, know ye that it hath hated Me before you : In the world you shall have distress : but have confidence, I have overcome the world : You are of God, little children . . . . they are of the world : therefore of the world they speak, and the world heareth them.” † The devil, the world, the flesh,—are not these the three great enemies of the Church and of her individual members, for ever warring against her

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answerable) theological reasoning. The decision of Innocent III. (Cap. Majores) seems very clear :—“Pœna originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei, actualis vero pœna peccati est gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus.”

\* The word has five different significations in the New Testament, on which see Ferraris, Bibliotheca, sub voce “Mundus” : “Quarto, accipitur pro hominibus mundanis ; quos vocamus mundanos, quia ea sola quæ in præsentî vident desiderant.”

† Matt. xviii. 7 ; John xv. 18 ; xvi. 33 ; 1 John iv. 5.

and them? Is not the world by far the most formidable of the three, especially as against the Church herself? By this world, with its impious principles, its wisdom, denounced by the Apostle, with its deadly hate, with its mighty power, the Church, but for a mightier power, would have ages ago been swept from the face of the earth—her name dimly remembered, like the names of ancient dynasties that have so long perished from among men. The world! Is not Quirinus one of her million evangelists, paid to spread her lying gospel, paid in the fairy coin with which she rewards her faithful servants, in the clapping hands and loud praises of her great chiefs and her nimble scribes? The world! Is not the Vicar of Christ the one only man on earth, to whom is given the full and supreme and universal commission to watch the insidious devices and evil teachings of the world, and in season and out of season to denounce, and condemn, and warn against them? Quirinus censures the Pope for despising the judgment of the world. Is he to respect it? Certainly not. Is he to hold himself indifferent to it as to a thing in itself neither good nor bad? Certainly not: for it is not so. He is to despise it, then. He is to despise it, as in itself despicable—folly and madness, as the Scripture, times without number, designates it. He is to despise it by not fearing it: for, though it rushes on him with great fury, he knows that it cannot prevail against him or against the Church built on him. He is to despise it by putting it aside and taking no account of it, in executing his first great task of teaching his flock, of guarding the deposit. Is the Pope to consult the devil's hornbook as a guide to be attended to in announcing the pure Gospel of Christ?

And now we think we have, from Quirinus's own pages, produced materials abundant for forming a just estimate of the man and the writer; for setting his character and his authority in their true light, clearly and fully. Intrinsically and seen through, he is nothing—not worth two drops of the ink we have wasted on him. But he represents a sect, contemptible indeed in its numbers, but strong in malice, indefatigable and unscrupulous in the pursuit of its object through dark and tortuous ways, hypocritical and mendacious.\*

“The number of fools is infinite,” says the Wise Man. The sect knows this; and knows, too, the old saying, “Fling plenty

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\* We take the following extracts from the admirable essay on the spirit of Jansenism, prefixed by F. Dalgairns to his treatise on Devotion to the Sacred Heart:—

“Jansenism was a planned systematic conspiracy against Rome, but not in the same sense as that of Luther and Calvin. Geneva and Augsburg waged an open war. Jansenism was a secret plot. Its strength did not lie in its



of dirt, some will stick." It is for this reason that, on second thought, we have devoted so much space to the exposure of Quirinus's true spirit—on second thought: for in commencing his article we had no other idea than that of tossing him off in a couple of sentences, and leaving him to rot into the oblivion which he was sure in no distant time to reach. One word more, and we part with him for ever.\*

The charge of want of freedom in the Council, on which, as we have already intimated, Quirinus keeps so constantly harping, requires not now any serious notice—required not at any time, but certainly requires not *now*, when the lapse of more than two years since the day of the great definition has displayed to the world such stupendous evidence of the perfect unity of the Church, "the whole body compacted and fitly joined together." Of all the arguments and insinuations levelled by Quirinus against the freedom of the Council there is but one,

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doctrines, but in the terrible tenacity with which its disciples clung to them, and the no less terrible obstinacy with which they determined to remain within the visible communion of the Church of God, for the very purpose of eating into its vitals, and braving its decrees. . . .

"They [the Jansenists] thought themselves happy if, with painful erudition, they discovered that the narrator of the triumphant death of a martyr made some blunder in the name of a Roman legion, or in the official title of some Roman magistrate. . . . Such was Jansenism in its first stage, the most repulsive and the most dishonest of heresies. . . .

"Their great principle, that it was possible to belong to the Church and yet be her opponent in matters in which she was not infallible, and their claim at the same time to be the judges of those matters. . . .

"The only real and thorough Jesuitism, in the Protestant sense of the word, was Jansenism." (pp. 6, 30, 32, 46.)

This picture is, we can say, from long and close acquaintance with the subject, a perfect photograph.

\* The present writer read on its first appearance, and read with unbounded delight, the pastoral of Archbishop Manning on "The Council and its Definitions," published towards the close of 1870. But, partly from old and intimate familiarity with the theological ground over which the Archbishop travels, and with so many of the writers who had travelled the same ground long before him; partly from the effect of twenty intervening and busy months, "tinging with browner shade the evening of life" and its fading power of memory; he had lost, except on one point, all distinct recollection of the details of that pastoral. On turning to it while writing one of the preceding paragraphs, he was most agreeably surprised to find that most of what he had marked in Quirinus for further exposure had been already noticed therein. We are glad of this for two reasons: first, because it abridges our work; secondly and principally, because, exclusive of other considerations, Dr. Manning's constant and active connection with the proceedings of the Council from first to last (Pastoral, pp. 2, 24) gives to his testimony a peculiar weight. We would beg to direct special attention to chapter 4, "Scientific History and the Catholic Rule of Faith." The reasoning is as clear and unanswerable as a mathematical demonstration.

which, if the statement of fact on which it is based were true, would tell seriously against that freedom. "Here the Bishops are in a sense the Pope's prisoners. . . . It is the Pope who makes the decrees and defines the dogmas; the Council has *simply* to assent" (p. 147). "On their [the Bishops'] arrival they were strung and fixed, like the keys of a harpsichord, into the great conciliar instrument, and they find that they are to be used by the hand of the mighty musician to produce tones which sound *to themselves* most utterly nauseous" (p. 292). "Even the most abject Placet-men of the majority . . . . had not quite expected to be summoned to Rome, *simply* in order to formulate the lecture notes of a Jesuit into dogmatic decrees for the whole Church" (p. 327). The Bishops or theologians, or both together, were summoned to Rome, that they "*simply* endorse the elaborations of the Jesuits as voting-machines in the prison-house of the Council" (p. 502).

Now it so happens, most unfortunately for Quirinus, that Friedrich\* has given, in the second part of the work named at the head of this article, the whole of the original drafts or *schemata* (the Jesuit "lecture notes" and "elaborations") as submitted to the Bishops. We beg the reader to compare, as we have compared, these drafts of the two dogmatic constitutions with the constitutions themselves as finally adopted and decreed; and he will find hardly a single paragraph or sentence, we believe not even one, standing in the latter as it stood in the former. Except in the general titles, "on Faith" and "on the Church," everything is altered,—the arrangement, the titles of the chapters, the matter of the chapters—not a little entirely eliminated—not a little entirely new introduced. In the first Constitution the Schema is cut down to about one-half its original dimensions, eighteen chapters reduced to four, a whole batch of matter entirely suppressed, and a whole batch of new canons subjoined. The second Constitution is reduced to about one-third of its original compass,—four chapters instead of fifteen, much very weighty matter put out altogether; the chapter on the Papal infallibility, not in the Schema in any form, inserted, and a series of canons expunged. In short, the Bishops so hacked and so completely transformed the Schemata, leaving but the faintest outline of them in their Constitutions, as if they had thereby intended to give to the

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\* Friedrich was one of Quirinus's fellow conspirators. He has since openly turned New Protestant. Of upwards of twelve hundred priests belonging to the diocese of Munich, just three have joined the Döllinger sect. This fact we have been assured of by a Bishop of the highest character, who, in the course of last spring, himself had it from the lips of the Vicar-general of that diocese.

world the clearest and most palpable proof that these Constitutions were altogether their own work, their own free and deliberate work, and no mistake about it. We thank Friedrich for giving us those documents, which we have not seen elsewhere, showing, as they do, that Quirinus is one of the greatest liars that ever lived, greater even than Macaulay's Barère—greater, and with this difference, that Barère lied to cover his own past infamy, while Quirinus lies to load with infamy the Vicar of Christ and the Bishops of the Church of Christ.

We have hitherto spoken of the ecumenicity of the Vatican Council under the two first conditions of convocation and celebration. Of the ecumenicity of the Council in its final issue we need not say one word; for this the only condition required, according to all Catholic theologians, is the confirmation of the Council by the Pope. The Jansenists, indeed, insisted also on the acceptance of the Council by the universal Church. But even this condition, were it necessary, has been fulfilled in a most marvellous manner. The lapse of more than two years has, as we observed above, exhibited the perfect unity of the Church to the eyes of all men. This and all other attributes of the Church remain always in her, undiminished, untainted; but their outward manifestations and signs are sometimes to the eye of the world, as well as to the eye of faith, far more splendid than at others. The sun is always, in his own centre of light, the same radiant luminary; but his brilliancy is to our eyes greater and lesser, as clouds and vapours come and clear away. From extracts given in the early part of this article, to which others from less suspicious sources might have been added, it is evident that certain parties confidently expected that some great schism, not only *from* the Church but *in* the Church, would arise out of the Council. But the mutterings that seemed to prelude the coming tempest, came only from the lips of the false prophets, and, having received no responsive echo from the vaunted ranks of disaffection, they at first died away in silent and black despair, to break out again, from time to time, in fitful bursts of rage and malediction. The victory of faith, of faith which overcometh the world, is complete and perfect, as was the victory of Michael over the dragon. It turns out that out of about ninety Bishops who were opposed to the defining of the Papal infallibility, not half a dozen were opposed to the doctrine: the rest were opposed, not to the doctrine, which they believed firmly, but to the definition of it; and this on the sole ground of the inexpediency, or, as it was termed, inopportuneness of that

definition. Mgr. Dupanloup, the Bishop of Orleans, was held up as one of the leading members of the French opposition, as he undoubtedly was. In a pastoral\* recently addressed by him to his clergy, he says: "In my letter of adhesion addressed to the Holy Father from Bordeaux, I reminded His Holiness that, if I had written and spoken against the opportuneness of the definition, as to the doctrine itself, I had always professed it, not only in my heart, but in my public writings." But whatever may be said on this point, one great fact is now clear to the whole world. The Bishops of the opposition, whether opposed to the definition itself or to the expediency of it, the Bishops of the whole Church, without even one solitary exception, have submitted to the definition. The lie, like the mark of Cain, is branded on the forehead of the liar. "The internal divisions which rent asunder the unity of the Roman Catholic system from its summit to its base," were but thin mists floating around the Holy Mountain. They have passed away: and from the summit to the base of that Mountain there is neither chasm nor mark of chasm. Through all the Church there is unity of faith—unity perfect and indestructible—as has been ever, as shall be ever, all days, even to the consummation of the world. Every day, from every clime, one glorious Credo arises to the throne of God, harmonious as the chant sent forth from all creation, in the first exulting dawn of its being, "when the morning stars praised Me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody."

Such was the Vatican Council from its commencement to the final absorption, so to speak, of its work into the Church's system. Let us now turn to a consideration of the work itself—always bearing in mind that that work is yet unfinished. We should have a most inadequate idea of the achievements of the Council of Trent if we formed a judgment only from its two first dogmatic decrees, important as these decrees are.

As the Council of Trent differed in many striking features from all the Councils that preceded it, so the Vatican Council differs in many striking features from the Council of Trent. Both were alike called into existence by the aggressions of the great Protestant heresy, or rather the enormous swarm of heresies comprised in the name of Protestantism; the earlier Council against Protestantism as it existed at that time; the later as it exists in our time. In an article in our number for

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\* A translation of which is given in extenso in the "Irish Ecclesiastical Record" for last August.

last January\* we noticed the two states of Protestantism; that of its earlier and chrysalis existence, and that of its latter and fully developed existence; that of its earlier and more definitely dogmatic life, that of its latter and thoroughly antidogmatic life; that of its earlier years, when it believed in a God and a revelation, and professed a religion or rather a multitude of religions; that of its latter years, when it has no form of religion, rejecting God and revelation altogether. But there was another development of Protestantism, which, as not coming within our scope, we did not notice in that article: and this was its influence on pretty large numbers of Catholics themselves. We do not mean that Protestantism continued for a time, after its rise, to lurk within the Church, as Arianism did. Even after the Council of Nice there were many Bishops, decided and obstinate Arians, who continued to hold their sees and to rule as Catholic Bishops.† There were even Arian Councils, and Councils mixed Arian and Catholics—as the Council of Nice itself was in a small degree.‡ Nothing of this kind happened at the period of the Reformation, either before or after the Council of Trent. Indeed, from the character and attitude which Protestantism assumed from the very outset, it could not have been so. The Arians, as far as they could, shuffled and parried, shirking a distinct and open profession of their heresy, veiling it under ambiguous formulas. The Protestants, at once and before the world, unfurled the standard of revolt, and proclaimed their “non serviam.” Arianism erred only in faith, and only in one dogma of the faith. Protestantism, as was observed in the article alluded to, rejected the whole foundation of the faith and nearly all the articles of the faith, and moreover rejected the whole liturgy, establishing a creed and form of worship, both entirely new.

The influence of Protestantism on Catholic minds has been exercised not in one way but in a variety of ways, and is to be referred not to any one law of our nature but to a variety of laws. We speak of secret, subtle, unsuspected influences. Hence we exclude the influence, for example, of argumentative works directly and professedly assailing the Catholic religion. Whoever takes to the reading of such works, without the proper motives and the proper precautions, does what he knows to be perilous to his soul, exposes himself freely to the dangerous occasion, and is already judged. But there is an influence

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\* Art. VI.: “The world turned Atheist,” &c.

† At the Council of Sardica, held twenty-two years after that of Nice, out of 380 Bishops there were nearly 80 Arian.

‡ Of the Bishops of the Council of Nice, at least 13 were Arian.

from mere literature, taking the word in its more restricted sense as comprising history, poetry, novels, and the like. There is an influence from books that treat of the Christian evidences or mental philosophy or metaphysics. There is an influence from frequent and close social intercourse with non-Catholics. There is an influence from maxims, constantly repeated in speeches, newspapers, and other periodicals, about civil and religious liberty, about secular education, about Church and State, &c. Catholics living under the pressure of persecuting laws, are exposed to the temptation of what is now called minimizing. Persons engaged in amicable discussion with Protestants, with a view to their conversion, are exposed to the same temptation: and a very serious temptation it sometimes is, as the result in certain cases has proved. The great mass of our Protestant literature is in tone and spirit thoroughly of this world. It takes no account of the eternity, beside which our whole present existence is but an instant of time, one pulse of the secondhand. Even in sermons and other writings of that kind, the narrow way, the everlasting fire, the difficulty of salvation—all such things are kept in the background. Extraordinary success, splendid achievements, great abilities—these and such like are the only objects of praise, the only idols of worship. With what a universal shout of derision has our Protestant press lately received the words of an English Catholic peer, “First Catholic, then Englishman!” Yet, what is this but the pithy expression of a principle of religion, which is self-evident to every Catholic, and should be evident to every one having any religion at all, to every one believing in a future life of rewards and punishment? What is it but saying, First the possession of the true faith, of the one sure way to the salvation of my soul: then, compared with that, to be English or French, to be rich or poor, to be prince or peasant, is of secondary importance?—as indeed it is, and of little importance—of no importance whatever. Of what importance was it to Cavour to have been Italian first, if he now dwell with everlasting burnings, to which his most wicked life, if unrepented of, has infallibly doomed him? Such is our Protestant literature. All these influences to which we have alluded, and others besides, have of their own nature a tendency to colour minds coming in contact with them: they teach by maxim, or seduce by example. Of course the Church herself remains, by virtue of the promise, untainted; or, rather, she displays her unflinching strength the more, in her conflict with error and sin. But neither individuals nor individual churches have the promise, and may be infected, as they have been.

It would occupy another article as long as the present, possibly two or three such articles, to give a satisfactory account of the taints which the Protestant influence has communicated to points of doctrine since the Council of Trent. Several of these doctrinal errors had been formally condemned in Papal Constitutions issued from time to time. Others had been left more or less untouched, and might have been held without any ecclesiastical censure up to the meeting of the Vatican Council. Confining ourselves to those errors which the Council has already condemned in its two existing constitutions, we proceed to place before our readers an account of its work. We may premise, however, that, besides condemning doctrines which had been previously reprobated by the great mass of eminent theologians, it has settled one or two points which had hitherto been moot questions, and discussed among them with perfect freedom.

*Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith.*—In the two first chapters and corresponding canons of this constitution, atheism, pantheism, and materialism are condemned, and the decree of the Council of Trent on the inspiration and canon of Scripture is renewed. On these points nothing need be said. But, besides this condemnation and renewal, there are some very noteworthy decisions contained in the second chapter. 1. In the first chapter is defined God's clear and certain knowledge of the future *free* acts of creatures. This, though held by theologians as revealed and *de fide*, had not been expressly defined in any previous Council.

Chapter II. *Of Revelation.*—2. It is defined "that God, the beginning and end of all things, can, by the natural light of human reason, be known *with certainty* from things created." It is well known to our theological readers that the opposite of this doctrine had been maintained in published writings by more than one Catholic philosopher in the present century, and that action was taken on the matter by Rome. As the authors are still living, and as they (not being men of "deeper views") yielded a sincere and loyal submission to the Roman decisions, we make no further comment.

3. It is defined that, though God can be thus known by the *natural* light of human reason, "yet it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal to mankind Himself and the eternal decrees of His will, in another and *supernatural* way."

4. It is defined that "to this revelation it is to be attributed that the divine truths which are accessible to human reason, can also, in the present state of the human race, be known by"

*all, without difficulty, with undoubting certainty, and without any admixture of error."*

5. It is defined that "it is not for this reason that revelation is to be called *absolutely* necessary, but because God, of his infinite goodness, has ordained man to a supernatural end."

This supernatural end is the enjoyment of God in the Beatific vision, a participation in God's own uncreated and infinite happiness for all eternity. This is an elevation to the attainment of which no creature whatever can, of its own nature, however excellent that nature may be, have any power or claim, or any disposition whatever. Divine grace and revelation, without which we cannot have faith, are absolutely necessary to elevate the creature and its works to a fitness for the supernatural end.

6. It is defined that the books of the Old and New Testament are held by the Church as sacred and canonical, (a) "not because, having been composed by mere human industry, they were afterwards approved by *her* authority; (b) nor *merely* because they contain revelation without any error."

The first member of this definition does not, as some have supposed, condemn, directly or indirectly, the third of the famous theses of Lessius and Hamel.\* For, what they held was that a book, though not written under inspiration, becomes Sacred Scripture, if the *Holy Ghost* should afterwards reveal that it contains no error. Whereas the Council speaks only of approval by the authority of the *Church*. What the Church approves of as true is infallibly true; but she does not *make* Sacred Scripture, she only *defines* what God has made so. It does not follow that God would not make a book Sacred Scripture by a similar approval. Then, observe, the thesis does not say that the book, originally uninspired, becomes *inspired*, but only says that it becomes *Sacred Scripture*. See below, n. 7, at the end.

7. It is defined that the books of the Old and New Testament are held by the Church to be sacred and canonical, "because, having been *written* by the *inspiration* of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and *as such* have been *delivered* to

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\* These theses, published in 1586, were as follows:—"1°. Ut aliquid sit Scriptura Sancta, non est necessarium singula ejus verba inspirata esse a Spiritu Sancto. 2°. Non est necessarium ut singulæ veritates et sententiæ sint immediate a Spiritu Sancto ipsi scriptori inspiratæ. 3°. Liber aliquis (qualis forte est secundus Machabæorum), humana industria sine adistentia Spiritus Sancti scriptus, si Spiritus Sanctus postea testetur nihil ibi esse falsum, efficitur Scriptura Sacra." The authors subsequently expunged the clause within parentheses. See Perrone de Locis, p. 2, n. 97, not., and Janssens, Hermeneutica Sacra, n. 30.



*the Church herself.*" In the hypothesis of Lessius and Hamel the book could not be said to be *written* by inspiration. Hence it would appear that their thesis is not in accordance with at least this clause of the definition. On the other hand, it may be said that the definition of the Council is not absolutely, and in respect of any and every hypothesis, exclusive; that she simply defines the actual ground on which the Church holds the aforesaid books to be sacred and canonical, without in any way touching on the question, whether a book might not be held as sacred and canonical on the other ground named in the thesis, if such ground existed in favour of any book. In reality, if God revealed of any book that it was free from all error, His authority would be just as much pledged for the truth of that book as for the truth of a book directly inspired by Him. We are of opinion, therefore, that the Council has left the aforesaid thesis quite unscathed.

8. As to the expunged clause of the thesis, affirming that the second book of Machabees is perhaps an example of the hypothesis—this is manifestly no longer tenable (if it ever had been). For the Council has most explicitly defined the books on the canon are held to be sacred and canonical, because *written* by inspiration. The book in question was therefore so written.

The Vatican definition of the ground on which the books of Scripture are held as sacred and canonical is, in substance and essence, the same as the Trent definition; but the former is by no means a mere repetition of the latter. The Trent definition simply affirms that they have God for their *Author*.\* The Vatican evolves this definition, and gives to it a greater precision, by (a) excluding the two grounds named in n. 6; (b) by expressly declaring that they have God for their author, *in as much as they were originally written under His inspiration*; and (c) that, as thus originally inspired, they were delivered to the Church. This we look on as a highly important addition.

Chapter III. *Of Faith*.—9. It is defined that the motive of faith is "the authority of God revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive." These two constitute the authority of God—His infinite wisdom, whereby He knows all things, and cannot be deceived; His infinite veracity, whereby He cannot speak otherwise than as He knows, and therefore cannot deceive.

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\* "Orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta [S. Synodus], omnes libros tam veteris quam novi testamenti, cum utriusque unus Deus sit *auctor*, necnon traditiones ipsas, &c. . . . pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur." Sess. 4.

On this point, now for the first time solemnly defined, theologians have been always, thus far, substantially agreed. A controversy has, however, existed among them as to whether the revelation itself forms a part of the motive of faith. Of course no one ever said that the sole authority of God in itself is sufficient. A revelation is evidently an essential condition for faith; hence the Council says "the authority of God revealing." The controversy is perhaps, to a great degree, verbal; but, in as much as the revelation, in itself and apart from the person revealing, has no weight whatever, it derives its whole moving force from being *God's* revelation.

10. It is defined (a) that, for the reasonableness of our faith, together with the interior helps of the Holy Spirit, God willed that there should be external proofs of the revelation, especially miracles and prophecies; and (b) that these proofs—miracles and prophecies—are most certain, and (c) suited to the understanding of all.

These definitions are opposed to errors that have been advanced, in different forms, in our own as in former times, some by infidel writers, some by Protestants, some, though rather obscurely, by Catholics.

11. It is defined that we are bound to believe, with divine and Catholic faith, not only those things which the Church, by her solemn definition, proposes to be believed as revealed, but also all that, "by her ordinary and universal teaching," she thus proposes.\*

A section of the Jansenists held that the solemn definition of a General Council was, at least in certain cases, necessary in order that the faithful should be bound to believe. The present definition is, however, not so important in reference to this manifest error, as in reference to certain productions of Catholic writers, chiefly in what is called popular controversial theology.

12. It is defined (a) that God has endowed His Church with clear notes (evidences) of her divine institution, so that she can be known by all as the guardian and teacher of revealed truth; (b) that to the Catholic Church alone belong all the divinely established motives [especially miracles and prophecies] of the evident credibility of the Christian faith; (c) that the Church, by herself [i. e. abstracting from the aforesaid evident motives of credibility], possesses a great and permanent motive of

\* The definition is, in form, new; but, of course, not so the doctrine affirmed in it:—"Aliquid potest constitui de fide per Universæ Ecclesiæ consensum, quando omnes fideles conspirant in aliquo dogmate firmiter credendo, cum quo unanimiti consensu non potest stare falsitas et deceptio: quia Deus assistit Ecclesiæ, ne tota decipiatur."—Lugo, de Fide, d. 1, n. 277.

credibility, and an indisputable witness of her own divine mission ; this motive and witness consisting in “ her wonderful propagation, her conspicuous sanctity, her exhaustless fruitfulness in all good things, her Catholic unity, her unconquerable stability.”

Observe, you have here enumerated the four great notes of the Church—Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, actual and potential (“*Catholicitas facti et juris*”), Apostolicity—the latter being included in the unconquerable stability.

13. For this reason, and also because God gives grace for perseverance in the faith, never deserting until deserted, it is defined that no one, having received the faith, can have a just cause (a) for changing it (b) or calling it in doubt (Can. iii. 6).

From this definition it follows that invincible ignorance can never be pleaded for apostasy from the faith.

Chapter IV. *Of Faith and Reason.*—14. It is defined that there is a twofold order of knowledge, each distinct from the other, not only in their principle [source from which the knowledge comes], but also in their object [the truth known]. (a) They are distinct in principle ; “ because in one we know by natural reason, in the other we know by divine faith.” (b) They are distinct in their object ; “ because, besides the truths which our natural reason is able to come to the knowledge of, there are other truths proposed to our belief, mysteries hidden in God, which we can know only through divine revelation.”

15. It is defined (a) “ that human reason, enlightened by faith, and seeking zealously, piously, and calmly, attains, by God’s grace, some, and that a most profitable, understanding of mysteries . . . , but (b) can never attain a perception of them, such as it may attain of the truths which constitute its own proper object.”

16. It is defined (a) that, though faith be above reason, there can never be any real opposition between them ; (b) and, as any such imaginary opposition arises, (i) either from the doctrines of faith being wrongly understood, (ii) or from holding false opinions as the dictates of reason ; it is defined (c) that, therefore, every assertion contrary to faith is utterly false.

17. It is moreover defined (a) that the Church, as guardian of the deposit of faith, has from God the right and the duty of condemning science falsely so called ; and (b) that, consequently, the faithful are absolutely bound to account as errors all such opinions as are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if condemned by the Church.

18. (a) Inasmuch as reason proves the foundations of faith, and, enlightened by it, cultivates theological science ; while

faith protects reason from error, and gives it manifold additional knowledge ; (b) it is defined that, therefore, not only no opposition can exist between faith and reason, but each gives support to the other.

A perfect illustration of this definition is furnished in the treatise "*de Deo ejusque attributis*," in almost every page of which reason and revelation, their exquisite harmony, the support given by each to the other, are displayed with marvellous precision and force and beauty. In no other theological treatise is exemplified more strikingly the true saying, that the study of scholastic theology, blended with dogmatic, tends very powerfully to lift up the mind to high and holy thoughts ; to draw it off from the things of earth and time, and pillow it on the bosom of the eternal serene. Of course the suitable dispositions are supposed, among which are mental aptitude, including a certain amount of imaginative faculty, and a keen relish for the study. To one who addresses himself to any study whatever, as a mere task, as a work to go through and have done with, that study, however in itself at once elevating and attractive, will be a mere burden, not elevating, perhaps depressing.

19. The Council moreover declares (a) that, in as much as the Church is neither ignorant of nor despises the benefits that men derive from human arts and sciences ; (b) nay, in as much as she acknowledges that, as they come from God, the Lord of all knowledge, so, if rightly used, they, His grace assisting, lead to Him ; (c) therefore, so far from opposing the cultivation of them, she, in many ways, aids and promotes it. (d) Nor does the Church forbid that these sciences should, each in its own sphere, make use of their own principles and their own method. (e) But, while recognising this rightful liberty, she carefully guards against (i) their imbibing errors, by opposing the divine teaching, (ii) or invading and disturbing the domain of faith, by transgressing their own limits.

These definitions constitute a complete body of Catholic doctrine on a subject that has become in our day of the highest importance—the proper provinces of Faith and Reason, together with the true and harmonious relations existing between them. The definitions are clear as they are complete.

20. At the close of the Canons corresponding with this Chapter, (a) it is defined that it is not enough to keep clear of heretical doctrine, but that those errors which approach more or less nearly to such doctrine are to be carefully avoided : (b) and the duty is declared of observing the Pontifical constitutions and decrees, in which such errors are condemned as are not expressly enumerated in the present Constitution of the Council.

*First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ.*—In the Introduction to the Chapters of this Constitution, the Council proposes to set forth the Catholic doctrine on (a) the *institution*, (b) the *perpetuity*, and (c) the *nature* or properties of the Apostolic Primacy. The definitions on the institution and perpetuity are given in the two first chapters, those on the properties occupy the third and fourth. Accordingly in Chapters I. and II. *Of the Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in Blessed Peter, and of the Perpetuity of the Primacy of Blessed Peter in the Roman Pontiffs*, it is defined, (21) in general terms, that the primacy, not of honour only, but of real and true jurisdiction over the universal Church was given by our Lord immediately and directly to S. Peter.

22. And that this same primacy is, by the same divine right, continued unceasingly to the successors of S. Peter, the Roman Pontiffs.

Chapter III. *Of the Power and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff.*—The nature and compass of the primacy of jurisdiction, thus defined in general terms, is in this chapter evolved and specified in detail. Accordingly it is defined (23) that this jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is ordinary and immediate.

24. And that all the members of the Church, pastors and people, individually and collectively, are bound in obedience to it, (a) not only in matters of faith and morals, (b) but also in whatever appertains to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the whole world.

For our non-theological readers it may be necessary to offer a few words of explanation on the phrases "ordinary jurisdiction" and "immediate jurisdiction." The meaning of these phrases will be best understood by briefly stating the two errors to which they are opposed. Several Gallican theologians formerly held that the Pope, though having jurisdiction in the whole Church and in every part of it, could not exercise this jurisdiction in the dioceses of other Bishops against their will, unless in some extraordinary case, as in that of urgent necessity; that, except in such case, he could not, for example, go into the diocese of another Bishop, and there, without reference to him, proceed to ordain priests, appoint to parishes, enact laws, &c.; that, in short, his jurisdiction, out of his own diocese of Rome, is *mediate* and not immediate. Of course the Pope never has interfered and never will interfere in the common every-day functions of Bishops, unless for some reasonable cause. But the full and strict right to act so and so is one thing; the prudent and salutary use of that right (of which the Pope is sole supreme judge) is quite another thing.

The Jansenists went much farther, and maintained a far more pernicious heresy, a heresy subverting the Church from her very foundation. They held that the whole ecclesiastical jurisdiction was given by Christ to the body of the faithful, and by them communicated to the pastors of the Church and to the Roman Pontiff himself; and that, consequently, the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is *delegated* and not ordinary—not attached permanently and by divine right to his office. This error had been repeatedly condemned by the Popes, especially by Pius VI. in the bull “*Auctorem fidei*,” issued against the synod of Pistoia, prop. 2 and 3.

25. It is defined (a) that, in virtue of this supreme jurisdiction over the universal Church, the Roman Pontiff has the right of free communication with the pastors of the whole Church and with their flocks, in teaching and ruling them in the way of salvation. As a consequence (b) the doctrine is condemned which affirms (i.) that this communication can be lawfully impeded, (ii.) or that acts done by the Apostolic See, or by its authority, require for their validity any sanction of the secular power.

26. As a further evolution of the supreme jurisdiction, it is defined (a) that the Roman Pontiff is the *supreme* judge of the faithful; (b) that, in all causes that come under ecclesiastical adjudication, recourse may be had to his judgment; (c) and that, as there is no authority higher than his, his decision cannot be overhauled or judged by any one. (d) Wherefore, the opinion is condemned which asserts the lawfulness of an appeal from his decisions to an ecumenical Council, as to a higher authority.

Chapter IV. *Of the Infallible Teaching of the Roman Pontiff.*—This definition, so long longed for, is given in words of as much clearness and precision as human language is capable of. It shuts out every possible evasion. The sacred doctrine is enshrined in an adamantine tabernacle, which no spear of man or devil can ever penetrate to the end of time.

27. (a) It is defined, (i.) as a revealed dogma, (ii.) that the Roman Pontiff, when speaking *ex cathedrâ*, that is, when, as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, defines any doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, (iii.) is endowed with the same infallibility with which our divine Redeemer endowed His Church in defining any doctrine on faith or morals; (b) and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.

Observe, the doctrine is defined as *revealed* : it is therefore strictly *de fide Catholicâ*, an article of Catholic faith ; and the opposite is absolutely heretical. He, therefore, who openly denies this definition is by the very fact cut off from the Church, and ceases to be a Catholic even outwardly and in name.

Such is the work achieved by the Vatican Council in only two sessions. The Council of Trent, whose dogmatic teachings embrace a wider field than those of all the preceding general Councils taken together, defined, after all, not much beyond what had been previously in substance the manifest faith of the Church. In the first Constitution of the Vatican Council doctrines are defined, which, as we have seen, might have been called in question, and were called in question by writers, in other respects thoroughly sound, and in all respects thoroughly and loyally Catholic in heart. But it is the third and fourth chapters of the second Constitution which constitute a monument of the special glory of the Vatican Council above all preceding Councils. We say the special glory ; for we believe that the body of definitions contained in those two chapters are calculated to contribute to the increased and more perfect consolidation of the *internal* peace, to say nothing of the visible unity of the Church, more than all the dogmatic definitions of all the other Councils together. Every one acquainted with the history of theological science for the last two hundred years, knows well the extent of disturbing and embarrassing influence which the Gallican doctrines, both moderate and extreme, on the Church, exercised in certain quarters of Christendom. It is true that, if you take the whole body of the faithful, lay and ecclesiastical, the number imbued with those doctrines was, at least comparatively, very insignificant. It is true that, among really great and learned theologians outside France, those doctrines had not, as far as we can now call to memory, a single defender. But there they were. The open enemies of the Church made a bad use of them : bad Catholics made a worse use of them ; but the worst use of all was made by bad governments calling themselves Catholic. Pius VI. in his celebrated bull (" *Super solidate* ") condemning Eybel (the Quirinus of his day) assigns, as one of the reasons of his delay in issuing the condemnation, a certain feeling of delicacy, as if he should have seemed to act on personal considerations. Something of this kind, no doubt with other good reasons, seems to have restrained the Holy See from long since issuing a solemn condemnation of the Gallican errors. And it is not a little remarkable that in the " *Schemata* " submitted, by order of the Holy Father, to the

Bishops of the Vatican Council, no mention whatever is made of the papal infallibility. The Council resolutely took the work into its own hands; and bravely and well has it done that work—sweeping with a single stroke the whole Gallican nuisance and every vestige of it clear and clean out of the Church, never more to reappear, except as a convict before her tribunal, with the indelible anathema branded on its forehead.

And now, in closing this long article, out of much that we have still to say but cannot say, we select one observation—an observation that would have come in with more propriety before the definition of the papal infallibility, but which even now may be not altogether useless. Against that definition it *had* been objected, on the sole ground of expediency, that, while it might drive some out of the Church, as being too heavy a burden and strain upon their faith, it might or certainly would prevent some, already on their way to the Church, from entering it.

As to the first difficulty, we have but one word to say. We see now the actual result, the actual extent of the apprehended or threatened evil. We see the miserable rag-fair of apostates, we see whom they have from the ranks of old Protestantism as their patrons and associates: and, while we sincerely deplore the awful ruin they are bringing down upon their own souls, we say of men who had been so minded, that their loss is to themselves a loss, but a gain to the Church, in which while they remained they were working much mischief, they can now no longer work. Their faith was burdened, solely because it was not a true faith. "They went out from us, but they were not of us. For, if they had been of us, they would no doubt have remained with us."

As to the second difficulty, we are quite out of the way of judging of the statement of fact. But, supposing the statement to be perfectly true, we say that, putting aside the line of action which the double duties of charity and truth prescribe to private individuals engaged in the conversion of non-Catholics, the Church is our mother, and her first her great duty is towards us her children; she is our shepherdess, and her first her great duty is towards us her flock. Most longingly she yearns for those who are not her children, that they may become so,—for those who are outside her fold, that they may enter it; most fervently she prays for this, most laboriously she works for it. But she cannot withhold a new and invigorating bread of life from those who are of her household, because those who are outside, approaching to her, turn from her in loathing of the manna. If the Council was firmly persuaded, as no doubt it was, that the definition would do much



and manifold good through the whole Church, it was no just reason for abstaining from that definition, because some not of the Church would make it a scandal to themselves, and remain in their darkness. The light that was to illumine the eyes and gladden the hearts of two hundred millions of Catholics should not be barred out from them, because two hundred or two thousand or two hundred thousand of non-Catholics would allege that its effulgence was too strong for their weaker organs of vision, and so turn away from it. This is the true principle. That the expectation of the result is being every day, from the day of the definition, more and more fully realized, the blind can see, and the deaf can hear. We behold as yet only the beginning, the early spring, whose full harvest may not come for another generation, or for a generation after that. Cavour is gone to his own place, Bismarck in the appointed hour will go there too, and Quirinus and Janus and the rest of them. Meantime the work of God, which they have so laboured to demolish, flourishes with growing strength and beauty of holiness. Upwards of six years ago the writer of this article ventured to predict, in a certain publication of his, that, if a general Council should ever again meet, and, if the question of papal infallibility were mooted in it, that infallibility would undoubtedly be defined. Little did he then dream that he should live to see that day: "he saw it, and was glad"—*Vidit, et gavisus est.\**

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\* The following extract, coming as it does from the pen of a decided Protestant, will, we think, prove interesting to our readers. We found it in a small and neat volume, "A brief Memoir of Pius IX.," recently published in Dublin, by M'Glashan & Gill. It is taken from a work of the celebrated German author Schiller, entitled "A Universal and Historical Review of the most remarkable affairs of State in the time of the Emperor Frederick the First." It may be found, the translator informs us, in page 39 of the eleventh volume of his collected works, published in Leipzig in the year 1838. It was first printed about the year 1790:—

"By such traits may be recognised the spirit which gives light to the Roman Court, and the unwavering firmness of the principles which each Pope, leaving all personal feelings in the background, finds himself forced to assume. Emperors and kings, enlightened statesmen and unbending warriors, are seen, under the pressure of circumstances, to sacrifice their rights, to become faithless to their principles, to yield to necessity: but such things were seldom or never witnessed in a Pope. Even when he wandered about in poverty, possessed not a single foot of land, nor a soul devoted to him in all Italy, and had to live on the charity of strangers, he held firmly to the rights of his See and of his Church. Whilst every other political community suffered, or still suffers, at certain times, on account of the personal qualities of those to whom their governments are entrusted, such was scarcely ever the case with regard to the Church and her Head. As dissimilar as the Popes may have been in their temperaments, ways of thinking, and abilities, so, in as great a degree, were they firm, alike, and unchangeable in their policy.

It was only after the preceding article had been sent to press that the English translation of Dr. Döllinger's Lectures on the reunion of the Churches\* reached us. More than ten years ago a certain theologian, in a published work of his, thus wrote of the German professor in reference to an outrageous panegyric passed on him in an English Review:—"Many entertain a high respect for that excellent person, Dr. Döllinger (who has deserved so well of the Catholic Church), but as a historical writer, by no means as a theologian. There is no evidence, as far as I know, that he is a learned theologian." When these words were written, the seeds of unsound doctrine had hardly begun to bud out of Dr. Döllinger's mind. Since then they have been growing more and more to maturity; until, in the volume before us, we have open and undisguised heresy in full bloom. Whatever may be said of his acquaintance with Protestant theology, his latter productions give the clearest and most unmistakable proofs, not only of his not being a learned Catholic theologian, but of his gross ignorance of Catholic theology, ignorance of its very elements. The spirit and tone of the Lectures so closely resemble the spirit and tone of Quirinus, including the furious malignity against the Jesuits; master and pupil are so much of one heart and one tongue; that to enter into any lengthened criticism of the former would be little else than to present our readers with a rehash of our strictures on the latter. To do this would be, we are persuaded, as tiresome for others to read as for us to write. We will, therefore, confine ourselves to a few loose notes.

In pages 2, 3, and elsewhere, Dr. D. speaks of the Catholic, the Greek Schismatic, and the Protestant Churches as forming parts, though separated and disunited parts, of one Church,—of "*the Church.*" He speaks of the "*Greek Catholic or Eastern Church*" as "separated from the *Roman Catholic or Western Church.*" By the former he means, of course, the Greek schismatics, who themselves have taken the title of "*Orthodox*" (as Dr. D. himself states), not having dared to take that of

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Their temperaments, ways of thinking, and abilities did not appear to have penetrated in the least into their office. Their personality, it may be said, melted into their dignity, and passion became extinguished beneath the triple crown. Although the chain of succession to the throne of Peter was broken with each departing Pope, and riveted again on the advent of his successor; although no throne in the world changed so often its occupant, or was assumed and resigned in so stormy a manner; yet this, however, was the only throne in the Christian world which appeared never to change its possessor. For the Popes alone died—the spirit which animated them was immortal."

\* "Lectures on the Reunion of the Churches." By John J. I. von Döllinger, D.D., &c. Translated with a Preface by H. N. Oxenham, M.A. London, 1872.

Catholic, as having well known that the title would not cling to them. We venture to doubt if even the christening hand of the great scientific historian will impart to it a new adhesive force. Seriously speaking, what a miserable figure this old man, once so honoured, makes in this dress of new Protestantism, or rather in these threadbare rags of a decayed Tractarianism.

In page 9 he takes up the Protestant doctrine of fundamentals and non-fundamentals, or, as it is now more commonly phrased, of essentials and non-essentials,—a doctrine than which, as opening the door for all kinds of error, none other in the whole body of Protestant theology is more dangerous. “The division of the two great ancient Churches of East and West is, or rather was, *unmeaning*, because of their *essential* unity of doctrine; now, on the other hand, since July 18, 1870, it is different.” Are the Catholic dogmas of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son and of the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff unessential, and the division on them unmeaning?

On the theological literature of Germany the Scientific thus delivers solemn judgment:—“In theology the disproportion is so great that the Protestant theology is at least six times richer than the Catholic in quantity and *quality*.” As to mere quantity, the statement, whether true or not, proves nothing. There are some books that deserve to be enshrined in gold, but there are millions of volumes fit only for waste-paper, fit only for lining trunks and lighting fires. A morsel of bread is, for human food, worth a ton weight of rotten fruit. As to quality, out of much that we have to say we can only make room for one brief observation. We should like to have from Dr. D. a definite answer to the two following questions:—What does he mean by theology? What does he mean by a good or bad, a rich or poor, quality of theology? In reference to the first question, we infer,\* from numerous and clear statements and allusions in his writings, that by theology he simply means a particular department of ecclesiastical history. From the same sources we infer, in reference to the second question, that a theology of rich quality would be a theology written on this plan, especially if written in the German language, and carrying out his own or other kindred doctrinal views. A work so

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\* But we are not left to inference. The accomplished translator of Dr. Döllinger's work on “The Church and the Churches” (London, 1862) says, in the Biographical Preface (p. vii), that he, “having ceded for some years his professorship of ecclesiastical history to Möhler, . . . took that of dogmatic theology, which in his hands was *transformed into a history of revelation* and of the development of doctrine.” Möhler died in 1838; so that of the end we now see, the beginning must have commenced upwards of thirty-five years ago.

written could with no more justice be called a treatise of theology than Lord Campbell's "Lives of the Chancellors" could be called a treatise of equity. Dr. D. never alludes to any of our true and great theologians, except to sneer at them. We doubt if he ever read two pages of S. Thomas or of Suarez. We doubt if he ever read a single line even of his own Germans, Tanner, Laymann, &c. &c.

In page 99 he ascribes to Catholic theologians "the doctrine that fear alone, without love of God, is sufficient for the remission of sins." No Catholic theologian ever held this doctrine. All Catholic theologians hold that the fear of God, springing from His grace, is good and holy and salutary, and, as the Scriptures expressly teach, the beginning of the love of God. All Catholic theologians hold that this fear, without the love of God, is insufficient for the remission of sins. A host of our greatest theologians\* hold that a *sincere sorrow* for past sin, based on this fear, together with a *sincere resolution* to sin no more, is a sufficient disposition for receiving the remission of sin, in the sacrament of Penance, through the absolution of the priest. Are we addressing ourselves to a theologian, or simply explaining a lesson in the Catechism to a little child?

We are heartily sick of this. We will give but one more instance of the thoroughly Protestant spirit and incredibly gross ignorance with which this wretched production swarms. In pages 63-4 he says that "Leo X.'s Bull against Luther condemned as errors such *universally familiar truths* as that the best penance is reformation of life," &c. Is it possible that Dr. D. has been up to this day ignorant of a principle for interpreting Papal theological censures, known to every merest theological tyro? The principle is this. Unless the contrary be intimated, propositions, selected for censure out of any writer, are condemned in the sense of the writer (*in sensu ab auctore intento*), that is, in the sense which they bear viewed in the light of the context, and according to the ordinary rules of interpreting human speech. A proposition, which in a Catholic work would be perfectly unobjectionable, might in a heterodox work be used to convey downright heresy. Words and phrases which, before the rise of particular heresies, were quite sound, became afterwards suspected and censurable, and could not be used at all by Catholic writers, or used only in a context which clearly indicated their Catholic meaning. We could give examples without end. We have one in the words quoted from Dr. D. in the second paragraph of this present

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\* Gormaz, in his *Cursus Theologicus*, published in 1707 (de Pœnitentia, n. 444, et seqq.), quotes upwards of one hundred and thirty theologians in favour of this opinion. How many might be added to the number since that date!

postscript. The phrase "Roman Catholic Church" is in itself perfectly orthodox, and is in common use among us. But in the passage referred to it is used to convey a meaning purely heretical, namely, that that Church is but a part (a branch, as the Tractarians used to say) of the Catholic Church, of which the Greek schismatics form another part.

Now Luther's proposition, that the best penance is reformation of life, might (at least if it had not been tainted by his use of it) be uttered by a Catholic without the least offence. For on Catholic lips it would simply mean that reformation of life is better, as it is incomparably better, than the mere performance of penitential works without such reform; or that, as all our theologians teach,\* priests in imposing penance should principally consider what will best conduce to the future amendment of their penitents. But Luther meant something entirely different from this, namely, that a reformation of life is *alone* necessary, and that there is *no* use in penance: as the Council of Trent so well explains it (*ibid.*, at the end of the chapter):—"They [the innovators] in such wise maintain a new life to be the best penance, as to take away the entire efficacy and use of satisfaction."

One word more and we have done. Towards the close of the seventh and last lecture, the Scientific thus delivers himself:—"I have found it the almost universal conviction in foreign countries, that it is the special mission of Germany to take the lead in this world-wide question [the fusion of the Catholic, Greek schismatic, and Protestant Churches into one], and give to the movement its form, measure, and direction. *We are the heart of Europe, richer in theologians than all other lands,*" &c.

This beats, and beats hollow, Hannibal Chollop's speech to Mark Tapley:—"We are a model to the airth. . . . We are the intellect and virtue of the airth, the cream of human natur', and the flower of moral force."

Strange, inexplicably strange, it is, that our German Chollop, in the very next page but one after that from which the above extract is taken, proclaims that those same Germans have yet a conquest to make more difficult to win than their recent victory over France, and which he tells is nothing less than "the conquest of ourselves, our indolence, our *pride*, our selfishness, our prejudices, our *easy self-conceit*." We did not think the Germans were quite so bad as all that. Perhaps the great man uses the plural form in the singular sense, as Popes and Kings say *we* and *us* for *I* and *me*. If so, we assent heartily.

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\* And as the Council of Trent (sess. 14, c. 8) clearly implies:—"Let them [priests] have in view that the satisfaction which they impose be *not only* for the preservation of a new life and a medicine of infirmity, but also for the avenging and punishing of past sins."—Waterworth's Translation.

NOTE TO THE THIRD ARTICLE OF OUR LAST  
NUMBER.

**I**N a note to p. 344 of our last number we ascribed to Mr. Allies the opinion, that Dr. Döllinger "has destroyed by one act of intense pride and overweening self-sufficiency the glory of so many years spent as a defender and champion of the Church." And in opposition to this we expressed our own humble view, that "long before the Vatican Council, Dr. Döllinger had forfeited all claim to be accounted a defender and champion of the Church." Mr. Allies however entirely disclaims the opinion with which we credited him. He writes to us as follows :

In the note of the DUBLIN REVIEW, p. 344, there is what I cannot but think a strange misconception of my meaning, in a passage in which I speak of Döllinger. I had said (and please observe the words I underline), "*A schism, having been for years brooded over, fostered by secret and unavowed writings, and by tampering with bad Catholics and ill-conditioned statesmen throughout the world, is at length hatched into a rickety existence by the most unhappy of priests, whose life has been prolonged beyond the age of seventy to destroy by this act of intense pride and overweening self-sufficiency the glory of so many years spent as a defender and champion of the Church.*" The expression "*this*" refers to *all* the antecedent sentence, in which I had in my mind Janus and other proceedings before that publication ; and of this whole complex act I say that it had destroyed the glory of so many years spent as a defender and champion of the Church—that is, of course, years which had passed before this act began. Thus my sentence exactly expresses what the writer of the note says constitutes the only point of difference which he feels with my speech. It expresses, that is, in so many words, that "long before the Vatican Council Dr. Döllinger had forfeited all claim to be accounted a defender and champion of the Church."

We have to express our sincere regret for having inadvertently misapprehended Mr. Allies' meaning ; and at the same time our great gratification, in having so valuable a corroboration of our own view on Dr. Döllinger's past position.

## Notices of Books.

*Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects.* By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. Third vol. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1873.

**A**NOTHER welcome volume of His Grace the Archbishop's Sermons, seven of which were preached on Rosary Sundays between the years 1866 and 1872, and all of which are more or less connected with the cause of the Holy Father. Amongst the many services which the Archbishop has rendered to the Church of God during his Episcopate, none will be remembered with greater gratitude by future generations than the untiring zeal with which, in season and out of season, he has pleaded the spiritual and temporal prerogatives of the Vicar of Christ; and although, always, as he himself tells us (Sermon viii. p. 189), turning with reluctance to any other matter than those divine and interior truths which are necessary to salvation, has borne witness "for the truth on the great laws and facts which affect the course and conduct of this world." Great, indeed, is the advantage, not only to England, but to the Church at large, that he has done so; for nothing can well be more important at the present day than that Catholics should be taught to see how, in all and each of the disheartening and trying events, as well as in the glories which have marked the Pontificate of Pius IX., the finger of God is upholding His Church, and preparing the way for her future triumph. The glories of the Holy Father's marvellous Pontificate speak for themselves, but we are all of us too ready to be discouraged when cross upon cross, and evil upon evil, and betrayal upon betrayal surround his path. If, then, our hearts are still brimful of hope and courage—for of course our faith as Catholics has been never shaken—it is chiefly to men like our Archbishop, and to himself in a very especial degree, that this is due; for as cloud after cloud has obscured the sky, and the prospects of the world have grown darker and darker, the Archbishop has never ceased to keep our eyes fixed upon the Divine promises made to the vicar of Christ in the person of St. Peter, and to the special Providence which is guiding his feet at every step, amidst the revolutions and convulsions of the world. There are few, it has always seemed to us, even among the leaders of the Church in our day, who have grasped so firmly the *whole* counsel of God as manifested in the Incarnation of His Son, or who have laid hold with so strong a grip on the rock of Peter as the Archbishop of Westminster. Hence it is that he is able to point out to his flock in so admirable and luminous a manner the guiding and protecting finger of God in every new vicissitude through which He permits the mystical

Body of His Son to pass, and to furnish to the world, which can see for the latter nothing but ruin and destruction, even new arguments, that Divine in its origin, and upheld by an Almighty Hand, the Holy Roman Church is indeed that kingdom of which it has been foretold, that of it "there shall be no end."

No one can read these Sermons, and especially the "Introduction" to the present volume, without recognising the truth of these remarks. The dethronement of God in His own world, the rejection of His Christ by the Governments of the earth, the Holy City of Rome, the city of the Incarnation and of the Blessed Sacrament of Mary, "redeemed" from God, and brought again into the bondage of corruption, and into subjection to the prince of this world, the seemingly universal triumph of the spirit of lawlessness, which will one day culminate in the person of the great Antichrist—the persecution of the bishops and religious orders, both in Italy and in the new German Empire, and—most hateful of all—the "perils by false brethren," in parts of Germany, supported, as in the latter by the civil power, for of themselves they are powerless. All these are shown to us as trials indeed, great and searching, but yet as so many stepping-stones, as it were, to the shore of the Church's everlasting rest.

"Look round the Christian world: the best is in schism; its churches are mosques; the Incarnation has departed from them. Look at the north and north-west of Europe: Protestantism has done its work in beating its fragmentary Christianity as fine as the dust of the summer threshing-floor, and the winds of the revolution are carrying it away. Wheresoever Protestantism has been the old Catholic churches are desolate. The Word made flesh is no longer there. The anti-social and anti-Christian revolution has descended upon Italy, submerged the whole Peninsula, and flooded Rome at last. The Incarnation has no longer a home in the Christian world. The Vicar of Jesus Christ is bid to go forth, because for two sovereignties to co-exist in Rome is impossible. The nations look on and applaud. They are all, either by active co-operation as in Germany, or by tacit connivance as in England, *participes criminis*. One and all alike say, 'We will not have this man to rule over us!' 'We have no king but Cæsar.' It would seem that the 'discessio,' or the falling away foretold by the apostle, is not far from its accomplishment. We are indeed entering upon perilous times; but we enter upon them with no fear. 'When these things begin to come to pass, look up and lift up your heads; for your redemption is at hand.' No Catholic doubts of the final and complete overthrow of the powers now in array against the Vicar of our Lord. They are more lordly, more imperious, and to human force more irresistible than ever before. But they have entered the lists, not against man, but against God. If we have to suffer, so be it. God's holy will be done! May He only make us fit for so high a grace, and hasten to the redemption of His Church in His own good time!" (pp. cvii. cviii.)

The "introduction" is particularly valuable for the light thrown upon the so-called "Old Catholic" schism in Germany, Prince Hohenlohe's note to the Governments of Europe, the text of which had apparently never previously been made public, is given in full, and the true source of the movement not only pointed out, but named:—

"The source of this opposition, then, was Munich. The chief agent



beyond all doubt was one who in his earlier days had been greatly venerated in Germany and in England. Truth compels me to ascribe to Dr. Döllinger the initiative in this deplorable attempt to coerce the Holy See, and to overbear the liberty of the bishops assembled in Council. Prince Hohenlohe is assuredly no theologian. The documents published by him came from another mind and hand" (p. xxxiii.).

Speaking of the persecution of the religious orders in Germany, the Archbishop says :—

"The attack upon the Jesuits and kindred orders, therefore, is a transparent feint. The real attack is upon the Church. The pretence of distinguishing between Ultramontanism and Catholicism is too stale to deceive any Catholic. The Holy See is Ultramontane, the Vatican Council was Ultramontane, the whole priesthood, the whole body of the faithful throughout all nations, excepting only a handful here and there of rationalistic or liberal Catholics, all are Ultramontanes. Ultramontanism is Popery, and Popery is Catholicism. Even English Catholics are not to be caught with such chaff. They do not believe in a Catholic who says that he does not believe in the Infallibility of the Pope. They know that this was explicitly or implicitly contained and affirmed in the Supremacy of the Pope for which our martyrs died. They know that their fathers persecuted ours for this, which they call Popery. There is no Catholicism to attack except Ultramontanism, and it is Catholicism that is attacked now : witness the exclusion of the clergy from the schools ; the mal-treatment of the Bishop of Ermland, and of Mgr. Namgonowski ; and, finally, the official threats of laws now preparing to regulate the Catholic Church in Germany" (pp. li., lii.).

Clearly, then, as His Grace had previously pointed out, it was the hand of God that gathered together the Fathers of the Vatican Council at the eventful moment of their meeting :—

"The Council of the Vatican was not convened an hour too soon. If the Gnosticism of what has well been called the Professordom of Germany had been allowed to spread its mixture of conceited illusionism and contemptuous rationalism for a few years longer, the faith of multitudes might have been irremediably lost ; and Germany, which now presents the noblest fidelity and constancy in its Episcopate, in its priesthood and in its laity, might have been a prey to the old Catholic schism, or to the tyrannical liberation of those who deify the civil power" (pp. xxxix., xl.).

Here is a striking passage in connection with the civil principedom of the Pope from the sixth Sermon :—

"Men will not believe that under temporal forms and accidents lie concealed and guarded the highest moral laws. They denounce St. Thomas of Canterbury because he resisted King Henry II. in matters of Church lands and manors, and tribunals and appeals. They accuse him of pride, worldliness, and avarice. But St. Thomas saw an intention that under these things lay faith, morals, and the divine authority of the Church, and that in these all was at stake. He won his contest by the shedding of his blood, and he saved these things for the English people for more than three hundred years. The usurpations of Henry II. triumphed in Henry VIII., whom Thomas Cranmer served and flattered, when he ought to have withstood. The instincts of St. Thomas are proved to be unerring by the spiritual and moral state of England now. The poor have been disinherited of their spiritual patrimony ; and the civil power, with its laws, has departed century by century farther from the unity of the Christian Church and faith ; but these

things men will not hear from our lips, They have been spoken of lately by one from whom I am sorry to be widely parted, but for whose fearless zeal I have a true respect. He has described the state of London as he sees it, and as we know it to be ; and London of to-day is the legitimate fruit of civilization without Christianity. This is the work of the same anti-social, anti-Christian spirit which is now exulting over what it believes to be the downfall of the temporal power of the Vicar of Jesus Christ" (pp. 145, 146).

To our own mind one of the most striking sermons is the tenth, on the "Divine Commonwealth." It is exceedingly simple, being nothing more than a contrast between the Commonwealth without God and Christ as we see it at the present day, and both the Jewish Commonwealth, in which the constitution was given by God Himself, and the Christian Commonwealth, animated by the spirit of the Gospel. Alas ! the rulers of the world have forgotten that God still sitteth as King for ever, and that the sword which they bear is not their own, but has only been lent them for a little time, and this, too, only to execute justice and mercy in His name, and that the day will surely come, sooner or later, when he will take back into His own hands the power which He has given them, and show Himself as "King over the whole earth." The inhabitants of our own day may erect monuments to "Rome redeemed from the Theocratic government" of the Vicar of Christ ; but as long as His Kingship is rejected, so long will the peoples of the earth, like the Jews of old, who refused to have God for their King, and who asked for an earthly King to lead them to battle, even as other nations continue to be ground down under such bondage and tyranny as must in the end lead to their own utter ruin. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there alone is liberty.

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*Address delivered at the Liverpool Collegiate Institution Dec 21, 1872. By Right. Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. London: Murray.*

THE earlier parts of this Address, however forcible and interesting, are altogether subordinate (both in themselves and in the speaker's manifest intention) to his criticism of Dr. Strauss's new work, and of modern unbelief. And by this straightforward and unflinching criticism, Mr. Gladstone shows to his very great honour that the bearing testimony to religious truth is with him a more influential motive, than is even the keeping together that political party, which gives him his high worldly position.

His expression of firm belief in Christianity has apparently stung almost to madness one writer in the "Pall Mall Gazette." The position at once assumed by that periodical was, that if Mr. Gladstone did not profess to refute Dr. Strauss in detail, he ought to have held his tongue altogether. This is really charming. Hardly a week passes, that our irreligious contemporary does not state or imply as an indubitable fact, that the great majority of profound thinkers are rapidly surrendering all belief in a Personal God. Does he ordinarily accompany such statements with *arguments*,

against Christianity and Theism? Of course not. He knows very well that they are unnecessary for his purpose; he knows very well that a vast majority of his readers are far more impressed by this kind of confident statement, than they would be by any argument he could produce. It becomes then a matter of vital importance; that the real nature of such allegations should be understood, and every one who possesses a character for intellectual power, does important service by the mere fact of energetically declaring his religious belief. Much more does one of Mr. Gladstone's great name deserve our warmest gratitude for such emphatic declaration; and it is abundantly possible that he may have made several individuals pause in a course of thought which, if unchecked, would have issued in shipwreck of their salvation.

We heartily recommend this Address to our readers' perusal. We would only protest against one sentence in the Introduction, which advocates the "duty of personal respect" (p 8) towards assailants of religion. We entirely agree, that religious controversialists injure their sacred cause, by assailing their opponents with invective and with the imputation of this or that definite evil motive. But no Catholic can admit, that disbelief in a Personal God is possible to any human adult of sound mind, without that grave moral culpability which, if unrepented, will be justly requited by eternal punishment. He may not therefore of course express himself in any way inconsistent with his conviction on this head; he may not speak, as Mr. Gladstone speaks (p. 8), of the pantheists' "*honest* self-delusion."

The Catholics of this Empire in general look to Mr. Gladstone as their main hope, for a legislation which shall treat them with justice and equality. It must greatly strengthen their confidence in him to observe that, Protestant though he be, he holds so much religious belief, and so firmly, in common with themselves.

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*My Clerical Friends, and their Relations to Modern Thought.*

London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1873.

**T**HIS is a most striking work, ably conceived and brilliantly carried out. Under the title "*My Clerical Friends*" the author most effectively contrasts, more especially in their teaching and in their relations to modern thought, the clergy of the Church of England with that other clergy, scattered throughout the world, of every nation and people and kindred and tongue, the members of which have been called by a Divine vocation to share in His everlasting Priesthood, Who is a "Priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech." The whole work is so skilfully constructed, that although here and there a digression may be somewhat too long, the reader is enabled step by step to observe and carefully examine on the one hand, the merely human origin and elements—not to speak of the assistance lent to them by the powers of darkness—and the illogical teaching, of an institution which in vain calls itself a Church; and, on the other hand, the Divine origin, super-

natural constitution, and marvellous unity of the teaching of the Church of the living God : until at the end the reader, unless perchance he has eyes that see not, is found to fall down upon his knees, and adore before the latter, with the cry upon his lips, "This is none other but the house of God and the gate of heaven." The work may be compared to a long street in some great capital, upon one side of which the traveller, as he passes along, finds glorious buildings of sublime architecture, and perfect proportions, and exquisite beauty, and on the other, nothing but rude huts and broken-down cabins ; until at the end of the street he finds himself standing face to face with the palace of the king, and recognizes at once that the mind of the same architect must have conceived both the royal palace and the stately buildings which on one side lead up to it, and that the wretched hovels on the other are but the poor contrivances of suffering humanity to give shelter to the famine-stricken, the diseased, and the homeless. The book no doubt has its imperfections, as we shall afterwards see ; but its general effect is so overpowering, that we cannot conceive how any, except the wilfully blind, can resist its conclusions. That it will embitter not a few readers—more, however, from the language, which is always racy, and sometimes caustic in the extreme—we have also but little doubt ; but when the first feeling of bitterness is over, and the book is taken up a second time—and it will be taken up *many* times,—we feel sure that every honest mind will acknowledge the cogency of the author's arguments, and the remarkable ability with which they are maintained from first to last.

The author has divided his subject into four chapters or parts ; viz., "the Vocation of the Clergy," "the Clergy at Home," "the Clergy Abroad," and "the Clergy and Modern Thought."

The first chapter proves most conclusively that the Church of England has never, as a Church, had the least idea of an altar, a sacrifice, or a priesthood. Thus the founders of that Church, we are told, who are certainly competent witnesses as to *their own* religious opinions, detested the very thought of such things, "and would have destroyed even that semblance of an hierarchy which they have preserved, if the Tudor sovereigns would have suffered them to do so." (p. 11.) No wonder then that our modern Ritualists should fling such ill-sounding names at the heads of the first Reformers, as those of "apostates, traitors, perjurers, robbers, villains." No wonder that Mr. Baring Gould should call the Reformation itself "a miserable apostasy," or that the "Union Review" should consider Barlow and Scory as "rascals," capable of any profanity, "even of going through a mock ceremony of consecration." Still, not all this current of abuse, can prevent the founders of the Church of England from being witnesses as to what they themselves held, or meant to bring about in their new Church (p. 12).

They not only avowed their intention to root out and abolish these very doctrines of the Christian Priesthood and Sacrifice, which some of their heirs now struggle so assiduously to receive, but actually succeeded in doing so. Never was success so complete. Inconsistent and vacillating in other projects, there was no shade of ambiguity about their purpose in this. Not only these doctrines, but every notion connected with or springing out of them, became as utterly unknown in England as in Corea or Japan. If they

were ever attended to by English bishops and clergy, it was only to revile them." . . . In the reign of Elizabeth "the *Daily Sacrifice* was so utterly exploded and all thought or memory about it, that there was hardly a parish in England in which 'the Lord's Supper' was celebrated more than three times a year. . . . A totally new religion had been substituted for the ancient Faith." (p. 13.)

So again, from the age of Henry VIII. to that of Charles I., "not a single voice was lifted up in England to protest against this violent suppression of the Christian priesthood. It was acquiesced in by the whole nation. There was an end of it. . . . If Barlow taught that a bishop need not be consecrated, Hooker was equally sure, as his own words will tell us, that a priest need not be ordained." (pp. 16, 17.) Hooker indeed, whose name is cited as a witness in favour of the necessity of episcopal ordination, "is the most decisive witness against it, both by word and deed." During life he taught that "there may be, sometimes, very just and sufficient reasons to allow ordination made without a bishop."\* And when about to die, he received the last rites of his religion, not from an Anglican minister, but from the unconsecrated hands of his friend Saravia, who had no power to dispense them. (pp. 19, 20.) During the reign of James I. it was still the same thing. Thus the 51st Canon of 1604 requires all the Anglican clergy to pray for the Church of Scotland, which was non-episcopal: and we know by the confession of Bishop Cosen that many ministers from Scotland and France and the Low Countries were instituted into benefices with ease, and yet were never re-ordained; and by the admission of Mr. Keble, that the early divines (of the Church of England) "never venture to urge the exclusive claim of the government by archbishop and bishop, or connect the succession with the validity of the holy sacraments"† (p. 22.) "Even Andrewes had no more belief in the necessity of episcopal ordination, as he himself assured Dr. Morton, than Barlow or Hooker." (pp. 24, 25.) Nay, the most eminent Anglican prelates, such, for instance as Morton, Bishop of Durham, absolutely refused to re-ordain Presbyterian ministers, on the ground that it would cause *scandal*. (p. 26.) It was only in the second half of the seventeenth century, that the doctrine of the invalidity of Presbyterian ordination arose, as an argument against the dissenters. In 1610, when James, thinking Episcopacy more in harmony with monarchy than Presbyterianism, selected three Scottish ministers for consecration, they were consecrated accordingly, without previously having been ordained priests, notwithstanding a mild protest from Andrewes, who took an active part in the ceremony. Fifty years later, Reynolds, a Non-conformist, was made a bishop; and, in our own age, Reginald Heber openly professed that in Germany he would "humbly and thankfully avail himself of the preaching and sacramental ordinances of the Lutheran Evangelical Church." As for the doings of Dr. Thompson and Dr. Wilberforce, who publicly ministered in a Presbyterian church in 1871, they are known to all. Truly, as Bishop Hall once said, "There is no difference in any essential matter between the Church of England and her sisters of the

\* Book vii. ch. xiv. Works, vol. iii. p. 286, ed. Keble. The passage was suppressed by Laud and his followers for many years.

† Preface to Hooker's Works, p. lix.

Reformation"; and, as our author remarks, "the chain of tradition from Barlow to Wilberforce is complete." Justly then does he propose the following dilemma to the modern Ritualists, who "abhorring the so-called Reformation, and nourished on other doctrinal food than their new community has ever dispensed, desire to revive an idea always living and operative in an older Church, but completely exploded in their own."

"Either the Church of England always believed in the grace of Orders and the Apostolical Succession, or she did not. If she did not, why do they profess it? If she did, why did *she* disown it? On the first supposition she denied a Divine truth; on the second she betrayed it. In either case only an irrational fanaticism, or an almost inconceivable levity of mind, can see in such a teacher the mouthpiece of God, and 'the pillar and ground of the truth.' The best friends of the National Church are they who maintain, like Bishop Tomline and Dean Elliot, that she never believed in 'any form of ordination whatever,' for in that case she has at least been consistent, and only resembles her 'Sisters of the Reformation'; while on the High-Church theory, which was invented to do her honour, she is the basest and most impious of them all. The worst enemy of the Church of England can offer no graver injury than is involved in the imprudent suggestion that she has always secretly believed truths, which she has always publicly denied." (pp. 34, 35.)

When we come then to sum all these things up, and remember that only so late as 1868 Dr. Wilberforce declared in Convocation that the Church of England had always within herself persons of *extreme divergencies of doctrine—a thing as inevitable as having different countenances on different men,*" and the Bishop of Salisbury was of opinion that if any attempt were made to enforce a uniform creed, "it would break up the Church," and the Bishop of Ely agreed entirely with his Right Rev. brother of Salisbury, and the Archbishop of Canterbury wound up the debate by saying—and, as our author remarks, "it is not reported that any one was heard to laugh"—that he "did not wish to restrain or curb the liberty of the clergy," it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that

"If, as some would fain believe, the gentlemen who occupy the national pulpits, only to display what Dr. Wilberforce styles 'extreme divergencies of doctrine,' were specially and individually called and set apart by the Divine Spirit, as the theory of 'vocation' implies, to be His unfaltering witnesses to Immaculate Truth, either He did not think it necessary to qualify them for their office, or was perfectly indifferent how they discharged it." (pp. 47.)

Our author had previously said:—

"A vocation to teach, and believe and teach whatever you choose, is a contradiction in terms. No man requires a vocation to do nothing. The feeblest of us can do that, any hour of the day, without any supernatural gift. The Church of England is evidently of this opinion. Even in the administration of her 'Orders,' with which she once so easily dispensed altogether, she displays so little gravity, and exacts such meagre conditions, as to encourage in her members the apathy which she manifests herself. There is a suavity of indifference in her languid and listless attitude towards the whole subject of ordination, and especially in her view of conveying it, which seems to reveal her candid impression that no human action is of less importance." (p. 44.)

The second chapter, "The Clergy at Home," although disfigured by a few personalities of somewhat questionable taste in connection with certain Anglican bishops still alive, is, nevertheless, a masterly exposition of the progress of the author's own mind towards the truth, which stands out in marked contrast to the help which he received from his Anglican clerical friends, whether of influence, teaching, or example. He found himself a clergyman of the Establishment, without ever having undergone the least preparation for it—no ecclesiastical training, no searching examination into his "vocation," no solemn retreat before the laying on of hands, as are to be met with amongst the "clergy of another sort,"—obliged to accept the instructions of a parish clerk as to how to baptize an infant, and ignorant both as to the mystery and administration of what is called, even by the Anglican Church, "the most comfortable sacrament of the body and blood of Christ." A sphere of labour having been assigned to him in a rural district, it was of course natural that, having to teach others, he should now begin to teach himself. He commenced, then, with the history of the "Reformation" and the "Reformers"; but soon discovering that the "Reformers," who were a jest and a proverb to one another, and each of whom thought all the rest miscreants, could only be "blind leaders of the blind." He took next to the study of Scripture. Engaged in this, it was not long before he perceived that S. Paul, although full of fatherly tenderness towards sinners, however fallen, could employ nothing but words of the most awful severity in his denunciation of *sects*—no "cheering tidings," as he remarks, for a minister of that community which has been described as "a hundred sects battling within one Church,"—while S. Peter used, if possible, even stronger language upon the same subject. He also examined into the true position held by S. Peter in the Christian polity, and the exact nature of the functions committed to him; and the views of his clerical friends on this momentous point are placed before us in a series of propositions, which, unless we are much mistaken, will make many an Anglican reader wince in agony; for "if they are true, it seems transparently evident that Christianity is false." (pp. 73-104.) We are sorry that our space forbids us to give these propositions in full; but to do anything short of this would utterly fail to convey to our readers any idea of the absurdity of the position of the author's "clerical friends." So too, for the same reason, we must refrain from referring to the admirable contrast which he draws between the "sects" and the one Church of Christ. We cannot, however, refrain from quoting part of the conclusion of this chapter:—

"That any one acquainted with her past history and actual condition, which is, perhaps, more shameful than that of any other sect now in existence, can sincerely believe that the Church established by law in England is that very *kingdom of God*, which was founded on a rock, and before which the Gentiles were to bow down, is perhaps a more enormous aberration of human reason than any which history records. Even her least ignorant members, as if to show that they know no more of the nature of the Christian Church than the lowest fanatics whom they profess to despise, threaten to desert her if their pretensions are rejected, and to construct for their private use *one more* new Church. They do not even suspect that man can no more make a church than he can make a world. They dream not

that it requires the whole omnipotence of God to do either. He has made *one*, and will never make another. To do so would be a *confession of failure* worthy of Jupiter or Buddha, of Barlow or Andrews, but not of the Most High God. If, then, any one can imagine that the Church now established in England, and destined to split into a hundred fragments as soon as the control of the civil power is withdrawn; . . . which never produced' (to quote from another passage a little further on) "a saint, a prophet, or a martyr, or the faintest similitude of either, with its 'three different religions and three score varieties of each'; with its ritual, which varies with the taste of each individual minister; and its doctrine, which is 'a confused gabble of antagonistic sounds'; with its bishops, who 'do not wish to restrain the liberty of the clergy'; and its clergy, 'who do not choose to be restrained';—if any one can imagine that such a church 'is that matchless edifice of omnipotent skill of which prophets and apostles spoke in such rapturous terms, and for which they predicted such a magnificent destiny,' what can he think of the architect of such a building." (pp. 132-133.)

We cannot follow our author through the third chapter—"The Clergy Abroad"—in his progress towards maturity of conviction. We give, however, two extracts. The first relates to the "Incomparable Sacrifice," the truth of which was now more than dawning on his mind:—

"God alone is worthy of God; and here He is at once the Priest and the Oblation: '*Ipsæ offerens*,' as one of the wisest of his servants has said, '*ipse et oblatio*.' In this sacrifice countless saints have found the abundant fulfilment of that gracious promise, '*I will not leave you orphans*.' For this is that last invention of the Creator's love, and maturest fruit of His incarnation, which converts even our fallen world into a true paradise, and without which it would be only a cheerless sepulchre, the home of sad and weary spirits, 'seeking rest, and finding none.' In this Divine Sacrifice the light of God falls upon human faces and illuminates human souls. It is more than a vision of angels, for *they* descend every day from heaven to look upon it. It is more than our life, for it is its end and object, and without it we could not live. I knew not then its manifold sweetness, but I was to know it later. May they who behold it from the sanctuary intercede for me, who am unworthy to look upon it even from the porch." (p. 162.)

The second extract sums up so amusingly the attitude of the Protestant mind with regard to missions to the heathen, that our readers, we are sure, will feel grateful to us for placing it before them. The scene is laid in the well-known *Salle des Martyrs* at the *Missions Etrangères*, where our author had gone with the "clerical friend" who accompanied him on his journey, and who, although he could talk of the "happiness of assisting at the holy sacrifice, which, he said, was also offered in the Church of England," always carried with him a neat edition of the Book of Common Prayer whenever he was present at any Catholic service:—

"My companion, who had assumed an air of intense depression, which he no doubt considered suitable to the occasion, as if he had just heard of the death of all his relations, inquired gravely 'what provision was made for the maintenance of the Society's missionaries!' When the superior replied with something like a smile, that 'they trusted for that to Divine Providence,' a still deeper gloom overspread his features. But on the whole he behaved very well, though he probably regretted that 'our Roman brethren, who are evidently not without good qualities,' should have such an extremely un-



favourable impression of the church of Dr. Tait. For my part, I also thought, during that visit, of that English institution, and shuddered at the thought." (p. 178.)

We must also point out as worthy of especial notice the admirable way in which the author gathers up the general opinion and sentiment of Anglicans, on the dignity and office of Our Lady, in a series of propositions, which are given much in the same way as those upon the supremacy of S. Peter alluded to above. After reading them, an honest mind can come but to one conclusion; namely, that to those who reject the office of Our Lady the Scripture is indeed a sealed book.

There is a passage, however, at the close of this chapter in which the author does not seem to us to have expressed himself with sufficient clearness, and in which, indeed, he seems to deny the possible salvation of those who die out of the Church's visible unity. The passage is as follows:—

"There is yet another delusion more persuasive than all the rest, which merits notice. It was a common thing with the Donatists and other rebels against the Church to boast of the virtues of their leaders. These virtues, as their illustrious adversary S. Augustine allowed, were sometimes real. Yet he declared that even if they were crowned by martyrdom they would not avail to salvation. S. Paul had said exactly the same thing before either of them. In his famous Epiphany sermon, *Sur la Loi*, Bourdaloue quotes the words of the great Doctor of the Latin Church, which express, he adds, 'the unanimous consent of all the Fathers.' Such virtues, S. Augustine observes, however eminent, profit nothing, to use the words of S. Paul, and will only increase the final condemnation of those who die out of the Church. 'They are the more to be reproved,' he says—'*magis vituperandi sunt*'—'and God will judge them with all the more rigour, because they lived so well and believed so ill.' *The same is true of all the children of revolt, of every school, and in every age.*" (pp. 256-7.)

In this passage the author seems to us to have forgotten the well-known distinction between the *anima* and *corpus ecclesie*, by which it becomes possible for those who in good faith die out of the Church's external communion to be saved. For this reason the last sentence, which we have marked in italics, appears to us entirely untenable. S. Augustine and S. Cyprian are speaking either of those who are leaders of sects, in whom it is more difficult to suppose good faith to exist, or of those who are wilful unbelievers; but we may surely reasonably hope that among all those who are, through no fault of theirs, in a state of schism or heresy, many may, notwithstanding, although not recognizing the claims of the Catholic Church, yet exercise divine faith in "Deus Unus et Remunerator," and be otherwise free from mortal sin. So, too, the words quoted\* from S. Paul are beside the question; for those who die in invincible ignorance, which, according to our author's view, cannot be said to exist, may die in the grace of God, not having sinned against light. A passage is also quoted from Dr. Newman's "Anglican Difficulties," lect. ii., in which the illustrious Oratorian says that the "grace given to Anglicans is intended ultimately to bring them into the Church; and if it does not tend to so, it will not ultimately profit them."

\* 1 Cor. xiii. 13—the well-known passage about charity.

But it is evident from the third lecture that Dr. Newman is speaking of the grace given to Anglicans to lead them forward to the Church, which, if rejected, will not of course avail them anything at the end. Then at page 79 Dr. Newman says, "Of course we think as tenderly of them as we can, and may fairly hope that what we see is in some instances the work of grace, wrought on those who are *in invincible ignorance*; but the claim is unreasonable and exorbitant if they expect their state of mind is to be taken in evidence, not only of promise in the individual, but of truth in his creed."

If then the author merely means that the virtues of sectarians are no evidence of the truth of their creed, he is right; but the passage quoted above seems to us to involve a far more sweeping condemnation.

There is also in the fourth chapter, "the Clergy and Modern Thought," a good deal with which we do not feel quite satisfied, although there is far more that is worthy of the highest praise. We cannot help feeling that the author treats with far too great a contempt and in far too light a tone the *intellectual* difficulties presented by "modern thought." No doubt it is intolerable that every new hypothesis of natural science or modern philosophy, changing as these do almost from year to year, should be exalted into a new Gospel. But to treat the speculations and difficulties of our "advanced thinkers" as imbecility, appears to us a grievous and lamentable mistake: first, because the latter are for the most part men of intellect; and, secondly, because nothing can well do the Catholic cause greater harm than contempt for its opponents. The subjects however touched upon by the author in his last chapter are of too vast importance to be dealt with satisfactorily in a notice like the present and we are already forced by its great length to hurry to a close.

We will only further say, therefore, that we cannot help doubting whether he has always taken due pains, rightly to understand those authors whom he so justly denounces. In one instance we are sure of this. Mr. Mill, in the passage quoted at p. 315, most certainly does not characterize *the God of Revelation* "as a monster of injustice and cruelty." Mr. Mill is speaking throughout of the "God" whom he supposes to have been imagined by Dean Mansel. We quite believe that he misunderstood the meaning of that Anglican dignitary; but however that may be, we explained in our number for last January (p. 73) what we are confident is Mr. Mill's meaning.

Notwithstanding these few imperfections, this very remarkable work will, we have no doubt, mark an *era* in Catholic controversy.

*Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, of the Oratory. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

*Historical Sketches.* Part II. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, of the Oratory. London: Pickering.

THESE two portions of F. Newman's collected works have appeared since our last issue. The chief content of the former is the well-known series of *Essays on "Anglican difficulties"*; a work which, notwith-

standing its great ability, will be somewhat circumscribed as to its permanent importance, by the circumstance of its dealing exclusively with one transitory and singularly hollow phase of theological opinion—the Tractarian. Incidentally, however, it contains many thoughts of great lasting value. As an instance, we will extract a very admirable sentence, occurring at pp. 264-265, which we also quoted in October. We italicise a few words.

“In matters of conduct, of ritual, of discipline, of politics, of social life, in the *ten thousand* questions which the Church *has not formally answered* even though she has *intimated her judgment*, there is a constant rising of the human mind against *the authority of the Church and of superiors*, and that in *proportion as each individual is removed from perfection.*”

According to F. Newman, then, there are “ten thousand questions” on which the Church has “intimated her judgment” without imposing it; ecclesiastical “superiors” are rightly employed in pressing such judgment on the acceptance of the faithful; and these in their turn do not hesitate to accept it, unless in proportion as they are “removed from” spiritual “perfection.”

The remainder of the volume is occupied with the well-known letter to Dr. Pusey on his “Eirenicon.” We suppose that the Patristic testimony on devotion to the Most Holy Virgin was never before so effectively exhibited and marshalled; and that this will long be accounted, in England at least, the standard work on this particular theme. At the same time, there are a few passages in the letter, of which we said at the time (April, 1866, p. 545) that we regretted the appearance; and now on consideration we feel the same regret. Yet we must explain, as we have often pointed out before, that F. Newman’s words have been grievously misinterpreted. It is quite a mistake to suppose, as many have done, that he censures certain “foreign writers,” such as S. Alphonsus and Ven. Grignon de Montfort, for excess or mistake in Marian devotion. We showed in detail on a former occasion (April, 1871, p. 454) that he disavows in the most express terms any such intention.

The second of the two volumes is half filled by the powerful series of lectures on the history of the Turks. As the “Month” has pointed out, these “embody the true Catholic instinct as to the hatefulness of Mahometanism, and its blighting influence upon the East, and upon all the countries where it has set its foot.” And this was peculiarly desirable at the time of their original publication; when Englishmen were largely blinded, by their political sympathy with Turkey, to the detestable character of its religion.

The rest of the volume is occupied with two biographical Essays, contributed long ago to the “*Encyclopædiæ Metropolitana*,” and with the original (Anglican) introduction to “the Church of the Fathers.”

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*The Athanasian Creed.* Four Lectures by FREDERICK CANON OAKELEY.  
London: Longmans.

WE have so lately (see the last article of our October number) expressed our own view of the present Anglican agitation on the Athanasian Creed that we must content ourselves with a very few remarks on these

interesting lectures. Canon Oakeley expresses the Catholic doctrine clearly, uncompromisingly, and at the same time most charitably. His first lecture is on the legitimate attitude of Catholics towards the present Anglican agitations ; his second, on the Creed itself ; his third, on the dogmatic principle ; his fourth, on the "damnatory clauses." To our mind no other part of the pamphlet is so touching, as his preliminary remarks on his continued affection for those Anglican friends, among whom he once played so conspicuous a part.

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*Catholic Worship, a Manual of Popular Instruction on the Ceremonies and Devotions of the Church.* By FREDERICK CANON OAKELEY, M.A. 2nd Edition. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

THERE are few in England who can write upon Catholic worship better than Canon Oakeley. We are not, therefore, surprised that a second edition of this popular Manual has been called for. The little work has been attentively revised with the aid of an able and experienced ceremonialist, and we trust that, according to the wish of the author, it will find its way into the hands of many recent converts and non-Catholic inquirers ; and, indeed, of all who wish to know more of the beauty of holiness, with which the Church worships God. The reader will find most useful information with regard to the permanent arrangements of Catholic Churches, the ordinary offices, as well as those proper to certain seasons, the devotional practices of the Church, and occasional offices. At the end will be found a glossary of ecclesiastical terms used in the work.

Not the least valuable portion of Canon Oakeley's Manual is the paragraph about indulgences. It is short, but to the point. There is no part of Catholic doctrine or practice on which Protestants are so profoundly ignorant as the subject of indulgences, while we fear that there are too many Catholics who forget the immense importance of gaining them. The subject of indulgences is one of vast importance, and we feel sure that, whether for the sake of the holy souls in Purgatory or our own souls, it cannot be too frequently brought before the minds of our people.

Canon Oakeley's Manual is admirably suited for distribution.

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*The Hidden Life of Jesus, a Lesson and Model to Christians.* Translated from the French of HENRI MARIE BOUDON, Archdeacon of Evreux, by EDWARD HEALY THOMPSON, M.A. Second edition. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

WE are glad indeed, to find that Mr. Healy Thompson's admirable translation of Boudon's "Hidden Life of Jesus" has reached a second edition. This is a sign that spiritual reading is on the increase among

English Catholics, and also that in these over-busy days there is a growing desire to know more and more of the hidden life of our Blessed Lord. What better remedy could we have for all the excitement, and hurry, and bustle, and shallowness of this superficial age, than to fix our eyes, as this little work teaches us to do, on our Lord hidden in His general self-annihilation, hidden as to His generation, eternal and temporal, hidden as to His natural qualities, hidden in His privation of temporal good, and of the esteem and friendship of creatures, hidden again in ignominies, hidden as to His power, offices, and dignities, hidden as to His graces and Divine mission, hidden even when most seen, hidden last of all in His glorious life, in the Blessed Sacrament, and in His most holy Mother and His Saints ?

But this is only half the lesson taught by this excellent spiritual work. In the second part we are led on to the practice of the hidden life and of union with God. We are told of the advantages of this life, and we are reminded of a truth, too often forgotten, that the highest Saints are they whose lives are least known to men. To realize the truth of this, we have only to think of God's dear and most blessed Mother, S. Joseph, and S. John the Baptist. We are next instructed how to keep ourselves healthy in the midst of the infectious atmosphere of the world, to give ourselves up to the practice of the hidden life with courage and fidelity, to avoid all self-display, to be watchful over ourselves whenever we are obliged to put ourselves forward, to prefer humiliation to the esteem and friendship of others, to take pleasure in being unknown, to make a holy use of the interior sufferings which hide us even from ourselves, not to fix our eyes upon ourselves, but to live only to God alone, as if there were only God and ourselves in the world ; and last of all, in order to draw down the blessing of God upon our practice of the hidden life, to have a special devotion to the Holy Family, to the holy angels, and to those Saints whose lives have been most hidden in Christ.

All this no doubt is quite contrary to the spirit of the age, which loves publicity and excitement, and which encourages men to put themselves forward, and make themselves a name, and heap up riches, and gain what is called a position in the world. All this, too, is hard to flesh and blood, and harder still at a time when soft living is the rule, and mortification the exception. Yet, after all, what is the doctrine taught in this work, what is the practice of the hidden life except simply the teaching and following of Christ ? the teaching and following of Him who has said : " Blessed are ye that hunger now, for you shall be filled. Blessed shall ye be when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you and shall reproach you, and cast out your name as evil for the Son of Man's sake. But woe to you that are rich ; woe to you that are filled ; woe to you that laugh now ; woe to you when men shall bless you." So too we know that " flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God." Yet it is just because the spirit of this work is contrary to the spirit of the age, and hard to flesh and blood, that we rejoice, and take it as a healthy sign, that the work itself has reached a second edition.

What joy, too, would it have given to Father Faber and Mother Margaret, with both of whom the works of M. Boudon were especial favourites—had they been still alive—to know of the success of a book which they

loved so much. Yet we may confidently hope that they *do* know of it, and that beholding all things clearly in the light of God, they are able to see—what we can only guess at—the hidden good produced by the publication of such solid spiritual works as the one now before us, and the growth of the hidden life in the souls of English Catholics. For this they prayed during their lifetime; surely it is no presumption to hope that they have not ceased to pray for the same cause, now that they have passed beyond the veil.

It is true, as the translator remarks, that in some of Boudon's writings there are certain inaccuracies of expression; but then we must also remember that as he wrote before the condemnation of Quietism, these can hardly be laid to his charge; and there can be no doubt that, had he lived after the condemnation, he would certainly have been the first to correct anything even seemingly out of harmony with the doctrine of the Church.

For the sake of those of our readers who may as yet be unacquainted with this work, we give the following extracts:—

“O how true it is, that there are few who are contented to find nothing in creatures, and to whom God alone suffices. But when God finds souls thus pure, disinterested, and faithful, He gives Himself to them with such profuse outpourings of His divinest graces, that He seems to have nothing in reserve for them. Nevertheless, after He has bestowed His most precious graces, He gives Himself to them with yet further excesses of love unspeakable. If it is written (Psalm cxliv. 19) that He will fulfil all the desires of those that fear Him, how much more of those who belong to Him alone through His only and most pure love! These are the souls that obtain from Him the sweetest favours, and that impetrate the greatest mercies. These are they that sustain the weight of His wrath, that turn away His anger from the people, and stay His chastening hand. . . . . When He is preparing to let fall His scourges on some city, province, or kingdom, a few such souls have power to avert His wrath. And what do they not effect in the order of grace! Be assured of this, that often in the sight of God, to them is due the glory of the great marvels which He works in the justification and sanctification of souls, although externally He uses for His purposes, preachers, missionaries, and directors.” (pp. 104-5.)

Again:

“In order thoroughly to understand this truth (namely, that the glory of God's marvels is often due to those whose lives are hidden in Christ), we have only to consider the most B. Virgin, who, retired apart in her humble abode, neither preached, nor administered any sacrament, and yet it cannot be doubted but that she was more useful to the world than apostolic men, and all other persons who were most actively employed in external works. . . . . Alas! they who look only at the outside of things imagine that they remain useless in the midst of their abasement; but they know not that by serving as victims to divine justice, for sinners, for the cities, dioceses, and provinces in which they suffer, they appease His wrath, and obtain incalculable benefits and unspeakable blessings for those places where they have thus been trodden under foot, whilst the glory is given to those who have laboured externally to procure them. . . . . O precious state, all holy, all divine; and yet, alas! this is the state which all the world flies from, from which even the devout turn away, corrupt nature not enduring to be deprived of the knowledge, the esteem, and the friendship of creatures.” (pp. 106-7-8.)

The words quoted in the last extract will have an additional interest, if we

bear in mind that for eight years this holy writer lay under one of the most disgraceful imputations from which a priest can suffer.

The merit of Mr. Healy Thompson's translations is too well known to require any words of praise. We heartily wish him success in this good work he has undertaken, of giving us not only a library of Religious Biography, but also select translations for spiritual reading. Perhaps we may be allowed to add in conclusion, that we should have been glad if Mr. Thompson had throughout the whole work translated the expression "Dieu Seul," by the English words "God Alone," as he has done at p. 90, and in some other places, rather than by the words "God Only." The former expression has become to us almost a household word.

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*The Book of the Holy Rosary. A Popular Doctrinal Exposition of its Fifteen Mysteries, with an Explanation of their Corresponding Types in the Old Testament, a Preservative against Unbelief.* By the Rev. H. FORMBY, of the 3rd Order of S. Dominic. Embellished with 36 full-page Illustrations. London: Burns, Oates, and Co. 1872.

THIS new work by Mr. Formby is, as we are told in his brief admonition to the reader, the result of the labour of many years, and it is evident that the author has taken great pains in endeavouring to carry his conception into execution. The plan of the work is excellent. After a general introduction on the duty of doing our best to acquire the knowledge of God, on the benefit of studying the Scriptures, and on the testimony of the types and figures of the Old Testament, the fifteen Mysteries of the Rosary are presented to the reader; the three divisions—namely, the Joyful, Sorrowful, and Glorious Mysteries—being severally preceded by some type from the Old Testament applicable to each; while each separate mystery is first explained in itself, and then illustrated by two or more types taken in like manner from the Elder Covenant. Thus, for example, the Joyful Mysteries, taken as a whole, are shown to us as typified by the Ark of the Covenant, brought by King David to Mount Sion; the Sorrowful, by the hostility shown to the rebuilding of Jerusalem; the Glorious (not quite so happily, we think), by the song of triumph of the three children in the furnace. So, again, the types selected for the Mysteries, taken separately, are as follows:—For the Annunciation, Eve and Adam banished from Paradise, and the prayer of Anna; for the Visitation, the Ark in the house of Obededom and the Burning Bush; for the Nativity, the fleece of Gideon, and the manna that came down from heaven; for the Presentation, the infant Samuel presented to Eli, and Moses gazing at the Promised Land; for the finding of Our Lord in the Temple, the sorrow of Anna for the absence of Tobias, and her joy at his return. The agony in the garden is typified by the prayer of Elias for the dead child, and his weariness because of the sins of the people; the scourging at the pillar, by Job smitten with a grievous ulcer from the sole of his foot, even to the top of his head, and by the rainbow as the sign of mercy; the

crowning with thorns, by the ram caught in the thorns, and by Daniel in the lion's den ; the carnage of the Cross, by Isaac carrying the wood for the sacrifice, and by David going forth to meet Goliath ; the Crucifixion, by the fountain in Paradise, the Paschal lamb, the passage of the Red Sea, the prayer of Moses on the Mount, the brazen serpent in the wilderness, and the rock which yielded sweet water. Coming to the Glorious Mysteries, we find that the sign of the prophet Jonas, and Samson bursting the bonds of the Philistines, typify the Resurrection ; the High Priest entering into the Holy of Holies, and Elias taken up from earth, the Ascension ; the giving of the Law, and the sacrifice consumed by fire from heaven, the mission of the Holy Ghost ; the visit of the Queen of Saba to King Solomon, and the return of Judith with the head of Holofernes, the Assumption ; while the coronation of the glorious Queen of Heaven is shown to us as shadowed forth by the raising of Esther to the royal throne, and by her intercession for her people.

We hardly, however, think that *all* the types are happily chosen. Thus, *e.g.*, after the striking type of the visit of Elias to the widow of Sarephta, including within itself several other types, such as the drinking of the torrent by the way during the three years and a half that the heavens were closed, the passing over to the Gentiles, the handful of meal, and the cruise of oil that wasted not, shadowing forth, as they did, the true bread, which cometh down from heaven, which was anointed with the unction of the Holy Ghost, and which, though eaten from day to day on the altars of the Church, wastes not, neither is diminished ; the two sticks, as a figure of the Cross of Calvary ; and, lastly, the resurrection of the dead boy, when laid upon the prophet's own bed, and touched by the prophet's body, as typical both of Our Lord's rising from the dead, and of the resurrection of the just to life eternal at the last day, because they have been touched by the body of Our Lord—after such a type as this—or rather, as we have said, such a collection of types—the weariness of the same prophet under the juniper tree seems to us hardly so striking. We should have thought that King David—the most typical, perhaps, of all the Old Testament characters—who when flying from the face of his own son Absalom, passed over the brook Codron, and went up the Mount of Olivets weeping and barefoot, with his head covered, and shortly afterwards was cursed by Semei, and stoned, and covered with the dust of earth, would have been a far more vivid type of Our Lord in His bitter agony. So, too, the rainbow of many colours, as typical of the many-hued appearance of our Lord's Body when scourged at the pillar, seems to us somewhat fanciful and far-fetched—not, certainly, calculated to further one of Mr. Formby's chief objects in publishing the work—namely, the preserving men's minds from unbelief, by giving them “an insight into the marvellous methods by which Divine Wisdom, long ages ago, has prepared the way for the Christian mysteries.” For our own part, we much doubt whether minds suffering from temptations to unbelief, especially at the present day, will greatly be relieved of their doubts by the light which the comparison with the types of the Old Testament is found to reflect upon the mysteries of Christianity. To us it seems, although we wish to speak with great diffidence, as if the beauty of harmony between type and mystery can only be fully realized by those who have drunk deeply of the spirit of the Church,



who have meditated long and attentively on Holy Scriptures in the spirit of little children, and whose eyes have been opened to the hardly lesser harmony which exists between the Church's dogma and spirituality and devotions.

Again, the explanation of the Mystery of the Coronation of Our Blessed Lady opens with a passage from the Apocalypse about the Marriage Supper of the Lamb (Apoc. xix.). Now, this is no doubt very applicable to the joy of all the Saints, which forms the second point on which the Church wishes us to meditate in this mystery. But the joy of all the Saints is but the secondary point, the chief one being the coronation of our Lady. And here we naturally look in Mr. Formby's pages, but in vain, for some allusion to that "mighty sign" which St. John saw in heaven when the temple of God was opened in heaven, and the *Ark of His Testament was seen in this temple*, and there were lightnings, and voices, and an earthquake, and great hail—a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars." (Apoc. xi. 19 ; xii. 1.) As the first book of Scripture foreshadows the redemption of mankind and the overthrow of Satan's power by bringing before us a Woman, a Child and a Serpent, so, too, the last book of Scripture sets before our eyes the final victory of the Mother and the Child over the old Serpent, who seduceth the whole world, as also the coronation of the Mother as the Queen of all Creation, the sun being her robe and the moon her footstool, and the stars of heaven her crown.\*

The doctrinal exposition of the Mysteries is for the most part conveyed in extracts from the fathers and doctors of the Church, of whom short biographical notices are also given.

Mr. Formby thus explains the idea which he had in view in composing this work :—

"Taking a lesson from the wisdom of the Church (who, in prescribing to her clergy and religious communities a system of prayer in common, uses especial care that the Breviary employed for this end shall be the richest possible repertory of knowledge ranging through the Sacred Scriptures, Patristic Theology, and Biographies of Saints), and the conclusion could not but plainly appear that the knowledge of God and the spirit of prayer were always intended to be yoked together, and that the happiest fruits were to be looked for from their union. Knowledge, by itself alone, St. Paul says, puffeth up (1 Cor. viii. 1); and ignorant piety borders on superstition ; it is their union that tends to make the Christian.

"But if knowledge and prayer are always intended to be yoked together, there certainly will be found in use in the great body of the faithful at least some one well beloved and universally accepted form of prayer to whose nature it would likewise belong, to be in a similar manner associated with knowledge, and which in consequence could not fail to possess capacities for conferring upon the general body of the faithful benefits similar in kind to those which accrue to the clergy, from the use of their Breviary. And what other can this be than the devotion of the Holy

\* See Dr. Newman's Letter to Dr. Pusey in his "Eirenicon."

Rosary with the beautiful system of popular theology contained in its fifteen mysteries? Again, like the Breviary, the Rosary enjoys the privilege of being either the joyous, social prayer of a multitude, or the pious exercise of complete solitude. And in either case the use of the devotion makes the same demand upon the mind of the pious reciter for a knowledge of the particular mystery which for the moment happens to be under contemplation.

“It remained, then, but to endeavour to collect together a volume of such doctrinal explanatory matter as could suffice to store the mind with the knowledge requisite to enable the act of the intelligence easily and pleasantly to accompany the words of the prayer, and thereby to offer the valuable twofold benefit of bringing a perceptible access of continually growing relish for the practice of the devotion, as also a pleasant and acceptable aid in what St. Paul declared to be the very necessary labour of endeavouring to please God ‘by growing in knowledge.’”

Now, agreeing with Mr. Formby in the main, there are nevertheless a few points upon which we must dissent from him. We agree with him in thinking that the knowledge of *God* and the spirit of prayer should always go hand in hand together, but there may be a deep knowledge of God without much knowledge of Scripture history, or of the types of the Old Testament; and, therefore, we regret that Mr. Formby, in speaking of the necessity of “increasing in knowledge,” has not always added the words which St. Paul adds—“of God.” For the same reason, we cannot utter so sweeping an assertion as that made by Mr. Formby when he says that *ignorant piety* (under which he would include, we presume, the piety of the unlearned) “borders on superstition.” On the contrary, we believe and know by experience that there is often far more knowledge of God amongst our unlearned poor than amongst our learned rich; nay, we will even go further, and say that we believe that the higher kinds of prayer are more often bestowed by God upon the former than upon the latter. Oh, surely, surely, there is many a poor Catholic who has never heard of the rainbow as the type of the many-hued body of Our Lord when scourged at the Column, or of the Queen of Saba, or of Queen Esther; but whose prayer or recital of the Rosary is full of the knowledge of God, because the mind of that poor Catholic is fixed upon *God alone*, or upon the central object of the mystery which he is contemplating. On the other hand, does it not too often happen to the learned, that with much knowledge about the *things* of God, their prayer is deficient in the knowledge of God himself, because their minds, instead of being fixed on God alone, are allowed to dwell too much upon what, after all, are but the means, and not the end? Nor will it do to quote, as Mr. Formby does, the words of St. Paul, “I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray also with the understanding” (1 Cor. xiv. 15), for it is clear from the context that the apostle is speaking of praying in an unknown tongue, in which “the spirit prayeth, but the understanding is without fruit,” and not in any way of ordinary prayer; for who can say that the higher kinds of prayer to which we have alluded above are without fruit to the understanding? In such prayer the spirit is enkindled with the fire of the Holy Ghost, and the understanding is lit up with the light of the Incarnate Word. Are we not told by all spiritual writers, that just in proportion as we are filled with God, and our prayer grows purer, so will images and the thoughts even of holy

things and holy scenes drop away from our minds, which will remain fixed upon God alone? So, too, are we not also told that those who are engaged in the study of theology run a special danger of becoming distracted in prayer, and cold and barren in meditation, and this on account of their more than ordinary knowledge of the things of God?

