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NECESSARY TRUTH.

In answer to Mr. Fitzjames Stephen.

[The following article appeared in the "Contemporary Review" of last March. As it was writen in defence of essays which have appeared in the Dublin Review, we must not fail to place it before our readers.]

I MAKE use of my first leisure moment, to defend certain articles of mine, against the criticisms of Mr. Fitzjames Stephen published in the December issue of "the Contemporary Review." The articles in question appeared respectively in the Dublin Review of July 1871, October 1871, July 1873, January 1874, and July 1874; and for brevity's sake I will call them Articles I., II., III., IV., V. They form part of a projected series—as yet far from being concluded—the purpose of which is to establish securely on argumentative ground, against the antitheists of this day, the existence of that Personal and Infinitely Perfect Being, whom Christians designate by the name "God." Now among the earliest and most essential steps in this argument is the thesis, that certain truths are cognizable by mankind as "necessary"; and it is against the arguments whereby I have purported to prove this thesis, that Mr. Stephen directs his assault. Without further preface then, I proceed to set forth, with as much clearness as I can make consistent with due brevity, the arguments which I have drawn out in the above-named articles; and I will notice Mr. Stephen's replies as I proceed. I hope my readers will excuse an appearance of egotism, which has painfully struck me on reading over again what I have here written, and which I have not had sufficient literary skill to avoid. At last my purpose is mainly one of self-defence; and I think it will appear on examination that I have hardly spoken oftener of *myself*, than Mr. Stephen has spoken of "Dr. Ward." Now therefore to begin.

He who denies the cognizableness of necessary truth, must assume one of the three following positions:—

1. He may admit, that our existent faculties declare as certain the existence of necessary truth; but he may add, that

we have no reasonable ground for regarding our existent faculties as trustworthy.

2. He may admit that our faculties are cognizable as trustworthy, but may deny that they testify as certain the existence of necessary truth.

3. He may deny that our faculties testify as certain the existence of necessary truth; and he may add that it does not much matter whether they do or no, because there is no reasonable ground for regarding them as trustworthy.

This last is Mr. Stephen's position; and I have therefore to make good against him two distinct theses. I have to show (1) that we have fully sufficient reason for regarding that as certain, which our faculties so declare; and (2) that they indubitably declare as certain the existence of necessary truth. I commence with the former of these two theses.

Nothing can be more intelligible in theory, than the position of those who deny the trustworthiness of our faculties. I will call them by their recognized name "philosophical sceptics." I will so call them—not at all intending to use the name invidiously, for I am engaged in dry and passionless argument—but merely for the convenience of having a name which may designate certain thinkers, to whom I shall not unfrequently refer.* And the position, I say, taken up by sceptics is most intelligible. "Suppose it were admitted," they say, "that our faculties testify ever so unmistakably the "existence of necessary truth, what inference could reasonably "thence be drawn? What imaginable proof can be given of the "thesis, that the utterance of our faculties corresponds with "objective truth? Professor Huxley has suggested as one "easily supposable hypothesis, that some powerful and mali- "cious being may have power over me, and find his pleasure in "deluding me; and that he may often enjoy this amusement, "as in other ways, so also by means of compelling my faculties

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* Mr. Stephen—having spoken (p. 58) of "those who think as" he, Mr. Stephen, does—protests in a note against my giving him the "nickname" of "phenomenist." He adds that he "dislikes" my "habit of coining words." I really think it far more convenient and intelligible to speak of "phenomenists," than to speak of "those who think as Mr. Stephen does." And indeed I believe that those philosophers themselves, who otherwise "think as Mr. Stephen does," will for the most part differ from him here. It is becoming a more and more common complaint, that so much confusion of thought finds entrance into philosophical discussions, through words of every-day use being employed to express important philosophical ideas. No word can endure the rough handling of every-day use, without acquiring considerable ambiguity of sense. What would Mr. Stephen himself think, if it were proposed to abolish technical *legal* terms?

"to testify what is entirely false. What imaginable *disproof* "can be given of this supposition? But apart from it altogether, there are ten thousand physical causes which may "possibly lead my faculties to this or that avouchment, while "in no kind of way do they suppose the *truth* of what is so "avouched. Indeed this is a case, if ever there were one, on "which the burden of proof lies on the other side. The so-"called orthodox assume that, by some law of nature totally "unknown, the phenomena of the human reason move in such "sequence, that its utterances invariably correspond with "objective truth. Nothing can be a more arbitrary assumption "than this; and yet it is constantly taken for granted without "one vestige of proof."

Now an obvious reply to such reasoning is always put forth by the philosophers who repudiate scepticism. We use such language as this to sceptical philosophers: "Why, in every syllable you say, you are taking for granted the very fact which you deny. You are *arguing;* or in other words you are making use (in fact very vigorous use) of your *reasoning faculty.* Yet how can you even guess that this faculty is not a mere instrument of delusion? If you are sincere in saying that you entirely distrust your faculties, your only intelligible course is profound and motionless intellectual inactivity." As far as I happen to know, this retort has never been met by any rejoinder which possesses even the semblance of plausibility.

The illustration to which I have myself commonly had recourse in assailing scepticism, has been the faculty, not of reasoning, but of memory. Thus I argue (I. 45) that—on the sceptical view—not only all knowledge of *necessary* truths is rendered impossible, but (quite as thoroughly and effectively) all knowledge of *experimental* truths also. The physical scientist tells me that he has just been witnessing a very important experiment. How do you know, I ask him, how can you even guess, that you have witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply, that you have the keenest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, I do not doubt at all that you have that present *impression,* which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that your present *impression* corresponds with a past *fact?* See what a tremendous assumption this is, which you, who call yourself a cautious man of science, take for granted. You are so wonderfully made and endowed—such is your bold assumption—that in every successive case your clear and articulate *impression* and *belief* of something as past corresponds with a past *fact.* At all events do

not take so vast a conclusion for *granted;* give some kind of *reason* for your acceptance of it.

In truth the distinction is fundamental, between our knowledge of our *present* and our *past* experience. "I am conscious of a most clear and articulate mental *impression*, that a very short time ago I was suffering cold"; this is one judgment: "a very short time ago I was suffering cold"; this is another and fundamentally distinct judgment. That I know my present *impression*, by no manner of means implies that I know my past *feeling*. Let men once admit the sceptical negation; and it follows that they have not the slightest means of knowing, or even reasonably guessing, anything of any kind whatever, except the facts of their immediately present consciousness. Their knowledge is less than that possessed by the brutes. I have pressed this consideration very frequently, in the articles criticised by Mr. Stephen; and I think that he should have encountered instead of ignoring it.

Professor Huxley (quoted by me in I. 45, note) has fallen into a fallacy, which I could never have expected to find in so able a writer, and which a little reminds one indeed of what Englishmen call an Irish bull. He says that "the general trustworthiness of memory" is one of those "hypothetical assumptions, which cannot be proved or known with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate consciousness; but which nevertheless are of the highest practical value, inasmuch as the conclusions drawn from them are always *verified by experience*." ("Lay Sermons," p. 359.) How can Mr. Huxley know or even reasonably guess, that any one avouchment of memory was ever even once "verified by experience"? Because he trusts his present act of memory. But why does he trust his present act of memory? He answers, because he *remembers* that his past acts of memory have been verified by experience. He trusts his present act of memory, because he knows that the past avouchments of his memory have been verified by experience; and he knows that the past avouchments of his memory have been verified by experience, because he trusts his present act of memory. The blind man leads the blind around a "circle" incurably "vicious."

My direct opponent in my various articles has been Mr. Mill; and I have therefore several times pressed this argument, against the particular position which he assumed. On one occasion (IV. 28) I have used the same method of reasoning, against what I understand to be the foundation of Mr. Herbert Spencer's speculations. That philosopher considers that no full trust can reasonably be placed in the

avouchment of our existent faculties, because he thinks that we may very possibly inherit faculties which have been denaturalized and artificialized by ancestral experience. I never could understand how Mr. Spencer would profess to show, that our *primitive* faculties deserve that credence, which he denies to our *inherited* faculties.

What then is that doctrine, which the opponents of scepticism regard as the foundation of all knowledge? This was the question which I treated, in the first of the articles criticised by Mr. Stephen. The doctrine which I maintained, may be thus stated with sufficient completeness for the present purpose. "Whatever our existent faculties (if rightly interrogated and interpreted) declare to be certain, is thereby instinctively* known to us as certain."

Now it would of course be a contradiction almost in terms, if I professed to adduce direct arguments for this thesis: because the very fact of adducing arguments would imply that our *reasoning faculty can be trusted;* which is part of the very conclusion to be proved. But I drew attention in my articles to various mental experiments, which any one may try for himself, and which are sufficient (I think) to convince him that the above-named thesis is true. The most irresistible perhaps of these experiments may be practised on that very faculty of memory, to which I have already appealed. I experience e.g. that phenomenon of the present moment, which I thus express: I say that I remember distinctly and articulately to have been much colder a few minutes ago when I was out in the snow, than I am now when sitting near a comfortable fire. Under these circumstances I find myself under the absolute necessity of knowing, that a short time ago I *had* that experience which I now remember. My act of memory is not merely known to me as a present *impression,* but carries with it also immediate evidence of representing a fact of my *past experience.* I will ask Mr. Stephen himself, whether, if he were in the position which I have described, he would not be as absolutely certain of having experienced the past cold, as of experiencing the present warmth; and whether he would not account the former certitude to be fully as reasonable as the latter. He says indeed (p. 73) that "every assertion which we make should be coupled either expressly or tacitly with some such qualification as this: 'as at present

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* As to this word "instinctively," I said (IV. 18, note) that I used it "as expressing the irresistible and (as it were) piercing character of the conviction to which I refer." "Let any reader consider," I added, "the keen certitude with which he knows, that he experienced those sensations of ten minutes back, which his memory vividly testifies."

advised, subject to further and better instructions, and upon the assumptions hereinbefore stated, I am of opinion, &c. &c.' " Would he seriously apply this doctrine to the case I have put? While sitting comfortably before the fire, would he so limit his belief in the past? Would he say no more to himself than this: "As at present advised, subject to further and better instructions, and upon the assumptions hereinbefore stated, I am of opinion that I have quite recently been out in the cold"? If he would not dream of so limiting his certitude—as I am sure he would not—what principle can he suggest on which such certitude may be called reasonable, except the principle involved in my thesis?

Those who care for further details of what I have said, will find them in I. throughout; in III. 7—26; and in IV. 24—29. The space however, within which my present remarks must necessarily be confined, obliges me to content myself with replying to Mr. Stephen's objections.

Firstly he objects (p. 45) that, according to my thesis, "a man has existent cognitive faculties, and he has also other faculties by which he instinctively knows."* I am quite unable to answer this objection, because I am quite unable to understand it. Let me again take for my instance that particular "existent cognitive faculty," which we call memory. Mr. Stephen says apparently that, according to my thesis, a man has an existent memory; and has also another memory, by which he instinctively knows that his former memory is true in its avouchment. I may fairly ask my critic to elucidate further this dark saying.

2. "When all is said," asks Mr. Stephen (p. 46), "what does it mean, except that people have certain ways of gaining knowledge, which from the nature of the case they are obliged to trust?" Surely he has not here even approached the real point. The question which has to be asked is this: "Can I *reasonably* trust those faculties, which I am in some sense *obliged* to trust?" If this question be not answerable in the affirmative, what would be the inevitable inference? That no such thing is attainable as knowledge or even reasonable guess-work; that we know nothing whatever, except the phenomena of our immediately present consciousness; and that all which we have fondly imagined to be science, whether mental or physical, is but the baseless fabric of a vision.

* As I am writing for the same periodical in which Mr. Stephen's article appeared, I may assume that my readers have that article at hand. If they are interested in this controversy, I hope that (in justice to both sides) they will have Mr. Stephen's article before them together with mine. In the text I refer to the whole paragraph of pp. 45, 6.

3. "All our knowledge comes to us through faculties, each and all of which are constantly liable to error, which we cannot in all cases detect" (p. 73). If this statement means anything inconsistent with the thesis which I am now defending, it must mean that our existent faculties, when duly interrogated and interpreted, can declare as certain what is untrue. Now as Mr. Stephen professes to be answering "Dr. Ward," surely, instead of saying that "he cannot understand how" his "assertion can be denied," he ought to have examined the reasons I have adduced for entirely denying it. One of these reasons was a "reductio ad absurdum," which I have already set forth, and which I will here briefly recapitulate. Mr. Stephen's statement utterly overthrows the possibility, whether of knowledge or even of reasonable guess-work. Take any phenomenon of the immediate past which my memory most keenly testifies :—I cannot reasonably even guess whether this is not one of those instances, in which my memory has fallen into an undiscoverable error; or in other words I cannot reasonably even guess, whether any such experience ever befell me.

But I also gave a direct reply to the arguments ordinarily adduced for the purpose of showing, that our faculties may declare as certain what is not really so. I fear I cannot do justice to myself under this head, without extracting the whole passage (I. 52—54). I have made a few verbal changes; but otherwise it ran as follows.

"Phenomenists are very fond of adducing this or that instance, in which they allege that our faculties declare as certain what is not really so. I see a straight stick in the water, and my faculties (they urge) pronounce as certain that the stick is crooked; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed fingers, my faculties pronounce as certain that my hand is touched by *two* substances. All these superficial difficulties are readily solved, by resorting to a philosophical consideration, which is familiar to Catholics, though (strangely enough) I do not remember to have seen it in non-Catholic works. I refer to the distinction, between what may be called 'undoubting' and what may be called 'absolute' assent.

"By 'absolute' assent I understand an assent so firm, as to be *incompatible* with the co-existence of doubt: but by 'undoubting' assent I mean no more, than that with which *in fact* doubt does not co-exist. Now the mere undoubtingness of an assent does not at all imply any particular *firmness*; but arises from mere accident. For instance. A friend, coming down to me in the country, tells me that he has caught a sight of the telegrams as he passed through London, and that the

Versailles government has possession of Paris.* I had long expected this, and I assent to the fact without any admixture of doubt. In an hour or two however the morning paper comes in; and I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, for that the army has only arrived *close up to* Paris. The extreme facility, with which I dismiss my former 'undoubting' assent, shows how very far it was from being 'absolute.' Its true analysis in fact was no more than this: 'there is an à priori presumption that Paris is taken.' But as no particular motive for doubt happened to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect on the true character of the assent which I yielded.

"Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly true, unless they yield to that proposition 'absolute' assent. But a moment's consideration will show, that my assent to the crookedness of the stick or the duplicity of the cherry—may accidentally indeed have been undoubting—but was extremely far from being absolute. Its true analysis was: 'there is an *à priori presumption*, that the stick is crooked or that there are two objects touched by my fingers.' The matter may be brought to a crucial experiment, by some such supposition as the following.

"I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of thought; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in whose moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect confidence. I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel two touching objects; but he explains to me the physical laws which explain my delusion, and I surrender it with the most perfect facility. He proceeds however—let us suppose, for the purpose of probing the depth of my convictions—to tell me, that I have no reason whatever for knowing that I ever experienced a certain sensation, which my memory most distinctly declares me to have experienced a very short time ago: or again, that as to the particular trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have no reason whatever for knowing, it to be triangular, and that he believes it to have *five* angles. Well—first of all I take for granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I find that I *have* rightly understood him, either I suspect him (as the truth indeed is) to be simulating; or else I pluck up courage and rebel against his teaching; or else (if I am too great an intellectual coward for this,) I am reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high road to idiocy. There is one thing at all events which I cannot

* This was of course written in 1871.

do. I cannot compel myself to doubt that, which my existent faculties testify as certain. So great is the distinction between merely 'undoubting' and 'absolute' assent; between my faculties testifying that there is an *à priori presumption* for some proposition, and their testifying that it is *certainly true*."

Surely here again it was Mr. Stephen's business to answer this, and and not to ignore it. He was called on by my argument to allege some clear instance, in which our faculties declare that as certain which is untrue; and he has not even attempted any such allegation.

4. "All our knowledge includes an element of memory or anticipation, each of which is in the highest degree fallible" (p. 73). I cannot understand why Mr. Stephen should have placed in the same category two things so different, as "memory" and "anticipation." No one of any school has even hinted that mere "anticipation" can form a reasonable ground of certitude.

As to memory—I will beg my readers to look back with some care to what I said just now, on the distinction between "absolute" and merely "undoubting" certitude. I at once admit, that by no means unfrequently there is an "undoubting" declaration of memory, which turns out to be delusive; but such declarations always regard the supposed experience of some time back. It is not however from such experiences as these, that I have ever drawn my illustration. That on which I have begged my readers to fix their attention carefully, is such memory as we all have of the *immediate* past. On the one hand such memory is always accompanied by the keenest instinctive certitude of our having gone through that experience which memory testifies; while on the other hand no one attempts to allege that its avouchment is ever untrue. I deny altogether, that the keen instinctive certitude to which I refer is ever felt by a sane man, without there being full warrant for such certitude. It is for Mr. Stephen to prove the reverse if he can.

In his last paragraph of all, my critic almost admits, that the practical result of his principle is what I maintain it to be. "It is surely possible," he says, "that death may resemble waking from sleep; and that many things which now appear to all of us truths and to some of us necessary truths, may turn out after all to have been necessary fictions, which fuller knowledge will enable us to lay aside. Dreams," he adds, "are often founded on realities; but when we wake, the reality is seen to be altogether unlike what in our dreams we were compelled to believe it to be." Yet even in this statement, as appears to me, Mr. Stephen shrinks altogether from the

full legitimate outcome of his scepticism. On what possible ground is he justified in assuming, that the "dream" of this life—or rather of this immediately present instant—is in the slightest degree "founded upon realities"? I have said "of this immediately present instant": because, from the sceptical stand-point, he has no reasonable ground whatever for even guessing, that his dream of this moment has so much as the faintest resemblance to that which was his dream a moment ago, or to that which will be his dream a moment hence.

I have now then, by defending my first thesis, laid (I hope) a sufficient foundation for defending my second. I am to maintain against Mr. Stephen, that certain truths are cognizable as necessary. I henceforward assume, that whatever our existent faculties declare as certain is indubitably true; and it remains therefore to argue, that our existent faculties declare as certain the existence of necessary truths.

Here at the outset a difficulty is raised: what is meant by the word "necessary"? In the articles criticised by Mr. Stephen, though I have implied what I am now going to say, I entered comparatively little into detail on this matter. My reason for not speaking at greater length on the subject was the very obvious one, that my direct opponent was Mr. Mill, with whom I was in entire agreement as to the meaning of the word. When I read Mr. Stephen's original paper, I fancied I was in equal agreement with *him;* because he gave, as one meaning of a "necessary truth," "a fact which could not have been otherwise" (p. 46). He now implies however, that he here intended a most important qualification, which I had no means of suspecting: he meant to say "a fact which could not be otherwise," *without the laws of nature being changed.* I need hardly say, that this is very far short of what I intended to express by the term a "necessary truth"; and my first business therefore must be to explain my meaning as well as I can. Now there are two modes of explaining the sense of a term: the "direct" and the "indirect." The "direct" way is that of decomposing the complex idea expressed by the term, into the simpler elements of which it is composed; as I might explain the term "hard substance," by saying that it is a "substance which resists pressure." But this way is of course not applicable, when the idea expressed by a term is perfectly simple; and in my articles (IV. 32) I expressed an opinion, that such is the case with the word "necessary." The way of "direct"

explanation being thus precluded, I must do the best I can in the way of "indirect"; or in other words I must so express myself, as shall best enable my readers to recognize an idea, which (I am confident) is a very prominent part of their mental furniture. In order to do this, I will draw their attention to what I consider an equivalent idea, of which I made frequent use in my articles for the purpose of illustrating my argument. A "necessary" truth then (I will say) is "a truth of which Omnipotence could not effect the reversal." Mr. Stephen, when directly treating this phrase of mine, entirely (as I consider) misapprehends it; yet before I conclude my article, I hope to show irrefragably, that the very idea which I intended to convey by this term is quite familiar to him, though he has failed to reflect on it. If there are other readers who have also failed to recognize clearly and distinctly in their mind the idea on which I wish to insist, I still cannot doubt that they will gradually do so if they will follow the course of my argument. And having now said enough on the sense of this word "necessary," I will next make a preliminary remark, for the purpose of explaining the exact point at issue.

Adopting Sir W. Hamilton's phraseology, I divide propositions into three classes. There are (1) "identical propositions" or "truisms"; in which the predicate expresses no more than has explicitly been expressed by the subject: as "this apple is an apple." There are (2) "explicative" propositions; in which the predicate expresses no more than has been implicitly expressed by the subject: as "hard substances resist pressure," or "a square is rectangular." And there are (3) "ampliative" propositions; in which the predicate expresses what has neither explicitly nor implicitly been expressed by the subject: as "diamonds are combustible," or "the base angles of an isosceles triangle are mutually equal."

Now as to identical and explicative propositions, the present controversy is not concerned with them. The denial of an identical or explicative proposition is of course a contradiction in terms: it is a contradiction in terms to say, that there is a certain oblique-angled square, or a certain hard substance which does not resist pressure. Now no important philosophical service whatever would be done by merely affirming, that it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence to effect what is a contradiction in terms. The thesis which I desire to make good is, that certain things are outside the sphere of Omnipotence, which are by no means contradictions in terms. In other words, the thesis which I desire to make good is, that certain ampliative propositions are cognizable as necessary.

Now I think there is no other field on which this battle can be so decisively fought out, as that which I chose, and on which Mr. Stephen has assailed me : the field of mathematical truths. There are various reasons why I think this, and he has himself incidentally mentioned a strong one. "The words which relate to time, space, and number," he says most truly and importantly, "are perfectly simple and adequate to what they describe; whereas the words which relate to common objects are nearly in every case complex, often to the highest degree." This statement includes arithmetical science as well as geometrical; but I shall begin with speaking of the latter.

Now my critic will certainly admit, that if reason declares the necessary truth of geometrical axioms, it no less certainly declares the necessary validity of the syllogistic process; and consequently, that to establish the necessary truth of the axioms, would be to establish the necessary truth of the whole body of geometrical science. This therefore is to be now our immediate point of debate: are geometrical axioms cognizable as necessarily true? Mr. Stephen answers this question in the negative, I in the affirmative.

The axiom, which throughout my articles I have chiefly used for the purpose of illustrating this question, has been the axiom that "all trilateral figures are triangular." Mr. Stephen denies, whereas I affirm, that this axiom is cognizable as a necessary truth.

He certainly begins his attack at the very beginning: for not only he will not admit that this axiom is a *necessary* truth, he will not admit it to be a truth at all. "A capital Z or N," he says, "is a trilateral figure, but it has two and not three angles." Well, Mr. Stephen is a good deal my junior, and the use of language may have changed since I was a boy : but when I learned Euclid, a "figure" was defined as "that which encloses space"; a condition certainly not fulfilled by Z or N. I submit, that the correct expression for either of these two shapes would be, "a line consisting of three straight lines."

Even however if the proposition were true, Mr. Stephen "never heard that it was an axiom" (ib.). I expressly stated the sense in which I used this term "axiom." "By axioms I mean those ampliative truths, which the geometer assumes as indisputable and uses as first principles" (V. 56). Now in all the gometrical treatises I have ever happened to see, the triangularity of trilaterals is treated as an axiom; for it is assumed as true without any profession of proof: nor indeed has Mr. Stephen himself professed to deduce it syllogistically from geometrical premisses. Supposing indeed all this were

otherwise, any acknowledged axiom would substantially serve my purpose; but Mr. Stephen himself is quite content to *accept* this as an axiom, for the purpose of joining issue on the present controversy.

In one fundamental particular he agrees with me against Mr. Mill. He holds it to be cognizable as certain (p. 59), that this axiom is no less true in the region of Sirius, than in the streets of London.* And he considers that this immeasurably extending proposition can be established, on the exclusive basis of experience. His argument consists of two successive steps, which I think he ought to have distinguished from each other more carefully than he has done.

Firstly, in his view, it is exclusively by experience we know, that space is "an enormous expanse or cavity in which" all the heavenly bodies "are contained" (p. 52). "Our eye tells us that Sirius is included in the vast vault which we call space" (p. 59). I will admit this proposition for argument's sake, though I could not admit it otherwise. I admit it for argument's sake: because the real issue between Mr. Stephen and myself is to my mind a most simple one; and I should be very foolish therefore if I mixed it up with what is among the darkest of metaphysical questions, the nature, origin, and authority of our convictions concerning space.

It is against the second step therefore of Mr. Stephen's argument, that I take my stand. He agrees with me in regarding it as a certain truth that, throughout the whole region of trimensurate space, all trilaterals are triangular. But he differs from me most fundamentally, in that he regards this immeasurably reaching proposition as capable of being established on the exclusive ground of experience. In fact if my readers will study carefully the whole argument of his which extends from p. 58 to the top of p. 61, they will see that he purports to establish his proposition by a short series of experiments, practised in one room upon "a single sheet of paper." I never in my life happened to light on a philosophical statement, which so astounded me as this; and I should have insuperable difficulty in supposing

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* In p. 60 Mr. Stephen somewhat limits his acceptance of the axiom. He will not admit more than that "*no one yet has been able to imagine or suggest a way* in which three straight lines can be made to cut each other in more than three places." But I suppose he will concede, that there is no more than an infinitesimal probability of any one "imagining or suggesting" such a way hereafter; and that his conviction therefore of the truth of the axiom falls but infinitesimally short of absolute and irreformable certitude. Indeed in p. 59 he says without reserve, that the axiom is true in the case of "all possible" trilaterals. In the text then I shall assume this as his opinion.

that so vigorous a thinker could possibly have made it, if the words were not unmistakably before my eyes. Surely it is like burning daylight (if I may use his own phrase) to exhibit those obvious and elementary considerations, which at once put his statement peremptorily out of court. I ought to apologise for gravely expressing so obvious a truism as what I have now to express, were it not that Mr. Stephen himself has so inexplicably lost sight of it.

A man experiences that which he experiences, and not that which he does *not* experience. He knows directly by experiment, that which he has himself experienced; and he knows indirectly by experiment, that which is reported to him on credible authority as having been experienced by somebody else. Now I need not here speak further of "indirect" experiment, because Mr. Stephen in no way refers to *this* as his ground of belief in the triangularity of Sirian trilaterals. I will confine myself then to the question of "direct" experiment.

According to Mr. Stephen, "Dr. Ward's reasoning seems to assume throughout that the acquisition of knowledge by experience must in all cases be a gradual process" (p. 58). But I hold no such opinion at all. One single experiment sufficed to show me, that I became warmer this morning when I approached the fire, than I had been a minute before; and, as Mr. Stephen truly says (p. 57), "one steady look is as good as ten thousand looks, for the purpose of producing a certainty" that "the sheet of paper before me is blue." One experiment is as good as a hundred, to assure me of that which I experience; and a hundred experiments are as useless as one, to assure me experimentally of that which I do *not* experience. But neither Mr. Stephen nor I was ever in Sirius; and neither of us therefore has any experience whatever of the trilateral objects there existing. He says indeed (p. 52) that we experimentally "learn the characteristics of space, by looking at things in it and moving about in it." Doubtless we may so learn the characteristics of that *portion* of space over which we *have* moved about; but we cannot experimentally learn what we have never experienced. By walking from Hampstead to Highgate, we can learn experimentally that the view is very pretty all the way; but if we wish to learn by direct experiment whether the view is equally pretty from Highgate to Holloway, we have no resource, except to walk or be otherwise conveyed along that particular road. It would indeed be an amazing statement that, after having frequently walked from Hampstead to Highgate without ever extending our stroll further, we could,

(by help of one sheet of paper) learn *experimentally* the character of the road from Highgate to Holloway. Yet this surely is an exact parallel of Mr. Stephen's doctrine. He learns by experiment the characteristics of a certain portion of space in London or elsewhere, "by looking at things in it and moving about in it" (p. 52); and then "with a single sheet of paper" (p. 59) he can learn *experimentally*—not what are the properties of space *on* that sheet of paper—but what are the properties of space at the distance of countless millions of miles.*

It is plain then that Mr. Stephen's argument must be vitiated by some most extraordinary fallacy; and a moment's consideration shows what that fallacy is. He is confusing *physical*

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* An objection may perhaps be thoughtlessly made against the argument of the text, on the following ground. "By *arguing* from experiment," it may be said, "we arrive at the knowledge of a vast number of truths, which "have not themselves been experienced. I know directly by experiment "that certain diamonds are combustible, and I know indirectly by experi-"ment that all those are combustible on which the experiment has been "made; but physical science, which is exclusively founded on experiment, "pronounces nevertheless that *all* diamonds without exception are com-"bustible."

To this I make the obvious reply, that our knowledge of nature would be confined to a mere catalogue of past and present experiments, were it not for one proposition, which is the basis of all physical science, and without which the latter could not exist. That proposition is (I need hardly say) that "nature proceeds on uniform laws." It is not true that physical science is entirely based on experiment, unless it be true that the above-named proposition can be established by exclusive appeal to experiment. The Hegelians, I am told, maintain that the uniformity of nature is a truth, which experiment could never suffice to establish, but which is known à priori as a necessary truth. According to the Hegelians then, physical science is *not* entirely based on experiment; and on *their* ground there is therefore no meaning whatever in the objection to which I am replying. Mr. Mill however maintained, that the uniformity of nature *is* cognizable with certainty by the exclusive means of experiment. I argued against this doctrine in II. 313-7, and rejoined on Mr. Mill's reply in IV. 32-38. Still it remains true no doubt, that in Mr. Mill's view physical science *is* entirely grounded on experiment. But then he added expressly, as his argument manifestly required, an essential qualification. The uniformity of nature, he said, "must be viewed, not as the law of the universe, but of that portion of it only *which is within the range of our means of sure observation*, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases" (Logic, vol. ii. p. 108, seventh edition). Mr. Mill would be as far as the Hegelians themselves from supposing, that any physical fact existing in Sirius could possibly be known to us by the exclusive means of experiment.

It is true enough that Mr. Mill fell into the very same fallacy of which I accuse Mr. Stephen, by holding that mathematical truths (though not physical facts) can be known by experiment to hold good in "the regions of the fixed stars." I argued against this position of his in II. 303, and rejoined on his reply in IV. 44-5.

experimentation with *mental* experimentation. He proves that Sirian trilaterals are triangular—not because he has made any experiments in Sirius—but because he has experimented on the idea of a trilateral as it exists in his own mind. Here are his very words (p. 56), though not his very italics. "Having seen *various* lines and triangles [trilaterals] we can *imagine others,* and argue about them as well as if they were represented by actual figures drawn upon paper." Here he is assuming that very thesis to be *true,* of which he is purporting to prove that it is *false.* He confesses in p. 59 that he has required nothing more for his demonstration, than "a single triangle and a single sheet of paper." But if he will reflect for a moment, he will see that he needed for it neither paper nor diagram at all; that when once the idea of a "trilateral" has entered his mind, the triangularity of that trilateral becomes a self-evident proposition. He says, indeed (p. 64), that "he does not know what I mean," when I speak of "knowing" a proposition "by the very conception of its subject"; and yet there can be no better illustration of my meaning, than his own way of proving the triangularity of trilaterals. He arrives securely at this truth, by merely manipulating his *idea* of a trilateral. He "knows by his very conception" of a trilateral, that it is triangular.*

Here it will be more convenient, if I pause for a moment to rectify a misconception of Mr. Stephen's. I had said that

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* What I have said in the text may be serviceably illustrated by a paragraph in II. 299, which I here append: "Necessary truths may be most clearly distinguished from those merely physical, by one simple consideration. Putting aside the propositions of psychology, with which we are not here concerned,—the philosopher learns *experimental* truths no otherwise than by observing *external nature;* but he learns *self-evidently necessary* verities by examining *his own mind.* A proposition is discerned to be self-evidently necessary, whenever, by simply considering the ideas of the subject and predicate, one comes to see that there exists between them that relation which the proposition expresses. So I judge it self-evidently necessary, that 'the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally wrong'; that 'malice and mendacity are evil habits'; that '$a+b=(a-1)+(b+1)$'; that 'all trilateral figures are triangular.' That these various propositions are not cognized by me as *experimental* truths, is manifest (we say) from one simple consideration; for in forming them I have not been ever so slightly engaged in observing external nature, but exclusively in noting the processes of my own mind. We are not here to consider the two first of the above-recited propositions; but at all events, as regards *mathematical axioms,* no one can possibly say that they are *psychological* affirmations. Since therefore they are ascertained by a purely mental process, and yet are no psychological propositions, they cannot be experimental truths at all."

mathematical axioms are "cognizable independently of experience"; and he therein understands me to deny (pp. 60, 61) that "sensation is essential to knowledge." Now considering that this last proposition is a most prominent part of the scholastic philosophy, it is not very probable that I intended to deny it. My meaning—I should have thought my very obvious meaning—was this. Let the conception of a trilateral once find its way into our mind—whether by help of sensation or otherwise is a purely irrelevant inquiry—by means of that very conception we know the triangularity of that trilateral "quite independently of experience"; that is, without experimenting on any trilateral whatever. We cannot, by merely *thinking* of that flower which we call a rose, know anything about the shape of its leaves; whereas on the contrary we *can*, by merely thinking of that figure which we call a trilateral, discover its triangularity.

To proceed. My critic lays great stress on the dogma of Transubstantiation, as inconsistent with what I have now been maintaining. "What intelligible distinction," he asks (p. 65), "is it possible to draw, between the state of our minds as to the proposition 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space,' and the proposition 'a body cannot be in two places at once'?" In other words,—if we know by our very conception of two straight lines that they cannot enclose a space,—why is it not equally true, that we know by our very conception of a body the impossibility of its being in two places at once? It would be very inappropriate to the occasion if I had to treat this objection at any length; because it is a pure "argumentum ad hominem," and has no bearing whatever on the controversy between Mr. Stephen and myself. If it were really true that the Catholic Church imposes a dogma indubitably contradictory to reason, that might be an excellent reason why Mr. Stephen should not become a Catholic, or why I should apostatize; but it could be no possible reason why Mr. Stephen and I should not unite in believing the cognizableness of necessary truth. It so happens however, that very few sentences are here necessary for Mr. Stephen's refutation; and those few sentences therefore may as well be written down. They are F. Newman's sentences, not mine; and they are endorsed by F. Franzelin ("De Eucharistiâ," p. 155, note), whom many Catholics, of whom I am one, account our greatest living theologian.

What do I know, asks F. Newman, of substance or matter? Just as much as the greatest philosophers; and that is—nothing at all. . . . . The Catholic doctrine leaves phenomena alone. It does not say that the

phenomena go; on the contrary, it says that they remain: nor does it say that the same phenomena are in several places at once. It deals with what no one on earth knows anything about, the material substances themselves.

It is far indeed then from being true, that we know by our very conception of a body the impossibility of being in different places at the same time. On the contrary, we can hardly be said to have any conception of "body" at all; that is, of substance as distinct from accidents.

I now take one step further. Not only is Mr. Stephen familiar with one idea, which he professes himself not to understand—the idea of a proposition being cognizable by our mere conception of its subject—but he is familiar also with another idea, which he still more energetically repudates: the idea of necessity. He says (p. 59) that his "experiment," which establishes the triangularity of certain trilaterals, "might readily be so managed as to apply to all *possible*" trilaterals. In other words he considers himself to have shown, that a non-triangular trilateral is *impossible.* Now what does he mean by "impossible"? Plainly not merely that there is no being who possesses sufficient power to *create* such a trilateral; for in his argument he has not ever so distantly approached the question, what powerful beings there may be in the universe, and what is the degree of power which they may respectively possess. He evidently means, that a non-triangular trilateral is a chimera (to use the Catholic expression) *intrinsically* impossible; a thing external to the sphere of Omnipotence. But to say that a non-triangular trilateral is intrinsically impossible, is merely to say in other words, that the triangularity of trilaterals is a necessary truth.

Having landed my critic in this admission, I will now reprint, with very slight alterations, his analysis (which is very fairly and candidly drawn out) of the reasoning on which I rested my case in the DUBLIN REVIEW. I will, at the same time, add the very few rejoinders which will be needed, on Mr. Stephen's replies to those arguments.

FIRST PROPOSITION.

The phenomenist admits that we can know, with absolute certainty, the triangularity of all earthly trilaterals; but he adds that our mode of obtaining that knowledge is experience and observation. My first thesis is merely negative; viz., that these are assuredly *not* the way in which such knowledge has been gained.

First Argument: Not one man in a million has observed, in external nature, the fact that trilaterals *are* triangular.

Second Argument: In the enormous majority of instances, when the axiom that trilaterals are triangular first becomes known to us, it is accepted as an entirely new proposition; and yet as being, notwithstanding its novelty, self-evidently true.

To this last argument Mr. Stephen replies, that very many things, proved only by experience and observation, are, nevertheless "self-evidently true": as for instance the fact, "that the words now under the reader's eye are printed on the page before him." I rejoin very easily. Mr. Stephen himself quotes in p. 56 my statement, that by a "self-evident" proposition, I mean a proposition "which is known to be true by the mere process of being pondered." The proposition that all trilaterals are triangular becomes known to me by the mere process of being pondered;* whereas the proposition that certain words are printed on a page now lying before me, certainly does not become known to me by the mere process of being pondered, but by the use of my eyes.

SECOND PROPOSITION.

The axiom that trilaterals are triangular, is known by us as necessarily true.

First Argument: The axiom is known to be certainly true, by the mere process of being pondered. But that which our faculties declare as certain, is infallibly true. Take then any trilateral which can be formed by Omnipotence itself: we know infallibly concerning that trilateral, that it is triangular. Or, in other words, it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence to make a trilateral which shall not be triangular.

Second Argument: The second reason for my second proposition is based on that conviction of necessity, which inevitably arises in our mind when we contemplate this or any other geometrical axiom. We pronounce at once, on the question being placed before us, that the triangularity of trilaterals is not simply a phenomenon which prevails within the region of our experience, but a truth which could not be otherwise; of which Omnipotence could not effect the contradictory. I allege this as a fact, of which every one must be cognizant who carefully and fairly examines his own mind.

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* Mr. Stephen objects that "imagining" is not the same as "pondering:" well, it is very certainly one particular *way* of pondering.

Mr. Stephen replies (p. 57) that "no such conviction of necessity arises in *his* mind." I have already replied by pressing on his notice one conviction, which has certainly arisen in his mind; viz., that a non-triangular trilateral is impossible. I have argued from his context, that he must mean that such a chimera is *intrinsically* impossible. And I must leave it for him to explain, if he can, the difference between a conviction that a non-triangular trilateral is intrinsically impossible, and a conviction that the triangularity of trilaterals is a necessary truth.

The reasoning which I have here very compendiously set forth, will be found somewhat amplified, though still briefly expressed, in IV. 57–61. Nor need I further notice Mr. Stephen's replies to that reasoning (pp. 55-7), because the rejoinder I should make on them is very obviously implied in what I have already set forth. I will conclude therefore this part of my subject, by considering the argument which he has drawn, and on which he seems to lay some stress, from the serviceableness of maps. "If the possibility of making and using maps," he said in his first paper (p. 52), "is not a fact taught by experience, then experience teaches nothing at all." By help of maps "we can reason about the relation of objects to each other, as well as we could if we confined our attention to the things themselves, and indeed in many cases much better." To this I answered as follows: "This is true within certain limits, but surely untrue beyond those limits. Suppose I have before me the map of a landed estate in Wales, and know from competent authority that the relative distance and position of the various parts are there represented with great accuracy. There are many inferences which I can draw from that map more readily than 'if I confined my attention to the things thmseleves.' True; but *what* inferences? Those, and those only, which have for their premisses (in addition to the data of the map) mathematical truths. Suppose I wished to find out what are the qualities of the soil, or what the colour of the neighbouring sea, or whether there is coal or precious metal below the surface: of what use would the map be to me for such purposes as these? I should be acting very absurdly, no doubt, if I sent to Wales to inquire whether throughout the given estate a straight line is the shortest path between two points; but I should act no less absurdly, if I attempted to discover the nature of the soil by arguing from the map. Why does this distinction exist? Of course, because mathematical truths differ from such other facts as I have mentioned, by being cognizable independently of experience."

Mr. Stephen thus replies (p. 52, note). "Surely this is not so. We can tell from a map much more readily than from actual observation, that Italy resembles a boot, or that the Alps and Apennines run in certain directions, or that Great Britain and Ireland are contiguous islands: but how are these mathematical truths?" Now I was speaking of *inferences* from, as distinct from what I called the "data" of, the map; and I was doing so, because Mr. Stephen on his side spoke of "*reasoning* about the relations of objects to each other." I said that we may learn, by studying a map, not only its data, but also certain *inferences* from those data. Before proceeding however to the consideration of inferences, let us consider the data themselves. Mr. Stephen "does not quite understand what the data of a map are." Yet surely the term is intelligible enough. They would be such as the following: the shape of the coast or other boundary; the relative positions whether of territories, or towns, or mountains, or lakes; the roads which connect places with each other; &c. &c. Let it be assumed, that we are credibly informed by veracious and competent eye-witnesses, that such particulars are represented on the map with approximate accuracy; it will then follow, that these data of the map are known to us by "indirect" experience as approximately correct. Now the facts mentioned by Mr. Stephen, that "the Alps and Apennines run in certain directions," and "that Great Britain and Ireland are contiguous islands"—these are among the data of the map; and of course no one ever dreamed of doubting that we may learn them from its study. Then as regards Italy's resemblance to a boot. (1) We know by indirect experience (i.e. through the map) that the coast of Italy has a certain general shape, which we may place before our mind's eye, and which I will call A. Then (2) we know partly by direct and still more by indirect experience, that the boots of civilized men have a certain general shape, which I will call B. It remains however to be explained how we know that shape A resembles shape B. I think this may fairly enough be called a geometrical truth; for it is merely the truth, that one curve resembles another. This however is nothing more than a question of words: at all events I maintain confidently, that the resemblance of shape A to shape B is a self-evidently necessary truth. It is within the sphere of Omnipotence to change the shape, either of Italy or of any given boot; but it is not within the sphere of Omnipotence to effect, that shape A shall not have a great resemblance to shape B.*

* Mr. Stephen mentions in the same connection "the resemblance of a portrait to a face"; and asks whether I should call this a mathematical

This is not however the kind of inference which I had in my mind, when I spoke of inferences from the map. I was thinking of a hundred different inferences, represented by such as the following: "The way from A to B through C is very far longer than the way from A to B through D." No doubt we might obtain this as an actual datum of the map, by measuring the two distances with a piece of string; but we shall commonly be able far more quickly (and quite legitimately) to *infer* it from the data, by help of geometrical truths.

On the whole then I maintain with perfect confidence that, according to the laws of human reason, the triangularity of trilaterals (or any other geometrical axiom) is known to us by purely mental experimentation, and is known as necessary. I have incidently summoned into court an adverse witness, if ever there were such a witness, in the person of Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. He himself bases his belief in the axiom on an experimentation, which we have seen to be purely mental; and (as we have also seen) he says in effect that a non-triangular trilateral is intrinsically impossible. But in saying that A is intrinsically impossible, we do but say in other words that the contradictory of A is a necessary truth.

Here I conclude my treatment of the two most fundamental theses, which are at issue between Mr. Stephen and myself. But various questions still remain, by no means unimportant. In the first place he brings against me what I think a most serious charge; viz., that, according to my doctrine, God cannot do what man cannot conceive. Then again he challenges me to speak more expressly than I have hitherto done, on the particular question of arithmetical axioms. I will meet these two challenges in a future paper, as expressly as I have met in this paper the still more serious philosophical accusations which I have now been repelling. I will take the same opportunity to meet my critic more directly, paragraph by paragraph and point by point, than I was able to do before I had completed the general answer to him which I have now set forth. It is only by such hand-to-hand conflict, that I can fully convey to my readers my own sense of (what I am obliged to call) the

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truth. Surely a moment's consideration would have reminded him, that there can be no objective resemblance whatever of a portrait to a face. A portrait is said to be like the original, when it so acts on the beholder's visual organs as to summon up in his mind an image resembling the original. The only possible similarity then is,—not between the original and the portrait,—but between the original and *the image suggested to a beholder* by the portrait. For obvious reasons I do not think such a resemblance as this is at all parallel to the resemblance between shape A and shape B.

utter baselessness and unreasonableness of his argument from beginning to end.

As I am writing in a non-Catholic periodical, I will conclude with an explanation, which is not however involved, one way or other, in the controversy between Mr. Stephen and myself. It may be asked, what is the relation which I believe to exist, between the necessary truths on which I have said so much and the One Necessary Being? The answer commonly given by Catholics, with which I entirely concur, is that necessary truths are founded on the Nature of God; that they are what they are, because He is what He is.

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD.

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Art. I.—MODERN SOCIETY AND THE SACRED HEART.

Der alte und der neue Glaube von D. F. Strauss. Bonn. 1874.

Sartor Resartus. By Thomas Carlyle (fortieth thousand of this Edition). London : Chapman & Hall. 1873.

Twenty Essays. By R. W. Emerson. London : Bell & Daldy. 1870.

Civiltà Cattolica. No. 599. Firenze : Manuelli.

AT the present moment, and for some time now, public opinion has been impressed with the great fact that we are passing through a crisis. In this judgment, not only Catholics and their opponents of the Revolution, but grave and impartial lookers-on, and statesmen, with the weight of government upon their shoulders, concur, as it would seem, with a strange unanimity—nay, we are informed again and again, that there never was an era so pregnant with great issues since Christianity appeared amongst men ; that the times have a tragic cast, and a fulness of energy, by which we may estimate the approach of some catastrophe, some dénouement without example, in the social order. Catholic readers will call to mind the passage, remarkable for its keen sagacity, in which Joseph de Maistre looks forward to the event, the resolution, as he predicts, of our complicated history, and prays that it may be favourable to the Church. Is there a man, indeed, let him be never so prosaic, who does not now and then ask himself, "How shall these things end ?" And the reason is plain. For a long while past we have stood by as witnesses of the break-up, the all but total ruin, of that time-honoured civilization, which, itself a manifest wonder, was created under the influence of the Church, on the ruins of the Pagan world. Centuries upon centuries of vigorous life ; the prescription of Imperial law ; the overshadowing protection of kings and senates ; the loyalty of populations far and wide ; all these have not availed to save the Christian and Catholic

πολιτεία : the public influence of that august code is, in more than one country, suspended ; and the Latin, in hardly less proportion than the Teutonic race, is exposed to a novel experiment, on the widest scale, and at the utmost peril of all involved. That experiment is nothing else than to direct Society in the whole, and in its parts without the aid of religion.

But as S. Thomas, in his lucid reasoning, bids us remember, human society is no mechanical contrivance, much less a chance result, or a blind combination of forces ; it is the concurrence, as its danger is the shock, of many elements, guided to their end by a Divine wisdom, which can plan and can bring to an issue what it has marked out in its design ; and even the beings who go to make it up—since they are in part "of uncompounded essence," and are not of material mould—even they, in all their endeavouring, work towards the realization of an end. Whether they take evil for good, or the apparent for the real, they must first apprehend and then labour : they must know before they can love. Not that, in every contest, the many have a firm grasp, have anything beyond a glimpse now and then, of principles or objects ; but it is possible for an historian, or a philosopher, to disengage from the confusion whatever has been the ruling idea, and the motive-power, to light up facts by the principles to which they must be referred, and to indicate the logical path along which any great theory has been realized. He is not to be carried away in the heat of an engagement; and whilst others hurry forward to gain the next position, or get absorbed in the effort to defend what has been gained, he is calmly surveying the field, tracking the plan of operations, and is learning to judge with accuracy of the duration and the result of a doubtful contest.

Christianity is engaged along the whole line, and there can be little doubt as to the enemy with whom it has to deal. Viewed as an attacking and aggressive force, it has eenb styled the Revolution ; in its normal state, or rather in its essential form and interior life, we have heard of it as that Modern Civilization with which the Church cannot come to terms. But now, since the Revolution is a movement in the social order, it must have an end ; and we may fairly inquire, "What does it undertake to do ? What does it aim at ?" This is a period of transition ; and its legitimate outcome we are told, is the triumph of modern ideas. It is surely seasonable to ask, what are these ideas, and what is their object ? We know what Christianity means ; can we learn the meaning of its competitor ? Let us make an attempt. If we are patient, perhaps the Modern Idea will disclose itself to our view. But our first effort should be to get some explanation of an Idea in the abstract ; this will throw an unexpected light on our researches, and will clear away the mist ; and instead of

laying down a definition to be afterwards resolved into its parts, we will indicate the process by which an Idea is formed and comes to its perfection, so that not only its nature, but the history of its growth, may be sketched in outline.

We mean, however, to bring out the Christian Idea too, not indeed in its fulness, or with the breadth of description, which it requires in its own place, but simply and so far as it is opposed to prevailing notions, and aims at breaking their strength. Since we believe in a Divine Ruler of this busy world; since we know Him to be infinite in those perfections, which the conceiving and carrying out of such vast counsels imply, we cannot but feel that, though He is looking on with patience now, He has already in His Hands the times which are to succeed our own. Many a one among those outside the Church is tempted to despair of mankind; but such a temptation is not likely to trouble a Catholic. Doubtless he too would give up his hopes and anticipations, were they not in the keeping of the highest wisdom and the most persevering love. Even the eyes of faith, as they gaze abroad, are drawn in anxiety and distress to the hurried strivings, and the fluctuating advance and retreat, of the men who are playing their parts in our current history. But those eyes can discern, amid much hesitation and uncertainty, that all these changes were long ago present to the mind of God; and that He has devised, if we may use the expression, a counter-scheme, a further unfolding of the hidden strength of the Incarnation, in which, by the merciful blending of tenderness with suffering, and suffering with love, the restlessness of His sinful creatures may find a respite, and come to a perfect peace. The fresh instance of God's Providence over men is the spread of devotion to the Sacred Heart. This, we may well believe, is to be the chief means of rescuing society at large, no less than the family and the individual, from lawless desires, from the spirit of revolt, and from the insane pride in momentary achievements, which have led the multitudes astray.

Whilst, therefore, we are engaged in discoursing of modern principles, we must not put out of our minds what is the end of these researches. We are to come at length to the supernatural devotion which is meant to overthrow those principles; or, rather, is meant to elicit from them whatever they have of good, and to make them subserve a Divine purpose. Our analysis will conduct the reader through a variety of topics, and may be a long way, at first, from suggesting the nature of our concluding remarks. But the disadvantage is common to all large prospects, and the end, we trust, will justify the course we have pursued. We will now do as we promised a moment ago: instead of taking a definition ready to our hands, we will endeavour to construct one from the facts of the case; and we must first show how any idea what-

ever, true or false, is received into the mind, and comes to have a bearing on the practical duties of life.

Every one, nowadays, has heard of the threefold stage, and the fatal course of development, by which Hegel traced the ascent of knowledge from its primal elements to its term. What amount of truth lies mixed up with falsehood in this theory of his, it is not our purpose to inquire ; but undoubtedly there are such stadia, and they can be separated off in some cases, quite easily—not indeed, in the growth of being, but in the acquisition of reflex certitude. This will be made clear by a moment's thought. When a youth goes through his education, he is taught very much—indeed, almost everything—not by the method of argument, but by the method of authority; he gets treated, not to the Socratic dialogue, with its irony and its inductive defining, but to the *Αὐτὸς ἔφα* of an earlier master, and if the teacher be not vacillating and uncertain himself, he will leave upon the mind of his pupil a consistent impression—what many would call a view, and we, in the course of these remarks, shall dignify with the name of an Idea. It may be poetical, religious, philosophical, in its outward dress, or in the illustrations and instances by which it is recommended to his notice. But the clothing matters little, for from the very beginning there will be a pervading influence at work, and it will tend to give uniformity and evenness to all that may befall him. Now a boy's experience is limited and shallow; nor can he apply to his Idea the touchstone of reality—his world is a world of dreams. If he is a clever boy, he will live much to himself, but without scepticism or doubting, and will fashion his little universe according to the pattern set him; he will be full of eagerness to enter the great world beyond—

> "And his spirit leaps within him to be gone before him then,
> Underneath the light he looks at, in among the throngs of men."

So far he has neither difficulty nor misgiving; how should he suspect that the views upon which he has been brought up are now to be tried, as by a sevenfold assay, in the fire and the crucible? This, indeed, is what few, comparatively, can be drawn to think upon, that experience of life is a searching test of opinion; they cannot measure views by facts, but remain boys all their time. The many, according to Carlyle, have no creed, but only cant; they profess one thing, and, as if the very course of nature demanded it, act up to another; and though we must except to so general a statement, there will be no difference of opinion as to the existence of such a class. Well, then, suppose our young man has gone through his university career with honour, and has come, at all events, to know the use of his eyes; suppose him to have ability and understanding, and his temperament and manners to be directed by the religion he

has learned—this is a very favourable and a rare case—if, then, you were to ask him the state of his mind, when he was a little way forward in the world, when the great scene is just opening upon him, you would discover him to be very different from his former self. His feelings might be as fresh, his affections as sound, his moral principles followed out as in the days of his home or school education ; but you would observe a gradual unsettlement of mind, a gathering, so to speak, of novel temptation upon him, and a consequent bewilderment, under the pressure of which he would answer yea and nay, by turns, to the self-same question. The first period of unclouded faith and serene acquiescence in, if we may say it, the word-pictures of his teacher, has been followed by darkness. The sight of this world, its complications and coils, its disputes, rancours, enthusiasms, its endless jarring and momentary calms ; all this wide-reaching, far illuminated spectacle, has put to flight the rest and quietness of early days, when he learned to speak the speech of others, and to think those sentiments and opinions true, which yet he had not examined. So again, there may be tokens visible to his companions of the conflict within ; it may be spiritual dryness and hardness of temper in men of a religious cast ; it may be uneasy suspicion and distrust in those who have long been hankering after the world's liberty, and now enjoy themselves as they please, and without fear of reproach ; in any case, there is a marked change, tending, it would seem, to an intellectual new-birth, a palingenesis of thought. The darkness and the loneliness remind one of the pilgrim's Valley of the Shadow of Death ; but Carlyle (who doubtless had a bitter experience of its pain and anguish) has pictured its forms, in his Titanic style, as the "Baphometic fire-baptism." So many discordant realities thrust themselves upon our gaze ; nature and history make such a vivid impression on sense and imagination ; opinions which summed up the universal aspect of things, are all at once become frail and shifting ; and whilst the truth shows itself in gleams—

> "Quale per incertam Lunam sub luce malignâ,
> Est iter,"

the eyes are ever seeking for a constant light, and do not find it. What a theatre it is, if one may allude to the intense words of Shakespere ; what a mighty drama, with its ten thousand acts, and its hidden catastrophes ; to a philosophic mind, what a monotonous unending repetition, like the movements of a chorus, where the same reality is ever putting on a strange face, and mocking us to the belief that the strangeness is new ! Analytic habits will, to be sure, make us keen observers of the recurring elements, and will mark them with a name : the philosopher finds only likeness and similitude in everything : love, hatred, pleasure, revenge,

youth and its visions, age with its uncertain retrospect, manhood, in the thick of its toil, it is all to him a multiplicity of action, but an almost identity of force. But our young man is not a philosopher, nor has he begun to analyze; he craves communion with whatsoever things are true, holy, beautiful, humanizing; he has unaccountable sympathies even with the terrible, the painful, the wicked; and this twofold, or it may be, triple tendency, has its utmost scope and expansion in this second stage, before the discords have been drawn into harmony, or have found simplicity in agreement. How much more if he has a share "in the prophetic soul of the wide world," if for him the perspective lengthens and draws out on every side, and the thousand-year processions of history pass into the field of his vision; if he can gather up the energy, the passion, the reckless surging to and fro of nations from East and West, till the "one touch of nature" making him kin to all, has pierced him through and mastered his power of judgment. What a hopeless task to digest all this into a chronicle of times and seasons! What a weariness in the march and recoil of all things under the sun! How is it to be framed in a mental vision that shall record the sameness and the diversity, that shall reconcile opposition, and bring high and low, celestial and terrene, into the compass of dutiful measurement or the proportions of a law?

We do not pretend that such a process of antagonism (the dialectic moment of our German writers) falls to the lot of every one. But, if a man once begins to think, he will undergo something like it, though his temperament may not allow more than a vague sense of oppression and difficulty to be perceived. In a century like ours, and in a society where each is his own master; where too, he has more philosophies within reach than can easily be reckoned; the agony of doubt, or the struggle against doubt, is sure to be more prevalent than in other countries and periods, where the Church has been the witness to every mind of the eternal, unwavering truth. In like manner we cannot affirm that, when once the temptation has begun, the clinging uncertain mist of opinion and unbelief will grow clear again. In the case of many there is never an unclouded sky over them; many others are content to leave things unsettled rather than incur the trouble of investigation, and few indeed could explain how they arrive at their final resting-place. But, from all we have said, it appears that there *is* a resting-place; and whilst the many have never left it, others, and they are the brain of a society which the Church does not enlighten, return after a search of varying duration, not indeed to the opinions they held, but to the calmness with which they held them.

The final stage of thought, which Hegel, for his own reasons, called the higher synthesis, consists, then, in the full and firm ac-

ceptance of a philosophy. Our books tell us that every system which is at one with itself, should be taken as an extensive series of conclusions, not brought together anyhow, but drawn from principles which, in their turn, repose on a comparison of certain apprehensions of the mind. Hence, if the philosophy stands to its first principles, and does not merely *seem* to have a unity, there will be such an intercourse between all its parts, that to accept one is to accept all. Hence too, if single apprehensions, which are a mental transcript of the object seen from only one point, may be termed Ideas (though this is not the Platonic or Thomistic use of the word), much more is the entire transcript, the combined view of the whole reality, to be called an Idea. And nothing, just now, is of more importance, than to insist on the force and cogency, in a system, of its hidden unity. We may halve a philosophy, at least, as it is written ; but an Idea refuses to be broken ; it must be taken or left, and does not allow of a compromise.

As, therefore, the mind's conceptions are not images in the fancy, nor a retention of the bare sensible experience in some fold of the brain ; as they are immaterial, nay, spiritual reproductions and intelligible copies of objects without, and of the soul reflecting on itself, so, but in a far nobler degree, the primal Idea of a system is beyond sense and its belongings, is unity in variety, and extension in intensity, because it gathers up the scattered elements and draws them into relations with itself. And, as the number of constituent parts is ever growing, so are the relations between them ; so that language fails to express their complexity and the closeness of their mutual dependence. Here is the starting-point of a whole philosophy. Take reason, that is, the instrument by which we draw conclusions, as the means of adjusting these elements or partial ideas, apply the conclusions so gained to the unfathomable realities all around us, and you will construct a system according to the admitted rules of its formation. Since, then, philosophy is the application of an Idea to the whole sum of things, and to the Maker of them ; since its province is to hold up the largest and clearest account, to give the last word (as far as human reason can do so) on the nature of God and man, of the universe visible and invisible, and the principles of its origin and scope, we seem to have touched upon its very definition, and may now reckon that we know some, at any rate, of the pretensions of the latest philosophy. If the mind acquiesces in any such account, whether discovered or learned, and the will is determined not to move from its position, this may be called certitude, on the proviso, that, to be certain of a thing is not indeed to know that it is true, but to think so without a misgiving. Whether a man can ever be so rooted in prejudice as to entertain security about a falsehood, does not concern us here. Practically we must admit a kind of mental

repose, the counterfeit of certitude in its proper sense; for there seems to be a darkening of the intellect which is final, as there is also a final illumination.

Schlegel, in a very remarkable book, has delineated the philosophy of life—the term, we think, is an apt one, and may bring yet more strongly before us the characteristics of the final synthesis into which we build up our knowledge. A world-wide Idea must have its roots in speculation, and could not exist without abstract principles, or, so to say, axiomatic formulæ; but these are seldom put into words, and are held unconsciously. The rival systems of which we hear are *living*, and have all the properties of life, implicit and explicit. A philosophy, worth the name, is no mere edifice—no piling up of dead stones into proportion, however beautiful it may look. Rather it is a keen, intelligent spirit, swift and mobile, whole in the whole, but also whole in every part, quickening with its own animation the remotest members, and drawing all the elements into a breathing, attractive unity. It has more within it than circumstances have yet unfolded, and, when seemingly exhausted, is capable of new and astonishing efforts. Its life, its vigour, its ceaseless activity, all these make it persuasive and efficient, for evil no less than for good, to an untold extent. If the Idea is indeed true, and in so far as it is true, that vital beauty and coherence will endure in fruitfulness; if it be false, as it may be in the whole, though its materials, in another form or mould, be useful and true, still it will flourish for a season, and to know the measure of its life will be given to few or none. But while it lasts, it will judge of all things, and be judged by no man; it will seek in itself the justification of every fact. It will claim "to dream," and more than dream, of all things in heaven and earth. The spiritual man, says the Apostle, judges of all things, for he discerns all, and enjoys the guidance of a higher light. Our varying philosophies do not always discern, but they lose the faculty of judging only at death; and meanwhile what a power they become in the world at large!

For, as we observed in the outset, every Idea is also an Ideal, since it is concerned not only with "the starry heavens above," but after all, and chiefly, with "the moral law within." Our speculation is directed to practice, and our whole being finds its quintessence in free-will. The possibilities of history, no less than the abiding presence of nature, are spoken of in that majestic discourse which man, since he looks before and after, cannot but make with himself. But history comes out of civil society, is elicited by the orderly contests of men whose warfare has limits that it dare not transgress, and seems to depend, in great measure, on the energy, perseverance, and heroism of single individuals. This is why, directly any one has learned to take an interest in

this or that philosophy, he is anxious to convince others, and, according to the bent of his character, to realize his thought in things around him. "The great science of man warrants," he will say, "the conclusions to which I have come, but how far is mankind from shadowing forth the beauty and strength of their ideal nature. I cannot change the laws of my being, much less can I hope to reverse any part of the universal order of things: but the society of men, to which I belong, passes through changes, and is capable of improvement, and upon that society I can impress my activity." Thus, philosophy lives for him, and he thinks of becoming its apostle. And since minds are affected in pretty nearly the same way, so that they are drawn to each other by certain affinities, or are instantly repelled and ranged in opposition, we have not merely the efforts of this or that man, but the combined movements and the increased momentum of numbers. We have the Idea no longer engaged upon abstractions; it will make the universe square with the pattern conceived, and will therefore seek its own actuation in the only flexible and plastic element that remains, in the moulding of society.

But with the change of period comes a danger hitherto not apparent. The test of such a theory is not logical consistency (though this be required), but success in meeting difficulties and overcoming them. If it goes from the schools and the lecturer's chair, nay, from books and newspapers and common talk, down into the world of action; if it is busied with great schemes, not to be planned and set forth in eloquent discourse, but to be carried out, and to have enduring results, there is put upon it a strain to which few theories have been equal. That must be a deep philosophy that shall be faithful to the experience of ages, and shall allow for the free play of the mind and heart of man. How many names are there from Homer all through the centuries to Goethe, and whatsoever great thinkers we can cite for our own time, who have studied with awe and wonder, confessing at last that the soul of man, as it is made visible in our common life, is beyond comprehension, and too subtle to be searched out? Is there an axiom or a formula which even comes nigh to exhausting the universe? Does the cunning of man reach to more than a promise of the all but infinite that lies beyond him? To a Catholic it seems that none but God knows the way of men upon earth—that His Providence is no less wonderful than the first creative act: He is justified by the glory of inanimate nature; and the course of ages, by reason of their mysterious connection and their strange succession, declares no less that the riches of His Wisdom are beyond our thought. If He should deign to teach us, our philosophy will not be in vain: should He be silent, or we not listen to His voice, how can we hope that our Idea has in it a promise or a blessing?

Hegel is sure that man is the conscious intellect in which nature comes to know itself: then there is no infinite intelligence, and the course of history is blind or fatal—is, in one word, a contradiction. Are we to believe that a limited mind, such as we know ours to be, can measure the height of heaven, alone and without help? If not, it follows that a finite Idea can never be established as the Ideal of society; and facts will be too stubborn for what is, at best, a parable without an interpreter. Nothing but a Divine economy, with the Spirit of God breathing life into it, can suffice for every emergency, and every crisis; can guide to its destined issue what has been begun.

Here, at length, we have reached the heart of the agitation; we discern with varying distinctness the forces as they meet in battle, and are afforded a means of conjecturing how it must end. Catholicity professes to have a message direct from heaven, and to know all truth, because the source of truth has enlightened her with a divine, a supernatural light. Revelation, as contained in Holy Scriptures and the living tradition handed down from Christ, is the sum of philosophy, since it holds within it the moral law, involves a distinct theory of human nature, and lays down principles to which all our investigation must conform. The Christian Ideal has borne the test of greatness and success: neither its consistency nor its life has been impaired by the shocks it has encountered in its long duration. How much can be said in favour of the opposite view? Will it bear to be made real? There have been, indeed, in the farther East, and on the shores of the Mediterranean, speculative teachings which have formed and directed nations in their culture, science, literature, social and political life. The founders of them were men of vast genius, endowed with the piercing intuition which has long been an Oriental gift. Can any one predict with confidence that the recent speculations are a solid foundation upon which to rear society? that out of them will emerge a polity, a civil hierarchy, or a fruitful epoch of literary and scientific progress? These are questions to which some true answer can be given, and upon that answer depends the future, not so much of this or that country, as of civilized Europe.

It has not been easy to get authors on the other side to speak out; they have preferred, for the most part, the easy task of criticising, in the midst of a learned leisure, those doctrines and practices of religion which seemed to allow them a prompt victory. Received opinions might be combated, it seemed, with any arguments, and the critic was not bound either to defend a theory in his turn, or to guarantee that his objections were not mutually destructive. So far, it was possible to be vague in one's confession of faith, and to assume an air of respect when Christianity chanced to be mentioned. But the right of free speech has now been

allowed, even to extreme and blasphemous teaching; and society does not shut its ears, as formerly, when a polished author declares, in a calm and assuring tone, that atheism is good morality and is likely to ameliorate our present troubles. The difficulty that once existed, of getting to know our adversaries' meaning, is therefore at an end: to reticence has succeeded a categorical statement, which may be likened, for its regularity, to one of the ancient creeds. We are admitted into the confidence of Stuart Mill, of Comte, of Moleschott, of Bruno Bauer, of Friedrich Strauss. By the aid of a little reading, and a little logic, we may gather, for ourselves, the scope and significance of their theories. Variety of colour and tone is to be expected; nay, since the theory is a false one, it is natural that contention and dispute should arise as to the compatibility of the different elements: but, overlooking what is personal or the result of circumstances, we discover that all these writers, and a great many more, are agreed as to fundamentals, and are swayed by the same motives in their attack on Christianity.

There are good reasons for selecting, from the number of recent books, the exposition which Strauss has bequeathed to posterity in his well-known confession of the new faith. The reception it met with in Germany and England proved that the author had dealt with his subject in a novel and interesting manner; the call for fresh editions is a sign that many are still taken with what he has said; and, whatever judgment we must pass on his sentiments, there is still room to deal fairly with him. He has been able to lay open to his readers a prospect of the future, and, whilst putting far away from him a controversial tone, to raise the issue between Faith and Infidelity to the level of a speculation. This, and it is done with candour, is, in spite of his grievous mistakes, a step in the right direction. Nothing comes of isolated argument: but oppose view to view, and the rational, the religious instinct, will do much for those in whom it is still alive. Here is the work done to our hands, which we might have had to go through for ourselves; the author is, in some respects, outspoken, and makes it his boast that he has kept nothing back. This much we may record, lest we should be accused of seeing no good in those who differ from us. But, assuredly, our first thought on looking into the book is not to praise the author: we cannot but feel pained and overcome at the sight of all that patience and ingenuity (for we allow the man had an intellect and a logical grasp of some things) expended in a base attack upon the purest and most venerated of human beliefs. We cannot thank such a one for being a blasphemer and a tempter of his brethren; we are not to be impressed by his velvet politeness, his courtesy with its touch of affectation and occasional scorn, or his sensibility to what European society holds to be decorous and right-minded. He would fain discuss, as it were, an abstract

question, and will hardly refrain from being sharp with us, if we grow excited in our answers to him. This indeed has been witnessed before, and is very striking in an age of criticism. The enthusiasm, the quickness, the anxiety of a Christian seem nothing else than bigotry to a man who says he has consecrated himself to reason. The one is all aglow with the sense of injury done to his Master: the other has no master; his gods are algebraic signs and the formulæ of chemistry; and devotion, in his eyes, is mawkish sentiment. Hence, we are said to be passionate, we overstep the bounds of politeness, we import declamations, and appeal to human nature in disputes that should be wholly impersonal. As if a discussion on the truth of our religion must be conducted like a piece of dialectic fence, or were no more than the debate of a literary association! So long as we avoid the arts of which we have no need; so long as we do not garble, interpolate, or misrepresent; so long as we are open antagonists on a fair field; it cannot be a matter of offence to any one that we describe in plain words the moral perversion, the dreadful, determined wickedness, of those who are wilfully blind.

The view which Strauss adopts is not, in its present form, the work of a single mind, but is rather the efflorescence of unbelieving theories, English and German and French, which have found a voice in almost every science, in most branches of industry, and in the press of all Europe, for now half a century. Hardly a day passes without some portion of it being argued in our journals; it has been touched with colour, sometimes delicately laid on, in the literature of fiction, in popular poems, in thoughtful dissertations; it has been clothed with Gospel imagery in more pulpits of Protestant Germany than can easily be reckoned; it is heard in the sermons of men to whom Pantheism and Liberalism are odious. Scientific men, politicians, the great commercial classes, are all under the same influence, and do little more than vary its outward tokens. In Germany, it has been exalted as the law of the land, objective and supreme, before which conscience must observe a respectful silence. In England, it is exerting the charm of a new religion with high speculations and an easy moral code, upon such as are learned enough to study it. It is worth while to point out how all this has come to pass.

At present we derive our intellectual life from intercourse with German writers, and are content to supply them with materials for their shaping; England, in this, as in so many other things, being a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the temple of the future. But, at the beginning of this century, the Fatherland was a region of mist and romance, of unknown speech, and, apparently, a backward civilization. A great revolution in philosophy was going forward beyond the Rhine; but philosophy, from its very

nature, does not address the multitude; and German philosophy seemed to have become, like Fichte's universe, "the dream of a dream." However, time, which brought round other changes, directed German energy and German acuteness to the investigation of science, history, language, and religion. Here were points that all the world could discuss. The eighteenth century, as it exists in the writings of the French, was no match for the profound and painstaking erudition of a later day; and the sudden expansion of thought, after the French Revolution, drove crowds of inquiring men to the mysterious oracles of Berlin and Weimar. But there is a law of give-and-take in most things; and as the master acts on the pupils, so, in time, do they react upon him. Free Trade in thought once established, it was to be supposed that the English genius would be powerfully felt in Germany. The result has surpassed belief. Recent philosophy, unlike its predecessors for many a day, is no less real than ideal. It speculates and experiments; and, though the speculation is ill-directed, and the experiments are not sufficiently combined, we see the dawning of a new era in the attempt now making to unite what should never have been disjoined.

In the rapid process of enlightenment two men are to be distinguished, whose names have a direct bearing on our subject. The mould into which all speculation during the last thirty years has been cast, is the work of Hegel and Goethe, and wears upon it the impress of their great and artistic genius. No two men could be less alike, to judge by what showed outwardly; no two, as it seems, could have given such aid to the enterprise they had at heart. We have all enjoyed our laugh atthe in comprehensible philosopher of Berlin, at his wild assertions and utterly grotesque defacing of axioms old as the world; and every one remembers the date when no answer beyond a note of exclamation was appended to the quotations made from him. This, of course, was the pardonable ignorance of common men; any system, clothed in such questionable shape as his, would have met with a like reception. His teaching is more ravelled and perplexed in manner, than all the subtlety of Scotus or all the barbarous Latin of the Nominalists could have made it. But Hegel was a deep thinker and enjoyed the gift of intuition, though some fairy had denied him the use of speech. His mistakes, not indeed on all points, but in certain fundamental theses, are the mistakes of a speculative understanding, and may be paralleled with the overpowering imaginations of those Oriental mystics to whom we owe Buddhism. He so far perfected the science of method, and sketched the lines of his encyclopædia in such strict accord with his principles, that, his first propositions agreed to, there is no choice but to close with his method and his doctrines. In him the heterodox philosophy reached its consumma-

tion; and those who had been pleased with its separate elements, found themselves compelled to take the whole. That whole was, at first sight, unsubstantial and dreamy, a play of dialectics in the mind of genius gone mad: but Hegel had pointed out a way back to the world of men, and shrewd observers predicted that Idealism would evoke its contrary, and strengthen the philosophy of sense. The saying of Hegel himself, that men ought not to dispute about the object, since the phenomena are nothing but that object, "the painted scenes are the reality," preluded the return of, not the method, to be sure, but many of the assertions, of eighteenth century teaching. That a group of phenomena make up a substance, or that substance is the phenomena *as* they are grouped; this will be intelligible in the system of Hegel, no less than in the system of Locke. Under all such sentences, there lies indeed the feeling of infinite identity, which Locke could scarcely conceive, much less worship; still, in every Pantheistic system, confusion of the higher and lower is inevitable. The ambiguity of the word Thought—since the time of Descartes—allows a man to uphold the Hegelian evolution, and to pursue it through its fatal course of affirmation, negation, and the final synthesis, whilst taking the whole of experience to be nothing but the changing forms of matter as expressed in the terms of a more or less perfect sense. Free observant science, therefore, possessed of every material appliance as an instrument of search, and the world of things visible and invisible within easy compass, now, to its great surprise, was reconciled with the axioms of a recondite and hitherto fruitless speculation. From that time we hear little or nothing of the air-drawn pictures that belong to the earlier days of German literature. Speculation, having reached its utmost limit, has been in part relinquished, and the application of its principles to the various departments of life and morals has issued in the present triumph of Hegelianism.

But the prophet of the nineteenth century is Goethe; in him the age found a voice. Dante has drawn the life of mediæval Christendom into a point of light in his divine song: Shakespere is the culmination of the heroism and high noble thought of many generations of Catholic England: such a greatness, too, belongs to the mind that alone has known how to combine and illuminate the ten thousand elements of our own wide-spread experience. To him the countless materials were no hindrance: they were the condition—so piercing and intuitive was his intellect, so faultless, as though it were of crystal, his imagination—of the very highest beauty and the subtlest order. He then, to whom the tranquil forms of sculpture became a model for his own creations, though he breathed the modern life into that long past beauty, grew persuaded of the fresh truth that dawned upon his contemporaries, and threw around it the halo of his steady light. So it is, alas!

the lesson taught in all the lyric prose and verse, in the abundant flowing style, and unembarrassed conversation of this polished gentleman, did but contain, though in a superlative perfection, maxims which hitherto had escaped the world's notice because of their uncouth vesture. No one, as Strauss remarks, unless he has been strange to the course of modern education, but has felt the influence of Goethe, and learned to think in his way. Here was a man who understood the times, and whilst careless of what went on around him, was busied with a chronicle and reflection of the spirit of the age. He made no pretence of teaching, yet those who have a right to speak tell us there is a profound philosophy in Wilhelm Meister, in Faust, in the Dichtung and Wahrheit. He would have been impatient of Hegel and the speculative school, although to him, no less than to Hegel, are due the form and the attractiveness of the newest philosophy. In truth, the many imperceptible causes that decide the aspect of things for a generation or an epoch were then at work, and minds of every rank and genius were holding communion with each other.

The doctrine they believed, like every other false philosophy, was made up of a truth and a fallacy. That truth is the reality of a physical universe, the reality of the indefinite expanse of things as they come into contact with sense and understanding. It was, to quote once more the phrase of an earlier time, " the starry heavens above," which they beheld and reached upwards to, as to their God. Side by side with this undeniable truth came the ever recurring fallacy, that behind or beyond the physical universe there is no reality. Some call this pantheism, others atheism; to us the name is of slightest consequence. What we know is, that for the infinite, these men mistook the finite, and brought the spiritual down to the level of matter. They were so conscious of earth and sky and sea, so deeply impressed with the life that slept or woke above and beneath, so captivated, as Wisdom tells us of their forefathers, " by the beauty of the creature," that to take a bolder flight seemed impossible. Men of quiet disposition, as they went to and fro, were surprised or bewildered at the enthusiasm, unknown to their own times and manners, with which mother Nature, the Great Reality, the Eternal Silences were invoked by the rising stars in literature and the physical sciences. It seemed to be mere rhapsody: yet we venture to say that, for this once, enthusiasm was partly in the right. A man who does not see can hardly criticise one who has eyes. For a long time the universe had been a mere background to the genteel comedy in which cultivated society took part. The Revolution came; science, in its modern sense, mapped out the world, conquered its secret elements, left nothing untouched or unexplored, and men,

at last, returned to the aboriginal fear and wonder which are recorded in the Vedas and the Homeric poems. We are long past the day of myths of the storm and the rain, myths of dawn and sunset, but science records the changes in the heavens, and speaks in a language that impresses the intellect still more than the fancy. The wide universe, instinct with life, harmonious with the beauty of a subtle and apparently unbroken order, fruitful too with consequence beyond the day-star and the frame of things itself (for something is eternal, were it only silence) ; all this majesty, vastness, and terrible unfathomed mystery, was so borne in upon this generation, that, instead of glorying in man's wisdom, they drew back and fell on their faces, they sought a refuge from the living yet unintelligent reality as it enclosed them on every side. Those who have read Hegel, or his commentators, will remember how strangely he describes the Vision of Being in the first moment of its dawn, how he lavishes words, and heaps together attributes, and after all, confesses that the object is beyond words. Strauss, in the name of modern philosophy, lays down as self-evident propositions, gained by a mere comparison of terms, that the universe is one, infinite, eternal, and is ever like itself and absolute. This he conceives to be the Buddhist and even the Stoic view of the world ; nor, probably, is he far out in thinking so. There is a well-known passage in the second book of Cicero's *De Naturâ Deorum*, in which we are told, "nihil omnium rerum esse melius mundo, nihil præstabilius, nihil pulchrius, nec solum nihil esse, sed ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius posse." Like expressions are to be met with in other works by the same author, in the *Tusculans*, *De Finibus*, and the *Republic:* so also in various places of Seneca and the later philosophers who followed, in whole or in part, the Stoic opinions. The opening of Pliny's second book of Natural History anticipates Strauss, as though it were a prophecy. It is right to hold, he says, that the universe, which the celestial sphere does but enclose, is a deity, eternal, immense, unborn, or uncreated, and destined never to pass away. To seek what is outside of this, is not the work of man, whose mind, in such an inquiry, does not even reach a conjecture of the truth. So then the world is all in all, nay, is itself *the all*, finite indeed, but as though infinite ; embracing all things in itself, the work of nature, yet not differing from nature ; so extensive that the mind cannot take it in, nor any measurement exhaust its greatness. But gods, in the proper sense of the word, there are none : and the whole mythology of the people is only an interpretation of nature.

However, it is to little purpose, one may observe, to liken the old and the new philosophies in this manner. There is a gulf not to be passed over between the calm half-supercilious investigation

of Stoics or Epicureans, and the passionate sense of mystery by which our own times are agitated. We should be tempted to say that the Christian temper, conversant with eternal thoughts and an unspeakable future, has bestowed a superior insight even into things natural, and has invested the world around us with a fresh light "that never was on land or sea"; a man, who has fallen from Christianity, still bears within him something of that high contemplative sense to which the mysterious and the infinite are not altogether unknown. Science is eager to confess that light, colour, magnetism, the pulsations of air, the combination of atoms, the grouping of forces in crystals and the strata of past ages, the transmission of forces vital and inorganic, that all these somehow elude search at the last, and not seldom appear a contradiction to the reason. And then the revelation hourly gathers light, of how much is near us, lying on the surface of things and yet impervious to sight and touch; the applications moreover of a single principle grow so complex and bewildering, or again meet us so unexpectedly, that the material seems to be, like a spirit, whole and entire everywhere. It is not to be wondered at, since all this is true and falls under every day's experience, that men, not trained to a practical religious life, are thrown out of the natural course, and wander into a region where the bearings are strange, and the issues of speculation uncertain. Whatever they have gained from the Christianity which they cannot help breathing, is applied, not to the correction, but to the adornment of their favourite theories; just as a poet, if he be a great genius and unhappily led wrong, will lavish his gifts and his melody on unworthy themes. Paganism, on the contrary, had not learned the noblest idea of God, and at best, could frame an imperfect hymn to the universal soul.

Nor is the modern Idea to be judged by its affinities with Buddhism, however startling and undeniable they may be. The same speculation admits of a thousand renderings, and, what is more, is acted upon, and moulded into a system by the circumstances of age, civilization, and social manners, among which it takes its rise. Present the world of to-day with the classic Stoicism, and you have achieved nothing—you are an antiquarian, not a statesman or a leader of the people. Teach in like manner the whole cycle of that strange oriental doctrine, of which we now hear from some as the rival of Christianity, and you incur the fate of a dreamer—the age turns away in scornful contempt. It is the revolt against established creeds that gives form, and colour, and practical influence to the theory of Hegel and his compeers. Buddhism agrees with the moderns in considering this visible universe as the only reality, and as neither beginning nor ending ever; it is further consistent with Hegel in alternately declaring that nothing

is, and that the sensible is somehow objective. But note how widely different are the conclusions from identical premises. The Eastern withdraws himself into contemplation, subdues every movement of passion, and longs vehemently for one only consummation, that the semblance of life, which he has, may be taken from him, and pain may cease with annihilation. The Western cannot learn this hopeless asceticism ; he believes that the cycle of things is an evolution from mere potentiality to some large perfection ; he worships progress, and looks out for the means of advancing society and mankind in its onward path. He does not esteem life to be evil, though he must admit pain and disappointment to be the common lot, and therefore his lot also. "The remedy for all wrong," says Strauss, "is unceasing labour." And in this he echoes the spirit of the age—a spirit, not of the finer sort, but base-born and earthy.

The law of progress is not, at first, connected with that sacred fear, that trembling in the presence of the universe, which we have called the basis of the modern Idea. We need a middle term ; and are furnished with it by the distinction, first indicated, it would seem, in the pages of Kant, between the world absolute, and the world relative. The world absolute is the sum of necessary laws, and all their manifestations, in whatsoever fashion. It is the all, to which belong properties and predicates the most various ; nay, to it must be referred all predicates, though they mutually deny each other. The great universe (which is really the objective Idea of the Pantheists) must be at the same time, one and many, inner and outer, matter and spirit, or, if Christian language is to be admitted, God and Creation. These are only different sides or aspects of the unnameable, which is itself beyond "the reaches of our soul." It is, then, not only the phenomena, but the abiding law, according to which they come into being, and after a season disappear. But the world, in relative sense, is any group of such phenomena as exist at one time, and is, therefore, limited and fleeting. In a yet stricter sense, it is the sun and planets, with their mutual relations and influences. The universe is an infinite complexity of lesser worlds, which pass through all the stages of growth and decay. There was a time when neither Earth, nor Sun, nor Fixed Star had any existence; there never was a time when the possibility of such things was not. Hence it may be said, with Kant, that the universe is a phœnix, which does indeed burn upon the funeral pyre, but only to receive thereby a newer and a fresher life ; all the parts live and die in succession ; the whole never dies. A system, in the course of ages, exhausts all the multiplicity of which it was capable, puts forth its perfections, so ripens, and so at length comes to its grave, which is none the less "the womb of all things." So vast is the universe, that a galaxy of stars may be as

the blossoming of a season, ready to be shaken off in the first wind; and so we are brought, by a descending process, to the la wof evolution in each part, and notably, in the part which most concerns us; we are able to take up the history of our earth, and trace it through physical changes, right on till it dictates the vicissitudes of mankind, the building up of society, and the teachings of morality. Without the idea of an *Ens in potentiâ*, which expands from within, and contains in itself infinite possibilities, the law of development can have no force against Christianity; once allow Hegel to speak, and Darwin becomes a master of the age. With Darwinism, in its proper place, resting on the foundations which German speculation has got in readiness, the whole scheme of religion, in its hitherto received significance, dwindles into a phase of imperfect civilization.

The two elements of progress, according to Strauss, may be expressed in the words "Kreislauf und Wechsel"; the infinite and immovable whole is ever, in some one of its parts, going through a cycle of change, until the highest perfection has been reached. For this author does not think there is a progress without end anywhere: although, strangely enough, he makes out the law of development to rest upon an infinitesimal advance in an infinite time. This, perhaps, is one of the gaps which he confesses may still not have been filled up in the modern theory. So again, he accepts pretty nearly the hypothesis of Laplace as to the formation of the sun and the planets, whilst other philosophers are not disposed to set much store by it. However, these are incidental differences: writers of every shade have come to admit the law of evolution both in physics and morals; and no other is so frequently called upon to explain the tangled phenomena, whether of geology in the material world, or history and politics in the world of men. To a Christian, no less than to Hegel, the world is a scheme, carried through successive parts to a final term; and divine truth itself is declared to be "first the seed, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." But without dwelling on the restrictions necessary in the use of such a doctrine, we must point out two fundamental ideas which, in the modern theory, are wholly wanting. The man who believes in God will admit development and progress, if it be simply the unfolding and making explicit of what was contained in germ from the beginning, and if it be the operation of a divine intelligence and will. In other words, the development allowed by a Theist, is either a dispensation from God, on the grand principle of S. Dionysius and S. Thomas, that divine things must be received humanly, since "Quidquid recipitur, secundum modum recipientis recipitur"; or it is an outshadowing in time of the eternal, an imitation that endeavours by its multiplicity, by its

πολυμέρειαν καὶ πολυτροπίαν,* to make more perfect representation of the incomprehensible. But the intelligent is the personal, and the personal, in its highest perfection, is God; nay, adds Strauss, the conception of the absolute lends itself easily to the doctrines of natural theology. But in nature, according to the moderns, the sum of laws and the sum of phenomena come to the same thing: the personal being whom man cannot help imagining, when he looks abroad, is only a reflex of man himself, just as the traces of design which seem to lie open to us when we reason about the system of the world, are fancies of our own, and must be discarded by the philosopher. Everything is as though it were the offspring of a mind, yet there is no such mind. This is a bold antithesis to the time-honoured and well-established doctrine that "where there is order, there also mind must be." We question whether any part of the modern lines of defence could be more easily assaulted and broken through; to say nothing of the Kantian fallacy which lies hidden in this assumption, viz. that man *cannot* argue from himself to the objective world. It is a comfort to think that, at last, in spite of the very great subtlety we have to combat, there is a matter short and easy to decide, by which the whole theory must stand or fall. As chance cannot produce a regular succession of events, so neither can there be subordination of part to part, without a mind to which the means, and the end, and their mutual relations, were known ere they came to be. This is by the way; our task is not to argue, but to make an exposition.

Even when a guiding intelligence has been thrust on one side, there is a gulf not easily overpassed; or rather a number of chasms, each wider than the other. How from unshapen matter arrive at the exquisite balance of force, as we perceive it in the crystals? The atomic theory is not an explanation, only a stubborn refusal to inquire. Still, suppose order to have arisen out of chaos; how does the inorganic produce the organic?—how does the principle of vegetation, whatever be its nature, bring forth, out of itself, the animal soul? Matter, in this theory has become immaterial, and, still more wonderful, has even so far increased its powers as to have reached the topmost perfection, and been transformed into spirit. Is there any explanation of this, plausible enough for the scientific world to receive, specious enough to be tricked out in poetic beauty and expounded in lectures for the million? What genius will do us this good turn? Well, we suppose Mr. Charles Darwin has achieved the crowning deliverance of embarrassed science. He it is who gives rest to the wearied head of German philosophy, and changing men into the lower forms has allowed them a pleasant time of it.

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* Cf. Hebr. i. ab init.

> O Melibœe, Deus nobis hæc otia fecit ;
> Namque erit ille mihi semper Deus ; illius aram
> Sæpe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus.
> Ille meas errare boves, ut cernis, et ipsum
> Ludere quæ vellem, calamo permisit agresti.

We are not here concerned with what this or that holder of Darwinism thinks, but with the logical sequence of ideas. It is nothing but this that gives to harmless pigeon-fancying, and the recreations of a country gentleman, their absorbing and world-wide interest. Change one species into another, and you have come upon the philosopher's stone, not now to transmute all things into gold, but that you may for ever confound quantity and quality, and resolve morals, history, politics, religion itself, into the undesigned concurrence of mere floating weeds, the atoms (if atoms they are) of some primal matter. Darwin is at the beginning of a great induction, which, by the logic of facts, is to drive Christianity out of the field. Not much has been done ; the protoplastic theory has to fight its way amid resolute opponents, who deny every inference from experience that Mr. Huxley would fain deduce : it will take many a weary battle before the world in general has changed its point of view, and come to believe that the laws of justice, love, and humanity are of so base an origin. But, waiving this consideration, we will suppose the full Darwinian speculation to be proved, and reckon up, with Strauss, its applications in the sphere of history. The physical world culminates in man : to the Hegelian as to the Christian, man is king of the visible creation, and takes up into himself the good qualities, the perfections, and, to some extent, the aims of the lower creatures : but he does much more. Human nature, the nature of the first man (however he came to be), has within it the elements of law and order as we see them in the ascending series of the Family, the State, and the Church. The difference of contention between Theist and atheist lies here ; that, if man be sprung from the earth, if he be nothing else than, to speak according to Strauss, "an incarnation of the brute," all the seeming nobility of his life is utterly quenched, and he remains, to the end of the chapter, such as fate made him at the beginning : his rhetoric and passionate glow of speech only serve to disguise and extenuate "the thing most brutish" that he is. But the reader would be more impressed, could he go through the pages of Strauss, as, line upon line and precept upon precept, they lay bare, with the authority of a teacher, what was man's first estate, and what the successive steps by which he came hither.

The beginning is like a poem of Lucretius. The unconscious, working without an aim, but producing what shows as if it were the work of design, moved onward, by fatal instinct, from age to

age, till the more perfect organisms rose out of the "battle for existence"; and then, by further selection and joining of best with best, that one of the ape races was evolved from which man, with the endowment of speech and reason, derives his origin. The first men (who wandered over the earth, or found shelter in caves by the sea and in mountain-sides, at an immemorial time beyond the Mosaic records), were nothing like so cultivated as the tribes of savages now to be met with; they had no religion, nor morality; they were cannibals, and had a community of wives. It was not till after many ages that these customs changed; experience, and the survival of the fittest, brought about some higher form of society—speech enabled the young race to gather the fruit of mutual thought and observation; then, at last, the rule of utility got to be established. The earliest dawn of civilization enjoyed, it would seem, a very large insight into Benthamism, and reasoned closely (though by instinct) on the benefits of what was afterwards called universal benevolence. Marriage was instituted, and even monogamy began to find favour. As culture advanced, religion grew up also; and the process was very similar to that which Comte and the Positivists have made so famous. However, Strauss here agrees with Schleiermacher, that the essential part of religion is a sense of dependence, and makes this the keystone of his theory. To complete it, he quotes the dictum of Feuerbach, that the origin of religion is Wish or Desire. Join these together, and contemplate the savage under the influence of them, defenceless in his canoe or his cave-dwelling, against the wild, unrelenting nature above and around him;—he cannot appease its wrath nor propitiate its favour; but he would fain comfort himself with an illusion, and he begins to conceive of the cloud and the rain, the thunderbolt and the hailstorm which ruins his harvest, as though they were persons, living and understanding like himself. It would be interesting to compare with this the study of religion contained in Browning's "Caliban upon Setebos." The leading thought seems identical. But Strauss multiplies his Calibans till they have peopled the world, and concludes that their rude Polytheism was the first religion. After this, Comte would have pointed out Monotheism as the final stage, by the philosophic reflection that unity is more economical than plurality, and quite as reasonable. Not so Strauss: Polytheism goes on its own way, till some line of royal poets—a Hesiod, a Homer, an Æschylus—have cast round it the freshness and majesty of their own high thoughts: Monotheism has a different origin. It is the religion of a horde, and is the projection into space and the heaven above them, of their feeling of unity and loneliness, as they go to and fro in the wilderness. It is, therefore, the invention of such races as the Jewish, the Arabian, and the Tartar, and these are inferior, in point of civilization, to

the Aryan races of Greece and India. And as the religion of Olympus lost the grossness of its early forms, so Judaism, in course of ages, more and more refined the idea of a national deity with which it set out. At length, if we may believe Strauss, the personal God of Israel was fused with the Absolute, not of the Greek myths, but of the Greek philosophy, and the result was the God of Christianity. Thus has a speculation, which started from the void inane, come into collision, on historic ground, and in the most practical way, with ideas and beliefs that, since the beginning of the world, have ruled the populations of East and West.

Hereupon should follow an exposition of the theory, by which Christian teaching and Christian history are made the natural and inevitable sequence, strange as it may appear, of the influences at work when Our Lord came amongst men. Morals, as Carlyle somewhere has it, are but "mores"; and since custom and utility are the ultimate explanation and sanction of right and wrong, we must look upon the axiomatic truths and wise sayings of the ancients as terse formulæ, embodying much experience, or, since we ought to use scientific language, expressing the sum of various inductions. This, and no other, is the account Strauss has to give of the Ten Commandments, and of that notable outcome of the mind reasoning rightly, the Ethics of Aristotle. "Thou shalt not kill" means, that an immense number of cases have shown the manifest utility of not taking away our neighbour's life, whilst an equally decisive experience predicts evil consequences to those who shall neglect the lesson of past ages. It would be easy to say "Risum teneatis"; but, calmly and simply, does this view bear the least likeness to what every man knows? A theory should explain facts, not change them into their opposites. Experience, then, had led to the acceptance of morality both among the Semitic and the Aryan races; the philosophic thought of God was rapidly filtering through the lower strata of the population; and Alexandria was bringing the two master-literatures of Israel and Hellas into close contact. This was the origin of Christianity.

What follows we cannot bring ourselves to transcribe; neither does it seem needful to pursue the odious task of recording blasphemies, which are only the dreadful conclusions of a dreadful first principle. Strauss has been at great pains to set the Life and Person of our ever-blessed and eternal Lord in the light of modern ideas. The method which explains that genius is the efflorescence of a necessary and fatal evolution, does not spare the majesty of the Incarnate Word; He, too, must be no more than a Teacher, of whom such things may be said as are lawful, when we endeavour to range and classify the great men of the earth; He, too, must belong to the age and circumstances, in the midst of which He deigned to pass through the cities of Judæa, and teach in the streets of

Jerusalem. It is not necessary to say more on this head; but there are some remarks in place, and, were they to be omitted, our estimate of modern thought would lose in clearness, and would help us very little in our attempt to realize the character of the times.

It has long since been observed that one main difference between pantheism and belief in God is this, that the former explains away persons, making them simply an instance (and not properly a concrete one), of some law or assemblage of laws, whilst Theism founds the Ideal in the Real, and Law in a Lawgiver. "Of Law," says Hooker in the well-known passage, "there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God," and therefore "her voice is the harmony of the world." The True, the Good, the Beautiful have their source in the essences of things created; yes, but not their primal source. Beyond the categories of time and space, of substance and accident,—beyond the attributes of Being as it is found in matter and spirit,—is the One, the Unchangeable, of whom all our speech can be uttered only in an eminent, an ineffable significance. And whilst order, grace, beauty, conformity to law and decree, flow forth from Him, and are in the Universe because He made all things, He Himself is not an Abstraction, nor an Idea, nor a Law, but a living personal Being, three Persons in the Unity of an undivided substance. Take away the notion of personality from God, and there remains no ground for hope or prayer, for love or desire. The world is suddenly a blank, or a painted scene, with none to act in it.

Now this has been the conviction of all who have lifted up their voices in prayer and thanksgiving; it is the keynote of those unapproachable communings with "the High and Holy One who inhabits Eternity," which have made the Book of Psalms the finest commentary we know upon the human heart; and it is the kernel of Christianity. We preach Christ, the Second Person of the most Holy Trinity, as He appeared in the Flesh. Jesus our Lord is the type of all justice; and His every act is the formula, the summing-up, of some Divine principle, is the realization of a moral idea; He is Justice itself, and the pattern of Perfection. But the prevailing opinion would take His morality without Him, and, judging according to the light within (which is darkened), would break up a living form into detached pieces, hoping still that they might live. To do this is nothing else than to dissolve Christianity, and by degrading it to the level of a school, or a philosophy, to make it an element, and not the essential element, in some polity and civilization of the future. This is the whole enterprise of modern science, as embodied in the speculation of Hegel, Strauss, Moleschott, Feuerbach, and their imitators, or disciples, in France and England. They recognize that

unity of the Christian Idea, which Protestantism and Rationalism have failed to grasp or appreciate; they see the dependence of Christendom upon Christ, and, somehow or other, have learned from S. Paul that the Church is the fulness of Christ and His Body. But since it is plain that the future must overtop the present excellence, they desire to find some chemical by which to separate this unity into its parts, and so to preserve what will assimilate with their new synthesis, as to reject every particle of mere refuse and antiquated dross. For instance:

Christian civilization has ever been noted for a characteristic way of acting, and is, in fact, the realization of Christ in all the walks of life, in the society of man, and in his energizings, of whatsoever kind. It implies a world beyond the grave; it takes for granted the soul's immortality, and, considering riches, honours, learning, genius, and all other gifts below, to have a relation as means to an end not yet reached, nor to be attained in the flesh, it subordinates the present to the future. Asceticism, self-denial, purity, obedience, poverty,—all these things are lawful and praiseworthy, since they bring a man into likeness with his model. Man, by painful effort, and by the exercise of free-will, clothes himself with the sorrows and the virtues of Christ upon earth, that hereafter he may be crowned with Christ, in the kingdom of everlasting peace, the final state of humanity made like unto God. This is what every child learns in the Catechism, and it contains the postulates and definitions of a practical science of life. But if so, it clashes with the unmistakable principles of our own day.

For modern philosophy cannot believe in the future life of anything that man calls his own; nay, it would accept, as Strauss puts it, the words of Tertullian, "Quod non est corpus, nihil est," were it suffered to interpret them in their obvious sense. If the grave closes all, then man has only such happiness to seek as he may find in this life, and his whole cunning must be directed to lessening pain and heaping up pleasure. In fact, he is but a highly-organized brute, with refined appetites, and a more subtle apprehension of means and ends. We do not chide the brutes for being led by their desires, and neither must we chide man. Free-will, as we are insolently told, has long been put aside as an anomaly by every philosopher of note; and, though man has some sort of control over circumstances, he is what the hereditary transmission of moral and physical qualities has made him. He is acted upon by training, temperament, climate, the spirit of the age, and cannot take himself in hand, or master the elements of his nature as he would like. Let him learn to be content; to conform him-

self and his views to the great universe; let him grow up in harmony with facts; and whether he take the Stoic or the Kantian morality, he will have acted wisely. Prayer is out of the question in a system where the law never alters and free-will is unknown; good works are useful in this life or nowhere; to restrain the appetites may be of service in the long run, to mortify them is a crime. Celibacy, poverty, contemplation, are, of their essence, immoral; and though they belong to the Christianity of Christ, they are vestiges of Oriental indolence, and have come to their present honour by an unwarrantable recoil from the indulgences of the Pagan religions. All that rests upon these worn-out virtues must pass away with the civilization of which they are the tokens; and restrictions, hitherto thought sacred, are to disappear before the march of the new ideas. Into this part of the subject we prefer not to enter: readers of Mill's autobiography will not have forgotten his expression of gratitude to Saint Simon and the Socialists, for their outspoken opinions on this momentous topic.

When, at last, the epic has been made prose, turned into the stuff of daily life, will there be anything to compensate for the visions man once believed in? Heaven is gone, immortality is gone, our Father, Who guided us by His Providence, is to be no more. Can we find solace anywhere, now that the infinite horizon draws in, and we are condemned to the present life? Who can brighten the clouds, as they take a sober colouring from man's mortality? This is not the question of a philosopher, rejoicing in his strength, and conscious (if we can allow the hypocrisy) that his only ambition is to possess the truth: it is a heartfelt cry, rising up from the people who have to earn their daily bread, and are not provided with the amenities of life. There is to be a religion of the future, since the human race can never forget its dependence; but there can be no cultus where sacrifice, prayer, invocation, mystery, are wanting to justify or support it. Hitherto, no people have lived without religion. Man has looked up to heaven, and thought it the dwelling-place of omnipotent love. Art, literature, and political life have found their inspiration and encouragement in religion, and the greatest empire the world has ever seen, was ruled over by a city which its citizens called "Templum et fanum deorum omnium." Religion, true or false, has ruled for thousands of years. Is the new philosophy also a religion?

To these anxious queries, felt rather than expressed, and demanding an answer right down in the heart of the people, we have not yet discovered any luminous or satisfactory replies. The future is to be the reign of Industry, carried through upon principles of Induction; it is to study and consecrate the classic

models of Art, whether Music or Painting; it is to assiduously cultivate the universal Literature in which all names and nations are destined to take a share. The educated have, therefore, some resource; their imagination—for this is the religious faculty—will be quieted or exalted by the contemplation of what the greatest men, their brethren in every generation, have been able to copy from all-creating nature. Future civilization will sum up all its work and nobility in the famous motto, "Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst." Every day will bring its earnest task to be fulfilled; every evening will furnish some occasion for joy and enlargement of heart, in the drama, the opera in its highest forms, and the mutual interchange of social courtesies. This looks fair, in fair weather; but still we are the result of circumstances, and the many are not yet capable of these airy, unsubstantial pleasures, of the fancy and the intellect. There is another view, not the modern, though far removed from Christianity; it is the Buddhist pessimism, which, in a hundred passages, Schopenhauer has expressed with appalling energy. Strauss himself is affected by it, and, at the very end, is struck by a painful misgiving that all is not right. The passage in which he expresses the result of all his labours is justified, he thinks, because it is true; but to our mind no more saddening words are to be found in the range of our present literature. We will translate what he has written, or rather (for it is of small consequence to preserve the wording), we will express its sense, as closely as possible to the original. He says pretty nearly this: "To take away belief in a Divine Providence, is to incur one of the most serious and striking losses which are involved in a rejection of Christian and ecclesiastical teaching. Here is the system of things, one huge machine, with its jagged iron wheels ever going round amid a roaring din, its heavy hammers and giant-pistons which ring out a deafening crash as they come down; and man, without help or protection, looks upon himself, and discovers that he is placed in the centre of all the wild commotion; he has no security, not for a single moment, that the wheels, in some unforeseen movement, may not lay hold of him and tear him asunder,—that some fall of a hammer may not smash him to atoms in its descent. The sensation of being abandoned and at the mercy of something else, something which no prayer can reach, is terrible indeed. But what does it avail to delude ourselves? *Our* wishes cannot alter the constitution of things, and reason demonstrates that the world is a machine like this. Our comfort must be in the thought of eternal necessity and unbroken order; for the inevitable course of fate is not merely reasonable, it is Reason itself. Then again we may grow used

to the spectacle of such a world, and take refuge in ourselves, in that inner life which is our own, and is still pleasant." Yes, but with the last faint gleam of day all is over, and "every yesterday hath lighted fools the way to dusky death." This is not a description of God's world, in which we are to strive with hope; it is an account of the abyss and its doomed inhabitants,—of their trembling, their unavailing supplication, their final despair. Surely it is the most complete answer we could have imagined, a refutation, in every sense, of the philosophy from which the everliving God is excluded. What does not satisfy the cravings of our human nature for help and grace and illumination, will never be the religion of mankind. The soul is naturally Christian, and knows its Father's voice.

We may sum up this discussion very briefly. There is a speculation whose roots are in the Life itself, whose development and application bring peace to the conscience, and abiding light, the calmness of a full assurance, to the intellect that is ruled by it. That divine law centres in the Person of Christ, the Son of the Father, but also the First-born of every creature, and the only way to our resting-place. It is humility always, penance and sorrow for sin in a race upon which are the trammels of bondage, hope in the promise of entire redemption, love, full of fear but not cast down, before the Lord of heaven and earth. It goes on from age to age, gathering up into its bosom all that mankind has to offer of beauty, holiness, chastened joy, goodness in thought and deed. No height is above it, no depth below it; no man, till death comes, is wholly shut out from its influence. It is the light of God's countenance, just, and merciful, and compassionate, as He turns to earth and views its children with desire of their love. It is the pledge of a triumph yet to be, when God's grace and man's free will shall have built up the heavenly Sion, and the Vision of Peace shall be for ever.

And there is a speculation, whose roots are in death, and its going forth into the world as the shadow of death. Its accompaniment is pride in the will, doubt in the understanding, rebellion in every lower appetite. Its object is the visible universe, but severed from the Mind and the Hands by which all things were fashioned. Its instrument is a short-sighted logic, arguing swiftly from distorted principles, and making more of difficulties than of evident truths. Its scope is to bring man down from all his hopes and longings, if they tend upwards, and to cheat him with the phantom of an earthly paradise. Its strength is in the passions of lust, the hunger after forbidden knowledge, the weariness of divine things which sets in upon a course of in-

dulgence, whether in avarice, luxury, or concupiscence. Its success would be the ruin of the firmest civilization; its predominance cannot but mean the reign of lawlessness; its defeat, which every human heart must long for, would be the kingdom of the Word Incarnate, fulfilled and manifest in the heart within, in our homes and our cities, in the empires that overspread the earth, in Christendom gathering the human race into one, and recognized as the One Fold of the One Shepherd.

But whilst we are alive to the gravity of our present situation, and especially to the strength and the wonderful success of the Revolution, we are none the less impelled to believe in some divine interference, which may restore Christendom to its normal peace and unity. The very greatness of the evil, and our own inability to cope with it, are motives for a rational expectation, in those at least who admit the teachings of the Church, that all these complications are working towards the accomplishment of the will of Providence. It may be fanatical to predict the manner or the details of the Christian Restoration, and yet be no more than the dictate of enlightened sense to look for the realization of our better hopes. The facts and principles upon which we have touched warrant as much as this, and of those facts and principles no sane man can entertain a doubt. It may even be alleged that the promoters of the Revolution themselves, whether they are to be called Liberals, Conservatives, or Communists, are in a state of alarm about the future, and do not reckon on keeping a permanent hold on the hearts and affections of the people. They are fond of crying out that, at last, the reign of progress has begun, and that their arduous struggle towards the light has brought them into the upper world and to the pleasant sunshine. But for how long? we may inquire. What does their ill-conditioned fear of "Ultramontanes" point to? Can they ignore the Church and its influence upon the millions of faithful throughout the world? Events taking place before our eyes are a sufficient answer, and of a sort that cannot be mistaken. No question that a struggle for supremacy is going on between the old and the new faith: no question either that the partisans of the latter have strong misgivings, which even now may serve to paralyze their efforts. They may possibly believe in their cause: they do not believe in its success.

It is at this turning point in European history that a solemn Act of the Roman Pontiff and the Universal Church is to be recorded as the promise of happier times. We have no wish to indulge our fancy, or to allow enthusiasm to warp our

calmer judgment; and yet we fear that however we soften our expressions, they will seem far-fetched and unreal to those who do not hold with us. That, perhaps, we cannot help. It may be permitted us to see, in the consecration of the Church to the Sacred Heart,* an act of the Sovereign Ruler of all things; and to gather from the circumstances attending it, some part of the designs of our merciful Lord, even though we run the risk of being called mystical and obscure. What interposition of heaven has been rightly taken by men? Must it not always be the case that they will hit beside the mark, when an event does not square with their previous anticipations and beliefs? They can make no account of what, if admitted, would ruin their whole philosophy; nor are we asking them to accept our view. All we say is this, that Catholics who argue from revealed premises will look upon this great occurrence as due, in some special way, to the care and oversight which our Lord has always exercised towards His Church. Seeing the importance of such an act in itself, they will judge that it must be important, too, as happening at this time: and further inspection will lead them to see how admirably it meets the wants and wishes of the servants of God, and to what an extent it satisfies even the desires of those who have wandered from the ways of peace. They will discover the tokens of God's presence in the unnoticed origin, the secret yet steady growth, the final acceptance on all hands, of a devotion, which brings the Incarnation into the centre of our hearts, and Christ into the midst of modern life. We will try to make our meaning clearer.

There is always a close correspondence between things that are antagonistic. It is their very nature to abolish, to negative, to destroy each other. And that is why philosophers tell us that "the knowledge of contraries is one." Since one is the undoing of the other, they must, in some way, be possessed of opposite qualities; and it is not too much to say, that things which so act upon each other, were meant to do so, and that this is the appointment of the Author of Nature. Now the like may be observed in the order of history; and similar conclusions will be drawn by every one who does not believe in the theory of Epicurus. The God of History is not Chance

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* This does not seem too strong an expression. These are the Cardinal Prefect's words, "Many requests from Bishops throughout the world and almost innumerable petitions from the faithful, come daily to our Most Holy Lord Pius IX., earnestly praying that he would be pleased to *consecrate the whole world* to the Most Sacred Heart. Wherefore His Holiness, *in order to fulfil in some way these pious desires*, has approved of the accompanying prayer, &c. &c.

or Fate, but the All-seeing, the All-merciful, the All-powerful, to whom free-will itself is no obstacle, even when it is freest. But as the Incarnation was the unravelling of the ancient superstitions, and the answer to the longings of a hundred generations of men, so some further manifestation of that unfathomable mystery will give the solution of our own tangled problems. The Faith once delivered to the Saints cannot be altered, cannot be added to, cannot be increased; but it shines in many lights and adapts itself to any change of circumstances. The light has been broadening and deepening as the objects brought before it have grown more numerous; and if the structure of society be elaborate, multiplied, and complex, what wonder that the truth of God, which knows in itself no vicissitude, should be found equal to the finest wrought machinery of our nineteenth century! As axioms contain a science, so the Faith contains, and contained from the first, an answer to the questions of the day. But that answer is no barren speculation, it is the exhibition to the world of Christ Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith, yesterday, and to-day, and the same for ever. Ever since the foundation of the Church, the Sacred Heart was worshipped with divine worship, and contemplated with supernatural love: in these latter days it has been yet more dwelt upon, more constantly invoked, more lovingly studied. The object of our love and worship is ever the same, Christ, the Son of God made flesh; we have only learned to think of Him in this special way as showing us His divine Heart, the living, beating Heart of flesh that suffered and was pierced for us, in which was treasured up the love by which He did all these things, by which He sought us, and saved us, and brought us into His fold.

Devotion to the Sacred Heart draws us to the meditation of a love which is as human as the love a father bears to his children, or a friend to his friend. It sets before us all the pathos and tenderness of such a love, its unwearied service, its generous self-forgetfulness, its constancy under trials and hardships, its enduring fervour even when it meets with ingratitude and neglect. The world has not tired yet—it never will tire—of hearing how love has overcome death, and has triumphed in its own sufferings. Let the story be told ever so brokenly, men will always stay to listen, and will find a consolation in the thought of love itself, though the issue is not triumph, but tragedy and ruin. Much more will the heart be constrained and conquered, as the pages of Holy Writ are unfolded, and the love that endured the passage through our mortal life, that beat in the heart of a child and a boy, that bore with outrage, homelessness, and sorrow, that wept at the grave of Lazarus,

that drew to itself the affcetion of the poor, the lonely, the desolate, that endured at last to die in an agony of grief and pain, is shown to men for their comfort and imitation. The love itself is so winning, who will not be touched by it? But now, in this is the mystery: that human heart is also the heart of God, that patient love is a love of infinite price, those tears are the tears of our Maker come in the flesh. The story is no longer a beautiful imagination; it is the revelation of the All-perfect, the account divinely-inspired of what He did and wrought amongst men for their salvation; it is the free gift of God which He will never take back from His creatures. Finite and infinite, visible and invisible, knowledge and love, all are united in One person, and that One is like to ourselves, clothed in such flesh as ours, speaking our speech, smiling with our smile, loving with a Heart that throbs like our own. This, we say, is Christ in modern life, and in this is the seasonableness of devotion to the Sacred Heart.

It is the answer to that cry which goes up continually to heaven,—not from the men of knowledge and science, nor from those who are intoxicated with their great power,—but from the many to whom life is a burden, to whom no morning brings joy, no evening offers a prospect of repose. Our Father in heaven is thinking of the millions of poor and ignorant, upon whom the weight of modern civilization presses so heavily. They cannot live without hope, and hope is banished from the reigning philosophy. Man is not immortal, there is no God, and no heaven: and as for those who have not been illumined by science, they are beasts of the field, or, as the pagans said, living chattels; and they should be well content to contribute, by their own immolation, to the spread of knowledge and the advance of mankind. But the Christian Faith tells every man that he is destined to live for ever, that his lot is in the hands of a just, patient, merciful God, that he has a Friend near him to whom he can always speak, and that his whole life may be spent, if he will only choose, under the shelter of God's wings and in the shadow of the Sacred Heart. Hope, joy, strength, encouragement,—all these are contained in the thought of that human love divine.

Distrust of Providence is the sin of our times; and not merely a chance crime, but the outcome of the philosophy which we have described at such length. It implies that the lower life is all we can look for; and experience tells us that, on this side of the grave, most men are filled with hopes which never come to be realized. The pioneers of the new civilization bid us be resigned: but resignation, if it can discover no outlet from its present captivity, is only despair. Now the invitation

to love and imitate the Heart of God is a pledge to us that our mourning shall be turned into joy, and itself holds within it an untold consolation. We know how men work when under the influence of love. Once let the poor and the troubled gain a glimpse of that prospect of future happiness, let them be assured that it is a Divine Friend and Master Who is laying the cross upon them, and they will bear their lot contentedly. The heroic resignation, which is often demanded of the poor, cannot exist, unless the love of Jesus is there to justify it with heavenly motives, and to soothe them with the thought that He has gone into lower depths of sorrow than they can comprehend. The joys of life are mainly anticipations and hopes. What more pleasant than to be able to look forward and count upon a day, when our very trials shall be the cause of abundant and lasting thankfulness! We need go no further into the subject; for it is a matter of experience, and any one can test it for himself, that those who live up to their religion,—that is, those who live in the company of their Lord and Master,—are full of trust and hope, whatever may befall them. And once again, the life of practical religion, at this moment, is and must be derived from devotion to the Sacred Heart. It is essential, therefore, if the multitudes of men are not to lose their belief in Providence, that they should realize in this clear and unmistakable manner the love of God in the Incarnation. Certainly, there are few who would deny that a universal daily homage to the Heart of our Lord is an admirable means to bringing about the end of divisions, and to appeasing the dull monotony under which the greater part of mankind now pass an embittered existence.

We are convinced, too, that cultivated society would be changed to an unheard-of degree for the better, if the like devotion could make its way among the wealthy and educated classes. The calamity of these classes is that knowledge and riches are pursued on their own account, or for the sake of the position they help men to gain. That is the signification of the common lament, that the age of chivalry is gone. Chivalry meant devotion to a person; it meant an heroic service, freely accorded to the merits of one who was recognized as the mirror of beauty and virtue. It was the denial of selfishness, inspiring a generous courage which could draw back from no sacrifice, and thought itself repaid by being allowed to express itself so nobly. How stirring would the times become once more, if men were labouring for this great unseen Monarch, and, instead of referring all to their own advantage, were intent upon heightening the glory, and, so far as in them lay, upon extending the influence of Him Whom they believe to be the sum of all

perfection, and the type of every good thing! Science at the present day is bold, presumptuous, rash,—is without modesty and vitiated by envy and pride; each man works for himself, and thinks he is capable of weighing the universe in his balance, and wresting her secrets, by main force, from nature. How much better to study at the feet of a Master Whose knowledge is infinite, Who is none else than the Word of God, and the ultimate reason of whatsoever is contained in heaven and earth! How men would gain in humility of the intellect, would learn to set the natural below the supernatural, and to confess bravely and constantly that God's wisdom is greater than man's power of penetration! Science then would be fruitful, not only in poor mechanical results, but in the truths which enrich life and which fill us with a spirit of adoration, whilst they lift us out of our petty cares into a region of sublime contemplation. We should have begun, at last, to bring our scattered investigations into the unity which has so long been sought for, and hitherto in vain.

The reflections that suggest themselves are too numerous and intricate to be properly dealt with here; and we must leave them to our readers who are interested in such a train of thought. We will content ourselves with one word more, designed to show what would be the legitimate result of such a devotion to our Lord, in society, whether high or low, and what it is that lies at the foundation of the present system of things. S. Paul has described the time of the great revolt as an age of coldness, of want of love, of heartless concentration in self. These are the characteristics of the nineteenth century. Charity has grown cold, because the hearts of men are given to the perishable creature, and there is enthusiasm everywhere except in the service of God. What is the consequence? The light of reason, as implanted in man, and increasing or diminishing with the whole being to which it belongs, that light, we say, has grown very dim; it has been all but put out by the strength and violence of the passions, or by the exclusive use of the logical faculty. Instead of trying to enlarge their apprehensions of the primary ideas, many have been content to argue from their first weak and vague conceptions, and to admit nothing that could not be fully explained by them. Had they been desirous to know about God, or the soul within them, or the life hereafter, they would have been more accurate and painstaking in their researches, they would not have seized the first opportunity to throw the whole subject aside, and declare that it was a part of the unknowable. Love would have given them light, an ardent desire for the truth would have led them, step by step, to the conclusion, that nothing can be true,

except what confirms the anticipations of the soul. They would have learned that truth is a great treasure, and is not bestowed upon the careless, the haughty, or the self-sufficient; and they would have been patient in difficulties, in the hope of sometime meeting with the amplest reward. The same disposition would have put them on their guard against insidious half-truths, would have kept them from accepting statements which ran counter to the universal sense of mankind and the imperative necessities of the heart. They would have caught, in fine, some glimpse of the momentous doctrine, that our moral being is a help, to an extent which we can hardly surmise, towards the speedy attainment and permanent possession of the truths that most nearly concern us.

But, it may be asked, to what purpose is all this reiterated? If modern society were filled with the love of Jesus Christ, no doubt it would put off its present opinions and manners; but it is not so filled, and how can the consecration of the Church affect that society which is lying in the outer darkness? This is the point to which we were coming. No one would be so foolish as to expect an immediate change in society, consequent on the solemn act in which we have just been engaged. The world can only be drawn to the Sacred Heart by first entering the Church; we do not quarrel with such an assertion, nor are we sanguine as to any visible or wide-spread conversion amongst the adherents of modern views. Our notion is of a different sort.

The Church of Christ is the only messenger of salvation from God, and her credentials are always legible to such as care to inquire into them. But there may come a crisis of unbelief; and then the light, set up by our Lord in the world, must be yet more bright and shining, if men are to gain its testimony and to be convinced of its existence. Devotion to the Sacred Heart seems to be intended to fill the Church with light and fervour, to deliver us from the careless indifference out of which so many of our troubles have sprung, and to kindle into a living faith the languid and sometimes conventional belief of the higher and middle classes. The spirit of independent thought, the greed after hasty and unlawful gain, the desire to forget that mortification is a necessity whilst we are in the flesh, all these evils have been raging outside the Church, and have at last infected many within it. On all hands, indeed, it is confessed, that the multitude of believers are of one heart and one mind; the original notes of unity in doctrine and communion in charity are still the heritage of the Apostolic Church; and yet, we have to deplore the stubbornness of those who wish to be at once Liberals and Catholics, we have to lament that many

among the laity are given over to frivolity, and are hardly to be distinguished from ordinary men of the world. These are sad admissions to have to make, nor are we at all willing to go beyond the mark; we are only referring to what has been repeatedly stated of Italy and France, and is true, to some extent, even of England. The Holy Father himself has declared, again and again, that the present state of things is a chastisement on Christendom, for its coldness in the service of our Lord. What we need is an earnest, enthusiastic loyalty, a steadfastness in word and deed, which refuses to truckle with the principles and opinions of those who call themselves enlightened. It is the half-heartedness of Catholics which paralyzes the action of the Church; for, as we have learned by recent experience, there is no task so disagreeable and difficult as that of dealing with the so-called moderate and Liberal party. The Roman Pontiff has told us all, that Liberal Catholics are, not indeed in intention but in effect, the worst enemies of the Church. Their prudence is of the world, worldly; and their policy, if traced to its legitimate principles, would involve the slavery of the spiritual to the temporal, would secularize every branch of education, and leave us only the name of Christians. We do not speak of the Revolution; we are pointing to those who think a compromise between the Church and modern society not only feasible, but right and becoming. How very alien they are to the mind of the Episcopate and its Supreme Head, may be gathered from the terms in which the Prayer of Consecration has been drawn up. We should imagine that there is absolutely no parallel instance, where the Pope and the whole Church have solemnly prayed against the spirit of disloyalty; and we think no course could be better for a Catholic than to meditate on the force of those words. We are bidden to ask for the conversion of such as are indifferent to the interests of the Church; then we are to go on and pray for the enlightenment of others, Catholics indeed, but obstinate in clinging to their own opinions, who refuse to submit to the decisions of the Holy See, and cherish sentiments at variance with her teaching. This is a most remarkable enumeration; too remarkable to be lightly passed over. It seems to be the case, unhappily, that some have grown tired of loyalty, and take all that comes from the Holy See in a spirit of cold criticism, not resisting, yet not furthering the wishes of the Vicar of our Lord. They look on, make remarks, indulge themselves in sarcasm, and have their highest interest fixed on anything rather than the public universal good of mankind. If once they could learn to be lovers of the Sacred Heart, they would find all this to disappear; they would

no longer be a prey to chagrin or bitterness. And the unity resulting thence would infuse a new vigour into the whole Church, and would allow of that persevering and successful effort by which modern society, in spite of all its imposing defences and its manifold prejudices, would be won over to the kingdom of Christ, and a reconciliation be at last effected. The Holy See cannot put forth its strength in overcoming the world, because so many influential Catholics think it no shame or scandal to be out of sympathy with the Holy See. Were things otherwise, then we might say, in the grand words of a Roman Pontiff, "Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus imperat, Christus ab omni malo populum suum defendat."

This is how the world must be converted once more, and the great apostasy of the nations brought to a desirable end. The truth, as it is made known to us in Jesus, must reconcile dissensions, root out abuses, restore the perfect form of Christian science, consecrate the researches and laborious toil which without love would remain fruitless. It has pleased God to prolong the years of our Holy Father to the time of the Universal Jubilee, in which we commemorate the revelations made, two centuries ago, to Blessed Margaret Mary. It has pleased Him also to put this design into the heart of His Vicar, and to fill the whole Church with an expectation of triumph through the Sacred Heart. We hail the act of consecration as a token that God is with us still; as an opening in the clouds to show us the serene sky beyond them; and as the beginning, if we are not unfaithful to our engagements, of a period of growth and expansion in the Church, which must bring with it finally the solution of all problems, social and religious, by the divine light of faith, and the prevailing efforts of love.

It seems proper to append here the translation of the Prayer of Consecration, italicising the words to which we have above referred. After what has been said, our readers will judge for themselves how far we have rightly interpreted its meaning :—

ACT OF CONSECRATION.

O JESUS, my Redeemer and my God! notwithstanding the great love which Thou bearest to mankind, for whose redemption Thou hast shed all Thy Precious Blood, Thou art yet so little loved by them in return; nay, so much offended and outraged, by blasphemies especially and by profanation of holy days. Oh! that I could make some reparation to Thy Divine Heart; that I could make amends for the great ingratitude and unmindfulness which Thou dost meet with from the greater part of men! Would that I could prove to Thee how much I desire to love and honour this

adorable and most loving Heart in the sight of all mankind, and more and more to increase Thy glory! Would that I could obtain the conversion of sinners; and that I could arouse from their indifference so many others who although they belong to Thy Church, have not the interests of Thy glory at heart, nor of the Church that is Thy Spouse! *Would that I could obtain also for those Catholics who still prove themselves to be such by many outward works of charity, but who through obstinacy in their own opinions, refuse to submit to the decisions of the Holy See, or cherish sentiments at variance with its teaching, should see their errors, and become persuaded that he who heareth not the Church in all things heareth not God who is with her!*

To obtain these holy desires; to obtain moreover the triumph and lasting peace of this Thy Immaculate Spouse, the welfare and prosperity of Thy Vicar upon earth, and the fulfilment of his holy intentions; that the whole Clergy may become more and more sanctified and acceptable to Thee; for the many other intentions which Thou hast, O my Jesus, in conformity with Thy Divine will, and which may help in any way for the conversion of sinners and for the sanctification of the just, so that we may all one day obtain the eternal salvation of our souls; and lastly because I know that it will be pleasing to Thy most sweet Heart, O my Jesus,—prostrate at Thy feet, in the presence of Most Holy Mary and of all the Heavenly Court, I solemnly acknowledge that by every title of justice and gratitude I belong wholly and solely to Thee my Redeemer Jesus Christ, the only source of every good that I have in soul and body: and joining in the intention of the Sovereign Pontiff, I consecrate myself and all that I have to this Most Sacred Heart, which alone I intend to love and to serve with all my soul, with all my heart, and with all my strength, making Thy will to be mine, and uniting to Thy desires all the desires that I have.

And, as a public sign of this my consecration, I declare to Thyself, O my God, that I wish in future, in honour of the same Sacred Heart, to keep according to the rules of Holy Church the Feasts of Obligation, and to procure their observance from all persons over whom I have influence and authority.

Uniting therefore in Thy Sacred Heart all these holy desires and resolutions, with which Thy grace inspires me, I trust to be able to give to It compensation for the great injuries It receives from the ungrateful children of men; and to find for my own soul, and for the souls of all my neighbours, happiness for me and for them all in this life and in the next. Amen.

Art. II.—A REPLY TO TWO CRITICISMS.—CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY, AND NECESSARY TRUTH.

Letter on "the Sovereignty in Modern States"; Dublin Review *for April,* 1875 *: signed, "W. P."*

Letter on "Necessary Truth"; "Tablet" for March 24th, 1875 *: signed "A. P. B."*

THESE two letters have no other connection with each other, except only that they are respectively criticisms of two theories which we have recently advocated. The two subjects, to which they respectively refer, differ from each other as widely in importance as in kind. The doctrine which we have expressed on civil sovereignty, is one which we believe to be true, and which at all events is not to our mind at all shaken by our correspondent's remarks: but we should abandon it without the slightest wrench or conflict of mind, if the weight of adverse argument appeared to predominate; nor can we see that any vitally momentous interests are compromised, whether it be decided one way or the other. On the other hand the doctrine which we have been maintaining in successive articles on necessary truth, is one which (in our humble view) is exceeded by no other as regards its immeasurable importance; insomuch that we do not see how the Existence of God could be argumentatively established at all, if the doctrine in question were surrendered. We should add however, that "A. P. B." does not surrender it; nor in fact can we see that his difference from us on his main point is other than purely verbal. And now, without further preface, let us proceed to deal with these respective criticisms. As "W. P.'s" letter appeared in our own pages, we suppose it ought to have precedence.

I.—Civil Sovereignty.

There is one retractation and apology, which is due from us at the outset. When we wrote our article of last October, we had no notion that any educated thinker doubted, as a matter of scientific theory, the correctness of Joseph De Maistre's statement (quoted by us in p. 273, note), that the Legislature, and not the Monarch acting individually, possesses in England sovereign authority. We find however in various ways that, not only our present correspondent, but other persons also of education and intelligence, dissent from De Maistre on this matter. Had

we known as much last October, we should not have used such unseemly language as we did. We should not have declared that "it would be talking like a baby to say in serious argument that the Monarch is sovereign"; or that to press such "popular language" "in argument, would be to build science on a pun." We must apologize for so speaking (though it was quite unintentionally) concerning persons, who deserve every possible respect at our hands. Nevertheless, as a matter of argument, we venture still to think that their opinion is quite destitute of foundation.

Those who regard the Monarch as de jure sovereign over England, must of course inclusively regard her as *de facto* sovereign; because otherwise they would hold, that no allegiance is due from Englishmen to the country's *existing* Constitution and Laws. We must of necessity therefore credit "W. P." with this doctrine, though (as we shall presently point out) some of his language sounds differently; because we know well, that no man living more distinctly recognizes than he does, the obligation which exists in conscience of loyalty to the existing English Government. But the doctrine that the English Monarch is de facto sovereign, is to our mind so simply perplexing and bewildering, that we hardly know how to answer it; we hardly know what premisses we can adduce, more self-evident than is the conclusion for which we would adduce them. And then further, when we have managed to put together the various premisses on which we rely, they all seem so undeniable, that we cannot even guess which are those that our correspondent would repudiate. Our best course therefore will be simply to set them down in skeleton outline. He will thus be able to put his finger on those to which he demurs; and we shall be most happy to insert a second letter from him—though it extended to much greater length than the first—expressing his reasons for the demur. Here then follow our premisses, expressed with the greatest attainable brevity.

I. The primary end, for which civil government was instituted, and on account of which it is most absolutely and imperatively necessary, is the protection of person and property; or (as theologians often call it) the preservation of exterior peace. Civil government has also various secondary ends,* the consideration of which would still further strengthen our argument; but there is no need of introducing such consideration for our present purpose.

II. Any country which possesses no civil ruler must be a

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* We treated the "intrinsic end of civil government" in our number for July, 1863. We would refer especially to our remarks in pp. 221-224.

prey to savage desolation and degrading anarchy, such as that described by Bossuet in the very powerful passage which we quoted in Oct. 1874 (pp. 269, 270). On the other hand, in any country in which there is *more than one* authority claiming (and admitted by a considerable proportion of the community) to be the supreme acting civil ruler,* civil war is ipso facto raging. In every peaceful and civilized country therefore, there is one and one only universally recognized supreme civil ruler. Now the "supreme civil ruler" is simply synonymous with the "civil sovereign." And for convenience' sake we will use the phrase "ruler" or "sovereign," and speak of "he" and "him," whether the sovereignty be vested in one individual, or in some organically constituted body.†

III. The de facto sovereign then is he, who decides supremely

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* We introduce the word "acting," in order to exclude such cases as those of the Count de Chambord; who claims indeed to be de jure sovereign, but does not attempt to act on his claim.

† In fuller elucidation of our meaning, we may be allowed to quote some extracts from our article on the End of Civil Government :—

"If men are to rise from a state of barbarism and civil conflict, if they are to live together even in tolerable ease and tranquillity, it is absolutely necessary that in any given place there shall be some one authority, having so much physical power at its command as to render permanent resistance hopeless. If there be no one authority thus transcendent in physical power,—the peace and tranquillity of society will be disturbed to the very foundation by each man's conflict with his neighbours. On the other hand, if there be more than one body thus pre-eminent in strength,—peace and tranquillity will be hardly less disturbed by the conflict of such bodies with each other. Civil war, if prolonged for any length of time, is nothing less than an inchoate relapse into anarchy; and the same thing may truly be said of protracted invasion, so far as regards the particular region occupied by invaders.

"A state of barbarism and anarchy is so manifestly and so very deeply injurious to men's best and highest interests, that no other proof is needed to show the Divine origin and sanction of civil government.

"This one authority, having so much physical power at its command as to render permanent resistance hopeless, is, of course, the civil government. It may be vested absolutely in one prince, or a number of persons may have an integral share in its administration. In the latter case there must be certain defined relations between those who have a share in it, according to which the supreme authority is exercised; and the sum of all these various relations is the political constitution.

"A man, or body of men, who should give no protection to person or property, would have no claim to the very title of civil government. A civil government which should in some small degree preserve exterior peace, but should not have sufficient power to do so with reasonable completeness, is, as it were, an infant and immature government. A civil government which has power sufficient for that purpose but fails to use it, is ipso facto tyrannical and unjust. The preservation of exterior peace appertains characteristically to the civil government; appertains in a certain special sense, in which no other duties can possibly appertain to it."

and in the last resort, what measures shall be taken by the community for protection of person and property.

IV. As Bellarmine points out ("De Laicis," c. x.), the sovereign might imaginably preserve exterior peace, without the enactment of laws; viz. by interfering, himself or by his deputies, on each particular occasion of disturbance, according to his or their arbitrary judgment. But such a mode of government would be no less degrading and calamitous to the people, than anarchy itself. As a matter of fact therefore, every sovereign governs through a code of laws; which are accepted by the people as issuing from him, and which they recognize in him the power to change at his will.

V. The protection of person and of property is a very large duty, requiring for its performance a legal code of some complication. Let us consider the former item alone. The sovereign must decide (1) by what officials the community shall be protected from violence; (2) by what officials offenders shall be tried; (3) what shall be the rules and forms of trial; (4) with whom shall rest the power of imposing punishment; (5) what shall be the scale of punishment for various offences; (6) by means of what taxes, or how otherwise, these various officials shall be paid; (7) what is to be the constitution of the army and how it is to be paid; (8) what shall be the relation to foreign states; &c. &c. And as regards protection of *property*, a much *more* complicated body of law is necessary, as any one may see on the surface.

VI. He therefore is de facto civil sovereign, who is treated by the community as having supreme power over all these arrangements; or in other words, as having power to enact or repeal laws.

VII. In England, to the Monarch as an individual no power whatever is conceded of enacting and repealing laws; and he cannot therefore be the sovereign.

VIII. The Legislature is ipso facto and by force of terms the Sovereign. In England the Legislature consists of Monarch, Lords, and Commons, acting towards each other in a certain given relation, which is called the Constitution.

IX. The same thing may be put in a somewhat different way. The English Monarch is bound to obey the Law, just as is any other individual Englishman. Our critic admits this; for he admits in effect (p. 533), that the monarch may not rightly do "a single unlawful act." Since therefore the Monarch is subject to the Law, while the Law is subject to the Legislature,—à fortiori the Monarch is subject to the Legislature; and is not therefore sovereign.

To us then it seems an obvious and even elementary matter of fact, that the Sovereign, who at this moment supremely de-

termines how Englishmen's persons and property shall be protected, is the Legislature. And if any one says on the contrary that it is Queen Victoria, we are simply bewildered by such a statement. It is evident to our mind, from our correspondent's language in p. 533, that whereas his theory requires him to hold the latter proposition, facts are too strong for him. He says that "the House of Commons have usurped *practically* [his own italics] the sovereignty"; by which he must mean, that the de facto Sovereign of England is the Legislature, whereof the House of Commons is by far the most powerful element. Surely any other view is paradoxical and repugnant to common sense, in a degree which can hardly be exaggerated.

So much on the de facto English sovereignty; and we now proceed to our second question, which is this:—Does the English de jure sovereignty reside in the same authority, which possesses it de facto? In other words, do Englishmen owe conscientious allegiance to the existing English Laws and Constitution? Of course no one, with whom we are now in controversy, would hesitate in giving at once an affirmative answer to this question; but it is for many reasons important to understand the grounds, on which this affirmative answer reasonably rests. In last October (pp. 264–276) we entered into this question at some length, corroborating our argument throughout by the dicta of Catholic theologians. We must hope that persons interested in the present controversy will refer to those pages, as we cannot do justice to our meaning by any abridgment or analysis. The substance however of our doctrine is this:—

1. The authority of civil government is derived immediately, not from God, but from the people. God has imposed on every people the obligation of submitting to some sovereign; but has left it in each people's hands, to decide at starting who that sovereign shall be. Our correspondent "had thought that some theologians hold the contrary opinion"; viz., that civil sovereigns receive their authority immediately from God. We can only say, that we do not ourselves happen to know of any such theologian; and that (as we pointed out) Bossuet, with all his Bourbonite proclivities, on this head agrees entirely with Suarez.

2. When the sovereign has once been appointed, the people are bound in conscience to pay him and his laws faithful allegiance and obedience, within the legitimate sphere of civil government. Whether there be certain extreme cases of tyranny under which such obligation ceases—this is a question, on which theologians differ, and on which it would have been irrelevant to our purpose to express an opinion.

3. In the event of some people having sinfully resisted and

overthrown their legitimate sovereign, it does not follow (however grave their sin may have been), that he continues for an indefinite period to be their de jure sovereign. We submitted the question to theologians (p. 292, note) what those principles are, which determine how long his de jure sovereignty continues. By consenting to crown Napoleon I., Pius VII. expressed officially his deliberate judgment, that, by that time at all events, Louis XVIII. had lost his right.

4. The ordinary and almost universal means, whereby it may be known whether any given claimant of sovereignty be authorized by the people, is the fact itself of his peaceful possession.

5. Every de facto sovereign therefore is de jure sovereign, except in certain rare cases, viz., where there is an adverse claimant, who has been de jure sovereign; who has been unjustly and sinfully deposed; and who has not yet lost his right. This exception, we need hardly say, has now no application whatever to England.

Whereas then the Legislature — Monarch, Lords, and Commons, acting together in accordance with the Constitution,—is the de facto sovereign of England,—so also it is the de jure sovereign.

Our correspondent does not, so far as we can discover, argue against any part of this reasoning. But he objects to the conclusion itself (p. 532), and his objection is well worthy of careful notice. The mere fact indeed, that (by what is called a constitutional fiction) the title of "sovereign" is given to the Monarch, will not (we think) on consideration be much pressed by him in argument. But the *oath of allegiance* cannot be slurred over. On our critic's showing, Englishmen who accept our theory could not honestly take that oath; or in other words, could not swear "true allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors." We reply however in the first place, that he himself would never dream of taking that oath, except in the very sense which we ascribe to it. If he really swore allegiance to Queen Victoria as being (in the strict scientific sense) sovereign of England, he would pledge himself (if he will allow us, even as an hypothesis, to make so offensive a supposition) to be on occasion a rebel and a traitor. He would swear that he is prepared to obey any ordinance, falling within the legitimate sphere of civil government, which any future English monarch might issue, though that ordinance were not sanctioned by Parliament or even by any constitutional adviser. Of course he has never sworn, nor ever will swear, anything of the kind. What he intends by his oath is, that he will pay allegiance to the English Constitution and Laws; to those Laws

which the Legislature (represented by Queen Victoria) sanctions, and which the Executive (represented by Queen Victoria) carries into action. This is substantially the sense in which every Englishman takes the oath; though various distinguished persons differ more or less from each other, in their precise way of *expressing* that sense. The Bishop of Clifton, e.g., in his Pastoral of last autumn, gave the sanction of his name to a mode of speech, which has been adopted by various able and learned men. He says that an Englishman, in taking the oath of allegiance, enters upon a "bilateral contract" with the Monarch; he promises to pay her due allegiance, if she will govern according to law. Now as to this mode of speech, we say (1) that it is in no respect a more obvious and literal interpretation of the wording of the oath, than is our own; and we say (2) that it is in substance simply identical with our own. I promise obedience to the Queen, only on condition that she govern legally; i. e. only on condition that she obey the Law; i. e. only on condition that she obey the Legislature. If I only promise to obey the Queen so long as she obey the Legislature, it is plain that my paramount civil allegiance is to the Legislature and not to her.

No Englishman in fact ever misunderstands the oath of allegiance which he takes; nor do we at all mean that we regret the constitutional fiction, which places the Monarch before the people as representative of Law. It is but an infinitesimal part of the population, which looks at things scientifically: and those who are not scientifically cultured, are far more impressed by the majesty and sacredness of Law when that law is embodied in their idea of a *person,* than they could be in any other way. In fact we agree on the whole with Mr. Bagehot's interesting Essay on the English Constitution; and we incline to think that any government, which does not abound in constitutional fictions, is shown by that very fact to be an unwise government. But all this is entirely external to the controversy between "W. P." and ourselves.

From what has been said it is easily seen, how profound is the difference between the Catholic doctrine on civil government, and that anti-Catholic theory which (for want of a better name) we will call "Stuartism."* If there were an hereditary

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* This is sometimes called the "divine right," or again the "legitimist" theory: but we indignantly refuse to give it an appellation, which would imply that we are one whit less earnest in upholding the "divine right" of "legitimate" civil sovereignty, than is the extremest Stuartist. What we here call "Stuartism," in our October number we called "hereditism." (See pp. 288-291.) We are not satisfied with either appellation, but cannot at the moment think of a better.

line of monarchs deriving sovereignty immediately from God, it would follow that no concession of the reigning king's could invalidate his successor's right of repudiating such concession. But according to Catholic doctrine (as we set forth last October, p. 275) if some Monarch, hitherto absolute, freely establishes constitutional government, by that very fact he abdicates the sovereignty, vesting it in the new organization which he establishes. From that moment,—to resist the new organization, whether in behalf of this Monarch or any of his successors, is to revolt against the existing sovereign and commit the sin of rebellion.

Now there is a passage in "W. P.'s" letter, which induces us to exhibit the same principle in a somewhat different form. Let it be supposed then that, by a slow, gradual, imperceptible process, the Constitution has been importantly changed; so that those relations which now exist between the various elements of the Legislature, are essentially different from those which existed a hundred years ago. In that case—since the process referred to has proceeded at each moment under the tacit sanction of the sovereign Legislature—we should maintain that it is the Legislature as *now* constituted, which is de jure sovereign; and that such a sovereign body as existed a hundred years ago, has ceased to have rights, as it has indeed ceased to be. This truth is evident also (we think) on another ground, besides that which we have mentioned; because it is the Legislature as *now* constituted which is in peaceful possession, and there is no rival claimant whosoever. Such is our own doctrine. As to our correspondent's, we have seldom seen a more perplexing passage than that which we proceed to cite:—

In the hypothetical case you put of a future king attempting to govern illegally by force, it appears to me that, however wrong he might be, he *could* be no rebel; the king can do no *legal* wrong, though the persons who act illegally by his orders are no doubt responsible. In practice it could not happen; for not only are the taxes, and the purposes to which they are to be employed, in great measure voted annually, so that the machinery of Government could not be carried on unless Parliament were sitting, but not even could military violence be used to enforce payment of illegal imposts, for the Mutiny Act (on which the existence of the army as an organized body is founded) is also voted annually, and renewed from year to year. In fact, the House of Commons have usurped *practically* the sovereignty which strictly speaking they delegate to a body, unknown to the old English Constitution, which is called the Cabinet; and the successive sovereigns have latterly acquiesced in the arrangement: but if ever there arose in England a vigorous king determined to assert his rights, and that from the moment he ascended the throne, he might work a great change without doing a single unlawful act (p. 533).

We must admit at starting, that these remarks oblige us to make one retractation. We hold firmly indeed that the Monarch, like any other individual, is a rebel, if he revolts against the Sovereign placed over him by God. But in October (p. 274) we said further, that the Monarch might justly be punished for his rebellion. "W. P." reminds us of the provision (a very wise one we think) made by the English Law,—that is in other words by the Sovereign Legislature,—that the Monarch is personally exempted from punishment, whatever his offences. It hardly ever happens (we suppose) that a person can be justly punished for an offence, which was not legally punishable when it was committed.

Now however for the rest of the paragraph; and we will begin with one or two minor comments. Surely the House of Commons does not now "practically" possess "the sovereignty"; for again and again the House of Lords throws out its measures. All which can be truly said is, that the House of Commons is by far the most powerful portion of the sovereign body. Still less can we admit that the sovereignty has been delegated to the Cabinet; indeed we do not understand the meaning of such a statement. Nor again can we understand our correspondent's drift, in pointing out that the Cabinet is "a body unknown to the old English Constitution." According to his view, the Constitution has no part in the sovereignty; which latter belongs to the Monarch exclusively. On the other hand according to *our* view, the sovereignty is vested in the Legislature,—not as acting in accordance with some antiquated Constitution,—but in accordance with the Constitution which now exists.

But on the whole passage we ask this broad question. Why is it undesirable that "a future king should attempt to govern illegally by force"? We suppose that the laws, against which the king is supposed to act, are not divine or ecclesiastical, but secular laws. But if he be Sovereign, these laws derive their entire authority from him, and he can repeal them at any moment on his own authority. Nor can we well imagine an occasion on which it would be more reasonable to repeal them, than one on which they impede him in the full exercise of that sovereignty which God has given him. Yet our correspondent's tone is as though secular "laws," which prevent the Sovereign from exercising his rights, had some kind of sacredness, nay were a blessing to the country. In fact the whole drift of the passage, as far as we can make out, is to prove the very thing which we maintain; viz. that the Monarch is not de facto sovereign of England. But if he were de jure sovereign and yet not de facto such, it would follow (as we have already

pointed out) that the existing English government has no de jure claim an the allegiance of Englishmen. And this conclusion certainly would be as monstrous in our correspondent's eyes, as it is in our own.

Here we leave English ground and cross the Channel. And as regards France, we will at once encounter that portion of our correspondent's argument, on which he lays his chief stress. These are his words :—

> You seem to think that the fact of Pius VII. crowning Napoleon I. settles the doubt as to his ever having been legitimate sovereign, and that all good Catholics ought to bow to it as a Papal decision to that effect. I am simply amazed at such an opinion. I thought no theologian, however extreme his views, held that the Pope was infallible in matters of personal conduct and policy (p. 534).

Now we directly *disclaimed* the opinion, that Pius VII. was exercising his prerogative of infallibility in what he did about crowning Napoleon; for we said (p. 291), "we do not see how by any means *short of an ex cathedrâ definition,* the Pope could have more emphatically declared the Emperor's de jure sovereignty." We do not understand, however, how the fact that Pius VII.'s decision was not strictly infallible, tends to show that Louis XVIII.'s conduct (see p. 292, note) was worthy of a "truly loyal Catholic." Suppose there is some property in my possession, of which I know that it is not mine, but am not sure whether it belongs to A. or B. I ask my confessor, and he tells me that beyond doubt it belongs to A. I do not like the decision, and so I consult a whole series of learned and able priests; and they all confirm the opinion, that beyond doubt it belongs to A. Under these circumstances, I hand it over to B. The confessors I have consulted were certainly not infallible, separately or jointly; but (to speak very much below the mark) my conduct would certainly not be accounted that of a truly loyal Catholic. The parallel is obvious. My allegiance is due by God's Law either to M. or N. It is not merely a series of confessors, but "the teacher of all Christians," who deliberately implies a solemn judgment that it belongs to M. This question is one of "morals" pure and simple; and by no means, as "W. P." suggests, one of "policy." Nevertheless I pit my judgment against the Pope's, and pay my allegiance to N. Nay the case is even stronger than as we have stated it; for I am led to do this, precisely through holding that anti-Catholic theory which we have called "Stuartism," against the Church's doctrine. Louis XVIII. did all in his power, that the largest possible number of Catholics should act as we have described. The only change which reflection

enables us to make in our criticism of such conduct is, that we understated the ecclesiastical disloyalty of which he was guilty. At the same time it cannot be necessary (we hope) to add, that we confine our remarks entirely to the external course of action which he pursued. We know nothing whatever of the motives which animated him; and are ready to accept whatever may be urged, as to the amount of invincible prejudice with which he had been imbued by the misfortune of a Gallican and Bourbonite education. For all we know, he may have been as devout as you please in his personal relations to God. But it is important in the interests of religion, that the true character of what he did (if our view be right as to its true character) should be distinctly set forth.

On the other hand, in regard to the response of the Holy See concerning Louis Philippe, we think there is much force in what our critic says; and so far we withdraw our original statement. The Pope's rescript, we admit, did not necessarily imply more, than that there was solid probability in the opinion of those, who regarded Louis Philippe's Legislature as de jure sovereign; and that those therefore who held that opinion, could lawfully take the oath of allegiance. At the same time we may add our own humble judgment, that the responsibility is so grievous of disturbing a de facto government, that no one is justified in resisting it, who is not *certain* that there is a legitimate adverse claimant.

"W. P." thinks (p. 533) it may fairly be urged, "that though Charles X. did wrong, he did not do such grave wrong as to deserve deposition." But we cannot see that he was deposed at all. Our correspondent himself admits it to be very doubtful, whether Charles X. was ever Sovereign; whether the sovereignty had not been vested, throughout his reign, in the Legislature, of which he was only one portion: and this latter of course is the position, which for ourselves we confidently maintain. On this view, the sovereignty had been vested in three distinct parties, co-operating according to the relations expressed in the Charter. But if one of these three parties under such circumstances refuses to co-operate any longer (in such relations) with the other two, surely the sovereignty is ipso facto broken up; and the community re-enters into its right and obligation, of choosing and submitting itself to a fresh sovereign. Charles X. had never been Sovereign; and by his own rebellious act he voluntarily abdicated what share he had possessed in the sovereignty. "W. P." adds indeed, that "the people as a body were not consulted as to their new sovereign." No; but they acquiesced in the peaceful possession of the incoming Government: and this is a no less valid

(while to our mind it is a far more healthy) indication of popular assent, than is a plebiscite.

We observe no other remarks of our correspondent which call for notice; and we will conclude therefore with thanking him for the assistance he has given in fathoming a question, which is of some speculative interest, and has certainly important practical aspects.

II.—Necessary Truth.

The second letter which we named at the head of our article, is the following:

Sir,—As the time fixed by you for the postponement of the discussion on this subject has now elapsed, and Dr. Ward's answer to Mr. Stephen has appeared in the "Contemporary Review," I hope you will allow me to make one or two remarks.

The whole subject is far too wide to be treated in newspaper correspondence, and I propose, therefore, to allude only to a single point of it, which to my mind, imperatively calls for comment.

At page 536 of the current "Contemporary" Dr. Ward says: "No important philosophical service whatever would be done by merely affirming that it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence to effect what is a contradiction in terms. The thesis which I desire to make good is that certain things are outside the sphere of Omnipotence, which are by no means contradictions in terms. In other words, that certain ampliative propositions are cognizable as necessary."

Such an opinion I must needs consider as most dangerous, and that in two different ways. 1st. It is well known to be a principal object with the infidel philosophers of the present day to limit the sphere of Omnipotence. Their intention is manifest, for they very quickly proceed to apply their philosophical theory to religion, arguing that revealed mysteries are impossible even to God. In this case I think it is incumbent on Catholic philosophers to use the greatest precaution in the use of terms, so as not to give even apparent countenance to the idea of there being any possible limitation of the Divine Power. Dr. Ward does not see the necessity of such caution, quite the reverse. It is very well to speak of the sphere of Omnipotence if by "sphere" you mean a universe, but most dangerous when you show that you mean only a limited sphere, by speaking of things "outside" it.

2. It is so universally laid down by Catholic philosophers that Omnipotence has no limits, except what is really not a limitation at all, the impossibility of effecting the agreement of contradictories, that when Dr. Ward says "certain things are outside the sphere of Omnipotence, which are by no means contradictions *in terms*" (the italics are mine) I suppose for certain that he holds that things may be contradictory *in themselves* without being so *in terms*. Now I submit that this is a most dangerous proposition, and for the following reason. Terms are the signs of ideas. Practically they may not in all cases give adequate expression to ideas, but in philosophy, at

all events, it is assumed that they are capable of expressing ideas, and to say that anything is no contradiction in terms is therefore equivalent to saying it is no contradiction in idea. Thus Dr. Ward evidently maintains that a proposition may be contradictory in fact whilst it is not contradictory in idea. *Per accidens*, owing to a defect of intelligence, no doubt this may be true, but Dr. Ward has excluded this exception in two ways: First, by the addition "by no means," i.e. however fully the idea may be expressed, still there will be no contradiction in terms though it exists actually; and, second, more explicitly, a few lines back, where he says (the italics are mine) "there are ampliative propositions; in which the predicate expresses what has *neither explicitly nor implicitly* been expressed by the subject."

Surely then it must follow from such a doctrine that we may entertain ideas in our mind which *are not* contradictory, whilst the objects which they represent *are* contradictory. But what could be conceived more subversive of all certainty? Every single syllogism resting, as all syllogisms do, on the principle of contradiction, would be thus rendered doubtful in its objective value, for whilst the terms are not contradictory their objects might be.

Dr. Ward might certainly reply—"There are many things which God cannot do, not because they are contradictions in terms, but because some other of His attributes forbids Him to do them"; but this is no real difficulty. The question is not what *God* can do, but what His *Omnipotence* can do. As far as *Omnipotence* goes, He has the power of doing a thing which would be unjust. The limitation which prevents Him from doing it is not the limitation of His power, but of His will. And as to things which depend upon His Immutability—for instance, that He cannot make void a prophecy—the impossibility is entirely *à posteriori*, and therefore does not enter into the present question, which is entirely *à priori*. The permanence of the natures which He has given to created things depends upon His creative decrees, and is therefore also *à posteriori*. There is nothing which it would be impossible for Him to make on the ground that there is no *ratio* corresponding to it in the Divine Essence, except things which are contradictory in themselves—that is, of course, nonentities. Otherwise His Essence would be limited. If a non-triangular trilateral be not a contradiction in itself, then *à priori* Omnipotence would make it. "*Omnia quæcumque voluit, fecit.*" These are inspired words, on which our language is modelled. If by the mercy of God we save our souls, at the end of the world we shall see that whatever God did not do was "*quia non voluit*," not "*quia non potuit*," and as we hope to see the matter then, so I maintain we ought to speak of it now.

