


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McCulloch, John Ramsay
Observations on the duty of
sea-borne coal.

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[McCulloch, John Ramsay]

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

DUTY ON SEA-BORNE COAL;

AND ON THE PECULIAR

DUTIES AND CHARGES ON COAL,

IN THE

PORT OF LONDON.

FOUNDED ON THE REPORTS OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES,
AND OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.


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James D.

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
DUTY ON SEA-BORNE COAL.

It is singular that the three Reports of Parliamentary Committees, recently printed, on the state of the Coal Trade, and the Duties on Coal, should have attracted so little attention from the press and the public. Few more interesting documents have ever come under our notice. The subjects investigated in them, are of vast importance to all classes of persons, but especially to the people of London.

Those conversant with the business, had long been aware that abuses of the most flagrant description had insinuated themselves into every department of the coal trade: but without a Parliamentary inquiry, it would have been difficult to make the public aware of the nature and extent of these abuses. They would have doubted whether such enormities as have been disclosed in the Reports, could really exist: and now that they have been exposed in all their native deformity, it will excite surprise how they ever were allowed to grow up amongst

us. But we take leave to say, that it will be infinitely more surprising, if, notwithstanding their complete exposure, they should still be allowed to flourish in the infamous luxuriance to which they have attained. Should such be the case, it will prove that the Government and the public are alike regardless—the first, of its most sacred duties; and the last, of its best interests.

The grievances that affect the coal trade may be divided into two great classes: first, the duty on sea-borne coal; and second, the regulations as to the sale of coal. The last are particularly oppressive in the metropolis, where every sort of iniquity that it is possible to practise in the trade, has been fostered and promoted down to this very day.

I. The Legislature of England seems to have too often forgotten that fuel is one of the articles most indispensable to existence. In our northern climates it is quite as essential as either food or clothes; its cost forms an important item in the expense of every family in the lower and middle classes, an increase of its price affecting them in precisely the same way as an increase in the price of bread. Not only, however, is fuel a necessary of life; it is also among the most important, or rather, we should say, *by far the most important, of all the instruments of manufacturing industry*. It is not because the inhabitants of Glasgow, Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, &c. are more industrious or inventive than those of Canterbury, Winchester, Exeter, &c. that they have made such prodigious advances in manufactures, wealth, and population, while the latter have been comparatively stationary—but it is because the former are abundantly supplied with fuel, while the latter are not. Since the invention of the steam engine, fire has become

of infinitely more importance as a moving power than either water or wind; and in the present state of the arts, those who cannot obtain abundant supplies of fuel at a cheap rate, must submit to be outstripped by their neighbours in the career of improvement.

Timber is the great article of fuel in France and most of the Continental States; but with us it is far too scarce and dear to be used as such to any considerable extent. Our deficiency in this respect is, however, of little importance, as we have the good fortune to possess inexhaustible supplies of the very best coal. But this invaluable mineral is not distributed equally over the country. The great coal-fields are mostly in the northern counties; and as coal is a very bulky and heavy article, its price must be considerably enhanced in London and the southern parts of the island, to which it has to be conveyed by a distant sea voyage, or by a lengthened inland navigation.

Considering the importance of coal as a necessary of life, and in the arts, one, not acquainted with the facts, would naturally conclude that it would be exempted from every sort of tax or duty, and that every possible facility would be given to its conveyance from the mines to the more distant parts. This is what all would be disposed to infer *à priori*; but we are sorry to say, that this is not the way in which the coal trade of England has been treated. Generally speaking, our commercial and financial system is founded on more enlarged and liberal principles than that of any other European country; but in the particular instance of the coal trade, it can lay claim to no such distinction. On the contrary, this important department of industry is subjected to the most unjust and oppressive regulations. And the patience with which they have been submitted to, strikingly evinces the pow-

er of custom, in reconciling us to the most pernicious abuses.*

Every one versed in the merest elements of political science, will be forward to admit that nothing but the pressure of the most overwhelming necessity, could ever excuse the Government of a country like England for laying duties on coal, an article so indispensable as a necessary, and so important as a manufacturing instrument: and it will be as universally admitted, that in the event of a crisis ever occurring to excuse the imposition of such a tax, it should be laid equally on all classes and districts. One is almost ashamed of saying a word in defence of so plain a principle. Suppose that the public exigences were such, that they could not be met otherwise than by laying a tax on bread, what would be thought of Parliament, were it to enact that this tax should be restricted to the counties south of the Humber, (upon which it must of course be greatly aggravated,) and that all the rest of the empire should be exempted from its operation? Would not such a proceeding be a manifest violation of one of the first duties of Government, which is bound to extend the same protection to all who are under its authority, and to subject them all to the same equal burdens? But these obvious and universally recognised principles have been trampled under foot in the case of the coal duty. It has been imposed without there being so much as the pretence of necessity to allege in excuse; and it has not been made to affect the whole empire, but *only particular portions of it*. Had it been made to fall exclusively on the inhabitants of those districts where

* This paragraph, and one or two of those that follow, are borrowed from an article that appeared on this subject, in No. 101, of the Edinburgh Review.

coal is produced, and where it is naturally cheapest, something, perhaps, might have been found to say in favour of the inequality; but such is not the case. The duty is imposed on *water-borne* coals only, or on those that are conveyed to great distances by sea,* and does not affect those that are consumed near the mines, or that may be conveyed by land. All the southern counties of England, as Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Middlesex, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Hampshire, Devonshire, &c. are destitute of coal-mines, and are obliged to import supplies of coal from the north by sea. And because such is the case, because the coal-fields happen to be in Northumberland, Durham, Lancashire, and Wales, Government interposes to increase the naturally high price of coal sent to the metropolis and the southern counties, by laying a duty on sea-borne coal of no less than *six shillings* a chaldron, being full fifty per cent. upon the price of coals as sold by the owners! Whether there be any tax so grossly unequal and oppressive in Turkey or Spain, we know not; but we believe we may safely affirm, that it has no parallel in any other European country. The nobility and gentry of the north may consume any quantity of coals that they please, without paying a single sixpence of duty. The lordly owners of the most magnificent castles in Northumberland and Durham, escape a tax that presses with grinding severity on the poorest inhabitant of a cottage in the south of England. Whatever may be said as to the equality of Englishmen's rights, it were worse than ludicrous, so long as this tax exists, to talk about the equality of their burdens.

* Coal sent to London by canals is burdened with a low duty that will afterwards be noticed.

The superior condition of the peasantry in the northern counties, as compared with the condition of the same class in the south, is a circumstance that forcibly arrests the attention of every one acquainted with the different parts of the empire. The statements recently made in the House of Commons, that the incendiaries whose diabolical outrages have caused so much consternation in Kent and elsewhere, do not belong to the labouring classes, will we trust turn out to be well founded. It is not denied, however, that the peasantry have been the parties principally engaged in the destruction of thrashing machines. It seems indeed to be generally believed, that hitherto no bad principle has taken root amongst them, and that their excesses are chiefly to be ascribed to the despair and recklessness inspired by extreme poverty. But whatever differences of opinion may exist as to other matters, every one acquainted with the condition of the poor, seems to be impressed with the conviction, that unless something be done to relieve their necessities, the most disastrous consequences may be expected to ensue. It would be inconsistent alike with our objects and limits, to enter upon any lengthened inquiries as to the causes that have led to such deplorable results—that have depressed the labourers of the southern counties so far below those of the North. Perhaps a good deal of the difference may be traced to the pernicious practice, so long prevalent in the South, of mixing wages and poor-rates together. But this is not the only cause of degradation that has been at work here. A great deal of the peculiar poverty and misery to be met with amongst the labouring classes of Kent, Hampshire, Suffolk, &c. is undoubtedly ascribable to *the operation of the coal duty, and of the various regulations under which the trade is conducted*. Were there a heavy tax on the beef, or bread, used in the southern counties,

which did not extend to the North, does any one doubt that it would have a most injurious effect upon the individuals subjected to its operation? Fuel, however, is quite as indispensable as either of the articles referred to; and being so, must not a tax on it equally affect those on whom it falls, and depress their condition, compared with those who are exempted from such an impost? It is not, however, by its direct effects only that the coal tax is injurious: it is so indirectly, by depriving those subjected to it, of means of employment that would otherwise be at their disposal. At present one has only to take up a map of England, distinguishing the coal districts, to learn at a glance the seats of manufacture and employment. But such is not the natural order of things. Were the duty and the regulations that grow out of it abolished, the expense of conveying coal by sea would be so much reduced, that many branches of industry which cannot at present be carried on except in the vicinity of the mines, might be carried on at a distance; while many that are now carried on in counties remote from the mines, though with difficulty, would be carried on with comparative facility and success.

There is a statement in the second Report of the Lords' Committee (p. 139,) which strikingly exemplifies what has now been stated. Mr William Stark, a manufacturer of Norwich, informed their lordships, that so long as yarn was spun by the hand, all that was used in that city was spun there; but that since yarn had been spun by machinery, Norwich had entirely lost this branch of industry, inasmuch as *the high price of coal caused by the duty had disabled them from erecting machines!* At the time that Mr Stark gave this evidence, there were from 4,000 to 5,000 persons unemployed in Norwich. And it is not, probably, going too far to say, that not

one-third of them would have been in that situation but for the coal duty.