We trust Mr. Formby will bear with us in making these remarks. We have no desire to depreciate knowledge, still less the knowledge of Scripture, or of all that can throw light upon the mysteries of religion; but we have felt ourselves compelled to offer these criticisms, as it has seemed to us that the learned author has somewhat undervalued the prayer of Christ's unlearned poor; for hitherto, at least, the poor have been for the most part unlearned. Yet it is of these the Apostle St. James writes: "Hearken, dearest brethren; hath not God chosen the poor in this world, *rich in faith*—(the Apostle says nothing about bordering on superstition), and heirs of the kingdom which God hath promised to them that love Him?"

We could have wished to touch upon some other parts of Mr. Formby's work, as *e.g.*, upon the fall of Eve, where we fear we should have again to part company from him upon one or two points, but we have already exceeded our space. There is, however, one other remark we must make. The work is called a "*popular doctrinal exposition*." We shall be glad indeed if the author's hopes are realized, but we fear that the price of this handsomely-got-up volume will confine it to the tables of the wealthy; while, from the style in which it is written, and the matter which it contains, admirable though it is, as well as from the quotations from Latin and French poets and writers,\* not always translated, it will, if we mistake not, be oftener in the hands of the learned than of those for whom it appears chiefly to have been intended. If we might be allowed to make a suggestion, we would venture to express a hope that before long the author will give us a cheap edition, consisting of the engravings, together with a short explanation of each mystery, with its corresponding types, so that the essential part of the work may be brought within the reach of a larger number of readers.

The engravings, as is usual in all Mr. Formby's works, are excellent, although some of them are hardly free from what we can only call posture-drawing.

Mr. J. H. Powell's designs have pleased us greatly, and are quite free from this fault. Mr. C. Clasen's introductory illustrations are also worthy of special praise.

In conclusion, we must assure Mr. Formby, that if in some respects we have felt ourselves obliged to differ from him, this has only been from a desire to see the "*Book of the Rosary*" improved to the utmost, and rendered still more profitable for the general good. We yield to no one in gratitude to Mr. Formby for all that he has done for the education of our children, and

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\* At. p. 4, Mr. Formby speaks of the "actual volume of the inspired writings as the '*fait accompli*' of the love and mercy of God." We have no objection to the use of a French expression when nothing equivalent to it can be found in English, but we think that in this instance at least Mr. Formby might have contented himself with plain English.

for the encouragement of a higher taste in art; and we heartily go along with him in his earnest hope that, by means of such efforts as his, "the Devotion of the Holy Rosary may be still more widely extended over the earth, so that the knowledge of God may also come to cover the earth, as the waters cover the sea." (Dedication.)

The work has been issued with the permission of the Father Provincial of the Order of St. Dominic, to the third order of which Mr. Formby belongs, and with the "Imprimatur" of His Grace the Archbishop.

We must have only to add that we are sure our readers will agree with us in thanking Messrs. Burns and Oates for the really good taste with which the volume has been produced.

*Norwich Cathedral Argumentative Discourses in Defence and Confirmation of the Faith, "Pleadings for Christ."* First and second series. Norwich: Henry W. Stacy; London: Hamilton & Co. 1871, 1872.

THESE two little pamphlets consist each of three discourses delivered in Norwich Cathedral during the past year. The first four, which are on "Christianity and Free Thought," "Christianity and Scepticism," "Christianity and Faith," and "The Demonstration of the Spirit," were preached by Dr. O'Connor; the last two, on "Above Reason, not Contrary to it," and "The Cumulative Argument in favour of Christianity," were added, by Dr. Goulburn, the Dean of Norwich, who also edited the two series, which are, we believe, to be followed by others. The circumstances which led to the undertaking are briefly indicated in the preface to the first series, where we are told that "The frightful prevalence of sceptical views among all classes of the community, and the alarming fact that even among the clergy themselves insidious objections to the things which are most surely believed among us are gradually winning their way, seem to make it imperative upon all persons and societies intrusted with the guardianship of the Faith to make some definite effort to stem the evil"; and that "It has been thought that this guardianship is one of the special functions of our cathedrals." And very justly. And as infidelity has been defeated in England once, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will be defeated again.

These discourses, therefore, are directed against scepticism. Their main argument and let it be understood that we are by no means in every respect endorsing it,—is as follows:—"WE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE CHRISTIANITY. . . . We can give you the very strongest possible probability—we can give you the very highest degree of evidence *short of demonstration*—for believing Christianity; but *we cannot demonstrate it*. I say again, WE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE CHRISTIANITY."\* It is by this circumstance, add the writers, that scepticism illogically attempts to justify itself. A sceptic is to be distinguished both from an unbeliever and from a doubter. An unbeliever is one

who disbelieves in Christianity because he believes in something else ; *e.g.*, in Judaism or atheism, which is inconsistent with it. A doubter is one who withholds his assent, not because he requires an improper kind of evidence, but because he thinks he has not enough of the proper kind. But a sceptic is one who when he has sufficient evidence of the proper kind, still refuses to believe, because he demands demonstration. And demonstration is an improper and unreasonable kind of evidence to demand as a condition of belief in religion. For there are two fields of thought on which the human faculties may be exercised. The first is that of *things*, *e.g.*, numbers, chemical substances, mechanical laws : here full and perfect assent is logically based only on *demonstration*, and the resulting certainty is the certainty of *science*. The second is that of *persons*,—that is to say, of our own persons, our existence and the validity of our intellectual and moral faculties, and of the persons of others : here full and perfect assent is based on highly probable evidence and on *trust*, and the resulting certainty is that of *belief*. And inasmuch as the Revealer of the Christian religion was a Person, Jesus Christ, and therefore the human faculties, in considering the evidence that this Person was what He represented Himself to be, are engaged on this second field of thought—scepticism is contrary to reason.

What is here to be attended to is the proof of the proposition, that when dealing with persons full and perfect assent is logically based on highly probable evidence, and on trust. In proof of it, the following argument is given :—In the first place, trust is a legitimate source of certainty. And so far is this the case, that doubt is useful on this condition only, that it starts from belief ; if it do not do so, it is pernicious.\* In the second place, the field for the exercise of this faculty of trust is that of persons. To begin with, moral principles rest on this foundation ; † and as our moral and our religious life are plainly of a piece, this affords ground for believing that religion will do so also. Again, we must trust other persons : — “ If a man were to say ‘ I do not trust my wife, my children, my friends ; I do not trust any one until they prove to me, demonstrate to me [in the strict and scientific sense of the word demonstration], leave me in no doubt of their honesty, their love, their truthfulness,’ . . . you would put that man into a lunatic asylum. And why ? Because you would say that he gave the surest evidence of madness ; that one part of his nature [the speculative reason] had acquired a diseased intensity, which had mastered all the rest. You would say that that man had gone mad with distrust and suspicion,—had gone sceptically mad,—and you would treat him accordingly. And yet I defy any one here to show logically that the man might not be right. I defy any one to give that man such a logical and scientific demonstration as would prove to him, beyond all possibility of doubt, that his friends, or his wife, or his children, were not in a conspiracy to deceive and to wrong him. You see, then, that there is an absolute necessity for trust in the ordinary affairs of common life.” ‡ Moreover, there is a reason for this disposition of things. It necessarily follows from our being not merely intellectual but also moral beings. And it is a part of our probation. Besides, every act by which we resist

\* Developed in ii. 13.

† Developed in ii. 15.

‡ ii. 15, 16.

the impulses of the lower and animal nature, is an act of trust in the natural or the revealed law. The first instinct of the child is that of trust ; whatever it is told it believes. And although in our intercourse with our fellow-creatures circumstances may arise which legitimately call for suspicion—for just as the speculative reason must be conditioned by the faculty of trust, so also must the faculty of trust be conditioned by the speculative reason ; yet we do not find that those who are always looking out for reasons for suspicion are the men of the highest and purest tone, the most improving and valuable amongst our acquaintances. Again, just as our own higher and moral nature cannot prove itself to our lower, but we must trust it ; so when in the course of life, we come into contact with others who are higher and better than we, these higher natures cannot *prove* themselves to be so. There is always room for disparagement, for imputation of motives, for accusations of onesidedness, or self-delusion, or hypocrisy. And on the other side there is always room for trust ; so that contact with a higher nature is a veritable probation. Nay, the lower nature, because it is lower, cannot perfectly understand the higher. And therefore—

“ Should we not expect beforehand that if there were a revelation of a perfect nature, it would appear to our lower natures in some respects unintelligible, in others mysterious, in others (even as our own nature appears to us in some points of view) self-contradictory ? For all mysteries, everything that we cannot understand, must come to our understanding in the shape of two contradictory propositions ; we view the thing on two opposite sides, because we cannot see all round it at once. Well, then, should we not expect that this perfect nature, in the revealing of itself to us, should thus try our faith ? If it would be unreasonable to expect that an inferior man should perfectly understand and appreciate a higher and a better man than himself, is it unreasonable to suppose that we might find some difficulty in perfectly appreciating the nature of the one supremely Perfect Being ? Should we not expect, judging from analogy, that we might have some difficulties of the same kind in understanding God that we have in understanding one another ; that there would be the same trial of our faith, the same testing whether we would choose to think better or worse of God—the same probation and discipline when brought to apprehend that perfect nature ?” (iii. 14.)

Again :—

“ We do believe that in answer to the craving desire of the soul of man to look upon human perfection, this earth has once been visited by a perfect man. . . . But if this be so, then you would expect before you opened a page of the Gospels—before you read a line of that wondrous life, that according to the analogy of all other holy and righteous lives we know of, this life should not demonstrate itself, should not make it an impossibility for the sceptical intellect to find fault with it ; that it should only reveal itself to those whose lives were in some measure like it,—that its wisdom should justify itself, but only to the children of wisdom.” (iii. 16, 17.)

So that as the subject of Revelation is a Perfect Nature, and the Revealer a Perfect Person, both the substance and the evidence of religion must of necessity leave room for trust, and be means of trial, and neither, consequently, can be susceptible of demonstration.

Adequately to criticise this argument, which might have been more pro-

foundly built up from a consideration of the nature of personality itself, would require a space much larger than that at our disposal. We therefore confine ourselves to three observations. Firstly, the reasoning contained in it demands a psychological analysis of the natural tendency to believe;\* and it would have been the duty of the lecturer to supply this had the nature of his auditory admitted of it. Secondly, the argument is, in fact, not an appeal from the evidence to something else which is not evidence, but, if it is worth anything, an appeal to another kind of evidence which the writers regard as illogical not to take into consideration. It is not an appeal from reason. It is an appeal to reason, demanding of it that when it pronounces a verdict as on the total evidence, it should take into consideration not only that part of it arising from speculation merely, but also another division of evidence asserted to be consequent on the action of other mental faculties. And therefore, thirdly, the question is not so much whether certain things are demonstrated and certain others not, as whether there are not two distinct kinds of demonstration, the one where the resultant certainty rests on grounds in the last resort speculative, and the other where it does not do so, and would not be certainty if it did so. But both will be equally demonstration, if we have regard to the effect they legitimately produce.

The first four lectures—those by Dr. Connor—are by far the most weighty and thoughtful; but he often, though no doubt unintentionally, seems to represent Christianity rather as a subjective conviction of his own than as an objective system of truth proved by objective evidence. For instance:—“They [unbelievers] for the most part tell us that though it is true that Jesus of Nazareth was very useful to humanity at a certain stage of its development, yet that humanity needs Him no longer. . . . We say, on the contrary, that Jesus Christ is still essential to the true spiritual life of man. Unbelievers will say to Christians, ‘Your facts are not so certain as those of philosophy or, science.’ We answer, It may be so to you, but it is not so to us.” Again, some of the beliefs of atheists, &c., “we think very monstrous”; “we do not think” there are circumstances in Christianity which should excite suspicion; “we Christians have our own way of accounting for” the change wrought by Christianity in the soul: and so on. We should be disposed to believe that these imperfections were altogether, as they no doubt are in part, errors of expression but not of thought, were it not for the original sin of private judgment which taints the whole series, and shows itself, for instance, in the following passage, wherein what the preacher supposed to be the proper attitude of a good Christian towards an unbeliever is described:—“You are not called on to begin by imagining yourself not a Christian, and then arguing yourself into Christianity; but you are entitled to say, I am a Christian; I have very good and satisfactory reasons for being a Christian, and before you ask me to give up my Christianity, give me some reason why I should do so; show me that all this is a delusion and a mistake: then I am ready to give up my Christian ideas at your bidding. But, meanwhile, I am not much disposed to rise up and go out of my Father’s house, where I have been sheltered and fed, at the bidding of any prodigal

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\* Cf. Bain, “The Emotions and the Will,” pp. 568–585. (1859.)

who has gone into a far country, and who cries to me to come and share his banquet, which may prove, after all, to be one of husks.\* This is a half-truth well put. But no one is justified in saying, "If I cannot detect the fallacy in your arguments, I will become an infidel;" he ought to say, at the very utmost "I will learn logic." And no one has a right wantonly to lay himself open to moral and intellectual danger, any more than any one has a right, without sufficient reason, to expose himself to physical danger. With reference, again, to the expressions previously quoted above. Of course, Christianity, in the sense of our belief in Christianity, is a subjective conviction, and we can say with perfect justice "I believe," "I maintain most resolutely," &c., concerning it. But how can any one imagine for a moment that this is inappropriate way of speaking in addressing persons already predisposed to scepticism? "Most excellently said!" they will reply: "that is just our position. What is actually true, no one knows; but that is true to you, and this is true to us." How much better it would be at once to take the higher ground; to say simply, "Christianity is true, scepticism is false"; and to leave out these "I's" and "to me's," which can be excused only by supposing them to have been inserted from a feeling of politeness. When a man is defending *himself*, he may if he pleases give up an advantage of which, if he chose, he might justly make use. It may even be called a chivalrous generosity for him to do so. But when he is maintaining the cause of another, he has no right to throw away any advantage of which he may fairly avail himself. Truth forgets that she is truth when she even forensically puts herself on an equality with error, or stoops to use a language invented by her rivals to conceal her pre-eminence.

"Pleadings for Christ" abounds in short, apt, and sometimes almost epigrammatic observations: e.g.,—"It is just as absurd to object to Religion that it is not Science, as it is to object to Science that it is not Religion." "You may be sure that no man will ever lightly change his religion, if his religion has ever changed *him*." "Whoever would deeply stir the tides of the human heart must not only announce a law, he must preach an idea." "Assuming for a moment that God was manifest in the flesh, how could we possibly understand this union, or know anything about it beyond the fact?" "We are triumphantly asked how a religion that claims to be a gospel for the poor should need all these laborious and intricate historical evidences to prove it. We might answer that the critical and metaphysical difficulties of these evidences do not much trouble the poor; they are mostly made, and have to be answered, by learned men." But this fashion of writing with special readiness lends itself to the concealment of a fallacy; so we have, for instance, the notable observation that "Christianity is a great experiment—a probable, a reasonable experiment, but still an experiment"; † *i.e.*, that belief is a leap in the dark. Sometimes the argument descends to puerility as when the Three Divine Persons, subsisting in One Nature, are compared to a man who is by turns a hungry being, a praying being, and a reasoning being. "How can this thing be?" asks the lecturer in triumph. "Can you explain it?" ‡ Sometimes the criticism of opponents sinks to caricature, as

\* iv. 11.

† ii. 23.

‡ iv. 10.



when Dr. Connor informs his hearers that they may be told by an unbeliever "that when a man is tempted to steal, for instance, he will be kept from stealing when he has learned that s-t-e-a-l spells steal; or that, when a man is tempted to shed the life-blood of his fellow-man, it will be a great help to him against the temptation, if he understands the anatomy of the body which he is tempted to slay."\* Dr. Goulburn, whose property the illustration about the hungry being is, was ill-advised enough in the same discourse † to attack the Catholic Church, as if by the doctrine of Transubstantiation, she implicitly denied the evidence of the senses: a mistake which a very limited acquaintance with Catholic Theology would have prevented him from making. Acquaintance with the writings of Sir William Hamilton would have done him the same good office; ‡ but that he is weak on scientific subjects is evident from his reproduction in the last discourse of a sensational newspaper-paragraph-derived idea about photographs in the eyes of the dead. § But the faults which we have noticed, and some others of a similar nature, which the reader will no doubt himself discover if he choose to peruse these discourses, must not in fairness blind him to the fact that they contain many excellent arguments, of which we would in conclusion instance one, || showing that the historical evidences are strongest when taken to prove a strongly dogmatic Christianity, weakest in the hands of Unitarians or Latitudinarians.

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*The Mystery of Life, an Essay in Reply to Dr. Gull's attack on the Theory Vitality in his Harverian Oration for 1870.* By LIONEL S. BEALE, M.B., F.R.S., &c. London: J. and A. Churchill. 1870.

**A**BOUT the meaning of this word *Life* there is an unfortunate ambiguity. Sometimes it is taken to mean the aggregate of the phenomena common to, and distinctive of all, living beings; sometimes the agency by

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\* v. 21.

† v. 25.

‡ Hamilton's Reid, p. 518. Dr. Reid, who is generally very trustworthy, had in this instance so far forgotten himself as to declare that Catholics require Protestants to prove that bread and wine are, not flesh and blood. So Hamilton promptly puts this stopper on him:—"The Catholics require nothing of the kind. They admit that *physically* the bread and wine are bread and wine; and only contend that, *hyperphysically*, in a spiritual, mysterious, and inconceivable sense, they are flesh and blood. Those, therefore, who think of disproving the doctrine of transubstantiation, by proving that in the Eucharist bread and wine remain physically bread and wine, are guilty of the idle sophism called *mutatio clenchi*." By *physically*, we hardly need explain, in so far as they are subjects of *physical* science—i.e. *quoad accidentia*, is meant. In the same way Theodoret speaks. By *hyperphysically* is in like manner meant in so far as they are subjects of hyperphysical science *ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἢ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, metaphysics, which penetrates to substances, or, in Kantian and Hamiltonian phraseology, noumena.

§ vi. 9.

|| iii. 18, 19; iv. 18—22.

which these phenomena are produced. Respecting the nature of life in the second sense two opinions are at present held. The first, which is that maintained by Dr. Beale, is the hypothesis that a peculiar vital force or principle animates each living being, and produces in it that part of the phenomena which cannot be accounted for by the operation of the physical forces of inorganic nature. Thus the motion of a living body is accompanied by an expenditure of nervous force—which is probably of the same fundamental character as the forces of inorganic nature ;—digestion arises from nervous influence and the properties of the gastric juice : but over these and the other processes is set a vital force. This preserves the balance of the organism by regulating them, and directing their action to a common end. It is called vital force to indicate that it is the source of formally vital phenomena, and to distinguish it from the forces which are treated of in general physics, and are denominated physical forces. It is supposed to be in its nature fundamentally different from physical force or forces ; for to explain phenomena which cannot be accounted for by physical forces we need, not something which merely follows their laws, and consequently would explain nothing which they would not explain as well, but something which shall co-ordain and regulate their action as it were from above. This vital force cannot, indeed, create the chemical elements or physical forces with which it has to deal, but the changes continually going on in the organism place in its hands a store of physical force which it can apply to this or that purpose, according to the needs of the living whole. And therefore its activity neither increases nor decreases the total quantity of physical force existing in the universe. The second opinion denies the existence of any such vital force as has been just described, and attributes vital phenomena to the operation of the physical forces ; it is therefore called the physical theory of life. On behalf of this theory it is argued that to pretend to explain the action of the varied and complicated machinery which dissection and the microscope show to be at work in a living body by attributing them to the operation of a “vital principle,” is as if a visitor to a cotton factory “were to give up in despair any attempt to acquaint himself with the meaning of the several processes that go on before his eyes, and were to regard it as a sufficient account of the transformation of raw cotton into a woven material, that it takes place by the agency of a calico-making principle.” It is pleaded that in every case where an explanation has been given of any phenomenon occurring in a living being, it has been explained by showing it to be produced by the operation of the forces of inorganic nature and of nerve-force—a force working through organized matter of a peculiar kind (nervous tissue), but correlated with the other forces ; and that as science advances the other vital phenomena will, if they are to be explained at all, be explained in the same manner. A plant or animal is, therefore, only a very complicated machine, and the effects seem to be wonderful, and the explanation is difficult, only because the complication is immense.

Which of these opinions is the correct one—what is in reality the nature of the agency by which vital phenomena are produced—can obviously be decided only by examination of these phenomena. And when we proceed more carefully to examine them, there are two things which at once fix our

attention—the first, the extraordinary character of the phenomena themselves ; and the second, the extraordinary character of organisms, in which alone they take place. Of the phenomenal definitions of life, consequently, some have drawn attention specially to distinctive characteristics of organisms or bodies of plants and animals, as, “life is the sum of the phenomena *proper to organized beings* ;” others to distinctive characteristics of vital phenomena, as, “life is a general and continuous movement of combination and decomposition.” But great difficulty has been found in constructing any definition which will include all that is alive, and exclude all that is not.

However, the most superficial observation of any living being through a considerable space of time discloses phenomena which even to the most thoughtless are so strange, and are so different from what we find in inorganic nature, as abundantly to warrant the appellation, “The Mystery of Life.” Any inorganic object, as a crystal, a stone, a lump of iron, a machine, remains the same only so long as it continues to be composed of the same particles of matter ; add to or remove from a watch a spring, a wheel, a lever, and its properties and powers are *pro tanto* altered. On the other hand, an animal or a plant continues to present the same appearance—to sleep and to feel and move in alternate periods, to bear leaves, and flowers, and fruit, in recurrent seasons,—not merely in spite of, but only on condition of continual renewal of its particles ; and if this renewal is prevented for any length of time, a thorough and radical change takes place, and it is resolved into a mass of putrescence. Breathing and the ingestion of food continually convey into the body new matter which becomes an integral part of it ; secretions and excretions continually carry away matter which was formerly an integral part of it ; by these means, indeed, the entire organism may in some species be several times wholly renewed in the course of its existence ; and this characteristic of life has suggested the second definition quoted above. We live only because we do not continue the same. Every living organism is *in fluxu*, and it is this very *fluxus* that ensures its persistent existence. Again, a non-living object is modified in exact proportion to the quantity and intensity of the external influences acting on it. The degree to which a spring is bent is a test of the pressure brought to bear on it ; the increment of motion in a moving body is a test of the attractive force which draws it on ; the distance to which the pith ball of an electrometer is repelled from the stem indicates, as precisely as humidity in the atmosphere and accidental mechanical imperfections in the instrument allow of, the tension of the electricity present. But it is not so with a living being. It possesses an internal activity able, within wide limits, to resist the action of external influences ; and when these without, or morbid agencies within, become too strong for it, it breaks down altogether, and death ensues. The temperature of the blood, for instance, is almost the same in the coldest as in the hottest climates. That which lives is continually exercising over itself a regulative power, and increasing or diminishing, as may be needful, the intensity of the processes going on within it. The heart beats more forcibly when disease of its valves offers any considerable impediment to the circulation. The blood is directed with greater force

and in greater quantity to the organs which are working than to those which are at rest. The secretion of gastric juice is regulated by the presence and quantity of food in the stomach. A living being possesses also a reparative power for healing injuries experienced by it, while no non-living product of nature can repair those which may be done to it. The healing of a wound, the growing together of the two ends of a fractured bone, convalescence from an illness, have no parallels in the inorganic world. Further, a living being has that most marvellous power of producing others the same in species with itself. It may be added that, at least, in the higher orders of plants and animals, which exhibit the phenomena of life in greater complexity and abundance, species are so rigid,—resist external influences so obstinately,—that all their members will die rather than become essentially modified by their environment. And even if it be granted to the disciples of the Darwinian that one species can be changed into another, the immensity of the time postulated brings the admitted rigidity of species into the strongest relief. Again, the duration of the life of a living being is not indefinite. It may continue to live for more than a hundred years, although of soft consistency and almost infinite complexity, its delicate fabric sustaining during that time a continual friction arising from voluntary and involuntary movements. But even if it be not destroyed or injured by accidental causes, vital phenomena manifest themselves in it for a period only about four times as long as that occupied by its growth and development. And these vital phenomena pass through a definite cycle. It grows and consolidates in infancy, childhood, and adolescence; remains for some time in full possession of its powers; and then becomes gradually weaker with declining years, until the descent is closed by death. It begins its distinct existence as a minute germ (the germinal spot), so small that it cannot be seen by the naked eye; and when it is made discernible by the microscope, it is but a clear homogeneous spheroid as structureless as a drop of water. It is, however, placed in juxtaposition to nutritive material, and absorbs it into itself until it is millions of times, perhaps, its original bulk; but, wonderful to say, it does not pass over to the nature of that which it absorbs, but assimilates it to itself, and by its inherent power places it here or there, and changes it thus or thus, so as to form itself into an organism of marvellous harmony and complexity, and resembling its parents, often in most minute particulars. And neither to the manner in which the organism is formed, nor to the nature of the organism which is formed, is there any parallel in the inorganic world. The best definition of an organism is probably the teleological one suggested by Kant; “an organized product of nature is one in which all the parts are reciprocally ends and means.” Thus the muscles, which are the organs of motion, and those of special and general sensation, *e.g.*, eyes, ears, and skin, whose behests it is the function of the greater part of them to carry out, evidently subserve the general good of the organism by assisting in supplying it with food and protecting it from incidental dangers. On the other hand, the nourishment of the immense mass of muscular substance purifies the blood by abstracting from it elements which, if retained, would render it unfit to be the pabulum of other organs. The same may be said of the adipose tissue, which at the same time serves as a reserve of heat, providing nourishment against time of need; of the horny

matter of the nails and hair, the former of which protect the extremities, while the latter afford protection against climate ; of the bile secreted by the liver, which secures digestion ; and of the calcareous matter of the bones and teeth, which remaining in the blood would produce diseases of the blood-vessels, as it does in old age, but passing on to the bones is the source of their necessary firmness ; so that, generalizing, it has been held that there is, as it were, a balance of organs, and that every organ is a secretion with respect to every other. The nervous system exercises a sort of general supervision over all the organism ; in return, the whole of the organism combines to support the nervous system. The circulatory system provides the digestive organs with the nourishment necessary to the fulfilment of their functions ; the digestive organs furnish the materials of the blood. The body of man is like his mind ; no part of it continues to function normally except the others do so also. Each part is the servant of the whole ; and the whole feels with, and in case of necessity comes to the assistance of, any of the parts.

Such are the most prominent and obvious characteristics of life. They do not belong to this living being and to that, but, *mutatis mutandis*, to all living beings whatsoever. They belong to nothing that is not alive. Their peculiar and distinctive character raises a very strong initial presumption against any opinion which asserts that the physical forces of inorganic nature are the cause of vital phenomena, and at once throws a heavy burden of proof on those who declare this to be the case ; and although some approach to some sort of a physical explanation of some of them may to some extent be made, this is as far from a fairly complete explanation of vital phenomena in their integrity as the piers and jetties of the opposite harbours of two continents are from bridging over the ocean which rolls between them. The continuance of the living being under varying external conditions, and still more the reproduction of plants and animals the same in species for at least many generations, are, to say the least, almost incredible, if we do not recognize the existence of an internal regulating principle set over the physical processes to direct and co-ordain them.

How, then, is this initial presumption met by those who hold the physical or molecular theory of life ? In the first place, they attack the opposite theory. Dr. Gull, for instance, in his "Oration," declares that "They who maintain the hypothesis of a separate vital force, independent of the ordinary forces of nature, and which has no special relation to them, do, by the very terms of the hypothesis, assume that the phenomena of living beings are out of the proper range of science, and they consign us to a perpetual mental-inactivity and ignorance in that region of knowledge in which, above all others, man is interested." But the amount of residual phenomena which require some further and non-physical agency to explain them, can be determined with precision only by exact knowledge which and how much of the total phenomena occurring in a living being can be explained by causes merely physical. While, therefore, the molecularist enters on the investigation of phenomena with a bias arising from a foregone conclusion as to the kind of cause to which he is to refer them, vitalism equally incites to the study of the phenomenon, but leaves the investigator free to refer any particular

phenomenon either to a physical or a vital agency ; for no one supposes that everything which takes place in a living organism is to be ascribed to its vital force, nothing to physical forces. Even if a person attributed the manufacture of cotton to a calico-making principle, that need not prevent him from examining the nature and action of the machinery, which would according to him be the means by which that principle worked. He would, in fact, from the nature of the machinery, see that it required some regulative principle, and he would find that principle in the body of workmen attending to the mill. It is also argued that certain of the phenomena which occur in living beings have been accounted for by the operation of the physical forces, and that consequently the rest are to be explained in the same manner. This, however, assumes that all the phenomena are of the same nature as those which, it is asserted, have been thus explained. This is the very point at issue ; and if some aspects of some phenomena presented by living organisms have been accounted for by the operation of physical forces, there are always other aspects which cannot be so accounted for. It is urged also that the molecularist theory is more in accordance with the present tendencies of science than vitalism is—*i.e.*, the present tendency of science is to explain phenomena by reference merely to matter and motion, and it is more in accordance with this tendency to explain life by matter and motion than to explain it in any other way. But this, as Dr. Beale very truly says, is only the constantly recurring dream about unity,—the idea that all phenomena, whether of inorganic nature, or life, or mind, are the results of some one universal law, stealthily influencing even modern and scientific thought. And this old dream of unity is distinctly unscientific.\*

In the second place, when the advocates of the physical theory of life endeavour to substantiate it, they do so not by proposing evidence in its favour, but by treating us to apologies for the lack of evidence, to dogmatic assertions, prophecies, suppositions, and vague language conveying no definite information. We are told, for instance, that if certain kinds of matter manifest vital phenomena, this is because of "their molecular machinery, worked by their molecular forces." This would be all very well as a sentence introductory to a description of the machinery and the forces, showing them to be such as would produce the phenomena in question. But, as it stands, it is on a par with, *e.g.*, an assertion that the battle of Waterloo was lost by the French because of the state of the weather, made by a person ignorant what the state of the weather was, and ignorant what influence it had, if any, on the defeat of the French army ; for it is at the same time admitted, that of this molecular machinery not a trace has ever been seen, that only the merest generalities can be inferred about it, and that these generalities are even ludicrously insufficient to form the basis of a train of reasoning, of which the physical theory of life shall be the conclusion. If we complain of this, we are told, with perfect justice, that it arises from the inherent difficulties of the subject—from the extreme minuteness of the molecules, the scanty and precarious

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\* Mill's Logic, Book iii. ch. xiv. § 7.

character of our knowledge of their movements, and the impossibility of knowing what these movements are when the molecules are combined in the unknown but doubtless complex manner in which they are combined in protoplasm. This is a very excellent reason for not accusing the investigators of negligence; but, as it is not evidence for the molecular theory, but an apology for the lack of it, it is one of the worst possible reasons for accepting their conclusions. We are then assured that evidence will be hereafter forthcoming. Forthcoming evidence, however, is not evidence until it comes. And what ground can there possibly be for believing that evidence will hereafter be forthcoming, except present evidence looking the same way? If this present evidence is not conclusive, or if no evidence at present exist, this state of things is not altered by predictions, which, if they have any weight at all, have weight only from present evidence. And by the time that we are, in the last resort, informed that there are privileged spirits who can investigate Nature by imagination, and explain her hitherto hidden mysteries by a process of divination, it has become plain to the meanest understanding that nonsense is being substituted for science. "Has Science," very pertinently asks Dr. Beale, "has Science, with her *observation*, her *experimental* method, and her *facts*, really been brought to this?" "The formation of tissue," he says in another place,\* "has been attributed to 'vacuolation' and 'differentiation,' and these polysyllables have lately been superseded [?] by the still more vague terms, 'subtle influences,' and 'external conditions,' and 'sundry circumstances.' And it has been affirmed that to the 'primitive properties of the molecules,' and 'natural selection'† may be referred all the varying forms and structures known to us, as well as all the phenomena of the living world. But such terms explain nothing. By their use further enquiry is discouraged, and the mind bent upon investigating the secrets of nature is misled at the very outset." Declarations that the tissues of living beings are formed by "subtle influences" and "sundry circumstances" would be invaluable, no doubt, if the persons making them could tell us any more than other men of science can as to what the "subtle influences" and "sundry circumstance" are. But the idea that any information is conveyed by statements so trivial as that vital phenomena are produced by "sundry circumstances" and "subtle influences," or that such statements are capable of supporting any theory of life whatever, only shows how even those whose mental training might be supposed to have put them out of the reach of such a danger, are liable to be imposed upon by mere words and phrases, and to confound verbal with real explanation. Again, the history of the formation of tissue is, according to Van Baër's law, a history of differentiations; so that tissue is formed by differentiation, not in the sense that differentiation is the cause of tissue formation, but that it is the manner of it. It is, however, the cause that is in question when we are examining theories on the nature of the agency which produces vital phenomena; and in the sense of

\* Page 58.

† Natural selection is, however, a *causa vera*. The question is about the *extent* of its operation, and the presence in this or that case of the *conditions* of its operation.

cause, it is as ridiculous to say that tissue is formed by differentiation as it would be to say that the earth's annual revolution round the sun is the cause of its going round that body once a year.

The character of the arguments—if arguments they can be called—used to support the physical theory of life are thus insufficient even appreciably to diminish the initial presumption against it. It is Dr. Beale's object in his Essay to supplement this presumption by a variety of special facts and arguments into which we cannot enter, but the general character of "The Mystery of Life" will have been abundantly evident from the above observations.

*The Scripture Doctrine of Creation: with reference to Religious Nihilism and Modern Theories of Development.* By the Rev. T. R. BIRKS. London: The Christian Evidence Committee of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1872.

IN this little volume (which we notice partly on account of the magnitude of the interests involved, and partly as a fair sample of the manner in which the conflict with unbelief is being carried on by its non-Catholic opponents) the Author, the fact, and the manner of creation are treated of, the speculations of Mr. Herbert Spencer being attacked under the first two heads, the Darwinian theory and the hypothesis of creation by law under the third. As Mr. Spencer also holds the Darwinian theory, and as it is in the form in which it is propounded by him that it is attacked in "The Scripture Doctrine of Creation," we may indeed say that it is to certain of Spencer's speculations as are dangerous to religion that the volume before us purports to be a popular answer.

To begin with, why does Mr. Birks take the Scripture doctrine of Creation as the keynote of his opposition to Herbert Spencer? This he himself explains at the commencement of his fourth chapter:—

"In the beginning God created heaven and earth. These words are the simple and sublime fountain-head of the mighty river of divine revelation. They claim, then, the deepest attention and the most careful study from every thinking Christian. In their original order they teach in succession four great truths, a beginning, an act of creation, a Divine Creator, and the reality of a created universe. And they exclude five speculative falsehoods: that nothing can be known of God or the origin of things; that there is nothing but uncreated matter; that there is no God distinct from His creatures; that creation is a series of acts without a beginning; and that there is no real universe; or, more briefly, Nihilism, Materialism, Pantheism, Evolutionism, and Negative Idealism." (p. 78.)

But Herbert Spencer's speculations can be called Nihilism only if an extremely odd signification be given to the word *Nihil*. He does not, any more than any one else, deny that anything exists; and therefore Nihilism is not a fitting term whereby to designate either his speculations or those of any other person. What he asserts is that clear and definite knowledge, know-



ledge properly so called, is of the phenomenal alone, and that although a dim, underlying, all-mysterious something manifests itself to us in all phenomena whether of our own minds or of the material universe, this something is, strictly speaking, unknowable, inasmuch as only a vague and indistinct apprehension of it, which cannot properly be called knowledge, is attainable. The whole bearing of these declarations manifestly depends, on the sense in which the word phenomenon is taken. Derived from *φαίνω*, its natural meaning would seem to be that which shows or reveals itself, a premiss, a *datum*, a material of knowledge. In this meaning of the word it is plain that we can know only phenomena, *i. e.* things appearing, and whatever can be legitimately concluded from them; and it is also evident, not only that we can have no knowledge of the ultra-phenomenal, but also that we can have no reason for asserting that anything beyond the phenomenal exists. But then in this sense the Divine Nature would be mediately a phenomenon; which everyone would feel to be a strange way of speaking. And in this signification phenomenon is not so commonly used; it is usually taken to denote quantities, qualities, and relations, as distinguished from the substance or substances in which they inhere. It is in this second sense that the term is employed by Herbert Spencer; and the gist of this part of his philosophy therefore is that our knowledge extends only to quantities, qualities, and relations, and that although a mysterious something lies beyond these, it lies also beyond the limits of our knowledge. In other words, his philosophy is a philosophy of knowledge of the phenomenal and nescience of the ultra-phenomenal, and may, therefore, with reference to the distinctive part of it, be called a Philosophy of Nescience.

Mr. Birks's little book consists of three parts. In the first, which is composed of three chapters, two on "Religious Nescience," and a third on "The Alleged Law of Scientific Progress," he attacks the position that God cannot be known. By the alleged law of scientific progress he means Auguste Comte's celebrated fancy that every science starts from a theological stage in which it supposes that the phenomena with which it deals are effects of the volitions of some conscious being or beings; passes through a metaphysical stage in which it refers them to metaphysical abstractions such as force, the powers of nature, etc.; and rests in a positive stage, in which it confines itself to the phenomena themselves, and declares it unscientific to refer them to any non-phenomenal cause whatsoever. This idea he supposes to be held also by Herbert Spencer; but erroneously; for Mr. Spencer has in his essay on the classification of the sciences condemned it as a faulty generalization, and given some very excellent reasons for dissenting from it. However, in the latter part of the chapter he successfully attacks Herbert Spencer's own hasty and equally faulty generalization that the religious history of man is the history of a progress towards complete recognition of the fact that the office of religion is to contemplate "the Unknowable." But the value of his criticisms is considerably diminished by the circumstance that he has not used the last (third) edition of "First Principles," in which some of the passages he objects to are suppressed.

What Mr. Birks calls Religious Nihilism we should prefer to call

Religious Nescience,—meaning by Nescience a dim and vague apprehension as distinguished on the one hand from entire and complete ignorance, and on the other from knowledge in the strict sense of the word. Mr. Spencer's "Unknowable" is the nearest approach he ever makes to the idea of a God, and, in fact, his opinion as to this Unknowable in parts remind one of the opinions held by some of the less orthodox Scholastics, that our concepts of the Divine Attributes in no wise resemble the Divine Attributes themselves [*conceptus æquivocus Dei*], e.g., that we call God wise not because there is in Him anything in any way corresponding to the most perfect wisdom which can be conceived by us, but because He produces the effects which would be produced by the most perfect wisdom. Nay, some of the arguments which Mr. Spencer employs are even the same as were formerly used by these Scholastics,\* whose opinion has long ago been exploded. And the state of mind in which his speculations about this "Unknowable" would leave a perfectly docile disciple, is one very far removed from a state of entire and complete ignorance. Such a condition would be, for instance, that in which a person would find himself, who, for the first time, and without any knowledge of Latin, beheld the word *homo*. In the first place, he would not know whether it meant anything at all; and in the second place, supposing it to mean something, he would have not the slightest idea what it did or did not mean: it might signify, for anything he knew to the contrary, dirty water, first love, howsoever, or a bean-stalk. In like manner complete ignorance about the Unknowable would be not to have the least notion whether it existed or not, or, if it existed, what it was like. But according to Mr. Spencer, we know of this Unknowable at least that it exists; and this, if not much, is at any rate something; we also know that it is mysterious, which is something more; and we are told † that the contemplation of it is an essentially religious act, so that whatever its nature is, its nature must be such that it is religious to contemplate it. We learn ‡ from the same teacher that it is "the Absolute," "the Ultimate Reality," "the Ultimate Cause," an "Incomprehensible Power," to the presence of which we are unable to think of limits, § and that if it does not possess personality, the assumption that the choice is between personality and something lower is erroneous, for the choice is rather between personality and something higher. || It would also appear that if what we call consciousness is not predicable of it, the choice is in like manner not between consciousness and something lower, but rather between consciousness and something higher; for Mr. Spencer informs us that it puts thoughts into people's minds, and more than that, that "when the unknown cause produces in" a man "a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief." ¶ And if he said, in his "Principles of Biology," \*\* that an enormous mass of the provisions of organic nature—"imply malevolence rather than benevolence," we are happy to say that he

\* Compare "First Principles" (Williams & Norgate, 1870), pp. 109-113, with Occam, *In Sententias*, l. 1, d. 3, &c.

† "First Principles," p. 99, &c. ‡ "First Principles," p. 96, &c.

§ "First Principles," p. 99. || p. 109. ¶ p. 123. \*\* p. 344.

has apparently changed his opinion, for he tells us in his "First Principles" \* that he is "convinced that all punishment, as we see it wrought out in the order of nature, is but a disguised beneficence : " which is obviously enough a sufficient basis for the ordinary argument for the continuance of our existence in another life. Now, whatever this theory may be, † it is certainly most inappropriate to call it Religious Nihilism ; and if it is called Religious Nescience, and the Being of whom Mr. Spencer makes the declaration which we have quoted is denominated the Unknowable, it must not be forgotten that Nescience is not taken to mean absolute ignorance, and that knowledge is used in a special and peculiar sense in which it signifies a knowledge more clear, exact, and complete than these declarations imply.

The conclusion, that the ultra-phenomenal somewhat of which so much is made in the Philosophy of Nescience is unknowable, is arrived at by means of two lines of argument, of which the first is that knowledge is only of the relative, ‡ and that the Ultimate Cause is absolute. But if the validity of this argument, which is in reality only a jumble of words, be conceded, much more than the Ultimate Cause will have to be excluded from knowledge ; for we must hold ourselves incapable of knowing not only the supposedly non-relative Ultimate Reality, § but also anything else which may be absolute. This, consequently, Mr. Spencer admits ; and supports his conclusion by a second line of argument, that whenever we attempt to realize the non-relative in thought we fall necessarily into insoluble contradictions.

\* "First Principles," p. 120.

† Mr. Spencer's "Unknowable" which he prints with a capital letter, as he does its congeners, "the Ultimate Reality," etc., often reminds us of the *Tò Ἐν καὶ Πάν* of the Pantheists, which underlies all phenomena : e.g., "First Principles," p. 113, speaks of the "indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence."

‡ "The relativity of human knowledge," says Mr. Mill in his "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," chap. ii, "like most other phrases into which the word relative or relation enters, is vague, and admits of a great variety of meanings. . . . When, therefore, a philosopher lays great stress upon the relativity of our knowledge, it is necessary to cross-examine his writings and compel them to disclose in which of its many degrees of meaning he understands the phrase."—An observation very useful to anyone who should undertake an examination of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy. It may be added that while Mr. Spencer declares that we have definite consciousness only of the relative, he admits a vague and indefinite consciousness of the non-relative also.—(F. P. p. 87.)

§ The "Ultimate Reality" will often remind the reader of *Substance* ; and the assertions about its unknowableness of the declarations which have been current since the time of Locke respecting the unknowableness of substance. As a matter of fact, however, we know substance just as much as we know attribute, as any one may convince himself by a little reflection. It is true we cannot know substance apart from attribute, but then just as little can we know attribute apart from substance ; we know both only in conjunction, and so we know both. But although we cannot know the one aloof from the other, yet when the two are presented together in apprehension we can attend to the one while we pay but little attention to the other, although we are conscious of its presence. And if we thus isolate some simple attribute,

According to Mr. Spencer, for instance, we can have an idea of a relative beginning of existence, a beginning, that is relative to this or that existence; but an absolute beginning, a beginning, that is, of all phenomenal existence, creation, and the absence of an absolute beginning, are alike, to use a favourite word of his, *unthinkable* by us. This is only one out of many alleged necessary and insoluble contradictions which he brings forward, and which Mr. Birks attacks with more or less good fortune; the more difficult of solution among them are merely borrowed from Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel; those which are original to Spencer himself are plain and therefore somewhat contemptible fallacies, and if they were as impregnable as he imagines them to be, their effect would be to destroy his own theory, by leaving no room for the positive statements respecting "the Unknowable" which we have quoted above.

Herbert Spencer's position that an absolute beginning of the universe and its existence through infinite past time are equally unthinkable, brings us to the second part of Mr. Birks's book, in which he treats of the fact of creation attacking the opinion that nothing can be known respecting the origin of things. This part, which consists of four chapters, completes the treatment of "Religious Nihilism." The first of these chapters is entitled "The Beginning"; its object is to prove that not only is it not inconceivable that there should have been an absolute beginning to the whole series of changes which the universe presents to us, but also that science favours such a supposition, while it is metaphysically impossible that past time should have been infinite:—an assertion better left out, and savouring too much of the system of thought contended against. The three succeeding chapters are on "The Creation of Matter," "Infinite Space," and "Force, Law, and Necessity." "Materialism, in its naked form, hardly deserves a formal refutation." It is "a maggot theory of the universe," a "dirt philosophy," as one might

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*e.g.*, a red *minimum visibile*, we are conscious only of three things respecting it: that it exists; that it is known by us; and that it has, or is, a peculiar *talitas*, if we may so speak, which is commonly to be expressed only by the name of the attribute, and is in the above case redness. If, however, we in like manner isolate some particular substance, *e.g.*, the *Ego*, we find that we are here also conscious of these three things, and neither more nor fewer: that it exists; that it is known by us; and that it has a peculiar *talitas*, which, when we compare it with other objects of thought, we find not to exist in them. So that what we know of attribute, that we know of substance; and if we say that we know more of attributes than we do of substances, this is because there are more attributes than there are substances, and because a multitude of relations arise in thought when we compare attributes together. The *Ego* itself, for instance, is but one, while it has for attributes an infinity of emotions, volitions perceptions, &c.; and therefore we know more of these than we do of it, just as we know a greater number of facts concerning a particular branch of study, *e.g.*, mathematics, than we do concerning any one single part of it, *e.g.*, the properties of the straight line. And this appears to be the true reason of the misapprehension that we have no knowledge of substance. Besides, to know that a thing is a substance is of comparatively little use; to know what its attributes are is practically all-important; to that we pay more attention to this second head of knowledge than to the first.

say. It therefore naturally has recourse to "Nihilism," in order to conceal a little of its shame; for "God may perhaps be only matter, and matter may perhaps be the only God, if the true nature of God and of matter is equally inscrutable, and veiled from us for ever in total darkness." So, in order to refute Materialism, our author attempts to determine what the real nature of matter is; the theory adopted being that of Boscovitch. The argument against Materialism and for Theism, which can now be securely brought forward, is thus seen to rest on two simple premises, that "it is impossible to avoid making the assumption of self-existence somewhere," and that "this conception wholly disagrees with the known characters of material atoms, their almost inconceivable number, their minuteness, unconsciousness, and dependence." The creation of matter was the endowing of positions with force (p. 126), as indeed anyone who follows Boscovitch must hold. But if we would to the best advantage maintain the createdness of matter, we must reject certain errors about infinite space: whence the chapter on that subject. "The conception of space as a real existence, prior to matter, and independent of the Divine will, seems often to be a covert defence of Atheistic Materialism. If this mighty void,—Infinite Space,—has a real and necessary existence before any creation, and wholly independent of the Creator, is it much harder to conceive that matter, the shifting and variable contents of this Infinite Space, may also be uncreated, and exist from all eternity?" The difficulty is met by a conclusion (p. 137) which differs only verbally from the Scholastic thesis that space (*Spatium imaginarium*) is the possibility of extended substance, and to this is tacked on a fanciful speculation that the fact of space having three dimensions strengthens the Theistic argument, for that these three dimensions typify the three persons of the Blessed Trinity. Force, Law, and Necessity are then considered, because on the view taken of them "the main contrast between the Scripture doctrine of creation and the theories of modern scepticism turns."

The third part, which deals with the theory of evolution, and treats of the manner of creation, consists, like the second, of four chapters, an introductory chapter on "Creation and Life" being followed by three chapters on "Creation and Evolution," "Evolution as an Inductive Theory," and "Creation by Law." The burden of this last chapter is that creation by law is, in reality, a contradiction in terms (p. 249), which is a good verbal criticism; and the main positions assailed in the second and third are set forth in the following passage from Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Biology":—

"The belief in special creations of organisms is a belief that arose among men during the era of profoundest darkness, and belongs to a family of beliefs which have nearly all died out as enlightenment has increased. It is without a solitary established fact on which to stand, and when the attempt is made to put it into definite shape, it turns out to be only a pseudo-idea. The mere verbal hypothesis, which men idly accept as real or thinkable, is of the same nature as would be one based on a day's observation of human life, that each man or woman was specially created, an hypothesis not suggested by evidence, but by lack of evidence, formulating absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive knowledge. This hypothesis, wholly

without support, essentially inconceivable, and thus failing to satisfy men's intellectual need, fails also to satisfy their moral sentiment. It is quite inconsistent with those conceptions of the divine nature which they profess to entertain. *If infinite power was to be demonstrated, then either by the special creation of individuals, or the production of species after a method akin to that of individuals, it would be better demonstrated than by the two methods the hypothesis assumes to be necessary.* If infinite goodness was to be demonstrated, not only do the provisions of organic structure, if specially devised, fail to demonstrate it, but there is an enormous mass of them which imply malevolence rather than benevolence.

Thus the hypothesis of special creations turns out to be worthless ; worthless by its derivation, worthless in its intrinsic incoherence, worthless as absolutely without evidence, worthless as not supplying an intellectual need, worthless as not satisfying a moral want. \*"—p. 344.

We conclude by extracting two passages, which contain Mr. Birks's reply to the sentence we have underlined. The first is the answer to that part of it which concerns special creation of each individual ; the second the answer to that concerning the evolution of species :—

"The first maxim of Christian Theism is that the design of creation is to glorify the great Creator by the wonderful works of His hands. This end must be secured, in the largest degree, by every increase in the fulness and variety of the gifts He bestows ; but subject to this one condition,—that the mode of their bestowment shall not wholly conceal their true source, and make it easy and natural to rest in second causes, and ascribe to them an origin independent of the Creator's will and good pleasure. The creation of plants and animals, with an imparted power to increase and multiply in successive generations without limit, plainly magnifies the power, wisdom, and foresight of the Creator in a very high degree. The gift of parentage, in every case, amplifies and redoubles the simpler gift of being. Nor is this the only gain. That scheme of nature, over which man is gifted with sovereignty and large control, is vastly extended, compared with a constant creation of individual plants and animals, by which all the higher arts of human life would at once expire. Human existence is enriched and ennobled by various ties of race, brotherhood, conjugal and parental love, and filial honour and obedience, far beyond what a scheme of mere individualism could attain."—pp. 212, 213.

"Its disciples [*i.e.*, the disciples of the evolution system] maintain that it

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\* The modesty of these assertions, remarks Mr. Birks, needs no comment Undoubtedly ; for it is idle to comment on the non-existent. The first head worthless by derivation, would considerably enlarge the field of discussion ; for it would array against Mr. Spencer the evidences for Revelation, as, if special creations are supported by Revelation, it is beside the mark to urge that the revelation was made before Mr. Darwin's speculations became popular with a certain class of persons. The second, that special creations are inconceivable, is merely an example of a bad habit of Mr. Spencer's, to call things inconceivable which are not inconceivable at all. The third, that they are without evidence, begs the question. As to the last, infinite goodness, wisdom and power, must have foreknown the consequences of the evolving process which it nevertheless set agoing ; so that if anything—*e.g.*, the existence of venomous animals—would on the hypothesis of special creations imply malevolence, it would on the hypothesis of evolution imply the same thing. We cannot, however, agree with Mr. Birks that evolution weakens the argument from design by spreading the design over a longer tract of time. For the quantity of design remains the same.

is unworthy of the Divine Workman to construct the machine of the universe in such a way as to need repeated repairs from His more immediate hand; and that it would be a nobler triumph of wisdom and power to construct it from the first as complete and perfect in its own latent powers, as to need no corrective or interference whatever. The reasoning would be sound, if we were at liberty to assume that the whole aim of the Creator is to form a wonderful piece of machinery, and not to reveal Himself to intelligent moral creatures, made in His own image. It is a scheme of providence, which implies that God is only the Supreme Carpenter of the universe, but not the Supreme Lawgiver, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords. To reveal a more perfect and wonderful mechanical skill and physical foresight, by throwing back every act of creative power to innumerable ages before the birth of man,—to hide Himself wholly from view by the very depth of His engineering skill, and leave mankind nothing within their reach to gaze upon but self-evolving powers of matter alone, might be a wise scheme of providence, if the purpose of God were only to develop a race of self-satisfied atheists. But certainly it is not the likeliest plan to weaken the notes of that celestial song from the dwellers upon earth; ‘Thou art worthy to receive honour, and glory, and power; for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are and were created.’”

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*Hints and Facts on the Origin, Condition, and Destiny of Man.* By PRUS MELIA, D.D. Second edition.

IN this edition (pp. xiv.-xxii.), Dr. Melia replies to the comment on his first edition, which we published in April 1872 (pp. 459, 460). We understand the respected writer to disavow one opinion, which we had thought not sufficiently repudiated by his language; and we will therefore do no more than express more at length what we urged in reference to that opinion.

Dr. Melia had said that social teaching is absolutely necessary to the first development of the faculties of speech and reason, as it is clearly proved that when social teaching has not been afforded, no speech is acquired nor the faculty of reason awakened. On this we remarked—

“We wish he had explained where lies the precise difference between what he here intends to express and the disapproved Louvain traditionalism. Our readers will find the doctrine of the four Louvain professors, as put forth by themselves, in our number for April 1869 (pp. 532-536). And in regard to the authoritative disapproval of this doctrine, we would refer to the documents published by us in January 1868.” (pp. 281-288).

We will here add that doctrine of the Louvain professors to which we referred, as expressed by themselves. The italics also are theirs:—

“Mens humana vi pollet internâ sibi que propriâ; per se et continuo actiosa est; attamen, ut homo hâc mente præditus perveniat ad expeditum usum rationis, opus habet externo aliquo intellectuali auxilio. Itaque opinamur, principia veritatum rationalium, metaphysicarum ac moralium, a Deo conditore humanæ menti indita esse; at simul arbitramur, hanc esse mentis nostræ legem naturalem sive psychologicam, ut homo *indigeat institutione*

aliquâ *intellectuali* ad obtinendum eum rationis usum, qui illi sufficiat ut distinctam Dei et veritatum moralium cognitionem sibi comparare possit. Non negamus, humanæ menti absquæ illâ institutione inesse confusum quemdam harum veritatum sensum, et vagam quamdam apprehensionem; sed loquimur hic de verâ cognitione, hoc est, de clarâ et certâ illarum veritatum notitiâ acquirendâ. *Institutionem* autem intelligimus externam quodvis intellectuale auxilium, sive de industriâ, sive non datâ operâ præstitum, idque sive voce, sive scripto, sive gestu, sive alio quovis modo, quem sociale commercium suppeditat. *Indigentiam* porro intelligimus *absolutam*; at non eo sensu, ut putemus, Deum non potuisse aliter condere hominem, sed eo sensu, ut putemus, esse eam indigentiam omnibus hominibus, quales nunc nascuntur, communem. Hanc vero absolutam institutionis indigentiam extare affirmamus, si sermo sit de expedito rationis usu acquirendo; minime vero dicimus quod e contra falsum putamus, singularum veritatum ordinis naturalis cognitionem ope institutionis esse comparandam: nam ubi homo jam usu suæ rationis reapse fruitur, ipse suâ solâ ratione quamplurimus veritates detegere atque cognoscere potest. Præterea notamus institutionem illam, quam dicimus ex nostrâ sententiâ, non esse habendam tamquam *efficientem causam per quam* homo perveniat ad expeditum rationis suæ usum, sed tamquam *meram conditionem sine quâ non* possit ad expeditum illum usum pervenire; quemadmodum, verbi gratia, aer, calor, humor requiruntur tamquam *conditio sine quâ non* possit manifestari vita, quæ in aliquo grano seminis reapse inest, sed involuta ac latens."

It will be seen by any one who reads the documents published by us in January, 1868, that, according to a response given by Cardinal Patrizi in the Pope's name, this doctrine has been theologically condemned by the Holy See; and we are very glad to record that Dr. Melia disavows it (p. xvii).

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*Etruscan Inscriptions analysed, translated, and commented upon.* By ALEX. EARL OF CRAWFORD and BALCARRES, LORD LINDSAY, &c. London: Murray. 1872.

THE object of this book, we are told, is not so much to give an accurate interpretation of Etruscan inscriptions, as to show that the language employed in those inscriptions is an ancient form of German, and thus to corroborate another argument derived from independent sources; namely that the Etruscans are a branch of the Teutonic race. The present volume was originally intended for private circulation only, but it has now been given to the public in order to prepare the way for a still more important work, in which the ancient German is employed as an instrument of etymological and mythological comparison and analysis. For, to employ the ancient German in this way, as the author points out, it is first of all necessary to prove "that it stands upon a par in point of antiquity with Greek and Latin, Zendic and Sanscrit, and that its written, or rather engraved monuments are centuries older than the Gospels of Ulphiles."

The Earl of Crawford and Balcarres is not the first to point out that the Etruscan is an Indo-European or even a Teutonic language, Dr. Pritchard, Mr. Bunbury, Dr. Donaldson, and others, having preceded him in more or



less definitely maintaining the same theory. Thus Dr. Pritchard, in his "Physical History of Mankind," although confessing that researches into the history of the Etruscans have hitherto failed, admits that "all that can be inferred as tolerably well established respecting the Etruscan dialect is, that it belongs to the class of Indo-European languages." Mr. Bunbury also, in his article on Etruria in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography, is of opinion that so far as we are able to form a judgment in the present state of our knowledge, although distinct from the Pelasgic or Greek family of languages on the one hand, and from that of the Umbrians, Oscans, and Latins on the other, there are good reasons for believing the many ingredients of the Etruscan to belong to the same great family, or to the class of languages, commonly known as the Indo-Teutonic." Dr. Donaldson indeed in his "Varronianus" goes still further, and connects the Etruscans with the Low-German and Scandinavian race, after a comparison of their language with the Scandinavian or Icelandic as existing in the ninth century. (Etruscan Inscriptions, note pp. 7, 8, 9.)

In the present volume, however, the learned author has approached the subject from a different point of view, "having resorted to a more remote and comprehensive field of general Teutonic antiquity, and having also, as he himself believes, "arrived at a distinct ethnological inference, and, indeed, specific conclusion as to the origin" of the Etruscans.

"Dr. Donaldson's argument," he tells us, "was, in fact, derived exclusively from comparison of language, leaving all other prior arguments from the patronymic 'Tyrrheni' or 'Thoringa,' from the correspondence of religious sympathies and usages, and from national character and institutions, untouched. The fact appeared to me that we had approached the subject from different points of view, from two opposite poles of the compass; he from the South, as a professed scholar, laying siege in due form to the walls and traditions of Tarquinü, with classical erudition and philological learning to which I could make no pretensions, and upon which he appeared to me in many instances to draw too readily and exclusively, when illustrations far more close and to the purpose—under one's very nose indeed—were to be found in the oldest Teutonic speech; but I myself from the North, as a roving Viking, ranging in my galley from shore to shore, seeking out our ancient kinsmen, and perhaps too rash and precipitate in the first instance in grasping by the hand, when I thought that I had recognized them, but with the advantage of starting from the cradle from which they also started in times of old, and of being preoccupied with the speech and traditions of our common Thoringa and Teuton forefathers rather more than with those of more polished races, whose claims could not have a more learned or more accomplished advocate than Dr. Donaldson." (Note, p. 9.)

Again:—

"Thus much I have been obliged to say in justice to myself with reference to the general theory I advocate [the author is alluding to instances in which Dr. Donaldson and others may have anticipated him]; but as regards the special application of this theory, I need fetter my lips by no such explanation. It has been allowed on all sides that it could not be asserted with absolute confidence that the Etruscan language was really and truly German till a sufficient number of the inscriptions had been analysed and found to render a clear and unmistakable response in that sense to the test applied

to them; and this test has now, I venture to say, for the first time, been effectually, however inadequately applied—but only as the last link in a long chain of previous induction." (Ibid.)

Some years ago the author, as he tells us (p. 3), had traced out and established "the links of descent in the Aryan race as represented by the three great families, which he styled, after the names of their respective eponym in the ascending chain, the Thoringa, the Hruinga, and the Totinga. It was in the course of these investigations that he became convinced, "by the convergence of almost every description of historical evidence, that the Tyrrheni or Etruscans belonged to the Thoringa family, and must consequently have been closely akin to the Tervingi, Thuringi, Tyrki (or pre-Odinito Northmen), and other Teutonic tribes, although come off from the common stock, bearing the Thoringa name at an extremely remote period. The Rhæti or Rasenic branch of the great stock known to the ancients as Etruscan similarly belonged,—so I inferred,—to the Hruinga family, and the general result I came to was, that the Tyrrheni and the Rhæti were the representatives, especially in the South, of the Tervingi and Grutingi, latterly known as Visigoths and Ostrogoths, in the North and West of Europe."

It became therefore a most important question, whether the Etruscan language bore out this induction or contradicted it. In order to determine this, the author began with the single words "transmitted to us by the ancients as Etruscan, and of which they have given us the interpretations in Greek or Latin." The result, we are told, proved that they all had a corresponding sense, not only in the Aryan and Japhetan tongues generally, but also more particularly in ancient German. The next step was to test the names of the Etruscan Gods, and of the old cities of Etruria. The result again proving that in repeated instances the latter more particularly corresponded "with the natural features of the country, and with the symbolism of coins, and other *indicia*, as reflected in the same Teutonic idiom." The same process was also applied "to the words connected with those Roman institutions which the classical writers especially inform us were derived from Etruria, the result being still the same. Lest, however, such words might have incurred disguise and corruption in transmission and transcription, the author determined to examine in like manner "the inscriptions written in the unmistakable original dialect." These then were accordingly tested, with a no less gratifying result; and having been re-examined are, together with others similarly tested, now given to the public in the handsome volume before us.

It is only fair to the author to add, that he himself wishes it to be understood that he has no pretensions to speak with authority in linguistic matters. He has, he thinks, but discovered and opened the door into the treasury of the Etruscan language, and he leaves it to "the Great Masters of the Linguistic Science . . . to enter in and take possession, to reduce the language to its grammar, to elaborate its lexicon, and to determine its exact place on the genealogical tree of German speech, preparing the way for inquiries in which jurists, mythologists, and the leaders of kindred schools of study in Comparative Archaeology will have to take part."

The inscriptions chosen for analysis are as follow:—1. Two very ancient

ones—the first of them discovered at Cære, and both of them generally looked upon as Pelasgian, but which the author believes to be likewise fundamentally Teutonic; also one or two more from Cære. 2. An archaic inscription, purely Etruscan, found near Tarquinii. 3. An inscription painted on an *amphora*, representing the parting of Alcestis and Admetus. 4. A series of inscriptions on votive offerings. 5. A selection from sepulchral inscriptions, some of them bilingual. 6. Two inscriptions relating to land tenure, found one of them at Volterra, the other at Perugia.\*

To the reader unacquainted with philology some of the interpretations will, no doubt, appear arbitrary enough, nor will his scepticism be lessened when he discovers how very much the various interpretations offered for the same inscription differ from one another; as, for instance, in the following purely Etruscan inscriptions on the Alcestis and Admetus amphora, discovered at Vulci:—

EKA : ERSKE : NAK : ACHRUM : PHLERTHRKE :

which reads, according to our author, "I pursue, or attack, the guarantor "[Alcestis]" through breach of engagement [on the part of Admetus, the principal] to appear at the fixed time of citation;" but, according to Dr. Donaldson, "This earthen vessel in the ground is a votive offering of sorrow" (Varronian, p. 209); while, if Mr. Dennis is to be trusted, it reads, "Lo! she saves him from Acheron, and makes an offering of herself!" (Cities of Etruria, vol. i. p. xc. quoted by Earl of Crawford, &c., p. 40).† Still, we

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\* Etruscan being exclusively a monumental language, it labours under a great disadvantage as to specimens of grammatical structure, but this notwithstanding, sufficient proofs are given in the Appendix (pp. 311, 312), that it was similar to that of the Teutonic languages.

† The inscription is thus analysed by the author. EKA : ERSKE : NAK—EKA-NAK, a compound, answering (whether, as the first person singular of the present tense of a verb, or as a derivative noun, is uncertain) to *nach hangen*—to pursue, hang upon,—but with the elements of the compound in the reverse order to that we are familiar with in German. The root *hang* might be traced further back, *e.g.* to *ag*, as in *ago*. II. ERSKE formed from *wer*, "cautio, vades," in modern German *gewähr*, akin to *warsscipe* (A.S) *werschaft*, and derived from *waren*, "cautionem adhibere."

THRSKE, although written after PHLER without break, is a distinct vocable, as shown by many other examples. Compare *durch*, "per, through." TURKE, written also TRKE, constantly occurs in connection with some specified sin or penalty, and thus is not identical with *turge*, "fraus, dolus," still less with the Icelandic *tregi*, "dolor," as urged by Dr. Donaldson, who finds perhaps his strongest plea for the affinity of the Scandinavian and Etruscans on the argument "that the words *thrice* and *suthi*, constantly occurring on Etruscan monuments of a funereal character, are translated at once by the Icelandic synonyms *tregi* and *sut*, both signifying "grief," or "sorrow."

PHLER a word constantly found, like THRKE TURKE in the inscriptions upon votive offerings in atonement for guilt. It corresponds with *vlur*, equivalent to *verlust*, "damnum." Here, perhaps, it means loss in the sense of forfeiture.

ACHRUM, to be read ASCHRUM, and divided as ASCH-RUM.—I. ASCH, corresponds with *aischen*, *heischen*, "expetere, citare," *heischung*,

believe that the author, although perhaps he may not as yet have succeeded in opening the door to the treasury of Etruscan inscriptions, has at least found the key. At any rate, if it be once admitted that the Etruscan belongs to the Indo-Teutonic family of languages (and certainly the amount of evidence brought forward in support of this theory is very great; nay, it is the only theory which is *throughout* consistently satisfactory), we have little hesitation in saying that the Earl of Crawford and Balcarres is right in connecting it rather with continental Germany than with Scandinavia.\*

Nor does the wide difference to be met with in the interpretation of Etruscan inscriptions prove anything against this view. "For that an inability," says Dr. Donaldson, "to interpret ancient monuments may be consistent with a knowledge of the class of languages to which they belong is shown not merely by the known relationship between the language of the Egyptian hieroglyphics and the Coptic dialects more recently spoken in that country, but still more strikingly by the fact that, although we have no doubt as to any of the idioms spoken in ancient Britain, no one has been able as yet to give a certain interpretation of the Runic inscriptions on the pillar of Bewcastle, and on the font at Bridekirk, which are both in Cumberland, and which both belong to the same dialect of the Low German language." (Varronian, pp. 215, sqq.) Dr. Donaldson, indeed, as we have seen, connects the Etruscan with Scandinavia; but, as the Earl of Crawford points out (note, p. 204), such affinities as really exist may be accounted for by the original unity of the various branches of the Thoringa or Thuringian family.

*aischung, aisch*—*e.* 'citatio,' this last word being almost identical with the Etruscan AISCH. II. RUM, answers to an ancient Teutonic word, *ram, rahm*, implying terminus, scopus, *gesetztes ziel*, prescribed limit (*up den ram*, signifying "tempore definito"), but including, in understanding and practice, the intervening *raum* or space of time and opportunity allowed to the person summoned, and constituting the *quernacht dwerchnacht*, or *zwerchracht* of old Teutonic law.

The author at one time connected NAK : THRKP with the *dwerchnacht* and only gave up this view with great reluctance. By similar understanding and practice this *ram*, "terminus," seems to have acquired the additional sense of pledge, or plight to appear, confirmed by the hand *ram*, "manus."

The above is, of course, only an abridgment of the author's analysis.

In reading this note the reader must bear in mind that it is not proposed to derive the Etruscan words from the Teutonic or German language proper, but from roots and verbal formations which, it is inferred, have existed in the mother Teutonic tongue, from which both German and Etruscan are descended (p. 241). At the same time the author is of opinion that, "in very many instances German (in the broadest sense), even as spoken at present, preserves the primitive forms of Aryan and Japhetan speech, with a purity and precision which are entirely abraded, and worn down, even in the Sanscrit," and that therefore, "to say the least, German is the contemporary and sister of Sanscrit, Zendic, Latin, and Greek."

\* Thus, for example (inter alia), the word *pfau* was used rather than *wad* for "pignus," and the god worshipped as Thor in Scandinavia, and as Donas and Thunaer by the ancient Saxons and Thuringians, appears as "Tunur" in the Etruscan inscription of S. Manno, near Perugia.—See p. 26.

In conclusion, we have to thank the author for the light he has thrown on a most interesting and important subject, hoping that what has now been done for the Etruscan tongue may also soon be done for the Basque, which has so long remained an outcast from every known family of languages.\*

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*Lives of the Saints.* By Rev. S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. March. London : John Hodges, 1872.

THE March volume of Mr. Baring-Gould's "Lives of the Saints" is now before us, and, like the preceding volumes, fully carries out the original intention of the author. In its own line, as a *compendium of valuable information about the Saints*, beautifully, simply, and reverentially written, this edition of the "Lives of the Saints" cannot fail to be productive of immense good ; and we wish it the widest possible circulation. We are bound, however, to confess that in this work, as indeed in most of Mr. Baring Gould's writings, there seems to us to be a certain want of depth of earnestness and holy unction, the presence of which, far from interfering with its beauty and simplicity, would greatly enhance its value. This does not arise in any way from want of reverence, but, as we believe, from the tone of the author's own mind, and still more, perhaps, from his inability as an Anglican, to realise the *fulness* of Christ as manifested in the holiest of His members.

We have an example of this in the way in which he treats the life of S. Joseph, the foster-father of our Lord, and the spouse of our Blessed Lady. Of course we all know that very little is told us in the Scripture about S. Joseph, but that little is so pregnant with suggestion, especially when looked at in the light of the Church's devotion to Him, that no Catholic writer could, we think, have been content with the meagre page which Mr. Baring-Gould devotes to his life. The saints of God live not only in their lives, but they live again in the life of the Catholic Church, reigning with

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\* We are sorry to be obliged to add that the author, who has shown himself so painstaking in all his researches, should in one short sentence have given utterance to three inaccuracies—to call them by no stronger term. Thus, in the concluding chapter, he says (p. 228),—"The first occasion of our visit to Volterra was in very early days—before Pio Nono had raised the cry of revolution in Europe, when he was still a simple monk in his cell at Imola, and when Gregory XVI. slumbered in S. Peter's chair at the Vatican." Now, to say that Pius IX. raised the cry of revolution in Europe is simply a calumny, betraying utter ignorance of contemporary history, while we need hardly remind our readers that the present Pontiff has never been a monk at all. As for Gregory XVI. slumbering in S. Peter's chair, the assertion is contradicted by the whole pontificate of that most vigilant and prudent Pope, who knew how to keep back with a firm hand the outburst of the revolution ; and at the same time—as in the case of the Emperor of all the Russias—to withstand the tyranny of the mightiest monarchs of the world. Anything but a "slumbering" Pontiff was Gregory XVI.

Christ and God. Hence it is that a Catholic mind, resting upon the Scripture narrative of S. Joseph's life as upon a sure foundation, naturally builds up upon it that second life of his, the result of which shows here to us how, eighteen hundred years and more since he fell asleep in the arms of Jesus and Mary, in his awful and yet most tender office as protector and pattern of the Universal Church. At the end of his brief notice, Mr. Baring-Gould tells us that the girdle of S. Joseph is said to be preserved among the sacred treasures of the Church at Joinville, in the diocese of Langres, and it is well. But it is something more to know, as every Catholic knows, that the mantle of S. Joseph is even now encircling the mystical body of our Lord in this its moment of bitter trial, as really and as truly as when once he wrapped it round His real body in the hour of cruel persecution. No Catholic life of S. Joseph can be complete without, at least, some account of the rise and development of the Church's devotion to him.

Again, Mr. Baring-Gould's position as an Anglican casts him off from the privilege of receiving certain facts, which every Catholic receives with loving trust. If we turn to the life of S. Joachim (March 20, p. 336), we shall find an instance of this:—

“Nothing whatever is known of S. Joachim,” writes our author, “except what is related in the Apocryphal Gospels, whence the name is derived. It is probable, however, that his name was traditionally preserved and adopted by the author of the Apocryphal Gospels.”

In the note also which precedes this short notice, we read that the Roman Breviary of 1522, published at Venice, contained it (the name) with special office, but this was expunged by Pope Pius V. ; and in the Breviary of 1572 neither name nor office is to be found. Now, surely Mr. Baring-Gould cannot be ignorant that both the name and office are contained in the Roman Breviary at present in use, and that the Feast and Mass of S. Joachim are now celebrated on the Sunday within the octave of our Lady's Assumption. This fact ought not to have been held back. But to come to the notice itself. We ask, first of all, if it be probable that the name of S. Joachim was traditionally preserved, and adopted by the author (Why author? There were many authors) of the Apocryphal Gospels, why may not this also be true with regard to the facts of the Church contained in the writings of S. Epiphanius and S. John Damascene, and received into the lessons of her present Breviary. The Apocryphal Gospels are to some minds a perfect stumbling-block, yet really there is no difficulty with regard to them. No doubt they are not the true Gospels of Jesus Christ inspired by the Holy Ghost ; no doubt also many errors and fables are contained in their pages ; yet it by no means follows from this that they may not also contain many facts perfectly true handed down by tradition. Nay, it is almost impossible that it should be otherwise ; for if S. John tells us that if all the things “which Jesus did were written every one—and this is no less true in their measure of the things connected with the Incarnation and the Gospel of Jesus,—the world itself, he thinks, would not be able to contain the books that should be written ;” and if, S. Luke says, that “many have taken in hand to set forth a narration of the things that have been accomplished among us, according

as they have delivered them unto us, who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word," it is simply impossible that a vast number of facts relating to our Lord's Incarnation—not contained in the inspired Gospels, which were written for a special purpose, and from which therefore only such facts were selected as seemed good to the Holy Ghost and the Apostles—should not also have been floating in the tradition of the Church from the very earliest times. Just as it is the Church alone that can determine the Canon of Holy Scripture; and as, according to S. Austin, we would not believe the Gospel were it not for the Church; so it is the Church alone that can determine which of the traditions handed down from the beginning are such as should be set before her children. Nay, to reject some facts,—such for instance, as the presentation of our Lady in the Temple, or her assumption into heaven, the latter of which many hearts are looking forward to see one day ruled as of faith, because it happens to be also contained in some Apocryphal Gospel,—would be almost as unreasonable as to reject some Gospel fact for the same reason. Both the Canon of Holy Scripture and tradition depend upon the judgment of the Church, and both alike must be determined by her authority. But then, alas!—would it were otherwise; we pray that it may soon be otherwise—our author does not recognize the authority of the *living* Church, with whom alone in this world belong the words of Eterna Life.

We observe that the life of S. Francesa Romana has been condensed from the admirable life of that saint by Lady Georgiana Fullerton, and that in treating of the birth-place of S. Patrick, the author follows the opinion which has been advocated in a past number of this Review.

Looked at from a literary point of view, one of the most beautiful lives is that of S. Euda of Oranmore-Aran, the "home of pilgrims," and the resting-place of saints. It is taken from the Bishop of Ardagh's touching description of his visit to the holy island. We extract the following account of his celebration of the Holy Mass:—

"With the permission of the excellent priest who has charge of the island we resolved, on the last morning of our stay at Aran, to celebrate mass in the ruined church of Tiglash-Euda, where in the year 540 or 542, S. Euda was interred. The morning was bright and clear, and the rigid outlines of the rocks were softened by the touch of the early sunshine. The inhabitants of Killarney, exulting in the tidings that the holy sacrifice was once again to be offered to God near the shrine of their saint and patron, accompanied or followed us to the venerable ruins. The men, young and old, were clothed in decent black, or in garments of white stuff, with sandals of undressed leather, like those of the peasants in the Abruzzi, laced round their feet; the women were attired in gay scarlet gowns and blue bodices; and all wore a look of remarkable neatness and comfort. The small roofless church was soon filled to overflowing with a decorous and devout congregation. We can never forget the scene of that morning: the pure bright sand, covering the graves of unknown and unnumbered saints as with a robe of silver tissue; the delicate green foliage of the wild plants; on one side, the swelling hill crowned with the church of S. Benignus, and on the other the blue sea, that almost bathed the foundations of the venerable sanctuary itself; the soft balmy air that hardly stirred the ferns on the old walls; and the fresh, happy, solemn calm that reigned over all.

"The temporary altar was set up under the east window, on the site where

of old the altar stood ; and then, in the midst of the loving and simple faithful within the walls which had been consecrated some twelve hundred years before, over the very spot of earth where so many of the saints of Ireland lay awaiting their resurrection to glory, the solemn rite of the Christian sacrifice was performed, and once more, as in the days of which S. Columba wrote, the angels of God came down to worship the Divine Victim in the churches of Aran." (Pp. 386-7.)

Most earnestly do we hope and pray that, before he has ended his holy labours, the author may be permitted to enjoy a still closer communion with the saints of heaven, by entering into communion with the one Church of Christ which is alone the mother of saints.

*Life and Times of Sixtus the Fifth.* By BARON HÜBNER. Translated from the original French by JAMES F. MELINE. New York : The Catholic Publication Society. 1873. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS little work cannot in any sense be called a translation of Baron Hübner's admirable history ; for not only, as we are told in the prefatory notice, are the purely political portions of the original—the minute relation of the intrigues and struggles of the foreign ambassadors at the court of Rome, and the details of minor ecclesiastical reforms almost wholly omitted, but even the biographical incidents are to a very great extent condensed. Nor can we give the same praise to Mr. Meline in the present instance which we so gladly gave to his life of Mary, Queen of Scots ; for although he himself pleads that "the necessity of condensing whole chapters into a few paragraphs, and entire pages into as many lines, has compelled him not only to paraphrase, but in some cases to substitute his own language for that of Baron Hübner," and that "abridgment has also necessitated a fresh arrangement of chapters," yet the condensation is carried out on so large a scale that almost all trace of the original is lost, and the result is meagre in the extreme. There is, in consequence, too often a "jerkiness" about the sentences which is far from pleasant. We have no doubt, however, that those who are unable to read the original work, or the somewhat expansive, but most excellent, translation of it by Mr. Jerningham, will feel grateful for this little sketch of the great Franciscan Pontiff and of Rome in his day. We extract the following description of Cardinal Montalto at the moment of his elevation to St. Peter's chair :—

"At this moment Montalto did not look his sixty-five years. Of ordinary height, but somewhat bent, he appeared smaller than he really was. His head, comparatively large, sank somewhat between two broad shoulders ; a forehead high and wrinkled, and arched ; and tufted eyebrows shaded two small but brilliant eyes. There was a play of expression in his face, but none of features, which seemed rigid. A swarthy complexion, high-coloured cheeks, and prominent cheek-bones plainly bespoke his Slavonian descent, and his hair and long, auburn, and bushy, Franciscan beard were rapidly growing gray. His appearance was neither majestic nor attractive, but he deeply impressed every one who looked at him." (P. 37.)



When the newly-elected Pope was carried to S. Peter's, a Mass composed for the occasion by Palestrina, but hardly worthy of the great master, was performed by the Papal choir.

"The Pope perceived it. Even at that moment so full of emotion, Sixtus was sufficiently calm to listen to the music. 'Pierlingo,' said he, 'has forgotten Pope Marcello's Mass.'

"This biting criticism deeply hurt Palestrina, but it has since been ratified by competent judges. It was the first word uttered by the new Pope—just severe, and pitiless, as he was to his pontificate." (P. 38.)

*Mr. Lecky's Criticism of Mr. Froude's "English in Ireland."* (Macmillan's Magazine for January, 1872.) London and Cambridge: Macmillan.

WE hope in our next number to review carefully Mr. Froude's volume; meanwhile we heartily recommend Mr. Lecky's strictures on it to our readers' earnest attention. The author has in this paper displayed very few, if any, of those characteristics of his, which every Catholic regards as so objectionable; while his good qualities appear in the most favourable light. We quote a passage on the Irish character:—

"To the long night of trial through which [Irishmen then] passed, we may probably ascribe a great part of their noblest characteristics: a deep and fervent attachment to their creed, which no threats and no blandishments could shake; a spirit of reverence and simple piety, of cheerful content and of mutual charity under extreme poverty, such as few nations in Europe can equal. In this period, too, was gradually formed that high tone of female purity, which is their distinguishing and transcendent excellence, and which in the words even of this bitter enemy, is 'unparalleled probably in the civilized world.' To writers who [like Mr. Froude] judge the moral excellence of a race by its strength and by its success, all these qualities will rank but low in the scale of virtues. A larger and a wider philosophy will acknowledge, that no others do more to soften and purify the character, to lighten the burden of sorrow, and to throw a consoling lustre upon the darkness of the tomb." (p. 261.)

*The Gallican Church.* A History of the Church of France, from the Concordat of Bologna, A.D. 1516, to the Revolution. With an Introduction. By the Rev. W. HENLEY JERVIS, M.A., Prebendary of Heytesbury; Author of the "Student's History of France." 2 vols. London: Murray, 1872.

MR. JERVIS in beginning his history—and it is due to him to say that he has written a most interesting history—tells us, and most truly, that "religion in a shape peculiar to one section of the human family, or one territorial circumscription of the globe, is, *prima facie*, an idea foreign to the genius of Christianity." This is certainly a condemnation of Gallicanism; and though we think he forgets it occasionally, the author has drawn up a

formidable indictment against the peculiar opinions which so many Frenchmen once regarded as the glory of their country, but which is now irretrievably lost.

Mr. Jervis admits, and we see no reason for disputing his admission, that a certain nationalism is not only permissible, but inevitable, provided it be limited according to the rule he lays down, namely, that the "field of essential theological doctrine" be not touched. It is a safe and reasonable limitation, for it includes more than the actual definitions, and people who observe the rule will hardly ever err, because the extent of that "field" is to be determined not by private caprice, but by the declaration of him who is the ruler and teacher of the Church.

But the principle laid down by Mr. Jervis, we find interpreted in a way which includes within it the peculiar opinions known as Gallicanism. He thinks that the opinions which once prevailed in France were perfectly innocent and lawful; but as the reader of his book, by his help, is able to trace the course of those opinions, and to observe their effects, we do not think that he will be able to convince many that there is nothing radically wrong in them; seeing that they led to, and brought forth the great revolution in Church and State from which France has not yet recovered.

The French "opinions" according to Mr. Jervis—and here also we agree with him—"belong to the domain of ecclesiastical polity; relating chiefly to the nature and extent of the authority vested in the Apostolic See, and in the individual person of its Bishops." (P. 2.)

Now, we believe that Mr. Jervis here, has not quite ascertained the character of his own opinions. He holds and says that "the Kingdom of Christ is world-wide" (p. 1). He admits that the French Church is a part of that kingdom, and yet says that the French opinions on "the nature and extent of the authority" by which that kingdom is ruled, are innocent. It is difficult to conceive that doctrines about the authority of the Queen should prevail in one county of England which are not accepted in the others. The inhabitants, say of Essex, maintain that no appeals from their magistrates may be decided in Westminster Hall, and that no decisions of the Courts, or even Acts of Parliament, are of any value in Essex till the magistrates in Quarter Sessions allow them. This is a state of things that Mr. Jervis would hardly justify unless the inhabitants could show a privilege to that effect granted by the Crown. The French opinions resembled the supposed doctrine of Essex, but nobody ever showed any ground for them, and no privilege was ever produced.

Though Mr. Jervis sees clearly enough that the Christian religion is a whole and perfect substance that is not to be tampered with, and that the Church is universal, and therefore must be the same in all lands, he does not see that the Gallican opinions were the principles of schism, and that they were used to foster one of the most insidious heresies that ever troubled the peace of the faithful. It is possible that Mr. Jervis has his own views about "essential theological doctrine," and that with him those words mean less than they mean in the mouth of a Catholic. That we believe to be the explanation, for he writes thus of the French opinions:—

“They may be said, also, to comprehend many collateral issues, radiating from this central point—issues affecting jurisprudence, legislation, discipline; the status and rights of the episcopal order in general; the legitimate terms of alliance between a national Church and a Christian State.

“Now, these are questions, doubtless, of considerable magnitude; but they are not of fundamental or indispensable moment. They are not questions *de fide*. The systematic exaggeration of their importance by the extreme partisans of Rome is one of the most unfortunate features of modern controversy. It is difficult to see how the cause of religion can be served by insisting on the dogma of Papal absolutism as if it were the corner stone of the whole Christian fabric—the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesie*. Such a theory clashed with incontestable facts. If this be an article of necessary faith, how is it that it has never been imposed upon the conscience of Christendom by the authority of any one undisputed Ecumenical Council? How is it that no such definition is to be found among the decrees of Trent? How is it that those who reject it have never in any age been branded with the anathemas incurred by formal heresy?” (Pp. 2-3.)

This extract shows accurately the precise point on which Mr. Jervis stands. He does not think that the government of the Church is equally divine with the dogmas of the Faith, as though the revealed truth on Church government were not itself a dogma. He thinks a General Council is above the Pope, so he asks why the Papal prerogatives have not been defined by a Council. He does not regard the Council of Florence as general, and he considers the Council of the Vatican as disputed. In a note he adopts the explanation of the last clause in the Florentine definition which has been ignorantly or unscrupulously maintained by modern heretics after the old Gallicans of the seventeenth century.

If Mr. Jervis could be patient with “the extreme partisans of Rome” he would ask fewer questions; for perhaps these have something to say for themselves after all. If Mr. Jervis is surprised that the definitions of the Papal rights made in Rome in 1870 have come so late, it is possible enough that heretics of the Arian type might in the fourth and fifth centuries have wondered also how the definition of Nice could have been so long delayed.

Mr. Jervis says the Church is the Kingdom of Christ, but he means something else. With him the Church is not a real monarchy, but a republic, the members of which have a jurisdiction really over their rulers. Thus he writes:—

“The remedy proposed was that of appeal to a General Council, as the supreme tribunal of Christendom; competent, should the necessity arise, to pass judgment even on the Pope himself. This is commonly quoted as one of the peculiar principles of Gallicanism; but in point of fact it is an original constitutional law of the Church Catholic.” (P. 82.)

This is what makes Mr. Jervis sympathize so much with a national Church which would not admit him to its communion, and which would look upon him as a layman. This “root of bitterness,” common to both, resistance to the Holy See, makes friends of enemies, and reconciles Pontius Pilate with Herod.

Mr. Jervis traces all the evils of France to the Concordat of 1516, by which the rights of Metropolitans were suppressed, chapters of cathedrals

deprived of the right to elect bishops, and monks to elect abbots. But Frenchmen themselves, Gallicans of unspotted reputation, tell us that the Concordat was a great boon; that it put an end to the intrigues of ambitious clerics, to simony, to the oppression of chapters and monasteries by powerful men living near them, and, not least, to brawling, fighting, and even shedding of blood.

The Concordat brought peace in its train, and put an end to a condition which De Maria stigmatizes as schism; but it did not bring all the blessings it might have brought, because the Gallicanism of D'Ailli and Gerson had taken root, and because the lawyers entered into the sanctuary.

Mr. Jervis prefers the Pragmatic Sanction to the Concordat which superseded it, so for many years did those men who boasted of the Gallican liberties, of which the Pragmatic Sanction was the most conspicuous monument. But its maintainers were inconsistent men. Gallicans hold that a general council is above the Pope, and that no Pope can dispense with any canons it may make. Well, it is hardly creditable, but it is the fact, the French Church, with the king at its head, did, in its famous assembly at Bourges, in A.D. 1438, modify the decrees of what it held to be a general council, and instead of accepting those decrees as the council passed them, accepted them only as amended by itself. Thus, not only is a general council, according to Gallicans, above the Pope, but the French Church is also above them both.

The truth is that the Concordat was an immense boon to the French nation and in particular to the bishops. Before the Concordat the election to the bishops and abbots were generally tumultuous, and few unsuccessful candidates were unable to discover some flaw in the process. The election then became litigious, and the question had to be argued in Rome at grievous expense to the chapters and monasteries, and, as the enemies of the Holy See say, to the great gain of the Pontiff. We may admit that the lawyers gained, but the Pope certainly gained nothing but trouble; and people who thus talk might as well say that the Lord Chancellor gains by the multitude of suitors in his court. If we accept the principle of these men we have another proof of the disinterestedness of their great bugbear the Roman Curia. It would have been a perpetual source of profit to the Roman lawyers to retain the Pragmatic Sanction, for out of that document they would have drawn reasons for endless litigation, and consequently would have drained France of its money.

The two men who are commonly regarded as the founders of Gallicanism, D'Ailli and Gerson, were once of another mind; at least the former was, by whom the latter was trained. Pierre D'Ailli, at least in A.D. 1388, held the Supremacy of the Sovereign Pontiff, and Gerson tells us that in his early days any one who denied it would have been regarded as a heretic. Well, these two men prevailed in France, and the new opinions which they taught crept into schools and universities, and chapters and monasteries, and even into the assemblies of the clergy, till at last the French people were generally persuaded that they were more or less independent Christians, and could treat on terms of equality with the Pope. The popular doctors of the nation invented the Gallican liberties, and the lawyers

then took charge of them to the ruin of the very Church they were supposed to defend.

Mr. Jervis very naturally likes these liberties, and especially the opposition to the Sovereign Pontiff; but then this liking leads him to be very gentle with the Jansenists, and to believe a good many stories for which there is no proof. He accepts the writings of Dorsanne, and looks on Guetter as an authority on whom he can safely rely; nor is he at all sceptical about the lies which have been told of Cardinal Dubois. The Jesuits of course must be sacrificed, and of the persecution they underwent in France under the Duke of Choiseul and the provincial parliaments in 1763, Mr. Jervis says, "none could deny that they were the victims of a righteous retribution." (Vol. ii. p. 357.)

We read this with some surprise, for Mr. Jervis is not under the dominion of all the prejudices of his sect. He is on the whole a very fair man, and we should refuse to believe of him that he has wilfully distorted facts or deliberately made an inaccurate statement. Still he thinks the violent suppression of the Jesuits in France lawful and just, and that the Jesuits deserved it.

His sympathy with the Jansenists is not unnatural, for they are enemies of the Holy See, and no doubt, on the same principle, the Jesuits are hateful because they are faithful to that See. Therein we think lies the key to the book which Mr. Jervis has written; it is the record of a long struggle, and of a deadly hate more or less disguised. Gallicanism set itself up as the rival of Rome, and fought for the supremacy. During the troubles caused by the French cardinals, who revolted against Urban VI., the principles which were at a later day known as Gallicanism laid the foundations, and in the Councils of Constance and Basle we saw the building completed; the French took it now into their own safe-keeping, and furnished it with the Pragmatic Sanction, and set the lawyers to keep guard over it and keep it.

The result frightened even the French Court, so the king consented to the quashing of the Pragmatic, and the Concordat was granted. But the evil spirit was not exorcised out of France, and erroneous doctrines were maintained. The Sorbonne yielded to the general corruption, and the fountains of learning were poisoned. The law-courts, filled with judges and advocates who held the Gallican opinions, interfered with the discipline of the Church, proscribed true doctrines, and finally insisted on directing the administration of the last sacraments, in defence of the Gallican liberties. In the reign of Louis XIV., so complete was the subjection of the Church to the civil power, that Bossuet, the great defender of the "liberties," found himself under the control of the royal censor of books. The pastorals of the "Eagle of Meaux" had to be corrected and allowed by the king's officer, who had become by this time a more correct theologian than the "orthodox" Bossuet. The Gallican liberties were wonderful things, for they seem to have made wise men foolish. The Abbé Le Dieu, in his "Journal," vol. i. p. 212, says of his master, Bossuet, that he, Bossuet, on one occasion thought that he had found an important opportunity for suggesting to the Pope what should be believed, and what should be proposed for Protestants to believe, on this matter of infallibility and the deposition of kings; for what he had written

intended for the instruction of German Protestants he wished to put forth for the instruction even of the Pope and the Cardinals.

Bossuet is, of course, a sort of hero in the eyes of Mr. Jervis, but he is obliged to say things of him that reduce his heroism to very pitiful proportions. Bossuet was a favourite at court, and was more or less indulged; he therefore had an air of independence about him which might deceive some people, and help them to think that the bishops were not the slaves of the crown that they really were. Bossuet was very respectful to the king, but he was not respectful to the Pope. He did not use bad language, that is true; but he was thoroughly disobedient, and dealt with the Holy See as with an enemy.

Gallicanism is gone now the way of all heresies, and Mr. Jervis must regret it in vain. His history of it is well done, and we can hardly find fault with him. He has traced that history down to the civil constitution of the clergy. We can wish for no better refutation of the principle, no clearer light than that which he gives us. He is not pleased, with the Council of the Vatican, but he justifies it all the same. His Holiness now reigning has in one sense done no more than Mr. Jervis. The latter has drawn up the indictment and proved it, the Pope pronounced the sentence. These two volumes furnish the very best reasons that men can desire against Gallicanism, and they come with the more force because they are arrayed by one who thoroughly approves of the Gallican positions. In this sense, we say it heartily, Mr. Jervis has done us a real, and we think a lasting, service.

*Mary, Queen of Scots, and her latest English Historian.* By JAMES F. MELINE. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

THE Memory of Mary, Queen of Scots, is dear to the heart of every Catholic, and every fresh effort therefore to clear up any difficulties that may have arisen as to her life, or the cause from which she suffered, cannot fail to be most welcome to all who love the truth. Mr. Meline therefore has done good service in exposing and refuting the errors of her latest English historian, who has done more perhaps than any other historian to darken the beauty of her character, and to cast a stain upon her fair name.

Mr. Froude has himself told us confidently, in his "Short Studies upon Great Subjects," "that it has often seemed to him as if history was like a child's box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please" (p. 7); and certainly he has done his best to put this view of his into practice, for in his own History of England he has spelt whatever word has seemed good to him. Henry VIII., Elizabeth, and Mary, Queen of Scots, are in his pages no more the Henry, Elizabeth, and Mary of history than he himself is an historian. We need not wonder then that in the present volume this author

should charge him with gross impartiality ; with sublimity of impudence in paradox ; with defective knowledge of all history before the sixteenth century, with errors in general and in details, in geography, jurisprudence, titles, offices, and military affairs ; with want of grasp of his materials ; with inability to discover the value of different state papers, and indiscriminate acceptance of written authorities of a certain class ; with being in matters of state a pamphleteer, and in personal questions an advocate, holding a brief *for* Henry *against* Mary Stuart ; with inserting language of his own between quotation-marks, which are usually supposed to convey to the reader the conventional assurance that they include the precise words of the text with manipulating documents, either by joining together two distinct passages, thus entirely changing their meaning, or by connecting two phrases from two different authorities and presenting them as one, or by tacking on irresponsible or anonymous authorities to one that is responsible, and concealing the first while avowing the last ; with insidious insinuations, dropping an allusion or remark, in apparently quite a careless manner, to build upon it afterwards a regular system of attack ; nay, with ignorance even of that very sixteenth century of which Mr. Froude tells us, with no little satisfaction in his "Short Studies," that "he might say that he knows more than about anything else." (Mary Queen of Scots, pp. 2—17.) These are grave charges, as the author owns, but are bound to say that he establishes them.

Mr. Meline does not of course profess to follow every step which Mr. Froude has taken, or to spell over again correctly every word which the latter has mis-spelt with his "child's box of letters ;" for, as he observes, "proper historical treatment in the case is difficult, not to say impossible, for the reason that he has produced, not so much a history of Mary Stuart as a sweeping indictment in terms of abuse, which few prosecuting attorneys would dare present in a criminal court, and in which he showers upon the Queen of Scots such epithets as "murderess," "ferocious animal," "panther," "wild cat," and "brute" (p. 21). Nor can we ourselves in a short notice attempt to follow Mr. Meline through all his refutations of Mr. Froude. We must content ourselves with placing a few of the most remarkable of them before our readers, first of all, however, calling their attention to the very striking passage which immediately precedes the words last quoted :—

"Our historian's views of the philosophy of history, of the agency of fate, and of the subordination of morality to the 'inevitable,' all undergo a radical change after leaving Henry VIII. His partisanship culminates in reaching Mary Stuart, when it comes out with more elaborate machinery of innuendo, more careful finish of invention, unscrupulous assertion, wealth of invective, and relentless hatred. Events, cease to be inevitable. The historian's generous supply of palliation and justification (usually, 'by faith alone') has all been lavished on Henry, or reserved for Murray.

"In no one instance is there 'fatal necessity of mistake' for Mary ; and her sorrows, her misfortunes, her involuntary errors, and the infamous outrages inflicted upon her by others, are, we are told, all crimes of her own invention and perpetration. Authorities cited are mainly her personal enemies, or her paid detractors. Of what she herself wrote there is rigid economy, and nothing is allowed to be heard from what is called 'that suspected source.'"

Mr. Froude's whole view of the character of Mary may be said to rest

upon the conception he has formed of her early education. "She was brought up," he tells us, "amidst the political iniquities of the Court of Catherine de Medicis" (vii.164). Upon this foundation, as Mr. Meline remarks, "an imposing superstructure is raised, and in all the succeeding volumes every pretext is seized for reference to the discovery that the education of the child Mary Stuart was entrusted to Catherine de Medicis. Worse than this, the reader is forced to suppose that such education had nothing to do with useful knowledge, but was confined exclusively to lessons in moral and political wickedness" (p. 25). Yet what is the truth? There is absolutely no foundation for Mr. Froude's statements and insinuations, for, according to the clearest evidence, as brought forward by Mr. Meline, during the whole of "Mary's sojourn in France, there was no such thing known as the Court of Catherine de Medicis. True, she was the wife of Henry II., and the mother of Francis and Charles, but this court was the court of the reigning king, and was so far from being even nominally that of Catherine, through personal or political influence that, although Queen Consort and Queen Mother, she was a mere cipher until she governed in the name of Charles IX.," when Mary had already left France for Scotland.\* The "political iniquities" therefore spoken of by Mr. Froude had not then begun. As to the personal relations between Mary and Catherine, it is notorious that on the one side there was "invisible repugnance," and on the other "hatred as intense as that of Elizabeth." Even Mr. Froude is very nearly correct in saying (vii. 310) that Catherine, who in the reign of Francis had seen the honour of the throne given to the Queen of Scots, and the power of the throne to the Duke of Guise and his brother, had wrongs of her own to avenge.

"And yet," continues our author, "full well knowing that her uncles, the Guises, held the power," Mr. Froude "continually misrepresents this innocent girl. Mary is the originator and executor of all their political crime and combinations, such as the assumption of the arms of England, and the refusal to ratify the treaty of Leith. He describes her as solely occupied with ambitious projects, of which she had no conception, and desirous of reaching Scotland rapidly, "with a purpose as fixed as the stars." The historical fact is that she had neither intention nor wish to go to Scotland. Even Martin admits that she went less from "choice than from necessity. Her mother was dead, and now all her affections, all her hopes, were in France. . . . Not long was she allowed to remain, for her uncles forced her to go to Scotland, and she embarked, broken-hearted and in tears."\* (p. 28.)

As another example of the way in which Mr. Meline deals with the crafty assertions of Mr. Froude, we extract the following:—

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\* "Son mari l'avait laissé sans crédit et sans pouvoir."—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, vol. xviii. p. 101. "Catherine de Medicis, qui depuis vingt-sept ans qu'elle était en France, avait toujours été écartée du pouvoir, loin d'être reconnue comme ayant droit à la régence de son fils, se voyait comme femme et comme étrangère l'objet d'une violente jalousie."—*Ibid.* vol. xviii. p. 185. Quoted by Mr. Meline.

† "La pauvre Marie partit avec desespoir ?—Martin, "Histoire de France," vol. x. p. 177.



“The alleged participation of Mary in the so-called Catholic league has always been one of the most serious accusations against her. Tytler regards it ‘as one of the most fatal errors of her life;’ and ‘to it,’ says Robertson, ‘may be imputed all her subsequent misfortunes.’ Mr. Froude has means of information which were not accessible when these historians wrote, and yet states the matter thus :—‘A copy of the bond had been sent across to Scotland, which Randolph ascertained that Mary Stuart had signed.’ And in this positive assertion he perseveres to the end. We have already had occasion to see that in any question touching Mary Stuart there is unrelenting war between Mr. Froude and respectable historical authority. In this case the result obtained from examination of the authorities is that—1st, Mary Stuart never signed the league; 2nd, she distinctly refused to sign it.

“Our English historian’s sole authority is Randolph. It would doubtless have been gratifying to him to have been able to cite Camden, De Thou, or Holinshed, or even Knox or Buchanan, but they are all silent upon this point. Failing these, he says that he quotes Randolph. But he misquotes him. Randolph did not say that he had ascertained that Mary had signed. He said, ‘She has signed, *as I hear.*’ His despatch is dated February 7, 1566, and it is contradicted by a later one from Bedford of the 14th. It was not then signed, and there is no pretence that she signed it afterwards” (p. 70).

So, again, the historians of the period state distinctly what sovereigns signed the league, and the name of the Queen of Scots is not mentioned. Moreover, we know, on the authority of a letter of the Bishop of Moldovi (16th March, 1567, original in the Medici Archives), that if the Queen had signed the league she “would then have been wholly mistress of her kingdom, in a position to establish fully the holy Catholic faith. *But she would never listen to it,* though the Bishop of Durham and Father Edmund (Jesuit) were sent to determine her to embrace this most wise enterprise.” (*Ibid.*) That Mary never signed the league is also maintained by Mr. Hosach in his well-known work, to which our author professes himself to be under great obligations.