There is just one other specious objection which might be taken to my argument. It might be urged, "To say, that 'a whale never existed' is not a contradiction in terms, and yet it is a falsehood which Omnipotence could not make to be truth." No doubt it is not *expressly* a contradiction in terms, but it is *implicitly*, for by "a whale" we mean an actual objective living animal of a certain kind which either is known to be, or at least to have been, in existence. Our idea in this case is a copy of the object, and implies the previous existence of the object. So too with the proposition "the Germans did not wage war with France in 1871," although there is no *express* contra-

diction between subject and predicate, there is a clear *implicit* contradiction for by "the Germans" we do not mean some imaginary abstract Germans, but certain individuals, the King, the Crown Prince, Moltke, &c., into the full idea of whom the fact of their having waged war with France in 1870 enters as a component part, just as "Wellington" and "the conqueror of Waterloo" are pure synonyms.

It is extremely painful to me to be thus obliged to write against one for whom I entertain so sincere a respect as for Dr. Ward, and to whom I most readily and gratefully acknowledge the obligations I have incurred through the medium of the DUBLIN REVIEW, but I think all your philosophical readers will admit that the words to which I have called attention ought not to be allowed to pass without comment. I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A. P. B.

We * replied in the "Tablet" as follows:—

SIR,—I have to acknowledge the courtesy with which your correspondent "A. P. B." expresses himself towards me, and of which I am truly sensible.

The question which he raises is undoubtedly one of very great moment, and I should have treated it expressly in a subsequent article of my series. As things are, I will reprint his article in the DUBLIN REVIEW, and make it the occasion of anticipating what I should otherwise have drawn out at a later period. My hands however are so full just now, that I fear I shall not be able to accomplish this before July.

I have already, in many paragraphs of the DUBLIN REVIEW, implied the answer I should give him; nor can I suppose that the difference between us is much more than one of words. In my view, just as in his, "Omnipotence has no limits, except what really is no limitation at all; viz., the impossibility of" creating a "non-ens," an intrinsically repugnant chimera. Moreover, I hold that any proposition, affirming the existence of such a chimera, must lead by necessary consequence to a contradiction in terms. But I think it of great importance for many reasons to insist on the truth, that the number of such propositions is extremely large; including as it does (among many others) the contradictories of all the mathematical theorems which have been or can be demonstrated.

I wish your correspondent had thought of quoting the last words of my article in the "Contemporary," as they bear closely on the question he has raised. "Necessary truths," I say, "are founded on the Nature of God; they are what they are, because He is what He is."—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

W. G. WARD.

At the same time there appeared a letter from another correspondent, signing himself "P. B. A.," which seems to us most able and entirely conclusive in favour of what we had said. It appeared however (as will be seen) from a later letter

* It will be more convenient in the following discussion, to use the editorial "we," as synonymous with "Dr. Ward."

of "A. P. B.," that "P. B. A." had not rightly apprehended the former writer's meaning. For our own part, we had been entirely unable to comprehend *what* "A. P. B." meant; while "P. B. A." understood him in that sense, which alone (to our mind) his words legitimately bear, but which (as it turns out) was not the sense in which he had used them.

The next week "A. P. B." published a brief and courteous reply to ourselves, with a short stricture on "P. B. A." In the same issue of the "Tablet" appeared a valuable letter from Canon Walker, objecting to one or two statements which "A. P. B." had made. We agree, we need hardly say, with every syllable of the philosophical doctrine contained in Canon Walker's letter; and so, on all points but one, does "A. P. B." himself. He wrote therefore a reply to Canon Walker in such a sense; and from that reply we extract one paragraph:—

> There are two classes of things (using the word in a very wide sense so as to include chimeras) which cannot possibly come into existence: viz. (1) those which are absolutely or intrinsically impossible, on account of the incompatibility of the terms; and (2) those of which the production would involve a repugnance to one or more of the Divine Attributes, other than Omnipotence. The former are à priori, the latter à posteriori impossible.

For our own part, as the Canon had evidently not read our "Contemporary" article and misapprehended therefore the exact point at issue, we published the following short letter:—

> Sir,—I have already explained that I cannot pursue in your columns the controversy concerning Necessary Truth, but must reserve for the Dublin Review what further I have to say on the matter. Canon Walker's valuable letter, however—with the entire doctrine of which I need hardly say I am in full accordance—suggests to me, that he and "A. P. B." may come to be at cross purposes in their discussion, so far as I am concerned, unless I add a little further explanation of my meaning.
>
> I do not call any proposition a "contradiction *in terms*," unless it contradicts something which its subject expresses. A contradiction in terms, I should say, may be "explicit"; as "this straight line is not straight," "this square is not square": or it may be "implicit"; as "this straight line is curved," "this square is not quadrilateral."
>
> I will now however instance a different class of propositions. Euclid has proved that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Let me take then the proposition, "this angle, which is in a semicircle, is not a right angle." I should not call this proposition "a contradiction *in terms*," nor do I think that it would commonly be so called. But I should say of it, that it leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction in terms; that as it stands its two terms are in reality mutually exclusive; that it involves a real contradiction; that it affirms the existence of an intrinsically repugnant chimera,

which (to use Canon Walker's admirable expression) is not "within the sphere of Power"; that consequently there is no disparagement of God's Omnipotence, in saying that He cannot create such a chimera.

I cannot fancy that there is any substantial difference among Catholics on this matter; or, that whatever apparent difference there may be, is other than mainly verbal. But, at all events, I trust I have made my own meaning sufficiently clear.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

W. G. Ward.

To this "A. P. B." made the following reply, and the correspondence closed:—

Sir,—Some of your readers must, I think, have been not a little surprised to learn from Dr. Ward himself, that he considers a proposition, of which the "terms are, in reality, mutually exclusive," to be no contradiction in terms. And I should have been much disposed to wonder at his uttering such a paradox, were it not that he has already shown symptoms of an inclination to agree with Kant, who endeavoured ineffectually to make a similar distinction in discussing the principle of contradiction. Kant objected to the principle of contradiction as expressed in the formula "*Idem non potest simul esse et non-esse*," and proposed to substitute for it "*Prædicatum quod rei repugnat illi non convenit.*" He is thus refuted by Balmes ("Fundamental Philosophy," Brownson's Translation, book i., chap. xx.). "The first observation of Kant refers to the word *impossible*, which he considers unnecessarily added, since the apodictic certainty, which we wish to express, should be contained in the proposition itself. Kant's formula of the principle is this, 'a predicate which is opposed to a subject does not belong to it.' What is the meaning of the word *impossible?* 'Possible and impossible absolutely are said in relation to the terms. Possible, because the predicate is not opposed to the subject; impossible, because the predicate is opposed to the subject': says St. Thomas, and with him agree all the schools. Therefore impossibility is the opposition of the predicate to the subject; and to be repugnant is the same thing as to be impossible; and Kant uses the very language which he blames in others." Dr. Ward can surely not attempt to deny that "to be repugnant" is the same thing as "to be contradictory"; but at any rate I will prove it from Tongiorgi. In his explanation of the opposition of propositions (*Logica*, lib. ii., cap. 3, art. 2), he defines opposition as "the mutual repugnance of two propositions, which proceeds from the affirmation and negation *ejusdem de eodem*": and presently declares that there is true opposition between contradictories.

But even Kant uses the words "excluded from" and "opposed to," as synonymous. He says (Balmes, ibid.), "Whatever is *excluded* from the clear and distinct idea of anything, may be denied of it"; on which Balmes remarks, "A predicate which is *opposed* to a subject is the same thing as that which is *excluded* from the idea of anything; 'does not belong to it' is the same as 'may be denied of it.'"

It must, therefore, be abundantly clear that the three words "contradictory," "repugnant," and "mutually exclusive," are simply synonymous.

If in trying to prove a thing impossible I should say, "It is a contradiction in terms, *because* the terms are mutually exclusive," I should only be ridiculed for tautology. Nevertheless Dr. Ward's whole theory does really depend, as he implies in his last letter, upon his establishing a difference between "a contradiction in terms" and "terms mutually exclusive of one another"; and it may fairly be argued that the theory is *in extremis* when its existence has to be staked upon such a distinction without a difference.

Dr. Ward's difficulty, however, is capable of easy explanation. Implicit contradictions may be distinguished as those in which the contradiction is either *mediately* or *immediately* evident. Both are equally contradictions in terms; for this reason, that the question of mediateness depends entirely on the intellectual capacity of the observer. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, in treating of propositions *per se notæ*, which are the positive form, or the reverse of contradictions in terms. He says (1, 2, q. 94, art. 2) that such a proposition as "the whole is greater than its part" is *per se nota* to the mass of mankind; but this "*Angelus non est circumscriptivè in loco*" is not *manifestum rudibus.* In the same way he would say (supposing for the moment that Euclid is a true analytical science*) that the proposition "The angle in a semicircle is a right angle" is *per se nota* to a mathematician, to whom it is immediately evident; but not to a schoolboy, to whom it is but mediately evident. Nevertheless, it is in itself *per se nota*, and its denial is a contradiction in terms; since it is only *per accidens* that the schoolboy cannot see the contradiction immediately, the fault being in him, and not in the proposition.

For my own part I was quite content to suspend the discussion of this

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* This episodical parenthesis refers to a theory, which the writer had expressed in his brief reply to "B. P. A."; viz. that geometrical truths are not really cognized by mankind as necessary, because philosophers cannot prove "the permanent and the universal symmetry of extension." Of course our divergence from him on this head is not regarded by him as a reason for accounting our philosophy dangerous to religion; because notoriously the whole body of Catholic writers oppose him on the subject, and teach exactly what we hold. Thus S. Thomas ("Summa," c. i. q. 82, a. 1),—speaking of the proposition that "the three angles of a triangle taken together equal two right angles,"—says that the "necessity" of this proposition is "natural and absolute," and arises "from a principle intrinsic" to itself. Since however such is our critic's doctrine on geometrical truths, it will be better in what follows to take our chief illustrations from arithmetic; as his reasons for doubting the necessity of geometrical truths have no bearing on arithmetical.

In saying that his doctrine on geometrical truths differs from the unanimous teaching of Catholic philosophers, we are not for a moment intending any invidious appeal to authority. On ground so purely philosophical, he has of course every right to hold that opinion which to him may seem conformable with reason; and if at any time he may be led to put forth in detail the arguments which have led him to his conclusion, we will give them every attention. We must express regret however, that in his reply to "B. P. A.," he has thought fit to call the opposite doctrine "a schoolboy notion." Is not such a term objectionable, as applied to the avowed doctrine of S. Thomas?

subject until July, and I have expressly limited myself in this letter to answering that of Dr. Ward in your last issue. But if I am attacked in turn by a third person, Dr. Ward cannot expect me to remain silent.—I am, dear sir, yours sincerely, A. P. B.

April 13.

Far from at all complaining, we are very glad that our critic published his last letter; for it was not till we read that letter, that we had any definite idea what was his controversial position. In all our experience we have met with none more singular. It may be summed up as follows.

I. The particular point, on which he thinks our position "most dangerous" to religion, is what we had said on the sphere of Omnipotence. On this matter we do not differ from him by so much as a hair's breadth.

II. The only question on which he has really argued against us is, whether a certain phrase, which occurred once incidentally in our "Contemporary" article, have or have not been used by us in its legitimate and proper sense.

III. Nevertheless this difference of terminology between him and ourselves suffices, in his opinion, to prove, that our "theory"—precisely identical though it be with his own—"is in extremis."

Let us take all this in detail. And first, what is his own doctrine, on the mode of harmonizing with Divine Omnipotence the existence of necessary truths? It may be expressed as follows; and, for the reason given in a preceding note, we take our illustration from arithmetic instead of geometry. It is a necessary truth, that $356 \times 184 = 65{,}504$; or, in other words, it is outside the sphere of God's Omnipotence to effect, that 356×184 shall be either more or less than 65,504. Is God's Omnipotence then compromised? God Himself forbid! Take such a proposition for instance as the following: "64,514 objects are here arranged in 184 rows, each row containing exactly 356." Such a proposition involves a contradiction; its terms are mutually incompatible; it affirms the existence of a "non-ens," of an intrinsically repugnant chimæra. Omnipotence is the power of doing whatever falls within the *sphere* of power.* But to create a non-ens does *not* fall within the sphere of power; it would involve foolishness in God even to contemplate the idea of creating, † what is intrinsically incapable of existence.

Those who have read "A. P. B.'s" letters with any care,

* This last admirable expression is Canon Walker's.

† This very true and forcible way of putting the matter occurs in "A. P. B.'s" reply to Canon Walker.

will see that we have stated his doctrine with perfect accuracy; and we now proceed to observe, that we agree with it in every single particular. What then is the point at issue between him and ourselves? A question of pure terminology. Let us revert to the proposition already cited, that "64,514 objects are here arranged in 184 rows, each row containing exactly 356." For facility of reference, we will call this "Proposition Z." We say, as our critic says, that Proposition Z is intrinsically repugnant; that it involves a contradiction; that its terms are mutually exclusive and incompatible: but we do not call it—whereas he does call it—"a contradiction in terms." His whole criticism comes to this:—that our theory on necessary truth is "most dangerous," because we use the phrase "contradiction in terms" in a different sense, from that which he regards as the more appropriate. Never surely was so much good zeal thrown away on so trivial an offence. But when he proceeds to say that this terminology of ours proves our "theory" to be "in extremis"—that theory all the time being precisely identical with his own,—we can no more understand his meaning, than if he wrote in Sanscrit.

As regards this trivial verbal question, we have been in the habit of thinking that Catholic theologians and philosophers use the terminology we have adopted. We have been in the habit of thinking that, according to Catholic usage, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is not applied to *all* intrinsically repugnant propositions, but only to one particular *class* of them; to those namely, which may be expressed in the form "A is not A," or (in other words) which directly contradict something expressed in the subject. We cannot better illustrate what we mean, than by the geometrical propositions mentioned in our second letter. (1.) The proposition that "this straight line is curved"—directly, though but implicitly, contradicts what is expressed in the subject; because the word "curved" precisely means "not straight." (2) The proposition that "this straight line is not straight"—directly and explicitly contradicts what is expressed in the subject. Either of these two propositions may be put into the form "A is not A"; and we call either of them a "contradiction in terms" implicit or explicit. But (3) of a different kind is the proposition, that "this angle which is in a semicircle is an acute angle." This latter proposition (according to the ordinary Catholic opinion that geometrical truths are necessary) is intrinsically repugnant; its terms are mutually exclusive and incompatible: but it does not directly contradict (either explicitly or implicitly) anything expressed in the subject, and we do not therefore call it a "contradiction in terms." Yet on the other hand it

leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction in terms; because, since I know by reason that every angle in a semicircle is a right angle, the proposition before us would land me in the conclusion, that "this right angle is not a right angle." In regard then to the proposition that "this angle which is in a semicircle is an acute angle"—we have been in the habit of thinking, that it would not be called by Catholic writers a "contradiction in terms." They would say of such a proposition, that "it *involves* a contradiction," because it leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction in terms; but they would not say, we think, that it is itself a contradiction in terms.

Our critic however has evidently paid more attention than we have to this portion of terminology; and we are quite prepared for the possibility, that our view of Catholic verbal usage may be a mistaken one. He has the issue then entirely in his own hands. Let him adduce a sufficient catena of passages to make it pretty clear, that Catholics ordinarily call *all* intrinsically repugnant propositions by the name of "contradictions in terms." If he were to succeed in this, he would succeed in altering our future "modus loquendi." We should think it inexpedient to use the phrase, in a sense different from that of approved Catholic writers; and we should therefore set to work to invent some other phrase for our own purpose.

Still, as *at present* advised, we should *not* apply the phrase "contradiction in terms" to the proposition that "this angle in a semicircle is an acute angle"; or again to the arithmetical proposition, which we have called Proposition Z. It may be asked however, whether we should call these propositions "contradictions," even without adding "in terms." And again it may be asked, whether we should call the terms of such a proposition "mutually contradictory." As at present advised, we should *not* so express ourselves in either case. We should not call two terms "mutually contradictory," unless in one term were expressed the *contradictory* of something expressed in the other term. But on all these trivial matters of language, we speak entirely under correction of such Catholic authorities, as "A. P. B." may adduce against us.

Nothing now remains, except to comment on various statements, which our critic and ourselves have incidentally made.

I. At the beginning of our first letter we said, that the question raised by "A. P. B." would have had to be expressly encountered by us in a later part of our series. This circumstance would have occurred thus. In our present course of articles, we hope to establish on argumentative ground the

Existence of that Being, Who, as being infinitely Perfect, is inclusively Omnipotent. An objection might be at once raised against this conclusion, drawn from the very doctrine of necessary truth which had borne so important a part in establishing it. "How can a Being be called Omnipotent, who has no power of reversing whatever is included in this vast mass of necessary truth?" To this we should, as one answer, have made the reply which has now been set forth. An "Omnipotent Being" is "One Who can do whatever falls within the sphere of power": but the contradictory of a necessary truth is a non-ens; and to create a non-ens, does *not* fall within the sphere of power.

There is a second answer to the objection, which of the two we rather prefer, as exhibiting more fully the whole truth. We expressed the foundation of this answer in our "Contemporary" article. "Necessary truths," we said, "are founded on the Nature of God: they are what they are, because He is what He is." This is the ground taken by F. Kleutgen in so many words; and substantially also by F. Franzelin.* In January, 1874 (p. 31), we thus set forth our reply to the objection supposed:—

On this, as on other occasions, we have often given, as a special explanation of the term "necessary," that the reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence. It is possible that here and there some Catholic may have been startled by this expression, as though it implied some disparagement of God's Attributes. Now since a very few words will suffice to remove any such misapprehension, those few words had better be inserted.

On a former occasion we laid down the following proposition, as that for which in due time we shall contend. We consider, with FF. Kleutgen and Liberatore, that all necessary truths are founded on God's Essence; that they are what they are, because He is what He is. Let us suppose then any Catholic to make the objection we suggested above. We would ask him, whether there is any disparagement to God's Attributes, in saying that He cannot destroy Himself; that the destruction of God is external to the sphere of Omnipotence. On the contrary, he will answer, God's Attributes *would* be intolerably disparaged, if He were *not* accounted Indestructible: Existence is involved in His Essence. Secondly, we would ask, whether there is any disparagement of God's Attributes, in saying that He cannot change His Nature; that He cannot make Himself, e.g., mendacious, unjust, unfaithful to promises. On the contrary, the Immutability of His Nature is

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* "Totus ordo metaphysicus constituitur legibus necessariis essentiarum, quæ leges *ideo sunt necessariæ quia Divina Essentia eas postulat.* Unde ipsa Essentia Divina, non liberâ voluntate sed *ex necessariâ Suâ Perfectione,* est fons et mensura totius etiam veritatis ordinis metaphysici."—De Deo, p. 316.

perhaps what is in my mind more than anything else, when I speak of His Greatness. But if He cannot change His Nature, it follows that He cannot change what is *founded* on His Nature; that He cannot change necessary truths. In saying then that the reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence,—so far from disparaging God's Attributes, we are extolling the Immutability of His Nature.

II. In regard to the theorem that "the angle in a semicircle is a right angle"—and by parity of reason in regard to every other demonstrated mathematical theorem—our critic says (in his last letter) that such theorem is *in itself* per se notum; and that, if it is not per se notum *to a schoolboy*, such circumstance arises from the latter's intellectual deficiency. We cannot think (as he does) that S. Thomas holds this doctrine; and as regards the passage to which he refers, we are extremely surprised he has failed to observe, that S. Thomas is expressly treating therein, not demonstrated theorems, but exclusively "*principia prima* demonstrationum." On the other hand, let him refer to S. Thomas's Summa I., q. lxxxii., Art II. Again, Liberatore, e.g. ("Logic," c. 2, a. 7) expressly lays down, that "by means of reasoning *new truths* are discovered."* At the same time here, as once before, we are as far as possible from implying, that, while he is on *purely philosophical* ground, "A. P. B." is bound even by the unanimous dictum of Catholic philosophers, if he thinks reason to be against them. But for our own part we certainly cannot concur with his remark. It seems to us, that I may understand most fully all which is meant by "an angle being placed in a semicircle," and all which is meant by "a right angle"; and yet be very far indeed from knowing, that "every angle placed in a semicircle is a right angle." Again it seems to us, that I may know the whole of what is meant by "356 × 184," and the whole of what is meant by "65,504"; and yet be very far indeed from knowing that "356 × 184 = 65,504." Surely in either case I arrive at my knowledge of the theorem, not by pondering its terms, but by combining with each other certain axioms.

To prevent however any possibility of misconception, as to the sense in which we use the phrase "contradiction in terms"—we will make one further remark; though there is no need of here insisting on it. "A. P. B." says that "propositiones per se notæ" are "the positive form or the reverse of 'contradictions in terms.'" There are many "propositiones per se notæ" however, of which we should not ourselves dream of

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* "Mens aut comparatione principiorum inter se *novas* earundem relationes dispicit aut [&c.]" "Ratiocinatione novæ veritates deteguntur."

saying that their contradictories are "contradictions in terms." Such is the proposition : "Every trilateral figure is triangular"; or "$(a-1)+(b+1)=a+b$"; or any other axiom, of the class which we call "ampliative."

III. In "A. P. B.'s" first letter is the following passage :—

Surely then it must follow from such a doctrine [as Dr. Ward's] that we may entertain ideas in our mind which *are not* contradictory, while the objects which they represent *are* contradictory. But what could be conceived more subversive of all certainty ?

We wish we could more clearly apprehend the meaning of this passage. We do not know whether the following remarks meet in any way what our critic intends; but at all events we set them down, for what our readers may find them to be worth.

Take Proposition Z. How many are there of even the most highly educated men, who would even guess, on hearing it, that this proposition is intrinsically repugnant? Not one, unless perhaps some arithmetical prodigy. But this proposition is only one sample of other million millions. The number is literally inexhaustible of arithmetical propositions, which are intrinsically repugnant, but of which no one would even guess the repugnancy till he had worked out the sum. So much is indubitable, and will of course be admitted by our critic. But some higher creature may see various propositions to be intrinsically repugnant—and God may see a still further number of propositions to be intrinsically repugnant—of which the human faculties (however keenly exercised) would entirely fail to see the repugnancy, from unacquaintance with this or that necessary first truth.* For instance, Catholics know by faith that a Divine Nature, not possessing the attribute of "Fecundity," is an intrinsically repugnant chimæra; but the human faculties of themselves could not ever so distantly have guessed this truth. Nor do we see how such a circumstance can have any tendency to engender scepticism. We do not see in fact how ignorance can ever foster scepticism, unless that ignorance be mistaken for knowledge.

IV. Our critic (first letter) thinks it "most dangerous" to say, as we have said, that chimæras are "outside the sphere of Omnipotence." Suarez however ("Metaphys.," Disp. xxx., sec. 17) says that they are "extra objectum Omnipotentiæ."

V. We do not think that "A. P. B." expresses himself

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* "Est *evidens* non posse lumen nostrum naturale esse regulam eorum, quæ in re ipsâ veram repugnantiam includunt aut non includunt."—Suarez, "Metaphys." Disp. xxx. sec. 17. See the whole passage.

correctly—though the question of course is substantially a verbal one—when he says (first letter) that "as far as *Omnipotence* goes, God has the power of doing a thing which would be unjust." God is a Being unalterably just; and surely it is intrinsically repugnant that He should act unjustly. On this point therefore we follow Canon Walker, and dissent from "A. P. B."

On the whole we thus sum up what we have urged. As to what we had said concerning the sphere of Omnipotence, there is not even the shadow of a difference between our critic and ourselves. The controversy he has raised turns almost exclusively on the purely verbal question, whether it is he or ourselves who use the phrase "contradiction in terms" according to the sense given it by Catholic writers. We believe it is we who have spoken in accordance with them, and that his comment is a mistaken one; but should the case prove otherwise,—there is on one philosophical conclusion we have ever maintained, which would be ever so distantly affected by the circumstance. No other result would ensue, except that (as it is inexpedient to use any phrase in a sense different from that unanimously adopted by Catholic writers) we should be obliged to devise some other phrase for expressing an idea, which peremptorily *needs* to be expressed.

In justice to ourselves we must make one final remark. We do not think it possible for any one to read with care that passage of ours from which "A. P. B." made his extract, without seeing what it was which we intended to express, by the phrase a "contradiction in terms." We think therefore we have ground of just complaint against our critic; because he has brought against us the very grave charge of advocating a "most dangerous" theory—that is, most dangerous to religion—without taking due care to ascertain what our theory *is*. On the other hand we have to thank him sincerely for the courtesy and even kindliness towards us with which he has written. Moreover we entirely agree with what is evidently his opinion; viz. that in these days all the chief speculative dangers which threaten religion originate in an unsound philosophy. We heartily admire the zeal of any one, who, when he believes on good grounds such danger to impend, comes boldly and outspokenly to the rescue; and we hope that, after the explanations we have given, our critic has less dread of our own theory than he had before. We have the more reason for so hoping, because his own doctrine on the sphere of Omnipotence is identical with ours, except as regards the point—almost entirely a verbal one—which we have just mentioned under the number "V."

Art. III.—SECULARISM IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.

Elementary Education Act, 1870.

Elementary Education Act, 1873.

Agricultural Children Act, 1873.

Instructions to Inspectors on the Administration of the New Code.

Verbatim Report of the Debate in Parliament during the progress of the Elementary Education Bill, 1870. Published by the National Education Union.

Report of the Committee of Council on Education, 1873–874.

WE shall make no attempt to prove that the present attacks against the Catholic Church can only be successfully withstood by the spread of a precise, accurate, and reverential knowledge of Catholic doctrine. The very instinct of self-preservation dispenses with all proof. Even were this not aroused, the attacks of numerous various and experienced foes, all converging on the same point, would show beyond doubt where lies the vital stronghold of the faith. Accordingly, after the failure of approaches from points theological, scriptural, ethical, and political, the true key to the position has been found; and the cry is, "Let us throw aside our long-trusted weapons; they are blunted, broken, worthless against the keen defence. We cannot despoil those who have the faith; let us endeavour to prevent the young from acquiring it. Let the school, then, be the point of attack; and let each one mask his advance with as much cunning as he can command." The true secret being at last found by common instinct, a tacit alliance has been made against the Catholic school. We admit that this is true science; for it is easier to starve the acorn than to uproot the sturdy oak, to deprive the baptized child of Catholic instruction than to make him reject, when once it has taken root, the one faith which alone satisfies the questionings and cravings of the intellect and heart of man.

That the school is the common point of attack is evident to the most superficial observer. The materialist Huxleyite would pursue even with persecution the teachers of an exclusively Catholic school. The Bismarckian upholder of the Divinity of the State would banish Catholic teaching from the school, or

enforce upon it heretical instruction. The ordinary sound Protestant cannot understand why Catholics are not content to learn merely what he considers the common truths of Christianity in public State schools. The Anglican objects to the school which teaches the errors of Rome. The Dissenter—the most sectarian of men—cries out that to support a Catholic school is to promote sectarianism. And the philosophical social reformer hates the Catholic school, as the personification of that public nuisance "the religious difficulty." These various forces are each represented by able men of great literary power, and some of them by "men of blood and iron." They have gained over not a few kings and legislatures, and the noise of the conflict has descended from Parliament to the cottage. But far above the din and confusion, undaunted by force, uninfluenced by sophistry, the infallible voice of the Head proclaims the mind of the Church, and condemns every system of education, however speciously defended, which prohibits the teaching of religious knowledge in the public schools. Many had been half gained over to the pernicious idea, that religion ought to be taught apart from the school; and secularism saw victory almost within its grasp. The Syllabus, however, unmasked the enemy, and was accordingly received with a cry of rage. From the moment of its publication to the present day, the attacks of secularism in one shape or another have been unceasing; but the defences of Catholic principle have grown more vigorous, for men have become more clear-sighted under the guiding light of its teachings.

In England, as in other countries, attacks have been made, and a system has grown up, and has been adopted by the nation at large, which no Christian can defend as in itself a desirable one. This system is beginning to have a marked influence on the relation of Catholic elementary schools to the State; and therefore we are sure we shall have the patient attention of our readers to the remarks we are about to make on this subject, relating chiefly to the amount of freedom of religious teaching enjoyed by our schools, their relation to the State and school boards, and the amount of security they possess with regard to the future. If some of the details may appear to the general reader of little importance, it must be remembered that it is only by such indications, often petty in themselves, that the future course of events can be at all accurately foreseen or guessed. Indeed our chief object in writing is less to give information for its own sake than, from an exposition of the changes in our position which have arisen since 1870, to induce Catholics to watch more narrowly the signs of the times, and to labour to defend against all attack whether legal or administrative the strictly Catholic character of our schools.

When last we wrote on this vitally important subject (April and July, 1872) we advocated two conclusions. On one hand we maintained, that there was nothing in the Act of 1870 which rendered it *impossible* that thoroughly good Catholic education should be given in Catholic schools receiving aid from the State. On the other hand, we urged that this result was rendered far more *difficult* by the new Act; and that, moreover, there was most serious danger, lest the evil principles so unhappily sanctioned by the Legislature should receive an increased and most alarming development. We deeply regret to say that our worst fears at this moment tend to being realized.

The first indication of the changes, which have since then been so rapidly introduced, appeared even before 1870, in the Government requirement that those who applied for building grants should agree to accept the Conscience Clause. This apparently harmless measure, once introduced, produced consequences which ought to have been foreseen. The strictly denominational character of such schools was thus in principle destroyed. Those who objected to this condition were debarred from Government aid towards the building of new schools; but still the grievance was little felt by Catholics, who for the most part, distrusting such connection with the State, built their schools entirely from their own resources. The step, however, from the permissive to the compulsory is but a small one in England; and Catholics soon found that the large sums, which they had thus relinquished for the sake of preserving the thoroughly Catholic character of their schools, did not purchase for them that immunity from State interference in religious teaching which they had hoped to secure. Having lost the building grants to avoid the Conscience Clause, they found the latter imposed upon them by the new Act, without any compensation for the price they had paid to escape it. The clause at first affected building grants only; it was now extended to all schools which received any kind of assistance whatever from the State. Not only was it extended to all aided schools, but its force and application became more clearly defined; and by means of a strict time-table, introduced to secure its operation, it brought the interference of the State to bear upon the very arrangement of each hour of the school day. Religion must be treated as a thing apart from the ordinary teaching of the school, and strictly confined to what may be called non-official hours. This latter restriction has been found in practice to limit the opportunities for religious teaching by the clergy in large towns; surrounded as they are by other pressing duties, which often make it impossible for them to be free at the particular hour appointed in the time-table.

The State having thus banished religion from the Government hours, it followed as a consequence that there would be no danger to the religious feelings of Protestant parents if their children frequented a Catholic school, and therefore it was required by the law that no child should be refused admission to a Catholic school on religious grounds. A Catholic school must now receive as many Protestant children as like to present themselves, even at the risk of thus filling up places which ought to be occupied by the Catholic children for whom the school was built. Would it not be reasonable to demand some alteration of this part of the law, so that a child might be refused admission to a denominational school on the ground that sufficient accommodation existed in a school of his own denomination, or in a Board school? This is required by the justice of the case, apart from the expediency of keeping up the Catholic character of any particular school.

The Code provides, that no school shall receive a grant amounting to more than half the cost of each scholar's education for the year; and the Act declares, that no religious school shall obtain aid from the rates: it follows, therefore, that at least half the cost of the education of a Protestant child attending a Catholic school must be borne by the subscriptions of Catholics, even though he attend the school to the exclusion of a Catholic child. Moreover, if such a law were taken advantage of to any great extent, Catholic teaching would lose much of its power over the minds of the children; for it would frequently happen that what would entail on a Catholic child the reproach of a grievous sin—e.g., spending the Sunday morning in the fields instead of attending at Mass—would be passed over without blame in the case of the boy next him who might probably be a Protestant.

But, in fact, we have to look to the future for the further logical developments of the Conscience Clause. In England there is no more potent argument for the advance of legislation in a given direction than that the principle has already been admitted in previous Acts of Parliament. This gives us reason to fear that the further advance of secularism in education will seize the position thus afforded; and that its advocates will argue that, as a Catholic school must admit scholars of every religion, and as the master as well as priest is prohibited from teaching religion during the ordinary school hours, therefore there can be no necessity why Catholic schools, as such, should be aided or even permitted by the State. Indeed why should denominational training colleges be supported by public grants, when, under the Conscience Clause, the masters are to teach children of all religions during the ordinary school hours, and are to teach the children of their own denomination only at a period

unrecognized by the Government, and external to the ordinary school teaching? Again, if, under the Conscience Clause, Industrial Schools have been established by School Boards, why should those be supported which do not admit the Clause? We fear that a principle has been admitted, which will work injury from the University to the Workhouse.

We are aware that many rest satisfied on the ground of the general fairness of public opinion, and of the fidelity of governments to contracts with religious bodies; but we contend that the introduction of the new legislation brought with it a rude instance of the facility with which Governments and Parliament shake off obligations formally contracted with religious bodies. For instance, the agreement with the Poor School Committee, that only Catholic Inspectors should be appointed to examine Catholic schools, was set aside without the smallest difficulty, upon an argument similar to that which we fear will work still greater mischief in the future. It was said that as the Inspectors were not allowed to examine in religious matters, and the Conscience Clause secured the admission of children of all religions and banished religion from the ordinary school teaching, there was clearly no need of maintaining the former arrangement. On this subject Lord Robert Montagu asked Mr. Forster whether under the Act "it was intended to obtain power to send any one of the Inspectors (of whatever religious denomination he may be) to inspect the schools of a different denomination." He also asked Mr. Forster "how he proposed to alter the present system of inspection without breaking the contracts with the religious bodies?"* And again, "whether the religious bodies had consented to let their contracts with the State be broken?" † Mr. Forster said, "they did not consider themselves bound to ask the religious bodies, and that they had not done so." We do not know, what answer the Poor School Committee gave to this declaration; nor what efforts were made by Catholics during the progress of the Bill to claim that "separate treatment," which our peculiar position demands, and which we had hitherto enjoyed. It was fairly assumed that the different Protestant sects had much in common, and might be satisfied by some common system; but we should have thought that Catholics would have resisted every attempt to deprive us of our former position, or to merge us into a system which, however acceptable to others, must, in

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* Verbatim Report of the Debate in Parliament during the progress of the Elementary Education Bill, 1870. Published by the National Educational Union, p. 34.

† Ibid., pp. 31, 32.

its developments, be found injurious to us. However unsuccessful such efforts on our part might have been, they would probably have produced at least this most profitable effect:—it would have been known that we felt ourselves injuriously affected by the breach of a formal engagement; and that what suited others well enough, might prove a grievance to us. A further favourable consequence would probably also have been gained; inasmuch as our complaints would lead fair-minded men, at least in the future, and before committing themselves publicly to any particular course, to make inquiry into, and give fair consideration to our wants and feelings.

During the debates on the education question in the House of Commons, not a single Catholic member spoke on the subject of the Bill. Lord R. Montagu was not then a Catholic. In the House of Lords only one Catholic peer spoke on the Bill; and he, referring to this very subject of the violation of the contract with the Poor School Committee, said, "Many years ago they came to a specific understanding with the Government on the subject of education; and received various privileges, such as that of having Inspectors of their own religion. These privileges they were now asked to give up, and he might remark that they relinquished them with a good grace, in order to show their desire to promote the education of the country at large." * The nobleman who spoke these words possesses the esteem and respect of all Catholics, for the personal labour and the large sums he has bestowed on the education of the poor, and also for the leading part he has taken in the conduct of Catholic affairs. From his well-known character, we feel that he would be the last to deprecate fair criticism on the policy pursued by Catholics at the great crisis of 1870. Indeed the crisis is not yet over, and the final shape which the relation of our schools to the State will assume remains still a subject of anxious consideration; and therefore it may not be out of place to state objections against what has already been conceded with a view to our safe conduct in the future.

With regard then to the statement made in the House of Lords, we cannot see how the relinquishment of our former privileges has affected, either for good or evil, "the education of the country at large"; on the other hand, we fear there was much danger to ourselves in such a concession. We believe that the strictly denominational character of our schools has thereby been weakened, and proportionate progress has been made towards the complete absorption of our schools—formerly

* Verbatim Report, p. 531. Published by the National Education Union.

perfectly Catholic—into the public school system of a non-Catholic State. Moreover it affords an apparent sanction to arguments, which may eventually injure us deeply; and opens the door to such a provision, as one lately introduced into the Code of 1875.

It was argued that as Inspectors were to fulfil a simply secular office, without touching on religion, there could no longer be any need of requiring them to profess any particular religion whatever. It was true that hitherto Inspectors did examine in religious knowledge in Church of England schools; but even in them Mr. Forster said the practice had proved an inconvenience. In introducing the Bill he said, "I hear clergymen complain that the children they instruct are subjected to examination in religious doctrines by an Inspector whose sentiments are different from their own."* The fact, that a Church of England Inspector was found a cause of inconvenience to a Church of England clergyman because his views affected his report on the examination in certain subjects, affords no argument for the removal of Catholic Inspectors from Catholic schools; for in these latter the Inspector did not examine in religious subjects. Why then should they have been retained? Because it might have been fairly anticipated, that questions would almost necessarily arise, between Catholic managers and schools on the one hand, and the educational authorities on the other, of which only a Catholic Inspector could judge fairly, as possessing a knowledge of Catholic matters and practices which a non-Catholic Inspector could hardly possess. However carefully religion may be put out of sight and removed from the view of the Inspector, it is evidently impossible to get rid altogether of deep moral questions in the education of the young. If a Church of England Inspector was found an inconvenience on certain subjects to a clergyman of the Establishment, what must be the relation of a similar, or, still worse, a secularist Inspector to a Catholic manager, when required, as is now the case, to make a portion of the grant depend on his inquiries into the teaching of matters, which all Christians as least must regard as essentially religious? The New Code for 1875, page 28, contains the following Instructions to Inspectors under the head of Discipline:—

> To meet the requirements respecting discipline, the managers and teachers will be expected to satisfy the Inspectors that all reasonable care is taken in the ordinary management of the school . . . to impress upon the children the importance of cheerful *obedience to duty*, of consideration and respect for others, and of *honour and truthfulness in word and act*.

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* Verbatim Report, p. 9.

Unless the Inspector is satisfied on these matters, he is required to make a reduction in the grant of one shilling per head on the average attendance of the year.

Surely duty, honour, and truthfulness are essential matters of religious teaching, and cannot successfully be taught without reference to God and religious duty towards Him. In this relation, "duty" has a much wider sense to a Catholic child than to any other, and embraces essentially religious observances which may not even be mentioned in a Protestant or Board school. How then is the manager, usually a priest, to *satisfy* the Inspector that these matters are properly taught? Moreover these matters must be taught in the "ordinary conduct of the school." If this embraces the "religious time," it can only be inquired into by a Catholic Inspector. If it excludes it, and refers only to the "secular time," then it is impossible for the manager to satisfy the Inspector on the subject: for 1st, he himself is forbidden by the Conscience Clause to teach during the secular hours the Catholic doctrines of duty, honour, and truthfulness; and 2ndly he certainly cannot allow the teacher, nor could a Catholic teacher make the attempt, to teach religious truths on a mere secular basis, without reference to any "religious catechism or religious formulary, which is distinctive of any particular denomination" (sec. 14, Act 1870). And yet that these subjects must be taught on secular principles apart from religious teaching, in order to satisfy the Inspector, and obtain the grant for discipline,—is clear from section 7, which says, that "it shall be no part of the duties of such Inspector to inquire into any instruction in *religious subjects* given at such school, or to examine any scholar therein in religious knowledge, or in any religious subject or book." If religion nominally banished is to be thus re-introduced, Catholics have a just reason for demanding the re-establishment of the old agreement concerning Catholic Inspectors; or, at least, the exemption of Catholic schools from the requirement of satisfying the Inspector on these essentially religious subjects. Indeed we regard it as an indignity inflicted on the clergy throughout the country, of whatever denomination, to be thus subjected in such matters to the School Inspectors. The various denominations are submitting to an enormous fine, by refusing to accept rates for the support of their schools, in order to preserve the liberty of teaching religion to their own children; and now they are to be required to prove to Inspectors, either that they actually do what they pay so heavily for the license to do, or that they teach secularism which they profess to hate and repudiate.

And here justice to our subject requires that we should notice

an objection which will occur to many, in reference to the points on which we have so far touched. It may be said "are not your objections so far as now stated theoretical rather than practical? The Conscience Clause works well enough, and only in some cases do the Bishops complain that religious knowledge has fallen to a lower standard; the Inspectors behave as gentlemen, and show a fair appreciation of their position. We must leave it to time to prove, whether the Code of 1875 will result in practical inconvenience on these several subjects." Were we dealing with an ordinary subject of every-day life, with its varying unwritten conditions, influenced by the current of changing custom or the accidental breeze of popular favour, —we should agree that the broad practical view was sufficiently safe to take; and that it were worse than useless to look under the surface to seek for almost occult principles, or to anticipate in the future a steady development of the forces we thought we discovered in action. But we are dealing with the statute law of a great nation, which, in the multiplicity and pressing nature of its legislative activity, can hardly find time to remedy even the admitted grievances of a minority. We are noting the logical administrative and almost necessary development of principles, embodied in written laws and codes of regulations, which, once inserted in the Statute-book, have no longer to be interpreted by common sense, nor by the comments of newspapers, nor even by the intentions of those who framed them; but by lawyers and judges, whose trained acumen is solely directed to give to every line and word, to every principle which can by any logical process be discerned under every provision, their fullest, uttermost, and most practical application, without feeling, without remorse, without the slightest responsibility for any injustice or oppression their interpretation may entail. No reticence on our part can hide any evil the School Acts may contain, either actually or in germ. And we may feel full certainty, that, even without the persistent action of the vast interest which the School Board, as opposed to the religious system, is evoking, the principles of the Act, however latent, will receive in time their full logical development. We believe that to be true of the School Act, which the *Times* lately said of another, "that the Bill might do a great deal—much more indeed than its framers knew or intended—both by its direct operation, and by the further legislation it would entail."

Already, indeed, the principles of the Act of 1870 have been somewhat further developed in the Act of 1873. In answer to difficulties which it was anticipated might arise from the former Act, Catholics consoled themselves that at worst they might

forfeit the grant at any time they pleased, and thus if necessary regain their former liberty. And in this view they were strengthened by the assurances of nearly all parties, that the new system was only to supplement the old, not to destroy or supplant it. Existing schools, especially the denominational ones, were to be encouraged, first for their moral effects on the population, and, secondly, as evoking a large personal interest on the part of the clergy and subscribers to such schools. Moreover it was urged, that the very instincts of the British ratepayer would prevent any attempt on the part of school boards to induce children to leave the voluntary schools, and thereby cast so large an additional weight on shoulders already burdened to the groaning point. Gratitude had been spoken of towards those, who for so many years had borne the chief weight of cost and the whole weight of labour in the elementary education of the country. Let us see how this supposed liberty stands after the legislation of 1873.

Under the former Act the educational wants of a district were to be ascertained by the visit of an inspector to all the elementary schools existing within the district. If a school, however efficient, refused to admit the inspector, or if, upon examination, were found below a reasonable standard, such school was not to be regarded as affording school accommodation to the district, and, as a penalty, a Board school might be built near it. The school itself, however, might continue to exist, subject only to the competition of the new Board school. Recognition by the Government was not required for voluntary schools; and this itself was a safeguard of no mean worth, as efficiency was estimated not merely by the education given, but also by the condition of the school premises, and the willingness to accept the conscience clause—a condition most distasteful to those managers especially who felt that they could dispense with the Government grant towards the support of the school. The provision of section 74, that a school board cannot compel the attendance of a child at a Board school if he "is under efficient instruction in some other manner," seemed innocent enough, and apparently contained no menace of injury to voluntary schools, which refused or were unable to place themselves under Government inspection. In the Act, however, of 1873, this has been developed in a most startling manner. The attendance at a school which is not "a public elementary school" is no longer to be permitted, unless it be proved to a magistrate, not that the school is a good one, but that the child has really profited by his attendance at such a school. However good the school may really be, the parent may be fined for sending his child to it unless he can prove to the magistrate

that the child is capable of passing an examination in the standard required by his age, according to the code in force for the time at the public elementary schools (Act 1873, sec. 24). While there are thousands attending Board and public elementary schools who cannot and do not pass the examination required by their age, no penalty attaches to their frequenting such schools; whereas if the same child attend any other school, the parent may be fined for sending him there. Thus irregular attendance, or stupidity, or culpable inattention on the part of one child may cause a serious loss of reputation to a voluntary school, and may lead to the withdrawal of many or all of its scholars, through fear of a school board prosecution. The scope of this measure will be better understood when we remark that a "public elementary school" is one which, besides accepting *all* the provisions of the conscience clause, is also a "school which shall be conducted in accordance with the conditions required to be fulfilled by an elementary school in order to obtain an annual Parliamentary grant" (Act 1870, sec. 7). Among these "conditions" are those requiring that the teachers shall be certificated, and that there shall be the required number of apprenticed pupil teachers employed in the school, &c. We need not say that there are many excellent convent schools, of enclosed and other orders, where these conditions cannot be fulfilled, and whose existence is practically menaced by the law as it stands now.

It is evident from all we have said that the liberty of maintaining schools, which do not fulfil the Government condition for gaining a grant, is in principle undermined by recent legislation; and moreover the practical possibility of withdrawing our schools from the operation of any future injurious law or code is also already in principle removed. As the case now stands, the parent of each individual child attending any elementary school not under Government inspection, is exposed to the worry of a school board prosecution if residing in a school board district.

Mr. Forster's intention in 1870 was "to complete the present voluntary system, to fill up gaps";* but the real principles embodied in the Act have since then been developed, independently it may be of his intentions, and have already given just cause for apprehension, that their ultimate effect will be the forcible absorption of all elementary schools into the Government system. We see this somewhat clearly in the School Act of 1873, and still more so in the "Agricultural Children Act" of the same year.

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* Verbatim Report, page 8.

That Act provides that it shall be illegal to employ children under a certain age in agricultural labour, unless they have made a certain number of school attendances within the year. So far we entirely sympathize with the intentions of the Legislature; but in a most unexpected way the Act deals a great blow at a large number of Catholic schools in agricultural districts. The Act defines "school" to mean one *recognized by the Government* as giving efficient elementary education. Attendances at school, however numerous, may not be counted for the purposes of the Act, at any uninspected school which is within two miles' distance from a Government or Board school. Again, children who have reached the fourth standard are, no matter what be their age, exempted from the operation of the Act; but the certificate in proof that they have reached such a standard, can only be issued by a Government inspector, or by some one deputed by him for the purpose (sec. 11).

It is hardly to be expected that our small village Catholic schools can support the expense fairly required for the maintenance of trained certificated teachers, even if a sufficient supply of such teachers existed; and the whole spirit of the education authorities would shrink from recognizing as efficient any school, which does not comply with the conditions which would fit it to be considered a public elementary school.

Again, the Act of 1873, the passing of which created little excitement among Catholics, for the first time brought our schools in relation — and in subject relation — with school boards. It had been fondly hoped that the School Board system, founded as it was "to supplement all existing organizations," would stand in relation to the central authority on much the same footing as the religious schools. There was to be no favour or preference for either, at least in secular matters. Whatever Government required was to be conveyed to each by the central authorities, to whom was entrusted the carrying out of the laws affecting elementary education, leaving the managers of religious schools and school boards on a footing of equality. Section 22 of the Education Act of 1873 has overturned all such anticipations about these mutual relations. It was thought probable that school boards or their officers might want information concerning the attendance of children, &c., from the managers of voluntary schools. We need not pause to inquire what regulations might have been made on this subject, fully compatible with the independent position of the voluntary managers; but the provision preferred by the Act is one which shakes to its foundation the standing of these schools before the country. The managers are thereby placed in legal subjection to school boards and their officers, in a manner which cannot

fail to generate opportunities and arguments for further increasing the power thus given for the first time to school boards over voluntary schools. Section 22 empowers school boards "to supply forms to any public elementary school, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable information with respect to the attendance of children." The managers of the school must fill up and return these forms "in the manner required by the School Board," and must give information whether a child attending such school "attends the same in the manner required by the said by-law" of the School Board. If this is not done by the managers, then they are required to produce "to such member or officer of the School Board, or other person as may be duly authorized in that behalf by the School Board, at any reasonable time when required by him, the registers and other books and documents containing information with respect to the attendance of children at such school, and shall permit him to inspect and take copies of and extracts from the same." Formerly the voluntary schools were governed by the Committee of the Privy Council; now they are subject to by-laws of the boards. They must so keep their books and registers as to be able to fill up forms "in the manner required by the School Board"; and, if they fail in this, then a member or officer of a school board may demand to see the registers, books, and other documents, and may even take copies of the same.

It is evident, then, that there is now another power over the voluntary schools, besides the Privy Council, which can make by-laws, in the framing of which the managers have no voice, and which can enforce them by an inspection of documents which the managers must produce "at any reasonable time when required by him [the member, officer, or other person] to do so." It has been lately stated at the meeting of the National Society, that the voluntary schools now teach eleven-twelfths of the children attending school, whereas school boards provide but for one-twelfth; and yet the latter can make by-laws for the former, and enforce them in a rough-and-ready manner with regard to books and documents, which is almost—if not quite—unknown to the law of England. To put the case plainly, the position is now entirely reversed. The one-twelfth are the official legal schools of the nation; to which the eleven-twelfths must be regarded as supplementary, and only to be barely tolerated until starved or worried into giving up their religious character. This state of things has been produced gradually, noiselessly, and in a roundabout way. We trust that Catholics at least will awake with alarm, before their schools are utterly undermined.

School boards, it was thought, would find enough employment in providing apparatus, books, &c., for the children who might be induced to attend their schools; but they have found leisure to bring pressure to bear on Catholic schools; and the result is, that the school-books, published under the sanction of the Poor School Committee and hitherto in use in Catholic schools, had to be altered to the exclusion of religious lessons, even in schools entirely Catholic. That this is a loss to our children no one will deny; but how could we resist the logical results of the conscience clause? And what defence shall we be able to make, when other Catholic matters besides school-books are attacked?

What renders the more serious this change in our books is, that the time required by the Government extends beyond the four hours of secular teaching; and therefore diminishes, more than is generally supposed, the time for religious instruction. The teachers have to devote one hour each day to the instruction of pupil teachers; this, added to the ordinary five hours of school teaching, makes their work sufficiently onerous. It would be undesirable to prolong the duration of their work, even were it possible. It is generally assumed that of these five one can be given to religious study, but this is not the case. A circular of the Education Department requires that "adequate time for marking the registers should be provided for in the time-tables—from five to ten minutes or more according to the number of scholars." This must be done twice in each day, and thus twenty or even thirty minutes must be taken from the fifth hour. The department cannot be expected to demand less, but on the other hand the alteration in our books must be felt the more in proportion to the diminution of other opportunities for religious instruction. How soon may we expect drilling and sewing, both required by the Code, to be relegated to times which do not interfere with the secular four hours? Indeed the temptation to do so must be very great in Board schools, in which religious instruction is not given, and where the fifth hour is not sacred as with us.

It is clear that we Catholics stand in great measure alone on this subject of religious instruction. Other denominations look upon religious teaching in schools as something, which can be treated with far less effort and application than subjects of secular knowledge. They do not teach much, for they do not think much can be taught, or ought even to be attempted to be taught. The Nonconformists hold this so strongly, that in most numerous instances they have handed over their schools to boards; not so much, we believe, because they thereby escape the obligation of finding money for the payment of

teachers, &c., nor because, in many instances, in London at least, they receive from the School Board payment as rent for the use of school premises filled with the same teachers and children, who before the Act was framed frequented them: but really and honestly because they believe that they can convey sufficient religious instruction to their children in their Denominational Sunday schools. Large numbers even of Church of England schools have been handed over to school boards for much the same reasons. That this has not been done to a greater extent, is rather surprising than otherwise; for the Archbishop of Canterbury, when lately presiding over the annual meeting of the National Society, declared that it was a common belief throughout the country, that very little effort, and therefore, we may add, but little time, was required to teach children the amount of religious knowledge they were capable of receiving. He said—

> It was commonly believed throughout the country at the present time that the sort of religious instruction which was suitable for children was of a very simple kind. Minute technical distinctions of theology were of course altogether unsuited to the minds of children. The simplest statements of the truths of Christianity were all that was desired or required. But this principle, *excellent as it was*, might be strained into a disapproval of the teaching of Christian doctrines to children.*

Of course no Catholic could for a moment admit that "the simplest statements of the truths of Christianity were all that was desired or required." The Catechisms in use in the schools of all Catholic countries, and the success with which they are taught, though containing minute distinctions of theology, are a sufficient answer to Dr. Tait's theory, or to what he states as the common belief throughout the country. Catholics hold no such belief; and we should be glad to hear that our practical success in this matter should be tested, by Dr. Tait asking one of our teachers to catechise the children in his presence. The common belief of the country, however, cannot be altered by anything we may say or do; and therefore it is true to say that we Catholics stand almost alone on this great question. We have not merely to contend with the avowed advocates of secularism; but it is much to be feared that the managers of Church of England schools would be content to forego much that is vital to us, and to submit without much opposition to regulations which, differing but very slightly from those at present in force, might prove fatal to our religious liberty.

Danger is arising also from another and perhaps an unex-

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* *Times* Report, June 10, 1875.

pected quarter. We, like all other classes of the community, are anxious that the teaching in the elementary schools shall be thoroughly efficient, so that the children of the poor may derive the greatest possible benefit from the opportunities secured for them. But our contention is, that a young man, who when at school had daily four hours of secular and one hour of religious instruction, is far more educated, and a far more valable citizen, than one who, while at school, had five hours a day of secular study, with merely the casual religious instruction of a Sunday school. His intellectual as well as his moral faculties would be more highly developed, and he would be better fitted for success in life. We do not however suppose that the intellectual power gained by religious study will enable the Catholic child to pass an examination in a special subject, to which a school board pupil has devoted that fifth hour of each day, which has been employed on a different subject by the Catholic pupil. When therefore the standard of examination in public elementary schools is raised, due proportion should be maintained, between the amount of work demanded, and the four hours of secular study required by the Code. If the standard of examination is raised so as to equal the product of five hours' work, it is evident that the same amount cannot be produced in four hours. In such a case our schools would almost necessarily fall below the standard, or be subjected to an unhealthy strain and pressure on the faculties of both teachers and children. In case of failure in what I may in this respect call the extra subject of the fifth hour, there would be a loud cry that our schools were below the mark; and that for the sake of what the masses have been taught to call "sectarianism," the education of our children was being injured. Effort would be vain to try to convince the general public, that our system produced a better article, though by a somewhat different process. "If," they will say, "religious teaching is impeding the progress of secular knowledge, why should Catholics be allowed to devote school time to what is superfluous, or to what may be sufficiently taught at some other time and place?" We fear that some such outcry as this will make itself heard in a comparatively short time.

In the meanwhile Catholics should watch vigilantly the many questions connected with grants and examinations; not so much for the sake of the money itself, as for the sake of preventing unfavourable comparisons between the amount earned by Catholic schools and that obtained by other denominations or Board schools. As an instance of what we mean, let us compare passages from the general reports of two Government Inspectors on the subject of arithmetic; premising that

the practice is to give three sums, the correct working of two out of the three securing a "pass" and grant. Dr. Morell says:—

The scholars in our primary schools are not good at solving arithmetical *problems*, which require any more than an ordinary degree of thought and skill. The fact is that the *foundations* of arithmetical knowledge and practice are for the most part firmly laid . . . but these secured, few *intellectual* operations are superadded. Still the intuitional foundation is there, and the superadditions can be easily appended whenever the time and opportunity arises for extending the whole sphere of primary education.*

Again,

The real power of arithmetical calculation is all involved in the readiness with which we deal with the more elementary processes, and it is just *these* which I feel perfectly convinced are worked into the minds of the scholars in our primary schools.

This Inspector is evidently content with the working of ordinary sums as distinct from the solution of problems. These latter are a test and a good one of the intellectual power of the boy in perceiving the real arithmetical questions underlying the statement of the problem; but it is no test of the ability of the boy to work the sum correctly if proposed as a "sum" and not as a problem. At page 31 of the same volume another Inspector says:—

My plan of testing the arithmetic of the four higher standards has been as follows:—to set three questions, two in the ordinary shape, in which rules are set forth in the test-books, and one in the shape of an easy problem. Now in the great majority of cases the "pass" has been secured by correctly working the two plain-sailing sums, and giving the go-by to the easy problem.

Apparently under the former Inspector a "pass" would be secured by two out of three "sums," under the latter but *two* "sums" are given, and a problem to which "in the great majority of cases" the "go-by" is given; thus requiring practically and in the majority of cases two out of two, not two out of three sums to be worked correctly. If this be so, it is evident that the schools in the district of the latter would earn a less grant than those in the district of the former; and, that schools, which in one case would obtain a good report, would, in the other, be blamed for failure in arithmetic. That such matters as these should be noted carefully, is of great importance to Catholics; as any failure, no matter from what cause, will probably soon be attributed to the amount of time given to religious instruction.

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* Report of the Committee of Council on Education, p. 132.

On questions affecting the amount of Government support for our schools, we Catholics have a right to most favourable consideration, on account of the very great efforts we have made in the cause of the education of the poor, during the ten years from the year ending August 31st, 1864, to the same date, 1873. The Government statistics* show clearly that Catholics have increased their voluntary contributions in a much greater ratio than the Church of England and the Dissenting bodies. We extract from the Report the following statistics :—

AMOUNT OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.

	1864.	1873.	Increase per Cent.
Church of England......	£226,268	£416,465	84·0
Dissenters	40,199	83,629	108·0
Catholics	11,293	35,814	213·3

AMOUNT OF SCHOOL PENCE.

	1864.	1873.	Increase per Cent.
Church of England......	£231,385	£451,509	95·1
Dissenters	77,500	184,857	138·5
Catholics	9,501	29,773	213·3

It will be admitted at a glance that Catholics have made proportionally much greater efforts during these ten years for the education of the poor than either the Church of England or Dissenting bodies; and that whereas Catholic voluntary contributions have increased in the same proportion as the payments of the poor in School pence, Protestant and Dissenting contributions have not increased in the same ratio as the fees of their poor schools.

Indeed, all the questions relating to the strictness of the code, and the raising of the standard of education, bear with a very unequal pressure on the denominational schools as compared with the Board schools. With regard to the former, it was fairly estimated that a diminution of the grant consequent on failure to reach the prescribed standard would prove a sufficient stimulus to great exertion; for the loss of grant would have to be made good by the supporters themselves of religious schools, burthened as they now are with the cost of the secular schools. But what pressure equal to this is brought to bear on Board schools? What they lose by a diminution of the grant is, *ipso facto*, made up by the rates, and the inconvenience to

* Report of the Committee of Council on Education, 1874, Tables, pages 19 and 20.

the managers is therefore almost nil. It is provided by law that the deficiency from one source shall be met by a proportionate increase from the other. In such a case it may be said that the ratepayers would raise so great an outcry as to force the School Board to succeed better at the next examination. But first the managers themselves are usually not members of the Board, and would remain quite undisturbed by the clamour, knowing that the bills must be paid whatever else might happen; and, secondly, the indignation of ratepayers has for many years been quite insufficient to control the conduct even of the guardians they themselves elect, and the country has again and again been deeply moved at the grievous scandals which have arisen in workhouses. So inefficient has been the controlling power of local opinion, that many laws have been lately made for the express purpose of effecting that which the ratepayers were unable or too negligent to do. How then can it be supposed that they will control school boards more efficiently than boards of guardians? Indeed, the school boards are much less under the power of the ratepayers; as they are elected for three years instead of for one, and are usually chosen from a more independent class than that which furnishes candidates for the office of guardian. We believe therefore that we are right in saying that any undue increase of strictness in the code would be a grievous loss to the managers of religious schools, and but a nominal inconvenience to school boards. Moreover if, as some eminent men think, the new code has raised the standard too high, the religious schools will suffer directly and at once from such a mistake, whereas the school boards will merely have to explain to the ratepayers that the children passed as good an examination as, under the circumstances, could have been expected.

We trust that the numerous difficulties we have pointed out will lead our readers to agree with us, that during the last few years very grave attacks have been made upon the religious character of denominational schools; upon the irreligious, and in some respects civil liberty; and upon their financial prosperity. It seems to us that inevitably, and by the almost spontaneous development of the principles embodied in recent legislation, these attacks will be multiplied in the future. Secularism in education, planted but a few years ago, has already waxed strong, and threatens to overshadow the whole of the country. Introduced to supply defects of accommodation, here and there, it already looks upon the great religious system, not merely as a rival, but as an intruder. Laws and codes must be framed in accordance with its aggressive spirit, and if they are injurious to the religious system so much the worse for the latter. Is it

not time that Catholics should take serious counsel as to their future conduct in so vital a matter? Can even a day be spared, when each day witnesses a further advance of that which we have so much reason to dread? The prudence of waiting until something is done positively incompatible with the continued existence of our schools may well be questioned, when we see a highly organized force steadily advancing against us. The facts we have mentioned appear to us a sufficient justification for crying out at once and persistently, so that our grievances may be known to many just-minded men who are at present ignorant of them. Will it not be a reproach to us if we wait until the last straw is placed on our backs—will not people ask why we did not cry out sooner? Indeed, the mere surprise of many will lead them, in the religious temper of the time, to look upon our declarations, if made too late, as the factious, unpatriotic result of Catholic principles.

We are anxious, then, that all educated Catholics should take a deep interest in the subject of the relations of our schools to the State — that they should be well acquainted with the Education Acts—the Codes, and their working—the Circulars of the Education Department—the by-laws made by school boards—the reports of Government and diocesan Inspectors, &c. &c., in order that they may be able to form a judgment on the great question of the day. We would wish all to remember, that resistance beforehand to any threatened advance of the State or of secularism is far easier and more likely to succeed, than the slow and uncertain effects of agitation for the after-repeal of laws and regulations, to which, in the first instance, we submitted apparently without a murmur. Catholics should vigilantly watch and eagerly scrutinize every Bill introduced into Parliament at all affecting education, and they should be careful to draw the attention of the authorities to all those administrative acts from which we may suffer in the slightest degree. Above all, their voices should be heard by all those whose duty or privilege it is to prepare Bills, and Codes, and Official Circulars, so that our objections may receive due consideration, before statesmen are publicly committed to any course affecting the interests of our schools. We do not feel that it is our place to point out what precise course ought to be adopted; but we do strongly protest against the want of special knowledge on these subjects which really prevails, and against the whole course of yielding without expostulation to almost every attack made on our religious freedom, which seems to have been our policy since the introduction of the Bill of 1870.

Art. IV.—THE PURPORT OF BISHOP FESSLER'S TREATISE.

The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes. By Joseph Fessler. Translated by Father Ambrose St. John.* London: Burns & Oates.

A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. By J. H. Newman, D.D. London: Pickering.

A NOTION has got abroad among some Catholics, that Mgr. Fessler's treatise was partially directed against a certain Catholic ultra party, which is supposed to exist, and to defend an exaggerated interpretation of the Vatican Definition. And from this supposition it is inferred, that the Pope, by complimenting the treatise, expressed his own special approbation of the more moderate line taken by the Bishop, as contrasted with that of the aforesaid contemporary ultras. We must maintain in reply that there is not so much as the vestige of a foundation, for any one part of this theory: and if the theory be such a simple delusion as we allege, every one will agree that the delusion should be dispelled at the earliest possible opportunity. In our last number however we were too much pressed both by time and by space, to set forth the necessary details. On the present occasion we hope to consider (1) those particular passages, which have probably led to the misconception; and (2) the general bearing and position of the treatise as a whole. Nor can we better commence our remarks, than by citing a brief note, which F. Newman inserted in the popular edition of his celebrated letter.

Fessler seems to confine the exercise of infallibility to the nota "heretical" (p. 137).

* Since this article first went to press, the news reached us of F. St. John's most unexpected death. As we are in a certain antagonism with him in the whole course of our remarks, we hope it may not be accounted impertinent if we say a few words on the sincere respect and regard which we feel towards his memory. The present writer cannot boast of having had any intimate acquaintance with him; but his character always appeared to us most touching, from its singular simplicity, peace-lovingness, and unobtrusive self-sacrifice. Our readers will not fail to remember F. Newman's earnest words of affection towards him in the "Apologia." F. St. John's theological stand-point differed in some important respects from our own; but we trust there is nothing in this article, which would have given him a moment's pain had he still been upon earth.

This edition of F. Newman's letter did not reach our hands, until long after our article on Bishop Fessler had gone through the press, and while we were very busy with other parts of our April number; and on the other hand the statement just quoted, coming from an authority of such weight, is so extremely serious, that it did not admit of perfunctory and incidental treatment. On the whole therefore we resolved to ignore it for the moment, reserving it for future consideration.

I. It is not more certain—so we must maintain—that the Bishop wrote his treatise at all, than that he advocated therein no such tenet as F. Newman supposes; and it will in no way therefore be disrespectful to Mgr. Fessler's memory, if we point out how theologically discreditable to him would have been any such advocacy. We will quote a passage to this effect from Cardinal Manning's "Petri Privilegium."

> All Catholic theologians, without exception, so far as I know, teach that the Church is infallible in all [minor doctrinal] censures. They differ only in this: that some declare this truth to be of faith, and therefore the denial of it to be heresy; others declare it to be of faith as to the condemnation of heretical propositions, but in all others to be only of theological certainty; so that the denial of it be not heresy, but error.
>
> To deny the infallibility of the Church in the censures less than for heresy, is held to be heretical by De Panormo, Malderus, Coninck, Diana, Oviedo, Amici, Matteucci, Pozzobonelli, Viva, Nannetti. Murray calls it objective heresy. Griffini, Herincx, Ripalda, Ferraris, and Reinerding do not decide whether it be heretical, erroneous, or proximate to error. Cardenas and Turrianus hold it to be erroneous; Anfossi erroneous, or proximate to error. De Lugo in one place maintains that it is erroneous; in another, that to deny the infallibility of the Church in the condemnation of erroneous propositions is heresy. All, therefore, affirm the Church in passing such censures to be infallible (iii. 74, 5).

F. Newman himself, we may add, is in full concurrence with other theologians on this subject. In condemning any proposition, he says (p. 136 or 121*), the Church "tells us . . . that the thesis condemned, when taken as a whole, or again when viewed in its context, is heretical or blasphemous or impious or *whatever like epithet she affixes to it.*" It is "of faith . . . that there is, in that thesis itself which is noted, heresy, or error, or *other like peccant matter as the case may be.*" "The act of faith *which cannot be superseded or trifled with* being the *unreserved acceptance,* that the thesis in question is heretical or the like, *as the Pope or Church has spoken of it.*" † So much then on

* When we cite F. Newman's letter in this article, our first reference shall be to the popular, and our second to the larger edition.

† There is a passage in F. Newman's Appendix (pp. 163, 4, or 147, 8)

the language of theologians; and it will be seen as we proceed, that the Church herself speaks in effect with even greater severity against the tenet ascribed to Mgr. Fessler, than do theologians. It is surely quite incredible, that the censors who examined the Bishop's treatise should have passed over so grave an error, even if the Bishop could possibly have fallen into it. And if our readers will give their attention to the extracts we shall at once cite from the volume, it will not be possible for them to doubt, that Mgr. Fessler's own words directly contradict the proposition ascribed to him by F. Newman.

The passage to which F. Newman refers as containing it, is at p. 11; and was quoted by us at length in April (p. 334, note). Like several other passages of the book, it is very far from clearly expressed; but we confess willingly, that among all the interpretations which can be given it, we believe that to be the true one which is most favourable to F. Newman's argument. As we explained the Bishop's words in April (p. 334), he seems to say, that if eighty *heretical* propositions had been sent round (designated as such) to the Bishops, under circumstances in every other respect similar to those of the Syllabus—there could have been no possible doubt that the issuing of such imaginary Syllabus was an ex cathedrâ Act; whereas on the contrary, as regards the Syllabus which was actually issued, he holds that there is a real opening for doubt on the point. Now even if we confine our attention exclusively to his opinion on the Syllabus,—that opinion not only does not prove, but effectually disproves, the suggested interpretation of his words. He says again and again, that the question of the Syllabus's ex cathedrâ character is not a certain but a doubtful one. But if he confined the exercise of infallibility to the nota "heretical," there could be *no possible* doubt in his mind, that the teaching of the Syllabus as such is not infallible. No tenet is "heretical," unless it directly contradicts what was (explicitly or implicitly) taught by the Apostles. How then could such propositions as the following be possibly condemned as *heretical?*

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which we do not quite see how to reconcile with his words quoted in the text. He seems therein on the surface to say, that no one can possibly accept the mere condemnation of a given thesis with *interior assent*, but only with that *external obedience* which is rendered by not publicly advocating such thesis. Of course he does not mean this; and we need therefore but briefly refer to his own statement as given in our text. Nothing surely can be more intelligible—as on some occasions nothing can be more important—than to accept with interior assent the proposition, that such or such a thesis deserves the censure with which it has been branded.

13. The method and principles, whereby the ancient scholastic doctors cultivated theology, are not suited to the necessities of our time and the progress of science.

38. The too arbitrary conduct of Roman Pontiffs contributed to the Church's division into East and West.

77. *In this our age* it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be treated as the only religion of the State, all other worships whatever being excluded.

78. *Hence* it has been laudably provided by law in some Catholic countries, that men thither immigrating should be permitted the public exercise of their own several worships.

If then the Bishop had really held that infallibility does not extend to minor doctrinal censures, it would have been to his mind *certain,* and no matter of doubt at all, that the issuing of the Syllabus was no infallible utterance. On the other hand the doctrine which he really did entertain about the Syllabus, is easily explained by another of his doctrines which he has expressed in so many words. "In theology," he says (p. 70), "it serves as a sure note of a dogmatic definition, when an opposite doctrine is branded by the Pope as heretical." What he means then is evidently this: "If the eighty errors had been expressly condemned as *heretical,* that circumstance would have sufficed to show the ex cathedrâ character of the Syllabus. But whereas such is not the case, *other* indications must be consulted, in order to decide the question whether it be ex cathedrâ or no; and those other indications do not suffice to make the matter clear."

We have fully confessed, that in the two pages on which we are commenting (as indeed is unfortunately the case with other parts of the treatise) the Bishop's language is somewhat difficult of interpretation; but the words to which we shall next refer in elucidation of his doctrine, are as clear as day. The doubt of theologians, he says, on the ex cathedrâ character of the Syllabus,

Is founded especially upon this, that the form of the Syllabus is quite different from that which the Pope usually adopts when he delivers *a solemn definition de fide.* In order to convince himself of this, Dr. Schulte need only peruse the Bull of Leo X. against Luther, the "Exurge Domine," . . . or the celebrated Bull of Pius VI. "Auctorem Fidei." . . . In these and in similar documents the intention of the Pope is expressed in the most decided manner, either at the beginning or at the end, that certain propositions must, by virtue of his Supreme Apostolical power, be regarded as incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals. . . . It may be said perhaps, that the Pope, by requiring that the Syllabus should be made known to the whole Episcopate, desired to raise all his utterances on the errors contained in the Syllabus to the position of doctrinal defini-

tions, such as would be, according to the Definition of the Vatican Council, utterances ex cathedrâ. This many theologians think may be assumed to be doubtful, until a fresh declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See (pp. 91, 2).

We cannot at all follow the Bishop in thinking, that the form of the Syllabus is more unlike the other forms of ex cathedrâ definition, than those other forms are unlike each other. On this we shall speak presently; but our immediate point is this. He says expressly, that the "Auctorem Fidei" is "*a solemn definition de fide*"; and he adds, that the propositions condemned in it, "must, by virtue of "the Pope's supreme Apostolic power, be regarded as *incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals.*" But he was of course fully aware, that more than half of these propositions are only branded with censures lower than that of "heretical." Propositions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 are condemned only as "false, temerarious, &c. &c.;" prop. 17 "captious, temerarious, &c.": and so on to the end of the Bull. We do not therefore see how he could easily have devised words more emphatic than those he has used, for the purpose of *utterly disavowing* the opinion, that "infallibility is confined to the nota 'heretical.'"

And certainly, on reading the "Auctorem Fidei," we cannot be surprised at Mgr. Fessler's confident judgment on its true character. In the earlier part of the Bull Pius VI. expresses himself as follows. We italicise one clause:—

> We can no longer delay fulfilling our Apostolical office. . . . On every side the judgment of the Supreme Apostolic See is not only waited for but demanded by assiduously repeated prayers. God forbid that the voice of Peter should ever be silent in that his See, wherein he, ever living and presiding, affords the truth of faith to those who seek it. . . . Such a wound therefore must be cut away, whereby not one member alone is injured, but the whole body of the Church afflicted; and by help of the Divine mercy provision must be made that (dissensions being cut off) the Catholic Faith may be preserved inviolate, and that (the advocates of evil being recalled from their error) those whose faith is approved may be fortified by our authority. Having therefore implored . . . the aid of the Divine Spirit . . . we have determined . . . that various propositions, doctrines, sentences . . . should be condemned *each with its appropriate note*, as by this our perpetually-to-stand (perpetuò valiturâ) Constitution we condemn and reprobate them.

At the end he adds the following command; and we italicise a word.

> We command therefore all Christians of either sex, that they presume not to *think*, teach, preach, concerning these propositions, otherwise than as is declared in this our Constitution.

It is plain then, that the opinion ascribed to the Bishop would have placed him in an attitude of direct rebellion against the Holy See; and would not only have deprived him of all authority as a theologian, but would have exposed him to grave ecclesiastical censure.

Now (2) there is another passage in his work, very similar in character to the one with which we have been dealing, and which we treated (April, 1875, p. 334) in company therewith. In p. 11, while denying that the "Multiplices inter" is a dogmatic definition, he admits that he should have thought otherwise, if any one proposition had therein been condemned as heretical; but since "heresy" is only one of various censures pronounced "in globo" on the condemned work, he thinks there is no proof of the Brief's ex cathedrâ character. As F. Newman understood him to mean by the *former* passage that he does not regard the Pope as infallible in pronouncing *minor censures*,—so by *this* passage the Bishop might be understood to mean, that the Pope is not infallible when pronouncing *censures in globo*. Now it curiously happens, that the very same passage of his book, which acquits him of the former charge, acquits him also of the latter. For he speaks, not only of Pius VI.'s "Auctorem Fidei," but also of Leo X.'s "Exurge Domine," as most indubitably "a solemn definition de fide"; adding that "certain propositions" are therein condemned "by virtue of" the Pope's "supreme Apostolical power," "as incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals." Now whereas the "Auctorem Fidei" pronounces various minor censures on various definite propositions,—the "Exurge Domine" on the other hand pronounces censures *in globo* on Luther's propositions, as respectively "pestiferous, pernicious, scandalous, &c. &c." It is with this case then as with the former. What the Bishop intended to say in p. 11 was, that the fact of Popes officially pronouncing some tenet *heretical*, is sufficient proof that they are speaking ex cathedrâ; whereas the mere fact of their pronouncing censures *in globo*, does not *by itself* suffice to establish that conclusion.

In this second case again it may be worth while to point out, what grievous ecclesiastical censure he would have incurred, had he really meant in p. 11 what his words might be understood by some to signify. The Bull "Unigenitus" censured in globo, and not otherwise, F. Quesnel's well-known 101 theses. Yet the Council of Embrun, specially confirmed by Benedict XIII., called its Definition the Church's "dogmatic, definitive, and irretractable judgment"; and added, "if any one does not assent to it in heart and mind, *let him be accounted among those who have made shipwreck concerning the Faith*."

We may add, that in pp. 64, 5 the Bishop expressly occupies himself with cataloguing the various Pontifical pronouncements, which he excludes from the character of ex cathedrâ Acts; and that he does not give the faintest hint of his supposed opinion, that minor censures or censures in globo are never to be accounted ex cathedrâ.

II. We will next consider a question cognate to the former, but on which Mgr. Fessler is far more open to primâ facie misconception. No tenet, as we have said, is heretical, unless it be directly opposed to what was explicitly or implicitly taught by the Apostles as divinely revealed. If therefore it were true that the Pope cannot condemn ex cathedrâ any theses except heretical ones, it would follow that he cannot define any doctrine ex cathedrâ, which is not an integral portion of revealed truth. And, as we mentioned in April (p. 333), here and there the Bishop has seemed to express this conclusion in so many words. Yet, as we then pointed out, there are two different reasons, which make it absolutely certain that he never intended anything of the kind. In the first place we have seen how indubitable he accounts it, that the "Auctorem Fidei" was "a solemn definition de fide"; and that all the "propositions" therein recited are infallibly ruled to be "incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals." Now by condemning these propositions, Pius VI. defined, among other things, (1) that Clement IX. had not acted as the Synod of Pistoia alleged; (2) that certain most holy doctors in past time had cultivated scholastic theology to the great benefit of the Church; and (3) that S. Thomas and S. Bonaventure had not been on a certain theme so deficient in accuracy and balance of mind, as the Synod of Pistoia alleged.* Assuredly no one of these infallibly defined verities is any part of revealed truth; they are three non-revealed, but infallibly defined, "doctrinæ de fide vel moribus."

In like manner, as we have also pointed out, Mgr. Fessler considers it indubitably within the sphere of Papal infallibility, to condemn the propositions recited in the Syllabus. But to

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* Prop. 13. "Propositio . . . quæ innuit Clementem IX. pacem Eclesiæ reddidisse per approbationem distinctionis juris et facti . . . falsa, temeraria, Clementi IX. injuriosa."

Prop. 76. "Insectatio quâ Synodus scholasticam agitat . . . falsa, temeraria, in sanctissimos viros qui magno Catholicæ religionis bono scholasticam exercuêre injuriosa . . . ."

Prop. 81. "In eo quod subjungit, sanctos Thomam et Bonaventuram sic in tuendis adversus summos homines mendicantium institutis versatos esse, ut in eorum defensionibus minor æstus accuratio major desideranda esset—scandalosa, in sanctissimos doctores injuriosa . . . ."

condemn props. 13, 77, and 78 of the Syllabus, is to define three non-revealed truths: viz. (1) that the method and principles of the scholastic theologians are not unsuitable to these times; (2) that even in this nineteenth century, when a country is circumstanced as Spain was in 1855, it is not inexpedient to exclude all non-Catholic worships; and (3) that it is not laudable, in a country circumstanced as New Grenada was in 1852, to allow immigrants the public exercise of their respective worships.

We have seldom met with a more lucid and powerful theological argument, than that in which Cardinal Manning ("Petri Privilegium," iii. 67–79) draws out a sample of the various non-revealed truths, necessary for security of the Deposit, on which the Pope beyond all possible question claims to teach infallibly. In their number are (1) various truths of natural reason and natural science; as that substance exists, or that the soul is the form of the body: (2) various truths of human history; as that the Council of Trent issued certain canons, or that Pius IX. defined the Immaculate Conception: there are (3) what may be called *dogmatic* historical facts; as that the Council of Trent was Ecumenical, or that Pius IX. is true Pope, or that the Vulgate is authentic: (4) there are truths of interpretation; as that Jansenius's book, according to its legitimate objective sense, contained five certain theses. And to all this we may add (5) that the Church has infallibly defined the aptitude of such words as "Consubstantial," "Transubstantiation," &c., in the sense in which she uses them. We may be very sure that the Bishop never dreamed of denying, that the Pope is infallible on such matters as we have now recounted. And F. Newman for his part cites with approval F. Perrone's statement, that infallibility extends to those "physical matters," which have necessary connection with dogma" (p. 130 or 115).

In fact F. Newman ably shows (p. 134 or 118)—as others have done before him—that the Church could not so much as define revealed truths, unless her infallibility extended beyond the actual limits of Revelation. These are his words, and we italicise those to which we refer.

As to the Pope's condemnation of particular books, *which of course are foreign to the Depositum*, I would say that as to their false doctrine, there can be no difficulty in condemning that by means of the Apostolic Deposit; nor surely in his condemning the very wording in which they convey it, when the subject is carefully considered. For the Pope's condemning the language for instance of Jansenius is a parallel Act to the Church's sanctioning the word "Consubstantial." And if a Council and the Pope were

not infallible so far in their judgment of language, *neither Pope nor Council could draw up a dogmatic definition at all;* for the right exercise of words is involved in the right exercise of thought.

When therefore Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops (see Fessler, pp. 53 and 63) speak as though the Pope's infallibility were confined to his exposition of the Deposit, it would be understood by all theologically trained Catholics, that such a statement could not possibly be understood literally; and when the Holy Father approved the Swiss Bishops' "Pastoral Instruction," he of course understood their language as every theologian would understand it. He understood the word "Deposit," "revealed truth," in the sense in which, as F. Franzelin testifies,* the phrase "the Deposit" is frequently used; so as to include "truths even not *in themselves* revealed, so far as they are *in contact with* revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter." And the Swiss Bishops themselves, in another passage also quoted by F. St. John, express their meaning with unmistakable accuracy. The Pope, they say, "is infallible solely and exclusively, when, as supreme doctor of the Church, he pronounces *in a matter of faith or morals* a definition, which has to be *accepted and held as obligatory* by all the faithful." We may add that F. Newman evidently interprets their doctrine just as we have done. For he quotes (p. 141 or 125) with warm sympathy the "Instruction"; while nevertheless he holds (as we have seen) that the Pope is not in any such sense "tied up and limited to the Divine Revelation" in his ex cathedrâ Acts, but that he can also define various non-revealed "doctrinæ de fide vel moribus." And we may add—as we did in our last number—one further remark. When it is remembered that even so well-informed a Catholic as F. Gratry thought there were Catholics who desired the definition of a "scientific, governmental, and political infallibility,"—it will be at once seen how important it is for good Catholics to do, what Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops have done; to insist on the truth, that the Pope is no otherwise infallible, than in his guardianship of what was once for all taught by the Apostles as revealed truth.

From what has been now said, we may draw an inference of some little moment. In the instances we have given, no Catholic can doubt that the Pope's infallibility extends to non-revealed truths which concern faith or morals. There are other such non-revealed truths, in regard to which there is some difference of opinion among Catholics. For instance, is

* See our translation of his "Scholïon," July, 1871, p. 263.

the Pope infallible in canonizing Saints? or in approving religious orders? or in defining the moral necessity of his civil princedom? Of such questions—as we have often mentioned—the Vatican Council deferred its treatment to a later period; nor have we any desire to enter here on an inquiry, how far, even under existing circumstances, the Catholic's obligation concerning them may extend. What we wish here to point out is this. The proposition, that a certain book published in the sixteenth century has a certain specified legitimate objective sense, is to the full as external to Revelation, as is the proposition, that A. B. is a Saint; or that this or that religious order merits approval; or that the Pope's civil princedom is necessary to the Church's wellbeing. Of course it is abundantly possible, that various persons, who regard the Pope as infallible in his theological interpretation of books, may not account him infallible in such propositions as we have just recited; only their reasons for rejecting the latter infallibility cannot possibly be, that the said propositions are external to the Deposit. And if Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops held (as of course they did) the Pope's infallibility on the sense of Jansenius's book,—there is nothing whatever in their language to show, that they did not equally account him infallible in canonizing Saints; or in approving religious orders; or in defining a certain doctrine on his civil princedom.

III. There is a third question, which we briefly treated in April (pp. 335–8), but which deserves fuller exposition than our time and space permitted us then to give it. Some have understood Mgr. Fessler as maintaining, that no Pontifical utterance can be ex cathedrâ, which does not *express* its own ex cathedrâ character. We reply, that to credit the Bishop with this opinion, is simply to stultify what is the whole drift and bearing of his argument from beginning to end. And we will commence with a few preliminary remarks on this particular head.

Among the various notes of an ex cathedrâ Act given by the Vatican Council,—which is it that every Catholic will account the most important? Which is it that most approaches to being legitimately called the "differentia" of such an Act? Assuredly, that it be issued with the ascertainable purpose, of obliging Catholics to its acceptance; or, as Cardinal Manning expresses it ("Petri Privilegium," ii. p. 61), that it be "published with the intention of requiring the assent of the Church." Now though, in a passage quoted by Mgr. Fessler at p. 48, Dr. Schulte seems to admit this condition as necessary,—yet no one can possibly read the citations adduced from him by the Bishop from p. 64 to p. 102, without seeing that the Professor in fact

entirely repudiates it. There is hardly one instance, if indeed there be so much as one, in which he attempts to show, that some given Act, affirmed by him to be an ex cathedrâ definition, was issued with the purpose of obliging the assent of Catholics to some given doctrine. This is in every successive case shown by Mgr. Fessler; and it is difficult to imagine a more crushing refutation of an opponent, than the Bishop accomplishes. He states this indeed himself strongly, but not at all too strongly.

Dr. Schulte, in presenting for our consideration numerous Papal expressions and Papal doings which he himself regards as so many infallible utterances, has enabled us to see that, with one single exception,* the conditions which the Vatican Council has declared to be requisite for an infallible definition, are not to be found in those documents which he parades before us; and therefore that all the Papal expressions and Papal Acts, therein spoken of, cannot, according to the Vatican Definition, come into the class of infallible Papal definitions.

Now we would draw emphatic attention to one simply patent and undeniable matter of fact. It is *not* "one of the conditions which the Vatican Council has declared to be requisite for an infallible definition," that the defining Act shall itself *express* the Pope's intention of obliging interior assent. What the Council requires is, that the Pope "define a doctrine concerning faith or morals, to be held by the whole Church"; or, as F. Newman excellently paraphrases the latter words (p. 129 or 115), that the Pope speak "with the *purpose*"—of course the ascertainable purpose—"of binding every member of the Church to accept and believe his decision."† In the passage

* The exception to which the Bishop refers is the concluding clause of the "Unam Sanctam."

† To our mind, F. Newman has expressed not only the truth, but the one fundamental truth, on the conditions of an ex cathedrâ Act, in p. 122 or 108. "The question," he says, "is unlike the question about the Sacraments: external and positive acts, whether material actions or formal words, speak for themselves. Teaching on the other hand *has no sacramental visible sign*; it is an 'opus operantis,' and *mainly a question of intention.*" In any given case therefore we have simply to consider, whether the Pope have sufficiently indicated his *intention* of obliging interior assent. And he may of course most easily indicate what has been his intention in some given utterance, without inscribing such intention on the utterance itself: as he most evidently did (not to mention a large number of other instances) in the two cases of S. Leo's Letter and Gregory XVI.'s "Mirari vos," to which we referred in April, p. 337.

Accordingly we see no difficulty whatever in the supposition, that some subsequent fact may for the first time make clear a Pope's previous intention. Those e.g. who hold, as F. Newman does and as we once did, that all the documents on which the Syllabus is founded were issued ex cathedrâ, must consider, in the case of several among them, that their possession of this character was first made known by the Syllabus. Again as to the

therefore which we have quoted, the Bishop necessarily implies that, in order to an ex cathedrâ definition, there is no need whatever of the Act itself *expressing* its own defining intention, if such intention be otherwise cognisable.

This we take to be Mgr. Fessler's deliberate opinion. But (as we have more than once said) his language is by no means always consistent with itself. In another page he much more stringently *limits* the sphere of Vaticanly-defined infallibility; while in another again (according to the obvious meaning of his words) he enlarges that sphere beyond all intelligible bounds. The former of these pages is p. 51; where he represents it as required for "an ex cathedrâ utterance," that *in* that utterance "the Pope must *express* his intention, by virtue of his supreme teaching power, to declare the particular doctrine on faith and morals to be a component part, &c. . . . and *as such to be held by the whole Catholic Church,* &c. &c." On this sentence we at once make three remarks. Firstly the Bishop does not even allege, that *the Vatican Council* has expressed any such restriction, but only lays it down as "the view of Catholic theologians." Secondly, such is most assuredly *not* "the view of Catholic theologians"; considering the unanimous acclaim with which they hail S. Leo's Letter to S .Flavian, not only as an instance, but even as among the most prominent instances, of "an ex cathedrâ utterance."* Thirdly, the Bishop elsewhere (p. 70) ascribes to Catholic theologians an opinion, entirely inconsistent with the former; viz. that "it serves as a sure mark of a dogmatic definition when an opposite doctrine is branded by the Pope as heretical," whether the Pope do or do not *express* his intention of obliging assent to his pronouncement. See our comment in April, p. 336. In the very instance which the Bishop alleges, Boniface VIII. in no kind of way *expressed* his intention of obliging interior assent.

In other respects also, the Bishop's affirmation of p. 51 is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere. For instance. If

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Syllabus itself. For our own part we maintained in April (p. 342) that its ex cathedrâ character was abundantly plain from the first. But those who do not admit this, may yet have been convinced as to what was the Pope's intention in 1864, by reading the words which he addressed to the assembled Bishops in 1867. See our April number, p. 342.

Father St. John, starting from the principle opposed to our own, arrives by legitimate consequence at an opposite conclusion. See his note at p. 52.

* It may be as well to point out, that no one can be further removed than F. Newman, from holding the opinion which in this one passage the Bishop seems to express. For instance, F. Newman regards as ex cathedrâ all the Pontifical Acts on which the Syllabus was founded. We should like to know how many there are of them, which *express* their own ex cathedrâ character.

it were always necessary to an ex cathedrâ utterance that the Pope should *expressly declare* its character, there would be no possibility of doubt on the question, which Pontifical utterances are ex cathedrâ and which are not. But the Bishop says (p. 5) that in "*a hundred*" cases the question is one of real difficulty. "It is the business of theology," he adds, "to support the different views which may be taken of this question by such arguments as it has at its command, and probably in this way to bring it to pass, that the right view *should become* the generally received view."

But further, if the Bishop had intended deliberately to maintain what he had affirmed in p. 51, he could not have written a single word of his fourth chapter. The whole argument of that chapter is as follows. Dr. Schulte alleged, that the various conditions of an ex cathedrâ Act on which Catholic controversialists had insisted, were mere "pleas devised" by those controversialists "to quiet the conscience" of their readers. No, replies the Bishop; Catholics insist on no other conditions, than those laid down by the Council itself. This is the one argument of his whole fourth chapter. But most certainly (as we have said) it is not one of the conditions laid down by the Council, that an ex cathedrâ utterance must express its own ex cathedrâ character; and this therefore cannot possibly be one of the conditions, on which the Bishop intended to insist.

Lastly, there is another paragraph of the treatise bearing on this particular subject, which is so much out of harmony with the rest, that we were unwilling in April (p. 337, note) to argue from it, because we suspected some mistranslation. On referring however to the French translation, we find that there also it appears; and the Bishop's intention is further made manifest (which we had not observed) by the quotation from Bellarmine which presently follows. The passage runs thus:

> As doctrinal definitions comprehend doctrines respecting the faith as well as doctrines respecting morals, it will often happen in the nature of things that definitions on the latter of these two subjects, viz. morals, will be issued to the universal Church *in the form of a command or prohibition from the Pope.* (Præcepta morum) (p. 44).

Now for our own part we are far from doubting, that the Pope is infallible on matters of universal discipline; or in other words that he is infallibly prevented by the Holy Ghost from issuing commands to the whole Church, which cannot be obeyed without transgression of God's Law. But what surprises us in the Bishop's statement is his opinion, that these "commands or prohibitions" will often be such "doctrinal definitions" as are contemplated by the Vatican Council.

According to this view—so far from the condition of p. 51 being necessary to an ex cathedrâ utterance—it is not even required for such an utterance, that the Pope shall *express any doctrine whatever.* A Pope's command, that this shall be done or that shall not be done, is often (according to Mgr. Fessler) by itself an ex cathedrâ definition of faith. We believe the Bishop stands quite alone in this opinion. Certainly no other theologians we know,—however firmly convinced of the Pope's infallibility in universal discipline—ever confused that infallibility with the infallibility of his ex cathedrâ teaching.*

As we have said however, we apprehend that neither the extreme statement of p. 44, nor the equally extreme opposite statement of p. 51, can be fairly taken as expressing the Bishop's real mind. In pp. 4, 5 he lays down as having been "defined by the Vatican Council," "that the doctrinal decisions of the Pope upon faith and morals, provided with all those notes which were prescribed in the well-weighed Definition of the Council, are free from error." Now this "well-weighed Definition" does not so much as *hint* at any necessity, that an ex cathedrâ Act must express its own ex cathedrâ character. Those therefore who advocate such necessity, in the Bishop's judgment contradict the Vatican Definition: for they say that a Pontifical utterance, possessing all the notes mentioned in that Definition, is not nevertheless ex cathedrâ, unless it possess a further note on which the Definition is profoundly silent.

One further remark in concluding this particular part of our subject. Considering the absolute and unreserved assent due by every Catholic to all ex cathedrâ utterances cognisable by him as such, it may seem strange that they are not distinguishable from *other* pronouncements by more decisive and unmistakable marks; that (as Mgr. Fessler says) in "a hundred" cases a theologian has difficulty in deciding, whether some given pronouncement be ex cathedrâ or not.† But in the first place (as of course all Catholics admit) there are innumerable dispensations of Divine Providence, for which man is unable even to guess the reason. Then secondly, as we pointed out last January (p. 190), Catholics fully understand, that no

* F. Newman (pp. 134, 5, or 119, 120) speaks of the Pope's infallibility in certain moral precepts; but he has appended a note to his popular edition, explaining that the Vatican Council does not define such infallibility. So Mgr. Fessler himself—notwithstanding his language of p. 44—explains in pp. 126, 7, that the question of the Pope's infallibility in universal discipline is not touched by the Vatican Council.

† We need hardly explain, that this difficulty mainly arises from the difficulty of deciding for certain, whether there are sufficient indications of the Pope's intention to oblige assent.

obligation is incumbent on any individual, whenever at the moment there is a solid and well-founded *doubt* of the obligation. Moreover thirdly (as we also pointed out in January) the difficulty does not at all affect those who are truly loyal and docile to the Church; for these submit their intellect, not to ex cathedrâ utterances alone, but to every intimation they can possibly discover of the Church's mind. But now we add fourthly, that the circumstance to which we refer is in fact a real blessing. Even under existing circumstances a very unfortunate habit is not unknown among even well-intentioned Catholics, of drawing "a hard-and-fast line," between the Pope's infallible utterances and those which are not strictly infallible; as though interior assent were due only to the former class. In April (pp. 229–232) we showed how extremely alien is Mgr. Fessler from this spirit; but in some quarters it is certainly to be found. Now as things are, a very powerful argument is adducible against these indocile Catholics; and this argument would fall to the ground, if an unmistakable distinction existed in every case between those Pontifical utterances which are and those which are not ex cathedrâ. Take any one of these Pontifical Acts—so we would say to such a person—which you so readily disregard: if you are not certain that it is ex cathedrâ, still less are you at all certain that it is *not* ex cathedrâ. What can be more evidently and on the surface disloyal, than to disregard a pronouncement, which, for all you know, may be one of those which the Holy Ghost has protected—not only with that special watchfulness which surrounds every official Act of a Pope,—but even with that choicest assistance, which infallibly preserves from error its substantial teaching? In one word then, the uncertainty which at times indubitably exists whether some given Pontifical pronouncement be or be not ex cathedrâ, is a very valuable probation of the Catholic's intellectual docility. We treated this question ten years ago, and here subjoin what we said on that occasion.

Meanwhile an objection has been urged against our whole view, which some thinkers regard as very serious. They consider that "the gulf is infinite which separates that which is of faith from what is not of faith"; and they allege very truly that our theory presents Catholic doctrine in a most different aspect. To us, their objection appears as unphilosophical as it is untheological. Is it the case in secular science, that a line can be broadly and sharply drawn, such that all on one side of that line is absolutely certain truth, while all on the other is quite open and undetermined? Is not the opposite fact notorious? Some conclusions are absolutely established; others nearly so; others, again, under present circumstances, are much more probable than their contradictories, yet by no means sure not to

be afterwards disproved; and so, along a kind of graduated scale, we finally arrive at those, on which as yet one side is not more probable than the other. So in theology. One class of doctrines unquestionably demands the assent of divine faith. Of a second class, it is quite certain that they are infallibly true, and probable that they are an actual part of the Deposit. A third class are beyond all doubt infallibly true, yet with no pretensions to be strictly of faith.* Of a fourth class, it is more or less probable that they are infallibly true. A fifth class are almost certainly true, though not infallibly determined. And so by degrees we arrive at those, on which every well-instructed Catholic has full liberty to take one side or the other. Thus the pursuit of theological science becomes one sustained discipline of intellectual docility; thus the student is constantly reminded, that he thinks under the assiduous superintendence and direction of that Holy See, whose continuous infallibility is the abiding light of Catholic doctrine (January, 1865, pp. 52, 3).

IV. There was a fourth point, on which we examined in April Mgr. Fessler's statements: viz. the *frequency* of ex cathedrâ utterances. He holds on the one hand, against Dr. Schulte, that such utterances constitute but a small *portion* of the Pope's official pronouncements; and in this we of course heartily coincide. On the other hand, as we pointed out, the Address to the Pope, which he signed in common with his episcopal brethren, suffices to show that (in his judgment) *absoluiely* such utterances are far from infrequent. We extracted in p. 339 the passage from this address, to which we refer; and it may be worth while to add a few words in illustration of our argument. Let some given Pontifical Act be supposed to exist, in regard to which certain Bishops declare, that in this utterance the Pope, exercising his "supreme office," has "proclaimed" some "eternal verity"; has "smitten with his Apostolic utterance" some "error of the time," which "threatens" (in company with others) "to overthrow the natural and supernatural order of things and the very foundations of ecclesiastical and civil power"; that in this Act the Pope has tended to "dispel the darkness which perverse and novel teachings have shed over men's souls"; that this Act has enabled Catholics, on one point at least, to know "what they are bound to hold, retain, and profess." Let these Bishops be further supposed to add, that in this utterance "Peter has spoken by the mouth of Pius," "for the safe custody of the Deposit"; and that they feel themselves bound to confirm the said utterance, because they are deeply convinced that the Pope is by divine right "teacher of all Christians." No one would dream of doubting, that they contemplate this given Act as having been issued ex cathedrâ. But in the

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* That is, "de fide immediatâ."

Address, the Bishops say that Pius IX.'s voice in a figurative sense "never has been silent," so frequent has he been in promulgating utterances of this very kind. Such being the case —whatever might be true of other Bishops—no one can doubt, that *those who signed the Address* accounted Pius IX. to have spoken ex cathedrâ very frequently. But Mgr. Fessler was one of those who signed the Address, and the conclusion is obvious.

We now pass from particular questions to the treatise as a whole. Some few Catholics (as we said at starting) seem in some way to have imbibed a notion, that the treatise was partly intended as a kind of manifesto against certain "ultramontane" * and exaggerated expositions of the Vatican Definition, and as a protest in favour of some more moderate interpretation. Moreover, we find in various ways, that such persons suppose the DUBLIN REVIEW to be included among these "ultramontane" ultras. In reply however to such suggestions, we affirm with fullest confidence, (1) that in no single respect does our view of the Vatican Definition differ from the Bishop's; and (2) that throughout his treatise his readers (if they will only be at the trouble to distinguish his own voice from that of his commentators) will not find the faintest appearance of his contemplating the existence of any Catholic ultra party, which he supposes to interpret the Definition more largely than he does. We begin with the first of these two propositions.

We believe that the mistaken impression to which we have just referred, has partly arisen from some words of F. Gratry, which Mgr. Fessler's French translator thrust into his Preface, and which, as it happens, have been more than once quoted in the Gladstone controversy. F. Gratry, as is well known, had been a strong opponent of the Definition; and when—like a loyally-intentioned Catholic as he always was—he submitted to its teaching, he put forth the following explanation of his previous attitude:—

> I combated an inspired infallibility; the Council's Decree rejects inspired infallibility. I combated a personal infallibillity; the Decree gives but an official infallibility. Writers of a school which I thought excessive, were undesirous of limitation to infallibility ex cathedrâ, as being too narrow; and the Decree gives but infallibility ex cathedrâ. I almost feared a scientific infallibillity, a political and governmental infallibility; and the Decree gives but doctrinal infallibility in matters of faith and morals.

It is difficult to imagine how a writer, otherwise so well-informed as F. Gratry, can have fallen into what we must be

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* This very word "ultramontane" is used by F. St. John in the note at p. 111, on which we shall presently comment.

allowed to call so supremely absurd a tissue of misapprehensions. We can only account for it by supposing, that he never read a line that had been written on the subject by the members of that "excessive school," which made him so uncomfortable. Let us take his statements point by point.

(1) There was an "excessive school" forsooth, which advocated "an inspired infallibility." Even F. Newman has in some way received an impression (p. 172 or 156), that certain "courtiers and sycophants" have "ascribed" to certain Popes "the inspiration of the Apostles."* Now as it is not easy to see how such a thesis would be otherwise than actually heretical,—we would earnestly submit to F. Newman, whether he ought to have implied such a charge even against "courtiers and sycophants," without adducing some proof. However, let this pass. Now as to the *word* "inspiration" having been occasionally applied to the infallible determinations of Popes and Councils,—we showed in January 1870 (p. 223, note) that this has been at times done even by grave theologians. Thus Orsi calls S. Agatho's Letter "a divinely inspired Rule of the Catholic Faith"; and S. Leo himself said that the "Definition" of Chalcedon is "through *divine inspiration*" indubitably consonant in all things with true doctrine. The word "assistance" is no doubt the recognized word. And it is a far more appropriate one, because (by the confession of all) the divine interposition given on such occasions is (as F. Newman admirably explains in p. 132 or 117) "simply an external guardianship, keeping" Popes and Councils "off from error; as a man's good angel, without enabling him to walk, might on a night journey keep him from pitfalls in his way." True it is that, as F. Newman also points out, "there is a sense of the word 'inspiration,' in which it is common to all members of the Church; and therefore especially to its Bishops, and still more directly to those rulers" when assembled in Council. But such inspiration, we need not say, differs in kind from the "inspiration of the Apostles"; and we may fairly therefore ask F. Newman to name any single "courtier or sycophant," who ever ascribed such inspiration to any successor of S. Peter.

(2) F. Gratry further thinks, that those exaggerating writers whom he dislikes ascribe to the Pope a "personal," as distinct even from an "official," infallibility. According to them, we suppose, if the Pope, in chatting, says to some friend, "I like

* These are F. Newman's words: Mr. Gladstone asserts "that Popes . . . have claimed the inspiration of the Apostles, and that Germans, Italians, French have ascribed such a gift to him. Of course he means theologians, not mere courtiers or sycophants, for the Pope cannot help having such till human nature is changed."

Franzelin's explanation of the Galileo difficulty," such explanation is thereby known to be infallibly sound. What was the good Father dreaming of?

(3) The same singular thinkers, it appears, "were undesirous of a limitation to infallibility ex cathedrâ, as being too narrow." We are tempted to cry out, like members in the House of Commons, "Name, name!"

(4) Nay, so numerous and influential were these writers, that F. Gratry,—forgetting the Holy Ghost in his terror,—"almost feared" that the Council might infallibly define "a scientific, political and governmental infallibility." We should think that no other temperament can ever have existed, so imaginative and at the same time so timid as F. Gratry's.

That Mgr. Fessler's treatise would be violently at variance with such views as those repudiated by F. Gratry, was certain beforehand, since the Bishop was a Catholic. We suppose that, if he had spoken of them at all, he would have ascribed to them (as we should) the note of heresy.

So far then at all events, we are at one with the Bishop. Again we heartily follow him in pronouncing as a matter of course, that "the Pope is not infallible as a man, or a theologian, or a priest, or a bishop, or a judge, or a legislator, or in his political views; or even in his government of the Church." * No Catholic ever dreamed of thinking otherwise.

Again the Bishop constantly inculcates that, even in the case of ex cathedrâ utterances, their infallibility does not extend to preambles, arguments, or obiter dicta. In our former controversy on the extent of infallibility, there was no truth which we more prominently enforced than this. We were always urging it.

Undoubtedly, if the Bishop had represented the Vatican Definition as confining infallibility to the strict Deposit—or to a pronouncement of the note "heresy," with exclusion of minor doctrinal censures—or to cases in which the Pontifical utterance *expresses* its own ex cathedrâ character—we should have been earnestly at issue with him. But we trust we have conclusively shown, that he has made no such restriction whatever. And we consider therefore the first of our two propositions to be irrefragably established; we consider it to be irrefragably established, that we are heartily in accordance with his treatise, as regards his general exposition of the Vatican Decree. That we should agree with all his incidental statements,

* Except indeed—which is not a matter touched by the Vatican Definition—that we consider him in some sense infallible (as we have already mentioned) in regard to matters of universal discipline.

could not be expected of course in the case of any uninspired writer; least of all in that of Bishop Fessler, whose incidental statements by no means unfrequently contradict *each other*. But (we repeat) his general view of the Definition is precisely our own.

Our second proposition is, that there is no trace, throughout Mgr. Fessler's treatise, of his contemplating the existence of any Catholic ultra party; of any party, which he considers to interpret the Vatican Definition more largely than he does, and against which accordingly he is intending to protest. Our proof of such a proposition must of course be mainly negative; and we can only say, let any one produce if he can some passage which contradicts our assertion.

The English Translator has certainly answered our challenge by anticipation; and has adduced indeed in his support, not one passage, but an entire chapter. Dr. Schulte has a chapter headed, "Pleas devised to quiet the conscience, and their confutation"; and the Bishop replies to that chapter under the same title, pp. 111–131. At the beginning of this chapter (p. 111) the Translator appends a note, saying that "the 'pleas' here spoken of are the replies supposed to be made by *ultramontane defenders of infallibility*,—not by Fessler himself,—to the view maintained by Dr. Schulte." We cannot for a moment accept such an account of Mgr. Fessler's meaning. In the very next page the Bishop says, that "what Dr. Schulte really means by the term 'pleas devised to quiet the conscience,' is the true and essential meaning of the Definition of the Vatican Council." According to *the Translator's* version then of Mgr. Fessler, this last sentence may be thus truly paraphrased: "There are certain pleas, which have been devised by ultramontanes to quiet the conscience. They are no pleas of mine; but on the contrary they are ultramontane pleas, against which it is one especial purpose of mine to protest. Nevertheless they do but set forth the true and essential meaning of the Vatican Definition."

Surely the drift of this fourth chapter is very obvious. Catholic controversialists have, from 1870 downwards, urged against the Döllingerite heretics these two propositions: (1) that no Pontifical utterances have been defined to be infallible, except those possessing the conditions mentioned by the Council; and (2) that such utterances as those alleged by Dr. Schulte do *not* possess those conditions. To this the Professor replies, that such conditions are mere "pleas devised" by controversialists "to quiet the conscience"; to prevent Catholics from seeing, how much is included in the obligation newly imposed on them. The Bishop rejoins, that on the contrary the conditions on which he insists are neither more nor less, than what were laid down by the Council itself in the very act of *imposing* the said obligation.

The Bishop, we repeat, contemplates no *Catholic* opponent whatever; no opponent except Dr. Schulte and the Döllinger-ites. He contemplates no doubt Catholics who differ from him on the authority of the Syllabus; or on the Pope's infallibility in universal discipline; or perhaps on the sense of the "Unam Sanctam." But there is no trace from first to last of his contemplating any Catholics, who differ from him on the sense of the Vatican Definition. It must be admitted indeed, that some of his *commentators* have understood him differently. Thus, as we have just seen, the English Translator mentions (p. 111, note) certain "ultramontane defenders of infallibility," whom he supposes to be at issue with "Fessler himself." And at starting (p. vii.) he warns his readers against "exaggerated statements, even when made with good intentions"; "for," he adds, "it is precisely to these statements that the now open adversaries of the Church appeal, in order to place the true doctrine before their dupes in an odious form." Presently he says (p. viii.) that "Bishop Fessler was really the exponent of the mind of *most of* the German Bishops." We will venture to say that, as regards his general view of the Definition, "he is "the exponent of the mind of" *all* "the German Bishops"; and we may also add, of all the Italian, French, Belgian, Spanish, American, and English Bishops. Indeed we do not see how any persons can possibly differ in substance from his exposition of the Definition, without ceasing to be Catholics at all. According to the Translator indeed (p. x. note), at a certain moment Bishop Hefele "became satisfied, that Bishop Fessler's pamphlet expressed the true sentiments of the Holy See on the subject of infallibility." We do not understand what sentiments, other than Bishop Fessler's, *could* have been those of the Holy See on the subject of infallibility.

But by far the most important statements of the Introduction, as to this imaginary ultra party, are supplied (pp. viii.–x.) by an anonymous Roman correspondent of a German Catholic newspaper; the "Germania." Now Father St. John, with characteristic candour, takes care to point out one serious inaccuracy, which this letter contains. According to the correspondent, Bishop Hefele at first doubted, whether Bishop Fessler's "defence of the Vatican Definition" "would be accepted as sound at Rome" (p. ix.): whereupon, the latter Bishop told the former, "that he had received from the Pope himself a Letter avowing his satisfaction with it." Now we may be very certain that Bishop Hefele would not have approvingly quoted Bishop Fessler, so long as he doubted whether the latter prelate's doctrine would be accepted as sound at Rome. Yet the "Germania" itself mentions, what

must have been a notorious fact; viz. that the Bishop's Pastoral, when it appeared, made frequent quotations from Bishop Fessler's work (p. x.). According to the correspondent then, the Pope's Letter to Mgr. Fessler must have preceded, by some considerable time, Mgr. Hefele's Pastoral. Father St. John however points out (p. x. note), that the latter was published on April 10, 1871; while the former is dated April 27 of the same year.

This is not the only inaccuracy, into which the correspondent has ascertainably fallen. "The Pope," he says, "made himself thoroughly acquainted with the contents of Bishop Fessler's work; and as his own judgment of it fully corresponded with the judgment of the [theological] commission [which he had named for its examination,] he wrote a letter to the Bishop with his own hand, praising him for the highly valuable work, &c." The obvious meaning of this sentence is, that the Holy Father, having carefully read the treatise, assured the Bishop that he found it highly valuable. Now F. St. John has done great service, in publishing what the Pope actually did write. We reprinted the Letter in April (p. 329): and as those who read it will see, Pius IX. neither expressed nor implied that he had read a single word of the treatise; but confined his commendation to the excellence of its design and scope.* The Bishop had sent him a copy; and the Holy Father in reply said that he observed with much pleasure what the Bishop was doing. We are very far from intending to suggest, that had the Holy Father read it, he would have approved its execution less cordially than he approved its design. We merely wish to point out, how little pains this correspondent had taken to discover the exact truth, and how impossible therefore it is to place reliance on his other statements. Newspaper correspondents in general are not commonly thought the most trustworthy of mankind; and this particular unit of the number is proved to have made two not altogether trivial mistakes.

Indeed *three*. One of his flourishing statements is, that Pius IX. "wrote a letter *with his own hand* to the Bishop of St. Polten." F. St. John, on whose accuracy one may always rely, explains (p. iv.) that it was the *signature* which was written with the Pope's own hand: no very rare and out-of-the-way compliment.

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* We think there is much ground of complaint against the French translator. He published Mgr. Fessler's treatise, as "a work which has been honoured by an approbative Brief from Pius IX."; without giving his readers any clue for discovering, to *what particular feature of it* the Pope's approbation had been directed.

In fact we are inclined to suspect, that this anonymous writer is the founder of that pseudo-Fesslerian tradition, which we set forth at the commencement of our article. There is nothing in Gulliver's Travels, we are firmly convinced, more simply fictitious than this tradition; but the correspondent of the "Germania" had taken up the notion, and all his characteristic touches tend to engender belief in it. Bishop Hefele forsooth had feared that the Vatican Definition meant something extreme and dreadful; and (though he had himself been present at the Vatican debates) still he was not reassured, until told by Bishop Fessler that the Pope had read every word of the "True and False Infallibility," and strongly approved the moderation of its tone. Unless there is some evidence in reserve of which we know nothing, we do not believe a single word of all this. That Bishop Fessler sent Bishop Hefele the treatise, and that the latter made large use of it in his Pastoral, is of course simple enough; it is doubtless true; and it is in all probability the whole truth.

We cannot more suitably close our article, than by once more expressing our sense of the invaluable service rendered in Germany by the treatise. The Bishop did not dream of any other antagonists, except Dr. Schulte and his Döllingerite confederates; and of them his refutation is crushing. Of course we think that the work would have been much more valuable even than it is, if it did not contain those incidental ambiguities and inconsistences of expression, which are by no means few, and on which we have been obliged somewhat severely to comment. But the French translator, cited by F. St. John in p. xv., does not at all exaggerate its characteristic merit.

Important documents well known in France, the collective declaration of the German Bishops of May, 1871, the "Pastoral Instruction" of the Swiss Bishops, have already set the principles, drawn out in form by Mgr. Fessler before the eyes of such of my readers who are not theologians. People have seen in a general way how these principles have to be applied to Bulls and other Papal documents, of which the adversaries of Infallibility endeavour to avail themselves. But the great advantage of this work of Mgr. Fessler, and that which gives it a particular interest, is the application this author makes of these principles to such numerous examples. All that the adversaries of the doctrine have drawn from history in order to assail it, has furnished the illustrious prelate with the opportunity of placing these very facts in their true light. Thus has he been able to show to men of good will, but hitherto imperfectly instructed in the matter, that the doctrine against which their understanding rebelled is not the true Infallibility defined by the Council of the Vatican, but the creation of ignorance and of passion—in fact, "a false Infallibility."

Art. V.—PRINCE BISMARCK'S SPEECHES.

Les Discours de M. le Prince de Bismarck (1862–1874), *avec sommaires, notes et table analytique.* Berlin, Paris et Londres (1867–1874). Five volumes.

IN 1859, when the names of Magenta and Solferino were in every man's mouth, when French bayonets and Piedmontese gold were changing the face of Italy, and the Revolution was celebrating throughout Europe its triumphs won beyond the Alps, there were men in Germany who saw in the Italian conflict the prelude to a fiercer struggle in their own fatherland, "The Italian War (wrote the German democrat Lasalle) is not only sanctified by every principle of democracy, but it is an enormous advantage to Germany, for to her it brings salvation. Napoleon III., when he invites the Italians to drive the Austrians out of the peninsula, performs a German mission; he overthrows Austria, the eternal obstacle to the union of our country. If the map of Europe is reconstructed on behalf of the nationalities of the South, let us apply the same principles to the North. Let Prussia act without hesitation. If she does not she will have given a proof that monarchy is incapable of national action." Such were the thoughts of the school of Lasalle. To them German unity was the necessary corollary of the establishment of the revolutionized kingdom of Italy. And farther away, on the shores of the Neva, the same thoughts were working in the mind of one who was ere long to realize them in action. The Prussian ambassador at the court of the Czar, Count Bismarck-Schönhausen, a name then almost unknown to Europe, was following with anxious eyes the policy of Cavour. In him the Piedmontese statesman was to find a ready imitator on a far wider scale; and it was the Nemesis of Napoleon III. that from his policy in Italy came the inspiration which made Bismarck the Cavour of Germany, and that in a certain sense Solferino was but the forerunner of Sedan.

Three years later Count Bismarck became prime minister of Prussia. On September 23rd, 1862, King William placed him at the head of the cabinet. He was engaged in a close conflict with his Parliament on the army question; the ministry of Hohenlohe had just fallen; and he called to his aid the clear head, iron will, and daring courage of Count Bismarck, well known to him, but known to few other men in the whole world.

The Count had received a practical training in European politics such as falls to the lot of few statesmen. Elected in 1847 to the Diet of his native Saxony, and in the following year to the German Parliament, he had acted the part of a thorough Conservative, expressing opinions many of which were directly belied by his subsequent policy, but gaining little or no reputation for political sagacity, though all Germany applauded and laughed at his trenchant sarcastic wit. But he succeeded in winning the friendship of the king's brother, Prince William of Prussia. There was a community of feeling between the two men; something of that instinct which tells men that they understand each other, and can work well together to a common end. And so, when after the collapse of the Liberal movement in Germany, Frederick William, a prey to disappointment, failing in health of body and mind, and overawed by the policy of Austria, began to yield up the direction of affairs to a great extent to his more strong-minded brother, Prince William in 1851 obtained the appointment of Count Bismarck as representative of Prussia at the diet of the German Confederation. For seven years he held that post at Frankfort, and all that time he was working with heart and soul to oppose at every turn the policy of Count Rechberg, the envoy of Austria. Close was the struggle between the two statesmen, but Bismarck was wily enough to show a bold front without ever giving his adversary the pretext for an open rupture. In 1858 his mission ended, and he was sent to St. Petersburg by Prince William, then Regent of Prussia. There he formed a cordial friendship with the Emperor Alexander, and laid the foundation of that intimate understanding between Russia and Prussia the practical working of which we are now witnessing. In 1861 the Prince Regent became king, and one of his earliest public utterances was a warlike speech in which he told his generals that Prussia's best hope was in her army—men knew not then what a terrible weapon it was. In the following year he transferred Bismarck from St. Petersburg to the Tuileries. There the Count had ample opportunities of studying the character and policy of Napoleon III. To the Imperial Court an *entente* almost amounting to friendship seemed to reign between the Emperor and the Prussian ambassador; and when, after a stay of only a few months, Count Bismarck suddenly left Paris in September, 1862, to be the head of the Prussian Government, he took with him the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour.

From that time to this Bismarck has pursued one consistent line of policy. Looking at isolated portions of it, separated by long intervals of time, it may not seem thus consistent with

itself. But, viewing it as a whole, we see how during those twelve years it has been gradually but steadily developed, each act preparing the way for that which was to follow, no point once won being ever lost, no step deliberately taken being subsequently withdrawn. Viewing it in the light of moral right and wrong—the only true criterion of the acts of every man whether prince or peasant—we must emphatically condemn his policy from first to last; but at the same time we cannot but appreciate the power, the daring, the infinite resource, the unbending resolution which was needed to carry it into effect; and we cannot wonder that in this half-pagan age of ours, when all things are judged by their success, the "man of blood and iron" is the idol of millions. If we wish to review the work of those twelve years in which he has made himself all but the dictator of Europe—if we wish to know the typical statesman of to-day, to study his policy, and appreciate his position as he views it himself—we have only to turn to the five volumes which contain the record of his speeches as minister of Prussia, chancellor of the North German Confederation, and Prince-chancellor of the new German Empire.

We cannot judge of Prince Bismarck's speeches by the ordinary rules of rhetorical art. With him it is impossible to separate the statesman from the orator. Their literary power is of no account beside their political significance. There is no attempt at eloquence, at oratorical ornament, at the ordinary graces of style and diction. What he has to say he says briefly, quickly, boldly; he appeals to his own knowledge of politics as the best of arguments; if he attacks an opponent he does so with a hurried impetuous onslaught, seeming to wish rather to trample down resistance than to carry conviction to the minds of his audience. There are few of the conventionalities of the Parliamentary speaker; there is still less of the art of the practised orator. But in this long series of discourses we find what is far more valuable,—a continuous and closely-connected exposition of his policy, a record of his achievements, and the visible stamp of his character as a statesman and a man, in which we can trace in bold but unmistakable outlines his views, the means by which he seeks to execute them, and the ultimate objects at which he aims.

But first a word as to the precise value of this record of Prince Bismarck's speeches. It is a republication of the official verbatim report made by the shorthand writers appointed by the State to record the proceedings of the Parliament. But these reports were invariably more or less corrected before publication by Prince Bismarck himself. In the Landtag of 1863 the Liberal leader, Dr. Virchow, drew attention

to some of these corrections, and called forth an explanation on the part of the Prime Minister.

I do not blame the reporters (he said) for not being always able to follow the exact words, especially when a man speaks quickly, as I often do ; and so I find that a reporter must be very well practised to be able to follow me, and that very few reporters are practised enough for that. There is a visible difference in the reports at each change of reporters, some things being omitted and others given in a way in which they were not put by the orator. A correction will, therefore, be always necessary. And it is very difficult to fix a rule or limit to these corrections, for each one can only have recourse to his own memory for what he believes he said. Besides I have not time for a minute correction and complete revision, for I have other and more important affairs to attend to. Indeed I feel the want of time to such an extent, that the necessity for a revision (from which I would gladly dispense myself) might often make me keep silence rather than have to correct what I would say.

We may expect, then, to find over harsh and violent expressions toned down, awkward admissions made in the heat of the moment minimized, and the argument polished and made more telling and concise. But we have still here the substance of the speeches, and the general form in which they were spoken, with the additional advantage that they have received a careful revision, and have thus become the deliberate and studied expression of his views and policy, published with his official sanction.

The first thing necessary for Bismarck's policy was the army. Germany was to be "made by blood and iron," and he well knew that in this warlike age of ours bold words are worth little unless backed by strong battalions. But the National Liberal party, headed by Virchow, had fastened their opposition upon the army budget, and, supported almost unanimously by the Chamber, obstinately refused to vote supplies, and demanded a reduction in the military forces of the kingdom. The conflict then begun did not really end until 1866. Supported by the King, Bismarck steadily refused to yield, and but for that stubborn resistance the course of European history would have been changed, and Prussia would still be to-day what she was twelve years ago, and nothing more. The Upper Chamber was with the Government, but neither by argument nor entreaty could the Chamber of Deputies be induced to vote the budget. At length Bismarck prorogued the Parliament, and continued to administer affairs just as if the budget had been passed. When, therefore, the Parliament reassembled in January, 1863, the war of words blazed out again with increased fury, and on the

27th an address to the King was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies charging the ministry with having violated the constitution. Prince Bismarck's speech in reply was one of the boldest he ever uttered. He defended the position of the ministry, and defined its responsibility, and pointed out the limits by which he asserted the power of the Chamber was circumscribed. His speech contained an exposition of his idea of the Prussian constitutional system, and showed how utterly different it was from that of England, the ministry being really and not nominally the servants of the Crown, and therefore not liable to be displaced by a vote of the Chambers, a fact which has been sometimes overlooked by the English press when commenting on the affairs of Germany. He mercilessly criticised the address.

This address of yours (he said) claims for the Chamber of Deputies rights which either it does not possess or only shares with others. If you have the right, gentlemen, the exclusive right of definitely fixing the whole budget and all its details; if you have the right to demand of his Majesty the King the dismissal of ministers who do not possess your confidence; the right of fixing by the budget-resolutions the numbers and organization of the army, the right also—which the constitution nowhere gives you, but which you claim in your address—of controlling the relations between the executive and its organs; you would then be in possession of the entire power of the government in this country. Yet this is the basis of your address as far as it has any. To my mind your claims may be practically summed up in these words: "By this address the House of Hohenzollern is summoned to transfer its constitutional rights to the majority in the Chamber." . . . . You take advantage of your right of voting the budget to pass a resolution which it is impossible to execute, unless we want to disarm Prussia, and count as lost the millions that have been spent on reorganizing the army, in order that we may recommence that reorganization again next year. If you required us to execute your resolution (and I cannot suppose that an assembly like this would pass a resolution which it did not mean to have executed), you would demand of his Majesty the King the disbandment of half the infantry and a third of the cavalry, in all 119 battalions, I cannot say how many regiments. But your resolution could not be executed, for it applied retrospectively to the past.

Later on in his speech he hinted that the Crown had at least might on its side, and so would be certain to conquer in the end. "Gentlemen," he concluded, "the mission of Prussian royalty is not yet ended: it has not yet become a mere ornamental decoration to your constitutional edifice, or a useless wheel in the machinery of Parliamentary government."

Day after day the debate went on, and almost every day Prince Bismarck spoke in reply to one or the other of his

adversaries. One of the most remarkable of these speeches was that of January 29th, in which he had the effrontery to tell the Chamber that though they were constitutionally elected they could not be said to represent the country. And moreover he attempted a proof of this bold statement by showing what a small proportion of the electors had voted at the last elections, and expressing his belief that a large proportion even of those who voted were unable to follow the course of politics in the Parliament. A strange speech certainly for a nominally constitutional minister! But words like these are an index to his mind. He is not the man to allow his plans to be trammelled by constitutional forms; and, supported by the King, he was able to set the votes of the Chamber on the army-budget at defiance, though the deputies had on their side the public opinion of all Germany and the powerful influence of the Crown Prince. It is from this period we may date the ill-will, almost amounting to enmity, which it is well known exists between the Chancellor and the Heir Apparent—a fact which at an early future will perhaps have a deep influence on the destinies of Germany. Four years after, as Chancellor of the North German Confederation, speaking in the Federal Parliament, he referred triumphantly to this conflict, for Sadowa had then justified his acts in the eyes of most of his hearers.

As (he said) the previous speaker has expressed a certain amount of astonishment at my having devoted perhaps the best years of my life to disputing the right of rejecting the budget, I will ask him to recall one fact, that he cannot be sure that the army which gained last year's battles would have possessed its present organization, if in the autumn of 1862 there had been no one ready to conduct affairs by order of his Majesty, without taking any notice of the vote of the Chamber of Deputies on September 23rd in that year.

Evidently Prince Bismarck held that success justified all the means by which it was accomplished. He certainly was never particular as to the selection of these. While he was thus securing the continuance of the reorganization of the army, by flagrantly violating the constitution, he proceeded to gain his second object, namely, to conciliate the friendship of Russia by a far more iniquitous course of proceeding. Early in 1863 the violent policy of the military government established at Warsaw drove the Poles into open revolt, and the flame of insurrection spread rapidly through all the Polish provinces of Russia. There was no agitation in the Polish provinces of either Prussia or Austria, and the latter power refused to concert any measures with Russia regarding the insurrection.

But, on February 8th, Bismarck concluded a convention with the Russian Government, by which its troops were allowed to pursue fugitive Poles into Prussian territory, and carry them back prisoners across the frontier, to be sent to the gallows or to Siberia. At the same time Posen was virtually placed in a state of siege. These acts of the Prussian Government added to the excitement in Western Europe on the Polish question. France was burning for war with Russia, but England held aloof, and the Emperor would not act alone. It was fortunate for Bismarck that England hesitated. Had the Western Powers declared war against Russia, his policy would have been nipped in the bud, for the struggle between him and the Parliament was then at its height, and he would have found it difficult to drag Prussia into war in the interest of Russia. On the Polish question he was violently assailed by the Polish and Liberal deputies, and he made several speeches in reply, boldly asserting that it was Prussia's interest that the insurrection should be crushed out by Russia; for if it succeeded, the new state would claim Posen, Dantzig, and Thorn. Prince Bismarck is still consistent in his fear and hatred of Polish nationality. And there is little doubt that his persecution of that noble champion of the faith Cardinal Ledochowski, though begun on religious grounds, has been embittered and intensified by Bismarck's seeing in him the representative man of Catholic Poland. How else can we account for the exceptional severity and cruelty which it has been the glory of the illustrious prelate to suffer in his prison of Ostrowo.

Of Bismarck's speeches on the Polish question the most remarkable is that of February 26th, 1863, for it led to one of the strangest scenes ever witnessed in the Parliament of Berlin. A motion had been brought forward by Herr von Carlowitz and the Baron von Hoverbeck calling on the Government to observe strict neutrality in the affairs of Poland. In reply, Bismarck ridiculed the interest shown by the German deputies in the Polish question. "This enthusiasm," he said, "for foreign nationalities and national aspirations, even when they can be satisfied only at the cost of our own fatherland, is a kind of political malady, of which, alas! Germany seems to have the monopoly." He charged the deputies with factious and unpatriotic conduct. They had applauded Herr Unruh when he said that if the Government involved the country in foreign complications by its Polish policy, the Chamber would refuse any exceptional supplies. "This," said Bismarck, "is saying to foreign nations, 'Invade us, it is a favourable opportunity.'" A storm of outcries interrupted him, and he coolly congratulated the Chamber on its expression of indignation,

and then there was another outburst, but order was restored by the President Behrend. Bismarck then, amidst new interruptions, launched out into a personal attack on his opponent Herr Unruh; evidently he had lost all command of his temper, as he so often did in more recent sittings of the Reichstag, when he had received a home thrust from some Catholic member of the Centre. At length Herr Behrend, as President of the Chamber, called him to order, but Bismarck turned sharply upon him:—

> I take the liberty, Herr President (he said, amid frequent interruptions), to point out to you that I cannot recognize your right to exercise a disciplinary control over words pronounced by me. I have not the honour to be a member of this assembly; I have not adopted your regulations; I have had no share in the election of your President; I am not then subject to the rules of the House. The power of the President does not extend to the place which I hold here. The only superior authority which I recognize is that of his Majesty the King, and I know not what rule of law or article of the constitution subjects me to your President. (Interruptions.) I do not speak here in virtue of your rules, but in that of the authority which his Majesty has conferred upon me, and of the paragraph of the constitution which says that the ministers must be allowed to speak whenever they request it, and must have a hearing. (Interruptions.) You have no right to interrupt me!

The President then pointed out that he had no wish to silence the Prime Minister, but reasserted his right to call him to order. This Bismarck flatly contradicted, and was returning to his attack on Unruh, when the President threatened to close the sitting, and only then he returned to the question before the House. Let us try and imagine an English minister holding such language to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and we shall have some idea of the cool effrontery of which Bismarck is capable, and which, indeed, is one of the main features of his oratory. It was more by means of this than of anything else that he was able to hold his ground in the stormy years with which his ministerial career began. It was thus he was able to coolly assert that wrong was right and right was wrong; that the constitution had very little to do with the budget, and that ministers need not heed the votes of the House; that it was the interest of Prussia to violate international law in order that Russia might the more easily trample out the flame of Polish nationality. Thus, in defiance of the Parliament, he completed the reorganization of the army, drew closer the intimacy with Russia, and asserted the independence of the Crown, and its power to ignore the votes of Parliament.

But all this had aroused a dangerous spirit in Prussia. It was easy enough to stifle the voice of public opinion by proroguing Parliament, and suspending the more outspoken journals (for the press of Germany was not then the subsidized, spiritless engine of the State which, with few exceptions, it is to-day), but beneath the surface the storm was gathering, and had peace continued, had nothing occurred to divert the popular mind from internal conflicts to the sterner strife of war, and to rouse the spirit of national aggrandizement, 1864 might have witnessed an outbreak which would have forced King William either to abandon his favourite minister or to fall with him, and give place to his more popular son, the Crown Prince. But the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark on Nov. 15th, 1863, the accession of King Christian, the agitation in the Elbe duchies, the destruction of their local government by the new Danish constitution, the Duke of Augustenburg's claim to their sovereignty, and the support given to his pretensions by the German Diet, reopened the Schleswig-Holstein question, and gave Prince Bismarck the opportunity, of which he availed himself with such consummate skill, to obtain a respite from the struggle at home, and to open the first great act of his daring foreign policy.

Fourteen years before, when the first Schleswig-Holstein war was declared by Germany amid the tempest of 1848, Bismarck, then beginning his political career, and acting upon principles and advocating views which were diametrically opposed to his subsequent policy, had publicly denounced the war, "deploring that the Prussian troops had entered Sleswig to defend the revolution against the legitimate sovereign of that country, the King of Denmark." He said that a "*querelle d'Allemande*" had been forced upon the Danes, and he declared that "the war was a rash, unjust, and disastrous enterprise." This speech is not to be found in the present official series. His earlier oratorical efforts have never been collected. They are scattered through the German papers of 1848 and 1849; but if they were republished they would form a strange commentary on this series of ministerial discourses. He was now to adopt the policy he had then so vigorously assailed, but in circumstances ten times more difficult than those of the earlier crisis, and which taxed all his versatile and unscrupulous statesmanship, and called forth all his headlong courage.

In virtue of the Treaty of London, signed by Austria and Prussia on May 8th, 1852, under the mediation of Russia, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been reunited to the Danish monarchy, and the two powers acknowledged Prince

Christian of Glucksburg as the future king. But the German Diet had always refused to recognize this treaty, and asserted that the law of 1650 was still in force, by which the Duchies were not united to the state of Denmark, but only to the direct line of the Danish kings, and were to revert on its extinction, not to the branch of Glucksburg, but to the German ducal family of Augustenburg. Accordingly when King Frederick died the Diet warmly adopted the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg, and on December 7th decreed the occupation of Holstein by Saxon and Hanoverian troops; thus showing at the outset its fear of Prussia. But before this crisis the question had been more than once discussed in the Prussian parliament. The treaty of London guaranteed the autonomy of the Duchies under Danish rule, and this was certainly violated by the new Danish constitution proposed a few months before the death of King Frederick. On the 17th of April Herr Twesten had asked if the Government considered itself bound by the treaty of London, at the same time urging that war with Denmark would be very unadvisable, and quoting Count Bismarck's former speeches to that effect. In his reply Bismarck adopted his favourite tone of haughty defiance. He refused to be judged by his personal opinions of fourteen years before. The previous speaker, he said, had sought to calm the fears of Denmark by alleging that Prussia was weak and divided by the conflict in the legislature, and therefore was not in a position to make war. "But," he went on, "I can assure you, gentlemen, that if we think it necessary to declare war, we shall do so, whether you give us your approval or not." As to the treaty of London, he said, the Prussian Government felt that Denmark had violated the autonomy of the Duchies, and Prussia and Austria, as signatories of the treaty, were prepared to support it.

This was plain speaking, but he knew that a bold course of action was the only safe one for him. He had already secured the support of Austria, and by inducing that power to declare a state of siege on the Polish frontier in Galicia, he obtained an assurance of the neutrality of Russia, interested as she was in the fate of the Duchies. The dynastic element was not introduced into the question until the accession of Christian IX. in November, and then the vigorous action of the Diet in support of the Duke of Augustenburg hurried on Bismarck into armed intervention. By his advice Prussia and Austria asked the Diet for authority to occupy the Duchies on the part of Germany with their armies, instead of the Saxon and Hanoverian troops. The authorization was refused, and then the two Governments resolved to occupy Schleswig and Holstein in their independent capacity as great European powers. As to

the ultimate fate of the Duchies nothing was agreed. Austria never asked Bismarck what it was to be, thinking perhaps that the matter was virtually decided, first by the joint guarantee of their local independence by the treaty of London, and then by the application to the Diet, which would naturally imply the decision of the question with a view to German and not merely Prussian interests. On his side Bismarck carefully concealed his real intention of annexing the Duchies to Prussia, as it would have unmasked his plan of eventually driving Austria out of the Confederation, and at the same time he studiously abstained from doing or saying anything to favour the claim of the Duke of Augustenburg, though he could not directly condemn it, or even show a marked antagonism to it, without endangering his relations with Austria. It will thus be seen how difficult was his position, and how daring his projects. He had induced Austria to ignore the decrees of the Diet, and thus establish a fatal precedent for her own expulsion from Germany in 1866. The Liberal party in the Prussian parliament saw their opportunity, and brought forward a resolution condemning the policy of Bismarck as to the proposed occupation of the Duchies by an Austro-Prussian army in defiance of the Diet, and threatening to refuse supplies in order to prevent its execution. Bismarck had already spoken on the subject before a committee of the house; he complained that in their *procès verbal* they had reported his words incorrrectly, expressing the idea truly enough, but more bluntly and frankly than he wished to formulate it.

The conclusion of my discourse before the committee (he said) has not been accurately reported. I have been made to say : " In a question like this the distrust between the Government and the Chamber of Deputies cannot be reciprocal. The Government would wish to be able to act with supplies constitutionally granted by the Chamber. But if it refuses these necessary supplies, the Government must take them wherever it can find them." I did not express the idea so bluntly ; what I said was : " We confidently expect that on your part you will vote in a constitutional manner and to their fullest extent the supplies which we require, and require so urgently that we must take them wherever we can find them." The idea is the same, but it is expressed more moderately, and it has not the crude, blunt form under which it appears in the report.

Thus it will be seen that from the first he assumed a position of independence of the Parliament. If they approved of the war, he would be all the better pleased to have their support, but if not, he would ignore their displeasure. If they voted supplies, it would be very satisfactory to be able to act for once in a constitutional manner, but if not, money should be

found for the war, and he would take it. And this model minister of absolutism, ready to act like another Richelieu, is the man of all others who is the hero of the Liberal press of Europe—because he hates and persecutes the Church.

On this occasion, in order to avoid informing the House of the views of the ministry, he read a despatch which they had addressed to the German courts, and which purported to be a complete exposition of these views, but was carefully written so as to pledge the Government to no particular line of policy. It spoke of the impossibility of the existing state of things being allowed to continue in the Duchies, deprecated any hasty decision on the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg, and proposed that they should be referred to the consideration of the Diet at some future date (ignoring the fact that by a formal vote the Diet had already decided the question); finally it proposed, as a possible alternative, the constitution of Schleswig-Holstein into an independent state under the Danish crown, but guaranteed by Germany, and holding the same position with regard to Denmark as Norway does to Sweden. This was a wily proposal of Count Bismarck's, for it effectually masked his real object while placing no obstacle in the way of its realization, for even had it been adopted, the claims of the Augustenburg family would have been discredited, their supporters in the Diet defeated, and Prussia would be still free to find some opportunity for asserting that Denmark had violated the compact, in order to overrun the Duchies as she did in 1866. But he knew very well that the proposal would not be accepted; it was only a mask for his policy, and so successful was it that more than one writer on the events of 1864 has seriously asserted that Bismarck was friendly to Denmark, wished to preserve the Duchies to the Danish crown, and was only forced into aggression by the course of events.

The discussion was resumed next day, and evoked another speech from Count Bismarck. We dwell upon those earlier debates, because the utterances of Bismarck on these occasions throw a clear light upon his later career, and, viewed in connection with his subsequent conduct, show very plainly what are his real aims, what is the true character of his policy. We have seen already how small is his claim to the applause of the boasted guardians of constitutional freedom, the so-called Liberal party, who are to-day supporting in Germany the foulest of tyrannies. Let us now examine for a moment his claim to be considered the champion of German unity. It has been loudly asserted that Bismarck, beginning the work in Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, and completing it at Versailles

in 1871, has realized what was for centuries the hope and prayer of the German people, by founding a German nation. We reply, that he has no more given real unity to Germany, than his precursor Count Cavour gave true unity to Italy. Prussia is the Piedmont of Germany, as Bismarck is her Cavour. Cavour was above all and before all a Piedmontese; in the same way Bismarck is and always has been above all and before all a Prussian. It has been his boast for thirty years. He has subjected all the minor states to Prussia, and called this new state the German Empire. Again and again he has asserted that he is a Prussian, that his policy is Prussian, and again and again he has ridiculed and assailed the idea of German unity.

"We are Prussians," he had said, in the Parliament of 1849, "and Prussians we desire to remain. I know that in these words I utter the creed of the Prussian army, the creed of the majority of my fellow-countrymen, and I hope to God we shall continue Prussians when this bit of paper is forgotten like a withered leaf of autumn."* The same spirit showed itself in his speeches in the Schleswig-Holstein debates of 1863-64.

> We are reproached (he said) with having nothing in common with Germany. There must be some singular charm in that word "German." We see every one trying to appropriate it to himself. Each one calls whatever is useful to him, or advantageous to his party, "German," and the meaning of the word is changed according to need. And thence it comes that at certain epochs it is called "German" to oppose the Diet, while at other times it is "German" to take the part of the Diet, when it adopts a progressist policy. And so it comes to pass that we are accused of wishing to have nothing in common with Germany, in order that we may pursue our own interests. But I can with justice hurl back this reproach at you. You do not wish to have anything in common with Prussia, because from the standpoint of your party and in the interest of your party, you do not wish Prussia to exist, and because you wish that Prussia should cease to exist, or exist only as a province of the National Union.

This was his view always. He refused to subordinate the interests of Prussia to those of Germany. The exaltation of Prussia,—that was his one idea. As to the German national party, he ridiculed, as we have seen, their aspirations. They should clearly define, he said, "where 'Germany' is, what 'Germany' is, and what is to be understood by the 'interests of Germany.' And to these questions one might give as

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* Hesekiel, "Life of Bismarck."

confused a reply in the political sense as the song of Moritz Arndt gave in the geographical." *

So the debate went on from day to day, Bismarck ever ready with a reply; now calmly arguing with his opponents, now assailing them with fierce invective, now using the weapons of banter and ridicule. Once, in replying to Dr. Virchow, he told him that he was too ignorant of politics to understand the question,—so ignorant indeed that he was not aware of his own lack of knowledge. And he did this not in so many words, but by a supposed case of some rash student opposing Virchow himself in his own lecture-hall.

I will not follow the previous speaker (said Bismarck) upon the historico-political ground which he has taken up. I will just ask him a question. Does not he think it possible that in that special branch of science which he himself professes, some one who had a taste for anatomy but did not make it his chief study, might, speaking before an audience personally well disposed to him, but not so profoundly versed in the science as the honourable member,—addressing himself, I say, to this audience, might not such an orator put forward most convincingly,—and perhaps even with all that eloquence with which the honourable member himself is gifted, —put forward, I say, in this specious manner anatomical principles which the honourable member, deeply skilled as he is in that science, would consider perfectly erroneous, and yet he would only be able to refute them before an audience as familiar as himself with all the details of the subject?

This was Bismarck speaking with a perfect command of his temper, and therefore able to coolly decline giving any reply to his formidable opponent, by telling him, in a kind of simile, that neither he nor the rest of the House could understand the reply he would be able to give to an audience more experienced in political affairs. Again he told the House that their opposition to his policy, their refusal to authorize a loan for the war against Denmark, only proved that they did not really represent the Prussian people.

If the people of Prussia (he said) had the same sentiments as you, I should simply say that the Prussian State had outlived its epoch, and that the time was come when it should give place to some other political organization. (Then, after quoting the words of Frederick William I., the father of Frederick the Great—"I am building up the sovereignty like a bulwark

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* An allusion to the famous song of Arndt, the watchword of the Unionist party:—

> Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?—
> So weit die deutsche Zunge klingt.
>
> What is the German Fatherland?—
> As far as sounds the German tongue.

of bronze," he continued): That bulwark of bronze is standing still. It forms the foundation of Prussian history, of the glory of Prussia, of Prussia as a great power, of constitutional royalty; and you will be able to overthrow this bulwark of bronze neither by your National Union, nor your motion of to-day, nor your *Liberum Veto.*

But it was all in vain. The Parliament heard his angry speech, and then by an overwhelming majority voted an address to the king refusing to grant supplies "to a ministry which lived in a state of war with the constitution." But Bismarck was not to be stopped in his career by Parliamentary votes and addresses. He took no notice of the opposition. He had defied the German Diet, and he now ignored the Prussian Parliament. As he had threatened, he took the money for the war wherever he could find it, that is to say, he levied the taxes just as if the budget had been voted. On the 1st of February the Prussian and Austrian armies entered the Duchies. The Danes had been encouraged to resistance by the declarations of the English ministry; but Napoleon remembered well how England had refused to act with him on the Polish question, and he now declined to support England in opposing the dismemberment of Denmark, and so the Danes were left to struggle single-handed against tenfold odds. Right gallantly they fought behind the ramparts of Duppel, but their stronghold was captured, Jutland overrun, Alsen invaded; and then the treaty of Vienna separated Schleswig-Holstein from the Danish crown. It was Bismarck's object to keep the fate of the Duchies still undecided, and, strangely enough, the indolence or carelessness of the Austrian ministry allowed him to accomplish this. No word was inserted in the treaty precluding Prussia from annexing the Duchies. "Every morning," said Bismarck, later on, "I expected Count Rechberg to come and ask me to sign a declaration that neither power should derive any territorial advantage from the treaty." But, by a strange fatality, Rechberg never took this simple precaution, and the first act of the political drama closed, leaving Bismarck free to pursue his policy unhampered by treaty obligations.

When he met the Parliament again in 1865, the conflict on the budget was resumed, but he was able to appeal triumphantly to the success of his policy in the Duchies, and to assure the deputies that he had a great object before him, and that he was working towards it as persistently as ever, though he was unable to tell them what it was.

Had I been able (he said) a year and a half ago to openly tell you in this House what was the object at which we then aimed, I think, gentlemen,

that you would not have made such a determined opposition to us. You are of opinion that, driven by the current of events, we have from time to time modified our object and our aims. But one day, when you will have the opportunity of reading the records of other proceedings, having quite as official a character as those of this House, you will see, gentlemen, that since December, 1863, *our object has never changed.* And in the same way, if we could tell you to-day what prospects we have of bringing our policy in the Duchies to a successful issue, and by what steps we consider that this result should be obtained, if we could give you as clear an explanation of our affairs as I give to His Majesty the King, I think that your lively opposition to our policy would become a little quieter. At least, if you were better acquainted with the technical department of diplomacy, you would not press us in this way, so as to place the ministry in the dilemma of having either to keep silence, and so seem to acknowledge the truth of what you say, or to refute you, and in so doing express opinions which, for political reasons, it would be better to keep in the background. We have been reproached with saying too much and doing too little, with taking a long aim and firing too late. I have indeed been surprised at this complaint, for really I expected that we would be reproached with saying too little about what we wish to do, so as to give you the mortification of not being always able to know exactly what object we are aiming at, and what means we are adopting in order to attain it.

During all this period, from the treaty of 1864 to the war with Austria, Count Bismarck had to exercise considerable self-command, and often to listen thus to the attacks of the opposition without making any attempt to refute them. He spoke very seldom in the Parliament, he said very little about either his policy or his aims. These were indeed matters "which, for political reasons, it would be better to keep in the background." Thanks to General Della Marmora, we now know pretty well what those reasons were. It was the most active period of Bismarck's career. He was negotiating the alliance with Italy, out-manœuvring Napoleon III., and leading Austria step by step towards the fatal rupture of 1866, while at the same time he had to contend at home with the Liberal opposition in the Chamber on the one hand, and, on the other, with the unwillingness for war on the part of the King and of the Court party generally. There are few speeches of Count Bismarck which date from this period; certainly he could not be reproached with saying much and doing little; for he worked on steadily and in silence. He had too much to do, he said, "to waste his time and his lungs" in arguing with the opposition, and when he spoke on political affairs it was not in the Chamber but in his cabinet, battling with the reluctance of the King, or cementing the alliance with the Italian envoy Govone, a man almost as wily

as himself, or on his short summer holiday walking on the sands at Biarritz in friendly chat with the French Emperor, leading him more and more astray with every word he said. We may pass briefly over this eventful period for two reasons. First, our subject is Bismarck's speeches so far as they reflect his policy and his character, and this was for him a time fruitful in action but not in words; and again, we very fully discussed it in these pages not long ago, on the occasion of La Marmora's revelations.* We pass on, then, to the next period of Bismarck's political career.

The Seven Weeks War of 1866 had placed Prussia, under the guidance of Bismarck, at the summit of power in Central Europe. While Von Falckenstein crushed the armies of Southern Germany, the mass of the Prussian forces, led by Von Moltke and the King, had poured into Bohemia, shattered the power of Austria by one deadly blow on the field of Sadowa, and dictated a treaty of peace with their vanguard in sight of Vienna. Of the states which had cast in their lot with Austria, some became the provinces of Prussia, others her allies, in a sense which made them more truly her tributaries, and the old Confederation disappeared to give place to the North German Bund, of which Prussia was rather the ruler than the leader, and this state of things continued until new and more startling triumphs on the battlefield enabled Bismarck to give a further development to his policy by proclaiming the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns, in the old palace of the French kings on New Year's day, 1871. His speeches, delivered in the interval between 1866 and 1871, divide themselves into two classes,—those addressed to the Prussian Parliament and those delivered in the Reichstag, or Federal Parliament of the North German Confederation. But though strict order would necessitate our following this arrangement, we prefer to take such of his speeches as illustrate our subject, rather in their chronological than in their local sequence.

The events of 1866 naturally modified Bismarck's relations with the Prussian Liberals. They saw him using the might of Prussia to draw Germany together into a forced unity under her supremacy; in his public utterances they could trace overtures made to them for their support; he spoke of the necessity of union between all parties; he ceased to assert, as he had previously done, the subjection of the Chamber of Deputies to the Crown and the Upper Chamber in the matter of the

* See the DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1874, article: "Prussian and Italian Diplomacy in 1866."

budget; for the fact was he had fought and won the battle; the army was now securely organized, and moreover welded together by the stubborn strife of war. From this time, then, there was visible a gradual *rapprochement* between Bismarck and the Liberals, in whom he knew he would find the best allies for his future policy. The first mutual concession by which the Prussian premier and the Liberals began their alliance was the bill of indemnity of September, 1866, which secured the ministry from the consequences of their acts in ignoring the votes of the Chamber on the budgets of the four years from 1862 to 1866, when Bismarck had virtually made the King levy taxes on his own authority. On introducing the bill he told the deputies that he did not himself confess that he was in the wrong, he did not ask them to confess they were in the wrong, it was simply asking them to let bygones be bygones.

We desire peace with you (he said). We would have sought it sooner had we had any hope of obtaining it. We think we shall now obtain it, because you will perceive that the King's Government is not so remote from having the same objects in view as those at which most of you are aiming, as you have perhaps hitherto believed; is not so remote as you may have been led to believe by the silence of the Government on many points, on which silence was a necessity. This is why we believe we shall obtain peace. We seek it loyally. We have stretched out the hand to you, and the report of your committee is a guarantee to us that you will not reject it.

He was right in his surmise. The bill of indemnity was passed, and then for the first time in the ministry of Count Bismarck he was able to administer affairs with a budget legally voted by both the Chambers. And so began the connection between the Prussian chancellor and the Liberal party, which was destined to bear such fatal fruit for Germany. Strangely enough almost immediately after this the name of Hermann von Mallinckrodt (the great Catholic champion, whose death was deplored throughout the world only a few months ago) appears for the first time in those speeches. In the Reichstag of 1867 he began that course of opposition to Bismarck which he pursued with unflinching determination until his death. He was perhaps the most evenly-matched of all his opponents, and we cannot pass over unnoticed the first passage of arms between these formidable antagonists.

In the Reichstag Bismarck naturally said much less of Prussia than of Germany; and indeed during the discussions on the constitution of the Confederation he adopted in his speeches many of the well-worn commonplaces of the German Unionist party. On one occasion he had spoken somewhat vaguely of Germany having "passed through six centuries of

suffering." On the 12th of March, Herr von Mallinckrodt, in a speech on the war of the previous summer, asserted with perfect truth that Prussia had been the aggressor, and then added, in allusion to Bismarck's speech:—

Count Bismarck told us lately about Germany's six centuries of martyrdom. I think that this is not a correct method of reckoning, and that our national martyrdom should not be dated from the time when Rudolph of Hapsburg destroyed the castles of the robber-nobles in order to give internal peace to Germany.

There was a sting in the allusion to the house of Hapsburg as the foe of robbery and the friend of peace in Germany, and Bismarck felt the reference to Prussia as the aggressor of 1866. La Marmora's documents were not then before the world: with his usual astuteness Bismarck had forced the enemies of Prussia into declaring war, instead of making the declaration himself; so now, in defiance of truth, he flatly contradicted Von Mallinckrodt's assertion. Then he went on to say that he should protest against the views as to German history which had been attributed to him. The "six centuries" went back to a period anterior to that of Rudolph of Hapsburg.

I have reckoned (he said) from the fall of the Hohenstaufens, and I think I am right. The honourable member has allowed himself to make a little flank movement in favour of the robber-nobles. Whence arose the brigandage to which he refers? From the anarchy in the German empire during the interregnum? And whence came the interregnum? From the defection of the Guelphs and the victory of the Ultramontanes.

