OCEANOGRAPHY MISCELLANEOUS—PART 2 HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE si COMMITTEE ON _ MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS . ON. OCEAN BIOMASS CONVERSION OVERSIGHT SEPTEMBER 26, 1979 OCEAN POLLUTION PLANNING AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT—H.R. 6615 FEBRUARY 29, 1980 UL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING ACTIVITIES OVERSIGHT AUGUST 26, 1980 OCEAN ENERGY OVERSIGHT---.. ‘ene | SEPTEMBER 25, 1980 os “RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL OVERSIGHT . NOVEMBER 20, 1980 7) Ne | Ms is "i ” “Serial No. 96-53 IK a Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries i RT ay | tra j Y4US DATA LIBRAR Ae ON EIB ENA YY & ARCHIVES | I4g0 ol bin, Bn tia’ vie Secanographic Institution | a 7 QO 0301 OOb9434 5 A OCEANOGRAPHY MISCELLANEOUS—PART 2 See HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS ON OCEAN BIOMASS CONVERSION OVERSIGHT SEPTEMBER 26, 1979 OCEAN POLLUTION PLANNING Se TION AND OVERSIGHT—H.R. 6615 FEBRUARY 29, 1980 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING ACTIVITIES OVERSIGHT AUGUST 26, 1980 OCEAN ENERGY OVERSIGHT SEPTEMBER 25, 1980 RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL OVERSIGHT NOVEMBER 20, 1980 Serial No. 96-53 as Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 6£=848 O WASHINGTON : 1980 COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES JOHN M. MURPHY, New York, Chairman THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Ohio! JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina MARIO BIAGGI, New York GLENN M. ANDERSON, California E (KIKA) pe ta GARZA, Texas JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi CARROLL HUBBARD, Jr., Kentucky DON BONKER, Washington LES AvuCOIN, Oregon NORMAN E. D’AMOURS, New Hampshire JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland DAVID E. BONIOR, Michigan DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii MICHAEL OZZIE MYERS, Pennsylvania? JOE WYATT, Texas MIKE LOWRY, Washington EARL HUTTO, Florida EDWARD J. STACK, Florida BRIAN DONNELLY, Massachusetts PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr., California GENE SNYDER, Kentucky EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana * JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland NORMAN F. LENT, New York DAVID F. EMERY, Maine ROBERT K. DORNAN, California THOMAS B. EVANS, Jr., Delaware PAUL S. TRIBLE, Jr., Virginia ROBERT W. DAVIS, Michigan WILLIAM CARNEY, New York MELVIN H. EVANS, Virgin Islands BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana* Car. L. Perian, Chief of Staff LAWRENCE J. O’BRIEN, Jr., Chief Counsel Juuia P. Perian, Chief Clerk/Administrator Jack E. Sanps, Minority Counsel SUBCOMMITTEE ON OcEANOGRAPHY GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts, Chairman LES AuCOIN, Oregon NORMAN E. D’AMOURS, New Hampshire DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JOE WYATT, Texas JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey DAVID E. BONIOR, Michigan MIKE LOWRY, Washington EARL HUTTO, Florida BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland EDWARD J. STACK, Florida JOHN M. MURPHY, New York (Ex Officio) JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey NORMAN F. LENT, New York DAVID F. EMERY, Maine ROBERT K. DORNAN, California WILLIAM CARNEY, New York PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr., California (Ex Officio) Ricuarp D. Norunc, Staff Director Donan F. Lippincott, Professional Staff JEFFREY R. PIKE, Professional Staff Curtis L. MarsHALL, Minority Professional Staff 1 Became Acting Chairman on June 18, 1980. 2 Served until October 2, 1980. 3 Resigned March 10, 1980. 4 Elected to committee March 10, 1980. 098) CONTENTS OCEAN BIOMASS CONVERSION OVERSIGHT enemp neld September 26, 1979 =... n,n te ee) ae hetioy Statement of: Adams, Martin R., Deputy Program Director, Solar and Geothermal Energy, Department of ICE B Ysera na ee Ean Erepaced statement iit: csrctecn cio nn pa) Sane Re aie geek Brinkhuis, Boudewijn, research professor, Marine Sciences Research Center, State University of New York, Stony Brook, on behalf of Don SLE TUS: Beer ca ek RR Oa ARE ain ge Squires, Don, director, New York Sea Grant Institute, State University of New York and Cornell University, presented by Boudewijn Brinkhuis.... Tompkins, Alan, biomass program manager, General Electric Co................. OCEAN POLLUTION PLANNING AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT Hearing eld February 29 198g) Yee s renovers:-ryeteutetiny)9 sgganade Text of: BisccuLive Connmunication| Nov abel. os en a pee enn ean a Statement of: Brown, Dr. Dail W., Acting Director, National Marine Pollution Program Office, NOAA, Department of Commence ste eres ete wee et Marner Swanson, Capt. Lawrence, Director, Office of Marine Pollution Assess- ment, NOAA, Department of Commerce o..c....ccccccesssesceessssssecec Walsh, James P. (Bud), Deputy Administrator, N OAA, Department of Commerce, and chairman, Interagency Committee on Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitormnpe eee ee ae Pec naredisi aie melt aunts onc ee ble icra age oe Additional material supplied: NOAA: Marine pollution program funding SUMUMABY, EH. on teh po Rh ke (III) lV Additional material supplied—Continued NOAA—Continued Page Question from Mr. Hughes and answe .........:.:cccccsseeeeeeeteteesteeneneneneenenens 91 Questions of Mr. Murphy and anSwers............--.-stecteeeane 144 OCEAN ENERGY OVERSIGHT Hearing held:September’25, 1980 ieee oii. eecesscetencs eos ceoeevct suscevapenceestengssssaeneeenmnaae 195 Statement of: Burr, Ralph E., Division of Hydroelectric Resource Development, Office of Resource Applications, Department of Energy............cceeccesceeeescereereeesereeeeees 196 Higgins, Thomas P., manager, Ocean Energy Systems, Lockheed Missiles SAS pace! Cor mews A ME EN 5, RR ec ongsrescetoo create cere te eee 228 Katz, Dr. Maurice J., Director, Office of Solar Power Applications, De- Partment Of MMOL CY:- sc... s0ccevcecsccescss-seccteust duegsasaes ot cnezes Uivis oaks <2 eee 196 Richards, William E., Acting Director, Ocean Energy Systems Division, Departinent OPN vcs... 0cisscvacsssscssossacetesdsecesebestevaechaaeessicastveserosist ee 196 Schremp, Edward Jay, former senior defense research scientist (prepared SEAGETINETIE) Eee tes vies wcateceeus saoes sce avassuce coucontostchuasenn tose consete vase cuss eeciens eens ee ee 241 Additional material supplied: Energy Department: Charts accompanying prepared statement of Dr. JETS (C2 BN 2) Ve ee ee oT SPP a 204 Higgins, Thomas P.: DAM-ATOLL—A System for Extracting Energy from Ocean Waves ising ne ec ee 232 RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL OVERSIGHT Hearing held! November'!20,"1980) io. fests ae ads Dee oS. 247 Statement of: Anderson, Dr. D. Richard, program manager, seabed programs division, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, N.M .............cccccccccescesceeeseeseneeeees 315 Prepared: statement ts. s...s.0522.esesssdtecineoweicees ns ss sescstereaset ne a eee 323 Anderson, Hon. Glenn M., a Representative in Congress from the State of COE TIITT Coo oe Wie aera pyar eae ei | | | Ee ro I Ie crsinencecece 265 V Statement of—Continued Brown, Leslie H., Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs, Department OUNSUALG ccrcetccnistieneietccte reece dh Te ee 1 TOIT EES anole: Prepared statement. :.0 to sl stheneatdovernuneniysseueecnviseeets, OLN Burton, John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of Califor- TUNA wget earae cei seaniduncesedtascandpuie roc tsncanensae i une Aus aeons antago oxihe, METAS) Charlow+ Ms. Robin, law-student 11). .n meen ie mein /ioenin ia ic Curtis, Clifton E., Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C......... Erepared( statement i ieee whens iveutticsssmncans., SOMIM ORI Albee Dyer, Robert S., senior staff oceanographer, Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection AB ENCY Stith Neenah nen IBOLT lye Prepared statement ...0.07 tc we Sone en 0. BOE ky ime Eissler, Fred, Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference... Golich, Conrad F., consultant to Project Tektite, San Francisco, Calif......... Holli rles_ D., senior scientist, Dean of Graduate Studies, oods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Mass......................... erepared:stavementy.. es) tel OF WUOUL 21 ISON h He ReneMIE! a. Mattson, Dr. Roger J., Director, Surveillance and Emergency Prepared- ness Division, Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Pro- CECtIONDA REMC ys MANS IA ayers Mons ik wage il nee dheneesdt IO Je. Le pared Statements... ot ore ee Oust OONaRY I Meee TT O'Connor, Thomas, Office of Marine Pollution Assessment, National Oce- anic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce ... Ostenso, Ned A., Deputy Assistant Administrator for Research and Devel- opment, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. De- Pabement role Commerce. teres aeesee ee ee ce Mea Anderson, D. R.: Answers to questions submitted by Hon. Gerry E. Studds. Energy Department: Executive order establishing the State Planning Council on Radioac- EPA: EPA to survey deepsea radioactive waste dumpsite in Atlantic (EPA ral Resources of the Committee on Government Operations............... pve Thomas E.: Answers to questions submitted by Hon. Gerry E. BS egret NOL ee Get MOR ain cae sian ee oe, AT, State Department: List ot parties to the London Dumping Convention as of November Tables pertaining to the dumping of radioactive materials at the Northeast Atlantic site for the Years sGVS-SOn es seeeh ene cette vi Additional material supplied—Continued ‘State Department—Continued Communications submitted: Page Anderson, D. R.: Letter of January 20, 1981, to Hon. Gerry E. Studds with O@NCLOSUTE ise s.icucvseucusceesustcasesenasn cans Senses satvbsisestOihenaceasesaceesenseipeninsee: ate eee 576 Corash, Michele Beigel: Memorandum of February 25, 1980, to Dr. Donald Oa ey ii. escccnchsuedoazecsencensenqareebeinseossensantesban chetetiapannstuetzen ce epee etre tease aaa 345 Eissler, Fred: Letter of October 3, 1980, to Hon. Douglas Costle..................-. 522 Finn, Daniel P.: Letter of December 16, 1980, to Hon. Gerry E. Studds With attachMent .;......:..cscocccsedccsesceshocescscossteecsacssesesudseceazaenaeeeeaastee te ee eee 529 Harvey, Thomas E.: Letter of February 10, 1981, to Hon. Gerry E. Studds With Enclosure 46: 5....002se ean pene : wander snr st avin dis. ate sh -omt pte 2 doe gates, delago id, 8y8 + ~ i - “ ri ‘eee b any be Oe Fae > * Ay 4 P a — A itv ‘ i re f phe ut oa LE Pek cc t oy iP VA *% ‘ ' « + F , ‘ P’ ist! , de. et ct na ee OCEAN POLLUTION PLANNING AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1980 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommitte met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Gerry E. Studds (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Studds and AuCoin. Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will come to order. Today’s hearing concerns the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act. Signed into law last Congress, this act has as its major purpose the coordination of ocean pollution research efforts currently per- formed by 11 different Federal agencies. The chief coordinating mechanism is to be a biennial 5-year plan, the first of which was published in late 1979. The first plan contains a listing of how much money each Feder- al agency is spending on specific pollutants, sources of pollution, and. their regional effects. As mandated by the law, the plan also categorizes as high, medium, or low priorities gaps or needs in current ocean pollution research and monitoring efforts. Unfortunately, although the first plan does list these priorities, it fails to state which three or four issues should be addressed first and foremost—a difficult question, but one that must be addressed. I realize the difficulties interagency committees encounter while attempting to rank certain problems as more pressing than others, but I do not think the underlying purpose of this law will be fulfilled until we know where there are disparities between current efforts and current needs. The most obvious question that needs answering is where do we go from here. Is there really a need for a new plan every 2 years, and will such plans make a difference in our struggle to minimize and eventually eradicate ocean pollution? [The bill and an executive communication follow:] (71) ee 96TH CONGRESS cme HR, 6615 To amend the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitor- Mr. ing Planning Act of 1978 to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of such Act for fiscal year 1981. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | FEBRUARY 26, 1980 MurpuHy of New York (for himself, Mr. McCuoskey, Mr. Fuqua, Mr. Stupps, Mr. PrircHarp, Mr. AMBro, Mr. WALKER, Mr. ForsyTHE, Mr. Brown of California, and Mr. BLANCHARD) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Science and Technology A BILL To amend the National Ocean Pollution Research and Develop- 1 2 3 + 5 6 ment and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978 to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of such Act for fiscal year 1981. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 10 of the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, as amended (33 U.S.C. 1709), is amended— (1) by striking out “and” after “1979,’’, and 73 2 (2) by striking out 1980.” and inserting in lieu thereof ‘1980, and not to exceed $3,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981.’’. O 74 EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION No. 3581 : ent aan 2 * | THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE S & Washington, D.C. 20230 % eo ia FEB 26 1980 om a : ©% werd Dear Mr. Speaker: : uoSi Enclosed are six copies of a draft bill "To amend Sections 4 and 10 of the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, as amended, to extend the appropriations authorization to carry out the provisions of such Act for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, and for other purposes.", together with a statement of purpose and need in support thereof. We have been advised by the Office of Management and Budget that there would be no objection to the submission of this legislation to the Congress and further that its enactment would be in accord with the program of the President. Sincerely, te. a, Secretary of Comme Enclosures Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. . Speaker of the House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515 aaa) ! mr 75 A BILL Yo amend Section 4 and 10 of the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, as amended, to extend the appropriations authorization to carry out the provisions of such Act for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, as amended (33°U.S.C. 1701, et seq.), iS amended as follows: (a) in subsection 4(a), by deleting "February 15" from the~-last clause of that subsection and inserting in lieu thereof "April 30;" and (b) in Section 10, by inserting a semicolon in lieu of the comma after "1979" and by striking the period after "1980" and inserting in lieu thereof "; not to exceed $3,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981; and such sums as may be ne@eeeany for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982.. 69-848 0 - 81 - 6 76 STATEMENL OF PURPOSE AND NEED The National Db sanyore iw eaen Research and Development ae Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, as amended, authorizes the establishment of a comprehenSive 5-year plan for ocean pollution research, development and monitoring which would coordinate all federal activities in these areas. This plan, completed in 1979, must be, revised every two years. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is designated as the lead agéiicy to prepare the above plan; to execute a program of ocean pollution research, develop- ment and monitoring in a senhee Giese with the plan; and to ensure dissemination of information from federal ocean pollution research, development and monitoring programs. The authorization of appropriations for this Act expires September 30, 1980. This bill will extend subsequent submission dates for the biennial revisions to the above plan from February 15 to April 30. Such an extension is necessary to assure adequate review of the plan by the Executive Branch on a schedule which promotes better coordination of the plan with the - budget projections for relevant agencies. The bill also will extend the appropriations authorization for carrying out the Act through fiscal year 1982. Such an extension will allow NOAA to carry out its functions under the Act for two more years. ie Mr. Stupps. Our first, last and only witness this morning is Mr. James Walsh, Deputy Administrator of NOAA, and Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Ocean Pollution Research and De- velopment and Monitoring. Good morning. STATEMENT OF JAMES P. (BUD) WALSH, DEPUTY ADMINISTRA- TOR, NOAA, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON OCEAN POLLUTION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING, ACCOM- PANIED BY DR. DAIL W. BROWN, ACTING DIRECTOR, NA- TIONAL MARINE POLLUTION PROGRAM OFFICE, NOAA; AND CAPT. LAWRENCE SWANSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MARINE POLLUTION ASSESSMENT, NOAA Mr. WALSH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. I will not ask you why San Francisco is on the front of your report. Mr. WALsuH. It was a very pretty picture, and actually I did not get much choice on it. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I welcome the opportunity to appear today in support of reauth- orization of Public Law 95-273, the National Ocean Pollution Re- search and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978. You can see why we call the act Public Law 95-2738. With me today are two individuals who spend most of their time on pollution matters in NOAA. Dail Brown, who is on my left, is presently the Acting Director of our national office. His present responsibility is putting together the plan and overseeing its imple- mentation. On my right is Larry Swanson, who is currently in charge of marine pollution assessment within our Office of Research and Development. It is Larry’s job to oversee our actual research proj- ects, such things as the funding of the projects under this act as well as under other pollution research programs within the Office of R. & D. He has the added responsibility of coordinating through- out NOAA all our marine pollution programs. We have a very sizable set of programs. The act mandated that a comprehensive 5-year plan for Federal ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring programs be developed in order to provide improved planning and coordina- tion of such programs within the Federal Government. A further purpose is to develop and disseminate information about pollution and its impact on the development of ocean and coastal resources. This undertaking has proved to be no small task. At present, 7 departments and 4 agencies are conducting or sponsoring nearly 1,000 discrete projects relating to ocean pollution research, develop- ment, and monitoring. Expenditures for these projects are project- ed to be $188 million in fiscal year 1980. The first 5-year plan is complete and work is already well under- way for revisions in 1981. We believe that the act has made a positive contribution to improve planning in this area, but much more needs to be done. Consequently, the administration supports reauthorization of the act for fiscal years 1981 and 1982. We have sent a bill to the Congress for that purpose. 78 I would now like to review for you our efforts to carry out the provisions of the legislation, and to outline our plans to improve the plan and our programs. The act requires the preparation of a 5-year plan which includes a detailed inventory of existing Federal programs, an assessment and ordering of national needs and problems, an analysis of the extent to which existing programs assist in meeting these prior- ities, recommendations for changes in the overall Federal effort where necessary, and a report on budget coordination efforts. The Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis- tration was named to lead this effort, in consultation with other Federal agencies having ocean pollution, research, development, and monitoring responsibilities. An interagency committee was established. I chair that commit- tee and Dr. Stephen Gage, Assistant Administrator for R. & D. at the Environmental Protection Agency, is vice chairman. Using subcommittees, a task force, and several workshops, the first 5-year plan was developed along with a catalog of Federal ocean pollution research development and monitoring programs for fiscal years 1978-80. These documents have been provided to this subcommittee. The several hundred individual statements of ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring needs and problems set out in the plan form the framework within which the priorities re- quired by the act were established. They reflect the many facets of the ocean pollution problem. National needs and problems were identified through an exten- sive review of agency missions by the interagency committee and through workshops involving industry, State and local government representatives, environmental groups, and other interested con- stituencies. As called for in section 4 of the act, initial priorities were established for major ocean use activities that may cause pollution. High-priority areas included land use practices, outfalls of municipal sewage, disposal of industrial waste, disposal of radio- active waste, steam electric powerplants, disposal of dredged mate- rial, oil and gas development, marine transportation, and the con- trol and mitigation of pollution. These initial priorities are not intended to replace those of indi- vidual departments and agencies. Rather, they are intended to be used, first, as guidance in assuring that all of the areas of most critical concern are addressed somewhere in the Federal effort; second, as the primary criteria for financial assistance to be made under section 6 of the act, and finally, as an additional tool to be used in the evaluation of mission-related activities. The plan recommends a number of tasks to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal effort. Important re- search areas are identified in which more emphasis should be placed within existing resources to a large degree, including: Effects of synthetic organics on human health; identification of critical habitats for living marine resources; determining the poten- tial impact of pollution on marine recreation; the cumulative ef- fects of coastal land use practices; specific pollution problems relat- ed to industrial waste disposal and municipal sewage outfalls; spe- cific problems related to the control and mitigation of ocean pollu- 79 tion, and in particular, improved tools for assessing the damage from oilspills; the need for long-term studies on natural, unpolluted areas in order to distinguish natural variations from pollution- caused changes; development of an improved capability to assess the social and economic consequences of pollution; better methods and approaches to identify potential pollutants and to evaluate isks. Both NOAA and the interagency committee have taken impor- tant steps to implement recommendations of the first 5-year plan. To provide a national focal point for coordinating Federal efforts on a day-to-day basis, NOAA has established the National Marine Pollution Program Office within its Office of Policy and Planning. This new office, which is staffed by NOAA and interagency repre- sentatives, is responsible for updating the plan every 2 years, im- plementing the recommendations, and providing staff support to the interagency committee. The next 5-year plan is due February 15, 1981. We are proposing a legislative change to extend the deadline for submission of the plan from February 15 to April 30. We believe such an extension is necessary to assure adequate review of the plan by the executive branch on a schedule which promotes better coordination of the plan with the budget process. The interagency committee is committed to seeing that the next 5-year plan builds upon this first plan to improve its quality and usefulness and is taking a number of steps to do so. First, agencies are developing 5-year planning prospectuses for their major pro- gram areas to allow the next plan to better project future direc- tions and levels of emphasis. Second, a series of regional workshops have been scheduled for June 1980, to develop specific statements of regional needs and priorities for consideration by the interagency committee. We are using Sea Grant for this purpose. Third, an extensive program review will be undertaken this year to determine how well Federal activities in petroleum-related re- search, development, and monitoring meet agency requirements and national needs. I know this is of special interest to you, Mr. Chairman. And finally, efforts will be undertaken to improve the budget coordination process. We have also taken a number of steps to establish a comprehen- sive and effective ocean pollution research, development, and moni- toring program within NOAA, as required by section 5 of this act. An appendix to my written testimony shows the pollution pro- gram breakdown, and the elements of NOAA which conduct those activities. NOAA’s diverse marine pollution-related activities, ranging from investigations of the levels of trace metals and synthetic organics in commercial valuable oil fisheries to assessment of the potential impacts of offshore oil development, have been described in detail and analyzed in the report and analysis of NOAA’s ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring activities—fiscal year 1978. That analysis shows NOAA’s base funding for marine pollution research, development, and monitoring activities of approximately $26 million for fiscal year 1980, with major activities underway in 80 the Office of Fisheries—NMFS—Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Services, and Office of Research and Development. To insure that those efforts are well coordinated and effective, NOAA has proposed the establishment of an Office of Marine Pollution Assessment within the Office of Research and Develop- ment. That office would have authority to coordinate planning and budgeting of all NOAA’s marine pollution activities. We are now developing a 5-year plan for NOAA’s programs which will help assure that they are responsive to the priorities and recommenda- tions of the Federal plan. The act provides authority to fund work in high-priority areas which are identified in the Federal plan as underemphasized. Funding can be provided to academic institutions, private firms, and other Federal agencies. $1.5 million in fiscal year 1980 funds will be devoted to the program, and we will be soliciting research, development, and monitoring proposals shortly. Section 8 of the act requires the Administrator of NOAA to insure that the results of ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring are made available in timely and useful fashion, a critical problem in our opinion. Responsibility for that effort has been assigned to NOAA’s Envi- ronmental Data and Information Service in the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Services. Two major initiatives are planned. The first will be development of a central coordination and referral capability to facilitate making data and information more readily accessible to potential users. The second will be establishment of a capability to provide data and information from diverse sources in a form more suitable for analysis and assessment. This is particularly useful for the Federal Government. That assessment capability will be directed at reducing large volumes of scientific data into forms which are more useful in making decisions on utilization, conservation, and development of ocean and coastal resources. The Administration seeks reauthorization of Public Law 95-273 for $3 million in fiscal year 1981, and such sums as may be appro- priate in fiscal year 1982. As I mentioned earlier, a legislative change is also requested to move the due date for the 5-year plan from February 15 to April 30. This concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer questions the subcommittee may have. [The following was received for the record:] STATEMENT OF JAMES P. WALSH, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear today in support of reauthorization of Public Law 95-273—the National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978. The Act mandated that a comprehensive 5-year plan for Federal ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring programs be developed in order to provide improved planning and coordination of such programs within the Federal Govern- ment. A further purpose is to develop and disseminate information about pollution and its impact on the development of ocean and coastal resources. This undertaking has proved to be no small task. At present, seven departments and four agencies are conducting or sponsoring nearly 1,000 discrete projects relat- 81 ing to ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring. Expenditures for these projects are projected to be $188 million in fiscal year 1980. The first 5-year plan is complete and work is already well underway for revisions in 1981. We believe that the Act has made a positive contribution to improved planning in this area, but much more needs to be done. Consequently, the Adminis- tration supports reauthorization of the Act for fiscal years 1981 and 1982. I believe we have sent a bill to the Congress for that purpose. I would now like to review for you our efforts to carry out the provisions of the legislation, and to outline our plans to improve the Plan and our programs. Section 4—The plan The Act requires the preparation of a 5-year plan which includes a detailed inventory of existing Federal programs, an assessment and ordering of national needs and problems, an analysis of the extent to which existing programs assist in meeting these priorities, recommendations for changes in the overall Federal effort where necessary and a report on budget coordination efforts. The Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration was named to lead this effort, in consultation with other Federal agencies having ocean pollution, research, development, and monitoring responsibilities. An interagency committee was established. I chair that Committee and Dr. Ste- phen Gage, Assistant Administrator for R&D at the Environmental Protection Agency is Vice Chairman. Using subcommittees, a task force, and several work- shops, the first Five-Year plan was developed along with a catalog of Federal ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring programs for fiscal years 1978-80. These documents have been provided to this Subcommittee. The several hundred individual statements of ocean pollution research, develop- ment, and monitoring needs and problems set out in the Plan form the framework within which the priorities required by the Act were established. They reflect the many facets of the ocean pollution problem. National needs and problems were identified through an extensive review of agency missions by the Interagency Com- mittee and through workshops involving industry, state, and local government representatives, environmental groups and other interested constituencies. As called for in Section 4 of the Act, initial priorities were established for major ocean use activities that may cause pollution. High priority areas included land use practices, outfalls of municipal sewage, disposal of industrial waste, disposal of radioactive waste, steam electric powerplants, disposal of dredged material, oil and gas devel- opment, marine transportation, and the control and mitigation of pollution. These initial priorities are not intended to replace those of individual depart- ments and agencies. Rather, they are intended to be used (1) as guidance in assuring that all of the areas of most critical concern are addressed somewhere in the Federal effort, (2) as the primary criteria for financial assistance to be made under Section 6 of the Act, and (8) as an additional tool to be used in the evaluation of mission-related activities. The Plan recommends a number of tasks to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal effort. Important research areas are identified in which more emphasis should be placed within existing resources to a large degree, includ- ing: Effects of synthetic organics on human health. Identification of critical habitats for living marine resources. Determining the potential impact of pollution on marine recreation. The cumulative effects of coastal land use practices. Specific pollution problems related to industrial waste disposal and municipal sewage outfalls. Specific problems related to the control and mitigation of ocean pollution, and in particular, improved tools for assessing the damage from oil spills. The need for long-term studies on natural, unpolluted areas in order to distin- guish natural variations from pollution-caused changes. Development of an improved capability to assess the social and economic conse- quences of pollution. oS methods and approaches to identify potential pollutants and to evaluate risks. Both NOAA and the Interagency Committee has taken important steps to imple- ment recommendations of the first Five-Year Plan. To provide a national focal point for coordinating Federal efforts on a day-to-day basis, NOAA has established the National Marine Pollution Program Office within its Office of Policy and Planning. This new office, which is staffed by NOAA and interagency representatives, is responsible for updating the Plan every two years, implementing the recommenda- tions and providing staff support to the Interagency Committee. 82 The next Five-Year Plan is due February 15, 1981. We are proposing a legislative change to extend the deadline for submission of the Plan from February 15 to April 30. Such an extension is necessary to assure adequate review of the Plan by the Executive Branch on a schedule which promotes better coordination of the plan with the budget processes. The Interagency Committee is committed to seeing that the next Five-Year Plan builds upon this first plan to improve its quality and usefulness. In this regard, agencies are developing five-year planning prospectuses for their major program areas to allow the next plan to better project future directions and levels of empha- sis. Second, a series of regional workshops have been scheduled for June 1980 to develop specific statements of regional needs and priorities for consideration by the Interagency Committee. We are using Sea Grant for this purpose. Third, an exten- sive program review will be undertaken this year to determine how well Federal activities in petroleum-related research, development, and monitoring meet agency requirements and national needs. I know this is of special interest to you, Mr. Chairman. And finally, efforts will be undertaken to improve the budget coordina- tion process. Section 5—Comprehensive NOAA program We have also taken a number of steps to establish a comprehensive and effective ocean pollution research, development and monitoring program within NOAA, as required by section 5 of the Act. There is an appendix that shows the pollution program breakdown and which elements of NOAA conduct those activities. NOAA’s diverse marine pollution-related activities, ranging from investigations of the levels of trace metals and synthetic organics in commercially valuable oil fisheries to assessment of the potential impacts of offshore oil development, have been described in detail and analyzed in the Report and Analysis of NOAA’s Ocean Pollution Research, Development and Monitoring Activities-fiscal year 1978. That analysis shows NOAA’s base funding for marine pollution research, development, and moni- toring activities or approximately $26 million for fiscal year 1980, with major activities underway in the Office of Fisheries, Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Services, and Office of Research and Development. To ensure that those efforts are well coordinated and effective NOAA has proposed establishing an Office of Marine Pollution Assessment within the Office of Research and Development. That Office would have authority to coordinate planning and budgeting of all NOAA’s marine pollution activities. We are now developing a 5-year plan for NOAA’s programs which will help assure that they are responsive to the priorities and recommenda- tions of the Federal Plan. Section 6—Financial assistance The Act provides authority to fund work in high priority areas which are identi- fied in the Federal Plan as under-emphasized. Funding can be provided to academic institutions, private firms and other Federal agencies. $1.5 million in fiscal year 1980 funds will be devoted to the program, and we will be soliciting research, development, and monitoring proposals shortly. Section 8—Information Dissemination Section 8 of the Act requires the Administrator of NOAA to ensure that the results of ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring are made available in timely and useful fashion, a critical problem in our opinion. Responsibility for that effort has been assigned to NOAA’s Environmental Data and Information service in the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric services. Two major initiatives are planned. The first will be development of a central coordination and referral capa- bility to facilitate making data and information more readily accessible to potential users. The second will be establishment of a capability to provide data and informa- tion from diverse sources in a form more suitable for analysis and assessment. This is particularly useful for the Federal government. That assessment capability will be directed at reducing large volumes of scientific data into forms which are more useful in making decisions on utilization, conservation, and development of ocean and coastal resources. The Administration seeks reauthorization of Public Law 95-273 for $3.0 million in fiscal year 1981 and such sums as may be appropriate in fiscal year 1982. As I mentioned earlier, a legislative change is also requested to move the due date for the Five-Year Plan from February 15, to April 30. That concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer questions the Subcommittee may have. 83 NOAA MARINE POLLUTION PROGRAM FUNDING SUMMARY {In millions of dollars} Fiscal year— 1980 1981 MESA (RD): NCW IRV GV KOE IPT Ceseea ateeesen memerrecrteet aa ttres eeettere trys us scoot cenrsersre’ tveacecsvonrearetivestsatisctomneerrre corer 18 18 PHNpeGet SUNT Se ropa tes corseeesehansca aneebber toe errr meaehenc ebeceeoco-eoe acct croeoco-pos-CyP occ cee 13 13 (OLESEN UTVTTIT TTS (USD) seer eencercoserecetccttctacdeccaceact no oop ae ence ae me ee ectemec A rae 2.9 2.9 PHA AAT Ne FTAMNATSENT TS (UF) Seer chestedian ase coerecoscronctonntl cn iedecneceeeebconnedtene etre oobsonnin cr eocerscbecceoduccted saree Cosco 5.0 7.6 (FaBeNt (LATHES: (RD) searcheares Rents acpesuacescsctacennnceeaee eta. Aen mnt ohiace ecand baccerd or eee epseecceroeceeecor cee 2.5 2.5 Jo EU (CRD) cssescccscoeccceretossn ctr i roa cca cereete 2.1 2.1 MicraconstitientSin(P) ise. ccceecosnen terme ceatserncer 192, 12 Ocean engineering (RD) .......ccssssesssssseecsssseesesssseeees 0.3 0.3 onpntenmeettects (RD) sce ccseescssctesccssecseeres-e 4.8 4.8 Public Law 95-273 (PP, RD, OAS): ret Cece ate Sic we ORM at OS SIU me UR Pa a UR ee oR 0.6 0.6 SECTION See a ee A tk a |e i ears od he ane tA 2c Br he Oller nee ces Sere HB ess ek eS ro rr nN ee OE ae EES ERE 1.5 17 CreeTAT ATA AS i at in NR le IR fs A OU RR 2 fl 0.1 0.7 TEVETROLONS (MEVGIETS (STONE (UND) cess -6 cidceeerececoscncce-ecrosbaor.cebocercece aecbs¥ ecear cern b-cinecconc raecaeeebor poner coosoeC cc 1.0 1.0 VO ee Re ee oe a ee See 25.8 29.1 Mr. Stupps. I guess, fundamentally, the most obvious question is: So what? We have the first plan now. As you say, it has an extremely nice cover. The real question is: What is any different in the field of ocean pollution research and monitoring than it would have been, had we not enacted this act in the first place? Has it really made a differ- ence of substance, in your judgment? Mr. Watsu. I believe it has, for one simple reason. Before the legislation was passed, it is fair to say that no one in the Federal Government had any idea of what was going on in this field. Now that we have an idea of what is going on, and we have also taken the time to identify what our needs ought to be. We have a far better basis for making planning and budgeting decisions than we did in the past. What might have happened in the past is that the field staff of NOAA or EPA would decide to see if they could sell a program to their bosses. The program then might have come up the system. The bosses would not have had enough time to look at it, and by the time it was approved, no one could have been assured of what they had approved. With this plan, we give the decisionmakers at the senior manage- ment level, as well as the budget level, an opportunity to look at the budget recommendations that come up from the field. The senior managment can now say, “If I am going to approve this research I want you to assure me that the following agency does not do it, and that it is aimed in the right direction.” It is an extremely useful document for that purpose. I find it particularly useful when assessing requests that come to me for funding. Sometimes these requests reach $100 million. Before this document, I had a heck of a time. I might have called up somebody I knew for information. But this document is so useful for me. It is almost indispensable for a manager. It helps us identify the areas that need to be addressed. 84 I think that your question really relates to how quickly the Federal Government reacts. My experience is that the executive branch’s calendar is usually 2 years behind the legislative calendar because of the bureaucracy involved. Consequently, I believe that while change is hard to see now, within a year or two more, you will see our programs begin to become more responsive to the statements from the Congress about what the national needs are. We will be able to give you a lot more information about things such as drilling muds. This plan is a much better technique for improving the helter-skelter planning process that is underway in the Federal Government. Mr. Stupps. Do you have any way of knowing whether any other agencies view it the way you do and use it to the extent that you do? Mr. WaAtsu. Yes, we have heard that it is being used by budget examiners throughout the Government. Mr. Stupps. Did you find—and I expect you did—duplication where no one knew it existed in terms of the application of re- search effort? Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir. There are programs that look like they are overlapping, and we have indicated that we think that those either ought to be sorted out or changed or new projects should be under- taken in certain areas. Mr. Stupps. When you find such things, I guess all you can do, and all that can be done under this program, is to make it abun- dantly clear, and hope that in turn they will make the right judgment. Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir. We respect the fact that power in the Federal Government is decentralized through many committees, agencies, bureaus, and offices; and we certainly are not going to tell them they must cut it out. But once the information is down on paper, and you have a document to use a tool for evaluation—— Mr. Stupps. I hope somebody has the authority to say, cut it out, if three agencies are doing the same thing. Mr. WaAtsu. I think more and more senior managers are saying, “If somebody else is doing it, let’s not do it. If we need to get into a gap area, let’s go for it.” I think what it does is give senior manage- ment in the Government a better handle. Mr. Stupps. How substantial a change would you anticipate in next year’s version of the 5-year plan, the first revision of it? Mr. WaALtsu. I think it will be a lot more refined. First of all, we will have a much better idea of how much each agency is planning 5 years down the line. We have established general guidelines. In addition, we are going to get into, in more depth, the largest area, petroleum, and begin to get down to project levels and to program purposes. There is a lot of money going into petroleum. Energy has become the budget watchword. People down the line say that energy is selling this year, and we need to do some pollution studies. The cumulative impact is that there are a lot of programs which are not coordinated. Through this plan we think in the petroleum 85 area we will be able to tell you where the problems are and how we will have to redirect ourselves. Mr. Stupps. Do you think there is really a need to mandate that this be done every 2 years? Mr. WAtsu. I believe there is a need, simply because it is very simple for people to fall back into traditional habits of taking a shortcut. NOAA has had the same tendency. For example, NOAA is charged with coordinating meteorology in the Federal Govern- ment under an OMB order. Recently, we discovered that we and other agencies had fallen asleep on how much time we put into it. I find that the demands of legislation are extremely helpful to keep this thing at the front burner, because so many things come along to make it look like it should go on the back burner. I find it useful to have that requirement, and to, quite frankly, have the pressure from Congress. Mr. Stupps. I am intrigued to hear you say that, because I expect, with the plethora of reports that are mandated by the Congress on a regular basis, that someone’s eye will be caught by this little innocuous bill on the floor and that person will say we are just requiring another report; and are we doing anything other than creating more paper, and perhaps a few more staff positions to fulfill yet another essentially formal but not particularly sub- stantive mandate of Congress. I take it you feel very strongly that is not the case? Mr. Watsu. No, sir. I think the critical thing is the process that has been created. The process is as good a one as can be put together, given the dispersion of power in the Federal Government. When you say reports, I think of something telling you what we did last year. What we are trying to do with the plan is tell us what to do next year. I think there is a critical difference. I don’t like to file reports about what we did last year. It takes a lot of time. I prefer to look into the future, and in my opinion, anything that helps us look better into the future is a good report if it is done right. Mr. Stupps. In your judgment, the time that you and your asso- ciates have had to devote has been time well spent, and not time spinning wheels? Mr. Watsu. I believe so. It has completely changed the way NOAA has done business in pollution. Three years ago I remember when NOAA appeared before Congress, they were not sure what everybody else was doing. We now have a group that manages all of NOAA pollution programs across the board. We establish a priority ranking of new funding on a collegial basis. We do it through the senior manage- ment level. It has rationalized NOAA’s research. We can tell you what we are doing and where we are going and where we want to head. Mr. Stupps. Do you know whether other agencies are doing this? How about EPA? Mr. WALsH. We understand that they are. It is being used by all the agencies in this manner, as well by as their budget examiners. The Interior Department has been quite supportive of this, and their programs are a very large part of it. We understand that it has been very useful. 86 Mr. Stupps. I am encouraged. My interest in this question was spurred by hearings in Hyannis when we actually had Federal agencies arguing on the witness stand as to who was responsible for what under the law. There was disagreement between NOAA and EPA and Interior about who was responsible for assessing damages after a major spill. There seemed to be general agreement that the Coast Guard was responsible for cleaning it up, but beyond that there was disagreement. I guess that is as good an example as any. Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir. Since that time, what we have done in the Federal Government is recognized that that was a completely valid criticism. First we needed to decide who was going to be the chief and who would be the Indians, and then decide what all our tribes were doing, and how to do it without stepping on each other’s toes. It is not an easy task in the large, cumbersome bureaucracy that we have. Mr. Stupps. I think the next level, for example, using the inci- dent of a major oil spill such as that, as the result of this program, we now know who was responsible, even though there is some overlapping. Or is there some clarification? Mr. Watsu. There has been clarification. Mr. Stupps. Someone is now responsible other than just knowing who is responsible? Mr. WALsH. Yes. We will make that even more clear as we move down the line to the agency prospectuses. We will be able to tell you the lead agency for drilling muds will be the Department of the Interior. That will be their job. Mr. Stupps. For research? Mr. Watsu. For research. If, however, that agency feels they do not have the expertise and might like to turn to some other agency, we will be able to do that. Mr. Stupps. For example, if there is a major oil spill, is it clear, or do you know whether or not it is clear, which agency has the responsibility for long-term damage assessment? Mr. WAtsH. Well, at the present time, based on decisions that have already been made, NOAA is in charge of damage assess- ment. Mr. Stupps. For monitoring over time? Mr. WatsuH. Yes; and I believe the national response team is considering right now and recommendations have been made, that NOAA be officially designated the lead agency. Mr. Stupps. I notice that you have in your ranking of priorities, or in the plan’s ranking of priorities, you sort of have three levels, high, medium and low, and you do not attempt to rank within those broad categories. Mr. Watsu. No, we did not. But if you will notice, we went beyond just the initial priorities. We made some detailed recom- mendations in the back of the document which break it down by type of activities, by regional bases, and by pollutant. Mr. Stupps. And you do rank in your subheadings underneath your broad categories. Mr. Watsu. Yes, in the back we put whether it is high or medium or low. 87 Mr. Stupps. My first reaction is that you avoided some critical areas in terms of national needs. But that is probably, at least in part, a part of the difficulty you have as an interagency committee, each of whose members must be watching their own area and not wanting to be outranked by someone else. Mr. WatsH. Even this ranking was extremely contentious and there are some people who would like to throttle me at the present time. Mr. Stupps. I can imagine. But I wonder, if we did not have that difficulty do you think a purpose would be served by a greater specificity of ranking within the broad categories? Mr. WALSH. The way the Federal Government does that kind of thing is to set these broad spectrums, and then each year go with a ZBB ranking. But it is very rare that you get a ZBB ranking across the board. Mr. Stupps. What kind of ranking? Mr. Watsu. Zero-based budgeting; I am sorry. Mr. Stupps. I am not sure that would be desirable. You would kick up a horrible fuss among people who feel they deserve to be higher or lower. Of course, I have my own particular parochial questions of you. In your high category you have oil and gas, and in your subhead- ings, ranked within that category, you have A, B, and C priorities. In your lower priorities are discharges from drilling. That is a B, and the effects of spilled oil is a C. How does one determine those are B and C, as opposed to A? Those are on page 136 of the plan. Mr. WAtsu. I think those rankings were judged on what we are presently doing, how much money we are putting into it now, the need to focus more in this area than in that area, and how much capability there is in the research community. The interagency team that went over this spent a good deal of time on it. I would guess that many of these things are changing. That is why we would like to revise the plan over time. We are trying to perceive what the national needs are as they evolve. Of course, the national needs seen by this Congress today are a lot different than what they saw 2 years ago. Mr. Stupps. To say nothing of what they will be next year. Mr. WaALtsu. So we feel that we do take a snapshot and make judgments at a certain period of time, and therefore, we would like every 2 years to improve them. Mr. Stupps. Do you, if pressed personally or officially, have any substantive changes to recommend in the statute other than those relatively minor ones? Mr. WaALtsu. The title. Mr. Stupps. I was saving that for the end. Mr. Watsu. I think that presently the legislation is fully accept- able to us, except for the change to the April 30 date. Mr. Stupps. Does the administration have an official position as to what the title ought to be? Mr. WaAtsu. No. Mr. Stupps. Do you have one personally? 88 Mr. WaAtsH. We were talking about this today, and we were thinking about conducting a lottery of some sort. Mr. Stupps. That is dangerous. Mr. WALsH. We could ZBB the names. The National Ocean Pollu- tion Planning Act would be just as acceptable. Mr. Stupps. I think some consideration should be given to the resulting acronym. Was it you or the Department of State who came up with the suggestion for Fishery Conservation and Manage- ment Act of Basic Understanding Governing Offshore Fisheries? Was that the State Department? Mr. WALsH. Ours was Governing International Fisheries Trea- ties. Mr. Stupps. Do you have anything better to suggest than that? I understand we may have difficulty with the Science Committee, who shares jurisdiction over this. Mr. Wa su. I think the Senate would say it is the House lan- guage that came out. Mr. Stupps. Is this something you bear responsibility for in your earlier incarnation? Mr. WALsH. Yes, I drafted that. Mr. Stupps. And you have had to live with that? Mr. WAtsH. Every now and then you have to see if what you suggested makes sense, and try to carry it out. Mr. Stupps. It is a humbling task, but we will attempt to do better. We will have informal consultations with the administra- tion, and we will not ask most of the affected 11 agencies. We will do our very best to come up with one. I want to thank you. I must say, when I first encountered the statute with any degree of closeness, I was extremely skeptical that we had done anything more than mandate a little more reporting on your part to us. But you sound genuinely convinced that we have stimulated something worthwhile. Mr. Watsu. I think it is working, Mr. Chairman. I think this kind of exercise is extremely useful for one simple reason, and that is that the decisions about funding tend to be made on an isolated basis. It is only rarely that the Office of Management and Budget will make a crosscut—that is, they will take a look at what like programs are going on. Most budget examiners do not like crosscuts. Crosscuts are diffi- cult and complex. This provides a very useful technique and proc- ess for us to do a relatively good crosscut and comparison. At least we know what everyone else is doing, and we will not step on their toes. Mr. Stupps. That is very encouraging. Mr. Pritchard has asked permission to submit questions in writ- ing. His job will be to keep away those from his side that will be trying to look for ways to save a little bit of money as we try to get this bill on the floor. Thank you very much. The subcommittee stands adjourned. [The following was received for the record:] 89 QuEsTIONS FrRoM Mr. MurpHy AND ANSWERS Question 1. In establishing priorities, how were the trade-offs made between cost to gather the information vs. the value of the resulting data (Sec. 4(b)(1)(B))? Answer. In developing the procedures for setting initial priorities for the First Plan, it proved impossible with the time and resources available to quantitatively estimate either the cost of projected research, development, and monitoring needs or the value of information to be obtained with any degree of reliability. Rather, a set of criteria were applied in a qualitative way to set both the priorities for specific need statements and overall categories. These criteria are: Immediacy of the pollution threat. Value and importance of the polluting activity to society and the economy. Distribution of the polluting activity, whether local, regional, or global. Value of the resources at risk. Likelihood of solving the problem in the near term, the availability of scientific expertise, and cost effectiveness. Question 2. In determining national priorities, what criteria were used to evaluate the adequacy of the level of effort (i.e. when is the research base adequate)? Answer. Priorities were established using the criteria presented in the answer to question No. 1 without any consideration of the adequacy of existing scientific and technical knowledge of the problem area. Only after priorities were established was the adequacy of the information base and the current program level considered to determine unmet high priority needs. The current state-of-knowledge was evaluated by the interagency task force with reference to numerous recent reports on different pollution areas such as the Estes Park report, “Proceedings of a Workshop on Scientific Problems Relating to Ocean Pollution”. Question 3. Could specific examples be given as to how other agencies have used this Plan? How has this Plan made a difference in the process by which research priorities are determined and the content of agency research programs? Answer. NOAA and EPA are examples of two agencies that are using the Plan to develop their current programs for fiscal year 1982. Because the Plan brought together for the first time program information on all agencies, a major benefit has been the awareness of the magnitude and emphasis of the ongoing Federal effort. A major accomplishment in the process by which research programs are developed is implementation of Task 23—the preparation of a 5-year prospectus by each agency. For the first time, many agencies are developing research strategies that look out 2- 3 years beyond the most current budget year. The Plan was published in the fall in 1979 and it is much too early to determine what impact it has had on the content of agency programs. Question 4. Can specific examples be given of the clarification of agency roles that have ued from the development of this Plan (as mentioned before the Subcom- mittee)? Answer. As noted in the answer to Question No. 3, a major accomplishment of the first Plan was the review, for the first time, of all agency missions, mandates, and research activities. This has resulted in clarification of agency responsibilities for all facets of pollution research, development and monitoring. As the second Plan is prepared, it is hoped that agencies will take on “lead agency” roles for pollution problem areas which are of interest to more than one agency. The National Marine Pollution Program Office is working with individual agencies to develop those lead agency roles. Question 5. What interagency research programs have resulted or are in the planning stage as a consequence of the development of the Plan? How are resources to be used more effectively to support management decisions? Answer. Because of the way the budget cycle is structured it is too early to expect that specific research programs will have been developed in response to the Plan. NOAA, through its Section 6 Financial Assistance program, is planning to spend $1.5 million on programs to address the unmet priority problems identified in the Plan. A specific interagency program on the marine pollution problems related to coastal land use practices is being jointly sponsored by the National Marine Pollu- tion Program Office, Office of Coastal Zone Management, and the U.S. Department of State. An interagency working group is looking at the problems of quality assurance across all agency programs and their recommendations should lead to specific programmatic changes. Question 6. What role does NOAA have in conducting research on the effects of ocean dumping of dredge spoil and sewage sludge (vs. EPA and the Corps of Engineers)? What research efforts are planned to carry out the research priorities cited in the Plan for these two problems? How are they to be coordinated with the appropriate regulatory agency? 90 Answer. NOAA’s role in conducting research on the effects of ocean dumping of dredge material and sewage sludge is to carry out programs of research on fate and effects, conduct environmental assessment studies, and develop and implement mon- itoring strategies. These studies and activities are responsive to the known concerns and interests of EPA and the Corps. Current needs include alternative disposal methods for dredged material, such as “capping”, and assessing procedural methods, such as bioassays. Recently, a special EPA/Corps/NOAA task force was established to consider the current controversy affecting dredging in New York Harbor. The task force is determining criteria for selection of test organisms, sediments to be tested, pollutants to be screened (in addition to PCBs) and bioassay procedures, in the New York Bight. Research planned in connection with dredged material and sewage sludge disposal in fiscal years 1980 and 1981 addresses the priorities set forth in the Federal Plan. These studies will include experimental dumps in the dredge site in the New York Bight in conjunction with the Corps of Engineers and studies in dredged spoil disposal sites in the Gulf of Mexico and Chesapeake Bay. Operational monitoring of the sewage sludge site in New York Harbor will be initiated this spring and will continue for a period of years. In addition, monitoring of the sewage sludge dump- site by the City of Philadelphia is planned to ascertain residual effects and recovery actors. Examples include joint definition of problems, development of strategy, joint experimental work and initiation of studies in direct response to other agencies’ requests. Coordination also occurs through periodic meetings or through symposia, both national and international. Finally, coordination on overall priorities and strategies within the framework of the Federal Plan will be handled through regional workshops on marine pollution assessment and monitoring. Question 7. What effort is NOAA making to develop better testing and monitoring procedures and strategies (as mentioned in the Plan) that can be used for determin- ing potential environmental degradation (e.g., from dredge soil and sewage sludge)? Answer. Improved testing and monitoring procedures and strategies evolve both from findings resulting from programs of research at specific sites and through investigations designed to yield results that can be applied to more than one site. For example, in the New York Bight, data on dissolved oxygen concentrations and contaminant concentrations in sediments and selected organisms, have been incor- porated into a comprehensive monitoring plan addressing the problems peculiar to that situation. Other work includes transfer of contaminants from sediments and the water column to organisms (Texas A&M) and studies on changes in species epenoenen of planktonic communities (University of Maine, University of Mary- and). Question 8. How does this Plan differ from other reports from scientific workshops on marine pollution research needs? Answer. Section 4 is very specific as to the content of the Federal Plan: a statement of national needs and problems; an ordering of those needs and problems a description of the current Federal Program; an evaluation of how well the current Federal program meets priority needs and problems; and recommendations to im- prove the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal effort. The focus of the Federal Plan is to improve the responsiveness of Federal activities in research, development, and monitoring to the needs of decisionmakers at both the Federal and non-Federal levels. The Plan differs from scientific workshop reports by setting priorities among the research needs and by relating those needs to agency missions and mandates. Question 9. It was stated that the recommendations should be accomplished pruners, within existing resource levels. How was it determined that this is feasi- e? Answer. Immediate actions to fill gaps in the Federal program are expected to be taken by application of the Section 6 Financial Assistance funds. $1.5M is available in fiscal year 1980. In reviewing the overall level of funding and projected increase, the interagency committee members agreed that resource levels were probably adequate to meet unmet, high priority needs. A number of areas were identified on page 10 of the plan where considerable effort is now underway but it is unclear that these efforts are well-coordinated. Improved efficiencies in these areas could free up funds to address gap areas. Question 10. What national needs and problems related to social, economic, and environmental values of ocean and coastal resources were identified? What plans are being made and by which agency to address these needs? When these values are identified and evaluated, how are they to be incorporated into the implementation of the Plan’s research program. Answer. Several hundred individual statements of ocean pollution research, devel- opment, and monitoring needs and problems related to social, economic, and envi- 91 ronmental values are set out in Chapter III of the Federal Plan. Because of the complexity of the overall ocean pollution problem, these needs and problems discus- sions are presented from several perspectives: Effects of ocean pollution on human health, living resources, recreation and aesthetics, including statements of regional needs and problems. Activities that cause marine pollution. Tools for evaluating ocean pollution, including research, monitoring, technology development, measurement technology, quality assurance, and date and information management. Tools for controlling and minimizing ocean pollution. The unmet, high priority needs are identified on pages 7-9 of the Federal Plan. Agencies are asked to respond to those unmet needs as agency program plans are formulated particularly for fiscal year 1982 but no specific assignments are made. The National Marine Pollution Program Office is working with individual agencies to genuly specific program steps that will be responsibe to the unmet, high priority needs. Question 11. What criteria does NOAA use to determine which high priority research topics to emphasize, what degree of effort should be directed toward each, and what the timing of the research products should be? Answer. NOAA uses several approaches towards determining research priorities, level of effort, and timing of research products. The Federal Plan now serves as a guide for the development of research needs and priorities. In addition to this guidance, NOAA seeks the advice of academic institutions and regulatory agencies such as the Corps of Engineers and EPA. Workshops have been held to solicit this information. Examples are: the Estes Park Workshop on Scientific Problems Relat- ing to Ocean Pollution, the Crystal Mountain Workshop on Assimilative Capacity, and the Regional Workshops on the Long-Range Effects Program. Some projects have advisory committees consisting of panels addressing user needs (products and timing), science and technology (technical design), and citizens and industry (public awareness and problems). The advice gained from these workshops and groups are then considered in the context of NOAA goals, objectives and resources for making decisions and program content. Question 12. When identifying research needs and agency responsibilities, what role did NOAA define for herself in supporting other agencies’ regulatory needs (e.g., EPA, Corps of Engineers)? How does NOAA ensure that research programs and results will be appropriate and timely for management decisions? Please in- clude specific examples. Answer. There are numerous ways which NOAA can and has supported other agencies’ regulatory needs. These include providing at-sea research capabilities, scientific assessments of particular sites or problems, and research relating to pollution problems and ecosystem functions. NOAA is an active participant in the national marine pollution program, and is aware of most of the time frames for management decisions surrounding basic issues. Consequently, we are in a position to anticipate the need for information at specific times. In addition, we seek guid- ance from the regulatory agencies in order to assure that we will be responsive. The workshops and advisory committees mentioned in Question 11 are examples of some of our interactions in this regard. We also established formal arrangements with EPA and the Corps of Engineers for the purposes of improving NOAA’s responsive- ness to their needs. The following list provides examples of NOAA’s responsiveness to important management decisions: 1. NOAA temporarily redirected the activities of the MESA New York Bight Project to assist in the selection of the alternative sewage sludge dumpsite, at the request of EPA. 2. NOAA, partially at the request of EPA, conducted research into the causes of the Long Island beach pollution incident and the 1976 oxygen depletion episode off the coast of New Jersey. 3. NOAA, at the request of EPA, developed routine water quality monitoring cruises in the Bight during the summer months. 4. NOAA provided ship support in 1974 to the initial testing of the concept of high-temperature incineration of organochlorides (Gulf of Mexico). 5. NOAA participates on task teams established to investigate area problems, e.g., in the case of PCB testing of dredge spoil in the New York Bight. QUESTION From Mr. HuGHES AND ANSWER Question 1. The Federal Plan for Ocean Pollution Research, Development, and Monitoring, fiscal year 1979-83 relegates sewage sludge dumping to a low priority 69-848 0 - 81 - 7 92 (p. 5). In view of the severe adverse environmental impact that the ocean dumping of municipal sewage sludge has caused in the ocean waters of the New York Bight, this low priority is both suprising and disturbing. I would like to know the reason for assigning sewage sludge dumping to a low priority in the Federal Plan. Answer. The national policy for the ocean dumping of sewage sludge is that it will cease in 1981. Given the extensive research that has occurred over the last decade, the local nature of the problem, and the current legislated policy, the interagency committee members agreed that a low priority should be placed on the research needs in this area. QUESTIONS From Mr. PRITCHARD AND ANSWERS Question 1. What work has been done on the criteria for the selection of sites for sub-seabed nuclear waste disposal? Answer. Several years of DOE-sponsored work have been devoted to establishing criteria for the selection of sites for sub-seabed nuclear disposal. The major criteria are that: the sea floor chosen be of long-term stability; it be covered with a thick layer of sediment; and it be at any abyssal depth. The best sites, therefore, would be in abyssal hill regions at the center of tectonic plates, with a 5 to 100 meter thickness of red clay sediment. Question 2. Is any work being done to map proposed sites? What type of mapping and profiling will be done? Answer. Some work has been conducted using conventional echo sounders for defining the surficial shape of the seafloor, and high energy sonic profilers for subsurface structure. Finer scale mapping will have to be obtained over the sites, when selected. Question 3. Based on the work up to this date on seabed disposal of radioactive waste, are there any studies which conclude that seabed is not viable and we should not conduct further studies? Answer. To our knowledge, five years of research have yielded no technical reasons why seabed disposal should not be studied further, and considered as a viable disposal option. Question 4. Has any work been conducted cn the method of waste implementation in the deep seabed in geologically inactive sites? Answer. Yes. The method currently being discussed is to use elongate conisters that would penetrate the sea floor and bury themselves in the sediment. Other alternative strategies are being considered including free-fall penetration, jet assist, and drilling. Question. 5. Would we have to develop new technology for the transportation and disposal of radioactive wastes? Answer. New technology for the transportation and disposal of radioactive wastes will in all probability need to be developed. This is of particular importance for the deployment of the canisters so that penetration in the sediments can be achieved safely and effectively. Question 6. Are there any methods of retrieving implanted waste canisters from beneath the seabed if the need arises? Answer. To our knowledge there are no proven methods of retrieving implanted waste canisters from beneath the seabed if the need arises. Such methods will need to be devised if retrieval in the future is a consideration. Question 7. Does NOAA have the capability to monitor the entire disposal process should sub-seabed disposal become a viable option? Answer. Yes, provided Class I ships can be dedicated when such disposal oper- ations are taking place. Ships of that size are needed to tow devices that can monitor the abyssal depths remotely. In situ sensors, which can be retrieved by surface vessels, will also need to be used. Question 8. Do submersibles exist that can travel to the depths where disposal might take place? Answer. The U.S. Navy’s TRIESTE II is a manned-submersible that can work at depths up to 6,00m. eee 9. Can the sediment withstand the high heat that nuclear waste gener- ates’ Answer. One of the key unknowns is the behavior of the sediments. The heat emanating from a canister during its initial 500 years may cause part of the sediments to rise and parts may harden into a brick-like substance. Experiments are planned to test the response of clay sediments to implanted heat sources. Question 10. What do we know about the dose rate to deep sea organisms? Answer. We do not know very much about this problem. This is being addressed in a number of ways, including studies in areas where low-level radioactive waste have been deposited. 93 Question 11. How long can we reasonably expect the sediment to contain radionu- clides? Answer. This depends on whether or not sediments remain stable, as discussed in response to question 9, and on the tendency for nuclides to be adsorbed onto sediment surfaces. Work is proceeding to determine how adsorption is affected by heat and pressure and by the chemical form of the nuclide. If the overlying clay sediment remains stable, nuclides must diffuse through interstitial water while maintaining adsorption equilibrium with the sediment. It has been estimated that nuclides that leak from a canister at depths more than 30m into sediment may not reach the sea floor for more than one million years. Question 12. What happens when radionuclides leak from the sediments? Answer. They are subject to adsorption onto sediment, diffusion through intersti- tial water, possibly biological uptake if near enough to the surface and, once into the water column, to oceanic diffusion and advection. Question 13. Does NOAA plan to involve the public in their analysis program? Answer. Should it be determined that NOAA is to play a more active role in this analysis, full public participation at significant stages would be planned. It is noted that public participation has been provided for a draft EIS by DOE that includes discussion of the seabed option. Question 14. What research needs to be completed? What is the time frame for research programs? Answer. What is required is greater technical development of canister implanta- tion and retrieval techniques, knowledge on the effect of heat on sediment stability, knowledge on biological paths for nuclide migration, and some more data on nuclide adsorption. It is estimated by DOE that a demonstration project of seabed disposal could be inaugurated in ten years. Question 15. Under P.L. 95-2738, does NOAA need additional funding in order to improve its coordination of the Federal research effort regarding the sub-seabed emplacement option, Answer. There is no need for additional funding under P.L. 95-273 to coordinate the Hederal research effort. Funding is needed, to accelerate the research efforts required. Question 16. What should be NOAA’s role in seabed disposal of radioactive waste? Answer. The NOAA Science and Services Policy Group is considering the appro- priate role for NOAA In the investigation of ocean disposal of radioactive waste. NOAA could play a supportive role to the technology planned for this disposal method. NOAA has the expertise to investigate the physics and chemistry of nuclide migration in sediments and in the ocean; the biological uptake and migration of nuclides; and disposal site surveying, selection and monitoring. ee 17. Are other nations doing research on the sub-seabed emplacement option? Answer. European nations are concerned with possible ocean disposal of high- level radioactive waste, but their commitment to study of the sub-seabed option is not as strong, as that of the U.S. [Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair. ] conn etait viata tee terenstipoe si eoepee: -RI “ nese . 1 yi veep 4 ea ‘ 2 ‘ 3 p +e i mm ¥ a.04 f >- 8 des, YF Hyoie uttveavyS i > rey rRaie Btu a abt ts | ‘ - war - L ae EO y 4 svat : 7 ¥ 2 rencaes 3 Lezty¢ ‘ o OTIS : hi " > ' q a ‘ ese, orh4 “~ 2 ™ : IS SPOT ELIOR US. Sites LIRIAS ike ek base fete t f : i < ‘ ‘ td « » : 7) , wl} a airiks - « @s = ' § ; ve . < a : it cat ; i a : OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING ACTIVITIES OVERSIGHT TUESDAY, AUGUST 26, 1980 HOUusSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Gerry Studds presid- ing. Present: Representatives Studds, Hughes, Breaux, Wyatt, Pritchard, and Carney. Also Present: Richard Norling, Don Lippincott and Diane Hull, Subcommittee on Oceanography majority staff; Curt Marshall, Sub- committee on Oceanography minority staff; Wayne Smith, Subcom- mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife majority staff; and Dan Panshin, Subcommittee on Maritime Education. Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will come to order. The subcom- mittee meets today to receive testimony from two Government agencies concerning environmental problems associated with oil and gas drilling activities on the Outer Continental Shelf. Specifically, we have asked the Coast Guard to provide testimony concerning the present availability and capability of oil spill con- tainment and cleanup equipment and technological improvements mich might be expected in this equipment in the foreseeable uture. In part II of this hearing, we will receive testimony from the Environmental Protection Agency concerning its policy in granting discharge permits for materials used in, or incidental to, offshore drilling. Both agencies bear particularly heavy responsibilities as frontier areas in the North Atlantic and along the Alaskan coast are opened to oil and gas development. Both areas contain some of the most productive fishing grounds in the world which not only make a significant contribution to our economy and the world protein supply, but having been harvested continually by generations of American fishermen, now form an important part of our national heritage. Whether or not that heritage continues beyond this generation will, in no small part, be determined by how well these two agen- cies carry out their environmental mandates. Insofar as the Congress has provided those mandates through various pieces of legislation, it is the responsibility of the Congress to see that its wishes are heeded and that the resources provided are adequate to the task. (95) 96 I feel that today’s hearing is a proper response to fulfill the subcommittee’s responsibilities for environmental and technologi- cal matters concerning the oceans. Mr. Pritchard, do you have a statement? Mr. PRITCHARD. Yes; Mr. Chairman, I do. STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOEL PRITCHARD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM WASHINGTON STATE Mr. PritcHARD. Mr. Chairman, the most recent studies of our Nation’s future consumption and production of energy have had some promising signs. They indicate that domestic consumption of oil will most likely decrease by about 8 percent in 1990 over what it was in 1979. Unfortunately, domestic production of oil is expect- ed to drop by even higher rates during this period, requiring the importation of about 60 percent of our oil needs in the year 1990, as compared to roughly 45 percent today. These recent studies really do not tell us anything we have not known from other studies, however, they graphically demonstrate the need to accelerate the exploration for and development of our enormous domestic oil and gas resources. According to the Department of the Interior, the Federal Govern- ment owns 85 percent of our remaining oil, and 40 percent of our remaining natural gas with about 60 percent of our oil being located on the Outer Continental Shelf. We must take steps now to accelerate production of these re- sources, but we should not do so to the detriment of other consider- ations. By acting now, we have enough time to give proper consid- eration to all aspects of marine development. If we delay the pro- duction of oil and gas, and a crisis develops, history tells us that many safety and environmental protection programs may be sub- ject to a considerable backlash. For the American public and for the members of the committee who have worked long and hard for the safety and environmental programs that were too long ignored, this would indeed be a catastrophe. The safety and environmental record of the U.S. offshore oil and gas activities has been quite good. However, some questions remain to be answered. The 88-year history, as well as many studies, indicate that oil and gas operations have not detrimentally impact- ed commercial fisheries or other marine activities. What some of these studies have indicated, however, is that there are some ques- tions concerning long-term impacts of drilling mud sediments, under particular conditions and at certain concentrations. We must take every step possible within reason to assure that there is not economic displacement or irreversible harm from Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas activities that would eliminate other uses of our oceans and coastal areas. Public Law 95-372, the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, provides for these considerations which is evidenced by the fact that out of six court challenges to Outer Continental Shelf lease sales in 1979, none have been successful. There are 10 Federal departments and agencies involved in Outer Continental Shelf leasings, two of which are testifying before us today. 97 There is no evidence that the current Outer Continental Shelf leasing program has not and is not operating safely, but again some questions have been raised. In looking for answers to these questions, we must remember that no responsible scientist or researcher can or will claim they can prove anything conclusively, and a negative cannot be proven at all. We must always be willing to accept some level of risk as we explore and develop resources offshore. In light of this, and of our concern for the wise use of our coastal and ocean resources, I look forward to today’s witnesses. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Our first witness, on behalf of the Coast Guard, is Capt. Charles Corbett, Chief of Marine Environmental Response Division, U.S. Coast Guard. Captain Corbett, welcome. I believe we last met in Corpus Christi. STATEMENT OF CAPT. CHARLES CORBETT, CHIEF, MARINE EN- VIRONMENTAL DIVISION, U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY MIKE CHRISTENSEN Captain CorBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. At an earlier round of the ongoing saga of the Coast Guard oilspill cleanup capability. Captain CorBett. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, realizing the large amount of our time this morning might be spent on questions, I have cut my testimony down to a bare minimum. Since it is only four pages I plan to read the entire statement. Mr. Stupps. Go right ahead. Captain CorsBett. I am Capt. Charles Corbett, Chief, Environ- mental Response Division of the Coast Guard’s Office of Marine Environment and Systems. I am accompanied today by Mike Chris- tensen of my staff. Thank you for this opportunity to present the Coast Guard’s views concerning the state of technological develop- ment and availability of containment and cleanup equipment for drilling activities on the Outer Continental Shelf. Technological development of containment and recovery equip- ment has proceeded to the point where it is realistic to expect successful operation of open ocean recovery equipment in 8 to 10 foot seas and in winds of at least 20 knots. This is considered the current “state of the art” and is based on observations made of the Coast Guard’s open water oil containment and recovery system used on the IXTOC I oil spill at the Bay of Campeche well site. We do not expect significant technological advances in this area since our experience indicates that this may be the outer limit at which mechanical recovery of oil is possible. This rationale is based on the premise that break up of oil and dispersion takes place in about an 8- to 10-foot sea. We have an R. & D. effort underway to develop a computer model that will predict the breakup and disper- sion of floating oil slicks in rough seas. As a result of the Presidential Initiatives of 1977, the Secretary of Transportation has approved for planning purposes a 3-year project to locate open water containment and recovery systems at 11 high risk areas around the country. Equipment would be stock- piled and maintained at facilities with the objective of attaining a 98 nationwide, aggregate recovery capacity of 200 tons of oil per hour, that is, approximately 1,400 barrels per hour, conditions permit- ting. We now have some of the equipment at each of our strike teams locations which, as you know, are located at Elizabeth City, N.C., Hamilton AFB, Calif., and Bay St. Louis, Miss. As you are aware, it is the spiller’s responsibility to control, clean up, and mitigate damages if a spill should occur. A Memoran- dum of Understanding between the U.S. Coast Guard and US. Geological Survey presently under development will task the Coast Guard with review of those portions of exploration or development and production plans which address the adequacy of the required oilspill contingency plan, including the adequacy of response, cleanup equipment and procedures. It should be noted that pending finalization of the memorandum of understanding the Coast Guard and U.S. Geological Survey have an informal agreement imple- menting this mechanism for lease sale 42 on George’s Bank. The Coast Guard review will occur prior to approval for actual drilling. The guidelines under which we intend to conduct the review will call for oil containment and recovery equipment to be “state of the art” that is, capable of effective operation in 8- to 10-foot seas and in winds of at least 20 knots. Since the quantity of equipment that we would require of the OCS lease operators should be related to the spill threat, a recov- ery capacity of at least 1,000 barrels per day should be the mini- mum recovery rate acceptable. A time of 6 hours for initiating recovery operations with pre- stationed equipment is the target we have set. That is, whatever amounts of equipment that we require OCS lease operators have available for responding to spills should be fully deployed and in operation within 6 hours from the time the spill occurs, weather permitting. Where equipment is to be staged will be left to the operator, but he must demonstrate that the response target criteria can be met under all conditions under which the equipment is expected to be effectively operated. Within 48 hours after a spill, an operator would be expected to have any additional equipment on scene and in position to address a spill of extraordinary dimen- sions. _ We also believe that response exercises must take place at least semiannually. At least one of these semiannual exercises must be structured to test the response mechanism under the most demand- ing environmental conditions in which it is expected to be effective, again 8 to 10 foot seas. Vessels capable of deploying and operating the “state of the art” response equipment, in its maximum effective state, must also be available within the same response time parameters as used for response equipment. The crews of all candidate support vessels must be familiar with equipment deployment and operating tech- niques, or a system developed for supplying trained crews/supervi- sors to the involved vessels within the response time. In addition to oil recovery equipment, offshore operators will be required to main- tain equipment for applying dispersants and adequate stockpiles of dispersants, if these are not readily available from vendors. This requirement should not be interpreted as a preference on the part of Government for the use of dispersants. Instead, it recognizes 99 that spills may well occur in which the mechanical removal of oil is not possible due to environmental conditions or weather condi- tions. Under circumstances such as these, it is desirable that all options be available. The decisions to use dispersants would of course be made using the criteria and procedures set forth in annex X of the National Contingency Plan. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I must say quite candidly that I do not believe there now exists an in-place capability to respond to a major oil spill in the Outer Continental Shelf. However, the Coast Guard will continue to work closely with other Federal and State agencies as well as industry of course, to pursue development of adequate contingency planning for the OCS, with the reliability and the level of performance which we think desirable. I thank you and the committee members for inviting the Coast Guard to par- ticipate in these proceedings. I will be happy to address any ques- tions you, or the other members may have. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. One thing we have learned is that we should never have anyone above the rank of captain testify on the part of the Coast Guard, if we want to get at some of the facts in the matter. I remember your diplomatic—how do I phrase this—your efforts at the hearing in Corpus Christi to set the record as straight as you possibly could, given the claims of some people of higher rank in the Coast Guard about the capability of the equipment. Let me just say that I appreciate your testimony very much. I find this one of the more shocking pieces of testimony from the Coast Guard in recent years only because in my judgment it repre- sents a complete reversal in tone, and to a large degree in sub- stance, of what the Coast Guard is saying with respect to its capability to deal with an oil spill in the high seas on the Outer Continental Shelf. Members of this committee will recall that over the years whenever I or other members of the subcommittee have sort of pressed the Commandant, whoever he might be at the time, of the Coast Guard with respect to that capability, we have gotten, in response, a very definitive tone, with the Commandant suggest- ing over the years, again whichever Commandant it may have been at any given time, the Coast Guard was indeed far better prepared. The state of the art was indeed far better than the deprecatory tone of my question may have suggested. And whenever any of us here suggested that perhaps we were not equipped to deal with a major spill under routine, never mind adverse conditions in the Outer Continental Shelf. The implication was that over the years on this committee we were somehow being alarmist raising doubts. Now I think you have unequivocably, explicitly stated what it is that we feared. As you well know, your testimony tracts a letter by the Commandant of the Coast Guard to the acting chairman of this committtee dated July 16 of this year. Let me read you a couple of things and I now all I can do is ask for your opinion but I want the record to reflect very clearly what is happening here. The Presi- dent sent a message to the Congress immediately after the Argo Merchant disaster. The Argo Merchant precipitated, if nothing else, a great many speeches by people in high office in the land. The President sent a message on oil pollution dated March 17, 1977. The Argo Merchant sinking was a December 1976 disaster as I recall. In it the President said the following: 100 Improvement of Federal ability to respond to oil pollution emergencies. I have directed the appropriate Federal agency, particularly the Coast Guard, the Environ- mental Protection Agency, in cooperation with state and local governments to improve our ability to contain and minimize the damaging effects of oil spills. The goal is an ability to respond within 6 hours to a spill of 100,000 tons. Now let me read to you for the purposes of the record, I know you are familiar with it, from the letter Admiral Hayes sent on July 16 to Mr Ashley, acting chairman of the committee. I quote, “The national response goals established by the President March 17, 1977, oil pollution message are not being implemented by the Coast Guard, nor are we in the process of deploying high seas containment and cleanup equipment at 11 strategic sites around the United States to respond to an oil spill of 100,000 tons within 6 hours.” At the very least that is refreshingly clear language that we are not complying with the directive of the President. Why not? Captain Corpett. Mr. Chairman, I think first of all the key phrase in the language that you read which the Commandant wrote is relating to the 6-hour element. We are, in fact—we will be locating our equipment at the sites which we have said that we would. Let me just insert into the record a short statement that I have on this, if you please. Initial emphasis on implementing the Presidential initiatives has been improving response equipment and improving operations procedures. At the time of the Presi- dent’s message of March 17, 1977, on rising pollution of the ocean we had no equipment which would permit the recovery of oil in seas greater than 5 feet. Since that time we have modified 13 devices for oil containment at sea and developed techniques that would permit us to deploy these devices in up to approximately 10- foot seas. There are four complete systems including pumping in our inventory. We have presently a contract for more of these Gevices and expect to have 26 complete systems built by the fall of 1981. Mr. Stupps. The fall of 1981? Captain CorBeEtTr. Yes, sir. These are fully budgeted and we expect to have them. Mr. Stupps. That is 4% years after the President’s message? Captain CorBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. At the end of Admiral Hayes’ letter of last month which you tracked in your testimony almost verbatim, he states to Congressman Ashley, ‘Quite candidly I must say I do not believe there now exists an in-place capability to effectively respond to a major oil or hazardous substance spill on the OCS or fisheries conservation zone. It will take some time before the situation im- proves.” That is the end of the letter. Captain CorBETT. Yes. Mr. Stupps. You have a similar statement in your own testimo- ny. Captain Corsetrt. I will just remark extemporaneously on that. I think by the time we will get our 26 skimming barriers located around the country that the Coast Guard will be in a relatively good position to attend to or address an open water spill. However, the main thrust of our activities on the Outer Continental Shelf is not to provide Coast Guard equipment but to insist—and I really mean this quite seriously—to insist that the operators have the 101 contingency plans, the operating procedures, the equipment to fully respond within 6 hours to an oil spill on the OCS. Mr. Stupps. Let me ask one other thing here and then I want to go on to other members. You and other members for the Coast Guard spokesman and I have gone round and round again as to what is the state of the art at the moment in any given year. As I understand the first page of your testimony, you think we have reached what may be the ultimate state of the art and that is the capacity to recover spilled oil in 8- to 10-foot seas in winds of at least 20 knots. You say we do not expect significant technological advances in this area since our experience indicates this may be the outer limit at which mechanical recovery of oil is possible. Well if that is true, No. 1, that is certainly the first time to my recollection this committee has been told that that is as far as we are ever going to be able to go. You may or may not know I was in Massachusetts this last week, in the middle of the summer, in August, wind was out of the northeast on Georges Bank, for the better part of a week, the seas were running at 16 feet and the winds were steady 25 to 35 knots in the middle of the summer, a not too unusual situation. God knows what the situation will be in January, February, March. That is August. If I understand your testimony correctly you are telling us there is simply no way that we can or very possibly ever will be able to deal with a major oil spill out there under most conditions and most months of the year, is that correct? Captain CorBetT. Everything except your last phrase, Mr. Chair- man. I think the environmental impact statement indicates to us at least that we will be able to recover the oil with our equipment operating in 8- to 10-foot seas approximatley 90 percent of the time on Georges Bank. But you are quite right in the seas of 16 feet, winds 40 knots or above, there will be no oil spill recovery oper- ations out there. Not only would the equipment not be able to operate out there, it will most likely break, the people will break. We will have people breaking arms, falling over the side, so forth. So it is a people problem as well as a mechanical problem. Plus the oil will disperse not only across but through the water column and even if you could mount a recovery operation it would be grossly inefficient because the oil would be spread in so many different directions that you could not address it. You need a lot of fine equipment, you need a lot of oil to make it operate really well. You need to become engaged with oil. If it disperses across the water or into the water column then your equipment really is not useful. Mr. Stupps. Your people-breaking problem occurs, I assume, on whatever vessel it is that carries your cleanup equipment, not the Coast Guard cutter. Captain CorBeEtT. Right. Mr. Srupps. In other words if they are out there under fairly cant conditions and a storm suddenly comes up they are in trou- e? Captain Corsett. I do not think they are in trouble as far as risking their lives, because we could get the vessels in. They would not remain out there. The vessels which are used for these kinds of operations are relatively small. People get seasick in that kind of 102 weather. The fumes—I know Mr. Wyatt will remember when we flew over the IXTOC spill. Mr. Stupps. He did not really get seasick. Mr. Wyatt. I was in an airplane. Captain CorBetTt. He will recall the fumes which we experienced at 500 feet were very noxious. This kind of thing is a people problem. This is another reason why we are talking about 8- to 10- foot seas. I really believe we can operate in that range. I also believe it will be a long time, if ever, as you suggest, that we will be able to operate in anything, say above 12-foot seas. Mr. Stupps. Right, and what you are saying to me is that during substantial segments of the year, and in fact during intervals even in summer under normal conditions we would not be able to deal with the spill on the Georges Bank or Gulf of Alaska or presum- ably other areas. Captain CorseEtt. I did not say that. I said on the Georges Bank the environmental impact statement indicates we can operate about 10 percent of the time. Mr. Stupps. I think you meant—— Captain CorBetr. Ninety percent of the time. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Whoever wrote the environmental impact statement concluded only 10 percent of the time do the waves go over 10 feet on Georges Bank, is that right? Captain CorBett. That is right. Mr. Stupps. The person probably could not find it on the map. I suggest if they can stand repetitive things and they work in Wash- ington which they probably do or they would not have written a statement like that, if they would turn on NOAA’s weather condi- tions radio reports and leave it on for a few days any given month in Georges Bank, they might revise their environmental impact statement. Mr. Pritchard. Mr. PriTcHARD. Tell me how much have we learned in the last couple of years from more recent oil spills since we had our prob- lem up in the Georges Bank area? Captain CorBetTT. We learned a great deal at the IXTOC 1 oil site in this matter of open water recovery. In fact we had scheduled an exercise, I think it was just a few months ahead of the time when the IXTOC 1 occurred, which was canceled because of IXTOC. We were eventually invited down to that site by Mexico to recover oil. We were quite delighted with the recovery efforts. We had some setbacks as well. I would like to read you some extracts, Mr. Pritchard, of some of the operational messages which were received from our man on the scene, Lt. Com. Jim O’Brian. Before I do that I would like to tell you a little bit about Jim. He is a Texas boy who grew up in Texas, he really has no ax to grind with anybody, he just reports the facts as they are. He is not in the business of selling equipment or anything of the sort. But he is very reliable at reporting facts as they are and really knows his business. On the 10th of August he reports: Failure of mooring points on initial pump sled during heavy seas prevented the establishment of the recovery system. Launched second sled and will utilize an improvised mooring design. Expect recovery/pumping ops to commence P.M. 10 August. 103 Containment barrier is working well. Operating in eight foot seas, 35 KT winds. Little entrainment and splash observed. 14 August 1979: Recovery rate, 265-300 GPM. Good slick inside barrier-4in.-4.5 in. deep. In other words the barrier is containing oil. Barrier continues outstanding performance containing oil in up to 12 foot seas. Oil has Specific Gravity of 0.92. This tends to slow down skimming rate in late afternoon. On scene WX generally constant, wind F/20KIS, seas E/3-12 ft. with subsiding of winds and seas during each 24 hour period for approx. 6 hours. 17 August 1979: Small storm center went through area two nights ago with 40KT winds. Five ton moorings were insufficient to hold system. Suction hoses torn loose from barrier, experience minor problems with other couplings. All damages re- paired, system on line yesterday utilizing twelve ton moorings. Estimate max 4,000 brls daily recovery on good day. Exercising pumping rate slow due to six hundred foot run from pumps to discharge point. Otherwise system working well. That is poorly phrased. What it means is that they had a signifi- cant head. The surfaces for example inside the hydraulic hoses were slowing them down. Barrier presently containing ten inches of product buildup with no entrainment or splash. This was quite significant for us, we were delighted. 20 August 1979: 19 August 79 estimate skimming barrier pumped 6,600 barrels. Storm center crossed area late 19 early 20 Aug. 40-50 KT winds, 12 ft. seas. Recovery barge taking on water, in danger of sinking. All efforts directed at saving barge. A barge provided by Mexico, by the way. 21 August 1979: Holding barge stabilized and pumping operations resumed at 1500 local 20 Aug 79. One prime mover remains inop due to salt water ingestion. Flushed with diesel and oil. Other prime mover manifold welded by support vessel and now operating normally. Pumping rate estimated at 5000 bbls average/day, with maximum of 400 to 450 GPM and minimum 250 to 300 GPM. Differences occur primarily in afternoon when prevailing wind shifts and product level decreases at barrier. 27 August 1979: One barrier parted during tropical disturbance. Appears vessel ran over it. OIC states repairs being made and anticipated no problem being on line when Pemex gives go ahead to commence pumping. 31 August 1979: NR two skimming barrier casrep due to collision with vessel. Presently in three sections. Skimming struts torn up, main tension line parted and suffered extensive fraying. Some flotation bags ripped or pulled off. Two outboard sections attached to NR one barrier as deflection barrier. Permanent repairs must await return conus. That is about it. This kind of testimony I am inserting is to demonstrate a couple of things. No. 1, our barrier works well but it requires innovation. It requires kind of stout-hearted guys to be down there and stick with the job. But we think that we are improving it all the time, learning more about it all the time and we really think it will work in 8- to 10-foot seas. There are times, such as the Burma Agate incident off Texas, when it did not work well at all. We were not able to moor the system as we were at Campeche. It was necessary to use vessels to move it around. We had winds that were contrary to the current. We had not nearly so much oil as we had at Campeche. We had a hell of a big fire on our hands. So we did not find it worked so well at that particular time. We are continuing exercises on a regular basis to improve our methods of deploying this boom. So I think your question was what 104 is the most significant thing we have learned. I think it was down there at the Bay of Campeche. Mr. PRITCHARD. Let me ask one other thing here. What kind of a response can you make today in the case of an oil spill in the Puget Sound area? Do you have this equipment—do you have just one skimmer or do you have a series of these things? How quickly can they be brought to the scene and what kind of skilled operators and ability do you have, say, in an area like the Straits of Juan de Fuca or Puget Sound? Captain CorBeTr. The equipment for a spill in that area would come from our Pacific strike team at Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif. It is ready to go if it is not being used some place else. It is air transportable by C-130 aircraft. I do not know the airport at which it would arrive. That element of the response time, and the people to accompany it, would be very quick and very effective, then the problem is getting it to the actual site of the spill. And also the weather. Mr. PRITCHARD. I understand the weather, I just wonder what your capacity as far as—what is your strike team; does it involve 6 or 25 people? Captain CorBett. Strike teams average about 25 people. I really could almost assure you that they—again weather affects airplanes being able to take off—but 4 or 5 hours up to your area, getting into the Seattle area, then ready to press on by truck or water- borne vehicle if the weather is OK to do so. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Breaux. Mr. Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Captain. I would also like to commend you publicly for the work that the Coast Guard did with the chemical spill that occurred in the Mis- sissippi River. Your obligation I guess has the supervisory jurisdic- tion over chemical spills in the navigable waters. Let me discuss maybe a slightly different question first. Your moneys for cleanup operations come out of what fund? Captain CorBett. 311K fund, established by the Clean Water Act. That is, providing it is necessary. We naturally hope that the discharger will pick up the bills. But if he does not we will certain- ly use the 311K fund. Mr. Breaux. Section 311 of the Clean Water Act provided the funds we used to clean up the IXTOC oil spill. Captain CorBetr. That portion of the spill that reached the Texas coast, yes, sir. Mr. Breaux. How much of the moneys do you have left in the fund at this point approximately? 2 aie CorBETT. Right now there is about $18 million in the und. Mr. Breaux. $18 million. The authorization and appropriation levels are what? Captain CorBEtT. $35 million. Mr. Breaux. And the appropriations were what, $35 million? Captain CorBeTr. We were never appropriated $35 million. It started out at $20 million and it is a revolving fund. So we have received moneys back from dischargers, moneys back from penal- ties and a number of supplemental appropriations. I did not come 105 prepared to detail those but it has been a continuing battle, it has reached very low levels at times. Mr. BrEAux. In general the Coast Guard will use those funds to clean up an oil or chemical spill. Then would the Government have an obligation to proceed against the person who actually caused the spill, to recover those funds? Captain CorBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. Breaux. And our Government does do that? Captain CorBETT. Yes. Mr. BREAvux. I am interested—— Captain CorBETT. You are speaking about domestic oilspills. Mr. BrEAux. Sure. You cannot use those funds to go clean up spills outside our territorial waters. Captain CorBeEtT. Yes, we can if it is a threat. Mr. Breaux. It has to be a threat. Say it is somewhere off the North Atlantic moving to some other country’s shoreline you would not be able to use it for that purpose? Captain CorBett. If in the opinion of the predesignated on-scene coordinator it poses a threat to our shoreline or waters then he could access the funds. We would not—we would let him make that judgment. But if it is headed some place else, I think the answer would be no. Mr. Breaux. OK. On page 1 you said that given the technological development of the recovery and containment equipment it is real- istic to expect they will be successful in seas up to 8 or 10 feet and winds of 20 knots. Then you continue to say the rationale is based on the premise that the breakup and dispersion of oil takes place in aout 8 to 10 feet seas. Is dispersion of and breakup of oil good or bad? Captain CorsBett. It depends. Dispersion down through the water column can be quite harmful to aquatic life. Though I am not a biologist. But if the oil is say, take the Argo Merchant where the oil was being spread out and forced to seaward, then I expect that the average layman on the coast of Massachusetts would say that was good, rather than having it coming into the Massachusetts shore- line in bulk. Sometimes when we disperse oil we do it intentional- ly. That is not necessarily good. It might save an amenity beach but it might kill a fish or two, so there are decisions which have to Be made by our on-scene coordinator as guided by the EPA and the tate. Mr. Breaux. Do you know if the reports are finalized on the effect of the IXTOC spill as far as the biology? Captain Corsetr. No. That is a NOAA responsibility. As you know they met some problem with funding. But I do not know the progress that they have made. Mr. Breaux. What about the obligation of an operator as far as a cleanup of a spill or containment of a spill, is it not their first obligation to proceed with cleanup and containment exercises? Captain CorRBETT. Yes, sir, it is. Mr. Breaux. And what role does the Coast Guard play? Is it a supervisory role to insure that they in fact have equipment and manpower to carry out the operation? Captain CorsBeEtT. Yes. The first role is exactly what you say, to be sure that they have the necessary equipment to remove the oil, 106 the personnel are well trained, they are exercised and in general they have a contingency plan and the wherewithal to address an oilspill on the OCS. Now although the law says that the discharger will address that spill, if he cannot do so or will not do so or is not doing it the way we think he should then we will declare a Federal response utilizing the 311 fund, commercial cleanup contractors in addition to our own equipment to address the spill. Mr. Breaux. What can you tell the committee about the efforts by operators, by industry, I guess, with regard to having equipment and the plan in place to address a potential spill? Captain CorsBetr. I can address that question for the Georges Bank because that has been getting most of my attention recently as far as that is concerned. The operators have placed on retainer, as we understand, it a group which is to develop their contingency plan and to develop the wherewithal, identify the equipment, Mr. Chairman, to respond to an oilspill on the Georges Bank utilizing the criteria which we have established and which I described in my testimony. As of yesterday, we have not received such a contingency plan. It is my personal view that it is within the wherewithal of that organiza- tion to develop it yet we still have not received it. I do not know why. If there are any doubts in anyone’s mind that we intend to give it a very close look just because we receive it late—if it is delivered late we are not going to rush through it for that reason, we are going to give it our most deliberate attention. Mr. Breaux. What about in areas other than Georges Bank, where we have had leasing for years? What about the most recent period of time, does industry have contingency plans in place, with equipment and manpower? Captain CorBetr. The OCS orders themselves require the contin- gency plan, the equipment, personnel, training, that sort of thing. Quite frankly in other areas the Coast Guard and Department of the Interior have not gotten as close together as we have on the Georges Bank situation. However, we do have regional response teams; the Coast Guard chairs those teams in the coastal regions and Interior is a member of those teams. But we have not had agreement with Interior where we would very specifically review those contingency plans although they are required, and I am sure Interior has reviewed them. Mr. Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Carney. Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just concerned about the utilization of dispersants. I know that is probably not your responsibility to make that determination, but I was wonder- ing do you have available studies on the use of it as opposed to containing the spills? Captain CorBett. We do have quite a large responsibility as far as the necessary studies the Environmental Protection Agency has the responsibility for studying the dispersant issue and has done so for a number of years. It has approved a number of dispersants. May I explain Annex 10 briefly of the National Contingency Plan. The predesignated on-scene coordinator has the authorization to use dispersants if he feels that there is a significant threat to life or property of say a gasoline spill, a light oil spill. He has the 107 authority to go ahead and move in on that right away. Outside of that the authorization is required of the regional response team member from the Environmental Protection Agency after he has consulted with the appropriate State. Then only if an important species is endangered or if the overall impact of the spill will be reduced by the use of dispersants. I might say historically in this country the use of dispersants has been quite conservative. I think that has been good. I think that as dispersants are becoming less toxic, and they are, our attitude toward them is changing some- what. I think this is a good change. I do not think it is going to change quickly however. But we are looking at things such as the pre-identification of certain areas in certain times of the years at certain temperatures where an on-scene coordinator might use dis- persants without referral to the RRT. One of the most important things about them is they must be used quickly, while the oil is fresh, before it emulsifies. So these decisions have to be made quickly because if you do not make them quicky you are out there applying dispersants not very effectively. So we are looking at ways we can make these decisions more quickly and effectively. Mr. Carney. I have to admire you Captain, you answered about four of the questions I was going to ask in that one answer. One thing, would I be correct in summarizing what you have said by saying that the Coast Guard is continually making new SOP’s as to the use of dispersants as more information is available to them and as the art and scientific reports as to their adverse effects are available to you? Captain CorBeTr. That is generally right, except it would be more accurate to say the regional response team, and the Coast Guard and EPA are on those teams, cochair those teams, are making those efforts, rather than the Coast Guard. EPA really has the overall responsibility for the policy on the issue of dispersants. Mr. Carney. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Hughes. Mr. HuGcues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Captain, for your testimony. I am a little concerned over your statement in response to earlier questions that you have not been as close, the Coast Guard has not been as close in following contingency plans in other areas of the OCS other than Georges Bank. What is the state of the siting or prepositioning of equipment and of contingen- cy plans generally in the Baltimore Canyon area? Captain Corsett. I do not know. I would be glad to respond to that for the record if you like. It is no doubt in the contingency plan which the industry has submitted to Interior. We can obtain it from Interior and provide it to you. Mr. HuGues. I would appreciate your furnishing it. It gives me great concern. Here we are, we have sunk about, I guess, between 13 and 15 test wells in the Baltimore Canyon. Exxon just recently announced they are going to sink another delimiting well in the Baltimore Canyon. It would appear from your testimony that we have not paid too much attention to contingency plans in that area. That gives me great concern in view of the fact it would appear likely that we are going to find commercially extractable quantities of at least natural gas in that region of the OCS. 69-848 0 - 81 - 8 108 Captain CorBeETtT. Let me just say that we intend to extend this memorandum of understanding with Interior to other areas of the OCS, including the Baltimore Canyon. That is no excuse for not having done it in the first place, I do not mean to imply it is. There are a number of cleanup activities around the Philadelphia area. | They are quite capable in that vicinity, I know that. But where they are located I really could not tell you. Mr. HuGues. Why would the Coast Guard be focusing attention on Georges Bank where OCS exploration is just underway and not be focusing attention on those areas that have seen quite a bit of OCS activity? Captain CorBett. I will be very direct, Mr. Hughes, the squeak- ing wheel syndrome really applies here. They are getting the oil right now and they have the Georges Bank which is a vast fishing ground. Mr. HuGues. I recognize the chairman of this committee is from the Georges Bank area and I am sure he has not been doing any squeaking. Let me just move on to something else. If you will respond to my concern in writing I would appreciate it. You indicate in your testimony that by the fall of 1981, 26 systems, I assume you are talking about pumping and other sys- tems, will be prepositioned around the country, that is, will be in place. How many systems exist presently. Captain CorBETT. We have 13 of the skimmers, but we only have 4 of those fully equipped with the pumping arrays. It does not mean they cannot be used in concert with some of the other equipment, both we and industry have the wherewithal to remove the oil once it is collected. But these pumping arrays were adjusted as far as their physical makeup because of some of the things we learned at the IXTOC spill. We are moving right along on getting that equipment. Not only will it be available by the fall of 1981, they are going to be coming in in bits and pieces. So our capability will start to improve soon. Mr. Hucues. So you have four complete systems, is that what you are saying? Captain CorBett. Right. Mr. HuGues. How rapidly are we bringing on line new systems? Captain CorBetr. The barriers are coming along at the rate of about one every 2 weeks right now. The pumping arrays are going to be a little bit slower because of some of these adjustments we found necessary to make resulting from our experience at Campeche. Mr. HuaGues. Are these systems owned by the Coast Guard? Captain CorBETT. Yes; they are. Mr. Huaues. You indicate there are ultimately to be 11 sites that will have equipment prepositioned. How many sites presently have any prepositioned equipment? Captain CorBeTr. Three, at our strike teams in Hamilton Air Force Base and Bay St. Louis, Miss. and Elizabeth City N.C. Mr. HuGues. What if anything is located at the prospective Philadelphia site or is that just a site in name at the present time? Captain CorBeTr. Well, it is a site in name only except that Philadelphia, you know, has historically had a lot of pollution- 109 related incidents. Industry is quite active there. I cannot be specific. Mr. HuGues. Much of that is not related to spills. Captain CorBetT.The Member Information Network The indus- try is quite active there. We really have felt like the cleanup industry in Philadelphia has been adequate to the cleanup of spills in aa area. But that is not to say that they are adequate to the OCS. Mr. HuaGues. You indicate and the President has indicated by Executive order that he wants a 6-hour response time to a 100,000- ton spill. What is our present capability? If we had a spill in the Baltimore Canyon, how long would it take the Coast Guard to respond? Captain CorBETT. How long would it take to deliver this kind of equipment we are talking about? Mr. Hucues. From wherever you have to bring the equipment from, like Elizabeth City. Captain CorBeTT. The same answer I gave to Mr. Pritchard earlier. To get it to the Philadelphia, or the nearest airport, Cape May, whatever, providing our airplanes can fly in the kind of weather which is occurring, very quickly, 4 to 6 hours. I do not see any problem there at all. The equipment is on pallets on trailers, put it in an airplane and off it goes. But it is when they reach that site, there is the problem. There is the problem of weather. I think in the Baltimore Canyon, if the weather was good, because the drilling activity is occurring and there are support vessels of the drilling industry’s types in the vicinity, getting it out probably would not be a serious problem. But if the weather is above 10, 12 feet it is not going to get out there, that is all there is to it. But to get it to the general area, we can move very quickly. I am quite confident of that. Mr. Huaues. Is there any OCS activity at all in the immediate vicinity of Elizabeth, N.C.? Captain CorsBett. I do not believe so, but I would defer to Interi- or on that. I am not aware of any. Mr. HuGcues. Why is the equipment prepositioned at Elizabeth City when most of the OCS activity is taking place north of that area? Captain CorBETT. When the Coast Guard—— Mr. Huaues. In Baltimore Canyon. Captain CorBeTT. When the Coast Guard first became involved with oil spill response, our philosophy was and I think it was correct at that time—we did not have a lot of equipment, people all over the country, at least who could respond to big oil spills. So the philosophy was to locate the equipment and the people at locations around the country and respond by aircraft. Since that time our philosophy has changed somewhat. OCS drilling activity is occur- ring. Transportation corridors have perhaps changed. We now feel like it is a more sensible idea to stage the equipment around the country than to place them at the three locations we now have. Mr. HuGues. Have you looked at possibly relocating some of that equipment that you have now to places where they have activity? Captain CorBeEtT. No; the 26 barriers and complete systems about which I am talking—I say with some confidence we have it about 110 in our hands, it is fully budgeted and we expect to get it. That equipment will go to these places. Mr. HuGueEs. I would hope equipment is located in those areas that are experiencing accelerated activity. Captain CorBeEtTtT. This is why these 11 sites have been identified, because of the activities which they are experiencing, not necessar- ily, however, OCS activity, because again we intend to insure at least starting with the George’s Bank, following on with the Balti- more Canyon and others, that the industry has the equipment themselves to clean up their oil spill. Mr. HuGues. You have it just reversed, the Baltimore Canyon is well under way, we have been exploring in the Baltimore Canyon for the better part of 3 years. We are now sinking delimiting wells. We should not wait until we begin producing before we develop the capability of responding as quickly as possible to a spill. As I understand it, the spills occur usually do not occur during the exploration process but during production and other processes. Ex- ploration as I understand it is a relatively safe, low risk, operation generally. Captain Corsett. I fully understand your point, Mr. Hughes. I suspect that the Department of Interior has been quite thorough in review of the plans submitted to it by the drilling operators in the Baltimore Canyon. But we, the Coast Guard, have not yet become involved in the review of those plans. That is a fact. Mr. HuGues. I am also concerned about your testimony that we seem to be at the outer limits, which is entirely conceivable, in that our present capability or, state of the art is 8- to 10-foot seas and 20-knot winds. Each year for the last several years this com- mittee has increased the authorization for research and develop- ment by about $25 million. The same thing RAS occured for fiscal year 1981. Do you know offhand how much of the research and development money in the fiscal year 1980 budget has been spent by the Coast Guard? Captain CorBeEtTT. No, sir, I do not. Mr. HuGues. Would you get that information for me? Captain CorBeEtTT. Yes; I can. Mr. HuGueEs. Would you also provide for the committee the type of projects that are underway in R. & D. Projects that you think will be funded for fiscal year 1981, so we know how much really is being spent on R. & D. and on what. Captain Corset. Are you talking about pollution response now? Mr. HUGHES. Yes. Captain CorBETT. Yes, sir, I would. Mr. HuGues. Thank you very much. In spite of my questions I think the Coast Guard does an absolutely great job, not just in this area of responsibility, but also with other functions such as air and sea rescue, aids to navigation, tanker safety, and in so many other areas that affect us along the coast. Thank you very much. Mr. Stupps. They do a particularly good job in responding to your questions. Did it occur to anyone that exploratory drilling is so safe because 9 out of 10 of those holes are dry. Mr. Wyatt. Mr. Wyatt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain Corbett, how many oilspills have there been in the last year? Captain CorBeEtT. Talking about spills of the—— 111 Mr. Wyatt. On the OCS. Captain Corset. On the OCS. Well as far as OCS activities, I do not recall any that are of a serious magnitude. We have had some shipping accidents. The Mexican blowout which I assume you are excluding. Mr. Wyatt. Let us start with Campeche, after that how many times has the Coast Guard responded to a spill on the OCS, due to drilling wells completed or blowing out? Captain Corset. I do not recall any at all except just a few days ago, Texaco-North Dakota did hit an inactive rig in the gulf but did not result in a spill of any magnitude. So to the best of my knowledge it is none. Mr. Wyatt. You have not been called upon in the last year since Campeche to respond to a spill? Captain CorsBett. Not resulting from OCS activites, right. Mr. Wyatt. Before that, would you tell me how many times you have been called upon to respond to a spill before Campeche? Captain CorBetTT. Well, I, myself, none. There have been some. I would be glad to give you a list of those say over the last 3 or 4 years if you like. There have been some. There have been some rigs which were damaged either through blowouts or whatever. Most of the activity took place as a result of the people problem, rescuing the people. I do know of one spill several years ago, quite a large magnitude, but I was not personally involved and do not even recall the name of it. Mr. Wyatt. Where was that? Captain CorBETT. That was in the gulf. Mr. Wyatt. How many years ago? Captain CorBettT. Well, I do not know, but I remember some of the incidents or some of the words revolving around the reports but I cannot be specific at all. Then there was Santa Barbara on the west coast, way back in 1969. Mr. Wyatt. In your memory there have been two? Captain CorBetTT. That is right, two major ones. I am sure that there are a number of small spills that occur from daily operating procedures at the activities. I would not want to be held down to two. Let me put it this way if you want to try to get it in perspec- tive. When you compare it with shipping accidents, when I think of an oilspill I think of ships or large dischargers from large facilities ashore. Generally speaking, I think that the oil industry has done a very good job of protecting us from damage to the environment from oilspills. Mr. Wyatt. The Coast Guard does not do—you do not do a study of the damage done, that is not your responsibility, is that correct? Captain CorBETT. That is correct, yes. Mr. Wyatt. Whose responsibility is that? Captain CorsBett. In the OCS or in the coastal areas of the country, NOAA has that responsibility; EPA in the inland regions. Mr. Wyatt. NOAA has responsibilities in the Outer Continental Shelf, bays and estuaries? Captain CoRBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. Wyatt. EPA has it in the inland areas? Captain CoRBETT. Yes. 112 Mr. Wyatt. You said earlier and I did not quite understand that you were having some difficulty in working with Interior, maybe difficulty would not be the correct word. Captain CorBEtTT. That is not correct. Maybe you would rephrase it. I did not say that at all. I said that in the earlier OCS activity the Coast Guard did not become involved in review of the contin- gency plans. Whose fault that is might be in part the Coast Guard’s fault for all I know. But as we started to see the activity on Georges Bank and the intense environmental concern, then we did become more involved with Interior and are assisting them in their review of the contingency plans. That will be extended to other areas as well. Mr. Wyatt. Is there some geological structure of Georges Bank that is different from that in the Gulf of Mexico or Baltimore Canyon that creates the environmental concern there? Is there a higher susceptability to blowout; is there as I said a unique geologi- cal structure in the Georges Bank? You know, we in Texas often- times—I think, fish very near to oil wells. If we can find a well, we go there and fish. So does everyone else. I think the same thing is true in Louisiana. Is there a big difference between up there and in the gulf? Captain CorBETT. I have not the slightest idea Mr. Wyatt. But there is a difference in the attitude I think of the people around Texas and Louisiana. Oil has been king for a long time as you well know. Coming from Oklahoma, I came from that part of the coun- try myself. But it is not so up around the Northeastern part of the country, perhaps. Mr. Wyatt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. I am going to answer your question myself. Mr. Hughes pointed out that traditional treatment for squeaky wheels, lubrication with oil. With regard to the dramatic revision down- ward of the goal in terms of cleanup capability —— Captain CorBett. Would you repeat that. Mr. Stupps. With regard to the dramatic downward revison of the Nation’s goal in terms of cleanup capability, in the March 1977 letter the President stated the “goal is an ability to respond within 6 hours to a spill of 100,000 tons;” 3 years later the Commandant of the Coast Guard says that our objective is a nationwide aggregate oil recovery capacity of 200 tons of oil per hour, conditions permit- ting. I cannot even calculate what percentage that is, but it is not much, compared to what the President said 3 years ago. Instead of 100,000 tons within 6 hours it is now an aggregate nationwide capacity of 200 tons per hour, conditions permitting. What hap- pened? Captain CorBett. What happened is that we are having to com- pete with resources of the government, and we looked at it very carefully. We determined that we could respond with nearly the same capability by reducing the numbers of locations by only a few and reducing the number of men from nearly 330-some to 20-some, and provide only slightly less, what in our view is only slightly less response capability. If you like, I would respond to that question more fully in writing. Mr. Stupps. I would. Because I do not think the reduction from 100,000 to 200 is slight. Do you? 113 Captain CorBeEtTT. We are not sure that one is not a rate and one is a total spill size. Mr. Stupps. I see. OK. Let us get that because on the face of it, it appears to be dramatic. _ Captain CorBett. I would like to respond to it in writing. Mr. Stupps. OK. I think the record in general will be held open for questions. You have talked in response to questions of other members about the mandate for the prepositioning of cleanup equipment in regions of OCS activity around the country. That is equipment which the Coast Guard will require to be prepositioned; is that correct? Captain CorBett. That is correct, purchased and owned by the operators or their agents. Mr. Stupps. Now is that a prior condition or one of many prior conditions, for example, for a final permit for exploratory drilling? Captain CorBEtTT. That is the intent. Interior grants the final permit, not the Coast Guard. But the intent is exactly that, that before the permit is granted, the equipment will be in place, the contingency plans approved, as approved by the Coast Guard, or I should say as recommended to Interior by the Coast Guard. So Interior has the final authority to grant the permit. But we are hoping and feel that Interior will rely heavily on the Coast Guard’s expertise in this field. Mr. Stupps. But Interior under the law has the authority to go ahead with or without the approval of the Coast Guard; is that correct? Captain CorBETT. Under the law, yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. Has that ever happened, have your recommenda- tions been ignored by Interior yet? Captain CorBett. No, sir. Mr. Stupps. You have no reason to think they would be, I assume? Captain CorBetT. No, sir. Mr. Stupps. With respect to the prepositioning requirements, they would be in any OCS region, generally defined the mid-Atlan- tic, Georges Bank, Gulf of Alaska, rather than for any particular company’s lease? Captain CorBett. Probably. It depends on the situation. For in- stance, on lease sale 42 it is by lease. As long as the 6-hour response capability is met, then it does not matter to us where they are sited. The equipment could be sited on the rigs themselves or on some of the vessels which support the rigs nearby ashore, or perhaps on some of the even fairly distant, I would not say remote, as long as they can demonstrate to our review process they can be there within 6 hours, then that is considered adequate. Mr. Stupps. Have you had such plans submitted with respect to lease sale 42? Captain CorsBett. No, sir, but we are hoping it will be fairly soon. We are watching that very closely as a matter of fact. But the plan itself has not yet been submitted to us. Mr. Stupps. Now the 11 sites of which only three are equipped at the moment around the country, these are Coast Guard sites as opposed to industry sites? Captain CorBeEtTT. That is right. 114 Mr. Stupps. What is the timetable at the moment for the deploy- ment of the remaining eight sites? Captain CorBETT. Over a 3-year period, 1984 is the last year in which the sites will be fully operational. We will have some equip- ment at each one of the sites as time goes by, but it will take about 3 years to get the thing fully in place. Mr. Stupps. No wonder Presidents are frustrated. Even if this President—without comment—were to be reelected, a directive which he issued in the first year of his first term will not be completely fulfilled in the year in which he leaves office at the end of his second term, that is incredible. Maybe you are not prepared to answer this, but has the Congress been stingy, or OMB, or what happened? When a President gives a directive—announces with great fanfare to the Nation that we are going to have eight sites, how come we now say that maybe 7 or 8 years after that directive we can get to the eight sites. It is not a very big item in terms of overall dollars. Captain CorBeTt. You are right, I would not be prepared to respond to that. Mr. Stupps. Yes. That is an awkward fall for all of us, is it not? Am I correct in my understanding that Clean Atlantic Asso- ciates, which is an industry group, has already positioned cleanup equipment in Davisville, R.I.? Captain CorBEtTT. I understand that, but I do not have that on good authority. Mr. Stupps. That has not been reported to you yet? Captain CorBetr. Frankly it would not be reported to me, it would be reported to our predesignated on-scene coordinator in Boston. He will make these decisions. Mr. Stupps. Admiral Hayes in testimony earlier this year before the Coast Guard Subcommittee of this committee, Chairman Biaggi pointed out: The most significant reduction in any particular category of the Coast Guard’s fiscal 1981 budget request was made at the OST level. In the operating expense category of maritime environmental protection in the amount of $23 million. What does this significant budget reduction represent? Will it hamper the Coast Guard’s ability to adequately respond to spills of oil or hazardous substances? Admiral Hayes’ answer was— It will not permit us significantly to improve our ability to respond to oil spills. It will also require that we redirect our efforts away from other areas of marine environmental protection when necessary to cope with the increasing demand cre- ated by hazardous chemical emergencies, particularly abandoned hazardous waste sites. Has it indeed been necessary to redirect efforts and resources away from the areas we have been talking about? Captain Corsett. I think in the area of hazardous wastes and chemicals as Admiral Hayes pointed out we would like to be able to train ourselves better to more adequately respond to those inci- dents I would agree. Mr. Stupps. But my question was, In order to do that, have we had to redirect efforts and resources away from the kinds of prob- lems we have been talking about this morning? Captain CorBetTt. Not significantly, but to some level, yes. Mr. Stupps. How significantly? 115 Captain CorBett. There I would ask to respond in writing. We are talking about dollars and cents now. Mr. Stupps. All right. Mr. Pritchard. Mr. PRITCHARD. No more questions. Mr. Stupps. Thank you Captain. I do not know whether you want to add generalization in response to my opening generaliza- tion. I have to commend you for being as straight forward and explicit and frank in its caviats about the modesty of our capabili- ty. I think that is to the good. We need to know. No problem is going to be solved by pretending it does not exist or less severe than in fact it is. Mr. Wyatt is gone, but it is obvious what he was trying to get you to say. Even if you are from Oklahoma, I appreci- ate the calmness of your response. He did not ask you prior to the incident in Chicago when the last DC-10 crash was. These are the kinds of things that mandate prudent people to proceed with ex- treme caution sometimes, given the magnitude of the resources at risk. Is there anything else you would like to add? I appreciate your own patience, and testimony in putting up with all the mem- bers of this committee including me. Captain CorsBetTT. No, sir. Only I have known Mr. Wyatt for sometime and I am sorry I had to disappoint him. Mr. Stupps. You were at that hearing in Corpus Christi where his own fishermen were saying the most unkind things about the oil industry. Captain CorBeEtTT. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I have enjoyed it. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. Now we have the Environmental Protec- tion Agency. R. Sarah Compton, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water Enforcement, Environmental Protection Agency. STATEMENT OF R. SARAH COMPTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT AD- MINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRON- MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Ms. Compton. Good morning. Mr. Stupps. Good morning. 2 ee aren: Did you want to make another statement before I egin? Mr. Stupps. I will do my best to refrain from making any state- ments until you have completed your testimony. I notice you have about 11 pages, feel free if you wish to summarize it, however you Wane to proceed. In any event it will appear in its entirety in the record. Ms. Compton. Thank you. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the authorities and responsibilities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate effluent discharges associated with offshore oil and gas exploration and production on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Dr. Suzanne Bolton, a marine biologist in our Ocean Programs Office is here with me today. As I will discuss in more detail later, EPA regulates these pollutants from OCS facilities pursuant to the Clean Water Act’s national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit program. This NPDES permit program is an important mechanism for insuring that the effluents associated with offshore oil and gas operations are discharged in an environmentally sound manner. However, just 116 as it is EPA’s responsibility to independently determine appropri- ate environmental limitations, it is also EPA’s responsibility to insure that NPDES permits for offshore oil and gas facilities are issued without unnecessary delays and in coordination with other Federal agencies having responsibilities on the OCS. Thus, EPA is committed to an OCS permitting policy and process which: (1) insures that NPDES permit limitations are established which will provide adequate protection of the marine environment; (2) Develops necessary permit limitation at the earliest possible stage in the OCS lease sale process. I will describe that a little bit later. To the extent possible, we are moving to achieve this by gathering and evaluting our information in cooperation with other Federal agencies as part of the development of environmental impact statements prepared prior to the OCS lease sales; (3) Estab- lishes in the rulemaking process appropriate permit limitations, such as new source performance standards and ocean discharge guidelines; and (4) Promotes the issuance of the less resource- intensive NPDES general permits and I will describe the general permit process later. EPA’s statutory authority to regulate discharges into marine waters from offshore oil and gas exploration and production oper- ations is derived from the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and its 1978 amendments, which you are familiar with, and from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, now known as the Clean Water Act. Section 402 of the Clean Water Act established the NPDES permit program to regulate the discharge of pollutants from point sources into waters of the United States including the territorial seas, continguous zone, and the oceans. Section 301 of the Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant without an NPDES permit or in violation of the terms and conditions of an NPDES permit. The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA or, if a State NPDES permit program has been approved, an approved State to issue NPDES permits. However, EPA issues permits to all point sources, such as mobile drilling rigs and production platforms, discharging into the ocean waters beyond the 3 mile territorial limit, regardless of whether the adjoining coastal State has an approved NPDES permit program. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Public Law 95-372, ex- tends Federal laws such as the Clean Water Act, to the seabed, subsoil, and fixed structures, such as artificial island drilling rigs, located on the Outer Continental Shelf. Thus, NPDES permits are required for all discharge from offshore oil and gas facilities in OCS lease sale areas. I would like to describe now our NPDES permit process. The NPDES permit process begins when the owner or operator of a pollution source files a standard application form for an NPDES permit. If sufficient information is not available to develop a draft permit, the State or EPA may request the applicant to submit additional information such as bioassay and bioaccumulation test data. Upon receipt of adequate information and after assessment of the guidelines applicability to this source and other matters, a draft permit is prepared and a public notice of the draft permit, IDE representing the intention to issue a permit, is published. Since the Clean Water Act (the act) requires EPA to provide for public par- ticipation in the permit process, the draft permit is made available for comment; the public comment period is specified in the public notice, and must be at least 30 days. If the permit is being issued by EPA, a State certification is requested to determine if the permit limitations are sufficent to meet State water quality stand- ards for the receiving water that is involved. Also if there is sufficient public interest, a public hearing will be held on the draft permit. After review of comments received on the draft permit, the per- mitting authority may issue or deny a final permit. If the terms of the final permit are significantly different than those originally proposed, then the final permit may be reproposed for public com- ment. After the final permit is issued, any interested party may contest its issuance or its terms within 30 days. As you know some of the flower garden permits which were just issued are being contested. If EPA issues the final permit the challenge is in the form of a request for an administrative evidentiary hearing. The permit process is governed by our consolidated permit regu- lations (an effort to streamline all of EPA’s permitting efforts which we hope works), and when EPA has approved a State NPDES program, is additionally governed by a memorandum of agreement with the State. EPA may object to the issuance of a permit by a State, if the permit does not reflect the guidelines and other requirements of the act. If the State fails to take timely remedial action, EPA may issue a permit of its own, though this has rarely occurred. An important new aspect of EPA’s regulatory reform effort is the provision which allows EPA or approved NPDES States to issue general permits to control the discharge of pollutants from numer- ous point sources located in the same geographic area if their discharges warrant similar pollution control measures. As I will discuss later, EPA issued 10 days ago its first three draft general permits covering over 2,000 offshore oil and gas facilities operating in the Gulf of Mexico. General permits can be issued without any application required from individual owners or operators. After deciding the geographic area to be covered by the general permit, the permitting authority develops a draft general permit which is subject to public notice, comment, and public hearing just as an individual permit. All NPDES permits, both individual and general, contain interim and final effluent limitations, schedules of compliance to achieve final effluent limitations, self-monitoring and reporting require- ments, and standard “boilerplate” language. Under the Clean Water Act, EPA has established effluent limita- tions guidelines for a number of industrial categories. One such category is the offshore subcategory of the oil and gas extraction point source category. The offshore subcategory includes facilities engaged in the production, field exploration, drilling, well produc- tion, and well treatment within the oil and gas extraction industry which are located seaward of the inner boundary of the territorial seas. The guidelines for the offshores subcategory are technology- based and form the basis for effluent limitations contained in 118 NPDES permits, such as the daily maximum limitation of 72 mg/1 of oil and grease in discharges of produced water established by the effluent guidelines for the offshore subcategory. Both exploration and production operations of the oil and gas extraction industry generate discharges subject to NPDES permit limitations. As you are familiar, these operations discharge drilling fluids, drill cuttings, produced waters, deck drainage, and sanitary and domestic wastes which are limited in part by the technology- based effluent limitations guidelines. As you may know, our prima- ry concern on the OCS has been with drilling fluids (or muds) and drill cuttings which, depending upon the nature of the receiving waters, have been regulated differently through NPDES permits. For the discharges I have just described, NPDES permits issued after July 1, 1977, contain interim effluent limitations based on the more stringent of effluent guidelines, representing best practicable control technology (BPT), or limitations necessary to meet the water quality standards of the receiving waters. When finally promulgated for new sources, final effluent limita- tions will be based on new source performance standards. Until new source performance standards are promulgated in about 18 months, discharges of conventional pollutants, such as oil and grease, will be governed by best conventional pollutant control technology or BCT. Most important for this hearing today, in addition to the technol- ogy based limitation I have just described, section 403 of the act may require more stringent permit limitations for discharges into the oceans. Congress paid special attention to discharges into the oceans and charged permit writers to make such complex determi- nations as the effects of pollutants on marine organisms, including ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability, and esthetic, recre- ation, and economic values, as well as human health. Furthermore, these determinations are to be made prior to issuing an NPDES permit. Based on these determinations, limitations necessary to minimize or prevent significant degradation, that is language from the act, may be imposed in the NPDES permit issued to a marine discharger. EPA will promulgate in the near future ocean discharge guide- lines to aid permit writers in making these determinations. Until that time, section 403(a) provides that a permit may be issued for a marine discharge if it is in the public interest to do so. Our interim policy for implementing section 403(c) provides that the criteria set forth in that section which I alluded to above are to be considered and applied in the issuance, reissuance or review of all NPDES permits for ocean dischargers. In addition, the ocean dumping criteria are to be applied to the fullest extent possible where appropriate. As you may be familiar, the primary aspect of the ocean dump- ing criteria that concerns us for the ocean discharge area is compli- ance with the “Limiting Permissible Concentration” (LPC). The LPC means discharge of that concentration of a pollutant which will not cause unreasonable acute or chronic toxicity or cause sublethal adverse effects on marine organisms. The scientific tests to determine an LPC for specific pollutants are laboratory tests conducted with appropriate sensitive marine organisms. 119 Now that you have an idea of our NPDES permitting process, I would like to describe briefly our OCS permitting policy. Because of the complexities involved in assessing the potential for significant harm of the marine environment, EPA has a number of actions underway to insure that effluent discharges associated with the development of offshore oil and gas resources are managed in an environmentally sound manner. At the same time, these actions are intended to expedite the issuance of NPDES permits to offshore oil and gas facilities and to avoid costly startup delays for facilities which would cause no adverse environmental impact. I know you heard a great deal about Government committees and may be skeptical about the virtue of yet another one, but the agency has created a much needed Outer Continental Shelf Coordi- nation Committee to coordinate agency efforts in this area. It is not mentioned in the written text but as you may know there are about five or six offices within EPA who have some role in deciding what our policy should be with regard to OCS. We have decided to combine those offices in part into a committee, which I chair, to have one unified policy from the agency. Two important functions of the committee are the development of a memorandum of under- standing to coordinate our research activities with the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Coast Guard, and the coordination of research activities by a drilling muds and formation waters task force. That task force is solely within EPA. The focus of the memorandum of understanding is to increase EPA’s participation in the OCS lease sale process during the devel- opment of environmental impact statements (EIS) in order to assess the vulnerability of specific lease areas to the discharges associated with offshore oil and gas operations. If we can assess vulnerability at this early stage, we can determine appropriate NPDES permit conditions and avoid delays in issuing NPDES per- mits. Inspection and compliance sampling requirements of each Federal agency will also be coordinated in the memorandum of understanding. The efforts of the Drilling Muds and Formation Waters Task Force will include the identification of gaps in current knowledge and research concerning the environmental fates and effects of drilling muds and formation waters. To further coordinate EPA’s activities on the OCS with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, EPA is also partici- pating in the Biological Task Forces for the Flower Gardens, Georges Bank, and Beaufort Sea. Both the Flower Gardens and Georges Bank Task Forces have now completed draft research and monitoring plans. Finally, I would like to acquaint you with the Agency’s most recent efforts to issue NPDES permits for offshore oil and gas facilities. For the record, I have submitted a chart which summa- rizes the status of NPDES permits issued for offshore oil and gas facilities. The largest number of offshore oil and gas dischargers is located in the Gulf of Mexico. There are approximately 2,000 facili- ties in the offshore subcategory currently operating in the Gulf. EPA’s Region VI office in Dallas recently published a public notice of three draft general NPDES permits which when finally issued 120 will regulate discharges from the majority of these facilities. Pro- ductive or unique biological areas, not covered by these general permits, will receive further evaluation, and may be the subject of future general permits. Different areas of the OCS may require different permitting strategies and different permit conditions. You may be familiar with the Flower Gardens in the Gulf of Mexico. To date, three final NPDES permits have been issued and nine additional draft NPDES permits have been proposed. The permits establish no discharge zones for both drilling fluids and cuttings to protect this sensitive marine ecosystem. I want to com- ment that the no discharge zones for the drilling fluids is greater than the area for the cuttings. EPA’s most recent NPDES permit- ting action concerns the Georges Bank. Our region I office in Boston is currently reviewing NPDES permit applications submit- ted by four companies for exploratory drilling in Georges Bank. As part of the application requirements, EPA required the applicants to submit bioassay and bioaccumulation test data for the drilling muds that they expect to use in this area. Appropriate NPDES permit limitations and monitoring requirements will be developed once these data are received and evaluated, along with the recom- mendations of the Georges Bank Biological Task Force. We have been working with the companies, other Federal agencies, and environmental groups and expect to publish the notice of draft NPDES permits for Georges Bank by December. In the next few years, EPA expects to continue efforts to issue NPDES permits in a timely manner through increased participa- tion in the OCS lease sale process, through efforts to increase the collection of scientific data on the fate and effects of the discharges from oil and gas facilities, and through coordination of NPDES permitting with the OCS lease sale process. Thank you for this opportunity to highlight our OCS permitting activities. I will be happy to answer questions concerning these activities. Mr. Srupps. Thank you very much, Ms. Compton. I have a number of questions but I think they all boil down to one in terms of importance. I am going to ask you the big one first, what I think is the most important one. And that gets at, I will get more specific in a moment, how your agency, given the way the law under which you operate reads, could be granting any permits or could have to this date granted any permits, for the discharge of drill muds into the ocean. Let me begin by quoting as you I am sure know by heart and I think you cited in your testimony, from section 403 which sets the criteria for ocean discharge permits. The last sentence of which, section 2, says: “In any event where insufficient information exists on any proposed discharge to make a reasonable judgment on any of the guidelines established pursuant to this subsection no permit shall be issued under section 402 of this Act.” I read that as an absolute outright prohibition on the issuance of a permit in the absence of sufficient information to assess the criteria which you are directed to assess and to follow in that section. EPA provided testimony before this committee earlier this year on this very subject when as you know we had scientists representing Interior, Commerce and EPA, one of whom was Dr. Bolton sitting at your right. Almost without exception they told us we do not know all 121 the components in drill muds, we are not aware of all of their chemical composition because to a certain extent that is proprie- tory data held in confidence by the industry. Inasmuch as we have studies done they do not answer questions on either short- or long- range effects with regard to the possible toxicity of the content of these materials. Let me quote for you. In those hearings I asked this question of the scientists. I said: In summary, if each of you were asked the general question, given the state of our knowledge at this time, as you understand it, of the effects both short term and long term on the marine environment of drill fluids, can you as scientists tell me the effects are such to cause serious concern—or do our studies indicate that while there may be some effects, they are not of sufficient magnitude to give us pause as we proceed? Mr. Hicut. At this time, we do not have the information that shows really that they are that harmful. Mr. Stupps. We do not have the information that they are harmful? Mr. Hicur. Yes. Mr. Stupps. Do we have the information that shows that they are not harmful? Mr. Hicut. We do, I think. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Burke? Mr. Burke. From what we know now, just right now, there are effects of dis- charge of drilling fluids. They are short term. They are localized. I do not know whether it is a cause for concern. I do not know whether the long-term implications of these materials being introduced into the environment are a matter for concern. Mr. Stupps. That was the Bureau of Land Management. Dr. Richards from the EPA said in response to that question, ‘“We have inadequate information for making a hazard assessment. The inad- equacy lies in the lack of understanding of the exposure of animals, particularly in these specific niches that I mentioned like the benthic communities.” Dr. Bolton said, “I would be very hesitant with the current state of knowledge to make any endorsement of general discharge of drilling muds, particularly in sensitive areas of the Outer Conti- nental Shelf.” Three of its scientists, three different agencies, saying we simply do not know. Let me quote to you from Research Highlights, 1979 from your own agency study done last year by the EPA on this very subject in the Gulf of Mexico. I am reading from your own publication which I gather is a summary of the research of the agency last year. It says: The research findings in this project and from the various scientific literature show that drilling fluid is ten times more toxic than industrial effluents such as untreated wastes from oil refineries or pulp mills. Carcinogens are discharged during drilling operations. Drilling compounds thought to be insoluable and there- fore biologically unavailable are, instead, activitely taken up by marine organisms. Chemicals normally discharged are capable of accumulating in marine organisms. Chemicals discharged persist for years in sea bottom sediments. A wide variety of organisms that normally live on the sea floor cannot grow on sediments contaminat- ed by drilling fluids. Effects of chemicals on coral may be delayed for a year before they can be observed. I still quote from EPA’s own publication: These findings do not answer all the environmental questions about the effects of oil and gas drilling. The effects of different chemical mixtures on different marine species still need to be determined to fulfill the data needs of future discharge permits. That is from the Environmental Protection Agency. Once again let me read you the law. “In any event where insufficient informa- tion exists on any proposed discharge to make a reasonable judg- 122 ment on any of the guidelines established pursuant to this subsec- tion, no permit should be issued under section 402 of this act.’ Under those circumstances, never mind the future, how could EPA have issued permits in the past? Ms. Compton. Well, I think that is a very good question. And at times a very difficult question to respond to. As I mention in my testimony with regard to the Flower Gardens that while we found the area to be of unique and sensitive biological concern, we made the reasonable judgment that the permit should issue in the public interest but that there would be no discharge of cuttings and drilling muds within a certain area of the Flower Gardens, in order to protect that area until we could undertake more research. With regard to the three general permits that we just proposed in the Gulf of Mexico, covering approximately 2,000 rigs, we con- cluded and made a reasonable judgment that because these areas covered by this general permit do not cover any live bottom areas or any hard bank areas or any other areas that we consider of biological concern or significant biological concern, that there would be no adverse impact based on the criteria listed in 403, in that area. We intend to make a similar assessment with regard to Georges Bank. We have asked that the applicant submit to us bioassay, bioaccumulation data on the 8 to 10 classes of muds that they intend to use in the Georges Bank and we will take a look at that information and see what the impacts would be on the Georges Bank organisms and together with other data that we have, decide whether we should require either the barging of the drilling muds or cuttings or meeting a limiting permissible concen- tration, in other words, a slow discharge of it, or normal discharge of the muds and cuttings. Mr. Stupps. My question to you really is how can anyone in that agency make such a determination and state that it is reasonable when your own scientists tell you that you do not know what you are talking about? Ms. Compton. Well, our own scientists have advised us that we need to know a great deal more about drilling muds and cuttings. Mr. Stupps. Right. The law says when you do not know, you do not permit. It does not say anything about reasonable or unreason- able. It says when the knowledge is insufficient you do not permit. Ms. Compton. It says—excuse me. It says if there is insufficient information to make a reasonable judgment. Mr. Stupps. Right. Ms. Compton. With regard to the general permits in the Gulf of Mexico which we just issued, we believe that because no areas of biological concern were involved in those areas that we could make a reasonable judgment that there would be no adverse impact on the environment or no significant impact. Mr. Stupps. I am sure Mr. Breaux will leap to the defense of the environment of the Gulf of Mexico and its fishing industry. My knowledge of the gulf’s particular regions is not great enough to question you closely as to whether or not there are significant commercial fishery resources in that area. You are about to be asked to make a judgment. You have application permits pending in Georges Bank? Ms. Compton. That is right. 