We are obliged to pass over almost without notice the chapter on Randolph’s letter quoted by Mr. Froude, in which he makes Mary say “she could have no peace till she had Murray’s or Chatellherault’s head” (vol. viii. p. 211), is shown not to have been written by Randolph at all, but by Bedford, who however wrote no such thing, merely remarking that a certified copy from the English Record Office has been obtained by the author, and is given in full. In this letter the words indeed are found :—“There is no talk of peace with that Queen, but that she will first have a heade of the Duke or of the Erle of Murrey.” But this evidently refers to the “talke” of the rebel lords and of their own invention, and should never have been put in Mary’s mouth, much less brought forward as his authority for his statement that “at least she would not lose the chance of revenge upon her brother.” Nor have we time to follow our author at any length in his exposure of Mr. Froude’s blunders about Mary’s letter to Elizabeth dated April 4th, 1566,—a letter which he thus himself describes :—“The strokes thick, and slightly uneven from excitement, but strong, firm, and without sign of trembling :” but which we know from the letter itself was not written by Mary, but merely signed by her,—a letter too in which Mr. Froude inserts passages which have no existence in the original! Truly we may say with the “Saturday Review”

that Mr. Froude does not seem to have grasped the "nature of inverted commas," and may ask with our author what prospect is there of reaching any solution of a question which for three centuries has been a vexed one among historians, and the never-ending theme of acrimonious controversy, if the subject continues to be treated as we find it in the work before us?"

The murder of Darnley and Mary's marriage with Bothwell are treated with the greatest clearness, and Mr. Froude's distortion of history carefully exposed. From the moment of the debauched and vicious Darnley's departure from Stirling, Mr. Froude takes up his brief for him with greater warmth. "He is now," says Mr. Meline, "the poor boy. In these pages every one from Murray down to 'blasphemous Balfour' is good, virtuous, or pious, just in proportion as they are useful to him against Mary Stuart; and Darnley begins from this moment to be more and more interesting, up to the scene where historical romance places him 'lying dead in the garden under the stars,' in the odour of sanctity, with the words of the Fifty-fifth Psalm expiring on his lips."

With regard to Mary's threat of revenge in connection with Darnley's death, attributed to her by Mr. Froude, the following will be read with interest:—

"As she left the room, she said, as if by accident, 'It was just this time last year that Rizzio was slaine.' The authority given for this statement is Calderwood. Calderwood! Who is Calderwood? queries the reader. Was he a servant of Darnley? Was he present at Kirk o' Field? and did he hear the Queen say those words? Or, perchance, was he a contemporary who received the statement from a reliable source? No information is given concerning him by our historian but the bare name of Calderwood. We find on examination that Darnley had been dead twenty years when Calderwood was born, and that about half a century thereafter he wrote a 'Historie of the Kirk of Scotland.' With its merits as a history of the Kirk we have nothing to do, but in so far as it undertakes to chronicle secular matters—which it does at some length—it is the merest trash, made up exclusively of Buchanan and the verbal gossip current among the enemies of the Queen of Scots. . . . No serious historian quotes him. But it is written that Mr. Froude shall not cite anything correctly, not even poor Calderwood, who wrote not what the historian puts into his mouth, but—'Among other speeches, she said that about the same time a bygone a yeare, David Rizzio was slaine'" (p. 156).

Later on, when speaking of the second deposition of Paris (Nicholas Hubert), implicating Mary in the murder, which was not made public till 1725, Mr. Meline contrasts Mr. Froude's readiness to believe everything ill of her, with his remarks upon the accusation brought against Leicester of the murder of his wife, Amy Robsart. "The charity of later years," says the historian, "has inclined to believe that it was a calumny invented, &c. &c.; and as it was not published till a quarter of a century after the crime—if crime there was—had been committed, it will not be replied upon in this place for evidence" (vii. 288). Justly does our author add: "You see we must draw the line somewhere. Against an edifying English gentleman like Leicester, we cannot admit testimony after, say twenty years; but it will give us great pleasure to receive any evidence against Mary Stuart to the end of time" (p. 162).

So, too, with regard to Mary's marriage with Bothwell, the ground upon which Mr. Froude attempts to build his argument is utterly cut away from under him. To take but one example :—

“How profoundly,” writes Mr. Froude” (ix. 75, note), ‘was she attached to Bothwell appears in the following letter, one of the two of which I have recovered her original words. It was written just before the marriage.’ A very rash assertion, continues our author. Not a single day was Bothwell absent from her from April 24 (abduction) to May 15 (marriage). . . . The writer’s ‘*I have recovered her original words*’ is a remarkable piece of cool presumption ; for the letter (State Papers, 1568, vol. ii. No. 66) has for long years been accessible to all and sundry who chose to examine it, and was repeatedly copied and commented upon before Mr. Froude was born. If the letter was written to Bothwell, how is it that Mary refers to two marriages—the one private, the other public ; the first as past, the second to come ? How is it that not yet being married to Bothwell, she describes herself as his ‘obedient and lawful wife’—words which, together with the last lines of the letter, are suppressed by Mr. Froude—‘and refers to his neglect and absence’”?

The important question of the “casket letters,” the authenticity of which Mr. Froude promised in his eighth volume to discuss, but which still remains undiscussed by him notwithstanding, and especially their external history, which according to Mr. Meline is sufficient to consign the plated chest to oblivion. . . . “as well as to render superfluous any argument on the internal evidence, which is if possible still more overwhelming,” are most clearly, skilfully, and thoroughly treated in this volume.

We can only touch upon two points: 1. The refutation of Mr. Froude's assertion, which he rests upon the authority of Throckmorton, that Mary herself admitted the existence of the casket letters in August, 1567. 2. The discovery at Simancas by M. Jules Gauthier, of a letter from De Silva to Philip, which reveals the important fact that the casket letters were already discussed in England, and known to *Elizabeth*, before the Scottish lords had made any public allusion to them.

1. Throckmorton writing to Elizabeth about the interview at Lochleven between Mary and Murray, is represented by Mr. Froude not only as repeating Murray's account of the interview, but also as asserting Mary's admission of the existence of the casket letters. The value of Mr. Froude's argument will be seen from the following extract, in which a part of Throckmorton's letter, and what Mr. Froude represents him as writing, are given in parallel columns :—

Throckmorton writes :—  
 “They began where they left over night, and after those his reprehensions, he used some words of consolation unto her, tending to this end that he would assure her of her life, and as much as lay in him, the preservation of her honour.”

Mr. Froude represents him as writing :—  
 “He had forced her to see both her ignominy and her danger ; but he would not leave her without some words of consolation. He told her he would assure her life, and if possible would *shield her reputation, and prevent the publication of her letters.*”

“The words in italics,” says Mr. Meline, “are not in Throckmorton, the

idea conveyed by Mr. Froude is not there, nor is there in all of Throckmorton's letters anything to warrant Mr. Froude's assertion. *It is all invention.* We know whereof we do affirm. There need be no question of conflict of reference in this matter. Mr. Froude cites 'Throckmorton to Elizabeth, Aug. 20, Keith,' and by that authority we stand." (Pp. 225-6.)

2. De Silva's letter discovered by M. Jules Gauthier, who was at first a firm believer in Mary's guilt (*Histoire de Marie, Stuart*), by which it is clear that the casket letters were *known to Elizabeth* before the Scottish lords had publicly alluded to them. On the 21st of July De Silva writes to Philip—we translate :—

"I told the Queen (Elizabeth) that I had been informed that the lords were in possession of certain letters, from which it appeared that the Queen of Scotland was knowing to the murder of her husband. She answered me that it was not true, and moreover that Lethington was therein badly employed, and that if she saw him, she would say a few words to him that he would find far from agreeable." (*Archives of Simancas*, leg. 819, fol. 108. Gauthier, vol. ii. p. 104).

"Mr. Froude's labours," continues our author, "have been referred to by his admirers as one of the triumphs of modern historical research. But although, as he states, he had 'unrestricted access' to that important collection, he does not seem to have made himself acquainted with this important letter. It appears that Elizabeth manifested no surprise at the ambassador's announcement, and this goes far to show that the forged letters were already under consideration in England as a means of inculcating the unfortunate Mary Stuart. It is equally evident that Elizabeth herself looked upon the letters as forgeries perpetrated by Lethington."\* (Pp. 231-2.)

Through the rest of the volume the author continues to pursue Mary's relentless historian up to the very scaffold, where according to the death warrant, "execution was done against her person, *as well for the cause of the gospel and the true religion of Christ*, as for the peace of the whole realm." But we have already far overpassed our limits, and will only conclude by renewing our thanks to the author for this most valuable contribution to Catholic literature. The work is written in a lively and agreeable style, and with not a little of the humour so peculiar to American writers.

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\* This agrees, adds the author in a note, with the intimation given by Camden, who evidently knew more of Cecil's secrets than he consigned to his pages, that Lethington (Maitland) was no stranger to their fabrication. It also accords with the frequently expressed suspicion of Mary herself, and with the opinions of several historians. Elizabeth's answer leaves but little doubt that the directing hand in the forgery was Maitland's, and we know that next to Murray and Morton he had the greatest interest in fixing upon Mary the odium of Darnley's murder.

*An Easy Demonstration and Catechism of Religion.* Translated from the Spanish of the Rev. JAMES BALMES, by the Rev. J. NORRIS. Second edition. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE second edition of this useful little work will be gladly welcomed. Anything from the thoughtful mind of Balmes is sure to be good. The work is divided into two parts. We are told in the advertisement to the "Easy Demonstration" that it was not the author's intention to write a catechism of Christian doctrine, or a compendium of the history of religion, but simply to fill up a void which exists in the education of children. The author is of opinion that "sufficient attention is not paid to the foundation of the truths" which our children learn at school; "and as it happens that when they leave school, and mix in distracted and dissipated, if not infidel or *indifferent* society, they do not carry with them the knowledge which may serve to sustain them in the faith of our holy religion. And what arms have been supplied to our youth during their education and training to enable them to defend their faith, if not in conversation, at least in the sanctuary of their own conscience. . . . And is not this department of instruction much more important and necessary than the teaching of arithmetic, geometry, drawing, &c., with which the minds of children are stored, in order that they may enter with profit and honour upon their respective careers?" (pp. iii. and iv.)

Again :

"Lamentable are the ignorance and neglect in these matters. Everything is taught, everything is learnt, except the grounds of our faith. And this is one of the causes why faith lies in so many hearts like barren seed, if, what is far worse, it be not carried away by the first breath of wind." (p. 10.)

In the midst of our educational crisis, when men are trying their utmost to separate religion from education, we consider the republication of this sterling little work as most opportune. It is a short but complete treatise on the grounds of our faith. The second part consists of a Catechism, in which the principal portion of the first part is compressed into a short space. We extract the following from the chapter "On the Existence of a true Religion."

"To say that all religions are equally good, that it matters not whether we be Christians, Mahometan, Jew, or Pagan, is to deny the providence of God, to assert that after He created the world He ceased to care for it, and that the human race walk onward the sport of chance, without object or end, as sheep without a shepherd. It will be said, perhaps, that a God infinitely great does not care about such tiny beings as we are, and regards our worship with indifference. Why, then, did He make us out of nothing (the existence of a God has already been proved) if He was not to take care of us afterwards. . . . For what object could a God who is infinitely just propose to Himself, in making out of nothing a creature which He would immediately abandon, without giving ear to his prayer, or accepting his offerings; indifferent as to whether he would follow this or that law, pay Him this or that worship, and leaving him alone and forlorn in the most horrid darkness? Who could ever conceive such absurdities as these? It would be equivalent to the denial of the goodness and wisdom of God; and a God without wisdom or goodness would not be God." (ch. ix. pp. 11 and 12.)

As far as we are able to judge, the translator has done his work well.

*Passion Flower.* A Novel. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

WE have been charmed and delighted with this novel. The contrast of character throughout is admirable ; and although the author—or shall we say authoress ?—has not been quite so successful in the handling of the incidents, yet the work is unquestionably one of real merit. The lights and shades in the characters of Beatrice and Agnes, the unselfish Johnny Carewe, and his unfortunate cousin Garrett, but especially of Lord Lyffton, which must have been the hardest, we think, to draw, are skilfully brought out, while Lord and Lady Mount Alton and Lady Margaret are natural in the extreme. It is, above all, in the knowledge of mind and heart that the writer excels. We have marked the following passages :—

“He” (Johnny Carewe) “was very fond of giving pleasure, but more so of doing good ; but, what is very rare with kindly people, he always kept possibility in view.” (P. 30.)

How true is the following :—

“Envious ! Why which of us can fairly be considered to be so happy that other mortals should wish their destiny to resemble ours ? What we make shift to bear might to them be intolerable, what we enjoy they might not relish. So many people are happy in spite of circumstances that I think the word envious one of the most foolish ever coined. If people only thought of what they say, how many words would go out of use !” (P. 61.)

And this again :—

“The next morning he” (Lord Lyffton) “breakfasted *tête-à-tête* with Lord Mount Alton. Beyond the ordinary civilities of the breakfast-table, little was said by either of them. It is only when we are alone with a person that we feel how much or how little we have in common with him ; and between these two there was very little in common. After all, perhaps, solitary companionship (if we may use such an expression) is the true test of friendship instead of separation, as has been so often asserted. Our dearest friends are those with whom we are happiest alone.” (P. 100.)

And this too :—

“So it ever is. We criticize our past selves as inexorably as we do our neighbours, and for the same reason—because it puts us in good humour by the contrast, real or supposed, with our actual present self.” (P. 224.)

Yet one more extract :—

“It is strange how in this chequered life of ours ‘one care doth tread upon another’s heel.’ It is seldom that a sorrow comes unattended. And surely it is wisely so. When our heart is worn out by its own vain wishes, with hopes and fears, shadows inconsistent, feverish, with all the changeful anxious world that is pent within a human breast, it seems almost like a relief to be brought face to face with some real, positive calamity—the severance of some old tie, or the hard cold features of want.

“There are moments when men think they have reached the extreme point of mental suffering, when they seem to have fallen into the ‘pit of misery and the mire of dregs.’ Then they fancy themselves familiar with sorrow in every guise, and say in their hearts that nothing can touch them farther. Vain illusion ! Behold them presently plunged into a lower lowness, a yet blacker desolation. What mortal has ever known the length and

breadth and height and depth of human woe? Who can look around over the world, and cry out, 'Is there any sorrow like unto my sorrow?' Ah, who, my brother, save He who became for us a Man of Sorrows,—who tasted in one bitter chalice of all the bitterness that earth can yield?" (Pp. 244—245.)

We sincerely trust, for the sake of our lighter Catholic literature, with which we are so ill provided, that "Passion Flower" will not be the only work we shall have from the pen of this accomplished writer.

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*The Merchant of Antwerp: a tale, from the Flemish of HENDRICK CONSCIENCE.* Translated by REVIN LYLE. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet, and Co. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE tales of Hendrick Conscience are so well known that their author requires no introduction to our readers. If we were asked in what the charm and merit of his tales consist, we should answer that their charm lies in their simplicity and truthfulness to nature, while their merit—a rare merit in these days—is to be found in their freedom from anything that might taint the hearts of the young. Not that in these tales love is excluded; far from it. The tale now before us may almost be said to be a love-tale. But the love, although strong and earnest, ready to undergo and suffer all things, is not the unholy passion of our modern sensational novels, which are eating away the hearts of so many of our English boys and girls; it is always kept in check by higher motives. So, too, we shall find that in the description of the world, and its pleasures, and its money-getting—its grosser vices are of course not touched upon—the author so contrives his plot as to make the reader feel that true happiness lies not with the world. At the same time there is no Puritanism, no sourness; while God and religion are never introduced at the wrong place, but just where, if they were to be omitted, we should feel the want.

In the "Merchant of Antwerp" we have the story of a young man, Raphael Banks, who, brought up in the house of his employer, where he has been treated as a son ever since his mother's death, to whom great kindness had been shown, both by his employer and his wife, constantly keeps the thought before him of one day repaying all their goodness. This, however, does not prevent him from secretly falling in love with his master's daughter, Felicité. Still, he knows his position too well to disclose his feelings; his only hope is one day to make a fortune, and then, to repay his master, and claim his daughter's hand. It is only when a rich young Antwerp merchant becomes her accepted lover, that he can bear it no longer, and leaves for America, still, however, bent upon repaying his master's kindness. His whole fortune consists of a few thousand francs recently left him; but although his heart is well-nigh broken, gratitude to his master bears him up. Meanwhile things begin to go badly with his master, M. Verboort; indeed grave difficulties had already arisen before Raphael's departure, which M. Verboort puts down as the chief cause of his leaving. Gradually matters get worse and worse with the old man; a large American house becomes fraudulently bankrupt, and

M. Verboort is unable to fulfil his engagements. In vain does he apply to the father of his future son-in-law ; far from receiving any assistance, the intended marriage is broken off, and the ruined merchant, reduced to great poverty, becomes insane. After a few years Raphael comes back from America the owner of a large fortune, with the intention of repaying his old master's kindness, but utterly-ignorant either of his misfortunes or of the breaking off of his daughter's marriage. Informed of the true state of things, Raphael succeeds with great difficulty in obtaining an interview with M. Verboort during one of his lucid intervals, but all offers of assistance are indignantly rejected. Nothing baffled, Raphael consults the best physicians as to the possibility of a cure, and is told that the only chance is to cause a sudden shock to the old man by the communication of good news. He therefore makes arrangements with some London and Antwerp merchants, who write to M. Verboort to tell him that the son of the head of the bankrupt firm in America has determined to pay his father's debts, and that they therefore forward him the first instalment of the money. We need not say that all this is a *ruse*, and that the money comes from Raphael ; but the *ruse* proves successful. The old merchant recovers, and finding out the deception that has been put upon him for his good, bestows his daughter's hand on Raphael, who in his turn enables his old benefactor to end his days in comfort.

Such is a brief sketch of the simple tale ; yet simple as it is, it is full of interest. The description of the insanity and recovery of the old man is admirably drawn. We give the following extract, begging our readers to remember that four years have passed since Raphael Banks's departure.

"Mr. Verboort no longer listened, but talked to himself and rubbed his forehead, like some one endeavouring to remember something.

"'Yes ! that is it,' he cried joyfully. 'I knew very well I had forgotten something. A pleasure-garden without a dwelling ! How absurd ! There will be a château with a carved front, large marble steps before the door, and a portico with high columns on both sides. A princely palace ! That is pride, is it not ? Yes ! but when one is rich, worth millions. Ah ! what is there on earth too beautiful for my Félicité ? Time is short, we must take the chance that offers ; for we are rich to-day and poor to-morrow. I must decide at once. Banks does not come. I ought to consult him about the plan. He promised to be here at nine o'clock. Where can he be ? Do you know Félicité ?'

"Suddenly he was seized with a violent attack, his features contracted, and he cried furiously :

"'Banks, Banks. He has abandoned and betrayed me, because misfortune has befallen me. Thou, O God, wilt demand an account of his ingratitude. . . . Poor, ruined, dishonoured ! Raphael, Raphael, what have you done ? There they are, there they are, the phantoms which pursue me, the death which threatens me ! Let me fly. The notes, the notes.'

"Félicité sadly followed her father, but his imaginary fear caused him to run so rapidly, that the poor girl could not overtake him till he was entering the house." (p. 156.)

The anxieties, uncertainties, and risks of a merchant's life are also vividly depicted.

The translation is on the whole fairly good, although we have noticed in several places the misuse of "will" and "shall." At p. 147 we were also



stopped short by the following sentence :—"I felt like kissing her hands for the remembrance."

As for the American spelling we suppose it is hopeless to say anything, as the work has been published in America; but when we meet with "traveling" and "travelers" it is enough to make readers in the "old country" throw down the book in despair.

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*Life of Monseigneur Berneux*, Bishop of Capse, Vicar-Apostolic of Corea. By M. L'ABBÉ PICHOU. Translated from the French, with a Preface, by LADY HERBERT. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

THIS is another volume of the "Missionary Series" from the pen of Lady Herbert, which seems never to rest from its labours in the cause of God's Church, and of His poor. We need hardly remind our readers that, like all the volumes of the same series, it is published for the benefit of the new Missionary College at Mill Hill, and it is indeed a beautiful offering to a beautiful cause. This work, we feel sure, will be productive of a twofold influence. Not only will it stir up all who read it to aid in sending forth fresh labourers to the harvest of souls in distant lands, but it will also quicken the spirit of self-sacrifice at home. Few fathers will be able to read the book without feeling how little *they* are doing for the Church of God, and how less than nothing are *their* mortifications compared with those which this martyred bishop underwent for his Master's cause.

Simeon François Berneux, Bishop of Capse in partibus, Vicar-Apostolic of the Corea, was born May 14, 1814, at Château-sur-Soir, in the diocese of Mans, and was beheaded for the Faith on the 8th of March, 1866. Most interesting is it to trace the spirit of martyrdom working within him even from his earliest years. It shows itself while still a boy, and although natural affection had a strong hold upon his heart, in his desire to study for the priesthood. At the age of twenty-one, still yearning after a more perfect life, he seems to have been strongly drawn towards the monastic life, and the sacrifice of his own will under the rule of S. Benedict; but God had another work for him to do. Three years later he felt that it was to the heathen that he had been called. So strong was the desire to offer himself for the work, that we are told his health gave way under it.

How touching is one of his letters to his mother after he had made up his mind!

"God is my witness," he writes, "that to save you from this sorrow I would willingly shed the last drop of my blood. There is but one sacrifice that I cannot make—I dare not sacrifice my soul. I must fulfil the will of God. And you would not desire it! You would, I know, rather see me dead a thousand times than permit me to be unfaithful to my vocation. For if the separation of a few years be so great a grief to us, what would it not be to be parted for ever! Let us offer the bitter sorrow we feel to our good God, and he will soften it, and help us to bear it. And as for me, it will double the weight I already bear if you continue to grieve so much." (P. 9.)

Here was, indeed, one who had laid to heart, and not merely heard, our Lord's words, "He who loveth father or mother more than Me is not worthy

of Me." And so the whole of his beautiful after-life, what was it but one constant passing from martyrdom to martyrdom, until at last, "torn and scourged, and bruised," "his legs broken in the torture," "his whole body one wound," weeping, not for himself, but for the poor pagans around him, he gave his soul to God, and his blood for the conversion of the Corea. We purposely abstain from giving any further extracts, for we would wish all our readers to obtain the work for themselves, for their own sakes as well as for the sake of the poor heathen for whom the servant of God laid down his life. We may point out, however, that his letter, written when in Tonquin, at the command of his superiors, in which he describes his arrest, interrogations, and imprisonment, is said by Mgr. de Carcassone, who pronounced his funeral eulogy in his native place, to be "one of the grandest and most touching pages in the history of the Church." Nor can we refrain from quoting the following from Lady Herbert's preface:—

"Throughout, the servant of God seems to be fearful of robbing God of the honour which is His due, by attributing to himself the least of the extraordinary graces he received. God alone, indeed, could have given our poor human nature the strength and the courage to bear without a word an amount of physical agony the very recital of which makes one shudder. The executioners being at last weary of tormenting him, he was thrown into a horrible dungeon, where he remained for months, exposed alternately to intense cold and heat, without shelter, without clothes, and nearly dying of hunger. What does he do? He composes a hymn of praise, of which the refrain is,

'Vive la joie toujours,  
Vive la joie quand même.'

'*Hilarem datorem diligit Deus.*' 'God loves those who give themselves with joy.' Such was eminently the spirit of this great servant of God." (Preface; pp. iv.—v.)

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*The Crusade, or Catholic Association for the Suppression of Drunkenness*  
London: Washbourne. 1873.

**T**HIS Crusade, placed as it is, with the approbation of His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster, under the protection of our Blessed Lady of the Immaculate Conception, can hardly require any further recommendation in our pages. We may perhaps, however, be allowed to say a word or two upon the little work which contains and explains the rules of the "Crusade." This most useful little book has a twofold merit. First, it is entirely free from the exaggeration so frequently met with amongst the friends of total abstinence outside the Church. Secondly, it contains rules for partial as well as total abstainers. Amongst non-Catholics there are some who hold that to take any alcoholic drinks at all is a sin. This of course is simple Manichæism, condemned by the Church. But there are others, who without going so far, maintain that all alcoholic drink is poison. This, too, no Catholic can hold, except with regard to cases where such drink cannot be taken without danger of intoxication, because then it becomes a real poison—for the inspired Scriptures, in the midst of its most solemn warnings against drunkenness, is careful to point out that "wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober. . . . Wine was created from the beginning to make men joyful, and not to make them drunk. Wine taken with moderation is the joy of the

soul and the heart. Sober drinking is health to soul and body." (Eccles. xxxi., 32—7.) These passages, coming as they do from a Deutero-Canonical book, will be of no authority to Protestants, but to Catholics they are the words of God. The "Crusade," therefore, in no way interferes with those who can safely take alcoholic drinks in moderation, although even *they* are invited, for the sake of their weaker brethren, or for self-justification, to embrace its rules for partial abstinence, and thus "to deny themselves something, either in quantity or quality, or place or time."

But how many are there who cannot take a little without being led on to take too much? The simple fact that drunkenness is perhaps one of the greatest evils of the present day is the sad, but too-convincing answer. To all such there is but one course open, and that is to abstain altogether, not trusting in their own strength, but placing their good resolutions under the guardianship of the Mother of God, and strengthening them by the Sacraments of the Church. We earnestly trust, therefore, that the "Crusade" will under the Divine blessing become a powerful means of lessening the fearful evil which is destroying so many thousands of our people.

But the Crusade must not be allowed to work alone. Every earnest-minded Catholic must aid it by every means in his power; by our prayers, by tender and considerate treatment of all who have fallen under the influence of the fatal habit, by trying to remove, so far as lies within his reach, the anxiety, and misery, and poverty, and degradation, which too often are the causes of drunkenness. We do not believe that any drunkard was ever yet reclaimed by harsh words about his having "fallen below the level of the brute," or other similar expressions. We have seen many instances in which words like these have hardened men in their drunkenness. We should bear in mind that it is not true that it is always men of the lowest natures or the most sensual, but very often men—yes, and if we may believe recent statements, women too—of the most delicate organization and refined character, who out of love of excitement give way to the excessive use of stimulants. Nor should we forget that in many more instances a craving for drink is hereditary, and therefore inborn, handed down to them, perhaps, from father and grandfather, and that this craving can only be distinguished by something higher than nature. In such cases contempt and harsh words are altogether out of place. So in like manner we must aid each one in his own sphere. The efforts of the Crusade, by endeavouring to provide happier, and brighter, and more inviting homes for the poor of Christ, to raise their social position, and to drive away anxiety, and want, and misery, and temptation far from their doors. We must try to bridge over the fearful gulf between the very rich and the very poor, which is the hateful inheritance bequeathed to us by Protestantism, and which is so utterly contrary to the spirit of Christianity. Not until we are thoroughly in earnest in all these respects shall we succeed in stamping drunkenness out of the land.

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*The Illustrated Catholic Magazine.* November and December, 1872. New Series. London: S. Joseph's Press.

WE are sorry to say that we cannot praise the present number of our only illustrated Catholic magazine. Three at least of the illustrations

are "sensational" in the extreme ; indeed, on first opening the number, we thought that some penny illustrated work had taken shelter by mistake under a Catholic cover. One of the illustrations, representing an escape from a prison at Toulon is worthy of the "Life of Jack Sheppard." We need hardly point out that of all those into whose hands this magazine may fall, by far the greater number will look at the engravings without reading the story, which might perhaps be supposed to qualify their bad effect. In the present instance, however, the chief illustrated story is itself objectionable, for in the five short chapters contained in this number we are entertained with such matters as forgery, suicide, seduction—not dwelt upon, it is true, but hinted at—murder committed in will, if not as yet in deed ; and the conversation is of as thorough a ruffian as ever succeeded in making a highly sensational escape from prison. Surely this is not a story to be placed in the hands of our Catholic boys and girls.

We are grieved indeed to speak so severely of one number of a magazine to which we wish all success, as having a great work to do, especially amongst the young, and which in many ways has done important and valuable service. Would it not be also possible, we may ask, to introduce a little more instruction and distinctively Catholic information in this magazine ? Certainly this can be done without making its pages either uninteresting or heavy.

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*The Catholic Family Almanack, 1873* .New York : The Catholic Publication Society.

**T**HIS is a very neatly got up illustrated almanack, containing valuable information about the Church in the United States, as well as sketches of the lives of Bishop Milner, Archbishop Hughes, Archbishop Spalding, Father Mather, Mother Seton, and others. The illustrations of the Rock of Cashel, and of the Cathedrals of Vienna, Cologne, and Chartres, are especially good. There are at present seven Archbishops and fifty-five Bishops in the United States.

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*S. Helena ; or, the Finding of the Holy Cross.* A Drama for Girls, in Three Acts. Translated and Re-arranged from the German by the Rev. T. A. BERGRATH. Baltimore : Kelly, Piet, & Co.

**W**E have no doubt that in the original German this little drama is well adapted for the purpose for which it has been written. We cannot, however, say the same for the translation, and are therefore unable to recommend it, at least in its present form, for the use of our convent-schools. Take, for example, the following (act iii., sc. iii.), where a dead woman (Claudia) has been raised to life by means of a towel which has touched the Holy Cross :—

"LYDIA (Claudia's daughter) (takes her mother by the hand, and leads her up to the Empress).—Fear not, my lady. It is my mother, well and strong. Our Lord has given her back to us again in honour and by virtue of His holy Cross !

"HELENA.—His name be praised for that. It helps to make our joy more perfect, and adds a special crown to grace this day. *Allow me, Claudia, to offer my congratulations.*

"CLAUDIA.—*I thank you very much indeed !*"

We pity the audience, and still more the young ladies who may have to listen to or utter the words we have placed in italics ; words suitable enough, perhaps, on the lips of young ladies when congratulating one another upon their approaching marriage, but ludicrously out of place at such a solemn moment as that of raising the dead to life.

The English also is in some places very faulty. What, for instance, are we to think of the following :—“ *The likes of you* certainly should not trouble me much in that case ” ? (Act i., sc. v., p. 16.)

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*Fleurange*. By MADAME AUGUSTUS CRAVEN. Translated from the French by M. P. T. New York : The Catholic Publication Society. 1872.

A N American translation of Madame A. Craven's beautiful story, although hardly, we think, worthy either of the original or of the excellent magazine in the pages of which it first appeared (the “ Catholic World ”). Madame Craven's works are of such a kind that, even in a good translation, although their essential qualities are preserved, the exquisiteness, so to speak, of their bloom is lost. How much more then is this the case, when the translation is but an indifferent one ? We feel it however only just to state that in the present instance the translation improves as it goes on.

The circulation amongst us of such purifying and elevating works as “ Fleurange ” can be productive only of unmixed good, teaching as they do the merciful tenderness of God's providence through all the changing scenes of life, and how all human love not founded upon Him, and therefore un-sanctified by Him, must sooner or later bear bitter fruit.

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*Whither shall We go ?* From the German of DR. ALBAN STOTZ. London and Derby : Richardson & Son. 1872.

A NOTHER pamphlet from the pen of the same author, in defence of Papal Infallibility.

“ I did not take part in the war with the French, because it is not in my line to shed blood, and exterminate Frenchmen. But I should like to have a share in this spiritual war, not only because my pen is accustomed to contention, but because it could not be altogether honourable if, in this loud tumult about matters of faith and the affairs of souls, I were to sit quietly behind the bush and look quietly on. Indeed, I have been told that readers and lovers of my writings would like to know what my opinions are respecting Papal Infallibility ; nay, it has already reached my ears that I am suspected of being an opponent of this article of faith.” (P. 5.)

The little work must have done a great deal of good amongst German readers, and we have no doubt that it will also do good in England.

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*Filiola* : a Drama in Four Acts.

*Earncliffe Hall* : a Drama in Three Acts.

*The Reverse of the Medal* : a Drama in Four Acts.

} For Young Ladies.

London : Washbourne. 1873.

O F these three little dramas the last is decidedly the best, although a certain stiffness is observable in all of them, a fault which seems to us to cling in a hopeless manner about almost all plays intended for young ladies.

*The Heart of Myrrha Lake; or, Into the Light of Catholicity.* By MINNIE MAY LEE. New York: Catholic Publication Society. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

A BRIGHT, sparkling, clever little tale, brimful and running over with what we once heard a good Roman priest describe as the "*gaudium Catholicum*." It is simply the story of the passing of a young girl from the gloom of Puritanism and education at "Science Hall," into the light of Catholicity and the joy of the cloister, as well as of the conversion of her mother, lover, and old Methodist uncle; and all this brought about by the religious practices, sound Catholic sense, and good example of a poor Irish servant. Yet everything happens so naturally, and the controversy is introduced so pleasantly, that the reader's interest in the tale is maintained to the end, without his ever finding it either extravagant or wearisome. This is a rare merit in a controversial story. We heartily recommend the work, and consider it well suited for distribution.

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*Maxims of the Kingdom of Heaven.* Second edition. London: Washbourne. 1873.

THIS is simply a collection of maxims taken entirely from the Holy Scripture, most suitable for meditation and reference. They are classed under different heads, alphabetically arranged. The work seems to have been appreciated, and has already reached a second edition. To the first edition a note was prefixed with the well-known initials "J. H. N.," in which we are told that the writer gladly availed himself of the opportunity which a friend had presented to him, of having a share, however small, in a work directed in so pious a spirit towards the promotion among Catholics of a habitual reverent meditation upon the sacred words of Him who spake as "man did never speak."

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*The Confessional Unmasked; or, the Revelations.* A Farce in two Acts, adapted from "Shandy Maguire," by Sen Columbeus. London: R. Washbourne.

NOT devoid of a certain degree of Irish humour, but to our mind the subject of the Confessional is far too sacred to be treated, however innocently, in the form of a farce. We doubt whether such works are not more productive of harm than good. The best that we can say for the work before us is that it is well intended.

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*The Witch-Mania of the Learned World.* By Dr. ALBAN STOTZ. London and Derby: Richardson & Son. 1872.

WE never read any of Dr. Stotz's writings without being reminded of William Cobbett. The present little pamphlet is, in fact, a defence of the Society of Jesus, which will prove most useful at the present time, when more perhaps than they have ever done since their temporary dissolution, the fathers of the illustrious Society are suffering persecution for justice sake.

THE

# DUBLIN REVIEW.

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APRIL, 1873.

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## ART. I.—THE RELATION OF SCHOLASTIC TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

*Die Philosophie der Vorzeit vertheidigt* von JOSEPH KLEUTGEN, Priester der Gesellschaft Jesu. Münster, 1860.

*The Dialogues of Plato.* Translated by B. JOWETT, Master of Balliol College. Oxford, 1871.

*Essays, Theological and Literary.* By RICHARD H. HUTTON, M.A. London, 1871.

*Essays, Philosophical and Theological.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. London, 1869.

IN the higher education of the members of most religious bodies, philosophy may or may not be a luxury; for the young Catholic there can be no question that it is a necessity. The Church has committed herself to the statement that it is possible for natural reason, quite apart from revelation, to prove the existence of God, the free-will of man, and the immortality of the soul. This implies an affirmation that there is such a science as philosophy, and that it belongs to a perfect education. It is plain that in the future English Catholic University, which must come sooner or later, philosophy must have a place. A university, whether it be one college or many, means a place where all sciences are taught; a philosophy therefore there must be. For many reasons it is furthermore plain, that the philosophy of the Church, as far as she has one, is scholastic.—We may take it for granted, therefore, that the scholastic philosophy will be taught at our university. There are, however, many other questions which will have to be answered when the time comes to establish that institution, and amongst them the foremost will be, what is to be done with modern philosophy? That it must be taught in some shape is plain, if only to be refuted. This teaching might take place in many ways. There might be a chair for

the History of Philosophy apart from that of philosophy itself. Or else, besides a professor of scholastic philosophy, there might be other professors licensed to give lectures on any systems which they chose, subject to being deprived of their license if they propounded wrong doctrines. These are practical problems depending on the resolution of a theoretical question, as to the precise extent to which the Church has committed herself to the scholastic philosophy. Is that system to be considered as the absolute truth in such a sense that all others must be absolute falsehood? Or is it the best known calculus into which the truth can be cast without excluding other systems which convey the same truth in a different terminology and by an independent method? These are questions which the present article does not profess scientifically to decide. Its writer agrees perfectly with principles already laid down in this REVIEW. The scholastic philosophy is binding on the conscience of Christians as far as it is connected with theology, and no further; as a connected system, however, it seems to us the most consistent. A writer who, like Gunther, were to write professedly against the system into which the Church has cast the formulæ of many, though not of all her doctrines, and to accuse it of being semi-Pantheistic, would deserve condemnation. It still remains, however, to consider how far the connection of this philosophy with theology extends, and to what extent it admits of progress in itself, and of the existence of other systems by its side. Profound questions might be raised as to the theory and the meaning of philosophical truth. Our aim, however, is far short of this. We desire to make some historical contribution to the question by examining the present tendencies of English philosophy, and seeing whether there are thinkers amongst us, who, without being scholastic, can be hailed as defenders of the truth.

We must confess that to us it would be a lamentable thing if we could descry nothing good in the present philosophy. We must indeed allow that modern philosophy as a whole has not distinguished itself. It has done nothing commensurate with the enormous ability and purity of intention of the man who founded it. All honour be to Kant for defending the eternity and majesty of the moral law against the frivolity of France, and the idea of causality against the scepticism of Scotland. But philosophy never recovered the shock which he gave it by looking upon the human personality as a phenomenon without a substance. In less than a hundred years this philosophy has run its course, and its outcome has been chaos. The aim of the transcendental method was to produce in mental science a



universally received doctrine after the fashion of mathematics ; its effect has been anarchy. The maxim of causality which it endeavoured to establish, is the very thing which it ruined, for we cannot but consider that Mr. Mill and Professor Huxley are the legitimate result of a system which destroys the validity of a priori truth, even while it establishes its existence. But does it follow from this that no progress has been made by this immense sifting of questions, by all this toil of thought ? We cannot think so. Some questions, have been raised, if not solved, of which S. Thomas never dreamed, or which he only saw at fitful intervals, without discerning their importance. Must we say that all human thought has been arrested at a certain date ? This would be but a bad compliment to the independent power which the Church has asserted to belong to the human intellect. Surely the very shock of the Church against the hard flinty stone of the Reformation must have elicited some light. We cannot believe that all modern thought comes of the devil, and rises out of the everlasting pit. This would be a miserable outlook. In that great stormy conflict thousands and tens of thousands of noble souls are struggling, and what chance have we of saving them if we hopelessly differ in first principles, if our very language is to them a foreign speech, if we have no thought in common ? It is all very well to refute ; the Church had far rather convert ; and conversion is well nigh an impossibility if the modern world is utterly reprobate.

Feeling as we do, we hail with pleasure the appearance of the two collections of essays mentioned at the head of this article. It is not to the credit of the candour or the profundity of the British reading public that volumes of such great literary ability and containing such traces of deep thought should not be better known. There is great reason, however, to think that the school to which these writers belong has more influence than is supposed, and that that influence is increasing. We hope to say much about them which will induce our readers to study them and judge for themselves. We are not, however, going to write a regular review. Our purpose is to use them as examples of thinkers absolutely independent of the schools, and whom yet we can look upon as advocates of truth. We trust that those most able writers will forgive us for using them for ends of our own. We wish to point out what we conceive to be the fundamental difference between Aristotelian or scholastic philosophy and modern thought, and how, nevertheless, writers essentially modern in their views have been led to return in part to older theories. In order to do this we must first ascertain what is Aristotelian and what is modern philosophy. In each case we

intend to treat the matter historically, rather than scientifically. As specimens of the old philosophy we will take Aristotle and the eminent Jesuit Father Kleutgen; in like manner we will assume Kant and the above-mentioned writers to be respectively representatives of modern, and of what we take leave to call, reactionary philosophy. We will conclude with some remarks on Mr. Hutton's conception of the relations between Theology and Philosophy.

In looking around us for allies it is strange for us to turn away from Oxford. None but those who have felt it can understand the fascination of Oxford, and how much it has cost some of us to give up the hope which flattered us, as we gazed in the '45 on its towers and spires, that the day might come when we might re-enter it in triumph. We owe some apology to Alma Mater for passing over to her philosophical enemies; and we therefore begin by giving our reasons for dissent, and we take Dr. Jowett's "Plato" as the type of her teaching. Of course we know full well that to talk of Plato and philosophy to the majority of those who have been sighing for Oxford is utterly beside the mark. To the generality that famous university was not a place of education at all, but a locality where their sons could form good connections, correct the awkward manners of boyhood, and acquire the polish of an English gentleman. What was Plato to such a one, or he to Plato? Amongst the advocates of Oxford, however, there were really conscientious parents feeling intensely their responsibilities, and asking anxiously where their children were to receive a higher education. To them the only valid answer is fully to acknowledge and sympathize with their dilemma, and to point out the fact that the Oxford education is bad, as education, besides being unfitted to prepare a Catholic for the battle of life. It is bad spiritually, because it teaches no positive truth; bad, as an intellectual gymnasium, because its tendency is to an atonic state of mind too weak to assimilate truth. Of this the book before us is a sufficient instance.

We must confess that Dr. Jowett's introductions are most delightful to our lower nature. If the reader is one who has suffered under the attempt to master the most learned Brucker's "History of Philosophy," he will understand the pleasure of emerging from that bewildering fog into the intelligible method of the Master of Balliol. Time was when Empedocles and Parmenides, Protagoras and Socrates stood in our minds for certain empty formulæ, unintelligible to us because the whole spirit of Hellenic thought had evaporated from them; in the pages of Dr. Jowett they are living men, and their dicta are stages in the grand development of thought,

steps in the progress of mankind. The charm of the writer consists in his power of throwing himself into that strange Greek life, with all its intellectual activity and its worship of physical beauty; he can enter into, while he condemns, its very crimes. With what marvellous facility he understands the state of things when men began, independently of tradition, to reflect on the universe, that chaotic time when logic was not—when metaphysic was in its infancy, and men in their simplicity took all words for thoughts and all thoughts for things. What a Rembrandt-light he throws on the Silenus mask of the face of Socrates, the “paradoxical, ironical, tiresome” old man; yet amidst all his caustic humour, illuminated from within by a touch of beautiful sadness, as of one forecasting his approaching doom, which he will not avert by anything mean or low. With Dr. Jowett’s help we even feel a certain pity for the Athenians, bored by this “gadfly,” a man fearless of consequences, overpowering in intellect, in season and out of season forcing them to think, and to look facts in the face, merciless to conceit, till they gave him up to the conservative Anytus, a sort of Attic Newdegate, and put him to death. We can see how even an Aristophanes could mistake [for a Sophist the most subtle but the least sophisticated of men, one who saw that the old Athens of Æschylus and Marathon had passed away and become rotten, that the city of the violet crown had lost its savour, that what has been called the dispensation of paganism was a worn-out formula, and that the State, once the nurse of heroes, could no longer mould men, a man finally who had a clear insight into the fact that the individual was now to come forth and assert his consciousness in the place of the State, which once absorbed him, and to find a rest for his feet in the great ideas of morality which he could discover within himself. Strange that mankind should have put to death the first man who bade them look into themselves, and who claimed something like a supernatural mission to preach on judgment to come and on the will of God. The fact was that he looked like a sophist because he professed to know nothing, and upset men’s pretended and traditional knowledge with his pitiless dialectic. He was not, however, a sophist; for to be a real sophist he should have professed the unknowable, not the unknown. He bade each individual not despair, but aspire after the mysterious God, who reveals Himself in the deepest aspirations of the heart; he was the apostle of the unknown God, of whose being he knew enough to die for Him. But the man of whom, after all, we learn most, and with whom we have, as it were a personal acquaintance in Dr. Jowett’s book, is Plato. There

he is not the traditional Plato, half canonized as an opposition saint by Plotinus, but the real living Plato, with "shifting points of view," whose mind had a progress and a history, who is allowed to contradict himself without the dangerous process of reconciliation; and who could argue as acutely as Aristotle against his own ideas, yet was ever faithful to the idea of the Good. A noble soul, "drunk with God," yet leaving us painfully conscious that only at times, if ever quite clearly, his God was to him personal. Such is Dr. Jowett's book on Plato, a great contribution to the history of human opinions, considered as facts. But, amidst this chaos of shifting opinions, this eddying whirl of thought, the student becomes painfully giddy and asks for a little truth. Of course it is highly interesting to see together the views on immortality of Plato and Hegel, Dante, Swedenborg, and Bunyan, but the fact that such and such a man held certain views on the subject is a very different thing from an answer to the question what is the truth on this all-important point. What does philosophy decide? Can natural reason decide anything? This is what is philosophy, what the student of philosophy has a right to know; and of truth in this sense there is hardly anything in these four volumes. "Oh, monstrous! But a halfpenny worth of bread to this intolerable quantity of sack." The hungry soul turns from the book with a painful sense that of the solid food of truth we have rather less than in the days of Plato.

It is not unfair to consider this book as typical of the philosophical teaching of Oxford. It is no new phenomenon. All who were members of that university thirty years ago took up philosophical books, in the contents of which they were examined with a total pretermission of their truth or falsehood. The candidate for honours who presented on his list the Republic of Plato or the Ethics of Aristotle, was simply asked what was the opinion of Plato or Aristotle; he was left to form his own conclusions or not, as he chose, as to the truth of their teaching. No one taught him how to prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, or whether such truths could be proved. The fragmentary thoughts on such subjects to be found in the Analogy of Butler did not mend the matter, for the argument of that great book led its author to put strongly the difficulties rather than the proofs of natural religion. Those, however, who were brought up at the Oxford of old had one great advantage. The philosophy which was read was not indeed taught as positive truth, but was on the whole true. The Organon, the Ethics, and the Republic were the purest fruits of Hellenic thought. The students of the time owe an incalculable debt to Oxford for teaching

them Aristotle so that they were able at once to pass on to the Summa of S. Thomas. Now, however, matters are very different. Not only is no positive truth taught, but that which is taught as opinion is often positive falsehood. No one, it is true, is compelled to take definite books into the schools, yet every studious youth who longs for honours knows perfectly well that questions will be asked involving a knowledge of such books as Mill's Logic and of Hegel's Philosophy. The result is that the mind of the student easily masters a system, as a fact, and loses the habit and the power of grasping truth as such. It will take in like a sponge anything in a fluid shape, no matter what, and retain a hold on nothing. Such an education as this, we maintain, is bad as an intellectual training. That this is no fancy of ours it is easy to show by a quotation from a quarter which will not be suspected of any connection with Ultramontane bigotry. We refer to an excellent article on "The Intellectual Condition of Oxford," from the *Spectator* for May 13, 1871. After describing the general tendency of the system to produce "a hazy and wavering state of mind as to ultimate truths," the writer proceeds to account for it: "There seems no doubt that it may be said to be produced by a good deal of study of the history of philosophy, a vigilant observation of the dissolving views of philosophical systems, without relation to any landmarks of philosophical truth. Professor Jowett especially approves of the great extension of this study of the history of philosophy, *i.e.* of the mastery of modern systems, with a view rather of giving vivid illustration to the ancient systems than to any criticism of their truth, but he does not seem to observe that this mode of approaching philosophical study is almost sure to produce a sort of intellectual vertigo. We are told that Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hamilton, and Mill, with dashes of Bentham, Mansel, and Herbert Spencer, are the philosophical authors now chiefly studied at Oxford, of whom probably only Hamilton and Mansel are likely to compete with Mill and Herbert Spencer for a real hold of the student's imagination. How is it possible that the roots of the pupil's belief should not be shaken." Considering that every decision of the Church for the last thirty years, from the condemnation of traditionalism to that of ontologism, has manifested her desire to impress on the minds of men the fact that there is such a thing as attainable philosophical truth, knowable by a process of human ratiocination, it is simply incomprehensible how any Catholic should call this good education.

Whither then are we to turn to discover signs of hope for modern thought? It is strange, but not the less true, that

gleams of light come to us not from the time-honoured and much-loved Oxford, but from the London University. We are perfectly aware that that institution produces a great deal of very bad philosophy. We do not wish any practical conclusion whatever to be drawn from our assertion, which does not by any means go to solve the difficulties which some Catholics have felt with respect to the examination-papers of London; we wish to pronounce nothing about them one way or other. All that we assert is that the school of writers who have set themselves to oppose every sort of philosophy which a Catholic would call bad, issues not from Oxford but from London. While Balliol and Oriel have been silent, the authors of the volumes of essays about which we are now concerned have consistently lifted up their voices against the systems of Mr. Mill and of Mr. Herbert Spencer. They have fought side by side with Catholics for the great truth that God is knowable by human reason, and for the intuitional nature of moral truths. They are as merciless on the theological agnosticism of Dean Mansel as on the physical agnosticism of Professor Huxley. We will, however, proceed both to contrast and to compare these writers with the philosophy which we venture to call the philosophy of the Church, as far as the Church can be said to have one at all. In order to do this we must enter at more length into its history.

The scholastic period may be said to be that during which the authority of Aristotle was acknowledged in the Christian scientific schools, and scholastic philosophy may in rough terms be said to be that of Aristotle. This must not be taken to mean a denial of the fact that Platonic elements are to be found in the schoolmen, nor is it asserted that the schoolmen never criticised Aristotle. S. Thomas himself, in a work on Angels as separate substances, prefers the opinions of Plato to those of Aristotle. Yet we certainly do mean to assert that Aristotle was considered as the culminating point of the human intellect, not to be differed from without very strong grounds. In the disputes between S. Thomas and Averroës, the question between the combatants was what did Aristotle say: both allowed that what he said was right. Few notions are so clearly Christian as that of a creation taking place in time; yet S. Thomas so far agrees with Aristotle as to allow that its eternity cannot be disproved by human reason. Even the English Franciscan Scotus, who, like his Irish namesake of the ninth century, has been called a Platonist, throws his views, where they approach most to those of Plato, into a system called formalism, from his shaping

them in the Aristotelian terminology about form and matter. S. Bonaventure, most mystical of schoolmen, does not venture to present his original doctrine of the influence of God's presence in the soul on our knowledge of Him, without using the Aristotelian theory of cognition. Even Vasquez, in differing from the maxim, *actiones sunt suppositorum*, prefaces his denial with an assertion that the dictum is not Aristotle's. Everywhere, in all Christian schools, he was, as Dante sang,

Maestro di color che sanno.

The scholastic system, as even the little which we have already said is sufficient to prove, is not a narrow system of formulas, but leaves room for numberless open questions, yet all are cast into an Aristotelian shape. Dominicans, Franciscans, and Jesuits forget their differences to bow before the old Stagirite. After a revolution of thought had cast him down, Cartesianism was for nearly two hundred years the philosophy of most schools except those of the Jesuits; a reaction has now set in, and the old king of thought has returned to his throne. We at least have no wish to send him back into exile.

There is no part of the history of human thought so strange as the influence of this old pagan on Christian schools. There must have been a disinterested love of pure truth in those mediæval men to inspire them with such enthusiasm for Aristotle, and to cause them to stick to him so loyally. What a temptation to Christian thinkers to throw him over when he came to them through Mahometan hands! "We fear the Greek though he bring us gifts," would have been the cry of men whose intellects were less broad, and whose hearts beat less high for truth. Above all, this heathen philosopher appeared as the patron and the watchword of a Pantheism which was poisoning the schools and eating into the heart of men's faith. Aristotle looked as little likely to subserve Christian purposes as Hegel. We can understand the outburst of wild delight with which the men of the Renaissance hailed the resurrection of Homer and of Plato from the sleep of centuries. The love for poets is not all disinterested, for they make part of the brightness of life; they sing of human joys and sorrows, and their words reach our inmost hearts and find their way, like music, to our bosoms. No wonder men went wild over the melody of Plato's style and the splendour of his thoughts. But what was there to enchant men with the Stagirite, whose voice had no eloquence but that of clearness, the very beauty of whose style, its only beauty, was quenched by a barbarous translation, who spoke neither to the heart nor to the imagination, whose patrons were infidels, and who had kept bad company in an age most sensitive to heresy?

This admiration is the more strange, because Aristotle had come down from the Patristic age with a bad reputation. Not only had the Christian Church of the first ages no official philosophy at all, but the early Fathers, if they were anything, were rather Platonists than Peripatetics. The language, in which the great doctrine of our Lord's divinity was couched, historically, indeed, had but little to do with Hellenic thought (for we suspect that S. John knew nothing of Plato), yet was certainly more akin to the Academy than to the Lyceum. Justin, Clement, and Origen were Platonists; and in the course of the controversy with the Arians, Aristotle had been very roughly handled, especially by S. Basil, who knew him well, since he had been a student of the University of Athens before he became a Christian bishop. It was then a bold stroke of liberality as well as of sagacity which induced the ancient schoolmen, instead of putting the old heathen on the Index, and burning his works by the hand of the hangman, to take him for their master. Two things have to be accounted for. Why take a heathen for their tutor, instead of inventing a philosophy of their own? and why pass over the brilliant Plato for the rude Aristotle? The first question, we think, is easily answered. They chose Aristotle primarily because he was a heathen, and lived before Christ. We have sometimes speculated how much S. Thomas, for instance, knew of the biography of him whom he calls "the Philosopher." Very little, we suspect. The son of a medical practitioner, in a small provincial town amidst the Thracian mountains, himself even the keeper of something like an apothecary's shop at Athens, had in the Middle Ages become a mythic personage. We think it is at Bayeux, but certainly in some Norman cathedral, that Aristotle, "the man with thin legs and small eyes," appears on the capital of a column as a Christian knight destroying a dragon. S. Thomas knew more than this, but we do not suppose that even he heard much more than that Aristotle lived before the coming of our Lord. That, however, was enough. The Church has ever had an indestructible trust in the human intellect when perfectly unadulterated. In spite of all its errors, the Church has believed in it, has ever defended it, even against its own despair of its power of attaining truth. To be trustworthy, however, it must be perfectly independent. No thinker of the nineteenth century can be independent, as the heathen were before Christ in that Hellenic world. A man of our time may be candour itself, he may descend into the pure depths of his consciousness to evoke truth out of it; but the consciousness itself represents the growth of a life, in the very roots of which must necessarily have entwined them-



selves prejudices for or against Christianity. He that is not for Christ is against Him. But a philosopher of the fourth century before Christ had nothing of the kind to divest himself of when he started on the discovery of the first principles of things. He could neither hate nor love a revelation which did not exist. In studying him, faith had no favour, but it had all it wants—a fair field. He was a pagan, it is true, the tutor of the beautiful Jupiter Ammon of Macedonia, and a worshipper of the gods, since he speaks in his will of a vow to Zeus and Athene, the preserver; but his paganism sat light upon him, and lay outside his Metaphysics. Thus, then, in effect, the schoolmen argued: "Here is natural reason in its purest form, without any admixture of revelation; let us hear it speak; it is God's creation; it can only speak the truth; on the long run we can safely trust the intellect to lead to faith, if it is only independent." The Church hates rebellion, but fears not independence. As the Christian revelation did not destroy but presuppose God's former revelation, and did not disappoint but crowned "the desire of the eternal hills," so it did not reverse but respected the dictates and traditions of this Gentile reason, even after the fall; that is, of the human intellect left to itself. Aristotle was to the Middle Ages the impersonation of reason.

Indeed the mediæval world was right. The Greeks were the very bloom of the human race, and Aristotle the flower of Hellenic thought. It is true that in Greek city life there was something narrow and parochial, till Greek thought, poetry, and art flushed into life, through contact with the barbarian world. As Hellas gained her first singer from Asia Minor, her first philosophers before Socrates belonged, like Aristotle himself, to her colonies. It required the intercourse with foreigners, the sight of new vegetation and new lands, and of unaccustomed seas, to bring out into activity the imagination and the intellect of the Greek. Thus Hellas became cosmopolitan in spite of herself, and won the right to represent the world's intellect. Aristotle was the culminating point of this great line of philosophers in a very real sense. Original thinker as he was, no man had a greater reverence for his predecessors. To convince oneself of this, one has but to read the treatise on the Soul. With the utmost care Aristotle enumerates and comments upon the views of all who came before him. He gravely weighs the arguments adduced for opinions which to us appear worthless or ridiculous. Starting from the view that like alone can know like, all had held more or less material theories of the soul. Nevertheless, before Aristotle propounds his own theory, he makes all his predecessors pass in review

before us. Heraclitus with his fluent soul; Diogenes with his soul of air; the soul of Democritus, composed of spherical atoms; that of Empedocles, made of fire, water, air, and earth—all have far more than justice done to them. The whole winds up with the description of Xenocrates, who made soul to be a self-moving monad; and lastly comes Plato's triple soul—cranial, thoracic, and abdominal. So hard was it for human science to disengage spirit from matter. Aristotle profited by all these errors; and not till he has discussed them all does he propound his own theory, founded on the distinction between form and matter. He was thus the heir of a long line of thinkers, winding up with Socrates and Plato; and in adopting his view, the Church reaped the fruit of the intellectual development of humanity.

In order fully to understand, however, the reason why Aristotle, and not Plato, was chosen by the schoolmen as their master, we must examine this very doctrine of form, which is the central point of his whole philosophy: and in doing so, we shall follow his own method, and briefly describe its history. It would be impossible to get at its meaning in any other way. It is one of those distinctions which have made the most profound impression upon mankind. It meets us in every science and in every school, and makes part of the philosophical language of all nations. In dogmatic theology we have the form and matter of the Sacraments; in morals, material, and formal sin: a logician speaks of the matter and form of propositions. Even Kant, the great opponent of ontology, imports the distinction into his theory of perception. What is this strange distinction which forces itself into the scientific speech of all mankind? If the form is the essence of the thing, is it such only in our thought, or does it enter into the composition of the object? To what science does it belong, since so many claim it? Is it a metaphysical or dialectical or a physical notion? We believe that most of the difficulties which attend the explanation of it arise from forgetting that it originally belongs to physics.

The passage in which Aristotle describes the evolution of the ideas of matter and form reads like a page of Hegel. He thus traces its history. All things are subject to becoming (*Werden*) or change, said Empedocles. Now, what is the meaning of this becoming? Does it spring from Being or from Not-Being. Plainly from neither. Not from Being, for what already is cannot become; not from Not-Being, for something cannot become out of nothing. It is evident, then, that all Becoming, all change, is a mere appearance. What, then, is reality? Nothing but

the mechanical play, the combination and separation of unchangeable elements; these with a moving force produce the appearance of change. These elements of Empedocles become the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. Heraclitus finds reality in Becoming, or change itself: this is the link in which the contradiction of Being and Not-Being is reunited. A far deeper thinker is the opponent of Heraclitus, Parmenides, who finds reality only in Absolute Being, that is in thought, which to him is Being and outside of which all is Not-Being. Out of the fusion of these two comes Plato; his reality lies in Ideas or Forms (*εἶδη*) existing outside both mind and matter. After all these Aristotle's conception that matter enters into the reality of things was a revolution in philosophy. Between Being and Not-Being he holds a third principle, the Potential, a passive principle, which never exists in and by itself, but is brought into reality by an active principle called the Form.

At first sight this language is difficult. Nothing, however, is easier than to make it intelligible. To this day the same question is debated, and is agitating the minds of men. What is the reality behind this universe of changing phenomena around us? Is there any reality? If there be, is it accessible to man? The question between atomism and dynamism still divides the scientific world, and though neither one nor the other perfectly represents Aristotle, yet the latter especially, which is most akin to his theory, assists us in understanding him. Whether scientific men adhere to the atomistic or the dynamic theory, there is a curious consensus amongst them on one principle, that the quantity of matter and of force in the universe is always the same. When one chemical substance is changed into another, the sum of existence in the world is not held to be increased; the change is held to be produced by a new arrangement or a new combination of ultimate particles, whatever they may be. Again, when a new force appears, the tendency of science is to consider that the increase is only apparent; the same amount of force remains; all that has happened is that a previously existing force has been converted into another. The Aristotelian theory, on the contrary, is that with each substantial change a new reality has taken the place of an old, an active principle has passed away from a given matter, and another active principle has been brought into being, and has taken its place. To take one of the commonest of illustrations, when so much oxygen and hydrogen have combined, and water is the result, what has happened? According to the common scientific view, the water is only

the result of the sum, and the re-arrangement of the molecules, which before appeared in the shape of that phenomenon which we called gas. In the Aristotelian view, an actual new force has entered into possession of the passive principle or matter. The old force has passed away from the elements; a freshly-generated force has come into existence. This force, together with the old passive principle or matter, which underlay the original gases, constitutes the substance water. Of course it is easy to say that our stock of chemical knowledge is not increased by affirming that "wateriness" is necessary to constitute water. A real truth, however, is gained if it is made out that over and above the old constituent parts an additional force has come in to hold them together, to create a unity, to be the cause of the new properties which affect our organs. The new substance water has perfectly new qualities, different relations to space, different operations in our bodies. We Aristotelians prefer to say that a new active principle has come in, and this we call the form. Be it observed, we interfere with no existing science. It still remains true that hydrogen and oxygen are the chemical constituents of water; we only hold that an additional force has come into being. None of the great forces of nature are interfered with; heat, electricity, magnetism, are undisturbed; we only hold that in addition to all these general forces each individual thing has a force of its own—viz., its form. Nay, these original forces are necessary to the Aristotelian theory, and find a place in it. Students of Aristotle will not forget that "the grand region of Form is the Celestial Body—the vast, deep, perceivable, circular mass circumscribing the Kosmos, and enclosing in and around its centre, earth, with the other three elements, tenanted by substances generated and perishable."\* Of this vast region we will make a present to modern science, whose votaries may fill it as they please. They are welcome to the waves of ether, which are necessary to the undulating theory of light; its beauty belongs to us as well as to them. To all these forces we even assign a greater power than the scientific men who think that we are their opponents, for to these general forces of nature we assign the faculty of calling into being the new form, which constitutes each individual thing. The chemist "lays it down as an incontestable axiom, that in all the operations of art and nature nothing is created; an equal quantity of matter exists both before and after the experiment; the quality and quantity of the elements remain precisely the same; and nothing

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\* Grote, ii. 220.

takes place beyond changes and modifications in the combination of their elements." According to the Aristotelian theory, on the contrary, under the influence of the universal forces of nature, out of the potentially stored up energy of passive matter there is generated a new active principle, an actually existing thing called the Form. It is often argued against the notion of a vital force, that those who maintain it ought in consistency to contend for the ancient theory of forms. We must confess that we here agree with Mr. Huxley; we contend for both the forms and the vitality. There is a strange likeness and unlikeness between the Aristotelian and the modern views. There is the same encyclopædic breadth, striving to introduce unity into all nature, and to find a link between chemistry and biology, physiology and psychology. But whilst modern science finds its unity in the endeavour to reduce generation to the type of ordinary evolution, the Aristotelian theory, on the contrary, takes this generation, that is the calling of a new substance into being, to be the type of all lower evolution. It can accept the facts on which the evolution theory is founded, while it explains them in its own way. In our view, the human embryo passes through a stage of vegetable and of purely animal life before it becomes a rational being; but in each case, on the scholastic view, a worn-out form passes away, and a new one takes its place. We have no objection to the facts on which the "cell theory" is built, but we cannot consider "the living body to be an aggregation of quasi-independent cells, each leading its own life." We agree with Kant that the special peculiarity of the living body is that "the parts exist for the sake of the whole, and the whole for the sake of the parts," and that whole, in our view, is the active principle of the organism which we call its form. In one word, our view of nature is, that the changes are not phenomena resulting from the material combination of things already in being, but the result of the union of passive matter, which potentially might be anything; and of a form or active force freshly called into being, which determines it to be that thing which it becomes.

Such is the Aristotelian view of force and matter, one which, we cannot help thinking, contains a great truth. We have high authority for considering it to be at least one true representation of nature. That same "individual essence of a thing," that form or *εντελεχεια* of the substance, "which causes it to be that thing," says Leibnitz, "consists in a certain power or actual faculty or capacity for action." And of the whole theory, he says: "Were it permitted to explain the course of our researches, there is no one, except those who are pre-engaged

by the prejudices of their imagination, who would not admit that these views are not of that confused and absurd character which is commonly attributed to them by those who despise the received doctrines, and who scoff at Plato, Aristotle, S. Thomas, and other illustrious men, as though they were but children in philosophy.\* These words of such a man as Leibnitz carry considerable weight; one who would at once dismiss as baseless a theory supported by such respectable tradition would betray an irreverent and unphilosophical mind. The question however, is, are the Aristotelian and scholastic views on form and matter in such a sense the absolute truth that all other systems are absolutely false? That they contain a truth we believe; are they obligatory on all men? What authority is there which compels mankind to believe them? Let us say boldly and clearly, none whatever. For this statement we have the assertion of the most powerful accredited exponent of the scholastic philosophy, the Jesuit Father Kleutgen. After speaking of an objection raised by scientific men to the doctrine, he adds: "Although we are confident of being able, with S. Thomas, to find a solution to this difficulty in a most satisfactory manner, still we do not think that the arguments, the nature of which we have explained, establish the theory of matter and form in an absolutely irrefragable manner; that theory is not evident in such a sense as to be the only one which can be held, and that every other ought to be rejected as a manifest error."† With this view we cordially agree. The ultimate composition of matter seems to be an insoluble problem. That theories concerning it are only partially true seems to us proved by the fact that all run up into a natural mystery. At the bottom of them we always find something which shows that the human mind has reached its limits. Just as the atomic theory lands us in an antinomy respecting the divisibility of matter, so the scholastic theory ends in *materia prima*, that is, in words only very partially intelligible, as a great and noble river loses itself in the sand. This does not prove that it is false, but it does prove that it is not absolute truth.

Is no part then of the scholastic philosophy binding upon

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\* "A System of Theology by Leibnitz." Translated by Dr. Russell, pp. 112—115.

† Ch. v. p. 423, French translation, 1869. In the German of 1863, which we use throughout, the corresponding passage is to be found, ch. iv. p. 341, vol. 2, in a somewhat different form. The whole seventh dissertation is so rearranged as to lead to the conclusion that this part of the work shows traces of the ameliorations proposed by the author for a second edition, and communicated to the translator.—*Avant-propos*, 7.

the conscience? We answer unhesitatingly that some particular decisions of the schoolmen have been adopted by the Church. They are not many yet, they are of great importance, and we are now going to comment on one especially, the adoption of which is a most marvellous instance of the sagacity of the Church in pointing out the philosophical truth best adapted to express her meaning, and to combat errors at that time unknown. We mean the peculiarly Aristotelian doctrine that the soul is the form of the body.

We have already called the appearance of Aristotle a revolution in philosophy. This is true above all of his doctrine of forms, but especially of his application of it to the soul of man. It is impossible to read anything of Greek philosophy before his time without being struck with the amazing naïveté of its one-sidedness. Each philosopher seems to get hold of some truth, and to ride it to death. It seems to us that the reason of this lies partly in their virtues and partly in their defects. It was a virtue in them to believe as they did in the veracity of their faculties. No critique of Reason had been written; no wealth of observation and experiment had overborne the first judgment of their senses. As yet, in the happy time of intellectual youth, innocent of disappointments, they believed in the infallibility of logic; and if the apparent crookedness of the oar in the water led them to see that sense might be distorted, no doubt ever crossed the Hellenic mind as to the trustworthiness of healthy, unbiassed sense when it saw right. So far they were to be envied. On the other hand, they were unable to take in truth in its whole breadth and many-sidedness, because they were ignorant of the great model synthesis which compels us to accept and to seek to harmonize apparently antagonistic truths, the unity of the human individual. They saw plainly enough that the senses present to us external objects under one aspect, as particulars, while our thoughts present them under another as universals. Because they knew nothing of the unity of man's nature which compels us to recognize both aspects as true, each philosopher, according to his bias, ignored one or other. Generally it was the world of sense and particulars which perished. If Parmenides on the one hand absorbed the multiplicity of phenomena into the oneness of thought, Democritus on the other looked upon all sensible objects as being in a perpetual flux of generation and destruction; so that change was the one law of existence; neither would allow that sense could be an object of knowledge. In the shipwreck of sense the unity of the human being itself was imperilled; it had nothing to defend it from being dissolved into a series of thoughts, or whirled away in the eternal flow of things.

It was a grand step when Socrates turned man's thoughts inward upon his own notions. Yet he fixed his eyes precisely upon those notions which have least of sense in them, and which, therefore, are least likely to lead man to reflect upon the duality of his nature, made up of body and soul, and to seek for the link which unites his twofold being. As long as Socrates occupied himself chiefly with noble ideas like the holy, the beautiful, the good, it was possible for him to mistake such generalizations for ideas in the Platonic sense, for objects outside of us, shining above and into us, independent of sensible objects and of the active powers of the intellect. The particular thus became a mere shadow of the universal, without any inherent reality. The soul, shorn of its highest activity, became a passive recipient of ideas, and man's nature became a loose trichotomy of body, of soul, and of a spirit, which was rather borrowed than his own. It was reserved for Aristotle to restore reality to particulars without relegating universals to the position of arbitrary fabrications of the mind or to that of mere names. He held universals to have a real existence outside the intellect, but solely in the particulars. He considered them to "be inseparable elements of the objects perceived by sense." A concept, according to him, is produced by two factors, sense and intellect. The unity of their joint product led him to seek for the unity of man's nature, and to find its expression in the formula that the soul is the form of the body.

The connection between Aristotle's theory of cognition, and his view of the relation between body and soul may very easily be made plain by contrast with other theories ancient and modern on the subject. If Plato's view be true, that the soul does not form its own notions at all, but receives them ready-made from the typical ideas themselves without it, it plainly requires no connection with the body to form them. If, on the other hand, modern nominalism is right, if the general notion is not even a thought but a name, and if the work of the mind in forming singular notions is the mere registering of bundles of attributes, and stringing them together by a law of association, then it is plain that for this it requires no such independence and activity of its own as to be a form at all, still less the form of a body of which it may be, not the activity, but a function. If, however, as Aristotle taught, the concept or notion is a joint product of intellect and sense, the intellect forming its own independent notions on the sensations which take place in the body, then, to form a concept, the same thing must both feel and think; in other words, the same soul must both be active in the body which



feels, and in the intellect which thinks. There is of course a further question as to the validity or objective truth of this notion. On this point there is a great disagreement between Aristotle and modern philosophy. The present tendency of thought is to resolve the qualities of the object into sensations of the subject, and what was once called a substance into a name. Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that the notion gives us a real insight into the object. This, it cannot be too often repeated, is the real distinction between Aristotle and the prevalent modern philosophy. His system is ontological, that is, he believes that objective truth really reaches the human mind.

In order to bring out the full contrast, we must now dwell at some length on the theory of cognition, which is peculiarly Aristotle's. It would have been quite foreign to habits of Hellenic thought to prove the externality of the outward world, for the simple reason that no one ever doubted it. That peculiar form of idealism, which results from the analysis of the sensations and the resolution of what Aristotle would call the qualities of the object into the subjective sensibilities of man, is owing to physiological research and is essentially modern. The whole, therefore, of Sir William Hamilton's polemic on the immediateness of the perception of the outer world, has no place in Aristotle. His view of the Ego was by no means so definite as ours, and it never occurred to him to search for the first sharp shock which separates it off in our minds from the Non-Ego. Whether then Aristotle was a Natural or a Cosmothetic Realist does not appear. His theory lay beyond Hamilton's division. He held, indeed, that the notion was a representation of an outward object, but that object was not an unknown but a known cause of sensations in us. It might be called an immediate representation in the same sense as an original portrait may be so called in contradistinction to a copy.

We will describe his view in his own terms, and explain its tendency by contrasting it with modern philosophy. Aristotle divides the faculties of man engaged in cognition, into the external and internal sense, and into the active and possible intellect. If we suppose a horse to be the object of perception, the external sense conveys the various sensations of its colour, shape, and sensible accidents, while it is the internal sense which distinguishes all these various separate sensations from each other, refers them to one group and gathers them\* into one image or phantasm, otherwise called

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\* We are aware that the common account assigns to the internal sense the function of distinguishing, not of collecting the various impressions of sense.

species sensibilis. Then, upon this image stored up in the imagination, begins the action of the intellectus agens, which discovers through the phenomena the essential idea of the horse, that is its species intelligibilis, formed and apprehended by the possible intellect.

A strange jargon this, yet by no means hopeless to translate into modern language. The act of perception may be divided into four moments, which in point of time may be more or less simultaneous. First comes a presentation of sense, then a representation of the Phantasy; then for practical purposes we may consider abstraction to be the equivalent of the intellectus agens, and generalization, or the formation of the notion itself, to be the equivalent of the intellectus possibilis. One thing only we must remember. Aristotle held the individual object to be known as something more than a bundle of attributes; he taught that the mind knew it to be a bundle of attributes held together by a certain force or activity, which he called a form. Abstraction, therefore, with him began with the individual object even before it was compared with other individuals. Abstraction was not only the concentration of our attention on the points of difference between a number of objects; it was also the process by which the intellect separates the qualities from the central form. The function of the intellectus possibilis is the formation of the notion, by which the form or nature of the object is apprehended, which notion, by comparison with other individuals of the same class, becomes general. This generalization is not only a process of reasoning but an insight into the truth.

It is easy then, if we bear this in mind, to classify Aristotle's theory of cognition in our present philosophy. We must begin by eliminating all questions which imply a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of body, nowhere, as far as we know, to be found in Aristotle. The system evidently belongs to those which hold our immediate object of cognition to be a modification of the mind, an affection of the intellect itself. But let no one suppose for a moment that in his view the intellect is passive. The expression intellectus agens is a proof of its activity; even the intellectus possibilis is active. The very notion of an

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Yet both Zeller and Brentano bear us out. ("Philosophie der Griechen, Aristoteles," p. 420. "Psychologie des Aristoteles," p. 95.) Difficulties might also be raised about the difference between species and phantasm, which would only needlessly prolong the discussion. The physiology of the senses is the weak point of scholasticism.

Aristotelian form is activity.\* The very meaning of a potential intellect is one which can apprehend, and form itself into a likeness of anything, no matter what; and this same intellect is active because it has a power of spontaneous activity which causes it to rise up as soon as it is roused by sense, and to pronounce judgment on its own sensations according to laws of its own. It is this which is meant by its being a *tabula rasa* and its having no innate ideas. It is not like a blank inanimate page, to be written on by sense, nor like the white sheet on which a magic-lantern throws its unreal phantasmagoria, nor even like the chemically prepared plate on which nature photographs herself. Though it has no innate thoughts, it has intuitions of its own; and by these it has the power of creating its own ideas, which, be it remembered, are not mere names for a collection of particulars, for they are not merely notional, but have a real outward basis corresponding to them, the general wrapped up in the particulars of sense.

The parentage then of Aristotle's views is simple enough. They are not akin to any views which look upon the idea as a passive copy of a number of sensations. The universal is an original creation of the mind, corresponding to a reality existing in the individual, not a mere name to register the experiences of sense. It is quite true that many Catholic writers speak of the universal as though it were contained in the particular, like a nut in its shell, and of the action of the intellect as though it were a mere stripping off of the phantasms and a transference of the universal contained therein to the intellect. They seem to dread all manner of scepticisms, unless the very identical sensible species, only denuded of its material phenomena, is apprehended by the mind, unless they restricted the action of the mind to the discovery of the naked universal with its clothes taken off. Such is not the language of Catholic writers who look for things under formulas. Kleutgen even acknowledges a temptation to find a resemblance to Kant in the Aristotelian theory of cognition.† In both, the notion or concept is the result of the independent action of the intellect upon sensations. In both, the intellect draws upon its own treasures and furnishes its quota to the result. The principles of the active intellect underived from sense are to Aristotle's intelligible species what the forms of the sensible

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\* Kleutgen, 732, denies the form to be a force, but asserts it to be the active principle in matter. V. S. Thomas, quoted in note. The difference is immaterial for our purpose.

† Kleutgen, "Philosophie der Vorzeit," 341.

intuition are to Kant's concept. The difference, however, is enormous between a form in the Kantian sense, which is purely subjective and has no corresponding reality in the object, and the principles of the intellect which Aristotle considered to be the laws of being, and to be valid for all objects external to the mind. But how is it possible that the laws of the material universe should find their expression in the immaterial soul? What is this mysterious universal which exists in the particulars of sense, and which can be copied by the intellect? Have we got back again to the unity of being and thought of Parmenides or to the Hegelian notion? The answer to this question throws a great light on the functions of the Form in the Aristotelian system. This universal is the Form mentally conceived. The failure in understanding this has misled both Mr. Grote and Mr. Mill\* in their views of Aristotle. They have not seen that this universal is really the mind's apprehension of the Form which we have described as existing in all individuals. The essence, the substance, the nature of the thing, that which corresponds to the notion in Aristotle's system are really various aspects of the Form in different relations, and the universal is the same Form apprehended by the mind.† This is the real point of contact between the physical and spiritual world. We have already described the Form as the principle which gives unity and activity to the phenomena, in other words, it fulfils the functions of modern Force. Activity or Form is the very thing which is common to material objects and to spirit. This explains such passages as the following in Kleutgen, directed against language respecting abstraction, which would reduce the schoolmen to an inferior species of Locke, as well as against such as would confound the scholastic theory with that of Kant. "According to the definition which scholasticism gave of abstraction, concepts although obtained by way of abstraction, are thus far *à priori*, that they are not obtained by comparing and completing the sensible images. However they do not for this reason presuppose the categories as

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\* In his review of Grote's Aristotle, in the "Fortnightly Review," Mr. Mill says, "Those forms which are in reality the attributes of objects, are thus the actual creators of objects, as they exist in *ἐντελεχεία* or completeness; and this attribution to forms of a kind of active power made it difficult to avoid regarding them as substantive entities" (p. 37). It is not only difficult but impossible not to regard them as entities, only not substances, because they must exist in some matter. Mr. Mill would not have called them attributes if he had remembered that there is only one substantial form to each object.

† "Philosophie der Vorzeit," 94.

forms *a priori* existing in the mind through which the activity of the intellectual faculty is determined. The peculiarity of that cognitive faculty, or *lumen intellectuale*, consists, according to the schoolmen, in that it apprehends in things that which does not belong to them in as far as they are material, but which they have in common with immaterial things, and in that by means of these highest ideas (such as Being, Substance, Oneness, &c.) it perceives in objects that which sense cannot reach, namely their essence.\* When therefore the schoolmen use such expressions as "*species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstrahere*," they do not mean "to purify the sensible image by stripping off (*abstreifen*) the material parts." † The function of the *intellectus agens* is to take the mind's attention off the mere material phenomena of the sensible image, and to fix it upon the fact that they are qualities radiating from a central force or Form. This Form the *intellectus possibilis* converts into a concept and calls "the essence," for, says Kleutgen, ‡ "according to S. Thomas, the essence is another name for the form." By induction, or a frequent recurrence of similar individuals, this concept becomes a universal notion; but it must not be forgotten that the universal, as such, exists only in the mind. "According to the true Realism," § says Kleutgen, "the universal exists in objects because the real essence of the individual thing corresponds to that which is apprehended by the universal notion; but as such, that is in its universality, it is only in the thinking subject." || It is thus a fabrication of the mind though not an arbitrary one. It is the mode in which the human mind represents to itself, according to its own laws, the real Form which exists out of it in the individual.

To sum up this discussion, it is in the notion of Form that lie both the contrast and the similitude between Aristotle and modern thought. By the doctrine that the Form really exists in the particular, he saves the reality of the outward world. By the view that the Form reappears in the mind under the shape of the universal, he makes that outward world accessible to the intellect.

While this account of Aristotle's theory of cognition is fresh in the reader's mind, it is best somewhat to invert the pro-

\* Kleutgen, 305. † *Ibid.*, 74. ‡ *Ibid.*, 92. § *Ibid.*, 74.

|| Kleutgen, 367. We are not sure that we should not call this Conceptualism, that is, according to Mr. Mill, the doctrine that "generality is not an attribute solely of names but also of thoughts." (Examination of Hamilton, c. 17.) He there makes the astounding assertion that Realism was the only orthodox doctrine "imposed as a religious duty in the Middle Ages." Yet Gilbert de la Porée was a realist, and was condemned.

posed order of this article, and to quote a passage of Mr. Martineau's Essays by way of showing his substantial agreement without concealing his differences. By a comparison of the following passage with the above quotations from Kleutgen, it will be seen that Force occupies in Mr. Martineau's system precisely the position assigned to Form in the Aristotelian view. It is the middle term between matter and spirit.

Is there any middle term which can aid the mutual understanding between the Religious and the Scientific view of nature?—any fundamental thought common to both, or passing as an essential from the one to the other? We think there is, viz., the idea of Force. That this really is an intermediate conception, more than physical, less than theological, will probably be conceded on both sides. It is less than theological; for in league with the epithet "material" it can quit the Theist, and take service with the Atheist. It is more than physical; for the term certainly goes beyond the meaning of the word "Law"; it expresses neither any observable phenomenon nor any mere order of co-existence or succession among phenomena. To our objective Perception and Comparison nothing is given but movements or changes; to our Inductive Generalization, nothing but the shifting and grouping of these in space and time. Such mental aggregates or series of phenomena complete what we mean by a law; but are only suggestive *signs* of a Force in itself imperceptible. As defined by Mr. Grove, the word denotes "that active principle inseparable from matter which induces its various changes." So well aware, indeed, are the more rigorous Inductive logicians (as Comte and Mill) of the hyperphysical character of this notion, that they would expel it as a trespasser on the Baconian domain; or, if it stays, strip it of its native significance, in order to reduce it to their service. Let any one, however, only imagine the sort of jargon into which, agreeably to this advice, our language of Dynamics would have to be translated: let him try to express the several intensities in terms of Time-succession, and he will need no other proof of the utter helplessness of physics without this hyperphysical idea. Mr. Grove most justly remarks: "The word 'Force,' and the idea it aims at expressing, might indeed be objected to by the purely physical philosopher as representing a subtle mental conception, and not a sensuous perception or phenomenon. To avoid its use, however, if open to no other objection, would be so far a departure from recognized views, as to render language scarcely intelligible.

It is admitted, then, that we have here a physical postulate indispensable to the interpretation of nature, yet not physically known. Its objective reality is guaranteed; the suspicion of its being a "mental figment" is excluded by the same security on which we hold the infinitude of Space and the impossible co-existence of different Times, viz., its subjective necessity as a condition for conceiving objects and phenomena at all; a necessity, we must add, evident in the habitual language, not only of those who consciously acknowledge it, but equally of those who, like the Positivists, affect to believe in a *γένεσις* of things without a *δύναμις*. Being thus, at the same time real in its existence and ideal in its cognition, Force admits of being investi-

gated both physically and metaphysically: and take it up in which aspect you will, the results are remarkable and concurrent.

It is impossible to read this passage without perceiving how similar are the Aristotelian Form and the modern conception of Force. It leads us to indulge the hope that the time may come when men will begin again to understand one another. While, however, Mr. Martineau's views of substance are so similar to those of Aristotle, we must not neglect to notice what seems to us a difference. That the substance, in his mind, is no figment but represents reality, is plain. Does he hold that the phenomena give us a real insight into the qualities of the object? We cannot help doubting it.

We begin rather ungraciously by finding faults in a book, with the general tendencies of which our object is to show our agreement. Mr. Martineau quotes a remarkable passage from Professor De Morgan, which seems to us very like one form of the doctrine held by some schoolmen. He seems to say that the idea or notion is imparted by the object and contained in the act of perception. "The idea of a horse is the horse in the mind," says Mr. De Morgan, "and we know no other horse. We admit that there is an external object, a horse which may give a horse in the mind to twenty different persons; but no one of these twenty knows the object; each one knows only his idea." This is certainly rather strong language, and we should prefer to say that the twenty persons did know the object through the idea, yet it contains what we conceive to be the truth; the idea is a product of the action of the mind, by which it represents the object to itself. This however seems to us to be precisely what Mr. Martineau denies. He objects to the whole notion of a representative idea on the ground of the impossibility of pronouncing on the likeness between an image and an invisible reality, or "an inaccessible thing." It may be that this is intended as an *argumentum ad hominem*, addressed to those who consider that the idea stands vicariously instead of an unknown reality. If it is so, we beg his pardon for our mistake. We cannot however but think that his own doctrine is that the act of perception gives us a bare notion of a non-ego, and in no way lets us into the nature of the object. Does not his theory, that all force can be resolved into will, imply that force has no nature at all of its own, that there is nothing intermediate between God's Will and ourselves, no forces to be known as objects of cognition apart from them? A tempting doctrine this, but we cannot think it true. We cannot help thinking that the idea is truly representative, not because it acts a vicarious part for the unknown thing, but because the thing is accessible and is

known. Mr. Martineau quite rightly says that a thing which is perceived is known. But what we contend for is that the act of perception contains something more determined than a non-ego, something that is about the object which impinges upon us. We know something more than that we are "resisted by an impediment," something, that is, about what impedes us. We are conscious, not only of an obstacle, but of a force acting upon us in a determinate way. The analysis of the act of perception is that our soul is conscious of two activities, its awakened intellect and the sensations of its body. Both are equally immediate, for in both the same soul is active. But in the sensation, there is another activity, that of the object without. We cannot then look upon the sensation as purely subjective; it is got between the external reality and the organ of sense. On this the soul does not look as a spectator; the sensation is its own vital act. It cannot indeed separate its own action from that of the outward force, yet from the difference of its own sensations it can have a real basis whereby to judge of the nature of that which acts upon it. It seems then that the reality is not so inaccessible as our opponents suppose. If, on the other hand, modern philosophers had remembered that the intellect is the form of the body, they would not have felt so much difficulty about the idea being a true representative of the reality. The very soul occupied in framing the intellectual idea, which is but a modification of itself, is equally the soul which feels the outward force not only impinging upon but transmuting its senses. The nature of the outer world is not enveloped in such utter darkness to us as is supposed. Our very life is imbued with it; our bodily organization vibrates to it down to its inmost depths. Is there a likeness then between the perception and its object? Not a physical likeness plainly, not the likeness of a photograph to the original. But there is a likeness which is immaterial. Or rather let us call it an affinity. Natures and forces, though different, may be akin to each other; and the intellect may rightly express in its own terms the reality which the soul feels in the body which belongs to it, for what is the intellect but the activity of the soul? The white snow is indeed physically, utterly unlike the cold which it produces, but that it produces cold in us is a real piece of knowledge about the nature of the snow, and the idea which includes this really represents it.

The difference between Mr. Martineau and ourselves may, however, not be so great as we imagine. A late writer has thus stated the two views: \* "As to our knowledge of matter, I always

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\* Dr. Duncan's "Colloquia Peripatetica," p. 66.



fluctuate between two positions—whether the mind in perception has a direct knowledge of the qualities, or only a sensation with an accompanying belief in the object. Both systems give me objectivity.” We should be glad to think that there was less divergence between us and the essays before us than we thought; and we now pass on to contrast scholasticism with what is most fundamental in modern thought.

A greater revolution in thought than ever happened before has taken place within the last ninety years, if we assume, as it seems to us that we may, the publication of Kant’s “*Criticism of Pure Reason*” as the commencement of all that has followed. It was then that began the conscious and deliberate break with all traditional philosophy and the substitution of another which have lasted ever since. Not that we would accuse Kant of the destruction of the result of Aristotelian thought. It already lay in ruins. That human faculties did really let us into the nature of the outer world; that the two factors of human thought, sense and intellect, both contributed their quota to this knowledge; above all, that ontology, the special contribution of the intellect, was a real science—all this was taught by Aristotle, and received by the thinkers of the schools all over the world. Educated men understood each other’s language, and held common principles with minor differences. But a new tower of Babel had been built, and men had ceased to speak the same tongue; nay, to think the same philosophical thoughts. It was not only that physical discoveries had destroyed the old physics of the schools; but ontological ideas, such as cause and substance, had been most grievously shaken. It was to save them that Kant wrote and thought. The British isles, though Germans affect to despise our metaphysical powers, must bear their full share of whatever praise or blame is due to this state of things. Locke had destroyed substance; Berkeley’s theory of vision had clearly shown how much was phenomenal in our views of distance and externality; Hume had referred cause to the law of association. It was to account for the perpetual cropping up of ontological questions, notwithstanding their insolubility, that Kant created the critical system. He saw that mathematical verities were the pure product of the human intellect, and yet were necessary truth. He cast an envious eye on the stability of mathematics, and on the onward progress and triumphant march of physical science, and he coveted the same brilliant qualities for metaphysics. He was no sceptic, but the very contrary. These ideas of substance and cause were in his view not empirical, but the exclusive work of the human in-

telleet, à priori categories, pure transcendental thoughts applied to the objects of sense, but owing in no way their origin to sense. If he had only done this, no great harm might have resulted. There was a truth in this which might have neutralized the error. But he proceeded to turn the world outside in by referring space and time exclusively to the mind, by considering them as simply furnished by the human intellect, without any corresponding reality whatsoever without. The result of this is that all our knowledge is of phenomena or appearances. The real object of our cognition is not a thing without us, for there is no without in the sense of space, except within. What we know is simply an affection of our own sense thrown on a background of space by the action of our minds, and occurring in time, which is the succession of our own being. Thus in the mind is a great sheet, which we call space, woven by itself out of itself, on which it casts the phantasmagoria of sense which we take for an outer world, without having the power legitimately to infer as much as a magic lantern as the cause, for is not cause itself simply à priori, our own way of stringing together time and succession? We are quite aware that Kant held that there was a thing in itself which was not a phenomenon, and which was not the Ego or the thought. But this noumenon or thing in itself is in no way whatsoever the object of human thought. We know its bare existence, and that is all. It is less under the conditions of thought than even the *materia prima* of the schools. It has no qualities; it is not a cause of phenomena. It is not in space, for space is only within us; and we do not put it into space. It is simply the unknown and unknowable.

Even here not all the blame is due to Kant. On the one hand there is so much à priori about the notion of space, so closely is it connected with the purely à priori science of mathematics, that it was easy to make a mistake. In his eagerness to save space from being empirical, he made it entirely subjective; he only forgot that without falling into the absurdity of making it entirely objective, it might be both subjective and objective. A thing is not unreal *because* it is à priori; things are not false *because* we think them. On the other hand, he is not the author of that dissolution of body, which had already been effected by Berkeley. Body had already been dissolved into a collection of sensations; he only made matters better by allowing it to be a collection of forces. Oh! that he had only managed out of the general wreck to save the truth of the existence of the soul. But it cannot be denied that the denial of all substantial soul, the dissolution of mind into a series of

thoughts, had already been effected by Kant. This seems to us the head and front of his offending—his unpardonable sin. He ought to have seen that the activities which must be attributed to the human intellect, that the tremendous sense of responsibility and of the durability of guilt, defying space and time, could only be the operations and the attributes of an independent spiritual force which knows itself; in other words, a substantial soul. That could not be a mere logical subject which was so real an object to itself. But to look upon the mind as a substance would have been to bring back all the old ontology. It would have been to confess that we had some real knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. It would have been to acknowledge that *a priori* notions were something more than the play of our own faculties, and that some thoughts were real which were not filled with the intuitions of sense. So the soul perished with the body, and man became a collection of sensations and a series of mental operations without internal bond. Besides which, one soul implies countless other souls, millions of noumena walking over the space filled by the world, fatal to the critic of pure reason. We give Kant full and entire credit for the wish to save by the practical reason what he had destroyed in speculation. There is a grand truth in the view that man's power of moral action carries him over space, time, and sense, and opens before him supersensible abysses which neither eye has seen nor ear heard. The majesty of duty, loved in and for itself, irrespective of all consequences, was a real metaphysic of the will parallel to that of the intellect. But even here Kant's evil genius pursued him. He contrived that even this absolute law should shut man up more completely within himself. He could not raise again from the dead by an act of will the God whom he had killed by the breath of the critical philosophy. A God rendered inaccessible to reason by its own antinomies was too feeble to be a rewarder of moral actions; His only use in the system of Kant. He was a God to whom it is absurd to pray, to whom we have absolutely no obligation, for the sanction of the moral law lies in Kant's view exclusively in man himself. It is lamentable to see a great genius like this coming so near the truth, yet missing it, burning, as children say, yet never finding it. In vain he tried to patch up again man's broken being, imagination linking together sensation and thought, the feeling of beauty acting as the mediator between the thinking mind and the moral will. He had lost the key when he denied man's substantial soul. The deluge had come, and the mountain-tops of thought were all submerged. The fountains of the great depths of thought had

been broken up; the mighty wave had gone over God and the soul; and the fair substance of all earthly things had been swallowed up. The only ark of safety left alone floating on the waters was the critical philosophy, a sorry refuge for the human intellect, thus shut up alone with its own thoughts, while the pitiless rain is pouring down from a godless heaven, hermetically sealed, without a door for egress, nor a God to open it, if there were one, and without a window to let in light from above, or to send out the dove over the waste of waters to bring back peace.

We have thus dwelt long on Kant because we cannot help looking upon him as one of those minds who influence the human race during a whole epoch for good or for evil. We are still under his influence; the deluge has never passed away. His philosophy contains two opposite elements, the existence of a world of noumena, of things in themselves, and the restriction of knowledge to phenomena. Of these two parts, one has been taken up by Germany, the other by England. The whole of German philosophy since Kant has been a perpetual search scientifically to construct a bridge to the noumenon. On the other hand it is impossible to mistake Kant's share in the philosophy of the Unknowable, which is now so powerful in England. It may seem strange to father upon Kant the idealist a philosophy which is more akin to matter. But it must never be forgotten that the critical philosophy has two children struggling in its womb, and it is almost a matter of accident which first comes to light. Mr. Mill owes his possibility to Kant as well as Fichte or Hegel. We do not mean by materialism of course the old theory of the non-existence of anything but extended matter, but we mean the philosophy which resolves thought into a product of sense. Kant had assumed two sources of knowledge, sense and thought, with a totally unknown root. It is only natural that the unknowable should be considered as non-existent, and it depends on the tendencies of the individual mind whether it resolve sense into a kind of thought or regard the products of thought as mere names which stand for the individual objects revealed by sense. It matters little, practically, whether you turn a man inside out or outside in. Whenever you have got rid of all ontology, that is, when once you have laid down that the human intellect is incapable of knowing anything except phenomena, then matter and spirit, sense and thought, become equally phenomena, and their attributes can be liberally interchanged. Man himself becomes a phenomenon and loses his unity, and is turned into a mere series of states of consciousness when he is deprived of a substantial soul. Cut

the nerves of motion and sense from the spinal chord and paralysis ensues; the whole man speedily falls to pieces when the soul is gone. Above all, in such a state of things the will ceases to be free. If it were an original, independent causality, it would be a noumenon indeed. It was by the will that Kant had hoped to regain what the speculative intellect had lost. There he placed the unconditioned, since by his will man determines himself out of his own spiritual being. This looked like a possible foundation for an ontology; but our hopes are frustrated by his assertion that this self-determination can tell us nothing about objects; it cannot tell us what we are, but what we ought to be. The will is a blind faculty, and the magnificent prospect which it promises us into a world beyond sense and self, turns out to be an intellectual fallacy. There the fault in our inmost being appears again, and the crystal which looked clear in its unity, presents a point where it may be cleft. A function weighted by antinomies and not justified by the intellect, cannot stand alone. After all, the will is but a faculty, and till we are told of what it is a faculty, it is a portent going about the world loose, unclaimed, and without an owner; while in Germany its function is merged into the absolute Ego of Fichte, in England it is broken up into states of consciousness, and lies at the mercy of motives and desires. Among dominant English thinkers free will has disappeared. In the doctrine of Evolution, man becomes the slave of inherited dispositions. This is the whole tendency of the age. All that we have said is embodied in a sentence of a book, which, amidst all the demerits of its cynicism, has at least the merit of plain-spokenness—we mean Strauss's "Old and New Faith." The whole result of modern philosophy is thus summed up. After some materialistic sentences he adds, "If one strives in these words to find clearly expressed a cynical materialism, I have nothing to say against it. Practically, I have always considered the opposition about which so much noise has been made, materialism and idealism to be a question of words. The real enemy of both is the dualism of that Christian view of the world which splits up man into body and soul, and separates his existence into time and eternity, and which places an eternal God-Creator over against the created and transitory world. To this dualistic view of the world, idealism as well as materialism stands in the same relation; they are both forms of monism, that is, they seek to explain the complex of phenomena out of one only principle, to represent to themselves the world and life as made of one piece."\*

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\* "Der alte und der neue Glaube," p. 212.

It is as a sacrifice to this one principle that thought becomes a mechanism subordinated to sense, and that will is the slave of antecedents. The great merit of Darwin's theory is said to be that "it shows how adaptation of means to ends in organisms can take place without any mixture of intelligence through the blind operation of a natural law." All teleology is treated as summarily as the miraculous in theology, for both imply will. "Final cause is your great miracle-monger in nature." There is but one great kingdom, and that is nature. This, then, according to Strauss, is the outcome of Kant's idealism. Notwithstanding Kant's view of the majesty of the moral law, neither the soul of man nor the God of practical reason has been able to survive the destruction of ontology.

In this state of things those men deserve a crown of some kind who have "not despaired of the republic." Men who have stood up for everything that is great in the natural order, for all that the Church declares can be proved by human reason, the existence of God, the free-will of man, and the immortality of the soul, deserve her thanks. It requires some intellectual courage to stem the current of the thought of the age in which we live. This is what has been done in the two collections of Essays which we have placed at the head of this article. There we have the remarkable fact that men without even so much of Aristotelian training as was given at Oxford, have spent their lives in a stand for ontology as opposed to phenomenism. That Mr. Martineau is no direct disciple of Aristotle, respectfully as he ever speaks of him, is quite evident from his criticism on "form," where, indeed, it seems to us that he makes a mistake in his view of Aristotle's meaning. Nevertheless, the old division of mental sciences, psychology, logic, metaphysics, and ontology, is brought back in triumph by one intimately acquainted with modern philosophy from the polemics of Kant to the thin logic of Mr. Mill. In all great questions, such as the reality of substance and causation; the conception of classes or "kinds," and above all the theory of reasoning, Mr. Martineau returns to the conclusions of the old philosophy. A man's views with respect to the validity of the syllogism as opposed to simply inductive logic, are a crucial test of his philosophic tendencies, and here Mr. Martineau is a conscious defender of Aristotle. The remarkable circumstance of all this is precisely that all this return to ancient thought has taken place by entirely modern methods. As we have already seen, the objective reality of thought, the Externality of the world, the validity of the causal nexus, were all taken for granted in the old philosophy; but we find all these problems grappled with in the pages which we have

before us. Modern philosophy is fought with on its own ground, and by its own weapons. In this terribly distracted and much abused century in which we live, we must confess that we see one virtue, and that is, a passionate worship of facts as opposed to theories. That the worship at times becomes idolatrous we quite allow. Yet we must confess that we have ourselves a great weakness for facts. The misery of the age is that it ignores all the deepest facts of human nature. It is precisely on these that Mr. Martineau, and especially Mr. Hutton, have taken their stand. While the former excels above all in clear exposition and in a rare power of imparting an almost dramatic life to the abstrusest subject, the latter brings to the help of God's cause a most remarkably subtle analysis of precisely those facts of human nature which modern thought can only account for by disputing, can only get over by ignoring. After all, it seems to us to be the most valuable quality in these writers, that they not only agree in fundamentals with the ancient schools, but also that they precisely unfold those truths which wanted developing in the schoolmen, and which have been developed by later Christian writers, such as Father Kleutgen. It is much that they should have bent all their energies to prove what Aristotle held long ago, and what Kant and his successors destroyed—the truth that man knows reality and not phenomena alone. But it is more remarkable that their progress has been parallel to, not in opposition to, that of the Catholic schools. That the scholastic doctrines required to be perfected and developed, especially in the philosophical account of the causal nexus, is acknowledged by their warmest admirer and defender.\* Both Kleutgen and Mr. Martineau have employed themselves in connecting the origin of the notion of cause with the exercise of our own spontaneous activity, whether of intellect or will. Again, a diligent reader of S. Thomas, who studies with all the affection and admiration which such a great saint and thinker deserves, will especially long for an explanation of that *synderesis*, the existence of which he fully acknowledges and yet has not sufficiently analyzed. We long to know what are those principles of the intellect and conscience which so lie at the root of all our mental and moral operations, and which are so immediate that he calls them innate, because they are not susceptible of proof, and require none, since they are lit up by their own truth. Every student of the "Philosophy of the Olden Time" will recollect how large a part of the book is devoted to an elucidation of first principles, and a reader of

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\* Kleutgen, 302.  
[*New Series.*]

the Essays which lie before us, will remember that the very truth for which, more than others, their authors have fought, is the existence, in the human intellect, of a power of intuition. We fully admit that probably there would be a question between the Catholic and Protestant writers as to the number of such principles; but there would be no difference of opinion as to the fact that "all knowledge implies intuition (schauen), that is, immediate knowledge of first principles."\* Even on a question which Mr. Hutton treats with great eloquence and acuteness, the proof of the existence of God, there is a real and profound agreement, though several of his expressions would not have been written by a Catholic philosopher.

It is startling to find him suppose that an Atheist can be in a state of invincible ignorance. It is still more surprising to find him speaking as if there could be no scientific proof of that great truth. We cannot think that he can really mean what his words seem to say, for he himself, in these striking essays, has furnished demonstrations of God's existence as novel as they are forcible. The real fact is that the arguments which he uses are rather moral than metaphysical. Yet even here a change has come over the spirit of our philosophy. Though Catholic writers still clearly assert that the old cosmological arguments are valid, yet there is in Kleutgen a manifest disposition to complete the proofs of God's personality by proofs drawn from the conscience and from man's moral nature. Less stress is laid upon any one argument, and more upon the cumulus of the whole. In answering an objection of Hermes that one of the common arguments from design is not inconsistent with the notion of a God immanent in the universe, Kleutgen answers it, not by denying the fact, but by pointing out that other arguments lie under the same defect, and require to be eked out by proofs of another kind. He allows that some demonstrations of God's existence are by themselves of no avail against Pantheists. † "That," he adds, "which is requisite to make an argument for the existence of God valid, is only that the being whose existence is proved should be no other than the one true God: *it is not requisite that this should be clearly brought out by this proof alone.*" In the same place he defends the traditional arguments on the ground that they "furnish elements, by the development of which men may be led to a definite knowledge" of God's personality. It is plain that the principle of cumulative evidence is here recognized, and that no fault can be found with those who consider any one proof by itself incomplete.