It was strange that in this first conflict between Von Mallinckrodt and Bismarck, the future leader of the Ultramontanes and the future chancellor of the Hohenzollern Empire, which was to renew the persecutions of the Hohenstaufen, the latter should allude to the downfall of that ill-fated race as the beginning of the woes of Germany, and speak of the Ultramontanes as the foes of the Empire, though, of course, only in a retrospective sense. Yet it truly shadowed out the mind of the man; his actual view of politics and his future policy were implicitly contained in that brief reference to the struggle between a German dynasty and the See of Peter, six centuries ago, which he himself was in a few years to imitate.

There were other speeches, too, in which the events of later years were dimly shadowed forth, or in which at least we can trace the tendencies which led to these events—speeches, for instance, in which the Polish nationality was violently assailed; in which the priesthood of Poland was condemned

for telling their people that they should vote as Poles and as Catholics; speeches in which Bismarck plainly told the Polish deputies that they represented not Poland but Prussia, and referred to the gallant deeds of the Polish *corps d'armée* on the fields of Nachod and Skalitz only to assert that the Poles had in battle with the Austrians "sealed with their blood their conviction that they belonged to the Prussian people." In all this we can trace the same animus which is visible in the fierce persecution of the Catholics of Posen and their heroic bishop at the present moment.

Of the other speeches of this session perhaps the most remarkable is that of the 28th of March, in which he made another concession to the Liberals by giving his adhesion to universal suffrage. And next in importance to this were two speeches, in which he made a very poor attempt to defend the retention of the Danish districts of Northern Schleswig in violation of the treaty of Prague, a breach of good faith on the part of Prussia which has now lasted nine years, and in all probability will last as long as Schleswig remains Prussian. But, for the most part, the speeches of this period had only a temporary and a local interest. It was a time of internal organization for Prussia and the North German Confederation. Bismarck was gathering the fruits of his victories of preceding years, and laying the foundations of the future Empire. It was a lull between two stormy epochs. There were few disagreements between Count Bismarck and the majority in the Chambers; and for the sake of this tranquillity he yielded many points for which he had violently contended in the period which ended with 1866—notably his theory on the incompetence of the Lower Chamber to reject the budget; and the question of the immunity of members of Parliament. On this last point he had long contended that liberty of speech in the English sense could not be permitted in the Prussian Chambers; but he now voted in favour of it, alleging that in doing so he was sacrificing his own private convictions for the sake of peace.

> On this occasion (he said) I act upon an opinion which I have often expressed in this very place; namely, that the constitutional life of a nation viewed as a whole consists of a series of compromises, and that the most important duty of a constitutional government is to favour mutual concessions amongst the great bodies of the State. A compromise can never be effected unless one is prepared, for the sake of a general agreement, to make a sacrifice of one's own convictions,—of sincere convictions, gentlemen, such as mine are, for I would speak of no other.

This is a principle on which Bismarck has acted on more

than one occasion, and it is a very convenient one, though somewhat difficult to reconcile with the possession of high principle in him who adopts it. Concession may be well enough on matters of minor importance, but Bismarck has applied his favourite theory of constitutionalism to affairs of serious import and with the most mischievous results. Thus it was that in direct contradiction to his utterances on the same subject in 1849, he last year gave his support to the civil marriage bill, and when taxed by the Catholic Centre with this apostasy from his former principles, he replied that his convictions were unchanged, but that he thought it right to sacrifice them to the exigencies of the time, acting as a minister of the Empire and not in his private capacity. This is the inevitable result of his theory:—in his opinion the political views of a minister need not necessarily regulate his policy, and the most cherished convictions are to be sacrificed for the sake of a compromise. This shows us how thoroughly the idea of the necessity of pursuing what is practically expedient at the moment, rather than what is theoretically good, has taken possession of his mind; to gain his predetermined end, that is his one object; success is his one criterion of good; arguments drawn from the first principles of right and wrong are but thrown away upon him. He never uses them himself, and apparently he does not understand them when used by others.

"How can I rule in Prussia, in Germany, in Europe?"—this is the question he has been asking himself, and answering in acts, since 1862. It is the key-note of his policy. We see it in his conduct in the crisis of 1862, in the affair of the Elbe Duchies, in the struggle with Austria, in the formation of the North German Confederation and of the Empire, and finally we see it to-day in his efforts to subject the Church in Germany to the all-powerful State which it has been the mission of his life to build up and to exalt. And that he is the virtual ruler of Germany there cannot be a moment's doubt. He does not hesitate to openly distinguish between the personal and the official acts of the Emperor, between those which he does in his individual capacity and those which are done in concert with the ministry, and to these last only does Prince Bismarck attach any importance. Thus, speaking in the Reichstag on the 18th of July, 1870, on the declaration of war by France, he denied that Count Benedetti had been in official relations with the Prussian Government, but, on the contrary, alleged that he was only in relation with King William at Ems, and his words lead to the necessary inference of the utter worthlessness of any pledges given to Benedetti by the king on that

occasion—pledges to which so much importance was attached at the time by those who wished to prove that Germany was assailed by France after making every possible concession.

All those personal declarations (he said) which they have endeavoured to obtain from his Majesty the King in private interviews, in which every appearance of good-will was manifested, and which perhaps they would have obtained if his Majesty did not maintain even in the intercourse of private life that firmness of character by which he is distinguished—all those declarations, I say, could not be acts of the State but only the expressions of an individual, so long as the monarch did not moreover formally confirm them in his capacity of Sovereign, and thus make known his wish to transform them into official acts.

This distinction so carefully drawn between the personal and the official acts of the Sovereign is an important one, and in this particular instance it shows how Bismarck held aloof from the conferences at Ems in July, 1870, determined to assert, as he afterwards did, the informal character of Benedetti's relations with the King; thus placing another obstacle in the way of the preservation of peace. He took no part in these negotiations, just as though he had been the sovereign and King William the minister, and it was only when the rupture with France was complete that he appeared upon the scene.

With the concluding volumes of this series of speeches we enter upon the latest and perhaps the most deeply interesting period of Prince Biamarck's career—that in which, after founding the German Empire, he revived the traditions of the Ghibelline Empire of former days by inaugurating the persecution of the Church in Germany. There have been many speculations as to what it was that prompted him to take this course. It has been said that the German persecution was begun because Prince Bismarck was intoxicated with the success of the German arms in France and of his own policy at home, and, like many another conqueror, in the pride of victory declared war against God's kingdom here on earth. But to us it seems that this is a very partial and superficial view of the origin of the Bismarckian persecution. It must be remembered that the mere glory of conquest, the flush of triumph, would not alone have been enough to induce the German chancellor to enter upon what even his own official press described at the very outset as a "doubtful and dangerous conflict with Rome." It was generally after a victory, too, that Bismarck was most conciliatory in his policy. His successes in 1866 were only secondary to those of 1870; Sadowa was eclipsed only by Sedan; the triumph of forming the North German Confederation was little less than that of

proclaiming the Empire. And yet it was in the period which immediately followed Sadowa that Bismarck made his most important concessions to the opposition, and showed indeed a marked anxiety to establish as far as possible a concord between all parties in the State. He knew that in thus welding together the various elements of German politics, lay the best hope of stability for the new federal system which he had just founded. One would have supposed, then, that after the still more startling triumphs of 1870 he would have pursued a similar policy; and certainly such a course of action would have been dictated by true statemanship, and, had he adopted it, the prospects of Germany would have been far brighter than they are at this moment. And it is very probable that such would have been his policy but for one circumstance,—the triumph of Germany over France coincided in point of time with the beginning of the wretched Old Catholic schism, the first seeds of which were sown before the war and while the Vatican Council was still sitting. It has been said that before the war, too, Bismarck had resolved on inaugurating a policy of persecution in Germany. We have not yet seen any real authority for the statement, and there is more than one circumstance which tends to discredit it. His words to the Polish deputies in the Reichstag, shortly after the opening of the session of 1871,—when he told them that they were not elected to defend the nationality of Poland, but to watch over the interests of the Catholic Church, and that it was by doing so that they would best discharge their duty to their constituents,—do not look like those of a minister who was at that time determined to assail the very interests in question. The revelations of Count Arnim have proved that while the Council was still sitting there were not wanting evil advisers to urge the Prussian Chancellor to abandon the course of toleration which he had hitherto pursued, and assume a position of hostility to the Church on the pretext of the new definitions; but we doubt very much if Bismarck accepted this advice as soon as it was given, and we are rather inclined to believe that he assumed an expectant attitude, watching events without for the moment resolving upon any change in the relations between the State and the Catholic Church in Germany.

But, as we said before, the guiding principle of Bismarck's policy is the insatiable longing for command. He had raised Prussia to the lofty height of Empire, and he was himself the ruler of her destinies, and now came the temptation to endeavour to extend his power into a hitherto untried realm. Could he reduce the Catholic Church in Germany to the position of a tributary of the State, the Emperor William, and, for every

practical purpose, he himself, would rule over all Germany almost as absolutely as the Czar over Russia. A church which would obey the orders of a central bureau at Berlin would be an engine of government which he might well long to possess. The beginning of the Old Catholic schism seemed to point out a way to the accomplishment of this end—an end which but for this he would perhaps never have set before him. Alas!—

> "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
> Makes ill deeds done!"

The Evangelical Church of Prussia was already subject to the control of the State, as were all the minor Protestant communions to a greater or less extent. The inauguration of a movement among a few of the Catholics of Germany, which, based as it was on heresy and schism, endeavoured to obtain some support from the authorities by arrogating to itself a quasi-national character, doubtless seemed to Prince Bismarck to afford him some prospect of being able to reduce the Catholic priesthood to the same tributary position towards the State as the Lutheran clergy, and he probably thought that by judiciously encouraging and fostering the revolt from Rome, the wretched insignificance of which he exaggerated into an affair of great importance, he might eventually see a State Church take the place of the Catholic Church in Germany. As we have said, he at first maintained a merely expectant attitude, watching the progress of the movement, and aiding it by supporting the Old Catholic professors at Braunsberg, Breslau, and Bonn in their rebellion against their bishops. When this policy had been so far successful as to give the Old Catholics a rallying-point in two of the universities, he proceeded, but still slowly and cautiously, to other measures. Up to the end of 1871 he himself had not said a word against the Catholic episcopate, priesthood, or people of Germany either in the Reichstag or in the Prussian Chambers, but with the opening of 1872 the persecution began. Already the liberty of speech of the bishops and clergy had been seriously menaced, but the first step which really indicated the new direction assumed by the policy of the Government towards the Church was the abolition of the Catholic department of the ministry of Public Worship and Education, followed as it was by the resignation of M. Mühler, the minister who held that portfolio, and the appointment to the post of Dr. Falk, the *fidus Achates* of Prince Bismarck in the persecution of the Church. Up to that time the relations of the State with the Catholic Church had been guided by the advice of the Catholic department, wholly composed of Catholics,

while a "Protestant department" regulated those with the Lutherans and Evangelicals; but, by the abolition of this system, the regulation of Church affairs and education in Germany, both Catholic and Protestant, was placed under the absolute control of a knot of Lutheran and Liberal officials presided over by Dr. Falk. Then followed the secularization of the schools, the expulsion of the Jesuits, the Lazarists, and the Redemptorists; the State regulation of ecclesiastical education, the establishment of the high ecclesiastical court; in a word, the long series of arbitrary and penal enactments, the sum of which was completed in this present year by the wholesale spoliation of the clergy and the law for the suppression of the convents.

But before the persecution had begun the Catholic leaders of Germany had marked, with keen insight into the politics of their country, the first signs of the coming storm, and had formed for the defence of the Church the party of the Centre, which has so nobly, but alas! unsuccessfully endeavoured to uphold the cause of trampled right and justice against the ruthless might of the persecutors of Germany. Its leaders were men of whom any country might well be proud, experienced statesmen and accomplished orators like Mallinckrodt, Reichensperger, and Windthorst. The latter had been the minister of King George of Hanover, and in 1866 had distinguished himself by the gallant struggle which he made to sustain the falling throne of his royal master. Prince Bismarck had the bad taste to attempt, by a reference to this, to attach the charge of disloyalty to the Empire to Herr Windthorst and those who followed him, and to speak slightingly of him as a "great general who had long been without an army," "a man who had for some years formed a little political party consisting only of himself, but at last, *à la Wallenstein,* had found some followers." But Windthorst succeeded in forcing the Prince to withdraw all the imputations of disloyalty which he had levelled against him. It was in reply to this champion of the Church and his illustrious colleague, Von Mallinckrodt, that most of Bismarck's speeches on the Church question were delivered.

We have no intention of attempting a full analysis of these speeches, far less of recounting the story of the German persecution. It has been amply discussed by the whole Catholic press, and has called forth a unanimous and unmistakable condemnation of Prince Bismarck's policy, not from Catholics only, but from every non-Catholic sufficiently acquainted with the course of events in Germany to form a just judgment upon them, and unbiassed by party or by creed. But we must notice

one or two points in these utterances of the arch-persecutor, which it is well to bear in mind. In the first place, then, Bismarck's policy is condemned by his own words spoken in the earlier part of the conflict. We grant that they may have been the words of a hypocrite, uttered only to mask his real intentions, but none the less they condemn him. "I subscribe to the principle," he said, "that *every creed amongst us ought to have full liberty of action, and full liberty of belief.*"* How would the May laws stand the test of this doctrine, adopted by Prince Bismarck almost as an axiom on this occasion? "I have pointed out," he said later on,† "the desire of the Government to attain to peace on the religious question, and *its resolution to give every satisfaction to so numerous a body of our fellow-citizens as the Catholics of Prussia.*" How has this promise been fulfilled? At the same period, too, he spoke in very respectful terms of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. "Even if we do not believe it ourselves," he said, "*every dogma which is professed by so many millions of the inhabitants of this country ought, in any circumstances, to be held sacred by their fellow-citizens and by the Government.*"‡ And yet he has made that very dogma one of the pretexts of the persecution.

At this time Prince Bismarck used only moderate and guarded expressions in the Parliamentary tribune; it was not until later on that he began those violent harangues in which he recklessly levelled a hundred groundless accusations against the Church in Germany. He asserted the existence of a league between the French Government and the German Catholics; he charged the Centre party with revolutionary tendencies; he alleged that in Poland the priesthood used the confessional as the means of a political propaganda; and, finally, in defiance alike of facts and common sense, he attempted to show that the Catholic opposition had an international character, and to attribute to it a part in a great conspiracy against Germany, having its centre at Rome, to which the origin of the Franco-Prussian war was to be attributed.

This conflict (he said, on March 10th, 1873) is the same as that which under the name of the struggle between the Popes and the Emperors fills up the history of mediæval Germany down to the ruin of the German Empire, and which ended only when the last representative of the august imperial race of Suabia perished on the scaffold under the axe of a French conqueror in alliance with the Pope.§ We have been very near a similar solution

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* January 30th, 1872. † February 9th, 1872. ‡ January 30th, 1872.

§ Here again we see Bismarck's admiration for the persecuting Hohenstauffens; and his hatred of Austria shows itself in his dating "the ruin of the Empire" from their downfall and the rise of the Hapsburgs.

of the situation, modified to suit the manners of our time. Supposing that the French war of conquest, the declaration of which coincided with the proclamation of the resolutions adopted at the Vatican,—supposing that this war had been crowned with success, I do not know but they would have related here in Germany too the *gesta Dei per Francos.*

There were many other statements made by Prince Bismarck which would have been absurd but for their mischievous wickedness; but we doubt if any of them can be compared to this. He knew perfectly well that there was no strife between Rome and the German Government in 1870, and yet he makes this monstrous supposition of the Papal Court having inspired the war, arranged that its outbreak should coincide with the Definition of the Dogma of Infallibility (or, as he calls it, "the resolutions adopted at the Vatican"), and then sent Napoleon III., not as he himself proclaimed to vindicate the *principes immortels de* 1789, but to enact again the *gesta Dei per Francos.* Had we not the official report before us, we might almost hesitate to believe that such a mad theory was so much as alluded to even by Prince Bismarck in the Prussian Chambers.

His other charges against the Catholics of Germany do not need refutation. He has never even attempted a serious proof of them. We have given one specimen of his oratory on the Catholic question, and it is enough. The same daring and random assertion, the same unblushing disregard for even the appearance of truth, marks many others of his speeches in the period from 1872 to 1874, varied only by invectives against the Catholic party, in which we can trace his disappointment and discomfiture at the first great failure of his policy that he has ever known. Again and again he has been called upon both in the Prussian Chambers and in the Reichstag to give some proof of his charges. He has never done so yet. We have looked in vain through his speeches for even an appearance of proof; we have found none. To the demand for it, urged by the men whom he calumniates, he replies only by repeating his charges. On one occasion, indeed, he went so far as to refuse all proof. He had accused the priesthood of Germany of a want of patriotism. "Where is the proof?" cried Windthorst, interrupting him. "I do not see the offence of what I said," continued Bismarck, but he was interrupted again, this time by the loud outcry of the Centre and Right—"Give us proof! Give us proof!" "Well, gentlemen," he replied, "look for proof of it yourselves!" And this is the man at whose beck the so-called Liberals of Germany have voted away the liberties of their Catholic fellow-citizens.

Nor does Prince Bismarck spare in his attacks the Catholics of other countries. When a short time ago Count Münster so far forgot both diplomatic etiquette and ordinary good taste as to charge the Catholics of Ireland with disaffection and disloyalty, in his speech at the National Club, he did little more than condense the attack made by his master upon Catholic Ireland in a reply to Windthorst on May 16th, 1873, when Prince Bismarck had the effrontery to assert that the priesthood of Ireland and the Ultramontane press laboured to destroy the respect for the laws, to undermine authority, to foment discord, to keep open old wounds, and to excite hatred towards the government. From this alone we might judge how far Prince Bismarck can carry what has been euphemistically termed the "art of misrepresentation," when Catholic interests or the conduct of Catholics are in question.

Such is the character of Prince Bismarck's utterances upon the conflict between the Empire and the Church; and as we read them we ask ourselves, is this the same orator as the statesman who, in 1864 or 1866, could so brilliantly explain and defend his policy, even before hostile assemblies? There has been a fatal change since then. He has attempted the impossible, and he has not only suffered a crushing defeat, but he has imperilled the results obtained by all his former successes. He has trod in the steps of his favourite heroes, the persecuting emperors of the Hohenstaufen line, and he is thereby exposing the empire of the Hohenzollerns to the direst danger. Can he suppose for a moment that his policy is drawing together the Catholic and Protestant states of Germany, or that he is securing the devotion to the new empire of its Catholic subjects? Is he not rather by an intolerable tyranny, doing all he can to make the very name of the empire hateful to them, and to hopelessly alienate them from it; and yet they are among the most loyal of the population of that empire, as they proved by their acts in the crisis of 1870, and under a just and tolerant government they would be its most secure and most trusty support. And upon the other hand, what has Bismarck gained by the persecution? Nothing. It has been an utter failure. And still he pursues the same insensate policy,—still he says, as he said in the Reichstag three years ago, "You need not fear; we will not go to Canossa." * Let him read once more the story of his hero, Frederick of Hohenstaufen. He did not "go to Canossa." He too fought on to the bitter end in the strife against the See of Peter, and for him and for his race it ended on the fatal

* May 14th, 1872.

field of Benevento and the scaffold of Salerno, and history has scathed his name with indelible infamy. The record of the German persecution will form as dark a page in the annals of our own days. Up to 1871 Prince Bismarck might have been called the most successful statesman of modern Europe, but since then, plunging into a conflict with a power which is invincible, because the might of God sustains it, he has encountered nothing but defeat. He has yet time to repair the evil he has done, to withdraw from the impious course upon which he has entered and which he has so long pursued; but if he perseveres in his present policy, he can expect nothing but disaster for himself and for the empire over whose destinies he presides.

Art. VI.—FATHER DUMAS ON THE SYLLABUS.

Études Religieuses, May, 1875. Art. V.

ONE great incidental advantage has arisen from the recent Gladstone controversy; viz. that the mind of Catholics has again been directed to a careful consideration of the Syllabus. In proportion as this noble utterance is more attentively considered, two conclusions (we think) will come to be regarded as certain. The first is, that its promulgation was an ex cathedrâ Act; and the second is, that no Catholic can safely take part in his country's intellectual and political life, unless he bear the teachings of the Syllabus carefully in mind.

We observe then with very great pleasure, that F. Dumas is beginning a series of papers in the "Etudes" on this important subject; and that if we may take that already published as a specimen, the series will be distinguished by signal ability. This first article is occupied in defending the former of the two conclusions, which we mentioned at starting; viz. the ex cathedrâ character of the Syllabus. To this we shall confine our attention in the present article; reserving to a future number his account of what doctrines they are, which the Syllabus teaches. On our present subject our best course will be to translate F. Dumas's article almost entire; for it is very difficult to abridge it without seriously lessening its force. We

will therefore only make one or two preliminary remarks, and then offer F. Dumas himself to the study of our readers.

We would especially draw their attention to a fact, mentioned by F. Dumas and also by the late F. Schrader. Pius IX., it seems, after he had defined the Immaculate Conception, did not thereupon dissolve the Commission of theologians who had been engaged in preparing the Definition, but kept them still together, for the purpose of assisting him in his teaching office, by a careful theological examination of contemporary errors. And their labours—so it would appear—bore a very important part, not only in preparing the various Pontifical utterances on which the Syllabus was founded, but also in preparing the Syllabus itself.

It will be further seen, that F. Dumas agrees with the late F. Schrader, in regarding the Syllabus as an integral part of the "Quantâ curâ." There is one argument however adduced for this conclusion by F. Schrader, which has not occurred to F. Dumas, but which we ourselves mentioned in April, p. 345. The Syllabus is a recital of errors already condemned; while the "Quantâ curâ" is occupied in condemning *further* errors. Now Pius IX. expressly affirmed in the Encyclical, that the errors which he had already condemned are an evil "fountain"; and that those condemned in the Encyclical are such as "*spring forth from*" that "fountain." The result then of connecting the Syllabus with the "Quantâ curâ" was, that the Bishops had in their hands one ex cathedrâ Act, exhibiting the whole mass of anti-Catholic falsehood, which the Holy Father had condemned from the commencement of his Pontificate.

The only feature in F. Dumas's article with which we find ourselves out of sympathy, is the severity with which he refers to F. Newman's view of the Syllabus; without however mentioning F. Newman's name. For ourselves, as we said in April (p. 341), from the first moment when we read F. Newman's letter, we never could see in that view anything inconsistent with the humblest and most loyal submission to the Pope's magisterium. To accept as ex cathedrâ the whole body of Pontifical documents on which the Syllabus is based, indicates surely anything rather than a grudging view as to the extent of Papal infallibility. Nor (as we also said) can we see any great practical difference, between this doctrine, and the doctrine that the Syllabus itself was issued ex cathedrâ. Mgr. Fessler's view (to which apparently F. Dumas refers with less disapprobation than to F. Newman's) surely gives *less* scope to Papal authority, than does the eminent Oratorian's; and yet even this, so far as we see, does not very far differ from F. Dumas's in its practical results. See our summary of Mgr. Fessler's theory

in April, p. 346. So long as it is firmly held that every Catholic is bound to accept with interior assent the proposition, that the eighty theses were justly condemned in the sense in which the Pope originally condemned them,—we cannot ourselves see that any serious mischief is done to the integrity of Catholic doctrine.

We now proceed to translate the principal portion of F. Dumas's article.

We have to show then that the Syllabus is of itself, and independently of the Pontifical Acts which form its matter, a true teaching ; that this teaching obliges the conscience of Catholics ; and that it obliges their conscience, because it emanates from the infallible authority of the Head of the Church. We shall not have omitted (we think) any point adapted to throw light on this serious question, if, after having followed it through all its *détours* and having discussed all its difficulties, we succeed in showing this threefold character of the Pontifical work : viz. (1) its doctrinal character ; (2) its obligatory character ; and (3) its character of infallibility.

To say that Pius IX., when he denounced with such force to the Christian world the errors of our day, wished to teach us nothing, that he had no intention to instruct us,—to allege this was, even at the time of the appearance of the Syllabus, a very bold paradox ; but, to assert and maintain it now, when we are the happy witnesses of the effect produced by this immortal Act, is to speak against evident truth. The Syllabus is not indeed sufficiently known or sufficiently studied. Still though [comparatively] little known, no one can deny that it has already rectified many ideas, corrected and enlightened many minds. Thanks to it, not only the learned and those who are the most attentive to its voice, but all Catholics without exception have a better knowledge of the risks which their faith incurs from certain doctrines. They have been warned ; they are on their guard ; they have a more distinct view of the road they must follow, and the dangers they must avoid. Pius IX. has then lighted a torch, and guided them by its light.

What is the use then of playing with words, as if vain equivocations could destroy the striking evidence of this truth ? Let men say as much as they please—"the Syllabus is a mere list, a catalogue, an index of contents, a recital of propositions formerly condemned"—will they have gained anything ? . . .

Is not *every* series of propositions condemned by the Pope a "mere list"? Did not Martin V. and the Council of Constance, Leo X. and S. Pius V. draw up a "catalogue," when they anathematized the errors of Wickliffe, John Huss, Luther and Baius ? Are not the Canons of our Councils "tables of contents," in which all the impious doctrines of heretics are set down, summed up, and condensed ? Is not every solemn definition, every creed, a recital, intended to remind a Christian of what he is bound to believe ? . . .

And now, if men fancy themselves to raise a great difficulty by asking us how the Syllabus, which, before its publication already existed in the Letters

of the Holy Father, could teach us something new, they are much deceived. Let us for a moment, as they will have the thing so, reduce it to the humble *rôle* of an *echo;* if this expression may be pardoned. Let us suppose that its whole force consists in repeating what has already been said. We would ask whether an echo does not sometimes convey to the ear a sound, which without it would not have been heard; whether it does not occasionally reproduce it more strongly, more sonorously, and even more distinctly. It is not a new voice that it utters. Be it so; but it conveys to us the utterance of the original voice, more fully and more loudly.

Comparison, it is true, is not reason; and we shall therefore leave figurative language on one side, and reply directly to the question put to us. We are asked what the Syllabus is of itself, independently of the Pontifical Letters which were its first origin: and we reply thus:

It is at least a new promulgation of anterior condemnations, more universal, more authentic, and therefore more efficacious. Every man knows the legal maxim, that a second publication powerfully confirms, and (if need be) even supersedes the first. The history of human legislation teems with examples proving this. When, owing to the neglect of men, or the difficulty of the times, or the fickleness or the unruliness of peoples, a law is not sufficiently known or exactly enough observed;—those in whom the sovereign power resides, promulgate it afresh, in order to strengthen its tottering authority. It is thus born again, and (even were it dead) receives a second life. What could the majority of Christians have known concerning so many condemnations, scattered, and we may say buried, in the voluminous collection of Pontifical Encyclicals, if the Syllabus had not given them light? How could they respect them? How could they obey them? It was necessary that they should again hear them from the great Pontiff, that they might submit themselves afresh to their authority, and again take upon themselves a yoke of whose existence many were ignorant. The well-being of the Church depended on this.

But further, the Syllabus is not only a new promulgation, it is often a luminous interpretation of the original documents to which it refers; an interpretation sometimes so necessary, that from the moment it were to disappear, the meaning of those documents on several points would become obscure, or at least doubtful. This is worthy of attention. In order to deny the doctrinal value of the Syllabus, much stress has been laid on this fact: viz. its being unaccompanied by any explanation or reflection. "It is a dry nomenclature," men have said, "of which neither the character nor the object can be determined." The real truth is, that it is precisely its brevity which is the cause of its luminousness. The eighty propositions, isolated from their context, present themselves to us in a clearer, more precise, and more accurately defined shape. In the original Acts the forms of the condemned errors might be found to be somewhat indistinctly sketched; whereas in the Syllabus, they stand forth definitely with singular vigour and force. This is certainly a very great advantage, and we would request our readers to verify it themselves. . . .

Let us confirm by example what we have just laid down. The second paragraph of the Syllabus has for its object the condemnation of "Moderate

Rationalism." Some of its seven propositions reproduce the teaching of a man, little known in France, though much cried up in Germany: a kind of independent Catholic, who, before breaking with the Church from which he is altogether separated, wrote some books, whose object was to sow among the students of the University of Munich the corrupt seed of "free science.' We refer to Herr Fröschammer. Pius IX. censured his errors in a letter addressed to the Archbishop of Munich on 12th December, 1862. Leave the Syllabus on one side and go to the Letter,—you will see there the condemnation of Herr Fröschammer and his books, and you will see nothing else. But who in France has ever read his works? The French Catholic who had read Pius IX.'s Letter would say to himself, "This Munich professor has doubtless written after his own fashion; he is doubtless temerarious, as is every good German who has plunged into the dark depths of metaphysics: but after all there is nothing to show me that what he has written is exactly what I think. Why then trouble myself with this Letter of Pius IX.? It does not affect me." Another example. In paragraph X. we find the principle itself of modern Liberalism thus laid down:—"It is no longer expedient in this our age, that the Catholic religion should be treated as the only religion of the State to the exclusion of all others." We are referred to an Allocution promulgated on 26th July, 1855, and commencing with these words: "Nemo vestrûm." What is this Allocution? A solemn protest of the Sovereign Pontiff against the iniquity of the Spanish Government, which, against its sworn allegiance to the rights of the Church and the eternal laws of justice, had dared to break its promises, by abrogating of its own authority the first and second articles of the Concordat. Pius IX., filled with grief, thus spoke:—"You know, Venerable Brethren, how in this convention, among the various decisions relative to the interests of the Catholic religion, We had especially laid down that the said holy religion should be the sole religion of Spain, to the exclusion of every other worship." The proposition of the Syllabus is contained in these words of the Allocution, and nowhere else. A man of very great sound sense or a man of scientific thought, on looking at these facts and attentively weighing the words of the Pontiff, would perhaps find the proposition condemned in the Allocution. But how many others there are who would pass it over! How many there are who would not see it at all; or if they saw it, would be in doubt, not knowing against which it was directed, the application of the doctrine, or the doctrine itself! How many would simply see in the words the dolorous lamentation of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, outraged in his dearest rights!

Let us now return to the Syllabus. With it, that which was obscure is made plain. The two propositions above quoted do not then present themselves in a confused and uncertain sense. On the contrary, by being disengaged from the surrounding circumstances which might obscure their meaning, and by being clothed in a more emphasized, universal, and abstract form, they assume a pronounced sense. Hesitation is impossible. It is not the teaching of Herr Fröschammer or the sacrilegious encroachments of the Spanish Government which are condemned—it is the doctrine in itself and in its substance. And since the Roman Pontiff, after having isolated it,

imprints on it a mark of censure by qualifying it as an error, he denounces it to all as meriting the lasting censure of the Church.

Hence it is that, for our own part at least, we will never accept without restriction a phrase which we continually meet with, even among writers for whom we have the highest esteem : "the Syllabus," they say, "has but a relative value—a value subordinate to that of the Papal documents of which it is the recapitulation." No ; we cannot admit this appreciation, but account it full of peril. Let us not soften down the truth, if we would preserve its salutary empire over souls. Catholics speak of the value of the Syllabus. What do they mean? Its authority? It has this certainly of itself, and from the sovereign power of him who publishes it ; it is as fully an Act of that supreme authority, as are the Letters or Encyclicals to which it refers. The sense of its propositions? Doubtless several of them, if compared with their sources, would receive thence some light ; but others, and these not the minority, would thereby either lose their precision, or would impart more light than they would receive. Of these two assertions, "the Pontifical Letters explain the Syllabus," "the Syllabus explains the Pontifical Letters," —the latter is, with a few exceptions, the more rigorously true. This is easily proved. Let us suppose that by some unforeseen accident one or the other of these pronouncements destroyed [the Syllabus or the assemblage of its sources], and no trace of their existence left? Which of these two would we especially desire to be preserved, in order that the mind of Pius IX. and the Church's judgment regarding the errors of our age should be more certainly transmitted to future generations? We do not hesitate to reply,—and sound sense, the evidence of facts, and Christian conscience will reply with us,—the Syllabus.

Nothing is more fruitful in subtleties, than the mind of a man desirous to escape from a duty which hampers him. We must not then be astonished if several opponents of the Syllabus have discovered ingenious distinctions, which permit them theoretically to admit the truths we have laid down, and to elude their consequences in practice. What have they done for this purpose? They have acknowledged the real value of this great Act in so far as it is a doctrinal declaration (or, if they prefer the phrase), "a manifestation of doctrine" ; adding nevertheless, that the Pope has imposed it on us, not as an obligation, but only as a direction. "Only as a direction" would be a happily invented notion, if it were easy to imagine, on so important a matter and in so solemn an Act, a truly efficacious direction,—such consequently as the Pope must have wished,—which was not an obligation. Let us not however reason on abstract grounds, but adduce a few positive proofs against this theory, which is more specious than solid.

First, we oppose the title of the Syllabus :—"A Syllabus of the principal Errors of our Age, censured in the Consistorial Allocutions," &c. To this we add the titles of the different paragraphs :—"Errors relating to the Church"; "Errors relating to Civil Society"; "Errors relating to Natural and Christian Morals." That the Pope, the guardian and protector of the truth, obliged by the duty of his office to preserve the Church from change or corruption of doctrine,—that the Pope (I say) should denounce to the Christian world some given tenet by branding it with the appellation of "error"

—this is evidently to forbid its acceptance; and to order all the faithful to keep aloof from it. What communication is there between light and darkness? between life and death? There can be no question of mere direction or counsel, when the highest of interests is in peril. Our duty is imposed on us by the very nature of the case. When then Pius IX. wrote at the head of the Syllabus that word "errors,"—and he intensified it by adding the yet more significant words "principal errors of our age,"—he said equivalently, "Here is death: avoid it." And if, to escape the obvious inference, any one professes to distinguish the obligation created by the nature of the case from the obligation imposed by the legislator,—we should remember, that the same Pius IX. pronounced that memorable sentence, applying it to the Syllabus: "When the Pope speaks by a solemn Act, he is to be understood literally; what he has said he intended to say." On our side we should say, What the Pope has done, he most certainly intended to do.

But what need of so much discussion? The proof of our assertion is expressed in so many words in the letter of his Eminence Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State, which was sent round to acquaint the Bishops with the will of our Holy Father. . . . [The Pontiff, says the Cardinal, has ordered the Syllabus to be compiled and circulated "in order that the Bishops may have before their eyes all the errors and pernicious doctrines which he has reprobated and condemned."] What then, we ask, is this Syllabus, ordered by the Holy Father to be sent to all the Bishops, but the text of the law, brought before the notice of those judges who are commissioned to execute it? What is it, but a rule which demands their submission, and which they are forbidden to transgress? They must not lose sight of it. Why? Because they are bound to introduce its doctrine into their own teaching; because they are bound to repress every temerarious opinion, which would venture to contravene it. In this sense all the Bishops understood the command given them. Their fidelity and the indomitable courage of their obedience show this fact. During the general excitement produced by the appearance of the Syllabus in France, the Government had the audacity to usurp the position of judge. The Minister of Justice and Public Worship forbade the publication of the Pontifical document in any pastoral instruction; alleging that it contained propositions contrary to the principles on which the constitution of the Empire reposed. What was the unanimous reply of the Episcopate? The letters of eighty-three Bishops testify. All, united in their resolve, opposed the ministerial letter with the words of the Apostle, "Non possumus." All declared that they must obey God in preference to man; and two of them, from their cathedral pulpit, braved the menaces of the Government, by reading to their assembled people that which they had not been permitted to print. Would they have thus acted, had they not been convinced that they were performing their duty, and thus acting up to the axiom of the Christian knights, "Do what you ought; happen what may"?

We shall not insist further on this point. Let us come to the question which may stand for all the others. We ask if the Syllabus be an infallible definition of the Vicar of Christ.

It seems to us that we have already answered this question. Can a defi-

nition ex cathedrâ be anything else, than an instruction regarding faith and morals, addressed to and imposed on the whole Church by her visible head on earth? How could we recognize it, were it not by this sign? and is not this the account given us by the Vatican Council? Reperuse the grave and carefully chosen words of the Fathers of that august Assembly, and you will find nothing there which better explains the exact and precise idea of an ex cathedrâ definition, than the account we have just given. Therefore, all doubts ought to vanish. The Syllabus emanates from him who is the Sovereign Master and Teacher of Catholic truth; it appertains exclusively to faith and morals, by the nature of the matter it contains; it has received, from the circumstances which accompanied its promulgation, the manifest character of an universal law of the Church. What more does it require, to be an irreformable decision, an act without appeal of Peter's infallible authority?

We know the objection made to this. Peter may speak, and yet not wish to use the plenitude of his doctrinal power. Yes, but when he restrains within voluntarily imposed limits the exercise of his authority, he shows it clearly. He takes care to explain, in order not to overtask our feebleness, that notwithstanding the obligation with which he is binding our consciences, he is not purporting as yet to pronounce a definitive sentence on the doctrine in hand. Does the Syllabus present the faintest indication of such reserve? What can be more definitive, than a judgment formulated in these terms: "This is error, that is truth"? Can such a judgment as this be ever reconsidered or annulled? Is it not so promulgated, as to preclude all possibility of change or explanation? In a word, can it ever be permitted us to say "What is error in this century is truth in the next"? It may be added that according to the confession of friends and enemies alike,—a confession strengthened by the declaration of the Cardinal Secretary of State,—the Syllabus is an annex and as it were an appendix of the Bull "Quantâ Curâ"; to which none could legitimately deny the character of a definition and an irreformable sentence. Consider all this, and you will understand how unreasonable it would be to disregard the evidence of facts, and acquiesce in an objection which has no solid basis.

The Holy Father's intention is not concealed under an impenetrable veil, as is sometimes supposed. It shows itself as soon as it is looked for, and it is easily discovered in the preparation of the Syllabus. It should be known that the Syllabus was not the work of a day. Pius IX. has repeatedly attested this: he had long resolved to strike a severe blow, and to blast the whole monstrous edifice of revolutionary doctrine. With this object, immediately after the promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception he transformed the Congregation of Cardinals and theologians who had aided him in the accomplishment of that work, into a congregation entrusted with the duty of setting forth in detail to the Apostolic See the new errors which had been ravaging the Church of God for the last century. Ten years passed by: Encyclicals were published; Allocutions pronounced; the theologians continued their labours: at last on 8th December, 1864, the moment for action having arrived, Pius IX. addressed that word to the world, which is still sounding in our ears; the "Quantâ Curâ" and the Syllabus were promulgated. It is clear that an Act, drawn up after such long preparation and

with such diligence, could not be compared to an everyday act. The Pope did not wish to lessen the evil, he wished to destroy it. So much exertion could not have had for its object to define nothing. Who then will dare to say, that the whole intention of a reign, and of a reign like that of Pius IX., has miserably terminated in a measure which has neither strength nor efficacy? To believe this would be an outrage, to assert it an insult, against the wisdom and prudence of the most glorious of Pontiffs.

But why such research for proofs? one reflection alone will cut short every difficulty. There are two ways in the Church to know if a Papal Act is, or is not, a sovereign definition, an infallible decision. The Pope who is its author must be interrogated, or else the people who submit to its teaching. Neither one nor the other can deceive us in their respective replies. The Divine Promise remains fulfilled to both; in the former when he teaches, in the latter when they hear and obey. This is what theologians call active and passive infallibility. Let us admit for argument's sake that Pius IX. has left us in ignorance. Let us suppose that he has published the Syllabus, but has not told us what kind of assent he requires from us. Well; as we all know, the great voice of the Christian people has proclaimed it for him. How often have the people repeated with an enthusiasm intensified by love, that this Syllabus,—despised, insulted by the enemies of the Church, —was accepted by them as the rule of their belief; received by them as the very word of Peter, as the very word of life come down from Heaven to save us! Is not this the way in which the Bishops and theologians, learned and ignorant, powerful and humble have in turn spoken? Who among us has not heard such language? A celebrated Doctor, Tanner, has said, that in order to distinguish among the doctrines of the Church those which belong to her infallible authority, we must listen to the judgment of the learned, and especially consult the universal sentiment of Christians. Let us keep to this decision: it reveals to us our duty towards the sovereign Act, by which Pius IX. has rescued the world from the darkness in which it was lost, and prepares a better destiny for it in the future.

We have the greater reason for so acting, because Hell, by its mad rage, gives us the very same warning, and proclaims the imperishable grandeur of the Syllabus. Neither Hell nor those who serve it have ever been deceived on this point. They have often explained their thought, both in their acts and in their words. What implacable anger, what torrents of insult, what relentless clamours! And when inopportune compromisers have told them that they are deceived, that the Syllabus was nothing or of little consequence, and ought not to excite their anger,—how have they replied to them, and crushed them under the weight of their contempt! At the end of 1864, at the time when the struggle excited by the promulgation of the Encyclical and the Syllabus was at its height,—an advertising agency in Paris, the agency of Bullier, published the following note: "The Encyclical is not a dogmatic Bull but only a doctrinal Letter. It should be observed that the Syllabus does not bear the signature of the Pope. This Syllabus again has been so published as to permit the belief, that the Holy Father attaches no great importance to it. We must then suppose that the propositions therein recited—assailing as they do neither the dogma nor the morals of Catholics,

nay in no way affecting dogma at all—are not condemned but only blamed." To these words, poor in sense, but insidious in expression, the "Siècle" replied—"And now there are some who tell us that the Encyclical is not a dogmatic Bull, but a doctrinal Letter; that the eighty propositions are not condemned, because they are not mentioned in the Encyclical, but only in the Syllabus; that the Syllabus has not the Papal signature; that it was only drawn up by a commission of theologians, &c. These persons would do better to be silent. Encyclical or Syllabus, the fact is that the theocracy has thrown down as ostentatious a gauntlet of challenge as possible against modern ideas. We shall see who will be conqueror."

Let us then leave such writers to arrange their mutual disputes. As for ourselves, hearing the voice of Heaven and Hell, the Church and the world, who unite to proclaim the momentousness of the ever blessed work of Pius IX., we repeat with a conviction more profound than ever, Yes, the Syllabus is the infallible word of Peter; and if our modern societies can be cured at all, it is by it that they will be saved.

Art. VII.—AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S PSYCHOLOGY. Part II.

(Continued from Vol. xxiii., No. xlvi.)

(Communicated.)

PART II.—THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

CHAPTER II.—THE COMPOSITION OF MIND.

THE contents of the sections of this chapter may be shortly stated thus:—§ 64. The mind's proximate composition,—states which appear simple being accepted as such. § 65. The distinction between feelings and relations. § 66. Division of feelings into those peripherally and those centrally initiated. § 67. Relations are equivalent to changes, simultaneous or successive, like or unlike. § 68. Tracts of feelings are differentiated from one another, as regards distinctness, according as they possess a greater or less number of relational elements. § 69. They are similarly differentiated as regards their cohesiveness. § 70. And also as regards their cohesion in clusters. § 71. And in clusters of clusters. § 72. Feelings limit each other most when they are of the same order. § 73. Vivid feelings and relations cohere with their faint likes in an orderly manner—the ultimate segregations grouping themselves as ideas of space, time, and

contrast. § 74. Thus the composition of mind is the same throughout, from its lowest to its highest elements, always consisting, as it does, of segregations and cohesions of clusters of nervous shocks to form first sensations, and secondly thoughts. § 75. This process conforms to the law of evolution, viz., the progress from indefinite, incoherent homogeneousness to definite, coherent heterogeneity. § 76. It also harmonizes with the facts as to nervous structure.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer endeavours to show that the proximate elements* of the mind are primary feelings and relations between such feelings, these relations being further given as themselves feelings of co-existence, sequence, and difference (qualitative and quantitative) between primary feelings. Here, however, he entirely omits all the highest components of mind, such e.g. as its perception of Truth and Goodness *as such*.

Nothing in this chapter really tells against the Peripatetic view that intellect and sensation are radically and essentially distinct, the latter being a concomitant of nervous action, and necessarily ending with it; the former (intellect) being only accidentally connected with such action, and, at the least, possibly surviving it, though making use of such action (and consequently of sensations) as the occasion of its activity. Mr. Spencer starts, however, with an *à priori* conclusion in favour of the essential identity of thought and sensation, and therefore in favour also of the essential identity between the rational mind of man and the sensitive faculty of brutes. He argues on, from what he conceives to be the feelings of the lower animals, till he comes to man. But of course if there *is* in man a new higher principle, then the "feelings" of the mere animal may be so taken up and transfigured by its action that the activities of brutes may be alike inadequate to serve *without it*, for the explanation of such higher activities as we know ourselves to possess. A cat perceives a mouse—a man both perceives it and perceives the perception. A man appreciates and knows the value of his knowledge. A brute possesses *first intentions*, but a man has *second intentions*. A brute perceives things related in place and time, and by difference—a man apprehends these relations *as relations*, i.e. he apprehends formal relativity. Nevertheless as a substratum (necessary as we now exist for so apprehending) he has "feelings" of the merely material relativity. A brute "feels" the things which are *de facto* related without cognizing the relation itself, i.e. he feels material relations without knowing them.†

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* In the last chapter the *ultimate* elements having been represented as "nervous shocks," its *proximate* elements are here represented as various aggregations of such shocks.

† The mental shock felt in passing from one feeling to another which is dissimilar to it, is, very superficially, confounded by Mr. Spencer with the

Moreover Mr. Spencer makes a fundamental error in that he makes all knowledge to be *classification;* but knowledge must first be direct and immediate, otherwise we get a *regressus ad infinitum.* He begins his classification (p. 163) by dividing the proximate components of mind into "Feelings," and the "Relations between feelings" (§ 65). He defines a "Feeling"* as (p. 164) "any portion of consciousness sufficiently large for perceivable individuality, and marked off from adjacent portions . . . . by qualitative contrasts; and which when introspectively contemplated appears to be homogeneous." He defines a "Relation" (between Feelings), as "characterized by occupying no appreciable part of consciousness.† Take away the terms it unites, and it disappears along with them; having no individuality of its own." But after this he goes on to say: "It is true that under an ultimate analysis, what we call a relation proves to be itself a *kind of feeling.*" . . . "And it is true that, notwithstanding its extreme brevity, its qualitative character is *appreciable;* for relations are (as we shall hereafter see) distinguishable from one another only by the unlikenesses of the feelings which accompany the momentary transitions." So that, after all, since a relation is admitted to be a feeling, and an appreciable feeling, the two kinds are thus admitted to differ only as *long* and *short.* On the next page indeed he says: "A feeling proper is an aggregate of related parts, while a relational feeling is undecomposable." It is all very well to say so, but if, as he admits, a relation has duration sufficient for appreciation of its quality, it must be as decomposable as a feeling of a flash of lightning.

In reality his two kinds are two species of the genus "states of consciousness," serving two kinds of *intellectual* activity. These material feelings are quite enough to explain mere brute reasoning. It is evidently quite a different thing to *feel* the shock of two feelings and to intellectually recognize the relation, to feel an enduring feeling and reflexly to recognize it.

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dissimilarity itself. It is the dissimilarity which is the relation; the shock is not the dissimilarity but the result of it. It is only in virtue of this discreditable confusion of ideas that Mr. Spencer makes out the relation of dissimilarity (as also of similarity) to be a feeling.

* This definition of feeling assumes the whole question that all mental phenomena are *feelings.* The definition is faulty moreover in using metaphorical terms.

† If so, a relation between feelings would not be an appreciable part of consciousness, i.e. we should be unconscious of it. But these relations are afterwards described as shocks, and so as occupying an appreciable part of consciousness, in contradiction to the definition. The word "appreciable" is a sadly vague term.

He divides (p. 166) feelings thus :—

FEELINGS	centrally initiated		Emotions. *
	peripherally initiated	from surface-nerves	External sensations.
		from internal nerves	Internal sensations.

And all these are again divided into vivid and faint, which he calls *real* and ideal respectively.

He now (p. 167, § 67) goes on to consider simple " relations," for which he says the occurrence of change is a necessary condition.† He says (p. 168) : " The degree of the change or shock constituting in other words the consciousness of the degree of difference between the adjacent states, is the ultimate basis of the distinctions among relations," resulting in feelings of likeness or unlikeness, quantitative or qualitative, and grouped under the heads " co-existence " or " sequence." But granted that this is the sensitive basis, it in no way accounts for our intellectual recognition of these various relations. It is too bad to say that " the degree of shock " *constitutes* the " consciousness of the degree of difference," however much it may induce feelings which serve as the occasion of conscious perception. Next (p. 168, § 68) he goes on to maintain that definiteness of feelings ‡ varies with the amount of the relational element, being greatest in the external

* Mere nervous sensations, however, as well as emotions, may be centrally initiated.

† This may mean either that change is necessary to the recognition or that it is necessary to the existence of relations. The first of these statements is a mere truism, which it would be scarcely worth any one's while to state ; for if no change takes place there is nothing new to recognize, and for this reason change is needed, not simply for the recognition of relations, but for the recognition of anything which has not been recognized before. In its second and more natural meaning, a relation may exist without change as easily as anything else. If a black and a white ball existed from all eternity, the relation of dissimilitude would have existed from all eternity as well.

‡ By a definite feeling is meant one that is sharply contrasted with other feelings. The relational element is merely the same thing in other words. The case is not therefore that of two things varying together, but the truism that a thing varies with itself, i.e. when it is present to a large extent, and *vice versâ*. That things contrasted must be in juxtaposition is also an old friend with a new face. If they were not in juxtaposition, they could not be contrasted. There is a certain ingenuity in the generalization that the more external the cause the more distinct the feeling, and yet this seems to be no more than a misleading half-truth. The cause of greater distinctness being (*a*) the presence of appliances (e.g. the lens) by which one nerve-extremity may be affected while its neighbour remains unaffected, (*b*) the conveyance of the distinct impressions thus produced by distinct channels to the brain, and (*c*) the importance of noting the distinct sensation thus produced. The distinctness and definiteness of certain sensations appear to be due to the combined influence of attention, and such physical antecedents as those above referred to. Mr. Spencer's explanation is *idem per idem.*

peripheral, and greatest of all in sight. As also, according to him (§ 69, p. 173), does coherence between feelings of the same kind; and again (§ 70, p. 175), the clustering coherently of feelings and (§ 71, p. 177) the clustering of clusters. Here, however, he introduces an error, he says (§ 70, p. 175): "There is little, if any, clustering of clusters among the simultaneous auditory feelings. But among the successive auditory feelings there are definite and coherent combinations of groups with groups. The fused set of sounds we call *a word,* unites with many others such into a sentence." Thus we have the intellect introduced without any notice, and then confounded with feelings of *musical sounds.* But the difference between intellect and sensibility is shown by the difference between our power of recollecting a sentence in a known language, and in an *unknown* one. He next proceeds to consider the agglomeration of clusters of feelings of different orders similarly conditioned. But he adds (p. 180): "The impressions which make up the visual consciousness of an object, hang together more firmly than the group of them does with the group of sounds making up the name of an object." This is true; but the illustration is ill-chosen, since a name is mostly the sign of a general conception—"A nightingale, and the notes of its song," would have been a better one. But the thesis of this section is not successfully maintained; indeed he himself admits that some complex groups cohere with very unrelational ones (p. 181), saying: "Between tastes and smells, and certain visceral sensations, such as hunger and nausea, there is, indeed, a considerable aptitude to cohere"; and indeed, as he elsewhere admits (p. 191): "Smells have exceptional powers of calling up remembrances of past scenes."

He now (§ 73, p. 181) turns to "faint feelings," and says: "The cardinal fact to be noted as of co-ordinate importance with the facts above noted, is that while each vivid feeling is joined to, but distinguished from, other vivid feelings, simultaneous or successive, it is joined to, and identified with, faint feelings that have resulted from foregoing similar vivid feelings. Each particular colour, each special sound, each sensation of touch, taste, or smell, is at once KNOWN as unlike other sensations that limit it in space or time, and known as like the faint forms of certain sensations that have preceded it in time—unites itself with foregoing sensations from which it does not differ in quality, but only in intensity." Here we come upon a surprising ambiguity. Does Mr. Spencer mean "*known*" directly and simply, as a sheep knows the bleat of its kind, or known consciously and reflexly, as when we say, "This A is like that B"? The former is *sensitive,* the latter *intellective.* But this singular confusion is further exemplified where he adds (p. 182): "An *idea,* or unit of knowledge, results when a vivid

feeling is assimilated to, or coheres with, one or more of the faint feelings left [we may well ask *where* left?] by such vivid feelings previously experienced." Then we are to term the unreflecting aggregation in a dog of a smell to a faint survival of a smell, an *idea*. What an idea!

But elsewhere (p. 228) he directly identifies ideas with faint sensations. His words are: "Vivid feelings or sensations directly presented, and *faint feelings* or *ideas* in which they are represented." But he is yet more deliberate in his confusion. He goes on: "From moment to moment the feelings that constitute consciousness segregate, each becoming fused with the whole series of others like itself that have gone before it; and what we call *knowing* each feeling *as such or such*, is our name for this *act of segregation*." A want of discrimination such as that here displayed, a confounding of an unconscious mechanical association and aggregation with a deliberate recognition of a feeling as possessing a certain character, is nothing less than amazing.

He continues (p. 183): "This union of present clustered feelings with past clustered feelings, is carried to a much greater degree of complexity. Groups of groups coalesce with kindred groups of groups that preceded them; and in the higher types of mind, tracts of consciousness of an excessively composite character are produced after the same manner." But no such complexity would account for a rudiment of self-conscious reflex mental action, although such repeated aggregations may well serve as an instrument of which the intellect can make use. He then goes on to the segregation of relations, and represents them as segregating according as they are strongly contrasted, or weakly contrasted, of ascending or of descending intensity, of homogeneity, or of heterogeneity; of co-existence, or of sequence, the two latter further segregating into space and time. But granted the fact of segregation, a new faculty becomes requisite to cognize them as strong, ascending, homogeneous, co-existing, &c., or as time and space. That the phantasma of a previously experienced sensation should become present in consciousness when a similar sensation is present is one thing; to recognize the sensation as strong, and note its strength, is quite another.

After this he proceeds to what he declares (p. 184) to be "the chief purpose of this chapter to bring into view"; namely, "the truth that the method of composition remains the same throughout the entire fabric of mind, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to the formation of those immense and complex aggregates of feelings which characterize its highest developments." Now here, *in limine*, it must be denied that "feelings" of any kind *characterize* the highest developments of mind, although of course it is true that feelings serve as the basis and material of such developments.

Making use of his previous assertion (disputed by me) that simple feelings, as sound, are made up of many nervous shocks on their subjective side, and other simple feelings, as *timbre,* of unions of simultaneous series of such shocks, he concludes that a *sensation* "is constituted by the linking of each vivid pulse as it occurs, with the series of past pulses that were severally vivid, but have severally become faint." But this I deny. I admit that such "sensation" is so "generated," as by the *material* element; but it is "*constituted*" by the *formal* element, namely, the sentient faculty. Carrying on the same scheme, he represents (p. 185) analogously the constitution of mind, &c., saying: "Mind is constituted only when each sensation is assimilated to the faint form of antecedent sensations. The consolidation of successive units of feeling to form a sensation, is paralleled in a larger way by the consolidation of successive sensations, to form what we call *a knowledge of the sensation as such or such,*" as if the mechanical addition of sensation to its like was at all the same thing as a knowledge of the sensation *as such*, which involves the conception of being and substance, and various subordinate genera. It is easy enough to *call* "feeling" "knowledge," but introspection shows they are exceedingly different. Similarly, "relations" are represented as becoming known through the segregation of relations. All this is mere assertion, and were it valid and true, brutes would have knowledge and reason, for they segregate "feelings" and "relations" materially, though they have no self-conscious knowledge of their feelings *as* feelings, or of the relations between them *as* relations—i.e. they lack the *formal* element of knowledge. But Mr. Spencer grounds all this on the assertion that feelings which seem to us simple, as that of *timbre,* are really compound and built up of contemporaneous series of minute nervous shocks on their subjective side—i.e. minute feelings of nervous shock. He must mean this, for to say a feeling is made up of objective nervous shocks would transgress all he says as to the absolute distinctness of the subjective and objective. But then if a feeling is felt to be made up of minute feelings, it is not simple. He must mean, therefore, that an apparently simple feeling, as *timbre,* is made up of a number of minute feelings that *are not felt.* Yet elsewhere Mr. Spencer says that unconscious sensation is a contradiction in terms. Certainly we can only investigate the subjective side of our being by introspection, and what that declares to be simple must be taken to be so. For what is "simple" but that which is incapable of analysis or decomposition? To call that which introspection declares "simple," *compound,* on account of any *objective* consideration, is to confound the two orders, and give the supremacy to that which he has elsewhere (p. 159) declared to be secondary.

We should note that Mr. Spencer every now and then indulges

in unwarrantably dogmatic assertions, and in assumptions of the very things which have to be proved, such as were noticed in the examination of his first part. Thus we meet with "In the last chapter we *saw*" (p. 184), when in fact we saw nothing of the kind. Again he says (p. 186), "Thus it becomes manifest," when it is really clear that it is rather the very reverse. Again he remarks (p. 187), "We have lately seen," that which is really not only invisible but impossible; and "We have seen that" mind "consists largely, and in one sense entirely, of feelings" (p. 192). Again (p. 194) he affirms dogmatically, "there is no likeness," "either in kind or degree," between internal feelings and the external agents on which they habitually depend.

He proceeds (p. 186) now with his process of segregation in clusters of feelings and relations, saying: "Knowledge of the powers and habits of things, dead and living, is constituted by assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited by their actions in space and time with other such complex relations.' Thus again he makes no distinction between material and direct acts on the one hand and formal and reflex acts on the other.

He concludes the section as follows: "That the same law of composition continues without definite limit through tracts of higher consciousness, formed of clusters of clusters of feelings held together by relations of an extremely involved kind, *scarcely needs adding*." This is a strangely confident remark! His argument is: As shocks are to tone, so are reiterated sensations to intellectual thought. But I deny the relation asserted by him as to the first, and as to the latter, many animals experience sensations and relations as varied and reiterated as a savage man, and yet we meet in them with no sign of self-consciousness, the possession of which by the savage shows him to be animated by a different and a higher principle. Thoughts are made actual and formally constituted by a new principle, just as potential sound which never becomes actual when reaching a cabbage or a honey-dew, becomes actual when reaching the auditory organ of an animal, being made formal by its (the animal's) sentient principle. Mr. Spencer then (p. 186, § 75) traces the correspondence between his evolution of mind and the laws of evolution of progressively more definite and heterogeneous integrates. Incidentally he says (p. 187), "Mental actions, ordinarily so called, are nearly all carried on in terms of those tactual, auditory, and visual feelings which exhibit cohesion, and consequent ability to integrate, in so conspicuous a manner. Our intellectual operations are indeed mostly confined to the *auditory feelings* (as integrated into *words*), and the visual feelings (as integrated into impressions and ideas of objects, their relations, and their motions)." Now as to the "terms," it is most true we

think by phantasmata, as all allow, yet such images are not all our thought. What is the image of a "relation"? We can understand "greater than" and "therefore" by the mathematical signs $\angle$ and $\therefore$, mentally abstracting from any particular things compared. In the same way words are "auditory feelings," but they are vastly more, and our intellectual operations do not at all (except in philology and music) regard them as "feelings," but exclusively in their intellectual relations.

Mr. Spencer (pp. 187, 188) attaches an importance to sight which seems exaggerated. He says: "After closing the eyes, and observing how relatively immense is the part of intellectual consciousness that is suddenly shorn away, it will be manifest that the most developed portion of perceptive mind is formed of these visual feelings." But those born blind can attain to the highest and noblest intellectual exercises; and this fact alone shows how independent the intellect is of even the most relational of the senses. But, after all, Mr. Spencer's conception of the process of mental construction is plainly inadequate to account for the mind as we know it; for it is not merely a discriminative but also a *retentive* power, and he has not in the least shown how it can be constructed as a retentive power out of his mental units. Again, as to his picture (p. 189) of mind-evolution, we may well ask what increased feelings of sensation or relation enable a man to say "I," when an orang cannot? But indeed, the whole process, even as represented by him, would be better expressed thus: *The more things are obtruded on the sentient faculty, the more that faculty energizes; and the more things are obtruded on the intellectual faculty, the more that also energizes, and the more we know of that faculty as it has the power of presenting itself to us in consciousness through its activity.*

He next (p. 190, § 76) proceeds to indicate the correspondence of his views as to mind with the facts of nervous anatomy. In the preliminary part he says: "If we consider each such [nervous] transformation to be physically that which, psychically, we consider a unit of feeling, then, remembering its appreciable duration, we may understand how it happens that when the waves of molecular changes brought by an incoming nerve-fibre exceed a certain rate of recurrence, the transformation set up by each lasts till the next commences; and hence the corresponding units of feeling become forced into a continuous feeling or sensation." But recurring beats do not result in a like-feeling, but a musical *sound*, and complex series induce a *timbre* sound. Thus, a musical sound is not a transformed beat-feeling, but a different thing, and could never be generated from beat-feelings, or by an increase in the frequency of *that which produces* beat-feelings, unless that power was latent and potential, and made actual by means of such

complicated beatings. The sensation (the beating) ceases absolutely when the other (the musical sound) arises. Individual differences of power (the personal equation) make only a difference as to the point at which a change takes place.*

The "anomaly" that "such unrelational feelings as *smells* have exceptional powers of calling up remembrances of past scenes" is, he says (p. 191), "probably due to the fact that the olfactory centres are outgrowths from the cerebral hemispheres." But musical sounds have a yet greater power of the same kind, and yet the auditory centres are always remote from the cerebrum, and, indeed, there is no special connexion even between the *optic centres* and the cerebrum.†

Altogether there is nothing in this second chapter which really ells at all against the view that intellect and sensation are radically and essentially distinct. There is really nothing in it against the view of sensation being but a result and concomitant of nervous action and ending with it. There is really nothing in it against intellect (although dependent on nervous action during life, because making use of feelings as the occasions of its exercise) not being necessarily or essentially connected with nerves at all, or against its being capable of surviving the destruction of the body. Feelings and emotions in a self-conscious being may be so modified by the presence of the intellect that takes them up and subserves them, that we can only argue imperfectly and with risk from what we are conscious of in ourselves down to the faculties of brutes. Our intellect transfigures these beggarly elements. A brute feels material relations without *knowing* them or knowing that he feels. *We* have an apprehension of a formal relativity.

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* To say that e. g. a sound is a transformed beat-feeling, and, in general, to say that certain sensations are other sensations *transformed*, is to commit the absurdity of supposing that sensations are something different from what they are felt to be, which is justly regarded by Mr. Mill as a token of metaphysical incompetence. The truth is, that the one sensation is succeeded by the other as the vibrations increase in frequency. To say that it is transformed into the other is to say that the sensation is a substance which persists while its attributes change.

† The "anomaly" may perhaps be explained by there being many more distinct sensations of smell than of e.g. colour, the former not shading into each other as the latter do. A sensation of smell, therefore, recalls fewer previous sensations, i.e. recalls sensations which have been presented on fewer occasions, and consequently recalls those occasions more distinctly, and less confused by multiplicity. Thus the odours of a pine forest, of new hay, &c., have been felt only on similar occasions, and thus recall distinct pictures. So the odour of eau-de-Cologne in a sick-room. But there is nothing in this that is peculiar to sensations of smell. Sensations of sight (e.g. the peculiar appearance of the atmosphere in Italy) will, under similar circumstances (i.e. if they have been experienced only under similar circumstances), recall pictures as distinct.

Mr. Spencer accounts for the segregation of relations; but the reflex apprehension of relations as related must be done by a persisting (therefore *substantial*) self-conscious something—the mind—which can turn to and fro, look back and forwards, and so apprehend relations and the *relatedness* of them. The attribution to man's soul of the power to abstract ideas from sensible materials explains everything, whilst nothing is *really* explained by Mr. Spencer's plan of merely *calling names*—e.g. calling segregated material relations—*ideas!* How, upon Mr. Spencer's hypothesis only, can we ever understand that wonderful power the mind has of *searching* for that which it knows yet does not know, because it has temporarily forgotten it, while its immediate recognition of it when it flashes on the memory proves that it was really known all the time, though it was temporarily incapable of recall?

CHAPTER III.—THE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS.

The sections of this third chapter may be thus summarized:— § 77. There are objects which are beyond consciousness. § 78. There is no equivalence between such objects and feelings. § 79. The connexion between object and subject varies according to the structure of the species. § 80. and of the individual. § 81. It also varies according to the constitutional state of the individual. § 82. and according to which part of the organism is acted upon. § 83. It also varies according to the state of such part. § 84. and according to the relative motions of subject and object. § 85. The feeling produced in the organism from its action upon external things is modified by circumstances. § 86. The same is the case with internal (endoperipheral) feelings, and in fact all we are conscious of, as properties of matter are but subjective symbols. § 87. This harmonizes with that absolute difference which exists between nervous structure and the feelings it occasions. § 88. But real objective existences are always necessarily implied and assumed.

Mr. Spencer here considers feelings in their relations to external objects, i.e. he considers objective causes and subjective effects.

At p. 193 we find mind stated to be "composed of feelings and the relations between feelings and *the aptitudes* of feelings for entering into relations," &c. Here then Mr. Spencer himself adopts a scholastic occult power.—"*Aptitudes*"; if this may be done once, why not many other times? Mr. Spencer asserts (p. 194, § 79) the truth that "the forms of sensation" may vary in creatures according to their organization, and compares a crab feeling by its claw with a man feeling by a stick (and here it may be remarked, by the way, how intellect enables us, as it were, to enter by imagination into the sensoria of inferior creatures) to

exemplify qualitative difference, and a nocturnal animal's appreciation of faint light, to exemplify quantitative difference. He also affirms (p. 196, § 80) that the same species may have similar differences, such e.g. as colour-blindness or other individual variations as to sense-perception, so that we may conclude that in no two individuals are such perceptions absolutely alike. But partial blindness, or deafness, or other similar infirmity, does not prove that men do not see and hear truly as far as they *do* see and hear. Vision that fails to distinguish between red and green is not *mendacious*, but *imperfect*; it sees colour, but inadequately. The colour-blind have no difficulty in understanding that distinctions exist which they fail to appreciate. And probably all eyes are altogether inadequate to apprehend the objective truth of colour as known to pure spirits. But again, colour-blindness is abnormal, and that abnormal physical conditions may produce imperfections of sensation in some cases is what all admit.

Mr. Spencer next shows (p. 197, § 81) "that quantitative and qualitative differences of sense-appreciation exist in the *individual* through illness and various different constitutional states," which nobody denies. He then (p. 198, § 82) refers to the familiar fact that the same external agent, e.g. "a whiff of ammonia," produces different sensations according as it is applied to different organs of the same individual. But this only shows that each order of sensations gives but a partial revelation of the external world, which nobody disputes, not that our senses are mendacious. If we saw with our nose and fingers in addition to our eyes, it would give no greater objective validity to the report of our senses.

Then (p. 200, § 83) the state of the part, heat, cold, &c., are shown by our author to modify sensations, and besides these also (p. 201, § 84) "the relative motions" of the perceived object and the perceiving sentient, as we find in the fall of tone in the whistle of an approaching steam-engine, and the modification produced in the spectra of receding stars. But surely these are but changes similar to that produced by the rapid rotation of a coloured disk or the changes in apparent size and position of lamp-posts, resulting from our change of position as we walk past them. No one ever disputed that our senses could be confused by complex motions.

Mr. Spencer then proceeds (p. 203, § 85) to consider the feelings which accompany the actions of the organism on external things, and shows that similar mechanical effects produce different quantities of feeling, as when we lift a weight with the finger instead of with the hand, and he also instances the effects of age and illness. Again (p. 204, § 86), he considers peripherally-initiated internal feelings and centrally-initiated feelings (emotions), and shows they may be modified quantitively and qualitively by (1) specific structure, (2) individual structure, (3) structure of different parts

of the body, (4) age, (5) constitutional state, (6) temperature, (7) circulation, (8) previous use, and (9) relative motion; and that these co-operate in ever-changing proportions, whence he concludes, "that subjective consciousness . . . is no measure of objective existence."

He continues to urge that certain oscillations produce an auditory feeling, but only in one organ, and that the same oscillations produce other feelings in other organs; whence he says we may become fully convinced that the form of objective action we call "sound" has not the slightest kinship in Nature with the sensation of sound which it arouses in us. He argues similarly with respect to the other senses, declaring that "the subjective state no more resembles" its objective cause "than the pressure which moves the trigger of a gun resembles the explosion which follows." So also, he says, we may conclude with respect to tension and other sensations of mechanical force; "thus we are brought to the conclusion that what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and unknowable. All the sensations produced in us by environing things are but symbols of actions out of ourselves, the natures of which we cannot even conceive." But here he is *too hasty.* Though all *sensations* would, of course, vanish in an insentient universe, qualities these senses make known might, nevertheless, be known by pure intellect, and thus all the objectivity in sensations which the greatest "realist" would desire will have existed in the world for all time. It is the ego which *knows* that the violet is sweet, though it is the nose which smells it, and though of course we cannot conceive (because the elementary experience is lacking) *how* such sweetness could become known without a sense-organ, can we really understand how it is known to us *with one?* No one ever supposed a mechanical force to resemble a sensation, but to become manifested to us *through* sensations. The senses are inadequate to exhaustively reveal all objectivity, but they are not mendacious. Our sensations are, as Mr. Spencer says, "symbols," but they are symbols by and through which the intellect comes to know objectivity—being, substance, extension, number, form, &c., things not to be expressed except in *terms of sensation*, but nevertheless not apprehended *as* sensations.

He goes on to declare (p. 207, § 87) the harmony of nervous physiology with his view, saying that when the structures of nerve-threads and cells are considered, it becomes inconceivable that any resemblance exists between the subjective effect and that objective cause which arouses it through the intermediation of changes resembling neither. That it becomes inconceivable *how* such a resemblance can be produced, *concedo*; that it is inconceivable

that it is produced, *nego*. Moreover, by the term "*effect*" is here properly meant, not the sensation merely, but the intellectual conceptions made known through sensation. Comparatively few persons will be ready to concede that as regards the extension, number, and shape of objects, "there is no likeness either in kind or degree" (p. 194, § 78) between such qualities as they exist objectively, and as they are known to us subjectively by the agency of our bodily organs.

He next (p. 207, § 88) turns to what he calls "an all-important implication," namely, the existence of an external world—"that the active antecedent of each primary feeling exists independently of consciousness" (p. 209). But how then can Mr. Spencer dare to affirm dogmatically that there is no likeness between that antecedent as objectively existing and that antecedent as known by us? We, on the contrary, may quite logically *on other grounds* arrive at an independent conclusion that there *is* such a likeness. "Likeness" I assert; "identity" I, of course, deny. Probably the material universe is clothed in a splendour of multitudinous kinds, some few of which are partly and feebly revealed to us with varying degrees of incompleteness by our senses, though revealed with ample sufficiency for our needs. Probably it everywhere throbs with objective harmonies, appreciated fully by pure spirits, and made known to us in a rudimentary and fragmentary way through vibration in our ears. And so with sight, smell, touch, and taste. "Touch" is but a minute acquaintance with surface as extended and figured; and "taste," though to us known so poorly and so rarely as to seem unworthy for spiritual enjoyment, may be conceived, though not imagined, to be a perennial source of spiritual enjoyment, not of course as tasted by an organ, but as intellectually known and apprehended.

The absence of light subjectively is darkness, and most of Mr. Spencer's school would deem the objective universe to be dark and also silent. But these conceptions, "darkness" and "silence," are really as "subjective" as light and sound. The absence of light as "*sensed*" by us is not objectively "darkness," but something which we cannot conceive. To think of the unseen universe as dark is to express objectivity in terms of the subjective, and is just as much to attribute objectivity to mere subjective sentiency as would be to adopt the most vulgar notion of the reality in the external world of our own very feelings of different kinds. Mr. Spencer's denial of likeness between the subjective and objective is indeed most unreasonable. He may say that from his point of view he sees no evidence, actual or possible, of such likeness, but he cannot affirm, without stupendous and absurd arrogance, that our senses *cannot* have been organized so as, most mysteriously, to make us truly acquainted with objective existences, together with

a variety of the powers and properties which such existences possess.

CHAPTER IV.—THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS.

The following is the substance of the several sections of this chapter:—§ 89. Relations, as we know them, exist only in consciousness. § 90. Those of coexistence vary with the structure, size, physiological state, and position of the organism experiencing them. § 91. Those of sequence are quantitively and qualitively affected by structure, age, and state. § 92. Relations of difference also vary with structure, bulk, and state. § 93. And because relations cannot be imagined without imagining (however minutely and transitorily) the related feelings, therefore the relations of co-existence, sequence, and difference do not exist, objectively, as we know them. All three being ultimately reducible to shocks are necessarily unlike such. § 94. This doctrine harmonizes with the facts of nervous structure. § 95. In spite of all this, conditions of objective existence are really symbolized by relations as we conceive them. There is some order and nexus beyond consciousness, and its real existence is implied throughout, as also that there is really an absolute.

The object of this chapter is (p. 210) "to show that the forms and degrees of relations between feelings are determined by the nature of the subject—exist, as we know them, only in consciousness, and no more resemble the connexions between outer agents than the feelings they unite resemble these outer agents."

Mr. Spencer begins by (p. 211, § 90) considering cognition of space in three dimensions (constituted of trebly compounded relations of co-existence), and maintains that it must vary qualitively according to the structure of the species. It must vary, he says, even in the same species, since two points contemplated from the side are conceived as a single relation, but as a double one when we stand between the points (p. 212). But surely this is simply a different *mode* of attaining the same result. Again, he says, a mouse traversing a space "cannot have the same conception of this space as a man," a proposition* which may *indeed* be conceded, as also that opium-dreams, or juxtaposition of large and small objects may alter our appreciations. But the conception of *space* itself is one thing, the conception of *quantity* of space is

* There is here some confusion. In the first example Mr. Spencer is really considering, not the space relation of two points to each other, but their relation to the spectator. In the second example, the mouse's idea (supposing it for argument's sake to have one) and the man's idea are respectively relative to the size of their bodies, and there is no more discrepancy than in saying that a furlong is more than a foot and less than a mile.

another. Everybody admits that "largeness" and "smallness" are essentially relative. Mr. Spencer also urges upon us the differences in impressions produced by the same object when viewed in different positions. But we may reply to this that *sensible* perceptions of relation, change, but not the *intellectual conception* of the relations of objectivity to which such sensible perceptions minister. Nay, the *very changes* of sensible perceptions intensify and make clearer the unity of those intellectual perceptions which they occasion.

A passing remark of Mr. Spencer's may here be noticed. He says (p. 214), "differences of quality in general are resolvable into differences in the ratios of the co-operative factors." But *quality* can never be identified with *quantity*. That which makes the ratio different *is* the quality, but the expression tends to mislead the ignorant into thinking that, profoundly considered, quantity and quality are fundamentally the same. That the ideas of quantity and quality are incapable of analysis or reduction into each other may be shown thus: Conceive two objects absolutely similar in *quantity*, we may then conceive that they differ in *quality*. One may be green, the other red; one transparent, the other opaque; one sonorous, one not; one in motion, the other relatively at rest; one a natural formation, the other an artificial fabric; one my property, the other the property of another; and so on.

He goes on (pp. 214, 215): "When we see that what is, objectively considered, the same connexion between things, may, as a space-relation in consciousness, be single or double; when we remember that, according as we are near or far off, it may be too large to be simultaneously perceived, or too small to be perceived at all; it becomes impossible to suppose any identity between this objective connexion and some one of the multitudinous subjective relations answering to it." But surely this is the *very* poorest and shallowest sophistry. No one has supported the assertion of "IDENTITY" even between the intellectual concept gathered from changing phenomena, and the object of that concept itself; still less between it and "some one of the multitudinous subjective relations [feelings] answering to it." But this absence of identity does not even go one step towards invalidating the correspondence between certain of the objective characters of objects and intellectual cognitions of such objects in and by the sensations they occasion, which sensations *present* them (in the sense of "*make them present*") to the intellect.

Next (p. 215, § 91) he examines compound relations of sequence, and he considers that herein qualitative differences of apprehension may be produced by the different structures of different animals, adding, "there is most likely a marked qualitative difference between that undeveloped sense of duration derived solely from the

experiences of inner changes, and that developed conception of time derived mainly from outer changes, but conceived to be a form of both outer and inner changes."

Now as to qualitative differences in animal sensations, all Mr. Spencer requires may be conceded, as such differences are but the materials of intellect. But if an intellectual animal could think by means of such materials of merely internal sensations as those Mr. Spencer supposes, such an animal would perceive time itself to be such as (like in nature to) the time we perceive—though its mode of arriving at such perception would be different. It need hardly be added that there is indeed a difference of quality between our perception of time and any feelings of a polyp.

As to quantitative differences of perception of sequence he remarks (p. 216): "Months to the old man appear no longer than weeks to the young man." Just so, the old man remarks a changed condition of sensibility, and he perceives a similarity of *feeling* between months now and weeks formerly as a result of that change; but he does not *intellectually* perceive months to *be* weeks, though they *feel* like them to him.

As to the effect of opium, &c., I readily concede all Mr. Spencer advances, but it is trivial and beside the question.

With respect to changes produced by "change of position among our experiences," he remarks (p. 217), as to the recollection of an evening passed somewhere a year ago: "There is a *conviction* that it was several hours long; but when contemplated it cannot be made of equal apparent length with the several hours just passed."* I reply to this—to the *feelings*, no! to the *intellect*, yes! It would be inconvenient as well as useless if our feelings did not change with distance in time as well as in place. Mr. Spencer admits a "CONVICTION," what more can we possibly require? He adds (p. 218), "life seems no longer at forty than it did at twenty." This is not my experience. I can recollect the leading events back year after year for thirty years, which I certainly could not have done at twenty. He also says: "To a lowly-endowed creature, conscious only of internally-initiated changes, it [time] cannot appear what it does to a creature chiefly occupied with changes that are externally initiated; since, in the last, it is partially dissociated from both orders of changes. Whence it seems inferable that, only partially dissociated as it is, it cannot have in consciousness that qualitative character which absolute dissociation would give it, and which we must suppose it to have objectively." This he maintains on

* This remark of Mr. Spencer's is singularly trivial, frivolous, and not at all to the point. It would seem as if he was here writing rather for children than for men.

account of the reason just before given, that "time, considered as an abstract from relations of sequence, must present a different aspect according to the degree of its dissociation from particular sequences." But to this may be replied: The idea of time is one thing, the possibility of recalling a greater or lesser number of more or less vivid phantasmata of things which happened in a given quantity of time, say a month or year, is a very different one; nor, probably, would even Mr. Spencer have ever confounded them together had not his theory obliged him to do so.

Mr. Spencer concludes this section by saying that "compound relations of sequences as we conceive them cannot be quantitively like the connexions beyond consciousness to which they refer, is proved by the facts that they vary in their apparent lengths with the structure of the organism, with its size, with its age, with its constitutional state, with the number and vividness of the impressions it receives, and with their relative positions in consciousness. Manifestly, as no one of these variously-estimated lengths can be taken as valid rather than the others, it becomes impossible to suppose equality between an interval of time as present to consciousness, and any nexus of things which it symbolizes." But these difficulties as to time may be answered in a way parallel to that in which those of space were replied to. "Feelings" change, but do not necessarily carry with them changes in the intellectual perceptions they occasion, nay the very fact of the phenomenal changes brings out yet more clearly the objectivity they reveal, and which is known by and to the *intellect* correctly, in spite of sensational variations when the organism is not so deranged that the intellectual faculties are thereby paralyzed.

He then (p. 219, § 92) proceeds to consider the compound relation of difference, and he infers that (since it "has to be conceived in terms of impressions that differ; and since the conception of difference cannot be dissociated from the order of impressions in which it is presented, if there is but one such order"), the "conception of difference becomes more independent of particular differences," "in proportion as the impressions become more multitudinous in their kinds," "and that, *therefore, in higher creatures it is not qualitively the same as in lower creatures.*" This should in fact be thus amplified, and such amplification would do away with that confusion between intellect and sense which Mr. Spencer makes. He should say: *Therefore in higher creatures the material* (*the direct sensitive cognition of things which differ*) *is gradually more and more elaborated, so that when taken up by an intellectual principle it is far indeed from being the same as in lower creatures.*

He concludes (p. 221) "that the compound relation of difference, as we know it, is dependent on structure," size, and state. I reply:

As we "know it," meaning, as it is presented to us *sensibly*, yes! as we "know it," meaning, as it is presented to us *intellectually*, no!

Next (p. 222, § 93) he considers the pure relations of co-existence, sequence and difference, and concludes that their relations "*as we know them*" do not obtain beyond consciousness, because they cannot be thought of without a "tacit recognition" of concrete existence ultimately derived from our feelings. But as to this it may be replied that "difference" (like genus and species) exists *formally* only in mind, though *materially* in things. The abstract is not, of course, the concrete. As to the "tacit recognition" of the concrete, that is merely the phantasmata necessary to all knowledge in our present condition. They are merely counters made use of by the mind. We understand five purely; through five counters, or five anythings. What proves that Mr. Spencer can think of pure abstract difference is, that he can write about it. Then as to this expression above quoted, "as we know them," we may reply: "As," in the sense of the means whereby we have them, no! "As," in the sense of agreeing with our intellectual apprehension so obtained, yes!

He next goes on (for the sake of clearness!) to attempt to simplify the expressions coexistence and sequence by means of terms expressing existences which in the first have, in the second have not, differences "in their order." Phenomena which can be experienced in different orders of succession (as the phenomena presented by an orange) being phenomena of coexistence, while those which can be experienced only in a single order (as those of a musical air) are phenomena of sequence. But what is the meaning of *order* if we have not yet got sequence, i.e. time? It may be contended that order as an intellectual act is primary, but anyhow it cannot be *really* understood without the addition in thought of either space or time.

Mr. Spencer sums up (p. 224) by reducing all perception to shocks accompanying transitions from one feeling to another. "That is, the relation of difference as present in consciousness is nothing more than a change in consciousness. How, then, can it resemble, or be in any way akin to, its sources beyond consciousness"? But what can be the meaning of saying that it is not *akin*, and *differs* from its source, if the category of difference is not applicable beyond feeling? If it is not so applicable, then it no more *differs* than it *agrees*, there being simply *no relation*. In fact, however, the perception of difference is *elicited* by shocks of sensitive change, but it itself is very much more, and the *intellectual* unit is a perception of being and non-being.

He goes on to say there is nothing between two colours, as they objectively exist, "answering to the change which results in us

from contemplating first one and then the other." I reply: Nothing between them like to the *feeling* of the change in the sensible perception—no! Like to what the intellect apprehends concomitantly with that feeling—yes! "Their relation [the two colours] as we think it, *being nothing else than a change of our state,* cannot possibly be parallel to anything between them, when they have both remained unchanged." This is equivalent to saying that no one thing differs from any other objectively; because no objective difference whatever is the same as a nervous shock. But this extreme position may be turned round and made use of to prove the objectivity of extension, since the objectivity of "difference" is certain, and yet it is the very same arguments (thus shown to be futile) which are brought against the objectivity of extension which are brought against the objectivity of "difference." Moreover, if a subjective relation of difference cannot exist without the momentary coexistence of its terms, the objectivity of difference is most *true* on this very account, because an objective relation cannot exist without this momentary existence of *its* terms.*

He then (p. 224, § 94) tries to show that physiology harmonizes with his doctrine, saying that all relations are composed of nervous elements, not "intrinsically different," and therefore cannot resemble intrinsically-different objective connexions." But what, then, is meant by using the term "intrinsically different"? Moreover, a set of apparently similar nerves may be as truly organized for revealing a variety of objective conditions as any one set.

He concludes that "it *needs* but to think of a brain as a seat of nervous discharges, intermediate between actions in the outer world and actions in the world of thought, to be impressed with the *absurdity* of supposing that the connexions among outer actions, after being transferred through the medium of nervous discharges, can reappear in the world of thought in the forms they originally had." But where is the "absurdity"? It is indeed true that it

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* Mr. Spencer, in saying that the nervous shock constitutes by its occurrence the consciousness of a relation of difference, and by its degree the consciousness of the amount of difference, contradicts what he previously said, that in relations of difference we have, (1) a feeling of some kind; (2) a feeling of another kind, which being distinguishable as another feeling, proves itself to be not homogeneous with it; and (3) a feeling of shock. For from this it follows that the consciousness of the relation of difference arises from the feelings being distinguishable and distinguished, which, he says, proves that they are not homogeneous, i.e. that they are different. The nervous shock is a subsequent affair; it does not make the difference, nor does it make the perception of difference. I could perceive that John, who was alive, is dead, and then I receive a nervous shock; I am not shocked by the difference between his past and present state until I have perceived it. The difference between two things which we consider, is not the same as, but is the cause of, a change in our state when we consider them.

is most mysterious *how* the nervous system gives us even any one symbolical message from objectivity such as Mr. Spencer allows that it does give. It is not *really* a bit more mysterious how it can reveal to us the objective relations which the realist believes it does reveal than how it reveals what Mr. Spencer allows it does reveal. Even he must admit that it can never be *disproved* that the universe has been so ordered that real objective relations become known to us *through* these "sensible symbols," provided we are adult, healthy, and use *all* our organs and faculties, sensible and intelligent. For what can be more absurd, when God has given us five senses to make use of, to complain that the use of one by itself leads into error? The truthfulness of the intellect's report as to the qualities of the objective world has the same basis as has its report as to the objective existence of that objective world, and the latter reposes on reason, as Mr. Spencer truly represents. He concludes the chapter (p. 225, § 95) by referring to the assumption universally made that "there exist beyond consciousness, conditions of objective manifestation which are symbolized by relations as we conceive them." "The very proposition that what we know as a relation . . . does not resemble any order or nexus beyond consciousness, implies that there exists *some such* order or nexus beyond consciousness." But how can it be "some such" order or nexus if there is *no* resemblance between them—"no likeness between them either in kind or degree"? (p. 194, § 78). The only meaning Mr. Spencer can really have is that which all philosophers would, of course, concede, namely, that objective conditions are not identical with subjective sensibilities, though made known to us through the latter by a complex and indirect process.

He then concludes by asserting the reality of an absolute and unknowable ontological order, giving rise to the phenomenal order, and an ontological nexus giving rise to phenomenal differences. "Though the relation of difference constituted, as we have seen, by a change in consciousness, cannot be IDENTIFIED with anything beyond consciousness; yet that there is something beyond consciousness to which it is due, is an inevitable conclusion; since to think otherwise is to think of change taking place without an antecedent" (pp. 226, 227). In the last words we see Mr. Spencer admits the fundamental nature of the law of causality. But the word "*identified*" should be carefully noted. Certainly what he speaks of cannot be *identified*, but whoever said it could? Whoever thought of *identifying* the mechanism of perception with the thing perceived? If he had only contended against "identity" instead of against "likeness" "either in kind or degree," there would have been no word to dispute, and no ill effects would have been involved in his system. The ontological order—dark to brutes—is revealed to man by his sensible experiences (feelings), and cor-

responding faint feelings (phantasmata) are, in this life, the *conditions* of it sreproduction or presence in thought. But because we cannot think without phantasmata, it does not follow that those *phantasmata* THEMSELVES are all our thoughts in each case.

Mr. Spencer always treats the mere means and occasions of intellectual action as *intellectual action itself*, owing to his fundamental confusion of thought with feeling, which leads him to such nonsense as speculating as to an oyster's conception of time and space! He indeed approaches the truth, but then stops short of it. It is certainly most true that it requires but a little change to transform his system (in spite of its generally very different spirit) into scholasticism. His fundamental error is not seeing that imagination and sensible phantasmata suggest to our intellect truths beyond images, not therefore adequately expressible by words though *conveyed* by words with practical efficacy to other minds. Meanings beyond the words themselves, and still more beyond their more ancient meanings, are continually suggested by language. Who, when he hears of the "spirit of Shakespeare," thinks of the pulmonary exhalation from his lungs! So such words as "substance," "cause," are symbols, and suggest images through which the intellect understands what is hypersensible, and by such language conveys it to other minds. Men who do not *really* so understand them have either a mind which is undeveloped or they are somehow abnormally constituted.

CHAPTER V.—THE REVIVABILITY OF FEELINGS.

The sections of this chapter may be thus expressed :—§ 96. The conditions of the revival of faint feelings by the occurrence of vivid ones, are § 97, the relational character of such faint feelings, § 98; and the faintness of present competing feelings, § 99. Feelings are also revivable according as they were originally strong or oft repeated, § 100, and according to the state of nutrition of the nervous tissue, § 101; and to the general physiological conditions present when the revival is attempted, § 102. Revivability also depends on the quality of the blood, § 103; and all these *à posteriori* facts, as to feelings, accord with the data furnished us by the nervous system, and demonstrate the correspondence of the two sets of phenomena.

In this chapter and the three following, Mr. Spencer considers the revivability and associability of feelings and relations, in connexion with the nervous mechanism of such revivability and associability. But such questions, though most interesting to the *Physiologist*, are to the *Psychologist* (such as recent controversies have made him) matters little more germane than are to the machinist questions as to the botanical relations of the woods of which his tools are made.

It may be noted, however, that Mr. Spencer, at starting, speaks (p. 228) of "faint feelings, or ideas" as equivalents, though antecedently (p. 182) he had represented ideas as resulting "when a vivid feeling is assimilated to, or coheres with, one or more of the faint feelings left by such vivid feelings previously experienced."

CHAPTER VI.—THE REVIVABILITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS.

The contents of the sections composing this and the following chapters, need not be separately given, as the notice of each will be very short. This is a very interesting chapter, and a very good one, showing, as it does, the material part of intellectual action—the conditions that direct that unconscious revivability of which our power of recollection makes use. Nothing in it, however, even tends to bridge over the difference between this material revival and the intellectual recognition of relations as relations, e.g., between the revival in a cat on its return home of associated sensible memories—or in one listening to the gnawing of a mouse—and our appreciation of time, space, and difference.

He begins by saying (§ 104) that from the changed order in which relations are continually experienced, "it results that relations of coexistence, of sequence, and of difference, come to be separable from particular pairs of impressions, and acquire a *quasi*-independence." But this does not and cannot result from the mere incidence of relations, it can only come from the presence of a mental power to abstract such conceptions from such incidental experiences—i.e., Mr. Spencer here quietly introduces the intellect without saying anything about it.

He then proceeds (p. 241, § 105) to the position that "relations in general are more revivable than feelings in general," and he illustrates it by the greater readiness with which we recall the relative position than the colours of a room inhabited in childhood. But indeed this illustration is a good one of a nearly pure sensible revival ; and we may see the difference of kind constituted by the introduction of intellect when we begin to arrange the parts of the mental picture by general conceptions of "right and left," and by other reflex attention to it.

He continues and shows (p. 243, § 106) that "the most relational relations are those of coexistence," then those of sequence, and finally those of difference. Again, he shows (p. 245, § 107) that "present relations hinder the representation of other relations, and (§ 108) most so those of the same order. He next makes plain (§ 109) that all the same physical conditions (use, state, blood, &c.) apply here, as were enumerated as being influential in the revivability of

feelings. Finally (§ 110), he shows a similar parity with the conditions of the nervous system to exist here, as in the last chapter was shown to exist with respect to the revivability of feelings.

CHAPTER VII.—THE ASSOCIABILITY OF FEELINGS.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer declares (§ 111) that the associability of feelings goes with their revivability, since (§ 112) the first can only become known through the second. He asks (§ 113), what is the ultimate law of the association of feelings? and replies (§ 114) that feelings of the three great groups associate themselves primarily with members of their own group; and the (§ 115) law is that each feeling associates itself with (p. 256) "the class, order, genus, species, and variety, of preceding feelings like itself." This he also shows (§ 116) to be congruous with nervous structure, and with the physical localization and proximity of different groups of cells and fibres.

CHAPTER VIII.—THE ASSOCIABILITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS.

This is an admirable explanation of the sensible perceptions of brutes, but in it there is not the commencement even of an explanation of one intellectual act.

He tells us (§ 117) that associability of relations varies with their revivability. The most relational (§ 118) are the most associable, and (§ 119) relations "aggregate (p. 262) with their respective classes and sub-classes."

Here he remarks (pp. 262–263) that the terms of a relation "can be known at all, as standing in relation, only by distinguishing between them in consciousness; and *the act of distinguishing between them* is the act of classing their relation along with relations of difference."

But the act of distinguishing automatically and indeliberately, though it is materially such an act of classing, is not formally such; it is formally such only by the action of *intellect*.

Again (p. 264) he says: "On looking, say, at a flower by the roadside, the relations among the feelings of colour which we receive from its petals *instantly* associate themselves with relations of coexistence in general, with the sub-class of visually-perceived relations of coexistence, with the sub-sub-class," &c. &c.

But in fact these *instantly* made automatic segregations are taken up by the intellect as perceptions of being, substance, &c. &c.—a fundamentally different thing.

He proceeds (p. 267, § 120): "Every relation then, like every feeling, on being presented to consciousness, associates itself with like predecessors. *Knowing* a relation, as well as *knowing* a feeling, *is*

the assimilation of it to its past kindred; and knowing it completely is the assimilation of it to past kindred exactly like it." Here is the old confusion between the material sensitive basis and the formal intellectual recognition.

He goes on to say that as in each great class the relations blend insensibly, each has a doubtful border—" a certain cluster of relations nearly like the one perceived, which became nascent in consciousness in the act of assimilation. . . . hence results the so-called law of association by contiguity."

He continues (p. 269) saying that the same law holds equally "in a plexus of relations among many feelings"—i.e. ordinary perceptions of objects. And he instances the perception of a pale face that was formerly seen red, and the redness "having served as a common term to many different but combined relations, it happens that when these are again presented, the assimilation of them to the like relations before seen, entails a consciousness of the missing term of these like relations before seen." But he entirely ignores the *mind*, which is absolutely required to *look* back, compare past with present, and formally recognize the relation indicated by the diverse sensations which have been automatically associated.

He goes on (p. 270): "The act of recognition and the act of segregation are two aspects of the same act." I reply, No! the first is the formal act of the intellect, which makes use of the previous automatic sensitive act as a material. Finally (§ 121) he shows how the facts stated respecting the conditions of associability of relations between feelings harmonize with the data afforded us by the study of the nervous system.

CHAPTER IX.—PLEASURES AND PAINS.

In beginning this chapter (§ 122) he remarks (p. 272) tha besides feelings, central or peripheral, real or ideal, there is a cross-division into "agreeable and disagreeable," and these arise from defective as well as excessive action, while many actions, he says, are neutral and indifferent. He objects to Aristotle's doctrine that "pleasure accompanies the action of a healthy faculty on its appropriate object," saying some tastes and odours are disagreeable in all degrees of intensity. But in fact the word "appropriate" saves Aristotle's definition, and makes it applicable to evolution—since this process makes manifest *what* objects are appropriate and what not, to each kind of creature. Mr. Spencer tells us (§ 123) that pleasures and pains are the concomitants of certain acts—pain attending excess, a great defect, or disuse of action; and he remarks (p. 274): "Solitude, necessitating quiescence of the faculties exercised in holding converse with our fellow-beings,

leads by-and-by to great misery." But the Cistercians, Camaldolese, and Carthusians certainly contradict this as regards Christianity, and show the exceptional nature of Christian influences.

He next observes (p. 278, § 124) that all excessive actions that tend to be fatal are painful, and (§ 125) that any species so organized as not to feel such actions painful would soon become extinct. Incidentally he remarks (p. 280): "If we except the human race and some of the highest *allied races*, in which foresight of distant consequences introduces a complicating element, it is undeniable that every animal habitually persists in each act which gives pleasure so long as it does so, and desists from each act which gives pain. It is manifest that, for creatures of low intelligence, unable to *trace involved sequences of effects*, there *can* be *no other guidance*." But it is just some of those creatures which are *far* lower than man, e.g. ants, which have this faculty most apparent, nor need any brutes be credited with higher faculties than ants have, in order to account for any of their actions. Yet Mr. Spencer ventures to say that there "*can be* no other guidance"! Can Mr. Spencer explain on his principles as here expressed the actions of the wasp *Sphex?*

He traces (p. 281) the failure of instinct, to individuals becoming exposed to conditions to which the race has not been accustomed by natural selection. He then proceeds (p. 281, § 126) to show how man, by the constant occurrence of new conditions, is continually having the adjustments of natural selection interfered with, resulting in the half sound belief that painful actions are beneficial, and *vice versâ*, and in a God propitiated by self-torture. But Mr. Spencer ought to guard against the application of this to Christianity and Christian asceticism, since such asceticism is fundamentally different and furnishes a good example, when compared with Buddhism and Hindooism, of superficial resemblance arising from deeper differences, and of the *independent origin* of apparently similar social structures. The principle of Christian asceticism is love. Far from believing that God is propitiated by self-torture, the Christian rejoices in the wonderful contrivance by which the love of an Omnipotent Being has provided a way for such creatures as we are to serve Him. God approves not the self-denial itself, but the love which produces the self-denial. What antecedent conditions, Mr. Spencer may well be asked, can have occasioned the happiness of the "religious life"?

In the next section (p. 285, § 127) comes a qualification to the effect that actions naturally selected will be those good for the *race*, and not necessarily for the *individual* after the reproductive period of life.

Finally (p. 286, § 128) as to the intrinsic natures of pleasures and pains, psychologically considered, he says this question may eventually prove unanswerable, and concludes (p. 288): "they are

largely, if not mainly, composed of secondary elements of feeling aroused indirectly by diffused stimulation of the nervous system." But first it should be noted that he admits (p. 286, § 128) that "pleasures to a large extent, and pains to some extent, are separate from, and additional to, the feelings with which we habitually identify them." Therefore he admits they are distinct feelings themselves, and that therefore they are subjectively unanalyzable accompaniments of other feelings, and perhaps of all, for the apparently neutral and indifferent partake of the general pleasureableness of mere existence.

His reply explaining the intrinsic nature of them by nervous stimulation is quite inadequate. Granted that stimulation and depression are the physical sides, the occasions and physical causes of pleasures and pains, it is plain that subjectively they are unanalyzable.

The orthodox history of man is quite reconcilable with evolution, and with these feelings as explained in this chapter. Adam's sin made man (by depriving him of supernatural guidance) fall into the condition of mere nature, and having once so fallen, then the non-adjustment of habits to successively new social conditions would explain the *physical* side of *material* sin and suffering. This is made formal suffering by our intellectual nature, and our intellectual nature also makes the spiritual side of material sin, while sin is *formally* constituted by the deliberate act of our free will.

Mr. Spencer's representations, forming the contents of the second part of his "Psychology," may be summarized as follows:—

Mind is only known in its states, which, though apparently simple, are really compound, and, as sensations are made up of reiterated minute shocks of feeling, so thoughts are composed of reiterated sensations segregated with their faint likes.

Mind is composed of feelings and relations between feelings, simultaneous, successive, like and unlike, segregated in similar clusters of clusters, with like faint predecessors.

Neither feelings nor relations down even to "difference" are equivalent to their objective causes, though an objective nexus is necessarily assumed and implied. Feelings and relations are revivable and associable according to their relational character, and according to conditions of vigour, repetition, state, &c., each becoming associated with its kind and sub-sub-kind.

Pleasures and pains correspond largely with general nervous stimulation, but otherwise are due to the action of natural selection, which has destroyed individuals who felt pleasure in what was self-destructive or destructive to their race, while it has preserved those who feel pleasure in acts of individual or racial utility.

The whole teaching of this part may be more shortly stated

thus: "Nothing is knowable but complexly segregated feelings (including relations, pleasures, and pains) transformed by repetition. These we are compelled to take as symbols of an unknowable objective order and nexus. The segregation of plexuses of vivid feelings and relations to antecedent faint ones is mind. In other words: Nothing is knowable but feelings, symbols of the unknowable, presented in the unanalyzable forms, Mind, Matter, and Motion. These arise and go forth, without any break, from physical actions, through merely vital actions, to the highest mental acts.

On the other hand, it is here affirmed that *external things*, as well as feelings, *are* knowable, and that objective truth is revealed to us through the self-conscious Ego, which also shows us that there *is* an essential difference between mind and matter. Also that these two entities are known to us intellectually, as also that the first cause must be of the nature of that one of these to which It has given the power to *know:*

Further, that this power "to know" is a power of the body, such body being subject to the laws of matter, and motion, and animality, and in this way, *hic et nunc*, our intellect is accidentally bound to follow the laws of the imagination, though it can indefinitely transcend the latter in its range:

Further, that the nature of the action of the human mind is fundamentally different from brute neurosis:

Finally, that it is utterly gratuitous to assume one underlying base of which matter and mind are diverging forms. Reason declares that the divergence between the two is fundamental, and that if both, as known to us by experience, are derivative, then that both such experienced mind and such experienced matter are the creatures of a Being who, as having Intellect and Will, may be spoken of as a Mind which can be conceived but not imagined.

Casting a retrospective glance over the two parts of the "Psychology" which have now been examined, the line of argument and rejoinder may perhaps not unprofitably be represented in the following manner.

Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," so excellent in many respects, has, so far at least, one glaring defect. "Reason," in our sense of the word, is nowhere considered, and yet to omit its consideration from a Psychology is strange indeed.

The two first parts of the work together show us vivid and faint feelings of different kinds, formed of aggregations of shock-like units of feeling, and which apparently answer to varied transmutations of units of nervous action, but which are in no way equivalent to, though symbolical of, objective being.

To this representation it may be replied that such condition may indeed be the material basis of thought, as vegetable irrita-

bility is of animal feeling; but that "thought" and "feeling" are radically and fundamentally different.

Mr. Spencer would probably admit the truth of such reply, but would parry it by saying that "thought" is certainly not a feeling, but is the aggregation of segregated feelings (substantial or relational) to their faint-like predecessors.

Once more then we may reply—such again is indeed the material part of thinking, but our intellect shows us that in "thought" there is something made known to us beyond the material correlatives of sensible terms.

To this reply Mr. Spencer might object, saying that no relation can be thought of, without our making use of sensible terms, even if these are almost infinitesimal.

As a rejoinder to such objection we should say that all indeed know and concede that the mind (as we experience it) cannot act without the use of phantasmata, but nevertheless introspection shows us that by means of these phantasmata we come to know something more than themselves. Thus, e.g., through the feeling of difference and the imagination of that feeling we come to know difference *as* difference, and as *a relation*, the aggregation of vivid to faint feelings and relations is one thing, the recollection of relation *as* relation is (as has been before urged) quite another thing.

Mr. Spencer would probably respond by calling our attention to musical tones and *timbre* as apparently simple feelings, different in kind from feelings of "shock," although really composed of minute shocks aggregated together.

But, as has been said earlier, such response may be answered by affirming, as is most true, that there is no ratio, parity, or common measure between the difference between any two feelings and the difference between a feeling and a thought. But also it may be urged that, even waiving this denial of parity, the facts alleged as explanations are not true, and tone and timbre though occasioned by are *not* composed of nervous shocks.

With respect to Mr. Spencer's denial of objective truth there may be ambiguity. When he asserts that our conceptions and perceptions are symbols of, but not equivalent to, objective being, all depends on the precise meaning given to "symbols" and "equivalence." Mr. Spencer asserts that subjective states have no equivalence with objective being because feelings of all kinds depend on varying conditions, and because even a relation of difference cannot be thought without its terms being momentarily considered, and therefore such relation of difference as it exists objectively, cannot be like our conception of it. Moreover feelings and nervous shocks cannot be like their objective causes.

Now all this has been already here denied, and equivalence of

subjective perceptions to objects has been asserted, because a normal medium of conditions is supposed, and because a relation of difference cannot exist without its terms existing, at least momentarily, so that herein there is complete equivalence between thought and objectivity. Again, to deny the objectivity of difference is to deny the objectivity of the contrast between "subject" and "object" (which Mr. Spencer makes the one *fundamental* truth), as also of the law of contradiction, and so all reasoning is annihilated. It follows that the objectivity of the "relation of difference" and of that of "identity" must be maintained if we would be rational at all. Yet as Mr. Spencer most truly says (p. 225): "How can such thoughts resemble nervous shocks?" But if by means of "shocks," objectivities so radically different from such "shocks," as are the relations of "difference," "coexistence," &c., become revealed to us, why may not other objectivities be so revealed also; and why should the difference existing between the acting mechanism and its product lessen the value of that marvellous product?

In this way the objectivity of all that which reason declares to be necessarily objective, is affirmed and justified; and even as to secondary qualities, their objectivity is shown to be by no means "impossible" as *partial* revelations, especially if, on other grounds, there should be any evidence for thinking them probably true however imperfect. Reason certainly erects no bar against their being so received.

Thus we must admit a sentient faculty with special sense-aptitudes, and a *sensus communis* for the synthesis of the various sense-perceptions of different orders, and also feelings of pleasure and pain, the whole being distributable into epiperipheral, endoperipheral, and central feelings. But besides this sentient faculty we also require (to explain the fact of psychology) the admission of a distinct intellectual principle endowed with the three faculties (1) knowledge, (2) memory, and (3) will. It is this intellectual principle which replacing in us a merely sentient nature, takes up and transfigures into intellectual phenomena those nervous actions which in brute animals result but in sensation, imagination, and emotion.

The admission of a "rational principle" in man suffices to explain all the facts without confusion. If the existence of such a principle be *not* admitted, then the facts of psychology cannot be explained without confusion and an inevitable miscalling of low things by high names, as when "motion" is spoken of as "sensation," and "feeling" as "thought."

Having taken this preliminary survey of pure subjective psychology, Mr. Spencer again returns to anatomy and physiology, and the adjustments, in different animals, of nervous structure to the changes in environing conditions. M.

Art. VIII.—FATHER COLERIDGE ON THE GOSPELS.

The Public Life of our Lord Jesus Christ. Vol. I. By H. J. Coleridge, S.J. London : Burns & Oates.

In January last we expressed our conviction, that the appearance of this first instalment of F. Coleridge's great work will be the beginning of a new era in the Catholic study of the Gospels. It was with great regret that we found ourselves prevented, by pressure both of time and space, from giving in April such a general exposition of its contents as we had hoped to accomplish; but we must no longer defer paying the debt we owe in this matter, not to F. Coleridge, but to the interests of Catholic truth and piety. Our brief comments indeed will at best be very poor and unworthy of the theme; and we will begin them with what must seem, as coming from a Catholic, a very common-place remark, but of which the bearing (we hope) will soon become apparent.

The fundamental dogma of Christianity may be thus briefly stated. When mankind had fallen, God did not content Himself with doing what would have fully sufficed for their restoration; with conferring on them pardon for the past under due conditions, and renewed strength for the future. He decreed that He would most unmistakably manifest to them the ineffable tenderness of His love, by personally suffering for their salvation. But since the Divine Nature cannot suffer, God the Son assumed a human nature, created for the very purpose of suffering; and then, clothed in that nature, He proceeded to close a life of bitter sorrow by a death of unparalleled anguish. In the case of those who apprehend this mystery at all worthily, language which on other subjects would appear rhapsodical and wildly extravagant, if applied to this theme will appear tame and inadequate.

But God has added to this a second entirely distinct mercy; a mercy, which by no means unfrequently escapes the explicit notice of Christians, by being, as it were, lost in the effulgence of the former. All which we said above might have been verified *in secret*. Its general truth might have been sufficiently revealed, but its details might have been entirely unknown. The Incarnate God, though suffering in His human nature no less than He has now suffered, might have lived an entirely hidden life, and died an entirely hidden death. Far different has been His choice. To this day all the localities are easily accessible, which

were trodden by His sacred steps. He spent three years in habits of most public communication, not only with the disciples whom he was training, but with the multitudes who were afterwards to turn against Him and procure His murder. His death was so public, that nothing could possibly have been more so; raised aloft as He was on the Cross, to be gazed at by His bitterest enemies, in such sense that every gesture, every movement, every word was exposed to their malignant comments. Lastly, as the obvious complement of this Divine appointment, the memory of His human words and acts was not left to the accidents and uncertainties of human tradition; but a selection from them was made by the Holy Ghost Himself.* And this selection again was by Him committed to an inspired record, the truth and trustworthiness of which was to be authenticated by an infallible Church in every subsequent age down to the end of the world.

It is perhaps hardly too much to say, that this second mercy, though inferior to the first, yet may bear comparison with it. It might be thought a first principle, that the ways and thoughts of God are infinitely above human cognisance; and yet—though this must always of course be in some sense true—yet it is also true, that what may be rightly called, in the simplest and most literal sense, the words and acts of Almighty God, His movements to and fro, the various events which successively occurred to Him, are placed before the humblest of His disciples for study and meditation. This is a mercy, we say, entirely distinct from the former. One of its purposes undoubtedly is, that God's ethical character (if we may so express ourselves) may be rightly apprehended by mankind. This character is very far indeed from being sufficiently set forth by the visible course of events; because what men experience is but an infinitesimal portion of His Providence. But by studying the life of Jesus Christ, a Christian learns e.g. how tender is God's love towards mankind; how singular His predilection towards the poor, the sick, the despised, the reviled; how immeasurably greater is His desire for men's sanctification, than for any other end which they can pursue. This undoubtedly is one great purpose He proposes, by the knowledge He has given of His human words and acts. Another is, that Christians may grow more and more in habits of tender intimacy and familiarity with Him, who is their Creator and

* "The first object of the Gospels considered as literary works, was not so much history as doctrine; the collection of the facts about our Blessed Lord, on which Christian instruction and doctrine had been founded. No doubt there were other divine purposes which guided the hands of the sacred writers, but this was the first and the chief."—F. Coleridge, p. 141.

Redeemer. For such familiarity, we need hardly add, gives them a power, otherwise (as far as we can see) unattainable, both for personally loving Him, and for making Him their model and example.

Such being the Four Gospels, it might have been anticipated with some confidence, that large portions of them would present serious difficulties of apprehension. Their contents are selected (as we have said) by the Holy Ghost from innumerable human utterances and actions of Almighty God; and it was of course certain, that a very large proportion of those utterances and actions would be more or less mysterious. Why should we suppose that this latter class would be passed over in the selection? It appertained doubtless to God's love for the little ones of Christ, that many things should be recorded, which may be sufficiently and profitably understood by pious souls, however deficient in learning and ability. But very great benefit is derivable from the further fact, that a large portion of the Gospels is of a different character. It is surely in the highest degree a spiritually elevating and profitable occupation, to study the words and context of any given portion of these holy records; to compare Scripture with Scripture, fact with fact, and passage with passage; to compare facts and words alike with Catholic dogma; and so successively, in each particular case, to arrive at the true intent of something which the Incarnate God has said or done. A nobler intellectual occupation can hardly be imagined.

Dr. Trench, the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin,—who is certainly among the most reverential, orthodox, and satisfying of non-Catholic commentators,—has very well set forth the difficulty which is to be found in various parts of the Gospels; and his words, we think, are well worthy of attention:—

I have never been able to consent with that which so often is asserted — namely, that the Gospels are in the main plain and easy; and that all the chief difficulties of the New Testament are to be found in the Epistles. There are, indeed, by the gracious provision of God, abundance of plain things— so plain, that no wayfarer, who seeks his waymarks, need err for lack of such —alike in these and in those. But when we begin to set the hard things of one portion of Scripture against the hard things of another, I cannot admit that they have right who assume it as lifted above all doubt that those of the Epistles infinitely surpass those of the Gospels. How often the difficulties of the Epistles are merely difficulties of form; not of the thought, but of the setting forth of the thought; of the logical sequence, which only requires a patient disentangling, and all is comparatively clear. But in the Gospels it is not the form of the thought, for that for the most part presents little or nothing perplexing; but the thought itself,

the divine fact or statement, which itself constitutes the difficulty. Nor, if I am right in affirming it to be so, is this in any way strange. For while there must be deep things everywhere in Scripture, things past man's finding out—else it were no revelation—surely it is nothing surprising that the Son of God, *Who moved in all worlds as in regions familiar to Him*, who was not the illuminated, but the Illuminator of all others; not inspired, but the Inspirer, should utter the words of widest range and mightiest reach, those which should most task even the enlightened spirit of man to understand. . . . .

The limpid clearness of St. John's style conceals from us often the profundity of the thought, as the perfect clearness of waters may altogether deceive us about their depth; and we may thus be too lightly tempted to conclude that, while St. Paul may be hard, St. John, at all events is easy. I believe this to be very far from the case.—("Studies in the Gospels," p. v.)

It is this noble work then, the exposition of the Gospels, in which F. Coleridge has engaged, to the signal benefit both of Catholic devotion and Catholic theology. He has made a start in the present volume, and its successor (as he mentions) will probably appear in July. When complete, it will be, as he says, a work "of considerable length and compass"; falling short indeed in these respects of no life of our Lord, which has hitherto appeared in ancient or modern times. One who comes to it mainly as a learner, cannot of course do it any kind of justice; but he may briefly set down one or two impressions which it has suggested to his mind.

Our first remark is this. Take the analogy of a human philosopher: those who have been carefully trained in his school, and still more those who have been frequently in his company, will catch far more forcibly than others the force and drift of his successive words and acts: they will see real and deep meaning, where others see no meaning at all; and they will see the true meaning of what others misapprehend and pervert. Thus it is those who have been trained in our Lord's own school;—who have been deeply imbued with true doctrine, whether on His Divine Personality or the endowments of His sacred humanity;—above all who have made Him their constant contemplation;—it is these who will most truly sympathize with His words and acts, and see their genuine significance. F. Coleridge then has laid the true foundation. His memory is richly stored with the thoughts and imaginings of such holy men; while (if it be not impertinent to make such a remark) every page displays his thorough mastery of all Catholic dogma which concerns the Incarnation. We should further add, that in his hands the devotional and practical contemplation of our Blessed Lord entirely preponderates over every other aspect of whatever scene may be in hand.

As to this last-named feature of the book, there is hardly one page which will illustrate it better than any other page. But we may exemplify the admirable use he makes of the meditations of Christian contemplative writers, by the quotation from Ludolph in p. 86, on the scene which must have ensued in the wilderness, when Satan was for the time finally conquered and angels thereupon ministered to the Victor. Or we may adduce a longer passage (pp. 168–172), where the author introduces with great force the comments which have been made by devout Catholics on our Lord's first miracle. Under this head we may also commemorate two or three beautiful extracts from the visions of Sister Emmerich; which he has in no instance however introduced, except where they serve to fill up the details of some scene, which urgently *needed* the being set forth in full detail. As to all this, it will happen no doubt again and again, that some particular significance, given by devout Catholics to this or that passage, will be scouted by Protestant critics as far-fetched and puerile. But if Catholics were to drop whatever non-Catholics account puerile, they would simply have to change their religion for a different one. And at last "Wisdom is justified by her children." Those who have been nurtured in the love of God and in habits of piety, "have their senses exercised to the discernment of good and evil"; and they can see many a thought to be heavenly and divine in character, on which children of this world look down as the merest foolishness.

Closely connected with what we have been saying, though distinct from it, is the author's introduction of such pious and ascetical remarks, as are naturally suggested by the circumstances on which he is commenting. Some may perhaps think there is a little too much of this; but we must say that to our mind he has as nearly as possible hit the happy mean. His business of course is exposition, not admonition; and in our opinion, he has introduced no other practical applications, except those which emphatically serve to set forth the full significance of what the Evangelists have recorded. We may instance what we mean, and at the same time exemplify the characteristically *Catholic* spirit which pervades the author's reflections, by citing his comment of the passage, in which our Lord promises to Simon the name of Cephas or Peter.

Thus we see that the Church, the dearest thought of our Lord's Heart after His Eternal Father, was in His mind at this time; and that it was the presence of Simon Peter that, if we may so say, called it up; the two being inseparable in the love of our Lord, as in the Providence of God, Peter and the Church that is built upon him; as in the Incarnation itself there are two

persons never to be separated, Jesus Christ and His Mother, through whom He became Man (p. 126).

In truth however we find it difficult to enter into any one's state of mind, who can complain of any Gospel commentary on the precise ground of its being too lengthy. Grecian and Roman histories are published of a most voluminous character, and no one grumbles. Sir A. Alison has given fourteen thick octavo volumes to a history of Europe during the first French Revolution, and is not rebuked for his prolixity; in fact, we believe, he is exceeded in length by Thiers. Where the matter is thoroughly solid and good, no one complains of length: or rather no one does so, unless the highest of all possible themes be the one treated. Such a complaint, we repeat, is to us unintelligible. If it is among the noblest, so surely it is also among the most arduous works which can be undertaken, to set forth in their entire bearing, in their deep significance, in their full suggestiveness, the human acts and words of Almighty God. Indeed the very highest endowments and the fullest detail will only enable a writer to accomplish this with *approximate* success. Doubtless in this, as in every other study, there must be manuals and abridgments, for the young and for those who are prevented by adverse circumstances from lengthened investigation. But to us it is perplexing, how leisured and pious Catholics—believing what they do on the Personality of Jesus Christ—can endure to go through life, without attaining the fullest knowledge and apprehension they can, of every act which He performed and every word which He uttered.

And this leads us to another consideration of much importance. It may be almost said, that to write such a comment as F. Coleridge proposes, is to write a "summa theologiæ" for ordinary Christians. The exordium of S. John contains the whole dogma of the Incarnation; his sixth chapter the whole dogma of the Blessed Eucharist; the parables recorded by the Synoptists contain a mass of miscellaneous doctrine. "The Holy Ghost shall remind you of all things which I have spoken to you." He "shall not speak of Himself, but shall speak what things He has heard." "He shall glorify Me, for He shall take of what is Mine and declare it to you" (John xiv. 26; xvi. 13, 14). It would seem that there is hardly one, if indeed there is one, of the Catholic dogmata, which did not receive its first rudimental promulgation, in some evangelically recorded utterance of our Lord's. Of course the discussions of scientific theology are absolutely requisite, in order that due light be thrown on these pregnant and rudimental utterances:

but these last in their turn react on many a patristic exposition or scholastic argumentation, imparting a freshness and power which it would not otherwise possess. "In these Scriptural words God Incarnate first uttered this dogma" — here surely is an announcement of a most touching and practical character. It is this side of theology, which such a writer as F. Coleridge will build up with extraordinary laboriousness and power. And those Catholics, who have no vocation to technical theological study, must derive from such exposition a far deeper, wider, and more vivid knowledge of their religion, than they would otherwise possess.

We next turn to a somewhat different kind of excellence. In late years the science of criticism has put forth quite a new start and development; and it would be most strange, if the new ways of thought (since they contain much truth) were not capable of throwing important light on the Gospel narrative. We have already said indeed, what profound and accurate apprehension of our Lord's words and acts has been exhibited by those great contemplatives, who understood Him better than others, because they loved Him better and enjoyed more of His intimate familiarity. On the whole however, they have usually fixed their gaze on individual passages, we had almost said on individual verses. Take by way of contrast, such intellectual exercises, as an investigation,—in the case of some given discourse — of the thread of meaning which connects its various parts; the drift of the discourse *as a whole;* its suitableness to the particular circumstances under which our Lord was speaking, to the auditory by which He was surrounded, to the stage of His ministry at which He had arrived; &c. &c. Or take again,—in the case of some given dialogue say with Nicodemus or the Samaritan woman—a careful examination of what was passing in the interlocutor's mind; of how our Lord addressed Himself to that state of mind; of what is the connection between each successive utterance of His and that which preceded and that which followed. Such investigations as these, it would appear, have been more familiar to moderns than to ancients, and perhaps more to Protestants than to Catholics. This fact leads us to mention one characteristic feature of the commentary before us.

F. Newman has more than once set forth, with his usual force of language, the Church's power and duty of what he calls "assimilation." In every age, she has diligently surveyed habits of thought and practice existing outside her own bosom—not merely for the purpose of denouncing what is false,—but also of assimilating and turning to good service what they might contain of truth. We have ourselves more than once ventured to urge

the importance of this being done at present, within the sphere of *philosophy*. It is of great moment—so we have submitted —that non-Catholic philosophy should be diligently studied by children of the Church,—not merely (though this of course chiefly) for the purpose of guarding the Catholic against those deplorable aberrations which are its predominant characteristics, —but also of appropriating and assimilating such truths as it may contain, to which Catholics may not hitherto have given sufficient recognition. F. Coleridge has acted on this principle within his own special line of thought, and has evidently made much study of Protestant writers. We need hardly say indeed, that whatever benefits could be obtained from modern criticism, would be most dearly purchased, if for their sake less store were set on that most precious possession, the Church's traditional interpretation of Scripture. But in the present author's hands,—not only this is preserved in its full and exclusive supremacy,—but in fact it is placed throughout in fuller and clearer light, by the very circumstance that the results of modern criticism have been duly incorporated and assimilated.

We have already mentioned one great advantage obtained from modern criticism: viz. in tracing the thread of our Lord's discourses or dialogues; discerning the appropriateness of each to its attendant circumstances; and the light again obtainable from those circumstances, towards its true interpretation. F. Coleridge achieves this task in a very masterly way; nor in fact do we happen to know any other commentator, Catholic or Protestant, who at all equals him in its performance. We may refer, as an instance, to his treatment of our Lord's dialogue with the Samaritan woman, and His following address to the Apostles (pp. 300–326). On the surface it is very far from easy to apprehend the drift and current of this scene; but the author works it up with complete success, into a consistent and intelligible whole. In particular we may mention the well-known difficulty (John iv. 35–38) about "sowers and reapers." F. Coleridge unites the two sentences, quoted by our Lord as proverbial (vv. 35, 37), into one single proverb, which he supposes to have been current: "Four months and the harvest cometh; one soweth and another reapeth." And taking this as his foundation, he brings out with singular force (pp. 323–327) the full bearing of our Lord's address to the Apostles. Nor is this all; for this suggestion as to the meaning of the proverb, does him service for another purpose entirely different. As we shall presently point out at more length, if there is one feature more characteristic of the volume than another, it is the author's appreciation of the Gospels in their *chronological* aspect. Now in this particular

instance, he is able to use his interpretation of our Lord's words as a complete reply to a certain exposition of v. 35, which would oppose great difficulty in the way of a satisfactory arrangement of Gospel chronology.

We must admit frankly, that we do not think the author equally successful in every part of our Lord's colloquy with Nicodemus (pp. 253–275); but this is perhaps among the very most difficult passages in all the Gospels. Certainly we are not ourselves acquainted with any commentator, who impresses us as more successful in treating it than F. Coleridge. But we expected greater increase of light from him on the subject, than we have in fact attained.

There is another mode of illuminating the Gospel text, over and above that just mentioned, which is a specialty of modern times, and has been perhaps more cultivated by non-Catholics than by children of the Church. We mean a study of the religious opinions, the domestic habits, the political condition, the physical circumstances, of contemporary Palestine,—as often solving some difficulty which would not otherwise be solved, or giving far greater liveliness and freshness to some word or act of our Lord than would be otherwise discerned. F. Coleridge mentions in particular (p. xiii.) the great advantage of being acquainted with "local knowledge and acquaintance with Biblical scenery and antiquities"; and quotes some French infidel as saying, that "a visit to the Holy Land is like a fifth Gospel in the intelligence which it conveys concerning our Lord's life." We are not aware whether F. Coleridge has visited the Holy Land; but in other respects we do not believe that any modern writer exceeds him, in his mastery of such knowledge as we are here mentioning. At the same time he is very careful to keep it in due subordination, and prevent it from overriding the higher purposes of exposition.

There is a further feature of Protestant commentaries, on which a word may be said in passing: it is sometimes called —especially as practised by one well-known Anglican dignitary—"picturesque theology." It would be an utter mistake to suppose, that it is a specially modern habit, to form this or that individual scene of our Lord's life into a group, which may be placed distinctly before the imagination, and which may be exhibited indeed by painting or sculpture. Against any such supposition, we need only appeal to the great stress laid by S. Ignatius on "composition of place"; to such visions as those of Sister Emmerich, or again Mary of Agreda; and also to the great Catholic painters. What Protestants have added to this, has been enlivening and enriching

these pictures, by introducing such matters as the scenery of Palestine and the contemporary habits of secular life. F. Coleridge has not failed to derive due instruction from such writers; but on the whole they are, we think, more antipathetic to the instincts of Catholic piety, than any other class of Protestant commentators. It would seem their constant effort to minimize the distinction between things sacred and things secular; to assimilate, as nearly as they can, the Gospel narratives to a record of merely human events. In them moreover is exhibited in its extreme degree a peculiarity, which is shared however with them by all Protestant commentators, and which is a source of unremitting distress to the Catholic student: we mean, that their deplorable ignorance of dogma is constantly issuing in some unintentional irreverence to Him, Whose Divine Personality they so grievously fail to apprehend.

The following passage may here be advantageously placed before our readers, as illustrating what we have said :—

> The use of the Gospels for prayer and contemplation suggests that Christian exercise of the imagination of which mention has already been made, and thus far, at all events, we may safely, if sparingly, avail ourselves of the beautiful pictures which have been drawn for us in contemplations like those to which reference has been made, just as we should of an actual picture drawn for us by Fra Angelico, or any other painter whose inspirations might be as pure, as holy, and as theological as his. Nor should we shrink, even in a narrative which aims at being historical, from helping ourselves now and then by the consideration of what we know must either have been, or be like what actually was, although there may be no distinct assertion to that effect from the pen of an evangelist. For there are facts in our Lord's life which are generally assumed as certain in the Church; as, for instance, that He ordained some at least of the Apostles priests or bishops at the Last Supper, or that he showed Himself after the Resurrection first of all to our Blessed Lady : assumptions as to which the Saints not only use words of sanction and toleration, but language which implies some censure on those who do not see that it could not have been otherwise (p. 141).

And here we may make an episodical remark. There is a very large number of sincere Christians in England, who (whether or no by their own fault) are external to the true fold. These persons profess to derive their creed from Scripture, and at all events are regular readers of the sacred volume. It may be under various circumstances a great advantage, if such men are brought to admit, how far deeper and more satisfying an interpretation of our Lord's words and acts is provided by Catholic theology, than is otherwise attainable. Let any fair-minded and competent Protestant be induced to compare such a commentary as F. Coleridge's with the best he can obtain in his

own communion: say, e.g., with Mr. Isaac Williams's which is in many respects written on a similar plan. He will be obliged to admit how far superior is the former in completeness, in depth, and above all in confronting the sacred text as a whole. With many Protestants, a first-rate Catholic commentary is (we may say) *the one* appropriate and hopeful method for their conversion.

Again, many a Protestant labours still under the notion, that Catholics put our Blessed Lord in the background, in order to find room for our Blessed Lady and the Saints. Such a work as that before us must (one would think) give a death-blow to this long-lived delusion.

We return however to the general course of our remarks; which is concerned with the religious interest of Catholics, rather than of Protestants. And in what we have already said we have in fact included one special excellence of this commentary, which it will be better however to name separately. Every scene which the author describes, he places with singular vividness before his reader in every detail; and constantly succeeds, by the very course of his narrative, in solving difficulties without even mentioning them. In this again we know of no other commentator who is at all his equal.

But the particular which, more than any other, distinguishes the present commentary from those hitherto written, is its way of dealing with the question of what are called "harmonies." As far as we know, F. Coleridge is the very first writer who has acted on what seems to us the true view of this question. The ancient Catholic writers,—whose attention (as we have already said) was fixed rather on individual verses and passages one by one, than on a larger field of view,—attached little importance to the *order* of Gospel events. Even had they otherwise been disposed to lay more stress on this particular topic, they would have been prevented from doing so to any great purpose, by a circumstance mentioned by F. Coleridge in p. x. S. Augustine's harmony is based throughout on the principle, that S. Matthew's order of events is the standard to which the other Gospels should be conformed. S. Augustine's authority was so deservedly great in the Church, that this principle was for centuries assumed as a matter of course; whereas F. Coleridge mentions it as "now generally admitted by students on the subject, that the order of S. Matthew's Gospel is not chronological" at all (p. xi.). Protestant writers then of the more orthodox school, as was not altogether unnatural, have seen keenly the difficulties besetting those schemes of harmony which had been perfunctorily accepted; and failing to find others entirely satisfactory, have more and more

tended of late to the opinion, not only that there is no discoverable order of connection in the synoptical Gospels, but that a large number of actual *mistakes* must be admitted to exist in their recital of subordinate details. F. Coleridge maintains on the contrary, that "to trace the onward march of the manifestations of our Lord, the gradual training of His Apostles, the development of His moral or doctrinal or mystical teaching" (p. xii.), is on the one hand a task which can be performed with continually increasing success, while on the other hand its performance must throw a flood of new light on the inspired record. We cannot do better, than place before our readers his own statement of the case.

No perfect life of our Lord can ever be written by human hand, because very large portions of it are entirely hidden from us ; and even as to those parts which we know most about, there is much more that we do not know. What Christian criticism can do is to attempt, as far as may be, to restore, if the expression may be used, out of the materials which are furnished by the Evangelists, the Life of our Lord as it was known, in its external facts, to the Apostles and those who were familiar with Him, before the Gospels were written ; to shed upon it the light which is furnished by Christian theology, from St. Paul and St. John to the Catholic writers of modern times ;—and then, to go on to point out the purpose and method, in accordance with which each several Gospel was composed. This may be a difficult task, a task which is impossible, perhaps, to accomplish completely ; but it does not follow that it should not be attempted, or that nothing short of perfect success can be valuable and profitable in advancing our knowledge of our Lord. Anything of the kind, that is true and sound as far as it goes, must be very precious ; and it would almost seem as if Christian students were intended to exercise their minds and powers in industry of this kind, by the very fact that it has pleased God that the records of our Lord's life should be divided, as they are, between four several witnesses (pp. xii. xiii.).

We may supplement these remarks, by some others which appeared in the "Month" for last May.

The criticism of the Gospels, in so far as it applies to the arrangement of the events which are related by the four several Evangelists, not always in the same order, and to the careful discrimination of the method and purpose of each one of the four, is to some extent a creation of later times, and has perhaps still to pass through more than one phase before it can be said to be completed. No one will certainly be inclined to assert that the exact chronological order and sequence can be assigned with perfect certainty to every single act and saying of our Divine Lord as recorded by the Evangelists. But this is only one of the extremes into which Gospel critics may be misled. There is another, and perhaps more fatal mistake—that of supposing that the Evangelists follow no method, and that they are constantly inaccurate ; for inaccurate they must be if they contradict one another. This error is perhaps more important at the present day than the other which we have

mentioned—more important on account of the sceptical direction in which the public mind in England is at present turned, in consequence of the many flaws in the logical armour of the High Church and "orthodox" party, who are so constantly abandoning the only positions from which the faith can be successfully defended, because they fear that what those positions really cover is the Catholic faith, and the Catholic faith alone. . . . .

The present volume has been written under the sincere belief, confirmed by many years of thought and study, that the Life of our Lord, as far as it is at present the will of God that we should be acquainted with it, was really before the mind's eye of the Evangelists as they wrote, and that it is not impossible to re-construct it, if the word may be used, at least in its main and determining outlines, out of the materials which they have collected, and which they have in their own Gospels dealt with after methods of their own, for which they had plain and grave reasons. This belief implies that there was a certain order and progress in our Lord's life from the first to the last, according to which He was manifested by the providence of His Father, first in this light, and then in that, according to the anticipations of type and prophecy, and as the occasions for the several kinds of evidence concerning Him succeeded one to another. . . . .

The writer's object is to furnish Catholic readers with suggestions which may help them in the intelligent meditation and contemplation of all that belongs to our Lord's history and character, and to the manner in which it was gradually manifested, whether to the people at large, or to thoughtful and devout minds, such as those of St. Peter and the other Apostles (pp. 105–107).

It is with intense interest that we wait for the gradual unfolding of this view in the successive volumes, which are now to be expected, and which will go over ground even more interesting than that covered by the one before us.

In these days of unbelief, there is an invaluable benefit—entirely distinct from those already mentioned—which this commentary cannot fail to confer. It will be impossible for any one to study with simplicity its series of volumes, without receiving the most deeply-seated conviction that the narrative is substantially true. The profound harmony and orderly progressiveness of its various parts, the inimitable touches of nature, the divine depth and beauty of our Lord's words and acts,—to all these F. Coleridge will do fullest justice; and taken in combination, they cannot but engender in the reader's mind the conviction we have named.

It remains to consider the particular form, in which F. Coleridge has placed before the world the result of his long studies and mature deliberation. On this subject again, it will be better that he speak for himself:—

It has not been my object to make the present work either a record of all the opinions which have been maintained on the various points treated in it,

or a book of reference for authorities. I have given the name of the author whom I have followed in cases where a reference to the work will be of advantage to the student, but otherwise I have been content with the result of researches, which I trust have been sufficiently wide and industrious to render it safe to say, that no important opinion or authority has been altogether neglected. The readers of many modern books on the Gospel history may well be frightened at the immense number of names of authors and books which meet their eyes at the bottom of the page, and they will sometimes be wearied at the long discussions in which all conceivable opinions and conjectures are dealt with and discussed. The truth is, that the field has been overgrown with critical writings without, as I venture to think, any proportionate benefit to true criticism; and it would be a real loss to the cause of truth if it were to be considered an established rule, that no one should deal with the critical questions connected with the Gospel history unless he has read all that has been written before him. Many authors merely repeat, either at second-hand or as the result of their own speculations, opinions which have been put forward over and over again, and perhaps as often answered; and the same may be, in its degree, said of the interpretations of the words of our Lord or of others which are recorded in the Gospels. I have endeavoured to keep down, as far as possible, anything that may interfere with the direct onward flow of the narrative or the commentary, by such discussions as rather exhibit the process by which a conclusion has been arrived at than add anythimg to the clearness of the doctrine or the history. Moreover any one who has studied the Gospels continually and critically will be aware that he is often unable to trace to its right author a view of facts or an interpretation of words, which has fixed itself on his mind after much reading and thought; and I trust that this will be an excuse for the paucity of acknowledgments and of references to authorities in the present volume. It has been written in the midst of occupations and distractions, such as would certainly have prevented me from undertaking it, if I had not thought it better to do what I could rather than wait for greater leisure which might never come (pp. xvi.–xviii.).

An objection may be imaginably entertained against the plan thus sketched, on the ground that it unduly commits the readers to F. Coleridge's own view, and leaves them no sufficient scope for individual judgment. But such an objection would proceed on a complete misapprehension of the main requisite for acquisition of knowledge, whether in sacred literature or profane. It is only by allowing others to judge for him in the first instance, that a man can acquire any power of reasonably judging for himself at last. Those who shall in the first instance have surrendered themselves unhesitatingly to F. Coleridge's guidance, will have acquired a knowledge of the sacred text, which will give them real right—such a right as they could not possess without some similar course of study—to a judgment of their own, between any given interpretation

adopted by F. Coleridge and some other which may be suggested as preferable.

But what is chiefly to be remembered is this. The one main ultimate object, at which every Catholic must aim in a Gospel commentary, is to help the student in acquiring such knowledge of our Blessed Lord's life in the flesh, as may generate familiarity with the thought of Him, and so issue in fuller and keener apprehension of God's Attributes, and generally in increased piety and devotion. But though all Catholics who write on the Gospel narrative must regard this as their *ultimate* end, there are several who do not make it their *immediate* one. Those e.g. who write on such a plan as Maldonatus's, lay down an invaluable foundation for a devotional superstructure; but then the persons who are to supplement such works by erecting such superstructures, are not so readily found. Maldonatus is so powerful an expositor, that a Protestant Archbishop (Dr. Trench) goes out of his way to eulogize the Jesuit Professor, as among the most successful commentators who have ever written. Yet no one would call Maldonatus's a *devotional* book; nor indeed would ecclesiastical students, as a general rule, include their Scriptural studies in the *ascetical* portion of their training. For our own part, we greatly prefer the method of those who, like F. Coleridge, pursue *immediately*, what all admit should be the *ultimate* end of their labours.

We would emphatically recommend however those who have this volume in their hands, to make it a matter of study and not of mere reading. It is not a work to be perused throughout and then laid aside. On the contrary, there should be frequent intervals, during which what has been read is made a matter of painstaking meditation and reflection. It is our belief, that those who so use it will in general find, that its use has marked a memorable era both in their devotional and their intellectual life.

Since this article went to press, we have received proof sheets of F. Coleridge's second volume, on "The Preaching of the Beatitudes"; a volume which at first glance seems even to exceed in interest the one we have been noticing. We insert part of the Preface, as illustrating some remarks we have made.

It may, perhaps, be as well to add a few words as to the general character of the work of which this volume forms a part. Any writer on the Life of our Lord must necessarily have to decide for himself how far he is to attempt to make his work a commentary or exposition. The words of our Lord form, after all, the largest part of what has come down to us concerning Him. The

Gospels, as has already been said more than once, were apparently intended as manuals of doctrine quite as much as historical memoirs, if not much more so. But the words of our Lord are living and pregnant, no commentary can hope to exhaust their meaning, while to record them altogether without commentary is often to leave the reader in much difficulty, and to deprive him of the light which Christian interpreters have been able to shed upon them. One of the main objects of this book, moreover, is to assist meditation, especially by drawing out the theological and practical meaning of our Lord's teaching. It is therefore, I hope, not unnatural that a comparatively considerable space should be given to exposition, especially in certain parts, the subject-matter of which forms what may be called the foundations of our Lord's practical doctrine, as in the Beatitudes and the Evangelical Counsels, or of His teaching with regard to God's government of the world, as in the Parables. It appears that during the first year of His Public Ministry, our Lord's activity in preaching throughout Galilee was immense and almost uninterrupted, while what remains to us as to that period, in the way of history, is comparatively little. But we should form a false estimate of the position in which He stood before the people in general, and particularly before the authorities at Jerusalem at the end of that year, if we were not at least to endeavour to take into consideration the wonderful stirring of hearts and minds which must have been the result of several months of continuous preaching of doctrines such as those which are summed up in the Beatitudes and the rest of the Sermon on the Mount, especially when it is remembered that His preaching was accompanied and enforced by a constant series of His most marvellous miracles. For this reason, to pass over such teaching without at least attempting to draw out the Christian commentary upon it, would be, in truth, to glide over without due attention one of the most important periods of His Public Life. There are many parts of that Life as to which we shall be able to pass onwards with comparative rapidity, but the teaching of the first year was the foundation of the whole, both as to the training of the Apostles and the formation of the large number of disciples who afterwards became the first members of the infant Church. Few people would think, without examining the subject, how deep are the traces of the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount on the first Christian communities, as far as we know them, and how naturally the teaching of the Apostles in their Epistles connects itself by direct descent with this first great publication of the Christian law.

Art. IX.—THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.

The *Fortnightly Review*, July 1, 1875. Art. I. The European Situation. By Emile de Laveleye. Art. VIII. The Military Position of England. London: Chapman & Hall.

PERHAPS there was no clause of the Syllabus which so roused the scorn of the Liberals of the universe, as that in which the Pope condemned this proposition, "The principle of non-intervention (as it is called) should be proclaimed and observed." That a principle, regarded as so beneficent, so enlightened, and so universally accepted ten years ago, should be thus gibbeted, as in a gallery of scarecrows, wounded the susceptibilities of many. In England, particularly, it was felt by the more advanced and philanthropic Liberals, those to whom politics are never wholly without poetry, and who hope ultimately to see the affairs of nations transacted on a system purely æsthetic, that the principle of non-intervention was a sublime discovery, the one fitting formula of the foreign policy of the future. But the future is a very big word. It is only a few months more than ten years since the Syllabus was issued. The world has never since grown weary of misreading and misconstruing that document; it is quite as much a topic of the day and of every day in 1875 as it was in 1865. But it is somewhat curious to consider that while the Syllabus stands in perpetual memory, as we are wont to say, demanding and compelling the attention of all men, especially of those who deny, and flatter themselves they despise, its authority—it is curious, we repeat, to consider how some of the most peculiarly popular doctrines which it condemns, and above all the doctrine of non-intervention, have been roughly exploded in some countries; and have quietly evaporated in others under the silently-exercised influence of the common sense of mankind. The latter case has been its fate in England. It has gone clean out of the memory of men, so that it is difficult nowadays to conceive when one last heard the phrase mentioned in a speech, or even in a leading article. Of course, a great many things have happened since the Syllabus was issued—Sadowa, Sedan, Russia's repudiation of the Treaty of Paris,—the general persecution of Christianity, for the present specially directed against the Catholic Church, in Germany; the general acceptance of the Infallibility of the Pope as a settled clause of the common law of Christendom—and, so far

as England is more particularly concerned, the two not utterly inglorious small wars of Abyssinia and Ashantee; the sudden and portentous development of Fenianism among the masses of the Irish population, and the still more sudden and not less portentous development of Toryism among the masses of the English population under the extraordinary thaumaturgic energies of Mr. Stephens and Mr. Disraeli. At the end of it all, we do not seem to know precisely where we stand. Every day brings its alarm—one day about Belgium, the next about Central Asia. The politician who should declare that nevertheless he relied with unabated confidence on the sublime and sacred principle of non-intervention to guide and to tide England in unshaken safety through all the perilous vicissitudes of the next ten years, would be no doubt regarded as fit to hold the seals of Foreign Affairs whenever Mr. Whalley is sent for to form a Cabinet and Dr. Kenealy becomes Lord Chancellor. If Prince Bismarck and Prince Gortschakoff could only feel quite sure that England's foreign policy would be guided under all conceivable circumstances by that anodyne doctrine, we should soon need to order new maps of Europe and of Asia. But as these questions, and other questions such as these, will hardly, at the present pace of events, stay *in statu quo* for ten years more, then England had better be ready for wars to which Abyssinia will seem but as a flash in the pan, and Ashantee as a dress parade.

Already there is some discussion as to what England could really do if she were fairly launched in a great foreign war, such as those projected by the Pitts, involving an active campaign on the Continent, and pretty nearly world-wide operations, both naval and military, on a considerable scale besides. Well, to begin at the beginning of England's power, she never was more mistress of the seas than she is to-day. When France and Spain combined declared war upon her in 1796, England at once surrendered possession of the Mediterranean, and retired to defend the home seas. The valour of Jervis and Nelson within two years restored her supremacy, but at the beginning of the war she confessed herself in danger of being overpowered. Nowadays the power of the navy of England has been estimated by the statesman who best knows its capacity, and who has done most to give it its living form, in words which faction has not ventured to challenge, and which, we apprehend, may well await a terrible test from history. Mr. Childers, in a debate on the state of the navy last year, uttered these memorable sentences :—

I am about to state a proposition which, no doubt, will be very carefully

criticized, and which I state in order that it may be criticized. I will state it in moderate language, and yet with the firm belief that I am not in the least exaggerating, or going beyond what is justified by the facts which I have given to the House, I fear in too great detail. My proposition is this : If, which may God avert, we should be, at twenty-four hours' notice, entangled, without an ally, in a war with the three principal maritime Powers, even allowing an ally to them, our strength is such that we should be able to hold our own in the Channel, in our Home seas, in the Mediterranean, and in the Chinese and Colonial waters. Within six months, such is the power of developing a force afloat which this nation possesses, we should have complete command of the seas, and have ruined our opponents' commerce ; and within twelve or fifteen months, at the outside, we should have added so many powerful ships to the Navy as would prevent any enemy's ship from putting to sea, without the almost certainty of meeting a superior British force.*

This being the state of the case as regards ships—to which may be added, moreover, the weighty facts that the art of building the modern iron-clad man-of-war becomes more and more an English specialty, and that the mercantile marine was never so effectually linked to the Fleet as it now is through the Naval Reserve—it remains to be added that the artillery power of England is more than equal to any conceivable emergency. The battery which Mr. Hardy lately inspected at Shoeburyness is, it may be said without exaggeration, the most powerful for its number that ever was composed, and would penetrate, long before it could get within range, the sides of the strongest war-ship now afloat under a foreign flag as easily as a swan-shot pierces a pane of glass. Money may perhaps have ceased to be considered the sinews of war. No country that is merely rich nowadays will find much of a bulwark in its money-bags. But the strength of a strong country in the next general war will be, more even than it has hitherto been for England, in her equally absolute command of gold and of iron. After all, moreover money has not grown scarce in England. The revenue on which Mr. Pitt went to war was hardly half of that which the United Kingdom now yields for the ordinary works of peace, under a system of almost open ports and without a single oppressive tax. It would be almost as easy for Sir Stafford Northcote to raise a thousand millions to-morrow as it was for Mr. Pitt to borrow a hundred last century. There remains the question of men.

* "The Naval Power of England." A Speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 30th April, 1874, by the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers, M.P. London : Longmans, Green, & Co.

Certainly a somewhat recklessly stimulated emigration has drained the great recruiting reserves of the kingdom. It will not be so easy to improvise big battalions in Tipperary or the Highlands in the next great war as it was in the last. Nor perhaps is it quite so clear, as some mettlesome critics imagine, that an English army is still of that temper that, with whatever foreign troops it might have to bivouac, its relation to them would be that of the spear-head to the shaft. Pit even Her Majesty's Guards, not to say an average Aldershot brigade, against the Prussian Guards, or the Brandenburg or even the Pomeranian infantry, and the impact of the one force upon the other might not be so merely like that of the harpoon upon blubber, as some of the idolaters of British infantry are pleased to suppose. Nevertheless it is, when the dash of the Irish, the steadiness of the Scotch, and the staying power of the English are perfectly blended, the best infantry that ever marched; and its bayonets will yet no doubt add a few illustrious lines to the long scroll of victories on its colours. Suppose again for a moment, as all recent speculation on the subject assumes, that Prussia were England's adversary in her next war, there is a very important factor to be added to England's power, which has not hitherto been at all estimated. During England's wars with France, it has always been necessary to garrison Ireland heavily, and it has been also necessary on occasion both to guard against invasion and to repress rebellion in that kingdom. But let a British army take the field side by side with the French against the Prussians, and we do not think we can possibly exaggerate when we say that Ireland would yield 100,000 fighting men within three months; that its militia would volunteer for active service; that its very police might be withdrawn. Within a year, the War Office might have besides the control of Indian, American, and Colonial divisions. In the first moment of such a war, England, meeting directly the systematic menaces which Prince Bismarck has been addressing to the Belgian Government, would of course at once occupy Antwerp,—as M. de Laveleye says, "Antwerp is the necessary point of debarcation for the English, and its gigantic fortifications have been constructed solely to preserve it to her" (p. 19),—she would thence organize the forces of Belgium and of Holland (200,000 men on a war-footing), help Denmark to strike for Schleswig, and on the soil where Ramillies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, and Waterloo were fought, mass her forces for a greater effort than Marlborough or Wellington ever made. It is not at all so certain that because Prussia holds Metz she would at once

enter upon a new war with France with an overwhelming superiority of force. Her next war with France will, because of her possession of Metz, differ from the last in this cardinal consideration that instead of closing the campaign with a siege of Paris after capturing one half, and masking the other half of the army against which she took the field, she will be in the first instance challenged to a new siege of Paris with lines of defence doubled in circuit and trebled in strength, while France will have at least two and probably three great army corps in the field independent of the garrison of the capital. It will be well for Prussia to be sure of the neutrality of Austria in such an hour; otherwise it would not be difficult to drive a wedge through the huge ill-welded bulk of the German Empire. That Empire is Catholic where it touches Austria with its Silesian and Bavarian border; it is Catholic where it touches France and Belgium with its Rhine provinces; and it may be admitted that it spares no conceivable pains to make its Catholic subjects regard themselves as alien to its political system. Prussia's base of operations against France will lie in the two immolated provinces, wherein every man, woman, and child looks to France with hope, and at Prussia with hate. Should any disaster befall a German army in France, its retreat under such circumstances may be a very ugly operation. Of course, the active alliance of Russia might render to Prussia in her next war all and more than all the aid which the Czar's benevolent neutrality afforded her in the last. But Prince Bismarck has lately learned that it is not too easy to count upon the policy of Russia. He has had hints that the Czar thinks he has gone quite far enough, and is determined he shall not go any farther at present. The Chancellor had apparently made up his mind to annihilate the Carlists some months since; but there appeared in the *Cuartel Real* an affectionate and timely letter from the Emperor Alexander to the Duke of Madrid, and all the inspired bluster about Spain in the Prussian official press forthwith promptly subsided. Again, it is fresh in the memory of all Europe what preparations were on foot for a treacherous and truculent war against France on the eve of the Czar's visit to Berlin in May; and how the Chancellor of the Russian Empire inflicted upon the German Government the humiliation of announcing to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to Emperor William the fact that his august master had determined the peace of Europe should not be broken just then. There was complete accord between the policy of England and Russia in that noble and prudent act of intervention, as our Ministers were able to announce in Parliament; and there is some reason to

hope that the relations between Austria and Russia have since become cordial again. Every such guarantee for the peace of Europe is good, even though it be only temporary in effect, and resting on no formal engagement. But the one only true and solid guarantee in dealing with a power like Prussia is that an adequate number of her neighbours should be prepared to overpower and inflict condign punishment upon her in the event of her breaking the peace wantonly. It may fairly be regarded as an axiom of English foreign policy for some time to come, that France must not be further plundered or dismembered. There is no power in Europe nowadays with which England has so many interests in common and so few interests in opposition. The ancient animosity of the two nations has so completely vanished that a war with France would now be generally regarded in England with little less horror than a civil war. Accordingly Prince Bismarck's most insidious apologists seem to suppose that they can best serve his interests by warning this country against the danger of being drawn unawares into an Ultramontane coalition. M. Emile de Laveleye, who curiously combines the affable omniscience of Mr. Grant Duff in discussing foreign affairs with the addled theological notions of Mr. Whalley, declares that in such a war as we have been imagining, "the defeat of Germany would have for its consequence the hegemony of Austria in the centre of Europe, and the triumph of Ultramontanism on the Continent, which the English, I suppose, can hardly desire." M. de Laveleye must have long fondly caressed the idea that the English were a very ignorant people before he thought of uttering such a sentence. Does he imagine that the English people are so unconscious of their true political interests—especially their interest in the independence of Turkey,—as to suppose that those interests were always in great danger while the centre of gravity of Germany was at Vienna, and that their foreign policy is comparatively free from trouble because it has been transferred to Berlin? Does he believe that the English people know so little of history and of politics as to believe that the policy of the Austrian Empire is now, or has ever been, to the knowledge of serious statesmen, guided by what he calls Ultramontanism? Is the policy of England, of France, of Italy, of Russia, of Austria—the Powers most closely related to Germany—of Belgium, of Holland, of Denmark, of Spain, of Turkey—Powers which might also be involved in a general war—so completely directed by the Vatican that M. de Laveleye can speak of a coming war in which the Government of Berlin may find "against her the sentiment an perhaps the arms of

the whole of Europe," as at the same time "a coalition under the auspices of Ultramontanism," and as a "struggle between the Papacy and the Empire"? Even Mr. Whalley would be incapable of setting the House of Commons in hysterics by such a flight as that. We will, however, quote the whole passage, that it may be seen we have not exaggerated its absurdity, and because it is such an exquisite example of what both Mr. Disraeli and Prince Bismarck would agree in describing as "Professors' Politics":—

To sum up in a few words. A great change in the equilibrium of Europe cannot come about without provoking a series of wars, because the loser is always bent on recovering his ancient position. Every state which aspires to supremacy or which obtains it, ends sooner or later by finding a coalition in face of it. All history shows this. Germany sees that a coalition will form against her under the auspices of ultramontanism, and she is naturally disposed to anticipate it by being first in the field. Hence the danger of war which has just alarmed Europe, and which cannot be dispersed because it arises from the very situation. The position of Germany, dominant as she may be at this moment, is one of the most critical. If she acts without provocation, she will have against her the sentiment and perhaps the arms of the whole of Europe. If she waits, the danger will perhaps be just as great, and she will by that time have lost her present superiority. To extricate the new Empire from these shoals, those who have its destinies in their hands will need a great deal of prudence, moderation, and clearsightedness, along with energy and decision in an emergency. In front of them the peace coalition has just risen up. Sooner or later will form against the war coalition. The struggle between the Papacy and the Empire will begin afresh, and who can predict the issue?