123 Mr. Stupps. As I understand it from not only your own scientists but those of other agencies, there is no way in this world that we have existing studies adequate to make a reasonable judgment of these questions in an area of the extraordinary biological delicacy of the bank. Under those circumstances how could you even consid- er such permit applications? Ms. Compton. As I mentioned earlier we are waiting for the data that is to be supplied to us by the applicants with regard to the classes of fluids that they intend to use in the Georges Bank area and when we receive that data we are hopeful that we will be able to make a reasonable judgment as to whether those muds can be discharged. Mr. Stupps. How can you make a reasonable judgment when your scientists have testified that no studies have been done upon which such a judgment could be based? We do not have the infor- mation. We have no idea what the long-term effects are, and very little idea, testimony indicates, what the short-term effects are. Ms. Compton. Our conclusion—I do not know what the bioassay and bioaccumulation data will tell us. The data may indicate that we should not allow any discharge of those muds and cuttings. The data from—— Mr. Stupps. The data from the oil industry? Ms. Compton. Yes. It may indicate that there are chronic and toxic effects and therefore there should be—— Mr. Stupps. You do not believe any more than I do, do you, that the oil industry is going to come in and tell you there are toxic effects from what they propose to discharge? You are going to rely on whether they tell you that or not. Ms. Compton. That is not the sole information on which we will rely in issuing these permits. Dr. Botton. We also have a research program ongoing in the New England area. Mr. Stupps. I just read from your agency’s own publication on the subject which raises more questions. It does not make one feel better about the situation. Ms. Botton. That is true, but I believe there has been a signifi- cant amount of information gathered in recent months that at least gives us a little bit more to go on. A draft study from the New England Aquarium gives us more information about toxicities. In fact one of the least toxic of the muds used in these studies was one ee the Baltimore Canyon, about which I believe Mr. Hughes was asking. Mr. Stupps. This speaks to the question of short-term toxicity but presumably does not speak to the question of long-range toxic- ity or long-range sublethal effects in behavioral changes. Dr. Botton. It is purely a prerequisite test in a spectrum of toxicity testing. Mr. Stupps. Purely the request. Toxicities. Dr. Botton. In a particular location. Mr. Stupps. The kinds of concerns of effect over time of the environment, one of which was raised by your own study. Dr. Botton. This is something we are still trying to address. Mr. Stupps. And presumably will not have addressed within the next few months when decisions will have to be made? 69-848 0 - 81 - 9 124 Dr. Botton. We will have some of that information then, yes, on the scallops and also some of the flounder of Georges Bank. ; Mr. Stupps. Over what period of time? Dr. Botton. I believe they have completed a 2-month study. Mr. Stupps. That is not long term. Dr. Botton. You extrapolate from those results, yes. To run longer term studies is often economically unfeasible, with the fund- ing we have for research. Mr. Stupps. I did not ask you that. Let me just say, you state we have to extrapolate on the basis of 8 months data. The EPA study with respect to coral says you may not be able to see effects for a year. So if you extrapolate on the basis of 3 months that would not be very productive. Dr. Botton. Fortunately, hard coral is not one of the problems with which we are dealing in Georges Bank. Mr. Stupps. We hope. Dr. BoLton. We hope. Mr. Stupps. Unless we find something a year later we did not see, right? Dr. Botton. I think we know that there are not hard corals. Mr. Stupps. We know they are not corals, we think we know that. Dr. Botton. To extrapolate from the discussion of hard corals to Georges Bank benthos would be stretching it. Mr. Stupps. We may be overextrapolating. Dr. Botton. Yes. Mr. Stupps. My concern I think is obvious. I think the law is unusually clear. That prohibition is not obfuscated or couched with too many conditions. It appears to me to be pretty much of an outright prohibition in the case of insufficient knowledge. If our scientific testimony has anything in common, even from agencies which tend to be more innately benign with respect to the indus- try, it is that we do not know effects, we simply do not know. We do not even know in some cases, as I understand it, what it is that we are permitting the discharge of, never mind what its effects might be. I really do believe, and I realize this is a question that it is not fair to pose solely to you, that someone, somewhere in that agency is making essentially a political decision, whether or not to permit a discharge, of what ought to be a scientific decision. The scientific evidence, inasmuch as this layman can understand what we have been presented with, is insufficient to answer those ques- tions. When the law says that in that case one shall not grant permits, somewhere a decision that is other than scientific is being made to proceed in the absense of clear scientific data which would allow us with confidence to answer those questions. Do you take issue with that observation? Ms. Compton. No, I do not take issue with that. I think the agency shares your concern for areas of unique and biological sensitivity. However, I feel that in areas that do not rise to that level, we are able to make a reasonable judgment such as we did in the general permits in the Gulf of Mexico. Mr. Stupps. Right. But you also grant in the case of the re- sources on Georges Bank it does rise to that level? Ms. Compton. Yes, I think that is the general consensus. 125 Mr. Stupps. Thank you. Mr. Pritchard. Mr. PritcHarRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess what we are really talking about is risk. First of all, you probably have been out on these rigs since you deal with it? You have not been on the rig? Ms. Compton. No, I have not. I have only been here about 3 months. I hope to get out. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Breaux will take you fishing any time. Mr. PritTcHARD. I said oil rig, not fishing. This drilling mud—how much in quantity is produced each day in an average drilling operation? Dr. Botton. They probably discharge between 100 and 200 bar- rels of mud a day. Mr. PRiTcHARD. Two hundred barrels of mud a day in the aver- age drilling platform? Dr. Botton. Exploratory. Mr. PRITCHARD. That is a little counter to what I have been told but—— Dr. Botton. The discharges are probably going to be larger on Georges Bank than perhaps you would see in the Gulf of Mexico because it is considerably different mud type that will be used. It is a lighter weight mud. Mr. PritcHarD. If we followed the chairman’s approach here we really would not allow any drilling offshore until we have deter- mined conclusively that these muds are not harmful or alterna- tives are available. What can you do with the discharge besides dumping it in the water. Ms. Compton. Well, you can barge the mud to either land dispos- al site or to an ocean dumping site and that is what the operators of some of the rigs are doing in Santa Barbara right now and will have to do. Mr. PRITCHARD. You mean they haul it out to a safer place in the water, less dangerous? Ms. Compton. That is correct. Mr. PRITCHARD. It would be silly to take it to shore? Ms. Compton. Not necessarily. There may be safe places on land to dispose of the muds, whereas they would have a significant adverse impact on the environment, the marine environment such as the Flower Gardens. Mr. PritcHARD. I see. When do you think you would have the answers to the chairman’s questions? Ms. Compton. With regard to whether we have sufficient data to issue permits in the Georges Bank? Well, we are reviewing those applications right now and we are awaiting the data from industry on the muds that they intend to use. We expect to propose the draft permits in December, so we should have the data by late. November or early December. Mr. PRITCHARD. But as I understand his statement, some of these things cannot be decided for a long time. Ms. Compton. One approach to the chronic problem is to issue short-term permits. We are contemplating issuing only 1-year per- mits in the Georges Bank. That is one option, that is—— Mr. PRITCHARD. You mean a 1-year permit for a person to estab- lish a drilling rig? Ms. Compton. Well, that is all the company has asked for. 126 Mr. PRITCHARD. I see. Ms. CompTON. One option is to allow them to discharge during that 1 year and for us to monitor the amounts, the discharge, the concentrations and also to monitor the data and effects, in other words, the dispersion, where the muds go, what effects they have during that year and follow up with a subsequent year of monitor- ing to determine the long-term effects. That is one option we may choose. Or we may choose to, as I said before, not permit any discharge. Mr. PRITCHARD. All right. I have no further questions, Mr. Chair- man. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Breaux. Mr. Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Ms. Compton for your testimony. It is unfortunate that having been here only 3 months I guess you are involved in such detailed questioning about the in’s and outs of some very technical subjects. Just out of curiosity, what were you doing before you became involved in this mess? Ms. Compton. I was the Enforcement Director in EPA’s Philadel- phia office. Mr. BREAvx. I sometimes get the impression that this whole area of offshore drilling is such a novel type of program that we do not know anything about it, we have never studied it, we do not know the effects of it. When in truth and in fact that is really not correct. There are numerous studies, are there not, that really go into very scientific consideration of the effects of the offshore oil and gas industry. Is that correct? We cannot say that we have been having it for 30 years and we really do not have any studies oe with the potential adverse effects of offshore drilling, can we? Ms. Compton. I would like Dr. Bolton to address that in more detail. I know my impression in making some decisions on these permits has been that the results of the studies, although they are numerous, are conflicting. That is one reason why we feel we need more data, is because the results of the various studies are not conclusive. Although I agree with you they are extensive on some subjects such as coral reefs, particularly the impact of pollution on coral reefs. Mr. BreAvx. I am pleased we are giving a great deal of attention to the Georges Banks area, as chairman of the Fisheries Subcom- mittee it is in fact one of the most valuable fisheries in the world. But the district I represent has been having offshore drilling for 25, 30 years. No one at any level, has ever said, hey it is really a problem. Has not EPA been looking at what has been happening in the gulf for 25 years? Ms. Compton. Again Dr. Bolton may be able to give you more detail. But we do not have baseline studies of what the gulf looked like before the drilling began. So it is difficult to assess the impact of the drilling. Another thing I have been advised in spite of increased technology with respect to fishing we have not increased our catches in the Gulf of Mexico. I do not know whether that is significant. Mr. BrEAvux. Run that by me again. Ms. Compton. I have been advised that—— 127 Mr. BREAUx. By whom? Ms. Compton. By staff. Mr. Breaux. Is that National Marine Fisheries staff or EPA staff? Ms. Compton. EPA. Mr. Breaux. With their expertise in fisheries. Ms. Compton. No—— Dr. Botton. I believe it is the NAS report which makes that statement, National Academy of Sciences. Mr. Breaux. National Science Foundation, what does the state- ment, I would like to make it part of the record. Dr. Botton. The statement was also quoted in the earlier hear- ing but it was to the effect that while you have approximately the same catch that you had 10 years ago it is taking ten times the effort. So the catch of fish has not decreased, however it is taking more effort to achieve that same catch. Mr. Breavx. I would like you to supply that, since you refer to it. Dr. Botton. Certainly. Mr. Breaux. Would you address what she was talking about on the studies there. Dr. BoLton. Pardon? Mr. BREAvx. She asked you to respond to the number of studies that I said must be in existence somewhere. Dr. Botton. Yes, there are a number of studies. I think one of the greatest advantages of those studies is that they provided study assessments which allow for the design of more effective and infor- mative studies. The biggest problem is that an industry has been trying to assess its effect upon the environment in what is essen- tially a new area—well, at that time a new area of ecological investigation. We have found a lot of pitfalls in these studies as they are assessed. The point is because you have studies does not necessarily mean the studies are the end-all and be-all of the scientific expertise. They have a lot of room for improvements. That is part of the reason why we analyze the results of these rig- monitoring studies is to improve their design so we can get more explicit answers on impact and environmental change. Mr. Breaux. I am all for studying. We can study the studies and study those studies; do reports on the studies of the studies. At some point we are going to have to make a decison whether to go or not go. I do not think study ever indicates in actual truth and veracity whether something is safe or harmful. Are you all familiar with we Rice University studies entitled “Offshore Ecology Investi- gation’”? Dr. Botton. Very familiar. Mr. BREAUx. What is your thought about that? Dr. Boiron. I feel there are a lot of flaws in many of those studies. The volume recently released has corrected many of the flaws in the original final draft papers. However, the main problem with that study, as I think you will note in the critique section of that volume, is the study design. The critique may be about the third or fourth chapter. The authors point out that there are no sufficient control sites for those studies. It is very difficult to run a scientific experiment without proper controls. 128 Mr. BrEAux. Can you say if a Member of Congress wanted to get brought up to date on the effects they should not read it? Dr. Botton. No; I would certainly read it. But I am not sure you can take everything in there at face value. You have to use a discretionary mind. Mr. Breaux. You should have another study to see if this study is accurate? Dr. BoLton. There already has been one. There has been a rather good critique made by one of the Woods Hole scientists. Mr. Breaux. What does he say? Dr. Botton. He points out a number of flaws—— Mr. Breaux. Has someone studied his study yet? Dr. Botton. I really do not know. Probably the oil company has studied Dr. Sanders’ study, I imagine. Mr. BreEAvux. I would like to incorporate this as part of the record, Mr. Chairman, not to have it printed or anything but just incorporated by reference, since it is such a large volume. It is entitled “Rice University Studies Offshore Ecological Investiga- tion,’ put together by a research consortium of a number of univer- sities, it was edited by a number of pretty distinguished editors who did not take part in the study, just as a matter of reference to our study. Mr. Stupps. Who funded it? Mr. BrEAvux. By the universities and I would imagine also by the industry. Dr. BoLton. The Offshore Operators Committee and several mud companies funded it. Mr. Breaux. I would hope so. It is dealing with their business. It is a study by the universities and I am sure the nasty old oil companies probably had something to do with helping to fund it. I want to make that very clear right now. OK. Are you familiar with what California has done with regard to the question of barging or discharging drilling muds? Ms. Compton. Are you saying the oil rigs in California? Mr. Breaux. The State of California used to require that drilling muds be barged on shore and disposed of on shore. The California legislature by unanimous vote of both the House and the Senate out there decided that disposing of drilling fluids, muds at sea was a safe method of doing it. But prior to that a California Lands Commission study went into great detail on whether they should or should not make that recommendation. The study indicated that it was better to dispose of it at sea and made some conclusions which would indicate that they could in fact do it without any significant deleterious effects on the environment. Is EPA familiar with what the California Land Commission study said? Dr. Bo_ton. I am somewhat familiar with it. I believe most of their determination was based on something pretty much of a qualitative assessment rather than a stringent quantitative assess- ment. Mr. BrEAvux. Most everything is, is it not? Dr. Botton. No, sir. Mr. BrREAvux. Pardon me? Dr. Botton. It is not. Mr. BREAVx. It is not? 129 Dr. Botton. No; it is possible to do a technically sound quantita- tive assessment, but not if the bulk of your studies are based on submersibles or less rigorous analytical tools without doing benthic sampling and analysis. Mr. BreAvx. I take it you do not agree with the California Lands Commission study? Dr. Botton. I do not think I have all the information upon which to base the decision. Mr. BrREAvux. You sound like you do not like it. Dr. Botton. That is possible, personally I may not like it. Mr. BREAUx. Oh, boy. Secretary Andrews—I would like to make this part of the record—in response to hearings held in the other body with regard to the disposal of drilling muds in particular, referred to studies and about the number of studies that we had and the number of monitoring programs that we already have. And they say that a task force was convened, a biological task force was established in October of last year and it has been meeting regularly and that that task force has developed a program of monitoring and re- search which directly tracks the provision of the legislation they were considering in the other body. And he states further, ‘Neither EPA nor Interior is allowing any activity on the OCS which pre- sents foreseeable significant adverse impacts to fisheries or any other resources.” Ms. Compton. I am sorry, I was somewhat confused. On what do you want our opinion? Mr. BREAUx. Well, the Secretary in a letter to members of the committee in the other body who were considering legislation to change the procedure in which drilling fluids are held, particularly at the Georges Bank area, the Secretary said in a written letter to the Senate he felt the bill that they were considering adds nothing to the authorities which are already in place. He says a biological task force identical to the one that the bill called for was estab- lished in October of last year and has been meeting regularly. The task force has developed a program of monitoring and research which directly tracks the provisions of the legislation and he says decisions on permanent conditions for the control or discharge of drill fluids and cuttings under the Clean Water Act are being made regularly in frontier areas by EPA. “Neither EPA nor Interior is allowing any activity on the OCS which presents foreseeable sig- nificant adverse impacts to fisheries or any other resources.” Ms. Compton. Yes; I am sorry, I understand your question now. The agency does agree with the Secretary’s letter and feels that there is adequate legislation and authority available to us to regu- late water quality with regard to oil drilling rigs and that with the activities and assessments that we are making, we have enough authority right now to protect those areas. Mr. BrEAUXx. What would EPA’s position be, as to whether EPA or industry or someone has to prove that the drilling muds that are used in drilling operations would in no way be harmful before Government regulates that activity? What I am trying to find out is what is EPA’s feeling on where the burden should lie before regulations are established? 130 Ms. Compton. Well, under section 403 of the Clean Water Act, EPA or the State in some cases, the permitting authority has to make an assessment of what adverse impacts would result from the discharge of pollutants. In order to make that assessment we ask the applicant for a permit, to supply us with data that will enable us to make that assessment. So the burden really lies with industry to give us enough data to show we should issue that company a permit to allow them to discharge those pollutants. Mr. Breaux. You could only deny a permit if it is shown that whatever is attempted to be permitted would, in fact, cause some harm or potential harm to the environment? Ms. Compton. Well, there are several criteria under section 403 of the act which we have to use in assessing whether there would be harm or degradation of the waters as a result of the discharge. Mr. Breaux. There is no legislative problem in EPA obtaining the information necessary to find out what chemicals or potential toxics if any, would be contained in drilling fluids, is there? Ms. Compton. No, there is not. There have been some comments made with regard to the confidentiality of the contents of drilling muds. However, we can obtain from industry the toxics that are in the drilling muds and their concentrations. That which is propri- etary is the percentage of elements that are in these particular muds and there is no need for us to have that information. We do have such authority under section 308 of the Clean Water Act to obtain the data on drilling muds that we need to make a decision. Mr. BrEAvUx. Do your biologists tell you that the percentages of the various chemicals are necessary in order to make a determina- tion whether it could be potentially harmful or not? Ms. Compton. What is important is the concentration of the toxics; for example, whether they are 10 milligrams per liter, of whatever is discharged. Mr. BreEAvx. I see. So if you have the concentrations your scien- tists tell you that is sufficient to make a projected decison on the potential harm? Ms. Compton. That is what I have been advised. Mr. BrEAvx. So it is clear from EPA’s perspective that one of the conditions prior to granting a permit for the discharge of anything at an offshore drill site, that EPA has sufficient authority to re- quire of the applicant to disclose to EPA the type of chemicals that et sgl would cover as well as the concentration of those chemi- cals? Ms. Compton. That is correct. Mr. Breaux. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would like if we could include for the record, it is just a page and a half letter I referred to from Secretary Andrews with regard to the subjects that I referred to. Mr. Stupps. Without objection. [The information follows:] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, _ OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., August 19, 1980. Hon. J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. _ Dear Senator Jounston: I have reviewed the new amendment to S. 2119 regard- ing the protection of fisheries on the Georges Bank which is now before the Senate 131 Energy and Natural Resources Committee. A number of modifications have been made in the proposed substitute which are responsive to the concerns I expressed in my previous letters to Senator Jackson regarding two earlier versions of the bill. I appreciate the movement away from provisions which would greatly obstruct or prevent oil and gas exploration on the North Atlantic Continental Shelf. The bill as now written, however, adds nothing to authorities which are already in place or activities that are already underway. A Biological Task Force identical to the one in the bill was established in October of last year and has been meeting regularly. The Task Force has developed a program of monitoring and research which directly tracks the provisions of the bill, and has formally recommended it to this Department where it is under expedited review for funding. Decisions on permit conditions for the controlled discharge of drill muds and cuttings under the Clean Water Act are being made regularly in frontier areas by EPA. Neither EPA nor Interior is allowing any activity on the OCS which presents foreseeable signifi- cant adverse impacts to fisheries or any other resources. To be frank, I can see no purpose served by passage of this legislation. But I can see considerable risk if it is reported by the Energy Committee. First, it greatly enhances the prospects for floor action on the Commerce Commit- tee bill, with its rigid zero-discharge requirement, which the Administration and I strongly oppose as tantamount to an exclusion of oil and gas exploration on Georges ank. Second, any new legislative guidance at this point will greatly upset the painstak- ing progress we have made toward a reconciliation of interests in the North Atlan- tic, a process which has involved intense interagency and Federal-State negotiations and a long-running lawsuit which was initiated in January 1978 and is just now approaching a new round of trial activity this fall. Third, it will set a precedent for special regionally-based legislation which will seriously threaten the reliability and even-handedness of the national program established by Congress under the OCS Lands Act, as amended. I ask that you allow the progress we are making in the North Atlantic to proceed without the uncertainty, dislocation, and renewed contention that would accompany passage of this legislation. I also ask that you allow us to continue implementation of the OCS Lands Act as the operative statute crafted by your committee to assure environmentally sound operations everywhere on the OCS. Sincerely, Crcit D. ANDRUS, Secretary. Mr. Stupps. Let me also for the record read in an exchange from the earlier hearing this year of this subcommittee on precisely this subject. The question of whether or not important information is proprietary and withheld. I quote my question to EPA’s own scien- tist Dr. Richards: What do we know about the composition of these animals (drilling muds)? Dr. RicHarps. The problem is not so much what we know, but what we do not know. Drilling fluid is a complex mixture of mixtures. The ingredients include a wide variety of chemicals. The problem is some of them appear to be proprietary. The American Petroleum Institute’s component listing states that fact. Another problem is that these mixtures appear to undergo transformations downhole. We know some of the things that go into the drilling fluids, but we do not know them all. Drilling fluid components contain contaminants—they are not pure chemicals— they are complex mixtures of industrial grade chemicals. Only the trade names of most chemicals are known. The problem is: in order to do predictive toxicology and predict what effect, these things would have on organisms, we really need more information on the chemical analysis. Dr. Parsons (NOAA). I agree with Dr. Richards’ statement also. In my review of permit applications, there is often mention of additives used in the drilling mud, but usually very little indication of what they are or what their concentration may be. I have before me a list of 15 categories of drilling fluid additives commonly used: lubricants, flocculants, bactericides, et cetera. I have no idea of what chemicals are found in these additives nor what their toxicities are. This information is not provided in drilling permits. So the scientists do not seem to agree with your characterization. Ms. Compton. Well, since April we have begun taking a new look at the way we are approaching permitting these facilities and one 132 point is that, as I mentioned to you, we are asking for bioassay and bioaccumulation data on the 8 to 10 classes of muds which industry says they will use in the Georges Bank. After reviewing that data we will probably conclude that if we are to allow the discharge of muds and cuttings in Georges Bank that they will be limited to those muds and cuttings that they have tested and submitted the data to us, that we do not—although what was stated earlier to the subcommittee is true and I am not changing that testimony in any way, I am saying that we do not necessarily need to know the entire universe of the muds before we decide what to do with particular drilling rigs if they are limited to the use of certain muds. Mr. Stupps. I will let the record reflect what the testimony of the scientists were. I am not sure it is consistent. I apologize Mr. Wyatt, it is your time. Mr. Wyatt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You said that the Rice study was reviewed and studied by a scientist from Woods Hole, is that right? Dr. Bo.ton. The what study? Mr. Wyatt. The Rice University study. Dr. Botton. I am sorry. Yes; Howard Sanders has done a review of it. It is not in publication yet. Since he has no funding I do not know when it will go into production. Mr. Wyatt. So only one person studied it? Dr. Botton. He is a rather well respected marine benthic biolo- gist. Mr. Wyatt. Twenty-three universities were involved with the Rice University study. Dr. Botton. That is right. Mr. Wyatt. We are talking one study of that and raising ques- tions, that is what you are saying? Dr. Botton. Yes. It is not the only basis for my comment. I have also read most of the original papers involved in that study and I have a consultant who is looking at the new addition of the studies now. There is a reasonable question as to its adequacy. I think industry in many ways also questions some of those studies. Mr. Wyatt. Industry questions the studies? Dr. Botton. Yes, for the very same reason. It is a scientific study done basically without control sites, based on inadequate design. Mr. Wyatt. And that is the primary objection? Dr. Botton. That is one of the primary objections, yes. Mr. Wyatt. Someone made a comment a moment ago that in the Gulf of Mexico you are getting the same catch with ten times the effort, is that correct? Dr. Botton. Yes. Mr. Wyatt. That is not true of the Georges Bank area for in- stance? Dr. Botton. I am not familiar with any similar statistics on Georges Bank. Mr. Wyatt. Any other fish areas in the country that we know of that do not have the same catch with more effort, or are you just familiar with the Gulf of Mexico? Dr. Botton. I am familiar with that particular study and cita- tion. 133 Mr. Wyatt. Have any other studies been made? Dr. Botton. I do not know if NAS funded other studies in other fisheries areas. They specifically brought out the gulf situation. Mr. Stupps. The National Marine Fisheries Service has regular annual figures on fisheries production throughout the country. Mr. Wyatt. National Marine Fisheries. Ms. Compton. National Marine and Fisheries Service. Mr. Wyatt. Have they indicated that that is the case? Dr. Botton. Dean Parsons who was at the hearing referenced by Mr. Stills is a representative of that organization and I do not remember him making any addition to that statement. Ms. Compton. We would be happy to collect that. Mr. Wyatt. I think that would be interesting to know. If we are going to throw out something that may raise a question, I think we ought to compare it with the other fishing areas of the country to make a determination if there is any significance in that fact. There may be absolutely no significance or correlation with tre- mendous amount of drilling taking place in the Gulf of Mexico. Every other fishing area in the country might also have the same catch. Ms. Compton. As I commented to Mr. Breaux, I did not indicate whether we knew there was any significance to that data or not. I simply commented in response to the fact that he said there had been no problems in the Gulf of Mexico. It is our understanding that we are not sure whether there have been any problems as a result of the drilling, because there are no baseline studies indicat- ing what the gulf was like prior to drilling andthe catch in the Gulf of Mexico has not increased in spite increased use of equipment and personnel. We would be happy to supplement the record with information on other fishing areas. Mr. Wyatt. Do you know if you are doing any of those kind of studies? Ms. Compton. NOAA is, I am sure. Ms. Compton. EPA is not involved in that type of study. Mr. Wyatt. You say on page four of your testimony: After review of comments received on the draft permit, the permitting authority may issue or deny a final permit. After the final permit is issued, any interested party may contest its issuance or its terms within 30 days. Who would any interested party be? Ms. Compton. In the Flower Gardens area, the Natural Re- sources Defense Council, as you know. Mr. Wyatt. That is an environmental group? Ms. Compton. Yes, it is a national environmental group. Mr. Wyatt. How are they funded? Ms. Compton. They are funded by over 100 foundations, to my knowledge. Mr. Wyatt. Is it a nonprofit corporation? Ms. Compton. Yes, it is. Mr. Wyatt. OK. They could object and have objected? Ms. Compton. Yes. They requested that an evidentiary hearing be held on the terms of the permit. They questioned its terms in the Flower Gardens. Mr. Wyatt. This was after you issued the permit? Ms. Compton. Yes. 134 Mr. Wyatt. Your scientists had determined that it could be issued? Ms. Compton. Yes. EPA issued the permit on that basis. Mr. Wyatt. Has anyone else objected to it? Ms. Compton. Yes, the National Wildlife Federation requested an evidentiary hearing. That is also a national environmental group. Mr. Wyatt. Do you know if there is any connection between those two groups? Ms. Compton. None, other than that the personnel know each other. Mr. Wyatt. What about the funding, do you think that might be the same? Ms. Compton. The National Wildlife Federation to my knowledge is funded by its members. The Natural Resources Defense Council seem to rely on foundation funding as well as members for funds. Also the industries who receive those three permits requested an evidentiary hearing also because they did not agree with the terms of the permit. Mr. Wyatt. Can you tell me if the law that requires the permit gives any interested party the right to request an evidentiary hearing? Ms. Compton. Our EPA regulations permit any interested party to request—— Mr. Wyatt. Your regulations. Does the law require that? Ms. Compton. That any interested party? I would imagine that the Administrative Procedures Act permits any interested person to challenge a Federal agency action, final Federal agency action. And I am not familiar with the Clean Water Act’s provisions. Mr. Wyatt. Could you tell me how you become an interested party? Ms. Compton. Pardon? Mr. Wyatt. Could you tell me how you become an interested party? Ms. Compton. In other words how an interested party—— Mr. Wyatt. Yes. Am I an interested party or Dr. Oppenheimer for instance in Texas an interested party? How do you become an interested party? Ms. Compton. I believe our consolidated permit regulations define interested party. I am not familiar with that definition. I assume it is someone who may be affected by the agency and the environmental groups would be affected because their charter is to protect the environment and they have an interest, and their mem- bers live in the area where the environment may be adversely affected. Mr. Wyatt. Can you tell me what studies you are currently doing in the Gulf of Mexico? Dr. Botton. Mainly working with larval recruitment and settling studies, a number of coral studies both in chronic and acute effects of drilling fluids on the corals. They are working with a number of studies of heavy metal bioaccumulation, particularly in shrimp. I penny that there are also studies ongoing on fish development and ehavior. 135 Mr. Wyatt. Have you found if there is any major damage, or any damage, in the studies you have conducted thus far in the gulf? Dr. Botton. The indication that we have from our field scientists is that there is cause for concern. Mr. Wyatt. That is not my question. Have you determined that there is damage being done, not cause for concern but is there damage being done? Dr. Botton. I think that you can say that even in the BLM rig studies that have been done, there is damage being done as a result of drilling operations in the immediate vicinity of the rig, yes, sir. Mr. Wyatt. And that damage is considered to be significant? Dr. Botton. It is certainly significant within the limitations of the rig radius, yes. Ms. Compton. Depending—I think the agency’s position depends on the area affected by the rig. In other words, there are many areas in the Gulf of Mexico that are not of significant biological concern where we would consider the damage not to be significant. However, in the Flower Gardens we decided that the damage may be significant, given its unique characteristics. Mr. Wyatt. Unique characteristics? Dr. Botton. The northernmost hard coral bank. Mr. Wyatt. What damage is being done there? Dr. Botton. To date? Mr. Wyatt. Yes. Ms. Compton. There is no drilling there now. Dr. Botton. No, there has been drilling there. Any damage that may have been done has not been directly tied with drilling effects, simply because the scientific community has not known about the Flower Gardens for that long. Fishermen did. Texas A. & M. I believe was credited with actually discovering the gee nature of the Flower Garden Banks. I am not sure of the ate. Mr. Wyatt. And you have been looking at this, you have been looking at Flower Gardens, and you have found no significant damage, is that correct? Dr. Botton. The Bureau of Land Management says there has been no significant damage. Mr. Wyatt. What about EPA? Dr. Botton. I do not know that EPA has the field studies that to substantiate that cause and effect EPA has not been doing field studies directly at the Flower Gardens. Mr. Wyatt. Are you familiar with any study that shows that there is significant damage done by oil drilling? Dr. Botton. There is a USGS coral coring study that indicates that there has been a decrease in the growth of corals beginning about 1957. But there is no way to really attribute that decrease directly to drilling activities. There are certainly many other fac- tors that could influence coral growth rate. Mr. Wyatt. Do you have any studies that show that you will ultimately come to a conclusion of any kind? Dr. Botton. There are completed EPA studies which indicate a change in recruitment and larval settling as a result of fine layers of drilling fluid on the substrat, so, yes—— Mr. Wyatt. On? 136 Dr. Botton. Trays containing different concentrations of drilling fluid are placed on the ocean bottom. A fine layer, I think about 2 millimeters, on that mud tray will change the structure of the community that settles there. So the change in community struc- ture is an impact. Fish often feed on these benthic organisms. Mr. Wyatt. In and around the area? Dr. Botton. These were done off of Pensacola, I believe, on EPA’s Stage I. So it is a field study but it was not done at the Flower Gardens. It was simply done with drilling muds that are used in the Gulf of Mexico. Mr. Wyatt. That would be during the time of drilling? Dr. Botton. These were muds taken off of drilling rigs during operations and then layered or mixed with azenic muds on trays which were set out along with control trays and larval organisms were allowed to settle on those trays. The control trays were com- pared with the experimental trays. The results indicated that, yes, the benthic community was affected. Mr. Wyatt. For what length of time? Dr. Botton. It was the length of the larval settling. I am not sure what the period of time used was. It was long enough to get a crop of larval organisms. Mr. Wyatt. Which would lead us to believe that there is a reduction—— Dr. Botton. That there is some change, certainly, in the Benthic community as a result of the presence of drilling fluids. Mr. Wyatt. Can you project from that kind of a study what the ultimate damage would be to the entire Gulf of Mexico or to a certain portion of the Gulf of Mexico? Dr. Botton. That is one of a complex of studies which will be used to make that type of assessment. But all of the studies are not completed. . Mr. Wyatt. How long will it be before the studies are completed? Dr. Botton. I believe our field scientists are planning to com- plete the effects studies by 1982. Mr. Wyatt. This is being done off the coast of Florida? Dr. Botton. These studies are part of a comprehensive program. Part of it is being done off Florida and in the gulf area, but part of it also is being done in New England in a number of marine labs. A lot of the work is being done by marine researchers as contrac- tors for EPA, paid for by EPA. Mr. Wyatt. In collecting samples do you find a greater, higher residue of toxicity in the Gulf of Mexico that could be attributed to drilling muds than you do in other areas? Dr. Botton. You certainly find higher concentrations of some of the heavy metals than you would find in many other areas. That is what makes much of the field studies very difficult to interpret, because the baseline of heavy metal contamination is so high. Initial experimental sampling that might be considered a signifi- cant increase in heavy metals concentration with a low baseline would be statistically nonsignificant given the high baseline. So it makes it difficult to make those interpretations in the Gulf of Mexico and certainly to extrapolate to other areas. ie Wyatt. Because you start with a higher baseline of heavy metals. 137 Dr. Botton. For instance, if you were to have a baseline of heavy metal concentration of 50 to 100 parts per million (ppm), perhaps in Baltimore Canyon or Georges Bank, you might typically find a baseline of 300 or 400 ppm in some parts of the Gulf of Mexico. These are purely hypothetical values. An increase of 5 to 10 ppm would be significant in the first instance, and not significant in the latter. The starting level of the contamination of the muds is much higher. Whether all of the contamination in the gulf is from drill- ing effluents is questionable; I certainly would not want to be held to it. There is an awful lot of contamination in the Gulf of Mexico coming from the Mississippi River which spreads across a good bit of the northeastern gulf shelf. Mr. Wyatt. Have we shown damage from heavy metals, the difference in the 3 to 400 parts per million? Dr. BoLton. There are a number of studies which could indicate that the level of chromium and other heavy metals found certainly could be a cause of concern. Chromium is one of the higher con- stituent metals of drilling fluids. Cadmium is also found in higher concentrations in the area, and that is a very toxic metal. Mr. Wyatt. That has shown up in shrimp, fish? Dr. Botton. These references are from sediment studies. Mr. Wyatt. Well, what is the problem with those high concentra- tions, I guess is what I am asking. Dr. Botton. All right. Many fish and other organisms feed on and in the benthos, in the muddy substrate. And if organisms are living in that material and are benthic feeders, they may concen- trate or at least accumulate a certain amount of heavy metals from that sediment. Those organisms in turn can be eaten by other organisms. So it is very possible to pass concentrations of heavy metals through the food chain. The example used before of Mina- mato Bay in Japan, with mercury contamination, is a good demon- stration of this effect. Mr. Wyatt. You then from these basic studies of sediment have detected a higher concentration of either cadmium or chromium in shrimp from the Gulf of Mexico? Dr. Botton. In the sediment. I am basing most of what I am saying on sediment data. BLM’s EIS on one of the gulf areas specifically makes reference to the higher concentrations of heavy metals 2 years after the location of the drilling rig. Mr. Wyatt. Of the what? Dr. Botton. Of a rig in a sediment area. So I am really basing my comments on the sediment concentrations. I am not that famil- iar with the concentrations of the heavy metals in the organisms, not so much because some of those measurements have not been made, but in many cases because the measurements were made of whole animals rather than of organs where metals might be con- centrated. This approach results in an immediate dilution of the concentrations of heavy metals. Mr. Stupps. We will go around again if the gentleman has more So adgcais I want to slip in, if I may, some questions that remain ere. Will the EPA discharge permits be submitted to the States for Pate eas determinations under the Coastal Zone Management ct! 138 Ms. Compton. I believe they have to be. Mr. Stupps. They will? Ms. Compton. I believe so. Mr. Stupps. OK. Ms. Compton. We have already been meeting with some of the States with regard to coastal zone management compliance. Mr. Stupps. Your proposed rule for ocean discharge criteria re- quires that an NPDES permit applicant must analyze all alterna- tive methods of reducing or eliminating pollutants. I assume that in the case of drill muds, barging offsite is one such possible alternative? Ms. Compton. Certainly. Mr. Stupps. If you reach the determination that you could not justify granting a permit for dumping into the water of these materials, is your statutory responsibility such that all you could do would be to simply deny that permit or could you also require or recommend alternative methods of disposition? Ms. Compton. Well, it seems to me that we could put in the permit a limitation that would not allow the discharge of the drilling muds and cuttings and that it would be up to the appli- cant, the discharger, to find a place to take his;drilling muds and cuttings. Mr. Stupps. Now if you, in an OCS area, were to deny permis- sion to discharge the drill muds, does the Department of the Interi- or, to your knowledge, have the statutory authority by virtue of some other statute to ignore your recommendation and somehow proceed in the granting under their permitting process of authority to dump the discharge? Ms. Compton. I believe that we have exclusive authority under the Clean Water Act to determine what discharges go into the ocean. Mr. Stupps. So whether or not Interior agreed with your find- ings, they would be final under the law with respect to these requests? Ms. Compton. That is right. Mr. Stupps. You made reference, heaven help us all, to a new task force for drilling muds and formation waters. Does it actually do research? What is it, who is on it, when was it established, and what a its relation to the famous biological task force on Georges ank? Dr. Botton. It is chaired by a representative from the Office of Research and Development. Mr. Stupps. Is that an EPA task force? Ms. Compton. It is an internal task force to coordinate the Ocean Programs and Research and Development Offices and other techni- cal offices to make sure we all know what we are doing. Mr. Stupps. I see. You don’t have a task force for intertask force relationships, do you? Ms. Compton. I am sure we do. Mr. Stupps. I am sure you do. I am sure someone thinks they are interfacing. When do you think your regulations on ocean dis- charge will be final? Ms. Compton. We are under court order to promulgate those regulations by September 30, 1980. 139 Mr. Stupps. 1980? Ms. Compton. Right. Mr. Stupps. You did make reference at one point in your testi- mony to some regulations being ready in approximately 18 months. What were they? Ms. Compton. Those are new source performance standards for the offshore oil and gas subcategory of oil and gas production or oil and gas facilities. Mr. Stupps. When do you expect to issue draft permits for Georges Bank? Ms. Compton. By December of this year. That is the schedule that we have right now. We expect that the bioassay and bioaccu- mulation data to be into the region 1 office in Boston by the middle of September. We have some of it now. Mr. Stupps. So extrapolation can get under way in earnest by the end of September? Ms. Compton. We will be reviewing the data on an ongoing process. Mr. Stupps. Dr. Bolton, you look like you were about to say something. Dr. Botton. No, I am just cold. Mr. Stupps. It is very cold. Dr. Bouton. Yes. Mr. Stupps. Are there any other questions? Mr. Breaux? Mr. BrEAuXx. What I am trying to get set in my mind is that a permittee who applies for a permit from EPA gives you the concen- trations of all of the chemicals that make up drilling fluids—is that correct? Ms. Compton. And then what? Mr. BREAvx. Is that correct, so far, a permittee who applies for a discharge permit to discharge drilling mud, you ask them to pro- vide you with information and I take it from your testimony what you ask them to provide you is the makeup of the drilling muds andthe concentrations of various chemicals that make up drilling mud? Ms. Compton. We ask them for the chemical elements in the drilling muds and for the concentrations. I would steer away from the word makeup. Mr. Breaux. You don’t get the percentages but you get the concentrations of the chemicals that comprise the drilling fluids? Ms. Compton. Yes. Mr. BrREAUx. What do you do with it then? Ms. Compton. The information? Mr. BREAUxX. Yes. Ms. Compton. Well, we are also waiting for more information, as I indicated earlier, from the applicants to determine whether those chemicals and those particular muds will cause acute or chronic toxic effect on the marine organisms that may be—— Mr. Breaux. Is there a Federal statute somewhere that says that the applicant has to bear that burden or is that a regulatory decision on the part of EPA? Ms. Compton. I believe section 308 of the Clean Water Act gives us the authority to request from any applicant or any discharger 69-848 O - 81 - 10 140 information that would enable us to make a decision on the impact of their activities on the receiving—— Mr. BrREAux. Suppose an applicant says, “Look, there are 18,000 studies on this, I don’t know which one to believe. People are studying the studies. But here is the concentration, I want a permit.” Can you deny the permit without showing that it is harmful? Ms. Compton. We can ask him for the bioassay and bioaccumula- tion data. If he doesn’t submit that data, I believe we have the authority to deny the permit. Mr. Breavx. That is kind of big—you believe. Are you in charge of granting the permits for EPA? Ms. Compton. Yes, I am. Mr. BreAux. You are not sure whether the burden is on the applicant or is on the EPA to say this is not healthy? That is the critical point, whose burden it is? Ms. Compton. I agree. And it is my understanding if they do not submit the data that we think is necessary to make a decision on whether they can discharge a particular pollutant, we can deny them a permit to discharge the pollutant. But I would feel more comfortable in supplementing the record. Mr. Breaux. I would like to see it, not only for the record, I would like you to submit to me and also to the committee an answer to exactly what I asked, whose burden it is? I get somewhat disturbed by our Government that can say unless you can prove it is not harmful, we are going to say you can’t do it. It seems to me it is incumbent on the part of the Government and regulation Saying in our opinion you have given us this information and our studies indicate that it is not something we can accept. But the information I have here this morning is we have a lot of studies and everybody is studying the studies but none of them are definitive and final. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to make a case that they would in no way create potential harm; that is, a permit would never be granted under that scenario? Ms. Compton. Congress, in section 403 of the Clean Water Act, I emphasize, gave the EPA the responsibility to determine with regard to ocean dischargers whether there would be degradation of those waters; in order to make that determination we need the information called for in the act. Mr. BreAvx. They give you information on what they are dump- ing in the water, there is no question about that, is there? Ms. Compton. No. Mr. Breaux. Then it is incumbent upon EPA to make the deci- sion whether it is harmful or not; it is not the burden of the applicant. Ms. Compton. OK, I misunderstood your earlier question. We can ask them for information to determine its toxicity but not necessar- ily what actual degradation that will occur. Mr. Breaux. That is EPA’s burden. Is that EPA’s burden? Ms. Compton. I would feel more comfortable if I provided this in a supplemental statement. Mr. Breaux. I know you have been only 3 months and I don’t know what Congress is about after 8 years. I can’t expect you to know all the answers in 3 months, obviously. But that is one of the 141 crucial questions, whether it is your agency’s responsibility to make a determination when they submit these ingredients whether or not it could be harmful. That is the basis of whether or not a permit is granted. If it is not harmful, a permit will be issued. My question is: Who makes the question on the potential harm, EPA or the applicant for the permit? There seems to be some question about that. So if you could, I would like a response in writing to the committee and also to me which would spell out how that is being handled within EPA’s shop. Ms. Compton. I will be happy to provide that. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Wyatt, did you ask for time? Mr. Wyatt. Yes. Can you tell me if you have any evidence that shows that the shellfish, for instance, coming from the Gulf of Mexico are harmful to people who eat it at all, after 30, 40 years of drilling in the gulf, as well as a result of effluents coming into the gulf from various rivers, et cetera? Dr. Botton. I am not that familiar with the public health aspect with the banning of shellfish in the gulf. Mr. Wyatt. You mean of all the studies that have been made. I don’t know how many have been made. Dr. Botton. I know shellfish were banned in the New England area after one of the oil spills. Human health was the rationale for the ban. Mr. Wyatt. For how long? Dr. BoLTon. I am not sure of the length of time. Mr. Stupps. We have had shellfish beds closed on many occa- sions, some of them for years at a time, because of oil spills, 10 years in one instance. Mr. Wyatt. However, in terms of the Gulf of Mexico, you are unaware that seafood taken from the gulf, seafood, any kind, have ever been banned in this country because of toxic levels in that seafood? Dr. Botton. I am not familiar with the banning of seafood from the gulf for that reason. Mr. Wyatt. Do you know how close we have come to that? Do you have any idea? Dr. Botton. I wouldn’t have any idea. I am sure there have been shellfish areas in the gulf, though, that have been closed off for one reason or another. It may be human waste pollution rather than oil and gas. But I would be very surprised if there had not been shellfish areas that had been closed. Mr. Wyatt. There ought to be some end result we are looking for here, not just, you know, making studies and running tests. Dr. Botton. In Mobile Bay, I know that no discharge is allowed because it is a shellfish bed. So they do not allow any discharge in that area. There must be some rationale for that State having that ban. It would suggest that there was some reason for them not allowing the discharges on the shellfish. Mr. Wyatt. But you are unaware of why that was done? Did the State of Alabama make that determination? Dr. Botton. I am sure the State must have been concerned about the effects of the discharges on the shellfish, however, the industry was not allowed to discharge because of the shellfishery. 142 Mr. Wyatt. I think that is fine, but it would appear further in your work at some point in time we would look to the final result, to me, which would be the logical conclusion and that is the damage being done, the high levels of toxic material that would be found in shellfish or seafood taken from the Gulf of Mexico because I would think that is what you—— Dr. Botton. I know there is research being done at the New England Aquarium laboratory for EPA on shellfish from New Eng- land, looking at the bioaccumulation of heavy metals from animals exposed to drilling discharges. Mr. Wyatt. If possible, Mr. Chairman, I would like for EPA to furnish this committee with the instances where we have stopped selling, or removing, seafood or shellfish, et cetera, from the Gulf of Mexico. Mr. Stupps. I would like to say to the gentleman, I don’t think that is within the jurisdiction of EPA. Those kinds of determina- tions are probably FDA determinations and that would go to the agency responsible for that question. They are not making any such claim. The gentleman is not challenging that oil is bad for fish? Mr. Wyatt. Of course not. I want to know how bad it is for fish. Mr. Stupps. Very bad. Mr. Wyatt. We don’t know apparently. Mr. Stupps. I am going to ask the gentleman’s permission to interrupt. Mr. Pritchard wanted to know the time frame for the Beaufort Sea draft permits? Ms. Compton. We have just received four applications there and are processing them; we are waiting for some more data. It may be as long as a year. Mr. Stupps. Well into the Reagan administration. Tell Mr. Prit- chard that. Let me say, I appreciate your patience. You have borne up well. I have not enforced the 5-minute rule to put it mildly on myself or other members of the subcommittee, and under the circumstances you have acquitted yourself very well indeed. Mr. Breaux left again, but I was pressing as to whose responsibil- ity it is to determine whether or not a discharge would be harmful. I think the statute which has been cited so much today, section 403 of the Clean Water Act, makes that explicit and clear beyond any question, it is EPA’s responsibility because Congress decided in that public law some 8 years ago that it would be. The administra- tive agency is charged with the promulgation of guidelines for determining degradation of the waters. You are also charged, I cannot resist reminding you one more time, in the event of insuffi- cient information to make that determination, not to permit any such discharge in question. Ms. Compton. My question with regard to that and my inability to answer with certain determination is because section 308 of the act allows us to collect whatever data we need to make a decision with regard to discharges into the water. And that may shift the burden back to industry who wants the discharge with regard to supplying that information. Mr. Stunpps. If they want it, they have to come to you and they have to present persuasive information. 148 Ms. Compton. That is one of the interpretations of reading the two sections together. Mr. Stupps. But the final evaluation of that data is yours, not theirs. Ms. Compton. Absolutely. Mr. Stupps. That is very clear. The record as I say will remain open. Members may wish to submit questions in writing to both agencies. Also in the record will appear the letter which I referred to from the Commandant of the Coast:Guard to Acting Chairman Ashley of this committee. Thank you again for your patience and your attendance. You have one more thing you wish to say? Ms. Compton. I do. I hope the committee will understand the position which the agency is in given the line of questioning from the two different positions that we heard today, and the difficulty with which we face very complex questions. _ Mr. Stupps. The difficulty of the agency’s position is abundantly and increasingly clear. I think the reference you make as you sit here being battered both from the gulf coast and from New Eng- land points up what I meant when I said what ought to be a scientific problem I think has become, to an extent which I deplore, a political rather than a scientific question. Your agency ought, in my opinion, to be making scientific judgments in accordance with the mandates of the statute. I realize—in addition, you live in the same world of political reality that we all do. As you point out, today’s hearing demon- strates clearly some of the conflicting pressures to which the Ad- cubis ator is subjected. That presumably is why he is so highly paid. Thank you very much. [The information follows:] U.S. Coast GUARD, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1980. Hon. THomas L. ASHLEY, Acting Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. CuHaiRMAN: I am concerned that information concerning the Coast Guard’s open water pollution response plans and objectives, which appears on pages 12 and 32 of House Report No. 96-909 (accompanying H.R. 6672), may be mislead- ing. The national response goals established by the President’s March 17, 1977 Oil Pollution message are not being implemented by the Coast Guard, nor are we in the process of deploying high seas containment and cleanup equipment at eleven strate- gic sites around the U.S. to respond to an oil spill of 100,000 tons within 6 hours. The strategy recommended in the Transportation System Center Study of 1977 has been modified in the light of later experience. Specifically the Secretary of Transportation has approved for planning purposes a three year projects to improve spill response at 11 high risk areas around the country. Equipment would be stockpiled and maintained at facilities with the objective of attaining a nationwide, aggregate oil recovery capacity of 200 tons of oil per hour, conditions permitting. Implementation of this plan depends on the normal budget process, to begin in fiscal year 1982. A small amount of the equipment ultimately needed to meet this objective is now in place at three Coast Guard Strike Team locations, but as noted in the Report on H.R. 6672, more equipment and storage facilities will be needed. If the need for a further federal effort is demonstrated, the Coast Guard has suggested a ten year program expansion to a 8,300-10,000 ton/day regional goal. At this time, though, it is difficult to forecast that far into the future. Although a prototype Zero Relative Velocity skimmer has been developed through Coast Guard R&D, a final decision to go forward with a production model has not 144 been made as yet, and, in any event, this small vessel is not designed for open water recovery operations. It does appear to be a significant advance in state of the art machinery capable of working in high currents encountered in relatively protected waters. Quite candidly, I must say that I don not believe there now exists an in place capability to effectively respond to a major oil or hazardous substance spill on the OCS or Fisheries conservation zone. It will take some time before this situation improves. Sincerely, J. B. HayEs, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant. QUESTIONS OF Mr. StupDS AND ANSWERS Question I. In the past, the Coast Guard has suffered from a lack of barging capability to carry spilled oil to disposal sites. Has this deficiency been corrected? Answer. We have found that ocean service barges and suitable support vessels exist in too few numbers in most areas to permit the establishment of local standby contracts. Also operators are reluctant to interrupt existing contracts with regular employers to provide vessels on short notice. To help fill the gap when a barge is not immediately available to carry spilled oil to disposal sites, we have procured 11 portable rubber bladders ranging in size from 10,000 to 240,000 gallons. In addition, offshore drilling operators are being required to address the need for tank vessels or portable storage containers for the recovered oil/water mixture in their contingency planning. Question 2. Could you provide a full inventory of containment and clean up equipment and its location which is currently available for use by the Coast Guard? Answer. The Coast Guard utilizes all available resources, including those from commercial contractors when possible, for cleaning up pollution incidents. We assuine however, that your question refers to the quantity of Coast Guard equip- ment available for open water use when the required resource is not available in the commercial sector. In the area of offshore open water recovery and containment, the Coast Guard presently has 19 skimming barriers (612-ft. each) of the type we used at the Cam- peche Well site and 4 skimming barrier pumping systems. The inventory includes 16 Adapts which are high capacity pumping units used to offload bulk liquid cargo from a stricken vessel, 2 viscous oil pumping systems and 11 portable storage bladders, ranging in size from 10,000 to 240,000 gallon capacity. We also own 2 large rotating disk skimmers though they are not designed for truly open water use. This equipment is located at our strike team locations on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts with the mix varying according to National and International needs and maintenance requirements. We are presently budgeted to increase our inven- tory skimming of barriers to 26 by 1982. These we plan to store at suitable high risk areas. Question 3. Given the Coast Guard’s inability to fulfill all of its inspection require- ments under the OCSLAA due to a shortage of personnel, what sort of inspection program for offshore drilling rigs is planned for Georges Bank? Answer. Because of resource limitations the Coast Guard is emphasizing inspec- tions of mobile offshore drilling units and manned platforms, and omitting required inspections of unmanned units. The units that will engage in exploratory drilling on Georges Bank will be mobile offshore drilling units and will all be inspected. Inspections are generally conducted prior to the start of drilling operations and as necessary thereafter. The Coast Guard has established a Marine Safety Detachment at Hyannis, Massachusetts staffed with four personnel to perform this function. This detachment is colocated with the U.S. Geological Survey Office in Hyannis. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. Coast GUARD, Washington, D.C., October 15, 1980. Hon. Epwin B. Forsytue, and Hon. Joe, PritcHARD, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. ForsyTHE and Mr. PritcHarp: Thank you for your letter of September 15, 1980, forwarding additional questions for the record on the testimony of Captain Charles Corbett, Chief, Marine Environmental Response Division, who appeared 145 before the Oceanography Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on August 26, 1980. Our responses are an enclosure to this letter. We appreciate your continued interest in this topic area. Sincerely, J. B. HAyEs, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant. Enclosures. QUESTIONS OF Mr. ForsyTHE AND Mr. PriTCcHARD WITH ANSWERS Question 1. What is your definition of a major oil spill of the size referred to in your statement? What is the flow rate of the blowout, the duration of the blowout, as well as the total level of spill in relationship to time? Answer. Within the context of OCS activities, we consider a major oil spill to be one which is discharging (or expected to discharge) at the flow rate of 1000 barrels during a 24 hour period. Since any blowout would include the threat of such a flowrate, it would be considered a major incident. There may be other occasions when a spill of lower actual discharge would be considered major; for example if an especially sensitive environmental condition existed at the time of the spill. Question 2“. What do you mean by your statement that you could not respond to a major oil spill? Does that mean you could not attempt to contain or disperse the spill, or does it mean you could not completely recover the oil? Please be specific on all accounts. Answer. Indeed, weather conditions permitting, we would attempt to contain, recover or disperse the spill (providing the discharger was not taking adequate action). It would be a rare occasion when, even with good weather, we could recover all of the oil. We do not believe that there exists an inplace capability to be fully responsive to a major oil spill on the OCS. Question 3. Have you ever claimed you could completely retain and recover the oil from a major oil spill? Answer. We have no recollection of consciously claiming that we could completely retain and recover the oil from an offshore discharge. On the other hand, we have often said recently, that oil spills are difficult to deal with, often hampered by weather, and that there is no one universal mechanism with which to address all discharges. Question 4. In cleanup operations and potential harm, is there a difference be- tween a tanker spill of refined products and crude oil? Answer. Refined products transported by tanker range from very light gasolines to heavy bunker oil, all of which are derived from crude oil. Generally, the lighter refined products are more toxic than the heavy refined products and crude oils. The type of cleanup operation and the potential harm from any of these oils, including crude, is largely dependent on the quantity spilled, the location, time of year, weather, current and wave action and other factors. The light refined products are more harmful because they mix more easily and impact a wide range of aquatic life. The heavy refined products and crude oils make a more visible mess but are relatively less toxic and easier to recover. Question 5. As you know, today’s state of the art in oil and gas operations far surpasses that which existed just eight or ten years ago. With this in mind, and to put things in proper perspective, how many major oil spills that have been caused by blowouts have occurred on the OCS in the past ten years, and how many have created significant recreational or biological harm? Answer. Our records indicate that since 1973, there have been 23 oil/gas blowouts from offshore production facilities. The record of oil spill quantity from blowouts is not accurately attainable. The Coast Guard would consider any blowout as a major incident or a potential major spill. In our view the two most significant discharges from offshore operations were the Santa Barbara Spill and the Chevron Platform spill. Both created recreational disruption. We have reports that the Santa Barbara spill resulted in biological harm. The degree of biological harm resulting from oil spills is highly controversial, even within the scientific community. Question 6. What entity actually has the responsibility to retain and clean-up crude oil spills as a result of OCS oil and gas activities? What procedures are involved, what stand-by safety measures are in effect, and what (subjective or objective) is your opinion of the record that has been established over the past seven to ten years? Answer. The lease operator has the responsibility to retain and clean-up crude oil spills as a result of OCS oil and gas activities. The Coast Guard provides technical 146 review of the lease operator’s oil spill contingency plan and advises the USGS on the adequacy of spill response, cleanup equipment and procedures. An MOU be- tween USGS and the Coast Guard that will formalize this arrangement is under development. Of course, if the discharger fails to take adequate action the Coast Guard would declare a Federal action and initiate a response. It is our opinion that the industry has had a good record over the past seven to ten years. Question 7. What role does the Coast Guard play in blowout clean-ups, what is the procedure, and how many times has the Coast Guard been involved in clean-up activity relating to U.S. OCS oil and gas activity over the past year? Please be specific. Answer. In accordance with National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the Coast Guard provides the On Scene Coordination (OSC), and would chair the Regional and National Response Teams. The OCS would engage those commercial and federal capabilities he judges necessary to address the dis- charge. This would occur only if the Coast Guard determined that the response action by the discharger was inadequate. In 1978, the Coast Guard was involved in 52 oil discharges from OCS offshore production facilities and no oil discharges from offshore pipelines. These amounted to 0.4 percent of the total number of oil spills in the U.S. that year. In 1979, the statistics are 21 oil discharges, and one oil discharge from the same Patines categories, amounting to 0.2 percent of the total number of oil spills in the U.S. None of these spills required significant Coast Guard response activity. Question 8. In your judgment, should there be or is there anything startling about your statement concerning your inability to perform clean-up operations in greater than ten foot waves or 20-knot winds? Answer. In our judgment, there is nothing startling about the inability to perform clean-up operations in greater than ten foot seas and 20 foot winds. As stated in the testimony, significant natural dispersion of oil takes place in 8-10 foot seas and in such conditions surface recovery operations may not be feasible, one reason being that people cannot fully or safely perform under such circumstances. Question 9. Does industry have any advantage over the Coast Guard in their ability to respond to, handle, or to control oil spills resulting from blowouts? Answer. Industry contingency planning is developed to respond to a known threat and of a narrow range of products at a specific location. The equipment can be maintained near the threatened area and logistics can be well planned ahead of time. The Coast Guard, on the other hand, is required to respond to spills over a wide area with uncertain volumes of a large range of products. In consequence, Coast Guard equipment is generally more portable, being transported in lightweight modules, covers a larger spectrum on oil and hazardous substances and is usable in a wider range of sea or environmental conditions. Transport delays can be expected and there may be times when, due to the multi purpose nature of the equipment, site specific hardware would be more effective. Question 10. How many clean-up operations have actually been conducted by the Coast Guard since 1970 resulting from blowouts by U.S. OCS operators? Question 11. How many clean-up operations of oil spills resulting from U.S. OCS blowouts has the Coast Guard been involved with in any capacity, and what was that capacity? Answer. Our records indicate that there have been 23 offshore blowouts reported to the Coast Guard since 1973. The role of the Coast Guard has been to monitor the eeonep and mitigation activities performed by the parties responsible for the dis- charge. Question 12. How many clean-up operations resulting from tanker spills has the Gs a been involved with since 1970? Please be specific and include products involved. Answer. Coast Guard tanker spill data for 1973-1979 is provided in Enclosure (2). Question 13. During clean-up operations, isn’t it a fact that high winds and rough seas are a benefit in cleaning up a spill (such as occurred during the Bay of Campeche cleanup operations)? Isn’t it also a fact that crude oil that mixes with the water column is actually broken down because of the natural events that occur when crude oil mixes with sea water? Answer. High winds and rough seas will always hamper an operation at sea. A storm will decrease the efficiency of the operation and increase the risk to person- nel. On the other hand such weather can, if carrying the oil away from an environ- mentally or economically sensitive area, improve the overall situation by reducing or eliminating the impact and subsequent stress of spilled oil on those areas. Oil when released to the environment begins a biodegradation process. Some oil mixes with the water right away, but most remains as a part of the slick. It is true 147 that breaking waves, or whitecaps, mix the oil into the water column faster. This does not necessarily speed up the biodegradation process. In fact, when the storm subsides, much of the oil that was mixed may return to the surface. It may take years for the natural process to entirely cope with an oil spill. Even with our best efforts, impacted areas often take a long time to recover. Question 14. How does our current ability to deal with an oil spill resulting from a U.S. OCS blowout relate to the U.S. record of blowouts over the past ten years? Answer. Our current offshore response capability was discussed at length during Captain Corbett’s testimony. Our projected offshore capability includes the acquisi- tion of 26 mechanical recovery systems by the fall of 1981. Based on industry’s capabilities in addition to ours, we feel the response posture for spills resulting from OCS blowouts will be rather good in 1981. We must keep in mind, however, that Coast Guard resources are used for vessel, pipeline, and other source mishaps as well as for OCS activities. Our emphasis for OCS activities is to see that the industry itself develops the capability to respond. Question 15. On March 17, 1977, the President sent a message to Congress request- ing that legislation be passed in order that we will be able to contain an oil spill by achieving a response time of six hours, and to handle a spill of 100,000 tons. This request was in response to the Argo Merchant breakup—a tanker containing refined products. How does this request relate to OCS blowouts, as compared to the more frequent and dangerous tanker spills? Answer. The goal which the President set for the Coast Guard in his message of 17 March 1977 has been used as a planning factor in the development of Coast Guard open water response. Proposed industry response requirements for spills related to OCS activity were considered in an effort to be consistent with the response goal mentioned in the President’s message. At the time of the President’s message on reducing pollution of the ocean we had no equipment which would permit the recovery of oil in seas greater than 5 feet regardless of the source. Since that time, we have modified devices for oil recovery at sea and developed techniques that would permit us to deploy these devices in up to approximately 10-foot seas. Regardless of whether the source of a discharge on open water is a tanker or an OCS blowout, the response effort would most likely involve the same equipment and techniques. Question 16. During questioning, Captain Corbett stated that, “the main thrust of our activities on the OCS is not to provide Coast Guard equipment, but to insist. . . to insist that operators have the contingency plans, operating procedures, the equip- ment to fully respond within six hours to an oil spill on the OCS”. . ‘ing was this policy instituted, and what has industry’s response to that policy een? Answer. The USGS requires planning for pollution prevention and control in their OCS Orders Governing Oil and Gas Lease Operations. These Orders were extensively revised in 1979. The recent revisions reflect the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 and contain requirements for the development of Oil Spill Contingency Plans. More specific equipment and operational guidelines were developed and transmitted by the Coast Guard for the consideration of the USGS Area Oil and Gas Supervisor, Region I, in March, 1980. These guidelines will be used in the review of oil spill Contingency Plans for Georges Bank. Question 17. Could you please give an update on the state-of-the-art in oil spill skimmer technology? Is the Coast Guard’s skimming barrier considered to be “state- of-the-art”’ and would it be required in an industry contingency plan? Answer. As stated in Captain Corbett’s opening remarks, the state-of-the-art for mechanical oil recovery seems to be operations in 8 to 10 foot seas and 20 knot winds. The skimming barrier in the Coast Guard’s inventory has operated in these conditions. This specific device is not required in an OCS operator’s equipment inventory. A device with comparable performance characteristics would be required. Question 18. If a large-scale oil spill occurred near Port Angeles, Washington, what would be the probable Coast Guard response in terms of time, equipment and other Coast Guard resources? Answer. A large-scale oil spill occurring near Port Angeles would probably re- quire response by the Pacific Strike Team located at Hamilton AFB near San Francisco, California. We estimate it would take 4-5 hours after a request is made to have an aircraft fully loaded enroute to the nearest Port Angeles airport with a three hour flight time. This response would depend upon the availability of aircraft and weather conditions permitting flying. Containment and recovery operations would commence as soon as suitable vehicles and support vessels capable of trans- porting, deploying and operating the response equipment are made available and the transport executed. 148 Question 19. Captain Corbett testified that operating capability of open Ocean oil recovery equipment will likely not exceed current state-of-the-art of eight to ten foot seas and 20 knot winds, and that in addition to hazard to personnel and equipment in more severe sea states an oil spill will not remain on the ocean’s surface in sufficient quantity to make mechanical clean-up feasible. Given these facts, why has the Coast Guard not advocated the use of low toxicity dispersants in such conditions such as are commonly used throughout the remainder of the world? Would not the use of dispersants as an acceptable tool increase the U.S. response capability to a satisfactory level? Captain Corbett when discussing use of dispersants commented, ‘Sometimes when we disperse, we do it intentionally. That is not necessarily good. It might save Amenity Beach but it might kill a fish or two... ’’ Please comment on the known effects of low toxicity dispersants on fish populations. Answer. Until recently, there were very few low toxicity dispersants. Even now there is disagreement in the scientific community on the effects of dispersants. Our policy recognizes the fact that the situation is being clarified and that dispersants are a useful option. Of course, any dispersant use would be under the provisions of Annex X of the National Contingency Plan, a copy of which is enclosed. Also enclosed is a portion of a U.K. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food report on research into the toxicity and control criteria of oil dispersants which we obtained from the USEPA. We suggest any further inquiries be directed to that agency which is the lead agency and has overall responsibility for the government policy on the use of dispersants. Question 20. Captain Corbett stated, in effect, that oil spill clean-up equipment in the Philadelphia area is inadequate for the OCS. Was this equipment designed for OCS operations and does its presence, in fact, have any relationship to OCS oper- ations? Is the Coast Guard aware of industry clean-up equipment dedicated to mid- Atlantic OCS operations? Is such equipment designed to operate in the OCS? On what basis have the 11 sites for stockpiling Coast Guard clean-up equipment: been chosen? Answer. While a large number of commercial contractors and cleanup coopera- tives exist in the Philadelphia area, most specialize in shore cleanup and have equipment that functions in protected waters and near shore locations. Our experi- ences have indicated that there is insufficient call for offshore equipment to make the large capital investment needed to maintain this capability attractive to the commercial sector unless stimulated by requirements such as those that are cur- rently intended for activities on the Georges Bank. We have requested from the USGS a specimen of mid-Atlantic contingency plans and will forward a copy when received. In answer to your second question, the eleven sites were chosen on the basis of a spill risk analysis based on historical spill data. The study identified locations of expected spills and was the key to site area selection. Question 21. Does the Naval Weather Service Detachment have cumulative prob- ability distribution data on wind speeds and wave height for the Georges Bank area to support that published in the EIS for Sale 42? Is or is not the wave height less than 10 to 12 feet greater than 90 percent of the time? Answer. The Coast Guard has no independent data to support or challenge the findings of the studies cited in the EIS concerning the sea conditions on Georges Bank. We understand that NOAA, under the supervision of the office of Environ- mental Data and Information Service is undertaking a ‘Climatological Oil Spill paeahe Guide for Coastal Federal Region I’ which should shed much light on this subject. Question 22. What type of capability does the Coast Guard envision for responding to spills in the Gulf of Alaska resulting from OCS activities? Answer. The Coast Guard plans to treat the Gulf of Alaska as other OCS Areas. The USGS has published OCS orders governing oil and gas operations which require the lessee to provide an oil spill contingency plan including an equipment inventory. This will greatly increase industry’s capability. The Coast Guard plans to maintain pollution response equipment at our Pacific Strike Team location, presently Hamil- ton AFB, near San Francisco; at or near Seattle, WA and Kodiak, AK. Equipment and people from the locations would be the first to respond from Coast Guard owned resources. The Coast Guard is also coordinating our Research and Development and response efforts with those of Canadian officials. Question 23. Could you explain precisely from your perspective the role of the Coast Guard, the Department of the Interior, and the industry in the development, evaluation, and approval of an oil spill contingency plan? Answer. The USGS requires, through their OCS orders governing oil and gas lease operations, that an Oil Spill Contingency Plan be submitted by the lessee for 149 approval. By informal agreement the Coast Guard reviews the plans and makes comments and recommendations to USGS. This procedure is being formalized in a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies. Coast Guard tanker spill data for 1973-1979 is provided in the following table. TANKERS SPILLS WITH COAST GUARD RESPONSE Material Light crude: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Heavy crude: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Natural gasoline: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Gasoline: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Jet fuel: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Kerosene: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Distillate: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Naphtha: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Mineral spirits: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Solvent: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Light diesel: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Heavy diesel: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Number 4 fuel oil: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Number 5 fuel oil: Number of spills Total gallons Sum recovered Number 6 fuel oil: Number of spills Total gallons 1973 1974 ee 113 14] etthestsiies 560,264 = 1,479,199 Pces tis 664,344 312,897 eee 66 114 TO Sevsaisasseet 1,536,107 341,385 pa Me 826,569 314,227 Beato l 3 ie ee 10 65 Seater ener Serre 60 eet 24 44 ee 99,708 137,373 ee ieee 3,862 3,250 edesicnneh 12 9 “oats 2,163 967 Ba sseistastes 863 262 ee 7 4 Beaters 927 77,901 Peet 429 3,646 Barents 10 19 Lee ee 1,878 4,693 Bie, 295 2,947 Jissacee 6 3 en ln 335 109 ee oe na ee 1 Sree ere PRE 8 15 Reheat erie eee 14 “ater 76 89 deeesiseosttiesne 378,459 42,378 Ree ae 2 64,430 13,452 ees 2] 24 Saree 11,200 3,386 ee seer 7,634 1,828 ee 2] 37 ae eee 2,604 44836 eee 1,504 44234 spears 6 5 De ceeds 9,075 742 Reveal 9,015 681 ers 225 233 Hares 117,440 1,058,722 1975 31 855,429 832,878 10 1,138 413 9 480 155 15 36,908 31,368 2 25 23 131,804 99,624 9 74,470 74,454 181 631,665 1976 1977 1978 1979 lll 120 159 138 497,553 9,674,885 33,024 910,206 66,095 27,413 12/882; surmise. 97 101 94 64 358,127 84,642 36,045 88,171 76,912 38,894 15,287 75,325 si ison hoes 1 5 3 168 4,309 Dine eee: ee rtiecttere Reeek oret erate 7A erence cee er 39 44 48 3] 19,090 80,811 271,773 400,983 6,449 78,617 86,829 28,759 r) 2 14 12 395,848 6 669,102 4°633 (4 Scere cece 148 4/249 ] 6 9 3 10 17,507 2,152 94 8 8,802 1,860 8 13 ll 9 12 1,042 1,003 124,835 2,165 739 908 983 32 sacar a. 4 l 5 Sag etiicss ditt 495 3 137 eee NNSA aeececcescrenacseerees 5 Pia AUP Ad ee et aes d he ob aren 1 fame ai cence aa erbmente teats elssoseeoetviser 25 Pe age eh 3 2 2 eater 1,060 ll 78 seater eerie DISD) coatadecteeadensento 82 114 98 123 105 24,141 270,856 293,213 207,831 16,656 106,331 11,236 18,870 15 34 2] 30 1,183 69,987 36,899 9,883 942 2,185 7,650 858 18 20 13 10 1,419 22,219 2,874 122,060 815 2,883 304 210 10 8 12 8 85,003 1,000 10,765 926 24,142 940 8,073 165 186 216 299 229 9,322,897 941,346 481,074 450,993 150 TANKERS SPILLS WITH COAST GUARD RESPONSE—Continued Material 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Sum recovered................ 74,385 553,914 107,763 = 1,277,390 204,632 56,119 69,044 Asphalt: Number of spills............. 22 16 12 15 21 21 21 Total gallons.................. 10,163 19,593 1,894 3,159 58,769 3,733 3,070 Sum recovered............... 8,533 6,169 1,503 3,621 56,002 1,944 1,204 Coal tar: Number of spills............. 2 2 4 4 3 5 3 Total gallons.................. 25 140 890 1,125 25 83 71,425 Sum recovered................ 20 140 35 831 5 132 718 Waste oil: Number of spills............. 4] 55 34 46 34 37 35 Total gallons................... 7,244 11,822 43,175 9,270 10,721 3,205 3,123 Sum recovered................ 5,832 4,085 23,278 6,930 4,074 1,567 1,627 Lube oil: Number of spills Total gallonsee. <2) .t.-cl.cnc-.eeteeee. Sum recovered LPG: Number of spills Total gallons.............0..... Sum recovered................ Hydraulic fluid: Number of spills............. 4 3 5 6 4 8 6 Total gallons.................. 33 122 64 83 24 297 26 Sum recovered...............- 22 28 13 72 21 263 8 Laquer paint: Number of spills............. 3 2 iheheerancenceneertre 2 l 4 Total gallons................... 3 1] 2 2 44 Sum recovered................ 2 ] 1A 39 Paraffin: Number of spills............. ] 4 i | ERR ects Total gallons................... 42 4,129 Sumrecoverete fe. fet te tccccccenes 4,000 Grease: NUMGETEOISSDIStecatar cet mecca emcee ere een recerte toe | abso cheek eds on 2 Ee Totalevallorsvecenases Meee. ce reenter eee eee | Ms MEME ED tne iichrn, ypsteeyh sores SIMTINICCOVEL CU tes ett re cee ete ee ete tenet, enn eee 1 sein Mixed petroleum: Number of spills............. 17 14 15 8 17 23 23 Total gallons.........0......... 1,436 4,300 7,204 643 9,364 41,699 892 Sum recovered................ 1,823 3,252 1,652 501 848 192 500 Oil based pesticides: Number of spills............. ] l ) Re ie Pe setae ac a cece eee nine Total gallons................... Sum recovered................ Unidentified light oil: Number of spills............. 12 1] 8 ] 12 9 18 Total gallons.......... sete 820 1,697 490 5,155 1,001 1,732 132 Sum recovered 794 1,656 223 5,122 126 47) 20 Unidentified heavy oil: Number of spills............. 16 17 1] 17 9 11 7 Total gallons................... 5,407 2,044 31,289 968 341 7,497 1,823 Sum recovered................ 2,244 1,749 31,097 480 223 244 1,500 Other oil: Number of spills............. 52 55 37 26 30 31 35 Total gallons .................. 4,482 5,740 3,825 1,892 4,057 1,225 843,130 Sum recovered............... 2,929 1,866 1,091 1,981 4,953 473 1,589 = — = — SS ES = = => SS = = = = = Ss | | i ———— SS SS ————— — —————— SS SSS —— I ——= == = Ef == _—— a _—————— t J : 2 =SSSSSS== , SSS = => = cS. _/ BSS SS = = 2 = = | ——S= = => = = = = k [ — Fs a = =a = = a i | : 151 Wednesday March 19, 1980 Part Ill Council on Environmental Quality National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Final Revision ENCLOSORE(2) 17832 152 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 40 CFR Part 1510 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Poilution Contingency Plan; Final Revision AGENCY: Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President. ACTION: Final Revision of National Contingency Plan. SUMMARY: These final revisions to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan update the Plan to conform to the Clean Water Act amendments of 1977 and restructure the Plan to eliminate duplication and simplify reading. Substantive changes include: (1) Increasing State participation in the Plan, (2) provision for the preparation of local contingency plans, (3) incorporation of the National Pollation Equipment Inventory System, (4) provision for Scientific Support Coordinators, (5) provision for periodic field testing, and (6) clarification of the application of the Endangered Species Act. These changes are designed to improve the efficiency, coordination and effectiveness with which Federal agencies respond to discharges or substantial threats of discharges of oil and hazardous substances. EFFECTIVE DATE: March 19, 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Foster Knight, Counsel, Council on Environmental Quality, 722 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 395-5750, or Richard Hess, EPA- Coast Guard Liaison, Headquarters, U.S, Coast Guard, G-WEP/73, Washington, D.C. 20590 (202) 428-9571. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A. Purpose We are publishing final revisions to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 CFR 1510 (as amended March 28, 1976). The Plan is the basis for Federal action to minimize pollution damage from discharges of oil or hazardous substances. The purpose of these revisions is to update the Plan and improve the efficiency, coordination, and effectiveness with which Federal agencies respond to a discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil or a hazardous substance. We expect the revised regulations to improve planning by and coo inagig among State. = Federal agefcies} tt raves of environmentaé damage and to facilitate evaluation of response effectiveness. B. Summary of Changes Made by the Final Revisions. 1. Changes to make the Plan track with the Clean Water Act amendments of 1977.—See particularly §$§ 1510.3, 1510.21. Following the Clean Water Act. amendments of 1977, the regulations modify the scope of the Plan (§ 1510.3) to include the expanded economic zone of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, The revisions apply the Plan to potential as well as actual discharges (§ 1510.21(b)). 2. Increasing the role of state participation in the Plan.—{a) States are invited to participate as full members of Regional Response Teams (RRTs). Full participation of high level state representation is desired. See § 1510.23(a) and § 1510.34 (a) and (f). {b) Section 1510.23(b). EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard should explore the possibility of entering into agreements with states which will delegate to the state spill cleanup responsibilities. (c) Section 1510.34 (m), (n) and (o}. Provisions for RRT members (including state members) to appeal decisions of the RRT to the National Response Team (NRT) and to request further review by CEQ 3. Local Contingency Plans.—The - revised Plan makes provision for local contingency plans for dealing with spills in ports or local areas. ; Sections 1510.36{d) and 1510.42 provide that the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is responsible for developing and © maintaining a local contingency plan for the OSC’s area of responsibility. Local plans must identify: (1) Environmentally sensitive areas, (2) most probable locations for pollution incidents, (3) the kinds of resources that would be needed to respond to spill incidents, (4) where such resources can be obtained, (5) plans of action for protecting vulnerable Tresources, (6) sites for disposing recovered oil and hazardous substances, and (7) a local organizational structure for spill response. To aid the development of local contingency plans, § 1510.34{d) provides that RRTs must designate members to assist the OSC in local contingency planning. 4. National Pollution Equipment Inventory System.—The revised Plan in § 1510.43 incorporates a national inventory of equipment and resources available for oil and hazardous substance spill response. 5. Scientific Support Coordinators.— The revised Plan provides a mechanism for coordination between the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and the scientific community during spills. Such a mechanism is necessary in order to provide the OSC with sound scientific advice in an orderiy way, so that the OSC does not have to devote scarce time to a number of different scientists who are concerned about providing cleanup advice and conducting experiments during spill cleanup operations. Section 1510.64(c) establishes a scientific support organization headed by Scientific Support Coordinators (SSCs) who are designated by EPA for inland spills and by NOAA for coastal area spills. 6. Annual Field Exercises.—The - revised Plan makes provision for periodic field testing by the RRTs of their spill response equipment and people. Section 1510.34(h) requires each coastal RRT to conduct annual training exercises in which equipment is actually deployed. Section 1510.34(i) strongly encourages each inland RRT to conduct annual training exercises. 7. Changes Reflecting Requirements of the Endangered Species Act.—The revised Plan specifically discusses the relationship between spill response and cleanup actions and the requirements of legislation protecting endangered or species. Section 1510.36(a)(3) provides that advice to the OSC provided by DOI through the Fish and Wildlife Service or by Commerce.through the National Marine Fisheries Service on the cleanup of spills that affect endangered species, shall be binding on the OSC (with specified exceptions). 8. Public Information.—The previous Plan provided for dissemination of - public information in Annex VI. The revised Plan moves the provisions of Annex VI to new § 1510.37. In addition, changes are made to make the Plan conform to the existing public information network. 9. Restructuring Plan for Easier Reading.—The previous Plan contained considerable useful information buried in its Annexes. The revised Plan shifts this more important material into the body of the Plan. The revisions also add new Annex material (new Annexes II, VI and VII). See attached comparison of Previous Plan and Revised Plan. In addition, the revisions eliminate duplicative material and rewrite some provisions to achieve clarity and to make minor corrections of outdated Plan information. Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 153 17833 Prewious Plan Revised Plan Annex | (Dietbuton).__._. Remains the same. Annex U (NLA.T. functors) functons are m Contingency Ptans.) Annex ill (Nasonel Response NRE functions are in }. § 1510.33. (Annex Ill-— and Office Locations of Agences.) Annex [V (Office Locations of Office locations are m Annex Annex Vit! (Documentation and and Cost Recovery). Recovery are in § 1510.55. = (Annex Vill—Definition of Technical Terms.) Annex XX (Funding) Funding ia in § 1510.65. Annex UX (blank). Annex X (Schedule of Remains the same. Chemcais end For Removal of Ol end Annex X0 (Non-Federai (Interests are in 5 § 1510.23. Annex XU) (blank) ——_____. Annex XII! (blank) ——___.. Annex XIV (blank). Annex XV (Techrucal Library ical Library le in Annex and Defirstions of Techrecal Vit, Defintion-of Technical Terms). . Terms is in Annex VHL ‘Denotes new annex maternal C. Background The Plan was first published as an interagency agreement in 1968. It became part cf the Code of Federal Regulations in 1970 in accordance with the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. Section 311(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act gives the President the responsibility for issuing the Plan. By Executive Order 11735 (August, 1973), this responsibility was delegated to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). In 1973 the Plan was published in its current format. The version that is being revised by these final regulations was publish in 1975 with some minor changes incorporated in 1976. A number of events over the past two years have identified opportunities for improving the Plan. In late December 1976, the Argo Merchant ran aground on Nantucket Shoals, 27 miles from Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. The Tesulting spill of 7.5 million gallons of oil led to a massive spill response action under the National Contingency Plan. Although the weather conditions : exceeded technological capabilities for recovery of the oil, those same conditions meant that no oil reached the Massachusetts shoreline. In April 1978, Massachusetts submitted a Petition for Rulemaking to revise the Plan, asking for specific changes. In addition, a spill of 250,000 gallons earlier in the year resulted in massive shoreline damage on the Chesapeake Bay as 27 miles of coastline were contaminated by the oil. On June 3, 1979 the worst oil spill in history began with the blow-out of 3 IXTOC No. 1, a well being drilled in the Bay of Campeche by PEMEX, Mexico's national oit company. Estimates of the oil spilled ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 barrels per day. Efforts to plug the well were unsuccessful and drilling of two relief wells began. By late July, 1979 cleanup efforts were only partially successful at best despite the efforts of Mexican authorities, the U.S. Coast Guard's Open Water Containment Recovery System and cleanup firms from around the world. Towards the end _ of the summer of 1979 huge oil slicks moved north and threatened the Texas . coast. The U.S. Coast Guard and Texas authorities prepared to try to protect the highly productive estuaries behind the string of barrier islands on the south Texas coast and to mitigate damage to beaches and the tourist industry. Oil from the spill ultimately reached the south Texas coastline affecting a large geographical area and a multitude of local and regional interests. Response efforts however were moderately successful in mitigating damage. As a result of such incidents and continuing United States dependency on ‘oil imported by tanker, attention from various levels of government has been: continually focused on the response capabilities of the federal government. Congressional subcommittees have investigated both the response to specific incidents and the general federal scheme for coordinated action. In response to-these events and as part of-its responsibility to recommend changes, proposed revisions have been submitted to CEQ by the national Response Team, the national group of federal agencies responsible for planning and coordination under this Plan. Some problems were also addressed in the Clean Water Act amendments of 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-217 amending 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg.) which changed the jurisdiction of the Plan. The revision of the Plan reflects these statutory anges. The revised Plan also addresses other problems noted in the course of response actions. In October 1977, CEQ requested information from the States on problems they had encountered in activities under the Plan. Twenty-seven states responded, generally expressing satisfaction with the Plan but offering suggestions for improvements. The Council published proposed revisions to the National Contingency Plan on May 14, 1979 (44 FR 28196) with 60 days for public review and comment. This comment period was extended upon request until September 1, 1979. The Council received comments from the oil industry, independent waterways operators, state, regional, and local governments and miscellaneous interested parties, totalling 29 written comments. In addition the regional offices of the principal federal agencies provided a number of technical comments. The Council's staff read and analyzed each of the comments received and developed recommendations were then presented to the National Response Team for further evaluation and recommendations. Finally comments raising significant issues together with staff and National Response Team Tecommendations for appropriate changes were presented to the Council for resolution. When, after discussions and review the Council determined that the comments raised valid concerns, the Plan regulations were modified to reflect those concerns. When the Council determined that reasons supporting the Plan provisions were stronger than ‘those for changing them, the Plan provisions were left unchanged. Part D of the Preamble describes the more significant comments received and how the Council responded to them. D. Comments and the Council’s Response Comments on Section 1510.5— Definitions One comment objected to the definition of “oil” in § 1510.5, to the extent it includes oil in combination with other substances, as being too vague and imprecise. The Council however determined not to change the definition as it repeats verbatim the definition of “oil” im § 311(a)}(1) of the Clean Water Act. Several comments were critical of § 1510.5(r)(1)'s definition of a minor discharge of a hazardous substance as “a quantity less than that defined as reportable by regulation (40 CFR Part 117).” The comments expressed concern that this definition was inconsistent with EPA's hazardous spills regulations where the enumerated substances are considered hazardous if a quantity equal to or greater than the “reportable quantity” is spilled. The purpose of the Plan is to provide for removal of oil and hazardous substances even in cases where no liability attaches to the discharger. There are many instances where the quantity of hazardous substances spilled cannot be accurately 154 417834 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980. / Rules and Regulations determined. A definition of minor discharge which excludes less than reportable quantities will discourage efforts to remove such spills. For these reasons, the Council determined not to change the definition of minor discharge of hazardous substances. The comments also recommended establishing a practical lower limit in the definition of a minor oil spill such as California’s 10 gallon limit. The Council determined however that the existing definition in § 1510.5(r)(1), “less than 1000 gallons”, is working well and should not be changed. Comments on Section 1510.21—Federal Responsibility Some comments pointed out that the proposed language for § 1510.21(a) did not adequately reflect § 311(c)(1) of the Clean Water Act by omitting the modifier “substantial” before “threat.” Section 311(c)(1) specifies Federal response actions where there are discharges or a “substantial threat” of such discharge. The Council agrees with these comments. Since this problem was presented in other parts of the proposed revisions, the Council is correcting it by changing the definition of “potential discharge,” in § 1510.5(n), to mean “any accident or other circumstance which constitutes a substantial threat of a discharge of oil or hazardous substance.” Thus, subject to § 311(c)(1), Federal responsibility exists for discharges and potential discharges. These changes address these same comments with respect ta §§ 1510.21(b), 1510.53(a), and 1510.63(b). Comments on Section 1510.36{b)—On- Scene Coordinator A number of companies and organizations involved in the carriage of bulk petroleum and chemicals in inland waters requested that § 1510.36(b) be changed to provide that the U.S. Coast Guard (rather than the Environmental Protection Agency) furnish or provide the On-Scene Coordinator for all navigable waters of the United States which are used by waterborne commerce. The principal reasons given in support of this change are: (1) that the Coast Guard is already required to be involved in inland waterway discharges in order to evaluate compliance with pollution prevention regulations and to evaluate penalty assessments, and (2) that it would be an unnecessary duplication of federal agency resources to have the EPA act as On-Scene Coordinator for inland waterway spills. Furthermore EPA's capability to act quickly as the On-Scene Coordinator was questioned by some commenters. The National Response Team which has overall operational and ; implementing responsibility for the National Contingency Plan : recommended that § 1510.36(b) not b changed because in certain inland waterway regions EPA provides the most effective Qn-Scene Coordinator, while in others (where the Coast Guard © is the most effective}, EPA normally predesignates the Coast Guard to serve as the inland waterway OCS. The National Response Team therefore recommended that the existing ~~ flexibility in allowing both the EPA an the Coast Guard to be On-Scene Coordinators for inland waterways (depending on the circumstances) is preferable to a fixed rule assigning only the Coast Guard to that function. Based on the National Response Team's experience and recommendations, the Council therefore determined to leave § 1510.36(b) unchanged. Some commenters expressed concern that the proposed revisions to the Plan (particularly § 1510.36(a)(3) with respect to compliance with the Endangered Species Act and with respect to the use of chemical dispersants governed by Annex X) diminished the On-Scene Coordinator's authority and effectiveness to respond quickly to a spill. These commenters requested that § 1510.36(a)(3) and Annex X be changed to eliminate restrictions on the OSC's authority. t Section 1510.36(a)(3) provides that advice to the On-Scene Coordinator provided by the Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior) or by the National Marine Fisheries Service (Department of Commerce) on cleanup actions that may affect endangered species shall be considered at all times and be binding on the On- Scene Coordinator unless in the OSC’s judgment contrary actions must be taken to protect human life. The Council does not regard this provision as a new limitation on the OSC’s authority to act but rather as an incorporation of the requirements of the Endangered Species Act which, since 1973, has applied to all activities of federal agencies and responsible federal officials. In essence, this provision is designed to assist the © OSC to comply with the Endangered Species Act, through the expertise of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in circumstances where cleanup actions may affect endangered species. Whenever the OSC determines that certain actions must be taken to protect human life, the OSC’s judgment will prevail over FWS or NMFS advice to the contrary. For these reasons the Council determined to leave this part of § 1510.36(a}(3) unchanged. Annex X is modified to include a cross-reference to § 1510.36(a}(3). These changes do not affect the OSC’s authority to use chemical dispersants such as to substantially reduce explosion or fire hazards to property where there is no threat to endangered species. With respect to the use of chemical dispersants covered by Annex X, several commenters recommended that the On-Scene Coordinator be provided with authority to allow the spiller or his agents to use registered chemical dispersants in offshore areas for protection of sensitive environmental or commercial fishery areas without the concurrence of the EPA representative on the Regional Response Team. The National Response Team carefully considered this request but concluded that the continuing involvement of EPA representatives before use of chemical dispersants outweighs any benefits to be derived by allowing the spiller ta use dispersants in such areas without advance EPA concurrence. The Council - adopted the National Response Team's recommendation with respect to this issue, However, it is the intent of the Plan that the EPA Regional Response Team member continue to work closely -with the Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators to provide greater guidance—in advance of spills—on the circumstances that justify use of chemical dispersants. Several commenters felt that the priorities of the Plan were insufficiently spelled out and recommended that the primary goals of a spill response be (1) to protect human life and limb and (2) to minimize ecological impacts of spills. The National Response Team believes that these priorities are inherent in the Plan and are already covered in § 1510.36(a)(3) and Annex X. The Council agrees with the NRT and that On-Scene Coordinators have adequate explicit guidance on these priorities. One-comment recommended that § 1510.36(a)(1) be clarified to provide that the first official from an agency with responsibility under the Plan to arrive at the scene of a discharge is to functian as acting OSC (if other than the predesignated OSC) until the OSC arrives. The NRT determined that § 1510.36(a)(1) already is sufficiently clear on this point by providing that the first official to arrive on scene “shall coordinate activities under the plan until the OSC arrives.” “Shall coordinate activities” includes authority to act as osc. : Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 155 17835 Comments on Section 1510.37—Public Information Network Several comments expressed concern that proposed § 1510.37(b) establishes a regional news office as the “single source of official information on the incident”, to the detriment of the public interest in obtaining information from public agencies and private interests. Section 1510.37 has been substantially rewritten, and eliminates the regional news Office as the single source of official federal information. As rewritten § 1510.37 provides for coordination of news releases through the OSC, through an on-scene news office or a national news office. Participating federal agencies are given a larger role in the public information network. At the same time, information from private interests on a pollution incident remains unaffected by § 1510.37 or any other provision in.the Plan, because the Plan cannot regulate the manner or content of information on a pollution incident provided by private interests. Ta provide for greater coordination with local government a new sentence is added to § 1510.37(a)(1): [When a major pollution incident occurs] “Those immediately capable, especially local. fire, police and government officials, will be contacted first so that they may use all available resources to notify the public of a potential threat.” Comments on Section 1510.42—Local Contingency Plans One comment recommended that local contingency plans also include development of methods for protecting environmentally sensitive areas. This is addressed in § 1510.42(a) (plans of action for protecting vulnerable . resources). Comments on Section 1510.43—National Inventory System One comment suggested that standard indemnification agreements be entered into between the Federal government and private parties whose cleanup equipment is listed in the inventory such that owners will be indemnified for any damage that may occur when the equipment is used at the direction of the On-Scene Coordinator. The NRT recommended that indemnification for damaged private equipment need not be addressed in the Plan because private equipment used by the OSC is obtained through rental or other contractual agreements which contain adequate indemnification provisions. The Council therefore deferred to the expertise of the NRT on this issue. 69-848 O - 81 - 11 Comments on Section 1510.63—General Pattern of Response Actians One comment objected to the sentence in § 1510.63(a)}(3)(i) which provides “The discharger's removal efforts are ‘improper’ to the-extent that Federal efforts are necessary to prevent further damage.” The comment expressed concern that this language prevents or discourages a discharger from seeking Federal removal assistance where Federal assistance would speed the discharger’s otherwise “proper” removal actions. The comment misconstrues § 1510.63(a)(3)(i). That section does not mean that otherwise “proper” removal actions by the discharged are rendered improper simply because the discharger seeks Federal assistance. Comments on Section 1510.64—Special Forces Several comments were received concerning this section. The State of Washington felt that this section duplicated and conflicted with its own ~ oil and hazardous spills contingency plan provisions governing marine Tesources damage assessment. Section 1510.64 has been substantially revised . based on NRT recommendations and the comments received. With respect to the State of Washington’s comment, § 1510.64(c)(2)(i)(aa) makes it clear that well developed state scientific support organizations like Washington’s should be employed to support the OSC. Section 1510.64 is not to be construed as requiring the development of duplicatory federal scientific support coordinators ~ where an effective state scientific support organization can be utilized to support the OSC, as coordinated by the state representative on the Regional _ Response Team. One commenter recommended changing the title of Scientific Support Coordinator to Scientific Support Advisor. However the NRT believes that Scientific Support Coordinator more accurately reflects the role of the scientific support organization which involves advice to the OSC and RRT but is primarily a coordination role. For this reason the title was not changed. Another comment recommended that the discharger be advised of the scope of studies to be undertaken by the scientific support organization and be offered an opportunity to comment on its potential liability. The Plan recognizes, as the comment points out, that the line between damage assessment studies (where there may be liability) and pure research (where there is no liability) is difficult to draw. However this problem is addressed in revised §§ 1510.65 (b) and {c) which make it clear that the OSC is to exercise sufficient control over removal operations (including damage assessment) to be able to certify that reimbursement is appropriate. Concern has also expressed that proposed § 1510.64(c)(1) “would seemingly exclude contractual agreements with commercial environmental firms” to provide scientific assistance and damage assessment for the OSC. This was not the intent, and § 1510.64(c)(2)(i)(aa), as rewritten, expressly includes industry. Comments on Section 1510.65—Funding . Several comments were received critical of the proposed language in § 1510.65(c). The concern expressed by these comments was that the proposed language implied that the OSC would not be requesting services and resources where essential to an effective Federal response. The Council agrees that the indicated language in proposed § 1510.65(c) was inappropriate. Therefore the last three sentences in proposed.§ 1510.65(c) were removed and conforming changes were made to the last sentences in $ 1510.65(b) and _ 1510.65(c). Other Comments The Commonwealth of Massachusetts urged that the Plan provide for the financial capability of the participating agencies in carrying out the Plan, through an annual assessment of funds available to each agency. The Plan is not authorized to require annual assessments. In response to this comment, however, § 1510.65 relating to funding has been changed to clarify each agency’s funding authority and responsibility. Massachusetts also indicated that proposed § 1510.64(c) providing for scientific support coordinators from both EPA and NOAA was a costly redundancy. Section 1510.64(c) has been modified but still preserves the SSC role for EPA in inland waters and for NOAA in coastal waters because the NRT determined this allocation of agency expertise would be the most effective. The New England Congressional . Caucus recommended provision in the Plan for requiring spill cleanup equipment to be stationed near areas of probable spills. The NRT recommended that rather than stationing equipment the most efficient approach is to maintain an up-to-date national inventory and to provide in local contingency plans for the identification of types and locations of clean-up equipment and resources. The Council adopted the NRT recommendation. The 17836 156 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations Caucus also recommended that the Atlantic Strike Team be redeployed to an area to the northeast of its present location. Deployment decisions are within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Council has therefore referred this recommendation to the U.S. Coast Guard. The International Association of Fire Chiefs expressed concern that the Plan unduly and excessively interfered with local agency authority to control and supervise spill response efforts, particularly with respect to responses by local fire and civil defense officials. A number of changes were made in response to this criticism in order to highlight the importance of coordination with local officials and to emphasize that the Plan covers only the Federal response. See §§$1510.23(a), 1510.34(f), 1510.36(d), 1510.37(a)(1) and 1510.42(a). Concern was also expressed that §1510.57(a) authorizes the OSC to keep the fire chief and civil defense officials out of the affected area. That section is not intended to give the OSC such authority. Local contingency plana, particularly with the cooperation of local fire and civil defense officials, are to be developed in a mammer consistent with local fire and disaster plans and requirements, See §1510.42(a). One comment recommended expansion and clarification of the Plan concerning the relationship between a responsible discharger (a discharger who is taking proper action to clean up the spill) and the Federal government. The comment recommended coverage of at least four points which are listed below with responses: (1) What is the continuing role of the OSC if the discharger is in charge of the clean up operation? This question is addressed by §§1510.21(a) and 1510.52(c) which provides that the OSC has a continuing responsibility to monitor clean up actions being taken by the discharger and to provide advice. (2) Does the OSC continue as the government spokesman for all levels of government? This is addressed in the affirmative by § §1510.5(k) (definition of OSC), 1510.21(a) and Section 1510.52(c). (3) How is government support and assistance obtained by the discharger (e.g. scientific support)? This is addressed by §§1510.52(c), 1510.63(a)(3), 1510.63(b)(3)(ii) and 1510.64. The OSC’s monitoring and surveillance duties includes providing advice and assistance to dischargers concerning proper cleanup and removal actions. Dischargers are encouraged to seek scientific support advice through the — OSC on matters not already covered by this Plan and annexes, and the applicable regional and local contingency plans. (4) How are relations with the news media and public handled? Section 1510.37 provides for relations with the . news media and for public information where there is a Federal response to a spill under the Plan. The Plan, of course, cannot govern the manner or content of information provided by the discharger. Where the discharger retains control of the cleanup and removal actions, the public information and news media provisions in $1510.37 will not apply; they only apply where a Federal response is initiated under this Plan. For the reasons given above, and because the NRT does not believe any significant problems exist in the “relationship between the discharger and the Federal government that are not already addressed in the Plan, the NRT recommended that no additional provisions be added to the Plan concerning these points. The Council deferred to the NRT’s recommendations. Several comments from the oil industry recommended that the Plan require the RRT to send copies of their activity reports (under §1510.34(g)(9)) to the oil industry. These reports are available to the public, the American Petroleum Institute representative attending NRT meetings as an observer - will be able to obtain copies of such reports and provide for appropriate distribution to the oil imdustry. One comment recommended deletion of the term “Coker Feed” in Annex VII as being inaccurate. This recommendation was adopted. *E. Additional Changes Based on Federal Interagency Comments and NRT Recommendations Following publication of the proposed revisions to the National Contingency Plan federal agency review resulted in a number of additional changes of essentially a clarifying nature. These are summarized below. The distinction between Federal primary and advisory agencies under the Plan has been eliminated since over a period of time it has become meaningless. Al] Federal agencies under the Plan are now referred to as participating agencies. See §§1510.5, 1510.22, 1510.32. Provisions governing referrals and appeals of decisions by the Regional Response Teams have been clarified. See §§1510.2(10), 1510.32 (m) and (n).. Descriptions of Federal agency expertise and roles under the Plan have been further updated. See §§1510.4, 1510.22(b), 1510.64(c), and Annex IL Section 1510.37 concerning the public information network has been substantially revised both in response to public comments and to incorporate experience gained by the NRT during 1979 concerning the Campeche Bay and other oil spills affecting U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico. Section 1510.64 relating to Special Forces has been revised in response to public comments-and NRT recommendations, particularly with respect to clarifying the responsibilities of NOAA, EPA and the Department of the Interior (Fish and Wildlife Service) in providing scientific support. F. Regulatory Analyses Because the Plan governs the Federal government's response to oil and hazardous substances pollution and does not regulate private activities, and since the revisions to the Plan are : primarily of a simplifying and updating nature, the Council, supported by a recommendation from the NRT, determined that a regulatory analysis under E.O. 12044 was not required in conjunction with the publication of the Final revisions. The final revisions to the National Contingency Plan implement the policy and other requirements of Executive Order 12044 (improving Government Regulations) to the fullest extent possible. The revised Plan has been simplified and substantially rewritten in plain language. In reviewing the proposed revisions the Council gave careful attention to minimizing any burden on the public. B . e determinations required by Section 2(d) of the Order have been made by the Council and are available on request. : G. Conclusion We could not, of course, adopt every suggestion that was made on revisions to the National Contingency Plan. We have tried to respond to the major concerns that were expressed. We are confident that any issues which arise in the future can be resolved through recommendations by the public, state and local governments and the participating agencies to the Regional Response Teams and the National Response Team. The National Response Team will continue to supervise implementation of the Plan and, where appropriate, make recommendations to the Council for additional revisions. We appreciate the efforts of the many people who participated in developing — and refining the revisions to the Plan. Gus Speth, Chairman. Part 1510 is revised to read as set forth below: Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980-/ Rules and Regulations PART 1510—NATIONAL OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES POLLUTION CONTINGENCY PLAN Subpart A—introduction Sec. : 15101 Purpose and objectives, 1510.2 Authority. 1510.3 Scope. 1510.4 Abbreviations, 1510.5 Definitions. Subpart B—Policy and Responsibility. 1510.21 Federal responsibility. 1510.22 Duties of Federal agencies. 1510.23 Non-Federal participation. Subpart C—Organization 1510.31 Emergency response activities and ; coordination. 1510.32 National Response Team. ” 1510.33 National Response Center. 1510.34 Regional Response Team. 1510.35 Regional Response Center. 1510.36 On-scene coordinator. 1510.37 Public information network. Subpart D—Plane_- 1510.41 Regional contingency plans. 1510.42 Local contingency plans. 1510.43 National inventory system. Subpart E—Operational-Response Phases 1510.51 Phase I—Discovery and notification. 1510.52 Phase —Evaluation and initiation of action. 1510.53 Phase [1—Containment and countermeasures. 1510.54 Phase [V—Cleanup, mitigation and disposal. 1510.55 Phase V—Documentation and cost. recovery. 1510.56 Pollution reports. 1510.57 Special considerations. Subpart F—Coordinating Instructions 1510.61 Delegation of-authority. 1510.62 Miulti-regional actions. 1510.63 General pattern of response actions. 1510:64 Special forces available to the OSC.. 1510.65 Funding. Ust of Annexes Annex - No. Se 1100 Osrixtion__ 1200 Format of Regonal end Local Contingency 1300 Regions and Office Locations of EPA end UO ee, : i Authority: Sec. 311(c)(2), Pub. L. 92-500, as amended; 86 Stat. 865, 33 U.S.C. 1321(c}(2); Executive Order 11735, 38 FR 21243 (August 1973). 157 Subpart A—tntroduction § 1510.1 Purpose and objectives. This National Oil and Hazardous Substances Polution Cortingency Plan provides for coordinated Federal action to try to prevent discharges of oil and hazardous substances, and to protect - the environment from damage when discharges occur. The Plan also promotes Federal-State coordination and encourages local governments and private firms to build capabilities for cleaning up discharges. §$ 1510.2 Authority. This Plan was developed in compliance with Section 311(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act, as amended (33 U.S.C. - ~ 1321(c}{2)). In Executive Order 11735, the President delegated to the Council on Environmental Quality authority and responsibility to prepare, publish, revise, ~ and amend a National Contingency Plan for the removal of oil and hazardous substances. (b) The Plan and its Annexes, and regional and local plans, provide for: . (1) Assignment of responsibilities among Federal agencies, in coordination with State and local agencies; (2) Identification, procurement, maintenance, and storage of equipment and supplies; (3) Establishment or designation of w A strike force to carry out the Plan ani (ii) Trained and adequately equipped emergency task forces at major ports; (4) A system of surveillance and reporting to give responsible Federal and State agencies the earliest possible notice of discharges of oil and lous substances-or imminent threats of such discharges. (5) Establishment of a national center to provide for coordination and direction of operations in carrying out the Plan; (6) Procedures for identifying, containing, dispersing, and removing oil _ and hazardous substances; (7) A schedule, prepared in cooperation with the states, identifying any dispersants or other chemicals that may be used in carrying out the Plan; (8) A system for reimbursing states for reasonable costs incurred in Temoving discharges: (9) A procedure for coordinating scientific support of cleanup operations, assessment of damage after a spill, and research efforts; and (10) A system for referral and appeal of decisions of the Regional Response Teams and On-Scene Coordinators. 17837 § 1510.3 Scope. ' (a) The Plan applies to all Federal agencies and is in effect for the navigable waters of the United States and adjoining shorelines, for the contiguous zone, and the high seas beyond the contiguous zone in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act or the Deep Water Port Act of 1974, or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United States (including resources under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1978), (See Sections 311(b)(1) and 502(7) of the Clean Water Act). (b) Implementation of this Plan is complementary to the Joint U.S./ Canadian Contingency Plan (including the annexes pertaining to the Great Lakes, and the Eastern and Western coastal areas); the Joint U.S./Mexican Contingency Plan (when adopted by both parties); end international assistance plans and agreements, security regulations, and responsibilities based upon Federal statutes and Executive Orders. This Plan shall be utilized to coordinate U.S. involvement in pollution incidents occurring in waters not under the management jurisdiction of the United States. § 1510.4 Abbreviations. (a) Department and Agency title © abbreviations: CEQ—Council on Environmental ty. Corps—U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. DHEW—Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. DOC—Department of Commerce. ~ DOD—Department.of Defense. DOE—Department of Energy. DOI—Department of the Interior. DOJ—Department of Justice. DOL—Department of Labor. DOS—Department of State. DOT—Department of Transportation. EPA—Environmental Protection Agency. FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency. FWS—U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. . MarAd—Maritime Administration. NMFS—National Marine Fisheries Service. NOAA—National Oceanic and ~ Atmospheric Administration. USCG—U.S. Coast Guard. . USDA—Department of Agriculture. USGS—U.S. Geological Survey. USN—U.S. Navy. - (b) Operational title abbreviations: ERT—Environmental Response Team. NRC—National Response Center. NRT—National Response Team. 17838 OSC—On-Scene Coordinator. PIAT—Public Information Assistance Team. SSC—Scientific Support Coordinator. RRC—Regional Response Center. RRT—Regional Response Team. $ 1510.5 Definitions. (a) Act—means the Clean Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq. (b) Activation—means notification by telephone or other expeditious means to the appropriate state and local officials, to the regional or district office of participating agencies, ar, when required, the assembly of some or all members of the RRT or the NRT. (c) Coastal waters—generally means U.S. waters which are navigable by deep draft vessels, including the contiguous zone and parts of the high seas to which this Plan is applicable and other waters subject to tidal influence. (d) Contiguous Zone—means the zone of the high seas, established by the United States under Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which is contiguous to the territorial sea and which extends 12 miles seaward from the same baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. (e) Discharge—includes, but is not limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping of oil or hazardous substances. Discharges permitted under Section 301, 302, 306, 318, 402 or 404 of the Act or Section 102 of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (Pub. L. No. 92-532) are not included. (f) Hazardous substance—means any substance designated as hazardous under subsection (b)(2) of section 311 of the Act (see 40 CFR Part 116). (g) Inland waters—generally means U.S. waters upstream from coastal waters. (bh) Major disaster—means any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, drought, fire or other catastrophe in the United States which the President determines to be damaging enough to warrant major disaster assistance under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-288). (i) Presidential Emergency Determination—a formal Presidential decision made at the request of a State Governor determining that a situation . constitutes an “emergency” in accordance with the provisions of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93— 288). (j) Oil—means oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil’ refuse and 158 oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil. (k) On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) — means the Federal official predesignated by the EPA or the USCG to coordinate and direct the Federal response to spills, and discharge removal efforts at the scene of a e: (1) Phases—response actions fall into five classes or phases. Phase I is Discovery and Notification: Phase I, Evaluation and Initiation of Action; Phase III, Containment and Countermeasures; Phase IV, Removal, Mitigation and Disposal; and Phase V, Documentation and Cost Recovery. Elements of any phase may coincide with other phases. For a full description of the phases, see Subpart E, § 1510.51- 55. (m) Plan—means the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. (n) Potential discharge—means any accident or other circumstance which constitutes a substantial threat of a. discharge of oil or hazardous substance. . Severity of potential discharges shall be classified according to the guidelines i in subparagraph (r} below. (0) Participating agencies—means all departments and agencies on the NRT that have responsibility and provide resources for the effective operation of this Plan. (p) Public health or welfare—includes all factors affecting human health and welfare, including, but not limited to, human health, the natural environment, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines and beaches. (q) Remove or removal—means the removal of oil or hazardous substances from the water and shorelines or taking necessary actions to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare. Under this Plan, removal refers to Phase III and IV response operations. (r) Size classes of discharges—The following classifications are provided as guidance for the OSC and serve as the criteria for the actions delineated in Section 1510.63. They are not meant to imply associated degrees of hazard to the public health or welfare, nor are they a measure of environmental damage. Any discharge that poses a substantial threat to the public health or welfare, or results in critical public concern shall be classed as major discharge regardless of the following quantitative measures. , (1) Minor discharge—means a discharge to the inland waters of less than 1000 gallons of oil; or a discharge to the coastal waters of less than 10,000 gallons of oil; or a discharge of a hazardous substance in a quantity less Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations than that defined as reportable by regulation (40 CFR Part 117). (2) Medium discharge—means a discharge of 1,000 to 10,000 gallons of oil to the inland waters; or a discharge of 10,000 gallons tc 100,000 gallons of oil to the coastal waters; or a discharge of a hazardous substance equal to or greater than a reportable quantity as defined by regulations (40 CFR Part 117). (3) Major discharge—means a discharge of more than 10,000 gallons of oil to the inland waters; or more than 100,000 gallons of oil to the coastal: waters; or a discharge of a hazardous substance that poses a substantial threat to the public health or welfare, or results in critical public concern. (s) United States—means the States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Subpart B—Responsibility § 1510.21 Federal responsibility. (a) This Plan seeks to insure a coordinated Federal response at the scene of a discharge, or a potential discharge of oil or hazardous substance that poses a threat to the public health or welfare. In the event of a discharge, the Federal OSC shall first promptly determine (under section 311(c)(1).of the Act) whether the person responsible for the discharge is taking proper action to remove the discharge or threat of discharge. If practicable, the OSC shall make the person responsible aware of his financial responsibility. If the OSC determines that the person responsible is taking proper action, the OSC shall monitor progress and provide advice. If the person responsible does not act promptly or fails to take proper removal actions, or if the person responsible is unknown, or if a potential discharge is considered to exist, further Federal - response actions shall be undertaken promptly in accordance with this Plan. (b) Removal actions taken under section 311(c)(1) of the Act are limited to the areas described in § 1510.3(a) (Scope of Plan). When a discharge or potential . discharge that poses a threat to U.S. waters, occurs outside the Plan’s jurisdiction, the procedures of this Plan and those of regional and local plans apply to the extent practicable; removal will take place under other legal authorities. (c) In accordance with section 311(d) of the Act, whenever a marine disaster in or upon the navigable waters of the — United States has created a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to the public health or welfare, because of a Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations discharge or an imminent discharge of large quantities of oil or a hazardous substance from a vessel,the United States may: (i) Coordinate and direct all public and private efforts for the removal or elimination of the threat; and (2) Summarily remove and, if necessary, destroy the vessel by whatever means are available without regard to any provisions of law governing the employment of personnel or the expenditure of appropriated funds. The authority for these actions has been delegated under Executive Order 11735 to the Administrator of EPA and the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, respectively, for the waters for which each designates the OSC under this Plan. (d) When the Administrator of EPA or . the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating determines there is an imminent and substantial threat to the public health and welfare because of an actual or. threatened discharge of oil or hazardous substance into or upon the waters of the United States from any onshore or offshore facility, he may require, through the Attorney General, that the U.S. Attorney of the district in which the threat occurs sectre the relief necessary to abate the threat. The NRT may request EPA or the USCG to exercise this authority. The action described here is in addition to any other actions taken by a state or local government for the same purpose. (e) Federal agencies with facilities or other resources which may be useful in a Federal response situation will make those facilities or resources available for use in accordance with this Plan and the Tregional and local plans. Federal Tesources shall be made available to the extent: possible, consistent with agencies’ operational requirements, within the limits of existing statutory authority, and within the spirit of the President's and the Congress intent to minimize discharges and their effects. (f)-Environmental pollution control techniques shall be employed in accordance with applicable regulations and guidelines, and regional and local contingency plans. In any circumstances not covered by regulations, the use of chemicals shall be in accordance with Annex X and must have the concurrence of the EPA representative or alternate fepresentative on the RRT. In the absence of the EPA representative or alternate, the concurrence of the appropriate EPA regional administrator must be obtained. (g) Response actions to remove discharges originating from Outer 159 Continental Shelf Lands Act operations shall be in accordance with the August 1971 Memorandum of Understanding between DOI and DOT concerning respective responsibilities under this Plan. (h) Discharges of radioactive materials shall be handled pursuant to the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan which is administered by the Department of Energy. § 1510.22° Duties of Federal agencies. (a) Each of the participating Federal agencies has duties established by statute, Executive Ordér, or Presidential directive which may be relevant to the Federal response to a pollution discharge. See Annex IV fora ~ description of applicable legal authorities. Regional contingency plans shall call upon agencies to discharge these duties in a coordinated manner. They shall provide for: (1) Identification of the statutory responsibilities of all agencies involved; (2). Prompt notification of agency Tepresentatives in the event of a threatened or actual oil or seeerctane substances spill; (3) Designation of agency “representatives to assist OSEs in developing local contingency plans; and (4) Coordination of agency Tepresentatives with the OSC during a pollution incident (see § 1510. 36(a)(3)}- (b) The following Federal agencies have specific duties and responsibilities which are relevant to a response to discharges of oil or hazardous substances: (1) The Council. on-Environmental Quality is responsible for preparing,. publishing, revising and amending the National Contingency Plan. The NRT will advise CEQ on necessary changes to the Plan and CEQ shall insure that any disagreements among participating agencies are expeditiously settled. (2) The Department of Agriculture provides expertise in managing agricultural, forest, and wilderness areas and in selecting landfill disposal sites. The Soil Conservation Service can provide to the OSC predictions of the effects of pollutants on soil and their movements over and through soil. (3) The Department of Commerce, through NOAA, shall provide Scientific expertise on living marine resources for which it is responsible, including endangered species and marine _ ~ mammals (see § 1510.36(a)(3)); coordinate scientific support, provide current and predicted meteorologic, - hydrologic, ice and oceanographic conditions for the high seas, coastal, and inland waters; provide charts and maps, including tide and current information, 17839 for coastal and territorial waters and the Great Lakes; and assist EPA in damage assessment in coastal areas and on the high seas, When requested by NRT, DOC through MarAd will provide advice on the design, construction and operation of merchant ships. (4) The Department of Defense, consistent with its operational requirements, may provide assistance in maintaining navigation channels, in the removal of navigation obstructions, and - in salvage. Upon request of the OSC, NRT, or USCG, the services and special equipment of the Supervisor of Salvage, USN will be provided as available for the cleanup and control of oil spills. Upon request from the OSC, locally deployed Navy equipment may be provided. ' (5) The Department of Energy administers, implements, and coordinates the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP). DOE will advise the NRT when assistance is required in identifying the source and extent of radioactive contamination, and in the removal and disposal of radioactive discharges. (6) The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is responsible for providing expert advice and ‘assistance on discharges or potential discharges that pose a threat to public health and safety. (7) Federal Emergency Management Agency participates in the development and evaluation of national, regional, and local oil and hazardous substance pollution contingency plans in accordance with Executive Order 12148, Section 2-1; monitors responses related to such plans in accordance with Executive Order 12148, Section 2-2; and evaluates State Governors’ requests for Presidential declarations of major disasters or determinations of emergency under Pub. L. 93-288 (42 U.S.C. 4401, et seq.), the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. (8) The Department of Interior, through the USGS, can provide expertise in the fields of oil drilling, producing, handling, and transportation by pipeline. The USGS supervises continuously manned facilities which can be used for command, control and surveillance of discharges occurring from operations conducted under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Bureau of Mines may provide analytical facilities which in an emergency could be of aid in identifying inorganic hazardous substances. Through its pollution response coordinators, the Fish and Wildlife Service of DOI will provide technical expertise to the OSC and RRT on fish and wildlife and their habitats, including migratory birds, marine 17840 160 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations —_EEEELL mammals, and endangered and threatened plants and animals (See __ § 1510.36(a)(3}). DOI is responsible for implementing this plan in American Samoa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands when required. (9) The Department of Justice can provide expert advice on complicated legal questions arising from discharges and Federal agency responses. (10} The Department of Labor, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, will provide the OSC with advice, guidance, and assistance regarding hazards to persons involved in removal or control of oil or chemical spills, and in the precautions necessary to prevent hazards to their health and safety. (11) The Department of Transportation provides expertise on all modes of transporting oil and hazardous substances. Through the USCG, DOT offers expertise in the domestic/ international fields of port safety and security, marine law enforcement, ship navigation and en ce the manning, operation, and safety vessels and marine facilities. The USCG also maintains continuously manned facilities which can be used for * command, control, and surveillance of oil discharges: occurring on the waters of the United States or the high seas. For those areas where it provides the OSC, . the USCG chairs the RRT which develops, implements, and revises the _ regional and local contingency plans as necessary. (12) The Department of State will lead in developing joint international contingency plans. It will also help to coordinate an international response when pollution discharge crosses international boundaries orinvolves - foreign flag vessels. Additionally, this Department will coordinate requests for _ assistance from foreign governments and U.S. proposals for conducting research at incidents that occur in waters of other countries. (13) The Environmental Protection Agency provides expertise on environmental effects of pollution discharges and environmental pollution control techniques. EPA will also advise the RRT and OSC on what degree of hazard a discharge poses to the public health and safety, and will coordinate scientific support, including assessment of damages, in the inland regions. For those areas where it provides the OSC, EPA chairs the RRT which develops, implements, and revises regional and local contingency plans as necessary. EPA will coordinate with USCG in the preparation of regional and local contingency plans for pollution control and protection of the environment. (c) All Federal agencies are responsible for minimizing the . possibility of discharges; for developing the capability to respond promptly ta discharges fram facilities they operate or supervise; and for making resources available for Federal pollution response operations. . (d) In addition to their general responsibilities under paragraph (c) of this section, participating agencies are responsible for: (1) Leading all Federal agencies in programs to minimize environmental damage associated with discharges from facilities they operate or supervise; (2) Providing representation as necessary to the NRT and RRTs, and giving assistance to the RRTs and OSCs in formulating regional and local contingency plans; (3)-Developing the operating capability in their particular areas of expertise for a rapid response to any pollution discharge in coordination with other Federal agencies; (4) Making necessary information available to the NRT, RRT, or OSC; and (5) Informing the NRT and RRTs (consistent with national security considerations) of changes in the” availability of resources that would affect the operation of this Plan. § 1510.23 Non-Federal participation. (a) Every State Governor is asked ta assign an office or agency to represent the State on the RRT. The State's Tepresentative should participate fully im all facets of RRT activities and shal} designate the element of the State . government that will direct state supervised discharge removal ~ operations. Participation of officials from municipalities with major ports and waterways is also invited in the RRT. (See $ 1510.34(f).} State and local government agencies - are encouraged to include contingency planning for discharge removal in all emergency and disaster planning, Federal local contingency plans required by this Planshall be coordinated with plans developed by state and local. governments. This is especially important for traffic control, land access, and disposal of pollutants in removal operations. e (b) States, industry groups, academic organizations, and others are encouraged to commit resources for removal operations. Specific commitments shall be listed in Federal regional and local contingency plans, EPA and the.USCG should explore the possibility of concluding memoranda delegating responsibility to concerned_ States for cleanup of certain spills. Details on reimbursement to states for removal actions taker under to this Plan are contained in § 1510.65 and 33 CFR Part 153. (c) It is partiqularly important to coordinate the technical information generated by scientists from the Federal and State governments, from industry, universities, and elsewhere to assist the OSC in developing cleanup strategies in environmentally sensitive areas; to assist in the performance of post spill damage assessments; and to assure that pertinent research will be undertaken to meet national needs. The scientific support aspect of this Plan is described in § 1510.64. (d) Federal local contingency plans should establish procedures to allow for well-organized and worthwhile —__ employment of volunteers. Local plans should provide for the direction of volunteers by the OSC, or by other Federal, local or state officials knowledgeable in contingency operations and capable of providing leadership. Local plans should alsa identify specific areas in which volunteers. can best be used such as: beach surveillance, logistical support, bird and wildlife treatment, and scientific investigations. Normally, volunteers should not be used for physical removal of pollutants. If the . substance discharged is toxic to humans, or if in the judgment of the OSC other dangerous conditions exist, ‘ volunteers shall not be permitted at on- scene operations. Regional and local contingency plans should provide for routine education and training of volunteers so that training during an actual incident will not be necessary. Information on discharge and removal efforts rapa be provibied to aan frequently during the course of planning to insure coordinated effort and ; meaningful participation. Subpart C—Organization § 1510.31 Emergency response activities and coordination. (a) Ina pollution emergency, the OSC is responsible for Federal on-scene coordination. The OSC provides reports to and receives advice from the RRT charged with regional coordination. The RRT is composed of representatives from the regional and district offices of the participating agencies, States, and local governments. (b) National coordination is accomplished through the NRT which receives reports from and provides guidance and advice to the RRTs. Activities are coordinated through the facilities of the national and regional response centers. (c) The organization of this Plan is shown in Figure 1. BILLING CODE 3125~01-M 161 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 17841 National Contingency Plan Concepts 1510.32 1510.33 al | Bal | i el I en ny al I | a q I J if : I te ron 9 Gar ee ee a ah: | . ; meee I 1510.34 | : - sl 1510.35 I 1 i I i i | | 1 1 FEDERAL AGENCY ee | RESOURCES 1510.23 1510.22 1510.23 BILLING CODE 3125-01-¢ Figur el 17842 § 1510.32 National Response Team. (a) The NRT consists of representatives from the participating agencies. It is the national body for planning and preparedness before a pollution discharge and for coordination and advice during a discharge. Each participating agency shall designatea - member to the team and sufficient alternates to insure representation. (b) Except for periods of activation because of a pollution incident, the representative of EPA shall be the chairman and the representative of DOT shall be vice-chairman of the NRT. The vice-chairman shall maintain records of NRT activities along with national. regional and local plans for pollution response. When the NRT is activated for a poilution incident, the chairman shall be the representative of EPA or DOT, depending upon the area in which the response is taking place. (c) NRT meetings are open td the public. Upon invitation of the chairman and with the consent of members, non- government observers may-participate without vote in any meeting of the NRT on matters of their direct concern. They shall be provided with reports issued by- the NRT. Invitations to participate shall be given toa non-Government organization if: (1) The organization can reasonably be expected tomake a significant contribution to the work of the Team; | (2) The organization's work, past and present, has a direct relationship ta the work of the Team; and (3) The organization is not represented at the NRT through another organization. (d) Normally, when the NRT is not activated for a pollution incident, it shall serve as a standing committee to evaluate the preparedness of the agencies and effectiveness of plans for responding to pollution discharges, to recommend needed policy changes in the response organization, and to recommend revisions to this Plan as needed. (e) The NRT shall consider and make recommendations to appropriate agencies on the training and equipping of response teams; necessary research, development, demonstration, and evaluation to improve response capabilities; and equipment, material stockpiling, and other operational matters as the need arises. CEQ shall be advised of any agency's failure to respond adequately to these = recommendations. (f) The NRT shall’ recommend revisions of this‘Plan to CEQ for approval and publication. (g) Scientific advisors shall be designated, from EPA, DOC-NOAA, and 162 DOLFWS, to advise the NRT on scientific matters related to pollution response, and to coordinate and oversee the regional scientific support ~ mechanism (see § 1510.64). They shall also evaluate and advise the NRT on the desirability of carrying aut research affecting waters and resources not under the jurisdiction of the United States. (4) The NRT shall establish and maintain a Research and Development Committee to: (1) Provide the latest information on Federal agencies’ research, development, and demonstration activities for spill response and cleanup; (2) Respond to NRT requests for scientific and technical information; (3) Identify appropriate research and -development initiatives; (4) Provide for information exchange between agencies om response research, development, and demonstration : projects. The committee shall report to the NRT at the June and December meetings and at other tenes upon Tequest. — : (i) Ad hoc committees may also be established from time to time. Representatives from the participating agencies with direct involvement in such committees’ charters shall serve on these committees, {j) Planning and preparedness responsibilities of the NRT are to: -(1) Make a continuing review of regional responses to pollution * incidents, with an evaluation of equipment readiness and coordination among responsible public agencies and: private organizations. (2) Consider necessary changes in policy on the basis of the continuing review of regional responses to bigatiations incidents; (3) Develop procedures to ensure the coordination of Federal, state, local government, and private responses to pollution incidents; (4) Review regional plans and reports of activities from RRTs, and make sure that RRTs are functioning satisfactorily. (5) Inform the Research and Development Committee on research requirements identified during of unusual materials or under unique circumstances; (6) Review continuously and act upon reports by the Research and Development Committee; (7) Maintain readiness ta respond to a nationally significant discharge of oil or hazardous substances; (8) Monitor incoming reports from all RRTs and activate the NRT fora . Lee ape incident when appropriate; an Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations (9) Meet monthly or more frequently _to review pollution emergency response actions of the preceding period, receive reports from the R&D Committee and ad hoc ‘committees. Information on the time and place of meetings may be obtained from the National Response Center (see §.1510.33). (k) The NRT shall be activated as an emergency response team when requested by any team representative or when a discharge: (1) Exceeds the response capability of the region in which it occurs; (2) Transects regional boundaries; or (3) Involves significant population hazards or national policy issues, . substantial amounts of property, or substantial threats to natural resources. When acting as an emergency response team, the NRT shall consist of representatives from the participating agencies. Each representative or an appropriate alternate shall be notified immediately by telephone of the emergency activation of the NRT. (1) When activated for a pollution incident the NRT shall meet at the call of the chairman and shall: (1) Monitor and evaluate reports from the OSC. The NRT may recommend to the OSC, through feat RRT, actions to combat the discharg (2) Request other er rodent state, and governments, or private agencies to consider providing resources under their existing authorities to combat a discharge of monitor response . © operations; . (3) Coordinate the supply of equipment, personnel, or technical advice to the affected region from other regions or districts; and (4) Prepare public information releases and transfer information between the OSC and the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the agencies concerned. Public information is . discussed in § 1510.37. (m) The NRT shall considerany . matter referred to it for settlement by an RRT or OSC when the matter cannot be resolved at regional level on an interagency basis. Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, further actions will not be taken on matters thus referred to NRT until the NRT position has been transmitted to the RRT and OSC. Any member of an RRT may petition the NRT for a review of matters considered by the RRT. Petitioning RRT members -may appear before the NRT to present their arguments but shall not have the Tight to vote in NRT deliberations on the disputed matter. While the NRT desires to achieve a consensus on all matters brought before it, certain matters may prove unresolvable through normal — debate or discussion. In such cases, Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 163 17843 each cabinet department or independent agency serving as a@ participating agency on the NRT shall be accorded one vote in NRT proceedings. § 1510.33 National Response Canter. (a) The NRC is the national communications center for activities related to pollution incidents. It is located at the Washington, D.C., Headquarters of the USCG. Notice of discharges should be made through a toll free number, a special local number, or through telephone and teletype circuits. (Details appear below and in Annex V.) The NRC relays notices of discharge to the appropriate OSC. It disseminates OSC and RRT reports to the NRT when appropriate. It provides facilities for the NRT to use in coordinating a national pollution emergency response when required. (b) The Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, shall provide the necessary communications, plotting facilities, and equipment. These will include: (1) A continuously manned communication center for receiving reports of discharges; (2) Telephone branch lines; (3) Teletypewriter circuits; (4) The latest updated charts of the Departments of Commerce, Interior and Defense for the U.S. waters, the Continental Shelf and the ocean areas adjacent to the U.S. Tetritorial waters; (5) Technical library on oil and hazardous substances pollution (described in Annex VII); and (6) Plotting and display facilities to depict the geographic position, movement, and extent of the discharge. (c) The USCG shall furnish technical Manuals and materials, and necessary administrative support to operate the NRC effectively and efficiently. (d) Participating agencies may use normal communication circuits to fulfill their responsibilities under the Plan. Teiephone numbers for the primary notification offices of interested agencies will be maintained in NRC and in RRCs. (e) First notice of a pollution discharge shall be made immediately (in accordance with 33 CFR 153.203) either to the NRC Duty Officer, HQ USCG, Washington, D.C., toll free telephone (800) 424-8802 (or 426-2675 in the Washington, D.C., local calling area), or to the predesignated OSC (see Annex MM). All notices of discharges received at the NRC shall be relayed immediately by telephone to the OSC. The NRC shall evaluate incoming information and immediately advise FEMA of potential major disaster situations. (f) Pollution Reports (POLREPS) shall be submitted by the RRT to the NRC as developments occur and not later than” 1600 local time on each day of a pollution response operation. Pollution Reports shall be disseminated by the NRC to NRT members as requested by those members, - § 1510.34 Regional Response Team. (a) The RRT serves as the regional body for planning and preparedness actions before a pollution discharge and for coordination and advice during a pollution discharge. The RRT consists of regional representatives of the participating agencies, state, and local government representatives as appropriate. The full participation of high level representation from States and local governments with major ports and waterways is desired. (See §§ 1510.23(a) and 1510.34(f).) (b) Except when the RRT is activated for a pollution incident, the representatives of EPA and DOT shall act as co-chairmen. When the RRT is ‘activated for a pollution incident, the chairman shall be the representative of EPA or DOT, depending upon the area : of the spill and the response. (c) Each participating agency shall designate one member and at least one alternate member to the RRT. Participating States and local governments should also designate one member and at least one alternate member to the Team. Agencies may also provide additional representatives as observers to meetings of the RRT. Persons representing Federal and State agencies shail be specified in each tegional contingency plan. F (d) RRT members shall designate representatives from their agencies to work with OSCs in developing local contingency plans, providing for the use of agency resources, and in responding to pollution incidents. (e) The chairman of RRT shall ensure that the regional and local contingency - plans adequately provide the OSC with assistance from the Federal agencies commensurate with agencies’ resources, capabilities and responsibilities within the region. During a pollution emergency, the members of the RRT- shall insure that the resources of their agencies are made available to the OSC as specified in the regional and local contingency plans. (6) Affected states are encouraged to participate actively in all RRT activities (see § 1510.23(a)), to designate representatives to work with the RRT and OSC’s in developing regional and local plans, plan for and make available State resources, and serve as the contact point for coordination with local government agencies in responding to pollution incidents. When the RRT is activated for a pollution emergency, affected States are invited to participate in all RRT deliberations. Any State or local government representative who Participates in the RRT has the same status as.any Federal member of the RRT. (g) When not activated for a pollution incident, the RRT serves as a standing committee to recommend needed policy changes in the regional response organization, to revise the regional plan as needed, and to evaluate the preparedness of the agencies and the effectiveness of local plans for the Federal response to pollution incidents. The RRT shall: (1) Make a continuing review of regional and local responses to pollution incidents, considering equipment readiness and coordination among responsible public agencies and private organizations; (2) Recommend revisions to this National Contingency Plan to the NRT, on the basis of observations of response operations; (3) Consider and recommend necessary changes in policy on the basis of the continuing review of regional responses to pollution incidents; (4) Develop procedures to insure the coordination of Federal, State, local government, and private responses to * pollution incidents; - (5) Review the functioning of OSCs to insure that local contingency plans are developed satisfactorily; (6) Be prepared to respond to a major discharge of oil or hazardous substances - outside its region; (7) Monitor incoming reports from all OSCs and activate the RRT when appropriate; and (8) Meet quarterly to review response actions carried out during the preceding period, and consider changes in both- regional and local contingency plans. In those regions having both coastal and inland RRTs, RRT meetings held in alternating quarters (inland in March, coastal in June, etc.) would meet this requirement. (9) RRTs shall provide letter reports on their activities to the NRT twice a year, no later than 31 January and 31 July. The reports will help to identify techniques and procedures that have worked well and subjects requiring improvement and should be circulated to other RRTs. At a minimum, reports will contain paragraphs covering: (i) Summary of Activities, containing highlights of routine meetings and activations during the reporting period; (ii) Organizational Matters, Outlining improvements made since the last report. Organizational matters requiring NRT action should be included. RRTs 17844 164 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations are encouraged to add detailed accounts of successful procedures; (iii) Operations, including recommendations, comments or observations on response methods, equipment, training or other operational matters which have not been addressed in the review of OSC reports. (h) Each coastal RRT is required to conduct an annual training exercise in which response equipment is actually deployed. These exercises should use all existing capabilities in the local port. area. Any funding required to support the exercise should be requested through the normal agency budget process. The RRT shall cooperate to the fuilest extent possible in field exercises. of member agencies. E (i) RRTs for inland regions are strongly encouraged to conduct an annual training exercise in which response equipment is actually deployed. RRTs for inland regions shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible in field exercises of member agencies. (j) The RRT shall be activated as an emergency response team when a discharge: P (1) Exceeds the response capability available to the OSC in the place where it occurs; (2) Transects regional boundaries; or (3) Poses a substantial threat to the public health and welfare or to regionally significant amounts of property. Regional contingency plans shall specify detailed criteria for activation of RRTs. (k) The RRT shall be activated automatically in the event of a major or potential major discharge. The RRT may be activated during any other pollution emergency by an oral request from any RRT representative to the chairman of the Team. Requests for Team activation shall later be confirmed in writing. Each representative, or an appropriate alternate, shall be notified immediately by telephone when the RRT is activated. POLREPS to the NRC from RRTs shall include the iime of Team activation, method of activation (e.g., telephone) and place of assembly (if appropriate). (I) When activated for a pollution incident, agency representatives shall meet at the call of the chairman and shall: (1) Monitor and evalute reports from the OSC. The RRT shall advise the OSC on the duration and extent of Federal response and may recommend to the OSC specific actions to combat the discharge; (2) Request other Federal, state or local government, or private agencies to consider providing resources under their existing authorities to combat a discharge or monitor response operations; (3) Help the OSC prepare information releases to the public and for communication with the NRT. Public information is discussed in § 1510.37; (4) Advise the regional head of the agency providing the OSC if the circumstances or progress of a pollution discharge indicate that a different OSC should be-designated; and (5) Submit Pollution Reports (POLREPS) to the NRC as developments - occur and not later than 1600 local time of each day of the operation. (m) Whenever insufficient national policy guidance exists on a matter before the RRT, or there is a question concerning the interpretation of national guidance, the matter shall be referred to the NRT for resolution. Time permitting, further actions will not be taken on such issues until the NRT has transmitted a position to the OSC and RRT. Should the matter directly affect a State or local government, the RRT representatives of the affected governments-may express their position to the NRT. (n) If any member of the RRT dissents from a decision of the RRT ona discretionary action pursuant to the Plan, or an interpretation of the plan, that member may appeal the decision to the NRT in accordance with § 1510.32(m). The dissenting member .shall notify the chair of the NRT of its appeal. During a major pollution discharge, a member who has pursued an appeal to the NRT may request further review by CEQ. (0) Any State or local government representative who participates in the RRT has the same status as any Federal member of the RRT. Although it is . preferable that RRT’s reach consensus . _ Views, there may be occasions when a vote is necessary. On those occasions, each Federal cabinet level or independent agency, the directly affected State, and the directly affected local government shall be accorded one vote only. ; (p) The RRT shall be deactivated by agreement between the EPA and USCC team members. The time of deactivation shall be included in POLREPS. ; (q) Boundaries for regional contingency plans shall follow those of the Standard Regions for Federal Administration as shown in Annex II. Boundaries for local contingency plans shall coincide with those agreed upon between EPA and the USCG to : determine OSC areas of responsibility: and shall be clearly indicated in the regional contingency plan. § 1510.35 Regional Response Center. The RRC is the regional center for pollution response activities. Each regional plan shall specify quarters for the RRC. The RRC provides facilities and personnel for communications, information storage, and other Tequirements for coordinating the Tesponse.to pollution incidents. § 1510.36 On-Scene Coordinator, (a) The OSC shall direct Federal pollution control efforts and coordinate all other Federal efforts at the scene of a discharge or potential discharge. The OSC shall be predesignated, as part of the planning and preparation for response to pollution incidents, by the regional or district head of the agency responsible for providing the OSC. (1) The first official from an agency with responsibility under this plan to arrive at the site of a discharge shall coordinate activities under the Plan until the OSC arrives. + (2) The OSC shall collect pertinent facts about discharge, such as potential impacts on human health and welfare; the nature, amount, and location of discharged materials; the probable direction and time of travel of discharged materials, the natural resources, including fish and wildlife and their habitat, and property which may be affected and the priorities for protecting them. (3} The OSC shall direct Phase II, Phase II] and Phase IV operations; that is, Evaluation and Initiation of Action, Containment and Countermeasures; and Removal, Mitigation and Disposal (see Subpart E, §§ 1510.51-55 for descriptive details). Advice provided by the EPA on the use of chemicals in Phase II] and Phase IV operations shall be binding on the OSC, except «s provided in Annex X of this Plan. Advice provided by the Fish and Wildlife Service (DOI) or by the - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DOC) on cleanup actions that may affect endangered and threatened species or their habitats shall be considered at all times and shall be binding on the OSC unless in his judgment actions contrary to this advice must be taken to protect human life. (4) The OSC shall provide necessary support and documentation for Phase V activities (Documentation and Cost Recovery). (5) The OSC will consult regularly with the RRT in carrying out this Plan and will keep the RRT fully informed of all activities under the Plan. (b) EPA and the USCG shall designate OSCs for all areas in each region. The EPA shall furnish or provide OSCs for inland waters. The USCG shall furnish or provide OSCs for the coastal waters, Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 165 17845 and for Great Lakes waters, ports and harbors. (c) All Federal agencies are required by Executive Order to develop -emergency plans and procedures for dealing with oil and hazardous substances spills caused by facilities or vessels under their jurisdiction. All Federal agencies, therefore, are responsible for designating the offices that will coordinate response actions for spills caused by facilities or vessels under their jurisdiction and for providing means to remove or mitigate such spills in accordance with this Plan and applicable Federal regulations and guidelines. If the responsible Federal agency does not act promptly or take appropriate action, to respond to a spill caused by a facility or vessels under its jurisdiction, the EPA or USCG (depending on the area where the - discharge occurs) shall assume the OSC functions. (d) The OSC is responsible for developing and maintaining a local contingency plan (Federal local plan) for the Federal response in the area of the OSC's responsibility. Designated Federal, State, and local representatives to the RRT shall assist in these efforts, (See § 1510.42.) § 1510.37 Public information network. (a)(1) When a major pollution incident occurs, it is imperative to give the public prompt, accurate information on the nature of the discharge and actions underway to mitigate the damage. Those immediately capable, especially local fire, police and governmental officials, will be contacted first so they may use all available resources to notify the public of a potential threat. Prompt disclosure of the facts helps to encourage cooperation by interested parties and to check the spread of misinformation. National administration policy and the Freedom of Information Act both call for maximum disclosure of information. (2) lf a participating agency believes public interest warrants the issuance of statements or releases and the on-scene or national news offices have not been activated, the affected agency should recommend activation. In the interim, all news releases or statements issued by participating agencies concerning the incidents will be cleared through the , OSE (b) When the NRT is activated, the Team chairman will contact the most appropriate agency and ask it to detail a professional information officer to establish and direct a national news office. Whenever possible, the director of the national news office shall be provided by the same agency providing the OSC. Requests by the director of the national news office for an appropriate number of professional and clerical assistants will be met by one or more of the parti ting agencies, (1) The Sree of the national news office will be responsible for overall supervision of public information activities of the NRT. The closest possible coordination will be maintained between the national news office in Washington and the on-scene news office. (2) Promptly after his designation, the director of the national news oifice will contact the White House Press Office and the Office of Governmental and Public Affairs to arrange whatever information assistance may be required by these offices. (3) All national news office news - releases will be cleared by the chairman of the NRT, or in his absence, the vice- chairman. (4) The Director of the national news office will have free access to meetings of the NRT and will be consulted on the possible public reaction to.the courses of action under consideration by the NRT. (5) At appropriate intervals, the director of the national news office may arrange news conferences at which the ~ NRT will respond to questions from the media representatives. (6) The director of the national news office will keep appropriate nationally- based press offices posted on developments. These include the press offices of the secretaries or directors of the participating agencies; Senators and Representatives whose States or ~ districts are affected by the incident. (7) The national news office will be provided with adequate space, ‘telephones, typewriters, communications equipment and other supplies by the U.S. Coast Guard at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The director of the national news office will determine what equipment and supplies are needed to insure an orderly flow of information and to accommodate visiting members of the news media. (c) An on-scene news office will be established upon the request of any agency participating on the RRT or the OSC to coordinate media relations and issue official Federal information on a pollution incident. The office will be staffed according to regional plans and applicable agency directives. Whenever possible, the on-scene news office will be headed by a representative of the agency providing the OSC. Any participating agency may, by request to the RRT, place a representative on the staff of the news office. The OSC shall determine location of the on-scene news office but every effort should be made to located it near the scene of the pollution incident. (1) The director of the on-scene news office shall.coordinate all public information activities for the OSC. The director's functions include: (i) Arranging news conferences for the OSC and other officials to make progress reports and respond to questions; (ii) Keeping local and regional government officials informed of the pollution situation through contacts with their press offices or other representatives; (iii) Keeping news media informed about the response effort and giving them as much cooperation as possible, for example, by arranging transportation to the scene of a pollution incident when possible; (iv) Issuing and distributing daily news releases so long as public interest warrants; (v) Giving citizens who make inquiries _ up-to-date information from the latest press release; (vi) Observing public reaction to the pollution incident and advising the OSC of any actions that might better serve public information interests; - (vii) Handling queries from public and commercial interests properly and promptly; (viii) Referring salesmen to technical personnel assigned to evaluate their wares; rig (ix) Upon request, offering special public information services for official visitors, including notifying the news media of the time, place and purpose of official visits; making press conference arrangements; and arranging for interviews; (x) Informing the public on the proper way ta deal with individual problems and damages from the poilution incident; and (xi) If necessary, drafting a model letter for participating agencies to use in answering mail inquiries, after the crisis has subsided. The model letter must be approved by the Chairman of the NRT. (2) It is important for the on-scene news office to describe accurately in news releases each agency's contribution to the response effort, and to make sure that the various agencies assisting the OSC are represented at press conferences. (3) Each OSC and supporting district or regional office must establish contacts and a working relationship with the regional news media as part of preparation and planning before a pollution incident occurs. 17846 (d)(1) A Public Information Assistance Team (PIAT) shall be available to help OSCs and agenies’ regional offices meet the demands for public information during a major pollution incident or threatened incident. Team members will be trained in journalism, public rejations, and photography, and will have a knowledge of pollution response techniques, equipment, and the laws and regulations relating to pollution incidents. PLAT will be based at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters and can be requested through the NRC any time. (2) lf the NRT has not been activated, the PIAT can serve as a center for answering inquiries in Washington, D.C., upon request of the parent agency of the OSC, Subpart D—Plans .. § 1510.41 Regional contingency plans. (a) The RRTs shall develop regional contingency plans for each standard Federal region. The purpose of these plans is coordination of a timely, effective response to pollution incidents by various Federal agencies and other organizations. Regional contingency plans must have a broad scope. They must include information on all useful facilities and resources in the region, from government, commercial, academic and other sources. To the greatest extent possible, regional plans will follow the format of the National plan. An example of the desired format is in Annex IL (b) Each region includes many scientists who can make significant contributions to the response activities of the OSC and RRT. Regional Scientific Support Coordinators (SSCs) shall organize and coordinate these scientists and their contributions to the greatest extent possible. SSCs with advice from - RRT members, shall also develop the parts of the regional plan that relate to” scientific support. § 1510.42 Local contingency plans. (a) Each OSC if responsible for developing a local contingency plan for. the Federal response in his area of responsibility (Federal local plans). The plan should provide for a well- coordinated response that allows integration of or compatibility with pollution response plans of local, State and non-Federal entities. The plan shall identify environmentally sensitive areas, the probable locations for pollution incidents, the kinds of resources required to respond to pollution incidents, where such resources can be obtained, plans of action for protecting vulnerable resources, methods and sites for disposal of recovered oil and hazardous pollutants consistent with 166 local and state plans developed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901, ef seq.), and a local structure for responding to pollution incidents. The Federal local plan shall be developed in concert with and shall be consistent with fire emergency and disaster plans prepared by State and local agencies. To the greatest extent possible, Federal local plans will follow the sample format in Annex IL (b) While the OSC is responsible for developing Federal local plans, a successful planning effort depends upon the full cooperation of all agency representatives, and includes the development of local capabilities to respond to pollution incidents. Particular attention must be given, during the planning process, to developing a multiagency local response team for coordinating on-scene efforts. The RRT must ensure proper liaison between the OSC and local representatives of RRT members. A National inventory of pollution response and support equipment (SKIM) has been developed to help OSCs and RRTs gain rapid access to resources during emergencies. This inventory is accessible through the NRC, remote data terminals at Coast Guard Districts and . Marine Safety Offices, and Captain of the Port Offices. The inventory shall include privately or commercially owned equipment as well as government resources. Regional and local planners shall ensure that data in the system are current and accuate, so that OSCs can make full use of it during emergencies, with minimal delays in obtaining needed resources. The Coast Guard is responsible for keeping the national inventory up to date with information from the regional offices of Federal agencies. Subpart E—Operational-Response Phases. $1510.51 Phase 1—Discovery and notification. (a) A discharge or potential discharge may be discovered through: (1) A report - submitted by a discharger in accordance with statutory requirements; (2) deliberate search by vessel patrols and aircraft; and (3) random or incidental observation by Government agencies or the public. (b) A discharge or potential discharge discovered through deliberate search should be reported directly to the NRC. Reports of random discovery may be provided by fishing or pleasure boats, fire and police departments, telephone operators, port authorities, news media, or others. Such reports should be made Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations to the NRC or the nearest USCG or EPA office. (See § 1510.33(e) and Annex II). Regional and local plans shall provide for all reports to be channeled to the NRC, RRC, and appropriate State agency (as agreed upon with each State) as promptly as possible. Reports of major and medium discharges received by either EPA or USCG shall be expeditiously relayed by telephone to appropriate members of the RRT as specified by the regional contingency plan. Reports of minor discharges shall be exchanged between EPA and USCG as agreed to by the two agencies. (c) The agency furnishing the OSC for a particular area is responsible for implementing Phase I activities in that area. $1510.52 Phase il—Evaluation and Initiation of action. (a) The OSC shall ensure that a report of a discharge or potential discharge is immediately investigated. On the basis of all available information, the OSC shall: (1) Evaluate the magnitude and severity of the discharge or threat; (2) determine the feasibility of removal; and (3) assess the effectiveness of removal actions. (b) When appropriate and as soon as possible after receipt of a report, the OSC shall advise the RRC of the need to initiate further Federal response actions. The actions may be no more than ¢ “activation of the RRT, or a request for additional resources for further surveillance, or they may extend to Phase II or Phase IV containment or removal operations. (c) Thé OSC shall ensure adequate surveillance over whatever actions are initiated. If effective actions are not being taken to eliminate the threat, or if removal is not being properly done, advise the responsible party. If the responsible party does not then take proper actions, or if the discharger is own or is otherwise unavailable, the OSC shall, pursuant to § 311(c)(1) of the Act, take whatever actions are necessary to eliminate the threat or remove the pollutant. § 1510.53 Phase IIl—Containment and countermeasures. Defensive actions should begin as soon as possible after‘a discharge or potential discharge is discovered. This phase may include actions to protect the public health and welfare such as: analyzing water samples to determine the source and spread of the pollutants; procedures to control the source of discharge; measures to keep waterfowl and other wildlife away from the polluted area; damage control or salvage operations; placement of physical Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 167 17847 barriers to deter the spread of a pollutant; use of booms or barriers to — protect specific installations or areas; control of the water discharged from upstream impoundments; and the use of chemicals and other materials, in accordance with Annex X, to restrain the spread of the pollutant and mitigate its effects. § 1510.54 Phase !V—Cleanup, mitigation and disposal (a) Actions should be taken to recover the pollutant from the water and affected shorelines. These actions include: the use of sorbents, skimmers and other collection devices for floating pollutants; the use of vacuum dredges or other devices for sunken pollutants; the use of reaeration or other methods to mitigate damage from dissolved, suspended, or emulsified pollutants; and special treatment techniques to protect public water supplies or fish and ; wildlife resources from continuing damage. (b) Pollutants and contaminated materials recovered in cleanup operations shall be disposed of in accordance with regional and local contingency plans (see § 1510.42(a)). § 1510.55 Phase V—Documentation and Cost recovery. (a) Documentation and cost recovery may involve a variety of actions, depending on the discharge. Recovery of Federal removal costs and recovery for damage done to Federal, State, or local government property is included. Damages to private citizens (including loss of earnings) are not addressed by this Plan. OSCs shall furnish documentation required by the revolving fund administrator to support Federal efforts to recover costs from responsible parties. Procedures to be followed to fulfill documentation requirements are specified in the Coast Guard directives in the 16450.1 series. : (b) Information and samples needed for legal and scientific purposes shall be collected during this phase. Information and samples are necessary for later identification of financially responsible parties, for scientific understanding of the environment, and for research and development. The samples and information must be gathered at the proper time during the removal operations, because otherwise. wind and current may disperse the evidence, (1) All agencies shall follow uniform procedures, described in Annex VI, for collection of samples and information. _ (2) The OSC shall take necessary actions during response phases to ensure necessary collection.and safeguarding of information, samples, and reports. (c) The information and reports obtained by the OSC shall be transmitted to the RRC. Copies will then be forewarded to the NRC, members of the RRT, and others as appropriate. § 1510.56 Pollution reports. (a) Within 60 days after the conclusion of a major pollution discharge and when requested by the RRT, the OSC shall submit to the RRT a complete report on the response operation and the actions taken. The ‘OSC shall at the same time send a copy of the report to the NRT. The RRT shall review the OSCs report and submit the report and an endorsement to the NRT for review. This shall be accomplished within 30 days after the report has been received. (b) The OSC’s report shall accurately ! record the situation as it developed, the actions taken, the resources committed -and the problems encountered. The OSC’s recommendations, based on these experiences, are a source for new procedures and policy. (c) The format for OSC’s reports will be as follows: se (1) Summary of Events.—This part is a chronological narrative of all events, including: : (i) The cause of the incident, . (ii) The initial situation; (iii) The organization of the response; _ and (iv) The resources committed. These sections may be presented separately or included in the narrative. If applicable, the following information will also be included: (v) The location (water body, State, city, latitude and longitude) of the spill; - whether the discharge was in connection with activities regulated under the OCSLA or Deepwater Port Act; or whether it might have or actually did affect natural resources under the exclusive management authority of the United States; (vi) Details of Federal or State efforts to replace or restore damaged natural resources; and (vii) Details of any threat abatement actions taken under sections 311(c) or (d) of the Act. (2) Effectiveness of Response and Removal Actions.—This part should candidly and thoroughly analyze the effectiveness of the response and removal actions taken by: (i) The discharger; (ii) State and local forces; (iii) Federal agencies and special forces; and (iv) (If applicable) contractors, private groups and volunteers. (3) Problems Encountered.—This part should list any problems encountered and describe how they affected the response. Particular attention should be given to any problems of intergovernmental coordination that may have occurred. (4) Recommendations.—This section should include all recommendations of the OSC. An endorsement from the RRT shall be included. At a minimum the following areas should be covered; (i) Means to prevent a recurrence of the incident, (ii) Improvement of response actions. Any recommended changes in the regional or National contingency plans should also be included. § 1510.57 Special considerations. (a) Safety of personnel.—Actual or potential polluting discharges threatening damage to air and water can also threaten human health and safety. The OSC should be aware of the hazards, should exercise great caution in allowing civilian or government personnel into the affected area until the nature of the substance discharged is known, and due caution should be exercised thereafter. Local contingency plans shall identify sources of information on anticipated hazards, precautions, and requirements to protect personnel during response operations. Names and phone numbers of people with relevant information shall be included. (b) Waterfow? conservation.—Oil discharges, particularly in estuarine and near shore areas, often cause severe stress to resident and migratory bird species. The DOI representative and the state liaison to the RRT shall arrange for and coordinate actions of professional and volunteer groups wishing to participate in waterfowl dispersal, collection, cleaning, rehabilitation, and recovery activities. Regional and local contingency plans shall, to the extent practicable, identify organizations or institutions that are willing to participate in such activities and operate such facilities. Waterfowl conservation activities will normally be included in Phase II and Phase IV response actions (§§ 1510.53 and 1510.54 of this subpart). Subpart F—Coordinating Instructions § 1510.60 Delegation of authority. As provided by Annex X of this Plan, EPA delegation of authority or concurrence in the use of chemical pollution control activities initially may be oral; however, written confirmation by the EPA representative on the RRT 17848 168 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations should be completed as soon a8 possible. $1510.62 Mult-regional actions. (a) If a discharge or a potential discharge moves from the area covered by one Federal local or regional contingency plan into another area, the authority for pollution control actions shall likewise shift. If a polluting discharge or potential discharge affects areas covered by two or more regional plans, the response mechanism of both plans shall be activated. In this case, pollution control actions of all regions concerned shall be fully coordinated as detailed in the regional plans. ; (b) There shall be only one OSC at any time during the course of a response operation. Should a discharge affect two or more areas, the EPA and USCG will designate the OSC, giving prime consideration to the area vulnerable to the greatest damage. The RRT shall designate the OSC if EPA and USCG members are unable to agree on - designation. The NRT shall designate | the OSC if members of one RRT or of two adjacent RRTs are unable to agree on the designation. § 1510.63 - General pattern of response actions. (a) When the OSC receives a report of a discharge or potential discharge, he should normally take action in the following sequence: (1) Investigate the report to determine pertinent information such as the threat posed to public health of welfare, the type and quantity of material discharged, and the source of the discharge. (2) Notify RRT members and the Scientific Support Coordinator, in accordance with the applicable regional plan. (3) Determine, in accordance with section 311(c)(1) of the Act, whether the discharger (that is, the owner or * operator of the vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which the ’ discharge occurs) is properly carrying out removal actions. Removal is being done properly when: (i) The discharger's cleanup is fully sufficient to minimize or mitigate damage to the public welfare. The discharger’s removal efforts are “improper” to the extent that Federal efforts are necessary to prevent further damage; and (ii) The discharger’s removal efforts are in accordance with applicable regulations and guidelines, including this Plan, especially Annex X. (4) Officially classify the severity of the discharge and determine the course of action to be followed. (5) Determine whether state action to effect removal is necessary within the meaning of section 311(c}(2)(H) of the Act (See § 1510.65(h)). (b) The preliminary inquiry will probably show that the situation falls into one of five classes. These classes and the appropriate response to each are outlined below: (1) If the investigation shows that the initial information overstated the magnitude or dangers of the discharge and no environmental pollution or potential pollution is involved, the case shall be considered a false alarm and should be closed. (2) Lf the investigation shows a minor : discharge with the discharger taking appropriate removal action, contact should be established with the discharger. The removal action should . be monitored to insure continued proper action by the discharger. (3) If the investigation shows a minor discharge with er removal action being taken, the following measures shall be taken: (i) An immediate effort should be made to prevent further discharges from the source. (ii) The discharger shall be advised of the proper action to be taken. (iii) Ifthe discharger does not follow this advice, warning of the discharger’s liability for the cost of removal, pursuant to § 311(f) of the Act, shall be given. (iv) The OSC shall notify appropriate state and local officials. He shall keep the RRC advised and initiate Phase I . and IV operations as conditions warrant. (v) Information shall be collected for possible recovery of removal costs when removal js effected in accordance with § 1510.55. (4) When a report of investigation indicates that a medium discharge has © occurred, or the potential for a medium discharge exists, the OSC shall follow the same general procedures as for a mimor discharge. Additionally, the OSC shall make a recommendation concerning team activation to the chairman of the RRT. 7 (5) When a report indicates that a major discharge has occurred, a potential major pollution emergency exists, or that a discharge or potential discharge which could arouse wide public concern has occurred, the OSC shall follow the same procedures as for minor and medium discharges: The RRC and NRC shall, however, be notified immediately of the situation even if the initial report has not been confirmed. $1510.64 Special forces available to the (a) The National Strike Force consists of the Strike Teams established by USCG on the East, West and Gulf Coasts and includes the emergency task forces to provide assistance to the OSC during Phase I, IV, and V operations as the circumstances of the situation dictate. When possible, the Strike Teams will provide training to the emergency task forces and participate with the RRT in regional and local contingency plan development. . (1) The Strike Teams can provide communications support, advice, and assistance for oil and hazardous substances removal: These teams also have knowledge of ship salvage, damage control, diving and removal techniques. Additionally, they are equipped with specialized containment and removal equipment, and have rapid transportation available. : (2) Emergency task forces, established by the USCG at major ports pursuant to section 311{c)(2)(C) of the Act, consist of trained personnel with supplies of oil and hazardous substances pollution control equipment and materrals, and detailed discharge removal plans for their areas of responsibility. (3) The Strike Teams will respond to requests for assistance from the OSC. Requests for a team may be made directly to the Commanding Officer of the appropriate team, the Coast Guard member of the RRT, the appropriate ~ area commander, USCG, or to the ~ Commandant, USCG through the NRC. Emergency task forces work directly for the OSC and are accessible through those offices. (b)(1) The Environmental Response Team (ERT) is established by EPA in accordance with its disaster and emergency responsibilities. The ERT includes expertise in biology, chemistry and engineering. It can provide access to special decontamination equipment for ~ chemical spills and advice to the OSC on: (i) Cleanup techniques and priorities; (ii) Water supply contamination and protection; (ii) Application of dispersants; (iv) Habitat restoration; and (v) Disposal of contaminated material. The ERT will be especially useful to the OSC in hazardous substances spill response and in damage assessment for all spills. (2) The OSC orRRT requests for ERT support should be made to the EPA representative on the RRT, the EPA Headquarters emergency coordinator or the appropriate EPA regional emergency coordinator. Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 169 17349 (c)(1) Scientific support is organized by EPA and NOAA, with assistance from DOI, to support the OSC by providing scientific assistance including: oceanography, chemistry, location of environmentally sensitive areas, assessment of environmental damage and coordination of on-scene scientific activity. Generally, the Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) for coastal oil spills will be provided by NOAA and those for inland spills will be provided ‘ by EPA. This delineation of responsibility may be modified within a tegion by agreement between DOC, DOI and EPA representatives to the RRT. ' (2) Scientific support coordinators serve as advisors to the RRT and OSC in planning and on the OSC staff during major spill response operations. (i) In planning, the SSC works with the RRT to identify vulnerable resources within the region and to establish and maintain a scientific support structure within the region. The structure should be adequate to provide the OSC with well qualified scientific assistance. Specific responsibilitiesvf the SSC in planning are: (aa) Establish contact with the scientific community within the region, including State, local, university, industry and others, to determine the existing capability to perform damage assessment that may be necessary in support of the OSC. In those regions whose states have well developed scientific organizations, they should be employed to support the OSC. (bb) Organize the development of those portions of regional and local contingency plans that deal with scientific support to the OSC and the responsibilities of agencies that must perform damage assessment of pollution incidents. The SSC shall advise each OSC of scientists who can provide scientific advice in assessing effects of spills in localized areas. (cc) Identify, in cooperation with the region's scientific community, research (basic or applied, data gathering, processing, etc.) required to support the OSC in mitigating the effects of spills and improve the existing capability to support damage assessment. (ii) When requested by the-OSC, the ~ SSC will function as a member of the OSC’s staff. In that capacity, the SSC functions as the liaison between the scientific community and the OSC. The extent and nature of SSC involvement in the operational mode shall be determined by the OSC. In order to provide an orderly and intelligible flow of information to the OSC, act asa mediator among differing scientific opinions, and advise the OSC on use by scientific personnel of limited common resources such as aircraft and veseels, the SSC shall: (aa) Coordinate response from scientific to OSC requests for assistance and to requests from RRT agencies for performance of damage assessment investigations; coordinate responses and requests from scientists interested in performing research on spills. (bb) Serve as the principal liaison for scientific advice from the scientific community to the OSC. The SSC shall ensure that differing scientific views within the scientific community are communicated to the OSC in timely manner. (3) The SSC will respond to requests for assistance from the OSC or from the chairman of the appropriate RRT. Details on provision of the access to scientific support shall be included in regional contingency plans. (d) The activation or involvement of any special forces shall not relieve the OSC of any responsibilities for notification and activation of any member agency of the RRT concerning a pollution incident. The activation and involvement of any special forces will not replace or impede the response actions of any RRT agencies in carrying out responsibilities outlined in § 1510.22, or in providing advice or assistance to the OSC or RRT relative to a pollution incident. § 1510.65 Funding. (a) If the person responsible for the discharge or threat of discharge does not act promptly, or take proper removal ° actions, or if the person responsible for the discharge is unknown, Federal discharge removal actions may begin under section 311(c)(1) of the Act. The discharger, if known, is liable for the costs of Federal removal in accordance with section 311(f) of the Act. (b) Actions undertaken by the participating agencies in response to pollution shall be carried out under existing programs and authorities insofar as practicable. This Plan intends that Federal agencies will make Tesources available, expend funds, or . participate in response to pollution ~ incidents under their existing authority. Authority to expend resources will be in accordance with agencies’ basic statutes - and, if required, through cross-servicing agreements. Specific interagency reimbursement agreements may be signed when necessary to ensure that the Federal resources will be available for a timely response to a pollution incident. The ultimate decision as to the appropriateness of expending funds rests with the agency that is held accountable for such expenditures. (c) A pollution revolving fund, administered by the Commandant, USCG, has been established pursuant to section 311(k) of the Act. Regulations governing the administration and use of the fund are contained in 33 CFR Part 153. The OSC skall exercise sufficient control over removal operations to be able to certify that reimbursement from the fund is appropriate. (d) Funding of response actions other than removal, such as scientific investigations not in support of removal actions or law enforcement, shall be provided by the agency with legal responsibility for those specific actions. (e) The funding of removal actions necessitated by a discharge from a Federally operated or supervised facility or vessel is the responsibility of the operating or supervising agency. (f) The following agencies have funds available for certain discharge removal actions: (1) The EPA can provide funds to begin timely discharge removal actions when the OSC is an EPA representative. Because EPA does not have funds authorized for this purpose, operating program funds may be used to initiate Phase II and IV activities; funding of continuing Phase III and IV actions, however, shall be determined on a case- by-case basis by the Oil and Special Materials Control Division at EPA. (2) The USCG pollution control efforts are funded under “operating expenses.” These funds are used in accordance with agency directives and applicable regional plans. (3) The Department of Defense has two specific sources of funds which may be applicable to a pollution incident under appropriate circumstances. (This does not consider military resources which might be made available under specific eonditions.) (i) Funds required for removal of a sunken vessel or similar obstruction of navigation are available to the Corps of Engineers through Civil Functions Appropriations, Operations and Maintenance, General. (ii) The U.S. Navy has funds available on a reimbursable basis to conduct salvage operations. (g) Certain emergency response activities under this plan may qualify for reimbursement as disaster relief functions. In making a declaration of a “major disaster” or a determination that an “emergency” exists, the President may allocate funds from his Disaster Relief Fund, managed by the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Director may then authorize certain reimbursements to . Federal agencies for assistance provided under direction of his office. (See Title 17850 24, CFR Chapter XIII. Part 2201, “Reimbursement of Other Federal Agencies under Pub. L. 91-606 (For use under Pub. L. 93-288 until revised).) The Director, FEMA, may also make financial assistance available to state governments and, through the states, to local governments (See Title 24, CFR Chapter XI, Part 2205, “Federal Disaster Assistance”). (h) Pursuant to section 311{c){2)(H) of the Act, the State or States affected by a discharge of oil or hazardous substances may act where necessary to remove such discharge and may, pursuant to 33 CFR Part 153, be reimbursed from the pollution revolving fund for the reasonable costs incurred in such removal. (1) Removal by a state is necessary within the meaning of section 311(c)(2)(H) of the Act when the OSC determines that the owner or operator of the vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which the discharge occurs cannot effect removal properly and that: (i) State action is required to minimize or mitigate significant damage to the public health or welfare which Federal action cannot minimize or mitigate, or (ii) Remove or partial removal can be done by the State at a cost which is less than or not significantly greater than the cost which would be incurred by the Federal departments or agencies. (2) State removal actions must be in compliance with Annex X of this Plan in order to qualify for reimbursement. (3) State removal actions are considered to be Phase III or Phase IV actions, under the same definitions applicable to Federal agencies: (4) Actions taken by local government > in support of Federal discharge removal operations are considered to be actions of the State for purpose of this section. (i) Regional and local contingency plans shall show what funds and resources are available from. Participating agencies under various conditions and cost arrangements. Interagency agreements may be necessary to specify when reimbursement is required. Annex I—1100 Distributian 1101 Plan Distribation * 1101.1 This Plan will be distributed to designated offices of participating Agencies, state and interstate water pollution control agencies and such other Federal, state, local and private agencies and organizations which are cooperating with and participating in activities in support of the Plan. 1101.2 Included in this formal distribution are the following: . Department of Agriculture ent = Commerce Department of Defense Depertment of Energy 170 Department of Health, Education and Weifare Department of the Interior Department of Justice Department of Labor Department of State Department of Transportation Environmental Protection Agency Federal Emergency Management Agency All state representatives to regional response teams . All state water pollution control agencies All interstate water pollution control agencies Other Pederal, state, local and private agencies and organizations, as appropriate 1101.3 Formal distribution of the Plan and amendments will be made by the Environmental Protection Agency. 1102 Amendment, Distribution and Format 11021 Amendments to the Plan and annexes will be made by sequentially numbered changes. Numbered changes will be effected by means of a transmittal sheet which identifies the Plan, the change number. and date, the page numbers affected by the change and any other instructions deemed necessary for purpose of clarity or to make - special emphasis or explanation of the change. There will be attached to the s the change without submission of revised pages. The use of pen and ink changes is limited to those cases where existing matter is being deleted or is of minor extent. asterisk will be placed in the left margin and the paragraph number or letter will be Annex []—Formats for Regional and Local Contingency Plans Regional Contingency Plan Letter of Promulgation. Record of Amendments. Table of Contents. List of Effective Pages. 100 Introduction 101 Authority. 102 Purpose and Objectives. 200 Policy and Responsibility 201 Federal Policy. 202 Multi-National Policy. Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 203 Federal Responsibility. 204 Non-Federal Responsibility. 300 Planning and Response Organization 301 Spill Response Activity and Coordination—General. 302 Regional Response Team. 303 Regional Response Center. 304 On-Scene Coordination. 305 Special Forces. 400 Coordinating Instructions 401 Delegation of Authority. 402 Notification. Multi-regional Responses, Multi-national Responses. Coordination with Special Forces. Termination of Response Activities. Resolution of Disputes. 500 Procedures for Reviewing and Updating the Regional and Local Contingency Plans 501 Responsibility. 502 Procedures for Review. Annex I—1100 Distribution. Annex I—1200 Regional Response Team. Annex [1}—1300 Regional Response Center. Annex [V—1400 Geographical Boundaries. Annex V—1500 Notifications, Communications and Reports. Annex VI—1600 Public Information. Annex VII—1700 Legal Authorities. Annex VII—1800 Documentation for Enforcement and Cost Recovery. Annex IX—1900 Funding. Annex X—2000 Cleanup Techniques and Policies. Annex XI—2100 Arrangements for Participation of Non-Federal Groups. Annex XI—2200 Interagency Support Agreements/Arrangements. Annex XII-—2300 State Contingency Plans. Annex XIV—2400 Multi-national Plans. Annex XV—2500 Regional Data Base. Annex XX—3000 National Contingency Plan. 88888 Table of Contents. List of Effect Pages. = 100 Introduction © 101 Authority. 102 Purpose and Objective, 103 Scope. 104 Abbreviations. 105 Definitions. 200 Policy and Responsibility - 201 Federal Policy. _ 202 Related State Policy. 203 Multi-national Policy. 204 OSC Responsibility. 205 Non-Federal Responsibility, 300 Planning and Response Considerations 301 Oil and Hazardous Substances Transportation Pattern. 302 Transfer Storage and Processing Facilities. 303 Historical Spill Considerations. 304 Hydrological and Climatological Considerations. 305 Local Geography. 306 Highly Vulnerable Areas. 307 Local Response Resources, 171 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 17851 308 Waterfowl Conservation. 309 Endangered Species. 400. Response Organization 500 Operational Response Actions 600 Coordination Instructions 601 Delegation of Authority. 602 Notification. 603 Coordination with Special Forces. 604 Termination of Response Activities. 605 Resolution of Disputes. 700 Procedures for Reviewing and Updating the Local Contingency Plan 3 Annex I—1100 Distribution. Annex II—1200 Pollution Response Personnel Assignments. Annex [I—1300 Geographical Boundaries. Annex IV—1400 Notifications, Communications and Reports. - Annex V—1500 Public Information. Annex VI—1600 Documentation for Enforcement and Cost Recovery. Annex VI—1700 Funding. i Annex VII—1800 Clean up Techniques and Policies. ‘ - Annex [IX—1900 Arrangements for Nan- Federal Groups. Annex X—2000 Interagency Support. Annex XI—2500 Geographical/Action Directory. Annex XVI—2600 Response/ Assistance Directory. o Annex []—Regions and Office Locations of EPA and the Coast Guard 1300 Geographical Boundaries Regional contingency plans shall be based ~ upon the Standard Federal Regions. Local plans shall be based upon the subregional area, for which each OSC is responsible for responding to pollution incidents. These plans are available for inspection at EPA " regional offices or USCG district offices as. _ shown in 1301 and 1302. Other agencies’ addresses and telephone numbers may be found in the United States Government Manual (issued annually) or in the local telephone directories. 1301 Environmental Protection Agency— Office addresses, telephone numbers, and map. : 1302 Department of Transportation— United States Coast Guard district offices addresses, telephone numbers, and map. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I Room 2303, John F. Kennedy Federal Bldg., Boston, MA 02203, Tel: (617) 223-7285. Environmental Protection Agency, Region II, Room 908, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY 10007, Tel: (201) 548-8730. Environmental Protection Agency, Region HI, Curtis Building, 6th & Walnut Streets, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Tel: (215) 597-9898. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV, 345 Courtland Street, NE, Atlanta, GA 30308, Tel: (404) 881-4062. Environmental Protection Agency, Region V, 536 South Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60605, Tel: (312) 353-2318. Environmental Protection Agency, Region VI, 1201 Elm Street, First International Bldg., Dallas, TX 75270, Tel: (214) 749-3840." Environmental Protection Agency, Region VU, 1735 Baltimore Street, Kansas City, MO 64108, Tel: (816) 374-3778. 69-848 O - 81 - 12 Environmental Protection Agency, Region VII, Suite 900, 1860 Lincoln Street, Denver, CO 80295, Tel: (303) 837-3880. Environmental Protection Agency, Region [X, 215 Freemont Street, San Francisco, CA 80295, Tel: (303) 837-3880. Environmental Protection Agency, Region X. 1200 Sixth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98101, Tel: (206) 442-1200. BILLING CODE 3125-01-8 172 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 17852 mec ll ud SHapeNhpragy jrucitioy e (SNOID3Y GNH ONY M3H ‘Wd3] SNOIDIY 143034 GUVONWIS v 9-40-921¢ 3009 ONTTTSa VOWYS NVOINIWY Xl é ° wyno 1 ie Sc4 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 173 17353 1302 Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard Districts 1st Coast Guard District, 150 Causeway Street, Boston, MA 02114, Duty Officer: (617) 223-3645. 2nd Coast Guard District, 1430 Olive Street, St. Louis, MO 63101, Duty Officer: (314) 425-4614, 3rd Coast Guard District. Governors Island, New York, NY 10004, Duty Officer: (212) 668-7055. 5th Coast Guard District. Federal Building, 431 Crawiord Street, Portsmouth, VA 23705, Duty Officer: (804) 398-6231. 7th Coast Guard District, Roam 1018, Federal Building, 51 SW 1st Avenue, Miami, FL 33130, Duty Officer: (305) 350-5811. 8th Coast Guard District, Hale Boggs Federal Building, 500 Camp Street, New Orleans, LA 70130, Duty Officer: (504) 589-8225, 9th Coast Guard District, 1240 East 9th Street, Cleveland, OH 44199, Duty Officer: (216) 293-3984. 11th Coast Guard District, Union Bank Building, 400 Oceangate Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90822, Duty Officer: (213) 580- 2225. - 12th Coast Guard District, 630 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA $4128, Duty Officer: (415) 556-5500. 13th Coast Guard District, 915 2nd Avenue, Seattle, WA 98174, Duty Officer: (206) 442— 5888. 14th Coast Guard District, Prince Kalanianaole Fed. Bldg., 300 Ala Moana, Honolulu, HI 96850, Duty Officer: (808) 516— 7109 (commercial only), AUTOVON—{315) 430-0111. 17th Coast Guard District, P.O. Box 3-5000, Juneau, AK 99802, Duty Officer: (907) 586— 7340 (commercial only), AUTOVON—{317) 388-7340. a BILLING CODE 3125-01-48 ~ 174 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday. March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 17854 D-10-92t€ 3009 ONITHA re Til - wunos | 1H ope) NINIONOH ~ o8 » NN; : ~ 49v39 9NO1 SLOWLSIG GUVN LSVOO “S ‘N nwanor NOWLVIYOdSNVUL JO LNINLYVd30 SILVLS G3LINN LI Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations Annex IV 1400 Legal Authorities. 1400.1 Federal statutes relative to control of pollution. by oil and hazardous substances are administered by several.departments and agencies. The following is a tabular summary of the most important of these authorities; Statute and Agency(ies) 1411 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (33 USC 1251, et. seq.), EPA, USCG, CORPS, Justice 1412 Safe Drinking Water Act amendment to the Public Health Service Act (42 USC 201); EPA 1413 Refuse Act of 1899 (33 USC 407; 411); CORPS, USCG, Customs, Justice 1414 Toxic Substances Control Act, 1976 (42 USC 2801}; EPA 1415 Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (42 USC-6901); EPA 1416 Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1978 (33 USC 1401 et. seq.}; EPA, USCG, NOAA, CORPS 1417 Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974 (49 USC 1801 et. seq.}; DOT 1418 Ports and Waterways Safety Act as amended (33 USC 1221, et. seq.}; USCG 1419 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (7 USC 121 et. seq.); EPA 1420 Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 USC 1501 et. seq.); DOT, DOI 1421 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, as amended (43 USC 1331); DOL DOT _ 1422 Oil Pollution Act of 1961, as amended (83 USC 1001-1002.5}; USCG, Customs, CORPS, State 2 1423. Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 USC 1531}; FWS, NOAA 1424 Intervention on the High Seas Act (33 USC 1471-1487); USCG 1430 Related Federal statues, not specific to oil and hazardous substances pollution control, but, nonetheless, applicable to discharge prevention and cleanup in certain cases are: 1431 Disaster Relief Act of 1974; FEMA, All Federal i ; agencies : 1432 U.S. Navy Ship Salvage Authority; U.S. Navy 1433. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 USC 701-718); FWS 1440 Important International Conventions and Agreements relative to oil and hazardous substances pollution control and liability are: 1441 International Convention for the ’ Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, and amendments 1442 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1443 Convention between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Envirenment 1444 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter Annex V.—Communication Services Available in National Response Center 1501 Telephone (voice) services available include: 175 1501.1 Commercial telephone available 24 hours per day, free (800) 424-8802 (or 428- 2675 in the Washington, D.C. local calling area); 1501.2 AUTOVON (Automated Voice Network}—General purpose switched voice network of Defense Communications Systems, which serves Continental U.S., Alaska, Europe, Pacific, and Panama; 1501.3 Washington Tactical Switchboard—Pentagon terminal of the tactical telephone system, operated by USAF; 1501.4. FTS—GSA operated government administrative telephane system; and 1501.5 SARTEL—Search and Rescue Command Coordination telephone network including leased Hotline telephone net extending from Halifax to New Orleans. 1502 Teletypewriter services available include: 15021 AUTODIN—A worldwide high speed user data communications system operated for and managed by the DCA to provide both direct user-to-user and store and forward message switching service for DOD and other government agencies; 15022 SARLANT—Coast Guard-leased teletypewriter system extending from Massachusetts to Texas (used to control and coordinate search and rescue incidents and to handle other operational traffic and priority administrative communications}; 15023 SARPAC—Same as 22 for the West Coaat U-S.; and 1502.4 TELEX—Teletypewriter exchange service provided by Western Union that serves Continental U-S., industry and government offices. TELEX also permits direct connections. Annex VL—Sample Collection Procedures 1601 Sample collection procedures to be followed by OSC: 1601.1 Several precautions mustbe - observed when taking and handling liquid samples for analyses as the character of the sample may be affected by a number of : common conditions. These-precautions concern the following: (a) The composition of the container, (b) cleanliness of the container; and, (c) manner in which the sample is taken.’ 1601.2 In taking such samples, the following procedures are to be followed in all cases: 1601.2-1 Glass or other appropriate containers of suitable size shall be used. The portion of the closure (sealing gasket or cap liner) which may come into contact with the sample in the container is of considerable importance. When-oil or petroleum bh ons are to be sampled, the closure should be made of glass, aluminum foil, or teflon. Pollutants other than oil may require special precautions auch as jacketing of glass containers or different closure material. The analysis laboratory should be consulted whenever a question arises to the appropriateness of any packaging material. 1601.2-2 Previously unused containers are preferred. Containers that have been cleaned with a strong detergent, thoroughly rinsed, and dried may be used. 1601.2-3 Some explanatory notes governing the above procedures are as follows: (a) Glass or other appropriate containers always must be used because 17855 plastic containers, with the exception of teflon, have been found in some cases to absorb organic materials from water and, in other cases, compounds have been dissolved from plastic containers; (b) as it is desirable to take a large sample of the pollutant, proper skimming techniques should be used to obtain a sufficient amount of oil for analysis; and (c) because pollution conditions change rapidly, samples should be taken promptly, and the time sequences and locations noted. 1601.2-4 Consult with the analysis laboratory personnel relative to special samples and unusual problems. 1601.2-5 Samples collected are to be transmitted for analysis, using special courier or registered mail (return receipt requested). Appropriate analytical laboratories are designated in the regional plan. Reports of laboratory analysis will be forwarded to the appropriate RRT for transmittal to counsel. Annex VIL—1700 Technical Information 1701 Technical Library 17011 A technical library of pertinent pollution control documents will be Maintained in the NRC and in each RRC. Such mformation should be useful as reference information to the experienced OSC and instructional to less experienced personnel. 1702 Specific References 1702.1 Asa minimum, the following reference documents will be maintained in the NRC and in each RRC technical library. 1702.1-1 Current National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. 1702.1-2 Current Regional and State Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. 1702.1-3 Current Directory of the American Council of Independent Laboratories. 1702.14 Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, 22 Vol., Kirkothmer, 2nd edition c1963-1971, John Wiley & Sons, New York, New York. 17021-5 Chemical Data Guide for Bulk Shipment by Water (U.S. Coast Guard CG- aaa ) 1702.1-6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Regulations ER 500-1-1 and ER S00-1-8 Emergency Employment of Army Resources (Natural Disaster Activities). 1702.1-7. Federal Disaster Assistance Program-Handbook for Applicants FDAA 3300.1, July 1973. 1702.1-8 Federal Disaster Assistance Pearce: Eligibility Handbook 3300.2, July es Federal Disaster Assistance Program-Handbook for State and Federal Officials 3000.4, December 1973. 17021-10 Handbook of Toxicology (National Academy of Sciences/National Resource Council). 1702.1-11 46 CFR-146. Transportation or Storage of Explosives or Other Dangerous Articles or Substances, and Combustible Liquids on Board Vessels. 1702.1-12 33 CFR, 3, 5, 121, 122, 124-6. Security of Vessels and Waterfront Facilities (USCG CG 239). 4 17856 176 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 1702.1-13 33 and 40 CFR parts implementing section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended. 1702.2 In addition to the library specified above, the RRC should have provision, either in publications or by computer terminal, for access to the EPA Technical Assistance Data System, (TADS) and the USCG Chemical ~ Hazard Response Information System (CHRIS). Annex VIII Definitions of Terms 1801 API gravity. An empirical scale for measuring the density of liquid petroleum products, the unit being cailed the “degree APT” 1802 Ash. Inorganic residue remaining after ignition of combustible substances determined by definite prescribed methods. 1803 Asphalts. Black, solid or semi-solid, bitumens which occur in nature or are produced as residues during petroleum refining. 1804 Bilge oil. Waste oil which accumulates, usually in small quantities, in the lower spaces in a ship, just inside the hull plating. Usually mixed with larger quantities of water. 1805 Blowout. A sudden, violent escape of gas and oil from an oil well when high pressure gas is encountered and preventive measures have failed. 1806 Boiling point. The temperature at which the vapor pressure of a liquid is equal to atmospheric pressure. 1807 Bunker “C” oil. General term used to indicate a heavy viscous fuel oil. 1808 Bunker fuel. General term for heavy oils used as fuel on ships and in industry. It often refers to No. 5 and 6 fuel oils. 1809 Bunkering. The process of loading fuel aboard ship. 1810 Gees tables. (Approximate Conversions). Barret parton Matenaie eng) ha eee Amation gasolines 2 OR Motor gasotines Kerosenes 77-83 Qe ay Diese! ods TTD Lubricating ole. 68-76 Fuel ode 66-7.0 Asphait brumens. 59-45 (As a general rule-of-thumb, use 6.5 barrels or 250 gallons per ton of oiL) 1811 Crude oil. Petroleum as it comes from the earth. There may be several thousands of different substances in crude oil, some of which evaporate quickly while others persist indefinitely. The physical characteristics of crude oils may vary widely. Crude oils are often identified in trade jargon by their regions of origin. This identification may not relate to the apparent physical characteristics of the oil. Commercial gasoline, kerosene, heating oils, diesel oils, lubricating oils, waxes, and asphalts are all obtained by refining crude oil. 1812 Demulsibility. The resistance of an oil to emulsification, or the ability of an oil to separate from any water with which it is mixed. The better the demulsibility rating, the more quickly the oil separates from water. 1813 Density. Density is the term meaning the mass of a unit volume. Its numerical expression varies with the units selected. 1814 Emulsion A mechanical mixture of liquids which do not naturally mix as oil and water. Water-in-oil emulsions have the water as the internal phase and oil as the external phase. Oil in water emulsions have oil as the internal phase. 1815 Fire point. The lowest temperature at which an oil vaporizes rapidly enough to burn for at least 5 seconds aiter ignition, under standard conditions. 1816 Flash point. The lowest temperature at which an oil gives off sufficient vapor to form a mixture which will ignite, under standard conditions. 1817 Fraction. Refinery term for a product of fractional distillation having a restricted boiling range. 3 1818 Fuel oil grade. Numerical ratings ranging from 1 to 6. The lower the grade number, the thinner the oil is and the more easily it evaporates. A high number indicates a relatively thick, heavy oil Number 1 and Number 2 fuel oils are usually used in domestic heaters, and the others are used by industry and ships. Number 5 and Number 6 oils are semi-solids that must be liquified by heating. Kerosene, coal oil, and range oil are all Number 1 oil. Number 3 is no longer used as a standard term for fuel oil. 1819 Innage. Space occupied in a product container. 1820 In personem. An action in is instituted against an individual. usually through the personal service of process, and may result in the imposition of liability directly upon the person of a defendant. 1821 In rem. An action in which the vessel or thing itself is treated as the offender and made defendant without any proceeding against the owners or even mentioning their names. The decree in an action in rem is 1822 Load On Top (LOT). po ballasting and cleaning unloaded tankers without discharging oil. Half of the tanks are first filled with seawater while the others are cleaned by hosing. Then oil from the cleaned tanks, along with oil which has separated out in the full tanks, is pumped into a single slop tank. The clean water in the full tanks is then discharged while the freshly-cleaned tanks are filled with seawater. Ballast is thus constantly maintained. 1823 Oil films. A slick thinner than .0001 inch and may be classified as follows: * Gallons of Standard term od per Appearance square mia “Barely vsbie"___ 25 Barely viele under most tavorabie light conditions. a 50 Viebie as a sivery ‘sheen on surtace water. “Signtly colored”. 100 Fst trace of color may be observed. “Brightly colored”. 200 Bright bands of color are visible. 1833 Tonnage. There are various tonnages applied to merchant ships. The one commonly implied is gross tonnage although in these days tankers and other bulk-carriers are often referred to in terms of deadweight. 1833.1 Gross tonnage. 100 cubic feet of permanently enclosed space is equal to one gross ton—nothing whatever to do with weight. This is usually the registered tonnage although it may vary somewhat according to the classifying authority or nationality. 1833.2 Net tonnage. The earning capacity of a ship. The gross tonnage after deduction of certain spaces, such as engine and boiler rooms, crew accommodations, stores, equipment, etc. Port and harbor dues are based on this tonnage. 1833.3 Displacement tonnage. The actual weight in tons, varying according to whether a vessel is in light or loaded condition. Warships are always spoken of by this form of measurement. 1833.4 Deadweight tonnage. The actual weight in tons of cargo, stores, etc., required to bring a vessel down to her load line, from the light condition. Cargo deadweight is, as its name implies, the actual weight in tons of the cargo when loaded, as distinct from stores, ballast, etc. 1634 Ullage. The amount by which a tank or vessel lacks being filled. (See also Outage). 1835 Viscosity. The property of liquids which causes them to resist instantaneous change of shape, or instantaneous rearrangement of their parts, due to internal friction. The resistance which the particles of a liquid offer to a force tending to move them in relation to each other. Viscosity of oils is usually expressed as the number of seconds at a definite temperature required for a standard quantity of oil to flow through a standard apparatus. 1836 Viscous. Thick, resistance to flow, having a high viscosity. 1837 Volatile. Evaporates easily. Annex X—Schedule of Chemical and Other Additives to Remove Oil and Hazardous Substances Discharges 2001 General 2001.1 This Schedule has been prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to section 1(2) of Executive Order 11735. This Schedule applies to the waters of the United States and adjoining shorelines. * the waters of the Contiguous Zone, and the high seas beyond the Contiguous Zone in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act or the Deep Water Port Act of 1974, or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United States (including resources under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1978). 2001.2 This Schedule applies to the use of any chemicals or other additives as hereinafter defined that may be used to remove oil and remove or neutralize hazardous substances discharges. Any chemical agent or other substance not specifically defined in this schedule will be considered by EPA on a case-by-case basis for use in the removal of oil and hazardous substances discharges. 2001.3 This Schedule favors development and utilization of sorbents, skimmers, booms and other mechanical control methods to remove or mitigate oil and remove, mitigate, or neutralize hazardous substances discharges from the environment with subsequent proper disposal. Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 177 17857 2001.4 Itis the intent of this Schedule that the use of chenticals and additives to remove or mitigate the effects of oil or hazardous substances discharges shall cause the least overall environmental impact. 2001.5 In implementing this Schedule and in maintaining its relationship with other Federal and State agencies, EPA shall recognize that some States may have more stringent laws, regulations or written policies Tegulating the use of chemicals in the removal of oil and hazardous substance discharges, in which case such laws, regulations or policies shall govern. 2001.6 It has been determined that because of the overriding need for prompt initiation of discharge removal actions no formal permit, as provided for by Sec. 402 of the Act, shall be ired before application of chemicals to mitigate the effects of a discharge. The provisions of Sec. 1510.21(f) and 1510.36(a)(3) of this Plan shall apply. 2002 Definitions Materials applied to oil or floating hazardous substances discharges are defined as follows: 20021 Chemical agents are those elements, compounds, or mixtures that disperse, dissolve, emulsify, neutralize, precipitate, reduce, solubilize, oxidize, concentrate, congeal, entrap, fix, gell, make the pollutant mage more rigid or viscous, or otherwise facilitate the mitigation of deleterious effects or removal of the pollutant from the water. 2002.2 Dispersing Agents are those chemical agents which emulsify, disperse, or solubilize oil into the water column ar act to further the surface spreading of oil slicks in order to facilitate dispersal of the oil into the watercolumn . 2002.3 Surface Collecting Agents a are those chemical agents which are a surface film forming chemical for controlling oil layer thickness. - 2002.4 Biological Additives are microbiological cultures, enzymes, or nutrient additives that are deliberately introduced into an oil or hazardove substance spill for the specific purpose of encouraging bio- degradation to mitigate the effects of a spill. 2002.5 Burning Agents are those materials which, physical or chemical means, improve the combustibility of the materials to which they are applted. 2002.6 Sinking Agents are those materials which are applied to oil and hazardous substance spills to sink floating pollutants below the water surface. 2002.7 Mechanical removal methods © include the use of pumps, skimmers, booms, earthmoving equipment, and other mechanical devices. 2002.8 Sorbents are essentially inert and insoluble materials which are used to remove oil and hazardous substances from water through a variety of sorption mechanisms. Examples include: straw, expanded perlite, polyurethane foams, reclaimed paper fibers, peat moss. 2003 Dispersing Agent Program for Spills of Oil and Applicable Hazardous Substances 2003.2 Authorization for Use of Dispersing 2003.1-1 Major and medium discharges. Dispersing agents may be used in any place, at any time, and in quantities designated by the OSC when their use will: 2003,1-1.1 In the judgment of the OSC, prevent or substantially reduce hazard ta human life. 2003.1-1.2 In the judgment of the EPA RRT member on a case-by-case basis, in consultation with appropriate State or Federal agencies, prevent or reduce substantial hazard to a major segment of the population(s) of vulnerable species of waterfowl; or, y 2003.1-1.3 In the judgment of the EPA RRT member on a case-by-case basis, in consultation with appropriate State and ~ Federal agencies, result in the least overall ‘environmental damage, or interference with designated water uses. 2003.1-2 Minor discharge. The provisions. of section 2003.1-1 shall apply. ’ 2003.2 Special Restrictions on Dispersing Agent Use: 2003.3.2-1 Chemical agents shall not be considered for use as dispersing agents unless technical product data have been. provided and accepted in accordance with hazards imminent that the time delay for obtaining a dispersant agent that is in compliance with 2003.3 would be excessive. 2003.2-2 Federal officials responsible for oil and hazardous substance spill response activities at all levels shail develop effective programs to insure that dispersants that are available for use in appropriate spill response actions are dispersants with adequate technical data on file with EPA. This effort will help preclude the avoidance of the EPA technical data program by manufacturers or suppliers who might wish to take advantage of the emergency conditions provision of 2003.2-1. 2003.2-3 For all situations where dispessants are used, accurate records shall be kept on dispersant types, brands, application rates and methods, effectiveness, environmental impacts, plus any other pertinent observations. 2003.3. Technical Product Data For Dispersing Agents 2003.3-1 Technical product data as outlined in 2003.3—6 on the physical, chemical and toxicity characteristics of a dispersing agent shall be submitted to the Oil and Special Materials Control Division (WH-548), Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460, at least 60 days prior to the use of the agent. Within 60 days of receipt of the data, EPA will inform, in writing, the submitter on the adequacy of the date provided. If additional information is requested or EPA desires to perform tests, the dispersing agent may not be considered for use until the additional needs have been satisfied and the submitter so notified. 2003.3-2 Information furnished in accordance with 2003.34 shall be maintained on file by the Environmental Protection Agency, Oil and Special Materials Control Division, (WH-548) Washington, D.C. 20460, to provide technical guidance to OSCs on the - acceptable circumstances of use and dosage rates for. dispersing agents. Any changes in the composition or formuiation of the dispersing agent that will affect any of the data being requested in 2003.34 shall be immediately brought to the attention of EPA and testing of the agent will be repeated prior to the use of the revised dispersing agent 2003.3-3 The acceptance and maintenance of product data by EPA does not constitute approval of the dispersing agent nor does it imply compliance with any EPA criterial or minimum standards for such agents. The OSC will determine which dispersing agent may be used for a apill event on a case-by-case basis using all available information in making such a decision. To avoid possible misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the EPA'a role in thia technical product data program, the manufacturer's representatives may use only the EPA letter advising compliance with 2003.3—4 in any adyertisements or technical literature on the dispersing agent. The EPA letter must be used in its entirety. Failure to comply with these restrictions or any other improper reference to EPA in attempting to demonstrate EPA approve! of the dispersing agent for use on spills of oil or hazardous substances shall constitute grounds for removing the technical product data from EPA files, which would preclude use of the dispersing agent except as noted in 2003.2-3 for imminent hazards. 2003.34 Required Technical Product Data 2003.3-4.1 Name, brand, or trademark, if any, under which the chemical agent is sold. 2003.3-4.2 Name, address and telephone number of the manufacturer, importer or vendor. 2003.3-4.3 Name, address and telephone number of primary distributers or sales outlets. 2003.3-4.4 Special handling and worker precautions for storage and field application. Maximum and minimum storage temperatures to include optimum ranges as well as temperatures that will cause phase separations, chemical changes or otherwise damage effectiveness of the chemical agent. 2003.3-4.5 Shelf Life. 2003.3-4.6° Recommended application procedure(s}, concentration(s) and conditions for use depending upon water salinity, water temperature and types and ages of the pollutants. - 2003.3-4.7 Dispersant Toxicity—Use standard toxicity test methods described in EPA Report “Standard Dispersant ; Effectiveness and Toxicity Test” (EPA R2-73- 201, May 1973) pages 22-34. This report may be obtained from the Oil and Special Materials Control Division (WH-548), EPA, Washington, D.C. 20460. 2003.3-4.8 Dispersant Effectiveness—Use standard effectiveness test methods in EPA R2-73-201. May 1973, pages 11-21. ~ 2003.3-4.9 Flash Point—Select appropriate method from the following: ASTM—D 56-70; ASTM—D 92-72; ASTM—D 93-72; ASTM—D 1310-67. 2003.3-4.10 Pour Point—Use ASTM D 97- 66 2003.3-4.11 Viscosity—Use ASTM D 445- 72 2003.34.12 D 1298-87 2003.3—4.13 Specific Gravity—Use ASTM pH—Use ASTM D 1293-65 17858 178 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 2003.34.14 Ionic Activity—Use Weatherburn Test as described below: Ionic activity tests (Weatherburn Test) Reagents: 1. Dye solution: 0.03 grams methylene blue, 12 grams concentrated. sulfuric acid, 50 grams anhydrous sodium sulfate dissolved in water to make a total of one liter solution. 2. Anionic surfactant solution—0.5% Aerosol OT (Sodium diocty! sulfo succinate). 3. Chloroform. Procednre: 1. Into a 25 ml. test tube, place 8 ml. of dye solution and 5 ml. chloroform. Add anionic surfactants solution drop by drop, shaking vigorously between drops and allowing phases to separate. Continue adding dropwise until the two layers are equal in color and intensity viewed in reflected light. Usually. 10 to 12 drops of anionic solution are required. 2 Now add 2 ml. of 0.1% solution of the unknown and shake vigorously. Results: 1. Chloroform phase (lower) is deeper in color and aqueous phase is mostly colorless—anionic is positive. 2. Water phase (upper) is deeper in color than the chloroform phase—cationic is positive. 3. Both phases are more or less the same color—probably a nonionic. 4. If the aqueous phase has become milky and hence slightly lighter in color, it may still be nonionic. Soaps do not react in this procedure. If both anionics and nonionics are present, the reaction of this test will be anionic positive. 2003.3-4.15 Miscibility—Use the test described below which is a modification of military specification MIL—C+22230 (ships): One part of the dispersing agent is mixed with 100 parts of synthetic sea water. The solution is agitated for one hour and any visible separation of the dispersing agent should be noted after this period of agitation. The test is to be performed with water temperatures at both 20°C and 0°C. The synthetic sea water shall be formulated as follows: Sodium Chlonde (grams).. Magnesium Chionda, hexahydrate (grams) Caicum Chionde dinydrate (rama)... 9.6 Sodium Sutfate entydrous (grams)... 24.0 Orstited water to make a tota/ of (liters)... 4.0 2003.34.16 Dispersing Agent Components Itemize by chemical name and percentage by weight of each component of the total formulation. The percentages will include maximum, minimum and average weights in order to reflect quality control variation in manufacture or formulations. At least the following major components shall be identified in complying with 2003.34.16. (a) Surface active agents. (b) Solvents. (c) Additives. If requested by the submitter, information from 2003.34.16 will be handled as trade secrets under provisions of P.L. 90-23, the Administrative Procedures Act. 2003.3-4.17 Heavy Metal and Chlorinated - Hydrocarbons Using reliable analytical chemistry techniques, state the concentrations or upper limits of the following materials: Arsenic, cadmium. chromium, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, zinc, plus any other metals that may be reasonably expected to be in the sample. Atomic absorption methods should be used and the detailed analytical methods and sample preparation shall be fully described; Cyanide using standard colorimetric procedures; Chlorinated hydrocarbons. Gas chromatography should be used and the detailed analytical methods and sample preparation shall be fully described. 2003.3-5 Analytical Laboratory Requirements for Technical Product Data: 2003.3-5.1 The required tests shall be performed by a qualified laboratory, 2003.3-5.2 The technical product data submission shall include the identity of the laboratory, the qualifications of the laboratory staff including professional biographical information for individuals responsible for any tests, and laboratory experience with similar tests. Laboratories performing bioassay tests for dispersant or surface collecting agent toxicity must demonstrate previous bioassay experience in order for their results to be accepted. EPA will not approve the selection of laboratories by intended submitters of technical product data prior to submission of the data. It is the responsibility of the submitter to select competent analytical laboratories based on the guidelines contained herein. 2003.3-5.3 EPA reserves the right to refuse to accept a submission of technical product data because of lack of qualifications of analytical laboratory, significant variance between submitted data and any laboratory confirmation performed by EPA, or other circumstances that will result in inadequate or inaccurate environmental information on the dispersing agent. 2004 Surface Collecting Agent Program for Spills of Oil and Applicable Hazardous Substances 2004.1 Authorization for Use of Surface Collecting Agents: Major, Medium and Minor Discharges. 2004.1-1 The OSC may authorize use of surface collecting agents on a case-by-case basis when their use will: . 2004.1-1.1 Result in the least overall environmental damage or interference with designated water uses, and 2004.1-1.2 Provide a key element in the most effective system for removing oil or hazardous substances discharge from the water environment. 2004.1-2 Mechanism for authorizing use. The OSC may authorize the use of a surface collecting agent verbally when on scene or by telephone prior to arriving on scene. In all cases, the OSC is obligated to comply with the provisions of 2004.2 prior to making such authorization. A review of the capabilities and expertise of the owner or operator or cleanup contractor prior to the occurence of the spill incident would be most beneficial in situations where telephone authorization is desired or contemplated. 2004.2 Restrictions on Surface Collecting Agent Use. 2004.2-1 The OSC may authorize the use of surface collecting agents only after being informed of the environmental conditions at the point of intended use. These environmental conditions include air and water temperatures, wind conditions, wave and current conditions, presence and relative density of debris and other floating matter on the water, type and condition of the oil or hazardous substance spilled, special biological factors such as waterfowl sanctuaries, wildlife refuges, spawning or nursery grounds, sheilrish beds, swamp areas, etc., and the availability of removal equipment that could be employed to remove the collected material from the water. Information on environmental conditions should be evaluated by the OSC from the standpoint that conditions such as strong winds, choppy waters, low temperatures, debris, and aquatic vegetation can adversely affect the performance of coilecting agents or complicate further removal operations. The performance can also vary with types of oils or hazardous substances. The agents can be effective with thin films of light oils but have little value with thick layers of heavy, viscous oils. The agents should not be used unless adequate removal equipment is available to remove the collected oil. 2004.2-2 A chemical agent shall not be used as a surface collecting agent unless the provisions of 2004.3 are complied with and EPA has informed the manufacturer's representative that the product is acceptable for use as a surface collecting agent. 2004.3 Technical Product Data for Surface Collecting Agents. 2004.3-1 Technical product data as specified in 2004.34 shall be provided to the Oil and Special Materials Control Division (WH-548), EPA, Washington, D.C. 20460, at least 60 days prior to the use of the agent. The use of existing surface collecting agents may be authorized by the OSC without complying with 2004.3 for 120 days from the effective date of this Annex. Within 60 days of receipt of the data, EPA will inform, in writing, the submitter on the adequacy of the data submitted. If additional data are requested or EPA desires to perform additional tests, the surface collecting agent may not be used until these additional needs have been satisfied and the submitter so notified. 2004.3-2 Information furnished in accordance with 2004.3—4 shall be maintained on file by the EPA, Oil and Special Materials Control Division (WH-548), Washington, D.C. 20460, to provide technical guidance to OSCs on the acceptable circumstances of use. dosage rates and special problems in the use of surface collecting agent. Any changes in the composition or formulation of the surface collécting agent that will affect any of the data requested in 2004.3 shall be immediately brought to the attention of EPA and testing of the agent will be repeated prior to the use of the revised formulation of the surface collecting agent. 2004.3-3 EPA will review technical product data for surface collecting agents and will issue approvals for agents meeting certain criteria. At present, the only minimum criterion established is for solubility which is described in 2004.13. This criterion classifies the substance as a surface collecting agent but is not an indication of the effectiveness or toxicity of the material. Other product data such as toxicity, chemical components, and Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations physical characteristics will be reviewed and, if the combined effects of these data and other factors will result in excessive hazard to the aquatic life, work safety, or other elements of the environment in the judgment of EPA, the Agency may refuse to approve the use of the agent. EPA may, from time to time, establish minimum criteria for the data being requested and may also require additional data to assist in arriving at a judgment on the environmental acceptability of collecting agent usage. To avoid possible misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the EPA's role in the surface collecting agent technical product data program, the manufacturer's representatives may use only the EPA letter advising compliance with 2004.34 in any advertisements or technical literature on the collecting agent. The EPA letter must be used in its entirety. Failure to comply with these restrictions or any other improper reference to EPA in attempting to demonstrate EPA approval of the surface collecting agent beyond that stated in the letter for use on spills of oil or hazardous substances shall constitute grounds for removing the technical product data from EPA files which would preclude use of the surface collecting agent. 2004.3-4 Required Technical Product Data 2004.3—4.1 Name, brand, or trademark, if any, under which the surface collecting agent is sold. 2004.3-4.2 Name, address and telephone number of the manufacturer, importer or . _vendor. 2004.3-4.3 Name, address and telephone number of primary distributors or sales outlets. 2004.3-4.4 Special handling and worker precautions for storage and field application. Maximum and minimum storage temperature to include optimum ranges as well as temperatures that will cause phase separation, chemcial changes, or otherwise damage effectiveness of the surface collecting agent. 2004.3-4.5 Shelf Life. 2004.34.46 Recommended application procedure(s), concentration(s} and conditions for us depending upon water salinity, water temperature and types and ages of the pollutants. | 2004.3-4.7 Surface Collecting Agent ~ Toxicity—Use standard toxicity test methods described in EPA Report “Standard Dispersant Effectiveness and Toxicity Test” (EPA R2-73-201, May 1973) pages 22-34. This report may be obtained from the Oil and Special Materials Control Division (WH-548), EPA, Washington, D.C. 20460. 2004.3-4.8 Flash Point—Select appropriate method from the following: ASTM—D 56-70; ASTM—D 92-72; ASTM—D 83-72; ASTM—D 1310-67. 2004.3-4.9 Pour Point—Use ASTM D 97— 66 2004.3-4.10 Viscosity—Use ASTM D 445— 72 2004.34.11 D 1298—67 2004.34.12 pH—Use ASTM D 1293-65 2004.3-4.13 Interim Test to Distinguish Between Surface Collecting Agents and Other Spill Cleanup Chemicals. Specific Gravity—Use ASTM 179 In order to distinguish between surface collecting agents and other chemical materials, this interim test procedure was developed. This test procedure is not an efficiency test. It is to be used only to distinguish between surface collecting agents and dispersant. Scope 1. Procedure to be used to determine the solubility in water under standard conditions of oil spill control chemicals. Method Summary 2, Five (5) milliliters of the chemical under test are intimately mixed with ninety-five (95) milliliters of distilled water, allowed to stand undisturbed for one hour, and.then the volume of the upper phase is determined to the nearest 1 milliliter. Apparatus 3. (a) Mixing cylinder, 100 milliliter subdivisions and fitted with glass stoppers. (b) Pipettes: Volumetric pipette, 5.0 millileter. (c) Timera ~ Procedure 4. Add 95 milliliters of distilled water - 22°C+/—3°C to a 100 milliliter mixing cylinder. To the surface of the water in the mixing cylinder, add 5.0 milliliters of the chemical under test. Insert the stopper and invert the cylinder 5 times in 10 seconds. Set upright for one (1) hour at 22°C+/—3°C and then measure the layer at the surface of the water. The major portions of the chemical added (75%) should be at the water surface as a-separate and easily distinguished layer. 2004.3-4.14 Surface Collecting Agent Components Itemize by chemical name and percentage by weight each component of the total formulation. The percentages will include Maximum, minimum and average weights in order to reflect quality control variations in - manufacture or formulations. At least the following major components shall be identifi {a) Surface active agents (b) Solvents. (c) Additives If requested by the submitter, information for 2004.3—4.14 will be handled as trade secrets under provisions of Pub. L. 90-23, the Administrative Procedures Act. 2004.3-4.15 Heavy Metals and Chlorinated Hydrocarbons Using reliable analytical chemistry techniques, state the concentrations or upper limits of the following materials: - Arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, zinc, plus any other metals that may be in the sample. Atomic absorption methods should be used and the detailed analytical methods and sample preparation shall be fully described; Cyanide using standard colorimetric procedures; Chlorinated hydrocarbons. Gas chromatography should be used and the detailed analytical methods and sample preparations shall be fully described. 2004.3-5 Analytical Laboratory Requirements for Technical Product Data: 17859 Follow stipulations in 2003.3-5 2005 Biological Additive Program for Spills of Oil and Applicable Hazardous Substances 2005.1 Authorization for use of biological additives, 2005.1-1 All discharges, the OSC may authorize the use of biological additives on water.or shorelines only after obtaining the approval of the EPA representative to RRT. The manufacturer or supplier of microbiological cultures or enzymes must obtain approval from State and local public health and pollution control officiale and furnish evidence of such approval to the EPA RRT representative. 2005.2 Special Restrictions on Biological Additive Use 2005.2-1 Microbiological cultures and enzyme mixtures shall not be considered for use as biological additives unless technical product data have been provided and accepted in accordance with 2005.3. 2005.2-2 The OSC must be supplied with the chemical composition and ratios of primary nutrients or nutrient additives prior to seeking approval for their use. 2005.3 Technical Product Data for Biological Additives 2005.3-1 Technical product data as outlined in 2005.34 on the constituents of a biological additive shall be submitted to the * Oil and Special Materials Control Division (WH-548), Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460, at least 60 days prior to the use of the additive. Within 60 days of receipt of the data, EPA will inform in writing the submitter on the adequacy of the data provided. If additional information is requested or EPA desires to perform tests, the biological additive may not be used until the additional needs have been satisfied and the submitter 80 notified. 2005.3-2. Information furnished in accordance with 2003.3—4 shall be maintained on file by EPA to provide technical guidance to OSCs on the acceptable circumstances of use and application rates for biological additives. Any changes in the composition of the biological additive that will affect any of . the data being requested in 2005.3—4 shall be immediately brought to the attention of EPA, and testing of the additive will be repeated prior to the use of the revised biological additive. 2005.3-3 The acceptance and maintenance of product data by EPA does not constitute approval of the biological additive nor does it imply compliance with any EPA criteria or minimum standards for such additives. The OSC will determine which biological additive may be used for a spill event on a case-by-case basis using all available information in making such a decision. To avoid possible misinterpretation ~ and misrepresentation of EPA's role in this technical product data program, the manufacturer’s representatives may use only the EPA letter advising compliance with 2005.34 in any advertisements or technical literature on the biological additive. The EPA letter must be used in its entirety. Failure to comply with these restrictions or any other improper reference to EPA in attempting to demonstrate EPA approval of the biological 17860 additive for use on spuils of oil or hazardous suostances shail constitute grounds for removing the technical product data from EPA files which would preclude use of the biological additive. 2005.3—4 Required Technical Product Data 2005.3—4.1 Name, brand, or trademark, if any, under which the biological additive is sold. 2005.3-4.2 Name, address and telephone number of the manufacturer. importer or vendor. 2005.3-4.3 Name. address and telephone number of primary distributors or sales oudets, 2005.3—4.4 Special handling and worker precautions for storage and field application. Maximum and minimum storage temperatures, 2005.3—4.5 Shelf Life. 2005.34.46 Recommended application. procedure(s), concentration(s) and conditions for use depending upon water salinity, water temperature and types and ages of the pollutants, 2005.3-4.7 Statements on the expected effectiveness of the additive including degradation rates and the test conditions and data on effectiveness. 2005.3-4.8 . For microbiological cultures furtish the following information: Listing of all microorganisms to species, ! Percentage of each species in the composition of the additive, Optimum pH and temperature range for use of the additive, Special nutrient requirements, if any, Separate listing of the following and test methods for such determinations: Salmonella, fecal coliform, Shigella, Staphylococcus Coagulase positive, and Beta Hemolytic Streptococci. 2005.3-4.9 For enzyme additives furnish - the following information: Enyzyme name(s), International Union of Biochemistry (LU.B.) oumber{s}, * Source of the enzyme, Uni nits, Specific Activity, Optimum pH and temperature range for the use of the additive. 2005.3-5 Laboratory Requirements for Technical Product Data: Follow stipulations in 2003.3-5. 2006 Burning Agent Program for Spills of Oii and Applicable Hazardous Substances 2006.1 Authorization for Use of Burning Agents . 2006.1-1 All discharges. The OSC may authorize the use of burning agents only when they will: 2008.1-1.1 Prevent or substantially reduce imminent threats to human life, limb, or property; 2006.1-1.2 Result in the least. environmental harm when compared to other removal or disposal methods. 2006.1-2 Prior to authorizing use under 2006.1-1.2, the OSC must obtain approval of the EPA RRT representative and all ‘If requested by the submitter, these items will be handled as trade secrets under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (Pub. L. 90-23). 180 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 55 / Wednesday. March 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations LEE applicable State and local public health pollution control officials. 2006.2 Speciai Restrictions on Burning Agent Use 2006.2-1 The OSC wilil evaluate the suitability of burning agents on a.case-by- case basis. Burning agents should be inert materials that will not, in themselves, be a water pollutant. The addition of oils (such as gasoline or solvents) as an igniter shall be avoided unless it is necessary under 2006.1-L 2006.2-2 A technical data program for burning agents will not be established at this time. 2007 Sinking Agent Program for Spills of Oil and Applicable Hazardous Substances 2007.1 Authorization for Use of Sinking Agents 2007.1-1 All Discharges Sinking agents shail not be applied ta discharges of oil or hazardous substances on the navigable water of the United States or the contiguous zone. 2008 Mechanical Methods and Sorbents Program for Spills of Oil and Hazardous Sudstances 2008.1 Authorization for Use of Mechanical Methods and Sorbents 2008.1-1 All D 2008.1-1.1 As stated in 2001.3, it is the policy of this Schedule to favor the use of mechanical methods and sorbents for removal of oil and hazardous substances spills. The OSC has the authority to use or prohibit specific mechanical methods and sorbents on a case-by-case basis. The OSC will select methods and materials that. in his judgment, will be most effective in - expeditiously removing the spilled material and mitigating the related damages, and will minimize secondary pollution from the removal or mitigation operation. Prior to -authorizing the use of sorbents, the OSC shall take into consideration hydrographic and meteorological conditions as weil as the characteristics of the sorbent and the availability of adequate containment and removal equipment. 20081-1.2 A technical data program for mechanical methods and sorbents will not be established at this time. (FR Doe. 80-8214 Filed 3-18-80: &45 amj BILLING CODE 3125-01-44 181 ISSN 0308 - 5589 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD DIRECTORATE OF FISRERIES RESEARCH FES ee BESEARGE No, Sf Research into toxicity evaluation and control criteria of oil dispersants M.G. NORTON and FRANCES L. FRANKLIN LOWESTOFT,1980 ENCLOSURE(4) Table 1 - Sea test results 182 Type Conventional (hydrocarbon solvent-based dispersants) Concentrates (tested asa 10% solution in sea water) Dispersant Agma EP 540 Ameroid Oil Spill Dispersant/LT Applied 8-40 Atlan’tol 3211 Atlan’tol 3211/E BP 1100X Corexit 8354 Dasic Slickgone LT2 Emkem Spillwash LT Emulsol LW Finasol OSR-2 Finasol OSR-3 Fleetex BD/3 Gamlen OSR LT 126 Kraken MC 563 Lankromul OSD Petrocon Oil Spill Eliminator IV Rochem Oil Spill Remover (WSA) Servo CD 2000 Shell Dispersant LTX Teklene TC-48 Wellaid 311 X-3125 Agma EP 559 Atlan’to]l AT7 Atlan’tol AT7 floating Compound W191] Compound W1986 Corexit 7664 Corexit 9527 Corexit 9600 Dasic Slickgone LTD Finasol OSR-5 Finasol OSR-7 Gamlen Oil Dispersant LT IMX 103 Leek A Leek B Nokomis-3 Conc. Quell - Oil CI Seawash Shell Dispersant Concentrate Spillaway Surflow OW1 Synperonic OSD 20 Synperonic OSD 41 Value 100 *Sicnificant increase in toxicity (Student's t-test, P= <0.05) Mean mortality (%) Method 1 Method 2 (oil & dispersant (dispersant added premixed before to oil film before addition to test tanks) agitation) Oil alone Oil and Oil alone Oil and dispersant dispersant - - 5 0 60 65 - - - - 80 20 _ - 70 90* - - 80 5 65 45 10 10 60 35 - = 40 35 10 15 35 30 = = 40 15 = - 60 60 — = - = 70 15 60 25 - - 60 45 = = 65 35 ~ _ 65 65 = - = = 5 15 - - 10 10 _ — 5 5 35 35 - - - - 40 45 = - 65 95* = - 5 15 = - 5 15 = - 55 80 = _ 40 55 = - 10 20 -_ = 10 5 = - 10 65* 25 90* 30 15* 40 70 55 70 85 95 20 40 35 95° 20 70* = - 70 80 50 60 55 75 = = 60 45 = = 45 80* = = 30 65* 50 70 20 25 60 75 55 80 = - 15 15 60 90 30 55 = = 35 30 50 70 55 95 45 55 55 60 - = 80 85 — - 50 50 which were significantly more toxic than physically- dispersed oil. Concentrate dispersants usually produced a dispersion which appeared to have a toxicity greater than the oil alone but only in five cases was this increase in toxi- city statistically significant (Student's t-test; P = <0.05). 3.2 Tests under non-standard conditions In order to validate the test procedure used for licensing purposes, experiments were conducted to determine the sensitivity of the test to variations in test conditions. These are described in Sections 3.2.1 - 3.2.8. 3.2.1 Effectiveness of physical dispersion Although every effort was made to form a repro- ducible dispersion of oil by physical means, the degree to which the oil was mechanically dispersed by the propeller action tended to vary between the test tanks. In Table 2 a subjective assessment based on a visual observation of the degree of dispersion is compared with the mean mortality (%) in a series of 284 test tanks. These data suggest a strong link between the subjective assessment of the degree of dispersion and its toxicity. The ‘poor’ dispersions were characterised by coarse oil droplets and thus a low oil/water surface area: the ‘good’ dispersions by fine droplets and a larger oil/water surface area. The suggested association between the degree of dis- persion and toxicity may be due inter alia either to the differences in oil droplet size (perhaps affecting its availability to the organism) or to enhanced dis- solution of soluble oil fractions across the increased oil/water interface. ; 183 tank was filtered through a Whatman No. 1 filter paper and the filtrate analysed for ‘dissolved’ oil by UV fluorescence spectrophotometry. The results (Table 3) showed that the finer dispersions using Method 1 were accompanied by an increase in the concentration of oil in solution. No such clear rela- tion was obtamed with Method 2, mainly because no ‘poor’ or ‘very good’ dispersions were observed. The concentzation of the water-soluble fraction of oil required to cause mortality of a range of species during a 96 h exposure period was found by Rice et al.(1976a, b) to be in the range 1.8-10.8 pl I”). In the sea test animals were exposed only for 100 min, and it appears unlikely that the concentration of the water-soluble fraction was responsible for the difference in toxicity observed; it seems likely that droplet size was a more important factor. Regardless of the cause of the change in toxicity, it is clear that variability in the degree of dispersion of the physically-dispersed oil in the control can mark- edly influence mortality. In order to minimise this pos:ibility and to ensure consistency of standard tes: conditions, results of tests in which the oil dispersion azpears to be exceptionally poor or variable are discarded. 3.2.2 The relationship between dispersion charac- teristics and toxicity To investigetz further the relationship between the droplet size of the dispersed oil and the toxicity of Table 2 - The relationship between extent of dispersion and toxicity of physicaliv-dispersed oil in the sea test Dispersion Method 1 description (oil added to tanks with (visual agitation) SSSI) Number of Mean observations mortality (%) Very poor - - Poor 14 35 Fair 26 55 Good 22 55 Very good tS 70 Method 2 (oil added to tanks before agitation) Number of Mean abservations mortality () 5 10 32 15 86 35 G) 45 7 55 A simple experiment was conducted to determine whether finer dispersions were associated with in- creased amounts of oil in solution. For this purpose 12 tanks were set up under standard test conditions; oil was added to six tanks already subject to agitation (as in Method 1 in Section 2.2) and to another six tanks before agitation was started (Method 2, in Section 2.2). The degree of dispersion was varied within each set of six replicates and assessed at the end of the 100 min exposure period. At the end of the experiment a sample of the oily water from each the dispersimn, a limited number of tests were carried out in which some of the characteristics of the oil dispersions produced by both methods of dispersant application were investigated. The standard test con- ditions were used for these experiments with analyses of water samples taken from the centre of the tanxs during the 190 min exposure period. The size distri- bution of the oil droplets in suspension in the oil and dispersant mixtures was measured using a Coulter counter with 200 ym aperture. Although the Coulter counter determinations were carried out immediately 184 . Table 3 - The relationship between extent of dispersion, concentration of oil in solution and toxicity of physically- dispersed oil in the sea test Dispersion description (visual observation) Method 1 ‘Dissolved’ oil (wl 1! Kuwait oil equivalents) Poor 0.5 Fair 0.8 Good 1.3 1.2 1.0 Very good 2.5 (oil added to tanks with agitation) Method 2 (oil added to tanks before agitation) Mortality ‘Dissolved’ oil Mortality (%) (ul 1? Kuwait (%) oil equivalents) 65 = = 70 0.7 35 1.0 50 50 1.0 50 55 0.6 55 65 1.1 55 1:2 70 70 = - after sampling, it was not possible to measure the droplet size distribution of the physically-dispersed oil using this method because of the instability of the oil droplets. The concentration of physically and chemically-dispersed oil present in each tank was also measured by ultra-violet fluorescence spectro- phoiometry. The results of these experiments are given in Figure 3. For each treatment, the mortality resulting from addition of dispersant to an oil film (Method 2) was less then that resulting from addition of the pre- mixed oil and dispersant (Method 1). For two of the three concentrate dispersants this reduction in toxi- city was accompanied by an increase in the mean droplet size of the dispersed oil. There also seemed to be an inverse relationship between droplet size and toxicity when Method 1 (premixing) was used for all three concentrate dispersants. Although there was an empirical link between increased droplet size and reduced toxicity it is possible that the Coulter counter itself may have modified the size distribution of the dispersed oil droplets or that this distribution could have changed between being sampled from the test tanks and analysed on the Coulter counter. In this case the larger droplet size when Method 2 (dis- persant added to oil film before agitation) was used could be due to the production of a less stable dis- persion in which some degree of droplet coalescence occurred before analysis. The concentration of oil dispersed by each method and dispersant was similar; such differences that did occur may have been caused by the difficulty of sampling through a surface oil film, especially in the oil only tanks. There was no obvious relationship be- tween the concentration of dispersed oil and toxicity. An attempt was also made to determine the cause of death of the shrimps in the test. The two principle effects of acute poisoning by oil are chemical toxicity (in which the oil hydrocarbons disrupt cellular or sub- cellular functions) and physical impairment (in which epithelial cells are coated and the animals are depriv- ed of oxygen) (Moore and Dwyer, 1974). Nelson- Smith (1972) suggested that the constituents of dis- persants could increase the uptake of oil components and Anderson ef al.(1974a, b) obtained evidence that the soluble aromatics of an oil were responsible for most of its toxic effects. Samples of shrimps from some of the oil and dispersant tanks were analysed at the end of the 24 h recovery period for naphthalene and its C,-, C,- and C,- derivatives by the technique of mass fragmentography (Law, 1978a). Concentra- tions of these compounds in the tissues of the shrimps which survived the experiments (0.3-0.8 wir? total naphthalenes) appeared to be greater than those in shrimps which had died (0.1-0.3 wl I), It is therefore unlikely that ingestion of these or related chemicals was responsible for the mortality. A micro- scopic examination of the dead shrimps revealed small oil droplets in the gill cavity and a coating of oil on the mouthparts and in the stomach. Little difference was observed between the shrimps exposed only to oil and those exposed to oil chemically- dispe-scd. It therefore seemed possible that shrimps were killed by physical processes, such as suffocation due to the mechanical clogging or damage of respira- tory surfaces. These effects have been noted by other workers (Nelson-Smith, 1972; McKeown and March, 1978). The experiments reported here have shown that the toxicity of the oil in the sea test is dependent upon a number of factors. A more precise determination of the individual contribution of each of these factors towards the toxicity of an oil or oil-dispersant dis- persion was not possible during these studies which dealt mainly with the validation of test procedures. 185 METHOD 1 METHOD 2 Oil alone 55% mortality 150 pl toil 45% mortality 550 pl toil Oil and BP 1100x 30765% mortality 700 pt (oil 5% mortality 650 pl toil 20 a a 10 s eu a Oil and Synperonic OSD 20 (concentrate) ¢ 4° 60% mortality 750 pl oil 40% mortality 850 pl Coit a 20 a 10 0 Oil_ and Shell Dispersant Concentrate 30 70% mortality 750 pl (Toit 45% mortality 900 pl Coit ~> c qa =) ao 2 @ Corexit 9527 (concentrate) o = = = 7" }80% mortality 750 pt (oil 60% mortality 900 pt Coit & > a 10 50 10 50 Droplet size (ym) Droplet size (ym) Figure 3. Crangon mortality, oil concentration and droplet size distributions of five oil/dispersant mixtures (mean of four replicate tests). Method | — Oil and dispersant premixed before addition to test tanks. Method 2 — Dispersant added to oil film before agitation. “S23 Variations in the sensitivity of shrimps to oil The response of Crangon to the physically- and chemically-dispersed oil was found to vary between tests. Ficure 4 shows the variation in mean mortality of shrimps caught at various times in 1976, 1977 and 1978 and exposed to physically-dispersed oil, to- gether with the temperature of the estuary water when the animals were caught. No clear seasonal or temperature-related change in sensitivity is apparent; the increased resistance during the late summer in 1976 and 1977 was not observed in 1978. The short- term fluctuations which occurred during this period may be due to the condition of the animals, the stage of breeding cycle or the extent and method of handl- ing before testing. As the sensitivity of the test ani- mals varies between tests and the toxicity of different batches of the standard oil may vary, it is essential to compare simultaneously the toxicity of a dispersant/ oil mixture with that of the physically-dispersed oil using the same stock of test animals. Within each set of replicate tests the yalues of the standard error are low enough to allow the detection of differences of toxic effect between dispersants. 3.2.4 Effect of changes in the degree of agitation The speed of the motors operating the stirrers used in the standard test was chosen as 1350-1450 rpm be- cause this produced a uniform and reproducible dis- persion without causing the test organisms stress (Section 2). Table 4 shows that when the motor speeds were reduced by half there was a reduction in toxicity of the physically-dispersed oil and a less significant decrease in the toxicity of the oil and dis- persant mixiure, reflecting the lower mixing energy in the system. The relative toxicities of the disper- sions obtained using the four dispersants remained unchanged at the lower speed. Because of the ab- sence of mortality in the contro] tanks where the oil was poorly dispersed at the lower speeds, however, the toxicity of the chemically-dispersed oil became of greater statistical significance. Thus, where tests are carried out for licensing purposes which involve a 186 pass-fail limit (Section 1), it is essential to standardise the degree of agitation by use of a fixed motor speed. 3.2.5 Effect of changes in the source of oil All the results presented so far have been obtained using fresh Kuwait crude oil, but as part of the valida- tion programme a number of standard sea tests have also been carried out using two fresh North Sea crude oils. The results of tests using fresh and ‘weathered’ Kuwait, Ekofisk and Auk oils, both alone and with four reference dispersants are shown in Table 5. Differences in toxicity between the oils were reflect- ed in the relative toxicities of the oil and dispersant mixture. Thus, the oil selected for the test did not affect the identity of the dispersants exhibiting the greatest and lowest toxicity. A comparison of the results for fresh and ‘weathered’ oil showed that, although ‘weathering’ reduced the toxicity of the oil and the oil/dispersant mixtures, their relative toxici- ties remained the same. The tests which produced the results in Table 5 were carried out over a period of 1 year and the difference in toxicity between the oils could have been affected by the various factors listed in the previous section. To enable a direct comparison of the relative toxici- ties of the oils, a single test was carried out in which a physical dispersion of all three oi’s, both fresh and ‘weathered’, were tested simultaneously using the same batch of shrimps. The results from this test, which are presented in Table 6, suggest that Auk oil is the most toxic of the three to shrimps. Exposure of fresh oil to air for only 24 h results in a significant reduction in its toxicity and it is essen- tial that standard oils be stored in small airtight con- tainers which are discarded after opening. This prac- tice has been adopted with the Kuwait oil used for the standard test. Moreover, the contents of one of these cans has been analysed by gas liquid chroma- tography every month to determine whether any Table 4 - Effect of reducing the degree of agitation on results of sea tests using four dispersants Motor speeds Dispersant (tpm) 1350-1450+ BP1100X Synperonic OSD 20 Shell Dispersant Conc. Corexit 9527 500-800 BP1100X Synperonic OSD 20 Shell Dispersant Conc. Corexit 9527 Mean mortality (%) Oil Oil and dispersent 10 10 55 60 30 55 30 nse 0 0 0 10 0 Ts 0 55* *Significant increase in toxicity (Student's t-test; P =<0.05). +As used in standard test (Section 1.3.1) .simulate field trials the dispersant was applied tothe 4. Beach test results 187 oil by means of sprayers similar to those used in the beach test. Because of the difficulty of adjusting the 4.1 Tests under standard conditions used for licensing sprayers to deliver an accurate quantity of dispersant directly onto the oil in the tanks, the nominal dis- persent to oil ratios of 1:10 and 1:20 are only approximate and no statistical analysis can be per- formed on individual results. However, there is some suggestion that the use of neat concentrates may generate a slishtly more toxic dispersion than the diluted dispersant. Table 10 - Beach tests results purposes The results of beach tests with a number of dispersants using the standard test conditions as described in Section 2.3 are given in Table 10. In the series of tests reported, exposure of the limpets to fresh Kuwait crude oil caused mortalities of between 30% and 95%, and application of dispersant led to a wider range of mortalities, varying from Type Conventional (hydrocarbon solvent-based) dispersants Concentrates (tested as a 10% solution in sea water) Dispersant Agma EP 540 Ameroid Oil Spill Dispersant/LT Applied 8-40 Atlan'tol 3211 Atlan’tol 3211/E BP 1100X Corexit 8354 Dasic Slickgone LT2 Emkem Spillwash LT Emulsol LW Finasol OSR-2 Finasol OSR-3 Gamlen OSR LT 126 Kraken MC 563 Lankromul OSD Petrocon Oil Spill Eliminator IV Rochem Oil Spill Remover (WSA) Servo CD 2000 Shell Dispersant LTX Teklene TC48 Wellaid 311 X-3125 Agma EP 559 Atlan’tol AT7 Atlan'tol AT7 Floating Compound W 1911 Compound W 1986 Corexit 7664 Corexit 9527 Corexit 9600 Dasic Slickgone LTD Finasol OSR-5 Finasol OSR-7 Gamlen Oil Dispersant LT IMX-103 Leek A Leek B Nokomis-3 Conc. Quell Oil CI Seawash Shell Dispersant Concentrate Spillaway Surflow OW1 Synperonic OSD 20 Synperonic OSD 41 Value 100 “Mortality significantly greater than oil control (Student’s t-test; P = <0.05) 69-830) — 8a — a3 Mean mortality (%) Oil Dispersant 40 40 65 25 65 70 65 100* 65 100* 35 15 65 SER 80 35 80 75 80 60 65 85* 65 90* 65 85* 80 50 80 55 40 Ss 50 55 45 60 80 70 45 20 35 100* 45 60 40 75* 65 D5 35 100* 50 80* 50 100* 50 10 45 70* 95 90 95 45 80 90* 66 22 80 30 55 50 60 30 60 20 80 65 95 55 50 65 50 15 35 100* 80 40 40 50 30 20 65 5 5% to 100%. About one third of the dispersants tested were significantly more toxic than oil, with little difference between conventional dispersants and concentrates. 42 Tests under non-standard conditions As with the sea test, the sensitivity of the test to variations in test conditions has been investigated and the influence of several variables is described below (Sections 4.2.1-4.2.4). 4.2.1 Variations in the sensitivity of limpets to oil Some indication of the variation of sensitivity of limpets to oil was obtained by examination of the mean mortality (%) of limpets exposed to oil during beach tests carried out in 1977 and 1978 (Figure 5). It is apparent that limpets are slightly less sensitive to the toxic effects of oil during the summer months and that the short-term fluctuations in mortality are low. The standard deviations within each set of replicate tests are low enough to allow detection of differences, between the toxic effects of oil and those of dispersants, with some confidence. 42.2 Effect of changes in the source of oil Approval of a dispersant for licensing purposes is based on its toxicity relative to that of a standard oil; thus variations in toxicity between oils could lead to different results. The sensitivity of limpets to 100 60 20 Percentage mortality Figure 5. 188 three oils is shown in Table 11 where the toxicities of Auk and Ekofisk oils, both fresh and ‘weathered’, are compared with that of the standard Kuwait oil using two batches of limpets. There appeared to be no significant diffs-2nce in toxicity between the different types of oil, or between fresh and ‘weathered’ oil. These results suggested that a coating of oil will result in similar mortalities regardless of the exact concentration or composition of the oil, and imply that the limpets were killed by being physi- cally coated with oil, rather than because of chemical toxicity. The detailed mechanism by which the oils used in these tests exerted their effects on limpets is not clear. Table 11 - Relative toxicities of three oils, both fresh and ‘weathered’ to two populations of limpets in the beach test Type of Mean mortality (%) ot Kuwait Ekofisk Auk Fresh 50 50 45 45 45 35 Weathered’? 35 60 55 40 50 40 * Fresh oil exposed to air as a 10 mm film for 24h Seasonal variations in the mortality of Patella exposed to fresh Kuwait crude oil under standard beach test conditions. t Mean % mortality and standard deviation. 4.2.3 Effect of changes in the application rate of oil and dispersant To determine the effect on limpets of changing the application rates used in the test, each of the reference dispersants and the standard oil were tested at three different application rates using the same batch of limpets. The results, presented in Table 12, show that a 75% reduction of the application rate of oil caused no significant reduction in the mortality of limpets in the test, consistent with the suggestion earlier that limpet mortality from oil is primarily due to physical rather than chemical processes. Dispersant toxicity does however, decrease as the application rate is lowered; thus the number of dispersants pass- ing the test (Section 1.4) was dependent on the application rate used in the test. In the standard tests this was set at the average rate used in practice (0.41 m7) (Section 1.5.2). These test results, how- ever, show that the danger of damage to intertidal organisms can be reduced if dispersants are used at low rates of application. To avoid increasing the damage already being caused by the oil spilt on the shores. dispersant should always be used at the mini- 189 mum application rate which results in effective re- moval of the oil. 4.2.4 Effect of applying dispersant to oiled limpets Although the standard test is based on a comparison of the toxicities of oil and dispersant to limpets, in a clean-up operation already-oiled organisms will be sprayed with dispersant. The additional effect of dis- persants on oiled limpets was thus determined using the four reference dispersants (Table 13). In each case the mortality of oiled limpets sprayed by dispers- ant was significantly higher than that of limpets ex- posed to oil or dispersant alone; this suggests that under most circumstances, the toxic effects of oil and dispersant are additive. A comparison of the effect of dispersant on oiled limpets with the effect of oil alone could thus not be readily used for regulatory purposes. Nevertheless, of the reference dispersants, those with a lower toxicity to unoiled limpets also cause the smallest increase in mortality when sprayed on oiled limpets. Thus the effect of restricting licences to products having a low toxi- city under the standard beach test conditions also minimises the adverse effects of oil-dispersant mix- tures On organisms. Table 12 - Effect of different application rates on results of beach tests using four dispersants Mean mortality (%) Application rate of Dispersant oil and dispersant (Im?) gae BP 1100X Synperonic OSD 20 Shell Dispersant Conc. Corexit 9527 Mean 02 BP 1100X Synperonic OSD 20 Shell Dispersant Conc. Corexit 9527 Mean 0.1 BP 1100X Synperonic OSD 20 Shell Dispersant Conc. Corexit 9527 Mean (Oy Dispersant 35 15 40 50 50 15 45 70* 40 40 40 15 40 30 25 15 50 45 40 25 40 5 25 15 25 5 40 40 35 15 *Mortality significantly greater than oil contro] (Student's t-test; P = <0.05) *Rate used in standard test (Section 1.3.2) Table 15 - Concentrations of oil in the water column resulting from natural and chemical dispersion at sea Details of spill Natural dispersion ARROW, Chedabucto Bay, USA April 1970 AMOCO CADIZ, Brittany March 1978 DRUPA, Norway February 1976 Ekofisk Bravo blowout, North Sea, April 1977 Experimental 14 t slick Experimental 7 1 enclosed slick Expenrental % t slick ELENI V, North Sea May 1978 Picnic Bay, Hong Kong November 1973 Chemical dispersion ELENI V, North Sea May 1978 (near wreck) DRUPA, Norway Experimental 230] slick Experimental 7 ] enclosed slick 190 Type of oil (and dispersant) Bunker C fuel oil Light Iranian and Arabian crudes Iranian crude North Sea crude - Heavy gas oil North Sea crude North Sea crude Heavy fuel oil Heavy marine diesel Heavy fuel oil + Dasic Slickgone LTD Iranian crude + Finasol OSR 2 Fresh Kuwait crude + BP 1002 North Sea crude + BP 1100X Maximum oil Source concentration qt?) 0.06 US Ministry of Transport, 1970 0.2 (offshore) Law, 1978b 0.2-0.3 Grahl-Nielsen et al.,1978 0.3 Grahl-Nielsen, 1978 1.5 Cormack and Nichols, 1977b 0.15 Ward and Davies, 1978 2.5 Cormack and Nichols, 1977b 3.4 (inshore) Law and Hall, 0.04 (offshore) 1978 0.06 Spooner, 1977 0.2 Law and Hall, 1978 1 Grahl-Nielsen et al.,1978 48 Cormack and Nichols, 1977b 78 Ward and Davies, 1978 to the concentrations which have been shown to be en- countered inirially following dispersisn of a slick. Where the less toxic dispersants are used, the 100 min LC50 value is substantially higher than concentrations actually measured under a chemically-dispersed slick. Observations at sea have demonstrated that subsequent dilution is rapid; in Cormack’s (1977) studies, the maxi- mum concentration of chemically-dispersed oil fell from 48 pl T? after 2 min to below 2 wl I? after 100 min. Therefore dilution during the first 100 min is likely to reduce the dispersed oil concentration to between 0.01 and 0.001 of the 100 min LCS5O value where the less toxic products are used. Weathering of fresh oil which is likely to occur before spraying with dispersant will also tend to re- duce the toxicity of the dispersed oil. Thus, provided marine organisms are not exposed repeatedly to concentra- tions of dispersed oil and provided there is adequate water 191 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, Washington, D.C., September 26, 1980. Hon. Gerry E. Stupps, Chairman, Oceanography Subcommittee, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisher- ies, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: In my recent testimony before the Oceanography Subcom- mittee, Congressman Breaux asked a number of questions concerning the burden of proof under section 403(c) of the Clean Water Act (the Act). Specifically, does EPA or the applicant for an National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit determine the degradation to the marine environment as a result of the proposed discharge? Section 403(c)(1) of the Act directs the Administrator of EPA to promulgate ocean discharge guidelines to be used in determining the degradation of marine waters when issuing an NPDES permit. Section 403(c)(2) prohibits the issuance of an NPDES permit for an ocean discharge in cases in which there is insufficient infor- mation on the proposed discharge to make a reasonable judgment on the guidelines. The permitting authority must make the determinations called for by section 403(c). The real question, however, is where the law places the burden of presenting sufficient information to that authority to allow the “reasonable judgment” required by the Act. EPA’s Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 FR 33290 (May 19, 1980), based on the Administrative Procedure Act, place the ultimate burden of persuading the Agency that an NPDES permit should be issued upon the permit applicant. The permit applicant bears this burden not only in its application for a permit but also in any subsequent envidentiary hearing on the permit. This means that the permit appli- cant should be prepared to submit sufficient information to support a determination to issue the permit. Once a permit is issued, that permit, or any of the conditions contained in that permit may be challenged in an evidentiary hearing. When a permit condition is challenged in an evidentiary hearing, EPA bears the burden of going forward to present an affirmative case in support of the challenged permit condition. The permit applicant, or any other hearing party, who contends that the issuance or denial of a permit is improper or invalid, or who challenges the inclusion or deletion of specific permit conditions, has the burden of going forward to present an affirma- tive case at the conclusion of the Agency’s presentation. The ultimate burden of persuading the Agency to issue an NPDES permit, howev- er, remains at all times on the permit applicant. This is particularly true in the case of an application for an NPDES permit for an ocean discharge because of the requirement in section 403(c)(2) that no permit be issued for such a discharge without sufficient information on which to make a reasonable judgment concerning the effects of the proposed discharge. I hope this satisfactorily answers Congressman Breaux’ question. A similar letter has been sent to Congressman Breaux. Please let me know if I may provide the Subcommittee additional information. Sincerely yours, R. SARAH ComMpPTON, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water Enforcement. Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will be adjourned. [The following was received for the record:] CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, House OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C., September 4, 1980. Ms. R. SARAH CoMPTON, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water Enforcement, Environmental Protec- tion Agency, Washington, D.C. Dear Ms. Compton: As a result of your testimony and response to questions at hearings held by the Oceanography Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I would appreciate your responding to the additional questions listed below. (1) Would you please supply this Committee with the raw data only from the EPA sundys on the effects of drill muds in the Gulf of Mexico, at your earliest conven- ience? 192 (2) During your appearance, you stated that the study of the studies by Rice University was flawed because, I believe you stated, there was no baseline informa- tion available on the Gulf of Mexico. My questions are: (a) Would you say those studies are irrelevant as to the impacts of drilling muds and other commercial activities on the OCS? If so, why, and if not, why? (b) If the Rice and other studies are flawed because of the lack of baseline informa- tion, what impact does this have upon EPA’s studies referred to in testimony before this Committee? (3) Are you prepared to state that any scientific study conducted under anything other than actual operating conditions could prove conclusively that there is or is not significant harm to marine biology from any OCS commercial activity? (4) Do you feel that applying these standards (i.e., conclusively proving no signifi- cant harm) to all uses of the oceans would be proper? (5) Can you supply this Committee with empirical evidence or research findings of the negative impacts of commercial activities (other than oil and gas) in the marine environment? (6) Would you mind telling this Committee if there is any research conducted under actual operating conditions on the OCS that you feel is relevant and that proves conclusively that there is or is not any significant negative impact to fisher- ies from commercial usage of the oceans? (7) Can you prove conclusively through research (without actually allowing events to continue until there is a significant negative impact) that oil and gas activities, commercial fishing, the dumping of dredge spoil or other commercial uses of the oceans will not have any significant negative impact on the marine biology? (8) In your statement, and in your response to questions, you expressed deep concern over providing adequate protection for the marine environment against harm from oil and gas operations, as is the case with all commercial activities I am sure, by using the regulatory authority you have by law. There is no reason this should be doubted, nor disagreed with. In response to a question by Mr. Breaux, you also stated, and agreed with the Secretary of the Interior Andrus, that there was adequate authority in law to provide for the safety necessary for the resources in the Georges Bank and as a matter of fact, you agreed that neither EPA nor Interior were permitting any activity that posed a foreseeable significant adverse impact to fisheries or any other resources on the OCS. In light of this, do you feel that there is more that should or could be done that is allowed or is not allowed by law to protect the marine biota? (9) Is there any level of commercial uses of the oceans at which you could say conclusively there will not be any foreseeable significant harm to the marine biology? If so, what is that level, and how could it be accomplished? (10) What is the scientific difference and relationship between “proving conclu- sively there will be harm” and “proving conclusively there will not be harm”? How does this difference relate to the modeling, conclusion, and usage of research as well as to its relevance? (11) What is the relationship and significant difference between scientifically proving there “will be no foreseeable harm,” and “there will be foreseeable harm’? What is the relevance of each? (12) What do you feel would be the impact of additional legislation, such as is being considered, to provide another layer of legal requirements to protect commer- cial fishing in the Georges Bank area from oil and gas operations, in light of the fact that EPA and DOI say that they have the legal authority to protect against foreseeable harm to fisheries and other marine resources? (13) Is the phrase “harm to the marine biology” necessarily significant as pertains to a negative impact on the marine environment? (14) Is the phrase “harm to the marine biology’ necessarily a relative or signifi- cant finding as pertains to significant negative impact on commercial fishing? (15) In EPA’s experience, have long-term biological effects of suspected toxic substances been substantiated when short-term effects were not detected? (16) Upon what evidence does EPA base the conclusion that the Georges Bank is more ecologically sensitive than the Gulf of Mexico? : (17) What areas onshore or offshore are now approved for disposal of drilling muds? What is the procedure for obtaining approval of such dump sites and what period of time is required to obtain approval? If needed, can EPA assure, without question, that such approved sites will be established? (18) Did the EPA participate in developing the protocol for conducting bioassays on drilling muds? Has an acceptable protocol been established which can be general- ly used by all laboratories? 193 We would appreciate your responses to these questions at your earliest conven- ience. Sincerely, EDWIN B. ForsyTHE. [Responses to the foregoing questions had not been received at time of publication. ] [Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned. ] RE Me eit beonuee, f believe van wtwted. | theré oe) nef rahe, anes 2 of eho wes, Ry epantiows woe: Bar ig. aay Those siadige are Tretheeaist un po the tenpecta ob be re rere a5 PUSS Mon, wna APS Chum § Cdk Deere apon © "2 wtindies re 4 this Corina cknemrrolbe goskitiantodas grit kot z H8-2T are yin peemered Yo wate ent any eientine wie) ‘comtueteas Oat Tin AmoG) CleaAradiiy cqiiens souk! prove Cox eeinly | harte to murme Malogy irom, say OCS cominertial ’ ‘poncctal » ' ! , gu ‘ wilt “ lone awe 5 WCOrten 2 z . Lib y 7, als, } ¥ ‘ eg | ; hi i & Ore t d aw urotect the : fu ora at wheal * He 4oaTorcinh bern t . . } Se wu ip gare a? tite diffi " shin betwrea te re will mot : ; : Oc Wee OF Si i i A : Y " i . at ' , ae betwe a ' * % { 6 ‘ore 7 \ ¥ 4 f t » o& , ‘ ! i a tt Mes sa si ' 19 rh 7 reo 7 pos ; : A : ; ru yin rt et ‘ id tC 7 - : ts é sl 4 “ ' > j at 4 vaF4 j ; a wil be es plueoc 7 : j : r } avticpete in doewerpiag Uw protocol for ednds Uo ol ~idritins muds? baa an acceptable projodel been establiatied which s a iv steed by ail | pater ips’ waa OCEAN ENERGY OVERSIGHT: WAVE, CURRENT, AND TIDAL POWER THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1980 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Gerry E. Studds (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representative Studds. Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will come to order. Today’s hearing is our fourth oversight hearing on renewable sources of energy from the ocean. In our first three hearings, which were held last year, we dealt with ocean thermal energy conserva- tion (OTEC)—which uses temperature differences in ocean water to produce electricity—and ocean biomass conversion, which uses the ocean as a place to grow plants for conversion to methane gas. Today we will focus on methods which would convert the energy in the ocean’s waves, currents, and tides into electricity. We understand that the Department of Energy has decided to focus the bulk of its efforts and funding for ocean energy systems on OTEC because its potential is far greater than any other ocean energy system. Although the United States is the world leader in many areas of scientific and technical endeavor, much of the work on the technol- ogies we are considering today has been done in other countries. Most of the early work on wave energy conversion was done in Great Britain. The only existing tidal power project of any size is at Rance on the Brittany coast of France. The Soviet Union has a small pilot tidal powerplant approximately 40 miles north of Murmansk. Given our dwindling energy supplies and our dependence upon foreign sources of fuel, we as a nation cannot afford to investigate alternative energy sources in as plodding and methodical a fashion as we could 10 or 20 years ago. The major purpose of our hearings today and those we have already held on ocean energy is not only to investigate the feasibility and potential of these emerging tech- nologies, but also to encourage DOE to hasten the development of those which appear the most promising. Because this is the last ocean energy oversight hearing which we will be able to hold during this Congress, we have grouped together wave, current, and tidal power in a single hearing. We understand that our choice of technologies for this hearing differs from the way DOE organizes its own activities. Many things (195) 196 are different from the way DOE organizes its own activities, and while our primary witness from DOE will discuss tidal power in his statement, he is not the official responsible for supervising DOE’s activities in this area. He will be accompanied by a representative of DOE’s Office of Resource Applications which does have that responsibility. Let me just say that to the utter astonishment of many people, the earlier hearings last year on OTEC, which we began with, led in an uncharacteristically prompt manner to the drafting, enact- ment, and signing into law of legislation in spite, may I say, of some of the testimony from the Department of Energy on that subject. While we do not anticipate as prompt a call for legislation in the other ocean fields which we are looking at now, it is very much our hope that we can find areas, if there be such, in which prodding, legislative or otherwise, would be helpful. Our first witness is Dr. Maurice J. Katz, Director of the Office of Solar Power Applications in the Department of Energy. Dr. Katz, as I understand it, you are accompanied by the two gentlemen I have listed here. STATEMENT OF DR. MAURICE J. KATZ, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOLAR POWER APPLICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM E. RICHARDS, ACTING DIREC- TOR, OCEAN ENERGY SYSTEMS DIVISION, AND RALPH E. BURR, DIVISION OF HYDROELECTRIC RESOURCE DEVELOP- MENT, OFFICE OF RESOURCE APPLICATIONS Dr. Katz. Yes, by Mr. William Richards, Acting Director of the Ocean Energy Systems Division, and by Mr. Ralph Burr from the Division of Hydroelectric Resource Development from the Assistant Secretary for Resource Application. Mr. Stupps. So we can all understand a little better the bureauc- racies of the Department of Energy, you and Mr. Richards, who works with you—is that correct? Dr. Katz. That is correct. Mr. Stupps. Are responsible for ocean energy systems, which includes waves, currents, salinity gradients and OTEC; is that right? Dr. Katz. That is correct. ~ Mr. Stupps. However, in the Department of Energy, tidal power is not an ocean system? Dr. Katz. That is correct. Mr. Stupps. It is hydroelectric. Dr. Katz. That is correct. Mr. Strupps. Therefore, that comes under another part of the department? Dr. Katz. That is correct. Mr. Strupps. OK. Now we have straightened that out, go right ahead with your statement. Dr. Katz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to testify before you today on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) alternate ocean energy systems program. ion I have with me, as we noted, Mr. Richards and Mr. Burr. What we are going to do today is tell you a little bit about tidal power and the alternate ocean energy systems program. It is the goal of DOE to assess and, if appropriate, develop options which can be used to extract and distribute significant amounts of energy from the oceans in a reliable, environmentally acceptable and cost effective manner. The program strategy to achieve that goal is to identify the energy resources that are avail- able, to identify the energy extraction and conversion techniques that can make them practical, and then to determine whether they are technically and economically feasible. Once this is done, we would then proceed to the development and demonstration of these technologies, which would induce industry to participate in the commercialization of ocean energy extraction devices. The primary emphasis, as you know from your own interest and participation in the ocean energy program, is in Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) which, studies show, is expected to be economically acceptable in island markets during the mid to late 1980’s. Dr. Bennett Miller, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Solar Energy, testified before your subcommittee on the OTEC program in January 1980. Today I would like to describe the status and progress in the alternate ocean energy systems program which includes projects in wave energy, ocean currents and salinity gradi- ents. Starting with wave energy, we all know that over the years there have been perhaps hundreds of concepts proposed to convert the surging motion of the waves into useful energy. The Department of Energy program is directed toward determining whether such con- cepts offer the promise of providing economic sources of electric power, and if they do, to develop the most efficient concepts for extracting that energy. The next slide gives us some information on the wave energy resources along the shoreline of the United States. The important thing to note is that it varies considerably from location to loca- tion. It also varies considerably by season. By far the greatest average potential for wave energy exists along the Oregon-Wash- ington coastline where the waves contain on the average over the year 30 megawatts per linear mile of wave crest. The California coastline has about half that potential per unit length, and other parts of the U.S. coastline have still lower wave potential. The numbers you see here are given for coastal waters about 2 miles offshore. There is higher wave energy farther out in deeper waters, about 5 to 10 miles offshore, but, unfortunately, if we go out that far, we will be increasing the costs for transmission cables and the like, and so the entire system cost may go up. The figure also shows the yearly incidental power averages that are available in those regions. That is shown in the second column. However, to estimate the electric power available, we must factor in both the efficiencies of extraction and conversion, as well as the spacing of the devices that we would use to extract the power along the coastline. 198 When you apply these factors, the wave energy could potentially supply about 1,300 megawatts in the Washington-Oregon area. This is between 5 and 10 percent of the power generated in that region. Mr. Stupps. Let me interrupt you one second, Dr. Katz. If there are members of the audience—I know there are many in the audience who have seen these slides, but if there are people in the audience who have not seen the slide presentation being made and wish to do so, feel free to sit around the lower rung of chairs here, if you think your reputations can stand being confused with Members of Congress. You would be perfectly welcome to do so. Go ahead. Dr. Katz. Before I discuss the Department of Energy’s program in wave energy, it is important to note that there is a significant international effort in the development of wave energy. It is an important element of our program to maintain an effective liaison with the international community, both to minimize duplication of effort, and also to get the maximum technical return on the invest- ment of the U.S. research and development dollar. Because the British have one of the best wave energy resources, the United Kingdom pursues a broad spectrum of wave energy development. They have expended in 1979, as; well as in 1980, approximately $8 million a year in R. & D. funds for wave energy development. Most of their early research has been in the develop- ment of devices that are generally deployed parallel to the wave front. These are called beam sea devices, and two of them are shown in the chart. The British have determined that the delivered electric power costs of their initial designs were exceptionally high. In fact, they were about 1000 mills per kilowatt hour. These costs were primar- ily due to the high structural costs and high mooring costs that are needed for such beam-sea devices. Redesign of the British devices is now reported to bring the electric power cost estimates at the Scottish coastline down to about 100 to 300 mills per kilowatt hour. While these costs are still generally uneconomic, they may be reasonable for small, isolated applications where the resources are exceptionally good. The Norwegians also have a very interesting program in the development of wave energy. They are emphasizing two systems which enhance power production by concentrating wave energy through focusing. I will be saying a little bit more about focusing when I talk about our program. One of the systems seen here uses a set of submerged pilings that bend the wave front and focus it to one point. As seen in the diagram it is somewhat analogous to the way an optical lens focus- es light rays to one point. Another technique they use is a resonant heaving buoy which is designed to maximize the amplitude of its vertical motion, and thereby capture as much energy as it can from the wave. To date the Norwegians have conducted both analytical studies and also model tests of these devices. The Japanese, on the other hand, are emphasizing systems in which air is driven through turbines by wave action, as shown in that chart. They have been testing navigation buoys utilizing this concept since the 1960’s, and this approach is also under investiga- She) tion by the U.S. Coast Guard and by the British who are using it in isolated applications. The Japanese also have tested full scale turbines aboard their vessel platform called the Kaimei which you see in that chart. They have succeeded in transmitting for some period of time an average net power of 25 kilowatts undersea for about 2 miles from this platform into the Japanese grid. The United States, Britain, Canada, and Ireland recently all participated with the Japanese in an international experiment on that platform that was carried out through the auspices of the International Energy Agency. The results of those experiments, while not yet completely analyzed, unfortunately showed signifi- cantly lower performance than was originally projected for the devices used. We suspect that the lower performance was due to suboptimal ship and cavity design on the Kaimei. Mr. Srupps. Do you have numbers in terms of relative costs? Dr. Katz. All of these were one-of-a-kind items, so it is hard to guess at what their production costs would be in a commercial setting. The U.S. program is managed by the Solar Energy Research Institute which has been assigned responsibility for the alternate ocean energy systems program. We are basing our program on what is being carried out in the international community as well as entering new areas of wave energy R. & D. The U.S. wave program’s primary initiative is in the investigation of devices oriented into the incoming wave rather than parallel to it, as done by the English. These devices, called head sea devices, offer the advantage of lower costs and higher survivability because their orientation allows them to have lower mooring forces and to suffer lower structural loads. Theoretical studies carried out at MIT have shown that these types of devices, if headed into the incoming wave, such as a ship cutting across a wave front, will produce about 20-percent less energy than the same device deployed parallel to the incoming wave. However, the lower costs give this design a more economic out- look than the more energy efficient beam sea devices. The MIT work, therefore, offers a sound analytical basis on which to contin- ue these types of investigations. The United States is emphasizing air or pneumatic turbine head sea devices since their conversion equipment is above the water and has the potential for reduced maintenance and increased reli- ability. As you can see in this chart, the sea water is well below the operating conversion equipment and this should lead to a longer lifetime for that equipment. This low pressure air turbine of innovative design is now under construction. While it is not practical to make an exact cost projec- tion at this time, it does appear to offer potential for improved performance and cost over the Japanese and British devices. Con- struction and offshore testing of this device is expected to be com- pleted during fiscal year 1981. A subscale wave tank experimental program is also planned to confirm the theoretical models for head sea devices which have 200 been developed and to provide an analytical capability for inter- preting the results of the Kaimei, the Japanese test platform. Continuation of this program would emphasize studies that broaden the responsible range of such systems to different sea conditions and thereby provide a basis for improving the total power output. A second thrust of the U.S. program in wave energy is to assess the potential of wave focusing to reduce the costs associated with extraction and conversion equipment. The size of a device needed to extract energy directly from an incoming wave front, plus the need for the device to survive storm conditions, make such hard- ware massive and therefore costly. An alternate approach to wave energy extraction is to concen- trate the wave energy before it is converted into mechanical or electrical power. If the wave energy is concentrated, then the con- version hardware can be made much more compact and thus can be made more inexpensively. If the concentrating structure can be made relatively simple, the system should be significantly less expensive than an equivalent size system without wave focusing. A very interesting focusing technique that is under development now is the DAM-ATOLL concept. As we see in the South Pacific, waves bending around small volcanic lands appear to leave the island with no lee side; that is, the waves appear to come at the island from all directions. This is the concept being applied in the DAM-ATOLL process. In this case we would make relatively small dome-shaped, man- made islands as you see in the chart. They would be submerged to refract incoming wave fronts so that the waves are then caused to approach the center of the atoll radially and appear as a concen- trated energy source at the inlet guide vanes which then feed to the turbine to produce electricity. This concept is being developed by the Lockheed Corp. Their representative will speak to you later this morning about it. In support of the two major thrusts discussed above, the U.S. wave program is evaluating the cost effectiveness of the total power delivery systems. This analysis will assess the cost of various generic components as they affect total power generation costs. A fourth element of the program is to solicit and assist in devel- oping additional wave concepts, to search out the new ideas that we are sure will be forthcoming. Such a solicitation is scheduled to be released by the Solar Energy Research Institute later this calen- dar year. Several unique environmental concerns are also associated with wave power and they are listed here. These concerns will be ad- dressed first in a generic environmental assessment, and subse- quently they will be evaluated for specific designs under develop- ment before any final design or construction is approved. By the end of fiscal year 1981 we anticipate achieving the following mile- stones: First, we will complete the analysis and evaluation of the results of the Japanese Kaimei test platform and determine the desirabil- ity of any future international program effort. Second, we will experimentally evaluate the innovative air tur- bine device over a range of sea conditions. 201 Third, we will complete the design and initiate the construction of a subscale model of the DAM-ATOLL device, for tests in a wave tank. Fourth, depending on the repsonses to the wave energy solicita- tion I just mentioned, we hope to begin the evaluation of one or more new wave power concepts. Lastly, we will complete the systems analysis for generic ma- chines to allow for detailed comparisons between technologies. The budget for the wave energy program in fiscal year 1979 was $581,000; in 1980, $935,000; and we estimate $1,190,000 for fiscal year 1981. Turning to ocean current energy research, there are several areas in the world where large, sustained ocean currents exist. It is the intent of our program to assess and, where appropriate, demon- strate devices which can extract energy from the velocity of ocean currents. The largest ocean current within the U.S. jurisdiction is the Gulf Stream as it flows through the Florida Straits. The maximum total power of this resource is estimated to be about 10,000 megawatts. However, potential adverse climatic impacts could limit the actual power which could be extracted in an environmentally benign manner to about 1,000 megawatts. Currently, the department is analyzing and testing two selected ocean current devices which have been proposed. The first shown here is a large ocean turbine. Its original design being analyzed was for an 80-megawatt device. Its dimensions were some 360 feet long and 560 feet in diameter. A large number of such devices would have to be deployed to realize the full potential of the resource in the Florida Straits. There are technical questions on the amount of power that can be achieved by optimum hydrodynamic design, low cost structural designs, and maximum current and storm survivability. Mooring and electric cable transmission are also questions that must be addressed with this technology, and will be in the coming fiscal year. Another approach that we are looking at is the multiple drogue chute concept in which the current is used to drag, if you like, a series of parachute-like devices that turn a continuous conveyor belt. We have no detailed economic evaluation on this concept, and we are awaiting a final report to assist in determining the role it will have in the future of the DOE ocean energy program. There are environmental concerns in ocean current energy as well, and some of them that we are reviewing are listed here. The concerns that are associated with global scale climate and Gulf Stream currents are difficult to determine accurately. There are many diverse oceanographic theories on the fate of the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic, and an informal exchange with oceanographers, both at Scripps and Woods Hole, indicates that there is a very low probability of significant impact on ocean circulation and on weather if the power extracted from the Florida Straits is less than 1,000 megawatts. However, a definitive answer to this question requires an exten- sive analytical program supported by ocean data. 202 The budget in the ocean current program in fiscal year 1979 is $160,000; in fiscal year 1980, $175,000; growing to an estimated $480,000 in fiscal year 1981. This growth from 1980 to 1981 reflects the initiation of a model test program to supplement the ongoing analytical studies and the feasiblity of large ocean turbines. The third element of the alternate ocean energy program is salinity gradients. One of the more intriguing potential methods for extracting energy from the ocean depends on the salt dissolved in it. Two salinity gradient methods have been identified to gener- ate energy from solutions of different salt concentrations that are separated by special membranes. The methods are called reverse osmosis and dialyctic batteries and are based on methods currently used in water desalinization processes. In those cases, electricity is used to change salt concentration. In our case we are using salt concentrations to produce electricity in the reverse manner. Salinity gradient energy conversion using seawater and river or groundwater as the two saline solutions has been investigated by the DOE. We are finding that due to very high cost and large membrane requirements, this type of energy conversion does not appear to be economically feasible. Because of these results, and because of the need for significant improvement in membrane life and performance to make even an expensive system work, technology development will be discontin- ued by the Office of Solar Power Applications until additional research indicates improved feasibility. Turning now to the Department’s activities in tidal power, the wave and current research and development that I described to you is being conducted, in the Office of Conservation and Solar Energy, and the tidal power work in the Office of Resource Applications. As you know, energy may be extracted from the tides by means of dams placed across the sea inlets. During periods of high tide, seawater is allowed to flow into the inlet where it is retained for release through electric generating turbines. France is currently operating such a system to supply electricity to their grid. In an effort to determine the potential of tidal power as an energy source for the United States, the Stone and Webster Engineering Corp. of Boston was commissioned to review its feasi- bility. Their two volume report resulting from this study was pub- lished in March of 1977. They found that costs far outweighed any benefits to be accrued through the lifetime of such tidal power projects. The study has been criticized because they considered only large- scale sites and no small-scale sites, and so subsequently the Depart- ment of Energy funded a feasibility study to be conducted at Half Moon Cove in Passamaquoddy Bay, Maine. This is underway and the data is being compiled. The results should be available in December 1980. In both cases, large and small tidal power projects, the costs of the civil works play a pivotal role. The Department has reviewed a number of proposals on tidal power development. None have shown any significant economic advances in this area over present tech- nology. Therefore, there is no additional support being requested in 203 the fiscal year 1981 budget. This may be reconsidered when the results from the small site study are completed. In summary, the alternate ocean energy program is in an explor- atory stage. Our thrust is to focus on those innovative and promis- ing concepts and systems concepts which are not presently being adequately pursued elsewhere. We will maintain our close associ- ation with ongoing programs in other countries and structure our program to complement the work being done elsewhere. Finally, we will continue to solicit and encourage new and inno- vative ideas which may not be identified within the structure framework of the program. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared testimony. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. [The charts that accompanied the prepared statement follow:] 69-848 0 —- 81 - 14 204 -"" BWAISAS NW300. L aundl4 (Uv3A/SOWND 40 SNA JIUNOS3Y J9uv1 009b-096 (€02) SBNOHd E0EZz VINIDHIA ‘VINGNVX31V SNNSAV NOLONILNNH 0SS2 NOILVHOdYOD 3SA 205 U.S. COASTLINE WAVE POWER POTENTIAL Avg. Power Per Crest Length REGION (Mw/mi ) OREGON/WASHINGTON 30 CALIFORNIA 15 NORTH ATLANTIC 5 SOUTH ATLANTIC 3 GULF OF MEXICO ] *ASSUMES 20% SPACING FOR DEVICES AND A 50% EXTRACTION EFFICIENCY 2 MILES OFFSHORE. FIGURE 2 Incident Power (MW) (2 Miles From Shore) 13,100 10,000 3,400 3,000 2,700 Likely Extractable Power * (MW) 1,300 1,000 340 300 270 AND CONVERSION 206 € ayndI4 HeY ||219490D © WED S,doyes SILd3ONOO WVdedOdd »f) 207 b daunyid Buisno0o+4 SAC 4idadONO9O WVdSO0dd NVISSMYON 208 CIRCULAR CYLINDRICAL SPARS HEAVING BODIES - FIGURE 5 209 GENERATOR CENTER-PIPE CAVITY RESONATOR (PNEUMATIC TYPE) FIGURE 6 f awe. " Weil igh ia sree BR Aas a ohaat el a Sure eels i SRA ir Vaya HEAD SEA DEVICE ETRIIDE oO Prototype Wave Energy Converter 212 Louvre Bleed Valves Stator Blades Fluctuating Air Volume Gearbox ir aK rf AC Generator FIGURE 9 213 OL aunyts = SANVA HOLVHANAD AGINS LAINI ee Ld4a9NO9 TIOLV-WVG G33Hx907 AO AldlIONIdd 214 LL dundis S4SN AAILILAdNWOO ANOZ IWLSVOO °® ALIOIXOL TOULNOOD ONIINOA ° NOILVYSLIV LVLIGVH ° SNYSALLVd NOISOYS /NOILISOdAG LNAWIGAS 40 NOILVYAL IV ® SNYSONOO IWLNAWNOUIANS NOISHSANOOD ADYANS SAAVM NVA90O 215 FY 1981 GOALS FOR WAVE ENERGY COMPLETE KAIMEI TEST AND EVALUATION PERFORM AIR TURBINE EXPERIMENTS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCT DAM-ATOLL FOR TANK TEST SOLICIT AND EVALUATE NEW WAVE POWER CONCEPTS COMPLETE SYSTEM STUDY/COST PROJECTIONS EReae 12 216 WATER SUPPORTED THRUST BEARINGS | RIM SUPPORTED COUNTER ROTATING CATENARY ROTOR SSOFT (170m) \ a= WIG \~ OCEAN SURFAC c a ; <2 ELECTRICAL POWER TO SHORE CTEM LTTE CORIOLIS OCEAN TURBINE UNIT FIGURE 13 217 vl Junot AOIAAG LNAYYHND AdAL YVANIT <———\a MO14 INSYUND TASHMAAIYNG - 14SS3HA DNIYOOW SAIdONVO a1avd aAlua LNIOd 319NIS 218 SL 4uNndI4 SLOVdWI TIVNOILALILSNI PUB *TV93A71 SNOILVOIAVN e VLOIG ANIUVN NO SLOVdWI °@ JLVWIID A1VOS 1VE019 NO SLOVdNWI e SLNAYYNOD WOO1NO SLOVdWI °@ SNYAONOOD IV LNAWNOUMIANS NOISHAANOOD ADHANA LNSAYYND NV3A9O VOE VUNFUNAIIUN Z99U NUNIINGIUN AVENUE ALEAANDHIA, VIRGINIA 22303 PHONE (703) 960-4600 69-848 0 81 15 219 of SETH CANAD ABT MAA A a FS 2 BE F Bi gE: ¢a FIGURE 16 960-4600 \* VSE CORPORATION 2550 HUNTINGTON AVENUE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22303 PHONE (703) 220 = = coc o o = ee r—a-4 =e Se “ec ze es pan c> =—-4 zu ae Zo ow oc 35 = =< z= oe => aa ew z= = o ~ = a Ee c =u ia FIGURE 17 221 Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Mr. Katz. Let me start out with the most explicit questions, just to get some sense of relative importance associated at least by DOE with these various potential sources of energy. Your figures for the fiscal 1981 budget request show $1.19 million for waves, $0.48 million for currents, and none whatsoever for salinity gradient and none whatsoever for tidal; is that right? Dr. Katz. Your figures are correct. Mr. Stupps. This is extraordinarily modest. Let’s put those in some perspective. You head what? Dr. Katz. The Office of Solar Power Applications. Mr. Stupps. The Office of Solar Power Applications, and under you is the Division of Ocean Energy and—— Dr. Katz. Wind Energy Systems. Mr. Strupps. What is the total budget of the Office of Solar Applications? Dr. Karz. Our total figure in the President’s budget for fiscal 1981 is $126 million. Mr. Stupps. $126 million? Dr. Katz. That is correct. Mr. Stupps. And of that, how much goes to the Division of Ocean Energy? Dr. Katz. $39 million. Mr. Stupps. Thirty-nine. The balance goes to wind? Dr. Katz. That is correct, $87 million. Mr. Stupps. $87 million to wind. It seems to me not very many years ago in my first term I had a discussion with the Federal wind program. It was one man. Dr. Katz. Many years ago it was one man. Mr. Stupps. I said not many years ago. That is a dramatic change. So you have $39 million in total in ocean energy, the bulk of which, I assume, is in OTEC? Dr. Katz. That is correct, by far. Mr. Stupps. Of the sources we are discussing today you have a total of a little over $1.5 million. What is the total budget of the Department of Energy? Dr. Katz. I believe that the fiscal year 1981 budget request for the entire Department, including military applications, is about $12.6 billion. Mr. Stupps. $12.6 billion. Those figures speak very clearly for themselves. In your current research on waves and currents, are you looking primarily or exclusively on engineering and resource assessment questions, or are you also actively analyzing the kinds of environ- mental and institutional questions that may ensue? Dr. Katz. I would have to say that we are primarily looking at the engineering and resources systems questions but not exclusive- ly looking at them. There is some work going on in the environ- mental and institutional areas, and perhaps Mr. Richards can give us some comments on that area. Mr. Ricuarps. Most work in the environmental area has been superficial on waves and currents other than looking at the impact on local climatology. We have looked at some of the specific issues 222 in waves and currents, for example, the impact of wave machines deployed in stopping erosion of beaches, the concerns about inter- fering with shipping, the effects of cabling, how are the surfers going to react to it. It is really going to be a large environmental question. The first thing we had to do before we started pursuing that—— Mr. Stupps. Did you say how the surfers are going to react to it? Mr. RicHarps. You start deploying long lines of wave machines up and down California, you are going to get an awful lot of people angry, sir. Mr. Stupps. I don’t wish to speculate on California politics. I am awfully glad you are thinking about the surfers. What else? Mr. RicHarps. I believe Dr. Katz showed a slide. Mr. Stupps. Right. Mr. RicHarps. We have started a program looking at the biota and the influence on the biota from the materials that come off the wave machines and the cabling. The principal problem right now is to try to get a device in a wave machine that is projected to be life cycle cost effective for delivering power. We will do the environmental work after we complete our stud- ies in fiscal year 1981. Mr. Stupps. There clearly are questions raised. One’s initial reaction to these proposals is just unbounded enthusiasm until you come back to Earth and look at some of the potentially competi- tive, I would think, uses in the coastal zone and immediate offshore waters and I hope you are beginning to look at that. I am a little disturbed about your fairly short shrift given to salinity gradients, not that I could possibly discuss with you the chemistry involved, but you indicated system studies for the solar pond salinity gradient concept have found the cost to be excessive and therefore you have discontinued or will discontinue your tech- nology development. Is it not the case that Israel concluded late last year that solar salt ponds were feasible and that they are developing a 25- megawatt power station to be operational by the end of next year? Dr. Katz. Yes, sir, your comments are correct, and the problem perhaps is with the technical community that likes to call two different things by the same name. Solar pond developing in Israel is based on thermal gradients. The salinity gradients I am referring to is a somewhat different physical process. Let me try very shortly to give you the difference. They are talking about absorbing rays from the Sun in a pond and using the heat collected to subsequently produce electricity. We are talking about using the different concentrations of salt through a process called reverse osmosis, and another process based on dialytic batteries to produce electricity. The latter two I mentioned, the ones we are looking at, do not appear to be economically feasible. The solar pond thermal gradi- ent process being reviewed by the Israelis does appear to be eco- nomically feasible and in fact the Department of Energy has been looking at the possibility of a cooperative program with the Israelis on this subject. 223 In addition to that, the Department is funding thermal gradient development as part of the solar thermal energy program. Mr. Stupps. Maybe I have the same misunderstanding here. You fund a portion of a study being conducted by Southern California Edison, do you not? Dr. Katz. That is solar thermal. Mr. Stupps. It is also solar thermal? Dr. Katz. Yes. Mr. Stupps. I think you made reference to this a moment ago. It has been suggested that because wave energy devices remove part of the energy obviously from waves approaching the coast, that a string of them might in some cases serve the same coastal protec- tion purposes as a breakwater or some other form of solid construc- tion in the ocean. Is this a potential benefit worth pursuing, and have you looked at that at all? Dr. Katz. We believe there is a potential benefit to the deploy- ment of wave energy conversion devices to increase the stability of beaches. We have reviewed it to see what effect it would have on beaches, and apparently, analytically it could have a stabilizing effect. It is possible that a wave device could be even more effective than a breakwater system in this regard. Mr. Stupps. I must say now that I have asked the question I tremble a little bit at the thought of trying to actually implement such a thing, playing around with Mother Nature with that degree of arrogance and to that extent of ignorance. You really wonder what it is you are doing. Dr. Katz. I agree with you in this case, and I| think Mr. Richards’surfers would also be disturbed. Mr. Stupps. I wasn’t so much thinking of the surfers. Are you from California, Mr. Richards? Mr. RicHArps. No, sir, I was born and raised in Washington, D.C. I just spent 10 years in California. Mr. Stupps. I really wasn’t thinking of the surfers. I was think- _ ing of the grander elements of nature, and the fact that we have found, as I understand it, that every time we have built a break- water or a jetty or any kind of riprap, that while we may have accomplished at least for the moment our purpose in that particu- lar place, we have brought upon ourselves subsequent and conse- quent results elsewhere along the coastline that had not been anticipated, planned or desired. Dr. Katz. Those of us who have been down at Nags Head know that Mother Nature rather does what she wants. Mr. Stupps. Yes, not even the Department of Energy sometimes can stop her. On page 7, you make reference to environmental concerns in general. Have you taken a look at whether taking substantial energy from the Gulf Stream might affect the ocean conditions which foster the extraordinary productivity of the Georges Bank fishery off New England? Dr. Katz. We do not have any conclusive studies in that area at this time. We have consulted with oceanographers both at Scripps and at Woods Hole. They express the opinion that they do not 224 envision any significant change. This is certainly an issue which we need to address prior to proceeding with major developmental work with ocean current systems. We do know that the natural meandering of the Gulf Stream is on the order of up to 100 miles; that any influence by ocean current devices is very small compared to Mother Nature’s natural meander. Mr. Stupps. Don’t you dare fool around with anything that feeds Georges Bank. I am having enough trouble protecting Georges Bank from the various departments and agencies of this Govern- ment as it is. Has any thought been given or should any thought be given, to the possibility of installing small generators in some of the endless series of breakwaters that have been constructed over the years by the Army Corps of Engineers? Dr. Karz. I think I will refer that question to Mr. Burr. Mr. Burr. We have not, Mr. Chairman, in the resource applica- tions or tidal area, no, sir. Mr. Stupps. Passamaquoddy, who is Passamaquoddy here? Mr. Burr. I am. Mr. Stupps. Do you have a rough estimate of the construction cost per killowatt capacity of the tidal project there or have we gone that far yet? Mr. Burr. We have not gone that far yet. Mr. Stupps. Was not major research done on this question 30 or 40 years ago? Mr. Burr. Oh, my goodness, many times. Mr. Stupps. Many times? Mr. Burr. Many years, yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. What happened to it? Is it absolutely irrelevant at this point? I have received so many questions in the last 10 years on that. I can predict with what regularity I will be questioned on tidal power in the Gulf of Maine. I have people saying, damn it, I remember when President Roosevelt studied that. Mr. Burr. That is right. Mr. Stupps. I don’t ask which President Roosevelt. What hap- pened to those studies? Are they absolutely useless at this point? Do we have to start over again every time? Mr. Burr. They are not useless. I don’t think we start over again every time. We build on that. Essentially what contemporary stud- ies have tried to do is look at improved technologies and improved economics and they still come out about where people expect them to come out, not economical. Mr. Stupps. It still does not look like it makes sense. Mr. Burr. For the foreseeable future it does not. We just don’t know what is going to come from this Passamaquoddy study yet, though. Mr. Stupps. The latest one? Mr. Burr. Yes. Mr. Stupps. And obviously you wouldn’t want to speculate about the likelihood of there ever being a large scale tidal power project in this country at this point? Mr. Burr. I would never say never, but I certainly couldn’t foresee it. 225 Mr. Stupps. Are the conditions in the French case so extraordi- nary as to make it not something to be comparable elsewhere? Those are extraordinary tides, are they not? Mr. Burr. It is a rather unique physical situation there, as I understand it, and I think I will back off at that. I am really not a technical expert on that, but it is rather unique and there aren’t too many things you can copy there. Mr. Stupnps. Is that because of the height of the tides? Mr. Burr. I really don’t know that I can be much more specific than that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Perhaps you and this committee ought to go look. Mr. Burr. I would be delighted. Mr. Stupps. Isn’t that in the Mont-Saint-Michele area? Mr. Burr. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. I think that requires an investigation. Are you in touch with the Canadian studies of the potentials of the Bay of Fundy? Mr. Burr. Well, we know about them, Mr. Chairman. I can’t say that we are in frequent contact with them. We know that they are interested and they know where we are looking, but no, we don’t have a great deal of direct contact with them. Mr. Stunps. So I do not detect an inordinate amount of enthusi- asm for tidal power and its potential. Mr. Burr. Frankly, tidal power has not been given a very high priority. Mr. Stupps. I guess you are not looking at it at all, you have no budget, right? Let us rephrase that. Not been given a high priority. Are we looking at it at all? Mr. Burr. Yes, this Passamaquoddy study is cost shared by our office and the tribal council, the Passamaquoddy Tribal Council. I think we are funding about two-thirds and they about one-third. The total cost is about $141,000 for the feasibility study. — Mr. Stupps. But that will not be continued next fiscal year? You said you have no money in the budget. Mr. Burr. For next fiscal year? Mr. Stupps. Yes. Mr. Burr. That is correct, no money in 1981. Mr. Stupps. You would agree that has a fairly low priority? Mr. Burr. It does, yes. Mr. Stupps. I certainly don’t purport to have the technical exper- tise to challenge you to a duel to the death at this moment over this table over the decision to put zero funding into this potential source, but we have had ample occasions in the past, as you will probably recall, where we have found a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Department of Energy not to be reflected anywhere else in the knowledgeable community on the subject. OTEC springs most recently to mind. So we just want to nudge a little bit to see if maybe somebody thinks it is interesting. I will stop asking you tidal questions since you obviously are not going to pay much attention to that for a while. I have a couple more, and then we will let you get back. It has been generally assumed, I think, that wind energy re- sources are greater over the ocean than they are over the land. On 226 the other hand, construction of wind generation facilities at sea would probably be more expensive than land-based facilities. Has the Department examined that potential trade off to deter- mine whether or not it makes economic sense to talk about wind generating farms on the ocean? Dr. Katz. The wind program has looked at that, and at least for now the trade off appears to make a lot more sense to develop and deploy wind systems on land than it does to build the platforms it would take to support them at sea. Mr. Stupps. Have you consulted the resident enthusiast of the University of Massachusetts on that? Dr. Katz. The resident enthusiast at the University of Massachu- setts has excellent contact with the Department of Energy’s wind program. Mr. Stupps. Good. Are you responsible for those grants a month or two ago to study the feasibility of wind power generators on Nantucket and in Pro- vincetown? You had better say yes because I am going to thank you. Dr. Katz. Undoubtedly. Mr. Stupps. Undoubtedly, very good. Continue that fine judg- ment. One other thing. The discussion of potential OTEC sites has focused to date so far as I know primarily on areas of the oceans where there is a sufficient temperature difference between warm surface water and cooler deep water. Would it not also be possible to use the OTEC technology to generate electricity from the temperature difference between ocean water and hot water from wells drilled in the Continental Shelf, and do you have any assessment of the magnitude of hot water which could be reached by wells drilled in various parts of the Outer Continental Shelf? Dr. Katz. Forgive me if I sound bureaucratic, but I have to start off that way. The geothermal energy people—— Mr. Stupps. Oh, good. Is that another energy department? Dr. Katz. Sorry about that—work for the Assistant Secretary for Resource Applications and are responsible for looking at the assess- ment of geothermal resources. However, we do recognize the possi- bility that OTEC technology could work between such temperature differences, and we have been, that is, our ocean people have been talking to the geothermal people about that and we are working on a resource assessment of the warm water that would be available there. Perhaps Mr. Richards can give us some more detail on that. Mr. Stupps. What happens when an ocean thermal resource converges with a geothermal resource? Do we have an interdepart- mental coordinating committee established? Dr. Karz. It is called level mixing I think. Mr. Stupps. It is called what? Dr. Katz. Mixing, mixing at various levels. Mr. Stupps. As long as it is not interfacing, we can put up with it. Did you want to add to that? Mr. RicHArps. Typically the resource map should be done by the end of this fiscal year. They will be top level resource maps that 227 look at both offshore winds, offshore geothermal, waves, currents, and OTEC, all overlaid on a single map. It should allow us to decide which resource is most appropriate and most cost effective for which demand and need in a given geographic area around the United States. It looks as though the geothermal source will run all the way from Baja California up to the State of Washington, north of the State of Washington, and on the eastern coast all the way from Norfolk, Va., up to Canada as well as through the gulf. The extent to which the technology will allow us to tap it I just can’t tell you that. Mr. Stupps. How far offshore are we talking? Mr. RicuHarps. It varies, sir. Sometimes it can be as much as 1 mile, 2 miles, 3 miles offshore, sometimes as much as 50 to 100 miles. It varies considerably. Mr. Stupps. Is the geothermal assessment component of this study being done with, among other things, the possibility of using the OTEC kind of technology to take advantage of that resource? Mr. RicHarpbs. Absolutely, sir. The reason we got into it in the first place is that we took a look at a decision which said if a geothermal well, is drilled, and the temperature is below some- thing like 90° or 100° centigrade, it should be capped 90° or 100° worth of heat to OTEC technology is like gold because it almost triples its efficiency. There is also the opportunity that it could cut down on the ant of cable runs that we need to deliver the electricity to and. Mr. Stupps. Why would that be? Mr. RicHArps. In the Gulf of Mexico it would not be 120 miles out from land, but only be 5 or 10 miles. In New England there is no other OTEC operation that I am aware of other than possibly an inverse OTEC. Mr. Stupps. We don’t want to be premature, but that has the potential of expanding the impact of OTEC dramatically beyond the warmer areas of the country that we were thinking of solely before? Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. Opening up even New England for the possible technology? Mr. RicHarps. Yes, sir. OTEC is primarily a way to extract energy from any low temperature difference. It doesn’t matter if it comes from geothermal, a bottoming cycle or the natural heat of the ocean. Mr. Stupps. That is very exciting. I am glad we ended on that and not on tidal. That is indeed enormously exciting it seems to me if indeed you are correct and there seems to be a consensus with respect to OTEC being the most immediately promising in regard to the various technologies in the ocean. Dr. Katz. The prevailing factors on the geothermal OTEC so- called will be the amount of the resource and the cost to get at it. Mr. Srupps. I take it from what you have said at this point that in all the variety of areas in which your concern is focused, you do not at this point see the need for statutory or legislative changes of any kind or initiatives? Dr. Katz. Not at this point. 228 Mr. Stupps. Very good. Thank you very much for your testimony. We look forward to staying in touch with you. Dr. Katz. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Our next witness, Mr. Thomas P. Higgins, manager, Ocean Energy Systems of the Lockheed Corp. Mr. Higgins, nice to have you back, sir. STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. HIGGINS, MANAGER, OCEAN ENERGY SYSTEMS, LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE CO., INC. Mr. Hiaains. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, my name is Thomas P. Higgins and I am man- ager of Ocean Energy Systems at Lockheed. It is an honor to be invited again by the subcommittee to discuss and present some of our activities in the ocean energy field. Today I will present a review of our activities to harness the energy in ocean waves. The energy in ocean waves is truly awesome, as we have been discussing here this morning. Significant evidence is provided by coastal destruction during storms. Even normal seas can exhibit large energy content by the manner in which the waves break on the shore and the surf explodes onto the beach. Scientists have calculated the amount of energy in worldwide ocean waves to be greater than the world’s oil supply. Now, how do we efficiently obtain this renewable, free energy? Man has observed the rise and fall of the ocean wave surfaces for many, many years and recognized that there is a source of energy to be utilized. While there have been many ingenious attempts to have various types of mechanisms ride the waves and convert the motion into usable energy, a cost competitive system has not yet been developed. I would like to describe a new concept mentioned by Dr. Katz, developed by a brilliant Lockheed scientist and recently patented, which utilizes a new approach to extract ocean wave energy and has a valid theoretical base. The inventor named his invention DAM-ATOLL. It can provide a source of electrical energy as do our large hydroelectric “dams” and it has a shape somewhat analogous to island “atolls” in the Pacific Ocean. DAM-ATOLL does not respond to the up-and-down wave motion, but utilizes wave refraction theory to alter the wave direction and thus concentrates the diffuse ocean energy, thereby offering the potential for a new cost competitive source of energy. While we have built a model and have verified the concept, I wish to make it clear that further development work remains to be done. Nevertheless, the concept is very exciting and intriguing and fortunately mechanically simple. The essence of the concept is embodied in these four statements: First, the DAM-ATOLL shell which is like a very large inverted bowl, or the roof of one of our modern football stadiums, is special- ly contoured so that it concentrates the ocean wave in two direc- tions—in the vertical direction much as the ocean beach concen- trates the energy, and in the horizontal direction by causing the wave to refract or bend toward the center of the dome. 229 Second, the concentrated energy is introduced into a vertical chamber in a manner to create an enormous fluid flywheel. This fluid flywheel provides a continuous power output from waves that are spaced apart in time. Third, the system does not impose energy transformations and hence the inefficiencies of energy transformations are eliminated. Fourth, and last, kinetic energy from the ocean wave is extracted by a simple turbine which can have a one shaft drive to the load device such as an electrical generator. Lockheed has built and tested a model to demonstrate proof of the concept. We regard it as a nominal 1/100 scale model. The test model was built as a proof-of-concept demonstration. Each compo- nent has not been analytically optimized, but the model demon- strated very encouraging qualitative results. A more complete description is contained in a technical paper which has been published and I have attached the paper to this statement for reference purposes. Your committee has devoted much effort to OTEC so I believe it would be of assistance to you for me to make some comparisons between OTEC and wave energy. ENERGY RESOURCE LOCATION OTEC, tropical latitudes, worldwide. Wave Energy: Middle to higher latitudes, primarily west coast of land masses due to the Earth’s rotation. DEVELOPMENT WORK OTEC, funded Government studies since 1974; technology work underway; total system demonstration by mini-OTEC last summer; firm plans for large scale pilot plant. Wave energy, Lockheed Co. efforts since 1975; Government funded work began in 1980; (Great Britain has had a large, active program for several years). POWER OUTPUT, FULL SCALE SYSTEM OTEC, 10’s and 100’s of MW per plant. Wave energy, a few MW at most per plant. Our discussion of wave energy, and DAM-ATOLL more specifical- ly, would not be complete without addressing the issues relating to the commercialization of this technology. To a large extent, suc- cessful market introduction of new energy technologies requires close cooperation between the private sector innovator and the Federal Government. As DAM-ATOLL technology progresses from the research and development stage through demonstration to market introduction, varying specific needs must be met. Fundamental to determina- tions of the appropriate roles for the private sector innovator and the Federal Government in addressing these needs are two param- eters: Potential economic benefits to the public and private sectors; and Risk inherent in the successful commercialization of the subject technology. 230 The degree of Federal and non-Federal government participation is also dependent on the progress being made in the technology’s evaluation. As I noted earlier, the simple DAM-ATOLL concept evolved when Lockheed urged its scientists and engineers in the midseven- ties to consider ways to adapt their knowledge to solutions to our domestic energy supply dilemma. The DAM-ATOLL inventor, Mr. L. S. Wirt, applied knowledge of acoustics to the ocean environ- ment and devised a new energy system. Since that time, Lockheed has utilized its discretionary funds to advance the technology through the proof of concept stage, and we were granted a patent in May 1979. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the Department of Energy has recently provided funds via the Solar Energy Research Institute for further developmental work on DAM-ATOLL which will lead to testing of a 1/50 scale model in 1982. The work for the Solar Energy Research Institute began this past July, but we feel that much valuable time was lost in negotiat- ing an acceptable arrangement with the Government regarding utilization of our background patent and data, and in obtaining sufficient rights for future inventions. We submit that the basic policy approach of the DOE on patents does not provide proper encouragement to industry to commercial- ize their inventions and in fact contains disincentives to innovation and risk-sharing by private industry; that is, the policy of taking title to inventions that are developed under Government contracts. We believe that the public would be better served if the develop- ing contractor were allowed to retain title to inventions while always reserving for the Government the worldwide, nonexclusive and royalty-free right to use the invention for any and all govern- mental purposes. Completion of the Solar Energy Research Institute contract will provide the necessary data to assess the appropriateness of a large scale-demonstration. Assuming sufficient developmental progress will have been realized to warrant such a large scale demonstra- tion, the next issue to be addressed is identification of the funding sources for this initiative. Because of the capital-intensive nature of the technology, private sector financing may be difficult to obtain. This expectation is based on two observations: Reluctance of electrical generation utilities to participate as in- vestors in such programs; and the cost of venture capital. To execute a successful program, Federal assistance will be re- quired. Satisfactory performance of the large-scale demonstration facility, when coupled with utility acceptance of the technology, will obviate the need for further Federal participation. Although we are in the early developmental phases of DAM- ATOLL, we consider it to be a likely source of renewable alterna- tive energy in those world areas where there is an adequate wave energy resource. After successful demonstration, there could be a large number of units, probably 100’s or 1,000’s, which would bene- fit from the economies of a production line. Our preliminary economic numbers indicate that DAM-ATOLL can be a competitive source of solar energy in the early nineties. An independent analysis by the United Kingdom Department of 231 Energy shows that DAM-ATOLL compares quite favorably with the various systems they are sponsoring. The primary emphasis for DAM- ATOLL has been to consider its use as a source of electrical energy to be tied into existing electri- cal grids. However, as we were just discussing, we recognize that if an efficient device can be developed to extract the energy from the waves, there can be alternate uses for the system such as protec- tion from coastal erosion and small harbor creation. Further, the relatively small power output as compared to large baseload generating plants can be of considerable interest to small countries or communities which have a large wave energy re- source. Mr. Chairman, your committee’s interest and past achievements to promote new ocean energy systems are most appreciated. I thank you for the opportunity to describe another system which we believe can assist in reaching solar energy objectives by the year 2000. Thank you very much. [The information follows:] 232 Presented at 2nd Miami International Conference on Alternate Energy 10-13 December 1979 DAM-ATOLL--A SYSTEM FOR EXTRACTING ENERGY FROM OCEAN WAVES T. P. HIGGINS and H. G. SCHREIBER Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., Sunnyvale, California, U.S.A. ABSTRACT A DAM-ATOLL is a dome-shaped structure located just below the neutral level of the sea. The special dome shape acts as a concentrating device to concentrate the wave energy in both vertical and horizontal directions. The concentrated wave energy is directed to a central core in a manner to create a vortex flow. This vortex, or fluid flywheel, acts as an energy storage device to permit continuous output power from massive pulses of wave energy input power. The vortex in the central core serves as a fluid flywheel from which energy is gradually and continuously withdrawn by a turbine. When the turbine drives an electrical generator, the nominal output of a 280 ft. diameter DAM-ATOLL is in the order of 1-2 MW, depending on the input wave energy. A 1/100 scale model has been constructed and operated as a proof-of- concept. The inventor received a patent in May 1979. The energy in ocean waves is truly awesome -- significant evidence is provided by coastal destruction during storms. Even normal seas can exhibit large energy content by the manner in which the waves break on the shore and the surf explodes onto the beach. Scientists have calculated the amount of energy in ocean waves to be greater than the world's oil supply -- now how do we efficiently obtain this renewable, free energy? Man has observed the rise and fall of the ocean wave surfaces for many, many years and recognized that there is a source of energy to be utilized. While there have been many ingenious attempts to have various types of mecha- nisms ride the waves and convert the motion into usable energy, a cost com- petitive system has not yet been developed. I would like to describe a new concept, developed by a brilliant Lockheed scientist and recently patented, which utilizes a new approach to extract ocean wave energy, and has a valid theoretical base. Footnote: Mr. Leslie S. Wirt and his associate, Mr. D. L. Morrow, have brilliantly applied their knowledge from one scientific field to develop a new concept in another scientific arena. A patent for DAM-ATOLL was issued on 8 May 1979. 233 Perhaps a simple analogy would be helpful. Man had seen birds fly, and for years tried to emulate them with various flapping devices like wings, but to no avail. The Wright brothers utilized a fixed wing which caused the air- flow to be in a manner to create aerodynamic lift, and man was able to fly. DAM-ATOLL does not respond to the up and down wave motion, but utilizes wave refraction theory to alter the wave direction and thus concentrates the diffuse ocean energy, thereby offering the potential for a new cost competitive source of energy. While we have built a model and have verified the concept, I wish to make it clear that further development work remains to be done. Nevertheless, the concept is so exciting and intriguing, and so mechanically simple, we believe it to be our mutual advantage to present it to you. The essence of the concept is embodied in these four statements (Fig. 1): First, the DAM-ATOLL shell is specially contoured so that it concentrates the ocean wave in two directions -- in the vertical direction much as the ocean beach concentrates the energy, and in the horizontal direction by causing the wave to refract toward the center of the dome. Second, the concentrated energy is introduced into a vertical chamber in a manner to create an enormous fluid flywheel. This fluid flywheel provides a continuous power output from waves that are spaced apart in time. Third, the system does not impose energy transformations and hence the inefficiencies of energy transformations are eliminated. OEM PEN IET LIE ES EIT ES CYLINDE CONTAINS .,1350 TONS OF 4®EA WATER Fig. 1 The DAM-Atoll Concept Fig. 2 The DAM-Atoll Core 234 Fourth, and last, kinetic energy from the ocean wave is extracted by a simple turbine which can have a one shaft drive to the load device such as an electrical generator. Now let me further explain the concept by a series of slides which build up to the total system starting with the central core. Consider a large cylinder, open at both ends, with dimensions of 30 feet diameter and 60 feet tall (Fig. 2). Such a cylinder encloses 1350 tons of sea- water. By creating a swirling vortex inside the core, one can have a source of energy (Fig. 3). The vortex action will cause a turbine wheel to rotate. Each of you have experienced a similar phenomenon by squirting water into the edge of a bucket of water, or by mechanically stirring a bucket of paint (Fig. 4). Now the way to cause nature to generate this fluid flywheel is to place a large dome over the central core (Fig. 5). For reasons I will explain in a moment, the dome structure needs to be in the order of 100 meters in diameter -- comparable in size to the roof covering a football field. As the wave travels over the dome, the velocity of the wave slows as the water depth decreases. This causes the wave to bend -- or refract -- so that it is focused or spirals into the center of the dome. Bending or refraction of the waves was known to the Polynesians who knew that there was no lee side or protected side for a volcanic atoll -- the ocean wave broke on the shore around all the periphery of the atoll. Our South Pacific landing forces in WWII had to learn the phenomenon the hard way. 2 SSS Rie ET, Fig. 3 The DAM-Atoll Fig. 4 The DAM-Atoll Fluid Flywheel Core Vortex Fig. 5 Wave Refraction While the refraction causes the deep wave to focus toward the center, once the wave breaks due to reduced or shallow depths, refraction principles no longer apply. It is then necessary to have some structure to guide the wave energy through the surf zone (Fig. 6). The inner portion of the guide vanes is contoured so that the energy is introduced tangentially into the core, and thus the fluid flywheel is created. A distribution of relative energy content in ocean waves as a function of the deep water wave length or periodicity of the waves is shown in Figure 7. While this distribution is not applicable all over the world, there is a pre- ponderance of wave energy in those waves which have a period or frequency between 5 and 10 seconds. The 10 second period corresponds to wave lengths of 156 meters, and the peak of this curve at 7 seconds cozresponds to a wave length of 78 meters. Examining a 10 second wave pattern which has a crest-to-trough height of two meters, Figure 8, shows an energy content of 4 Mw (or 4000 Kw) of energy per 100 meters of wave front. Or for each meter of wave front, there is 40 Kw (or 40,000 watts). The height of the waves, or swells, is important because the energy content is proportional to the square of the height. One of the key features of the DAM-ATOLL system is that its performance is not dependent upon a directional orientation. Regardless of the approaching wave direction, or for random seas, the wave refraction will occur so that the energy is directed and concentrated to the central part of the special dome shape structure. The dome size which concentrates the wave energy needs to be about the same diameter as the predominant deep water wave length, hence the earlier statement that the dome should be in the order of 100 meters in diameter. 69-848 O - 81 - 16 eats D. SEC - 3000" 2, PERIO Fig. 7 Energy Sprectrum A cross-section of a DAM-ATOLL unit would appear this way (Fig. 9). A large dome shell is required to cause the wave to refract toward the center. Concrete is a potential candidate material. Multiple units would utilize a large amount of concrete as often used in hydroelectric dams. This feature, plus the similarity to the real world of waves refracting around atolls, led to the naming of the System as DAM-ATOLL. The shell structure may either be attached to the bottom of the ocean, or it may be designed to float such that the top of the dome is at the water surface. Note that there is water underneath the shell. 237 ae. Ber ae sENERGY PER 100 M OF WAVE FRONT IS 4 MW Fig. 8 Ocean Wave Energy AO pe aS Om Nee aR ARO Sor EL eee Be ee! Fig. 9 Cross Section The central core is also continuously filled with water. A turbine wheel is located at the bottom of the central core, and a diffuser section is designed to aid the water flow of the relatively small amount of water flowing downward in the core. The only structures above the surfaces of the water are the guide vanes and the load device driven by the turbine wheel. I wish to emphasize that the main power source for the turbine wheel is the rotating vortex within the core, and not a vertical fall or translation of water as utilized by hydroelectric turbines in large dams. 238 Lockheed has built and tested a model to demonstrate proof of the concept. We regard it as a nominal 1/100 scale model (Fig. 10). You can see the vane structure at the top which guides the waves into the central core; the central core and turbine are also visible through the plexiglas shell. The test model was built as a proof-of-concept demonstration. Each com- ponent had not been analytically optimized, but the model tests demonstrated very encouraging qualitative results. The 1/100 scale model demonstrates the energy concentration by refraction very vividly. The inlet guide vanes were configured to provide an ommidirec- tional capability with respect to the relative orientation between the unit and the approaching wave. The fluid flywheel, which is to stabilize the impulsive incoming wave power at the top opening of the flywheel to a quasi-steady rotational motion at the lower end of the fluid flywheel, was well demonstrated. Though the wave power at the flywheel inlet was impulsive regardless of regular or irregular waves, the turbine rotation was fairly uniform. The power output efficiency of the 1/100 model test was low. Tests were conducted at the Lockheed Oceanographic Laboratory in a 320 ft. long wave tank. Wave frequency and amplitude were varied over a wide range. The unit, which was designed as only a proof-of-concept system, performed for all input waves but highlighted the need for component and system optimization. Figure 11 shows the variation in efficiency with wave period. The peak efficiency corre- lates well with the design wave period. It is expected that design refinements Fig. 10 Scale Model 239 ee 1,5" NOMINAL WAVE HEIGHT 2.07 NOMINAL WAVE HEIGHT EFFICIENCY (%) DATE: FEBRUARY 1979 TEST FACILITY: LOL MODE SCALE: 1/100 DRAFT: 0 4 5 6 7 'B 9 10 YW 12 13 14 FULL SCALE WAVE PERIOD (S) Fig. 11 Preliminary Model Test Results will permit the efficiency to remain relatively flat over an octave variation in wave period from the design wave period. System efficiencies of 25% to 45% are expected. Each full scale unit, 80 meters in diameter, is expected to generate one to two Mw of electricity, depending upon the input wave energy. The system is omnidirectional and utilizes wave energy regardless of the relative direction of the approaching wave. Concrete and steel are two candidate materials for full size units. Cost of installed units is estimated to be a few million dollars, such that we believe a cost competitive number of about $3,000 per Kw can be attained in areas with large wave energy resources. As with any solar energy system, the initial cost is high compared to a fossil fuel plant, but an overall savings is realized because of the free solar fuel. Now that a proof-of-concept model has been built and tested, our program plan specifies two additional, larger models. A fixed 1/50 scale model with design refinements we now know can provide good quantitative data. The 1/25 scale model would be floated to obtain open ocean dynamic data. Data from these 2 models would then be used to design a unit to be tested in the ocean. The open ocean demonstrator should be at least 1/10 scale, and it would be desireable and most interesting if it were as big as 1/2 scale. Assuming success at each stage in the development program, full size DAM-ATOLLS could be operational in the "80's. Subsequent to our press releases made at the time the patent award was announced in May 1979, we have received numerous expressions of interest in the DAM-ATOLL potential throughout the world. We are optimistic that DAM-ATOLL will prove to be cost-competitive and a benefit to mankind. Additional benefits of coastal protection and harbor formation could benefit less-developed countries as well as others. 240 Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, sir. Did you conclude that your scientist who made this invention was brillant because of the invention or because of his name for it? That is a marvelous name. Mr. Hicains. The inventor is not only prolific as a scientist but he comes up with good, catchy names. You can imagine the name has given us some trouble, but some notoriety also. Mr. Stupps. I think it is marvelous. I can see naming a boat that way immediately. You are uncharacteristically kind in your references to the De- partment of Energy in this testimony compared to some of Lock- heed’s observations in the past, as I recall. Do you share DOE’s projections and assessments of the resource potential of wave energy at this point, or do you find them, as you have suggested in the past, to be lagging a bit behind the scientific and corporate and academic community in their enthusiasm and awareness of the situation? Mr. Hiacains. In terms of the wave energy resource that is availa- ble, I think we share the same information as to the amount of resource that can be available for wave energy systems. In terms of the development, we had hoped to initiate contracted work a year or two ago, but we had numerous discussions relative to the patent issue before we were able to resolve those issues and begin the contract that I referred to in the testimony. Mr. Stupps. That patent issue seems to me to raise questions that far transcend this or any particular technology. Mr. Hiaeins. Correct. Mr. Stupps. In terms of good relationships between the Govern- ment and private enterprise. Mr. Hiaarns. Correct. Mr. Stupps. I don’t want to get into that one here. Setting that one aside for the moment, I take it you do not have any strong criticism, you don’t see the Department dragging its feet on this technology as you have in the past on others? Mr. Hicoains. We feel that we could proceed somewhat faster in the current program, but subject to the funding available, we are now planning to do basically a year’s worth of analysis. We will then proceed into the design of a model, the 1/50 scale model which would be twice the scale we have tested. We hope from that model to obtain good, quantitative data which will enable us to assess wave energy far better than we have been able to do in the past. Mr. Stupps. Does wave energy appear to you now to be continu- ous enough to support base load power needs? Mr. Hiaains. In some areas, such as the Pacific Northwest, and in some areas such as off of Scotland and Ireland, there may be some capability to support base load. It is not to the same degree of base load support that OTEC would be. Mr. Stupps. And it is generally west coast-oriented because of the earth’s rotation? Mr. Hiaains. Yes, sir, the waves tend to be considerably bigger on the west coasts of land masses; for example, the Pacific North- west coast and the coasts of Ireland and Scotland. 241 Mr. Stupps. I gather some informational brochures on the DAM- ATOLL indicate that the structures could be used to create artifi- Eu eeee water ports. What does that mean and how would that work’ Mr. Hiccins. We have considered in some discussions the capa- bility that if we could successfully moor some of these large struc- tures in the open ocean, we could create sheltered water which would be beneficial to loading and unloading tankers or ocean drill rigs or anything of that nature where we would like to have calmer water. That problem that remains would be to successfully moor such large structures. Mr. Stupps. Would there be some impacts elsewhere, as there is, for example, if you build a breakwater, you simply divert current or anything else, where in this case you wouldn’t be diverting it. You would be removing the energy. Mr. Hiccrns. It would essentially be removing the wave energy and creating calmer water behind the units. Mr. Stupps. Are you looking at all into the possible environmen- tal consequences, whatever they might be? Mr. Hiaains. To date we have not, no, sir. Mr. Stupps. Do you plan to do that? Mr. Hiaarns. Yes, we would like to do that. Mr. Stupps. Is Lockheed looking at all at any of the other technologies that we mentioned this morning, current or salinity gradient? Mr. Hicerns. No, sir. We have considered them but we have no active work on currents or tidal power or others. Mr. Stupps. Finally, do you see at this point any need for legisla- tive or statutory initiatives or changes in this area right now? Mr. Hiceins. At the present time, until we have proceeded fur- ther on the wave energy development work, we do not see the need for any further legislation. Mr. Stupps. Very good. How refreshing. Mr. Hicerns. Good. Mr. Stupps. Thank you, sir. Mr. Hicerns. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Thank you for the enthusiasm your corporation has brought. The subcommittee stands adjourned. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD JAY SCHREMP, FORMER SENIOR DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENTIST Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the present oppro- tunity to submit to this subcommittee the following comments regarding (i) a recent five-year engineering study performed by me within the specialized area of ocean wave energy conversion, and (ii) certain findings, arising out of that study, which promise to hasten considerably both the development and the industrial application of ocean wave energy technology, particularly in the United States. By way of introduction, I would first like to cite a previous statement submitted by me to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which appears at pp. 1015-1019 of the published record of that Committee’s Hearings on Energy Financing Legislation, held on July 25, 26, and 27, 1979. As stated on pp. 1018-1019 thereof, the above mentioned five-year study “has definitely shown that there exist new avenues of approach offering unprecedented opportunities for an accelerated development of the technology for large-scale indus- 242 trial wave energy conversion at sea, first to electricity and then, in situ, to a variety of synthetic fuels including hydrogen. “The development of this technology along these new avenues of approach would proceed for the most part at sea, on an incremental basis. Without entailing an excessive initial investment of funds, it would be proved to be both commercializable and economically competitive at each successive level of wave energy extracting capacity. At no level within the range between an initial 1 MW or less and an ultimate 100 MW or more would there be any major technical roadblock, or any factors (other than possible international jurisdictional ones) that might inhibit early adoption by private industry. “Hach seagoing ocean wave energy system contemplated here, of whatever wave energy extracting capacity, would extract almost all subsurface wave energy availa- ble within a correspondingly predetermined annular region spanned by an array of submerged wave energy absorbers surrounding and upported by a central platform- vessel. After suitable conversion, the extracted wave energy would be conveyed inwardly to the central platform for further conversion and subsequent storage and/or product processing. “Every such system would be so designed as to operate safely in practically any sea state, in such a way as to extract wave energy efficiently in light as well as heavy seas. “Implementation of this technology on a large scale could, of course, significantly influence future trends in a wide variety of related industries. . . .” A complete description of an illustrative seagoing ocean wave energy conversion system of this kind was published on June 28, 1979, as an international patent application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. For the sake of brevity, rather than reproduce that publication here, I will merely cite it as follows for the interest- ed reader: its International Publication Number is WO 79/00349; and its title is “System for Extracting Subsurface Wave Energy.” A corresponding United States patent will issue before the end of this calendar year. The remainder of my present statement will be concerned with defining more clearly the general idea—expressed in the passage just quoted above—of implement- ing on a large commercial scale the foregoing ocean wave energy conversion tech- nology through its direct application to certain potentially related industries. For this purpose, I shall confine most of the following discussion to one particular industry which has, in my opinion, not only an immediate need for, but also by far the greatest likelihood of benefiting from, the kind of innovative cross-fertilization of ideas that can come from the direction of ocean wave energy conversion technol- ogy. That industry—one that remains yet to be established for the direct liquefaction of domestic coal—could thereby set the pace for the entire domestic commercial synthetic fuel industry whose creation “from scratch” is the principal objective of the recently passed Energy Security Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-294). This act anticipates that, by the end of a projected four-year “Phase I” of a concerted government-industry effort to build commercial plants, a comprehensive strategy can.be formulated for meeting the overall synthetic fuel production goals of the United States. It is furthermore the intent of this act that that strategy shall be based on experience gained under Phase IJ; and a crucially important part of such experience will have to do with environmental effects associated with facilities already by then in being, and will presumably enable reliable projections to be made about future environmental effects and future water requirements. Already, however, in an article ' entitled “Energy Technologies and Natural Envi- ronments: The Search for Compatibility,’ John Harte and Alan Jassby have direct- ed attention to the National Academy of Science’s CONAES study as being “prob- ably the most ambitious effort to date to assess all energy sources and evaluate and compare environmental impacts’; and they have made the following very signifi- cant comment relative thereto: ‘This study focuses attention on new energy technol- ogies that could provide substitutes for petroleum and natural gas. It concludes that the most serious ecological impacts result from the water consumption requirements of these technologies, and that these water requirements could severely constrain their rate of development.” More specifically, in another article? entitled “Energy and Water,” based on the above mentioned study, John Harte and Mohamed El-Gasseir have shown that “in the scenarios for intensive coal use, . . . the eastern regions (of the United States) will become vulnerable to drought”; and they have cautioned that, “before setting forth on a course of massive development of a coal-conversion industry in the 1 Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 3, 1978, pp. 101-146. 2 Science, Vol. 199, 10 February 1979, pp. 623-634. 243 United States, it would be important to explore further the implications of this finding for freshwater and estuarine ecosystems and for present and future human activities that depend on reliable freshwater supplies.” These authors have also pointed out that, “in the West, present-day consumption of water is already a large fraction . . . even of total runoff. Because the West is already vulnerable to drought, the additional water consumption for scenarios with intensive coal use would greatly exacerbate the existing problem of competition for water rather than create, as in the East, new kinds of problems.” It is quite probable, therefore, that the experience to be gained during the above mentioned projected Phase I might simply confirm—at the cost of many billions of dollars and at the further cost of at least four years of irrecoverable time—that, because of water supply constraints in both the eastern and western United States, a synfuel industry of the magnitude and form generally envisioned at this time will run a great risk of never becoming a fully developed and commercially viable one. When viewed in this light, does not the entire future synfuel industry, or at least do not some of its most important areas (categorized according to resource/technol- ogy), exhibit a need for, and a likelihood of benefiting from, ‘‘the kind of innovative cross-fertilization of ideas that can come from the direction of ocean wave energy conversion technology’? The answer, I am convinced, is in the affirmative; and, as indicated above, that affirmative answer can first be supplied, and can best be formulated, in terms of a future industry devoted to the direct liquefaction of domestic coal. That answer, in short, consists in providing a certain “oceanic approach” to the problem of satisfying the “supporting resource’ requirements of those synthetic fuel technologies, whatever they might prove to be, which are compatible with such an approach. As will be seen below, among the various synthetic fuel technologies, that of direct coal liquefaction is a particular one which has all of the elements needed for an optimal “match” to that approach. Among the major direct coal liquefaction projects that are now being prosecuted in this country, any one of the following three, for example, could be a potential stepping stone to a series of commercial coal conversion plants whose overall direct liquefaction processes would incorporate a certain technologically, economically, and environmentally promising new methodology that proceeds directly from the afore- mentioned “oceanic approach”: namely, (a) the Exxon Donor Solvent (EDS) coal liquefaction project; (b) the Gulf SRC-II alternative fuel oil project; or (c) the H-Coal project undertaken by Ashland Oil and a consortium of other companies. Under this new methodology, the only intrinsic changes that would affect the overall direct liquefaction process presently employed in any one of these three projects (a), (b), and (c) would involve those subordinate processes whose sole purpose is to satisfy the “supporting resource” requirements of a commercial coal conversion plant. All such subordinate processes, moreover, would be equally applicable to any such overall direct liquefaction process. One such subordinate process would of course be that by which water is supplied to a commercial coal conversion plant. Under the aforementioned new methodology, the source of supply of water would not be continental freshwater runoff, as it has almost always been hitherto for commercial plants with similar water requirements, but instead would be seawater obtained directly from the ocean at a suitable offshore site generally located within the continental limits of the United States. The water thus supplied would be desalinated only according to need. A second such subordinate process would be that by which electricity is supplied. The electricity supply process, under the new methodology, need no longer involve land-based electric utility plants powered by fossil or nuclear fuels. Instead, the ultimate source of electric power, in whatever quantities might be desired, would be ocean wave power extracted and converted at a second, more distant, offshore site. A third kind of subordinate process would include all hydrogen production proc- esses required for a commercial direct coal liquefaction plant. The customary hydro- gen production processes, all of which entail large-scale consumption of fossil fuels together with large-scale emissions of rejected carbon dioxide, would be replaced, under the new methodology, by a large-scale unitary water electrolysis process whose ultimate source of electric power would again be ocean wave power extracted and converted at the second, more distant, offshore site. A fourth kind of subordinate process would include all plant fuel combustion processes. All such processes, which likewise customarily entail large-scale consump- tion of fossil fuels together with large-scale emissions of rejected carbon dioxide, would be replaced, under the new methodology, by corresponding hydrogen combus- tion processes. It is thus clear that a sustained application of the new methodology described above would gradually bring about a deliberate concentration of this country’s 244 entire future coal liquefaction industry along the coastal areas of the United States adjacent to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Gulf of Mexico. In my judg- ment, such a development, if extensively but prudently implemented, would surely yield immense environmental, economic, social, and defense-related benefits to the United States. Again in the interest of brevity, I will here touch only briefly on a few of the most important of these expected benefits. On the whole, the entire future synfuel indus- try, as it is generally envisioned at this time, presently faces profound uncertainties affecting a wide variety of technical, cost, timing, and especially environmental and raw material estimates that relate to the undertaking and the development thereof. The resulting risks, as perceived by many of those in the private sector from whom major capital investment might be sought, are actually much too great for there to be any confidence on the part of the private sector that that industry will soon, if ever, become viable enough commercially to do without permanent Federal subsidi- zation. On the other hand, as has already been indicated above, the crucial differ- ence between that future industry’s becoming genuinely viable commerically and its becoming commercially moribund may very weill lie in whether or not a sustained application of the aforementioned new methodology and its parent “oceanic ap- proach” takes place. Consider, for example, what benefits would accrue to the entire future coal liquefaction industry through the selection of a site for a proposed commercial direct coal liquefaction plant that would be located in conformity with this new methodology, and more particularly within a few miles of the Atlantic coast. Such a site might be located, say, between Norfolk, Virginia, and Elizabeth City, North Carolina, conveniently close to an established railway connecting those two cities. Bituminous coal from one or more relatively nearby mines could be economically and expeditiously moved by high-volume rail transportation all the way through to the site. While the cost for such transportation could of course be avoided by reverting to the conventional procedure of locating the site very close to a preselect- ed coal mine, it will nevertheless be found, from much broader considerations of commercial viability of the kind pointed out above, that any such additional cost would be overwhelmingly compensated for by many other benefits that would cat ae to the proposed project and, through it, to the entire future coal liquefaction industry. The most evident of these benefits, for a site thus located within a few miles of the Atlantic coast, would be the immediate availability of any desired quantity of seawater that could be provided by means of one or more large diameter pipelines extending seaward, under Currituck Sound and its outlying sand dunes, out into the open ocean approximately as far as the three-mile limit. The selected offshore source or sources of seawater could be conveniently located near the ocean bottom wherever, by suitable prior assessment, it was determined that neither entrainment (passage of organisms through the proposed plant) nor impingement (impact by fish and other nonentrainable organisms against the pipeline intake structures) would result in significant environmental or economic damage. An important related environmental benefit would result from the fact that, relative to their populations at large, far less significant quantities of aquatic biota would be entrained from the presently contemplated water sources in the open sea than from conventional estuarine or riverine water sources. Furthermore, as I have previously indicated, by far the greatest compensating benefit to result from application of this water supply selection methodology is one that ultimately has to be evaluated in terms of its contribution towards conserving the nation’s total supply of freshwater. For in this connection the prime importance of any initial application of the presently suggested site selection methodology— whether or not it is the one described above—lies in what it promises will happen if and when it is replicated many times and at many different coastal sites. If, in addition, an early decision were to be reached and announced by the Federal government, to the effect that it would foster the widespread but prudent use of the presently suggested site selection methodology as a guide-line in developing this country’s entire future coal liquefaction industry, that small step alone would go far towards immediately dispelling the above mentioned perception by the private sector that the risks involved in capitalizing that industry are prohibitively great. In terms of energy conservation, however, it is equally important that, for a coastal site such as the above, the ultimate source of all forms of energy required to operate the entire direct coal liquefaction process, including the collection of neces- sary seawater and the production and collection of necessary hydrogen, electric power, and desalinated seawater, would be ocean wave energy—extracted, convert- ed, and delivered by means of one or more wave energy converters of the kind described in the above cited International Publication No. WO 79/00349. Here, for 245 perhaps the first time, the possibility arises of achieving on a very large commercial scale an essentially perfect match between a renewable energy source and an energy end use, almost entirely free from the usual kinds of mismatch between supply and load that occur, for example, in the transmission and distribution of electricity (at a cost over twice the cost of generation) to nonindustrial customers of private utilities in the United States. Here, too, for perhaps the first time, is to be found a technologically and economically feasible example, on a very large commer- cial scale, of the complete decentralization—with all of the concomitant gains in economy that characterize a successful “soft technology’’—of what would ordinarily be regarded as a centralized ‘‘hard technology.” The illustrative wave energy converter described in the above cited International Publication is an embodiment that would be particularly appropriate for service on the high seas, at locations having appreciably higher than average significant wave heights; and it would accordingly have a maximum wave power output exceeding 50 MW. On the other hand, for service off the North Carolina coast, as contemplated here, waveconverters of the same kind could be constructed on a scale perhaps half as great in terms of linear dimensions. In the latter case, the waveconverters would draw approximately 50 feet. They would be capable of operating in any one of a broad range of sea states, and at any depth up to 200 feet or more, adjustable according to the sea state. They could therefore be safely operated at maximum wave power output, even in extremely stormy seas, in coastal waters whose depth was a little as 400 feet. However, in order to maintain a maximum annual rate of wave power output, it would be desirable to operate the waveconverters at or slightly beyond the boundary of the continental shelf or, in other words, at distances from the North Carolina coast in excess of 50 miles, where the water depth would always exceed 500 feet and the significant wave height would be appreciably greater than that encountered closer inshore. Even on this reduced scale, each waveconverter employed would have a maximum wave power output in excess of 15 MW; and its hull displacement—which would be sufficient to support a turbine, an electric generator, and complete facilities for hydrogen production by electrolysis of water—would exceed 15,000 tons. The hydro- gen thus generated by one or more such waveconverters would be pumped to shore via a pipeline or pipelines laid on the ocean floor. A variety of alternative methods would also be available for transmitting any desired portion of the wave-generated electric power to shore. Is there something unique about this particular kind of waveconverter, one might ask at this point, which excludes from consideration, at least for the immediate purposes of the present commercial application, other kinds of waveconverters as well as other forms of ocean energy source, such as ocean thermal energy conver- sion (OTEC), ocean currents, ocean salinity gradients, and even windmills located at sea? My reply to this question would be that, in order to demonstrate the commer- cial viability of any ocean energy source in the context of the present commercial application, two necessary conditions must simultaneously be satisfied. The first is that the energy source must already have reached a relatively advanced stage of technical readiness; and the second is that it must independently possess a reliable means of survival under severe storm conditions, such that operation of the means of survival will not interfere with the ocean energy extraction process. For the particular kind of waveconverter that has just been under discussion, the required means of survival can actually be identified with, and can thereby serve to enhance, the ocean energy extraction process itself. That this is so has been shown in the above cited International Publication No. WO 79/00349. Moreover, on refer- ring to pages 1-11 of that publication, where those particular features are identified and explained which insure safe and effective waveconverter operation even in extremely heavy seas, it will be seen that every such safety feature is lacking not only in all contemplated OTEC installations, but also in all of the most technically ready waveconverters that have hitherto been proposed by others. In every such instance, in fact, it is only by adopting the means and methods recommended in the above cited publication that such safety features could be realized in practice. With respect to the state of technical readiness of the kind of waveconverter described in that publication, it has already been pointed out in my statement of last year to the Senate Banking Committee (see above) that “at no level (of wave energy extracting capacity) within the range between an initial 1 MW or less and an ultimate 100 MW or more would there be any major technical roadblock. . . .” It should here be stressed, moreover, that the extensive American experience with OTEC and the equally extensive British experience with the Salter waveconverter can, in combination and as a kind of by-product, provide the utmost assistance in bringing closer by a number of years the commercialization of other kinds of ocean energy source as well, including the particular kind of waveconverter recommended 246 here. Indeed, such a synergistic effect can result notwithstanding the fact that certain serious roadblocks still face both the American proponents of OTEC and the British proponents of waveconverters such as Salter’s—roadblocks which, it should be noted, simply do not arise for waveconverters of the kind recommended here. As I have already indicated above, both the development and the industrial application of ocean wave energy technology, if pursued along those avenues of approach that are recommended here, could receive a tremendous impetus from taking advantage of a unique opportunity which has arisen at this particular time and in this particular country: namely, an opportunity to play a crucial role in promoting the commercial viability of a future United States synthetic fuel indus- try. However, while I believe that to this end emphasis should be placed, in the near term, upon assigning that crucial role initially to waveconverters of the kind recom- mended here, I also believe that, over the long term, equal attention should be given to the development of other ocean energy sources and of certain novel combinations thereof—especially including combinations with the presently recommended wave- converters—for the purpose of ultimately achieving the widest possible application of this country’s vast ocean energy resources to its future synfuel industry. [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned.] RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL OVERSIGHT THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1980 House OF REPRESENTATIVES, : SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Gerry E. Studds, chairman, presiding. Present: Representatives Studds, Anderson, Hughes, Mikulski, Akaka, Forsythe, Pritchard, and Carney. Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will come to order. Today’s hearing will focus on the environmental implications of the ocean disposal of radioactive waste. The possibility that high level wastes will be emplaced in the deep seabed is currently under study by the Department of Energy. Low level wastes have, in years past, been routinely discarded in U.S. waters, and are cur- rently being dumped under regulated conditions by several nations overseas. We hope today to discuss the extent to which we understand the effects of radioactive waste dumping on the marine environment, and to identify areas in which we do not know enough to make a reasoned judgment about the wisdom of allowing ocean disposal of such waste in future years. We are concerned today with two distinct types of radioactive wastes—high level—including, for example, the long-lived and ex- tremely toxic elements found in spent fuel rods from nuclear powerplants—and low level—less radioactive materials such as con- taminated hospital and laboratory equipment. The most likely dis- posal techniques for the two differ greatly, as we shall hear shortly. Beginning immediately after World War II until the late sixties, the United States, as a matter of public policy, routinely permitted the ocean dumping of low-level wastes. These materials were placed in 55-gallon steel drums lined with concrete and towed to vaguely determined sites, from Massachusetts Bay to the Farallon Islands off San Francisco. Unfortunately, since they were consid- ered to be useless garbage, their precise location and contents were not recorded. In recent years, the Environmental Protection Agency has been able to locate only a minute percentage of these drums, some of which were damaged and leaking. We hope today to be able to discuss at length the findings of both EPA and others to date, the plans for future monitoring of these sites, and the likelihood of future ocean dumping of low-level wastes. Several European nations, incidentally, are currently (247) 248 dumping low-level wastes at one site in the northeast Atlantic, and the Japanese are planning to establish a site in the Pacific. What we plan to do with our high-level wastes in the future is an even more important issue because such materials can cause irre- versible biological damage and, in some cases, must be isolated for hundreds of thousands of years. The current administration has funded considerable research into land-based mined repositories— such as salt domes or granite—for high-level wastes. However, the Department of Energy is also looking into other potential disposal mediums—of which subseabed disposal is one. This yet to be developed technology would require the implantation of high-level wastes, probably contained in steel cannisters, in the clays of remote, stable areas of the deep seabed. It is evident that preventing the migration of radionuclides into the food chain is one of the keys to toxic waste isolation, and in this case the retentive nature of the clays would have to act as the primary barrier. Whether deep sea organisms would either affect or be affected by nuclide migration is an additional area for research. It is important to remember that the marine environment out- side U.S. waters is also of vital significance. The knowledge gained by our scientists about radioactive waste disposal can be extremely helpful in our negotiations with those nations which may be more eager than we to consider large-scale ocean disposal operations. It is quite possible, for example, that high-level radioactive waste disposal will be undertaken by the Japanese or by several Europe- an nations, provided they are successful in interpreting the London Dumping Convention in a manner which will allow them to do so. Domestically, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972—Ocean Dumping Act—prohibits the disposal in the oceans of high-level wastes. Thus, an amendment to this law would be necessary before any high-level waste disposal could occur. Essentially what we are confronted with, once again, as has frequently been the case and experience of this subcommittee is that it is an investigation not so much of man’s knowledge, but of man’s ignorance. We may be humbled by what we do not know, and we may have caused damage the magnitude of which we cannot begin to understand. We want to know what has been done in the past, we want to know what is being done now, and we want to know what we know and do not know about what we have done, and finally, what we ought to do. Mr. Pritchard, do you have an opening statement? Mr. PritcHarD. I would only say that this hearing is aimed at two quite distinct issues. First, we would like to examine some of the technical and legal issues surrounding the question of the subseabed emplacement of high-level nuclear waste and, second, due to the initiative and the introduction of a bill by my colleague from California, we would like to examine the question of the monitoring of nuclear waste dumpsites, primarily low-level waste dumpsites off the U.S. coasts. Since we have not dumped any nuclear waste off our shores since roughly 1970, and according to DOE, we will not be making a decision on subseabed emplacement of high nuclear waste, prob- ably until the year 2000, we would like very much to clearly distinguish between these two different issues in this hearing. 249 Therefore, we will try to deal primarily with the high-level waste subseabed emplacement issue in the morning, and the low-level waste monitoring issues, to what extent we can, in the afternoon. I think it is an important question, and I think that the more we get into it, we realize how short we are in actual facts, and how necessary it is for us to get the proper research going immediately. That is all. Mr. Stupps. Any other members have an opening statement? If not, our first witness is Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Senior Deputy Assist- ant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State. STATEMENT OF LESLIE H. BROWN, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSIST- ANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We want to thank you for inviting the Department of State to appear before the subcom- mittee today. I welcome the opportunity which the subcommittee has provided to discuss the issues associated with the disposal of radioactive waste in the oceans. How we, as a nation, and as a member of the world community, deal with these issues will have a significant effect upon our foreign relations as well as upon our efforts to insure the long-term protection of the marine environ- ment. The principal international agreement governing ocean disposal of a wide variety of substances, including radioactive wastes, is the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dump- ing of Wastes and Other Matter. This is the so-called London Dumping Convention. Under the London Dumping Convention, the dumping of high-level radioactive waste is prohibited. Special per- mits are required before other radioactive waste may be dumped. Forty-seven countries now are parties to the London Dumping Convention. This includes the United States. Papua-New Guinea, Surinam, Honduras, and Japan all became parties this year. There are also a number of regional conventions dealing with radioactive material which are as strict or stricter than the London Dumping Convention. For example, the Convention on the Protec- tion of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, the so- called Helsinki Convention, prohibits all dumping by the parties except that of dredge spoil; the protocol for the prevention of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by dumping from ships and aircraft prohibits essentially all dumping by the parties in the Mediterranean. The United States is not a party to these regional dumping agreements. The London Dumping Convention relies primarily upon the In- ternational Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—in carrying out its re- spouses with respect to the sea disposal of radioactive materi- als. The London Dumping Convention designates the IAEA as the body to define “high-level radioactive wastes and other matter” whose dumping at sea is prohibited. The current revised definition of such materials was adopted by the fourth consultative meeting of the Convention parties in 1979. It is a definition based upon 250 radioactivity per unit mass of packaged material. For the dumping of low-level radioactive wastes that is permitted under the Conven- tion there is also an established limit on the total mass of radioac- tive materials which may be dumped annually at a site and recom- mended total quantities which may be dumped at each site. There is no limit on the number of sites, although site proliferation has been discouraged. The IAEA is also responsible for providing recommendations to parties on practices for dumping these low-level radioactive wastes. These include guidelines on environmental evaluation of dumping applications, dumpsite selection, monitoring, assessment, packaging of materials, and recordkeeping. The definition and recommendations are under continuous review. As part of this effort, several activities are underway, including: (a) A review of the oceanographic model used in formulating the Definition; (6) A review of de minimis levels, to establish criteria for consid- ering materials to be nonradioactive for ocean dumping purposes; (c) The initiation of a coordinated research program on trans- uranic cycling in the marine environment. The IAEA is committed to continuing its responsibilities under the London Dumping Convention and other conventions. The United States very strongly supports this role. Another international agreement concerning the regulation of ocean disposal of radioactive materials is the multilateral consulta- tion and surveillance mechanism functioning within the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Coopera- tion and Development (OECD). Established in 1977, this body is charged with setting and review- ing guidelines, standards, and procedures for the safe disposal of radioactive material at sea. The NEA guidelines, which are to take into account the standards of the London Dumping Convention and the IAEA’s definition and recommendations, cover dumpsites and packaging and operating procedures related to sea disposal. They also call for assessment and review of environmental, ecological, and radiological protection studies relating to sea disposal activi- ties. They require periodic assessments—at no less than 5-year intervals—of the continued suitability of the selected dumpsites. Participating countries which decide to carry out dumping oper- ations must notify the NEA 6 months before the scheduled date of the operation, 12 months if a new site is proposed. They must include in the notification the composition and characteristics of the material, the site and reasons for its selection, including an environmental assessment, and the procedures to be followed. These latter must be in accord with NEA standards and recom- mended practices. In addition, the country of origin must name, or request the appointment of, an escorting officer to insure compli- ance. The NEA reviews the proposed plans, if necessary seeking the views of outside specialists, and names an NEA representative to observe the operation. The NEA maintains records of disposal operations which, with the approval of the country involved, may be furnished to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or- . ganization (IMCO). 251 Twenty-two countries now participate in this NEA mechanism and Japan is expected to join soon, now that it has ratified the London Dumping Convention. The United States, as a member of the NEA, participates in expert group meetings and, as a member of the steering committee, reviews all activities relating to the ocean disposal of radioactive material. In actual practice, few of the countries that are parties to the London Dumping Convention or the NEA surveillance mechanism engage in ocean dumping of radioactive materials. In 1980, only four countries: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Switzerland disposed of low-level radioactive wastes at sea. The total radioactivity of materials dumped, however, is significant and it increased this year. Protection of the entire marine environment requires that efforts be pursued to improve the effectiveness of the ocean dumping regime established under the London Dumping Convention. Our concerns about the Convention’s effectiveness center around three issues: One, the adequacy of the IAEA definition and recommendations; Two, the need for more thorough research on the environmental effects of ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes; and Three, the need for monitoring and assessment of the dumpsite which is presently in use in the northeast Atlantic Ocean. With respect to the IAEA definition, let me expand on this a bit. In our judgment, the IAEA definition of high-level radioactive material is incomplete and requires qualitative terms in addition to the present quantitative limitations. Under the present definition, no isotopes or particular types of waste are excluded from consider- ation for at-sea disposal as long as their concentration is sufficient- ly low. The U.S. position, reflected in the Marine Protection, Re- search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, is more specific about what constitutes high-level waste. The act defines high-level waste as: The aqueous waste resulting from the operation of the final cycle solvent extrac- tion system, or equivalent, and the concentrated waste from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels, or irradi- ated fuel from nuclear power reactors. The U.S. definition precludes the dumping of certain substances that are often considered to be among the most dangerous and toxic. We are also concerned that the IAEA definition was based upon assumptions that may be shown to be invalid as our knowl- edge of marine ecology improves. On the question of the need for research and monitoring, we have been frustrated in our attempts to better grapple with the impacts of dumping by the lack of scientific evidence on critical features of the marine environment and the effects upon it of radioactive materials. There is an acute need for more information on basic biological and physical processes. Moreover, we believe that a more thorough assessment of the sites used for dumping radioactive materials, including the north- east dumpsite, in the Atlantic must be undertaken, and a regular monitoring program begun. In this regard, we are pleased to note that the NEA has accelerated the development of a monitoring program which is expected to come before its steering committee 69-848 O - 81 - 17 252 for approval in April. Needless to say we welcome this develop- ment. Our concerns are part of the record. We have raised them repeat- edly in several fora: The NEA; the consultative meetings of the London Dumping Convention; and the IAKA. The philosophical underpinning for these concerns is the idea that we should take no irreversible actions which might destroy resources for future generations. Mr. Chairman, this summarizes our prepared statement on inter- national rules applicable to the ocean disposal of radioactive mate- rials. But we have been asked to address a specific item about H.R. 8119, a bill to require the Secretary of Commerce to undertake a study to determine the effects of past ocean dumping of radioactive wastes. This bill, if broadly interpreted, could be construed to call for a study of the Northeast Atlantic Dumpsite as well as dumpsites used previously by the United States. Such a study would consti- tute a valuable addition to the overall body of knowledge on ocean disposal of radioactive materials. Therefore we warmly support its objectives. As noted, there has been progress recently in efforts to encour- age a thorough review of the effects of dumping practices at the Northeast Atlantic site. A study such as that called for in H.R. 8119 would be helpful if it effectively complemented, and was carried out in cooperation with the NEA program. Mr. Chairman, that concludes the summary of my prepared statement. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY LESLIE H. Brown, SENIOR Deputy ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Chairman; Thank you for inviting the Department of State to appear before the Subcommittee today. I welcome the opportunity which the subcommittee has provided to discuss the issues associated with the disposal of radioactive waste in the oceans. How we, as a nation and as a member of the world community, deal with these issues will have a significant effect upon our foreign relations as well as upon efforts to ensure the long term protection of the marine environment. The principal international agreement governing ocean disposal of a wide variety of substances, including radioactive wastes, is the 1972 Convention on the Preven- _ tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Dumping Convention). Under the London Dumping Convention, the dumping of high-level radioactive waste is prohibited. Special permits are required before other radioac- tive waste may be dumped. Forty-seven countries are parties to the London Dump- ing Convention, including the United States. Papua New Guinea, Suriname, Hondu- ras and Japan all became parties this year. There are also a number of regional conventions dealing with radioactive material which are as strict or stricter than the London Dumping Convention. For example, the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention) prohibits all dumping except that of dredge spoil; the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft prohibits essentially all dumping by the Parties in the Mediterranean. The United States is not party to any of these regional dumping agreements. The London Dumping Convention relies primarily upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAHA) in carrying out its responsibilities with respect to the sea disposal of radioactive materials. THE IAEA The London Dumping Convention designates the IAEA as the body to define “high-level radioactive wastes and other matter’? whose dumping at sea is prohibit- 293 ed. The current revised definition of such materials was adopted by the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Convention Parties in 1979. It is a definition based upon radioactivity per unit mass of packaged material. For the dumping of low level radioactive wastes that is permitted under the Convention there is also an extab- lished limit on the total mass of radioactive materials which may be dumped annually at a site and recommended total quantities which may be dumped at each site. There is no limit on the number of sites, although site proliferation has been discouraged. The IAEA is also responsible for providing recommendations to Parties on prac- tices for dumping low level radioactive wastes. These include guidelines on environ- mental evaluation of dumping applications, dumpsite selection, monitoring, assess- ment, packaging of materials, and recordkeeping. The Definition and Recommendations are under continuous review. As part of this effort, several activities are underway, including: (a) a review of the oceanographic model used in formulating the Definition; (b) a review of de minimis levels, to establish criteria for considering materials to be non-radioactive for ocean dumping purposes; (c) initiation of a coordinated research program on transuranic cycling in the marine environment. The IAEA is committed to continuing its responsibilities under the the London Dumping Convention and other conventions. The U.S. strongly supports this role. THE NEA Another international agreement concerning the regulation of ocean disposal of radioactive materials is the Multilateral Consultation and Surveillance Mechanism functioning within the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Established in 1977, this mechanism is charged with setting and reviewing guide- lines, standards, and procedures for the safe disposal of radioactive material at sea. NEA guidelines, which are to take into account the standards of the London Dumping Convention and the IAEA‘s Definition and Recommendations, cover dump sites and packaging and operating procedures relating to sea disposal. They also call for assessment and review of environmental, ecological and radiological protection studies relating to sea disposal activities, and require periodic assessments—at no less than 5 year intervals—of the continued suitability of the selected dump sites. Participating countries that decide to carry out dumping operations must notify the NEA six months before the scheduled date of the operation (twelve months if a new site is proposed). They must include in the notification the composition and charac- teristics of the material, the site and reasons for its selection (including an environ- mental assessment) and the procedures to be followed. These latter must be in accord with NEA standards and recommended practices. In addition, the country of origin must name, or request the appointment of, an Escorting Officer to ensure compliance. The NEA reviews the proposed plans, if necessary seeking the views of outside specialists, and names an NEA representative to observe the operation. The NEA maintains records of disposal operations which, with the approval of the country involved, may be furnished to the Inter-governmental Maritime Consulta- tive organization (IMCO). Twenty-two countries now participate in this NEA Mechanism, and Japan is expected to join soon, now that it has ratified the London Dumping Convention. The U.S., as a member of the NEA, participates in expert group meetings and, as a member of the Steering Committee, reviews all activities relating to the ocean disposal of radioactive material. In actual practice, few of the countries that are parties to the London Dumping Convention or the NEA Mechanism engage in ocean dumping of radioactive materi- als. In 1980, only the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Switzerland disposed of low-level radioactive wastes at sea. The total radioactivity of materials dumped, however, is significant and it increased this year. Adequate protection of the entire marine environment requires that efforts be pursued to increase the effectiveness of the ocean dumping regime established under the London Dumping Convention. Our concerns about the Convention’s effec- tiveness center around several issues: (1) the adequacy of the IAEA Definition and Recommendations; (2) the need for more thorough research on the environmental effects of ocean disposal of low-level radioactive waste; and (3) the urgent need, in our view, for monitoring and assessment of the dump site which is presently in use in the northeast Atlantic Ocean. 204 THE IAEA DEFINITION In our judgment, the IAEA Definition of high-level radioactive material is incom- plete and requires qualitative terms in addition to the present quantitative limita- tions. Under the present Definition, no isotopes or particular types of waste are excluded from consideration for at-sea disposal as long as their concentration is sufficiently low. The U.S. position, reflected in the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, as amended, is more specific about what constitutes high- level wastes. The Act defines high level waste as ‘“‘the aqueous waste resulting from the operation of the final cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated waste from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels, or irradiated fuel from nuclear power reac- tors.” The U.S. definition precludes the dumping of certain substances that might be permitted under the Convention, substances that are often considered to be among the most dangerous and toxic. We also are concerned that the IAEA Definition was based upon assumptions that may be shown to be invalid as our knowledge of marine ecology improves. NEED FOR RESEARCH AND MONITORING We have been frustrated in our attempts to better grapple with the impacts of dumping by the lack of scientific evidence on critical features of the marine envi- ronment and the effects upon it of radioactive materials. There is an acute need for more information on basic biological and physical processes. Moreover, we believe that a more thorough assessment of the sites used for dumping radioactive materials, including the northeast Atlantic site, must be un- dertaken, and a regular monitoring program begun. In this| regard, we are pleased to note that the NEA has accelerated the development of a monitoring program which is expected to come before its Steering Committee for approval in April. We welcome this development. Our concerns are part of the record. We have raised them repeatedly in several poe the NEA; the Consultative Meetings of the London Dumping Convention and the IAEA. The philosophical underpinning for these concerns is the idea that we should take no irreversible actions which might destroy resources for future generations. Mr. Chairman: That summarizes the international rules applicable to the ocean disposal of radioactive materials, as well as our concerns regarding their effective- ness. Now I’d like to address a specific item about which you have asked—H.R. 8119, a bill to require the Secretary of Commerce to undertake a study to determine the effects of past ocean dumping of radioactive wastes. This bill, if broadly interpreted, could be construed to call for a study of the Northeast Atlantic site as well as dump sites used previously by the U.S. Such a study would constitute a valuable addition to the overall body of knowledge on ocean disposal of radioactive materials. Therefore we warmly support its objectives. As noted, there has been progress recently in efforts to encourage a thorough review of the effects of dumping practices at the Northeast Atlantic site. A study such as that called for in H.R. 8119 would be helpful if it effectively complemented, and was carried out in cooperation with, the NEA program. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. That is not very encouraging testimony, in many respects. You do not have to persuade this particular subcommittee of what you call your philosophical underpinning, namely, “that we should take no irreversible actions which might destroy resources for future generations.” That is precisely our concern. As you know, there are some mistakes in dealing with the oceans, that you simply cannot make twice, and that is what we are most concerned about here. Regarding your own concerns about the inadequacy of interna- tional existing arrangements and ways in which they are less satisfactory than our own domestic legislation with respect to ocean dumping, you say at the bottom of page 4 that, “the total radioactivity of materials dumped, however, is significant’’—speak- ing of the Northeast Atlantic at this point—‘‘and it increased this year. 299 What volume has been dumped in that site, and how does it compare with what we know, for example, has been dumped off our own shores? Mr. Brown. Well, I do not know what in fact has been dumped off our own shores, but with respect to—— Mr. Stupps. Neither do we, incidentally. Mr. Brown. So I gather. For example, I have some figures from IMCO that cover 1978, and the totals run upwards of 8,000 metric tons by the four countries named. With a radioactivity level of, I guess it is 43,000 curies, that is beta gamma, you have an alpha count of 1,000 plus, and tritium of 36,000 curies. We could get you a complete—probably a more complete list. It will take some time, because IMCO is the body that keeps the records on this. Mr. Stupps. I am sorry to hear this. I would appreciate that very much, if we could do that for the record. Mr. Brown. I will see what we can get. [The following was received for the record:] TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DUMPED AT THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC SITE FOR THE LAST 3 YEARS 1978 19792 1980 rotalaweieyite(metricntons) esses cee at een ek adn Ree Seater © eee Sl04b: aks eae 8,396 Radioactivity (curies): Betaymammanexcludin atti tile ccc.cxcseeses--ceeeteeeecesereeeetteee meen cere eee AS ON Gs. eee neon 126,279 TURRET acces ease a a a I eat SOS ae me 104,369 AiDiabaee ten ae kere hea TS RIES TAPES VPA ON eRe nec AGRO POS. ee eee 1,868 VACUA csc be a eo eee a A eh eben ae CHO PA gaia es teas 240,912 1Data not yet available. Source: IMCO. TABLE 2.—1978. ORIGIN OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DUMPED AT THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC SITE Radioactivity of wastes—curies Weight— Count fb Beta/G a metric tons ect Tritium Alpha tritium) 1. Joint operation: elgium 1,083 iy i lppcoeenen tiene den a |. sek Netherlands 1,562 1,065 472 5 Switzerland 733 4,072 390 27 PRBGI OITA NaH. Re aes bess, oe A cere ae Be hale, en eens 2,588 660 3,051 255 See UT Ce ere Se a ey Es 2,080 36,607 32,700 814 [LOtal eee eee rsh h meh 14 ted tea Pero eh ALG: eel a 8,046 43,015 36,613 1,101 Source: IMCO. TABLE 3.—1979. ORIGIN OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DUMPED AT THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC SITE Radioactivity of wastes—curies Weight — ——_Beta/Gamma metric tons (excluding Tritium Alpha tritium) Country PRU nited Ninos se cence eects ease bee oe eerie teeecies cece 2,014 40,091 40,991 1,381 Note—data for other countries not yet available. Source: IMCO. 256 TABLE 4.—1980. ORIGIN OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DUMPED AT THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC SITE Radioactivity of wastes—curies Country Beta/gamma (excluding Tritium Alpha tritium) Weight— metric tons 1. Joint operation: Belgium 3,520 18,000 9,000 72 Netherlands 1,880 1,200 200 2 Switzerland ~ 300 1,000 55,000 3 Zc UnitedKKin SOOM «Ses seccctavsstce tevcscateers At back ohn. Stee cee 2,696 106,079 40,169 1,791 [otal eee cae ee ee eet eee ee ee 8,396 126,279 104,369 1,868 Source: IMCO. Mr. Stupps. When you enumerate your principal concerns on page 5, and there are three of them, with respect to the adequacy of the Convention, you begin with your concern regarding the adequacy of the IAEA’s definition of low level waste, and you say that, “the U.S. definition precludes the dumping of certain sub- stances that might be permitted under the Convention, substances that are often considered to be among the most dangerous and toxic.” What do you have in mind there? Mr. Brown. Plutonium, various actinides. Plutonium is very long lived, very toxic. These substances are all the products of reprocess- ing of spent reactor fuel. Mr. Stupps. Those are defined by the Convention as low level? Mr. Brown. In terms of the Convention, you could dump them, if the concentrations were sufficiently low. That is our concern. Mr. Stupps. Does the United States consider them to be high- level wastes, and therefore prohibited? Mr. Brown. Yes, indeed. Mr. Stupps. And not discussable in terms of dumping? Mr. Brown. That is right. Mr. Stupps. Perhaps this is not a fair question to ask of you, but what would be the powerplants of a decommissioned nuclear sub- marine, low level or high level waste? Mr. Brown. I think I would defer to the DOE for that one. Mr. Stupps. I am sure they will defer to somebody else. But we will ask them that. You refer to the need for more thorough research on the environ- mental effects of the ocean disposal of those wastes, and obviously those are concerns that we would address to scientists, who will testify later, and you talk about the monitoring of the dumpsite. At least that implies that there is some, which is more than we could say with respect to the dumpsites off our own shores. Let me ask you, does the London Convention apply to public vessels, vessels owned by the subscribing States? Mr. Brown. Do you mean using those—— Mr. Stupps. Military vessels, for example. Mr. Brown. So far as I know, the London Dumping Convention covers all vessels under the registry of the parties, but let me turn to my lawyer. [Short pause. ] 207 Mr. Brown. No, I stand corrected. It does not cover military vessels. Mr. Stupps. It does not? Mr. Brown. It does not. Mr. Stupps. Again, you are probably not the one to ask, but that leads me to wonder whether our own Ocean Dumping Act applies to our own public vessels. Mr. Brown. Let me again turn to—— Mr. Stupps. That is probably a question, in fairness, to ask EPA. Mr. Brown. We will have to check the records for that. Mr. Stupps. Do not worry about that. That one is not urgent. But if your answer is that the London Convention does not apply to the public vessels of the nation states adhering to the Conven- tion, then is there any legal prohibition on the dumping of radioac- tive wastes by national military forces? Mr. Brown. That, too, I guess we would have to go back to the lawyers on that one. The question has never been posed to us. It is not something that has yet come up. I certainly think—— Mr. Stupps. The military forces are increasingly in possession of these materials, as you understand. Mr. Brown. Our best guess on that one is more than a guess, that if radioactive wastes were dumped from a military vessel, it would not be covered by the London Dumping Convention. That is a possible loophole. Mr. ForsyTHeE. If the gentleman will yield. The point really is not whether it is the vessel. It is military waste dumping on a public vessel, or whatever. So as far as you know, there is no connection between military waste and the Con- vention, I gather. Mr. Brown. I do not—I have read the Convention, and I do not remember that it made a distinction in terms of the source of the wastes. What it does is it simply defines the dilution, if you will, or the radiation of the mass. Mr. ForsytTHE. Because here, our waste problem is about 90 percent military, and if that kind of ratio is worldwide, and it is not covered, we have a real problem. Mr. Stupps. Yes, I do not want to—— Mr. ForsyTHE. Thank you. Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, could I read you the article that covers this, from the Convention? Article VII, paragraph 4 states: This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law. However each Party shall ensure by the adop- tion of appropriate measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention, and shall inform the Organization accordingly. Mr. Stupps. I doubt that there is a lawyer around who could not weasel out of that last proviso. Mr. Brown. I will defer to the lawyers. Mr. Stupps. For example, the U.S. Navy has sunk at least one decommissioned submarine reactor in the ocean, and there is the question of what to do with nuclear powered vessels, in general. Let me allow other members to go on. I am going to have to enforce this strictly, the 5-minute rule, because we have a long day. Mr. Pritchard? 258 Mr. PRITCHARD. Even if the United States does not utilize a seabed to dispose of radioactive waste, other countries may not have a politically acceptable land-based option. Are any countries studying the seabed option? What kinds of coordination are we having, and what kinds of information are we getting from them, if they are studying the option? Can you respond to that? Mr. Brown. There is some international cooperation on sub- seabed disposal that has been organized under the Nuclear Energy Agency, and its Radioactive Waste Management Committee. The United States, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom participate in the seabed working group, which provides a forum for assessment of progress, coordination of cooper- ative cruises and experiments, information exchange, and discus- sion of legal and policy issues. Now, through the seabed working group, the United States and Japan are jointly studying the North Pacific for subseabed disposal. Mr. PRITCHARD. Do you feel that you are getting the information from these countries? Mr. Brown. Yes, we do, sir. Mr. PRITCHARD. I have another question. Are there any plans by the U.S. Government to develop nuclear waste storage facilities in any of the Pacific islands of the trust territories at this time? Mr. Brown. Well, as you are probably aware, sir, we have a joint arrangement with the Japanese to study the feasibility of using a Pacific island as a possible site for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. There was an agreement for such a joint study signed in Tokyo last July, July 18. There was a recent meeting, just last week, in fact, of the steering committee, which is made up of my boss, Ambassador Pickering, and counterparts on the Japanese side, together with several other technical people, and a work plan was agreed to. The work will begin on the first of January. It is a 2-year feasibility study. There are no plans at the moment to build such a facility in the Pacific. But the United States and the Japanese are looking at the feasibility of such a storage site. Mr. PRITCHARD. Would you have to come back to Congress to get authorization to go ahead with the building? Mr. Brown. Absolutely. Mr. PritcHARD. I think Mr. Akaka will probably be interested in this. All right. Thank you. I know we have a lot of members here who also have questions. Mr. Stupps. Ms. Mikulski? Ms. MIiKuLsk1. I just have a few questions, Mr. Brown, and I would like to compliment you on the philosophical underpinning which you so clearly stated on page 6. My question, one on page 2, you related that we are not involved in these regional conventions in the Mediterranean and so on. Could you tell me, briefly, why is it that we want to leave ourselves with more flexibility and certain loopholes because the London Convention is broader? Mr. Brown. Such regional conventions reflect common geograph- ic concerns. Membership is generally limited to countries in the 259 area. Therefore, the United States is not eligible to join many such groupings. The Baltic Sea is a long way from the United States, as indeed is the Mediterranean. Ms. Mikutsxki. Can you tell me, in your work in the State De- partment, is there any level of sentiment, or the level of sentiment for banning ocean dumping totally, regardless of level? Mr. Brown. Well, I guess the short answer is that the sentiment is expressed by the fact that we do not any longer do ocean dump- ing. I make a distinction here between ocean dumping and the examination of subseabed disposal, which may or may not be ocean dumping, depending on how you define it, but the short answer is that some such sentiment exists. Ms. Mikutski. Around the world? Mr. Brown. Well, only 4 countries of the 47 who are members of the London Dumping Convention are dumping, and you can imag- ine why: Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. They are all small countries, they are all countries with nuclear power programs, fairly active nuclear medical programs and the like, and land-based dump sites are very hard to find in those heavily populated countries. Ms. Mixutsk1. Is there any evidence that there is illegal dump- ing going on, for example, here in the United States, in terms of land-based disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes, as I am sure you are aware of from newspaper accounts, and others, that there is illegal dumping that goes on. Some guy thinks he is dumping molasses some place, and it is PCB. I wonder, as our country monitors, and looks at these things, is there any evidence of illegal dumping? Mr. Brown. None that has come to my attention, and one reason why I think it would be perhaps a little more difficult is the very danger of the substances themselves. They are radioactive, which means that they must be specially packaged, or the guys who dump them are going to suffer. It is not a question of just dumping the stuff in a drum, and rolling it off the pier. But we do not have—at least I have not seen—any evidence of illegal dumping. Ms. Mixutski. The third question, and then my final one, be- cause I know we have to move on. The way this is dumped in place, of course, it must be shipped. I will be asking EPA about the nature of the containers. But do we have very strict provisions on the safety of the vessels carrying these materials around the world, so that you say, al- though this is a safe spot, it has to travel through a whole lot of ocean to get to the alleged safe spot. Do we have very strict guerialems on containers, on the types of vessels shipping them, et cetera’! Mr. Brown. Well, the Nuclear Energy Agency at OECD is re- sponsible for setting up the procedures in accordance with IAKA recommendations. I am not personally familiar with those, but it may be that one of your other witnesses, either in EPA, or NOAA, would have better knowledge of the technical characteristics of what is required of the ships than I would. Ms. Mrikutsk1. Thank you. As a daughter of Madam Curie, who wonders what she did to Mother Earth, when they invented this stuff to start the whole 260 thing off, I appreciate your concerns about the oceans. Because if Mother Earth were here she would have a lot tougher questions to ask, and I think that is what we have to think about. What have we done for our mother? Mr. Stupps. Do you want to follow that, Mr. Forsythe? Mr. ForsyTHE. Thank you. Mr. Brown, in regards to the London Convention, and the IAEA, you said that 47 nations are signatories to the London Convention. How about other nuclear nations, other than the Western nations, U.S.S.R., China, India? Mr. BROWN. Well, I will submit for the record, with the Chair- man’s permission, the parties as of November 1980, but let me just say that most of the major nuclear nations are members of the Dumping Convention, but there are a few key holdouts. Korea is one. Iraq and Iran are not parties. India and Pakistan are not parties. Brazil is not a party, nor is Taiwan. Mr. ForsyTHE. Thank you. I think it would be good to have that in the record. I appremale it. Mr. Brown. Yes, sir. [The following was received for the record:] List OF PARTIES TO THE LONDON DUMPING CONVENTION AS OF NOVEMBER 1980 Date of entry into force} NP OMANI STAIN IE: 0 20sc Sit LIE SP en SIE Aug. 30, 1975. PAP OOM A Ws 2. 5500sccpaets 2st xathacseap «des Monee atevyeveees Oct. 12, 1979. By@lOrisstan SSRs... f...+s+-kepgcbannpote hone leetoxasan Feb. 28, 1976. (OVC Is Hake Rie te ae LRM a | SEA aE ee Dec. 14, 1975. GaperV erde sista... 22hi..ccstassecterinc wotote aoa June 25, 1977. Ciitle:..23 ae etosirie . bicleisen goer Bad Sept. 3, 1977. (O19 | OLE eee & bles ~etentetetets HM Sy < olibetd Jan. 1, 1976. Denmark’. .S cheese titre sce ae hea Aug. 30, 1975. Dominican Republiok:....27.8..2824.4....8688 Aug. 30, 1975. Finland sie ii AS AD BOR a FR. June 2, 1979. FSCO tet ek, eee eater tors, eh oe Mar. 16, 1977. German Democratic Republic ..... Sept. 19, 1976. Germany, Federal Republic of.... Dec. 8, 1977. Guatemala...oN7 Sateeats trekkers Aug. 30, 1975. Hat Gi apcects Ti ES ish ee. bp eehs.c Se Sept. oT, 1975. ONG aS hess hae See. ate: eee June 1, 1980. lnitielgcia' en en a ae Mar. 6, 1976. 1 Rotel Woe BE AS Ee Bie, Cai ok ge eet ee 9 2 ee eS Oe Aug. 30, 1975. JAPAN. 23... acres ee en ee ie Nov. 14, 1980. JORG AM cx. osc S bis ap eet aces ee heck cer, Aug. 30, 1975. Kenya sett. «0: ttertan, eck tania de teeta es. cre: Jan. 16, 1976. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya................::::e0000 Dec. 22, 1976. IMOXICO AEA ER SS. Rescthoe edness: See ee tee shoots Aug. 30, 1975. Monaco ttt. ce te...2e ee FOIR...S June 15, 1977. Moraceahs Sa tee AS vo ites, ae PUES sade Mar. 20, 1977. Netherlands’. hs.) Grecsaisec tee ore I Jan. 2, 1978. INewiZeallan diester cciaatce & cacti Aug. 30, 1975. INIB EPI a Sti. ci tees. .edto. teehee hoo eat totes Apr. 18, 1976. NOnway 22.28 SR ee Sek. BREE Aug. 30, 1975. Panama oe Os le ee Aug. 30, 1975. PapuaiNew; Guinea.....csisc..-.fsccsscsscchcesesaotaee Apr. 9, 1980. PH ppINES:, 022.2 Bee eee eee Aug. 30, 1975. POL ATGREE. Stereo cnc atc ave. t ATE. eles Feb. 22, 1979. Portia ir. cAsvaccsssstresstactetnatt ott ET May 14, 1979. South Africayt7..22201 JRIAO As Le Sept. 6, 1978. Spain secs ge. eres bce ee ce een cy Aug. 30, 1975. Suriname Sweden 247..21688..06.. 5, SU Aug. 30; 1975. 261 OVATION AI bcccsice sc sceu tes tars Crosses cengacecees suonisescvdupecs Aug. 30, 1979. EWU RITSTE och aR eal er ei i i a May 13, 1976. Ret ATIP SSE «..sco-srce. stesso sees tevtestacescetancts Mar. 6, 1976. United Arab Emirates .............cccccccsesscseseeees Aug. 30, 1975. TUES ORR pessces sesecsrere cake fos beazieuvon Sicasepes «sss tioceecavas Jan. 14, 1976. United Kingdom Dec. 17, 1975. United States............... Aug. 30, 1975. Yugoslavia..............0 July 25, 1976. VPI Se gee ero boca rotertre Oct. 16, 1975. 1 Under Article XIX the Convention enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of a Party’s instrument of ratification or accession. 2 The precise date will depend upon the date of the earliest deposit of Suriname’s instrument of ratification with one of the four depositories (Mexico, U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.). Mr. ForsytTHE. Going on to an item that you have already al- luded to in your testimony, this question of definition, and you mentioned that you differentiated between waste, the disposal and subseabed emplacement. Do you really have much knowledge of where that is heading, as to whether you believe that a subseabed emplacement should come under the convention, and should be regulated the same as a disposal? Mr. Brown. I was not making a judgment as to whether it should or should not be. The fact is that subseabed emplacement wasn’t really considered when the convention was negotiated. I do not think people thought—— Mr. Forsytue. I recognize that, and I am not challenging as to whether or not you are making a judgment. It seems to me that at this point in time it is being discussed, and therefore should—I would believe, clearly come under the same international convention. Mr. Brown. There is certainly a good case to be made for it. Mr. ForsytuHeE. Is the United States pursuing that line of the—— Mr. Brown. Not at the moment, because we really do not even know whether it is technically feasible to do, and an awful lot of research is going to have to be done, and it is research that is not terribly easy to do. We are dealing with deep waters, and deep sediments, and the like, but it is—— Mr. ForsyTHeE. Do you not think we should get it under, even though we do not know how we are going to regulate it, before we suddenly find, somebody has got a bright idea, and away we go? Mr. Brown. Well, I think the point is well taken. I think per- haps what we need to do is to—is to raise this, both within the Government, that is our own Government, certainly with the scien- tific community, and the parties to the convention; see what—how other people think about it, what the sentiment is, is there suffi- cient reason to think that—— Mr. ForsyTueE. If it is going to happen, regardless, if there is that potential, it seems to me that the International Regulatory Agency ought to be right up front. Mr. Brown. If you are certain that you know what you are regulating. I think that is probably the basic problem. Mr. ForsyTHE. Yes. Mr. Brown. I am not sure we even know. Mr. ForsytHE. If not, see that that whole area is forcefully put forward, because that, of course, is a trap that Ms. Mikulski was 262 referring to. We did not know what we were doing, and now, 50 years later, we found that we have messes that are terribly unfor- tunate. It is hopeful, that as far as radioactive material is concerned, we were aware from the beginning that there was a major problem. This is no time to back off, because we are desperately searching for newer and better and safe disposal methods. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Anderson? Mr. ANpeErRSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your endorsement of my bill, H.R. 8119. When the State Department warmly supports one of my bills, it is kind of a surprise, and I want to thank you for it. You did put a condition, you said, to the bill, if broadly interpret- ed could be construed to call for a study of the Northeast Atlantic site, and that part I would like to clarify a little bit. The bill actually says, for the purposes of carrying out the study required under paragraph 1, the Secretary of, that is Commerce, shall locate and survey those sites within ocean waters at which radioactive wastes were destroyed during the period concerned, and that where less than 6,000 feet in depth, or used for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste, regardless of depth. I do not see how you could say that it does not directly have a study of that, and if there is any question in that, I would like to have some help from your Department in tightening it up, because the purpose of the bill is to get at the site, such as the Northeast Atlantic site, and everything else. Mr. Brown. Well, Congressman, I suspect this is lawyerly lan- guage inserted by the drafters of my statement. We certainly will look at it. If there is a problem, I am sure that it is just the wording of a phrase, or something, so that we want to be sure that the Northeast Atlantic dumpsite is included, that is the one that concerns us all, and not just the ones within our territorial waters, or within 200 miles of the U.S. coast. Mr. ANDERSON. I understand I will be on testifying in a few minutes, and my testimony, for the most part, comes from the Pacific Ocean, from the dumpsite that is, I think 40 miles, AEC dumpsite 40 miles off of San Francisco, and we have reports of dumping maybe 15 or 20 miles, so we are concerned with both oceans, but my bill definitely was not intended to cover the North- east Atlantic site. Mr. Brown. If our lawyers have any problems with the specific wording of the bill, we will get back to you. Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. It does not mean New England. It means England. We are the Northwest Atlantic. How far off the coast of which European country is the European site? Mr. Brown. It is about 700 kilometers off of England. Mr. ANDERSON. We are talking about a safe site off England, 700 kilometers. Mr. Stupps. Right. Mr. Carney? Mr. Carney. I would like to ask a question of the Chairman. 263 Was that disposal of the nuclear submarine accidental, or done purposely? Mr. Stupps. No, it was a matter of policy. Mr. Carney. I see. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. The reactor was successfully sunk. Mr. CARNEY. We successfully sunk one of our own. Mr. Stupps. And they have attempted, subsequently, to find it, and they cannot. Mr. CarRNEY. How many dumpsites do we have within our terri- torial waters? Mr. Stupps. Are you asking me? Mr. CARNEY. No, I looked your way. I was kind of smiling at you, the way you answered the first question, but I was addressing the witness, Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown. At the moment, we have no dumpsites within our waters, except the ones that seem to be—that Congressman Ander- son referred to. There may be some that are within 12 miles, but most of them are 40, 50, 60 miles offshore, and most of them we seem to have lost track of. If you go back to the fifties and sixties, when we were doing some dumping, the records are adequate, you can answer your ques- tion—— Mr. Stupps. Let me encourage you not to ask the Department of State what occurs within our territorial waters. Mr. Carney. All I am trying to do is get a handle on the total amount of radioactive material that has been dumped in the oceans to this date. I do not know if Mr. Brown is the witness to ask that question of. I perhaps should have saved that for our next panel of witnesses. Mr. Brown. I think I might defer to them. Mr. CarRNEY. You had mentioned various dumpsites, and I was wondering offhand if you had known that. I think my line of questioning would be best to ask of the next panel, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Akaka? Mr. Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we have been eagerly awaiting the opportunity to hear what this Nation is doing to research the disposal of nuclear waste in the ocean, and as a representative of Hawaii, I am deeply disturbed by the possible effects of radioactive waste in the oceans. I also speak for the people of the Pacific, as we all know, the effects of nuclear energy is not new to the islands of the Pacific. We have received reports, from time to time, that some are taking place, with low-level material around the Pacific area, areas can be named, but it is disturbing to the communities of the Pacific, because many of the people there depend on the ocean for their livelihood, for their food, and we are very concerned that this might be affecting the lives of the people in the Pacific, and there- fore we look at our Nation, and wonder, in case of Japan’s recent announcement to drop 10,000 barrels of low-level waste in an area about 600 miles north of Guam, and my question to you is, what has been the response of the the United States to these plans that Japan has? 264 Mr. Brown. Well, let me answer first by saying that we do not encourage anybody to dump low-level waste in the Pacific, the Atlantic, or any other ocean. On the other hand, Japan, as a member of the London Dumping Convention, has made very clear that it will abide by all of the procedures and recommendations, the guidelines of the London Dumping Convention, and of the [IAEA.] There is, therefore, no international law we can cite to prevent Japan from carrying out this dumping under the convention, which permits it. Mr. Axaka. Has the United States been in contact with Pacific Island Nations regarding nuclear waste disposal? Mr. Brown. Yes, indeed, we have. I might add, the Japanese have, as well. Our consultations with the various Pacific nations have been primarily on this other activ- ity that I mentioned earlier, that is the Pacific Basin joint spent fuel feasibility study for land-based, that is surface, disposal, inter- im storage of spent reactor fuel. That would not be underwater. That would be on an island, if it turns out to be feasible. We have discussed that 2-year study with, virtually all of the Pacific Basin countries, including with the Government of Hawaii. Mr. AKaAka. Besides Japan, are there other countries in the Pacific Basin, bordering the Pacific Ocean, that are studying, or contemplating ocean disposal of radioactive waste? Mr. Brown. Not that we are aware of. But I do note that neither Korea, nor the government on Taiwan, are parties to the conven- tion, and yet they are both quite active in the nuclear field; they both have active nuclear power programs. So they must at least have considered it, although, to our knowledge, none has occurred except for one case. The Koreans did admit to dumping a few barrels off the Korean coast on a trial basis sometime ago, of low- level wastes, but we have no evidence of organized dumping efforts. Mr. AKAKA. What about the Philippines? Mr. Brown. Not to my knowledge, sir. Mr. AKAKaA. You said earlier that plutonium is within the defini- tion of low-level waste convention. Will plutonium be dumped by the Japanese within the next year? Mr. Brown. I do not know that we know what the composition of pire Japanese material will be, although we could probably ask them. Mr. AKAKA. Thank you very much. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. Let me ask you two quick questions for the record, if I may. With regard to the situation in the Northeast Atlantic dumping site, can you assure us, one way or the other, as to the European reaction to U.S. studies and monitoring of that dumping. Would that “2 looked upon favorably by the European parties to that action? Mr. Brown. If we just did it unilaterally? Mr. Stupps. Or would we be able to secure their cooperation? Is it something that they would look upon favorably? Mr. Brown. We would hope to do it in collaboration with the Nuclear Energy Agency. They have said they will undertake this monitoring effort and, in April, we would hope to put it together. 265 Mr. Stupps. Most of the questions to you have concerned, in one way or another, the question of low level waste. With respect to the possible future subseabed emplacement of high-level waste, does the United States believe that that is prohib- ited by the London Dumping Convention? Mr. Brown. The Legal Adviser’s Office has advised us that high level radioactive waste could not, under the present circumstances as we understand them, be emplaced in the seabed consistent with our obligations under the London Dumping Convention. The legal question of the scope of the convention has not been fully resolved in reaching this conclusion. Until seabed emplace- ment is studied further, we must assume that it cannot be under- taken without significant risk to the marine environment. Therefore, under any reasonable interpretation of the conven- tion, this activity would now fall within the scope of the conven- tion. Mr. Stupps. But that is the U.S. position. Have other nations signatory to the convention stated their views on that question? Mr. Brown. We are not aware of any. Mr. Stupps. So it may well be an open question in the minds of other countries? Mr. Brown. It may well be. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much. Did you wish to add to that? Mr. Brown. No. Mr. Stupps. All right, thank you. I must inform the next witness that he is not who he thinks he is. Prior to our going to the Department of Energy, we have a request from a member of this committee to present some testimo- ny, and the Chair will call on Congressman Anderson of California. STATEMENT OF HON. GLENN M. ANDERSON, A REPRESENTA- TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be assisted in my presentation by John Cullather of the committee staff. I would like to thank the distinguished subcommittee chairman. Perhaps we better wait until—— pelts Stupps. It is a vote, but we can proceed for 5 minutes, if you ike. Mr. ANDERSON. It will take a little over that but I will go ahead and go as far as I can. I would like to thank the distinguished subcommittee chairman for the opportunity to testify on the present problems that have resulted from ocean disposal of radioactive nuclear materials. As most of us in this room today are aware of the present crisis at the Love Canal chemical disposal site and the many others across this country, we too should be made aware of the dangers of the hap- hazard practices of disposing of nuclear wastes in our ocean envi- ronment. It is for this purpose that I introduced H.R. 8119 to provide for a through study to determine the effects of certain past ocean dump- ing of radioactive wastes in our marine environment. When Dr. William Rowe, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Pro- grams in EPA, testified before this subcommittee in 1978, he stated 266 their research has tried to determine the fate of the radioactive waste packages dumped by the United States under the Atomic ean Commission (AEC) licensing authority between 1946 and EPA has never adequately answered this question. First, let us destroy the myth that the only materials the United States dumped in the ocean were low-level radioactive wastes. EPA uses the Ocean Dumping Act definition of high-level radioactive waste to refute any assertions that high-level materials were dumped in the ocean. This is not a quantitative definition. According to EPA officials you could have a gallon of waste from a nuclear reprocessing facility and a gallon of waste from Berkeley Laboratory, they could be identical in content and radiation emissions, equally deadly, but because the first came from a reprocessing facility it would be defined as high level and because the second gallon came from a laboratory it would be low level. Therefore, to get a more representative view of the danger these materials may present, let us use an Atomic Energy Commission definition from their 1955 declassified report on Radioactive Waste Disposal Practices in the Atomic Energy Industry. This report de- fines 50 millirems or less per hour as low level, and 2 rems or more per hour as high level. The licenses issued to the disposal companies stated that: The radiation level at any accessible surface of the container shall not exceed 200 millirems per hour. So immediately we find that at the exterior surface of the drum a person or marine life form may be exposed to intermediate radiation. Next we must examine the types of packaging used to keep the exterior radiation exposures below this 200 millirem requirement. An even more detailed example was given in the declassified 1955 AEC report which described the procedures used by the Wes- tinghouse Atomic Power Division—Bettis Field facility in Pitts- burgh, Pa., to dispose of their wastes, and it stated: High level solid wastes are accumulated in specially prepared 55 gallon drums. Sheet metal cylinders four inches in diameter having peripheral lead shields of varying thicknesses (1 inch to 4 inches) are set in 55 gallon drums. Concrete is poured around the shielded cylinder up to its top which is about 12 inches below the top of the drum * * *. Operating personnel insert high level wastes as they are created * * *. After each drum receives its charge of high level waste, a lead plug is inserted into the four inch cylinder prior to removal from the working areas. These drums are then moved to the processing area where they are filled to the top of the drum with concrete. Drums containing high level wastes make up the largest proportion of waste packages shipped from Bettis * * *. Wastes are shipped via a commercial trucking company to the Navy dock at Earle, New Jersey. This was the Navy’s embarcation location for radioactive materi- als to be dumped at sea. In 1955 alone, Bettis Field packaged 740 high- level drums for ocean disposal. Similar procedures were fol- lowed by the Brookhaven National Laboratory for the disposal of their high-level nuclear waste material. What we must look at here is not the external radiation levels— but the internal radiation levels—which will threaten the marine environment when the containers are crushed and EPA studies have found 25 percent of the containers have been visibly crushed. According to the Congressional Research Service, 6 to 8 inches of concrete can decrease the radiation emissions by a factor of 10, and 267 the lead insulation may also reduce the internal radiation emis- sions by a factor of 10. So the internal radiation levels may be much higher than the 200 millirem external radiation. Possibly between 2 and 20 rems per hour. As a comparison, the NRC only allows workers in an atomic energy plant to be exposed to 5 rems per year. I mentioned before 2 to 20 rems per hour. We are talking about the NRC of 5 rems per year. One can only speculate about the danger posed by the drums which an AEC inspector found on a ship which measured over 1,500 millirems on the outside of the drum. These high-level drums originated at Livermore Laborato- ries. This brings us to the mysterious concrete forms which were used to dispose of large radioactive materials. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Anderson, if you will suspend now, we have the second bells for a vote, and the subcommittee will stand adjourned for 10 minutes. We will be right back. [Short recess. ] Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will come to order. Mr. ANDERSON. In my remarks I made the comment that we must not look at the external but the internal radiations, and we will. I pointed out that 25 percent of the containers had been, according to EPA studies, had been visibly crushed, and I compared then the internal radiation level may be much higher than the 200 millirem, probably between 2 and 20 rems per hour, as compared to the NRC which allows workers in an atomic energy plant to be exposed to 5 rems per year. One could only speculate to the danger posed by the drums which an AEC inspector found on a ship which measured over 1,500 millirems on the outside of the drum. These high-level drums originated at Livermore Laboratories. This brings us to the mysterious concrete forms which were used to dispose of large radioactive materials. I have here diagram D-0048 illustrates one such concrete struc- ture. Inside lies a beryllium nuclear warhead, for which the dispos- al company said “Considerable risk would be involved in cutting the cone to fit regular barrels.” Drawing D-0045 shows us the “High Level Configuration of a Solidified Liquid Drum Block.” As you can see from this illustra- tion, the high-level drum is located closer to the center of the block to provide additional concrete insulation. Again concrete insulation can decrease the radiation emissions from over 2 rems internally, to under 200 millirems externally. And, finally, in drawings D-0049 and D-0042, can you show both at the same time? We will ee D-0049 first and then D-0042. You can hold them both up there. We have two more specially designed ‘“‘high level” waste contain- ers, with between 10 and 8 inches of steel and concrete insulation to reduce the high internal radiation levels. To my knowledge, the EPA has never seen, let alone examined, one of these structures which weigh at least 10 tons each. EPA may say if high-level drums were present it would have been noticed in their samples. Which leads us to the crux of the whole issue—just how representative of all the wastes dropped were the few drums which EPA examined. There were over 48,000 radioactive waste containers dumped in the Pacific Ocean, EPA 69-848 O - 81 - 18 268 saw approximately 200, and examined the sediment around even fewer. There is no way you can tell from the outside of a 55-gallon drum its internal configuration and whether it has a lead shielded canister of high level waste on the outside. And, as I said before, EPA has not looked at the concrete forms, some of which had recorded external emissions of 1,000 millirems per hour or con- tained 1,000 curies of radioactive material, or the high level waste containers. One reason their samples may not be representative is the EPA expeditions never look in the right place. Chart 18645 is an oceano- graphic map of the Farallon Island region. And point C is the location where EPA has done their research for the 6,000 foot dumpsite, and where they maintain that over 44,000 containers were disposed. Then we must look at the areas where the three AEC licensees were allowed to dump their nuclear waste material. The square area illustrated by dashes is the dumpsite in which the Nuclear Engineering Co. was allowed to dispose of their waste under their license issued October 22, 1958. Note that the EPA site is not located inside this licensed area, and 5% miles from the center of the dumpsite, point D is the disposal site in which the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, the Ocean Transport Co., and later the Nuclear Engineering Co. used as center for their dumping operations in 1950 and 1960. They were required to unload the nuclear waste material within 5 miles of this point, which is the 78 square mile circle drawn on the map. As you can see, the area which EPA examined is not in the dump zone, and is 7 miles from the central dump coordinate. The Nuclear Engineering Co.’s license was later amended to require them to dump in the trapezoidal area marked on the map as a “Chemical Munitions Dumping Area.” On April 8, 1962, at the request of the State of California, the AEC changed the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory dumpsite to this same trapezoidal area. Again, we can see that the area in which EPA explored is not in the dumpsite, and is over 6 miles from the center of the dump- site. So the question remains, do the few drums EPA examined truly represent all the drums since their tests were conducted outside these licensed dumpsites, and failed to include the high level waste concrete blocks and drums. Which brings us to the military, probably the single largest nuclear waste dumper in the country. Only a portion of the military’s disposal operations even came under the purview of the AEC. Any wastes generated from oper- ations which are exempt from the Commission’s regulatory author- ity under section 91(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, are also exempt from the Commission’s safeguards provided that the waste remains in the possession of the military until the ultimate disposal. The Army shipped all of its waste material originating west of the Mississippi River to the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. According to their standard operating procedures manual, the ma- terial was then shipped to the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, in San Francisco, which performs their ultimate dis- posal. The wastes were much more hazardous than we have been 269 led to believe, and possibly more hazardous since they were not solely from the Navy’s laboratory experiments. But I am not sure anyone really knows what types of deadly radioactive materials were disposed of in this manner. How much waste was disposed of in the Pacific? I am not sure anyone knows. The Air Force did not know their quantities, a 1957 Atomic Energy Commission report—WASH-734—states that ‘‘the estimated curie content could be off as much as a factor of 10.” And under the curie content column of some of the company terminal manifests we have reviewed, are nothing but question marks. There are many unknowns. This is why I introduced H.R. 8119. We need a comprehensive fish monitoring program to insure that these deadly wastes do not make their way back to the human food chain through the fish. But, in order to fully protect those of us who like to eat fish, it is necessary to determine where exactly the wastes are located, their concentration, and if the area being moni- tored adequately represents all the waste dumpsites. If we were to implement such a monitoring program based upon the research EPA has conducted to date, we would have no assur- ances that in 20 years a disposal site, would not be causing cancer among those individuals who eat fish caught in this region. We could have a marine “Love Canal.” In my view, we must insure for future generations that the practices of handling these volatile materials does not adversely affect the health and welfare of this and future generations. Ladies and gentlemen, I submit the other alternative is much too high a price for the human race to afford. To dispel any further notions that these drums were disposed of in the safest possible manner, I would like to read a section from the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory’s application for renew- al of their nuclear waste disposal license. It summarizes the kind of care given to these drums. “After each dump, a thorough inspec- tion is made of the dump area to ascertain that all containers have sunk. In the rare event of a floating radioactive waste container, it is sunk by gunfire.” So much for care in handling and making sure these wastes did not float ashore. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time and, of course, we have the things to back up the statements that I have made here today, quoted out of various official documents. [The following was received for the record:] TESTIMONY BY CONGRESSMAN GLENN M. ANDERSON I would like to thank the distinguished Subcommittee Chairman for the opportu- nity to testify on the present problems that have resulted from ocean disposal of radioactive nuclear waste. As most of us in this room today are aware of the present crisis at the Love Canal chemical waste disposal site and the many others across this country, we too should be made aware of the dangers of the haphazard prac- tices of disposing of nuclear wastes in our ocean environment. It is for this purpose that I introduced H.R. 8119 to provide for a thorough study to determine the effects of certain past ocean dumping of radioactive wastes in our ocean environment. As a Member of the full Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com- mittee, and former member of this subcommittee, I feel the time is now to deter- mine the extent to which this practice took place, and the adverse impact it may have on the marine and human environment. 270 When Dr. William Rowe, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Programs in EPA, testified before this Subcommittee in 1978, he stated their research has tried to answer two basic questions: One: Does the technology exist to precisely survey or monitor a deep ocean site to detect possible releases and movement of radioactive materials? and; Two: What was the fate of the radioactive waste packages dumped by the United States under the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) licensing authority between 1946 and 1970? EPA has never adequately answered this question. First, let’s destroy the myth that the only materials the U.S. dumped in the ocean were “low level” radioactive wastes. EPA uses the Ocean Dumping Act definition of “high level radioactive waste’ to refute any assertions that high level materials were dumped in the ocean. This definition states: “High-level radioactive waste’? means the aqueous waste resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equiva- lent and the concentrated waste from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels, or irradiated fuel from nuclear power reactors. This is not a quantitative definition. According to EPA officials you could have a gallon of waste from a nuclear reprocessing facility and a gallon of waste from Berkeley Laboratory, they could be identical in content and radiation emissions, equally deadly, but because the first came from a reprocessing facility it would be defined as “high level’’ and because the second gallon came from a laboratory it would be “low level’”’. Therefore, to get a more representative view of the danger these materials may present, let’s use an Atomic Energy Commission definition from their 1955 declassi- fied report on “Radioactive Waste Disposal Practices in the Atomic Energy Indus- try.” This report defines 50 millirems or less per hour as “low level,’ and two rems or more per hour as “high level.” By inference, this leaves the spread between 50 millirems and 1999 millirems as “intermediate.” The licenses issued to the disposal companies stated that: “The radiation level at any accessible surface of the container shall not exceed 200 millirems per hour.” So immediately we find that at the exterior surface of the drum a person or marine life form may be exposed to intermediate radiation. Next we must examine the types of packaging used to keep the exterior radiation exposures below this 200 millirem requirement. Testimony by John A. Kaufman, a Professor at the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1958, described the methods they used to dispose of all their nuclear wastes—both high and low. He states: “All nongaseous waste is packaged in concrete. .. The concrete packages are made so they can be stored safely for an indefinite period and eventually be safely transported by truck to a barge for disposal at sea at a depth of 1000 fathoms (6000 feet) . . . The solid wastes from high-level operations are discharged into shielded waste containers.’’ At the waste processing area the waste container is placed “into a specially designed concrete block for sea disposal.” The report goes on to say that “High level large-volume aqueous wastes produced during high-level chemistry work ...are discharged into specially designed and_ shielded waste containers . . . The wastes are then solidified either in the waste container or in a specially-constructed concrete block.” An even more detailed example was given in the declassified 1955 AEC report which described the procedures used by the Westinghouse Atomic Power Division— Bettis Field facility in Pittsburgh, Pa., to dispose of their wastes. “High level solid wastes are accumulated in specially prepared 55 gallon drums. Sheet metal cylinders four inches in diameter having peripheral lead shields of varying thicknesses (1 inch to 4 inches) are set in 55 gallon drums. Concrete is poured around the shielded cylinder up to its top which is about 12 inches below the top of the drum . . . Operating personnel insert high level wastes as they are created. . . . After each drum receives its’ charge of high level waste, a lead plug is inserted into the four inch cylinder prior to removal from the working areas. These drums are then moved to the processing area where they are filled to the top of the drum with concrete. Drums containing high level wastes make up the largest proportion of waste packages shipped from Bettis. .. . Wastes are shipped via a commercial trucking company to the Navy dock at Earle, New Jersey.” This was the Navy’s embarcation location for radioactive materials to be dumped at sea. In 1955 alone Bettis Field packaged 740 high level drums for ocean disposal. Similar procedures were followed by the Brookhaven National Laboratory for the disposal of their ‘‘high level’’ nuclear waste material. What we must look at here is not the external radiation levels—but the internal radiation levels—which will threaten the marine environment when the containers 271 are crushed—and photographs taken by EPA show a significant number have been, presumably due to defective packaging—by the over 3,000 pounds per square inch of water pressure at the disposal site, or the deterioration resulting from a combina- tion of sea water, pressure, and the passage of years. According to the Congressional Research Service 6 to 8 inches of concrete can decrease the radiation emissions by a factor of ten, and the lead insulation may also reduce the internal radiation emis- sions by a factor of ten. So the internal radiation levels may be much higher than the 200 millirem external radiation. Possibly between 2 and 20 rems per hour. As a comparison the NRC only allows workers in an Atomic Energy Plant to be exposed to 5 rems per year. This is material which meets the AEC definition of “high level” materials. One can only speculate about the danger posed by the drums which an AEC inspector found on a ship which measured over 1500 millirems on the outside of the drum. These high level drums originated at Livermore Laboratories. This brings us to the mysterious concrete forms which were used to dispose of large radioactive materials. Other than referring to ‘experimental matrices” in their report to this Subcommittee in 1978, EPA has never given us any information about their content or potential danger to the marine environment. I have here drawings which I understand were made by Livermore Laboratories for the compa- nies who disposed of their waste material. Diagram D-0048 illustrates one such concrete structure. Inside lies a beryllium nuclear warhead, for which the disposal company said “Considerable risk would be involved in cutting the cone to fit regular barrels.” Drawing D-0045 shows us the “High Level Configuration of a Solidified Liquid Drum Block.” As you can see from this illustration the “High Level” drum is located closer to the center of the block to provide additional concrete insulation. Again, concrete insulation can decrease the radiation emissions over from over two rems internally, to under 200 millirems externally. And finally in Drawings D-0049 and D-0042 we have two more specially designed “High Level” waste containers, with between 10 and 8 inches of steel and concrete insulation to reduce the high internal radiation levels. To my knowledge the EPA has never seen, let alone examined one of these structures which weigh at least 10 tons each. EPA may say if “high level’? drums were present it would have been noticed in their samples. Which leads us to the crux of the whole issue—just how representa- tive of all the wastes dropped were the few drums which EPA examined. There were over 48,000 radioactive waste containers dumped in the Pacific Ocean, EPA saw approximately 200, and examined the sediment around even fewer. There is no way you can tell from the outside of a 55 gallon drum its’ internal configuration and whether it has a lead shielded canister of high level waste on the outside. And as I said before, EPA has not looked at the concrete forms, some of which had recorded external emissions of 1500 millirems per hour or contained 1,000 curies of radioac- tive material, or the “High Level’ waste containers. One reason their samples may not be representative is the EPA expeditions never look in the right place. Chart 18645 is an Oceanographic map of the Farallon Island region. Location A on the map is the approximate location of the 150 drums of radioactive material which were dumped in three barge trips. Location B is the 3,000 foot dumpsite where EPA has done exploratory work. According to EPA there are 3600 drums at this site. And point C is the location where EPA has done their research for the 6,000 foot dumpsite, and where they maintain that over 44,000 containers were disposed. Then we must look at the areas which the AEC licensees were allowed to dump their nuclear waste material. The square area illustrated by dashes is the dumpsite in which the Nuclear Engineering Company was allowed to dispose of their waste under their license issued October 22, 1958. Note that the EPA site is not located inside this licensed area, and 5% miles from the center of the dumpsite. Point D is the disposal site in which the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, the Ocean Transport Company, and later the Nuclear Engineering Company used as center for their dumping operations in 1959 and 1960. They were required to unload the nuclear waste material within five miles of this point, which is the 78 square mile circle drawn on the map. As you can see the area which EPA examined is not in the dump zone, and is seven miles from the central dump coordinate. The Nuclear Engineering Company’s license was later amended to require them to dump in the trapezoidal area marked on the map as a “Chemical Munitions Dumping Area.” On April 9, 1962, at the request of the State of California, the AEC changed the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory dumpsite to this same trapezoi- dal area. Again, we can see that the area in which EPA explored is not in the dumpsite, and is over 6 miles from the center of the dumpsite. So the question remains, do the few drums EPA examined truly represent all the drums since their 272 tests were conducted outside these licensed dumpsites, and failed to include the “High level” waste concrete blocks and drums. While we were discussing locating the actual dumpsites, I should mention, that EPA has been trying to determine the actual disposal locations. Yet after six years research, they have failed to list at least two sites I know of, one off the New Jersey Coast at 41° 33’ N latitude by 65° 30’ W longitude, and a site off the California coast at 37° 40’ N latitude and 124° 50’ W longitude licensed to the Military Sea Transpor- tation Service in 1959. Which brings us to the military, probably the single largest nuclear waste dumper in the country. Only a portion of the military’s disposal operations even came under the purview of the AEC. Any wastes generated from operations which are exempt from the Commission’s regulatory authority under Section 91(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, are also exempt from the Commission’s safeguards provided that the waste remains in the possession of the military until the ultimate disposal. The Army shipped all of its waste material originating west of the Mississippi River to the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. According to their Standard Operat- ing Procedures Manual, the material was then shipped to the U.S. Naval Radiologi- cal Defense Laboratory, in San Francisco, which performs their ultimate disposal. The wastes were much larger than we have been lead to believe, and possibly more hazardous since they were not solely from the Navy’s Laboratory experiments. But I am not sure anyone really knows what types of deadly readioactive materi- als were disposed of in this manner. For example, the Nuclear Engineering Compa- ny wanted to dispose of materials for the Air Force. In an April 1959 letter to the AEC they stated “In many cases, the equipment being disposed of is obsolete, has been at the originating site for years, and there are no longer any records available indicating the type and quantity of isotope involved.” How much waste was disposed of in the Pacific? I am not sure anyone knows. The Air Force did not know their quantities, a 1957 Atomic Energy Commission report (WASH-734) states that “the estimated curie content could be off as much as a factor of 10.’’ And under the curie content column of some of the company terminal manifests we have reviewed are nothing but question marks. There are many unknowns. This is why I introduced H.R. 8119. We need a comprehensive fish monitoring program to insure that these deadly wastes do not make their way back to the human food chain through the fish. But in order to fully protect those of us who like to eat fish, it is necessary to determine where exactly the wastes are located, their concentration, and if the area being monitored adequately represents all the waste dumpsites. If we were to implement such a monitoring program based upon the research EPA has conducted to date, we would have no assurances that in 20 years a disposal site which we were not monitoring would not be causing cancer among those peas who eat fish caught in this region. We could have a marine “Love anal. Thirty-five years ago man began the nuclear age with exploding the first atomic bomb. Most of the material used in that first bomb will remain with us for the next 20,000 years. In my view, we must insure for future generations that the practices of handling these volatile materials does not adversely affect the health and welfare of this and future generations. Ladies and gentlemen, I submit the other alternative is much too high a price for the human race to afford. To dispell any further notions that these drums were disposed of in the safest possible manner I would like to read a section from the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory’s application for renewal of their nuclear waste disposal license. It summarizes the kind of care given to these drums. ‘After each dump, a thorough inspection is made of the dump area to ascertain that all containers have sunk. In the rare event of a floating radioactive waste container, it is sunk by gunfire.” So much for care in handling and making sure these wastes didn’t float ashore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman. What is the date of the last quotation? Mr. ANDERSON. From the radioactive disposal procedures, March 21, 1961, and it is quoted right here, in here, the area of dumping approximately 55 miles northwest of San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge, “After each dump, a thorough inspection is made of the dump area to ascertain that all containers have sunk. In the rare aven} of a floating radioactive waste container, it is sunk by gun- ire.” 273 Mr. Stupps. 1961? Mr. ANDERSON. 1961. Mr. Stupps. Any questions? Ms. MiKkuLskI. The location of the dumpsite, Mr. Anderson, is this in the earthquake-prone zone, do you know? Mr. ANDERSON. You mean the Farallons, this site? Ms. MIKULSKI. Yes. Mr. ANDERSON. It is about 60 miles—about 40 miles west of San Francisco. The actual dumpsite is near the Farallon Islands which are a famous group of islands off the San Francisco coast. I would not think it would be in the earthquake zone, but probably 30 or 40 miles west of it. Ms. Mixutski. A shock would be felt? In other words, all the earthquake alerts that we know in the San Francisco area, the Earth would crack? Mr. ANDERSON. You could feel it all the way to Los Angeles, the shock would carry, yes. Ms. MIKULSKI. So there could also, by placing it near San Fran- cisco, I mean apart from the terrible part of placing it near San Francisco, it is doubly dangerous because it is in an earthquake zone, is that right? Mr. ANDERSON. Close to an earthquake zone, yes, and it would be felt by a shock. Ms. Mixkutski. Well, Mr. Anderson, I would like to thank you for bringing this to the committee’s and the country’s attention. I think this is really a blockbuster. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Congressman. Our next witness is from the Department of Energy, Mr. Sheldon Meyers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Waste Manage- ment, Department of Energy. STATEMENT OF SHELDON MEYERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY FOR NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPART- MENT OF ENERGY Mr. Meyers. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to take part in the discussions on the possibility of disposal of radioactive wastes beneath the ocean floor. I will describe how this concept fits within the Presi- dent’s national waste management program, and outline in some detail the objectives, status, and plans for assessing the technical and environmental feasibility of the subseabed disposal concept. The Department’s nuclear waste management program, includ- ing the examination of subseabed disposal, is based on the Presi- dent’s message to the Congress on Radioactive Waste Management which he issued in February of this year. In that message, sub- seabed disposal is viewed as an alternative option for isolating radioactive waste. Mined geologic repositories are the focal point of the comprehensive national radioactive waste management pro- gram, but the Department will continue to support a limited pro- gram to evaluate other disposal alternatives as longer range op- tions. Options currently under assessment include disposal of high level wastes in very deep boreholes, disposal in space, and emplace- ment in ocean sediments in regions where the ocean floor is known to be geologically stable. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I 274 would like to submit a copy of the President’s cited message for the record. Mr. Stupps. It will appear in the record. [The following was received for the record: | 275 THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL WASTE-MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FEBRUARY 12, 1980 Today I am establishing this Nation's first comprehensive radio- active waste management program. My paramount objective in managing nuclear wastes is to protect the health and safety of all Americans, both now and in the future. I share this responsibility with elected officials at all levels of our government. Our citizens have a deep concern that the beneficial uses of nuclear technology, including the generation of electricity, not be allowed to imperil public health or safety now or in the future. For more than 30 years, radioactive wastes have been generated by programs for national defense, by the commercial nuclear power program, and by a variety of medical, industrial and research activi- ties. Yet past governmental efforts to manage radioactive wastes have not been technically adequate. Moreover, they have failed to involve successfully the States, local governments, and the pubiic in policy or program decisions. My actions today lay the foundation for both a technically superior program and a full cooperative Federal- State partnership to ensure public confidence in a waste mangement program. My program is consistent with the broad consensus that has evolved from the efforts of the Interagency Review Group on Radioactive Waste Management (IRG) which I established. The IRG findings and analysis were comprehensive, thorough and widely reviewed by public, industry and citizen groups, State and local governments, and members of the Congress. Evaluations of the scientific and technical analyses were obtained through a broad and rigorous peer review by the scientific community. The final recommendations benefited from and reflect this input. \ My objective is to establish a comprehensive program for the management of all types of radioactive wastes. My policies and pro- grams establish mechanisms to ensure that elected officials and the public fully participate in waste decisions, and direct Federal departments and agencies to implement a waste management strategy which is safe, technically sound, conservative, and open to continu- ous public review. This approach will help ensure that we will reach our objective —- the safe storage of all forms of nuclear waste. Our primary objective is to isolate existing and future radio- active waste from military and civilian activities from the biosphere and pose no significant threat to public health and safety. The responsibility for resolving military and civilian waste management problems shall not be deferred to future generations. The technical 276 program must meet all relevant radiological protection criteria as well as all other applicable regulatory requirements. This effort must proceed regardless of future developments within the nuclear industry -- its future size, and resolution of specific fuel cycle and reactor design issues. The specific steps outlined below are each aimed at accomplishing this overall objective. First, my Administration is committed to providing an effective role for State and local governments in the development and imple- mentation of our nuclear waste management program. I am therefore taking the following actions: e By Executive Order, I am establishing a State Planning Council which will strengthen our intergovernmental relationships and help fulfill our joint responsibility to protect public health and safety in radioactive waste matters. I have asked Governor Riley of South Carolina to serve as Chairman of the Council. The Council will have a total of 19 members: 15 who are Gover- mors or other elected officials, and 4 from the Executive departments and agencies. It will advise the Executive Branch and work with the Congress to address radioactive waste management issues, such as planning and siting, con- struction, and operation of facilities. I will submit legis- lation during this session to make the Council permanent. e In the past, States have not played an adequate part in the waste management planning process -- for example, in the evaluation and location of potential waste disposal sites, The States need better access to information and expanded opportunity to guide waste management planning. Our relation- ship with the States will be based on the principle of con- sultation and concurrence in the siting of high level waste repositories. Under the framework of consultation and con- currence, a host State will have a continuing role in Federal decisionmaking on the siting, design and construction of a high level waste repository. State consultation and con- currence, however, will lead to an acceptable solution to our waste disposal problem only if all the States participate as partners in the program I am putting forth. The safe disposal of radioactive waste, defense and commercial, is a national, not just a Federal, responsibility. e TI am directing the Secretary of Energy to provide financial and technical assistance to States and other jurisdictions to facilitate the full participation of State and local govern- ment in review and licensing proceedings. 