\* Kleutgen, 333.

† *Ibid.*, 921.‡ *Ibid.*, 924.



There is, however, a better way of defending Mr. Hutton. It is an undoubted fact that the enormous majority of men believe in God without any scientific demonstration of His existence at all. We find ourselves believers in God as we awake to the fact that we are the children of our mothers: There is no point of time which can be called the dawn of reason, and if there were, there is no break of continuity, not a moment's suspension of judgment, when we arrive at its use, and no questioning of the spirit whether we are right in believing in God: We continue to believe in Him as we continue to breathe, without reflecting on the mechanism of the lungs. Thus it happens that when in after-life the few, who are capable of it, apply acquired science to the proof of God's existence, the reasons, which they find, most inadequately represent the reasons why they believed. They need not be those which convinced them at all. At its very best, logic is only an imperfect representation of the arguments which help to carry conviction to the intellect: it can only reproduce the dry bones even of these, and conviction is the work of the whole living man. After all, the modes in which an infinite spirit presents Himself to the intellect and finds His way into the deep heart of a creature, are more subtle and delicate than the many speechless looks and unreasoning indications by which the news of the love of one human being is conveyed to another, and equally defy analysis. Let any one sit down and try to find the middle term of a passionate burst of beautiful music. It is possible for a man to accept God as the conclusion of a syllogism; but did any of us ever meet with such a one, or ever hear of him? It is this unreasoning knowledge of God which Ontologism has caricatured and distorted. S. Anselm, a saint whose mind was as profound as his soul was loving, saw and felt it, and only made the blunder of attempting to put it into a formal process with mood and figure. It is chiefly on this unscientific conviction of God's existence, a persuasion too deep for words, too boundless even for thought, that Mr. Hutton dwells. We wish that we had space to quote some of those pages in which, with a vein of indignant emotion, he pierces the firmament of hard brass with which Agnosticism would surround the universe. What we would point out here is the fact that modern theologians insist far more than has ever been done since patristic times, on this very unscientific knowledge of God. We apprehend that this kind of conviction is the "assent" which Father Newman, whose doctrine some most absurdly connect with Kant, has disjoined from reasoning, in a famous book which seems to us to be not so much in opposi-

tion to as beside the scholastic system, and which could not for that reason be thrown into scholastic language. Above all, we find the same development in Father Kleutgen. Not with the eloquence of Mr. Hutton, but with equal clearness and force, he reminds his readers of man's early conviction previous to demonstration. "We must carefully distinguish," he says,\* "between the knowledge of God, of which we here speak, and that which is independent of and previous to all scientific argument. Just as a man, as soon as he only comes to the use of reason, by the sight of his own bounded and dependent being, and by the consideration of the universe, is assured of the existence of God without being brought to it by painful proof of the theoretical reason, so he wants no learned teaching to recognize God in the voice of his conscience." In the same place he speaks of "God-consciousness." Elsewhere he calls it that "spontaneous knowledge of God which may be called *immediate*, inasmuch as it is imparted without any strained, nay, without any conscientious reflection."† "Dig deep enough, and I shall lie among my ancestors," once said a dying Catholic, who was to be buried in an old churchyard, which had become Protestant. Thus too in philosophical questions, while shallow thinkers are wrangling on the surface, men, who by whatever method have once reached the depths where lie the roots of conscience, will soon find out the old foundations which must underlie all natural truth.

Is this true also of supernatural truth? Is it to be found in the earth beneath, by the strength of the intellect? or can we by the sheer force of mind climb up for it to the heaven above? To this a Catholic can only answer with a peremptory negative. Not only must God reveal to us, for instance, the Incarnation from without, but the kinship between that great truth and the intellect must not be stretched so far as to make it possible for the reason, even after the revelation has taken place historically, to find a necessary foundation for it in itself. However the existence of Christ may be said to satisfy all the deepest yearnings of the human heart, no Catholic can hold that it can be proved by reason to be, on the ground that it must have been. This is a question which concerns the relation of reason to faith, of natural to revealed truth. It lies beside our proper subject, yet we must advert to it, for we must not leave our readers under the impression that there are not wide differences between us and the two writers whom we have been glad to praise.

\* "Theologie der Vorzeit," 418.

† "Philosophie der Vorzeit," 909.

It is therefore impossible to close this article without saying a few words on the position assumed in these volumes of essays towards the Catholic Church, and towards revealed truth in general. There are many arguments used in them which require but little notice, for they rest on a false assumption, which we trust that this article has helped to dispel. Mr. Martineau speaks of an alliance between negative metaphysics and theological dogmatism; he also does but scant justice to Father Newman, when he represents him, of all writers in the world, as advocating an acceptance of religion with too little reference to conscience. We trust that Mr. Martineau will do us the justice to acknowledge that our metaphysics are not negative, and that our system takes in to the full all the deeper and higher facts of human nature. It is, however, mostly to Mr. Hutton that we now refer. He too uses some arguments of which it is really high time to get rid. The day is past when, with any chance of success, dogmas, as such, can be disparaged as empty formulas, when the mistake can be made of supposing that a definite faith is not in accordance with the deepest aspirations of our nature, *because* it is imposed by an infallible authority, as if what comes to us from without could not receive a response from within. We are glad to find that the last essay in Mr. Hutton's first volume was written before the rest. Great, indeed, must have been the ignorance of the Catholic system prevalent when a man of his ability and honesty could accuse the Roman Church of sighing "for a divine administration, not for a vivid conscious communion with the Spirit of God." He probably would not accept such men as Tauler or Thomas a Kempis as specimens of the state of the ordinary Catholic, but he will believe us when we say that the aim of every Catholic priest is to exhort his children, whether English noblemen or Irish peasants, to a communion of "spirit to spirit" with God. If he had known more of the history of God's Church he would never have written the essay on "Romanism, Protestantism, and Anglicanism." He chose a most unfortunate example for his theory that the "social" aims of Rome influenced her doctrine, and that "her dogma sprung out of her ritual," when he brought forward the "Christian practice of baptism" and its supposed "social influence" as the source of the doctrine of its "mighty regenerating power." Had he not read how the Roman Church in the third century, in the teeth of the greatest saint and martyr of the day, in spite of a supposed apostolic tradition, at the risk of separating from her spiritual dominion half Asia and all Africa, put out of her hands the exclusive administration of that sacrament by decreeing that heretical baptism was valid, on the ground

that the rite, which is the gate of salvation, must have been made by Christ as wide as possible. Here the dogma of regeneration dictated the administration of the rite. If Mr. Hutton had then known the story of the condemnation of Honorius, he would never have argued that Rome cared nothing for "truth as truth," and that dogma was subordinated to hierarchical purposes. If the Roman Church had not preferred God's truth a thousandfold to her own dignity, she would not have acquiesced in and promulgated the anathemas of a council against a Pope, because he had neglected to condemn a heresy.

There is, however, a portion of that essay which we must notice, because it throws light on the views of the author on the relations between philosophy and religion. In his strictures on Father Newman's account of the spread of the doctrine of the Assumption of our Lady, he blames him for laying down the principle that the internal evidences of a dogma supply for the lack of external proof. We cannot think that at that time Mr. Hutton held the views advocated in the rest of his volume. If there is one principle more than another essential to his system, it is the view that Christians accept the doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord far more on account of its fitting into the yearnings of their nature than on account of the evidence of the fact.

We should, however, be doing gross injustice to Mr. Hutton if we simply used his theory as an argumentum ad hominem. We should pity the man who could read without a deep respect the eloquent words in which he describes the yearning of humanity for the Incarnate God. All honour be to the man who has fought his way by intellectual struggles from a dry Unitarianism to an intense personal love for our Lord God. We must not be too critical on his arguments when the result is so satisfactory. Who would have the heart logically to dissect the wondrous fascination which the gospel of Christ exercises on a religious mind? Nor do we call upon him to offer up as a sacrifice to logic a faith which has evidently become a portion of his inmost life. If we thought that there was any chance of this, we should leave him in good faith. Ours, at least, is not what is called in one of the most characteristic of these essays, "the hard Church." We would rather that he were illogical than impious. But there is no need of such a lamentable alternative. We can sympathize intellectually to the full with one who has "run after the perfumes" of the Person of Christ. It is a valid argument that the vision of Christ is too beautiful to be human. We fully admit that the inmost fibres of man's heart are entwined with the life of the Eternal Word,

and that the conscience, nay, the very flesh of man, cry out for the living God. What has logic to do with the cry of man's agony, or with the thirst of the wounded hart for the waterbrooks? Who would analyze chemically the fire of the Holy Ghost? But what we do find fault with in Mr. Hutton is precisely that according to his theory, the revelation of the existence of the Son of God is not a supernatural truth, taught by the Holy Ghost, but a truth so natural to man that very defective external evidence is enough to guarantee it, without anything infallible either to originate or transmit it. It is quite plain that in proportion as you diminish the external organs of revelation, you are forced to find its proofs in its internal adaptation to man's deeper nature, and it is further plain that it is possible to exaggerate this fitness so as to confuse the natural and supernatural order. The temptation to do this, we believe, lies deep in all Lutheran theology. The dictum "*humana natura capax divinæ*" is called Luther's shibboleth by one who knows his writings well\*—a shibboleth which contains truth, but which obviously may be so exaggerated as to destroy the supernatural. Indeed, the more you reject the divine mode of transmission through the organ of a Church supernaturally preserved from error, the more you are thrown on man's natural capacity to receive it, and the more you are likely to degrade the supernatural task of the Spirit. That Mr. Hutton speaks of a supernatural Spirit helping us to rise above ourselves, we are well aware; but this Spirit is just as much and just as little supernatural in his teaching of the Incarnation as in his teaching of the natural truth of the existence of God. To the Catholic the Incarnation is a supernatural truth in the sense that it is not a development of an old truth. Mr. Hutton persistently denies its supernaturalness in this sense. In his view it is "a natural complement" of the existence of God (p. 281). It is revealed in exactly the same way as the existence of God itself (p. 271). So natural is it that it is a fact "whose roots of causation we discern running deep into the constitution of man and the character of God" (p. 244). So natural is it that on the imperfect historical evidence of four Gospels, none of which are infallible, three of which contain grave errors, all of which, as they stand, are mixtures of truth and falsehood, the belief in the Incarnation comes out of the soul of man when it catches sight of the historical Christ, just as letters written in invisible ink come out before a fire. No wonder that on this view an infallible Church is superfluous. We yearn for an infallible Church as a safeguard against our own reason,

\* Dorner.

lest it should intrude its human conclusions, not into the evidence for, but into the very conception of the Man-God. Mr. Hutton bids us be of good cheer: individual human nature in its highest aspects is perfectly adequate to the task without any infallible help. Thus the Christian religion becomes a transcendental philosophy guaranteed by historical facts, themselves with very scanty evidence; just as a moral intuition is enough to construct without infallible aid a code of morals out of the practical moral problems presented to it by the outward world. As a man put face to face with a moral question is enabled to make out his duty by the light of conscience, so by the illumination of the deep yearnings of his nature a man discovers the existence of an incarnate God.

We cannot help thinking that such a theory as this is utterly inconsistent with facts. It leads to unexpected results which Mr. Hutton would be the last man in the world to welcome. If there be one fact more than another which has forced itself on the modern Church it is the existence of invincible ignorance. But what room is there left for invincible ignorance in a theory which makes the Incarnation as natural to man's reason as the existence of God or as moral truth? Are all Unitarians then so destitute of the deepest yearnings of man's nature, that they are unable to see the necessity of an Incarnation? If the existence of the Man-God is so natural to man as to dispense to a great extent with external evidence, and altogether with the teaching of an infallible Apostle, nay of an infallible Christ (for Mr. Hutton's Christ is not above error), then surely it ought to be impossible for one, who accepts the facts of the Gospels, inculpably to make a mistake about His Godhead.

We cannot understand invincible ignorance of primary natural truths. That through accidental circumstances, through bad teaching or faulty education, men may be ignorant of some remote deductions from first moral principles or some truths about God, is no doubt conceivable. But we must remember that in Mr. Hutton's view the Incarnation, instead of adding difficulties to God's existence, makes it easier to be believed (p. 283). How, on a large scale, among cultivated men of high character, whose attention is continually fixed upon the subject, invincible ignorance should prevail with respect to so natural a truth we cannot understand. Again, inculpable ignorance of supernatural truths which require external promulgation through a supernatural organ, and which are inaccessible to human reason, is quite conceivable; but we cannot understand ignorance of truths which rest on universal reasons, lying in the deepest depths of man's nature.

But the most remarkable thing is that these universal reasons which ought to unite mankind into a vast Catholic Church turn out to be a disintegrating power, which makes all union impossible by the very nature of the system. The simple fact is, that from the very moment that an infallible authority has been withdrawn, ever since the Reformation left man to the "universal reasons" of which Mr. Hutton makes so much, the belief in the Incarnation has become less and less, till in Germany, for instance, it has almost disappeared. The atoms which, according to this theory, ought to have been held together with the force which forms the diamond, fly asunder, never more to be united. Mr. Hutton foresees this; he trusts so little to his reasons that he is obliged from his very theory to provide the broadest possible church for inevitable dissenters. We need hardly say that he is a latitudinarian of the laxest kind. After all, his Incarnation is his own conclusion, and he is too modest to impose it on the universe. That happens to him which is the fate of all who reach something resembling the truth, through reasoning, without authority. They cannot believe that Christ has revealed His Godhead so clearly as made its acceptance imperative. His universal reasons leave room enough for a huge mass of particular error. A Christianity utterly stripped of dogma and reduced to bare facts,—a vague trust in an ambiguous Christ; such is the result. A Gospel torn to shreds and positively honey-combed by rationalistic criticism, so that in the uncertain light, no man can tell fact from falsehood, universal reasons without sufficient strength to impose their own truth and not luminous enough to shine by their own brilliancy, and, for the result of all, a Christ with an equivocal Godhead:—this is not a Revelation. This Christ, who reveals himself in a way so slovenly that mankind is, from the very theory of the revelation, incapacitated from ascertaining whether he be God or man, is not believable.

We should do Mr. Hutton injustice if we represented this mass of confusion as the whole upshot of his theory. He has one point of external evidence which is better than this. He points to the history of the Christian Church, and finds there evidence of a new and supernatural life brought into the world by Christ. He argues that a dead Christ, a Christ from whose grave the stone had never been rolled, a Christ who was not eternal and divine, could never have so regenerated earth. "I cannot understand the history of the Christian Church at all, if all the firmest trust which has been stirred by faith in the actual inspiration of a nature at once eternal and human, has been lavished on a dream." The Unitarian Gospel,

as he implies, never did and never could have converted the world. This is all most true and beautifully said; but he should have added, that the Church which did convert the world was a Church which claimed infallibility. The Church which transfused the living stream of His blood from her own veins into those of the earth there can be no doubt, was a dogmatic Church. If he asks us why we believe in the infallibility of this Church, we answer: on the self-same grounds as he believes in the Incarnation. Men believed in Christ because they saw marks of divine mission about the men who preached Him. The same men who told them that Christ was God also told them that the Church was infallible. Why should they believe one and not the other? Belief in Christ and submission to the Church was one act and not two. It was not a successive process of first believing in an unerring Church, and then in a Christ preached by her. They saw marks of Godhead about the whole religion, and accepted all together: its Incarnate God and the Church which He bought with His blood. We too have felt all the yearnings for the living Christ which Mr. Hutton so well describes, and when we ask ourselves how it was that the earth came to believe in Him, how the world was twice converted, first, the old Roman world, East and West, and then the Teutonic, the sole and only answer is: not by a collection of independent units with universal reasons, impotent to produce a universal answer to our anxious question "who is this Christ?" but by a Church which claimed to speak in His name, and to have received from Himself the gift of infallibility. We believe in this gift for reasons of two kinds; because *a priori* we cannot conceive how it is possible that the Christ's original revelation should have been preserved without an infallible Church; secondly, because in point of fact we find a Church claiming infallibility from the first, as Christ asserts His own Godhead. This Church is believable as Christ is believable. For her men feel the same enmity, for her men feel the same yearning, the same divine longing deep in their inmost heart, as they do for Christ; and if they ask themselves the meaning of this profound feeling, they find that it is a part and parcel of their love for Him, of their thirst for knowledge about Him; for she alone, absolutely alone, who claims to represent Him, has a definite message about Him. We must confess that the history of the last three hundred years by no means disposes us to alter our view. The experiment has been fairly tried, to teach the Incarnation without an infallible Church. If it had succeeded, men might have been inclined to reverse the experience of the first fifteen hundred years of



the existence of Christianity, and to conclude that an adult Christianity could now walk alone without a Church. But what has been the effect of the Reformation on the doctrine of the Incarnation? It has introduced endless confusion. We have sown vanity and have reaped the whirlwind. It has struck away the authority of an infallible teacher and trusted first to external evidence. When the progress of science has fearfully shaken, if not destroyed, this external testimony, then thoughtful and earnest men have sought its proofs in man's inmost nature. They have thus unwittingly destroyed the supernaturalness of the doctrine. Above all they dare not assert it to be so certain as to claim the homage of the world. When a new religion presents itself to mankind, before men accept it, their first question is what are its doctrines? To the question "What is Christianity" no one gives a definite answer but the believer in an infallible Church. The theory which we are considering does not even attempt it. What is Christianity is so far undiscoverable that men must agree to differ, and all are Christians who trust in Christ, whether He be God or not. This is not the "social and the growing religion" which converted the world. We could have told beforehand that it never could be social and could never grow. It will never bring back to Christianity a generation fast falling away from Christ.

Yet after all there are noble accents to be heard in Mr. Hutton's pages. It is a noble hope that Christianity will still, in spite of all, bring an element of the divine into the "vulgar modern life of England." It was an attempt worthy of a deeply religious mind to bring all the acuteness of a singularly subtle intellect, and the eloquence of a master in the art of writing, to serve the cause of Christ, sorely imperilled among scientific men. It is a fearful moment when men who long to believe, see, or think that they see, that geology and history and criticism sap the foundations of their faith. It is a fearful moment when men come to ask themselves if facts be against faith, what then? Mr. Hutton describes himself as one who is "fully alive to the force of the literary and scientific scepticisms of the day." He certainly in the very volume before us shows how deeply he feels the havoc made by criticism on the Bible. His essay on the Fourth Gospel speaks of the difference between the Evangelists in terms which startle us. A sort of Quixotic candour comes over him under the disguise of a chivalrous acceptance of fact, whenever he meets with any of the rapidly shifting theories raised by criticism about the Scriptures. Yet, after all, who would deny that the present state of critical science has brought with

it certain supposed facts at this moment difficult to answer? What is our attitude towards them? We can look them in the face with the utmost calmness; we can dispassionately master all facts, and give their due weight to objections, for we are perfectly certain that whatever turns out to be the truth will not be against the faith. We can afford to wait. We can trust the Church, who herself is waiting. The state of science at this moment is such that all decisions are premature; for the theories, nay the facts of yesterday, are perpetually met by the counter facts and theories of to-day. It is too much to ask the Church to decide on perpetually shifting evidence. How can she build in the crater of a volcano or establish herself on an earthquake? Meanwhile we feel perfectly sure that the Church, which at first discountenanced the heliocentric theory, and then altered a traditional interpretation of Scripture to suit it, when once it became evident, will not be narrow-minded in her appreciation of proved facts and will judge unerringly when she judges at all.

To sum up the whole of what we have said, it appears to us that there can be no chronological division of philosophy into good and bad. Scholasticism and modern philosophy need only differ as two methods, scholasticism leaning to the ontological and deductive, modern philosophy to the psychological and inductive method. Each method may be wrongly used; as modern philosophy has its Kant, so scholasticism had its Occam. We are scholastic to the backbone, for we consider the only chance of obtaining a definite philosophy to lie in the acceptance of the Aristotelian system as a basis. But a king of thought can only be brought back by willing minds, not by a coup d'état. We would deprecate with all our might any attempt to thrust scholasticism down the world's throat as the only possible mould of truth. Important questions have arisen of late years which the schoolmen did not contemplate, and which have to be faced manfully. If we were asked what we thought about the future of philosophy, we should say that we do not dread the influx of physiology. It will only end in the return to the old doctrine that the soul is the form of the body. To bring about this consummation we must do justice to our enemies; we must master their theories, not attack them by ridicule or contempt. Above all, we must make the old philosophy intelligible and attractive to our contemporaries. It is not enough to say to ourselves that we possess the truth, and that it must make its way by its own weight when it is brought in contact with error. Truth may be dull and error may be brilliant. It is even within the bounds of possibility

that an evil-minded undergraduate might prefer the brilliant falsehood of Huxley to the truth of some conceivable advocates of the scholastic revival.

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A kind critic has forwarded to us the following objection :—

“In order to show that the principle of matter and form is not necessary for Christian philosophy, it is not enough to show that it cannot be demonstrated by mere reason. It is necessary besides to show that it is not necessarily pre-supposed for certain dogmatic truths.”

We answer that a truth which cannot be demonstrated by reason is not a truth of philosophy at all, and belongs to another science, that of theology. Our plea was therefore sufficient for our subject, which is scholastic philosophy. We agree, however, with our critic so far. A proposition which is a necessary premiss implied in a dogmatic truth ought not to be contradicted by philosophy. What truth, however, do we contradict when we say that the principle of matter and form is not binding on the conscience as the only explanation of nature? The Church, indeed, has said that the living body has a form, viz. the soul; it does not follow from this that all natural objects are composed of matter and form, which is what the scholastic philosophy asserts. The Church has committed herself to the truth of the distinction of matter and form in the case of the human individual, and in no other. In the case of the sacraments the use of the terms is clearly analogical. Even if it were not so, it is plain that no conclusion as to the physical composition of the universe can be drawn from supernatural entities.

In order to prevent misunderstanding, we also hold that it is the business of Catholic philosophy to show that any given philosophical doctrine, not provable by reason but required by theology, cannot be proved to contradict reason. We, however, contend that the scholastic view of matter and form is not required by theology, except in the case of the soul.

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## ART. II.—THE TRUE MISSION OF THE TEUTONIC RACE.

*Conversion of the Teutonic Race. Conversion of the Franks and the English.*

*Sequel to Conversion of the Teutonic Race. S. Boniface and the Conversion of the Germans.* By MRS. HOPE. Edited by the Rev. JOHN BERNARD DALGAIRNS. Washbourne. 1872.

SO much labour and research have been spent in these latter years on the special genius and characteristics of the Aryan families, that there are few people of any pretensions to cultivation who have not made themselves to some extent acquainted with the subject. Mr. Cox's volumes on the myths and poetry of the great Japhetian race have also been a source of enjoyment to many, and have opened up controversies and suggestions embracing a wide field of interest, to which the gradual unfolding of Sanskrit literature and development of the affinities of Hindû and Scandinavian mythic poetry has essentially added.

We are not, however, going to wander into those tempting regions of intellectual inquiry, but, bending our steps in another direction, confine ourselves to following the course of one or two branches of the great family in their relations with the Church, or, as we may briefly term it, in their Providential history; first in their individual fruitfulness, and next in their missionary results in different ages.

It need scarcely be said that the time, as well as the causes of the first great movement or emigration of the Aryan race is uncertain. All that is known is, that the great Japhetian family broke and divided into two streams, flowing east and west.

The Eastern flood poured through Persia to India, when it drove out the primitive Dravidic race, and occupied the great peninsula as far as the Ganges. The fine climate and enormous natural resources of the soil released them from so much of the sordid labour of life, that the emigrants early acquired a high degree of civilization, and are soon seen to possess vast armies, powerful governments, considerable commerce, and refined arts and manufactures. With this branch of the family we shall have nothing further to do, for, with all their gifts of natural wisdom, stores of intellectual sagacity and wealth of attainment, the Eastern Aryans did not receive, or at least

did not make their own, the one priceless pearl of the true faith; and thus lost all share in the great mission of their Western brethren.

That second stream of the Indo-Teutonic source split into the well-known currents of Greeks, Romans, Kelts, Germans, and Slaves. In the Old Scriptures we read briefly the record:—

The sons of Japheth: Gomer and Magog, and Madai, and Javan. . . .  
And the sons of Javan: Elisa and Tharsis, Ceththim and Dodanim. By these were divided the islands of the Gentiles in their lands, every one according to his tongue and their families in their nations.\*

It is needless to speculate upon the causes of the almost immediate lapse of the three later divisions into barbarism; but the most obvious probability is that whereas the Greeks and Romans settled down very early into cities and social forms of government, carefully preserving such primitive Eastern traditions as the loss of religion allowed, the three remaining families, scattered farther towards the north, by little and little adopted entirely nomade habits, and thus fell away more and more from traditional control and the restraints of government and settled law. They had, too, to fight a fiercer battle with the elements and a rigorous climate, which made the toil of subsistence the full work of their daily life; and, as the necessary result, tillage, hunting, and the manufacture of weapons, utensils, and rough clothing sufficiently taxed both their bodily strength and mental energies. The chief general tradition they preserved was of their Eastern origin, which was carefully handed down by the Frank, Saxon, Bavarian, and Swabian families, and embodied in the Eddas as the migration led by Odin from Asgard, in the East, "the city of the blest."†

Separating, then, from the stream of Kelts, who, under various subdivisions, flowed over Spain, Gaul, and our own islands, and from the Slaves, who, pursuing a more irreclaimable course of nomadism, scattered to the north-east and through the Asian plains, we follow the German branch of the Teuton family as it spread generally from Scandinavia to the Vistula, Danube, and Black Sea, and who may be roughly divided into Allemanni, Frisians, Burgundians, Saxons, Franks, Scandinavians, and English. All of these, with various shades of distinction, early divided themselves into nobles, freemen, serfs, and slaves, or nobles, freemen, and serfs. The whole governing

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\* Gen. x. 2, 4, 5.

† "Conversion of the Franks and the English," p. 5.

body—kings, chiefs, magistrates, and priests—were chosen from the noble class, the freemen were trained to arms, and the serfs tilled the soil. Thus from the earliest beginning, with the truest discernment of real government, a body of *apicoroi* were set free to set an example to the tribes or settlements in the law of social order and rule, and to teach lofty principles of truth, justice, and honour, and the cultivation of the higher faculties. The whole noble class, and it alone, was initiated into the meaning and knowledge of the Runes, or traditional lore and language of an older time, and discussed every important matter before it was submitted to the general assemblies. But while certain points of early German government thus lean towards oligarchical tendencies, the whole body of freemen was thoroughly protected in its ample rights. The whole of the land was parcelled out to villages or families, and belonged equally to all for the common use. All that an individual could own was his house and garden, and the cows and sheep he had reared. Allotments were made to every freeman, which he was obliged to cultivate by traditional observances—sowing, reaping, and exchanging the crops by rule; and after the ground was cleared it was thrown open to the general village herds. Besides this, the primeval forest, the natural pastures, ponds, and fisheries were free to every freeman alike without restriction. Even in war the spoils were drawn by lot, each taking his share; and if any one transgressed the traditional rules, or infringed upon his neighbour's rights, he was tried by his peers; and no man might strike or bind the guilty except the priests, "the representatives of the Higher Powers." Whenever the settlements naturally outgrew their quarters and means of subsistence, a colony, chosen by lot, would prepare for emigration. Sacrifices were then offered, the idols, with the women and children, were loaded in waggons, and the men appointed accompanied them, driving the flocks and herds. In this way, through pathless districts of forest and plain, the German stream moved gradually onwards from the Hindû-Koosh to Scandinavia, and thence, still urged on by providential impulse, a portion descended in what seemed countless hordes upon the outposts of the age-worn and enfeebled Roman empire. A second division spread along the Baltic shores, and quickly threw itself into that fearless system of sea-marauding which, in after-years, made the Vikings and their descendants the terror of Europe. But wherever, or for however long a time these roving tribes were absent from their original settlements, they still retained their rights, and from time to time returned to claim their lands. In the fifth century a family of Heruli who had been wander-

ing for two hundred years, and had obtained a grant from Rome in Illyria, resolutely turned away from this luxurious settlement, and went back across the whole of Europe to Scandinavia, where they were honourably received, and obtained portions of land. In this instance a strong family resemblance is discernible with our own countrymen at the present day.

It will easily be seen that the wide freedom allowed and even offered to individual action must have weakened the collective power or social union; and this fact was so keenly felt in the principal Teuton nations that they elected kings, either for life or a fixed term, or instituted the custom of vowed service, by which men bound themselves to a chief for life or for certain wars or undertakings. The vow was made on oath with religious ceremonies, a ring or badge was adopted, and the service entered upon took precedence of all other duties for the time.

In this way was planted that marvellous germ of feudal service and lofty devotion which Christian teaching afterwards ripened to such magnificent results.

Side by side with this great principle of service and self-sacrifice, which went so far as the endurance of captivity and the offering of life itself for the chief to whom the vow was taken, sprang up that reverence and tenderness towards women which distinguished the German tribes above all others even in their pre-Christian days. Women were considered by them to be the recipients of Divine secrets and mysteries, and the gifts of wisdom and counsel in difficulties. The wife was the adviser and confidante of her husband, instead of being looked upon, as in the Latin and Greek branches of the family, as his plaything and slave. At marriage she received a yoke of oxen, a horse, and a spear, as symbols of her help to her husband in the field, in battle, and in mediation; that she was to bind his wounds, and bury him, and, if left alone, to avenge his death. In some tribes a second marriage was forbidden, and in others the widow died with her husband.\* Far, however, as natural virtue and reason extended its sway over the German pagans, and marvellous as were the results in preserving them from the hideous iniquities of other heathen, it will readily be conceived that men allowed themselves more latitude than they gave to women, and that polygamy was a frequent privilege of the kings and chiefs. Still, marriage was always celebrated with religious rites, and the gross and monstrous sensuality of classical nations was unknown to the pagan

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and English," p. 13.

Germans. Their chief faults were drunkenness, and fits of violent, almost insane fury, which they looked upon as inspirations from the gods.

It is well worth noting that this very violence of wrath, which mere natural virtue had no power to control, was used as a "Divine indignation" to break up and stamp to death the vast rottenness distinctly sustained by the powers of darkness, which the Roman empire had spread over the habitable earth.

And all the earth was in admiration after the Beast. And they adored the Dragon which gave power to the Beast, and they adored the Beast, saying: Who is like to the Beast? and who shall be able to fight with it? . . . . . And he opened his mouth in blasphemies against God, to blaspheme His name, and His Tabernacle [the Church] and those that dwell in Heaven. And it was given to him to make war with the Saints, and to overcome them. And power was given him over every tribe, and people, and tongue, and nation; and all that dwell upon the earth adored him: whose names are not written in the Book of Life of the Lamb. . . . .

She is fallen, she is fallen, that great Babylon, which made all nations drink of the wine of the wrath of her fornication.\*

No one can glance at the history of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries without being struck with the Providential character of the great outburst of migration which threw wave after wave of invasion upon the once irresistible Roman power. The Empire had been divinely spread over the known earth, and strengthened to a profound peace, that our Lord's birth might take place under its shadow, that His hidden and teaching life might be guarded by the outward bulwarks of a vast political power, and that the announcement of the first creed and opening labours of the Apostolic college might be carried on beneath the network of the most marvellous administrative unity the world has ever known. Had not the cry been raised, "If thou release this man thou art not Cæsar's friend, for whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against Cæsar," † our Lord himself might, had He so willed, have appealed to the Roman law and gone free. S. Paul successfully asserted his Roman citizenship at Philippi, against the injustice of being scourged—"men that are Romans uncondemned,"—and again at Jerusalem when about to be tortured. But when the Church had fairly struck its roots into the earth, and the grain of mustard-seed spread into a growing tree, room had to be made for it to fill the place of the noxious decaying growth that cumbered the land.

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\* Apoc. xiii. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8; xiv. 8.

† S. John xiv. 12. Acts xvi. 37; xxii. 25.



Then, as if upheaved by an irresistible impulse, the "fountains of the great deep" of the Asiatic nations were broken up; and beginning from China, the ocean of humanity poured forth its floods from east to west. Tatars, Huns, and Sarmatians urged on the Slaves, Germans, and Visigoths in a mighty stream south-westwards; across the Danube, the Rhine, the Rhone, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, rolled countless hordes of Goths, Vandals, Franks, Burgundians, and Lombards, with tribes and subdivisions too many to name; while swarms of Keltic Scots, Picts, Angles, Danes, and Normans, spread themselves through the British islands, and overflowed into the north of Gaul.

Like those of the avenging Flood, the succeeding punishment and miseries of the irruption of this human deluge are inconceivable to our enfeebled notions of the power of endurance. Whole countries became deserts, tenanted only by wild beasts and birds of prey. The largest cities of the Empire were repeatedly sacked, and the ruined and smoking streets choked with putrid bodies. Italy lay like one vast slaughter-house, and even the Saints then living were convinced that the world drew towards its end. S. Jerome, S. Augustine, and S. Gregory poured forth their lamentations on the miseries around them, suspended their writings, and prayed to be taken out of the world.\* Here and there only, by the very fact of being driven out into remote islands and desolate savage spots, the scattered survivors gathered some remnants of strength, and began to form themselves again into republics and states under the traditions of Roman law and social order.†

The depth of the depravity of the Roman empire may be partially—though only partially—gauged by the cruel sharpness of the cure. That great writer of our own time, whose marvellous intellect seems able to seize at a glance the depths and shallows of historical truth, observes, in his "Callista," that no living man can gauge the hideous depravity of heathenism, or conceive in the least degree what a Christian would have to suffer in walking through the streets of a pagan city. And in the midst of a desolation which gives a foretaste of the "latter times," it was only through the Church, as she arose and put forth her strength, that the afflicted nations were now saved and healed. This came about chiefly through the wonderful hold the faith asserted upon the German people. Early in the fourth century

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English," pp. 51, 52.

† Venice was the most remarkable of these settlements.

German bishops are found assisting in councils; and at the beginning of the fifth, the chief part of the German settlers in the Roman provinces they occupied were Christians. The German clergy had their full orders; monks, nuns, and hermits were numerous, and the religious services were carried out with proper liturgical forms. It is worthy of remark that Roman paganism had never taken the least hold of the German tribes, who revolted at its foulness, while the teaching of captive bishops and priests, on the other hand, immediately won a hearing and commended itself to their previous just, temperate, and upright natural sense. They quickly seized and appreciated the mystery of the Incarnation and consequent virtue of the Sacraments, the Communion of Saints, and the reverence due to the Blessed Virgin; and early conceived a warm attachment to Rome as the central See of S. Peter and guiding power of the Church. No doubt the presence of many eminent saints increased and stirred up the continual loyalty of Germany and Gaul at that time. S. Hilary, S. Martin, S. Athanasius, and S. Jerome (at Trèves, which was also the birthplace of S. Ambrose), form a group of teachers whose stamp upon any nation must have been indelible. S. Ambrose wrote one letter to the Queen of the Marcomanni which converted the entire tribe, and he was also the friend of Arbogastes, the Frank chief who then chiefly ruled in Gaul.\*

Then were beheld those vivid, divinely-guided instances of the power of the Church, or of the Church through her Saints, of which the history of the time is full. In the sack of Rome by Alaric, when sacred vessels belonging to S. Peter's, of great value, were found by a soldier in a house, the fierce chief himself ordered the trumpets to sound a truce; the Goths carried the vessels in procession on their heads, while they joined with the Christians in singing hymns as they deposited their booty in triumph in the basilica. S. German, again, in the fifth century, hastened to meet Eocari, who was laying waste Armorica, and, seizing his horse by the bridle, rebuked him for all the sins of his life. Eocari, in great awe, immediately withdrew his army. S. Loup, or Lupus, at Troyes, S. Geneviève the shepherdess at Paris, and S. Aignan at Orleans, with like courage crossed the path of Attila, the "scourge of God," and saved their cities from destruction. The defeat of this terrible ravager at Châlons, where 300,000 men were left dead on the field, led to his retreat to Cologne, and the massacre of S. Ursula, S.

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English," pp. 58, 59.

Pianosa, and the British Virgins, upon whom the ridicule of an age of ignorance has been thrown. These consecrated women, driven from Britain by the Saxon heathen, had crossed to Holland and gone to Cologne, whence some of them had accompanied S. Servatius to Rome on a pilgrimage to pray against Attila, whose ubiquitous presence and ravages can scarcely now be realized. No strength of man or virtue of woman was spared by this monster and his Huns; and when he found that none of these women—of whom Cologne was full—were to be overcome, he ordered them to be driven into a plain or field, and shot with bows and arrows. After the massacre, the Huns left the place, and the citizens came out of hiding, and buried the fallen martyrs all together in trenches or sarcophagi, with urns full of blood or saturated sand. Afterwards a basilica and convent were built in their honour, and a great devotion to them sprung up at Cologne. It was not till nearly twelve centuries afterwards (A.D. 1640) that a formal examination was made, and the fosses and sarcophagi opened. Then were found the three tiers of skeletons in two rows, carefully laid side by side, with their arms crossed and their faces towards the east, dressed as the Church orders in the case of martyrs, and with the vessels of blood by their sides. The form of the skull was Keltic, and, with few exceptions, the skeletons were of young women in full health. Above the tiers of bones lay vast quantities of arrows, with skulls and bones arrow-pierced, and vessels of blood-steeped sand. It is possible that, after the massacre of the consecrated virgins, the enraged Huns put all the women of the town to death, and that the well-known pile of skulls and bones in the church of S. Ursula at Cologne were the remains of these secondary victims.

One of the most marvellous instances of the power of the Church in her Saints is seen in the life of S. Severin, the apostle of Noricum, of whose birth or position nothing is known. He lived, after the manner of the Eastern hermits, in a cell on the borders of Noricum and Pannonia, whence he was summoned by the people wherever invasion threatened, took the command of the province and defence of the towns, and checked the armies of the barbarians. S. Severin always fasted till sunset, walked barefoot on the ice, slept on a hair-cloth; and grace in him seemed to have extinguished every natural weakness of the flesh. Small wonder was it, therefore, that the popular voice hailed him as a delivering angel, sent by God to guard them from the invading barbarians, or that he succeeded in bringing sinners to repentance, and the whole province to amendment of life. S. Severin collected

alms for the common expenses, the ransom of captives, and feeding of the poor. When the Allemanni ravaged the province, S. Severin visited their king, and obliged him to free the captives he had made. Odoacer, when going as a young Herulian barbarian to be one of the Imperial Guard, had sought S. Severin's blessing before starting. The Saint said to him, "Go to Italy; you are now clothed in skins, but you will soon lavish gifts on multitudes." This prophecy was completely fulfilled; and Odoacer was also distinguished from the other northern conquerors by his moderate and just treatment of the conquered. S. Severin breathed his last while impressing upon the heathen king and queen of the Rugii that they should be just and merciful towards their people; and the good government and social order established by him endured for two hundred years. It is so much easier to despond and fear than to persist in well-doing with hope, that nothing but the suggestions of the Paraclete, the Comforter abiding in the Church, could have sustained the Saints of that epoch under the burthen of working up the scattered threads of Christian life into a web sufficient for carrying on any practice of religion amid the universal chaos and wreck.

Nothing but the clear light of faith divinely sustained could have supported men like S. Severin in a work which resembled only bridging over gulfs and torrents with frail staves and reeds, scaling inaccessible precipices with a rotten cord, or catching up clay, refuse, and stones indiscriminately, to build any kind of *opus tumultuarium*, as a timely bulwark against the flood. Men of such spiritual gifts and temper, annealed to such perfection that they are in very truth but a little lower than the angels, must also have fully discerned the failing nature of their materials, and that the labour would be, as it proved in S. Severin's case, only the building of bridges, which fell away as soon as the gulfs and torrents were passed. For nearly all the divisions of the great Teuton family which had been the objects of his rebuke or teaching,—the Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Heruli, Rugii, &c., fell away into Arianism, while the other great division of Franks, Lombards, and Saxons still remained in darkness and the shadow of death. Thus to human eyes and reasoning, the fasts, and prayers, and self-punishment, and unwearied toils and lofty virtue of the Roman hermit had all been in vain, and even good men would doubtless speak among one another of his wasted and unsuccessful life.

No more instructive or salutary lesson could have been handed on to English Catholics than such instances as his, especially when we are ourselves sorely tempted to forget our

high calling, and to gauge things by the perpetual test of visible results and fruit. For while thus losing himself and his whole life and learning in the light of the "Eternal Years" to come, S. Severin was carrying out the full office of a saint. Though reduced to the frailest thread, he had carried on the golden line of Catholic tradition, he had preserved Christian life enough to bear witness to the perpetual, undying truth, throwing forward the light of that truth also to the coming generations; and although the rapid flood of the Arian heresy swamped and choked the rich harvest he might have reaped in his own day, when those floods subsided and dried away, the seeds, which he had sown with many tears, sprang up in full sheaves in another time. For the end of the fifth century, which even to saintly eyes looked like the destruction of the Church and the world in one—was lit up with fresh light. The Burgundians, as we have seen, had fallen into Arianism, but the daughter of the Burgundian king, Gondebald, remained true to the Catholic faith. She married the pagan Sicamber, Clodwig, or Clovis, king of the Salian Franks, but had her sons baptized, and strove to convert her husband to the faith of Christ, to whom he objected as a "weak, weaponless God." The battle of Tolbiac with the Allemanni, ended in Clovis invoking "Jesus, the God of Clotilda," and obtaining a complete victory, just when his army was about to give way. He had vowed, if victorious, to be baptized in the Catholic faith, and he kept his vow by sending for S. Vidast, the holy priest of Toul, to instruct him; and being solemnly baptized in the cathedral at Rheims on Christmas day (A.D. 496), S. Remi, the Bishop of Rheims, led the king by the hand, and as Clovis walked along, looking at the beautiful procession—new to his eyes—of priests and acolytes with the cross and book of the Gospels, he said to S. Remi, "Father, is this the kingdom of Jesus Christ which you promised me?" The holy Bishop answered, "No, my son, it is only the beginning of the road which leads to it." When the proud chief asked for baptism, S. Remi said to him, "Sicamber, bow thy head meekly, burn what thou hast worshipped, and worship what thou hast burnt."\* We dwell more fully upon this well-known most beautiful record, because the whole of Christendom discerned the unusual importance of the conversion. Contemporary Saints spoke of it to one another with an outpouring of joy, and Pope Anastasius himself wrote a congratulatory letter to Clovis, containing the remarkable and prophetic words, "Our bark is tossed about with a furious

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English," pp. 75, 76.

tempest. But we hope against hope; and we praise God that He has drawn you out of darkness in order to give His Church a protector capable of defending her against all her enemies." It is also most worthy of note that S. Remi, in his visit to Clovis and Clotilda on the Christmas eve, gave them both much counsel as to their future lives, and assured them, "if they and theirs would faithfully keep God's law, that they should inherit the power of the Roman empire, sustain the Church, and reign gloriously."\*

Still the history of the Merovingian kings will always resemble the well-known aspect of the two streams of the Rhone and the Arve, flowing side by side; one in its crystalline blue, the other foul, muddy, and unsightly. Terrible crimes, and sensual brutality and excess, mingle with signal acts of faith, devotion, and acknowledgment of God; and, as we shall see, the supernatural life of grace flourished abundantly underneath the crumbling decay of the latter ages of the Merovingian dynasty.

The secret of this vigorous coexistent supernatural life must be sought in the faith given to the Divine promise at that time, and the manner in which this faith was carried into practice by the Church.

"Seek ye therefore, first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."† For the Holy See, the Christian and spiritual Rome, at once cast aside the outer husk in which the pagan and earthly Rome had sought and found its greatness. Irresistible conquest, order, law, the perfection of administrative polity, intellectual culture, and social civilization, all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, which had been the reward for demonship under the Empire, the Church threw away as chaff, grasping only at the salvation of souls, at religious truth, and at local unity in faith and mind. And on this very account it was given, that out of the chaos of the drowning ancient civilization, the Church, as a true ark, caught up and rescued all that was of real value, and for which in truth she had been planted, and the creation of the world been begun. In proportion to our own faith, we shall ever bear this momentous truth in mind, extending the promise to far more than its letter for "meat, drink, and raiment."

It was a distinct sign of supernatural help amid the terrible shocks of the age, that about the time of the conversion of the Franks, S. Benedict was born (A.D. 480). Having been

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English," p. 79.

† S. Matt. vi. 33.

taken far education to Rome, which then stood like a city of refuge high above the ruins and wrecks of the falling Empire, S. Benedict, though a mere boy, revolted at the voluptuous vice about him, and wandered away to the mountain districts above Subiaco, where he took refuge in a cave. Here he led for some years so preternatural a life, that his fame spread through all the country round, and crowds of all classes flocked to him for counsel, instruction, reproof, or consolation. Early in the sixth century S. Maurus and S. Placidus, two Roman patricians' children, were brought by their fathers to be placed under his training, and so numerous a flock had surrounded him that they filled twelve monasteries above Subiaco. After some time, led by God through the grace of persecutions, S. Benedict transferred his monks to the Abruzzi, and there founded his still more famous monastery of Monte Cassino, which became the school of religious teaching and general learning for the whole of Europe. There he drew up that magnificent body of constitutions, the first monastic rule composed for Western Christendom, which has been said to be sufficient in its wisdom and administrative power to govern an empire. The Benedictine rule unites the most complete discipline with the spirit of loving charity, and in it the first grand attempt was made to fuse the characteristics of the Latin and German elements of the Teutonic family. The former are discerned in the fact that the excessive bodily austerities of the Eastern and eremitical bodies are partially exchanged for incessant occupation under strict obedience; developing the great spiritual doctrine that the supreme burnt-offering is the offering of self-will in all its ramifications. The German element shows itself in the freedom of the common life, where all ranks were mingled, and the youngest monk had his seat in chapter, and gave his voice with equal freedom as the Abbot himself. Even after the vow of "stability" was taken, the monk was free to depart, and the clothes in which he came to the monastery were kept for him. Vast bands of men of all classes and talents flocked under this rule, alternately giving themselves to prayer, study, and manual labour; and as their intercourse with the outer world was considerable, a vast leaven of Christian principles and culture extended through the ample population occupying the Roman territory, so that S. Benedict became, in fact, the great patriarch and legislator of modern civilization.

For within a century after S. Maurus had seen the star-sown path by which the soul of "the beloved of the Lord" had gone up to his crown, the magnificent Benedictine rule had spread through Italy, France, England, Germany, and

Spain, and thenceforth flourished, through more than a thousand years of the world's story, as a chief treasury of religion, learning, and instruction in itself, and the source of innumerable offshoots of monastic life.\*

Before the Franks were yet Christians, their country had nourished an apostle destined to perpetuate the faith through many generations in a fresh branch of the Teutonic family, from whom another great missionary was to return and spread the light of the Gospel in Gaul. Towards the end of the fourth century the marriage of a Roman soldier, stationed near Boulogne, with the sister or niece of S. Martin of Tours, had produced a son, now known as S. Patrick. This boy was carried off by pirates, and sold as a slave to an Irish chief, with whom he remained in bondage for six years. After many adventures S. Patrick received the tonsure at Lerins, went to Rome, lived many years with S. German, and finally, in the year A.D. 432, was sent by Pope S. Celestine to Ireland, where his sixty years' apostolate won for it the title of the "Isle of Saints." One great principle established by S. Patrick has always sustained the people he converted. His early prayer had been—"Lead me, I beseech Thee, to the seat of the holy Roman Church, that, receiving authority there to preach with confidence Thy sacred truth, the Irish nation may be gathered to Thy fold through my ministry." His last exhortation—repeated throughout his apostolaté much like the "Little children, love one another" of S. John—was, "*The Church of the Irish is a Church of Romans: as you are Christians, so be ye Romans.*" By simple obedience to this saving principle of loyalty, the Irish faith has ever been singularly guarded in its purity from heresy and the tendency to fall into schism. The first apostle of Burgundy was another Irish saint, Columban (A.D. 540-3), who studied at Bangor, and thence passed, with a party of monks, to the Burgundian court of Gontram, the son of Clotaire I., to whom and to his lords he preached the Gospel. S. Columban was led by a kind of passion for prayer and solitude to separate from his intimate companions and make his abode in a cave, out of which he gently expelled a bear, saying to him, "Depart hence, and return not hither." Which the bear obeyed. The most astonishing facts are told of S. Columban's mastery over the wild beasts and animals of the Vosges, among which he built his monasteries and made his own retreat. The fierce or timid creatures came to lick his hands and perch upon him; birds nestled in his gown, and squirrels ran up and down it. Bears left

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English," p. 118.



their prey, or refrained from touching all but the portions given them by the monks, and often awaited their leave before beginning to devour. About a hundred and eighty miles of territory (Franche-Comté) had been depopulated by heathen ravages, and the mountain-chains and torrent-beds were overrun by wild beasts. Here again we see the marvellous power of the Church under the Merovingian kings. Notwithstanding the exceptional severity of S. Columban's iron rule, which, unlike that of S. Benedict, made no allowance for weakness, sickness, diversity of character, variety of gifts, men flocked to put themselves under his training, feeling, with the inherent magnanimity of the German nature, that the war against evil and the wild freedom of the flesh was the noblest battle they could wage. Long-haired nobles bowed their proud heads voluntarily to be shorn of their boasted golden locks, the badge of their rank, and cheerfully mingled with the hinds and slaves, who, in seeking the monastic life, rather gained than sacrificed liberty.

So wonderful a conquest inevitably raised up storms against S. Columban, who was not, like S. Patrick, personally known at Rome, and who obstinately adhered to several obsolete Irish customs, differing from those of the Burgundian bishops and the Catholics of the time. Gontram's successor, Thierry, was a young man of licentious life, governed by his mother, Brunehaut or Breuhilda, who stirred up so great a persecution against S. Columban that he was expelled from Burgundy. After wandering through Switzerland, where he expelled the evil spirits at Bregenz, without finding a resting-place, S. Columban preached to the Lombards of northern Italy with great success, and settled at Bobbio. Then his predictions against Thierry were fulfilled, and Clotaire invaded and took possession of Austrasia and Burgundy, and recalled S. Columban to Luxeuil. But the fiery old Irish Saint felt that persecution and rebuff had only led him more completely on the way pointed out by God, and committing to Clotaire the protection of his monks, he decided to remain where he was. And then the rugged, fearless old man chose himself out a cave near the abbey of Bobbio, which he fitted up as a Lady Chapel, and, like S. Cuthbert and the earlier hermit-monks, he gave himself up wholly to prayer and fasting till his death (A.D. 615), leaving his staff to S. Gall, whom, with characteristic severity, he had forbidden to say mass so long as he himself should live.

Almost innumerable settlements and saints sprang up in France under the rigid Columban rule. At Remiremont a large church, seven smaller ones, and a double monastery, for

men and women, were built, and the *Laus Perennis*, or "Perpetual Praise," was kept up day and night in seven separate churches. The three sons of a Frank noble on the Marne, Adon, Radon, and Dadon, founded the three abbeys of Jouarre, Reuil, and Rebais. Dadon became afterwards Archbishop of Rouen, where his fame as S. Ouen is well known. S. Philibert, one of his friends, founded the great abbeys of Jumiéges, Noirmoutier, and of Montvillers, for women.\* S. Valery, the angel-child, first a shepherd-boy, and then the novice-gardener at Luxeuil, was so distinguished by his pure angelic life, typified by the perpetual perfume which hung about him, that S. Columban once said to him, "It is thou, my well-beloved, who art the true abbot and lord of this monastery." After S. Columban's death, he settled at Leuconnaus, at the mouth of the Somme, where first the abbey and town of S. Valery-sur-Somme, and then the abbey and town of S. Valery-en-Caux, where his relics were translated by our Richard I., grew up about his foundations. The son of a German noble, probably sent from Constance to Luxeuil by S. Columban, named Audomar or Omer, afterwards bishop of Terouanne, planted a colony of monks in a marsh, where they raised an abbey known as S. Bertin's, which became so renowned that twenty-two monks in it were canonized. S. Omer built a church on a neighbouring hill, which became the cathedral of S. Omer's, afterwards so famous a nursery of missionaries in our own post-reformation persecutions.

Thus did the narrow, rigid, fiery Irish monk break up and burn the soil of France, and was made the means of fitting it for the wider and more loving rule of the majestic Benedictines, which some years later was imposed by the bishops upon the whole country, and which more entirely suited the children of a German race.

The story of the Benedictine influence upon our own re-conversion, after the heathen Saxons and the worship of Odin and Thor had flooded Britain, is too well known to be dwelt upon. It was Gregory, the Roman Benedictine, who, having started for Britain and been recalled, afterwards became Pope S. Gregory the Great, and speeded S. Augustine, the prior of his own monastery, to fulfil the work so long delayed. From the arcade of that monastery, dearly loved and often visited by thoughtful Catholics at Rome, who are wont to go there from time to time to gaze on the calm, majestic face of S. Gregory as it is carved in his marble likeness, and to renew their thankfulness for the amazing gifts vouchsafed to them

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English," p. 227.

by the Church—the train of monks filed down, starting on their long and toilsome journey, and after many delays, and nearly giving up their intention, landed at Ebb's Fleet, on the Isle of Thanet, then in the kingdom of Ethelbert the Bretwalda, whose wife Bertha was a Christian. After the king's baptism, and the permission given by him to restore the British churches, S. Augustine went to Lyons, and was consecrated "Archbishop of the English," with freedom to fix his see wherever it seemed most fit. Great and wise freedom was also used by S. Gregory as to the English character and customs, and he wrote to S. Augustine, "You know, my brother, the custom of the Roman Church, in which you were bred up; but it pleases me that if you have found anything, either in the Roman or the Gallic, or any other Church, which may be more acceptable to Almighty God, you carefully make choice of the same, and sedulously teach the Church of the English, which as yet is new to the faith, whatsoever you can gather from the several Churches. For things are not to be loved for the sake of the places, but places for the sake of good things."\*

S. Augustine made his visitations, travelling as a poor monk throughout England, healing the sick, and working many marvels on his way. He was received with great honour, and in a sort of triumph, in the north, but on the south coasts with every insult and injury, till he besought a plague on the people, which frightened them from their worship of evil spirits. In A.D. 604 S. Augustine died, and his successor (Laurentius) was about to leave the rebellious and backsliding Angles with reluctant sorrow, when S. Peter appeared to him in a vision, and scourged him with many stripes, saying, "Why wouldst thou forsake the flock which I have committed to thee? To what shepherd wilt thou commit Christ's sheep, who are in the midst of wolves? Hast thou forgotten my example, who, for the sake of those little ones whom Christ recommended to me in token of His love, endured bonds, stripes, imprisonment, and even the death of the Cross, that I might at last be crowned with Him?" Laurentius went next day and related what had happened to him to the king, when Eadbald for ever renounced paganism and his sinful life, and was baptized. This was the turning point for England at that time. Mellitus and Justus came back from France to their labours, succeeding each other in the see of Canterbury after the death of Laurentius, and all idolatrous rites were thenceforth forbidden in Eadbald's kingdom.

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and the English."

From one Saxon kingship to another the light was thus handed on, but always by help of the vigilant eye and watchful guardianship of Rome. S. Paulinus in the north, S. Birinus, sent by Pope Honorius, at Dorchester (Dorcia), near Oxford, where he maintained his southern see through five years of pagan rule under Penda. In 648 A.D. Cenwealh recovered the throne of Wessex, and his first act was to build a minster in honour of S. Peter at Winchester; and when the western see was removed thither from Dorchester, the body of S. Birinus was carried there also. In Mercia, Oswy founded Medishamatide Abbey (Peterborough), and also dedicated to S. Peter. This abbey, which afterwards became so famous, was consecrated by Deusdedit, Archbishop of Canterbury (A.D. 664), in presence of four bishops, S. Wilfrid, S. Oswy, and a crowd of kings, thanes, earls, and dukes, who all subscribed the charter, and listened to the noble words of Wulfhere, king of Mercia, spoken with the abounding love of a loyal heart.

And so free will I make this minster, that it be subject to Rome alone. And it is my will that all of us who are unable to go to Rome shall here visit S. Peter. . . . Whosoever shall take from this my gift, or the gifts of other good men, may the Heavenly gatekeeper take from him in the kingdom of Heaven; and whosoever will increase it, may the Heavenly gatekeeper increase his state in the kingdom of Heaven.

The last fruits of S. Gregory's undying love for England were Sussex and the Isle of Wight. Although the South Saxon king Ethelwalch, and his queen Ebba, were both nominally Christians, they did not spread the faith among their subjects, and perhaps they were thus taught to recognize the truth that the seed of faith must be sown with a divine blessing from the Church before it can become fruitful. S. Wilfrid, driven from his diocese of York by persecution, was thus made use of to bring this blessing to the southernmost shores of England. He converted the savage fishermen of Sussex, had the promontory of Selsey given to him as his maintenance; and the heathen king Cadwalla, who conquered and slew Ethelwalch, gave him also the town of Pagenham. It was probably S. Wilfrid's prayers and example which had subdued Cadwalla, whose cruelty and fierce character was so completely turned to the energy of goodness after baptism, that he gave up his crown "for the sake of an everlasting kingdom," and went as a pilgrim to Rome to be baptized at S. Peter's, hoping thence to pass to the joys of Heaven. On Easter eve (A.D. 689) Pope Sergius baptized him under the name of Peter, love for whom had brought him "from the

ends of the earth"; and a few days afterwards, still in his white robe, the king fell ill and died.

This fact has been once more noted for more reasons than its great beauty of teaching. It strikes the keynote, again and again repeated in exquisite kindred melodies, of the distinctive difference and distinction between the conversion of England and that of other nations. The great Roman provinces of Italy, Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul, and Spain, had been completely sodden and steeped in the corruption of Roman civilization, when they were converted to the faith. So rapid and universal was the transmutation, *to a certain depth*, of every metal subjected to the fusion of that marvellous furnace of pagan Rome, that all the great provinces of the rotting empire, and the barbarous nations with which they had been overrun, were, so to speak, veneered with a thin coating of civilization to one rapid and apparently equal polish. Beneath this coating the savage barbarism remained in full vigour.

When, therefore, this pagan varnish was exchanged for the externals—and, in many cases, only the externals—of Christianity, the barbarism still remained untouched, though the force of habit quickly spread a Christian surface above it. The Saxon kings and population, on the contrary, were still fresh in their noble German habits and instincts when S. Augustine landed in the Isle of Thanet, and they received Christianity almost rather as the supplement and interpretation of their natural principles than as teaching tending in an opposite direction; and in this divinely-prepared virgin soil the faith took root instantly, struck deep into the hearts of the people, and in sixty years had filled all England without the shedding of a single drop of blood, solely through giving it and its hearers full and perfect liberty of action.

In this most signal and singular fact lie cause for our deepest thankfulness, as well as lasting principles for the guidance of thoughtful and discerning Catholics for the time to come. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."

Perfect liberty was joined from the beginning with loyal and loving obedience to the Holy See, and the Saxon kings and Saxon Church therefore were thoroughly organized without the intermixture of any corrupt or obstinate national customs. The orders of clergy, the monastic institutions, ritual and externals of religion, even the books and music, were all provided for by the patterns furnished by Rome, and the traditions thus providentially given, were long handed on and cherished in this country. The Saxon kings, especially, from the magnificent S. Ethelbert at Canterbury, who at once resigned his palace

and its precincts for S. Augustine's use, took up the cause of the Church in a long succession, and worked hand in hand with whatever bishops or missionaries laboured in their kingdoms. S. Edwin, S. Oswald (whose great business in life was prayer), S. Oswin (who succeeded S. Oswald in Deira), led lives which we should now think saintly in the cloister. S. Oswin, above all, whose beautiful life was written by Father Faber, is worth considering as an example of the principles we have noted as governing the Saxon people after conversion. His warm friendship with S. Aidan, no doubt, laid deep foundations for his spiritual progress; and S. Aidan, we are told, "loved the king as though he was part of his own soul"; and while upbraiding him for his faults, cherished him also with spiritual conversation. S. Oswin, therefore, took care of his people like a father, relieving their wants, taking special care of strangers, and carefully watching while enforcing the execution of the law; and, at the same time, diligently laboured at his own soul; watched, fasted, and prayed. Of him were spoken the beautiful words—

Truly drawn by the sole contemplation of his Creator, he lived in the royal purple as David did, poor and sorrowing; poor in spirit even while he abounded in wealth and royal state; sorrowful in spirit, because he trusted not his heart to his abundance of good things. In the midst of a noisy court, which was ever too much for him, he fled far off, and remained in the solitude of his mind, even when his subjects thronged about him. Abroad he carried himself as a king, in a kingly way, but inwardly he was a king over his own affections, courageously exercising himself in humility and poverty, and pouring out his whole soul in works of mercy.\*

Having been, at last, attacked by his jealous colleague, Oswy, he said to his generous army, who implored him to let them cut a way for him, "I pant after martyrdom, and the joys of the heavenly kingdom." Then kneeling down, he prayed:

Father of mercy, and God of all consolation, whose Son is the angel of great counsel, whose Spirit is the comforter in difficulties, grant me in this strait to choose the better way. . . . Flying I displease Thee; fighting I displease Thee.

And he waited, trusting in God. He and his servant were both slain—we may rather say martyred—and buried in one grave at Gilling, near Richmond, in Yorkshire. Yet even this great cruelty and sin widely differed from the savage treachery and bloodthirst of the Merovingian barbarians. It is recorded

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\* "Conversion of the Franks and English," p. 320.

of Oswy that this—the one sin of his life—stirred up in him such contrition that thenceforth he made every reparation both to the Church and in his life; and when he died was preparing to start with S. Wilfrid to end his days in penance at Rome. His later life and great penitence were so remarkable that they gained him a place in the English Martyrology. S. Ceadwalla was by no means the only Saxon king who renounced all for Christ's sake. S. Ethelred, of Mercia, resigned the crown to become a monk in Bardney Abbey; S. Sigebert, S. Sebbi, who entered SS. Peter and Paul's Abbey in London, and was buried in Old S. Paul's Church; Benred and Offa, S. Richard and S. Ina, the most famous of them all, who founded an English school at Rome, and an hospital for pilgrims, now known as S. Spirito. In all these, and other instances too many to note, we see a signal love and loyalty to Rome invariably, and, as it were, essentially, mingled with the thirst for a higher life and heavenly things.

Time fails us even to mention the long roll of bishops and monks whose light shone in England during the period of the Saxon kings. It must suffice to say that they carried on the same principles in an unbroken chain, sustaining and guiding the kings in their course, and, in spite of the serious dangers and difficulties in the way, keeping up the practice of journeying to Rome, to revive and renew the spirit in which they wished to govern their flocks. Five times during his life did S. Bennet Biscop brave this terrible task of crossing the Alps to Rome, bringing back with him books, music, and teachers, with ecclesiastical arts, which made his monasteries of Wearmouth and Jarrow the wonders of his time.

The labours of the higher clergy, of the archbishops of Canterbury in chief, true primates and pastors of the shepherds as well as of the flocks, would fill a volume of themselves. The life of S. Theodore alone would be a valuable record of the unwearied toil, the unshaken courage, and the lofty principles acted upon by the bishops in that golden age of the English Church. The story of the primate's deposition of S. Chad and restoration of S. Wilfrid is well known, and probably there are few men in any age who would have carried out principles with such searching zeal and courage, or so run the risk of giving local offence. S. Theodore appointed the bishop of Rochester, from his great skill in the pure Roman (Gregorian) music, as well as for his knowledge of ecclesiastical discipline. S. Theodore discerned the fact that the thoroughly Saxon elements of local influence and a certain good-humoured looseness in regard to strict discipline had wrought the great abuse of buying bishoprics or paying sums to the Crown for re-

maining undisturbed, and he therefore ordered that the bishops within the limits of Canterbury should always be appointed in synod.\* The first of his synods was held at Hertford, A.D. 673, and was the foundation of another chief element of ecclesiastical consolidation in England. He divided East Anglia, Mercia, and York into dioceses, and drew up one Book of Canons for England.

S. Theodore's attention was next concentrated on bringing English education to a level with that of the Italian schools, devoting himself, with Hadrian, the abbot of S. Augustine's, to that of Canterbury, which became a source of learning to the whole of England. S. Bennet Biscop transplanted its system to his northern monasteries; and thus the tone and plan of studies was equalized throughout the country.

Besides secular studies, Latin and Greek, and music, a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures was inculcated, and language and grammar were looked upon as the keys by which "the deep and most spiritual signification of God's Word" was to be attained.† A general enthusiasm for learning in its true and wide sense then spread through England. Schools were established in the convents of women, and nuns wrote and composed in excellent Latin for the time, besides studying the Vulgate and the Commentaries of the Fathers in the originals. Books were hunted up and prized with enthusiasm, and the chief manual work of monks and nuns was copying manuscript volumes. The impetus given by S. Theodore thus reached so high a point, that when Charlemagne, under English influence,‡ began to revive learning in France, he sent for books to England. The learning of Wearmouth and Jarrow culminated, as is well known, in the extraordinary labours of S. Bede, who, while there as yet scarcely existed a written form or any grammar of his own language, translated the Four Gospels and the Psalter into English.

The one thing only which now seemed wanting to the intense vitality of the English Church was supplied towards the end of the seventh century, when the missionary spirit again revived, and burst out in a flow of zeal such as has seldom been known in the history of the Church. S. Willibrord; the Northumbrian, with a few companions, had led the way by leaving England to convert the Frisians and Franks, taking care first to secure the blessing from Rome, which he

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\* In York they were elected by the clergy.

† "The Conversion of the Franks and the English," p. 438.

‡ Alcuin's.



knew could alone cause the good seed to spring into life. In the spirit of this blessing S. Willibrord worked on for fifty years, and towards the end of his labours baptized Pepin-le-Bref, the son of Charles Martel, the founder of the great Carolingian dynasty in France. After fifty years of a most toilsome episcopate, S. Willibrord died (A.D. 744), handing on his work to one of his relations, and a still greater apostle, who completed what he had begun.

Winfrid, afterwards S. Boniface, born at Crediton, in Devonshire, was one of a whole family of saints. His sister married S. Richard, and became the mother of S. Willibald and S. Walburga.\* From a very early age Winfrid showed unusual nobleness and power; and when the monks and priests, who at that time travelled through England on a sort of perpetual Home Mission, came to his father's house, the child eagerly questioned them about Heaven, the soul, and their own vocation; and after much opposition from his father, was at his own wish made over to the Benedictines at Exminster to be educated and trained as a future member of the Order. From Exminster, Winfrid's passion for learning procured his being sent on to Nutschelle, in Hampshire, an abbey rich in books and teachers; and where he gained such a knowledge of Holy Scripture, that the whole abbey, and monks from outside it, applied to him for interpretation of the Divine Word. The chief English convents of nuns sent for him to open to them the Sacred Book, and explain the mysteries of God; and after his ordination, Winfrid was much sought in counsel by his superiors and the bishops, and everything prepared him to rise to the highest ecclesiastical offices.

Winfrid's own ambition led him in quite another direction, and he was only thirsting to cast everything behind him to preach the gospel to the heathen. After much reasonable opposition from his abbot, he was at last allowed to depart with a few companions, and he sailed for Friesland (A.D. 716), where they found S. Willibrord's work lying in ruins. Winfrid returned to Nutschelle for the winter, when the monks intended to elect him abbot; but Winfrid, by his gentle, humble opposition, prevailed upon them and the bishop to let him pursue the course towards which God was leading him, and bade his companions a final farewell in the year 718.

The first essential duty, as usual, was to seek a blessing on his work from Rome, and thither Winfrid and his companions went; and having confessed and communicated at S. Peter's

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\* S. Willibrord, S. Lioba, S. Burchard, and S. Willibad are said to have been also his relations.

tomb, he sought S. Gregory II., who filled the pontifical chair at a most momentous time. The insults of the Emperor Leo the Iconoclast had caused Rome to shake off ancient ties with the Lower Empire, while the converted Lombards and Germans were falling back into heresy or absolute paganism. The Mahometan power was extinguishing the Eastern Churches one by one, had wholly submerged the African, and had driven the Spanish Christians from the cities into their mountain-holds. Bavaria, Allemannia, and Thuringia were either heretic or heathen; and even France, under the Merovingian decadence, was eaten up with heresy, simony, and licentious living. Beyond the Frisian and Saxon heathen stretched the still more ferocious Scandinavian hordes, and the illimitable wastes of Slavonic and Tatar barbarism.

When, therefore, Winfrid presented himself before Gregory, with his vast stores of knowledge hidden under his childlike simplicity, the Pope asked him kindly for his credentials, and after reading the Bishop's letters, and conversing with him daily throughout the winter, gave him a letter from himself, ordering him to "haste and kindle . . . that saving fire which our Lord came to cast on earth," authorizing him also to administer the Sacraments according to the traditions of the Apostolic See. He further bade Winfrid inform himself if he met with difficulties in his apostolate. Having bound himself by vow to the service of the Apostolic See, Winfrid then left Rome, crossed the Alps, and went down into the whitened fields of his future toils. Passing rapidly through Bavaria and Allemannia, Winfrid passed on to Thuringia, where, though Christianity was not dead, it was so corrupted by revived heathenism, that both priests and flocks would go straight from mass to pagan rites and debauchery. Here Winfrid toiled for some time, but not meeting with much success, he passed into Austrasia, took boat on the Rhine, and went to Utrecht, just as the conquests of Charles Martel were reopening Friesland to Christian influence.

For three years Winfrid laboured at the conversion of the Frisians, with a persistence, gentleness, and ingenuity of love, which showed his supernatural guidance in the work; he penetrated the country of the wild Hatti (Hesse), who had never before heard the Gospel, and converted numbers of the population. Then having written to Rome, according to the Pope's command, for advice under the new circumstances, S. Gregory II. sent him word that he wished to see him on the subject, and Winfrid accordingly left his work as it was, and started on his second journey to Rome.

This time, after visiting the tombs of the Apostles, and noti-

fyng his presence to the Pope, Winfrid wrote out at full length an exposition of his faith and knowledge of Catholic doctrine. After consideration, the Pope told him he was about to send him as Bishop to Germany. He was consecrated by S. Gregory himself in the Vatican, under the name of Boniface, on S. Andrew's day, A.D. 723, and afterwards took an oath on S. Peter's relics, to remain faithful and true to the Holy See. S. Gregory, on his part, promised always to help and protect Boniface, and gave him a book of Apostolic Canons and Decrees of Councils, which is credibly supposed to be now shown in the library of Würzburg Cathedral. In the spring of A.D. 724 Boniface returned to his labours, dismissed with beautiful and prophetic words from the Pope.

Take, therefore, the pastoral staff with the smooth stones of the Divine law, that when the giant, who began to destroy all Israel, shall boast of his certain victory, thou mayest, like David, meet the enemy of the human race in battle. *And if, in that combat, the martyr crown be offered thee, accept it willingly.\**

The apostolic or missionary bishops had indeed need to be sustained by every supernatural and external aid, for their limits and jurisdiction were bounded by no power but the authority of Rome. They were consecrated *episcopi regionarii*, and the territories of the heathen were open before them to any extent. Boniface, therefore, was now armed with almost unlimited powers, which served only to humble him more thoroughly in his own sight. He first went to the court of Charles Martel, for assistance, and there he came in contact with a number of wicked priests, exercising their functions while living in sin, and spreading numberless heresies among the people. Even these men, whose conduct he held in abhorrence, Boniface treated courteously, hoping to win some of them by gentleness from their wicked lives. Charles Martel gave him a sort of circular letter for the chief officers of his dominions, and with this he returned to Hesse. Here he felled the great Thunder Oak (Donnereich) at Geismar, where the chief worship of Thor was carried on. Boniface himself struck the first blow with a huge axe, and as his monks continued the work, a loud rustling sound was heard, and the oak fell, split in four parts, with a thundering sound. Not a monk was injured by the fall, and a number of the pagan inhabitants were converted and baptized. With the hewn planks of this oak Boniface and his companions built an oratory dedicated to S. Peter, which was the first Christian Church in

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\* "Conversion of Germany," p. 82.

Hesse. He then made a progress through the country, destroying the oldest and most popular idols.

From Hesse Boniface passed to Thuringia, where the chief obstacles arose, as in the other half-converted portions of Germany, from vicious priests, and the obstinate mingling of pagan with Christian rites. The Thuringians are said to have been converted after a miraculous intervention against the king of Hungary, who exacted tithe of women and children, as well as goods, from which Boniface delivered them. Thenceforward, churches and monasteries sprang up, and Christianity began to make slow but solid progress. Even as pagans, the Germans had habitually given generously to their gods; bringing the richest spoils of war to be burnt, or throwing them into the sea, in the hope of regaining them in after-life.

This grand natural impulse was ripened by grace into a magnificence in giving which seemed unbounded. Land, woods, clothing, food, and labour were placed at the Bishop's command, and nothing was left for him to beg for but books, and prayers, and helpers in the work. And then it was that this last great need was answered from England by the most supernatural and marvellous response ever recorded in the annals of missionary story. For five-and-twenty years, during which Boniface still carried on his toils in Germany, English monks and nuns poured in one constant stream of emigration to help in converting the heathen Germans. They flocked into all parts of Scandinavia, setting at defiance the hardships and dangers of their exile, to share in carrying the Gospel news to the fierce pagans, and in spreading the boundaries of the Church of Christ. The saintly old Abbot S. Wigbert made the sacrifice of his quiet life in the beautiful Abbey of Glastonbury, and went out bent with age to take charge of the monastery at Fritzlar, where he brought up a whole school of English missionaries, whose zeal spread the Gospel through every corner of Germany. Boniface, who had received the Archbishop's pallium in A.D. 732 from S. Gregory III., made his third visit to Rome in A.D. 738, and there gathered round him a fresh army of illustrious fellow-workers; and here, besides his own missionary labours, and occupying himself in the reconstruction of the German Church, it is probable that Boniface was of signal service to Gregory III., from his personal knowledge of Charles Martel, to whom, soon afterwards, the Pope transferred the protectorate of the Church, and sent him the keys of S. Peter's tomb.

In this act there were probably two objects involved;

first, that of signifying the Pope's approbation of the signal stand made by Charles Martel against the Saracens, who had overrun France even as far as Dijon; and secondly, to obtain such an influence with Charles Martel as would check the fatal lawlessness of bestowing the Church lands upon savage nobles and licentious priests. In Rome, among those who gathered about Boniface was his own nephew, Winibald, whose character stands out in its exceeding beauty, purity, and sweetness, even among the crowd of his saintly companions. Winibald and Willibald, the two sons of S. Richard, whom they had persuaded to go on a pilgrimage to Rome, but who had died at Lucca on the way, had become distinguished for their spirit of self-sacrifice and mortification. Willibald extended his pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and afterwards took up his abode with the Benedictines at Monte Cassino. Winibald remained in Rome for some time, then revisited England to stir up a fresh fervour in missionary zeal, and finally returned to Rome just in time to greet his uncle, the great Apostle of Germany.

The veteran soldier of Christ and the fervent recruit were soon joined in wider bonds of love than those of family ties, and when the Archbishop asked the young monk to come and sustain his failing years, Winibald gave himself up for life to his uncle's service. They became the strictest friends, constantly exchanging holy thoughts, and seeking out together the mysteries hidden in holy Scripture. A number of Winibald's English friends, among them S. Sebald, accompanied Boniface to Germany; but he was not content without the two brothers, and after the lapse of some years, when Willibald had returned to Rome, the Pope bade him leave Monte Cassino and go to Germany, saying, "Our love to God is proved by our love to our neighbour. . . . He who has attained to great virtue, and yet, preferring his own tranquillity to the profit of others, refuses to be a bishop, deserves to suffer all the pains of the lost souls, whom, as a prelate, he might have converted." On hearing this, Willibald immediately made his sacrifice, and with a few companions set off for Germany, where he built the monastery of Eichstadt, and became the first bishop of that see. Winibald then built a monastery in a wild tract at Heidenheim, under the rule of S. Benedict, and there, while evangelizing the rough heathen population, advanced daily in his own spiritual life.

Very striking and beautiful is this picture of a Benedictine monk of more than a thousand years ago, whose words and deeds stand out before us in such vivid colouring that we seem

to know Winibald as if he had lived among us. The whole strength and secret of that exquisite character is *lovingness*. Pure, and stainless, and gentle as he was, he never shrank into himself, or gave way to the fastidious retirement which refined purity without lovingness is apt to encourage. No matter how rough, and lawless, and savage, and vile the surrounding heathen might be, Winibald was always among them; and though he was firm as a rock in checking their idolatrous practices, and separating them from their sinful marriages or connections, he was still as sweet and gentle as a brother with them all.

With his monks he was both father and mother in one, urging them on in their high calling, but providing for all their wants and needs, and nursing them in sickness with the utmost tenderness. And whatever he did and wherever he went, Divine words of Holy Writ ever dropped like honey from his lips; for like most of the saints of that great time, the Scriptures were their daily strength and food, the very light of their eyes, and the beloved law of their hearts. And it was because of this fact, and because of the fulness of the Divine word by which they were nourished, that they waxed so perfect and so strong, at once lofty in their spiritual growth and wide and tender in their love.

Before Boniface died, the great keystone was firmly set in the arch of Christian polity by the transfer of the Western Empire to the Carolingian race, which was also confirmed in the protectorate of the Holy See. The corruption and rottenness of pagan Rome, which had concentrated itself in the vicious Byzantine Empire, finally culminated in heresy and insolent demands on Rome, while the Lombards threatened to invade and take possession of the city on the north. The Pope, therefore, in A.D. 753 took refuge with Pepin at Pontyon, in Champagne, where he was met with great reverence by the the famous "Mayor," and taken in solemn procession to the palace. Soon afterwards the Pope crowned Pepin, with his two sons Charles and Carloman, and his queen Bertrade, at S. Denys, under the title of "Patricians of Rome"; and Pepin, setting out for Italy, defeated Astolphus, the Lombard king, and bound him to keep peace with Rome. Astolphus, however, broke his oath, and laid siege to Rome, when the Pope wrote to Pepin in these remarkable words, speaking in S. Peter's name:—

I, Peter, called by Jesus Christ to be an Apostle, to whom He committed the care of His sheep and the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, I have chosen you to be my adopted sons, and . . . exhort and beseech you . . . to deliver my town of Rome, my people, and the Church where my body

rests, from the outrages of the Lombards. . . . The nation of the Franks has shown more love to me, the Apostle Peter, than all the nations of the earth. . . . If you obey quickly, be assured that you will have a great reward in this life . . . and without doubt eternal glory.

How Pepin reduced Astolphus to beg for mercy is too well known to need repetition here. The emperor Constantine sent him an embassy begging for the restoration of the Exarchate of Ravenna, but Pepin replied that he had risked his life many times solely out of love for S. Peter and for the expiation of his sins, and that nothing should ever induce him to defraud the Apostle of his own. He left his deputy Fubrad to receive the keys of Ravenna and the other chief towns, after which Fubrad went in person to Rome to lay them on the Apostle's tomb with a deed of gift, making them over to S. Peter, the Church, and the vicars of Christ for ever.\*

Having thus been the chief providential means of founding and drawing together that magnificent structure of the visible Church, which wrought and cherished such marvels of Christian faith for ages to come, it remained only to S. Boniface to crown his labours by his death. He was allowed to foresee it for a whole year before it came to pass, so that he was able to make a complete visitation of his diocese during the twelve months. He was also allowed to consecrate his own successor, in his coadjutor Lullus. He sent for S. Lioba, the Englishwoman whose hidden life of strenuous and unceasing missionary work runs in so beautiful an undercurrent to those of the Archbishop, and after exhorting her never to quit Germany, nor to be overcome by the sacrifices and difficulties of missionary life, he gave her his Benedictine cowl as a perpetual remembrance of his last words.

To Lullus he minutely recommended the churches and monasteries, and especially the care of the clergy, and then like S. Paul, the great German Apostle told his weeping fellow-labourers that his hour was come, and that he was eager to depart to be with Christ. He desired Lullus to bury his body at Fulda, and to be careful to put the winding-sheet in which it was to be wrapt into the box with the books. Then those who sobbed about him "knew that they should see his face no more."

S. Boniface, with a few companions, embarked on the Rhine (A.D. 754), went to Utrecht and the *Zuider Zee*, and to all the towns and villages on its shores inhabited by the Frisian people, to whom his heart had first been drawn. Wherever

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\* "S. Boniface and the Conversion of Germany," pp. 277, 278.

his boat could navigate, he visited and instructed the people, spoke to them of God and the kingdom of Christ, and converted thousands as he went. In this way he went on to Dookinga, the boundary between East and West Friesland, where the pagans rose up fiercely against him and resolved to sacrifice the missionaries to their idols.

For some time past, Boniface, knowing by Divine revelation that the hour of his death was close at hand, had been more diligent than ever in preparing himself, as well as his clergy and lay adherents, to resist the assaults of their enemies. That last night of his life on earth he spent in prayer and praise, and it was noticed that a bright celestial light shone round the tent in which he prayed. The next morning Eoban, with all the clergy and monks, came to him, and exhorted him not to desist from preaching, but to announce God's word only the more boldly the more furiously the heathen raged. Filled with joy at the strength of their faith and love, he went out of the tent to preach to the people of the village. . . . As Boniface stood at the door of the tent, he held a book of the Gospels in his hand. His hair was white as snow, his tall majestic form was bent by age, and his countenance beamed with the fulness of grace and virtue.

The pagans came on with loud cries, armed with swords and spears, and clashing their arms together, and while S. Boniface was exhorting his companions they all rushed violently upon them.

Hiltebrant, whose office it was to serve the bishop's table, and who was only half dressed, was the first who was killed. The next was his brother Habmunt, the deacon, who was struck down as he came out of the tent. Then all the others one after another were despatched ; last of all came the turn of Boniface. As he fell; he raised his hands to heaven, and the fatal blow almost cut in two the book of the Gospels which he still held in his hand. Thus what he had most loved in life, was his sole defence in death.\*

All Germany and Gaul were stirred with grief and horror at the martyrdom. The relics of S. Boniface were collected and buried with honour, first at Utrecht, and afterwards, by miraculous indication, at Fulda, where a vast concourse of people accompanied the remains. Churches were afterwards built at every resting-place on the way, and Pepin erected a church in honour of the collected martyrs on a high mound, from which a stream of clear water, as at S. Alban's, burst forth.

Six-and-forty years later the protectorate of the Church by the Franks, for which S. Boniface had laboured, was consummated by the crowning of Charlemagne, the son of Pepin, by S. Leo, in S. Peter's, after the midnight mass on Christmas

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\* "Conversion of S. Boniface, &c.," p. 289.



night (A.D. 800), when the Roman people proclaimed him Charles Augustus, crowned by the Hand of God, great and pacific Emperor of the Romans." And thus was gloriously fulfilled S. Remi's prophecy to Clovis, that *the Frank nation should inherit the power of the Roman empire and exalt the Church.*

Very few words of ours are needed to fill up the outline of the great threefold story so admirably told by Mrs. Hope. Grasping firmly the only light thoroughly trustworthy in history, and searching its dark places by this help, under the guidance of an editor whose keen research and almost unerring instincts are even more remarkable than his attainments, the writer has brought out in the fulness of truth those great principles which are so much forgotten, or obscured in their integrity, among us in this generation.

He who runs may read in this record, in which the good and evil sides are equally set forth,—that the Frank, English, and German branches of the Teuton family rose to their unparalleled Christian greatness through their supernatural faithfulness to the Vicar of Christ. The blessing and the sanction of S. Peter were at once the seed and the "gentle rain" which brought forth the rich harvest of faith and good works; and the fruitfulness of the yield was always in proportion to the loyal care with which the bonds between each nation and the Holy See were maintained and renewed. And it is largely worth noting that as immorality of life and shameful scandals arose among the clergy and people, and the simplicity of union with the Chief Pastor became corrupted, both faith and faithfulness dwindled away, so that both clergy and kings, whether Merovingian, Saxon, or German, spread heresy and disobedience, as well as the polluting influence of their lives.

And the sole cure and restoration to health was invariably found in a fresh recurrence to the Vicar of Christ, and to those divinely-given principles of which he is the depository and channel. There is no personal feeling or bond to this or that Pope; neither softness nor party spirit. One dies, and another takes his place. The second Gregory is followed by a third, of another nation and antecedents, knowing nothing, as men would now say, of his surroundings or his work. But whether he were Roman noble or Syrian monk, S. Boniface seeks him with the same confidence and with an equally undoubting trust. S. Peter sits under either name in S. Peter's chair, and the power of the keys and the feeding of the sheep and lambs of the flock are still given into his hands. It was this clear, lofty, single-hearted belief in Divine principles

which smoothed the rugged Alps, and bridged the winter torrents, and shortened the weary leagues between the men of that day and the Eternal City; and carried them, as if winged, through obstacles and dangers which we should shrink to face.

For the children of these great nations have fallen away to other principles and different ways of acting. The Holy See has been dealt with in modern policy as an aggressive enemy, a dangerous tyrant, a permitted evil, or a helpless burthen, by those who owe greatness, civilization, and even Christian being to its undying love.

We, in especial, have built up for ourselves another science and a new civilization than that which is invariably "added" to the seeking first the kingdom of God and His justice, and we are now reaping our full harvest of the whirlwind. We have put our faith in treaties which are swept away like ropes of sand; in vast commercial conquests which the swift, stealthy approach of an overwhelming power is snatching from our hands; in systems of poor relief which engender pauperism while swallowing up our substance; in laws against crime which maintain for us a standing army of criminals; in councils and boards of education, whose only office seems to be to reveal that the gross ignorance, brutal immorality, and hideous crime of our English population degrade us below the level of all the countries of Europe.

It behoves us, English Catholics, above all others, to keep our eyes fully open to the great truths of history, and to read them by the light of faith. Among the many critical moments in the record of our story, this present time is one in which a recurrence to Divine and unchangeable principles is our only safety. "All the kingdoms of the earth and the glory of them" are not only *promised*, but *given*, for the time, to those who will side with the giver, and take up the standard of rebellion against the Kingdom of Christ; and we can never resist their enchantment nor stand firmly on the rock, unless we cherish in ourselves both the meekness and the strength, the loving docility and the royal-hearted faithfulness, which made Catholic England the jewel of S. Peter's crown.

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## ART. III.—LITERATURE AND DOGMA.

*Literature and Dogma*: An Essay towards the Better Apprehension of the Bible. By MATHEW ARNOLD, D.C.L. London: Smith, Elder & Co.

*Are We Christians?* By LESLIE STEPHEN, in the "Fortnightly Review" for March, 1873. London: Chapman & Hall.

IT is an old saying, but a true saying, made immortal by Bossuet, that the history of Protestantism is a history of variations. The spirit of reform is the unluckiest of spirits. He has been allowed no natural or preternatural repose; and his sole hope of quiet has always been in the dissolution of the body which he has been doomed to inhabit. Lutheranism was a change, and has ever been changing. Calvinism was a change, and has ever been changing. Anglicanism, if distinctively anything, was a change, and has ever been changing. And so of all the other almost innumerable sects who hold up their hands protesting—to any one of them Proteus might profitably have gone to school.

Nor is a cause for all this difficult to find. When the seamless tunic of the Church became uncomfortable wearing—torn it could never be—the old coat of heresy was donned by the reformers. But the old coat was threadbare, and suspicious about the seams. Never had it been much else than a sad garment, its sole recommendation being that it fitted loosely; but the rough usage of fifteen unquiet centuries had reduced it to such a state of shabbiness that it became but a frail covering in stormy times. The only hope for it was in perpetual patching. In that interesting artistic pursuit Protestant apologists have had to pass their days. And so has progressed, or, at least, in some sense persisted, that tragedy most amusing, that comedy most heart-piercing: the tragedy ending in marriage, at which Erasmus laughed; the comedy ending in murder, over which Loyola wept; that "glorious, godly reformation,"

"Which always must be carried on  
And still be doing, never done,  
As if religion were intended  
For nothing else but to be mended."

It would seem, however, that the end has come at last; the old coat has literally dropped to pieces. Protestantism as a form of Christianity is extinct. No doubt some appearance of life is still kept up in the Protestant churches by the

galvanic operations of wealthy divines; but really and truly Protestantism in England, as well as in Germany, is a corpse. It has lost all real hold upon the hearts and intellects of men. Of course, we are not denying the existence of many Protestants who heartily wish to be Christians, and firmly think they profess Christianity. But however candid and convinced these may be, they are as a body in no true sense of the word Christians at all. Doctor Strauss has lately published a very remarkable book, "Der alte und der neue Glaube." In it he proposes to himself the question whether any educated person at present is a Christian, and he answers with remarkable decision, "No." In the current number of the "Fortnightly Review," Mr. Leslie Stephen makes the same inquiry, not with regard to the really educated class, nor with regard to the class at the opposite pole of development, who follow Mr. Bradlaugh, but with regard to that great body of Englishmen "whose intellects are not active enough to care for scientific impulse, and yet too active to be content with a pure absence of ideas," and though he gives no decided reply, it is obvious that Mr. Stephen considers all that body of Englishmen believers of a something which is not Christianity. Of course, neither Dr. Strauss nor Mr. Stephen puts the question with regard to Catholicity. Catholicity is regarded by both, though so many millions believe it, as a kind of religious curiosity long since deservedly relegated to the top-shelf of the theological museum. Of course, too, neither Dr. Strauss nor Mr. Stephen knows enough of Catholic adherence to Catholic faith to be able to speak authoritatively, or with confidence, of the mental attitude of Catholics; and Mr. Stephen, at least, is too cautious a writer to speak without knowledge. Each furnishes a report of his own acquaintance, Dr. Strauss testifying for the highly educated class everywhere, Mr. Stephen testifying for the great body of Protestant Englishmen; and each says of the class for which he speaks that it has renounced Christianity.

That such a result should at last arrive was of course inevitable. From the moment that the right of private judgment—the right of every stupidity and of every sciolist to determine his faith for himself—was proclaimed as the main principle of Protestantism, it was clear that Protestantism had simply begun its march to utter infidelity. But though the result was inevitable, it is not the less to be deplored. Protestantism in any form was bad enough; but Protestantism in any form is less bad than what is now taking its place. If it did nothing else, it kept alive some faith in the main doctrines of natural theology, and some respect for the main doctrines of natural morals; and while a man has a consciousness of God, and a

conscience for God's Law, his chances of salvation are far from desperate; he may, indeed, under God's mercy, go up from the low level of merely natural religion to the highest heights of orthodox belief. But when every shred of religious faith is torn from his soul, and nothing is left him but a religious nihilism, without a God and without a hope, his position becomes so perilous as to be practically fatal. And it is such a religious nihilism that is everywhere taking the place, the naturally inherited place, of Protestantism now. The critical philosophy of Kant led to the annihilating philosophy of Hegel. The private judgment of the sixteenth century has led to there being nothing left to judge about in the nineteenth. The work of Luther has been finished logically by pulling it down.

The two latest expounders of the new system are Dr. Strauss and Mr. Mathew Arnold. Most people know the former as one of the most able opponents of the doctrine of Christ's divinity. A very short time ago Dr. Strauss determined to distinguish himself in a larger field. He published the book to which we referred above, and in it gave the world his views on the main questions of modern theology. Of the four questions which he proposes to himself to discuss, the two first are of most importance. They are (1), Are we Christians? (2) If we are not Christians, is there any religion that we can follow? When Dr. Strauss asks are *we* Christians, he means by *we* all those who, like himself, have independently, and with enlightened minds, examined for themselves the basis of faith; and for that body, which he considers a very large one, he answers that Christians they are not, and cannot be. They cannot believe in the Articles of the Apostles' Creed; they cannot believe in the Trinity; the divinity of Jesus Christ is evidently a mistake; the biblical account of the Creation and fall of man is too plainly a myth; the Devil was obviously stolen from Persia; Humanity and Christianity are fundamentally antagonistic. And so on. But if we are not Christians, says Dr. Strauss, is there, secondly, any religion left us to follow? To this question he gives no definite reply. The reply to be given, he says, depends upon what religion means. It would appear that that is a matter very difficult to settle. Dr. Strauss finds the origin of religion in the feeling of awe with which the primitive people regarded the Physical World; and it is his decided conviction that religion was at first polytheistic, and that only after some time, when men saw that one God was as good as a thousand, did monotheism commence. Dr. Strauss' own private opinion is that God is — nothing in particular, and that prayer to God is particularly

unscientific. That the soul of man is immortal, Dr. Strauss thinks very uncertain; and he is quite certain that we believe in our immortality because when other men have died we are accustomed to keep them in memory. John Jones believes that he, John, is immortal because he had a brother Tom, and brother Tom is dead, and yet (wonderful to tell) he, John, sometimes thinks about him, remembers him, and would, on the whole, rather like to meet with him where they might drink eternal ale. Dr. Strauss declines to say whether, with no God in particular, no hereafter, and no hope, a man can have a religion. But he hints very strongly that he, Dr. Strauss, has none; and as Dr. Strauss is about the finest specimen of the educated and enlightened class, we may fairly conclude that that class either has no religion or is on the way to rid itself of any little superstition it may chance to retain. The various members of it may not be Strausses just yet, but they will be Strausses, or more than Strausses, by-and-by. The great critic is not unapproachable.

Nor is he unapproached. To the eternal honour of England she has produced a man who has even outstripped, nay, distanced Dr. Strauss. This man was a poet once. He was more. He was a professor of poetry. He was, perhaps is, more still; he was an Inspector of National Schools, and as such had frequent opportunities of watching how the religious idea grows. Last of all he became known to fame as a very independent literary critic indeed, with a remarkable turn for calling common things by most uncommon names, and with a turn equally remarkable for speaking of the highest things in not quite the highest terms. But within the last few days he has surpassed even himself. His latest book really surprised us. We had been inclined to give him credit for very extraordinary performances; but we did not hope for anything so extraordinary as "*Literature and Dogma.*" We had heard of a certain class of persons who rush in where angels fear to tread; but in that class we were not prepared to find a person who really must have got a fair education. We were very well convinced of Mr. Arnold's imbecility when he found himself in face of real difficulties, just as we were convinced of Mr. Kingsley's imbecility when he passed from writing novels to writing against Dr. Newman; but we never dreamed that such a notable lover of "*Sweetness and Light*" as Mr. Mathew Arnold would, throughout 388 octavo pages, employ himself not in reasoning, nor in trying to reason, but in covering things the most sacred with ridicule the most insulting. "*Ignorance,*" says Mr. Carlyle, "is an awkward, lumpish wench, not yet gone into vicious courses,

nor to be harshly used ; but ignorance and insolence these are for certain an unlovely mother and bastard." The mother and the bastard are of Mr. Arnold's kith and kin. It has been our lot to read some of the very worst things that have been said in the very worst way by Voltaire and the Voltairian School ; but not even the old fanatic of Ferney was so unbearably impudent as the author of " Literature and Dogma." Let us give a solitary instance. The professor of poetry is speaking of the most Blessed Trinity. He describes the Three Persons thus (p. 306). The Father is,—

A sort of infinitely magnified and improved Lord Shaftesbury, with a race of vile offenders to deal with, whom his natural goodness would incline him to let off, only his sense of justice will not allow it ; then a younger Lord Shaftesbury, on the scale of his father, and very dear to him, who might live in grandeur and splendour if he liked, but who prefers to leave his home to go and live among the race of offenders, and to be put to an ignominious death, on condition that his merits shall be counted against their demerits, and that his father's goodness shall be restrained no longer from taking effect, but any offender shall be admitted to the benefit of it on simply pleading the satisfaction made by the son ; and then, finally, a third Lord Shaftesbury, still on the same high scale, who keeps very much in the background, and works in a very occult manner, but very efficaciously, nevertheless, and who is busy in applying everywhere the benefits of the son's satisfaction and the father's goodness.

That is Mr. Arnold's method of describing the Blessed Trinity. And by-and-by when (p. 310) he wishes to be rid of the dogma he relieves himself by saying, " and certainly the fairy tale of the three Lord Shaftesburys no man can verify." And a little further on (p. 312) when he wishes to go a step further and to deny the existence of any personal God whatsoever, he introduces the subject with the words, " the whole difficulty is with the elder Lord Shaftesbury." We have ourselves some regard for light and some regard for sweetness. We know the difficulties the man will meet who seeks a fair measure of either, and we therefore can abstain from blaming Mr. Arnold if his measure of each be small. But Mr. Arnold knows that large masses of his countrymen will regard the language we have quoted as blasphemous and disgusting. Under these circumstances is there in using such language and using it needlessly, any sweetness at all? Mr. Arnold is, as he is fond of saying (and we reverence him for such frequent confession of an unpalatable truth) gifted with no talent of reasoning, no power of following any thought, however simple, through any serious inferential process. But it does not require very exalted powers of reasoning to

VOL. XX.—NO. XL. [New Series.] 2 B

discover when one is simply impudent. And we really do think that Mr. Arnold is able to see so far. We must, therefore, with, however, all possible sweetness, say he is somewhat to blame. Conscious impudence is, after all, a drawback in a professor of culture.

Mr. Arnold's book professes to be an essay towards a better apprehension of the Bible. There may be many, he says, with whom the Bible has small respect; but he is not one of those. He is deeply concerned lest Bible religion should eventually come to nought. He thinks it has almost reached that unfortunate pass, and that unless some one steps in chivalrously to its succour we shall soon have the mortuary columns of the newspapers announcing its doom. Mr. Arnold himself undertakes to be the champion of the Bible. There is just one way of saving it, and that way he adopts. By a process, for which he tells us he is specially suited, he extracts from the sacred volume its sole important truths, and these he commits to a secure immortality in his own everlasting work. The Bible may fail, and is very likely indeed to fail; but the book of Mr. Mathew Arnold, D.C.L., published by Smith, Elder & Co. is imperishable.

Our author, therefore, starts with the principle that the right religion is the religion of the Bible. That principle, he says, is admitted by all the Churches, Catholic as well as Protestant, and he adds, with indubitable profundity, that *from the nature of the case it must be admitted*. He fortifies himself in this very learned position by a quotation. The quotation is given in inverted commas (Preface, viii.), but without reference, and it is ascribed to Dr. Newman. This is the quotation:—"The Bible is the record of the whole revealed faith; so far all parties agree." We have looked for that passage in Dr. Newman's books. We have not found it. It is not a matter of much importance; but at the same time we do not think that Dr. Newman could have written the quoted words after his conversion. We hardly think he could have written them at all. The expression "the Bible is *the record* of the whole revealed faith," has a haze and an indefiniteness about it very much in the style of Mathew Arnold; but very little in the style of John Henry Newman. But seeing that, according to Roman Catholics, the Bible does not contain all revealed faith; that there are revealed truths which are not in the Bible;\* it is very plain that if Dr. Newman

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\* "Ecclesia ..... constante reconservavit hoc principium, videlicet ..... esse veritates aliquas revelatas ..... quæ scriptæ non sunt."—Franzelin, "De Traditione et Scripturâ," p. 214.



ever wrote the passage quoted at all, he wrote it before he was an authority on Catholic dogma or Catholic opinion. As we have said, however, the matter is one of the smallest importance. We have only one purpose in mentioning it here. We wish to illustrate for Mr. Arnold how dangerous it is after all to speak with the boldness of ignorance. For Dr. Newman is living still; and Mr. Kingsley has not been heard of greatly since a certain *Apologia* came to be written.

Having settled for himself that the Bible is the place where religion is to be found, Mr. Arnold stops himself, like Dr. Strauss, to ask what religion means. Beyond one point on which he insists vigorously, namely, that dogma has nothing to do with religion, his view of religion is not remarkably well defined. But we shall see by-and-by, that, according to Mr. Arnold, definiteness is the chief of intellectual sins. It is of the essence of everything to resemble the gown of Nora Creina, and the moment a man begins to be accurate, that moment he begins to be wrong. But though Mr. Arnold's notion of religion would hardly stand a Socratic scrutiny, he has a notion of it—and a very original notion indeed. His principles do not allow him to communicate it by definition. But he does better. He communicates it by nods that are quite as good as winks, after the manner of Mr. Browning in *Sordello*. And he communicates it by examples. Of these latter we shall give the reader a few:—

By the dispensation of Providence to mankind, goodness gives men most pleasure. That is morality. The path of the just is as a shining light which shineth more and more unto the perfect day. That is religion. Live as you were meant to live, is morality. Lay hold on eternal life, is religion. Love not sleep lest thou come to poverty, is morality. My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and finish His work, is religion.

In fact, Mr. Arnold says religion is morality touched with emotion. Contemplate some moral proposition; wait till it moves you; make some eloquent remark, or utter some excited exclamation, and you have got religion. Religion in reality is chiefly made up of dashes, interjections, and notes of exclamation.