It is said that when Count Bismarck in the year 1862 was recalled from Paris to become Prime Minister of Prussia, he took leave of the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in these words—"*Le Libéralisme n'est qu'une niaiserie qu'il est facile de mettre à la raison; mais la Révolution est une force, et il faut savoir s'en servir.*" When we find a very philosophic Belgian patriot like M. de Laveleye pleading the cause of Prince Bismarck after such a fashion in the sentences we have just quoted—of Prince Bismarck, who notoriously offered to sacrifice the independence of Belgium to France, and who would undoubtedly abolish it to-morrow if it suited his purpose with infinitely less consideration than he gave to the sentiments and interests of the smallest German duchy which he absorbed—when we find this Belgian professor pleading Prince Bismarck's cause with such ludicrous bigotry and such base servility before

England, that is to say before the one only ally in whose honour and disinterestedness Belgium can trust—we get an inkling of the full extent to which Prince Bismarck has known how to avail himself of the best services both of Liberalism and of the Revolution. In order to bring them both to his side but one thing was necessary, and that was to persecute the Church. It was a very great risk that Prince Bismarck faced when he undertook to do that wicked and wanton thing. The richest and most populous of the Prussian provinces are Catholic; Alsace and Lorraine are Catholic; Posen is Catholic; Bavaria is Catholic, and has just elected a Catholic, or, as the Liberal Press prefer to call it, an "Ultramontane" majority to Parliament. All the instincts of a great statesman's policy should, we might suppose, have determined him to avoid any considerable difficulty in the region of sentiment even, not to say conscience, while dealing with provinces whose allegiance must be regarded as in some degree reluctant, and whose territories lay at the frontiers where the new Empire was most exposed to war. There was no difficulty in avoiding a contest with the Church. Prince Bismarck has never been able to allege a reason, of the class which statesmen recognize and understand as motives of policy, for subverting with such animosity and thoroughness the good relations which had grown up in the course of time between the Catholic Church and the Prussian and other German Governments. There is but one adequate method of explaining his new policy. It became, after the war with France was over, or at least it seemed to him, necessary that he should have the utmost support of all the force of the Revolution throughout Europe, and of course what little help the spirit, *niais* though it be, of continental Liberalism could render to him. To declare war on the Catholic Church was the one simple sufficient method of rallying all these elements on his side. He risked his master's Crown, the peace and integrity of the Empire, perhaps. He deliberately chose that risk. On the other hand, he gained the good-will of the Revolutiontary party in France, which is already far more resigned in consequence to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine than any other class of its public men, and which would willingly sacrifice half a dozen more provinces to Prussia to-morrow, if it could thus get a majority in the Assembly with which to commence at a respectful distance an imitation of the Falck laws in the form of a few additions to the *Cultes* section of the Civil Code. He gained the revolutionary party in Austria, who may at this moment be described to their deep dishonour as more Prussian than the Prussians themselves. A writer in the *Fortnightly Review*, whose information has evidently been carefully col-

lected, and whose authority on this point at least we shall not dispute, gives the following succinct statement of the *état des esprits* at Vienna :—

Geographically viewed, Austria is more dangerous to Germany, and her alliance with another great power would seem more threatening ; but this contingency is felt and met at Berlin by the dexterity with which the German element in Austria and Hungary is played off against the unity of the Hapsburg dominions. A steady stream of professors and journalists coming from the north permeates Viennese society, fills the lecture-rooms of Prague, and occupies the most important posts in the press everywhere. The lessons they teach are two, pressed with ceaseless iteration. All that Austria can hope of good in the future must come from her eight millions of German blood ; and the loyalty of these eight millions is to depend on the subservency shown at Vienna to the dictates of Berlin. * * * * Those eight millions of German-speaking Austrians serve Prince Bismarck's purpose better where they are than if added prematurely to the Empire.

It may be so. As yet peace is, if not essential, very useful to Austria; and the piping of the myriad professors fills the air as on an idle day the cawing of the crow is louder than the bursting of a crop of corn through the soil. Nor, we may be sure, will Austria wantonly break the peace. But it may well be in the providential scheme of history that a day of triumphant compensation is reserved for the misfortunes which her Kaiser has borne with such patient dignity; and should that day ever come, the eight millions of German-speaking Austrians will be, where they have ever been, in the van of her army of many nations.

In Belgium, it is quite plain that Prince Bismarck's policy has also borne fruit. M. de Laveleye witnesses for the ideologues. The blood-stained pavements of Ghent witness for the mob. There are thousands of Belgians, no doubt, who hate the God of their fathers and the Church of their baptism with a hatred so possessing their most miserable souls and bodies that they would gladly see their free Constitution trodden under the Uhlan's heel forthwith and for ever, if only they could at the same time see the majority of their fellow-countrymen deprived of the simple boon of religious liberty, of the right to worship at their ancient shrines, and of being buried in Christian graves. In England, there is, thank Heaven! no revolutionary party worth counting as a political force, but there is a sufficiency of that species of silly and semi-simious, or as it is pleased to call itself "advanced" Liberalism, which sees in the tyrannies and villanies of the Revolution all over the world the sort of measures it would enact if it could, and which regards Prince Bismarck as far and away the greatest Liberal of the age, though he has,

when it suited his purpose, treated the whole system of parliamentary government with worse than the scorn of Strafford, and with "thorough" success; and though he has done and is doing his best to abolish both civil and religious liberty (which indeed are inseparable) throughout Germany. What had he to offer to all these men—professors of black arts and dismal science—statesmen in the sulks—journalists, who daily pickle public opinion in the seven deadly sins —Red Republican clubs, whose natural instinct it would otherwise be to flay him alive, and make a big drum of his skin—the fatuous lights of Jewry, and the much bedizened hierophants of Masonry—for their distinguished consideration and benevolent neutrality at all times, their active sympathy and support on occasion? To have all the force, be it more or less, of the Revolution on his side in this age one thing alone was necessary,—to blaspheme the Church of God, to harass the ministers of Christ, to insult His vicar! Then the Prince of the powers of the air, the world and the children thereof, the enlightened public opinion of Liberalism, the volcanic energies of the Revolution, the very gates of Hell, were at once rallied to his side. Yet the bark of Peter will ride out the storm. One such compact we have witnessed in these latter days, when the Emperor Napoleon, in complicity with the secret societies, commenced the revolutionary war of Italy in 1859. We have seen to what end the policy then begun brought the French Empire. We shall hardly have to wait so long a time to see the result of a similar policy on the newer and less homogeneous German.

The state of France still remains the subject of our gravest anxieties and withal of our bravest hopes. The evidences of a widespread revival of religion abound; and the National Assembly has by two formal Acts—the sanction of the Church of the Sacred Heart at Montmartre, and the law enabling Catholic Universities to be founded—borne testimony to the faith of the nation in a way sure to bring down many blessings and graces from God. It is, nevertheless, impossible to watch for long the unwisdom and wrong-headedness of the various parties in that marvellous legislature without a sense of dizziness—without a fear that any day the fortunes of France may be again jeopardized by some sudden movement of frantic faction. It is with reluctance and grief we are obliged to confess, that, in the transactions of the last two years, the Republican party have excelled, in all the talents and qualities proper and necessary to success in public affairs, that party with which our natural sympathies are most identified. It has been, on the other hand, we cannot deny, the perverse policy of the Right, and especially the Extreme Right, which

has established the Republic as the definitive form of Government in France. Such a result was certainly not within the scope of their wishes or intentions. Consequently we can only conclude that they must have been blinded by personal and party animosity to a strange degree, when they allowed themselves to be so excited, cozened, and manipulated that the result was, as it obviously was, brought about by their means. They have so spoken and acted that the cause of the Count de Chambord, which in the year 1872 was almost triumphant, is now at such a pass that a miracle would be necessary to give it even a chance of success. It was evident to all Europe, no doubt, from the moment when the Count wrote his last, most ill-inspired, and luckless letter, in which he stipulated the adoption of the white flag as the national standard, that an immediate and unconditional restoration was impossible. But his restoration then and there became impossible, not, we believe, so much from any innate and universal feeling of Frenchmen about the symbolical value of one or the other flag. It was still more so because of an unexpressed but general conviction that in the condition in which France and her people then were, the writing of such a letter, however agreeable to the feelings of a refined and chivalrous party, was so utterly inopportune as to make it in the highest degree doubtful whether the Prince could possibly own those graces of state proper to a statesman and a sovereign which the French nation had a right to ascertain, if possible, that he possessed, before restoring him to the throne of his ancestors, in possession especially of such an unconditioned authority as was then claimed for him. A nation of a mocking spirit, and which mocked under the old monarchy just as readily as since the Empire, was neither edified nor suffused with loyalty when it found at such a crisis a question of heraldry and upholstery invested with a sort of pseudo-sacramental character. Yet the cause of the monarchy was not utterly ruined by that letter. The Government was still in the hands of the Royalist party. Its chief was the gallant and loyal soldier, whom the Count de Chambord had himself lately called the "modern Bayard." The Prime Minister, the Duc de Broglie, possessed in his rank and connections, in the courage and energy of his character, in the wide range of his studies, in that clear mastery of all the affairs of France which he at once displayed on obtaining the opportunity of power, possessed, it cannot now be denied, the precise qualities which in those days the Royalist party ought to have been most proud to have discerned in their chief. It was no secret that he was most dreaded by M. Thiers and M. Gambetta of all the public men who sat on the Right. But the dislike of the Extreme Left

for the Duc de Broglie was a limp feeling in comparison with that with which he was regarded on the Extreme Right. They would have had him sacrifice the policy, the safety, the peace of France to a point of honour—to the colour of a yard of bunting. It was, after the Count de Chambord's letter, simply impossible then and there to restore the monarchy. There was no majority to vote for its restoration in the Assembly. There was no movement among the masses of the population clamouring for its return. There was not a brigade in the army would strike a *coup d'état* for the whiteflag. Indeed, Marshal MacMahon said the Chassepots would go off of their own accord in quite another sense if it were unfurled before them. The course of common sense under these circumstances was to give the country the best institutions of government possible; cordially and loyally to sustain the Septennial Marshalate; so to postpone the definitive establishment of the republic, and, as the late Duc de Broglie said, "give time" to revive the principle and tradition of monarchical government in the common sense and goodwill of the nation. On the contrary, the Extreme Right and the organs of their peculiar predilection assailed all the statesmen capable of conducting the government of the country on their own side of the House, but more especially the Duc de Broglie, with an untiring and unscrupulous animosity. The hatred with which M. Gambetta, M. Thiers, and M. Dufaure were regarded was a weak sentiment in comparison. When a minister's deadliest enemies are among his supposed majority, ruin is not far off—not the ruin of the minister, who in this case has lost not honour nor real power, but the ruin of a party, of a policy, of a crown. The Duc de Broglie's ministry fell, and with his ministry fell the last hope of the French monarchy in the existing state of France. The Republic has now been regularly and lawfully established. It owes its acceptance by the Assembly and the country at large to the practice by the Republican party of the very qualities in which the Royalist party showed itself deficient—discipline, obedience to the authority of its leaders, readiness to take advantage of opportunity, skill in profiting by the dissensions of its opponents. But even still the Republican party, had they been all statesmen and sages, could not have converted the rickety institution which resulted from the Pact of Bordeaux into that organized framework of policy and administration now being consolidated. History will testify that the last French Republic was no chance product of a rush of the Paris mob, garotting the executive and paralyzing military discipline, but was the net result of, and was the deliberate verdict of the French people upon, the unreasonableness and the uncharitableness of the Legitimist party.

It is with great reluctance and regret that we speak in such terms of men who are, whatever be their errors, the flower of the ancient Catholic gentry of France. But this is a very serious, even a very awful age, in which we live. For the present moment there is a lull and a breathing space. But we have no reason to assume that it will last for long; or that at its end France may not have terrible trials to undergo, perhaps more grievous calamities to endure than she has yet sustained. Meantime symbols, ceremonies, points of honour, however interesting and curious to chivalrous hearts, seem to mock the stern gravity of the times. In France religion needs to be protected, order to be maintained, property to be secured, peace to be preserved. There is a new Constitution to be established, and much will depend on the character of the Government by which that Constitution is launched. We do not believe it admits of a doubt that the Government of Marshal MacMahon is the best Government possible in France under existing circumstances, and is therefore entitled to the loyal and steadfast support of all good Frenchmen and all good Catholics. It is the part of honourable men, if they seriously think otherwise, to have the courage of their convictions—to cross the floor of the House, and sit in opposition with M. Thiers and M. Gambetta. But it is not the part of wise or of good politicians, while their country is in the gravest difficulties, to form what we in England call a "Cave" in the midst of their party, to have a good understanding with the enemies of Government, to hamper its action, and on critical occasions to leave it in the lurch. The party which pursues such a policy is, as the old proverb says, "good for neither king nor country." France is fast recovering from the mere financial embarrassments of the war. A new army has sprung from her soil, an army, according to every testimony, well-disciplined, well-principled, and well-conducted. No armed Commune is, in these days, likely to challenge its Chassepots. But in order that France may again assume and retain the great place to which she is entitled in the councils of Europe, more is needed than the assured conviction that she is free from the danger of civil war in the streets of Paris. Other states, especially those states which are her natural allies, have a right to expect that her Government be not liable to be upset by every whirlwind of temper in the Assembly; have a right to be well-assured that her institutions rest on the solid support of men of common sense and of goodwill. If, as we hope and trust, the coming dissolution results in the election of a strong and sensible legislature, France will, long before the Septennate comes to its close, have revindicated her rightful rank as the first nation of Christendom.

CATHOLIC LIBERALISM.

Translated from an article by F. Ramière, S.J., in the *Etudes* of July, 1875.

AMONG the myriad forms which are assumed by that Proteus, Liberalism, there is one under which it contrives to approach to truth so closely that it is frequently confounded with truth. We allude to Catholic Liberalism, whose seductive exterior renders it especially dangerous.

Let us consider the gravity of this danger, and justify the zeal with which we believe ourselves to be called upon to combat Catholic Liberalism. Let us suppose that at the moment of the great religious reaction which marked the early years of the Restoration of the French Monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII., the heads of the Anti-Christian sect had assembled for the purpose of concerting means for repairing their defeat; and that the cleverest and wickedest of their number had addressed the others in these words:—"We have deceived ourselves. The open war which we have been waging against the Church has purified instead of destroying her. She is re-erecting her altars, mustering her forces, re-establishing her ancient institutions, and recovering her prestige in the mind of the people. We must change our tactics, and, in order to get the better of our enemies, look for auxiliaries in their own ranks. Let us seek out an error sufficiently specious to delude even the most fervent Christians, and sufficiently contrary to tradition to bring them into inevitable conflict with the authority which is the depositary of that tradition—a system whose apparent object shall be to restore the popularity of Catholicism, and whose real effect will be to divide the fasces of its unity; a system which, when priests and laymen full of zeal for the conversion of externs shall embrace it, will push its most ardent champions into schism, and leave in the hearts of others a bitter leaven of distrust and discontent; in short, a doctrine which, while favouring all our principles, shall leave us no further trouble than the deducing of its inevitable consequences in theory and in practice."

If such a programme had been proposed in the councils of the enemies of the Church, would it not have been hailed with enthusiasm as the most powerful engine of warfare ever directed against the holy city for its overthrow?

Liberal Catholicism is nothing else than the realization of this programme.

The calculation which we have reduced to a formula has not been made by any man, but it has assuredly been conceived by the immortal enemy of Jesus Christ, the father of lies, the infernal inventor of every heresy.

As for Liberal Catholics, we can only regard them as unfortunate victims of delusion. Not only do we entertain no doubt of the original

rectitude of their intentions, but in that very rectitude we find the chief motive which leads us to detest their error. Yes, it is because it estranges from us our bravest and most devoted defenders, because it deludes the brightest intellects and the most generous hearts, because its venom penetrates into the veins of Christian society,—therefore it is that, with Pius IX., we regard this error as the most deadly of pestilences: *Pestem perniciosissimam.* By fighting against Catholic Liberalism to the death, far from failing in love and respect for Liberal Catholics, we offer them the most solid and effectual proof of our devotion. In addition, we are but complying with the request of several of their number, in thus undertaking the exhaustive treatment of the question which divides us. Our former articles were received, on the one hand. with almost exaggerated goodwill; while, on the other, they were subjected to criticism none the less usefu that it was not pleasant; and on both a desire was expressed for the elucidation of a too much prolonged dispute. It will not be our fault i he present article does not give satisfaction to both classes of readers.

I.—An Exposition and History of the Question.

The preliminary statements of our first article (January, 1874) ought to have convinced our readers that Liberalism opposes to Catholic doctrine a very old error under a new name. Ever since its entrance into the world, Christianity, which is the rendering of humanity divine through the God-Man, has had to measure itself against an enemy which it has conquered without being able to destroy—paganism, or the adoration which humanity renders to itself, with more or less deliberate consciousness of its crime. That idolatry, which had at length embodied itself in the Roman emperors, far from laying down its arms when Constantine upset its throne immediately set about the work of reprisals. Since then, not an age has elapsed in which it has not endeavonred with more or less success to gain the victory over Christian faith and morals by means of heresies and sensualism. But it is especially in the political order that reviving paganism, has striven to regain power which would enable it to extend its dominion into every other sphere. It has succeeded only too well. Byzantium first and Germany afterwards have yielded to its prowess; but it was France who, in the person of the unworthy grandson of St. Louis, Philippe le Bel, gave revived paganism its first durable triumph, and commenced the great apostasy of Christian peoples. The movement has taken four centuries to develop itself, and it ended at the termination of the last century by a solemn proclamation of the deposition of Jesus Christ and of the emancipation of modern society. Since then triumphant paganism has changed its form; from being monarchical, it has become demagogic; Liberalism has taken the place of Cæsarism. At bottom it is the same error,—the substitution of human pride for divine authority. So long as the childhood o peopl es

lasted, they consented to bend their necks to the yoke of a monarch, and to adore humanity in his person; but, when they reached adult age, they would no longer submit to this yoke, and every man pretended to a right to adore himself. This is the latest development of Anti-Christianity.

Such is the genesis of Liberalism. But how has this error, which is the opposite of Christian doctrine, contrived to combine with that doctrine so as to form Catholic Liberalism? Alas! just as in ancient days the sons of God wedded the daughters of men, by whose beauty they had been tempted, this combination is the result of the fascination which the false independence of error exercises even upon those who dare not entirely shake off the yoke of truth. Man rarely flings himself unreservedly into either good or evil; in his reason and in his will there are intermediate steps between full submission and utter revolt. Thus all the great heresies have their diminutives: by the side of Arianism we have semi-Arianism; by the side of Eutychianism, Monothelism; by the side of Lutheranism, Jansenism. Already the resurrection of monarchical Cæsarism had given us Gallicanism, which is Catholic Cæsarism. Catholic Liberalism, on its side, is only the mitigated form of anti-Christian Liberalism.

This doctrine, which at first found enunciation only by some isolated writers, acquired a public existence in France in 1830. At this date the school of Catholic Liberalism was born: its father was the Abbé de La Mennais, and its cradle was the journal called *L'Avenir*. For fifteen years all the sections of the revolutionary party, united under the standard of Liberalism, endeavoured to render religion odious by identifying its cause with that of monarchical absolutism. This perfidious tactic had been unconsciously helped by certain royalists; whose famous formula, "The throne and the altar," appeared to subordinate the altar to the throne, and exposed the former to succumb to the catastrophe which ended in the destruction of the latter. The Church could not accept any such solidarity; and it was her duty to render her eternal interests completely independent of every political *régime*. If the school of the *Avenir* had not proposed to itself any other object, it would have deserved well of religion. Unhappily, with impetuosity which was less excusable in the head of that school than in his young disciples, it pushed things to extremes, and adopted for its programme the mutual independence of religious and civil society. Without consulting the Church, the new apologists proposed to the Liberal party a treaty of peace in the name of the Church, in virtue of which she should recognize and sanction the social order which had been established in opposition to her, on condition that she should be left complete liberty in the individual order.

We know what came of this. The Church held that she could not accept the bargain which these unauthorized negotiators had concluded in her name, and refused to purchase the toleration which was offered to her at the price of her traditional teaching. The doctrines of the *Avenir* were condemned;

and, with the exception of their leader, who speedily justified that condemnation by his revolt, all the defenders of the proscribed system proved their good faith by the frankness and generosity of their submission. Happy would it have been if, at a later day, they had not allowed themselves to be seduced by the illusions which they appeared to have completely abjured! Little by little, all that had been so clearly understood, was forgotten. Notwithstanding the perfect distinctness of its language, they persuaded themselves that the Encyclical "Mirari vos" condemned only the exaggeration of Liberal doctrine; and they believed themselves authorized to remain Catholic, while they reproduced the theories of the *Avenir* under modified forms.

On one side, however, the Liberal Catholic school,—though on every other faithful to its origin,—has deviated from it remarkably: it was at first the sworn enemy of Gallicanism; it has now become its close ally.

Under the Restoration the Gallicans were firmly attached to the monarchy, whose rights they exaggerated; and the *Avenir*, by the law of reaction, flung itself into an exaggerated ultramontanism, which did not take sufficient count of the rights of either the Episcopate or of the civil Power. Both parties were far from suspecting that in reality they were supporting themselves upon one and the same principle, that is to say, upon the negation of the rights of the Church with regard to civil society. This affinity between the two rival schools did not reveal itself, until the epoch of the Council arrived, and there was reason to believe that that august assembly was about to define the social sovereignty of Jesus Christ in His Church. Then a curious "right-about-face" movement took place. The Liberals, who had formerly been remarkable for the ardour of their ultramontanism, suddenly revealed themselves as Gallicans; this old error, which had been regarded as dead, acquired an unsuspected strength of resistance by its union with the great modern heresy. It was on the field of Gallicanism that the great doctrinal battle of 1869 was fought, but Liberalism bore almost all the brunt of it.

Everything leads us to believe that, if the Council had finished its work, the second of these errors would have been included in the anathema with which the first was struck; but, arrested in its labours by the fresh eruption of the revolutionary volcano, it could do no more than condemn Liberalism indirectly, by the sanction which it gave to all the doctrinal Acts of the Holy See.

Hence arise the difficulties of the actual situation. Catholics imbued with Liberal principles are almost in the same position as that in which the Gallicans stood previously to the definition of July 18th, 1870. They know well that they have with them neither the Holy See nor the immense majority of the Catholic Episcopate. But they support themselves upon the credit of certain illustrious leaders, with whom they believe they cannot go astray. If they have numbers against them, they imagine that they have quality for them; to the weight of authority they oppose the light of their own reason.

If we reproach them with dividing the Church, they reproach us with ruining it, and reducing it to utter powerlessness ever again to regain the moral rule over society.

Let us, nevertheless, gladly acknowledge that the hour draws near when this fatal illusion shall be dispersed. We already see a division taking place among the ranks of the Catholic Liberals analogous to that which parted the semi-Arians and the semi-Pelagians in the fifth century. There were among them two classes of minds, united by a common delusion, but animated by very different dispositions; the first, by far the greater number, were devoted above all to truth, and only adhered to error because they identified it with truth: the second, on the contrary, obstinately attached themselves to error, and would have nothing to do with truth, except in so far as it was allied with error. The *Old Catholic* schism has rid us of these false brethren, who concealed a purely schismatic spirit under the mask of Catholicism. By a fortunate re-action, those among Liberal Catholics, who were more Catholic than Liberal, have come to understand more and more clearly day by day the necessity of abjuring their Liberalism, and of becoming purely and simply *Roman* Catholics.

What have we to do in order to accelerate this desirable result? The question is not one of refuting the principles of Catholic Liberalism, which has no principles. It is plain to our mind that the distinction between the Liberal Catholic and the pure Catholic or pure Liberal consists in this,—that the former does not dare to profess the Catholic doctrine opposed to Liberalism, or the Liberal doctrine opposed to Catholicism. His system is less a doctrinal error, than a practical delusion, which beguiles the clearest intellects and the most generous hearts, by equivocal affirmations and deceitful promises. We shall deprive it of its power of seduction, if we prove that its most specious maxims are but sophisms, and that its brightest promises can only result, and in fact have only resulted, in a disastrous failure. By this double demonstration we shall terminate our inquiry into the bankruptcy of Liberalism.

The latter portion of our task will impose upon us the painful necessity of calling men, who have excited our utmost gratitude by their eminent services to the Church, as witnesses to and organs of the Liberal delusion. But, thanks to a providential concourse of circumstances, certain of these illustrious adversaries have spared us the pain of strife with them, by refuting their own errors. In the life of Père Lacordaire, M. Foisset has given a deeply instructive history of the origin of the Liberal Catholic school. On reading it we perceive that this school has been subject to the common law which constrains error to turn upon itself. At the end of forty years we find it has returned to its point of departure. The sophistries upon which it rests in our time are no other than those which La Mennais employed in 1833, and which Lacordaire refuted with vigorous logic in a series of admirable letters addressed to the Count de Montalembert.

Nothing shows more clearly the seductive power inherent in this doctrine,

than its persistence in Catholic society so long after its earliest defenders appeared to have entirely relinquished it. And yet how many new lights have since been added to that which chased away their errors!

To this obstinacy let us never weary of opposing enlightenment; and let us so speak, that, if men will still persist in repelling true doctrine, it will at least be impossible for them to travesty it.

II. The Ambiguities of Catholic Liberalism.

1. I find a leading equivocation, and that not the least perfidious, in the character attributed by Liberalism to the strife which it has stirred up in the bosom of the Church, and in its definition of the two camps.

This equivocation is frequently expressed in the following formula: Liberalism is a free opinion from the moment that it has not been formally condemned by the Church. In fact, in the eyes of Liberal Catholics, the thunders and lightnings of the anathema are the only means by which the Church can enlighten her children. So long as she does not command them, on pain of damnation, to believe a truth or to reject an error, her words have no value in their eyes; and as, up to the present time, no sentence of this kind has proscribed liberalism, they maintain that the controversy between them and their adversaries is an agitation outside the traditional teaching of the Church, and in the open field of free opinion. They hold themselves perfectly authorized to sustain their error, and have only against them, as they believe, a coterie of extravagant and intolerant men, who, understanding nothing of the exigencies of modern society and the true interests of the Church, compromise the cause which they serve by the blind obstinacy with which they pursue unrealizable Utopias. "I must acknowledge it," said M. de Montalembert, at the Congress of Malines, "the enthusiastic devotion to religious liberty which animates me is not general among Catholics. They desire it for themselves, but there is no great merit in that. Generally speaking, every man desires every kind of liberty for himself. But religious liberty in itself, liberty of conscience for others, freedom for the worship which one denies and rejects,—this is a thing which disquiets and frightens many among us. If we examine the motives of this dread, we can trace them back to three principal causes, and I really do not know which is the most chimerical and the least well-founded." He adds, a few pages later, "I have neither the right nor the wish to condemn those who think otherwise. I do not dispute their orthodoxy, God forbid! I will voluntarily admit them to be my superiors in virtue and in knowledge. Only, so long as I shall be mixed up with the affairs of this world, I shall be careful to keep clear of them, as of people with whom one can do nothing at the present day." (Laughter.)

The excellent Catholics who laughed at this jest, evidently did not know that

at the head of those who "thought otherwise" than M. de Montalembert was Pope Pius IX., who had already set forth his thoughts very plainly in several Briefs and Allocutions, before he formulated them in the Encyclical "Quantâ curâ." They did not remember that Pius IX., in repelling Liberal doctrine, had merely trodden in the footsteps of Gregory XVI., Pius VI., and all the preceding popes. However strange such oblivion may seem among Catholics, it is perfectly intelligible in an audience carried away by the charm of an eloquent speech. But how came M. de Montalembert to write those phrases, and send them to be printed? Did he forget the solemn acts of the Holy See, which had condemned his theory of liberty for error? Did he not remember that, in order to escape from that condemnation, his former master La Mennais applied the accusation of non-comprehension of the needs of modern society, which is a favourite weapon of Liberalism, to the Pope himself? "The Pope," said he, "is a good religious who knows nothing at all about the affairs of the world, and has no idea of the state of the Church." Such language in the mouth of a priest who has not broken away from the Catholic unity is indeed culpable, but it does not lack a certain frankness. In defence of Liberalism the chief of its adversaries must be attacked. But can there be good faith in pursuing with invective those whose crime consists in following the guidance of the Pope, while lavishing on the Pope himself testimonies of the most profound respect? Certainly, if ever man was loyal by nature and in his resolves, it was the chivalrous "Son of the Crusaders"; and the sympathy with which his noble character inspires us does but render more odious the error, which obliged him to hide the secret gist of his thought until within a short time of his death, when he revealed it in words which must ever be regretted. And, on this point, all liberal Catholics are subjected to the same necessity, and conceal the truth under the same reserves. They vary in the designation of their adversaries: the enemies of some are the Jesuits; those of others are certain journalists; others again are content with accusations against "a certain school." These same subterfuges were employed at the epoch of the Council to rnder the defenders of the Pontifical infallibility odious and contemptible. This proceeding was not more loyal in the first of these two questions than in the second; it is even more unjustifiable historically, because Pontifical infallibility, although defended as a truth of Faith by the body of Catholic doctors of all ages, had been contended against in France during a certain period, whilst Liberalism has never had either a school or a doctor of any authority in its favour. Gallicanism pretended to free the temporal power of kings from the direct or indirect authority of the Papacy; but it never maintained freedom to propagate error, and it never dreamed of separating civil from religious society.

The adversaries of the Liberals are, then, not a party, not a school, but the whole of Catholic tradition. The Liberal doctrine is a thing of yesterday; it has never been the subject of other than the most unequivocal reprobation on

the part of the Church. It is true that, up to the present time, that reprobation has not taken the form of anathema; but by what right can the doctrinal power of the Church be limited to the fulmination of anathemas? When Jesus Christ said to His Apostles: "Go, teach all nations; he who believeth in your word shall be saved, and he who believeth not shall be lost"—He did not set the limit to the power of His Apostles within which the Liberal Catholics would fain confine it. Whence do they derive the faculty for restricting the sovereign and immutable word of God which they arrogate to themselves? Such a pretension is the more untenable on their part, inasmuch as, if the Church would listen to them, she should never pronounce an anathema. Did they not, at the time of the Council, denounce this too imperious manner of imposing belief, as contrary to the tolerant usage of our times? Thus, on the one hand, they desire that the Church should never pronounce an anathema, and on the other they refuse to obey her, except when constrained by anathemas to do so. What course then remains for the Church to adopt, so as to content them, except to strip herself of her doctrinal power? Evidently all those among them who are really Catholics can no longer preserve this delusion, for they have heard the Pope condemn it in the Syllabus, with the assent of the whole Catholic Episcopate. After the Church has clearly manifested her mind in anything appertaining to the great interests under her charge, it is not permitted to any Catholic to attribute to himself the right to disobey her. Now, on the subject of Liberalism, the Church has manifested her mind a hundred times, and she has never varied from it. Only ignorance and want of reflection excuse those who class Liberalism among free opinions.

2. What is to be said of those who, not content with demanding toleration for their system, would pretend to impose it upon us as a tradition if not a dogma of the Church? The delusion of Catholic liberals has extended even to that point; and to support this strange pretension they have employed a second equivocation, which would appear incredible, if we did not see it maintained by the most illustrious masters of this school and formulated in the best authorized programmes. Let us hear M. de Montalembert. "This liberty of conscience has not an anti-Christian origin; it has, on the contrary, the same origin as Christianity and the Church. It was created and born on the day when the first of the Popes, S. Peter, replied to the first of the persecutors, *Non possumus.* We cannot leave unsaid that which we have heard and seen. Ought we not to obey God rather than men?"

It requires no great perspicacity to perceive that in this instance the eloquent advocate confounds two things which resemble each other as much as day resembles night: Christian liberty and liberal liberty, the freedom of truth and the freedom of error. Who doubts that the Church has always insisted on her right to preach her doctrines? Can we suppose that a single Catholic exists who is so stupid as to attribute to liberty of conscience thus understood "an anti-Christian origin?" Is it not precisely because we

wish to maintain inviolable that liberty of the truth, that we refuse to admit in principle the right of error to a liberty which has never failed to become oppressive? M. de Montalembert's argument proves only one thing; that having undertaken the defence of a bad cause, he was constrained to have recourse to the most unfortunate of expedients: to travesty at once his own doctrine, and the meaning of his adversaries. Unhappily, the travesty does not stop there. It extends to the holy Scriptures. The *Non possumus* of S. Peter is interpreted in a sense which the Apostle would have repudiated as a sort of apostasy.

We should like to know what reply he would have made to any one who had asked him whether, in uttering these words, he intended to claim equal liberty for every error and for the doctrine of Jesus Christ; whether he meant to declare himself satisfied if the Sanhedrim would place the Son of God in the same rank with Jupiter and Adonis. Saint Peter a Liberal! Why, it was he, on the contrary, who pronounced the first solemn condemnation of Liberalism, by declaring to societies as well as to individuals that they could find salvation only in submission to the one Saviour, Jesus Christ.—*Nec enim aliud nomen est sub cœlo datum hominibus in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri?* If the equality of rights between error and truth had been in the mind of the Apostles, they would not have lacked opportunities for proclaiming that doctrine. Rome, which so freely opened its temples to all the divinities of the conquered peoples, would not have refused a place to Jesus Christ if He would have consented to be admitted on the same footing as the gods of Persia and Egypt. That which brought such cruel persecution upon the Apostles and their successors was the immovable firmness with which they confessed Jesus Christ, not only as the true but as the "*one* Lord." It is a pity that Liberalism was not invented earlier; it would have spared Christianity much persecution and Paganism many crimes. We cannot hinder Liberal Catholics from attributing to themselves a wisdom beyond that of the Apostles; but when they attribute to the Apostles their own manner of interpreting the rights of truth and liberty of conscience, they are contradicted by every line of the Gospel, and all the facts of history. The Christian doctors quoted by M. de Montalembert are no more favourable to him than the Apostles. Tertullian does indeed blame the employment of constraint in leading souls to the truth, but we must not conclude from thence that he attributes to truth and to error equal rights, which is the only point in dispute between us and the Liberals, as we shall soon see. Again, the advocate of Liberalism quotes S. Augustine, who carried his aversion to that doctrine to the point of rebuking the maxim proclaimed by Tertullian. After having blamed the use of constraint, he acknowledged that it had the happiest effect in the case of the Donatists, and he expressly retracted his former sentiment. That the Liberals should refuse to follow S. Augustine so far we understand, but at least let them cease to boast of him as a patron of their doctrine.

3. Before we go further it is necessary to explain an important conse-

quence which is deducible from the prejudicial point we have just established. We have defined the character of the strife, let us now define the relative position of the combatants. If the doctrine opposed to Liberalism be the traditional doctrine of the Church, no one has a right to charge the defenders of that doctrine with responsibility for the grievous results of this most lamentable controversy. It is also an equivocation, but this time aggravated by an injustice, to accuse them of disturbing the peace because they are fighting in defence of the traditions of the Church; and this injustice is increased when all sorts of motives, unworthy alike of men of honour and of Christians, are imputed to them. Supposing the question were regarded merely in its practical light, how can a Catholic take it ill that other Catholics should regulate their thoughts and their conduct by the decision of those to whom Jesus Christ has promised His assistance? How can he dare to impute to them as a crime that they brave public opinion? If they did so out of pure bravado, one might indeed call theirs insensate acts, but which nevertheless did not lack courage; for public opinion is the idol of modern societies, and the idolatry of which it is the object is more seductive than ever was the worship of Diana of the Ephesians or of Astarte in Phœnicia. M. de Montalembert may say what he pleases; this is the true rising sun before which the men of our time, and especially the publicists, are more ready to prostrate themselves, than before the inferior powers. It is incomparably easier to break a lance with a Cæsar than to disdain that great goddess before whom the Cæsars themselves bent low. If, then, the adversaries of Liberalism were acting out of pure caprice, we ought not to refuse to regard them with the esteem which all men who resist a yoke to which the proudest have submitted are entitled. But if, in accomplishing this perilous task, they believe themselves to be fulfilling a sacred duty; if, beholding the unjust discredit which has been successfully cast upon the traditions and the great deeds of the Church their mother, they consequently face this unpopularity; if, instead of pleading "extenuating circumstances" for her, as some of her children have done, they defend her rights, and glorify her past, how can any Catholic refuse them his esteem and his gratitude, even though he does not share their convictions? Above all, how can he dare to accuse them of *outraging reason, justice, and honour!*

We shall say no more in refutation of a production so lamentable that its editors themselves have had the merit of rebuking it, but which they have unfortunately not been able to withhold from the public. The writers in the *Civiltà Cattolica* need no defence. The praise and encouragement which they have received from the Vicar of Jesus Christ suffice to avenge them for the accusations and reproaches of any adversary, were he gifted with the eloquence of a Pascal. It is better to say no more of these delusions, which the light of death has dispersed. But we are bound to wish that they may be also driven away from the living. In the interest of our dignity, as well as in that of truth and justice, it is to be desired that once for all every per-

sonal question should be put aside in a controversy which is completely independent. In every war both sides may be wrong, but the errors of either do not make the other right. Even in defending the holiest cause one may give a needless blow, or fail in correct aim. I do not think any soldier has ever found in that fact an excuse for forsaking his flag, or for outraging such of his comrades as have given more brilliant proofs than he of devotion and of courage in their common cause. At any rate, the faults of the combatants have nothing to do with the justice of the cause, and there is no justification for fighting against Catholic tradition in saying it is ill defended. When two powers go to war, each accuses the other of having broken the peace. Prussia has recently taught us what advantage may be got out of such an accusation, and how the foe whom one wants to push into strife may be tricked into assuming the odium of aggression. So in struggles between Catholics, each party has tried to throw the responsibility of the hostilities upon the other. But in this case the stratagem deceives none but those who choose to be deceived. Jesus Christ has unmasked it beforehand by establishing a centre of unity in His Church. From it we can always learn with absolute certainty who they are who disturb union, and who they are who fight for its maintenance. Union is adhesion to unity ; division is, on the contrary, opposition to unity. Do not then accuse the champions of unity of disturbing union ; for it is its cause which they defend, even when they use only persuasion as a means for the spread of their doctrines. That man must, indeed, have lost the Catholic sense who should prefer him who undermines the foundations of unity, to him who, fighting in the open day for the defence of the sacred citadel, does not always direct his batteries with absolute precision.

4. Whatever may be the influence over their minds which the Liberal delusion has gained, Liberal Catholics feel how difficult their position is from the point of view of tradition, and how crushing is the weight of authorities contrary to their doctrine. In order to escape it, they have recourse to another equivocation. The matter in dispute is not a dogmatic question, they say, in respect of which authority has the right of sovereign decision. M. de Montalembert reiterates this declaration several times in his speech at the Malines congress. "I am not dealing with theory, and above all not with theology, here," he said ; "I am not replying by dogmatic arguments to the dogmatizers who condemn me, and whom I reject. I invoke facts, and I draw from them the purely practical teaching which I propose to you."

Hereafter we shall examine into the question whether the Liberals would have a right to repudiate the direction of the Church, even supposing the truth of these allegations had been established. We shall concern ourselves at present only with the misunderstanding in which this discussion has been intentionally enveloped. He whom we are now dealing with is of the number of those which Liberalism keeps most carefully alive in the mind of its adepts. But, however desirous he may be to lull their conscience to sleep by this delusion, he cannot open his mouth without contradicting himself

and rushing into that domain of theory which he seemed to interdict. In the same discourse, in which the most sincere and eloquent of the defenders of Liberalism made the protestations which we have just quoted, —twenty lines after those in which he mocks at the *proud and laughable pretension* of those who dream of the reign of the absolute,—we find him making the following declaration :—"This being said, I feel more at my ease in declaring that of all the liberties of which I have hitherto undertaken the defence, liberty of conscience is, in my eyes, the most sacred, the most precious, the most legitimate, the most necessary. . . . Yes, we must love and serve all liberties ; but among them all, religious liberty merits the tenderest respect, exacts the most absolute devotion ; it is she which hovers over the highest, purest, and vastest regions. She alone illumines two lives and two worlds, the life of the soul like that of the body, and heaven like earth."

"To believe in the truth," he adds, a little later, "to the point of consecrating to it one's honour, one's repose, and one's life, and, nevertheless, to respect liberty of soul in him who ignores or abandons the truth ;—*that it is which has hitherto appeared difficult*, and which now seems to be nothing but *a simple and natural act of justice, or at least of Christian charity.*"

In all good faith, is this simple practice ? Is this the language of a soldier who is examining his ground, and not rather that of a teacher who is expounding a theory ? He who, a few minutes ago, declared that he desired to remain in the relative, has he not, at a bonnd, sprung into the sphere of the absolute ? Have justice and Christian charity changed their nature during the course of years ?

Is it not to reverse theology, and to set one's own judgment above the dogmatic infallibility of the Church, to canonize as the most precious, sacred, legitimate, and necessary of its rights, that which she has declared to be iniquitous and pernicious ? If the Holy Spirit, whose assistance is always with the Church, is *par excellence* the Spirit of Charity, the pretension to excel that Spirit in the practice of this virtue is the most audacious of all the encroachments of which human pride can be guilty in the domain of theology.

Thus it is that, in spite of their firm resolution and their sincere piety, the most skilful defenders of Catholic Liberalism are constrained to heterodox affirmations, so soon as they need to prove their system in the right. It could not be otherwise. Take all the other questions of politics and morals, that great question of the relations of Church and State belongs to the realm of dogmatic principles, concerning which no one can remain in an indifferent attitude. To wish to treat this question from a purely practical point of view, without in any way touching those principles, whether to affirm or to deny them, is as chimerical an attempt as that of the architect would be who should endeavour to construct an edifice without the smallest reference to the laws of equilibrium.

Here we touch with our finger the radical delusion of Liberal Catholics,

and the essential absurdity of their system. Here is their exact situation: as Catholics, they profess the dogmas taught by the Church in the religious order; but, as Liberals, they reject the necessary consequences of those dogmas in the social order. As Liberals, they admit the antichristian constitution of modern society; but, as Catholics, they reject the antichristian principles on which that constitution is founded. If the chief function of reason consists in deducing the consequences of principles, and in tracing consequences to principles, it must be acknowledged that no system was ever more irrational than Catholic Liberalism.

But logic has its exigencies from which one cannot entirely free oneself, as Liberal Catholics have just proved to us. At the very moment when they proclaim that they do not wish to deal with theory, they are doing so, in spite of themselves; and the theory upon which they build up all their sophisms is in itself the most glaring of equivocations.

5. Let us beg them to make known to us this *simple duty of justice and charity* which the Church had ignored up to the day on which Liberalism discovered it. "It is," they reply, "the duty of according to others that liberty which we claim for ourselves." "Yes, Catholics, understand it well," cries M. de Montalembert, borrowing the words of Père Lacordaire, "if you desire liberty for yourselves, you must desire it for all men and under every sky. If you demand it for yourselves only, it will never be granted to you; give it, where you are masters, that it may be given to you, where you are slaves." All the philosophy of Catholic Liberalism is contained in these lines; so that we find the same thought reproduced under a thousand forms in all the manifestoes and publications of this school.

Now, there is really nothing but an equivocation in this pretended system of equity. It would certainly be unjust to demand for *ourselves* liberty which we should refuse to our fellows. But is it for ourselves that we demand anything whatever? Is it not solely for Jesus Christ, the Son of God and the only Saviour of men, that we demand the submission which is due to Him, and without which it is impossible to accomplish His mission of salvation towards societies? Unbelievers may be mistaken concerning our thought, but Liberal Catholics cannot be so mistaken. They know perfectly well that if we demand a special protection for the Catholic truth, it is because God has made it the indispensable foundation of social order. But then what becomes of the pretended principle of justice? Let us substitute exact for cynical expressions in the phrases which we have just quoted, and that which appears to be equity will come out in its true light as iniquity. Here is the translation of these sentences:—

"The Catholic Church desires liberty for herself, and in that she has no great merit. In general, every man desires every kind of liberty for himself. But religious liberty in itself, liberty for creeds which she denies and repels, that is what the Church of Jesus Christ ought henceforth to accept and to demand, as the most sacred, legitimate, and necessary of all liberties. Catholics, understand this; if you desire liberty for Jesus Christ, and for

the doctrine which He has revealed to men as the only way of salvation, you must desire the same liberty for all errors, and for every seduction. Give it to all the enemies of this Divine Saviour in those places where He is still Master, in order that it may be given to His servants in those places where they are slaves." Thus expressed, the Liberal theory brings to the light of day the fundamental error which is in it, and which its defenders endeavour to hide under ambiguous forms; that error is the parity of rights between truth and falsehood, between Jesus Christ and Belial. Admit that the doctrine which Jesus Christ committed to the keeping of His Church is an opinion, ike those which are described in the religious, political, and philosophical world, and the conclusions of the Liberals become undeniable law. But if you suppose that this doctrine of Jesus Christ bears upon it incontestable marks of truth, and that it is as obligatory for the salvation of men and of societies as the laws of common justice and of individual morality, how can you demand, in the name of equity, the same protection as that due to the men who are charged with the propagation and the defence of that doctrine by God Himself for those who attack it with every disloyal weapon? Would you venture to apply your theory to any other social interest, to the public health, for example? Would you say that one cannot claim liberty to sell wholesome aliments, and refuse to poisoners freedom to drive their accursed trade? If you are a Catholic, you are bound to believe that the anti-Christian propaganda does more harm to the soul than poisons can do to the body. How then can you maintain in principle that the liberty of this propaganda is a simple duty of charity and justice?

6. Again, there is, in this very word "liberty" an equivocation against which we ought to protest untiringly. When Liberals argue against the Catholic doctrine, they always assume that the question at issue between themselves and their adversaries is one of *constraint*, whereas it is in reality a question of *defence*. Why does the Church repel, in principle, the liberty of the press, and freedom of conscience, as understood in the Liberal sense? Because they are the instruments of oppression; yes, instruments of the most iniquitous and most fatal of all oppressions, the oppression of feeble souls under the doubly ignominious yoke of falsehood and of immorality. We know how, before the abolition of the slave trade, the traffickers in human flesh procured the objects of their infamous trade. They offered to the degraded African races those intoxicating drinks which they eagerly covet, and in exchange the poor wretches gave them their fellow-men, and even their own children. The freedom of the press brings with it a more inhuman traffic, since, instead of dealing in bodies, it drugs souls, and makes them slaves of falsehood. Lacordaire understood this when the liberty of the press, condemned by the encyclical *Mirari vos*, was supported by the *Avenir*, and he strove to make Montalembert, who was always in favour of this false freedom, understand it too. "Are you well persuaded," he wrote to him, "that liberty of the press is not the oppression of honest intellects by perverse intellects, and that God, in bending all minds

under the authority of the Church, has not done more for the real liberty of humanity than all the writings of Luther, Calvin, Hobbes, and Voltaire? Is it quite clear to you that the freedom of the press will not be the ruin of European liberty and of literature?"

If he to whom those lines were addressed had had them more constantly before his mind's eye, he would have spared himself the injustice of which he was guilty in representing the traditional doctrine of the Church ss inimical to liberty. The only liberty reproved by that doctrine is the liberty of tyranny. It does not demand that the civil power shall employ force to impose the faith on unbelievers. That which it does demand is, that in a society which has the happiness of possessing the unity of faith, falsehood should not be permitted to overthrow that society, and to wrest their faith from feeble souls by the seduction of its sophisms. It does not give the civil power a right to define the truth, or to meddle in questions of doctrine; but since the mission of that power is to defend social rights, since in societies constituted on Christian principles, the Catholic doctrine possesses a social existence, the civil power ought to defend it as the common property of all the members of society. This obligation is so rational that Liberalism is constrained to acknowledge it at least in words. "That which we ought to demand from the State," says M. de Montalembert, "is that it shall not hinder, *nor allow to be hindered*, the observance of the laws of God and the Church, and that it shall *protect religious rights* like other rights." Let Liberalism frankly accept this principle, let it admit all the practical consequences, and we shall cease to attack it. But then, let it abandon the demand for political rights equal to those of religious. The two pretensions are absolutely incompatible. In order that Catholics may be completely free in the exercise of their religious rights, and that the observance of the laws of God and the Church be preserved and delivered from all trammels by the protection of the State, it is evident that the State must come forth from the neutrality to which Liberalism condemns it. It cannot, at one and the same time, protect the religious rights of the Christian workman who wishes to observe the Sunday abstinence from labour; and the irreligious employer, who makes the violation of this duty a condition of his workmen's wages; it ceases to guarantee the sacred right of a baptized child to a Christian education, if it gives free scope to the promoters of Atheist education. Let not Liberalism tell us, therefore, that it only repudiates constraint; no, its principles necessarily lead to the oppression of souls; and for that reason they can never be accepted by the Church, which is the mother of souls, and charged by Jesus Christ with the defence of their liberty.

7. There is another and equally odious equivocation with which it would also be well to have done, once for all; it is that by which the Liberals represent their adversaries in the light of blind defenders of arbitrary power and national enslavement. Forty years ago Lacordaire refuted the sophistical declamations of Liberal polemics on this point. He wrote to his

friend, in the letter which we have already quoted :—"The encyclical of the Holy Father does not contain the doctrine which you repel with so much fright. There is no question of becoming either a partisan of the Emperor Nicholas, or an enemy of the liberty of the world and of the Church." A little later (Feb., 1834) he writes again :—"What do we differ upon? Upon nothing, if it be not the purely gratuitous imagination that Rome has condemned liberty, in itself, and desires nothing better than to see the kings put religion, with hands and feet tied, into a guard-room in their palaces." The eloquence of Père Lacordaire did not suffice to disabuse the Liberal Catholics of this *imagination*, which was to their minds so evident a reality that they make it the basis of the classification of the system which they put forward to regulate the relations of the Church with the State. In a carefully elaborated note, by which M. de Montalembert wished to explain and justify his unfortunate formula, "a free Church in a free State," he expresses himself thus :—"Let us ask whether, in the actual state of the world, any other situation can be imagined besides these four—The Church free in a free country, the Church enslaved in an enslaved country (Russia, &c.), the Church enslaved in a free country (Sweden, Portugal, Piedmont), the Church free in an enslaved country." If these four solutions are really the only ones which could be found for the problem, we could not reject the first, which is the Liberal solution, without accepting the fourth, "The Church free in an enslaved country," as the formula of the traditional doctrine of the Catholic Church.

Assuredly the spouse of Jesus Christ never consented to be a slave either in a free or in an enslaved country. Since M. de Montalembert himself recognizes that his solution, "the Church free in a free state," had not been hitherto admitted; since he makes it the *modus vivendi* of the Church with modern societies, it follows that the anterior state of things, that which Catholics had previously regarded as their normal condition, can only be expressed by the other formula, the Church free in an enslaved country! But who is there who would venture to sustain this formula? Who, without giving the lie to history, could call the France of S. Louis an enslaved country? Has not M. de Montalembert told us that, a hundred years ago, after Christian order had been systematically disturbed during four centuries by the encroachments of the royal despotism, "there was in France an entire order of individual, local, and municipal liberties which no longer exist?" When we pray for the re-establishment of Christian order, it is not, assuredly, slavery that we invoke. Besides, this very writer, who places before us the alternative between the Church free in a free country, and the Church free in an enslaved country, hastens to add that the second solution has never been, and never can be realized. What becomes then of all argument? What is the place of Catholic doctrine in these four systems, among which it is pretended that we must necessarily choose? Has it not been juggled away, to constrain us to accept the liberal solution?

Let us not be mistaken. In selecting the discourse of M. de Montalembert

at the Malines Congress for special consideration in this, the first portion, of our discussion, we had no intention of attacking the man. We have chosen his speech because we do not know of any other such skilful, complete, and authoritative exposition of Catholic Liberalism. On examining it closely, we have just seen to what it reduces itself;—to a series of equivocations, which are [specious only because they conceal the thought which they appear to express, and which turn into repulsive errors when that thought is brought to the light of day.

8. We cannot be reproached with having gone too far back for an opponent, in our endeavour to combat the doctrine of Catholic Liberalism, for we should have sought in vain for a more recent exposition of that doctrine in the writings of the heads of the school who have survived M. de Montalembert. Since the Sovereign Pontiff's reprobation of their ideas has become more explicit, they have given up the defence of them, and many of the number repudiate the name of Liberal Catholics, a title in which they formerly gloried. No, they say, in religion we are purely Catholic; it is only in politics that we are Liberal. Under this formula, which expresses the latest evolution of the school, we feel there is still an equivocation. What is this political Liberalism under whose shade its professors hope to hide themselves from the anathemas of the Church? Does it relate to the preference accorded to representative institutions over absolute monarchy? But this is positively beside the question. When have the adversaries of Catholic Liberalism ever reproached its adherents with this preference? To credit us with such a design is evidently to put public opinion on a false scent. Everything leads us to believe that the political Liberalism under which shelter is sought is nothing else than the Liberal theory of the relations between civil and religious society. This Liberalism is political, in fact, but it equally touches the rights of the Church. To pretend that the Church has nothing to do with it would be to grant the truth of the fundamental principle of the Liberal heresy. If the men who formerly showed themselves favourable to this error desire it should no longer be imputed to them, it is indispensable that they should disclaim it, and they must not rest satisfied with opposing us by a formula which is at least as ambiguous as that under which the semi-Arians endeavoured to shield themselves.

The following is, then, our first conclusion:—Instead of serious arguments Catholic Liberalism is supported only by equivocations; and, consequently, it is absolutely untenable as a practical system from the double point of view of the end which it proposes to itself, the course which it takes, and the results which it obtains. Nothing will be wanting to our demonstration, if we can prove that, in this triple aspect, the reality completely gives the lie to the brilliant promises with which Catholic Liberalism has been beguiling us for forty years.

H. Ramière.

(*To be continued.*)

Notices of Books.

The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes. By Dr. Joseph Fessler. London: Burns & Oates.

Since our article on this volume was printed off, a fact has come to our knowledge which we ought to mention. A certain correspondent of the *Germania* stated in 1872 that the Pope had "directed a translation" of the treatise "to be made into Italian, and instructed a commission of the different nationalities to examine it and report on it." We have shown in our article how entirely untrustworthy is this correspondent; but we now understand from what seems to us excellent authority, that inquiries have been made in Rome on the subject, and that the above statement is entirely unfounded. We do not know whether a translation of the work was published at Rome, though (if it were) no doubt it was submitted to the usual censorship; but the correspondent himself implies that the copy sent *to the Pope* by Mgr. Fessler was in *German.*

For our own part, we shall continue entirely to disbelieve the statement we have above mentioned, until some evidence is adduced for it worthy of being called evidence.

The Spirit of Faith. Five Lectures by Right Rev. Bishop Hedley. London: Burns & Oates.

These most suggestive lectures inspire us with an earnest hope, that Bishop Hedley may have the opportunity of writing a complete and systematic treatise on the great question which they treat. Everything connected with the acquisition of Catholic faith is just now a matter of exceptional moment. Even sincere Protestants are beginning to admit, that Protestantism is effete as a widely influential principle. The flood of boundless infidelity, now so rapidly rising, can be resisted by no other agency than that of the Catholic Church. The vital inquiry is, how faith can be implanted in the mind of those who now reject it.

The Bishop's opinion—and it is our own—is, that the alternative whether this or that given person becomes a Catholic, depends (under God) much less on the question how cogently the argumentative evidences of Christianity

are brought before him, than on the question what *disposition* he may bring with him to their examination. The Bishop (see p. 43) by no means disparages the value possessed in their place by the irrefragable argumentative proofs, adducible for the truth of Christianity. Still at last, as the Vatican Council has declared, "The Church of herself, because of her admirable propagation, her eminent holiness, her inexhaustible fecundity in every good, her Catholic unity and unconquered stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable proof of her own divine mission. And thus, like a standard set up to the nations, she both invites to her those who do not yet believe, and also gives her children full ground for knowing that the Faith which they profess rests on a most firm foundation. To which testimony of hers a powerful assistance is added by power from above."

But then, in order that he may be duly drawn by this "power from above," the inquirer must bring with him certain dispositions positive and negative, acquired by his free co-operation with those aids of grace which have been given him from the dawn of his reason. And it is the Bishop's main business, to inquire what these dispositions are. In this respect these lectures remind one of F. Newman's magnificent sermon (the fifth of "Occasional Sermons") on "Dispositions to faith." At the same time the Bishop's course of thought is essentially different from F. Newman's.

His first lecture is on the absolute necessity which exists, that men should be guided on a thousand matters of fact by testimony, unless the whole social world is to fall into ruin. Nay (as the Bishop puts it with admirable aptness) men are actually *compelled* to believe on testimony.

"Let us suppose, for example, that a trustworthy friend walks into your house, and mentions that he left his home at such an hour, or that he met and spoke with such and such a person; you are obliged to believe him, You cannot help having that much additional knowledge. It is true that by an extraordinarily violent mental effort, proceeding from some strong prejudice or prepossession, you may so confuse yourself as to doubt at last. But with your mind in a state of quietness and candour, on the first reception of the information you assent; the very make and texture of the human mind compels you. It is no more possible for you, with your senses in their healthy state, to help seeing trees and houses when they stand before you and you look towards them in the daylight, than it is for your minds to doubt upon due and sufficient testimony" (pp. 5, 6).

There is one incidental statement however in this lecture, which gives us some little difficulty. The Bishop seems to imply in p. 9, that without faith the mass of ordinary men will not arrive at firm and well-grounded conviction on the Existence of an Infinitely Perfect God. We would submit to his Lordship's better judgment, whether F. Kleutgen's doctrine on this head is not rather to be followed, as we set forth that doctrine last October from p. 447 to p. 453. F. Kleutgen considers that, apart from faith altogether, God infuses into all adults a reasonable knowledge of His Existence, by means of their implicit reason. This point of controversy however, whatever its value, has no bearing on the general scope of the Bishop's argument.

Faith then in some religious informant being so absolutely necessary, the next question is how men are to find their trustworthy informant. This will practically depend on the question, in what spirit they look out for him, and by what notes they seek to discern him. Here the Bishop's argument implies the doctrine, on which F. Newman so powerfully enlarges in the sermon to which we have already referred. God has given all men a clue to the true religion, by the moral faculty which He has implanted in them. In proportion as, on the one hand, they cultivate that moral faculty by conscientiously obeying its dictates,—and in proportion as on the other hand the Catholic Church is presented to them according to her true aspect—in that combined proportion they will recognize the plain notes of her divine commission.

"A man who has accustomed himself to call things by the name which *the undisciplined and sinful human heart* is in the habit of calling them, will easily pass by God, even at the moment when God is very near him. When Elias stood on the top of Carmel the Lord passed by him. There was a great and strong wind before the Lord, overthrowing the mountains and breaking the rocks in pieces; the Lord was not in the wind. And after the wind, an earthquake; and the Lord was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake, a fire; the Lord was not in the fire. And after the fire, the whistling of a gentle air. And Elias heard the gentle wind, and he knew it was the Lord. . . . He is the type of the heart that knows where to see God. But most men act otherwise. They take the flash and the noise and the rush of some earth storm for the manifestation of God" (pp. 24, 25).

And they do this, because they have not trained themselves to obeying God's voice within them, and thus learning its true accents.

"The truth of this is never more clearly seen than in the case of multitudes in this country who are looking for, or perhaps think that they have found, what they call the Gospel. They take certain big and sounding names from the world's vocabulary, and measuring by them the revelation of God, they accept as much as they can cover with these names. Wealth and material power are names which earthly wisdom bows before; and is it not true they go a long way in helping men to choose their form of Christianity? But if you say these are vulgar notions, and educated and refined minds are far above measuring truth by power to strike and power to pay, I say that there are other words as dangerous and as false. Liberty, Independence, Progress, Free Inquiry—these are some of the notions which numbers of people bring to test the Gospel by. If they find any form of religion, like the Catholic Church, in which these names are not held in high esteem (at least as understood by them), then, like the Jews of old, they are straightway 'scandalized.' It cannot be true. It cannot be meant for them. Freedom is a glorious privilege. Progress is the inalienable birthright of the human race. Independence is the prerogative of man's noble nature. And being full of views like these, they settle down with such scraps of God's word as seem to suit" (pp. 26, 27).

On the other hand

"Revelation cannot be approached, except in an attitude of what may

be called the lowliness of worship. We come to it, not to criticise it, not to improve it, but to learn and to act. We cannot afford to lose one jot or one tittle of the precious light. The temper of the believer is the temper of Moses with unshod feet prostrate before the mysterious Voice in the wilderness" (p. 28).

In profound harmony with this principle, our Blessed Lord and the Church after Him is always "absolute, peremptory, and magisterial." This is the very characteristic note of truth.

"A man need not be a shrewd reasoner, need not be a great philosopher, reader, thinker, or scholar, to be able to make out God's revelation. He need only be guileless, unprejudiced, earnest. You will say, Then how is it so many in this world miss God's light? Because they are sinful, prejudiced (though not always by their own fault), or indifferent. Because they come, not to submit, but criticise; to discuss and to pass sentence" (p. 33).

Here then is one way, in which a person is prevented by his own moral defect from discovering the authority of Catholic Christianity. He has not entered on his inquiry as a learner, but as a critic. A second obstacle, also arising from moral defect, is commemorated in the Bishop's third lecture: viz. *prejudice.*

"The ignorant, the ill-educated, and the average-minded—in fact, the bulk of humanity—are exposed to the danger of allowing their reason to be blindfolded by the influence of their wants, inclinations, and passions. And even the most intellectual and the most cultivated are sure to have their convictions tinged with a large infusion of their likings" (p. 45).

There is one obvious and one only way of avoiding this: viz. that men shall cultivate the habit of directing their action, not in accordance with their own tastes and likings, but in accordance with duty. The world in general derives an incredibly large portion of its judgments from education and example. Why? Because it has not cultivated that faculty, which has the power of *neutralising*, in continually increasing degree, the prejudices which arise from education and example.

But there is even a more powerful antagonist to faith than any yet mentioned, and which is treated by the Bishop in his fourth lecture: viz. that "wilfulness" which arises from the corruption of human nature. When true religion is offered to men—whether Christianity to heathens or Catholicity to Protestants—on the one hand (as has been said), they are strongly impelled against it by the disgust with which those around them receive it; but on the other hand they are even more strongly impelled against it by the pride and passion which characterize the natural man (p. 70), and by the antipathy to heavenly truths which such pride and passion engender. So the world without, and the worldly spirit within, play into each other's hands in resisting the design of God.

What then is His weapon, if we may so express ourselves? Those in general (we have said) most readily arrive at religious truth, who have been most diligent in moral action; but no one can be diligent in moral action without habits of constant prayer.

"If I were asked for one royal road to the happiness of Faith, I should answer, with all the Saints, that it is prayer. No one who prays can be lost. God wishes all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. But He has not promised to save those who are so immersed in the pleasantness or the business of this life as to give Him no share in their thoughts and none of the worship which is His right. We must bow to His majesty and beg for His precious gift. We must make ourselves feel, with all the fervour of our heart, that we are helpless if He do not help us, and blind if He do not enlighten us. And He will hear the prayer of the humble heart. Be sure that He will hear. Whether it be that He gives us new reasons or helps us the better to penetrate old ones; whether He send us a man, or a book, or an inspiration; whether He cast us down as with a lightning stroke, or lay His hand gently upon our eyes and ears; let us be assured that He will hear us. If He must send His angel from the heavens to teach us, then His angel will be sent. But it is He alone, and not ourselves, who can open our eyes and let us see the light" (pp. 103, 104).

It is a great and rarely tasted pleasure, when a course of remarks, at once so theoretically profound and so practically momentous, is placed before the Catholic public and thus brought before our notice. Every thought of Bishop Hedley's has been carefully elaborated, and every word accurately weighed.

S. Thomas of Aquin and Ideology. By Mgr. Ferré, Bishop of Casa Monferrato. Translated by a Father of Charity. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1875.

WE are extremely glad of every fresh fact, which shows that Catholics are more and more recognizing the vital importance of Catholic philosophical unity. So far we heartily rejoice at the appearance of this translation: and we are glad of it also for a totally different reason; viz. that is well for English Catholic students, trained in a truer philosophy, to have means of compendiously knowing what has been advocated by so powerful, thoughtful, and religious a writer as Rosmini. But we fear that our sympathy with the volume before us hardly extends further than this. It raises three questions, and they ought to be kept apart: one is about the facts, viz. how far philosophical disunion among Catholics extends; the second is about the true interpretation of S. Thomas; the third about the merits of Rosmini's own philosophical theory. We hope to publish an article in our next number, dealing successively with these three questions; but we will not shrink from expressing at once the conclusions for which we shall argue in that article.

(1) On the first question—we think there has of late risen to the surface a far greater appearance of growing philosophical unity, than was visible when Mgr. Ferré delivered his address five years ago to the Academia Romana, or when we expressed our own opinion on the subject in July,

1869. The Catholic presses of Germany, France, and Italy are busy with the publication of manuals, treatises, and elucidations of S. Thomas; at Naples and Rome the leading authors are purely Scholastic, and their books have sold with unexampled rapidity; in Germany there is the widest acceptance of Aristotle, and the best known writers (such as Kleutgen and Stöckl) have confuted Hermes and Günther by means of the Scholastic teaching. On the other hand, the perilous systems which had gained ground in France and Belgium have fallen under the displeasure of the Holy See, and have been given up by such as held them. Moreover, even six years ago—and this we would insist on—it was observable that the theologians of highest repute, were strenuous in their support of S. Thomas and Suarez; though, of course, they claim the liberty to improve, to perfect, to accommodate the phraseology to recent experiments, nay, to modify the doctrine itself in minor particulars.* We may mention F. Franzelin, the lamented F. Schrader, the Jesuits in the Tyrol, and some distinguished professors at Louvain. There are no names that stand higher.

(2) S. Thomas has long been kept in the background; but now, at his coming forward, he brings in his train philosophers and commentators, nourished upon his teaching, and full of a living tradition as to its sense. The office of interpreter is, doubtless, one of great risk and delicacy; though the Scholastic keenness, not to say justice, of thought, has made their explanation of Aristotle (even from a Latin text) the wonder of succeeding writers. And the works of S. Thomas have been open to all, and have given rise to a vast exegesis, stretching over nearly six centuries. This is the old and received commentary, more or less discrepant in detail, but in general principle exact, consistent, fruitful in deduction. What of the new? One cannot but think of our Protestants, whose private judgment is a match for Fathers and Councils together. All the commentators on S. Thomas, it seems, before Rosmini, have erred from the right way, and have missed the meaning of, perhaps, the clearest author that ever lived. Here is a modern philosopher, who starts up from the quiet contemplation in which he has been long occupied, and tells us, not merely that he has found out an original and satisfactory theory—we might believe that—but that he alone can trace out for us the meaning of a world-renowned book, upon which folios of comment already exist. For ourselves, we had rather trust Suarez and Cajetan than the most plausible of modern prophets. But what if your new critic is furnished with a preconceived doctrine, not really unheard of before, but flourishing on the other side of the Alps? Now, if we may make bold to say it, Rosmini is nothing more in our eyes than Emmanuel Kant done into Italian. He himself tells us that Kant was in the right path, but that his theory wanted simplifying; and the Nuovo Saggio undertook to simplify it. We should have gathered no less from a comparison of the systems. Now Kant, as a matter of fact, seems to have borrowed a great deal from S.

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* See our remarks in July, 1869, pp. 222–225, and pp. 40–42.

Thomas, and to have skilfully distorted it all, so as to round off his own philosophy. Rosmini's adaptation is, perhaps, more subtle, and is quite as bewildering: but the Ideal Being is not a talisman to unlock the treasures of the Angelic Doctor. Any one, whose duty leads him frequently to the Scholastics, will be amazed at the notion which Rosmini would instil into us.

We have no wish to assert without proving: so we will set down a few remarks, by way of justification. Mgr. Ferré assures us that S. Thomas does not treat professedly of the origin of ideas, which of course is the main point in dispute. We think the opposite can be made out. The Saint defines, analyzes, and describes at length the Intellectus Agens, the Intellectus Possibilis, the faculty which he calls the Estimative; he assigns their office to the phantasmata, discriminates most acutely between sense and intellect, and goes fully into the various modes by which we know matter and mind, singular and universal, necessary and contingent, finite and infinite. Few can have written more copiously on the subject. Moreover, he treats it polemically, and that very often; for his great antagonist is Averrhoes, whose doctrine of the Impersonal Reason could not be confuted, unless by a full exposition of the opinion prevailing in the schools. The sources, too, from which we gain S. Thomas's view, are numerous and varied. We will add to Mgr. Ferré's "De Veritate" and "De Magistro," the Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima," the "De Unitate Intellectûs," the "De Ente et Essentia" (of which more at another time), and, of course, the two great achievements, the "Summa Theologica," and the "Summa Contra Gentiles."

But long before a student has read all the parallel passages, he will be convinced that S. Thomas held no doctrine of innate forms or innate conceptions. As against Rosmini, however, we have two strings to our bow; and even though one might be broken, the other would still hold good. Either, in fact, the Angelic believed in no innate ideas, or he held a great many; nay, he went beyond Gioberti, and allowed of con-natural, unacquired *principles*, both in the speculative and in the practical order. Let any one go through the question "De Veritate," among the Qq. Disp. (16, art. 1), and he will find a clear statement that there is a knowledge of the truth, "sine inquisitione," in the practical, no less than in the speculative intellect; that this is "quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis"; and, finally, that such knowledge is a "habitus naturalis *principiorum*." Either, then, S. Thomas held more, or, (as we maintain) he held less than Rosmini: in no case are the theories identical. But really he would lay down, that the "quædam scientiarum semina"* are principles derived from the comparison of ideas; and that all our ideas, including the first and largest, that of Being, are gained, by abstraction, from the sensible and material world. "Aliqua sunt," he declares, "quæ statim, sine discursu (that is, without demonstration),

* We must remark, en passant, that Rosmini and the ontologists perpetually confuse knowledge and science, though the terms and conceptions are very distinct, and S. Thomas is careful to indicate his meaning.

obtinentur ; sicut principia prima, quæ quisque statim probat audita." What are not understood till they are *heard* evidently do not belong to the intellect from the beginning. As, moreover, the mind is endowed with no innate judgments, so neither has it innate ideas or species. S. Thomas is explicit on this head: "Intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est, in principio, in potentia ad hujusmodi species omnes (Summa, P. I., q. 84, art. 3). And in another place : "Intellectum possibilem, qui, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad *omnia intelligibilia,* sed determinatur ad hoc vel aliud per species a phantasmatibus abstractas" (Qq. Disp. De Anima, art. 5). What is the usual answer to these quotations? No other than this, that the idea of being is *not* a "species abstracta," and that all S. Thomas lays down is about species, not about the primal idea. But this is not borne out in any way.

On the contrary, we have many phrases like the following:—"Primæ conceptiones intellectûs . . . . quæ statim, lumine intellectûs agentis, cognoscuntur, per species a sensibilibus abstractas . . . . sicut *ratio entis,** et unius, et hujusmodi." In fact, all the transcendental concepts are formed by abstraction, and the concept of Being is no more than the first of these. "Quamvis illa, quæ sunt in genere *prima* eorum quæ intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus, sint prima cognita a nobis, ut ens et unum," (Super Boeth. de Trin.) We must be allowed to add, that S. Thomas starts from a position, the very opposite to Rosmini's. Take these words, as the summing up of the Scholastic theory ; "Operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiæ ; intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo ; et ideo propria operatio ejus, est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus" (De Mem. et Rem., lect. 1.). Whence he concludes, "Naturaliter (anima) non potest cognoscere aliqua, nisi quæ habent *formam in materia,* vel quæ per hujusmodi cognosci possunt." All knowledge, in this life, depends upon the senses ; intellectual knowledge, though of so high a perfection, is not due to the immaterial soul by itself ; and that soul is, first, a "tabula rasa," but living and self-moving, and possessed of the faculty of abstraction.

Just at this point, we are met by a strange fancy of Rosmini's, upon which, as in duty bound, Mgr. Ferré dilates with satisfaction. We have, says S. Thomas, certain faculties natural to us, and of these the principal are, the Intellectus agens, the faculty of abstraction, and the Intellectus possibilis, or understanding properly so called. The one is the motive-power, the root and seed, of the act of intellectual knowledge: the other elicits that act from out of itself, when it has been rightly prepared and furnished. "Intellectus possibilis est qui speciem recipit, et actum intelligendi elicit": "Intellectus agens nihil recipit, sed est *potentia* animæ, quæ facit *omnia* intelligibilia actu" (De Potentiis animæ, art. 6). An-

* If the very idea (ratio) of being comes by abstraction from the senses, then, not simply all *determinate* knowledge, but all knowledge whatever is gained by this process. Mgr. Ferré mistakes on this head (p. 27).

other lucid statement occurs in the polemical tract, "De Unitate Intellectûs," written against Averrhoes. The Intellectus Agens then, is a faculty of the soul. "No," says Rosmini, "it is not a faculty, but an idea, the idea of Being as I have described it." This, we confess, passes our comprehension. Worse still, should it be alleged that the Intellectus Agens is *both* an idea and a faculty. If things are like their definitions, then ideas and faculties are no more the same, than the power of seeing is identical with the impression on the retina. No wonder S. Thomas is dark, nay, involved in contradiction and altogether past cure, if he mixes terms after this fashion. But is not the Intellectus Agens the light of the soul? If any one will turn to Franzelin's "De Deo Uno," page 142, he can see for himself that this much-debated phrase admits of a dozen orthodox meanings; that, in one of these meanings, the Intellectus Agens may be called a Light, but that, as lights are many, the Ideal Being need not be confounded with a power of the soul, nor, indeed, be reckoned among the primal lights at all. But we cannot delay over all this just now. To our mind, the controversy about S. Thomas is already settled; it was natural, to be sure, that those who first stumbled upon him, should read him in the light of modern notions, but for some years past, the old books have been diligently studied, and the result seems, in a high degree, satisfactory. His theory of knowledge lies in a nutshell. Rosmini admits innate faculties, and one innate idea. S. Thomas thinks, that if innate faculties be granted, and if of these one be a faculty of abstraction, the rise, development, and perfection of knowledge, in a human being, may be clearly traced out, and accurately explained.

We are obliged by lack of space to omit in this notice any direct discussion of the Rosminian view. Perhaps, indeed, the positive method of exposition, which we hope to pursue in our proposed article, will throw more light on these difficult questions, and leave our readers in that calm state of mind which is essential to a philosopher. Philosophy is contemplation, and contemplation, as we know, is peace. When we have learned the truth, we shall be able to detect some shadows of it, even in the subtle aberrations of the theory of Ideal Being, and we shall have avoided the risk of needless controversy. Meantime, we are anxious to see one point cleared up, as to which Rosmini is obscure and unsteady. The Ideal Being is an *object*, contemplated by the mind, yet not to be confounded with the realities of the sensible world. What then is this object? It has the properties of infinitude, immensity, and necessity, and that in the modern sense of those terms. Is it then God Himself? Or is it, as we are inclined to think, the Absolute of Hegel and the Germans? These are questions that call for definite and intelligible replies, which have not as yet been given.

Peace through the Truth: or Essays on Subjects connected with Dr. Pusey's Eirenicon. By Rev. F. Harper, S.J. Second Series, Part I. London: Burns, Oates & Co. 1874.

THE famous "catapult" discharged by Dr. Pusey is the occasion, at this distance of time, of another volume from F. Harper, marked with the seals of his solid learning and patient searching into the questions he discusses. The first volume appeared in 1866, dealing with Dr. Pusey's strange statements concerning the doctrines of the Eucharist, of the Immaculate Conception of our Blessed Lady, and of the unity of the Church. Now, we have a most careful and elaborate discussion of the statements made concerning the Papal power of dispensation with the impediments of matrimony; and the matter is so abundant, that the second volume is very nearly twice the size of the first.

F. Harper, in his Preface, reminds his readers that Dr. Pusey has not yet redeemed the promise he made of answering the first volume. The promise was made so long ago, that we may now fairly presume it never will be redeemed. Against this we have the advantage of Dr. Pusey's silence upon subjects, with which he is certainly not competent to deal, and in dealing with which he has made many mistakes. F. Harper says (Pref., x.), that he "was forced to point out, over and over again, the absence in Dr. Pusey of those qualifications which are absolutely indispensable for any one who takes upon himself to discuss grave questions of theology." That being so, and we cannot for a moment doubt it, it is quite conceivable that silence is a gain for all men. F. Harper further enumerates seventeen points—these, of course, are not all—upon which Dr. Pusey (who began the controversy) was bound to say whether he held his own opinion or yielded to his adversary. But there is no answer.

F. Harper begins his present Essay by stating the question raised by Dr. Pusey, and does so in that Doctor's words. He then simplifies and makes somewhat plainer the meaning of his opponent, so that every one may have a clear apprehension of the matter in dispute. Dr. Pusey has, it seems, asserted that Popes have contradicted each other in serious questions; and from that premiss, which is his own, comes to the conclusion that the sovereign Pontiff is not infallible when he speaks ex cathedrâ in deciding disputes in matters of conduct and belief.

F. Harper, in the present volume, deals with the first alleged contradiction: the declaration of one Pope that certain persons cannot marry certain persons without breaking the Divine Law, and a dispensation given to such persons by another Pope. Dr. Pusey considers the dispensation, on the part of the Pope who gave it, to be a direct contradiction of the Pope who said the marriage was unlawful. F. Harper has stated the question fairly and clearly; and then, having done so, proceeds to discuss the principles on which the question turns.

But as Dr. Pusey and he have no common principle, or, if they have, it is not held in the same sense by both, F. Harper is compelled to dig down to the very roots of the question, and explain what is meant by law, human and Divine, natural and positive, civil and ecclesiastical. The non-perception by Dr. Pusey of the distinctions made in the schools, has led him into many errors, and into the making of some assertions which, with better knowledge, one may reasonably hope he never would have made. Then, again, Dr. Pusey had to explain, or thought he had to explain, a system of law, with which he is not familiar, and which he cannot possibly understand, because it is not respected in the community to which he unhappily belongs. He knows what confusion an uninstructed layman falls into, when he speaks or writes on the subject with which he himself is familiar ; and he, in the same way, not being acquainted with the meaning of terms in a system of law which is not his own, has fallen into trouble. F. Harper has the advantage both of learning and experience, and the gain of training; all of which have been withheld from his adversary who, in entering on the controversy, had to study it and to learn it by his own unaided genius.

We pass over the earlier part of the work before us; but not without respect for the patience of the writer who, following Dr. Pusey into his favourite recesses of Patristic learning, overtakes him, and discovers the nothingness of the claims which his friends and admirers put forward on his behalf and on their own. The Fathers were Catholics, and their words can be understood only by those who know their language. Dr. Pusey knows Greek and he also knows Latin, but the Greek and the Latin are the Greek and the Latin of the heathens; whereas the Fathers, who used those languages, used them to convey to others that which was not known upon earth, when men spoke Greek and Latin in what is now called their purity, and when the words faith, hope, and charity, would have been unintelligible.

We, therefore, shall speak here only of that part of F. Harper's book, where he pursues Dr. Pusey into his fortified camp, built up out of canon law, but canon law strangely understood. F. Harper himself seems to admit that this is the more important portion of his work; though we should not like to forget that people will be very much instructed, especially in these days when we take our notions of law out of the first magazine or newspaper we may meet with, by the very clear and even profuse dissertations on law in general, and on the traditions of the Church. But as these portions may be regarded as prolegomena, and as the question is in fact about the acts or decisions of determinate Popes, it seems on the whole more useful, and more to the purpose, to turn to that part of the book in which he discusses the administration of the law.

Dr. Pusey has maintained that certain commandments concerning the marriage of Hebrews, recorded in the book Leviticus, are commandments of the Natural Law and, therefore, unchangeable. He says further, it seems, that one Pope, at least (Innocent III.), held the same opinion ;

and that another Pope dispensed with the observance of those commandments, and consequently set aside, in that case, the obligations of the Natural Law. That is the question which F. Harper meets; and for the solution of which he had to write dissertations upon law in general, and on the Mosaic law in particular. The very way in which heretics speak of the law of God and the law of men does but perpetuate certain delusions current among the better sort among them. F. Harper's book will, on this point, be of great service; for he has shown so clearly the obligations of law, and determined so accurately what law is binding. No doubt Dr. Pusey will be very much astonished at some of the statements; but they are statements made by every Catholic, and are the common teaching propagated throughout the Church. The question raised by Dr. Pusey, in days of selfwill and lawlessness, cannot but find a solution very different from that which he must himself desire. He, no doubt, sincerely believing that certain marriages are forbidden by the Divine Law and therefore not allowable among Christians, said so; but, unhappily, his zeal lacked the virtue of discernment. He did not understand the question, and he has made a most grievous mistake. Having made the mistake, he séems to have fallen in love with it. Probably he cherished it the more, because he thinks he can use it as a weapon against the Church. Be that as it may, that is the principal service which it renders to him. His principle seems to be this: certain marriages are forbidden by the Divine Law, which is indispensable, but Catholics are allowed to contract certain marriages so forbidden; and, that being so, Dr. Pusey proclaims to the world, either that the Pope treats the Divine Law with contempt, or that one Pope contradicts another, and that, therefore, the Pope is not infallible.

A question like this demands, in the first place, great learning on the part of the person who raises it, to say nothing of sobriety of mind and reverence for authority. That, in substance, is the question which F. Harper has been forced to discuss.

In the first place, the learned Father has to show what the Divine Law is; and, in doing so, has been forced to throw down the elaborate building raised by Dr. Pusey on the sands. The Oxford Doctor has confounded human with Divine law; now the Divine law, the obligation of which he seeks to enforce, is certainly a Divine law, but a Divine law not in force. The whole law of Moses was a Divine law, Divinely given, but it was not binding on heathens, nor is it binding on Christians now. Dr. Pusey seems to have treated the Divine law of marriage, given to the Jews, as a law of perpetual obligation, binding, in virtue of its first promulgation, on the consciences of men baptized.

F. Harper has taken great pains, and has been very patient in this. He has shown that the law given by Moses came to an end in the Passion of our Most Blessed Lord, and that it is not binding now; for Christians are under the new law of grace, not under the law given by Moses. Dr. Pusey, on the other hand, seems to have spoken as if certain portions of the old law were still in force, because it is a portion of the old law: forgetting that the obligation of any part of the old law, as such, was done

away with; or, that what is in force now, is in force, not because it was made known by Moses, but because it is a part of the law of nature, or re-enacted under the new dispensation. In clearing up the obscurities introduced by Dr. Pusey, F. Harper has been very elaborate, speaking very clearly, and enforcing very strongly the true doctrine, of which his adversary does not seem to have had any notion.

Persons outside the Church are hardly ever surprised at any assertion made concerning her discipline; possibly some may regard the strangeness of the assertion as no inconsiderable element in the proof of its truth. This is, in a few words, what Dr. Pusey maintains. F. Harper says, p. 351—

"Let us recall to mind, once more, what those assertions were. The Oxford Professor undertook to show by the constant voice of the Church for fifteen centuries, that the Levitical prohibitions, forbidding marriage within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, formed part of the Natural Law; were, consequently, eternal and unchanging; not subject, therefore, to dispensation by human authority: and that they continued to bind the consciences of Christians by virtue of their original Divine promulgation."

Now, a grave charge of this nature, brought against Saints and Doctors, against whole nations, among whom, surely, there must have been some men with conscience and adequate knowledge, has not startled Dr. Pusey in the least degree. In fact, it is he himself who says that the sovereign Pontiffs have been setting aside the Eternal Law whenever they had a mind to do so.

We shall not follow F. Harper into his discussion of the Eternal Law, in which he shows how Dr. Pusey does not understand the question. It is a long and laborious discussion; and some, probably, will be surprised to learn how few are the Divine prohibitions in the matter of marriage.

F. Harper is a theologian, and writes as it becomes the school to which he belongs; but the canonists will probably not be overpleased, at the way in which he treats them and their science. They are, however, accustomed to it for many generations; they have received what they think scanty justice from theologians; and they comfort themselves, occasionally, by retaliating on their foes who, they say, discuss questions they do not understand, and apply principles which they have not mastered.

They will, undoubtedly, object to one canon of interpretation laid down by F. Harper as follows—

"It is of great importance to the understanding of a decretal, that we should inspect it as it stands in the letter or record from which it is taken, if that be possible."

There can be no objection to an historical account of any decretal; but, if that historical account is to modify the strict decision, objections will be raised against the theory. The decretal stands by itself, and is law; it may now subserve, as it stands in the *Corpus Juris*, a purpose quite distinct from that for which the Bull containing it was issued. The Bull stands as it always stood; but a portion of it may be placed among the decretals, for the decision of a question not raised when the Bull was

published. The second volume of the *Corpus Juris* is law, as it stands, by the Act of the Pope Gregory IX. The decretals therein contained are the decretals of Gregory IX., who made them law in the form in which they are published, though he wrote but few of them himself. In the same way, the Clementines, canons decreed in the Council of Vienne, but subsequently changed and corrected by Clement V., are laws; yet, not because they were made in a general Council, or corrected by Pope Clement afterwards, but because John XXII. published them and gave them the force of law. F. Harper would have spared himself much labour, if he had forgotten for a moment that he was a theologian in his examination of *Litteras tuas* of Innocent III., p. 321. The Pope is not discussing doctrine, nor explaining the degrees of consanguinity; but he is deciding a question of law, or, to speak more intelligibly, a question of procedure; namely, whether a decree to be pronounced in a certain suit should be pronounced in one form rather than in another. The canonists have had their revenge upon the theologian here.

It is impossible to read F. Harper's work without a sense of the great pains and labour which he has inflicted upon himself. The patient study and the varied reading, and the industrious ordering of all the details of a most ungrateful task, are evident on the face of the book. Were it not for the end which the learned author has before him, we should certainly regret that he should be employed in the refutation of a forgotten pamphlet. But perhaps we should not look on his work in that light, but rather as a substantial treatise on certain subjects which it fully discusses; establishing principles and clearing away objections that might be lawfully raised; though, in this case, they are raised by one outside the Church, and are not always pertinent to the matter in dispute.

"Peter Auriol and Durand of S. Pourçain agree in considering all the degrees of consanguinity in the direct line—ascending or descending—to be included in the prohibition of the natural law; so that, as the former tells us, if Adam were to be alive now, that law would interdict him from marriage, since all the women on earth have sprung from his loins. One would have anticipated that the patent absurdity of the conclusion would have suggested a doubt as to the truth of the premises; yet, on the contrary, this strange proposition has found admirers among some few even of the post-Tridentine writers on moral theology" (p. 415-416).

That opinion about the second marriage of Adam is a very old and a very common one. F. Harper thinks it a patent absurdity; but we should not like to say that the great men who held it were not sufficiently acute to detect an absurdity, not to speak of a patent absurdity. The question can never be raised in a practical form, and so it may never be settled. F. Harper relies on the use he makes of the authority of S. Thomas for his ridicule of this opinion. It is true that S. Thomas is believed to confine the prohibitions of marriage, by the natural law, to that of father and daughter, mother and son. If so, then, by the law of nature alone, Adam might have married one of his grand-daughters,—much more,

if he were alive to-day, could he marry any one he pleased, so far as the law of nature is concerned.

As we have touched upon this question, we may as well say one word more. F. Harper says—

"Thus we find that Scotus agrees with S. Thomas and the seraphic Doctor in limiting the prohibition of the natural law to the first degree in the right line; and also, as it would seem, though his expressions are more vague, and the idea less consciously present to his mind, in the main reason assigned for such prohibition" (p. 409).

We once heard an inveterate Thomist declare that Scotus founded his theology upon the principle of contradiction of the theology of S. Thomas. If that be true, F. Harper must have made a mistake when he said that Scotus agrees with S. Thomas. But, as an Archbishop of Canterbury has also declared that the Dominicans and Franciscans were divided upon all questions that admitted of dispute—*in omnibus dubitabilibus*—we are not sorry, in defence of the Bishop, that we can find something to say against F. Harper's accuracy. S. Bonaventure held perhaps, with S. Thomas, that the prohibitions of the Natural Law went no further than the first degree; we will not dispute that, because it is probably the meaning of his words, though we find it difficult to think so ourselves. But as for Scotus, he certainly held even the opinion which F. Harper calls a patent absurdity; namely, that Adam could never have a second wife. The prohibition, he says, touches not only father and child, but the whole straight line: *non intelligitur tantum de patre proximo, sed de quocumque in linea recta, ita quod si Adam hodie viveret non posset ducere aliquam uxorem* (4 *Sext. dist.* 40, *qu. unica*). Cardinal Cajetan in his commentary on S. Thomas (2da 2[dæ] *qu.* 156, art. 9), agrees with F. Harper and says that this doctrine of Scotus is unreasonable. *Hoc enim absque ulla ratione dicit.* And the Cardinal was a Thomist.

F. Harper is entitled to his opinion, and we do not dispute it. But, while we thank him for his book, the value of which people will appreciate the more they read it—and it is not to be read in haste—we must blame him, and we do so most seriously; He ought to have given an Index to his book and has failed to do so.

The Troubles of Our Catholic Forefathers, related by Themselves. Second Series. Edited by JOHN MORRIS, Priest of the Society of Jesus. Burns & Oates, 1875.

AMONG our other and far more weighty obligations to F. Morris, we are delighted to acknowledge, in his Preface to this second series of a great work, an excellent retort courteous to the "Pall Mall Gazette." In reviewing his former volume, that very able authority carped at his want of a sense of humour in publishing a certain wonderful story relative to Mrs. Tregian, to which F. Morris thus replies:—

"I am fain to confess that the same deficiency has accompanied me while compiling the present volume. The old writers, whose words I print, have told various stories which seem to me extremely droll; but I plead guilty to the accusation that I have not seen the fun of omitting them. . . . I have not felt myself obliged to suppress anecdotes, which though gravely told long ago, now raise a smile in the perusal. To strike out such stories as those of the devils swimming like fishes beneath a man's skin, or Mrs. Bellamy's wonderful plant, or the Glastonbury Mouth of Purgatory . . . may be a method of showing a 'sense of humour,' but it would be a poor way of bringing back the records of a bygone time. Our gratitude to our Catholic forefathers for the precious inheritance they have bequeathed to us is not the less serious and deep because we are now and then amused by their quaint tales, and certainly we do not regard them as less trustworthy witnesses to the historical events they relate, because they reflect with accuracy the feelings of their own time."

And we must confess also that if anything could add to our confidence in F. Morris's conscientious exactness as a chronicler, these words would go far to increase our trust. The present volume is of greater interest, in our eyes, from its containing only the sum of two, and not many lives; that of the saintly Jesuit, F. Weston (d. 1615); the other the well-contrasted narrative of Anthony Tyrrell's fall. Both were missionaries during the hottest contests for religion in Elizabeth's reign, and, as F. Morris justly observes, our knowledge of what our forefathers suffered would be most incomplete if we did not set before us the vivid pictures of the influences brought to bear by the Government upon such Catholics as were weak both in faith and character. F. Weston was a friend of F. Campion, both at Oxford and Douay, and he tried to induce F. Weston to accompany him to Rome, when he went to offer himself to the Society of Jesus in 1572. F. Weston did not join the Society till later, but while on the English mission he took the name of Edmonds, out of reverence for his martyred friend. At Seville F. Weston was known as "Holy Father William." One of the many instructive chapters of his career is that headed "Life in the Clink," in which public prison, among many priests and gentlemen, he found a poor Catholic, who had a wife and two children, shut up as a priest. Even in the Clink, however, the priests were able to secure vestments, chalices, and everything needful for celebrating mass, which they kept concealed under loose bricks, hearthstones, &c.; and on the Christmas Eve (1587) F. Weston was visited by all the Catholic prisoners, heard their confessions, celebrated three masses, and gave communion to the whole band. To achieve this a way was found of drawing back the locks and replacing them afterwards. According to the method pursued in our own time by Mr. Gladstone and others, F. Weston was incessantly examined upon what he should do and what he should teach in certain cases which had never happened. Which side he should take as to the Spanish fleet, what he should uphold as the duty of others; with, he says, "various forms of speech and inventions of possible contingencies, which, though of course they sometimes happen, may very possibly not happen at all; and upon the ground of an hypothesis . . . they would have turned my words into a crime, just as if the facts themselves had existed."

After his imprisonment in the Clink, and an interlude, F. Weston was shut up in Wisbech Castle, and during the last five years there, organized, with his companions, a kind of College life, of which the account is very interesting. From Wisbech Castle F. Weston was sent to the Tower, but after seventeen years' imprisonment he was at last denied the martyr's palm. Elizabeth went to her own place, and James I. being proclaimed king, set the imprisoned Catholics free (1603), though even then, those who refused to "conform" were driven into exile. A crowd of persons assembled on the Tower quay to see F. Weston embark; for, of course, he instantly prepared to leave the country which he had so lovingly and faithfully served.

"The Catholics made no secret of their veneration. They fell on their knees about him, kissed his hands and begged his blessing, feeling sure, like those of Ephesus when St. Paul left them, that they should see his face no more. God, who often shows his acceptance of a generous will by the sacrifice of the very proffered service itself, and the substitution of a cross to be borne in union with the Prince of Pastors, had allowed F. Weston to be actively engaged in behalf of the souls for whom he risked his life, for two years only at liberty of the nineteen that he had spent in England. The coveted palm of martyrdom was not bestowed, and Father Weston must now go into exile, after a missionary career that the world would regard as a failure, but which was as acceptable to God as if the good-will had been crowned by the most brilliant success" (p. 278).

The royal pursuivants did not relax their hold upon the formidable company of four feeble priests until they had seen them safely stowed at Calais; whence F. Weston, "almost blind, half broken down, prematurely old," and not able to keep his attention fixed upon more than three or four lines of a letter at a time, went on to St. Omer's and Rome, and there actually so far recovered his health as to be set to work again in Spain. He laboured successfully for nine years at Seville, when he was appointed rector of the English College at Valladolid, where he died soon afterwards. When he was told that his hour was come, the saintly confessor replied, "*Lætatus sum in his quæ dicta sunt mihi, in domum Domini ibimus.*" F. Weston's skull is kept as a pious relic at the Jesuit Noviciate at Roehampton, and certainly no better memorial could be set before the novices of the way to live and die. The portrait given of F. Weston is copied from that at Sant' Andrea at Rome, by Mr. Charles Weld.

In the second not less valuable part of the book, F. Morris has this excellent passage. He quotes from Froude's "History":—

"'It was towards the close of the Pontificate of Gregory XIII. . . . that two young English Jesuits, Anthony Tyrrell, who tells the story, and Foscue or Fortescue, better known as Ballard, and concerned afterwards in the Babington conspiracy, set out upon a journey to Rome upon a noticeable errand.' . . . To readers who are accustomed to Mr. Froude's habitual inaccuracy in the statement of facts, it is hardly needful to say that they must not think, because Mr. Froude thinks well to say so, either that Tyrrell was ever in the Tower, or that he or Ballard were Jesuits. The one is as false as the other, and it is not less false that Gregory XIII. approved of a proposal for the assassination of Queen Elizabeth."

The unfortunate Anthony, whose lapses are here commemorated with much instruction for our use, claimed to be a descendant of Sir Walter Tyrrell, who "unaware hit King William Rufus in the breast, that he fell down dead and never spake word." He was made priest about 1579-80, and was a student of theology at the English college in Rome, and for some time suffered imprisonment bravely, and laboured as a true missionary for the faith. But, in the end, his courage altogether failed him, and he yielded to the stress of punishment and the representations of the Queen's officials, and bore false witness against many Catholics, among them the Pope, then Gregory XIII. In his various recantations Tyrrell gives a list of all the people he had aspersed, the Pope being at the head of the list of foreign Catholics. His extraordinary sermon or address, which he began at St. Paul's Cross, and was not allowed to finish, because, like Balaam, having come to curse the Church, he uttered upon it a fervent blessing, is given entire, just as he threw the copies of it among the crowd. After acknowledging himself four times a Catholic and three times a Protestant, this most unfortunate man was induced to retire to the Low Countries, where his name in a list of apostates is endorsed, *Mortuus est pœnitens.*

A Catechism of Christian Doctrine arranged according to the Order of Ideas. By Antonio Rosmini Serbati, D.D. Translated from the Italian. London: Burns & Oates.

We cannot be expected, on occasion of a small volume like this, to enter on the question—a most important and many-sided one—which is the best order and method whereby to imbue the youthful mind with Christian doctrine. We suppose all will agree however, that some very short catechism—such as that now in use among English Catholics—should be at starting firmly imprinted on the memory, even though at first it be but very partially understood; in order that it may serve as a nucleus, round which religious knowledge shall be gathered in proportion as it is acquired. Yet we wish Rosmini had explained in what precise relation he intended his own catechism to stand, as regards such elementary manuals; and certainly his translator's preface (p. xiv.) speaks, according to the more obvious sense of his words, as though no such elementary manual were desirable. The question we have raised must surely in practice be a very important one, and we regret that it is here ignored.

The general *matter* of Rosmini's Catechism, (as distinct from this question of order and arrangement) seems to us admirable; and likely to confer great benefit on large numbers, even of those who are not exactly "in statu pupillari." We hardly know, where so much is excellent, how to choose one passage for eulogy in preference to another. It will be more

practically serviceable perhaps, though much less gracious, if we mention the few particulars, to which we think, under correction, that exception may be justly taken.

At p. 11 (q. 70) the wording is as though God did not impose on Adam and Eve at their creation the Natural Law—so far as that Law was applicable to their situation,—but only the positive command about the forbidden fruit. Doubtless at p. 8 (q. 47) the true doctrine had been partially implied : but it is only at p. 11 that God is spoken of as their "Lawgiver" ; and here it is that we specially regret the omission which we have named.

In pp. 12, 13 we think that Rosmini has said either too much or too little, on the circumstances of the Fall. This fact seems to have originated in Rosmini's plan, mentioned in the Translator's Preface (p. xv.), of introducing various "Biblical narratives." Whether this be generally a desirable feature, we will not here inquire ; but in the passage to which we refer, a Biblical narrative is put forth at length, of which we should say, that without commentary the said narrative will be but very partially intelligible to the young, while at the same time no commentary is supplied.

In p. 21 Rosmini says virtually, that the Jewish moral law as such remained in force, after the judicial and ceremonial laws were abolished. Of course the *Natural Law* is immutable in its general principles ; and would bind, whether it had or had not been specially promulgated to the Jews. But we strongly agree with an opinion expressed by F. Harper in his recent work ; viz. that much evil may result on occasion, if it be supposed that any part whatever of the Jewish law *as such* remains of obligation.*

It may be said indeed, that the authorized "Catechism of Christian Doctrine" fails to draw the distinction which we are urging. But neither does it state the opposite doctrine ; nor, consistently with the brevity which is its principle, could it enter upon the subject. Rosmini, on the contrary (p. 21, q. 122), in answer to the question, "*How many* commandments of the *Law of God* are there?" answers "There are ten." And he says (q. 121) that "the moral law, which was given by God *to the Hebrews*, has *still* to be obeyed by all mankind." Surely the obvious sense of these words is, that God's moral law demands obedience *because* it was promulgated to the Hebrews and has not been repeated. And these passages, we think, give additional importance to our former remark, that when God is spoken of as Adam's "Lawgiver," the words used by Rosmini sound as though God did not, as Lawgiver, impose on Adam the Natural Law.

In p. 49 (q. 271) words are used which may be understood as meaning, that a *rapid* recitation of the Lord's Prayer, accompanied with only

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* "Probabilius censeo Christianos non obligari, ex vi legis Moysi, ad præcepta Decalogi et moralia ejusdem legis."—Suarez, "De Legibus," l. 9, cap. xi., n. 22.

a *general* sense of its meaning, would never obtain graces from God. This seems to us at variance with the recognized practice of the Church, but we are not clear whether Rosmini intended to say it.

In p. 94 (q. 100) it is said that the contrition required for absolution must in such sense be "greater than any other sorrow," that "the sinner grieves more for having violated the Law of God than he would for losing the whole world." It seems to us, that to leave such a statement without further explanation, must engender innumerable and most calamitous scruples in those who study the Catechism. There is no question in all Christian doctrine, we would submit, which needs more careful, detailed, and well-balanced explanation, with the view of avoiding either extreme, —than that which concerns the duty of detesting mortal sin "super omnia"; and Rosmini was no doubt capable of throwing much light on it, had he made the attempt.

We trust that the very fact of our putting forth these individual criticisms will show how much we admire the volume as a whole.

Remarks on a Late Assailant of the Society of Jesus.
London: Burns & Oates.

THIS truly admirable work belongs to a class, of which it is difficult at first sight to see the utility. Catholics do not need them, and it is found by calamitous experience that Protestants will not read them. Yet in fact they have a most important place of their own. When the Protestant inquirer has come to see the utter insufficiency of his own religion, and at the same time the immense primâ facie cogency of the Church's notes,—he is often still haunted by individual objections. These objections, even if unsolved, very probably would not prevent him from fulfilling his vocation in due time; still their solution at all events greatly promotes his peace of mind. Under these circumstances, he would eagerly devour such a volume as the present.

In fact almost two-thirds of it (pp. 31–80) are occupied with accusations, which have no more force against Jesuits than against other Catholic theologians. These accusations—the accusations namely which are brought against Catholic teaching on "mental reservation," or which allege that Catholics regard "the end" as "justifying the means," or a thousand other such—rouse up in the ordinary Protestant an excitement of feeling, which almost precludes the possibility of calm examination; and they require to be dealt with, not only with knowledge and accuracy, but with great delicacy of touch. We have nowhere seen them (to our mind) more successfully encountered than in this volume.

We are greatly amused by the recital (p. 50) of Dean Howson's statement, that he felt obliged at Bonn, for practical purposes, to "the temporary use of language *admitting of various shades of meaning*." In plain

English, the Dean equivocated, for the sake of what he considered a pious end.

We may add, that for our own part we agree with the present writer (p. 51) in his preference for that solution of the "mental reservation" difficulty which was given by Scotus, over that given by S. Augustine and S. Thomas.

De Romani Pontificis, in ferendâ infra hæresim censurâ, infallibili judicio. Dissertatio Inauguralis quam conscripsit JOHANNES VERMEULEN. Trajecti ad Rhenum: Weller.

WE have often mentioned, on the authority of Cardinal Manning and others, that the Vatican Definition on the "subject" of infallibility, was to have been supplemented in the following year by one on the "object," sphere, extension, of that prerogative. It was by no means the least of the calamities inflicted by the Gallo-Prussian war, that this intention was for the moment frustrated. We are delighted therefore with everything which indicates, that theologians are giving their mind to the matter.

The question is a large one; and the present Essay deals with what is by far its easiest point. We can warmly commend it however; and we are rejoiced to find from it, that F. Knox's now classical volume on infallibility—so often praised in our pages—has been translated into German as well as Italian.

We must return to the Essay in our next number; as the author expresses some difference from Dr. Ward, mentioning the latter writer by name, on the deference due to those doctrinal decisions of a Pontifical Congregation, which are not issued in the Pope's name. We shall be able to show that the author importantly misunderstands what Dr. Ward has said.

The Story of a Soul. By Mrs. AUGUSTUS CRAVEN. Translated by Miss EMILY BOWLES.

THAT large section of the reading public which is familiar with Mrs. Craven's works, whether in their original tongue or in the beautiful English dress with which Miss Bowles has invested them, will hail with pleasure the appearance of a new story by the same hands.

In many respects "The Story of a Soul" is inferior to none of its predecessors; indeed, in the delicacy and subtlety of the introspection, the artistic treatment, the perfection of finish, it may possibly surpass them. The interest of the story is centred, as its name indicates, on the workings of the inner life of the heroine under unaccustomed and stormy existence; it is easy to see how congenial is such a subject to the curiously subtle and

introspective mind of the authoress, and with how loving a pen she traces every light and shadow, every spiritual and moral progression and retrogression, every variation in short in the soul's barometer. The analytical bent of Mrs. Craven's genius suggests a comparison between her writings and those of an English poet, with whom in other respects she has but little in common. We refer to Mr. Coventry Patmore; and those who are familiar with the "Angel in the House" will find no difficulty in tracing the resemblance we notice between that psychological analysis of wedded love, from the dawn of betrothal to the mysterious night of parting and of death, and the more spiritual and religious, but not less microscopic observation which Mrs. Craven bestows on the innermost feelings and motives of her heroines. We are sometimes inclined to shrink from such complete setting open of the secret chambers of the soul; but with Mrs. Craven this feeling is much allayed by the womanly delicacy of the manipulation and the lightness of touch which can probe thus deeply, and yet not wound even our insular reserve and timidity in matters of feeling.

The plot of "The Story of a Soul" is not a very original or complicated one, although the book keeps its hold upon our interest from the first page to the last. The story is thrown into an autobiographical shape, and though we object to this form of narrative where the interest depends on the plot or on the minute working out of various incidents and characters, it is well adapted to so personal and individual a claim as is urged on us by Ginevra, the "lovely, golden-haired Sicilian." It would indeed be difficult to imagine a heroine more calculated to rivet the attention and secure the sympathy of the reader. She comes before us in her early girlhood—her last day of childhood, in fact—for the death of her dearly-loved mother that very evening, hastened as she feels it to have been by her girlish imprudence and impulsive disregard of the conventional rules of propriety, more stringently binding, perhaps, upon maidens of the higher classes in Southern Italy than in any other part of the civilized world, brings out in her all the latent but terrible capacities of suffering which her happy childhood had hitherto left dormant. We can trace the process of the upbreaking of her soul through its thin crust of vanity and love of admiration through the dreary months of her father's suspicious watchfulness and her penitential seclusion; a process quickened and intensified by her brother Mario's stern revelations, for the poor little carnation thrown in innocent folly from a balcony has produced a crop of strife and bloodshed such as we, in our calm and unimpassioned North, should deem not alone sinful, but immoderate and unwarranted.

The days of Ginevra's solitude and mourning close with her brilliant marriage to Lorenzo, Duke of Valenzano—wealthy noble, enthusiastic artist, travelled man of letters, devoted lover, but lacking those principles of faith and of practical religion without which "a man's stainless honour is a feeble warrant of faithfulness." A brief period of sunshine falls to her lot, undimmed save for that cloud which sooner or later must fall upon the life of every believing wife linked to a husband who does not share her belief, of seeing that the happiness which makes her aspire to their closer

union in praise and thanksgiving to God finds in him no higher expression than a more and more earthly love for herself; that misreading of the "Beatrice in suso, ed io in lei guardava," which, to a sensitive and highly-wrought nature like Ginevra's would be so exquisitely painful, not alone from the sense of religious separation, but from the failure it denotes of comprehending or sympathizing with the finest and most precious parts of her individuality.

It is with Ginevra's married life that the greater part of the book is occupied, and we will leave it to tell its own story of anxiety, disappointment, and suffering; of a faithless husband and of a young wife neglected and insulted, sighting a precipice from which she is reserved in time to make the moment of danger one of the most complete and lasting victory; and of the mingled happiness and sorrow which steep the close of "The Story of a Soul" in a soft twilight glow—half the grace of the departed day, half the harbinger of that which is to arise.

Though the chief thought and labour of the authoress has necessarily been given to the portrayal of Ginevra, yet the book abounds in subordinate characters, all filled in with great delicacy and finish. Ginevra's half-sister, Livia, is one of those types of high spiritual perfection which Mrs. Craven is so fond of placing near her more earthbound heroines, as though to point the contrast between the eager, passionate life, dependent (even when striving most to serve God and be united with Him) on human affections and cares for its happiness and well-being, and the calm, hidden lives of those who have given up all the hopes and joys—and with them many of the sorrows—of earth, and who appear to be already raised above them. In many respects Livia recalls to us the Mother Magdalen of "Fleurange"; but a deeper interest attaches to her than to that beautiful and noble nun from the terrible and peculiar trial which is laid upon her, and of which we are allowed a glimpse. She is not lovely or particularly winning, and, owing to the superstition of her countrymen, who credit her with that fatal gift of Southern Italy, the "Evil Eye," she is condemned, though overflowing with love and sympathy which she yearns to give and to receive from those around her, to live as it were apart and alienated from all. We cannot sufficiently praise the manner in which this part ot the story is treated, and the few slight but sympathetic touches which reveal the blighting of the poor girl's life when even her devoted and self-sacrificing love for her young sister is supposed by those about her to turn to Ginevra's harm and injury. Later on, when the wrench is over, the sacrifice consummated, Livia is permitted—thanks to that glorious and divine compensation which sometimes forestalls Heaven to those who are most heavily laden amongst the bearers of earth's burdens—to be all and to do all that she has ever dreamt of being to and doing for Ginevra; and the scenes between the two sisters in the Neapolitan convent, when the nun's fierce yet tender touch tears away the veil which trouble and wounded feeling have begun to spread before the eyes of the sorely-tried wife, are amongst the finest in the book.

Mario, the half-brother, with his high sense of justice and honour, and his real goodness of heart, obscured by sternness and jealous bitterness, is an

interesting character; and the affected, impertinent, frivolous, but really devoted and unselfish friend, Lando Lundi, no less than Ginevra's aunt, Donna Clelia, with her social aspirations, her uncouth worldliness, and her good-natured "tall girls," whom Lundi so amusingly takes in hand, and ends by selecting a wife from, very pleasantly relieve what might be, perhaps, otherwise, considered the over-seriousness of the story.

The sketches of the de Kergy family, though but lightly touched, are quite delightful, and make us long to have more of them. We have no doubt that the relations between Diana and her mother are the true and natural ones between mothers and daughters in the best and most cultivated class of French society; and we turn to them in their easy, fresh confidence and affection, their community of feeling in all matters of interest, whether great or small, with a feeling of keen pleasure from the ordinary types of school-bred girls, either insipidly ignorant and frivolous or demurely precocious and self-conscious, who with mothers to correspond, of repressive sternness or of worldly neglect of their daughters' interest and happiness, form so large a proportion of the characters in French stories. Gladly too do we turn to Gilbert de Kergy as a relief from the usual run of profligate or, at best, sentimental heroes, and, in spite of his hours of weakness and of dallying with temptation, read his true greatness of soul and his honour—not "rooted in dishonour," or founded like Lorenzo's on the mere caprice or the good impulse of the moment, but on the eternal, unchanging basis of faithfulness to God, to conscience, and to fellow men. We feel very glad that Gilbert is made happy at last by the sweet and lovely Countess Stella, whose devotion to Ginevra and gentle patience under her own sorrows are very charming and endearing.

We wish we could stop here, for it is an ungracious and ungrateful ask to criticise what has given us, and will we are sure give to others, such pleasure as the "Story of a Soul" has afforded us; but we feel constrained to express the strong opinion we hold that Mrs. Craven has been mistaken in her choice of a subject. Why should the delineator of "Fleurange"—that fragrant "angel-flower," so pure and spiritual, and yet so thorough a woman, and conveying so deep and much-needed a lesson—have here trenched upon ground which we would so gladly see abandoned to quite another class of writers? It must not be imagined for a moment that there is to be found throughout the book a single idea or expression that is not delicately pure and refined; but Mrs. Craven's readers, whether Catholic or Protestant, are certainly not of a class to require the morbid excitement of the French novel, nor do they require to have the same kind of subject treated in a religious spirit: the mere attempt to do so must, we think, end more or less in failure, even from a literary point of view, and we feel too great a reverence for the lofty talent and noble character of the authoress not to wish her to remain always in the high and pure atmosphere which is native to her, and to which she is so entirely congenial, leaving to more earthy minds and pens the duty (if it be one) of depicting and analyzing such trials and conflicts as Ginevra's married life imposes upon her.

It would be difficult to speak too highly of the merits of the "Story of a Soul" as a translation. As in her previous renderings of Mrs. Craven's French works Miss Bowles has succeeded in overcoming the difficulties of a peculiarly idiomatic style and choice of words, and (the highest praise which a translator can aspire to) in making her work thoroughly readable and pleasant to many who are masters of the French language, and who will not usually read a translation. She has done more than this, for with rare skill she has succeeded in transferring to her pages the real Italian spirit and atmosphere of the story, without departing from the translator's accuracy, and those who know how uncommon a gift is that power of rendering atmospheric effect, even when unhampered by the necessity of adhering to the words of another, will fully appreciate Miss Bowles's success, and the freshness and individuality which are the result of it. May we venture to express a hope that when next Miss Bowles's name appears on the title-page of a work of fiction, it will not be merely as an interpretor, but as giving us, as she has done in "In the Comarque," all the fullness and richness of her own thoughts clothed in her own original and poetic words.

English Men of Science: their Nature and Nurture. By THEODORE GALTON, F.R.S., Author of "Hereditary Genius," &c. London Macmillan & Co. 1874.

THIS very curious book professes to be a natural history of men of science. It is founded on the results of answers made to a long string of queries which the author circulated among about a hundred individuals of that class who have attained a position before the public,—such as Fellows of the Royal Society, presidents of sections of the British Association, professors in some college or university of importance. These queries were of a most exhaustive and searching description, including their parentage, kinsfolk, religion, politics, originality or eccentricity of character, hereditary peculiarities, special talents, measurement inside the rims of their hats, energy of body and mind, if remarkable, early education—its merits and demerits, year of marriage, wife's maiden name, and any facts of peculiar interest in wife's family. We merely select a very few of the questions, which fill four octavo pages. Mr. Galton's correspondents seem generally to have answered his queries with great simplicity and good-nature, and he has largely quoted from their replies, carefully omitting names and clue to the individuality of the writers. We do not propose an analysis of the work, but shall principally call attention to two points: (1) the conclusions the author arrives at with regard to the religious bias of men of science, and (2) the views on education which he states in his summary at the end. It appears that out of ten scientific men seven call themselves members of the established Church of England, Scotland, or of the disestablished Church of Ireland, and three to one or more of the following "sects," named in order of their representation.

1. None whatever [if that can be called a sect]; 2. Established Church, with qualification; 3. Unitarian; 4. Nonconformist; 5. Wesleyan; 6. Catholic; 7. Bible-Christian. But their religious feeling requires explanations. Mr. Galton, as a man of logical mind, perceives it necessary to state exactly what he means by "religious bias." He says it comprises three things:—

"1. Great prevalence of the intuitive sentiments . . . the intuitive sense of a supreme God, who communes with our hearts and directs us. 2. A sense of extreme sin and weakness . . . 3. Revelation of a future life and other matters, variously interpreted by different sects."

He is led by his inquiries to conclude that religion, in the third aspect thus set forth, is not actively accepted by many of his correspondents who describe themselves as religiously inclined; nor again, that the second element he mentions represents the views of many of them. If religious bias be taken in the first acceptation, there may be two or more out of every ten scientific men who have it; but of this minority he cannot certainly say how many are religious in the sense of all three paragraphs. We are not surprised at these results, which a very moderate acquaintance with scientific literature would have led outsiders to anticipate. But the case is even worse, viewing it as Catholics, than Mr. Galton puts it. In his mind evidently the predominant idea as to religion is, that it is *sentiment.* If the predominant idea be a *creed,*—that is, if his third element be greatly intensified and placed first instead of last,—the proportion of religious men among the devotees of science which he fixes will probably be considerably reduced. This surely proves a frightful state of things, when we reflect that this evil can only go on with accelerated rapidity, since religion is more and more lessening its hold upon education, even such hold as it had in the years when the men of science now conspicuous received their early training.

Mr. Galton registers his results with such calmness, that for the greater part of the book his own feelings hardly appear; but at the end he congratulates the world on the manner in which the gigantic monopoly which, in education, as managed by the [Protestant] clergy, curbed the inquiring spirit and the pursuit of inductive studies, and gave all reward to mere classics and mathematics, is yielding to the efforts of educational reformers; and his ideal future presents a "scientific priesthood" to the nation,—a sort of new profession of men of science, provided for by sanitary and statistical business, and devoting themselves to "the health and well-being of the nation in its broadest sense." In other words, the body is to take the place of the mind, understanding the latter word in its loftiest sense. It was a curious feature of the decline, or rather the feculent corruption, of the Roman empire, that at no period did the study of bodily health assume a more prominent place, as a glance at its literature, and even its material remains, shows. And, on the other hand, science itself, by a slow but sure process, went to ruin in the same period. So it will be with modern Europe, if the infidelity now in progress be not arrested. The undue growth of a part of the human mind is no healthy development,

and what seem to be its gains,—the stupendous discoveries of the present day,—may fall out of the grasp of generations whose decay is being prepared by the very men who have been the agents in achieving these wonders.

Horæ Hellenicæ: Essays and Discussions on some important points of Greek Philology and Antiquity. By John Stuart Blackie, F.R.S.E., &c., Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

THIS is a collection of essays that have already appeared in various learned periodicals, on questions of Greek philology interesting to all who have scholarly tastes. The readers of Grote, Max Müller, Gladstone, and others of that class, will probably welcome in a permanent form these kindred investigations. It is always somewhat difficult to write a notice of a volume of scattered treatises on subjects each of which well deserves an article; yet we shall endeavour to give at least a short table of contents, and an estimate of their general drift and value. The essays seem to fall under about three classes:—(1.) The religious and mythological aspects of the early literature of Greece—viz., the Homeric "theology"; the Prometheus Bound of Æschylus; the interpretation of the old Greek myths. (2.) The history of philosophy and history proper; the pre-Socratic philosophy, the Greek Sophists, the agrarian laws of Lycurgus. (3.) Linguistic in general, onomatopœia, the modern Greek language, and popular poetry; accent in languages and the nature of the English hexameter. It is perhaps a little characteristic of the Scottish Professor that he has not *sorted* his essays, but thrown them into the volume pretty much as they came. They show throughout a genial spirit, a mind thoroughly fond of its special work, and consequently, we imagine, a capacity of imparting interest in it to those outsiders whose ears still ring a little with what Clough calls, with perhaps a happy confusion of metaphor—unless he meant it for slang—

"The musical chaff of old Hellas."

The author himself says, in his preface, that his essays are "the product of hard reading and hard thinking." He has written on subjects of this kind since the year 1839, and has evidently kept himself up with the advance of the times, or rather, contributed diligently towards it. The essay on accent furnishes a useful *résumé* of the question of the pronunciation of the Greek language as regards the conflict of accent and quantity. It is easy to give the unclassical reader some idea of the difficulty of the question. The Greek accents are registered by a system of notation introduced by Aristophanes of Byzantium, B.C. 250, and his marks exactly correspond to the accents used this day in every corner of Greece; but, on the other hand, if we follow that notation alone as our guide in reading Greek, all the music of the language in poetry at once disappears. Accent says

ánthropos, but quantity demands that the second syllable be long; and how are we to combine the two? Professor Blackie accuses all who cannot of want of ear. He ingeniously cites the English word *lándholder* to show it is possible to pronounce such a word as *ánthropos*, and yet keep the second syllable long. Matthiæ long since, by printing the word with musical notes, showed the same thing. We doubt, however, the prudence of attempting, as Professor Blackie would desire, the introduction of an accentual pronunciation of Greek into English schools. In the first place, it must necessarily be arbitrary. Were we simply to take the modern Greek system, that would be perfectly intelligible and consistent; but then it is admitted, even by Professor Blackie, that the modern Greeks have sacrificed quantity; therefore we cannot take their system as it stands; and any other system can only be what the individual teacher or teachers think right, that is, in many instances, quite certainly wrong. The present writer recollects once hearing a Frenchman who had taught himself English by a certain system (probably as good as any system can be which exhibits pronunciation merely to the eye) read a few lines of English, the effect was the most indescribably ludicrous thing that it is possible to conceive; and it is not too much to suppose that our accentual quantity in reading Greek would have seemed considerably more ludicrous to an ancient Greek. Because, in the case we have related, the worthy and industrious French scholar was aided by a most elaborate and complete representation of English pronunciation for French eyes. Now the Greek accents merely mark the stress on a certain syllable, and give no key, good or bad, to help the "*Anglicum* abhorrens ab *Græcorum* nominum pronuntiatione os" (to apply Livy's lively description of the mistake into which Hannibal led his unfortunate guide in the attempted march to Casinum). Take accent alone, and we will not say you will do wrong. The first Greek who greets you at Athens with *kalè 'spêra* will afford you that assistance which nothing ever can but the voice of a living tongue. Take quantity alone, and the language of Homer, though dead, still retains a loveliness in death, a sweetness and melody which is perhaps not to be found in any language still floating on the lips of mankind. But the same poetry, if accent be introduced, will, in most readers' mouths, become utterly inharmonious, and the learner also runs the great risk of losing his perception of quantity in prose, a risk which, as we have seen, has operated with fatal effects on modern Greek, and of which it is too late in the day to check the recurrence. At the same time, the study of the accents will never be omitted by a scholar who wishes to be a sound one. This study always *tends* to realize itself in the pronunciation, which in a great number of words may be hit without sacrifice of harmony.

The chapter on "the Philological character of the modern Greek language" contains much curious information on that subject. Professor Blackie shows that very many of the changes from ancient Greek exhibited by Neo-Hellenic are not corruptions, but developments, either ancient words in new acceptations, or the efflorescence of a very genuine power of growth shown in the variety of terminations of substantives and verbs, which constitutes so marked a feature of the present language. We are

not sure that we should go with him in the praise he implies of the process of restoration that has been going on under the auspices of modern Greek scholars since the establishment of the modern Greek monarchy. When the modern Greeks for centuries spoke a language they artlessly called Romaic, it had at least the charm of not pretending to be other than what it was—a strange, barbarized jargon, witnessing to various influences, Turkish, Venetian, Albanian, and what not. Now, a modern Greek newspaper reads too often like a school-boy's literal translation of an exercise by the help of his dictionary. Thus, to take the first phrase that occurs to our memory, "a tragic scene" is *tragikè skēnc.* It seems to show the same contrast to ancient Greek that a modern Athenian in Parisian costume does to his old-fashioned fellow-citizen in braided jacket and snow-white kilt. All these attempts happily, however, do not succeed in removing the characteristics of which Professor Blackie has adduced so many and such valuable examples, illustrative of various laws in the history of human speech generally, as well as of Neo-Hellenic in particular. Several specimens for instance show how *slang* makes its way into lexical diction. For example, *kyrios* (ancient Greek for "a master") is now used for "father," just as we may imagine, in the course of centuries, "governor" effecting a similar displacement in English. *Basileúo* (to reign) now signifies "to set," as the sun. Some poetic mind had gazed on the glories of a Greek sun-setting:—

> More lovely now, ere yet his race is run,
> Sinks o'er Morea's cliffs the setting sun.

And the idea suggested itself that those bright beams seemed like the crown of the monarch of day. "He is reigning in his glory," such a poet might have said, and the expression was caught up by kindred minds, and gradually accepted by the people. *Meteōrisma* (floating in the air) is the modern Greek word for "an amusing tale." *Tachý* (swift) is now used to signify "the morning." We will not stay to expand this last notion; but will remark the curious parallel of the epithet given by Homer to night—*thoê*, also "swift." Perhaps the explanation of both will be found in the rapidity of the appearance and disappearance of the light of day as we approach the tropics.

On the subject of the Homeric theology, we find, as may easily be anticipated, a great deal of ingenious discussion, backed by solid knowledge of Homer. But it is right to say, which might also be expected, that the author writes like a professor in a Scotch Protestant university, and occasionally says things that give one an idea of the danger of sending Catholic youth to study even mere literature in non-Catholic places of education. For example (p. 44), he speaks of a "far-reaching, closely-banded corporation of priests, fencing society round with a bristling rampart of artificial orthodoxy such as exists now in many parts of Christendom." Again (p. 45), Homer "has not the remotest conception that the Divine Spirit, like the electric fluid, has any exclusive preference to being conducted through a sacerdotal channel." Of course essays like these represent lectures; and the effect of such lectures upon unformed minds, eagerly

listening to the ideas of a teacher whose command of his subject, and desire to do it and them justice they would justly admire, may easily be conjectured.

Professor Blackie holds that there is nothing to show any marked distinction between the Iliad and the Odyssey as to religious conception, and accounts for certain traits coming out more prominently in the former, from the different nature of the subject treated. Yet it is curious to observe, that in his string of passages to prove the reference of the events of life in the Homeric writings to the Divine Providence, out of eighteen passages quoted, thirteen are from the *Odyssey*, and only five from the *Iliad* (pp. 10, 11). He brings out with considerable clearness the view, that in the Homeric system universal agency in events, evil as well as good, is attributed to the gods; and that consequently that system allowed, so to speak, no place to the idea of a devil. Mr. Gladstone, in his *Studies on Homer* (vol. ii. p. 159), endeavours to trace in the Homeric *Ate* the tradition of the Evil One as Tempter. It appears to us Professor Blackie's view—though we object to his manner of expressing himself—is in the main the truer one. Ate, he thinks, might have been worked out as the Siva of the Hindus, but "makes not the most distant approach to the Christian idea of the devil" (p. 20). In fact, if nature, with the early Greeks, was co-extensive with Divinity, and with the universe of thought and matter, there was no room left, strictly speaking, for the notion of sin. On the subject of the Thracian Lycurgus and his persecution of Dionysos, which Professor Blackie compares with the portentous figments of the Hindus, we should be inclined to differ from him. It has always appeared to us that that myth contained a fragment of real history, from the great intrinsic probability of the Dionysiac worship having caused trouble to rulers at the time it arose, as in fact it did, centuries later, to the Roman Senate. Thus the attempted putting-down of this worship might be represented as a direct warfare against the god himself.

We have not space to enter into the various questions involved in the myth of Prometheus, which forms the subject of a characteristic article in this volume. Professor Blackie begins by quoting, from a source we should hardly have expected to find referred to in this volume—Thomas à Kempis—the maxim, *Omnis Scriptura Sacra eo spiritu debet legi quo scripta est*, which he calls "a most admirable rule of interpretation, not for the Bible only, but for all books" (p. 60). It is a rule, however, involving much danger when too closely followed in certain branches of literature. People try "to throw themselves into the spirit" of authors and of ages, when that spirit is often a very bad one; and, moreover, we are by no means sure that it is always the way to get at the true interpretation. Professor Blackie himself allows the potters and torch-runners of the Ceramicus knew no more about the legend than we do. Did they know as much as cultivated men may probably at this day conjecture as to the spirit and purpose of a genius as far beyond them as Æschylus? However, the principle followed by the learned professor is, to judge of the play by what popular feeling would be, as exhibited in the earliest presentation of the myth, that of Hesiod; and his inference is, that the sympathies of the

audience would go with Zeus, and not with his victim. He is therefore opposed to the very natural inclination which leads one to trace foreshadowings in that extraordinary drama of some of the deepest points of Christian faith. Here again, his manner, though guarded, is much the reverse of satisfactory. Thus, he talks of "language in reference to the mythical demi-god of Greek fiction, similar to that which Christians are every day in the habit of using with regard to the *historical founder of their faith*" (p. 69); and further on he says, "the most remarkable, and in every way the most interesting parallel drawn between the mythical tortures of Caucasus and the real agonies of Calvary, is that drawn by our countryman Shelley, in his supra-mundane poem of the Prometheus Unbound" (p. 71). We are not accusing Professor Blackie of infidelity, but we ask, is this the style in which a man would talk whose intellect is governed by Christianity? And if it is plainly not, is not the importance more and more clear of ancient literature, as part of education, being studied and taught by men who really have faith, which in Protestant schools and universities, seems daily more and more vanishing away?

Life of Father Henry Young. By Lady GEORGIANA FULLERTON. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

WE tender our most grateful thanks to Lady G. Fullerton for this truly edifying Life of this saintly Priest, Father Henry Young, the chaplain of S. Joseph's Asylum, Dublin. In her opening chapter, Lady G. Fullerton gives a graphic account of the family of Father Young, and tells us that his father received "a commensurate recompense for his devotion to the clergy, and his hospitality to his fathers and brethren in the faith, in the gift of religious vocation bestowed on so many of his sons and daughters. Four of his sons were chosen by Jesus Christ, the great High Priest, to minister at His altars, and three of his daughters elected to follow the Lamb as His spouses for all eternity." It was indeed a holy household, and there is "no doubt that the training they received in their paternal home prepared the way for their vocation. Rich as their father was, they had not been reared in luxury and self-indulgence. Exact obedience, strict discipline, early rising, punctuality in all their duties, and especially in their religious exercises, had been constantly enforced; and as they grew up, the society and the associations that surrounded them must have had an influence on their future lives, and impressed them with a sense of the nothingness of all that has not God for its object and eternity for its end."

It is not surprising that, under such training, Henry, the eldest of these children should, at a very early age, have gained the title of "the Saint," and the whole of his after-life proved to be in accordance with his early promise. "He seems to have never given any uneasiness to his parents,

but, from his earliest age, evinced a degree of virtue and piety which made him the example of his youthfnl companions." At the age of sixteen he commenced his ecclesiastical studies at the Roman College of the Propaganda, and it was here "that began his career of detachment from everything that the world considers desirable or attractive," but the course of events did not allow him to continue his studies. The second invasion of Rome by the French troops, in 1808, led to the dispersion of the students of the Propaganda. Henry Young took refuge in the house of the Vincentian Fathers, and there spent the remainder of his sojourn in Rome. He was ordained on Pentecost Sunday, 1810, and four years afterwards returned to Ireland, arriving on Christmas morning, when his first proceeding was to go to the Augustinian Church, where he said his three Masses before he saw his parents. It is indeed gratifying to read of the zeal, austerities, and missionary labours of this holy priest, of which an ample account is given in this little work, and many anecdotes are also there recorded. "His father one day calling to see him, told him that if he had any friends he should like to invite to dinner he would be most happy to entertain them; Father Young replied that he had some friends to whom he very much wished to give a good dinner. The day was fixed, and Mr. Young on his return home gave suitable orders. The hour named for the feast arrived, and so did Father Young, accompanied by a large party of the most miserable beggars. Mr. Young remonstrated, but his son settled the question by saying, 'You told me to invite my friends, Father, and I have done so; I have no other friends.'" A religious who knew him for many years, thus writes:—"I think Father Young had a remarkable grace for hiding his great spiritual gifts and talents under an abstracted and occasionally somewhat rough exterior. Though not destitute of talents, he cared little to cultivate what might attract the world and its honour." His humility was not the least remarkable of his virtues. When at Clondalkin, it was touching to see "this aged priest, from his deep love of obedience, of humiliation, of childlike and holy simplicity, handing his letters to the Prior to be opened before he would read them, or asking permission to walk in the grounds or go to town." "The tenderness of heart of this austere and saintly man revealed itself n various ways. When his brother James died, and he saw the playmate of his childhood and the companion of his labours laid in the grave, Father Young wept long and bitterly." At length, after a long life spent in the service of God, he was at the age of eighty-five, to use his own expression, "called to go home." He passed from the scene of his earthly labours on he 17th November, 1869. For an account of the miracles wrought by his intercession, we refer our readers to Lady Fullerton's work.

Organum Comitans ad Graduale Romanum, quod sub auspiciis S.S.D.N. Pii Papæ IX. curavit Sacrorum Rituum Congregatio. Proprium et Commune Sanctorum a Fr. X. Haberl et Jos. Hanisch. Sectio I. Ratisbonæ: Sumptibus, chartis, et typis Friderici Pustet, S. Sedis Apostolicæ Typographi. 1875.

THE frequent demands made for an accompaniment to the Official Gradual (the Ratisbon edition) is stated by the editors as being the motive for its appearance. The authors were encouraged by the success of Dr. Witt's setting of the *Ordinarium Missæ*, to undertake the more formidable task of the *Proprium de Sanctis* and the *Commune Sanctorum.*

On this part of the work two men were engaged, both intimately connected with the Gradual itself, though in different ways: Haberl, who was commissioned by the S. Congregation of Rites to revise the Gradual throughout and also to supply the Chant to the offices which, since 1615, had been added to the Missal; and Hanisch, the organist of the Cathedral at Ratisbon, who has practically, and with admitted success, worked at the accompanying of it.

Musicians know that the question of harmonizing the Plain Chant has of late years occupied some attention. Besides, different systems prevail. In France, the Chant is thrown into the pedals, and the harmonies formed on this basis. In Belgium, two at least of their best organists hold that no note is to be admitted into the harmony which is not found in the air. In Germany, Schneider never employed either sharp or flat: while Mettenleiter gives to each note its chording without any connected sequence. Still he generally keeps to the old counterpoint called *nota contra notam.* Dr. Witt, however, has adapted, as far as possible, the stystem of modern harmony to the modes; and where they, from the position of the semitones in the scale, present difficulties to modern art, he gets over them by uniting the accompaniment in a flowing style founded on a bass, which is maintained till some marked change in the melody demands another. This plan we can conceive the best to meet the difficulties which the *Graduale* and *Tractus*, more than any other part of the Plain Chant, present. In these harmonies not only the ordinary triads and their inversions are used, but also the diminished triad is employed, and sometimes the dominant seventh, though only exceptionally in conclusions. A characteristic of the work is the use of *suspension* and *syncopation*, giving opportunity to an organist to throw himself, by means of his art, into the singers, and carry them on with great effect. We believe that the answer to a demand often made, viz. for a treatise on the art of harmonizing the Plain Chant, is here furnished to a great degree, if only it is admitted (and the three names connected with this work give great weight to the theory) that the rules for doing it agree more or less, *mutatis mutandis* of course, with ascertained principles of modern counterpoint.

At least two-thirds of the work are now complete. The first of the two parts contains the whole of the *Proprium de Sanctis* and the larger portion of the *Commune Sanctorum*, which embraces also the Votive Masses most frequently used. The whole, when finished, will reach, we may reckon 300 or 400 pp., and the cost will be under 30s. The part needed to complete it is the *Proprium de Tempore.*

The *Graduale* and *Alleluia* are not set for the instrument, and the editor gives us the reason, that they were purposely omitted, in order to stimulate the industry of the choir to study and master that part of the Chant unaided by the organ. The very character, too, of these portions of the Mass admits less of accompaniment than the others. Besides, the size and price of the work are thus diminished.

As the late Provincial Synod has now adopted the Ratisbon editio "tanquam norma," some work at least like the above became doubly necessary.

Vie de S. Catherine de Ricci, de Florence. Par le Rev. Père Hyacinthe Bayonne, O.P. Paris, Poussielgue Frères, 1873.

THIS truly interesting life of S. Catherine de Ricci, of Florence, by Father Bayonne, will be welcomed in this age of materialism and incredulity by every sincere Catholic who desires to know something of the ascetic life led by the daughters of him whom Holy Church addresses in the Antiphon on his Festival as the "rose of patience, and the ivory of chastity."

Although the order of St. Dominick can boast of such examples of advanced asceticism as B. Stephana di Quinzana, whose life we hope to see one day published in England, S. Agnes of Monte Pulciano, S. Catherine of Sienna, S. Rose of Lima, and S. Catherine de Raconigi, yet we have ever felt a deep devotion to this glorious saint, who received from her Divine Spouse, "the ring of espousal, and the stigmata," and who, at the age of thirteen entered holy religion as a Sister of the Regular Third Order of S. Dominick. It is true, as F. Sandrini observes, in the "Introduction to his life of S. Catherine," that no other saint has had more biographers than this glorious virgin, one of the ornaments of the order of S. Dominick, whose life we are now noticing. Her life was first written by F. Razzi, to whom we are also indebted for the life of B. Stephana, and other saints of his order, who, being appointed confessor of St. Vincent's convent at Prato, where S. Catherine was professed, and where she spent her long life, used to be so astonished at all that he heard and read of S. Catherine, that more than once he has sent for the sisters who were her contemporaries to hear the marvellous incidents of her life confirmed by them. His life of our saint was approved by Cardinal Alexandrin, nephew of S. Pius V. F. Razzi's life of S. Catherine was founded on the MS. narrative left by her confessors, F. Francis Timoteo de Ricci, O.P., her uncle, and her first confessor, and F. Tomaso Neri, O.P.; the lives by the Bishop of Fiesole,

Mgr. Francesco Cattani da Diacetto and F. Silvano de Razzi. Besides these F. Bayonne mentions five other lives of S. Catherine, one "*Breve Racolta della Vita di suor Caterina de Ricci,*" written by Sister Maria Maddalena Ridolfi, who lived on terms of great intimacy with S. Catherine at the convent of S. Vincent, and who "heard the voices of the angels who celebrated her happy death." Our saint was born on the 23rd April, 1522, and on the following day was baptized at the Church of S. John the Baptist at Florence, and at a very early age, the little Alexandrine, for so she was called at home, showed signs of piety. The first words she learned to lisp were the sacred names of Jesus and Mary, which she often repeated, not as a lesson, but as from an interior inspiration, "*spinta cosi dalla grazia.*" We read that when only three years of age she spent her time in silence and solitude, so as to be absorbed in God, and lost in the contemplation of His mysteries, and, even at this early age, to quote the words of F. Sandrini, "she showed herself to be a living disciple of Jesus crucified, before even she had the power of publicly showing it." The gift of a religious vocation seems to have been freely bestowed on this family, since S. Catherine's four sisters followed her to the convent of S. Vincent de Prato, and her eldest brother became a son of S. Dominick, and was professed at the same convent as her uncle. Our space will not permit us to speak of S. Catherine's sanctity in her childhood, which was so great as to induce her stepmother to say that "she was the chosen temple of the living God, the privileged sanctuary of the Holy Ghost, and the *chef-d'œuvre* of the right hand of the Omnipotent," and that, "instead of being her mother, the child was *her* preceptor and master in virtue, her refuge and consolation in affliction." When very young, one of her aunts, the abbess of the convent of S. Pietro in Monticelli, Sister Lodovica de Ricci, O.S.B., struck by her precocious piety, induced her brother to allow her niece to become a pupil at S. Pietro. While here she conducted herself as a religious, although doing her duty as a pupil. F. Sandrini says, "No religious profited more than she did by the peace, silence, and recollection that reigned at Monticelli, where all was done for Heaven, and where the object of each one was to work out her own salvation with fear and trembling.

She spent the greater part of her recreation, although her saintly preceptress occasionally made her take part in the games and recreations of her school-fellows, at the foot of a beautiful crucifix in the convent chapel, bathed in tears of compassion and sympathy for the sufferings of her Divine Spouse. Dame Lodovica, seeing her affection for the Passion of Our Lord, taught her the principal Mysteries of the Passion, and during this holy exercise, "she identified herself so closely with the sufferings of Jesus Christ, that she became by the expression of her features and the attitude of her body, His living representation. During the first of the five Paters she placed herself at first upon her knees, her arms raised towards Heaven, her face pale, and suffering the anguish of the Agony; then her two arms were clasped upon her breast, with a grave and majestic air, as Jesus bound at Gethsemani. In the second mystery she remained standing, motionless, her right hand resting on her shoulder, like Jesus at the pillar of flagellation. And so of the others, always making her move-

ments accord with the corresponding scenes of the sufferings of our Divine Redeemer." In consequence of her devotion to this crucifix, it became celebrated and popular in her native town, under the appellation of "Il crocifisso della Sandrina," and the following inscription was placed at its foot, after her happy and glorious death, by Canon Salvini:—

> "Beata Catharina è Ricciorum gente dûm piè
> Sanctèque in hoc virginum collegio educaretur,
> Ex adversa specula Christi crucifixi imaginem
> Hanc ex ejus tunc puellæ nomine Alexandræ,
> Exindè vocatam, non sine lacrymis et quandòque
> In extasim rapta adorabat."

In consequence of this public veneration, the sisters removed the crucifix to the chapel of S. Anthony, where, in 1871, it still continued to receive the homage of the faithful. One would have supposed that our little Alexandrine would have petitioned to be received into this convent; but she was so much afflicted by the want of their love of poverty that she even spoke of it to her mistress. It seems that on the death of an aged Religious, a prayer-book, richly illuminated, had been found in her cell, and that two of the younger Religious had actually quarrelled respecting its possession, each wishing to appropriate it to herself. The scene so afflicted little Alexandrine that she withdrew herself to a retired part of the cloister, and there thus expressed herself:—"Is it possible that the heart of the spouses of Jesus Christ, who is all sweetness and humility, can thus open itself to anger and resentment? Where, O good Jesus, are the poverty of spirit, the interior death, the detachment from all created objects? You had neither roof nor shelter in your life; and you were so poor at death that your Body was wrapped in a borrowed winding-sheet. And here are these holy virgins, your spouses, the beloved of your Soul quarrelling with each other for a few leaves of paper! What folly, for a little worthless book, to expose themselves to the danger of being themselves effaced from the Book of Life for all eternity!" On being found in tears by her mistress, she said, "Mother, how could you wish that I should not grieve? Do you not see how God is offended in this house? how religious observance is despised, not only as regards the rules, but even as to the vows, to the counsels, and even the Divine precepts? Pardon me, but I am resolved to leave as soon as I can, since I have not the courage to live in a place where the devil sows discord, and ruins charity as well as the spirit of poverty." She then, with her aunt's consent, left Monticelli, and returned home. Her father, imagining that she had been wearied with the religious life, thought of marrying her. In 1532, when she was about ten years of age, two lay-sisters of the convent of S. Vincent of Prato called on her father, who had some property there, and was then residing at S. Paolo. They had with them a donkey, which carried the alms they received. On seeing them, little Alexandrine hastened to meet them, and was so taken with their modesty and recollection (*compostezza*) that she asked her father's permission to allow them to spend a few days with her. To this her father gladly consented; and during their

visit at S. Paolo, Alexandrine watched their conduct, and discovered that the more she saw of them the more she was attracted towards them. After considerable trouble, Alexandrine obtained permission from her father, who had other views for her, to spend eleven days at S. Vincent's Convent. At the termination of this period, the little Alexandrine refused to return to S. Paolo, alleging that she belonged to S. Vincent, and requested her brother, who had been sent for her, to tell her father that she was only bound to obey God on a point which He had exclusively reserved for Himself, as the Creator and Father of our souls. M. de Ricci lost no time in going to Prato, determined to bring her back by force to the paternal roof; but his daughter was inflexible to all his persuasions, as she declared that she would rather die than leave her convent. However, when he asked her as a favour to return to S. Paolo, and spend a few days with her family, she consented, in obedience to her uncle, F. Timoteo and the prioress, Sister Margaret di Bardo, to spend ten days with her family At the termination of this probationary period, she asked her father's permission to return; but he deferred that time so indefinitely, that Alexandrine, perceiving that he was only playing with her simplicity, became so seriously ill that her physician imagined her to be in a rapid consumption. Her stepmother, and all about her, understood the cause of her illness, which increased so rapidly that her life was despaired of. Still, during her illness, she preserved a hope of being able to consecrate her virginity to her Divine Spouse. It happened that during one of her lethargic attacks, Jesus Christ appeared to her, holding in His hand a dazzling and beautiful ring, accompanied by His Holy Mother and the glorious martyrs S. Tecla and S. Cecilia, whom he had appointed as her special protectors. Fixing upon her a look of infinite goodness, He asked her why she thu afflicted herself on the subject of her entering religion, when He himself assured her that she would succeed. Alexandrine replied to Him with the deepest humility:—"My sweet Redeemer, you know the depths of my soul; you know that I am grieved at one thing, that is to see indefinitely adjourned the happiness of consecrating myself to you." Our Lord then said to her, "It is to hasten this moment that I am come to cure you." This He did at the same moment, in giving her His blessing. Then He warned her to prepare herself to suffer in the religious life great trials, contradictions, and troubles of all sorts; that she would have to endure cruel infirmities of body, by sorrow and anguish of soul, either through the distrust and persecution of men, or the snares and attacks of the devil, and that the extraordinary graces, visions, and ecstasies, with which she would be favoured would cause her great trouble. But He exhorted her not to lose courage, assured her that He would be always with her, and that with His assistance she would triumph over all obstacles, to the great profit of her soul and the honour of God. After this, smiling upon her with great kindness, and showing her the brilliant ring which He held in His hand, He said to her:—"Here is the ring of the sacred espousals which I shall soon celebrate with you, so that you may be my beloved spouse." Then the Blessed Virgin, and the two holy martyrs who accompanied her,

approached, and addressed to her the most affectionate words for her encouragement. Then the vision disappeared, leaving her restored to health and radiant with joy. This gracious vision reassured Alexandrine; and in a few days after, her father took her to S. Vincent's, and thus restored his daughter to her monastery. Previous to giving in detail the narrative of S. Catherine's noviciate, F. Bayonne gives a short account of the religious who were her contemporaries at Prato; which we omit, trusting that we shall one day see this interesting life appear in an English translation. S. Catherine's noviciate was an exceedingly painful one: it was indeed a trial such as few have to endure, and those precious souls whom the Heavenly Refiner cleanses and purifies as gold and silver. During her novitiate, her mistress was Sister Magdalen de Strozzi, who had entered religion in 1514. "Her soul," says F. Razzi, "was of a perfect purity, and she was remarkable for her fervour, as well as for her humility; zealous for the observance; ever affable and cheerful, she did everything with that composure which is the sign of perfection." S. Catherine nearly failed in the ordinary trials of the novitiate; for everything seemed to conspire against her, as her mistress regarded her love of prayer as the following of her own will. So that as her novitiate approached its termination, it became a question whether she should be received or not; but she begged for her profession with such tears and bitter sobs, promising the sisters with "perfect simplicity that she hoped to receive from the Divine Mercy, for the whole time of her religious life, the strength and virtues in which she had been deficient during her year of probation." She accordingly made her final vows in the hands of F. Angelo de Diacetto, at that time Prior of S. Dominick's of Prato, and afterwards Bishop of Fiesole. After her profession, her trials became more severe than ever: she was regarded by the sisters as useless, being treated as an inoffensive idiot, and tolerated with no little pity, although occasionally the object of their innocent mirth. When about sixteen years of age, she was taken seriously ill, and so continued suffering most severely until the age of eighteen; and yet during this lengthened period of suffering she was so gentle and patient that all were moved to tears, incapable of understanding how God, so good and just, could leave such an innocent child to suffer so cruelly and without relaxation, or how so weak a creature could continue thus racked with pain without making a single complaint or uttering a moan, by which nature would instinctively relieve itself.

The sisters had earnestly prayed to Our Lady for her cure, when they resolved to have recourse to F. Savonarola and his companions, whose anniversary was at hand. On the 23rd May, the end of the triduum which S. Catherine and the community had held in honour of Jerome Savonarola and his companions, she asked permission to remain alone in her cell on the vigil of the Holy Trinity, so as to pray with greater fervour to Savonarola and his companions. About four in the morning, being overcome with fatigue, she laid her head upon her arms folded upon the altar where their relics were lying, and fell asleep. "Then," says the convent chronicler, "three religious, wearing the habit of S. Dominick,

appeared to her, surrounded by a great halo. Sister Catherine, addressing the one in the centre, said to him, "Who are you?" "What," replied the religious, do you not know me?" "No, father," said Catherine, "I do not know you." "But from whom are you asking for your cure?" "From Father Jerome," she immediately replied. "Very well, I am Father Jerome, and I am come to cure you; but promise me first, always to obey your superiors and confessor, and then go to confession this morning for communion." He then made the sign of the cross over her, and she was immediately perfectly cured.

Shortly after this miraculous recovery, she was again October, 1540, supposed to be dying of small-pox, when she was once more cured by B. Jerome. On this occasion she composed a Lauda in honour of B. Jerome and his companions Dominick and Sylvester. Our limited space will not allow us to dwell on her sufferings and trials, or on the ecstacies and visions with which she was so peculiarly favoured. We shall merely refer to her mystic marriage with her Divine Spouse in 1542. We are told by her biographer, F. Razzi, that on Easter Day, 9th April, Catherine being in her cell, about dawn Jesus Christ appeared to her, covered with glory, wearing on His shoulder a resplendent cross, and on His head a beautiful crown, accompanied by his Blessed Mother, S. Mary Magdalene, S. Thomas of Aquin, and other saints of the order of S. Dominick. Her cell was filled with a radiant light, and a multitude of angels, gracefully clothed, were arranged in order, bearing in their hands various instruments of music. At the view of this majesty Catherine was seized with great fear, and having made the *obéissance* prescribed by the rule, she prostrated herself three times on the earth to adore Jesus. Then the Holy Mother of God prayed her Divine Son to take Catherine for His Spouse. Jesus joyfully consented, and when the Blessed Virgin presented to Him the hand of His humble betrothed, He drew from His finger a brilliant ring, which He placed on the index-finger of Catherine's right hand, saying to her:—"My daughter, receive this ring as a witness and a pledge that you are mine, and that you will be ever mine." And Catherine, wishing to show her gratitude, could find no expression commensurate with the favour she had received; the angels immediately drew forth from their instruments such a sweet melody, that her cell seemed to have become a paradise. Jesus then exhorted her to the practice of humility, of obedience, and all Christian virtues, and having given her to taste of the pure and elevating joys of the soul which are reserved for His beloved Spouses, He disappeared with all His cortége. This ring was always visible to her own eyes, but not always to those of others, nor did it always present to the eyes of others the same appearance.

Very soon after S. Catherine received the sacred stigmata, when only twenty years of age, and bore it for forty-seven years. Passing over the narrative of these forty-seven years, we simply mention her influence over Jane of Austria, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, and others, especially S. Philip Neri, and conclude with a reference to her glorious death. She was seized with her last illness, after compline, on January 27th, 1590. On the 31st she asked for the five turpentine pills which had been pre-

scribed for her. On taking them she said, "Jesus, I take these five pills in honour of your Five Wounds, and as they are given me for the cure of my body, may the merits of your Five Wounds serve also for the cure and salvation of my soul." Finding herself worse, she asked, on the Vigil of the Purification, for the viaticum, and prepared for it by sacramental confession. On hearing the tinkling of the little bell which announced the arrival of her Divine Spouse, coming for the last time under the sacramental form, to accompany her into His Divine presence, getting out of bed, she exclaimed, "My Jesus is coming, let us go and meet Him." She knelt on a small stool supported by Sister Maria Angela de Segni and Sister Maria Benigna Acciajuoli. "She then turned towards her sisters, who were all standing round her bed in tears, truly inconsolable for losing such a mother, and humbly asked their pardon for not having always consoled them in their trials as she had desired through the weakness of her nature. She then made her profession of faith in all the doctrines and truths taught by the Church of Rome, and received the Holy Eucharist with inexpressible devotion. In a few hours after she received the Sacrament of Extreme Unction; and then sending for each of her sisters, she recommended them to live in peace and union among themselves, to be careful in the regular observance, and not to allow the question of *meum* and *tuum* ever to be introduced into their monastery, as the question of property in a monastery was fatal to the love of God, a source of great disquietude to the conscience of every one bound by vow to voluntary poverty. Her last prayer was a *Pater Noster*. Between one and two A.M. on Friday, the 2nd of February, 1590, angelic voices were heard over the convent of S. Vincent de Prato, singing the words, 'Come, Spouse of Christ, come and receive the crown which the Lord has prepared for you from all eternity.' And at that very moment she closed her eyes, and extending her arms and feet in the sign of the cross, she gently gave up her soul into the arms of the angels, who conducted it to its Creator." We may conclude the notice of this interesting life by F. Bayonne, in the words of Father Serafino Razzi, "è priege in carita, per le mia salute è buona fine."

The Story of S. Stanislaus Kostka. Edited by HENRY JAMES COLERIDGE, of the Society of Jesus. Burns & Oates. 1875.

VERY possibly many of our readers will say, on seeing the title of this volume advertised, that it is a very old story, and that they are already sufficiently acquainted with the lives of the canonized Jesuits. But if they will restrain this first impatient impulse, born of the insatiate craving for something new which is universally acting upon our literature, spreading a shallow breadth instead of a really fertilizing channel among us, they will find abundant interest in this fresh and delightful narrative. It is essentially a "Story," told in one continuous, closely-woven course, absolutely without comments, or views, or patches of any other matter. Taken, so to speak, from the raw pollen of Boero, it is so

kneaded and digested into pure honey by the Editor, as to possess a charm, both of quaintness and fitness, in the telling, that is rarely met with. And there is the further advantage, always considerable, of having what we may call the technical touches correctly given; a Jesuit's life written by a Jesuit, and supplying thus the exact values of the ideas and original expressions. The journey of young Stanislaus—born of two of the noblest Polish families, Kostka and Kriska—to Rome, and the simple way in which Blessed Canisius speaks of him to S. Francis Borgia, afford a striking contrast to our modern, noisy way of exalting the worldly condition of those who become reconciled to the Church, or who leave the ordinary way of life to follow the counsels of our Lord. "Stanislaus, a Pole, a good youth, of gentle blood." is what Blessed Canisius wrote from Augsburg; and his one strong expression to S. Francis Xavier, "I look for great things of him," has reference wholly to the future and the supernatural life, and has no allusion whatever to his birth and ancient blood, and his position in the world. It is now more than three hundred years (A. D. 1567), since Stanislaus entered Rome by the Flaminian Gate from the northern road; yet the story of his resolute firmness in leaving his home and his people is still fresh and new. From the earliest age, in fact, it may be said of him that, despising the things that were behind, he pressed forward, without once halting or looking back; and his life, in consequence, though full of simplicity, is one course of heroism. "S. Stanislaus Kostka leads the band of these youthful flowers of the Society, some of whom have been beatified or canonized, while the memory of others has remained fragrant within the body itself, though unknown to the Church at large. In one particular, indeed, he went before all the other Saints of the Society, in that he was the first to receive from the authority of the Supreme Pontiff the title of 'Blessed.'"