In the very instructive and able Report, recently distributed, of the late Committee of the House of Commons, on the state of the Irish poor, we find the following paragraph. “ If the manufactures of Ireland are to be sustained, it can only be by the application of machinery. But this is impeded by the duty on coals. Many of the most intelligent witnesses examined, concur in representing that the tax on coal tends to prevent the increase of manufactures. Mr Williams, to whom much of the extension of steam navigation is due, states, that ‘ vessels frequently return from Liverpool to Dublin without freight, and that if coals were not subject to duty, this back trade might be supplied by an increased introduction of coals into Ireland, to a considerable extent ; that even a reduction of 1s. a ton would turn the scale in favour of sending coal into the interior of Ireland.’ Another witness affirms, on the authority of one of the principal manufacturers in Dublin, that ‘ the repeal of the coal tax would lead to a double demand for labour in a single establishment ; and that where 700 workmen are now employed, employment would be given to 1,400 or 1,500.’ ‘ If this trade were free from restrictions,’ observes Mr Roe, a director of the Bank of Ireland, and secretary to the Chamber of Commerce, ‘ the small craft that cross the British Channel might in many cases employ themselves in bringing back a return freight of coal.’ ‘ The direct practical effect of these duties,’ continues the same witness, ‘ is to discourage the industry, and consequently to augment the distress, of the country ; with this additional disadvantage, that in many instances the Irish manufacturer, who finds himself unable to withstand the competition of his rivals, in Scotland especially, who

‘ pay no duty on coal, is disposed to attribute his failure ‘ to legislative injustice.’ Nor is it alone the duties which are complained of, but the restrictions ‘ and delays arising ‘ out of the regulations necessary at the custom-house ;’ these naturally aggravate the pressure, and operate in a scarcely inferior degree to enhance the price of coals. *A free trade in coal would be followed by a reduction in price, much beyond the mere amount of duty.* If the coal which now sells at 20s. a ton, were relieved from duties and regulations, Mr Roe conceives that it would be laid in by the manufacturers at 14s. or 15s. So very considerable a fall in price, or even a fall not quite so important, could not be but felt by all the brewers, distillers, and other manufacturers throughout Ireland. It could not but give additional facilities to the inland steam navigation, and to the commercial relations of the country.” The Committee, on these grounds, have recommended the repeal of the coal tax, “ as soon as it can be effected consistently with the financial interests of the empire.”

Now, if such be the effects of the coal duty in Ireland, where it only amounts to 2s. 5d. a chaldron, and where turf is comparatively abundant, what must it be in the South of England, where it is 6s. and where there is hardly any turf? Every statement made by the witnesses examined by the Irish Poor Committee, and every remark made by the Committee itself, as to the injurious influence of the tax, are quite as true if applied to Kent or Middlesex as to Leinster or Ulster. Those who reflect even for a moment on the many important businesses carried on in London, and other places in the South, that are deeply injured by the coal duty, will, we are convinced, agree with us in thinking, that its repeal would do more to promote industry, and consequently to increase the demand for labour, in the districts subject to its operation, than

any other measure it is in the power of Parliament to adopt. Those acquainted with the metropolis can hardly require to be told, that the pressure of this most impolitic tax has already caused the desertion, to a great extent, of several manufactures established in its neighbourhood.

The mischievous operation of the coal duty on the poor is, therefore, as clear as the sun at noon-day. It deprives them of employment, and benumbs them with cold. We would beg to ask whether there be a gentleman, connected with the southern counties, ignorant of the severe privations occasioned by the scarcity and high price of fuel, and of the depredations to which plantations and palings are in consequence exposed? Let none, therefore, presume to say, that the distress of the poor of Kent, Surrey, &c. is of a sort that cannot be sensibly relieved by legislative interference. To afford them material and immediate relief, we have only to treat them as we treat others; to allow them to supply themselves with fuel in the same way that the peasantry of Yorkshire and Northumberland are supplied. We do not mean to say that this relief would be sufficient; but no reasonable person can doubt that it would be very considerable; and it cannot be withheld without prolonging inequality and oppression.

Dr. Smith has truly stated, that considering the vast importance of plentiful supplies of fuel, if a *bounty* could in any case be justified, it would be so were it given upon the conveyance of coals from the mine to the consumer. But such, he adds, is our policy, 'that where coals are naturally cheap, they are consumed duty free; where they are naturally dear, they are loaded with a heavy duty!' (Wealth of Nations, iii. p. 451.) We leave it to others to determine whether the disastrous influence of such a tax, or its glaring injustice, be its most prominent characteristic.

But injustice can be carried even farther than this.— Nothing can be more oppressive than to lay a peculiar tax on sea-borne coal, unless it be, *to tax such coal when carried to peculiar districts only*. Now this is the fact with regard to the duty in question. It falls with its utmost severity upon the southern counties of England, while it is comparatively light in Wales, and does not at all affect Scotland! The *gabelle* in France, which had no inconsiderable share in bringing about the revolution of 1789, was not more unequal than the coal duty. Most certainly, however, we do not object to Scotland being exempted from it; and on this ground, at least, she is under solid obligations to the late Lord Melville. What we object to is, that a tax which has been repealed in one division of the empire, because it was proved to be subversive of the public prosperity, should be maintained in others, where it is quite as injurious. Are the labourers of the Lothians and Berwickshire less able to pay a tax on their fuel than those of Kent and Hampshire? Are the manufactures of Norwich less likely to be ruined by the coal duty than those of Perth? Every one knows that these questions must be answered in the negative; and yet from the want of a Henry IX. or some other cause, the southern counties continue subject to a scourge from which the North has been exempted for forty years.

It would, however, be uncandid not to mention, that even in the South there is one limited district—one favoured oasis—in which sea-borne coal may be used, duty free! In 1797, the subscribers to the Monmouthshire Canal, which terminates at Newport on the Bristol Channel, obtained, by some sort of management which reflects infinite credit on them, whatever it may do upon others, a power to export coals, free of duty, provided they do not carry them to the west of the Holmes islands at the

mouth of the Channel. And within the limits thus assigned to this favoured company, are Bristol, Bridgwater, and some other populous places. The effects of this privilege have been most striking. If our readers will but glance at the Bristol Channel, as laid down in any map of England, they will see that Cardiff, which is quite as abundantly supplied with coal as Newport, is but a very short distance from the latter, and is in every respect as well situated for carrying on an extensive trade in coal. In consequence, however, of the exemption from the coast duty, enjoyed exclusively by the Newport coal, the export of it amounts to about 550,000 tons a year, while only about 60,000 tons are exported from Cardiff. (Second Lords' Rep. p. 165.) Can partiality and preference be carried farther? Admitting, which is not true, that the Scotch peasantry cannot so well afford to pay taxes as the peasantry of Kent and Surrey, are the citizens of Bristol and Bridgwater in the same unfortunate predicament compared with those of Deptford and Rochester? And what is there so very meritorious about the Monmouthshire Canal Company, that they should enjoy the privilege denied to the coal-owners of Cardiff and Swansea, of sending coals, duty free, to Bristol and Bridgwater? Those who succeed in explaining and justifying such anomalies, will have little difficulty in proving that the *alcabala* is a most excellent tax, and Don Miguel the most humane and enlightened of European princes.

We have heard it alleged, that it would be inexpedient to take off the duty on sea-borne coal for some time to come, because its existence gives a stimulus to the projects now on foot for constructing canals and rail-roads! But whatever the adventurers in such schemes may say, we hardly think that any minister or legislator will be bold enough to avow such a doctrine. We detest all prefer-

ence of any one interest to any other interest. But if preferences are to be shewn, the shipping interest, at present so unjustly depressed by means of the coal duty, has, to say the very least, quite as good a claim to favour and patronage, as the projectors of the schemes in question. If rail-roads cannot be made from London to the North without keeping up a tax so destructive of industry as the coal duty, we pray they may never exist. But let not the subscribers to such undertakings deceive themselves by supposing that the duty on sea-borne coal will be continued. It is not in the nature of things that so flagrant an injustice can be permanent.

Besides the duty of 6s. a chaldron payable to Government on coals carried by sea, they are subject, especially those imported into London, to various charges, if possible still more indefensible. But, before proceeding to investigate these items, we shall give some account of the prime cost and price of coal.