Mr. Arnold has therefore discovered both what religion means and that all true religion is found in the Bible. The reader, of course, sees that unless all morality be in the Bible, which is hardly true, these two points can scarcely stand together. But that may be allowed to pass, for these two points are only preliminary to the main business of the book. That main business is the statement of a certain principle and the principle's application. The principle is that only in one peculiar way and by one peculiar class of men can the Bible

be rightly understood. The way is to eliminate everything that is not emotional—everything that looks definite or precise, or matter of fact. The class of men who can interpret the Bible must not be scientific, they must not be able reasoners, they must not be men with “a system based on principles interdependent, subordinate and coherent.” Analytic power is a curse, and theological expertness an abomination. The men who alone can see what the Bible means are men of culture—whatever that means—men of fair spirit, men of balance, men who have read the best things that have been said and thought since the beginning. A plain person might remark that such very extensive reading of such very good things would require, in order not to be simply ruinous, the very highest powers of mind. But Mr. Arnold does not see this, for Mr. Arnold is not a plain person. Be sure you have culture, be sure you cannot reason, read the classics of the world, and then you can understand the Bible. Of course, it is only Catholic commonplace that no private individual, whatever his endowments, has a right to interpret the Scriptures independently for himself. Of course such interpretation leads and has always led to the most ruinous results. Of course, even before Mr. Arnold’s days, not one man in a thousand, not one man in twenty thousand, could securely say that he had the gifts and acquirements necessary for the interpretation of books so various and so difficult as are the Sacred Scriptures. But after Mr. Arnold’s days? After “*Literature and Dogma*” has laid down the law, who can open his Bible with a hope of understanding it any more? Who is it that has this delicate and refined and sensitive culture, this exquisite literary tact and taste, this acquaintance with the best things that have been said and thought in all the world, this fairness that excludes prejudice and the balance that excludes staggering, this affluence of the *Zeit-Geist* or Time Spirit, which, in common with his German compeers, Mr. Arnold makes so important; and who has all these qualities at the same time, that he is like Mr. Arnold, utterly uncursed with the power of steady consecutive thought? According to Mr. Arnold, no man living fulfils the description but one, and he is an Inspector of National Schools. His name is Mathew Arnold. Professor Huxley, Mr. Darwin, Dr. Newman, Mr. Herbert Spencer, the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester, are spoken of by our author with either undisguised contempt or with a sneering patronage; but Mr. Mathew Arnold is very freely and very frequently put forward as the man of the time. There is no God, he says, but the Stream of Tendency, or the Not-Ourselves, and not Mahomet but Mathew is his prophet.

Catholics are of course very little concerned with Mr. Arnold's principle of Scriptural exegesis. They hold that the Bible is infallibly true; Mr. Arnold considers it always fallible and often false. They hold that the Bible is inspired—and we remark for our author's sake that Infallibility and Inspiration are different things;—Mr. Arnold regards Inspiration as simply impossible. It is, therefore, not very interesting to know how Mr. Arnold applies his principle. It is, sooth to say, a little wearisome to follow him in his wanderings; for even the style of "Literature and Dogma" is very dreary and nerveless, and what one might call phthisical in the extreme. Painful cough, hollow cheeks, cold sweat on forehead, tottering limbs, eyes glassy and hopeless—that would be the incarnate semblance of Mr. Arnold's new book. In the paper of Mr. Leslie Stephen, which is mentioned at the head of our article, there is much to object to on the score of unfairness; but as a mere piece of literary work it is excellent—strong and clear and direct and trenchant. Mr. Arnold's book has no one good quality that even his best friend can discover. We cannot, therefore, put ourselves or our readers to the trouble of attending him in his application of his principle to the Old and New Testaments. The most we can do is to state briefly a few of the conclusions to which he comes and his manner of making them out. This, we think, will be found extremely curious.

To start with the existence of God, whom, as we saw, Mr. Arnold calls the elder Lord Shaftesbury. It is pretty generally admitted that some supreme being exists, who, by His power created the world—by His intelligence and volition rules it. Men have not been able to come to an agreement at any time as to the full nature of this supreme being. But they have very generally agreed that he is an individual with intelligence and will and power; and they have been always accustomed to speak of Him as an intelligent, independent person. That has been the almost universal opinion of men in all times. And if any doubt might arise as to Pagan views of the Deity, no doubt can arise as to Jewish views of the Deity. The God of the Hebrews, of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, was very fully described in the Bible. Mr. Arnold goes to the Bible, and the God he finds there is described by him as either—he gives us a choice—the *stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being, or the power not ourselves which makes for righteousness*. But what is this stream, and what is this power? Mr. Arnold cannot say what either of them is; but he can say what either of them is not. The power not ourselves is not a person. It is not an

intelligence; it has no volition; it is not Creator; it is not Father. It is (as well as we can make out), when distinguished from religious emotions which come upon us, and which Mr. Arnold therefore calls beautifully, not ourselves,—as distinct from these, we say it seems to be nothing. And that according to Mr. Arnold is the true doctrine of the Bible.

Mr. Arnold's method of coming to this result is instructive. The Jews did, he says, undoubtedly call God a Person, their Creator, their Father, their King, their leader in battle. They undoubtedly said that He had spoken with several of their countrymen, had wrought for them the most extraordinary and the most palpable wonders, had appointed their governors and made their laws. But all this Mr. Arnold turns aside, and calls it by an interesting German nickname which characterizes it as all—lies. And how does he find it out to be all lies? In this way. The idea of God as personal maker and ruler of the universe is, he says, an idea which never could have occurred to the original Hebrew mind; for that idea depends on other ideas, which to Mr. Arnold are horribly and hatefully metaphysical, such as the ideas of causation, creation, and identity; and that latter class of ideas no Hebrew could entertain in the early times. Did any one since the earliest times ever dare to speak, much less to print and publish, such insufferable nonsense? Do not the commonest coalheavers believe in a personal God? And in order to do so, have they to study metaphysics? Do not the Scriptures in every page testify that the God the Hebrews believed in, rightly or wrongly, was a God so personal that the main objection to their mode of conceiving Him is, that they went very near making Him only a magnified man? The fact is that Mr. Arnold is hoist on his own petard. The stream of tendency, or the power not ourselves—that is the metaphysical conception (if it be anything but nonsense) which not one of a thousand Englishmen is capable of grasping, and which the Hebrews—a race not given to metaphysics—would regard as only a passing fume of too potent wine. The personal God, ruling, ordering, loving—that is the concrete Being Whom the lowest and simplest and least speculative races can apprehend, and have always apprehended. Taking Mr. Arnold's own view of the Bible, therefore, the more simple and primitive he makes the Hebrews, the more concrete and tangible must have been the Deity. There is not a race of men upon the earth, and there never was, who could believe in God as a stream of tendency. We doubt very much if any one individual could by any process of "culture" bring himself to such a belief. But certainly that never could have been the faith

of an entire, especially a simple and unmetaphysical, race; and yet Mr. Arnold assumes that it was, in order immediately to make it fit with the Bible. And that is his great method of interpretation.

But upon this matter there is something still more curious in Mr. Arnold. One naturally asks the question, why does Mr. Arnold himself reject the notion of a personal Deity?—for it is to be recollected that Mr. Arnold, who is so hard on systematic belief in others, goes to the Bible with a systematic belief of his own, and tries to show that his own systematic belief is there. Why, then, is Mr. Arnold, the poet, disposed to an unpoetic atheism? He gives his answer, short, and (he seems to think) eminently satisfactory. It is that the existence of a personal God, such as the elder Lord Shaftesbury *cannot be verified*. That is all. What does that mean? The word *verified* has a technical, scientific sense. If Mr. Arnold uses it in that scientific sense, his meaning is that God cannot be put under a microscope, or weighed, or measured, or submitted to chemical analysis, or lectured on and experimented upon, or labelled or shelved by Professor Tyndall or Professor Huxley. If he wishes to maintain that God cannot be verified in that fashion, we are willing to admit that he speaks correctly. God cannot be verified in that fashion, but neither can the stream of tendency. But besides the process by verification, there are other processes of proof. And if Mr. Arnold means to say that the existence of a personal God cannot be proved, we must beg leave to say that he does not speak correctly. God's existence, the existence of a Supreme Ruler of the Universe, mighty, and wise, and good, can be proved in many ways. But to Mr. Arnold we suggest only one, and any one who has read Mr. Arnold's book will know our reason for its selection. The proof is, that Jesus Christ taught the existence of such a Supreme Being; spoke of Him as His Father; prayed to Him; represented Himself as having known Him, seen Him, come from Him; nay, when He was called upon at the most solemn epoch of His life, He told the High Priest, His tormentor, that that very God would send Him one day to judge the world, and that that very High Priest would see Him coming on the clouds. Now, that things of this kind could be said of Mr. Arnold's Stream of Tendency is purely absurd. That they were said of God by Jesus Christ Mr. Arnold admits. We quote only such Scripture as Mr. Arnold confesses authority.

But perhaps Jesus Christ was wrong? If so, Jesus Christ was a liar. But perhaps He was a liar? Oh, the riches of the wisdom and power of God! When our Lord lived among

men upon the earth He had many enemies, all only too anxious to say bitter and bad things of His name; and yet they dare not accuse Him of a single sin. It is the same now. He is hated in many quarters; but such is the awful reverence around Him, that even Mr. Mathew Arnold must bow to Him as if He were indeed divine. Mr. Arnold has some sharp things to say of Peter and James, and John and Paul; but he has nothing sharp to say of Jesus. He even speaks of Him with admiration, and the only part of his book where he gets even to the outskirts of eloquence is when he is kissing the robe of Christ. But he distinctly repudiates the notion of Christ's divinity.

It is not quite easy to follow Mr. Arnold in any part of his book; but in that part of it which he devotes to our Lord it is especially difficult to comprehend him. He sets himself principally to discover what was our Lord's own testimony to His person and nature, and what was the testimony thereto of the principal New Testament Scriptural writers. The latter testimony to Christ's divinity has been ordinarily accounted strong. Take, for instance, the evidence of Christ's resurrection from the dead, supplied by nearly every book of the New Testament. That Christ died, that Christ arose, that Christ lived on earth after His resurrection—these things may be true or false; but if they be false, there is scarcely a writer of the New Testament who was not simply a conscious liar. Now, Mr. Arnold does not go so far as that; but he goes so far as to say that the story they agree in telling about the resurrection is a legend! Let Mr. Arnold give up his sweetness a little. If he have a hard thing to say, let him say it. If he believes that Christ never rose, let him call S. John and S. Matthew—who say they saw Christ after He had arisen—what they ought to be called in the interests of truth—liars. But Mr. Arnold will not venture so far. Then Christ arose. Mr. Arnold knows very well that in the circumstances Christ's resurrection proved His Divinity.

But what is Mr. Arnold's opinion of Christ's testimony to Himself? In plain language, Mr. Arnold does not say. But what he does say, in a very mysterious manner, appears to be this: Christ never claimed to be God. Those that thought He made the claim misunderstood Him grossly. When He said He came from God, was the Son of God, was God, He only meant that He came out of the stream of tendency, and was the son, being the lover, of righteousness. Now, throughout this article we are not arguing with Mr. Arnold; that we conceive to be quite unnecessary, and quite useless. We are only offering suggestions as we pass, in order that his method may

be more apparent. On the explanation we have just seen him giving of the words of Christ we make this suggestion. Let us suppose that Mr. Arnold was right; that Christ never claimed to be Divine, and that they who understood Him to make the claim misunderstood Him. But then the fact stands that they really understood Him to make the claim. His own disciples so understood Him. The Jews in general so understood Him, as is plain from the account of His trial. Jesus knew all this. He knew well that they thought Him Divine, and He knew well what was their idea (not Mr. Arnold's) of a divinity. That being the case, we ask the question, Would a holy Being have allowed such a view of Him to be entertained, even by a single man for a single hour, if the view was what Mr. Arnold maintains that it was—misleading, absurd, destructive of true morality, and, as the Jews themselves would think, absolutely blasphemous? The *suppressio veri* is sometimes a lie. If ever it was a lie, it would have been so in this case. On that day when Christ asked the chosen twelve, Whom do men say that I am? and Peter answered, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God; and Christ, knowing well what Peter meant by the living God, rejoined, Blessed art thou, Simon, son of John, because not flesh and blood have revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven—on that day, we say, if Mr. Arnold's ideas were correct, Christ (if we may utter such words) spoke falsely. But Mr. Arnold does not accuse Christ of speaking falsely. What, then, does Mr. Arnold mean?

The suggestion we have just thrown out is applicable to another procedure of Mr. Arnold's. In illustration of the vain way in which people understand the words of Scripture, he quotes that portion of the sixth chapter of S. John's Gospel where Christ speaks of the necessity of "eating" Him to have life, of eating His flesh and drinking His blood, and so on. Mr. Arnold, of course, has nothing to say of the real Presence, except that it is simply a dream. Now, here again we are concerned, not with argument against Mr. Arnold, but with illustrating his method. Suppose, then, that study of letters, study of the best that has been said and thought in the world, enables Mr. Arnold to find a meaning in the words of Christ which excludes such a signification as all Catholics and very many Protestants have seen there, still the crowd that listened to Jesus had not the advantages of Mr. Arnold. They believed Jesus to mean directly and plainly what He said; and He did not make any, even the smallest attempt to correct them. He went farther: He went on to confirm them in their impression, repeating such phrases as we have quoted above

over and over, and in still stronger form. He went farther still. Crowds were round about Him, for whose good, as Mr. Arnold would admit, He was anxious. Disciples were by Him whom He had already won, and whom He wished to retain. With Him and through His teaching all were to be brought to righteousness. But now He sees not the crowds alone, but His disciples depart, because the words He had used had given them offence. He lets them go, and go in error. And this He does while (following Mr. Arnold) He had used phrases which (not being men of letters) they had naturally misunderstood; and while far from correcting an error for which He himself was responsible, He does His best to fix the error permanently in their minds. If all this were true, would Christ's character be upright, as even Mr. Arnold confesses it? To let a man for no fault of his own lose his chance of righteousness looks worse than cruel: to confirm a man in an error into which he has guiltlessly fallen looks nearly as bad, if not quite as bad, as a direct lie. But it is Mr. Arnold's method to make no account of things like these. Reasoning is not in his line. He is so very sweet as to be more modish than persons of fashion. He therefore believes a thing because he believes it.

Mr. Arnold's view of the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, whom he calls the third Lord Shaftesbury, is as interesting as his views of the other two; and his method is always the same: the Holy Ghost is only a pneuma or influence, and that is proved because there is such a thing as an influence recognized by Mr. Arnold. Whatever Mr. Arnold has verified, felt, or seen, that is accepted. Beyond that, no matter what contradictions the denial involves, Mr. Arnold denies everything. Here we have another suggestion to make. Our author apparently accepts that portion of the Gospel of S. John where the transactions of the Last Supper are described. He throughout believes, or affects to believe, that Jesus Christ was scrupulously truthful, and (though not a man of letters, who had read the best things said and thought in the world) rather an intelligent person. Now, in the part of S. John to which we have referred, Christ speaks of the—what we call the Holy Spirit, and what Mr. Arnold calls the influence. Every one, of course, who speaks of the Holy Spirit knows He is an influence. But when Jesus Christ speaks of Him, does He not speak of Him as something more? We submit it with all due deference, not having, unfortunately, as yet read all the best things that have been said or thought in the world, but we do think that if the influence of which Jesus Christ speaks be not also a person,



and a divine person, then by all the laws of speech Jesus Christ is a lying pretender. For how does He describe the influence? As a Comforter, whom He will send to abide with the Apostles for ever; as the Spirit of Truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it knoweth Him not, nor seeth Him; as the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in Christ's name to teach them all things, and to bring all things that they have heard from Christ into their remembrance; as the Comforter (again we quote from the authorized Protestant version) whom Christ will send, and who is so great that it is better to have Christ go in order that He, the Comforter, should take His place; as the Spirit of Truth, who will guide the apostles unto all truth, and who shall speak nothing but what He shall have heard from Jesus. How can Mr. Arnold make the words we have quoted stand with his doctrine? Jesus Christ himself was an influence; but Jesus Christ was a person. The influence with which He contrasts Himself, who is to take His place, who is to perfect His teaching, who is to get orders and commission from Him, must have been, if there be any meaning in language at all, a person too. We may point out, moreover, in passing, how in the passages quoted Jesus Christ testifies not only to the Holy Spirit, but directly to Himself. He testifies directly that He is Divine. For even supposing the Holy Ghost was a mere influence productive of religious emotion, how could Jesus Christ undertake to send that influence when He himself was dead and buried, if He himself was not God? Imagine a mere man promising that when He himself had passed beyond verification, he would send a Spirit to his fellow-men to teach them all truth, and to abide with them for ever; and imagine that same man knowing—as, according to Mr. Arnold, Jesus Christ knew—that over any such spirit in others he had no control, and that such a spirit or influence was a product only of brooding over the laws of morality! How could a holy and wise Being make such a promise? But, according to Mr. Arnold, our Lord was a holy and wise Being. Once more, therefore, we are entitled to ask, What, then, does Mr. Arnold mean?

One other instance of Mr. Arnold's method, and we shall leave him in his literary repose. He devotes a chapter of his book to the "Proof from Miracles." Mr. Arnold does not tell us what he means by a miracle, and we shall therefore assume that he uses the word in its popular, which loosely is also its proper signification. Of course he denies that a miracle is a possible thing, and of course in his system it could not be a possible thing; a *stream of tendency* would hardly be

equal to raising a man from the dead. But Mr. Arnold cannot conceal from himself that large masses of men have believed, and are still believing, not only that miracles are possible, but that miracles have been really wrought. He cannot conceal from himself that the Bible, which he chivalrously volunteers to save, gives the history of many miracles plainly and simply. And Mr. Arnold cannot, therefore, avoid the question, How did men come to believe in such fictions? His method of answering that question is peculiar, and we hope characteristic. He quotes a passage from Shakspeare, and tells us that there is the answer. This is the passage with Mr. Arnold's introduction. "Under certain circumstances, " wherever men are found, there is, as Shakspeare says :—

No natural exhalation in the sky,  
 No scope of nature, no distempered day,  
 No common wind, no custom'd event,  
 But they will pluck away its natural cause,  
 And call them meteors, prodigies, and signs,  
 Abortive presages and tongues of heaven.\*

Now, for one moment let us make to Mr. Arnold a merely literary suggestion. Did he really understand that passage when he read it—and it is not a hard passage to understand? We think not. What he had to illustrate was, how men came to believe that actual miracles—that is, actual impossibilities (according to Mr. Arnold)—had happened. But does the passage of Shakspeare illustrate such a proceeding? Why, it only illustrates a fact which no man, Catholic or Comtist ever denied—namely, that men will occasionally regard as miraculous facts what are not miracles at all. It illustrates how, in certain circumstances, men may believe, for instance, that cures which are really effected by natural means are effected by means supernatural; but it does not illustrate how men come to believe a thing to have been effected by supernatural means which was never by any means effected at all. We would really advise Mr. Arnold not to read so much. Sir William Hamilton has very wisely said that reading is usually in the inverse ratio of thought. And when Hobbes was taunted by a certain university magnate with the narrow extent of his reading, the author of the "Leviathan" replied with, we will admit, a little Philistinism, "If I had read as many books as you I would probably be just as great a fool." These are not, we are afraid, among the best things that have been said or thought in the world, for Mr. Arnold does

not appear to have seen them; but they are worth remembering.

But it is only on applying his method to a particular miracle that Mr. Arnold makes his fitness to be a theological teacher sufficiently clear. He speaks of the resurrection of Lazarus. He cannot get over the fact that the Biblical writer believed in the miracle, and that the Christian contemporaries of the Biblical writer believed in it too. But he accounts for the belief; and he accounts for it in this way. Mr. Arnold is rather verbose in the passage, and so we shall give only its substance. "After the death of Lazarus," he says "Jesus had a conversation with Martha, the dead man's sister. On hearing of His friend's demise Jesus remarked to the afflicted girl, 'Your brother will rise again.'" It was the after-remembrance of these words, says Mr. Arnold, out of which the legend grew. What a simple way of settling a matter that baffled Hume, perplexed Rénan, and did not appear at least twenty years ago quite facile to Dr. Strauss! But there was yet another way of looking at the matter which does not appear to have occurred to Mr. Arnold. The Bible narrative, which he admits to be authentic, tells plainly that Lazarus died; that Lazarus was buried; that he was in the grave for four days; that at the word of Jesus he suddenly came to life; that he returned with his people to his own home. And the Bible narrative tells all this at a time when of a surety plenty of people were living, who, if the narrative were a lie, could and would contradict it; for Lazarus had neighbours in abundance, and neighbours who hated Christ and Christians. That he died, that he had a funeral, that he was in the grave four days, that he leaped up therefrom at a word from a certain teacher, that he came back living to his home, are facts about which these neighbours could be hardly in error. The Biblical writer must have been a very bold person to make all these statements before the neighbours of Lazarus, supposing these statements were lies. And the neighbours must have been very un-Jewish and very unnatural people to listen to such lies without a word of contradiction. For even though Lazarus's resurrection became a legend for Christ's followers, it never would become a legend for Christ's enemies; for these latter, supposing it untrue, it remained always simply and personally a lie. And it especially remained a lie to be hated, stamped out, exposed with many-tongued triumph over all the world. It never was so exposed. We are sure our readers can make the necessary inference. We hope Mr. Arnold can do so too. Anxious for his well-being, there is one assistance which we wish to offer. We beg of him to

read two poems of Mr. Browning, one of which is called "Bishop Blowgram's Apology," and the other of which is called "The Epistle of Karshish." The former must interest him as touching upon Mr. Gigadibs, the Literary Man. The latter he will find congenial, because Karshish is "the picker-up of Learning's crumbs; and both poems will illustrate for him the difference between a man of letters who can reason and a man of letters who can only read. The Epistle, moreover, will remind him of Lazarus, and the Apology will suggest an escape from his literary difficulties. Mr. Gigadibs bought some agricultural implements and went to Australia.

But we have followed our author far enough. Our object throughout has simply been to give specimens of his conclusions and specimens of his method. We have never attempted in any serious way to reason with him, except when certain suggestions started up unasked from his own pages. To reason with him was, we knew, very unnecessary, it being enough to state his views; but it is impossible to put his book aside without some very serious reflections. What, first of all, strikes the present writer after reading "Literature and Dogma," and remembering other books of the same tendency which have appeared within the last twenty years, is the immense impudence which characterizes what are usually called—it must be in Mephistophelian mockery—"the thinkers" of the time. Some of these are, in their own peculiar provinces, men of great distinction; and we are very unwilling to question their right to be distinguished. But how have they attained their professional eminence; how has Mr. Darwin made a great name in one way, Professor Huxley in a second way, and Professor Tyndall in a third? By a life of patient, laborious research, aided by the favouring circumstance that rivals were not abundant. And yet these men, with no training whatever for the task, with no knowledge whatever of the subjects save what they gather from newspapers written by men who are also in blissful ignorance of the bearings of what they say, venture upon the most serious theological problems with all the confidence, and not a particle of the modesty, of S. Thomas or Suarez. It is quite the fashion for every shoemaker, Odger among the number, to go a whole world beyond his last. How laughable it would be if it were not so sadly, lamentable to listen, for instance, to Professor Tyndall propounding his views of prayer! Professor Tyndall is an able man—no one can more willingly than we admit his ability—but in theological matters he is utterly out of his element; and it is his own fault. He is like that metaphysical dove in the famous illustration of a Platonic error given

by Kant. The atmosphere of careful analysis, patient investigation, cautious inference, guarded statement, which supported him in his own domain, he thinks he may leave behind him when he flies, or attempts to fly, into the loftier spaces of religious speculation. He does leave it behind him; and as a not unnatural consequence he simply flutters and falls.

Indeed, we doubt very gravely whether the so-called "scientific men" of our generation—many of them, at least—are quite deserving of that title. Of course a mere experimentalist may call himself a man of science, and, in fact, he is so after a manner; but we, personally, should not like to give him the name. To our minds no man is worthy of it, except a man who, with industry and curiosity, possesses also a large amount of logical and constructive power. The work of science is not so much the aggregation of facts as the ordering, classifying, reasoning from, generalizing, facts; and these processes, to be conducted fairly, require in a high degree such qualities of mind as we usually think of in connection with Aristotle and Newton and John Stuart Mill. But these are qualities not very characteristic of our modern men of science. Who that has ever read their books attentively, but has been almost painfully struck with their miserable inability, as of thoroughly untrained men, to grasp a subject firmly, to take it to pieces orderly, to point out its meaning and purpose clearly, and to avoid these blunders of statement and inference of which we find no traces in men of really logical minds. In the days of Aristotelian scholastics fact was neglected and intellectual acuteness cultivated to an almost morbid degree. These were the days, consequently, of the

"Gens ratione ferox et mentem pasta chimæris."

But we have changed all that. We have gone into the opposite extreme. We load our brains and our books with facts, and we take no trouble to acquire the skill and strength to use them; and, as a consequence, our facts never tell. Take as an instance that notable man of science, Mr. Charles Darwin. He proposes a certain theory of the origin of animal species. Let us suppose that the various species *might* have originated in his way; but they might have originated in our way as well. The theory of simultaneous creation is at least as possible a theory as that of successive development. Mr. Darwin supports his theory by facts. But what do his facts prove? At the very utmost, that his theory is possible. He has no fact to show that a man *is* a developed monkey, though (let us admit) he has facts to show that man *might be* a developed monkey. Yet he and his followers—his followers especially—

who know neither the facts nor the way to use them, go on complacently to affirm that the Darwinian theory is not only possible, but actually true; and that, too, while the evidence which Christians produce, and which Mr. Darwin never troubles himself to examine, shows clearly that successive development, whether it be possible or impossible, is, as a matter of historic truth, only a fiction. Compare that kind of intellectual conduct with the ways of Newton. The Pythagorean system of the universe was even in Newton's day shown to be a sufficient explanation of all the phenomena of the solar system. Many men said it was therefore true. But Sir Isaac was a little too logical to make such an inference. He very well knew that the only correct influence under the circumstances was, that the theory of Pythagoras was possible. He said no more.

But this indefensible boldness of which we have been speaking is not a characteristic of our men of science alone; it is, and perhaps in a higher degree, a characteristic of our men of letters. We have just seen an instance—we admit an exaggerated instance—of it in Mr. Arnold. But instances of it, and in very high quarters, are only too common. Examine the writings of Mr. Carlyle or of Mr. Froude; you will find each of them talking of Catholic doctrines and Catholic practices with a dogmatic ignorance that is truly astounding. Both are, though in very different degrees, men of eminence; both are owners of very valuable gifts, though these gifts, we are sure, will prove to be rather of the showy than of the substantial kind. But what reasoning power does either possess? As much as is necessary for a high-coloured word-painter. And what does either of them know about Catholicity? About as much as Cromwell did of gentleness, or the Regent Murray of truth. Both Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Froude owe their knowledge of the Catholic religion to the journals and atmosphere of London. And what can be gathered there is as much Catholicity as it is Attic salt or ozone. Did either of them ever set himself seriously and resolutely to study out with genuine fairness the evidence for Catholicity? It took Dr. Newman three parts of a lifetime, and one of the finest minds in existence, to conduct and complete the study. Has either of the puritan historians ever tried to do likewise? Was any large part of the labour bestowed so lavishly in glorifying Cromwell and traducing the Queen of Scots ever given to finding whether, after all, "popery" may not be simply and solely true? *Credat Judæus.* And yet each of these eminently conscientious men will speak of popery as a thing that he has long since examined through and through, and found to be an

abomination. Mr. Carlyle is a great hand at giving rules to young people, and many of his rules, though indictable as commonplaces, are thoroughly wise. He has very often insisted on the necessity of preserving a religious silence till one has some guarantee that one understands the thing about which one feels impelled to express an opinion. That is a rule which every man in the world will do well to follow. More especially should it be followed by men who propose to be the teachers of the time.

But the temerity of our learned men is not the only nor the most serious subject of reflection suggested by "Literature and Dogma." Considered in connection with the paper of Mr. Leslie Stephen, and with other evidences which we possessed already, it plainly points out the very deplorable fact that, taken in the lump, England is perhaps infidel; but surely not seriously Christian. It is something that the number of English Catholics is even now very considerable, and goes on increasing with a hopeful rapidity. It is something, too, that among the Protestant Clergy there are many men who still cling on tenaciously to the few poor planks that the storms have left them. Mr. Leslie Stephen, it is true, does not think much of that phenomenon. "The old method," he writes (p. 283), "of arguing from creeds to genuine beliefs, from what men say to what they think, has become a mere byword. Were it applicable, we should have to suppose that some people still believe the Athanasian Creed." The reader perceives the slur which Mr. Stephen throws on, for instance, Archdeacon Denison and many other distinguished members of the Established Church. We do not, we must say, concur with Mr. Stephen. We believe that many of the Protestant clergy are earnest, zealous, conscientious men, incapable of hypocrisy; and we believe that they aid the English Catholics a good deal in keeping England from swift and utter corruption. For it must never be forgotten that the loss of Christianity by a nation is invariably followed by moral and intellectual ruin. "Virtue," Dr. Strauss says, "is its own reward, and only for that reason is it right to be virtuous." That, we have no doubt, is extremely fine. But where there are no religious sanctions such as Christianity supplies, there will be very little virtue to be rewarded; and this not merely in the lowest classes, but in the highest. There will, of course, be some show of virtue preserved, such as was the case in certain directions, till some Saturday Reviewer detected the Girl of the Period. But the crash will come at last; the exposure will in the end be made; some Juvenal will arise to write some Sixth Satire; and then

what before was vice with a veil will be vice naked and not ashamed. And such books as Mr. Arnold's hasten the crash.

But such books as Mr. Arnold's may do much more. Of course, as against the Catholic Church, or as against any fairly educated Catholic person, such books are altogether innoxious. But there is a considerable number of Catholics whom they would easily harm. There is no denying the fact that opinions of "the stream-of-tendency" character are every day becoming more fashionable, and that it is thought rather a proof of unusual genius to avow and defend them. Now, there are some Catholic young gentlemen who are not proof against the fascinations of fashion, and who are not quite so conversant either with the theory or the practice of their religion as may be desirable. For such as these, books like Mr. Arnold's might chance to be dangerous. From "Literature and Dogma" itself the danger is not serious. That book, indeed, is so evidently childish both in thought and execution, that it might be harmlessly left to amuse the nursery. But there are men who will defend Mr. Arnold's opinions, or opinions similar to his, with a faculty of reason which has been no part of Mr. Arnold's inheritance. And from men like these the danger to certain classes of our Catholic youth will arise.

In Catholicity, however, wherever there is danger there is also a means of escape from the danger. During another age, and in other countries, the remedy in cases like the present was obvious and expeditious. It was a remedy which would hardly find general favour in our present times; but it would meet with the approval of at least one distinguished, but not quite logical patient, Mr. Carlyle. "If a man go on harming himself and harming others," says that writer, in "Shooting Niagara," "the best thing you can do with him, best for himself and all around him, is to take him to the nearest tree and hang him up, *quamprimum!*" We do not quite agree with Mr. Carlyle; here, as in most other places, a certain passionate impatience is too much apparent in his speech. Still, though the propriety of the quoted passage be more than questionable, the principle it suggests is not in its application to books else than a good one. If books are dangerous they ought to be destroyed. But that principle, however true in theory and however desirable in practice, cannot be acted upon in England now. We have blessed Liberty of the Press; like the Liberty of Private Judgment, it leads, as all men are seeing, to inevitable intellectual and moral ruin; but this is a free country, and every man has perfect permission to go to the Devil, when, and where, and how he pleases. And so the ancient mode of



settling such books as that of Mr. Mathew Arnold, with its beautiful remark about "the three Lord Shaftesburys," is no longer available.

But besides those which will occur to every Catholic, two other remedies remain, which, though they may be not quite able to alter the past, will be effective preventives in the future. In the first place, we invite Mr. Arnold, and men like Mr. Arnold, to study the religion of Catholicity. We assure them they will find the study extremely interesting; and we assure Mr. Arnold in particular that until he has devoted himself to the perusal of some of the great Catholic controversialists he can hardly be said to have mastered the best things in the way of thought and speech that have appeared in the world. But he and his friends must be prepared to find the study somewhat large; they must be prepared to find it somewhat novel; they must be prepared to find it somewhat difficult, demanding concentrated, intense, and patient thought, and not by any means to be mastered, as Mr. Gigadibs masters his subjects for the "Cornhill Magazine." And they must be prepared especially to find it bringing them into contact with writers who probably were not men of "culture," but who were surely men who would break all the bones of one of our modern "thinkers" in one short five minutes. But though hardships beset his way, still if Mr. Arnold should only take heart and try the task he will have his reward. We do not say that he will become a Catholic, for conversion depends on many things besides inquiry; but he will have the reward suited to a man of letters. We could almost undertake to guarantee that if Mr. Arnold will only look up the best things that have been said by Suarez and Father Perrone, and if he pay attention to the style and system of these two writers, he will evermore be saved the shame of writing as he has lately written. For, really, even the general conception of his last book is a monstrous bull. He denies the Bible's inspiration; he denies that it is always, or even generally, truthful: most of it, on his own showing, must have been written by a pack of impostors; and yet he goes systematically to find the true religion in its pages! He reminds us very much of a distinguished Irish gentleman who was asked by a friend of his some time in the night what o'clock it was. "Bedad," he replied, "I don't know; but wait a minute, I'll light the candle, and go look at the sundial." Mr. Arnold lighted his candle—he went (let us say) to the sundial; but he had previously—the naughty giant—snuffed the sun from the heavens. Let him study a little scholastic logic; let him read less, write very much less, think vastly less of the critics that annoy him; and he will be

safe in future from such inconsistent procedures. He will, moreover, be more just to Christianity.

But the main remedy against the infidel literature of the time lies not in the honesty of our opponents, but in the zealous vigour of ourselves. We must be ever ready to render a reason for the faith that is in us, and ready to render it in such a manner as to make it respected by even the most fastidious of cultured unbelievers. We must have our youth ready to do, in proper proportion, exactly the same. Education of the higher kind, scientific, literary, wide, liberal, conceived in no narrow spirit, directed with no narrow aims, is, for us, a pressing necessity. This is not the place to say by what means such an education may be most satisfactorily insured. But that, by some means, it should be insured to the Catholic youth of these kingdoms is abundantly clear. It would have at least one salutary effect, that, namely, of making such publications as "*Literature and Dogma*" religiously rare. There is an idea current with the "thinkers" of the time that among Catholics there are none of whom they need be afraid. Not only, they say, is the Roman Church opposed to science, but she actually possesses no scientific men. "The Roman faith," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, "cramps and ultimately destroys all genuine love of speculative truth." Nothing scientific, learned, liberal, say our thinkers in general, can come out of Rome. That is a very consoling reflection for them to make, and they act upon it with a bravery that is worthy of wide admiration. But this bravery is slightly suspicious. It reminds one of that memorable warrior, Sir John Falstaff, hacking at the corpse of the dead Percy. Our "thinkers" attack, simply because they think they can attack with impunity, everything that Catholics hold most dear. In these circumstances our consequent course is very obvious. The "thinkers" have long enough been under the delusion that they are the monopolists of knowledge; it is time to undeceive them. They have long enough been carrying the war into our camp; it is time to carry it, straight and strong, into theirs. The first step in the offensive march will be made when we have established among us a proper system of University Education; the second step will be made when, from very fear, the thinkers will study before they speak; and the third will be made when the Catholic Church is, as she alone has the right to be, the teacher of all truth to all the nation. That end is not yet; but it is not so far off as people imagine. When England has at last to select between God and the stream of tendency, between Catholicity and Nihilism, we have no doubt of where her choice will fall.

## ART. IV.—THE GORDON RIOTS.

*Sketch of a Conference with Earl Shelbourne ; Wesley's Popery calmly Considered ; Defence of the Protestant Association. 1780.*

A COMPLETE narrative of the origin and the achievements of that baleful conspiracy which, towards the close of the eighteenth century, sought a renewal of the horrors of the fell penal code against the Catholics of Great Britain has, strange to say, never been presented to the student of English history. A plot, warily concocted, carried out with diabolical capacity and energy, which had for its object the oppression of a large but helpless and most innocent portion of the community, and which almost resulted in civil war, seems to deserve more conspicuous, detailed, and authentic notice than can be possibly afforded by a few violent partisan pamphlets, or by the abridged and sensational description of writers of romance. We have therefore ventured to undertake a faithful account of a neglected and almost forgotten portion of the religious history of this country, but which yet is full of solemn instruction both for Catholic and Protestant readers.

The political condition of the Catholics of England and Scotland, even so late as the end of the eighteenth century, was such as it is difficult for us at the present day to realize. Nearly the whole of the sanguinary laws of the Tudor and the Stuart were still in full force against them. No Catholic could be attorney, or justice, or post-master, nor sit in Parliament, nor vote at elections, nor keep fire-arms, nor defend a suit at law, nor be guardian, or executor, nor practise law or physic. Any person apprehending a Popish Bishop, Priest, or Jesuit, and prosecuting to conviction, was entitled to £100 reward, and the convict was imprisoned for life. Catholics were disabled from purchasing, or inheriting, or taking any lands by descent, devise, or limitation, but these were to be given to the next of kin (provided he were a Protestant). The punishment for saying Mass was perpetual imprisonment, and the same was the penalty for teaching in a private family. To convert a Protestant to the Catholic faith was the crime of high treason.

Such, in brief, was the law in England down to the year 1778, a condition of things worthy a heathen emperor or an oriental despot. And there was this additional ignominy in

connection with the statute from which the Catholics suffered chiefly at the period to which we refer, that it owed its existence not to a mistaken religious zeal, but merely to vile, political manœuvre. The Act of the 11th and 12th of King William originated in party faction. It was brought into the House of Commons by the Opposition, without any hope, or indeed any desire, that it should become law; but in order that the Court party, by rejecting it, as it was confidently supposed they would, might incur with the nation the odium of favouring the Papists! The Court party saw through the snare, and avoided it by passing the severe measures proposed. Thus from 1699 until 1778 Catholics were the victims of enactments of the harshest description that had become law simply to serve the purposes of party intrigue.

It must not, however, be imagined that the people of England were nearly as bad as their legislators would have made them. The instances are many in which the well-protected Protestant shielded from the storm his perfectly unprotected Catholic fellow-creature. It was made a point of honour in several counties not to give the least encouragement to either priest-hunter or informer. It also not unfrequently happened that men were to be met with of sufficient moral firmness to refuse to add to their own estates, by a criminal acceptance of property forfeited for conscience sake, an act which they rightly enough judged would condemn them to undying infamy. For the honour of human nature we rejoice to record this; at the same time it will be easily conceived that these were the exceptions. The reward that was held out to cupidity was so great, and impunity in the injustice was so certain, that it was not to be expected of the ordinary run of mankind that they would abstain from such a lucrative spoliation of the defenceless, as offered itself before their very eyes in the persons of the Roman Catholics.

But a change was near at hand. Urged on by a strong sense of the indignities and wrongs of which they had been for so long a time the victims, and, moreover, encouraged by a promise of hearty support from all those who in enlightenment and culture were greatly in advance of their age, the Catholics of England resolved at length to make an effort to obtain from the Government some recognition of their right to be protected by the legislation of their native land. With this object, on the 1st of May, 1778, the Catholic peers and commons of Great Britain presented an address to his Majesty, through Earl Surrey and the Lords Linton and Petre, stating their patience and peaceableness during years of past rigour, and expressing a hope that his Majesty would see no obstacle

between his loyal Catholic people and their admittance to the rights common to all British subjects. This address was intended to pave the way for a motion which it had already been resolved to put before the House of Commons, a fortnight later, for leave to bring in a Bill for the relief of the Catholics of England from their present grievances and shameful disabilities. As it was known would be the case before they ventured to present it, the address met with a gracious reception, and, thus encouraged, Sir George Saville, on the 14th of May, moved for permission to bring in a Bill for "the repeal of certain penalties and disabilities provided in an Act of 10th and 11th of William III., entitled 'An Act to prevent the further growth of Popery.'"

Saville, upon whom Burke passed this encomium, that "he was an instance of true genius with a fortune, which, though unencumbered by luxury or excess, was sinking under the benevolence of its dispenser," was in every respect the guardian spirit of the persecuted Catholics of those dark days. In a splendid torrent of indignant oratory, he denounced the long-standing wicked oppression:—

I plead the cause of an oppressed body of men, who are almost forgotten in the patience and silence with which for many years they have endured their grievances. The Bill, of which I ask the repeal, is a standing memorial of civil rancour and discord. It holds out a pecuniary reward to stimulate avarice to do what nature refuses, it renders the Catholic a foreigner in his native land, for he can acquire no estate, either by purchase, donation, or industry. The effect of this Act upon the clergy is to oblige them to conceal themselves either in private houses, or as the chaplains to foreign ministers; its effect upon the whole body of Catholics is to condemn them to beggary and ignorance. Protestantism has no right to exist if it uphold knowingly so infamous a law.

He was seconded by Dunning, who with a noble daring went into particulars that must have stung with reproach many a member of that House of Commons who was living sumptuously upon the spoils torn from the old Catholic families:—

This disgraceful law makes it felony in any foreigner to officiate in England as a priest, but high treason in a native. By it, Catholics being educated abroad forfeit their estates, which are bestowed upon the next Protestant relative. By it power is given to the son to take the estate from the real proprietor, even though he may be his own father. It prevents the Catholics from acquiring any legal property by purchase, which word is applied by the law to all property acquired by any other means than that of descent. All of these disabilities, which are a disgrace to humanity, it is our object to repeal. And although this law has been softened in practice, still

are the Catholics constantly at the mercy of the basest of mankind, for on the evidence of any of these wretches, the informers, whom the law encourages, our judges are bound to enforce all the shameful penalties of the Act. To continue these is therefore nothing less than to hold out a most powerful temptation for deeds, at the thought of which nature recoils with horror; for they are calculated to loosen the bonds of society, to dissolve all obligations, to poison domestic life, and to annihilate every principle of honour.

The motion was received with universal approbation; the Bill was accordingly brought in, and passed without a single negative; for, as Saville remarked, "Every member who had read over the Act of William III. saw at once that in repealing it, he was, after all, not so much doing a favour to Catholics as trying to remove a dark disgrace from Protestantism." And yet this relief Bill, though regarded by those in whose favour it was passed as a great boon, did no more than repeal part of 1st Act of 11th and 12th of the reign of William III., namely, those clauses that offered a reward for the conviction of any bishop or priest accused of exercising his sacred functions, as also that enactment by which Catholics were disabled from purchasing or inheriting property. The faithful were still subject to penalties if they attempted to teach, or to be present at Mass; they were still prohibited from holding any public office; in fact, the greater part of the enactments of the penal code remained in full force against them. Yet the appeal of the Protestant Association stated it as a huge grievance that "the remaining laws against Popery were but as a body without the soul."

The Act (18 George III. c. 60) which thus gave tardy and partial relief to a most ill-treated and long-suffering body of men, and which received the support and approval of the honourable-minded of every religious persuasion, was, however, destined to produce results beyond all human calculation.

The General Assembly of the Protestants of Scotland happened to be sitting when the English Act was in agitation. Upon a notice being laid before the Assembly that a remonstrance against the Catholic Relief Bill should be forwarded to Parliament, it was, much to the honour of that body, rejected by a majority of one hundred. An Act so tolerant and just encouraged the Scotch Catholics to proceed with a measure which naturally they had already contemplated, namely, to prepare a petition to the legislature for an extension to them of the same relaxation of the penal code as had been granted to their brethren in England. Accordingly, an address for this purpose was drawn up, and received the signatures, not

only of the chief Catholics, but also of some of the most eminent amongst the Protestants of Edinburgh; first amongst whom appeared Robertson the historian. All seemed to promise fair; an early day was appointed for the presentation of the address; and the event was looked forward to with eager expectancy by the Catholics, who sought to be relieved from an odious and oppressive law, as well as by the real patriot, who wished to see a dark stain removed from the statute book of a Christian country. Both were doomed for a time to be grievously disappointed.

The report that the Scotch Catholics were secretly at work labouring to effect their release from the penal laws which had so long weighed upon them, had been spread amongst the Calvinists from the first, and had met with derisive incredulity. When, however, it became known for a certain fact that the petition was ready for presentation, that no less a person than the Lord Advocate himself had undertaken to present it, and that the Government was quite prepared to grant all its demands, the panic and dismay of the Scotch bigots rose to a critical pitch. Societies were at once formed for the "Defence of the Protestant Faith," committees were appointed to issue pamphlets to inflame the popular mind, fly-sheets were scattered about in thousands, describing the "idolatry of Popery," the "crimes of the Jesuits," the "slaughter of kings and Protestant nations as taught by the Popes." It may be as well to put on record that the most seditious and the most criminal of all these foul productions was the work of a nonconformist clergyman hired for this especial task by the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge. The "Protestant Safety Committee," as it was called, had appointed it, as its chief duty, to rouse the western shires of the kingdom, to keep the public in a state of constant agitation by violent anti-Catholic articles in the newspapers, by alarming placards on the street walls, by inflammatory "no Popery" harangues at the corners of the thoroughfares.

The effect was soon too evident. It began to show itself first in angry, menacing declarations against the Catholics, made in the provincial synods, at which also resolutions were passed to oppose every attempted measure of relief. The zealots called upon the people from the pulpits to undertake for themselves the protection of the national church, and to avoid as plague-stricken all those false shepherds who had been bribed to betray the chosen flock of God. There was no misunderstanding the intention of all this, and they whom it most concerned were naturally the first to perceive, and to endeavour to defeat it. So a message was sent to Lord North

through some of the northern members, stating that the Catholics of Scotland, unwilling to be the cause of any civil disorder, would refrain from making the proposed application to the legislature for a participation in the legal benefits that had been conferred upon their coreligionists in England. A circular to this effect was widely spread throughout Edinburgh, Glasgow, and other centres of the Protestant agitation, in the hope that it would assuage the fanatical fury of the bigots.

But it was too late. The prospect of a season of violence and riot, greed for plunder, added to the excitement of irreligious hate, had roused the worst blood of the fiercest mob in Europe. And so well known was the magistracy of Edinburgh at that time, and so little apprehensive were the conspirators of any attempt at effective opposition to their designs, that public notice was given that it was the intention of the Protestants of Edinburgh to assemble for "the defence of their king, their country, and their creed, now threatened by the emissaries of the Pope." They specified the time of their rising, their place of meeting, and the object they had in view, and concluded by summoning all "good men and true" to come forth to their aid. On Sunday, Jan. 31st, 1779, the following incendiary letter was found scattered through every street:—

MEN AND BRETHREN—Whoever shall find this letter, will take it as a warning to meet at Leith Wynd on Wednesday next, to pull down that pillar of Popery, lately erected there.

(Signed) A PROTESTANT.

P.S.—Please to read this carefully; keep it clean, and drop it somewhere else. Addressed to every Protestant into whose hands this shall come.

True to their word, only a little earlier than they had notified, did the Edinburgh mob assemble to carry out their programme. Late in the afternoon of Tuesday, 2nd February, the Bishop's house and chapel were surrounded by crowds mad with zeal and whiskey. The first intention of the rioters was to pull the building down piecemeal, and make a bonfire of the fragments; but their impatience getting the better of their instructions, they broke in the windows, and threw lighted torches into the apartments. A few moments and all was in a blaze, which, spreading to several adjoining houses, soon made a great conflagration. While this was going on, the Lord Provost and magistrates, with the Deacon Convener of the trades, held a meeting in Goldsmiths' Hall, and passed a resolution to the following effect: "That General Skene be applied to—that all tradesmen shall keep their servants and



apprentices within doors—that the magistrates shall assemble at Fortune’s tavern, and that the City guard shall patrol the streets!” Meantime unopposed, the rioters repaired to the old Catholic chapel in Blackfriars Wynd, to which they set fire, as well as to half a dozen houses close by, taking care to beat down with crowbars the timber-work of the upper flats, so as to secure the entire destruction of these “nests of Popery.” While thus engaged, a cry was raised, “To the traitors who have aided the Relief Bill,” and, catching at the inspiration of vengeance, the mob rushed forthwith to punish those who had ventured to show sympathy with the efforts of the Catholics to obtain some mitigation of their grievances. Robertson, McDonald, Lockhart, and Crosbie the advocate, were the four who had made themselves chiefly conspicuous by their courageous support of the oppressed; and to the houses of these gentlemen the rioters hastened to take ample revenge. They, however, had received timely warning of what they had to expect, and the mob on its arrival saw such preparations made for defence that they were compelled to content themselves with breaking a few windows. To console their diappointment, the rioters (now swelled to many thousands, and receiving hourly increase by the arrival of sympathizers from the outlying districts, and furthermore encouraged by the criminal apathy of the civil authorities) proceeded to fire the town in several places at once, spreading the intelligence as they poured along that the magistrates were against the Papists, and that the military had sworn not to discharge a single shot upon their fellow Protestants.

The danger that thus menaced themselves, their city, and all society, woke up the magistracy a little from their hitherto scandalous indifference. Some troops of dragoons were ordered into the town, the Duke of Buccleugh’s fencibles were paraded before the mob, and a proclamation was issued by the Lord Provost;—this, for the moment, was all that the law felt itself bound to do for the defence of property and life, in the very presence of raging conflagration, and of a vast body of seditious ruffians, bent upon nothing less than universal havoc and spoliation. The city firemen, when marched with their engines to the various scenes of destruction, refused to play upon the flames, “having no wish,” as they said, “to take part with the Pope against the Protestants.”

Fortunately for Edinburgh and its people, there existed at this time a body of shrewd, sensible men, the heads of the various city crafts. To the efforts of these it is due that the Modern Athens did not incur a fate similar to that which, eighteen months later, overwhelmed London. Moved by their

representations, and by the certain assurance they gave him that unless the most energetic measures of repression were speedily adopted, Edinburgh would be soon nothing but a heap of ashes, the Provost and his advisers seemed at last to realize the danger, and to recognize their duties. Orders were issued to the troops to fire upon any assemblage of men that refused to disperse after sufficient warning. At the same time another proclamation made its appearance, which, in spite of its unmanly cowardice, had the effect of convincing the rioters that their hour of impunity was past. It may not be amiss to rescue from oblivion this unworthy document. After humouring the mob by the assurance that no repeal should take place of any of the laws in force against the Papists, the proclamation continued thus :—

After this public assertion, the magistrates will take most vigorous measures of repression, being satisfied that any future disorder will proceed only from the wicked views of bad men. The magistrates are aware that the riots have hitherto been due to the apprehensions of well-meaning people.

This disgraceful statement implied two singular circumstances : first, that hitherto the civil power had not done its duty ; and, secondly, that the rioters had been in a manner justified in their past acts of violence. Feeble and servile as it was, still, united with the order given to the troops to treat the town as being for the time under martial law, it met the emergency sufficiently. A few days, and Edinburgh had resumed its usual aspect. The ruins of two chapels and of a score of houses, the presence of the military in the streets, the appearance of nineteen rioters (all of whom were, however, pardoned) before the magistrates—these were the only traces that seemed to remain of a conspiracy which had completely paralyzed the civil power, and had established a reign of terror over a city numbering 80,000 inhabitants.

In Parliament, the tampering policy of the Scotch magistracy during the no-Popery riots was made the subject of the severest animadversion ; and in the debate of March 15th, 1779, the Lord Advocate for Scotland was reminded by Mr. Wilkes of the Scottish Catholic Relief Bill, and was asked whether he had come to the House prepared to fulfil the engagements he had made to “the most deserving and the most ill-treated of his Majesty’s subjects.” The answer of the Lord Advocate was that he had consulted the Catholics of Scotland, and had been informed that they deemed it more prudent, in the present excited condition of men’s minds, to defer putting forward their claims—a reply that provoked this rejoinder from Wilkes : “It seems to be imagined that the

Government of Great Britain is to be overruled in its administration of justice by whatever sentiment is uppermost amongst the vilest scum of the population"; to which he added these ominous words: "The mob of Edinburgh has set a fatal example to that of London."

The "Committee for Protestant Interests," that had arranged the above plot, which, contrary to their intention and hopes, had only half succeeded, contrived nevertheless to be the authors of a more fatal disaster in England. They stand before us branded with two especial disgraces—it was they who contrived the infamous penal code in Scotland, and from them came the suggestion of the formation of that society in England similar to their own, which, under the name of the "Protestant Association," was to bring about such terrible events. Indeed, some months before their own comparative failure, the Scotch zealots had resolved (to use their own phrase) "to come to the aid of their brethren in England"; and already their correspondence with the fanatics in London and other places was carried on with a regularity that told of a resolute and well-concerted plan.

"The Protestant Association" had but one great object, namely, by every means, by sermons, by pamphlets, by placards, by street ballads, by alarming handbills, by the incessant rumours of a thousand impending dangers, to arouse throughout the kingdom a universal panic and indignation against the Catholic body. The end of this, they hoped, would be to terrify the Government into a repeal of the Relief Bill, and the re-introduction of all the disabilities of the Code of William III.

Until the autumn of 1779, this diabolical Association worked on in secrecy. Its agents were everywhere—they penetrated into the lowest alleys, into the worst ale-houses—they were busy in the fourpenny debating clubs, and in the cellars where apprentices held benefit meetings—among the sailors of Wapping, and the slaughterers of Newgate Market. For these, the lower, ignorant classes of society, the agents of the Association proclaimed the wildest follies: "the King and his Ministers were about to be assassinated by order of the Pope,"—there were "20,000 Jesuits hidden in the caves of Surrey, who were ready at a signal to blow up the banks and bed of the Thames, so as to drown London and Westminster." To the more sensible, better educated portion of the community, they spoke of the danger that would threaten the Protestant succession if the Papists acquired power—of the civil liberties so dearly bought by the Revolution, all of which the Catholics were bound by their creed to disannul on the

first opportunity. All this incessantly repeated, seen upon every wall as they walked the streets, and found occupying a conspicuous place in every newspaper, began at last to take effect even upon men the least fanatical. From its very persistency, they came to imagine that so much clamour and sensation proceeded from something. The wisest, indeed, still laughed—better had they made themselves ready.

In this state of agitation of the public mind came forth from the Association its celebrated "Appeal to the People of England." We will give our readers an extract from this production, which Burke stigmatized as "a seditious document, its object being to excite general odium against the Catholics, so as to cause the repeal of the most just Act ever passed; in style contemptible, in reasoning futile, in design malicious."

To tolerate Popery, is to be instrumental in the perdition of immortal souls, and of millions that only exist in the prescience of God, and is the direct way to provoke the vengeance of a holy and jealous God against our fleets and armies. In the commission given to the princes of Israel to break down idolatrous altars is stated the duty of all princes and rulers to prohibit the practice of idolatry within their jurisdiction, and to extirpate every monument of it. The indulgence granted to the Papists will operate, sooner than was apprehended, the subversion of the State and the ruin of the nation. Popery is not only high treason against the King and the State, but also high treason against God. We therefore call upon the people, and particularly the clergy of the metropolis, to preserve the civil Constitution and the Protestant religion, by petitioning Parliament for the repeal of the late Act. We invite the people dispersed all over the kingdom to establish associations similar to that of London, with committees to correspond with the head Association. The present Act has put the sword into the Papists' hands, and England will again be deluged with the blood of martyrs.

From this extract a just idea may be formed of the character of that infamous appeal, in which, after twelve months of busy plotting in secret, the Protestant Association proclaimed itself to the world, and more than hinted at its future work. Its compilers were challenged by several Protestants of note to produce any Catholic publication so opposed to Sacred Scripture and the doctrines of Christianity, as this diabolical production. Such as it was, however, it answered perfectly the purpose of its framers. Men of every grade in society flocked in numbers to enrol themselves members of the Association. Subscriptions poured in sufficient to defray the expenses ten times over, and even to satisfy the monetary cravings of Joshua Bangs, the secretary. The enthusiasm spread with a rapidity which seemed calculated to involve the whole nation

in a practical denial of the first principles of religion and common sense; so that, in a few weeks, the Rev. Daniel Wilson, chief manager, was able to announce in the public journals, that the great Protestant Association was in readiness to act against "the enemies of God," that every man who had signed his name, was "sworn to defend the House of Hanover and the true Protestant interests," and that a general meeting would be summoned early in December for the transaction of important business, and particularly for the election of a "suitable president." A suitable president! The phrase was ominous, but the choice made by the Committee was still more so. While all peace-loving, well-disposed persons were indulging in the hope that the menaces of the Association would be confined to angry words, or at most to violent but legal efforts against the Catholics, they were bitterly disappointed by the publication of the following in the daily papers:—

At a general assembly of the members of the Committee of the Protestant Association, it was unanimously resolved, that on account of the noble zeal for the Protestant interests which has distinguished the public conduct of Lord George Gordon, his lordship shall be requested to accept the position of President of our Association.

Lord George Gordon was third son of Cosmo, Duke of Gordon. At an early age he entered into the navy, but retired from the service during the American war. Soon after he obtained a seat in Parliament, where he at once made himself conspicuous by his eccentric behaviour and puerile violence. Having joined the Presbyterian body, he forthwith assumed, not only the most obnoxious doctrines, but even the manners and the language of their earliest founders, the Cameronians. Of a prim, formal, meagre figure, clad in sombre garments, his long hair falling lank upon his shoulders, his restless eye glaring with triumphant spiritual pride, with a harsh, loud voice, and much vehement ungainly gesture, he seemed the very personification of a Puritan leader of the time of Claverhouse. "Scotland," said Mansfield, "set us an example of violence, and obligingly sent us a commander to head it." Burke described Lord George Gordon as "a Don Quixote, armed with the resolution of the Protestant Association for a lance, and his own letters upon true Presbyterianism for a target." This is far too complimentary, for he possessed neither the noble-mindedness nor the moral worth of the eccentric Spaniard. It would be more true to regard him as a compound of the characters of Habakkuk Mucklewrath and Corporal Humgudgeon, well fitted to pour forth "a word in season" to the wild Western Whigs of the old Scottish Covenant, or to

“uplift his testimony” against the Black Indulgence at the Grass-market at Edinburgh. Sufficiently eccentric to be dangerous, he had yet consciousness enough to give purpose and malice to his actions; at once a hypocrite and a fanatic, but probably without direct choice or design; for the real hypocrite, especially in religion, becomes, by unconscious degrees, fanatical, while the real fanatic is never for long wholly pure from the taint of hypocrisy.

Such was the man who, in an evil hour, was chosen to head the Protestant Association. He had been not only an eye-witness, but also a busy plotter during the conspiracy in Scotland, and thus he was able to carry on his fresh undertaking, instructed against failure by the mistakes of others. His first public manifestation of what was fermenting in his gloomy brain, occurred in the course of a violent speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of May, 1779, in the course of which he remarked:—

A million and a half of people are not to be despised; he might be told he was uttering treason; but they should keep the King to his coronation oath. Who could prevent them? General Gage, General Burgoyne, or Sir William Howe? They would do no more against them than they had done in America.

He concluded a wild, incoherent harangue, by moving,—“That the petition of the Scotch Papists be read, that the House come to the resolution of dismissing the same, and of giving no encouragement whatever to the Roman Catholic religion in Scotland.” No seconder being found for this, he cried out, “Oh, Lord Frederick Campbell, for God’s sake assist me; I speak the desire of a million and a half of Protestants.” Some months later, in the debate of November 26th, on the address to his Majesty for the speech from the throne, Lord George again hinted at what was so soon to come.

Will any gentleman answer, that the people shall pay more taxes without a revolt at home? I mention the possibility of a revolt, because our Constitution has borne so much already. When the people shall show an inclination to demand redress, I will accompany them with the greatest pleasure. I am afraid I speak too loud, so as to give an appearance of passion to what I say, but I assure the House that these are my most deliberate sentiments. I advise Lord North to save the country and his own life, to turn from wickedness and mend his ways, for as yet the public clamour for revenge is not raised against him.

Notwithstanding frequent outbursts such as these, which were usually accompanied with his favourite threat, that he had “120,000 able men in Scotland, who would quickly remedy

the state of things," no notice was taken by the Government, who, unfortunately, fell into the blunder of mistaking a malignant enthusiast for a harmless fool, while his fellow-members (a few excepted) endured his oratory with a kind of amused listlessness, and spoke of him contemptuously out of the House, as the comedy of each parliamentary session.

Under such a leadership as that of the dangerous man whom we have been endeavouring to depict, it will be easily imagined that the thousands who swelled the lists of the Association (and who were mostly from the turbulent classes) began to grow impatient of mere speech-making and of the dull occupation of voting resolutions against the Catholic Relief Bill. But to do them justice, not the most violent of them all seemed to despise the employment of constitutional and legitimate means, more thoroughly than their worthy President himself. Indeed, he seems to have lost but little time in giving the profligate wretches who everywhere crowded round him the clearest idea of what sort of work was shortly to be put into their hands. At the very first meeting, held at the Crown and Rolls, Chancery Lane, Lord George read part of the penal laws of Charles and William, and said, "By assenting to the Quebec laws and to the late Act in favour of the Papists, the King was in the position of James II. after his abdication: it is my opinion that his Majesty has broken his coronation oath." On May 5th, 1780, the House of Commons was preparing to rise, when Lord George surprised them by a speech more than usually treasonable:

Scotland, he said, was ripe for insurrection: all the inhabitants, except the Papists, were ready. They had invited him to be their leader, and he had accepted the post, for he preferred death to religious slavery, and would perish with arms in his hands or prevail.

And on May 9th the following advertisement appeared in the public press:—

This is to give notice, that in compliance with a petition addressed to the President of the Protestant Association, the committee has resolved that another general meeting of Protestants be held before the London petition is presented to the House of Commons. All true friends of Great Britain, and of civil and religious liberty, are exhorted to unite in support of the Protestant interest before it shall be too late. Those of London and the environs, who wish the repeal of the late Popish Bill, are desired to sign the Protestant petition, which they may have access to at the President's house in Welbeck Street every day before four o'clock.

GEORGE GORDON, President.

This delay was to give time for the presentation of petitions from other parts of England, from Wales and Scotland, before

the appearance of the monster petition of London. At length, on Tuesday (29th May) at Coachmakers' Hall, Long Acre, was held the last preparatory meeting of the Committee of the Association, at which Lord George Gordon gave utterance to the following unmistakable treason:—

The Popish Relief Bill was carried so rapidly that the people had no time to oppose it, or to make themselves acquainted with the consequences. Indulgence to Papists is inconsistent with the principles of the Revolution, endangers the succession of the House of Hanover, and threatens the country with destruction. I wish so well to the cause that I will go to the gallows in it and for it, but I will not present the petition of a lukewarm people. The only way is to go in a bold manner, and show we are resolved to defend Protestantism with our lives. If you mean to spend your time in idle debate, you had better at once choose another leader. I am ready for all, but I am not a man to do things by halves. There is no danger you go into that I will not share; and remember, the Scotch carried their point by their firmness.

After this plain speaking, a resolution was put that "the whole body of the Protestant Association do attend at St. George's Fields on Friday next, at ten o'clock, to accompany Lord George Gordon to the House of Commons, on the deliverance of the Protestant petition." This being, of course, carried, his Lordship said, "If I am attended by less than 20,000 men, I will not present your petition."

To leave, as it seemed, the Government without the shadow of an excuse for its shameful negligence when on the brink of so much danger, Lord George, the very same evening, gave notice in the House that on the following Friday he should present the Protestant petition, accompanied by the whole body of his Association; in addition to which, all the newspapers of the next morning contained the following notice:—

Protestant Association! Whereas no hall in London can contain 40,000 persons, it has been resolved that we do meet on Friday next, the 2nd, in St. George's Fields, at ten o'clock—that this Association do divide into four sections, namely, London, Westminster, Southwark, and Scotch, the Protestants of the city on the right, the Protestants of Westminster on the left, the borough of Southwark forming the main body, and the Scotch residents in London the rear division—that all do wear blue cockades to distinguish them from the Papists, and also from those who approve the late Act in favour of Popery—that the magistrates of London, Westminster, and Southwark, are requested to overawe any evil-minded persons who may wish to disturb the legal and peaceable deportment of his Majesty's Protestant subjects.

By order of the Association.

GEORGE GORDON, President.



Thus for three entire days was the Government in possession of full intelligence of the dangerous and illegal proceeding that had been resolved upon; yet it did nothing; and this inexplicable and criminal apathy not unnaturally gave rise afterwards to the charge against it of having encouraged this rising, so as to be able to throw odium for the future upon all popular demonstrations. It is related of the French ambassador that when he heard of the resolution of the Association, and that no steps were to be taken to interfere with it, he exclaimed, with a keen knowledge of mankind, "Well, then, in about nine days your London may be reduced to ashes." The ridiculous invitation, at the conclusion of the above notice, calling upon the guardians of the public peace to sanction by their presence the acts of those who were about to break the law, was a master-stroke of the mediocre genius of John Wesley, and excited universal derision. Forty thousand men bent upon violence, and already guilty of seditious language, wanted protection, and looked to the civil power for it! As Milner justly observes: "The managers of the Association foresaw the consequence of assembling together so large a body of people; or rather, intending from the beginning all the mischief that ensued, concerted beforehand the means of throwing the blame of the riots upon those very persons against whom they were directed."

By the hour of ten on the ever-memorable morning of June 2nd, 1780, the open space, known then as St. George's Fields, Southwark, presented the lively appearance of a military parade-ground on a day of national rejoicing. Drums beating, bands playing, banners flying, and forty-five thousand men, all wearing blue cockades and marshalled in their ranks with almost soldierly precision, told the affrighted citizens of London and Westminster that the Protestant Association was ready to carry out the fiercest menace of its furious President. The singing of hymns and psalms, with which their leaders amused the time until the arrival of Lord George, was a shrewd device, that gave an air of religious solemnity to the vast assemblage, and served to stir up their fanatical zeal, impressing upon the common mind the pleasing idea that it was aiding some high cause instead of indulging in vulgar riot.

It was not yet noon when the screeching of the bagpipes and the clamour of many voices proclaimed the near approach of the man who was destined to be the author of more crime and misery than perhaps in his sane moments even he could have contemplated without concern. Lord George came to the gathering of his followers, accompanied by several field

preachers of the Kettledrummy and Poundtext stamp. A short stirring speech, followed by a long extempore prayer of the most extravagant and almost blasphemous character, and then the whole living mass, six abreast, each man wearing the blue cockade of the Association, moved forward on their march to the Houses of Parliament. To prevent confusion, the mob had been marshalled in three divisions, the first of which followed the route by London Bridge, the second crossed the river by Blackfriars, while the third, preceded by the President's coach, passed over the bridge at Westminster. In front marched a man bearing an enormous roll of parchment, containing the signatures to the petition for the repeal of the obnoxious Bill. The day was intensely hot, and as the rioters frequently refreshed themselves with ale and spirits on the way, by the time they reached Palace-yard, most of them were ripe for any amount of drunken frolic and outrage.

It was half-past two in the afternoon when a great shout announced the arrival at their place of destination of the three divisions of the "No-Popery Mob." Obeying the instructions given them beforehand, many of them rushed forward to secure possession of all the avenues from the outer gate up to the very entrance of both Houses, which latter they attempted, but in vain, to force. Others in the meanwhile crowded into Parliament Street to encounter such members as had not been fortunate enough to reach Westminster before the rioters. Each member as he was met was stopped, and compelled to assume the blue cockade, and in many instances required to take an oath to vote for the immediate repeal of the Catholic Relief Bill. But with the exception of Ellis, Burke, and a few others, who had honourably distinguished themselves for years against the malignant spirit of the Nonconformists of that period, no members of the Lower House appear to have been maltreated. It was against the Lords that the leaders of the mob directed their especial vengeance. The Archbishop of York, and Bathurst, president of the Council, were dragged from their carriages and severely hustled; Lord Mansfield's carriage was smashed, and he himself narrowly escaped with his life; the Bishops of Lichfield and Lincoln would have certainly been murdered, had they not contrived to find a refuge in the house of Atkinson, an attorney, where they changed clothes, and, thus disguised, concealed themselves on the leads of the adjoining houses; Lords Townshend and Hillsborough made their appearance in the House covered with mud, their garments in rags, and without their wigs; Lord Stormont's coach was

broken into a thousand pieces, and he himself remained in the hands of the mob for half an hour. The confusion in the House may be imagined, as member after member made his appearance bearing upon his person the marks of the indignities and violence he had received. As the Duke of Richmond rose for the purpose of putting a motion to the House, he was interrupted by Lord Mansfield, who informed the Peers that Lord Boston was that moment in danger of being murdered by the rioters under the very windows of their committee-room. At this intelligence the members rose manfully in a body, and carried by acclamation a proposal of Lord Radnor that they should proceed at once with drawn swords to his rescue. At the moment they were about to make the gallant and desperate attempt, the unfortunate peer made his entrance covered with blood, and his clothes torn from his back.

In the midst of the wildest disorder, with the roaring of the mob without, and in momentary danger, should the doors be forced, of being slaughtered at their posts, the members of both Houses, nevertheless, maintained their presence of mind, and yielded nothing either of their dignity or privilege in the face of brute force. In the Lords, Earl Shelbourne rose in his place to ask what steps had been taken by Government to guard against that of which it had received more than sufficient warning; while in the Commons Dunning censured the ministers for having neglected to commit Lord George Gordon the first night that he threatened them with the cut-throats of the Association, and went so far as to accuse them of engaging the mob to insult and overawe the members of the Opposition. Mr. Rous moved that the assistance of the civil power be called in to the aid of the British Parliament, besieged by the "dregs of the populace and the scum of the Scotch fanatics." When something like order was restored, Lord George Gordon rose, and, in the midst of interruption and hisses, informed the House that "the Kirk had gained a great victory over the Papacy"; that he had with him "a petition signed by 120,000 of his Majesty's Protestant subjects, praying for a repeal of the Act passed last session in favour of the Roman Catholics." He concluded a speech of the usual description, by moving to have the said petition brought in. He found one man, Alderman Bull, who was not ashamed to act as his seconder. Leave was therefore given for the introduction of the monster petition of the Protestant Association, which it had taken careful months of unflagging zeal to swell to its present gigantic proportions. Thus far successful, Lord George next moved "That the House do immediately take this Protestant petition into consideration,"—again seconded

by Alderman Bull,—the question was put to the vote, when there appeared—For the petition, 6; against it, 192.

But it must not be supposed, that during the several hours that were consumed over the excitement occasioned by the arrival of the mob, and over the noisy altercation consequent upon the introduction of Lord George's petition, that the President of the Protestant Association showed himself in the least degree wanting to the disgraceful cause which he upheld, or to the ruffianly thousands to whom he looked for his chief support. With a restless irritation, he was incessantly moving in and out of the House, and from the gallery that looked down into the lobby, acted the part of fogleman to direct the cheers or the groaning of his lawless followers. He also addressed those nearest to him, telling them what members were speaking, and whether they were favourable or opposed to their wishes. On one of these occasions he said :—

The Speaker of the House has just declared that you are here under the pretence of religion, but you are a good people and have a good cause. Mr. Rous has just moved that the civil power be sent for; but don't you mind, keep yourselves cool and be steady.

A gentleman coming up and endeavouring to dissuade him from continuing his discourse, Lord George called out in a loud voice to the mob: "This is Sir Michael le Fleming, and he has just spoken for you like an angel; but as for Mr. Burke, I am sorry for him." After which he began to caress Sir Michael in a childish manner. The Rev. Thomas Browne, Chaplain to the House of Commons, venturing to rebuke the mob, and to warn Lord George that he would have to answer for all the consequences of that day's excitement, the latter exclaimed: "Now, this is the clergyman of the House of Commons—I insist that you ask him what is his opinion of the Popish Bill." Upon which the mob roared out, "To h— with the parson, no Popery for ever." Lord George then retired, but shortly afterwards re-appeared, flushed and excited, and addressing the rioters, said :—

You have been called a mob, and peace officers have been sent for to disperse you; some have mentioned calling out the military, but I hope nobody will think of taking that step, as it would infallibly tend to create division. The Scotch had no redress till they pulled down the Mass houses. The alarm has gone forth for miles; but you have a good prince, and no doubt his Majesty will send down word to his ministers privately, to repeal the Act when he hears what his subjects wish.

Several of the mob cried out, "Do you wish us to go, Geordie?" To which he replied :—

You are the best judges of what you ought to do; but I will tell you how

the matter stands. The House is going to divide upon the question whether your petition shall be taken into consideration to-day or on Tuesday next. There are for taking it now only myself and six others ; but if it is not heard at present, it may be lost, for to-morrow the House does not meet, Monday will be the King's birthday, and on Tuesday the Parliament may be dissolved ; so I leave it to you whether you should go away. You may stay or do as you please, but in Scotland they did not mince matters. Would you not wish to be in the same state as they are in Scotland ? or would you have your petition considered now ? We are very much opposed ; but I do not like delays—a repeal, a repeal, no Popery.

He was going on in this dangerous strain, when three gentlemen, coming out into the lobby gallery, thrust themselves between him and his audience. They were Colonel Gordon and Generals Grant and Conway. Colonel Gordon, addressing his relative, said : “ My Lord, do you intend to bring your rascally adherents into the House of Commons ? if you do, the first man of them that enters, I will plunge my sword, not into his, but into your body, my Lord.” General Grant besought him, for “ God's sake, not to lead those wretched people into danger.” The poor enthusiast turned from them without deigning an answer, crying out at the same moment to the mob : “ You see, in this effort to persuade me from my duty, an instance of the difficulties I have to encounter from such wise men of the world as my friends here at my side ; but I tell you and them, that the King has broke his coronation oath.” This was too much for the loyalty of Conway, who, seizing him by the arm, exclaimed : “ Were you not insane, I would deal with you as a traitor.” Then, facing the crowd, which began to show signs of impatience and uneasiness, he coolly delivered himself of these few soldierly words :—“ I am General Conway, of whom you have heard—a military man, who deems it his duty to protect this House with his sword. We are all armed, and are not to be intimidated nor overpowered by a rabble. There is only one entry, and that is narrow ; men of honour defend this pass, and many lives will be lost in the attempt to force it.” Thus speaking, and menacing the crowd with his hand, the General withdrew, followed by his friends, who took care that Gordon should accompany them. Their return into the House was the signal for renewed uproar. “ So disgraceful a day,” said Burke, “ was never before beheld by a British Parliament.” The rioters hold possession of the lobby of this House, and we, the representatives of the nation, are prisoners in the hands of a vile faction.” “ I wish to know,” said Ellis, “ from Lord George Gordon himself, whether it is his wish to bring these men, whose wild outcries now strike our ears, within the walls

of this House?" Upon which, Colonel Holroyd, addressing Lord George, said: "My Lord, at first I thought you were only mad, and was going to move that you might be sent to Bedlam; now, I see there is much more malice than madness in this business, and declare that, if you attempt to go out once more and address that mob, I will instantly move that you be committed to the Tower." The audacity of the conspirator quailed before this display of honest valour, and the leader of fanaticism and riot, the chosen champion of physical force, shrank back into his seat, overawed by the higher moral power of Right.

Meanwhile, without the House the aspect of affairs was every movement becoming more threatening. The justices and the constables, who had been sent for at an early hour, had seen at a glance how utterly impossible it would be for them to attempt to cope with numbers so immensely superior to their own. They had therefore contented themselves with remaining drawn up near at hand, and occasionally rendering assistance to Sir Henry Molyneux and the doorkeepers under him in the difficult task of guarding the entrance to the House of Lords. In this they had hitherto been hardly interrupted, the chief body of the mob finding sufficient occupation in listening to their President and observing his movements. When, however, Lord George disappeared, and in the custody, too, of the men who had bearded and defied them, it seemed to strike the crowd that, triumphant and insolent as it had shown itself to be, it had nevertheless been surprised into an ignominious defeat. As this became more and more apparent, when, having waited a considerable time, Lord George did not again show himself in the gallery of the House, the mob raising a shout, or rather a roar of indignation and disappointment, pressed on towards the lobby, with the evident intention of trying their strength against its defenders. Fortunately for the few brave men, who, stationed there, were risking their lives in the cause of order, there came up at this moment a strong party of horse and foot guards, with Justice Addington at their head. At sight of this, the first really formidable opposition that had presented itself to their violence during the whole day, the rioters halted, and the magistrate, taking advantage of their hesitation, addressed them in a few earnest words, imploring them to disperse, adding, however, with a most unpardonable want of firmness, that if they would do so, he was ready at once to dismiss the troops. Nothing, of course, was farther from the intention of the many inferior leaders of the rioters than to suffer the latter to return to their ordinary course of life, without taking a signal vengeance

upon that hated class against whom they had plotted so long, and, as it now appeared, so unsuccessfully. But this was a scheme not to be arranged in a moment, and, therefore, after a short deliberation, in which (as it was afterwards proved) centres of meeting were fixed, and some half-dozen obnoxious persons were marked out to be remembered when the time came, the order was given, and the mob, after three cheers for Lord George and the Protestant Association, began slowly to disperse.

In the meantime the House of Commons had voted its adjournment until Tuesday, the 6th of June, and the exit being free, the members took their departure, pondering upon the events of the day, not without misgivings for the future. At dusk the guards were ordered home—the streets in the neighbourhood of Palace-yard were gradually deserted—here and there a few citizens remained, discussing the threatening events of the day, and congratulating each other on their peaceful conclusion.

But what the real conclusion was, we hope to be able to relate in a future article.

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#### ART. V.—THE CHURCH AND MODERN MEN OF SCIENCE.

*Histoire des Sciences et des Savants depuis deux Siècles.* Par ALPHONSE DE CANDOLLE. Geneva, 1873.

**T**HIS is a remarkable book. The scientific eminence of its author would demand respectful consideration for any statements as to facts put forward by him, as also that his inferences from such facts should not be put lightly on one side. In the present instance, however, M. de Candolle has collected so large a mass of data, has taken such evident pains to be just and impartial, and has advocated his views with so much temperateness and moderation, that he has earned a special right to a patient and attentive hearing. In spite, however, of his manifest desire to be impartial, it is, we think, no less manifest that he is actuated by an unconscious, though very natural, bias in favour of Switzerland and of Geneva. The work will be primarily welcome to lovers of physical science. It will be so because more than half of it is taken

up in investigating the conditions (geographical, historical, social, political, and religious) which favour or retard the march of scientific discovery. Most cultivated minds will, moreover, feel an interest in its contents, since more than a hundred pages are devoted to what the author deems the probable future of the human race, while shorter chapters are devoted to the somewhat divergent topics of language, disease, the supernatural, free-will, and vitality.

From Catholics, however, the book demands particular attention, as the author again and again addresses himself to the question respecting the influence of the Church, and especially of its discipline, on the progress of scientific discovery and, by implication, on the general process of social and political evolution.

In order to investigate the conditions favourable to scientific discovery, M. de Candolle has recourse to the awards of the great scientific societies of Paris, London, and Berlin respectively. Thus he avoids that temptation to partiality towards his own special pursuit, to which a scientific writer must in such an inquiry be evidently exposed. He gives a list of the ninety foreign associates of the Academy of Sciences at Paris from 1666 to 1870. He also gives lists of the foreign members of the same academy, of the Royal Society of London, and of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin, at four different periods; namely, at 1750, 1789, 1829, and 1869. Then taking all these names together, he analyzes them according to their nationalities, and according to the proportion borne by the numbers of elected scientific men of different nations to the amount of the population in their respective nations. He also then examines the scientific rank of the different countries at the respective periods of 1750, 1789, 1829, and 1869. Finally, he passes in review the various nations, to examine how they are circumstanced with regard to eighteen conditions, which he sets down as favourable to the progress of physical science.

It may be well here to consider first such of the results arrived at, as will have especial interest for us Catholics.

M. de Candolle shows very conclusively that the physical, and especially the biological sciences, have been promoted by eminent discoverers, the far greater number of whom were not even nominally Catholics.

This fact he makes evident by comparing the number of Catholic and non-Catholic foreign associates of the French Academy and foreign members of the Royal Society of London, and especially by comparing the Catholic and Protestant populations of Switzerland. The Swiss Catholics are to



the Protestants as 50 to 150 ; and yet, while thirteen Swiss Protestants have been chosen members of the French Academy, not one Swiss Catholic has ever been so chosen.

He also points out the remarkable number of men of science (such as Linné, Hartsoker, Euler, Jenner, Wollaston, Olbers, Blumenbach, Robert Brown, Berzelius, Encke, Mitscherlich, Agassiz, &c.), who were the sons of Protestant ministers, and finally calls attention to the number of distinguished naturalists who were the descendants of Protestant exiles or of voluntary emigrants from France, Belgium, Italy, and Austria; such as the Bernouillis, Trembley, de Saussure, Bonnet, de Candolle, Cuvier, Herschel, &c. &c.

We have not the least disposition to dispute our author's facts, which are advanced with moderation and fairness, if with a certain complacency, which is excusable enough in him. We, however, altogether demur to certain of his inferences from them, and utterly deny that the influence of Catholicism is prejudicial to the intellectual and physical, any more than to the moral well-being of any nation. We equally deny the inference that Protestantism has anything in it more favourable to scientific research and discovery than has Catholicism.

Indeed, M. de Candolle himself says: "J'attribue fort peu cette différence aux dogmes"; and he says so with reason as regards any positive effect of Protestant belief, since Protestantism has no dogma, and makes no affirmation whatever that Catholicism does not make also.

How little Protestantism, in so far as it remains positive, has to do with scientific culture is shown us (p. 127) by M. de Candolle with respect to his own city. He says of Geneva:

Pendant près de deux siècles (1535 à 1725), les principes absolus des premiers réformateurs ont régné complètement chez les laïques et les ecclésiastiques . . . pendant toute cette période aucun Genevois ne s'est distingué dans les sciences. De 1720 à 1730 le principe Calviniste d'autorité vint à faiblir; l'éducation et les mœurs changèrent dans un sens libéral, et depuis 1739 . . . Genève n'a cessé de produire des mathématiciens, des physiciens et des naturalistes, dans une proportion remarquable pour sa faible population.

Nevertheless, we fully admit that where Protestantism prevails, physical science *is* more favourably circumstanced than in places thoroughly Catholic. And we also admit that this will generally be so, as the result of differences in both religious teaching and discipline, and notably through the marriage or celibacy of the clergy.

With these anticipations and admissions, M. de Candolle's facts seem to fully accord. It may be well then that we should

look them fairly in the face, and see if they demand any apology on our part, and whether they should be a matter of either surprise or regret; whether, in fact, we should wish to have them otherwise if we could. We are far from thinking that we should wish them otherwise, for we are convinced that the advantage which, in this respect, Protestant countries enjoy is simply due to the gradual decay of religious knowledge and decline of religious zeal, which necessarily accompany the introduction and progress of Lutheran or Calvinistic heresies.

As we have seen to be the case in Geneva, and also elsewhere, the gradual abandonment of what was at first retained as positive belief in Protestantism has gone hand in hand with the progress of physical science in Protestant countries; and we are convinced that, abstractedly considered, absolute Antitheism and Atheism are still more favourable than Protestantism to physical science, inasmuch as they still more effectively hinder the mind from directing its attention to other considerations than the sequences and coexistences of sensible phenomena.

M. de Candolle somewhat absurdly puts down, in his lists of savants, all non-Catholics, such e.g. as Humboldt, Franklin, and Priestley, &c., as *Protestants*; thus giving to Protestantism a fictitious importance. Could the truth be easily arrived at in such matters, we believe the lists would justify our assertion of the greater scientific influence of opinions still less dogmatic than those of Protestants. Much as we regret it, we cannot but fear there would be little difficulty in making a far longer list of non-Catholic physicists who share the theological views of, e.g. Professor Huxley, than of non-Catholic physicists who share the religious opinions of e.g. the late Professor Faraday.

Yet, in spite of the advantages of Antitheism over Protestantism abstractedly considered, we should none the less be prepared to expect *à priori* that a community in which Antitheism was universally professed would be less favourable to physical discovery than one in which Protestantism was professed; and this for two reasons. First, because (the restraints of fundamental religious belief being removed) its morality would be lower, and the action of the passions less restrained. Secondly, because the comparatively feeble aliment supplied to the religious instinct by Protestantism is enough to favour and promote a pious contemplation of nature, while it is insufficient of itself to fill and satisfy the mind and so act as a successful rival in interest to merely natural knowledge. Yet a moral Antitheism which should not forbid a senti-

mentally pietistic contemplation of the universe, might be the very best possible nidus wherein to develop an enthusiastic and passionate pursuit of physical science purely and simply for its own sake, which is the kind of pursuit most likely to result in discoveries calculated to make their authors for ever famous, and is that sort of pursuit which M. de Candolle advocates.

But no Catholic—no rational being whatever, who having once realized what theism means accepts it; i.e. no true theist—CAN follow physical science, or any other pursuit (whether health, wealth, or what not), purely and simply for its own sake! To any one who has once understood and accepted the religious idea, that idea must be dominant, and everything else held in subordination and subservience to it.

Protestantism does in words present to the mind the same fundamental truths as Catholicism does; but the difference with which the latter, as compared with the former, brings those truths home and makes its children practically realize them, is simply infinite.

It is then the very fulness of religious life, the very exuberance of the wealth the Church throws open to Christians, the profuseness with which it presents for their acceptance measures of religious mental food, pressed down and running over, which tend to divert the intellectual and voluntary activity of Catholics from mere considerations of terrestrial or cosmical phenomena to matters which all must concede to be infinitely higher, nobler, and more important, if once they realize God and their own souls as actual and immortal realities.

In connexion with the foregoing considerations may be noticed the facts which M. de Candolle adduces respecting the decrease in the number of the Catholic clergy who from time to time have attained to eminence in the domain of physical science. Down to the end of the eighteenth century the number was considerable; at the present day the Rev. Father Secchi stands almost alone. This decrease our author proposes to account for either by the increasing speciality of the several sciences, each demanding a constantly increasing concentration of mind as a condition of eminence, or by the changed material condition of Catholic clergy since the great French revolution; none being now left with considerable revenues but without cure of souls, as was the case with so many of the illustrious Abbés under the *ancien régime*.

There is, however, yet another consideration. The existence at the same time of many priests eminent in physical science may denote one of the three things. (1.) It may either denote an

overflowing and superabundant amount of zeal and devotion, prompting clerics to works of supererogation, as in the case of the eminent members of the Society of Jesus, and of some others; or (2.), it may denote a superabundant clergy with the presence of a natural taste for physical science which there was no need to curb or limit; or, (3.) finally, it may denote a lowering of the religious level and the access of a secular spirit, conditions which cannot be denied to have been but too prevalent during the pre-revolutionary period, and more or less throughout the whole eighteenth century. Catholics have shown in the past, and show to-day (by such examples as Leverrier, Van Beneden, Sullivan, Secchi, and many others), that the practice of their religion is quite compatible with eminence in physical science. No more than this is to be desired. To place a proficiency in physical science as amongst the things most desirable for Catholics generally, would be equivalent to a denial, not only of revelation, but even of natural religion.

The prejudiced spirit which a devotion to physical science is apt to generate, is exemplified by the expressions employed by M. de Candolle himself, who gives as one of the causes favourable to scientific discovery, the presence of a public "*curieux de choses vraies ou réelles, plutôt que de choses imaginaires ou fictives,*" the former class being composed of sensible phenomena, and the latter including matters of religion. He also\* deliberately rejects the use of the word "nature" and its derivatives, and consequently of "the supernatural" and its derivatives.

That the sons of Protestant ministers should contribute largely to scientific discovery also harmonizes well with the view here maintained. In many of these families we might expect to find just that order and regularity of life, that sobriety of morals, that absence of positive religion, but presence of more or less religious sentiment, which offer the combination most suitable for the formation or development of character best adapted for eminence in a career of physical science.

That part of the discipline of the Church which M. de Candolle joins with Mr. Francis Galton† in stigmatizing, is the celibacy of the clergy. Their objection to this regulation is the withdrawal of so many of the best-disposed minds of each generation from all direct share in the propagation of each succeeding one. Who can estimate, they

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\* *Op. cit.*, p. 436.

† See his work on Hereditary Genius.

exclaim in common, the deteriorating effect on the population of Europe, of this wide-spread abstinence—this abandonment to the less virtuous part of the community of the task, of its continuation, with consequent transmission of lower and more degraded characters and inclinations, to the exclusion of the higher and nobler ones? It cannot be denied that there is a certain amount of truth in this objection; but its quantity seems to us to be strangely exaggerated by these writers, while other considerations we think show that clerical celibacy has effects so beneficial as to far more than merely compensate for those of its consequences which, abstractedly considered, have an unfavourable tendency on social and political development. The view of these writers seems exaggerated on two accounts. First, because the effects of inheritance itself appear to be over-estimated by them; and secondly, because by “dispositions morales,” M. de Candolle seems\* to mean rather amiable and kindly feelings, than any conscious direction of the will towards duty as such.

The last-named writer indeed differs from Mr. Galton, and attributes a much greater effect to education and early association than he does, and M. de Candolle’s observations extend over a far greater number of instances. He says : †

M. Galton a étudié, d’après les dictionnaires biographiques, 65 des principaux savants depuis Aristote jusqu’à nos jours. Il a constaté lesquels avaient eu des pères, frères, fils ou autres parents rapprochés, plus ou moins célèbres. Je ne doute en aucune manière de l’impartialité du choix mais en bornant mes observations à l’espace de deux siècles sur lesquels abondent les informations, en m’appuyant sur quelques centaines de noms au lieu de 65, et surtout en employant les listes de membres étrangers formées lentement et scrupuleusement par les trois corps scientifiques les plus compétents qu’on puisse trouver, j’ai évidemment une base plus large et plus solide que celle de M. Galton.

As to the result at which he arrives, he says : ‡

De ces faits et des renseignements biographiques à moi connus dont je parlerai tout à l’heure, je conclus dans un sens *plutôt contraire* à l’action de l’hérédité proprement dite. Elle me paraît avoir eu peu d’effet, excepté dans les sciences mathématiques. Ce seraient les *influences d’éducation, d’exemple, de conseils dérivés, &c.*, qui auraient été prépondérantes.

Our author departs altogether from the belief that scientific acquirements and special scientific aptitudes are transmissible. He brings forward against this belief his facts as to the excessive proportion of distinguished men of physical science, who were the sons of Protestant ministers.

\* *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

† p. 94.

‡ p. 101.

As to this he remarks : \*

Si la capacité pour les sciences était une affaire d'hérédité, il y aurait bien plus de fils de médecins, pharmaciens, &c. sur nos listes, que de fils de pasteurs. . . . Les études que les hommes de l'art médical ont faites, les travaux auxquels ils doivent se livrer habituellement par leur profession, sont bien plus dans la sphère des sciences que les études et les travaux d'un pasteur.

Secondly, he adduces against this belief the fact that the numbers of distinguished savants who have had similarly distinguished sons is vastly greater in Switzerland than elsewhere. As heredity cannot but be the same everywhere, the explanation of this fact must be sought in some other cause, and M. de Candolle finds it in the altogether exceptional manner in which education and family life are conjoined in Switzerland.

Thirdly, he advances against this belief the fact that so many eminent men nearly related have been eminent in diverse branches ; so that these special faculties and aptitudes must have been acquired, and not inherited.

Je citerai sans avoir à faire la moindre recherche : les deux Humboldt, Œrsted et son frère, jurisconsulte et ministre d'état en Danemark ; Hugo de Mohl, botaniste, frère de Jules de Mohl, orientaliste, de Robert de Mohl, jurisconsulte, et de Maurice de Mohl, économiste et conseiller des finances ; Tiedemann, fils d'un philosophe célèbre ; Madame Necker, auteur de l'Education Progressive, fille de géologue de Saussure ; Ampère, érudit et littérateur, fils de physicien, etc. Dans l'hypothèse d'une hérédité fréquente de dispositions propres à chaque science, ces exemples seraient extraordinaires. †

M. de Candolle of course does not deny any more than we do, a certain tendency to inheritance ; and in the scientific order he finds it just as we should à priori expect it, namely, in powers of calculation, resulting in effects which, as we know, may be produced by a machine. It is true also that our author thinks that the action of inheritance is more perceptible in what he calls "faits moraux," than in "faits intellectuels."

To this we may reply : (1.) First, that his opinion as to the greater force of heredity in "faits moraux" is based only on his personal experience, which he himself remarks is "sans doute peu de chose." (2.) Secondly, that (as we said before) his "moral facts" refer mainly to amiable feelings. But real morality is a matter of intellect and will, rather than feeling.

\* *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

† p. 112.

Moreover, even if it were true that our feelings and sentiments were specially heritable (of which he gives us no proof whatever), the progress of mankind would be much better served by a less quantity of amiable feeling and a greater quantity of well-instructed moral perception and vigorous will, than by a greater amount of amiable feeling, accompanied by a religiously ill-instructed intellect, directed by a weakened if not perverted will.

We feel greatly indebted to M. de Candolle for his proofs as to the supreme effects on the character of education, counsel, and example. With such proofs in our hands, the superabundantly beneficial effects of clerical celibacy must be patent to all Catholics, though of course more or less hidden from the eyes of those who, like M. de Candolle, are, by their unhappy position, personally unacquainted with the internal life of Catholicism and its effects on the individual heart and will. To Catholics, the suggestion that S. Francis of Assisium, S. Ignatius, S. Vincent of Paul, S. Francis of Sales, or in our own day, the Curé of Ars, would have had a more beneficial effect on the world's morality by becoming fathers of families than by leading the lives they did, is simply ludicrous.

We conclude, then, that in spite of all the admissions and concessions we have made, we could not wish the facts to be other than they are, and that the subordination amongst Catholics of physical science to other studies or contemplations is a matter far from demanding either apology or regret.

Nevertheless we do not deny that the conduct of Catholics would be more perfect if they were to *add* to their interest in things supernatural a greater regard for the beauties and wonders of God's natural creation. Moreover, considering the nature of many of the controversies of the day, we are convinced that a more deliberate and careful cultivation of physical science by English Catholic laymen of wealth and leisure is a matter greatly to be desired.

If, however, we concede that a gradual religious atrophy has favoured the absolute devotion of many minds to physical science, we do not for a moment allow that it has been favourable to the cultivation and development of philosophy. It is indeed remarkable, that those very countries of Europe which have lagged behind in physical science have possessed an exceptional degree of philosophical culture.\* Not to mention writers of the epoch of Suarez, we find amongst moderns

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\* Amongst the hopeful signs of the future for the United States, is a tendency to appreciate and cultivate philosophy,—a tendency which far more than compensates for any slight inferiority as to physical science.

a Sanseverino, a Liberatore, a Balmes, and a Kleutgen. It is true that the names widely known and appreciated as philosophers are those of North Europeans, such as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, &c. But we are confident that this fact is due partly to that decay of philosophy which accompanied the rise of physical science, partly to the establishment, wherever heresy or infidelity prevailed, of an inveterate prejudice against the traditional Catholic philosophy; which philosophy has indeed been, for a time, widely abandoned but most certainly has never been refuted.

M. de Candolle, it is true, asserts for the moral sciences a substantially similar distribution to that of the physical sciences. But, in the first place, he includes amongst these moral sciences, History, Political Economy, and even Statistics; and, secondly, he derives his estimate from the awards of the French Academy of Moral and Political Science, which from our point of view, is not only an incompetent body, but one almost certain to be hostile to and prejudiced against cultivators of the traditional philosophy. Moreover, physical science itself must ultimately rest upon a philosophical basis, and the importance of the work of those teachers who cherished through evil times the true philosophy, will one day be generally recognized, and it will then be manifest who are those that have most powerfully contributed to the progress of humanity.

M. de Candolle throws light on many social questions of more or less importance. Thus the hitherto favourable effect of aristocracy on the progress of science is brought out remarkably. Of the 90 foreign associates of the French Academy, 41 per cent. were of noble family, while 52 per cent. belonged to the middle class, and only 7 per cent. to the class of artisans and labourers.

The scientific men of France have sprung in much larger proportion from the lowest social class; the three classes of those elected by the Societies of London and Berlin being 35, 42, and 23 per cent. respectively. Nevertheless, even here the disproportion is enormous, considering how small a portion of the total population the upper classes constitute.

Our author, however, recognizes some good effects for science in democracy (however politically disastrous), and amongst them he places its tendency to divert the higher class of minds from political activity to the profit of higher culture. He says:—

Pour moi, qui en ai profité d'une manière très-positive, il me serait impossible de ne pas être reconnaissant envers la démocratie absolue de mon pays. Si je laisse une faible trace dans la science, je le dois certainement au loisir que deux révolutions et certains procédés administratifs m'ont imposé,



à l'âge où la maturité d'esprit se trouve le mieux combinée avec la force intellectuelle. . . . En général, quelle que soit la forme ou la tendance d'un gouvernement, les hommes qui cultivent la science pour elle-même doivent s'estimer plutôt heureux s'ils sont en défaveur dans la région gouvernementale.

It is also interesting to note that the smallness of a state is, according to M. de Candolle's tables, a condition favourable to its scientific eminence. He brings forward as evidence, the Swiss cantons and Denmark; and general prosperity and cultivation seem especially to belong to small communities, as the Italian republics, the German free cities, and the ancient states of Greece. If pre-eminent intellectual and physical splendour shines forth at some centre of a wide area, as Paris, it seems so to shine at the expense of that wide area of which it is the centre. The provincial cities of France have little to boast of in comparison with the various chief towns of Germany and Italy.

M. de Candolle asserts that the process of the world's political evolution takes place by successive alternate processes of centripetal integration and centrifugal disintegration.

Une fois la nation parvenue à une complète uniformité, sans institutions locales autres que celles qu'on veut bien laisser ou donner, sans aristocratie indépendante et responsable, sans diversité réelle de mœurs et d'opinions d'une province à l'autre, on voit commencer une phase particulière qui conduit, par une voie lente, à de nouvelles constitutions de peuples.

Chaque individu, dans un vaste pays uniformisé, compte pour si peu parmi les millions d'unités humaines, et les minorités y sont tellement impuissantes, qu'on prend l'habitude de courber la tête. On ne porte plus au pays qu'un intérêt vague et théorique. Chacun ne pense qu'à soi et sa famille. . . . Dans un système républicain, c'est le triomphe des ambitieux, des intrigants. . . . Ordinairement cet état de choses conduit très-vite à un pouvoir monarchique absolu, mais dans l'un et l'autre cas, ce n'est plus que la force brutale d'une insurrection ou d'une révolution de palais qui peut donner au malheureux public la satisfaction de changer de maîtres. . . . Alors commence le travail de dislocation. La grande association uniformisée n'a plus de force contre des ennemis intérieurs ou extérieurs. Personne n'a de motif ni de pouvoir suffisant pour résister. Les chefs se divisent, les provinces se revoltent, les étrangers envahissent, et après des événements, qui peuvent être lents comme la chute de l'empire romain, ou rapides comme le fractionnement des possessions espagnoles en Amérique, de nouvelles nations se trouvent formées qui décriront à leur tour leur ellipse.

These considerations possess a peculiar interest at this epoch, when it seems possible that we may be about to witness a widespread process of political dismemberment.

Should it take place, it will not be physical science alone that will be the ultimate gainer, however much evil may incidentally and for a time accompany the phenomena of political disintegration.

The process of European centralization has gone on continually increasing since the disruption of the empire of Charlemagne. The constitution of the Prussian-German Empire is its last expression, and the previous centralization effected in the Swiss Confederation and unification of Italy seemed to indicate that there was little enough hope of our again seeing small, active and thriving autonomous political communities.

But all the while beneath the surface a contrary and centrifugal movement seems to have been preparing. It has found manifest expression in the kingdom of Hungary, while the cause of home-rule in Ireland (reinforced perhaps by the recent attempt to establish a maimed and secular Irish University) seems to be rapidly gaining a wider and wider acceptance.

But the most startling revelation of the transformation which had been silently effected took place in Paris in 1871; and, in spite of repression, it is a question whether the passion for democratic decentralization is fast becoming more and more spread amongst the French population.

Now also Spain, a country which, were its conservative forces stronger, would be especially well fitted for local autonomy and federation, is rapidly marching in the same direction. The revolutionary kingdom of Italy, apart even from the consequences of its spoliation of Christ's Vicar, shows many indications of collapse and subdivision into a republican federation which may in part (*e.g.*, Venice, Genoa, Pisa) repose on a really traditional basis.

The Austrian empire cannot be confidently affirmed to grow in cohesion; and although Hungary, having gained its own ends, has aided the Germans to deny a similar benefit to the Czechs, a still further disintegration is predicted by many who foresee it with regret.

Lastly, the new German Empire, which has had in its favour so strong a national sentiment, is itself actually destroying that sentiment through its brutal disregard of the rights of conscience, and of the first elements of freedom.

It is by no means impossible then, that the often talked of "United States of Europe" will one day be realized; and hateful as may be the processes by which that realization will probably be effected, the result may be less detestable than the consolidation of monarchies like that of Prussia.

In a multitude of small autonomous republics, when order has once succeeded in subduing the disorder of revolutionary passions, it is easy to foresee certain advantages, however numerous and great may be the accompanying disadvantages.

In the first place, as M. de Candolle tells us, physical science will be placed under the most favourable conditions, and the same may be said for literary and general culture. Secondly, each government will be well acquainted with the needs and conditions of its own population; thirdly, we may hope for the natural evolution of an aristocracy in which once more social distinction may be generally accompanied by functional activity; and lastly, the demoralizing effect of vast capitals, such as Paris (demoralizing two hemispheres at once) will be greatly attenuated by their lessened power of attracting to them individuals removed from the salutary effects of home influences, and of a local public opinion.

But if the general neglect by monarchs of their first and supreme duty, the protection and advancement of God's Church, is to be chastised by their general deposition—if the elimination from the political arena of the kingly office is to be the just retribution for conduct the prodigious folly of which is yet more amazing than its deep culpability—then a noteworthy consequence follows, and a remarkable contrast presents itself.

There is one king whose kingdom is not of this world, though supreme over it, and one sovereign whose "temporal power" not only remains intact, but seems even to be augmented by the destruction of his "civil principedom." There is a supreme ruler and infallible judge of both kings and peoples, who is at the same time the servant of the servants of God.

Should the civilized world become split up into small and diversely aggregated atoms in the way above suggested as possible, how magnificent will then be the contrast between Christ's kingdom, spread over the whole globe, and any mere earthly state! His Vicar will rule throughout all lands as the one only widespread power—a power as unbounded by geographical limits as uncontrollable by physical force—a power ruling without appeal the highest questions of interest to man—at once the greatest, as the last of monarchies.