Life of Rev. F. Bernard, C.S.S.R. Translated from the French by Rev. P. Claessens. New York: Catholic Publishing Society. London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

WE always hail with pleasure the publication of such volumes as the one now lying on our table. Such Lives are calculated to do an immensity of good by displaying bright examples to the world, and showing that Holy Church still brings forth a succession of such eminent preachers as was this remarkable son of S. Alphonsus Liguori.

Father Bernard was born at Amsterdam on the 12th December, 1807. The favourite amusement of little Bernard in his childhood was "to play priest." "Scarcely a day passed in which he was not seen, in his youthful simplicity, representing the functions of the holy priesthood. When he celebrated Mass, or gave Benediction in his chapel, he required his brothers and sisters to be present, and would not permit them either to speak or laugh. The service was frequently preceded or followed by a *sermon,* as if the youthful *curé* had a

presentiment of his vocation to a missionary life. On one occasion he preached on the holy name of Jesus; of this sermon his family preserved a precious remembrance. His relatives still recall the love for Jesus, which shone forth in every word of the little preacher. Those who heard him were deeply affected, and his parents were moved even to tears.' In 1820, he became a pupil of the Hageveld Institute, where brilliant success attended him; and when ordained priest, he preached his first sermon in the diocese of Liege, where his first Superior at the Hageveld Institute was Mgr., afterwards Bishop, Van Bommel, who died a holy death at Liege on 7th April, 1852. On the suppression of the Hageveld Institute in 1825, and the establishment of the Collegium Philosophicum by William I., Bernard with his friend Beelen returned home, "determined not to enter an institute which was condemned by all true Catholics. They did not, however, interrupt their studies. Having a knowledge of Greek and Latin, they wished also to acquire that of the Hebrew tongue, which could not fail to be useful to them. They took lessons of a Jew in Amsterdam," and when they had completed their philosophy, they began theology under the direction of Abbé Bogaerts, one of their former professors at Hageveld, which they completed at the Gregorian University at Rome, better known as the Roman College; for, notwithstanding the Concordat of 1827, "the Calvinistic government found reasons to delay the execution of the treaty, and did not allow the reopening of the seminaries."

Father Bernard celebrated Mass for the first time on the Feast of S. Joseph, 1832; having been ordained on the Feast of S. Patrick, and entered the Order of the Redeemer in May of the same year with the sanction of his Diocesan, whose parting words to him were, "Go, my son; but you must absolutely return, for I wish to introduce this Congregation into my diocese." He entered his novitiate at the convent at Wienhaus, where Fathers Madlener and Doll were successively his masters in the spiritual life. "They testified that during the course of his novitiate he gave his confrères an example of every virtue, particularly of obedience and regularity, of humility and the spirit of mortification." He was professed in 1833, and sent with F. Hugues to S. Frond, where he was appointed to teach theology, and this was "the arsenal where he prepared his cannon and shot."

His first mission was at Thimister, where he and "his confrères laboured with indefatigable zeal, and by their united efforts brought forth fruits of salvation. The number of those who sought to be reconciled to God during the course of this mission was so great that it was necessary to ask for a reinforcement of confessors. Twelve fathers were occupied in the confessional from an early hour in the morning till late at night." Of th great battle of Verviers, which was commenced amidst unforeseen di culties, he thus writes :—"I can assure you we have had, thanks be to God, our share of sufferings. But the humble period of our Congregatio has passed; henceforth we shall be no longer unknown. Verviers h raised us to an eminent position. We will hold on, and, with God's grace will courageously pursue our course." In 1840, he was sent to Holland, where he laboured most successfully, and at Grave was the means

sending away a circus troupe, which had been sent for from Antwerp for the purpose of drawing away the people from the exercises of the mission. At Hulst, he defeated the lieutenant of the gendarmerie, by acting upon the advice given him by the Bishop of Liege :—" Reply to the evil-disposed by questions, and force them to submit to be questioned, instead of submitting yourself." It seems that on the third day after the arrival of F. Bernard and his two companions at Hulst, a gendarme " rang the bell at the dean's door, and asked to speak with his three guests. Father Bernard quieted his two confrères and the affrighted dean, and communicated to them the plan he had devised. He proposed to interrogate the gendarme, while his two companions filled the respective offices of clerk and usher. The Father, seated in an arm-chair, addressed the gendarme with the gravity of a judge. 'My friend, what do you wish?' 'I am sent by my lieutenant; I did not come of my own accord.' 'Do not be uneasy about that; but who is your lieutenant?' 'Mr. N., of Ghent.' 'And what does he want with us?' 'I am to inquire whether you are strangers or not.' 'Go and tell Mr. N. that we are natives of Holland, and that we exercise our ministry in Holland. And now, another word: should your lieutenant desire to know more, let him address himself to the chief authorities of the Hague; they will teach him how to treat the subjects of the king.' The poor gendarme, covered with confusion, commenced to stammer out excuses, and told his judge that he had also orders to learn the impression produced by his sermons. 'And on this point,' he said, 'I will be able to speak from experience; for, although a Protestant, I have listened to your sermons, and they have deeply affected me.' He then took a humble leave of the fathers."

Those who know the mysteries of grace and its connection with suffering and prayer, will not be surprised at the prodigious influence exercised by Father Bernard. He possessed, it is true, all the human endowments which are necessary for a great orator—" vir bonus dicendi peritus." Of majestic appearance, possessed of a strong and flexible voice, rare facility of expression, ardent language, profound science,—all were united harmoniously in his person. But his true power of expression came from higher sources; it flowed from his lively faith and his ardent love for Jesus Christ, for the Church, and for souls. This triple love was the principle of his zeal and the source of his most beautiful inspirations.

He left Southampton for the United States in 1848, but did not finally reside there until 1851, when the American House, having been made a Province by His Holiness Pius IX. he was made Provincial, and arrived at New York on the Feast of S. Joseph, 1851. Shortly after his arrival, he heard of his mother's death at Amsterdam, and he thus wrote to his brothers and sisters :—" I cannot conceal it," he says; " although for twenty years I have made to God the sacrifice of my parents and of my family, the death of my mother has not the less deeply afflicted me. Ah! I know that I was her child; the child ofan incomparable mother! We have known her in life; her death has caused us to see still more clearly what a treasure the infinite goodness of God had given us in the tenderness of this cherished mother! Ah! how happy you are, you who have seen our mother on her bed of suffering; you who have been able to address to

her words of consolation, to give her the last filial kiss It should be an alleviation to your grief to have witnessed her passage to a better life; to have been able to entertain yourselves with her. As to myself, I find no one here who understands me when I speak of this good mother, when I mourn her loss. All I can do is to prostrate myself before my crucified Saviour, and to offer Him as a son the sacrifice of the dearest of mothers. Ah! more than ever do I thank God for all she has done for you and for me. I unceasingly recommend her soul to Him. Oh! may our last end be like unto hers." He remained in America till 1852, when he was appointed Superior of the Convent at Limerick, where he resided three years, and among other missions gave what is still remembered as the Great Mission at S. Michael's Church, Dublin.

In 1855 he left Ireland, where his name is still remembered with those of F. Gentili and F. Ignatius Spencer. He died in 1865, at Montzen, near Aix-la-Chapelle, from the effects of an accident. While reciting the Rosary for the children who were to make their first communion on the last day of May, he wished "to ascend the steps of the altar of the Blessed Virgin, before which the children were kneeling: he tripped against a bench which projected, and, seeing himself about to fall to the left, he instinctively straightened himself to the other side, tearing a sinew of the knee, and fell helplessly on his back. The people came in haste to his assistance, and placed him on a chair; he continued to say, 'Hail, Mary, full of grace!' as if he had not been in the least inconvenienced by the fall. Soon, however, the pain became so intense, that by his request he was taken to the pastor's residence opposite the church." He lingered on for a few months, and we are told by his biographer that in the midst of the agonies of death he did not lose the use of his reason; and when, towards the dawn of day, his confessor asked him if he desired to receive absolution and the plenary indulgence *in articulo mortis*, he replied by a look of joy, and made the sign of the cross, as if in the pulpit. Absolution was repeated in the same manner about eight o'clock. "It was Saturday, September 2nd, 1865, about nine o'clock in the morning, when the soul of Father Bernard left this world to receive the palm promised to the faithful soldier of Jesus Christ." We would refer our readers, more especially those who remember his labours in Ireland and England, to this interesting Life, which, we trust, will have a salutary and wide-spread influence, so that Father Bernard's Mission may still be a living influence among us.

The Great Land Question: being a Verbatim Transcript of the Correspondence in *Doe* versus *Roe*. By CHRISTOPHER CAVANAGH, B.A., LL.B. Lond.

THE Author—or, perhaps, we ought rather to call him the communicator—of this imaginary correspondence has discussed in 207 pages "The Great Land Question" in all its various branches. Primogeniture, Entails, and Land Transfer are in this pamphlet fully considered

from a legal, social, and political point of view. All that can be fairly urged on either side is presented to the reader in clear and precise language, and with a considerable amount of humour. On the one hand the advocates of *legal reform* cannot fail to appreciate the arguments of *John Doe*, whilst, on the other hand, those opposed to change cannot fail to admire the genuine conservatism of *Richard Roe*. The value of the present pamphlet, however, consists chiefly in this, namely, that by fairly representing the arguments on both sides of a great question, it affords the thinking public an opportunity of judging for themselves whether reform is really necessary and what direction it should take. For thus contributing to the formation of a *healthy public opinion* upon "The Great Land Question," Mr. Cavanagh deserves very considerable praise, and his efforts ought to receive all the more encouragement at present when there are really so few who write in an unprejudiced and impartial spirit on popular questions, or who even attempt to state fairly the arguments on both sides. That part of Mr. Cavanagh's pamphlet to which the reader will naturally turn with most interest, is where he treats of that branch of the land question which is at present engaging the attention of the Legislature, namely, *Land Transfer*. Mr. Cavanagh has made himself quite at home with his subject. In the seventh letter he as it were paves the way for the consideration of the *Land Transfer Bill* by a very full and learned account of our system of conveyancing, taking occasion to point out the defects of that system. The merits of the *Land Transfer Bill* of Lord Cairns are then set forth by *John Doe*, whose arguments are very cleverly combated by *Richard Roe*.

Of Mr. Cavanagh's style of writing we cannot speak in terms of unmixed praise. He certainly is always intelligible, but then, on the other hand, in his desire to be witty, he is now and then a little wanting in refinement. True wit, Mr. Cavanagh should remember, derives all its force from beauty of expression :—

> "True wit is nature to advantage dress'd,
> What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd."

And when a writer makes use of wit as a weapon against an opponent, he should bear in mind that it is to be used as a finely-tempered rapier and not as a pole-axe. On the whole, however, we can recommend this pamphlet to our readers as being an elaborate and scholarly disquisition on the "Great Land Question."

The King's Highway ; or, The Catholic Church the Way of Salvation. By Rev. A. F. Hewit, of the Congregation of S. Paul.

"THE King's Highway ; or, The Catholic Church the Way of Salvation," is a remarkable book, and we hope it will prove successful in inducing those for whose benefit it is especially written, to inquire where the King's Highway leads, and to find the way of salvation. F. Hewit complains, and with justice, that "most of the books written in English, with the direct object of convincing Protestants of the truth of

the Catholic religion, are specially adapted to the use of Episcopalians of High Church opinions,"—a complaint we have often heard repeated by converts from Calvinism. In "The King's Highway" F. Hewit uses King James's version of the Sacred Scripture, "because it is the one with which his Protestant readers are most familiar"; at the same time taking care to ascertain "that the passages quoted are substantially correct renderings of the original texts, and occasionally making remarks to make the sense of the words used more obvious and precise." In the first chapter he refutes the Calvinistic doctrines of Particular Redemption, Election, and Reprobation, and proves that the way of salvation through the merits of Christ is prepared for all mankind; for he says, "God the Father loves all men, in a special sense, because they partake of the nature of His Son. Jesus Christ loves them because they partake of His own nature, are His race, and of one blood with Himself. This relation to Jesus Christ as the mediator, and to the Father as God the Saviour, is contracted by that generation from Adam which makes each individual man a member of the human race, and by virtue of this relationship every man is made a capable and fit subject of the mercy of God and the grace of Christ." In the second chapter he refutes the Lutheran and Calvinistic doctrine of Justification by Faith alone, and after explaining the nature and office of faith as the first prerequisite to justification, he proves the Catholic doctrine of Saving Faith. He then proceeds, in the third chapter, to speak of Regeneration and Sanctifying Grace, and says hat the Sacraments are instruments of Grace. After proving his proposition regarding the Sacraments in a manner which must, and doubtless will, satisfy many an inquirer now wandering in the wilderness of Calvinism that "The King's Highway" alone is the way of salvation as revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and that it is, as the Prophet says, a "straight way, so that fools shall not err therein," and that the *Via Regia* leads to the Catholic Church, in which ALONE salvation can be found,—he concludes that "the inquiry after the true Church, the true faith, the lawful sacraments, is not one of secondary importance, relating to non-essential matters. It is a question of life and death, an inquiry after the true and only way of salvation established by Jesus Christ. The only consideration admissible by any upright and conscientious person who fears God and wishes to save his soul is, What is the truth, what is my duty? The only honest decision, when these are ascertained, is to follow them *immediately*, without regard to any temporal motives or interests."

The Eucharist and the Christian Life. Translated from the French of Mgr. DE LA BOUILLERIE, Archbishop of Perga, Coadjutor of Bordeaux, by L. C. London: Washbourne. 1875.

THIS little work is simply the development of an idea which the good Archbishop of Perga has ever felt, and which must be entertained by every Catholic; viz. that the Eucharist is the centre of the Christian Life; that "it teaches us our chief desires and makes us love them; that it pervades and unites in itself all the grace that is necessary

to us; that it communicates to the whole of religion a marvellous efficacy and a charm of which it alone has the secret"; for His Grace says with truth, "the Holy Eucharist has so many different perfumes, and its shades are so diverse, that it is sufficient in itself to delight every soul, and render it beautiful before God."

The Holy Eucharist seems to have been the actuating impulse of the whole life of the right reverend writer, for he says, "I have for a long time had the habit, very sweet to me, of referring everything to the Eucharist." The chapters which especially struck us as the most beautiful in this admirable work are the second, third, fourth, and seventh. The Eucharist and Childhood is the title of the second chapter, and what can be more beautiful than the following passage, when he refers to the joy of the first Communion? "The child has come to the age when all that is good and noble in his nature begins to develop itself in him; when all that is corrupt and bad still hesitates to invade him; when he is already man in mind and heart; while he still resembles the angels in innocence and piety. Already his young intelligence accepts the truth with joy, as his eye opens to the light of day, and the first longings of his heart draw him towards what is good; he loves God, and he loves his mother. But especially the grace of the Lord, which has rested upon him since the day of his baptism, and which already worked within him while he still slept in the obscurity of his cradle; this grace gives to his nature a quiet celestial beauty, this grace it is which prepares and opens the sacred refuge to which the Saviour will come. He comes—with what transport, with what generous effusion! The golden vessels of our altars are too cold, too poor, too narrow, to contain the Sacrament of love; the Saviour stays in them only in order to come to us. But, alas! our own souls, disfigured by sin, worn by contact with the world, grown old in the practice of evil, are they worth more than the gold of our ciboriums? Jesus Christ prefers the child, beautiful and living tabernacle, whose ornament is purity, and who opens to receive Him with a love unequalled. Who may tell the discourses between the child and the God of the Eucharist! O, Christian soul, you have often communicated—is it not true that this first colloquy between Jesus Christ and you had more delight than all the others? What did the Saviour say to you, and what did you answer Him? This is your secret and the secret of the King. But remember that your last words were a promise. The first communion of the child is only so sweet and so important *because* it makes promise for his future"; for, as His Grace reminds us, "The God of the Tabernacle calls chiidren unto Him, and He opens to them the kingdom of heaven; therefore, love to become a child at the feet of the Eucharist!" In the third chapter he speaks of the Eucharist and Prayer; in the fourth, of the Eucharist and Labour; and in the seventh, of the Eucharist and Charity. But we refrain from any lengthened quotations from a work which we are convinced will soon form a portion of the reading of every Catholic in the land. It is destined to do its work in this country. At the present period men are seeking and yearning for the truth; they feel that there is no consistency save in the Catholic Church; and they feel that as the Eucharist shows us Heaven, and it is *it* which conducts us there, so there

is no peace save in that Church which believes in the Real Presence, and teaches her children that their morning prayer should be to hear Holy Mass, and their evening prayer, a visit to the Blessed Sacrament.

The Orphan's Friend. By Rev. A. A. Lambing. New York: Sadlier & Co. 1875.

"THE poor ye have always with you," are the words of unerring truth; and hence it is that we welcome with genuine pleasure "The Orphan's Friend," written by one who had formerly been the Chaplain of S. Paul's Orphanage at Pittsburg, and himself, as he says in his preface, born in great penury, and "obliged to spend the years from early childhood to manhood at hard labour, and thus learn to sympathize with others placed in similar situations; and learn also, by painful experience, what the trials, hardships, and temptations are to which persons of this class are usually exposed, and which can never be learned so thoroughly as by actual contact with them." "The Orphan's Friend" is replete with instruction for children when they most require it,—viz, at that period of life when they leave the Asylum which has sheltered them, to fight the life-battle of every day, and to encounter the difficulties of their position; for with the class for whose benefit the work is especially written there is no real sympathy, and they have no friend but God. The style of the work is simple, and especially adapted to children. The second chapter, "On Leaving the Asylum and entering your New Home," begins as follows:—"It is always a hard trial on young persons to change their manner of life. When a boy leaves home to enter college or learn a trade, or work on a farm, or find employment in public works, everything appears new to him. He has other masters instead of his parents, other companions in place of his brothers and sisters, another home to live in, a different church to attend, and, in a word, you might say he is in another world altogether." . . . . "But the parents of these children are still living, and will not forget them." . . . . "But this is not the way with you, my dear children. There are, no doubt, many who wish you well and pray earnestly for you; but they are persons whom you seldom or ever meet, and are not such friends as others have. There can be no greater change in the world than that which happens to a boy or girl that leaves the Asylum." . . . . "Nothing is the same." . . . . "There will be a new master and mistress, another home, different kinds of work, other companions, a different church, and a priest to whom you are a stranger, but who loves you as he does all his people, especially the young. It is only to God and heaven that you are able to look and find no change. But this is a great consolation and encouragement, to feel that wherever you are, God is still your Father, and heaven awaits you as the reward of a good life." The work is divided into short chapters, each forming an instructive lesson, given in an agreeable manner. In that on Fidelity the reverend writer says, "A good child will do something more

than perform its duty faithfully ; it will also take an interest in its work, no matter whether it is a girl at work in the house or a boy in the shop or the field. And this it will do for several reasons. In the first place, if you love the person with whom you live, you will naturally like to see everything belonging to him go on well. Then the work a person takes an interest in appears so much easier. Besides, every boy and girl ought to feel an honest pride in being able to do as much work as other children of the same age, and in doing it as well, if not better. The good effect of this fidelity will be easily seen in the love and kindness which the masters and mistresses of such children will show them, and the great interest they will take in the children's welfare." Speaking on the "Necessity and advantage of instruction," our author says, "A very holy priest, who died a few years ago in France, used to say, when speaking to his people, 'My children, I often think that most of the Christians who are lost, are lost for want of instruction,—they do not know their religion well.'" From this chapter it is unnecessary to quote further. The advantages of placing such a compendium of instruction as this in the hands of these children will be apparent to those who have their interest at heart, or who wish to diminish crime and ignorance in the world.

Which is Right? By LEE SILLOBY. London : Burns & Oates. 1875.

WE have to thank the writer of this tale for a few hours' amusement and instruction. In "Which is Right?" we have portrayed in a striking manner the onward progress of three souls to the Church. The heroine, Annie Turner, is the daughter of a Baptist minister, who, while on a visit to an Anglican uncle, Mr. Grainger, is struck by the remarks of the Ritualistic rector of Lowfields on the unity of the Church, and her attention aroused by a sermon which she hears from Mr. Hartley on the Real Presence. "The vicar's words had taken a strange hold upon her, and she could not understand the intense longing she felt to be able to believe in their truth. She was conscious that whilst listening to them a new revelation of the love of God had appeared to be unfolding before her, and that her own affections had bounded immediately in response to it. But she was shocked to think that this should have been the case ; for the doctrine which, as the vicar explained it, appeared to her so beautiful, would, she instinctively felt, be condemned by her father as both Popish and unscriptural." During this visit, Annie made the acquaintance of a young Catholic gentleman, "by whom she was very much attracted," but who suddenly left Lowfields on discovering his own attachment to her, because, having "witnessed in his own family the evil results of marriage between those who, differing from each other on questions of the most vital importance, can have no real union of heart, he had registered a vow to Heaven never to marry any other than a Catholic." Annie returned home in outward appearance "unchanged by her visit to Lowfields ; yet the result of that visit was a complete revolution of her inner life, a deep and lasting alteration in her opinions and sentiments, and a

conviction, continually repeated to herself, that she could never again be the light-hearted happy girl she had been ere it had taken place." "Before her visit, her perfect confidence in the system of belief in which she had been educated had become slightly unsettled. *Now,* it was shaken to the foundation, and she felt as though she were drifting out into an ocean of doubt, where, tossed about by the surging waves of conflicting opinions, she could find no plank to which she could cling, no rock on which she could plant her foot and feel secure." Soon after her return, Annie's father was induced by an officious member of his conventicle to give a course of lectures on the doctrine and practices of the Church of Rome, and to prepare himself for his task, bought several books written by Catholic authors, containing explanations and defences of their doctrines." And he said to Annie, "As they are the works of some of the ablest men of that persuasion, no doubt the very best will be made in them of a very bad cause." Had Mr. Turner known what he was doing when he placed those books in his daughter's hands, "he would surely have thrown them into the depths of that muddy-banked reservoir attached to the mill he had passed but a few moments before." These books were eagerly read by Annie, and she was anxiously seeking for all the information she could obtain regarding the Infallibility of the Church and the Holy Eucharist, when an incident occurred which, but for the Divine Grace, might have marred her course Romeward. Meeting some Catholic children, who, in answer to her questions, told her that they were taught to worship the Blessed Virgin, and deceived as to all that she heard from them, by "translating it according to her own preconceived notions and prejudices, she imagined that she had discovered a grand error in the Church which claimed to be the only true one," and, for the time, "she came to the conclusion that there is no Infallible Church after all"; and "as she walked home, she determined to read no more of those Catholic books which had affected her so powerfully." Moreover, she resolved to endeavour to be contented with the denomination to which she belonged; for since no Church was perfect, why should she not keep to this?" So on that same evening she carried back the books to her father's library, and determined to think no more about the Catholic Church. Time went on, and notwithstanding her previous resolutions, her anxieties began to unsettle her health. Her failing health was the cause for another visit to Lowfields, and while there she accepted an invitation to visit, with her cousin, a friend in Worcestershire. A railway accident occurred, her cousin was seriously injured, and was kindly received into the house of a Catholic lady, whose only son, Father Bernard, had been their travelling companion. Here our heroine became acquainted with the Catholic religion as it is practised in a pious family, and having resolved to co-operate with the grace of God, she determined to submit to Holy Church. After her cousin's recovery, and the return of the two girls to Lowfields, Annie mentioned her determination to her uncle, and, at his request, had an interview with Mr. Hartley, "whose arguments were so vapid, and his reasoning so dull, that Annie easily *got the better of her opponent.*" Annie then wrote to her father, giving him an account of all her doubts, fears, and decision. This letter Mr. Turner answered in person, determined to use every effort to

change his daughter's purpose. He began by treating her convictions as a "ridiculous fancy," professing to believe that a little calm reasoning would dispel the "temporary delusion" under which she was labouring. "Finding that her convictions were too deeply rooted to be overturned so easily as he had anticipated, he brought all the force of his intellect to bear upon the task which he had undertaken, and very different were the arguments which he brought forward from those of which he had made use in his lectures on the Romish Church. But these, powerful as they appeared, could not affect Annie; for even when she could not confute them, she did not doubt their falsity." We pass over the trials which succeeded this interview. Annie persevered, and was at last received into the One Fold, and had the happiness of being accompanied by her uncle in her submission to Holy Church.

Having seen Annie, with her uncle, safe in the Church, we will refer our readers to "Which is Right?" as a very amusing and interesting story, and we also recommend the book to those who desire to know something of what the fruits are—rather different from those of the Holy Spirit—which are the produce of dissent. Although Miss Turner is the leading personage of the story, the doings of others may interest the reader, since, besides the double conversion of Annie and her uncle, two others of our characters find their way into the Church from different points; her cousin, who was received into the Church on her deathbed, and a young Anglican curate, whose ecclesiastical studies and Ritualistic practices brought him to a confession which shocked his vicar: "To tell the truth, I feel as though I were only just outside the gates of that Eternal City, and I do not think it will be long ere I knock and reques permission to enter."

Margaret Roper; or, the Chancellor and his Daughter. By AGNES STEWART. London: Burns & Oates.

MARGARET ROPER has been published at an opportune moment, as Rome is now considering the question of the canonization of her noble father, and the martyr Cardinal Bishop of Rochester, the Ven. John Fisher. Miss Stewart, in a short address to her readers, says that "it would be hard to separate Sir Thomas More from his daughter, so united were they in life. With the filial devotion of Margaret, and the beautiful simplicity which marked the character of her father, all must needs be charmed, and must surely grant to that great man the credit of having laid his head on the block from a firm conviction in the truth of the doctrines of the faith he professed." A sketch of the home and family of Sir Thomas More, taking us back to the society of so many distinguished personages, must be always interesting, more especially when traced by the hand of one so well qualified for the task as is Miss Stewart. One or two passages we may select:—

"I wish I had been able to discover for my reader the copies of Margaret's letters, which elicited the following from her good father,

who, amidst the distractions of a court life and the exactions the king made upon his time, yet found leisure to compose letters so full of wisdom and fatherly love. 'Thy letters, dearest Margaret, were grateful unto me, which certified me of the state of Shaw; yet would they have been more grateful unto me if they had told me what you and your brother's studies were, what is read amongst you every day, how you converse together, what themes you make, and how you pass the day amongst you; and although nothing is written from you but what is most pleasing to me, yet those things are sweets which I can only learn through you or your brother. And, in short, I pray thee, Meg, see that I understand by you what your studies are. For rather than I would suffer you, my children, to live idly, I would myself look to you with loss of my temporal estate, bidding all other cares and business farewell, amongst which there is nothing more sweet unto me than thyself, my dearest daughter. Farewell.'"

Passing on to a later period of Margaret's life, we read that:—

"A young maiden she was, very young, when she became the bride of William Roper, who had received a university education, had dwelt some time in the family of Sir Thomas, and was much given to learning. Margaret had fully realized the bright promise of her childhood, she bid fair to become as the valiant woman of the Scriptures, opening her mouth to wisdom, having the law of clemency upon her tongue, opening her hand to the needy, and stretching out her hands to the poor. Skilled in the languages of the ancients, she had grown up wise as a serpent, and innocent as a dove.

"Her father had made her his almoner, and having hired a house for many aged people, whom he relieved daily, also made it her charge to see that they wanted nothing, and he made her the mistress of all his secrets respecting his private charities, which were liberal and numerous."

But the lives of the Chancellor and his daughter were not destined to pass on always so smoothly. When Sir Thomas by his upright defence of right and justice had lost the favour of his master, Miss Stewart tells us that—

"In the quiet hours of the night he slept not, but thought over the worst that could possibly happen to him, with prayers and tears begging God to strengthen him, so that in the hour of danger the flesh might not triumph over the spirit. And as his mind was fertile in devising expedients whereby his family might feel less grievously the blow when it did come, he once assembled them to dinner, having first hired a pursuivant to come and knock loudly at his door, and give him warning to appear the next day before the commissioners. Poor Lady Moore and his children started to their feet, pale as death, when the dreaded word 'pursuivant' fell upon their ears, and it was not easy for More to calm the fears he had himself excited with a view to better enable them to bear the impending calamity."

For an account of the arrest, imprisonment, and death of the Chancellor and the untiring devotion, courage, and prudence of his daughter during these heavy trials, we beg to refer our readers to Miss Stewart's interesting work, as also for the description of Margaret's after-life, and its closing scenes, and the doings and fate of those with whom she was connected:—

"In the persecution of the monks of the Charter House, Mistress Clements bribed the jailer to let her have access to them; she disguised herself as a milkmaid, with a pail on her head full of meat, wherewith she fed them, putting meat into their mouths, they being tied and not able to stir or help themselves, which having done she afterwards cleaned their prison-house, performing every duty with her own hands. After several

days, the king understanding that they were not dead, ordered a stricter watch to be kept over them, so that the jailer durst not let her in any more; but by her importunity and increased bribes she caused the tiles to be removed from over their heads, and by a string let them down meat in a basket, approaching the same as nearly as she could into their mouths, and they did stand chained against the posts; but they not being able to feed themselves, or at least very little, and the jailer very much fearing that it would be perceived in the end, refused to let her come any more. And so, soon after, they languished and pined away, one after another, what with the stench and misery and want of food which they there endured."

We read that "Mary, one of the daughters of Margaret, was an ornament to her sex; she was maid of honour to Queen Mary Tudor. She translated into English part of her grandfather's 'Exposition of the Passion of our Saviour,' which he wrote in Latin. She was a great favourite with the Queen."

The recent controversy with Mr. Gladstone has drawn special attention to the Catholic doctrine on the relations between Church and State. Under these circumstances, we await with the greatest possible interest the promised translation of Hergenröther's great treatise on the subject, which is to appear (we understand) in August or September. We trust a careful review of the work may appear in our next number; and meanwhile we have great pleasure in placing the prospectus before our readers:—

The Catholic Church and the Christian State, in their Historical Development, and in relation to the Questions of the present day. A series of Historical Essays on Church and State. Translated from the German of DR. JOSEPH HERGENRÖTHER, Professor of Canon Law and Ecclesiastical History at the University of Würzburg.

THIS work is composed of eighteen connected Essays, in which various questions relating to Catholic doctrine, Church history, and Canon Law, which occupy a prominent place in modern controversies, are thoroughly discussed. The author, whose profound learning and zeal for the Church are well known, and who, as regards Ecclesiastical history, may be considered the intellectual head of Catholic Germany, has had as his especial end in this work to make the Middle Ages better known, and to point out the extreme difference between those times and our own. In doing this he shows how groundless are the apprehensions often expressed by modern Governments of the power and the teaching of the Holy See. Moreover, in the course of the discussion he cites and explains a great number of important documents, so that his work presents an invaluable store-house of materials for the use of theologians and historical students. But the work is not merely for these, but is also well fitted for the use of the general public. The questions discussed in it, as a glance at the table of contents will show, are such as must be forced on the attention of all Catholics who take any part in the intellectual and political life of their country; and the clear and straightforward way in which Dr. Hergenröther treats them will enable even an ordinary reader to reach, without difficulty, the right conclusion.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, in a letter published in the January number of *Macmillan's Magazine*, spoke of this work as follows:— "It will be time to discuss the Constitution 'Unam Sanctam' with him

[the writer of the article on 'Prussia and the Vatican'] when he has not only read, but mastered, Hergenröther's 'Katholische Kirche und Christlicher Staat,' in which the Accusations of the Munich Old Catholics are fully refuted."

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THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1875.

Art. I.—F. NEWMAN ON ECCLESIASTICAL PRUDENCE.

A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. By J. H. Newman, D.D. London: Burns & Oates.

Le Père Newman et M. Gladstone. Par le P. Ramière. (*Etudes Religieuses,* Février, 1875, art. 4.)

On former occasions we have not failed to commemorate the various noble defences of Catholic truth, contained in F. Newman's celebrated letter; we made large use of that letter in exhibiting the Catholic answer to Mr. Gladstone; and we have defended F. Newman's arguments against Mr. Gladstone's attempted reply. But there is one particular in his letter,—and that one closely concerning ourselves,—on which we have not hitherto spoken in any detail. We refer to the language of extraordinary severity, which he has thought it his duty to use against certain of his fellow Catholics: a severity which derives especial significance from the fact, that he is usually so very mild and forbearing in his animadversion on others; and that in this very letter he has spoken of the Döllingerite heretics themselves in language of remarkable indulgence (p. 117 or 104*). Now no one will suggest a doubt that, in company with many better men, the Editor of this Review is an object of the disapprobation thus emphatically expressed; and that F. Newman has rebuked him, not only for what he has personally written, but still more for the general principles on which he has conducted the periodical committed to his charge. But while this periodical continues its course, it must be conducted either on the same principles as before or on different principles. If on different

* In our present article, as once before, when we quote from F. Newman's letter, the first number refers to the smaller and the second to the larger edition.

principles, the fact ought to be distinctly stated. On the other hand if (as is the case) we are still convinced that our old principles are the true ones, our readers may fairly demand at our hands that we express distinctly our reasons for so thinking. F. Newman has characterized our language and course of action, as both insolent in itself, and disastrous to the Church's highest interests. When such charges have been brought by a writer, so eminent in intellectual power, so conspicuous alike for sagacity and general charitableness of thought,—it cannot be right for us to continue using the very same kind of language and pursuing the very same course of action, without answering his objections. Our direct reason for not having done so at a still earlier period is, that in April we were occupied with Mr. Gladstone; and that for July we had to write an article on Bishop Fessler, which was manifestly an indispensable preliminary to the present. But even otherwise, it was not until the excitement raised by Mr. Gladstone had subsided, that the proper opportunity arose for treating prominently a domestic controversy.

There is a further reason however for our present article. In opposition to those principles of ours which he rebukes, F. Newman lays down a doctrine of his own: a doctrine, which we are by no means sure that we rightly apprehend, but which—if we do rightly apprehend it—we think open to the precise objections that he has brought against ours; viz. its being gravely injurious, not only to the Church's general well-being, but also to the spiritual interest of souls. But if this be our opinion, it becomes a duty to place it on record, together with the reasons on which we found it; and so submit it to the judgment of those, who are competent to decide on so important a question. At the same time we should violently outrage both our own personal feeling and our sense of obvious duty and propriety, if we did this otherwise than in a tone of profoundest respect for that great man, who in innumerable ways has conferred such signal benefits on the Church, and who in every personal respect is so immeasurably our superior.

F. Newman begins very early indeed in his pamphlet, with denouncing certain Catholics whom he regards as extreme. These are his words:—

> I own to a deep feeling, that Catholics may in good measure thank themselves, and no one else, for having alienated from them so religious a mind. There are those among us, as it must be confessed, who for years past have conducted themselves as if no responsibility attached to wild words and overbearing deeds; who have stated truths in the most paradoxical form, and stretched principles till they were close upon snapping (p. 4).

Plainly it is impossible to answer so general an indictment as this. We are very far from implying, that F. Newman has not a perfect right to prefer it. He possesses, and must know that he possesses, vast influence over no inconsiderable number of English Catholics; while he is regarded by the whole Catholic body without exception with sincerest respect and affection. Now he is profoundly convinced that the habits of thought and language, prevalent in what he accounts a certain extreme school, deserve all the reprobation which he expresses. When he wrote his pamphlet, he had no leisure for expatiating and enlarging on the various charges he has summed up in the above sentence, because his main business was to answer Mr. Gladstone. But no one acts under a more constant sense of duty and responsibility than F. Newman; and he may well have felt it his bounden duty to take the opportunity offered him, for throwing the whole weight of his influence into what he considers the scale of Christian charity and moderation. We do not at all demur therefore to his having spoken so openly: we only affirm, that others are to the full as convinced on their side as he on his. They entirely deny, that they have been guilty of "wild words and overbearing deeds"; that they have "stated truths in the most paradoxical form," nay in any form at all paradoxical; or that they "have stretched principles till they were close upon snapping." They can give no answer in detail to what has not been alleged in detail; though it is extremely painful to them, both on public and (in many instances) on private grounds, that F. Newman should so judge of their labours in that cause, which is no less dear to them than to him. Perforce however they content themselves with praying God, that the least possible injury may accrue to His cause through such language; language, they admit, which F. Newman has been obliged to utter, by that very habit of fearless obedience to his conscience, which in him is so attractive and edifying a quality.

There is another charge however, far more definite in character, brought against us, which demands our very careful attention. This charge is implied in various portions of the letter, but finds perhaps its most intelligible statement in the following:—

So difficult a virtue is faith, even with the special grace of God, in proportion as the reason is exercised, so difficult is it to assent inwardly to propositions, verified to us neither by reason nor experience, but depending for their reception on the word of the Church as God's oracle, that she has ever shown the utmost care to contract, as far as possible, the range of truths

and the sense of propositions, of which she demands this absolute reception. "The Church," says Pallavicini, "as far as may be, has ever abstained from imposing upon the minds of men that commandment, the most arduous of the Christian Law—viz., to believe obscure matters without doubting." To co-operate in this charitable duty has been one special work of her theologians, and rules are laid down by herself, by tradition, and by custom, to assist them in the task. She only speaks when it is necessary to speak; but hardly has she spoken out magisterially some great general principle, when she sets her theologians to work to explain her meaning in the concrete, by strict interpretation of its wording, by the illustration of its circumstances, and by the recognition of exceptions, in order to make it as tolerable as possible, and the least of a temptation, to self-willed, independent, or wrongly educated minds. A few years ago it was the fashion among us to call writers, who conformed to this rule of the Church, by the name of "Minimizers"; that day of tyrannous ipse-dixits, I trust, is over: Bishop Fessler, a man of high authority, for he was Secretary General of the Vatican Council, and of higher authority still in his work, for it has the approbation of the Sovereign Pontiff, clearly proves to us that a moderation of doctrine, dictated by charity, is not inconsistent with soundness in the faith (pp. 125, 6, or 111, 2).

As a protection against such "tyrannous ipse-dixits," in various portions of his letter—as e.g. in p. 141 or 125—he earnestly recommends the large use of "a wise and gentle minimism." He expresses his "repugnance to impose upon the faith of others more than what the Church distinctly claims of them"; and adds, in rebuke of certain Catholics, that "there has been of late years a fierce and intolerant temper abroad, which scorns and virtually tramples on the little ones of Christ."

We have said that this charge is more definite than the one which we previously considered. Yet even as regards this,—after having given it our best attention,—we can only set forth F. Newman's meaning with a certain conjecturalness. We need hardly however add, that nothing could give us greater pleasure than to find that we have misapprehended him; and we shall not be willing only but eager to retract any comment we make on his letter, which may turn out to have been founded on misconception.

We understand F. Newman then as holding, that any Catholic offends against charity, who presses any ex cathedrâ utterance on the acceptance of his brethren, as being obligatory in any sense more stringent, than the widest and most indulgent interpretation which prevails among theologically instructed Catholics. According to this doctrine,—if I set forth arguments for the purpose of proving, that the Pope intended such utterance to mean more than certain theologically instructed Catholics admit, and that these Catholics

therefore are under an obligation of reforming their opinion —I am thereby exhibiting "a fierce and intolerant temper, which scorns and virtually tramples on the little ones of Christ." Should these arguments indeed have convinced me, I may without reproach accept the stricter interpretation for *my own* guidance; but when I proceed to set forth these self-same arguments before *others*,—especially if I do so with earnestness and emphasis—I am guilty of a "tyrannous ipse-dixit."* And F. Newman bases this doctrine on the allegation, that interior assent to the Church's voice is a most arduous duty; and that a large number of Catholics therefore would be tempted to apostasy, if any one ventured to tell them that such or such a doctrine, which they do not at present receive, is really imposed by the Holy Father on their interior acceptance.

We cannot see that F. Newman means less than we have stated. He might imaginably indeed intend no more than this. He might intend only to say, that any one acts cruelly and intolerantly who,—merely because some proposition happens to suit his own personal taste,—at once without any solid ground assumes it to have been taught ex cathedrâ, and endeavours accordingly to force it down the throat of others. But then F. Newman's criticism of the word "minimizers" shows that he is referring primarily to ourselves; and for our own part we should not fall one inch behind F. Newman, in heartily denouncing such tyranny as is here supposed. No reader of the DUBLIN REVIEW, we are perfectly convinced, will allege that we have ever pressed our interpretation of any ex cathedrâ Act as the true one, without alleging solid argumentative grounds in its support; whether or no our arguments in any given case be accounted conclusive. No: the charge which he brings against us must certainly be something different from this.

We repeat then—we cannot see how to credit F. Newman with any other doctrine, than that which we have in fact ascribed to him. At all events it will be better directly to encounter the said doctrine, whether it be F. Newman's or no; because there is no doubt that many well-intentioned Catholics both hold it themselves and ascribe it to F. Newman. And we will begin by submitting to his judgment what has always appeared to us the rationale of ecclesiastical definitions, in reference to that peril of scandalizing Christ's little ones, which he so keenly feels. We would suggest then as follows.

It is in the very highest degree important for the sanctifica-

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* "Men if they will may maximize for me, provided they keep from dogmatizing" (p. 163 or 147).

tion of Catholics, that the Deposit should be preserved in its full integrity. On the other hand, take any grave error which at the moment may be threatening the purity of that Deposit: the authoritative condemnation of such error (notwithstanding its immediate and eventual benefit) must incidentally also inflict serious momentary, and perhaps even permanent, injury. "Self-willed or independent or wrongly educated minds" (to use F. Newman's words) will repudiate the condemnation; some from perversely or inculpably misunderstanding its purport, and others from greater or less sympathy with the error condemned. It will be instructive to look at this general fact, as exhibited in some particular case; and we will take our illustrative instance (many others would equally serve our purpose) from the account of the Fourth Council, given by F. Newman himself in his "Essay on Development." See pp. 303—307. By far the larger portion of the Bishops assembled at Chalcedon accepted indeed heartily S. Leo's Tome, but refused in the first instance to insert its characteristic phrase "*in* two natures" in their Definition; nor did they concede the point, until they were coerced into doing so "by the resolution of the Pope, acting through his Legates and supported by the civil power" (p. 307). What to all appearance has resulted from this "resolution" of S. Leo's—in company with blessings which cannot be exaggerated—has been the formation of that vast Monophysite sect, with its various ramifications, which has inflicted such terrible injury on souls. Yet no Catholic thinks of doubting, that the Council was guided in what it did by the Holy Ghost's promised assistance, and that its good largely preponderates over its evil.

Now we may make a purely imaginary but most intelligible supposition. When S. Leo's Legates have departed, and the disintegrating effect of what has been done manifests itself more and more in the rapid ripening of formal schism—when large numbers are preparing to leave the Church rather than accept the Definition of "in two natures"—some influential Catholics, actuated by truly charitable intentions, argue with these persons as follows: "There can be no doubt on the sub-"stantial meaning of the Definition: it was issued for the pur-"pose of condemning Eutyches, and of solemnly affirming that "dogma concerning the Incarnation which he denied. By all "means therefore let Eutychians, if they will not renounce "their heresy, leave the Church's visible communion. But "*you* are no Eutychians: * you think of leaving the Church,

* "The great body of the protesting party disowned Eutyches" (F. Newman, p. 308). "It is allowed by Vigilius of Thapsa that" "in many cases" "their difference from the Catholics was a simple matter of words" p. 309).

"purely because there is one particular *phrase* in the Defi-
"nition which offends you. Surely this is most unreasonable.
"Definitions of the Church are not like passages of inspired
"Scripture: what they declare is (by God's promise) infallibly
"true *in substance;* but there is no promise that the *words*
"expressing it shall always be those most apt for the purpose.
"In the present case our own opinion is, that they *were* aptly
"chosen; but God forbid we should insist on this as a condition
"of communion. So difficult a virtue is faith, that the Church
"has ever shown the utmost care to contract as far as possible
"the range of truths and the sense of propositions of which
"she demands the absolute reception; and we can never
"believe—we entreat you not to believe—that she can have
"intended to excommunicate her loyally intentioned children,
"for no other offence than a verbal misunderstanding."

We now come to the direct point of our illustration. A loyal and clear-sighted Catholic puts forth every effort, to resist this threatened perversion of the Church's teaching. He takes most sedulous care indeed, not in any way to exaggerate or misrepresent what the Council has defined. He uses every legitimate resource to remove the existing prejudices against it; he explains to his brother Catholics its profound harmony with the dicta of the early Fathers; nay he points out how necessary are the defined words, for the very purpose of protecting what S. Athanasius and S. Cyril had laid down. Still on the other hand he insists on the fact, that the "in two natures" is no incidental expression or obiter dictum; that S. Leo—"the very one commissioned by the Saviour with the guardianship of the Vine"—had enforced the phrase, as absolutely necessary to the protection of the Church's Faith; and that whatever he has enforced as essential must be *held* as essential. On this, the influential Catholics above mentioned, seeing that their excellently intentioned plans for averting schism are threatened with failure, proceed to denounce this Catholic champion for his "tyrannous ipse-dixits"; and charge him with "virtually trampling on the little ones of Christ." We think F. Newman will admit, that had such maxims been allowed to prevail, the Faith would long since have disappeared from the face of the earth.

All loyal and clear-sighted Catholics then at that period accepted as a matter of course, on faith in Christ's promises,—not only the proposition that Christ is in two natures,—but also the proposition, that S. Leo consulted the true permanent interest of the Faith and of Christian souls, by insisting on the expression of that Verity. In other words they took for granted, not only that he defined truly, but also that

be defined opportunely. This is the great argument against F. Newman, on which we would insist. He says, "forbear from insisting on any doctrine which may injure the little ones of Christ." We ask most respectfully in reply—what private Christian in the fifth century could have *guessed* by his own lights, whether the enforcement of the "in two natures" would have caused greater benefit or injury to the little ones of Christ? It is for the Church and the Holy See, acting under the Holy Ghost's enlightenment, to decide on such a question; and if you call on an individual to exercise his private judgment on it, you impose on him a work—so we would earnestly venture to submit—which is preposterously and absurdly beyond the reach of the human faculties. It is surely the business of a Catholic writer, not to attempt what is grotesquely impossible, but to follow as best he can the guidance of the Holy See; to insist on the doctrines on which the Supreme Pontiff insists; and to be confident, without the shadow of a doubt, that by so doing he really promotes the welfare of souls.* Such is the principle on which we have throughout acted, and which to us seems the only intelligible one. We do not for a moment deny, that great judgment and forbearance are often obligatory, in dealing with individual cases; that "self-willed, independent or wrongly educated minds" are spiritual invalids, requiring careful and tender treatment. But a Catholic public writer is not the spiritual physician of individual souls; he addresses the Catholic body as a whole: and we hold, for the reasons we have given, that his paramount duty is to follow as best he can the guidance of the Holy See. We are not wishing to

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* Since the sentence in the text was written, we have received the "Etudes" of August; which (p. 259) cites a passage from a Brief of Pius IX. so singularly to our purpose, that we must not fail to cite it. It was addressed to "the members of the General Assembly of Catholic Committees," and bears date only the 22nd of this last July. We italicize a few words.

"Since nothing can be established either stable or *useful to the true advancement of souls*, unless it rest on *sound doctrine* or if it detract in any respect from the truth,—you who have in view the solid good of your brethren, have resolved with great wisdom *to follow faithfully and in all obedience the teachings of this Chair of Truth:* and taking [the said Chair] for your guide, to avoid with care all errors and perilous opinions; *especially those which have been proscribed* in the Apostolic Letter 'Quantâ curâ' and in *the Syllabus annexed to it* (qui y est joint)."

Here is another distinct declaration of the Holy Father, that he published the Syllabus as an annex to the "Quantâ curâ." Moreover he affirms, that all who take for their guide the teachings of the Chair of Truth, must repudiate the errors recited in the Syllabus. Lastly he lays down, that such submission to the Holy See is especially necessary for *the true advancement of souls.*

defend *ourselves*, but to maintain a principle which we think of great moment. If F. Newman is able to show, that we have given to any Pontifical utterance a more stringent sense than legitimately belongs to it—or that we have insisted on any "extreme" doctrine on which the Pope has not given us the example of insisting—then we shall confess that we have deserved rebuke at his hands. We are not denying that such may have been the case, though we are not aware that it has been. We only submit to him, that this and no other is the standard by which our past course ought to be measured.

Various objections have been raised, whether by F. Newman or others, against this principle; and by replying to these objections, we shall be able to put the whole matter in a fuller and clearer light.

I. In pursuing the end we mention, we have often enough been obliged to lay stress on the proposition, that this or that given Pontifical Act was certainly issued ex cathedrâ; though we well knew that various Catholics, even theologically instructed Catholics, thought otherwise. It has been plausibly objected, that by so acting we have violated the doctrine of "probabilism." But to this we have replied, that we in no way violate that doctrine. Undoubtedly, so long as there are grave theologians who doubt the ex cathedrâ character of some given Act, no priest (however strong his personal conviction) has a right to impose his own opinion in the Confessional, or in any other way to press men to accept it on his mere ipse-dixit. But this is in no way whatever inconsistent with the supposition, that it may nevertheless be a sacred duty on his part to propagate in other ways his own conclusion. He can put forth his best efforts, to convince others by theological reasoning; to persuade individual Catholics of the intellectual submission they owe to this utterance; nay to effect if possible, that the opinion opposed to his own shall gradually lose all extrinsic probability (as in his mind it never *had* any *in*trinsic) by its chief supporters deserting it. To do all this, is in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of probabilism; and in many instances his loyalty to the Holy See and his zeal for the sanctification and salvation of souls may make such a course his imperative duty. And we will here further assume (for this is outside the present question) that if a priest may be called on by ecclesiastical loyalty to do this, so also may a layman writing under due ecclesiastical censorship.

II. F. Newman however is himself so large and ungrudging as to the number of Pontifical Acts which he admits to be ex cathedrâ, that he would not occupy the precise ground of

objection which we have just considered. He considers indeed that we have tyrannically endeavoured to force our own opinions down the throat of our brother Catholics; but he considers us as having done so,—not so much by unduly enlarging the list of ex cathedrâ Acts—but rather by pressing our own private interpretation of such Acts, as the one exclusively tenable. At the same time this is in principle the same objection as that which we have just considered; and our answer to it is substantially the same. A priest, who is firmly convinced after careful examination that some given ex cathedrâ Act defines this or that given doctrine, nevertheless may not enforce on his penitents any obligation of accepting that doctrine, so long as there is solid extrinsic probability on the other side. But it may be his sacred duty nevertheless to do all he possibly can, in the way of persuading the Catholic body, theologians and laymen, that his interpretation is the true one.

It may be reasonably asked however, what are the data given to a Catholic, whereby he may know what the precise doctrine is which has been defined in any given ex cathedrâ Act. On this head we take it there is no difference whatever among theologians—nor do we see how there can be—on the matter of principle. Suppose the actual wording of such Pontifical utterance to admit in itself reasonable doubt as to its true interpretation, it will be the theologian's business—by pondering both its text and every relevant circumstance—to discover what the Pope *intended* to define. There may be occasionally real difficulty in coming to a certain conclusion on this matter; but as regards the large majority of instances, we are confident there will be no substantial difference of opinion, among those who sincerely give themselves to the inquiry.* It will be impossible of course here to examine successively even the ex cathedrâ Acts of the reigning Pope. But one general remark may be made, which is, we think, of considerable moment.

In no single instance that we can remember has Pius IX. complained, that any definition of the Holy See has received an *exaggerated* interpretation; whereas he has repeatedly rebuked the opposite fault. In his commanded Letter to the Count de Beaulieu, which we quoted in April, 1865 (p. 480), he pronounces that had Gregory XVI.'s "Mirari vos" been "received as it should have been," there could have been "no

* Catholics "easily *forget to inquire* what the Church has to say, and persuade themselves too at times that the Church cannot have said anything that will interfere with their ideas."—F. O'Reilly, S.J., in the "Month" for Sept., 1871, p. 187.

dissension nor reason for doubting" the soundness of those principles, which the Count had been maintaining against Montalembert. In the Brief to M. Périn which we translated last April (pp. 535, 6) Pius IX. affirms, that those who "obstinately adhere" in principle to the liberties of 1789 "place their own private judgment above the teachings of the Church." Such indeed has repeatedly been his language; but we may save ourselves the trouble of otherwise citing it, because the very emphatic Act of last June may well stand for a large multitude of utterances. As our readers will remember, the Pontiff indulgenced a prayer, and wished that it should be recited on the same day by every Catholic throughout the world: a prayer which contained the following clause:

WOULD THAT I COULD OBTAIN ALSO FOR THOSE CATHOLICS WHO STILL PROVE THEMSELVES TO BE SUCH BY MANY OUTWARD ACTS OF CHARITY, BUT WHO THROUGH OBSTINACY IN THEIR OWN OPINIONS REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE HOLY SEE, OR CHERISH SENTIMENTS AT VARIANCE WITH HER TEACHING, [THAT THEY] SHOULD SEE THEIR ERRORS, AND BECOME PERSUADED THAT HE WHO HEARETH NOT THE CHURCH IN ALL THINGS, HEARETH NOT GOD WHO IS WITH HER.*

The Holy Father then labours to impress on every one of his subjects a conviction, that one chief danger of the time, — for the removal of which special prayer should be offered to Almighty God,—is the existence of Catholics who do not accept the full teaching of the Holy See. The three principal needs of the time, in his judgment, are (1) that sinners (including of course formal heretics) be converted; (2) that Catholics be roused to zeal for God's glory and the Church's interests; (3) that a certain body of Catholics, who in some sense indeed are zealous but who are unsound in doctrine, may at last submit themselves to the full teaching of God and the Church. When therefore some given ex cathedrâ Act is before the consideration of Catholics,—they should remember that the divinely-appointed "Teacher of all Christians" has emphatically warned them against any *inadequate* apprehension of Pontifical teaching, while he has given no kind of warning in the opposite direction. They must not of course on that account force upon any ex cathedrâ Act a sense which is not certainly therein contained; but at the same time they should remember that, in their supreme pastor's judgment, the present *danger* is on the side of undue minimism.

III. It is plain from many passages of F. Newman's letter,

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* See the whole prayer cited in our last number, pp. 37, 8.

that one principal ground of his rebuke is the distinction we have been in the habit of drawing, between sound and unsound, loyal and disloyal Catholics; a distinction which he accounts schismatical in tendency and injurious to the Church's unity. We have more than once explained ourselves on this matter; and in what follows we shall have little to do, beyond repeating what we have already said. But before we proceed to this task, we will make two preliminary remarks.

The first refers to a contrast which F. Newman has felt it his duty to draw (p. 141 or 125), between F. O'Reilly's theological temper, and that which has been exhibited by those whom F. Newman censures. We should certainly feel that a considerable adverse presumption would be generated against ourselves, if this allegation could be sustained; but we submit that it cannot be at all sustained. F. O'Reilly is most justly described by F. Newman as "one of the first theologians of the day"; and it is a great loss to the Church, that he has published so little: but even the few publications of his which exist, amply suffice for our purpose. Among the most thoroughly well-balanced and satisfactory theological expositions which have ever appeared of the Pope's doctrine on his civil princedom, was one inserted by F. O'Reilly in the "Month" of Sept. and Nov., 1871. We are not here going to enter on the matter of this treatise; but we would draw attention to such a passage as the following (Sept., p. 178), italicizing a few of the words:—

The parties opposed to each other [on this question] are on the one side *sound well-informed Catholics;* on the other, infidels, many Christians not belonging to the true Church, *Catholics who are culpably unsound in their views,* and lastly, *ignorant or deluded Catholics.* . . . For us *right-thinking Catholics,* as we consider ourselves to be, &c. &c.

He then proceeds to imply, that all "sound," "right-thinking" Catholics pay due deference to certain ecclesiastical utterances, which he proceeds to recite; and which, he says (p. 184), "carry an obligation with them" of interior assent. Presently comes the following passage; in which the italics are his own:—

The denial of the necessity of the Temporal Power in that mitigated sense of necessity I have endeavoured to explain, though not liable to the same charge [of actual constructive heresy], is undoubtedly unsound and uncatholic. Such views on the part of Catholics may be variously accounted for. In some they may be the effect of culpable deception coming from others or from themselves. This as well as other causes is often helped by a certain obliquity of mind akin to partial derangement. Then there is in many

a reckless presumption, which makes them adopt, on the most sacred subjects, opinions which strike them as reasonable, without any proportionate examination, and especially without consulting authority. Of course if the Church speaks clearly enough *for them*, being Catholics, they will not hold out; but they easily forget to inquire what the Church has to say, and persuade themselves too at times that the Church *cannot have said* anything that will interfere with their ideas (pp. 186, 7).

Still stronger expressions may be found in F. O'Reilly's article on Irish Education, in the "Month" for March, 1872 :—

The great evil to be feared [from mixed education] is not apostasy, but a kind of unsoundness which may easily be found in professing Catholics. A certain undesirable class of them are an easy fruit of such training— a class distinguished by doctrinal looseness joined with a very imperfect allegiance to the Church, and, as a necessary consequence, a commenced proclivity towards unbelief. Even those who have been educated at Catholic schools too often become later infected with this pestilence, which is found floating in the moral atmosphere of society (p. 180).

We should certainly be surprised, if any passage could be cited from any other Catholic writer, speaking more confidently than this on the existence of doctrinal unsoundness among certain Catholics.*

This reference to F. O'Reilly was the first preliminary remark we had to make. Our second is one which we have expressed again and again, but which cannot too often be repeated. Catholics remaining such cannot possibly differ from each other on any dogma, which the Church teaches *as part of revealed truth*. In the Catholic Church one definite exhibition of revealed truth, whether as to dogma or practice, is placed alike before student and peasant—to be apprehended by them of course variously according to their respective endowments but nevertheless one and the same—whether they are only seeking to obey God's commandments or whether they desire to advance interiorly in His love and service. This exposition of revealed truth was accepted by M. de Montalembert and the Liberal Catholics, as heartily as by the Count de Beaulieu himself.

Every Catholic, we say, renounces as a matter of course those

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* There is one particular expression of F. O'Reilly's, on which F. Newman lays stress as especially opposed to our own doctrine. F. O'Reilly says that "Papal infallibility is comparatively seldom brought into action." But, as we explained last January (p. 214), we entirely follow him in this statement. Ex cathedrâ pronouncements constitute a very small proportion indeed of the Pope's official Acts; and it is necessary again and again to press this fact on the attention of Protestants, who tax Catholics with ascribing infallibity to everything which the Pope says or does.

tenets, which the Church condemns as directly contradictory to revealed truth; because he who advocates any such tenet ceases ipso facto to be a Catholic. But then the Holy See has often condemned certain opinions, not as heretical but as meriting some minor censure. Now those who continue to maintain such opinions as these latter, do not therefore become heretics, but only unsound Catholics. And the question is, which of the two parties is justly arraigned for violating Catholic unity—those Catholics on the one hand who cleave to such errors, or those on the other hand who protest against the former class. F. Ramière answers this question so pointedly, that we are very glad of an opportunity to quote his words. They will be found in his admirable paper on Catholic Liberalism, which we translated in July. "We can always learn," he says, "with absolute certainty who they are who disturb union. Jesus Christ has established a centre of unity in His Church. Union is adhesion to unity, division is opposition to unity. Do not accuse then the champions of unity of disturbing union." And conformably with this, one special rebuke pronounced by the Holy Father on the Liberal Catholics has always been, that —by not accepting the definitions of the Holy See—they so grievously disturb union. So in his commanded Letter to the Count de Beaulieu: "Let them advert to the detriment inflicted by them on the Church's cause, which . . . . *demands union of mind and opinions,* and claims from Catholics that they should, as it were, in a phalanx, rush with one accord against the common foe." And so, quite recently, in his Brief to M. Périn: "If these men *had not thus divided the united forces of the Catholic family,* the audacious machinations of revolutionists would have been restrained." Christ desires indeed that the Church should be thoroughly one in doctrine; but He desires that she should be retained in unity by *submission,* not by *indifference,* to the full teaching of His Vicar. And now the Holy Father (in the prayer to which we have already referred) has declared in words of extraordinary strength, that the one main evil prevalent, among those Catholics who are not simply worldly and irreligious, is that so many of them through obstinacy decline submission to the decisions of the Holy See, and so refuse to hear what is the very voice of God. It is surely singular, that a Catholic writer should be accused of schismatical tendency for no other offence, than that of drawing prominent attention to what the Holy Father regards as among the gravest evils which afflict the Church.

IV. "None but the schola theologorum," says F. Newman (p. 4), "is competent to determine the force of Papal and Synodal utterances." As this sentence stands in his letter, it expresses

against Mr. Gladstone a very important truth; because it was quite impossible for one in Mr. Gladstone's circumstances to understand the true Catholic doctrine, on those various matters which he treated so peremptorily and superciliously. But there is another very different sense in which this expression has sometimes been used, by Catholics who desire to minimize the teaching of the Holy See. It has been implied before now, that the faithful can never hear their pastor's true voice, except through the medium of theologians; that in the days of Jansenism, e.g., ordinary laymen had no means of knowing that their assent was required to the dogmatic fact concerning Jansenius, until theologians had said their last word on the subject; that in 1832 the followers of Lamennais were not called upon to renounce his errors, until they had given every attention to the theological arguments he was to adduce, whether against the ex cathedrâ character of the "Mirari vos," or on the true purport of its teaching; and so in a hundred other instances.

We do not suppose that F. Newman himself can sympathize with this view; because his opinion is well known, that, in the days of Arianism, the unlearned laity apprehended the Catholic dogma more purely, than almost any other class of the whole Christian community. "Perhaps" this fact was permitted, he says, "to impress upon the Church, at that very time passing out of her state of persecution to her long temporal ascendancy, the great evangelical lesson, that not the wise and powerful, but the obscure, the unlearned and the weak constitute her real strength" ("History of the Arians," 3rd edition, pp. 454, 5). We cannot indeed follow F. Newman, in what he says to the comparative disparagement of Catholic Bishops and others; but we think that his opinion concerning the simple and unlearned (whether historically certain or no) is thoroughly in accordance with human nature. There cannot be a greater mistake—as he has himself often admirably pointed out—than to suppose, that those who for want of due education cannot *argue* on some given subject, are on that account unable to *reason* thereon. On the contrary, when they are really bent on some end, they will often reason with surprising correctness as to the means of its attainment. And so it will happen again and again, that those who may have received no theological education, but who look with humility and simplicity to the Holy See for guidance, will apprehend the teaching of that See far more accurately, than many a theologian who is twisted by an unconscious bias in his dealing with Pontifical Acts. Devout Catholics in Italy e.g. see with the clearness of intuition that the Pope has really imposed on

Catholics an obligation of believing the moral necessity of his civil princedom; while this or that theologian is perhaps stumbling over imaginary difficulties, and doubting the indubitable.*

Pius IX. has on various occasions notably sanctioned the principle for which we are here contending; and one instance of this is so remarkable, that we must not fail to adduce it, though we have before mentioned it in our pages. The facts were stated in the "Bien Public" of Ghent for January 4th, 1870. We italicize one or two sentences in the letters which we shall cite; the originals of which will be found in our number for April, 1870, pp. 310, 1, note.

Three young Catholic Belgian laymen, Editors of the "Catholique," thus addressed the Holy Father:—

Assured as we are that the only efficacious means for resisting the propagation of pernicious doctrines consists in the faithfully receiving, respecting, and practising the teachings of the Holy See, we have particularly applied ourselves to inculcate and to strengthen both by example and exhortation respect for those august teachings. Such has been the thought which originated the foundation of our Review, and which has throughout inspired its editorship. In order to treat those political and social questions which chiefly occupy men's minds, especially in our country, *we have always taken for our guide the light of the Ecclesia Docens and the decisions which have emanated from your Holiness's infallible authority.*

The character we have thus given to our publication has brought upon it much opposition, not only from the enemies of our Faith, but *often also from many Catholics:* who, while preserving sincere and devoted attachment to the cause of religion, nevertheless do not understand either promoting that cause or seeing it promoted otherwise than by more indirect methods; and witness with a certain impatience the exposition and development of the majestic severities of doctrine. We have had to defend ourselves, in opposition to their criticisms, from the reproach of *disturbing the uniformity of Christian influence over public affairs* through our support of isolated and unpopular opinions.

To this the Holy Father replied by a Letter bearing date November 4, 1868. From this letter the "Bien Public" publishes the following extract:—

Equivocal and captious opinions have been introduced for a long time past by a false philosophy and propagated by the delusive attractions of liberty. Having been still more widely spread and intensified by a continual course of revolutionary (désordonnés) events, they have not only given a large opening to impiety and sedition, but (which is perhaps not less afflicting)

* F. Newman is very sensitive to the danger of "scandalizing Christ's little ones." It seems to us, that in many cases there is no more certain way of scandalizing Christ's little ones, than the minimizing Catholic doctrine.

they have carried away a large number of pious spirits. These, by their example and authority, bring round others to the same opinions, develop the evil germs therein contained, and (contrariwise to their sentiments and intentions) *weaken the force which ought to have been directed unanimously and unitedly against the common enemy.*

We congratulate ourselves therefore that, in the combat which you have undertaken against the enemies of religion and authority, you have made it your rule to follow faithfully the teachings of the Holy See and *to explain them in the purity of their original sense;* in order that the people may be penetrated with pure and sound doctrine, and learn to understand the occult perfidiousness of formulæ which, more than at other epochs, flatter so insidiously the tendencies and lusts of our age. And we felicitate you because, without suffering yourselves to be discouraged, you sustain a combat already long-continued, in which you are called on to contend, not only against the enemy, but *also and often against your brethren.*

The Holy Father then certainly does not teach, that "none but the schola theologorum is competent to determine the force of Papal utterances."

V. We now lastly come to that extract from F. Newman's letter, which we gave at starting. The thesis which we are opposing (be it remembered)—whether or no F. Newman intends to maintain it,—is this; that any Catholic offends against charity, who presses any ex cathedrâ utterance on the acceptance of his brethren, as being obligatory in any sense more stringent, than the widest and most indulgent interpretation of it which prevails among theologically instructed Catholics. This is the thesis, which we understand F. Newman to maintain; and in virtue of which (as we apprehend his meaning) he rebukes us for "scorning and virtually trampling on the little ones of Christ." Now it is hopeless to arrive at a mutual understanding, so long as the controversy remains involved in generalities; and we will therefore select as our ground of argument one particular instance, among the various propositions which we have before now maintained, of the kind to which F. Newman so gravely objects. Having set forth our grounds for maintaining that proposition, we will attempt to estimate the force of F. Newman's reply.

In the Encyclical "Singulari nos" Gregory XVI. declared to the whole Episcopate, that in the "Mirari vos" he had "according to the authority given him" "defined" "the Catholic doctrine" in regard to obedience of subjects; in regard to indifferentism; also in regard to "the restraining extravagant licentiousness of opinions and utterances (deque frenis injiciendis evaganti opinionum sermonumque licentiæ)"; &c. &c. Moreover he added, that this is the doctrine "which alone it is lawful to follow"; and which "according to the

duty of his office" he had "proclaimed to the whole Christian flock." No fact in the world then can be more certain to a Catholic, than that the lessons of the "Mirari vos" "in regard to the restraining extravagant licentiousness of opinions and utterances" were taught ex cathedrâ; and that in their general substance therefore (as distinct from obiter dicta and peculiarities of language) they are infallibly true. From those lessons we here extract that portion, which concerns liberty of the press.

To this may be referred that liberty—most foul and never sufficiently to be execrated and detested—that liberty of the bookselling trade to publish any kind of writings, which some men dare to demand and promote with so much violence (tanto convicio). We shudder, venerable brethren, in beholding with what monsters of doctrines, or rather with what portents of errors we are overwhelmed, which are disseminated everywhere far and wide by the immense multitude of books, and by tracts and writings, which are small indeed in bulk, but in wickedness very large, and from which a curse has gone forth over the face of the earth which we lament with tears (è quibus maledictionem egressam illacrymamur super faciem terræ). But there are some, alas!, who are carried away to that degree of shamelessness as pugnaciously to assert, that the foul mass of errors thence breaking forth is compensated with sufficient abundance (satis cumulatè compensari) by some book which, in this so great storm of depravity, may be put forth to defend religion and truth. It is sinful, in truth, and condemned by every law, that a certain and greater evil should be purposely inflicted, because there is hope that a certain amount of good will be thence obtained. Would any one in his senses say that poisons should be freely circulated and publicly sold, because something of a remedy is possessed, which is such that it sometimes happens that those who use it are delivered from destruction?

Now no unprejudiced man—or rather indeed no sane man however prejudiced—can read this passage and fail to see, that what Gregory XVI. condemns, is not some *imaginary* liberty of the press, but that very liberty of the press which existed before his eyes when he issued the Encyclical. He declares that "a curse has gone forth over the face of the earth" in consequence of such liberty; and that any one is "shameless" who maintains that this evil is sufficiently compensated, by the incidental advantage which may arise, from Catholics being enabled by this liberty to write more conclusive controversial defences. We never heard of any Catholic, learned or unlearned, theologian or layman, who attempted to interpret the passage otherwise than as we do. We have maintained therefore that every Catholic is materially under a strict obligation (whatever cases there may be of invincible ignorance) to accept this doctrine as infallibly true. Catholics are of course not at all obliged to deny, that the existing liberty of the press

is under present circumstances less disastrous than any other practicable course. But they *are* obliged to hold, that it *is* an evil; whereas those who are imbued with the poison of Liberal Catholicism regard it as a real good and true social progress.* There is no proposition we have ever maintained, which Father Newman will more severely rebuke than this. He will not rebuke us indeed for *holding* that the existent liberty of the press is an evil, nor even for holding as our own private opinion that the doctrine we have set forth was infallibly taught by Gregory XVI.; but he will rebuke us for alleging, that *all Catholics* are under the consequent obligation of accepting such doctrine.

We ask then, on what ground he would base his rebuke. He replies (p. 141 or 125) that he has a "repugnance to impose upon the faith of others more than the Church distinctly claims of them." We assure him that we entirely share his repugnance. But how can absolute interior assent by possibility be more "distinctly claimed," than it was by Gregory XVI. in the "Singulari nos" to his teaching in the "Mirari vos" on liberty of the press?

F. Newman further replies (p. 125 or 111) that, considering the difficulty presented to an educated mind by the obligation of faith, the Church ordinarily makes as little demand on that virtue as possible. But surely careful consideration would show F. Newman, that this answer is beside the mark. We would say "transeat" to all such statements concerning the Church's general practice, and confine our attention to each particular instance as it arises. In the case of any given ex cathedrâ Act, let the text itself and all the relevant circumstances be considered. When a competent inquirer has done this, either he will judge that there is reasonable doubt whether some given doctrine be there defined, or he will judge that there is no such reasonable doubt. In the former case we heartily concur with F. Newman, that such a person would act quite indefensibly in alleging that Catholics are strictly *bound* to hold such doctrine. In the latter case we do not see how F. Newman could fail to concur with *us*, that the opposite conclusion follows; for he fully admits that interior assent is due, where the Holy See "distinctly claims" it. The general question whether faith be easy or difficult, is surely quite irrelevant when we deal with a particular case. The only pertinent question is, what *demand* upon faith is made at the moment by the Holy See.

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* In pp. 493, 4 of our number for last April we state what seems to us the true teaching of the Holy See on the subject.

Since F. Newman however has raised the question about this supposed difficulty of faith, it will be more satisfactory perhaps if we briefly express our own humble opinion on the subject; though of course it would carry us much too far if we attempted to argue it out. For our own part then, we can thoroughly understand a non-Catholic thinking that the Catholic doctrine of infallibility imposes an intolerable burden on the Catholic's intellect; though we of course think very differently. But we confess we cannot understand F. Newman's position on the subject. He concedes that there is a living infallible oracle, whose utterances may reach me at any moment and demand my absolute interior assent. But let this be conceded, and surely the strain on my intellectual liberty is not substantially different, whether the Tridentine *Canons* alone are binding on my acceptance, or the Tridentine *Capitula* also; whether I am bound to renounce the Syllabus-condemned errors in the shape they wear in the Syllabus, or only in the shape they wear in the original documents. F. Newman considers that Pius IX. has condemned eighty propositions ex cathedrâ; that he has condemned them, not by one blow, but in some thirty successive Apostolic Letters; that as each of these Letters appeared in turn, Catholics as a body had to examine it carefully, to see what doctrine it might teach ex cathedrâ. We cannot for the life of us see how our own view of things would impose a task more "arduous" than this.

No doubt there are many Catholics, on whom such a pronouncement as the "Mirari vos" does impose (as we have often observed) a specially arduous duty; but it is not to these persons that F. Newman is referring. There are many educated Catholics who take no special interest—as there is no reason why they should—in matters strictly theological, and who accordingly would not find a moment's difficulty in accepting any definition whatever which falls within that sphere. But when the Holy Father pronounces ex cathedrâ on matters which are primarily political,—however intimately these matters may concern religious interests,—the burden thereby imposed on such Catholics differs, we may even say in *kind*, from that imposed by strictly theological definitions. But no one will allege that such a fact gives reason for presuming that the Holy See will never exercise a right, which indubitably belongs to her, and which is so especially important in times like the present: we mean the right of pronouncing ex cathedrâ on matters, which concern faith or morals, though appertaining primarily to the political order. On the contrary it is a distinct and great benefit to the Church, that such men

as we have described be furnished with an opportunity for captivating their intellect into the obedience of Christ, within a sphere wherein such captivity really requires of them exertion and self-sacrifice.

Reverting to F. Newman, we have next to deal with his quotation from Pallavicini (p. 125 or 111). Now it is admitted on all hands that—whereas the *consent* of theologians on any proposition carries with it much weight, because it leads us to presume that such proposition is traditional in the Catholic schools—the mere isolated statement of an individual theologian (unless indeed he be a S. Thomas or a Suarez) carries with it no *extrinsic* authority whatever. Pallavicini was pressed by a difficulty. Certain objections had been raised against Leo X.'s "Exurge Domine," on the ground of its only condemning Luther's propositions in globo, and not making it clear which particular error was visited with which particular censure. Pallavicini, pressed for an answer, adopted that cited by F. Newman. For ourselves we cannot assent to his remark; which indeed (considering all that appears on the very surface of Church history) surprises us not a little. But be it observed that he does not so much as hint, that the arduousness of faith is a reason for individuals minimizing Catholic doctrine. This latter is F. Newman's inference, but it is not Pallavicini's statement.

At last however, as we have already pointed out, this whole question on the arduousness of faith is quite outside the argument; and we will now therefore resume our consideration of the various reasons, on which F. Newman founds his rebuke of the ecclesiastical course we have pursued. He alleges thirdly (p. 125 or 111) that, in interpreting the doctrines of the Holy See, theologians universally aim at the end of "making them as tolerable as possible and the least of a temptation to self-willed independent or wrongly educated minds"; whereas (such is his implication) *we* have pursued a very different course. But he has not mentioned any instance—and we really doubt whether one can be found—in which any theologian whosoever has declared his purpose to be what F. Newman supposes. The well-known words of Zallinger express what we believe is their unanimous principle. "Papal Constitutions have force" he says "only in that sense and within those limits, to which *the Pope intended* them to be confined." Every theologian in dealing with an ex cathedrâ Act lays down for himself the golden rule, that he will interpret it to the best of his power according to the Pope's ascertainable intention, be that intention narrower or wider. We never heard of one who *professed* any other principle; though some

of them, from unconscious bias, may have failed to act on it faithfully and impartially.

Lastly comes F. Newman's reference to Mgr. Fessler, p. 126 or 112. On this however there is little we need say, beyond referring to our July article on the Bishop's treatise, and to our supplemental notice of it at p. 219. On the one hand the treatise has really no special authority whatever, and there is no reason for supposing that the Holy Father ever read a word of it. On the other hand the difference of the Bishop's opinions from our own is so inconsiderable, that we are simply at a loss to understand what F. Newman can mean, by contrasting his "charitable moderation of doctrine"* with our own "tyrannous ipse-dixits."

It is a great relief to turn from a subject on which F. Newman so severely condemns us, to another very cognate matter, on which however we can far more fully claim his sanction. We have hitherto spoken concerning actual definitions of the Holy See. But the Church is not a mere taskmistress commanding obedience; she is appointed in a far wider sense as the Christian's guide to heaven. There is a large number of religious lessons and truths, which she proposes without imposing; which she plainly intimates, without actually commanding their interior acceptance: and it is characteristic of a good and loyal Catholic, that he diligently searches for such truths in order that he may embrace them. We have more than once drawn attention to F. Newman's emphatic statement of this doctrine; but we will here again cite it, adding a few italics:—

In matters of conduct (he says), of ritual, of discipline, of social life, in the *ten thousand* questions which the Church *has not formally answered* even though she has *intimated her judgment*, there is a constant rising of the human mind against the *authority of the Church and of superiors*, and that in proportion as *each individual is removed from perfection*. ("Difficulties felt by Anglicans," pp. 264, 5.)

According to F. Newman then, there are "ten thousand questions" on which the Church has "intimated her judgment" without imposing it; ecclesiastical "superiors" are rightly employed in pressing such judgments on the acceptance of the faithful; and these in their turn do not hesitate to

* "A moderation of doctrine dictated by charity." We suppose that the difference between Mgr. Fessler and ourselves on which F. Newman would mainly insist, concerns the Syllabus. But as we pointed out last April (p. 332), in the Bishop's judgment, part of the "true obedience" which "the faithful owe to the Pope" is that they shall hold every proposition recited in the Syllabus to have been justly censured.

accept it, except in proportion as they are "removed from" spiritual "perfection." And that this passage expresses no mere passing thought of F. Newman's but his firm and deliberate judgment, is evident, not only from the fact that it is reprinted in the latest edition of his work, but also from the fact that it is contained in the admirable selection from his writings, which we noticed last January (p. 223), and which was drawn out with F. Newman's sanction. We may add, that words immediately preceding the passage we have quoted are found in his letter to the Duke of Norfolk (p. 147 or 130). We do not quite understand indeed, why theological and philosophical questions are not included by him among those, on which the Church may intimate her judgment without formally answering them; but the general doctrine of the passage is the very one on which we are here insisting.

A testimony, in some respects perhaps even more impressive than the preceding, of F. Newman's loyalty to the Holy See may be found in his sermon on "the Pope and the Revolution."

> In his administration of Christ's kingdom, in his religious acts, we must never oppose [the Pope's] will, or dispute his word, or criticise his policy, or shrink from his side. There are kings of the earth who have despotic authority, which their subjects obey indeed but disown in their hearts; but we must never murmur at that absolute rule which the Sovereign Pontiff has over us, because it is given to him by Christ, and, in obeying him, we are obeying his Lord. We must never suffer ourselves to doubt, that, in his government of the Church, he is guided by an intelligence more than human. His yoke is the yoke of Christ; *he* has the responsibility of his own acts, not we; and to his Lord must he render account, not to us. Even in secular matters it is ever safe to be on his side, dangerous to be on the side of his enemies. Our duty is,—not indeed to mix up Christ's Vicar with this or that party of men, because he in his high station is above all parties,—but to look at his formal deeds, and to follow him whither he goeth; and never to desert him, however we may be tried, but to defend him at all hazards and against all comers, as a son would a father, and as a wife a husband, knowing that his cause is the cause of God. And so, as regards his successors, if we live to see them, it is our duty to give *them* in like manner our dutiful allegiance and our unfeigned service, and to follow them also whithersoever they go, having that same confidence that each in his turn and in his own day will do God's work and will, which we have felt in their predecessors, now taken away to their eternal reward. ("Sermons preached on various Occasions," p. 286.)

The same loyal spirit is manifested in the noble passage which has given such great and universal edification, with which he concludes the letter to the Duke of Norfolk.

> There is only one Oracle of God, the Holy Catholic Church and the Pope

as her head. To her teaching I have ever desired all my thoughts, all my words to be conformed; to her judgment I submit what I have now written, what I have ever written, not only as regards its truth, but as to its prudence, its suitableness, and its expedience (p. 148 or 131).

F. Newman implies of course by these words, not only that he personally thus defers to the Church, but that Catholics in general would act more laudably in proportion as they thus defer. In other words—according to F. Newman—Catholics act more laudably, in proportion as firstly they look to the Holy See and Episcopate for the doctrines which they shall accept as true, and secondly as they guide themselves by the same "Oracle" in regard to matters of religious "prudence, suitableness, expedience." God grant that Catholics in general may ever act on this principle!

Passages of a similar tendency, though not to our mind quite so unmistakably expressed, will be found in p. 141 or 125, and p. 147 or 130.

It is no part of our present business to explain and vindicate the doctrine we would maintain, on the loyalty which Catholics owe to every intimation of the Church's mind; because we have often enough done so on previous occasions, and all with which we are here concerned is F. Newman's *sanction* of that doctrine. Still, before dismissing the subject, we will make two remarks.

In the first place we heartily admit, that there is something indefinite and impalpable in this "mind of the Church" about which we have been speaking; and that within a certain limit good Catholics will fairly differ from each other, whether this or that particular lesson be really intimated by her teaching and practice. We say "within a certain limit." No good Catholic e.g. can doubt, that whatever doctrine may be directly expressed in some Pontifical Act which is not actually ex cathedrâ—that such doctrine should be embraced as substantially true; and that it would be intolerable for him to pit his own private judgment against the official utterance of the Holy See. Then again it was always most manifest that "the principles of 1789" were disapproved of by the Holy See, from the moment of their promulgation and before they were condemned ex cathedrâ. In like manner mixed education, mixed marriages, and the like were most unmistakably opposed to the Church's mind, before she formally condemned them. Passing from practical matters to speculative, the Church has certainly implied in a thousand ways that the scholastic philosophy has her especial sanction, and that its fundamental principles are in profound harmony with Christian dogma: a matter on which we are not aware that any ex

cathedrâ definition has been given. On the other hand there may be real difference of opinion among the best Catholics, in what degree this or that detail—even important detail—of the scholastic philosophy is a matter for free criticism; and in July 1869 we availed ourselves of F. Kleutgen's guidance, to express dissent from what seems to us the somewhat extreme view of certain excellent Catholics on this head. Similarly (to speak of an indefinitely less important matter) we argued in last January against the opinion, that a constant use of figured music in the Church services—figured music of a far lighter character than Palestrina's—is in any way inconsistent with the Church's spirit and intimations. While strongly maintaining therefore, with F. Newman, that each individual, in proportion as he is more spiritually perfect, will be more eager in following the Church's various intimations,—we do not deny that occasional mistakes have been made in appreciating those intimations, or that serious evil may result if such mistakes are uncorrected. Yet on the other hand again, full, temperate and friendly discussion will do much to remove these divergences, as is shown by every-day experience. And on the whole, as it seems to us, there should be much mutual forbearance among those Catholics, who really make a great point of conforming themselves to the Church's mind, but who may more or less mutually differ as to what the Church's mind *is* on certain particulars.

Our second remark is the following. Every fresh social phenomenon does but show more clearly, that the time is approaching of an internecine and in some sense final conflict between the Church and the Revolution. This fact indeed (for various reasons) is far less visible in England than elsewhere; and is therefore in general far less vividly apprehended by Englishmen — even by Catholic Englishmen — than by foreigners. On this account, in the first article of our last number we studied "the modern idea," as it exhibits itself on the continent of Europe and threatens there to leaven the large mass of society. Compromise indeed is proverbially far more congenial to the English than to other nations; but now even the English mind—as displayed in the rising generation—is moving downwards with breathless rapidity. The Church's rulers are naturally becoming more and more alive to the critical nature of the situation, and exerting all their energy to prepare their flock for the conflict. Catholic education of clerics, of educated laymen, of the lower class, is everywhere occupying the Church's keen attention; controversial works are becoming larger and more profound; and Pius IX. has never ceased from raising his voice "like a trumpet"

against the detestable social maxims of the day. Of course, by how much the longer the final conflict can be postponed, by so much the Church will have greater time and leisure for completing her preparations; and we are very far from being hopeless of the result whenever the crisis may arrive. But one thing, we think, is plainly visible; viz. that the Church's main hope of success depends on her children being united, in fullest loyalty, heartiest confidence, most unreserved submission, to their divinely appointed rulers.* This it is which should occupy the chief attention of Catholics, as being the most urgent necessity of the time.

Suppose e.g. certain zealous Catholics continue to sympathize —nay in public speeches and otherwise to *profess* their sympathy—with the principles of Liberal Catholicism, and thus to set at naught the teaching of the Holy See and the Episcopate. When the crisis comes, such men (however well-intentioned) would be a simple source of weakness in the Catholic camp; and would in effect (however contrariwise to their intention) throw their weight into the scale of irreligion and godlessness. And generally, for our own part we view with anxiety any phenomenon, which threatens to disturb the undivided loyalty of Catholics. What can be more admirable in itself, than a Catholic's devotion and gratitude towards some individual or religious body, to whom he may owe a spiritual debt, which no words can express and no requital repay? Yet there is need of watchfulness, lest the simplicity of devotion and submission to Pope and Bishops be in any way impaired. Again one Catholic prefers absolute, another constitutional, civil government: but in God's name let not such minor difference impair their hearty union in the Church's cause.† If the Church be worsted in the impending contest, we may be very certain that settled civil government of every kind will be overthrown also; and those therefore who are most zealous for the Count de Chambord or Don Carlos, will in reason be very far *more* zealous for Catholic unity. This great momentousness of Catholic union and subordination is one main reason indeed, why we regard it as so vitally important that the whole obligatory teaching of the Holy See

* We need hardly say that if any national Episcopate were in any respect out of harmony with the Holy See, it is to the latter exclusively that loyalty would be due. But there is hardly one feature of the time so reassuring and consoling, as the complete harmony which exists between the Church's divinely appointed rulers and their divinely appointed head.

† We are assuming what we take to be undeniable; viz. that the Church has in no kind of way intimated her judgment, that the Count de Chambord or Don Carlos is de jure sovereign of France or Spain respectively.

be diligently circulated throughout the Church; and why we venture to think F. Newman's "wise and gentle minimism" so fundamental a mistake.

In the same spirit we must demur to such a sentence as the following. "The English people," says F. Newman (p. 4), "are sufficiently sensitive of the claims of the Pope, without having them, as if in defiance, flourished in their faces" (p. 4). Ought English soldiers then in the Crimea to have refrained from playing "God save the Queen," lest they should wound the susceptibilities of their French allies? Yet the present case is indefinitely stronger. Nothing can be further from the wish of English Catholics, than to give their fellow-countrymen unnecessary offence. But the whole future of society may depend on the hearty enthusiasm with which Catholics shall rally round the Holy Father. Such enthusiasm is specially generated and preserved, by his name being a constant watchword on their lips; and it would be deplorable indeed if, from fear of annoying "the English people," they were in any degree less frequent and less fervent in putting prominently forward what is the very badge of their profession.

We now proceed to another particular in F. Newman's letter, very cognate however to those which we have already treated. Since he so severely rebukes those who are zealous for what they believe to be the true interpretation of existing ex cathedrâ utterances,—still more severely should we expect him to rebuke those, who strained every nerve in order that a fresh ex cathedrâ utterance might be added to the number. We cannot be so much surprised therefore as we otherwise should have been, by such language as the following:—

> What I felt deeply, and ever shall feel while life lasts, is the violence and cruelty of journals and other publications, which, taking as they professed to do the Catholic side, employed themselves by their rash language (though, of course, they did not mean it so), in unsettling the weak in faith, throwing back inquirers, and shocking the Protestant mind. Nor do I speak of publications only; a feeling was too prevalent in many places that no one could be true to God and His Church, who had any pity on troubled souls, or any scruple of "scandalizing those little ones who believe in" Christ, and of "despising and destroying him for whom He died" (p. 107).

On this passage we would first remark, that we desiderate therein the fairness and candour, which are in general so singularly F. Newman's characteristics. In his judgment (p. 156 or 140), the Definition of 1870 merely "decided between two prevalent opinions," which had previously stood

on equal footing with each other in the Church. But he has failed to remember that, though this was his own view, it was very far from being the view of those who were so earnest for a definition. Cardinal (then Archbishop) Manning e.g. entirely denied, that Gallicanism was "an opinion which Catholics are free to hold without blame" ("Petr. Privilegium," i. p. 91); or that its falsehood was theologically doubtful (ii. p. 41). And notoriously the large majority of Catholics considered that, independently of and antecedently to the Vatican Council, the dogma of Papal infallibility was cognisable with absolute certainty as a revealed truth.* For our own part (as we have more than once said) we have always entirely shared this opinion, and we may refer to the "Petri Privilegium" as conclusively establishing its truth. But whether the opinion were well-founded or no, at all events those who promoted the Definition firmly held it; and this fact by itself suffices to show, what was the real motive and temper of their movement. Was it charitable or uncharitable, that a Catholic, who regarded this verity as certain, should earnestly desire for all his fellow-Catholics a share of its blessedness? or that he should earnestly wish for the Church that increased union and strength, which would result from her expressly teaching and avowing a vitally important and indubitably revealed dogma? Surely the "little ones of Christ" would be cruelly treated, not by being infallibly taught, but by *not* being infallibly taught, a truth revealed by Christ for their benefit. And the obviously appropriate season for the promulgation of such teaching, was the first Ecumenical Council which had been assembled, since the deplorable Gallican articles had been so insolently published.

When first this enthusiastic yearning for a definition of Papal infallibility possessed so large a number of Catholics—lay and clerical, educated and simple—they had no reason whatever (so far as we know) for suspecting, that any Catholic whosoever would thence derive an occasion of evil. They had no means of suspecting that there were any professing children of the Church, who would hesitate for a moment to accept the dogma, so soon as the Vatican Council might define it. But if they *had* suspected this, their reasons for desiring a definition would have on that very account become both stronger and more unanswerable. Those who refused to hear an Ecumenical Council, denied ipso facto the infallibility of the Ecclesia Docens. But (as we have more than once argued) those who

* F. Newman himself commemorates the fact (p. 18 or 16), that "all but a few of so many hundred Bishops" concurred "in the theological judgment so long desired at Rome."

deny the infallibility of the Ecclesia Docens, were as simply heretics before the Vatican Council, as Arians were before the Nicene, or Lutherans before the Tridentine;* and their opinion, as soon as it openly displayed itself, was simply an overt heresy claiming to be anathematized. In fact Pius IX., so we would humbly submit, could not have forborne from condemning it, without a violation of duty similar to that for which the Church has anathematized Honorius; and it is not easy to see how he could have condemned this heresy, without at the same time expressly defining the revealed dogma on the "subject" of infallibility.

We have no right to complain, that such arguments as these do not impress F. Newman as sufficiently strong, to counterbalance those which he considers to exist on the opposite side. But we do keenly regret, that he expresses himself as though theological argument were entirely confined to his own side of the question. In some strange way he takes for granted, that "in many places" those who were earnest for a definition could not possibly have had even plausible religious ground for their earnestness; that they must have been persons who had no "scruple of scandalizing those little ones who believe in Christ, and of despising and destroying him for whom He died."† And all this is the more singular, because F. Newman himself (p. 18 or 16) has never called the Definition inopportune.‡

In what we have been saying, we by no means intend to deny (though neither do we intend to affirm) that some excellently-principled Catholics may have been carried away by their zeal, and used language which would not unnaturally be understood as attempting some kind of dictation to the episcopal minority. We by no means say that the fact was so, because the circumstances are not sufficiently fresh in our memory. But we fully admit that *if*, and *as far as*, this was done,—we have not a word to say in defence of such Catholics, except to plead

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* So Archbishop Troy in a passage quoted by F. Newman (pp. 13, 14, or 12, 13), recognizes only two opinions on the "subject" of infallibility, as possibly existing among Catholics: viz. (1) that the Pope is infallible when teaching dogmatically on faith and morals; and (2) that "the expressed or tacit acquiescence of the Church assembled or dispersed" is required, "to stamp infallibility on his dogmatical decrees." We need hardly point out that "the Church" here must mean the "Ecclesia Docens"; because it is spoken of as either *assembled* or dispersed.

† In fact, F. Newman says more than this. He says, not merely that they had no such scruples themselves, but that they regarded those who *had* them as unfaithful to God and the Church.

‡ "For myself I did not call" the Definition "inopportune; for times and seasons are known to God alone, and persecution may be as opportune, though not so pleasant, as peace."

in extenuation the inevitable excitement of an arduous conflict. Even had the Episcopate been slow in appreciating the true position of circumstances—a supposition which to our mind is removed from truth in the extremest possible degree—it is the business of the Holy Father (as at Ephesus or Chalcedon), and of no other person, to influence and stimulate the Bishops in Council assembled. But we do not believe there was ever a Council in the whole history of the Church, in which the Fathers displayed more doctrinal unanimity, or more enlightenment as to the full bearing of what they did. *

In what we have hitherto said, we have not considered the complications introduced into the situation of 1870, by the attitude of such writers as Mgr. Maret. The position, however, of these theologians constituted a further necessity for the Definition; if such a remark indeed be logically admissible, where the necessity was absolute already. F. Ramière, in the paper which we name at the head of our article, has so admirably treated this particular feature of the then crisis, that we are sure our readers will be pleased by our setting before them the whole passage: the italics throughout being our own. F. Ramière thus commences, in reference to F. Newman's language about "destroying those for whom Christ died."

Like Jesus Christ Himself, the doctrine whose interpretation he has intrusted to His Church performs a double function in the world: it is at once the principle of resurrection and ruin, the source of life and the occasion of death. Being divine light, it has for its first mission to enlighten humble and sincere intelligences; but those proud minds which will not be illuminated by its rays cannot fail to be plunged in deeper darkness. Hence it results that the Church, charged with distributing to men the divine treasure, has two interests to consult: the interest of truth itself, which aims at expressing itself more and more, and the interest of souls captive to error, which an unseasonable manifestation of the truth might the more blind. In what degree one of those two interests should prevail over the other—when it is necessary to express the truth, when it is seasonable to conceal it—*this is what Jesus Christ keeps to Himself to make known to His Church.* He Himself at one time concealed Himself in the desert of Ephrem to escape from His enemies; and afterwards came openly to Jerusalem, although He foresaw the death there awaiting Him: and thus it is that *He suggests to His Church sometimes wise delays*, sometimes a boldness that one might be tempted to account rash. After the Church has spoken, every Catholic submits in silence, *convinced that God's wisdom is greater than his own.* But before the heavenly oracle has pronounced itself, two contrary drifts

* We have not a dream what F. Newman intends, when he implies (p. 107 or 95) that possibly "things occurred" "within the walls of the Council Chambers" "which it is not pleasant to dwell upon."

display themselves among Christians, nay among doctors themselves. Some, more occupied in the interests of truth, earnestly invoke its authentic manifestations, and oppose with a pitiless energy the errors that tend to darken it; others, full of compassion for the souls captivated by those errors, avert as much as they can those rigorous measures that would drive these poor souls to yet further distance from the truth, and use all their endeavours to veil the brightness of a light that would injure weak eyes. Each of these two drifts is legitimate, when remaining within its proper limits; but each of them is in danger of trangressing those limits. On one side, imprudence, by its exaggerations, compromises the cause it intends to serve; on the other, cowardice no less compromises it by its fatal capitulations (p. 266).

Presently F. Ramière proceeds to consider the crisis which existed, when the Council met in 1870.

Let us look back at the epoch when the Council assembled. Gallicanism, which had been thought dead, had all at once revived, and inflicted on the constitution of the Church blows that tended radically to overthrow it. Till then, this error had been purely theoretical, and had not prevented the French Episcopate from giving to the Catholic world the example of the most prompt and complete submission to Pontifical judgments. But behold, in a work which had been long in preparation, a Bishop, placed at the head of the most celebrated school of France, notoriously supported by other influential prelates and effectually helped by the Imperial Government, announces his intention to obtain, if he can, from the Council the transformation of the monarchy founded by Jesus Christ into an aristocratic republic; rendering obligatory the decennial meeting of Councils; investing them with supreme legislative power; and compelling the Pope, under penalty of deposition, to execute their decrees, while his own decrees would be subject to the sovereign revisal of this ecclesiastical Parliament. At the same time, other still more prominent publications suggested the existence of a vast conspiracy, tending to establish in the Church an opinion, constantly repudiated by the immense majority of bishops and doctors. F. Newman is right; there were then many troubled souls; there was a great scandal for "the little ones who believed in Jesus Christ." But this scandal exhibited itself in a contrary way to that which the illustrious writer supposes. He would hold quite a different language if, instead of undergoing the influences of an heretical country, he could have appreciated the state of minds among the believing populations. In all the Catholic universe,—even in France the birth-place of Gallicanism,—the faithful would have been drawn by the instinct of their faith to accept the Definition of Pontifical Infallibility with the same unanimity and enthusiasm, as that wherewith they received the proclamation of Mary's Immaculate Conception. But when a dogma, unanimously admitted until then at least in practice, was attacked by masters in Israel, by prelates reputed learned and pious, a great uneasiness took hold of men's minds. The danger was considerably increased by the alliance of the Gallican opposition with the worst enemies of the Church, rationalism and Cæsarism. Men, who since have thrown off the mask, were in common cause with those Catholics, who simply contested the opportuneness of the

Definition; and with diabolical art were concealing, under the patronage of these venerated auxiliaries, the most virulent attacks against the Papacy and the very authority of the Church. Soon it was not only the Pontifical Infallibility which was in question; the person of the Pope, the dignity of the Bishops, the legitimacy of the Council, were violently attacked. Such was the situation, in the presence of which Catholics stood; those whom F. Newman accuses of "violence, cruelty, and temerity." Even were it true that some, in the heat of struggle, forgot that moderation which suited the justice of their cause, would they not in truth be excusable? When a child sees his mother insulted, has any one the right to reproach him for the excessive vivacity with which he flies to her defence? Now,—we assert it and none can deny it—it was the Church herself, which was insulted by the most ardent adversaries of Pontifical Infallibility; and the interests of Catholic unity predominated of right over every other consideration (pp. 268–270).

So much on the circumstances of the Vatican Definition. We will conclude the present article with submitting to F. Newman's judgment one further criticism; which however is of much less practical importance, than the others on which we have dwelt. We have said that he is not ordinarily led, by his advocacy of "minimism," to minimize the number of utterances which he accounts infallible. Yet there are two prominent cases in which we think he has done so; viz. the Tridentine and Vatican Capitula.

There are theologians of name, he says (pp. 130 or 116), as Tournely and Amort, who contend that even those most instructive Capitula passed in the Tridentine Council, from which the Canons with anathemas are drawn up, are not portions of the Church's infallible teaching; and the parallel introductions prefixed to the Vatican anathemas have an authority not greater nor less than that of those Capitula.

We will begin with the Tridentine Capitula; and we will borrow from Dr. Murray ("de Ecclesiâ," d. xvii. n. 278) what certainly seems to us his conclusive proof, that the Council of Trent expressly declared those Capitula to be definitive. There are but comparatively few of the Tridentine Sessions, he points out, in which there are any affirmative Decrees at all, with subjoined condemnatory Canons; and in each one of these the language of the Council is most unmistakable. Thus the 6th Session contains sixteen Capitula on Justification; and they are succeeded by the following clause:—"After this Catholic doctrine on Justification," says the Council, "*which unless a man have received firmly and faithfully he cannot be justified*, the Holy Synod has thought good to subjoin these Canons, in order that all may know, not only what they are bound (debeant) to *hold and*

follow, but also what to *avoid and flee.*" There is no hint at any kind of difference, between the authority of the Capitula and of the Canons. In the 13th, 14th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Sessions, adds Dr. Murray, the language is entirely similar. We have seen that F. Newman regards Pallavicini as a writer, who would shrink from affirming, without most conclusive proof, that any given doctrine is obligatory on the Catholic's interior assent. Yet here is Pallavicini's statement in his history of the Council. "From which words," he says, "*it is clear* (liquet) that the Synod intended that those things should be believed by faith which the Decrees, no less than those which the Canons, contain" (l. 8, c. 13).

There are some few theologians no doubt, such as Amort and Denzinger,* who have denied that these Capitula are infallible; but we do not see how this affects our argument. Suppose these theologians were charged with unsoundness, for thus contradicting the express words of the Council; what would any advocate of theirs say in their defence? He would indubitably argue, that their fault was simply one of inadvertence; and that had they *observed* the facts to which Dr. Murray calls attention, they would never have ventured to hold such an opinion. We are perfectly confident in like manner, that when F. Newman's attention is called to the same fact, he will abandon his opinion on this particular subject. Most assuredly he would not maintain that he is at liberty, on the authority of any theologian however distinguished, to set aside what the Church has expressly declared. But in the present instance the case is immeasurably stronger; because the theologians to whom he appeals exhibit no indication whatever, that they have *observed* the Church's declarations.

As regards the various affirmative utterances prefixed to the Vatican Canons, F. Newman says (as we have seen) that "they have an authority not greater nor less than that of" the Tridentine "Capitula"; and we might content ourselves with this statement. But it will be more satisfactory, if we treat the matter on its own independent ground. We need hardly remind our readers, that all the declarations of the Vatican Council, whether affirmative or negative, are promulgated in the Pope's name, "sacro approbante Concilio"; and the question therefore which we have to consider is, whether there is sufficient indication that he is speaking ex cathedrâ in the

* We speak of Denzinger's Introduction to his admirable "Enchiridion." We rather think that F. Newman is mistaken in mentioning Tournely as on the same side; but this is of course quite unimportant.

affirmative, no less than in the negative, pronouncements of the Council.* These pronouncements are contained in the two Pontifical Constitutions "Dei Filius" and "Pastor Æternus"; and we will consider the two separately.

In the "Dei Filius" here are the words which immediately precede its affirmative teaching; and we italicise those to which we would draw attention:—"Now therefore . . . we have determined to *profess and declare* the salutary doctrine of Christ before all *from this Chair of Peter* (ex hâc Petri Cathedrâ), *proscribing also and condemning* by the power given to us by God the errors thereto opposed." Of the two, Pius IX. is rather *more* express in setting forth that his *affirmative* exposition of doctrine issues from him ex cathedrâ, than in setting forth that his *condemnation of errors* possesses the same authority.

In the "Pastor Æternus" his parallel words are these:—"We . . . account it necessary . . . to propose . . . the doctrine [which concerns the Primacy] *to be believed and held by all the faithful* . . . and to proscribe and condemn . . . the errors . . . contrary thereto." Here again, he says even more expressly that his *affirmative* exposition of doctrine is obligatory on the faith of Catholics, than that his *condemnation of errors* imposes the same obligation.

We do not understand F. Newman however to maintain, that Catholics are at liberty to withhold their interior assent from any part of the affirmative teaching set forth by the Tridentine and Vatican Councils. For he proceeds at once to say, that "such passages" as the Tridentine and Vatican Capitula "are too closely connected with the Definitions themselves, not to be what is sometimes called by a catachresis 'proximum fidei.'"

Over and above the Tridentine and Vatican Capitula of which we have been speaking, there is another very important ecclesiastical pronouncement, which we regard as undeniably infallible, but to which F. Newman does not ascribe that character: we mean the Syllabus. Last April (pp. 340–346)

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* There is one opinion which we expressed in our original article on "The Definition of Papal Infallibility" (Jan. 1871, pp. 186, 187), which we are pleased to find that F. Newman holds even more confidently than we ventured to do. We said that "Œcumenical Councils are spoken of" in the Preamble to the Definition, "not as possessing any infallibility of their own, but exclusively as among the various helps supplied by Divine Providence for the exercise of *Papal* infallibility." So F. Newman (p. 168 or 152) expresses himself. "A Council of Bishops of the world around" the Pope "is only one of the various modes in which he exercises his infallibility. The seat of infallibility is in him, and they are adjuncts." And he proceeds to quote the sentence of the Preamble, on which we ourselves relied.

we joined issue with him on this theme; and we have here only one further remark to make. "Who is its author?" he asks (p. 88 or 79); "anyhow it is not the Pope." "If the Pope," he presently adds, "should ever make that anonymous compilation directly his own, then of course I should bow to it and accept it as strictly his." Now since we wrote in April, we observe that the Pope has done the very thing which F. Newman desiderates; for in a Brief addressed to F. At, of the Congregation of the Sacred Heart, and dated April 20th, 1874, he expressly authenticates the Syllabus as having been *published by himself.**

At last however it must not be supposed—because we demur to one or two particular features in F. Newman's treatise—that we for a moment forget the many magnificent expressions and vindications of Catholic truth with which it abounds. We did the fullest justice we could to these, in our April article on "Mr. Gladstone and his Critics"; and we did so with most hearty sincerity. As regards indeed one or two of the matters we have now been discussing with him, we cannot profess to consider them of small moment. Still, after taking them into account, we are confident that the permanent effect of the letter to the Duke of Norfolk will be almost exclusively for good; and that it will be found, as time goes on, to have conferred, both on the Catholic and non-Catholic world, benefits of a really important and lasting character. As to its singular genius, brilliancy, and intellectual vigour, there cannot of course be a second opinion. Nor must we undervalue the great moral support which accrues in England to the Church's cause, from the spectacle of a mind, which all Englishmen admit to be so great and gifted, unremittingly devoting its highest energies to her service.†

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* Licet...nequiverimus hactenùs dilecte fili versare volumina...quæ nobis obtulisti, nihilo tamen minus cum ex...titulo didicerimus ipsa te exigere proposuisse ad Syllabi errorum *a nobis editi* doctrinam, munus tuum habuimus acceptissimum.

† Since this article went to press, we have seen the very remarkable letter, addressed in 1871 by M. Albert Dechamps to F. Gratry, which has recently appeared in the "Monde." Its line of argument is so similar to our own, that we have inserted a translation of it in another part of our number.

Art. II.—RANKE'S AND GREEN'S HISTORIES OF ENGLAND.

History of England, principally in the Seventeenth Century. By Leopold V. Ranke. 1875. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Short History of the English People. By J. R. Green, M.A., Examiner in the School of Modern History, Oxford. 1875. London: Macmillan & Co.

Memorials of S. Dunstan. Edited from various MSS. by William Stubbs, M.A., under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. 1874. London: Longman & Co.

Matthæi Parisiensis Chronica Majora. Edited by Henry Richards Luard, M.A., under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. 1874. London. Longman & Co.

RANKE'S literary reputation and the strange popularity of Mr. Green's volume, in addition to the fact that both treat of the great religious and political questions of the day, demand some notice of their respective works. Ranke's object, as he tells us, is to trace in the history of England and illustrate through its means, the close connection and constant struggle between Church and State, between monarchical and representative institutions, and the mutual action of independent nationalities, to which he ascribes the characteristic life, the continuity of development, and the ascendency in the world, of the great indivisible community of the Latin and Teutonic nations, which has been formed under the influence of the Western Church. In other words, since Christianity alone possesses the power to develop the whole of man's being, true national life, involving continuous progress and world-wide ascendency, has been possible only in those nations which have embraced it; and in them alone has been fully developed the inevitable conflict between the natural and the supernatural, between Cæsarism and Ultramontanism, between selfishness, whether of king, people, or nationality, and the justly balanced rights of each as embodied in Christian law. Mr. Green gives us the history of the same struggle in more practical detail, though with less philosophic insight. But his exaggerated wish to limit his subject to the English people, often robs his sketch of breadth, and sometimes even of truth; while the recklessness, with which he sacrifices facts and chronology to the exigencies of a favourite theme or a brilliant paragraph,

renders great caution necessary in accepting his statements. Mr. Rowley has correctly described his book as "full of blunders, misstatements, misconceptions," and "distinctly misleading" assertions, which "far transgress the bounds of permitted blundering," and are of "exceptional flagrancy."*

The political part of the subject is well drawn out by both Ranke and Mr. Green. Under this head we include the development and interior struggles of Protestantism; for both writers show how religious and political questions were always intertwined, thus proving the essentially political character of Protestantism, which though it at first overran the whole of Europe, held its ground permanently only in those countries in which it could ally itself to a political party. Did our limits permit, it would be interesting to trace how long the Catholic faith lingered in the mass of the people, how Catholic social principles, as explained in our article of last October, were unconsciously embodied in the contending theories of the first revolutionary period, and how the force of public opinion was crippled by the exclusion of Catholics from national life, as was dimly perceived even by the moderate party in 1660.† The first of these points is not so clearly brought out by either of our historians as by Hallam; and neither mentions the significant fact, that though the marriages of the clergy were early recognized even in courts of justice, their children continued to be illegitimate till the reign of James I. Thus, Mrs. Parker dying during the Archbishop's lifetime, her brother, and not her children by the Archbishop, was declared to be her heir-at-law.‡ Again, though Ranke remarks on the different spirit of the English and Scotch Protestants, yet he fails to notice the fundamental opposition in their revolt from Rome. In England the civil power usurped the authority of the Church; but in Scotland a self-constituted ecclesiastical body erected itself against the civil power. In England Cæsarism triumphed over Ultramontanism; while in Scotland a pseudo-Ultramontanism, so to say, trampled on royalty. Further, both writers commit grave errors in connection with the foundation of the Anglican episcopate. In describing the unanimous acceptance of the royal supremacy by Archbishop Warham and both houses of Convocation,§ Mr. Green omits to state that the words "*as far as the law of Christ will allow*" were inserted in a parenthesis.|| Again, he says that the dependence of the episcopate

* Fraser's Magazine, Sept. 1875.
† Ranke, vol. iii. l. 13, c. 6.
‡ Hallam, Constitutional History, c. 4.
§ P. 329.
|| Wilkins, Concil. ii. p. 742, ap. Lingard, vol. vi. c. 3, p. 178, ed Dolman, 1848.

on the Crown "would have been complete had his (Thomas Cromwell's) policy been thoroughly carried out, and the royal power of deposition put in force as well as that of appointment."* But the royal power of deposition, as well as of appointment, was put in force, when Elizabeth deposed thirteen out of fourteen Catholic bishops who refused the oath of supremacy, and appointed others in their stead. Ranke says that the Catholic bishops resigned their sees.† But this is disproved by the fact that when in 1563 Bonner was called on by Horne, the Anglican Bishop of Winchester, to take the oath of supremacy, which could be tendered only by an archbishop or bishop, he evaded the demand by challenging Horne's title, on the ground that he had been appointed while the see was occupied by the imprisoned Catholic bishop. The judges of the Queen's Bench admitted the validity of his plea, thus overthrowing the jurisdiction of almost the whole of the Anglican episcopate.‡ Mr. Green here makes one of those startling assertions which prove how little he is to be trusted as an historical guide. He says:—

> The nomination of bishops has ever since the accession of the Georges passed from the king in person to the minister who represents the will of the people. Practically, therefore, an English prelate, alone among all the prelates of the world, is now raised to his episcopal throne by the same popular election which raised Ambrose to his episcopal chair at Milan.

Is Mr. Green really so ignorant of ecclesiastical history as to believe that political opinions had even the most remote influence in the election of S. Ambrose to the chair of Milan, and that Jews, pagans, and heretics,—by which two last names liberal-minded sceptics and dissenters were then known, took part in his election?

Our principal object, however, is to demonstrate how two historians, one of them hitherto renowned for learning and love of truth, and the other holding a responsible office in our leading University, have condescended, under the influence of prejudice and bigotry, to the grossest falsifications of facts. The just and enlightened spirit, which has made Ranke's History of the Popes a standard authority for Catholics, is here replaced by slighting and inadequate notice of important matters connected with the Church, by the careless assertion of almost exploded calumnies of which he evidently doubts the truth, by inuendo and vituperation beneath the dignity of history, and by misstatements which would not be passed over in a schoolboy under examination. While he assails the whole

* P. 330. † Vol. i. l. 3, c. 1. ‡ Froude, "Elizabeth," c. 6.

Catholic Church, Mr. Green's hostility is more specially directed against the Papacy; but he indemnifies himself for his limited field of warfare by the bitterness and wildness of his attack. We shall proceed to follow out the more important falsifications of both in chronological order.

In the vain hope of robbing Rome of the glory of the conversion of England, Mr. Green has compressed into his section on the Northumbrian kingdom a really amazing number of misstatements.* We now learn for the first time that

> It was possibly the progress of the Irish Columban at her very doors which roused into new life for a time the energies of Rome, and spurred Gregory to attempt the conversion of the English in Britain.

A glance at contemporary history proves, that at this time the Lombards kept the "energies of Rome" fully "roused," and that S. Gregory's missionary zeal, which was one of his marked characteristics, embraced not only Britain, but the whole Roman empire. Moreover, as he started on his abortive mission to England before 579, sent S. Augustine thither in 595, and died in 604, it is impossible that he could have been spurred on by S. Columban, who did not come to Italy till 612—613.

We are also surprised to hear, that after the death of Ethelbert in 616 a Pagan reaction, interrupted only by the conversion of Edwin, set in, that "the Roman Church in Kent shrank into inactivity before" it, and that "the Church of Ireland came forward to supply its place." Then, "English religion had for a hundred years its centre, not at Canterbury, but at Lindisfarne," and "the real metropolitan of the Church as it existed in the north of England was the Abbot of Iona." Round Lindisfarne Mr. Green skilfully groups all the personages and incidents which give such a charm to this period of English history. S. Chad goes to the conversion of Mercia; S. Birinus, "a preacher from Gaul," penetrates into Wessex; and S. Cuthbert, S. John of Beverley, S. Hilda, the song of Ceadmon, the glories of Whitby, and touching tales of apostolic life and royal sanctity are formed, by dint of jumbling together facts and dates as in a kaleidoscope, into a brilliant and fascinating picture of the Irish Church of the North. But at length Rome moved "to regain the ground she had lost, and her efforts were seconded" by S. Benedict Biscop and S. Wilfrid, whose life was "a mere series of flights to Rome and returns to England, of wonderful successes in

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* Pp. 16—34.

pleading the right of Rome to the obedience of the Church of Northumbria, and of as wonderful defeats." The strife rose so high, that Oswy in 664 summoned a council at Whitby to decide on "the future ecclesiastical allegiance of England." The decision was against Lindisfarne, which consequently sank into obscurity; and Rome in 668 dispatched Archbishop Theodore "to secure England to her sway," to group all the English sees "round the one centre of Canterbury," and thus to found "the Church of England as we know it to-day."

Such is the delusive, kaleidoscopic representation of Mr. Green; but the real facts, as told by Bede and the English Chronicle, and arranged in true order of time, give a totally different picture. The Pagan reaction in Kent, on the death of King Ethelbert, lasted only during the few months or weeks that his son Eadbald wished to marry his father's widow. But after he had overcome his passion for her the Roman Church in that kingdom, far from shrinking into inactivity, effected the conversion of Northumbria and East Anglia, and prosecuted its missionary work at home with such vigour that within a few years idolatry in Kent was extirpated, the public observance of Lent was established, and Saxons and Jutes were qualified to be ordained priests and bishops.* In Northumbria, after the death of Edwin a Pagan reaction, which lasted about a year, compelled S. Paulinus to return to Kent, but he left behind him his deacon James, who continued to make converts and kept up Roman customs. Meanwhile S. Aidan founded Lindisfarne in '34 or '35, and spread the faith through the north of Northumbria; and in the same year S. Birinus came into Wessex from Rome with authority from Pope Honorius to preach where no other teacher had preceded him. Thus, two missionary streams entered England from the north and the south, and when they met a question, not of faith or "ecclesiastical allegiance," but only of the astronomical cycle, naturally arose out of the different times of keeping Easter. Strife was kindled, not through any movement of Rome, but through the zeal of Ronan, an Irishman, who advocated the modern Roman Paschal cycle as corrected by astronomical calculations at Alexandria, and the hot temper of Finan, Bishop of Lindisfarne, who held tenaciously to the old Roman cycle which S. Patrick and S. Columba had followed before the astronomical error on which it was based, had been detected at Alexandria.† Immediately after the Council of Whitby S. Chad removed

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* English Chronicle, an. 640; Bede, l. 3, cc. 7, 14.
† Bede, l. 3, c. 25.

the chair of the North from Lindisfarne to York; thus cutting down Mr. Green's hundred years of Lindisfarne's supremacy to thirty. Three years later all the English bishops except one having been carried off by pestilence, Oswy, King of Northumbria, united with the King of Kent in sending Wighard to Rome to be consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury; and the following year, Wighard having died, in petitioning the Pope to send an archbishop to England. This fact proves that Oswy, who had been educated at Iona, already considered that the primacy of Canterbury extended over his own kingdom quite as much as over Kent, and it thus disposes of Mr. Green's assertions, that Lindisfarne had hitherto been the centre of English religion, and the Abbot of Iona the metropolitan of the North, and that Archbishop Theodore's task was to group all the English sees round Canterbury. It was after the removal of the chair from Lindisfarne that S. Chad went to Mercia, that S. Cuthbert, S. Wilfrid, S. Benedict Biscop, and S. John of Beverley laboured so zealously, that Ceadmon sang, and that Whitby, which was not founded till after 655, rose to great repute. S. Wilfrid, whose life, Mr. Green says, was a "mere series of flights to Rome," went there only three times, with an interval of fifty years between his first and last journey. On all three occasions his object was only personal, and "the right of Rome to the obedience of the Church of Northumbria" was in no way implicated, for all his opponents acknowledged this right by sending envoys to plead their cause against him. His life was indeed a series of "wonderful successes," chequered with trials, but unbroken by a single defeat.

Mr. Green also attacks the Irish Church. After praising her so long as he can use her for his own purposes, he suddenly turns round against her, describes her clergy as "robbed of all really spiritual influence," contributing "no element save that of disorder to the State," dissociating "piety from morality," and with "hundreds of wandering bishops"; and he rejoices that from such a chaos England was saved by the victory of Rome at Whitby. Notwithstanding, he winds up the section by saying,—

> As the Roman communion folded England again beneath her wing, men forgot that a Church which passed utterly away had battled with Rome for the spiritual headship of Western Christendom.

Both these assertions betray total ignorance of Irish history. Though the Irish Church had not the Roman gift of organization, her monasteries were famed during many subsequent centuries for strict discipline; and the existing Irish MS.

literature, which belongs to this period, proves that the monks and clergy had not lost the learning and the studious habits which characterized them in earlier times. Far from battling with Rome for spiritual headship, the Irish never forgot S. Patrick's parting injunction, "The Church of the Irish is a Church of Romans. As ye are Christians so be ye Romans"; nor his canon that when any question arose which they could not easily decide, they should refer it to Rome. This Paschal controversy is a striking instance of their obedience. In 630 the bishops of the south of Ireland referred the question to the Apostolic See, and on the return of their envoys in 635 they adopted the corrected Roman cycle. The northern bishops also appealed to Rome in 640, but their envoys happening to arrive while the Papal Chair was vacant, they brought back a letter written under a misapprehension, which only condemned the Quarto-deciman heresy; and being conscious that they were free from that, they adhered to the old Roman cycle till 703, when Adamnan, formerly Abbot of Iona, convinced them of their error. An unbroken stream of Irish pilgrims flowed to Rome as late as the twelfth century, when S. Malachy, Archbishop of Armagh, died at Clairvaux on his way back from his second visit to the city; and Irish missionaries constantly sought the authority of the Pope before settling down in their respective fields of labour. And even S. Columban, notwithstanding the rough and presumptuous tone of his correspondence with Popes S. Gregory and Boniface IV., gloried in the devotion of his nation to the Apostolic See, saying, "We are bound to the Church of S. Peter. For although Rome is great and illustrious, yet it is only through this chair that she is great and renowned among us."*

We now pass on to S. Dunstan. We must here depend principally on Mr. Stubbs's valuable work, "Memorials of S. Dunstan," which displays a critical acumen and a just and generous spirit that cannot be too highly estimated. It contains careful reprints from the best MSS. of the six lives of the saint already known to us, five of which having been written within a hundred and forty years of his death, form an unusually strong body of contemporary or almost contemporary evidence. There are also some fragments of his ritual, and letters from several of his contemporaries. In his Introduction Mr. Stubbs points out the great value to historians of the lives of English saints, and in answer to the charge that their subjects were narrow-minded and superstitious, and the writers ignorant and pedantic, he says:

* Moran, Essays on the Early Irish Church, p. 98.

Although such charges may be sometimes true, the popular devotion has not generally been wasted on the memory of selfish ascetics, nor have the works of mere pedants been, as a rule, preserved and multiplied by an admiring, undiscriminating posterity.*

Of S. Dunstan he says:

Of the importance of Dunstan as a historical personage there can be no doubt. He was the close friend and chief minister of Edgar, the king around whose name the last glories of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom circle. His wise influence, possibly his active share in the administration, kept off the evil day for ten or twelve years after Edgar's death. He was canonized in popular regard almost from the day he died. He was the favourite saint of the mother Church of England for more than a century and a half, during which there were numbered among his successors, the scholar Elfric, the martyr Elfige, Lanfranc the statesman, and Anselm the doctor and confessor; his glory was at last eclipsed, but it was by no less a hero than Thomas Becket. The memory of his greatness was permanent, or the belief in his miracles would have been impossible.†

To the great prelate and statesman whom a learned Protestant writer and critic thus estimates, Ranke gives only a brief and supercilious remark. After noticing that Edgar, "under Dunstan's influence," thanked the grace of God for the extension of his rule, he adds:

The ruling motives of life in Church and State make it conceivable that a monkish hierarch, such as Dunstan, shared, as it were, the king's power, and shaped the course of the authority of the State.‡

Mr. Green does S. Dunstan justice as a statesman, but he sets him before us in a strangely novel character. He tells us that "his monastic profession seems to have been little more than a vow of celibacy"; that "throughout his manhood he won the affection of women"; that he became the chaplain of a noble lady to whom "he ever clave"; whom he "loved" in "wondrous fashion," and of whose wealth he had unreserved command; that "we see him followed by a train of pupils, busy with literature, writing, harping, painting, designing"; and that "the tie which bound him to this scholar life was broken by the death of his patroness."§ The foundation of this little romance is, that persons of both sexes and all classes praised his wisdom and virtues,|| and among those who came to consult him was a royal lady, a widow, bound by the strictest religious vows, who derived such profit from his counsel that she took up her residence at Glastonbury; and

* Introduction, p. 8. † Page 9. ‡ Vol. i. book i. chap. i. p. 21.
§ Page 52. || Vit. Osbern., c. 14.

S. Dunstan "ever clave to her," and showed his regard by obtaining for her many miraculous and spiritual favours, some of which are recorded by his biographers. She had a warm maternal affection for all persons of the royal race, to whom she often ministered; and from religious motives and on account of the poverty of the place, she also relieved S. Dunstan's wants. On her deathbed she entrusted to him the disposal, "according to God's will," of her property, which he at once distributed to the poor and to various churches.* She was not his patroness, and she had no share in his temporal advancement. Nor had his application to learning and art any connection with her; for it began when as a youth he received the tonsure, and continued throughout his whole life.

Mr. Green also speaks of his "roughly" drawing Edwy, who "had contracted an uncanonical marriage," back to the coronation feast; of "his rough treatment of the married clergy, and the violent transfer of property which his measures necessitated"; and of his "system," as if his ecclesiastical affairs were peculiar to himself. † This "system" Mr. Stubbs correctly describes as the first Benedictine revival. He traces it back to Alfred, who, finding that society was totally disorganized, that religion and education were at the lowest ebb, and that monastic life was extinct, founded monasteries, and sent to the Continent for monks to train his infant communities and teach in his schools. His daughter, Elfthryth, took part in a similar revival in Flanders; and his grandsons, Arnulf and Edred, with Archbishop Odo and Elfege the Bald, Bishop of Winchester, prosecuted it vigorously in Flanders and England. But in England "it was not crowned with success or brought into perfect accord with the Benedictine discipline until Dunstan had seen the old rule in working at Blandinium, and Oswald and Ethelwald had brought instructions from Fleury." ‡

Mr. Stubbs, however, has made one very serious mistake. He reprobates with indignation the "most hateful detraction" of later writers, in illustration of which he quotes a passage from Milman's "Latin Christianity,"§ in which S. Dunstan is represented as "persecuting the married clergy, which in truth comprehended the whole secular clergy of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom," as the "type and harbinger of Hildebrand," as "an iron-hearted monk" trampling the royal power under his feet at the coronation of King Edwy, and perpetrating the horrible cruelties to which it was a prelude. Mr. Stubbs insists that

* Auctor. B., c. 10. Osbern, 3, 15. † Pp. 52-56.
‡ P. 85. § Vol. iv. p. 25, ed. 1867.

The career of Dunstan was no anticipation of that of Hildebrand: it was the very counterpart of that of Gerbert, the student, the practical workman, the wise instructor of a royal pupil, the statesman, the reformer, and the patriot. . . . . . The charge of persecuting the married clergy is as baseless. We have no means of judging what proportion of the secular clergy was married, nor how many of the secular clerks who held property were married, and the same evidence which proves their marriages proves also how lightly the marriage tie sat upon them.*

He argues from S. Dunstan's not having expelled the secular clergy from the churches of Canterbury, London, and Worcester, that though his own life and personal influence were guided by an ascetic spirit, his position as a statesman obliged him to avoid a policy of persecution, that "it is possible that he acted as a check rather than a spur on the zeal of Edgar,† and that the "enforcement of monastic discipline, not the compulsory celibacy of the clergy," was "the object of his church reforms."‡

The origin of Mr. Stubbs's mistake is the circumstance that, in common with most Protestant writers, he supposes that the secular clergy, at least in England, were at liberty to marry, that celibacy was compulsory only on monks, and consequently that when S. Dunstan permitted secular clergy to remain in his own cathedrals, celibacy was not enforced by him. S. Gregory the Great's letters, especially one on the celibacy of sub-deacons in Sicily, § prove that the Roman Church made celibacy compulsory on all who were in *holy* orders—i.e., on all priests, deacons, and subdeacons. In his letter in answer to S. Augustine's questions, after ordering that he and all his clergy shall live together and have all things in common, he adds, that "if there are any clerks not received into holy orders who cannot live continent, they are to take wives, and receive their stipends abroad"; || thus plainly showing that there were secular clergy in England from the first, which some Protestants have considered doubtful, and that celibacy was compulsory on all who were in holy orders—in fact, on all those whose spiritual descendants the present Anglican clergy pretend to be. That this was the discipline of the early English Church is proved by the constant reference in the first English councils to the Roman canons, and by the Excerpta and Pœnitentiale of Egbert, Archbishop of York.¶ The canons of a council held in the early part of the reign of Ethelred II. show that at this time many

* Pp. 117-120. † P. 86. ‡ P. 120.

§ Regist. Epp. S. Gregor. Magn., l. 1. Ep. 44. || Bede, l. 1, c. 27.

¶ Wilkins, Concilia, t. i. pp. 102, 103, 117, 133.

of the secular clergy in holy orders were not only married, but had two or more wives, dismissing them and taking others at their pleasure.* That the enforcement of celibacy on these and on all others in holy orders, was an object of S. Dunstan's reform, is conclusively proved by the laws of Edgar,† in framing which he must have had a share, and also by one of his own penitential canons, quoted by Mr. Stubbs, in which a Mass priest, a monk, or a deacon, who returns to live with the wife to whom he had been married before ordination, is condemned to do penance as for murder. His permitting secular clergy to remain in his own cathedrals, only indicates that he succeeded better in reforming them than his friend Ethelbald did at Winchester, where they refused to amend their lives and had to be forcibly expelled.

As to Edwy, what Mr. Green designates by the mild term "an uncanonical marriage," Mr. Stubbs points out to have been a monstrous connection which Edwy, a boy of only fifteen, kept up at once with Elgiva and her mother.‡ He vindicates S. Dunstan's conduct at the coronation, because he and Bishop Kinsige acted only by the order of the assembled Witan of the kingdom; and the subsequent cruelties, if they ever took place, which is generally considered doubtful, must have been perpetrated during S. Dunstan's exile. He winds up the subject with the following fine remark :—

> As for the charge of trampling on the royal authority, it may be dismissed in a word. Men's views of what constitutes vice may differ, but any rule that condemns Dunstan condemns John the Baptist also ; and if any error on the side of severity is pardonable, it is when the rebuke is addressed to the vices of princes : why is Dunstan to be blamed for that which was the glory of Ambrose and Anselm ?§

Another misstatement of Mr. Green's is, that Ethelred II. was forced by the "coalition" of the Danes "with the clerical party under Archbishop Sigeric, the inheritor of the policy of Dunstan, to buy a truce from the invaders and to suffer them to settle peacefully in the land." || It is always considered a part of Alfred's wise policy that he settled Guthorm and his Danes as peaceful subjects in Northumberland, East Anglia, and a great part of Mercia and Essex. But this is the first time we have heard that Ethelred followed his good example. As to the coalition of the clergy with the Danes, it has no historical foundation. Archbishop Sigeric merely united with the two Ealdormen, Ethelward and Elfric, in recommending

* Wilkins, Leges, p. 120. † Wilkins, Concilia, pp. 229, 233.
‡ Vit. Auctor. B., c. 21 ; Roger of Wendover, vol. i. p. 257, ed. Giles ; Chronica Majora, t. i. p. 459. § P. 119. || P. 57.

Ethelred to buy them off,* a measure which Mr. Freeman speaks of "as the necessary consequence of any treaty with Danes,"† and which has now become a usual circumstance of civilized warfare. As well might M. Thiers and the French Assembly be said to have formed a coalition with the Prussians when they consented to pay the exorbitant war indemnity.

We now proceed to the Norman-Plantagenet period. Here we shall often have recourse to Mr. Luard's reprint from the best MSS. of Matthew Paris's "Chronica Majora." His object is to correct the corrupt version in general use, which was prepared for publication by Archbishop Parker or some one whom he employed, who had no scruple about changing what he did not understand or did not like. He has traced the sources from which Matthew Paris compiled his work, shown how he altered or added to his authorities, and proved his access to earlier annals which are lost to us. He has thus added greatly to the value of the chronicle as an historical authority. He also points out how the above details throw light on the extent of the library at S. Alban's and the education of the monks.

With reference to this period Ranke says:—

> We may regard it as the chief result of the Norman-Plantagenet rule, that England became completely a member of the Romano-German family of nations which formed the Western world.‡

From this opinion we must differ, because modern historians, such as Stubbs and Freeman, show that all through the preceding centuries close connection and mutual influence were kept up between England and Western Europe by personal intercourse and royal marriages, by constant pilgrimages to Rome, and by correspondence with the Popes. The Norman conquest had, however, the important result of maintaining this connection and carrying England on along the course of Christian civilization, instead of leaving her to be drawn back into the Pagan barbarism of the North, which Ranke has shown in a preceding chapter was very powerful at this time. For in spite of Harold's brilliant personal qualities, his evident want of ability as a ruler, the civil dissensions, the national exhaustion, and the low state of religion and morals, leave little doubt that, except for the Normans, this must have been her fate. This period was a critical era for the whole Western world. The wandering hordes had settled down in their future homes and were forming themselves into distinct

* Chronic. Flor. Wigorn., an. 991, p. 149, ed. B. Thorpe.
† Norman Conquest, vol. i. c v. sec. 6. ‡ Vol. i. l. 2, p. 91.

nations. But they yet retained the happy consciousness of unity, and one faith, one Church, one code of personal and social morals, and one supreme judge of princes and people, were still the common possession of all. Their old restlessness now found vent in the intense activity and energy with which they struggled to adapt their old habits to their new circumstances, to extend or limit their respective boundaries and mutual rights, to harmonize the absolute power of the war chief with the personal independence of the free man. Amid ceaseless fermentation and violence there was a constant yearning after order, and as questions of right and justice constantly arose, they were by common consent referred to the Pope, in whose Divine authority all believed. It is scarcely possible to conceive a state of things more diametrically opposite to our own. And yet Ranke and Mr. Green, in common we must confess with the generality of Protestant writers, commit the mistake, at once so absurd and so historically unscientific, of viewing this period and the actors in it through the medium of modern opinions and feelings. Because they themselves deem it an intolerable slavery to obey Pope, bishop, or parson, they ignore the fact that this very obedience was the highest expression of the personal freedom that the barbarian had brought from his German forests, where a free man, even were he judged and found guilty by his fellows, could not be bound or struck except by the priest who was the representative of the gods. Because they themselves scorn to submit, what Dr. Newman aptly calls their "right of self-will,"* to any authority human or Divine, they refuse to believe that their ancestors, in simple Christian faith, beheld in the Pope the real Vicar of Christ. They waste their labour in devising theories of priestcraft, and intrigues and struggles for supremacy, in order to account for that obedience, while it is evident, as Dr. Newman has shown, that the concentration of Papal power

> Was not the work of the Pope ; it was brought about by the changes of times and vicissitudes of nations. It was not his fault . . . . that France, England, and Germany would obey none but the author of their own Christianity, or that clergy and people at a distance were obstinate in sheltering themselves under the majesty of Rome against their own fierce kings and nobles, or imperious bishops.†

Ranke tells us that in the eleventh century the hierarchy "was striving to perfect its supremacy," and that "it was precisely in the enterprise against England that" it "con-

* Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 58. † Ibid., p. 30.

cluded its compact with the hereditary feudal state, which was all the more lasting in that they were both still in process of formation." In the Church thorough changes ensued. It seemed "intolerable at Rome that there should be a Primate of the English Church connected by his Church position with a phase of the supreme priesthood now condemned and abolished"; and "under the authority of Papal legates the great office-holders of the English Church, who had been opposed to the newly arisen hierarchic system, were mercilessly deprived of their places."

The conquerors, no less than the conquered, felt themselves oppressed by the yoke which the two supreme authorities laid on them, and hence both combined to oppose them. But centuries elapsed before this could be effected. The first occasion for it was given when the two authorities quarrelled with each other, and alternately called on the population to give its voluntary aid. . . . . Close as their union was at the time of the conquest of England, yet even then their quarrel broke out. . . . . Gregory VII. demanded to be recognized as feudal lord of England.

William refused.

For the first time the Popes had to give up altogether the attempt to make kings their feudal dependents. . . . . They then formed the plan of severing the spiritual body corporate . . . . from their feudal obligation to the sovereigns. . . . . Far-reaching differences did not appear until the higher ecclesiastics embraced the party of the Papacy, which happened in England through Thomas Becket.*

Mr. Green also speaks of "the claims which were now beginning to be put forward by the Court of Rome." But far from perceiving any compact between the Church and the State, he represents William as making use of the Church to check the aggressive spirit of the feudal baronage, and at the same time enforcing his own supremacy over the Church. In his usual exaggerated tone, he even asserts that "William was indeed the one ruler of his time who dared firmly to repudiate the claims of Rome." On the other hand, he does justice to William's religious reforms, and in his portraiture of Lanfranc and S. Anselm his really admirable gift of graphic delineation of character is happily displayed.

Let us follow out these several charges successively. We deny that the hierarchy was not perfect in the Norman-Plantagenet period, or that it was then in process of formation, or that claims new in principle were put forward by the Court of Rome. Such assertions are contradicted by the whole course

* Vol. i. l. 1, c. 2, 3.

of previous history. It could easily be shown that there is not a single act of S. Gregory VII. or Innocent III. which has not, as far as principle goes, its counterpart in earlier times. Consider such facts as the following. There had been the excommunication of the iconoclast emperors by S. Gregory II. and S. Gregory III.: S. Gregory III., or in any case Zachary, taking for granted the freedom of Rome from allegiance to the Eastern Empire, and bestowing the protectorate of the City, under the title of Patrician, on the Frank Mayors of the Palace: the transfer of the throne of Gaul and Germany from the Merovingian to the Carlovingian race: the imperial crown placed by S. Leo III. in the name of God, on Charlemagne's head. We are not inquiring whether such precedents can strictly be called parallels; but at all events they are entirely similar in principle: and this fact suffices to refute Mr. Green's statement. No one dreamt of disputing the right of successive Popes to perform these acts, every one of which took place under the moral conditions which the Cardinal-Archbishop of Westminster has recently taught us, are required for the exercise of the Church's authority in temporals. On the one hand, the whole of Western Europe was Christian, and thus it was "subject to the Divine Law, of which the Roman Pontiff was the supreme expositor and executive." On the other, the nations, by their "faith and free will," had subjected themselves to "the Christian jurisprudence, in which the Roman Pontiff was recognized as the supreme Judge of Princes and of People. . . . . It was by their free will that it was maintained in vigour; and it was in conformity with their free will that it was exercised by the Pontiffs."* The peculiar characteristics of the Norman period caused more frequent reference to be made to the Pope, and thus brought his authority into greater prominence. But that authority was in principle only what it had ever been. The above moral conditions being then in force, his authority was acknowledged even when it was not obeyed. These conditions have long passed away, and therefore the perverse practice of judging that period by modern notions is evidently so absolutely illogical, that it can be ascribed only to ignorance or to the dishonest hope of extracting political capital from it.

We have already spoken of the Papal supremacy in England during the first century after the introduction of Christianity. It is also expressly acknowledged by subsequent early English writers. It is proved by the constant pilgrimages to Rome,

* The Vatican Decrees, 83-5.

kings and nobles, bishops and abbots, clergy and laity, rich and poor, offering their personal homage at the feet of Christ's Vicar. Thither King Ethelwulf took his favourite son, Alfred, to be crowned by S. Peter's successor. Thither went Cnut to vow himself, with rich offerings, to the service of God. At the prayer of kings, bishops, and abbots, Popes constantly granted charters in confirmation of acts of the civil power; they established or restricted archiepiscopal jurisdiction, confirmed the election of metropolitans, enforced canonical discipline, and revised conciliary decrees. In 991 Pope John XV. intervened to prevent a war between Ethelred II. and Richard I., Duke of Normandy, and his legates bound down each to respect the rights of the other.* Only a few years before the death of S. Edward the Confessor, Stigand, Archbishop of Canterbury, was suspended,† Archbishop Aldred of York and the Bishops of Wells and Hereford went to Rome to be consecrated, legates came to England to secure obedience to the Pope's decree that Aldred should not hold the See of Worcester with that of York, and frequent Papal letters were received denouncing the desecration of Christian worship even by persons in holy orders.‡ Thus the position of the English Church was the same before as after the Conquest. There was no abolished "phase of the supreme priesthood" with which Stigand could be connected, and no "newly arisen hierarchic system," to which "the great office-holders of the English Church" could be opposed.

The accounts given by contemporary writers of the Pope's sanction of William's pretension to the English throne, do not afford the least foundation for Ranke's assertion of a compact between the hierarchy and the feudal State, or for the common popular notion that William promised to hold England as a Papal fief. It was in accordance with established usage that when Harold violated his oath to aid William's election and his promise to marry his daughter, the latter should lay his complaint before the Pope. Harold did not answer the charge, and the Pope made the only award that was possible. William of Poictiers, who is the most explicit of our authorities, says that the Pope gave William a banner "as the suffrage of S. Peter, in order that under it he might more confidently and securely attack his foe"; that this banner was carried before the army at Senlac; and that after the victory William in

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* Memorials of S. Dunstan, Ep. Johan. Pap. XV., p. 397.
‡ Hoveden, an. 1062, vol. i. p. 106.
† Vit. Ead., p. 431, ap. Norman Conquest, vol. iii. c. ii. p. 13.

return sent Harold's banner to the Pope, with the announcement of "Rome's desired triumph over the tyrant."* All the contemporary writers and all the old chronicles are either silent as to the Pope's sanction, or confine themselves to saying that William had his authority or approval. The only foundation, and that not an historical one, for the story of the fief, is the Roman de Rou, written a hundred years later, which makes William offer, that "if God would grant him to conquer England, he would receive it from S. Peter, and serve no other duke."†

Great changes in the English Church were indeed made, but not with the motive that Ranke assigns to them. It was not at Rome only that Stigand's usurpation of the English primacy seemed "intolerable." It was contrary to fundamental Catholic principles, and therefore intolerable to all sound Catholics. He had already been suspended, and the invalidity of his orders had already been acknowledged by Aldred and the bishops who went with him to Rome, by S. Wulfstan, and even by Harold, who, in spite of established usage and political considerations, superseded him and was crowned by Aldred. Ranke's note on Harold's consecration is not very creditable to either his scientific criticism or his appreciation of the spirit of the age. First he quotes the supposititious Ingulf, who in this case, however, is supported by the other chroniclers; then he expresses surprise that the Bayeux tapestry, the object of which was to extol William at Harold's expense, should have named Stigand; and finally he says that "Harold could not possibly have meant, ... by passing over the Archbishop of Canterbury, to declare him to be incompetent, since he had been appointed by his party."‡ Harold's first object would, of course, have been to secure the grace which was believed by all his subjects to confer a right to the crown, and which was dependent on the orders of the consecrator. Consequently, to suggest that mere party motives could have induced him to forfeit this grace by receiving his crown from a suspended archbishop, is unworthy of a writer of Ranke's standing.

The discipline and morality of the English clergy are generally acknowledged to have fallen very low during the Danish invasions and the reign of S. Edward the Confessor. Monks lived as earls, indulging in feasting, dice, horses, dogs, and falconry,§ and a second Benedictine revival was needed.

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* Guillelm. Pictav. Du Chesne, Scriptor. Normann., pp. 197, 201, 206.

† Norman Conquest, vol. iii. c. xiii. p. 318. ‡ Vol. i. l. 1, c. ii.

§ Will. Malm., Gest. Pont., 70, ap. Norman Conquest, vol. iv. c. xix. p. 362.

Religion itself was imperilled among the laity by the dissolution of clerical morals; for the popular indignation against incontinent and married priests was so great, that the people often threw off all subjection to them, baptized their infants themselves, using the wax from their ears mixed with oil for chrism, refused viaticum and burial from them, burnt the tithes due to them, trampled under foot the body of our Lord which they had consecrated, and poured out His blood upon the ground.*

As bishops and abbots could be judged only by the Pope, William requested S. Gregory to send legates to England. He was crowned by them on Easter Day 1070, thus acknowledging the Pope's supremacy. In synods held at Winchester and Windsor they examined the orders of all the clergy, and degraded Stigand and many bishops and abbots. The grounds of Stigand's condemnation were, that he had usurped the chair of Canterbury during the lifetime of Robert, its occupant, whose pallium he had worn at Mass; and that he had received another pallium from the anti-pope Benedict, whom the Roman Church had excommunicated for simony.† Ordericus Vitalis says that he was also condemned as a perjurer and homicide.‡ In such sweeping reforms it was only to be expected that some of the clergy should have been said to have been degraded without adequate cause. But all seems to have been done with due regard for justice; for two years later we find the Pope ordering that the deposition of Alric, Bishop of Chichester, should be again looked into by Lanfranc.§ The excellent spirit which animated William is declared by the contemporary writer quoted by Mr. Green, who says,

> In choosing abbots and bishops he considered not so much men's riches or power as their holiness and wisdom.‖

The writer in the English Chronicle, who knew William personally, notwithstanding his very severe judgment of him also says,—

> He was mild to those good men who loved God, but severe beyond measure towards those who withstood his will.......Such was the state of religion in his days that all that would, might observe that which was prescribed by their respective Orders. ¶

It is quite true that both conquerors and conquered felt themselves oppressed by the yoke which the State laid on

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* Chronica Majora, t. ii p. 12. † Wilkins, Concil., t. i. p. 322.
‡ Orderic. Vital., Du Chesne, Scriptor. Normann., p. 516.
§ Wilkins, Concil., t. ii. p. 5. ‖ Green, p. 82. ¶ An. 1087, p. 461.

them; but there is not a shadow of evidence for Ranke's assertions that the Church oppressed them, or that they combined to oppose the Church, or that the Church, either at this or any future time, called on the population to aid it against the State. Mr. Green represents the attitude of the Church correctly when he says,—

> As Anselm had withstood William the Red, as Theobald had rescued England from the lawlessness of Stephen, so Langton prepared to withstand and rescue his country from the tyranny of John.*

He also points out that in Stephen's reign "England was rescued from this chaos of misrule by the efforts of the Church." But though he mentions incidentally that Henry, Bishop of Winchester, acted as Papal legate, he fails to notice, and probably to perceive, that it was the Pope, who through successive legates, thus rescued England, "asserting the moral right of the Church to declare sovereigns unworthy of the throne," "the responsibility of the Crown for the execution of the compact" between kings and people which "had become a part of constitutional law in the charter of Henry I.," and "the right of a nation to good government." † The first of these legates was Alberic, Bishop of Ostia, who held a council in London in 1138.‡ He was succeeded in the following year by Henry of Winchester, who held the office till 1143, when Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury, took his place.§

We deny that there was any quarrel between William and the Church. An unflinching, resolute will, which bowed neither to God nor man, was William's most striking characteristic. Probably, therefore, there was ground for Eadmer's complaint, which Mr. Green, however, repeats as if it were a law of the land, that all things, Divine or human, awaited his order, that no Papal letters could be received, no synod held, no excommunication or ecclesiastical censure issued, without his permission.|| William's great aim was to consolidate a strong government in England. With this view he

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* P. 122. † P. 99.

‡ Chronica Majora," t. ii. p. 173. At this council Theobald was consecrated by the Legate. Mr. Luard gives us to understand that in the MSS. the words are "*ab episcopo consecratus legato.*" But Archbishop Parker has thought it desirable for evident reasons to insert "*cum*" before "*legato.*" Mr. Luard thinks that "*episcopo*" is accidentally written for "*ipso.*" But the original reading seems to us quite right. We often read about a cardinal legate, and a bishop legate appears to be equally correct. Chron. Major., t. ii. pref., p. 25.

§ Hoveden, t. i. pp. 196, 197, 206.

|| Eadmer, Hist. Nov. 6, ap. Norman Conquest, vol. iv. c. 19, p. 438.

bound not only the laity, but also the clergy, in feudal vassalage. The effects of this measure in secularizing the clergy and creating complications of jurisdiction, were to be deprecated. But it was not a violation of the Church's rights, and it is not noticed in S. Gregory's correspondence. From a similar motive he forbade the bishops, whose presence was greatly needed at home in seasons of revolt, to go to Rome as they were bound to do at stated intervals. But though Gregory complained bitterly through his legate,* and in his correspondence with Lanfranc there was no quarrel. Again, when William, in defiance of his brother Odo's claim to episcopal immunity, laid hands on him, saying, "I do not condemn a cleric or a bishop, but I arrest my count," Gregory remonstrated in friendly terms.† William could have had no difficulty in clearing himself when he represented the critical circumstances, and that Odo, besides his misdeeds in England, was collecting troops to go to Italy as a candidate for the antipapacy. Thus, in this case, too, there was no quarrel.

In fact, it was a part of William's policy to govern according to the laws both of S. Edward and the Church; and a quarrel with the Pope was one of the last things that he would have permitted. He allowed Lanfranc to recover by legal procedure the Church lands which he himself had bestowed on his brother Odo; and even to define and reduce to the minimum the royal rights over lands belonging to the Church.‡ Other instances of the same kind might be quoted. He was careful to carry his measures by legal means, as is proved by his forbearance in waiting for above three years for the arrival of the Papal legates to degrade the bishops who stood in the way of his reforms. A similar spirit of obedience is to be seen in his constant communications with the legate Hubert, and in the correspondence with Gregory about the Bishop of Dôl, when the only favour granted to his intercession was, that the bishop's case should be again inquired into; S. Gregory significantly adding, that he had no doubt of William's acquiescence in the final decision, whatever it might be, because justice, which he was not only prompt to do himself, but which he loved and approved when done by others, was the virtue for which he was distinguished and which principally recommended him to God and man. Lanfranc and William always worked harmoniously, so that they were

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* Rer. Gallic. et Francic. Scriptor., t. xiv.; Ep. Gregor. Pap. VII., 118.

† Ibid. 164.

‡ Ernulf, Anglia Sacra, t. i. pp. 334–6; ap. N. Conquest, vol. iv. c. i. p. 364.

styled the two steers which drew the car of England; and though William's passions frequently led him to commit uncanonical acts, they were regarded as illegal and exceptional, and did not prevent his priding himself on being an obedient son of the Church.

It seems bold to question whether Gregory ever demanded feudal homage from William, but there is fair ground for doing so. In the first place, there appears no reason why he should have made the demand, because already as Vicar of Christ he had from William greater submission than he could have had as his feudal lord; and in the next, a more proper time for the demand, if it was to be made, would have been immediately after the Conquest when he was crowned by the legates in 1070, or at latest on Gregory's accession in 1073. Moreover, there is not the slightest reference to the demand in Gregory's correspondence, except in two letters from William and Lanfranc. William says that Hubert had admonished him on Gregory's behalf to do fealty to him and his successors, and to be more careful to send the usual payments to the Roman Church. Fealty he refused to do, because his predecessors had not done it; but he promised to send the money partly by Hubert, and partly by Lanfranc's messengers; ending with the words, "Pray for us and for the salvation of our kingdom, because we have loved your predecessors, and you, above all, we sincerely desire to love and obey." * Lanfranc alludes vaguely to a demand made by Hubert, to which he had tried without success to persuade William to accede. But his letter is chiefly occupied with assurances of his own undiminished obedience and affection. † However before the Legate could leave England there came to him a letter from Gregory rebuking him for his delay and expressing a great desire for his presence, because he had signified to him that Teuzon, as his legate, had said things about the king of England which Hubert knew were not according to his orders. Gregory also complained bitterly of William's not allowing the bishops to come to the Apostolic threshold, and bade Hubert threaten him with S. Peter's anger.‡ But not a word is said about William's refusal to do fealty. Nor does this refusal prevent Gregory shortly after expressing his satisfaction at the report, which Hubert on his return had given him of William's prudence, honesty, and justice, and exhorting him to persevere in

* Ibid., Ep. 117. † Opera Lanfranc., t. i. Ep. 11, ed. Giles.

‡ Ep. 118. S. Gregory's letter to Hubert runs thus:—"Significasti autem nobis Teuzonem, quasi ex parte nostra legatum, adversus Anglicum Regem verba dixisse, quæ noveris ex nobis mandata non esse."

his obedience to the Apostolic See.* Nor did the demand prevent William's appealing to the Pope against his son Robert, to whom Gregory consequently wrote, exhorting him to honour and obey his father and mother.† Thus there is fair reason for concluding that the demand for homage had been made by Hubert in consequence of a misrepresentation of Teuzon's, and not in accordance with Gregory's orders.

We now come to Ranke's assertion, that when "the Popes had to give up altogether the attempt to make kings their feudal dependents," "they then formed the plan of severing the spiritual body corporate . . . . . from their feudal obligation to the sovereigns."‡ This accusation, made in 1859, when the first volume of this history appeared in Germany, throws curious light on the charge of conspiracy against the State recently laid against the Church. Bismarck then belonged to the Junker party, but "Delenda est Carthago" was already the watchword of the secret conclaves to which he has since bound himself. The charge is as false as it is mischievous.

The first instance which Ranke gives of this alleged Papal conspiracy against the State, is the dispute about investitures between Henry I. and S. Anselm. This was not, strictly speaking, a question of feudal obligations, which were only of a civil nature, but of the fundamental principle of the Catholic faith, that spiritual powers can be transmitted by spiritual superiors alone. Bishops and abbots were under the same obligations as barons and knights to swear fealty and do homage for the *temporalities* of their fiefs; but princes took advantage of this feudal incident to usurp the right both of nomination and of investiture with the ring and crosier, which were the recognized symbols of the spiritual jurisdiction. The real nature of the dispute is proved by its final settlement, of which the conditions were, that fealty and homage being civil duties, they should be exacted from the clergy before they received their *temporalities*; while the king resigned his pretension to confer the ring and crosier, as denoting spiritual jurisdiction. The Church's resistance to the encroachment on her spiritual authority, was not any new plan now formed by the Popes. For S. Gregory the Great, in the eighth and ninth centuries, protested against the appointment of bishops by lay princes; Withred, King of Kent, at the Synod of Beckenham in 694, declared it to be contrary to the institutes of the English nation; and it was condemned by the General Councils of Nice

* Ibid., 136. † Ibid., 138. ‡ Vol. i. p. 40.

in 787 and Constantinople in 869, and recently by Popes S. Gregory VII. and Victor III.