Much has frequently been said of the coal-owners' monopoly; but we are satisfied, after a pretty careful investigation of the circumstances, that no such monopoly has ever existed; and that the enormously high price of coal in the metropolis is to be ascribed wholly to the various duties and charges laid upon it, from the time that it passes from the hands of the owner, to the time that it is lodged in the cellar of the consumer. What means have the coal owners of obtaining a *monopoly price* for their coal? They enjoy no exclusive privileges of any sort; they are a numerous body; and the trade is as open as any other to all capitalists to engage in. The number of places on the east and west coasts, both of England and Scotland, and the southern parts of Wales, from which coals are exported, render it quite visionary to suppose that any general agreement to keep up prices can take

place amongst the various coal proprietors. And though such an agreement were entered into, it is impossible it could be maintained. The *power* of producing coal greatly exceeds the present demand; many new mines have been recently opened, and many others would be brought into activity, were the price artificially enhanced. It is true that the coal-owners on the Tyne and Wear, having experienced the ruinous effects of throwing a superabundant quantity of coal upon restricted and already glutted markets, have occasionally met together, and each having named the price he thinks his coal will command, and at which he intends to sell it, they have proceeded jointly to regulate, according to the probable demand, the quantity that each shall raise during any particular period. By means of this arrangement, the supply and price of coal has been kept, during the time it has existed, comparatively steady. Common prudence prompts and justifies such an arrangement; but it also suggests the necessity of reducing the price of coal to the lowest level that will afford the customary rate of profit. For were the price demanded by the Northern coal-owners raised above this level, new mines would be opened in Durham and Northumberland, the imports from the Tees, whence excellent coal *is at present brought*, would be augmented, and fresh competitors, from Swansea and several other places, would come into the field and undersell them. Government should encourage and promote this fair competition; but it ought, at the same time, to do equal justice by all the competitors. It is not to lend assistance to, or remove burdens from, one set of adventurers, which it does not lend to, or remove from others. It is no part of its duty to say *how* coals, or any species of produce, shall be carried to market. It is bound to give every reasonable facility for the opening of new channels or modes of con-

veyance between all parts of the country; but it is glaringly unjust to lay a heavy tax on the coals conveyed by a particular channel, from which those conveyed by other channels are exempted. This is not to encourage competition, but to suppress it. Such a system necessarily diverts the capital and industry of the country into unnatural channels; and establishes monopolies in favour of certain classes, to the extreme injury of others, and of the public.

Instead of the business of coal-mining being, generally speaking, an advantageous one, it is distinctly the reverse. Sometimes, no doubt, large fortunes have been made by individuals and associations engaged in this business; but these are rare instances. The opening of a mine is a very expensive and hazardous operation, and of very uncertain result. Collieries are exposed to an infinite number of accidents, against which no caution can guard. The chances of explosion have, it is true, been a good deal lessened by the introduction of Sir Humphrey Davy's lamp; and some mines are now wrought, that, but for the invention of this admirable instrument, must have been entirely abandoned. But besides explosions, which are still every now and then occurring, from the carelessness of the workmen, and other contingencies, mines are very liable to be destroyed by *creeps*, or by the sinking of the roof, and by drowning, or the irruption of water from old workings, through fissures which cannot be seen, and consequently cannot be guarded against. So great, indeed, is the hazard attending this sort of property, that it has never been possible to effect an insurance on a coal-work.

Mr Buddle, of Wallsend, a coal-owner and engineer of the highest respectability, and intimately acquainted with the state of the coal trade, informed the Committee of the House of Lords, that 'Although many collieries,

‘ in the hands of fortunate individuals and companies, ‘ have been perhaps making more than might be deemed ‘ a reasonable and fair profit, according to their risk, like ‘ a prize in a lottery ; yet, as a trade, taking the whole ‘ capital employed on both rivers, he should say that cer- ‘ tainly it has not been so.’—(First Report, p. 56.) Again, being asked, ‘ What have the coal-owners on the Tyne ‘ and Wear, in your opinion, generally made on their ‘ capital employed ?’ He replied, ‘ According to the best ‘ of my knowledge, I should think that *by no means ten ‘ per cent. has been made as simple interest, without al- ‘ lowing any extra interest for the redemption of capi- ‘ tal.*’—(P. 57.)

In addition to the vast expense attending the sinking of shafts, the erection of steam engines, &c. and the risk of accidents, the coal, after being brought to the surface, has frequently to be conveyed seven or eight miles to the place of shipping ; and those whose collieries are in that situation have to pay *way-leave* rents, amounting, in some cases, to £500 a year, for liberty to open a communication, or a rail-road, through the properties lying between them and the shore.

But the coal-owner is subjected to still farther difficulties. The smallness of the coal used in London is uniformly remarked by every individual from the North who visits the metropolis. And yet, singular as it may seem, none but large coals are shipped from the Tyne and the Wear for London. The cause of the metamorphosis, which the coal undergoes in its passage to the consumer, is not, however, difficult to discover ; and it admirably illustrates the nature of the regulations under which the trade is placed. Coals are nominally sold by the owners to the shippers by weight, or by the chaldron waggon, which is *supposed* to contain, when full, 53 cwt., and is

stamped as such by the officer of the Customs. But the weight of the waggon depends in a great degree on the size of the pieces with which it is filled, so that, in point of fact, coal is sold by measure. It is stated by the celebrated mathematician, Dr Hutton, who, being a native of Newcastle, was well acquainted with the coal trade, that, ‘If one coal, measuring exactly a cubic yard (nearly equal to *five* bolls,) *be broken into pieces of a moderate size, it will measure seven bolls and a half; if broken very small, it will measure nine bolls*; which shews that the proportion of the weight to the measure depends upon the size of the coals; therefore *accounting by weight is the most rational method.*’ The shippers are well aware of this, and insist upon the coal-owners supplying them with large coal only; and to such an extent is this principle carried, that all coal for the London market is *screened*, as it is technically termed, or passed over gratings, which separate the smaller pieces. Inasmuch, however, as coals are sold in all their subsequent stages by measure, no sooner have they been delivered by the owner, than it is for the interest of every one else, into whose hands they may come before reaching the consumer, to break them into smaller portions. ‘The ship-owner,’ says Mr Buddle, ‘and every person from the consumer through the whole chain of dealers in coal up to the coal-owners, cry out for round coals; what is the object of that? Although our waggons are loaded by weight, it is quite notorious we sell by measure; and every hand that those coals pass through, from the mine down to the cellar of the consumer, every time they are lifted, an increase of measure takes place; consequently every man, from the coal-owner to the consumer, is benefitted by every breakage of the coal. This has been carried in some instances to such an extent, that I have found

‘it necessary to place persons on board ships to prevent
 ‘ the crew from breaking the coals with the carpenters’
 ‘ mauls! *I believe that the profit of many of the retailers*
 ‘ *in London arises chiefly from the increase of measure*
 ‘ *by the breakage of coal.*’—(First Lords’ Report, p. 59.)
 Mr Burgin, who had been a coal-meter, declares that
 ‘ he never went to work without seeing the coals knocked
 ‘ to pieces.’—(Com. Rep. p. 46.) And Mr Brandling, a
 most intelligent and extensive coal-owner, states, that in
 consequence of the breakage, the coals are reduced in
 London to a size inferior to what they would be, were
 they put on board *unscreened*, and subjected to no addi-
 tional breakage.—(Com. Rep. p. 260.)

That such a system should have been so long perseve-
 red in, is truly astonishing. Dozens of acts of Parliament
 have been passed to preserve the public from fraud in the
 measuring of coal, and yet any coal-merchant who breaks
 his coal a little smaller than his neighbours, will, by ma-
 king the same quantity measure farther, defraud his cus-
 tomers quite as effectually as if he sold them larger coal
 in a deficient measure. But though the attention of Ho-
 nourable Gentlemen has been repeatedly called to this
 easy method of defrauding the unsuspecting citizens, it
 does not seem to have ever attracted the smallest portion
 of their concern. They have continued, with an Irish
 sort of discernment, to occupy themselves in stopping
 up the spigot, while the liquor was running out at the
 bung-hole.

But what has been already stated, is not sufficient to
 shew the whole mischief arising from the regulations en-
 forcing the sale of coal by measure. The quantity of
 coal separated by the process of *screening* is often very
 great,—amounting, in some cases, to from 20 to 25 per
 cent. of the whole; and the greater part of this residue,

containing a portion of the very best coal, is *burned on the spot*. ‘I have known, says Mr Buddle, ‘at one colliery, as many as from 90 to 100 chaldrons a-day destroyed. If they were not consumed, they would cover the whole surface, and in the burnings of them they are extremely destructive; *they destroy the crops a great way round, and we pay large sums for injury done to the crops, and for damage to ground.*’—(First Lords’ Report, p. 72.) The waste of coal is in this way enormous; and the coal-owner is obliged to charge a higher price upon the coal sold, in order to indemnify himself for the loss of so great a quantity, and for the mischief he does to others in burning.

‘Different opinions,’ says the Committee of the House of Commons, ‘exist as to the quantity of coal in the northern coal district; but should it prove to be as great as the most sanguine persons imagine, it is impossible to contemplate, without regret, such an extensive waste of a valuable commodity, which no art can reproduce. Even were the quantity of coal inexhaustible, and the waste in that view unimportant, it is, we think, evident that the selling price must be increased by this process. The expense of raising and bringing to the surface is incurred equally on the wasted coal, and the labour of *screening* is not inconsiderable. Mr Brandling states, that in one colliery in which he is engaged, they obtain 23*s.* for the screened coal, and for the same coal un-screened 18*s.*’—(Report, p. 13.)

The sale of coals by weight instead of measure, as recommended by the coal-owners and the Committees of the Legislature, would, therefore, be a great and signal improvement. It would, by relieving the former from the necessity of *screening*, enable them to sell coal considerably cheaper; it would take away all motive from the

shippers and retailers to break coal ; and it would afford the best attainable security to the public against the frauds to which they are now exposed.