Leaving, however, for the present these loftier matters, and returning to the consideration of the work before us, it is with extreme pleasure that we find M. de Candolle, combating against the late Mr. Buckle's views as to the relation of statistics to the freedom of the will. Although, to refute Mr. Buckle at the present day is a task which may be de-

scribed as a slaying of the slain, it is none the less a consolation to find that his views have one vigorous opponent the more in the ranks of physical science. In his contention, however, we must say that our author's criticism by no means equals the copious, vigorous, and effective attack made on Mr. Buckle by an English Catholic fifteen years ago.\*

M. de Candolle's definition of civilization is as follows: †—  
1. The non-employment of force, save for legitimate defence, or the repression of illegitimate violence; 2. a great division of labour; 3. individual liberty of opinion and action, upon the condition of not injuring others.

This definition strikes us as at once redundant and incomplete. It seems redundant in that abstinence from the injury of others includes the non-employment of illegitimate force. It seems incomplete in that it is so simply negative. In a really civilized community there should surely be recognized the positive duty of aiding those who have just claims on our assistance, and in many cases of postponing or declining legitimate gratifications, if thereby we may largely promote the permanent welfare of others. We would venture to suggest, as a shorter and yet more complete definition of civilization, "a state of society in which there is a widespread tendency to carry out Christian principles into all the smaller relations of life."

In his essay on "The Advantage to Science of a Dominant Language," ‡ M. de Candolle recognizes the great benefit of a common scientific tongue; but he is, we think, a little unjust to Latin. The facility with which it was employed in the middle ages to accurately express all the niceties of the controversies of that period, and the easy construction of sentences adopted, shows, we believe, that it could have been equally accommodated to the exigencies of modern science had its employment remained as general as before the destructive movement of the sixteenth century.

One prophecy of M. de Candolle, very interesting to Englishmen and Americans, concerns the rapid future increase of our own tongue. From the present rate of multiplication of the different populations, he estimates that in a century the three principal languages will have increased in the following proportions:

English will have increased from	77	to	860	millions.
German	„	„	62	to 124 „
French	„	„	40½	to 69½ „

\* See "Rambler," New Series, vol. x., 1858, pp. 27 and 88.

† p. 366.

‡ p. 292.

In the present aspect of political affairs on the continent, and especially considering the different conceptions of religious freedom common in Germany and Switzerland on the one hand, and in England and the United States on the other, the future predominance of English language and literature—and consequently of English political and social conceptions—is a matter of serious congratulation. Indeed it appears to be a most providential circumstance that English classical literature should be destined one day to become the classical literature of the world.

As to the predominance of good over evil in the literature of England when compared with that of other countries, we may quote Dr. Newman. He says :\* “ I would not say a word to extenuate the calamity, under which we lie, of having a literature formed in Protestantism ; still, other literatures have disadvantages of their own ; and, though in such matters comparisons are impossible, I doubt whether we should be better pleased if our English classics were tainted with licentiousness, or defaced by infidelity or scepticism. I conceive we should not much mend matters if we were to exchange literature with the French, Italians, or Germans. . . . As to France, who is there that holds a place among its writers so historical and important ? who is so copious and versatile, so brilliant as that Voltaire, who is an open scoffer at everything sacred, venerable, or highminded ? Nor can Rousseau . . . be excluded from the classical writers of France.” He adds grave and valid objections to Pascal, Descartes, Rabelais, La Fontaine, and Montaigne, citing Hallam’s assertion that Montaigne had “ led the way to the indecency too characteristic of French literature.”

As to Italy he animadverts upon Ariosto, Pulci, Boccaccio, Macchiavel, and Giannone.

Dr. Newman continues : † “ Not only are things not better abroad, but they might be worse at home. We have, it is true, a Protestant literature ; but then it is neither atheistical nor immoral ; and, in the case of at least half a dozen of its highest and most influential departments, and of the most popular of its authors, it comes to us with very considerable alleviations. For instance, there surely is a call on us for thankfulness, that the most illustrious amongst English writers has so little of a Protestant about him, that Catholics have been able, without extravagance, to claim him as their own, and that enemies to our creed have allowed that he is only not a Catholic because,

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\* “ Lectures on University Subjects.” p. 93.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

and as far as, his times forbade it. . . . A rival to Shakespeare, if not in genius, at least in copiousness and variety, is found in Pope; and he was actually a Catholic, though personally an unsatisfactory one. . . . . Again, the special title of moralist in English literature is accorded by the public voice to Johnson, whose bias towards Catholicity is well known."

But who can tell the importance in the future of the additions to English literature made by the author himself who has been just quoted. No other living writer has, in spite of sectarian jealousy, taken so profound a hold on the existing generation of Englishmen. The name of Dr. Newman is a household word far and wide in England, and the works of no other contemporary author have a fairer promise of future life and a permanent place in the treasury of English classics.

M. de Candolle is an ardent disciple of Mr. Darwin, and he delights in illustrating "natural selection" from the most varied sources. One application which he makes of the doctrine is curious. In an article on "Alternation of Diseases"\* he offers an explanation of the alleged decreasing efficacy of vaccination by the cessation through its agency of a certain process of natural selection.

During the earlier and virulent period of the disease those persons naturally most apt to take the poison would be rapidly killed off; but the effect of vaccination being to check by degrees this destructive process, a large number would again come to be born who happened to possess that peculiarly dangerous constitution, now less exposed to speedy elimination. Whether or not there is any truth in this notion, it is at least ingenious.

In spite, however, of our author's zeal for "natural selection," many of the facts he adduces, as to the past history of man, are so confusing and contradictory that they would be fatal to that hypothesis, were it not so elastic and Protean that its advocates find no difficulty in making whatever facts are presented to their notice, harmonize with it.

If we show that the history of mankind has been a history of progress, they will reply that "natural selection" eminently accords with progress. If we say that there has been no essential advance since the ancient Egyptians and Chinese, they will say that the action of natural selection is as compatible with a stationary condition as with change. If we could establish that since any given remote period social changes had been continually for the worse, and that thus the history of mankind has been a history of retrogression, they

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\* *Op. cit.*, p. 427.

would reply that natural selection is as likely to result in retrogression as in progress. Finally, if we show that there has been both retrogression and advance, they meet us by saying that both retrogression and advance are phenomena which the action of natural selection would lead us to expect.

Nevertheless there are certain facts and considerations presented to us by M. de Candolle which seem to tell against the views both of Mr. Darwin and of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Thus he calls attention\* to the fact that it is in the human species only that classes of society are formed. We do not find amongst even the most intelligent vertebrate animals of social habits, such as monkeys, dogs, and birds, that similar individuals associate together. On the contrary, the strongest and most voracious individuals contend against each other and exclude the one the other. The best, considered physically, do not appear to congregate. The most rapid do indeed find themselves side by side in flight or migration; but this is the result of a merely material condition, and in no respect voluntary. Moreover families associate together in groups even less than individuals do.

As to social insects, the so-called "classes" are not classes at all in the sense applied to that term in human society. They are (as amongst slave-making ants), either individuals of another species, or they are (as with the workers amongst bees) individuals stunted in development by a systematically defective nutrition.

The existence of "classes" then is the result of the intellectual activity of man, and could never have been evolved from the mere activity of brutal instincts.

Again, the curious facts M. de Candolle brings forward † respecting sudden and remarkable modifications of offspring induced by temporary internal parental conditions, harmonize with the view, that if species are developed by a natural evolutionary process, that process is rather due to a deep-seated internal positive cause ‡ than to any merely negative external agency like that of "natural selection."

Against the notion that true human nature may have been evolved from a brutal state, may be brought forward the fact adduced, § that the less intelligent and foreseeing individuals will be those who by imprudently hasty unions, will tend most to be the parents of succeeding generations; as also the other circumstance he alleges, || that high intellectual culture tends both indirectly and directly to impair fecundity.

\* *Op. cit.*, p. 348.

† p. 332.

‡ See Chapter XI. of the "Genesis of Species." Macmillan. 1872.

§ *Op. cit.*, p. 424.

|| p. 392.

Again he tells us,\* that natural selection can only act on man in a manner "douteuse, temporaire, et extrêmement lente," and that a "direction souvent regrettable de l'espèce humaine" may be attributed to it. On the face of the matter then it is difficult to see how civilization could ever have been developed from barbarism by "natural selection," as this process exhibited by our author himself. He says : †—

En définitive, l'état de société appelé barbarie paraît ne favoriser absolument que la beauté physique. Il est contraire à la moralité et peu favorable aux progrès de l'intelligence.

Surely then, if there is so much in "natural selection" hostile to human progress, it is gratuitous to ascribe that progress exclusively to "natural selection," especially since the existence in man of an intellectual principle at once explains it, while even the existence of classes of society cannot, as we have seen, be accounted for save by the operation of such a principle.

As to future progress, we are reluctantly compelled to avow that there are many facts far from reassuring. Certainly the development (which seems imminent) of a state of society in which each man is a warrior, cannot but be considered as a very notable and melancholy *retrogression*, compared with the condition of Western Europe in the thirteenth century. This is fully recognized by M. de Candolle. He says : ‡—

Il est clair qu'en imposant par contrainte une profession essentiellement contraire à la liberté de chaque instant, d'une nature dangereuse, et qui vous force à faire des choses auxquelles vous répugnez, comme de prendre le bien d'autrui et de tuer, on revient aux pratiques des barbares.

Respecting the probable future of the whole human race and its destinies at a moderately remote and at an extremely remote future, M. de Candolle § is far from confirming the brilliant vaticinations of a Herbert Spencer, a Galton, or a Büchner, who all anticipate the realization of a terrestrial paradise of peace and prosperity.

As to a matter of a few thousand years merely, our author considers it probable that but three great races of men (more or less intermingled) will exist: Negroes in the tropics, the descendants of Europeans in the coldest climates, and Chinese in the intermediate regions.

In 50,000 or 100,000 years, he predicts other probabilities, but with many reservations as to unknown cosmical and pathological possibilities. Amongst these are the using up of metals and coal, which will render the existence of steamboats and

\* *Op. cit.*, 426.

† p. 364.

‡ p. 367.

§ p. 411.



railways impossible, and altogether make the existence of the most civilized people the most miserable, while tranquil, agricultural populations of warm countries, with few wants, will be relatively the best off.

Further he predicts the gradual submersion of the land by the constantly erosive action of water, entailing a great destruction of terrestrial animals and plants; and though man is better able to preserve himself, yet from the want of wood and metal, he will be unable to save himself by ships. Compelled to inhabit scattered islands, man is to be reduced to a condition of isolation of which we can now hardly form an idea, and which is to precede his utter and final extermination.

In criticising Messrs. Herbert Spencer and Galton, M. de Candolle remarks\* :—

En général, les deux auteurs dont je viens de parler, tout en faisant des réflexions très-justes et quelquefois très-originales, très-dignes d'attention, me paraissent avoir un peu trop oublié l'inégalité de développement des classes et des peuples. L'histoire est pourtant d'accord avec la théorie pour montrer à quel degré la marche du côté d'intelligence et de la moralité, est irrégulière et douteuse, même dans le laps de temps de plusieurs milliers d'années. Depuis Socrate jusqu'à Lavoisier, combien d'hommes éminents n'ont pas péri d'une mort misérable, victimes de la force et de l'ignorance du grand nombre! Combien de populations d'élite n'ont pas disparu! Combien d'invasions de barbares n'ont pas eu lieu!

There can, we think, be little question but that M. de Candolle's view of the picture is the more reasonable one upon the data accepted in common by him and by the writers he criticises. But what a pitiful result does he not present to us, what an anti-climax to the constantly repeated vaunts and boasts regarding civilization and progress!

M. de Candolle's sentiments as to immortality are unknown to us; but Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school, like Büchner and Vögt, regard belief in it as a puerile and baseless dream.

It is difficult to us to understand how those who accept the dismal dogma of annihilation can really feel much interest as to whether the human race endures a few thousands of years more or less.

If, after a period of increasing prosperity, its doom is gradually and miserably to decline and finally become extinct, without leaving any trace of its existence save in the form of fossils or fragments—

“Blown about the desert dust  
Or sealed within the iron hills  
No more—”

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\* *Op. cit.*, p. 423.

it seems to us that the end might just as well come "sooner" as "later."

If the soul be merely mortal, not only is each individual the phenomenon of a passing moment, but the existence of the whole human race is, as it were, but a mere bubble, rising and bursting on the surface of a vast and desolate ocean. When such beliefs become widespread, it is easy to understand the progress of that system of nihilism of which Schopenhauer was the prophet. It cannot be denied that there is a certain sad consistency in those who decline to advocate a purposeless activity—care, strife, anxiety, and toil without aim and without recompense. The spread of materialism amongst isolated individuals has again and again been accompanied by a corresponding spread of self-murder—now even advocated in our popular literature. The spread of this desolating negation amongst nations may also lead to processes of national disintegration such as the world has not witnessed for many centuries. We seem to have a threatening foretaste of this melancholy process in the self-mutilations of Paris, and further examples may be approaching in Spain, if not also in Italy.

God in His mercy may intervene to check speedily the spirit of denial, and so make such transformations comparatively harmless. But otherwise the Holy Father's words must be fulfilled, and the revolution, running its full course, will destroy itself with its own hands. Christian civilization being then demolished, human society will be reduced by force to a re-assertion of its most elementary principles for individual self-defence. The Church will be the only institution to survive the wreck of all those who have so disastrously for themselves attacked her. Under her auspices will doubtless then arise a new and fresh Christian civilization, and she will then be seen by all as plainly—that which her children now know her to be—the only true promoter of human progress, the only sustainer of really beneficent activity, and the constant advocate of such human manifestations as are at once truthful, beautiful, and good.

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ART. VI.—MR. FROUDE ON THE ENGLISH IN  
IRELAND.

*The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century.* By JAMES ANTHONY  
FROUDE. Vol. I. London : Longmans & Co.

THERE is no department of the literary profession which requires loftier qualities than that belonging to the historian. These qualities, too, must run as well in the moral as in the intellectual order. It is not enough for the historian to possess some of the highest of the poet's faculties, though the possession of such faculties is, for the worthy fulfilment of his vocation, absolutely a necessity. Nor is it enough that with the poet's power of vision he possesses the philosopher's power of wise and precise discrimination. It is absolutely requisite that the historian be not only a great man but also a good one. His office is the pure objective presentment of pure objective truth. Any sacrifice of truth made by him, even for mere purposes of literary effect, is an abuse of his profession; but if he sacrifice the object of his office to party purposes, he ceases to be a historian, and becomes, by universal acclaim, something much lower than a writer of romance. He must never write except without prejudice. He must ever tell the truth, and tell it with that lofty impartiality which has made the name of Tacitus a name to be respected for ever. History must be always for him an end in itself, and not a means to an end. His own personality, with all its political, social, and historical prepossessions, must be forgotten as he writes; and he must view and reproduce the past with solely the eyes and the power of a pure intelligence. He is essentially a judge, and not a special pleader.

Now, the vocation of a historian being so lofty and sacred, it is no wonder that the veritable historians of the earth are not many in number. Such a union of such rare endowments as go to make one is not, we may be sure, found very often. A real poet is a much more lightly equipped being than a real historian; and we have it on fairly good authority that a real poet—with the requisite gifts and the requisite training—is discoverable, perhaps, not oftener than once in fifty years. But pretended poets—wanting some in natural endowment, others in disciplined habits—we have in large abundance. It is the same with historians. In this world generally there is

nothing so common as mistaken vocations; and there is no department of human life in which it is easier to mistake one's vocation than in the business of writing history. It is so natural to think that because one is skilled in word-painting, therefore one is called to make the past live for the present. It is so natural to think that because one is conscious of one's attachment to truth, that therefore one is called to discover the truth and to tell it. But it is not so very natural, and it is certainly not so very common, to remember that not merely the power of word-painting, nor merely the inability to be guilty of wilful misrepresentation, is sufficient for the historian; and that for the calling with which he supposes himself called both these qualities, along with many others, are absolutely indispensable. And yet these things, if a man do but consider what history means, must be remembered.

That Mr. Froude possesses, and in large measure, many of the qualities which we ascribe in perfection to the ideal historian, is, we believe, undeniable. He has, as we shall have to say, evoked a large amount of very angry criticism, and, as is generally the case, such criticism has not been marked by just discrimination. It is not our manner in any case to indulge in wholesale abuse, and, in fact, we do not like to be abusive at all. But in respect of Mr. Froude our condemnation of him could not be other than qualified. There is no one of his books which does not possess properties which we are bound to admire. We know, for instance, of no writer in later times who, in the best sense of the word, is more picturesque; and, barring occasional pleonasms, we know of few writers whose style is more accurate. Nor are these the highest of Mr. Froude's literary qualities. He is undoubtedly somewhat cynical and a little too much addicted to regaling himself on gall and wormwood; but in all his books there is such a certain manly, almost angry, contempt for what the author thinks mean; or unveracious, or cowardly, that one is disposed to accredit Mr. Froude, not only with some of the highest intellectual, but with some of the highest moral powers. Take, for instance, that address on Calvinism delivered when he was Rector of St. Andrew's University. There is nothing in modern non-Catholic literature whose general tone is nobler and more elevating. After reading it, one can hardly believe the things that we fear have been said only too truly of Mr. Froude.

For, in the most essential quality of the historian, Mr. Froude has been found to be wanting. For him the highest thing is not the presentment of objective truth, but the success of his own subjective opinion. We should be far from saying, as

was once said of him by the *Saturday Review*, that he does not scruple the direct falsification of evidence ; but it must be said of him that he views evidence with such a lamentable unpreparedness of mind that the results are the same as if he had been consciously untruthful. He professes to be impartial, and probably he tries to be so. But he rarely succeeds in the trial. It has been remarked that there is hardly one of the leading characters of Byron's poems who is not Byron himself. Something similar must be said of Mr. Froude—Mr. Froude's history is leavened by Mr. Froude's nature ; and it is his nature to be a partisan. In the prospectus to his *History of England* he tells us that his composition of that work was purely accidental. The profession which he had originally selected he was obliged to abandon, at the same time that his first mistake in determining his vocation debarred him from other lines of life which he should have wished to follow. As a refuge from "an enforced leisure," he took to the writing of history. This candid account explains all. We can only grieve that Mr. Froude's second choice was no wiser than his first. In neither case had he the requisite call.

From the publication of the earliest volumes of the "History of England," it was sufficiently evident where Mr. Froude's great deficiency as a historical writer lay. The subsequent volumes only made the nature and extent of the deficiency more painfully clear. With all his brilliant ability it became obvious, even to those who believed him incapable of conscious falsehood, that he could scarcely be trusted. But it remained for his last publication to sign his death-warrant as a historical writer ; and that last publication, aided by his last lectures in America, has undoubtedly made it quite impossible for him to expect to be credited in that capacity any more. We hardly indeed remember anything so sad in its way as the result of Mr. Froude's late fiasco against Ireland. It is popularly reported that the brilliant historian was miserably unsuccessful all through ; that the common-sense of our cousins was more than a match for his pungent rhetoric, and that he, who had, a strong and solitary knight-errant, undertaken the conquest of American opinion, was positively hunted out of the country by a strike of Irish servant-maids. But we do not allude so much to his own personal fate in America as to the fate of his book at home. "The English in Ireland" has been either laughed at or scoffed at by every one who has read it. Scarcely any of its critics have spoken of it save with unqualified censure. And it has in some quarters excited an indignant hostility quite unparalleled in literature of late years.

Nor are we surprised that this is the case. Mr. Froude's

“English in Ireland” is one of the least historical of historical books that we have ever seen. It abounds in errors of fact; it abounds in errors of judgment; it is undisguisedly and almost passionately one-sided; and there predominates throughout it all, the presence of a bitter, splenetic spirit, utterly unbecoming a dignified historic work, and utterly unworthy of Mr. Froude himself. We cannot deny it the possession of some valuable qualities. It publishes many interesting facts hitherto altogether unknown, or known only partially. It preaches in many places a lofty heroism in the conduct of national and of private life, which is very acceptable in these unheroic days. It sustains the author’s character as a writer of great point and brilliancy, and occasionally its eloquence is of the very highest kind. But all these excellences are nothing in the balance as against its one great vice of unfairness. That unfairness is so very obvious that at first sight one can hardly consider it unconscious; and we do not therefore blame the critics who have lately been making suggestions similar to that of the *Saturday Review*. We hope, however, in what we have to say, to give Mr. Froude invariably the benefit of the doubt, and to rather incline to softness than to severity; and we shall take special care not to follow his own method of treating his opponents. We shall not argue by insinuation.

The opening portion of Mr. Froude’s book is entitled “Preliminary.” This portion is written with a certain amount of philosophic pomp not natural to Mr. Froude, and it is devoted to a statement of general principles which are supposed to determine the conduct of nations. Before we pass on to the main business of the treatise, it will be well to consider one or two of these principles. We shall thereby be able to appreciate Mr. Froude’s ability in political and social speculation. He opens with a principle of some magnitude both in conception and in expression. Put simply, it is the following:—If two nations or parts of nations are contiguous, and if it be for the interest of either to be superior, they will remain independent just as long as the weaker can maintain its independence successfully. Mr. Froude advances this principle not as a mere opinion, but as a law that has ruled and ought to rule nations; and he infers from it that England and Ireland should be one nation, which was to be superior being determined by which was the stronger. Now we have an opinion that Mr. Froude’s first principle, put thus simply, hardly needs refutation; but we shall at the same time point out a few of the suppositions and the consequences which it involves.

In the first place, there is no force in Mr. Froude's principle as applied to the connection between England and Ireland, which does not apply with force a hundredfold to the case of England and France. England and Ireland are farther apart than England and France. It would be very much for the interest of France to have possession of England. Mr. Froude's principle is therefore a standing excuse for and a standing exhortation to a French invasion of England. And if it be said that the French and the English are not homogeneous peoples, we answer that neither were the English and Irish at the time of the Norman invasion, and that the homogeneousness of neighbouring nations can hardly be required—if we are to believe history—to justify the conquest of one by the other. But in the second place, let us apply the principle to the case of France and Belgium. You have there two nations standing side by side. There is between them no such barrier as the Channel of St. George, especially as that channel was for the rude navigators of the twelfth century. The peoples of Belgium and of France are identical in race, almost identical in customs and manners, and, one may say, perfectly identical in language. Every one knows, and the revelations of late years brought it out pointedly, that for France, Belgium would be the most important and most valuable of possessions; but does any one say, therefore, that France has a right to the possession of Belgium? We hardly believe that even Mr. Froude would say it. Or take still another case. Canada and the United States are contiguous. Their populations are homogeneous, as far as homogeneousness can be said to exist on the North American continent. It would be very much for President Grant's interest to annex the Dominion, and at all events he may (which will be all the same) come at any moment to think so. Has he, therefore, Mr. Froude's philosophic permission to tear away the last vestige of English power in America, and to make the Monroe doctrine dominant from Greenland to the Gulf of Mexico? Let us charitably imagine that Mr. Froude's common sense is better than his philosophy.

As the complement of the principle of which we have just been speaking, Mr. Froude has another in the very next page. It is what we may call the doctrine of International Darwinism. The law of nations as of nature is the survival of the fittest. "Strength," we are told, is a rude but adequate test of superiority or "inferiority." The right of a people to self-government can consist in nothing but their power to defend themselves, and no nation has a right to resist invasion unless she has the perfect power to resist it. The big bully is

to be master in Dame Terra's school, and no little fellow whom he fags to death has the smallest right to oppose him. Where Mr. Froude got that doctrine it would be hard to say. We knew very well that there was a modern body of inquirers, supposed to be presided over by Mr. Carlyle, who talked very much in the style of the old Scandinavian:—

“ Force rules the world still,  
Has ruled it, shall rule it ;  
Meekness is weakness ;  
Strength is triumphant  
Over the wide earth ;  
Still is it Thor's day.”

But we had never seen the doctrine presented in its nakedness as it has been by Mr. Froude. We need hardly point out the atrocious consequences to which a prevalent belief in such a doctrine would give rise. It would be, applied to nations, what the Rob Roy doctrine—

“ That they may take who have the power,  
And they may keep who can,”

would be as applied to individuals. The survival of the fittest supposes a perpetual struggle to discover who the fittest are ; and thus unceasing international strife is the first principle in the political gospel of Mr. Froude.

But foolish and fatal as are the principles of our author—and we have selected as samples the two that he himself puts primarily forward—the purpose of their manufacture is abundantly clear. England's right to seize Ireland is shown not merely because the countries were contiguous, and because it was England's interest to be superior, but because the English were the stronger and the more fit to survive. And thus, on high *à priori* grounds the conquest of Ireland becomes a thing whose justice it is folly to question. But the justice of the conquest rests not on such grounds alone. It rests on the peculiar character and condition of the Irish people. These are such, and have always been such, that any rule save their own ought to be received by them with gratitude. And this gives Mr. Froude an opportunity of illustrating from the various epochs of Irish history, commencing with the Norman invasion, that for most of her sufferings Ireland has fundamentally herself to blame. At no time scarcely was she worthy of good government, and at all times she failed in what we have seen is the first duty of a conquered country, — she failed to submit. So Mr. Froude is led by his line of exposition to asperse as much as possible the Irish character ; and he follows that line undauntedly. The Cromwellians, who described the Irish as



a people of God's wrath, to be dealt with as the Canaanites were dealt with by Josue, were in general content with language which, though strong and scriptural, was deficient in point; but Mr. Froude runs through the whole gamut of ill-will, from passionate invective to sniggering sneers. Sometimes he is forced to be complimentary to the people of Ireland, but his compliments are barbed with insult. For instance, "Ireland's great men," he says, and he adds immediately, by way of needful explanation, "for great men were born in Ireland as elsewhere." And though he tells us, what we knew to be pretty well founded, that the Irish are unstable, passionate, reckless, yet he adds a thing of which we were in ignorance, that in the case of an Irishman "there is always, even behind the most fervid language, a cool calculation of interest." In fact, Mr. Froude omits no opportunity of shying not merely brickbats, but bad eggs at the Irish. And obviously it was for the sake of such exercise that Mr. Froude's book was written.

But before we refer specifically to our author's list of charges against Ireland, we must do him the justice of admitting that his severity falls not on Ireland alone. He is almost, if not quite, as severe on her English rulers. He has something good to say of the Normans, and, of course, he has something good to say of Cromwell; but for all the others who undertook the management of Ireland he has, in the main, wrath and contempt. The burden of each successive chapter is the same; the fatuous imbecility of English rule; the wretched see-saw between blind severity and blind indulgence. England, we are told, managed Ireland by playing off the internal factions against each other, maintaining a general equipoise, which method of making things comfortable inevitably produced agrarian conspiracies, mock patriotism, rebellion, and the still weltering chaos of discontent and disloyalty.\* Again, we are told that England governed Ireland for what she deemed her own interest, making her calculations on the gross balance of her trade ledger, and leaving her moral obligations to accumulate, as if right and wrong had been blotted out of the statute-book of the universe.† All this is extremely true, and it is well to have it admitted by an authority like Mr. Froude; but we do not think it harmonizes quite perfectly with Mr. Froude's doctrines of force as the proper pacificator of disputes and of strength as a standard of international morality.

We now come, however, to Mr. Froude's main thesis, which

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\* p. 570.

† p. 588.

underlies and unifies his last production, the thesis, namely, that the Irish as a rule have been cruel, currish, cowardly, licking the hand that struck, and snapping at the hand which strove to fondle. The charge of cruelty is an old one in Irish history; but it has generally been a charge not against the Irish, but against their conquerors. Mr. Froude, however, while admitting that the latter did a good deal of "killing" from time to time, thinks that the former were at least worthy rivals. As we do not purpose to dwell at any length on this matter, we shall refer only to that fact upon which Mr. Froude principally relies. What we may call the affair of 1641, Mr. Froude regards as the most diabolical slaughter ever planned by a human brain, a slaughter in which it was intended to include every English Protestant living in Ireland, and which was accordingly, excogitable only by the brain of a Papist Celt. Now it is rather strange that the very same evidence which is produced by our author in support of his terrible view would prove that Protestant ghosts were seen, we suppose, bathing, and heard, we are assured, calling for vengeance, from under the bridge of Portadown. It might, moreover, be admitted that Mr. Froude's facts are true, and yet it might be contended that even his own History of England would supply plenty of parallel provoking facts on the other side. But, in truth, there is no evidence for the view of Mr. Froude. Its only support is in the lying tales of panic-mongers, who wanted an excuse for robbery and murder. The history of Bishop Bedell, Protestant Bishop of Kilmore, makes the real nature of the rising of the North apparent. So far were the native Catholics from desiring to slaughter English Protestants indiscriminately, that the Bishop, with as many fugitives as liked to join him (and at one time they numbered nearly 1,400), were allowed to reside peaceably in his lordship's palace. That his lordship's notions of the Irish insurgents were very different from those of Mr. Froude is plain from the fact that it was with the insurgents he preferred to remain. That the insurgents were not such ruthless savages as Mr. Froude supposes is plain from the fact that when Bishop Bedell died he was buried with almost royal honours by the Irish army. But this charge of wholesale cruelty against the Irish is scarcely worthy of serious consideration. We refer to it here simply in order to be a little methodical, and because it is made a very prominent charge by Mr. Froude. And we decline to deal in recriminations. The *tu quoque* argument is never a remarkably good one; and recent controversies make it altogether unnecessary to use it here.

Another ruling characteristic which our author finds in the Irish Papists is their currish craft. He discovers an exemplification of it in Hugh O'Neill; and to this exemplification we wish to refer, as giving us an opportunity to put forward a broad general answer to the book of Mr. Froude. Hugh O'Neill, our author tells us, was intriguing with Spain at the same time that he was full of loyal professions to Queen Elizabeth. Hugh O'Neill is, of course, only a single instance, and logicians are not accustomed to argue from single instances to general rules. But let that pass, logic not being the strong point of Mr. Froude. We have, however, a very sufficient answer to this case of Hugh O'Neill. Admit him to have been treacherous and hypocritical, still these accomplishments were acquired by him, not in Ireland, but where he got his education, at the English court. In that court, what is known as Machiavellianism was developed into a science. It was the object of Elizabeth and of her courtiers to make O'Neill as much like themselves as possible. Mr. Froude is not quite fair when he complains that the chieftain practised the noble arts taught him by his masters. And O'Neill's conduct becomes all the less reprehensible when one remembers that twice had Elizabeth tried to have his uncle Shane assassinated.

But, as we have said, we touch on this case simply because the reply to it suggests a principle of very general and very effective application. The principle is this. In Ireland there is an admixture of races; those races have not yet amalgamated; they certainly had not amalgamated in those times of which Mr. Froude has written; and it very frequently happens in Mr. Froude's book that the Papist Celt is saddled with crimes that are not his own. Moreover, bad company is dangerous. Man, and therefore Irish man, is a mimetic animal; and every man finds it far easier to imitate bad men in ill-doing than to imitate good men in well-doing. Now, in general, the persons that have come to regenerate Ireland were not exactly lights to be put up on a candlestick. Let us, following the method of Mr. Froude, briefly inquire.

We begin with the Normans. The Normans are people of whom Mr. Froude has very elevated ideas. And according to him they were more or less martyrs to the cause of Ireland. For when they came there, he says,\* with something of a constabulary method of expression, "they took charge of a nest of armed savages, with no settled industry, and no settled habitations, and scarcely a conception of property." It was

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\* p. 14.

so kind of these chivalrous gentlemen to take the Irish into custody, and to prevent them, in their state of intoxicated barbarism, from harming themselves! But, somehow, this representation of the case does not dovetail with a few generally admitted facts of history. These Normans, in the first place, do not seem to have been altogether suitable apostles of civilization. Thierry puts them down as the *colluvies* of all sorts of continental free lances and robbers. Of those of them that had come to England, naturally the most restless and the most needy would follow that incarnate representation of Mr. Froude's history, Strongbow; and it is very doubtful if such persons as they would set a very good example to the people whom they "took in charge." But in the second place, our author's description of the Irish at the conquest is apparently overdrawn. They were scarcely "a nest of armed savages, with no settled industry, and no settled habitations, and scarcely a conception of property." Long before the Norman invasion they had among them what Mr. Froude has perhaps heard of as the Brehon code, and this code bears very curious testimony to the existence of an Irish civilization at all events as high as that of the Normans. We shall not go to the trouble of mentioning its provisions,\* nor shall we ask Mr. Froude to consult the Irish writers who have written about it. But we shall refer him to one authority who is certainly no bigoted lover of Ireland. If he will consult the first volume of Mr. Hill Burton's History of Scotland, he will find here and there some reasons to modify his views of the barbarity of the ancient Irish.

But taking things even as Mr. Froude puts them, what was done by these Normans for Irish civilization? As many of the Irish as could be caught were civilized off the face of the earth, and the chivalrous followers of Strongbow took their empty places. In the second year of the reign of King John it was pronounced "not murder" to kill a mere Irishman; and in the reign of Edward the Fourth the further advance was made of putting a premium on Irish assassination. This is the law:—"It shall be lawful for any Englishman to kill any Irishman who cannot 'prove' [to the Englishman's satisfaction, of course] that he is out for honest purposes; and the bringer-in of the said Irishman's head, with his aiders to the same, may distrain and levy with their own hands, &c." Of course, in such circumstances as these, every Irishman who cared for his life kept at a respectful distance

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\* We may refer our readers, however, to the article on the Brehon law which appeared in our number for April, 1871.

from the new colony ; and, because in pure self-preservation the Irish people elected to dwell in the remote and less accessible parts of the island, they are called by Mr. Froude "wild and wayward vagabonds." A little earlier\* he informs us that "there was not originally any one advantage which England possessed which she was not willing and eager to share with Ireland," a statement which is simply astounding. About the same place we are assured that the Normans introduced, where no such thing existed before, some kind of order and law, a statement which is still more remarkable. As a matter of fact, no matter what disorders reigned in Ireland before the invasion, that event only introduced others still greater. There were not only the attacks of the newcomers on the natives, but there were the perpetual squabbles among the new comers themselves. From Strongbow to Henry VIII. the Normans in Ireland were playing that French game which the great English feudal lords were never strong enough to engage in, except once in Stephen's time, and once again during the wars of the Roses. From day to day it was Butler against Fitzgerald, De Burgh against De Lacy, without any central power to control them, nay, with England, when she found the families growing dangerously powerful, secretly setting them on to intestine strife. Of course we do not wish to forget that in course of time some of the foreign families became attached to the Irish race, adopted some of their customs, and ruled their Irish retainers with a chivalrous generosity. But in so far as they did all this they ceased to be Normans. Civilization came not from them to the Irish, but from the Irish to them.

The next band of regenerators of any importance arrived in Tudor times. We may call them by the general name of Undertakers. In speaking of these we find our author become more than ordinarily paradoxical. For instance, he tells us in page 49 that Elizabeth and her Undertakers were very anxious to protect the Irish owners in the possession of their lands ; that England had a scrupulous anxiety to secure their estates to the Irish owners. Mr. Froude thinks that any such respect for Irish property was foolish ; and it is his opinion that Elizabeth should have planted Munster with Protestants "resolutely and thoroughly." After so much it is curious to hear him speak of the causes of the Desmond Rebellion. He tells us that disgust with Irish anarchy had led to the discussion of schemes for resettling the South by the English ; that volunteers came forward from England

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\* p. 12.

offering, in exchange for the lands, to bear the cost of military occupation ; that Cecil hinted that first the Irish should forfeit their lands by some act of rebellion ; that the volunteers took the hint ; that the country was mapped out, and that claims began to be made on the Irish estates through the medium of defunct Norman charters ; that the Irish saw what was coming ; that their susceptibilities were excited, and that they rebelled. Wholesale confiscation was the consequence. How this manœuvring of Cecil and of the Undertakers shows an English anxiety to protect Irish landowners it is not very easy to perceive.

Between the Tudor times and those of which Mr. Froude's book purports specially to treat, namely the hundred years subsequent to the Williamite wars, the only other apostles of Irish civilization whom we think it worth while to notice are the Cromwellians. And of them we need only say that their scheme of regeneration is abundantly well known. They would regenerate by exterminating. Their sole baptism for Ireland was the baptism of blood. The slaughter at Drogheda, of which Mr. Froude speaks so carelessly, was perhaps exceptional ; but the spirit that dictated it was dominant in all the years of Oliver's Irish rule. The country was reduced to a state even more horrible than its condition after Kinsale. The printed declarations of the Council, 1653, speak of numbers starving on the highways, and of children left to be devoured alive by beasts and birds of prey. Women, like famished wolves, were known to rush upon a horseman, tear him from his saddle and devour his beast ere it had time to completely die ; and there are even accounts given us of children killed by their parents and devoured. We have even a story that in its surroundings looks more horrible still. A Colonel Richard Lawrence, being out one night with his troop, came upon a large fire, around which he found "a miserable company of old women and children, and betwixt them and the fire a dead corpse lay broiling, which, as the fire wasted, they cut off collops and ate." It is for no sensation purpose we mention these horrors. They are known to all readers of Irish history. We mention them for the sole motive of drawing the reader to observe how they were caused. Sir Charles Coote had laid down as a principle that in order to settle the Irish difficulty, not only the Irish foxes, but the Irish cubs must die ; and he had put the principle to practical account in Wicklow, where he ordered that no Irish person should be spared, save and except these not very usual entities, "infants of a span long." The Cromwellians followed the plan of Sir Charles in some places ; in others they adopted

one quite as effective, and not quite as provocative of the revenge of despair. They starved, or tried to starve, the nation to death. Scythes were imported from England to cut down the corn which the Irish would have to live upon in the winter time.

When Mr. Froude has sketched the history of Ireland for the previous seven centuries he has the reader ready to enter with him upon his main business, the history of the eighteenth. And we are anxious that the reader should remember here what we deliberately declare to be the purpose of all portions of the book before us. Its obvious, though not its avowed purpose, is by ruining the Irish character to ruin the Irish cause. A secondary, but we think only a secondary purpose with Mr. Froude, was to insinuate a defence for the English method of governing Ireland. With that method of course Mr. Froude finds fault. But he finds fault with it for a reason precisely the opposite to that which makes it be generally blamed. It is generally blamed for its cruel severity; Mr. Froude blames it because it was not severe enough. Three or four attempts—we may specify Cromwell's—were, he thinks, made to rule Ireland wisely; but from weakness and want of persistence in the rulers these attempts fell through. For it is clearly and almost avowedly Mr. Froude's sentiment, that the only policy fitted for Ireland is the policy of extermination. "True freedom," he says, "the inhabitants of the sister isle never sought or cared for; all they wanted was to be left free to plunder and kill." And when in his American tour he states his reason for that extraordinary undertaking to be because American opinion is worth to the Irish 500 pieces of cannon, he hints pretty clearly what must in the end be, according to him, the mode of solving the Irish question. The British empire is to be saved as the German empire was made, by blood and iron. And such being the view of Mr. Froude, we see a plain reason for his plain purpose in his latest performances. Let all the world know, he says, that we must rule Ireland with an iron rod. But let all the world know, he adds, that Ireland is unworthy of being ruled in any other way. And therefore does he set himself definitely and persistently to blacken the Irish. And it is only by keeping that thought in mind that one sees sustained connection in the book of Mr. Froude. Without that gleam of darkness visible it is a chaos.

Now what are these charges which Mr. Froude makes against the Irish character? It is not easy to collect and methodize them, for they are scattered through a vast variety of pages, and are very often so finely pointed as to be barely

perceptible; but they may, we think, be reduced to two classes—charges against the general Irish character, and charges against special Irish acts. When we have put a few specimens of both these classes before our readers, we shall be able to determine not only whether Mr. Froude's Irish policy is practicable, but also whether it is necessary. Of course, if we are doomed to go again through the old Cromwellian furnace, we must try to take the ordeal as cheerfully as we can. But we would not like to try it; and we therefore hope that we may discover reasons for thinking that Mr. Froude's Irish policy is not a necessity.

The principal crime which Mr. Froude puts to the account of the Irish is the crime of a cringing cowardice. He does not venture so far as in plain direct speech to call them cowards; but all through his book he persistently insinuates that they are; and to prove that they are is essential to his argument even as conceived by himself. If they were a valiant race, bent on death sooner than submission, it would not be possible to defend the useless attempts stretching through centuries to bring them to obedience; and it would be altogether impossible to advocate against them that policy which Mr. Froude recommends for the future; but the Irish, our author says, would neither "submit honourably nor resist courageously": they could do nothing but be inappeasably discontented, and this inappeasable discontent has been attended by a "paralysis of all manliness." Mr. Froude's proofs of the characteristic cowardice of the Irish race are not very numerous. One, to which he refers at some length, is the result of the rising in 1641. The Irish army at that time was, he believes, overwhelmingly stronger than the army which smote it hip and thigh, and scattered it as a single lion would scatter a pack of curs. But on this instance of Irish impotence it is not necessary to speak. Recent writers have so exposed Mr. Froude's facts and figures that we may regard this portion of his book as expunged. But there is another line of argument which Mr. Froude follows with great verve and gusto, and which has at first blush undoubtedly some appearance of cogency. It rests on a contrast between the Irish and the Scotch. The latter made a strong and sturdy and valiant resistance to English encroachment; and even when they were beaten, had won the respect and admiration of their conquerors: but the Irish always made a poor fight. They were quick enough to rebel, quick enough "to plunder and kill," but as for standing up and battling heroically for what they considered their freedom, the people of Ireland never had the courage to do it.



Now it is no part of our present business to exalt Irish bravery by depreciating Scottish; but we think this contrast of Mr. Froude very unhappy. It used to be the boast of the invincible Englishman, and his highest boast too, that he never knew when he was beaten. That is a knowledge which the Irish people, even according to Mr. Froude, never could acquire; but it is a knowledge which the people of Scotland acquired very quickly. If the weaker of two is beaten and submits, his submission may be taken as a proof of discretion; if he be beaten and will not submit, his defiance of his victor is, we think, scarcely a proof that he is wanting in valour. But in truth this contrast of Ireland with Scotland demonstrates nothing so much as Mr. Froude's ignorance of the state of the case. Scotland had never to fight, as Ireland has been always fighting, against enemies stationed in her own household. The country of Mr. Carlyle was at the time of its conquest by England a poor barren country. English adventurers were too cunning and too fond of good things to bother themselves about "the bannocks of barley meal"; and consequently, though for purposes of safety Scotland was sometimes invaded, sometimes occupied, it was never colonized by an English population. With Ireland it was very different. For her every one was ready. The man who looked upon the world as his oyster, "which he with sword would open," and the man

"Whose most ingenious wit  
With legal maxims did not fit,"

was only too willing to settle as a sentry and proprietor on Irish soil. The land was excellent, and was believed to be far better than it is in reality. The wool of Irish sheep was famed throughout Europe, and the most rapid and most extensive English fortunes were there made by sheep-farming. And so English adventurers were always prepared to pass over to Ireland, and, give them but their letters of marque, they were never wanting to "stir up a convenient treason," and to carve out their own slices from the lands of the King's Irish enemies. Ireland, in fact, became both colonized and garrisoned at the same time, and by the same people; and it was the garrison colony which kept her for England down from the days of Cromwell on to the days of William, and even to our own. If such a course had been adopted in Scotland, supposing the country rich enough to make such a course feasible, what kind of fight would the Scotch have made? This is asked on the supposition that the attempts of Scotland to retain her independence are worthy of the praises

lavished on them by Mr. Froude,—a supposition which, as we do not wish to give needless offence, we have no desire to question; but Mr. Froude can hardly be ignorant that it has been often questioned. If he will run his eye over the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth volumes of Guthrie's "History of Scotland," he will find reasons for doubting whether, in contrasting Irish bravery and persistence with Scottish bravery and persistence, the latter can have its horn exalted. Scottish valour has been too often tempered by such acts of discretion as the abandonment of Mary and the sale of Charles I.

But an Irish crime of far greater magnitude in our author's eyes than cowardice is their adhesion to the Roman Catholic religion. After the Celt, the thing that Mr. Froude hates most is the Papist. He obviously believes that a follower of the Pope is either a debased idiot or a malignant rogue. At the same time he thinks that the Irish might have been brought to Protestantism if Protestantism had been presented to them in a proper shape, and in an effective manner. Not Anglicanism, which is cold and formal, but Calvinism, which is emotional and simple, is suited to the Celtic character. Now, we cannot help wondering that Mr. Froude has such a contempt for Catholicity. Even in our own times he has seen it deliberately selected as the one reasonable form of Christianity by many of the ablest living men; and the Church which has won to it such spirits as Dr. Newman and Archbishop Manning not only has even thus some *primâ facie* ground for its credibility, but is for evermore lifted beyond the region of contempt and derision. A man may not believe in Popery; but the day is gone when any man who looks about him can speak of Popery as it was the Protestant fashion to speak of it in the heyday of Tresham Gregg; and we are sorry to find Mr. Froude repeating or re-echoing the foolish, somewhat screamly abuse of the "no-Popery" ages.

But even if Popery be so abominable, and if the Irish be such persistent Papists, did it never occur to him that possibly—speaking from Mr. Froude's standpoint—the Irish are not to blame? He appears to admit that the blame must be borne partially by those who offered the Irish not the Calvinistic but the Anglican form of the Reformed religion. But we do not attach much weight to the admission. In making it Mr. Froude is evidently not quite conscious of what he is saying. Anglicanism is a creation of a much later date than the time of Elizabeth, or James I., or Cromwell; and it is a notorious fact that the early English reformers were,

when they were anything definite, disciples of Calvin. But besides the form of Protestantism which was offered to the Irish, was there not some little thing to prevent its acceptance in the manner of offering it, and the men by whom it was offered? When we mention the names of Loftus and Montgomery and Borlase, we suppose ourselves to have said enough as to the character of the Protestant missionaries; and we have only to ask, was it not somewhat difficult for a plain Celt to believe that a religion could be true which had such apostles? And then, furthermore, however desirous a person may be to be converted, he does not like to be converted at the point of the bayonet, or by the threat of the halter. If reasons were as plenty as blackberries, Sir John Falstaff would not give a reason upon compulsion. Even on their own supposition that Catholicity is false, the English have adopted a strange way for overthrowing it. The thing that a man clings to longest and hardest is the thing for which he has suffered. His blood and tears are on it, and for him it is holy for ever. The main reason, of course, why Irishmen remained Catholics, was their knowing that Catholicity is true; but England was careful to provide them with a secondary reason also, viz., their knowing that Catholicity was persecuted. They felt themselves challenged whether they would abandon an old friend and save themselves, or stand by the old friend, even in his misery, and give their blood for the sake of older and better years. We are confident that the vast majority of Irishmen needed no other motive for firmness in their religion than those afforded by divine grace; but Mr. Froude's countrymen did all they could to ensure that there should not be even a considerable apostate minority. They unconsciously and unintentionally completed the work, and fulfilled the prayer, of S. Patrick.

Besides the two great charges of which we have been speaking Mr. Froude has many others to make against the Irish people, whether of the present or of the past. They have no literature; they have no native architecture, and they never borrow anything in that department without ruining it by some Irish modification; their women are remarkably pure and modest; but Ulster ladies of high degree were for a long time given to wearing garments of scant dimensions; they have no taste in domestic arrangements, and you will hardly find one Irish cottage with the blush of roses upon its walls; one sees in Ireland a complete absence of cleanliness of person and habit; and a vast variety of other defects which, though in themselves very ridiculous, are yet valuable, as pointing out the animus with which Mr. Froude's book was

written. Those which we have just collected we must also leave mere public opinion to answer. We pass on to the last portion of Mr. Froude's book, that in which he desires to impress the reader with the general idea that even in the eighteenth century the Irish were characterized by the most insufferable lawlessness and the most barbarous atrocity. The purpose of trying to make out these charges is of course evident. The former portions of the book are supposed to have shown that the Irish were in Norman, Tudor, and Cromwellian days governable only by the strong hand. The last portion shows that the same phenomena lasted down even to our own century. That, taken in connection with the various disturbances of the last ten years, sustains Mr. Froude's general conclusion. The general conclusion we have expressed before. The reader will remember it in connection with Mr. Froude's delicate allusion to the "500 pieces of cannon."

The lawlessness and atrocity which Mr. Froude ascribes to the Irish of the eighteenth century he finds especially exemplified in two classes of Irish actions, actions of smuggling and actions of abduction. For any of our readers who have a taste and time for light reading we would recommend this section of the book. In writing on the abductions especially Mr. Froude will be found equal to Mr. Hepworth Dixon. For this we are sincerely sorry. The Muse of History has a character; and Mr. Froude has a name. Still as Mr. Froude appears to rely for the furtherance of his purpose upon these chapters of his book especially—his narrative of historical events being merely padding—it is necessary to say a few words about them.

In respect of the cases of forcible abduction, let us suppose that they were numerous. But Scotland is an immaculate land in the eye of Mr. Froude, and abductions at the time he speaks of were quite as common there as in Ireland, and more common. Sir Walter Scott informs us that in all cases of Scottish abduction the sympathies of the female Scottish population were on the side of the abductor. That is a charge which might be made to tell against the nation north of the Tweed, and it is a charge which not even Mr. Froude can make against the women of Ireland. But, furthermore, in Ireland who were the abductors? It is Mr. Froude's business to make out that they were Papist Celts. But he hardly succeeds. To any one who knows the state of Ireland at the time it must be quite evident that for one outrage by Papists on Protestants, there must have been twenty in the contrary direction. And Mr. Froude himself unwittingly admits something of the same. "The heroes of these performances," he

says,\* "were often highly connected." But if they were highly connected, they were not Papist Irish. For as MacFirbis says (and what was true in his time was true for 150 years later), "it is a contrast to the old glories of the Gaedhill that not one in a hundred of Irish nobles possesses as much of his land as he could be buried in." Besides Mr. Froude gives us the names of some of these abductors, at the same time that he calls abduction "a form of crime peculiarly Celtic." The names are such as Lucas, Stock, and Cotter; and these are about as Celtic as the popular names of Brown, and Smith, and Jones. Here, therefore, we make application of the distinction already laid down. All of Israel are not Israelites; and all who inhabit Ireland are not Papist Irish. The Papist Irish have sins of their own in abundance to answer for; let us spare them the necessity of being responsible for the sins of the sons of Cromwellian and Williamite drummers. We do not wish to say that the Papist Celts did never act after the model of their regenerators. We suppose that they, like other men, fell through bad example. But then let the burthen be put fairly on deserving shoulders; and because a man born in Ireland or imported into Ireland, and retaining unmixed the characters of his race and his religion commits a crime, let not that crime be put down as peculiarly Irish, and the perpetrators of it represented to the world as Papist Celts. If the colonists are ruffians, let it not therefore be assumed that ruffianism is indigenous to the soil.

But in point of fact Mr. Froude does assume something of the kind. He admits that the "Irish gentry," that is, the English colonists, were lawless. But he finds out that the Irish gentry were not to blame. They were corrupted by those Papist Celts, the Irish people. "Ireland," he says, demoralizes every one who goes to live there; there is a fatal fascination about both land and people which undermines the most steadfast resolution." That we must beg leave to consider very extraordinary. The relations of master and slave, which the English in Ireland ever tried to establish and consolidate between themselves and the Irish, did not certainly tend to the improvement of either. Both Virginian planters and Virginian slaves were injured by Virginian slavery; but he would be regarded as rather a wild person who would say that all the blame was to be laid on Quashee, or on Virginian air. If the Virginian planter found himself injured by the society of his niggers, he always had at hand

the option of relieving himself of his sable temptations; and if English virtue found itself relaxing in the Irish atmosphere, the passage was not very wide across the Channel of St. George. But the fact is, that if the Englishman degenerated in Ireland he had only himself to blame. He degenerates abroad everywhere he goes. At home he is a tolerably peaceful and worthy fellow; on the continent he becomes too often an eccentric bear or a reckless blackguard; in such out-of-the-way places as the backwoods or the diggings it is always on the cards that he will degenerate into a rowdy and a ruffian. It ought to be remembered that for a long time Ireland was the backwoods and diggings of England.

The same principle which we have applied to Mr. Froude's cases of abduction will also apply to his cases of smuggling. These, too, are plainly in a great degree the work of the colonists. There is proof of it even in the book of Mr. Froude. For instance, he gives us with much richness of detail one *cause célèbre* where smuggling rises to the dignity of rapine. But who are its heroes? The Crosbies of Ardfert; the Rev. Francis Lawder, Protestant Vicar-General of the diocese; a Mr. Banner; a Hassett or Blennerhassett; but not, among the ringleaders, one Celt at all. No doubt in such a case some of the underlings were Celtic, and no doubt, too, when the twelve chests of silver bullion that had been part of the Danish East Indiaman's cargo came to be divided, some Celts got a share of the plunder. The plan of the division was indeed remarkable, and throws some light upon not only the state of the peculiar case, but the state of the times. A third went to Lady Margaret Crosby; a third to the "gentlemen"; and the remaining third to the actual plunderers. Redress for the plundered was simply impossible. Sir Maurice Crosby was the Earl of Kerry's son-in-law; "the whole country side, members of Parliament who had votes, high officials in Church and State,"\* were implicated. No wonder that Captain Heitmann complained indignantly that the judges were in a conspiracy to suppress the inquiry. Of course they were. The colonists stood together as the Tammany Ring people stand together; but these colonists were not Celts. We should not like to affirm, without having previously consulted Dr. Darwin, how many years and how many intermarriages it would take to make Celtic blood assimilate with Cromwellian; but the assimilation had certainly not taken place at the date of the above transaction, 1729.

But the case we have mentioned was a case not of smuggling,

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\* p. 494.

but of robbery. In so far as smuggling, pure and simple, is concerned, we would not much care if Mr. Froude had shown that the Papist Celts to a man engaged in contraband traffic. When one considers how their honest trade was barred by the English, one is not likely to blame them very severely for an endeavour to strike a balance by trade that the laws disallowed. In page 448 Mr. Froude himself tells us that "the restrictions on trade and commerce were so preposterous that ingenuity could not have invented a policy less beneficial to the country (England) in whose interests it was adopted, or *better contrived to demoralize the people (the Irish) at whose expense it was pursued.*" The Irish wool trade was abolished. Irish cattle were not allowed to be imported into England. Every Irish manufacture except that of linen was destroyed, and the manufacture of linen was permitted simply because in that article, England having none of it, there could be no national rivalry. When it is that the laws of a land become so ridiculously unjust that a subject of the land may decline to observe them is never a very easy matter to settle; but it is never a very difficult thing to settle, when for breaking a law a man has a very plausible excuse; and if ever a people had a plausible excuse for defrauding the revenue, it was the Papist Irish in the days of the penal laws. Moreover, as we have said, the example was set them by the colonists themselves.

Furthermore, it is as plain a fact as any in Irish history that the English systematically attempted not only to extirpate as many of the Irish as possible, but to demoralize all that remained. For the great bulk, therefore, of Irish crime the English are responsible. They systematically made crime by the Irish almost a moral necessity. From the old statutes of Kilkenny, when they refused either to introduce English law beyond the Pale, or to recognize the Brehon as a valid code, but insisted, as far as they could, on condemning the natives to utter lawlessness, on to the times when they disallowed the least efforts at education, religious or secular, "because the people were easier to keep down when they were ignorant Papists," their plan of action was still the same. Whom they could not kill in body they resolved to kill in mind. They, of course, made occasional mistakes, blessing sometimes where they meant to curse; but their animus, fixed and resolute, is unmistakable. How was it, for instance, that the penal laws were often allowed to be a dead letter in all their enactments against the priesthood? The same men who incited younger sons to conform by the bribe of their fathers' property, and who enforced continually the miserable statute that no Papist should have a horse worth more than £5, shut

their eyes very often to the presence in the land of 3,000 unregistered priests, acting, according to the law, at the peril of their lives. And why? Because the colonists preferred their serfs to remain Papists and Irishmen, knowing that if they became Britons and Protestants their serfdom would end. "Treat a wolf like a dog," says Mr. Froude, "and he will be a wolf still." We cannot enter sufficiently into canine or lupine nature to say; but we know that if a man is systematically treated as an inferior, there is a great chance that eventually he will come to believe in his inferiority. The English knew the principle, and acted upon it. Their object was to get the Irish people to believe themselves slaves.

But the Irish could never be got to believe it. Happy, contented Sambo and they belong to different tribes. Neither would they melt away like the Tasmanians and Red Men. They did not belong to the "rotting races"; and because they would neither cheerfully submit nor quietly die out, they come in for the contempt of Mr. Froude. Had they imitated the Scotch and accepted the situation, Mr. Froude would sing their praises; had they disappeared in a gentle romantic decline, some English Fenimore Cooper—Mr. Froude himself, perhaps—would have given them the immortality of a three-volumed novel; but they persisted in living, they persisted in resisting; they are full of life and resistance even now, and Mr. Froude has nothing for them but—500 pieces of cannon!

In whatever remarks we have been making upon the book of Mr. Froude we have been especially anxious to keep before our own mind and the minds of our readers the book's real character. It is not an historical work, and to treat it as an historical work would be folly. It is simply a very voluminous party pamphlet, which for purposes not well concealed adopts a thin historical disguise. Mr. Froude has not so much his story to tell as his thesis to prove, and he works up his proof with all the arts which a highly cultivated and not highly conscientious rhetoric offers. Facts and dates and interesting stories he gives in abundance; but one can see with half an eye that these are but the quasi-historic myrtles with which he wreathes his glaive. His one enduring aim—and of it he never loses sight for a moment—is to get it believed that the only policy for Ireland which was or is or will be effective is the policy of resolute relentless repression. And the correctness of that view he endeavours, as we said, to establish by exhibiting the Irish character as for evermore unmanageable in any other way. The plan of Mr. Froude's book has determined the plan of the present article. We could not regard "The English in Ireland" as a serious



subject for historical criticism. It is simply a polemical production, without the directness of argument and candour of statement and completeness of method which such productions require. And viewing it as a polemical production, we have simply referred to so much of it as appeared best to enforce the thesis of its author. Mr. Froude's thesis is that a Cromwellian policy for Ireland is both necessary and practicable. We now reply that the necessity of such a policy has not been proved by Mr. Froude's book; and that the impracticability of such a policy has been suggested by the issue of Mr. Froude's American lectures. With a few words on these two heads we shall bring this paper to a close.

In the first place then, with regard to the necessity of such a policy. What is and has been the general bearing of Ireland towards England during the last seven hundred years? Mr. Froude answers one of "inappeasable discontent." With a protest against the word inappeasable we admit the reply. But we ask further, what caused the discontent? Mr. Froude answers the currish character of the Irish Papists. That, we say, is a new reading of history. We think it requires small research to show that it is not a true one. When the Normans first seized Ireland, it was natural enough for the Irish, without their being curs, to exhibit some serious displeasure. No man is quite content to be turned out of his home, even though the intruder be a grand person who rides a war-horse and shines in mail. We may moreover admit that native displeasure with the foreigners continued for a considerable time, the time being all the longer because the Irish, as the Brehon Code testifies, had a very keen sense of the difference between *meum* and *tuum*. But what in the circumstances ought the conduct of the Normans to be? At the very least they should abstain from insulting and assailing the men whom they plundered. And we should be justified in expecting from them much more than such abstinence. They ought to have treated the natives kindly; to have won them round by generosity to accept the situation; to have shown them that, though they were dispossessed of their inheritance, they might yet manage to live in a comfortable though inferior position. All this would be much more the duty of the invaders, if they, as Mr. Froude assures us is true, had attained to a comparatively lofty civilization, and if the natives, for which also we have the word of Mr. Froude, were wild houseless barbarians, with only the faintest notions of order and law. But we have already seen that none of these things were done by the Normans. They robbed and murdered the people without any limit save

their own satiety or the people's disappearance. In course of time indeed they came, in the districts which they inhabited, to mix with the people, to understand them, and to treat them with kindness; and the consequence followed which has ever in like circumstances followed in Ireland, the people loved them and served them with a loyalty of which the countrymen of Gurth were simply incapable. But in the outlying districts, whitherward the mass of the inhabitants had fled, the Normans sowed the seeds of a strong though not an undying hate. These things do not look as if they proved for Mr. Froude. When the strangers, used them with anything like fairness the Irish were loyal\* to the strangers. When the Irish hated the strangers, it was only because robbery and murder, legalized by such statutes as those of John and Edward IV., made anything but hatred impossible. These two facts appear to us to convey a lesson very suitable for Mr. Froude.

But not in Norman times did England and Ireland come into formal connection. The portion of Ireland that had been subdued, even down to as far as the days of Elizabeth, was comparatively small. But in her Majesty's time the whole island was doomed to subjugation, and was actually subdued. We pass over the history of the complete conquest and of the means by which it was accomplished, and we go on to ask, in the reign of Elizabeth, or the reign of James I. or the reign of Charles I., what inducements were held out to make the people contented and loyal? The answer is not much of a mystery. It is recorded in bloody rubrics over all histories, both of England and Ireland, that if the governments of these times did not deliberately mean to drive the Irish people to desperation, that thus they might drive them to death, then the conduct of these governments had no meaning whatever. The people were starved, banished, murdered; their lands were seized and given to strangers. To make laws against Catholicity was (and was known to be) the same as to make laws against all the people; and against Catholicity laws of the most sanguinary character were ac-

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\* The loyalty of the Irish figures in a remarkable way in the book of Mr. Froude. It is the sole virtue which he admits they possess. We were deeply gratified when we fell upon the admission, for it was by no means pleasant to find the Irish characterized as utterly and irretrievably vicious. And still we are not happy. Mr. Froude cannot acknowledge Irish loyalty without sneering at it as "that virtue of barbarism"; and how he can consider the Irish seriously loyal, and yet say that under their "most fervid language there is always a cool calculation of interest," we are unable to see. But Mr. Froude is an Utilitarian. It is absurd to be loyal, except when loyalty pays.

cordingly made. There were rebellions. But where is the wonder? Even a deer will turn to bay; even a worm will in his death-hour endeavour to sting. If from time to time—in 1599 and 1641 for instance—the trampled, starving, dying Irish had not leaped up at the throats of their oppressors, they would be either equal to the angels that some enthusiastic people consider them, or worse than the curs they are made by Mr. Froude. Rebellion is a “foul, dishonouring” thing. But defence of one’s life is not necessarily rebellion. There is a point of insult and oppression beyond which neither a man nor a people can permit tyranny to go. And in the life of Ireland that point has been reached pretty often. Mr. Froude wishes it to be reached once more.

But going still on to the next instance of a manifestation of Irish discontent, that, namely, which was signalized at the Boyne and Aughrim and Limerick, who were to blame? We put altogether out of view that the Irish were fighting for the apparently legitimate king, and could not therefore be properly regarded as rebels. We admit freely that in the main it was true of the people, though scarcely true of the leaders, that they were fighting, not so much for the cause of James as for the cause of Ireland. But, once more, where is the wonder? Here, as before, it is not any constitutional discontent, nor any natural lust to “plunder and kill,” but simply the inability to endure torture for ever, and the “inappeasable” instinct of self-preservation that puts the Irish in arms. And it was so throughout all that eighteenth century of which Mr. Froude has written, so, even, of that disastrous rising in Wexford, which brought the century and the independence of Ireland to a close.

And getting into our own century—which is, perhaps, after all, the one of most practical importance in the discussion which Mr. Froude has excited—what evidence is there in the history of the last seventy years that our author’s theory of the proper method of governing Ireland is true? Is it supported by the phenomena of “Forty-Eight,” or the phenomena of Fenianism? We are not able to think so. Both the Young Ireland party and the party of O’Donovan Rossa have been justified by the two highest, and probably the two best authorities in the land. Mr. Disraeli said, more than twenty years ago, that the state of Ireland was such as in any other land—what a hint!—would be remedied by revolution. Within the past few years Mr. Gladstone, with that dauntless honesty which is his greatest distinction, declared (1.) that never till our time had justice been offered to Ireland, and (2.) that Fenianism was the phenomenon which compelled himself to

make Ireland the offer. We are not concerned to make any special inference from these declarations. But what a havoc they make among the "preliminaries" of Mr. Froude!

But then—and this is the consideration which most of all moves Mr. Froude—Irish discontent is inappeasable. Even when justice has been done to Ireland on the most liberal scale she will still continue to exhibit dissatisfaction. The more she receives the larger and louder are her demands. The Home Rule agitation is now her favourite; give her Home Rule and she will ask for Repeal of the Union; Repeal being conceded, she will insist on Complete Separation; and even now, with all her peaceful professions, she fosters Fenianism as fondly as ever. Such considerations as these move many men as well as Mr. Froude; but they do so unworthily. That the Irish difficulty has, as yet, been only partially solved, is true; and true also it is that the Irish people fret under the delay of its complete solution. But the steps that have been taken to solve it have conducted to more beneficial results. Parliament was lately congratulated that for a considerable time not a single treason case had occurred in Ireland. Fenians may be numerous, but they put in no public appearance; and, to any one who knows the country, it is a patent fact that while the hold of Fenianism on the home-Irish was never of a very solid kind, it has relaxed and almost entirely loosened during the past few years. Fenianism is essentially a conspiracy, and the home-Irish are as essentially, in any large sense of the word, an un-conspiring race. While Parliament exhibits a desire to be just the Fenian society is powerless in Ireland.

Neither the story of Ireland's past nor the state of Ireland's present proves the blood-and-iron scheme to be a necessity. Nor are we quite sure that such a scheme would be found to be practicable. As against himself, Mr. Froude has demonstrated its impracticability. He had an idea that Ireland and England would once again have to come to blows. Ireland, he knew, would be easily beaten if the two countries, in their present respective conditions, were left to fight it out by themselves. But Ireland, he also knew, would not in such a case be left without help. Of that help he, in, we believe, a pure spirit of patriotism, determined to rob her. He set himself systematically to degrade her in American opinion, because, as he frankly said, American opinion was worth to the Irish 500 pieces of cannon. He had a fine field; for there is no man more open than an American to the advances of truth. If Ireland had the 500 pieces at her service before Mr. Froude's expedition, she has double the number after it. The *New York*

*Herald* says of Mr. Froude, "he has aroused a warmer and more general sympathy for the unfortunate country than we ever felt before"; and the *New York Tribune*, "he has damaged the cause of England more than 10,000 Fenians could have done." Than Mr. Froude, England has had no worse enemy and Ireland no better friend for the last 100 years. That, however, is not Mr. Froude's fault, but Mr. Froude's misfortune.

But even though Mr. Froude had never visited the American continent and never written the unfortunate book before us, his policy for Ireland would, we think, be, however splendid in theory, in practice impossible. We are supposing that "the ten minutes' submersion" devoutly prayed for once upon a time, will not yet awhile, be accorded by an England-admiring Providence; and that if the Irish are to be kept under by force it must be in the old Cromwellian way. It is that way, or any similar way of ruling Ireland, that we believe to be at present impracticable. The Irish cannot be crushed out or crushed down now. Golden opportunities of exterminating them were, as Mr. Froude pathetically laments, foolishly lost; and such opportunities, it appears to us, will not be afforded by the neglected Deity another time. Over all the world the Irish have become a power which no nation of the world can afford to despise; and, wherever they are, they carry with them, we will not say a hatred of England, but a passionate unforgetting love of the land of their fathers. Never more than at present, never so much as at present, were they devoted to the cause of their country; and the introduction of a policy of repression in the island now would lead inevitably to consequences which it is as well not to contemplate. We do not in fact like to touch on this most irritating subject at all. But Mr. Froude having begun it, the thing must be done fairly, fearlessly, and to the end. It is our view, then, that such a policy as he counsels would, if applied to Ireland, create such a gigantic and relentless Fenianism as would hardly stop with the empire's dismemberment. And we should not be surprised if, after his American experiences, that, too, is the view of Mr. Froude.

But whether such a policy as our author counsels be practicable or not, there is no man of sense or feeling who would not bitterly lament its necessity. Recourse could be had to it only when all other milder means had been tried and found unavailing. But Mr. Froude is impatient—he is unfairly impatient. He would have Ireland pass at once and completely from a state of justifiable discontent and suspicion to a state of contentment and trust. But neither the heart of a man nor

the heart of a nation can be changed in a manner so sudden. The hatred which has been hardening for centuries must have years to soften it; and memories where insult has been cut in with burning steel cannot have their writing erased by a few repentant kisses. It is Mr. Froude's greatest error that he thinks feelings can be uprooted as easily as opinions are changed; and it is his greatest crime, that when eyes were softening and hands were joining in love, he shouts out the old revengeful battle-cries, which, while they are remembered, give small hope of anything but war to the knife. We are sorry to have to speak of Mr. Froude in this way; in some points of view we even respect and admire him, and have spoken of him throughout with respect and admiration; but on the very face of his book it is plain that his purpose was the cruellest and most malignant mischief. We hope and trust, even for his own sake, that he has utterly failed; that he has not turned a single English heart to thoughts of tyranny, or a single Irish heart to thoughts of revenge. And even now, extending to him a charity which he scarcely deserves, we do for his book the best thing in our power. We advise all men, Saxon and Celt, to forget it.

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#### ART. VII.—THE IRISH UNIVERSITY BILL.

*Speech on moving for leave to bring in a Bill relating to University Education in Ireland.* By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., First Lord of the Treasury. London: John Murray.

*Speech on the Second Reading of the Bill relating to University Education in Ireland, 6th March, 1873.* By Sir ROWLAND BLENNERHASSETT, Bart., M.P. London: H. S. King.

*Speech of the Archbishop of Westminster at the Catholic Club Dinner of Liverpool, 20th March, 1873.*

**T**HE Irish University Bill, which last month nearly caused the collapse of the most powerful Government England has seen since the Union, is as yet too burning a question to be handled at large in these pages. Indeed, as we write, Mr. Fawcett's Bill awaits the attention of Parliament, and it is not impossible, or even improbable, that of the mountainous throes of the earlier part of the Session, the enactment of that Bill may be the ridiculous result. The passing of that measure indeed can settle nothing—can only make

more evident, on the contrary, the necessity for a complete and comprehensive settlement. The conditions of such a settlement we shall have abundant opportunity and occasion to discuss. At present a few remarks on the history of the late Bill and on the attitude of the Irish Episcopate towards the Government, may not be ill-timed or unavailing.

When Mr. Gladstone rose in the House of Commons on the evening of the 13th of February to propose the third great measure of his Irish Policy, any one who remembered the same place, when in 1869 the Church Bill was introduced, must have felt that Minister and Parliament were weary of their work. The Premier looked jaded and depressed; his manner was absent. It was observed that he was about to address the Speaker without waiting for the House to go into Committee, in which state alone it can hear such a measure introduced; and that he had to be reminded of another important formality, the reading of the passage from the Queen's gracious speech referring to the Bill. Throughout great part of what he said he spoke with evident difficulty, not always with that lucid order, and but rarely with that noble ardour, which are the chief elements of his eloquence. The aspect of the House was one of chill and suspicious reserve. The majority of the Liberal Party seemed to feel that their leader was making a third hopeless effort to propitiate an unreasonable and ill-conditioned people; that the attempt was foredoomed to fail; but that unlike a failure in the Irish Church or Land Questions, a failure in Irish education might have complications so extensive as not merely to shipwreck the ministry but to dislocate the party. That the Bill must contain considerable concessions to Catholic interests was regarded as certain, and such concessions might be very seriously viewed by English and Scotch constituencies, which had hailed with delight the disestablishment of the Irish Protestant Church, and seen without an atom of regret the Irish landlord's powers curtailed. It was well known that Mr. Gladstone had given his whole mind to the subject, and was staking fame, power, even it had been already whispered his very connection with public life, on the measure he was about to propose.

To such a painful tension of expectation succeeded an extraordinary triumph of the orator's power and the statesman's skill. It was not a success of enthusiasm. The House had hardly warmed, even at the end. It was strictly a success of esteem. When Mr. Gladstone sat down there was a unanimous sentiment that he had overcome all the difficulties of the subject, set forth the principles of an equitable compromise between antagonistic interests, and provided for the legiti-

mate advancement of learning while respecting the rights of conscience. In the lobby of the House Irish Catholics and English Dissenters interchanged opinions without reserve. It was felt for the moment that both wings of the majority might as willingly follow the whipper-in on this measure as they had in division after division on the Irish Church Act. The Irish Tories seemed satisfied with the augmentation of honour which the University, so much of whose history rightly belongs to their connection, was about to receive, and with the splendid endowment still reserved for Trinity College. Their silence was golden. Mr. Disraeli, observant of their satisfaction, was supposed to be well content with the prospect that another Irish difficulty, and that one associated with peculiarly unpleasant memories, was likely to be for a time at least shunted out of the way. Such seemed to be the mood of Parliament on that memorable night, and for a week at least such seemed to be the general temper of the country.

Then followed a change most complete. Of a sudden the heavens darkened, the great deeps heaved, the winds blew from all the points of the compass at once. The invisible powers, which on great occasions are said to be permitted to agitate the minds of men and possess the spirits of nations, seemed all let loose. Which was to be the side of the angels, which that of the fallen angels, Mr. Disraeli himself could hardly tell. The London Press commenced a formidable concert, in which the big drum of the *Times* had to modulate the shrill fife of the *Daily News* and the many-noted ophicleide of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, while the triangle of the *Advertiser*, accompanying the *Standard's* barrel-organ, kept not too accurate harmony at the verge of the crowd. Mr. Gladstone has never made Mr. Disraeli's mistake of saying he is "a gentleman of the Press, and has no other scutcheon;" but he is quite as much hated by certain gentlemen of the Press as if he had wounded their morbid susceptibilities by some such stroke of patronizing flattery. A great minister, who can also exercise, whenever he pleases to address the people directly, a great sway over public opinion, is an objectionable personage to able editors who have then to tack and veer and follow the current, which in ordinary times they guide or seem to guide. Perhaps Mr. Gladstone is not personally, sufficiently amiable to able editors. Whatever be the cause, certain it is that whenever opportunity offers, influential sections of the London Press, and especially that section of the Liberal Press which loved to fawn on Lord Palmerston, are eager to pursue him with an alert and morose pertinacity. A grand occasion had now pre-



sented itself; and although they had almost all proclaimed beforehand that the Irish University question could only be settled on the principles laid down in the Bill, and although they had at first generally accepted it as a masterpiece of state-craft, the moment the Government seemed to be in danger it was accused, abused, taunted, warned, and above all advised in a way that would have moved the envy of Bildad and Elihu, if they were still in the flesh. In the House of Commons, meantime, ardent advocates of the Bill became first its feeble apologists then its unsparing denouncers. Rarely does the opportunity occur in politics for such a rapid, complete, and pronounced tergiversation as Mr. Horsman's, which no doubt will become a historical instance; but there were many honourable and right honourable gentlemen who, it is well known, had the same reversible temper, if not the same acrobatic audacity.

By the time the debate on the second reading commenced, the Bill had been condemned on all hands. A section of the English Radicals and the mass of the English Tories conjointly denounced it as an elaborate contrivance for placing the higher education of Ireland under the Pope's control. The Scot looked askance, though determined to vote straight. From Ireland the sounds were, though strange, not long uncertain. Trinity College stigmatized the Bill as spoliatory, and the Queen's University reviled it as obscurantist. Catholic opinion was naturally in a very confused and divided condition until the Irish Bishops having met, and having most carefully considered the measure—having, in addition, as we are assured, taken particular pains to become informed as to its probable effect and operation upon existing Catholic academic institutions, adopted the following remarkable resolutions:—

*Resolutions of the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, assembled for the consideration of the proposed University Bill:—*

“1. That, viewing with alarm the widespread ruin caused by Godless systems of education, and adhering to the declarations of the Holy See, we reiterate the condemnation of mixed education as fraught with danger to that divine faith which is to be prized above all earthly things; for ‘without faith it is impossible to please God’ (Heb. xi. 6), and, ‘What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? (Matt. xvi. 26).

“2. That while we sincerely desire for the Catholic youth of Ireland a full participation in the advantage of University education, and in the honours, prizes, and degrees intended for the encouragement of learning, we are constrained by a sense of the duty we owe to our flocks to declare that the plan of University education now before Parliament, as being framed on the principle of mixed and purely secular education, is such as Catholic youth cannot avail themselves of without danger to their faith and morals.

"3. That the distinguished proposer of this measure, proclaiming as he does in his opening speech that the condition of Roman Catholics in Ireland in regard to University education is 'miserably bad,' 'scandalously bad,' and professing to redress this admitted grievance, brings forward a measure singularly inconsistent with his professions, because, instead of redressing it perpetuates that grievance, upholding two out of three of the Queen's Colleges, and planting in the metropolis two other great teaching institutions the same in principle with the Queen's Colleges.

"4. That, putting out of view the few Catholics who may avail themselves of mixed education, the new Bill, without its being avowed in point of fact, gives to Protestant Episcopalians, to Presbyterians, and to the new sect of Secularists, the immense endowments for University education in this country, viz., to Trinity College some £50,000 or more, some splendid holdings, library, and museum, to the new University £50,000, to the Cork College £10,000, to the Belfast College £10,000, while to the Catholic University is given nothing; and, furthermore, the Catholic people of Ireland, the great majority of the nation, and the poorest part of it, are left to provide themselves with endowments for their Colleges out of their own resources.

"5. That this injustice is aggravated by another circumstance. The measure provides that the degrees and prizes of the New University shall be open to Catholics, but it provides for Catholics no endowed intermediate schools, no endowments for their one College; no well-stocked library, museum, or other collegiate requisite; no professional staff, nor the means for coping on fair and equal terms with their Protestant or other competitors, and then Catholics thus overweighted are told that they are free to contend in the race for University prizes, and other distinctions.

"6. That as the legal owners of the Catholic University, and at the same time acting on behalf of the Catholic people of Ireland, for whose advantage and by whose generosity it has been established, in the exercise of that right of ownership, we will not consent to the affiliation of the Catholic University to the new University, unless the proposed scheme be largely modified; and we have the same objection to the affiliation of other Catholic Colleges in Ireland.

"7. That now more than ever it behoves the Catholics of Ireland to contribute to the support of the Catholic University, the one only institution of the kind in the country where Catholic youth can receive University Education based upon religion.

"8. That we address to the Imperial Parliament petitions embodying these resolutions, and praying for the amendment of the Bill.

"Signed on behalf of the meeting:

"PAUL, CARDINAL CULLEN, Archbishop of Dublin, Chairman.

"GEO. CONROY, Bishop of Ardagh and Clonmacnois;

"JAS. M'DERMOTT, Bishop of Raphoe, Secretaries.

"Presbytery, Marlborough-street, Feb. 28."

These resolutions may certainly be said to have decided the fate of the Bill. But it is due to the Bishops and due to the Government as well, to observe in connection with what after-

wards happened, that the resolutions of the Bishops did not impress upon the Irish Catholic members the duty of rejecting the Bill on its second reading. On the contrary the natural inference from the sixth and eighth resolutions, which state that without serious modification the Bill could not be accepted as satisfactory, and that their Lordships proposed to petition Parliament for its amendment, would have been that the Bill should be allowed to get into committee, as nowhere, save in committee, could such amendments be introduced. It is due, we repeat, to the Irish Bishops, who have been somewhat truculently assailed for having wantonly caused the shipwreck of a Government which had done and suffered so much for the Catholic people of Ireland, that the precise practical bearing of their acts should be fairly estimated and represented. There was absolutely nothing in the resolutions of the Bishops to prevent an Irish Catholic member of Parliament from voting for the second reading of the Bill, or from not voting at all.

But the debate on the second reading of the Bill had not long proceeded before it became apparent that the Government had become bewildered and unnerved. It was no secret that there had been more division in the Cabinet upon it than perhaps upon any measure which had engaged their care since they came into office. The views of Mr. Lowe on education in general are tolerably well known. The views of Mr. Fortescue, as to the degree of respect due to the conscientious convictions of the Irish Catholics, in regard to higher education in particular, have been not less openly avowed. So it was that when Mr. Lowe defended the Bill he did so in a tone which naturally alarmed and irritated Catholics. When Mr. Fortescue spoke on its behalf, he could not help conveying his persuasion and his hope that the Catholics of Ireland, long spoiled of the access and opportunity of liberal learning, would once more be enabled, through the gradual action of the Bill, to revindicate their ancient intellectual glory; and there were supporters of the Government who regarded such expressions with suspicion and anger. To and fro the debate ran for a week a devious and uncertain track. No Catholic member of eminence had as yet, on the night before it closed, spoken against the Bill. On the other hand, Sir Rowland Blennerhassett had made a very able speech in favour of its second reading, in which he announced, however, his intention of proposing serious amendments in committee. Late that night, Mr. Cardwell rose. He spoke for an hour, and as he spoke the Bill appeared to crumble under his touch. At the end there seemed to be nothing left of it that could be

regarded as essential or fundamental, except the dissociation of Dublin University from Trinity College. The clauses which were supposed to have been inserted with special reference to Catholic interests and principles, were treated merely as ballast. One was fatally reminded of the tone in which, when Chief Secretary, the right honourable gentleman had told the Irish people that Tenant Right would never be legalized by Parliament, and that the Established Church must be maintained. The tone, even more than the tenor of what Mr. Cardwell said, was fatal to the Bill. It was felt with anxiety and regret by Catholic members of the Liberal party, staunch supporters of Mr. Gladstone for many years, and who were not likely, on a question of such magnitude, to prefer that course which already promised to be the most popular, to that which they might feel to be the path of principle and honour, that the Bill must now be not merely not supported, but opposed. They felt that if there were to be amendments in committee, the Government were giving no indication that they would be of such a nature as the Irish Bishops had petitioned for, but the contrary. There has not been in our time an occasion on which the exercise of discretion on the part of an Irish Catholic member was more difficult or the responsibility of the decision greater. But for Mr. Cardwell's speech, there is no manner of doubt that many representatives of Catholic constituencies would have voted for the second reading with the few who still clung to the belief that Mr. Gladstone would make extraordinary efforts in Committee to render a measure, to which he had given so much thought, acceptable to those for whose welfare it was intended. We are as little disposed to censure those who clung to this hope to the end, and who, in doing so, had the letter of the Bishops' resolutions with them, as to deny that the majority exercised a legitimate discretion in utterly destroying the Bill. The history of University Education in Ireland has hitherto been a series of abrupt and violent checks just at the moment when some definite object appeared to be almost attained. It is a subject of which the solution appears to be as yet reserved by Providence, and on which the estimates of current opinion are little likely to anticipate correctly the judgment of history; and it is certainly a question which will yet furnish a very curious and instructive chapter of Irish Catholic memoirs.

The speeches with which Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone closed the debate were memorable, not only on account of the gravity of the immediate occasion, but because of the evidently carefully considered declarations which they contained as to the future relation of the two great parties in the State to the

Catholic Church in regard to education and endowment. These we shall take leave to record for future convenience of reference.

When Mr. Disraeli rose, it was certain that the Government would be, if not defeated, sustained by so slight a majority that perseverance with the Bill, and probably even continuance in office, would be impossible to them. As is his custom whenever he is engaged in any rather ambiguous stroke of party warfare, the right honourable gentleman veiled his attack with that air of cabalistic pomp, which reminds one of the mysterious rites with which Wizard Anderson used to screen the operation of converting a gold watch into a pancake. He spoke with solemnity of the rights of University Faculties, especially of Trinity College's "ancient and famous Faculty of Divinity." He imagined with horror the prospect of a university in which the religion of the Koran, the Vedas, or Zoroaster might be instilled into the minds of ingenuous Irish youths, forbidden to neutralize their effect by reference to the Thirty-nine Articles or the Syllabus. Then the danger of the classics so affected him that for ten minutes he spoke in a way that would have charmed the heart of Abbé Gaume. "In an age in which young men prattle about protoplasm to young ladies who, in gilded saloons, unconsciously talk Atheism," he imagined the effect on the young men of Stephen's Green and the young ladies of Merrion Square of a series of lectures delivered by some profoundly protoplasmic professor about Mr. Munro's new edition of Lucretius. But anon his voice grew deeper and more solemn. It seemed to come from the very depths of his soul, if not from the very soles of his boots. Through its tones breathed, as it were, an unearthly echo of the past, a dim-resounding chord of Zion's harp. He imagined the position of the professor of ancient history, some Irish Olave, no doubt equally learned in the Talmud, the Maha-Bharata, and the Brehon law, and he shuddered as he said that he felt that he would "be involved in great peril." How in great peril?

I suppose the mind of Europe, and I believe I may almost say of America, has been formed by two of the smallest States that ever existed, and which resembled each other in many particulars. Both were divided into tribes; both inhabited a very limited country and not a very fertile one; both have left us a literature of startling originality, and both on an Acropolis have raised a most splendid temple. I can see the unfortunate professor in the new University, restricted in his choice on so many subjects, deprived of divine philosophy, not permitted to touch on the principles of ethics, looking around him at last with some feeling of relief and fixing on the inexhaustible theme of Athenian genius. He would do justice to the Athenian tribes—

their eloquence, their poetry, their arts, and their patriotic exploits. But what if the professor, lecturing on ancient history, were to attempt to do the same justice to the tribes of Israel? I suppose he could hardly deal thoroughly with Hebrew history without touching on the origin of the Christian Church, and then it would be in the power of a single one of his audience to menace him for the course he was pursuing and to denounce him to the Council, who, if they had a majority—and a majority of one would do—might despoil of his seat a man illustrious for his learning. A single vote would do, and probably it would be carried by a single vote. The vote of Carlow College might deprive this Professor of Ancient History of his chair.

The House was pervaded by a thrill of comic awe quite equal to one of the subtle hysterical effects of the late Mr. Robson, the actor. There was a shiver of horror at the thought that Carlow College should be animated by such an unrelenting hatred of Christianity, mingled with a chuckle of admiration for the artistic ingenuity with which that tiny jet from the waters of Babylon had been for an instant turned on.

But the right honourable gentleman had a serious object in his speech, an object of such paramount and permanent importance that he was prepared to take some risk of losing votes absolutely necessary for the defeat of the Government rather than leave it unaccomplished. It was necessary that it should be clearly understood by his own party and by the country, as well as by the Catholics who were going into the lobby with him, that the policy formerly familiarly called "levelling up" was for ever renounced; not merely this, that it should also be renounced in terms of such deadly insult to the principal prelate of the Catholic Church, and the representative of the Holy See in Ireland, that what Lord Derby called the natural alliance of the Catholics and the Conservative party should be clearly seen to be, so far as that country is concerned, absolutely at an end. After alluding briefly to Lord Derby's connection with the system of national education, he said—and there was no want of meditated distinctness in his words, or of deliberate earnestness in his utterance:—

Let me remind the House—for though it is modern history I may be pardoned for referring to it (a laugh)—of the general system under which Ireland was governed a few years ago, and the system which had prevailed for a considerable time. It was a system which endeavoured, not equally, but at the same time gradually, to assist, so far as religion and education were concerned, the various creeds and classes of that country. It had in its rude elements been introduced into Ireland a very considerable time back, but during the present century it had been gradually but completely developed, and it was called, or has been called of late years, concurrent endowment. I am not going to entrap the House into a discussion on the merits of concurrent

endowment, for concurrent endowment is dead, and I will tell you in a few minutes who killed it. But this I will say of concurrent endowment, that it was at least a policy, and the policy of great statesmen. It was the policy of Pitt, of Grey, of Russell, of Peel, and of Palmerston. The Protestant Church of Ireland under that system had held its ascendancy, of which, in my opinion, it has been unjustly and injuriously deprived. The Roman Catholics had a magnificent and increasing collegiate establishment, the Presbyterians had a *Regium Donum*, which I always was of opinion ought to have been doubled. So far as Lord Palmerston was concerned—and Lord Palmerston was always called the Protestant Premier—he was prepared, and had himself recommended in this House, to secure to the Roman Catholics their glebes. That policy is dead. When Lord Derby had to consider this question, he had to consider it under the influence of that policy. Devoted as he was to the cause of united education, it was his opinion, on the representations which were made to him by those who represented the Protestant Church, the Protestant College, and the Protestant University of Ireland, that the position of Roman Catholics with respect to University education was, I will not say “scandalous,” but was one which demanded the consideration of every statesman. Propositions were made and placed before him. It became our duty, according to our view of our duty, to place ourselves in communication with the Roman Catholic hierarchy. We thought that was the proper course to pursue—that it was better to attempt to bring about a satisfactory settlement, of which there appeared to be some probability, by such straightforward means than by dark and sinister intrigues. Two Roman Catholic prelates were delegated to this country to enter into communication with the Government. Unfortunately, when the time had arrived, power had left Lord Derby, and he was unworthily represented. I did not think it my duty or for the public service to place myself in personal communication with those gentlemen, but two of my colleagues did me the honour of representing me and the Government on that occasion, one of them eminent for his knowledge of Ireland and of the subject, the late Lord Mayo, and the other a man most distinguished for his knowledge of human nature, Lord Malmesbury; and I am bound to say that they represented to me—and I mention them as admirable judges of the matter—that those negotiations were conducted by the Roman Catholics with dignity, conciliation, and moderation. I may have been too sanguine, but there was a moment when I believed that some settlement of this question, honourable and satisfactory to all classes, might have been made. I am bound to say that no offer of endowment was made by the Government. I am still more bound to say that no offer of endowment was urged, although it might have been mentioned, by the Roman Catholics. I am bound to say this because the right hon. member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Bouverie) referred to a document of much more ancient date—a communication from Sir G. Grey. I suppose the Roman Catholic hierarchy had profited by the experience of that negotiation. It is unnecessary to dwell on these particulars for a moment. The right hon. gentleman says I burnt my fingers on that occasion. I see no scars. The right hon. gentleman opposite has been a pupil of Sir R. Peel. He sat in the Cabinet of Palmerston, who was supposed to be a devoted votary of the policy of concurrent endowment.

The right hon. gentleman suddenly—I impute no motives, that is quite unnecessary—but the right hon. gentleman suddenly changed his mind and threw over the policy of concurrent endowment—mistaking the clamour of the Nonconformists for the voice of the nation. The Roman Catholics fell into the trap. They forgot the cause of University education in the prospect of destroying the Protestant Church. The right hon. gentleman succeeded in his object. He became Prime Minister of England. If he had been a little more patient, without throwing over concurrent endowment, he would perhaps have been Prime Minister as soon. The Roman Catholics had the satisfaction of destroying the Protestant Church—of disestablishing the Protestant Church. They had the satisfaction before the year was over of witnessing the disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church at Rome. As certain as we are in this House, the policy that caused the one led to the other. It was the consistent and continuous achievement of a man who is entitled above all others to the reverence of Protestants—and that is Cardinal Cullen. For if there be one man more than another to whom the fall of the Papacy is attributable it is to his Eminence. And now, Sir, see what occurred. The Roman Catholics, having reduced Ireland to a spiritual desert, are discontented and have a grievance; and they come to Parliament in order that we may create a blooming Garden of Eden for them. The Prime Minister is no ordinary man. (Ministerial cheers.) I am very glad that my sincere compliment has obtained for the right hon. gentleman the only cheer which his party have conferred upon him during this discussion. (Opposition cheers and laughter.) The right hon. gentleman had a substitute for the policy of concurrent endowment, which had been killed by the Roman Catholics themselves. The right hon. gentleman substituted the policy of confiscation. You have had four years of it. You have despoiled churches. You have threatened every corporation and endowment in the country. You have examined into everybody's affairs. You have criticised every profession and vexed every trade. No one is certain of his property, and nobody knows what duties he may have to perform to-morrow. This is the policy of confiscation as compared with that of concurrent endowment.

The anxiety and depression which had visibly weighed on Mr. Gladstone all through the progress of the debate, and which had been particularly perceptible in the earlier part of that evening, had utterly vanished when he rose at midnight to speak what might in all probability be his last speech as Prime Minister—what it was even said might be, and in the tone and substance of the speech there was some evidence that he so regarded it himself—his farewell to public life. Mr. Gladstone never spoke a greater speech, but its eloquence consisted more in its straightforward and magnanimous spirit than in art of persuasion, or sleight of fancy, or colour of words. Not that these were wanting. Sentence by sentence built up its argument like solid stone on stone. Every word clear, and fit, and stately moved in ordered



rhythm. Even a rare flash of humour now and then gleamed with fine effect across the always sober and often solemn strain of his discourse. But his eloquence was as much in what he abstained from saying as in what he said. There was not a word that taunted those who had gone so far with him, and for whom he had gone so far, but who now felt it their duty to roughly frustrate the last great enterprise of his Irish policy. For the House whose confidence he had so long possessed, which had sustained him in such a series of splendid achievements, but which had now suddenly become, in a way no one could explain, cowed and confused, he had only words of grateful respect and touching homage. To fall from power with dignity and courage may be fairly expected from any man who is fit to bear the weighty burden and the arduous toil of a British Minister; but no British statesman, we venture to say, ever invoked the verdict of Parliament at the last resort, and before certain defeat, in a spirit of such magnanimous serenity, such considerate tolerance, and such gracious good-will.

Towards the close Mr. Gladstone spoke of the policy of the State towards the Catholic Church in Ireland. This passage was one and the chief of those which were thought to give his speech a certain valedictory character. We may with advantage here record it as the deliberate expression of his opinion in a controversy which has by no means come to a close.

Now, with regard to endowment to a Roman Catholic College or University, there has been some variety of expression of opinion in this House from very different quarters, I grant. My right hon. friend the President of the Board of Trade stated to the House that he regrets the state of opinion and feeling, which makes it, in his judgment, totally impossible to ask Parliament for anything in the nature of endowment for a Roman Catholic college or university. The senior member for the University of Dublin has gone somewhat further than my right hon. friend, for he states, without hesitation, if I heard him aright, that he is favourable to concurrent endowment. My hon. friend, the member for Waterford, in like manner, in his speech yesterday, did not disguise that which has long been the well-known feeling of his mind on this subject. Well, my own view differs even from that of my right hon. friend. I don't admit that the claim of the Roman Catholics has been made good to the endowment of a college or university. I don't found that exclusively on the state of Protestant opinion. If that were all, I should be ready to oppose myself to the tide of that opinion, however strong it might be; but I think there are the best reasons, strong and obvious, why it is impossible to entertain the question of Roman Catholic endowment. The claim that is made is in direct opposition to the policy of 1869. If there is to be a Roman Catholic endowment, or the endowment of any other establishment, Magee College, or any other under

ecclesiastical control—for Magee College is under the ecclesiastical control of the General Assembly, just as the Catholic University is under the control of the Roman Catholic prelates—then I say we were entirely wrong in 1869, and that the surplus of 5,000,000*l.* which remained after satisfying vested interests, making some concession to the House of Lords, in order not to lose our Bill, and winding up the affairs of Maynooth and the *Regium Donum*, ought to have been divided among all the religious communions of Ireland if the claim for endowment is a good one. (Hear.) But it is said we are about to pass a Bill which places the Roman Catholics on a footing of inequality. On the contrary, it is the claim advanced by the Roman Catholic prelates that involves the principle of inequality. We have not endowed, and are not now endowing, any other persuasion in Ireland. The Queen's Colleges have an endowment, but they are not given to one persuasion more than another. It is said that Belfast is made to serve the purposes of the Presbyterians, but it offers no facilities to the Presbyterians beyond what it and Galway offer to the Roman Catholics. Trinity College has an endowment, but it keeps it only on condition of opening its doors and honours and emoluments to the different religious communities of Ireland without distinction. But there is another reason which applies to all religious communions in Ireland, and I am bound to say it applies to the Roman Catholic communion at the present moment with peculiar force. The claim of the Episcopate with regard to collegiate and academic institutions, as I understand it, is this: they demand that they shall be supreme in all matters of faith and morals, and that it shall rest with them exclusively to determine what matters are matters of faith and morals. I am one of those who think that if the laity of the Roman Catholic Church choose to submit to those demands, it is neither policy nor justice on our part to punish them, and to say, as we do say now, "So long as you submit, you shall not have free access to University degrees and emoluments." It is the worst policy in the world; it is withholding from them the means by which, as I believe, liberal sentiments would spread among them. But it is a serious matter to propose that, where these relations exist between the Episcopacy and the laity, public endowment shall be given to them. The sentiments of the laity may change; they may begin to withhold this free submission; they may begin to do that which many think they have done at other periods of history, and not to acknowledge that sort of absolute domination which now appears to be established within the limits of the Roman Church. But if you give an endowment to a college which is founded on the principle of episcopal absolutism, it becomes a means of fixing and perpetuating the relation of power on the side of the bishop, and absolute submission and servitude on the side of the laity. These appear to me to be reasons, quite irrespective of any abstract argument, of the most conclusive force against the demand that is made. The hon. and learned member for Oxford, in the course of his eloquent speech, said he entertained hope of the laity. I have the fortune or misfortune to count ten years for one of the political years of my hon. and learned friend; I have little before me, I have much behind; I have an account to render of the past and present; and though I have not, like him, the prospect of a

future which I trust will be to him rich in all manner of prosperity and distinction, yet the duties of the moment are solemn. I wish to leave on record the strong conviction I entertain that it would be a grave and serious error on the part of this House were they to give the slightest encouragement to the demand that is made for introducing into Ireland the system of separate endowment for separate religious institutions for academic purposes, and thereby distinctly to renounce and repudiate the policy of 1869, to which the great majority of this House were parties, and which I believe none of us regret.

The Government were defeated by a majority of 3 in a division in which 571 members voted. Out of the entire Irish representation only 15 voted for Government. Thirty-five Irish members, staunch supporters of Mr. Gladstone's previous Irish policy, voted with Opposition. The Irish Tories mustered as many more. Whatever might be the fate of the Ministry, the Bill was thus absolutely rejected by the representatives of Ireland. A political crisis for which there is no recent precedent in the history of the Constitution followed. The Opposition, pressed in every possible way to take office, persistently declined. Though they had not hesitated to use art and energy to defeat the Government on a question of vital policy, they declared that they knew they did not possess the confidence of Parliament. Nor does it appear that they, in so many words, asked the Queen for permission to dissolve, though the question was so far considered that Mr. Disraeli felt bound to excogitate an entirely new theory of dissolution, the sum of which is that no Opposition should ever take office. The secret history of those mysterious days will hardly be known to our generation. The result was, that as the Queen's Government must be carried on, Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues were compelled by the obligation of public duty reluctantly to resume their several offices. On Monday, the 17th of March, Lord Granville, in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone, in the Commons, announced that Her Majesty had requested her late Ministers to continue to carry on the administration of affairs. This Irish crisis thus came not inauspiciously to an end on Saint Patrick's Day. If on the part of Catholics there was nothing to repent in what had passed, there was, on the other hand, nothing to exult over. That organ, which Mr. Disraeli describes as the "historical conscience," and which belongs to nations even more properly than to individuals, would have been vexed perhaps with abiding qualms and scruples at the remembrance that a Minister who had made such sacrifices for and rendered such services to Ireland, had at the end been rudely flung from office, perhaps banished from public life, by Irish votes. If in public affairs there be indeed

the side of the angels, there may also be, we assume, the side of the brutes. In every country there is a party which it would not be altogether uncharitable to describe as the Brutal Party, unreasoning, ungrateful, suspicious, vituperative, clamorous, and truculent. In Ireland it exists—on a small scale, thank God! It exulted over the fall of Mr. Gladstone with a loud noise, as if a great enemy of the land had been smitten hip and thigh in the hour of his triumphant evil-doing. That the Bill had perished was to many wise and holy men, no doubt, a cause of heartfelt congratulation. That the Ministry remained was not, perhaps, the less, under all the circumstances, a great mercy.

The Archbishop of Westminster has, with admirable clearness, sagacity, and good feeling, well expressed in the following passage of his speech at Liverpool what were the first sentiments of Catholics who had given some attention to the history and conditions of the subject of Irish University Education, and who had also taken into consideration the position of the Government and the temper of the House of Commons in regard to the prospect of passing any adequate measure on the subject.

I heard the whole of that debate, and this I must say, that I am perfectly convinced that the desire on the part of the Government was to do the utmost that men could do under the conditions of Parliament and the public opinion of this most divided, and, I am sorry to say, anti-Catholic country, for so it is still to a great extent. They did their utmost I firmly believe. I do not speak thus as a partisan or supporter—for I have already protested that I am not more of a politician than the Bishop of Liverpool—but because I believe that they did most honestly and most honourably desire to give to the Catholics of Ireland the power of obtaining degrees upon terms consistent with their conscience; and I may say that that Bill did give to the Catholics of Ireland the power of obtaining degrees on terms better than those on which Catholics can take degrees in England. I will say in what point this is true. No Catholic in England can take a degree without either exposing himself to the pestilent infidelity of Oxford, or going to the London University; and at the London University no Catholic can take a degree without being examined in the ethics and in the metaphysics, which are held by the professors of that University.

But His Grace added—

I am not an apologist for, and I am not going to enter upon a defence of this Bill. The Catholic Bishops of Ireland have taken the only course they could take. Fully recognising, as I recognize, the desire of the Government to deal justly, and to put University degrees within their reach, I believe they would have gladly accepted that, even though there were no endowments. They would have said—let the endowments pass, as the endowments of the

Established Church, now disestablished, were refused by us ; give us only sound education. But what did this Bill do ? It extended, it consolidated, it further endowed, it made permanent, and it gave an impulse which would have extended all over Ireland, to the same system of mixed and godless education against which the Bishops of Ireland from the year 1845 had protested. I quite admit that, on the one hand, the Government could hardly do otherwise than press on in the path which, unfortunately, was opened in that year. The condition of legislation in this country we all know. Government are not free agents. Public opinion holds a tyrannous sway over them. Parliament bends to public opinion ; and therefore I will not blame them, though I lament it.