The next instance of Papal conspiracy is the contest of S. Thomas of Canterbury with Henry II. This also had no connection with feudal obligations, or with the loyalty of subjects to their sovereign. Mr. Green speaks of "the constitutional position of the Primate as champion of the old English customs and law against the personal despotism of the Kings."* This was the position that S. Thomas assumed, and he won "the love of the English people in a struggle in which nothing but an unerring instinct could have shown them that their interest was in anyway involved." † The first subject in dispute was the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. In these courts, justice being administered according to a fixed code, and ecclesiastical jurisprudence having anticipated the horror of bloodshed to which Protestant England has only recently attained, all the poor and defenceless, as well as the clergy, found shelter in them; while the Norman barons, being often disappointed of their habitual sanguinary vengeance on all who had offended them, complained of their leniency. In this dispute S. Thomas was supported, not only by universal Christian practice, but also by established English custom, and more especially by the statute in which the Conqueror forbade bishops and archdeacons to sit in the Hundred Court, and secular persons to judge ecclesiastical causes. ‡

The second subject in dispute was the Constitutions of Clarendon. These again formed no part of the feudal obligations of Henry's subjects, but were infractions of established laws. Mr. Green directs our attention to the Charter of Henry I., in which "the evil customs by which the Red King had enslaved and plundered the Church, were explicitly renounced," as "the first limitation which had been imposed on the despotism established by the Conquest." § Henry II.'s object was to convert these "evil customs" into the written law of the land; and had he succeeded and turned the Church into a powerful tool of the State, the struggle for constitutional liberty in the reign of his son John would have been impossible, and the history of the English people and the development of the national character, would have been reversed. Thus O'Connell, whose words the Cardinal-Archbishop has lately made familiar to us, said with truth that S. Thomas was the greatest patriot that England ever had.

Ranke reproaches S. Thomas with having opposed consti-

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* P. 122. † Freeman, Norman Conquest, vol. i. Preface.
‡ Wilkins, Concil., t. i. p. 368. § P. 87.

tutions framed by the lay and spiritual nobility in agreement with the king. In the eyes of Cæsarism this is of course a crime. But Englishmen will deem it an honourable distinction, that he stood alone in freedom of speech and vote, while all around him crouched before the tyrant. The Constitutions were not framed by the "lay and spiritual nobility," but by two of the king's followers at his command; and the bishops and barons acquiesced in them merely from terror. Ranke taunts him with not possessing "the inflexible obstinacy which distinguishes most of the champions of the hierarchy," and with coming to a decision, taking "the hierarchic side resolutely," and appealing to the Pope "only when his vacillation endangered him personally."* This accusation is absolutely false. Before the king entered the council-chamber, which was filled with armed men, S. Thomas professed his readiness to die for the Church. From a love of peace, and trusting to the solemn pledge of the Grand Master of the English Templars and a French Templar, that if the king's dignity were satisfied by a public submission no more would be heard of the matter, he at first made a general promise to observe the customs. But as soon as the king's order to commit the customs to writing revealed his intention to convert them into laws of the realm, S. Thomas took his stand firmly, protesting against each constitution as it was read aloud, and when he was called on to sign and seal them, instantly exclaiming, "By the Lord Almighty during my lifetime seal of mine shall never touch them." Then, wishing not to exasperate the king, he demanded time for consideration, but his intention never vacillated.† Ranke must be aware that he was not in greater danger at Northampton than at Clarendon; for the danger lay only in his inflexible resolution to die for the Church rather than yield. As to Ranke's assertion that Henry "had to do penance,"‡ it is well known that the penance was entirely voluntary, and was performed many years after Henry's reconciliation to the Church, when his conscience had been awakened and his heart broken by the misconduct of his sons.

Mr. Green's narrative of this contest is fair, but he is strangely mistaken in saying that S. Thomas set his seal to the Constitutions.§ Some of the bishops are said to have signed and sealed, but who they were, or how many, is un-

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* Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 43.

† The details of this Council are given by Herbert of Bosham and Fitz Stephen, both of whom were present, and also by Roger of Pontigny, Grim Garnier, and William of Canterbury, all of them intimate friends of S. Thomas.

‡ Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 46. § P. 104.

known. Their signatures, however, were in any case invalid without that of the Archbishop and the Pope's confirmation.

The popular feeling of the time is expressed in the Chronica Majora, which styles the Constitutions of Clarendon "iniquitous constitutions and liberties, and dignities detestable to God." It also describes S. Thomas as having suffered patiently for so many years in order to protect the liberties of the Church.*

The critical point, however, in this discussion, is the relations of John with the Pope and the barons, which are misrepresented by both Ranke and Mr. Green. Ranke says:—

> Innocent III. thought good to decide a disputed election at Canterbury, by passing over both candidates, including the king's, and caused the election of, or rather himself named, one of his friends, from the great school at Paris, Stephen Langton. As King John did not acknowledge him, Innocent laid England under an interdict.†

Mr. Green also asserts that Innocent pushed his "claims of supremacy over Christendom further than any of his predecessors," and that, though "a better choice" than Langton "could not have been made," "the step was a violent usurpation of the rights both of the Church and of the Crown." ‡

We have already shown that Innocent did not claim any power beyond what his predecessors had exercised. The other charges, that he unlawfully usurped jurisdiction and encroached on the rights of the Church and the Crown in favour of his own friend, are equally false. The monks, the bishops, and the king, had all appealed to him, thus recognizing his jurisdiction over the English Church. Not only had the king no right to make the appointment, because the freedom of ecclesiastical elections had been guaranteed by himself and his predecessors at their coronation, and more explicitly by Henry II. after S. Thomas's death, but he had publicly promised that he would accept whosoever should be elected by the monks of Canterbury, who went to Rome as proctors for the whole community. He had, it is true, secretly bound the monks by oath to elect no one except his former candidate, John de Gray; § but this was an illicit proceeding on both sides, and therefore not binding. In giving judgment on the former elections, about the informality of which there could be no doubt, the Pope disqualified both candidates. The monks were thus unable to fulfil their illegal promise to the king; and as they trembled at his anger, the Pope adopted a very usual

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* Chronic. Major., t. ii. pp. 225—282. † Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 49.
‡ P. 119. § Ibid., p. 514.

form of procedure and bade them elect Stephen Langton, thus relieving them of responsibility and in no way violating their rights. Langton was not a private friend of the Pope's, but an Englishman of high birth and prebend of York, at whose elevation to the Cardinalate John had already expressed great pleasure. The Pope's sole motive, as Mr. Green allows, was "to free the Church of England from the royal tyranny"* but at the same time he was careful to avoid irritating John. Though he told the monks that it was neither necessary nor usual to await the consent of princes to an election made before the Apostolic chair, yet as a matter of courtesy he sent messengers to John, wrote to him explaining all the circumstances, and deferred Langton's consecration till sufficient time had elapsed for an answer to have been received.†

John's rage and cruelty were consistent with the terrible verdict of his contemporaries, "Foul as it is, hell itself is defiled by the fouler presence of John."‡ His excommunication, and after the lapse of a certain time, his deposition, were in accordance with the universal law of Christendom. At that time kings held their crowns "by the grace of God," and when through excommunication they forfeited that grace and became, so to say, outlawed from Christendom, they were *ipso facto* deposed, just as in the present day if a king of England or his heir become a Catholic, or marry a Catholic, he *ipso facto* forfeits the crown. The Pope did not openly instigate John's subjects to revolt, as Ranke says.§ After waiting far beyond the time allowed by law for repentance, he, as supreme judge of princes and of people, and at the pressing entreaty of Langton and the English bishops, pronounced the sentence of deposition and declared the penalty which European and national law had already adjudged.

Both Ranke and Mr. Green misstate the circumstances and order of events, so as to make it appear that John's resignation of his crown and oath of fealty were a condition of his reconciliation to the Pope, and also that constitutional freedom was demanded and won quite independently by Langton and the barons, while the Pope united with John to crush the liberty of his subjects. All this is diametrically opposite to the truth. John resigned his crown of his own free will, not at the time of his submission to the Pope, but two days after; while the oath which secured the liberty of all his subjects, both lay and clerical, was a necessary incident of his reconciliation to the clergy, and consequently of his submission to

* P. 19.
† Chronic. Major., t. ii. p. 517.
‡ Green, 118.
§ Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 49.

the Pope, of which that reconciliation was an integral part. Instead of forming a "monstrous alliance with the tyranny of the Crown," as Mr. Green asserts,* the Pope consistently supported the liberties of England, which were only imperilled and retarded by the violence of the barons and the imprudence of Langton. This will appear more clearly if we run rapidly through the facts.

As late as August, 1212, John treated Pandulph at Northampton with excessive insolence;† and it was not till he was convinced that the troops whom he had assembled on the coast to resist Philip of France, would desert him on the field of battle, that he made up his mind to submit. On the 7th of May, 1213, he invited Pandulph to come to him. On the 13th, in the presence of his nobles and a large crowd of people,‡ he accepted all the conditions required by Innocent; but neither in them nor in the Pope's private instructions was there any mention of the oath of fealty.§ On the 15th he resigned his crown and kingdom to the Pope, declaring that he did so of his free will and by the advice of his barons, without being constrained to it by either force or fear; and his act being unexpected, and Pandulph not authorized by the Pope to receive his homage, he promised to do it if he were ever able to go to the Pope. All this occurred in the presence of the nobles, who were so far from feeling the "wonder and disgust" alleged by Mr. Green, that the principal of them signed the deed of resignation,‖ and at a later period they reminded the Pope that they had compelled John to take this step.¶ On the following day, May 16th, Pandulph went to France in order to avert the imminent invasion of England. For though John's submission necessarily annulled the Pope's sentence of deposition and his command to Philip to carry it into execution, yet there can be little doubt that had not John placed himself under the protection of the Holy See, Philip would have continued his enterprise against England quite independently on his own account.

Most English writers regard John's resignation of the crown and oath of fealty as disgraceful acts. But fealty and homage, though indicating the acknowledgment of a superior, were not then deemed disgraceful. The kings of Scotland frequently did homage for their crown to the kings of England. Henry II. swore that he and his eldest son and their successors received and held the kingdom of England from Pope Alexander III.

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* P. 143.

† Chronic. Major., t. ii. p. 534.

‡ Ibid., 541.

§ Lingard, vol. iii. c. i. p. 33, ed. 4.

‖ Ibid., p. 544-6. Roger of Wendover, vol. ii. pp. 263-70, ed. Bohn.

¶ Mauclerc, in Rymer, Fœdera, 1, ap. Ranke, vol. i. l. 1, p. 50.

and his successors, and that they reputed themselves in perpetuity true kings of England only while the Pope and his successors held them as such.* The following year, in a letter preserved by his secretary, Peter of Blois, he mentioned as a thing perfectly understood between himself and the Pope, that he held the kingdom of England in fee from the Roman Church.† Richard Cœur de Lion, in 1193, resigned the kingdom of England to the Emperor, and received it back again from him to be held as a fief of the Empire subject to the tribute of £5,000 per annum.‡ It was therefore neither extraordinary nor disgraceful that John should have followed the example of his father and brother.

Innocent also is accused of selfish ambition for accepting England as a fief. We cannot, of course, pretend to scrutinize his interior feelings, but his exterior acts and the circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion that he could not have been actuated by any self-interested motive. In the first place, he was not personally a gainer, for the paltry annual payment of one thousand marks, when compared with the £5,000 promised by Richard to the Emperor, can be considered only as an *honorarium*. In the next place, feudal relations entailed mutual duties, the lord no less than his vassal being responsible to his own superior, or, if he had not one, to the feudal society at large, for the fulfilment of his obligations. It is, therefore, evident that the Popes, as Vicars of Christ being responsible to God alone, possessed much more power than they could possibly have as feudal superiors; and consequently that regard to the public welfare, or in some cases compulsion, could have been their only motive for accepting feudal relations. In their own States they adapted themselves to the feudal system, as they have done to all the successive phases of European society. They are frequently taunted with having made the Norman Dukes of Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily their vassals; but the creation of this fief was wrung from Leo IX. by Robert Guiscard and his brother when he was their captive at Beneventum. It was a great triumph to them, but a deep humiliation to him, as appears from the touching circumstances of his return to Rome and his penitential death-bed.§ The evident motive of Alphonsus, King of Portugal, in 1139, and of Peter of Arragon, in 1204, for making their respective kingdoms Papal fiefs, was to gain the protection of the Holy See.‖

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* Muratori, Rer. Ital Scriptor, t. iii. p. 463, ap. Lingard, vol. iii. c. v. p. 265.

† Pet. Bles., ep. 136; ap. ibid. ‡ Hoveden, an. 1193, vol. iii. p. 212.

§ Geschichte der Stadt Rom., t. ii. l. 5, c. ii. § 3.

‖ Rohrbacher, t. xv. p. 410, t. xvii. p. 48.

In like manner the object of both John and the English barons in taking a similar step, was to further their respective interests. They alone were practically benefited by Innocent's acceptance of the gift, since it gave him the power of helping them directly and more efficiently in temporal things, while his spiritual authority would have enabled him to do so only indirectly.* Ten years before, when Philip, as John's feudal lord for his continental dominions, had seized Normandy, John had appealed to Innocent and accused Philip of perjury. At that time the Pope could do no more than exert his spiritual influence on Philip's conscience, as appears from the letter, in which he says:—"We do not arrogate to ourselves the right of judgment as to the fief; that belongs to the King of France. But we have a right to judge respecting the sin"—*i.e.* the perjury.† But now, as we have seen, he had the feudal right—a right quite distinct from his position as Pope, to forbid Philip to invade his fief, and thus to save England from invasion and possibly even conquest. If we follow out the course of subsequent events, we shall see how his feudal authority was also exerted for the promotion of national liberty.

On the 20th of July Langton and the exiled bishops came to Winchester, where John met them, and throwing himself at their feet, besought them to have mercy on him. Langton then gave him absolution, but without removing the Pope's excommunication, as Ranke says,‡ which was evidently beyond his power; after which, as the usual resolution of amendment required on receiving absolution, John took an oath to love and defend the Holy Church and her ministers, and to observe the laws of his predecessors, and especially those of S. Edward the Confessor. This was only the concluding act and consequence of his submission to the Pope, with whom its terms must have been arranged; whereas Mr. Green places it before the act of submission, which is evidently absurd, since the expulsion of the clergy was the very point which made that submission necessary.

Shortly after at a council held at St. Alban's John renewed his oath to observe the laws of his predecessors, the name of Henry I. being substituted for that of S. Edward. He then prepared to carry the war into France. But his barons refused to follow him, some because he was still under excommunication, others because he had already delayed his departure so long, and others again because their feudal obligation did not

* The Vatican Decrees, p. 47. † Lingard, vol. iii. c. i. p. 12.
‡ Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 51.

extend to foreign service. Breaking out into his usual furious rage, he marched north to revenge himself on them; but Langton boldly followed him, reminding him that when he had received absolution he had sworn that no one should be punished without a formal trial, and in spite of John's threats would not leave him till he had compelled him to return. Thus it is evident that English liberty had been already provided for by the Pope without the intervention of the barons.

On Michaelmas Day Nicholas, Bishop of Tusculum, arrived in England as the Papal Legate, and at a council at S. Paul's John again formally resigned his crown to the Pope, and the deed which had formerly been only sealed in wax, was now stamped in gold. But neither the Chronica Majora nor Roger of Wendover says that he did homage.* There is reason to suppose that this ceremony, which makes such a striking picture in Protestant histories, never actually took place. The following Christmas John held his court at Windsor, and in token of the universal joy he distributed gifts to a great number of his principal vassals. The Legate now proceeded to fill the vacant sees and abbeys, as legates had done immediately after the Conquest, and to arrange the amount of the payments stipulated to be made to the clergy. Langton and the bishops, who seem not to have been actuated by the same generous spirit as S. Thomas, were dissatisfied at the loss of patronage, and complained of the smallness of the payments adjudged. But the Legate insisting that any larger payment would injuriously depress both the king and the country, the Pope, out of regard to national interests, confirmed his decision. In June, 1214, the interdict was at last removed.

In the preceding September, in a council held at S. Paul's, and very fully attended by bishops, abbots, barons, and clergy, Langton had produced a copy of the charter of Henry I., and all who were present had promised to give their lives, if necessary, in its defence.† After John had met with his disastrous defeat at Bouvines in July, 1214, the barons began to complain that he had returned to his old tyrannical practices; and they appealed to the Pope, entreating him that, as he was the lord of the English, he would compel John to respect their ancient liberties, and reminding him that it was they who had forced John to give him the fief.‡ This proves, as Ranke says, that they "saw in the Pope a natural ally."§ In November they received the Pope's answer, expressing a hope that peace being

* Chronic. Major., t. ii. p. 568-70; Roger of Wendover, t. ii. p. 290.
† Chronic. Major., t. ii. p. 552.
‡ Mauclerc in Rymer, Fœdera, i., ap. Ranke, vol. i. l. 1, c. iii.
§ Vol. i. l. 3, c. iii. p. 50.

now concluded with France, they would give up their confederation against the king and he would observe good faith with them. He wrote to the king to the same effect, and desired Langton to exert himself to keep peace between them. The barons, however, secretly continued their military preparations, and in January they appeared before the king in arms and demanded the observance of the liberties to which he had bound himself when he received absolution at Winchester, thus proving that they at least regarded these liberties as secured to them through the Pope. John deferred his answer till Easter, when, on these laws and liberties being explained to him, he exclaimed, "Why do they not demand my crown?" The barons took up arms, besieged Northampton and Bedford, seized London, and marching to Runnymede, compelled John to sign not only Magna Charta, but also a deed by which he empowered twenty-five barons to enforce the execution of all that he had promised and made over his principal castles to their nominees. Ranke allows that by these conditions "the legal and indispensable powers of the king's government were impaired," and that "it could not be expected that King John or any of his successors would let this pass quietly."* Is the Pope then to be blamed for annulling the charter when he heard of the violent proceedings of the barons, and the outrageous clause against the king's authority, and John protested that he had signed the deed only under compulsion? At the same time he wrote to the barons, pointing out how unjust was their conduct in making themselves judges of their own cause, and saying that "as he would not have the king deprived of his rights, so he would have him desist from harassing them, lest by evil customs and iniquitous exactions, the kingdom of England should be oppressed in the Pope's name"; he also desired them to send envoys to the General Council that was about to be held, in order that "the king might be satisfied with his just rights and honour, and the clergy and laity might enjoy the peace and liberty due to them."† The barons, however, though they had been parties to the king's oath of fealty and had themselves appealed to the Pope, refused to stand by his adjudication and flew to arms. Now only do we first hear complaints of John's resignation of his crown and oath of fealty to the Pope. Now also, and not before the assembly at Runnymede, as Ranke says,‡ did the Pope excommunicate the barons, and suspend Langton for refusing to publish

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* Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 54. † Chron. Maj., t. ii. p. 620.
‡ Vol. i. l. 1, c. iii. p. 53.

the excommunication. Then followed the horrible ravages, first of the barons, then of John's Poictevins, and finally of the French troops under Louis. Happily John's death released England from this misery. His son Henry was crowned and a royalist party formed by the Papal Legate. The barons deserted Louis, and finally peace was made between Henry III. and Louis at Merton, in Surrey, and Magna Charta, with the omission of the article subversive of the king's authority, was proclaimed. Thus, by the Pope's persevering action from John's submission to the conclusion of this peace, were secured the constitutional liberties which had been obscured and endangered by the violence of the barons and Langton's want of judgment.

The conduct of the barons all through John's reign was despicable. So long as they had liberty to plunder and ravage the lands of the Church, they condoned his tyranny and his outrages on their domestic honour; and even when the Pope released them from their oaths of allegiance, they could find courage only to plot with a foreign prince to betray the monarch under whose banner they were assembled. They co-operated in John's act of submission to the Pope, rightly believing that they might draw profit from it; but when they found that, though the Pope was resolved to maintain their rights, he would not uphold their turbulent subversion of all authority, they resumed their former predatory habits, and committed a double treason, first against their own sovereign, and then against the prince whose aid they had invited. Such are the men whom Protestants celebrate as the champions of their liberties, while they ignore the action of the Pope to whom they are really indebted for Magna Charta. Ranke acknowledges at the close of Henry III.'s reign, that "it was above all things necessary to withdraw the legislative authority for ever from the turbulent grandees";* but he fails to remark that this was the very object at which Pope Innocent aimed when he rejected the revolutionary Charter of Runnymede.

Several other subjects demand notice, but our limits permit us only to point them out.

That Mr. Green should form a different opinion from ourselves about Mary Stuart is not surprising. But it is quite unjustifiable that he should paint her character, and the incidents of her life in the darkest colours, without a single word to warn us that during three centuries they have afforded matter for controversy in Latin, French, Italian, and English.

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* Vol. i. l. 1, c. iv. p. 69.

Ranke no less effectually misleads the reader by diverting his attention from the points on which the controversy turns to some secondary detail. Thus, he declines to assert that every word of the Casket Letters is genuine, or to lay stress on every expression, because "they may have suffered much alteration" through the several translations. But the question is not about translations or verbal alterations, but about the genuineness of the original letters, the two principal of which were in Scotch when Murray exhibited them to Elizabeth's Commissioners at York, but in English when shown at Westminster; and in an Act of Murray's first parliament they are described as "written and subscrivit with her own hand," while others denied them to be her "awin handwrit," and charged them upon her accusers as devysit by thamesalfis." Again, he dwells on petty details about Darnley's murder and Mary's love for Bothwell, as affecting "the degree of" her "complicity," But the question is, whether the murder was not a conspiracy formed by the nobles, her accusers, of which she was not even cognizant, and whether the marriage with Bothwell was not forced upon her by another conspiracy of the same nobles at the "Ainslie's Supper." Again, he quotes the opposite opinions of Tytler and Mignet about the insertion of the damnatory clause in her letter to Babington, as if it were a mere question between these two writers, and not a world-wide controversy, based on the fact that the letter with the damnatory clause is absolute nonsense, while without it, it is perfect sense, but quite harmless.* For further details we refer our readers to our articles on Mary Stuart and the Casket Letters in our 3rd and 14th volumes.

Against another misrepresentation of Ranke's we must protest most gravely. He tells us that the priests in the seminary of Rheims persuaded Savage and Babington to secure themselves eternal happiness by killing Elizabeth; that Mary's claim to the English crown, "through its combination with the religious idea," led her into the guilt imputed to her; and that in the assassination of Buckingham "there is no mention of any participation of a minister of religion."† All this evidently implies that it is a Catholic doctrine, inculcated by Catholic priests, that eternal happiness is secured by the murder of religious and political enemies. We cannot suppose that Ranke is ignorant that while Wickliff, Knox, Buchanan, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, Milton, and many other Protestants, uphold the lawfulness of such assassinations, the Fathers of

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* Vol. i. l. 3, c. iii. pp. 273, 274; c. v. p. 307.

† Vol. i. l. 3, c. v. pp. 306, 315; line 5, c. ix. p. 583.

Constance strongly condemned the execution of justice by the populace or private individuals, and later writers, especially the Jesuits, maintain this doctrine. But we will not pursue the subject, as it was fully and most satisfactorily treated in the "Month" a year or two ago.

Finally, before we close we must confute the assertion of both Ranke and Mr. Green,* that F. Garnett and the other Catholic priests were either parties to, or aware of, the Gunpowder Plot. On the contrary, it is notorious that F. Garnett heard of it only in the confession of F. Tesimond, who also knew it only through the confession of Winter, one of the conspirators, and even Protestants are aware that the seal of confession is inviolable. If, therefore, Protestant writers mention that F. Garnett knew it, they ought in common honesty to add how he knew it. As to Ranke's assertion, that he had been consulted and declared the enterprise lawful,‡ the fact is that Catesby, wishing to ascertain the opinion of the Jesuits without letting them know his motive, took advantage of a conversation about the war in the Low Countries to ask how far it was lawful to take a fort by assault and thus cause the death of many innocent persons; and F. Garnett's opinion was given on this totally different subject. For a year the Jesuits had been very uneasy because they feared that the severe measures of government might drive Catholics into some conspiracy. In August, 1604, F. Garnett wrote to Rome, "If the affair of toleration go not well, Catholics will no more be quiet. What shall we do? Jesuits cannot hinder it. Let Pope forbid all Catholics to stir." Again, in May, 1605, he wrote, "All are desperate. Divers Catholics are offended with Jesuits; they say that Jesuits do impugn and hinder all forcible enterprises." And again on the following 24th July he wrote, "They further say that no priest shall know their secrets."†

There are many other less important subjects and minor details into which we would gladly enter did space permit. But we have said enough to indicate the character of the two histories under review. We hope at some future time to return to Ranke; but as for Mr. Green, it is only necessary to refer our readers to the article in Fraser's Magazine, already quoted, in which his gross blundering is exposed in some detail.

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* Green, p. 463.

‡ Vol. i. l. 4, c. iii. pp. 411, 412.

† F. Gerard's Narrative, pp. 65, 73, 75, 77.

Art. III.—ANGLICANS OF THE DAY.

The Public Worship Regulation Act.

The Tempter's Cup. By George Anthony Denison, M.A., Vicar of East Brent, Archdeacon of Taunton. James Parker & Co.

Visitation Charge. By the Archdeacon of Totnes.

Report of the Proceedings at the Bonn Conference. With a Preface by H. P. Liddon. Rivingtons.

The Church Herald.

Rome and the Newest Fashions in Religion. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. J. Murray.

IN October, 1872, we noticed some of the aspects which the Church of England then presented to the curious observer. Since that date we have not reverted to the subject. Yet the last three years have not been the least eventful in the annals of Anglicanism. The incidents crowded into that brief space, each pregnant with fruitful lessons, have served to demonstrate once more, by new and decisive evidence, how deep and wide is the gulf which separates the Church of England from the Church of God. Never perhaps was the true character of that institution revealed in a more glaring light. The growth of new fervour among some of its adherents has only provoked new and more envenomed conflicts. A professed zeal for the integrity of dogmatic truth has only led to a more wanton betrayal of it. A simulated craving for unity has ended in the cynical boast that it is neither expedient nor attainable. A pretended reverence for authority has been accompanied by new outrages against all who claim to hold it, whether from God or the State. An attempt to revive Catholic doctrine and ritual has united the Anglican Bishops and the Legislature in a league of hostility, unparalleled in the previous policy of either, and culminating in the Public Worship Regulation Act. The only appreciable results of all that has been attempted in the Church of England, by any of its schools and parties, during the last three years of turmoil and agitation, have been these: the growth of a more inveterate and lawless individualism, the aggravation of private hate and public disorder, the betrayal of all positive truth to the derision of the unbeliever, the display of a more deliberate and implacable malice against the Holy See and the Catholic

Church, the obliteration of humility and obedience from the Anglican code, and the proved impotence of the national sect either to diminish the number of its antagonistic creeds or to furnish its members with any intelligible rule for choosing between them.

How far it is possible for thoughtful and educated members of the Church of England—to whom its origin, past history, and present condition are fully known—to remain inculpably ignorant of its true character, is a question which we do not propose to consider. But if there is any room for doubt about the limits of their responsibility, there is none whatever about our own duties towards them. They are plain and imperious. Upon us who possess, by the grace of election, and without any merit of our own, the highest gifts which even the munificent bounty of God can confer upon the creature, there rests an obligation which no discouragement can suspend and no difficulty cancel. We must endeavour, at whatever cost, to impart to others the benedictions which we have ourselves received. It is this thought which inspired in every age the heroism of apostolic missioners. It is this thought which stirred the heart of S. Philip Neri when he blessed the priests departing from Rome for the English mission, and said to those true witnesses, "*Salvete flores martyrum!*" For we are the heirs of the promises, who dwell even now in the sanctuary of God, and are fed with the true manna, *omne delectamentum in se habentem.* It is to us, who are the flock of Peter, that his brother Apostle cries: "You are come to Mount Sion, and to the city of the living God, and to the church of the first-born, who are written in the heavens." (Heb. xii. 22.) Woe to us if we have no care for "those who are without." It is our part, first by pure example, and then by loving and earnest words, to "compel them to come in." If we fail to-day, we shall perhaps succeed to-morrow. The work may be difficult, and too often doomed to fatal sterility; but if it is God who gives the harvest, it is we who must plant the seed.

Our controversy with Anglicans would be more hopeful if we had any principles in common. When we speak with them of the Church, we are not so much as talking about the same thing. There are no two concepts in the whole range of human thought more radically opposed, no two more mutually destructive, than the Catholic and the Anglican view of the Church of Christ. They do not support, but exclude one another. They have no more identity than light and darkness. They coincide like life and death. According to the Anglican theory, the Church has no centre of unity, no permanence of form, no immunity from error, no exemption from

decay. Her teaching may become false, her unity be shattered, her authority lapse, her charter expire. If there was ever One Holy Catholic Church, there are now a dozen, neither of which is either catholic or holy. If it was once her mission to "teach all nations," the obligation is now reversed, and it has become the duty of many of them to teach her. If the great Prophet of Redemption announced, "Every tongue that resisteth thee in judgment thou shalt condemn," he was evidently mistaken. A good many tongues have now no other occupation, and they still wag merrily. If her Almighty Founder promised to be with her "till the consummation of the world," either He repented the promise, or His Presence has been wholly ineffectual; for she has had only an ephemeral life, like the insects which perish at sunset. The Apostles had not yet been translated to their thrones in heaven when she had already begun to decay. The very Sees which they founded and governed "erred in matters of faith." There was no exception; and as the whole Church had thus lapsed into error, in the very hour in which she was quenching Paganism in the blood of her martyrs, we are not surprised to learn, on the same authority, that "the whole world"—which could not well escape the infection of the Church's evil example—"learned and unlearned, all ages, sects, and degrees, had been drowned in damnable idolatry for eight hundred years and more." It sounds like a bad jest, but it has been a fatal one for England. The Noachian deluge spared at least a single family, but the Anglican deluge has no remorse. Everybody is drowned. S. Augustine, S. Paulinus, S. Wilfrid, S. Wolstan, S. Cuthbert, S. Boniface, and S. Anselm in England; S. Louis and S. Bernard in France; S. Thomas Aquinas and S. Francis of Assisi in Italy; and all their fellows in every other land—the Anglican theory requires that they should all be "drowned in damnable idolatry." And it drowns them accordingly. The Anglican Ark was not yet built. The submerged "idolaters" would have declined to enter it if it had been. They would have preferred drowning, being as sure to reach heaven by water as by land. We who have received their heritage are still of the same mind. And so are our adversaries. Time has not improved their estimate of the Church of Christ. Only the other day two Anglican journals announced that, since the Vatican Council, "the Roman Church has apostatized from the faith." The announcement seems superfluous, since the catastrophe occurred, according to Anglican formularies, many ages ago. It is an unprofitable exercise to slay the dead. Yet from one end of England to the other, amid the tumult of day and the silence

of night, a hoarse cry is still heard, "Down with her!" Anglicans of every school still echo the maledictions of their apostate fathers of the "reformation." The crowning glory of their divided sect, they tell us every hour, is to "keep people from Rome." That sect may make truth a jest, and be itself a jest to every other community of men,—even to Turks, Hindus, and Chinese,—but if it can bar the way to the Church which made England Christian, who would not pardon its shortcomings? Such a merit atones for many defects. "The nationality of a Church," as an English journal candidly observes, "is more essential than the nature of its creed."* In other words, let it be precisely that which Apostles said the Christian Church should *not* be, and it has fulfilled its end. It has become the antagonist of the Universal Church. It has made the failure of the latter the *raison d'être* of its own existence. "Lo! here is Christ," it says; and not elsewhere. Only a few months ago one of its most conspicuous ministers cried aloud from his pulpit, "Whoso leaves the Church of England leaves Christ." He was warning his hearers against that Roman Church, "to which," as the saints said with one voice, "error can have no access." The first principle of Anglicanism is that the Church has failed. They would not have been obliged to make a new one if she had not. "Be careful," said an Anglican Bishop lately, "how you make concessions to the Roman Church; for if she is not apostate you are." He had reason to say so. And the apostasy began, as the Nineteenth Article declares, with the Apostolic Sees. "Jesus Christ had said, 'Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My word shall not pass away.' Yet we are told that it passed away, *except from paper*, by the end of a century or two."† Anglicans undertook to restore it. "But it is still more perplexing to conceive how men who hold such opinions as these should attempt to do what, according to them, Jesus Christ and His Apostles could not do; that is, to establish the reign of truth on earth."‡ They cannot help making the attempt, impious and futile as it is. Every new sect professes, like the Anglican, to "reform" the Church of God. That is their peculiar business. They undertake to do "what Jesus Christ and His Apostles could not do." Some of them will tell us presently how far they have succeeded. Mr. Gladstone has already told us that only forty years ago the Church of England "was the scandal of Christendom." Even the

* The *Globe*, October 18, 1872.

† "The Ritual of the New Testament." By the Rev. T. E. Bridgett, ch. v. p. 254.

‡ Ibid.

Church of God, in the Anglican view of it, was hardly a more complete failure than that.

People who hold that it is possible to reform God's Church by making new and purer ones, fail to see what their theory implies. A comparison may serve to open their eyes. If the kingdom of nature had been what they suppose the kingdom of grace to be, the world would have been uninhabitable. If there had been no more unity in the material universe, no better ordering of its elements, no closer adjustment of its parts to one another, than Anglicans say there is in the spiritual, we should all have been plunged long since in universal chaos. If the Cosmos had come to confusion as quickly as, according to them, the Church did, and displayed the same total incapacity of self-preservation, it would have been at this hour only a heap of ruins. Happily the planets do *not* jostle one another, nor the earth cease to bear fruit, nor darkness cover it at noonday, nor the rivers flow backwards, nor the birds fall for want of air to support them, nor the seasons usurp each other's place, nor ear-splitting discord supplant the harmony of the spheres. After the lapse of æons, the mighty fabric of creation displays no crack nor flaw. It is still as perfect as in the hour when it came from the Creator's hand. Yet no one dreams, or would dare to hint, that God loves in the spiritual the disorder and confusion which He has employed all the resources of omnipotence to exclude from the material world. If He had made a Church liable to corruption and division, as Anglicans say, He would have contradicted Himself, denied His own nature, and cancelled the work of redemption. He would have shown less care for His elect than for the humblest flower which blooms securely in the cleft of the rock, or the meanest insect which finds a safe home in a leaf shaken by the wind. He would have produced a helpless monster, the sole blot on His fair creation. Men may make such Churches, and have made many: Arian, Nestorian, Lutheran, Anglican. But they neither come from God nor lead to Him. He has simply nothing to do with them. They may have wealth, numbers, and sounding titles; but they are no more His work than the Municipality of London, or the Royal Academy, or the Holborn Viaduct. A "reformed" Church is *necessarily* a human one.

The Catholic view of God's Church is in every point the negation of the Anglican. It is the view of the Prophets and Apostles. What Isaias and S. Paul said of her is for them literally and visibly true. They understand that if the material creation, with its incomparable harmonies, majestic laws, and unbroken repose, is a masterpiece of Divine omnipotence, the

Church is more. The heavens, indeed, "declare the glory of God," but the Church is "the fullness of Him who filleth all in all." Her life is His life. Her voice is His voice. Her acts are His acts. In the material creation He had to deal with passive elements, which could oppose no resistance to His will, and had no choice but to obey throughout all the wide realms of space the laws by which He determined their form and motions. In the spiritual creation it was not so. Here the task was more difficult, if we may be pardoned for speaking of difficulty where none can exist. It was no longer a question of the unity of unresisting bodies and the harmony of physical forces, but of human souls and wills. They were free agents, free to reject God's law and follow their own, who were now to be united, with their own coöperation, in a supernatural fellowship, so intimate, penetrating, and unearthly, that it was to be compared by God Himself to the union between the Eternal Father and the Son. It was of a mystical society, composed of men of all tribes, nations, and tongues,—including all that was naturally most infirm, restless, indocile, and capricious,—that a decree went forth that they should not only be to the end of time "of one heart and one mind," while all outside that society were to abide in sullen individualism or in a diabolical confederation of revolt; but that they should "all be one, *as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee:* that they also may be one in Us." (John xvii. 21.) Such a Church was worthy of God. And such a Church He has made.

The greatest marvels of the material creation were now surpassed. Of that wondrous creation Jesus Christ was indeed the Almighty Builder, but of the new spiritual fabric He is "the chief corner-stone." He made the world, but was not of it; when He made the Church, she was "bone of His bone and flesh of His flesh." It was from the wound in His side that she came forth, like Eve from the substance of Adam. He and His Church are one. As S. Paul says: "No man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, *as also Christ doth the Church.*" For He made her His Bride, "a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but holy and without blemish" (Ephes. v. 27–29). S. Paul only says after the event what David and Isaias said before it. They predicted the Espousals; S. Paul was a witness of them, and "the friend of the Bridegroom." And because this is God's Church, the mirror of His perfections, the Bride whom He has chosen, the Queen in whose hand He has placed His own sceptre, He will not do less to secure her stability, whom He designs to be for ever to all elect souls

"the pillar and ground of the truth," than He had already done even for the lowest forms of unintelligent matter. He will do unspeakably more. He will not fail now in His latest work Who never failed before. Better that the whole material creation, from which He has banished disorder with such triumphant might, should lapse into chaos than that confusion should lay hold of His Church. He who ordained the stately march of the planets, and the growth of all trees and herbs, "from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall," and confirms in every age the supremacy of law to the uttermost confines of space; how shall He tolerate in His Church the sordid decay and piteous disruption from which all His lesser works are exempt, and which would dishonour Him more than the dislocation of the firmament or the crash of a thousand worlds? Only demons could suggest the impious thought,—though *they* know it is false,—or men perverted by demons. If His adorable purity obliged Him to choose an Immaculate Mother, how should He endure to embrace a defiled Spouse? Christian instinct rejects with horror the notion of an erring, corrupt, divided, and failing Church. It could as easily bear to contemplate the humiliation and dethronement of God. The one conception is not more intolerable than the other. The Church cannot err, because He is pledged to guide her into all truth; cannot be corrupt, because impurity is not allied with the Holy One; cannot be divided, because she is the image and reflection of His unity; cannot fail, because He has said that no combination of human or devilish wickedness shall ever prevail against her. He made the promise, and He has kept it. After eighteen centuries she is still what she ever was. The stars of heaven do not revolve in their courses with a constancy more immutable than hers. But she is more wonderful than they; for they change not, while she has growth and development, yet remains ever the same. In the new world as in the old, amid modern as amid ancient forms of civilization, while all around her reign chaos and interminable conflict, she inspires the same enthusiasm, proclaims the same truths, kindles the same faith, exerts the same authority, baffles the same snares, outlives the same enemies, unites all hearts in the same supernatural unity, and opposes everywhere to brute force, or impotent menace, or subtle treachery, the same unchanging front. Such a Church is manifestly Divine. Even the hardened Rationalist,—marvelling at the contrast which she presents to all human institutions, and hardly moved to smile at the disastrous efforts of National Sects to ape her serene majesty,—exclaims: "If God has made a revelation, the Roman Church

is its only witness." He is almost tempted to believe with the Saints that she *cannot* fail. He protests that it would be nothing wonderful if she should bury all her enemies in the future as she has buried them all in the past. And this he expects, not because he believes with the Saints that God is her sure defence, but because he perceives that all which man has attempted against her has failed. He thinks history will repeat itself. The friends of God expect her future triumphs, and predict her coming victories, on quite other grounds. In every age it has been with them an elementary truth that "no weapon that is formed against her shall prosper." They know that to the last hour of time her authority shall be intact, her unity unimpaired. They have only compassion for those—whether Arians, Donatists, Greeks, Lutherans, or Anglicans—who think that their own apostasy can weaken her life, their own corruption taint her purity, their own disintegration make her divided. The crimes of men cast no shadow on the holiness of God, nor the revolt of sects on the unity of His Church. "Si eam Deus fundavit in æternum," says S. Augustine, "quid times ne cadat firmamentum?" The heavens shall fall in shameful ruin before a stone of the Church shall be moved out of its place; and in spite of the infirmity of her members, her spotless purity is so inseparably united with that of her Founder that, as the same Saint told the Donatists, "præcidendæ unitatis *nulla* est justa necessitas." "Adulterari *non potest* sponsa Christi," said S. Cyprian, "incorrupta est et pudica." "Obumbrari potest," said S. Ambrose, "deficere non potest." So evident was this the truth to all Saints, that even when himself a fugitive from heretical violence, and when the *potestas tenebrarum* seemed to menace the very life of the Church, S. Chrysostom warned her enemies and his that their warfare was as vain as it was impious: **οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησίας ἰσχυρότερον.**

Such was the sublime confidence of the saints and martyrs in the eternal union between Christ and His Church. The kingdoms of this world might fail, but not His. *Fundavit eam in æternum.* They were as sure of her as of Him, and for the same reason. That she should ever be mutilated by division or tainted by corruption was for them a thought worthy of hell, though in hell they know better. It is only men who are foolish and guilty enough to believe what demons know to be impossible. Even men cannot believe the lie till they have lost the faith, and with it all right understanding of the works and counsels of God. The most thoughtful and temperate Anglican has no truer conception of the nature, constitution, or destiny of the Church of God than the blinded

adherent of the most ignoble sect born yesterday of ignorance and self-will. According to Catholic faith the Church cannot fail; according to Anglican opinion she cannot but fail. A horrible necessity lies upon them to maintain that the *Sponsa Christi* is corrupt and divided. They have left her, and must give a reason for having done so. Henceforth it is their own justification which concerns them, not hers. They can only prove theiy own innocence by assuming her guilt. Let the work of God be accounted impure, so that their own may be established in its place. With this design they flinch from nothing. With mingled arrogance and imbecility they offer to do "what Jesus Christ and His apostles could not do." They will remedy God's failures. And as if this were not a sufficient proof of dementia, they will pretend that it is He who invites them to do it! He cannot make a perfect Church without their help. They are willing to offer it. He made one Church, which has proved a failure; they have made a multitude, no two of which are alike, though each of them is better than God's. Nestorius, Eutyches, Photius, Barlow, John Knox, Mr. Wesley, and Dr. Döllinger, to name only a few, have each been able to detect the fatal errors and corruptions of God's Church, and to create a new one incomparably superior to it. Each has produced a *different* one; but this only proves the immense fertility of their resources, and the boundless opulence of their creative genius. God was only able to make one Church, but His creatures can make any number. They are all exact reproductions of the "Primitive Church," though not one of them resembles another; which leads to the pleasant conclusion that the Primitive Church must have been a hundred different things at once. They are all eminently "Scriptural," though they agree in nothing; but as a cheerful "Reformer" said of the Bible, to which they all appeal with equal confidence:—

> Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque,
> Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.*

The only point in which they ever were or ever will be agreed is in their low esteem for the unfortunate Church which God was able to make, but was not able to preserve. They say things of her every day which the deist, being totally indifferent to sectarian interests, would scorn to say. Of the Papacy, which is their special abomination, because it is the rock on which the Church is built, even Mr. Lecky tells them: "It has had no rival, and can have no successor." What

* Werenfels, quoted by Alzog, vol. i. p. 153 (ed. Pabisch and Byrne)

Anglicans say of it, we know, and shall see some fresh examples presently. They are quite willing to make the Church the derision of the world, by their senseless denunciations of her errors, corruptions, usurpations, and divisions, and even to convince it that God's Revelation has no claim to respect because its chief witness is a liar. That is the outcome of all their teaching, the testimony which they bear against God and His Church. According to them, as a living writer observes, "the history of religion is an immense anti-climax. Judaism is a half success. Christianity is a catastrophe." *

If it be, it is they who have made it so. In the sixteenth century, the Church of God, after converting all Europe, and inaugurating in every province the reign of justice and truth, was bowing the far-off heathen nations to the yoke of Christ. For more than a hundred years after the so-called Reformation not one of the new human Churches gave so much as a thought to the conversion of the pagan world. In the seventeenth century, Catholic apostles, as marvellous in heroism and sanctity as any of their predecessors, were still renewing the spiritual triumphs of other days, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of China, and from the frozen wastes of Hudson's Bay to the sunlit waters of the river Plate. They counted their converts by millions, and their children remain to this hour. God was never more mightily present with the Holy Roman Church than in the two centuries which followed the pretended Reformation. Never did He adorn her with more illustrious saints, nor give to the service of her Supreme Pontiff a greater company of apostles. This was His answer to those who said that His Church had failed. The more the gates of hell raged against her, the more He illumined her with the light of His glory. S. Ignatius and S. Francis Xavier were God's refutation of Cranmer and Barlow, S. Philip Neri and S. Francis of Sales of Beza and Calvin. While religion was dying out in every Protestant land, hundreds of Catholic martyrs were shedding their blood from China to Peru. If nations of the Old World were reeling in apostasy, God bade His Church arise and conquer the New. Even at this hour her evangelists still offer to Him their lives in the furthest East. But they no longer convert whole nations. The men who announced that "Christianity is a catastrophe" have made it so. The spurious religions which stifled truth at home have smitten it with impotence abroad. The heathen now disdains a discordant revelation to which they who present it give a hundred different meanings. The effect of the Reformation has been to

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* F. Bridgett, *ubi supra*, ch. v. p. 250.

make the conversion of heathendom impossible. Heresy and unbelief at home, failure and confusion abroad, such are the evidences which the reformed Churches are able to offer of their ability to do "what Jesus Christ and His apostles could not do." They have improved His Church and religion by delivering the one to hatred and contempt, and the other to extinction. Yet Anglicans still continue to disparage and revile the work of God, and remain as insensible to the majesty of His Church as they are indifferent to the ignominy of their own.

They do not, indeed, all use the same violent language about the one, nor hide so carefully the shame of the other; but they all proclaim in chorus, impenitent and unteachable as Jews, that the Holy Church of Christ is divided and corrupt. They only differ about the question whether the Church of England is any better. A good many of them think not. Some of them make no secret of their conviction. A gentleman of cultivated mind, strong opinions, and, we have no reason to doubt, serious life, thus addressed his co-religionists on the first day of last July. "We live," said Archdeacon Denison,* "in a cold, hard, presumptuous, and unbelieving time. England, which, some two hundred and fifty years ago, led the way in Europe in sowing the seeds of atheism and deism by the hands of Hobbes and Herbert, is receiving back with accumulated usury her own godless venture." And then he admits, without designing to do so, what Goethe noticed long ago, and Shelley, Charles Lamb, and many others declared in their own name, that it was the shameful contradictions and impious compromises of his own Church which forced men into unbelief. "The Church corporate"—he means the Establishment—"was silent then: is silent now. It cannot excommunicate penally: it does not so much as condemn in the name of Christ. It is moved to declare against Primitive and Catholic usage: it is not moved to declare against *denial of the Eternal Godhead of the Son.*" The Church of England has accepted with so much tranquillity the denial, by a vast majority of its bishops and clergy, of many other revealed truths,—including baptism and the sacrifice of the altar,—that the lamentation of Archdeacon Denison seems to be somewhat tardy. Does he expect his sect to change its principles and mode of action because a few of its ministers have changed theirs? If "the Church of England," as he continues, "appears to have endorsed the verdict of the World of England that it has no proper authority over men;

* "The Tempter's Cup," a Sermon.

and to find all such authority as it has in Acts of Parliament and in courts of law"; perhaps this is because the Church of England takes a more exact view of its own character than he does. That so-called Church cannot change its nature simply because he and a few others wish it to do so. It is too late. If *all* its members shared the wish, it would still be too late. He admits, indeed, that what he calls "the language of the time" is heard "in mouths from which it ought least to be heard—more particularly in the mouths of the bishops of the Establishment." They are quite content, like all their predecessors, with things as they are; that is, with Acts of Parliament and law courts. "The peace of indifference—that is, the peace of unbelief—the peace of indifference, and of its own child, compromise, is represented sedulously in high places, ecclesiastical and civil, as being the peace of Christ. . . . . Authority of the Church, declared by its living voice, there is, properly speaking, *none*." So much the better, we should have thought, for if such a Church could speak, what would it be likely to say? And as to the peace of "indifference" and "compromise," we hardly understand why Archdeacon Denison should resent the apathy in which he lives so contentedly himself, or denounce the treason which he commits every hour of the day. Does he not live, of his own choice, in communion with men who abhor doctrines which he considers divinely true? Why, then, does he reproach others for doing what he does himself, or condemn the profane system of compromise by which he so cheerfully profits? The most "indifferent" of mortals has surely as just a notion of the "peace of Christ" as he has.

The further we advance in the flowery path of his reflections the more perplexed we are. "A Synod of the Church in Ireland"—he says "Church," though he knows very well that most of its members are, and always were, mere Calvinists —"mangled the Athanasian Creed. Faithful men in Ireland and England say publicly that this is a just cause of separation. I agree with them entirely." Yet the Episcopalian Church in the United States does not use the Creed at all, mangled or otherwise, and probably a great majority of Anglicans heartily sympathize with the American practice. Why does Archdeacon Denison condemn in Ireland what he tolerates in England and America? "Every Separation," he continues, "is not Schism"; and he refers to Acts xix. 9 in proof of that statement. This is the strangest piece of exegesis with which we are acquainted. We are told in the passage referred to, that after S. Paul had taught for three months in the synagogue at Ephesus, finding that "some were hardened,

and believed not, speaking evil of the way of the Lord, he separated the disciples" from such unpleasant company, and disputed from that time "in the school of one Tyrannus." And thus because S. Paul thought it no "schism" to separate his Ephesian converts from hardened unbelievers, Archdeacon Denison infers the consoling proposition that every separation is not schism, and adds triumphantly: "We are in a bad case here in England if it be." In other words, because S. Paul thought it right to separate neophytes from impious railers, Anglicans were quite innocent in separating from the Church. Such a use of Holy Scripture is almost as judicious as that of the fierce Scottish sectaries, who, when they felt inclined to murder an enemy, said to one another, "Phineas rose up and executed judgment," and then murdered him without compunction, and with clear warrant of inspiration.

Archdeacon Denison regrets very much, and so do we, "the proud questionings and miserable cavillings, and 'contentions of science' about the Book in which Revelation is set forth." But whose fault is it? If people will reform the Church of God they are sure before long to reform His Revelation. The one act leads to the other. S. Augustine, in whose time the Canon of Holy Scripture was first determined, was so sure that the indefectible Church was its only infallible guardian and interpreter, that he did not scruple to say: "Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas." Take away the authority of the Church, and men will soon learn to say that she might just as well have promulgated a false Canon in the fourth century as a false Creed in the second or third. Why not? If she could err in one part of her office she could err in another. And Anglicans contend that she began to err almost as soon as she began to exist. It is true that they are not all of one mind on that point, though they only differ about the exact date. "When first the notion was proclaimed in Europe that the Catholic Church had corrupted her ways upon the earth, and betrayed the deposit of truth, men asked in surprise *when* this had taken place, and how far back in the ages they were to look for pure Christianity." They did not always receive the same reply. "Of the innovators some claimed five, some six, and some even seven centuries from the death of the Apostles. Very soon, however, it was found safer to declare that the conversion of the nations, and the establishment of Christianity in the fourth century, had proved fatal to the Gospel. Afterwards it was granted that even in ante-Nicene times the evil was accomplished. Now it is confessed"—by Anglican writers whom this author quotes—"that by the end of the *first* century 'all was altered,' and the

'momentous change' was effected. The enemy has abandoned rampart after rampart of history, and retreated to the citadel of the Bible. There are signs that he is preparing to abandon even that, though he is determined to blow it up, rather than leave us to occupy it."* The signs are multiplying, as even Archdeacon Denison perceives. It is, no doubt, a matter for tears that Englishmen, once the kinsmen of the Saints and favoured children of the Church, should learn to sneer at the Bible after sneering at her. But this progress was inevitable. The greatest reprobate among them does not think worse of the Bible than Archdeacon Denison does of the Church. If he tells them that the one is divided and corrupt, why should they not tell him that the other is no better? He has his private opinion, and they have theirs. The one is not more injurious to God than the other.

If this needed any proof, his own words supply it. Archdeacon Denison has the merit of candour. What he thinks he says. The "Reformation," he tells us, has not been very successful in England, though he entirely approves it. "The principle of the Reformation," he says, "I accept wholly." He is not so tolerant of its results. "The thing which suffered most," he continues, in that movement,—when there was "sacrilege such as the world has seldom indulged itself in before, or since,"†—"and which ought to have suffered least, is the Church of Christ." He is mistaken; the Church of Christ is exactly what she was before, and will be to the end. It is very different, he admits, with the Church of England. "If there were corruptions of, and additions to, Primitive and Catholic doctrine," — of which, one should think, the Church of God is as good a judge as he is,—"there have been, all through the last three hundred years, such countless heresies and schisms . . . *as the world had not seen before.*" The principle of the Reformation, which he approves so cordially, has been fruitful. "The great general issue," he goes on, "down to and at this present time, being this; that the so-called Christian world here in England is every day more and more abandoning Revealed Religion, and falling back upon Natural Religion, if indeed upon so much as this." It seems to us, and we fancy Archdeacon Denison will not care to dispute it, that it was hardly worth while to "reform" the Church of God only to produce such results as these. We should like to present to his mind, if he will permit us to do so, a reflection which his remarks suggest to our own. If any one can seriously maintain, as the Archdeacon does, that the

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* F. Bridgett, ch. v. p. 253. † *Sermon*, p. 44.

Almighty could not keep His own Church from corrupting the faith, and then tried to improve matters by framing another which corrupted it still more, we will not ask him what he thinks of the Church, but we are strongly tempted to inquire what he thinks of God? One thing is evident. Instead of assuming, with ordinary Christians, that any work proceeding from God is likely to succeed, gentlemen of Archdeacon Denison's opinions are bound to conclude that it is sure to fail.

It may well be a sad consideration for him and his school that they have taught multitudes to accept this horrible conclusion. The ludicrous account which Anglicans give of the Church,—her early decay, manifold corruptions, subverted constitution, and usurped authority,—and the still more ludicrous failure of the Sects to which, on the Anglican theory, God committed the task of repairing her ineradicable faults; naturally confirms the unbeliever in his agreeable opinion that the whole thing is a delusion. What else should he think of it? Archdeacon Denison tells him in his Sermon that it was a duty to separate from the Roman Church, to which England owed everything, for these urgent reasons:—because she had corrupted "Primitive Doctrine and Discipline"; because her claims were "an intolerable grievance"; because she was guilty of "scandalous abuse of spiritual power"; and, above all, because the Pope is not the Vicar of Christ nor Supreme Pastor of His flock. The unbeliever applauds sentiments which so entirely agree with his own. He sees with undisguised satisfaction that they are fatal to Christianity. He wants to have the right of revolt, and Anglicanism gives it to him. If he had lived in the days of the revolted Hebrews, he would have said to Moses, as they did: "Wilt thou rule like a lord over us? Why lift you up yourself above the people of the Lord?"* He claps his hands when Archdeacon Denison says the same thing to Peter and his successors. Moses replied that he only claimed the authority which God had given him, and could not claim less. The Pope makes the same answer. He did not *make* his office, but was appointed to it. Neither Moses nor Peter could abdicate his authority without denying God who gave it. He had a sovereign right to appoint *His own test* of human obedience and to bid His creatures accept it. It was Moses once, it is Peter now. We know what befell the Hebrews who rebelled against Moses; Archdeacon Denison will now tell us what has come of the revolt of Anglicans against Peter.

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* Numbers xvi.

When they first fell away, they held of course every Catholic doctrine; and for a few years, at the instigation of their new Pontiff, Henry Tudor, only denied that supremacy of the Holy See which was God's provision for the unity of the Church and the perpetuity of the faith. They had better have denied almost anything else. In less than thirty years they had trodden every Catholic doctrine under foot. Here is Archdeacon Denison's description of what they are *now* :— "The Church of England is moved to declare against Primitive and Catholic usage: it is not moved to declare against denial of the Eternal Godhead of the Son." Only the other day it admitted a Unitarian to *communion* in Westminster Abbey. "The Bishops of the Establishment have not been, and are not, in their corporate action, Primitive and Catholic men, they are only Protestant men." They have now united with Parliament in passing a law which he says "is a law for 'stamping out' the Catholic doctrine of the Holy Eucharist." They would probably reply, as some of them *have* replied, that that was done long ago, and that every change made in the Anglican Prayer Book was expressly designed to stamp it out more effectually. The real innovators, they justly contend, are Archdeacon Denison and his friends. "The Bishops are selling its Catholicity as fast as they can"—for anything it will fetch. Fortunately there is not much of it. "The Establishment," he continues, "after an experiment of above three hundred years, has at the most only half the people of these islands"; and at least two-thirds of that half care nothing whatever about it. Finally; "the Establishment is about to cease from among us. If any man doubts this, I do not care to argue with him. I believe it wholly."

It appears, then, from the narrative of this friendly historian, that the Anglican Church can hardly be said to have done "what Jesus Christ and His Apostles could not do." It was created with that ambitious design, but was never further from accomplishing it than at this moment. Its sublime purpose, Archdeacon Denison assures us, was to supplement the incapacity of God, and restore in its integrity "Catholic and Primitive usage," so calamitously disfigured by His erring Church; and now it is itself about to expire without having done anything of the sort. On the contrary, such "usage" is precisely the object of its most impassioned protest, and such scraps of diluted "Catholicity" as had escaped the process of reform its Bishops are now "selling as fast as they can." Having totally failed to reform the Church of God, which took no notice of them, they now renounce all

hope of reforming their own, which only notices to condemn them.

A good many Anglicans hold Archdeacon's Denison's opinions, but not many approve his public avowal of them. They are not so candid as he is. Why tear away the veil which hid the plague-spotted face of the National Church? What if it is devoured by cancer or made hideous by leprosy? Why call everybody's attention to such a spectacle? "The picture drawn by a strong hand," observes the *Church Herald,** "is a very mournful one. *But who shall deny its truth?*" And then the writer insinuates that he had better not have drawn it! "We regret this virtual confession of defeat. As such this manifesto is as unsatisfactory a thing as has been uttered for many a day." It would have been so much more discreet to pretend that everything is for the best. "We would rather have......been urged to win back in time that of which we have been robbed." It is impossible to confess more frankly their insatiable desire for self-delusion. In an article which immediately follows in the same journal, on "The Present Aspect of Church Affairs," they utter the same lament, and solace their grief with the same shadowy consolation. "There can be no question that the present is a very serious crisis; the most serious, perhaps, which the Church has experienced since the times of the Rebellion. What threatens her is no less than destruction, the dissipation of all ostensible claim on her part to be a branch of the Catholic Church." It is the Bishops, they continue, who menace the Establishment with this fate. "The whole of the present activity of the Episcopal Bench runs in this direction." When did it ever run in any other? Why charge the existing Anglican Bishops with "as infamous an act of treason as is recorded in the whole course of the Church's history," when they are doing nothing whatever but what all their predecessors did before them? Are they either more Erastian or more Protestant than Cranmer, Ridley, Bramhall, or Andrewes? "They must admit fully and frankly," says the *Church Herald*, "that the Church of England is Catholic." How can they, when even Laud said, in controversy with Catholics, "the Church of England *is Protestant*"? What is it to them that a few score of its ministers have adopted opinions, during the last thirty years, which not one in ten thousand of them held during the previous three hundred? Must the Bishops repudiate the whole Anglican tradition, and disavow the whole history of their sect, because a few of their clergy choose to do so?

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* August 4.

How few they are is undesignedly admitted by another Anglican journal, the *Church Times,* which imprudently noticed in a paragraph on the ensuing "Church Congress," not only the number of selected Low Church orators, "likely to be very offensive to Churchmen," but "the outrageous prominence which is given to the Broad Church school." Does this look, the Bishops may fairly ask, as if the Church of England, which never was Catholic before, is becoming more Catholic now? Yet the *Church Herald* tells them that "they must open their eyes to what other people see perfectly well, and must retract their steps." And then comes one of those fantastic *nugæ* of solemn trifling and elaborate self-mystification which are the peculiar charm of Anglican literature. "Will the Church at large accept, or will she repudiate, the faithless treachery of her Bishops? On that point we have no doubt. She will repudiate it." This cheerful anticipation that the Establishment will require its Bishops to confess their total misconception of the nature of Christianity, and that they will presently do it,—though it agrees in every point with that of all their predecessors,—is worthy of men who can always beguile their penury in the present by feasting on an imaginary banquet in the future. The sanguine writer in the *Church Herald* has "no doubt" about the coming festivity. Archdeacon Denison is both more intelligent and more conscientious. "As for waiting," he says, "for the Synodal action of the Church of England, the suggestion moves to nothing but a melancholy smile. It is indeed a case of

> Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis ; at ille
> Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum."

Another archdeacon has lately displayed in a strong light a characteristic of Anglicanism, which his colleague of Taunton unaccountably omits to notice. But the speech of the one and the silence of the other are due to the same cause. The one refers to it without a suspicion of its tremendous gravity, the other passes it by because it does not even attract his attention. Yet if serious Anglicans were to fix their thoughts upon it, it is probable that the Church of England would not last six months. A vigorous thinker on the other side of the Tweed once described the teaching of the Anglican Church as "a conflicting gabble of antagonistic sounds." If there is one fact which betrays more clearly than another the true nature of that institution, and its deadly influence upon those who belong to it, it is not only the co-existence among them of contradictory doctrines on the most sacred truths of religion, but the utter indifference with which this impious caricature

of Christianity is regarded by men of *all* schools and parties within the Establishment. It may be, as Macaulay said, "a hundred sects battling within one Church"; but as long as each of these discordant sects can profess its own particular heresies, it is quite content that all the others should do the same. The only conceivable opinions which solicit in vain a modest share in the universal toleration are those, as their advocates complain, which tend, however obliquely, towards the Catholic faith. And it is a dismal revelation of the secret spirit of the so-called "Catholic movement," that not only its most active agents ask no more than a bare toleration for truths which they profess to consider *divine*, but remain willingly in a communion in which they are publicly denied by all around them. Many of them even defend and justify, both by word and example, the treason from which they can only purge their souls by saying anathema to the guilty sect which encourages them to commit it. The Archdeacon of Totnes, who belongs to one of the sections of the High Church party, appears to be of this class. His sentiments would be incredible if we did not encounter them so often in Anglican writers that they have ceased to be even surprising. We take the report of his observations from the *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette* of the 6th of August. "The atmosphere of the religious world," he told the clergy of his archdeaconry, "was very unsettled and disturbed, and it could not be denied that there was much cause for anxiety." He did not see anything new or alarming in the fact that so many different religions were taught simultaneously "in our beloved Church," for he knows that it could not prolong its creditable existence on any other terms; but the active organization of its conflicting parties for a battle in which each is determined to conquer is quite another matter. "The Church of England had always, in her Evangelical Catholicity, contained within her fold men of the most divergent opinions on many important subjects." But what of that? These harmonious Christians—who only dispute about such trifles as Baptism, the Priesthood, the Real Presence, and the Sacrifice of the Altar—"had been content to differ as widely as S. Paul, S. James, and S. Peter." If these words had been pronounced in presence of any of the Apostles whom he thus impudently slanders, the Archdeacon of Totnes would have received a reply which would have made his ears tingle, and would perhaps have moved him to compunction. The Jews would have stoned a man to death who had dared to say of Moses and Aaron what this Anglican is not ashamed to say of S. Peter and S. Paul. What does it matter, he suggests, if the Church of England is represented

at the same moment, and with the same authority, by Dean Stanley and Dr. Pusey, Dean Close and Dr. Liddon, Dr. Leo and Dr. Baring, Mr. Carter and Mr. Haweis?—*i.e.*, as the *Church Herald* remarks, by men who "*have nothing in common*";—was not the Apostolic Church represented by such divergent theologians as S. Peter and S. Paul? It is not we who ask the question, but the Archdeacon of Totnes. We may ask, however, in our turn, "What does it matter if Christianity is made a jest, its Apostles insulted, and its pillars overthrown, if in the general ruin and degradation we can manage to hide the turpitude of the Church of England?"

But if this gentleman is not in the least disturbed by the polyglot version of Christianity which reflects so much honour on the "Evangelical Catholicity" of his sect, it is only on condition that all who use its different dialects pretend that they are talking the same language, and that they are saying the same thing. If they prefer to abuse each other, each in his own tongue, he will not answer for the consequences. They may be fatal to "our beloved Church." "He feared party manifestoes more than anything else. Nothing had done so much to stereotype and harden their differences"—which were quite unimportant in themselves—"and to create a sort of indifference for common interests and sympathies, as the action of the organized societies which represented each party. The existence of those societies had drained the Church of charity, had intensified differences, magnified the dangers of the crisis, and given a bitterness to the present controversy peculiarly painful and injurious to the cause of truth." He is so nervous about *truth!* Believe what you like in secret, as you have always done, but don't fight about it in public, lest you injure truth! He is even solicitous about unity—at least the appearance of it, which is all he cares about. "These societies might be useful as party organizations; they were destructive in their very essence of the unity of the Church." Yet even he will not deny that they only *reveal*, without creating, the disunion which existed long before them. He would like to conceal it. He thinks it sounder policy. Perhaps it would be if there were any chance of its succeeding. Bossuet quotes in the "Histoire des Variations" a letter from Calvin to Melancthon, in which the feeble strategy of the Archdeacon of Totnes was anticipated, and to quite as little purpose. "It is of great importance," said the former, "that no suspicion should

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* August 6.

reach posterity of the divisions amongst us; for it is beyond imagination ridiculous, that after having broken off from the rest of the world, we should agree so little amongst ourselves in the very outset of our Reformation." It does not matter whether we agree or not, say contemporary Anglicans, more hardened than Calvin himself, if we can only hide our divisions.

The Archdeacon of Totnes forgets that if there were no "organized societies" to display the unity of the National Church, there would still be, as the Archdeacon of Taunton says, "what are called in the bad and sloppy English of our day, 'organs of Church opinion,' meaning Church newspapers." As no two of them agree together, and they seldom agree long even with themselves, the project of concealing the chaos in "our beloved Church" is eminently futile. We have only space for a single example, though the fierce hostility which Anglican journalists display towards each other merits fuller illustration. A writer in the *Church Herald* threw out the suggestion, with earnestness and sobriety, that devotion to our Lady should find a place in the Church of England. The want of it, he wisely thought, was the cause of many evils. The suggestion was approved by others. "It is indeed a sad thing," said one of them,* "that in the Catholic church of England such utter disrespect and irreverence should be shown towards Our Most Blessed Lady." He proposes, therefore, to celebrate "the Feast of the Assumption," not hitherto recognized in the Anglican kalendar, "and then the Queen of Heaven may look on us again." We doubt not that gracious Lady—to whom the Church says "Thou alone hast overcome all heresies"—will look upon such as him, and bring them into the fold of her Son. But immediately after his pious communication, in the same column, follows one from a certain Canon Crosthwaite, an habitual correspondent of the *Church Herald*, and a fluent railer at Catholic faith and practice. If we quote his odious words, it is only to show the unity of sentiment among Anglicans. "How any one can read the Gospels," says this person, "and mark how our Lord treats His mother when she *does* appear, and then make her, as Romanists do, the Ruler of her Son, is almost incomprehensible. *We thought we had got rid of this for ever;* but no! it is returning again, with all the intensity of the Dark Ages." Would that it were true! England would be happy beyond her deserts if it were.

The relations between Anglicans and other aliens from the Church are too significant to be omitted in this sketch. In the beginning they made no secret of their fraternity with

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* *Church Herald*, August 11.

foreign Protestants. Parkhurst, as Macaulay notices, "uttered a fervent prayer that the Church of England would propose to herself the Church of Zurich as the absolute pattern of a Christian community." From Parker to Hooker, Bramhall and Andrewes, they all recognized the motley sects of the Continent as "true Churches," and concurred without a protest in the admission to Anglican benefices of men who had never received Episcopal ordination. Hooker taught that Episcopacy had no higher sanction than "force of custom," and made his last confession to a Calvinist. It was not till Laud's time, when English Dissenters had become formidable, that they adopted in self-defence certain Catholic ideas which they had hitherto scouted, and first pretended that ordination by Bishops was of Divine institution. Their present representatives are quite as eager to fraternize with Jansenists or Döllingerists as *they* were with Zuinglians or Calvinists.

However sectaries may revolt against the authority of the Church, they cannot obliterate the fact that unity is God's law, nor altogether hide their own uneasiness in violating it. Hence the Bonn Conference. Even the author of the newest sect in Europe affects to deprecate the disunion of Christians! A Calabrian brigand, with hands dripping blood, might as reasonably harangue his henchmen on the obliquity of homicide. It is like Herod denouncing sacrilege, or Caiaphas rebuking injustice. But the heresiarch issues his invitations, and Anglicans hurry to Bonn. No two of them agree together about their own religion, or ever will, though they propose to simulate a fictitious agreement with the religions of others. They represent no one but themselves, and are not even delegates of the sects to which they respectively belong. Yet they affect to do in their own name what they protest the Church has no power to do in hers, and offer to help God to restore the truths which He has allowed her to corrupt. Like the Archdeacon of Totnes they are very susceptible about "truth"; and they prove their sensitiveness after this manner. Among the English contingent at the late Conference were "the Rev. J. F. Smith, Chesterfield, and Mr. G. Booth, Chesterfield." These eminent divines have only a local reputation, but a correspondent from Chesterfield tells us who they are. "Mr. Smith is the minister of the Unitarian body in this town; Mr. Booth is a Primitive Methodist, returned at the last School Board election here at the head of the poll as an advocate of secular education."* It is intolerable to the scrupulous conscience of Dr. Döllinger and Dr. Liddon, who

* See the *Tablet*, August 21.

value "truth" above all things, to hold communion with Christians who share the lamentable errors of S. Anselm and S. Francis of Sales, but they nobly resolve to purify a fallen Church by the help of a Unitarian and a Secularist.

Dr. Liddon observes in his preface to the Report of the Bonn Conference of 1874 by Professor Reusch,* speaking of the Döllingerists: "All the revolutionists of religious thought have paid them compliments, and have held out to them the hand of fellowship." These amiable revolutionists perfectly understand that Reinkens and his English allies are playing their game, and we shall see presently that they have good reason for the flattering opinion. But there was another gentleman at the Bonn Conference of 1875 whose presence must have been almost as soothing to Dr. Liddon and the other Anglicans as that of Mr. Smith and Mr. Booth—at least if they happened to know his published opinions. The gentleman in question was the Rev. J. J. Overbeck, D.D., a member of the Russian Church. In 1866 he printed a book, which appeared simultaneously in Russian, German, and English, and was much approved, he tells us, by "Russian theologians." Its subject was, "Intercommunion between the English and the Orthodox Churches." It must be pleasant reading for Anglicans. This Russian assistant at the Œcumenical Council of Bonn, whom we regret to be unable to quote at greater length, thus attests the admirable coincidence of religious opinions among its sympathizing members.

"Even the most advanced believing party of the English Church cannot claim Catholicity of belief."†

"The English Church stands *insulated*, without any recognized Catholic sister-Church, *disowned by the whole Catholic Church*, unable to be controlled on the Catholic deposit of faith."‡

"The English Church neither teaches nor enforces the dogma of the Invocation of Saints. . . . Therefore the Anglo-Catholics are, most decidedly, no Catholics, but Protestants."§

"In the Orthodox teaching," about our Lady and the Saints, "what a gratifying contrast with the tame style and subdued voice of the Romish teaching in the Council of Trent!" Dr. Liddon and his associates find that "subdued" teaching intolerable, but solicit recognition by the Russian Church, whose "Orthodox formularies," as Dr. Overbeck observes, "say to the Holy Virgin, 'Thou art the *salvation* of the Christian race'; 'intercede for us and *have mercy on us*'; 'all of us have you as our *Mediatrix*'; 'by thy compassion, O Lady,

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* P. xxiv. † P. 22. ‡ P. 28. § P. 40.

heal and deliver those who are sick'; 'consent, O Immaculate, to save thy servants'; '*the only help* of man'; 'Mary, *purify* us'; 'we all fall down before thee.'"* He adds: "Dr. Pusey has not the slightest idea of the *vital importance* of the dogma of the Invocation of Saints. . . . And what do we learn from the opposition of the Anglo-Catholics to this dogma?—that their idea of the Church is defective and truly Protestant."

On the subject of Anglican Orders Dr. Overbeck, speaking in behalf of the Russian Church, is equally emphatic. An English gentleman at the Bonn Conference, who calls himself "Bishop of Gibraltar," related with complacency, that "the Patriarch of Constantinople" had recognized the validity of his Orders. He was probably under a delusion; though the simoniacal Phanariote who usurps that title, and from whose jurisdiction Russia has taken care to separate not only herself but Greece and Bulgaria, would no doubt recognize the Orders of Mr. Spurgeon or Dr. Cumming for a few dollars, if they cared to pay that price for his worthless certificate. Dr. Overbeck, who is evidently familiar with Anglican literature, quotes Cranmer, Barlow, Hooker, Cosins, Field, Mason, Hall, Stillingfleet, Bramhall, Usher, Wake, and Warburton, to prove that the Church of England *never* taught even the necessity of Episcopal ordination; and adds that the Roman Church was "rigorously orthodox" in re-ordaining converted Anglicans, that "the Eastern Church can but imitate her proceedings," and that "all further controversy is broken off and indisputably settled." †

Lastly, the same writer, after declaring the Church of England to be "*no Church at all*,"—the Italics are his own,—because it has "no organic life, no unity, and harbours heresy," protests that "no sincere, pious, and open Orthodox" has any doubt about it. "The Orthodox Catholic Church does not recognize the English Church *to be a Church*"; ‡ while of the American Episcopalian body, also represented in Bonn, he says bluntly: "it is merely *a fashionable Protestant sect*."

Considering that the company assembled at Bonn proposed to convince the incredulous world of the substantial identity of their religious opinions, it is difficult to understand how the Russian contingent on one side, and the English and American on the other, could look each other in the face without laughing. It is true that most of them were too angry to laugh at anything. If Dr. Overbeck sat next to Dr. Liddon, or anywhere near him, they must have presented a delightful illus-

* P. 46. † P. 71. ‡ P. 89.

tration of the concord of sectaries. "We are the purest Church on earth," says Dr. Liddon;—"You are no Church at all," replies Dr. Overbeck. "We cannot accept or adopt the practice of invoking the departed saints of Christ," says the Englishman; * "Which only proves that you are Protestant heretics," rejoins the Russian. "It is against our honour to discuss our Orders," says the Anglican; "The question is finally settled," retorts the Photian: "the Roman Church justly denies them, and so do we." Why should these voluntary exiles from the Church regret to be separated from her when they are so happily united among themselves?

The actual discussion was melodious with the same ravishing harmony. These sympathetic theologians tried hard to persuade themselves and others that they held the same doctrine about the Sacrament of the Altar; but they did not quite succeed. The clause proposed by Döllinger, and accepted by the English and American visitors, was as follows: "The Eucharistic celebration in the Church is *not* a continuous repetition or renewal of the propitiatory sacrifice offered once for ever by Christ upon the cross." This revolting heresy Tatschaloff promptly repudiated in the name of the Russian Church, and in these words: "The Eucharistic Sacrifice *is* essentially the same as the Sacrifice of the Cross, inasmuch as the very same Lamb of God is now offered in the Eucharist Who was once offered on the Cross." † But if these gentlemen, who deplore so keenly the sad errors of the Church of Christ, and were obliged to desert her on account of them, flatly contradict each other even about the most sacred mystery of religion, they do not despair of convincing the world that they are entirely of one mind. And so indeed they are: not in caring a straw for *truth*, but in a common purpose to kill it by compromise. They avowed the pious intent with remarkable candour. Like the founders of Anglicanism they did not want to determine truth, about which they all differed, but only to hit upon a form of words which should determine nothing. After fighting for a long while about the *Filioque* clause, which Tatschaloff said "must be rejected as *false*,‡ and which Döllinger confessed was "a dogmatic difference between the two Churches," Reinkens suggested that "love is the first of commandments." Love of what? Certainly not of truth, which they immediately proceeded to deal with after this fashion. The Greek Rhossis proposed crudely to have "the clause so framed as to leave the question open"; to which

* "Bonn Conference," Preface, p. xxviii.
† "Report of the Bonn Conference," p. 73. ‡ P. 36.

Janischew responded, "We Orientals cannot admit that the doctrine *is* an open question"; while Döllinger was not ashamed to say, "If we can agree in a proposition which shall *in no way* touch the dogmatic question from either point of view, we shall have made the first step towards an agreement"; that is, an agreement each to keep his own opinion, which they could have done just as well without going to Bonn. The spirits of confusion who presided at their debates must have been tempted to laugh at this droll conclusion, if their sombre mood could ever be enlivened by mirth.

The Anglicans at Bonn surpassed, as might be expected, everybody else, except perhaps the Protestant Episcopalians from the United States, in the cool self-complacency of their rhetoric. Dr. Liddon contrived to surpass them all. What he thinks of the claims of positive truth he frankly confesses in his preface to the Report. If Russians, Greeks, and Döllingerists differ about questions of dogma, he says, that is no reason why Anglicans should not fraternize with them all. Let truth take care of itself. "We, of the English Church, are already unable to assert before Christendom that we practically hold even some serious doctrinal differences to be a bar to religious communion." Is he not himself in contented communion with Dr. Tait, Dr. Fraser, Dr. Temple, and Dr. Stanley? "We coöperate," he continues, "with those who deny that which we deem true, or assert that which we deem false."* S. Paul or S. John would have called this apostasy. Dr. Liddon differs from them. "The charities of intercourse," he blandly observes, will perhaps "bring us to union." As the intercourse has already lasted three hundred years, and they are now more fiercely divided than ever, it seems hardly prudent to count upon that improbable result. Meanwhile, these revilers of God's Church display their own love of "truth" by communicating willingly with all who blaspheme it. Dean Howson ventured at the Conference to express an opinion unfavourable to a proposed thesis. "The thesis is quite correct," he was informed by Dr. Liddon: "the proposed thesis contains the genuine substance of the doctrine of the primitive Church"—of which Dean Howson probably considered himself as good a judge as his modest critic. But Dr. Liddon can teach anybody. When the Russians and Greeks protested against Döllinger's clause on the Invocation of Saints as an insult to the Seventh General Council, and a denial of the "universal practice" of the Church, Dr. Liddon, who is as able to impart wisdom to the East as to the

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* P. xxviii.

West, and whose prophetical office takes no account of geographical limits, severely admonished them "to accept it"; which they positively refused to do; whereupon the sagacious Döllinger mildly observed, "the matter must rest for the present." When there was a dispute about Tradition, Dr. Liddon magisterially observed: "The Easterns *cannot* object to the (clause), *as* it expresses the teaching of the primitive Church"—of which he carries a complete digest in his pocket. He has apparently received from Almighty God, probably at a private interview, the exceptional immunity from error which He did not think it expedient to confer upon the Catholic Church, or even upon the Russian. Neither the Church of S. Peter nor that of Peter the Great can dispense with the assistance of Dr. Liddon.

What Döllingerism will ultimately become we do not care to speculate. It is of very little importance except to those who embrace it. Its founder began by making the Council of Trent his sheet-anchor, to the extreme disgust of Dr. Wordsworth. He has already drifted from those moorings, and will probably drift further. Archdeacon Denison, who seems to think there were already sects enough in the world without making a new one, says in his Sermon: "I am informed, in a quarter which commands my belief, that in Germany the so-styled 'Old Catholics' are already abandoning the daily Sacrifice. The information has not surprised me."*

It is fair to the English press to notice that, in spite of its sympathy with every form of spiritual revolt, it had none for a Conference, composed of all sorts of heretics, no two of whom held the same opinions, though they were all burning to restore the "unity" which they had themselves broken, and all eager to reform "truth" by inventing formulæ which should say nothing about it. Even the world can judge such impostors as these. The *Times*, the *Daily News*, and the *Pall Mall Gazette* represent a considerable amount of English opinion. They all welcome any combined action against the Catholic Church, yet even they have only ridicule for the Bonn Conference. It "will sow discord instead of peace," says the *Times*. "In England it will do harm if it should do anything at all. The Bishop of Winchester and Canon Liddon give mischievous counsel when they invite their countrymen to seek for 'the reunification of Christianity' in the Old Catholic Conference at Bonn. If charity should begin at home, so should peace. The English friends of the Old Catholics will find ample room for their pacifying spirit in their own country.

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* Appendix C.

Our own Established Church is not specially famed for harmony of doctrine or of deed." The *Times* seems to think that the English who went to Bonn would have done better to heal the divisions in their own sect, or at least to make the attempt, before they meddled with those of others. "Everbody will agree with everybody else," the same journal observes, "when all deliberately use words for the purpose of concealing what they mean. Dr. Döllinger and his friends are playing at a ridiculous game of verbal jugglery. They agreed with each other at the end of the Conference just as little as they did at the beginning." The sole result, it adds, of the hollow compromises accepted by Dr. Liddon and the rest, was "not only to bring ridicule on themselves, but to expose their creed itself to the shafts of the scoffer." But they evidently felt no remorse in doing at Bonn what their sect has done for three centuries at home. "The proceedings of the Conference," observes the *Daily News*, "seem to ordinary readers to suggest rather a compromise than a cordial concurrence of sentiment." But the *Pall Mall Gazette*, with its customary penetration, goes to the root of the matter. "Old Catholicism," it says with quiet irony, "is not a specially credible creed. It is hard to believe in a Church perpetually but infallibly legislating on supernatural matters through a human organ,"—the greatest intellects of every age have believed it firmly ;—"but to believe in a Church which professes to have had this legislative virtue for several centuries and then to have mysteriously lost it, is to some minds still harder." In this brief sentence there is a complete though undesigned refutation, not only of Anglicanism, but of every possible form of anti-Roman religionism. Even the world understands, and writers in the *Westminster Review* consistently argue, that if the Roman faith is not true, Christianity is demonstrably false. Grant that its chief witness is a liar, and there is an end of Revelation. The prevarications of Anglicans, as the *Times* reminds them, "expose their creed to the shafts of the scoffer." Even Dr. Döllinger admitted at Bonn that "schism has lowered the authority and honour of our religion in the eyes of Mohammedans and other unbelievers, and we have only to think of the millions of Asiatic Christians who have become Mohammedans even in recent times, in order to realize what an infinity of mischief it has wrought."* And then he makes a *new* schism himself, in order to render it still clearer to Mohammedans and others that the Church of Christ is, as he assures them, so divided and corrupt that it has become

* "Report of the Bonn Conference," p. 22.

absolutely necessary to make another. They are quite willing to believe him, or his Anglican friends who tell them the same thing; and they naturally dismiss Christianity from their thoughts as a fugitive and incoherent philosophy, unworthy, by the confession of its professed advocates, of serious attention. The Hindus and Chinese, assured by Anglican missionaries that the only Christian Church which presents any semblance of Divine credentials is false and depraved, come to exactly the same conclusion. They call the Protestant missionaries, in their peculiar dialect, "lie-preaching devils." Our Rationalists at home, accepting the Anglican theory of the humanism of the Church, argue in the same way as the pagans abroad. In his Bampton Lectures for 1866, Dr. Liddon noticed fretfully the concurrent testimony of pure reason, "that either all orthodox Christianity is false, or the exclusive claims of the Church of Rome must be admitted to be valid." But the passage which we have quoted from the *Pall Mall Gazette* furnishes another basis for the same conclusion. The acute writers in that journal do not believe that there ever was a Church empowered by God to "teach all nations," and therefore entitled to claim the submission of all men; but they perfectly comprehend that if such a Church ever existed for a single hour *it must exist now.* It could be no harder to maintain than it was to create it. If it was an essential adjunct of Christianity once, it must be so always. If the obligation to "hear the Church" ever existed, it must exist to the end of time. The obedience which was a primary condition of salvation in one age cannot become an impediment to it in another. And the authority which, by God's decree, had a right to claim that obedience could never forfeit it. Hence it follows that the Church dreamed of by Anglican and other separatists,—which was designed by her Almighty Founder to be "the pillar and ground of the truth," but unfortunately "erred in matters of faith"; which could "legislate infallibly" *six* times,* but completely broke down the seventh; which all the powers of hell could not injure, but which fell to pieces of itself;—such a Church, as the *Pall Mall Gazette* easily perceives, is a fiction equally unworthy of God and odious to man. It is a Church "still harder to believe" than that which saints obeyed and for which martyrs died, and which continues to assert in the nineteenth century exactly the same authority which it claimed in the first. The *Times* may well say that men who profess to believe in such a

* Anglicans pretend to admit the *first six* Œcumenical Councils, though these utterly condemn them; and reject all the rest, which do not condemn them more decisively.

Church "expose their creed to the shafts of the scoffer." They do more. They encourage the unbeliever to contend, by a legitimate deduction from their own premisses, that the Christian religion can have no better title to the reverence of mankind than its false and foolish witness.

We must not omit to notice, as a characteristic illustration of the spirit of Anglicanism, that while the English press is nearly unanimous in its slight esteem for the hollow insincerities of the Bonn Conference, the only exceptions are found in the ranks of Anglican journalists. They are too eager to find associates in their own exile from unity to be very particular whom they accept, or on what conditions a fictitious alliance can be obtained. Thus the *Church Herald* * gravely observes that the proceedings of the Conference may be recorded "with great satisfaction"! The *Church Times* † has something else to say. "We are glad to state that Canon Liddon has left town to attend the Old Catholic Conference"—where he was to fraternize with Jansenists, Greeks, American Protestants, Danish Lutherans, and Mr. Smith of Chichester. "This is important, as some Anglicans will probably be present who are likely to give expression to sentiments calculated to misrepresent the doctrines of the Church of England." This precaution of setting Anglicans to watch Anglicans, so that they might be ready to contradict each other as to the religion of their own sect, was hardly wanted to justify Dr. Overbeck's opinion, that "the Church of England *is no Church at all.*"

The last incident in connection with contemporary Anglicanism to which we must briefly allude is not the least significant. That a man once so discreet and conscientious as Mr. Gladstone should have degenerated in a few weeks, under the influence of malice towards the Holy See and the Roman Church, into a mere intemperate brawler, so as to have incurred the contemptuous reproach even of Protestant writers, is a melancholy proof that moral dignity does not long survive religious degradation. It is probable that if his incendiary pamphlets had not been the production of an ex-premier they would not have found a hundred readers in all England. Even Englishmen only laugh when an angry and disappointed Liberal tells them, as Mr. Gladstone does in his new preface, of "the design of Vaticanism to disturb civil society," of which it has been for long ages the only fulcrum, "and to proceed, when it may be requisite and practicable, *to the issue of blood* for the accomplishment of its aims." Such un-

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* August 25. † August 13.

scrupulous violence in announcing his new opinions, of which the acts of his own public career are a sufficient refutation, justifies the vehement condemnation which we prefer to express in the language of others rather than in our own.

"It is truly sad," observes the *Pall Mall Gazette*,* though it has little love for the Catholic Church, "to see a man of Mr. Gladstone's mark in the world surrendering himself to influences which—impossible as it may be for his mind to fall quite so far—must yet inevitably bring him nearer and nearer to the mental level of Mr. Whalley every year he lives." His petulant inconsistency is noticed by the same journal when it says, with perfect truth, that "the pretensions of Rome have been every whit as exorbitant time out of mind as they are now," and as they will be till the second coming of Christ; and that Mr. Gladstone was once able to contemplate them without any apprehension for the welfare of civil society—an apprehension which Burke ridiculed in his day with the contempt which it deserves. When he was in office, "he was not wont to be so timid. He was meditating a policy not of determined resistance but of studious conciliation. He was not disclosing to his countrymen the plans of the 'conspiracy,' but devising concessions to the conspirators." And as to his criminal suggestion that the Church, which produces only martyrs and confessors, is ready to shed blood for her own objects, the *Pall Mall* righteously replies that "the retort" of Cardinal Manning, "that Mr. Gladstone is making himself 'an agent against the peace of Christian Governments,' though severe, is not undeserved."

With a single example from the provincial press we will leave the subject, adopting as a sufficient expression of our own sentiments the words of Father Newman: "I venture to think he will one day be sorry for what he has said."† The *Newcastle Daily Journal* does not speak for us, but for itself and its readers. "There are not ten Englishmen," it says, "who, after all is done, believe more than they did before that the dogma of infallibility has affected the loyalty of English Roman Catholics." Even Mr. Gladstone seems to understand that in that part of his programme he has totally failed. "He has now thrown all his tracts together under a flippant and inaccurate title, and he has introduced them with a short essay in every respect objectionable and beneath the dignity of the writer. To speak of the dogma of the Pope's infallibility as 'a new fashion in religion' is surely, to say nothing of its taste, something very nearly approaching to stupidity."

* August 14. † "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," p. 6.

There is more of the same kind in the Newcastle journal; but if Mr. Gladstone has only disdain for the remonstrance of Catholics, he will probably have only resentment for the indignation of Protestants.

There is a closer connection than may be apparent at first sight between the sermon of the Archdeacon of Taunton, the Charge of the Archdeacon of Totnes, the Anglican newspapers, the Bonn Conference, and the pamphlets of Mr. Gladstone. They all betray the same origin, and tend to the same result. They all show that between the Catholic and the Anglican view of the Church of God—to repeat the observation with which we commenced—there is absolutely nothing in common. If two men should accurately describe to the same audience, the one a village in a West African jungle, the other the proudest capital in Europe, they would not draw two pictures having less resemblance to each other than are presented respectively by Catholics and sectaries of what both profess to regard as *the Kingdom of God* on earth. All the writers whom we have quoted, and all the schools of thought in whose name they speak, agree in denying to that Kingdom every note and mark which Prophets and Apostles ascribe to it. All represent it as a scene of confusion and disorder in which there is no place for the throne of a Divine Ruler and Lawgiver. Satan might reign in such a chaos, but not God. It has no centre of unity, no source of jurisdiction, no recognized authority. It is not in harmony, but in shocking and palpable contrast with every known work of God. It is a formal negation of His truth, a permanent protest against His Law. It has one code in this province, and a totally different one in that; and no one can reconcile them together. It has no common tribunal, and no court of appeal. It is tumultuous with divisions which none can heal, disputes which none can decide, and contradictions which none can silence. It is not the fulfilment of a Divine plan, but the ruin of it: a ruin in which man is crushed, and God is overthrown. If this is all that remains of the Kingdom of Christ, no such Kingdom ever existed. If "the Church of the living God" has become a "house divided against itself," Revelation is a fiction, and Christianity a catastrophe.

Yet there is still in the world a Church which is *all* that Prophets and Apostles said she should be, and in which every promise of God has been fulfilled to the letter. Neither David nor Isaias, neither S. Paul nor S. John attributed to her a gift or prerogative which she does not possess in undiminished plenitude at this hour. There is nothing like her under the vault of heaven. She is everywhere, and everywhere the

same. The youngest of her children, in the newest of modern States, has the same ardent faith towards God, the same rational enthusiasm towards her, which she knew how to inspire in ages long past; and the converted New England Puritan is as wholly mastered and penetrated by her spirit, and docile to her voice, as a devout peasant of old Spain, or a French philosopher like Ampère, or an Italian savant like Secchi. In every generation, and in all lands, she subdues the most reluctant hearts, and attracts the homage of the most rebellious intellects. And she never did either more triumphantly than now. If the Archangel cried in the moment of victory, "Who is like to God!" with equal reason may we exclaim in the moment of combat, "What shall be compared with His Church?" Her authority, at once gentle and imperious, like that of God, was never more undisputed than now, in spite of all that the children of revolt can do against it. Even the unbeliever proclaims that it is just what it always was. "Her pretensions," he says, "have been as exorbitant time out of mind as they are now." She can never abate them. God has bidden her "teach all nations," and given her power to do it. She is doing it now, and will do it to the end of time. Pius only says what Gregory and Innocent and Leo and Peter said before him. When he is gone, God will say the same things by his successor. And therefore the Anglican disparagement of the Church of God is for Catholics only a cunning fable of the Evil One, who was a "liar from the beginning." He knows that if he cannot destroy the Church he can at least destroy those whom he persuades to make the attempt. He hates her, indeed, because she alone can baffle his arts and break the bonds of his captives; but most of all he hates her Supreme and Infallible Pontiff, the chosen Shepherd of the flock of Christ, the Rock on which His Church is built. Against him he kindles the rage of sectaries. He teaches them to abhor, as he does, the central authority by which God willed to maintain through all ages the unity of His kingdom, the purity of His revelation, and the obedience of His elect. The lawless and self-willed hate her because she is what she is. If she were human, like the counterfeits which they have fashioned for themselves, they might despise but would have no quarrel with her. In that case she would absolve schism and palter with heresy, betray truth and enthrone compromise in its place. She would not be built upon Peter but upon Judas. Sectaries know so well what she is that when they want allies they run to Moscow, Athens, or Bonn; but never to Rome. They know it would be time lost. Their instincts do not deceive them. Human

churches are pliant, and will make bargains; the Church of God imposes conditions, but never accepts them. She is too near to God for that. The motto of the sects is "*Conspire*"; that of the Church "*Obey.*" And therefore all who oppose their own will to that of the Most High hate her. She is an importunate witness who condemns their revolt, and rebukes their self-sufficiency. They pretend, indeed, to follow what they call "the Primitive Church," while each declares his own sect to be the only true pattern of it; but if they had lived eighteen centuries ago, they would have been in that age exactly what they are in this. Their first thought would have been to "reform" the Church according to some scheme of their own. They would have disputed with Peter, as they now dispute with Pius. It is not in them to *obey*. The sectary is always the same. What he was in the days of S. Paul he is now. And the authority which he resists he easily learns to hate. It may be that men who at this hour spit in the face of the Church would have done to her Founder, though it seems to them impossible, what the Roman soldiers did to Him in the Hall of Pilate.

Art. IV.—THE DEIFICATION OF THE ROMAN EMPERORS.

Les Césars. Par le Comte de Champagny. 4 tom., 4ème édition, Paris: Ambroise Bray. 1868.

History of the Romans under the Empire. By C. Merivale, LL.D. 7 vols. London: Longmans. 1862.

THE deification of the Roman Cæsars, as a serious and persistent usage that went on for centuries, and pervaded a very large part of the world, deserves more special consideration than is commonly given to it by historians. The ordinary view taken of it, is that which many of the ancients themselves,—for instance, the geographer Pausanias,—took. He remarks, that in old time there were gods who became such from being men, as Aristæus, Hercules, Amphiaraus, Castor, and Pollux. But in his own time, he goes on to say, none became a god from being man, unless nominally so, and from flattery to exalted

rank.* Flattery no doubt had very much to do with it, but it seems hardly sufficient alone to account for this strange mockery. Nor can we agree with so learned an authority as Colonel Mure in regarding this practice as precisely the same in kind with the hero-worship of the mythical period.† Though we shall revert to this part of the question before quitting the subject, the belief that the two classes of worship were essentially distinct warrants us in treating the latter independently. Had it been simply a further exhibition of a system already handed down in the ancient world and always in operation, it would be necessary to begin the discussion of the imperial deifications with those of the heroic period. As it is, we shall not for the present seek its roots beyond the historical times.

The deification of mortal man was hardly a Roman practice in its origin. Even at starting, provincial superstition had perhaps more to do with it, in the case of Julius Cæsar, than the feelings of the native Romans; and it was in the Hellenic world that the foundations had been laid for it. Instances of it occasionally occur in what relatively may be called modern Greek history. The founders of colonies commonly received divine honours; and the well-known instance of Brasidas affords an example of popular gratitude according the same homage. Another curious case, is that of the Egestæans, as Herodotus relates, worshipping Philippus, one of the companions of Dorieus, slain in battle, for no other reason than that they were struck by his extraordinary beauty. But the first real commencements of imperial deification begin with the period of the Macedonian monarchy. A temple was built in honour of Amyntas II., at Pydna, of which it is true the sanctity was bnt little regarded by his son, the great, but unscrupulous Philip II., who, when some of the Pydnæan traitors had taken refuge in the temple, upon the capture of the town, put them to death, after having enticed them out on promise to spare their lives. Under the Egyptian Ptolemies the practice became very prevalent. A lively picture is given us in the seventeenth idyll of Theocritus, of the deification of the founder of that house. Seldom has a true poet more degraded his art than here, where the most exquisite melody of verse, and the gayest wealth of imagery, are prostituted to gratifying the vanity of an incestuous despot. The Father, he says, made Ptolemæus son of Lagus to be of like honour with the

* Paus., viii. ii. 2.

† Col. Mure, "Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece," vol. i. p. 26.

blessed Immortals, and a golden palace was built for him in the house of Zeus. Beside him sits, in friendly sort, Alexander, "a hard god to the Persians with their many-coloured mitres," and opposite them is the throne of Herakles, wrought in solid adamant. For of both Ptolemæus and Alexander the stout Heraclide was the ancestor, and both counted Herakles as their first progenitor—a very bold piece of false heraldry in the case of Ptolemæus. So, when Herakles, satiated with nectar, goes to his chamber, he is escorted by both, one bearing his bow and his quiver, and the other his club. In the same idyll we find that Ptolemæus Philadelphus built temples to his father and mother, and set up statues of them in gold and ivory.

In the historical times of Rome, perhaps the first illustration of the deification of mortals as an idea (for he did not carry it out) is presented in the design of Cicero to erect a temple to his deceased daughter Tullia; but the practice seems to have been not unusual as a piece of flattery on the part of the Asiatic provincials to their Roman governors. In all these cases we conceive that the popular religion had derived this tendency from the Macedonian and Alexandrian innovations. With reference to deceased rulers of the Roman world, as is well known, it begins with the beginning, with the apotheosis of the great founder of the empire.

The worship of Julius Cæsar after his death seems to have been a spontaneous passionate expression of feeling on the part of the people before it became a legally instituted observance. And there is nothing at all to surprise us in the rise of this vehement feeling. The achievements of the man had ranged in every direction of the known world, from Britain to Egypt, from Spain to the Euxine; the East and the West were in conflict on his destiny; and his actions, independently of their real magnitude, were illuminated by that pervading splendour which always makes the proceedings of the true leaders of mankind seem even greater than they really are. At the eve of his death the world had but rested for a brief period from the terrific excitement of the civil wars; its master intended to set it in motion for conquests to rival those of Alexander; and all at once this mighty spirit was stopped in mid course by the desperate and yet cowardly strokes of his assassins. Let any one who wishes to form an idea of the effect which that event must have had upon the seething multitudes of Rome, read the wonderful description of it in Plutarch. Hardly was the deed done, when its madness was apparent in the wild excitement with which the funeral of the murdered Cæsar was celebrated. Let us draw from Suetonius

and Dion Cassius* some of the striking features of the scene, because they will assist the reader in conceiving the state of the public mind which made it ready for the idolatry which soon followed. There was placed in front of the Rostra a gilt chapel copied from the Temple of Venus, the fabled ancestress of the Julian house. In this chapel was placed an ivory couch covered with gold cloth and purple. At the head was a trophy on which hung the robe Cæsar had worn when he was murdered, covered with stains of the blood which had flowed from his three-and-twenty wounds. It is not perfectly clear from Suetonius's account whether the corpse of Cæsar was placed on this couch. Plutarch, however, states distinctly it was burnt by the mob in the Forum, and with this Dion Cassius agrees. At the funeral-games were sung, by way of dirge, verses from a tragedy of Pacuvius applicable to the fate of Cæsar :—

Men' me servâsse, ut essent qui me perderent ?

Instead of the usual panegyric, the consul Antonius bade a public crier read out the decree of the Senate which had given to Cæsar at once divine and human honours, and the oaths by which they had all bound themselves for his safety. Antonius then added "a very few words of his own," which we had rather conceive with Shakespeare than accept the rhetorical speech given us by Dion Cassius as its representative. The magistrates carried the couch down from the Rostra into the Forum. The crowd, at first greatly agitated, and then in furious rage, rushed forward and seized the corpse. Some wanted to take it to the senate-house of Pompeius, and burn it in the chamber where Cæsar had been slain; others were for burning it on the Capitoline. The soldiers were afraid of the temples being set on fire, and forced the multitude to stay where they were in the Forum. A pile was there constructed, the couch placed upon it, and fire set to it by means of waxlights, as was said, by two persons girt with swords, and each carrying two javelins, a particular, suggestive of the twin Dioscuri, which we should imagine to have been a mythical addition to this strange passage of history. The mob then heaped up the pile with dry twigs, benches snatched from the tribunals near, anything that came to hand. There was great danger to the adjoining houses from the blaze, and such was the mad confusion that order was not restored till some of the most disorderly of the crowd had, by order of the consuls, been precipitated from the Capitoline rocks. Those who have visited Rome can easily realize the whole picture, and for the last incident we would refer those who have not to a powerful chapter (not, however, connected

* Suet., C. Jul. Cæs., 84 ; Dion Cass., xliv. 35, 50.

with our present subject) in the novel of "Transformation." Everybody pressed forward to fling offerings on the burning pile. The musicians and the actors tore off the costly triumphal dresses in which they had been habited for the ceremonial, and threw them into the flames; the veteran soldiers, who had followed their great commander through so many campaigns, added their cherished armour and weapons, with which they had come to the funeral, noble ladies flung their jewels, the Roman youth their golden *bullæ* and tunics striped with purple. But not Romans only shared this mourning. The vast multitude contained strangers — we might almost say, in the language of Holy Scripture, "from every nation under heaven." Each group of foreign garb and hue mourned round the funeral-pile in their own national manner and usage, and, adds Suetonius, "*the Jews especially,* who even kept frequenting the place whole nights in succession."

When minds are in this state, they are sure to be struck by any unusual phenomena in nature, and to conclude that they have some great significance and meaning. It was said that a comet appeared for seven nights after Cæsar's murder, and then disappeared; that the sun, for a whole year after, had a pale and wan appearance; and that the atmosphere was unusually dark and cold, and that the fruits of the earth consequently failed. Many other particulars might be added, of which our own great dramatist has made such striking use. We may, however, quote from Cowper, some less familiar lines, which show that even in very modern times a connection has been felt, by those who would most disclaim superstition, between the behaviour of the physical universe and the actions or calamities of mankind. In 1783, at the near approach of the great French Revolution, it is certain that the earth itself must to a considerable extent have been in an exceptional state. Some time previously to the bursting forth of that moral volcano, Cowper writes thus ("Task," book ii.) :—

A world that seems
To toll the death-bell of its own decease,
And by the voice of all its elements
To preach the general doom. When were the winds
Let slip with such a warrant to destroy ?
When did the waves so haughtily o'erleap
Their ancient barriers, deluging the dry ?
Fires from beneath, and meteors from above,
Portentous, unexampled, unexplain'd,
Have kindled beacons in the skies, and the old
And crazy earth has had her shaking fits
More frequent, and foregone her usual rest.

Is it a time to wrangle when the props
And pillars of our planet seem to fail,
And Nature, with a dim and sickly age,
To wait the close of all?

To return, however, to the institution of the hero-worship paid to Cæsar; it appears at once to have been commenced by the people on the scene of his cremation in the Forum, where they erected a solid column of Numidian marble, 20 feet high, inscribed with the words *Parenti Patriæ.* At this column they long offered sacrifices, paid vows, and settled certain suits, the litigants swearing by Cæsar. This inconvenient devotion was attempted to be put down by the consul Dolabella, who overthrew the column. When, however, the triumvirs obtained supreme power, the worship of Cæsar was formed into a regular branch of the state religion. Its principal regulations were as follows:—1. A chapel (*herôon*) was erected to him in the Forum, and also on the spot where his body was burned. 2. His image was carried in procession in the Circus, with a model of the temple of Venus; on the other hand, his image, being that of a god, was forbidden to be carried among those of the other illustrious persons of the Julian house in funeral processions of that family. 3. On occasion of any victory, a month of rejoicing was appropriated in honour of Cæsar, though deceased, as well as of the victor. 4. All were obliged to celebrate his birthday, carrying laurel branches, and keeping festival. Those who disobeyed this enactment were placed under the curse of Jupiter—and of Cæsar himself; if senators, they and their sons were fined 250,000 sesterces (£2,220 nearly). Cæsar's birthday, which was on the 12th July, happened to coincide with the festival of Apollo; and there was a Sibylline oracle which forbade the feast of any other "god" being kept simultaneously with that of Apollo; Cæsar's was, therefore, transferred to the day before. 5. The day of his murder was reckoned among the *dies nefasti,* and no meeting of the Senate could be held on it. 6. His chapel was constituted an asylum, and whoever took refuge in it was secured from banishment or confiscation of goods,—an honour that had never been accorded in Rome to any other god, except under Romulus. Yet it is a curious illustration of the practical character of the Romans, of the change wrought by the lapse of time in their religious feeling generally, and also of that vein of solemn hypocrisy which latterly underlaid it so grossly, that the sanctuary was carefully fenced round in such a manner as to render it impossible for any one to get access to it.*

* Dion Cass., xlvii. 19, and lvi. 32.

A curious parallel might be drawn between the last stage of Roman and Hellenic paganism and its earliest. In the formation of both, the poets had a large share. We do not contend that the polished and artificial legends of the age of Augustus are to be regarded as equivalent to the child-like, unconscious imaginings of Homer or Hesiod; but still they are analogous to them, and bore to them the same relation which the Cæsarean idolatry did to the equally false but less guilty delusions of archaic times. Since we have seen that the worship of Julius was, in its first origin, due to the impulse of the people, it will now be interesting to observe how it was exhibited in the most popular poetry of the age immediately succeeding. The *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti* of Ovid will afford some remarkable details. In the former, Venus is about to rescue her descendant from the daggers of his assassins by wrapping him in a cloud, as she snatched Paris from the hands of Menelaus. But Jupiter forbids this. It was written in the iron leaves of the book of destiny that Cæsar had fulfilled the years which he was to spend upon earth. He was now to become a god in heaven, and be adored in the temples of earth. Let his goddess-mother seize his soul as it quitted his mangled form, and carry it on high. No sooner said than done. Venus enters invisibly the Senate-house as Cæsar falls, and suffers not his soul to be dissipated into the air, but bears it up to the stars. It kindles in her arms, she releases it from her bosom, and, flying above the moon with a long ringlet of flame, it shines a star among the rest in the firmament. The same idea had been presented by Virgil in the well-known line:—

Ecce Dionæi processit Cæsaris astrum.*

We see in this, as might be pointed out in other cases, hero-worship and star-worship combined. In the *Fasti*,† Ovid has manufactured a different, but even more curious bit of mythology for the newly-created god. Vesta tells the poet that the deified Prince had been her Priest; that the sacrilegious weapons of his would-be murderers had, therefore, been aimed at her; that she had snatched him away, and left an empty image in his place; the form that fell by the assassins' daggers was only the shadow of Cæsar; he was now in heaven, and dwelt in the court of Jupiter, whilst worshipped in his temple in the Forum. But as for those who had attempted, against the divine will, to assail the life of the pontiff, they had deservedly perished. The field of Philippi, and their scattered bones, whitening the earth, witnessed to this.

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* Ovid, Metam., xv. 843; Virg., Ecl. ix. 47. † Ovid, Fasti, iii. 697.

The *Metamorphoses* had not been quite perfected at the time of Ovid's banishment, A.D. 9. The *Fasti* were chiefly written subsequently to that date. If now we go back to Virgil, in the fifth Eclogue, which was written about B.C. 42, we find that he hardly goes the lengths of Ovid. In the person of Daphnis, Cæsar is raised to Olympus, and sees the stars under his feet; nature proclaims him a god; still he is not placed in the rank of the chief gods. Two *aræ* (lesser altars) are assigned to him, two *altaria* to Phœbus, with whose festival, as already stated, the birthday of Cæsar coincided. On the *aræ*, libations only, not sacrifices, were offered. Two cups (*pocula*) of new milk were placed on the altar, and a large bowl of oil and libations of wine were poured out to the hero. The poet describes this ceremony as being celebrated half-yearly, in the spring and autumn, and vows offered to the hero, as to Bacchus and Ceres.*

The *cultus* of Julius spread everywhere, as we shall see, and to it was soon added that of the living Augustus. As before, we shall have recourse to the poets, for the manner in which the theology of the new worship, if we may use the expression, was worked up. The passages we shall cite are familiar enough, but perhaps they are often read as mere words of extravagant flattery, whereas they simply expressed that which to have ridiculed would have been a serious state offence,—solemn absurdities, indeed, but like the Pagan religions generally, conventionally accepted as true. In his first Eclogue (B.C. 41) Virgil, in the person of Tityrus, declares that he personally shall always regard Octavian, to whom he owed his own prosperity amid the general ruin, as a god; that he knew of no gods elsewhere so ready to help; that, twelve days in the year, that is, once a month, his domestic altars (here *altaria*) smoked with sacrifices to him.† In the first Georgic (B.C. 37), all the art of the poet seems lavished in framing for the emperor (not deified during his lifetime so far as regarded Rome, though his worship was sanctioned in the provinces) a future position and sphere of action among the deities whom the poet invokes.‡ He had called upon Bacchus, Ceres, Pan, Minerva, and sundry minor gods and goddesses, under their various attributes, but the sphere to be appropriated to Cæsar, the group which he is to join, is left unsettled. The new god was free to make his own choice, and, so far from its being limited by the great deities already in possession, Virgil conceives that Augustus may either take charge of earth and its cities, its fruits and its seasons, or else of the wide sea and all its waters to furthest

* Virg., Ecl. v. 65. † Ecl. i. 43. ‡ Geo., i. 24–42.

Thule, so that sailors should invoke his divinity *alone*. He would thus displace even Neptune, much more the semi-divine Dioscuri, or Portunus. Or shall he ascend to heaven among the stars? There was room for him in the Zodiac, for, in the old astronomy, the Scorpion occupied two signs, and was quite ready to draw back his claws from the House of Virgo, in favour of a twelfth Ruler of the sky. As for Tartarus, strange to say, it is but named to be excluded. It is not likely, the poet thinks, that his god will entertain the dire ambition of reigning in hell. It will be recollected that, in the distribution of the universe among the sons of Cronus and Rhea, Zeus had the sky and clouds, Poseidon the sea, Hades the dark world below, whilst the earth and Olympus were common to all three brothers.* In Virgil's conception then Augustus is elevated to a rank quite equal to that of any of the members of the Olympian Triad. It is true that he is not imagined as usurping the sceptre of Zeus, for, after all, a star appears to be sufficient to contain his glory; still the poet conceives he may become the god of the earth, and that the great globe may recognize him as the source of its abundance. On this supposition, he would take for his own the fourth region, which, in the Homeric theology, was the common inheritance of the Kronid brothers, and would rule in general over a whole department of nature, special functions in which are left to those deities to whom they appertained, such as Bacchus, Ceres, Minerva, Pan, the Fauns, and the Dryads, or the demigods Aristæus and Triptolemus. It must be allowed that the Olympian hierarchy might feel obliged to the poet for his forbearance, for the early idea that the *raj* (as the Hindoos would say)—the rule of Zeus was not *eterne*, but that he also was destined to be dethroned, as he had dethroned his father, might have afforded Virgil the idea of making his new deity not merely a brother near the throne of Zeus, but himself the new occupant of that throne.

In the opening of the third Georgic,† the poet has indulged his fancy in devising the ritual of the new worship of which he constitutes himself the prophet. He imagines that he had retired to his native Mantua with the honours of a poet, as though having carried away the prize in one of the great rhapsodic or other poetic contests in that "dear land of glorious lays," on whose genius his own had been so completely formed. How does he work up this day-dream? He constructs ideally, in commemoration of his achievement, a marble temple in some green field on the banks of the Mincius, and consecrates it to Cæsar, his god. "Cæsar shall be in the midst of it, and

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* Hom., Il., xv. 187.

† Virg., Geo., iii. 10-39.

shall occupy the temple." The doors should be of carved ivory and gold, and the actions of the deified sovereign, past or anticipated, should be the subjects represented on them,—on one side a battle-scene, the Gangaridæ (an Indian tribe on the Ganges), and the Romans; on the other, a naval engagement on the waters of the Nile; Asiatic cities subdued; Mount Niaphtes; the flying Parthians with their bows, trophies in token of the subjection of the East and the West, and the symbolic figure of Envy surrounded by the torments of Tartarus, the wheel of Ixion, the stone of Sisyphus, the avenging Furies, and the stream of Cocytus. Statues of Parian marble should adorn the temple,—the heroes of the royal line of Troy, Tros himself, Anchises, with others of the mythic ancestors of the Julian House, and Apollo as the founder of Troy. There must also be games in honour of the imperial divinity, on such a scale as to eclipse even the Olympian and the Nemean. The poet would preside, clad in the purple of a Roman magistrate, and wearing an olive garland. The chariot-race, the foot-race, and the pugilistic combat should be varied with scenic exhibitions, and wild Britons, embroidered on the purple curtain, should seem to be raising it as it ascended. The games over, solemn processions should move towards the shrine, and oxen should be sacrificed to the god.

We have here a lively picture of the temples erected, and of the worship celebrated in honour of Augustus and other emperors, even during their lifetime, in various important cities of the empire.

Turning to Horace, we find idolatrous flattery enough in him also, though it is hardly laid on with that thickness which astonishes us in Virgil, at first sight the more elevated mind of the two. We take as a fair example of the style of his adulation the beginning of the 1st Epistle of the Second Book: comparing the gratitude of men to Augustus with that earned by heroes like Romulus, Bacchus, Castor and Pollux, he remarks that the latter were only received into the temples of the gods after their death, and during life had had to lament the envy of mankind, whereas Augustus received those honours whilst present in the world, and had altars (*aras*) at which oaths were administered by his divinity. This idea of the emperor's being a *present* god occurs in Horace rather frequently, and is so managed as to cause the line between the human and divine to be somewhat wavering. Thus (Od., i. 12) invoking the son of Saturn as father and guardian of the human race, he says the fates have given to him the care of Cæsar, who will rule the wide globe, second only to him whose chariot shakes Olympus. Again (Od., iii. 5), he believes that Jupiter

reigns in heaven, because he thunders from thence, but Augustus will be held to be a *present* god (*præsens divus*), when the Britons and Parthians have been subdued. So too (Od., iv. 14) he apostrophizes Augustus as the *tutela præsens Italiæ dominæque Romæ*. In Od., iv. 5, after a highly-wrought picture of the blessings of peace, order, and security, as enjoyed by the empire in consequence of Cæsar's rule, he says that Cæsar is honoured as a god at the dessert (*alteris mensis*), with many a prayer, and with libations from the *pateræ;* and that his divinity is mingled with that of the *Lares*, even as the Greeks honoured those of Hercules and the Dioscuri, among which very heroes he had imagined (Od., iii. 3) Augustus as already quaffing nectar in heaven. In Od., i. 2, we have a *motive*, as artists would say, introduced into the devotion, somewhat different from those which we have already studied. In that well-known ode, as most readers will recollect (written B.C. 22), the poet, after describing the tremendous inundation of the Tiber from which Rome was suffering, asks which of the gods the people were to invoke in the calamities under which they were suffering, what prayers the consecrated virgins were to address to Vesta, or who was to be commissioned by Jupiter to expiate the public guilt? Apollo? Venus or Mars? both of them ancestors of the Julian house. Or had they already a god among them, Mercury, in the shape of Augustus? If so, long might he remain among his people, and late return to his home in the sky.

Ovid, appealing to the pity of Augustus from his miserable place of exile, says, "I swear by the sea, by the lands, by a third divinity, by thee, *a present and a visible god;* my mind favoured thee, O greatest of men. . . . . I prayed that thou mightest be slow in seeking the stars of heaven. . . . . and I gave pious offerings of frankincense for thee." * Here, as often in Ovid, we see this blasphemous flattery in its transition state. Augustus is not exactly one of the gods of Olympus; yet, as mere idolatry, perhaps the conception is more dishonouring to God and man as he puts it, than that of worshipping the deceased emperor, supposed to be deified. However, in one remarkable passage,† he describes himself distinctly as treating not only Augustus, but the other members of the imperial family, as among his household gods; and attributes to Augustus a kind of earthly omniscience which those can best imagine who have most deeply studied that terrible creation of human genius and wickedness—the old Roman empire.

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* Ovid, Trist., ii. 53—59. † Ex Ponto, ep. iv. ix. 105—134.

My piety is not unknown: the strange land where I dwell sees that I have a chapel of Cæsar in my house. His dutiful son and his priestess-spouse stand by his side, divinities of no less importance now that he is made a god. And that no part of the House may be absent: both his grandsons stand there, the one next their grand-dame's side, the other next their sire's. To these give I words of prayer together with frankincense, as often as day rises from the eastern orb. The whole land of Pontus,—you may ask it,—witness of my observance, will say that herein I lie not. The land of Pontus knows that I celebrate the natal day of the god [Cæsar] with games, on a scale as great as we can on this coast. . . . . Mere verses will sometime reach the ears of Cæsar. Nothing escapes him which is done in the whole globe. Recognized among the gods above, thou certainly seest and knowest this, O Cæsar; as the earth is subjected to thine eyes. Stationed among the stars on high, thou hearest our prayers which we give forth with anxious lips. Thither too perhaps these verses may make their way, which I composed and sent concerning thee, when thou wert newly made a god. I augur therefore that by these thy divinity will be softened; and not undeservedly hast thou the gentle name of father [the title of *Parens Patriæ*].

It will be admitted this is serious language—at any rate, not language uttered with a flattering smile on the face, but which was intended to be listened to with gravity on all sides, from the living idol on his throne, down to the meanest slave who offered him a pinch of incense. Yet the idol himself did attempt to keep the devotion within certain limits. For example, he caused some silver statues that had been erected to him in Rome to be melted down, and to be used in making the gilt *cortina* of the Palatine Apollo.* Perhaps the good sense of Augustus felt that in reality such honours were a degradation, or, more probably, that vague idea, so prevalent in the ancient world, of the danger attendant on extraordinary elevation from the jealousy of heaven, might have kept reasonable minds within bounds. At all events, the worship was not common in the lifetime of Augustus, in Rome and the rest of Italy. According to Dion Cassius,† "no one of any consequence ventured on it" (which by the bye is a proof that the worship was *popular*); and Tacitus‡ distinctly states the principle, "that divine honour is not paid to an emperor before he has ceased to act among mankind." Permission, however, was accorded, in the lifetime of Augustus, to consecrate temples to him in Asia, at Pergamus and Nicomedia; and from that beginning the like took place in all parts of the Roman empire. It was proposed by the allied kings to complete the stupendous temple of the Olympian Zeus at Athens (which, however, was not finished till the time of Adrian), at their common expense,

* Suet., Oct., 52. † Dion Cass., li. 20. ‡ Tacit., Ann., xv. 74.

and dedicate it to the Genius of Augustus.* This, after all, shows how thoroughly dislocated the whole system of Paganism must by that time have become. In most towns of the provinces, besides temples and altars to Augustus, sacred games were instituted in his honour, which were kept every term of five years.

When Augustus had departed, this fanatical craze which had taken possession of so large a part of the human race, was indulged its free action. At his cremation (we shall describe later in detail the ceremonies of the deification of a Roman emperor), an eagle was let fly from the funeral pile, which was supposed to carry his soul to heaven. A hero-chapel in Rome itself was decreed him by the Senate, and others erected in many other places, "partly with the goodwill of the populations," remarks Dion,† "partly against it." The room in the house on the Palatine where he was born was consecrated as a shrine. The house afterwards belonged to a young man of patrician family, C. Lectorius. Having been found guilty of adultery, he urged in mitigation of the penalty, besides his age and rank, his being the possessor, and as it were the sacristan (*æditwus*) of the birthplace of Augustus, and besought that mercy might be shown him in honour of his own special and peculiar god (donari quæsi proprio suo ac peculiari deo ‡). The house at Nola, in which he died, was consecrated as a sacred precinct (*témenos*); the festival of his birthday had equal rank with the festival of Mars; sodalities were instituted all over Rome in his honour; we find the Emperor Tiberius, and after him Caligula, sacrificing to him in the palace, quite naturally and as an habitual act of devotion. But perhaps the best idea of the extraordinary dimensions to which this superstition grew in the Roman world will be afforded by Philo's description of the temple of Augustus at Alexandria:—

The whole world voted him [Augustus] honours equal to Olympian. Witness to this is afforded by temples, gateways, vestibules, colonnades, so that whatever magnificent buildings cities ancient or modern possess, they are surpassed in splendour by the temples of the Cæsars, especially in our own Alexandria. For there is no sacred precinct like what is called the Augusteum (*tò Sebástion*), the temple of "Cæsar Ascending," which is built on an elevated situation right opposite the most favoured harbours, being large and conspicuous, such as is not to be seen elsewhere, full of votive offerings in pictures and statues, ornamented all round both with gold and silver, a most spacious precinct, adorned with cloisters, libraries, courts, groves, gateways, open spaces, all in the most costly fashion, an object of hope to those who set sail, a place of safety to those who reach the haven. (Philo Jud., "De Legat. ad Caium," c. 22.)

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* Suet., Oct., 60. † Dion Cass., lvi. 46. ‡ Suet., Oct., 5.

Tiberius followed the same policy as Augustus. The cities of Asia at their own request were permitted to erect him a temple, and ambassadors came to Rome from eleven of those cities, each claiming to have the honour to be selected as the locality. The emperor in person attended in the Senate to hear their representations, the summary of which, given by Tacitus,* is one of the most singular records of that extraordinary age. Four states, among which was Laodicea, were at once set aside, as unequal to the expense. Ilium, in itself not a mean city, as recent discoveries show, and interesting to the Romans as the supposed cradle of their race, was also summarily rejected. Halicarnassus pleaded that it had experienced no earthquakes for 1200 years; a strong argument, when the object was to find a seat for a worship intended to be as enduring as the empire. Pergamus had already a temple of Augustus, and was bidden to be content with that. Ephesus and Miletus were held to be sufficiently occupied with the worship of Diana and Apollo respectively; and the choice in the end lay between Sardis and Smyrna. For the former was pleaded the traditional colonization of Etruria by the Lydians; for the latter, certain great services the Smyrnæans had rendered to the Roman people, and the fact also that they had been the first to build a temple to the City of Rome, which they had done as far back as B.C. 195, before Carthage had fallen. The question being put to the vote, the Senate decided in favour of Smyrna, and a supernumerary legate was appointed for the proconsul of Asia, charged with carrying out the decree. Yet Tiberius did not covet this honour more than Augustus had done. He had already refused permission to the province of Further Spain to erect a temple to himself and his mother Livia, with the condescending declaration, in a speech to the Senate on the subject, that he called them to witness, and desired posterity to remember, that he was a mortal, and discharged the offices of man. He excused the inconsistency of his having indulged the Asiatic cities in a request to raise a shrine to himself, to Livia, and to the Senate collectively, by the example of Augustus, and also by the Senate's sharing in the proposed worship. But this refusal seems by no means to have met with universal approbation in Rome. Some thought it showed moderation, but many took it as the mark of a degenerate mind, because the noblest of mankind had the loftiest ambition.† It will be noticed that Rome, and even the Senate, were deified, as well as the emperor; and this kind of worship was of long standing. Traces of it appear as early as

* Tacit. Ann., iv. 55. † Ib. iv. 38.

the Macedonian period, in which (as already remarked) we first observe the deification of kings in the recent sense of the word, as opposed to the primitive hero-worship. Thus, in a decree cited in Demosthenes (*De Coronâ*, § 92), Sestos and three other cities of the Chersonese order the construction of an altar to Gratitude and to the People of the Athenians.

To return, however, to our immediate subject. Accusations were laid against individuals for offences, trivial or serious, against this worship. For example, one Cassius was accused of having sold, together with some gardens, a statue of Augustus; Rubrius, of having perjured himself in swearing by Augustus. Tiberius, with the grave hypocrisy of which he was such a master, wrote to the consuls that it was not an offence against religion, if the effigies of Augustus were included "like other images of gods," in the sales of gardens and houses; and that perjury by his name must be treated just as if the accused had sworn falsely by Jupiter: "*Deorum injurias dis curæ.*"* A lady of rank, Appuleia Varilla, grand-niece to Augustus himself, was charged with jesting at the god Augustus, at Tiberius and Livia, and this was attempted to be brought under the law of treason. Tiberius, though he declined to allow the attacks made on himself or his mother to come before the court, required that anything "irreligiously spoken against Augustus" should be condemned.† A public accusation of carelessness as to the ceremonies of the god Augustus (*incuria cæremoniarum divi Augusti*) was brought against the Cyzicenes; and Cyzicus was in consequence deprived of the privilege of being a free city, which rank it had held since the time of the Mithridatic war, B.C. 74.‡ The indifference, and even discouragement, shown by Tiberius to this mode of adulation as far as he was personally concerned comes out not seldom. Thus, he sharply rebuked certain flatterers for styling his occupations "divine." We will add another very remarkable instance, furnished in a letter of Herod Agrippa's, given in full by Philo in relating a transaction we shall describe further on. From this it appears that *Pontius Pilate*, procurator of Judæa, not so much to do honour to Tiberius as to vex the people, dedicated some gilt shields in Herod's palace, in the Holy City. These shields were not adorned with any image or anything else that was forbidden, but had simply an inscription stating who dedicated them, and for whom. We translate as follows Herod Agrippa's account of the excitement which ensued, and of the interference of the emperor:—

As soon as the multitude perceived what had been done, and the matter got

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* Ib. i. 73. † Ib. ii. 50. ‡ Ib. iv. 36.

noised abroad, they putting forward the four sons of the king [Herod Antipas], who lacked not royal dignity and fortune, and his other descendants, and those among themselves who were in authority, petitioned that this innovation in the affair of the shields might be remedied, and that their hereditary customs, which of old had always been maintained, and which had been untouched by emperors and kings, might not be disturbed. And when Pilate obstinately gainsaid them—for he was unbending in his nature, self-willed, and not to be soothed—they cried out: "Do not cause a sedition, do not cause war, do not break the peace. The emperor's honour does not mean the dishonour of ancient laws; let it not be to give a pretext for contumely to our nation. Tiberius wishes none of our customs to be abolished. But if you say he does, exhibit either an order or a rescript, or anything of the kind, that we may cease troubling you, and having chosen ambassadors, petition the sovereign." This last hint made him more wrathful, as he was afraid lest they should really send an embassy and prove, and give in detail, as regarded the rest of his administration, the corruption, the outrages, the rapines, the assaults, the contumelies, the homicides without trial, one heaped on another, the savage and endless cruelty he had shown. Therefore, like a man in anger and hate, he was nonplussed, neither having the courage to take down the offerings he had once dedicated, nor willing to do anything to pleasure those subject to him, and, at the same time, not ignorant of the firmness of Tiberius. But those in authority, seeing and understanding that he was repenting of what had been done, wrote to Tiberius letters of most earnest entreaty. And when he had read them, in what style did he speak to Pilate, and what sort of threats did he make? How angry Tiberius was, though he was not easily aggrieved, it is needless to relate, as the matter speaks for itself. For straightway, without putting off till the morrow, he wrote to him with innumerable reproaches and rebukes for the novel proceeding he had ventured on, and ordering him immediately to take down the shields, and have them removed from the metropolis to Cæsarea Augusta, near the sea, that they might be dedicated in the temple of Augustus,—and dedicated they were. Thus both objects were maintained, the honour of the emperor, and the ancient custom regarding the city of Jerusalem.—(Philo Jud., "De Leg. ad Caium," c. 38.)

The reign of Caligula brings us into quite a new era of the worship of the Cæsars. That emperor is commonly regarded as a madman, and there is certainly much to justify that view. At the same time, it is difficult to draw the line between the moral derangement of vice, carried to extraordinary lengths, and insanity, properly so called. But in fact, it was of small consequence to the empire upon which he was let loose as a scourge, to determine how his depraved soul was properly to be classed. We will endeavour, however, to give the impression we have formed, in relating how this despot acted as the chief of the religion of the wide regions under his sway. Before attaining the purple, he had shown chiefly a cringing spirit, in which the keen and cruel eyes of Tiberius discerned a temper as

merciless as his own, though without his greatness, detestable as he was. The iron firmness of the government of Tiberius had left the empire, materially speaking, as prosperous as he had received it from the hands of Augustus. The populations all over the Roman world welcomed with transports of joy the accession of the son of Germanicus, little knowing the character he concealed, and for seven months a kind of golden age of rejoicing prevailed over the earth; feasting, sacrifices, processions—the world seemed to keep holiday, and there brooded over all the still atmosphere and the deceiving brightness which was to end in the storm. The new emperor at first was popular as a ruler, but he also, from the first, gave himself up to that indulgence of vice and luxury of which his position gave him unbounded opportunity. The consequence was, that he fell into a dangerous sickness, from which, physically, he recovered, but his mind seemed to have received some strange shock; or else it reverted, and with one bound, to what it had been from the first, but had concealed, with an artfulness singularly superadded on the most ferocious passions, and an eager, restless intellect. Into the history of his murders, his incests, and cruelties, of course it does not belong to the subject marked out for this article to enter. Only the religious aspect of this strange being, who had the world under his sway, is here considered. It was to have been expected that the deification of several members of his family, which, as we have seen, had been imposed upon mankind with the emphasis and energy of absolute power, would set such a mind as Caligula's on thinking; and, with supreme power, from thinking to acting there is a very short transit. He was, in his way, a sort of political philosopher and a theologian. He reflected that the animal world are ruled by beings of a different and higher order than themselves, that sheep and oxen and goats are not governed by creatures of their own species, but by their respective herdsmen; and by a very natural analogy he might infer that he, the leader of that most excellent herd, the human race, must also be of a different and superior order to those whom he governed; consequently he must be divine, and it only remained to determine to which, among the many orders of deity the celestial hierarchy he believed in was supposed to contain, he, Caius Cæsar, belonged. He began by affecting the conventional costume of different demigods, Dionysus, Hercules, and the Dioscuri. As for heroes of less distinction, Trophonius, Amphiaraus, and the like, he ridiculed their power as less than his own. He wore a lion's hide, and wielded a club (both, however, gilded), like Hercules; he put on a cap of the style which Castor and Pollux were represented with; or he clad himself in fawn-

skins and carried a thyrsus like Dionysus. But soon it did not satisfy him to assume the attributes of beings but half divine; he began to array himself in the fashion of such gods as Mercury, Apollo, and Mars; with the herald's staff and winged sandals of the first, or with a rayed crown on his head, bow and arrows in his left hand, and the symbolic figure of a Grace in his right, and surrounded by choruses to sing pæans in his praise, like the second; or with cuirass, helmet, and shield, like Mars, and attended by a troop of gladiators and executioners to execute such cruelties as came into his head. He caused the choicest statues of the gods to be decapitated, and the heads replaced by his own likeness. He appeared on his tribunal in public in the style of Jupiter, and was even saluted as Jupiter Latiaris. Yet more, he caused a temple to be constructed to his own godhead, and instituted priests and victims for the worship to be offered to himself. The priesthoods were sold to the highest bidders, and were eagerly sought by the richest men in Rome. The victims were the rarest and most costly species of birds,—flamingoes, peacocks, capercailzies, guinea-fowl, and pheasants.* Sometimes he acted as his own priest, and offered sacrifices to himself; and all this was acquiesced in, if not approved, by the populace.

Caligula's accession to the empire was in March, A.D. 37. The strange pranks we have described, commencing after the first two months of his reign, had been going on for about two years and a half, when, towards the end of A.D. 39, they became complicated by a new mania his wickedness took. As he had usurped the throne of the false king of heaven, he began to be jealous of the worship of the True, and sought to have himself set up to be adored in that Temple from which, though he knew it not, the Divine Presence had departed. To understand this anticipation of the conflict of Paganism, in one of its most thoroughly diabolical forms, with Christianity, it is necessary to offer some remarks on the position of the Jews, at this period, in the Roman empire. The well-known passage in the Acts of the Apostles, describing the day of Pentecost, gives the clearest idea anywhere furnished of the universal diffusion of the Jews over the civilized world. From the Euphrates to the Tiber, in all the wide provinces of the empire, probably no important seat of commerce was destitute of a Jewish community, and theirs was then, what it has never been since Christianity began to penetrate that mighty mass, a highly proselytizing religion. We know from the words of our Lord

* Suet., Calig., 22.

that they would compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and pagan evidence points quite in the same direction :

> Veluti te
> Judæi, *cogemus* in hanc concedere turbam.*

In Rome, in the days of the Cæsars, they had, as now, a regular *Ghetto,* but it was in the Trastevere, on the opposite side of the river to the present. They were strangely favoured by the earlier emperors. We have seen that Julius Cæsar must have been a great patron of theirs, since they so lamented his death. Augustus Cæsar had sacrifices daily offered, at his own expense, in the temple of Jerusalem. His wife Livia made costly golden offerings to the temple; and Tiberius, as we have also seen, interfered to protect the religion of the Jews against the tyranny of Pilate, even when that tyranny took the form of adulation of himself. But nowhere were they more numerous than at Alexandria,—in those days the Liverpool of the Roman world. A quarter of the town was occupied by them, and they had very numerous synagogues, usually called, by Greek and Roman writers, *proseuchæ,* or "prayer-houses"—"meeting-houses," we might popularly render the word. They even became as much hated by the Alexandrian mob as their descendants are by the Turks at Diarbekr at this very day, and they underwent, about the time we are now studying, a no less cruel and savage persecution from that mob, which added to the levity and childishness of Greeks the fanatical ferocity native to the Egyptian. Into the history of the other sufferings then sustained by the Jews we need not enter. What concerns our own subject is, that the Alexandrians, who had taken up with zeal the new form of Imperial idolatry, insisted on statues of the emperor being set up in the Jewish synagogues, and actually placed a statue of him in the principal one. The Jewish population, though it would appear they were willing to go any lengths to conciliate the emperors, short of breaking the law of Moses, were naturally in a state of great agitation at this outrage, and resolved on sending an embassy to make a representation on the subject to the emperor personally. Philo, to whose important narrative of it we owe these details, headed this embassy, and proceeded with it to Italy. The emperor was kept well informed of all that passed at Alexandria, and had begun to set his heart on carrying out what the mob had so zealously initiated; he was also influenced by persons about him who were enemies of the Jewish nation, particularly one Helicon, a freedman of some education, who was his principal chamberlain. Whilst the embassy, however, was seeking

* Hor., Sat., i. iv. 143.

an audience of the emperor, news arrived of a far more terrible profanation that was being contemplated against the Holy of Holies in the Temple of Jerusalem.

This proposed profanation was suggested by another transaction, not started originally by Caligula himself. At Jamnia, in that part of Palestine anciently occupied by the Philistines, there was a mixed Gentile population, very hostile, as elsewhere, to the Jews among whom they dwelt. These people, on purpose, according to Philo, to get the Jews into a difficulty, raised a mud altar to the emperor in one of the synagogues. The Jews overturned it; the matter was reported to Caligula, and the suggestion was made to him, which he eagerly adopted, of having, by way of reparation to his insulted divinity, a colossal statue of himself set up for adoration in the Holy of Holies in the Temple at Jerusalem, which he proposed to have dedicated to himself under the title of "Caius, the newly-manifested Jupiter." Orders were sent to Petronius, prefect of Syria, to take steps to carry this into effect, and artisans were set to work at Sidon to cast the colossus. Petronius was one of those Romans, of whom there were very many in that age, with some leaning towards Judaism, and was very reluctant to execute this command. The Jews also flocked into Phœnicia to entreat him to delay: he decided on temporizing, and wrote to the emperor urging this, on the ground of the danger to the harvest from the excitement of the population. Caligula was enraged at this interference, but, as he mingled a good deal of caution with all his madness, when dealing with the governors of distant provinces, especially those in command of considerable forces, he at first praised Petronius for his prudence. Soon after, with the changeableness which also belonged to his character, he repeated his orders that there was to be no delay in completing and setting up the statue.

Whilst all this was going on, Herod Agrippa I., afterwards king of Judæa (whose miserable end is recorded in the Acts of the Apostles), at an interview with Caligula, was informed by him of the outrage he contemplated. Agrippa became so agitated as nearly to faint, and had to be assisted to leave the room. When he was able to recover himself, he wrote a long remonstrance to the emperor, entreating him to forbear his design. This remonstrance, which Philo gives at length,* is one of the most remarkable documents extant on the subject before us. Agrippa chiefly relies on the precedents of special favour shown to the Jews by Augustus and Tiberius, who had always respected the privileges of the Temple. We shall quote

* Philo Jud., *De Legat. ad Caium*, 36–41.

some passages from this letter (in addition to the extract referring to Pontius Pilate, previously given), in order to show how very distinctly the Roman emperor was made to understand what he was doing when he threatened the profanation of the Temple. Agrippa describes, in a striking manner, a visit paid to Jerusalem by his namesake, Marcus Agrippa, son-in-law to Augustus and maternal grandfather to Caligula himself. This was in the time of Herod the Great.

Having viewed the Temple, and the order of the priests, and the worship rendered by the inhabitants, he admired it, thinking that what he had witnessed was something beyond measure awful and greater than words could describe. And his conversation with his friends, who came with him at the time, turned on nothing else but praise of the Temple and of all it contained. And to prove this, all the days he spent in the city to gratify Herod he resorted to the precinct, being delighted with viewing the establishment and the sacrifices and the ritual, and the order and sanctity that surrounded the High Priest, whenever he put on his sacred vestments and commenced to offer the victims. And after adorning the Temple with such offerings as he was permitted to do, and having conferred whatever favours he could on the inhabitants without harm, and paid many compliments to Herod and received money, he was escorted to the harbours by the whole population, with leaves scattered over him, and admired for his devotion.

The following passage presents, in compact form, some of the main arguments urged by Agrippa :—

They say that the intended dedication will be in the very sanctuary [the Holy of Holies], into which the High Priest enters once a year on what is called the Fast, only to offer incense, and to pray, according to a national custom, for prosperity and peace to all mankind. And if some one—I say not of the other Jews, but of the priests, and not of the lowest in rank, but of those whose station is next after the first, were to enter either by himself or with him ; nay, rather, if the High Priest himself were to go within on two days in the year, or even three or four times in the same day, he undergoes inevitable death. . . . How many deaths, then, think you, those consecrated to these rites would endure, if they saw the statue brought in ? I think they would cut the throats of their whole families, wives and children, and sacrifice themselves the last over the bodies of those dear to them. Tiberius knew this : and what of your great-grandfather, the best of all the emperors that ever was, the first-named Augustus, because of his virtue and fortune,—he who poured peace everywhere over land and sea, to the ends of the world ? Did he not, when he heard by rumour concerning the Temple, and that there is nothing set up in it wrought by hands,—no visible imitation of the Invisible nature,—admire and worship it ?

He described in detail the protection which Augustus had afforded to the collections made by the Jews towards the main-

tenance of the Temple, and the aid personally given to the Temple worship by Augustus himself and the empress Livia; and he ends by declaring that he is ready to relinquish the regal dignities which had been conferred on him by Caligula, if he may but be spared this threatened outrage to his ancestral religion. Caligula received this protest better than might have been expected; he even praised Agrippa's courage, and, for the moment, seemed to have dropped his principal purpose. He wrote to Petronius, ordering him to take no further step about the Temple, but, on the other hand, to punish any opposition to the erection of altars or images to him elsewhere. Soon after, however, his wayward self-will again reverted to its favourite object, and he now gave directions to have a statue of gilt bronze prepared, not at Sidon, but at Rome, and intended to have it quietly transported to Palestine, and set up, taking the people by surprise.

In the mean time the Jewish envoys were admitted to their audience. They had previously heard of Caligula's design upon the Temple, and Philo gives a description of the agitation and distress of the friend who conveyed the news, in itself most touching and impressive. Yet what Christian can forget that, only five or six years before, the chiefs of the Jewish nation, persons possibly, or even probably, intimates of Philo himself, had crucified the Lord of the Temple? Or who can avoid recognizing the Hand of God in this prelude of the vengeance that has pursued that miserable race ever since? Or again, what Christian can forget that this very Herod Agrippa, who pleaded for the Temple as we have seen, was the same who, about three years after these events, "stretched forth his hands to afflict some of the Church, and killed James, the brother of John, with the sword; and seeing that it pleased the Jews, proceeded to take up Peter also"; and who, almost directly after, accepting from his flattering subjects an adulation identical in character, though not in extent, with the blasphemous worship he had protested against when claimed by the emperor, was "forthwith struck by an Angel of the Lord, because he had not given the honour to God; and being eaten up by worms, gave up the ghost."*

The famous audience was given whilst the emperor was busy inspecting some magnificent buildings he had caused to be constructed in the gardens of Mæcenas and Lamia, near Rome. The overseers of the works were in attendance, and the unfortunate ambassadors had to keep following the emperor, who, whilst engaged with the architects, kept up a running fire of

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* Acts xii. 1, 2, 20-3.

questions at his petitioners, jesting at them, but also almost frightening them out of their wits; a party of their enemies were also in attendance at the same time, to put in an accusation against them, and chime applause at the emperor's witticisms, so keenly sharpened by the power to inflict death on the instant, if the fancy took him. "Are you," said he, "the hated of the gods, who do not believe that I am a god, though I am now acknowledged by all but you, but who, instead, worship your Un-named One?" And lifting up his hands to heaven, he uttered a blasphemy which Philo dares not record. The hostile ambassadors eagerly told the emperor on this, that he would hate the Jews yet more when he knew that they alone of all mankind had not offered sacrifices of thanksgiving on his recovery from illness. The Philonian envoys exclaimed in an agony, "Lord Caius! we are slandered! for we sacrificed, yea, sacrificed hecatombs, and after libations of the blood on the altar, we did not carry the meat home to feast upon, as the wont with some is, but we delivered the victims as holocausts to the sacred flame; and we did this thrice, not once only. First, when you succeeded to the empire; secondly, when you escaped that heavy sickness, which all the world shared with you; thirdly, in honour of your Germanic victory." "Granted," retorted the emperor, "all this is true; you sacrificed, but it was to Another, and not for me. What use was it then, for you do not sacrifice to *me*." The crowd of flatterers and sycophants grinned their applause. Running up and down stairs, finding fault here, ordering greater cost there, the emperor suddenly turned to the Jews and said, "Why do you abstain from pork?" Another burst of laughter, almost to scandalize the regular courtiers, the rule being, that even a gentle smile in the presence of the emperor was dangerous, except to his most favoured familiars. The Jews respectfully offered explanations, and one of them unluckily suggested that many people did not eat lamb. "Quite right," said Caligula, "it is not nice." Next he proposed the very wide question, "I should like to know the principles of your political constitution." They had scarcely begun an exposition of them, when he ran into a large building, and gave orders to have some doors fitted up with glass; then came back and asked more gently, "What were you saying?" and, without hearing them to an end, again rushed to another room, where he had ordered the plans of the building to be ready for his examination. At last, he finished off with the remark, "They seem to me to be rather unfortunate and silly than wicked, as they do not believe that I have allotted to me the nature of a god," and so dismissed them, only too glad to have escaped with their lives out

of the lion's den.* The question of forcing the admission of his statues into the synagogues and Temple was put an end to, soon after, by the assassination of the tyrant.

Caligula's range of wickedness had extended further than any of the line of bad men who came before or after him, for no Roman emperor but he, in setting himself up as a god, had intended more than to be one of the many false gods who already crowded the pagan heaven. The other horrible features of his life we have happily not been called upon, for the present purpose, to reproduce; but as lust and cruelty have ever been neighbours, it may well be imagined, from what has already been said, that they had better be left in their own darkness. The scene, however, in which the Divine vengeance overtook him, seems worth attempting to describe. His insolence and cruelty had naturally long provoked many persons past endurance; his life had begun to be conspired against, but more than one such attempt had been foiled. At length a conspiracy was initiated by Cassius Chærea, an officer in his guard, whose deadly hatred he had incurred by verbal insults of the most atrocious kind, such as giving him for watchwords names of effeminate or disgusting associations, and by actions yet more intolerable. As usual in events of imperial history of this description, many strange omens are recorded as having portended what was approaching; among them it is mentioned that there had been in preparation for the night of the day in which the emperor was assassinated, a scenic exhibition to amuse him, the subject being hell, and the performers Egyptians and negroes. On January 24, A.D. 41, he had unwillingly risen, at one o'clock in the afternoon, still suffering from the excesses of a banquet the day before. After offering sacrifice to Augustus Cæsar, he was passing through a gallery leading to a theatre in his palace, where happened to be assembled a band of noble youths, who had been brought from Greece and Ionia, and were under musical training. He was asked to hear them sing a hymn which had been composed in his own praise, and to give them some encouragement. It had been noticed that morning that the emperor was, contrary to his usual custom, so affable and goodnatured in his conversation that all present were surprised at it. He wished the boys to repeat their performance, which they would have done but that the leader of the band complained of the cold. At this moment the conspirators entered the gallery, and Chærea, calling out the ominous words *Hoc age!* ("Mind what you do!"—a formula used in sacrifices), struck the emperor violently with his sword

* Philo Jud., 4, 5, 44, sqq.

from behind, between the shoulders and the neck. Caligula staggered forward, uttering a groan, but nothing more. The others then rushed about him, each striking and stabbing. The tyrant rolled weltering on the pavement, and screamed, every limb contracting with agony, "I am living yet! I am living yet!" The fatal blow was given by a conspirator named Aquila. Thirty wounds were counted on the corpse. He was but twenty-nine, and had reigned not quite four years. In the midst of the confusion that followed, his body was secretly removed to the Lamian gardens (in the villa of which he had received the Jewish embassy), and there half burnt on a hastily-constructed pile, and interred. It afterwards received more solemn burial by his sisters.*

One might have imagined that, looking back on the life of such a deity as Caligula, men would have been shamed out of the madness which possessed them. But it was not so. The foolish Claudius in his turn received the honours of divinity at his death, revoked indeed by Nero, but restored by the sagacious Vespasian. Nero deified his deceased wife Poppæa, and it was one of the charges against the virtuous Thrasea that he did not believe Poppæa to be a goddess.† In the long line of the Roman emperors, and members of the imperial families, down to the establishment of Christianity, fifty-three of these deifications are reckoned, of which fifteen were those of females.‡ Nay, the same honour was in some instances extended to favourites. Thus L. Vitellius (father of the emperor of the same name) worshipped among his household gods golden images of Narcissus and Pallas, freedmen of Claudius.§ This may have been a private devotion, but the worship rendered to Antinous, the vile object of the attachment of the emperor Hadrian, may be said to have been even more extraordinary than that of the deified emperors. At the city in Egypt named after him, Antinoopclis, he had not only a temple, but an oracle of great celebrity. He died about A.D. 122, and in Origen's time, a century after his death, the deluded Egyptians dreaded the anger of the god Antinous against those who broke the rules of their superstition; and they classed him with Apollo and Jupiter. Celsus went so far as to say they would not tolerate his being compared with those gods. He had also a temple and elaborate honours at Mantinea.||

The ceremonies of the apotheosis of a Roman emperor have been described for us in great detail by Herodian,¶ as they took

* Suet., Calig., 58; Dion Cass., lix. 29. † Tacit., Ann., xvi. 21, 22.
‡ Champagny, "Les Césars," t. iii. p. 238. § Suet., Vitell., 2.
|| Origen, "Contra Cels.," iii. p. 132, ed. Spencer; Paus., viii. ix. 4.
¶ Herod., iv. 1–4.

place at the deification of Severus. We may suppose that at that date they had attained their full development, and we proceed, therefore, to fill up by means of this account the less detailed sketch already given of the ceremonial as used for the first two Cæsars. Severus, we need hardly say, died at York in A.D. 211. His body was burnt in the usual manner, and the ashes placed with aromatics in an alabaster vase. His two sons, Caracalla and Geta, conveyed these from Britain to Rome, where they were received by the people wearing laurel chaplets, and by the Senate. After an address from the latter, the two princes, habited in purple, led the procession, the consuls following, bearing the urn. Caracalla and Geta were then saluted as emperors; the ashes of Severus were adored, and taken processionally to the temple, where were the monuments of Marcus Aurelius and his predecessors, with whom they were entombed. So much for the merely human funeral. Now for the deification.

An image of waxwork was made, exactly resembling the deceased emperor, but represented as pale, like a sick person. This image was laid out on a very lofty couch of ivory, with coverlets of cloth of gold, at the entrance of the palace. During most of the day were seated, at the left of the couch, all the senators, in black cloaks; at the right, all the Roman ladies of rank, either by birth or marriage, in white dresses, without necklaces or jewellery. This went on for seven days successively. Doctors came daily, and approached his couch, viewed the imaginary patient, and reported on each occasion that the emperor was getting worse. At last, when he was supposed to have died, the noblest members of the equestrian order and chosen youths of the senatorian families carried the couch on their shoulders through the *Via Sacra*, and set it out in the Old Forum, at the place where the Roman magistrates used to take the oaths customary on resigning their offices at the end of the year. On either side of the couch were placed steps in the form of a staircase. On the one side were a chorus of boys of the noblest patrician families, and on the opposite ladies of rank, each singing hymns and pæans to the deceased emperor, in measured and majestic strains of music. Here we are tempted to quit Herodian for a moment, in order to borrow from Seneca some idea of the style of these lamentations or *næniæ*. In his satirical poem on the deification of the emperor Claudius, called *Apocolocynthosis*, he has given a parody of them. It is true that the composition is a mere insulting jest, yet we may be sure that the general effect has been carefully preserved in those doleful anapæstics:—

Fundite fletus, Edite planctus, Fingite luctus,
Resonet tristi Clamore forum : Cecidit pulchre
Cordatus homo, Quo non alius, Fuit in toto
Fortior orbe.

We translate, as follows, that portion of the dirge which is capable of being rendered seriously, omitting the concluding part, which turns the whole into ridicule :—

O weep ye, and wail ye, let sorrow abound ;
With the voice of your woe let the Forum resound.
A hero has fallen, of those to their rest
Whom earth has received, the bravest and best.
The speed of his charge not a foeman could stand,
Nor Parthian look back, as he fled from his hand.
The Median cohorts he drove o'er the plain,
And on lands which we knew not, far over the main,
On Brigantes and Britons, he fasten'd Rome's chain.
Wild, azure-tattooed, their chieftains we saw,
And the tides of the ocean, of Romans in awe.

After this, the couch was borne to the Campus Martius, where, in the most open part of the plain, was raised a quadrangular structure of large planks, in the form of a house, filled with combustibles inside, and adorned outside with hangings of gold cloth, ivory statues, and various paintings. Upon this edifice was placed another, smaller, but on the same plan, with open gates and doors; on this, a third and a fourth, each diminishing in size, till the last, which was lowest in height of the series; the general effect, says Herodian, resembling that of a lighthouse tower, or pharos. The couch was then raised, and placed in the second chamber, with all kinds of aromatics, sweet gums, and distilled perfumes, fragrant fruits and foliage, piled up in huge heaps, for not a nation, or city, or person of consequence in the empire but sent their best gifts to do honour to the emperor who was about to be deified. After the aromatics had been thrown on, till no room was left for more, an equestrian procession was made round the edifice, all the knights riding round it, in regular order, and making certain circumvolutions in the manner of the old Pyrrhic dances. Similarly, a great procession of chariots followed. In each chariot sat persons dressed in the official robe, with purple in front (*toga prætexta*), and wearing masks to represent the most illustrious Roman generals and former emperors, whose august assemblage in the other world the deceased monarch was expected to have joined. When all this had been done, the prince who was to succeed him in the empire, taking a torch,

applied it to the building, and all around also joined in this act. In an instant, of course, with such a quantity of spices and gums, the whole was in a blaze, and as the blaze ascended, an eagle was let fly into the air from the turret at the top, and was believed by the Romans to carry the soul of the departed emperor to heaven, thenceforward to be worshipped among the gods.