It has, however, been said by those who profit by the existing system, that the sale of coal by weight would not really put a stop to fraud, but would merely turn it into a new channel ; and make that be done by *wetting* coal, which is now done by selling it in deficient measures. But the fallacy of this representation is obvious. Very few individuals ever think of re-measuring the coal brought to them ; and besides, as has been already shewn, the correctness of the measure is no security against fraud, so long as it is impossible to regulate the size of coal. But were coals sold by weight, every one would *see*, at once, whether they were unusually wet ; and any dealer, who should attempt to defraud his customers in this way, would immediately lose his employment. This is a natural check which every individual has it in his power to apply, and which is found to be quite effectual in preventing frauds in the sale of sugar, and many other commodities. But, in point of fact, the extent to which the weight of coal can be increased by wetting, is, in all cases, very limited, and in the case of large coal quite inconsiderable. Mr Horne, an intelligent coal-merchant, has made some experiments which throw much light on this subject. He put into a *wet sack*, 2 cwt. or 224 lbs. of *small coal*, and these being completely wetted and *immediately* weighed, were found to have gained 28 lbs. in weight ; after they had been an hour in the sack, the increased weight was reduced to 20 $\frac{3}{4}$ lbs., and after standing three hours it was reduced to 14 lbs. Mr Horne says, that *at the end of six hours*, when the increased weight was still farther reduced, the coals were so very wet that he could not have sent them to any body.—(Com. Rep. p. 90.) When *good*

sized coals were treated in the same way, the increased weight from wetting, at the end of three hours, only amounted to about $6\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. on 2 cwt. ; and when *large coals* were wetted, the increase at the end of three hours on 2 cwt. was no more than 4 lbs. It is clear, therefore, that there is nothing to be apprehended from frauds from wetting were coals sold by weight. The offence is not one that could be perpetrated to any great extent even on the blind ; and it is not one that can be perpetrated at all on any individual having his eyes open. Such statements require no corroboration ; but if they did, it would be found in the experience of Scotland and of many parts of England. In the former coals are uniformly sold by weight, and we are not aware of its ever being stated that the practice causes them to be unduly wetted. Nothing, therefore, can be more futile than this objection to the plan of selling by weight ; and we do hope that the Legislature will at length see the necessity of interposing to put an end to the practice of selling by measure,—a practice which, while it raises the price, and occasions the destruction of a vast quantity of coal, opens a door to the commission of every species of fraud.

Besides obviating fraud, the sale of coals by weight might be made a means of saving a great deal of labour in their delivery. At present coals, when about to be delivered in London, are uniformly put into sacks, containing each three bushels, and then again into waggons, containing, at an average, 31 sacks. Now this sacking of the coals is a very laborious and expensive, and, in nine cases out of ten, a *perfectly useless process*.* Were the plan of selling by weight adopted, waggons with close

* In some cases sacking may be necessary, as in carrying coals to some parts of the Temple, and other places not accessible to waggons.

sides might be used, into which the coals might be delivered in bulk directly from the lighters; their weight being determined by deducting the weight of the empty waggon from its weight when full. In this way, not only would the waste of labour in filling the sacks be completely avoided, but the *shooting* (as it is called,) or delivery to the consumers' cellars from the waggons, would be facilitated. To accomplish so desirable a change, nothing would be necessary but to have weighing machines, under proper officers, erected near the principal wharfs, and distributed throughout the city. No waggon should be permitted to leave any of the wharfs without a ticket from the officers, stating the weight of the waggon when empty, its weight at leaving the wharf after being loaded, and (consequently) the weight of coal in it. And, in order to check any frauds that might be committed between the wharf and the consumer's house, the latter should be authorised, whenever he thinks fit, to send the waggon to be re-weighed at the nearest weighing-machine; and in the event of its weight turning out deficient, the coal should be forfeited. This is the plan for the delivery of coal adopted at Edinburgh, Glasgow, &c. It is found to be quite effectual for the prevention of fraud; and is not half so expensive as the defective, and, as Bentham would call it, fraud-generating and fraud-protecting system followed here.*

* The Committee of the House of Commons seem to suppose that coals when weighed at the wharf might be sent to the consumer in close waggons. But who is to see that these waggons are not opened by the way? Nothing but the power to have them re-weighed, and forfeited if they be deficient in weight, will be sufficient to prevent fraud. And this will equally prevent it, whether the waggons be open or shut.

II. In despite, however, of the heavy expense attending the digging of coal from the mine, and conveying it to the shore, and of the waste occasioned by *screening*, the coal-owner only receives from 12 to 14*s.* the chaldron, for that very coal which is afterwards sold in London for 50 or 55*s.* ! And, enormous as this difference must appear, it is less than it really amounts to ; for owing to the breakage that the coal undergoes, it may be moderately estimated, that *five* chaldrons of coal at Newcastle or Sunderland, are expanded into six or seven, previously to their being lodged in the consumer's cellar.* The items which *quadruple* the price of coal in its transit from the owners to the consumers, have been specified with great minuteness, in the evidence of Mr Buddle, before the House of Lords, and of Mr Bentley before the House of Commons. We have condensed them into the following statements ; on the accuracy of which every dependence may be placed. They deserve the attention of every one who likes a good fire, and dislikes being swindled.

It appears from the correct and valuable monthly returns of the coal market, published by Mr Pearsall of that establishment, that the *average* price during the last month (October, 1830) of the *best Wallsend coals* imported from Sunderland, was £1 16*s.* 11*d.* per London chaldron. The Committee of the House of Commons state in their Report, that ‘ Mr Horne, a coal-merchant, stated, ‘ that if he gave 33*s.*, the market price for a chaldron of ‘ coals on board ship, he made an addition of 13*s.* 9*d.* to ‘ that price for delivering it to the consumer's cellar.’ If, therefore, any of our readers laid in their winter's stock of fuel during last month, and ordered of Mr Herne, or any other coal merchant equally respectable, *the best*

* There are abundant proofs of this statement in the different Reports.

Wallsend coals, they would, according to the above statement, be charged for them £1 16s. 11d. plus 13s. 9d. or £2 10s. 8d. a chaldron. We proceed to shew what portion of this sum of £2 10s. 8d. reached the coal-owner, and what portion was absorbed in the transit from the coal-owner to the consumer. The whole price would, according to the evidence before the Committee, be thus distributed:—

CHARGES UP TO THE TIME OF ARRIVAL IN THE PORT OF LONDON.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
<i>Coal-owner.</i>						
Paid Coal-owner for Coals - - - - -	0	14	0			
Deduct River Duty paid by him for Improvement of Sunderland Harbour - -	0	0	3			
	<hr/>			0	13	9
<i>Coal Fitter.</i>						
Keel Dues, and Fittage (including Seven Miles' Water-Carriage) - - - - -	0	2	3			
<i>Ship-owner.</i>						
For Freight, including Insurance of Ship and Cargo, Pilotage, Seamen's Wages, Wear and Tear of the Ship and Materials, Discharging Ballast, &c. - - - -	0	8	6½			
<i>Municipal Dues.</i>						
River Duty, as above - - - - -	0	0	3			
Pier Duty, Lights, &c. paid by Ship	0	0	5¼			
	<hr/>			0	0	8¼
	<hr/>			0	11	5½

CHARGES IN THE PORT OF LONDON.

<i>Government Tax</i> - - - - -	0	6	0			
<i>Municipal Dues.</i>						
Trinity and Nore Lights, Tonnage Duty, Trinity House for Ballast, &c. - - - - -	0	0	5			
Entries, &c. - - - - -	0	0	2½			
	<hr/>			0	6	0
<i>Carried forward</i> - - -	0	0	7½	1	5	2½

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Brought forward - - -	0	0	7½	0	6	0	1	5	2½
Corporation of London Metage -	0	0	4						
Ditto Orphans' Dues - - - -	0	0	10						
Ditto Meter's Pay and Allowance	0	0	4						
Ditto Market Dues - - - - -	0	0	1						
Ditto Ld. Mayor's Groundage, &c.	0	0	0½						
Ditto Land Metage - - - - -	0	0	6						
Ditto Undertaker - - - - -	0	0	1						
Coal-whippers - - - - -	0	1	7						
	<hr/>			0	4	5½			
<i>Coal Factor.</i>									
Factorage and Del Credere Commission -	0	0	4½						
<i>Coal Merchant.</i>									
Buyer's Commission - - - - -	0	1	0						
Lighterage - - - - -	0	2	0						
Cartage - - - - -	0	6	0						
Credit - - - - -	0	2	0						
Shootage - - - - -	0	1	3						
Add for even money - - - - -	0	0	3						
(See Com. Rep. p. 8)	0	12	6						
Add for Discount, Scorage, and Ingrain (see same Rep. p. 9) -	0	2	2½						
	<hr/>			0	14	8½			
							1	5	5½
							<hr/>		
Making the price paid by the Consumer - -							2	10	8
							<hr/>		
Which is thus apportioned :—									
Coal-owner for Coal - - - - -	0	13	9						
Ship-owner, &c. for Voyage to London - -	0	11	5½						
Government Duty, Corporation Charges, and London Coal-merchant - - - - -	1	5	5½						
	<hr/>						2	10	8
							<hr/>		

With respect to these charges, we believe that very little reduction can be looked for in those incurred in the rivers Tyne and Wear, or in the rate of freight. The shippers complain, that at the present prices they are losers; and it appears indeed, by the evidence of Mr Bentley before referred to, that of the 8s. 7½d. allowed

for freight, there would remain to the ship-owner (after deducting insurance of the cargo and some other charges applicable to ballast) somewhat less than 6s. 4d. a chaldron, to cover pilotage, navigating, victualling, insuring ship, wear and tear, &c. It is, besides, abundantly certain, that if the profits derived from this rate of freight exceeded those of other ship-owners, competition would speedily sink them to the common level.