277 Second, for disposal of high level radioactive waste, I am adopting an interim planning strategy focused on the use of mined geologic repositories capable of accepting both waste from repro- cessing and unreprocessed commercial spent fuel. An interim strat- egy is needed since final decisions on many steps which need to be taken should be preceded by a full environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act. In its search for suitable sites for high level waste repositories, the Department of Energy has mounted an expanded and diversified program of geologic investiga- tions that recognizes the importance of the interaction among geologic setting, repository host rock, waste form and other engi- neered barriers on a site-specific basis. Immediate attention will focus on research and development, and on locating and characteriz- ing a number of potential repository sites in a variety of different geologic environments with diverse rock types. When four to five sites have been evaluated and found potentially suitable, one or more will be selected for further development as a licensed full- scale repository. It is important to stress the following two points: First, because the suitability of a geologic disposal site can be verified only through detailed and time-consuming site specific evaluations, actual sites and their geologic environments must be carefully examined. Second, the development of a repository will proceed in a careful step-by-step manner. Experience and information gained at each phase will be reviewed and evaluated to determine if there is sufficient knowledge to proceed with the next stage of development. We should be ready to select the site for the first full-scale reposi- tory by about 1985 and have it operational by the mid-1990's. For reasons of economy, the first and subsequent repositories should accept both defense and commercial wastes. Consistent with my decision to expand and diversify the Depart- ment of Energy's program of geologic investigation before selecting a specific site for repository development, I have decided that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant project should be cancelled. This pro- ject is currently authorized for the unlicensed disposal of transuranic waste from our National defense program, and for research and develop- ment using high level defense waste. This project is inconsistent with my policy that all repositories for highly radioactive waste be licensed, and that they accept both defense and commercial wastes. The site near Carlsbad, New Mexico, which was being considered for this project, will continue to be evaluated along with other sites in other parts of the country. If qualified, it will be reserved as one of several candidate sites for possible use as a licensed reposi- tory for defense and commercial high level wastes. My fiscal year 1981 budget contains funds in the commercial nuclear waste program 278 for protection and continued investigation of the Carlsbad site. Finally, it is important that we take the time to compare the New Mexico site with other sites now under evaluation for the first waste repository. Over the next five years, the Department of Energy will carry out an aggressive program of scientific and technical investigations to support waste solidification, packaging and repository design and construction including several experimental, retrievable emplacements in test facilities. This supporting research and development program will call upon the knowledge and experience of the Nation's very best people in science, engineering and other fields of learning and will include participation of universities, industry, and the' government departments, agencies, and national laboratories. Third, during the interim period before a disposal facility is available, waste must and will continue to be cared for safely. Management of defense waste is a Federal responsibility; the Depart- ment of Energy will ensure close and meticulous control over defense waste facilities which are vital to our national security. I am committed to maintaining safe interim storage of these wastes as long as necessary and to making adequate funding available for that purpose. We will also proceed with research and development at the various defense sites that will lead to the processing, packaging, and ultimate transfer to a permanent repository of the high level and transuranic wastes from defense programs. In contrast, storage of commercial spent fuel is primarily a responsibility of the utilities. I want to stress that interim spent fuel storage capacity is not an alternative to permanent disposal. However, adequate storage is necessary until repositories are avail- able. I urge the utility industry to continue to take all actions necessary to store spent fuel in a manner that will protect the public and ensure efficient and safe operation of power reactors. However, a limited amount of government storage capacity would pro- vide flexibility to our national waste disposal program and an alternative for those utilities which are unable to expand their storage capabilities. I reiterate the need for early enactment of my proposed spent nuclear fuel legislation. This proposal would authorize the Depart- ment of Energy to: (1) design, acquire or construct, and operate one or more away-from-reactor storage facilities, and (2) accept for storage, until permanent disposal facilities are available, domestic spent fuel, and a limited amount of foreign spent fuel in cases when such action would further our non-proliferation policy objectives. All costs of storage, including the cost of locating, constructing and operating permanent geologic repositories, will be recovered 279 through fees paid by utilities and other users of the services and will ultimately be borne by those who benefit sock the activities generating the wastes. Fourth, I have directed the Department of Energy to work jointly with states, other government agencies, industry and other organi- zations, and the public, in developing national plans to establish regional disposal sites for commercial low level waste. We must work together to resolve the serious near-term problem of low level waste disposal. While this task is not inherently difficult from the standpoint of safety, it requires better planning and coordination. I endorse the actions being taken by the Nation's governdrs to tackle this problem and direct the Secretary of Energy to work with them in support of their effort. , Fifth, the Federal programs for regulating radioactive waste storage, transportation and disposal are a crucial component of our efforts to ensure the health and safety of Americans. Although the existing authorities and structures are basically sound, improvements must be made in several areas. The current authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license the disposal of high level waste and low level waste in commercial facilities should be extended to include spent fuel storage, and disposal of transuranic waste and non-defense low level waste in any new government facilities. I am directing the Environmental Protection Agency to consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to resolve issues of overlapping jurisdiction and phasing of regulatory actions. They should also seek ways to speed up the promulgation of their safety regulations. I am also directing the Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency to improve both the efficiency of their regulatory activities and their relationships with other Federal agencies and state and local governments. Sixth, it is essential that all aspects of the waste management program Be conducted with the fullest possible disclosure to and participation by the public and the technical community. I am directing the departments and agencies to develop and improve mech- anisms to ensure such participation and public involvement consistent with the need to protect national security information. The waste Management program will be carried out in full compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act. Seventh, because nuclear waste management is a problem shared by many other countries and decisions on waste management alternatives have nuclear proliferation implications, I will continue to encourage and support bilateral and multilateral efforts which advance both our technical capabilities and our understanding of spent fuel and waste management options, which are consistent with our non-proliferation policy. 280 In its role as lead agency for the management and disposal of radioactive wastes and with cooperation of the other relevant Federal agencies, the Department of Energy is preparing a detailed National Plan for Nuclear Waste Management to implement these policy guidelines and the other recommendations of the IRG. This Plan will provide a clear road map for all parties and will give the public an opportunity to review the entirety of our program. It will include specific program goals and milestones for all aspects of nuclear waste management. A draft of the comprehensive National Plan will be distributed by the Secretary of Energy later this year for public and Congressional review. The State Planning Council will be directly involved in the development of this plan. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission now has underway an important proceeding to provide the Nation with its judgment on whether or not it has confidence that radioactive wastes produced by nuclear power reactors can and will be disposed of safely. I urge that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission do so in a thorough and timely manner and that it provide a full opportunity for public, technical and government agency participation. Over the past two years as I have reviewed various aspects of the radioactive waste problem, the complexities and difficulties of the issues have become evident -- both from a technical and, more importantly, from an institutional and political perspective. How- ever, based on the technical conclusions reached by the IRG, I am persuaded that the capability now exists to characterize and evaluate a number of geologic environments for use as repositories built with conventional mining technology. We have already made substantial progress and changes in our programs. With this comprehensive policy and its implementation through the FY 1981 budget and other actions, we will complete the task of reorienting our efforts in the right direction. Many citizens know and all must understand that this problem will be with us for many years. We must proceed steadily and with determination to resolve the remaining technical issues while ensuring full public participation and maintaining the full cooperation of all levels of government. We will act surely and without delay, but we will not compromise our technical or scien- tific standards out of haste. I look forward to working with the Congress and the states to implement this policy and build public confidence in the ability of the government to do what is required in this area to protect the health and safety of our citizens. JIMMY CARTER THE WHITE HOUSE 281 eee ee eee February 12, 1980 THE WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT HIGHLIGHTS In a Message sent to Congress today, the President outlined a comprehensive national radioactive waste management program. This program is based on the report of the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management published in March, 1979. The paramount objective in managing nuclear wastes is to protect the health and safety of all Americans, both now and in the future. The disposal of nuclear waste should not and will not be deferred to future generations. The key elements of the President's program are: C) All levels of government share the responsibility for safe management and disposal of nuclear wastes. - In order to provide a more effective role for State and local governments the President has created a State Planning Council of elected State, local, and tribal officials and heads of cabinet departments and other federal agencies. Governor Richard Riley of South Carolina will serve as Chairman. State Representative Paul Hess of Kansas will serve as Vice Chairman. The Council will advise the Executive Branch and will work with Congress on key radioactive waste management and disposal issues, especially related institutional decisions. - The basis of the relationship between States and the Federal government in the siting of high level waste repositories will be the principle of consultation and concurrence. @ Pending reviews required by the national Environmental Policy Act, an interim planning strategy for disposal of high level and transuranic waste has been adopted that relies on mined geologic repositories. - The program directed toward siting and opening repositories will be technically conservative, include expanded and technically diversified research and development and site investigations, and move carefully, in a step by step manner, toward site selection and operation of the first high level waste repository. 282 a - Immediate attention will focus on locating and characterizing a number of potential repository sites in a variety of different geologic environ- ments with diverse rock types. This effort will be supported by a comprehensive research and develop- ment program. When four to five sites have been evaluated and found potentially suitable for a repository, one or more will be selected for further development as a licensed, full-scale repository. The site for the first full-scale repository should be selected by about 1985: and it should be Operational by the mid-1990's. - The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project will be cancelled since it is unlicensed and cannot accept commercial wastes. The site of the proposed project at Carlsbad, New Mexico, will be investi- gated further and if found qualified will be reserved for consideration along with other candidate sites in different geologic environments as a licensed repository for high level wastes. e The safe interim storage of commercial spent fuel from nuclear power reactors will continue to be the respon- sibility of the utilities operating these plants until a permanent geologic repository capability exists. However, the Administration will continue to press for legislation to build or acquire limited spent fuel storage capacity at one or more away-from-reactor (AFR) facilities for those utilities unable to expand their storage capabilities and for limited amounts of foreign spent fuel when the objectives of the U.S. nonprolifer- ation policy would be furthered. e The Department of Energy will work with the States in their efforts to establish a reliable commercial low level radioactive waste disposal system. cS) The Administration will submit legislation to extend Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing authority to cover all DOE facilities for transuranic waste disposal and any new DOE sites for disposal of commercial low level waste. Under existing law, NRC has licensing authority over DOE facilities for disposal of high level radioactive wastes. ® Specific actions will be taken to improve and expedite regulatory actions by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ® The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is determing whether or not it has confidence that radioactive wastes can be disposed of safely. The President is urging the NRC to conduct its proceeding in a timely manner and to 283 ee provide full opportunity for public, technical and government agency participation. @ The President's Fiscal Year 1981 budget. for the Department of Energy reguests $670 million in budget authority for nuclear waste programs. Other Department and agency reguests total $49 million. A brief description of the various types of nuclear waste and the quantities buried, stored, and now being produced will be found in the background section of this Fact Sheet. OBJECTIVES for waste management plannning and hat existing and future radioactive waste activities (including commercial spent be discarded) should be isolated from ficant threat to public health and The primery objective implementation will be t from military and civilian fuel if and when it is to the biosphere and pose no signi safety. ™e following principles will guide our program: The technical program must meet all of the relevant radiological protection criteria, as well as any other applicable regulatory reguirements. Although zero release of radionuclides or zero risk from any such release cannot be assured, such risks should fall within pre-establlished standards and, beyond that, be reduced to the lowest level practicable. @ The responsibility for establishing a nuclear waste Management program will not be deferred to future generations. C) The nuclear waste management program should explicitly include consideration of all aspects of the waste Management system including safety, environmental, organizational, and institutional factors. ® The basic elements of the program should be independent of the size of the nuclear industry and of the reso- lution of specific fuel-cycle or reactor-design issues of the nuclear power industry. ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM qa Relations with State and Local Governments @ the President has created, by Executive Order, a State Planning Council to advise the Executive Branch and work with the Congress in making and implementing decisions on waste Management and disposal. SIs} 0) = BL = ale) 284 The council will be chaired by Governor Richard Riley. There will be 14 members who are designated by the President as follows: eight governors; five state and local government officials other than governors; and, a tribal government representative. The Secretaries of Energy, Interior, and Transportation and the Adminis- trator of the Environmental Protection Agency are also members. The Council will provide advice and recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Energy on nuclear waste management including interim storage of spent fuel. In particular, the Council will: ‘ (a) Recommend procedural mechanisms for reviewing specific nuclear waste management plans and pro- grams, including the consultation and concurrence process designed to achieve Federal, State, and local agreement which accommodates the interests of all the parties. (b) Work on development of detailed nuclear waste Management plans and provide recommendations to ensure that they adequately address the needs of affected States and local areas. (c) Advise on all aspects of siting and licensing of facilities for storage and disposal of nuclear wastes. (d) Advise on proposed Federal regulations, standards, and criteria related to nuclear waste management programs. (e) Identify and make recommendations on other matters related to the transportation, storage, and dis- posal of nuclear wastes that the Council believes are important. e The principle of consultation and concurrence will apply in the siting of high level waste repositories. Under the framework of consultation and concurrence, a host State will have a continuing role with regard to the Federal government's actions on the siting, design, and construction of a high level waste repository. Ze Interim Planning Strategy for High Level and Transuranic Waste Disposal Pending reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act and in order to provide interim guidance to the radioactive waste Management program for its near-term actions and following the consideration of alternative technical approaches, the President 285 SS sSSsssssSesnssssnsnsss, has adopted a comprehensive interim planning strategy. The main components of the strategy are: @ Mined geologic repositories will be the primary focus of work for safe disposal of high level radioactive waste, including unreprocessed commercial spent fuel. fo) The repository program will proceed in a technically conservative step-by-step manner, from the needed technical evaluations, through site selection, inde- pendent licensing review and ultimately to opening and Operating a repository. @ Immediate attention will focus on (1) research and development, both in laboratories and at sites where underground workings can be used to study rock and waste form properties and interactions, and (2) loca- ting and characterizing potential repository sites in different geologic environments and relying on diverse rock types. @ Once four or five sites in a variety of geologic envi- ronments have been evalvated and found potentially Suitable for a repository, one or more will be selected for Eurther intensive study or characterization and development as a licensed repository. @ Ultimately, several high level waste repositories will be opened, sited regionally insofar as technical. con-. siderations related to public health and safety permit. Prior to proceeding with the first full-scale repository, an intermediate step might be taken by disposal of a relatively small quantity of high level waste in a licensed geologic test facility in order to gain experience applicable to subdsequent actions with respect to full-scale repositories. Such a facility is not an essential component of a program leading to a full- scale, high level waste repository. It would provide an option, however, to test technical readiness and to exercise elements of the licensing process after an adeguate site characterization program has been completed. Following completion of environmental reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act, the President will reexamine this interim strategy and decide whether any changes need to be made. Following this strategy, the choice of site for the first full- scale repository should be made about 1985 and operations should begin by the mid-1990's. MThese dates reflect current estimates of the minimum time required to do the work necessary, including time for licensing and to permit full State and local government and public paritcipation in decisionmaking. 286 The President's interim waste disposal strategy offers three important advantages: (1) it provides maximum redundancy and conservatism so that no single or small number of setbacks would undermine the entire program, or even cause great delay; (2) sites can be selected by comparing several loca- tions among themselves thus providing greater confidence that the wastes will be disposed of safely; (3) time will be available to put in place a good scientific program, to build procedures for licensing, public review and interaction, and to establish decisionmaking processes with State and local governments. The Department of Energy is taking the following actions to implement this strategy: C) Regional, area and site investigations are being Planned on a national basis to identify suitable high level waste repository sites. A variety of geologic environments and potential host rock types are being examined and this program will be expanded to ensure that the necessary sites will be available from which to select the first repository site. ‘e Research and development in laboratories and at test sites has been increased. Greater attention is now being given to a variety of possible waste forms, including spent fuel, to waste packaging and to waste- rock interactions under repository conditions. ® Three test facilities are planned: a granite facility in Nevada, a basalt facility in Washington State, and a salt facility at a site yet to be chosen. The President has decided that the Waste Isolation pilot Plant (WIPP) project as currently authorized will be cancelled. fMThis project, for which construction has not yet commenced, is cur- rently authorized for the unlicensed disposal of transuranic waste from our National defense program and for R&D using high level waste. Reasons for the cancellation are: C) Proceeding now on the basis of a single site is inconsistent with the strategy to compare sites with differing geologic characteristics prior to selection. e An unlicensed facility is contrary to the President's policy. 287 er A facility for tranasuranic waste alone would provide 2 . « no useful experience relevant either to licensing or to disposal of high level waste. e It would also be an inefficient use of funds. The site near Carlsbad, New Mexico which was being considered for this project will continue to be evaluated and, if qualified, will be reserved, along with other sites, for possible future use as a licensed repository for high level wastes. The DOE's FY1981 budget contains funds in the commercial nuclear waste program for ion of the Carlsbad site and continued characterization protect ] ; an , activities to determine suitability as a high level waste repository. \ Although mined geologic repositories will be the focal point of the comprehensive national radioactive waste management program the DOE will continue to support a limited program directed toward other disposal alternatives. These include disposition of high level wastes in very deep boreholes and emplacement in ocean sediments in regions where the ocean floor is known to be geo- logically stable. These alternatives are considered to be longer range options to the mined geologic repository strategy. Sie Interim Storage of Defense and Commercial High Level Wastes. The following actions are being taken to ensure safe and adequate care of defense and commercial nuclear waste in the interim period before a disposal facility is available: C) Adequate technical and financial resources will be made available to maintain defense wastes safely. @ Research and development at various defense facilities will proceed leading to plans for processing, pack- aging, and ultimate transfer to permanent repositories of transuranic and high level wastes from defense programs. C) Although spent fuel storage capacity is not an alter- native to a permanent disposal capability, adequate storage must be provided until repositories are avail- able. Primary responsibility for safe storage of commercial spent fuel lies with the utility industry. However, a limited amount of government storage capac-— ity for commercial spent fuel would be desirable to provide flexibility to the national waste disposal program and an alternative for those utilities unable to expand their storage capabilities. The President continues to seek early enactment of legislation that would authorize the Department of Energy to: (1) design, acquire or construct, and operate one or more away-from-reactor storage facilities, and (2) accept for storage, until permanent disposal facilities are 288 available, domestic spent fuel, and a limited amount of foreign spent fuel in cases when such action would further the objectives of our nonproliferation policy. Cost of constructing and operating away-from-reactor storage facilities will be borne by the users. The Administration will continue to pursue both international and regional cooperative efforts to study nuclear fuel management options consistent with our nuclear nonproliferation policy. 4, Low Level Waste. Three commercial burial grounds -- South Carolina, Washington State and Nevada -- are currently available to receive low level wastes originating in non-governmental industrial, medical and commercial activities. These have been operating intermittently because of inadequacies in waste packaging and shipment. Pres- sures have been mounting to find additional disposal sites to provide needed capacity for an. ever-increasing inventory of commercial low level wastes. The Department of Energy will work with the States to assist in their activities to establish regional disposal sites for low level wastes from the Nation's hospitals, research institutions, industry, and utilities. Until such time as additional disposal facilities can be sited and licensed, DOE and NRC will assist States in setting up interim storage facilities within the States. The State Planning Council will give low level waste Management early, priority attention. Other actions being taken in the area of low level waste include: e DOE will review by 1981 alternative low level waste disposal technigues and determine whether any changes should be adopted in the future. fo) DOE will accelerate R&D on improved methods of dis- posing of low level wastes. e DOE will continue the existing land burial technology program presently designed to upgrade all DOE low level waste disposal operations by 1988. @ DCE will take action to ensure that adequate attention is given to the hydrologic characteristics of proposed locations for the future siting of low level waste disposal facilities. 56 Uranium Mill Tailings. Past control of mill sites has been poor, with little or no attention to the problem of proper disposal of tailings upon completion of milling operations. The Uranium Mill Tailings 289 Radiation Control Act of 1978 was passed to changed this situ- ation. EPA is directed to issue standards and criteria for disposal of mill tailings. NRC has licensing authority over active sites, and DOE is authorized to take remedial action at inactive sites. The NRC and EPA are now developing standards, criteria, and regulations defining acceptable levels of radon emissions, siting, impacts on groundwater. The final Generic Environmental Impact Statement, (NUREG 0511, Draft issued 4/79) on uranium milling by NRC is nearing completion. DOE, in cooperation with State governments, is now taking remedial action on abandoned tailings piles. DOE,will continue to develop improved means of disposing of or stabilizing mill tailings over the long term. 6. Decontamination and Decommissioning. As a general rule, unrestricted use of land will be the ultimate objective of D&D and institutional controls should not be relied upon after some period of time to provide long-term protection of people and the environment. However, because certain existing sites and/or facilities cannot be decontaminated at a reasonable cost, or perhaps at any cost, long-term institutional control may be reguired in these exceptional cases. These will require development of site-specific programs by NRC and DOE. The following actions will be taken: C) DOE will prepare a nationwide plan for the decontami- nation and decommissioning of surplus facilities owned by DOE and other government agencies. C) DOE will work on designs for the construction of new facilities which will facilitate their eventual decommissioning. @ For new Federal facilities, decontamination and decommissioning specifications will be included in the initial design, and institutional arrangements will be Made to ensure sufficient funding. The funding for D&D of government-owned facilities and sites will be through Federal appropriations. Responsibility and methods for financing D&D of licensed facilities will be determined by the regulatory process. We Transportation. Safe and reliable transportation of nuclear wastes is an essen- tial component of the total waste management system. While complete assurance that release of radioactive material will not occur during normal operation or in serious accidents is impos- sible, it has been demonstrated that it is unlikely that a 290 significant release can occur under most credible accident environments. To improve the existing transportation system and enhance public confidence in it, the following actions are being taken: e DOE is pursuing a program for testing and evaluating the performance of current and future generation waste packaging systems. e The Department of Transportation is being directed to increase itsS management attention to nuclear waste matters and is completing its rulemaking on the role of Federal and local government bodies sin routing of nuclear waste transportation along highways. e DOT and NRC are working closely with the States to strengthen the nation's overall capability to respond to any transportation emergencies involving shipment of radioactive wastes. ® DOT will develop a data bank on shipment statistics and accident experience to be operational by 1982. 8. Financing. The princivle that will be applied to financing the cost of nuclear waste management and disposal is that the cost should be payed by the generator of the waste and borne by the beneficiary of the activity generating the waste. Utilities will pay the cost of storage and disposal of waste from power plant operations and pass these costs on to their customers. The government will pay the cost of storage and disposal of wastes from defense and government R&D activities and finance it from tax revenues. 9. Regulatory Actions. The Federal programs for regulating radioactive waste storage, transportation, and disposal are a crucial component of our efforts to ensure health and safety. The following improvements are needed in the regulation of radioactive waste disposal: @ The current authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission to license the disposal of high level waste and low level waste in commercial facilities should be extended to also include the storage of spent fuel, as well as disposal of transuranic waste and non-defense low level waste in any new government facilities that might be built. e The Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for creating general criteria and numerical standards applicable to nuclear waste management activities. The President has directed EPA to accelerate its schedule 291 sss for the preparation of these criteria and standards and to prepare a position paper that will indicate EPA's approach to setting standards and address the relation- ship between EPA's standards and actions taken by NRC and DOE. EPA and NRC will complete a Memorandum of Understanding dealing with coordinating methodologies and procedures. The Department of Transportation is responsible for regulating the transport of radioactive wastes, in part sharing that responsibility with NRC. The coordination between the two agencies is provided by an existing Memorandum of Understanding between them. DOT is completing its rulemaking on the role of Federal and local government bodies in the routing of nuclear waste transportation along highways. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now commencing a formal proceeding to determine whether or not it has confidence that radioactive wastes produced by nuclear power reactors can and will be disposed of safely. The President has urged the NRC to conduct this proceeding in a timely and thorough manner and to provide full opportunity for public, technical and government agency participation. 10. Legislation. Legislation addressing the following areas will be submitted to Congress to implement the President's program. State Planning Council. To provide a permanent basis for the State Planning Council, which has been created by Executive Order. Licensing Extension. To implement the extension of NRC licensing authority to all new transuranic and new non-defense low level waste disposal facilities and any other facilities decided upon following the review of NRC's licensing study (NUREG 0527, September 1979). Low Level Waste. To assist the States in managing commercial low-level waste. The legislation will include authority for the States to enter into regional organizations or compacts for operation of the sites. Decommissioned Facilities Surveillance. To establish institutional responsibilities for long-term surveil- lance of formerly utilized Federal facilities which have been decommissioned and sold or otherwise released to unrestricted use. 292 The President will continue to press for authority to construct one or more away-from-reactor interim storage facilities for commercial spent fuel. This bill is already under consideration by the Congress. This legislation, or additional legislation, will implement the principle that costs of nuclear wastes dis- posal will be paid by the generator and borne by the beneficiary of the activity generating the waste. 11. Implementation and Management Structure. Many Federal departments and agencies are necessarily involved in one or more aspects of nuclear waste management. In addition, the President's policy calls for full involvement of State, regional and local governments and organizations in program plan- ning and execution. The President has designated the Secretary of Energy to be responsible for overall program integration and to establish necessary coordination mechanisms. The Secretary of Energy will assume the lead role for: (1) coordinating all Federal nonregulatory aspects of radioactive waste management; (2) working out effective relationships with regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and (3) developing strong and effective ties between the Federal Government and the States on all aspects of radioactive waste storage and disposal. Within the Department of Energy, day-to-day activities are under the direction of an Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy (ASNE) who reports to the Under Secretary and the Secretary. Under the ASNE the Office of Nuclear Waste Management (ONWM) is responsible for executing policy and managing all aspects of the nuclear waste management program. Regulatory responsibilities are by law assigned to the Environ- mental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation. The Department of Interior has authority over Federal lands that might be used for waste storage or disposal and has extensive geoscience expertise in the U.S. Geological Survey. An Interagency Working Committee has been established by the Department of Energy to coordinate and inte- grate associated activities of DOE, DOI, EPA, NRC, DOT, and State. The President has also instructed DOE and DOI to prepare a Memorandum of Understanding between them delineating areas of cooperation and mutual responsibility and creating procedures to ensure they work jointly and reinforce each other's activities. The primary planning mechanism will be a comprehensive National Plan for Nuclear Waste Management. The President has directed that this be produced by 1981 and be updated biennially there- after. It is to be submitted for public review in draft and in revised form to the public and the Congress. The plan will include: 293 e summaries of the status of knowledge relevant to dis- posal of high level, transuranic, and low level radio- active wastes and uranium mill tailings; fo) multi-year program plans for (1) interim management of high level radioactive waste and spent fuel; (2) site gualification for geologic repositories, and (3) R&D in the earth sciences and waste form and containers for high level and transuranic waste disposal; @ plans for low level wastes; ® a plan for decontamination and decommissioning of surplus government facilities; \ @ a plan for remedial action at inactive mill tailings sites; @ an integrated NEPA plan, covering the NEPA activities of all relevant agencies; e updated cost estimates for all proposed activities; ® proposals to improve intergovernmental decisionmaking and resolution of environmental, economic and social issues associated with radioactive waste storage, transportation, and disposal; @ specific program goals and milestones for developing necessary regulations. The President has issued detailed instructions to all Federal agencies to ensure that his program will be implemented. 12. Public Participation. It is essential that all aspects of the waste management program be conducted with the full disclosure to and participation by the public and the technical community. The President has directed the departments and agencies to develop and improve mechanisms to ensure such participation and public involvement consistent with any need to protect national security information and to comply fully with the National Environmental Policy Act. This includes providing technical and financial assistance to permit informed public input to programs and decisions and to support nongovern- ment efforts to increase social and technical understanding and agreement on nuclear waste issues. Formal mechanisms for receiv- ing the best scientific and technical advice available and regu- lar input from the interested public will also be strengthened. 294 13. International Cooperation. Because nuclear waste management is a problem shared by many other countries and because selection of wsate management alter- natives has nuclear proliferation implications, the President will continue to encourage and support cooperative bilateral and multilateral efforts which advance both our technical capabili- ties and our understanding of spent fuel and waste management and which are consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy. 14. Funding. (Funding is addressed in detail in Chapters 2 & 3 of the basic document.) 5 295 EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE STATE PLANNING COUNCIL ON RADIOAVTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 1-103. The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the Council. 1-2. Functions. 1-201. The Council shall provide advice and recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Energy on nuclear waste management (including interim management of spent fuel). In particular, the Council shall: (a) Recommend procedural mechanisms for reviewing nuclear waste Management plans and programs in such a way to ensure timely and effective State and local involvement. Such mechanisms should include a consultation and concurrence process designed to achieve Federal, State, and local agreement which accommodates the interests of all the parties. (b) Review the development of comprehensive nuclear waste management plans including planning activities for transportation, storage, and disposal of all categories of nuclear waste. Provide recommendations to ensure that these plans adequately address the needs of the State and local areas affected. (c) Advise on all aspects of siting facilities for storage and dis- posal of nuclear wastes, including the review of recommended criteria for site selection and site suitability, guidelines for regional siting, and procedures for site characterization and selection. (d) Advise on an appropriate role for State and local governments in the licensing process for nuclear waste repositories. 296 1-4. General Provisions. 1-401. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), except that of reporting annually to the Congress, that are applicable to the Council, shall be performed by the Secretary of Energy in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services. 1-402. The Council shall terminate thirty days after it transmits its final report to the President, but in no event shall it terminate later than eighteen months after the effective date of this Order. THE WHITE HOUSE February 12, 1980 Mr. Meyers. The DOE’s disposal activities are also consistent with the programs described in hearings before congressional au- thorization and appropriation committees and contained in the fiscal year 1981 Appropriations Act, Public Law 96-367. Because of current congressional interest in other previous ocean disposal practices, it might be helpful to review those earlier prac- tices as a preface to considering the unrelated subseabed disposal concept. The disposal of high level radioactive waste into the ocean has never been practiced by the U.S. Government and is now prohibited by U.S. domestic legislation—the Marine Protection, Re- search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972—and also by the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter, which the United States has ratified. The United States has, however, previously disposed of low level radio- active waste in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. No new licenses for ocean disposal of low level waste have been issued since about 1960. Furthermore, the practice of ocean disposal was discon- tinued by 1970 mainly because of the opening of less costly low level radioactive waste land burial sites. The safety of this previous practice was predicated on the assumption that, even if the waste were released at the time it reached the ocean floor, natural dilu- tion and dispersal would result in environmental safe levels of radioactivity. Ocean disposal was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commis- sion’s (AEC) Office of Regulation until 1972 when the Marine Pro- 297 tection, Research and Sanctuaries Act centered regulatory respon- sibility in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). At that time, the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- istration (NOAA) were directed to initiate a comprehensive and continuing program of monitoring and research regarding the envi- ronmental effects of the past practices. As a result, the EPA has conducted specific studies of the impact of dumping at the major sites in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies have cooperated fully with the EPA in these studies which have concluded that there is no evidence of harm to either man or the environment as a result of this past disposal practice. The Department is continuing to cooperate with the EPA in assembling a comprehensive data file on all past U.S. ocean dispos- al activities. Specifically, the Department is requesting its field organizations to accumulate basic data on all ocean disposal activi- ties carried out by the AEC or its contractors which were not under the auspices of an AEC license. We understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will provide the EPA with similar information for all previously licensed disposal activities. The EPA is also looking into ocean disposal carried out by other Government agencies. The Department of Energy will continue to cooperate closely with the EPA as it carries out its responsibilities regarding ocean disposal. I would like now to describe our current subseabed disposal program which should not be confused with the ocean disposal practices just described. The existence of deep sea technology, such as deep seabed drilling, drill hole reentry, and deep sea emplace- ment and recovery of large equipment, makes: it reasonable to include deep ocean sediments as a candidate medium for the dis- posal and isolation of radioactive waste. These sediments are thick, uniform, and stable deposits which have accumulated over millions of years and are in the process of becoming sedimentary rock. Disposal in such sediments could provide effective isolation of ra- dioactive waste from the biosphere. The primary objective of the subseabed disposal program is to assess the feasibility of the technical, environmental, engineering and institutional approaches for disposing of solidified and pack- aged high level nuclear waste and/or packaged spent reactor fuel in geologic formations under the world’s oceans. A secondary objec- tive is to assess the seabed disposal options of other nations and cooperate with them when appropriate. Sandia National Laborato- ries has the prime responsibility for coordinating and managing this program for the Department. The subseabed disposal program has adopted a reference system for study purposes even though that system may have to be altered as additional information is acquired. The reference subseabed dis- posal system assumes that solidified high level wastes or spent reactor fuel in high integrity, long lasting containers would be buried in highly stable clay sediments. These sediments would be: First, away from the edges of oceanic tectonic plates—to avoid volcanic and seismic activity; second, away from the edges of major circular surface currents—to avoid subsurface agitation and fishing associated with these currents; and third, in areas of low biological 298 activity. Several methods appear feasible for emplacing wastes at depths of about 10 to 30 meters beneath the sediment surface. Though none of the methods has been developed in detail, at this time, we are considering free-fall penetrators, power injection, and trenching or drilling. It is clear that much additional research and development is needed before the feasibility of the concept will be demonstrated. Two key questions must be answered in order to demonstrate tech- nical feasibility and environmental acceptability of subseabed dis- posal. First, is there a barrier or set of barriers, natural or man- made, that will offer satisfactory containment of radionuclides? Second, will these barriers remain adequate after introduction of waste containers? The natural barriers under consideration include the canister, the waste form, and the use of layers such as over- packs. Although no definite conclusions have been reached, at pres- ent subseabed disposal appears to be a viable disposal option. Ac- cordingly, the subseabed disposal program is a multidisciplinary effort to identify technical, institutional, legal and regulatory issues which must be addressed and resolved on a national and international basis. A multiyear subseabed program plan, issued in January 1980, outlines in some detail the current and planned activities. The United States leads the world in ocean drilling for research purposes. The International Phase of the Ocean Drilling under the management of the National Science Foundation with support from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the Soviet Union, has resulted in a greatly increased knowledge of the ocean floors. A final environmental impact statement on the management of commercially generated radioactive waste has recently been made available to Congress and the public. This statement will serve as the environmental basis for a formal decision on whether to adopt our proposed high level commercial waste strategy, which is based on the disposal of radioactive waste in mined geologic repositor- ies—with the alternative subseabed disposal concept also assessed as a future alternative. The DOE subseabed disposal program budget for fiscal year 1981 is $6.9 million. Our principal near-term milestones are: First, in 1981, we plan to select three regional areas in the North Atlantic and North Pacific and, within those areas, select one or more smaller areas in each ocean for more detailed study; and second, complete fabrication and design verification testing of an in situ heat transfer experiment for field testing by late 1983. The explora- tory studies and subprogram testing that we will be conducting under the subseabed disposal program subject the public to no risk at all. No radioactive waste will be emplaced at this stage. In the international activity, an integral part of the subseabed disposal program is the international cooperative research and de- velopment which is coordinated through the Seabed Working Group of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development. That working group current- ly consists of six nations—Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, United States, with West Germany and Switzerland participating as observers. The objectives of the working group are to provide a 299 forum for discussion, assessing progress, and planning future ef- forts, coordinate research vessel cruises, share facilities, exchange information, discuss international policy issues, and identify inter- national issues requiring resolution. The subseabed disposal program plan includes long-term plan- ning for public participation and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act. Efforts are being made to identify public concerns at an early date in order to factor them into the planning process for further scientific, technical and environmen- tal investigation. Should the subseabed disposal concept prove environmentally and technically feasible, the Department recognizes that institu- tional and public acceptance of the overall concept will need to be gained as well. Now, with regard to legal considerations, which were brought up earlier, the U.S. Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 prohibits ocean disposal of high level wastes and provides for EPA licensing of all low level radioactive waste disposal into the oceans. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the implemen- tation of subseabed disposal of spent nuclear fuel would be in violation of the cited act and would, therefore, require specific U.S. congressional action before adoption. But further technical and environmental information must be developed before we come to final judgments concerning whether the existing legal framework needs to be modified. Similarly, we have not made a final judgment as to whether our existing international treaty obligations need to be restructured. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have, and I can in- clude my printed statement for the record, if you wish. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHELDON MEYERS, Deputy ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to take part in the discussions on the possibility of disposal of radioactive wastes beneath the ocean floor. I will describe how this concept fits within the President’s National Waste Management Program, and outline in some detail the objectives, status, and plans for assessing the technical and environmental feasibil- ity of the subseabed disposal concept. In the course of my discussion, I will also address the related points raised in Chairman Studds’ October 30, 1980, letter to Secretary Duncan. INTRODUCTION The Department’s nuclear waste management program, including the examina- tion of subseabed disposal, is based on the President’s Message to the Congress on Radioactive Waste Management which he issued in February of this year. In that message, subseabed disposal is viewed as an alternative option for isolating radioac- tive waste. Mined geologic repositories are the focal point of the comprehensive National radioactive waste management program, but the Department will continue to support a limited program to evaluate other disposal alternatives as longer range options. Options currently under assessment include disposal of high-level wastes in very deep boreholes, disposal in space, and emplacement in ocean sediments in regions where the ocean floor is known to be geologically stable. With your permis- sion Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a copy of the President’s cited message for the record. The DOE’s subseabed disposal activities are also consistent with the programs described in hearings before Congressional authorization and appropriation commit- tees and contained in the fiscal year 1981 Appropriations Act (Public Law No. 96- 69-848 O - 81 - 20 300 367). A table describing the historical funding levels for the Subseabed Disposal Program is attached to my prepared statement. PAST OCEAN DISPOSAL PRACTICES Because of current Congressional interest in other previous ocean disposal prac- tices, it might be helpful to review those earlier practices as a preface to considering the unrelated subseabed disposal concept. The disposal of high-level radioactive waste into the ocean has never been practiced by the United States Government and is now prohibited by United States domestic legislation (the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972) and also by the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter, which the United States has ratified. The United States has, however, previously disposed of low-level radioactive waste in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. No new licenses for ocean disposal of low-level waste have been issued since about 1960. Furthermore, the practice of ocean disposal was discontinued by 1970 mainly be- cause of the opening of less costly low-level radioactive waste land burial sites. The safety of this previous practice was predicated on the assumption that, even if the waste were released at the time it reached the ocean floor, natural dilution and dispersal would result in environmentally safe levels of radioactivity. Ocean disposal was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Office of Regulation until 1972 when the Marine Protection, Research & Sanctuaries Act centered regulatory responsibility in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). At that time, the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were directed to initiate a comprehensive and continuing program of moni- toring and research regarding the environmental effects of the past practices. As a result the EPA has conducted specific studies of the impact of dumping at the major sites in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Department of Energy and its prede- cessor agencies have cooperated fully with the EPA in these studies which have concluded that there is no evidence of harm to either man or the environment as a result of this past disposal practice. The Department is continuing to cooperate with the EPA in assembling a compre- hensive data file on all past U.S. ocean disposal activities. Specifically, the Depart- ment is requesting its field organizations to accumulate basic data on all ocean disposal activities carried out by the AEC or its contractors which were not under the auspices of an AEC license. We understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission will provide the EPA with similar information for all previously licensed disposal activities. The EPA is also looking into ocean disposal carried out by other Government agencies. The Department of Energy will continue to cooperate closely with the EPA as it carries out its responsibilities regarding ocean disposal. THE SUBSEABED DISPOSAL PROGRAM I would now like to describe our current subseabed disposal program which should not be confused with the ocean disposal practices just described. The existence of deep sea technology such as deep seabed drilling, drill hole reentry, and deep sea emplacement and recovery of large equipment, makes it reasonable to include deep ocean sediments as a candidate medium for the disposl and isolation of radioactive waste. These sediments are thick, uniform, and stable deposits which have accumu- lated over millions of years and are in the process of becoming sedimentary rock. Disposal in such sediments could provide effective isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere. The primary objective of the subseabed disposal program is to assess the feasibil- ity of the technical, environmental, engineering, and institutional approaches for disposing of solidified and packaged high-level nuclear waste and/or packaged spent reactor fuel in geologic formations under the world’s oceans. A secondary objective is to assess the seabed disposal options of other nations and cooperate with them when appropriate. Sandia National Laboratories has the prime responsibility for coordinating and managing this program for the Department. The Subseabed Disposal Program has adopted a reference system for study pur- poses even though that system may have to be altered as additional information is acquired. The reference subseabed disposal system assumes that solidified high-level wastes or spent reactor fuel in high-integrity, long-lasting containers would be buried in highly stable clay sediments. These sediments would be: (1) away from the edges of oceanic tectonic plates (to avoid volcanic and seismic activity); (2) away from the edges of major circular surface currents (to avoid subsurface agitation and fishing associated with these currents); and, (8) in areas of low biological activity. Several methods appear feasible for emplacing wastes at depths of about ten to thirty meters beneath the sediment surface. Though none of the methods has been 301 developed in detail, at this time, we are considering free-fall penetrators, power injection, and trenching or drilling. It is clear that much additional research and development is needed before the feasibility of the concept will be demonstrated. Two key questions must be answered in order to demonstrate technical feasibility and environmental acceptability of subseabed disposal. First, is there a barrier or set of barriers, natural or man-made, that will offer satisfactory containment of radionuclides? Secondly, will these bar- riers remain adequate after introduction of waste containers? The natural barriers under consideration include the sediments, the basement rock, and the ocean. The man-made barriers being assessed include the canister, the waste form, and the use of layers such as overpacks. Although no definite conclusions have been reached, at present subseabed disposal appears to be a viable disposal option. Accordingly, the Subseabed Disposal Program is a multi-disciplinary effort to identify, technical, institutional, legal, and regulatory issues which must be addressed and resolved on a National and international basis. A multi-year Subseabed Program Plan, issued in January 1980, outlines in some detail the current and planned activities. The U.S. leads the world in ocean drilling for research purposes. The Internation- al Phase of the Ocean Drilling under the management of the National Science Foundation with support from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United King- dom, France, Japan, and the Soviet Union has resulted in a greatly increased knowledge of the ocean floors. A final Environmental Impact Statement on the management of commercially generated radioactive waste has recently been made available to Congress and the public. This statement will serve as the environmental input for a formal decision on whether to adopt our proposed high-level commercial waste strategy, which is based on the disposal of radioactive waste in mined geologic repositories—with the alternative subseabed disposal concept also assessed as a future alternative. The DOE Subseabed Disposal Program budget for fiscal year 1981 is $6.9 million. A table of historical funding levels is attached to this statement. Our principle near- term milestones are: (1) in 1981, we plan to select three regional areas in the North Atlantic and North Pacific and, within those areas, select one or more smaller areas in each ocean for more detailed study; and (2) complete fabrication and design verification testing of an in-situ heat transfer experiment for field testing by late 1983. The exploratory studies and subprogram testing that we will be conducting under the Subseabed Disposal Program subject the public to no risk at all. No radioactive waste will be emplaced at this state. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY An integral part of the Subseabed Disposal Program is the international coopera- tive research and development which is coordinated through the Seabed Working Group of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Orgainzation for Economic Cooperation and Development. That Working Group currently consists of six nations—Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, U.K. and U.S., with West Germany and Switzerland participating as obervers. The objectives of the Working Group are to: provide a forum for discussion, assessing progress, and planning future efforts; coordinate research vessel cruises; share facilities; exchange information; discuss international policy issues; and identify international issues requiring resolution. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION The Subseabed Disposal Program Plan includes long-term planning for public participation are response requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act. Efforts are being made to identify public concerns at an early date in order to factor them into the planning process for further scientific, technical, and environ- mental investigation. Should the subseabed disposal concept prove environmental and technically feasi- ble, the Department recognizes that institutional and public acceptance of the overall concept will have to be gained. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS The U.S. Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 prohibits ocean disposal of high-level wastes and provides for EPA licensing of all low-level radioac- tive waste disposal into the oceans. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the implementation of subseabed disposal of spent nuclear fuel would be in violation of the cited Act and would, therefore, require specific U.S. Congressional action before adoption. But further technical and environmental information should be developed before we come to final judgments concerning whether the existing legal framework 302 needs to be modified. Similarly, we have not made a final judgment as to whether our existing international treaty obligations need to be restructured. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have. Historical funding levels for assessment of subseabed disposal Fiscal year: Thousands DS at is SED A Beer bh Ce RO dy Ueto 1$1,500 1 Funds provided by Office of Military Application and Office of Naval Research. 2 Beginning in fiscal year 1980, funded by DOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; between fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1979 funded by the Environmental! Program. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Mr. Meyers. On page 3 of your testimony, you refer to the studies which EPA has conducted and in which the Department of Energy has cooper- ated, of the previous low level dumping, and you say “These studies have concluded that there is no evidence of harm to either man or the environment as a result of this past disposal practice.” Do you mean to imply that the studies, in fact, are final conclu- sions and no final study is required? Mr. Meyers. As far as I know, the studies are ongoing but evidence to date indicates that there has been no harm to man and the environment. Mr. Stupps. To date. OK. Lower down on that page, you say that “The EPA is also looking into ocean disposal carried out by other Government agencies.” What other Government agencies? Mr. Meyers. The Department of Defense, and perhaps some of om other research organizations. I am not familiar with all of them. ma Stupps. The Department of Defense is most likely one of them’ Mr. Meyers. Yes. Mr. Stupps. Has your agency been involved in the search for the nuclear reactor from the Seawolf, which was scuttled 21 years ago? Mr. Meyers. The search for it? As far as I know, we know the area where it was disposed of. Mr. Stupps. You know where? Mr. MEYERS. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. I have an article in front of me from the September 1980 Science Magazine in which it says, with reference to the Seawolf—— Mr. Meyers. May I change that? Mr. Stupps [continuing]. Efforts to find the Seawolf have failed. The Navy did find debris from the Scorpion after it was lost. It goes on. Mr. MEYERS. Yes, I stand corrected. That is true. Mr. Stupps. We cannot find it? Mr. Meyers. Right. I believe the Navy has attempted to locate the Seawolf reactor vessel, but has not found it. 303 Mr. Stupps. In what way has the Department of Energy been involved in the search for it, and what damage might have ensued from it? Mr. Meyers. As best I understand it, the environmental effects of disposal of that particular irradiated pressure vessel are practically nil. The prime source of radioactivity is cobalt 60 which is an integral part of the metal and has a half-life of some 5 years. This means that in 10 half-life periods the radioactivity will be reduced to innocuous levels. In the last 20 years, the significant radioactiv- ity has decayed away. Mr. Stupps. Has the Department of Energy been involved in the search for, or a study of that vessel? Mr. MEYERS. I believe the Department, through our naval reactor program, has given technical support. I will provide, now, addition- al Seawolf disposal information. [The following was received for the record:] THE DISPOSAL OF THE USS SEAWOLF REACTOR The first reactor in the USS SEAWOLF was a liquid metal intermediate range power reactor and was not a breeder reactor. Although the original reactor plant operated satisfactorily for approximately two years, it was replaced with a pressur- ized water reactor because the liquid metal type of reactor plant was determined to be unsuited for continued submarine application. The weight savings that had been sought in using the more compact liquid metal design was lost due to the need for additional shielding. With a water-cooled reactor the reactor compartment can be entered to make repairs after the reactor is shut down. With a liquid metal plant there is a considerable delay time which was considered undesirable for a warship which might suffer battle damage requiring immediate repair. There was also a fire hazard with liquid sodium which can react with water creating an additional hazard in a submarine application. The reactor was designed by the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. General Elec- tric was the primary manufacturer. The USS SEAWOLEF reactor plant was disposed of at sea. On April 18, 1959 the radioactive reactor vessel and reactor plant components from the sodium-cooled nuclear reactor plant in the submarine SEAWOLF were escorted by the U.S. Coast Guard to a disposal site in the Atlantic Ocean 120 miles off the East Coast of the U.S. and sank in 9,000 feet of water at latitude 38°30'N and longitude 72°06’W. The expended nuclear fuel was not disposed of at sea but was shipped to special Govern- ment facilities for processing in the same manner as for other expended nuclear fuel. The disposal was conducted at a site approved for sea disposal of radioactive waste by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. This disposal site was used by other organizations for a number of years for radioactive waste as noted in a report issued by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (Ocean Dumping, A National Policy, October 1970). The radioactivity was sealed within the heavy steel reactor vessel for disposal. The radioactivity was restricted from release not only because it was located inside the reactor vessel but because it was further contained as an integral part of the corrosion resistant stainless steel internal reactor vessel structure. A release into the surrounding area would be expected to occur only due to corrosion of both the reactor vessel followed by slower corrosion of the stainless steel. Furthermore, the products of corrosion of the steel are primarily solid rust-like materials which are extremely insoluble in sea water and therefore tend to remain attached to the metal surfaces or remain locally on the bottom sediments. The total amount of radioactivity was approximately 33,000 curies and was pre- dominantly cobalt 60, which has a 5 year half-life. In the twenty-one years since disposal the radioactivity has decayed to less than one-tenth its original value. In summary, the radioactivity should remain within the SEAWOLF reactor vessel wae it decays away and no significant effect on the marine environment is expect- ed. Source: Provided by Chief of Naval Information, U.S. Navy. 304 Mr. Srupps. I am not a scientist, but the technology involved in the particular reactor fueling that submarine is different from the current generation of submarines, is that correct? Mr. Meyers. That is right, that was a sodium cooled reactor. As ae I know, we did not build more of those. That was one of a ind. Mr. Stupps. The question of the future disposal of the fuel, of the powerplant of the current generation of nuclear submarines is an altogether different question. Mr. Meyers. Let us make one thing clear. We are only talking about the reactor pressure vessel. No fuel was disposed of; just an empty shell. With regard to the reactor fuel, it is taken out for processing purposes and goes to our plant in Idaho. It is processed iene to extract the remaining uranium which is again made into fuel. Mr. Stupps. I gather that we do have a question. This article considers scuttling old Navy subs. Mr. Meyers. There is a question of what we are going to do in the future with respect to some of these things. The plans for disposal of Navy reactors will be going through a complete review. There will be no precipitous actions taken. It is not going to be a case of it just happening. Mr. Stupps. That was not my question. Am I correct that the question of the disposal of the reactors on these submarines as they become decommissioned is an open ques- tion of which one of the alternatives being considered is burial at sea? Mr. MEYERS. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. That is correct? Mr. Meyers. That is correct. Mr. Stupps. Now, do these reactors constitute low level or high level waste? Mr. Meyers. Well, we are talking only about irradiated pressure vessels in any case, but whether these constitute high level or low level waste depends upon definitions. Mr. Stupps. I know. That is why I asked. Mr. Meyers. And the definitions of low level waste and high level waste are imprecise at this time. The only definitions for high level radioactive waste that exist in the Code of Federal Regulations appears in 10 CFR, part 50, appen- dix F, and 40 CFR 227. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 10 CFR part 50, appendix F, defines high level waste as the effluents from a reprocessing plant. The Environmental Protection Agency in 40 CFR, part 227, defines high level radioactive waste—for pur- poses of EPA responsibilities under the Marine Protection and Sanctuaries Act—as irradiated fuel from nuclear power reactors and effluents from a reprocessing plant. Mr. Stupps. So under the existing regulations promulgated pur- suant to the Act, those would be considered low level? Mr. Meyers. Again, they certainly are not the effluents of a reprocessing plant. One of the things that NRC is doing right now is trying to come to grips with defining more precisely the various categories of 305 waste, but under the existing definition, you know, it is something less than high level waste. Mr. Stupps. I think we may, in future hearings, ask the Depart- ment of Defense to appear. On page 6 of your statement you say, “A final environmental impact statement on the management of commercially generated radioactive waste has recently been made available to Congress and the public.” The principal option is the landbased disposal one? Mr. Meyers. That was its conclusion. It concluded that deep geologic disposal on land was the way to go. Mr. Stupps. How detailed was the seabed operation? Mr. Meyers. The assessment of subseabed disposal used all the available information we have now, and remember, we are in a very early phase of an extended research program, so it analyzed the available data. Mr. Stupps. We are, as you say, in a very early phase of this research. What are we doing with a final environmental impact statement? Mr. Meyers. The final environmental impact statement is to decide which disposal option—or options—should be emphasized in DOE’s R. & D. program. The approach proposed in the environmen- tal impact statement is to develop mined repositories for land disposal in geologic formations. Mr. Stupps. Not final in the sense of resolving the question once and for all? Mr. Meyers. We obviously are looking at alternatives to land- based geological disposal, and should something appear much more attractive before we build a land repository, we would have to reopen the issue. Mr. Stupps. You mean more attractive, or less unattractive? Mr. Meyers. Probably the latter. Mr. Stupps. Let me ask you one final thing. On the last page, page 7, you say, “It has been suggested that the implementation of subseabed disposal of spent nuclear fuel would be in violation of the Ocean Dumping Act.” By whom has it been suggested, and what is the opinion of the Department of Energy? Mr. Meyers. The Environmental Protection Agency suggested it. I think it is related to the explicit exclusion of high level waste and spent fuel from ocean disposal. Spent fuel does contain high level waste, but there are some utilities that carry spent fuel on its books as an asset, so one cannot say now it is a waste. If spent fuel is reprocessed, the residual waste products are high level waste. I know some attorneys at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission cur- rently consider spent fuel as high level waste, but at the same time they said we ought to get congressional affirmation on that. Mr. Srupps. It is a currently arguable point. Mr. Meyers. There is no doubt that spent fuel contains high level waste, but spent fuel of itself has residual value and has not been declared to be high level waste. Mr. Stupps. Your agency has not concluded as of this point that pie galesegibed disposal would be prohibited under the current stat- ute! 306 Mr. Meyers. I cannot answer that. I do not recall. | Mr. Stupps. Could you get us the answer from the Department of Energy on that? Mr. Meyers. Yes. [The following was received for the record:] POsITION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ON SUBSEABED DISPOSAL As I indicated in my testimony, the EPA has, on several occasions, advised Congress of its position that the sub-seabed emplacement of radioactive waste falls within the purview of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 1401 et seg. Under EPA’s interpretation and absent an amendment to the Act, sub-seabed disposal by the United States of high level radioactive waste could _not take place since the Act precludes permits for ocean disposal of high level wastes. After an independent review of the Act, we are of the view that EPA has correctly interpreted the Act and that ocean dumping includes deep seabed emplace- ment for purposes of disposal. In this respect we note that the Act includes within the definition of “dumping” the “intentional placement of any device in ocean waters or submerged land beneath such water. . . .” (emphasis added) 42 U.S.C. 1402(c)f). It could be contended that careful emplacement of waste into sub-seabed geologic formations is not “dumping” within the Act’s intended courage. However, as a practical matter, we would seek to amend the Act in the event that sub-seabed emplacement emerges as the preferred disposal option. Mr. Srupps. The question is, quite simply, Has the Department reached a conclusion with respect to the question of whether or not the subseabed emplacement of these wastes would be in violation of the ocean dumping statute. Mr. Meyers. There are some letters from various people at EPA who indicate that the act does cover subseabed disposal. Mr. Stupps. I would not be surprised if EPA came to a different conclusion. Mr. Meyers. I do not know what their conclusion is, but I will find out and include it in the material I just promised to get for you. Mr. Stupps. OK. If you can get that, I would appreciate it. Finally, you say, with respect to the same question, “We have not made a final judgment as to whether our existing international treaty obligations need to be restructured,’ for example, whether the London Convention would similarly prohibit subseabed em- placement. I take it that there is no manipulation among your own lawyers? Mr. Meyers. I believe the Department of State said the same thing. Mr. Stupps. The Department of State said it was? Mr. Meyers. Well, we get conflicting signals. Some people there think it does; others do not. Mr. Stupps. That is what I am trying to get at. What do you think? Mr. Meyers. I honestly do not know. Mr. Stupps. I do not mean you personally. I mean the Depart- ment of Energy. Mr. Meyers. I will be glad to get that. Mr. Stupps. Would you get that for the record also? Mr. MEYERS. Yes. [The following was received for the record:] 307 PositION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ON THE LONDON CONVENTION The Committee requested DOE’s position as to whether the London Ocean Dump- ing Convention (Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter) prohibits the deep seabed emplacement of high level radioactive wastes. The Convention does not deal expressly with sub-seabed disposal. Moreover, the ambiguity of key provisions allows arguments supporting or rejecting inclusion of sub-seabed disposal within the Convention’s scope. Article IV, Section (1)(a), as supplemented by Annex I of the Convention, prohibits the “dumping” of high level radioactive waste, which is ‘defined on public health, biological, or other grounds, by the competent international body in this field at present, the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency, as unsuitable for dumping at sea.’”’ Current standards are contained in IAEA Document INFCIRC 205-addendum 1/Rev. 1. As defined in the Convention, ‘“dumping”’ includes disposal ‘‘at sea.” The “at sea’ phrase may be interpreted to refer to the locus of the dumping operation or the final position of the materials disposed of. In our view, the better reading of the Convention is that it does not prohibit sub-seabed disposal which is carried out in a technically satisfac- tory manner calculated to isolate the waste from the marine environment. The State Department maintains that the strict legal scope of the Convention in this respect cannot be determined until the technical options are clarified. In this respect, we note that EPA, in a recent memorandum by its General Counsel, took the view that the Convention’s ambiguity should be resolved in favor of prohibiting sub-seabed disposal of high level radioactive material. We have been unable to discover any evidence that the drafters of the Conven- tion, which was a U.S. initiative, gave any consideration to sub-seabed disposal. As a practical matter, the parties of the Convention would probably disagree as to the Convention’s coverage of sub-seabed disposal. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. Mr. Pritchard? Mr. PritcHARD. Do you have a memorandum of understanding with NOAA and EPA for research in this whole area? Mr. Meyers. We are working with them very closely, but we do not have in existence a memorandum of understanding. We are working toward one. Mr. PRITCHARD. Do you think you will have one? Mr. Meyers. I would expect so. Mr. PRITCHARD. It would be helpful, would it not? Mr. Meyers. Yes, it generally is helpful to outline areas of re- sponsibilities, and who does what. Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems to me that it would be a helpful thing, and I am sorry you do not have one already, but I know these things do not come easily. That is all I have. Mr. Stupps. Ms. Mikulski? Ms. Mixutsxki. Mr. Meyers, you talked about these geologic for- mulations in which there is potential for placing nuclear waste. Why do you think the Earth—or what is the scientific explana- uion for why the Earth is currently formulating these rock depos- its? I will tell you why I am asking. I find when the Earth forms something, it is usually the way to her own protection, the genera- tion of new life. Therefore, my second question will be if we start putting this nuclear gunk in these rocks, if it could not further upset some balance in the Earth—— Mr. Meyers. That is the essence of the research and development program underway now. We know that those areas have been geologically stable for millions of years, and in several more mil- lions of years they will form into sedimentary rock. 308 The program is trying to find out whether or not by emplacing the solidified waste down there, whether there will be any effect whatsoever. Ms. Mikutski. What purpose does the rock form now, or do you not know? : Mr. Meyers. When you say what purpose does it serve, I do not now. Ms. Mikutski. On page 7—see, I think you do not know a lot. That is why what we are embarking on here is so dangerous, that I think it is—see, I think it is—it is my own personal opinion that the Earth, that the ocean is really the womb of the Earth, and by putting this stuff in we totally generate the basis of life on Earth, and we, and people know by philosophical indications. On page 7, you talk about identifying the public concerns on these issues of how is that going to happen, that other people are concerned about, how can they participate in these processes? Mr. Meyers. As our program expands and proceeds, we have a rather—the subseabed disposal program is part of a larger waste management program. We will be, among other things, putting out a national waste management plan that encompasses all portions of the program. That plan will be discussed with various groups, the public in general, and other interest groups, for an extended period of time. Additionally, when any major action with significant environ- mental impact is proposed to be taken under the waste manage- ment program, a specific environmental impact statement will be prepared. It is the Department’s policy to hold public hearings when it issues such statements. But we are going to make every effort to see that there is meaningful public input to the subseabed disposal program. We are at a very early stage in the program that seems to have merit, and, as far as I know, we would not proceed if anything untoward came up. So we share your concern. We are not out to spoil the environment. Ms. Mikutsk1i. What has been the role of the United Nations as it relates to the analysis? Mr. Meyers. I believe the United Nations sponsored the London Convention, as part of this activity. Ms. Mikutsk1. What about this work group that is so—— Mr. Meyers. That is the Nuclear Energy Agency, which is part of the Organization for Economic Development. There are other countries which, for one reason or another, are interested in seabed disposal, and we enumerated them earlier. We have worked out a cooperative program so that we can exchange information in the most efficient manner possible. Ms. MikutskI. But the United Nations is not the central coordi- nating body in this. Mr. Meyers. No, not for this subseabed program. It is the Nucle- ar Energy Agency. Ms. Mixku.ski. My final question, Mr. Meyers, is from a charge— since you are in charge of the nuclear waste management, DOE, what type of containers have they used, or in consideration, were being used, for this type of shipping, or are those issues also under consideration? Mr. Meyers. Do you mean for the subseabed program? 309 Ms. MIKuLsKI. Yes. Mr. Meyers. We are looking at a number of container materials. One of them that is the most attractive is a titanium alloy. Wheth- er or not we will need special ships, I just do not know at this time. We have not reached that stage of engineering systems analysis. We are still at the early stages of examining scientific feasibility, but I would not expect that the engineering of a particular contain- er, or ship to carry the waste would be a very difficult engineering problem. Ms. MIKULSKI. What is the half-life of, say the kind of nuclear waste that we are considering? Mr. Mevers. Well, it goes to thousands of years. Ms. Mikutsk1. How long? Mr. Meyers. Thousands of years. Ms. MiIkKuLskI. How many, 5, 10, 100,000? Mr. Meyers. Well, it depends upon the efficiency of the recy- cling, or the reprocessing process, for one thing, whether or not you get all the plutonium out. In the case of spent fuel, where you do not get the plutonium out, then it remains in the spent fuel, and I guess the plutonium half-life is something on the order of 24,000 years. Ms. MIKULSKI. 16,000 years, so we are trying to think of some type of container that is going to last 16,000 years, sitting in a rock at the bottom of the ocean? Mr. Meyers. No, not necessarily. The container may not have to last that long a period of time. _Ms. Mixutsx1. Maybe only 14,000? Mr. Meyers. The emplacement in the sediment is such that we would expect that even if the container just dissolved completely the day it was put down, the migration of those nuclides would be no more than 3 or 4 feet from where they were placed. Ms. Miku.sk1. Unless they are in an earthquake zone. Mr. Meyers. Again, we are trying to locate stable sedimentary areas of the ocean floor, and there seem to be many that have been literally stable for millions of years. Ms. Mixkutsk1. I thank you. I just find it so astounding. I buy cans of string beans, to tell me that they have to be taken off the shelf in 3 or 4 years, and then we think in terms of storing nuclear waste, with the half-life just 16,000 years, and in a container, and putting it in a place that we are not sure it is going to be stable, is just—— Mr. Meyers. Well, that is, again, remember, what the program is about. We are not convinced that it can be done. Ms. Mixutski. I know what the program is about. I am just telling you that I really do know what the program is about and I do not like it. That is it. You have to know a Polish woman to know something about the curie contact factor. It drives you up the wall. Mr. PritcHarD. Would the gentlelady yield? You do not object to the research in trying to find out the facts? Ms. Mikutskt. I do not object to the research but I think it is an absolute waste of time. I am someone who thinks that we should ban nuclear to the point of production. It is my belief that if it is something that is not naturally biodegradable, it should not be 310 manufactured at all. I would feel much more secure if the research that we were putting in in dealing with this kind of stuff is going in to find alternative resources that were available to nature and would naturally be decomposed. That is why I think the research ought to go, that is where I think our commitment ought to go, I think the Earth and its people would be happier if that happened. Mr. PritcHarD. I guess the only other thing is if you have foreign countries that have very little control over, and they are going to be producing and possibly using the ocean, we also have to go ahead with the research, do we not? Ms. Miku.tsk1. I think the fact is, again, the moral leadership of the United States ought to formulate a policy to discourage that and encourage the scientists of the world to pursue the objectives that I just outlined. As long as we are fighting in a rear guard action, there will never be. We cannot get rid of it, whether it is PCB’s or nuclear or whatever, and eventually we are going to, under the guise of saving ourselves, kill ourselves. Mr. Stupps. That is a biblical citation that you better not re- spond to. Mr. PRITCHARD. I will not. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Carney. Mr. Carney. I appreciate what my colleague from Maryland says. However being one who has been the benefactor of nuclear medicine having gone through some very chancy invasive proce- dures diagnostic procedures relating to my heart, now it can be done with far less risk utilizing nuclear medicine. I appreciate the other side of the coin, as well. But we do have to be very careful. The Department, you say in your statement on page 3, is con- tinuing to cooperate with the EPA in assembling comprehensive data on ocean dumping activities in the past. Do you think you have the ability to assemble the data necessary to have a grasp on how much is indeed in the ocean now from our past practices? Mr. MEyErs. Well, the best we could do is go through the records that we do have and provide them to the EPA. Mr. Carney. Do you have any idea how much might have been dumped that is not a matter of record? Mr. Meyers. I do not know. The nuclear licensing program rec- ords where those things were quantified are easier to get than to search through the Department of Energy’s or predecessor agency’s own laboratory records which were not licensed but we are trying to do the best we can in assessing what was done several years ago. Mr. Carney. How much of this waste would you say offhand would be related to the practice of nuclear medicine? Mr. Meyers. Well, I cannot give you figures from the past, but the current generation rate of so-called low-level waste, which in- cludes the residue of medical nuclear medicine is on the order of 25 percent of the total, and the total quantity of low-level wastes is perhaps 3 million cubic feet per year. So, 25 percent of that would be related to the nuclear medicine. Mr. CarRNEY. You made a statement, and I believe I think we heard contradictory statements, where you said even if the waste were released, referring to the waste that we put into the ocean 311 e prior to this, by the time it would reach the ocean floor, natural dilution and disbursal would result in an environmentally safe level of radioactivity. Does that statement apply to all the waste that is in the ocean in your belief? Mr. Meyers. I would guess, based on what has gone into the oceans to date, the natural dilution; and dispersion within the ocean would be rather innocuous, and within acceptable standards. Mr. CarRNEY. The ocean itself has a vast amount of radioactivity? Mr. Meyers. That is right. Mr. Carney. How much, in relation to that natural amount, have we added over and above? Mr. Meyers. You probably could not even measure it. One of the reasons that I made the statement that I did is that in comparison with the natural radioactivity of the water, the material that we put in would be much below that. Mr. CarNEy. What do you mean by much? Five times? Three times? Mr. Meyers. I do not have the figures with me but I can get them for you. Mr. CARNEY. Could you estimate that amount? Mr. Meyers. Something like a few percent of the total. Mr. Carney. A few percent less or what we put in? Mr. Meyers. A few percent of the naturally occurring radioactiv- Mr. Carney. Of what we put in there now? Mr. Meyers. Yes. Mr. CARNEY. Going back to that submarine, which intrigues me somewhat. You said that the waste in that submarine is relatively little. What exactly did they do? Did they take out the fuels? Mr. Meyers. Yes, the fuel was taken out and only the steel reactor pressure vessel was disposed of. The radioactivity is in- duced radioactivity and it is essentially cobalt-60 with a half-life of about 5 years. Within 50 years the level of radioactivity will be greatly reduced and you will be bearly able to measure that. One of the anomalies in the nuclear business is that we have very sophisticated instru- ments and we could measure levels of radioactivity that would be impossible, say, in the toxic chemical arena. The levels that would be in the water associated with the pressure vessel—that is, assum- ing that it dissolves, and we know that it does not—would be relatively innocuous. Mr. Carney. Would it be fair to assume based on what you said that the level of radioactivity that would come from that vessel would be less than what would come from someone walking around with a pacemaker on them? Mr. Meyers. Than what? Mr. Carney. Less than the radioactivity of a person walking around with a pacemaker on. Mr. Meyers. Probably. I do not know the numbers but I would guess yes. Mr. Carney. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Anderson? 312 4 Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 5 I share some of Barbara Mikulski’s skepticism. If we cannot even document what went on in the past, how sound are our studies of these future prospects? But, anyway, Mr. Meyers, you state that no new licenses for ocean disposal, low-level waste, have been issued since about 1960. I would like to clarify that point. Although no licenses were issued to new companies, licenses have been issued since 1960 to companies already disposing of nuclear waste. And I may add that without the benefit of public hearings, is that not true? Mr. Meyers. I am not certain about the public hearings but I do know that the companies that were disposing of waste in 1960 continued to do so up until 1970 when it was stopped. Mr. ANDERSON. So there were licenses granted to the old compa- nies up until 1970? Mr. Meyers. I am not certain of that. Under their existing li- cense, they were able to continue dumping. Whether the licenses were modified I do not know, but again no new licenses were issued. There was continuing dumping up until 1970 when it did stop. Mr. ANDERSON. Am I to understand that that was without the benefit of public hearings? You stated that you were assembling comprehensive data files on all ocean dumping. When will this be complete? Mr. Meyers. I am not certain. But it is our intention to make our related files available to EPA. Mr. ANDERSON. I would hope you would make this information available to this committee. Mr. Meyers. Yes, sir. (The information which is very voluminous is being kept in the subcommittee files. ] Mr. ANDERSON. When you state that the disposal of high-level radioactive waste into the ocean has never been practiced by the United States, are you using the nonquantitative definition used in the Ocean Dumping Act? Mr. Meyers. The only precise definitions of high level waste are the ones that I mentioned earlier, that is 10 CFR, part 50, appendix F, and the 40 CFR, part 227 definitions. Mr. ANpDERSON. How do you define high level? Mr. Meyers. I believe—I do not recall the exact language, but it has to do with the first cycle solvent extraction from a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. It is spelled out in that particular context. Mr. ANDERSON. May I read that, so that you will understand what I was pointing out earlier? I mentioned the AEC, they defined low level as 50 millirems, or less per hour, and high level would be 2 rems, or more per hour, an intermediate would be those in between. Now, that, you can measure that. When you talked about the highly sensitive equipment that you had to measure these things, you could measure that, but when you try to do it with a definition that I think you are working from, a definition states, “high level radioactive waste means the aqueous waste resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, 313 and tHe concentrated waste from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalents in a facility for reprocessing a radiated reactor fuel, or radiated fuel from nuclear power reactors.” That is the definition that you are using. Mr. Meyers. That is—that is the applied definition. Mr. ANDERSON. And, which to me, does not—you are not really doing anything major then. Mr. Meyers. Let us go back to your discussion of the millirems, as a measure of dose rate. One could conceivably have something that emitted radiation in excess of—what was the number that you had for high level? Mr. ANDERSON. Two rems, or more per hour. Mr. Meyers. One could have material that emitted 2 rems per hour that remains radioactive perhaps for only 5 years, and after 5 years its radition level is insignificant. It may start at a high level of radioactivity, but may yet deteriorate in a very short period of time. In that case you would not consider it to have a lasting environmental impact. Mr. ANDERSON. What would be the impact on the person, or the fish, whatever, that would be in contact during those first 5 years? Mr. Meyers. It would depend on what you did with it. If that particular material were contained, it would have very little effect. Mr. ANDERSON. Supposing you ate it? Mr. Meyers. Well, I would not want to eat it. If it were that high in radioactivity, one could store it for a period of time, wherein the level of radioactivity would decrease substantially, so that you could process it, package it, and contain the radioactive material. Mr. ANDERSON. Then it would not be 2 rems. Then it would fall into other categories. Mr. Meyers. That is one of the problems that we have in trying to define radiation levels by dose rates rather than using specific isotopic levels. If you use a definition like curies or dose rates, you could define something as high-level radioactive waste, which would require substantial processing, packaging, not only substan- tial, but expensive, and by the time you are ready to dispose of it, it is innocuous, and you have essentially spent a lot of money that you did not need to spend. Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I think we are going to have to go into the definition a little bit later, too. Have you examined, Mr. Meyers, the data and site justification res Hiab the EPA states that there is no known environmental arm? Mr. Meyers. I have not myself read that. Mr. ANDERSON. Has the Department? Mr. Meyers. The Department staff has, yes. Mr. ANDERSON. Just because there is no known harm, does not rule out the possibility that there may be in fact harm to the environment, is that not true? Mr. Meyers. Well, I suppose you could take that approach. Mr. ANDERSON. That is the purpose of our study in our bill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Akaka? Mr. Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 314 Mr. Meyers, representing a State in the Pacific ae about the nation’s of the Pacific, I want to ask some questions about the Pacific area, and on page 1, you mentioned the term “geologically stable,’ that are being conducted, are to determine such areas. Can you tell me what geologically stable—have there been earth- quakes? Mr. Meyers. Yes, geologic stability means that there has been no seismic activity, no volcanic activity, no disruptive events over long periods of time. Mr. AKAKA. Can you tell me whether these tests have been conducted in the Pacific? Mr. Meyers. Where? Mr. AKAKA. In areas. No, have these tests been conducted in the Pacific areas? Dr. Meyers. Yes, surveys have been made in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Mr. AKAKA. Can you identify the sites? Mr. Meyers. Yes, I can certainly give you an accurate descrip- tion of where they are. I do not have it with me now. The next witness, Dr. Anderson of Sandia Laboratory, will talk about those sites. Mr. AKkakA. On page 4 you talk about sediment that could pro- vide the effective isolation of radioactive waste. Again, the question I ask is what do you mean by effective isolation? Mr. Meyers. Effective barriers means that it will retain the radioactive material so as not to adversely affect the biosphere. In other words, when it is put into the sediments, it will essentially stay there. Mr. AKAKA. And this—I heard you say earlier that that would be forever. Mr. Meyers. Essentially. Mr. AKAKA. I guess the next witness will provide the answers to where the other sediments are found in the Pacific area. We know that all of the discussion and experiments, also research is going on, because there is a buildup of high level waste around the world. What is happening to all of this waste at this time? Mr. Meyers. It is being stored. Mr. AKAKA. Is it being stored in areas in our country, is it being stored on land or—— Mr. Meyers. Yes, there are two kinds of high level wastes. One is the spent fuel elements that are essentially being stored at the reactor sites. These are being stored in spent fuel storage basins. The other category is waste which evolves from weapons produc- tion. It is stored in tanks at our Savannah River plant, and in South Carolina, and in our plant in the State of Washington. We also have calcined material stored in Idaho, where we process the reactor fuel elements from the naval reactor program. These are the DOE high level waste storage areas. Mr. AKAKA. Is there a time frame, as to whether we will have to begin storing it in depositories, such as salt seabeds? Mr. MEyErs. Yes, we have a time frame laid out in the program plan, when the geological repository will need to be available. 315 T is no safety reason why one could not store the waste in those tanks for extended periods of time. Mr. Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Mr. Meyers. I appreciate it. Mr. Stupps. Our next witnesses are Dr. D. R. Anderson, director, seabed disposal program, Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque, N. Mex., and Dr. Charles D. Hollister, senior scientist and dean of graduate studies, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Dr. An- derson and Dr. Hollister, I understand you have a joint paper, which testimony will be presented by Dr. Anderson. Let me an- nounce at this time that after the testimony of Dr. Anderson and Dr. Hollister, the subcommittee will break for lunch and we will resume with our final witnesses at 2 o’clock this afternoon. Dr. Houuister. Dr. Anderson will be describing the seabed dispos- al program. I think from the oceanographic community’s point of view our first reaction is also similar to those of this committee’s: “Why our oceans? And certainly not in my ocean.” So, we have had a lot of research and a lot of deep thinking that has continued. And what Dr. Anderson and I will try to do is to tell you what we know and what we don’t know. We don’t know a whole lot, but we also do know a lot. I would like to share that with you. Mr. Stupps. How long is your slide presentation going to be? Dr. ANDERSON. It will be probably 15 minutes. Mr. Stupps. I was going to say if there are some people who would like to sit around this inner circle, in spite of the risk to their reputation of being considered as Members of Congress, you are pleased to do that. Dr. Ho.uister. Particularly for the slides, I think it is really nepasrenit to see them in order to understand what the oceans are all about. STATEMENT OF DR. D. RICHARD ANDERSON, PROGRAM MAN. | AGER, SEABED PROGRAMS DIVISION, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY, ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.; AND DR. CHARLES D. HOLLISTER, SENIOR SCIENTIST, DEAN OF GRADUATE STUD- IES, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, WOODS HOLE, MASS. Dr. Ho.LuistErR. Why don’t you get started? Dr. ANDERSON. OK, I will. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are pleased to be here today to address the subject of disposal of nuclear wastes by burial in the sea floor. I would like to summarize our testimony briefly here, which addresses the seabed disposal option for high-level waste or spent fuel, and give additional information of general interest. I would like to begin the summary by addressing the question of why the oceans were ever considered for disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Back in 1974 the Atomic Energy Commission was faced with the problem of disposal of high-level wastes or spent fuel. They chose to look at the entire globe for possible repositories. If they did not assess that portion of the globe covered by water as shown in the first slide, we would not, we, meaning mankind, would not have made a complete assessment. The 70 percent of the globe covered 69-848 O - 81 - 21 1 ? 4 316 4 | by water, is the area we are now considering. The pon dis- posal program addresses two major questions. The first question for the program is: Is the subseabed disposal of high-level wastes or spent fuel feasible? This is a feasibility study rather than a study which takes an advocacy position. The second question is: Are the ocean disposal programs of other nations acceptable? We figure that we must assess the other nations’ programs as well as ours to know whether the research that they are doing is adequate. The concept for the subseabed disposal in cross section is repre- sented in the next slide. (Figure 2 from written testimony.) These topics, or areas of research, will be addressed later, so I would like to identify them here. The canister, the heated sediments, and waste form is in what we call the near field heated zone. The area outside of the heated zone is called the far field zone. The depth of burial is likely to be somewhere between 30 and 100 meters from the surface of the sediment and will be determined by ion trans- port studies to be discussed later. Next comes the physical and biological oceanographic programs followed by an emplacement program, a human uptake program, and a sea transport program. Next slide. (Figure 7.) The research approach within the program starts with making postulations of kinds of response developing mathematical models to predict what would happen; acquiring properties from the labo- ratory and from the field; making predictions of response and finally checking the predictions against field verification test. If one finds that that section of the model is predicting correctly then it is coupled with others and to make a total systems model to give predictions of the response of the geologic formation. If the model is found to be incorrect, then it is necessary to improve the proper- ties and the postulations—physics, chemistry, et cetera. The main sections of the systems model are the thermal input, the waste form, and canister in the near field, the far field ion transport, the benthic boundary layer, the biology and physical oceanographic studies, the dose effects to the biota, and finally dose effects to man, this is the procedure for assessing the technical and environmental feasibility. Next slide. (Figure 6.) I would like to point out that we have developed go and no-go gates within the program where we stop and assess the program using both scientists from within the program and external to it to see if the concept is still feasible. If feasibility is shown then the program proceeds to the next gate. We have gone through gate No. 1. We are in the process of addressing those functions in gate No. 2, which will allow an assessment of the technical and environmental feasibility. For the next moment I would like to concentrate on what is required to pass this gate. All of the units of the system’s model, as I discussed earlier, must be operational. The properties that are needed to feed those models are bracketed, but not necessarily validified. Verification tests of as many of the systems sections as possible are completed, and at least one site in each of the north- ern oceans—Atlantic and Pacific—identified. ae 317 Finally, a document prepared for review which identifies wheth- er the program at this point is technically and environmentally feasible. If it is not found feasible the program is stopped. The timeframe for this gate is 1986-87, funds permitting. On the next figure you can see the subsections of the program. They are: Site selection, environmental studies, multiple barrier quantification, waste emplacement, transportation, risk/safety analyses, and social scientific. Each of the sections is defined in detail in the program plan. I would now like to address some of the research done to date. One of the most important problems for the disposal of high-level wastes is the effects of heat. Figure 9 shows the temperature pro- file of an emplaced canister—50m depth—as a function of time. At the canister’s surface the temperature is very high for this calcula- tion, 250° C, but it decays very, very rapidly. In less than 10 years it has passed through the peak temperature and starting to de- crease. This means that we can test in real time for a lot of the thermal responses of the geologic formations that are critical to the program. Our in situ heat transfer experiment (ISHTE), which is the equivalent of an underwater Moon lander, is being developed to verify the thermal predictions and models that we now making. The ISHTE experiment will be on the floor of the ocean for approximately 1 year and will measure temperatures at the canis- ter interface and at locations radially out from the canister, the can sediment interface is expected to reach approximately 300° C. To develop the best canisters we have thus far measured corro- sion rates of typical materials in the marine environment. The best material found is ticode-12, a titanium, copper, nickel alloy (figure 11). Figure 12 shows that, for example, if you want a canister that lasts 1 year, ticode is not the choice, from a cost standpoint. How- ever, if you want a canister that lasts 300 years of longer ticode-12 is a very, very acceptable material as far as cost is concerned. Figure 8 shows two views of the results of the calculations that have been made for radionuclide migration. On the left half of the figure the little black spot is the canister. These calculations as- sumed that the plutonium was released instantaneously after the canister was put into the sediments and the hole was acceptedly plugged with sediment. The figure there represents a snapshot of the radionuclide concentration around the can, 100,000 years into the future. The plutonium has moved approximately four canister lengths during the period of time and has decayed to essentially background. There is one problem, however to date we have only developed an understanding of the response of positively charged radionuclides. We have yet to assess the problems dealing with the negatively charge radionuclides. Positive ions, it seems, stick very well to the sediments. Negative ions may not stick at all. Future nuclide transport research will address the movement of the negative charged nuclides through the red clay sediments. Another area that we have not yet addressed and remains un- known concerns the plastic properties of the sediment. Since the sediments are plastic they are relatively immune to mechanical things like earthquakes, impacts and earth fracture—there is no 318 capability of long-term cracks developing. That is the nose aspect. The negative part is that under low loads the sediments and the cansiter may move. Figure 10 is a picture of the results of first calculations that we have made using a new predictive mechanical mode. The canister is placed 30 meters into the plastic sediments. Estimated material property laws and properties were used. The displacement of the canister has been calculated as a function of different viscosity laws. In no case, however, does the can breach the sediment bar- rier. The research that will be done in the next 3 years will be to show whether these estimates were correct. In the biology and physical oceanographic sections the subsec- tions of the model that are being developed are the ones that address the dose to man and the dose effect to the fauna. Our approach to the effects on the fauna is to try and find species that are from shallow water, that are analogs of the deep water ones and test them as to their radiation sensitivity. If we find that there are none, then we will use the data already available for the shallow water analogs. These studies will take several years. The areas of the ocean that we are looking at are shown in figure 15. We have focused down from the large oceanic basins to these using criteria developed by the program. Due to economics we have not looked at the southern hemisphere. In the figure the Hawaiian Islands are at the bottom left hand below the center square in the Pacific. The three areas in the Atlantic span the mid-Atlantic ridge. During the next 6 years, the regions will be decreased to approximately 1- by 1-degree squares of approximately 60 nautical miles on a side the size of the area we think is adequate. Finally, the international program—the Seabed Working Group—which has been mentioned earlier today is a restricted subcommittee under the Nuclear Energy Agency’s Radioactive Waste Management Committee. Mr. Glen Boyer of the United States is the chairman of that group. Six nations are members. Two more have indicated that they plan to join next year. There are seven task groups—see figure 14—the left-hand side, which address the many phases of the seabed research program, are the nations and below their task group representatives. There are two reasons why some of those nations do not have individuals in every group: One is that the countries have just recently joined and their programs have not yet developed. The other is that in some instances, their primary inter- ests are in other areas such as low-level waste disposal. Participa- tion is then only in areas where high-level waste studies are com- plementary to low-level studies. I would like to terminate my testimony at this point. Dr. Hollis- ter and I will try to answer any questions. Mr. Stupps. Thank you gentlemen, very much. We will keep you folks in place. We will be going for a few moments and then break. You are trying to do research on phenomenon which could occur tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years from now; can we do such research? 319 Mr. ANDERSON. Charley, would you like to handle that one? Dr. Ho.uister. No; I am an oceanographer. In my 15 years or so in the business, I look at sediments in the seafloor and the rocks as a predictive scientist. What we are trying to do is to learn about the history of the oceans, back in time, so that we can do some credible predictions in order to answer the types of questions you just put forward. And the way to do this is simply take a core sample of the bottom of the ocean. We did this about halfway between Hawaii and the Aleutians. And we learned a lot. For example, we learned that this part of the North Pacific has been stable for at least 65 million years. During this time, the dinosaurs died out, the Alps were formed, the Himalayas formed, the Hanford Basalts were extruded, the Isthmus of Panama closed, the ice ages came and went, and of course Mount St. Helens was the most recent example of geologic unpredictability of the continents. The point is, there are some areas on the ocean that are very, very active: Earthquakes, lots of them, faults, et cetera. But based on volumns data, not the least of which are the results of the deep sea drilling project, we have been able to make a geologic map of the other 70 percent of the globe. So, by way of answering your question, there are very predict- able areas in the sea floor that we have been able to identify. And, certainly, vast areas of the north central Pacific have simply been moving northwestward for nearly 200 million years at a rate of about 6 feet in 60 years, which is, say, a man’s height in his lifetime; the whole plate is moving slowly westward. There are large areas in other oceans that are also away from spreading centers, away from volcanos, and also are beneath areas of extremely low biological productivity. If one considers this stability and the account of history one then has some credibility in saying that next 10,000 or 100,000 years may be equally boring in that this piece of real estate chuggs its way westward at about 8 or 4 inches a year. Dr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, the record that has been devel- oped on that 24-meter core we think is a continuous record from the day we took it back approximately 70 million years into the past. Nothing has been found that shows that the area has experi- enced anything that would make it unacceptable. Information like that gives us a very strong basis for predictive response of global processes over up to 1 million years. Mr. Stupps. I, of course, would not be inclined to challenge anything said by a doctor coming from Woods Hole, anyway. I appreciate that. That was an answer comprehensible to a layman. I appreciate that very much. Mr. Carney? Mr. Carney. No questions. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Akaka. Mr. Akaka. Thank you very much. Mr. Stupps. I am sure you took note of that map. Mr. AKAKA. Yes. I notice that the discussion has been all about the Pacific. And you commented that the area north of Hawaii, between Hawaii and the Aleutians, I think you said that is about the most stable 320 area you have found thus far, which means, then, that this area will probably be considered for subseabed deposits. Is that true? Dr. Ho.LuisTEr. Yes. What we are looking for is midplate, and by that I mean in the middle of a lithospheric plate. It is not along the old Hawaiian Emperor Seamounts chain, and it is not along the trenches, where there is a lot of volcanic activity and it is not along the spreading centers where the crust is breaking open. We are looking for geologic predictability in the centers of the big gyrs. We have about a half-dozen countries, and at least that many ships right now taking samples and looking in certain Atlan- tic areas that may satisfy our site-selection criteria. Our criteria are, quite simply, the demonstration beyond a doubt that the areas are geologically stable and have been so for very long periods. So, as this plate moves westward a hot spot continues to form the islands of Hawaii. And so it would be absolutely ridiculous to assume that someone would put waste “upstream” of where the Hawaiian Islands are forming now. Mr. AKAKA. You talk about this being predictive. I read that it is predicted that Diamond Head might erupt. So it is true that Hawaii is still alive volcanically. Dr. HouuistTer. Absolutely. This is something we all know; there is not a single student of marine geology who would argue with: that. Mr. AKAKA. I also learned that you have been doing studies north of Guam. Is this the same area you are talking about? ; Dr. Ho.uistER. Depending on how you mean, “real close,” then 1,000 kilometers is close. It is up in a large area of the northwest- ern Pacific that we are studying. The sediments are much thicker there than they are 1,000 kilometers north of Hawaii. My feeling is that the siting effort identifing really large—mil- lion square kilometer regions—where we can take a few samples to see if our predictions, or our hypotheses are correct, that is, that nothing has happened there for tens of millions of years. We are a very long way from choosing a site. Mr. AKAKA. Right now, this area you are talking about as being a very stable area between Hawaii and the Aleutians; can you give me a longitude and latitude reading on that area? Dr. HOLLIsTER. It is about 30 degrees north and 158 degrees west. It is 5,000 meters deep. The water is about 2° C. It is pitch black. It has 500 atmosphers pressure, say, 20,000 PSI. The mud is about 200 or 300 feet thick. It is very flat. The mud itself is rusty-colored clay with a consistency of Crest toothpaste on the surface. Basically, it is one of the most boring pieces of marine geological real estate there is. Mr. Stupps. He wants to know which congressional district. Mr. AKAKA. I am sure that it is mine. “Dr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a point missed that I really wanted to dwell upon very strongly. That point is that the program is, in effect, looking for reasons why this option is infeasible rather than feasible. Ocean scientists, 321 of which 16 universities are represented and use approximately 70 percent of the total funds of the program per year, all have that attitude. We fund them at less than 30 percent of their total yearly support, so that they will not be controlled by the program. Hope- fully, when and if they find something that makes it infeasible, they will stand up without damaging their careers—loss of finan- cial support—and say it is infeasible and here are the reasons why. Mr. AKAKA. To summarize, would I be correct in saying that you have found an area, that you have given me the longitude and latitude of an area in the Pacific, north of Hawaii, south of the Aleutians, that you are considering to be very feasible at this time as a place for storage in the subseabed? Dr. ANDERSON. At the very most preliminary work, yes. The term we use is “regions.” There are four. Of those four, the ranking that we have given them now is that the more westerly ones are the more interesting to us because the sediment thickness is greater. The farther you move to the east across the Pacific, the thinner the sediments become, the sea floors are younger, and the less interesting they become. We have not identified the exact depth that we might want to put a canister of waste into the sediments. If that number becomes 50 meters, for example, then obviously we will have to find an area in excess of 50 meters of sediments for it to be useful. If you go north of Hawaii, there are some areas in the eastern part of that central block that are less than 50 meters thick. So, therefore, they would not be adequate. Mr. AKAKA. Can you identify the most western area that is feasible now in the Pacific? Dr. ANDERSON. With the very first screening; yes. The more westerly we look, the more optimal. Dr. Ho.LuistErR. You know why that is? Because the farther west you go, the older the crust, and the thicker the sediment cover. This is a very simple and straightfor- ward concept as you might know. But I think there is another point. Could I interrupt? I am going to, anyway. I think the idea should be stated this way: I’m a research scien- tist and I think to defend something that hasn’t been shown to be feasible is a little premature. Do you know what I mean? I am trying to say we don’t know if this concept is useful. So I think this is more of an information exchange rather than a de- fense. I don’t feel at all comfortable in standing up in front of you defending it as though I was an advocate. I was simply asked a long time ago to look at the other two-thirds of the planet’s geolo- gy. And you do that by just taking the simplest places first and looking at those. And we are really in the middle of the feasibility phase of this program. We have so much more to learn. But on the other hand, we already know a lot about the geology of the submarine world because it is, in some cases, so boring. If I never see another red clay core again, I will be very happy. It is a boring and tedious piece of geology. 322 And, therefore, most of us get our reputations by studying the spreading centers where the very hot vents are; the National Geo- graphic covered our work there and everybody is very excited. That sort of action turns you on. But to look at 1 million square kilome- ters, where you take a core here and you go 500 miles and take another core and you lay them side by side and they are exactly we same, well, you really don’t get too excited about that sort of thing. I think the oceanographic community, which has been briefed all along about this concept is aware of the subseabed program. We have no secrets. We have gone to the International Council of Scientific Unions (Paris) and said, “What is wrong with the concept?” And from a geological point of view we are cautiously optimistic. But until we know whether these sediments will “burp,” because it may become buoyant after emplacing a hot “core,’ we have a problem. And if so, we will just shut the program down. Mr. AKAKA. Let me ask this: Would you say, then, that the most feasible region extends north of Guam, and west? Dr. HOLLISTER. Yes. Mr. AKAKA. Thank you very much. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much, Doctor. This was absolutely fascinating. The defense of the infeasible may be uncommon where you work but it is common practice around here. Dr. Ho.uistEer. I am beginning to learn the process. Mr. Stupps. I understand that minority counsel has one ques- tion. Mr. MARSHALL. Just one quick question to Mr. Anderson. The whole subseabed program appears to rely very heavily on mathematical modeling. Could you tell us how you plan on verify- ing some of these models that you will be constructing? Dr. ANDERSON. It is a very good question. I will try. Because we are talking of long periods of time, very much longer than we will be able to continue an experiment, we have taken the approach that we must use mathematical models which have the best physics, chemistry, biology in them, and then verify those through similar but accelerated tests. The in-situ heat transfer experiment is the first of our verifica- tion field programs. We plan to put a thermal source into the bottom and then watch the development of the time temperature profiles. These will be matched against the predictions. A similar type of experiment can be carried out for each subsection of the program. For example, the ion transport verification is also rela- tively easy and quick because you can use ions that do not stick as tightly as plutonium does. Remember it only moves four canister lengths in 100,000 years. If you use something like chlorine, it will move much more rapidly. So over a few years you can observe the distance that it has moved. Understanding that you have the phys- ics right, it then becomes a matter of putting in the appropriate and correct parameters, and making the predictions. 323 We can check the physics, the permeability and such by using the faster moving ions. We then have to make one assumption that the absorption coefficient—the sticking coefficients—that we have measured for something like plutonium are indeed correct. In 10 years, of course, the plutonium, if our calculations are correct, will not have moved far enough for us to be able to see it. Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. I wish we could spend all afternoon. This is fascinating. We are not used to witnesses who actually know something. We are usually hearing from government agen- cies, as you know. So it has been most enlightening. I deeply appreciate it. I particularly would like to spend the rest of the day on that burp that you mentioned. I imagine that is a multimillenial burp? Dr. Houuister. Yes. That is a real problem: How does the sedi- ment behave when it is heated up? We don’t know the answer to that. But I am not afraid of not knowing that answer now. I am really only afraid we won’t have the time before the advocates move in or the others move in and either close it off or open it up. I think the option ought to at least survive through the feasibil- ity before we close it down. The nuclear waste is here now, even if we turned everything off. That is what I am told. So, as a scientist I am trying to figure out what to do with it in the most geologically sensible way I can. Mr. Stupps. It is pretty sobering to think that some of us may have to make essentially political decisions on the basis of a pretty awesome lack of knowledge. our statement, of course, will be placed in the record in full. ‘ ey prepared statement of Dr. Anderson and Dr. Hollister fol- Ows: PREPARED STATEMENT BY D. RICHARD ANDERSON, PROGRAM MANAGER, SUBSEABED DISPOSAL PROGRAM, SEABED PROGRAMS DIVISION 4536, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATO- RIES, ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEx., AND C. D. HOLLISTER, SENIOR SCIENTIST, DEAN OF GRADUATE STUDIES, Woops HoLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, Woops Ho ze, Mass. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, we are pleased to be here today to address the subject of the disposal of nuclear wastes by burial in the sea floor. We will describe the activities of the Subseabed Disposal Program and some of the salient points of the subseabed disposal option. STRUCTURE The Subseabed Disposal Program, or SDP, is charged with two major tasks (Fig. 1). The first is to assess the feasibility of using the deep sea sediments as a repository for high level nuclear wastes or spent fuel. The second is to develop the apeaty to evaluate ocean disposal options considered or proposed by other nations. The SDP does not consider dilution in ocean waters or dumping of canisters of waste on the ocean floor as a viable disposal option for high level wastes. Rather, we are investigating the feasibility of burying canisters of high level waste, or HLW, in ae types of deep-sea sediments many tens of meters below the sediment surface ig. 2). Assuming that subeasbed disposal is found to be feasible, it still would be neces- sary to demonstrate, before any disposal operation could begin, that the disposal option can meet performance criteria established by the EPA to ensure the safety of man. The major research efforts of the SDP at this time are to describe and quantify the response of the canisters, the waste form, and the sediments to the radiation and heat from high level waste or spent fuel. This research is divided into a number of areas. (Fig. 3). specifically: 324 Site studies to investigate areas of the oceans which may have a predictable geologic future and to determine the properties of the sediments in these areas. This is being done in cooperation with a number of nations. Environmental studies to investigate the transport mechanisms, both physical and biological, by which nuclides could be transported back to man. This research includes studies of mixing rates in the ocean and an assessment of life in the deep sea. Multibarrier identification and quantification to investigate the natural and man- made barriers that could be interposed between buried wastes and mankind. This includes material corrosion studies, migration of nuclides through sediments, and the physics and chemistry of a heat source in the sediments. Safety analyses to use all available information to predict the safety parameters and the amount of environmental impact expected from all phases of the subseabed program. Emplacement of wastes in sediments, transportation, and social-scientific issues are all areas which will receive more attention in the future. Much of the research in these areas done for the SDP is conducted by researchers at major oceanographic institutions and universities in the United States. Selection of researchers with established interest and expertise in areas important to the SDP has permitted an efficient use of effort and funds. Other research is carried out at various private and government-supported laboratories (Fig. 4). The SDP work schedule is divided into four phases (Figs. 5 and 6). Phase 1, completed in 1976, was the estimation of technical and environmental feasibility on the basis of historical data. Phase 2, to be completed about 1987, is the determina- tion of technical and environmental feasibility from newly acquired oceanographic and effects data. Phase 3, to be completed about 1995, is the determination of engineering feasibility and legal and institutional acceptability. Phase 4, to be completed about 2010, is the demonstration of disposal facilities. At the end of each phase of the program, concept feasibility is assessed. This assessment requires both internal and external review. At each of these reviews, a comprehensive report will be prepared summarizing the results of that phase. If results indicate that the subseabed disposal concept is unacceptable, the program will be terminated and emphasis thereafter will be placed on demonstrating this unacceptability to other nations which are considering using the seabed for HLW or spent fuel disposal. SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS High-level waste must be isolated from the biosphere for tens of thousands of years. Since it is impossible to conduct experiments on this time scale, it is neces- sary to construct models to predict the behavior of canisters and radioisotopes in the sediments. The models are developed by using a reiterative plan (Fig. 7) that requires them to pass a field verification test before they can be accepted. Research to date indicates that the highly absorptive nature of oceanic clays provides an effective barrier to radioactive cations. The results of predictions from a model developed in the program indicate that plutonium would have migrated only a few meters 100,000 years after emplacement (Fig. 8). The models to predict nuclide migration must take into account the heat produced by the waste. The heat production of the waste is the major complicating factor in subseabed disposal. For a specific waste package, the temperature of the sediment reaches a maximum shortly after emplacement, then begins to decrease (Fig. 9). This heat curve points out that it is possible to do experiments, perhaps of 15 years’ duration, during the worst case—highest temperature—time after emplacement. A related area of research concerns the resistance of sediment to movement induced by the heat (Fig. 10). Corrosion experiments indicate that it will be possible to build containers that will last longer than the thermal period of the waste (Fig. 11), and that these containers will not be excessively costly (Fig. 12). For the last ten years, oceanogra- phers have had the technology to routinely drill in deep sea depths and the ability to re-enter such holes. With this technology, we assume that canisters could be retrieved if it were desirable. These selected examples have yet to be verified in the field. Some technical questions, such as canister retrievability, will have to await further engineering studies for definitive answers. The research to date, however, seems to be promising. WHY CONSIDER SUBSEABED DISPOSAL Areas of the ocean floor have a number of features that make them quite attractive for technical reasons. The seafloor and its covering of sediment is a very simple geological environment. It is geologically young and has not undergone the 325 complex history of the continents. We can observe the processes by which the sea floor is being made, transported, and subducted in various areas; this allows us to make sound predictions about the future of sites in the oceans. The plastic sediments of the ocean floor are also without faults or fissures, and can easily be studied with acoustic techniques. In the areas under consideration, these sediments are uniform over wide areas. This simplicity greatly increases our ability to make accurate models. The ocean itself presents an unsurpassed barrier to human intrusion, whether deliberate or accidental, to the repository. The areas of the sea floor under consider- ation are perhaps the least valuable property on the earth. There is little reason for anyone to visit the area. The canisters could be placed individually, or in stacks a few canisters high. A single disturbance, from whatever cause, should affect only one or a few canisters. The remainder of the repository would not be jeopardized. The populations in the area floor under consideration are very sparse (Fig. 13). The emplacement of canisters would temporarily disturb about 0.01 percent of the disposal area. For these reasons among others, the seabed is being considered for the disposal of HLW by a number of nations which may lack suitable land-based areas available for safe disposal of nuclear wastes. The SDP cooperates with these nations in an international working group (Fig. 14) to share information and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. SITE STUDIES The ocean is clearly too immense for detailed study over large areas. It is possible to use existing data and exclusion criteria, however, to narrow down the oceans to areas for detailed study. This process has led to the selection of midplate, mid-gyre regions as the most promising for our studies. The areas under consideration are away from plate boundaries where seismic activity is concentrated (Fig. 15). They are away from the coastal regions, which have productive waters where fishing activity is concentrated (Fig. 16) and which may also have valuable hydrocarbon deposits or manganese nodule deposits having high copper content (Fig. 17). The low primary production in mid-gyre regions allows the deposition of sediment types that provide the best barrier to nuclide migration. The sediments at locations within these areas are uniform over a wide lateral extent. Cores from different locations may have the same features even though their deposition rate may differ (Fig. 18). The mid-gyre regions also provide areas of very stable environment which are insensitive to global climatic changes (Fig. 19). Locations have been found where deposition has been continuous for many millions of years (Fig. 20), and is most unlikely to stop in the next million years. Thus, these areas of the ocean appear to offer a predictable, simple environment that is remote from man’s activities. In summary, we are cautiously optimistic about the possibilities for subseabed disposal of high level wastes and spent fuel, in that to date we have not identified anything which makes the concept infeasible. 326 Figure 1. Central Issues of the Subseabed Program Is Subseabed Disposal Of High Level Waste Or Spent Fuel Feasible? Are The Oceanic Disposal Programs Of Other Nations Acceptable? KEY QUESTIONS Is There A Set Of Natural And Man-Made Barriers Which In The Undisturbed State Satisfactorily Contain The Radionuclides? Can The Suitably Packaged Waste Be Safely Placed In A Sedimentary Geologic Formation? Are The Barriers Still Adequate After Intrusion? HUMAN UPTAKE SEA cbs aaa TRANSPORTATION L-~ ii ~ x eauees DOCK = Zz us PHYSICAL & LAND MASS ti] BIOLOGICAL < OCEAN- a OGRAPHY = WJ reo gel FAR FIELD (30 - 100 m) Confinement NEAR FIELD (Heated Zone) Medium) WASTE FORM & CANISTER BASEMENT ROCK (Not to Scale) Figure 2. Subseabed Disposal Concept 327 SYOLVSILSSANI WdlONIdd “p‘'y'az'G'9 S3AILIAILOV yO4 @ATIeRUSeSOId3y SYOLVOILSAANI TWdlONIYd SYOLVOILSAANI WdlONlYd 8 ALIAILOV 404 YOLVNIGYOOD WVY9Oud IVOINHOSL SAIMOLVEOSV?] VIGNVS V ALIAILOV Y¥O4 YOLVNIGUOOD WVY9O0Ud IWOINHOIL SAIMOLVYOSV?) VIGNVS YIJOVNVW WVYDOUd dNOud SAINOLVYORV] VIGNVS ONIWAALS - WOINHODAL NOILVIOSI JLSYM 4O NOISIAIG — SYaLYVNOGV3H we ibetd juawebeuew weiboig ~Tesodstq peqeesqns “¢ einbta 328 Figure 4, Program Participants CORNELL UNIVERSITY P. Dawson - Mechanics FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY G. Weatherly - Physical Oceanography HARVARD UNIVERSITY 1. Bupp - Economics A. Robinson - Physical Oceanography LAMONT — DOHERTY GEOLOGICAL OBSERVATORY OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY D. Hayes - Geophysics R. Anderson - Geophysics MASSACKUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY J. Ecmend - Ocean & Sediment Chemistry J. Kildow - Legal /Political Aspects OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY G. R. Heath - Geochemistry W. Pearcy - Biolosy H. Herrmann - Legal /Political Aspects PRINCETON UNIVERSITY K. Bryan - Physical Oceanography SCRIPPS INSTITUTION OF OCEANOGRAPHY EE OF OCEANOGRAPHY A. Yayanos - Biology R. Hessler - Biology K. Smith - Bioiogy P. Doyle - Core Dating M. Mullins - Biology F. Spiess - Engineering UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA - BERKELEY W. Houston - Geotechnical Properties J. Mitcheil - Geotechnical Properties UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA W. Seyfried - Geochemistry UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE J. Kelly - Legal /Political Aspects UNIVERSITY. OF NEW MEXICO E. Nuttall - Chemistry UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND A. Driscoll - Ocean Engineering E. Laine - Geology A. Silva - Geotechnical Properties J. Knauss - Legal / Politica! Aspects UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON B. Taft - Physical Oceanography P. Jumar - Bis!ogy T. Ewart - Ocean instrumentation L. Olson - Ocean Instrumentation A Nowell - Pnvsical Oceanoarachy WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY V. Schultz - Biology WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION . Bowen - Radiation Chemistry . Hollister - Physical Oceanography - Tucholke - Ges'ocy . Armi - Physical Oceanography . Rhines - Physical Oceanography . Sayles - Geochemistry ™wvUe-wWoc ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORIES S. Fried - Chemistry A. Frie¢man - Chemistry BATTELLE NORTHs\EST LABORATORIES E. Foster - Mechanica! Engineering W. Templeton - Radiation Biology CIVIL SYSTEMS, INC. P. Dzwilewski - Geotechnical Modeling R. McCurly - Gestechnical Modeling CONCEPTS DeVELOPMENT INC. D. Jackson - Biology C. Koplik - Risk Analysis URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING D. Deese - Lega! /Poiitica! Aspects WATERWAYS EXPERIMENT STATION B. Rohani - Geotechnical Properties DOE JECT D. G. Boyer OTHER E. W. Johnson (MRC) D. S. Smith (EPA) A. Malahoff (NOAA) R. Bennett (NOAA) SANDIA LABORATORIES D. R. Anderson - Program Management L. Brush - Hydrothermal Geochemistry LS. Gomez - Radiation Biology R. D. Klett - Systems Engineering J. Lipkin - Material Properties C. M. Percival - Mechanical Engineering D. M. Taibert - Emplacement Studies D. G. McVey - Heat Transfer M. G. Marietta - Appiied Modeling J. L. Krumhansl - Hydrothermal Geochemistry K. L. Erickson - Chemistry L. Abrego - Metaiiurgy W. J. Magnani - Meta'lurgy C. H. Karnes - Mechanics MA. Neusom - Emplacenent Studies M. Schiess - Empiacement Studies 329 Figure 5. Tasks Reguired to Pass Go/No Go Gates for Each Phase Gate 1: FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT FROM HISTORICAL DATA (Completed) Gate 2: TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FEASIBILITY All Units Of System Model Made Operational All Properties Bracketed But Not Verified Verification Tests Completed On Certain Property And Model Units At Least One Site In Each Of The Northern Atlantic And Pacific Oceans Identified And Initially Characterized Technical And Environmental Feasibility Document Prepared Gate 3: ENGINEERING FEASIBILITY All Units Of The System Model Developed And Verified All Properties Verified Several Sites In The Atlantic And Pacific Oceans Identified And Characterized Engineering Feasibility Document Completed And Reviewed Long-Term In -Situ Experiments Initiated Conceptual Design Completed National And International Legal And Political Positions Established Draft Environmental Impact Statement Written And Reviewed, And License Application Submitted Gate 4: | DEMONSTRATION OF DISPOSAL CAPABILITY Title | And Title 11 Designs Completed License Or Permit Received Dock And Ship Built And Tested ~ Land Transportation Network Made Operational Monitoring Network Developed 330 AN3W31LWIS LOVdAI WAIN3WNOUWIANS & & G3AI3934 LIWN3d G3uvdaud G3M3IA3¥ 7 N3LLIEM ALNIGISV34 IWIN3WNOXIANS NOILINYLSNOD Siies s2T Le 2 WOINHD3L + ' ; : \ H S1NOd]u AUWWWNS HOTVIN © NOILWZIN3LOVYVHO : SNW390 NY3HLYON ONIMOLINOW 31S S3LIS WH3A3S 31S 3NO WNis WILINI ' 4N3WNdO13A30 TWOILIHD S3IGNLS LIS 1 1 | TENT , baie 35vyHO1sS 1 W327 1 13m S31LINDW4 LHOd ONwISNOD poe \ Wain 1) tauih aaa y 1 wate ; | au ' ' I NOILVLYOdSNVYL ' 1 1 \ ! i 7 Se oe oa | ee on ANA3IWSS3ASSY ¥SIN ' 1 | i} 1 { ' | \ i i I NOILISINDOV ALNadOud G37IV130 ONILENOVES ALY3dONd IWILINI NOILONYISNOD \ | S4S31 7313 (42UIM 2 2a)9wWoRaUE,) ! \ (aus) W374 Vays) 1 3a SBANdO}AASCVISGON INSWIOVIdWa ' 4 ' \ \ ; \ ! ae a ES oi ee eee ee Ie 2 eee eee \ \ | _ NOIISOd TVNOLLWNUSINI 9 IYNOILVN HSITAVISA SISLNAIDS/WIS0S | | ' ' | 1 | ' ' 1 1 es i 1 NOILISINOOV ALwadOUd O371V130 ONIL3NOVEE ALUIdOUd TWILINE 3NNILNOD ' $1S31 1313 NOILDIG3Nd LN3NdO13A: 1314-44 LN3WIG3S ! 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NOILISINOOV ALWadOUd 3NNILNOD H SNoIsIOaud $1S31 07314 NOILDIRNd 1N3NdO73A30 1300W Y3LSINVD ' ' \ : NOILVOISILNYNO 1 ; MalNeVeILLINW J \ ' i \ ' NOILISINOOV ALuadOUd G3TIVIIG ONILBNOVUS ALY3dOUd TWILINI ONINOLINOW 31IS j SNONLOIGRUd $1831 Q73I3 NOHIG34d INawao1aA3a 7aaow AHdVYDONVAIO W9ID01018 \ NOILISINDOV Alu3dOUd GaTIVIIG ONILSNOVES AlWadOUd WILINI ONINOLINOW 3LIS D SNOLLDIOaud SiS31 Oval Nouoiaaua INaWa01aA30 13G0W 4 AHdVYSONWS9O IWSISAHd \ i ' ' S3IGNLS \ \ ; W.LNAWNOUIANA | ‘ 1 \ ' ' ' U S3LIS WH3A3S SNV390 NY¥3HLNOS 1 ' 1 ' \ I ' ' ' ' O00Z 6661 8661 4661 S661 S661 P66I E661 766 661 O661 6861 S861 4861 9861 SB6I esl EB6I Ze6I I86I O86I Zadeyd ARTATIOY OTJZeEuUWeAbOIg *9 aINbtYy 331 Figure 7. Research Approach HYPOTHESIS MATHEMATICAL MODEL PREDICTION FIELD VERIFICATION PROPERTIES + Figure 8. Plutonium Concentration in the Sediment at 100,000 Years WATER MAXIMUM CONCENTRATION & 816 x 10 °° tq im} x ee 1 n __ CANISTER ‘ Ze ji as Z eZ es : = - Z TH) i » 0 0 r 1 r 4 “it! ole 20 RADINIS 69-848 O - 81 - 22 TEMPERATURE —°C x 200 150 100 50 Figure 9. 332 Canister Surface R=0.15m 100 TIME (Years) Temperature at Seven Locations Radially Outward from Center of Canister as a Function of Time 333 1000 NOTE: 1 KW OF 10 YEAR COOLED UOo (21 KW/M’) HAS D = 17.8” 1 KW OF 10 YEAR COOLED UOo2/PU (49 KW/M3) HAS D = 13.2” = O p= 100 Z Lu = LU O < a Qa 0 a = 2 DECAYING SOURCE INITIALLY AT 1 KW < 10 = 1 10 100 1000 TIME, YEARS Figure 10. Maximum Vertical Displacement of a Water Molecule with Initial Position Directly Above the Cask 334 Deoxygenated EXO Oxygenated [(\\\\\\) RRR a ie, INANANUNUNUAAAAAAANARANUNANAAAANRANAANANNDNI Corten - A VUMOOVerncM rrr rrrrrrrrrmnwanawwaac ee | GO NCUOSENOSOSAONONO RT ] Comer NANANNANNNNSANAANNUNNNNNNAURUANNNNRANNT | | Lead RRO OKRA \NANNNNNAANAAAANRRARNNANNNNUNNNRNNURRAN l Ebrite 26-1 ROO MMM . Monel 400 PKK KKK KKK KY | | Hastetloy C-276 RRR | | pe WNANANNANAARANAAAAAAAAAAAN | | TUVYVVVV wu | EXXXRY | Le Re MN NNNNNANANNANANS | . 0001 001 01 +4 1 10 Figure 11. Corrosion Rates (mm/yr) in 250° Brine Figure 12. Relative Overpack Costs Alloy Lys 29 yrs 300 yrs A36 Steel 0.3 7 83 Lead 0.3" 5 64 90-10 CuNi Q:7* 4 52 Ebrite 26-1 0.6" 3 28 Ticode 12 iv im i * minimum 1.6 mm wall assumed - jnundated, oxidizing, 250°C brine corrosion data used bistribution of the Eenthos 335 Ocean RAY Piomass in the Werld 1) < 0.05; 2) 0.05-0. 1; 3) 0. 1-1.0; 4) 1.0-10; 5) 10-50; 6) 50-300; 7) 300-1000; 8) > 1000 [20]. FIGURE 14 NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY-- RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT CUMMITTEE -- INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP SEABED WORKING GROUP NEA SECRETARIAT F. GERA TASK GROUP COORDINATOR D. R. ANDERSON (US) TASK GROUP CANADA JAPAN PHYSICAL OCEAN = HORIBE CANISTER - - WASTE FORM - - BIOLOGY HARGRAVE ICHIKAWA SEDIMENT & ROCK CARSTON - SITE CRITERIA BUCKLEY HOTTA SYSTEM ANALYSIS = H. ISHIKAWA *LEAD CORRESPONDENT CANADA JAPAN FRANCE NETH. UK US FRANCE MADELAIN CHAUVIN POTTIER BELOT RANCON®? WANNESSON DE MARSILY® G. VILKS R. ICHIKAWA A. BARBREAU TO BE APPOINTED F. S. FEATES D. GLENN BOYER (CHM) NETHERLANDS UK PRANGSMA HILL® = MARSH = MARPLES CADEE PENTREATH = FRANCIS SCHUETTENHELM SEARLE VAN DORP WEBB US ROBINSON MAGNANI® KRUMHANSL® YAYANOS® HEATH HOLLISTER® TALBERT Figure 15. Plate Boundaries Where Seismic Activity is Concentrated Figure 16. Distribution of Primary Production (modified from PARSONS & TAKAHASHI, 1973) 90° {20° 1509 80° 150° {20° #968 60° 30° o° 30° 60° 90° foe Rez ft “KS arta tora = ue 80°" 60° 60° 80° F] <100 mgc/m*/day 100-150 mg C/m/day FEE] 150- 200mgC/m* day FEE] >250mg C/m*/day 337 52 FERROMANGANESE DEPOSITS PACIFIC OCEAN NORTH AMERICA NICKEL CONTENT IN WEIGHT PERCENT @ ee. 15-20 10-15 5-10 <5 —— Se EEE EEE eemeeeaer” WORN, HORN AND DELACH, 1972. LAMONT-DOWERTY. IDOE /MSF GX33616 TECHNICAL REPORT NO 3 MALUSTRATOR Vv aiPPON COMPILATION: Mt. PARSONS AND |. SUSSILLDAUX eS Figure 17. Nickel Content of Ferromanganese Deposits of the Pacific Ocean an OL 6 8 Z 9 S v £ c t 0 - 338 g36 HSV Vv WNWIXVIN NHN @ ASNVHO YO1O9 NMOYE/S45NE Vl=¢ AHOO/1LAYOO SUOT}EOOT JUSTAFJIG wWOIJZ S9a10D usaeMjZeg ARTWIOJTUN “BT eANbtg L409 AO HLd3ad sjuawuoitAug eTqeys ATTeT eUT 10 ‘ol 24nvla 202i 20S! 208! 00S) 002 - 209 209 0 .0r for) ine) or -0 0 .o¢ .0f (9.) S3YNLVY3SdW3al 390vsyNsS vas isnonv 209 > e~- 206 202! 20S! 208! 205) 202! 340 Ohis, a3 “ih NOITIIN) 39Y INSW 341 ee Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will resume at 2 o'clock. [Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed for lunch at 1:05 p.m., to reconvene at 2 p.m.] AFTERNOON SESSION Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee will resume. Our first witnesses are from the Environmental Protection Agency—Dr. Roger J. Mattson, Director of Surveillance and Emer- gency Preparedness Division, Office of Radiation Programs, Envi- ronmental Protection Agency, and Mr. Robert S. Dyer, Senior Staff Oceanographer, from the same office. As I understand it, Dr. Mattson, you have a presentation to make, and then Mr. Dyer has a slide presentation? Dr. Mattson. We both have prepared testimony. Mr. Dyer’s presentation involves a slide presentation. He will summarize his testimony as he shows the slides. Mr. Stupps. Yes. If you could summarize it, we would appreciate it. The full text will appear, of course, in the record. STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER J. MATTSON, DIRECTOR, SURVEIL- LANCE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC- TION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT S. DYER, SENIOR STAFF OCEANOGRAPHER, OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Dr. Mattson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have this opportunity to describe what we know about the past ocean disposal of radioactive materials, to comment on some international aspects of this waste management practice, to consider the question of disposing of high-level radioactive wastes in the ocean, and to describe actions now underway with respect to monitoring low-level radioactive waste dumpsites. With me today is Mr. Robert Dyer, the senior oceanographer on my staff. He will follow my testimony and summarize the dumpsite survey activities. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The problem of what to do with radioactive waste came with the advent of nuclear research and weapons technology in the 1940’s. There were several kinds of waste generated in these activities. Sea disposal was used for the more dilute concentrations of these wastes, that is the so-called low-level radioactive wastes. Sea dispos- al began in 1946 under the licensing and contracting authority of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In 1960 the AEC stopped issuing new licenses for sea disposal of low-level wastes and made land burial facilities available at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and Idaho Falls, Idaho, for its contractors and licens- ees. In 1962, AEC licensed the first commercial land burial facility in Beatty, Nev. After 1962 most low-level radioactive wastes were disposed of at land burial sites, primarily because of the lower costs. Between 1962 and 1970 sea disposal of nuclear waste was little used, and in 1970 it was stopped completely. 342 i Although the materials dumped in the ocean were considered to be low-level waste, they were not harmless and were given special attention in their handling and transport. However, since these materials were of little or no value, good records of their quantities and isotopic composition were not maintained. Additionally, there is some uncertainty about the location of some dumpsites because of navigation inaccuracies. Between 1946 and 1970 the United States dumped approximately 89,500 containers with an estimated radioactivity content of 94,600 curies. Our review of available documents indicates that four dumpsites, out of a total of more than 37 reported dumpsite areas, received between 95 and 98 percent of all the radioactivity dumped. Three of these sites are in the Atlantic: One is in Massachusetts Bay, another one is about 120 miles off the Maryland-Delaware coast, and another site is about 200 miles off the Maryland-Dela- ware coast. The fourth dumpsite area that received large quantities of radioactivity is near the Farallon Islands at a distance of more than 40 miles offshore from San Francisco, Calif. It now appears that this large Pacific dumpsite is an area in excess of 500 square miles and it contains several reported radioactive waste disposal locations. Further details concerning the dumpsites and other in- formation on ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes are provided in the factsheet I have appended to this testimony. It is ap updated version of a factsheet we previously have made availa- e. UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS I would like to talk a little about the controls or laws that govern ocean disposal. Prior to 1970, the ocean disposal of radioactive material was under the control of the AEC. In 1970, the Council on Environmen- tal Quality (CEQ) issued a report to the President calling for a national policy on ocean dumping. It recommended a continuing prohibition on the dumping of high-level radioactive waste in the ocean. It further stated that “dumping other radioactive materials in the ocean would be prohibited except in a very few cases for which no practical alternative offers less risk to man and his environment.” This concept has governed the U.S. policy on this matter for the last decade. In December 1971 the AEC amended its regulations (10 CFR, part 20.302) to reflect the CEQ proposals regarding sea disposal, and they still read as follows: The Commission will not approve any application for a license for disposal of licensed material at sea unless the applicant shows that sea disposal offers less harm to man or the environment than other practical alternative methods of disposal. In 1972 Congress passed Public Law 92-532, the Marine Protec- tion, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, commonly called the Ocean Dumping Act. It prohibited the dumping of high-level radioactive waste and radiological warfare agents. The act is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and all materials not specifically prohibited from ocean disposal are subject to our permit review authority. Low-level radioactive wastes are one ex- ample of such materials. 343 In 1973, pursuant to the Ocean Dumping Act, EPA issued broad policy guidance in the form of regulations (40 CFR, chapter I, subchapter H, part 227) regarding sea disposal of low level radioac- tive waste. The basic requirements in those regulations were isola- tion and containment of the radioactive isotopes to prevent their direct dispersion and dilution in ocean waters. The regulations also required that the containment system function until the radio- decay of the waste to innocuous levels. These same requirements were contained in EPA’s revised regulations in 1977. These require- ments are intended to reduce the risk to man and the marine environment from any future ocean disposal practice. Although special containers, such as steel drums with concrete caps, were used in the earlier U.S. sea disposal operations, there was neither a requirement nor an expectation that the material would remain in the drums. The material was expected to be released eventually as the drums and the concrete within them deteriorated. In 1972 the international convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter was developed. This is the so-called London Dumping Convention. It was ratified by the United States in 1974, and it came into force in 1975. It now has been ratified by 32 nations with accessions by another 14 nations. This convention provided for the first international control over sea disposal of radioactive waste. In the convention the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency is designated as the responsible body for developing the specific technical requirements and defini- tions. Within the text of this convention there is a specific prohibi- tion on the sea disposal of high-level radioactive waste or other high-level radioactive matter, as these terms are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency. HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE OCEANS You have asked us to consider the question of disposing of high- level radioactive waste in the ocean—be it on or in the sea floor. It is EPA’s opinion that use of the ocean for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste is currently prohibited, both under the proscribed activities of the Ocean Dumping Act—Public Law 92-532—and the dictates of the London Dumping Convention. With your permission, I would like to submit for the record copies of internal EPA docu- ments describing the basis for our opinions on sea disposal of high- level waste. Mr. Stupps. Fine. They will be placed in the record. [The documents referred to follow:] 344 INVA UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 f . May 10, 1976 OFFICE:OF GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM : a TO : Dr. William D. Rowe Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Programs FROM : James A. Rogers Assistant General Counsel Water Quality Division (A~-131) SUBJECT: Application of the Ocean Dumping. Act to Seabed Emplacement of Radioactive Wastes N SS You have asked me whether the "terminal storage" of radioactive wastes by deep sea bed emplacements would be covered by the Marine Protection, Research and Sanc- tuaries Act of 1972, as amended, 33 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. The placement in the ocean floor of devices containing such wustes clearly falls within the purview of this Act. Assuming that the radioactive wastes are not "high level" (for which no dumping is allowed*) they explicitly fall within the definition of "material" for which an ocean dumping permit is required. See, sec. 3(c), 33 U.S.C. 1402{(c). AmMonly when devices containing wastes are placed on or in submerged lands "for a purpose other than disposal" and the placement is "otherwise regulated by Federal or State law" or is conducted "pursuant to an authorized Federal or State program," may the activity be exempted from coverage of the Act. Sec. 3(f),'33 U.S.C. 1402(f). Even were the deep sea bed emplacement to be conducted pursuant to a State or Federal program, it is unlikely this activity could be considered as other than a disposal operation. y Of course, that this activity falls within the cov- erage of this Act does not mean it cannot take place; it means only that the procedures and safeguards implicit in the Act must be followed, and that an EPA permit must be obtained before such emplacement can begin. James A. Rogers xiGe Clay LUO (al ea SIU Se Game 4u2i(a)) . 345 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Ke WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 FEB 2> 198U OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL SUBJECT: Deep Seabed Emplacement of High Level Sy Radioactive Wastes and the Ocean Dumping ‘ Convention-—Your Request for Opinion FROM: Michele Beigel Corash ew ; General Counsel (A-130) ian i TO: Dr. Donald Oakley Acting Director Office of International Activities (A-106) Eckardt C. Beck Assistant Administrator for Water and Waste Management (WH-556) This responds to your request for a legal opinion as to whether the London Ocean Dumping Convention (Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter) prohibits the deep seabed emplacement of high level radioactive wastes. The import of the question is that emplacement of containerized high level radioactive wastes in stable seabed sediments is emerging as a possible technological option for disposal of such wastes. Conclusion While the language of the convention is ambiguous, the better view would seem to be that the convention prohibits the deep seabed emplacement of high level radioactive wastes. = Discussion Under the London Ocean Dumping Convention, the contracting parties undertake to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping. Art. II. To that end, they agree to prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter listed in Annex I and to regulate with permits all other dumping. Art. IV. Annex I lists mat- erials as to which dumping is prohibited (except when present only as trace contaminants). The list includes: High-level radio-active wastes or other high- level radio-active matter, defined on public health, 346 biological or other grounds, by the competent inter- national body in this field, at present the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency, as unsuitable for dumping at sea. The Convention's definitions are contained in Article III. The term "dumping" is defined, in relevant part, as follows: 1. (a) "Dumping" means: (i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea: zk «tk (b) "Dumping" does not include: x *& * (ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention. (Emphasis added.) It is apparent that the Convention regulates deep seabed emplacement of radioactive wastes if the wastes are defined as “high-level" by the appropriate international body and if emplacement constitutes “disposal at sea." This discussion will assume that the wastes in question are "high-level." On the second question, you have properly observed that the phrase "at sea" could refer either to the location of the disposing party, and thereby include disposal from a vessel "at sea" by emplacement of wastes beneath the ocean floor, or to the actual disposal into ocean waters, which would include disposal down to:to but not below the seabed. The language of the Convention does not resolve this ambiguity; hence, it is not clear from the actual terms of the Conven- 1e_Conven= tion whether control of seabed d emplacement - is i is_included in the > parties’ agreement... ae I have ieee Baredned. that the issue has not been formally discussed at meetings pursuant to the Convention and that informal discussions suggest that the parties probably would not agree on the interpretation of "at sea” in this context. Several parties reportedly have stated that they would regard deep seabed emplacement as a violation of the Convention, but scerke 347 these may be parties having no need of a radioactive waste disposal alternative. Other parties, faced with the problem, May interpret the Convention more permissively. In 1976, the House Subcommitttee on Energy and the Environment, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, held oversight hearings on Radiological Contamination of the Oceans. Serial No. 94-69 (1977). Subcommittee Chairman Morris K. Udall requested various agencies to state their views of the legal status of disposing of high level radioactive wastes upon, or under the ocean bottom. The responding agencies were of various views. The Department of State concluded that disposal upon the ocean bottom falls within the Convention's prohibition, and disposal under the ocean bottom would be prohibited if it poses a threat of pollution to the marine environment. ay/ The Energy Research and Development Administration determined that "dumping" under the Convention can be interpreted as including deep seabed emplacement. 2/ EPA's response was limited to legality under domestic law, concluding that emplacement is barred by the Ocean Dumping Act. 3/ Finally, David A. Deese, associated with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, wrote that in his opinion customary international law clearly prohibits any form of high-level radioactive waste disposal upon the sea bottom by all countries, but the legality of disposal under the ocean bottom requires additional investigation. al Mr. Deese noted the ambiguity of the Convention's "at sea" phrase in the definition of "dumping." He tentatively suggested that the parties contem- plated oBt¥n that "at sea” referred to dumping where early 17 Letter from Kenpeon Bice Jenkins, Acting Assistant Secretary of Congressional Relations, Department of State, Nov. 16, 1976, Serial No. 94-69 at 798-799. - 2/7 Letter from Stephen H. Greenleigh, Assistant General --. =~ Counsel for Program Development, ERDA. Aug. 4, 19764.. Serial” No. 94-69 at 816-817. 