In looking back generally on the subject of which we have given a sketch, we cannot but regard the deification of the Cæsars as a phase of Paganism peculiar to its later period, and different in kind from the idolatry of earlier time. As we remarked at the outset, this has been denied by Colonel Mure, and very emphatically. He says :—

> The most subtle casuistry can point out no generic difference between the apotheosis of kings or great men in the historic ages of Greece and Rome and that of popular heroes in fabulous antiquity. Whatever difference may exist is to be sought, not in the spirit of the system, but in that of the times and circumstances.*

Another authority of note, Dr. Merivale, we presume takes an opposite view, for he ascribes this innovation to Oriental influence, which undoubtedly, whether he is right or wrong in this supposition, did widely differ in its character from the Western ideas. We quote the following sentences from him :—

> The prostitution of personal dignity by self-display in the theatre and circus, *the assumption of the divine character* to the utter destruction of all remaining sense of religion ; exaggerated extravagances in shows and buildings—all these are attributes of Oriental sovereigns which Caius was the first of Roman emperors to exercise.†

Again, he speaks of the Eastern kings as always near allied to divinity, and calls it "a political dogma which the Macedonians had found established in Asia, and they had willingly availed themselves of it." Now, as to Col. Mure's view, it appears to us that it is precisely in the spirit of the deifications of the heroic and historical ages that a great difference does exist. Of hero-worship in Homer there is little trace. The most distinct cases of it are Erechtheus, in the Iliad, and Ino (Leucothea), in the Odyssey. Of both little is said, but in the case of both we seem to see clearly that they are, though human, still highly supernatural beings. Erechtheus is the child of the earth, the nursling of Athena. Ino is made a goddess of the sea. Dionysus, too, in Homer, from what little we hear of

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* Col. Mure, ii. 5.

† Merivale's "History of the Romans under the Empire," vol. iv. p. 362.

him (particularly in the Homeric hymn under his invocation), is not only the son of a god, but of mysterious, extra-human character, given shelter by Thetis in the sea when flying from the persecution of Lycoorgus, and terrifying the Tuscan pirates who had carried him off captive by strange and awful prodigies on board their ship. In all this we behold the range of fable, of wild myth, however it is to be explained. Now in the apotheoses of the Roman emperors, the only approach to this is here and there the imitation by some perjured senator of the story of Julius Proculus and the message he brings from the deified Romulus.

It may be urged in reply, that there is nothing to distinguish the worship of Agamemnon from that of Julius Cæsar, of Helen from that of Livia or Octavia. We would contend that there is one marked distinction. The worship of the former class (in cases where the hero is not merely a god who has lost that rank in the popular mythology), arose at no date that can be assigned, but is to be accounted for principally by the tendency to divinize the past, carried to its utmost degree. We see the first beginnings of this in Homer, in his wistful comparisons of the strength of his heroes with the degeneracy of the men of his own time. People would look back to the days of the Trojan War, or to the epoch so styled (which the ruins of Mycenæ, and now of Ilium, prove to have been a great one), and their poets relating the marvellous deeds of the heroes who made it ring with their praises, it scarcely needed a step to place those heroes at a celestial elevation. The worship of the Cæsars, on the contrary, is all absolutely of the present. Horace, in the passage already quoted, characterizes it by this distinction,—

> "Præsenti tibi maturos largimur honores."

And after Augustus was supposed to be raised to the skies, he still was not exactly the sort of god that Hercules or Triptolemus was, with a halo of fable round him, and belonging to a period marked off from the present as the golden age was from that of brass or iron. Perhaps another and still deeper distinction may be drawn. The Cæsars may be called *conventional* gods. That is, the State made them, and insisted on their worship; and such men as Tacitus and Pliny, whilst practising the religion outwardly, assuredly did not believe it in their hearts. And in its degree, the same spirit would pervade all classes, who accepted a hideous imitation of a system which in early times had at least the palliation of its birth from an unsuspecting and childish stage of society. Lastly, in the special worship of the Cæsars, largely entered the predominance, exhibited in the old Italic mythology, of the *genius*

or deified personality of the individual man. People swore by the *genius* of Cæsar; and that this *genius* should be worshipped as a public god, when disengaged from the bonds of mortality, was quite in keeping with the character of the national system, notwithstanding the very late period at which political circumstances enabled it to be brought out and recognized by the State.

We did propose to conclude this article by a discussion of the popular comparison instituted by Protestant writers,—for instance, Colonel Mure, already referred to,—between the deification of the emperors and the canonization of saints in the Catholic Church. But really, to any mind that takes the least trouble to inform itself from the most ordinary sources of an authentic kind, as to what canonization really is, and the sort of evidence on which it depends, such a discussion must be superfluous. Are not the saints *servants* of the Most High? Do we offer sacrifice to them? Is not the exalted rank to which they are raised merited by innocence of life and heroic virtues, which have been subjected to the most sifting examination and scrutiny? And of a comparison which would either place side by side the persons, or the *cultus* of portents of wickedness like some of the Roman emperors, and the holy and humble men and women, the martyrs, and the confessors, and the virgins of the Catholic Church, may we not say, *securus judicat orbis terrarum?* And if any Protestant reader, not knowing by experience the devotion towards the blessed saints, is afraid of disturbing that worship which is due only to the Supreme, let him know that, like many other difficulties in the controversy, this, when practically solved, becomes an argument, instead of a difficulty, for the question will at once suggest itself,—If saints are so great, what must be their Creator and Lord?

Art. V.—S. THOMAS ON THE THEORY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

S. Thomæ Aquin. Summa Theologica. Bar-le-Duc, 1873.

Rosmini-Serbati. Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine dell' Idee. Edizione quinta, riveduta dall' autore. Torino, 1853.

Philosophia Christiana, cum antiqua et nova comparata, auctore Cajetano Sanseverino. Neapoli, 1862.

La Filosofia Antica esposta e difesa del P. Giuseppe Kleutgen. Roma e Torino, 1867.

Lehrbuch der Philosophie, von Dr. Albert Stöckl. Dritte Auflage. Mainz, 1872.

Della Conoscenza Intelletuale. Del P. Matteo Liberatore. Seconda edizione. Roma, 1874.

S. Thomas of Aquin and Ideology. By Mgr. Ferré. Translated by a Father of Charity. London: Burns, Oates, & Co., 1875.

THE publication last on our list is concerned with the Rosminian theory of the Ideal Being, and purports to show that S. Thomas, in his various writings, drew out a theory with which that one is in substantial agreement. In our July notice of it (p. 223) we expressed our intention of examining his argument. But on reflection we are very unwilling, where there is no absolute necessity, to say one word in disparagement of an admirable religious, such as Rosmini; and we shall confine ourselves therefore to the exhibiting that interpretation of S. Thomas in which the other writers have concurred whose works we have above cited. We feel confident that S. Thomas wrote to be understood; and that, with a little patience and study, he can be understood; and we will therefore simply place before our readers what we understand him to teach on the question with which we are here concerned. As to Rosmini, he offers an account of S. Thomas which we think is incorrect, nor does the system, as a whole or taken in its fundamental tenet, appear to us acceptable; but there is much subtle observation, much seasonable and convincing argument in what we have seen of it, and we heartily endorse, what several of his opponents have recognized, the energy, namely, and success with which Rosmini combats the philosophy of Sense. In his many years of

meditation, pursued according to a severe and painstaking method, it would be wonderful if there were not large and noble additions made to the conquests of philosophy. These then we may and ought to receive with thankfulness: it will be permitted us indeed to express our diffidence in the formal principle to which he reduces his philosophy, but we do not wish, for a moment, to lose the benefit of so much depth and penetration. It is in this way that the Scholastics dealt with authors whom they did not otherwise receive; nay, if we may venture to say it, there are some authors of a recent date who, in spite of the most serious blemishes, would contribute not a little to Catholic Philosophy. We are thinking of men to whom the Church is unknown; but how much greater a boon will not the writings of those Catholics afford, who, even if mistaken in some points of philosophy, have yet studied in a spirit of zealous piety, and from a desire of helping their brethren in Christ?

We propose, by way of preface, to remark on the present state of philosophy amongst us, not as intending to be lengthy on that topic, but to express some of the thoughts which reading Mgr. Ferré has suggested. And it may, perhaps, be the fittest introduction to the setting forth that view of S. Thomas's theory, which, allow us to say it once more, has been advanced in many different quarters, and by authorities of great name. Among the questions which may be looked upon as emphatically questions of the day, a prime importance attaches to the connection between Philosophy and Revelation. What is the province of each? what affinities are there between the historical series of religions and the no less authenticated series of philosophical creeds? Is there a kindred spirit pervading the Christian Revelation and the Aristotelian system of thought? Such are the inquiries to be heard in the circles where discussion and reflection exert a sway. Nor can we fail to notice how immediately the political world is affected by the propagation of large doctrines,—we may instance Communism,—which admit of being described as religious and philosophical at the same time. It is held by many that the habits and cast of thought which dispose a man to religious faith are produced and fostered by certain theories in metaphysics, and are just as surely prevented by others. It would seem, indeed, that as principles have, by their nature, more influence than doctrines, the main thing to ascertain, in dealing with others for the purpose of altering their views, is their intellectual build, and not the number of dogmas they may or may not have admitted. Religious controversy for the last thirty years or more is a proof of the widespread conviction to which we

allude, for the battle between Rationalism and the Church has thrown into the background Dogmatic Protestantism, and this for no other reason than that first principles are said to carry with them the germs of dogmatism or doubt on the whole subject in dispute.

And, as a matter of fact, since Philosophy includes a science of God, a science of the soul of man, a science of moral action, and an investigation into the value of what we call Truth, it is clear that Revelation has deep and close affinities with it. The conclusions of the human science afford some kind of criterion by which to judge of that which is alleged to be divine, they furnish the "præambula fidei" which the Church takes for granted in addressing herself to mankind, and they suggest at least the outlines and faint lineaments by which we bring home to ourselves mysteries that have once been revealed. These, of course, are some of the functions of Theological Science, but the roots of such a science, nay its possibility and limits, are contained in the rational theory which, by valid argument, demonstrates the Being and Attributes of God, the Immortality of the Soul, the Nature of Good. In like manner false religions are grounded, somewhere or other, on erroneous philosophies, and as we accept or reject the one, we are on our way to receive or refuse the other.

Now, unless we mistake altogether, the history of Thought and Religion for more than seven hundred years has stamped this view with a high approbation. There has been an advance and reflux of ideas, and a growth and decline of religious influence, from which intelligent observers would have drawn a conclusion very like our own. Let us try to indicate some few of the facts which seem to warrant this remark.

If scepticism is not, as it cannot be, an exposition of doctrines, we may probably reduce all other systems under two heads,—Oriental Pantheism, which often shows itself as atheism, and the theory of Creation. The former holds within it all that the Gnostic, Arabian, and Jewish philosophers have taught concerning emanations; the latter is best exemplified in the fusion which S. Augustine began and S. Thomas seems to have perfected, of the teachings of Aristotle and Plato with the dictates of Christian theology. As no philosophy but the central and true one can be wholly consistent with itself, we do not assert that each of the great authors who have erred belongs simply to the Pantheistic school, but we mean to say that when arguments and conclusions have been fairly weighed, it will be possible to reduce the conflicting statements, whether of one or of many writers, to the radical principles we have touched upon above. But it is also to be observed that orthodox

opinions are stated sometimes by an author, who, if summed up, will turn out a pantheist; and on the other hand, some whose belief is right, occasionally commit themselves to this or that which is proper to the enemy. Having premised so much, we may now remark that the Oriental doctrines—in the present time held by many scientific and literary persons—found their way into Europe through the well-known schools of Mahometan Spain; and their alarming diffusion among the learned of the day was one of the chief causes which led to the establishment of the Scholastic philosophy. Aristotle had been interpreted, by the great commentator Averroes, in a sense the most hostile to Christianity, and the genius of Abelard was leavening the Western intellect with a ferment which was to be the fruitful germ of heresies and to set the world in commotion. In the course of the next two centuries Aristotle had been baptized, and the schools of Christendom had learned to revere him as their master. The circumstances under which this revolution took place are very remarkable.

In the Middle Ages there were generations of humble-minded and enlightened men, nourished on the mysteries of the faith, and familiar, so to speak, with the features and the characteristics of truth. They culminated in the eminent speculative minds, of which Albertus Magnus, S. Thomas, and S. Bonaventure furnish the rarest specimens. These authors, at the command of the Episcopate and the Holy See, were bidden to investigate the world of man and of nature, and to gather from their contemplations the full and sufficient answer to such as impugned the philosophical basis of religion. It was a work of many years, but had been successfully brought to an end in the course of the thirteenth century, a time which we may call the palmiest in Church history; and, by a remarkable coincidence, notable also for its recognition of the true relations between the spiritual and the temporal powers, notable for its wealth of intellectual and artistic endowment. It cannot be denied that we owe the scholastic philosophy to the guidance and patronage which the Church so wisely exerted in that far-away time, and the result corresponds very aptly to the anticipations in which a sagacious mind might have indulged. Until the Reformation, in spite of Occam and the elegant Platonists of the Renaissance, the elementary teaching in philosophy was a marvel of acuteness, subtlety, and exalted common sense; nor was there, it appears, any fundamental discrepancy between the general statements of S. Thomas and those even of his keen-sighted rival, the illustrious Scotus. The living teachers who came after them were more at variance than the books upon which they

lectured, and the divergence was capable of being made wider; but it was possible to hold with any of the schools and to retain a rational belief in Christianity. Much had been left open to dispute, but the common grounds among the Scholastics were of far wider extent than now exist among philosophers, and afforded a hope that controversies, if pursued to their issues, might be amicably decided. Even incidental statements of opinions which in the last analysis would prove unorthodox must have been of rare occurrence.

All this was changed at the Reformation. Luther's principle of free inquiry implies the supremacy of human reason, and therefore Rationalism; nay, go a step further and you are landed in Pantheism. His doctrine of grace, and Calvin's fatalism, lead, not immediately to rationalism, but still to the theory of Emanation. And as, during the Middle Ages, there was witnessed an orderly growth of one truth out of another, and even when disputations arose, the Catholic Faith was left intact and uninjured, thus showing of what spirit was the whole philosophy, so there has been a development of the Protestant system, and a gradation through all the centuries since its birth, and we can now tell what Luther's first stammerings meant. The great tradition of the schools fell back at the approach of modern philosophy, it took refuge in seminaries or remote seats of learning, and whilst Aristotle and S. Thomas were forgotten, the new doctrine went on its triumphant way amid the applause and excitement of a wondering world. The names which meet us henceforth, from Bacon to Descartes, and from Locke to Hegel and his successors, are those of men to whom the Lutheran doctrines supplied a method and a beginning. If now there was anything true or solid in the writings of metaphysicians, it was due more to instinctive reasoning than to consecutive or long-sustained argument. The truth, if there, was a fragment; the error was part and parcel of the whole system. Such was the state of philosophy outside the Church, and even here and there, within its precincts, when once the scholastic yoke had been cast off. As the ancient theory crystallized—for the spirit of life had gone out from it—the new gained in energy, variety, and boldness. Europe seemed on the point of accepting the views which long ago in the Middle Ages had been preached to her by the Arabians.

And then, at last, there was an awakening among Catholics to the paramount necessity of defending Reason against Rationalism, and the mysteries of the Faith against the assaults of Pantheism. The attempt was made, not once or twice, but repeatedly, and yet there was little pro-

mise of success. The ground was strewn with disjointed fragments, the remains of philosophical systems which the Church would not approve. De la Mennais, Gioberti, Günther, Ubaghs, men of penetration and learning, and eager to do their utmost, though not all of the same stanch loyalty and devotion, these have left their names in the desert and have passed away with the task unfulfilled. When one experiment after another had come to naught, it was seen that the mistake, fatal from the first, had been the neglect of S. Thomas and his contemporaries. The line of orthodox tradition had been broken in the sixteenth century; it must be taken up again and carried onward. First was required a diligent study of the volumes which for so long had remained unopened; and then, and no less imperatively, a comparison must be instituted between the old and the new philosophy, and our position towards the nineteenth century be defined.

This seems our situation at present. The reaction to scholasticism gains strength every day, and the patient consideration of its history and genius will have the further effect, we think, of showing its intimate connection with Catholic theology; but, as we are still in mid course, and the work is of great extent, it is no wonder that Catholics are not yet all of the same mind. Though we cannot dwell upon the matter, we will try to point out the salient features of our state at the moment.

Reaction tends to an extreme, and consequently we may expect to find disciples of S. Thomas who are more Thomistic than S. Thomas himself. His doctrine we have implied above is in close agreement with that of Albert the Great and S. Bonaventure, and even, we are assured, with the subtly-worded dissertations of Scotus. But the Angelic has given rise to two schools of commentators, the Dominican and the Jesuit, which, agreeing in the main—that is, in many of the leading theories of Ontology, Cosmology, and the Mental Science—have found great pleasure in disputing over the rest. The latter writers are eclectic in disposition, and borrow from all without fear of S. Thomas, nay, in very recent times, they have been his critics as well as his admirers. A Thomist, on the other hand, finds in his master all, or nearly all, that he can desire to know, and is nowise tempted to follow after strange gods. At the present moment, since we are running with the tide, a great many authors, including some of the Society, are much taken with the strict interpretation (we are not saying it is always the correct one) of the Angelic, and there are likely to be yet more conversions to that view. This becomes of great importance when the

question is mooted, not what does S. Thomas mean? but how much of the modern writings can be incorporated with the Catholic philosophy of the future? It is true that, since the time of Luther, systematic thought has been, as in its origin, so in its growth, alien or hostile to the faith; but we cannot cast away the many remarks which have fallen from non-Catholic thinkers: we must utilize them, and it would be a strange thing to suppose that we have no materials for an advance upon S. Thomas. Herein, we are afraid, there will be some difference of opinion. The downright advocate of mediæval philosophy will be loth to talk of modern progress, and will urge with some reason that a combination of opposites is usually attended with an explosion in which they both disappear. Others again have been impressed with the force and clearness of passages in recent authors, and may even be disposed to make the scholastics subsidiary, and to pursue their own researches, not as under the eye of a master, but free and untrammelled. We feel the danger of risking an opinion which attempts to satisfy all, or almost all, these demands, and yet to be simple or intelligible. But the venture is perhaps necessary.

True enough then, that the concordant teaching and the common method of the Scholastics must be preserved in the future; true also that whatever does not agree with the ultimate principles of their philosophy is to be judged a mistake, and that the spirit of modern investigation must be eliminated from our own pursuit after knowledge; true finally, that if there are questions yet unanswered, the materials for many an answer may be come upon in the writings we already possess; but, when so much has been conceded, we have still to take into account the treasures which 300 years of great energy and multifarious experience have collected for us. Our world has opened out on every side, and the new prospects have given us new and momentous data, which could be neglected only at the risk of preparing for ourselves discomfiture and reproach hereafter. Let then philosophy extend its researches, penetrate yet more deeply into the foundations of thought, reset problems and unfix machinery now grown stiff and useless, and bring in the sciences of chemistry, physics, and their like, to correct the erroneous deductions of the ancient schools. Questions which were once of no importance are now in the world's conversation, preliminary disputes have to be settled in matters which the School either omitted, or only dealt with incidentally. And there are additions of extreme gravity which are necessary to the perfection of such fundamental treatises as the discussion of concrete reasoning, the criterion of truth, and the ultimate elements of matter.

Whilst then, we cannot hope for a reconciliation between the old and the new philosophy, in their spirit, method, or chief results, it is our earnest anticipation that the new may be employed, both frequently and abundantly, in the completion and arrangement of the old. But the scholastic system must be the basis upon which to build, and its primary declarations on the origin of ideas, and the nature of intellect, must be the standard to which other philosophies conform.

An enterprise, therefore, such as Rosmini took in hand, is worthy of the most favourable consideration. It cannot be wrong, it must be seasonable, to attempt the adaptation and enlargement of S. Thomas, which that pious and gifted philosopher had so much at heart. Out of nature's infinite book of secrecy, the Angelic has deciphered the elements, and has put together the pages that explain the rest, but he has left the volume unfinished, and some one is yet needed to unite the fragmentary work of the moderns with his earlier productions. What then could be the harm ? what rather would not be the good? of studying all that has been offered, and vindicating to newly discovered truth its place in the first of sciences ? All we ask is that S. Thomas be admitted as the text, for the most part certain and established, and that even original genius pay him the homage of using his language, where possible, to express its own thoughts. One text and one common speech would go far to remove confusion and to strengthen the bands of peace. Beyond these things we can demand nothing : we say, with S. Vincent of Lerins : "Crescat igitur, multumque, vehementerque proficiat intelligentia omnium." The Church does not bid her children be intolerant and suspicious of the march of intellect, and if another mighty spirit arise to write the Summa Philosophica of the nineteenth century, he will be hailed on every side almost as a messenger from heaven. The enterprise, indeed, is one of great pith and moment. It calls for a union of critical, speculative, and experimental talent, which is hardly, without miracle, to be attained. And if even a man be found with such gifts, he may have begun at the wrong point, or may be unable to reconcile his own discoveries with the teachings of his predecessors.

We must now proceed with our exposition of S. Thomas's doctrine; and we would beg our readers to give us as much attention as they would vouchsafe to any novel theory, suppose, in experimental science.

The method which S. Thomas employed in searching out the origin of ideas—if we may designate the whole investigation from its nobler part—is worthy of special remark. We

may make this enterprise the very first in philosophy, and then we must assume as little as possible, or we may undertake it later on, when we have gone through the discussion with the sceptics. As we have already hinted, there was little or no anxiety about scepticism during the Middle Ages, and the regular treatise "On the Value of Knowledge" did not exist. It was assumed that the avouchment of our faculties has an objective value, and in that assumption was included a large amount of evidence on every possible topic. Such evidence was freely employed in the question of the genesis of knowledge, and it gave ample scope for the spiritual, almost angelic, inquiries and contemplations in which the Scholastics abound. They did not begin to seek for the upgrowth of the intellectual world till they had come to be familiar and at home in that exalted sphere. It seems to us that this is the wisest course, and that any other would be not only difficult but unsatisfactory. Let us suppose, then, that we are in contact with an objective world, that it acts upon us, that we may rely upon the testimony of our powers of sense and reason. It need not matter to us whether, with S. Thomas, we simply use what we have, or, with the moderns, prove that we have what we seem to have. For the present, let scepticism be mute.

Furthermore, knowledge is only possible when we have a subject and an object,—the thing that knows and the thing that is knowable. Hence we may begin from either term, and argue out the nature and capacities of its correlative. What things can be known? This is the discussion about truth which has a place in Ontology. What are the things that know? This is treated wherever the nature dealt with is raised above inorganic substances. Again, we may start a general question. What is knowledge, and under what conditions does it exist, or what grade of perfection does it denote? But this we fear would be too abstract, unless something is set down by way of preface. S. Thomas, like all scholastics, would first ascertain, from the science of Being, what the ontological note of "Truth" contains. It will be easier for us if we begin with what is nearest to us,—our own experience and the immediate conclusions therefrom.

Facts, then, have brought it home to us that we have a power, in general, of knowing, that is, to start with, of reproducing within ourselves the outer world, and of being conscious of our own feelings and actions. We experience the changes in our situation and circumstances, we feel, we assert, we think. We are susceptible of an inward mould or impression, which plants, for instance, and the elements betray no signs of, and there is, somewhere within the sphere which we call "Ego," a resem-

blance, though faint and irregular, of the things around us, and of our former self. All this is of immediate experience, and not to be called in question. But the phenomenon which we call knowing has not always the same character, nor does it always disclose the same properties in things, whether in ourselves or in the world at large. To bring out our meaning, take the following sentences as correctly exhibiting portions of our knowledge—the grass is green, the ball is heavy, I am sleepy, this will be hurtful to me, yonder man is my friend, I am thinking, truth is good, I will to love God.* Each of these assertions implies knowledge, but the objects to which they refer, and the sort of knowledge, may differ in their nature considerably; nay, it does not take long to see that, if we call these various acquisitions and operations by one name, we are sinking their differences in doing so. Now kinds of knowledge which differ specifically, that is, which do not take the same definition, can be gained only by faculties which differ in like manner: in other words, if we have many and various knowledges, we must have many and various faculties of knowing; for the power of knowing must correspond, in some way, to the thing that is known and to the way in which we take hold of that thing. Technically, faculties are as their operations and formal objects. As, then, some objects are, for instance, material, and some others immaterial, in the sentences above quoted, the operations by which they are apprehended cannot be the same. Reasoning such as this might be rightly employed, even if there were no other grounds of proof that knowledges may differ essentially; but there are, and it is worth while to state them.

What in man is united, in other creatures, both higher and lower, is found in detached and separate portions. We usually say that the brute creation possesses knowledge, though in varying degrees of perfection. Modern research will tell us, with considerable accuracy, how far that knowledge can go, and the ancients have proved to us where it must halt. The Scholastics would contend that brutes have, or may have, both outer and inner sense, imagination and memory, and a faculty which is now called by the general name of instinct. This denotes a very extensive range of capacity—capacity which admits of being improved and cultivated (under the hand of man), though not of being altered in kind. Brutes cannot speak, even to themselves, but they have in their interior

* These sentences include judgments of the external and internal sense, of the facultas æstimativa, of pure consciousness, of the speculative intellect, of the intellect as apprehending acts of the will.

sense the beginnings of a dreamy consciousness, and present, in other ways, a foreshadowing of the intellectual life above them. No scholastic would say what Descartes has said, that brutes are only automata skilfully contrived and kept going: if we can argue from signs to causes, then we must assert knowledge in the lower animals, a true apprehension of sensible qualities in the concrete, and even of some things which in themselves are not obvious to sense. According to S. Thomas there are two kinds of knowledge, and so much of analogy may be found in both that they merit the same general name, and the lower knowledge is a part of man's own inheritance, an element in his nature, but it takes a greater perfection and delicacy when it is lodged in a rational soul.

So far forth, there is a knowledge shared by man and brute which may serve to bring them into one large class, and to distinguish them from whatever does not know. Man will be different from other animals, first, by the whole extent of his higher nature, and next, by the perfection which his sensible faculties acquire from their union with reason. Whatever brutes can know we will refer to sensible knowledge, and we shall be able to track its course in the history of man himself.

But observing that history, we shall notice, both in the individual men and in the race, that there is another kind of knowledge to be accounted for. The human race is in possession of science, practical and speculative, of literature, art, politics, commerce, and religion. Of the useful arts, of politics, or rather of social arrangement, there are faint anticipations in some of the lower creatures. But we may say absolutely that man alone knows anything of science, commerce, literature, morality, religion; he alone discerns these higher goods.* Now just as the eyes imply the existence or possibility of light, as faculties presuppose objects, and have no *raison d'être* if these are impossible, so surely we must either confound our kinds of knowledge, or admit a hierarchy of being which may be known intelligibly. When objects under certain aspects are incommensurable, then either the different aspects cannot be known, or must be known by different faculties. We might argue hence, if our alleged experience be true, to the existence of a world above sense, a κόσμος νοητός, but this is not our purpose at the moment. Allow that intellect and sense are different, in what do they differ?

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* Compare the majestic chorus in Antigone (330, *seq.*):—

Πολλὰ τὰ δεινά, κ' οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει.

S. Thomas answers that they differ in themselves and in their objects. Sense is an organic faculty, intellect is inorganic; the object of sense is the material, the object of intellect, as such, the immaterial. We will take each separately.

The organs of sense are so intimately united that the whole body of man is called an organism. It is a combination of material texture, of which the parts, like those of a machine, work into each other, and produce a fore-ordained result. Hence these parts, or organs, are defined according to their end and function: they are not for themselves but for each other and the whole, they involve a definite purpose, and when that becomes unattainable they are doomed to be unframed and broken up. As they are portions of matter, they are subject to its laws, and have by themselves no action which may not be explained by physics and chemistry.* But in life they subserve a higher purpose, not chemical nor mechanical, and are informed by a principle sui generis. The dead eye cannot see: the living eye sees, and therefore knows. The living ear is susceptible to music, not simply to the stirring of the air, but to the indefinable impression which accompanies musical vibration. The informing principle is not the organ, nor to be confounded with it, but we attribute feeling, which is a kind of knowledge, to the organ informed; for, certainly, common people would be considerably astonished if told that they do not see with their eyes. Perception, moreover, only takes place through the organ, and is an act of sense. There must be, therefore, some strict combination of one element with the other, of the organ and the vital principle, a community of being and operation which we try to express by saying that the soul informs, elevates, takes to itself the material organ. Knowledge gained by the sensible soul will be gained in, by, and through the complex instrument of which it makes use, an instrument not separated from it, nor external to the whole being, but sharing in the same substantial unity. That knowledge will show to a keen eye the twofold cause in which it had its origin: to some it will involve a contradiction which they are bound to dissolve by taking asunder its component parts, either attributing perception to the intellect, (although intellect does not exist in brutes, whilst perception does) or crediting matter with the power of formal knowledge. The Scholastics would not allow that matter, in and by itself, can know, and they would not

* We omit here the question whether chemistry can account for organic tissue.

deny perception to the brutes. All knowledge, even that which depends on an organism and gets wrapped up in material folds, is immaterial, not capable of being weighed or measured, or moved, nor yet of resulting from the concourse of atoms. Hence it was held by the Scholastics that between the spiritual order of being and the material we must interpose an immaterial order, so that the real principles of things are three in nature,—spiritual, immaterial, material. The difference then between sense and intellect is not the whole width of material and immaterial, for sense is knowledge, and the merely material cannot transcend its own sphere, and reach to knowledge. But we must assign the ground of distinction which S. Thomas points out. Whatever perfection the brutes have, whether sense or desire, is so immersed in the extended living instruments which it uses, that there are always the two elements present, the material and immaterial, and their mutual action is necessary for the result. The functions of the body, by which it is an aid to sensitive knowledge, include a thorough, minute, and pervading influence of the physical system on the higher powers; and the scholastic theory, that sense is an organic faculty, may be looked upon as reiterated and confirmed by the observant physiology of the day. We may therefore pass on to the delicate and subtle inquiry about the nature of the intellect.

On the threshold we feel a difficulty which is not indeed of our making but is the growth of these unspiritual latter days. The intellect is not often called on to exercise its highest offices, and in consequence they have been forgotten, and some half-sensitive faculty has usurped the noblest name of all. What do we mean by intellect? Negatively, we might say it is the faculty of knowledge which is wanting in brutes. A not inapt description would be that it is the Kantian Pure Reason. But we will keep to S. Thomas, who indicates that it is, in the first place, the faculty of acquiring science. It may be a good deal more than this, but here we have a sure foundation for what is to follow. And what is science? Briefly the knowledge of abstract or universal principles, of the conclusions derived from them, and of concrete singular things as viewed in the light of those principles. Science is engaged with definitions, and these represent the formal causes of things,—the essences, natures, intrinsic and unchangeable notes, from a knowledge of which we exhibit the properties, attributes, and operations of whatever we scrutinize. Thus there may be a science of matter, a science of the soul, a science of thought, reasoning, being,—there may even be a

science of language and society. And in all these, the object to be discussed must be capable of reference to the necessary, the universal, the immutable. The objects of science cannot but be, to use a beautiful expression "rationes rerum stabiles," and these are contemplated in their secret and innermost essence. Science, in a word, penetrates the surface and reaches to the heart of things, pierces the veil of accidents and grasps the Noumenon, the thing in itself. Now man has the possibility of gaining, not perfectly but in a measure, this supreme and satisfying knowledge. He has even realized the possibility, and the whole human race is doing something to realize it still more. The faculty by which we come to know scientifically is called the intellect.

It follows that from the consideration of what it does, we may come to learn what it is. Call it that which sees spiritually; then, it may be heightened or lowered in range and intensity, but it will always see in this way, spiritually, and in no other, it will remain the same thing and have the same attributes. The reader will pardon us for insisting on the stability of orders and genera so repeatedly: Darwinism has made the universe "a sea of wax," one uniform material, capable of putting on, and therefore of putting off, a thousand shapes which glide easily into each other. We, on the other hand, perceive the finest shading off of perfection from perfection, but we recognize in the delicacy of the graduation that essences are always themselves and incapable of alteration. Hence, whatever conditions may fetter the working of the intellect, it will always exercise its own specific function and rest in its own object. Now the intellect, we said, is the faculty of scientific knowledge, therefore of special knowledge, therefore not of sensible knowledge, therefore finally it is not a sensible faculty. But the account we gave of sense is that it operates in and through the organs of the body; then a non-sensible faculty will not operate through such organs, will be inorganic and wholly immaterial. Another argument, and to our thinking the main one, is often put by the Scholastics as follows. We have a power of reaching to the conceptions of virtue, justice, unity, reasoning, and suchlike. But these are universal, necessary, and spiritual, have no proportion to anything material, and cannot therefore be apprehended by a faculty which works through extended media. Therefore, as science of this kind cannot be in the sense or imagination, we must dismiss the world of sense, and admit that we have another and a higher light within us; in a word, the intellect is not an organic faculty.

The Scholastics, then, have full warrant for their principle

that knowledge is twofold,—sensitive and scientific. The facts are certain, and the sound judgment of mankind is unanimous about them. And this recognition brings with it a confession of two worlds, not severed from each other, but distinct,—the world of matter and the world of mind. The proper object of sense is the former, namely, the material. Intellect, however, though conversant in the first instance with immaterial views and aspects, and needing, in some way, to have its object raised to its own level, is capable of bringing all things under the general concept of being, whence it is said "objectum intellectus est ens." This is called in the schools "objectum adæquatum materiale." We may say in more modern phrase that whatever is, is knowable, and may be represented sooner or later, directly or reflexly, in pure thought. But S. Thomas did not assert that the chief and primary object of the mind is, in this life, everything that exists. The formal object of the intellect is, as we shall see, the essence or nature of sensible things.*

It has now been shown, we trust, that human nature is endowed with differing capacities of knowledge. Man has the faculty of sense, because he is akin to the lower creation, in which sense alone gives the light of action and desire: he has intelligence, because he is like the spiritual creatures who more closely resemble the intellectual energy of the All-knowing and All-loving. Not only does he stand in the conflux of two eternities, he has been set in the confines of a double universe, and is the link between what is purely spiritual and what is sunk to the level of the inanimate and material. If his operations are manifold, complex, and involved in each other's movements, it is because he partakes of the many orders wherewith God has made the world a fair and cunning harmony, this answering to that, the lower looking towards the higher, the veil already transparent in the light it was meant to conceal. Here moreover, we see a reason for asserting a dependence of the understanding upon sense. Man exists in the substantial unity of various elements, he lives a triple life of growth, sense, and intellect, and yet he is not a mere aggregation of forces, he is one, rounded, as it were, into a single undivided essence. And although he has a soul which can endure of itself, and does not need the body in order to exist, yet, whilst he is on earth he will be able to do nothing spiritual

* We are happy to find a thesis of F. Palmieri which summarizes these remarks:—"Docemus objectum formale intellectus esse per se essentiam rerum, objectum materiale esse omne ens; in statu autem unionis cum corpore (objectum formale) esse primo essentiam rerum materialium." (Instit. Phil., vol. ii. p. 462.)

which will not leave its mark on the flesh, nor will he learn how to think unless imagination and sense afford him the material. This is what has been asserted by ancient and modern philosophy. The Scholastics said "the intellect does not understand that of which there is no image in the imagination,"* and Leibnitz has allowed that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense. This is not the transformation theory of Condillac. It means only that man is a composite being, that his faculties are developed and exert themselves in a fixed order, that the lower subserve the higher, but that no one is interchangeable with any other. In a creature like man, the less perfect precedes the more perfect, and as his physical nature comes to its best by degrees, so must sense be before reason, and the first workings of reason be unfinished and rudimentary. The soul has to win its perfection; and since it has been established in the lowest place, it will need, as S. Thomas says, many and involved operations before it can display its free activity and expatiate in the higher regions of thought.

When the life of growth has brought the organs of sense to their due perfection, the senses begin to wake up and to take hold of the objects round about. They do not at once apprehend distinctly, the elements are not numbered, and the whole makes an impression long before the parts are discernible. When the objects come to their proper focus, then, at last, things are seen both fully and clearly, and sense in the quiet of satisfaction rests in what it has obtained. But senses are many, outer and inner; they all are moved, as scope is given them, from their original sleep into a life of action, and they perform their several functions, the lower contributing, the higher bringing to perfection. What is seen by the eyes leaves its impress on the imagination, the inner sense knows the object, and knows also the sensation which it has produced; and one apprehension after another fills up the first outline of the reality which remains there unchanged. When the senses have done their office, the instinctive appetites, hitherto

* The word image, "phantasma," must be taken in a wide sense. It signifies that symbolic representation which the imagination produces whilst the intellect is at work in its own way. It may be no more than the attenuated reminiscence of a word, and is not needed to show the nature of what we think, but partly that the intellect may begin to act, and partly that it may persevere in its action. F. Palmieri says (p. 482): "Nam quotiescunque vel immaterialia cogitamus, componimus semper aliqua phantasmata quibus objectum cogitabile adumbretur, et si phantasmata ex rebus sensibilibus desint, vel minus sint opportuna, adhibemus vocabula, vel analoga signa, quibus mentis cogitatio defixa teneatur."

dormant, are roused into desire, they stretch out to get to their end, and the circle of knowledge, completed thus by an outward-tending curve, returns to the object from which it began. The faculty of knowledge has been brought into play, and has gained some of the perfection for which it was made, since faculties are for the sake of acts, and acts are ordained to the perfecting of nature. In the brutes there would still be possible the exercise of memory, and some faint apprehensions of future utility, but all further action would be a repetition of what had gone before.

In man, however, the imaginative apprehension is followed by an act of the intellect. The whole question on the origin of ideas must be decided by our analysis of that first act. What has the sense achieved? It has come to know the colour, taste, size, weight, and so forth, of the sensible object; it has accurately measured and taken a valuation of the outside. But this same object is being, cause, substance, has various invisible and intangible relations to other substances, is capable of being defined and classified, and of having a science made upon it; and as all that can be predicated of it is resolvable into modes of being, it does not matter what object we take to start with, for undoubtedly in every affirmation that we make, being is implicitly affirmed, just as every science, in some way or other, rests upon, and may be referred back to, the science of being. Thus then we have the elements of our problem before us: a material object which has acted on the senses and imagination, and the human intellect, not as yet acting, but ready to act; and it is admitted that the origin of the idea of being will decide for us the origin of all other ideas.

S. Thomas asserts that the first act of the mind is abstractive and analytic, is due to what he calls the Intellectus Agens, and results in the apprehension of a direct universal, which is Being without an adjunct or qualification. The mind abstracts by a natural and instinctive movement, and by this very act of abstraction, or ideal separation, apprehends, not this or that determined aspect or mode of being, but Being in communi, although it requires an act of reflection to notice that the ratio apprehended is common. An object at once sensible and super-sensible has been brought, by the lower life, into contact with the soul, and this is how the innermost nature of that object, lying beyond and outside of sense, has begun to be grasped and intelligibly represented in our higher knowledge. The mind first abstracts, then and thereby apprehends, afterwards judges. Apprehension is less perfect than judgment, and precedes it. The intellect, in so far as by its inherent energy it pierces through

the material conditions, may be called the faculty of abstraction: so far as it apprehends, and in this manner reproduces the object ideally, it is known as the formal intellect, Intellectus Possibilis. In man nothing is innate but his nature, and the faculties which it includes. Faculties may be quiescent, and the mind is at first simply in potentia. We do not inherit, but acquire knowledge; and as the sense so the intellect is a blank surface, a tabula rasa, till the first apprehensions have written upon it. Let there be only capacity, spiritual and immaterial, on the one hand, and opportunity on the other, and man, from his actual ignorance,—ignorance of general and particular, of finite and infinite, of concrete and abstract,—may rise by natural and spontaneous development to the highest height of human science.

We have now to explain these statements, and to prove that they represent the theory of S. Thomas. To begin with; it is an axiom in the schools that, "the knowing is to itself the measure of the knowable:" "Cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis;" hence, if we are to ascertain the process of knowledge in any intellect, we must ask ourselves where, in the scale of being, that intellect has been set. For, the same object, as we know, can be apprehended by Almighty God, by the angels, by man, and by the brute creation, without changing its nature or essence; but the knowledge which God has of anything is infinitely perfect, and in creatures there is a descending order of knowledge which corresponds to the nature of the various subjects that know. The Scholastics considered that man is the lowest of intellectual substances, and that his mode of knowledge is lowest, is indeed nothing else than abstract views of the world around him, and of himself, from which he gains a shadowy and far-off notion of God and spiritual things. What did they mean by abstraction? S. Thomas will teach us something about it in the following passages:—

Cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, sc, ipsa natura rei, et abstractio, seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura, cui accidit vel intelligi, vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus: sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi, vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis est in intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi, sine ejus odore. Si ergo quæratur ubi sit color, qui videtur sine odore, manifestum est quod color, qui videtur, non est nisi in pomo. Sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, in quantum in visu est similitudo coloris, et non odoris. Similiter, humanitas quæ intelligitur non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur

ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturæ speciei, et non individualium principiorum (Summa, I. q. 85, ar. 2).

We must beg our readers' indulgence if we add another quotation to complete this part of our exposition.

Ista autem abstractio non est intelligenda secundum rem, sed secundum rationem. Sicut enim videmus in potentiis sensitivis, quod licet aliqua sint conjuncta secundum rem, tamen illorum sic conjunctorum visus, vel alius sensus, potest unum apprehendere, altero non apprehenso. . . . sic multo fortius potest esse in potentia intellectiva. Quia licet principia speciei vel generis nunquam sint nisi in individuis: tamen potest apprehendi unum, non apprehenso altero . . . . et sic semper intellectus formas abstractas, id est superiora, sine inferioribus intelligit (Opusc. 63; De Potentiis Animæ, c. vi).

We learn from these clear statements that real natures or essences only exist in the singular and individual; that they are understood, ideally reproduced, in so far as they are abstracted; that abstraction makes them universal (and from other passages, we know the universal is the proper and formal object of the human intellect); that this abstraction is an ideal separation, which leaves the real nature intact; that it is due to the special imperfection of the intellect, just as another sort of abstraction is due to the imperfection of the several senses. In another place, we are told that the same object is singular as perceived by the senses, but becomes universal on being understood:—

Efficitur postea universalis per actionem intellectus depurantis ipsam a conditionibus quæ sunt hic et nunc (Opusc. 55; De Universalibus, tract 1).

Thus then the abstract is the universal. The universal, however, is of two kinds, direct and reflex. The direct universal, S. Thomas again informs us, is the nature apprehended in the first instance, upon which the mind has not yet reflected, nor compared it with other natures which are like it. The reflex universal is gained when we perceive that our first abstraction corresponds with various others taken from different objects: it is formed by comparison of the like intellectual outlines or sketches, and is then applied to all the things which agree in the pattern. Of course, the direct is before the reflex, and the initial act of abstraction does but cut away the conditions of time and space (hic et nunc) and, in a word, all singular notes; these are afterwards recovered by the conversion of the intellect upon the sense. The direct universal expresses the simple essence, which in itself is neither one nor many, because indifferent and unchanged, whether realized in a single object or in a thousand; it is an absolute not a relative concept, and is the real presentation which a thing makes of itself to the

mind contemplating it. In fact, it is expressly laid down by the Saint that the intellect has for its object the essences of things: "objectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia," and these are real. It is connatural to us, he says, to know the natures which sense cannot apprehend: we know them by the intellect, which, considering then, abstracts from the individual and material. Thus, then, it is clear that the first act of the mind, without which there could be no universal, and consequently no science, is the act which prescinds from the mere contingent individual, (who is known by sensible marks,) and which renders it possible to gaze at the essence, which is not contingent, but in a true sense necessary and absolute.*

Moreover, the faculty which abstracts is the Intellectus Agens:—

> Oportet ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quæ faciat intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et hæc est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem (P. I., q. 79, ar. 3).

But the intellectus agens does not understand; it is the intellectus possibilis, which by expressing in itself an ideal image of the essence (the celebrated Verbum mentis) elicits the formal act of understanding. Hence the active is the efficient cause, the potential is the formal cause by which we are said to know:—

> Intellectus agens non facit species intelligibiles actu, ut ipse per eas intelligat . . . . sed ut per eas intelligat intellectus possibilis (Contra Gent., lib. ii. c. 76).

As, then, there is no understanding before the act of abstraction has taken place, and as the intellectus agens does not understand, we must admit that the first act of the mind is not knowledge, but is only the preparation for it. Hence that act should be called natural, and instinctive, nor can it depend on any motion of the will.

Next, it is asserted by S. Thomas that the idea of being is the first we obtain, and that it comes to us by abstraction:—

> Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens (Qq. Disp. de Veritate, q. 1, ar. 1).

And

> Illa quæ sunt in genere *prima eorum quæ* intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus, sunt prima cognita a nobis, ut ens.†

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* S. Thomas says distinctly that there are three acts of the mind,—simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning; that they develop themselves in this order, and that it is impossible to make a judgment unless the simple apprehension of an essence in itself, or absolutely, has gone before (see lib. i. Periher.). Now, as he has already told us that apprehension of an essence implies abstraction, it is clear as day that the first act of the mind is not a judgment, and therefore not synthetic.

† Cf. these assertions: "Prius in conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia

Passages to the same effect may be drawn from his other works. This idea of being, since it is the simplest and widest of all, cannot be confounded with the notion of possible being; for it prescinds alike from possible and real, and exhibits the most indeterminate of all aspects. In the first apprehension the mind does not advert to the reality of what it is beholding, and the assertion of objective existence (what I behold, exists) is due to the subsequent act of reflection. In like manner, the intellect does not distinguish between possible and real, for being, as such, contains only one note, and is incapable of further analysis, whilst possible being contains two, and implies negation. Possible being is resolved into, negation of present being, aptitude for future or past being. But the primary concept must be simple and equal only to itself. It is therefore, as we said, a universal without addition or qualification.

Furthermore, there are, according to the Angelic Doctor, no innate ideas in the human mind:—

> Cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se habeat aliquid ad formam . . . . quo se habet ad actionem illam. Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum tam secundum sensum, quam secundum intellectum, et de tali potentia in actum reducitur, ut sentiat quidem per actiones sensibilium in sensum, ut intelligat autem per disciplinam, aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quæ sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quæ sunt principia intelligendi (P. I. q. 84, ar. 3).

It is well known that the words "similitudo," "species impressa," and "species intelligibilis" answer to what, in modern language, is called an idea. Hence we are prepared for the direct and categorical statement of S. Thomas, a statement which cannot be too often called to mind:—

> Intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter sibi inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad hujusmodi species omnes.

This is said in the famous article which inquires "utrum anima omnia intelligat per species sibi naturaliter inditas?" The Saint of course answers negatively, and, in doing so, tells us that the form is the principle of action, that as a faculty is related to the action, so it is related to the form; that as we do not always understand, as there is a time when we understand nothing, so it appears that our understanding is sometimes without any form, or principle of action. This would

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secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, in quantum est actu" (P. I., q. 5, ar. 2); and "Quædam vero sunt quæ possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia, et actus, et alia hujusmodi" (P. I., q. 85, ar. 1).

be impossible were even a single idea innate or connatural to us. In writing also against Avicenna, he declares that were the soul able (secundum suam naturam apta) to receive any ideas not by the aid of the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand, and the union of body and soul would serve no purpose. If then, he concludes, our intellect depends on the first cause, it can only gain science by means of sensible and material essences (Q. 84, ar. 4).

In addition to this, we are informed again and again by S. Thomas that this is the difference between the human intellect and the angelic:—

> Inferiores substantiæ intellectivæ scilicet animæ humanæ habent potentiam activam non completam naturaliter: sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantiis spiritualibus superioribus, id est, in angelis, naturaliter completa est per species intelligibiles connaturales. Et hoc etiam ex ipso modo essendi hujusmodi substantiarum apparet (P. I. q. 55, ar. 2).

He is speaking of natures, therefore, and not of operations, and he says that the higher intellects have, in actu primo, similitudes or ideas not received from creatures, but that man has an intellect which, in actu primo, is not complete, which needs to gain the form by which it acts from sensible things. As Albertus Magnus remarks somewhere, Aristotle's tabula rasa is so called because it contains no writing on it, "nec perfectam nec inchoatam scripturam;" and this is precisely the opinion of S. Thomas.

Documents put in as evidence are dry reading, and, if the jury is to be won over, should be used sparingly. We can assure our readers that the quotations just made represent only a portion of what we might bring forward, for the volumes of S. Thomas are full of decisive passages on the matter in dispute. But it is usual for an advocate to sum up his evidence, and to place it in the most favourable light which orderly and distinct narration can afford him. We have dealt with our subject analytically, and in detail. May we attempt to draw out a brief view, or speculation, and so to impress our readers with a sense of the consistency of S. Thomas? Our view of his doctrine would be such as the following.

The whole universe, spiritual and material, is built up in the likeness of God, and as He is Being in its fulness, infinitely one, infinitely true, infinitely good, it follows that whatsoever is, or is possible, has sealed upon it this triple resemblance to God. And He has so established the scheme of things, that there is a gradation from lowest to highest, and in what is beneath a prophetic shadow of what is above. The divine

perfections, supremely one in their source and essence, are reflected and imitated brokenly in created substances, accidents, and elements. The very lowest of all represent something that is in God, and are beautiful because He is beautiful. And since He is pure Spirit, an infinitely perfect Act of intelligence and love, all that has been created by Him must either be spiritual in itself or capable, at least, of reproduction in an intelligent mind. But whilst mind, even if limited and contingent, is in itself a light, matter is in itself dark, holding, somewhere within, the possibility of colour, apt therefore to be illuminated, but needing that a light from above should fall upon it.

Now of intelligent substances God has created two distinct orders: there are substances which neither inform a body nor are destined to inform one, and there are others which, from their very nature, have an aptitude and disposition to be found as the vital principle of a material organism. For these latter God has prepared a world, sensible and material, which they are to use as an instrument or means of reaching to their own perfection. They are not at once in the state which is to be their ultimate resting-place; they are to begin from the very beginning, to pass through all the stages which lie between, and to come at last to a full and unimpeded exercise of their highest faculties. What are the gifts with which God furnishes them at the outset? The germ of the material organism, and a soul which has the capacity of knowing, first the outer and afterwards the inner truth of things. God does not set them working: understanding and sense are quiescent and abide their time. When it arrives, the faculty which can do least and gain least begins to prepare its object for the light of intellect which is to elicit the latent colours and exhibit the abiding relation of attribute with attribute, property with substance, effect with cause. It does not matter where the investigation begins: all things are united both by mutual influence and interaction, and by the likeness which they bear to each other.

But now observe a difference: our intellect is so feeble and restricted that it can attain only indistinct and general views, it must travel backwards and forwards, must consider its object repeatedly, and instead of reaching to the living unity which impresses it, is engaged with the sectional and dissevered parts. A higher intellect would be capable of realizing to itself a solid image of the object, would gather up all the manifold predicates into one, and, naming that, would exhaust the whole nature contemplated; the ideal synthesis would be perfect, singular, and exactly resembling

the reality in its essential oneness and simplicity of being. But the process of our thought is neither so swift nor so fortunate. We first divide the object, which exceeds the measure of our mind, into those views or facets by which it is turned to other things and is like them: we apprehend one such view in itself, then another, then a third, and as we persevere in our gaze the views draw together and begin to show us that they are identified in the same object. This is how analysis goes before synthesis, and the universal before the particular. That we can gain universal ideas is a sign of intellect within us: that they are the necessary and only means of scientific knowledge proves us to be lowest in the scale of mind. Our analysis may be, and very often is, accurate; when we analyze all objects into aspects of being, truth, and goodness, we are not deceived, but have fashioned an outline of the world which no sceptic will ever destroy. But synthesis is difficult, and seldom or never perfect; the views do not harmonize, and the mind, trying to reconcile the predicates it has gained in the ideal separation, finds that they seem contradictory, that their union or realization in one object is a mystery. They are at best abstract, what they so variously represent is concrete, and the principle which would solve contradictions in a higher synthesis has not yet been discovered. Hence it is to be said that the ideal representation is inadequate, and, if asserted without limitation, may be false. Apprehension with us is always one-sided and partial, nature in its infinite variety is never universal, and is therefore whole and a unit, but a unit which is equivalent to many series of fractional quantities, and all but exhausts the power of this highest and spiritual algebra.

And, if we inquire further, how comes it that the same reality gives rise to such different conceptions: we are told that the perfection of knowledge is relative to the perfection of the subject, not of the object. Knowledge is a vital action, elicited by a faculty in a certain order of being, and there is a scholastic canon that "operatio sequitur esse," the nature of a thing is the law of its working. Our intellect, as such, is capable of aprehending all that exists, the object of the mind is simply being; but it must apprehend by abstraction, and its subsequent judgments and reasonings are dependent on that first vast and indefinite view which sets before it the one note attaching to all things. Given, therefore, the faculty of abstraction, we need no more than an object brought into near contact with it. The idea of being straightway is expressed in the intellect, and by its means all others are gradually produced; it is the extrinsic form of knowledge

gained by the mind, not inhering in it essentially nor constituting its nature. The intellectual substance is real, its constituent principles are real, are not anything ideal; it does not possess, either consciously or unconsciously, the idea of being till this has been suggested from without; it must first exist before it can know, and if the idea were necessary to its existence, there never would be a potential intellect, nor a change from quiescence to energy. It would possess already that largest of views in which all things are alike, and would, by its very essence, be always looking out on the universe, and apprehending, even if it did not judge. It would not need to be affected by any external object, and the idealism which reckons a material world superfluous might be admitted without detriment.

But it has been ordered otherwise: we are meant to reach our ideas by apprehending immaterial forms in the matter to which they communicate the likeness of God; we make use of sense to bring the object near us, and we then read, though in a dim and sometimes flickering light, the intelligible characters which God has impressed on His creation. Hence, all our knowledge is the offspring of a union between subject and object, not merely because we cannot know unless there be an object—for the real subject may become an ideal term to its own operation—but because the material was meant to exert a real influence, according to its nature, on the immaterial in which it is reflected; and as resemblance accompanies and results from generation, we may expect to find in the idea some characteristics both of subject and object. As the immanent term and product of a vital action* it is spiritual, in nowise corporeal, not tangible, nor visible even to the pure eye of imagination, and possesses something of the everlasting stability of the soul in which it inhabits. As a representative symbol of a distinct and individual object, it enables us to see what is really contained in its prototype, and though it does not reveal to us all at once the properties of that material essence, it discloses the hidden depth from which they issue. Thus are we enabled to detect in things their truth, that is, their conformity to the divine pattern upon which they were made, and to express, in spiritual modes, the conditions and attributes of matter.

But our final explanation of anything whatever, the least as the greatest, betrays the initial vagueness and the limited

* We cannot spare the time to develop that most beautiful and illuminative doctrine which is concerned with the vitality of knowledge. But how much of the theology of the Blessed Trinity depends upon it!

penetration of our view. We must define, not simply in words, but in the mind itself, by means of genera and differences. We have only the vague concepts of force, relation, effect, substance, essence, being, and the like, by which to denote the things which to eye and ear are bold and unmistakable. There is a true solid meaning in each of these words. We cannot convey it to another, perhaps, but we can make sure when he has it; still, we are looking through a darkened glass; for whilst sense is an aid to thought it is also a hindrance. We must needs abstract from sense, and the abstract is at once the indefinite. Compatible with all qualities, abstract being requires the reality of none, it is not something in rerum natura, but a mode by which we conceive of things; it neither possesses nor rejects attributes, it simply *prescinds* from them. It is not infinite, or eternal, in a positive, but merely in a negative sense. It is the condition of all knowledge, but by itself tells us least. It is not used absolutely in one sense, but hides within its compass divisions which only analogy can unite. As the indefinite may stand for the infinite, abstract being may become the symbol of God; but He is the fulness of reality, and this is no reality at all, is but as an algebraic formula, which by its very emptiness of concrete value, is capable of representing all the numbers ever conceived.

If now we are asked, "What is the light of the intellect?" What is that power which God has implanted in the soul, as a reflection of His own infinite intelligence? we may answer in one word that it is the faculty of abstraction. This is to name it in its root and source, not to exhibit the marvels which are wrought by its means. We say that the youngest child, the most untutored savage, possesses this faculty, but we do not imply that it springs into life perfect, or is at the same level in all men, or may not be trained and cultivated till it changes—and yet not changes its essence—into the highest forms of contemplative musing. It draws away the veil of sense, yet leaves the great realities in mist and cloud. It opens up a view not hitherto dreamt of, and, showing us the substance of the world, makes it possible to have a rational will, choosing good according to the eternal and essential order which the world has to God. It is a light, therefore, which cannot be mistaken for any other, and we learn from the consideration of it what is the range, and what are the limits, of human thought and invention. If we trace up first principles, the "rationes seminales scientiæ," to the ideas from the comparison of which they are evolved, if we observe that each idea may be resolved into being and

a mode of being, we come at last to that formless concept which, in its very absence of properties, betrays that it is due to abstraction. The intellect which abstracts that is not thereby and at once in possession of all knowledge; there is need of other abstractions, less vague, more determinate, by which we learn the categories of being, and the subdivisions of the categories. Here begins the science of Ontology, called Prima Philosophia, and successive applications of its universal dicta in various provinces will bring us to the wide array of sciences which we look upon to-day. But, first as last, whether we deal with the idea of being, or with the most complex assertions of a subtle mind, the initial process by which all are obtained is one and the same. Our faculty of acquisition is the faculty of abstraction. This is the meaning surely of that remarkable passage which has been, we know not how, regarded as witnessing to the theories of innate ideas, and which we now transcribe as a proper summary of our last remarks:—

> Similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiæ acquisitione, quod præxistunt in nobis quædam scientiarum semina, scilicet *primæ conceptiones intellectus*, quæ statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur *per species a sensibilibus abstractas*, sive sint complexa, ut dignitates, sive incomplexa, *sicut ratio entis, et unius, et hujusmodi*, quæ statim intellectus apprehendit. Ex istis autem principiis universalibus omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quæ prius in potentia, et quasi in universali cognoscebantur, tunc dicitur aliquis scientiam acquirere.

Here, it seems to us, are the views briefly and clearly stated, which we have insisted upon in the foregoing pages. The successive resolution of special into general sciences, the ultimate tracing of these to principles and axioms, the further analysis of axioms into concepts or ideas, the mode by which ideas are gained, the identity in this respect between the idea of being, and others of a greater or less range, and that all apprehension whatever is due to the faculty of abstraction, all these momentous declarations are contained in the words of S. Thomas. Supposing, therefore, the mind to possess these conceptions and axioms, of course it is able to acquire science, and that, to speak absolutely, without a teacher, and of course it already knows in outline, what it will afterwards learn in particular and proper shape. But S. Thomas does not say that the first concepts are innate, nor that any single one of them is; on the contrary, he lays down that they are all due to abstraction, and are produced by the action of mind upon objects represented in the sense.

Thus then, we have passed in review most of the points which would come into discussion when innate ideas are in question, and that we may once for all define S. Thomas's position in this controversy, as it appears to us, we will here insert the sketch of his doctrine with which F. Liberatore closes his first volume. Something of what we have already asserted has been drawn from that clear-headed and accomplished writer, though we have preferred to put it in our own way, and to enlarge upon it by a study of the Angelic himself. We make bold to say that no other interpretation will square with mediæval philosophy, and that commentators who arrive at a different conclusion will find S. Thomas perplexed, and, often enough, in contradiction with the common opinions of his day, and with his own previous or subsequent writings. F. Liberatore describes as follows :—

I. S. Thomas derives the origin of ideas from an intellectual light, sealed upon the soul, and so operating by an inherent power as to abstract ideal representations from sensible things. These representations inform the understanding, and so enable it to express rational concepts.

II. There is a triple analogy or likeness between sense and intellect; for (*a*) both possess knowledge, but (*b*) not always, being sometime in complete rest or quiescence, and sometime in act, and (*c*) both imply a kind of passivity, for sense is perfected by the sensible object, and intellect by the intelligible.

III. There is an essential difference between sense and intellect, the former is an organic, the latter an inorganic faculty. Hence this may be called separated (as it is by Aristotle), whilst that is wholly united to the material.

IV. Besides the external and internal sense, we possess the faculty of imagination, formerly styled phantasia, which is not the intellect, for it is found in brutes, and does not belong to the pure intelligences above us.

V. The senses present the material object to the intellect, and this through the highest and most refined faculty of the lower nature, viz., the imagination.

VI. Sense and imagination exhibit the concrete, individual object, although in that object the essence is different from the individuation. For individuals, as such, are wholly distinct one from another, but they may and do agree in specific or essential principles.

VII. The proper object of the intellect is the quiddity, essence, or being of things, the object of sense is the material and concrete individual. This is another and essential difference between the two faculties.

VIII. To abstract the universal from the particular means simply to apprehend the quiddity or essence without those individual or concrete circumstances which make no part of the definition, or do not enter into the specific nature of the reality to which they belong. Hence the prime object of the intellect is the universal, though, of course, it is true that we afterwards apprehend the particular; but this takes place by means of reflection. Direct knowledge of the singular is proper to sense and imagination.

IX. It follows that the object of the intellect, whilst we are in the body, does not comprise those forms which subsist apart, in a world above the senses, but only such forms as dwell in sensible things. These are apprehended in an ideal, that is, an abstract manner, and not physically. But as we do not affirm that they exist in the abstract, our apprehension is merely imperfect, not false.

X. Besides the faculty of intellectual apprehension, and what is included in it, we must recognize an active power which can exert itself upon the sensible object, and make it intelligible in actu, or, in other words, bring out the essence which is latent beneath the sensible qualities. This "virtus immaterialis activa" is the natural light of intellect, and is called thus after the analogy of material light.

XI. The conception of each and every idea takes place in the order of apprehension, called by S. Thomas "conceptio incomplexa." The judgment which affirms the existence of singular things is an after act, and is elicited in the order of reflection.

XII. Finally, we may explain the whole intellectual process, if we acknowledge in the higher nature of the soul a power which is able to bring out or manifest the essence of whatever the senses perceive. And this is the light of reason, the intellectual activity to which we have asserted the force of abstraction.

One further remark seems in place. It may be urged that, after all, be these statements ever so true and important, they take us but a little way on in the analysis of intellect. They go, perhaps, one step beyond experience, and there they stop, and when we inquire any further, the Scholastics have nothing to offer us. Well, for our own part, we are willing to admit the justice of the observation, and are only anxious that it should be allowed its proper value. For if it is narrowly looked into, it will be seen to confirm the whole theory on which we are engaged. Were we able to set out from an inborn pure idea, we should not need to toil painfully through the sensible operations which are now the sole means of reaching to knowledge. One pure conception would unlock to us the whole spiritual world; our cognizance of God, of the angels, of our own soul, would no longer be by analogies, likenesses, and symbols taken from the senses. Instead of our very thoughts requiring, as they do at present require, the language of metaphors and symbols, we should be enabled to use our spiritual intuitions in their native clearness. Then indeed, our philosophy would correspond to that "arcana scientia" which has been the desired object of so many vehement and unbridled searchings after knowledge. But in our lowly condition we must be thankful to arrive at such ultimate facts as an investigation, conducted with prudence and intellectual humility, can discover.

Such then as we have set forth we believe to be the doctrine of S. Thomas. In the truth of that doctrine, the present writer has a confidence which he would like to call absolute. Whatever speculations others may bring forward must, in his opinion, either agree with this elementary exposition, or if they disagree, are capable, to that extent, of being shown to be inaccurate.

Art. VI.—MARY TUDOR.

Mary Tudor. An Historical Drama. By Sir Aubrey de Vere, Baronet. London : Pickering, 1845–1875.

Queen Mary. A Drama. By Alfred Tennyson. London: Henry S. King & Co.

AMONG typical figures of illustrious women celebrated for their sorrows, the eldest daughter of King Henry the Eighth has always stood before our mind's eye as the most truly tragic. More violent calamities have fallen upon other royal women's heads than those which marked her life off into miserable epochs, and the axe of the executioner did not end her long slow anguish. But who among the number had Mary Tudor's burthen of sorrow to carry through life, and to the very threshold of death ? Not her own mother; for though the closing years of the life of Katharine of Arragon were deeply sad, she had some joy and content in her time; her whole existence was not a thwarting of her nature, and a warping of all the instincts of womanhood. Not the two queens, her monstrous father's wives, whose heads had fallen on the scaffold while Mary was yet young. Anne Boleyn and Catherine Howard had their share of the good things of this life, and enjoyed them in their way, before the sudden plunge into the abyss of ruin, shame, and death which was the end for each. In the anguish of her own lot, Mary might have been tempted to envy them, if it could be possible for a woman on whose purity no shadow had ever rested, to envy any life which had the brand of unchastity upon it. Not the Lady Jane—" Epiphany Queen," as the people called her—to whose sweet serene life the sudden, brief, wofully-expiated treason of her kinsmen was the first and last interruption ; who left a loved and honoured memory to the world,—the memory of a victim,

almost a martyr,—her one weakness laid to the account of others, her strength to her own. Mary Tudor might turn her eyes on these three—one of them a familiar, haunting ghost—and ask of them what were their griefs compared with hers? And the historical student of the present day, trying to read her story aright, by the cross lights of chronicle and legend, trying to make out the woman, to get a defined image of her against the lurid background of invective and calumny, the growth of prejudice long after her time, the accumulated fables of religious rancour and political hate, looks at the typical figures which have arisen since, and is disposed to regard her as more eminent in woe than even Mary Stuart and Marie Antoinette. They have had successive defenders, to whom, through the ages, their name and fame have been dear; but who has cared to break a lance for "Bloody Mary"? The dry and studiously passionless rectification by Dr. Maitland and Dr. Lingard of misstatements which had long gained general credence; their succinct refutation of falsehoods which have passed into the very alphabet of English history, have, though accepted by scholars, made but little impression upon the public mind, and we Catholics are accustomed to regard the "Bloody Mary" tradition as equally ineradicable and impervious to argument with those of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the "martyrdom" of Galileo, and have, indeed, hitherto been more indifferent to the former than to the latter. Thus, Mary Tudor stands, in the eyes of the present, the far-distant posterity of her time, pre-eminent in wretchedness, the greatness which no calm appreciation can deny to her, cast out of sight, in the reprobation which attends, with the mechanical regularity of a *claque*, upon the mention of her.

The exceeding piteousness of Mary's fate, its every mode of suffering taking the colossal proportions belonging to her greatness, its dark threads of destiny woven in with the golden tissue of her royalty, makes her then a tragic character. Invest the simplest gentlewoman in Mary's realm with Mary's nature, as it comes out in the testimony of those chroniclers who came nearest to her own time, or even by that of inimical historians of later periods, in all that concerned her domestic life; surround her with such family relations as Mary's; make her equally miserable as daughter, sister, and wife; give her a false lover,—even without the treason which added to the treachery of Courtenaye; wring her heart through every actuality, recollection, delusion, and illusion of her life; deprive her of the boon of beauty, of the gift of attraction; fill her soul with a dreadful longing for the love of one human being to whom she is ready to sacrifice all; deny her that

love; substituting for it coarse contempt, cruel abandonment, gross and insolent infidelity; make her sick heart for a moment glad with the blessed hope of a child who shall be her very own, and must needs love her, then dash that hope to the ground, and stamp it out with ribald ridicule. Make her old before her time, bowed with wasting and repulsive illness; with vain regrets as the companions of every hour, and terrible remorse for the arrows which fly by night; let her last days be agonized by a hope deferred, until the sickness of the heart is unto death, and her last hours be tortured by the knowledge that her only friend is dying; let the news of the bitterest defeat which Fate can now inflict,—since the bitterest of all has been inflicted,—be the last intelligence which her mortal senses receive,—and there is a tragedy in that woman's story which the poet's imagination can hardly surpass.

All these were the facts of a woman's life who was a Monarch in a despotic and bloodthirsty age, when human life was held in comparatively small reverence, when opinions were faiths, and faiths were passions; the ruler of a people who had strenuously supported her rights without any predilection for herself, who, as strenuously, though not effectually, opposed her will upon the point dearest to her, her marriage, whom she alienated more widely every day, who suffered under her ill-fated reign the two evils which a people not sunk in money-worship hold to be the worst of public ills—religious persecution and military defeat. This woman was a Tudor, with the pride and the fierceness of her race in her; and she lived and died, beaten at every point. This is the simple truth of her story, apart from analysis of her character, from palliation, or justification, or wholesale condemnation of her deeds. Mary Stuart, her cousin, had at least a past of triumph before Fotheringay, and the wretchedest queen the world has since seen had a long spell of brilliant happiness before the Temple and the Conciergerie; but Mary Tudor had no broad sunshine ever in her life, nothing but the sickly and deceptive gleams which made its darkness to be felt more palpably.

Here was raw material for the dramatic poet's handling in abundance, happily but seldom furnished by human lives at their worst. And all around lay lavish heaps of accessories;—the stirring, momentous history of the time;—the terrible strife of creeds;—the unloosing of the cruel instincts of men at a period when tolerance of any kind, either political or religious, had no existence at all either as a theory or a practical rule of conduct; the press of great figures, great whether in good, in evil, or in the mingling of both, and great names;—the jostling of great events and the moral atmosphere of intense conviction which

pervaded England, on whichever side that conviction was enlisted;—the strong sharp outlines, the vivid untoned colours in which events present themselves in mental pictures of the time. We cannot believe that these treasures of fact and of suggestion were altogether unnoticed as generation after generation produced its poets and its dramatists. A more probable interpretation of the silence of the seers and the singers, was, that the accumulation of legend about the image of Mary Tudor,—the repulsiveness of the theme outweighing its tragic force,—caused frank believers in the "Bloody Mary" bugaboo, in the woman as a mere monster, to shrink from the lurid atrocity of such a portraiture, and discerners of the true under the legendary to dread the thankless labour of making plain the result of their discriminating search. It is easier, less provocative of ridicule and blame, to level down an historical idol than to level up an historical bugbear.

Thirty years ago, when the sources of authentic information respecting those long byegone times were few and feeble in comparison with those now at the disposition of the student of history; before the great work of the Calendar of State Papers had been undertaken, before the documentary evidence of the actual period of Mary's reign, and of the public estimate of it had been made available for comparison with the judgments of the later historians; a student and a poet, whose mind had thoroughly conceived the tragic greatness of the theme, gave the world a portraiture of Mary Tudor, in a drama which was not published until after his death, and which, but little noticed at the time—1845-6—is now the subject of a strong revival of public interest. To a right appreciation of Sir Aubrey de Vere's drama, "Mary Tudor," some acquaintance with the writer will largely assist us; especially as we have to consider his work in connection with, and in contrast to the Poet Laureate's drama, "Queen Mary." If we had not always to remember that the popular Protestant notion of the Catholic mind is that it is incapable of candour in its criticism of any subject in which controversial issues are involved; that its grand object is the suppression of truth; and that it is in some mysterious way bound by the Catholic conscience which is its counsellor to explain away or even justify the crimes or the errors of great personages who were Catholics; if an invincible prejudice of this kind did not exist,—with a whimsical resemblance to the invincible ignorance which fixes its own interpretation of papal infallibility upon us, and insists on our accepting it,—we should not dwell upon the fact that Sir Aubrey de Vere was not a Catholic. It would be a sincere gratification to us to be able to believe that in the appreciation of a

great historical and literary achievement that fact might make no difference; that the drama would be regarded as the impartial expression of the result of those studies which Mr. Aubrey de Vere describes, in his deeply interesting preface to the present edition of his father's works.

But we can flatter ourselves with no such delusion:—we are much farther from the calm haven of any such impartial academic, abstract, critical judgment as this, than Sir Aubrey de Vere would have been, if he had been a Catholic when he wrote his drama. Twenty-eight years ago the storm which has been raised by the spread of the Catholic faith, by the success of the Catholic hierarchy in England had not begun to blow; and the old dogs of war were sleeping, at least with one eye.

That is all changed now, and the fact of Sir Aubrey de Vere's having been an Anglican will count higher, with a very few honourable exceptions, in the critical estimate of his drama, now "called out of obscurity, after lying neglected for twenty-eight years, a period longer than the ordinary term of literary popularity," than its poetic beauty, and its careful research. In our own estimate of his work, the fact does not count at all; we miss no element in it which the grace of faith would have inspired; we find no element in it which the Catholic truth reproves. To explain the spirit in which Sir Aubrey de Vere's drama is written, we avail ourselves of his son's words.

> The author of the work was an Anglican; but in it there will be found no bias. His mind knew no partizanship, and in the subject of his drama he recognized a theme too high for onesided zeal. The interest which he took in the chief characters of that age was a human and historical, not controversial interest; and he knew how often there is room in the same hearts for heroic virtues and for destructive passions.

So just a mind as Sir Aubrey de Vere's has rarely expressed itself on any subject on which strong and passionate contention reigns, and the sense of this all-pervading justice, which in the most exact measure of the phrase causes him to "nothing extenuate nor set down aught in malice," is a distinct and constant source of pleasure in the reading of the dramatic poem, which opens beside the deathbed of King Edward the Sixth, and ends beside that of the "sad Queen," of whom he makes the Earl of Oxford say,—

> If ever victim to a broken heart
> Hath died, she lies before us.

In Mr. de Vere's Preface he indicates a few of the authorities to whose writings Sir Aubrey de Vere chiefly resorted;

and, by a curious coincidence, while that Preface was still unpublished, a writer in *Fraser's Magazine* for October furnished an inclusive but much more extensive list of estimates of Queen Mary, in an article on "The Character of Mary Tudor." Mr. Piggot also specially referred to the drama by Sir Aubrey de Vere,—written so many years ago, and which had presented a view of Mary's character similar to the writer's own, but without apparent effect on public opinion,—as an accurate representation of the Queen according to the authentic records of her own and the immediately succeeding time.

"The last century," says Mr. De Vere, "was, perhaps, the time least reasonable in its estimate of Mary Tudor. An earlier age had, it is true, produced those reckless writers so sternly exposed in Dr. Maitland's essays on 'Fox's Martyrs,' 'Puritan Veracity,' and 'The Ribalds,' but the higher earlier authorities, little tempted as they were to extenuate her faults, yet wrote of her with justice even when with severity, and demonstrate that the red spectre which startled our childhood represented, not a popular tradition descending from her own time, but the literary tradition of a later day—a day that had forgotten much, and had not investigated." From the "Annals of England," by Francis Godwin, one of Queen Elizabeth's bishops; from Fuller, Camden, Burnet, and Jeremy Collier; witnesses whose testimony can hardly have been willing, and must therefore needs be honest, the author of "Mary Tudor" studied the character, which he presents with vividness and intensity, with sympathy and force worthy of the greatness of the topic, of its absorbing interest, and of its terrible gloom. He studied it with all the ardour of predilection, among his many and far-reaching studies, and with the deep conscientiousness which was characteristic of all his work. "He used to affirm," says Mr. De Vere, "that most of the modern historians had mistaken a part, and that the smaller part, of the sad queen's character, for the whole of it, and that our dramatists had left one great place vacant in their gallery of English historical portraits. . . . His conception of Mary's character was no arbitrary abstraction of wickedness or of weakness, but an original idea, unquestionably consistent with itself and, as I believe, with history—an idea fruitful in dramatic aptitudes, and morally deep, though simple also. Round that idea his whole drama crystallized itself....His estimate of her will be found to be wholly *unapolegetic.* It is just to great virtues, but it neither conceals nor palliates offence."

When we see what Sir Aubrey De Vere makes of the sanguinary bigot with a dash of idiocy,—for surely that is what the

general conception of Mary Tudor comes to,—of the superstitious fool who fell in love with a phantom, and when it took form as Philip of Spain, propitiated the brutal idol with burnt-offerings of human flesh and blood,—we are at a loss to understand how this great and admirable drama can have failed to impress the reading world, to which when it first appeared, it must have been more astonishingly novel than it is to us. In those days no access was to be had to the wonderful fifth volume of the "Calendar of State Papers at Venice";* yet its lengthy report on England, made August 18th, 1554 (a month after Philip's landing in England), to the Venetian Senate by Soranzo, their Ambassador at the court of Mary, might have been Sir Aubrey de Vere's text.

The first part of the drama embraces the troubles which ensued upon the death of Edward the Sixth, the usurpation of Jane Grey; the episode of Courtenaye's treachery, which is very finely interwoven into the catastrophe, the second insurrection, the Queen's withdrawal of the pardon she had granted to Northumberland and Dudley, their execution, and Jane's,—the latter without Mary's full and reasonable consent,—and her terrible paroxysm of remorse and foreboding. Elizabeth is seen but little, but she is made very effective; and her character is presented with masterly skill in the scene in which she overwhelms Courtenaye, false to both sisters in being false to one, with her disdain. Though with the first appearance of Mary, when she comes to the death-chamber of the boy-king, just after Northumberland and Cranmer have induced him to sign the will by which he devised the crown to the Lady Jane, the true tragic note of her character and her fate is struck, she does not cast all the others so utterly into the shade as in the second part. Very grand is her disdain for the conspirators, her pity for the gentle and most unwilling puppet, her gracious appeal to Dudley to bethink him and tender her the homage that is her right, very sweet her regret for the ungrateful brother whom she had loved,—for Mary had faithfully kept the promise she made to her father.† The literary skill with which the complex character, the contending impulses, the mental strife of Mary are con-

* Edited by Mr. Rawdon Brown, and published in 1873.

† Mr. Piggot (*Fraser's Magazine* for October) alludes to the last interview of Henry VIII. with his daughter, as recorded by Pollino, thus:—"When the king felt his death was near, he ordered his daughter to be sent for, and said: 'I know that I have caused you infinite sorrow. I pray you to take it all in good part, and promise me to remain as a kind and loving mother to your brother, whom I shall leave a helpless child.'" Those familiar with the history of the succeeding reign know how faithfully she kept her promise, and how her brother rewarded her.

trasted with the simple, direct calmness of Lady Jane Grey, (whom Sir Aubrey de Vere keeps free from the unpleasant pedantry with which most writers have, rightly or wrongly, invested her),—the victim, sacrificed, but never deceived, is very striking; and the treatment of the character of the Duke of Northumberland is one of the most remarkable merits of the drama. His levity, his utter want of principle, his ruthless trampling upon the fears and scruples of those whom he was pushing to their destruction, the touches of low cunning in him, his exultant gibing at the Queen in the security of pardon, his instant readiness to plot anew, his craven fear when Fakenham brings him the news that the pardon is revoked, and he must die, his equivocal semi-recantation on the scaffold,—all these are finely touched, and in one passage especially there is a ring like the boldly mixed, but telling metaphor of Shaksperian soliloquy. It is in the first scene of the third act, when Northumberland, at Cambridge, finding his soldiery melting away, and his friends going over to Queen Mary, muses thus:—

> I have plunged too deep. The current of the times
> Hath been ill-sounded. Frosty discontent
> Breathes chilly on the face of our attempt:
> And, like the dry leaves in November winds,
> These summer-suited friends fly my nipped branches.
> What's to be done? Time, like a ruthless hunter,
> Tramples my flying footsteps! Banned and baited
> By my own pack, dogs fed from mine own hand
> Gnash fangs and snarl on me!

The pathetic dignity, never losing the characteristic note of simplicity, which pervades the closing scenes of Jane's life, her words to Bedingfield, the serene elevation of the atmosphere of this portion of the drama, are all most admirable; and they are succeeded, with the finest possible dramatic effect, by the half-mad burst of agony to which the Queen gives way on entering Jane's room in the Tower, only a few minutes after she has left it, and while the executioner is actually holding up her severed head upon the scaffold outside. Mary has had a fit half of stupor and half of raving, under the keen torture of Courtenaye's treachery, when she overhears his declaration of love to Elizabeth, and loathing of herself; and there is true tragic power in the three scenes: the first, the unbearable suffering of the woman despised, who is also a Queen betrayed,—with a slight dash of madness, already hinted at in one of the earliest scenes;—the second, the calmly heroic death of Jane

Grey;—the third, a fresh access of the Queen's passionate misery, intensified by the remorse which, with but brief intervals, when flattering voices try to lull her to rest, pursues her to the end.* We do not understand why Sir Aubrey de Vere departed from the historical version of the execution of Guilford Dudley without a final interview with his wife. It is generally admitted, we believe, that the Queen gave permission for a final meeting between the condemned prisoners, but that Lady Jane declined it, on the grounds that it would disturb their peace, and distract their thoughts from the meeting in the better land that was so near. Perhaps the softer trait which he introduces into Jane's conduct pleased better his poet soul, and yet is it quite fair to his otherwise nobly discerning and impartial view of Mary to give a place to the line we italicize in the parting scene between the Duchess and her child?—

JANE.

Our sands
Have almost run, I must be quick. Will he
See me once more? one last, last kiss bestow?

DUCHESS.

The malice of the Queen forbids.

JANE.

Say mercy—
Else were our hearts left beggared of all firmness.
'Tis best thus. We shall meet—yes, ere yon sun,
Now high in heaven, shall from the zenith stoop,
Together they will lay us in our coffin,
Together our poor heads. Weep not, my mother,
But hear me. Promise you will see this done.

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* Mr. Piggot points out that there is a remarkable confirmation of the evidence that Mary was not individually responsible for the execution of Jane, that it was the Council who enforced the "political necessity," in the fact that, within a few months of that dreadful deed, the Duchess of Suffolk, Lady Jane's mother, was an attendant on the Queen, and solicited her to take into her service Lady Jane's first cousin. "Had the Duchess," says Mr. Piggot, "looked upon Mary as the heartless destroyer of her daughter, is it possible she would have been thus in attendance on the Queen"? We are inclined to think this argument is not so strong as it looks. Those were times in which people got over the killing of their near relatives with surprising ease. Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth killed their kin ruthlessly, but the survivors came to Court all the same. Queen Mary had less kinsmanly blood on her hands than any of the three; and in the first instance she liberated the Duke of Suffolk at his wife's intercession; of which good deed Bishop Godwin speaks as a "wonderful instance of mercy." The Duke requited it by joining Wyatt's rebellion, and fell by the axe perfectly unpitied.

DUCHESS.

I promise.

JANE.

So our bones shall intermingle;
And rise together, when the angelic trump
Shall lift us to the footstool of our Judge!
What shall I give thee?—they have left me little—
What slight memorial through soft tears to gaze on?
This bridal ring—the symbol of past joy?
I cannot part with it; upon this finger
It must go down into the grave. Perchance
After long years some curious hand may find it,
Bright like our better hopes, amid the dust,
And piously, with a low sigh, replace it.
Here—take this veil, and wear it for my sake.
And take this winding-sheet to him; and this
Small handkerchief so wetted with my tears,
To wipe the death-damp from his brow. This kiss—
And this—my last—print on his lips, and bid him
Think of me to the last and wait my spirit.

The sweet pathetic courage of the woman's satisfied heart, the woman to whom this world has given life's best boon, true love, and who is but stepping over to the other shore to find it there, is beautifully drawn here. This fine passage needs, however, the succeeding scene, the soliloquy of the wretched queen, fresh from the treasons and the stratagems which she met with all the fierce and fiery courage of her race, but felt with all the bitter sensitiveness of her own nature; the doubly wretched woman, newly stung by the falsehood of a kinsman suitor, and the triumph of a sister,—a triumph which that sister disdained,—to be fully appreciated. The following is the queen's soliloquy (p. 132), the utterance of a misery which makes her despise life, her own, or others:—

MARY (*alone*).

I have no thirst for blood; nor yet would shrink
From shortening earthly life: for what is life
That we should court its stay? a pearl of price
In festal days, but mockery to mourners.
What's life to thee—thy loved one dead—poor Jane?
What's life to me, by him I loved betrayed?
I take from thee what is no loss to thee,
And much infects the realm. Gladly would I
My life on such conditions sacrifice.
The time for thy short widowhood is come:
But ye shall reunite above. For me
The heart's black widowhood must be for ever.
Jane, on thy block the throned Queen envies thee!

Mr. Piggot, who has recently exposed a vast number of grave errors in the much-praised volume by Mr. Green, which, until he did so, was supposed to be the conclusive book of English history, for ever after which mankind in general were to hold their peace, shows that not only is there not a tittle of evidence to support his assertion that only the interposition of the Emperor (Charles V.) and the Council saved Elizabeth from death on the charge of being implicated with Courtenaye in Wyatt's rebellion, which had sent Jane Grey to the block, but that there is conclusive evidence to the contrary in the correspondence of the Spanish ambassador, who did all he could to procure the condemnation of Elizabeth, and actually told the Queen and peers at the Council board that "It was of the utmost consequence that the trials and *executions* of the criminals, especially of Courtenaye and the Lady Elizabeth, should take place before the arrival of his Highness." The ambassador comments on Mary's refusal to punish her sister for an unproven offence, or to admit cypher letters as evidence against her, (an awkward precedent to be recalled in discussion of the measure afterwards meted by Elizabeth to the Queen of Scots), with indignant surprise. "It was evident," he writes, "the Queen wished to save Courtenaye, and of course Elizabeth, since she does not allow that her guilt was so manifest as his." Mary had already shown "weakness" in sparing Lady Jane Grey on the first occasion, here was another "weakness." The time was coming fast, however, when all such weakness would have passed away from Mary Tudor, when her ruthlessness would be equal to any demands upon it which her Council or her Parliament might make. In the first part of the drama,—than which, however, the second is very much finer in both the dramatic and the poetic sense,—the lights and shades of the Queen's character are delineated with great skill, so that its potentialities are all clear for the development of the second part; the *crescendo* movement of the dirge music to which her life was set. Among the evil passions imputed in after ages to Mary, of which there is no trace in contemporary documents, is her persistent hatred of Elizabeth. The documentary evidence proves, in fact, the contrary, proves that until the Wyatt rebellion brought the princess under suspicion, the sisters lived on terms of the greatest cordiality. Sir Aubrey de Vere discards the popular view of the relations between Mary and Elizabeth, and in a touching and beautiful scene, which occurs on Wanstead Heath, by Epping Chase, shows us the Queen yearning for her young sister's love, and seeking peace in an assurance of it. In an earlier passage he paints Mary's admiration of Elizabeth's comeliness and talent;

which is proved by her letters to Henry VIII., when the poor little princess was disgraced and banished. One touch of completeness would be lacking to the tragedy of Mary's life if there had not been the bitterness of betrayed affection as well as the sting of offended right in her sister's paltering with her foes. By fine incidental touches the gentler qualities of Mary are brought out; her love of music and of nature, her care for the poor, her acute sympathy with and comprehension of their sorrows, her self-denial, her frugal way of life—the sensuality of her race had no place in her nature, nor had its avarice—her fine taste in dress, and pleasure in ceremonial splendour; her veneration for the past, and cherishing of the memory of the dead. In the first portion of the drama we discern in every scene the author's analysis of her character, though it is not until the last that the key-note of the tragedy is struck. We see her brave and queenly, with the warrior spirit which inspired all of her blood, tempestuous of temper, and with a vindictive vein which she dreads:

> Preserve me, Lord,
> From the vindictive fiend that tempts my spirit,

she prays, when Elizabeth reminds her that their young brother had loved her well "till traitors edged between." The outburst of this vindictiveness is grandly shown when she revokes Dudley's pardon in revenge for Courtenaye's offence. We see her, in intervals of calm between the storms, vigorous in intellect, noble, modest, magnanimous, rising above the suspicion inherent in her nature, with a passionate love of the people in her. All her feelings are passions;—religion, duty, hate, sorrow, dejection;—she is ever hopeless, pursued by the past, profoundly convinced of the vainness and the worthlessness of life. So we read the poet-dramatist's purpose in the first portion of his work; wherein he gathers up his forces, to let them loose in all the strength and fury of action in the second.

With the burst of frenzied remorse in the last scene of the First Part, the fountains of the great deep in Mary's soul have been broken up. The stream of blood has issued forth, to widen on its way. Mary knows herself to be guiltier than she seems. There is no attempt to conceal that the sanguinary vein of the Tudor was in Mary. What is shown throughout is that this was compatible with many great qualities, and so made her character a tragic one. In the second part of the drama, its whole tone is raised and strengthened, the action is continuously pro-

gressive, the terrible interest is cumulative, the atmosphere is lurid and storm-charged; fatality hovers with extended wings, sweeping nearer and nearer, and the tortured figure of the queen is the central point of the tragedy of a people and a reign. Throughout the second part of the drama we are to see Mary Tudor with the qualities and the characteristics of the first, realizing, at her best, her description of herself:—

> Too much grief hath made my mind unpliant:

at her worst, her fears for herself, when, foreboding the triumph of the evil within her, she had moaned out:—

> Something here, in my burning heart and brain
> Tells me I yet shall be all good men's loathing.

Without here entering on the historical argument, we must avow our opinion that Mary's sanguinary acts were indefensible, and deserve the name of persecution. As to the proportions in the responsibility for this persecution which are to be severally assigned to herself and her advisers we have nothing to do. Sir Aubrey de Vere would probably have called various acts acts of persecution, to which we should not ourselves attach that name. But we believe that he read the history of the time in the spirit which Mr. Piggot prescribes for the historian, when he says:

> It is absolutely necessary for the historian to endeavour to emancipate himself from party or sectarian bias. The whole controversy is cleared of at least one element of misjudgment, when we state that *religious toleration was unknown at that period*, and is the product of a comparatively recent time. Newspaper articles or popular lecturers may allude to the struggles of our forefathers in the sixteenth century for "civil and religious liberty"; but the conduct of those who had the mastery in the reigns of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth, as well as that of Mary, shows very clearly that no thought of toleration ever entered into their minds. They endeavoured—more or less conscientiously—to discover and hold by the absolute truth; and the dominant section, whatever its belief, mercilessly crushed its opponents. The inability to grasp the fact of the non-existence of religious toleration is at the root of the popular feeling against Mary. Once realize that Mary and her advisers could hardly be expected to rise superior to the numerical feeling of the time, and their conduct appears in a new light. Elizabeth, in making Popery a treasonable offence, escaped the odium which has attached to Mary.

This is no more and no less than the truth, and its perception was easy to a mind, which, to repeat Mr. de Vere's words, "knew no partisanship." Hence, we have the perfect delineation

of the "Awful Queen," the unspeakably wretched woman,—a supremely tragic figure, not a monster, not the "red spectre of our childhood"; a woman reproved by her own conscience, austerely penitential, who shared the callousness to human suffering of her time, adding to the sanguinary impulse of her race the indifference of one to whom pain was habitual and death not to be feared. Persecutors have often been found highly susceptible to the arguments of pain when they have been turned against themselves;—Cranmer is not a solitary, though he is the readiest instance of this truth;—but no one can doubt for a moment that if Mary Tudor had been the persecuted one, her constancy would have been unshaken. She rated, prized, and held to her right with passionate pride and tenacity, but she held to her conscience and her faith with firmness far beyond the power of the fire and the steel which she used against the conscience and the convictions of others. It is neither our duty nor our object to plead her cause, nor did Sir Aubrey de Vere plead it. But he saw the whole, not only one side of her character, and he weighed the provocation, not only the cruelty, of her deeds. In words far more eloquent than any at our command,—though they perhaps imply a general doctrine on the use of the secular arm to which we cannot assent,—Mr. de Vere shows us what his father found in the authentic records from which he drew his masterly interpretaton of the Queen.

It cannot be urged that the severities of Mary's reign were measures of political defence only or chiefly. Unlike her successor, Mary avowed her acts:—she persecuted; and she must bear the stigma. But persecutors are of various sorts. If the worst of the Cæsars persecuted, several of the best, it has been remarked, were betrayed into the same course.

The chief error of one-sided historians is a negative one. They should not have forgotten from whom Mary had learned the deeds which darkened her last three years. She had probably first heard the arguments by which persecution was defended from those who, in her brother's reign, had forbidden her the exercise of her own worship in her own house, or from those who had assisted at the deaths of Fisher and More. Practically, the fatal lesson was taught her by those very prelates, who, though their earlier acts have been forgotten in the sympathy called forth by their sufferings, yet might have equally perished under that "Act of the Six Articles" which they had themselves administered in the days of Henry VIII.

Those historians should not have ignored her virtues. They should not have forgotten that despite her desire to be well with Spain, she had protected the daughter of Anne Boleyn when, on the twofold ground of Wyatt's and Noailles' intercepted letters, she, and most persons besides, believed the princess to have connived, if not conspired, with rebels.

They should have remembered that if, unhappily, there was in Mary's

nature the tameless passion and the arbitrary will of the Tudors, she alone of that house had, in the first year of her reign, abated the despotic power of the Crown, and passed those laws which deserved the applause of Blackstone.* They should have remembered how she had warned her council that no marriage they could devise for her could shake that first marriage which bound her to England; and under what circumstances she had declared that she loved her people, many of them then in revolt against her, with "a mother's love." Mary erred against the land, as well as against the Faith which she loved; yet she had a patriot's heart. At the close she says truly:

> "I have been
> As one who saw some vision in the air
> Of elemental beauty, which, when grasped at,
> Vanished, and left behind a grinning devil:
> Too late I find how far from good I've wandered—
> . . . God! Thou knowest
> What, under better guidance, I had been."
>
> *Mary Tudor*, p. 312-13.

They should have weighed more carefully those early wrongs which wrapped her later life in gloom—

> "Sum up my personal life. You knew me first
> A daughter, witness of her mother's wrongs—
> A daughter conscious of her father's crimes—
> A Princess, shorn of her inheritance—
> A lady, taunted with foul bastardy—
> A sister, from a brother's heart estranged—
> A sister, by a sister's hand betrayed—
> A rightful Queen, hemmed by usurping bands—
> A reigning Queen, baited by slaves she spared—
> A maid betrothed, stung by the love she trusted—
> A wedded wife, spurned from the hand that won her—
> A Christian, reeking with the blood of martyrs—
> And now, at length, a hated tyrant dragging
> Her people to unprofitable wars;
> And from her feeble hold basely resigning
> The trophy of long centuries of fame.
> I have reigned—I am lost—let me die!"
>
> *Mary Tudor*, p. 319.

For Mary the past had ever flung itself upon the present and wielded it like a Fate. From the lonely terror of her childhood, and the "torpid despair" of her youth, to the defrauded hearth, the disgraced throne, and the premature grave, her whole life had been one long frustration. It is unjust to assume that her lot was hard because her heart was hard. There must have been gentleness as well as fierceness, a love generous and human, a love not disnatured, and restricted to a single and worthless object, in one whose best consolation, when recovering from those recurrent maladies which threatened her reason itself, was found in ministering to the poor, who loved her so well, and called their children by her name. Nor should

* Many salutary and popular laws in civil matters were made under her administration.—BLACKSTONE.

it be forgotten that, though Mary persecuted, yet the worst cruelties were perpetrated in her name by her council, when she lay almost unconscious in those terrible illnesses.

While some historians have exaggerated Mary's share in the persecution, others have extenuated the offence by attributing it to a passion, amounting to a craze, for a ruthless husband. There seems nothing in authentic documents, in her letters, or her touching testament, to justify this view. A being long friendless had indeed squandered too much of a credulous expectancy on her future husband, the son of that Spain which she had been early taught to revere, and the kinsman of that mother whom she deplored. After the marriage, her love for him, though far beyond his deserts, was no other than that loyal, reverential, and long-enduring love continued by a faithful wife to the undeserving; a dutiful love never discarding the allegience which true affections bear to that moral nature out of which they spring. In this drama the blame of the persecution is not removed, so far as she sanctioned it, from the Queen. Philip's urgency neither controls nor blinds her, though indirectly all strong love for the unworthy has its tendency to dim the better insight.

She is disinterested, devout and sternly sincere. She is strong in self-sacrifice and the sense of duty. She is brave and queenly: against vanity, frivolity, and all our lower temptations, she is proof. She remains still that child, so soon to be an orphan, briefly but significantly described by the dying Queen Katherine in Henry VIII., as so "modest," and so "noble." When courts were most corrupt, her's remained unstained; and the early love supposed to have existed between her and Pole, though mournfully remembered once and again before her marriage (p. 95-160), is but glanced at afterwards in a single half-page of nearly their last interview. Conscience is with her the great reality; in her failures she is austerely penitential; in her affections there is neither levity nor a hard and restless quest for enjoyment. They are grave and lofty, if also yearning and exacting. Their largeness and dutifulness is marked by this—that they are faithful, though in sadness, to all who have a legitimate claim on her. She will not discard her tried friend, Pole, to propitiate her angry husband; she has not lost respect even for her terrible father; she loves the brother who deposed her, and the sister who is the one hope of all conspirators; she is loyal to her race, loyal to her country, loyal to her faith. But that large heart has in it room for much evil as well as for good. For pity only it has little room. To Mary misery had made life more than a burthen; she despised it, and only guessed how any one could value it when a gleam of happiness had flickered across her path (p. 132). When her perpetual misery deepened it flamed up into wrath; and with wrath the fierce old temptation stirred within her.

Mary sought the good, yet her good was changed, partly through her own fault, into evil; she forgave traitors their treason, yet put them to death for their religion. She was strong, if narrow in intellect; and few needed counsel more. There was but one with whom she could profitably consult Pole; and much as she revered him, she did not walk by his counsels.

The guilty whom she had spared turned against her :—in her anger she punished the comparatively innocent; and Jane Grey died. Many might have vindicated that sentence as a political necessity; but Mary and Fakenham alike recognized the guilt. The temptation had triumphed; and with the remorse of Mary, Part I. ends. The Second Part brings the retribution, and imparts to the whole that "poetic justice" which a true drama requires. She rises out of her despair and finds rest in duty. With duty done comes hope; and again it betrays her. She discovers that she is scorned by the husband for whose sake she has lost the love of her people, that her dream of offspring is but the omen of death, and that she has become the laughter of her enemies. Again misery swells into tempest. Her whole nature, except when there is a lull between the gusts, is passion. Her soul is riven; and the stream that wells forth is blood. She lifts her hand against that religion which stigmatizes hers as idolatry, and has vowed its fall. She condemns Cranmer—misinformed indeed; but still it is the old offence. The key-note is struck a second time. Her destinies are closing around her. It is this blending of great good and great evil in a character, not weak but strong, and a heart not small but large, that creates what is needful for Tragedy. Undeserved affliction is not Tragedy; neither is that punishment, which is punishment alone.

To the end Mary's character in this drama will be found true to the original conception. It was essentially one of self-devotion, and at the close her thoughts are not for herself. Successively there come to her the news of fresh conspiracies, of an invasion from Scotland, and of the loss of Calais. It is for her people that she bleeds; it is that word, Calais, not the name of any object of personal affection, which, as the dying English Queen affirms, will be found graven on her heart. She knows what will be the sentence pronounced on her by posterity, and that it will be in part just; but she knows also that in the principal part it will be a calumny.

> "Shame's never-dying echoes
> Shall keep the memory of the bloody Mary
> Alive in England. Vampyre calumny
> Shall prey on my remains. My name shall last.
> To fright the children of the race I love."—P. 320.

But with the end comes also peace—

> The mist that brooded o'er the face of things
> Is lifted. Death is sent to make us sane.

She has erred by making her will a nation's law, and she tenders a warning to her sister—

> Not to strongly rule
> This kingdom (for I know and fully trust
> Her noble intellect), but fondly rule it,
> Leaving the issue of her cares with God.

The Tudor dies away out of her blood as the chill of death approaches it,

and a great human soul, sorely tried, deeply humbled, but true also, and faithful to great aims, surrenders itself in hope to its God :—

> Bury me with my mother :
> Raise tombs of honour to our memory,
> And grave on mine the motto I have loved—
> Prophetic may it prove—" Time unveils Truth."

The expectation awakened by this exposition of its purpose is nowhere and no whit disappointed by the perusal of Sir Aubrey de Vere's drama. It has the stir, the rumour, the under-current of real life in it, while the great personages play their great parts. The curtain falls, at the end of the First Part, upon Mary's crime and remorse, to rise in the second upon her half-insane fanaticism, her gloomy sense of doom and despair, her ill-requited love for Philip of Spain, her marriage, the reconciliation of England with the Holy See, the political and religious troubles of the time, the persecution, the execution of Cranmer, the vain intervention of Cardinal Pole, the cruel treatment of his wife by Philip, his abandonment of her, and her despair and death. Great care is bestowed upon the character of the Princess Elizabeth, with whom the author deals as impartially as with Mary ; indeed he makes it plain always that he considered " that the large license conceded to dramatists in matters of detail, renders it yet more their duty to set forth substantial truth while illustrating great historic characters and events." The only departure from historical accuracy in the drama is in a scene in which Gardiner is represented as bringing the news of Cranmer's execution to the Queen, who is in a state of distraction from horror and remorse ; then rushing away, unable to speak, while Fakenham tells the horrid tale. The interview is interrupted by Margaret Douglas, who comes to announce Gardiner's sudden death to the Queen. Mr. de Vere believes that in this instance Sir Aubrey was led astray by an erroneous tradition. Gardiner died a penitent four months before Cranmer's execution, not suddenly, but after a three weeks' illness, ensuing on a long period of decline, and Dr. Lardner's brief description of his last hours, which he takes from Wardword and Cardinal Pole's letters, is as follows :—" During his illness he edified all around him by his piety and resignation. He desired that the Passion of our Saviour might be read to him, and when they came to the denial of St. Peter, he bid them stay there, observing, ' I have sinned like Peter, but I have not wept like Peter.' "

With interest next in depth to that with which we trace the tragic image of the Queen through the successive phases of

the life which truly might be called "a long disease," we turn to his portraiture of Cardinal Pole, and the part in the events of the close of Mary's reign which he assigns to that remarkable man—in many respects of a type quite exceptional in his age. In his case, also, Sir Aubrey de Vere goes back to the purer sources, before the legends gathered around and obscured his image. The early historians, especially Bishop Godwin and Bishop Burnet, drew the Cardinal-Legate's character in favourable colours; and the former adds to the picture of his learning, modesty, engaging temper, prudence, and dexterity,—"in short, nothing had been wanting to his consummate excellences, if the Roman religion had not unhappily debauched him from his natural clemency against the professors of the Reformed religion." Regarded in its poetical aspect, there is nothing in the drama so fine, so tender, so stately, as the delineation of Reginald Pole; of his unworldliness and magnanimity, his deep, but sombre, sad piety, his great gift of spiritual imagination, his fearless justice, dutifulness, and patriotism, his strong self-government, his love of the people, and his loneliness of soul. In the Cardinal and the Queen we have the converse characters of the drama, in Philip of Spain the reverse of both. Again we borrow from Mr. de Vere an eloquent summary of Pole, as Sir Aubrey had him in his mind's eye. "The princely churchman, who had lashed the vices of Europe's proudest king, and declined the Papal throne—the Church's bravest champion, yet, on his return to power, the meekest of her sons—the voluntary exile—the lonely student, whose wisdom seemed 'incorporated with his substance'—sorrowful from habitual remembrance of 'those great ancestral woes,' but alike in victory or failure serene—statesman as well as priest—the favourite of successive Popes, but obsequious to none; in faith devout, yet unenthusiastic,—a patriot zealous for his country, but not believing that spiritual isolation was a part of her greatness." Such was Pole in character, what was he in act? Had he been at the head of all, he could have done all; but he could not work with others. He hates the intriguer, the factious, the mercenary, the cruel; and most of those around him are such. He can no more understand their littleness than they can understand his greatness. He can chasten the baseness of Philip, and gently reprove the pride that mingled with Queen Mary's highest aspirations: but he succeeds in nothing. Here again all is frustration.

He is cramped;
Within the jealous precinct of a court
Large energies like his lack room to move.

The poetic gems of the drama are the scenes in which Pole has a part; the finest of these is one in which, with exquisite delicacy and tenderness, the old love of their youth is just glanced at once and no more, by him and the persecuting, persecuted Queen, after a hideous scene with Philip, and the triumph of the king's machinations against Pole, by the withdrawal of his legateship. In Act IV. scene 4, the Queen and the Cardinal are in conference in the Queen's closet at Whitehall:

CARDINAL.

The silent moth gnaws not more fatally
Tissue of gold, than sadness gnaws our heart.
Let us apply the moral.

QUEEN.

Cousin, why blame
Me, not my fate?

CARDINAL.

Fate! In your body dwells there
An evil spirit, that your life must be
A purgatory? Think you God directs
'Gainst you alone his thunders? Arms 'gainst you
His judgments? Oh, what torture like self-torture?
See yourself as I see you, heavy-browed,
With troubled eye, and countenance aghast.

QUEEN.

God made me weak and fallible.

CARDINAL.

Poor Soul!

Be to yourself more charitable. Think
That One there is who answers for your faults,
And multiplies your merits.

QUEEN.

Hope rests there:
Or I were mad.

CARDINAL.

All men are born to suffer.
What are the consolations of the Scripture,
The fruit of exhortation and of prayer,
If now you quail? No, you shall quail no more.

QUEEN.

My web of life was woven with the nettle
My very triumphs were bedewed with tears,
What now is left?

CARDINAL.

Religion. As the sunbow
Shines in the showery gloom, and makes the cloud
A shape of glory, in thy path she stands
A herald of high promise. Blessed emblem !
Religion bids thee hope ! This gloomy life
Must be amended ; we must draw thee hence.

QUEEN.

Thanks be to God ! time works while we gri
Deprive not sorrow of the shade she needs
The sad quiescence of desponding thought.
Job also raised his voice, and wailed aloud,
And so was comforted. Remember, also,
In weeping I can pray : should I not ?

CARDINAL.

Yea,
Pray with thanksgiving : 'tis the sum of duty !

QUEEN.

Whene'er I turn my thoughts to God, one image
Stands between me and heaven. Instead of prayer
A sigh for Philip trembles on my lip.

CARDINAL.

To pine thus for the absent, as men mourn
The dead, is sinful.

QUEEN.

Speak no more of him.
Thoughts holier be my guide. You pity one
Who twines her heart to the decaying creature,
Yet may win heaven. All earthly vows are light
As winds ; faithless as ice. I raise my eyes :
There I find love enduring—ever loyal !
Ay, loyal ; for the Saviour, through our flesh,
Hath bound Himself to man's community ;
And with immortal garlands without thorns
Shall crown his chosen.

CARDINAL.

Hear me, Queen of England
Thus I preach comfort to thee. Live for thy People !
Make England happy ! It is a noble thing
To stablish thrones on bounty ; reign through love :
To make the spacious heart of man our kingdom.
O'er such a Prince the hand of God shakes forth
Blessings like rain on the green lap of Spring.

For him no stabber lurks in palace courts,
His march is tranquil in the front of battle:
Good luck attends his counsels. Prosperous
At home, and reverenced in lands remote,
All eyes wake for him, and all tongues pray for him:
His life shall be a blessing to his people;
And his just memory their rightful dower.

QUEEN.

But how make good the portraiture? Alas!
We cannot pace the avenue to glory
Until with blood its sacred palms are sprinkled.
Our churches were baptized with martyrs' gore,
Which holocausts must purge.

CARDINAL.

I spoke not, daughter,
Of glory: I besought thee to be good.
The chief of greatness is surpassing goodness:
And that outsoars the ken of mortal eyes;
Hidden with God. Yet I would have thee glorious;
Radiant with all heroic qualities;
Magnanimously bent on great designs;
Profuse in liberality; sedate
Even in devotion; scrupulously just;
Al this hath Mary been: why not so still?

QUEEN.

O Reginald! thou guiding, this might be.
To thy pure hands I would confide the staff
Now feebly held by the apostate Cranmer.

CARDINAL.

To speak of him I sought you.

QUEEN.

First decide:
Will you accept this charge?

CARDINAL.

And Winton curse
The hand that doth supplant him?

QUEEN.

He deserves
Promotion; but not thus.

CARDINAL (*musing*).

He who hath stood
Upon the first step of the Papal throne,
And vacant left the Vatican, may look
With eye undazzled on the chair of Lambeth.

QUEEN.

The Church requires your service : you must yield it.

CARDINAL.

I answer to her call and yours. A wrong
It were to both if Stephen Gardiner made
The crosier but a bloody battle-axe.
You must spare Cranmer. Hear me. He hath been
Your mother's foe—a false friend to her rival :
Therefore 'tis great to spare. But in the main,
Though weak, he is good ; ardent in search of truth,
Though apt to wander ; generous when not fearful ;
Clear-sighted when self-interest blinds him not.
Such men are dangerous, if desperate :
We must not make him so—for such make martyrs ;
And martyrdoms make error popular.

QUEEN.

I wish not for his death.

CARDINAL.

But Gardiner wills it :
Ay, and will have it, if you be not watchful.
Strange things are rumoured of the Council's doings
While you lay sick.

QUEEN.

What can I do ?

CARDINAL.

No evil,
That good may follow. Openly remove
The heretick prelate by prerogative ;
And, though most irksome, I will bear his burthen.

QUEEN.

I have long thought it strange that you refused
The greater honour though the heavier burthen :
The proffered crown of Rome.

CARDINAL (*after much agitation*)

Look not alarmed. [*A pause.*
You touch the mind's immedicable wound.—
O God ! that I had died before I knew thee !—
Pardon me—pardon me !

QUEEN.

We both need pardon.
Let us forget the past. God strengthen us !

CARDINAL.

Fear not. Henceforth we gaze upon each other,
As the two Cherubim upon the Ark;
The living God between!

QUEEN.

Then take my hand:
—It will be colder soon. May God be with you!

This is followed, in the Fifth Act, by a very grand scene, in which Pole withstands Gardiner, in the presence of the Queen, and expresses his horror and detestation of the cruelties practised on all ranks of men in the Queen's name, at the instigation of Philip, who rules his deserted wife through her terror of his refusing to return to her, and is now pressing the execution of Cranmer. The Queen makes her moan:

Would that I were dead!
The faculty of power slips from my grasp:
And I remain the servile tool of wrong.

From the noble image of Cardinal Pole, to whom Sir Aubrey de Vere imputes more self-abnegation than we have gathered from any history of him, to the detestable image of Philip, is a a change from daylight to darkness. We do not see much of him; his appearance on the scene is brief, as it was in the life of the poor woman whose heart he won in so unaccountable, and broke in so dastardly a fashion; and never does Pole show more nobly than in a great scene where the Cardinal, who, according to Mr. Froude, adulated Philip to the blasphemous extent of comparing him to the Redeemer, denounces his conduct to his face, before the Queen and Gardiner. The brutal disrespect, the coarse, yet ingenious cruelty, the mocking contempt, the grinding despotism of Philip to his wife; the scornful indifference with which he learns that she is informed of his low intrigues, the impatience, outraging common decency, with which he girds at the delay in acquiring certainty about her condition, the hideous cruelty of nature which does not even comprehend pity for any creature's pain, the fierce bigotry, without a touch of personal piety in it, make up a powerful picture, strengthened with some fine touches of self-illustration on Philip's part. Bonner and Gardiner come to tell him that the Queen, despite his threats, refuses to dismiss Pole in disgrace, and they find him musing, and laughing. He says:—

I was musing,
The feather of a pleasant phantasy
Tickled me, and I laughed—did I not laugh?

GARDINER.

Right joyfully, methought.

PHILIP.

There you mistook.
I never laugh for joy.

Again, he tells the Queen that the prelates must die, or he will never see her more; and she makes answer:—

I do but dream—
It cannot be—thou canst not be so cruel.
Unsay it.

Then Philip says:—

Thou canst dream; well know I that—
I, never.

The famous incident of Mary's destruction of her false and cruel husband's picture, which Sir Aubrey de Vere and Mr. Tennyson introduce into their several dramas, is placed by the former immediately after a scene in which Philip adds to his brutal conduct and his disdain of the Queen's jealous reproaches for his infidelity to her, an insolent hint conveyed in a coarse metaphor, that her own confidences with Pole are too little restrained. Then the whole nature of the modest and pure woman, such as Burnet and Fuller, Camden and Collier, describe her, flames up, and she orders from her presence the wretch on whom so much love has been lavished, at such a cost, as peremptorily as she had previously besought him earnestly for a brief day's delay in his departure. Here the woman's tragedy reaches its utmost depths; that of the Queen has yet to plunge into forlorner deeps. She turns on her base torturer:—

Begone! I must bear insult—I am helpless—
But you pollute my chaste mind with your gibes.
It is enough. I know my fate. Begone!

PHILIP (*after regarding her for some time scornfully*).

For ever! [*He turns from her suddenly and goes.*

QUEEN (*alone*).

I submit to God's decree!
Was it for this my maiden liberty
Was yielded?—to be spurned—despised—and still
Bear on without redress? O grief! O shame!
[*She approaches the picture of Philip.*

Back, silken folds! that hide what was my joy
And is my torture! Back! See, I have rent you—
False, senseless idol, from thy tinselled frame.
I wrench thee forth—I look on thee no more!
And thus—and thus— [*She tears up the picture.*
The desecrated temple of my heart! [*A pause.*
My brain is hot—this swoln heart chokes my throat.
Yet am I better thus than self-deceived.
Die, wretched Queen! O die, dishonoured wife!
I pant for the cold blessing of the grave!

Deeply pathetic is the picture of the woman's broken heart thenceforth; the growing trouble of the brain, and the anguish of the mind, tempest-tossed between fear, fanaticism, the unloosed Tudor vein of cruelty—for Philip said truly:—

Her hand if once with blood incarnadined
She'll love it as the Henna dye is loved
In Moorish harems.

Of Cranmer, as he is presented in the drama, we can only say, as Sir Aubrey de Vere makes Pole say of him, "A weak, good man." But we think Macaulay's is the truer portrait and the juster summary, all testimonies weighed; that Cranmer's fate is the least pitiable of the terrible fates of those bad times, and that he deserved it. It strikes us, as a passing remark, *apropos* of Cranmer, that no one, to our knowledge, has ever reckoned the tragic end of Catherine Howard among the memories which must have gone with him to the scaffold. It was that picturesque right hand of his that gave over the letter of accusation against the "little girl" to her cruel husband, the letter which brought her to the scaffold just six months later than her wedding, which, if we remember rightly, that right hand had blessed. The persecuting bishops, the disaffected lords, have all their parts in the drama, and a curious one is assigned to Edward Underhill, the "hot Gospeller," who for all his heresy and his preaching of the new doctrines, was Mary's loyal faithful servant. We find him turning up as a kind of chorus throughout, and always bearing testimony to the natural goodness and generosity of the Queen. We can afford space for only a few more extracts from a work which recommends itself more strongly to our taste, and our respect, as we search its pages for the author's interpretation of a time between which and ours such thick mists of misstatement have interposed. The first is Fakenham's lament for Cardinal Pole:—

So, at our need, hath perished our last hope!
For first in worth, as place, was he in council;

And knew so well the interests of the State
Were with God's law entwined, that he became
Restorer of Religion ; and made perfect
The shattered superstructure of the realm.
—— What birth, outside the purple, was so glorious
As his, whose sire and mother both derived
Their lineage from the throne ? The Church's champion
He of her sons was the most moderate.
His learning was profound ; his heart all bounty.
From youth, he shunned the world. The privacy
Of rural life, pure air, the quiet stars,
Enamel'd meadows, breath of woods and streams—
At these, the breasts of Nature, he imbibed
Devotion—and so nursed his soul for Heaven.
He travelled through that land whose names are story ;
Beheld Rome's wonders ; spiritually tasting
The intellectual flavours of an age
Whose noblest were his mates in after time.
When Harry probed him touching the divorce,
He lashed the royal vice, and woke its fury :
But God was his protection. Long he lived
A voluntary exile ; watchful, studious.
Behold him next a Cardinal, at Trent,
Presiding o'er the Council : then at Rome,
Refusing the great Christian bishoprick :
At Mentz, once more, a mild recluse ; his soul
In letters, which he loved, and pious needs,
Devoted : and, at last, recalled to England,
Restorer of the Cross !
His was not
The tactique of the soldier : he advanced
His counsel with persuasion ; ever suing
The royal heart for merciful awards ;
While sterner men, or weaker, frowned or wavered.

A second passage is the "Hot Gospeller's" testimony to the character of the "Awful Queen," as she lies dead before the eyes of Oxford, Fakenham, and himself : —

Let me speak, Sir ;
For I have known, and been protected by her,
When fierce men thirsted for my blood.
I say not
That she was innocent of grave offence ;
Nor aught done in her name extenuate.
But I insist upon her maiden mercies,
In proof that cruelty was not her nature.
She abrogated the tyrannic laws

Made by her father. She restored her subjects
To personal liberty; to judge and jury;
Inculcating impartiality.
Good laws, made or revived, attest her fitness
Like Deborah to judge. She loved the Poor:
And fed the destitute: and they loved her.
A worthy Queen she had been, if as little
Of cruelty had been done under her
As by her. To equivocate she hated:
And was just what she seemed. In fine, she was
In all things excellent, whilst she pursued
Her own free inclination without fear!

The proportion, the development, and the aim of the two tragedies are better appreciated when we bear in mind that Sir Aubrey de Vere intended his work to have been a trilogy, entitled "The Daughters of Tudor," and ending with a play founded on Queen Elizabeth and her reign. No doubt we should have read in that concluding drama studies of Elizabeth's Counsellors, as fine and discerning as those before us of the sombre and terrible men who prompted and carried out the dread purposes of Queen Mary. That the absence of a partisan spirit which makes "Mary Tudor" a work as remarkable as it is beautiful would have characterized that drama also, is abundantly indicated by the only fragment of the projected play which Sir Aubrey de Vere wrote, and which harmonizes finely with a description of the Princess, also put into the mouth of Edward Underhill, the "Hot Gospeller," and which must be our last extract.

A noble creature
Is she, in faith! the fiery spirit sparkles
From her large eyes, whether in joy or anger.
Her carriage stately and regardant, firm
As a soldier, fearless in the midst of danger,
She stood like Pallas 'mid the fabled gods!
In her
Study hath wakened wisdom. She is bold
In counsel, as enlightened; clear, discerning,
Magnanimous, authoritative; yet ever
Most gracious in demeanour. She will be
The glory of her time.

The "fragment," which we find in Mr. de Vere's preface, consists of the following lines, and is a good example of the author's pure and lofty verse:—

CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH.

Her successor will need the help of God;
For, after such a princess, to please men

Were nothing less than miracle. This lady
Stood out among the great, their great example :
And what have been held virtues masculine,
As wisdom, learning, magnanimity,
She most excelled in.
A warlike nation she secured from war :
Religion from religious jars she fenced :
She had that art to range around her throne
Men who had winnowed truth and weeded learning
From pedantry and ethnick sophistries.
But I have done. These things are heirs to Fame ;
Which history, whoever treads beside her,
An honest muse shall blazon to the world.
Alas to see her self-subverted thus :
Of a doomed race the last !

"Mary Tudor" is the work of a mind high, large, and good; with conception and continuity and intellectual purpose throughout. We know that two at least of the great minds of the present, to whose critical judgment we should certainly bow if it did not coincide with our own, place Sir Aubrey de Vere's drama next to Shakspeare. Regarded as a poem, its beauty is rather that of the ideal and spiritual world—and in that best wealth it is very rich—than the beauty of the eye and ear, though there is much of that also. In grace of form, in subtlety of delicate expression, in musical falls, in the *finesses* of the poet's art, it is surpassed by Mr. de Vere's own dramatic poem, *Alexander the Great;* but "Mary Tudor" has higher dramatic qualities, and a more sympathetic aim.

To turn from the contemplation of Sir Aubrey de Vere's drama, "Mary Tudor," to the Poet Laureate's "Queen Mary," is to "decline upon a lower level"; is to leave ideal and spiritual beauty aside. A more finished form of diction, and a few lyrical gems, daintier, and of a finer polish than the nobler work has to show, offer their more superficial charms to dazzle and distract us from the perception of the grave inferiority of Mr. Tennyson's historical perception. Of the beauties of his drama we shall have much to say, though amid the tumultuous chorus of exaggerated and indiscriminate praise our notes of sincere appreciation may probably fall very flat and small; but the work as a whole, strikes us with a sorrowful sense of disappointment, to which, paradoxical as it may sound, those very beauties contribute. They are jewels sewn on homespun, incongruous and inharmonious, and they form themselves in the mind of the reader into a group apart; they are "bits" to be remembered, like the extracts one writes out in one's sentimental youth, in-

different to, oblivious of, their context. The beauties are beautiful, but they do not form a beautiful poem; and the drama is without conception or continuity. Mr. Tennyson deprives the central figure of its typically tragical character; and we feel the deprivation, the unpleasant and uneasy sense of loss, all the more that we have been studying and enjoying the completeness of Sir Aubrey de Vere's intellectual and sympathetic vision of the "Awful Queen." Mr. Tennyson's Queen Mary is not "awful"; she is, on the contrary, abject. Fear-exciting—yes; because invested with power to execute her evil will, which is all evil; but the elimination from the portraiture of her of all grandeur of nature, the curiously shallow view of her—a shallow view even of her worst side, which is the only side Mr. Tennyson presents—are destructive to the idea of the tragic. Mere wickedness, mere grovelling folly and cruelty, even mere misery, however intensified—and Mr. Tennyson piles them up, alongside of the Smithfield fires, most lavishly—are not tragic by themselves, nor can the mingling of them make a true tragedy. There must be inherent greatness, and the strife of contending impulses and passions, to reach that standard. Mr. Tennyson shows us no such strife in his "Queen Mary." He makes her say, indeed, in a paroxysm of pain, to Lady Clarence, when she finds one of the scurrilous papers that were dropped about the palace,—

> Mother of God,
> Thou knowest never woman meant so well,
> And fared so ill, in this disastrous world;

but he lets us see none of her well-meaning, only her ill-faring; and for the life of us we cannot pity her, or hate her, or feel any sentiment other than contemptuous disgust towards her. Surely such is not the sentiment which would be roused by a truly dramatic handling of the story of Mary Tudor's life, even according to the vulgarest version of it? The "red spectre" ought, at least, to make us shudder. But it does not; it never thrills our nerves at all. It is merely hideous, not terrible. If we could suppose the woman whom Mr. Tennyson depicts, to be, not an historical personage at all, but a creation of his imagination, with all the surroundings and circumstances ideal, so that he should have had no help from chronicle or legend, we could find no sympathy in our fancy or our feelings for such a creation; we should remain unmoved before its appeal to awe, aversion, or compassion. How much less should it move us to any or all of those feelings, being a deliberately-selected, mean representation of an image pre-emi-

nently capable of tragic treatment, and calculated to force the beholder into a pronounced mental attitude towards it? It is a positive relief to the ignominious light in which Queen Mary appears when even her personal bravery is admitted, so sick-fancied, vacillating a creature is she made until she is turned into the "blood-demon," as a critic has aptly described the Mary of this drama, with her half-crazy infatuation about the cousin whom she has never seen, and her snappish bitterness all round to other people.

We have no quarrel with Mr. Tennyson on the ground that he has adopted the legendary "Bloody Mary," and the violently-prejudiced versions of many of the motives and the deeds of the times, for which we are not apologists. In that respect, he has done what has seemed good in his eyes, and he has the support of the wideness of dramatic license on his side. What we complain of is, that with such grand material for true tragedy—more ample material than that which Sir Aubrey de Vere used to such fine purposes—he has failed to produce true tragedy, and that he has dwarfed the image of the Queen. Even the vulgar versions of her, the spurious growth of time and party spirit, make Mary great; but Mr. Tennyson makes her, as one of his characters says, "small and scandalous." We could almost find it in our conscience to pardon Philip for going away and keeping away from such an intolerably elegiac and hypochondriacal creature as the Laureate's Mary,—a woman who combines the cruelty of King Coffee with the lachrymose manners in private life of Dickens's Mrs. Gummidge, and that lady's well-founded conviction that she "had better be a riddance." When she is not breathing threatenings and slaughter, or talking in a strain which reminds us of Joanna Southcote about the babe which was never born—(a year or two ago the little garments which the Princess Elizabeth made for it were in the Kensington Museum, as fresh as though she had set the last stitches in them the day before)—she is whimpering and whining about Philip after a manner inconceivable in a queen and a Tudor. There are certain passages, among others of great beauty, which narrowly escape the fatally comic; and the unpleasant flavour of the Queen's slavishness to a love which the poet represents as a mere phantom, is almost sickening at times. There is no need for this distasteful element; it does not deepen the tragedy; a more elevated love, more queenly, more true womanly, would be more pitiful, spurned. Her cousin Philip was as little of a stranger to Mary, by report, as Queen Victoria's cousin Albert was a stranger to her before he came to England. Mary had always maintained a close and confidential correspondence with the Emperor Charles V., her

own uncle, just as Queen Victoria did with her uncle, the King of the Belgians; and—only that, in an admirable spirit of economy, all Mary's letters, which at the beginning of this century were safely preserved at the Escurial, have since been used as waste paper—it might doubtless be proved from them that though, to use a homely simile, she did "buy a pig," she did not purchase the animal "in a poke." Queen Mary going about kissing her cousin's miniature, asking grave men like Gardiner their opinions of his personal appearance, and pumping her own maids-in-waiting about their knowledge of any stories to the discredit of his morals, is an unpleasant image, whose unpleasantness is increased when we read in Bagenhall's description of the royal wedding at Winchester, the following lines, in reply to Stafford's question:—

How looked the Queen?

BAGENHALL.

No fairer for her jewels.
And I could see that as the new-made couple
Came from the Minster, moving side by side
Beneath one canopy, ever and anon
She cast on him a vassal smile of love,
Which Philip, with a glance of some distaste,
Or so methought, returned.

We do not know whence, among authentic early records, such a conception of Queen Mary's character may be derived; it is quite opposite to Burnet's, Camden's, and Jeremy Collier's estimate of her. The Princess whom they describe would have smiled on no man "a vassal smile of love"; but if those records had been capable of this kind of interpretation, we should have thought that the poet, projecting a true tragic image, would have used his license for the rejecting of it. Sir Aubrey de Vere makes Mary a loving and devoted wife, who strains her sense of duty to the falsifying of her conscience, it is true, though he lays the blame of her own cruelties upon her own shoulders; but this sickly-minded, fawning slavishness, so repulsive to think about, has no place in even the most miserable moments of his Queen Mary's conjugal wretchedness. The great longing of a lonely heart for love, the bitter disappointment, mingled with the keen sense of an outraged right, taking strong hold of an imperious nature, when it finds that the longing is vain; these are elements of tragedy, and a great heart might well be broken by such a grief; but there is in Mr. Tennyson's delineation of it something so ignoble, that it leaves us impervious to pity. That he should show us Mary as a

tigress, with red, stretched jaws, and with rending claws in the vitals of her people, well; and if he so conceives her story, good; there is tragedy in that; but the princely Tudor whining and slavering like a spaniel at Philip's boot-heel is unpleasant and incredible. Mr. Tennyson's reference to the youthful attachment between the Queen and Cardinal Pole forms a strong contrast with Sir Aubrey de Vere's delicate and solemn handling of the same theme. We have quoted the latter, and now quote the former, as a curious instance of how variously two minds may be affected by the same image. In the second scene of the fifth act, the Cardinal has sought the Queen to complain that Pope Paul IV., after depriving him of the legateship, has cited him to Rome for heresy. He laments his fate, rails at the Pope, recounts his grievances in a querulous, peevish way, pleading to the Queen the zeal of his persecutions, how he has "gone beyond her late Lord Chancellor" in burning her subjects; and beyond his "own natural man" as well; so as to be called "the scourge and butcher of their English church." Mary consoles him:—

> Have courage; your reward is Heaven itself.
>
> POLE.
>
> They groan amen; they swarm into the fire
> Like flies—for what? no dogma. They know nothing;
> They burn for nothing.
>
> MARY.
>
> You have done your best.
>
> POLE.
>
> Have done my best, and as a faithful son,
> That all day long hath wrought his father's work,
> When back I've come at evening hath the door
> Shut on him by the father whom he loved,
> His early follies cast into his teeth,
> And the poor son turn'd out into the street
> To sleep, to die.—I shall die of it, cousin.
>
> MARY.
>
> I pray you be not so disconsolate;
> I will do mine utmost with the Pope.
> Poor cousin.
> Have I not been the fast friend of your life
> Since mine began, and it was thought we two
> Might make one flesh, and cleave unto each other
> As man and wife?
>
> POLE.
>
> Ah, cousin, I remember
> How I would dandle you upon my knee

At lisping age. I watch'd you dancing once
With your huge father; he looked the Great Harry,
You but his cockboat; prettily you did it,
And innocently. No—we were not made
One flesh in happiness; no happiness here;
But now we are made one flesh in misery;
Our bridemaids are not lovely—Disappointment,
Ingratitude, Injustice, Evil-tongue,
Labour-in-vain.

MARY.

Surely, not all in vain.
Peace, cousin, peace! I am sad at heart myself.

POLE.

Our altar is a mound of dead men's clay,
Dug from the grave that yawns for us beyond;
And there is one Death stands behind the Groom,
And there is one Death stands behind the Bride.

MARY.

Have you been looking at the "Dance of Death"?

POLE.

No; but these libellous papers which I found
Strewn in your palace. Look you here—the Pope
Pointing at me with "Pole, the heretic,
Thou hast burnt others, do thou burn thyself,
Or I will burn thee." And this other; see!—
"We pray continually for the death
Of our accursed Queen and Cardinal Pole."

MARY.

Away!
Why do you bring me these?
I thought you knew me better. I never read,
I tear them; they come back upon my dreams.
The hands that wrote them should be burnt clean off
As Cranmer's, and the fiends that utter them
Tongue-torn with pincers, lash'd to death, or lie
Famishing in black cells, while famish'd rats
Eat them alive. Why do they bring me these?
Do you mean to drive me mad?

POLE.

I had forgotten
How these poor libels trouble you. Your pardon,
Sweet cousin, and farewell! "O, bubble world,
Whose colours in a moment break and fly!"
Why, who said that? I know not—true enough!

We take exception to this scene, not because Mr. Tennyson

has chosen the vulgar version of the character of Reginald Pole, but because the clumsy recalling of their youthful attachment comes without any naturalness from the Queen, and is met with no touch of the serious grace which Sir Aubrey de Vere lends to the allusion; because the whole thing has an awkward mechanical suggestion of having been purposely constructed to bring in the mention of the "Great Harry," that pride of the Tudor navy, even at the cost of the vile phrase, "your huge father"; because Pole's forgetting that the libels trouble Mary is as absurd as his calling her "Sweet cousin," and taking ceremonious leave after such a hideous outburst of bloody-minded raving on her part, is either silly or insolent; and because from beginning to end of the scene there is not one truly poetic or dramatic touch. Many other scenes are equally devoid of either, while in some they are plentiful; and little gem-like phrases will remain set in the memory of readers of this drama when they shall have forgotten where they found them. We could not point to any work of equal note and interest which is so unequal in its workmanship. It is quite confusing in its lack of continuity; the action hops about with such uncertain motion that we are constantly wondering where we are, and trying back on the history of the time to catch the sequence of the writer's fancies, until we find that it is only labour wasted; that there is more pleasure to be had from it by dismissing such considerations; that it is like his story of King Arthur, which was begun at the end, and may be read in the middle. It lends itself to extracts as no real drama ought to lend itself, and the best passages in it are, so to speak, side-bits; not the utterances of the principal personages at all. The departures from historical accuracy in matters of fact, however admissible by the license of the poet-dramatist, are, in our opinion, errors in taste, and one of them is clearly a lessening of the tragic interest of the situation. The solitude of Mary's deathbed, none akin to her near, is one of the features of her history on which the mind dwells with a certain awe;—this solitude, which was to be around her once-happier sister too, in her death-hour, with the ghost of Jane Grey to make it terrible to the one, and the ghost of Mary Stuart to make it terrible to the other, if, indeed, the phantoms of their lost loves were not of so importunate presence to both that they heeded no other. Mr. Tennyson brings the Princess Elizabeth to Queen Mary's deathbed, makes her receive from her sister the injunctions which are historically recorded, and be herself the one to announce the Queen's death. This is an error of taste, it seems to us, a sacrifice to the procuring of a stage effect, which might have been left for adoption in an acting

version of the drama, but distinctly injures the poetical effect by forcing its staginess upon our attention. Cecil's soliloquy is fine; and his colloquy with Alice, who is always saying good things unintentionally, is characteristic; then comes the interruption:

Enter ELIZABETH.

ELIZABETH.

The Queen is dead.

CECIL.

Then here she stands! my homage.

This has too much of the "tag" about it; it is too happy a thought. Elizabeth's next utterance turns into an actress's "lines" at once; and we fancy ourselves shutting up our glasses, getting into our coats, and wondering whether we shall be able to get the carriage up in decent time. It is a pity that the closing verses are thus marred by the sense of impending green curtain, for they are good:

ELIZABETH.

She knew me and acknowledged me her heir,
Pray'd me to pay her debts, and keep the Faith;
Then claspt the cross, and pass'd away in peace.
I left her lying still and beautiful,
More beautiful than in life. Why would you vex yourself,
Poor sister? Sir, I swear I have no heart
To be your Queen. To reign is restless fence,
Tierce, quart, and trickery. Peace is with the dead.
Her life was winter, for her spring was nipt:
And she loved much: pray God she be forgiven.

The Princess says nothing of the other charges of the Queen; that from her goods, "three convents, for charitable watching of the poor" should be re-endowed, and "a hospital for worn-out soldiers" endowed. Yet, mention of that last request might come graciously from Mr. Tennyson. Sir Aubrey de Vere does not withhold it. We have said, Who has cared hitherto to break a lance for "Bloody Mary"? There is just one place where she might be named without curses—Chelsea Hospital.

Another departure from historical accuracy, unwarranted, so far as we know by any rumour or legend, consists in making her add "Philip" to "Calais" in her famous speech. Here is the Laureate's version of Mary's words:

Women, when I am dead,
Open my heart, and there will you find written
Two names, Philip and Calais; open his,—
So that he have one,—

> You will find Philip only, policy, policy,—
> Ay, worse than that—not one hour true to me !
> Foul maggots crawling in a fester'd vice,
> Adulterous to the very heart of Hell.

To our mind the real story, which gives the Queen of England back to her patriotism, through the wound the country has just suffered; which makes her dying utterances something like an echo of the famous speech (paraphrased by both poets in the works before us), delivered by her in the beginning of her reign at the Guildhall; an echo full of the haunting sadness of distance, but with the true tone still—is far the nobler one.

Since the "Northern Farmer" revealed to the world the richness of the Laureate's humour, nothing humorous that he has written has been so much talked about, so unanimously praised and admired as the wonderful dialogue between the two old gossips, Joan and Tib, who "talk about the burning" on their way to witness Cranmer's execution. And that dialogue is deserving of the admiration it has received; it is marvellously clever. It is a picture of the callous temper of the times, and a perfect representation of the unchanging modes of thought of the ignorant masses; it is repulsive, attractive, provoking, irresistibly amusing—altogether indescribable; and the best thing in it is the story which Joan tells Tib, after Tib has told Joan how her "owld man wur up and awaay betimes, wi' dree hard eggs, for a good place at the burnin," about "owld Bishop Gardener's end." But excellent as the humour of the dialogue is, this, the most humorous portion of it, is totally misplaced; for, though the story imposed on Burnet in his time, it could not have been credited in Queen Mary's, for the reasons assigned by Dr. Lingard in the last note to his history of her reign (Lingard's History of England, vol. v. p. 272):

> Fox, on the authority of an old woman, Mrs. Mondaie, widow of a Mr. Mondaie, sometime secretary to the old duke of Norfolk, tells us that Gardiner, on the 16th of October, invited to dinner the old duke of Norfolk; but so eagerly did he thirst after the blood of Ridley and Latimer, that he would not sit down to table, but kept the duke waiting some hours, till the messenger arrived with the news of their execution. Then he ordered dinner; but in the midst of his triumph God struck him with a strangury; he was carried to his bed in intolerable torments, and never left it alive. Fox, iii. 450.
>
> Burnet has repeated the tale. Burnet, ii. 329.
>
> 1. The old duke of Norfolk could not have been kept waiting; he had been twelve months in his grave. He was buried October 2nd, in the preceding year.
>
> 2. Gardiner had clearly been ill for some time. Noailles (v. 127) in-

formed his Court, on the 9th September, that the Chancellor was ill with the jaundice, and in some danger. On the 6th of October, 1555, he was worse, and in more danger from the dropsy than the jaundice. There was no probability that he would live till Christmas. From the 7th to the 19th he was confined to his chamber, and left it for the first time that day to attend the Parliament. The dates are irreconcilable with the story in Fox, according to which he must have been seized with his disease on the 16th, and could never have appeared in public afterwards.

The story might have filtered, from its first invention, down to the Tibs and Joans who went to see Campian hanged, drawn, and quartered at Tyburn; but it could not have been in circulation when "the vire tuk holt" of Cranmer on the 21st of March, 1556.

All the scenes in which Elizabeth appears are fine, and a pretty bit of lyrical bagatelle, in the Laureate's best trifling style, fits in well with the somewhat pert and flirty part, but shrewd withal, which the Queen's sister plays. A few noble lines are put into the Queen's mouth, and the ultimate expression of her despair is very fine. The beauties of the drama, though abundant, fail to make it beautiful, and are like pictures hung in a gallery, independent of, sometimes discordant with, each other. Here is one of them—the Queen's burst of joyful hope when she learns that Philip is coming:—

> God change the pebble which his kingly foot
> First presses into some more costly stone
> Than ever blinded eye. I'll have one mark it,
> And bring it me. I'll have it burnish'd, firelike;
> I'll set it round with gold, with pearl, with diamond.
> Let the great angel of the Church come with him,
> Stand on the deck, and spread his wings for sail!
> God lay the waves and strow the storms at sea,
> And here at land among the people!

We see little of Philip in Mr. Tennyson's drama, but that little is powerfully drawn for its purpose. Was he so utterly unlike a gentleman, we wonder? Without prejudice to his vices and his hatefulness, we doubt it. The portrait of him in a panel of the Hôtel de Ville at Brussels, said to be the best ever made of him, is that of a gentleman. This Philip is a foul-mouthed, coarse person, whose brutality is as obtrusive as his bigotry.

Mr. Tennyson's drama is to be acted. Sir Aubrey de Vere's tragedy will never be played. The world is richer by a good many sparkling jewels of fancy and expression that the Poet Laureate has bestowed upon it; but Mr. de Vere, by the republication of his father's work, has endowed it with "one entire and perfect chrysolite."

Art. VII.—IRELAND AND O'CONNELL.

The O'Connell Centenary Address, Dublin, 1875. By Thomas Lord O'Hagan. Dublin: M'Glashan & Gill; London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS painted two portraits of Mr. Burke, well known through the excellent engravings of Watson and Hardy. One was published in 1771, the other in 1780. A close comparison of the two prints affords one of the most curious studies in physiognomy that can be conceived. A youth sublime still adorns the manly visage, full of modest worth and radiant with lofty thought, which Reynolds, with a labour inspired by loving insight, painted of Lord Rockingham's secretary in the early days of his public life. The other has the cast of age so thoroughly and indelibly stamped on its every lineament that it becomes difficult to conceive how within so few years, and those the early years of middle life, any human countenance could have presented aspects of such complete contrast to the same artist. Within those quick and arduous years, a world-wide vigilance and charge have lifted the broad arch of the brow, on which already presses a weight of great affairs, far as America, far as Hindostan. The eyes are no longer lit with early manhood's sparkling spirits and ambitious hope, but seem to diffuse through their sad steady glow a sense of soul-struck awe, and a spirit of indomitable will. Labour and care have writ their wrinkled lines on cheek and forehead. The mouth has lost its tender and gracious curve, and now breathes only the compressed purpose of conscious power. Beauty of sense, grace of form, charm of expression, youth's ambrosial locks and sunny smile, fade away as the soul and the skull of the master of statesmen display their massive outlines more clearly before us.

During those years Mr. Burke suffered much agony on account of mankind. He knew more of the general state of the world, it may fairly be said, than any other public man, perhaps than any other human being in it, and Terence's noble line was perfectly true of him, that nothing that was human was alien to him. His political prescience was so vivid and exact that it might almost be mistaken for the gift of prophecy: and yet he had no actual power but such as comes of the grace of persuasion. He saw in Europe, Asia, and America visions of great public calamities impending, soon to be realized, which

might be averted by wise policy and resolute conduct. He was powerless to prevent what he predicted, and he knew that he protested in vain. But he never lagged or faltered, always hoping, among the most unseemly broils of faction and the basest manœuvres of party, for the return of men to their better sense—and, at all events, freeing his own soul by declaring the truth for the honour of God, the judgment of history, and the instruction of posterity. Such, for example, were the motives which must have sustained him at this period in making his great speech on moving his Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies, than which there is no nobler monument of his genius, his spirit, and his style; of which every word was self-evident truth and wisdom; yet from which he can hardly have expected any sensible effect. And there was none; but in after-days that speech has become the chart of the Colonial policy of the Empire. Writing to his friend Mr. Champion, during the recess of the same year, he says, in the sad, fore-boding vein which had by that time grown familiar to him—"Things are come to a crisis in America. I confess I cannot avoid a very great degree of uneasiness in this most anxious interval. An engagement must instantly follow this proclamation of Gage's. . . . . If we are beat, America is gone irrecoverably. . . . . Things look gloomy. However, they have a more cheerful aspect to those who know them better; for I am told by one who has lately seen Lord North, that he has never seen him or anybody else in higher spirits." With such wisdom are men sometimes governed. The interval, another month of that fateful summer, passed. What Mr. Burke had forecast as to its course was precisely fulfilled. Five days after Gage's proclamation the engagement of Bunker's Hill was fought. It was an engagement in which both sides claimed the victory, but at the end of which there is no doubt now that America was irrecoverably gone. While Lord North, awaiting the next New York packet, was in the highest spirits, and Mr. Burke, full of gloomy forebodings, was writing the letter just quoted to his chief confidant among his constituents in Bristol, General George Washington, gazetted Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Thirteen United Colonies, had already arrived in the camp before Boston, to complete the investment of General Gage's army.

Irish affairs and Catholic interests were very much before Mr. Burke's mind at this period. Indeed they occupied him always with a degree of intensity and to the exercise of an amount of personal zeal, influence, and pains, of which but few have any conception, and of which there is only indirect evidence as to the extent. Such evidence, for example,

is a passage in a very affecting letter from Dr. John Curry, of Dublin, to him in 1778, containing a copy of the first Act passed by the Irish Parliament "for the relief of his Majesty's subjects in Ireland professing the Popish religion." "That address and petition," Dr. Curry writes to him, "which you may remember you drew up, and left with me in the year 1764, was found by us here so excellent a performance in every respect, and that it set forth our grievances in so affecting a manner, that we happily resolved to begin our humble suit by laying it before our viceroy in due form, and requesting he would transmit it to be laid before his Majesty; which we are assured was done, and made such an impression, as was, in a great measure, productive of what has since followed, far beyond expectation. *Dimidium facti qui bene cœpit habet.*"

That masterly address, written in an hour, in which the genius of the land which was and of the Church which was not his, seemed to inspire him; in whose form a manly and pious dignity are finely blended with all the pathos of that long patience to which the Irish Catholics could then appeal,—contains at the same time a perfectly concise and lucid, and therefore, from its very simplicity, a piteous and terrible review of the powers, active and latent, of the penal laws as they then stood, as well as nearly every argument adapted to affect the minds and souls of statesmen towards their repeal. At the time when it was taking its effect in an Act of Parliament, Mr. Burke was in close confidential communication, unknown, of course, to Dr. Curry and the Irish Catholics, with the Speaker in Ireland, and with the Chancellor and law officers in England, and was urging strongly, in reference to the American war, a policy of large concession to Ireland in regard both to trade and religion. The Irish Catholics, though they could not be aware of the full measure of his service to them, were, however, very sensible as to what they understood he had done on their behalf, and they wished to testify it in the only way in which they knew how to do so then,—by a present of money. He at once, on becoming aware of their intention, wrote to Dr. Curry, who was their agent on the occasion,—"I am satisfied that you and the gentlemen concerned are perfectly incapable of meaning any offence to me, and therefore so far from taking any, I consider the thing as very kindly imagined and am obliged to you for your intentions. But it is impossible for me, with any agreement to my sense of propriety, to accept any sort of compensation for services which I may endeavour to do upon a public account." The money was nevertheless remitted; and it was returned with a kindly letter to Mr. Anthony Dermott, then acting as treasurer of the Irish

Catholics, by the following post. "Those," wrote Mr. Burke—a very poor man at the time, as indeed he was all through his life—"those who will receive such rewards very rarely do any services to deserve them. Therefore I recommend it to you to look very carefully about you before you make any such use of your money." Having heard that the Catholics thought at the time of "collecting some little fund for public purposes," he added, "if I were to venture to suggest anything relative to its application, I think you had better employ that, and whatever else can be got together, for so good a purpose, to give some aid to places of education for your own youth at home, which is indeed much wanted." In advising Dr. Curry on the same occasion, as to the best course to be pursued by the Irish Catholics in pressing the further redress of their claims on the legislature amid the competitions and antagonisms of parliamentary parties—casting the far glance of his mind apparently along the great tract of time that divides those days from ours—he wrote this simple sentence, which, simple as it is, is nevertheless charged with all the apposite profundity of his wisdom, the delicate consideration of his sympathy, and the intimate knowledge of the nature of his countrymen, which he always cultivated and cherished. "All that I wish," said he, "is that you would not return hostility for benefits received,"—words that ought to be graven on the Irish mind and heart in letters enduring as Ogham writ.

Mr. Burke had every reason that could inspire a noble nature for the heroic patience and lifelong devotion with which he sustained the cause of the Irish Catholics. He had early borne their reproach. When Lord Rockingham was about to appoint him his private secretary in 1765, the Duke of Newcastle warned the Premier that he was taking to his bosom, and placing all the secrets of empire in the power of an Irish Jesuit fresh from Saint Omer, who was a Jacobite to boot. In every movement from that date to the day of his death, for the redress of Catholic grievances and the advancement of Catholic interests, he was a potent influence, most efficient, no doubt, in what has never transpired, but regarding the uses of whose genius, wisdom, personal influence, and perfect independence, it needs no great historical insight to say that they counted for much. No minister of England would on any Irish question disparage the authority of his advice. His known opinion on any such subject naturally commended itself to the common sense of all men of good will in both the great parties. In the passing of the five or six statutes, which within his lifetime raised the Catholic from the state of a mere outlaw, derelict of every right of property, franchise, worship, and education, to the state

of a citizen of assured, though imperfect privilege, Mr. Burke's service counted for more, we believe—certainly for not less—than the influence and exertions of all other persons concerned added together. For such powers and for such designs he paid the fitting price. He had the witness of his own clear conscience, the respect of all the great minds of his age, the love of many friends, noble and true; also a very general degree of public obloquy and private calumny in both kingdoms; and almost the certainty that, brought face to face at times with the Protestant mob of London, or the Catholic mob of Dublin, he might be carrying his life in the palm of his hand, and that if he escaped being trampled upon, he would certainly be hooted down. He did not hesitate to confront the first danger during the Gordon riots, but with a simply sublime courage, when he heard the rabble were about to wreck his house, first made sure of his wife's safety, and then walked out into their midst, telling them his name, and awing them by the mere serene scorn of his presence. "I thought," he afterwards wrote of this incident to his early friend Richard Shackleton, of Ballitore, "that if my liberty was once gone, and that I could not walk the streets of the town with tranquillity, I was in no condition to perform the duties for which I ought alone to wish for life. I therefore resolved they should see that for one I was neither to be forced nor intimidated from the straight line of what was right." The straight line of what is right leads to true peace and real glory, but it hardly ever leads to present popularity. His devotion to the cause, his vindication of the rights of Ireland in regard to commerce, but far more in regard to religion, was regarded with as little favour by the populace of Dublin as that of London, and it very soon cost him the sacrifice of that position which he esteemed the greatest honour that had ever been conferred upon him, the representation of the city of Bristol. His speech at the hustings, before the election, is an everlasting lesson to the generation who never die out, those whom he calls contemptuously in one of his letters "the little wise men of the West who are resolved to persevere in the manly and well-timed resolution of a war against Popery." It contains a perfect picture of the criminal blunder by which the Penal Laws were originally passed, and of the first proceedings towards their repeal. It vindicates the true relations of the British Constitution to the Catholic Church. It exhibits the folly of a merely Protestant policy on the part of such an empire as England, with strong Catholic provinces, and obliged to co-operate with powerful Catholic allies. It denounces and ridicules the system of "proscribing citizens by denominations

and general descriptions" as not merely impolitic and unjust, but base and malicious and stupid. At the end he said "the charges against me are all of one kind, that I have pushed the principle of general justice and benevolence too far. In any accident which may happen through life, in pain, in sorrow, in depression, and distress, I will call to mind this accusation and be comforted."

But it was all in vain. He was advised by his friends that the mob persisted in regarding him as an American, an Irishman, and a Papist. Speaking in the same speech of his notorious and common unpopularity both in England and Ireland at the same moment, he exclaimed, "What then? What obligation lay on me to be popular? I ever tried to serve both kingdoms. To be pleased with my service was their affair, not mine." It is doubtful indeed whether he would have fared as well with the Dublin mob as he did with that of London or of Bristol, had he gone before them face to face. That mob has always been coarse in its habits and unstable in its fancies. In the previous generation it had hooted, hissed, and pelted with mud Dean Swift over and over again before it took to the fancy of worshiping him. Even Mr. Grattan in his old age once experienced its foul temper. In that charming letter which Mr. Burke wrote to Mr. Thomas Burgh, of Old Town, on the general estimate of his character and conduct which prevailed in his native country, and especially in his native city in 1780, he says with all his sweet and wise good humour:

> It undoubtedly hurts me in some degree; but the wound is not very deep. If I had sought popularity in Ireland, when in the cause of that country I was ready to sacrifice, and did sacrifice, a much more immediate and a much more advantageous popularity here, I should find myself perfectly unhappy; because I should be totally disappointed in my expectation; because I should discover when it was too late, what common sense might have told me very early, that I risked the capital of my fame in the most disadvantageous lottery in the world. But I acted then, as I act now, and as I hope I shall act always, from a strong impulse of right, and from motives in which popularity, either here or there, had but a very little part.

A few sentences afterwards, alluding with just the faintest tinge of playful sarcasm to the project which had been on foot of erecting a statue to his honour in Dublin only two years before, he adds:

> I believe my intimate acquaintance know how little that idea was encouraged by me; and I was sincerely glad that it never took effect. Had such an unmerited and unlooked for compliment been paid to me two years ago, the fragments of the piece might at this hour have the advantage of

seeing actual service, while moving, according to the law of projectiles, to the windows of the Attorney-General, or of my old friend Monk Mason.

Thus, even despiteful usage and unworthy construction were not missing among the links which bound him to the service of every righteous Irish cause, by all the obligations proper to a life-long loyalty and fidelity of service.

But as the period, of which Sir Joshua Reynolds's portraits suggest the limits, tended towards its close, its gloom seemed to deepen on every side, so that Mr. Burke might have sometimes felt his state well prefigured in the familiar opening lines of the *Divina Commedia*:—

> Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita
> Mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,
> Che la diritta via era smarrita.
> Ahi, quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura
> Questa selva selvaggia ed aspra e forte
> Che nel pensier rinnuova la paura!
> Tanto è amara che poco è più morte.

And there can be little doubt to any one who studies his speeches and his public and private letters, especially those preceding and connected with the Bristol election, that of all the affairs in which he took part, Irish and Catholic affairs caused him the gravest anxiety, and boded to him most misfortune. Writing to Lord Rockingham three weeks after the letter to Mr. Champion, already quoted, on the condition of the American colonies, he said, "I have been very far from well for some weeks past; but I am, thank God, perfectly recovered. Indeed my head and heart are as full of all kinds of anxious thoughts as they can possibly hold. For some time I had sunk into a kind of calm and tranquil despair, that had a sort of appearance of contentment, but indeed we are called to rouse ourselves, each in his post, by a sound of a trumpet almost as loud as that which must awaken the dead." This letter is dated the 4th of August, 1775. The following day Daniel O'Connell was born in a remote village on the coast of Kerry. There could hardly have seemed a greater historical improbability to the mind of Mr. Burke in those days, should such a vision have occurred to him, than the fact that the greatest popular tribune of modern history, and the man destined to be not untruly named the Liberator of Catholic Ireland, should be born in those days, of all places in the world, among the wilds of this remote and desolate region. When Mr. Arthur Young, mainly at Mr. Burke's instance, made a few years afterwards that famous tour

of Ireland which he recorded in one of the most valuable books ever written upon that country, it may be remembered how he records his approach to Kerry much in the strain which a traveller of the present day would employ when fronting the great table-land of Thibet, or after scaling some hitherto unattained altitude in New Guinea. "September 25th," he writes, having left the comparatively civilized and cultivated region of Cork behind, "I took the road to Nedeen" (now Kenmare), "through the wildest region of mountain that I remember to have seen; it is a dreary but an interesting road. The various horrid, grotesque, and unusual forms in which the mountains rise and the rocks bulge; the immense height of some distant heads, which rear above all the nearer scenes, the torrents roaring in the vales, and breaking down the mountain sides, with here and there a wretched cabin and a spot of culture, yielding surprise to find human beings the inhabitants of such a scene of wildness—altogether keep the traveller's mind in an agitation and suspense."