The charges for coast lights, Trinity Corporation dues, &c. are very heavy; and were they reduced, as they certainly might be, some reduction might, perhaps, be made in the charge on account of freight.

But with respect to the other charges, consisting of the government duty and the London municipal dues, and payments on account of deliverance to the consumer in the metropolis, amounting in all to no less than 25s. 5½d. a chaldron; we have no hesitation in saying, that they may, and ought to be, reduced considerably more than a half.

1. With respect, in the first place, to the government duty of six shillings a chaldron, it is unnecessary to repeat what we have already stated as to it. A tax so grossly unequal and oppressive, is a disgrace to the country, and ought to be unconditionally repealed. The duty amounts to about £800,000.* This sum is not very considerable; but it must not be imagined that the repeal of the coal tax would cause a corresponding reduction of the revenue.

* The entire gross duty derived from *water-borne* coal in 1828 was £922,682. This, however, not only includes the sea-borne coal, but the duty, to which reference will afterwards be made, of one shilling a chaldron on coals brought to London by canals. Subjoined is an official 'Account of the Annual Revenue derived by Government from the Duty on Coals for the last ten years; distinguishing the amount received for Home and Foreign Duty.'

The stimulus which it would certainly give to industry in the South, is in this respect, as well as others, a highly important consideration. It is almost certain that it would, by encouraging manufactures and the arts in large districts of the country where they are at present either not prosecuted, or prosecuted under great difficulties, be a means of adding both to their wealth and population. But, independently of this circumstance, the fall in the price of coals, consequent to the reduction of the duty, would give the consumers greater means of purchasing other things. Most of the considerable buyers of coal, including all the middle and upper classes, would immediately expend, if not the whole, at least a very large part, of whatever they saved by the reduction of its price, in the purchase of additional quantities of taxed articles. The beneficial influence of this measure would not, however, be confined to its effects on these classes—it would directly and materially improve the condition of the whole

CUSTOMS REVENUE ON COALS, CINDERS, AND CULM.

Years.	Gross Revenue.				Total Gross Revenue.	Deductions from the Gross Revenue for drawbacks on Exportation, &c. and Re- payments on Over-Entries.			Net Produce of the Duties on Coals, Cinders, and Culm in the United Kingdom						
	On Coals, Cin- ders, and Culm, brought and car- ried Coa-twise, or by Inland Na- vigation, in the United Kingdom		On Coals, Cin- ders, and Culm exported to Fo- reign Parts.			£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.			
1819	957,899	9	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	48,861	7	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,006,760	17	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	19,891	13	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	986,869	4	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
1820	1,086,564	17	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	48,359	3	9	1,134,924	1	0 $\frac{1}{2}$	18,928	13	3	1,115,995	7	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
1821	1,019,865	10	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	50,911	13	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,070,777	3	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	20,744	9	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,050,032	14	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1822	1,006,506	2	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	52,771	4	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,059,277	6	10	21,425	0	8	1,037,852	6	2
1824	1,145,659	1	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	44,020	5	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,189,679	6	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	21,911	8	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,167,767	17	11
1824	948,810	16	10	42,821	16	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	991,632	13	8	23,340	17	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	968,291	16	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
1825	859,918	14	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	43,421	1	10	943,339	16	7	26,109	11	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	917,230	4	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
1826	972,839	19	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	40,553	17	8	1,013,393	17	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	26,309	19	10	987,083	17	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
1827	862,526	8	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	45,182	9	3	907,718	17	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	24,349	8	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	883,369	9	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1828	922,682	1	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	41,423	6	2	964,105	7	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	28,017	2	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	936,088	4	10

population of London, and of the southern counties; and there would also, in consequence of the greater demand for coal, be a decided improvement in the condition of the very numerous body of persons engaged, as miners, sailors, &c. in the trade. It is almost superfluous to add, that the lower classes, according as they became better able to afford them; would infallibly increase their consumption of tea, sugar, beer, spirits, tobacco, &c. or of those articles that are the great sources of revenue; so that we believe it may be confidently predicted, that instead of losing, the revenue would, in a very short period, be materially benefitted by the repeal of the coal duty.

We hope and believe that Ministers will take this view of the matter; but if they resolve upon continuing this detestable tax, they are bound, at all events, to take measures for rendering it equal. The imposition of a heavy burden upon certain districts, from which others, quite as rich, are totally exempted, is scandalously subversive of every principle of justice. The pressure of the tax, should it not be given up, must be made equal and universal; particular districts and interests must no longer be enriched at the expense of others quite as well entitled to protection. To effect this equalization, the obvious plan is, to lay the duty indiscriminately upon all coals brought to the mouth of the pit; and those best acquainted with the circumstances state, that if it be imposed in this way, a duty of one shilling a chaldron will yield a revenue equal to that which is now derived from the six shillings on sea-borne coal. "If coal," says Lord Kames, "must pay a duty, why not at the pit, where it is cheapest? Is it not an egregious blunder to lay a great duty on those who must pay a high price for coal, and no duty on those who have it cheap."—(*Sketches of the History of Man:—Finances*, sect. 7.)

But there are very great, if not insuperable, difficulties in the way of a measure of this sort. It would not be possible to make any exception in favour of the coal used by manufacturers; and it is not to be doubted that a duty even of one shilling a chaldron, would be exceedingly injurious to almost all descriptions of manufactures, and particularly to those of iron, which have been in a very depressed condition. But this very circumstance is of itself a conclusive argument in favour of the unconditional repeal of the duty. Every one who reflects on its operation, or who is aware of the poverty of the labouring classes in the southern counties, and of the severe privations the tax imposes on them, must be satisfied that *its continuance on its present footing is out of the question*. And if the interest of our manufacturing establishments, to the successful prosecution of which cheap coal is so essential, will not allow the duty to be equalised, nothing remains but to abolish it. This would be a signal boon to all classes, and would do more, as has been already shewn, than any other measure, to improve the condition of the impoverished peasantry of the South.

2. The *municipal* charges on coal in the port of London amount in all to 4s. 5 $\frac{3}{8}$ d. a chaldron. Amongst others, there is the *orphans' duty*, as it is termed, amounting to ten-pence. This duty was imposed by statute in 1694, to enable the city of London to discharge the principal and interest of a debt due from them to the orphans, and other creditors referred to in the Act; and it is of importance to observe, that the various sums collected by the city under the statute in question, had liquidated the entire debt, for the payment of which the duty was originally granted, so far back as 1782. But the corporation has contrived to get one charge after another thrown upon this duty; and it is at present appropriated to the

payment of the sums borrowed to complete the approaches to the new London bridge. A Committee of the House of Commons investigated the subject of the orphans' duty in 1828, and recommended that a bill be brought in for the ultimate liberation and extinction of the fund, after the purposes to which it is at present applicable have been accomplished. We trust that this recommendation will be attended to, and that, though this duty cannot, perhaps, be immediately got rid of, a security may be obtained for its final abolition.

The charge for *metage* is three or four times what it ought to be, supposing that the meters did their duty, which they do not.* The Act 47 Geo. III. cap. 68, established two sets of coal meters; one set is employed on

	£.	s.	d.
* The Corporation of London pay the labouring meter out of the 4d. per chaldron metage, which they claim by prescription, alleged to be confirmed by charter of King James the First	-	-	1
Government pays him	-	-	0½
Meter's pay and allowance from the ship, in lieu of provisions	-	-	4
			5½

The residue (3d.) of the 4d. city metage, after paying the expense of providing vats, &c. *netting nearly £19,000 per annum, goes into the private coffers of the Corporation; and they perform no duty to the public in return for this heavy impost, except that of selecting from their own body the above overpaid functionaries.*

Net produce of the 4d. prescriptive metage, received by the Chamberlain of London, after all expenses are deducted.