In order fairly to understand the position in which the bishops of Ireland were placed, it is necessary very briefly to revert to the history of their previous negotiations with the Government on the subject of University Education. The negotiations may be divided into three different periods—those at the time of the first foundation of the Queen's Colleges, those at the date of the Supplemental Charter to the Queen's University, and those with Lord Mayo on the subject of a Charter to the Catholic University. It is enough to state concerning the first negotiation that the main point on which the bishops joined issue with the Government was the principle of mixed education itself, and that the only compromise to which they would have consented was the appointment of a strong staff of Catholic professors in each college to the various chairs in which they apprehended that matters dangerous to the faith of Catholic students might be introduced by non-Catholic teachers. The demands of the bishops were refused. The colleges were founded without any such guarantees as they required. They were condemned by the Synod of Thurles as dangerous to faith and morals. In a few years it became evident that they had utterly failed to fulfil the design of their founders, and in 1866 negotiations on the basis of the Queen's University were resumed.

The spirit in which the Irish bishops entered upon these negotiations is expressed with admirable clearness in the letter of Cardinal Cullen to Sir George Grey. The four archbishops had been deputed to negotiate with Government ; and his Eminence, writing in their name, said :—

The archbishops are anxious to impress on Her Majesty's Government the right of Catholics to equality in the matter of education with their Protestant fellow-subjects, and to point out to you, if necessary, how far the Government measure may fall short of securing to them that equality. The archbishops are also instructed to state that the Roman Catholic Episcopal body, while declining to accept as satisfactory any arrangement which will leave preponderating advantages to existing State institutions.

collegiate or University, that have been condemned by the Catholic Church, will not refuse for themselves and their flocks concessions that may diminish the evils and injustice of which they have had so long to complain ; it being, however, distinctly understood that such acceptance is not to be construed as an acquiescence in any form of mixed education.

After having had an interview with the Secretary of State, the proposals of the bishops were embodied in a Memorial signed by, we believe, the entire Irish hierarchy, the Archbishop of Tuam excepted. Their Lordships proposed—

1. That the Catholic University should be chartered as a college within the new (Queen's) University in such a manner as to leave the department of teaching Catholics altogether in the hands of Catholics, under the control of their bishops, and they submitted a draft of charter based on that of King's College, London.

2. That in order to put this college on a footing of equality with other institutions, a suitable endowment be given to it.

3. That for the same reason bourses and scholarships be provided, either by the application of existing or the creation of new endowments, so as to place the rewards of merit equally within the reach of all.

4. That the Catholic University College be authorized to affiliate other colleges and schools.

5. That the tests of knowledge be applied in such manner as to avoid the appearance of connecting, even by the identity of name, those who avail themselves of them, or co-operate in applying them, with a system which their religion condemns.

6. That these tests of knowledge be guarded against every danger of abuse or of the exercise of any influence hostile or prejudicial to the religious principles of Catholics ; that they may be made as general as may be, consistently with a due regard for the interests of education, the time, manner, and matter of examination being prescribed, but not the books or special authors, at least in mental and social science, in history or in cognate subjects, and that, in a word, there be banished from them even the suspicion of interference with the religious principles of Catholics.

7. That the Queen's Colleges be re-arranged on the principles of the denominational system of education.

To this memorial, Sir George Grey replied at length. He said that the Government had no intention of interfering with the principle of mixed education on which the Queen's University was founded, or of proposing any change of method in regard to the management of the Queen's Colleges ; but that they would enable the Queen's University to give degrees to all comers in the same way as the London University, and

were willing to grant a charter of incorporation, as a college of the Queen's University, to the Catholic University. While admitting that the Archbishops ought properly to be constituted visitors, the Secretary of State added that if the college was to receive a charter from the Crown, its governing body should contain a considerable proportion of laymen. He further stated that ministers were not prepared to propose to Parliament that the college should be endowed, but that they would ask for the grant of a sum to provide bourses or scholarships open to all students being members of the Queen's University. He concluded by saying that no power to affiliate colleges could be given, and that all questions as to "tests of knowledge" must be left to the Senate of the University, which the Government hoped to be able to constitute in such a manner as would command the confidence of all religious denominations.

To this communication his Eminence replied on the 11th of February, 1866, in a letter, of which the following is the principal passage:—

Having communicated your reply to these prelates, I regret to say that they are all of opinion that the promises held out to them in that document are far from corresponding to the hope which they had entertained, that the present Government, so liberal and enlightened, would have taken some effective step to place them and their flock on a footing of equality with their fellow-subjects of other religious denominations in regard to education. However, they are not willing to give any decided opinion upon this matter until they shall have seen the proposed charter of the new University and the draft of a charter for the Roman Catholic University College in the form in which the Government would consider it admissible.

It is not necessary to trace this negotiation through its subsequent stages. The supplemental charter to the Queen's University was issued by the Crown. It was rejected by the Convocation of that body, and the Master of the Rolls issued an injunction forbidding the newly constituted Senate from proceeding to act upon it. It has since remained a dead letter.

Lord Derby having acceded to power, in the course of the following year a communication was opened with his Government by the Archbishop of Cashel and Bishop of Clonfert, deputed for that object by the Irish Hierarchy. In writing to the Prime Minister they stated that they were authorised to apply for a charter and endowment of a Catholic University, and had received a discretionary power to treat of the whole matter without any limit or restriction, save the occurrence of some difficulty of great moment. The sub-

ject was referred to Lord Mayo, then Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, and was considered by him in a detailed Memorandum, evidently drawn up for the information and consideration of the Cabinet. After recapitulating the correspondence with Sir George Grey, Lord Mayo proceeded to admit that "a just claim exists for the creation of a university of a denominational character . . . which should stand in the same position to Roman Catholics that Trinity College does to Protestants." He declared his belief that direct Government control over its conduct would not, in his belief, be successful, inasmuch as "the success of a university depends very much on its independence;" but he held it to be "indispensable that a lay element of much power and influence should be introduced into the governing body of the new University." He proposed, therefore, that a charter for a Roman Catholic University should be granted to the following persons to be named in the charter, who should form a senate not exceeding twenty in number, all being necessarily Roman Catholics:—A Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor, four Bishops, the President of Maynooth College, six laymen, the Heads of the colleges proposed to be affiliated, and five members to be elected one by each of the five faculties of the University. He proposed that vacancies in the first Senate nominated by charter should be filled in the case of the Chancellor, and six lay senators by election in a convocation to consist of the Chancellor, Senate, Professors, and graduates; in the case of the Bishops, by election of the Hierarchy; in the case of the members representing Faculties, by election therein; in the case of the President of Maynooth and the Heads of affiliated colleges, *ex officio*; and in the case of the Vice-Chancellor, by the Chancellor's appointment. On the University so constituted, Lord Mayo proposed to confer university powers as full as are possessed by Trinity College, with no restriction on freedom of teaching, save that no student of another faith should be required to attend any Catholic religious observance, or should be subject to teaching in any religion except his own. He also proposed that the Senate of the University should have a veto on the appointment of the professors and officials of the affiliated colleges. What was really said on the subject of endowment has been so often disputed that it might be supposed Lord Mayo's memorandum was a confidential Cabinet minute, and not a published Parliamentary paper.\* These are Lord Mayo's exact words:—

Until the colleges are firmly established it may be proper to postpone the

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\* No. 288, Session 1868.



question of endowment. It is one of great difficulty, and need not form an indispensable portion of the plan.

It may, however, be necessary to ask Parliament to provide a sufficient sum for the payment of the expenses of the examinations, for the foundation of a certain number of university scholarships, and the giving away of prizes ; and also the payment of the salaries of certain officers and servants of the university, and perhaps some provision for a university hall and examination rooms.

The Archbishop of Cashel and Bishop of Clonfert had, as Mr. Disraeli in the late debate reminded the House, a long interview with Lord Malmesbury and Lord Mayo ; and at its end they agreed to state their objections to the plan proposed by the Government in writing. Their objections may be most simply expressed in the form of the counter proposals to which they led. The Prelates authorized to treat on behalf of the Irish Hierarchy proposed—1. That the Chancellor should be always a Bishop, to be elected not by Convocation, but by the Senate, and that Cardinal Cullen should be the first Chancellor. 2. That the six lay members of the Senate should also be elected by the Senate, and not by Convocation. 3. That all heads of affiliated colleges, without limitation to the number of twenty, should be members of the Senate. 4. That the University Senate should have no power of veto on the appointment of professors or other officers in the affiliated colleges. 5. That the Bishops on the Senate should have an absolute negative on all books taught in the University curriculum, and on the first nomination of professors. And here it is proper to state the reasons which the negotiating prelates had for urging this proposal, in their own language, as it seems to have been that one which Lord Mayo felt he either should not accept or could not carry with the consent of the Cabinet and Parliament. The paragraph is in these terms :—

In the course of your Lordship's statement, you observed that the presence in the Senate of four bishops, and of the President of Maynooth College, together with the circumstance that all the members of the Senate should be Roman Catholics, afforded a sufficient guarantee for the safety of faith and morals. We duly appreciate the desire of the Government to provide an adequate guarantee for that purpose, and on behalf of the Irish bishops we very willingly record their sense of the kindly disposition thus evinced. But it is our duty to state, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that the safety of faith and morals in the University can only be secured by recognizing in the Bishops as members of the Senate the right, which as Bishops they possess, and which all Catholics must acknowledge them to possess, of pronouncing authoritatively on matters of faith and morals. That right belongs to them, and to them alone, as compared with laymen, and even ecclesiastics

of the second order. According to the doctrine and discipline of the Catholic Church, it is not competent for laymen, not even for clergymen of the second order, however learned, to judge authoritatively of faith and morality. That is the exclusive province of Bishops. As faith and morality may be injuriously affected either by the heterodox teaching of professors, lecturers, or other officers, or by their bad moral example, or by the introduction of bad books into the University programme, the very least power that could be claimed for the Bishops on the Senate, with a view to the counteraction of such evils, would be that of an absolute negative on such books, and on the first nomination of professors, &c. &c., as well as on their continuing to hold their offices after having been judged by the Bishops on the Senate to have grievously offended against faith or morals. It will be observed that the power here claimed relates solely to matters intimately connected with morality and doctrine.

On the subject of endowment, the negotiating Prelates made no express stipulation, but they strongly urged the propriety of providing adequately for the maintenance of an efficient staff of university professors. Lord Mayo met those proposals with a general negative. He said the Government had determined to name as first Chancellor "a layman of rank, influence, and position"; that they could not agree to exclude any of the members of the University from taking part in the election of that officer, or of the lay senators; and that they believed a governing body, which should have the power of filling up vacancies amongst themselves, would not command public confidence. In regard to the position and attributes of the episcopal members of the Senate, he said:—

The proposition that the episcopal members of the Senate should possess any power greater than that of their lay colleagues, is one that Her Majesty's Government cannot entertain.

It would establish a system of education essentially different from that which was intended, and therefore the Government cannot agree to give to any of the members of the Senate a power over teaching, books, discipline, or appointments which is not enjoyed equally by all.

The object of the Government was to create an institution which, although denominational in its character, would be thoroughly independent, self-governed, and free from any external influence, either political or religious.

The proposals made in your letter would strike at the very root of these principles, and I am therefore, with extreme regret, obliged to inform you that the recommendations contained in that letter cannot be entertained.

The Archbishop of Cashel acknowledged the receipt of Lord Mayo's letter. The negotiation paused. Lord Mayo, not having received any further communication from the negotiating Prelates, after an interval of a fortnight, declared that he considered the transaction was at an end. The Archbishop

gravely demurred. Lord Mayo rejoined. But no more was heard of the charter. The truth is, events had swept the negotiation out of the negotiators' hands. Mr. Gladstone's resolution condemning the Irish State Church had been carried while it was pending. Lord Mayo's policy for Ireland was to be supplanted by one far juster, larger, and grander, which, however, was itself doomed to founder in its turn, after apparently far greater and more difficult achievements, in the attempt to settle the sufficiently simple question of Catholic Education. This is the position we have now reached.

For some time to come, the policy of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy in regard to the question of University Education is certain to be the subject of severe scrutiny, and, we hope, of just and candid as well as of ample comment. We have thought it well to give side by side with the narrative of what befell Mr. Gladstone's Bill, a *précis* of the previous negotiations on the subject. The demands therein advanced on behalf of the Catholics of Ireland must now be considered in connection with what we perceive to be the sense of Parliament and the solemn declarations of statesmen. Certainly they have to be so considered by a people who have on not a few occasions shown their capacity of making statesmen reflect, and Parliament completely change its mind in a very brief space of time. If the people of Ireland are willing to contend for the absolute freedom of Catholic education with the same spirit, unity, and longanimity that they devoted to the not more noble cause of their civil emancipation, they will assuredly prevail. Circumstances not of their choice have given or are giving that people the charge of the cause of Christian education not merely in their own country, but in England and the United States, as well as throughout the British empire. At Melbourne, at New York, at London, nowadays, the issue is still the same, whether the knowledge of God shall or shall not be excluded from the instruction given by the State to the young. If the Catholic people of Ireland choose to insist upon their right to have a Catholic system of education, University, collegiate, and popular, there is no power on earth can prevent their attaining it. Its achievement only demands a prudent policy, an unwavering and undivided purpose, and an energetic application of the considerable political power at their command.

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## Notices of Books.

*The Life and Letters of S. Francis Xavier.* By HENRY JAMES COLERIDGE, of the Society of Jesus. Vol. II. London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

THE second volume of Father Coleridge's "Life of S. Francis Xavier" fully maintains the very high estimate which we formed of the first volume.\* We have now before us the complete life of the great Apostle of the Indies, who, more perhaps than any other since the day of the "Twelve," has deserved to be called an apostle; and a noble addition it is to our literature. The present volume continues the history of the Saint in three more books, from his return to India to his sailing for Japan, from his sailing to Japan to his last return to India, and then from that period to his death at San Chan in 1556.

The great work of evangelizing India undertaken by S. Francis Xavier ought to have more than an ordinary attraction for English readers, since the empire of that vast country has passed into English hands; and we wish that we could hope that those who are now engaged in its government would learn wisdom from the mistakes and failures and apathy of past rulers, as well as from the lessons and warnings of the Saint. Great indeed are the responsibilities of those nations to which Divine Providence has confided the government of heathen lands, yet how rarely are these responsibilities acted up to or even realized! The aggrandizement and enrichment of the home country, not the spreading of Christ's kingdom, are almost always the chief objects of rulers who call themselves Christian; nay, the work even of a saint raised up by God for the conversion of the heathen may, as we see in the case of S. Francis, be hindered, hampered, fettered, delayed by the coldness, indifference, perverseness, and opposition of those in power, as well as by the want of faith and corrupt lives of the Christian population. We have a remarkable instance of the way in which S. Francis Xavier's work was hampered by the want of a christianizing policy on the part of the Indian officials in the matter of the Rajah or King of Candia, whose cause he had espoused, although Don Joam de Castro, the Governor of the Indies,

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\* We expressed, indeed, our own humble opinion, that what we called the "hagiological" method of writing a Saint's life is, on the whole, more profitable than the "biographical"; but we added that the latter also, which F. Coleridge has adopted, possesses unquestionably great advantages of its own.

was himself a true-hearted Christian, and at the end died an heroic death. It occurs in the 2nd chapter, p. 38 :—

“When Francis Xavier arrived at Goa, with the envoy of the King of Candia, of whom mention has already been made, Don Joam de Castro was at Bazain, some way to the north, along the coast, engaged in military preparations and enterprises. . . . It would appear that there was some reason to fear that the Governor was not disposed to take active measures for the simple furtherance of religion, or at least that influential members of the Council were likely to oppose such measures. The letter of the King of Portugal to the Governor, though not strong enough to force an actively christianizing policy upon the Indian officials, was strong enough to rouse their enmity against the advocates of such a policy. There had already been occasions on which voices had been raised in the Council, saying that it did not much matter whether the Indian princes in alliance with the Crown of Portugal became Christian or remained heathen. The Rajah of Tanore had sought baptism, and the Council, as we gather from Lucena, had refused to take his part in the quarrels with neighbouring princes which ensued.”

We are glad, however, to find that Francis succeeded in bringing the Governor over to his own wishes, although, owing to treachery, the issue of the expedition sent to Candy proved unfortunate. Don Joam de Castro was himself, as we have said, a true-hearted Christian, and died like a hero, with S. Francis by his side. On his death-bed he asked pardon for anything he might have said against his fellow-men in his letters to the King. Feeling himself growing worse, he sent for the Council of Government, as well as the superiors of the Dominicans and Franciscans, and Francis Xavier, and told them that he had nothing of his own to provide himself with medicine and attendance, begging them, at the same time, to order some part of the King's money to be applied for that purpose.

“Then he had a missal brought him, and raising his eyes to heaven swore on it, that he had never taken for his own use the money of the King or of any one else, and that he had never made any contract or bargain to increase his own property. He begged that notice of this declaration should be entered on the King's books. Soon after this, having received devoutly all the last sacraments of the Church, he expired in the arms of Francis Xavier. It was the sixth of June ; he had been Governor for two years and eight months. ‘They opened,’ says Faria y Sousa, ‘a private desk of his, and what they found therein was a discipline clotted with blood, and three reels, such was his treasure’ ” (p. 49).

Yet, if we may believe the same annalist, this Christian Governor “died of a disease which in his own time killed no man, though in old times it had killed thousands ;” for even “diseases die,” he adds. This disease was a “keen sentiment of the miserable state in which he beheld India, without seeing any way to repair it”—a state brought about by the degeneracy of the Portuguese.”

A still more remarkable instance of the opposition shown to S. Francis's apostolic labours by a Christian ruler at a later period of the Saint's life is to be found in the conduct of Don Alvaro d'Ataide, to whom the “*Captaincy of the Sea*” had been entrusted, and who, with the most obstinate malice, refused to allow him to set out on his mission to China. At last, indeed, Don Alvaro allowed Francis to go to San Chan, but alone, without an

embassy. Writing to Diego Pereira upon the subject, in June, 1552, the Saint says :—

“ I have ceased to have any dealings with the Commandant, who has not hesitated to oppose a voyage which could have done so much for the spreading the Christian religion. May God forgive the man ! I grieve for his lot, for he will have to suffer a far severer punishment than he can ever have imagined ” (B. VI. ch. ii. p. 519).

The departure of Francis from Malacca for San Chan and his firmness towards Don Alvaro, are so admirably described, that we venture to give the account in full. In the following we have the true apostle full, indeed, of tenderness of heart, and yet shaking off the very dust of his feet because of God's judgments :—

“ At length the day came for the ‘ Santa Croce ’ to sail. Francis once more left the ship, and went up to his favourite shrine of our Lady del Monte. There he remained in prayer until sunset, while a crowd gathered around to see him for the last time. At last he was told that the anchor was weighed, and that sail was being set. He went down the hill to the shore, accompanied by numberless friends, weeping and entreating him not to risk himself in so perilous an undertaking as that of an attempt to enter China. He said he was going whither God called him, and consoled them with loving admonitions and warnings. Before he reached the strand, the Vicar-General, Joani Suarez, came to take leave of him. He asked Francis whether he had taken leave of the ‘ Capitan ? ’ Would it not be better, and might not people think that he had been moved by human feeling if he left without saluting Don Alvaro ? Francis answered with firmness and dignity. He and Don Alvaro would meet no more in this life ; they would see one another again in the valley of Jehosaphat, on the day of the terrible judgment, when Jesus Christ, the Son of God, would come to judge the living and the dead, and they would both stand then before him, and Alvaro would have to give an account of what he had done in preventing him from going to preach to the unbelievers the faith of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who had died on the Cross for sinners. Very soon, indeed, would Don Alvaro feel the beginning of the chastisement for his sins—chastisements which would fall on his honour, his property, and his person ; and as for his soul, might Jesus Christ our Lord God have mercy thereon ! They came then to the open door of a church which looked upon the sea, and there Francis knelt down and prayed aloud to Jesus Christ, the Love of his Soul, by the horrors of His most holy death and passion, by the precious wounds which He was always presenting for us to His Eternal Father, and the merits thereof, to have pity on and to save the soul of Don Alvaro, that he might find mercy and pardon before the Lord. He bent himself down to the ground, and prayed in silence for a while ; then he rose up and took off his shoes, and beat them against one another, and against a rock by the shore, that he might cast off from his feet the very dust of Malacca. The people were stupefied ; but the vicar spoke a last word : ‘ How ? is this parting for ever ? for I surely hope in our Lord that you will soon come back to us with much peace ! ’ ‘ As it pleases the mercy of God ! ’ Francis answered, and mounted the side of the boat which was to take him to the ship ” (pp. 525-6).

As the Saint had prophesied, so it came to pass ; for Don Alvaro was afterwards superseded, grave charges having been brought against him. He was put into prison, and his goods confiscated ; and, having been sent to Portugal, died a miserable death.

“ He had already a sort of leprosy creeping over his body, and while in prison at home a bad abscess broke out in his neck, and his whole body became so corrupt, that no one could be found to go near him and wait upon him. In this state the poor man died ; helped, as may be trusted, by the prayers for the salvation of his soul of the Saint, who had predicted so accurately the inevitable temporal chastisement which his public opposition to the Church had brought upon him ” (p. 574).

Wonderful it is to see how, by the Divine permission, the preaching of the Gospel to a nation or kingdom seems literally to hang upon a thread ! S. Francis himself tells us in one of his letters (cxi.) that, had Don Alvaro's brother been Governor of Malacca at that time, as he had been before, then “ the embassy to the Chinese empire, on which we had fixed our hopes so much for a great extension of our holy faith, would certainly have had a more favourable issue. How different has his own brother Don Alvaro acted towards me, in taking from me the means of sailing for China, and depriving me of the vessel placed at my disposal by the Governor. May God forgive him ! ” (pp. 521-2). Had Don Pedro de Silva been Governor of Malacca that year, Francis might have done for China what he had done for India, and gathered countless souls into the net of the Church. But it was not so to be.

The whole history of Portuguese influence in India, with some bright exceptions, is sad in the extreme, and may well make us tremble for our own Indian empire ; for what will England leave behind her in India as a memorial of what she has done for Christ's kingdom, when her hour of rule shall be over—if, at least, we may judge from what she has already done,—except some few of the advantages of material civilization, and the seeds of religious indifference and unbelief ? Thus are nations ever being weighed in the balance and found wanting, and their kingdom divided and given to other nations. And yet a true Christian policy, far from interfering with their temporal greatness, would but add to it, as Francis points out in one of his letters to Pedro de Silva in reference to Japan. “ I write this to you,” he says, “ that you may understand how much you are bound to God for choosing you for so great a work, and for casting deep into your mind the seed of that most praiseworthy design of enlarging the frontiers of our holy religion in these parts of the world. Nor, believe me, will a man who seeks first the kingdom of God ever want abundance of opportunities of human prosperity ; for, in case I am mistaken, this expedition of ours to Japan promises to produce rich results to the King and to his realm, the interests of which you devote yourself to with so much faithfulness and diligence ” (xxxiii. p. 280).

The notes to the fourth book, which contain an account of Japan, sent to S. Ignatius from the statements of Anger (Han Siro), a Japanese convert, as well as the account by Jorge Alvarez, and also the fifth book, which gives us the history of Francis's own visit to Japan, will be read with intense interest at the present moment, which seems to be another turning-point in the history of that intelligent and most interesting country ; for who can say whether the extraordinary movement towards civilization which

is now going on in Japan, and which has taken the world by surprise, will tend or not to the furtherance of Christ's kingdom ?

The following remarks of F. Coleridge with regard to the early accounts of Japan will be read with interest :—

“ We need hardly enter into the many questions that might be raised by a comparison of these accounts of Japan, which are obviously written in the most perfect good faith, with the present state of the country, in many respects, no doubt, greatly different from its state in the 16th century. The first account, taken from the lips of Han-Siro, afterwards Paul of the Holy Faith, is clearly the work of a religious of the College at Goa, and may be somewhat coloured by the desire which such an enquirer would naturally feel to discover as many resemblances to Christianity as possible in the religion of the country to which so much attention was then drawn within the walls of the College. These resemblances extended, in the mind of the writer, not only to external rites, but also to many religious doctrines. The merchant, Jorge Alvarez, whose name appears in the travels of Mendez Pinto, takes a more simply external view of the Japanese than the writer in the College. Both of these seem to speak more highly of the morals of the Japanese in general than modern travellers would speak. . . . . The accounts must be taken as interesting in themselves, because they are among the earliest statements concerning Japan which can have reached Europe in the sixteenth century, and interesting, also, for our present purpose, because they show us what Francis Xavier had heard about this country and its inhabitants before he himself landed on its shores ” (p. 222).

It is consoling to learn that S. Francis himself was of opinion that the Japanese did not sin against reason. Thus, writing to Don Pedro de Silva Commandant of Malacca, he says :—

“ The soil of this country, as far as I have hitherto been able to perceive, is now so well and happily disposed to receive the seed of heavenly doctrine, that we have the best right to expect a plentiful harvest of souls if only cultivation be not wanting. The nation is one with which reason prevails over passion very generally. They commit many sins, but the sins they commit do not establish a prescription against the authority of right reason, because they generally sin through ignorance ; so that it is easy to see that they will amend if they are taught. Thus even bad customs leave to reason its empire in some sort unimpaired, since they are not followed openly against its decree, but rather insinuate themselves in an irregular and underhand manner, as it were, without establishing themselves in possession. Thus it is that this nation has not much accustomed itself to indulge in full licence of following vice against the vain reclamation of reason, as is the case elsewhere when men sin knowing what they are about, and with unblushing malice.”

As might have been expected of so an intelligent a people, the difficulties felt by them in the Christian religion, although sometimes relating to trivial subjects, not unfrequently had to do with mysteries, which are still felt as difficulties by many at the present day, no less acutely than when Francis preached in Japan—difficulties which, as F. Coleridge points out, will always be found in serious and thoughtful minds, to whom the Christian doctrine of the universe is presented, if they have not some high and reverential ideas concerning the nature and attributes of God, and the position and rights



with regard to His creatures and the government of the universe which He has made for His own glory.

“The bonzes, says Mendez, came to the Father, and begged him to forgive them the past, and then asked him their new questions. It astonished them, they said, if God foresaw things past as well as future, by reason of His infinite knowledge, how it was that he did not, when creating the angels, foresee the disorder which Lucifer and the rest would cause by their disobedience, so as to prevent the necessity of His divine justice having to condemn them to perpetual punishment. If He foresaw that, what could be the explanation why His Divine mercy did not prevent an evil from which so many other evils would follow, so many offences against the Divine Majesty? But if to justify Him it is said that he did not see it, then what the Father taught concerning Him was false. Francis answered this difficulty, declaring to them ‘very largely,’ says the reporter, what was the truth in this matter; but they contradicted him with reasonings so subtle, that he turned to Duarte de Gama, who was by his side, and said: “See! what these people say does not come from themselves, but from the devil, who instructs them on this subject; nevertheless the confidence I have in God makes me hope that He will answer for me” (pp. 327-8).

Again—

“The bonzes raised the question about God’s foreknowledge of the sin of Adam and its consequences. Why did He not prevent it! Again, they objected to the great delay in bringing about the healing of the sins of the world by means of the Incarnation. If God was to send His Son to redeem the descendants of Adam after his fall, why did He not show more diligence in succouring so extreme a need? And they added, if it were replied that the delay was in order that men might learn the enormity and hideousness of sin, this was not enough to excuse God from a want of care and attention in waiting so long. All these difficulties, says Mendez, the Father answered with reasons so clear and pertinent that it was impossible to reply to them” (p. 328).

We confess to a feeling of disappointment that the true answers of the Saint have not been preserved in full, for although answers are attributed to S. Francis Xavier by many of his biographers, they do not appear to rest on the same authority as the questions of the bonzes; and although he himself alludes in one of his letters to the difficulties felt by the Japanese, he does not give his own answers at any length. He tells us, however, that, by God’s favour, he succeeded in solving all their questions, so as to leave no doubt remaining in their mind. A saint’s answers to such fundamental difficulties would be as valuable to Englishmen of the present day as they were to the Japanese in S. Francis’s day, although it may very well be, that a saint of God, by the very fact of His sanctity, would enter far more deeply than other men into the mind of God, and therefore, perhaps, look at these difficulties from too high a point of view to be appreciated by ordinary minds. We venture to say this, because in one of his letters to the Society in Europe (lxxxvi.), in which he refers to the difficulties of the Japanese with regard to the punishment of hell, he seems to have but little sympathy with such objections. It is from God’s point of view that he regards the question, not from that of poor, weak man.

“One of the things,” he says, “that most of all pains and torments these Japanese is, that we teach them that the prison of hell is irrevocably shut, so that there is no egress therefrom; for they grieve over the fate of their departed children, of their parents, and relatives, and they often show their grief by their tears. So they ask us if there is any hope, any way to free them by prayer from that eternal misery; and I am obliged to answer that there is absolutely none. Their grief at this affects them wonderfully; they almost pine away with sorrow. But there is this good thing about their trouble: it makes me hope that they will all be the more laborious for their own salvation, lest they, like their forefathers, should be condemned to everlasting punishment. They often ask if God cannot take their fathers out of hell, and why their punishment must never have an end. We gave them a satisfactory answer, but they did not cease to grieve over the misfortunes of their relatives; and I can hardly restrain my tears sometimes at seeing men so dear to my heart suffer such intense pain about a thing which is already done with, and can never be undone.”

Here we see great tenderness of heart towards the living; but so utterly has Francis identified his whole being with His Maker, conscious that in Him justice and mercy have met together, that he hardly seems to feel the difficulty which causes them such bitter pain.

The following remarks of F. Coleridge upon the whole subject are admirable:—

“The Japanese bonzes were intelligent and clever, but the force of their objections did not lie in the ability of those by whom they were urged. It lay partly in the nature of the subjects to which they referred, inasmuch as the plan of God in the government of His creatures is a scheme which human understanding can never entirely comprehend, though faith and reason alike enable us to see that that scheme contains nothing that is unjust or unmerciful, or in any way inconsistent with the character of God, as He has revealed Himself to us. It lay partly, also, in the fact that the whole idea of God as a Creator, and, consequently, as absolute Lord over His creatures, who have no right before Him except such as result from His own ineffable holiness, and the essential conditions of the nature which He has given them, was an entirely new thought even to the wisest of the Japanese, as well as in the constant tendency of human nature in its present condition to exalt itself and make itself the centre and arbiter of the world. And whenever even Christian minds are untrained in true thoughts and reflections concerning the dominion and nature of God, and in the practice of that humility which is the natural attitude of a creature to its Creator, there will be a danger of their not seeing at once the answers to such difficulties as those now mentioned which are given by our Lord and His Apostles. More than this, after all has been said that Scripture and Catholic theology teach us to say, with regard to the government and providence of God, there will always remain that inadequacy in our conceptions of both, which leaves us much to adore without attempting fully to explain it, in that reverential spirit which made S. Paul exclaim, after unravelling one great difficulty of this kind, the reprobation of the Jews, ‘O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and His ways how unsearchable!’”

We must again offer our warmest thanks to F. Coleridge for this most valuable work. The letters of the Saint, we need hardly say, will be found of great spiritual use, more especially to missionaries and priests. We will conclude by expressing an earnest hope that the good seed sown in Japan by

Francis Xavier may before long spring up into a glorious harvest for the Church of God. The martyrs of Japan, now raised to the honours of the altars, are interceding for their country, and he, its greatest Apostle, is adding, we cannot doubt, his prayers to theirs. There is much in the past which leads us to hope the very best of the future.

“It is now believed,” says F. Coleridge, “that when in our time Japan was partially opened to Europeans so many generations after the great persecution of Christianity, which seems to have drowned it in blood, and when no Catholic priest had been in the country for more than two centuries, there were still communities of Christians who had kept up their practice of the Gospel law, the Catholic creed, and the administration of baptism. And even the renewed persecutions of the present day”—now at last, we trust, stopped for good—“will not, as we may confidently hope, in God’s mercy, avail to stamp out in this noble, intelligent, and faithful race the remains of the religion of Jesus Christ, so long ago painfully planted on the soil of Japan by the modern Apostle of the East” (p. 351).

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*The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo.* A new Translation.

Edited by the Rev. MARCUS DODS, M.A. Vol. V. Writings in Connection with the Manichæan Heresy. Translated by the Rev. RICHARD STOTHERT, M.A. Vol. VI. The Letters of S. Augustine. Vol. I. Translated by the Rev. J. G. CUNNINGHAM, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1872.

WE have here two new volumes of Messrs. Clark’s translation of the post-Nicene Fathers, an undertaking so spirited and praiseworthy that we are glad to be able to say that the execution of the present volumes is quite equal to that of the former ones, already noticed in these pages. The translator of S. Augustine’s Letters, indeed, seems to us to be the ablest of all the gentlemen who have hitherto appeared in connection with the work. Mr. Cunningham has not been quite so rigid in his rules of translation as his fellow-workmen; he has allowed himself more liberty to express sense by sense rather than phrase by phrase, and he has been more lavish of his words. Two words of the text are sometimes fearlessly expanded into a dozen. For instance: where S. Jerome says “*tacentem stimulas*,” we have it rendered, “You are disturbing the peace of one who asks only to be allowed to be silent”; and the result is that the translation is certainly more readable, without at the same time ceasing to be sufficiently exact.

The first of these volumes is taken up with the writings of S. Augustine against the Manichæans, and terribly dry many people will think them. “*Ne Paulus mendax sit, Manichæus anathema sit*,” is the summing up of one of the chapters against Faustus; and it is to be feared that it expresses the sort of conclusion that readers would be tempted to adopt. Yet there is no doubt that S. Augustine did a great work, and did it most thoroughly, by his writings against the Manichæan heresy. That which alone gave Manichæism any intellectual strength, in the West at least, was its doc-

trine of the nature of evil. We might safely say, that if Manichæism had not adopted the "double principle," the good and the evil Deity, some other sect would have arisen to do so, and some Augustine would still have been forced to oppose it. The problem of the existence of evil is a problem that the human mind inevitably meets as soon as ever it begins to have definite scientific notions of the nature of God. We need not say that the question is not unknown in our own days. But the reasoning which proves convincingly to all unprejudiced minds that the existence of evil does not oppose the existence of one only God is due to the intellect of S. Augustine.

Mani, or Manes, was a native of Persia or of Chaldæa, and lived towards the end of the third century. The countries at the head of the Persian Gulf, where Mani was born, lay in the very track of all the things, material and intellectual, that were borne from India to the West, and from the shores of the Caspian to Ceylon, or *vice versâ*. Buddhism, the great revolution in Hindoo philosophy; Magianism, the devil-worship of the descendants of the men who built Babel; and the fire-worship of the enemy of the Magians, the Persian Zerduscht, met there, and mingled intellectually, as the great rivers Tigris and Euphrates seemed to confuse their streams in the marshy lands that lay at the head of the Gulf. It would be difficult to say to which of the great Oriental philosophies or religions Manes owed the chief ideas of his teaching. At the time he lived Buddhism was strong and flourishing, and from Buddhism he perhaps borrowed at least a multitude of details and a general spirit; but the great feature of two Principles came from his own native land: it was Magian, and it had come down from the first days after the Flood, when the devil began to make himself worshipped in opposition to God. The fanatical asceticism he preached, together with the opinion that it was wrong to destroy the life of any living thing, evidently point to Buddhism. The rest of his system was apparently an arbitrary eclecticism in which Christianity and Judaism, the Gospels and the religious myths of the Hindoos, were blended together in the spirit of those sects who, during the early centuries of our era, produced so many fantastic systems under the generic name of Gnosticism. It is difficult to explain how Manichæism could become so powerful or so widespread as it soon did. Its author was put to a cruel death; Christians and Mohammedans, Pagan emperors and Christian fathers, combined to execrate and condemn it. Yet it lasted far into the Middle Ages, and keeps re-appearing in Church history up and down France, Italy, and Switzerland. It has been usual to explain its success by the immorality of its doctrine. It does not appear that Manes himself was an evil liver; and although S. Augustine draws a very dark picture in the book here translated (*de moribus Manichæorum*) of Manichæan morals, yet he in other places seems to imply that its teachers were not openly licentious. But there is no doubt that the mystical language used in formulating the doctrine of the sect was liable to the utmost abuse by the ignorant; and there is no more doubt that Manichæism and immorality came afterwards, not without justice, to be identified in the minds of the faithful. And this explains the severity with which all kinds of rulers visited it when they had a chance. Perhaps the fact that it was more or less of an astrological, magical, and physical system attracted some minds. S. Augustine seems to have been drawn to it by its

pretensions to explain the kingdom of natural phenomena.\* And then we must allow for the fascination which devil-worship has always exerted over the human mind, as well in Old Testament days, as in the Middle Ages and in our own times.

Manichæism was widely spread and dangerous in the lifetime of S. Augustine. The want of a real Christian philosophy made it a hard struggle for the Church to present her doctrines in the learned and polished centres of Italy, Greece, Syria, and Africa, without allowing their purity to be corrupted; just as the want of a Catholic physical philosophy in modern times makes it more or less difficult to get a hearing from the world for many Catholic doctrines, without sacrificing something of importance. S. Augustine in great measure supplied the Church with a philosophy; that is, he showed how to argue, from admitted principles, on many points of Christian revelation. Matter, evil, and the nature of God, were questions on which the Church thought aright, but on which her knowledge was unsystematic; and it was on such points that the sharp intellects of the decaying Pagan civilization often managed to raise systems of their own, whose danger in deceiving the minds of believers was out of all proportion to the length of time they were destined to endure. We hear of Manichæism at this time in Italy, in Greece, in Asia Minor, in Roman Africa, in Gaul. S. Augustine himself had been a Manichæan; and this is the reason, perhaps, why his attacks on this heresy have, not only a keenness unusual even in him, but a carefulness and a measured thoroughness which bespeak the mind that knows by personal experience what it has undertaken to discuss. "My prayer," he says in the treatise against the "Fundamental" Epistle of Manichæus, here translated—

"My prayer to the one true, almighty God, of whom and by whom, and in whom are all things, has been and is now, that in opposing and refuting the heresy of you Manichæans, as you may after all be heretics more from thoughtlessness than from malice, He would give me a mind calm and composed, and aiming at your recovery rather than at your discomfiture."

He had begun to write against them almost immediately after his baptism. Before his ordination he had sent forth five treatises on Manichæism—his anti-Manichæan Pentateuch, as Paulinus of Nola calls them. Two of these are here translated—those "On the Morals of the Manichæans," and "On the Morals of the Catholic Church." The book on the "Fundamental" Epistle of Manichæus was written when he was a Bishop. Shortly after finishing it, he was called upon by the Catholics of Africa and Italy to write against Faustus, the great Manichæan leader, who, as S. Augustine says in the "De Utilitate Credendi," was bragged of by his party as the man whose arrival was to decide every possible question. The twelve books against Faustus are here given, and they take up 400 out of less than 600 pages. The editor has added an interesting preface, in which we are glad to observe that he speaks with merited severity of the heretical bias that runs through the great work of the Lutheran Beausobre. There is also a useful index.

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\* Conf., l. v. 3, 4, 5.

The editor introduces the first volume of "Letters" with a short and readable preface, which is little more than an expansion of a couple of lines quoted from the Benedictine introduction. "Ut oculi aliis corporis sensibus præstant, ita illustrium virorum Epistolæ ceteris eorum scriptis passim antecellunt." "In his familiar correspondence, we see the man as he is known to his intimate friends in his times of relaxation and unstudied utterance." A great many of S. Augustine's Letters were written in times of anything but relaxation, and many of them are dogmatic treatises, worded as carefully as his books on the Trinity. But still it is true that they are full of traits of personal character. The translation, as far as we have compared it, is for the most part correct, and is generally fluent and happy. Here and there the translator is bold and successful; as for instance, where he meets, in a letter from S. Augustine to S. Paulinus, those troublesome expressions, "Germanitatem, Beatitudinem, Humanitatem tuam," and renders them "As a brother, as a saint, and as a man." He displays, in another place, a discrimination not generally met with in Protestants, when he translates in a letter from S. Augustine to S. Jerome, the word "propositum" by "vows." Many who take up this volume of "Letters" will turn to that part of it which contains the record of the "misunderstanding" between the two great doctors of the Latin Church. S. Augustine displays in all his letters to S. Jerome, especially in the earlier ones, a feeling that is an unusual one for him; he shows himself to be *nervous*. Nothing could be a greater proof than this of S. Jerome's fame, even while yet alive. The introductory passages of the letter (28 Ed. Ben.) which occurs first in this translation, are an expression of Augustine's sincere and hearty, but excited admiration for the great solitary of Bethlehem. "Never was the face of any one more familiar to another, than the peaceful, happy, and truly noble diligence of your studies in the Lord has become to me." This is not a very good sentence, but the Latin is nearly as bad. There must be a mistake—probably in the word "læta"; "studiorum tuorum quieta, læta, et vere exercitatio liberalis" should perhaps be s. t. *quieta lætitia*, as the older editors corrected the MSS. "For although I long greatly to be acquainted with you, I feel that already my knowledge of you is deficient in respect of nothing but a small part of you—namely, your personal appearance; and even as to this I cannot deny that since my most blessed brother Alypius has seen you, and has on his return been seen by me, it has been almost completely imprinted on my mind by his report of you; nay, I may say that before his return, when he saw you there, I was seeing you myself with his eyes." The report of S. Jerome's personal appearance brought by Alypius to S. Augustine is one of those things that it would have been interesting to have seen. In this volume many will read, for the first time, the exact words of S. Jerome's lengthy vindication of himself against his younger antagonist, and also the honourable and ardent expressions with which Augustine answers his appeals to fraternal charity. Perhaps the "Letters" of S. Augustine will prove to be the most popular volumes of this translation.

*The "Old Catholics" at Cologne.* A Sketch in Three Scenes, by Herr FRÖHLICH. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

ALTHOUGH hardly equal, we think, as a *jeu d'esprit*, to the "Comedy of Convocation," "The Old Catholics at Cologne" will be perhaps of even more service to non-Catholic readers. "Formally to turn Convocation into a comedy," as a contemporary has remarked, is, in the opinion of many, "hardly necessary"; but the true position of the "Old Catholics" of Germany, and their utter want of logical foundation, are so completely lost sight of by most Englishmen, that an amusing, yet at the same time argumentative statement upon the subject must be of very great value; and all the more so, since prelates and dignitaries of the Anglican Church have rendered confusion worse confounded, by aiding the movement with their active sympathy. When, however, we say that the present *brochure* is hardly equal to the "Comedy of Convocation," we are far from laying the fault of this to the charge of the author, who has certainly done his best to enliven the subject; but the subject itself hardly offers so many points for amusement as are to be found in that most singular of religious assemblies known as the Convocation of the Anglican Establishment. True, that the "Old Catholics" are quite as illogical and absurd, and as hopelessly divided in their religious opinions, as the members of Convocation, but the former are devoid of that air of self-satisfied assurance and decorous complacency which render the latter so helplessly open to ridicule. The "Old Catholics" attack the Church like men who are moved by a spirit of delirious hatred against her, and who seem to have forcibly quenched their own better judgment; the Anglican prelates and dignitaries remind us of men who, gaitered and aproned, have embarked upon the ocean in a tub full of holes, yet who take pleasure in assuring themselves and their friends on shore with a smile of silent content that they are, all and each, commanders of the finest "iron-clad" afloat. Still the "Old Catholics at Cologne" is by no means dry reading, and, as might have been expected, is especially amusing, whenever such Anglicans as the Right Revs. Drs. Fossil and Greene, Dean Courtley, and the Bishops of Lincoln and Ely appear upon the scene. As a specimen of the admirable way in which the worth of the "Old Catholic" leaders is hit off in a few words, we give the opening of the first scene:—

"Is that Knoodt?" asked a delegate of a friend who was standing near him. 'Yes,' said the delegate; 'most distinguished man. He has been personally excommunicated by the Pope.'

"That does give prestige," continued the other: 'But tell me, who is the delegate with the flaxen hair, and rather a youthful look? I think it is Professor Friedrich!' 'Tis he—the King of Conceit! That is the man who wrote in his *Diary* that *he* was the only theologian who could have taught the Pope and the Council. That is the man who said that he united in his own exceptional person the gifts of Döllinger and Talleyrand.' He should have added, 'and also of Lucifer'; but no author is at all times accurate.

"If I mistake not, that is Reinkens," said the first of the speakers, 'who has just now entered the room. I believe he has a hobby for the reunion of Christendom, which——'

“ ‘*This* Congress is likely to promote,’ broke in his communicative friend, ‘All men who splinter the Church talk much of the reunion of Christendom. It is the way they solace their consciences. Reinkens is the Bishop-elect of the old Catholic body. He will get his orders from Utrecht, or from one of the Armenian Bishops. It will be quite the same to *him* whence he gets them. He will be perfectly indifferent!’ ‘You do not think highly,’ pursued the first speaker, ‘of the spirits assembled in Congress?’

“ ‘On the contrary. Considering the fact that they have come to Cologne expressly to rebel against the Church, they are precisely the spirits I should expect to see congregated for so beneficent a task’ ” (pp. 3-4).

Our author’s remarks on the Dean of Westminster, and other lights of the Establishment, who, whether present or absent, might be supposed to sympathize with the “Old Catholics,” or illustrate the absurdity of their position by the still greater absurdity of their own, are pungent in the extreme, but not unfairly so; for surely no sarcasm can go beyond the reality. One of the cleverest features of this pamphlet is the way in which the secret contempt of the “Old Catholics” for their would-be Anglican friends is quietly hinted at:—

“Among the delegates who had *not* been invited—except by themselves—to the Congress, was Dr. Stanley, Dean of Westminster, and Chaplain-in-Ordinary to the Queen. He had been in turn the supple introducer to his own elastic communion, of a schismatical Greek Archbishop, a Protestant Hindoo Reformer, and an apostate Carmelite monk; and he ended by going to the Congress of Cologne without any mission from his Church. But some notable absentees were jocosely ‘asked for’ by the more acute Old Catholic delegates. ‘Where might be Archdeacon Denison?’ who would have instructed the Congress in his original views of what was *not* the Sacramental Real Presence; or the Dean of Ripon, who would satisfactorily have proved that there was no Real Presence at all? ‘Where was Mr. Whalley?’ who would have been invaluable as a guide on the wiles and machinations of the Jesuits; or Mr. Newdigate, who would have thrown much light on the religious orders in England? Where was the Bishop of Winchester, who, having at one time preached so much Popery that he was suspected of being almost in earnest, afterwards preached so much Protestantism, that it was thought he might not be sincere? And where were the editors of the Protestant newspapers, the *Church Times*, *Saturday Review*, or *Punch*, who know so much more theology than do Popes or Councils, that really it seems superfluous to have recourse to either, when we learn everything by consulting them! And lastly, where was the Archbishop of Canterbury, who, as the highest representative of private judgment, ought certainly to have been at the Congress?”

Again:—

“Dr. Wordsworth, Bishop of Lincoln, aproned and gaitered, entered the room. He wore a gold pastoral cross (probably bought for the occasion). As a compliment to the schism to which he belonged, he was asked to address the Congress.”

He did:—

“In a neat Latin speech, ornate with grace, and with Theophilo-Anglicano-Protestantism, he lashed the Congress unmercifully. He meant to be polite and also to be orthodox; but his habit of teaching the whole of Christendom what it is its duty to believe, made him a trifle too didactic; and Herr Fröhlich remarked to a neighbour, ‘This man thinks himself the Pope. Dr.



Wordsworth in the course of his speech, insisted that the Congress should repudiate Trent, and accept the Thirty-nine Articles. This command, though qualified by scholarship, and by ideal infidelities in general, did not meet with popular approval. He next launched a poem on the marvellous purity of the Church to which he belonged, and was proceeding to picture that paradise of immaculateness known as the 'Church of England,' when he was summarily stopped by Herr Ernst.

"*Herr Ernst.*—My lord, I beg you to pardon me. But you have entertained us for a moment with a poetical view of the 'purity' of the Church of England. May I ask—is that purity vindicated by this most remarkable fact: that after having protested against the appointment of Dr. Stanley to the Deanery of Westminster Abbey, on the ground of detestable heterodoxy, you now sit by his side in this Congress as a teacher of the same communion?" (pp. 5-6.)

Were we to give all the good points in this remarkable pamphlet, we should have to transfer the whole to our pages. But our object is rather to urge those of our readers who may not as yet have seen it, to purchase it for themselves. Still we cannot refrain from extracting the simple, lucid, but very telling passage in which the question of the orthodoxy of Pope Honorius is made clear even to the most ordinary mind.

Dr. Greene is of opinion that the strongest argument against the Vatican dogma of the Infallibility—he means from the Roman Catholic point of view—is, that one of the Popes, Honorius, was actually condemned for heresy. Accordingly he gets Dean Courtley to sound Herr Fröhlich upon the subject, who, with Herr Ernst, had first of all rejected the dogma of Infallibility, and for this reason had been elected delegates to the Congress, but who, repenting of their error, had resolved to go to the Congress in 'Old Catholic' guise, and then take the part of the Church.

"*Herr Fröhlich.*—Honorius! the very strongest precedent in the history of the Church for the personal infallibility of the Popes. (Here laughter of a contemptuous kind rang to the very roof of the hall, and caused several delegates who were standing far off to come and inquire the cause.)

"*Herr Fröhlich.*—It is really instructive that the enemies of the Church, while ransacking the history of the Church through something like eighteen centuries, have laid principal stress on the fallibility of a Pope who was 'oecumenically' pronounced infallible.

"Assuming that the story is correct; as told by Anti-Catholic adversaries (though we have no right whatever to assume this, for Gerson when challenged in open court to produce a single precedent, made no allusion to Honorius; and the Greeks at Florence, who would have rejoiced to produce him, had he been even possibly a heretic, appeared to have forgotten his name), what is the weight of testimony which it brings to either side?

"(1.) It is certain that the letter of Honorius, written to the patriarch Sergius, was a purely *private* letter, and therefore not *ex cathedra*. This is proved by the fact, that the heretic Sergius did not publish it to the rest of the bishops, nor was it prominently brought to light before the sixth General Council. Whereas, had the letter of Honorius contained a definition of faith, it must have been sent to all the bishops; because, as a high authority has told us, 'the 'magisterium' of the Pontiff in matters of faith concerns *all*, and must by *all* be known.' Either, therefore, the letter was private, in which case it was not dogmatic; or it was public, in which case the heretic Sergius was afraid to publish what condemned him.

“(2.) It is certain that the letter of Honorius contained no dogmatic statement. Honorius declares this when he says, ‘We have not to teach and to define either one or two operations,—’ *Non nos oportet unam vel duas operationes definientes prædicare.*” Thus Honorius expressly guards Sergius against inferring the intention of a dogma.

“(3.) It is certain that there is not in the letter so much as a single word which can be construed into heresy. John IV., the contemporary of Honorius, and one of his successors in the See; S. Maximus, also his contemporary, often styled ‘the light of the East;’ besides the most celebrated historians, such as Tourneley and Natalis Alexander, have borne vigorous testimony to this fact. Indeed, to read the letter of Honorius is to be convinced that he most scrupulously vindicated the true doctrine of the Catholic Church.

“(4.) It is certain that the 6th General Council did *not* condemn Honorius for heresy, but for negligence in not swiftly repressing it, as Pope Leo II., the very Pope who gave his sanction to the decrees of the 6th Council, so clearly and explicitly conveys: ‘Honorius, who did not make the Apostolic See resplendent with the Apostolic doctrine; but by a profane treason allowed the faith, which ought to be without blot, to be exposed to subversion.’ . . . And the same truth was expressed by Pope Leo, in his letter to the Bishops of Spain: ‘He did not extinguish at its commencement the flame of heretical doctrine, as became his apostolic authority, but by negligence nourished it.’ . . . . It was for ‘recommending silence’ that Honorius was condemned, not for teaching heresy. And Dr. Döllinger, in his *History of the Church*, witnesses to this very same truth:—‘Sergius wrote a most artfully composed letter to gain to his side the Pontiff Honorius;’ and he adds that ‘Honorius suffered himself to be misguided’ by the perfidious tactics of Sergius. ‘For this,’ says Dr. Döllinger, ‘Pope Leo II. placed the errors of Honorius *in his inactivity.*’ Here, then, we have the solution of the matter. Honorius was guilty of negligence in not annihilating a heresy; but no single word that he wrote could imply that he believed or taught one.

“(5.) It is further certain that Pope Agatho, who presided in part over the session of the 6th General Council (that Council which condemned Honorius), believed in Papal infallibility. These are his words, addressed through his legates to the Council, and adopted by the Council as their own:—‘The splendid light of the faith, transmitted successively from the holy apostles Peter and Paul, by means of their successors, even to our humility, has been preserved pure and without spot, without *ever* having been obscured by heresy or defiled by error.’ And again, in a letter to the Emperor, he says: ‘The Lord and Saviour of all, the Author of our faith, has promised that the faith of Peter shall never fail, and commanded him to confirm his brethren. No one is ignorant that *all* the apostolic pontiffs, our predecessors, have done this with confidence.’ While elsewhere he affirms that the Roman See ‘*hath never turned aside from the path of truth to any error whatsoever; whose authority, as of the prince of all the apostles, the whole Catholic Church at all times, and the universal Councils, faithfully embracing, have in all respects followed.*’ Such were the words of Pope Agatho, while judging the case of Honorius, and while the Council was judging it.

“(6.) My last point is this, and I hold it conclusive: that the 6th General Council, in its very last sitting, and *after* it had judged Honorius, *subscribed* these letters of Pope Agatho, from which I have just now quoted; using these words with regard to them:—‘Our eyes saw the ink and the paper, but our souls heard Peter speaking by the mouth of Agatho. Therefore we leave what should be done to *you*, as Prelate of the first See of the Universal Church, standing on the firm rock of faith; having read through the letter of a true confession, sent by your paternal blessedness to our most religious

Emperor, and which we recognize as divinely written from the Supreme Head of the Apostles.' Thus, then, we have an Ecumenical Council—while judging the case of Honorius, and pronouncing him guilty of negligence—declaring that no single Pontiff had erred from the Catholic faith; that the Roman Church 'had never turned aside from the path of truth to any error whatsoever'; that it had 'never been obscured by heresy nor defiled by error'; and that 'all the apostolic Pontiffs had confirmed the brethren in the faith.' We have the infallibility of the Popes taught directly by that Council which condemned Pope Honorius for negligence. And, moreover, we have this illustration—in the very last sitting of the Council. I call this the happiest example of useful, though ungenerous, controversy; when the strongest precedent *against* infallibility is the strongest proof for it."

Nothing could be more concisely or neatly put; and in this instance, as in so many other of his works, the author is never so convincing than when briefly summing up the arguments in support of some truth, or the absurdities and errors of those who oppose it. As an example of the writer's caustic style, we give the following. It is Herr Fröhlich who speaks:—

"Conversely, heretics are supremely disobedient, and therefore supremely unwise. They worship their own individual brains; forgetting that in doing so they are really worshipping Satan, the prince of pride. Now, it may seem to you a trite observation that Satan is a very clever Protestant. He is the greatest intellect of the fallen. He has used his intellect, for six thousand years, to master the intellect of man. But you heretics always talk about intellect as though *you* were its only possessors. You forget that Satan, who has had six thousand years to study the weaknesses of man, brings to bear on *their* intellect his marvellous mind, *plus* his marvellous results. I wonder, Mr. Dean, if you were to subtract the Devil out of the 'religious' operations of your country, how much would be left of 'intellect' or 'Protestantism' that you could strictly call your own?" (pp. 34—37).

The origin of the Church of England through persecution is also admirably brought out, and the following will cut to the quick. It is still Herr Fröhlich who speaks:—

"But, gentlemen, there is one remark with which I would conclude my protest, and I beg your attention to it: that whereas among Catholics, every Catholic who has been guilty of persecution is judged by the laws of humanity, and without reference to this creed or that; among Protestants, the great doctors of persecution, Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, Calvin and Knox, Lords Russell and Cecil, Lords Cornwallis and Clarendon, Cromwell and Cranmer, Titus Oates and Walsingham, Ridley and Latimer are not only *not* reprobated in history, but are cherished as Protestant heroes, and niched in the fane of true chivalry" (p. 63).

Sarcasm, especially in religious matters, is a very delicate weapon. It must kill—not merely wound. If it succeeds in only doing the latter, the poisoned barb will simply irritate, and cause unnecessary pain. There is nothing of this in the present pamphlet. The sarcasm is deadly, and must prove fatal to the "Old Catholics," and their Anglican supporters.

The good which is done by works of this kind is simply incalculable; for although many may pretend not to read them, they *will* read them in private; and the result will be the complete collapse of all illogical positions and inconsistent theories, at least in every case where the mind of the reader is not blinded by bigotry and prejudice, or rendered callous by indifference.

*A Visit to Louise Lateau, with a Short Account of her Life.* By the Rev GERALD MOLLOY, D.D. London : Burns, Oates & Co., 1873.

WE have already more than once called attention to this remarkable case of Stigmatization and Ecstasy. In the present work Dr. Molloy has not contributed any new information, but he has given us a pleasantly written account of his own visit to Louise Lateau, an interesting sketch of her life, and an exact description of her stigmas and her ecstasy. He has also brought together such an amount of evidence to show that the extraordinary phenomena of her life are genuine wonders as to exclude all suspicion of fraud in every unprejudiced mind. At a time when disbelief in the supernatural is so general, Dr. Molloy's agreeably-written little work cannot fail to do much good, and we can ourselves testify, from our own experience, that it is being read both with eagerness and interest by Protestants. We cannot, however, refrain from expressing a regret that the writer has not availed himself of the additional information to be found in the work recently, we believe, published by Dr. Troubert-Gourbeyre, Professor in the Medical School of Clermont in Auvergne. The more medical evidence we can have in connection with such a subject the better.

We have said that no one can read the evidence brought forward by Dr. Molloy without at once dismissing from his mind all suspicion of fraud. The whole case, therefore, is reduced to one of two alternatives : either the phenomena are supernatural, or they are the effect of disease. Not surely the latter, for it would be infinitely easier to believe that they are supernatural, than that any disease could bring about results so regular and precise ; in connection, too, with the most momentous event which the world has ever witnessed—the Crucifixion of the World's Redeemer. A strange disease, indeed, which could produce on a Friday, the day on which our Lord was crucified, the first trace of the stigmas on her left side ; on a Friday, the first blood-shedding from the upper surface of both feet ; on a Friday, the first blood-shedding from the palms and backs of her hands ; on a Friday, her first ecstasy ; on a Friday, the coronet of bleeding points round her head ; and that only on a Friday these same manifestations should be renewed.

"All these nine stigmas," says Dr. Molloy, "are permanent and indelible, but only on Friday do they bleed. During the rest of the week they are distinguished by a bright red colour, and a certain glossy appearance. No fracture of the skin is observable, even when they are scrutinized through a magnifying-glass. The forehead, on the other hand, shows no permanent marks : and on Fridays only is it possible to recognize the points from which the blood escapes" (p. 49).

Again, it must be a strange disease that can bring about effects so precise as the following—always, be it remembered, in connection with the same awful event :—

"Most startling and solemn of all is the closing scene of the Ecstasy. The ecstatic girl rises with a bound from the floor, on which she has been so long prostrate. Her pulse, which in the early stages was healthy and regular

beating seventy-four strokes a minute, has gradually become extremely rapid, and at the same time feeble. It is now hardly perceptible, and, when distinct enough to be counted, is found to be going at the rate of a hundred and twenty to the minute. Her breathing, too, has got fainter and fainter, and often cannot be recognized at all, except by having recourse to artificial means of observation. Death at last seems to be approaching. The body is cold; the eyes are closed; the head falls down on the chest. A deadly pallor overspreads the face, and a cold sweat breaks out through the skin, even the rattle comes in her throat.

“This condition lasts about ten minutes; and then the current of life flows back. The body gets warm; the pulse revives; the cheeks resume their wonted colour; the contracted face expands again. Then the re-animated girl looks gently round; the eyes fall softly, first on me, then on another of the familiar objects around; and the Ecstasy is over.”

Certainly, to believe that effects such as these can be produced regularly every Friday of the year, and year after year, by some unknown disease, is far more difficult of belief than to assign them to His Almighty power, who is the Author of grace as well as of nature. Nor can the phenomena be explained by the power of imagination, to which many might be inclined to attribute them, for the girl is wholly devoid of imagination:—

“Downright common sense seems to be her distinguishing characteristic. Her piety, too, is practical and unobtrusive. Entirely free from affectation, she follows the beaten paths, but she follows them with fidelity. She loves solitude and retirement, and except in obedience to her ecclesiastical superiors, she never speaks about the extraordinary phenomena of which she is the subject” (p. 43).

It is impossible to conceive how imagination, any more than disease, can produce at regular intervals such precise and ordered effects.

The only alternative, therefore, left is, that the phenomena are supernatural. Now, the supernatural is twofold—divine and diabolical. No one, however, when he considers the goodness of the girl herself, the history of her life, the circumstances under which the marvellous effects are wrought, their influence upon the bystanders, can for a moment attribute them to the latter. Nothing, therefore, remains for us but to say that the finger of God is here.

This once granted, we need not be surprised that this ecstatic girl should have been raised up, in the midst of an unbelieving generation, as a living witness to the truth of an order higher than that which we see, and, above all, of that great mystery, which to a Catholic heart is so easy and sweet to believe, but which, as when it was first proclaimed, seems even now a hard saying to very many—the mystery of the Eucharistic Presence of our Lord. Even in the midst of her ecstasy, that Presence is ever recognized and adored. “As the needle follows the loadstone,” so does the soul of the Ecstatica follow Him, who is the one attraction of her heart. Sacred vessels which contain it not may be received in the same way as other holy things—with a smile of joy; but the vessel alone which contains the Presence can move her to adoration.

A remarkable instance of this is given by Dr. Molloy at p. 66. Two

vessels—one containing the Holy Oil, and the other a Pyx, empty, as it was thought—were brought into the presence of Louise:—

“The Bishop took the case containing the Holy Oil, and presented it to the Ecstatica. No effect was produced until it touched her lips; and then she smiled, as she is accustomed to do, at the contact of things that are blessed. The Pyx was next presented. When it was two yards off the transport of joy returned; she fell upon her knees in adoration as before, and followed the sacred vessel whithersoever it was carried.

“It was five o'clock in the afternoon when the Bishop and his three fellow-witnesses left the cottage. They went at once together to the parish church. There, in the presence of all four, the Pyx was opened; and it was found to contain a pretty considerable fragment of the consecrated species.”

These are no doubt great marvels, at which modern men of science will only smile; but we would remind the latter, in the words of Dr. Molloy, that “there may be a bigotry of scepticism as well as a bigotry of religious zeal”; and we “would express a hope that they will not themselves commit the error they have reprobated in others; but rather come to consider the facts that are here set forth in that fair and candid spirit which they would desire in a theologian, if he ventured to discuss the significance of a chipped flint or a fossil skeleton” (Preface, iii. iv).

No Catholic, we feel sure, can lay down this little book without feeling, as we remarked in a former notice on the same subject, that a great wonder has been raised up amongst us, and that God has indeed visited His people.

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*As Regards Protoplasm.* By JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, F.R.C.S. and LL.D. Edin. New and Improved Edition. London. Longmans, Green & Co. 1872.

MR. HUXLEY'S Essay on the Physical Basis of Life was originally a lecture delivered at Edinburgh in 1868, as the first of a series of Sunday evening addresses on non-theological subjects instituted by the Rev. J. Carter, a clergyman belonging to we know not what denomination. It was afterwards published in the “Fortnightly Review” of February, 1869. In the same year Dr. Stirling, the author of “The Secret of Hegel,” replied to it in a lecture read before the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh and subsequently published under the title of “As Regards Protoplasm.” Some observations of Mr. Huxley's in a paper on “Yeast,” which appeared in the “Contemporary Review” of December, 1871, led to the issue of this “New and Improved Edition,” an octavo pamphlet of seventy-six pages, in which the original essay is augmented by a second part in special reference to the second part of Mr. Huxley's first Essay, and by a “Preface” in reply to the criticisms in “Yeast.”

Examination of Dr. Stirling's remarks on the second part of the paper “On the Physical Basis of Life” would occupy a greater amount of space than we can here afford, inasmuch as it would bring us into the very heart

of the controversy on the "Relativity of Knowledge;" for in that second part Mr. Huxley sets himself to refute "Materialism" from his special standpoint, which is, that we are as unable to construct any materialistic theory as, according to him, we are to construct any spiritualist theory. All our knowledge is relative. We know causation only as unvaried sequence. We know nothing of any world external to consciousness. We know nothing of matter or spirit in themselves; and as we are consequently quite incompetent to come to any conclusion in their regard, it is useless, and therefore foolish, to trouble our heads about them.

We are, however, obliged to content ourselves with merely indicating the existence of this second division of Mr. Huxley's Essay. A great part of its first division deals with facts which have for some time been pretty well known to students of biology. A considerable portion of Dr. Stirling's reply is also taken up with describing the properties of protoplasm and the progress made by biology in investigating it. These descriptions need not detain us; and plainly enough there is nothing more disquieting in being told that we are made of living protoplasm, than in being told that we are made of living dust; for, as Dr. Stirling says, the thought immediately arises how much is implied by this very important qualification, *living*. The two writers are at variance as to the history of the cell-theory, but the difference between them is not one with which we need concern ourselves. It is not in the descriptions, nor in the history, but in the conclusions drawn on the basis of the cell-theory and of protoplasm investigations, that the speciality of the essays on "Yeast" and the "Physical Basis of Life" consists; we shall therefore speak here only of these conclusions, and of the grounds on which they are attacked by Dr. Stirling. The conclusions themselves are four in number. The first is, that all protoplasm of all living beings is identical: therefore there is only one material basis of life. The second is, that all vital phenomena, including feeling, intellect, and will, can be resolved into one or other of the three kinds of phenomena—nutrition, reproduction, and vital movement,—manifested by, and proper to, living protoplasm: so that this one basis of life is also an adequate basis, or, is capable of giving an account of all phenomena observable in plants or animals, under animals including man. The third is, that the properties peculiar to living protoplasm are simply those of its chemical components when combined in the way in which they are combined in protoplasm; so that, using the word physical in the meaning in which we use it when we call the molecular theory of life the *physical* theory of life, protoplasm is the physical basis of life. It is the basis of life *quâ* a material substance, investigable by physics, not *quâ* informed by a soul. The fourth conclusion enunciated in "Yeast" apparently obviates an objection, and has to do with the relation of the individual cells to the organism as a whole.

The reader will have perceived that the first conclusion is introductory, the fourth supplementary. The second and third form the minor and major of a syllogism of which the conclusion is that all vital manifestations, including feeling, intellect, and will, are due to the properties of the constituents of protoplasm. Mr. Huxley's phraseology is, therefore, distinctly materialistic. But his philosophy, he protests in the second part of his Essay, precludes the

affirmation of materialism. He believes that "the further science advances the more extensively will all the phenomena of nature be represented by materialistic forms and symbols." But then he also believes that "the man of science, who, forgetting the limits of philosophical enquiry, slides from these formulæ and symbols into what is commonly understood by materialism, seems to place himself on a level with the mathematician, who should mistake the  $x$ 's and  $y$ 's with which he works his problems for real entities; and with this further disadvantage, as compared with the mathematician, that the blunders of the latter are of no practical consequence, while the errors of systematic materialism may paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of a life." Thought ought to go one way, terminology another: a valuable idea, which some clever person might develop into a theory of naming. An important admission, too, this of Mr. Huxley's, that materialism may paralyze the natural energies and destroy the natural beauty of a life; for it implies that materialism will do all this, if not prevented by an adequate controlling influence. And the power by which he proposes to prevent materialistic terminology from leading to materialistic thinking is only the fantastical "doctrine" of the "Relativity of Knowledge," a "doctrine" as stupid as it is false, a "doctrine," moreover, which not one human being out of a thousand will ever really believe in. "These clever things come from that talkativeness which is floating on the surface of society just now; for from thence is this idle speaking, which has been cleverly got up for the young men."\*

Of Mr. Huxley's first assertion, that all protoplasm is, in form or general appearance, in substance or chemical composition, and in function or kind of activity, the same in species, Dr. Stirling denies each of the three parts. And if his denial can be substantiated by evidence, protoplasm is the name not of any one kind of thing, but of a multitude of things specifically differing in form, function, and substance. If so, however, the appellation, "the Physical Basis of Life," is a misnomer; for not to speak of the implication that the basis of all life is purely physical, there is only a physical basis of this tissue and a physical basis of that, a physical basis of this species of living beings and a physical basis of that species,—but there is no one basis of all tissues and all species, from and by which all are built up, and through which all are reduced to unity. This part of the controversy has also an obvious bearing on Darwinism.

As to difference in form, Dr. Stirling refers † to Stricker, a German physiologist, as stating that protoplasm varies almost infinitely in consistence, shape, and "structure":—"In consistence, it is sometimes so fluid as to be capable of forming in drops; sometimes semifluid and gelatinous, sometimes of considerable resistance. In shape—for to Stricker the cells are now protoplasm—we have club-shaped protoplasm, globe-shaped protoplasm, cup-shaped protoplasm, bottle-shaped protoplasm, spindle-shaped protoplasm, branched, threaded, ciliated protoplasm, circle-headed protoplasm; flat, conical, cylindrical, longitudinal, prismatic, polyhedral, and

\* *Axiochus*, n. 15; *inter Opera Platonis*; translated by Burges.

† "As Regards Protoplasm," p. 30.



palisade-like protoplasm. In structure, again, it is sometimes uniform and sometimes reticulated into spaces that contain fluid." But are these differences specific or merely accidental? A typical species is a natural group, the individuals composing which are, on the one hand, differentiated from each other only by a given number of definite properties *plus* the effects that follow from them; but, on the other hand, separated from the members of other species by differences running through their whole nature. Mere variation in form, if it cannot be connected with other differences more fundamental, cannot be accepted as adequate ground for specific distinction. We are consequently thrown back on differences of composition and of function.

As to the second point, difference of composition—accepting the modern chemical theory—a chemical species is, confining ourselves to compounds, a collection of substances whose molecules are composed of the same elementary bodies combined in the same proportions and quantities, and arranged in the same manner. A chemical compound, to be the same in species with another, must be composed of the same elements: thus, water and sulphuric acid are not specifically the same, because the one is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, and the other of sulphur, oxygen, and hydrogen. The elements must also be present in the same proportions: thus, ether and alcohol, although both composed only of carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen, are not the same in species, because the proportion of the carbon to the other two components is less in alcohol than in ether. If components and proportions are both the same, but the absolute quantity of the components present in each molecule of the compounds is not, the compounds will be specifically different: thus, oil of turpentine and oil of lemons both contain the same elements, and these in the same proportions; but the absolute quantity of the elements contained in an oil of turpentine molecule is twice as great as that contained in an oil of lemon molecule. And even though elements, proportional quantities and absolute quantities should be the same, two compounds will still be counted specifically different if their components are differently arranged in their respective compound-molecules. Urea and cyanate of ammonia, racemic and tartaric acids, are cases in point. Now, it is admitted that the existence of these four requisites of unity of chemical species cannot be verified in the case of living protoplasm. The first two could be verified only by actual analysis; the last two by reasoning on the results of actual analysis. But analysis of a living protoplast is impossible, both because it cannot be, for analytical purposes, disengaged from the formed matter which accompanies it, and, still more, because it would die in the process. The analysis would be an analysis of a dead, not of a living, protoplast; and if the phenomena of life depend on the chemical constitution of protoplasm, then when the protoplasm dies its chemical constitution must be changed. The assertion that all protoplasm is chemically identical is, therefore, an assumption without evidence. It is also an assumption against evidence. For, although the chemical identity of all living protoplasts cannot be established or negatived directly, it can be tested indirectly by the use of re-agents. The same compounds under the same circumstances behave with the same re-agents in the same way. But, "with regard to the action

of re-agents, these must be denied to produce the like results on the various forms of protoplasm. With reference to temperature, for instance, Kühne reports that the movements of the amœba are arrested in iced water; while, in the same medium, the ova of the trout furrow famously, but are arrested even in a warmed room.\* That two samples of unknown chemical constitution react in the same way with a re-agent—that, for instance, they give black precipitates with sulphuretted hydrogen—does not prove them to be chemically identical. But that they do not react in the same way is, if the experiment has been properly made, of itself proof conclusive that they are chemically different. And as to the chemical species of living protoplasts, if nutrition be regarded as the continual formation, by the matter of the protoplast, of exceedingly unstable combinations, the decomposition of which produces effete matter, then, inasmuch as the effete matter resulting from the activity of some protoplasts chemically differs specifically from that resulting from the activity of others, the chemical nature of the protoplasts themselves must be held to be specifically different. Even though they could be analyzed exactly—they can be roughly analyzed, as far as elements and proportions go—and found to consist of the same elements in precisely the same proportions, the absolute quantity and manner of arrangement in one case might be very different from what it is in another.

Difference in function, on which we have now to say a few words, is of greater importance than the preceding differences in themselves; for life, phenomenally considered, is a matter of function. By function we mean that in doing or suffering which the subject of the function is normally a means to an end. This end may be either the execution of some movement, or the formation of concrete things, as osseous, cartilaginous, or nervous matter. The concrete things produced in virtue of a function may, again, either be unlike that by which they are formed, as in the three examples just instanced, or they may be specifically identical with it. Between the movements of different protoplasts, regarded merely as movements, there has not, as yet, been found any difference which can be looked on as specific. But the matter is otherwise when we come to consider the concrete things which these protoplasts produce; for functions, it is almost unnecessary to say, are discriminated by the differences between what they form: thus, to form bone is one function, to form blood another; and these functions are specifically distinct, since the things produced are so. Specific functional distinctions between protoplasts show themselves, in the first place, when we examine the formed matter which they respectively produce. Not only is this formed matter unlike the protoplasts by which it is formed—which would be nothing to the point—but that produced by some protoplasts is specifically different from that produced by others; from which we may justly conclude specific difference of function between the protoplasts themselves. Thus we have bone protoplasts, which produce the formed matter of bone; muscle protoplasts, fat protoplasts, keratogene or horny-tissue-forming protoplasts, pigment protoplasts, nerve protoplasts, protoplasts of all the other tissues, each producing only its own kind of tissue, and uninterchange-

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\* "As Regards Protoplasm," p. 29.

able with the rest. If the protoplasts which form different tissues themselves differ in chemical constitution, then they belong to distinct chemical, as well as to distinct physiological, species; if they are of the same chemical constitution, the fact that they do produce different tissues is only the more remarkable, and seems the more to demand some higher and regulative principle for its explanation. But besides producing formed matter, which is unlike themselves, protoplasts also produce other protoplasts which are like themselves; and this they do either immediately—by subdividing, or by sending forth processes which, detaching themselves afterwards, become distinct protoplasts—or mediately, a long and complicated series of intermediate changes and productions intervening. By immediate reproduction protoplasts produce only other protoplasts identical in species with themselves.\* Bone protoplasts will produce only bone protoplasts; fat protoplasts arise from fat protoplasts; if a protoplast, whose function it is to form this or that special tissue, subdivides or sends out processes, the resulting protoplasts have the function of forming only the same kind of tissue—except, perhaps, in certain abnormal conditions of the system or the protoplast. In mediate reproduction the course of things is very different, but the lesson it teaches is the same. An acorn, itself the offspring of this or that species of oak, contains within itself a minute protoplast which, through the instrumentality of a series of changes almost infinite in complexity, produces another protoplast possessed of powers like its own. The acorn is embedded in the ground; the little protoplast, supplied with nourishment, divides and subdivides almost *ad infinitum*. But it does not immediately produce protoplasts similar to itself; on the contrary, it loses its identity in giving birth to protoplasts capable of forming the various tissues of the future oak. The plant rises above the ground; it grows to a tree; it flowers and fructifies, and new acorns come to maturity on it; and each of these contains a minute protoplast, from which will grow a tree of the same species as that which produced the parent acorn. Then has the first protoplast produced another like itself, and the process of mediate reproduction is complete. Now, the definition of a botanical or zoological species is, that it is a collection of living individuals which may, as far as botany or zoology is concerned, be believed to have been derived from a common ancestor. Individuals, consequently, which cannot be believed to have been derived from a common ancestor, belong to different species. All protoplasts, therefore, which by mediate reproduction produce organisms differing in species, must themselves also be held specifically to differ, inasmuch as they cannot be believed to have been derived from a common ancestor; and the same reservation which, on the Darwinian theory, is necessary to save specific distinction of plants and animals, is sufficient to save specific distinction of their producing protoplasts.

Thus far of the specific non-identity of all protoplasm. We now come to Mr. Huxley's second conclusion, on which we cannot do better than quote his own words:—

No very abstruse argumentation is needed, in the first place, to prove that

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\* With the exception of embryonic protoplasts.

that the powers, or faculties of all kinds of living matter, divers as they may be in degree, are substantially similar in kind.

Goethe has condensed a survey of all the powers of mankind into the well-known epigram—

“Warum treibt sich das Volk so und schreicht? Es will sich ernähren  
Kinder zeugen, and die nähren so gut es vernag.  
\* \* \* \* \*

Weiter bringt es kein Mensch, stell' er sich wie er auch will.”

In physiological language this means, that all the multifarious and complicated activities of man are comprehensible under three categories. Either they are immediately directed towards the maintenance and development of the body, or they effect transitory changes in the relative positions of different parts of the body, or they tend towards the continuance of the species. Even those manifestations of intellect, of feeling, and of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties, are not excluded from this classification, inasmuch as to everyone but the subject of them they are known only as transitory changes in the relative position of parts of the body. Speech, gesture, and every other form of human action, are, in the long run, resolvable into muscular contraction, and muscular contraction is but a transitory change in the relative position of the parts of a muscle. But the scheme, which is large enough to embrace the activities of the highest form of life, covers all those of the lower creatures.—*Fort. Rev.*, Feb. 1869, p. 130.

“This,” remarks Dr. Stirling, referring to the quotation from Goethe, “means, quite literally translated, ‘Why do the folks make such a pother and stir? They want to feed themselves, get children, and then feed them as best they can: no man does more, let him do as he may!’ This really is Mr. Huxley’s sole proof for his classification of the powers of man. Is it sufficient? Does it not apply rather to the birds of the air, the fish of the sea, and the beasts of the field, than to man. . . . To elevate the passing whim of mere literary *Laune* into a cosmical axiom and a proof in place—this we cannot help adding to the other productions here, in which Mr. Huxley appears against himself.”\* Further, this classification being inaccurate, it was to be supposed that the higher powers of man would, more energetically than the others, resist being comprehended under it. The reader will have noticed the mere fetch—for it is nothing more—by which Mr. Huxley brings intellect, feeling, and will under movement. They can even apparently be classified as movements only by excluding the knowledge which those who possess them have of them. But to do this is simply to exclude intellect, feeling, and will themselves. To say that to others than the subjects of them mental phenomena are known only as transitory changes in the relative position of parts of the body, is a way of speaking so grossly and evidently inaccurate as scarcely to be misleading, for it confounds the mental phenomena themselves with the outward bodily movements by which they are or may be accompanied. These mental phenomena cannot be known as movements—for they are not movements—and a thing cannot

\* “As Regards Protoplasm,” p. 35.

be known as what it is not. We know the feelings of others, not as movements which they are, but through movements which they produce, and these movements are to us signs of feelings only in so far as we have ourselves experienced feelings similar in kind.

Let it, however, be granted that the intellectual, volitional, and sensitive phenomena which we experience in ourselves are due to properties of the living organism. No one who believes in the union of soul and body can, indeed, refuse to make the concession. The only result of its being made is, that the question whence did the organism—the living human being—get these properties at once presents itself for solution. Do they belong to it because its matter is combined with a soul, a spiritual principle? Or do they result simply from the properties of its material constituents?

Here comes in Mr. Huxléy's third conclusion:—

“Carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen, are all lifeless bodies. Of these, carbon and oxygen unite in certain proportions and under certain conditions, and give rise to carbonic acid; hydrogen and oxygen produce water; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These new compounds, like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are lifeless. But when they are brought together, under certain conditions they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm, and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life.

“I see no break in this series of steps in molecular complication, and am unable to understand why the language which is applicable to one term of the series may not be used of any of the others. . . . When hydrogen and oxygen are mixed in certain proportions, and an electric spark passed through them, they disappear, and a quantity of water, equal in weight to the sum of their weights, appears in their place. There is not the slightest parity between the passive and active powers of the water and those of the oxygen and hydrogen which have given rise to it. At 33° Fahrenheit, and far below that temperature, oxygen and hydrogen are elastic, gaseous bodies, whose particles tend to rush away from one another with great force. Water, at the same temperature, is a strong though brittle solid, whose particles tend to cohere into definite geometrical shapes, and sometimes build up complex imitations of the most complex forms of vegetable foliage.

“Nevertheless, we call these, and many other strange phenomena, the properties of the water, and we do not hesitate to believe that, in some way or another, they result from the properties of the component elements of the the water. We do not assume that a something called “aquosity” entered into and took possession of the oxide of hydrogen as soon as it was formed, and then guided the aqueous particles to their places in the facets of the crystal, or among the leaflets of the hoar-frost. On the contrary, we live in the hope and in the faith that, by the advance of molecular physics, we shall by-and-bye be able to see our way as clearly from the constituents of water to the properties of water as we are now able to deduce the operations of a watch from the form of its parts and the manner in which they are put together.

“Is the case in any way changed when carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and in their place, under the influence of pre-existing, living protoplasm, an equivalent quantity of the matter of life makes its appearance?

“It is true that there is no sort of parity between the properties of the components and the properties of the resultant, but neither was there in the case of the water.”—*Fort. Rev.*, pp. 139, 140.

So that Dr. Stirling, naturally enough, represented Mr. Huxley as declaring that his life-matter, protoplasm, is due to chemistry.\* Whereupon Mr. Huxley, much, apparently, to the surprise of Dr. Stirling, retorted † that this was an utter misrepresentation; that the idea of protoplasm being due to chemistry was in his judgment absurd; and that "certainly I have never said anything resembling it." "One is pleased," replies Dr. Stirling, ‡ to think that Mr. Huxley has come to consider such an opinion 'absurd.' But—"Certainly I have never said anything resembling it!" Mr. Huxley, for aught I know, may have some quibble in his mind about the phrase 'due to chemistry'; but he has always, and everywhere, for all that, described his life-matter as due to chemistry; and here are a few examples." Some portions of the passage last quoted are then brought forward in proof, after which Dr. Stirling proceeds:—"It is a pity to see a man in the position of Mr. Huxley so strangely forget himself. . . . It is not every gentleman who so lightly allows himself such heavy weapons as 'utter misrepresentations;' and I can only say, as regards them all, that I am really sorry Mr. Huxley should have so indulged himself." But Mr. Huxley, perhaps, had in his mind the positivist theory about properties.

To the great body of those whose attention has been drawn to it, the main interest of this controversy about protoplasm lies in this, that on the determination come to regarding it depends the answer to be given to the question, Do vital phenomena originate from protoplasm considered simply as a material substance, or do they postulate the presence of some higher agency? To evince the need for some such higher agency two lines of argument may be made use of. Firstly, it may be argued that the phenomena presented by the individual protoplasts cannot be accounted for without having recourse to some higher agency. Secondly, it may be argued that the co-ordination of these protoplasts into an organism reveals the presence of such an agency. On this second line of argument, which is by far the stronger of the two, we have seen that Mr. Huxley hardly touches. But the greater stress he lays on the phenomena presented by the individual protoplast, and the less he attributes to the organism of protoplasts, the more does he seem to account for the totality of vital phenomena exhibited by an organism, by seeming to account for those exhibited by a single protoplast. Thence the bearing of the following passage on the general argument:—

"Kant defined the speciality of the living body to be that the parts exist for the sake of the whole, and the whole for the sake of the parts. But when Turpin and Schwann resolved the living body into an aggregation of quasi-independent cells, each, like a *Torula*, leading its own life and having its own laws of growth and development, the aggregation being dominated and kept working towards a definite end only by a certain harmony among the units, or by the superaddition of a controlling apparatus, such as a nervous system, this conception ceased to be tenable. The cell lives for its own sake, as well as for the sake of the whole organism; and the cells, which float in the blood, live at its expense, and profoundly modify it, are almost as much independent organisms as the *Torule* which float in beer-wort."—*Cont. Rev.*, Dec. 1871, p. 33.

\* "As Regards Protoplasm," p. 58.

† *Cont. Rev.* Dec. 1871, p. 36.

‡ "As Regards Protoplasm," Preface, pp. 9-11.

A spoonful of yeast is composed of a multitude of distinct plants ; and each yeast-plant, or *Torula*, consists of only a single cell, which would continue to live even though all the other cells were removed ; but although the beer-wort is necessary to it, it is not necessary to the existence of the beer-wort. Now, an organism, in the language of Kant, is a being which is at once the cause and the effect of itself—a being of which the parts are possible only in their relation to the whole, of which the whole is possible only in its relation to the parts. A single yeast-cell would have been declared by Kant to be an organism, for this relation obtains between the parts and the whole of each individual cell. Mr. Huxley's idea of protoplasm, says Dr. Stirling,\* seems to be that it is, as it were, so much ointment in a box, any part of which scooped out will be so much life-stuff, and as truly life-stuff as the whole. But, he adds, this is not the idea of the great German physiologists. Even those who have given up both cell-wall and nucleus as essential constituents of a cell, nevertheless require a certain measure of protoplasm, a protoplast, which in their eyes is the essential cell. "Schulze and Brücke and Kühne . . . pretty well confine their attention, like Mr. Huxley, to the protoplasm. But . . . they refuse to give consideration to any mere protoplasm-shred which may not yet have ceased, perhaps, to exhibit all sign of contractility under the microscope, and demand a protoplasm-cell. . . . 'Omnis cellula e cellula' is the rubric they work under as much now as ever. The heart of a turtle, they say, is not a turtle ; so neither is a protoplasm-shred a protoplasm-cell." But the same relation which obtains between the individual cell and its parts obtains also between an organism which, like the body of man, is composed of a multitude of cells, and the individual cells, which are its ultimate organized parts. The difference between a spoonful of yeast and a human body is, that the one is a heap of cells, the other an organism of cells. To take the example given in the above quotation, we are told that the blood-corpuscles profoundly modify the condition of the blood. This implies that if they were to cease to exist, the state of the blood would be different from what it is. But could such a change take place without the most serious injury to the system resulting ? If it could not, the blood corpuscles are necessary to the organism. Conversely, the rest of the organism is of course necessary to the blood corpuscles, for they live and perform their normal offices only if supplied with proper nourishment, and this proper nourishment is contained in the fluid matter of the blood, which the whole organism is directly or indirectly engaged in providing and preserving in a proper condition. Again, that each cell lives also "for its own sake" is in no wise inconsistent with the *dictum* of Kant ; for the essence of the matter is, that it lives as well to subserve the *esse* or the *melius esse* of the rest. That the cells have their own laws of growth and development is essential to the idea of a *means*. If a thing had no properties in itself, it could be of no use to anything else ; and the individualization, so to say, of the ultimate organized parts which is effected by the cell-theory—the acknowledgment of the fact that they have each their own distinct laws of action—only makes their organization into

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\* "As Regards Protoplasm," pp. 26, 27.

one whole the more remarkable. The more marked the individuality of each officer, the more noteworthy is the controlling power of the general. Let not the reader, moreover, imagine that Mr. Huxley explains anything when he refers the working together of the aggregation of cells to a harmony. The working together *is* the harmony; and the harmony, the working together, whether manifesting itself equably over the whole organism, or centring, as it were, in a nervous system, is what has to be explained.

We have here endeavoured not only to indicate some of Dr. Stirling's lines of argument, but also to bring out the relation of his Essay to the papers on "Yeast" and the "Physical Basis of Life." "As Regards Protoplasm" brims over with fact and reasoning, and is at the same time lightly and agreeably written. "Anything more complete and final in the way of refutation than this Essay," Sir John Herschel pronounces, "I cannot well imagine." It will well repay perusal.

*Irish Wits and Worthies; including Dr. Lanigan, His Life and Times.* By  
W. J. FITZ-PATRICK, Esq., LL.D. Dublin: James Duffy, Son, & Co.  
1873.

THE chief interest of this work is of course centred in the life and times of Ireland's great ecclesiastical historian, Dr. Lanigan. The want of such a work has been long felt; but we may be well content to have waited so long, when we find that it has been undertaken by so able a writer as the biographer of Dr. Doyle. It is as a biographer, we think, that Mr. Fitz-Patrick excels, for he never forgets those small traits, and minute touches, which, however unimportant in themselves, contribute so much to the faithfulness and life of a biographical sketch. Like most biographers of merit, the author is by no means free from a certain amount of egotism, which here and there may perhaps tempt us to smile; but this, as we think our readers will generally find, far from interfering with the interest of the work, does but serve to render the narrative more life-like and amusing.

It must have been no easy task to form a correct estimate of Dr. Lanigan's life and character, overshadowed as was the former by the cloud of mental disease which darkened his declining years, and the latter by the suspicion of false doctrine, which, for a time at least, although unjustly, obscured his prospects; and it must have been a still less easy task to place this estimate successfully before the reader. We may, however, congratulate Mr. Fitz-Patrick on the result, although there are some things which we would have gladly seen omitted, others upon which the author, perhaps, is hardly qualified to form an opinion, and not a few passages of somewhat questionable taste.

Dr. Lanigan's boyhood in Cashel, his studies at the Irish College in Rome, his life in the University of Pavia, his return to Ireland owing to the wars of the First Napoleon, and his cold reception in his native land in consequence of his connection during his residence in Italy with Pietro Tamburini, who acted as promoter of the Heretical and Schismatical Synod of Pistoia, but



who must not be confounded with Tomaso Tamburini, the Jesuit author of a well-known Moral Theology, are all most interestingly and graphically described. But, as might have been expected, it is in his description of Dr. Lanigan's after-life in Ireland that the author's skill as a biographer is chiefly shown. His struggles to obtain employment, his intercourse with the wits and worthies of his day—and when has Ireland been without wits and worthies?—with Richard Kirwan, and Denis Taaffe, and Dr. Drumgoole, and Father Michael Keogh, and others too numerous to mention, his labours as assistant librarian of the Royal Dublin Society, in connection with the uncongenial subjects of sheep, and hemp, and agriculture, his writings under the signature of Irenæus, his attack on Jack Giffard, well known by his sobriquet of “the Dog in Office,” his efforts to resist the Veto, the characteristics of his “*Magnum opus*,” the ever-deepening shadows of his sad mental disease, which at last completely darkened his splendid intellect, and brought him to the tomb—all these are successively placed before us as so many pictures of his life in Ireland.

Speaking of Dr. Lanigan's labours, Mr. Fitz-Patrick remarks:—

“Since Lanigan lived and laboured, an immense flood of light has been shed on the history of Ireland, thanks to the investigations of O'Donovan, O'Curry, and other Celtic scholars; and yet we are not aware that anything he has written has been invalidated by recent discoveries, or is at all inconsistent with the present advanced state of knowledge on the subject” (ch. xxxiii., p. 235).

And again:

“Dr. Lanigan's work has, on the whole, well stood the test of time and information supplied by recent discoveries. Eugene O'Curry's able work, extending to upwards of 700 pages, “The MS. Materials of Irish History” —one which finally deals with the ecclesiastical domain—fails to indicate any error of date or fact upon the part of Dr. Lanigan, although by no means unwilling to criticise him severely, as the general tone of the work warrants us in assuming” (ibid. p. 236).

Mr. Fitz-Patrick had previously written at p. 233:—

“Wonderful as Dr. Lanigan's research and multifarious illustrations must be considered, his skill of analysis and accuracy of erudition were still more wonderful. The work contained, perhaps, too large a mass of notes to present an artistic appearance; but if not a neatly-formed mosaic, it was a strangely-built tower, which no assault could shake. Some peevish critics were found to object that ‘these notes constituted a very labyrinth, wherein the mind grows bewildered, and often loses sight of the principal figure or figures.’ But, on the other hand, it was impossible to view without admiration the depth of Dr. Lanigan's sagacity, and the comprehensiveness of that grasp of thought ere it lost its tension; while some kindly friend saw even grace in the curving digressions which frequently marked his up-hill progress; and though the widening flood of his discourse often ran to a considerable distance, it always swept majestically round again to the original point of departure.”

So, also, the amiable and accomplished Bishop of Ossory, Dr. Moran, observes of Dr. Lanigan:—

“The most illustrious name on the roll of ecclesiastical historians of Ireland is that of Rev. John Lanigan. His critical remarks have contributed more

than those of any other writer to illustrate the early life of our Apostle" (p. 250).

Nor are eulogies of Dr. Lanigan confined to Catholic writers ; he is held in equal esteem by Protestant authorities. Amongst others, Mr. Baring-Gould thus writes :—

" I take Dr. Lanigan as my authority for dates, and I have a great opinion of his accuracy " (p. 251).

We need not remind our readers that Dr. Lanigan, in his great work, while he has added to what is valuable in Usher, has also corrected the errors to be found in Harris's supplemental letter, as well as those of Ledwich, Hanmer, Campbell, Cressy, Dempster, Dachry, and even of our own Dr. Milner.

With regard to the charge of Jansenism brought against Dr. Lanigan, we certainly consider that Mr. Fitz-Patrick has perfectly succeeded in clearing him from it. Remembering, however, Dr. Lanigan's connection with Tamburini, we cannot help thinking that a little more humility on the good Doctor's part would not have been out of place, and that the author is somewhat unnecessarily severe on Dr. Hussey for the part he took in the matter ; for although undoubtedly mistaken, he seems to have acted conscientiously throughout. It must be borne in mind that in those days Jansenism was both vigorous and wide-spread, and all the more dangerous because it lurked within the Church's borders, and tainted with its hidden poison even many learned and good men. The startling allusion to the almost abject poverty of a relative of the "sparkling," and "brilliant," and "potential" Dr. Hussey, with his "éclat," and "jewelled hand," is in very bad taste, and quite uncalled for. By the way, Mr. Fitz-Patrick seems to be fond of alluding to bishops' "jewelled hands ;" but is he correct in speaking of the "richly jewelled hand" of Innocent XIII. ? We had always thought that the only ring worn by the successors of the Fisherman of Galilee was the Fisherman's Ring, which, if we mistake not, is formed of a *cameo*, not a jewel.

If Dr. Lanigan was no Jansenist, it is equally certain that he was no Gallican. Thus we are told, at p. 230, that he gave Fleury's "Ecclesiastical History" no quarter. At p. 215, vol. iv. of his great work, he applies the epithets "nonsense" and "lie" to some of Fleury's flights ; and at p. 269 he accuses him of suppression, disingenuousness, and an absence of discrimination—a grave indictment against any historian !

We mentioned above that there were some things in this work which we would gladly have seen omitted. Amongst these is the report, published in the Appendix, upon the alleged mal-administration of the Irish College at Rome by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus. The author admits that "the tone of some of the statements is, perhaps, unnecessarily severe, and evinces an animus imbibed but from contemporary events and revolutions." (Appendix, p. 307.) But he justifies its publication in the following words : "An historic writer has often an irksome duty to discharge ; he must needs struggle to suppress all temptation to suppression, when, as in the present case, fear may arise lest some few should deprecate what many will hail with interest" (p. 27). As a further justification, he writes in the Appendix as follows (p. 306) :—

“There will be persons found, no doubt, including ecclesiastics, to censure us for ‘re-opening a question which the restoration of Jesuits in 1814 closed.’ But it is not we who re-open the question, nor did that act of grace close it. All enlightened divines, secular and regular, are for full ventilation of that interesting point; and candour has equally distinguished both sides. The revelations made by Father Theiner, Prefect of the Secret Archives of the Vatican, led Father Roothaan, General of the Jesuits, to write a long letter to Father de Revignan, dated December, 1852, urging him, as his biographer says, to write a book on Clement XIII. and Clement XIV., the high-minded champion and the reluctant destroyer of the Society; and he proposed to give glory to the former, and to justify the latter, and to show that on this point, as on all others, the expression of the Comte de Maistre, which he took for his motto, is verified, and that the Popes have need of nothing but the truth.”

Now, we are certainly no friends to any kind of suppression of facts, however painful, whenever truth is at stake, or when the object which a writer has in view may be served by their disclosure; but in the present instance we can find absolutely no reason at all for the publication of a report which not only throws very little light on the history of the suppression of the Jesuits, or upon the life of Dr. Lanigan, but which abounds in frivolous accusations and statements, which, according to the author’s own admission, are perhaps unnecessarily severe, and coloured by contemporary events and revolutions. In a work on the “Wits and Worthies” of Ireland it is singularly out of place. More than this, its publication is exceedingly inopportune at a time when the enemies of the Church are more than ever embittered against the heroic sons of S. Ignatius, and will only be too glad to catch at any straw that can be brought to tell against them. The Society of Jesus, although it had one of God’s Saints for its founder, and has ever been remarkable for the saintliness of its members, is still a human institution, and therefore subject to human infirmities and failings; but there is a time to speak and a time to be silent, and certainly this is not the time to revive the memory of past differences; still less so, when those very differences were, if not the result of, at least deeply tinged by, unjust prejudices against the Society. The allusion to Father Theiner’s work is equally unhappy, for it is no secret that that work has been generally considered ill-timed and ill-advised, and that it has only embittered the question without throwing any new light of importance upon it.

We have got another fault to find with our author. He sometimes speaks with too great confidence, as if priding himself on his superior knowledge when a little more acquaintance with his subject would have shown him the incorrectness of some of his own statements. Thus, for instance, speaking of the too well-known Synod of Pistoia, he says:—

“To many ecclesiastics its history is but imperfectly known. Ranke dismisses it in two lines, and it is altogether ignored by Reeves and others in their histories of the Church. This seems the more strange, inasmuch as the daring character of the Council within so short a distance of the capital of Christendom and centre of unity, excited at the time a wonderful sensation” (p. 51).

Mr. Fitz-Patrick is evidently not aware that, although Ranke may dismiss the Synod in two lines,—his history, it must be remembered, is exceedingly

condensed—and, although it is ignored by Reeves and others in their histories of the Church—ecclesiastics of the present day derive their knowledge of Church history from some higher source than Ranke or Reeves. Besides, there is hardly a theological student who has completed his course without having had his attention drawn to the many errors of the Synod of Pistoia ; for however limited his knowledge of Church history may be, he cannot fail to come across the Synod and its errors in his theological course.

Another fault which, although small, we can hardly pass over is, that the author in aiming at effect not unfrequently makes use of epithets which leave an unpleasant, if not an incorrect impression upon the reader's mind. Thus, at p. 378 he speak of the noviciate of the Order of Charity as "chilling." He means, of course, to contrast the austerities of convent life with the fascinations of the world ; but surely "chilling" and "charity" are words which do not go well together.

Notwithstanding these few blemishes, we heartily recommend Mr. Fitz-Patrick's new work to the Catholic public, and indeed to all who are interested in Ireland's "Wits and Worthies."

In conclusion, as an instance of the pleasant way in which the work is for the most part written, we extract the following account of Richard Kirwan, the accomplished President of the Royal Irish Academy (p. 123).

"Kirwan never lost his priestly aspect" (he had entered in early life the noviciate of the Jesuits, although he afterwards, unfortunately, abjured the faith) "and to the end of his long life was always to be seen wrapped in a sacerdotal cloak. This he did not relinquish, even in the house, no more than his hat—a strange cross between Guy Fawkes and Dr. Troy's. In this garb he did the honours of reception at their brilliant conversaziones, which Dublin still remembers with delight. They had previously been held in London, and were regularly attended by Dr. Priestley, Horne Tooke, Sir George Banks, and Mrs. Macaulay. Records of the conversation are still preserved in the MS. of the late Martin Dean, Esq., of Galway. In Dublin he resided in Cavendish Row, and each Wednesday, at six o'clock, was the time appointed for the admission of his friends. 'At seven, the knocker,' observes a citizen, 'was removed from the hall-door, and this was the signal that he was not to be seen ; for he felt disinclined to disturb his guests with introductions or the noise of the knocker. Those already admitted were entertained with refreshments, but, above all, with conversation enriched by extensive knowledge, travel, and intercourse with the most remarkable men of the age. Mr. Kirwan reclined on a sofa, rolled in a cloak, and another thrown over his lower limbs, his hat on, a long screen behind him, and a blazing fire before him, no matter whether winter or the dog-days. He always solicited permission to wear his hat, and was allowed this privilege even in courts of justice ; nay, he wore it at the levée which he constantly attended in his capacity of Inspector-General of his Majesty's Mines." So consistently anxious was he to keep up the supply of caloric, that if accosted in the street by the Viceroy himself, he would eagerly push on, and, unless his friend joined him at the same rapid pace, there was no chance of one word of conversation."

*Christianity and Positivism.* A Series of Lectures to the Times on Natural Theology and Apologetics. By JAMES McCOSH, D.D., LL.D., President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton. London: Macmillan & Co. 1871.