Its very seclusion and wildness made Kerry a fit cradle for a great native leader. The spirit of freedom dwells in the mountains, and the cadences of ocean have a spell and a lesson for him who is born to move masses of men by the sound of his voice. The waves taught him their music, and early filled his mind with the sense of their vastness and freedom. He loved to speak of them as breaking on the cliffs of Kerry after rolling for three thousand miles from the grim shores of Labrador. The "kingdom of Kerry," as it was the fancy of its people to call it, had remained from its very picturesque and unprofitable remoteness the most Celtic region of Munster. There can hardly have been a drop of Norman or of Saxon blood in Daniel O'Connell's veins. He was a Celt of the Celts, of a type which becomes more and more rare—that in which black hair luxuriant and full of curl is combined with an eye of grey or blue; with features small, but fine, yet in the nose leaving room for amendment; with lips plastic, nervous, of remarkable mobility and variety of expression; with a skull curiously round; with a figure graceful, lithe, yet of well-strung muscles, capable of great endurance. It is a type which some Irish ethnologists suppose, not without reason, to be of Spanish origin; and there were two very remarkable Irishmen of the same period who were fine examples of its form. One was General Clarke, Duke de Feltre, French Minister of War throughout, and indeed before Napoleon's reign, and who was also for some time Governor-General of Prussia; the other, not built on so grand a scale, was Thomas Moore, the poet. Nature gave to Mr. O'Connell a frame as perfect and commanding as ever was

developed of this rare type; a voice of unparalleled volume and range; ever-buoyant energy, unfatiguing perseverance, a quick wit, a sound and capacious understanding, craft bred and stimulated by the sense of oppression, courage easily flaming to headlong wrath at the hurt to pride of withheld right; every talent that every great orator has possessed (some in excess), with, most of all, the talent of speaking in the strain of its own sympathies to every audience, from the highest and most accomplished to the lowest and most ignorant; and to these last, he often spoke of his best, and he loved to speak best of all. In Kerry there still remained, a hundred years ago, there even yet remains, more that tells of what Celtic and Catholic Ireland was like than in any other district of the South. Many of the native gentry, elsewhere banished and erased, or reduced to become traders in the towns built by their ancestors and tenants on their own estates, in Kerry held some little-coveted fragment of ancient property on sufferance, and maintained at least the show among their people of the old tribal order. Of the Irish titles, which are still borne by the heads of Celtic septs, by far the greater number were transmitted in Kerry, or in neighbouring districts of Cork and Limerick, "where the king's writ did not run." There or thereabouts, in the wild southwest, dwelt a hundred years ago, and there are still to be seen representatives of The O'Donoghue of the Glens (near kinsmen of the O'Connells), O'Grady of Killballyowen, MacGillicuddy of the Reeks, The O'Donovan, The O'Driscoll—and two titles which, though only dating from the period of the Pale, told of traditions hardly less dear to the Irish memory and imagination, the Knight of Glin, and the Knight of Kerry, scions of that illustrious house which for many a hundred years had accepted for its motto the reproach that it was more Irish than the Irish themselves. Five years before O'Connell's birth, died the last MacCarthy More, greatest of the Kerry toparchs, and lineal descendant of that Florence MacCarthy who, as Sir William Herbert once said, "was a man infinitely adored in Munster"; and now Kerry was about to give birth to a man destined to be infinitely adored throughout Ireland. Kerry still spoke the Irish tongue, and it was the tongue that Daniel O'Connell learned on his nurse's knee. Such was the soil from which he sprung, and he was racy of it.

It is only in the history of colonies that we find instances of such remarkable progress in the arts and pursuits of life as was made by the Catholics of these kingdoms in the twenty years that followed the first relaxation of the Penal Laws. So early as 1780, Mr. Burke on the hustings at Bristol, warned the English people against the commercial dangers connected

with any retrograde policy in legislation regarding religion. "You are apprized," he said, "that the Catholics of England consist mostly of our best manufacturers. Had the legislature chosen, instead of returning their declarations of good-will" (on the occasion of the Gordon riots), "to drive them to despair, there is a country at their very door to which they would be invited; a country in all respects as good as ours, and with the finest cities in the world ready built to receive them. . . . What a spectacle would it be to Europe to see us at this time of day, balancing the account of tyranny with those very countries, and by our persecution driving back trade and manufactures, as a sort of vagabonds, to their original settlement!" There is an interesting instance in his correspondence of the far greater though perhaps less perceptible progress in prosperity—spread as it was over so large a surface, and so many complex interests—of the Irish Catholics. In 1781 there was a great alarm of a French invasion at Cork. Sir John Irwine, commanding the forces, arrived, and found the city in a state of panic. He had assembled the garrisons of all the Munster towns, and he wanted money to pay his army and provide his commissariat. The military chest was nearly empty. The loyal Protestants of Cork looked askance when he offered them Latouche's paper. He was at last forced to apply to the principal Catholic merchant, Mr. George Goold, who at once gave and procured for him all the gold he wanted. Mr. Goold writes of the event with natural pride to Mr. Burke. "Hence you see," he says, "a Roman Catholic stepped forth in the hour of danger to support the Government, when *others* would not risk a guinea. Your sense of us is in this small instance proved. I am singularly happy to have had in my power the doing what I have done; and hope our legislators will see that there are not a people more steady in this quarter, nor a people that less merit a rod of severity by the laws than we." Long before the Irish Act of 1793 was passed, the trade of Ireland throughout three of the provinces had in great part passed into Catholic hands. Mr. Grattan cited a remarkable instance in the debate on that Bill. "Mr. Byrne," he said, "complains that he pays to the revenue near £100,000 annually, and he has no vote." He further argued with great effect against the objection that the admission of the Catholics to political privileges would be dangerous to property in land, that, on the contrary, the number of Catholics interested in the existing state of landed property by mortgage, purchase, or otherwise, was "the majority of the principal members of that community." No one can trace the proceedings of the general Catholic Committee convened in 1792 without feeling that their descendants would find it diffi-

cult in the present day to elect 250 delegates so irreproachable as to personal character; so respected by their neighbours of different denominations in the counties and boroughs which they represented; so wise and yet so bold in both counsel and conduct; so straightforward and yet so elevated in the terms of all their public proceedings; and among whom evidently the tradition of the old gracious and courtly Irish manner still obtained, for, it is told, that George the Third and his ministers were much amazed by the dignity and address of the members of their deputation, when the Irish Catholics for the first time since the battle of the Boyne stood face to face with an English king on the 2nd of January, 1793.

On the 9th of April in the same year, the Act of Catholic Relief received the royal assent. It abolished at one stroke every disability and incapacity affecting Catholic property. It gave the elective franchise, and thus immediately transferred the centre of political gravity in the country. It opened to Catholics the jury-box, both grand and petty, even the bench, and all other offices connected with the administration of the law, except that of Lord Chancellor, and of Sheriff of a county. It gave the right to take University degrees, and therewith the privilege to practise learned professions; the right to carry arms, still regarded as the outward sign of the rank of a gentleman; the right to hold the Royal Commission in the Army and Navy; the right of appointment to all offices and places of trust, except those of Lord Lieutenant and Lord Deputy; the right to be members of any lay body corporate, except the governing body of Trinity College, any law, statute, or by-law of such corporation to the contrary notwithstanding. As Mr. Wolfe Tone, summing up the scope of the Act, said with his usual point, "From comparison" (with the Catholic Petition) "it will appear that every complaint *recited* has been attended to; every grievance *specified* has been removed. Yet the prayer of the petition was for *general* relief. The Bill is not co-extensive with the prayer." Twenty years afterwards, Mr. Plunket, speaking in the House of Commons of the political position of the Irish Catholics, exclaimed, "Where is the idiot who imagines they can remain as they are? The state of the Catholics of Ireland is, in this respect, unparalleled by anything in ancient or modern history. They are not slaves, as some of their absurd advocates call them, but free men, possessing, substantially, the same rights as their Protestant brethren, and with all the other subjects of the empire; that is, possessed of all the advantages which can be derived from the best laws, administered in the best manner, of the most free

and most highly civilized country in the world. Do you believe that such a body, possessed of such a station, can submit to contumely and exclusion?" It sounds for the moment almost like a burst of bathos draped in blarney to name Daniel O'Connell, the "Liberator" of a people who had by their own wise and manly conduct attained such a position, when he was only a lad of eighteen, completing his course of rhetoric in a French seminary.

It was soon seen how little the letter of the law availed against the close discipline and long-riveted force of the Protestant Ascendancy. The Catholic had the right to vote, but he could only exercise it under the control of the Protestant landlord, and for one Protestant candidate or another. The Catholic had the right to sit on juries, and it was permitted to him when it so pleased the Protestant sheriff. The Catholic was entitled to employment in numerous offices of trust and honour, but the Irish Executive for the seven years that preceded the Union, and the Imperial Administration for the whole space of a generation afterwards, with a very brief interval, was based, in deference to the royal will, on the principle of proposing no measure that should unsettle Protestant Ascendancy. The patronage of the Crown was throughout the entire of that period, and naturally enough under the circumstances, exercised on purely Protestant principles. Very early the profound political insight of Mr. Burke enabled him to measure the whole situation; and his mind exactly forecast the slow but certain method of deliverance. The shadow of death was already upon his soul, and death was far from unwelcome to him. But his last most anxious thoughts and prayers were given to the cause of the unhappy people whom he loved so well, and who had not—who indeed have not even yet—anything like an adequate sense of his services to them. Writing to Dr. Laurence in November, 1796, he says:—

The heavy load that lies upon the Irish Catholics is that they are treated like enemies, and as long as they are under any incapacities, their persecutors are furnished with a legal pretence of scourging them upon all occasions, and they never fail to make use of it. If this stigma were taken off and that, like their other fellow citizens, they were to be judged by their conduct, it would go a great way in giving quiet to the country. The fear that if they had capacities to sit in Parliament they might become the majority, and persecute in their turn, is a most impudent and flagitious pretence, which those who make use of it know to be false.

Again in the same letter he says:—

The ill-will of the governing powers is their great grievance, who do not suffer them to have the benefit of those capacities to which they are restored nominally by the law.

But where the remedy, whence the power, who the leader and deliverer of this variously oppressed and cunningly persecuted people? That only by the force of a still stronger Catholic organization and association could the Protestant ascendancy ultimately be vanquished and deposed, Mr. Burke saw with that calm foresight which seemed to grow only more vivid as his life was ebbing fast away. That a great political genius was necessary to combine and re-form the power of the Catholic people of Ireland for this long and arduous labour, he completely recognized. What better proof could be given how fully he felt all this than the regret which he expressed in one of the last letters he wrote on Irish affairs, that youth and strength were no longer his to spend in such a cause:—

> Favour (he writes) they (the Irish Catholics) will have none. They must aim at other resources, and to make themselves independent in *fact*, before they aim at a *nominal* independence. Depend upon it that with half the privileges of the others, joined to a different system of manners, they would grow to a degree of importance to which without it, no privileges would raise them, much less any intrigues or factious practices. I know very well that such a discipline among so numerous a people is not easily introduced, but I am sure it is not impossible. *If I had youth and strength I would myself go over to Ireland to work on that plan*, so certain I am that the well-being of all descriptions in the kingdom as well as of themselves, depends upon a reformation amongst the Catholics. The work will be new and slow in its operation; but it is certain in its effect. There is nothing which will not yield to perseverance and method.

This letter was written to his much-beloved friend Dr. Hussey, then directing the newly-founded college at Maynooth. It pleased God to reserve the mighty mission and the glorious career which it foreshadowed—so that the task might be the more perfectly fulfilled, and the triumph at all points complete—for an Irish Catholic, born in the sackcloth and ashes of the Penal days, and in one of the most remote and desolate districts of Ireland, yet destined to raise, educate, and re-form his people, until they displayed before the eyes of a wondering world all the organic unity of a disciplined nation, actuated in their politics by principles of religion, and controlled in their public conduct by moral motives alone. Then their leader, already in anticipation called by national acclamation their Liberator, forced his overt way into the very sanctuary of the constitution, and defied those who held all the power of the greatest empire on earth to dispossess him of his vantage-ground. Mr. Burke's letter to Dr. Hussey was written almost from his death-bed. He died on the 8th of

July, 1797. The following Hilary term Daniel O'Connell was called to the Irish Bar.

It is very difficult to apply the standard of historical criticism to Mr. O'Connell's character and career without at least seeming to speak in a strain of hyperbole. Lord Lytton, in those lines of singular power and felicity which describe him in the act of addressing a monster meeting, raises the image of the great Athenian orator as the fitting illustration of his marvellous mind-compelling power, and majestic energy and ease of speech. But even his enemies would have said that Demosthenes was not his perfect parallel; that he had all the craft of Ulysses, and when he pleased, the tongue of Thersites as well. In our modern days the son of a Corsican notary, immediately after the most all-levelling revolution the world has as yet witnessed, implanted a worship of himself in the heart of the French nation, surpassing in its self-sacrificing devotion all the loyalty ever lavished on its bravest and holiest kings. But Napoleon was a great soldier, and empires are the natural estate of conquerors, and from a very early age he had the whole power of the government of France to work out his purposes. O'Connell had the whole power of the government which conquered Napoleon, wielded at last by the soldier who gave him his final defeat, opposed to him at every point, and from the beginning to the end of his great achievement; and his method was to try if it were possible to make the same use of peace as a means of victory that soldiers make of war. He led his people out of bondage, not less ignominious than the Egyptian, through a probation that may fitly be compared even in point of time, with that of the Sinaitic desert, and, on the whole, with perhaps a better behaviour on the part of those who followed him; yet he was not visibly, awfully, raised and inspired by the living God, face to face, as Moses was. His career is unique. From its commencement to its close, he carried the whole apparatus of his power within his head. His sceptre and sword was the gift of speech; and he spoke to and for the most impoverished, neglected, and uncultivated people in all Christendom.

Myths naturally germinate in the shadow of so conspicuous a figure; and the Irish mind is not by any means incapable or indisposed to mature and embellish myths. But historical justice will never be rendered to Mr. O'Connell, if some of the legends, which are now obtaining acceptance in his regard, are allowed to deface, in some respects to efface, the true constituent elements and proportions of his character. The extreme nationalist party, who of late have taken the impudent fancy of claiming him as all their own, know nothing of him that is worth knowing, if they do not know the utter abhorrence in which he

would, were he living now, hold all their method and proceedings. To Mr. O'Connell, a Fenian or a philo-Fenian, or even a person trying to make amnesty to Fenian prisoners a national question and a cause of hatred and ill-will against the party to which he belonged, would have been simply the most execrable being crawling on Irish ground, and the butt of his most flagrant invective. Mr. O'Connell was not merely a member of the Liberal Party—he may be said to have been the principal founder of the Liberal Party, contradistinguished from the Whig party as it existed when Parliamentary Reform was carried. He would have simply idolized Mr. Gladstone for what he has done. He distinctly intimated his intention of postponing, which meant, so far as he was concerned, abandoning the Repeal Agitation, if such measures as Mr. Gladstone has since carried, were accepted by the Liberal Government which just before his death succeeded Sir Robert Peel's. Throughout his career he was in this respect distinctly consistent. Though a United Irishman while the movement was a legal agitation for the Reform of Parliament, he unhesitatingly shouldered his musket against the rebellion of 1798. Much grieved as he was by the Union, he never showed the slightest sympathy with the movement of Robert Emmett. He would never have hesitated, had there been occasion, to say that that gallant enthusiast deserved to be hanged, and that his epitaph had much better remain unwritten. Loyalty was with him not so much a sentiment or an obligation, as a native instinct and almost a master passion. The word "loyal" was always in the front of the curious and somewhat bizarre nomenclature by which he loved to designate his peculiar institutions. It was the first title of his "Loyal National Repeal Association," and though it did not appear in the name, it was the predominant and all-pervading quality of the character of the most cherished and distinguished of his great functionaries, the "Head Pacificator." The first time that Mr. O'Connell's own name may be said to have become known to literary fame was when Lord Byron, in that immortal poem—which it is difficult to conceive how any but an Irishman can have written, so instinct is it with all that is most Irish in its genius, passion, and point—stigmatized the servile adulation of almost idolatrous loyalty with which the Catholic Tribune welcomed George the Fourth to Ireland :—

> Wear, Fingal, thy trapping! O'Connell proclaim
> His accomplishments. His! And thy nation convince
> Half an age's contempt was an error of fame
> And that Hal is the rascaliest sweetest young prince.

He assailed the Young Ireland party with dour ferocity, and even in the Repeal Association took pains on one occasion to point out to the officers of the Crown, with his exact legal precision and with a plenitude of cogent authorities, how the line they were pursuing was one strictly tending towards High Treason. The present Home Rule movement he would have simply laughed to scorn. He was not a statesman in that large and liberal sense of the word which attaches to the name of Mr. Burke, or even of Mr. Grattan. He was well on towards sixty years of age when he first entered Parliament. Then the disposition of the lawyer to think only of those immediate, perhaps somewhat unscrupulous effects, which, nevertheless, obtain the verdict—the exultation of the demagogue riding the whirlwind and directing the storm of his own exciting, always counted for much too much with him, and checked or forbade the full growth of the wisdom that shapes large acts of policy, and controls the destiny of nations. But earnest and sincere as he was in urging the restoration of that Irish Parliamentary system which he had seen, even in its cramped and incomplete condition, full of beneficent vigour and fruitful of local prosperity, he would never have dreamed of asking the people of England to unhousel themselves of the Constitution that has stood since the days of Edward the Confessor, in order that a handful of Irish members should have the privilege of brawling one half the year at College Green and the other half at Westminster. He asked to have Ireland for the Irish, but not, as Mr. Delahunty has neatly phrased it, Ireland and Great Britain into the bargain. It is to be regretted that his administrative powers, which were probably considerable, were never tried by the charge of a Ministry. He was very near taking—it is even said that for some hours he was appointed to—legal office at one time; but he hardly ever contemplated, what his power in Parliament would have well entitled him to, a seat in the Cabinet. Apart from the administrative faculty, he probably lacked the higher gifts of the art of government. It cannot be said that he even showed evidence of any very great constructive genius. His Repeal Agitation had apparently no plan,—and yet he spoke as if it had, solemnly declaring more than once his readiness to lay his head on the block if he did not succeed within a period of a very few months; but if he had a plan, it was like General Saint Ruth's plan of the battle of Aughrim, which he would not tell to any of his lieutenants, and which a Dutch cannon ball, at the crisis of the action, whisked away with his head. Neither did Mr. O'Connell apparently possess that other great gift in affairs of State—the art of multiplying his own

powers by using to the utmost, and honestly honouring the powers of, other men. His favourite followers were too often sycophants and time-servers. He brooked no rival near the curule chair, seated wherein, amid the corn-sacks and coal-barges of Burgh quay, he, every Monday, discoursed, almost all day long, to the "pious peasantry patriarchally presided by a patriotic priesthood"; and whence, when he chose, he could make his words reverberate in the Cabinets of Kings, and in the shanties of backwoodsmen. He brooked no rival present, or even possibly *paulo-post-futuro*. Indeed, a young Ireland wit once profanely ventured to say that he was in his latter days somewhat jealous of the influence of King Brian Boroihme over the Irish mind.

Another myth concerning Mr. O'Connell, which has assumed much more ample and stately dimensions, is that which makes of him an heroic, docile, and devoted Ultramontane. It is painful to disabuse pious minds of an illusion which it is naturally agreeable to them to entertain in that state of inaccurate knowledge which commonly prevails about Irish, and especially about recent Irish history. But it is not less a myth than the interesting legend that Fin Mac Cool threw the enormous boulder that stands above the wood of Rostrevor from the side of Omeath mountain four miles across the bay; and, indeed, it has hardly so much foundation as that fine Ossianic tradition, because the boulder is of the same stone as Omeath mountain, and if Fin Mac Cool did not fling it across, there is only a dreary geological theory to fall back upon. But to yet middle-aged men, it may seem as if it were only the day before yesterday that they heard Mr. O'Connell protesting against the Pope's attempting to interfere with Irish priests in the discharge of the duty they owed to their country; and that because the Holy Father had written a letter to certain bishops, drawing their attention to very peppery language used at certain Repeal meetings. The truth is that Mr. O'Connell was throughout part of his life what we would now call a Liberal Catholic, and to the end of it a Catholic Liberal. He would have been in complete accord with M. de Montalembert as to his speech at Malines; and it would be easy to quote from his speeches and letters in every year of his life passages in the same sense as strong, and even stronger, than anything that discourse contains. If even an Apostolic Delegate had attempted in his time to control the political action of the Irish clergy in a sense which he should regard as opposed to his views—in that case, having ventured to "protest" (that was his word) against the Pope's doing so—how, may it be imagined, would he have dealt with the Delegate? With every expression of the most obsequious

homage and veneration for his sacred office, but with an obstinate will and a rooted conviction that he was contesting a question of life or death for the Catholic power in Ireland, and the determination not to yield an inch to the Delegate, to the Propaganda, to the Pope himself. We have ventured to say that Mr. O'Connell was not, in the high sense of the word, a statesman. He certainly was not a theologian; and what little he knew of the science came to him through French and not through Roman sources. We have very little doubt that had the DUBLIN REVIEW advocated its present principles in his day, he would have had it solemnly expelled from the Repeal reading-rooms. It will be impossible ever to form a just historical estimate of Mr. O'Connell's character, if this side of it be falsified by a fond delusion. It is nevertheless the truth to say that, according to his lights, which the circumstances of the time tended to render far from clear, he was the most powerful and devoted champion of the Church and of the poor that the world has had to respect and bend before for ages. His devotion to the hierarchy and priesthood of Ireland was, like his loyalty to the Crown and Constitution, deep-rooted in his inmost nature, and readily overflowed under the least emotion in expressions of glowing tenderness and abounding veneration. His personal piety was simple, humble, deep, and sustained, his solace in anxiety and his strength in labour. In his latter days it was a sight that might suffice to convert a sinner to see the grand old man go to the altar of God, with a step as if his youth came back there in the presence of Him who rejoiceth youth, but bearing humbly the life-long badge of his penance, the black glove on the hand that had shot D'Esterre.

The time has come, or nearly come, when the history of the Catholic agitation, and especially of the great epic act which closed it, the Clare election, may be fairly and completely written. The materials available for the elucidation of all its circumstances are in great part accessible. On the other hand, the time is yet far off when an impartial historic survey of O'Connell's later career can with justice be attempted. The memoirs to serve for its study are yet scanty. Perhaps the greatest embarrassment his historian will have to deal with is that rare *embarras des richesses*, the superabundance of his hero's own utterances. There never was a public man on more easy and more intimate terms with the public. He was always taking them into his confidence, and in movement before their view, sometimes in his robes of state, very much oftener in free and easy déshabille. He spoke whenever he was wanted without apparently any more thought about it than have the wind that blows, and the bird that sings. The

result is that, though obviously and undoubtedly the greatest orator of his age, it may be that posterity, not under the spell of that majestic presence, the charm of the far-flashing eye and mobile mouth, ignorant of the magic music of his voice, as well as of all the local colour, and shifting, even trivial, circumstances of the day, which he wove into that easy rolling weft of simple Saxon words, will find whole reams of Mr. O'Connell's speeches, when he was in the very meridian of his power, simply unreadable; if read, imperfectly intelligible; as to their acknowledged effect, absolutely inexplicable. But again there are speeches of his, when he rose to all the dignity of a great occasion—which curiously enough he sometimes seemed to think it not quite worth his while to do—occasions upon which he has stamped the impress of his genius in fiery and weighty words that the world, not to say Ireland, will never suffer to be forgotten. It is very probable that he deliberately sacrificed splendid trope and classic figure, allusional effect, and the light gleam of fancy or of wit, the flight of thought sublime, and the roll of pealing periods to the people whom he loved so well; by whom above all he desired to be understood and appreciated; whom he aimed to educate in his political system; and who could only understand simple words, and natural effects of humour, pathos, indignation, and persuasion. There has been, and may be many an Irish patriot who would offer up his life for his country, but who would long hesitate about sacrificing his figures of speech at the shrine of pure patriotism. Mr. O'Connell loved to be called (how strangely the once familiar words begin to sound!) "the man of the people." The magnificent gifts which God had given to him were by him given with all his heart and soul to the service of that people, upon whom oppression had at last lain so heavy, that in the land of ancient learning its children no longer knew how to read and write.

For this reason, if for no other—and there is a host of others—the Irish Catholics owe to their Liberator's memory honour so long as water runs from the hills which have one by one echoed the far-darting tones of his melodious voice, or grass grows on the plains on which his own people, men, women, and children, assembled in hundreds of thousands to see him and to hear him. And it was a holy and a wholesome thought, it was truly meet and just, right and salutary, that that hour of gloom a hundred years ago, which made Ireland the richer to all time by a soul destined one day to give her such great joy, should be celebrated with prayer and incense, with the eloquence of the pulpit and of the forum, with the long pomp of popular procession, and the hos-

pitable splendour of civic celebration. An Irish Cardinal, surrounded by that ancient hierarchy,—which for now nearly fourteen centuries has stood sentinel in the sees that S. Patrick founded, and never failed in faith,—did the solemn honours of his Cathedral to the great servant of God, of His Church, and of His Poor, for whom the prayers of Priests and people, from all the shrines of all the Irish Saints, that day rose on high. There were Prelates, too, who came from Germany, now in the gripe of an oppression like that which Ireland overcame, to breathe free air, and seek the secret of O'Connell's strategy. There were others, who attested by their presence the ancient friendship of France, which owed more than one victory, and owes its present illustrious ruler, to the Penal Laws. The simple fact contains a great lesson of wisdom for German statesmen, if they have not all got possessed by the souls of dragoons. The solemn eulogium of the dead was preached by the Archbishop of Cashel, and while, in power and finish, it might be not unfavourably compared with some of the masterpieces of the French pulpit, it was even more to be admired for its direct simplicity and its fragrance of native piety. He was heard by Peers and Commoners, to whom the dead man had opened Parliament; by Judges, whose path to the Bench he had made straight; by whole Corporations whom he had raised to their estate. From all the shores of the four seas, and from every town in the great central plains, the Irish people came to their capital to do honour to the memory of the man who for so long had lived every hour of his life in their service. Many camped in the streets, as their fathers did during the Clare Election. The waters of the bay bore for the time a floating population thick as that of a Chinese river. Men who have seen popular and civic commemorations in many cities say that there was something indescribably impressive in the aspect of that great assemblage. For three hours marched by a steady, unbroken, wide line of men,—men, of whom two out of three were fit for any military or industrial task. There was something not merely impressive in the force, but electric in the spirit of such a mass of men moved by one feeling and sentiment. A close observer—none could be better qualified—wrote of the general effect it produced upon him at the time :—

As one who saw the monster meetings in O'Connell's time, I can affirm that the procession was finer than either the Donnybrook or Tara musters with which it has been compared. The men were more vigorous-looking and better clad ; they marched better, and though it is difficult to say why, they looked brighter and more intelligent. No doubt, a larger proportion were educated, for more than half the grown men in the meetings in '43 were at school when

the only public system of education was the infamous Kildare-place Schools, established for proselytism, and they had been imperfectly taught or not taught at all, in poor private schools. I do not know if any one has calculated the expenditure involved in the procession; the number of flags and their average cost, the badges, the bannerets, the carriages, the sums paid to railways and hotels,—the total must have been enormous. The procession was as orderly as a Court pageant,—excepting the escapade in Sackville-street, of which nineteen-twentieths of the people knew nothing. It was strictly sober, and remarkably good-humoured.

But that escapade in Sackville-street, and a similar escapade at the banquet the same evening, showed very clearly that there is something very rotten in the state of Ireland. Lord O'Hagan had been selected by the committee to deliver the Centenary address. Of his selection, it might suffice to say that if Mr. O'Connell himself had been asked to name during his life the Irishman of all men best qualified to do honour to his memory, by the lustre of his eloquence, by the character of his career, by the liberality of his culture, and the width of his sympathies, finally, by his devoted and masterly vindication of every Catholic cause that has needed defence in Ireland in our days,—he would assuredly have thought of the name of Thomas O'Hagan. It is not at all likely that he would have thought of Mr. Isaac Butt as a person peculiarly qualified to pronounce his panegyric. In such a conjuncture, Sheridan's curious ejaculation might have occurred to him in a novel sense: "Save me from the calenture of my fame, preserve me from the peril of my panegyric!" But if he could have known that the friend whom he so much loved would live to be the visible proof that Catholic Emancipation had advanced a stage farther than he carried it, by ascending the woolsack as the first Catholic Chancellor, in a Ministry which should disestablish the Protestant Church of Ireland, make Tenant Right legal in every province, and, at his instance, by Lord O'Hagan's very hands, abolish the system of jury-packing,—if, we say, Mr. O'Connell could have known all this, is there an Irish Catholic worthy of the name, who can doubt what feelings would have swollen his great and generous heart? But there are Irish Catholics, it would seem, who are not worthy of the name. A promiscuous rabble, bearing black flags and other grotesque insignia, utterly indecent and out of place on such an occasion, handled by a small gang of Members of Parliament, one of them suspended on an adjacent lamp-post (self-pilloried so to speak) directing their manœuvres*—with loud cries of "Butt, Butt!" stormed the platform, and at its crowning moment drowned all the

* Mr. A. M. Sullivan, M.P. for the county of Louth.

glory of the first centenary of Daniel O'Connell in a foul and scandalous riot. Lord O'Hagan was not there, happily, unhappily. He had been suddenly summoned to Antrim in consequence of the dangerous illness of his daughter, and the fact was perfectly well known (that nothing should be wanting to season the ignominy of such an act), at least to the honourable gentlemen the ringleaders of the riot.* It had been intended that that masterly address, than which nothing more truly to the honour of Mr. O'Connell's memory will be said before his next centenary, should be under the circumstances simply read or taken as read. But even to the touch of nature, which makes human grief akin to us all, this wretched Dublin rabble, and the shameless malignants who egged it on, were deaf and callous. If there was a spark of sense among them, they must have felt that such conduct at such a moment was the deadliest method they could pursue to prevent the release of the unfortunate men whose sufferings they pretended to have at heart. But sparks of sense are not struck in mobs, nor by the hands of the new generation of Irish members. Dean Swift, in the Preface to one of the editions of the "Tale of a Tub," announced two works for publication, which were perhaps suggested by his experience of some such scene; one being "A Description of the Kingdom of Absurdities," and the other "A Modest Defence of the Proceedings of the Rabble in all Ages." Were he living, he would have described that scene in the vein in which the hanging of William Wood was described, so that it should be foul in the memory for ever. Could Mr. O'Connell have beheld such a scene in Dublin, with what a flood of wrath, with what words that would cut like whips leaving a long sore weal behind each of them, would he, at so dastardly an insult to his friend, have faced that miserable crew, and their still more miserable fuglemen. It is said that an officer of Irish lineage in the Egyptian service was tempted to revisit the land of his ancestors on this historic occasion, and that, utterly unknown, he was at the centre of the scene. He was asked afterwards what he thought of it. "Think of it?" he answered, "I don't know. I do know what I should like to have done with it, had

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* "At Glenariffe, on the 14th October, 1875, Madeleine, wife of Colonel MacDonnell, and eldest surviving daughter of the Right Honourable Lord O'Hagan. R. I. P."

Mrs. MacDonnell was grand-niece on her mother's side to the young delegate from Antrim to the Catholic Convention, Mr. Teeling, whose spirited and eloquent speech, but for the influence of Mr. Keogh, of Mount Jerome, had led the Convention to refuse any measure of Relief which did not include the right of sitting in Parliament. He was wiser than Mr. Keogh, though it could not well have seemed so at the time.

I had to deal with it in my district. Given that rabble a good strong dose of grapeshot, and impaled the gentlemen deputies along the bridge. It was like the jackals and apes gibbering and howling over a dead lion in the desert." But Eastern manners are rough. The Lord Mayor did all that was decorous and becoming under the circumstances. Finding that the riot was sufficiently well contrived for its purpose, he at once deprived the proceedings of all authority and significance by withdrawing the sanction of his presence as Chief Magistrate of the city from the place.

Mr. Butt was there, ready to take advantage of a brilliant opportunity, but the Lord Mayor so dealt with the occasion as to deprive it of the element of opportuneness. Another Member of Parliament* then mounted the platform, and entered his impudent protest against the selection of Lord O'Hagan to deliver the address on the score of his being a Government pensioner. Shade of O'Connell! Could the old man have risen from his grave and heard such outrage heaped upon his memory! The Liberator was not a whit more choice than the Drapier in the selection of his epithets, when the sound of what he regarded as mere blatant balderdash invaded his ear. "Will any one stuff a wisp of hay in that calf's mouth?" is said to have been the rather gruff way in which he once stopped a flood of such impassioned rigmarole. In the name of that common sense, which it is to be hoped has not utterly deserted the Irish people, what was the grand aim and object of the thirty years' war of Mr. O'Connell's early life, except to establish the right of the Irish Catholic to hold any office and share every privilege emanating from the Crown and Constitution? Was it not a notorious mortification to him (aimed at him personally, as it almost certainly was), that the highest office in the profession he belonged to and so much loved, remained by the Emancipation Act closed against the Catholic? By a happy accident, aiding the zeal and skill of Sir Colman O'Loghlin, that exemption was removed in time to enable Mr. Gladstone to give a proof in the person of a man, then universally loved and respected, of what the spirit of his Irish policy would prove to be. Mr. O'Hagan became Lord Chancellor of Ireland amid the applause of Irish Protestant and Catholic alike. If Mr. O'Connell had lived to see that day, it would have been to him one of over-flowing contentment. But the young sparks, who illustrate Irish political genius in the senate and on the stump nowadays, are wiser in their generation. They rather seek their inspirations in the nimble tactics of Mr.

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* Mr. O'Connor Power, M.P. for the county of Mayo.

Facing-Both-Ways, at Westminster; it is their line, with much over-acted moderation, to reclaim every right, every privilege of which their constituents are deprived. In Lord O'Hagan's person, the right of the Irish Catholic to preside over the whole administration of justice in the country was for the first time established; and, lo! here is a triumphant type of the mettle and the mental condition of the representative men of the Irish Catholics nearly half a century after Emancipation! An Irish Member of Parliament—a whole pack of them—can be found to hound on a mob against such a man as Lord O'Hagan—and in his absence—and by way of doing honour to Mr. O'Connell's memory! It was brave, it was discreet; nay, it was chivalrous, it was magnanimous. It is to such men statues should be raised, not to O'Connell. In his excellent, though in truth somewhat too voluminous "Essay on Some of the more Admirable Qualities of the Irish Character," Count Palæologus Mac Namara somewhere says, "Oh, for the glory of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds! Oh, for the pleasure of eating your cake and having it!" This scandalous scene was repeated and surpassed before midnight. The same rabble, or a similar, not one whit more capable of self-control or decorum, with no more thought of the honour of their country or of the respect due to Mr. O'Connell's memory, again with the same significant countersign, the cry of "Butt, Butt!" hissed and hooted down Sir Charles Gavan Duffy at the Banquet in the evening. He is the one surviving fellow-prisoner of Mr. O'Connell, who has held with unstained reputation and sustained capacity an eminent public position before the world. He is the first Irish Catholic, born and trained on Irish soil, who has proved by conducting with undeniable energy, resource, and address, the government of a great political community, that Irish Catholics are not incapable of the virtues and talents proper to a state of self-government. He has, at whatever cost—and the cost has at least been years spent in opposition that might otherwise have been spent in office—always declared his devotion to the Irish Cause; always with might and main defended Catholic Interests in the colony of Victoria, especially the leading interest of Catholic Education. Before he left Ireland, twenty years ago, he had rendered to his country services that ought not to be forgotten, that never shall be forgotten. He had suffered for Ireland the wearing solitude of prison, the cruel anguish of an uncertain fate, the still more poignant agony of noble labours balked, of sanguine hopes inscrutably baffled. The reception that awaited him on his first appearance before his fellow-countrymen, after an absence of many years, during which he had added a new page of historic honours to the Irish

name, was a storm of yells and hisses. The Lord Mayor, again seeing that the riot was too carefully pre-arranged to allow any hope of obtaining a fair hearing for the speakers, with admirable decision at once left the chair, and ordered the lights to be extinguished. The brawlers dispersed in the darkness. They had disgraced, so far as they could, the Irish name. They had violated in turn every one of the favourite principles of Mr. O'Connell! and so, as if it were their desire to make such an occasion a sort of after-taste of Purgatory to him, most scandalously outraged his memory. They had disgusted and dismayed the distinguished foreigners, who had come from distant sees to testify their respect for Ireland. They had shocked the moral sense of the whole world. Such was the scene with which the celebration of the first Centenary of Daniel O'Connell closed.

The Holy Father has testified his sense of the hospitable splendour with which the Lord Mayor celebrated this great occasion, and of the truly Catholic spirit which he displayed in all its arrangements, by conferring upon him the distinguished honour of the Grand Cross of S. Gregory the Great. His Holiness has since signified his warm approval of the O'Connell Leagues, which are springing up for the defence of Catholic Liberty in the regions where the Church is undergoing persecution on the Continent. A cabal of Members of Parliament, backed by the Protestant journalists of Dublin, have however, it seems, determined that wherever else the O'Connell League may exist, it shall not presume to extend its operations to Ireland. So be it; if indeed it must be so. Not the least of the services rendered by the Lord Mayor to his countrymen on this occasion—one which required considerable moral courage, and obtained for him the honour of a great amount of abuse—was his publicly fixing the personal responsibility of the scandalous scenes in Sackville Street and at the Banquet, on the honourable gentlemen engaged. He has attributed the principal blame for the uproar in which the Banquet closed to Mr. Philip Callan, M.P. for Dundalk. Mr. Callan has denied the imputation. We are not concerned to dispute his denial. He was there, and he no doubt did all that was becoming to so important a personage on so great an occasion. We commenced this paper, as it were, face to face with Mr. Edmund Burke a century ago; we close it face to face with Mr. Phillip Callan. Such a conjuncture has, if not much poetical propriety, at least the air of a mysterious dispensation. After all, Mr. Callan is more truly the representative man of the Ireland of our days than any other who can be named. Others are accidents; he is a cause. Others are transient and volatile elements; he

is the long-matured and concrete result of twenty years of Catholic politics. He has done things that Mr. O'Connell in all his pride of power could not do. Mr. O'Connell defeated a Cabinet Minister at Clare; a gentleman personally much esteemed, with a strong local connection, a friend to the Catholic cause, but a member of an anti-Catholic government. Mr. Callan defeated a Cabinet Minister of a far higher order of mind and character than Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald; of a more ancient and widespread connection with his native county, of a previously unbounded popularity, and whose name had, a short time before he met his constituents for the last time, been written—in words that will endure as long as his country has annals—as that of the Irish Minister during whose administration the State Church ceased to exist as a public establishment, and the protection of the law was spread at last for a sanction and a shield over the property of the Irish tenant. Mr. O'Connell was never so great a person in his native district as he was elsewhere, and, it may be fairly doubted whether he could at any time of his life have got himself elected at once for the county of Kerry and the borough of Tralee. He alone, of all great Irishmen, anticipated Mr. Callan in the stroke of a double return to Parliament, having been once seated for both Cork and Kilkenny at the same election. But it is Mr. Callan's rare good fortune to be a prophet in his own country. Herein he surpasses Mr. O'Connell. He not merely succeeded in ejecting Sir George Bowyer from Dundalk, and Mr. Fortescue for Louth. He carried Mr. Alexander Sullivan on his shoulders into the spare seat for the county. Mr. O'Connell would never have dreamed of such a thing as setting up Mr. Barrett, the editor of his favourite newspaper, for the second seat in Kerry. To continue this instructive parallel, it is difficult to conceive Mr. O'Connell deliberately going into any constituency in which he knew the Bishop would publicly oppose him. The high-minded and gentle Prelate who rules the Primatial see of Ireland, wrote a letter full of indignant sorrow at what he regarded as an act of wanton ingratitude, to Mr. Fortescue. It had no perceptible effect. Indeed the influence of Archbishops is of little account, amid the portentous upheaval of new and undoubtedly very ugly political forces in Ireland nowadays. Even Mr. O'Connor Power has been able to oust the Archbishop of Tuam from his once unbounded electoral power in Mayo. Still stronger facts however remain to be stated. Mr. Callan has admitted with perfect candour, on his oath, in a court of justice, that he was a candidate for office (for the Governorship of a Colony or a Commissionership of Railways, we believe) not very long before the election in

which he defeated Mr. Fortescue; and strange to say it was through Mr. Fortescue's friendly offices that he actually hoped to get place. So great is the sway of his personal character over the minds of his colleagues, that even those of them who do not hesitate to assail Lord O'Hagan behind his back, and in the hour of his affliction, as a Government Pensioner, seem to think of this strange aberration from the strict line of patriotic duty as a charming foible that ought only to endear their unfathomable friend still more to their hearts. It transpired on the same trial, or on another,—for the Louth election gives much occupation to the Courts,—that while aspiring to represent the person of the Queen in Hong Kong or Barbadoes, Mr. Callan did not at all disdain the aid of the old Fenian Centres, who were by no means the least effective of his electioneering agents. He apparently retains, through all revelations and vicissitudes, his supreme popularity, and his curious but considerable power. His career affords a singular study of the ways of public life in Ireland, for those who have the mind —may we add the stomach?—to pursue that branch of political philosophy. Why it is, that with such faculties and energies as he has exhibited, he should have the patience to wait for the reversion of the leadership of the Irish Party in Parliament passes comprehension. Perhaps he does not think the game is worth the candle in these days. It is indeed an age in which any full-sized frog may by swelling his sides sufficiently hope to be taken for at least a bullock; and in which, in some countries, even minnows have been known to pass muster, not at all unfrequently, for Tritons.

If Dean Swift had written that "Modest Defence of the Proceedings of the Rabble in all Ages" which he designed, he would probably have warned his countrymen to beware of allowing the ascendancy of that element in their affairs; because history tells that from the days of Barrabas of Jerusalem to the days of the Commune of Paris, not to mention later dates, nations which have allowed their rabble to hold their proxy on solemn public occasions, have incurred grievous jndgments thereby. There is abundant evidence to our belief that the authority of the rabble in Ireland has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. There is a not inconsiderable proportion of the population of that country which, by mere audacity, constantly achieves the control of public affairs, and for whom Mr. O'Connell, we fear we may add Father Mathew, would seem to have lived and toiled in vain. How much of the great political and moral reforms once associated with those names now really remains? There must be something very rotten in the state of Ireland when such scenes as we have

referred to can come to pass, and the name of Ireland and the memory of O'Connell, and the persons of eminent and honourable men, suffer outrage thereby; and that men of good will and good sense, in the presence of such scandals, should seem to be cowed or indifferent, or to take it easy, and even find some amusement in the squabble. There is an utter and conspicuous absence herein, at all events, of the usual signs of a sane national spirit and of a keen public conscience. It is a pity when the sense of shame at public iniquity begins to fade in a Christian nation. Symptoms there are, some of which we have specified, that the ancient influence of the Priesthood in the public and politicial life of Ireland is passing away—is in certain regions eclipsed, if not extinguished. We know by the historical experience of other nations, once as zealous for the faith and devoted to the Church as the Irish, how slow are the early stages of popular demoralization, how rapid the career of subsequent deterioration and decay; and how, in France and Italy especially, the process has been mainly accelerated by the excessive development of the public power of the rabble. This is the state that Ireland seems to have entered upon, a sufficiently anxious but far from a hopeless one. It would be a work worthy of Mr. Burke or of Mr. O'Connell to re-form her power, and reanimate her spirit—but these be the days in which Mr. Philip Callan is, according to all recognised tests, the desired and the elect of his people—and great men are generally vouchsafed to nations who in some degree deserve their service.

LETTER FROM M. ALBERT DECHAMPS TO REV. F. GRATRY.

[See the note at the end of our article on F. Newman. The italics throughout are the author's.]

April 24, 1871.

Rev. and Dear Father,—Our last interview greatly consoled me. You do not know how greatly you are to me, not only a master, but a friend. After the Scriptures, the "Imitation of Jesus Christ," and the works of the Fathers and the Saints, your beautiful writings on God, on the soul, on Jesus Christ, the blessed Virgin, the Church, the "Credo," and the sophists of our time, are those in which I find most light and strength. At the close of our conversation you spoke to me of my brother, who truly loves you as you love him; and of the silence, which he would wish you to break, but which you think it your duty for the time to maintain.

I now beg of you to listen to my brother, or rather to respond to what the Church requires from you.

To me it appears that I have a special claim on your attention; I have thought like you on some of the questions which still trouble you; in a certain measure I have shared in what I, and even you yourself, call your errors; I am a convert; and this perhaps is a motive why you should listen to me with greater attention.

Before the Encyclical of 1864 I addressed to the Pope, in the name of our friends MM. de Montalembert, de Falloux, Albert de Broglie, Cochin, &c., a memorial pleading for silence. A few days ago I reperused this memorial; and I found that the reasons I there laid down in favour of preserving silence, are precisely the same as those which the Bishop of Orleans at the commencement of the Council laid down against the opportuneness of the Conciliar Definition relative to Infallibility.

Before the Council and during the first period of that great Assembly, I was an inopportunist. I was of opinion that the question should not be laid before the Council, just as I had thought that it would be better for the Pope not to publish the Encyclical.

I belonged, therefore, to the party of silence, until the Church, by the combined voices of Council and Pope, had spoken.

I was sincere, but I was mistaken.

Permit me to open to you, as to a Confessor, my entire soul; and to explain to you how I retraced my steps, by the light not only of the Church's decisions, but also of the gigantic events which we are witnessing, and in which the hand of God so visibly manifests itself in order to point out the errors of our ephemeral systems. I was mistaken; the Church has taught me so; I believed, at first through submission and without clearly seeing; but I sought a clearer vision, and now I enjoy all the lights of my faith.

I will tell you what I was. I was a Liberal in the rational and Christian sense of that prostituted term; there is doubtless no motive for ceasing to be so in this sense; the time is at hand when Christians, nay Catholics alone, will undertake the defence of human liberty, odiously oppressed as it is by Liberal tyranny, whether that tyranny assume the name of republic or empire. But this name of Liberal is too ill-defined, it hides too many deplorable equivocations, for us still to accept it; the name of Catholic is good enough to satisfy us.

I have never been a Gallican. I was brought up on the knees of the Count de Maistre in horror of Gallicanism; and I have never been tempted to become either a democratic Gallican after the example of Lamennais, or a monarchical Gallican after the example of Bossuet. The question of [Papal] Infallibility has never been a difficulty to me; I have always believed in it; far from my reason being troubled, I have, on the contrary, never understood how, without that Infallibility, doctrinal authority and the Church's unity could stand. Infallibility, as the Comte de Maistre has so excellently remarked, is necessarily supposed in every supreme authority in this world, in every authority which judges without appeal. But if in human things and human institutions it is but *supposed* and does not really *exist*, such is not the case in Divine things and institutions. The Church being *divinely* established as a *teaching* institution, Infallibility *necessarily* exists in it in the authority which defines matters of faith. Infallibility, such as the Council has defined it, is not absolute; for the doctrines of faith and the revealed law are alone its object; its sphere, that of faith and morals, being clearly marked out by the Constitution of the Vatican Council. With regard to the sphere of science or the sphere of politics, *when faith is not in question*, all is outside the question of Infallibility. Thus the latter, having its limits and its conditions, is not absolute.

Again, Infallibility is not *personal*, in such sense as to have for its object the *personal thoughts* of the Pope, or to *belong to a person who can never be mistaken in anything;* thus rendering the Pope infallible in all that he does and says. This would be Infallibility of the private person; whereas Infallibility belongs only to the *public person* * *in the exercise of his supreme function of teaching* in matters of faith and morals. † The Church has the Deposit of Revelation, of Holy Scripture and of Tradition; the Pope is its supreme guardian; the Evangelic promise of Infallibility is nothing more than the promise of fidelity in the guardianship and defence of that sacred Deposit. When the Pope, or the Council united with the Pope, declares that a truth is contained in the Deposit of Revelation, he does not invent it, but merely discriminates and affirms it; he does not create a new truth, but confirms and elucidates an old one.

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* Muzzarelli.

† Allow me to place before you the words of Cardinal Sfondrati, quoted by S. Alphonsus Liguori: "Cum hoc privilegium infallibilitatis in publicum Ecclesiæ bonum vergat, noluit Deus illud *personæ*, sed *officio* annecti, et *tunc solum præsto esse, cùm pontificali officio fungeretur.*"

Infallibility then is not *absolute:* neither is it *personal* in the absurd meaning attached to this expression; though it is so in the sense that *it is to the person of Peter, the head of the Church,* that the divine assistance has been promised, *not to manifest to the world new doctrines or new revelations, but to keep and set forth faithfully the Revelation transmitted by the Apostles, or the Deposit of the Faith.** In fine, Infallibility is not separated. How could it be so, having for its object the very Tradition of the Church? Besides, never has a doctrinal definition ex cathedrâ been met by a protest of the universal Church. Where is there a dogmatic constitution of the Holy See, which has not been held as *law* in the Church? Never had such a thing been seen, and never will it; it would be giving the lie to the Gospel. Doubtless, the head cannot be separated from the body of the Church; but the head united to the body does not less remain the one head. To suppose that they can ever be separated, is to deny the Church, to forget the promises of Jesus Christ, to abolish the whole of history, to renounce the Catholic Faith.

This is a long and yet very incomplete digression. I merely wished to say that I had never been a Gallican. Scarcely any one appeared to be so, before the controversy which was raised on occasion of the Council. I find a proof of what I now affirm in your own works. The last controversy before the Definition by the Council turned principally on the opportuneness of this dogmatic Definition of the Church's belief in Infallibility ex cathedrâ.

But though I was not a Gallican, I again affirm that I was then an inopportunist. Almost all politicians were like me in this respect. It was the thought of the effect which would be produced on the men of our day and the results which would ensue in existent society, which principally actuated us. In other words, we regarded the question rather from a political than a doctrinal point of view. In presence of contemporary facts, we were afraid of the divisions which we supposed probable; of the resistance which might trouble Catholics in the countries placed at the head of the social movement of our epoch; of the abandonment and perhaps the hostility of governments, who might facilitate the machinations of Italy against the Papacy.

Such were the thoughts and the fears which I shared at the opening of the Council. How is it that I have changed? that I have been enlightened? Why do questions and facts appear to me under a totally different aspect?

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* These are the words of the Constitution "Pastor æternus," where the Vatican Council declares that Infallibility is not the result of new revelations or inspirations, but merely of divine assistance. The Council recalls at the same time *the means* which this divine assistance has always led the Sovereign Pontiffs to adopt, when there has been question of defining doctrines of faith contained in the Scriptures or in Apostolic Traditions. Then, in fact, the Popes convoked Councils, or interrogated the dispersed Church, or took other means furnished by Providence. Was not the dispersed Church interrogated by Pius IX. before his definition of the Immaculate Conception? And was not a General Council convoked before the Definition of the Infallibility ex cathedrâ?

Why have I been converted, whilst at the same time recovering that peace of conscience and of soul which had for a moment abandoned me?

I owe it in the first place to the grace of God, to whom I prayed earnestly. I have experienced the truth of that beautiful sentence of Bossuet's, which you are so fond of quoting in your admirable meditations on abandonment and self-sacrifice. "I was on my road to slavery through independence: I took a contrary path, and passed through obedience to liberty." A severe combat took place within me. As you know, there are two regions of the soul, both of which you have described. In that region of my mind where dwelt my cherished opinions, I found conflicts, quasi-revolts, and great tumult; when I ascended into that other region of the soul where one prays, suffers, and loves,—that region where one meets God more directly,—all appeared to me illumined by another light, in which I once more found repose. I then felt that I had been becoming estranged from the Church, and that I had been no longer walking in the path of humility and obedience. "The knowledge which comes from on high through the influence of grace," says the Imitation, "is quite different from that acquired by the labour of the human mind." Who has not experienced this?

Thus I commenced by saying "I believe"; now, as I shall presently show, I can say "I see." But before seeing I had already certitude through my faith. I am sure of my faith; I am far less sure of my opinions. The history of my opinions during sixty-three years is too often the history of my errors. I am attached to my opinions, for they are my sisters; but I am still more firmly attached to my faith, which is my mother. Now this faith would collapse if I could no longer say in all truth and sincerity, "I believe in the holy Catholic Church." I could not however say it as I ought, if I entertained a doubt, not merely as to the truth, but as to the wisdom of the Definitions of a Council united to the Pope; a Council, moreover, the most numerous, the most manifestly œcumenical, and the most free of all the Councils. If the Church be not there, where can she be? Not at Trent, nor Constantinople, nor Nicea; Councils whose inconestable œcumenicity was, however, less unmistakably displayed than that of the Vatican. This would be going beyond Gallicanism, which never thought of questioning the decisions of a General Council united to the Pope. We should no longer stop at 1682; for most certainly, were Bossuet still alive, he would make as energetic an act of adhesion to the Definitions of the Council as Fénélon himself: we should have to go back to Luther, that is to say, into open heresy; into the abandoning of our holy Mother, the Church. Our poor Döllinger is in this position. He, who at Munich in 1832 urged M. de Lamennais to submit to the Encyclical "Mirari vos," which had not the support of a General Council, is now in his turn in revolt. Let us pray earnestly for him. Do you not think, dear Father, that you would be performing a great act of charity, which would bring down the blessing of our Lord, if you, whose voice is so powerful, would grasp this poor soul on the edge of the abyss into which he is about to fall? This was what Montalembert did a very few days before his death, with regard to the unfortunate Père Hyacinthe, in a letter full of light and faith which I read with profound edification.

I am persuaded that the author of this letter must have had great merit before God. Mde. de Montalembert has told me how our dear friend, when on the very threshold of the tomb, had a conversation with Countess Werner de Mérode which gives me assured confidence. Mde. de Mérode, hearing him make use of some of those excited words which we must attribute to the weak state of his nerves rather than to his reason and his heart, was rather alarmed, and said to him: "But what would you do if the Council, united to the Pope, were to define Infallibility?" Charles de Montalembert, thus placed in presence of his Catholic Faith, cast one glance towards the Countess, and then the great orator, with the firm accent of a Christian making his act of faith, replied, "Well, simply, I shall believe."

Another train of consideration has opened my eyes to my then error of appreciation. Why were we inopportunists? Our principal motive was our fear lest the Definition should serve as an occasion or pretext to the bad will of Governments; thus bringing about a perilous situation. Our political view was perhaps correct, but was it so with our religious one? We had understood the present, but had we understood the future as well? We started from a human stand-point; but it was necessary that we should attain to a divine one, and this the Church has effected. After having listened to the Church, let us turn our attention to history.

Let us reperuse the history of the Church and the Councils from Nicea until now, and we shall be convinced that it has ever been thus; that whenever any Council has defined a dogmatic truth of Christianity, reasons of inopportuneness far graver than those of our own day appeared to stand in opposition to those Councils, and urge on them silence. In every instance I have found inopportunists; the prudent and the wise, who wished to avert the condemnations of great heresies, or to avert dogmatic definitions; and the reasons of these men were exactly similar to what our reasons were at the opening of the Vatican Council.

Before Nicea, Constantine interposed to silence S. Alexander and Arius. He reproached them with creating divisions amongst Christians, by raising a question which he styled frivolous. Eusebius of Cæsarea and other illustrious Bishops preached forbearance and silence. They predicted long dissensions in the Church. Arianism threatened the world; it invaded Europe and Africa; the barbarous nations, whom the Church should have baptized, embraced Arianism. The Roman Emperors became Arians. Many centuries of mighty struggles were necessary to overcome this heresy. S. Athanasius, S. Hilary, S. Ambrose, S. Basil, S. Gregory of Nazianzum resisted it. And all this for the sake of a word which may appear, if not frivolous, as Constantine said, at least subtle, in the eyes of the world,—the word "consubstantial." Could it not then have been said with more apparent reason than now, that it would be better not to raise that question? that three hundred years had passed without that Definition? that to purchase it at the price of long convulsions in the Church and society was neither wise nor prudent?

A situation exactly similar arose at the period of every one of the Councils convoked in analogous circumstances; such, for example, as at the origin

of the Greek schism. For many long centuries Photius has torn from the Church a large portion of the East, and that for a question more subtle in appearance even than that of Nicea—the Procession of the Holy Ghost. Could they not then have said on the question of the "Filioque" all that was said at Nicea?

Luther alienated from the Church almost the half of *the States* of Europe.* Might it not have been maintained at the Council of Trent that the definition of "Transubstantiation" was neither so necessary nor so opportune, as to make worth while the creation of such a disaster? This was what in fact happened: Charles V. was at the head of the inopportunists of that epoch, as Constantine had been before Nicea.

The question then is this. If the inopportunists of every age had been listened to; if the compromise of silence had been adopted towards Arius, Pelagius, Nestorius, Eutyches, Sergius, Photius, Huss, Luther, and Jansenius; if, in order to avoid these troubles in the Church, and the loss of States which she has sustained, she had not opposed to error definitions of faith—what would have happened? The apparent peace which would have been purchased by this base cowardice would have been the abandonment of truth and the ruin of the Church. We should not now know what is God's Trinity in Unity, or the divinity of Jesus Christ, or grace and free will, or the Blessed Virgin, or the Divine Eucharist, or the Sacraments, nay, or the Church herself. One vast doubt, the fruit of the silence of the inopportunists, would have brooded over all Christian truths; by this desire of averting the divisions and separations consequent on heresies and schisms (I am speaking of course per impossibile), Christianity would have been destroyed, and the Church annihilated; we should belong at this moment to the Christianity of Channing and the free-thinkers.

Let us suppose for an instant that the first Council convoked since 1682 had maintained silence on the subject of the Gallican error, what would have been the result of that silence? To give Gallicanism new strength. Before the Council, this question appeared dormant; it had not been perceived that Gallicanism, instead of expiring, was transforming itself; from the absolutism, which was its characteristic under Bossuet, *it was becoming liberal*, and THE SEPARATION OF THE CHURCH AND THE STATE was its formula. The silence of the Council would have restored to this error a life which was thought extinct. On the eve it was scarcely tolerated; the jurists of the Napoleonic Empire maintained it, but scarcely one Bishop of France followed the maxims of the Empire on this point. On the morrow of a Council which should have admitted the inopportuneness of the Definition, it is evident that Gallicanism would have been no longer reproved though tolerated, but *authorized*. Silence would not have preserved the former "status quo"; it would have made 1682 assume unprecedented dimensions;

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* I say *the States*, because Catholicity is always living in those States as elsewhere. The Catholics of Germany, England, the North, and even of those States where persecution rages, live in the true faith, and, if needs be, would die for it.

it would have been the triumph of Gallicanism. My brother has clearly shown this in his letter to a magistrate. No one has tried to gainsay him.

Permit me to dwell a moment longer on one of the facts of history which have shed most light on my mind. I wish to speak of what took place in 1650, in regard to Jansenism and Port Royal.

I find face to face at that era, Rome and a celebrated school rendered illustrious by the greatest names of the time—Arnauld, Nicole, and Pascal.

Had I lived then, I should have been attracted to those men without sufficiently seeing the drift of their doctrines. I feel that Port Royal, regarded from its beautiful side, would have had for me much attraction; Mde. Chantal and Thomassin themselves experienced this attraction. The aureole of austerity which surrounded Port Royal, the good faith of most of its disciples, the learning of Arnauld and Nicole, and the genius of Pascal, all this would perhaps have inclined me towards the inopportunists who, together with some French Bishops, were pleading at Rome the cause of silence. I should have been struck with the danger which existed, lest the condemnation of Jansenism might create a great schism, cast out of the Church an honourable school, numbering in its members the greatest genius of that time, and all this for questions which might appear obscure. I should have been so much the more attracted to the party of silence because the Pope, on account of contemporary wars, was then unable to convoke a Council. He was doubtless neither alone nor separated; since eighty-eight Bishops of France, the Sorbonne, the religious orders, the universities, the majority of the Bishops of Spain and the Netherlands, solicited the condemnation of Jansenism. Still the voice of a Council had not been joined to the Pontifical word; and the dogmatic definition of Infallibility had not yet been pronounced. Here was one more opening for trouble and strife. Human reasons, political wisdom, seemed then, far more than now, on the side of the inopportunists. And yet the facts of history proclaim that Rome was right, and that Port Royal and the inopportunists were wrong.

It is now fully acknowledged that the chief cause why a large portion of the French population has abandoned the Christian life, Catholic practices, and the use of the Sacraments, is the narrow and desolating doctrine of Jansenism; which has left traces of rigorism in the spirit of the French clergy. If one could analyze all the causes of the religious declension in France, among the most weighty would be found the Jansenistical doctrine, which has scared away souls from the Church and favoured the re-action of unbelief.

When an error, a heresy springs up, men observe but little the great though distant consequences which this corruption of Catholic truth must produce, and they estimate inadequately its deplorable results. Contemporaries, those especially who are ruled by political ideas, are less struck by these far-distant consequences of the error, than by the present perils which a condemnation or definition might bring about through the divisions and troubles which it would occasion. And yet, as I said before,

all history proves that these mighty trials, victoriously traversed by the Church militant, have powerfully served evangelic truth and civilization.

S. Vincent de Paul, with his clear saintly vision, "oculus simplex," was not thus taken in. He, the apostle of charity, of condescension, of prudence, he was the very soul of the movement directed towards obtaining from Rome a condemnation of Jansenism. It was he who urged the Bishops to sign the letter addressed to the Pope petitioning for condemnation of the five propositions. It was he who obtained the adhesion of eighty-eight Bishops. Eleven resist: he opens a remarkable correspondence with the Bishops of Lucon, Allet, and Pamiers, who defended the cause of inopportunism and silence on exactly similar grounds to those which actuated the inopportunists at the last Council. Men should read the letters of S. Vincent de Paul. They furnish the best and most complete reply to the inopportunists of our own times. All the reasons which S. Vincent de Paul urged in opposition to silence in 1651 are the best calculated to combat the silence party of to-day. Reperuse these letters, Rev. and dear Father, they will strengthen you as they have strengthened me. The non-adhering Bishops in 1651 proposed a compromise *forbidding either party to dogmatize.* "This," says S. Vincent de Paul, "only served to establish error on a firm footing; for, seeing that it was treated as on an equality with truth, it profited of this time to propagate itself."

One of his missioners consulted him on the subject of authorizing silence in his congregation. S. Vincent de Paul wrote to him thus: "To preserve silence on these occasions, is, according to the great Pope S. Celestine, to supply error with weapons." S. Vincent de Paul did not approve "of his priests disputing, attacking, and defending with angry vehemence; but he wished them to speak when circumstances demanded it, and not be deterred from so doing through fear of creating for themselves enemies." "God forbid," he exclaims, "that these weak motives which fill hell, should prevent my missioners from defending the interests of God and of His Church. O my Jesus! it is not expedient that it should be so; we must be 'unius labii.'"

I must say that among the motives which have tended to enlighten me, those furnished by reading the letters of S. Vincent de Paul have not been the least powerful.

Another example was likewise of advantage to me, and it has to do with you even more than with me: I mean that of F. Thomassin, one of your brothers of the Oratory, whom you hold in great veneration. He had in all sincerity upholden Jansenistical propositions. He retracted these after the publication of the Bull of Innocent X. He went in search of all those to whom he had communicated his former sentiments, in order that they might know of his submission, and in his "Dogmata Catholica" he made a public confession of his errors. "A theologian," he said, "should glory in learning from the Church, by learning that of which he was ignorant and renouncing what he had learnt badly."

It appears to me certain that if Thomassin thought it his duty to make this act of courageous submission on occasion of the Bull of Innocent X

and the Constitution of Alexander VII., he would do the same with less hesitation still on occasion of the decision of the Œcumenical Council of the Vatican, confirmed by the Sovereign Pontiff. Oh! remind our poor Döllinger of Thomassin and S. Vincent de Paul, stretch out your hand to him, bring him back to the Church. It would be terrible to think that a long life employed like his in so many useful labours for the service of the Church, of truth, and of right, should have a fatal termination in the service of error and of evil. God will not permit it, and He will make use of you to prevent it.

To sum up. I see, after having first believed; the clouds of my mind have dispersed and the light shines. But, I repeat, I was certain of my error, before I saw why and how I was mistaken. My faith rests on an assemblage of motives decisive to the eyes of reason, and on the intimate experience of grace which obscurity cannot weaken. Now, my Catholic faith is the faith of the Church; the Council joined to the Pope is manifestly the Church. To deny this would be to yield to a fearful temptation; and he who did so would no longer be either with Bossuet or Pascal, but with Luther. I will say with Thierry: "I see, by history, the manifest necessity of a Divine and visible authority for the development of the life of mankind. Now, all that is exterior to Christianity is of no avail. Moreover, all that is exterior to the Catholic Church is without authority. Therefore, the Catholic Church is the authority which seek, and I submit myself to it. I believe what she teaches."

What firmness in these words which you yourself received from the lips of the great historian! What power of reasoning! What simplicity of faith!

Oh! dear Father, I do not think of you when I say all this. I should have to ask your pardon many times were such a thought to enter my mind. It is you who have taught me what revolt and pride are, and of what value for salvation are humility, obedience, the simple faith of a little child, so strongly recommended by your Fénélon. If I had temptations and doubts, it would be to your charitable heart that I would impart them.

A. Dechamps.

[We need hardly remind our readers, that F. Gratry made a full act of Catholic submission before he died. He has left on record the impression which he had received of what it was which the advocates of the Definition desired: an impression to which was mainly owing his dread of that Definition. Perhaps in all ecclesiastical history there can hardly be found another so astounding misconception of theological opponents. See our last number from p. 99 to p. 101.]

Notices of Books.

[Notices of one or two important books are unavoidably postponed.]

The Public Life of Jesus Christ. Vol. II.: *The Preaching of the Beatitudes* By H. J. Coleridge, S.J. London : Burns & Oates.

IN our last number we set forth as best we could the great and unique excellence of F. Coleridge's work, both as regards its general plan, and as regards the execution of that plan in the one volume which had appeared. Every one would have expected that the second volume would be more interesting even than the first, from the more interesting nature of the portion of the Gospels therein treated. But few, we think, would have been prepared for so magnificent an exposition as that of the Beatitudes, which occupies more than half the volume; and which to our mind indefinitely excels every other commentary which is in use whether among Catholics or pious Protestants. In fact the Beatitudes cannot receive any worthy interpretation at all, except by means of that *expository* treatment, which is one of F. Coleridge's chief peculiarities.

F. Coleridge's style appears to us singularly forcible and beautiful. But what especially impresses us, is the profound ascetical treatment given to each successive Beatitude; and the manner in which each is shown to arise, with a characteristically divine fulness of aptitude, from that which has preceded. The whole may be considered an ascetical treatise perfect in itself, no less than a biblical commentary. F. Coleridge shows himself thoroughly versed in the great Catholic ascetical writers, and we are delighted to find that

"It may be hoped that portions of this and other great ascetical works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which are either inaccessible from their rarity, or formidable on account of their great length, may be translated or abridged in the series of ascetical works, which has been commenced under the same management as that to which the present volume belongs" (p. 229).

We may take indeed the present opportunity for testifying, what is everywhere felt among English Catholics; viz. the very great benefits conferred by the English Jesuits in this "Quarterly Series."

We must indulge in the gratification of transferring to our own pages some extracts from this volume; and we hope that, by doing so, we may

induce those of our readers who have not yet entered on a study of the work to lose no time in commencing.

In the following passage the author draws attention to an undeniable fact, which some Catholics seem perhaps afraid of looking in the face:

"The sacrifice of the Cross is of infinite efficacy, and by virtue of it a new Creation has come into existence. But the actual results of what our Lord has done and suffered and purchased correspond rather to the disappointment which He allowed to cloud His soul at the time of the Agony in the Garden, than to the intrinsic power of His work, or even to the glowing language in which the fruit of that work has been described by the Evangelical Prophet. The souls in which the grace which our Lord has left behind Him is allowed to accomplish all that it can accomplish, are few indeed; and what is true of single souls is true of that multitude and community of single souls of which the Church is made up, and of the teeming world around her, which she has the mission as well as the power to convert and transform and beautify, with all the glories of the creation of grace. She shows her divine origin, her heavenly mission, her supernatural gifts, by what she does, because any one of her countless triumphs is the result of a power and a presence which is nothing short of divine. If she had suffered greater losses and endured more relentless opposition and persecution than she has actually suffered, she would still have proved herself to be what she claims to be by evidence which no human reason could gainsay. But what is enough for testimony is not enough for complete success, and it is for a witness that the Gospel is to be preached to all nations" (p. 148).

Here is a vigorous comment on the "hunger and thirst after justice." The little reference at starting to an ant-hill has a certain playfulness about it, which of course would not often be in place in such a treatise as the present :—

"The condition of man in this life is one of craving and desire. The world is full of restless unremitting activity. If an ant-hill is disturbed, we see the hundreds of ants which belong to it running to and fro in what seems to us to be wild confusion, and as far as it appears, they do nothing else but run about. Do not the blessed citizens of heaven look down thus upon the world of men below them, and might they not wonder at what is the end and what the gain of all the actions which they behold? The external activity of mankind, whether it be in pursuit of wealth, honour, or in pursuit of pleasure – for the silly butterflies of the world are as busy in their way as the working bees—is yet nothing in comparison to the seething confusion within, the perpetual straining of desires, hopes, ambitions, the constant working of the passions of every kind toward their objects, indifferent or bad, shameful or gainful, so that it would seem that the mind and heart can never live without some food in the way of complacency or desire, aversion or displeasure. Our merciful Father, Who knows the restlessness of our nature, because it is always striving after its end under some form or other, true or false, fantastic or rational, has met our needs by giving us what to love and what to aim at, and so He has made it possible for our desires to work themselves in perpetual activity and at the same time ennoble themselves, elevate us, place us nearer and nearer to Him, and heap up for us infinite treasures and ineffable joys, which are indeed true treasures and true joys, in the life to come. Even in the natural order it is constantly seen how a noble ambition, or some sudden call of duty or patriotism which requires

devotion and self-sacrifice, or even the having a new purpose given to a life by means of some deep personal attachment, makes men out of boys, and serious workers out of triflers and fops, and in this way develops and improves whatever is good and capable of being made better in the character of those who are thus possessed. And it is of the nature of such ambitions or desires as are thus generated to become engrossing and absorbing, and to extinguish, by excluding, all other concupiscences. What must it be, then, when this hunger and thirst after all the mighty and fertile range of virtues rise up in the soul? The lower passions are at once lulled to sleep, the appetites are tamed, reason regains her sway, the voice of conscience is louder and clearer, the mind becomes illuminated by faith, the will becomes robust and decided, the whole man becomes larger and stronger and nobler, his thoughts and principles and aims are insensibly changed till they become the thoughts and principles and aims of the children of God. This is a wonderful benefit, to be understood best by comparing the misery of a soul which is left to grovel in the filth of lower desires with the pure and lofty activity of the saints whose conversation is in heaven" (pp. 231-3).

The foundation of all spirituality—we need hardly say—is the Catholic doctrine on the end of man. The same doctrine, says F. Coleridge, is "the key of the riddle of life."

"At no hour and under no circumstances are we not surrounded by opportunities of virtue, nor is there anything which comes across our path, good or bad, spiritual or material, which cannot be as it were turned to gold for the enrichment of our souls in the true treasures of heaven. Man's life is short and feeble, and he can do but little in any other way. The loftiest intellectual flights are not in themselves very much; the discoveries of science, the guesses of philosophy, the feats of statesmanship, the grand achievements of art, the material conquests of the physical forces of nature which can be compassed for the service of man, these are great indeed in their degree, but they are but little, after all, above the common actions and works of men. The loftiest mountains of the earth are but the most insignificant elevations of its surface when compared to its circumference; and in the same way the noblest things which genius and industry have brought about are altogether insignificant in relation to the nature and end of man, except as far as they partake of the character of moral or spiritual elevation. Man is one of the weakest of God's creatures, except that he can use grace and choose good and merit the eternity of heaven. And this he can do in every moment of his life; this all men alike can do, young and old, rich and poor, learned and ignorant; this is the one dignity of humanity, a dignity more precious than diamond mines or streams flowing with gold, more fertile and fruitful of blessings than the cornfields or the vineyards of the whole earth" (p. 235).

These are but specimens, taken almost at random, from the spiritual treasures to be found in the volume.

Elementa Philosophiæ Christianæ. Auctore P. ALBERTO LEPIDI, O.P. Volumen I. Lovanii: 1875.

Institutiones Philosophicæ, quas tradebat DOMINICUS PALMIERI, S. J. Vol. I. et II. Romæ: 1875.

De Intellectualismo, juxta mentem Syllabi Vaticanique Concilii. Auctore P. M. BRIN. Coutances: 1875.

Ontologie, Thèses de Métaphysique Générale. Par A. H. DUPONT. Louvain: 1875.

Théodicée, Thèses de Métaphysique Chrétienne. Par A. H. DUPONT. Louvain: 1874.

THE above works, which have issued almost contemporaneously from the press, are a valuable and striking contribution to Catholic philosophy. They take in a wide field; hardly a question of pure metaphysics is left untouched, and in one or other of the volumes there are discussions which for precision, fulness, and subtlety leave little to be desired. It happens, indeed, that the writers have different objects in view, and approach their task from the most various points, but this only renders more evident the unity which prevails amongst them. F. Lepidi is, perhaps, the least polemical in style and intention; M. Brin, as may be argued from his title, is engaged in controversy all through; M. Dupont has, in the main, set forth the chief assertions of the Thomist school in his two treatises; F. Palmieri has thought for himself, and has spent much time in accurately proving whatever he has laid down. So again, they differ in their manner of dealing with the same subjects, for whilst M. Brin has enriched his book with references to the ancients, and has multiplied quotations from Rationalists and Positivists, in the others not very much history has been introduced, and the method is that of calm abstract declaration. Hence, we should say that learning is the characteristic of M. Brin, and penetration of F. Palmieri. The Dominican professor at Louvain suggests, in every page, the tranquillity of a monastic school; M. Dupont, lecturing from the chair of a university to a mixed audience, displays the vivacity and animation which seem to be inseparable from the language he employs. But it is remarkable how closely they agree in fundamentals. Not, of course, that they arrive at the same conclusions on every important topic,—this is by no means the case,—but they use the same philosophical method, and even in their differences show that they argue on the same ground, and allow the same tests of truth and falsehood. Controversy with them becomes domestic, and seems to confine its issues within the limits of general peace and concord. The result is, that when one has read them all, one feels a sense of satisfaction; the matters about which they are at variance look like petty details when contrasted with the broad surface of unity which they present, and instead of engendering confusion, afford an insight into the genius of orthodox philosophy.

For how do they contrive to be so amicable, nay, to give mutual support to their whole position? We can find two reasons, both of which deserve

to be noticed. On the one hand, our authors keep steadily in view the subordination of Reason to Faith; on the other, they have all studied S. Thomas and the Scholastics. Revealed Theology guides them through the contest with Ontologism, Hegelianism, Positivism; it throws light on the difficult investigations of Cosmology, on the nature and possibilities of material things, on the proofs for the existence of God, and the truth of creation. Their arguments are shaped and their course directed by the requirements of the higher science of which philosophy is a handmaid. We do not of course mean that they use revealed truth as part of their premisses; for such a practice would be as fundamentally opposed to the Church's own teaching, as it would be extravagantly at variance with reason. But we mean that the Church's doctrine is in their mind throughout, and suggests the various conclusions which reason is to establish. At times they may be uncertain how to prove this or that, but they know how to rebut such reasoning as would overturn the dogmas of the faith—and they have written, we say, after much conversing with the tradition of the schools; even when they are not expressly quoting that tradition, we can see they are led by its spirit. Most instructive it is to watch their treatment of the Angelic. They reverently accept his teaching, when, as so often happens, it is sufficient in itself to establish a theory or refute a fallacy. Sometimes it needs no more than to put S. Thomas's words by the side of erroneous statements; the mind is enlightened, and the difficulty vanishes. But there are cases where S. Thomas has not devoted a special study to the matter in hand; there are cases when his solution is incomplete, or not satisfactory, or seems unequal to the problem. Under such circumstances, our authors avail themselves of more recent authorities, or use their own ingenuity to arrive at an answer. We may even say that in no question do they simply turn to authority: they carefully examine the grounds upon which statements have been made, and accept or reject with great but not unbecoming freedom. This is especially to be remarked in F. Palmieri: his book is no doubt scholastic, but its contents owe their force and energy to the conspicuous powers of reasoning which he displays. And this leads to another observation. These volumes belong, unmistakably, to the nineteenth century. They imply the presence of a great antagonistic philosophy with which the air is resounding, and when they seem to be most abstract they are dissolving the sophisms and exorcising the spirit of the new learning. It may perhaps be truly asserted that a Catholic, who should dwell for long upon such reading, would find himself sufficiently armed against scepticism and rationalism. We do not mean that they take away difficulties by magic: rather we may say, especially of FF. Lepidi and Palmieri, that their style is that which so pleased the ancients, "Lenis, minimeque pertinax." They do not effect a sudden conversion, but they quiet and tranquillize the mind, and suggest to it that truth is not in the strife of tongues, but in silent and peaceful research.

However, there are few modern systems which they do not confront, and on the whole, if we may be allowed to judge, with encouraging success. Opinions may vary as to the force of particular arguments, as, indeed, it

is difficult to *express* any argument so as to suit all minds; but we think that, directly or indirectly, the authors before us do confute the erroneous philosophy of the day. It is true they have not always realized the position which they attack, as may perhaps be instanced in their treatment of phenomenism. M. Brin and F. Lepidi seem to be engaged, not so much in converting their infidel or sceptical opponents, as in showing their Catholic readers that un-Catholic philosophy, taken as a whole and systematically, is absurd. This, of course is perfectly legitimate and at the same time very serviceable, but it may throw an air of weakness over arguments which should stand on their own basis. It is one thing to convince the faithful that certain systems are incompatible with what we know to be the truth, and quite another to meet our adversaries on their own ground, and oblige them to admit the dictates of sound reason. How often it happens that an orthodox writer seems feeble, because of his security! The truth is a great possession, but it should not make us overlook the difficulties, which may be certainly formidable, on the opposite side. We do not at all insinuate that such oversight is common with our present authors: we are only anxious to point out an occasional flaw.

If we must note something separately of each writer, we would say, to begin with F. Lepidi, that his book, the first volume of a course, is emphatically a beautiful book. It comprises, first, an introduction to the study of philosophy, and next, the science or art of Logic, in four sections. We have said "the science or art of Logic," for we have no wish at present to enter upon that important inquiry, which, to our minds, carries with it momentous consequences. F. Lepidi's treatment supposes that Logic "directs the mind to the acquisition of truth." His teaching, therefore, includes a great deal which is foreign to Formal Logic. On the points which he discusses, the fulness, accuracy, and arrangement are worthy of high praise. We will not affirm that this is a complete treatise, even of Formal Logic, since there are additions, made in recent times, to which it does not allude; but, were those inserted, we know not what more, in point of lucidity and order, could be desired. He is especially good on division and definition, and on the method of recognizing and distinguishing simple apprehensions. This latter, as readers of F. Newman will know, is a difficult and delicate subject, but F. Lepidi treats it well.

F. Palmieri has not yet brought out his Natural Theology, and we await his next volume with much eagerness. But in the two parts already published he is clear, brief, and precise, weighty in argument, very skilful in answering objections, as subtle as a mediæval logician, and yet watchful to conciliate physical and biological science. We would put his book into the hands of a man if we wished to persuade him that scholasticism is common sense. Though, indeed, F. Palmieri is not a strict disciple either of S. Thomas or the Thomists. In his preface to the Anthropology he says: "Læto sane animo spectamus eam animorum inexpectatam conversionem, qua . . . ad vetera instituta repetenda non pauci festinant; atque huic conversioni promovendæ nos quoque pro virili nostra parte studemus. Verum cavendum est ne soli auctoritati, summorum licet virorum, inniti velimus." And in fact his thesis on the origin of ideas, and his whole physi-

cal theory, are more like a discovery than a reiterated tradition. He does not hold the theory of matter and form, nor the scholastic notion of space; he rejects the real distinction between Essence and Existence, between the faculties of the soul and the soul itself, and, as far as words go, he denies the Intellectus Agens.* Whatever may be thought of his doctrines, and this, of course, is not an occasion for discussing them, we may assert that he is extremely interesting, and is sure to find many who will agree with him. He makes his readers think.

M. Brin has composed a suggestive treatise, in which not a little must be called new as to its form and collocation, though he is not anxious to claim the merit of invention, but prefers to carry on the Catholic tradition. Still, on his own showing, the theory of induction found in his pages is not due entirely to the Scholastics. We will not now attempt to decide whether his induction corresponds to the mode of arguing commonly so called, but we think it deserves to be studied. He makes great use of the Syllabus and the Vatican Decrees, and brings out forcibly how much service would be done to philosophy if these decisions were more constantly borne in mind. One might also gather from his book the tone and gesture of the newest philosophy which he combats. He directs his attack mainly against Rationalism, Positivism, and the New Criticism, and is well read in his opponents. His division of Logic is worth considering: first he treats of the subject, or the intellect; next of the object, or truth: lastly of the relation between subject and object, or evidence. This makes Logic the most important part of philosophy, and gives room for the discussion of almost every system of the day. He argues very frequently ad hominem, and this is excellent, but, as we remarked above, he is too conscious that his audience, being Catholic, will be favourable.

Lastly, M. Dupont has conveyed into clear and simple French, the theses which are usually defended in the schools. He is, on some points, thoroughly Thomistic, though not on questions connected with prevision and free-will. His manner is brief and sententious; he does not develop either the objections or their solutions, but usually indicates in two or three technical phrases what distinctions are to be employed, and leaves further illustration to the sagacity of his reader, or, as we suppose, to the industry of the professor. His books make a concise summary of Ontology and Natural Theology, but they are too formal to be used without other aids to knowledge. It has been shrewdly remarked that "he is a philosopher who proves his minors," and we cannot help thinking that M. Dupont would have rendered great service to the world if he had given more attention to "proving his minors." For instance, he overthrows the dynamic theory by asserting that if it were true, "daretur actio in distans." Very properly said; but when we come to the minor, "non datur actio in distans," we are not furnished with a proof except from authority. The like omission occurs more than once, and to our thinking it is a blemish.

* As he proves that the Intellect has the power of abstracting, and that abstraction is its first act, we do not make so much of this last discrepancy.

But after making every criticism that reasonably can be made, we must express our great gratification that Catholic philosophy should receive daily, as it is receiving, such important additions. It needs only to persevere in the same earnest and laborious course. Modern theorists indeed should be carefully studied by the Catholic philosopher for more reasons than one; but it must never be forgotten that there is an existent Catholic philosophy, which should be the centre, from which Catholic investigations start, and round which they cluster.

Ueber die Grenzen der mechanischen Naturerklärung (On the Limits of the Mechanical Theory of Nature). Von Dr. Freihr von Hertling. Bonn. 1875.

THE systems of Hegel and Schelling have ceased to find favour in Germany, and their doctrines are passing into oblivion. But their influence on the latest philosophy is very perceptible, and has contributed more than anything else to the propagation of theories which, a few years ago, would have been rejected with scorn. The leading thought of both these men was to reduce all knowledge and experience to one principle; hence their opposition to the schools both of Aristotle and Leibnitz, which were committed to a dualistic philosophy, and upheld a real distinction between God and the world. In our present period, which has been styled the Revulsion to Sensism, an onlooker may trace the same endeavour to bring the manifold to an original and essential unity, though in a different philosophical shape. The authors who set forth the fashionable doctrines are to be found both in England and Germany: they have come to the study of philosophy after much experience and even frequent success in the province of natural science. Amongst ourselves the names of Huxley and Tyndall are just now prominent; amongst the subjects of Prince Bismarck we read of Moleschott, Büchner, Haeckel, Schmidt, Virchow, and many others, who have undertaken to explain the whole course and origin of the universe. Their teaching is admirably simple, at least on first hearing, and promises to do away with the long conflict between metaphysics and experimental science. For, suppose we admit that the amazing variety of nature can be brought to an identity, that our only elements are matter and force (Kraft und Stoff), and that the Darwinian evolution has raised matter, through stages and moments, to the highest orders of life, intellect, and will, it is evident that all problems are solved; we know without further trouble whether there is a God, whether the soul is immortal, and why it is not so; what is the essence of the moral law and of our boasted liberty of will. Archimedes wished only for a standpoint to set the world in motion: give these gentlemen some uniform matter and the play of mechanical force thereupon, and they will construct the whole scheme of things without difficulty or hesitation.

In the learned and thoughtful volume before us, Dr. Hertling raises

some questions which the materialists have indeed provoked, but have not yet answered. He is not bent upon setting up a counter theory, although he indicates his own convictions, but he determines with remarkable success how far the atomistic view is equal to the task assigned it. That view should be sufficient to evolve the universe from two elements, or rather from the single element of matter, since force by itself is nothing. Now the facts to be explained include the first origin of all things, the beginning of motion (unless motion be eternal), the appearance of design in the world at large, the growth of life, the phenomena of moral liberty and moral responsibility, and the peculiar nature and properties of the intellectual soul. All these matters have been handled in time past by such men as S. Thomas, Albertus Magnus, Aristotle, and Plato. In their opinion, the origin of the universe must be referred to a perfect Intelligence, and is due, say the Christian philosophers, to an exercise of creative will. Moreover, there is nothing in the world which does not bear upon it marks of design, and physical experience loses half its value, unless it be shown to testify the doctrine of final causes. Hence we can trace the battlefield upon which our quarrel must be fought out. Necessary evolution from atoms is the denial of creation, intellect, free will, and eliminates the distinction between organic and inorganic, between life and the absence of life. Is there any ground for admitting such a kind of evolution? Is it anything better than a capricious and one-sided interpretation of the facts, due to prejudice, and to the exclusive study of physical science? These are the questions which Dr. Hertling ventilates, and we think they suggest matter for thought even to professors of chemistry and biology. He states them with clearness and candour, substantiates his exposition of current views by an array of quotations from their upholders, and preserves throughout a calmness, nay almost a nonchalance, which argues him free from bitterness of prejudice. Though an admirer of the Scholastics, he does not suppose that their sole authority will be decisive; he prefers to let his adversaries speak, and to gather arguments from their own avowals. He knows his audience well, and appears before it as a scientific critic who solicits a hearing in the interests of knowledge. He is careful to refrain from dogmatizing, and yet has the skill to recommend his own conclusions. Those conclusions are throughout reasonable and satisfying, and have the further merit of lending themselves naturally to the defence of Christianity.

We have no space to follow him through his reasoning; for he has contrived in 160 pages to discuss all the points mentioned above. On each one of them he has something noteworthy to remark. He examines in greatest detail the theory of Natural Selection, and argues well that the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, even if granted, suppose and require an original design, and therefore, a creative Intelligence. He shows that the eternity of matter, and the absolute fixity of the Laws of Nature, must be considered as unproven; he distinguishes, with nice accuracy, between the recurring uniformity of experience, and that necessity which we know to be intrinsic and essential to things. He proves that free will implies intention or design, and must be given up if the theory of

the atomists be accepted. He shows at some length that the soul of man is not and cannot be a simply organic force, and that S. Thomas was right in asserting for it a true independence of matter.

In his last chapter he reviews the philosophy of empiricism, that, namely, in which there are no necessary truths, but all is referred to experience and induction. He opposes to it the necessity, and consequent universality, of mathematical axioms. This brings him across Stuart Mill, for the theory of association is an attempt to analyze the axioms of geometry and the kindred sciences into mere summings-up of past experience. We need not enlarge upon his answer, for what he has written corresponds almost verbally with the arguments put forth in this Review, which, as we have reason to know, have fallen under his knowledge. In like manner, he had previously touched upon the question of Determinism, and though his observations are brief, they coincide so far as they go with our own remarks upon the subject. However, we should not omit to notice his method in this chapter. He confutes Empiricism by means of the necessary axioms, and uses in the enterprise all that Kant and the Critical Philosophy have objected to Hume. But he does not, hereupon, submit to the philosophy of the "Critique." On the contrary, he shows that our faculties are trustworthy, and that their testimony has an objective value, and in doing so he makes skilful use of consciousness as the basis and groundwork of certainty. He has here expressed, with great clearness, the teaching of S. Thomas, and has put an orthodox sense on the famous "Cogito ergo sum," which Descartes borrowed from S. Augustine.

The matter, then, in our judgment, is excellent. In the form we could wish for a clearer distinction of part from part, and an occasional summary of the argument. There is no Index Rerum, and the table of contents is perplexingly scanty. That the sentences should be long and involved is natural, we suppose: German sentences are a kind of organic growth, and flourish much as our English oaks are wont to do; and yet, who that has read Goethe does not see that better things are possible? But these are slight failings in a work of great learning and penetration. We heartily wish it success, and trust it may rouse the indolent who have fallen, unwarily, into the slough of materialism.

The Contemporary Review, April, 1875. Art. V. "Instinct and Reason." By St. George Mivart. London: Strahan.

By an accident which we much regret, we omitted to notice in our last number this most important paper. Mr. Mivart is rapidly rising (or we may rather say has risen) into the very first rank of Catholic champions, in that field of controversy which is now more important than any other; the controversy against antitheism in its various shapes. His knowledge in one branch of physical science is unusually extensive and profound; he has a good current acquaintance with those branches which

have not formed his special study; and (chief of all) he has occupied himself sedulously in mastering Catholic philosophy. Then to all these qualifications he adds another, without which they would be of little controversial service. He has thoroughly realized to himself the position of those whom he opposes, and consequently assails them with no other arguments than such as are really relevant and cogent. Perhaps it not unfrequently happens, that able and excellently principled Catholic writers, in arguing against modern irreligionists, do not sufficiently bear in mind the indispensable necessity of this particular qualification.

The question discussed in Mr. Mivart's paper leads him into the very centre of the infidel position. Let it once be established that there is an impassable gulf—an absolute difference of kind—between human knowledge on one hand and the very highest apprehension attainable by brutes on the other—the dominant irreligious theory of this day at once collapses. Infidels may proceed to construct a new battery, but they must abandon that which they now occupy. Now it is not too much to say, that Mr. Mivart does irrefragably establish the above-named conclusion. We heartily recommend then any Catholics who are interested in these momentous questions to study the paper. It is expressed so pregnantly and concisely, that we can give no proper analysis of it; and we will only therefore attempt the briefest outline of its contents, adding a few extracts.

Mr. Mivart begins with expressing the obvious but continually forgotten truth, that he who would appreciate the relations which exist between reason and instinct, must not only study with attention the characteristics of instinct, but must study with no less attention the characteristics of reason. It is amazing how often this self-evident truth is forgotten.

"Perhaps the most remarkable circumstance connected with living English writers, on questions such as those we here refer to, is the conspicuous absence in them of any manifest comprehension of those very powers they so continually exercise, and their apparent want of appreciation of that Reason to which they verbally appeal. 'Hamlet,' with the Prince of Denmark omitted, may well serve as a symbol of the curious psychology of the school to which reference is made. Thus while what Instinct is, and can do, is now fairly appreciated; what it is not, and what it cannot do, though Reason can and does, is generally lost sight of and ignored."

Mr. Mivart proceeds to supply this omission. He shows step by step that men exercise "deliberate thought, inference, voluntary attention, active memory, will, moral judgment, and speech" (p. 777), while the lower animals do not even approximate to the display of any such faculties. And he anticipates one objection :—

"Are such powers, however, possessed by *all mankind?* Putting aside idiots as beings whose latent faculties are inaccessible to our research, and who are manifestly in an abnormal pathological condition, we have no hesitation in affirming that they are. The mental nature of all men is essentially one; and if there are those who do not appear to understand such conceptions as 'goodness,' 'truth,' and 'justice,' they can at least be *made to understand it.* The essential oneness of human nature is

sufficiently attested by witnesses the least likely to be biassed in favour of such unity, and the most fitted by their abilities, and the patient labour they have bestowed upon the subject, to express an authoritative judgment."

He then proceeds to quote in his favour even Mr. Darwin and Mr. Lewes.

On the other hand, in addition to the powers just named, mankind possess a lower class of powers also :—

"1. *Vegetative* powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction.
2. A power responding to unfelt stimuli by means of nervous interconnections—*reflex action.*
3. A power of inadvertently performing appropriate actions in response to felt stimuli, such actions, termed *instinctive,* being provided for beforehand by the special organization of the body.
4. A power of experiencing sensible pleasure and pain.
5. A power of indeliberately cognizing sensible objects, of which some start or exclamation may be the sign—*sensible cognition.*
6. Activities effected by the union, agglutination, and combination of sensations in more or less complex aggregations, and simulating inference.
7. A power of automatic or *organic memory,* which may exhibit itself in unintellectual imitation.
8. A power of responding by appropriate actions to pleasurable and painful sensations and emotions—*organic volition.*
9. A power of experiencing vague pleasurable and painful feelings—*emotional sensibility.*
10. A power of expressing such feelings by sounds or by gestures understood by our fellows, and replied to by corresponding sounds and gestures—*emotional language.*"

And powers substantially the same as these are undoubtedly found in brutes. Mr. Mivart's ultimate conclusion is this :—

"Instinct and Reason seem to form two distinct regions—two distinct kinds of activity—whereof the former serves as the material for the latter. In order that mere instinctive faculties may become rational, there is needed the introduction from without (as Mr. Lewes well says) of a new form or force, which is self-conscious, and so can distinguish itself from what is not itself, and can analyze both. With this new principle once introduced, mere sensation is transformed into conscious sensibility ; the imagination, from being passive, becomes active and creative ; appetite becomes passion, and attachment friendship. The association of images prepares the association of ideas. Association becomes inference. In a word, from the mere animal, we have man ; and what was but direct, indeliberate, and unconscious Instinct, becomes reflex, deliberate, self-conscious Reason, with true memory, intelligence, and will."

We cannot dismiss this paper without citing some remarks, which are but indirectly connected with Mr. Mivart's general subject, but which express a truth of supreme religious and philosophical importance :—

"In the temporary philosophical decline which has accompanied the rise of physical science, very many modern theologians, neglecting the old rational conception of a 'Deus analogus,' have been asserting a 'Deus univocus' with the natural result of producing the modern opposite error of asserting a 'Deus æquivocus.' In other words, the absurdity of

asserting that the terms which denote powers and qualities in man have the very same meaning when also applied to God, has naturally led to the opposite absurdity of denying that there is any relation whatever between certain terms as applied to God, and the same terms as applied to man. It has become necessary to return to the old, safe 'via media' of the schoolmen; and maintain with them that though no term can be used in precisely the same sense of man and of God, yet that none the less there *is* a certain relation of *analogy* between these two uses of the same term."

Letters to a Sceptic on Matters of Religion. By J. L. Balmes. Translated by the Rev. W. M'Donald. Dublin: Kelly.

THIS work is full of valuable and admirable thoughts, insomuch that we heartily recommend it to Catholics who are brought across the scepticism now so miserably prevalent. It is not indeed a methodical treatise, as the translator observes (p. viii.); and indeed the most arduous of all controversies finds in it no place, because the sceptic with whom Balmes was dealing believed in God (p. 22). But the few extracts we shall give will suffice to show how profound a line of argument is often to be found in it.

"It sometimes happens, my dear friend, that the negation of reason does not come from humility, but from an excessive pride, from an exaggerated feeling of superiority which disdains to examine, and believes that to see a thing thoroughly it is enough to look at it without any mental exertion. You will not find me among the number of those who appeal to reason in everything, and grant nothing to sentiment; nothing to those sudden inspirations which spring up in the depths of our soul without our knowing whence they have come to us. I know, and I have often told you, our reason is weak in the extreme, and excessively captious, proves everything, refutes everything; but between this and denying its right to vote on the questions of metaphysics, rejecting it as incompetent to effect anything in them, between truth and error there is an immense distance" (p. 147).

"I remember when I was studying theology, that I heard the professor explain the doctrine that faith is a gift of God, and to gain it, neither miracles nor prophecies, nor the other proofs of the truth of our religion, are enough, but that in addition to the motives of credibility, we need *the pious stirring of the will: pia motio voluntatis.* I candidly acknowledge that, at the time, I did not comprehend doctrines like these, nor did I thoroughly grasp their meaning, until I had left those abodes where the very air is filled with faith, and found myself in circumstances quite different, and in contact with people of every class. Then it was that I fully realized the depth of God's goodness towards the true believer, and *the sad condition of those who rest their faith on the motives of credibility—who confine themselves to science and forget grace.* Frequently have I met with men who, in my opinion, saw as well as I the reasons that militate in favour of our religion; and yet I believed, and they did not" (p. 131).

"Explain the doctrine of Pantheism as you will, it involves the negation of God; it is pure Atheism, only it takes another name. If all things are God, and God is all things, God is nothing; the only thing that will exist

is nature with its matter, and its laws, and its agents of diverse orders: all which Atheists admit, and do not think they have thereby abjured their system. If the creature believes he is a part of God, or God himself,—by the very fact he denies the existence of a God superior to himself, who can demand of him an account of his actions; the Divinity will be to his ears an empty name; and he can adopt the saying of the German, who, on rising from a banquet, exclaimed:—'We are all gods who have dined very well'" (p. 145).

The Sacrifice of the Eucharist, and other Doctrines of the Catholic Church, explained and vindicated. By the Rev. Charles B. Garside, M.A., Author of the "Prophet of Carmel." Burns & Oates, London. 1875.

MR. GARSIDE is not an unfamiliar author, and we welcome him with pleasure again. Popular authors free from trashiness and fine writing are not so common as we could wish them to be, and it is a sound comfort to have a book of this kind, plainly, clearly, and concisely written, without any affectation on the part of the writer, nor parade of an unwieldy learning. It is true that Mr. Garside's book has a learned, a very learned side to it, but it is not obtruded; and his learning is woven into the texture of his book in the most natural and easy way, and that is one of the tests of true learning.

The book before us, though singularly unpretending in form, contains an immense mass of most useful instruction; we might add, especially in these times, when in reality ignorance seems to be conquering whole districts for itself under the disguise of diffused knowledge. And special praise is due to Mr. Garside for his plain speaking, and his unbending earnestness in defending the truth. Controversialists are generally supposed to be of the combative order; but in fact they are too often men of peace, very much disposed to make matters pleasant for the adversary at the expense of others. Their besetting sin is sometimes to pare down, and make the Catholic verity look as much as possible like heresy. Mr. Garside is utterly free from this virtue or vice, as men may regard it. He does not tell the heretics that they are nearly right, nor insinuate that he wishes the Catholic doctrine was less difficult to defend. He is perfectly frank and straightforward, accepting the teaching of the Pope with all his heart and defending it with all his might.

The "Psalter of S. Bonaventure" has been a scandal to many. The controversial temper which counsels the throwing overboard of everything that is likely to embarrass the plan of the battle, has forced too many to adopt a very expeditious method, when they are confronted with that most innocent of books. Mr. Garside is more fearless, because he has mastered the subject, and accordingly disposes of the difficulty in an honest way. Whether the Psalter be the work of S. Bonaventure or not, he seems to say, I ask you what is there amiss in it? He defends it against the use made of it by heretical cavillers, by asking them to say where the mischief of it lies; and hitherto they have not done so. Mr.

Garside is, we think, most admirable in his exposition of the matter, and we cannot refrain from reproducing here the terse and eloquent ending of his arguments:—

"What right, moreover, have they [heretics] to sit in cynical judgment upon language that was never intended for them, and which presupposes a whole system of belief, which, however true, is foreign to their own views? Is there any body of men having their own principles, customs, laws, that would not, indignantly even, refuse to be weighed and measured by the arbitrary scale of utter strangers? Why are Catholics to be the only religious society in the world from whom their avowed enemies arrogantly demand, as a right, that they should never speak, write, or even pray, except in such terms, that it is impossible for them to be misunderstood by the most ignorant, prejudiced, suspicious, and hostile critics that all the various conflicting sects of Christendom choose to claim as their legitimate offspring and representatives?" (p. 281).

This book of Mr. Garside is especially useful as a manual wherein may be found a clear and concise answer to nearly all the objections against the Catholic Faith current among Protestants; and what adds to its value is the fact that the answers are given much more in the form of a statement of the true doctrine rather than in the form of a triumphant reply, which almost always humiliates without convincing. The Protestant who may read it, will find his objections overthrown; but he will have not added to that, the uncomfortable sense that Mr. Garside thinks him a fool. The learned author writes charitably as well as clearly, never forgetting that winning souls is his object, not the manifestation of his own knowledge; and by way of example, we would call special attention to that part of his book, wherein he treats of the relations between the Church and the Scriptures. In what he has there written he has kept in mind the necessity of representing accurately the Catholic doctrine and practice much more than the objections of heretics, who will find those objections melting away like ice beneath the rays of the sun.

In recommending it with all our hearts to our readers, we may add that they have a perfect assurance of its freedom from all unsound opinions in the *nihil obstat* of the Very Reverend Dr. Bans, the learned Canon Theologian of the Chapter of Westminster.

The Popes of Rome and the Popes of the Oriental Church. An Essay on Monarchy in the Church, with special reference to Russia, from original documents, Russian and Greek. By the Rev. CÆSARIUS TONDINI, Barnabite. Second edition. London: Washbourne. 1875.

WE see with pleasure that a second edition of this learned work has been called for. Not very many years ago very few people took any interest in the grave questions touched upon by Father Tondini, and we are the more pleased to see this second edition because we may fairly presume that, amidst the turmoil of affairs, there are people who are not

incurious about the rights and authority of the Holy See. The Russian bishops, true bishops *ordine*, but false bishops in every other sense, seem to be neither more nor less than the ecclesiastical clerks of the Emperor. They have no power whatever that he has not given them, and he has given them very little: for why should he give them any? They have torn themselves away at his request from the divine power, of which they might have their share, as once they had, and he sees no reason for trusting men who have once been unfaithful to their trust.

In England the history of the Russian bishops can be more easily understood than in any other country, for the Parliament has established and preserves men whom it calls bishops upon terms like those of Russia. But in England the fraud is more complete, as the imposition is more honest: there are no bishops to be had. The Emperor of Russia was able to secure the sacerdotal gifts for his tools, but Queen Elizabeth failed; and the English robbed the Pope only of his earthly possessions, lands and houses. Not so in Russia: there the bishops went out of the Church with the supernatural gifts, and used them, and it is difficult to say which of the two nations is most to be pitied.

We recommend the book with great pleasure to our readers, who will find it full of knowledge, and of knowledge not easily obtained, on the Russian schism.

The New Reformation: a Narrative of the Old Catholic Movement, from 1870 *to the present time.* With a Historical Introduction by THEODORUS. Longmans & Co. 1875.

THERE is nothing of which the world talks so much as "reason," and nothing which it uses so little. In questions of religion it hardly even professes to do so. What has reason to do with the matter? Must we abandon the privileges of error, and forfeit the luxury of prejudice, at the dictation of reason? Absit! We know a better method than that. There is a Church which pretends to be Divine, and whatever it says must be condemned; there are sects which glory in being human, and whatever they affirm must be approved. The whole philosophy of the subject is contained within these limits. Here is a writer, for example who has mastered that salutary first principle. His conclusions flow from it as naturally as water runs down hill. He offers to instruct his countrymen in the true view of the Vatican Council. He has quite made up his own mind about it, and proposes to help others to do likewise. If they will only adopt his method, nothing can be easier. He has read everything which can be said against it, and assumes that it is all true. If it is not true, it ought to be. Why should he trouble himself about what can be said on the other side, or take any notice of it? Life is not long enough for such dilatory proceedings. We are all in a hurry now, and must get to our conclusions as quickly as possible. Start from the broad principle that whatever the Catholic Church does is wrong, and you may lock reason

in a cupboard or fling it out of window. If we use reason, we must suspend our judgment, which nobody wants to do; Theodorus least of all. He only quotes authorities who say what he wishes them to say. He thinks the matter is settled when he has introduced to the English public "Janus," "Quirinus," the illustrious Abbé Michaud, Lord Acton; the "Saturday Review," and the reports of the Anglo-Continental Society! Having brought this troop of credible witnesses into court, and bribed the door-keeper to exclude all others, he looks the jury in the face and asks for a verdict. No doubt he will get it.

He admits, indeed, that there *are* other witnesses, but only of a sort whom no one would believe on their oath. His own—heretics of every school and sect—are not only miracles of learning and prodigies of virtue, but he begs the intelligent jury to observe what amazingly good-looking fellows they are. Surely you must notice, he says, their distinguished appearance and dignified manner? Look at Reinkens! What a brow! And do you note the light in Döllinger's eye, and the more than Jove-like majesty of Knoodt and Michelis? The jury smile approvingly. Probably they laugh outright when the eloquent Theodorus, who reminds us a good deal of "one Tertullus, an orator," describes to them the witnesses whom he has *not* brought. He talks to them of Bishop Mermillod, whom critics almost as capable as Theodorus have compared with Bossuet, and gives this agreeable account of one of the most faithful prelates and eloquent preachers of our age. "A man of obscure origin, but of imposing presence and unsurpassed assurance, with a talent for intrigue, and possessed of a certain showy art of rhetoric improved by his Jesuit training at Rome" (ch. iv. p. 180). Evidently the jury can dispense with such a witness as that—which is just what Theodorus wishes them to do. He despatches everybody else who happens to differ from him with the same graceful expedition. Certain prelates opposed for a time, for reasons which seemed to them valid, the Vatican Definitions. Being men of faith and piety, they preferred the judgmont of the Church, as soon as it was pronounced, to their own; which was hardly fair to the infidels and Protestants who had so warmly applauded their previous attitude. They ought to have defied the Church. Theodorus would have much preferred that course, and sees in their Christian submission only a proof of "the moral cowardice of the bishops" (ch. ii. p. 112). Why did they not imitate the estimable Reinkens, he asks, who justly esteemed his own infallibility above that of the Church? How forcibly did Reinkens remark, in his "Speech at Cologne," as Theodorus notices, that the German bishops thought "that schism is the deadliest mischief in the Church," and "fell victims to this scrupulosity." Reinkens and Theodorus have no sympathy with such effeminacy of conscience. Stick to your own opinion, they nobly exclaim, and laugh at the bugbear of schism. If S. Peter said anathema to all who "fear not to bring in sects," that was only a proof of the "reactionary" temper which he displayed on so many occasions. Reinkens would have smiled at his scrupulosity, as many a judicious Reinkens of the apostolic age did. But if the inopportunist bishops "fell victims" to their conscience, this is more than can be said of Theodorus. He still quotes them as witnesses

on *his* side, just as Protestants quote Wickliffe, though the poor man recanted his errors and submitted to the Church. Look at the noble Archbishop Darboy, he says. Well, we look, and we find that long years before the Vatican Council, when he was only a professor of theology, he taught the doctrine of Papal infallibility, which he again professsd almost in his last words, when he was about to be assassinated by wild beasts, to whom that doctrine was almost as odious as to Theodorus, and for much the same reasons.

Theodorus prefaces his history of Döllingerism with an Introduction of fifty pages, in which he contrives to epitomize the whole history of Christianity in general and of the Papacy in particular to his own entire satisfaction. In this condensed narrative—of which *one* item is "the relations of Rome to Christendom during the first eight centuries" !—he wisely ignores the idea that God had, or could have had, anything to do with the matter. If the Church were the dismal farce which Theodorus supposes her to be, this total suppression of her imaginary Founder would be worthy of praise. It would be too horrible to think that with *such* a Church as he describes, which was always stumbling from one stupid crime to another, the Most High had any connection whatever. Theodorus does well to put Him out of sight, and treat the whole subject as purely human. But even from this point of view he might have had "scrupulosity" enough to be a little more temperate in his assertions, and a little more accurate in his facts. He treats witnesses of the first ages exactly as he does those of our own. He is talking about "the Roman supremacy," and as he cannot deny that the *principalitas* of the Holy See was proclaimed by a disciple of the Apostles, he cheerfully adds: "Irenæus asserts that the Church at Rome was founded by St. Peter; but his statement is manifestly incorrect" ! (*Introd.*, p. 6.) It may be that Theodorus has means of judging, eighteen centuries after the event, which Irenæus had not; but he does not tell us what they are. Irenæus is an awkward witness for Anglicans, and so he treats him as he does Bishop Mermillod. S. Cyprian wrote to Antonianus: "To be united with the See of Rome is to be united with the Catholic Church"; but Theodorus would say to him also, "manifestly incorrect." It is so easily said, and so conclusive! He makes equally short work of the Councils. The Fathers of Nicæa, Ephesus, and Chalcedon, he says, knew nothing of "the unjustifiable pretensions of the Romish See." It is about as true as if Mr. Green had told us in his history of England that the Tudor dynasty reigned in Japan, or that Buddhism was first taught by William the Conqueror. Even Theodorus might know, and probably does know, that one of the first acts of the Council of Chalcedon, composed of nearly 600 *Oriental* bishops, was to depose Dioscorus, "because he had presumed to hold a synod without the approbation of the Holy See"; which seems to prove that they did not exactly coincide with Theodorus about its "unjustifiable pretensions." He might know too that when the same Council claimed that Constantinople should rank immediately after Rome,—a claim which the reigning Pope peremptorily quashed,—the Imperial Commissaries apologetically observed that the error was venial, because "the supremacy

of the Bishop of Rome over all—πρὸ πάντων πρωτεία—had been preserved inviolate" (Alzog, vol. i. p. 665). But no doubt the judgment of the Council and the Commissaries, like that of S. Irenæus, and every one else, was "manifestly incorrect."

It is fair to our lively author to notice that he is quite as willing to contradict himself as he is to contradict others. Thus he says very truly that "the sentiment of nationality" characterized Pagan religions, while it was the special glory of Christianity to ignore "national differences," and, as the Apostle said, to make of all nations one family in Jesus Christ. How this could possibly be done without a fixed centre of unity he omits to say. He even notices, without suspecting that he is betraying the antichristian nature of such religions as the Russian and the Anglican, that heretics always fell back on the Pagan impiety of national beliefs. He frankly records their "endeavours to set up a national Church independent in its action and *subject to no central authority*. Such was the schism of the Donatists." In what single particular did it differ from the schism of the Anglicans? "Such was the heresy of the Monophysites, which resulted in the foundation of the Coptic or Egyptian Church." Such, he continues, was "Byzantinism, the expression of the national political spirit of the Greek Empire." He even admits (*Introd.*, p. 22), that "Lutheranism took its rise in a spirit of *German* nationality." In other words, wherever schism and heresy prevailed they immediately destroyed the fundamental idea of Christianity, and restored that of Paganism. No sect ever bore this mark on its front in more indelible characters than the Anglican. But this does not disturb the composure of Theodorus. If national Churches were an insult to Christianity in earlier ages, they are its most beautiful product in our own. Any other view of them is "manifestly incorrect." If God designed that there should be one Church for all nations, and the same in all, some of His creatures have discovered that each nation should have its own, and the more of them the better. There are fifty in England and a hundred in Russia. Yet Theodorus tells us that it is not possible to deny the benefits which flowed from God's view of the subject, or that, even in the most difficult conjunctures of human society, "the consciousness of forming part of a great Christian commonwealth gave to Europe a sense of unity and like aspirations which would otherwise have been altogether wanting." If in our own day supernatural unity has been replaced by diabolical discord; if every nation is now the enemy of every other, and each is watching the favourable moment to assault and crush its neighbour; if there is no longer any central authority to decide religious disputes, or arbitrate between warring factions; if Pagan nationalism has supplanted Catholic fraternity, the right of revolt has banished the obligation of obedience, and nobody knows what is coming next: what does it matter? Have we not at least baffled the arrangement by which the Creator proposed to deprive the creature of these very advantages, and emancipated ourselves from "the unjustifiable pretensions of the Romish See"? The intelligent Theodorus considers this a sufficient compensation.

Men who talk of "the unjustifiable pretensions of the Romish See

might as reasonably complain of the unjustifiable pretensions of God There is no difference between them. That See claims only the authority which He gave it, and which it has used for long ages in the defence of truth, justice, and liberty. "For a power emanating from God," as F. Schlegel observes, "and truly divine, can never violate or subvert any established right, whether essentially sacred, or hallowed only by prescription." As to the history which Theodorus gives of Döllingerism, it appears from his own account that if he had waited a little longer he might have described its end as well as its beginning. "The Munich Conference," he tells us (ch. iii. p. 156), "recognized the *Symbolum* of Pius IV. as *the creed of Old Catholicism*"; but at the Bonn Conference Döllinger announced that the Council of Trent cannot be "regarded as œcumenical," and that his sect was not "bound by its decrees." Theodorus calls this "doctrinal progress"! It is the only sort of progress he is able to record, in spite of the patronage of Bismarck. "The statistics published up to March, 1875, do not indicate any great accession to the numerical strength of the party." (*Conclusion*, p. 276.) In Bavaria, "the movement is at a standstill," and the few Döllingerists only a subject of ridicule. In Austria, "its principles have gained for it the sympathies of the Liberals," but not of Christians. In France, "Old Catholicism must be regarded as virtually non-existent. The total number in Germany will still appear to be under 50,000." Before long it is likely to be zero, *plus* a score of fussy and conceited professors. Theodorus is a mathematician who deals only with vanishing quantities. In describing what he calls "the New Reformation," he is an artist who paints only shadows.

Paris, ses Organes, ses Fonctions, et sa Vie, dans la Seconde Moitié du XIXme Siècle. Par MAXIME DU CAMP. Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1869–1875. Six volumes.

M. MAXIME DU CAMP'S great work on Paris, begun some years ago, has just been completed by the appearance of the sixth and concluding volume. It is unique of its kind. It is not in the ordinary sense of the words a description of the city, or a sketch of the life and manners of its people, far less a history. He approaches his subject from a new point of view, and treats it upon a plan which we do not remember having ever seen adopted before. He regards Paris as one great organized body, and—much as a skilful naturalist would describe the structure of some animal, pointing out the uses of its parts and explaining their structure and development—he enters into every detail of the life of the great city. He traces out for us the complex organization which governs and directs it, and provides for all the wants of its two millions of inhabitants. He tells us how it is linked by railway, post, and telegraph with the rest of the world; how day by day its supplies of food flow in from far and near, never failing to meet the needs of its people; how it is lighted and drained and supplied with water; how crime is repressed and justice

administered, what kinds of crime are the most frequent, what is the condition of the criminals, whence they come, how they live, how they are treated when they fall into the hands of the law; how the poor are succoured, how the hospitals are managed and the asylums for the insane. Then we have an account of the institutions for children abandoned by their parents, for the deaf and dumb, and the blind; and a long and careful study of the state of education in Paris, from the primary schools to the *Lycées* and the University. The cemeteries are described, vast in extent, but already too limited for the dead of the great city; and finally we have an account of the finances of the municipality which forms the keystone of the whole system. The substance of the work has already appeared in a long series of essays in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, but they have been revised and partly rewritten before their publication in their present form; and they now constitute, not a mere collection of articles, but one perfect and connected whole.

A work like this cannot fail to be of deep interest in many points of view, and to furnish much material for study and for thought. Its successive chapters are not like those clever highly-coloured sketches that an active "special correspondent" might supply week after week to one of our leading journals, and which, though entertaining for the moment, would be devoid of all permanent value. This is the work of a man who knows Paris thoroughly, and can bring to bear upon his purely local knowledge the results of experience obtained in travels in many parts of Europe, and can illustrate his subject by facts drawn from widely different paths of study and research. He has successfully resisted the temptation to praise all he meets with in his favourite city; he freely criticises the various systems and organizations with which he comes in contact, and does not hesitate to point out faults on the one hand and to suggest reforms on the other. We cannot, of course, agree with many of the opinions which he expresses, but he invariably puts them forward with moderation, and while giving his own judgment shows a respect for that of others. We might wish too that one or two of the subjects treated of had been excluded from a work intended for general circulation, as, for instance, some of those discussed in the two chapters on vice and crime in Paris. But it is only fair to add that M. Du Camp is not of the school which speaks of those things either lightly or with indifference, and one cannot read these portions of his work without feeling that even here below, apart from all human justice, sin carries with it its own terrible punishment, and is the cause of nine-tenths of the misery in the world. It is pleasing too to find in his pages more than one generous protest against the headlong pursuit of pleasure, which is working such ruin to thousands in every great city in Europe, but to which the rank materialism and the brief prosperity of the Second Empire gave so fatal a development in France. "Long ago," he says, "Edouard Thouvenel, a man of sound clear judgment, said to me, sadly, 'The success of *Orphée aux Enfers* makes me doubt of the future of France'; and he was right. To abandon the love of the beautiful, and to seek for amusement at any price, is to enter upon a path in which there is no escape from ruin."

M. Du Camp gives no special place in his work to the subject of religion. There are chapters on *Les Malfaiteurs* and *Les Prisons*, but there is none with the title of *Les Églises.* But indirectly he has much to say on the subject, for his researches in the prisons, the hospitals, the schools, the refuges, and charitable institutions generally, were continually bringing him in contact with the practical work of the Catholic Church, and more especially of the religious orders. No one will suspect the brilliant essayist of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of any undue partiality for priests and nuns; had he found cause for censure, there is no doubt that he would not have hesitated to take advantage of it; and this gives a twofold value to his repeated eulogies on the zeal and devotion of the religious orders in labouring for the poor of Paris, and to his testimony to the immense amount of good which they effect. "There are priests," he says, "in the prisons of Paris who are saints, and who fulfil with admirable zeal the mission entrusted to them." But unfortunately they have for the most part to deal with men hardened in crime and ignorant of even the first rudiments of religious knowledge; and so it is no wonder that their efforts are too often unavailing.

The chapter on the Refuges for penitent women is most interesting. There were several of these institutions in Paris before 1789, but they were all swept away in the storm of the Revolution, which in its blind fury destroyed everything directly or indirectly connected with the Church. It took more than twenty years to restore them; and now there are in Paris two Refuges for Penitents directed by communities of nuns, and a third, managed by some Anglican deaconesses, which receives only Protestants. M. Du Camp speaks very highly of the two Catholic institutions. In one of them he saw an old woman of seventy-seven, who had been there since its foundation, and he tells us what he heard from her of the privations which the nuns and penitents of this convent had to suffer in its early years:—

"They were so poor and destitute that they slept on dry leaves, and had nothing but coarse bread to eat; they had no fire in winter, and went to bed at sunset because they could not buy candles. But little by little things improved: they got beds, and good blankets, and light. They were able to eat meat and to buy medicine for the sick, for there are only too many of them among these poor waifs of depravity. Instead of rough *sabots*, they now wore list slippers; and at last they built a little chapel, where the image of the Immaculate One seems to watch over these repentant sinners."

Such was the story of suffering and sacrifice told by this old woman, who had been fifty years under the protection of the good nuns. It is painful to have to add that, though their days of trial are over, these two refuges are still by no means well endowed, and week after week have to refuse numberless applications for admission within their walls.

Speaking of the Dames du Bon Pasteur and their work, M. Du Camp remarks:—

"To whatever philosophical or religious sect one may belong, it is impossible to witness the work to which they devote themselves in a pure

spirit of charity, without feeling the most profound admiration for them. Like a diver who would throw himself into an ocean of mire and filth in search of a pearl, they go down into the corrupted depths of our half-decaying civilization to find there some fallen creature, whom they take by the hand, raise up and support. . . . . In the infirmary of S. Lazare, in the infectious rooms of the hospital of Lourcine, they go and sit by the beds of the sick, they tell them the story of Mary Magdalen, they speak of Him whose breath cast out demons, they assert that innocence though lost can be regained. To these poor souls weighed down with vice they give wings, and help them to rise up to the region of thought, where they gain a knowledge of themselves and the hope of a better life. . . . . It is easy to visit the poor, to take them clothes and food, to bind up the wounds of the weak, to succour the afflicted; but only a heart grown great in virtue and glowing with its fire can penetrate into this labyrinth of impurity and rescue from it the poor creatures whom the monster has not entirely destroyed."

But he is not content with a mere panegyric of the work. He makes a touching and eloquent appeal to the rich to aid it by their contributions, and we trust his words will not be wholly without effect in adding to the scanty treasury of the Refuges of Paris.

We might say much about the hospitals of the city, and the six orders of nuns who tend the sick in their wards. The system on the whole seems to give excellent results, and it is pleasing to see how in the twelve great hospitals science and religion work hand in hand in the service of the poor and the afflicted. But the organization is not by any means a perfect one, and its weakest point seems to be the employment of paid nurses to assist the nuns in the wards, who by themselves would not be numerous enough to attend to the immense amount of work entrusted to them. The nurses are badly paid, and when the eye of the sister is not on them they cannot be trusted for a moment. With better pay the directors could easily procure a better class of attendants, and then there would be little fault to find with the hospital system of Paris.

But we must pass on to M. Du Camp's account of the schools and the University, which seems to us the most valuable portion of his entire work. It has a special interest at the present moment, when, by the law for securing the freedom of higher education in France, the University has just been deprived of its old monopoly. We may divide the educational institutions of Paris into three classes—the primary schools, the secondary schools or *Lycées*, and the University. "It is sad to confess," says M. Du Camp, "that in this unfortunate matter of public education the higher one goes the more painful discoveries one makes. The primary schools of Paris are very good, the secondary schools are middling, but higher education is getting worse and worse. It seems to be attacked with anemia, and is dying of poverty." This is a frank confession, and a testimony of great value with reference to the present crisis in France. More than this, the facts collected by M. Du Camp show us what is the real cause of this state of things. In the first place, the primary schools are acknowledged to be excellent, and it must be added that most of them are under the care of the religious orders. We are sorry we have not space for M. Du Camp's charming description of the schools of the

Sisters of Charity, which he proves are the best in Paris, and there is no doubt that the competition with them really promotes the efficiency of even the purely secular primary schools. But when we come to the *Lycées* and the University, we see the fruits of the old system of a monopoly of higher education in the hands of the University, a state-protected hotbed of Liberalism and infidelity. The entire object of their teaching is to give the student a superficial acquaintance with several subjects,* and a very thin varnish of culture. In a few brilliant lectures, he is indoctrinated into the popular views of the day, and then he passes an easy examination, and receives his degree. Up to this present year, the University had no rival to dread, and so it persistently refused to reform its system. It will now have a hard battle to fight in order to hold its own against the Free Catholic Universities.

"The best way to witness the results of the course of study pursued up to the present time," says our author, "is to assist at the examination for the degree of *bachelier-ès-lettres*. There our system of secondary education is seen in all its worthlessness. . . . The matter of the examination is not very difficult: some scraps of Latin and Greek; a few French authors, invariably Corneille, Boileau, Racine, La Fontaine, and Molière; a little philosophy; a few words of history and geography; and enough of mathematics to show that one can count. The history is limited to that of France, and begins with Louis XIV.; so that if one asked one of the pupils what king had the honour of having Sully for his prime minister, he would have a right to refuse to answer, because the question is not in the programme. . . . The examination is a mere matter of form, the degree only a certificate that the holder has been a student. It does not open the way to any career."

As for the teaching of physical science, which it is generally taken for granted is always sure to find a congenial home in an irreligious university, it is in the most wretched state in that of Paris. The books are piled up in outhouses and sheds, and heaped on staircases and window-ledges, for there is not shelf-room enough in the original library. The laboratory is too small for the students, and they can only be shown a portion of the experiments: the natural history collection is in a state of decay; and the dissecting-rooms of the medical school are in such a condition that they are a permanent danger to the health of the neighbourhood. Such is, or at least very lately was, the condition of the scientific department of the University of Paris.

On the great question of the freedom of education M. Du Camp very effectively supports from his own point of view the position so successfully taken up by the French Episcopate. He condemns the secularization of the schools.

"I think," he says, "that in all its stages education ought to be free. For freedom leads to competition, competition produces emu-

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* We may remark *en passant* that M. Du Camp seems to attribute the origin of the modern superficial system of education to the Jesuit colleges of the last century. If he knew more of the present system and past history of the Jesuit colleges, we venture to say that he would never have entertained this erroneous idea.

lation, and thence comes progress. Every privileged body falls into a fatal state of listlessness, into what is called tradition, that is to say idleness, and then all good results from it are at an end. It would be very useful then that the clergy and the University should meet face to face, if only to arouse the energies of both. But in another point of view one might well be surprised that the question (of the secularization of the schools) should have been raised at all, for there is just as much intolerance in preventing a man from going to mass as in forcing him to go. And one cannot conceive how those who demand a purely secular system of education can call themselves *free* thinkers. Liberty is one and the same for all. It is just as much a free act of the mind to believe in any religion, as to refuse to believe in any at all."

He then argues that the Liberals are pursuing a suicidal policy in attacking the Catholic schools. He points out that men will never hesitate in choosing between schools which tell them there is nothing beyond death, and those which teach their children that a good life will certainly be rewarded hereafter; and recurring to the subject of the schools of the Sisters of Charity, he says, that when he goes into their schools he does not ask what religion they profess, but he sees that their teaching can do nothing but good to the children, and he admires them for it. It would be well if the Liberals of France could be brought to see the weight of these plain, straightforward arguments, so forcibly urged by one of themselves in favour of the freedom of Catholic education. In conclusion, we must repeat that the book is from many points of view a most valuable one; we have only touched upon those features of it which have a direct interest for Catholics, but every one will find in it much that is interesting, and it throws light on many a varied phase of human life.

The Bible and the Rule of Faith. By ABBÉ BÉGIN, of Lowal. Translate from the French by G. M. WARD (Mrs. PENNÉE). London: Burns & Oates.

THOSE Catholics who are brought much across the characteristic controversies of the day—controversies which are the most serious of all, because there is no common ground between the parties—are sometimes tempted to regard with a little impatience the old-fashioned polemic between Catholics and Protestants. But most unreasonably. True it is, we suppose, that in the now rising generation there are hardly to be found any men of really powerful mind, who accept Christianity while rejecting Catholicity. But at last how small is the proportion of really powerful minds! and how large the proportion of those, who have been trained Protestants and remain content with that training! There are many Catholics, therefore, more or less interested in the conversion of such Protestants, who will be very grateful for a work, which exhibits the Catholic reply to Protestantism in a pointed and telling way. There cannot be found perhaps another controversy, in which the reasoning is so exclusively on

one side as on this. There are arguments more or less plausible, which may be adduced for the Arian doctrine on our Lord's Nature; for the Pelagian doctrine on Grace; for the Lutheran doctrine on Justification. But we never happened to fall in with an argument possessing the most superficial shadow of plausibility, which can be alleged for the Protestant Rule of Faith as against the Catholic.

The treatise before us seems the very book itself, which would be desired by such a Catholic as we suppose. The reader is not summoned to any abstruse thought or minute investigation of doubtful facts; but is carried in the very simplest of styles along the very simplest of arguments. The Abbé Bégin, it appears, was a pupil of F. Franzelin's; and he has introduced some admirable extracts from F. Perrone's Italian treatise on the Rule of Faith: but he has not troubled himself with any of the profounder theological questions, which those writers have handled.

The general argument is admirably analyzed in the preliminary Table of Contents. There is of course a common ground postulated between the combatants; viz. that Christianity is a divinely given religion, revealing certain momentous dogmata, which Christians are required faithfully to hold. If this be so—such is the argument of Part the First—the Rule of Faith must possess certain ascertainable characteristics. But the Protestant Rule of Faith—adds Part the Second—does not possess these characteristics; whereas—concludes Part the Third—the Catholic Rule of Faith does possess them. The reader is carried most agreeably along this unanswerable line of argument. The remote Rule of Faith—the proximate Rule of Faith—successively receive due attention. The writer shows how impossible it is for Protestants on their principles to establish the inspiration of Scripture, and at the same time how utterly their religion collapses without *belief* in that Inspiration. He quotes an admirable passage from Cardinal Wiseman (pp. 106—111), to show that the Church warmly encouraged vernacular translations of Scripture, until the heresies of the sixteenth century compelled a change of discipline. And he exhibits with clearness and power the incredible inconsistencies into which Protestants are driven by their theory.

We would venture to make one suggestion, which is applicable not only to this volume, but generally to Catholic controversial works. Does not the author express himself a little unguardedly in regard to the Church's *doctrinal unity?* He speaks (p. 231) as though doctrinal differences among Catholics "turned entirely on points in regard to which authority has defined nothing." But surely he here lays him self open to an obvious retort. As we pointed out in our last number (p. 38), the Holy Father has summoned all Catholics to pray, that those Catholics "who through obstinacy in their own opinions refuse to submit to the decisions of the Holy See or cherish sentiments at variance with its teaching, should see their errors." Pius IX. himself thus publicly declares, that there are certain Catholics who "cherish sentiments at variance with the teaching of the Holy See." We do not for a moment mean, that any real difficulty accrues to the Catholic argument from the existence of such Catholics because we are convinced that such is not the case. But—so we would

submit—such facts render it necessary to set forth that Catholic argument which is derived from the Church's doctrinal unity, with greater discretion and reserve than M. Bégin has thought necessary.

There is no ground whatever for Mrs. Pennée's fears (p. ix.) that her "share of the work" may have been "very imperfectly performed." We never met with a more readable book; nor should we have ever guessed that it was a translation.

Commentatio in Librum Danielis Prophetæ, sive de Temporibus Gentium, cum Appendice. Auctore GUILELMO PALMER, M.A., Collegii S. Mariæ Magdalene, apud Oxonienses, olim Socio. Romæ, ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide. 1874.

THE learned author of "Christian Symbolism," "Egyptian Chronicles," and "The Patriarch and the Tsar," has turned his versatile pen to another field, and published in Latin a running commentary on the Prophecies of Daniel. He does not undertake to cover the whole ground of the book, but only the twelve first chapters in their bearing upon "The Times of the Nations" (Luke xxi. 24); which expression of our Lord he takes to be the period of Israel's exile and oppression under the Gentiles, whether Pagan or Christian (p. 139; also Preface). Nor does he pretend to treat even these chapters in an exhaustive manner; but rather in the spirit of suggestive meditation he throws out such reflections and conclusions as his intimate acquaintance with chronology, symbolism, and history has enabled him to form, to test them by the fresh lights which the gradual evolution of the Divine Plan is continually casting on the prophecies. And indeed it is upon this that he grounds his plea for admission into the already well-filled ranks of commentators. For the treasures of Scripture, as he remarks, are so inexhaustible that there is ever room for further discovery and elucidation, and the nearer we approach the events prefigured or foretold, the more distinctly they loom out from the surrounding haze (Preface). In such a spirit he puts forward his views of Daniel's visions; and though claiming for them the attention of the learned, he has no wish to push aside other orthodox interpretations which may seem, at first sight, to conflict with his own, but which, after all, are most frequently but partial views of a subject, so many-sided, that there may be many successive fulfilments of the same event.

The author's modesty, however, must not prevail with us to shut our eyes to the genuine merits and worth of his book. He is a deft unraveller of the tangled web of written history; and knows how to handle the facts that seem to make against him so skilfully, that under his touch they resolve themselves into harmony with him, with themselves, and with the Prophet. He has also a keen and almost instinctive glance into the significance of the symbolic imagery which presents them to the mind or the eye, whether

of the prophet or of the heathen kings; in which he is enabled to steady his views by the additional light which he borrows from the Revelations of S. John. For the first and the last Apocalypse have so much in common, that they serve to illustrate one another; and what is clear in one helps us to bring into the field of view and reduce to focus the vague and undefined masses of the other. The Apocalypse of John, however, comes in only as an appendix to that of Daniel.

The best exemplification of our author's manner is to be found, perhaps, in the line of argument which he pursues, to show that Mohammed is foreshadowed by the prophet as one of Antichrist's forerunners, and exhibits in his person and measures the chief characteristics of his antitype (pp. 45—53, 95—99, 164—205). He even ventures to brand him with the number of the beast, 666 (pp. 196—200). And what will fall in with the general feeling of the Christian populations that groan under the shadow of the Crescent—from the indications furnished by the Prophet he expects that the Mohammedan power will come to an end in the year 1880 or 1897 (p. 23). In the present gloomy state of the religious and political world there is, indeed, some temptation to seek in prophecy anticipations of great and speedy changes in society, and not a few look forward to a not very distant winding-up of our sublunary history altogether. Our author is not so easily impressible. He conceives it quite possible, and—considering the immense continents still unpeopled—even probable, that we may yet be 360,000 years from the end of the world (p. 137), and so have an enormous margin for the yet unfulfilled prophecies to be accomplished. But this sobriety does not indispose him from suspecting that Prussia may be the power symbolized by the "little horn" (Dan. vii. 8), with "a mouth speaking great things." According to his computation, it comes immediately after the ten great powers of the Western Roman world, corresponding to the ten horns of the prophecy; and although it has not yet uprooted three of these ten horns, as the prediction requires, the present generation may be destined to witness the catastrophe (pp. 219—221). But the whole commentary is very suggestive. In choosing Latin for the vehicle of his thoughts, Mr. Palmer probably felt that he could thus command a far larger circle of appreciative readers than if he had written in English. And it must be said that, with somewhat of an English flavour here and there, the language is plain and perspicuous throughout. In conclusion, we have to thank the author for an unpretending commentary on Daniel, calculated to throw much light on the dark utterances of the Hebrew prophet.

Readings from the Old Testament. Arranged with Chronological Tables, Explanatory Notes, and Maps. For the use of Students. By J. G. Wenham, Canon of Southwark. London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

WITH a true and loyal fidelity to his plan, Canon Wenham has finished his "Readings from the Old Testament." It has already found its way into several of our upper schools, and will doubtless before

long become a general class-book. We most sincerely thank Canon Wenham for his excellently well-arranged and well-digested Index, a point in which the majority of books intended for students are sadly deficient, and which must have cost him no little trouble and pains. Its insertion has considerably enhanced the value and usefulness of the Readings from the Old Testament, and we doubt not that those of our young friends, and even their parents and tutors, who use this book, will cordially thank Canon Wenham.

This concluding volume contains the remaining portion of the Old Testament, from the Book of Kings to the Machabees.

Etudes Religieuses. September, 1875. Lyon : Lecoffre.

THIS number contains the conclusion of M. Ramière's article against "Liberal Catholicism," of which we translated the first part in our last number. The treatment of his subject is continued in the same powerful and unanswerable style, which our readers will have admired in the first article. We hope to give a translation of it in January.

The Orphan Sisters; or, the Problem Solved. By MARY J. HOFFMAN. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

THE "Orphan Sisters" is got up with the usual exquisite taste of Messrs. Sadlier & Co., New York, and we trust that it will have the circulation which it richly deserves among that class for which it is especially written, viz., the misguided and perverted followers and disciples of Theodore Parker, Emerson, and Spinoza.

The Family. By Rev. A. RICHE. Translated by Mrs. J. SADLIER. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

THIS little "multum in parvo" comes to us from the ever prolific press of Messrs. Sadlier & Co., New York, and is translated by Mrs. J. Sadlier, whose name alone is a guarantee for her fidelity.

"The Family" is only a portion of a valuable work from the pen of Rev. Auguste Riche, for which he had obtained not only the special benediction of His Holiness, to whom it is dedicated, but also the *imprimatur* of his own Diocesan, H. E. Cardinal Donnet, Archbishop of Bordeaux, who says of it:

"It is clear, attractive, worthy of its subject. It fixes the uncertainty of semi-believers, overthrows the prejudices of prejudiced men, and defeats

the attacks of our enemies, however insidious they may be. Its inspiration, full of faith and charity, springs from the benediction of the beloved and holy Pontiff, Pius IX., to whom you have made known your pious project."

It is is also approved by the eloquent Bishop of Orleans, and by the Bishop of Nîmes, Mgr. Plantier. Most cordially do we agree with Mrs. Sadlier in regarding this work as very opportune at the present day, when—

"The most widely spread objection against Catholicity is, that it is no longer in accordance with the actual condition of society. To answer this objection completely, it is necessary, in the first place, to study Christianity historically, in its relations with society in past ages; then to observe it in its relations with the society of the present day; and afterwards deduce what society would, at least probably, become in the future without Christianity."

This threefold study has long engaged the attention of the Abbé Riche; who seems to have made the refutation of this prejudice, now so active, and indeed one of the chief instruments for the war waged against the Church in the latter part of this nineteenth century, his special study.

The Christian Church, in obedience to her Divine Founder, raised the sacred bond of marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, and made it indissoluble. Christ Himself pronounced its indissolubility, and elevated woman from the state of a slave to that of a companion to her husband; and His representative on earth even consented to the loss to Christianity of this northern island rather than consent to the unjust repudiation of Katharine of Arragon by her lawful husband. What would become of the family indeed without Christianity, when "marriage would be nothing more than a mere civil contract, analogous to any other contract, whereby a couple would mutually bind themselves in the bonds of the family, under certain conditions, precisely as though they bound themselves in any other association? Nay, it is impossible to measure "the depth of the abyss into which this fall would precipitate woman," for the Divine maternity of Our Lady being false (in which every Christian woman has found her reinstatement and her glorification), she would again naturally become what she was before the advent of Christ, a very slave of man, the king of nature. It is, however, by the ennobling of that One Woman, whom God chose to be His mother according to the flesh, that she was elevated from her debased condition as a slave and a tool, to that equality which was originally her position when He created her as a companion to Adam; and of this our first father had a glimpse when he exclaimed on seeing Eve: "This now is bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh."

We sincerely hope that at no distant period Mrs. Sadlier will give us the remainder of l'Abbé Riche's labours on Catholicity considered in its relations to society.

Correspondence.

CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY.

[AFTER the offer we made in our last number, it would under any circumstances have been our duty to insert the following letter. But we are the more rejoiced in doing so, because it will give us the occasion in a future number of speaking somewhat more at length than space permitted in October, 1874, on one or two subordinate particulars connected with the general doctrine of civil sovereignty. In our own humble opinion, the consideration of these particulars will exhibit in still clearer light the truth of our own doctrine on the subject: but of this it will be for others to judge. Meanwhile we are grateful to our respected correspondent for his handsome expressions in our regard.]

To the Editor of the "DUBLIN REVIEW."

SIR,—As you are so courteous as to offer me the permission to address you a second letter on the question of "Civil Sovereignty," I feel it would be ungrateful not to avail myself of your generosity, though I hope I shall not trespass upon you so far as to accept your additional offer, viz., to extend my present letter to a greater length than the first. Indeed, my labour is somewhat shortened by your fair and candid retractation of some of the statements in your former article against which I contended, notably that which represented a future King of England as being, in a hypothetical case, a rebel legally punishable by some superior and sovereign authority.

The main issue still existing between us is whether the term *sovereign* is justly and truly applied to the Queen, or whether the use of such title is anything more than a constitutional fiction. I might reply by saying that though I maintained the Queen to be truly sovereign, yet I never said she was *absolute* sovereign; but such an answer, though good as far as it goes, would be imperfect. The real answer is (if you will permit me to say so) that you have failed to distinguish between the supreme legislative and the supreme executive power. But such a distinction is surely of the highest importance. I do not pin my faith entirely upon Blackstone, but he is a high authority nevertheless, though there are points in which we may differ from him. Now, this is what Blackstone says (book i. chap. ii.): "With us in England this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one legislative, to wit, the Parliament, consisting of King, Lords, and Commons; the other executive, consisting of the King alone." Then in treating of the executive authority, he says (chap. vii.): "And first, the law ascribes to the King the *attribute* of *sovereignty* or pre-eminence."

Now it is to be observed that although the legislative authority is in some respects superior to the executive, inasmuch that the legislature can enact laws which the executive is bound to carry out; yet in another way the executive authority is much more important, since it is always in action, while the legislative power is so only during the sittings of Parliament, which sittings can be suspended by the Crown, that is, the supreme executive authority; and not only so, but by the same executive authority Parliament can even be dissolved. I do not say that this is the historical reason why the oath of allegiance is taken to the Crown (which is, as I said, the supreme executive power) and not to any legislative body; but it shows how very fitting it is that such should be the case. The existence of the executive government is vitally necessary for the well-being of the country, but the legislative power might be conceived *in theory* to be non-existent, as we might suppose the laws of a country to be so perfect that there would be no need of enacting fresh laws or repealing old ones. Indeed I believe in some countries this is actually supposed to be the case; in Turkey, for instance, where the Sultan, though the absolute executive sovereign, has (if I mistake not) little if any legislative power. However this may be, there is no doubt as to the principle on which we act in England. As to the interpretation put upon the oath of allegiance, neither can there, I think, be any doubt about *that;* we swear *true* allegiance to the Queen, but not such obedience as would lead us to do unlawful acts at her bidding; thus a religious in taking the vow of obedience does not mean to include anything in which there is sin, but his superior is none the less his superior for that; and we, when taking the oath of allegiance to the Queen, do not mean to include such things as would be sin in the eyes of the law. From this you will see that I do not regard the Queen (nor I suppose does any one) as *absolute* sovereign even in her executive capacity; but I maintain that the title of sovereign is justly and rightly attributed to her nevertheless; and if, on the other hand, you, Sir, hold that the title of sovereign cannot truly be applied to any one (whether an individual or an assembly of men), but such as governs with the power of unlimited despotism, I can but say I profoundly differ from you. Take even the whole body of the legislature in England, the Queen and Parliament together, though it is commonly supposed that they are omnipotent, yet I believe that this opinion is an erroneous one, and that there are certain things which are *ultra vires* even for Parliament proceeding with the Royal assent. I said just now that I did not pin my faith upon Blackstone, though I quoted him for showing the obvious distinction between the legislative and executive authorities, and for attributing to the monarch the supreme authority in the latter: he, I believe, holds this quasi-omnipotence of Parliament; but there are greater names than his on the other side. I have seen the following quotation from Lord Coke; I have not verified it, but fully believe it to be correct: "In many cases the Common Law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void. For, when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be

void." (Benham's Case; 8 Reports, p. 118.) Here is another quotation, from Lord Holt, which, as in the former case, I believe to be correct: "It is a very reasonable and true saying that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person should be party and judge, it would be a void Act of Parliament. An Act of Parliament can do no wrong; though it may do several things that look pretty odd. But it cannot make one that lives under a Government judge and party. It may not make adultery lawful," &c. (City of London *v.* Wood, 12 Modern Reports, p. 687.) I give another quotation, from Lord Hobart: "An Act of Parliament may be void from its first creation, as an Act against natural equity. For Jura Naturæ sunt immutabilia, sunt Leges Legum." (Hobart, R. p. 87.)

If these great authorities speak truly, there is no sovereign power in this country at all in the sense in which you seem to me to use the word, that is, in the sense of an absolute unlimited despotic power; for there is an authority which can limit the power both of Queen and Parliament,—the Common Law, the unwritten law of England. You express some surprise at my speaking "as though secular laws, which prevent the sovereign from exercising his rights, had some kind of sacredness, nay were a blessing to the country." I do think the Common Law of the country is a blessing to it, and has a sort of quasi-sacredness; but I do not think it prevents the sovereign from exercising his rights, only from exceeding them.

I ought also to observe that, according to the theory of the Constitution, the monarch has not only the supreme executive power, but *in a certain sense* the supreme legislative power also; for Parliament does but advise him, though it is quite true that he cannot act without it. If, then, what I have stated be true, the monarch, however wrongly or unlawfully he may act, can never be a *rebel;* for there is no authority above him to whom he is accountable; but his acts are null and void; also persons acting illegally by his orders are punishable.

It is necessary now that I should touch upon one or two other points upon which I have laid myself open to misconception. I was alluding to the practical working of the machinery of government in modern England, a question apart from the main issue between us, and so far of minor importance, though in itself highly interesting. The passage which you quote from my former letter, beginning "In practice it could not happen," to "doing a single unlawful act," should be read as if it were a parenthesis. I meant to point out that, as things are now, it would be impracticable for an English king to break entirely with Parliament and govern by main force. I also meant to say, however, that a king, possessing the requisite amount of ability and vigour of character, might, without doing anything contrary to law, free himself from some of the trammels of the modern system of Parliamentary government, and reassert some of the rights and powers appertaining to the Crown, but which have been allowed gradually to drop out of the hands of the monarch into the hands of the House of Commons and the Cabinet. In saying that the House of Commons had "*usurped*" the sovereignty, I spoke loosely and inaccurately:

that in which the successive monarchs of England have more and more acquiesced can hardly be termed usurpation in the rigid sense of the word. I ought to have said, "The House of Commons have gradually acquired the predominant power." And as regards the Cabinet I ought not in strictness to have said that the House of Commons *delegated* the sovereignty to them. The Cabinet consists of men nominally the servants of the Crown, really selected by the Prime Minister out of both Houses of Parliament, and dependent mainly for their existence on the temper of the majority of the House of Commons. So far, therefore, I spoke inaccurately: but it is quite true that the Cabinet do practically exercise some of the most important functions of sovereignty; and furthermore, in saying that the Cabinet is "a body unknown to the old English Constitution," I simply stated a fact known to every one acquainted with the elements of English history.

And now, as you say, we will cross the Channel. I will first touch upon the question of the coronation of Napoleon I., and then upon that of the insurrection against Charles X., and I shall be brief upon both heads, because I feel myself here somewhat out of my depth. As to the first point, I do not say that the conduct of Louis XVIII., in protesting as he did against the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope, was "worthy of a truly loyal Catholic": it is one thing to treat the actions and proceedings of the reigning Pope with the deepest respect, and another thing to hold, when you look back upon them as a matter of history, that they were certainly right. I confess that I thought a great distinction existed between the decrees or decisions of Popes, even such as were not infallible, and the personal conduct of such Popes; I imagined in fact that a special deference was due to the first of these which was not necessarily due to the second. If however I am wrong in so supposing, I entirely submit to the opinions of those theologians and other learned persons who are better instructed than myself on this subject. But I would raise the following question:—"Is it clear that Pius VII. intended to pronounce any judgment at all on the subject? Might he not have argued with himself thus: "There is good reason, in the present abnormal state of things in France, to think that the existing *de facto* ruler, Napoleon Bonaparte, may justly be treated as the lawful sovereign, partly because for the moment he is the only possible sovereign, and partly for other causes; so, without passing any judgment on the claims of the exiled family, and without intending to bind the consciences of others, I decide upon crowning Napoleon." I do not of course presume to say that this actually was the line of reasoning that the Pontiff followed; I only suggest that it might have been so.

On the whole subject I speak with the greatest diffidence. And I believe I ought to withdraw one thing which I threw out in my last letter as a possible element of the question; viz., that perhaps Pope Pius VII. was not quite a free agent at the time: I think, however, that he really was so, and such objection as I raised on that score must fall to the ground.

Now, then, on the second point, I have very little to urge, since you so frankly admit that the Pope's decision as to the lawfulness of taking the

oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe is not to be regarded as conclusive of the question whether the Revolution of 1830 was justifiable or not. It is supposed by some (I suspect not without truth) to have been the work of that edifying society known as the Carbonari. If, however, on the other hand, it was justifiable according to the existing French laws and constitution; if the people of Paris had a right to take up arms and effect a change of government by force; and if, further (as you suppose), the acquiescence of the rest of the French people, accustomed as they were to submit to everything that came from Paris, whether bad or good, is to be rightly held as a valid act of the nation assenting constitutionally to the new order of things; then all I can say is that one may heartily wish the French people joy of having such laws and constitutions, and may feel thankful that we have none such ourselves. I do not pretend to know enough about the French nation and their laws to pronounce upon the matter: I am quite satisfied with your very candid admission that Pope Gregory XVI. did not decide the question either way.

And now, Sir, it only remains for me to thank you for your great courtesy in allowing me to reply to you in this second letter, which is a proof (if any were wanted) that you have nothing but the interests of truth at heart.—I remain your obedient servant, W. P.

ROSMINI'S PHILOSOPHY.

To the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—In the Notices of Books in the July number of the DUBLIN, on "S. Thomas of Aquin and Ideology," your reviewer seems to identify in some way the philosophy of Rosmini with that of Hegel and Kant. He was probably not aware that similar charges had been made some years ago by a writer in the DUBLIN, and honourably withdrawn by him in the course of a correspondence between that writer and myself, which, with your accustomed fairness, you printed in the DUBLIN.

I had quoted from a letter of a distinguished ecclesiastic, whose name and authority to speak on the matter, from personal knowledge of the facts, were known to you. He wrote thus:—"Rosmini's works, after four or five years of most rigorous scrutiny at Rome, were dismissed with the fullest acquittal ever given to the works of any writer except those of a canonized saint, and, I may add, with the strongest declarations on the part of the Holy Father."

On this the writer in the DUBLIN thus expressed himself:—"It is only just and fair now to state emphatically that since Rosmini's theological and philosophical system has been submitted to the scrutiny of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, and declared free from dogmatic error, his name ought not, in any, even passing, allusion, to be coupled with those of

men whose theological and philosophical opinions have been condemned as erroneous."

I feel sure you will feel that it is just and fair to reprint the above in order to do away with the impression unintentionally conveyed by the notice in the July number of the DUBLIN.—Dear Sir, yours truly,

W. LOCKHART.

14, Ely Place, London, E.C.,
October 5th, 1875.

[Father Lockhart writes in a spirit of candour and courtesy, for which we have sincerely to thank him ; but even were his tone different, it would be our duty to insert his letter. We are very glad of the opportunity to explain, that nothing can have been further from our intention than to assail Rosmini's doctrinal orthodoxy ; and indeed, by expressly speaking of him as "so powerful, thoughtful, and *religious* a writer," we thought we had sufficiently shown how extremely far we were from "identifying" his personal opinions with those of Hegel and Kant. We confess however that if we had to re-write the notice, we should dwell at greater length than we did on Rosmini's perfect theological orthodoxy ; and we must express our sincere regret for not having done so.

But we consider that the merits of his philosophical system are open to the freest criticism. After his acquittal by the Congregation, we certainly should not account it permissible to think that anything contained in his works contradicts Catholic doctrine. But we are at liberty (as we conceive) both to think and to say, that this or that particular in his philosophy has a very undesirable affinity with this or that particular in the philosophy of Kant or Hegel ; and that it would lead *by legitimate consequence* to anti-Catholic conclusions. In like manner, many a Catholic argues against certain doctrines concerning physical premotion, that they would lead by legitimate consequence to a denial of Freewill. He does not dream of implying (God forbid !) that those who hold such doctrines do in fact deny Freewill. What he impugns is not their theological orthodoxy, but their philosophical consistency. And if Catholics were not allowed to prefer a similar indictment against Rosmini's philosophical system, it would follow that they are bound to regard that system as substantially true: which no one dreams of maintaining. Any system covering such ground as Rosmini's, which is not substantially true, would be quite sure to issue legitimately in this or that anti-Catholic theological conclusion. If therefore Catholics were not allowed to hold that Rosmini's system occasionally issues by legitimate consequence in such conclusion, they would be required to hold that it is substantially true. And this (we repeat) most assuredly will be maintained by no one.

Accordingly F. Palmieri, S.J.—one of the most distinguished Roman theologians, and writing under Roman censorship—does not hesitate to say in his recently published "Institutiones Philosophicæ," that the Rosminian system "is no more than an accidental modification of the Kantian" (tom. ii. p. 526).

It will be found that in our article on "S. Thomas's Theory of Knowledge," we express our sense of Rosmini's great philosophical power and truly excellent philosophical intentions. And (as we have already said) we feel on reflection that in our July notice we ought to have dwelt at greater length and more emphatically than we did, on our conviction of his entire doctrinal orthodoxy.]


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