	£.	s.	d.
In the year 1824	19,088	2	4
1825	18,340	7	11¾
1826	18,645	6	9½
1827	17,599	1	1
1828	18,479	8	8
1829	18,632	14	5

board ships delivering coal, their duty being to ascertain and certify the quantity of coal delivered out of the ship; the various duties levied upon coal, the freight, and even the price agreed upon by those who have bought the coal, being settled according to the ship meter's return. Were the duties on coal abolished, this source of expense might be entirely got rid of; but so long as they are kept up, the employment of ship meters will be indispensable. The meter's pay and allowance from the ship on account of provisions, amounts to about 4*d.* a chaldron, in addition to which he gets 1*d.* a chaldron allowed him by the city of London, and $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* by government—being in all 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* Now it is a fact, that the meters employed in the North to measure coals brought to bank by the pitmen, get only *two* farthings a chaldron, while the ship-meter on the Thames gets *twenty-two* farthings for a far less onerous duty! This, however, is not all; the corporation of London (who, we hesitate not to say, have been the indulgent foster-fathers of every abuse connected with the coal trade) exact, over and above the 1*d.* they pay to the ship meter, 3*d.* a chaldron, which goes into the corporation fund, forming an item of nearly £19,000 a year. How such an abuse was suffered to grow up we know not; nor does it appear by any evidence we can find, either in the Parliamentary Reports, or the lucubrations

Annual amount of municipal dues upon Coal imported into London, taken in the year 1828, upon an average of the three preceding years:

	£.	s.	d.
City metage, 4 <i>d.</i> per chaldron - -	25,210	2	0
Meters' pay and allowances - -	24,068	11	0
Water baillage, Lord Mayor, &c. -	3,229	3	3
Coal Market - - - - -	6,302	10	6
Orphans' duty - - - - -	63,025	5	0
	<u>121,835</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>9</u>

with which the Common Council have favoured us, on what grounds the 4*d.* per chaldron was granted to the meters, by the 47 Geo. 3, as pay and allowance, in addition to the 4*d.* paid to their employers. The effect, however, has been, to carry to the Corporation coffers the large annual revenue above-mentioned; that body having ingeniously contrived to shift to the public, the charge on account of that very duty for which it continues to receive the remuneration awarded by ancient usage and charter! Certainly it is high time that something were done to put an end to this monstrous exaction. Why should the inhabitants of Westminster, Southwark, &c. be obliged to pay £19,000 a year to the funds of the aldermen and common-councilmen of the city? We do not envy them their turtle, but we protest against being taxed to pay for it.*

The management of coal when brought to the wharf, and before it is sent to the consumer, is devolved entirely on a set of civic functionaries, called *land-meters*. Even though these persons had been each of them as watchful as Argus, their superintendence could not, owing to the facility with which frauds may be committed by breakage, be of any considerable importance; but the fact is, that they do not so much as pretend to trouble themselves about their duty. It has been conclusively proved before the Commons' Committee, that a very large part, perhaps not less than THREE FOURTHS *of the entire coal sent to the different parts of the city, is dispatched without being measured!* Were the existing system intended for the

* In a Report lately drawn up by a committee of the common-council, we are graciously informed that they will consent to any regulation that may leave them the same *nett revenue from coal that they now enjoy*. Marvellous disinterestedness!

protection of fraud, it is not easy to see how it could be improved. The consumer gets the coal-meter's ticket, certifying the measurement of the coals sent him; and he, 'good easy man,' trusts implicitly to this *official* guarantee. At bottom, however, he has no security, save only the *word of the dealer*; the certificate of the meter being, in nine cases out of ten, founded upon it, and not on any knowledge of his own. For this precious protection the consumer has to pay 6*d.* a chaldron—three times what it ought to be, were it as effective as it is worthless.

But even this is not all. The meters have no right nor power to interfere in the measurement of any coal, provided it be sent out in quantities less than *nine bushels*. Now, as every one knows, all the labouring classes belonging to this immense metropolis, as well as very many of the smaller sort of shop-keepers and tradesmen, buy coal from chandlers and other retailers, in one or two sacks at a time. With such sales the meter has nothing to do. He merely gives the shadow of protection to the rich, who, if they please, may, in this respect, protect themselves; but the poor man, who has neither time nor means to secure himself against fraud, may be plundered without opposition, and with the most perfect impunity.

Of the items which make up the 4*s.* 5 $\frac{3}{8}$ *d.* of charges in the port of London, another is the fee of the *coal-whipper*, or coal-heaver—that is, the deliverer of the coals from the ship to the barge or lighter. The fee is about 1*s.* 7*d.* and is at least *six* times as great as it ought to be. At Newcastle and Sunderland, the filling of a chaldron of coal into the waggon costs from 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.* to 1 $\frac{5}{4}$ *d.*; and admitting that to raise coal from the hold is a little more difficult, still, if 3*d.* or 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* were allowed, it would be a most liberal payment. But the truth is, that this item should be struck off altogether. It is occasioned by a *regulation*

peculiar to the Thames, which prevents the crews of colliers from performing this indispensable part of their peculiar duty. In the out-ports, to which luckily this preposterous regulation does not extend, the crews act as coal-heavers, and they do so without either asking or obtaining additional wages. And there certainly is no reason whatever for supposing that the case would be in any respect different in the port of London, were it not for the regulation referred to. In 1829, the total amount of money paid the coal-heavers, was £107,566 13s.; every shilling of which may be saved to the citizens, by simply *allowing* the crew to perform the function of coal-heavers.*

The evidence given by the ship-owners and captains before the Parliamentary Committees, establishes, in the fullest manner, all that has now been stated. To discharge a ship when loaded with timber is admitted to be rather more difficult than when she is loaded with coal. Luckily, however, the masters of all ships other than colliers, may employ, in their discharge, either the crew, or such other labourers as they think fit, without any sort of interference. And it is proved, that while the cost of discharging a ship of 300 tons, laden with coal, amounts to about £36, a ship of the same burden, laden with

* The following is an official account of the import of coal into London since 1820 :—

Years.	Chaldrons.	Years.	Chaldrons.
1820	1,280,114	1825	1,443,193
1821	1,312,730	1826	1,475,809
1822	1,345,345	1827	1,508,425
1823	1,377,961	1828	1,541,041
1824	1,410,577	1829	1,583,511

timber, may be discharged for £9 or £10!—(Com. Rep. p. 321.)

The following extract from the evidence of Mr Fawcuss, a ship-owner engaged in the coal-trade, sets the nature of the present system in the clearest point of view.

‘ Are there any charges in the port of London of which you complain?—Heavy charges on the delivery of ships.

‘ What is the charge of which you complain?—DOUBLE *what it would be provided the trade was free.*

‘ Do you refer to the system of unloading your ships by means of whippers?—By being compelled to pay it under act of Parliament.

‘ Do you conceive that if you were allowed either to employ your own crew, or other labourers obtained at the moment, you could deliver your ships as well and cheaper than at present?—*Full as well, and for half the money.*

‘ Do you conceive you could make much use of the services of your crew in delivering ships, supposing you were allowed so to do?—No doubt of it.

‘ Are your crews at this moment quite unemployed during the delivery of your ships by the coal-whippers?—Not quite, they help and assist the lightermen.

‘ Are they fully occupied?—They are not.

‘ Could you induce them, by an increase of wages not equal to what you are obliged to pay the whippers, to assist you in unloading your ships, if the law permitted it?—I have no doubt of it.

‘ A moderate increase of wages would enable you to employ the men in unloading the ships without detriment to what they otherwise would have to do?—It would be no detriment.

‘ Although to a certain degree they are employed, still they are not fully employed?—All that which they do, could be done after the hours of delivery.

‘ Could they do what they now do with the lighters, and still be employed in unloading the ships?—At present they only assist the lightermen:

‘ Do you not suppose the lightermen would charge more if they had not the assistance of your crews?—They have no right to any assistance. They contract to take the coal into the craft and take them away.

‘ Would they not be obliged to employ other hands?—They would be obliged to attend more themselves.

‘ Is the assistance rendered by the crews of any great moment ?—

‘ Not of any great moment.

‘ In case you were allowed to employ them, the difference would not be considerable ?—Of a trifling nature.

‘ In all other ports you are allowed to employ them, except London ?—That I ever had any concern with.

‘ Are the ports you have been concerned with, better or worse in other respects, as to the delivery of coal as to natural difficulties ?—

‘ There are none ; they do it in the same way as the whippers do in the pool.

‘ Is there any difficulty arising from the system of unlading coals to lighters in London !—None at all.

‘ Have you ever come to London with other cargoes than coal ?—
‘ Yes : several cargoes of timber.

‘ Which cost you the most in delivery, the coals or timber ?—*A ship with coal cost me £23, and I got her delivered with timber for £7.*

‘ The £23 includes the meter’s charge ?—And the meter’s man.

‘ Do you conceive that the unlading a timber ship requires greater labour than unlading her with coal ?—Not much more.

‘ Could the same description of men unload and load with coals as with timber ?—Yes.

‘ With the same physical force ?—The same.

‘ And do the work as completely as the whippers usually do it ?—
‘ Equally as well.

‘ It would not require a more powerful man to load a ship with coals than it would with timber ?—It would not.

But the abuses that infect this department of the coal trade, are still more scandalous and more widely ramified. The evidence taken by the Committees shews, that the wages of the whippers when employed amount to from 10s. to 16s. and even 18s. a day, and yet they are at all times wretchedly poor ! The reason is, that they are in a state of worse than Egyptian bondage. They are furnished to the shippers by a class of persons denominated *undertakers*, licensed by the city of London, who are universally connected with the keepers of public-houses. The latter recommend the whippers to the undertaker, and they recommend those in preference who lodge in

their houses, and those only who drink, or at least pay for, a certain daily allowance of bad gin and still worse beer! Sometimes also the undertakers are themselves butchers, or have provision shops, and then the whippers are exposed to the depredations of two sets of harpies instead of one. To such a height is this infamous system carried, that in many instances the whippers are obliged, against their will, to lodge in public-houses, sometimes even when they have families. They are, in fact, compelled to spend more than half their earnings upon drink; not because they are enamoured of drunkenness, but because it is for the advantage of the publicans that they should be brutalized! The toleration of such a system is most disgraceful to the magistrates and people of London. Were it merely rumoured that the negroes of Barbadoes or Antigua were compelled daily to swallow a certain quantity of bad rum or beer for the benefit of their masters, the city and the country would be in a flame. Meetings would be held in every parish; language would be ransacked for terms sufficiently strong to express the indignation of the speakers at such conduct; and Mr Hansard would nett at least £500 by printing the petitions with which the table of the House of Commons would be loaded. But, provided the same thing be done in Britain, neither saint nor sinner bestows so much as a thought on the matter. And the citizens of the metropolis cheerfully consent to pay £110,000 a year, that a class of their fellow-townsmen may be kept in a state of habitual drunkenness and degradation.