DR. McCOSH, who has left Great Britain for the United States, is one of the steadiest and most judicious of British writers on Psychology and Metaphysics. "Christianity and Positivism," an English reprint of a course of lectures delivered by him in the spring of last year in the Union (Presbyterian) Theological Seminary, New York, on the manner of answering a number of infidel objections and difficulties, will be especially interesting to those who have made themselves acquainted with his previous publications. He here makes application of his philosophical principles to the religious needs of the present day, in so far as Natural Theology is concerned; and to the two divisions of the series in which this subject is treated ("Christianity and Physical Science," and "Christianity and Mental Science") he adds a third\* ("Christianity and Historical Investigation"), which deals with the historical evidences of Christianity. These subjects are considered popularly and with reference to current difficulties which have arisen out of the partial descent into public thought of the physical theory of evolution, the speculations of Mr. Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer, and the attacks which have been made on the authenticity of the Old and New Testaments, and especially of the Gospel narrative. The lectures were addressed to young men; their title, "Lectures to the Times," is not belied by their character. They are not, of course, without their faults, but that the author has taken care to keep himself well read in the latest contributions to the solution of the difficulties and objections which he has undertaken to discuss is evidenced by, for instance, the fact that he has made himself acquainted with Mr. Wallace's then recent opposition to Mr. Darwin, with Mr. Mivart's book on the "Genesis of Species," and even with Dr. Frankland's experiments on Spontaneous Generation, the results of which were published in "Nature" only in the beginning of 1871. Mr. Mivart's criticisms on Darwin's conclusions from Natural Selection he calls "formidable objections, supported as they are by an array of facts by an accomplished naturalist" (p. 350†). A surprisingly large amount of ground is covered; and, at the same time, the topics dealt with are handled with a lightness of style which will be somewhat unexpected by those who know Dr. McCosh only by such works as his treatise on the "Method of the Divine Government"; frequently, also, with an aptness and force of illustration which materially assists the argument in carrying conviction to the mind. Occasionally, however, the argument itself is rhetorical rather than logical; the style is not unfrequently forced; and the author brings himself too prominently forward.

\* Pp. 220—340.

† Mr. Darwin himself, in the last edition of his "Origin of Species" (1872), also speaks of them as a "formidable array, illustrated with admirable art and force by a distinguished zoologist" (p. 176).

By Positivism, Dr. McCosh does not understand the peculiar system of Auguste Comte, but—distinguishing Positivism from Comtism—the system of thought of which Professor Huxley is perhaps the best living representative. The basis of this system is what is commonly called phenomenism, according to which human reason in its speculative efforts ought to aim solely at presenting the world of phenomena in scientific unity; and this it is endeavoured to do by means of the theory of evolution, which binds the different parts of the system together, and gives it at least an appearance of theoretical consistency. Positivism, therefore, will be deprived of its power as a system by successful attacks on either (1) the denial of knowledge of the supersensible, which forms its speculative groundwork; (2) the theory of evolution, by means of which it is carried out into detail, and bound together into an apparent scientific unity; (3) the utilitarian theory of morals, which alone is compatible with positions essential to the Positivist system; (4) the historical speculations by which it has been attempted to dispose of Christianity as an historical religion, so leaving Positivism to be the religion in the future; or (5) the arguments by which it has been endeavoured to show that, the historical evidences apart, the doctrines of Positivism and of Christianity respectively are in themselves such that the first can, and the second cannot, be the guide of future human progress.

Dr. McCosh assails Positivism by each of these five lines of argument; and in his sixth lecture gives us to see why he has entitled his book “Christianity and Positivism,” and how, in attacking Positivism, a field of battle is selected whereon defeat will, to all antagonists of religion, be fatal. It is, he tells us, of no use for any one now a days to trouble his mind about the old Unitarian Rationalism of the last century. It is now as torpid as it once was active. No party which at present has any hold on the higher class of minds would accept its defeat as decisive against itself. It confessedly could not stand, and gave place to a “showy intuitionism.” A delightfully unorthodox interpretation of isolated passages of Holy Scripture was once the strong drink of minds comparatively strong; it is now the sickly beverage of weak-minded clergymen who are afraid to go any farther, and try to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. The “showy intuitionism,” again, had in itself no root of permanent vitality, for which reason it was succeeded by a vague and misty sentimentalism. And this sentimentalism is now showing itself destined to fall before Positivism. When, therefore, we would oppose ourselves to the denial of dogmatic Christianity, it is Positivism that must be the point of attack; and, Positivism once overthrown, we shall be carried on to the affirmation of Christianity, orthodox and dogmatic, without its being any longer possible to halt in any of the exploded errors intermediate between that capital error and the truth. To accept as antagonists the elder Rationalism, which is now a matter of ancient history, or the showy Intuitionism, or the misty Sentimentalism, would be only to squander energy, waste time, fight with shadows; as systems, they are dead or dying, and Positivism is absorbing into itself whatever in them is worth answering now. All that it is necessary to do with respect to these intermediate errors is to separate the precious and the vile, to show that certain parts of them really belong naturally to Christianity,

while certain other parts belong as naturally to Positivism ; and to defend the first and attack the second. These are no really common doctrines among the different phases of infidelity.

But, it may be added, there are no really common doctrines between the different phases of infidelity only because there are no strictly common doctrines whatever. So-called "common doctrines," "doctrines held in common by a plurality of denominations of Christians," and so on, are common only materially and *de facto*. They are not common formally and *de jure*. The doctrine, for instance, of the existence of a living God is not a doctrine which finds its expression in Deism. The God of the Deist is, it has been well said, like the idols of the Gentiles, the work of the hands of men, and has ears and hears not, and a mouth and speaks not. The assertion of a universal reign of *mechanical* laws in the present,\* joined with the assertion of miracles in the past, is like new wine in old bottles. The acknowledgment of the Dogmatic Principle—the principle that religious doctrines are not matters of indifference, but have a definite bearing on the position of their holders in the Divine sight—in exact logic involves the reprobation of private judgment.† And the admission that a Revelation has been made to man carries with it the acceptance of the Dogmatic Principle, for it is preposterous to imagine that Almighty God determined, indeed, to make a Revelation, but when He came actually to do so found that after all He really had nothing particular to say.‡ The Dogmatic Principle carries with it the idea of a teaching, and therefore of a visible, Church ; the idea of a visible Church involves the Sacramental Principle. Religion implies Theology, for Theology is the science of Religion ; and Theology implies Dogmatic Evolution.§ And similarly of other doctrines ; so that, if we would speak with precision, there are no doctrines which are in reality common, for the plain reason that every doctrine has leanings and connections which carry it out of the sphere of common doctrines. It is impossible to mediatize Christian dogmas. They are not bricks, which any one may pick up to build his house with ; they are not inert matter, which any system indifferently may assimilate. They are living creatures. They have each their individual tendencies and modes of activity ; they need each its proper food, and cannot live without a congenial atmosphere to breathe in. They are parts of an organism.

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\* See DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1872, p. 339.

† "The true root of Popery is the supposed necessity of Orthodoxy." Blanco White, "Observations on Heresy," Letter I.

‡ "Tracts for the Times," No. 85.

§ Hampden, Bampton Lectures, Lecture I.

*Biological Science in Relation to Religious Belief.* Being the Introductory Address delivered at St. Mary's Hospital Medical School, Oct. 2, 1871. By ALFRED MEADOWS, M.D., M.R.C.P. London: Henry Renshaw, 356, Strand. 1871.

THE party which, sheltering itself under the name of science, attacks the received religious beliefs has two advantages over those who defend them. In the first place, fear, as the Holy Scripture tells us, is a betrayal of the succours which reason offers, in consequence of which many most excellent people who know nothing whatever about physical science are, precisely for that reason, terrified the more by so-called "scientific" objections to Christianity; and it is therefore a royal road to notoriety to give them a good sound fright by means of some unverified speculation, which is, very probably, in the state in which Dr. Kopp declares chemistry to have been some time ago—namely, "in its babyhood, and talking most pernicious nonsense." In the second place, the power of mere words is great; and the growing tendency to apply the word "science" almost exclusively to the secular sciences, and the terms "scientific men" and "men of science" to those who cultivate them, tends to throw into the shade the scientific character of theology. It then becomes possible to speak of science and religion as things distinct and contradistinguished one against another; and, this once done, an ulterior fallacy creeps in, and it becomes possible to say that in such or such a question science is on one side and religion on the other, the fact commonly being that some physicists are opposed to commonly received beliefs, and that in their opposition they are in turn opposed by other physicists on grounds of physical science itself. In this connection we notice, and have great pleasure in noticing, Dr. Meadows' sensible and healthy address, in which he briefly runs over the principal biological mixed questions.

Remarking that "some people seem to take a special delight in talking about the conflict between science and religion," he utterly repudiates the notion that they can be in opposition: speculative thought may, and very possibly will, be frequently at variance with revealed truth, but not science, and still less the demonstrated facts of science.\* He will neither absolutely affirm nor absolutely deny that man is descended from the lower animals by means of natural selection; nor, not having received a theological training, does he enter into the bearings of the Darwinian hypothesis on the first chapters of Genesis; but, he says, if it is true—

"and I must say it is a long way from being proved as yet—it does not appear to me in the least degree to affect man's present dignity, or his responsibilities to his conscience or his God. These are in no way touched by his mode of origin, for they rise out of his present condition. . . . People tell us sometimes that Christianity must be a myth, because the Bible makes man such a noble act of creative power, whereas science, they say, shows him to have been descended lineally from a marine ascidian. . . . To all which I

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\* p. 14.



can only reply that Christianity is certainly not based on any exalted estimate of man's corporeal origin ; on the contrary, the same authority which tells me he is to be saved actually makes him of meaner origin than do these speculators, for in that book I read, not, certainly, that man came from a marine ascidian, but that he was formed out of the dust of the earth."\*

A lower origin still, undeniably.

But, even granting for a moment that the higher organisms were evolved out of a few lower forms, it must be remembered that this is only a part of the evolution system. For whence did these lower forms themselves come ? On this subject, as some of our readers will no doubt remember, Sir William Thomson, in his address before the British Association, hazarded the supposition that they may have dropped down to the earth from nobody knows where, carried on meteoric stones. About this queer fancy—which, even if it were accepted, would not account for the origin of life, but merely remove it out of sight—Dr. Meadows very justly says :—

“I really think, if scientific men can gravely put forward such wild and visionary notions as these, to use an expression suggested by Sir William himself, then the sooner we look elsewhere than to science for explanations of these phenomena the better it will be. It may be, as he says, that such an hypothesis ‘is not unscientific ;’ all I can say is, that if it be not, so much the worse for science” (p. 21).

And respecting Professor Tyndall's idea, that life may have been from the first potentially contained in the fiery nebular mass which was the beginning of things, he says :—

“Now that such an hypothesis as this should be gravely put forward in such terms by a man in Professor Tyndall's position is, I think, a most lamentable thing ; and I would seriously warn you who are just beginning your career of scientific study against being led away by such a flighty—for I cannot call it scientific—use of the imagination” (p. 20).

On the subject of the *nature* of life, which is bound up with that of its *origin*, Dr. Meadows tells us that “undoubtedly the Scotch verdict of ‘not proven’ must be accepted as against the physical hypothesis ; for as yet there is not on record, so far as I know, a single experiment or observation in support of it” (p. 24). But while he regards the physical theory of life as evidenceless, he will not go so far as to say that it is necessarily opposed to religion.

“The history of scientific beliefs is full of instructive lessons in this respect, and we cannot yet afford to dogmatize too narrowly on the connection of science with Christianity in such a manner as to make the one dependent upon the other. This much, however, I do know, that on the principle which I have already enunciated, not even the clearest proof of the so-called physical basis of life, nor the actual demonstration of any single fact in science, however much it might seem to contradict my most cherished beliefs, would have the smallest effect in shaking my faith in the fundamental truths of Christianity. Regarded from a religious stand-point, it matters nothing to me whether the functions of my body, or the growth of a tree, are per-

formed in obedience to what is called a physical or a vital law ; neither am I concerned to know whether I sprang from a marine ascidian or from nothing ; for I know that all laws and all matter, whether in the vegetable or the animal kingdom, the organic or the inorganic worlds, must have originated from the great Lawgiver, and that He saw that they were good " (pp. 27, 28).

Here, it is unnecessary to say, we cannot altogether follow Dr. Meadows. The physical theory of life is, if it be extended to mental life, incompatible with Christianity, inasmuch as it involves either Materialism or the "Philosophy of Nescience." It will, however, have been noticed that in this address the author speaks sometimes as a biologist, as when he gives his opinion as to the state of the scientific evidence on the questions on which he touches, sometimes as a theologian, as when he asserts this or that conclusion to be compatible or incompatible with the Christian Revelation ; but it is only when he speaks as a biologist that he speaks with authority ; and then alone, consequently, can we lay much stress on his utterances.

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*Lessons in Elementary Anatomy.* By ST. GEORGE MIVART, F.R.S., &c.,  
Lecturer on Comparative Anatomy at St. Mary's Hospital, Author of  
"The Genesis of Species." London: Macmillan & Co. 1873.

WE have great pleasure in noticing this useful and opportune hand-book, intended by its author, in the first place, "for teachers and for earnest students of both sexes, not already acquainted with human anatomy ;" and, in the second place, "for students in medicine, and generally for those acquainted with human anatomy, but desirous of learning its more significant relations to the structures of other animals." The book thus possesses a distinctive character, and occupies a place unfilled by any work with which we are acquainted ; nor do we doubt but that it will prove extremely useful. It contains about 500 duodecimo pages, clearly printed, without waste of space. The text is illustrated by over 400 woodcuts, which are lettered, not, as is too often the case, with unmeaning 1, 2, 3, 4's, [or equally unmeaning a, b, c, d's, but with initial or guiding letters of the names of the parts shown by the woodcuts.

Although entitled "Lessons in Elementary Anatomy," and in fact divided into twelve lessons, the style is much more compressed than the title would lead the reader to anticipate, and the amount of matter in a lesson far exceeds what could be carried away from a sitting. The arrangement of the subject-matter is as follows :—The first lesson gives a general account of the human body, and also of the principal divisions of the animal kingdom, for "it is clear from the nature of the case that man's body can be comprehended only by means of an extensive acquaintance with the bodies of other animals. . . . The exclusive study of man's body, though sufficient for the mere art of the surgeon, has led to quite erroneous estimates of the nature and meaning of parts of it ; errors corrected only though the general science of organic forms,

*i.e.* the science of Morphology." The next five lessons treat of the internal skeleton—of Osteology, of the bones, which demand an exceptionally minute consideration, both as being the framework on which the rest of the organism is built, and as being its most durable portion. "Parts of the skeleton, or casts of such, are all we possess of a vast number of animals formerly existing in the world, but now entirely extinct; a good knowledge of the skeleton must therefore be of great utility to those interested in Palæontology." The other six chapters treat respectively of "The External Skeleton," *i.e.*, the skin and its appendages, as hair, horns, feathers, &c., "The Muscles," "The Nervous System," "The Circulating System," "The Alimentary System," and "The Excretory Organs." The conclusion of this last lesson or chapter is a recapitulation in which are summarized the points of difference between man and the brutes.

A biological student may take for his subject either the whole world of living beings, or one of the two great kingdoms—the kingdom of plants or that of animals—into which it is divided, or some particular species, say the human. Whichever he does, he may consider the living beings which he has chosen for consideration either statically or dynamically. He will consider them dynamically, if he examines the laws of their growth and development, the development and functions of the parts of which they are composed. He will, on the other hand, consider them statically only, if he simply takes the body of a plant or animal as the chemist or crystallographer takes a lump of nitre or salt, and endeavours to ascertain what it is, without troubling himself to enquire how it came to be, or to what use it is adapted. If he elect to do this, he may yet take either of two points of view. He may, like the chemist, occupy himself chiefly in investigating the nature of the *matter* of which the tissues are formed. He may busy himself in answering such questions as, What is the chemical composition of bone, of muscle, of nervous matter?—what are its reactions with heat, with light, with electricity? He would in such a case be studying the physics and the chemistry of living beings. On the contrary, he may examine chiefly their *form*, the manner in which their parts are arranged, and in this case he will be a student of Anatomy, the science which treats of the structure of living beings. By structure, however, we may mean either the minute structure which is revealed only through the microscope, or the relatively massive structure which can be discerned by the naked eye. Of the use of the microscope the older anatomists of course knew nothing. Had they been acquainted with it, they would no doubt have included the minute along with the massive structure in their anatomical treatises; but they could not do so; and, partly from the tradition thus established, partly from microscopy being a special study, the minute structure of tissues and organs has come to be treated of apart from the relatively massive structure which is the subject-matter of books on Anatomy, and has been relegated either to special treatises on Histology—as the treatment of the minute anatomy, &c., of the tissues has been called—or, like the chemistry and physics of animal and vegetable bodies, to works on Physiology. That this practice is in itself to be approved of will hardly be maintained. Nor would it have been impossible, before describing the bones, muscles, and the rest, to have described the various

tissues which enter into their construction, to have described also the minute anatomy and the physical and chemical characteristics of these tissues and of the resulting structures. But it would have been inadvisable to introduce too many alterations of manner of treatment into an elementary treatise ; and Mr. Mivart has kept to the old tradition. Besides, his book is one of a series of class-books being published by Messrs. Macmillan ; and his treatment of his subject was therefore conditioned by the way in which the writers on cognate subjects were treating theirs.

To pass on to another point of view. Anatomy may be introduced to the student in any of the three following ways :—Firstly, The anatomy of some one species—the human species, for instance—as in manuals of human anatomy, may be alone considered. Less abstract, and in many regards more interesting than any other, this method of treatment precludes the safe formation of large generalizations, and is attended by other disadvantages, some of which have been already hinted at. Secondly, it may be endeavoured to consider the anatomy of all species, without giving to any species more prominence than is warranted by peculiarities of structure which it may exhibit. This method, which would give us a manual of comparative anatomy, while it would afford the largest possible scope for generalization, would be profoundly uninteresting to the majority of readers. Thirdly, some one species may be taken as the text, a text to be commented on by illustrations drawn from other species. This is the method followed in these Lessons, which thus form an introduction both to human and to comparative anatomy. “Man has been selected as the type, because his structure has been the most studied and is the most intimately known, as also because our own frame is naturally the most interesting to ourselves. But this book has no pretension to be a ‘comparative anatomy.’ It does not profess to give a complete account of the anatomy of any group of animals. It contains but a selection of facts intended to illustrate the variations which nature shows in that type of structure to which man’s body belongs.”

In whichever of these three ways they are presented, the facts which constitute the subject-matter of anatomy need interpretation. This science is to a large extent the groundwork of the science of biology, of which it is a part. It lays before the student an immense assemblage of facts, often to all appearance quite unconnected with one another, which it is utterly impossible to retain in the memory. These facts consequently need to be generalized, in order that they may be even remembered ; they need principles, in order that they may be bound together into a science and their significance brought out. The description of the facts has been called descriptive anatomy. Their interpretation has been called philosophical anatomy. The two divisions need very different mental qualifications for their successful prosecution, but they are naturally inseparable parts of one and the same science of anatomy.

One of the principles of interpretation is interpretation by function. Of this, which may be called physiological interpretation, Mr. Mivart has not, as it appears to the present writer, made as much use as he might reasonably have made. It would, we think, have been better if, for instance, in the lesson on the muscles some account of their respective functions had been

given, as is done, *e.g.*, in Gray's Anatomy. The list of the characteristics which distinguish the body of man from that of even the highest apes would have had far greater life and interest if the functional meaning of the differences enumerated had been pointed out. To describe in one book the structure of, say, the human body, and in another the action of the parts described, is like describing in one book the parts of a steam-engine, and reserving for another the description of what they do when the engine is in motion. Structures are far more intelligible, and are therefore far more easily remembered when their functions are explained; theoretically, therefore, description of structures and description of functions ought to run together. But the separation which is made between anatomy, the part of biology which treats of structure, and physiology, the part of biology which treats of function, may be apologised for as being practically useful. It leads to a division of labour on the part of both student and of teacher. It is also an accomplished fact, and Mr. Mivart had to govern himself accordingly; but he need scarcely have pushed it so far.

Interpretation by function or use\* neither stands by itself, nor would be sufficient if it did. In some cases, indeed, it fails us altogether; for there are structures—as, in the human species, the muscles for raising the ear,

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\* The basis of interpretation by function is sufficiently obvious. On the one hand, structure implies function: if an organ had nothing to do it would, in the natural course of things, become atrophied, as a limb does which has been crippled. On the other hand, function implies structure; a function cannot be performed if there is no structure capable of performing it. "Zoology has," says Cuvier, "a principle of reasoning which is peculiar to it, and which it employs with advantage on many occasions. This is the principle of the *conditions of existence*, vulgarly called the principle of *final causes*. As nothing can exist if it do not combine all the conditions which render its existence possible, the different parts of each being must be co-ordinated in such a manner as to render the total being possible, not only in itself, but also in its relations to those which surround it; and the analysis of these conditions often leads to general laws, as clearly demonstrated as those which result from calculation or from experience."—(*Règne Animal*, p. 6; quoted by Whewell, *Hist. Ind. Sc.*, vol. iii. p. 389 of third edition.)

The principle of the conditions of existence is not, however, peculiar to zoology, nor is it identical with, though it often implies, the principle of final causes. We may distinguish finality into formal and material finality. Material finality exists whenever a thing is useful for an end, whether it be believed to have been made with a view to the end in question or not. For instance, the property of the circle that all right lines between circumference and centre are equal, and the property of the triangle, that its three interior angles are together equal to two right angles, are useful for a variety of purposes; but no one supposes that these properties were conferred on these figures with a view to those purposes. The finality, adaptation, or whatever it may be called, which the biologist, as a *biologist*, takes into consideration, and which the principle of the conditions of existence supposes, is material finality. Formal finality exists when the effect is unintelligible if we do not suppose in the cause the idea of the effect as the condition of the possibility of the effect or the principle which determines the cause to its production. This is the finality which the principle of final causes supposes; the treatment of it belongs to natural theology, not to biology.

drawing it back, and drawing it forward—which have no known use. Again, where the function which a structure is adapted to fulfil can be detected, there are often features about it the design of which cannot be detected. From our not knowing what the use of a thing is, it does not indeed follow that it fulfils no purpose whatever; but it is evident that we cannot interpret structure by function so long as we remain in ignorance of the latter.

The other principle of interpretation, the morphological or homological, is largely employed by Mr. Mivart. Its general character may best be explained by a comparison. If we examine the art-monuments of any well-defined period and group of nations—Byzantine paintings, Egyptian statues, mediæval architecture—we find, indeed, adaptation of means to ends. The mediæval cathedral is obviously suited for Catholic worship. This roughly answers to the principle of interpretation by function; but we cannot explain all the peculiarities in the architecture of, say, the mediæval cathedrals by reference to the functions they were meant to fulfil. We find also in the art-monuments of a period or people a certain general character which enables us to say that they belong to this or that school,—adherence to a certain type,—the presence of an idea; and by reference to this general character we are able to explain much which could not have been explained by reference merely to function. This roughly answers to the homological or morphological principle of interpretation, the principle of explaining the structure of this or that species, the presence, absence, form of its organs, by reference to a common type on which it and correlated species have been constructed. Thus the presence in the human species of muscles of the external ear, of a muscle similar to that by which the great toe of quadrumanous animals can be moved in a manner analogous to that in which the human thumb can be moved, may, like the presence of mammae in the male, be referred to adherence to the general type on which the structure of the highest vertebrate animals is planned—a type which, if we may so speak, may be supposed adhered to for the sake of uniformity, even where particular parts have no apparent use. The type or plan of organization may show itself either in different parts of the same living being, or in parts of one living being homologous with parts of another. As an example of the first case, we may take the curious fact that in plants the angle at which the leaf-veins separate from the principal vein which runs up the centre of the leaf is also the angle at which the branches separate from the trunk, the twigs from the branches, and the leaves from the twigs. As an example of the second, we may take the wing of a bird, the arm of a man, the fore-leg of a bear, which, although very different in external appearances, and put to very different uses, are made so closely on the same plan that they answer to each other almost bone for bone. Structures which fulfil the same use, whether or not they correspond as to their place in the plan of organization, are said to be analogous, as the eye of a cuttle-fish and the eye of a man, the wing of an insect and the wing of a bird. Structures, on the other hand, which correspond as to plan of organization, are, whether or not they fulfil the same use, said to be homologous, as the air-bladder of a fish and a human lung vesicle, the air-bladder of a fish being simply a lung vesicle enormously exaggerated in size, and subserving a new function. Again, the bones of the skull are now

universally recognized to be three or more transformed or metamorphosed vertebræ. The consideration of homologues has been denominated morphology and homology.

Of morphology or homology Mr. Mivart has largely availed himself; but as the bones, &c., of the lower animals have not in many instances the same names as the corresponding bones in man, and as the study of homology has necessarily resulted in the construction of a large number of new technical terms, his book is thereby crowded with a multitude of very hard names, some of them of very great length and very alarming appearance. This, however, was inevitable. Nor is it objectionable. The use of special technical terminology not in use in ordinary conversation and literature is in a high degree favourable to precision. The mnemonic difficulty, inseparable from their employment, will not be much felt by the readers of this book, as at the end of it there is a remarkably accurate and complete index, by consulting which the student who has forgotten the meaning of a term can at once turn to the page where its signification is explained. It may be added that the book is written in a very orderly manner. So far as we have been able to detect, a term is not used until its meaning has been explained.

It is not surprising that in an anatomical work even the author of the "Genesis of Species" should have said nothing of natural selection, a principle which claims to give a reason for both the functional and the homological principles of interpretation. Natural selection, however, is but an empirical law; it is not ultimate, and itself requires explanation. Reason could be rendered of it in the last resort only by ultimate biological laws—laws which yet remain to be discovered, discovery of which would set at rest for ever the vexed questions which now agitate the minds of men.

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*S. Anselm's Book of Meditations and Prayers.* Translated from the Latin by M. R., with a Preface by His Grace the ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER. London: Burns & Oates. 1872.

WE have long looked for a translation of this admirable work. In any case, our expectation would not have been disappointed, for we understand that it was the intention of the Editor of the "Mediæval Series," published by Messrs. Richardson, to have given us a translation had he not been forestalled by the present translator.

The writings of S. Anselm are by no means easy to render into English, but we have the testimony of His Grace the Archbishop that the author of the work now before us has succeeded in giving the sense of the original with accuracy, in a pure diction, which renders it an acceptable contribution to our works of solid piety. These Meditations speak both to the intellect and to the heart, while they place before us some of the highest thoughts that can engage the mind of man.

"The works of S. Anselm," says His Grace, "exhibit an intellectual light, order, subtilty, penetration, and precision, which give him a high place among

the scholastic theologians of whom he was the forerunner and the guide. But even in the purest intellectual exercise of the reason, his writings are pervaded by the gift of piety, which makes its warmth sensibly felt. He may be regarded as the type of faith, rendering to God the reasonable service of the intellect. . . . S. Anselm explains his whole method in these words: 'As the right order demands that we should first believe the deep things of the Christian faith before we venture to discuss them by reasoning, so it appears to me to be negligence if, after we are confirmed in faith, we should not endeavour to understand what we believe.' (*Cur Deus Homo*, l. i. c. 2.) Here we have his method in direct contradiction to the rationalism of these later days, which makes reason the test, the measure, and the criterion of faith, destroying thereby the essence of faith, as well as the matter proposed to its belief. As S. Augustine says: 'If you ask of me, or of any other Doctor, not unreasonably, that you may understand what you believe, correct your definition, not so as to reject faith, but so as to perceive by the light of reason the things which, by the firmness of faith, you already hold.' . . . Therefore it was reasonably said by the Prophet, 'Unless you believe, you will not understand.' So S. Anselm taught that we must first believe, then understand; that the rational understanding of revealed truth comes by contemplation, analysis, and precise conception of the truth which we already believe to be the word of God."

For our own part we can conceive of nothing at the present day better adapted for daily use than these "Meditations of S. Anselm." We subjoin the following extracts:—

"Woe is me! woe is me! Against whom have I sinned? I have dishonoured God; provoked the Omnipotent. Sinner that I am, what have I done! Against whom have I done it? How wickedly have I done it! Alas, alas! O wrath of the Omnipotent fall not on me; wrath of the Omnipotent, where could I endure thee? There is no place in all of me that could bear thy weight. O anguish! these sins accusing; then justice terrifying; beneath, the yawning, frightful pit of hell; above, an angry judge; within, a burning conscience; around, a flaming universe! The just will surely be saved; and the sinner entangled thus, whither shall he fly? Tight bound, where shall I crouch and cower; how shall I show my face? To hide will be impossible, to appear will be intolerable; I shall long for the one, and it is nowhere; I shall loathe the other, and it is everywhere! What then? what then? What will happen then? Who will snatch me from the hands of God? Where shall I find counsel, where shall I find salvation? Who is he that is called the Angel of Great Counsel, that is called the Saviour, that I may shriek his name? Why here He is, here He is; it is Jesus, Jesus the very judge himself, in whose hands I am trembling" (2nd Med. pp. 41-2).

Again, on the science of God, and the inadequacy of human thought to alter it:—

"Though the whole world were filled with books, yet the unutterable science of Thy Being cannot have due utterance; for since Thou art all unspeakable, no writer's and no limner's skill could describe Thee or portray Thee. Thou art the fountain of Light Divine and the Sun of eternal splendour. Great Thou art without quantity, and therefore infinite; good without quality, and therefore the truly and supremely good; and none is good but Thou and Thou alone. Thy will is act; for power and will are one in Thee. By Thy mere will Thou madest all things out of nothing. Thou dost fulfil all creation without any lack whatever, and dost control it without toil, and



dost rule it without fatigue ; and there is nothing that can disturb the order of Thy kingdom, whether in little things or in great. Thou art contained in all places independently of place ; and enfoldest all things without distribution of thyself ; and, neither moving nor inert, art present everywhere. Thou art not the author of evil, for Thou canst not make it. There is nothing that thou canst not do, nor didst Thou ever repent of anything that Thou hadst done. As we were made by Thy goodness, so are we punished by Thy justice, and set free by Thy tender mercy. Thy omnipotence controls all things, and rules and fills what it has created. Nor, though we say that Thou fillest all things, do all things therefore hold Thee, for they are rather held by Thee. Thou dost rather pervade all things, one by one, severally ; nor must we suppose that each separate object holds Thee by way of proportion to its size, the greatest more and the least less, since rather Thou art all Thyself in all things, and all things are in Thee. Thy omnipotence embraces all things ; nor can any one find a recess wherein to avoid Thy power ; for he who has Thee not at peace with him will never escape Thee in thine anger" (14th Med., pp. 184-5).

The translator has done his work carefully and well, as any one may see who will take the trouble to compare it with the original. He has also rendered the work far more convenient by adding a suitable sub-title, or at least a numerical indication to such of the Meditations as do not in the printed editions show where they are capable of an enforced subdivision. The book is beautifully printed, and is published with the "*Nihil obstat*" of F. Humphrey, and the *Imprimatur* of His Grace.

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*The Divine Sequence ; a Treatise on Creation and Redemption.* By F. M.  
London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1873.

IT is an extremely cheering sign of the times that English Catholic literature is so rapidly increasing in quantity and so rapidly improving in kind. Some years ago our religious books, especially those of a devotional character, were mainly if not quite entirely, translations from the French and Italian. But we think that much advantage results from having *some* devotional books of purely English origin. Nations have their idiosyncrasies ; and these foreigners are never quite competent to consult for or even perhaps to perceive. But it is partly through such peculiarities of character that one's feelings are swayed. Generalities addressed to humanity at large are sometimes not so successful with an individual as would be specialities addressed to his special self. As our author says, "you cannot console a crowd"; and the aphorism suggests a truth of all the emotions. To succeed, the religious writer must learn a lesson of the orator and poet ; he must address himself not to humanity but to men. The English character, from our great admixture of race, being so very complex and distinctive, the advantage of approaching it in, we may say, a *national* fashion, is all the greater.

The little volume before us is, we think, apart from its general excellence,

specially suited for English readers: Unpretending as it is, it contains a very large amount of the solidest and strongest sense clothed in a style unusually clear and vigorous as well as elegant and refined. It manifests, moreover, both a very respectable acquaintance with scholastic theology and a habit of trained solitary thought which, as the author deplures, is very unusual in our busy time. If indeed we have a fault to find with the book at all, it would be, that it is too learned and too largely suggestive. But these are faults upon virtue's side.

The volume consists of four chapters. In the first of these the author illustrates how God is revealed to us in creation; in the second, how He is revealed to us in the highest pure creature, the Blessed Virgin; and in the third, how He is revealed to us by the Church, and by what we may call, in general, the Church's machinery. The fourth chapter is a practical pendent to the other three, treating as it does of that Hidden Life whose excellence and method the other three are supposed to enforce. While the whole book merits very high commendation, we must confess to a special liking for its practical portions. These are the opening part of the first chapter and the whole of the fourth; which contain, not only passages of a peculiarly tender eloquence, but thoughts of the very highest moment for these graceless years. in which we are living. It is the author's earnest conviction that what people of the present especially require, are the large habits of simplicity of action and thought, steadiness and solitude of mind, patient inter-communion with the larger and loftier doctrines of Christianity. Here, for instance, at page 9, is a passage which many Catholics will do well to remember:—

“We waste our intellectual and our spiritual strength in too great complexity; we lose sight of the value of uniform ideas; we break the ray into prismatic colours which dazzle more than they illuminate. We get out of the shadow of immensity, because it oppresses our littleness; but we forget that only the eye which is accustomed to a wide horizon learns to measure vast spaces and to recognize what is afar.”

And here again a still more striking passage:—

“Religion, piety, and devotion is not a military discipline nor a thing to be regulated by the ringing of a bell. It is the state of the soul as before God. It is only consonant with simplicity, earnestness and self-denial. . . . We make our very souls into the unconscious prayer-mills of the eastern fanatic, and flutter little petitions and practices unheeding through the day, like the fragments of paper turned round by the handle of his machine. *We are satisfying our itching for outward activity and at the same time loving sight of ourselves and of God.*”

We think the reader will travel far before he lights upon words more pungent and truthful than these. It is the absence of single-minded concentration of self upon really great and worthy objects, coupled with the other want of earnest memory of the mysteries about us, that produces the pitiable pettiness of modern life. Our science and politics and poetry and literature and religion, are all trivial, because what we give to each is but a fraction, and frequently a very vulgar fraction, of our souls. And it is hard to blame us. We are fallen upon evil days. Modern society, so hot and restless and imperious, makes anything like dwelling with the “Eternal

Silences" particularly hard ; and modern men, therefore, as compared with the men of more thoughtful and steadfast and solitary ages,

"When men lived alone like the eagle,  
Nor flock'd like the crow,"

are fallen away from all that is mighty in intellect and all that is noble in heart. It is something to hear one voice, and that a Catholic voice, calling us back to the higher atmosphere and grander stillness of primeval years.

The central chapters of the book are, to a large extent, engaged with the evolution of the more fundamental Christian doctrines. With these we are not completely pleased. In speaking of such delicate matters as the Processions of the Blessed Trinity, the mode in which the Divine Attributes balance and perfect one another, the order of the Divine decrees with respect to the Creation, the Fall, and the Incarnation, the attitude of the Divine Will with regard to the salvation of man, there are required, as nothing shows better than scholastic theology, the keenest theological training, the most accurate theological knowledge, and a delicacy of expression of which we are afraid the English language is quite incapable. And while our author may be fairly excused for having failed slightly where success was impossible, we could have wished he had confined himself to those practical and emotional matters where the rudeness of our language entails no risk, and where exaggeration is often a merit. There are passages in the book before us which we would wish to see remodelled in its second edition ; such, for instance, as the first paragraph in page 61, the sentence commencing at the foot of page 85, and, in the Appendix, the note marked A. The changes we would desire in these places are not of much moment. We speak of them at all only because with books so admirable as the one before us we are inclined to be fastidiously critical.

A peculiar charm in this little volume which, for obvious reasons, we merely glance at in ending, is the tone of tender resigned sadness which runs through it all. The book is dedicated "to the Sacred Memory of a Great Sorrow" ; and the reader feels as he goes along, that frequent pondering before the shrine on which the book has been offered, has given the writer a pathetic power arising rather from the writer's personality than from the truths which he tells. For ourselves it has been borne in upon us as we read that many of the pages were yet wet with the author's tears, and that conviction has made us hang over the volume with such an interest as we have not felt for a long time.

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*The Threshold of the Catholic Church. A course of plain instructions for those entering her Communion.* By REV. JOHN BAGSHAW, Missionary Rector of St. Elizabeth's, Richmond ; with a Preface by Monsignor CAPEL Washbourne.

MR. Bagshaw's book, the "Threshold of the Catholic Church," supplies a great want in the best possible way. There are many books which set the claims of the Church before Protestants, but as far as we know there

is none which can be used as a complete course of instruction for converts. Even in the case of persons who possess faith, and are quite prepared for reception into the Church, it is generally most necessary that instructions should be continued for a considerable time after they are once within her pale, and that for two reasons. On the one hand, they come across a multitude of doctrines, opinions, ceremonies, pious practices, which can hardly have been fully explained to them before their reception, and which are either simply unintelligible, or else a positive difficulty to them. Without regular guidance, they are almost sure to fall into serious mistakes. They will exaggerate the importance of some things, or underrate that of others, and fail to see that there is Catholic spirit as well as Catholic doctrine, both of which have to be learned with pains and humility. On the other hand, a convert brings with him the habits and instincts of years spent in heresy; he needs something positive to drive them out, and that real education which comes from studying the doctrines, the ceremonies, and the devotions of the Church in a methodical manner is the only thing to set him right. The book before us begins with five admirable instructions on the great truths of the Faith, the testimony and authority of the Church, prayer and the Sacraments, and in the Commandments. These instructions are supposed to do all that is wanted for the convert before he is actually received. They are followed by five more instructions on the means of preparing for the Sacraments, on the most essential practices of a devout life, and on such devotions as are nearly universal among Catholics. Mr. Bagshawe, very modestly tells us that "what his book contains may easily be found in others," though not all [in the same book. This would of itself be a sufficient reason for publishing his present work. But we are inclined to disagree with him as to the facility of finding instructions equally good on the subjects which he treats. His book is not merely a convenient compendium; it has very special merits of its own. It succeeds most admirably in uniting solidity of principle and theological exactness with great simplicity of language. It keeps the attention fixed chiefly, though not exclusively, on the public devotions of the Church. It draws out with great skill the Catholic idea of worship, and insists on the reverence due to the ceremonies of the Church, the ritual of the High Mass, &c. Above all, it breathes throughout a spirit of strong common sense. It is the work not only of a thoughtful writer and good theologian, but of a wise and experienced priest.

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*Life of S. Ignatius, of Loyola.* By Mrs. PARSONS. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

A PLEASANTLY-WRITTEN abstract of the life of the great founder of the Society of Jesus. At a time when, in so many lands, the enemies of the Holy Name are straining every nerve to vent their hatred against it by persecuting those who serve under it, the hearts of Catholics naturally turn with still greater love and gratitude to the suffering members of the Society, and

all that concerns them. At such a time a popular life of their Sainly founder will be read with especial interest, and the true reasons why they are persecuted will be made better known ; for it is only because the disciples have clung with such faithful and filial love to this Master's teaching that they are hated by ungodly men for Christ's name-sake. May the prayers of S. Ignatius, if not for his children's sake, at least for that of the Church of God, shorten the evil days !

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*The Life of Baron de Renty ; or, Perfection in the World exemplified.*  
London : Burns & Oates, 17 & 18, Portman Street. 1873.

**T**HIS is the fourth volume of the Library of Religious Biography, edited by Mr. Edward Healy Thompson. We may at once pronounce it an excellent book in its kind. A biography of any description it is very hard to write well ; and our readers know that with regard to religious biographies in particular, there is the initial difficulty that very eminent authorities disagree as to the general principle which should rule their composition. Without trenching on that question here, we have no hesitation in saying that the book before us ought to satisfy all classes of opinions. Its narrative of the outer facts of the life of Baron de Renty, is ample, without being painfully exhausting, while its revelation of his inner character has the merit of a clear, steady completeness, unburdened by those analytic details which subtle writers sometimes rate too highly. And the style is throughout so perfectly fresh and buoyant as to make weariness in the reader impossible.

The plan of the volume is admirable. The book is divided—omitting the Introduction—into three parts. The first part, which is entitled “Perfect Conversion,” gives, besides much of De Renty's outer history, the narrative of those inward movements by which he advanced to complete self-conquest. In this part there are many things which will be found very valuable for every Christian. There is, for instance, the little story about duelling. De Renty was in the army ; and at that time (the boisterous period of the Thirty Years' War) the French officers did almost as much to kill one another in private as did the Imperialists and Spanish in the public field. A brother officer quarrelled with De Renty, and was grossly wrong in doing so. De Renty calmly showed the gentleman his error. The gentleman was not satisfied, and challenged De Renty. The latter quietly replied that he would not fight ; that duelling was against the laws, both of God and of the King ; that he had already given the challenger satisfaction ; and that the challenger ought not to consider his refusal to accept the challenge a proof of fear. But this Christian conduct did not suit the man of war. He and a friend of his waylaid De Renty (also accompanied by a friend), and rushed upon him with drawn swords. But De Renty showed that in self-defence he could fight to advantage, for he very quickly disarmed his martial antagonist. The great point, however, is that though his previous refusal to fight had got him spoken of as a poltroon, he would not say a word, nor let his friend say a

word, of the after rencontre, when both his skill and his courage were shown. He did not value such notoriety. "Bulls," he would say, "may surpass men in boldness and daring, but theirs is a brutal courage; ours ought to be reasonable and Christian."

The second part of the book describes De Renty's "Active Life of Charity." This will be found to read like a novel. The incidents of note in De Renty's career were not indeed numerous; but the little anecdotes of his career here recorded are likely to reveal his character more than it could have been manifested by narratives of larger facts; and at all events they are so charmingly given by the writer as to make the book, even for those who read it with no religious purpose, thoroughly delightful. Take, for instance, the following passage (pp. 256, 257), which literally we select at random:—

"It was a beautiful sight to witness his equanimity amidst all these troubles and annoyances. His heroic charity not seldom triumphed over the hardest hearts, and subdued the fiercest spirits. One day he went to see a man who had conceived some jealous suspicions against his wife; he had in consequence ill-treated her, and had gone so far as even to wound her with a knife. As might be expected, De Renty was very ill-received, and no sooner had he begun to remonstrate with him than the man burst forth in the most abusive and threatening language, and, raising his hand, as if about to strike, endeavoured to drive him by violence out of the room. But De Renty quietly kept his ground without uttering a single word or making the slightest gesture, either of alarm or of displeasure. The infuriated man paused: he had made his attack and it seemed foiled by the impassibility of its object. De Renty was now in his turn to be the aggressor. Drawing near, he threw his arms around the miserable man and embraced him, speaking at the same time words of such touching tenderness that the evil spirit within him was vanquished by this assault of love. In a moment all anger had melted away; he was appeased and ready to listen to reason. After visiting him several times De Renty prepared him to make his confession, which he had neglected for twelve years, and also perfectly reconciled him to his wife. The change was solid and lasting, for the man led henceforth a good and Christian life."

A book which abounds in anecdote of that character, so well told and so pointedly illustrative of very commonplace, perhaps, but very essential virtues, cannot but be widely successful.

But it is in the third part we think that the writer appears to most advantage. In it he gives us, what is so very hard to give, the "Interior and Mystical Life" of De Renty; and he has managed to pack into it an amount of good sense and of ascetic theology, mingling with and modifying each other, which we do not remember to have seen before in so small a space. There is nothing forced and nothing far-fetched; everything is, like De Renty himself, simple in the best sense of simplicity, and sublime in the only good sense of sublimity. De Renty was a plain man who walked with God; and this third portion of the book before us is a plain piece of composition with the light upon it of "Truth Divine." And as De Renty's great value as a model, is his possession in the world of simple sublimity, so the great value of this portion of our volume is its wonderful success in making the highest truths for the conduct of life bend themselves so as to enter "at lowly

doors." What, for instance, can be more plainly profound than the paragraph commencing at page 365, from which, however, we can afford to take only the few following extracts :—

"The other rampart of his purity," says our author, "was, as he told his director, simplicity. This simplicity protected him from all multiplicity of *doubleness of motive and aim*; from all reflections on the past as to what he had said or done himself, or what others had said or done; from all those retrospects which are prompted by the anxieties of self-love, in which the mind re-enacts the scenes through which one has passed, awakening thereby corresponding impressions of complaisance and self-satisfaction, or of disturbance and regret at the part one has played, and provoking inward comments on the defects exhibited, or sins committed by others. . . . Multiplicity, as all know, is reckoned to be one of the greatest obstacles in the spiritual life; and although too great a multiplication of even good occupations, whether exterior or interior, may and does often lead to it when such are not dictated by the Spirit of God, *nevertheless it does not essentially consist in this multiplication, but in the multiplication of motives. No one can well have been immersed in a greater multitude of affairs than was De Renty, yet no one had cultivated more devotedly singleness and unity in mind and purpose.*"

That, we look upon as a passage of great practical wisdom. Many people, and those of very high ability, think of engagement in a multiplicity of affairs as so dissipating as to render spiritual stability impossible. They are all for unification of self through a unification of objects. But the plain answer to this is, that such unification of objects is, for people of the world, impossible. And the life of De Renty, explained by the wise principle of our author, shows that such unification of objects is not necessary. If the eye be pure and simple, the whole body—no matter how multitudinous its members—will be lightsome. And if that were not the case, perfection, or an approach to perfection, would be for the anxious man of business simply impossible.

We have great pleasure in recommending this Life of Baron de Renty to all our readers. But we recommend it more especially to two classes of persons: to those who because the dress of sanctity has changed, think that sanctity itself has ceased to exist; and to those who ask how a city man can follow the counsel, "Be ye perfect as my Heavenly Father is perfect." The Life of Baron de Renty will be instruction to both.

*The Book of Perpetual Adoration; or, the Love of Jesus in the Most Holy Sacrament.* By H. M. BOUDON. Translated from the French. Edited by the Rev. J. REDMAN, D.D. London: R. Washbourne. 1873.

**B** OUDON'S Book of Perpetual Adoration was considered by M. de Courson to be the most beautiful of the books written in honour of the Most Holy Sacrament. We are told in the Preface, that when it was first published this book met with wonderful success. It was translated into German, Italian, Spanish, Flemish, Polish, and even into Latin. Fifty

thousand copies were sold in a very little time, and such great blessings attended it, that eighty thousand persons in the town of Augsburg and the neighbourhood gave in their names to take an hour for the adoration of the Most Holy Sacrament. We do not wonder at this, for the words of the holy writer go straight to the heart. Take, for example, the following :—

“ We have read of saints on whose minds the impression caused by the Sacrifice of the Mass was as vivid as though they had been present at that sacrifice of Calvary of which this is the Memorial, differing only in the mode of its offering. But we, how lightly do we pass over these things ! Could we manifest greater indifference if all that faith teaches were a mere fable ? And yet our memories are impressed, and our hearts melted, by whatever is touching and pathetic, even though we know it to be mere fiction and the creation of fancy. Meanwhile the blood of a God, which flowed so copiously from all its fountains with unspeakable pain and unutterable torment—insomuch that the very sun hid his face, while the earth trembled, and hardest rocks were rent asunder—this self-same blood in very substance is daily shed for us in its mystic outpouring on our altars, and our hearts are frozen still, and harder than adamant rock.”

The work is divided into two treatises, in the first of which are set before us eighteen motives for loving Jesus Christ in the Holy Sacrament, while the second contains nine practices for its adoration and love. At the end of the book will be found a course of twenty-four adorations, a method of assisting at the processions of the Holy Sacrament, as well as a method for hearing Mass with profit, together with other devotions. We earnestly hope that this little work may meet with many readers, and that it may thus help to warm this cold, heresy-stricken land with greater love for the Holy Sacrament of the Altar.

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*Church Defence. Report of a Conference on the Present Dangers of the Church.*  
London : Washbourne. 1873.

WE have elsewhere remarked that it is generally when treating of the Anglican Establishment that the wit and humour, and banter and cutting irony of the author of “ My Clerical Friends ” are seen at their best. To our mind “ Church Defence ” is quite as clever, and humorous, and caustic, and scholar-like, as his “ Comedy of Convocation,” which a few years ago excited such general interest.

How natural is the whole Conference, as the members, one by one, rise up before us ! There is Archdeacon Tennyson, for instance, who proclaims himself ready to fight all within his own Church, whether bishops, clerks, or laymen.

“ As for those who wished to substitute the abominations of the pretended Reformation, which he agreed with Mr. Baring-Gould in calling ‘ a miserable apostasy ’ for Catholic truth, he would fight them everywhere and always, in the valley and on the plain, by day or night, as long as he had a voice to speak or a hand to write ; but he would defend the Church of England, in spite of the heresies tolerated within her, because she was the only pure



branch of the Catholic Church in this realm ; or at least, though she had some present defects, they hoped one day to make her so " (p. 17).

There, too, is the Rev. Silas Trumpington, who, at moments of more than ordinary difficulty during the meeting, is moved to say aloud, without rising from his seat, " Let us pray," and who seems about to do it, to the great alarm of every member of the Conference. He, for example,

" would cheerfully accept the unholy challenge of the Archdeacon, and contend with him in his Master's cause. He had been requested by earnest members of his flock to attend the Conference, but had warned them not to expect any good from it, much less any benefit to vital religion. His brother Softly (Archdeacon Softly had preceded Archdeacon Tennyson), if he might call him so in the bonds of Christian love (the Archdeacon did not seem to see things in that light, and made no responsive sign) had spoken stirring words of truth, for which he tendered him his best thanks. It was because they were false to the great principles of Protestantism that their enemies were about to prevail against them. They had abandoned the ark of the Lord, and the Philistines had borne it away. They could only recover it by forsaking their idols, and turning, like the Israelites of old, in weeping, and fasting, and mourning, to that pure and reformed faith which too many among them had denied. . . . Let Rome perish with her idols, but let the chosen people of England gird up their loins, and follow after the sainted martyrs who had left them a goodly inheritance, and built up the Protestant Church amid the fires of Smithfield. Sabbath after Sabbath he addressed this exhortation to his own people. There were some who now invited them to cherish an adulterous love for the apostate Church of Rome, and to admire her pretended saints ; but what had she ever produced which could be compared with the great lights of Protestantism ? When he thought of the precious Cecil, the apostolic Wesley, or the godly Simeon, he was tempted to say, as Brutus said of Cæsar—

" ' It is impossible that Rome  
Should ever breed thy fellow ' " (pp. 17, 18).

It appears that this unexpected quotation from " Julius Cæsar " exercised a somewhat curious effect upon the company, for we are told that Archdeacon Tennyson became convulsed with laughter. Prebendary Smiles, after coughing twice impressively, directed a glance of just reproof towards the offender. The Bishop of Dorchester smiled, Mr. Hooker seemed shocked, and Mr. Weasel took snuff. As for the Rev. Silas Trumpington himself, he looked straight before him, or as nearly straight as an inveterate Strabismus permitted, and appeared to glare at some object in the distance.

The various conflicting opinions of the several parties which now divide the unfortunate Church of England are all admirably and humorously set forth by such typical speakers as Canton Lightwood, the Bishop of Dorchester, the Bishop of Brighton, Dean Marmion, the Rev. Prebendary Creedless, and others ; while the Rev. Mark Weasel, Anglican Unattached, is the *enfant terrible* of the Conference.

At the very beginning he throws down a bone of contention by remarking that he did not regret having accepted the invitation of the learned Dean Marmion, but " he thought it important to define clearly at the outset *what* they were called upon to defend. There were four totally different Churches of England in that room, and a good many more outside it. Which of them

was it proposed to defend?" (p. 6). His chief speech is an exhaustive condemnation of the Anglican theory. It is too long for quotation here, while to extract a few passages would be only to spoil it. We must refer our readers to the pamphlet itself, promising them that a rich treat is in store for them. In order, however, to tempt our readers to read the work themselves, we will give the conclusion:—

"It was sometimes made a reproach to the Crown or to Parliament that the free action of the National Church was unfairly limited, and the synodical deliberations of her clergy tyrannically restricted; but it seemed to him that the State could offer no greater service to the Church of England, no better evidence of its benevolent sympathy, than by mercifully prohibiting them from revealing to the world, that if they were all teachers of a divine religion, no two among them could agree together what it was. Without referring—which would perhaps be indiscreet—to the singular unity of opinions between their Lordships of Brighton and Dorchester, who both read the same Bible, and were ornaments of the same Church, he might venture to observe of those less eminent dignitaries, Archdeacon Softly and Canon Lightwood, that they proposed exactly different remedies for the malady which they agreed to lament. The one suggested, as a sure specific, to make the Establishment more Protestant; and the other, as a sovereign remedy, to make her more Catholic. He was afraid that under this treatment the recovery of the patient was doubtful. The first appeared to him a superfluous, the second an impossible cure. To make a Church Catholic which had never been so before was as if one should ask a crow to assume the plumage of a pheasant, or a dog to take the form of a horse. No such case, he believed, was recorded in natural history. Churches, like animals, must keep their own nature. Even the "hypothetical transmutations" of Mr. Darwin, prolonged through countless ages, could do nothing for them. A Church which had been Protestant in the first hour of its existence must remain Protestant to the end, though half its clergy should repudiate its origin, and learn to profess any number of Catholic doctrines. How clearly High Churchmen perceived this unwelcome fact was proved every day by their bitter hostility to the Catholic Church. Though draped in the very robes which they had pilfered from her sacristies, they ceased not to avow their aversion to their doctrine, and their contempt for their authority. Though professing to be quite as Catholic as herself, and even a trifle more so, and affecting the most enlarged and universal sympathies, a caged squirrel was not content with a narrower home, nor a mole with a more limited horizon, than they. It seemed impossible for them to be consistent for five minutes together. They were always peering over their neighbour's wall, and stealing whatever unripe fruit they could reach, though it was sure to disagree with them; but they could not refrain from pelting his unoffending servants whenever they came within view. Their instinct, seemed to tell these imaginary Catholics, as soon as they saw a real one, that they were in presence of an enemy. It was a proof that men could not be Catholics and Protestants at the same time. They must take their choice. Cicero wrote admirable prose, but very poor poetry; and in like manner their High-Church friends were excellent Protestants, though they did not seem to know it, but very indifferent Catholics. It was open to them to be either or neither, but they could not be both. There was not such a compound animal in nature as an ecclesiastical mermaid—fish and 'mulier formosa superne.' They must consent to be either all woman or all fish. And even if they could attain, in some far-distant age, the summit of their ambition, and leaven the whole English population, as Canon Lightwood proposed, with their own peculiar ideas—a consummation which was about as likely as that all the fish in the sea should have the same number of

scales, or all the birds in the air the same form of beak—their failure would be only the more conspicuous than ever; for their Church would still be, in the sight of all mankind, a purely local and national institution, as completely separated, as in the days of Parker or Bancroft, from the rest of Christendom, and not one hair's-breadth nearer to Catholic unity; but if this would be its character even when their wildest hopes were accomplished what must it be now?" (pp. 70–3).

Prebendary Creedless, in a logical speech from his own point of view, completes the overthrow of the Anglican system; and we need not wonder that Archdeacon Tennyson should after this proclaim that he should never think of this Conference without shame and confusion.

The whole pamphlet sparkles all through with passages quite as brilliant as any we have quoted, and we earnestly recommend it to the notice of all members of the Establishment, whether Ritualist, or High or Low, or Broad or Unattached.

*S. Joseph: his Life and Character.* By the Author of the "Pilgrim."  
London: Burns, Oates & Co. 1873.

A VERY thoughtful estimate of S. Joseph's life and character. To write in any way worthily of the great Saint of the hidden life requires both much previous meditation and careful judgment; but we need hardly say that the Author of the "Pilgrim"—for some fresh work from whose pen we have been long and anxiously waiting—is in both these respects eminently fitted for the task. This little work, indeed, is evidently the fruit of deep meditation on those few passages of Scripture which speak to us of S. Joseph; while, where so little is known, and therefore so much room is left for conjecture, the author is always prudent, ever taking the safe side, and perhaps assigning even less to the foster-father of our Lord than what might be considered still consistent with the Scripture account. The work, therefore, is admirably calculated, in the words of the writer, "to lead others to meditate for themselves on the mysteries of which" S. Joseph "is the guardian." For, while ample matter is provided for meditation, fanciful conjectures are carefully excluded. At the same time, the estimate formed of S. Joseph is by no means meagre, but is supplemented by trustworthy traditions judiciously handled, and illustrated by notices of well-authenticated relics, and short, but lively, descriptions of holy places. As might have been expected from the author of the "Pilgrim," a few well-chosen words succeed in placing a scene more vividly before our eyes than is often accomplished by more lengthy and pretentious descriptions.

We are not, indeed, sure that we ourselves might not, quite consistently with the Scripture account, assign to S. Joseph a greater extent of supernatural knowledge, and an earlier consciousness of his own share in the design of the world's redemption than is allowed to him by the author; still, "it is useful to ourselves," as the writer remarks (p. 28), to consider Joseph only as he appeared to man, leading an ordinary life among persons of his own class, with only the aid of ordinary grace and conscience, and the knowledge of the law of Moses, and to know that he acted up to the measure of the grace

bestowed on him ; for the Holy Scriptures tell us that he was a just man, and in the inspired language that word contains all virtues."

The chapter on the Hidden Life of S. Joseph is especially valuable. The following extract will be read with pleasure :—

"If a life spent with Mary would sanctify Joseph, what must have been the heavenly influences of the presence of our Lord! Volumes have been written on visits to the Blessed Sacrament ; but Joseph beheld Jesus. He spoke to him, and heard his answers. Others may hear His inspirations with the interior ear, but Joseph heard with his bodily ears His answers to his questions. His eyes are, as the Scriptures express it, the light of His countenance, and were turned on Joseph. The whole being of Joseph absorbed into itself the visible and tangible Presence, which, when perceived by faith only, has power to raise the Saints into ecstasy. How do we believe in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament? and what must have been the life of Joseph while he spoke, and moved, and laboured, while he ate, and drank, and slept, in the visible presence of God? Those who attend on kings know the personal influence of a mere earthly sovereign ; and what must have been that Presence which found favour with God and men? Yet let us remember that when the woman cried out in rapture, 'Blessed is the womb that bore Thee!' our Lord replied that those are more blessed who hear the Word of God and keep it ; and that He said to S. Thomas, 'Blessed are those who have not seen, and yet have believed.'

"The external actions of S. Joseph were the same before and after the angel's revelations. He had still to labour, and now he must labour for a family ; but what a family ! It is said by a Lapidist that his actions in contributing to the support of Christ related to the order of hypostatic union, and were, therefore, inconceivably superior to any others. If the kingdom of heaven will be the reward of those who serve Christ in the person of the poor, what will He give to him to whom He can say literally,—'I was hungry, and you gave Me meat.'"

The concluding paragraph of the work, in which the writer speaks of the growth of our knowledge of S. Joseph, and of devotion towards him, is also excellent, and offers a marked contrast to the meagreness of Mr. Baring-Gould's life of the Saint, to which we called attention in our last number. We should have been glad, however, if this point had been also more fully treated in the present work ; for, as we then said, the Saints and Servants of God have all of them a double life : one, that which they spent on earth ; the other, that which they are now spending in heaven as glorified members of Christ's Body, the Church, and by means of which they still influence the world. Great was the glory of S. Joseph to be the foster-father of our Lord on earth, but we know now that it was also his eternal destiny, for which his earthly life was but the preparation, to be the created shadow of the Father over Christ's everlasting Church, which is His Body.

A hope is modestly expressed in the Preface that the writer may be forgotten, while the reader contemplates for himself the heavenly objects, and is led by the aid of grace to behold and understand what no one can teach another. Not so : we feel sure that everyone who has read the "Pilgrim," and who now reads the "Life and Character of S. Joseph," will be reminded at almost every page of the thoughtful and thoroughly Catholic-minded author of the former work. We trust we may soon have another volume from the same pen.

*Bibliographia Catholica Americana.* A list of Works written by Catholic Authors and published in the United States. By Rev. JOSEPH M. FINOTTI. Part I. New York: The Catholic Publication House.

THIS is a most useful and interesting record of Catholic works published in the United States from 1784 to 1820 inclusive, and as the compiler intersperses his list of books with notices of many of the authors, will prove invaluable to future historians of the Church in that country. We gather from the humorous Preface that Mr. Finotti is a bibliomaniac, but unlike most bibliomaniacs he is not desirous of keeping all his good things to himself, and does his best to spread far and wide the knowledge of the books which he has himself collected, or about which he has been able to receive information. He tells us that it is to an attack of old-fashioned rheumatism—envious friends called it *podagra*—which forced him to spend days, and weeks, and months, on a venerable arm-chair in his library, that we are indebted for this work. We suppose it would be uncharitable to wish Mr. Finotti another return of his old enemy, but we may at least hope that he will be able to find some leisure time to enable him to complete the second part, and thus to bring down his list of Catholic works to the present day. In order to show the real merit of this work, we cannot do better than place before our readers the following letter from the Right Rev. Dr. Bayley, formerly Bishop of Newark, and now Archbishop of Baltimore.

“Rev. and Dear Sir,—Since my return home I have thought over the matter, and am more and more convinced of the soundness of the advice which I gave you, to publish immediately your most interesting and valuable *Bibliographia Catholica Americana*.

“If you wait until such a work is perfect, you will never publish it.

“You have collected a great amount of curious bibliographical and biographical matter which should not be allowed to pass into oblivion.

“The publication of your work will excite an interest on the subject, and will bring out additional information, which will enable you to perfect it in a second edition

“It is a great mistake to suppose that such works are only curious or interesting—they are most useful; and one of the best signs that the Catholic Church has taken root, and is growing up vigorously in this country, will be an increased interest among our people about everything connected with the planting and spread of our Faith in this part of the world.

“Bibliography is a sort of antiquarianism, in which everyone takes an interest.

“You may put me down as a subscriber for twenty copies if you publish it.

“Yours, with sincere regards,

“J. ROSEVELT BAYLEY.”

We have carefully looked through the work, and we can safely endorse the compiler's statement, that “the Catholic literature in the United States previous to 1820, scanty as it may appear, must be allowed to have been in advance of the money-making, sickly, riding-on-both-sides-of-the-fence efforts of more recent dates.”

The “*Bibliographia*” is beautifully printed upon really admirable paper.

*A May Chaplet, and other Verses, for the Month of Mary*, Translated and Original. By KENELM DIGBY BESTE, priest of the Oratory of S. Philip Neri. London: R. Washbourne, Paternoster-row. 1873.

THERE was a time when the blessed Virgin Mother of the Lord was the central source of the highest inspiration of art. The very idea of the Madonna may be said without exaggeration to have made a Raphael possible, and whenever the marvellous Italian has a worthy successor that successor will be one whose genius has been fed on devotion to the Mother Maid. As yet we have had no poet to do for our Lady in verse what Raphael has done for her on canvas. In our own country especially men of high poetic powers have not had the advantages of Catholic training and Catholic faith. But of late years a very important change has been observable; some of our most gifted poets have, though not professing Catholics, manifested a very Catholic spirit. And from the ranks of Catholics themselves we have some poets of a very high order. These, as would be expected, have instinctively given their allegiance, not to the old pagan muses, but to that loftiest specimen of womanhood, the Virgin Mary; and some of them—as for instance Mr. Aubrey de Vere, in his “*May Carols*,”—have achieved a high success. The Rev. Kenelm Digby Beste, author of the book before us, is the latest and not the least worthy singer of the Virgin’s praises.

When we name Mr. Beste as the author of the volume before us we are exposing ourselves to misconception. As is mentioned in the brief preface, the volume consists of two classes of poems, of translations from the French of Father Philpin de Rivière, and of original verses from the pen of Mr. Beste. The book contains 176 pages, and of these 105 are devoted to renderings of the hymns of the French Oratorian. Both as a translator and as an independent composer Mr. Beste’s work is very laudable. He is gifted with a considerable pathetic power, and his style of expression is simple and chaste. His choice of metre is usually very happy, and the melody of most of his verses leaves nothing to be desired. But the great charm of his volume is its manifest sincerity. Mr. Beste is no writer of religious common-place. Evidently what he says he not only believes thoroughly but intensely feels.

If we were to say that Mr. Beste is a great poet, Mr. Beste himself would be the first to laugh at us. But some of the poems in the volume before us, both among the translations and among the original verses, are admirable. The following, for instance (page 28), has much of the careless power of Mr. Browning. It is called “*The Avowal of St. Bernardine of Siena*”; and we think we shall please the reader by quoting it in full. Here it is:—

“ My heart is not mine any longer,  
 I confess it to you, dearest friends ;  
 I love, and no love could be stronger,  
 For my Loved One the whole world transcends—  
 My heart is not mine any longer !

'Tis useless to dwell on her beauty,  
 She has utterly conquered my heart—  
 To praise her I feel is my duty,  
 But her fairness excels all my art—  
 'Tis useless to dwell on her beauty.

I cannot endure life without her,  
 Nor the length of the night and the day—  
 'Tis life to be thinking about her,  
 So I love her, and live in that way—  
 I cannot endure life without her !

My study is only to find her—  
 Unto this all my powers are trained ;  
 My hope is that she will be kinder ;  
 My mind and my will are enchained—  
 My study is only to find her !

For her, then, my whole soul is yearning—  
 After God she has now all my love ;  
 'Tis a bright and pure flame ever burning,  
 'Tis a true vow recorded above—  
 For her, then, my whole soul is yearning !

So, now, need I name this fair Maiden  
 And say, Mary the Mother of God ?  
 My bosom at last is unladen—  
 She should have every drop of my blood !  
 So now, need I name this fair Maiden ?”

There is no one of our readers who will not acknowledge this for a very beautiful little poem. It possesses a simplicity of strength which we should like to see more common in the poetry of the period ; and its versification is positively charming. The tone of thought throughout it has that delicate familiarity which so becomes a Catholic's address to his Heavenly Mother, and which we should scarcely expect from any but a French mind. Father Beste has translated the French verses with a refinement of thought and taste not unworthy of the original.

But we should be doing F. Beste an injustice if we did not present our readers with a specimen of his powers as an independent composer. We are sorry that our space is limited, and that our quotation must be consequently short ; but we advise all our readers to refer to the book itself. They will find in its concluding pages ample proof of F. Beste's merit as a writer of thoughtful and polished Catholic verse. Take, for instance, the following lines from the poem "Meeting Jesus with the Cross," to be found at page 124 :—

“ O ye, who dwell in this great toiling town,  
 Ye think your lot unknown !  
 Your labour borne alone !  
 Through din of day and through the gloom of night,  
 And whether fall or fight,  
 Your life is kept in sight—

Turn, only turn ! One walks ye then must meet !  
 He follows in the street—  
 With wounds in Hands and Feet !

\* \* \* \* \*

By country paths, there used to stand the Cross  
 'Mid primroses and moss ;  
 Now England mourns its loss—  
 From this blest sign the foolish nation fled,  
 Scarce placing it with dread  
 Above the sleeping dead—  
 Yet Faith beholds it still. In every town,  
 Though men pass idly down,  
 Christ comes with Cross and crown.”

Not to speak of their eloquent tenderness, there is about these lines a finished touch of execution very creditable to F. Beste. In the merely mechanical portion of the poet's art he undoubtedly is possessor of a great deal of skill ; and as poetic thought and poetic feeling can never be wanting to one who, like F. Beste, is wont to keep himself in close personal connection with the great doctrines of our faith, we only hope that he will very often in the future use his powers as a writer of verse to bring home to the Catholic heart what has already possession of the Catholic intelligence. Such books as the one before us, in an age like the present, when the great danger to everything, but especially to religion, is a want of thoroughness, are invaluable. Man is a thinking animal, but, as Dr. Newman so beautifully illustrates, he is very much more ; and the revolutions effected in men are effected not so much through thought as through feeling. The great force of the world is often rather the poet than the philosopher.

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*Ierne of Armorica : a Tale of the Time of Chlovis.* By J. C. BATEMAN.  
 London : Burns & Oates, Portman Street. 1873.

THIS is a volume of very great interest and very great utility. As a story, it is sure to give much delight to such of its readers as have a taste for books of fiction ; while, as a story founded on historical fact, it will benefit all by its very able reproduction of very momentous scenes. In the latter aspect it is that we admire it most. The period following the break up of the Western Roman Empire was one of the most stirring of all the periods in the history of Europe. It was then that these rude collisions between the old order and the new ideas occurred, which resulted in determining largely the fate of all future society. The conflict was especially exciting in that part of the Continent which is now known as France. What with Gauls, Armoricans, Visigoths, Britons, Franks, and the various offshoots of the Allemanni—what with religious differences between Christians, Arians, Druids, and idolaters of various kinds, the France of the latter half of the fifth century was an extremely unsafe place for people of peaceful dispositions ; and yet the influence of Christianity upon the genius of a single



prince, the famous Chlovis, reduced the anarchy to a creditable state of order and law. It is as it illustrates this civilizing power of the true Church that the book before us is especially valuable.

The tale itself is very simple, though the actors in it are very numerous. Ierne is an Armorican princess of great estimation among the Druids. The high priest of these, indeed (whose name is Gwench'lan, and who is reported to be of the best Druidic blood of Greater Britain), regards her as of especial spiritual power in the conduct of religious rites. At the time that the story opens she is a willing captive in a convent which enjoys the protection of Chlovis, though that monarch is as yet unconverted. The Druids, at the instigation of Gwench'lan, concoct a plan for her recovery. The plan is successful; and Ierne is borne forcibly back by her uncle, the high priest, to the depths of the Armorican forests. When the King Chlovis hears of the outrage he is very wroth, but just at the time he had no pretext for delivering Ierne. He, however, commissions a young officer of much bravery, named Ethelbert—whose lofty love for Ierne is the best creation in the book—to follow Ierne and her captors, and secretly discover both the mode of her treatment and the place of her abode. This, though at great peril and after some startling adventures, Ethelbert succeeds in doing. He even manages an interview with Ierne, in which he assures her of the King's protection. Meanwhile Siegbert of Cologne, cousin and liegeman of Chlovis, entertains a brutal passion for Ierne. He had once before carried her off, and it was out of his hands that she had been delivered when she took refuge in the convent. Siegbert has not yet renounced her. He plots to take her from the Druids a second time; and with the help of a cunning Danish prince he succeeds. But his success is only partial. As he and his friends are conveying the damsel to Cologne, they are accidentally met by Ethelbert and another officer of the king. After a severe scuffle the lady is rescued, and is afterwards received with much affection by the sainted Clothilde, whom Chlovis had but lately espoused. In the scuffle Ethelbert is severely wounded, and in the fever which followed his wounds discloses his love for Ierne. Ierne herself admits to the King and Queen that the passion is returned; and the king, who honours Ethelbert as one of his best warriors, determines to have the young people united as soon as possible. But here occurs a very pathetic and very noble scene. During a period of Ethelbert's illness his chances of recovery seemed to disappear; and Ierne, who was watching him, and who, though as yet unbaptized, had still some knowledge of Christianity, vowed to God that if He spared her valiant champion, she would evermore live the life of a Christian virgin. When the king hears of the vow, and hears that Ierne is bent on keeping it, he is somewhat angry; but after a time it is agreed that Ethelbert himself should be asked to determine whether the maiden shall procure ecclesiastical releasement from it or go on to preserve it. The passages which describe the subsequent interview between the lovers are very touching. We are sorry that we can give only a couple of extracts. After putting Ethelbert in possession of the state of the case, Ierne goes on:—

“Dost thou comprehend, most dear and valiant youth, all this vow implies?

“Not your death, lady? Oh, say it is not that!” he implored, with eager eyes raised to her.

“No; not my death in the one sense thou fearest, noble Æthelbert; but my death to all that is held most dear in the world. By consecrating my life in this manner, I put it beyond my power ever to share the highest human joys, ever to fulfil the wishes of the king my Lord, who designed to give me—to thee.”

“The king? Did he wish?—did he mean it? Oh, no, no; believe me, most illustrious lady, that I never dared to hope for such high reward. That I had dared to love you with a worship which makes all other women as mere shadows to me I confess with deep humility; but I never dared to raise my aspirations to such an audacious height. To be allowed to reverence you at a distance, to think of you as the one guiding star of all my actions, to be called your warrior, to be your servant, to be allowed to bear your beloved symbol on my shield, to shout your beloved name in the thickest of the fight is all, all I ever dared to hope.”

It was now the turn for Ierne's tears to fall in a raining shower from her eyes. She looked into his face, as if in homage to his noble spirit, and said to him as soon as she could command her voice:—

“And so it shall be, beloved youth. Thou shall be all this to me. Thou shall love me all thy life. And I, in the depths of the Holy House of Refuge, where the rest of my life will be spent, will offer up my prayers daily, hourly, for thy welfare and thy honour. And thou shalt live for me, knowing that nothing can be more dear to me than thyself. Thou shalt live to devote thyself to my unhappy country. Would my best heart's blood could redeem her from the tyranny and oppression of a cruel worship, and restore her to the pure Faith she once enjoyed!” (pp. 305, 306).

And so the lovers, as yet unstrengthened by Christian baptism, agree on their great mutual sacrifice of self. But the sacrifice was fated to be but of brief duration. The Druids again try to recover their young priestess, and, by the treachery of a Greek slave, they, though with much loss to themselves, succeed in bearing her away. Chlovis at once, for this time he has a good excuse, marches an army into Armorica; the Druids are beaten; but the savage high priest, sooner than let his niece be restored to the Franks, stabs her to the heart on the field of battle. She dies; but before her death is baptized by a Christian officer. Her lover does not survive her long. Chlovis has soon to declare war against Alaric, King of the Visigoths; and though the enemy is miraculously routed, chiefly through the visible help of the dead Ierne, Æthelbert is killed. But he had before been received into the Church, and in his dying hour his Ierne is permitted to attend him. The remainder of the book describes the consolidation of the new French kingdom. Chlovis and his chiefs are all (somewhat suddenly) converted.

We have given merely an outline of the story as it is in the story of Ierne. But it is much more the story of Clothilde and Clovis; and we doubt whether its title is properly selected. But there is not much in a name. And the book is excellent. If we are to have a literature of fiction at all, we hope it will include many volumes like that of Mr. Bateman.

# INDEX.

ACTA ET DECRETA Sacrosancti et Œcumenici Concilii Vaticani, die 8 Decembris, 1869, *reviewed*, 159.

Annual Reports of the Presidents of Queen's Colleges, and Appendices, 1850-72, *reviewed*, 77.

Anselm (S.), Book of Meditations and Prayers, *noticed*, 513.

Arnold (Mathew), Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects, *noticed*, 209.

—————, Literature and Dogma, *reviewed*, 357.

BAGSHAWE (Rev. J.), Threshold of the Catholic Church, *noticed*, 517.

Balmes (Rev. J.), An Easy Demonstration and Catechism of Religion, *noticed*, 271.

Baring-Gould (Mr. S.), Lives of the Saints, *noticed*, 255.

Bateman (J. C.), Ierne of Armorica, *noticed*, 530.

Beale (L. M.B.), The Mystery of Life, *noticed*, 235.

Beste (K. D.), A May Chaplet, and other Verses for the Month of Mary, *noticed*, 528.

Birks (Rev. T. R.), The Scripture Doctrine of Creation, *noticed*, 242.

Blennerhassett (Sir Rowland), Speech on the Second Reading of the Bill relating to University Education in Ireland, *reviewed*, 448.

Boudon (M.), Book of Perpetual Adoration, *noticed*, 521.

—————, The Hidden Life of Jesus, *noticed*, 222.

CANDOLLE (A. DE), Histoire des Sciences et des Savants depuis deux Siècles, *reviewed*, 401.

Catholic Family Almanack, 1873, *noticed*, 278.

CHURCH (THE), AND MODERN MEN OF SCIENCE, 401-420: remarkable character of M. de Candolle's book, 401; deserving of particular attention from Catholics, 402; statistics of the great scientific societies, 402; denial that Protestantism is more favourable to scientific research than Catholicism, 403; in Protestant countries physical science is better circumstanced than in Catholic, 403; the reason why, 404; Antitheism better suited than even Protestantism, 405; the fulness of their religious life prevents Catholics from devoting their attention to physical phenomena, 405; M. de Candolle and Mr. Galton on Celibacy, 406; its tendency in their opinion to lower the character of the human race, 407; reply to their statements, 409; the cultivation of physical science by Catholic laymen a desirable thing, 409; Democracy and Science, 410; Progress of Political Decentralization in Europe, 412; should it still

further progress how magnificent will be the contrast afforded by the Papal power, 413 ; probable growth of various nations, 414 ; English classical literature will most likely become the classical literature of the world, 415 ; F. Newman on the predominance of good over evil in English literature compared with that of other countries, 415 ; M. Candolle on natural selection, 416 ; predictions as to the future of the human race, 418 ; deplorable effect of the spread of Materialism, 420 ; the Church the only true promoter of human progress, 420.

Coleridge (F.), *Life and Letters of S. Francis Xavier*, *noticed*, 470.

Conference (Sketch of a), with Earl Shelbourne, *reviewed*, 381.

Confessional Unmasked, or *The Revelations*, *noticed*, 280.

Conscience (Hendricke), *The Merchant of Antwerp*, *noticed*, 273.

Conversion of the Teutonic Race. Conversion of the Franks and English, *reviewed*, 326.

Craven (Madame A.), *Fleurange*, *noticed*, 279.

Crawford and Balcarres (Earl of), *Etruscan Inscriptions Analysed, Translated, and Commented upon*, *noticed*, 250.

Crusade (The), or Catholic Association for the Suppression of Drunkenness, *noticed*, 276.

DEFENCE OF THE PROTESTANT ASSOCIATION, *reviewed*, 381.

Divine Sequence (The), *noticed*, 515.

Documenta ad illustrandum Concilium Vaticanum anni 1870, *reviewed*, 159.

Dods (Rev. M.), *Works of Aurelius Augustine*, *noticed*, 477.

EARNSLIFFE HALL, *noticed*, 279.

FILIOLA, *noticed*, 279.

Finotti (Rev. J. M.), *Bibliographia Catholica Americana*, *noticed*, 527.

Fitz-Patrick (Dr. W.), *Irish Wits and Worthies*, including Dr. Lanigan, his *Life and Times*, *noticed*, 498.

Formby (Rev. H.), *The Book of the Holy Rosary*, *noticed*, 225.

Fröhlich (Herr), *The "Old Catholics" at Cologne*, *noticed*, 481.

Froude (J. A.), *English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, *reviewed*, 421.

FROUDE (J. A.), ON THE ENGLISH IN IRELAND, 421-448 : the high character of the office of the historian, 421 ; Mr. Froude's qualities as such, 422 ; in the most essential quality he has been found wanting, 423 ; his unfairness most conspicuous in his "English in Ireland," 424 ; his work almost universally condemned, 424 ; his "Preliminary," 424 ; his principle that of two contiguous states, the more powerful shall become the master of the weaker, 425 ; and, therefore, that England should subjugate Ireland, 426 ; his unjust view of the Irish character, 427 ; he condemns generally the English rule in Ireland, 427 ; his charge of cruelty against the Irish, particularly during the rebellion of 1641, 428 ; his accusation of treachery against Hugh O'Neill, 429 ; the Normans, 429 ; their cruel laws, 430 ; quarrels amongst them, 431 ; the " Undertakers " of Queen Elizabeth, 431 ; the light way in which Mr. Froude speaks of their conduct, 431 ; the Cromwellians, 432 ; their exterminating policy, 432 ; terrible condition of the native Irish, 432 ; the obvious

purpose of Mr. Froude's work is to ruin the Irish character, 433 ; the English method of governing Ireland is blamed not because of its severity, but for the opposite reason, 433 ; his charges against the Irish—first, their cowardice, 434 ; contrast between the Irish and the Scotch, 434 ; difference in the two cases overlooked by Mr. Froude, 435 ; his second charge—their adhesion to their ancient faith, 436 ; the day for contempt of the Catholic religion has passed, 436 ; the chapter on Abduction, a piece of sensational writing, 438 ; Irish lawlessness, 439 ; that feature not peculiar to the natives, 439 ; the robbery of the Danish East-Indiaman by the colonists, 440 ; responsibility of the English for Irish lawlessness shown by Mr. Froude, 441 ; the "English in Ireland" is not an historical work, but a voluminous party pamphlet, 442 ; his thesis is the necessity for a Cromwellian policy, but his work does not prove it, 443 ; he admits that the Irish were loyal when well treated, 444 ; enough was done in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to make them disloyal, 445 ; is Irish discontent inappeasable? 446 ; Fenianism not an Irish institution, 446 ; damage done to the English power by Mr. Froude's book and his American trip, 447 ; complete failure of the object of his work, 448.

GLADSTONE (Right Hon. W. E.), Address delivered at the Liverpool Collegiate Institution, *noticed*, 212.

———, Speech on moving for leave to bring in a Bill relating to University Education in Ireland, *reviewed*, 448.

GORDON RIOTS (THE), 381–401 : deplorable state of the English Catholics in 1778, 381 ; origin of the penal laws of William III., 382 ; the disfavour with which they are received even by Protestants, 382 ; efforts to obtain their repeal, 382 ; Sir George Saville's Bill, 383 ; encomium by Burke upon Sir George, 383 ; passage of the Bill without a single negative, 384 ; tolerant action of the Scotch Protestants, 384 ; endeavour of the Scotch Catholics to obtain a similar relief to their English brethren, 384 ; counteraction among the more bigoted Calvinists, 385 ; the Edinburgh riots, 386 ; destruction of the Catholic Bishop's house in Edinburgh, 386 ; success of the prompt measures to suppress the riot, 388 ; prophetic language of Mr. Wilkes, 389 ; the Protestant Association and its objects, 389 ; the nefarious means which it used, 389 ; its celebrated "Appeal to the People of England," 390 ; character of Lord George Gordon, 391 ; his violent speeches in the House of Commons, 392 ; mistake of the Government as to his character, 393 ; the Protestant petition, 394 ; criminal apathy of the Government, 395 ; meeting of the No-Popery mob in St. George's Fields, 395 ; it invests the Houses of Parliament, 396 ; danger to the members from the mob, and their dignified conduct, 397 ; the petition rejected by the House of Commons, 398 ; childish proceedings of Lord George, 398 ; gallant conduct of Colonel Gordon and General Conway, 399 ; threatening aspect of affairs outside the House, 400 ; dispersion of the mob for the time, 400 ; adjournment of the House, 401.

Greg (W. R.), *Enigmas of Life*, *reviewed*, 48.

HELENA (S.), or the Finding of the Holy Cross, *noticed*, 278.

Hope (Mrs.), Sequel to Conversion of the Teutonic Race, S. Boniface and the Conversion of the Germans, *reviewed*, 326.

Hutton (R. H.), Essays, Theological and Literary, *reviewed*, 281.

Howley (E.), Competition, Endowment, and Trinity College, Dublin, *reviewed*, 77.

Hübner (Baron), Life and Times of Sixtus V., *noticed*, 258.

ILLUSTRATED CATHOLIC MAGAZINE, *noticed*, 277.

IRELAND IN THE REIGN OF JAMES I., 1-48: two methods of writing history in vogue, 1; difficulties in the way of earlier Irish historians, 2; State help facilitating the acquisition of a correct knowledge of Irish history, 2; the editorial labour required in making the present collection, 3; importance of the documents now published, 4; accession of James I., 5; despotic acts of the English Lords Deputy, 6; misery of Ireland at the time, 8; grievous famine and pestilence in Ireland, 9; cruelty of the Council to the poor Irish in London, 10; Sir Arthur Chichester's policy, 12; ravages of the English soldiery, 13; rapacity of the commanders, 14; advice of Queen Elizabeth to her Irish officials, 15; extortions of Sir G. Carey, 18; depreciation of the currency in Ireland, 20; mingled prodigality and parsimony of James, 22; straitened condition of the Treasury, 22; confiscation of the lands of the native Irish, 25; off-handed proceedings of the English officials, 28; trial of Downing for murder, and his acquittal, 28; the case of Mead, the Recorder of Cork, 30; pathetic condition of the Church in Ireland, 31; religious persecution by James, 32; course intimated for the suppression of the Catholic religion, 33; Sir John Davys on the absence of religious instruction, 34; unfitness of the new Protestant hierarchy for their position, 34; the "Undertakers" of Elizabeth, 37; James's views for the plantation of Ireland, 38; the disfavour with which they were received, 39; bad character of the immigrants whom King James introduced, 40; the mistaken policy of Elizabeth and James in regard to Ireland, 41; two courses to pacify Ireland open to James, 42; failure of the royal policy, 44; fears of a Spanish invasion, 45; results which might have occurred from a change in the English policy, 46; verdict of posterity on King James I., 48.

IRISH PRIESTS AND LANDLORDS, 119-137: attempted defence by "C" in the *Tablet* of the Galway landlords, 120; weakness of his arguments, 120; the intervention of the priests was simply to enable the farmers to vote according to their convictions, 120; the Galway tenant farmers unanimously favoured Nolan on public grounds, 121; their political servitude, 122; extenuating circumstances in the landlords' case, 122; their unjust treatment by the Constitution, 123; want of true liberality in "C," 124; reasons why every Galway priest should have worked heartily for Nolan, 125; admission of "C" that the priests legitimately take part in political agitation, 125; cheering prospects from the priests' political leadership in Ireland, 127; without doubt some evils result from such leadership, 128; "C's" assertion that bishops put spiritual

pressure upon priests denied, 128 ; the *Spectator* on our October article, 129 ; the priests desire to do full justice to the landlords, 130 ; Irish animosity towards England inevitably increased by the Keogh judgment, 131 ; remarks on "C's" Supplementary Letter, 133.

**IRISH (THE) UNIVERSITY BILL**, 448-469 : introduction of the Bill, 449 ; both Minister and House weary of their work, 449 ; successful reception of the Premier's introductory speech, 449 ; subsequent state of public opinion, 450 ; the Bill condemned by all parties, 451 ; resolutions of the Irish bishops, 451 ; debate on the Second Reading, 453 ; Mr. Cardwell's speech fatal to the Bill, 454 ; Mr. Disraeli's speech, 454 ; his anticipations should the Bill be carried, 456 ; his reference to the policy of Concurrent Endowment, 457 ; speech of Mr. Gladstone, 458 ; defeat of the Government, and political crisis, 461 ; the Archbishop's speech at Liverpool, 462 ; previous negotiations of the Irish bishops on the subject of University Education, 463 ; propositions by their Lordships for a Catholic University, 464 ; rejection of the Supplemental Charter by the Queen's University, 465 ; correspondence of the Archbishop of Cashel and the Bishop of Clonfert with Lord Derby's Government, 466 ; prospects of the question, 469.

**ITALIAN ARCHITECTURE**, 104-119 : introductory remarks upon a former article, 104 ; all styles of architecture suited to the requirements of Christian worship, 105 ; adaptation of the Pagan basilicas to Christian Churches, 106 ; the wise inspiration of the Pope in adopting the Italian style for St. Peter's, 107 ; harmony of that noble building with the living Church, 107 ; the symbolism of Gothic architecture, 109 ; its beauty, 109 ; chief characteristic of the Italian style, 110 ; its suitability for Christian worship, 110 ; comparisons of the two styles, 111 ; reasons for the adoption among the Northern nations of the Gothic instead of the Italian, 113 ; signs of a coming change, 114 ; question whether Gothic churches are really popular with the poor, 115 ; Italian churches better suited to them, 116 ; the greater expense of the Italian churches, 117 ; yet they can be built cheaply, 118 ; they are better suited for the ceremonies of the Church, 118 ; conclusion, 119.

**JERVIS (Rev. W. H.)**, *The Gallican Church*, noticed, 259.

**Joseph (S.)** *His Life and Character*, noticed, 525.

**Jowett (B., D.D.)**, *The Dialogues of Plato*, reviewed, 281.

**KLEUTGEN (F.)**, *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit vertheidigt*, reviewed, 281.

**LABOURERS (THE) AND POLITICAL ECONOMY**, 48-59 : deplorable condition of the agricultural labourers, 48 ; recent attempt to ameliorate that condition, 49 ; political agitation amongst them, 49 ; sympathy of the Archbishop of Westminster for them, 50 ; objection to the agitation drawn from political economy, 50 ; true province of that science, 51 ; opinions on the duty of the Legislature, 53 ; Mr. Greg's exposure of Malthus's doctrine on population, 53 ; discredit thrown upon political economy by the acceptance of that doctrine, 54 ; the long period which would elapse before the world could arrive at the condition predicted by

Malthus, 55 ; his conclusion purely hypothetical, 57 ; opinions of Mr. Nassau Senior in opposition to Malthus, 57 ; the duty of all true Catholics to submit to the Church's teaching throughout the whole sphere of moral action, 59.

Lecky (W. H.), Criticism of Mr. Froude's "English in Ireland," *noticed*, 259.

Lee (Miss M. M.), The Heart of Myrrha Lake, *noticed*, 280.

Letters from Rome on the Council, *reviewed*, 159.

Letters signed "C" in the *Tablet* of Nov. 30, Dec. 7, and Dec. 14, *reviewed*, 119.

LITERATURE AND DOGMA, 357-380 : the history of Protestantism one of variations, 357 ; the demise of Protestantism, 357 ; assertion by Dr. Strauss that no educated person is a Christian, 358 ; such a result inevitable when the right of private judgment was proclaimed, 358 ; Dr. Strauss and Mr. Matthew Arnold are the latest expounders of the new system, 359 ; Mr. Arnold's new work "Literature and Dogma," 360 ; his impious description of the Holy Trinity, 361 ; his views of the Bible, 362 ; his notion of religion, 363 ; according to him there is only one proper exponent of the Bible, and his name is Matthew Arnold, 364 ; no one good quality to be found in his work, 365 ; his doctrine confuted by himself, 366 ; he is difficult to understand when he is speaking of our Lord, 368 ; whatever he has verified or seen is accepted, all beside is denied, 370 ; his denial of miracles, 371 ; his remarks on the raising of Lazarus, 373 ; modern Men of Science, 374 ; question whether many of our modern "scientific men" are deserving of the title, 375 ; ignorance of Catholicity displayed by many of our literary men, 376 ; Mr. Leslie Stephen on the religious state of England, 377 ; the amount of mischief which Mr. Arnold's book will cause, 378 ; a word of advice to Mr. Arnold, 379 ; a proper Catholic education the best antidote to such works as "Literature and Dogma," 380.

MARTINEAU (REV. J.), Essays, Philosophical and Theological, *reviewed*, 281.

Maxims of the Kingdom of Heaven, *noticed*, 280.

McCosh (J., D.D.) Christianity and Positivism, *noticed*, 503.

Meadows (A.) Biological Science in relation to Religious Belief, *noticed*, 506.

Melia (P., D.D.) Hints and Facts on the Origin, Condition, and Destiny of Man, *noticed*, 249.

Meline (J. F.), Mary, Queen of Scots, and her latest English Historians, *noticed*, 264.

MISSION (THE TRUE) of the Teutonic Race, 326-356 : the division of the Japhethian family, 326 ; the great Eastern migration into India, 327 ; the Western into Europe, 327 ; a further division into five races, 327 ; the Germanic race, 328 ; its system of Government, 329 ; chivalrous respect of women, 329 ; completion of the mission of the Roman empire, 330 ; second influx of the barbarians, 331 ; miseries they inflicted upon the Empire, 331 ; influence of the Church upon the leaders, 332 ; massacre of S. Ursula and the Virgins, 333 ; S. Severin, 333 ; his prophetic farewell to Odoacer, 334 ; his unwearied well-doing, 334 ; relapse of the barbarians after his death, 335 ; baptism of Clovis, 335 ;



birth of S. Benedict, 336 ; he founds his monastery at Monte Cassino, 337 ; characteristics of his Rule, 337 ; S. Columban arrives in Burgundy, 338 ; severity of his Rule, 339 ; spread of the Faith through France and Burgundy, 340 ; S. Gregory and S. Augustine, 340 ; the latter lands in England, and baptizes King Ethelbert, 341 ; he dies, and is succeeded by Laurentius, 341 ; continuous conversion of Britain, 342 ; difference between Britain and the other provinces of the Roman Empire, 343 ; the Saxon royal Saints, 345 ; enthusiasm for learning throughout England, 346 ; conversion of the Frisians and the Franks commenced by S. Willibrord, the Northumbrian, 347 ; it is continued by S. Winfrid, 348 ; who is consecrated by S. Gregory as Bishop of Germany, under the name of Boniface, 349 ; religious assistance given by England to S. Boniface, 350 ; great success of his labours, 352 ; he is allowed to foresee his death, 353 ; he visits Dookinga, and there receives his martyrdom, 354 ; the Christian greatness of the Teutonic race owing to its faithfulness to the Roman Pontiff, 355 ; its falling away, 356 ; necessity for its return to its former obedience, 356.

Mivart (St. George), Lessons in Elementary Anatomy, *noticed*, 508.

Molloy (G., D.D.), A Visit to Louise Lateau, with a Short Account of her Life, *noticed*, 486.

My Clerical Friends, and their Relation to Modern Thoughts, *noticed*, 213.

NEWMAN (J. H., D.D.), Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching, *noticed*, 220.

———, Historical Sketches, Part II., *noticed*, 220.

Note to the Third Article of our October Number, 208.

Norwich Cathedral Argumentative Discourses in Defence and Confirmation of the Faith. "Pleadings for Christ," *noticed*, 230.

OAKELEY (Canon), Catholic Worship, *noticed*, 222.

———, The Athanasian Creed, *noticed*, 221.

PARSONS (Mrs.), Life of S. Ignatius of Loyola, *noticed*, 518.

Passion Flower, *noticed*, 272.

Pichou (M. L'Abbé), Life of Monsig. Berneux, *noticed*, 275.

QUEEN'S COLLEGES (THE) IN IRELAND, 77-103 : intention of Parliament in founding the Queen's Colleges, 77 ; general opinion on the necessity for their establishment, 78 ; indications of the realization of the project, 78 ; necessity for a thorough Matriculation Examination, 78 ; the proper business of a University, 79 ; proposed Curriculum of the Queen's University, 81 ; objections to it, and reasons for a four-session Curriculum, 82 ; proposed prizes for competition of the new Graduates, 82 ; failure of the scheme of the founders, 83 ; Mr. Thompson's appointment as Professor at the Queen's University, 84 ; his opinion upon the three years' Curriculum, 85 ; his evidence upon the failure of the whole scheme, 86 ; Mr. Killeen's evidence on the decline of the number of pupils, 87 ; accordance of his opinions with those of Mr. Thompson, 88 ;

deplorable condition of the competition at the various Queen's Colleges, 89; divergence from the original ideas of the founders, 90; introduction of Professional Education into the Colleges, 91; deficiency of Graduates, 92; "Honour" Graduates and "Pass" Graduates, 93; subjects for which a "Pass" degree might be obtained, 94; the examinations, 95; what the Queen's University meant for Ireland, 96; its failure, 98; want of rudimentary knowledge in the pupils, 99; intra-collegiate examinations, 102; necessity for a revision of the whole scheme, 103.

REGULATIONS of the Queen's University in Ireland, 1850-1872, *reviewed*, 77.

RELATION (THE) OF SCHOLASTIC TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY, 281-325: Philosophy must have a place in future Catholic teaching, 281; how far the connection of Scholastic Philosophy with Theology extends, 282; Mr. Hutton and Mr. Martineau's Essays, 283; Dr. Jowett's Plato the type of Oxford teaching, 284; the charm of Dr. Jowett's work, 285; Philosophy at Oxford thirty years ago, 286; alteration in the system of instruction at the present day, 287; Aristotle and the Schoolmen, 288; his influence upon Christian Schools, 289; why his philosophy was selected instead of that of Plato, 290; its high character, 291; his doctrine of Form, 292; his application of it to the Soul of man, 297; his view of the relation between body and soul, 298; the theory of Cognition, 299; summary of the discussion, 303; Mr. Martineau on Force, 304; general agreement between him and Aristotle, 305; difference in doctrine between the writer of the present article and Mr. Martineau, 305; the work of Kant, 307; its effect upon the philosophical world, 309; his philosophy consisted of two parts, one of which has been adopted by England, and the other by Germany, 310; credit due to Messrs. Martineau and Hutton for their stand for Ontology, 312; Mr. Hutton on the existence of God, 314; the belief of such existence present in most men without its being proved scientifically, 315; though in the main friendly to the Church, had Mr. Hutton been somewhat better acquainted with its early history he would not have written some of the Essays, 317; the difficulty of understanding invincible ignorance of primary truths, 320; Mr. Hutton's Essay on the Fourth Gospel, 323; objection to some remarks in the present article, and reply to such objection, 325.

Renty (Life of Baron de), *noticed*, 519.

REPLY TO MR. RENOUF BY F. BOTTALLA, 137-160: Mr. Renouf undertook to prove that Pope Honorius was condemned for heresy, 137; but he has failed in his charge, 138; his misunderstanding of our views in this discussion, 139; Pope Agatho's Letter, 140; Mr. Renouf does not understand the Catholic view of an Ecumenical Council, 140; the three professions of faith contained in the *Liber Diurnus*, 141; doctrinal decisions of a Council are of value so far only as they receive the approbation of the Holy Pontiff, 141; Mr. Renouf's misrepresentation of Leo II. with regard to the decision of the Sixth Council, 142; Honorius cannot be convicted of heresy merely by letters signed with his name, but written by some one else, 144; the charge of negligence,

145 ; the second Profession of Faith, 146 ; a synodical anathema does not imply eternal damnation, 147 ; reasons for the condemnation of Honorius, 148 ; the conduct of the trial a great interference of the civil power in an ecclesiastical matter, 150 ; Leo II. never wished to brand Honorius with heresy, 151 ; distinction between Honorius and the Monothelites, 152 ; the cause of his condemnation was neglect of his pontifical duties, 153 ; Mr. Renouf's inference from the decree, 154 ; whatever Mr. Renouf has proved, he has proved nothing against Papal Infallibility, 155 ; the letters of Honorius, 156 ; conclusion, 158.

Report of the Endowed Schools Commission, *reviewed*, 77.

Report of the Meeting held at Exeter Hall, December 10, 1872, *reviewed*, 48.

Report of the Queen's Colleges Commission, 1858, *reviewed*, 77.

Returns moved for by the Right Hon. Chichester P. Fortescue, M.P., July 5, 1870, *reviewed*, 77.

Returns moved for by the O'Connor Don, M.P., June 24, 1870, *reviewed*, 77.

Russell (Rev. Dr. C. W.) and Prendergast (J. P.), Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, of the Reign of James I. (1603-1606), *reviewed*, 1.

Reverse (the) of the Medal, *noticed*, 279.

STEPHEN (Leslie), Are we Christians ? *reviewed*, 357.

Stirling (Dr.), As regards Protoplasm, *noticed*, 488.

Stotz (Dr. Alban), The Witch Mania of the Learned World, *noticed*, 280.

—, Whither shall we go ? *noticed*, 279.

STUDY OF RELATIONS (A), 59-76 : The Hegelian resolution of Being into Relation, 60 ; objection anticipated that abstractions are nothing, 61 ; reply to such objection, 61 ; the difference between Physical and Metaphysical Being, 64 ; their constituents, 64 : division of Relation into Predicamental and Transcendental, 64 ; metaphysical constitution of things by Act and Term, 64 ; whatever exists is knowable, albeit what the preacher of "Lay Sermons" inculcates, 65 ; a thing exists through Essence and Being, and either component without the other is not, 66 ; Active Power the first mark of Substantial Being, 66 ; a substance without activity cannot be, 67 ; example of Act and Term in the constitution of matter, 67 ; demonstration of the inertia of matter, 69 ; proof of the scholastic dictum "forma est id quo agens agit," 69 ; what a Transcendental Relation is the complement, 70 ; Predicamental Relation, 72 ; nothing can exist that does not contain a Transcendental Relation, 73 ; the constituents of physical beings, 73 ; the difficulty of knowing the Absolute, 74 ; man's inchoative and precise knowledge of the Absolute, 75 ; both possible, 75 ; God's knowledge of the Absolute, 76.

THOMPSON (D'Arcy W.), Wayside Thoughts, *reviewed*, 77.


VATICAN COUNCIL (THE), 160-204 ; object of the present article, and impediments which stood in the way of its execution, 159 ; opening of the Council, and its preliminary proceedings, 160 ; the pseudo-prophetic article in the *Times*, 160 ; who are the authors of the predicted schism, 161 ; if a Catholic


had predicted it, his name would have become a by-word of reproach, 162 ; characteristics of the Council, 163 ; the work of Quirinus, 165 ; the bitter spirit in which it is written, 165 ; the *raison d'être* according to its writers, 166 ; its Jansenist character throughout, 167 ; the present Pope, 167 ; the amount of unmerited aspersion to which he has been subjected in the press, 167 ; Quirinus excels all in vituperation, 168 ; story of a sanctimonious Methodist, 169 ; Quirinus on the Pope's character, 170 ; and on Archbishop Manning, 171 ; the Minority, who they are, 172 ; Quirinus's panegyrics upon them, 173 ; the Majority, and who they are, 174 ; Quirinus's attacks upon them, 175 ; his deficiency in scientific history, 177 ; evidence of the French historians on the ecumenicity of the Council of Florence, 179 ; Quirinus's high theology, 180 ; his propositions are entirely false, 180 ; extract from Lessius on the great Judgment Day, 184 ; wilful perversion by Quirinus of the Speech of the Holy Father, 185 ; reply to his charge of want of freedom in the Council, 187 ; ecumenicity of the Council in its final issue fully proved, 189 ; influence of Protestantism upon Catholic minds, 191 ; Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, 193 ; of Revelation, 193 ; of Faith, 195 ; of Faith and Reason, 197 ; Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 199 ; of the power and nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, 199 ; of the infallible teaching of the Holy See, 200 ; it was feared that the declaration of Papal Infallibility would have been a loss to the Church, but it has proved a gain, 202 ; the definition by the Council has been of infinite value to the Church, 203 ; Dr. Döllinger's Lectures on the Union, 204.


WESLEY'S POPERY CALMLY CONSIDERED, *reviewed*, 381.

Westminster (Archbishop of) Speech at the Catholic Club Dinner of Liverpool, *reviewed*, 448.

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