3. After all, however, the charges which attend the delivery of the coals from the ship to the consumer's cellar, are the most exorbitant. In fact, the charge for conveying a chaldron of coals from the pool, a little below London bridge, to the consumer's in the city, amounts to no

less than 14s. 8½d.; being MORE THAN THE PRIME COST OF THE COAL IN THE NORTH, *including the rent of the landlord, the expense of mining, of bringing the coals to the surface of the mine, and carrying them to the ship!* Is it necessary to say another word to convince every reasonable man of the existence of intolerable abuses in this department of the trade? Abuses, be it observed, that have grown up in districts subject to the control and under the very nose of that Corporation, whose orators are so very fluent in descanting upon the evils of what they are pleased to call the coal-owners' monopoly!

One item in the charge of delivery is *lighterage*, being a sum of two shillings a chaldron paid for conveying the coals from the ship to the wharf. This charge is not quite so objectionable as some of the preceding, but still it seems to be in no ordinary degree exorbitant. It is mentioned by Mr Buddle, in his evidence, (First Lords' Rep. p. 121) that the Tyne keelmen, who take the coals from the spouts or staiths, as they are termed, to deliver them so the ships, are paid only 1s. 6d. a chaldron, though they have to navigate *their keels from seven to eight miles*, and though it be far more difficult to shovel the coals from the keels into the port-holes of the ships, than from a lighter to a wharf. Were the charge for lighterage reduced to the same level in the Thames as in the Tyne, it would not certainly exceed eight-pence or nine-pence a chaldron. But before this desirable result can be accomplished, this department of the trade must, like all the rest, be thrown open. Here, again, the trammels of the Corporation of London interfere. At present no individual can act as a lighterman who is not free of the Watermen's Company, and who has not served seven years as an apprentice upon the river. Competition is thus wholly excluded, and the charges rendered double what they would be under a different system.

The next item in the charge for delivery, is 6s. a chaldron for cartage from the wharf to the consumer's residence. The only way to judge of the reasonableness of this charge, is by comparing it with the sums charged for similar work done elsewhere. Now, assuming the average weight of the chaldron to be 27 cwt. and the average distance to which coals are carted one mile and a half, the charge will be 3s. 5½d. per ton, per mile; but in the North, in Durham, Lancashire, &c. it is usual to let the cartage of coals, including the loading, by contract, at from 7d. to 8d. a ton on turnpike roads, and 9d. and 10d. on heavy country roads. So that the expense of cartage in London is *four* or *five* times as much as it costs in the North,—a difference which cannot be accounted for by the greater expense attending the keep of men, horses, &c. in the metropolis, and it is almost entirely a consequence of the perverse regulations in the Act, 47 Geo. III. cap. 68, under which the trade is conducted.

Exclusive of the enormous charge of 6s. for cartage, there is a further charge, 1s. 6d. for *shooting*, that is, for unloading the waggon into the cellar. Next to the item for whippers, this is the most outrageous overcharge in this lengthened catalogue of abuses. There are thousands of labourers in London who would be glad to be allowed to perform the same work for 3d. or 4d. for which the citizens are obliged to pay 1s. 6d. Indeed, we believe it might be done for a good deal less. Mr Buddle says, 'At the rate we pay our waggon-men for filling the waggons, *I believe they would be very glad, for 2d. to heave these same coals out of the cellar again up the hole.*' (First Lords' Report, p. 121);—an operation which, every one knows, would be about ten times as troublesome as pouring them down:

The monstrous extravagance of the charges which affect the coal in its passage from the ship to the London consumer, may be further illustrated by contrasting them with those attending its passage from the pool to a far greater distance in the country.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE COST OF TEN CHALDRONS OF COALS DELIVERED TO A CONSUMER AT FELTHAM, IN MIDDLESEX, SEVENTEEN MILES FROM LONDON.

	<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Paid for ten chaldrons of coals in the pool, (including all charges up to, and with the delivery into the lighter, and including also 1 <i>s.</i> per chaldron buyer's commission)			
£19 3 <i>s.</i> —being per chaldron	1	18	3½

EXPENSES OF CONVEYANCE FROM THE POOL TO FELTHAM, PER CHALDRON.

Lighterage from the pool to Isleworth	0	2	0
Unloading from barge to waggon	0	1	0
Cartage from Isleworth to Feltham (five miles)	0	4	0
	0		7
Total cost at Feltham	2	5	3½

Now the charge for conveying a chaldron of coal from the pool to the vicinity of St. Paul's, a distance of about one mile and a half, was, at this very moment 12*s.* 6*d.* being 5*s.* 6*d.* more than what was required to convey it ELEVEN TIMES AS FAR *on roads not subject to the regulations imposed in the city of London.* Well and truly is it stated by the Committee of the House of Lords,—
 ‘that in every stage, from the port of shipment to the
 ‘coal merchant's wharf, and thence to the consumer's
 ‘cellar, the regulations under which the trade is con-
 ‘ducted *are productive of delay, of an aggravation*
 ‘*of expense, and an encouragement to fraud!*’—(Sec-
 cond Lords' Report, p. 8.)

The Parliamentary Committees doubted whether the question as to the expediency of abolishing the duty on sea-borne coal came properly before them; but the House of Commons' Committee felt so strongly the impolicy of the tax, that, notwithstanding the restriction placed upon them by that doubt, they have declared their conviction of 'the expediency, both as regards the general prosperity of the country, and that of its shipping interests in particular, of removing all duties on coal consumed in this kingdom, whenever financial arrangements can be made for effecting such removal with security to the public revenue.' The Committees have also strongly recommended the introduction of the plan of selling by weight, and the abolition of the existing regulations with respect to the coal trade in the port of London. We cannot doubt that these salutary recommendations will be carried into effect, that the sale of coals by weight will be made imperative, that ship-masters will be allowed to employ their crews or other labourers in the unloading of coal, and that lightermen may be employed, though they have nothing to do with the Watermen's Company, and carters, though they have nothing to do with the Association of Carmen. These will be great and beneficial changes, but these ought not to satisfy the public. The coal duty ought to be immediately repealed. Is it to be endured, that the whole southern counties should be subjected to a most oppressive tax on an indispensable necessary of life, from which those in the north are perfectly free; that manufactures should not merely be checked, but actually driven from very extensive districts; that thousands of workmen should be thrown out of employment, and severe privations inflicted upon those that are employed, for the sake of the paltry sum of £800,000 a year? We do not, however, presume to affirm, that in the present critical situation of affairs, an *abatement of revenue* should be

made even to this extent. But it admits of demonstration, that by depressing the industry and degrading the condition of millions of people, the coal tax keeps a vast deal more out of the public coffers than it puts into them; and though it were not so, is a tax to be maintained that is confessedly *partial and unjust*? that has every quality that a tax ought not to have, and not one that it should have? If a tax must be had, to replace the coal tax, it were easy to suggest twenty, each of which might be made to yield twice the revenue without doing one-tenth of the injury that it does.

It has been estimated, apparently on good grounds, that the repeal of the coal duty and of the existing regulations with respect to the trade in coal, would save the inhabitants of London from a MILLION TO TWELVE HUNDRED THOUSAND POUNDS A YEAR! at the same time that it would afford very great additional facilities to almost every branch of industry carried on in the city. The apathy which has been displayed by those so deeply interested in this affair is most singular. John Bull is the most inconsistent of animals: he loaded the table of the House of Commons with petitions against the leather duty, which added from one to two per cent. to the price of his shoes; but he submits, apparently without a growl, to taxes and regulations which add from forty to fifty per cent. to the price of his fuel!

But, whatever be the conduct of the citizens of the metropolis, or of the gentry of the South, ministers are bound to take care *ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. They cannot but know that the abolition of the coal duty would materially improve the condition and stimulate the industry of the immense population of this and all the southern counties, besides being of great advantage to the coal districts and the shipping interest. We do therefore hope that they will see the propriety of imme-

diately proposing the total repeal of this unequal and destructive impost. Its abolition is the *greatest boon they can confer on the public*. It will afford the best earnest of their determination to put down injustice, and to relieve, as far as possible, the distresses of the poor; at the same time that it will shew that they have sagacity to adopt the means best calculated to effect their object.

Besides the 6s. of duty which affects all coals that are conveyed by sea, there is an additional 1s. of duty laid on those exported from the Tyne. This peculiar duty is denominated the *Richmond shilling*, in consequence of its having been granted by Charles II. to the Duke of Richmond. It was purchased up by Government in 1799, and ought to have been repealed forthwith. It is bad enough, certainly, to lay an exclusive tax on sea-borne coal; but it is infinitely worse to lay a comparatively high duty on the coal sent from a particular river.

A small supply of coal is brought to London from Staffordshire by canal navigation. This coal is loaded with a duty of 1s. a chaldron. But this duty ought to share the same fate as that laid on sea-borne coal. It yields very little revenue, and may therefore be abolished without any difficulty.

Besides abolishing the duty on sea-borne coal, and on that conveyed to London by canals, it would be greatly for the public advantage, were a change made in the magnitude and mode of assessing the duties on exported coal. Nothing can match the absurdity of the way in which these duties are at present imposed. It has been said, that by allowing coal to be exported at a low duty, the Netherlanders and French might advantageously employ it in their manufacturing establishments; and to guard against this contingency, a high duty has been laid on its exportation. We are not aware that any

other reason has ever been assigned in vindication of the existing regulations with regard to exported coal; and yet, inexplicable as it may seem, *small* coal, or that very coal which is used in manufactories, is allowed to be exported at a duty of 4*s.* 6*d.* a chaldron, while *large* coal, or that which is exclusively used in dwelling-houses, is burdened with the enormous duty of 17*s.*

But, notwithstanding the low duty on the coal used in manufactories, the greatest export of it that has taken place in any one year, was only 60,315 chaldrons. This shews that the apprehensions entertained of its being extensively exported, are in a great degree visionary. Perhaps, however, an equal duty of 4*s.* or 5*s.* a chaldron might be imposed on all coal exported; as, by this means, a check would be given to the export of that which may be used in the arts, at the same time that a vast additional facility would be given to the export of that which is used for domestic purposes only. Were a measure of this sort adopted, it may be fairly inferred that the revenue from exported coal would be at least doubled or trebled.

But the expediency of imposing any duty upon the export of coal may be doubted. National policy seems to recommend a measure that would necessarily render the States consuming English coal, dependant upon us for their supply of so indispensable an article; and this view of the matter is strengthened, when we consider that if high duties be laid on English exported coal, coal mines may be opened abroad, which otherwise would be permitted to remain unworked.

The practical question for the Legislature to determine upon this point, is—

Can the home market take off the whole produce that may be supplied by the sea-borne coal mines? If not, it may be concluded, on general grounds, that every facility ought to be afforded to the exportation of coal; an article

which all will allow is the produce of domestic industry. But should narrower views be entertained, and it should be determined to prevent the coal-owners from sending their produce abroad, then surely they are entitled to the most favourable treatment at home. They might, indeed, did justice always prevail in national counsels, expect to receive a *bonus* for being deprived of privileges enjoyed by every one else; whereas, besides being shut out of the foreign market, they are loaded with peculiar and exorbitant duties even in the home market!

It has, indeed, been sometimes said, that the exportation of coal ought to be prohibited altogether; that the coal-fields of Great Britain are but of limited extent; that the supply of the home consumption will ultimately exhaust them; and that nothing should be done to accelerate, but every thing that is possible to avert, an event that will most probably be destructive of our superiority in the arts. But nothing can be more futile than these apprehensions. Although the foreign coal trade were absolutely free, our readers may be assured that the national debt will be every shilling paid off many centuries before posterity begins to feel any serious falling off in the supply of coal.

A very intelligent gentleman, Mr Hugh Taylor, coal-owner, and coal-agent for the Duke of Northumberland, laid the following estimates before the Committee of the House of Lords.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE EXTENT AND PRODUCE OF THE DURHAM AND NORTHUMBERLAND COAL FIELDS.

	<i>Durham.</i>	<i>Square Miles.</i>
From South Shields southward to Castle Eden, twenty-one miles; thence westward to West Auckland, thirty-two miles; north-east from West Auckland to Eltringham, thirty-three miles; and thence to Shields, twenty-two miles, being an extent or area of	- - - - -	594
	<i>Northumberland.</i>	
From Shields northward, twenty-seven miles, by an average breadth of nine miles	- - - - -	243

Portion excavated.

	<i>Square Miles.</i>
In Durham,	
On Tyne, say - - - - -	39
On Wear - - - - -	40
	—
	79
 In Northumberland,	
Say thirteen miles by two - - - - -	26
	— 105
	—
	732

Tons.

Estimating the workable coal strata at an average thickness of twelve feet, the contract of one square mile will be 12,390,000 tons, and of 732 square miles - - - - -	9,069,480,000
Deduct one-third part for loss by small coal, interceptions by dikes, and other interruptions - - -	3,023,160,000
	—————
Remainder	6,046,320,000
	—————

This remainder is adequate to supply the present vend from Newcastle, Sunderland, Hartley, Blyth, and Stockton, of 3,500,000 tons, for a period of 1727 years.

It will be understood that this estimate of the quantity of coal in Durham and Northumberland can only be an approximation, especially as the south-eastern coal district of Durham is yet almost wholly unexplored; but the attempt is made, in the hope of satisfying your Lordships that no apprehension need be entertained of this valuable mineral being exhausted for many future generations.

There is also a considerable extent of coal-field in the northern and south-western districts of Northumberland; but the foregoing comprises that which is continuous, and most suitable and available for exportation.

ANALOGOUS ESTIMATE OF THE CONSUMPTION OF COAL IN GREAT BRITAIN.

	<i>Tons.</i>
The annual vend of coals carried coastwise from Durham and Northumberland is - - - - -	3,300,000
Home consumption, say one-fifth - - - - -	660,000
	<u>3,960,000</u>
Which quantity supplies about 5,000,000 persons; and supposing the whole population of Great Britain to be 15,000,000, this must be trebled; for though these two-thirds of population are perhaps less able to afford fuel, yet taking into consideration the manufacturing districts, and the cheapness of coal in the interior, the estimate will not be too high - - -	11,880,000
Consumed by iron works, say 600,000 tons of metal, to produce which requires at least four times the quantity of coal in making even pig metal, and the extraordinary consumption in the Cornwall, &c. mines -	<u>3,000,000</u>
Consumed in Great Britain - - - - -	14,880,000
Exported to Ireland, say, - - - - -	700,000
Total tons, exclusive of foreign exportation -	<u>15,580,000</u>

Dr Buckland, the celebrated geologist, considers Mr Taylor's estimate as very much exaggerated. But in his evidence before the Commons' Committee, Dr Buckland quotes and approves of a paragraph from Bakewell's *Geology*, in which that gentleman states, that *the coal in South Wales alone is capable of supplying all England, at the present rate of consumption, for 2,000 years.* This is a pretty comfortable assurance, though it does not, certainly, afford any excuse for the destruction caused by the expense and utterly useless practice of screening.*

* Mr Taylor has published a letter in the *Durham Chronicle*, vindicating the moderation of his estimates, on what appears very satisfactory grounds.

Mr Buddle gives the following estimate of the number of persons engaged in the different departments of the coal trade on the Tyne and Wear, in the conveyance of coal to London, and in the London coal trade :—

‘I hold a paper in my hand stating the number of people employed in the coal trade in each department. I would beg to observe, the returns from the Tyne are official documents; from the Wear I have no returns, but it is an approximate calculation. The number of persons employed underground on the Tyne are,—men, 4,937; boys, 3,554; together, 8,491; above ground, men, 2,745; boys, 718; making 3,463; making the total employed in the mines above and below ground, 11,954, which in round numbers I call 12,000, because I am pretty sure there were some omissions in the returns. On the river Wear, I conceive there are 9,000 employed; making 21,000 employed in digging the coal, and delivering it to the ships on the two rivers. From the best calculations I have been able to make, it would appear that, averaging the coasting vessels that carry coals at the size of 220 London chaldrons each vessel, there would be 1,400 vessels employed, which would require 15,000 seamen and boys. I have made a summary. There are seamen, 15,000; pitmen and above-ground people employed at the collieries, 21,000; keelmen, coal-boatmen, casters, and trimmers, 2,000; making the total number employed in what I call the Northern Coal Trade, 38,000. In London, whippers, lightermen, and so forth, 5,000; factors, agents, &c. on the Coal Exchange, 2,500; 7,500 in all, in London. Making the grand total in the North country and London departments of the trade, 45,500. This does not, of course, include the persons employed at the outports in discharging the things there.’

In another place, Mr Buddle states, that ‘colliers are always paid by the piece,’ and consequently their wages, although at the same rate per chaldron, vary according to the quantity of work they have to do; and it is difficult to form an average, they vary so very considerably; they have varied from 14s. a week to, in some instances, 40s. The colliers can earn up to 5s. or even more per day; but there is not full employment for them; they have seldom been earning more than half that sum during the last

year (1828); 2s. 6d. is the certain wages that they are hired to receive from their employers, whether they are employed or not; that is a tax on the coal-owner, during the suspension of his colliery from any accident, for he pays them their wages whether they are employed or not. The men have the option of finding work elsewhere; but if they cannot do so, they may call upon their masters to pay them 14s. per week; it was 15s. a week till last year (1828).

Sea-borne coal, imported into any port of Ireland, is charged with a duty of 1s. 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. a ton, or 2s. 5d. a chaldron. But, in order to provide a fund for improvements, that which is imported into the port of Dublin is charged with an additional duty of 11d. a ton! The duties on sea-borne coal imported into Wales, are nearly the same as those on importation into Ireland. Scotland, as already observed, is fortunately exempted from this odious impost.

In conclusion, we have only to observe, that taxes may be oppressive, but, if general and equal, can scarcely be said to be unjust. The tax on sea-borne coal is, however, confessedly partial and exorbitant, and is, therefore, at once *unjust* and *oppressive*. Need more be said to induce an enlightened Legislature to consent to its immediate repeal?







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McCulloch, John Ramsay
Observations on the duty on sea-borne coal.

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