3/ Letter from Roger Strelow, Assistant Administrator for Alen a and Waste Management, Sept. 10, 1976, Serial No. 94-69 at 800. 4/ Letter from David A. Deese, Marine Policy and Ocean Management, Sept. 30, .1976, Serial No. 94-69 at 820-823. 69-8u8 0 ~ g94 _ 959 348 interaction of wastes with the water column might be expected. 5/ However, he acknowledged that additional study of that con- clusion was appropriate. While the Convention does not expressly encompass pollution below the seabed, the Convention's introductory statement of reasons for the parties' agreement recites that the parties were: Recalling Resolution 2749 (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the principles governing the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The UN resolution, "Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction," states: ll. With respect to activities in the area [the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction] and acting in conformity with the international regime to be established, States shall take appropriate measures for and shall co-operate in the adoption and implementation of international rules, standards and procedures for, inter alia: (a) The prevention of pollution and contamina- tion, and other hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and of interference with: the ecological balance of the marine environment; (b) The protection and conservation of the natural resources of the area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine environ- ment. the Ci i These provisions contain no explicit limitations on parties' conduct with respect to the subsoil, but the Convention refer- ence to the UN resolution does indicate that the Convention— Parties felt some concern with possible pollution of the subsoil, at least as that pollution could impact the marine environment. - . 57 See Deese, “Law of the Sea and High Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Potential Geologic Option under the Deep Seabed?" at 40, Serial 94-69, 823 at 868. 349 The Convention's definition of dumping excludes the placement of matter for a purpose other than disposal, unless the placement is "contrary to the aims of this Con- vention." A "placement" is therefore "dumping" whether or not its purpose is disposal, when it is “contrary to the’ aims” of the Convention. Thus, seabed emplacement of radio- active materials, even if undertaken for storage rather than disposal, is prohibited if the emplacement could lead to contamination of the ocean. To determine whether the parties intended to bar subsoil emplacement, either directly or in order to protect the marine environment, it would be appropriate to consider the extent to which subsoil emplacement poses a hazard to the environment upwards of the ocean floor which the parties may have seen fit to regulate. However, that hazard cannot be confidently assessed. Proponents of the disposal would argue that the high-level radioactive wastes can be safely isolated in con- tainers placed in geologically stable formations below the ocean floor. Opponents would counter that the radioactivity hazard will last roughly a million years and that it is impos- sible to assure the safety of these irretrievable containers over that period of time. In light of the Convention's ambiguity and the poten- tial importance of the issue, it seems likely that a final decision on the question will be determined politically. Nevertheless, the better view is that the Convention does cover the activity. The implicit purpose or "aim" of the London Ocean Dumping Convention is to control all sources of pollution of the marine environment. See Art. I. The Convention can best implement that aim if the phrase "at sea" in the definition of dumping is interpreted as covering any disposal into or below the ocean waters from a source located at sea. That interpretation is consistent with the UN re- solution on the seabed and subsoil and with the definition of dumping which includes any deliberate placement contrary to the aims of the Convention.. If the parties decide in the future to reverse this-interpretation as the technological considerations become clearer, they may of course do so by explicit agreement. In the interim, maximum protection of the marine environment from this uncertain hazard is assured. 3 350 Dr. Mattson. Today we have no program underway for high- level radioactive waste disposal in the ocean. We are aware that the Department of Energy (DOE) over the past few years has developed a program to evaluate the technical and scientific feasi- bility of the seabed emplacement of high-level radioactive waste. We receive published information from the DOE program and par- ticipate in informal information exchanges from time to time. The scientific research performed under the DOE program is of high caliber and provides some useful information for our own studies, and our cognizance of the program helps to avoid duplication of efforts. SURVEYS OF OLD U.S. DUMPSITES Turning now to our surveys of the old U.S. dumpsites, with the passage of the Ocean Dumping Act, the EPA launched a technical program to understand the effects of past radioactive waste dump- ing practices. The program was designed to reflect what we see as both active and passive roles for EPA under the act. That is, we must develop the regulatory framework for evaluating permits for ocean disposal of radioactive waste, we must evaluate ocean dispos- al relative to other methods of disposal such as shallow land burial, and we must impartially evaluate individual permit requests based on the best available scientific information. With all of these roles in mind we began a series of dumpsite survey operations in 1974. The results of our site-specific dumpsite survey program have been described in other congressional hearings, including one held by this subcommittee in May 1978. At that time we provided de- tails of our surveys through 1977. And Mr. Dyer will provide you with technical details of our most recent survey in July of 1978 which was conducted shortly after your previous hearing on nucle- ar waste disposal. These surveys and the contractor and agency reports which re- sulted from them are the beginnings of the technical data base for our development of a regulatory program for any future dumping of low-level wastes. This information will, in part, provide the basis for improving the criteria used to pick dumpsites, the criteria for packaging systems for isolation of the radioactive materials, and the criteria for dumpsite monitoring. MONITORING OF U.S. DUMPSITES As you are aware, there has been recent controversy about the need for additional monitoring to assure public safety from expo- sure to radiation from the abandoned waste dumpsites. Last month, October 1980, we had the opportunity to appear before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Oper- ations to talk specifically about the Farallon Islands and public health. Three issues arose in those hearings, as follows: One, the problem of obtaining and assessing the records of past disposal operations; Ne the public health impact, if any, indicated by EPA surveys; an Three, the need for future monitoring of existing dumpsites. 351 On the public health question, our position has been clear for some time. That is, although EPA does not recommend the past dumping practices and would not permit those activities to be done the same way today, our preliminary evaluation of their environ- mental consequences indicates no harm to man or the marine environment. It should be clearly recognized, however, that the information we have collected is not encyclopedic. It does represent a pioneering first step in developing general monitoring programs for both abandoned and active dumpsites, but more information is desirable from a scientific and a public health point of view. In the view of your subcommittee’s previous interest in the moni- toring of low-level radioactive waste dumpsites, I would like to provide you with some ideas that have evolved since the hearings in California. A first point on which we are making progress is understanding the various kinds of monitoring that may need to be performed. We see three, and eventually four, basic kinds of monitoring that need to be considered. The first I shall call marketplace monitoring. It is designed to address the public concern about the possibility of elevated radiation in food. It consists of periodic radioactivity meas- urements of fish and other seafood bought and eaten by the gener- al public in areas near manmade sources of radiation. This assures that there are no significant quantities of radioactivity reaching man. The second type of monitoring I will call dumpsite monitoring. In this type of monitoring, samples of water, bottom sediment, edible marine organisms, and other biological species are collected to examine the distribution of radioactivity in marine species in and near a dumpsite. Such monitoring indicates how the waste materi- al might be transported physically and biologically from the site and potentially to man. A third type of monitoring deals with the general distribution of radioactivity in the oceans; that is, radioac- tivity from natural sources, fallout from nuclear weapons testing, and radioactivity from other activities of man. This monitoring we could call general marine environmental assessment monitoring, or simply baseline monitoring. Baseline monitoring is particularly im- portant to provide information about the normal or ambient con- centrations of marine radioactivity against which to measure the impact of any future radioactive waste dumping. It is also impor- tant because it provides fundamental data about the marine food chain. A fourth type of monitoring is compliance monitoring. This is primarily a regulatory activity performed after dumping has occurred to verify that regulatory requirements have been met. It is my view that marketplace, dumpsite, and baseline monitor- ing should all be done. I am not optimistic that we at EPA can undertake monitoring to assure public safety while still maintain- ing progress on the development of regulations to control any future disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The latter area, of course, being the concentration of our activi- ties in the past. If progress is to be made on both of these fronts, it probably will require a strong cooperative interagency program that pools the capabilities and expertise of the cognizant Federal agencies. 352 During the past month, discussions about future monitoring and monitoring strategies have intensified. Both NOAA and EPA are committed to developing a monitoring strategy, and high priority is being given to the development of a concise, mutually agreeable, statement of purposes and costs for the ocean monitoring of radio- active materials. The legislative basis for these efforts is the Ocean Dumping Act where the responsibilities of EPA and NOAA are described in title I and title II, respectively. In areas where we don’t have resources, we will seek more through our normal budge- tary process. An effort of this magnitude will require the assistance of other agencies as well. Federal agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and States, such as California and perhaps Massachusetts, Maryland, and Delaware, would likely have an interest. At this time, the NRC and DOE are providing us with their records on past dumping operations and locations to assess whether other sites, in addition to the sites we have already surveyed, may have substantial quantities of radioactive waste. We have also asked the Department of Defense to determine whether it has additional information. INTERNATIONAL MONITORING In addition to our work on U.S. dumpsite monitoring, we have for some years encouraged and are participating in the develop- ment of an international ocean dumpsite monitoring plan. You have heard it described earlier today. An effort to develop a plan was initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1978 pursuant to its responsibilities under the London Dumping Convention. In addition, the Interna- tional Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established an international consultation and surveillance mechanism for sea dumping of radioactive waste to provide guid- ance to its member countries. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) -of the OECD administers this consultation and surveillance mecha- nism for the dumping by some European nations of low-level nuclear waste into a site in the Northeast Atlantic. In addition to participating in the development of the interna- tional monitoring plan for the Northeast Atlantic dumpsite, we have agreed to contribute to its implementation. At present, we are waiting to see what gaps in technical expertise may be identified so that we might recommend U.S. participants or EPA technical as- sistance where most needed. Participation in this monitoring activ- ity will assist us by supplying valuable information about an ac- tively used site, at minimum cost, to expand our data base for evaluating this sea disposal option for the United States. CONCLUSIONS EPA has a program for achieving several objectives by 1985. They are as follows: One, evaluation of ocean dumping as an option for disposal of low-level radioactive waste. 353 Two, development of regulations to control any future dumping of radioactive wastes. Three, development of criteria for (a) selection of ocean dump- sites, (b) packaging of radioactive wastes, and (c) compliance moni- toring. Four, development of a program for evaluating requests to EPA for permits to conduct ocean dumping of low level radioactive waste. To meet these objectives, EPA plans to conduct research and monitoring similar to previous EPA dumpsite surveys. Additional monitoring to further evaluate the safety of past ocean dumping and to establish certain useful baseline data also seems desirable, although such monitoring is presently beyond the scope of EPA’s resources. We are developing plans with NOAA for cooperative research and monitoring to meet our regulatory purposes and these other purposes. As a part of this effort we are studying options for pooling of existing resources and determining what additional re- sources need to be requested. With that brief summary of our program, I will turn to Mr. Robert Dyer, who will provide the details of the most recent dump- site survey conducted in 1978. He will also synthesize some of the findings and implications from our surveys of 1974 through 1978. [The prepared statement of Roger J. Mattson, in full, follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF RoGER J. Mattson, DIRECTOR, SURVEILLANCE AND EMER- GENCY PREPAREDNESS DIvIsION, OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRON- MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee; I am Roger Mattson, Director of the Surveillance and Emergency Preparedness Division of EPA’s Office of Radi- ation Programs. I am pleased to have this opportunity to describe what we know about the past ocean disposal of radioactive materials, to comment on some interna- tional aspects of this waste management practice, to consider the question of dispos- ing of high-level radioactive wastes in the ocean, and to describe actions now underway with respect to monitoring low-level radioactive waste dumpsites. With me today is Robert S. Dyer, the senior oceanographer on my staff. Following my testimony he will summarize our dumpsite survey activities. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The problem of what to do with radioactive waste came with the advent of nuclear research and weapons technology in the 1940’s. There were several kinds of waste generated in these activities. Sea disposal was used for the more dilute concentrations of these wastes, that is the so called ‘low-level’ radioactive wastes. Sea disposal began in 1946 under the licensing and contracting authority of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In 1960 the AEC stopped issuing new licenses for sea disposal of low-level wastes and made land burial facilities available at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Idaho Falls, Idaho for its contractors and licensees. In 1962, AEC licensed the first commerical land burial facility in Beatty, Nevada. After 1962 most low-level radioactive wastes were disposed of at land burial sites, primarily because of the lower costs. Between 1962 and 1970 sea disposal of nuclear waste was little used, and in 1970 it was stopped completely. Although the materials dumped in the ocean were considered to be low-level waste, they were not harmless and were given special attention in their handling and transport. However, since these materials were of little or no value, good records of their quantities and isotopic composition were not maintained. Addition- ally, there is some uncertainty about the location of some dumpsites because of navigation inaccurancies. Between 1946 and 1970 the U.S. dumped approximately 89,500 containers with an estimated radioactivity of 94,600 Curies. Our review of available documents indi- cates that four dumpsites, out of a total of more than thirty-seven reported dump- 304 site areas, received between 95 and 98 percent of all the radioactivity dumped. Three of these sites are in the Atlantic: one is in Massachusetts Bay, another one is about 120 miles off the Maryland-Delaware Coast, and another site is about 200 miles off the Maryland-Delaware Coast. The fourth dumpsite area that received large quantities of radioactivity is near the Farallon Islands at a distane of more than forty miles offshore from San Francisco, California. It now appears that this large Pacific dumpsite is an area in excess of 500 square miles and that it contains several reported radioactive waste disposal locations. Further details concerning the dumpsites and other information on ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes are provided in the Fact Sheet I have appended to this testimony. It is an updated version of a Fact Sheet we previously have made available. UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS Prior to 1970, the ocean disposal of radioactive material was under the control of the AEC. In 1970, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued a report to the President calling for a national policy on ocean dumping. It recommended a continuing prohibition on the dumping of high-level radioactive waste in the ocean. It further stated that “Dumping other radioactive materials in the ocean would be prohibited except in a very few cases for which no practical alternative offers less risk to man and his environment.” This concept has governed the U.S. policy on this matter for the last decade. In December 1971 the AEC amended its regulations (10 CFR Part 20.302) to reflect the CEQ proposals regarding sea disposal, as follows: ‘The Commission will not approve any application for a license for disposal of licensed material at sea unless the applicant shows that sea disposal offers less harm to man or the environ- ment than other practical alternative methods of disposal.” In 1972 Congress passed Public Law 92-532, the Marine Protection, Research, and Sauctuaries Act, commonly called the “Ocean Dumping Act.” It prohibited the dumping of high-level radioactive waste and radiological warfare agents. The Act is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and all materials not specifically prohibited from ocean disposal are subject to its permit review authori- ty. Low-level radioactive wastes are one example of such materials. In 1973, pursuant to the Ocean Dumping Act, EPA issued broad policy guidance in the form of regulations (40 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 227) regarding sea disposal of low level radioactive waste. The basic requirements in those regulations were isolation and containment of the radioactive isotopes to prevent their direct dispersion and dilution in ocean waters. The regulations also required that the containment system function until the radiodecay of the waste to innocuous levels. These same requirements were contained in EPA’s revised regulations in 1977. These requirements are intended to reduce the risk to man and the marine environ- ment from any future ocean disposal practice. Although special containers, such as steel drums with concrete caps, were used in the earlier U.S. sea disposal oper- ations, there was neither a requirement nor an expectation that the material would remain in the drums. The material was expected to be released eventually as the drums and the concrete deteriorated. In 1972 the International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter was developed. This is the so called London Dumping Convention. It was ratified by the United States in 1974, and it came into force in 1975. It now has been ratified by 32 nations with accessions by another 14 nations. This Convention provided for the first international control over sea dispos- al of radioactive waste. In the Convention the International Atomic Energy Agency is designated as the responsible body for developing the specific technical require- ments and definitions. Within the text of this Convention there is a specific prohibi- tion on the sea disposal of high-level radioactive waste or other high-level radioac- tive matter, as these terms are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency. HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE OCEANS You have asked us to consider the question of disposing of high-level radioactive waste in the ocean—be it on or in the sea floor. It is EPA’s opinion that use of the ocean for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste is currently prohibited, both under the proscribed activities of the Ocean Dumping Act (PL 92-532) and the dictates of the London Dumping Convention. With your permission, I would like to submit for the record copies of internal EPA documents describing the basis for our opinions on sea disposal of high-level waste. The high-level waste material prohibit- ed from disposal is defined in the Ocean Dumping Act as “The aqueous waste resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system or equiva- lent, and the concentrated waste from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, 399 in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels, or irradiated fuel from nuclear power reactors.” We have no program underway for high level radioactive waste disposal in the ocean. We are aware that the Department of Energy (DOE) over the past few years has developed a program to evaluate the technical and scientific feasibility of the seabed emplacement of high-level radioactive waste. We receive published informa- tion from the DOE program and participate in informal information exchanges from time to time. The scientific research performed under the DOE program is of high caliber and provides some useful information for our own studies, and our cogni- zance of the program helps to to avoid duplication of efforts. SURVEYS OF OLD U.S. DUMPSITES With the passage of the Ocean Dumping Act, the EPA launched a technical program to understand the effects of past dumping practices. The program was designed to reflect what we see as both active and passive roles for EPA under the Act. That is, we must develop the regulatory framework for evaluating permits for ocean disposal of radioactive waste, we must evaluate ocean disposal relative to other methods of disposal such as shallow land burial, and we must impartially evaluate individual permit requests based on the best available scientific informa- tion. With all of these roles in mind we began a series of dumpsite survey oper- ations in 1974. Such work also had been recommended by others. In 1974, an oceanographic assessment of disposal of wastes in the marine environment was performed for EPA by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. One of the research recommendations that came from the assessment was that, “the most valuable criteria for the establishment of future dump sites can be obtained from monitoring current disposal operations.” The Council also recom- mended that “Abandoned disposal sites should be studied to determine long-term chemical transformations and transport of waste materials.” The results of our site-specific dumpsite survey program have been described in other congressional hearings, including one held by this subcommittee in May, 1978. At that time we provided details of our surveys through 1977, so today I will only summarize those efforts. Mr. Dyer will provide you with technical details of our most recent survey in July, 1978, which was conducted shortly after your previous hearing on nuclear waste disposal. In August, 1974, we surveyed at the Farallon Islands 900 meter site. We used an unmanned submersible to locate some of the radioactive waste drums for the first time. This was followed in 1975 by a similar survey at the Farallon Islands 1,700 meter location. In both surveys radioactive waste drums were found and samples of sediment and biota were taken. Concentrations of plutonium-238, and plutonium- 239, 240 were detected in the sediments near some drums that were higher than what normally would be expected from weapons-testing fallout. In 1975 and 1976 we conducted manned-submersible surveys of the Atlantic 2800 meter (9300 feet) dumpsite off the Maryland-Delaware Coast. In these surveys we located radioactive waste drums, took carefully positioned sediment core samples, and performed radioactivity analyses that confirmed the presence of elevated levels of cesium-137 in sediments immediately adjacent to selected radioactive waste drums. We also recovered a drum from the site for detailed analysis to assess the long-term integrity of the standard metal drum and concrete matrix packaging system. In 1977, we successfully undertook additional surveys at the Farallon Islands at depths of 900 meters and 1700 meters. The first survey was designed to provide estimates of biological activity and diversity and to obtain samples of water and ocean sediments. The second survey was designed to recover a radioactive waste drum from the 900 meter location for laboratory analysis. Additional biological and sediment samples were collected, and current meters were deployed to measure the speed and direction of the water moving though the dumpsite region. The last in our series of survey operations was conducted in 1978 at the deepest of the four major U.S. sea disposal areas, the Atlantic 3,800 meter (13,000 feet) site. A waste drum was recovered from this site also. These surveys and the contractor and agency reports which resulted from them are the beginnings of the technical data base for our development of a regulatory program for any future dumping of low level wastes. This information will, in part, provide the basis for improving the criteria used to pick dumpsites, the criteria for packaging systems for isolation of the radioactive materials, and the criteria for dumpsite monitoring. 396 MONITORING OF U.S. DUMPSITES As you are aware, there has been recent controversy about the need for additional monitoring to assure public safety from exposure to radiation from the abandoned waste dumpsites. Last month (October, 1980) we had the opportunity to appear before a subcommit- tee of the Committee on Government Operations to talk specifically about the Farallon Islands and public health. Three issues arose in those hearings, as follows: (1) The problem of obtaining and assessing the records of past disposal operations; (2) The public health impact, if any, indicated by EPA surveys; and (3) The need for future monitoring of existing dumpsites. On the public health question, our position has been clear for some time. That is, although EPA does not recommend the past dumping practices and would not permit those activities to be done the same way today, our preliminary evaluation of their environmental consequences indicates no harm to man or the marine environment. It should be clearly recognized, however, that the information we have collected is not encyclopedic. It does represent a pioneering first step in developing general monitoring programs for both abandoned and active dumpsites, but more information is desireable from a scientific and a public health point of view. In view of your subcommittee’s previous interest in the monitoring of low-level radioactive waste dumpsites, I would like to provide you with some ideas that have evolved since the hearings in California. A first point on which we are making progress is understanding the various kinds of monitoring that may need to be performed. We see three, and eventually four, basic kinds of monitoring that need to be considered. The first I shall call “market place’ monitoring. It is designed to address the public concern about the possibility of elevated radiation in food. It consists of periodic radioactivity measurements of fish and other sea food bought and eaten by the general public in areas near man- made sources of radiation. This assures that there are no significant quantities of radioactivity reaching man. The second type of monitoring I will call ‘“dumpsite” monitoring. In this type of monitoring, samples of water, bottom sediment, edible marine organisms, and other biological species are collected to examine the distribution of radioactivity in marine species in and near a dumpsite. Such monitoring indicates how the waste material might be transported physically and biologically from the site and potentially to man. A third type of monitoring deals with the general distribution of radioactivity in the oceans; that is, radioactivity from natural sources, fallout from nuclear weapons testing, and radioactivity from other activities of man. This monitoring we could call “general marine environmental assessment” monitoring, or simply “base- line” monitoring. Baseline monitoring is particularly important to provide informa- tion about the normal or ambient concentrations of marine radioactivity against which to measure the impact of any future radioactive waste dumping. It is also important because it provides fundamental data about the marine food chain. A fourth type of monitoring in “compliance” monitoring. This is primarily a regula- tory activity performed after dumping has occurred to verify that regulatory re- quirements have been met. It is my view that market place, dumpsite, and baseline monitoring should all be done. I am not optimistic that we at EPA can undertake monitoring to assure public safety while still maintaining progress on the development of regulations to control any future disposal of low-level radioactive waste. If progress is to be made on both of these fronts, it probably will require a strong cooperative interagency program that pools the capabilities and expertise of the cognizant Federal agencies. During the past month, discussions about future monitoring and monitoring strat- egies have intensified. Both NOAA and EPA are committed to developing a moni- toring strategy, and high priority is being given to the development of a concise, mutually-agreeable, statement of purposes and costs for the ocean monitoring of radioactive materials. The legislative basis for these efforts is the Ocean Dumping Act where the responsibilities of EPA and NOAA are described in Title I and Title II, respectively. In areas where we don’t have resources, we will seek more through our normal budgetary process. An effort of this magnitude will require the assistance of other agencies as well. Federal agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and States, such as California and perhaps Massachusetts, Maryland and Delaware, would likely have an interest. At this time the NRC and DOE are providing us with their records on past dumping operations and locations to assess whether other sites, in addition to the sites we have already surveyed, may have substantial quantities of radioactive waste. We have also asked the Department of Defense to determine whether it has additional information. 357 INTERNATIONAL MONITORING In addition to our work on U.S. dumpsite monitoring, we have for some years encouraged and are participating in the development of an international ocean dumpsite monitoring plan. An effort to develop a plan was initiated by the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency in 1978 pursuant to its responsibilities under the London Dumping Convention. In addition, the international Organization for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established an international consulta- tion and surveillance mechanism for sea dumping of radioactive waste to provide guidance to its member countries. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD administers this consultation and surveillance mechanism for the dumping by some European nations of low-level nuclear waste into a site in the northeast Atlantic. In addition to participating in the development of the international monitoring plan for the northeast Atlantic dumpsite, we have agreed to contribute to its implementation. At present, we are waiting to see what gaps in technical expertise may be identified so that we might recommend U.S. participants or EPA technical assistance where most needed. Participation in this monitoring activity will assist us by suppling valuable information about an actively-used site, at minimum cost, to expand our data base for evaluating this sea disposal option for the United States. CONCLUSIONS EPA has a program for achieving several objectives by 1985. They are as follows: 1. Evaluation of ocean dumping as an option for disposal of low level radioactive waste. 2. Development of regulations to control any future dumping of radioactive wastes. 3. Development of criteria for (a) selection of ocean dumpsites, (b) packaging of radioactive wastes and (c) compliance monitoring. 4. Development of a program for evaluating requests of EPA for permits to conduct ocean dumping of low level radioactive waste. To meet these objectives, EPA plans to conduct research and monitoring similar to previous EPA dumpsite surveys. Additional monitoring to further evaluate the safety of past ocean dumping and to establish certain useful baseline data also seems desirable, although such monitoring is presently beyond the scope of EPA’s resources. We are developing plans with NOAA for cooperative research and moni- toring to meet our regulatory purposes and these other purposes. As part of this effort we are studying options for pooling of existing resources and determining what additional resources need to be requested. At this time Mr. Robert Dyer, Senior Staff Oceanographer and project manager of our dumpsite surveys, will provide details of our most recent dumpsite survey conducted in 1978. He will also and synthesize some of the findings and implications from our surveys of 1974 through 1978 at the major Atlantic and Pacific radioactive waste dumpsites. 358 FACT SHEET ON OCEAN DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIALS INTRODUCTION Low-level radioactive wastes are routinely generated by a wide range of military and non-military operations, including nuclear powerplant operations, commercial manufacturing processes, and research and medical institutions. When we say low-level radioactive wastes, we generally mean all those materials not directly resulting from the processing of spent reactor fuel. Low-level wastes defined in this way may be hazardous, depending upon their concentration and their proximity to man or other organisms. The bulk of these low-level wastes are by-product materials, especially materials such as equipment, tools, and lab clothes which have become contaminated by exposure to or contact with radioactive materials. Some examples of by-products materials are radioactive cobalt, strontium, americium, and cesium. At times, they also may include small quantities of "source materials", such as uranium and thorium, or traces of "special nuclear materials" such as plutonium or enriched uranium. From 1946 through 1970 the United States disposed of these radioactive waste materials either by shallow land-burial at government-owned sites, or by ocean dumping at AEC-approved sites. Because the materials were potentially hazardous, they were given special attention in transport and handling. But because they were regarded primarily as garbage, precise records apparently were not kept of the disposal operations. Materials for land burial were packaged in a wide variety of containers, while materials for ocean disposal were encased primarily in concrete-filled steel drums. Today, the records of the ocean dumping activities consist primarily of licenses issued by the Atomic Energy Commission to private contractors and of logs indicating the approximate locations of disposal sites. In most of the cases the records do indicate the nature of the materials, the quantities, the estimated radioactivity, and the approximate coordinates of the dumping location; unfortunately, they do not indicate the specific isotopic content, and neither the content of the containers nor the precise dumping locations can be verified. Records of military operations and government contractors (such as the national laboratories) may also still exist, but are not currently available. 359 The environmental survey work of the ocean nuclear waste dumpsites by EPA was initiated under the mandate of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (PL 92-532) in order to provide a technical basis for both the development of regulations and criteria and the consideration of future disposal alternatives. In 1974 EPA sent an initial survey team to the Farallon Islands dumpsites to confirm the feasibility of locating the containerized waste packages, and to determine if any measurable amounts of radioactivity could been released into the dumpsites. Using an unmanned submersible vehicle several cannisters were successfully located, underwater photographs were taken to assess the condition of the drums, and sediment samples were collected in proximity to both intact and imploded drums. Low levels of plutonium 238, 239, and 240 were detected. In 1977, two additional surveys of the Farallon Island Sites were undertaken; the first to provide estimates of biologic activity and diversity, and to take samples of the water column and the ocean bottom, and the second to measure ocean currents and attempt the recovery of one of the waste cannisters. In the Atlantic Ocean a similar series of investigations was undertaken at the 2800 and 3800 meter sites. A preliminary sampling team went out to the 2800 meter site in May, 1974: in 1975 three dives in a submersible vehicle were made at the 2800 meter site to locate and document the condition of drums and take a variety of sediment, water, and biological samples. In 1976 similar data and a waste canister were recovered from the 2800 meter site for detailed laboratory analysis of canister corrosion and physical integrity, and in 1978, similar samples were obtained from the 3800 meter site and a waste drum was recovered for analysis. This Fact Sheet is a summary of information currently available to EPA about these waste dumping activities. It includes: ; 1) A history of dumping operations. 2) A tabular summary identifying all known sites, the types of materials dumped, the licensed dumping agents, and indicating whether or not EPA has surveyed the sites; 3) Summaries of the survey work which has been done under contract to EPA and in conjunction with EPA scientists; 4) A list of the principal statutory authorities relating to the ocean dumping of low-level radioactive materials; 360 HISTORY OF DUMPING OPERATIONS On the basis of the information EPA has gathered to date, the following are salient points in the history of U.S. ocean dumping of radioactive materials. A tabular summary of the designated dump sites follows this list o Between 1946 and 1970 the ocean dumping of radioactive wastes was conducted under the licensing authority and direction of the Atomic Energy Commission; o In 1960, the AEC imposed a moratorium on the issuance of new dumping licenses, allowing existing licenses to remain in orce and to be renewed; o By 1963 most ocean dumping activities had been phased out, and, in 1970, the U.S. terminated all ocean dumping of radioactive waste materials; o In 1973, the U.S. ratified the 1972 London Dumping Convention, prohibiting, among other things, the ocean disposal of high level nuclear wastes and allowing for the future dumping of low-level radioactive wastes only under controlled conditions stipulated by the Convention; o From 1946 thru 1962 (two years after the license moratorium), the U.S. dumped a total of approximately 89,400 containers with an estimated inventory of 94,400 curies (Ci) of radioactivity; o Between 1963 and 1970 (when all dumping was terminated) the U.S. dumped only about 350 containers with an estimated total activity of about 230 curies. o The Farallon Island Sites (collectively) received approximately 99 percent of the radioactivity dumped in the Pacific Ocean; o The Atlantic 2800 Meter Sites received approximately 96 percent of all radioactivity dumped in the Atlantic. 361 : _ yO9S}oURAY UeS ON : (0) M.bd Stl Obol (1) saytw QOv Ni 20.0” — OF8T Oul20puay ade) [Id ON obaig ues MOE 121 OY9E (1) O MS SAytw o¢2 N,00_2£ = Old¢ Obstg ues Old ¥OIS{IURAY URS M,00, SET Live (1) | SOB Noes POU GE NC Ue ee bd ON ¥S2,abuy so] M, SOgbEL OLSb (2) Dane NU [ne ert re (OMG WOO NA Pe bee 000 pee ees 2 DU YMSOr utd ON ¥4apsog &9/40 M,10,S21 6600 (t) O9bf Ww te £0°0 | JO M Saji oF Ni pO. 2b ld ON _A4apsog 89/40 Mibbd2l 8262 (1) i) So, tw ON ytap4og e@9/ 40 (!) 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In some instances these areas were identified by single coordinates and the wastes were concentrated in relatively specific areas, while in other instances the AEC designated much broader areas and allowed those dumping to proceed according to general guidelines. Dumping under these designations resulted in much less concentrated dumping activities and a multitude of individual "“dumpsites". The number of such individual dumpsites under a particular heading in this column is indicated in parentheses. The designation Al through Al2, GM1 and GM2, and Pl through P13 refer to the NRC site numbering system. Central coordinates designate dumping areas thought to have received concentrations of waste materials. Actual coordinates may have varied over wider distances. Approximations for land references: an asterisk means that EPA has not plotted the coordinates on nautical charts to confirm the stated distance from land; blanks mean we haven't found the information yet. Three types of materials were dumped under AEC licenses or by AEC contractors: by-product materials (B), source materials (S), and special nuclear materials (SNM). By-product materials refer to a wide variety of substances which were exposed to incidental radiation. Source materials include uranium and thorium. Special nuclear materials include plutonium, uranium-233, enriched uranium—233 or 235, and any other materials which the AEC may have determined to be special nuclear materials. Radioactivity is given in estimated curies at the time of packaging. Waste materials were generally either packaged in special containers which were then placed in concrete-filled steel drums, or mixed directly in concrete which was in turn placed in the steel drums. 366 AEC U.S. Atomic Energy Commission AML American Mail Lines ARC Atlantic Refining Company CMDC Coastwise Marine Disposal Corporation CR Chevron Research FWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ISC Isotope Specialty Company MP Magnolia Petroleum MSTS Military Sea Transport Service NEC Nuclear Engineering Company NIH U.S. National Institute of Health NRDL U.S. Naval Radiation Development Laboratory OTC Ocean Transport Company PN Pneumodynamics SMO Socono-—Mobil 071 UG University of Georgia UH University of Hawaii There were some AEC approved ocean dumping sites for which EPA has no records of dumping activities. They are as follows. Pacific Ocean Atlantic Ocean 39°30'N; 125°40 37°40'N; 124°50 36° 00'N; 124 00 34 30'N; 122 50 W 41°33'N; 65°30'W W 41°33'N; 65°33'W W 41°28-38'N; 65°28-45'W W 38°30'N; 72°00'W 36°30'N; 74°13'W 36°15'N; 76°35'W 34°15'N; 76°35'W Based on NRC memorandum of 8/14/80 additional dumpings appear to have taken place in the 1960's and are being characterized in ongoing records research. Under the terms of the AML license, AML was authorized to dump along the path of its shipping route beyond depths of 1,000 fathoms (1830 meters). Report published by NOAA in April 1973, "Submersible Inspection of Deep Ocean Waste Disposal Sites Off Southern California" describes survey of Santa Cruz Basin. See note number 3/, above. 367 SUMMARY OF EPA SURVEYS OF PAST DISPOSAL SITES FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTES A number of reports have been prepared for the Office of Radiation Programs (ORP) of the EPA to describe surveys of the old ocean disposal sites for radioactive materials. These surveys have been generally described in EPA Annual Reports to Congress, ORP Radiological Quality of the Environment Reports, the EPA Journal and elsewhere. In 1974, an initial survey term was sent to the Farallon Islands sites. These teams used an unmanned submersible vehicle to locate waste drums. The Atlantic 2800 meter depth site was similarly investigated in conjunction with NOAA studies at Deep Water Dumpsite (DWD) 106. This was followed in 1976 by an EPA survey of the Atlantic site using the manned submersible ALVIN. In 1977 two additional surveys of the Farallon Islands were undertaken to provide estimates of the biological activity and diversity or the area, and to obtain a wide range of samples. In 1978, the ALVIN was again employed to investigate conditions at the 3800 meter depth Atlantic radioactive waste disposal site. Geologists, biologists, radiochemists, physical oceanographers and oceanographic engineers from many universities and oceanographic institutions participated in shipboard and onshore laboratory tasks in connection with the EPA surveys. Reports of this work have been submitted to the Office of Radiation Programs in various stages of completion and about 30 are currently on file with EPA. All of these reports have been provided to the House Government Operations Committee Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, and to other interested government officials. The reports are summarized below in two sets: those prepared in conjunction with the Pacific Ocean site investigations, and those prepared in conjunction with the Atlantic Ocean site investigations. Five of the Atlantic reports and three of the Pacific (Farallon Islands) reports are final and have been published; and the remaining reports are in varying stages of completion by contractors or are undergoing scientific review within and outside EPA. The reader should be aware that both data and interpretations presented by the contractor for the reports still undergoing review may be either incomplete or subject to misunderstanding, and do not necessarily represent conclusions of EPA at this time. 10 368 Atlantic Ocean The following is a summary of seventeen research reports prepared for EPA/ORP on the 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1978 surveys of the 2800 meter and 3800 meter Atlantic dumpsites. In some instances where researchers were involved in investigations at both the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean sites, there may be overlap between information reported in Atlantic and Pacific Ocean reports. (1) Dyer, Robert S., "Investigation of Radioactive Waste Disposal at Deepwater Dumpsite 106", in May 1974 Baseline Investigation of Deepwater Dumpsite 106, NOAA Dumpsite Evaluation Report -I, December This published report describes the purposes of sediment and biological sample collection at the site and the manner in which shipboard operations were conducted. Recommendations for future work are also included. (2) EPA Eastern Environmental Radiation Facility (EERF) radioanalytical data, found in: Dyer, Robert S., "Environmental Surveys of Two Deepsea Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites Using Submersibles", Management of Radioactive Wastes from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, IAEA, Vienna, March 1976. This published paper describes the early survey work at the 900 meter and 1700 meter sites in the Pacific and the 2800 meter site in the Atlantic. Radioactive waste containers were located for the first time, with the use of submersibles. Radioanalytical results by EERF for the 2800 meter site in the Atlantic are presented in Table IV. Cesium-137 contamination was found in three sediment cores taken from near waste containers. It is believed to be the result of leaching from the concrete matrix of the containers. At the Farallon Islands, values for Pu-239, 240 found in sediment samples taken from near some waste containers exceeded expected values for this latitude and depth, as did the ratio of Pu-238 to Pu-239, 240. The plutonium distribution in the sediment near some containers indicates that the release from the containers could have occurred many years ago. (3) Neiheisel, James, "Sediment Characteristics of the 2800 Meter Atlantic Nuclear Waste Disposal Site: Radionuclide Retention Potential", EPA Technical Note ORP/TAD-79-10, September 1979. This EPA published report characterizes the sediments from the 1974 2800 meter radioactive waste disposal site survey. The chemical analyses were performed on sediments which had been in storage. 11 369 “-2¢ genchemical work, particularly the effort on cation exchange sasactty. will contribute to understanding of the potential for miseatinn of radionuclides released into the deep marine environment, weere radionuclide retention by the sediments is anticipated. The nrigin cf sediments at the site and characteristics of sediment tian are also of interest; the report indicates the source as the danoasit- 5 continental shelf and the Hudson Canyon adjacent to the dumpsite. Bowen, Vaughan T., and Linda Graham, "1976 Site-Specific Survey of the Atlantic 2800 Meter Deepwater Radioactive Waste Dumpsite: Radiochemistry", May 1979, man This report presents the data on levels of radioactivity found in sediment cores obtained at the 2800 meter site adjacent to a radioactive waste container and in various areas of the disposal site. Cesium-137, plutonium-239,240, and americium-241 in some sediment cores were found to be above the expected range for weapons testing fallout in sediment for this latitude and depth. In addition, iron-55 and cobalt-60 were also found in sediment cores and are believed to have originated from the waste containers. (5) Colombo, P., R.M. Nelson, Jr., and M.W. Kendig, "Analysis and Evaluation of a Radioactive Waste Package Retrieved from the Atlantic 2800 Meter Disposal Site," September 1978. This published report presents the results of analyses performed by Brookhaven National, Laboratory on the first radioactive waste container recovered from a waste disposal site. It was retrieved by EPA for the purpose of container corrosion and matrix degradation analysis for the 2800 meter depth Atlantic radioactive waste disposal site. Analyses in the report indicate that the container had withstood the rigors of the deep ocean environment. The authors estimate that a minimum of 100 years in the deep ocean environment would be required before the concrete waste form would lose its integrity. (6) Dayal, R., S.A. Oakely, and I.W. Duedall, "Sediment Geochemical Studies of the 2800 Meter Atlantic Nuclear Waste Disposal Site", June 30, 1978. This report analyzes and discusses the physical and chemical properties of the sediments collected at the 2800 meter site. These parameters influence the amount of binding of radionuclides to the sediment. Cs-137 and Cs-134 were found to have been released from a radioactive waste container, but the sediments were determined to be an effective barrier to migration. It was found in this study that bioturbation (the reworking of sediments by organisms) can actively redistribute radionuclides vertically in the sediment column. Pore water migration, in comparision, was negligible. UD 370 (7) Dexter, Stephen C., "Cruise Report on R.V. Cape Henlopen 12/76, 1976 Atlantic Radioactive Waste Dumpsite Survey". This report presents the various scientific operations which were ongoing during the 1976 radioactive waste disposal site survey, where the various sampling stations were located, and the manner in which operations were undertaken. (8) Dexter, Stephen C., "Materials for Containment of Low-Level Nuclear Waste in the Deep Ocean", August 1978. This generic report of deep ocean corrosion processes for steels and concrete explains in easily understandable terms the mechanisms and expected rates of corrosion. The report concludes with recommendations regarding improvement of the reliability of the containers potentially used for future ocean disposal practices. (9) Polloni, Pamela T., and Isabelle P. Williams, "Characterization of the Atlantic 2800 Meter Deepwater Radioactive Waste Dumps ite-Macro-Infaunal Analysis", August 1977. This report summarizes the findings of an investigation into abundance, biomass and species composition of the benthic infaunal community at the 2800 meter depth site. Age structure was also investigated. The samples were collected as a part of the sediment sampling program with the use of a Soutar box core. High species diversity was found. Polychaetes, followed by crustaceans, were the most abundant organisms. No extraordinary organisms or distribution of organisms were discovered. (10) Rawson, Martine Dreyfus, and William B.F. Ryan, "Geologic Observation of Deepwater Radioactive Waste Dumpsite-106", EPA-520/9-78-001, June 1978. The bottom terrain of the 2800 meter radioactive waste disposal site was investigated by direct visual observation using the manned submersible ALVIN. It was found to be characterized by meandering channels, with some boulders and rock outcroppings. The report attempts to interpret the geological history of the site, where major natural disturbances appear to have occurred in the past. The rate of sedimentation at the site is estimated to be 5 cm per 1000 years. Sediment deposition in addition to this, with potential to further bury radioactive waste containers, could occur through future downslope sediment slumping. 13 371 (11) Reish, Donald J., "Survey of the Benthic Invertebrates Collected from the United States Radioactive Waste Disposal Site in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans", June 1977. Taxonomic identification was made of the benthic infaunal organisms at both the 1975 Farallon Islands west coast radioactive waste disposal site and in 1976 at the 2800 meter Atlantic site. This report describes the infaunal populations collected from both coasts, and provides a comparative analysis. The West coast typically constitutes a more productive infaunal regime. Polychaeates were the most abundant constituent on both coasts, but the number and size of the east coast populations were much smaller than the west coast, as expected. The author concludes that a greater opportunity for biological movement of radionuclides exists at the west coast site location. (12) Carney, Robert S., "Report on the Invertebrate Megafauna Sampled by Trawling in the Atlantic 4000 meter Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site 1978", September 1979. Examination of the benthic population via ottertrawl] showed that the predominant megafaunal organisms at the 3800-meter radioactive waste disposal site were brittle stars (ophiuroids) and hermit crabs (pagurids). This information is in accord with sampling data from other regions of the N.W. Atlantic from similar depths. It is believed that the ophiuroids, as well as sea cucumbers (holothuroids) could contribute to vertical bioturbation. Pagurids and ophiuroids could transport adsorbed nuclides laterally. Characterization of bottom fauna will assist in assessing potential pathways for radionuclide transport from the deep ocean to man. (13) Dexter, Stephen C., "On Board Corrosion Analysis of a Recovered Nuclear Waste Container," Technical Note ORP/TAD-79-2, August 1979. This published EPA report discusses a short-term corrosion analysis of the exterior of the radioactive waste container retrieved from the Atlantic 3800-meter radioactive waste disposal site. The container surface is described prior to subsequent detailed laboratory analysis. Some suggestions for improvement of package design are also incorporated. Such information will be useful to EPA in determining packaging criteria for sea disposal of low-level nuclear wastes. (14) Hanselman, David H., and William 8B. F. Ryan, "1978 Atantic 3800 Meter Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Survey—Sedimentary, Micromorphologic and Geophysicai Analyses", June 1979. 14 372 This report describes the geological and topographical regime at the 3800 meter radioactive waste disposal site. The area was observed directly through use of the manned submersible ALVIN, and was found to be unstable, due to sediment slumping or avalanche activity. The containers might be buried by these activities in the future. They also might be moved around and thus be subject to damage mechanisms other than corrosion. Such geological information is important in developing future site selection criteria for the ocean disposal option for low-level radioactive materials. (15) Musick, John A., and Kenneth J. Sulak, "Characterization of the Demersal Fish Community of a Deep-Sea Radioactive Dump Site (Results of Cruise, EPA-7801, R. V. ADVANCE II, 21-27 June 1978), May 1978. Bottom fish were collected through deep water trawling operations. No differences were found between the fish assemblage at the radioactive waste disposal site and other regions of similar depth. The dominant fish species was Coryphaenoides armatus, the rattail, a large mobile species capable of long-distance migrations. This information on fish population abundance, biomass, diversity and migratory patterns assists in evaluating potential transport of nuclides from the site to man. (16) Reish, Donald J., "Survey of the Benthic Invertebrates Collected from the United States Radioactive Waste Disposal Site-Atlantic Ocean 3800-Meter Location", November 1979. Infaunal populations were taxonomically identified. As was the case ' at the 2800 meter site, polychaetes were the most abundant group at the 3800 meter site. Since they actively rework the sediment, the potential for slow radionuclide movement through the sediment exists. The organisms collected at this site were also similar in their small size to those obtained at the 2800 meter site; Atlantic specimens are typically smaller than Pacific infauna. Some mention is made in this report of feeding patterns and potential food chain links. While some new species and genera of polychaetes may have been collected, no unusual or aberrant forms were noticed. (17) Schell, W.R., and A. Nevissi, "Radionuclides at the U.S. Radioactive Waste Disposal Site in the Hudson Canyon, 350 Km Off New York City", January 1980. 15 373 This report, in first submission format by the contractor, provides radioanalytical data for the nuclides cesium-137, lead-210, plutonium-238, plutonium-239 and 240, americium—241, and strontium-90 in biological and sediment samples taken from the 3800 meter Atlantic dumpsite in 1978. The sediments tested did not show significant levels of radioactivity. Americium-241 was recorded in very high levels (significant concentrations) in the rattail fish, Nezumia bairdi, although not in other biological samples or in sediments obtained adjacent to radioactive waste containers. The americium in the fish was in lower concentrations in the muscle, or edible, fraction of the fish. The rattail is not a commercially harvested species in the United States, and no commercial fishing occurs in the immediate vicinity of the dumpsite. No other nuclides were found in elevated concentration in this or other biological samples. The author concludes that the observed americium—241 in the rattail fish came from the radioactive wastes. In EPA's judgement this is a speculative conclusion, and it cannot be verified at this time. Other possible explanations are measurement error or bioconcentration by the rattail fish of fallout from atmospheric weapons tests. Study of this data is continuing, and it appears that resolution of the open questions will have to come from further baseline and dumpsite sampling. Independently Published Reports by Survey Participant (1) Ito, Akihiko, "Surveys of Deepsea Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites by USEPA. This report, in Japanese, describes the participation of this Japanese scientist in the EPA surveys of the Atlantic Ocean 2800 meter disposal site. (2) Schell, William R., "Radionuclides at the Deep Water Disposal Sites Located Near the Farallon Islands in the Pacific and at the Mouth of the Hudson Canyon in our Atlantic", Presented at the Second International Ocean Dumping Symposium, Woods Hole, a., 15-19 April 1980. In this report, Schell summarizes his work for EPA at the Atlantic and the Pacific dumpsites (number 10 in the Pacific summary and number 17 in the Atlantic summary). (3) Schell, W.R., and S. Sugai, "Radionuclides at the U.S. Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Near the Farallon Islands", Health Physics, Vol. 39., No. 3, pp 475-496. This report is a formal publication of the work conducted for EPA by these researchers at the Farallon Islands dumpsites (number 10 in the Pacific summary). 16 374 Pacific Ocean The following is a summary of eleven research reports prepared for EPA/ORP on the 1974, 1975, and 1977 surveys of the Farallon Islands radioactive waste disposal sites. (1) Dayal, R., I. W. Duedall, M. Fuhrmann, and M. G. Heaton, "Sediment and Water Column Properties of the Farallon Islands Radioactive Waste Dumpsites," September 1979. Dayal et al have analyzed the sediments collected at the site for geochemical properties which might affect the behavior of radionuclides in the marine environment. Dayal found that the nuclides tend to adsorb to the sediment rather than remaining suspended in the water column. This report is important in understanding the role of such parameters as pore water diffusion and also bioturbation for nuclide mobilization. The sediments at the site are being characterized in order to evaluate chemical interactions of radionuclides with the sediments and to predict potential transport pathways for radioactivity in the oceans. (2) Interstate Electronics Corporation," Operations Report - A Summary of the Farallon Islands 500 Fathom Radioactive Waste Disposal Site," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Note ORP-75-1, December 1975. This previously published report has been circulated extensively; it summarizes the operational aspects of EPA's early survey work at the Farallon Islands. (3) Interstate Electronics Corporation, "Operational Plan, Phase I, 1977 Farallon Island Survey," IEC 446SP 550. : This operational plan describes the logistics involved in the first phase of our 1977 survey, during which we performed surface ship trawling and coring operations for geochemical, radiochemical, and biological analyses. Participants are listed. (4) Interstate Electronics Corporation, "Operational Plan, Phase II, 1977 Farallon Island Survey," IEC 446SP 551. The plan presents the logistical plans for the second phase of the 1977 Farallon Islands survey. EPA used the Canadian manned submersible PISCES VI to make bottom observations and to obtain sediment cores in close proximity to radionuclide containers for subsequent radiochemical and geochemical analyses. Participants are listed. 17 375 (5) LFE Environmental Analysis Laboratories, "Radiochemical Analysis of Samples from the 900 Meter Pacific Dumpsite," September 1979. This report presents raw data, without interpretation, of radioanalysis of sediment and biological samples. It has undergone only preliminary EPA review at present. The conclusions which we have drawn from the report are that the radiation measured in the biota is in the range expected from fallout and that the concentrations present do not represent a source of harm to either man or the marine environment. Concentrations of radioactivity in fish collected in the vicinity of the Farallon Islands are within the ranges occurring from atmospheric fallout. Human consumption of such fish would yield an annual estimated dose that is approximately 1,000 times lower than the dose from radioactive materials occurring normally within the human body. (6) Reish, Donald J., "Survey of the Benthic Invertebrates Collected from the United States Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Off the Farallon Islands, California," August 1978. The contractor taxonomically identifies infaunal and benthic organisms collected at the site. He reports no unusual findings in terms of biomass or species present. No aberrant forms were found. EPA is attempting to characterize the biological populations in the site area. We are interested in studying the role of benthic and infaunal organisms in terms of the potential for bioturbation (reworking of sediments which might enhance mobilization of radionuclides), and for biological uptake for potential transport through marine food chains. (7) Robison, Bruce H., "Cruise Report: Farallon Islands Disposal Site Survey; Phase I - 25 August to 2 September 1977. Dr. Robison's report summarizes the operations of the 1977 site survey and also provides useful suggestions for future survey work. (8) Robison, Bruce H., "Midwater Trawling Summary: Farallon Islands Disposal Site Survey, 1977." Midwater organisms, many of which may be highly migratory, could provide a go—between food chain transfer mechanism between deep ocean and near-surface waters. This report identifies and describes the mid-water populations found at the Farallons site. As in Reish's report (06), there were no unusual findings in terms of biomass or species present, and no aberrant forms. The sample size was insufficient to provide an understanding of actual food chain pathways between bottom and mid-water regions. 18 376 (9) Rego, Jennifer A., "Deep-Sea Echinoids and Asteroids of the Northeastern Pacific: An Aid in Selecting Candidate Species for Chromosomal Analysis-And-Observations Concerning Three Species of Sea Stars Collected by the Velero II," March 1980. A literature search was performed by Rego to predict which benthic invertebrates were most likely to be found in the vicinity of the Farallon Islands and which ones might prove suitable for future chromosome study. The second section of the report describes deep-sea starfish collected at the site in 1977. Although a baseline study to determine capability of visualizing size and number of chromosomes was not possible from Rego's technique, interesting information concerning life history was obtained by laboratory examination. Our office has an interest in determining whether a marine organism's response to radiation can be detected via cytogenetic laboratory procedures. (10) Schell, W. R., and S. Sugai, "Radionuclides in Water, Sediment and Biological Samples Collected in August-October 1977 at the Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Near the Farallon Islands," July 1978. Dr. Schell. reports on his measurements of very low levels of radioactivity in sediments obtained at varying distances from radioactive waste containers and in sediments and biota from the surrounding vicinity. Although his radiological techniaue for plutonium is less sensitive than that of other researchers, his estimation of the upper limit of plutonium that could be present is apparently consistent with the conclusion of no radioactivity in excess of background. There was no detection of plutonuim in the edible portion of any fish. In the case of cesium, his results were easier to compare with existing literature and they are comparable to background radiation. (11) Silver, Gary R., "A Taxonomic Review of the Farallon Island Sponge Fragments," February 1979. Dr. Silver, an hexactinellid sponge specialist, analyzed samples of the large hexactinellid for taxonomic purposes. EPA first observed these sponges growing on the radioactive waste containers at the site His report confirms that this sponge, a new species, is indeed a typical hexactinellid which is growing to a normal hexactinellid sponge size. It is not an aberrant organism. EPA's interest in the sponge stems from curiosity concerning the sponge's large holdfast and the potential impact it might have on acceleration or deceleration of container corrosion. Ue 317 STATUTORY AUTHORITIES There are seven principal authorities relevant to the ocean disposal of radioactive materials, to oceans research, and to monitoring and surveillance of dumpsites: 0) The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 Under this Act the Atomic Energy Commission, (AEC) was given exclusive authority for all matters pertaining to atomic energy. Subsequent executive actions and Acts of Congress transferred those authorities to other Executive Agencies. 0) Energy Reorganization Plan: No. 3 of 1970 Under the Energy Reorganization Plan of 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established, and the authority to “establish generally applicable environmental standards for protection of the general environment from radioactive materials..." was transferred from the AEC to EPA. (0) The Marine Protection; Research; and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 This Act (PL 92-532), commonly referred to as the Oceans Dumping Act, authorized EPA to regulate ocean dumping. Furthermore, the Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with the Administrator of EPA, was directed to “initiate a comprehensive and continuing program of monitoring and research regarding the effects of the dumping of material into ocean waters..." (0) The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 the AEC was abolished and its regulatory authorities were conveyed to the newly created Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) while its other responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Energy. 20 378 0) EPA Regulations and Criteria for Ocean Dumping On January 11, 1977, EPA issued regulations and criteria for ocean dumping pursuant to PL 92-532 (40 CFR Parts 220 - 229). These regulations specify that: 1) radioactive materials must be contained to prevent their dispersion into ocean waters, and 2) the containment system must be designed to remain intact until the radioactive materials decay to innocuous levels. 0) The National Ocean Pollution Research and Development : and Monitoring Planning Act of 19/76 Under this Act (PL 95-273), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminsitration (NOAA) is directed to: 1) establish a comprehensive 5-year plan for federal ocean pollution research and development and monitoring programs; 2) carry out a comprehensive program of ocean pollution monitoring, including radiation; and 3) provide necessary data to support and provide for the conservation, utilization, and development of ocean resources. fe) The London: Dumping Convention The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Dumping Convention) was convened in 1972 to prevent pollution of the marine environment. The Convention was signed by the United States in December, 1972 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in August, 1973. The Convention became effective in August, 1975, and has since been ratified by about 40 nations. ot Stupps. You are going to synthesize and maybe even summa- rize? Mr. Dyer. Yes. Mr. Stupps. You are going to do a slide presentation? Mr. Dyer. Yes. That will require dimming the lights. Mr. Stupps. That is a real crusher. The lights will have to be dimmed, I guess. Mr. Dyer. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today. The primary focus of today’s discussion will be on the most recent surveys we have done in the Atlantic—— Mr. Stupps. Again, as we did this morning, if people want to move up here, you may do so. Mr. Dyer. As I was saying, I would like to focus my comments today primarily on the results of our most recent survey in the Atlantic, at the 3,800 meter dumpsite, in June 1978, shortly after your last set of hearings on this subject. There are two reasons why I am pleased to be here today. First, we haven’t had this opportunity before to discuss this survey activity. Also, I am glad to be here in light of some recent developments in the London Dumping Convention which add even greater import to this 3,800 meter survey—in August 1978 the IAEA issued its recommendation for sea disposal of low-level nucle- 379 ar waste. Two of the site selection recommendations were that the minimum acceptable disposal depth should be 4,000 meters or greater, and the geographic restriction should be between 50° north latitude and 50° south latitude. Coincidentally, this U.S. 3,800 meter Atlantic disposal site comes very close to fulfilling these requirements for the depth and does, of course, fit into the latitudinal restrictions. Mr. Stupps. Are you close to that microphone or as close as you can properly be? Mr. Dyer. I hope so. Mr. Stupps. That seems to be a little better. Mr. Dyer. The IAEA in its recommendations talked about four major objectives for monitoring. One of them was to make an estimate of exposure. A second reason was scientific investigations. A third reason was improved public understanding. A fourth was conservation of ocean resources. While we have been concerned with all four of these objectives, our primary focus has been on dumpsite specific surveys for scien- tific investigations. Between 1974 and 1977 the initial activities that this office par- ticipated in were surveys in the Atlantic and Pacific at depths ranging between 900 and 2,800 meters. This particular 1978 survey at 3,800 meters was a real stress on existing technology. It was the deepest site of the United States’ major dumpsites and required fairly rigorous technological applications. What I will do now is to run through a series of slides represent- ing interesting aspects of the 1978 survey. (Slide No. 1.) TABLE |—PRIMARY U.S. RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMPSITES Estimated an Estimated No. activity in of 55-gallon drums at time : : Distance from Ye Site Coordinates Depth (m) land. (km) dumpsite used die ante fe dP oa Atlantiq¢eerees cst ote mene lee 2c 38°30'N 2,800 190 1951-56 14,300 241 400 2a OGKWameeteeee eMe SN ete 7 Mere Nene Dee RCs Atlanticuetenmeece meri. be ne be 37°50'N 70°35’W Atlantignme tae 38 42°25'N Massachusetts Bay 70°35’W Pacific: Farallon Islands 37°38'N 123°08’W Farallonilslandsese.. 2a nee 37°37'N 1,700 71 1946-50 44,000 13,400 L23oaWhx tt facie ate nah ee eae TREY Saree aoe thea eee ene "This does not include the pressure vessel of the N/S Seawo/f reactor with an estimated induced activity of 33,000 Ci. The first slide we see here is of a prepared table listing the four major U.S. dumpsites based on the most recent information we have obtained. We can see here that three of the sites are in the Atlantic, and one, with a series of subsites, is in the Pacific. Focusing on the Atlantic for just a moment, there are two col- umns: One is the estimated number of 55-gallon drums dumped at the site, and the other is the estimates of radioactivity, in curies, in the drums. About 10 percent of all the drums dumped into the 69-848 O - 81 - 25 380 three major Atlantic dumpsites went to Massachusetts Bay, and the rest was evenly divided between the two deep Atlantic sites. Mr. Stupps. May I ask you one question there? You said the estimated numbers. I assume you mean that very literally. I recall a story in the Boston press with respect to the Massachu- setts Bay dumping which quotes the person who captained the barge or did the dumping as saying he made up those figures when some Government agency insisted on them. He had no idea in the world what he had dumped. The figures he gave were estimates he just made up in response to a demand by the AEC at that time for some numbers. And the rest of his records were burned in a fire. These are really rough estimates, I guess. Mr. Dyer. These are estimated numbers that have been provided to us from the archival records. Mr. Stupps. Whose archival records? Mr. Dyer. Well, recently NRC has been providing information to us. And, of course, we had to reach back into the old Atomic Energy Commission records. Mr. Stupps. The dumping you are talking about predates the NRC, does it not? Mr. Dyer. Yes. Mr. Stupps. And predates EPA? Mr. Dyer. Definitely. Again, the estimated activity in the drums at the time of packag- ing is just that, namely, estimated activity. These were wastes; and so no rigorous effort to characterize this material was made. We can see that the majority of this radioactive material went into the 2,800 meter dumpsite located approximately 120 miles off the Maryland-Delaware border. The remaining radioactivity inventory was about equally divided between the deeper of the Atlantic dump sites at 3,800 meters and the Massachusetts Bay site. If I could have the next slide, please. (Slide No. 2.) SLIDE No. 2 Slide No. 2 shows the three major Atlantic dump sites. I think that any future survey activities we would be considering would include these three sites. The Massachusetts Bay site (Al) is at a depth of about 300 feet. The site located about 120 miles offshore of the Maryland-Delaware Coast (A3) is at a depth of about 9,300 feet. The deepest site (A4) is in about 13,000 feet of water. May I have the next slide, please? Mr. Stupps. How deep is the Massachusetts Bay site? Mr. Dyer. Roughly, 300 feet. In June of 1978 we initiated the survey at the 3,800 meter dumpsite. (Slide No. 3.) 382 SLIDE No. 3 Slide No. 3 shows the primary research vessel, the R/V advance II. This ship provided the logistical support for our sampling pro- gram which consisted of a radioactive waste drum recovery, trawl- ing operations for biological organisms, and water, sediment, and biota analysis. This ship, coupled with the manned submersible vehicle ALVIN and its support ship, the R/V LULU, provided the primary logisti- cal support for our survey objectives. (Slide No. 4.) 383 = | add sg sem... % mmm. . / SLIDE No. 4 Slide No. 4 is a shot of the manned submersible ALVIN which was used by us in both 1975 and 1976 for our early surveys at the 2,800 meter Atlantic dumpsite. It is a fairly unique vessel. It has a 384 particular advantage in that it now has a depth capability to 4,000 meters and has a manipulating arm which allows very, very pre- pee pneas on the bottom. What we see in this slide are a quiver with a series of core tu with T-handles. These T-handles allow for remote-controlled ae ment by the ALVIN manipulating arm and sampling in close prox- imity to whatever we want to look at on the bottom. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 5.) Sure No. 5 Slide No. 5 is a dramatic shot of the ALVIN as it is about to submerge. I should point out that while these may seem like rou- tine submersible dives in order to go to that 3,800 meter depth we had to get the whole submersible system recertified by the Navy. Up until that time it had been certified to a depth of approximate- ly 12,200 feet. To go to this depth, it had to be recertified for 13,200 feet. Right now, that 4,000 meter or 13,200 feet depth of certifica- tion is maximum. As we will see in a few minutes, we found drums at this site at 3,985 meters, only 15 meters short of the maximum depth this submersible can go. If there are drums further out, there is no readily available system to go down there to take direct observations. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 6.) SLIDE No. 6 Slide No. 6 shows you what we saw when we first arrived on the deep-sea floor in the dumpsite area. The site is in the outer reach- ers of the Hudson Canyon axis. It is strongly swept by bottom currents. What we are seeing here is marl or claystone talus blocks. The area is surrounded by very high cliffs. The topographical relief is up to 600 feet. It has a very irregular bottom and is difficult to work in with a submersible. If you look at the irregularity of this bottom and couple it with the strong currents that are flowing through it, you can imagine that it was very hard to move through and do any actual on-the-bottom survey work. In the center of this picture can be seen one of the two most ubiquitous organisms in the area, the hermit crab. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 7.) 386 SLIDE No. 7 This is, again, nearby, but the bottom features are considerably different. Here we have white cobbles of Eoceanerage chalk. You can see the direction of transport downslope. Some of the cobble- sized material is glacial erratics: Again, the area is relatively steep and irregular. There has been a strong sweep by bottom currents and translocated material in a southwesterly direction through this site. And, again, all of this compounds the difficulty of traversing in a submersible that will only average about 1 mile per hour through relatively flat terrain. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 8.) 387 SLIDE No. 8 This slide (No. 8) is an interesting photograph, a Libby’s fruit cocktail can. It has not been there for long since is shows no silt layer or biological encrustations. We arrived at this site expecting that nothing had preceded us. And what we found in almost all the sites we looked at was trash jettisoned from surface ships. But what is interesting about this area is that it is practically featureless. There are no biological organisms to speak of, either on the surface or burrowing in the bottom. And the whole area has been swept very smooth by relatively strong currents, suggesting sediment burial and a relatively unstable sediment surface. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 9.) 388 SLIDE No. 9 Here we see one of the first drums that we observed from the submersible. It is a standard 55-gallon drum. It shows the typical corrosion along the chimes and weld points, and yet it is in fairly good condition. It has been lying on the ocean bottom in excess of 16 years. Again, you can see the talus slump blocks around the drums and the drum corrosion products on the sediment surface. We can also see in this photo indication of the direction of the current. It is moving toward the viewer, in a southerly direction. Corrosion prod- ucts can be seen in the foraminiferal sands which have been build- ing up behind the drum, along its long axis. On the other side of the drum we observed that the sediment had been scoured out considerably. In the background the rat-tail fish, C-o-r-y-p-h-a-e-n-o-i-d-e-s a-r-m- a-t-u-s is visible. This is the most ubiquitous fish and we have seen it in all of the deep sea dump sites. It is found at 2,800 meters and 3,800 meters. It is probably an important link in any food chain transfer from deep-sea disposal sites since it has been found in most of the deep-sea regions throughout the world. What is most interesting about the last few slides is the great variability shown in the sea bottom features over relatively short distances. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 10.) 389 SuipE No. 10 This drum is the one that we ultimately recovered for analysis. This drum was only a matter of 100 or 200 yards away from the drum in the previous photo. And yet the other drum was sitting on the sediment surface in an area where there was a lot of erosion and scouring. The area where this drum came to rest is quite obviously a strong depositional environment. The sediment is moving quite massively and rapidly downslope. This drum couldn’t have been down here more than 20 years since the site was reportedly used only between 1957-59. And this drum is not buried only to its terminal velocity at impact. Most of the burial is due to sediment sweeping down and covering the drum. The hypothesis is that with enough time some of these drums would be completely covered, and may, in fact, have already been covered. There are certain artifacts in this photo not normally present. I don’t know if you can see this, but there is a track at a distance behind the drum and a pile up of sediment and another track immediately in front of the drum. Both are artifically induced by the sled track of the submersible ALVIN. Another interesting point is that there is very little corrosion and practically no biofouling of this drum or the drum seen in the previous photograph. There is also very little observable biological activity in the area. The paint surface is relatively intact, which indicates that the erosional scour we would expect to see in this canyon axis is not present here. This drum was selected for recovery because of its good condition, and presence of some identification markings. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 11.) 390 SLIDE No. 11 The drum lift and recovery system was fairly standardized by the time we undertook this survey, although we had only recovered two drums; once in 1976 in the Atlantic, and once in 1977 in the Pacific. In this 3,800-meter site instead of using a winch on the ship to recover a drum from the bottom we used a direct lift with the ALVIN submersible, since this was a 55-gallon drum and consider- ably lighter than the 80-gallon drum recovered from the Atlantic 2,800-meter site in 1976, a report on which I have enclosed for the record. The drum was brought up very close to the surface with a harness underneath the submersible, and then the line was at- pai to the ship’s winch and it was hoisted the last few hundred eet. Standard radiation protection procedures were in place. All per- sonnel handling the drum had to wear special clothing, and they all had film badges to record any radiation exposure. There was a rubber sheet over the deck to protect it. As we will see in the next slide the drum was immediately placed into a jet-engine container. I should also add that everybody who came anywhere near this drum had a film badge. There was no exposure reported for any of the personnel. [The following was received for the record:] 391 ON BOARD CORROSION ANALYSIS OF A RECOVERED NUCLEAR WASTE CONTAINER by Stephen C. Dexter Assistant Professor of Ocean Engineering and Materials Science College of Marine Studies University of Delaware August 1979 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Environmental Protection Agency Under Contract No. WA-6-99-2767-J Project Officer Robert S. Dyer Radiation Source Analysis Branch Technology Assessment Division Office of Radiation Programs U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20460 TECHNICAL NOTE ORP/TAD-79-2 392 EPA REVIEW NOTICE This report has been reviewed by the Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the EPA. Neither the United States nor the EPA makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. 393 EPA TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS Publications of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Radiation Programs (ORP) are available in paper copy, as long as the EPA/ORP supply is available, or from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA 22161. The following reports are part of the EPA/ORP 1976 Ocean Disposal Report Series: ORP/TAD-79-1 ORP/TAD-79-2 ORP/TAD-79-3 ORP/TAD-79-4 ORP/TAD-79-5 ORP/TAD-79-6 ORP/TAD-79-7 ORP/TAD-79-8 ORP/TAD-79-9 ORP/TAD-79-10 Materials for Containment of Low-Level Nuclear Waste in the Deep Ocean On Board Corrosion Analysis of a Recovered Drum from the Atlantic 2800 Meter Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Analysis and Evaluation of a Radioactive Waste Package Retrieved from the Atlantic 2800 Meter Disposal Site Reports of Infaunal Analyses Conducted on Biota Collected at the Atlantic 2800 Meter Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Geologic Observations of the Atlantic 2800 Meter Radioactive Waste Dumpsite Sediment Geochemistry of the 2800 Meter Atlantic Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Ocean Current Measurements at the Atlantic 2800 Meter Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Survey Coordination and Operations Report - EPA Atlantic 2800 Meter Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Survey 1976 Site Specifie Survey of the Atlantic 2800 Meter Deepwater Radioactive Waste Dumpsite: Radiochemistry Sediment Characteristics of the 2800 Meter Atlantic Nuclear Waste Disposal Site 394 FOREWORD The Environmental Protection Agency, (EPA), was given a Congressional mandate to develop criteria, standards, and regulations governing the ocean disposal of all forms of wastes pursuant to Public Law 92-532, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. Within this Congressional mandate, EPA has initiated a specific program to develop regulations and eriteria to control the ocean disposal of radioactive wastes. EPA has taken an active role both domestically and within the international nuclear regulatory arena to develop the effective controls necessary to protect the health and safety of man and the marine environment. The EPA Office of Radiation Programs (ORP) initiated feasibility studies to determine whether current technologies could be applied toward determining the fate of radioactive wastes dumped in the past. After successfully locating actual radioactive waste containers in three of the primary radioactive waste disposal sites used by the United States in the past, ORP developed an intensive program of dumpsite characterization studies to investigate the following: (a) the biological, chemical and physical parameters, (b) the presence and distribution of radionuclides within these sites, and (c) the performance of past packaging techniques and materials. These studies have provided needed information and data on the past and present nuclear waste disposal activities concomitant with the growing national and international concern for the long-term effects of this low-level waste disposal option. ORP has now completed the fifth in a series of Pacific and Atlantic Ocean dumpsite surveys which began in 1974. This survey of the Atlantic 2800 meter deep-sea radioactive waste disposal site, which is centered at coordinates 38930'N, 72°06'W and located approximately 120 miles east of the Maryland-Delaware coast, was conducted in June 1976. A major objective of this 1976 Atlantic survey was the first recovery of a steel and concrete container from any deep-sea dumpsite. In conjunction with the survey, EPA/ORP initiated a contract study to evaluate, prior to extensive laboratory analysis, the chemical, biological and corrosion status of the exterior of the container immediately upon recovery. The following report presents this evaluation. Readers of this report are encouraged to inform the Director, Technology Assessment Division (ANR-459), Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460, of any errors, omissions, or other comments. David S. Smith Director, Technology Assessment Division Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-459) 395 Abstract During the 1976 Atlantic 2800m radioactive waste dumpsite survey, an 80-gallon low-level radioactive waste container was recovered. Within the two hour interval between the time the container first emerged from the ocean until it was encapsulated, the exterior condition of the drum, including the appearance of corrosion product films and attached biological growths, was extensively documented photographically. In this report, representative photographs, as well as the results of limited chemical and biological analyses performed by University of Delaware personnel during the above two hour interval, are presented. These results are discussed in light of previously published deep ocean corrosion data, and recommendations on improving shipboard sampling and analytical procedures are given. 69-848 O - 81 - 26 396 1.0 INTRODUCTION On July 31, 1976, an 80-gallon nuclear waste container was recovered by the Environmental Protection Agency from a depth of 2783 meters in the Northwestern Atlantic Ocean at a point approximately 120 miles east of the Delaware-Maryland border. The container was hoisted aboard the research vessel, Cape Henlopen, where it was photographed, and samples were immediately taken of corrosion products and attached biological growths. The container was then encapsulated in a jet engine shipping container which was flushed thoroughly with argon to minimize any further corrosion. The elapsed time from when the container first broke the surface of the water to the start of the argon flushing process was two hours. The purpose of this report is to describe the photographic, chemical, and biological analyses performed on board the ship by University of Delaware personnel during those two hours and to present the results of those analyses. 2.0 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS Both the surface condition of the container as it came on board the ship, and the recovery operation itself, were documented phot eerantieaine Thirty-five mm color slides of the container were taken as soon as it broke the surface in order to record the volume and distribution of corrosion products before any changes due to decreasing pressure and increasing temperature took place. After the container was secured to the deck of the ship, photographs were taken in a systematic way so that they could be related to the correct position on the exterior of the drum upon subsequent laboratory examination. 397 2 Close-up photographs were taken of all interesting features including biological growths. Close-up photographs were located with respect to the container by taking photo pairs. First, an overall picture was taken of the container with a cut-out cardboard frame held over the feature of interest. The camera was then repositioned and a close-up photograph was taken of the area within the frame. The photographs presented in this report were printed from color plates made from selected original color slides. The pH of the corrosion products and the mud layer, where it was still clinging to the drum, was spot checked at several locations while the drum surface was still wet. Readings were taken with pH indicator papers and recorded for each location. Samples of the corrosion product were taken both from the outer layers (reddish orange) and from the layer immediately adjacent to the bare metal surface (greenish black) at a location just above the mudline on the eylindrical surface near the metal end and were examined for bacterial activity. The examination was done both immediately on board the ship as well as subsequently ashore in the laboratory. A Unitron BPH phase contrast microscope was used for all observations. The samples observed on board were examined directly at 600X by spreading the moist sample on a glass slide. These observations were very difficult due to ship roll and vibration. The samples to be observed in the laboratory were diluted with seawater that had been passed through a 0.22 um membrane filter (Millipore) and encapsulated in glass vials to prevent them from drying. In the laboratory, these samples were spread between a glass slide and coverslip and examined in phase contrast 398 3 at 1500X using an oil immersion lens. No special measures were taken to avoid bacterial contamination of the sample nor were aseptic techniques used in preparing the filtered seawater. 3.0 RESULTS 3.1 Photographic Analysis Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the container showing the locations from which each of the photographs in Figures 2 through 9 were taken. Figures 2 through 9 show the general condition of the container immediately upon recovery. Note that the container as it sat on the deck was upside down compared to its position on the sea floor. Figure 2a shows the concrete end of the drum seconds after it first broke the surface of the water. The identifying markings on the concrete end are legible in Figure 2b and include such information as the package number (28), the volume of the waste-matrix mixture (9.0 cubic feet), the weight of the package (1682 pounds), the most hazardous isotope present in the package one meter From (cobalt-60) and the dose rate at,the surface of the drum at the time of packaging (3 millirads/hour). Information not clearly visible in Figure 2(b) indicated that the radioactive waste package was prepared in 1961. Prior to the start of recovery operations the drum sat partially embedded in the bottom sediments. The sediment line is clearly visible in Figure 2, the black portion of the concrete end having been in the mud. 399 4 Figures 3a and 3b show the surface condition of the container after hoisting out of the water but before securing on deck. There was a 10 to 15 minute interlude here while the radioactivity level of the drum was being measured. As seen in the photographs, the container is in remarkably good condition after 14-15 years of immersion. The mud line can again be seen in Figure 3b between the two arrows. Note that the upper half of the drum, which was below the mud line, is less corroded than the lower half which was exposed to the water column. The view in Figure 3a, for instance, shows most of the area that was in the mud, and there is very little corrosion visible. Identical areas on the drum surface are labeled "A" and "B" on Figures 3a and 3b. On seventy-five percent of the metallic surface area of the drum (and on considerably more of the area below the mud line) the original black enamel finish was still intact. Several of the more interesting areas of the container surface were photographed in detail after the container was secured on deck. These are shown in Figures 4 through 9. Figure 4 shows the surface above and below the mud line on the left portion of the cylindrical surface of the drum as seen in Figure 3b. The large area of bare metal surface showing there as well as the bare metal showing on the raised ribs of the drum in Figures 3a and 3b were Probably scraped clean as the drum was dragged along the bottom during the initial part of the hoist precedure. There is little doubt that this happened, as the track of the drum where it was dragged along was clearly visible from the deep submersible, Alvin, upon subsequent inspection of the site. 400 5 Figure 5 shows the heavy concentration of corrosion products just to the lower right of the letter "A" in Figure 3b. By the time this picture was taken, some of the corrosion product had been scraped off into sample bottles. Other portions of it had rubbed off against the nylon webbing, visible in Figure 5, which had been installed as an additional aid to handling shortly after the picture in Figure 3b was taken. There was no attempt made at this time to scrape all the way through the corrosion product layer to determine the condition of the underlying metal as this was planned for subsequent laboratory operations. The outer steel container was in the worst condition around the rim at the concrete end as shown in Figure 6. There was no marked difference in the condition of the rim above as opposed to below the mud line. A sample of the corroded edge of the metal was clipped off with metal shears for later examination at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. When the container first arrived at the surface, it was apparent that there was a perforation in the metal drum as a stream of seawater was observed coming out as if under pressure. The stream can be seen just below the letter "B" in both Figures 3a and 3b. The area from which the stream came was below the mud line and is shown close up in Figure 7. By the time this photograph was taken, the pressure had nearly equalized and the remaining liquid was seeping out as shown. Some of this liquid was collected by the EPA Project Officer for subsequent laboratory analysis. Upon further examination with a probe, it became apparent that the perforation was not due to corrosion but was a recent puncture. It is suspected that this occurred as the drum was being dragged along the bottom as related above. 401 6 Figures 8a and 8b show the condition of the metallic end of the drum. The mud line runs between the two arrows from upper right to lower left of Figure 8a, the portion to the upper left having been buried in the bottom sediments. The corroded area in the center of the metallic end is shown in Figure 8b. This appearance is typical of a painted steel surface in the early stages of seawater corrosion. The small white streaks near the lower rim of the metallic end as seen in Figure 8a were the only macroscopic biological growths that were found attached to the drum. They were sampled and identified as polychaete tubes under separate contract by Dr. Donald Reish of California State University. There was very little corrosion below the mud line. Where corrosion did take place, it appeared to be highly localized as in Figure 9. Instead of being spread uniformly over the surface, the corrosion took place in the form of broad shallow pitting (see arrows). It is estimated that the depth of attack was 0.2 to 0.5 mm. As there were no corrosion products associated with these pits upon recovery of the drum, one can only assume that the products were scraped off as the drum dragged along the bottom. This is a reasonable assumption as this portion of the drum was below the mud line prior to recovery. 3.2 Chemical Analysis The pH of the corrosion products was measured with pH indicating paper at several locations both above and below the mud line. The pH was generally 402 7 found to be between 6 and 8. There was one notable exception. The pH of the water bubbling from the puncture described in connection with Figures 3 and 7 was between 13.0 and 13.5. 3.3 Microbiological Analysis Despite the fact that aseptic techniques were not used in sampling the corrosion products, no microorganisms could be positively identified microscopically as being present in the corrosion products. Both the red-orange outer layer and the greenish-black inner layer adjacent to the bare metal surface were examined. Since the shipboard observations were very difficult due to vibration problems, observations were also made in the laboratory. The same negative result was obtained. 4.0 DISCUSSION The overall condition of the container that was recovered was much better than might have been expected given the duration of exposure in the deep ocean (probably in excess of 14 years). The often localized nature of the corrosion that did take place was also somewhat surprising as one normally expects steel structures to be corroded uniformly over the exposed surface. Before drawing any conclusions about the significance of the good condition of the drum to future ocean dumping, however, two things must be considered: first, this is only a single data point; second, this single point is purposely biased. Many of the containers observed by the submersible, Alvin, were in worse condition than the one recovered. This particular drum was selected for recovery because it appeared to be in good enough condition to survive the trip to the surface and yet provide meaningful information on past packaging performance. 403 ss 8 The corrosion rate of uncoated plain carbon steel in aerated quiescent seawater is normally as high as 0.25 to 0.40 mm/year (10 to 16 thousandths of an inch per year cmey] ) for the first few months of immersion! »@)3, Gradually, as the fouling and corrosion product layer builds up, the above rate decreases@ to 0.03 to 0.13 mm/year (1 to 5 MPY). In addition, this rate depends directly on the concentration of dissolved oxygen present in the seawater and on the pH of the seawater’. Within the range of pH 4 to 10 the corrosion rate of steel is independent of pH and depends only on how rapidly oxygen can be supplied to the steel surface. As the pH becomes more basic than 10, however, steel becomes passive in seawater and the corrosion rate drops rapidly to a negligible valuel. The well known corrosion behavior of steel in seawater described above may partially account for the good condition of the recovered nuclear waste container. Although dissolved oxygen measurements were not made at the drum recovery site, it is generally found that the dissolved oxygen in the deep ocean decreases rapidly with depth from 7 ppm at the surface to a minimum of about 0.5 ppm at 750 meters, then rising again typically to 2 or 3 ppm at great depth. Occasionally the dissolved oxygen at great depth may rise again to a value as high as that at the surface or even higher. Given the good condition of the recovered drum, it can be speculated that the dissolved oxygen in both the water and the sediments at the drum recovery site was low (perhaps 1 to 2 ppm). This, coupled with the low temperature to be expected at great depth, would account for the relatively low corrosion rates observed. In addition, the conerete inside the drum was saturated with 404 9 seawater, and its pH was reported in the results section to be between 13 and 13.5. This is consistent with other measurements reported for the pH of seawater in conerete?. The corrosion rate of the steel on the inner surface of the container should, therefore, have been negligible and corrosion should have proceeded from the outside only. The difference that this can make is illustrated by the fact that the steel container was in the worst condition around the rim at the concrete end where the steel extending beyond the concrete by about two centimeters was exposed to ambient pH seawater on both sides. The perforated condition of the steel in that area was shown in Figure 6. The corrosion rate of steel in seawater is not usually influenced significantly by the presence (or absence) of iierobkeeienee The one noticeable exception to this is in anaerobic bottom sediments where the corrosion rate of steel normally is negligible. If sulfate reducing bacteria are present, however, they allow the formation of a loosely adherent FeS scale on the steel which is cathodic to the bare metal surface!?©, This produces a galvanic couple which accelerates the corrosion of the steel and is accompanied by hydrogen evolution. The excellent condition of the portions of the recovered drum that were buried in the sediments testifies that sulfate reducing bacteria were probably not active in sediments in the recovery area. This view is also supported by the negative result of the microscopic investigations reported in the results section. If sulfate reducing bacteria had been active, we should have been able to detect them in the corrosion products. 405 10 5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS It is not possible based on the one container that was recovered to make any definitive conclusions about the suitability, from a corrosion viewpoint, of this method of packaging nuclear wastes for ocean disposal. It is possible to say that at least one of the many containers dumped 16 to 20 years ago Survived its stay on the bottom with the exterior in reasonably good condition. It is also possible to make recommendations for increasing the value of future work of this type: 1. Determine the dissolved oxygen concentration both in the water column within about ten meters of the bottom and in the upper one meter of the sediments at the dumpsite. This should be done both several months before and again several months after, as well as at the time of the survey (total of three measurements with at least six months from the first to the last), in order to detect if there is any variability. This type of data, which was not available for the work reported here, would have allowed a more meaningful corrosion analysis. The expected corrosion rate could have been estimated more accurately and related directly to other published deep-sea corrosion data. 2. Retain the services of a qualified marine microbiologist to test the sediment samples for the presence of microorganisms. The sulfate reducing bacteria are particularly important for evaluating the corrosion behavior. Also have this person arrange to test the corrosion products for bacterial activity by culturing techniques as well as by microscopy. 406 4 The above recommendations should be extended to include not only research on the effects of past dumping, but also research on sites that may be under consideration for future dumping. In this way it will be possible to detect and eliminate sites whose characteristics might accelerate deterioration of the container by corrosion. 407 12 REF ERENCES F.M. Reinhart "Corrosion of Materials in Hydrospace - Part I. Irons, Steels, Cast Irons and Steel Products," U.S. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Technical Note N-900, July 1967. F.W. Fink and W.K. Boyd, "The Corrosion of Metals in Marine Environments," DMIC Report 245, May 1970, p. 9-22. Marine Corrosion, F.L. LaQue, Wiley-Interscience, 1975, p.95. Corrosion and Corrosion Control, H.H. Uhlig, second edition, John Wiley, IMLS joeVeq D.R. Lankard, "Cement and Concrete Technology for the Corrosion Engineer," Materials Performance, 15, August 1976, p.2H. Microbial Aspects of Metallurgy, J.D.A. Miller, editor, American Elsevier, 1970. 408 ‘s}JUaWIpP|s 84} Ul Pappequia sem uOoILIOd papeys ayL "100]} BBS BY} UO UOI}ISOd $s}! 0} pasedwod uMOp apisdn si aay painjoid se pue ‘yap ay} UO jes }I Se JQUIeE}UOD ay, “G6 YHnOIYyI Z soinbi4 ul sydesboxoYd ayy JO suol}e90] 84} Hulmoys Jaule}UOD pas9A0da1 |y} JO WeJbeIp d1}eWaYIS *L aanbiy JILIYINOD ONF od ree crear ear ot eee es JIN/7 CNW Figure 2. Nuclear waste container. a) a few seconds after breaking surface of water, b) identification marks on con- crete end. 410 (b) Figure 3. Nuclear waste container showing: a) portion of surface that had been buried in the sediments, and b) the mud line between arrows. 411 Figure 4. Left end of cylindrical surface of nuclear waste container aS seen in Figure 3(b) after securing on deck. 69-848 O - 81 - 27 Figure 5. Heavily corroded portion of cylindrical surface of container just to the lower right of letter "A" in Figure 3(b). 413 A -“ NX, wah aie een ee ee ipo Figure 6. Corrosion around the rim of the concrete end of the container. 414 Figure 7. Water oozing out of perforation on cylindrical surface of container. Location of the perforation is just below the letter "B" an Figure, 3i(a) and) (bb) Figure 8. Metallic end of nuclear waste container: a) mud line shown between arrows, b) close up of corroded portion. 416 Figure 9. Localized corrosive attack (see arrows) on cylindrical surface below the sediment line. 417 Mr. Dyer. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 12.) SuipE No. 12 This is a close-up of the drum immediately after recovery. We tried to keep this drum in the atmosphere for as short a time as possible. It was put into a jet-engine container and purged in argon, an inert gas, to prevent further deterioration. This photo shows quite clearly the drum inventory number, which is “952”. The drums shows very little evidence of biofouling. There is very minor corrosion along the surface. This drum was on the ocean bottom for a minimum of 16 years at a pressure of almost 2,000 pounds per square inch and yet it is in relatively good condition. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 13.) SLIDE No. 13 This slide shows a close-up of the concrete end of the waste package. Most of the radioactive wastes were packaged in 55-gallon drums. The top of the drum was cut off; the waste was put inside; and concerete was poured around and over the waste to make a solid matrix. What we can see here in this slide is that the concrete shows very little evidence of spallation or cracking. There is some surface dissolution of the concrete material. The cylindrical hole in the center of the concrete is where the radioactive waste is located, in this case a piece of iron pipe embedded or set into the drum with concrete poured around it. It doesn’t show up too clearly in the slide here, but the drum has been perforated along the chime area by seawater corrosion. This corrosion is expected where you have both sides of the metal exposed to seawater, since seawater is very corrosive. Where the drum has only been exposed on one surface, there has been very little corrosion. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 14.) 419 rag oat /, oe eae I) arn ee a ee a r 1 * a wee i mit ‘an acne se nanan Sait: Pha ea oo ta rine 7 a Supe No. 14 Here, we are looking at the other end of the drum from that seen in the previous slide. There are a couple of interesting features to note. First, you can see that there is very little biofouling; and 420 second, corrosion is mimimal. The upper one-quarter of the drum in this photo was in contact with the sediment and shows no evidence of corrosion. One of the things we are very interested in, especially if we look at sealed emplacement of low-level waste in the future, is whether there are differential corrosion rates be- tween what is actually in contact with or under the sediment versus that part of the drum directly exposed to seawater. What we have found in the past is that there is retardation of corrosion to that part of the drum which has been buried in the sediment. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 15.) SLIDE No. 15 I should add we were rather fortunate in this survey. ‘If, I could just go back for a moment to the previous slide— There is one aspect of these surveys that I don’t want you to overlook, and that is the weather and sea state. The sea here is relatively calm. These kinds of operations are extremely weather dependent. On both the drum search and recovery the ALVIN cannot be launched in a sea state greater than about four, which means that if you have any bad weather, which is very common in the Atlantic, you can sit on station for the duration of the survey mission and not get anything done. We were very fortunate. Again, you could not recover this drum unless the seas were relatively calm. Now, to the next slide. (Slide No. 15.) The recovered drum which was stored in a jet-engine overpack purged with argon was brought back to Port Jefferson, New York. It was off-loaded and transported to Brookhaven National Labora- tory (BNL) for analysis. BNL has just completed the analysis on 421 the drum and we have not yet received the report. There is gener- ally a 2 to 8 year lead time between the drum recovery and completion of the drum analysis since it entails both matrix evalu- ation of the concrete and testing of the metal for corrosion rates, for both that portion of the waste package buried in the sediment and that portion of the package exposed to sea water. However, we have completed the analyses of the drum that we recovered in 1976 from the Atlantic 2,800-meter site, and obtained some very interesting results. First of all, we knew that the most hazardous radioactive isotope disposed of in that drum, based on the labeling on the drum, was cobalt-60. After more than 12 to 14 years of immersion, none of the cobalt-60 had been released. However, the cesium-137 had been leached from the concrete and was found in the sediment in the vicinity of the site. The other aspect of the analysis concerned the metal container and concrete matrix. Based on the corrosion analysis, the metal container was estimated to last between 25 to 37 years. The con- crete itself was estimated to survive for 104 years in that particu- lar environment. I should also add that the philosophy underlying these early disposal operations was that the metal drum itself was not intend- ed to provide any significant containment for these wastes. It was primarily a form for transport and handling. Although the primary focus of our 1978 Atlantic survey effort was to investigate the 3,800-meter dumpsite, there was also a sec- ondary objective. This objective was to assist the U.S. Navy, at their request, in: Putting down corrosion test panels at the Atlantic 2800m dump- site for an estimate of corrosion rates of stainless steel after vary- ing lengths of immersion in a deep-sea site. And, (2) Looking, very briefly and unsuccessfully, for the SEAWOLF reactor which reportedly had been dumped at the At- lantic 2,800-meter site in the late 1950’s. I should add also that our primary role here was logistic support. The actual program elements and objectives were handled by the avy. (Slide No. 16.) r Bd a Fs. SLIpE No. 16 Slide No. 16, then shows the corrosion test panels (foreground) in the ALVIN sampling basket, which we deployed for the U.S Navy. Sediment coring tubes, equipped with T-handles, and water sam- plers are also visible in the sampling basket. An interesting historical feature of the Atlantic 2,800-meter site that was fortunately missing in the 3,800-meter site was the multi- ple-use aspect. I mean, by that, that the 2,800-meter site received chemical wastes and munitions, as well as radioactive wastes. The Massachusetts Bay site also received chemical toxic wastes in addi- tion to radioactive wastes. (Slide No. 17.) 423 SiipE No. 17 Slide No. 17 shows some sort of a munitions drum, unidentified World War II military ordnance. We don’t have any further infor- mation on it. Signs of biofouling are quite evident in this slide (Eunephthya Sp.) The biofouling is limited but still greater than that observed at the 3,800-meter site. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 18.) SuipE No. 18 424 We found litter throughout the 2,800-meter site. Here we see a box of munitions, possibly obsolete ammunition. We came across hundreds of these boxes. I think that the “bottom line” to this is that in any future monitoring of disused, multiple-use dumpsites we should be particularly aware of the widespread nature of this ordnance. And that we do nothing about the properties or behavior of most of it. I don’t think we would want to go out and start bumping around these sonar targets in a submersible; which brings me to another point, the problem of confusion of targets. If you have a dumpsite with multiple-use such a the 2,800-meter Atlantic dumpsite, and you are out in a submersible at 9,000 feet, you are traveling fairly blind. You can’t run you external lights coontinuously or you will run down the battery. When the lights are on you can only see in a forward arc about 150° for about 25 to 30 feet. Therefore, your sonar is the only thing that really tells you what is out there ahead. The targets, these munitions drums and explosives, give you the same or similar signals as do the radioactive waste drums. Therefore you don’t know whether to avoid the target or not until you are quite close to it. This, then, requires caution and a fairly slow traverse rate. While the 3,800-meter dumpsite appeared relatively barren of biological organisms, the 2,800-meter site appeared more biological- ly active. The following six slides are illustrative of some of the more common fish and invertebrates present at the 2,800-meter dumpsite. While the fish are of considerable oceanographic inter- est, they also compound the difficulty of describing potential bio- logical transport mechanisms for radioactivity from a dumpsite. Each of the fish shown may represent part of a separate food chain or components of the same food chain. They may also be present, but as yet unobserved at the 3,800-meter dumpsite. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 19.) 425 SuipE No. 19 Here we see the rattail fish, Coryphaenoides armatus. This was found at both the 3,800 meter dumpsite and 2,800 meter dumpsite. This fish is unbiquitous throughout the area. The eel-like fish is a Synaphobranchus. Both of these fish are bottom feeders, although Synaphobranchus is also a pelagic feeder. (Slide No. 20.) SLIDE No. 20 426 In slide No. 20 we see another fish photographed at the 2,800- meter site, Antimora rostrata. This fish is a bottom feeder. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 21.) SLIDE No. 21 427 This is another genus of rattail fish, Halosauropsis. This rattail is found fairly predominantly at the 2,800-meter site and is a bottom feeder. We did not catch it at the 3,800-meter site and the maximum depth of habitation for this fish may be somewhere between the 2,800-meter and 3,800-meter dumpsites. If you consider that the international dumping recommendations recommend 4,000 meters as the minimum acceptable disposal depth for radioactive materials, you are seeing a very good techni- cal reason for selecting that depth. You have reduced the number of biological organisms and types of species found that could take up and/or transport the radioactive material, thus reducing one risk pathway to man. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 22.) SLIDE No. 22 This is called a tripod fish because it sits up off the bottom on its elongated pectoral fins while it waits for food to swim by. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 23.) 69-848 0 - 81 - 28 428 SLIDE No. 23 This fish is called a chimaera, and is rarely seen. We don’t know anything about how common it is. It may be important in potential food chain transfer of radioactive materials from the deep sea or it may not be. What is noteworthy is that we didn’t catch any of these fish in our trawl nets. This fish was only observed directly from the submersible. I think an important consideration in deep- sea monitoring, both now and in the immediate future, is that just because you go out and conduct trawls or other sorts of sampling doesn’t mean you are really sampling all the different kinds of organisms that are in the dumpsite area. If you do trawl, you probably won’t catch the chimaerid fish, For example. You won’t catch the fast-swimming fish. You may only get a very small cross-section of what is in that dump site. So, even using existing technology today, you may not be able to predict all the food-chain transport mechanisms. Next slide, please. (Slide No. 24.) 429 SLIDE No. 24 Whenever we go out and do a deep-sea survey, as soon as we answer one question another question pops up. This slide illus- trates that point. This is a starfish called Dytaster sitting on what appears to be a mound encircled by a fairly concentric ring of small burrow holes. This is only found at the 2,800-meter Atlantic site. We haven’t found it at any other site. We don’t know what causes it. The deep-sea biologists don’t know what causes it. We have probed this area and never found a proof-positive causal agent for these circles, commonly called ‘fairy rings’. And yet the most common feature throughout the 2,800-meter site has been the pres- ence of these fairy rings. We still don’t know what they are due to, or their significance, if any. Before I conclude my statement I would like to introduce for the record, the Press Release we issued prior to this 1978 3,800-meter survey, which outlines in much more detail the objectives of that survey. [Environmental News, June 19, 1978] EPA To SurveY DEEP-SEA RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMPSITE IN ATLANTIC The Environmental Protection Agency will conduct a research investigation at the deepest of the four major oceanic radioactive waste disposal sites used by the U.S. between 1946-1970. The site is located at a depth of 13,000 feet, approximately 200 miles off the Maryland-Delaware coast. An estimated 14,500 fifty-five gallon drums containing a total of 2,100 curies of radioactivity were deposited at the site approximately 20 years ago. Using the deep submersible ALVIN, operated by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the Office of Radiation Programs plans to conduct a detailed survey of the condition of the radioactive waste drums dumped at the site and to examine the ney po around the drums to determine if the radioactive contents have been released. 430 The research vessel LULU, support ship for the ALVIN submersible, will depart for the site from Woods Hole, Massachusetts on June 20 and will rendezvous with a second research vessel, the ADVANCE II departing from Wilmington, North Caroli- na on June 18. Present plans call for an eight-day survey with the participation of over thirty researchers from eleven academic institutions, three U.S. Federal agen- cies, and the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute. An EPA oceanographer will descend in the ALVIN submersible to the 13,000 foot depth in order to examine the condition of the drums and to determine the feasibil- ity of retrieving one of them for later analysis. This will be the twelfth submersible dive in the last four years and is part of the comprehensive survey program developed by the Office of Radiation Programs to study the effects of past dumping of radioactive waste. Scientists aboard the ADVANCE II will conduct a comprehensive program of water, sediment, and biota sampling. The collected material will yield information on the levels and extent of radioactivity in the dumpsite area, the ability of sedi- ments to absorb and immobilize selected radioactive materials, the presence of biological food chains which could transmit radioactivity to man, the extent to which biological organisms could redistribute radioactivity, and the geologic stabil- ity of the dumpsite area. The “Ocean Dumping” Act of 1972 requires EPA to set regulations controlling ocean disposal of all materials including low-level radioactive wastes. The Act specifically prohibits ocean disposal of high-level radioactive wastes. The United States has not dumped any radioactive wastes in the ocean since 1970, although several European nations are actively using this form of disposal. The technical and operational results of this EPA radioactive waste dumpsite survey program, which commenced in 1974, will be evaluated to determine the feasibility of developing more comprehensive ocean disposal regulations and standards. As stated earlier, we are concerned with monitoring for various objectives, the foremost of which has been a firsthand scientific attempt to examine the many biological, chemical, goelogical physi- cal processes acting on the radioactive waste drums in abandoned U.S. nuclear waste disposal sites; processes which could transport or immobilize the radioactive materials. The ability to assess and/ or predict as closely as possible the impact of past and potential future low-level radioactive waste disposal activities is of consider- able importance to our agency mandates. Health impact monitoring of abandoned sites is also perceived as important. But, both of these goals are predicated on our ability to understand the ocean processes that can contribute to or impede that radiological impact. As a result of our survey at the Atlantic 3800 meter dumpsite, what have we learned about the ocean conditions at this site? First, the biological populations living in and on the ocean bottom sedi- ment are scanty, and are fewer in numbers and species per unit area than either of the shallower Pacific-Farallon Islands dump- sites investigated. Second, the evidence of slump scarps and avalanche deposits, coupled with a noticeable lack of biological activity, suggests that the area is geologically unstable. Third, there is strong visual evidence of a rapid, Southwesterly- moving undercurrent. And fourth, there is no convincing crise: of any elevated concentrations of radioactivity in the biota, sediments, or water collected from the dumpsite. The future use of this site would appear undesirable based on its geologic instability and the difficulty in monitoring the area. How- ever, lack of extensive biological populations, and the presence of strong dispersal forces would seem to suggest lower potential for physical and biological accumulation of any of the radioactive 431 waste contents, thus perhaps reducing the potential impact of the dumping operations. Important questions remain unanswered, however, and further sampling to obtain the answers is warranted. This concludes my prepared statement. We will be happy to answer any questions you may have on all aspects of our surveys. [The prepared statement of Mr. Dyer follows (the slides referred to in the statement were included in the preceding text):] PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. DyER, SENIOR STAFF OCEANOGRAPHER, OFFICE oF RADIATION PrRoGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to present to you some of the details of our site-specific survey work at abandoned U.S. nuclear waste dump sites in the Atlantic Ocean. Since we last appeared before you in 1978, we have completed a survey at the deepest of four major U.S. nuclear waste dumpsite areas, a site located approximately two hundred miles east of the Mary- land-Delaware coast at a depth of 3800m (approximately 13,000 feet). I would now like to describe to you in more detail the results of this survey effort, for two reasons: (1) We have not had the occasion until now to present this informa- tion before Congress, and, (2) This site comes closest to fulfilling the minimum disposal depth requirement of 4000m and meets the geographic restriction to the area between 50° south and 50° north latitude as established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAA) in 1978. These requirements were set pursuant to the London Dumping Convention for the siting of any nuclear waste dumpsites now, or in the future. As a signatory to the Convention, the U.S. is bound by these require- ments. Therefore, any information obtained from this 3800m dumpsite should be directly applicable to future U.S. deep-sea siting considerations. This 3800m site raises a basic site selection question, which I shall discuss in more detail later: Once a radioactive material is released into a deep-sea environment is it better for it to be rapidly diluted to lower concentrations over a wider area, or localized to keep the radioactivity at higher concentrations within a narrow region? Dr. Roger Mattson has briefly discussed the specific objectives of our past survey activities as well as recent considerations we have given to the question of monitor- ing. By way of introduction I would like to put this site-specific survey into perspec- tive with both Dr. Mattson’s remarks and the general objectives of environmental monitoring as presented by the IAKA in their recommendations for controlling sea disposal of nuclear waste (INFCIRC/205/Add.1/Rev.1, August 1978). The IAFA has set out four basic objectives for environmental monitoring of deep- sea disposal sites: (1) Assessment of actual or potential exposure of man and other sensitive elements of the biosphere, or estimation of upper limits of such exposure; (2) Scientific investigations; (3) Improved public understanding; and (4) Conservation of ocean resources While our past survey activities have been concerned with all four of the IAEA objectives, our focus has been on dumpsite-specific scientific investigations in accord- ance with EPA regulatory responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act (PL 92- 932). Althrough there are different kinds of monitoring activities with different specific objectives, they are all related to a better understanding of what happens to the radioactive material after disposal in an ocean dumpsite. Our overall concern has been on the general monitorability of a site. Unless the technology exists to allow direct investigation of a dumpsite to verify scientific assumptions made re- garding the site suitability, then the site should not be used. The initial activities engaged in by this office from 1974-1977 demonstrated that techniques exist for actually performing certain dumpsite-specific monitoring activi- ties. Using both manned and unmanned submersibles we evaluated the conditions of radioactive waste drums in situ, recovered such drums for laboratory analysis of the metal container and concrete matrix, and collected precisely-located sediment sam- ples to determine if, and to what extent, radioactive materials had been released from nuclear waste packages at dumpsite depths ranging between 900m to 2800m. Our 1978 survey at the Atlantic 3800m site, however, represented the strongest challenge to date for available deep sea monitoring technology. The site contains the fourth largest inventory of radioactivity, based on the most recent information reported to us (see Fact Sheet submitted by Roger Mattson). But it is the most San att shore (200 miles) and of the greatest depth (3800M, or approximately ; eet). 432 With the permission of the chairman I would like to present a series of slides which highlight important features of this Atlantic 3800m dumpsites as well as important aspects of our 1978 survey activities. Slide No. 1.—Presents a table listing the four primary U.S. radioactive waste disposal areas. Three of these areas are located in the Atlantic while the fourth very large area is near the Farallon Islands, offshore from San Francisco. The three Atlantic dumpsites listed in this table account for almost 99 percent of the total radioactivity inventory dumped into the Atlantic betwen 1946 and 1965. It should be noted that the reactor vessel from the nuclear submarine SEAWOLF was also disposed of at the Atlantic site 120 miles offshore from the Maryland-Delaware border at a depth of 2800 meters or (9,300 feet). It differs from the other wastes in that it is primarily induced activity fixed in the stainless steel reactor vessel. Slide No. 2.—Is a map showing the locations of the three major U.S. Atlantic disposal areas. Any future plans to monitor abandoned U.S. east coast dumpsites should include these three sites. Ships logs of many of the deepsea disposal activities suggest that the radioactive wastes were placed in a broad area around the desig- nated dumpsite coordinates. Therefore, it is important to factor this information into any planned monitoring activities within and around the three sites if mean- tage penipavisons of site-specific versus baseline or ambient concentrations are to e made. Slide No. ?.—Shows the Research Vessel ADVANCE II out of Wilmington, North Carolina which provided logistics support for drum recovery, trawling operations for biological samples, large-volume sediment sampling, and seawater sampling in the 3800 meter dumpsite area. This ship along with the manned submersible ALVIN and its support ship R/V LULU comprised the necessary system to meet our survey objectives. These objectives were detailed in an EPA Press Release of June 19, 1978 which I would like to submit for the record. The objectives included: (1) an extensive program of water, sediment, and biota sampling to measure concentrations of radio- activity and its distribution within the 3800m dumpsite; (2) identification of any unexpectedly high concentrations of radioactive isotopes in the 3800m dumpsite region; (3) identification of commercial species of fish and invertebrates; (4) observa- tions of the geologic stability of the area; (5) observations on radioactive waste packaging performance after immersion in the deep-sea for many years; (6) recovery of a selected radioactive waste package, and; (7) evaluation of the suitability of existing technology to fulfill deepsea monitoring requirements now and in the future. Slide No. 4.—As with our previous 1975 and 1976 Atlantic surveys at the 2800 meter dumpsite, the submersible we used was the DSV ALVIN. It is a three-man submersible equipped with video and 35mm external cameras and a remotely con- trolled manipulating arm. It was necessary to recertify the ALVIN for diving to 4000m (approximately 13,200 feet) from its previous depth limit of 3660m (approxi- mately 12,000 feet) in order to meet our survey requirements. This is a permanent recertification. The deepest point we reached during the three dives at the 3800m site was 3985m. At present ALVIN is the only manned, untethered submersible available to civilian agencies, which can operate to this depth. In this slide we see the ALVIN just before its first dive into the 3800m site. The core tubes, modified with T-handles for use by the manipulating arm, are seen in the basket attached to the front of the submersible. Slide No. 5.—ALVIN starting a descent. Slide No. 6.—Shows the bottom conditions in this 3800m dumpsite. This site is near the main channel of the outer reach of the Hudson submarine canyon and has walls varying from gently sloping to vertical cliffs up to a height of approximately 200m. Marl! or claystone talus blocks appear in the foreground, probably derived by slumping from steep adjacent walls. A small hermit crab is also visible in the foreground. This photo is indicative of the irregular terrain we encountered throughout the 3800m site. The irregular terrain coupled with strong southerly-flowing bottom currents made bottom traversing quite difficult in the ALVIN submersible. Slide No. 7.—Is another view of the bottom terrain slightly deeper (3970m) in the dumpsite area. The white cobbles are Eocene-age chalk, while some of the other cobble-sized materials are glacial erratics. Slide No. 8.—Is reminiscent of those cliched situations where one finds a beer can at the top of a supposedly unconquered mountain. Here is a neatly situated fruit cocktail can in a most unlikely location. The area is striking in its lack of features. The area is swept smooth by the currents and there is no evidence of biological activity. 433 Slide No. 9.—Shows the first of the few drums found in the site. This is an intact 55-gallon drum showing characteristic blistering corrosion at the chimes and weld points. The surrounding terrain is irregular with marl talus blocks adjacent to the drum. Corrosion products can be seen in the foraminiferal sand “downcurrent” (nearest the viewer) of the drum. The ubiquitous rat-tail fish (Coryphaenoides arma- tus) is seen swimming near the drum. The drum and surroundings are notable for their absence of sessile (non-motile) or burrowing biological organisms. The compact- ed nature of the sediment suggests an erosional surface where strong scouring action has removed the surface sediment layers. Slide No. 10.—Shows another drum seen in the same general vicinity. It is numbered “953” in yellow paint on the upper surface. The drum is considerably buried by sediment but the surface paint is in good condition suggesting downslope deposition with little turbidity scour. Again there is a noticeable absence of biologi- cal organisms. The sediment piled up at the near-end of the drum and the straight- line depressions in the background are caused by the sled track of the submersible ALVIN. This drum was selected for recovery because of its good condition and identification makings. Prior to recovery, a series of precisely-positioned cores were taken at two meter intervals up to twelve meters from the drum. These cores were analyzed for the man-made radioisotopes plutonium-238, plutonium-239, 240, and cesium-137, as well as the naturally-occurring radioisotopes such as uranium, thor- ium, and radium. there was no evidence of elevated plutonium-238, plutonium-239, 240, or cesium-137 in any of the core samples. Slide No. 11.—The drum recovery was carried out in a manner similar to the 1976 Atlantic 2800m site recovery operation described in our 1978 testimony. The sub- mersible ALVIN attached the lifting harness to the drum without incident, but instead of having the support ship winch the target drum off the bottom, the ALVIN lifted it directly to the surface where it was then pulled out of the water by the R/V ADVANCE II. Slide No. 11 shows the deck preparations for recovery. All personnel wear protective clothing and radiation exposure badges. The deck is covered with rubber sheeting and the drum is immediately placed into a jet-engine overpack for storage and transport. Slide No. 12.—Is a closeup of the long axis of the waste drum shortly after recovery. The identification number is clearly visible. The drum is in excellent condition considering its immersion in more than 13,000 feet of water for over sixteen years. There is no significant biofouling as compared with the drums seen and recovered in the Atlantic 2800m and Pacific-Farallon Islands 900m dumpsites. Slide No. 13.—Is a closeup of the concrete-cap end of the waste package. The concrete appears to be in good condition with no obvious evidence of spalling and only minor surface dissolution. There is perforation of the metal rim of the drum from corrosion where both sides of the metal drum were directly exposed to sea water. The cylindrical hole in the concrete houses a metal pipe, probably contami- nated with radioactivity. Subsequently this was found to be the only waste present in the concrete matrix. The analytical objectives for recovering this drum were: (1) to determine the metal corrosion rate in that portion of the drum exposed to free- moving seawater; (2) to determine the corrosion rate in that portion of the metal drum directly in contact with the sediment; and (3) to estimate the dissolution rate of the concrete matrix. Slide No. 14.—Is a view of the metal-capped end of this same drum showing some minor evidence of corrosion and biofouling. The portion of the drum imbedded in the sediment is seen in the upper left quadrant. We were fortunate that the weather and seas were both calm during this very weather-dependent search and recovery operation. Shortly after recovery the drum was sealed in a jet-engine container overpack and purged with argon, an inert gas, to prevent further deterio- ration. Slide No. 15.—The drum was off loaded at Port Jefferson, New York and taken to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) for analysis. Although the analysis is not yet complete, we do have the results of a similar set of analyses performed by BNL on the drum we recovered from the Atlantic 2800m site in 1976. That drum had been immersed for approximately fourteen years and the analyses indicate that the metal would last between 25-37 years before it would no longer provide any barrier to the migration of its radioactive contents. The concrete matrix is estimated to provide containment for upwards of 104 years. During the approximately fourteen years of immersion, none of the cobalt-60 contaminated waste was detected to have been released, while the cesium-137 had been leached from the concrete matrix into the sediment immediately surrounding the drum. With reference to the estimated longevity of the metal, the metal drum is not considered a primary barrier to the waste and was used simply as a convenient form of handling and transport of the waste for disposal. 434 3800M DUMPSITE CHARACTERISTICS The biological sampling program conducted in the 3800m dumpsite area focussed on the infauna (living in the sediment), epifauna (primarily megafaunal inverte- brates living on the sediment), and fish. The infauna populations are scanty and are dominated by small nematodes, crustaceans, and polychaete worms. The infaunal populations at both the Atlantic 2800m and 3800m dumpsites are both fewer in numbers and species per unit area than either of the shallower Pacific-Farallon Islands dumpsites investigated. The predominant epifauna are brittle starfish (ophiuroids) and hermit crabs (pa- gurids). Although the number of deepsea samples taken was very limited, the mega- epifauna composition at the disposal site was comparable to similar depth locations in the northwestern Atlantic. Coryphaenoides armatus (rat-tail) was the dominant fish species present. It feeds on pelagic organisms as well as scavenges the bottom, and probably represents an important link in deep-sea food chains since it has been reported from abyssal depths around the world. In fact a feeding link was demon- strated at this 3800m dumpsite between the rat-tail fish and a burrowing holothur- ian (sea cucumber) Molpadia. The evidence of slump scarps, avalanche deposits, and lack of biological activity indicates that this is a geologically unstable area. There is also visual evidence of strong scouring from the southwesterly moving Western Boundary Undercurrent. The area shows high topographic relief and is difficult to work in both on the bottem and by trawling and other ship sampling methods. There is no evidence of any elevated concentrations of radioactivity in the biota, sediments or the water, with the possible exception of americium-241 in two specimens of the rat-tail fish Coryphaenoides armatus. Discussion of the americium-241 is presented in more detail in the Fact Sheet submitted by Dr. Mattson with his testimony. The future use of this site would appear undesirable based |on its geologic instabil- ity and the difficulty in monitoring the area. However, lack of extensive biologcial populations, and the presence of strong dispersal forces would seem to suggest lower potential for physical and biological accumulation of any of the radioactive waste contents, thus perhaps reducing the potential impact of the dumping operations. Important questions remain unanswered regarding this site—questions such as the velocity and direction of the currents flowing in and around the dumpsite area, and the seemingly anomalous values of americium found in two fish specimens. Further sampling to answer these questions is warranted. 2800M DUMPSITE SURVEY ACTIVITIES The last two ALVIN submersible dives in our 1978 Atlantic survey program were conducted at the 2800m dumpsite. At the request of, and in cooperation with the U.S. Navy we provided submersible time during our survey activities to: (1) Conduct a brief but unsuccessful attempt to locate the SEAWOLF reactor vessel at this site. (2) Assist in the deployment of corrosion test panels to study the corrosion rates over time of various alloys at the depth approximating the disposal depth of the N/S SEAWOLF reactor vessel. This is a long-term study. Slide No. 16.—Shows the corrosion test panels (foreground) in the ALVIN sam- pling basket, ready for deployment on the ocean floor. By way of comparison with the 3800m site I have a few slides showing types of wastes, in addition to radioactive waste, deposited in the 2800m dumpsite. Slide No. 17.—Shows WWII military waste of undefined content, but clearly dated from that time period. Slide No. 18.—Is typical of the hundreds of boxes of ammunition we observed while traversing the area in the ALVIN submersible. The presence of other types of waste in this 2800m dumpsite complicates the identification of radioactive waste drums by sonar location since ordnance and other packaged waste materials give a similar sonar return signal. In addition, operating in an explosives or ammunition dumping area poses a greater risk from accidental contact with the wastes them- selves while exploring the bottom. Routine trawling for biologicial samples from a surface ship should be done outside the immediate dumpsite area to avoid acciden- tal recovery of these wastes. While the 3800m dumpsite appears relatively barren of biological organisms, the 2800m site appears more biologically active. The following six slides are illustrative of some of the more common fish and invertebrates present at the 2800m dumpsite. While the fish are of considerable oceanographic interest, they also compound the difficulty of describing potential biological transport mechanisms for radioactivity from a dumpsite. Each of the fish shown may represent part of a separate food- chain or components of the same food chain. 435 Slide No. 19.—Shows the ever-present rat-tail fish (Coryphaenoides armatus) on the right, and the eel-like Synaphobranchus on the left. Both fish feed pelagically; the rat-tail also roots for food in the sediments. Slide No. 20.—Shows another common deep-sea fish, Antimora rostrata, common at the 2800m depth but not caught during our trawls near the 3800m dumpsite. Slide No. 21.—Is a photograph of another genus of rat-tail fish, Halosauropsis, a bottom feeder. Slide No. 22.—Shows the tripod fish, (Bathypterois longipes), found at both the 2800m and 3800m sites. Slide No. 23.—Shows a chimaera, (Harriotta raleighana), a bottom feeder not commonly caught. Because many species of fish are rapid swimmers they can avoid a trawl net or a slow-moving submersible completely; hence what we see here may be only a small cross-section of a broader range of unobserved organisms present in the site. Most of these fish are bottom feeders and could be important in bioturbation (the stirring of the bottom sediments by marine organisms). Bioturbation can result in remobilization of the radioactivity released into or on the sediment surface, with subsequent physical transport or biological uptake and transport. Slide No. 24.—This last slide illustrates the perennial problem in science—for every question answered another one pops up. The two prominent features in this slide are a starfish and a relatively concentric circle of small burrows called a “fairy ring’. Of the four sites surveyed, we have observed these rings only at this 2800m site. They are, by far, the most common bottom feature in the area, but the source of these rings in unknown. Sampling within the rings has turned up nothing. The rings are undoubtedly caused by a common inhabitant of the site—but what one? SUMMARY To date we have looked at four U.S. ocean dumpsite locations—two in the Pacific Farallon Islands area, and two in the Atlantic at depths of 2800m and 3800m. As stated earlier, we are concerned with monitoring for various objectives, fore- most of which has been a firsthand-attempt to examine the many biological and physical processes acting on radioactive waste drums in abandoned U.S. nuclear waste disposal sites—processes which could transport or immobilize the radioactive materials. The ability to assess and/or predict, as closely as possible, the impact of past and potential future low-level waste disposal activities is of considerable impor- tance to our agency mandates. Health-impact monitoring of abandoned sites is also perceived as important. But both of these goals are predicated on our ability to understand the biological, chemical, physical, and geological processes which con- tribute to or impede that radiological impact. This concludes my prepared testimony. We will be pleased to respond to any questions the subcommittee might have regarding our nuclear waste dumpsite survey program. [From the EPA Environmental News, Mon., June 19, 1978] EPA to Survey DreEp-SEA RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMPSITE IN THE ATLANTIC The Environmental Protection Agency will conduct a research investigation at the deepest of the four major oceanic radioactive waste disposal sites used by the U.S. between 1946-1970. The site is located at a depth of 13,000 feet, approximately 200 miles off the Maryland-Delware coast. An estimated 14,500 fifty-five gallon drums containing a total of 2,100 curies of radioactivity were deposited at the site approximately 20 years ago. Using the deep submersible ALVIN, operated by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the Office of Radiation Programs plans to conduct a detailed survey of the condition of the radioactive waste drums dumped at the site and to examine the ae potion around the drums to determine if the radioactive contents have been released. The research vessel LULU, support ship for the ALVIN submersible, will depart for the site from Woods Hole, Massachusetts on June 20 and will rendezvous with a second research vessel, the ADVANCE II departing from Wilmington, North Caroli- na on June 18. Present plans call for an eight-day survey with the participation of over thirty researchers from eleven academic institutions, three U.S. Federal agen- cies, and the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute. An EPA oceanographer will descend in the ALVIN submersible to the 13,000 foot depth in order to examine the condition of the drums and to determine the feasibil- ity of retrieving one of them for later analysis. This will be the twelfth submersible dive in the last four years and is part of the comprehensive survey program 436 developed by the Office of Radiation Programs to study the effects of past dumping of radioactive waste. Scientists aboard the ADVANCE II will conduct a comprehensive program of water, sediment, and biota sampling. The collected material will yield information on the levels and extent of radioactivity in the dumpsite area, the ability of sedi- ments to adsorb and immobilize selected radioactive materials, the presence of biological food chains which could transmit radioactivity to man, the extent to which biological organisms could redistribute radioactivity, and the geologic stabil- ity of the dumpsite area. The “Ocean Dumping” Act of 1972 requires EPA to set regulations controlling ocean disposal of all materials including low-level radioactive wastes. The Act specifically prohibits ocean disposal of high-level radioactive wastes. The United States has not dumped any radioactive wastes in the ocean since 1970, although several European nations are actively using this form of disposal. The technical and operational results of this EPA radioactive waste dumpsite survey program, which commenced in 1974, will be evaluated to determine the feasibility of developing more comprehensive ocean disposal regulations and standards. Mr. Stupps. Thank you very much for a very interesting presen- tation. Let me ask some questions and then I will yield. I will try to avoid those questions which I suspect Mr. Anderson would like to ask. I will let him handle some of those. You say on page 11, Dr. Mattson, of your testimony, and I quote: I am not optimistic that we of EPA can undertake monitoring to insure public safety while still maintaining progress on the development of regulations to control any future disposal of low-level radioactive waste. When was the last dumping of low-level waste in this country? Dr. Mattson. 1970. Mr. Stupps. Then why, at this point, is EPA developing rules and Be for the future dumping of low-level radioactive waste! Dr. Mattson. Because the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972 gave that responsibility to EPA for any future dumping of low-level radioac- tive waste. What the act did, in essence, was give EPA the regulatory au- thority that previously resided in the Atomic Energy Commission. One of the things required by the act to be considered in setting criteria for any future radioactive waste dumping was the good- ness, if you will, of the ocean dumping relative to other options, for example, shallow land burial. Mr. Stupps. Does the act explicitly address the question of low- level dumping? Dr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. And it vests in the EPA the authority to permit any future dumping of that kind? Dr. Mattson. That is right. Mr. Stupps. Does it direct EPA to proceed to promulgate regula- tions or does it simply vest that authority in you, in the event that someday somebody will request such a thing? Dr. Mattson. I would say my reading of it puts it more in the former category than the latter. It has been EPA’s understanding since the act was passed in 1972 that it was to develop regulations for any future dumping. Mr. Stupps. Have you been doing that for 8 years? Dr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. How are you doing? 437 Dr. Mattson. Well, we said in our testimony we would probably not be in a position to issue permits before 1985. Mr. Stupps. That was a 13-year development of regulations? Dr. Mattson. Yes, sir. It is a very small program, and I am reminded by a voice behind me, that we did issue regulations in 1973 and then revised them in 1977, in both cases stating some fundamental principles which would apply to any future dumping. I covered that in my testimo- ny. Mr. Stupps. Have you had, since 1972, or do you have reason to anticipate any request for such permits? Dr. Mattson. We have no requests. We would anticipate that there may be some requests. Let me try to be more specific in what they might be. The naval reactors people have under consideration sea disposal as one alternative for the ultimate disposition of the low-level radioactivity from nuclear submarines. Mr. Stupps. Has the Navy communicated that to you? Dr. Mattson. Yes. We are aware that the Navy has that consideration underway. Mr. Stupps. Does the Navy need a permit if it conducts disposal itself? Does the Ocean Dumping Act apply to public vessels? Dr. Mattson. It is my understanding that the Navy would need a permit from EPA in order to conduct such dumping, yes. Mr. Stupps. Let me repeat and partially rephrase the question. Were you here this morning? Dr. Mattson. Yes. Mr. Stupps. You heard that the London Convention does not apply to public vessels. Does the Ocean Dumping Act apply to U.S. public vessels, that is, to vessels of the Federal Government? Dr. Mattson. It is our understanding that it does. Mr. Stupps. It does? Dr. Mattson. Yes. Mr. Stupps. So the Navy could not dispose of the reactor contain- er or any other radioactive waste material without a permit from EPA under the Ocean Dumping Act? Dr. Mattson. That is our understanding. Mr. Stupps. Is it also the Navy’s understanding? Dr. Mattson. I believe it is. Mr. Stupps. So, then, is it really fair to say that insofar as you feel pressure to proceed with the development of these regulations, it is because of the anticipated request from the Navy? Dr. Mattson. No. I should have finished. We become aware from time to time of renewed interest in low-level radioactive waste dumping in the ocean as support fluctuates for shallow land burial. That is to say, from time to time people lose enthusiasm for shallow land waste disposal and renew their interest in ocean disposal. We believe we have a mandate from the Ocean Dumping Act to continue the evaluation of the ocean dumping alternative. We feel we have no choice but to proceed to develop our regulatory pro- 438 gram which considers ocean disposal of these materials relative to land disposal. Mr. Stupps. You say from time to time you had indication that people are more interested than they have been in the past. What kinds of people? Who, to be precise? Dr. Mattson. Well, I think it is not in the nature of communica- tions from people telling us, here is something we would like you to permit. It is just watching the mood of the Nation and particularly States who now have shallow land burial facilities within their boundaries. Shallow land burial is not a popular waste disposal option in this country today. Mr. Stupps. I understand that. But is the lack of precision in response to my question because you cannot be more precise or because you do not wish to be? Dr. Mattson. There isn’t anything more precise to say. There is nobody specifically saying to us we intend to dump low-level radio- active waste in the ocean, so please get on with your permitting program; nobody has said that, other than the Navy, and they have not said it in those words. They have said that they have the alternative of ocean dumping under consideration. Mr. Stupps. In other words, you would have us believe this is actually a situation in which a Federal agency is looking toward the future with a good deal of political sophistication. I think that is what you are saying. I think that is commendable if that is the case. You were saying to us on page 11 of that sentence, which I quoted to you, that your current resources are inadequate both to monitor past dumping and to continue the development of the future regulations, as I understand it. If that is the case and if your resources remain inadequate to do both the way you would like to do them, would you think that the monitoring would be a higher priority, that is, monitoring what has already been dumped? Dr. Mattson. It is my technical judgment, and one widely agreed upon outside of EPA in the scientific community, that those previ- ously dumped wastes portend no harm to man or to the marine environment. So to monitor them for public health reasons is not of a high priority today nor has it been in the past. The thing that has pushed us to a position of support for public health monitoring for the old dump sites is the difficulty people have in accepting the technical judgment, and the small amount of monitoring we have already done as proof that there has been no public health impact. Mr. Stupps. Do you really believe your retrieval of three drums out of many thousands constitutes proof of that? Dr. Mattson. No, sir, that is not what I said. I said it has been our technical judgment based on an understanding of what materi- als were dumped and where they were dumped and how long ago they were dumped and our interpretation of the less than encyclo- pedic data that we have already collected, that there has been no harm from that past radioactive dumping. Mr. Stupps. That is not what you just said. As I understand what you are now saying is that you have yet to detect any harm. That is not the same thing as saying we have proved that there has been no harm. 439 Dr. Martson. I am saying two things. I am saying we would expect not to be able to detect harm; and the few measurements that we have done do not detect harm. Mr. Strupps. Fair enough. You would expect not to be able to detect it if you were to try to detect it. But that is not very reassuring and certainly not scientific proof. An expectation of inability to detect is hardly a proof of the absence of something. Dr. Mattson. No. If there had been harm, I am convinced we could detect it. The radioactivity measurements are very precise measurements. They are relatively expensive measurements to take at very low contamination levels. And if there were harm occurring and if we were to do the measurements, we would be able to detect it. I am saying something different from that. I am saying given the relatively small amount of radioactive material that was dumped, given the wide dispersal of that material from a number of sites, given the long time since it occurred, given the fact that anything that leaks becomes diluted in the ocean environ- ment, considering all of those things, it would be our technical judgment that the radioactivity could not reach man in harmful concentrations. That is based on a general understanding of the pathways, less than complete but a technical understanding none- theless, and based on experience with how radiation can concen- trate in foods consumed by people. Now we have done some measurements in addition to making those kinds of judgments. The measurements that we have done, although less than encyclopedic, do confirm that reasoning, that scientific rationale. Mr. Stupps. I am haunted by your euphemism of less than encyclopedic. I mean there are some alternative ways of stating that that are somewhat less laudatory. Dr. Mattson. Well, the reason I keep bringing that in, sir, is that it is true that more measurements would support this case better. We are not trying to make the case that monitoring should not be done. If people want better assurance, that assurance can be provided through monitoring. There are measurement techniques that could detect harm if it were occurring. Mr. Stupps. If I understand you correctly, it is your judgment— and I suspect you would have added, had you been less diplomatic than you were, “political pressures to the contrary and notwith- standing’ —that there is no need for further monitoring of these former dump sites. Is that a fair summary of your position? Dr. Mattson. There is no need for further monitoring to assure me and the scientists that work for me that there is no harm occurring to man, that is true. However, in order to better under- stand the movement of radioactive material in the marine environ- ment, and because there are larger quantities of radioactivity still being dumped elsewhere in the world, and because radioactivity might be dumped again by this country, we would need to do more scientific measurements in those old dump sites. Mr. Stupps. That gets me to my next question, on the Massachu- setts Bay site, which was both the shallowest and the closest to land. Is that correct? Dr. Mattson. Yes. Mr. Stupps. Has there been any monitoring at all at that site? 440 Dr. Mattson. No, there has not. Recall again that I have just said that we did not do public health-type monitoring. We were doing the dump site monitoring for scientific and model develop- ment reasons. And recall what Mr. Dyer said about the rather pioneering efforts that are involved. That submersible is the only one we knew of that could go to those depths. Nobody had ever recovered barrels before. What we did with the early surveys is to begin where we thought we had the highest likelihood of success of finding barrels. Now some of the more detailed information about Massachusetts Bay has only come, I think, to our attention in recent months; for example, the amounts of radioactivity dumped there and the shallowness of the site. I would say that Massachu- setts Bay would be high on our list for health effects monitoring, the market basket kind of monitoring for the future that we have talked about with staff at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. It has not been a high priority in the past because we did not feel we had that much to learn from Massachusetts Bay, nor do we feel we had a high probability of success at Massachu- setts Bay, nor for that matter did it look like any sites that might be proposed for the future. Mr. Stupps. But now you say, based on information recently available to you, you have changed that position and you think it ought to be looked at? Dr. Mattson. No. Well, yes and no. I think Massachusetts Bay ought to be looked at. Let me say that at the outset. Mr. Stupps. I thought you just said you were satisfied there was no need for further looking. Dr. Mattson. Well, if we do public health monitoring, and I believe we should, then we should do Massachusetts Bay. People should not be kept on edge by these scientific judgments. If a scientific judgment is not shared by lay people and they want better proof from the scientists, then it is only a matter of money to provide the better proof. And science can do it. For those reasons I would say we should do the public health monitoring. It would be our technical judgment, knowing the general site characteristics of Massachusetts Bay, knowing the other things that are in that site, and knowing the fact that other kinds of monitoring for radioactiv- ity go on routinely in this country, that there is not a problem and if there were, we would have seen it before. That is less than a satisfying answer. So if we do public health monitoring, Massachusetts Bay would be high on our list of places to go and do it. Mr. Stupps. All right. I think I understand what you are saying but you are being a little reluctant to put it as clearly as you might, I suspect, in the hall. Again you are saying your scientific judgment is not necessary, but you recognize the degree of public concern would be such that it would be justified in order to put the public concern at rest and conduct further research? Dr. Martson. Yes, because the other side of the coin is that my less than positive answer might frighten the people of Boston. And I do not believe they should be frightened. Mr. Stupps. The less than positive answer based on the less than encyclopedic judgment. Dr. Mattson. Yes. 44] Mr. Stupps. I have many more questions but let me go first to Mr. Anderson. Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was looking at your demonstration a moment ago, the drums that you were seeing, the barrels. They look like they were in very good condition. Did you pick out good barrels to show? The reason I ask the question was because in your testimony in San Francisco I believe it was, you stated, 25 percent of all the barrels you observed were damaged. And you provided, and we have pictures I believe, you provided pictures showing them pushed in, concaved in, one almost busted in half, and also showing fish life and other forms of life growing from the same damaged barrels. I wondered why the barrels you show today were in such good condition as compared to those we found on the west coast. Dr. Mattson. Well, that is a very good point. It occurred to me as I was watching. We should have put in some other slides when we were putting this together. I apologize. There are other reasons though. Mr. Dyer did purposely pick an undamaged barrel to bring to the surface because it was quite a distance he had te drag it and he did not want it to fall apart en route. And he did not want people to be exposed to radiation when they pulled it on board the ship. It is also true that the biological activity in the Atlantic sites is much less than the biological activity in the Farallon Island site. So the pictures you see in the Farallon Islands with sponges and a lot of organisms attached to the barrels are different than what you see in the Atlantic site. Mr. ANDERSON. You answered me. I was told it was probably too hazardous to pick up the more damaged barrels. Mr. Dyer. Could I respond to that briefly? I think that one of the things we brought out in our California testimony was the packag- ing differences. In the Pacific site most of the packaging was a sandwich configuration. You simply poured a 10-inch cap of con- crete into the bottom of the 55-gallon drum, you put your waste in the middle, and then you packaged the concrete over it. This left significant air voids. And when you subjected these voids to high pressure, you had implosion. And what we noticed, I think in fairness I should say, is we did not see any imploded radioactive waste drums in the Atlantic dumpsites. Most of the barrels we looked at were what we call a monolithic design, that is, homogene- ous concrete mix. There were only very small air voids present in those waste packages. So we have two different kinds of packaging systems. Mr. ANDERSON. I did not want the committee to get the impres- sin that all the barrels looked that good as the one we saw here today. Now, you said in your testimony that you had four dump site locations, two in the Pacific Farallon Islands and two in the Atlan- tic. And following up on my testimony earlier here today and in the map we put out, which I assume you have copies of, we show that the sites that you chose to make your survey, site B and site C on the map I am showing, are both not within the actual dump sites, the licensed dump site I should say. For example, the first one here was done by the Nuclear Engineering Co. That in the map was the square, was the rectangle that we have here. That 442 was the Nuclear Engineering Co. And the EPA site you chose on that was not located in the licensed area and was 5% miles from the dump site. And then going on, the next one, the circled site here, that is the one where the Ocean Transport Co. and the Nuclear Engineering Co. used that as the center for their dumping operation. And again the area which EPA chose is not in the dump site and is 7 miles from the center of the dump. The fourth one, the trape- zoid section there, that is by the Nuclear Engineering license and the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory. Again they were over 6 miles from the center of the dump site. So my question is why did you choose two sites to test the barrels—I should first ask is why should you have found barrels located that far out of the dump site? Second, why did you choose those barrels rather than those that were in the actual dump site itself? Dr. Mattson. Let me try a general answer and then Mr. Dyer can give you the reasons for the specific locations that were chosen. There are more than the four sites you just listed at the Farallon Islands area. Mr. ANDERSON. There are three licensed there, are there not? Dr. Mattson. There are eight subsites within the Farallon Is- lands dump site area. Mr. ANDERSON. Are they licensed? Dr. Mattson. I am sorry but the person who put together the list is not here and we cannot answer that question. The sources of the wastes were both licensed and unlicensed activities. That is, some of the activities were conducted by AEC licensees and the others conducted by AEC contractors. My guess is that the eight sites represent some of each. This is the reason that the estimated size of the Farallon Islands site has grown over the last 2 or 3 months. We were developing testimony in September for the October hear- ings. We were using 250 to 300 square miles. Today we are saying something in excess of 500 square miles. As the records continue to become available and as we are able to pin down precisely where the specific locations are—and we are not finding a lot of new materials that were dumped but we are finding more information about where—the area tends to expand. So first of all I do not think there is anything mysterious about not being in the three sites that you have listed. There are in fact eight subsites. But let us let Mr. Dyer refresh our memory on this. Mr. Dyer. When we first looked for information in 1973 we went back to the only published records we could find generally availa- ble, which was Joseph’s paper of 1956. If you will note the slide we showed in California, there was the large AEC-licensed area, there was also the NECO and Chevron Research dumping areas, but then there was a very large polygon closer to shore which was the original area reported by Joseph as having been used. What we now know, that is the large square AEC-licensed area, and the NECO and Chevron Research dumping areas come to light only a few weeks ago after NRC completed its first review of their licens- ing records. This information is still not complete. We have not completed receiving information from DOD or DOE. But the poly- gon area is the area that contains the so-called three sites: The very shallow, apparently accidental, site at about 300 feet, and the 443 3,000-foot and 6,000-foot sites. These, according to Joseph, were variously used between 1946-62. There are records of the U.S:S. Cahokia carrying the waste to the sites. And these were records that will probably turn up independently when DOD, DOE, and NRC complete their records search. Mr. ANDERSON. Well, of these three sites that are used, those are the largest licensed sites. And I wonder why you did not use those coordinates? For example, the three main AEC-licensed depositors in the San Francisco area were the U.S. Navy, the Nuclear Engi- neering Co., and the Ocean Transport Co. Did you not contact these groups before you made your decision to dive into those areas? Mr. Dyer. Our records were that the largest users or generators of the waste were the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories. Mr. ANDERSON. These companies I am referring to are the ones who disposed of their waste that would go into those three licensed areas. Mr. Dyer. I am not exactly addressing your question. I am trying to explain where we got our records and why we went to those areas we selected. Dr. Mattson. Congressman, do you understand that the data you have in front of you today Mr. Dyer did not have when he made his choices. It was not a clear trade off between your data you are reading from today and what he was choosing from in 1974, 1975, and 1977. He may have been able to find it. Mr. ANDERSON. The license has been available for the last 20 or 30 years. Dr. Mattson. That is true. Mr. ANpERSON. And in our letters to you and to them we gave the information prior to your hearing. Dr. Mattson. These surveys were conducted in 19—— Mr. Dyer. 1974 was the first one. Dr. Mattson. The decision he made as to where to go was on the basis of Arnold Joseph’s report from the Atomic Energy Commis- sion, a readily available document. The kind of records searching which has uncovered the sort of document you are referring to had not occurred at that time. And one can argue it should have, but it had not. This is the man who made the choice of where to go. And he told you the basis on which he made that choice. Mr. Dyer. I think I would like to add one thing here. One of our first objectives of the surveys was to evaluate the existing technol- ogy. And what we were looking for was whether any submersible system or remote control system could examine the sites closely. What we had determined from the earlier surveys that had been done for the AEC in 1958 and 1960, was that the only systems available to look at the sites were surface ships that could random- ly drop down sampling devices and collect samples. But the prob- lem was they did not know whether they were anywhere near radioactive waste drums. We wanted to be certain that these sites actually did contain radioactive waste drums. So we wanted a system that would be able to go down there and look. At that time the only system available was the CURV III, belonging to the U.S. Navy. And that CURV III was really only operating to about 3,000 feet. AG Sane 0) o Mal = WE) 444 So when the records of Joseph’s indicated that there was a site at 3,000 feet that did allegedly contain radioactive waste, we went there in 1974 and did demonstrate that we could go down and find these wastes. This was more of a technology demonstration and evaluation. Mr. ANpERSON. Again, I suppose my feeling is that with the damaged containers that you found there, my feeling is that if you had gone into the actual center of where most of them were dumped you would even have found more damaged containers than the ones that you did. Again, so we kind of understand what we're talking about, on the dump sites here, I have a little map that was provided for me that shows we have—on the west coast we have at least 12 dump sites, including the 3, I guess, off Canada, and 7 or 8 off California, and then 1 off Hawaii and so on. And we have about 18 on the east coast and 2 off the gulf. Mr. Mattson. Well, sir, I’m not sure what you're referring to. Our factsheet lists 16 dump site areas in the Pacific Ocean, some of which aren’t very close to California, and within some of those dump site areas there are as many as eight subsites, like the Farallon Islands, and then Santa Cruz with three subsites, and Los Angeles with two. We would need to sit down and, in detail, compare all of these— we also have a list, I believe, of half a dozen other licensed but unused sites. Some of these were sites that the State of California approved and recommended to the Atomic Energy Commission for future low-level waste disposal, of which the AEC only used one. So unless we could compare them point by point, I’m not sure whether we're talking about the same sites or not. Mr. ANpbeERsSON. I don’t want this to go too long, either. I would like to get something on this definition. The Ocean Dumping Act’s definition of high-level wastes refers to equivalent aqueous wastes from operation of the first cycle extraction of solvent systems and subsequent extraction cycles. My question to you is, What is equivalent? How do you define an equivalent of that kind of definition in quantitative terms? Mr. Mattson. Well, first as a scientist and then as a representa- tive of EPA, let me try to give an answer. As a scientist, I think I would try to approach it through a specific activity relationship. I would say if the radioactivity was in isotopes of the same kind that came from the extraction process and in concentrations of a similar sort, then that would be some test of equivalency. I think what must have been meant by the Congress in using those words was to give some little bit of flexibility to the use of the words “high-level waste.” I can’t say today that there has been any flexibility taken. The interpretation that you heard throughout the day by different Federal agency representatives is a common interpretation. It has been the standard usage reflected in AEC regulations and in EPA regulations to define high-level waste in terms of the origin of those wastes with respect to the fuel reproc- essing operations or to the spent fuel. Now, we have said in our testimony that you really shouldn’t be worried about definitions when you’re worried about public health 445 effects. High level, low level, who cares? It’s the concentration of radioactivity and its proximity to man that you’re worried about. EPA is going to try to help this problem a little bit in its high- level waste environmental standard, which is due to be issued for public comment next year. In that standard the traditional defini- tion is used for high-level wastes, and then it is supplemented by a specific activity number. I don’t remember that number off the top of my head today. People are aware of the problem. To us, it’s a bit of a semantics problem. We should be worried about these wastes for what they were and how close they can get to man, not what they were called. Mr. ANDERSON. I suppose I maybe shouldn’t be commenting on this. I am more at ease with a definition like the one that AEC used which defined the low level at 50 millirems or less per hour and 2 rems per hour or more as high level. I can understand that better, and I don’t quite understand—— Mr. Martson. If I might interrupt you, that was not an AEC definition. And this is a good opportunity to clear that up. Mr. ANDERSON. OK, fine. Mr. Mattson. That was the definition that appeared in a report published by the Argonne National Laboratory. I have a copy of the report cover and also the specific page that I think you’re referring to; it is in my notes here. It was written by a consultant to Argonne National Laboratory who spent some time there one summer lecturing on waste man- agement to the scientists at Argonne. In that report he said that he would adopt a definition for the purposes of talking to those people. Later in the report he referred to the materials that had been disposed of in the ocean as low-level waste; that is, he changed his own mind about the definition. If that’s the same definition you’re referring to, I think it’s probably a misnomer to call it an AEC definition. The correct AEC definition was in 10 CFR part 50, appendix F, and it’s still there today. Mr. Meyers from the Department of Energy cited it this morning in his testimony. It is consistent with the definition that is in NRC’s new regulation 10 CFR part 60, and it is consistent with the definition that’s in EPA’s regulations, put there last spring. Mr. ANpERsON. The information I have, I’m informed, came from the AEC report, the Arnold Joseph report of the 1955 AEC. Again, that’s for you people to take a look at, because we want you to take a look at it and help us straighten this whole thing out. Mr. Martson. We would be willing to take a look at that, but I don’t believe Arnold Joseph defines—— Mr. ANDERSON. It’s Arnold Joseph, 1954. Mr. Mattson. We would be willing to look at that, and if you ee to supply an answer for the record that would help straighten this out. Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Hughes. Mr. HuGues. I understand from previous testimony that there is really very little information available on the type of canisters and dumping locations. 446 Have you been able to reconstruct at all from past records the material that went into some of the dumpsites where there have not been retrievals? Mr. Mattson. There are several kinds of information available. There were some survey articles written. This report we have been talking about, written by Arnold Joseph, attempted to say general- ly what kinds of canisters or other containers had been used. There were pictures drawn in that book of concrete vaults, of the steel drums with the concrete poured in it in varying ways. Mr. Dyer just described a couple of ways that they used the concrete. That kind of information I think we’re fairly comfortable with, understanding or feeling we know the spectrum of things that were put out there. But the exact isotopic content, which radionuclides were put in those barrels, and in what number of curies, that kind of information is poor. We are, on occasion, able to find in the records whether the material is source, byproduct, or special nucle- ar material, names invented under AEC regulations. In some instances people did make estimations of curie content. In others, the people responsible for the dumping didn’t know how. I saw somewhere today that someone referred to question marks in records. I have seen those myself. So the precision of what was in the barrels is not high. Mr. Huaues. So that when you actually are able to retrieve a barrel from a particular location, that doesn’t necessarily represent the contents of the barrel at that particular site? Mr. Mattson. No; when we pick a barrel, and we have picked three to bring to the surface, we have no way of telling whether that is representative of all the materials. If I might digress for just a moment; in looking at the sediments near the barrels that were broken, where we could see they were leaking, and trying to understand how the radioactive materials were transported away from the barrels, the kinds of materials we find are plutonium, cesium, strontium, in elevated levels relative to fallout levels. Our measurements show that those elevated levels trail off rather rapidly as you move away from the barrels. In the technical reports which we have made available there are figures which show this behavior. This is part of our regulatory development plan, to understand how the materials, once they leave the barrels, are transported in the marine environment. So from that kind of work we have a fair picture of the kinds of materials that were dumped there, and they’re what we would expect. They’re the junk from laboratories, from hospital uses, from production uses, weapons production activities in the early years of the nuclear program. Mr. Hucues. If I could just go to another topic altogether, the mandate of the EPA under the Ocean Dumping Act is to regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal. Because we prohibit high-level wastes, I think it’s a fair assumption that EPA was to perhaps make some findings to determine whether or not it would be in the public interest to permit the dumping of low-level wastes not pro- hibited by statute. What do you envision to be the responsibility of the Administra- tor in developing a program for low-level waste dumping? What are 447 the parameters of the program, and what do you look for? Obvious- ly, the first determination that I would think you would have to make if the canisters were breached would be whether it would jeopardize the food chain or violate the statute dealing with unrea- sonably degrading or endangering public health—you have the standards set forth in the statute. Mr. Mattson. I think that clearly EPA has to compare the ocean dumping of these materials with their shallow land burial. Shallow land burial doesn’t guarantee isolation of these wastes from the terrestrial food chain. It doesn’t guarantee that the materials will be there until they have decayed to innocuous levels. The history in this country is replete with examples of materials that haven’t stayed confined to waste disposal areas, both high level and low level. Mr. Huaues. Where will you find that particular standard in the statute? Mr. Mattson. I’m sorry, sir? Mr. HuGues. Where do you find that particular standard in the statute? Mr. Mattson. The statute says that before EPA can permit an activity allowed under the statute—that is, before we could issue a permit for low-level radioactive wastes—we have to find that it’s the preferable thing to do relative to other alternatives. Mr. Dyer can dig up the citation and we can give you the number. Mr. Dyer. Yes; I have it. I think what Dr. Mattson cited earlier was the basic CEQ established premise, that you would have to consider ocean disposal relative to land-based alternatives. Mr. Hucues. I’m trying to find out where you find that. Mr. Dyer. Yes, I shall obtain the precise citation for you. Mr. Mattson. I’m reading from section 102 of the Ocean Dump- ing Act—I’ll read a couple of introductory sentences and then jump down. It says: ’The Administrator shall establish and apply crite- ria for reviewing and evaluating such permit applications and in establishing or revising such criteria shall consider, but not be eae in his consideration, to the following:” It goes (a) through i). Paragraph (g) says: “Appropriate locations and methods of dis- posal or recycling, including land-based alternatives, and the prob- able impact of requiring use of such alternate locations or methods on considerations affecting the public interest.” Mr. Huaues. But the statute itself indicates that in determining whether a permit program will be utilized, the Administrator will determine whether such dumping will unreasonably degrade or endanger the public health and welfare. Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir; that’s another finding that must be made. I’m not disagreeing with that. Mr. Hucues. In essence, what I’m trying to find out is what do you feel are the parameters of your findings in determining wheth- er or not to permit the dumping of low-level wastes? Mr. Mattson. Well, whether sites and canisters can be pre- scribed that would still make the alternative viable, that would assure no significant effect on the health of man or the marine environment. These are the kind of tests we would apply. 448 Mr. Hucues. Now, if we were to work on the assumption that canisters could not be constructed to contain low-level wastes, in your judgment would that be, per se, a violation of this section of the statute? Mr. Mattson. No; if we were to make that decision today, that it was impossible to make a canister, independent of cost, to meet that test, then we could say today what the requirements are for a permit. There shall not be any permits is what we would say. Mr. Hucues. That’s what I’m trying to find out. Mr. Mattson. That case is an alternative available to EPA. It could very well be that by the time we get to 1985 and issue our criteria that they are so prohibitive in terms of cost that ocean disposal is not practical compared to land-based disposal. Mr. Huaues. Let me take you through the second stage. Obviously, in talking in terms of whether or not canisters can be constructed to contain low-level radioactive waste, you have got to talk in terms of the timeframe. Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Hucues. What, in your judgment, is the timeframe that would be required to comply with the terms of the statute, because obviously a canister can be constructed to contain low-level wastes—— Mr. Mattson. We can make it independent. Mr. HuGues. Ten years? What timeframe are we talking about? Mr. Mattson. We can make it a variable timeframe, because of the fact that radioactive materials have different half-lives; that is, it takes different species different lengths of time to decay. That’s the reason that in the regulations that have been issued so far the concept of innocuous levels was used. So something with an 8-day half-life will decay to innocuous levels very rapidly. The canister that you could put it in and put it in the ocean, for example, might be much less complex than the canister you would want to put plutonium in with a 24,000-year half-life. So it would vary. I think you can understand, at least theoretically, there are some radionuclides or low-level wastes that could be put in the ocean in canisters that you would reasonably expect to survive through enough half-lifes to reach innocuous levels. Now, whether it’s eco- nomical to do that and to separate radionuclides that way and still pursue the option, I don’t know. Those details haven’t been thought out, and criteria haven’t been developed. Mr. Hucues. How far along are you on that type of criteria? Mr. Mattson. Well, at this point we have spent—— Mr. HuaGues. I don’t know how anxious the Navy is to dump. Mr. Mattson. We have spent on the order of $1 million or so on this kind of research. We have spent, in terms of staff years, probably a half a dozen with EPA employees. We have surveyed sites and gathered data on the point sources of elevated radioactiv- ity in the marine environment for the first time—no one has ever done that before. We have proven that there is a technology availa- ble for learning more. We have contractors who are assembling the kinds of considerations that ought to go into siting criteria, much like the kind of work that the Atomic Energy Commission would have done years ago in formulating the considerations for siting 449 fixed facilities on land, waste disposal or power generating, which- ever. A fair amount of progress has been made, but again, this is a relatively small effort in EPA. It would have to grow in order to get into public health assurance monitoring, and if it didn’t grow, and we were to get into that, then the regulatory development would be slowed. Mr. HuGues. It is a very modest effort; $1 million is relatively modest when you consider the potential risk involved and the magnitude of the problem. But in the short time I’ve been around here, I find that agencies have a way of expediting these matters once it becomes critical, that they find a need to dump. When you suggest to me that the Navy is already concerned that they have materials to dump, I have a feeling that all of a sudden we’re going to awaken a few years from now and discover there’s a critical need to dump yesterday. That’s what gives me such great concern—and I know Massachusetts is concerned. I have a few dumpsites in my region, and my colleague from California has dumpsties and he’s concerned about it. It seems that whenever we find ourselves in a bind we always take the easy way out and we dump. That’s how we dumped before. I am uncomfortable with the progress we’re making, I’m not so sure that it makes sense to differentiate really between high-level waste and low-level waste, given how much we really know about the subject. I am concerned because it is so difficult to retrieve from the ocean bottom. At least with land disposal methods, it’s a lot easier to retrieve the material than it is from 13,000 feet down. Are you comfortable with the distinction between low level and high level, and do you feel that makes sense? Mr. Mattson. Well, I think there are two broad categories in waste disposal problems that we need to deal with in this country, and it is convenient to speak of high level on the one hand and low level on the other. It’s when you try to get very precise and use those definitions, to say this is OK and that one’s not, that you get into difficulty—— Mr. Hucues. That’s—— Mr. Mattson. If somebody says low-level waste portends no health problem to this Nation, either on land or in the ocean, then he’s wrong. There are problems that have to be dealt with. Mr. HuGues. That’s why I questioned it. But I have some very basic problems, as to whether it makes sense to differentiate be- tween high-level and low-level wastes. Mr. Mattson. Well, I think it does make sense to differentiate. Mr. HucGues. I realize that, but I felt that what we make we could unmake. Mr. Mattson. One point that does come into this conversation is worth mentioning, and that is we haven’t concentrated in our discussion here about research on the subject of radioactivity in the marine environment. The NOAA people are next on the agenda, and there is a continuity in this problem area. That is, you make measurements in a dumpsite, we make measurements in the mar- ketplace, and you ask yourself two kinds of questions: Is there enough radioactivity in the things that are reaching man to hurt 450 him—that I can answer for you today. That’s a fairly straightfor- ward calculation and the science is well developed. But another question that you should ask yourself is: How does it compare to what’s normally there, either from low-level manmade activities such as fallout from weapons, or from nature. In answer- ing those kinds of questions, the data is very, very limited. We have done very little basic research about radioactivity in the marine environment. Mr. Huaues. Thank you. My time has expired. You have been very helpful. I appreciate your testimony. You have answered a most important question to me. If I understand your testimony correctly, you indicated that if we conclude you can’t build a canister that would be safe enough to contain this material, then it would violate the statute? Did I understand your testimony correctly? Mr. Mattson. I’m saying you could not comply with the statute unless you produce a canister that will contain the materials until they decay to innocuous levels. Mr. HuGues. Yes. Mr. Mattson. EPA has said that in its regulations issued in 1978. Mr. Hucues. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. Let me ask you a couple of very quick final ques- tions. I understand Mr. Anderson has a couple of equally quick ones. With respect to the Ocean Dumping Act, is it your understand- ing that it applies to all U.S. citizens, both public and private? Mr. Mattson. Yes. Mr. Stupps. Does it apply to those citizens in all the waters of the world, or just in certain waters, within certain kinds of U.S. jurisdiction? Mr. Mattson. All waters of the world. Mr. Stupps. All waters of the world. Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. This may be redundant, but I want to make certain I understand it clearly. It would apply, for example, to the U.S. Navy anywhere in the oceans of the world? Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. With respect to high-level wastes, the disposal in the sea of high-level wastes, is illegal both under our domestic law and under the London Convention; is that correct? Mr. Martson. I’m not a lawyer, I’m an engineer—— Mr. Stupps. I think that’s why—— Mr. Mattson. The word “illegal” is not the one I used in my testimony. I said “prohibited.” To the extent they mean the same, then I would agree with your statement. Prohibited, yes. I’m not sure what illegal means as an engineer. Mr. Stupps. Let’s just agree to talk in common English and the hell with the lawyers for the moment. Mr. Mattson. OK. They mean the same to you and they mean the same to me. Mr. Stupps. All right. 451 Now, do you consider the subseabed emplacement of high-level wastes to be sea disposal, which is prohibited by the law and by the convention? Mr. Mattson. Well, I don’t want to give a simple answer to the question, because I think you should understand that there is some spread within Federal agencies to the answer to that question. Mr. Stupps. We're getting that impression. Mr. Mattson. We have given for the record EPA’s General Coun- sel’s opinion on the question of the prohibition of high-level waste in or under the seabed, deriving both from the London Convention and from U.S. laws. Personally, it would be my expectation that if anyone were to begin to advocate the placement of high-level waste in or under the ocean, that person would be well advised to bring it back to the Congress. We would like to see it brought back to the Congress. Mr. Stupps. To hire his or her own set of lawyers to enter the fray? Mr. Mattson. Well, I would not like to see this question resolved by being cute with the existing—— Mr. Stupps. I understand. In other words, there’s sufficient dis- agreement to obviously make it an arguable proposition which could stand some clarification by statute? Mr. Mattson. Yes. Well, for one thing, some of these approaches weren’t around or weren’t being discussed, at the time the law was developed or at the time the convention was written. Mr. Stupps. I understand. Very quickly, you say on page 12 that you have also asked the Department of Defense to determine whether it has additional information. Has the Defense Department been forthcoming and cooperative in that regard? Mr. Mattson. We have no indication that they won’t be. I must say that we haven’t asked them until very recently. It had been my general impression—and I think it was some other people’s general impression—that if we worked with the old AEC records, either in the AEC laboratories or in the licensee’s records, that we would get everything we wanted. In Congressman Moffett’s hearings in California there were some allegations made that we were unable to respond to. We have written to the Department of Defense at the policy level asking for what’s in their records and an assessment of how good their rec- ords are. That is, we don’t want an answer that says “we don’t have any records.” Mr. Strupps. May I ask you to share that response with this committee when you get it? Mr. Mattson. Of course. Mr. Srupps. I share a little bit of the concern that Mr. Hughes expressed. Can you tell us to what extent you sense a pressure of a time nature from the Navy with regard to the likelihood of their BEd MOTI permission to dispose of reactor containers from subma- rines? Mr. Mattson. I sense the opposite. I think that the Navy needn’t be in any hurry to dispose of submarines. They’re not going to rot or fall apart. These are substantial machines and are constructed 452 substantially. Even as they go out of service, I see no compelling urgency to make these decisions. Now, they may decide, having heard me say this on the record today, to apply tomorrow, but I don’t expect they will, nor if they did, do I think there’s a compelling case that I’d have to give them an answer the day after tomorrow. Mr. Stupps. Nor could you if they did. Mr. Mattson. Nor could I. Mr. Stupps. Finally, with respect to the responsibility under the law for monitoring of the kind we have been discussing, is the law or laws clear as to what extent that is your responsibility and to what extent it’s NOAA’s? Mr. Mattson. We think it is. Mr. Stupps. And so do they. Mr. Mattson. In our discussions with NOAA of the past few weeks, it leads me to believe we can work this out. There has been some lack of clarity in varying people’s minds in the past, and in ours—I’m not trying to point a finger at NOAA—in ours and theirs. Mr. Stupps. I think they’re pointing a finger at us. We write those unclear laws. Mr. Mattson. We’re working hard to put together jointly a monitoring plan in response to the other subcommittee’s interest, and we expect to produce that in another few weeks, and then bring it up to policy officials and Congressmen and say is this the kind of thing the people had in mind and is this the kind of price tag that you had in mind? Mr. Stupps. So you’re working to see that the statutory responsi- bility is increasingly less ambiguous; is that what you’re saying? Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. Mr. Anderson, do you have a couple of quick questions? Mr. ANDERSON. I think he’|] like this next one. A 1978 General Accounting Office report states that of all the EPA programs, radiation protection is the least funded, that the agency is unable to anticipate future radiation problems adequate- y. Is that still true today? Mr. Martson. I’m sorry, sir. I have been at EPA only 3 months, and I personally feel a little uncomfortable making that kind of sweeping judgment for you. It would probably be in error. There are programs that the EPA could have responsibilities for that are larger than the programs that are there today. A convinc- ing case hasn’t been made, and it’s incumbent upon the people there to make that case, me being one of them. Mr. ANDERSON. I suppose my question should be, Do you feel that your agency is adequately funded? Mr. Mattson. Oh, yes, sir. Mr. ANDERSON. You think it is? Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. ANDERSON. To do the job today, to come up—— Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir; my perception of the job may grow—— Mr. ANDERSON. To anticipate dealing with the radiation prob- lems adequately? 453 Mr. Mattson. I must say that the budget process winds it’s way yearly, and we get an opportunity yearly to give you an answer to that question. Mr. ANDERSON. Just 2 years ago the General Accounting Office said you didn’t have enough. Mr. Mattson. Yes; in fiscal year 1983, in the next budget round, I would expect that if we’re going to undertake a lot of new monitoring responsibilities in radioactivity in the marine environ- ment, and NOAA is going to undertake them, you will see growing budgets in those areas. But for what we are charged with accom- plishing today, the budget is adequate. Mr. ANpDERSON. Now, one kind of report on what you have been doing. This year the Office of Radiation Programs spent $9,950 for post- operations filming for a documentary production of your Atlantic and Pacific dumpsite surveys, and $27,000 for the preparation of this film. My question is, why spend this $37,000 of the taxpayers’ moneys for a documentary film when we should be spending that money to document what’s going on and the dangers that these things may pose to the marine environment? Now, maybe you have a use for that documentary film today that we’d like to hear about. I just wondered why we needed a movie of it today. Mr. Mattson. Well, one thing that happens to people when they work in radiation is that they get frustrated at the inability to communicate the dangers of radiation, factually and straightfor- wardly, to the American people, to Congressmen, to the lawyers, to whoever doesn’t have an education in radiation science. I didn’t first approve that movie, but I am sympathetic with the money that is being spent there. It is a legitimate attempt—— Mr. ANpERSON. Are you using it, then, to educate the people? Mr. Mattson. We will be when it’s finished. It isn’t finished yet. I have seen working drafts of it. There are difficulties in making movies that communicate factually and still keep people’s atten- tion. You walk a fine line between scaring them to death and not keeping their attention. We're going to try it. We may fall on our face. But this seemed like a good place to try. This is a complicated issue. As the Con- gresswoman from Baltimore said this morning, it’s like meddling with mother nature. People are concerned about radioactivity in the ocean. We’re going to try to communicate to them in a form somewhat different than we have in the past. We’re used to techni- cal documents read by engineers and other scientists. In my judg- ment, it was worth the expenditure of the $37,000, or whatever it adds up to. Mr. ANDERSON. When will we see the premiere? Mr. Mattson. It will be some weeks yet. Mr. ANDERSON. It’s some weeks off? Mr. Mattson. Yes; we’re still walking that fine line. Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. You say you’ve only been with EPA for 3 months? Or with the Government for 3 months? 454 Mr. Mattson. With EPA for 3 months. Mr. Stupps. So you have been longer with the Government? Mr. Mattson. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. Oh; I was going to suggest that might be why you had such ease in communicating with us. [Laughter. ] Thank you for a fascinating time. We appreciate it, and we'll probably be back with more questions. Mr. Martson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupps. Our next witness—and I don’t believe we’ve ever had a hearing this long in this subcommittee without having this witness appear—James P. Walsh, Deputy Administrator of NOAA You are still Deputy Administrator of NOAA, are you not? [Laughter. ] STATEMENT OF JAMES P. WALSH, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ACCOMPANIED BY NED A. OSTENSO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR RE- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, NOAA, AND THOMAS O’CON- NOR, OFFICE OF MARINE POLLUTION ASSESSMENT, NOAA Mr. Wa su. I'll answer your last question first, Mr. Chairman. I am not only today the Deputy Administrator, I am the Acting Administrator and will continue as the deputy into the near future. However, I suspect that this will be my last and most enjoyable appearance before this committee. Mr. Strupps. We can’t deal with emotion like that, you know that. [Laughter. ] Copies of your statement and resumé—— Mr. WALSH. Will be burned. Mr. Strupps [continuing]. Are on the table, and they will be made a part of the record. Mr. Wats. All right, sir. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES P. WALSH, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OcEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) activities related to ocean disposal of radioactive waste products. The disposal of high-level radioactive waste products. The disposal of high-level radioactive waste has been viewed as a relatively minor issue compared to other problems with nuclear fuel, until recently. Now considerable concern exists about the desirability of land disposal of high-level nuclear waste. Consequently, alternative methods of disposal are being examined in depth. NOAA is conducting some research in a number of areas which will help evaluate the potential environmental effects of seabed disposal so that the alternatives will be more clearly understood. This morning I will focus primarily on NOAA’s activities concerning ocean dispos- al of high-level radioactive waste and will comment briefly on the possible environ- mental effects of low-level radioactive waste disposal in the ocean. OCEAN DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE 1. NOAA’s legislative authorities In recent years, NOAA has been assigned responsibility for a number of marine pollution research programs. The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-532) authorizes an ocean dumping research and monitoring pro- gram. Section 202 of the Act calls for the study by NOAA of the long-term effects of ocean pollution. In addition, the national Ocean Polution Planning Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-273) requires NOAA to prepare a 5-year federal plan for ocean pollution re- search, development, and monitoring, and to establish within NOAA a comprehen- 455 sive program of ocean pollution research. Finally, NOAA has special responsibilities for protecting living marine resources and their habitat under the Fishery Conser- vation and Management Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, Title II of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. However, other agencies, in particular the Environmental Protection Agency, are the principal regulatory agencies in this field. NOAA’s role is principally science and service support and advisory, although we have limited regulatory authority to protect living marine resources. In the international area, NOAA has, with EPA, been active in supporting the scientific and diplomatic efforts of the U.S. to the London Dumping Convention, which came into force in 1975. Much of the work under this Convention is focused on standards for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste in the oceans, the monitoring of dump sites, and the enforcement of applicable national laws. The disposal of high-level radioactive waste at sea is prohibited by the Convention and an amendment might be required before the emplacement of such wastes in the deep seabed could be carried out. NOAA’s current involvement in research assessing seabed disposal of high-level radioactive waste is in those areas where NOAA has traditionally had substantial expertise and responsibilities—areas such as ocean surveying, charting, sediment engineering, pollution assessment, fisheries, and data management. I will describe our projects in more detail in a moment. NOAA’s overall policy, however, has been to concentrate research in our established areas of expertise within the limits of available resources and to coordinate closely with the Department of Energy (DOE) so that the two agencies’ programs complement rather than duplicate each other. 2. NOAA-DOE coordination Other witnesses have described DOE’s lead responsibility for radioactive waste management under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1978. NOAA has a close working relationship with DOE and its contractor, Sandia Laboratories. We are currently discussing with DOE how NOAA can assist in investigating the subseabed disposal option of radioactive wastes. Six areas have been tentatively identified where NOAA may be of help. The areas include: Site studies.—NOAA has recently acquired the capability of mapping in detail large areas of the seafloor using a SEABEAM swath mapping system. This may be useful in mapping and geophysical investigations at several potential DOE site study areas. Historical data.—NOAA has best quantities of data which, if compiled in appro- priate format, could be of substantial importance. For example, charts of primary productivity, fishing density, water temperature and salinity, and currents are needed for the site selection and risk analysis pertaining to ocean areas under consideration for disposal sites. Site data link.—At field study sites where long-term observations will be needed, NOAA could provide the satellite communication link needed to relay field data to a processing facility in the continental United States. Deep ocean engineering and technology.—As the DOE Program moves into the engineering feasibility demonstration phase, NOAA could provide data and input on ocean engineering methods and techniques. Site monitoring.—NOAA, by virtue of its experience in ocean pollution programs, could assist DOE in developing strategies and techniques applicable to monitoring oceanographic parameters at subseabed disposal sites. Peer review.—NOAA has been requested by DOE to provide peer review of DOE research programs and field experiments. We hope to sign an interagency agreement with DOE in the near future which will outline specific joint activities. 3. NOAA Research Activities NOAA’s current research activities reflect this coordination with DOE. NOAA research projects underway or well into the planning phase include the following: MONITORING TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING FOR OCEAN DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES This project will identify existing technology and engineering capabilities and requirements for deep-sea radioactive waste disposal site monitoring, and will for- mulate objectives and technical approaches that can be used for technology develop- ment and planning purposes. It began in August 1979 through a two-year grant from NOAA to the Rand Corporation, and the Marine Physical Laboratory of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. NOAA has worked with DOE to assure that the project will not duplicate DOE research. 456 INTERACTION OF RADIONUCLIDES WITH SEDIMENTS AS A GUIDE TO THE FATE OF RADIOCHEMICAL WASTES DISPOSED OF IN THE SEA This study is designed to provide a scientific basis for predicting the fate of radionuclides in the marine environment, whether implanted in the sea floor (high- level wastes), deposited on the seabed (low-level wastes) or released accidentally. The project is funded jointly by NOAA’s Office of Marine Pollution Assessment and the Office of Sea Grant. The research will be conducted by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. The project has two objectives: (1) to characterize the physical and chemcial factors which may affect the interaction of marine sediments with both global fallout and emplaced radioactive waste constituents; and (2) to delineate the process- es and sedimentary characteristics which may influence or govern the transport of these waste constituents within the sediments and between the sediments and the overlying seawater. DEEPWATER SEDIMENT PORE PRESSURE PROBE (PIEZOMETER) SYSTEM The NOAA Marine Geotechnical Program has developed with the DOE-sponsored Sandia Seabed Disposal Program plans for the design and fabrication of a deepwater piezometer system to measure long-term changes in pore water pressure and sea- floor stability in sediments at seabed disposal study sites. Piezometers are used to measure the change of pressure of a material subject to water pressure. The system will be used in Sandia experiments in Fiscal Year 1981. These cooperative NOAA-DOE programs should do much to further the investiga- tion of disposal of high-level radioactive wastes within the seabed in a safe, environ- mentally acceptable manner. At this point we know relatively little about many aspects of seabed disposal, but these projects and others will begin to provide a basis for making decisions about ocean disposal of high-level waste. OCEAN DISPOSAL OF LOW-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE I would like now to comment briefly on the low-level radioactive waste at existing disposal sites off the U.S. continental shelf. Over the past decade, NOAA pollution research and monitoring priorites have been directed, based on the best available scientific opinion, toward those pollutants entering the marine environment that posed the most significant threat to human health, living resources, and environ- mental quality. Because the evidence so far indicates that radionuclides pose a lesser threat than other pollutants, NOAA has not placed a high priority on re- search concerning low-level nuclear wastes. I would like to summarize for you the scientific evidence which led to that management decision. In 1971, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that in terms of ecological effects, the consensus of the scientific literature was that radionuclides are not likely to be significantly deleterious in populations of marine organisms at the dose rates for the most contaminated environments. The NAS also concluded that there was no evidence that past ocean disposal of low-level waste has jeopard- ized humans or any marine species. In 1978, a workshop of scientific experts met in Estes Park, Colorado, at the request of NOAA, to review the status of our scienific knowledge on all ocean pollution and to recommend areas where further study was necessary. These ex- perts concluded that to date, no impacts on human health have been documented from the ocean disposal of radionuclides and no effects harmful to marine organ- isms are known, even at the sites of large discharges. The workshop did recommend, however, that existing low-level radioactive waste dump sites should be watched for leakage of radionuclides to test the validity of present data about retention of disposed materials in sediments, and to provide a basis for the selection of future disposal areas for low-level radioactive wastes. In 1979, NOAA issued the first five-year federal plan for ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring under the National Ocean Pollution Planning Act of 1978. The plan, developed in cooperation with ten agencies, evaluated the full range of ocean pollution problems, assigned priorities to research needs, and identified high priority unmet needs. The monitoring of existing radioactive waste dump sites was considered to be a medium to high priority information need. A need was perceived primarily for assessment of residual radionuclide abundance and recovery rates in order to evaluate future requests for ocean disposal of low-level wastes. Given this backdrop of scientific opinion on the relative threat posed to human health and living marine resources and the limited amount of ocean pollution research funding available, NOASA has not assigned a high priority to monitoring radionuclides at existing dump sites. Instead, NOAA’s pollution research and moni- toring have focused on those areas where there is a strong scientific consensus as to 457 the magnitude of the pollution problem, such as the problems associated with toxic organic materials. NOAA has sought to work with other agencies which are involved in radionuclide research whenever possible. In particular, over the past several months NOAA researchers have been informally discussing with scientists from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) areas where NOAA may coordinate with EPA on investi- gations of low-level radioactive waste disposal. We look forward to reaching agree- ment between the two agencies on a cooperative effort of the kind NOAA and DOE have established for high-level waste disposal. This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have. Mr. Srupps. If you could identify for the record the people by whom you’re accompanied. Mr. Watsu. Let me first start on my right. I think most of you know Ned Ostenso, who wears two hats in NOAA. He is Director of our Sea Grant Program, and he is also Deputy Assistant Adminis- trator for Research and Development. On my left is Tom O’Connor, who is with the Office of Marine Pollution Assessment. I am pleased to be before you again today to discuss NOAA’s activities related to ocean disposal of radioactive waste. The dispos- al of high-level waste has been viewed as a relatively minor issue compared to others involving nuclear fuel, until quite recently, when concern has been growing over disposal. We have begun looking more seriously at other alternatives for disposal including ocean disposal. NOAA is assisting in these efforts primarily by providing science support. This morning I will focus on our activities concerning disposal of high-level radioactive wastes and also comment briefly on low-level radioactive wastes. First, with regard to high-level wastes, let me say generally—and this applies also to low-level wastes—that we have a number of responsibilities under several statutes to conduct ocean-dumping research and monitoring. This comes under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, as well as the National Ocean Pollution Planning Act. We conduct a broad program of marine pollution research. It is by no means complete and comprehensive, but it attempts to cover all the major problems that are perceived at a given time. We also have special responsibilities, as you know, for protecting living marine resources under the Fishery Conservation and Man- agement Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, and others. However, in this field other agencies—in particular, the Environ- mental Protection Agency—are the principal regulatory bodies. NOAA’s role is primarly science and service support and advisory, although we do have some limited regulatory authority to protect living marine resources. In the international area we have, with EPA, been active in supporting the scientific and diplomatic efforts of the United States under the London Dumping Convention, the so-called Ocean Dump- ing Convention. Most of the work under this convention has been focused on standards for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, the monitoring of dumpsites throughout the world, and the enforce- ment of applicable national laws. 458 As you know, the disposal of high-level radioactive waste is, in the opinion of many, prohibited by the Convention, although the interpretation is somewhat unclear. An amendment might be re- quired before such wastes could be emplaced in the deep seabed. Our current involvement in research assessing seabed disposal of high-level radioactive waste is in those areas where we have tradi- tional responsibility or have expertise: Areas such as ocean survey- ing, charting, sediment engineering, pollution assessment, fisheries, and data management. I will describe our projects in a little more detail in a moment. However, our overall policy has been to con- centrate on research in our established areas of expertise within the limits of available resources and to coordinate closely with the Department of Energy so that our two programs do not overlap but, rather, complements the other’s research. Let me turn to our coordination with the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has already talked about their radioac- tive waste management program. We have a close working rela- tionship, which is getting closer with DOE, and its contractor, Sandia Laboratories. We are currently discussing with DOE how we might assist in investigating the question of subseabed disposal of radioactive wastes. We have yet not signed a formal interagency agreement, but we have identified six areas in which NOAA might be of help. One, we may assist with site studies. We have recently acquired the capability to map large areas of the seafloor in detail, using SEABEAM’s swath sonar system. This could be quite useful in looking at potential sites in more depth. Two, NOAA also has vast quantities of data on the ocean, on questions such as productivity, fishing density, ecosystems, water temperature and salinity, and currents which would be needed in any kind of site selection and risk analysis. Three, we have the satellite capability to link up field activities and relay information to processing facilities as a service. Four, we have some capability in the area of engineering feasibil- ity in the ocean, and we plan to provide input to DOE on ocean engineering methods and techniques. Five, we also could assist DOE in developing strategies and tech- niques applicable to monitoring oceanographic parameters at var- ious seabed disposal sites. Six, finally, we have been requested by DOE to review through the scientific peer review system their research programs and field experiments. We hope to sign an interagency agreement with DOE in the near future which will outline these specific joint responsibilities. My written testimony then, Mr. Chairman, highlights in some detail other further studies. I think Ill skip that for now in the interest of brevity. Let me conclude by saying that the research I have described here I think will help better understand the alternatives for dispos- al of high-level nuclear wastes in a safe and environmentally ac- ceptable manner. At this point we must confess we know relatively little about many aspects of seabed disposal, but we hope these projects will help remove some of the uncertainty. 459 Let me now turn to low-level radioactive waste at existing dispos- al sites. Over the past decade, NOAA’s pollution research and monitoring priorities have been directed, based on what we consid- er to be the best available scientific opinion, toward those pollut- ants entering the marine environment that are known to pose, or are believed to pose, the most significant threat to human health, living resources, and environmental quality. Because the evidence so far indicates that radionuclides pose a lesser threat than other pollutants, NOAA has not placed a high priority on research con- cerning low-level nuclear wastes. I would like to summarize for you the scientific evidence and deliberations which led to that manage- ment decision. In 1971, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that in terms of ecological effects, the consensus of the scientific literature at that time was that radionuclides are not likely to be significant- ly deleterious in populations of marine organisms at the dose rates estimated for the most contaminated enviroments. Based on what we know now, that is the conclusions of scientists, the National Academy also concluded that no evidence existed showing that past ocean disposal of low-level waste had jeopardized humans or any marine species. In 1978, a workshop of scientific experts met, under NOAA’s auspices, in Estes Park, Colo., to review the status of our scientific knowledge on all ocean pollution issues and to recommend areas where further study was necessary. These experts concluded that to date no impacts on human health have been documented from the ocean disposal of radionuclides and no effects harmful to marine organisms are known, even at the sites of large discharges. The workshop did recommend, however, that existing low-level radioactive waste dumpsites should be watched for leakage of ra- dionuclides to test the validity of present data about retention of disposed materials in sediments, and to provide a basis for the selection of future disposal areas for radioactive waste, low level, if that should occur. In 1979 NOAA issued the first 5-year Federal plan under the National Ocean Pollution Planning Act. The plan, which was devel- oped in cooperation with all concerned Federal agencies, evaluated the full range of known ocean pollution problems and assigned priorities, and identified high priority, unmet needs. The monitor- ing of existing radioactive waste dumpsites was considered to be a medium to high priority information need. A need was perceived primarily for assessment. of residual radionuclide abundance and recovery rates in order to evaluate future requests for ocean dispos- al of low-level wastes. Given this backdrop of scientific opinion on the relative threat posed to human health and living marine resources, and—let me underline this, even though it’s not underlined in my testimony— the limited amount of ocean pollution research funding available, NOAA has not assigned a high priority to monitoring radionuclides at existing dumpsites. Instead, NOAA’s pollution research and monitoring have focused on those areas where there is a strong scientific consensus as to the magnitude of the pollution problem, aay as the problems that are associated with toxic organic materi- als. 69-848 O - 81 - 30 460 NOAA has sought to work with other agencies which are in- volved in radionuclide research whenever possible. In particular, over the past several months NOAA researchers have been infor- mally discussing with scientists from EPA areas where NOAA may coordinate with EPA on investigations of low-level radioactive waste disposal. We look forward to reaching agreement with EPA, as we do with DOE, on the studies in this area. That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. I must say, one wonders, if this is the fate of research considered to be a medium to high priority, what happens to that considered to be less than medium to high? I assume it’s simply—— Mr. WALsu. It’s a zero sum game, Mr. Chairman. Every time a problem comes up, as long as you're dealing with a finite amount of resources in terms of people, computers, scientists, ships, the Alvin, or whatever, you’ve got to make some choices. The way we look at it, in many cases we're sitting there with one fire engine and five fires. We can choose only one of the fires. Obviously, four of the people with fires are going to be very unhappy with us. But it’s just a question of resources and what we know at the time. Let me emphasize that 100 years ago people still believed that open sewers were not a health problem. We have learned some- thing since then. We built open sewers back then, but now we don’t; we now understand there are health problems associated with open sewers. So it all becomes a question of what you know. If you’re not comfortable with what you know, you have to start doing more research. And that’s going to be expensive, particularly if you deal with the ocean. Mr. Stupps. I knew the answer to that question. I simply wanted it on the record, and I will refer it to the minority members of the subcommittee so they, in turn, can relay it to the people moving into town. Let me backtrack a second. In your section generally on low-level wastes, it is replete with statements about a lack of evidence indi- cating environmental damage resulting from low-level waste. Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupps. It does not, however, cite any convincing evidence that environmental damage does not occur as a result of the dump- ing of that waste. HEN? you got it perhaps backward there? Are we assuming too much’? Mr. WatsuH. Well, what happened is that the scientists will sit down and take a look at all the research that has been done, and generally what is understood about the processes, and draw a judgment as to what they know. The quality of that judgment depends of course, on the quality of the data base and the quality of the understanding of the environ- mental factors. As we have said to you time and time again before this committee, the natural processes in the ocean, how the ecology works, and the pathways, of pollutants through it, are areas not fully understood. Identifying cause and effect is difficult in the ocean, whether you are talking about oil spills or the loss of fish next year. 461 So based on what is known, given limited information, scientists have drawn certain conclusions. Concerning certain pollutants, like heavy metals, polychlorinated biphenyls or Kepone, scientists have concluded that those pose very serious problems. They’re problems about which we know something—for example they are toxic to human health and animals. They also pose problems in areas close to the human population and to heavy concentrations of living resources that are used by people. Therefore, scientists make their judgment, and their judgment is limited to what we now know. Mr. Stupps. On page 10 you state that research into the effects of low-level waste dumping is needed not because of harm which may have resulted from past dumping, but rather because we need to prepare for requests for future dumping permits? Mr. WaALsH. Yes, sir. And this gets to perhaps a difference in philosophy between EPA and NOAA on the question of monitoring. EPA’s responsibility is regulatory. We look upon their monitoring requirements to be those that are related to questions of regulation and site-specific issues. Our view of monitoring is to go beyond that and to look into the future as to what questions we haven’t answered. In other words, if you take a snapshot now of a nuclear dumpsite, for example, and you test the sediments and test the animals, you'll draw certain conclusions. What we're trying to do is push out the frontiers of fundamental understanding so that the site-specific, regulatory monitoring will mean something that we understand, so that we will focus on problems that we haven’t seen. The problems of PCB’s sneaked up on us; DDT did the same. We spend a lot of time looking at oil pollution, but there are other problems coming down the road, particularly the synergistic effects of all pollutants in the natural environment. So what we in NOAA are trying to focus on in our science, is what don’t we know. We can look at these sites and draw conclusions, depending on the exposure levels and the like, but what we’re the most afraid of is whether we’re missing something when we’re down there. Is there some flaw in our understanding that leads us to conclude it’s not a problem? We want to do the research to be convinced of that. Mr. Stupps. I understand. So to your knowledge, who is proposing the use of the ocean for low-level waste disposal at the present time? Mr. Watsu. To my knowledge, there are countries in the world that are still using dumpsites under the Ocean Dumping Conven- tion—— Mr. Stupps. I mean in our own country. Mr. WALsuH. In our country? I would have to defer to EPA on that issue. I think they mentioned the Navy. Mr. Stupps. What I'm getting at is we did ask them. Do you think the necessity or the possible necessity to move beyond land-based disposal options is a political one or an environ- mental one, inasmuch as a square foot of land seems to be repre- sented by somebody in this institution as opposed to a square foot of ocean? Mr. WAtsu. On that question generally, going beyond just ra- dionuclides, it is pretty clear that since 1970 we have had a philos- 462 ophy in our laws and our policy that the ocean is definitely not the place to dump, if for no other reason than we don’t know what’s going to happen there. It is an environment in which things tend to move around and combine and react in a way that we truly don’t understand. Therefore, the policies have been aimed at land disposal as an area that we know something about. That’s a rough estimate of Government policy as contained in the statutes passed since 1970. My view is that as we learn more about the dangers of land disposal, and the kinds of things that can occur with land disposal, whether it’s related to ground water pollution, which is a serious problem that we are slowly awakening to, then the ocean itself will be looked at, for no other reason than the uncertainty of what will happen. Let me put it another way: We may know more about the problems in land disposal than we know about the problems of ocean disposal and it will come to be looked upon as a better medium, for no other reason than that. In other words, uncertainty, and how we resolve questions of uncertainty, may end up having people focus on the ocean. There are really two schools of thought in this debate. We have debated this issue, and we sponsored a conference just this summer. There will be articles coming out in a journal from Woods Hole which will set out the two points of view. One will say that yes, we can dump more in the ocean; the other will say no, we can’t. That debate I believe may very well carry itself into a national debate involving legislation. I think the in- creased interest in ocean disposal is simply reflective of the chang- ing view of where we are going to put all this stuff we don’t want around. I perceive the ocean will be looked upon as a disposal place. Mr. Stupps. I do, too. I think it’s clear that is happening. We had an agency, as you just heard, scurrying about preparing regulations looking toward the permitting of the future ocean dumping of low-level wastes. I was just fishing for the sense if that was entirely for reasons with respect to the environmental conse- quences of land disposal, or whether there are other related politi- cal consequences of land disposal. Mr. Watsu. I think it’s a combination, Congressman, of what we know scientifically, of economic issues, of regulatory issues, of polit- ical questions. Obviously, Three Mile Island has changed every- body’s attitude toward whether they want any wastes in their back yard. South Carolina and Washington State are now being very dubious about something that they didn’t seem to be concerned about previously. Mr. Stupps. Although they’re clearly perfectly logical places for such things. [Laughter.] Mr. WaALsu. In any event, our pitch from NOAA—and I personal- ly believe this very strongly—is that it would be a mistake not to do the research and try to understand what’s going to happen, because in the face of uncertainty a lot of bad decisions can and will be made, paralleling the one people made 100 years ago that open sewers were fine and healthy. Mr. Stupps. Please don’t keep reminding us of that. 463 I have one question here from Mr. Pritchard. He wants to know how much ship time of the NOAA research fleet has been allocated for the mapping of possible subseabed emplacement sites. Mr. WAtsuH. At the present time, none. We were discussing that with DOE. I want to add my 2 cent’s worth, if I could. In areas in which there is uncertainty about responsibility re- garding ocean activities, decisions about who should do what tend to be made by the Office of Management and Budget. They make those decisions based on who has the function. Presently we are under some pressure, to cut down in NOAA interagency support programs as a way of cutting personnel. That results in agencies like EPA, who would rather come to NOAA and try to get the expertise aboard ships, being faced with our need to retrench deeper and deeper into our own responsibilities, and we’re not able to provide those services to EPA. It’s a problem that concerns me very much, because I guarantee you that if every agency in the Federal Government develops the capability we have in NOAA, there will be a lot of waste. Mr. Stupps. This is your last appearance no doubt before this and perhaps any other subcommittee in your current disguise. I am sure you'll be back, in spite of some of the judgments made by the people from—I assume that’s your home State way out there—— Mr. WAL.suH. No, I was born and raised in Oregon. Mr. Stupps. Oh. [Laughter. ] OK. Well, enough of this between the lines. I am sure we'll see you again, and I certainly appreciate the breadth and diversity of the testimony we have received from you in the past—how many years has this administration been in? Four, I guess. Mr. WaALtsu. I can’t remember. [Laughter. ] Mr. Stupps. It seems forever. Thank you very much. The best of luck to you. Mr. Watsu. Thank you, sir. Mr. Stupps. Our next witness is Mr. Clifton Curtis of the Center for Law and Social Policy. Mr. Curtis? Your testimony is fairly lengthy, and I would encourage you, if you can and if you will, to summarize it. It will appear in its entirety in the record. Mr. Curtis. I will do that, Chairman Studds. [The following was received for the record:] 464 November 20, 1980 STATEMENT OF CLIFTON E. CURTIS ON BEHALF OF CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY, CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION, COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP, COSTEAU SOCIETY, CRITICAL MASS ENERGY PROJECT, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOUNDATION, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CENTER, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, GREENPEACE, U.S.A., HUDSON RIVER SLOOP CLEARWATER, INC., NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE SAFETY, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, NUCLEAR INFORMATION RESOURCE SERVICE, OCEAN EDUCATION PROJECT, OCEANIC SOCIETY, SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE, INC., SIERRA CLUB, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNITED METHODIST LAW OF THE SEA PROJECT, AND THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY : BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES CONCERNING NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE OCEANS I am Clifton E. Curtis of the Center for Law and Social Policy, a public interest law firm located in Washington, D.C.*/ I appre- ciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of 22 environmental/public interest groups -- the Center for Development Policy, Center for Environmental Education, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Costeau Society, Critical Mass Energy Project, the Environmental Action Foundation, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Environmental Policy Center, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, U.S.A., the Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., the National Campaign for Radioactive */ Robin Charlow, a law student in the Center's clinical program, helped prepare this testimony. 465 =p Waste Safety, the National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Information Resource Service, the Ocean Education Project, Oceanic Society, Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference, Sierra Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the United Methodist Law of the Sea Project, and the Wilderness Society*/ (hereafter the "public interest" organizations) — to discuss their concerns with respect to the disposal of radiological wastes in the marine environment. These public interest groups have a combined membership and sponsorship exceeding 5,700,000 persons throughout the United States and abroad. Many of these groups have had a long history of active interest in the development of sound ocean and nuclear waste management policies — both nationally and internationally — that provide for effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment. The Center for Law and Social Policy has addressed issues related to the ocean disposal of radioactive waste on numerous occasions during recent years. Since 1978, I have been a member of the EPA/Department of State Ocean Dumping Coordinating Committee. In July 1978, I testified before this Subcommittee concerning this same topic. I served as an Advisor on the U.S. delegation to the Third Consultative Meeting of the London Dumping Conven- tion ("LDC"), and represented Friends of the Earth, International and the Oceanic Society at the LDC's Fourth Consultative Meeting. In February 1980, the Center and the Oceanic Society co-sponsored a one-day workship in Washington, D.C., entitled "Nuclear Waste Management: the Ocean Alternative." *7 Attached as Appendix A is a brief description of these Organizations. 466 These hearings represent a useful contribution to the United State's efforts to formulate sound and rational controls related to the potential disposal of radiological wastes in the oceans. Thev provide a forum for clarifying U.S. policies and program activities--both domestically and in relation to the efforts of other nations and international organizations. The record being developed here enhances the possibilities for effective coordination of the statutory and regulatory responsibilities lodged in such agencies as the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. These hearings provide the Congress with an opportunity to assess the adequacy of existing domestic statutory authority. Additionally, they should assist our public officials in developing a comprehen- sive and explicit national policy that is a prerequisite to the international pursuit of mutually acceptable approaches to pre- preserving and developing the resources of our oceans. Finally, the public airing of this country's efforts in addressing the issues associated with dispoal of radiological wastes in the marine environment is essential. Given the Roeranar debate which continues over the appropriateness of nuclear technology in meeting our nation's energy needs, the 467 == public must be kept fully informed as to matters that affect the viability of continued reliance on that technology, not the least of which is the effort to arrive at long-term solu- tions to the waste disposal problem. The recent citizen outcry over possible health and environmental hazards resulting from previous U.S. dumping operations off the California coast also illustrates the need for informing and involving the public on these issues. Hearings held last month in San Francisco by the Subcommittee on Environ- ment, Energy and Natural Resources of the House Government Operations Committee pointedly demonstrate how the government's failure to attend to the public had contributed significantly to the growing sense of alarm. In addition, these hearings proved that the suggestions and activities of the public were vital in uncovering the full picture of past dumping and its effects. GENERIC CONSIDERATIONS According to EPA estimates, from 1946 until 1970 the U.S. dropped approximately 95,900 curies of low-level radiological wastes into ocean areas off our Pacific, Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Several European countries are currently engaged in a systematic program OE GhamosNg low-level radioactive materials into the Northeast Atlantic. In addition, Japan has announced its plans to begin placing radioactive wastes in ocean areas near the Pacific Islands, with 5,000-10,000 barrels of low-level Materials scheduled for dumping in 1981. According to Department of Energy calculations, the projected quantities of United States' commercial and military radioactive 468 =5= wastes that will have been produced by the year 2000 will be approximately 8,000,000 cubic meters of low-level wastes, 835,900 cubic meters of transuranic wastes, and 320,000 cubic meters of defense-related high-level wastes. By adding the projected 89,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel generation that will have occurred by the year 2000, which will have to be stored or reprocessed, it is evident — even excluding any worldwide projections — that long term solutions must be found for managing our nuclear wastes. The current administration has taken significant steps in this direction, first, by forming the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management ("IRG") to examine the problem, and then, by adopting most of the recommendations contained in its 1979 Report. This report identifies the primary objective of waste management planning and implementa- tion - that nuclear waste be isolated from the biosphere and pose no significant threat to public health and safety. While the dominant focus of the IRG Report was on land-based geologic disposal, the ocean disposal option and institutional respon- sibilities relating to it were noted and discussed. Similarly, the U.S. Radiation Policy Council, which was created as a result of the IRG recommendations, includes within its charge the consideration of alternatives to shallow land burial for low-level radioactive wastes. At present there exists a consensus within the United States that the ocean alternative is not a viable disposal 469 =3= medium for high-level radioactive caskets Similarly, ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes is not considered an environmentally or economically preferable disposal medium. Moreover, while scientists disagree on the magnitude of harm that has been or could be caused by ocean disposal of radioactive wastes, there is agreement that very little is known about the actual impact of previous low-level radioactive waste dumping on the marine environment or on the food chain pathways. Absent highly acceptable land-based repositories, however, the oceans will receive increasing consideration as a disposal medium — for both high- and low-level radioactive wastes — if for no other reason than their "out of sight — out of mind” limited constituency appeal. HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE A. Legal Considerations ‘The legality of dumping and seabed emplacement of high-level radioactive wastes is governed by two international treaties. Article 25 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, to which the U.S. is a party, provides that "Every state shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste...." In addition, the U.S. was one of the key instigating forces behind adoption of the 1972 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and other Matter ("London Dumping Convention" or "LDC"), which has Since been ratified or acceded to by the U.S. and 45 other countries. Article IV and Annex I of the Convention clearly prohibit dumping of high-level waste in the ocean. While there is some apparent disagreement within our government as to the 470 == legality of seabed emplacement of radioactive wastes under international law, our reading of the LDC leads to the con- clusion that such treaty law prohibits the emplacement of high-level radioactive wastes. Domestically, the 1972 Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act ("Ocean Dumping Act") governs ocean dumping. Certain sections of the statute (33 U.S.C. §§1402(f) and 1412(a)) prohibit the issuance of permits to dispose of high-level radio- active wastes in the ocean. With respect to the legality of seabed emplacement of high-level wastes under U.S. law, the consensus of the government agencies that participated in this Subcommittee's 1978 hearings was that such emplacement is prohibited. Some very preliminary work directed at assessing international and domestic legal issues associated with seabed emplacement of high-level waste is presently being done under the Department of Energy's Seabed Disposal Program ("SDP"). Under the SDP work schedule, the Department of Energy might recommend statutory changes, in the early 1990's, of our domestic and international law to affirm the legality of seabed emplacement. We agree that no changes in the controlling domestic and international laws should be considered for the foreseeable future, since it would be premature to review such legal principles prior to determining that emplacement is environmentally and technically sound. B. Concerns and Recommendations The U.S. is involved, both nationally and internationally, in examining the feasibility of emplacing these wastes under the seabed. DOE's Seabed Disposal Program received funding 471 aR= of over $5 million in FY 1980. The program's funding has increased to $6.9 million for FY 1981 and the projected budget request for the next several years increases substantially (FY'82 ($13.6 million); FY'83 ($20 million); FY'84 ($22 million); FY'85 ($32 million); FY'86 ($32 million)). The SDP has been incorporated into DOE's National Waste Terminal Storage Program, treating seabed emplacement as another one of the geologic disposal options under review. SDP officials also participate in an international forum, the Seabed Working Group, sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's ("OECD") Nuclear Energy Agency ("NEA") . Six member countries of the Seabed Working Group, along with other observer nations, meet annually to exchange information on each country's efforts in the sub-seabed emplacement area. : The infusion of significant sums of money into the SDP raises several concerns about its current structure and activities. It is questionable whether sufficient cost and environmental comparisons of land versus ocean options have been made. Annex VI to the London Dumping Convention requires contracting parties to consider the "practical availability of alternative land-based methods of ... disposal" when establishing criteria governing the issuance of permits for dumping low-level radioactive wastes. Moreover, NRC regulations concerning disposal of low-level radioactive wastes (10 C.F.R. §20.302(c)) state that "[t]he Commission will not approve a license for disposal of ... material at sea unless the applicant shows that sea disposal offers less harm to man or the environment -9- than other practical alternative methods...." Denmark and Sweden have pressed for a similar mandatory comparison of land and ocean alternatives in regard to incineration of matter at sea. Some comparisons of the seabed option and land- based alternatives based on very tentative, general assessments of economics and environmental effects have been made. It would appear, however, that more detailed cost estimates and comparisons of ocean and land-based alternatives are called for even at this preliminary stage. Additionally, it seems quite possible that no clear "stop-program" points will emerge as the SDP unfolds. Specific activities to be conducted under the four different phases of the SDP overlap in time, so that the phases themselves do not embody definitive program breakpoints. Absence of such program segregation would hinder accountability and review prior to commitment of additional money to unwarranted research and development. Systematic information exchange within the U.S. would help to coordinate the activities of the various agencies involved. Though DOE is currently formulating a memo of understanding with NOAA outlining their interrelationship on SDP work, there is no systematic consultation with or dissemination of information to other interested or affected agencies and outside groups, such as: EPA and NRC, who would have regulatory responsibilities in this regard; DOT, which has responsibilities concerning the transportation of wastes over land prior to vessel transport; DOD, as a major producer of high-level nuclear waste; CEQ, as a representative of the executive branch; outside scientists; 473 =iL(0\= and, of course, the public. One example of the lack of coordination involves technology transfers for packaging. EPA and the Navy are apparently looking into packaging design for low-level waste ocean disposal, while DOE's SDP is examining packaging for high-level waste seabed emplacement. These activities and others of this nature should, at the very least, be discussed regularly in a common public forum to avoid overlap and to identify areas where one party might assist another. Concerning the matter of interagency coordination, we believe that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, rather than DOE, should be given the lead agency role for coordinating the various non-regulatory ocean disposal program activities. Pursuant to Public Law 95-273, NOAA has responsibility for coordinating and monitoring federal agency activity related to ocean pollution research, development and monitoring, with particular emphasis on the inputs, fates, and effects of pollutants in the marine environment. In this context, NOAA's first five-year plan, which in part established priorities for national needs and problems, ranked the disposal of radioactive waste as a high priority concern. To date, NOAA's involvement in seabed emplacement issues has been limited. It should, however, have or be given the staff capabilities and resources to perform such a lead agency coordination function. The perceived lack of communication and oversight in the seabed disposal area is particularly troublesome in light of the participation of SDP researchers and policy level officials 474 == in international discussions. Although the Seabed Working Group ("SWG") is not a policy setting body, members do maintain cognizance of policies developing within each country. It would therefore seem appropriate to have some regular inter-agency consultation on SWG seabed emplacement issues. The public interest organizations believe that an advisory committee on seabed emplacement should be established which would include participation of all these administrative agencies, executive branch involvement, peer review by scientists, and outside representation by concerned public interest advocates and others. The creation of such a committee is supported by the IRG recommendation that additional, more effective means of public participation be required. A public advisory committee would contribute toward assuring built-in neutrality, alleviating potential redundancy, adérainatine efforts, personnel and facilities, and assessing and formulating U.S. policy on this isssue. LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE A. Legal Considerations The London Dumping Convention permits placement of low-level wastes in the ocean upon issuance of a permit by the individual country involved (Article IV and Annex II). In issuing a permit the member nation must consider certain factors enumerated in Annex III, as well as recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") (see Annex II(D)). The IAEA's latest recommendation were issued in 1978 and approved at the third consultative meeting of the London Dumping Convention. 475 =ileoe Domestically, the Ocean Dumping Act allows ocean placement of low-level wastes upon issuance of a permit by the EPA (33 U.S.C. §1412). The EPA must, likewise, establish criteria for permit review, considering certain statutory factors enumerated in the Act. B. Concerns and Recommendations EPA is currently developing regulations for issuance of low-level dumping permits and expects that site selection, packaging criteria and monitoring regulations will be completed by 1985. EPA is also conducting a scientific investigation of past U.S. dumping operations and of the effects of such dumping on the marine environment. As discussed at the House hearings concerning the effects of past dumping in the Farallon Islands area, the general scientific assessment, although by no means unanimous, was that no human health hazard currently exists. Nonetheless, the entire range of scientific viewpoints represented at the hearings concurred in the need for continued monitoring. Internationally, the U.S., under EPA's leadership, has been an active EOS: LaSev in the consultative and intersessional meetings of the London Dumping Convention. As the report of the fifth consultative meeting, held in September 1980, demon- strates, the U.S. continues to be the major force addressing environmental concerns. In the past, the U.S. has succeeded in incorporating into the LDC provisos a minimum ocean disposal depth of 4,000 meters for low-level radioactive waste, a strenghened IAFA definition of blacklisted high-level wastes, and requirements that an environmental assessment be made in connection with proposed dumping operations. G9=sle © = 61 = 37 476 -13- The U.S. also participates in an NEA- sponsored program for overseeing the dumping of low-level wastes in the Northeast Atlantic by certain European nations. In this area, the United States has been pressing for the development of adequate monitoring and site assessment plans, and has agreed to a one-year extension of our participation, until 1981, conditioned on development of these criteriaand plans. Participation in such operations is important for three primary reasons: (1) operations are conducted in areas of the "global commons," belonging to all nations, (2) observation of these dump sites will allow the U.S. to observe what occurs at the time radioactive waste is dumped,and to compare those findings with knowledge concerning the effects over time (as was gleaned from EPA's Farallon Islands investigations), and (3) the results of these operations have implications for U.S. dumping standards now being developed by the EPA. While these hearings are primarily focused on issues concerning seabed emplacement of high-level wastes, the public interest groups believe that there are several points concerning the United States' current national and international activities involving low-level radioactive waste disposal that merit attention. Internationally, it is vital that the U.S. con- tinue to take an active part in meetings and conferences, and in the development of multi-national policies and procedures. The IAEA's upcoming agenda includes assessment of its outdated ATT alle oceanographic model currently applied to predict the dispersion of pollutants in the ocean, issuance of a technical document in early 1981 to qualify and supplement packaging requirements, development of a definition of de minumus radiation, and publication in early 1981 of "Criteria for Selection, Manage- ment and Surveillance of Ocean Dumping Sites" to fulfill Annex III of the London Dumping Convention. These items are important to EPA's regulatory program, in particular, and deserve our thorough review. The U.S. will need to urge the IAEA to assimilate any changes that are necessary, both now and in the future, just as it is currently pressing for further revision of IAEA's 1978 Definitions and Recommendations to accommodate later scientific and policy developments. As in the past, the U.S. must continue to persuade the contracting parties to the London Dumping Convention to accept certain safeguards and ideas which many have been reluctant to embrace, including an international register of all radioactive waste dumped into the oceans, a global limit on the number of dump sites, and an unambiguous understanding that environmental assessments are required in the notification of a country's intention to dump. Finally, the United States should oppose the continued use of the Northeast Atlantic dumpsite by the NEA if an adequate monitoring system, including mandatory neutral observers, is not established by the time of the NEA's April, 1981 Steering Committee meetings. 478 GS Domestically, our policy regarding ocean dumping of low-level radioactive waste needs further clarification. In October, 1970, the Council on Environmental Quality issued a report which concluded that ocean dumping of any radioactive wastes presented a very serious and growing threat to the marine environment. Since 1970, the U.S. policy has been to dispose of low-level radioactive wastes through shallow land burial. Also, in a recent letter from Douglas Costle, Administrator of EPA, to Governor Camacho of the Northern Mariana Islands, Mr. Costle stated that "until we have a better understanding of the possible impacts of low-level radioactive waste disposal in the ocean, the United States will not encourage other nations to ocean dump." le However, EPA's present efforts to develop permit criteria lead to the impression that U.S. dumping may be resumed. Prior to EPA's compliance with its proposed permit regulations schedule, a U.S. policy decision should be made as to whether it is appro- priate or feasible to give such serious consideration to the use of the oceans as a low-level disposal medium. Ata minimum, our international obligations regarding radioactive waste should be reflected in the general dumping regulations EPA intends to issue in 1981, since we are already committed at least to those requirements. Another major domestic concern is the monitoring of past dumpsites. The Ocean Dumping Act provides the statutory authority for such monitoring tasks. Pursuant to that authority we encourage EPA and NOAA to reach adequate understandings concerning future monitoring activities. The specific 479 iG arrangements could be set forth in a memorandum of understanding ("MOU"), as was suggested by Congressmen McCloskey and Moffett at the Farallon Islands hearings. Such an MOU should also require monitoring of specific sites. Absent an adequate MOU, monitoring should be statutorily required. Having reviewed the evidence presented at last month's Farallon Islands hearings, we believe that the most appropriate course of action would be to undertake an in-depth investigation of a few selected dumpsites (e.g., the Farallon Islands, Santa Barbara and Massachusetts Bay areas). Sites should be chosen which, according to available records, seem to contain the most substantial and toxic quantities of radioactive material. Evidence of significant potential for harm to man or the marine environment at these sites would trigger broader review, that is, a survey of all additional dumpsites. As a final recommendation, the public interest organizations believe that the current Ocean Dumping Coordinating Committee and the Ocean Dumping Advisory Committee, which address inter- national and domestic concerns respectively, need to be strengthened. One point the Farallon Islands hearings made painfully apparent was the effect that lack of coordination and reluctance to take on responsibility by and among federal agencies have had in creating delays and in contributing to public concerns. As in the case of the proposed advisory committee on high-level waste disposal, both low-level advisory committees should include all affected administra- tive agencies (essentially the same as for high-level 480 ang =. wastes), executive branch representatives (CEQ), peer group review by outside scientists (for whom the possibility of participation would be significantly enhanced if their expenses were covered) and members of the concerned public. Again, the Farallon Islands hearings clearly illustrate the importance of outside oversight. More extensive lists of past dumpsites were compiled by groups such as Committee to Bridge the Gap, with its limited access and resources, than by any of the government agencies. Having scientists — representing the Oceanic Society (through its Ad Hoc Scientific Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Michael Herz) and the U.S. Mussel Watch Committee — affirm the "no current hazard" findings of the EPA,provided an important non-governmental perspective. Moreover, the systematic exchange of information amongst government agencies and the public can only benefit the process. For example, the need for better cooperation on the part of the Department of Defense was a major recurring them of the Farallon Islands hearings. Such DOD cooperation is even more essential in light of the Navy's potential plans to scuttle decommissioned siiihchtia submarines bv sinking them to the ocean floor. The memo of understanding between NOAA and EPA requested at the Farallon Islands hearings, though helpful, is simply not enough; it does not include all groups who should be involved and would not provide for the kind of detailed, continuous review that is called for. As an illustration, the IRG recommended (at page 79 of its March 1979 Report) that by 481 -18- 1981, DOE and NRC should review existing and alternative low- level waste disposal techniques and determine whether any should be adopted in the near future. Given EPA's regulatory responsibility in this area, it seems obvious that that agency should be one of the key participants in arriving at such decisions, CONCLUSION The oceans — which cover nearly three-fourths of the world's surface — occupy a critical role in maintaining a livable environment. Given the extremely hazardous nature of radioactive wastes, their disposal into our oceans is fraught with potentially irreparable consequences. National policies that determine the manner in which we seek to preserve, protect, and utilize our vital marine resources must be rationally advanced, subjected to continuing and rigorous public review, and based on definitive environmental and technical studies that incorporate support activities on land. Until all these concerns have been met, there should be no serious thought given to changing our present U.S. policy opposing ocean disposal or seabed emplacement of any radioactive wastes. Assuming these concerns are one day met, all the variables associated with a comprehensive nuclear waste management policy (e.g., economic, social, environmental and political considerations) must then be factored into any decision concerning the ocean alternative. 482 APPENDIX A The Center for Development Policy is a non-membership group whose offices are located at 401 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. The Center for Environmental Education is a Washington-based group with over 300,000 sponsors and coordinating offices in London, Tokyo, Vancouver, and Canberra. The Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based environmental research group has approximately 1,500 participants. The Costeau Society, whose principal corporate office is at 777 Third Avenue, New York, New York, and which has additional offices in Norfolk, Virginia, Los Angeles, California, Paris, France, and Monaco, has a membership of approximately 160,000 persons. Critical mass Energy Project, a non-membership group which has subscribers to its monthly journal and legislative reports comprising about 10,000 persons, is located at 215 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Wachinaeas. D.C. The Environmental Action Foundation, whose principal place of business is at 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., has a membership of 22,000 persons. The Environmental Defense Fund, whose principal place of business is 475 Park Avenue, New York, New York, has a membership of approximately 45,000 persons and a 700-member Scientists' Advisory Committee, including members residing in 18 foreign countries. The Environmental Policy Center, whose principal place of business is at 317 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C., has no members itself but represents coalitions of citizens around the country. Friends of the Earth, whose principal place of business is 124 Spear Street, San Francisco, California, has a membership of over 25,000 persons and is affiliated with 483 "sister organizations" in 12 foreign countries. Greenpeace, U.S.A., whose principal office is in Washington, D.C. and whose major regional office is at Building E, Fort Mason, San Francisco, California, is a national organization composed of local member- ship groups with 120,000 sponsors and donors. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. is a non-profit organization with 5,000 members, offices at 112 Market Street, Poughkeepsie, New York, and local supporting organizations all along the Hudson River. National Campaign for Radioactive Waste Safety has a west coast office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, an east coast branch in Lawrenceville, New Jersey, and somewhere between 6,000-7,000 contributors. The National Wildlife Federation, whose principal place of business is at 1412 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., is composed of associate members and members of state affiliate member organizations, comprising over 4.6 million persons. The Natural Resources Defense Council, whose principal office is at 122 East 42nd Street, New York, New York, and which has additional offices in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, California, has a membership of approximately 46,000 persons, including members residing in 21 foreign countries. The Nuclear Information Resource Service is a non-membership information clearinghouse organization with offices at 1536 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. The Ocean Education Project is a non- membership group operating at 100 Maryland Avenue, N.E., 484 Wsahington, D.C. The Oceanic Society, whose principal place of business is at Magee Avenue, Stanford, Connecticut, and which has an additional office in San Francisco, California as well as nine regional chapters, has 60,000 members. Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference is a non-membership organization whose principal office is 4623 More Mesa Drive, Santa Barbara, California. The Sierra Club, whose principal place of business is at 530 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, has a membership of approximately 184,000 persons, including persons residing in 62 foreign countries. The Union of Concerned Scientists, with its headquarters and principal place of business at 1208 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massa- chusetts, is supported by 100,000 sponsoring members living both within the U.S. and abroad. The United Methodist Law of the Sea Project is a non-membership group with offices at 100 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. The Wilderness Society's principal place of business is 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., and the group has a membership of approximately 50,000 persons. STATEMENT OF CLIFTON E. CURTIS, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY MS. ROBIN CHARLOW, LAW STUDENT Mr. Curtis. I am Clifton E. Curtis of the Center for Law and Social Policy, a public interest law firm located in Washington, D.C. Here at the table with me is Robin Charlow; a law student in our clinical program at the center who worked with me in prepara- tion of this testimony. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of 22 environmental/public interest groups. There is one additional group that signed on today, Capt. Jacques Cousteau’s organization, the Cousteau Society. They asked to be included and have endorsed the comments that I have put together. As I indicated, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the con- cerns of these 22 organizations, which I won’t list as they are stated in the prepared testimony, their concerns with respect to the disposal of radiological wastes in the marine environment. Those groups have a combined membership and sponsorship exceeding 5.5 million persons throughout the United States and abroad. Many of these groups have had a long history of active interest in the development of sound ocean and nuclear waste management poli- cies, both nationally and internationally. 485 The Center for Law and Social Policy has addressed issues relat- ed to the ocean disposal of radioactive waste on numerous occa- sions during recent years. In my prepared testimony I have set forth a number of those instances where we have been involved in both domestic and international activities. These hearings represent a useful contribution to the United States’ efforts to formulate sound and rational controls related to the potential disposal of radiological wastes in the oceans. I ap- plaud your decision in this intersessional period to convene these hearings and bring before this subcommittee the various agencies that are involved. I think there is this continuing need to try and bring out of the nooks and crannies of our different Government programs articulated public statements as to what is happening in programs that could have a significant influence on future activi- ties in this area. Mr. Stupps. Thank you. “Intersessional’”’ sounds much better than “lame duck.” I like that. [Laughter. ] Mr. Curtis. I tried to euphemistically deal with your problem. Finally, I indicated that the public airing of this country’s efforts is essential, given the national debate which is continuing over the appropriateness of nuclear technology, and that the public must be kept informed as to matters that affect the viability of continued reliance on the use of nuclear power. Waste disposal is certainly one of the critical issues. The recent citizen outcry over possible health and environmental hazards resulting from previous U.S. dumping operations off the California coast also illustrates the need for informing and involv- ing the public on these issues. Hearings held last month concerning the Farallon Islands radioactive waste dumping pointedly demon- strated how the Government’s failure to attend to the public had contributed significantly to the growing sense of alarm. In my prepared testimony I have set forth several generic consid- erations about the amount of dumping that has been done in the past, and projected dumpings according to some Department of Energy calculations. I will leave that as stated in my prepared testimony. I will state, though, orally, after putting into my prepared state- ment the description of how many cubic meters of low-level/high- level transuranic wastes and the metric tons of commercial spent fuel, I decided I would try to relate that to something more under- standable for me. So, looking at it in the context of football fields, we found that the low-level wastes, the 8 million cubic meters, if placed on a football field, would rise to almost a mile high, 4,375 feet. The transuranic wastes, if placed on a football field, would be about 457 feet high, this stack of wastes. And for the high-level wastes, a stack of waste material 175 feet high. At present there exists a consensus within the United States that the ocean alternative is not a viable disposal medium for high-level paclonchlye wastes. You have heard that in the testmony of others today. Similarly, ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes is not considered an environmentally or economically preferable disposal medium. However, as Bud Walsh indicated just a few moments 486 ago, absent highly acceptable land-based repositories, the oceans will receive increasing considerations as a disposal medium—if for no other reason than “out of sight, out of mind” limited constituen- cy appeal. There has been some discussion of the legality of high-level seabed emplacement. While there is some apparent disagreement within our Government as to the legality of seabed emplacement, my reading and the reading of those groups who signed on to this testimony, based primarily on my interpretation of the treaty and language therein, is that under the London Dumping Convention seabed emplacement is prohibited. Domestically, under the Ocean Dumping Act, it is the view that has been expressed here, as well as in the 1978 hearings before this subcommittee that seabed emplacement is prohibited. Some very preliminary work directed at assessing international and domestic legal issues associated with seabed emplacement of high-level waste is presently being done under DOE’s seabed dis- posal program. Under that SDP work schedule, DOE might recom- mend statutory changes in the early 1990’s of our domestic and international law to affirm the legality of seabed emplacement. Contrary to the implication of Congressman Forsythe’s question to DOE witness Sheldon Meyers, we agree with that scheduling. We believe that no changes in the controlling domestic and inter- national laws should be considered for the foreseeable future, since it would be premature to review such legal principles prior to determining that emplacement is environmentally and technically sound. Listed is a few concerns and recommendations in my prepared testimony. They are set out more fully there and I will briefly highlight them now. DOE’s seabed disposal program received funding of over $5 mil- lion in fiscal year 1980. In my prepared testimony I have shown the projection of funding for the next several fiscal years, which by 1986, if their budget request is granted, would be $32 million. The infusion of significant sums of money into the SDP raises several concerns about its current structure and activities. It is questionable whether sufficient cost and environmental compari- sons of land versus ocean options have been made. In my prepared testimony I have cited the London Dumping Convention; I have cited EPA’s domestic regulations, and made reference to another international set of negotiations involving incineration at sea, that showed the need to look at land versus ocean and the need to make the preferential judgment for land, unless you could show that it was more harmful than turning to the ocean. I think that type of comparison needs to be made now for seabed emplacement in more detail than it has. The second concern, it seems quite possible that no clear “stop- program” points will emerge as the SDP unfolds. Specific activities to be conducted under the four different phases of the SDP, as Dr. Charlie Hollister laid out, along with Rip Anderson earlier today, overlap in time, so that the phases themselves do not embody definitive program points. 487 Absence of such program segregation would hinder and could hinder accountability and review prior to commitment of addition- al money that might be unwarranted research and development. Another concern involves the systematic information exchange within the United States which we believe needs to be strength- ened in order to help coordinate the activities of the various agen- cies. Though DOE is currently formulating a memo of understand- ing with NOAA and with EPA, outlining their interrelationship of their seabed emplacement work there is no systematic consultation with or dissemination of information to other interested or affected agencies and outside groups—outside groups being peer review by scientists and the public, to the extent we believe it is needed. One example I have listed on page 10 of my prepared testimony of this lack of coordination involves technology transfers for pack- aging. Another concern involves interagency coordination. We believe that NOAA rather than DOE should be given the lead agency role for coordinating various non-regulatory ocean disposal program ac- tivities. This ties in to Public Law 95-273 which gives NOAA the lead agency role for monitoring research and development. To date, NOAA’s involvement in seabed emplacement issues has been limit- ed, as Bud Walsh indicated, and they have a mandate to look into six different issue areas. We believe it is critical that they be given the staff capability and resources to perform the kind of lead agency coordination role that I think properly should be housed within that agency. Another concern involves the perceived lack of communication and oversight in the seabed disposal area in international discus- sions. We think it would be appropriate to have some more regular interagency consultation than now exists on the seabed working group issues that have arisen and will continue to arise as future meetings are held. Finally, as_to high-level concerns, the public interest organiza- tions believe that an advisory committee on seabed emplacement should be established which would include participation of all these administrative agencies involved, the executive branch involve- ment, the particular CEQ, peer review by scientists, and outside representation by concerned public advocates. A public advisory committee would contribute toward assuring built-in neutrality, alleviating potential redundancy, coordinating efforts, personnel and facilities, and assessing and formulating U.S. policy on this issue. I think if I had to choose one of these concerns in the high-level area as being the most important, it would be this one, Chairman Studds, the need to set up a mechanism like this to have some outside involvement, with a program that—I don’t want to sound too critical, but I just think it’s a program that needs the kind of accountability that hearings such as this provide and that an advi- sory committee such as I have recommended could assist in provid- ing. Turning to low-level radioactive waste, which I recognize is not the primary focus of this hearing, but there has been considerable discussion of, in part because of Congressman Anderson’s concern about monitoring off the California coast, in my prepared testimo- 488 ny I have set forth the statutory bases that apply to low-level radioactive waste dumping under both the London Dumping Con- vention and the Ocean Dumping Act. I would like to very briefly address a few concerns in this area. EPA is currently developing regulations for issuance of low-level dumping permits and expects that site selection, packaging criteria and monitoring regulations will be completed by 1985. Bob Dyer and Roger Mattson of EPA went into this in more detail so I won’t repeat or go into what is contained in my prepared testimony. Internationally, the United States, under EPA’s leadership, has been an active participant in the consultative and intersessional meetings of the London Dumping Convention, and it continues to be a major force addressing environmental concerns. Through U.S. efforts, several provisos in the LDC have been written into law and agreed to by the contracting parties, provisions that would not have been there but for the U.S. efforts. The United States also participates in an NEA-sponsored pro- gram for overseeing the dumping of low-level wastes in the North- east Atlantic by certain European nations, and I believe was one of the leaders in suggesting and encouraging that a detailed monitor- ing program be created by the spring of 1981. One concern that the public. interest groups have with respect to low-level wastes is in the international area. We believe it is vital that the United States continue to take an active part in meetings and conferences, and in the development of multinational policies and procedures. There are a variety of areas that we set forth in the prepared testimony, concerns dealing with the IAEA and with the NEA, issues that we believe are important and require the attention of the various U.S. agencies. One issue that I did not mention in my prepared testimony that I would like to cite is the possible area for addressing what is an international concern, in the area of nuclear exports. I have repre- sented some environmental groups in the last several months con- cerning the expert of nuclear facilities to the Philippines. I think, in looking at the issue of compliance with a mechanism like the London Dumping Convention it might be that the United States could require of potential exporters of nuclear technology that the recipient nation be a signatory to the London Dumping Convention in order to be allowed to receive the technology that the United States has. It might be a way of at least raising the standard to a minimal level as set forth under the London Dumping Convention. Domestically, we believe that the policy regarding ocean dump- ing needs further clarification. Again in my prepared testimony I have cited a letter from EPA Administrator Doug Costle that just went out this past week to the Governor of the Northern Mariana Islands, in which I think appropriately Doug Costle stated that: Until we have a better understanding of the possible impacts of low-level radioac- tive waste disposal in the ocean, the United States will not encourage other nations to ocean dump. However, as some of your questions earlier today, Chairman Studds, have indicated, EPA’s present efforts to develop permit criteria lead to the impression that the United States may resume dumping. Prior to EPA’s compliance with its proposed permit regu- lations schedule, a U.S. policy decision, made not just by EPA but 489 by all the affected agencies and by the U.S. Congress, should be made as to whether it is appropriate or feasible to give such serious consideration to the use of the oceans as a low-level disposal medium. At a minimum, our international obligations regarding radioactive waste should be reflected in the general dumping regu- lations that EPA intends to issue next year, since we have already committed ourselves to those requirements. Another area of concern is the monitoring of past dumpsites. We would encourage EPA and NOAA in the very near future to reach adequate understandings concerning future monitoring activities. The specific arrangements could be set forth in a memorandum of understanding, but that would need to include specific site monitor- ing. Absent an adequate MOU, prepared, we believe, within the next several weeks at most, monitoring should be statutorily re- quired. In that vein, we could well agree with the kind of provi- sions set forth in Congressman Anderson’s bill, or something simi- lar. I’m not necessarily certain that NOAA is the appropriate place to house it. It may be more of a mixed relationship between NOAA and EPA than what is set forth in the bill. As a final recommendation, the public interest organizations believe that the current Ocean Dumping Coordinating Committee and the Ocean Dumping Advisory Committee, which address inter- national and domestic concerns respectively, need to be strength- ened. One point the Farallon Islands hearings made painfully apparent was the effect that lack of coordination and reluctance to take on responsibility by and among Federal agencies have had in creating delays and in contributing to public concerns. An advisory committee should be created, an advisory committee that contains the elements I suggested with respect to high-level should be set up. It should be much stronger than what now exists, and it should include all affected administrative agencies, peer review by outside scientists and members of the concerned public. Moreover, the systematic exchange of information amongst gov- ernment agencies and the public can only benefit the process that creates such an entity. The need for better cooperation of the Department of Defense was a major recurring theme at the Faral- lon Islands hearings. If you had such an advisory structure that brought them in as a participant, hopefully you would bring out of them a little more of the information we somehow have had trou- ble getting to date involving their activities and their proposed research. An article in the Boston Globe earlier this year talked about several million dollars of research being done by the Navy with respect to low-level waste research. I think other agencies could clearly benefit by that information to the extent it’s not classified. In my opinion, most of it should not be treated as classified. In conclusion, national policies that determine the manner in which we seek to preserve, protect, and utilize our vital marine resources must be rationally advanced, subjected to continuing and rigorous public review, and based on definitive environmental and technical studies that incorporate support activities on land. Until all these concerns have been met, there should be no serious 490 thought given to changing our present U.S. policy opposing ocean disposal or seabed emplacement of any radioactive wastes. Assuming these concerns are one day met, all the variables associated with a comprehensive nuclear waste management policy such as economic, social, environmental and political consider- ations, must then be factored into any decision concerning the ocean alternative. Thank you, Chairman Studds. I would be glad to answer any questions you or your staff might have. Mr. Stupps. Thank you, Mr. Curtis. I appreciate both your pa- tience and the kind of lengthy, detailed, and comprehensive testi- mony we have come to expect from your organization. I will not keep you long. Let me just ask you, on page 5 you state “there exists a consensus within the United States that the ocean alternative is not a viable disposal medium for high-level radioac- tive wastes.” Did you hear the Department of Energy’s testimony this morn- ing? They stated, and I quote, “At present subseabed disposal ap- pears to be a viable disposal option.” I assume this is a consensus minus the Department of Energy? Mr. Curtis. It may be semantics, Chairman Studds. It is not a viable medium at the moment. There may be experimentation and demonstration studies by the early 1990’s. It’s an option now that they’re looking at, not a medium that is being used. I may have not stated—— Mr. Stupps. Well, it wouldn’t be the first consensus from which the Department of Energy was missing. I just was wondering whether—— Mr. Curtis. No, I understand that the Department of Energy does see it as an option. Obviously, the fact that they are commit- ted or have committed close to $6 million reflects that. Mr. Stupps. That’s a mere nothing for them. Mr. Curtis. Overall in the waste management program it’s close to $225 million, so it is a drop in the bucket comparatively. But it’s growing quickly. Mr. Stupps. Yes; I wasn’t being entirely facetious. The last stat- ute which emerged from this subcommittee, signed into law a couple of months ago, was the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, for which the testimony was universally enthusiastic with the exception of the Department of Energy which mumbled incoherent- ly something about the next century. So they, as I say, are fre- quently missing from consensuses. Do you share the concern of some of us with regard to the current effort within EPA to proceed to promulgate or to devise, whatever they do over the years, prepare to promulgate regula- tions with respect to future low-level dumping? Does that bother you, or do you think that’s a sensible, rational fullfilling of their statutory responsibilities at this point? Mr. Curtis. It’s within the ambit of their statutory responsibil- ities. I have indicated in my testimony that I think we need a US. policy decision on whether or not the use of the ocean for low-level waste is appropriate. It’s not so much for environmental reasons in the 1970’s that they stopped dumping, although that clearly was a reason, but 491 economically, where shallow land burial was found to be less costly. I think they need to decide whether as a matter of policy the United States is going to look to the ocean for low-level wastes. That could well affect the need for regulations and the time-con- suming effort that that takes. That obviously would involve bring- ing into the discussion the Department of Navy and how serious it is about looking to the oceans as an alternative. I do think there was some discussion earlier about the require- ments, of maybe needing to emphasize monitoring more now than being involved with regulation writing. Title II of the Ocean Dump- ing Act does clearly require comprehensive monitoring programs be carried out, and they indicate it should be underway and set up within 6 months after the act was passed, which would have meant by spring of 1973. So obviously they have delayed somewhat in accomplishing that. I think that is the most important task that could be accom- plished now. Mr. Stupps. Finally, I gather you read the London Dumping Convention to prohibit the seabed emplacement of high-level waste, is that correct? Mr. Curtis. That’s correct. Mr. Stupps. And that reading, at least in your judgment and that of your attorneys, is unequivocal, unlike the judgment or the conflicting judgments you have heard from other Federal agencies today? Mr. Curtis. The judgment runs somewhat similar to that pre- sented through EPA’s Office of General Counsel, that they at- tached to their statement. In the preamble language to the London Dumping Convention, I would agree there’s a question as to whether ‘“‘at sea’ is the place to make the decision about whether or not it’s legal or illegal. That’s vague language and I don’t think you would find in the debate that led to the enactment of the LDC a discussion of seabed emplacement with respect to the use of those two words. But the preamble language also makes reference to United Na- tions General Assembly documents which do specifically mention the seabed, beneath its floor, and make references to that. Then taking it one step further, as did the State Department, if you look at the fact that even if it isn’t dumping, other activities have to not be contrary to the spirit of the London Dumping Convention and query whether seabed emplacement—unless you can be absolutely certain that it’s not going to leak into the marine environment— then it’s contrary to the spirit of the act which was set up to insure that radioactive wastes do not interfere with the marine environ- ment. So for that colloge of concerns that I have in looking at the LDC, I think it is an appropriate reason to say it’s illegal. Mr. Srupps. Thank you very much for your testimony. We do a ariwitn it. And we also appreciate your waiting as long as you id. Mr. Curtis. Thank you. ROSS Tan— (ah | 29) 492 Mr. Stupps. I am informed we have one final witness, a gentle- man who has apparently requested an opportunity to testify and has come all the way from California, Mr. Conrad Golich. We will be pleased to receive your testimony for the record, Mr. Golich. As I understand it, the staff has told you you may have 5 minutes. They’re yours. STATEMENT OF CONRAD F. GOLICH, CONSULTANT TO PROJECT TEKTITE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. Mr. Goticu. Thank you. I have presented a rather lengthy total statement here, but I will read only a short, three-page statement here to the committee and I will leave the reading of the rest of the material to you at a later time. Mr. Stupps. Very good. I appreciate that. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONARD F. GOLICH; CONSULTANT TO PROJECT TEKTITE INTRODUCTION I am Conrad F. Golich, a private consultant on radioactive waste management to Project Tektite, a San Francisco, California based non-profit educational and re- search organization concerned with the oceans. My technical background includes a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering and graduate work in industrial design from the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois. |I have approximately eight years experience as a systems engineer and technical writer for corporations in the aerospace industry on projects such as the Titan missile, the Agena satellite, nuclear submarine communications, and hydraulics for nuclear power plants. I have four years of experience involving the sujbect of radioactive waste manage- ment as a result of studying the Farallon Island radioactive waste dump site off the coast of San Francisco and adjacent to my home town on the coast of Marin County north of the city. Among other activities, I have testified in San Francisco at congressional hearings in 1976 and 1980 by the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the Committee on Government Operations, at hearings by the Federal Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management in 1978, and at the hearings held in this year by the Federal Radiation Council. PROBLEM Radioactive Waste management focuses on disposal methods in the Earth, space, and the oceans, and these hearings address themselves to the subject of ocean dumping of low and high level wastes in past, present, and future. Disposal methods follow the old approach of dispersion, which has now been replaced by the concept of concept of containment. Containment must also include retrievability to assure maximum safety for the entire planet. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is no “safe’’ place to dump any of the toxic wastes produced by our technological society. Dumping anywhere has to be cleaned up later, and only creates more contaminated waste to be dumped some- where else. Radioactive wastes can not be cleaned up by dumping them somewhere else where they will poison more of the environment. We must invent a method of neutralizing and transmuting and recycling all toxic wastes, especially radioactive ones which remain deadly for thousands of years. In the meantime, we must safely contain them so that they can be retrieved later when we have agreement on a correct long-term solution. Therefore, I will present a proposal for a safe, retriev- able, containment system that will buy us the time to design and implement a genuine solution to this crucial global problem. SOLUTION Project Tektite has received a proposal from the Marine Resources Company in Austin, Texas for a containment system that could be applicable to radioactive wastes already dumped onto the ocean floor, and that might provide a retrievable containment system for temporary storage in the ocean. This is particularly impor- tant in view of continued dumping around the globe, such as in the North Atlantic, and intentions by this country to dump high-level radioactive wastes in the ocean off Hawaii or Guam or elsewhere, and the intention by Japan to dump them in the ocean near there next year. 493 The proposed system utilizes electrodeposition of minerals in the sea water onto wire mesh structures by charging the wire with low-voltage, high amperage electric- ity. Within six months to a year, waste material could be cocooned with any size and thickness of a covering similar to mollusk shells such as clams and oysters. The resulting structures are stronger than concrete, impervious to sea water, last virtu- ally indefinitely, and can be repaired in place, if found necessary, by simply re- charging them with additional electricity. By making these covering mechanically retrievable, they could be removed at a later time if desired, or they might prove to be continuously safe and allowed to remain in place. Furthermore, it is theoretically possible that electromagnetic fields within the wire frame might provide a barrier to the radiation inside—no claims are made to this effect, but research is now being conducted by private experiments. Other benefits are possible, such as the fact that marine life seem to be attracted to the structures, and could create a new fishing ground in the area, and provide massive sources of protein to help solve the world food problem. Also, the activities entailed in testing this system, such as at the Farallon Island dump site, could produce many techniques and equipment essential to the development of ocean technology which is just beginning. This system is not merely a concept, but has been developed for some ten years, and actual demonstrations are functioning in the ocean now. The process is patent- ed, and considerable interest exists in numerous possible applications, and various technical journals and publications have presented information about it. Additional information is available from the Marine Resources Company and from Project Tektite. CONCLUSION The oceans of the world are a common resource for mankind, and should be utilized as a solution to global problems, and not as a convenient sewer for addition- al pollution. Out of sight, out of mind, is a throw-back to the dark ages, and is not appropriate to solving today’s problems as we approach the twentieth century. The technology of the space age must be applied to inner space in the oceans, as tektites come from the stars to the ocean floor. That is the mission of Project Tektite. I have appended these brief remarks with two previous statements made to the Government Operations Committee and the Interagency Review Group. Additional information is available on request. Thank you for your attention to my presenta- tion. STATEMENT MabDE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ON OCTOBER 7, 1980 INTRODUCTION My technical background includes a bachelors degree in Mechanical Engineering and graduate work in Industrial Design from the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois. I have approximately eight years experience as a systems engineer and technical writer for corporations in the aerospace industry on projects such as the Titan Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the Agena Satellite program, communi- cations equipment for nuclear submarines, and hydraulic sales engineering for nuclear power plants. I have been concerned about the Farallon Island radioactive waste disposal site since May of 1976, when the subject was first brought to public attention through a New York Times article which was reprinted in the San Francisco Chronicle. I subsequently alerted California State Senator Peter Behr to the situation, and he obtained Environmental Protection Document ORP 75-1 (1975) and IAEA-SM-207/ 65 which was presented at the “International Symposium on the Management of Radioactive Wastes from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle” in March of 1976. These were transmitted by me to Congressman John L. Burton in July of 1976, and he in turn arranged for the Congressional hearings held by this subcommittee in fall of that year, chaired by the late Congressman Leo J. Ryan. Tests made subsequently in 1976 and 1977 at the Farallon Islands by the Environmental Protection Agency were a direct result of the subcommittee hearings. In the four years since then, I have studied the question of radioactive waste management in general, and the situation at the Farallon Islands in particular. I have obtained and read numerous reports and documents on these matters, and have been personally responsible for much of the media publicity generated on the subject. Through the assistance of many private individuals and concerned public officials such as California State Assemblyman William Filante, Marin County Supervisor Barbara Boxer, San Francisco Supervisor Quentin Kopp, and Congress- man John Burton, we are once again faced with the problem of atomic wastes in the 494 ocean, and with their possible harmful impact on the health and safety of the people of the San Francisco bay area, the nation, and indeed all humanity. PROBLEM Much of the testimony that will be presented today to this subcommittee will address itself to the question of whether or not there is a problem at the dump site off the Farallon Islands. Expert testimony will claim or disclaim potential health hazards for humans who consume fish from the local area. I will leave the argu- ments about the significance of these facts to others more qualified to discuss them. However, recent information has been released to the public about some fifty dump sites on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, locations on the west coast from Mexico to Canada, air drops from military airplanes at undetermined locations, scuttled ships from atomic bomb testing now lying off San Diego, radioactive levels in locally caught fish, ruptured barrels and concrete blocks that were never intend- ed to maintain structural integrity, and health problems in humans exposed to supposedly harmless testing in Utah, and military personnel exhibiting unexpected diseases from exposure to atomic bomb testing. It seems obvious that elaborate assurances of safety from the laboratories who dumped their garbage at the Faral- lons and elsewhere will not suffice in the face of the growing evidence of long-term and potentially lethal poisioning of the oceans. It also seems absurd to suggest that these hearings are concerned with matters that are “trivial” and “insignificant” as has been reported by media accounts of researchers from the source of the problem that we must deal with. Therefore, I will present some data on potential solutions that should be implemented as soon as possible. SOLUTION As a result of my research and my attendance at various governmental hearings on nuclear waste management, it is apparent that “official” federal efforts are being directed towards disposal of radioactive wastes in the earth, space, or oceans. Numerous scientific studies (referred to in the appendix to this statement) indicate that none of these approaches are acceptable from a primary standpoint of environ- mental safety. From my experience as a systems engineer, I have determined that another entire method of dealing with these toxic materials is now available, but has been virtual- ly ignored. Specifically, I refer to what has been termed, ‘‘transmutation”. It in- volves procedures that recycle radioactive substances into inert material, with the potential release of extremely large amounts of safe, useable energy. This approach has been given almost no mention in federal waste management discussions and documents, and is currently receiving little, if any, funding. Dr. Edward Teller, the well-known expert in the nuclear field, has said that if we bury atomic wastes now, we may have to mine them in years to come to utilize their vast energy potential. I believe that for scientific, legal, and political reasons, disposal of radioactive materials in the earth, air, or water, will prove to be unsafe, and impossible to implement successfully. Therefore, it is necessary to direct our efforts to invent and carry out methods of deactivating and neutralizing atomic wastes. This will prob- ably require large scale research and funding, on the order of the original Manhat- tan Project, to solve the global problem of what to do with some five billion gallons of deadly posion. With respect to the question of radioactive wastes already in our oceans, I suggest that attention be given to a method recently discussed in the IEEE Journal of Oceanic Engineering, July 1979, Volume OE-4, Number 3, (ISSN 0364-9059), “Elec- trodeposition of Minerals in Sea Water, Experiments and Applications’ by Dr. W. H. Hilbertz (page 94). The subject is also presented in the March/April 1980 issue of NEXT magazine. Dr. Hilbertz, of the Marine Resources Company (2812 Hemphil Park, Austin, Texas 78705, 512-478-7164) has developed a method of creating artifi- cial structures in the ocean that might be used to contain radioactive wastes already on the oean floor. On page 62 of the NEXT article, it says that: “Fortunately, others are beginning to see merit in Hilbertz’s basic idea, and some are actually experimenting. At the State University of New York’s Department of Material Science and Engineering at Stony Brook, the department head, Dr. Herbert Herman, is growing structures in aquariums and outdoors in water taken from Long Island Sound. Dr. Herman is enthusiastic. ‘* * * You can use it perhaps to cocoon disposed waste you don’t want to leach out. Possible nuclear waste. We're testing the material’ s reaction to radi- ation in seawater by bombarding it with gamma rays.’ Although his experiments are in the early stages, Dr. Herman is very optimistic.” 495 CONCLUSION Radioactive waste management has been called a problem of centuries. I hope that these hearings will prove to be a step in the direction towards a solution to one of the most important and dangerous situations facing all of mankind. I hope that I have been able to suggest some possible answers for your consideration. I have appended to this statement, a report made to the federal government’s “Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management’. Additional data from my extensive files on this subject will be supplied to this committee on its request. Thank you for your attention to these remarks. 496 497 STATEMENT MApE BEFORE THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT ON AuGusT 3, 1978 SUMMARY The Farallons Islands Radioactive Waste Disposal site near San Francisco pro- vides a prime example of the radioactive waste problem facing the world today. Nuclear Waste Management in this country focuses on permanent disposal methods in the Earth, the Oceans, and in Space. Available technical data indicates that all of oe methods are now unacceptable from a primary consideration of environmental safety. Instead, management should be directed to cease further production of such long- lived and deadly poisonous wastes, and to acquire a scientific method of deactivation of radioactive substances. Public input must be utilized by means of extensive information, education, debate, and voting on the basic questions involved. Public monies must be trans- ferred from continued pollution to safe solutions. INTRODUCTION The Farallons Islands Radioactive Waste Disposal site lies some 22 miles offshore of my home town in Marin County, just north of San Francisco California. Under approximately six thousand feet of water, lie nearly 50,000 metal drums and 150 concrete blocks containing some of this country’s first radioactive wastes from as early as the nineteen-forties. They contain irriadiated organic materials such as discarded laboratory clothing and experimental animal remains, and parts of dis- carded prototype reactors, respectively. As a result of three years of investigation, some facts have emerged which bear directly on the question of nuclear waste disposal in the oceans, and on the overall nuclear waste problem. While a discussion of the moral, political, social, economic, and legal aspects of nuclear weapons and energy is essential to an overall solution to this global problem, my technical background leads me to a problem solving approach. The Nuclear Problem invokes such scientific controversy and political hysteria, that we must attempt to achieve some concensus based on commonly agree upon principles. Consequently, I will base my discussion on existing information in the public and private sectors. Hopefully, as scientists are fond of saying, “the facts speak for themselves.” Included in this submittal are a number of reprints from San Francisco bay area newspapers. (See Appendix A) They show some of the media response to the studies made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the Farallons in the last few years. In addition, references will be made to government and other documents to substantiate observations and conclusions made in this report. The definitive report at the Interagency Review Group (IRG) hearings in July 1978 in San Francisco was the U.S. Department of Energy draft “Report of Task Force for Review of Nuclear Waste Management, February 1978” (DOE/ER-0004/D), the “Deutch report.” It states in the Overview (page 2) that “Public health and safety must be the primary consideration, and the policy and programs must be credible to and accepted by the American public.” And under Fundamental Princi- ples (page 5), Design Criteria, it reaffirms that “The paramount consideration should be safety.” I completely agree with these statements, and will confine this discussion to the question of safety as it pertains to the Farallons, the oceans, and nuclear wastes in general. The Deutch report also says that “The emphasis of this report is on the ultimate disposal of these wastes.” For reasons have to do with safety, I do not agree with this premise, as will e fully explained in the following discussion. THE FARALLONS FISH STORY First then, is the specific example of the Farallons Islands ocean dump site. It is obvious to all that, in retrospect, it was a bad idea. Done under security conditions, the operations took place before much data about low-level radiation hazards was available. The ordinary 55-gallon drums ruptured by implosion, some immediately, and the concrete blocks’ materials have leached into the water. Consequently, radioactivity has contaminated the ocean floor under the islands’ National Wildlife Sanctuary, amidst abundant marine life, and in the immediate proximity to a major metropolitan area. An extensive analysis of this situation is contained in Appendix B to this report. The crux of the matter, however, is possible danger to public safety from any retention of radioactivity in the marine environment, which could lead to contami- nation in seafood consumed by humans. At Congressional hearings in San Francisco in 1976 (Government Operations, Conservation, Energy, and Natural Resources subcommittee), EPA officials said that there was “probably no uptake’”’ of radioactiv- 498 ity in the local fish. However, in 1977, the State of California's Health Department, Radiological Health Section, detected Cesium 137 in samples taken from a Berkeley local fish market. And in 1978, the EPA tests at the Farallons site confirmed the State of Califor- nia’s findings. According to a Lawrence Livermore Laboratories report of January 6, 1978 (Radionuclides in the Marine Environment Near the Farallons Islands, UCRL- 52381), approximately twice the amounts noted in the State of California tests were found in Red Rock Cod caught near the Farallons Islands. Lawrence, formerly known as Radiation rather than Livermore, incidentally, is one of the orginal sources of the materials which were dumped at the site. The report, prepared under contract with the U.S. Energy Research & Development Administration, has been made public, but the EPA has not yet issued one. It is expected to basically substantiate the LLL document. Essentially, the LLL report attributes the local contamination to global fallout from the sixties, since tests from the Chicago fish markets have about the same amounts of radioactivity. This is claimed, despite clear evidence in a previous EPA report that Cesium and Plutonium in a core sample of the ocean floor contained concentrations which ‘“‘exceed the expected fallout range’’ (made to the Internation- al Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, March 1976, [AEA-SM-207/65). One explanation is a “very low-level manifestation of transport or radioactive contamination from an area other than at Station 183A ....” That the source may be from the 150 concrete blocks at the Farallons is suggested by an extensive discussion on page 10 and 11 of the same report, about Cesium 137 leaching from containers at the Atlantic 2800 meter dumpsite. However, when an average person looks at the color photographs of the bottom- feeding red fish next to a ruptured barrel filled with irradiated dead animals (EPA Operations Report, ORP-75-1), no amount of “official explanation” will suffice to dispel obvious concern about possible contamination in the food chain to humans. This is especially so, since Cesium 137 is some “7-15 times )greater” (in potential hazard) “than from Strontium 90.” It is absorbed through the stomach into the blood stream, and then into the bone marrow where it causes leukemia—cancer of the blood. (Appendix B contains copies of correspondence with the California State Department of Health and of the documents referenced therein.) Finally, I and two other local scientists agree that the recent EPA tests at the Farallons must be considered inadequate and superficial, since they did not throughly monitor the local abalone, clams, oysters, and mussels, which are known to bioconcentrate radioactivity by a factor of ten to one. In addition to local con- sumption, oysters are grown commercially in Pt. Reyes Station, a nearby local community in the heart of a National Seashore visited by thousands of tourists annually. Meanwhile, increasing argumentation continues in scientific circles about the potential dangers of accumulating even low-level radiation over time spans as long as thirty years (Goffman, Sternglass, and others). The general concensus, however, seems to be that no amount of radioactivity can be guaranteed safe because of its uncertain effects on long-term genetics in plants, animals, and humans. Hence, the cessation of ocean dumping by this country in the sixties based on the change in the then Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) philosophy from dispersion to containment in its disposal methods. Casting doubts on the overall effectiveness of the EPA’s ability to monitor, under- stand, or control risks to public health from radiation sources is a Government Accounting Office report (described by the media as “scathing”), CED-78-27 of January 20, 1978. While the DOE may call safety its primary criteria, the facts are that “Of all EPA programs, radiation protection is the least funded” (from GAO report, Digest). The bottom line of our Federal policy on radiation safety seems to be “all talk and no money.” ADDITIONAL OCEAN DUMPING Dissatisfaction with the EPA handling of the Farallons problem led me to suspect the surveys had a primary purpose of preparation for consideration of renewed ocean dumping by this country. Obviously, an existing low-level radiation dumpsite cannot be admitted to be unsafe, if additional dumping of high-level waste is to have any credibility. Also, it could lead to embarassing political conflict with Great Britain, which is currently the largest source of continued ocean dumping of Euro- pean low-level radioactive wastes. The total amount dumped by seven countries is approximately three times the curies disposed of by the United States in the ocean before we stopped doing it here in the nineteen-sixties. In fact, Mr. Robert S. Dyer, who was in charge of the Farallons surveys in 1977 and 1978, has said: “For certain classes of radioactive wastes, ocean dumping onto the ocean floor, under carefully controlled conditions, may offer an environmentally 499 acceptable technique . . .” And, at the outset of the 1977 effort, he said, “We need to learn how long the drums will last, and how to improve the packages.” While omitting tests on the shelled seafood, and failing to retrieve a new kind of giant sponge which grows on the Farallons barrels, the EPA did manage to recover one intact drum. This was sent to Brookhaven National Laboratories to aid in designing a new, so-called approved container—an obvious prelude to more ocean dumping. These suspicions are confirmed by a June 30, 1978 Office of Science and Technol- ogy Policy (OSTP) draft report. It describes a seven-million dollar study started in 1974 by the Federal Government in conjunction with Sandia Corporation and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. And the results of this work is contained in a seventy-page issue of Oceanus magazine from Woods Hole, Volume 20, Number 1, Winter 1977, entitled ‘(High-level Nuclear Wastes in the Seabed?” The topics included in the contents are: “Burying Faust, Disposing of High-Level Radioactive Waste, The Seabed Option, Barriers to Radioactive Migration, Physical Processes in Deep-Sea Clays, Abyssal Communities and Radioactive waste Disposal, and Seabed Emplacement and Political Reality.’ From the first subject, an editorial, reference is made to what is regarded by some as “the Faustian nature of the disposal bargain—present advantage in return for liability stretching millenia into the future.’’ The editor also says that “We have not solved ... the problem of permanent disposal ... Where? . . . there is disagreement among the experts.” And, “Terrestrial disposal may prove feasible or it may not. The search for alternatives is on, some of it at sea. Several scientists have spent the past three years (1974-1977) investigating the sub-seabed in certain deeps. . . . They do not now advocate emplacement of high-level radioactive wastes in those abyssal clays, but they have not encountered anything that would automatically rule out such disposal. ... We are surrounded by poisons of our own making, some extremely dangerous and long lived. We have not dealt with them well, witness our belated awakening to the threat of ‘environmentally caused’ cancers. Perhaps radioactive waste, with its almost archetypal ability to inspire fear, can sharpen our sensing of reality.” In “The Seabed Option” (page 25), Mr. Hollister of Woods Hole says that “there appears to be no scientific or technical reason to abandon the seabed disposal concept at this time.” This is claimed despite the admission (page 31) that “It is assumed that the canister will develop cracks or leaks after a few hundred years.” And, “. . . the waste elements must not be allowed to escape from the seabed for a million years.” On page 27, the canister is described: “When newly filled, such canisters will give off 10 to 30 kilowatts of heat as well as radiation so intense that anyone foolish enough to spend even a second at a distance of 3 feet from the canister would be exposed to as much radiation as the NRC presently permits people working with radioactive materials to receive during their entire lifetimes.” And, “Their (Sandia Laboratories) best estimate at present is that material capable of confining the wastes for a few thousand years can be found, if reasonable temperature levels are maintained (not greater than 200 degrees Centigrade). Again, this is far from the minimum of a million years of total containment that is needed.”’ He (Mr. G. Ross Heath) concludes that “The gaps in our knowledge considerably exceed the facts in hand when it comes to deciding whether High-Level wastes can be safely contained in the seabed of the deep ocean.” Once again we are being asked to rely on hopeful expectations that future designs will deliver us from our continued creation of the problem today. In the same report (page 40), Mr. Arnold J. Silva of the University of Rhode Island says “At this stage of the program, we do not know whether the unlithified sediments of the deep seabed form an effective barrier to contain high-level wastes.” (After they have leaded from the breached 100-year canisters . . .) With respect to environmental impact, Hessler of Scrips Institute and Jumass of the University of Washington say (page 46): “The fauna (involving the abyssal bottom) is likely to be sensitive to minor environmental perterbations, and would require a very long time to recover. Nor is its isolation so complete as to preclude the possibility of biological transfer of harmful substances if radionuclide leakage were to accidentally occur. . . . the amount of available data on the deep-sea community is very small, much too small to form a sufficient base for such an important conclusion. .. . To date, nothing is known about the ways in which deep- sea organisms will respond to exposure to radionuclides.” It appears that Mr. Hollister’s optimism is not substanciated by other data further along in the same Oceanus report. Despite the above scientific unsolved problems, Congress was told at a Merchant Marine and Fisheries subcommittee hearing (May 15, 1978) that the DOE and the NRC feel ocean disposal of nuclear wastes deserves continued investigation. Sheldon Meyers, director of material safety for the NRC, said the commission staff is beginning preliminary work to assess the risk of seabed disposal. He said it is an 500 “intriguing concept” .. . James L. Liverman, acting assistant secretary of energy for environment, said the department’s study of samples from the ocean floor turned up “no surprises which would preclude the use of the sediments as a confinement medium.” (Associated Press, May 16, 1978). Aside from the obvious fact that a four-year, seven-million-dollar research pro- gram is hardly “preliminary work,” I simply do not understand how deadly radioac- tive canisters that leak into an unknown environment containing very sensitive life forms can be considered an “intriguing concept.” Perhaps as a plot for another Hollywood science-fiction horror movie, but certainly not as a viable program which considers safety as a paramount consideration. And where does this latest ‘‘mad scientist” syndrome suggest is the best location for “ultimate disposal?” Six hundred miles north of Hawaii! “Plutonium Pollution in Paradise’ might be a successful movie title, but as reality, it seems more like a nuclear nightmare to a common sense engineer like myself. Clifton E. Curtis testified on July 11, 1978, at those same committee hearings on behalf of some three million people in numerous environmental groups around the nation and the world. While his emphasis was on legal aspects of the problem (he represents the Center for Law and Social Policy), his conclusion ends with the clear statement that “Regarding radioactive waste that might be dumped on or beneath the ocean floor, the necessary research activities have barely begun. Given the extremely hazardous nature of radioactive wastes, their disposal into our oceans is fraught with potentially irreparable consequences. Absent convincing research that such adverse consequences will not occur, the current U.S. policy (dating back to 1970) that prohibits the use of the oceans for the dumping of radiological wastes must be maintained.” (Emphasis mine.) SPACE AND GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL If seabed disposal does not “provide reasonable assurance that there is no signifi- cant threat to public health and safety (Deutch report, fundamental principles), what other options are there? Fortunately, no serious consideration (to my knowledge) has been given to an- other science fiction concept of sending rockets loaded with radioactive garbage into deep space or, God forbid, into the sun. Rocket firings are not totally reliable, and accidents could contaminate large areas of the population. And even eagerness to get nuclear power plants off the waste disposal hook, cannot justify tampering with the unknown processes of our local star upon which all Earth life depends. There obviously is no way to predict accurately what the long-range consequences might be, and we only have one test model which is not replaceable, the sun. Now then, if the sea and the sky are unacceptable safe places for radioactive waste disposal, then all that is left is the land. But where on land, and in whose back yard will it be accepted as safe? New York voters and California voters have recently said emphatically, “not ours.’ And English and Japanese governments don’t have sufficient land of their own, and so must return their wastes back to the U.S.A. where they came from. Aside from the political question of State approval (or veto) for locating a Federal depository, is geological disposal a currently viable option? See Appendix C which covers the following discussion. Both of these questions are addressed in the 9 June 1978 issue of Science maga- zine. The title says it all: “Nuclear Wastes: The Science of Geologic Disposal Seen as Weak.” While Federal agencies such as ERDA have declared that the only problems are “straightforward technology and engineering development,” the article says “It comes as a surprise, therefore, to discover now that there seems to be an emerging consensus among earth scientists familiar with waste disposal problems, that the old sense of certitude was misplaced. Although these scientists continue to find the concept of geologic disposal attractive intuitively, some are stating explicitly that the scientific feasibility of the concept remains to be established.” And “. . . ac- knowledgment that a secure scientific foundation for geologic disposal is still lack- ing, points to an important milestone in official deliberations over radioactive waste management.” “,. . five USGS scientists observed: . . . some key geologic questions are unan- swered, and answers are needed before the risk associated with geologic contain- ment can be confidently evaluated . . . interactions are not well understood, and this lack of understanding contributes considerable uncertainty to evaluations of the risk of geologic disposal of high-level waste . . .” (See also the Department of the Interior news release of May 2, 1978: ‘‘scientists conclude that a number of potential geologic stumbling blocks must first be dealt with.’’) “A panel of eminent earth scientists which has made an evaluation for EPA of the state of knowledge relevant to geologic disposal has put the matter much more strongly. “. . . We are surprised and dismayed to discover how few relevant data 501 are available on most of the candidate rock types even 30 years after wastes began to accumulate from weapons development. These rocks include granite types, ba- salts, and shales. Furthermore, we are only just now learning about the problem of water in salt beds, and the need for careful measurements of water in (salt) domes.” The Science article concludes with the following: “In light of the consensus that seems to be emerging, that the present waste program lacks a sure scientific footing, some surprising developments may be in the offing. There could, for instance, be some deemphasis of salt as the preferred geologic medium in favor of a broader and deeper investigation of the available alternatives. These might even include an examination of such nonconventional approaches as disposal of wastes in super-deep holes and emplacement in the deep seabed.” Well, disposal in super-deep holes is covered in Appendix C of the OSTP draft report of 3 July 1978. It says, ‘At least ten years of R & D with a level of several millions of dollars per year, would be required to develop this proposed concept to a level that would warrant a demonstration with radioactive wastes.’ This means, of course, that the safety question is at least ten years away from being tested. And, ‘emplacement in the deep seabed’’ brings us back to “square one,” which has previously shown to be currently unacceptable from the view of safety. So we are faced with the dilemma of leaking and overcrowded storage facilities now, that need replacement based on another decade of continued research with uncertain results even then. At this point in the discussion, it can be clearly seen that the safety problem of nuclear waste disposal in the ocean, the sky, or the land, is unsolved. This fact is the basis of California’s moratorium on additional nuclear power plant construction. It is also the basis for a Congressional committee’s similar recommendation that: “3. Congress and the executive branch should consider requiring that further licenses for nuclear powerplant construction be conditioned upon the timely and satisfactory resolution of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel permanent disposal and storage problems.” (Nuclear Power Costs, Committee on Government Operations, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee, Leo J. Ryan, Califor- nia, Chairman.) ALTERNATIVES TO DISPOSAL Aside from its scientific uncertainties, the entire “disposal’’ approach to nuclear waste management violates an obvious common sense observation that disposal will never yield a truly safe solution. There is no place to safely “hide” radioactivity, even though it is invisible. And the only acceptable safety, when we are dealing with the survivial of all life on Earth, is ‘zero errors,” not so-called “scientific” guestimates about radioactive behavior over a million years based on 30 years of actual experience. And the whole emerging story about long-term health and genetic hazards from even low-level radiation suggests an imminent world-wide cancer epidemic on hu- manity’s doorstep. (Dr. Helen Caldecot, of Australia, has documented this situation, and it is included in Appendix D herein.) We have fouled our own nest with deadly poisons, and seeking to ‘dispose’ of our wastes is akin to sweeping them under the rug or throwing them overboard. Unfor- tunately, radioactivity, like the feared ‘““monkey’s paw,” has an incredible way of “migrating,” as scientists say, back into the plant, fish, animal, and human environ- ment. (If Plutonium sounds bad, be prepared for a shock when you read the effects of Americium which uptakes readily into the plant kingdom. Finally, mere “disposal” methods are an attempt to lock the gate after the nuclear nightmare has already escaped and spread radioactive pollution into the land, the seas, and the atmosphere. The day of reckoning is at hand. For even if a miracle occurred today—with world peace achieved, nuclear arms dismantled, and all radioactive production halted—the wastes we already have produced might still kill all life on planet Earth. It is absolutely imperative that some alternatives must be sought which are not based on a fatally illusionary “out-of-sight, out-of-mind” disposal decision. The “genie must be put back into the bottle,” (or the devil back into the pit, if you prefer), if true safety is to be accomplished. Of course, this general approach smacks of the impossible. But if we are better off safe than sorry (or worse, doomed), then necessity must surely be the mother of invention in this case. And invention by definition, accomplishes the impossible. After all, it was Archimedes, not the poets, politicians, priests, or businessmen, who invented the solution to a Roman fleet that outnumbered the Greek town ten to one. Not one Roman ever reached shore from their burning ships. 502 DEACTIVATION With certainty, rather than so-called ‘‘reasonable assurances” of safety in mind, what must be sought is some method of deactivating radioactivity. Recycling wastes by methods such as breeder reactors does not neutralize the radioactivity—in fact, they produce more than they consume. Moreover, the nuclear weapons proliferation aspect of breeders has resulted in a Presidential veto over use of these devices. Very little information on deactivation is available from some two years of personal investigation into the radioactive waste problem. Transmutation is a little known and strictly experimental concept, and is given only casual mention in all of the literature surveyed. A discussion held with an Arizona State Senator indicated that Sandia has attempted some research on a method of neutralization with no known results. Fusion is conceivably a basic physics answer to new energy that might be applied to a deactivation system. However, a breakthrough in this research is still consid- ered to be decades away, if ever. Furthermore, there is apparently a monumental argument raging among top nuclear physicists between Plasma Fusion and Migma Fusion (June 1978, New Times magazine). The first method follows a process devised by the Russians, is well funded by Federal millions, has only a 10 percent rate of energy return, and involves radioac- tive Tritium waste products. It is not expected to yield practical results for many years, although many scientists are trying. The second is essentially a solo effort by a brilliant but eccentric Yugoslav named Maglich, who claims to have a 3 to 1 energy output to input ratio. It does not have any radioactive byproducts, and involves high intensity magnetism to contain and bend a beam of particles to fuse after collision. Unfortunately, full data disclosure has been requested by, but refused to, an interested environmental organization. His continuation is currently funded by Arab oil interests (whose efforts to monopolize the world uranium market are now well known), who may wish to hedge their bets on energy control. Mr. Maglich displays photos of both Tito and Carter in his office just down the road from his Plasma Fusion proponents, who believe his efforts to be totally in error. Some research has been done on utilization of the Earth’s electromagnetic field as an energy source and as a possible method of counteracting nuclear radioactivity. Nicholas Tesla did extensive research in Earth fields to achieve wireless transmis- sion of electrical power. Some mystery surrounds the exact nature of his results, if any, including stories of government confiscation of his records following his death in New York. Dr. Wilhelm Reich had “Orgone” theories, including a pamphlet entitled “The Anti-Nuclear Radiation Effect of Cosmic Orgone Energy.” He ended up dying in a Federal prison after conflicts with the medical profession, and his books were burned by the government. Aside from their medical validity (he claimed a cure for radiation sickness), his ideas might provide some clues to radioac- tive solutions. They should be reexamined in the light of today’s needs, away from the “witch-hunting” mood of the McCarthy era of the fifties. Patrick Flannagan, another eccentric genius, has promoted the values of “pyramid power” as some new energy source. All of these approaches however, have been shunned by official scientific circles as impossible or simply incorrect. It is classic in science, of course, for the lone wolf heretic to be proven eventually correct, only to be the founder of yet another following of true believers who now profess the “new” irrefutable truth. Nonewithstanding current scientific resistance to what Dr. C. G. Jung called “non-causal reality,’ new evidence is rapidly being discovered by researchers in what might be termed bio-physical and Earth magnetics. It appears that the Rus- sians have far surpassed this country in such efforts, although national security efforts probably preclude much public information on these matters. In any event, hundreds of millions of our tax dollars are being expended to produce deadly radioactivity, and to perpetuate the maladjustment with huge accu- mulations of undisposable wastes. Surely some of the money being expended to produce the problem could be used to fund a serious, objective, scientific inquiry into how to clean up our nuclear pollution machines. RECOMMENDATIONS I cannot help but think of the similarity of the nuclear dilemma to the “Electra” airplane problem of the late fifties. I first flew in one as a newly graduated engineer 503 on the way to my first out-of-town interview. The vibrations and noise in the cabin between the wings was so loud and irritating, that I was forced to sit in the tail section to avoid it somewhat. I could not help feeling that something was obviously drasticaly wrong mechanically. Shortly thereafter, the wings started falling off in flight, causing seveal fatal crashes. At that point, there was only one safe answer to the problem, they were all grounded indefiniately. Only after extensive redesigning, were they allowed to resume flying. If safety is truly our prime consideration about radioactive hazards, then the facts available today require that we must adopt the following: 1. Halt immediately all land and ocean dumping of any radioactive wastes. 2. Halt all further production of nuclear power plants and weaponry. 3. Phase out existing nuclear power production as soon as possible. Consisting of only 13 percent of our nation’s electrical energy mix, it can be readily replaced by a combination of conservation, existing fossil fuels, and adequately funded renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass conversion. 4, Design and construct as soon as possible (from two to five years), an interim (fifty to one hundred years to buy us precious time), maximum retrievable, below- ground storage facility for all low- and high-level radioactive wastes. 5. Initiate and implement, as soon as possible, remedial health measures to combat our massively expanding radiation-caused cancer and genetic damage to untold future generations. Certain substances have already proven effective in removing radioactivity from the human body. (Appendix D) 6. Redirect public funds from 2. and 3. above to develop ecological technologies (“Ecology”), and to investigate and create a method of deactivating deadly radioac- tivity. CONCLUSIONS In the final analysis, the nuclear question in general, and radioactive wastes specifically, is too important to be left up to politicians, agencies, or corporations alone. It is a matter for decision of, by, and for the people. This could best be accomplished by a nation-wide referendum equally funded to both sides of the controversy by a Federal tax check-off, as is now done with Presidential elections. More immediately, the lesson of California’s Proposition 13 should not be lost on the elected and appointed representatives of ‘we, the people.” The nuclear arms race and the radioactive poisoning of our planet proves that existing government policy does not work. Unless our representatives listen to simple sanity, “No nukes, or no money’ will be the bottom line. It can manifest as a tax-payers’ revolt at the Federal income tax level. Or it can be the campaign slogan to elect an environmen- tal safety conscious House of Representatives in this fall’s coming elections. The noes constitutionally originates bills of revenue, and as the saying goes, “cash is ng. It is ironic that our civilization should be faced with extinction of our own making at the same time that we reach for the stars and imortality. I hope that I have been able to defuse to some extent the mood of confrontation on the nuclear question, and shed some light on possible areas of co-operation towards mutual safety and survival. After all, the lives we save will be our own and our future generations of children. Wake-up America, it is our spiritual destiny to show the way. And, “where there is a will, there is a way.” Put the “us” back in the USA. Mr. Goticn. I am Conrad Golich, a private consultant on radioac- tive waste management to Project Tektite, a San Francisco based nonprofit educational and research organization concerned with the oceans. My technical background includes a bachelors degree in me- chanical engineering and graduate work in industrial design from the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago. I have approximately 8 years experience as a systems engineer and technical writer for corporations in the aerospace industry on projects such as the Titan missile, the Agena satellite, nuclear submarine communica- tions, and hydraulics for nuclear powerplants. I have 4 years of experience involving the subject of radioactive waste management as a result of studying the Farallon Island radioactive waste dumpsite off the coast of San Francisco, and 504 gevecent to my hometown on the coast of Marin County, north of the city. Among other activities, I have testified in San Francisco at con- gressional hearings in 1976 and 1980 by the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the Committee on Government Operations, at hearings by the Federal Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management in 1978, and at hearings held in this year by the Federal Radiation Council. Radioactive waste management focuses on disposal methods in the Earth, space, and the oceans, and these hearings address them- selves to the subject of ocean dumping of low and high level wastes in past, present, and future. Disposal methods follow the old approach of dispersion, which has now been replaced by the concept of containment. Containment must also include retrievability to assure maximum safety for the entire planet. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is no safe place to dump any of the toxic wastes produced by our technological society. Dumping anywhere has to be cleaned up later, and only creates more contaminated waste to be dumped somewhere else. Radioactive wastes cannot be cleaned up by dumping them some- where else where they will poison more of the environment. We must invent a method of neutralizing and transmuting and recy- cling all toxic wastes, especially radioactive ones which remain deadly for thousands of years. In the meantime we must safely contain them so that they can be retrieved later when we have agreement on a correct long-term solution. Therefore, I will present a proposal for a safe, retrievable, containment system that will buy us the time to design and imple- ment a genuine solution to this crucial global problem. Project Tektite has received a proposal from the Marine Re- sources Co. in Austin, Tex. for a containment system that could be applicable to radioactive wastes already dumped onto the ocean floor, and that might provide a retrievable containment system for temporary storage in the ocean. This is particularly important in view of continued dumping around the globe, such as in the North Atlantic, and intentions by this country to dump high-level radioactive wastes in the ocean off Hawaii or Guam or elsewhere, and the intention by Japan to dump them in the ocean near there next year. The proposed system utilizes electrodeposition of minerals in the sea water onto wire mesh structures by charging the wire with low voltage, high amperage electricity. Within 6 months to a year, waste material could be cocooned with any size and thickness of a covering similar to mollusc shells such as clams and oysters. The resulting structures are stronger than concrete, impervious to sea water, last virtually indefinitely, and can be repaired in place, if found necessary, by simply recharging them with additional elec- tricity. By making these coverings mechanically retrievable, they could be recovered at a later time if desired, or they might prove to be continuously safe and allowed to remain in place. Furthermore, it is theoretically possible that electromagnetic fields within the wire frame might provide a barrier to the radi- 505 ation inside. No claims are made to this effect, but research is now being conducted by private experiments. Other benefits are possible, such as the fact that marine life seems to be attracted to the structures, and could create a new fishing ground in the area and provide massive sources of protein to help solve the world food problem. Also, the activities entailed in testing this system such as at the Farallon Island dumpsite could provide many techniques and equipment essential to the development of ocean technology which is just beginning. This system is not merely a concept, but has been developed for some 10 years, and actual demonstrations are functioning in the ocean now. The process is patented, and considerable interest exists in numerous possible applications, and various technical journals and publications have presented information about it. Additional information is available from the Marine Resources Co. and from Project Tektite. In conclusion, the oceans of the world are a common resource for mankind and should be utilized as a solution to global problems and not as a convenient sewer for additional pollution. “Out of sight, out of mind” is a throwback to the Dark Ages. It is not appropriate to solving today’s problems as we conclude the 20th century. The technology of the space age must be applied to inner space in the oceans, as tektites come from the stars to the ocean floor. That is the mission of Project Tektite. I have appended these brief remarks with two previous state- ments made to the Government Operations Committee and the Interagency Review Group. Additional information is available on request. Thank you for your attention to my presentation. Mr. Stupps. Mr. Golich, I thank you very much, both for your patience and your willingness to be as concise as you were. You took precisely the 5 minutes you were allocated. I know that doesn’t seem like much after the trip you made. I really do appreci- ate that. Your statement will appear in its entirety in the record. I don’t know if we'll be able to reproduce this cartoon from the Chronicle. Mr. Goticu. I don’t think that’s essential. Mr. Stupps. We will simply try. I think it’s critical. [The cartoon follows:] (| S : P Las “Is it too late to get you back in the lamp?” 507 Mr. Gouicu. Well, I might also point out, which you will read in there, that basically—this sounds a little outrageous, but in my opinion I’m probably one of the world’s experts on the question of nuclear waste management. I spent 4 solid years studying this subject, and there’s a million angles to it that are just beginning to come out now. I would really like you to consider the fact that I would like to make myself available as a consultant to this whole problem here. I am willing and able to do that. Mr. Stupps. We’re going to make your paper also available to the relevant agencies. It is exceptionally difficult to appear outrageous in Washington, let me reassure you. Thank you very much. Mr. Gouicu. Thank you. Mr. Stupps. The subcommittee stands adjourned. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF Hon. JOHN L. BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I would like to commend you for taking the time to hold a hearing on the important subject of radioactive waste disposal in the oceans. The purpose of your hearing, as I understand it, is to look ahead to the possibility that our oceans could be used as sites for the disposal of radioactive waste materials. This issue is of special significance to me because the 5th Congressional District of California is on the Pacific Ocean and only 50 miles from the Farallon Islands dumping site which served as one of the earliest sites for low level wastes placed in the Pacific between World War II and 1970. I know you are aware that our distinguished colleague, Congressman Moffett, kindly complied with my request to bring his Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources to San Francisco for hearings this past October on the past practice of radioactive dumping at the Farallons. The people I represent in the San Francisco Bay Area are justifiably concerned that these practices which the U.S. permitted under the Atomic Energy Commission may have resulted in serious contamination of the ocean waters and sea life. Moreover, I think that they are outraged by the casual manner in which the government conducted this disposal program, leaving behind a few, vague records about what was dumped, how much and where. The fact is, we cannot even get a comfortable handle on what the federal govern- ment has allowed in the past in the way of radioactive disposals that occurred in our oceans. If we do not even have a good grasp now, and it has been ten years since the U.S. permitted low level ocean dumping, I hardly think it is wise to be consider- ing high level radioactive disposal in the ocean unless the technology of safe containment is fully developed and tested. My main concern is that scientists are becoming too eager to plunge ahead on pursuing ocean disposal of high level wastes, which could include nuclear fuel rod assemblies. I think that this is dangerously premature because we don’t have any kind of satisfactory account of past disposals, and those were relatively low level in comparison. Our previous experience with nuclear waste disposal in this country has not given me much confidence in the government’s ability to safely allow ocean disposals in the future without a major overhaul of policy and without major technological advancements. We have learned through the San Francisco hearings that the En- vieonmental Protection Agency has hardly been able to do more than scratch the surface. Their surveys have only located a small percentage of the 55-gallon drums and they report that many were broken and leaking into the ocean. According to the EPA, the records of ocean dumping activities by the Atomic Energy Commission only provide approximate coordinates of the dumping location, and they do not indicate the specific content, and neither the content of the containers not the precise dumping locations can be verified. Furthermore, records of military operations and government contractors might exist but are not available. 69-848 O - 81 - 33 508 Recently, we have found some information that the United States Navy scuttled many of the ships that were used during the nuclear testing of the 1940’s. Many of these ships were radioactive as a result of the testing and then they were sunk off the California coast. Although we have asked the Navy to verify this information and release us related facts, I bring this up here to underline the pattern of casually dumping radioactive materials in our oceans. These thoughts are not encouraging. We cannot be proud of the government’s past efforts on this to protect the public and we cannot go ahead ignoring all the gaps in the recollection of what was done. We must get a complete picture first and that will mean active monitoring of fish, other sea food, water samples and ocean sediments to measure any effects on the food chain and the marine environment. Hopefully, this will produce not only greater future safeguards but also knowledge upon which to base any future decisions about dumping nuclear wastes into the oceans. 509 735 Wimbledon Livermore, CA 94550 December 24, 1980 Congressman Gerry E. Studds Subeommittee on Oceanography Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 3577 Annex #2 U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Dear Congressman Studds: As eoneerned citizens who are knowledgeable in the area of environmental radioactivity and the Farallon situation, we are writing to offer our input to your deliberations. Our professional experience in environmental radiation, public health, and waste management totals over 30 years. We would be happy to provide curricula vitae if desired. We recently testified before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources at their hearings in San Francisco, and we attended your hearings in Washington last month. We requested the opportunity to present testimony at your hearings, but this request could not be accommodated. We are very concerned about the misinformation and lack of knowledge exhibited in the comments of subcommittee members as well as witnesses at these hearings. Enclosed you will find a report we have prepared for the Subcommittee entitled "Hazard Assessment of the Farallon Radioactive Waste Dumpsite." We hope that this report will be included in the record and will be brought to the attention of the subcommittee members. We believe the report will be useful in placing the problem in perspective. We would be happy to discuss the report or offer any other assistance the Subeommittee may need. Sincerely yours, Coy Choate \Ob - Smith Jerry J. Cohen Bus (415) 422-8908 Bus (415) 422-6445 Res (415) 462-9276 Res (415) 447-2265 CFS:elm Enclosure 510 December 12, 1980 HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF THE FARALLON RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMPSITE Craig F. Smith Jerry J. Cohen As a result of the extensive publicity devoted to the Farallon Radioactive Waste Dumpsite, a review of this situation was undertaken. Based on the information currently available, some useful insights and conclusions can be stated at this time. This report will present some general observations, and then will offer specific summary comments and conclusions relating to the Farallon situation. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS Leaking Barrels A seriously mistaken impression given in media coverage is that the unsealed waste containers observed at the dumpsite constitute an error or miscalculation of some sort on the part of responsible officials at the time the dumping occured. Even forty years ago scientists were well aware of the corrosive properties of seawater. There was, in fact, no intent or belief that the barrels and other containers would not leak. The concept was that, considering the dispersive capacity of the ocean, the total quantities of radioactive material disposed simply were not sufficient to constitute a significant hazard. With regard to the alternative waste disposal philosophies of "dilute and disperse" versus "concentrate and contain", it should be noted that ocean disposal uses both principles to advantage. Since the intent of oceanic disposal is to provide both isolation from the immediate human environment and a huge medium for dispersal in the event of release from the dump site, it is apparent that in either case the public health is protected. As previously mentioned, the waste packages were never intended to be leakproof. Their major function was to hold the waste until it reached the ocean floor. Any subsequent leakage would be naturally dispersed by normal oceanic processes such that no significant hazard could result. That was the philosophy at the time and it still makes sense. For erate current International guidelines for sea disposal of radioactive waste 1) state: "The container shall be made sufficiently strong or pliable to remain intact and retain its contents under the pressure encountered during descent to the sea floor." Second hand drums, lined with lead or concrete, as used at the Farallons, could well serve the purpose. Since most of the containers were lined with concrete, it was reasonably assumed that placing steel tops would be superfluous. The tops would have added little extra protection. It is difficult to understand the excessive concern regarding the waste containers used since there is no scientific indication of any significant hazard resulting from these practices. 511 How serious is the hazard? A rational approach to placing the severity of potential hazard in perspective is to relate it to that due to naturally occurring radioactivity. Nature has placed considerable quantities of toxic and radioactive material in sea water, einai such radionuclides as Uranium (10-3 parts per million), Radium 0 ppm) and Potassium-40 (.05 ppm). (2) If one considers only the eed column roughly defined by the Farallon dumpsite ( ~10,000 km@,~1.0 km deep), this defines a volume of 1013 cubic meters. Considering only the Radium content, one would expect a total inventory in this volume of 1000 grams (1000 curies) of this naturally occurring radionuclide. Via ingestion pathways (which are the predominant route for human exposure in this case), this amount of Radium is equivalent in toxicity to, for example, 4 tons (250,000 Ci) of Plutonium-239. A similar perspective is obtained from considering the naturally occurring Radium present in the sediments (10,000 km2 by 2 meter depth) contained in the Farallon dumpsite. The radium content in these sediments amounts to 6700 grams. This quantity of radium is equivalent in ingestion toxicity to 26.8 tons (1,675,000 Ci) of Pu-239. According to WASH-734,(3) the total inventory of all radionuclides in the Farallon dumpsite is 14,000 Ci, of which only 30 Ci consists of long lived alpha activity. If all 30 curies were Plutonium-239 (a very pessimistic assumption) or even if all 14,000 curies were Plutonium (a completely absurd assumption), the hazard would still be trivial compared to the naturally occurring Radium in the same area. It should also be noted that Radium follows roughly the same exposure pathways and behaves similarly to the transuranic elements toxicologically. In brief, from a radiological standpoint, it would be inconsequential whether the drums leak or not! "High-Level" versus "Low-Level" Wastes The assertion has been made that the nuclear wastes dumped at the Farallons and other sites were not "low-level". This assertion is found to be rather peculiar since there was not at the time, nor is there now, any universally accepted definition for high or low-level wastes. There have been, in fact, several suggested definitions, but as yet none are official, or even generally accepted. In the nuclear industry, "high-level" waste is usually understood to be the raffinates from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Low-level wastes are those produced from other sources. It should be pointed out, RAHeNet» that the term low-level waste does not necessarily imply low azard. In any case, whether the waste is high or low-level is somewhat irrelevant from a public health standpoint. The important question is how much is there? What is the total inventory? Estimates on the total quantity of radioactivity present have been available for some time in WASH-734 and other reports. Once in place, the semantic classification of the waste, by itself, has little or no bearing on its environmental consequences. (a) 512 Accuracy of Waste Inventory Estimates Concern has been expressed that, since the inventories of radioactive waste are not known exactly, there could be a problem. In particular, WASH-734 indicated that estimates of total radioactivity could be off by a factor of 10. The fact is that we are not totally ignorant of the inventories of waste materials, and even the limited information available is sufficient to permit an analysis of whether the dumping practices could possibly pose a threat. First it should be noted that being off by a factor of 10 could mean the estimate could be either high or low by that value. In any case, it will be shown that from a standpoint of potential hazard to either health or environment it is insignificant whether the estimate is off by a factor of 10 or even 100 for that matter. As previously discussed, the column of water defined by the Farallon dumpsite (104 km3) contains quantities of naturally occuring radionuclides which make the radioactive waste trivial in comparison, from either a radioactivity or a hazard viewpoint. Table 1 lists these natural radionuclides, along with their mass, radioactivity and Toxicity Index. The Toxicity Index is a simple measure of potential hazard expressed as the volume of water required to dilute a given quantity of a toxic or radioactive material to acceptable public drinking water standards. Table 1 Some Naturally Occuring Radionuclides in 10,000 km3 of Average Seawater (Estimated Volume of Farallon dumpsite water column) Radionuclide Mass (Tons) Radioactivity (Ci) Toxity Index (m3) Uranium-238 104 3 x 103 3 x 106 Radium-226 10-3 103 1 x 10%? Potassium-40 5 x 10° 3 x 106 3 x 108(a) Total 1 x 1010 Based on a computed dose factor for K-40 relative to K-42. 513 Possibly the components of the radioactive waste of greatest concern at the Farallon dumpsite are the long-lived alpha emitting radionuclides whose total quantity is estimated to be about 30 Ci. Unfortunately we do not have a nuclide by nuclide breakdown, but if we conservatively assume the entire quantity is Plutonium-239, its toxicity index would be 106 m3, a factor of 10,000 below that of the naturally occurring radium in the seawater. Indeed, if the entire estimated waste inventory of 14,000 Ci (alpha, beta and gamma) were Plutonium-239 (an absurdly conservative assumption, given only to make the point) the waste would still constitute a small hazard relative to the natural radioactivity. Further, it should be noted that the toxicity of the naturally occuring radionuclides, large as it may seem, is orders of magnitude lower than that of certain naturally-occuring, non-radioactive toxic components of sea water. Table 2 presents the Toxicity Index for several of these non-radioactive toxic constituents, together with the Uranium and Radium for comparison. Thus, the waste toxicity is insignificant in comparison with the toxicity of the local natural radioactivity; and this, in turn, is insignificant compared to the non-radioactive toxic material. (Also, note that the toxicity of these non-radioactive materials will last forever.) Table 2 Toxicity Index of Sea Water Components in 10,000 Km3 of Average Seawater Element Mass (grams) Toxicity Index*(m3) Selenium 4 x 1010 4x 1012 Arsenic 3 x 1010 -2 x 1011 6 x loll -4 x 1012 Lead 4x 1010 -5 x 1910 8 x 1011 -1 x 1012 Bar ium 5 x loll 5 x loll Mercury 3 x 108 1 x 1011 Silver iexa1028 33) ao? 3 x 1920 -6 x 1010 Uranium 1 x 1010 3 x 10 Radium 1 x 103 1 x 1010 Computed as the volume of water required to dilute inventory to EPA drinking water standards. Given the above, it would seem that from a standpoint of potential hazard (which should be the overriding consideration) it would make little difference whether the estimated inventory of the radioactive waste were "off" by a factor of 10 or even much more. Some important points related to this analysis are: (a) Despite its predominance, one should not be concerned with the biological effects of the natural radioactivity in that life has evolved for billions of years in this environment and seems to have adapted to it quite well. In fact, in previous millenia, levels of 514 natural radioactivity were much higher. In addition, the fraction of total human background radiation exposure due to oceanic radioactivity is extremely small. (b) Special concentration mechanisms considering biological pathways of exposure would apply to the natural radioactivity in a manner similar to those of the radioactive waste components. (c) Oceanic radioactivity due to worldwide fallout from atmospheric and undersea nuclear weapons testing was not considered in this analysis. In itself, this fallout would largely account for observed patterns of radioactivity in environmental samples in the Farallons vicinity. This will be discussed in greater detail later in this report. (d) Although comparisons based on airborne pathways (inhalation as opposed to ingestion pathways) might have provided a somewhat different result, such analyses have not been performed since only a miniscule fraction of oceanic radioactivity could conceivably reach man via air. This would be true for either the natural or waste radioactivity. Comparison with International Recommendations The International Atomic Energy Agency (4) has recommended standards for limitations of radioactive disposal in the sea as follows: “high-level radioactive wastes or other high-level radioactive matter unsuitable for dumping means any material with a concentration in curies per unit-gross mass (in tonnes) exceeding: (a) 10 Ci/t for a-active waste for half life greater than 50 years. In the case of 226Ra, not more than 100 Ci/yr may be dumped at any one site); (b) 103 Ci/t for 8/y-active waste (excluding tritium) but the limit for 90sr plus 137Cs is 102 Ci/t; and (c) 106 Ci/t for tritium. The definition is based on an assumed upper limit to the dumping rate of 100,000 tonnes per year at any one site." Assuming 47,500 containers at the Farallon dumpsite (0.2 Tons/container), 14,000 curies of beta-gamma radioactivity and 30 curies of alpha activity, the dumpsite contains 1/1000 of the allowable annual dumping limit for beta-gamma and 3/10,000 of the annual limit for alpha waste at an individual site. If the Farallon dumpsite could conceivably be considered a hazard, then the IAEA recommendations are too lenient by many thousand fold. This is highly unlikely, however, since considerable scientific deliberation went into them. As a reasonable guideline to these deliberations, the occurrence of natural radioactivity was considered. This is precisely the approach used in this report in assessing the hazard of the Farallon dumpsite. 515 e@ Recent Studies Recent studies on the Farallon Dumpsite released by the EPA do not support the conclusion that there is or could be significant environmental or public health consequences due to past waste disposal activities. The application of common sense to the problem provides the necessary perspective. First, it can generally be agreed that radioactive waste containers indeed were dumped at the Farallons and other oceanic sites. Second, these containers undoubtedly are corroding and leaking. Given these facts, it would be very surprising if levels of radioactivity in the immediate vicinity of the containers were not elevated in some manner, whether we could measure this increase or not. It would seem that the overriding question, therefore, should be one of potential hazard or threat to health and the environment. Any implication that the mere existence of any radioactive material could constitute a significant hazard is patently false. Our assessment indicates that, although levels of radioactivity in the immediate vicinity of the waste canisters may indeed be elevated over background levels, the commensurate hazard involved could, at worst, increase from negligible to insignificant levels. Such an increase may be of academic interest, but certainly does not warrant significant concern since, at its worst, the hazard due to the radioactive waste would still be considerably lower than that due to naturally occurring oceanic radioactivity. In terms of the levels of radioactivity in the general area of the Farallons, the report prepared in 1978 by Noshkin(®) concludes: © Total radionuclide inventory. Quantities of 239+240py and 137cs in Farallon sediments and water are not significantly different from the amounts from nuclear debris (from atmospheric nuclear explosions tests) delivered to the open oceans. Open Pacific plutonium fallout was 2.2-4.4 mCi/km2, ) Radionuclides in marine animals. Fish and benthic invertebrates collected from the Farallon region contain body burdens of 239 + 240py no different than similar marine species living and feeding in open oceans. Farallon Rockfish contain radionuclide concentrations within the range found in fish from the open Atlantic. Farallon benthic invertebrates have plutonium concentrations similar to invertebrates from northern-latitude oceans. These observations are consistent with those of the 1971 National Academy of Science study which found: (6) "Over the past quarter century, the major sources of artificial radioactive materials to the sea have been worldwide fallout from the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere and the chronic discharge of low-level wastes from operating reactors and fuel processing plants. Much less significant additions have resulted from nuclear detonations below the surface of the sea, from the disposal of low-level waste in packages, and from the inadvertent loss of radioactive materials". 516 It may be added that, the total health and environmental impact due to the addition of all the "artificial" radioactive materials to the sea is, in turn, much less significant than that of the naturally occuring radioactivity (see previous calculations), which in turn, is far less significant than the impacts due to the stable (non-radioactive) toxic elements in seawater. Some have suggested that, since measurements of radioactivity in the immediate vicinity (within a few centimeters) of a ruptured container were elevated compared with the levels of radioactivity in the general area of the Farallons, a problem must exit. The fallacy of this conclusion is best described by analogy. Suppose one were to visit a large city, measure the height of the first person he encountered, record the height as say, five feet, and leave to return the following year. On the second visit the same procedure is followed by measuring the height of the first person met and recording the height to be six feet. From such analysis, can one conclude that the average height of the city's residents is increasing at the rate of one foot per year? The absurdity of such a procedure is increased if, on the second visit, one were to seek out the tallest person before measuring the height. The point is that from the data available, one cannot determine that levels of radioactivity are increasing. On the other hand, the data available do support the conclusion that levels of radioactivity are simply too small to present a significant hazard. In general, the interpretation of data such as that reported in the various EPA reports must be done with caution. It is not unusual that a set of environmental samples taken from the same population, or "statistical universe" may vary by orders of magnitude in their radioactivity content. Given the nature of this variance, it takes a large number of samples and sophisticated statistical methods to determine significant differences between sample sets, much less cause and effect relationships. To reach a firm conclusion on the basis of a single data point is problematic since it can result in gross misinterpretation of the situation. Perspective on Units Since many people are relatively unfamiliar with the physical units of environmental radioactivity, it is important to offer perspectives on the meaning of these units when presenting an analysis. For example, granite is a material with which most people are familiar. Many public and private buildings are constructed with granite, and man has lived, and even thrived with granite in his immediate environment during his entire existence. Granite contains uranium and its decay products, just as other crustal materials do, as trace constituents. The average granite contains some 6.7 parts per million uranium. When the alpha activity of the uranium and its daughter products are calculated, the result is some 18,000 picocuries of alpha radioactivity per kilogram of granite. When this value is compared to the aplha activity (Pu 239 & 240 of ocean sediment at the Farallon dumpsite, the latter values are found to be extremely small. 517 Another perspective can be seen in the concentration of the relevant radionuclides which are permissible for public drinking water. These are shown in Table 3, expressed in units of pCi/kg. Table 3 Maximum Permissible Concentrations (Public Drinking Water) Nuclide Permissible Concentration (pCi/kg) Pu-239 5,000 Cs-137 20,000 Sr-90 100 When the values reported in the EPA studies (both for sediment and sea life concentration) are viewed in terms of these drinking water standards, once again they are found to be extremely small in nearly every case. The only exception to this was a single core sediment sample taken within 5 cm of a particular waste canister in the Atlantic. A similar sample 4 meters away from the first gave readings for the most part below detectability limits. Another insight on relative hazard may be gained from a comparison with the natural radioactivity of fish. According to a study of the Health and Safety Laboratory (USAEC-HASL-224, April 1970), fish in the average San Francisco diet contain a Radium-226 concenration of 0.26 pci/kg. (Fish in the average New York City diet contain 0.89 pci/kg.) This is simply due to the natural occurrence of Radium in oceanic waters. Comparing drinking water standards, it can be shown that one picocurie (pci) of Radium-226 is equivalent in ingestion toxicity to 250 picocuries of Plutonium-239. Therefore the "hazard" due to eating fish in San Francisco, simply due to its natural Radium-226 content, is equivalent to its having a plutonium "burden" of 65 pci/kg. The maximum value for Plutonium content of fish at the Farallon site in the muscle tissue or edible flesh that was actually observed and measured was 0.008 + 0.003 pci/kg. From this perspective it can be concluded that the maximum hazard from Plutonium in fish from the Farallon dumpsite is a factor of 8125 less than that due to naturally occurring Radium in the same fish. Note again that Radium is just one of many naturally occurring radionuclides in the marine environment. To place the measurement in further perspective, consider the natural radium content of other food products. Since, curie for curie, radium is 250 times more toxic than plutonium via ingestion, the equivalent plutonium toxicities of everyday food products can be easily computed. For example, Brazil nuts, due to their natural radium content, have an equivalent plutonium concentration of 3,500,000 pCi/kg. Placed in this perspective, a one ounce serving of Brazil nuts is equivalent in terms of plutonium radiotoxicity to 27 million pounds of fish sampled at the Farallons. The consumption of Brazil nuts should not be a particular 518 hazard when done in moderation. It is likely that the hazard due to their caloric content would exceed that due to their radioactivity. Other foods have less radiotoxicity than Brazil nuts, but at the same time, are far more radiotoxic than Farallon fish. Compared to the .008 pCi/kg of measured plutonium in fish muscle, the following plutonium equivalents (based upon radium content) are interesting: Peanut Butter 30, 000pCi/kg Grapes 7,250 pCi/kg Peas 1,525 pCi/kg Carrots 1,525 pCi/kg Bread 750 pCi/kg Potatoes 300 pCi/kg Beef 200 pCi/kg Pork 200 pCi/kg Cheese, eggs 250 pCi/kg Fish (average San Francisco diet) 65 pCi/kg Clearly, anyone reluctant to eat fish from the Farallons due to its radioactive contamination would best be advised not to eat just about anything else either! Use of Weapons Background as a Measure of Hazard A common tendency of those unfamiliar with environmental radioactivity is to assume that weapons background levels of radioactivity represent a significant health hazard. Thus it is used as a benchmark level for cursory evaluation for levels of environmental contamination. The levels of radioactivity from weapons testing and the resultant hazard on a worldwide average basis are so low compared to naturally occurring radioactivity that extremely sensitive techniques (such as extensive chemical preparation and alpha spectroscopy) must be used in order to even detect its presence in the environment. It is only due to the fact that radionuclides are detectable at extremely low levels (i.e. far, far below levels of health hazard) that the evaluation of weapons background contamination of the environment can be carried out. Since the levels of environmental contamination due to weapons testing are extremely low compared to naturally occurring background radiation, it is possible to have localized contamination at a dumpsite which exceeds weapons background levels by many times, but which is still totally insignificant compared to natural background levels. This is the case at the Farallons, and thus it is improper to conclude that localized contamination levels in excess of weapons background present a measurable health hazard. 519 SUMMARY COMMENTS As a result of a review of the available information, and an analysis based on the natural toxicity of the Farallon area, it is concluded that there is no significant current or anticipated future public health hazard as a result of past practices in the ocean dumping of radioactive wastes. Even under the most pessimistic assumptions regarding the contents of the radioactive waste containers at the Farallon dumpsite, no significant hazard could conceivably result from even a complete release of this material to the ocean. The toxic potential of the radioactive waste is trivial relative to that of the naturally occurring radioactive and non-radioactive toxic material existing in the same sediment and water column. It is safe to assume that if the naturally-occurring oceanic poisons were a serious problem, mankind would long since have succumbed to their effects. The levels of radiotoxicity represented by the waste dumpsites are not unprecedented either qualitatively or quantitatively. Indeed, the toxic inventory of the natural radioactive materials far exceeds anything that man has added. In this regard, it is important to note that no distinction can be made between the effects of "human made" and "natural" radioactivity. In fact, it has been determined that the major “human made" nuclides of concern (Plutonium, Cesium 137, and Strontium 90) exist naturally, although at low concentrations. The continued bombardment of the public with scientifically baseless allegations of environmental threats can in time have serious consequences. It can lead to the misdirection of government resources toward solving non-existent problems such as the environmental effects of the Farallon dumpsite. Squandering public money and effort in this manner precludes the possiblity of spending it in areas where it might be more beneficially applied. Another consequence of pursuing the "Chicken Little" approach by causing public alarm over such trivial or non existent problems is that, at some future time, a genuine and serious public health threat may appear. Because of previous false scares, legitimate warnings may be ignored by the public. It is extremely important to consider this possiblity before jt gets to the point where we "cry wolf" once too often. 520 References 1. Guidelines for Sea Disposal Packages of Radioactive Waste-NEA, OECD, Paris, France, November, 1974. 2. Weast, R. C., Ed., CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 59th Ed, CRC Press, 1978. 3. Joseph, A.B., "United States' Sea Disposal Operations: A Summary to December 1956," WASH-734, August 1957. 4. The Ocenaographic Basis of the IAEA REvised Definition and Recommendations Concerning High-level Radioactive Waste Unsuitable for Dumping at Sea, Tech. Doc. 710, TAEA, Vienna, 1978. 5. Noshkin, V.E. et al., "Radionuclides in the Marine Environment near the Farallon Islands," UCRL-5281, January 6, 1978. 6. National Academy of Sciences, "Radioactivity in the Marine Environment," Prepared by the Panel on Radioactivity in the Marine Environment of the Committee on Oceanography, National Research Council, 1971. PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRED EISSLER, SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference is a California environmental organiza- tion headquartered in Santa Barbara. We are concerned about the dumping of radiological wastes in our area within the vicinity of the Channel Islands National Park and Marine Sanctuary. We wish to support efforts to promote government monitoring of these dumpsites and actions to control any harmful effects of the radionuclides upon the marine ecology and edible fish. Two sites and possibly three have been utilized for radiological dumping purposes. Approximately 33 miles southeast of Santa Cruz Island (83°39'N, 119°28’W) is a Navy disposal area in the Santa Cruz Basin identified on navigation maps as a munitions and chemical dump. Between 1946 and 1972 some 3,100 drums containing 108 curies of contaminated wastes were jettisoned in this area, according to availa- ble reports which EPA officials indicate could underestimate the actual amount by a factor of at least ten. A second site in the channel region (34°30'N, 122°50’W) is located 106 miles west of Point Arguello, according to a reference in the Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal Hearings Record before the Special Subcommittee on Radioactive Wastes, JCAE (86th Congress), page 2683. Possibly a third site in the Santa Barbara Basin proposed by the National Acade- my of Sciences as a safer disposal area than the Santa Cruz Basin (National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council ‘‘Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste into Pacific Coastal Water,” Publication 185-1962 may have been utilized on the basis on the NAS recommendation. The Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors and local environmental groups as well as our organization are on record in favor of surveillance of these dumpsites. Scenic Shoreline addressed a letter to EPA Secretary Douglas Costle raising a number of questions on this crucial issue and we would like to submit this letter for your hearing record. It is our understanding that these and other ocean disposal areas in the nation’s coastal water were multiple purpose dumps. In the case of the Santa Cruz Basin Naval dump, munitions wastes and chemicals besides radiologically-contaminated laboratory equipment, garments, and other materials were all jettisoned in the same type of 55 gallon drum making the radioactive drums somewhat more difficult to identify. We would like to suggest since all these drums would probably be inspected to identify the radioactive ones, that the monitoring program be extended to an appraisal of the impact upon the marine ecosystems not only of the radiological wastes but the assorted chemicals and munitions wastes to determine their toxicity separately and in combination. No attention has been given to these other wastes which may in some cases be as toxic or more toxic than the radiological materials ~ and could possibly have a significant synergistic effect as well. It was not long ago that the dumping issue received national attention with the proposed disposal of nerve gases in the Atlantic Ocean. Militray dumping and the 521 vast array of industrial chemicals other than radioactive materials present signifi- cant environmental problems. Recent studies conducted at the University of California at Santa Barbara indi- cate that fish eggs (eelpout-melanostigma pammelas) sink to the sea bottom at the Santa Cruz Basin and the life cycle of the species provides a potential transport mechanism into the water column of the radionuclides posssibly leaking from the drums deposited in that area. Fish samples of the indicated species collected rou- tinely can be provided by the UCSB oceanography department. The university, however, does not have the capability for measuring the potential radioactive con- tent of the fish. The Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, however, does have this capability. We urge that your Committee expedite the measurement of the potential radioactivity of these fish in the basin by encouraging EPA to facilitate immediately the necessary tests of this transport mechanism that potentially cycles radionuclides into food chains affecting edible fish. ; The slipshod manner in which the radioactive wastes were handled by a nuclear industry that prides itself on its safety record is especially disquieting. We urge the most careful consideration of our questions to Secretary Costle and the broadest possible site monitoring and remedial program including surveillance of the associ- ated munitions and chemical wastes dumped along with the radionuclides. 522 SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE, INC. 4623 More Mesa Dr. Santa Barbara, CA 93110 (805) 964-2492 October 3, 1980 Honorable Douglas Costle Environmental Protection Agency 401 "M" Street S.W. Washington, D. C. 20460 Dear Secretary Costle: Scenic Shoreline is a party to evidentiary hearings on the disposal of drill muds and cuttings at Lease Sale 43 tracts. Ocean dumping generally, however, is a prime interest. Recent publicity on radionuclide disposal at the Farallon Islands reminds us that similar dumping has occurred in the vicinity of the Channel Islands National Park and Marine Sanctuary. We seek information from your agency on this channel dumping and request specific EPA studies of disposal procedure and the impact of dumping upon the marine environment and on food chains reaching man, The Committee to Bridge the Gap has documented more than forty-three ocean dump sites.("Table of 43 Former Ocean Dump- sites for Nuclear Wastes," August 19, 1980 -- the Committee indicates five more have been identified). EPA is concentrating its research on four sites, two in the Atlantic and two at the Farallon Islands on grounds that 90% of low-level waste containers were dumped at these four sites. We request extension of the studies to include the channel because of the particular ecological sensitivity of this area, the cumulative stress upon this channel marine environment of a number of resource exploitive activities, the difficulty of extrapolating data from the Atlantic and the Farallons to the channel, the special circumstances of disposal under Navy auspices here, and other crucial factors. — Your recent Fact Sheet ("Radioactive Waste Dumping off the Coast of California," EPA, Office of Radiation Programs, August 15, 1980) fails to offer sufficient assurance that intensive research of past disposal practices will be undertaken to highlight the need for the necessary vast improvements in waste disposal in line with new legislative directives on ocean dumping. . a. The Fact Sheet notes (6) that EPA has sixteen reports on the 1977 surveys of the Farallon Islands dumping that will be published in April 19381. There, is no indication of studies of other disposal areas such as the Channel. 523 Costle Ze b. .The list of Pacific Coast dumpsites (4) fails to include one and possibly two sites in the Channel region in addition to the one (Santa Cruz Basin) you list (See below.). c. Appended to the incomplete list of West Coast sites is the note (5): "Dumping sites were designated and licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission and data on sites, containers and radioactivity would now be withtthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the records still exist." This AEC-NRC information presumably is now within the hands of EPA as a basis for its research on agency regulatory plans. Scenic Shoreline requests this data. We also request an investigation on the reasons for destruction of records if in fact they are non-existent. d. g. The Fact Sheet indicates (6) that EPA has not issued any permits for ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes allowable under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. The Fact Sheet states that EPA studies underway "for determining whether such dumping should be allowed and where" is scheduled to be completed by late 1985. Scenic Shoreline -here- in_requests additional information on these studies. h. "EPA and NOAA", according to the Fact Sheet (2), "are currently preparing an interagency agreement to coordinate oceanographic activities for evaluating ocean dumping as an option for future disposal of low-level radioactive waste." Is a draft agreement available? What are the opportunities for public input during deliberations on the agreement? i. The Fact Sheet refers to EPA regulations and criteria for ocean dumping issued January 11, 1977 (1): "These regulations specify that: "1, Radioactive materials must be contained to prevent their dispersion into ocean waters, and "2. The containment system must remain intact until the radioactive materials decay to innocuous levels." The definition of “innocuous levels" in any meaningful context would require that ocean dumping not be permitted. Further information on these legal terms would be helpful in our studies, In somewhat greater detail we would like to define our findings and concerns with respect to the Santa Barbara Channel area dumping program, not only radionuclide disposal but other chemical dumping and munitions disposal as well, 1. Your Fact Sheet and other sources refer to the Santa Cruz Basin site (33° 39' N, 119% 28° W), some 33 miles southeast of Santa Cruz Island. Between 1953-61 approximately 3,100 55 gallon drums of low level Fadiation wastes were jettisoned in 525 Costle 4, a five by five mile or nine by nine mile area. In 1957, 1960, and 1972 the dump area was evidently monitored. We would appreciate access to these monitor reports. 2. The 3,100 drums at Santa Cruz dump contained 108 curies of radioactive material. A similar number of barrels at one of the Farallon sites contained 1,100 curies. (The curie count at San Diego seems low as well, 4,415 packages containing 33.6 curies.) Unquestionably the records for these dumpsites are fragmentary. Additional information is useful on the accuracy of the records on the radioactivity of these wastes. There is also no sufficient reason to believe that the number of drums alleged to have been dumped represents a valid statistic. In correspondence with Committee to Bridge the Gap, an EPA official notes: "...there are gaps in the data, or sometimes conflicting data concerning locations and curie amounts of the wastes. As much as 10% error in estimate in curie amounts should not be unexpected; effort at the time of the dumping was not put into extremely accurate measurement and recording of wastes, as they were seen as just that -- something to throw away. In addition, many existing records, estimates though they were, were periodically destroyed with other file records as they attained twenty-five years of age." This appraisal is confirmed by AEC documents. There is reason to believe that the records could be off by considerably more than a factor of 10. For this and other reasons each of the radionuclide disposal sites should be investigated. What plans does EPA have for thorough investi- gations of each specific disposal Site in the nation’s waters? 3. Little information is available on a second site in the Channel region (34° 30' N, 122° 50' W), 106 miles west of Point Arguello. The Fact Sheet fails to mention this site which is referenced in "Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal Hearings" before the Special Subcommittee on Radioactive Wastes, JCAE (86th Congress), p. 2683. Any available data and references on this site would be helpful in our research, 4, Possibly a third site exists in the Channel. A National Academy of Sciences report (71) observes: "Santa Barbara Basin appears to be a better place for dumping than Santa Cruz Basin, owing to its softer bottom (barrels sink deeper), faster rate of deposition (burial in about 50 years), low oxygen content (probably little rusting of barrels), and absence of minor amount of benthos (no boring of concrete, mixing of sediment nor transport by migration). Probable avenues of escape of wastes of both basins are to the west, but reentrance into the borderland is perhaps less likely for the Santa Barbara Basin than for Santa Cruz. Apparently Santa Cruz Basin was chosen merely because it is the deepest close basin, without any regard for oceanographic 526 Costle Dm factors. However, the considerations above suggest that Santa Barbara Basin would be a better area. Field investigations along these lines are recommended." (National Academy of Sciences -- National Research Council "Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste into Pacific Coastal Waters" (Publication 985 - 1962).) Marine scientists today probably would not accept the Santa Barbara Basin as a better alternative to the Santa Cruz site, but in the event that field studies were conducted and seemed to demonstrate the advantage of the alternative site, dumping gould have occurred in the Santa Barbara Basin. Does EPA have information on this ossibility? Did the Academy or some other agency conduct field studies? What are the impacts of wastes on the basins and the probabilities of escape a wastes from both basins into the borderlands? 5. Multiple sites exist at the Farallon Islands. What are the possibilities of multiple radioactive dumpsites within and outside the designated areas of the Channel region? 6. Short-dumping needs investigating. In difficult weather, barges hauling radioactive wastes would dump their loads in the open ocean short of the designated sites. This practice of the 50's and 60's may still represent a problem today in the control of other than radioactive wastes. A 1973 NOAA report (Robert Brown and Edward Shenton, "Submersible Inspection of Deep Ocean Waste Disposal Sites off Southern California," Plesseyw Environnental System) noted "indication of poor dumping control" indicated by "lack of debris" in the official dumpsite in the San Diego-Mexican waters. What evidence has been compiled on dumping control, waste monitoring, short dumping and other littering practices? References to EPA policy on dumping en- forcement would be helpful. 7.° The EPA has not addressed the complexities of multiple waste dumping at the various identified radiological sites. The NOAA-Plessey report (30) notes that investigators of the San Diego site were surprised that the area was also a munitions dump. The Farallon Island sites were also subject to multiple dumping if such an inference from the Information Paper (4) is accurate: "...it was the only site (at the Farallons)used exclusively for dumping radioactive wastes." The Santa Cruz site is listed on navigation charts as a U.S. Navy chemical and munitions dump. What chemicals besides radiological wastes are dumped at this and other Channel sites? Did the EPA 1972 moratorium against radio- logical dumping apply to chemicals and munitions? Is the Nav obliged to observe this moratorium or has the Navy recognized the EPA order? 8. Public attention in California recently has focused primarily on radiological dumping. To understand this issue, a 527 Costle 6. review seems necessary of ocean dumping in general. Does EPA have a chart or list of all ocean dumpsites for a variety of toxic and other wastes? What information is available on the interaction and cumulative impact of multiple waste disposal (chemical and radiological wastes, and munitions, for example) on the marine environment and food chains reaching man? 9. We request that EPA studies be conducted on the various past dumping activities in the Santa Barbara Channel. This recommendation is in line with the final proposal of the Information Paper calling for "continued examination of other sites" (22)(See f. above). The National Academy of Sciences, 1962 Publication 935, discussing the Santa Cruz site (See 4% above), recommends (4) that an impartial agency should reappraise the Academy findings in ten years. 10. The NAS-NRC Publication 985 also stressed a clearly defined dumping procedure, including biological baseline research, monitoring, record keeping, and agency coordination-processes which were essentially ignored, an inexcusable failure in such an extremely hazardous enterprise and especially by an industry that repeatedly claims it is more careful, safe, and economic than any other. How did this inexcusable failure occur and what measures are being taken to assure that it cannot happen again? Specifically, we request data on federal and state efitorts to coordinate their statutory and regulatory responsibilities over ocean dumping in the analysis of past failures as the basis for formulating rational controls over potential future ocean dis- posal, domestically and internationally. What roles in this coordination are performed by EPA, Department of Energy, State Department, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Defense, and Department of Commerce (NOAA)? What actions in the fields of research and policy formation are being taken under the terms of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972; National Ocean Pollution, Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978; National Environmental Policy Act of 1972,, and other applicable legislation and treaties. What statutory authority is being developed to strengthen existing controls over waste disposal? While EPA evidently has completed the most extensive research of any agency on ocean dumping, much of the data has not been released publicly. We seek information on the con- tinuing research program, including an inventory of the research projects being sponsored by the EPA on past, present, and future ocean dumping of radiological and other toxic wastes with refer- ence to specific offices, personnel, status of research, and documents available on these projects. We would appreciate information on the funding levels for these projects; estimates of the budget necessary to complete the appropriate research; recipients of past and future government contracts through EPA 528 | Costle ier and other agencies, the amount of the contracts and their purpose; and the specific statutory authority for which the agencies are receiving their funding in these research fields. Any interim conclusions and reports on the research findings would be helpful. We welcome and appreciate whatever information you can provide to educate the public on the increasingly crucial issue of ocean dumping. Cordially yours, Fred Eissler President 529 Woops HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION WOODS HOLE, MASSACHUSETTS 02543 SS ESESESESEES Phone (617) 548-1400 TWX 710-346-6601 December 16, 1980 Hon. Gerry E. Studds, Chairman Subcommittee on Oceanography Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Congressman Studds: I welcome the decision of your subcommittee to conduct hearings on the disposal of nuclear waste in the oceans, including inter alia the emplacement of high level radioactive waste under the deep sea floor. These hearings, held on November 20, 1980, continue the involvement of your subcommittee in the important issue of seabed emplacement, which was previously before the subcommittee on May 15 and July 11, 1978. This issue has also been considered in hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee on July 26 - 27, 1976. As a result of these three sets of hearings, as well as administrative developments, several federal agencies have now gone on record on various occasions concerning the feasibility of seabed emplacement of high level waste, its legality under domestic and international law, and the policy and institutional problems presented by this concept. As your hearing on November 20 indicated, the federal agencies continue to be unwilling to offer determinative opinions on the legality of emplacement; in addition, the statements available to date are sometimes in conflict. To an extent, the reluctance of the agencies to assume legal positions is justified in terms of the preliminary status of the proposal and resultant unclarity about the best ways to proceed internationally. It is unlikely, however, that international acceptance or rejection of seabed emplacement will depend on resolution of the abstract legal question whether such an activity would be subject to the London Dumping Convention as a form of ocean "dumping". Its acceptability to the industrial partners of the United States will probably depend on the technical adequacy of the proposal and the satisfactoriness of the consultations which have been conducted among the OECD group. The acceptability of seabed emplacement to other nations may depend on other factors as well as these. While discussions between the the OECD nations and other blocs might be cast in the language of international law (the obligation to avoid pollution of the global commons) and the law of the sea (the common heritage in the seabed), these discussions will be responsive to the means by which the industrialized nations of the West organize 530 Hon. Gerry E. Studds, Chairman, December 16, 1980 Page Two their dialogue with these nations on other matters, such as the issue of the benefits of nuclear technology. To assess the potential political viability of seabed emplacement, there- fore, it is necessary to supplement the legal discussion under the London Convention with broader considerations. These include how to build satisfactory frameworks for its implementation within the London Convention and OECD framework, as well as how to relate this proposal to other outstanding issues in the international control of the nuclear fuel cycle. To assist your subcommittee in this endeavor, I am transmitting a study on the subject of international institutional considerations relevant to seabed emplacement. You may find this study illuminating in that it charts the previous statements of the federal agencies, as well as international organizations, on this issue as well as indicates some of the international organizational and political issues that will have to be addressed in further development of the concept. ad wapessis (ES ) - Sore On _f ’ (aes sohaatt Daniel P. Finn, ae Research Fellow DPF/ef1 531 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUB-SEABED DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE by Daniel P. Finn Research Fellow Marine Policy and Ocean Management Program Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 4 August 1980 532 INTRODUCTION This paper examines in a preliminary way the institutional issues associated with the potential sub-seabed disposal (SSD) Ge eacioseeae wastes. ‘This techniaque, as currently conceived, involves the burial of such wastes in sediments of the seabed in abyssal plains located away from the edges of tectonic plates and away from the rims of the ocean basins (mid-plate/gyre regions, or “ypg") 2 Due to the technical complexity of this method of disposal, it will likely only be employed for certain com- ponents of the nuclear fuel cycle waste stream. These include high-level wastes (HLW) left after reprocessing of’spent nuclear fuel spent fuel itself in the event that it is decided to dispose of all or some of it directly without reprocessing, and wastes containing transuranic elements (TRU wastes) which are generated during the operation of power reactors, military weapons, manufacturing operations, and See ee The intent of sub-seabed disposal for these types of wastes would be to assure virtually complete isolation of the wastes for the time necessary to bring them down to acceptable levels of radioactivity before significant quantities were released into the environment -- variously estimated at 100,000 to 3,000,000 years. Emplacement techniques could also be used for low-level wastes (LLW) which do not fall into any of the above categories; at present, however, such wastes are regularly disposed of by shallow burial on land or (by several countries other than the United States) through dump- ing of containers of LLW at sea. While the international decisions concerning sub-seabed disposal itself and the arrangements for other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle which might 533 affect sub-seabed disposal will undoubtedly respond primarily to political considerations, the sheticutional aspects of this proposal must be examined in order eo determine its feasibility from this perspective. By interna- tional institutional aspects are meant the set of formal substantive and procedural requirements which are generally recognized by nations as posi- tive prerequisites in carrying out such a project. Such institutional issues can be conveniently viewed from the dual perspective of law and organization -- that is, what substantive standards apply to sub-seabed disposal as a matter of international law and what organizational forms can be utilized to perform such necessary actions as to interpret these standards, facilitate compliance with tueaidee even conduct the various administrative activities that might be required in connection with the ' proposal. Since the organizational possibilities for actually administering a sub-seabed disposal project on the international level edcnghate various and could serve a number of different objectives, and since only preliminary steps have been taken at this point to secure the cooperation of other nations in the development of this proposal, concrete institutional arrange- ments will not be discussed here. At some future point, in projecting an organizational pathway to serve various objectives connected with the pro- posal, it will be useful to sketch out in a systematic form the full range of organizational possibilities so that an informed choice can be made of appropriate institutions to serve the desired functions. At present, how- ever, it is enough to indicate in general the importance of involving inter- national organizations in the development of the proposal and give some preliminary indication of how such organizations have been and can be used to provide an institutional vehicle for introduction and implementation of a sub-seabed disposal proposal. —2- 534 The choice of a repository for HLW will be responsive to international legal and political considerations ee addition to echnical criteria. For example, the Antarctic Treaty currently prohibits disposal of radioactive wastes in Antarctica,” and it is unlikely that an effort will be made to overcome this prohibition unless there are compelling reasons to do so, especially in view of the United States' interest in obtaining a satisfac- tory regime for the allocation and management of Antarctic resources. Similarly, sub-seabed disposal must be seen in connection with legal devel- opments in the law of the sea (LOS) and also in connection with the politi- cal questions of international equity, linked with the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which might be raised in any attempt to use an area of the global commons for exclusive national use. Several international political factors could, however, also tend to favor sub- seabed disposal. Sub-seabed disposal could be promoted by the United States as a comprehensive solution to the problem of ocean disposal of nuclear wastes, notably by the members of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). Sub-seabed disposal, administered through an appropriate international regime and open to all nations, could also be viewed as a service provided by the advanced industrial states to LDC customers, and hence as a counter the other way, in negotiating the equity claims mentioned above. Domestic political considerations may also be important in choosing a HLW disposal strategy. Different regions within the advanced industrial nations may. oppose their use for disposal sites. The problem of local acquiescence could become particularly acute in connection with any international organ- ization of the nuclear fuel cycle which included acceptance for disposal of HLW attributable to nuclear programs in other countries. Both these =se 535 problems could tend to make sub-seabed disposal, which would occur at sites outside national a ee More attractive. Although ultimately a number of political factors will strongly influence the viability of sub-seabed disposal as a waste disposal option, Ae ace eae aE re Must be given to a range of institutional con- siderations. These include the international legal standards applicable to activities like sub-seabed disposal and the organizational means by which these standards will be interpreted and applied. While political factors are certainly important, ae cannot always be addressed straigh+t- forwardly. Political discussion of the merits of sub-seabed disposal will likely hinge in great part on institutional matters -- such as whether relevant international legal standards have been followed and whether appropriate organizational measures have been pursued. A convincing legal interpretation which is presented in appropriate organizational forms could carry great weight in defusing political objections or channelling them into a structured framework in which productive negotiations can take place. If an adequate organizational approach is taken both in developing a sub-seabed disposal proposal and implementing it, political arguments based on such extrinsic considerations as international economic equity, technology transfer, and the like may be made considerably more tractable. Once the preliminary legal and organizational questions have been addressed, then a structure of institutions -- including appropriate standards and_ procedures -- should be designed which can also cope satisfactorily with such political factors. The following sections will consider institutional matters arising out of multilateral arrangements involving the U.S., its industrial partners, 536 and other relevant States and the general obligations created by interna- tional law and the law of the sea. This consideration will help to charac- terize in a preliminary way the range of international institutional con- siderations applicable to development of the seabed option. 537 I. Multilateral Arrangements The chief nie DaReee a institution dealing with pollution of the oceans due to eeiipanets waste disposal is the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of weeres and Other Matter (hereinafter "Ocean Dumping éanveheiohon ey "the Convention") signed in London in 1972.4 This Convention was concluded largely through the efforts of the United States, which had previously enacted Title I of its hapate Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq. (1972). The Con- vention was modelled to a great extent on the provisions of the U.S. legis- lation. It became effective according to its terms in 1973, and came into force for the United States in 1975. At the time it ratified the Convention, the U.S. amended its own ocean dumping legislation to conform with the Con- vention. The Convention generally applies to "dumping", which is defined in Art. III, Sec. l(a) (i) as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, platforms or other man-made structures at sea." Annexes to the Convention classify substances into different regimes of regulation. Dumping of substances in Annex I, which includes high-level wastes, is prohibited. Art. IV, Sec. 1(a). Dumping of substances in Annex II, which includes other radioactive wastes or radioactive matter, de subfase to national permitting authority. Id., Sec. 1(b). The dumping of unlisted substances is subject to general permits. Id., Sec. l(c). fener: III of the Convention specifies criteria to be employed in issuing permits for any dumping at sea. Id., Sec. 2. Pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. (4) (a) of the Convention, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been designated as a recommendatory body to the Intergovernmental -6- 538 | Maritime Consultative logeedevebes (IMcOo) -- which serves as the Secretariat for the Convention -- for the purpose of technical advice, specifically with reference to the content of the Annexes to the Convention as they pertain to radioactive substances. The regulatory regime created by Art. IV of the Convention is subject to exceptions contained in Art. V. The relevant exception here allows issuance of a special permit for ocean dumping of substances prohibited by Art. IV, Sec. (1) (a), including HLW, "in emergencies, posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and admitting no other feasible solution." Before such a permit can be granted, however, the responsible State is obliged to consult "any other country or countries that are likely to be affected," as well as IMCO. IMCO is supposed to recommend procedures for such dumping, after consultations with affected States and other interna- tional organizations (presumably the IAEA). The State proposing to issue an emergency permit for the dumping of prohibited wastes is instructed to follow IMCO's recommendations "to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the time within which action must be taken and with the general obli- gation to avoid damage to the marine environment." A State so acting is also obliged to notify IMCO of the action it has taken. The definition of "disposal at sea" under the Convention is also sub- ject to an exemption contained in Art. III, Sec. (1) (b) (ii). Under that section, "placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof" is not considered dumping, "provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims" of the Convention. At the time the Convention was drafted, there waS apparently little indication that sub-seabed disposal of nuclear wastes was a technically feasible option. Soon afterward, 539 however, IAEA took formal note of the possibility of such disposal, and made a preliminary aces raneiin that it be excluded from the terms of the Conventionts For the past several years, a number of ane agencies, both public and public-supported, have investigated the technical aspects of sub-seabed eiereca, | Some legal and political analysis has also been carried out, notably by Desseea ‘The issue was aired at Congressional hearings in 1976 and 1978, and the Department of State, EPA, and ERDA presented legal positions at the earlier momma. ° A working group on sub-seabed emplacement has also been formed as an informal subgroup of the * Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) . 1° Lately additional legal opinions have been produced by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and by the Environmental Protection Agency (Epa) 27 Although other aspects of the Ocean Dumping Convention may be problemmatic in relation to sub- seabed disposal, the legal discussion thus far has centered on whether sub-seabed disposal would constitute "dumping" within the terms of the Convention. 69-848 © - 81 = 35 540 A. Legal Issues (1) The Definition of one Under the Ocean Dumping Convention Article IV, Sec. (1) (a) of the Convention prohibits the "dumping" of HLW. "Dumping" is defined in Art. III, Sec. (1) (a) to include disposal "at sea". At first glance, this definition would appear to include sub- seabed disposal, because the operations leading to disposal would be conducted from vessels at sea and because the final position of the mater- ials deposited would be at geographic coordinates covered by ocean waters. The definition in the Convention may also be interpreted to exclude sub- seabed disposal, however. As Deese has commented, the "at sea" phrase of the definition can be interpreted to refer to the locus of the dumping operation itself or the position of the materials disposed of. Semanti- cally, the latter interpretation appears preferable, since the definition specifies separately that the act must be carried out from "vessels, air- craft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea". Since the second "at sea" applies to the location of the vessel or facility from which disposal is undertaken (and therefore presumably to the location of the activity itself), the first "at sea" may be read to apply to the position of the materials disposed of. This position should in turn be read to be the final position of the materials, since there is nothing that prohibits the transportation of HLW over or through the sea for the purposes of dis- posal elsewhere. If the final position of the wastes were such that they 4 would be completely isolated from the marine environment, then emplacement of wastes in the seabed may not be "dumping" within the operational terms of the Convention, since it would not result in final disposal "at sea". Thus, it has been claimed that sub-seabed disposal should be considered 541 a variety of deep geological emplacement that happens to be beneath the Ocean. This would be true due to the nature of the containment, regard- less of the fact that the ocean sediments into which the waste would be anatase aae indisputably formed by Re processes operating within the ocean basins, and are not geologically related to the underlying rock of the seafloor. | There does not at present appear to be clear authority for resolution of the question whether stibeseabe disposal would be "disposal at sea" within the meaning of the Convention. The Convention itself was drafted in 1972 -- apparently before the concept of sub-seabed disposal became a serious proposal. Nothing in the Convention itself or associated documents mentions the possibility of sub-seabed disposal. The report of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations does not comment on the sossieidee Shortly after the Convention was signed and the IAEA was assigned to develop technical recommendations for refinement of the Annexes to the Convention, the IAEA proposed to adopt a draft paragraph submitted by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission taking note of the possibility of sub-seabed disposal and suggesting that it be considered as excluded from the terms of the Convention. A preliminary report of the IAEA stated: Certain methods of radioactive waste disposal, although not feasible at this time, may eventually be developed technically to the point of proposing the long-term isolation of wastes by emplacement beneath the seabed. Such methods should be evalu- ated as variations of deep geological burial on land and are excluded from the scope of this document because they will not contribute to the radioactivity of the sea.13 The Department of State objected to the statement, however, on the grounds that it was inaccurately included in a section of the IAEA draft entitled "Sources of Radioactivity in the Sea" and was not in a separate == 542 appendix on icp techniaues of wane aienceet ee _The statement was then deleted from subsequent IAEA vecomentarionse presumably in Pare because of the U.S. objection and also apparently because of ai ericulttes of developing a definition of emplacement in or beneath the eeabede Furthermore, it does not appear that IAEA would have the legal autho- rity to construe the scope of the Convention's application to specific disposal activities. Although Annex I calls for IAEA to define which wastes should be considered as HLW "unsuitable for dumping at sea," Art. XIV, Sec. (4) (b) of the Convention defines the authority of the IAEA as advisory with respect only to “any scientific or technical aspect of the Annexes". While this section gives the IAEA authority to advise the parties to the Convention concerning what substances should be considered HLW within the prohibition of Art. IV, Sec. (1) (a), and may give the IAEA authority to advise the parties to what extent sub-seabed disposal would represent an isolation of the disposed wastes from the marine environment, it does not appear to give IAEA authority to define the scope of the Convention even if technical considerations are involved. The present IAEA recommendations to IMCO on revising the definition of high-level waste in Annex I of the Convention and the dumping criteria of Annex III do not include any reference to sub-seabed disposal. The recommendations state only: Nothing in this Document shall be considered as encouraging the dumping at sea of radioactive waste or other radioactive matter. 16 (Emphasis in original.) Although IAEA may have no formal role in determining whether the Con- vention applies to sub-seabed disposal of HLW, IAEA recommendations will however be influential in creating the climate in which such proposals =ilie \ 543 will be received. Two developments at the IAEA May result in creating amore favorable climate for sub-seabed disposal. First, IAEA has, upon U.S. lead, adopted recommendations applicable to the dumping of non-HLW that encourage an "isolation and containment" rather than "dispersal and r F 17 a eee dilution" strategy for dumped wastes. In connection with such a stra- tegy, IAEA has recommended consideration, in dumping non-HLW, of several factors that would also be relevant in case a sub-seabed disposal option were chosen for HLW, including the physical properties at the dumping site, pathways through which wastes might be transmitted beyond the disposal site, the characteristics of the container and matrix, and geological characteristics of the sige" IAEA has also recommended a cessation of dumping of liquid or unpackaged radioactive waste into surface and shallow waters, as well as a prohibition on the dumping of unpackaged liquid radio- active waste into the deep sea unless the liguid waste is incorporated . r ___ al’) into an insoluble matrix. Second, consultants to IAEA have recommended that the distinction between HLW and non-HLW be eliminated and that only release rate should be considered in any regulatory regime. The consultants' report states: 2. The initial concentrations of radioactivity in wastes dumped into the deep oceans are unlikely to be important in determining the subsequent hazards to man, although the total radioactivity in a canister may need to be limited for operational reasons. 3. The hazards to man and the ecosystem are largely deter- mined by the rates of release of radioactivity to the oceans and it is these which should be controlled. We have not been able to establish on radiological grounds any upper limit to the initial concentration of radio- activity in wastes destined for deep ocean disposal. 4. We conclude therefore that there are no high level wastes that are intrinsically unsuitable for dumping at sea but that quantities dumped should be strictly controlled on the basis of release rate limits. =12- 544 5. The rates of release of radioactivity to the oceans can be reduced by suitable containment and packaging of wastes. When it has been established that wastes can be contained for a given length of time, an allowance for decay in situ, relative to that time may be considered. Emplacement of waste canisters into certain seafloor sediments may pro- vide additional containment and should be further investi- gated ...20 ; The movement within IAEA toward waste disposal systems that achieve isola- tion and containment of wastes, the acceptability of which are based on the release rates from such dispositions instead of the nature of the substance deposited, weakens the basis of the legal prohibition against the disposal of HLW although of course it does not eliminate it. The prohibition against disposal of HLW at sea under the Convention is based on an administrative rather than a technical rationale, since as noted in the IAEA consultants’ report, there is no scientific reason why HLW should be treated differently from non-HLW, provided the release rates do not exceed acceptable maxima. The administrative rationale for treating HLW differently fron non-HLW is the assumption that the release of the sub- stances contained in HLW could easily exceed the maximum acceptable rates for such substances if there were a failure of containment devices. HLW, because of its radiological, chemical, and thermal characteristics, is also more likely to escape from conventional containment. If the nature of the methods of disposition were such that virtually complete isolation of the wastes in question could be assured for the necessary time, however, then there would be no administrative rationale to prohibit all oceanic disposal of HLW but allow continued disposal of LLW. -13- 545 (2) The Effect of Other Provisions of the Convention on Sub-Seabed Disposal i (a) Emergency permits. Art. V of the Convention creates an exception to the general prohibi- tion on disposal of HLW at sea. Under Sec. 2 of this article, a State party to the Convention may issue a special permit for disposal of HLW "in emergencies, posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and admitting no other feasible solution." This exception is accompanied by consultation and notification requirements that have been described supra. While this emergency permit provision would not appear on its face to allow for dis- posal of HLW at sea based simply on geographical factors or a difficult storage situation, the U.S. has entered a formal reservation to this section which may somewhat expand its scope. The United States understands that the word "emergency" as used in Article V, 2 refers to situations requiring action with a marked degree of urgency, but is not limited in its application to circumstances requiring immediate action.21 While the U.S. reservation on this point may create a technical loop- hole that would allow sub-seabed disposal of HLW even if sub-seabed dispo- sal were determined to ee disposal "at sea," it would be unlikely that a party to the Convention, or even a nonparty like Japan, would proceed with a systematic waste disposal system based on sub-seabed disposal relying solely on "chronic" factors of a geographical nature, such as shortage of available land or satisfactory geological formations for long-term storage of EW. 77 The exception, and the U.S. reservation to it, could however be read as permitting sub-seabed disposal, as well as ordinary marine disposal, in situations with some unspecified degree of “urgency.” -14- 546 (b) Retrievable storage. Art. III, Sec. (1) (b) (2) of the Convention exempts from the scope of "dumping" the "placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere dispo- sal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.” It has been argued that this provision could allow for retrievable storage of HIW. 7? Retrievable storage could be Bareded either as a systematic disposal option or as a test program to determine whether the isolation from the Marine environment achieved by sub-seabed disposal would be complete. Reso- lution of the question whether a particular retrievable storage program would or would not be within this exemption to the coverage of the Conven- tion would hinge on the purposes of the program and the actual prospects for retrieval. Any systematic program of storage would probably be con- strued as "contrary to the aims" of the Convention, especially if the prospects for retrieval were dim -- as they would likely be, because of the expense and technical difficulty of retrieval. However, a test program of retrievable storage of actual HLW would appear to fall within the exemp- tion, since such a program would be on a limited scale, retrieval would be a genuine prospect, and the program would not be construed as a subterfuge for ultimate disposal. (3) Federal Agency Views A number of federal agencies have now issued statements of one sort or another on the legality of sub-seabed disposal under international law. Several such statements were triggered by Congressional inquiries, the 4 5 2 first round stemming from hearings conducted by Rep. Udall in 1976. The Department of State concluded at that time on the international issue: -15- 547 The Convention defines "dumping" as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea." Under these definitions, disposal of high-level radioactive wastes upon the ocean bottom falls within the Convention's prohibition, as will disposal under the ocean bottom if it poses a threat of pollution to the marine environment. We note that the concept of seabed emplacement is a novel one. No concrete proposal has yet been made for such a method of disposal, and there exists the possibility that new technolo- gies might be developed which would permit the emplacement of wastes in the seabed with little or no danger to the marine environment. The Department would wish to examine the question of applicability of the Ocean Dumping Convention to such a technology if it were proposed. 2> (Emphasis added.) NOAA has issued a very scholarly legal opinion on the question of the legality of sub-seabed disposal under the Comrenciontaa The NOAA opinion concludes: Disposal of high-level radioactive wastes through sub-seabed emplacement is not necessarily "disposal at sea” of such wastes, aS prohibited by the Ocean Dumping Convention, and the resolution of this issue will depend largely on technical devel- opments. A technically satisfactory showing that such emplace- ment of high-level wastes in the subsoil of the seabed would not lead to release of radioactive materials into the marine environment could be considered to place such disposal outside the operative terms of the Convention. To a significant degree, however, this issue will be resolved by the future actions of States parties to the Convention. The Convention also contains other provisions, including a provision allowing for disposal of wastes under “emergency” conditions and a provision exempting placement of materials for purposes other than disposal, that could be construed as allowing limited sub-seabed emplacement under suitable condi- tions. Strangely, the "Federal Plan for Ocean Pollution Research, Development, and Monitoring, Fiscal Years 1979-83" prepared by an interagency committee chaired by NOAA in response to the 1978 act of similar name contains the following contradictory statement. (It is not clear whether or this repre- sents a reversal of position by NOAA or a failure to properly clear the -16- 548 latter document through agency legal channels.) International treaty and U.S. law currently ban at-sea disposal of high-level radioactive wastes by deep-ocean emplacement. However, this disposal option should be evaluated and. compared with land disposal options for future use in any overall comparative study of methods for nuclear waste disposal.27 EPA has also issued a legal opinion on the applicability of the Ocean Dumping Convention to sub-seabed disposi EPA's lawyers, while conced- ing that the language of the Convention itself was ambiguous, concluded that "the better view" was that the Convention prohibits sub-seabed dispo- sal. In reaching this conclusion, EPA argued that a reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) in the preamble to the Convention (in which the resolution is "recalled" by the parties to the Convention) justifies the view that the Convention was intended to prevent all pollution of the oceans, including the seabed itself. The General Assembly resolution spoke of prevention of pollution to the marine environment and protection and conservation of the natural resources of the "area" (i.e., the seabed and ocean floor and its subsoil) and prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine environment. (The United States voted in favor of . 2 E ae ote. 29 this resolution.) It is unclear whether these provisions are binding, are an authoritative guide to interpretation of the Ocean Dumping Convention, or even apply to sub-seabed disposal. Nevertheless EPA found in them suffi- cient support to ascribe a protective interpretation to the Convention. . Of course, this application is not directly supported in the operative terms of the Convention or in any material accompanying the Convention. Indeed, work done by the IAEA shortly after the Convention was concluded sought to exclude sub-seabed disposal since it was thought by IAEA that == 549 sub-seabed disposal should not be considered as contributing to radiation in the Beasoe Finally, representatives of the State Department have recently indi-~ cated continued willingness to entertain the concept of sub-seabed disposal as an internationally acceptable waste disposal aeetien. 2" Ambassador Richardson indicated recently that if sub-seabed disposal led to no radio- logical effects outside the sediments themselves that it would not come within the terms of the Convention, or for that matter the Law of the Sea Treaty currently being negotiated. -18- 590 B. Organizational Issues International organizations can have an important role in interpreting the provisions of new proposals under existing multilateral arrangements and providing a range of services associated with formulating and imple- menting such proposals. The NEA, for example, has played an important . role in implementation of the 68255 Dumping Convention and the other regional dumping conventions in assuring the parties that appropriate safeguards were being taken during operations. The OECD Council has established a Multi- digeerai Consultation and Surveillance Mechanism for Sea Dumping of Radio- active Waste under the auspices of the NEA which strengthens NEA's previous role in overseeing dumping Stes eoes 3 © Under this mechanism, regular pro- cedures are established for prior notification and consultation, interna- tional surveillance, and reports on dumping operations. NEA has also ‘ developed guidelines for he construction of sea dumping’ packages for radioactive waste and has recommended. operational procedures fa duping International organizations can, however, serve an important role in defining the regime applicable to new proposals such as sub-seabed disposal. We have seen how the work of the IAEA and its consultant groups has already played a role in interpretation of the application of the Ocean Dumping Sane vention to sub-seabed disposal. While IAEA is not authorized to interpret the operative terms of the Convention, its recommendations about interpre- tation of the Annexes (including defining the scope of HLW as an Annex I substance which is prohibited for disposal at sea and making recommendations on the dumping of LLW) could be important in determining how to proceed in constructing an institutional framework for sub-seabed disposal. The recent amendment of the Annexes of the Ocean Dumping Convention to include -19- 551 special regulations for the incineration at seas? of hazardous chemicals and the adoption of technical guidelines for such operations*© is a good illustration of how a creative use of such international organizational channels might work. The applicability of the Convention to incineration at sea was deter- ~~ mined through amendments which were adopted through the "speedy amendment" provisions of the Convention applicable to amendments of the Annexes. Art. XV (2). The amendment and accompanying material were prepared by special consultative Grouse including ad hoc scientific committees, °° which met under the auspices of IMCO, ene secretariat for the Convention. The amendment themselves and the other material were adopted by the parties to the Convention?” at their regular consultative meetings. Incineration at sea of toxic substances, primarily halogenated hydro- carbons, had been carried out by several European nations both prior to the effective date of the Convention and after ate 20 The United States had issued special permits for incineration operations on three occasions, twice for chlorinated hydrocarbon wastes stored in Mississippi (which were burned at a site in the Gulf of Mexico) and once for the incineration of Agent Orange, a notorious Vietnam-era herbicide contaminated with extremely toxic dioxin, for which incineration was authorized at a site in the Baeietewan For a number of reasons, the application of the Convention to incineration operations was not clear. First, such disposal may not be "disposal at. sea" at all, since effective incineration at sea may not lead to measurable changes in the marine.environment at the incineration site. Second, although the substances for which incineration at sea would be conducted would likely include substances whose dumping is prohibited by Annex I of the Convention, -20- 552 a paragraph of that Annex provides that the prohibition on dumping of Annex I substances does not Seale to substances which are "rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chémical or biological processes sates sea" and which do not make marine organisms ‘unpalatable or endanger the health of humans or domestic animals. Annex I, Par. 8. Incineration at sea is likely to produce wastes that. are either completely neutralized by sea~ water (HCl) or are present in such small quantities that the specified harms would not ordinarily occur. Third, the prohibition on dumping Annex I substances does not apply to the dumping of certain substances -- includ- ing mercury and cadmium compounds, organohalogen compounds, persistent plas- tics or synthetics, or oil mixtures -- which are contained only as "trace contaminants". Incineration of prohibited wastes at sea would, in addi- tion to providing virtually complete elimination of the organohalogens, probably result in only small amounts of these other prohibited substances. It was not clear, furthermore, how the notion of "trace contaminants" in the Convention should have been applied to substances considered for incin- eration, i.e., whether the wastes themselves should be considered or the wastes as transformed during incineration and dispersed through an atmos- pheric plume. (It was ultimately decided that combustible substances should be considered in their plume densities but that incombustibles like cadmium and mercury, which would be delivered to the ocean as particulates, should be evaluated in terms of their initial concentrations in the waste.) The device of amending the Annexes to define more clearly the meaning of the Convention's prohibitions in relation to incineration enabled the parties to the Convention to bring such operations within effective regu- lation without having to resolve in detail the underlying question of == 593 whether or to what extent such operations were covered by the Convention, and how such questions would be resolved for specific operations. The amendments to Annex I authorized incineration of organohalogen compounds and oils (which would ordinarily be incinerated along with other more toxic substances in order to achieve satisfactory combustion) provided the regulations adopted by the parties which were also inserted into Annex I were Sonaenela These “eg uleysienes: provide performance and other stan- dards applicable to many aspects of incineration operations, including flame temperature and other operational controls, survey of incinerators and other equipment, recording of seetownariea! and the like. A set of technical Grideinesen was also adopted which provide more definite stan- dards for equipment which, if adopted, would make such operations much safer; the parties agreed to take these guidelines into account in issuing permits for incineration of Annex I eebaeaneesens The parties also agreed to consider the regulations and guidelines in issuing the special permits they were authorized to issue anyway for substances included in Annex capt? A similar multilateral approach could be tried in constructing a regime for sub-seabed disposal and in determining the effect of the Ocean Dumping Convention on this proposal. By means of a technical amendment to the Annexes, the parties could agree among themselves not to contest the lega- lity of sub-seabed disposal provided it were implemented conformably to mutually agreed standards. If this procedure were chosen, it would be possible for the parties to agree on rigorous international standards for sub-seabed disposal without on the one hand prejudicing their freedom to implement such a project by declaring it within the scope of the Convention, or on the other hand losing their ability to control it by declaring it =2D= 504 outside the framework of the Convention. Political conflict based on the legality of such a proposal guabe the Convention could also be avoided. Although it is to be hoped that any institutional aeetibe thes under the Convention associated with sub-seabed disposal are given careful and full deliberation, use of this sort of procedure would also simplify their adoption, since amendments to the Annexes can be made by the simplified technical amendment procedure used for the incineration amendments; in addition, no further domestic measures would be necessary to ratify such amendments. The marine incineration amendments indicate one way in which efforts could be made through international organizations to facilitate agreement on an international regime for a new proposal like sub-seabed disposal. These amendments secured multilateral recognition of incineration opera- tions and regulation of them without the political conflict that could have arisen had the parties proceeded to make unilateral interpretations of the Convention. Thus, specific standards for various operations connected with sub-seabed disposal, developed by standing international organizations or through structured consultations, may represent a method of interpreting existing legal obligations under multilateral agreements like the Ocean Dumping Convention in relation to this emerging proposal. In the field of disposal of eee wastes at sea, the IAEA has issued a definition of HLW within the Annex I prohibition and a set of recommendations con-. cérning dumping operations, as authorized by Annex II. IAEA would logi- cally provide a forum to deal with other aspects of HLW disposal such as sub-seabed disposal, espcially in relation to its other functions under the Ocean Dumping Convention. IMCO and the NEA could also provide a forum for -23- 559 resolution of the institutional Mestee ereceneed by sub-seabed disposal. Aside from their functions under multilateral agreements, such inter- national organizations as the IAEA and IMCO, and to a teases extent such regional bodies as NEA, may also have a role in defining the requirements that arise not from multilateral agreements but from general international law. This point will be examined next. = DA Moone ~My = (4) — Sa 556 II. Global Responsibilities A. Legal Issues In addition to multilateral arrangements, sub-seabed aaoeasal must be evaluated from the perspective of. the general international institutional framework which is evolving both with respect to environmental matters in general and specifically the new provisions on marine pollution and the regime of the seabed being developed by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS rz) .*” In terms of general environmental obligations, there are now no clear standards of a substantive or proce- dural nature to guide States. Commentators have nevertheless noticed a trend toward a “shared resource/common heritage" approach in which States would be obliged to undertake certain procedures before commencing activi- ties that would be likely to cause severe environmental problems outside national jurisdiction and also to ensure that their activities do not cause significant harm to the environment or interfere with the equitable interests of other Sarat Conceptually speaking, these procedural and substantive duties are primary rules of obligation which impose require- ments on the conduct of States, regardless of the difficulty of ascribing these rules a definite content at the present eee For example, recent work on the allocation of shared resources (in this case, international rivers) emphasizes the importancé of prior notification of actions likely to affect the interests of other States, environmental assessment, and the need to consult with a view toward an equitable solution of resource pone itera Similarly, decisions of the OECD Council have recommended both substantive and procedural standards for proposed actions which could ; 3 51 have a transfrontier environmental effect. -25- 597 In addition to such Renuons but still primary rules, the actions of States that have an terns edonad environmental effect may generate secon- dary legal aansecnencese” These secondary rules define the legal conse- quences both of failure to act in accordance with primary rules and also of cases in which the relevant primary obligations ERE observed but legally cognizable effects nevertheless sraaviseedl. Thus, a State may be held responsible for certain actions with international environmental con- sequences; this responsibility could entail an obligation to take appropriate steps to restore the situation or to pay damages. Recent authoritative work has even included a notion of international crimes which would include inter alia massive pollution of the oceans or samoseinese. While no international criminal machinery exists at present, an action which falls into this cate- gory could have serious legal and political consequences for the acting State. With regard to marine pollution specifically, the draft. negotiating text of UNCLOS III carries over the definition of pollution from the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.>> This definition, which is reproduced here, appears to contain much the same ambiguity with regard to sub-seabed disposal as the Ocean Dumping Convention. "Pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to Marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.26 The negotiating text, officially referred to as the Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2 (ICNT/Rev. 2), also states a general obligation -26- 508 of States to protect the marine environment. with respect to “dumping”, States would be obliged to minimize to the fullest possible Mar. the re- lease of toxic eubsLaneeas 26 Interestingly, the definition of dumping in the ICNT/Rev. 2 could be construed to include sub-seabed didtadatiseict the double use of the phrase “at sea" has been deleted. Dumping is now defined to mean, inter alia: --. any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea. 58 In view of all the eaetieies of terminology and the qualifying words on obligations, however, certainly this clause cannot be construed absolutely to prohibit sub-seabed disposal. In addition to the articles on marine pollution and associated matters, the important results of UNCLOS III for present purposes is the establish- ment of a regime of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Under the proposed LOS text, the seabed is declared the common heritage of makina The United States previously recognized this status by voting in raven of General Assembly Resolution 2749(XXV) in 1970; in the recently passed Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, however, Congress has indicated that this resolution was signed in the expectation that a comprehensive LOS treaty would be agreed Bpen One could argue therefore that the adherence of the U.S. to the common heritage concept was limited in scope and was in- tended to be in connection with development of an international regime for the exploitation of seabed nei In addition, the text of the Gebiitrall Assembly resolution speaks primarily about the resources of the seabed (in addition to its environment as discussed above); one could also argue that the acquiescence of the U.S. in its principles was limited to mineral =J7= 559 exploitation activities. It is not at all clear that sub-seabed disposal should be considered a use of the seabed included in the scope of these provisions. Sub-seabed disposal would not appear to be a use of the re- sources of the seabed. No tangible resource would be used, and it does not appear that the storage capacity of the deep sea Senate is so limited that it itself should be considered a scarce good which should be removed from national appropriation. Provided sub-seabed disposal was performed in resource-poor areas, it would appear unlikely that sub-seabed disposal sites would become candidates for mineral extraction. Furthermore, while this possibility should be explored Repessin ever emplacement would probably be far enough into the sediments that subsequent seafloor mineral activities could still be carried out. Finally, while minerals no doubt exist in the earth's crust beneath the sediments, it is unlikely that it would become an exploitable resource in the foreseeable future. Similarly, it would appear unlikely that the existence of HLW repositories in the seabed would : significantly impede mining of the sediments themselves or underlying resources should this be pursued as an'economic activity. Also, the ICNT/Rev. 2, in defining the scope of activities subject to regulation under the seabed regime, limits itself mostly in terms of “activities in the Area", which has a technical definition as: --- all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.©2 This would appear to exclude sub-seabed disposal operations. (There is some ambiguity in the text on this point, however.) Regardless of the technical legal validity of applying the concepts of the UNCLOS III seabed regime to sub-seabed disposal, however, political -28- 560 realities are likely to be such that a sub-seabed disposal proposal would generate considerable international attention revolving around the notions of preservation of the global marine environment and utilization of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. At the very epcees lengthy consul- . tations with other nations and rigorous environmental assessment will be necessary to deal with such a political reaction. Multilateral or inter- national institutions measures uSing existing frameworks such as the Ocean Dumping Convention consultations and international organizations such as the IAEA and IMCO could also provide an opportunity to obtain international recognition of such a proposal. These functions of the international organ- izations are also recognized in the ICNT/Rev. 2 at several points; it could be argued on this basis that the standards developed in these organizations represent new international law applicable to emerging uses of the oceans and seabed and provide an acceptable channel to obtain international recog- nition of such new uses. The following paragraphs from the ICNT/Rev. 2 are presented to illustrate how the use of international organizations to create generally recognized standards is authorized by the text: irticle 207 Pollution from l#nd—based sources RKEKKKKKKKK KK KK KKK KKK KKK KKK 4. States, acting especially through com : i i i 7 t petent international organi or diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish ¢lobzl and regional ralece 7a stenderds and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, taking into account characteristic regionel features, the cconomic capacity of developing States and their need for econonic devolopment. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary. 5. Laws, regulations, measures, rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 respectively shall include those designed to minimize, to the fullest possible extent, the release of toxic, harmful and noxious substences, especially persistent substances, into the marine environment. -29- 561 ixticle 208 Pollution from sca-bed activities 1. Coastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, : reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising frou or in connexion with sec-bed activities subject to their jurisdiction ond from artificial islonds, installations 2nd structures under their jurisdiction-.. KKKKKK KKK KHER RAKE RAKE 4. States shall endeavour to harnonize their netionel policics at the appropriste regional level. 5. States, acting especially through competent international or,auizations or diplom=tic conference, shcll establish global and regional rulcs, stenderds and recommended practices ond procedur:s to prevent, reduce ond: control pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connexion with sea-bed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures urder their jurisdiction referred to in psragraph 1. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shell bs re-examined from time to time as necessary. Article 209 Pollution from activities in the Area 1. ‘International rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be established in accordence with the provisions of Part XI to prevent, réduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area. Such rules, stendards and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examinéd from timé to time as netessary. 2. Subject to other relevant provisions of this section, States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area undertaken by vessels, installations, structures and other devices flying their flag or of their registry. The requirements of such laws and regulations shall be no less effective than the international rules, standards, recommended practices and procedures referred to in paragraph 1. frticle 210 Dumping 1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from dumping. KKK KKKKKK KKK KEK KRKKKKREKER 4. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, sh2ll endeavour to establish global end regional rules, stendards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environnent by dumping. Such rules, standards end recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined from time to tine as necessary. -30- 562 Article 211 Pollution from vessels 1. States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, shall establish internationel rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vesscls and promote the adoption, in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routing systeus designed to minimize the threat of accidents which might cause pollution of the marine environment, including the coastline and related interests of coastal States. ~Such rules and standards shall, in the same manner, be re-examined from tine to time as necessary. KKKKKK KKK KKKKKKKR KKK KKK KEK asl] 563 B. Organizational Issues While the substantive Standards applicable to actions with an impact on the global environment are difficult to state in any detail, there appears to be a Srowtny consensus among commentators that the primary obligations of States in this area also encompass certain procedural duties. These include prior notification of oe States, adequate environmental assess-—- ments including information sharing and jointly-conducted environmental analyses where possible, as well as good faith consultations with other States toward the objective of achieving a solution to environmental con- flicts which respects the equitable interests of all affected States, both in their rights to enjoyment of a healthy environment and their exercise of rights to use national and global resources with appropriate considera- tion of the interests of other States. These procedural obligations suggest the range of functions which intermational organizations could serve in relation to development of sub-seabed disposal as a waste-disposal option. Technical and institutional issues related to sub-seabed disposal could be aired in international organizations in order to fulfill the: duty to notify other States of proposed activities and consult with them about the extent of anticipated environmental effects and the effect of the proposed activity on other beneficial activities. The international organizations could also be involved in environmental assessment efforts. Optimally, such organi- zations could also be brought to develop a set of Substantive standards ~ 25 well as procedures for development and implementation of a sub-seabed disposal proposal. Ultimately, a new organization could even be created which would exercise a range of functions related to sub-seabed disposal. -32- 564 Such an organization conceptually could serve a variety of functions, including facilitation (e.g., information sharing, observation and sur- veillance, and other functions); management (formulation of operational criteria and other policies); and even actual operational Pasponei nse Aside from serving as an important element of a legal case for sub- seabed disposal under the provisions cited earlier, such an organizational compo~ nent could also provide an important vehicle to resolve outstanding poli- tical issues. Political opposition to sub-seabed disposal could easily arise since sub-seabed disposal could be perceived to pose some level of risk for the Bakes rests = environment and: would represent a use of the deep seabed which has been claimed as the common heritage of mankind. Although sub-seabed disposal could be claimed to be a universal benefit in that it could solve a severe problem for many nations, viz. the HLW disposal problem, the less-developed countries (LDC's) could plausibly contend that the proposal would primarily, at least in the intermediate term, benefit the advanced industrial States which are accumulating signi- ficant amounts of HLW as a result of widespread commercial nuclear power generation. The creation of a new international institutional framework for sub-seabed disposal which involved appropriate forms of international organization could moderate these objections. Through a new institutional regime, sub-seabed disposal could be linked to other issues involving the nuclear fuel cycle and the much-contested obligations of States under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Sub-seabed disposal, since it would occur in areas beyond national jurisdiction, could be linked to an overall internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. For example, an institutional framework to implement sub-seabed disposal could be linked =sisi= 565 to the establishment of multinational spent fuel reprocessing Centers! * Such centers, it has been argued, could contribute greatly to alleviating the problem of diversion of weapons material while still offering adequate assurances of supply of fuel for existing and planned LWR's and the FBR when it comes into Ponereial opeerticng == One of the leading legal and political difficulties with sub-seabed disposal could then be turned into an advantage. Since sub-seabed disposal would occur in international areas, it could be more easily linked with other forms of international organiza- tion of the nuclear fuel Groleeos Sub-seabed disposal would also circumvent the problem of the reluctance of dhe supplier States to provide per- Manent disposal within their borders for HLW generated by nuclear programs elsewhere. Instead of being viewed as a use of international areas for national purposes, then, sub-seabed disposal could be seen as linked to the general international equity issue created by the contrasting duties of the nuclear weapons States and non-nuclear weapons States under the NPT, under which the non-nuclear weapons States have agreed to forego nuclear weapons development while the nuclear weapons States have undertaken to transfer nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. NPT, Art. tv(2).°7 The provision of international fuel cycle services including HLW disposal as well as re- processing could mitigate demands for a further sharing of reprocessing uodnmallany > Beeondiung on the regime which is chosen for international disposal of HLW and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, reprocessing and waste disposal services could be provided through an international organi- zation, a consortium of nuclear suppliers, or some other international 69 : arrangement. Recipient countries could be brought into the system through =34- 566 dissuasion (i.e., provision of efficient and ealiabie fuel and waste ser- vices) or through threat of sanction (exclusion from services or other Measures) in case they proceed with national reprocessing Bffores. © Such a resolution of the equity issue inherent in the NPT could also go far in resolving the more general equity concerns that could be voiced in relation to uses of the marine environment and the seabed by the ad- vanced industrial countries. These concerns, which are related to the general call for the creation of a New International Economic Order, could be alleviated by an international regime for sub-seabed disposal which would benefit all nations by providing an essential fuel cycle service. In this way, international organizational measures could provide both a legal and political support for a sub-seabed disposal program. =355 567 III. Conclusion It must be concluded that the Ocean Dumping Convention is at best ambiguous with regard to sub-seabed disposal. As both the NOAA and EPA opinions indicate, this ambiguity likely means that political considera- tions will be important in deciding what institutional regime will apply to sub-seabed disposal. The United States has already, through the Seabed Working Group of the NEA, taken steps to obtain the cooperation of some of the other major parties to the Ocean Dumping Convention. If such efforts are successful both within the NEA group and the parties to the Convention, then appropriate organizational chauntas could be followed to achieve institutional acceptance of sub-seabed disposal and an appropriate regime for it under the Convention. If the agreement of the other parties te the existing multilateral arrangements is not obtained -- for instance if the other parties seek to pursue other ocean disposal strategies such as direct dumping of HLW -- then the Convention would no longer provide an adequate framework for discussion of this issue and general principles of interna- tional law would have to be addressed. Good models of international organizations that might provide the technical and administrative support for the implementation of a sub-seabed disposal program do exist. These include the NEA and the Multilateral Consultation and Surveillance Mechanism of the OECD Council. The amend- ment of the Ocean Dumping Convention to include control of and provision of technical guidance for the incineration of hazardous chemicals at sea was described above as an example of how the institutional implementation of a sub-seabed disposal program might occur. =365 568 Given the recent accelerated deve lopment of the concept of a nation's global responsibility (and accountability) for its actions, any sub-seabed disposal program will likely require extensive intermational consultation even outside of any existing multilateral arrangements. Specifically, the Third United Nations Genference on the Law of the Sea has been developing a regime of the seabed that, in some future form, will have to be addressed by the nation or group of nations that seeks to Sorell ces pape eae disposal. Examples were provided above of how international organizations, adhering to the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Revision 2), can be used to create generally recognized standards for new rere The organizational structure of previously established internationally recognized standards for a new activity such as sub-seabed disposal might be a critical vehicle for resolving the political issues that will arise when a formal proposal is made. Either the standards themselves or a new regime tied to them which truly internationalizes the program might serve to answer the likely (and reasonable) contention of less-developed countries that the sub-seabed disposal program would primarily benefit the advanced industrial countries. Thus, appropriate international organizations might help provide both legal and political support for a sub-seabed disposal program. =aye 569 FOOTNOTES Descriptions of SSE contained in this report are taken primarily from the following sources: (1) ERDA, "Alternatives for Managing Wastes From Reactors and Post-Fission Operations in the LWR Fuel Cycle," Vol. 4, May 1978; (2) Sandia Laboratories, "Report to the Radioactive Waste Management Committee on the First International Workshop on Seabed Disposal of High-Level Wastes, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, Feb. 16-20, 1976; (3) ."High-Level Nuclear Wastes in the Seabed?", 20 Oceanus 1 - 67 (1977) (papers from the Woods Hole Workshop, supra) . : (4) 94th Cong., 2d Sess., House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and the Environment, Oversight Hearings, “Radiological Contamination of the Oceans," July 26-27, 1976 (1977) (hereinafter “Hearings") ; (5) 95th Cong., 2d Sess., House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Sub- committee on Oceanography, Hearings, May 15 and July 11, 1978 (unpublished) . For a more complete description of the nuclear waste problem, see Willrich & Lester, Radioactive Waste: Management and Regulation (1977); for more formal analysis of the insti- tutional concerns raised by waste management as well as the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, see Rochlin, Plutonium, Power, and Politics: International Arrangements for the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel (1979). The Antarctic Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794, TIAS No. 4780, in force (1961), Art.v(1). 26 U.S.T. 2403, TIAS No. 8165, in force (1975). Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, as amended, 33 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. IAEA Doc. GOV/1622 (Sept. 3, 1973). See sec. (3), infra. Papers by Deese include: (1) “Law of the Sea and High Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: a Potential Geologic Option under the Deep Seabed?", in Hearings, supra n. 1(4), at 823; -38- 10. alate 12. Abele 14. 15. 16. alzIG 570 (2) "Seabed: Emplacement and Political Reality," 20 Oceanus 47 (1977); : (3) Nuclear Power and Radioactive Waste (1978). Hearings, supra n. 1(4). Legal positions of the State Department, EPA, and ERDA appear at 798, 813, and 816 respectively V sec. (3), infra. See, e.g-, Seabed Working Group, Report to the NEA Radio- active Waste Management Committee (NEA/RWMC), transmitted with letter from D. Glenn Boyer, Chairman, Seabed Working Group and Alex Paige, U.S. Representative to NEA/RWMC to O. Ilari, Nuclear Energy Agency (March 15, 1979). See sec. (3), infra. See "Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea Held at London, October 30-November 13, 1972, Which Produced the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter," in 93rd Cong., lst Sess., House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva- tion and the Environment, "Ocean Dumping," at 16 (1973). See IAEA Doc. GOV/1622 (Sept. 3, 1973). Airgram No. A 9894, from U.S. Dept. of State to IAEA (Nov. 30, 1973). Deese, in Hearings, supra n. 1(4) at 963, n. i IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/205/Add.1/Rev. 1. Id.. It has been claimed that the regulation of disposal at sea under the Convention is based on the need to develop a regulatory regime that would ensure that wastes dumped into the ocean would be adequately diluted and dispersed by ocean waters to prevent environmental damage, and therefore that sub-seabed emplacement is outside the regime of the Convention. James L. Liverman of ERDA has stated: The (sub-seabed emplacement) concept involves locating a suitable, stable sub-seafloor geologic formation and emplacing canisters of wastes within the formation, utilizing one of a number of techniques to penetrate and emplace, that are applications of current technology. The radioactive material itself does not, therefore come into contact with the ocean and became dispersed. -39- 571 The seabed concept is thus quite unlike sea dumping and should: be thought of as a variant of isolation of radio- active waste within stable geological formations on land, the difference being that the coordinates are at sea. Also, because of the potentially higher costs of this technique, it would almost certainly be reserved for solidified, encapsulated high-level waste which could not be sea Fi dumped under the London Convention. Hearings, supra n. 1(4), at 554-555. This logic could be read to mean that as IAEA and the international community move toward a regime of ocean dumping that stresses the need for isolation and containment of wastes, that a single conceptual model is being developed that should apply to sub-seabed emplacement as well. However, although IAEA has begun to stress the containment of wastes, containment of wastes that are not embedded in the sea floor will never achieve complete isolation. The IAEA containment strategy is therefore not a complete isolation strategy, unlike sub-seabed emplacement. It may thus be argued that sub- seabed emplacement remains a unique method of disposal that does not fall under the terms of the Convention. 18. IAEA Doc. GOV/1622 (Sept. 13, 1973). 19. id.. 20. The Radiological Basis of the IAEA Revised Definition and Recommendations Concerning High-Level Radioactive Waste Unsuitable for Dumping at Sea: Report of the Consultants Meeting to Review the Radiological Basis of the Provisional Definition and Recommendations for the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA - 211 (1978). 21. The Convention, Appendix IV. 22. See Deese, Nuclear Power and Radioactive Waste (1978), at 82. 23. See Deese, "Seabed Emplacement and Political Reality," 20 Oceanus 47, 52 (1977). 24. Hearings, supra n. 1(4). 25. Id., at 798-799. 26. Memorandum from Daniel Finn, Staff Attorney, to Sam Bleicher, Deputy Assistant Administrator, NOAA, “Sub-Seabed Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes" (Nov. 10, 1978). -40- 69-848 0 - 81 - 37 27. 28. 295 30. 3s 32. 33. 34. 35, 36. Si7/6 38. 395 40. 572 NOAA, August 1979, at 86. Memorandum from Michele Beigel Corash, General-Counsel, to Dr. Donald Oakley, Acting Director, Office of Inter- national Activities, and Eckardt C. Beck, Assistant Administrator for Water and Waste Management, "Deep Seabed Emplacement of High Level Radioactive Wastes and the Ocean Dumping Convention" (Feb. 25, 1980). See Kronmiller, The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining (1980), at 234 et seq. IAEA Doc. GOV/1622 (Sept. 13, 1973). See, e.g., Address by Thomas R. Pickering, Asst. Secy. for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, "Ocean Development in the 1980s," reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 146. See Ocean Science News (Feb. 18, 1980). See Nuclear Law Bulletin (No. 20 (Dec., 1977). See Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 23 (June, 1979). Resolution of the Parties to the London Dumping Convention at the Third Consultative Meeting, 12 October 1978, with Attachment, "Amendments to Annexes to the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter Concerning Incineration at Sea," and Addendum, "Regulations for the Control of Incineration of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea." See Technical Guidelines on the Control of Incineration of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, IMCO Doc. IV/4 (13 pas 1979), adopted at the Fourth Consultative Meeting. For example, the Ad Hoc Group on Incineration at Sea. See, e.g., IMCO Doc. LDC IV/4 (13 March 1979). For example, the Ad Hoc Scientific Group on Dumping. See, e.g., "Report of the Ad Hoc Scientific Group on Dumping," IMCO Doc. LDC IV/3 (30 March 1979). See nn. 35 - 36, supra. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Incinera- tion of Wastes at Sea Under the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention (Feb. 1979), at I - 7 et seq. -4l1- 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. S26 573 See id., at I - 10 et seq. Ocean Dumping Convention, as amended, Annex I, Par. 10. Id., Annex I, Addendum. See n.- 36, supra. See n. 43, supra. Ocean Dumping Convention, as ananaede Annex II, Par. E. Of course it is speculative at present whether the draft treaty being negotiated at UNCLOS III will result in an actual international agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, States could claim that the articles of the draft text do not represent .a codification of international law and that they are not bound by them. Regardless of this point, however, it is probable that the provisions of the text will speed the development of customary international law in the directions indicated in the text; this would be true especially for sections of the text, like the articles on marine pollution, upon which general consensus had been reached at UNCLOS III. See, e.g., Laylin, "Emerging Cus- tomary Law of the Sea," 10 Int. Law. 669 (1976) - See, e.g., Prof. Willem Riphagen (Professor, University of the Hague and Member, International Law Commission), “The International Concern for the Environment as Expressed in the Concept of 'Common Heritage of Mankind’ and of ‘Shared Natural Resources'" (forthcoming) . See R.Q. Quentin-Baxter, "Preliminary Report on Inter— national Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/334 (24 June 1980), par. 20. See, e.g., S. Schwebel, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, "Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navi- gational Uses of International Watercourses," UN Doc. A/CN. 4/332. See generally resolutions contained in the publication OECD and the Environment (Paris, 1976). See generally International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on State Responsibility," Yearbook of the International *Law Commission 1979. -—42- DS 54. 2215 56. ihe 58. Fie) 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 574 See R.Q. Quentin-Baxter, supra n. 49. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n. 52, Arc. 19. "Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment," Report of the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5 - 16, 1972, UN Doc. A/Con£. 48/14. : United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (11 April 1980), Art. 1. Id., Art. 194(3). Ta.,- AGEL Td? , -ATeECS1s62 Pub.L. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553, (June 28, 1980), Sec. 2(a) (7). See generatly Kronmiller, supra n. 29. ICNT/Rev. 2, supra n. 56, Art. l. This general classification of potential functions is given in Rochlin, Plutonium, Power, and Politics: Inter- national Arrangements for the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel (1979), at 189 et seq. See especially pp. 302 et seq., in which extraterritorial arrangements for nuclear waste disposal, like SSE, are considered within this framework. See Rochlin, supra n. 63, at 257 et seq. See, e.g., Futter, "The Case for Multinational Reprocessing Centers -- Now," 16 Colum. J. Trans. L. 430 (1977). See supra n. 64. See, e€.g., Greig, "The Interpretation of Treaties and Article IV.2 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," 1978 Austx.- Int.-L. Yrbk. 477). See Rochlin, supra n. 63, at 269 et seq. Id. Id. -43- 575 DECEMBER 8, 1980. Dr. Rocer R. Mattson, Director, Surveillance and Emergency Preparedness Division, Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. DEAR Dr. Mattson: On behalf of the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I wish to thank you for appear- ing as a witness at our November 20 hearing on radioactive waste disposal in the oceans. I am enclosing several follow-up questions the answers to which I would like to be able to include in the record of the hearings. Thank you again for your willingness to provide the Subcommittee with timely information on this increasingly important and controversial area of concern. With kind regards. Sincerely, Gerry E. Srupps, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography. Enclosure. 1. EPA, in its testimony, mentioned the need for “a strong, cooperative inter- agency program’ to monitor radioactive waste sites in the ocean. a. What specific plans does EPA have to devolop such a program? b. What would be the scope and primary purpose of such a program? c. What would be the anticipated cost of implementing such a plan? d. Are legislative changes necessary to allow such a program to go forward? 2. To what extent are we able to assess the possibility that the increased dumping of waste at the northeast Atlantic dumpsite will have a damaging cumulative effect on the ocean? Please describe the status of current and proposed research into this question. 3. In formulating regulations for low level waste dumping, how does EPA propose to compare the relative harmfulness of ocean dumping of radioactive wastes versus “other practical methods of disposal’? 4. (a) In EPA’s view, does the definition of “high level waste” used in the Ocean Dumping Act accurately reflect the relative hazards of dumping various kinds of radioactive materials into the marine environment? For example, is it not true that waste from a research laboratory could have radiation emission levels equal to a similar amount of waste from a reprocessing facility and yet not fall under the definition of “high level waste”? If EPA agrees that the current definition is inadequate, what language would it recommend? (b) Please describe EPA’s supplement (specific activity number) to its high level radioactive waste definition, and discuss how that number is determined and the purpose for which it is used. (c) How does the IAEA definition of high level radioactive waste differ from the US. definition? 5. (a) From a regulatory standpoint, to what extent has the ocean dumping of military generated radioactive waste historically been treated differently from civil- ian waste? (b) To what extent is such waste treated differently today? 6. Dr. William Schell, under contract to EPA, found very high levels of Ameri- cium-241 in the rattail fish at the Atlantic dumpsite in 1978. The rattail fish is highly mobile and could possibly transport radionuclides from ocean depths to surface waters. Would you please comment on the high concentration of radionu- clides found in the fish and the role of marine organisms in the transport of radionuclides? DECEMBER 11, 1980. Dr. D. RicHaRD ANDERSON, Program Manager, Seabed Program Division, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, N. Mex. Dear Dr. ANDERSON: On behalf of the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I wish to thank you for appear- ing as a witness at our November 20 hearing on radioactive waste disposal in the oceans. I am enclosing several follow-up questions the answers to which I would like to be able to include in the record of the hearings. 576 Thank you again for your willingness to provide the Subcommittee with timely information on this increasingly important and controversial area of concern. With kind regards. Sincerely, Gerry E. STupps, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography. Enclosure. DECEMBER 11, 1980. Dr. CHARLES D. HOLLISTER, Senior Scientist and Dean of Graduate Studies, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Mass. Dear Dr. Ho.uister: On behalf of the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I wish to thank you for appear- ing as a witness at our November 20 hearing on radioactive waste disposal in the oceans. I am enclosing several follow-up questions the answers to which I would like to be able to include in the record of the hearings. Thank you again for your willingness to provide the Subcommittee with timely information on this increasingly important and controversial area of concern. With kind regards. Sincerely, Gerry E. Stupps, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography. Enclosure. 1. What specific findings might cause you to make the determination that the subseabed option is unacceptable? For example, if after extensive research, there still remain doubts about the ability of sediments to act as a barrier, would that be a logical program termination point? 2. (a) Please summarize if you can, the subseabed disposal research program of cg countries, and explain how they compare in scope and funding to that of the US. (b) Do you believe that as long as any nation is considering subseabed disposal, the U.S. should be researching this option? 3. To the best of your knowledge, what would be the scientific advantages (predict- ability, safety, monitoring, etc.) of subseabed disposal over land-based disposal, and vice versa? 4, How deep in the sediment would you project the waste cannisters should be emplaced? Isn’t there a trade-off between isolation and safety (greater depth), and retrievability (more shallow burial)? Is retrievability being investigated? 5. (a) Given the extremely slow maturation rate of some deep sea organisms, how is it possible to measure in an experimental framework the potential effects of radionuclides on such creatures? (b) What research is being performed on the possibility that biological mecha- nisms could influence the movement of radionuclides? 6. If radioactive wastes were to escape from both the cannister and the sediment, do we know enough about deep sea currents to predict accurately the fate of radionuclides in the ocean? SANDIA LABORATORIES, Albuquerque, N. Mex., January 20, 1981. Hon. Gerry E. Stupps, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Washington, D.C. Dear Sir: Enclosed are answers to the questions in your December 11 letter for inclusion in the record of the November 20 hearing on radioactive waste disposal in the oceans. The responses of Dr. Hollister are included in these answers. We were grateful to have the opportunity to describe the project. If you or any other members of congress have any questions about the subseabed program we would be most willing to provide answers or an overview of the program. Sincerely, : D. R. ANDERSON, Supervisor, Seabed Programs Division 4536. 1. The finding that the deep sea sediments would not prevent the release of radioactive wastes to the environment, below the standards to be set by EPA, would 577 make the subseabed option unacceptable. Present models indicate that the sedi- ments will be able to contain the wastes. If these models cannot be verified by field experiments, or if properties in-situ are such that the models predict unacceptable release of radionuclides, the program would be halted. Results that might prove the sediments an inadequate barrier would include: There is extensive natural water movements through the deep sea sediments in question: The absorption properties of the sediment are lower or more unpredictable in-situ than in the laboratory; the strength of the heated sediment is inadequate to prevent extensive cannister migra- tion: The sediment cannot properly be sealed after cannister emplacement. Field verification of these properties and models, is necessary research before a proper evaluation of the subseabed option can be complete. If the subseabed option was found unacceptable the major research programs of the project would be terminat- ed. It would be desirable to maintain some organization responsible for evaluating other nations programs of oceanic disposal of high radioactive waste and to be able to demonstrate and document the finds of the U.S. subseabed program. 2. Five nations currently spend some funds for research to assess the feasibility of seabed disposal of radioactive wastes. One other nation will start research in 1981 and two others are considering research. The U.K. and France have the most active programs. Our program is complimentary with theirs in that we are not presently funding U.S. ships to study areas in the Atlantic. The U.K. and France fund ships to research the Atlantic and we are allowed to participate in their cruises and obtain copies of their data. If one were to consider the European programs as a whole it would be fair to state that their scope of investigations is as broad if not more so than the U.S. program. It is difficult to delineate specifically the funds expended for research on sub- seabed disposal of radioactive wastes. Research in the ocean is often of use in a number of program areas and cannot be strictly defined as research for subseabed disposal. For example, in the U.S. research on subseabed disposal it is quite easy to state how much money goes through the program. However without ongoing re- search in oceanography and to some extent land based nuclear waste disposal, the subseabed program budget would be unable to make significant progress in evaluat- ing ibe option. With this in mind some 1981 budgets for the various countries are isted: Winitedestatess. AGU 8 A bel. Gani 6.1 million dollars. Winitedvisne dome. tiers cceetesscconee 3 HW ATA CG meter eee ne csarethece retercteate ere ete terenes 3 CBOE pc cencd Saba AES eS Ee 1 WEStMGerimany?.tictccccccccccsecuncsccseeserssacteces- severe 0.5 (CRIT EG Econ crete Ren CECE te ae ere Eee eee 0.5 INGUHET ATS Hee eeeccse te Weer eae eritrecs on ceeres To begin 1981. Siwilbzenlandeeencs utes ae AW ela eae Considering. BIS) FER CT a cote Ube dane ceet etree omer eee Considering. It would be prudent for the U.S. to maintain the capability to evaluate other nation’s research programs, which may involve funding some field research, until that time when the nation proposing disposal can document the safety of the program to the standards we expect of ourselves. 3. The use of the ocean sediments as a repository for high-level nuclear wastes would offer a number of advantages to land-based mined repositories. First, the areas of the ocean that would be suitable for disposal offer a very predictable geologic environment. The central portions of the oceanic plates have the lowest seismic activity on earth. Areas can be chosen that have no volcanism. The continu- ously depositional nature of the central gyre areas of the ocean is remarkably insensitive to climatic changes. Second, the oceans present an unsurpossed natural barrier to man’s intrusion to the repository. The deep sea floor is perhaps the least valuable property on earth. The clay sediments (essentially dust blown off the continents) is of no commercial value. Manganese nodules of high copper and nickel content are concentrated in areas of the ocean that are being avoided even though the collection of nodules from the sea floor above a repository would be unlikely to disturb the repository. We cannot trust societal controls to prevent intrusion into the repository for the 10,000 year minimum life of a repository. Thus, it is signifi- cant that a society less technically advanced than our own would simply be unable to disturb the repository. The cannisters placed in the deep sea sediments would be essentially independent of each other. Any operation that disturbs one or a few cannisters would not degrade the barrier properties of the remainer of the reposi- tory. These first two features are very important since EPA calculations on mined repositories indicate that almost all of the risk of a repository is associated with unexpected breaching of a repository. The third desirable feature of the ocean 578 sediments is that they are structurally a very simple geologic formation. The sedi- ments are uniform over a great horizontal extent and are free from faults, fissures or cracks. This means that the models that are developed to predict the behavior of waste movement (beyond the heated zone) in the far field will be relatively simple and less difficult to verify. The far field will be the barrier after a cannister fails and will be the barrier for perhaps 90 percent of the lifetime of a repository. Fourth, the maximum temperature that the sediment will experience occurs within about 2 years after emplacement and the heat will begin to dissipate into the ocean after 15 years allowing us to experiment and monitor in real time the worst case conditions that will exist in the repository. This is a result of the relatively short distance between the heat source of the waste cannister and the heat sink of the ocean’s waters and the high thermal conductivity of the sediments. The deeper a heat source is placed in a geologic media the longer it takes for the heat pulse to pass through the surrounding media. Land based disposal offers the advantage that it can be done completely within the U.S. making the disposal operations free from international consideration of control. Since man has been mining for thousands of years the engineering neces- sary for mined repositories will probably require less development than the engi- neering necessary for a subseabed disposal. Although there is considerable scientific technology to draw upon there has never been a commercial scale operation on the deep sea floor. 4, The necessary depth of emplacement of containers cannot be stated precisely at this time. The depth will depend in part on the exact physical and chemical properties of the sediments at a given site in the ocean. Thus the burial depth could well be different at various regions in the oceans. The necessary depth will also be in part determined by the requirements for safety. The shallowest burial presently considered as a reference case for calculation is burial of 30 meters. For most of the major radionuclides this would be a very adequate barrier. Plutonium for example would migrate (based on present model predictions) only about 10 meters in 100,000 years. The lifetime of a repository will probably be required to be 10,000 years. Other isotopes that absorb less strongly to the sediments may make it desirable to have a deeper burial. If emplacement of cannisters is done by a drilling operation they would probably be placed deeper into the sediments, perhaps to depth of a few hundred meters. There probably would be a trade-off between depth and ease of retrievability. We assume that with present technology cannisters placed 30 to 100 meters into the sediment should be relatively easy to recover. The emplacement, recovery, and other engineering considertations have not been major areas of research of the program to date. It is not planned to pursue these topics in earnest until the fundamental scientific question of the deep sea sediments ability to contain radioac- tive waste is more adequately answered. 5. Researchers in the project have for the first time collected and cultured in the laboratory bacteria that are native to the deep sea. It can safely be stated that they are native to the deep sea since they can only be grown at deep sea temperatures and pressures. These organisms, with very reasonable doubling times of a few hours are being tested for their radiosensitivity. Deep sea amphipods, apparently ubiqui- tous in the deep oceans, have also been captured and maintained in the laboratory are also useful experimental organisms. Although there appears to be nothing unique about the biochemistry of dep sea organisms except that their enzymes may function optimally at deep sea pressures, it has been hypothesized that the organ- isms have evolved at different background radiation levels and thus may have radiosensitivity different from terrestrial or shallow water organisms. For example, their capacity to repair sublethal radiation damage may be different from non- barophilic organisms. The organisms isolated from the deep sea will be used to test that hypothesis. The deep sea organisms maintained in the laoratory will also be used to see if the uptake of radioisotopes is different from similar shallow water organisms. Another area of biological research within the project is to determine any possible biological pathways in the ocean that could transport radioisotopes to the surface waters and to man. A second part of this research is to build models that will allow as to quantify the rates of transfer. The first half of the research has to date involved studying the mobile near-bottom scavenging organisms. We wish to know their abundance, their vertical and horizontal range, their life history, and their metabolism. For the second half of the project models are presently being construct- ed cok should allow us to make the necessary calculations of biological transport of nuclides. In an effort to obtain the best possible guidance for the program’s biological research, the program is funding a biological oceanography workshop. About 50 579 deep sea oceanographers and radioecologists, most of whom have no affiliation with the project assemble for a week in January 1981 to consider the biological ramifica- tions of nuclear waste disposal in the seabed and to make research recommendations. 6. Our present knowledge of the ocean would allow us to predict the movement of radioisotopes by water movement on a short time frame, months to a few years, or in a long time frame, about 1,000 years. The intermediate time frame is far less well understood. This is an active area of interest on experimentation in physical ocean- ography. A nunber of research projects sponsored by various funding agencies have advanced our understanding of meso-scale motion in the last decade. During the next decade a considerable resolution of the picture of meso-scale oceanic circulation is expected. DECEMBER 16, 1980. Hon. EpwarpD HIDALGO, Secretary of the Navy, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. SECRETARY: On November 20, 1980, the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee conducted an oversight hearing on radioactive waste disposal in the oceans. At this hearing, the subject of the possible scuttling by the Navy of older model nuclear submarine reactors was broached. This raised questions about the potential environmental impacts such disposal would engender. It would be most helpful to the Subcommittee if the Navy could respond to questions for the record about this potential action, in addition to details on the research the Navy has conducted into locating the previously scuttled USS Seawolf reactor. Thank you for your willingness to provide the Subcommittee with timely informa- tion on this issue. With kind regards. Sincerely, Gerry E. Stupps, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography. [The questions submitted are the same as those included in the letter of response which follows:] DEPARTMENT OF THE NAvy, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., February 13, 1981. Hon. Gerry E. Stupps, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washingtion, D.C. DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated December 16, 1980. In your letter you requested answers to questions on the Navy’s plans for ultimate disposal of decommissioned nulcear-powered subma- rines and on the Navy’s efforts to locate the SEAWOLF nuclear reactor vessel that was disposed of in the Atlantic in 1959. In accordance with your request, I have attached the information responding to your questions for inclusion in the Committee hearing record. Should you have any further questions, we will be pleased to provide you with any additional information necessary. Sincerely, THOMAS E. HARVEY, Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Logistics). Enclosure. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES Question 1. Approximately how many nuclear-powered submarines does the Navy plan on phasing out of its fleet, and when does it anticipate that these phase-outs will occur? Answer 1. There are three submarines, the TRITON, HALIBUT and NAUTILUS, which have been decommissioned and have been in protective storage since 1967, 1976, and 1979 respectively. In addition, the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT and ABRAHAM LINCOLN are presently undergoing final defueling and decommission- ing for placement in protective storage. Excluding the THEODORE ROOSEVELT and ABRAHAM LINCOLN, the Navy has 113 commissioned nuclear-powered sub- 580 marines. All 113 will eventually be decommissioned as they reach the end of their useful service lives, nominally considered to be in the range of 25-30 years. Question 2. (a) What are the options that are being considered for disposal? (b) If scuttling in the ocean is a possible option, what portions of the submarine would be scuttled? (c) If this option is pursued, will the Navy apply to the Environmental Protection Agency for ocean dumping permits? Answer 2. The Navy is currently conducting preliminary studies of two alterna- tives for the ultimate disposal of defueled decommissioned nuclear-powered subma- rines. one alternative is to bury the submarine’s reactor compartment housing the reactor plant, after defueling, at an existing Federal land disposal site. The second alternative under preliminary study for ultimate disposal is to place the entire submarine after defueling, at a site in a deep part of the ocean where there is virtually no likelihood of its being disturbed by human activities, seismic action, or ocean movement. No decision has been made on one alternative for disposal over the other since the Navy is still collecting data. Any decision to proceed would not be taken until completion of an Environmental Impact Statement, taking into account the views of the public and government and non-government organizations. If the Navy were to choose land disposal as a preferred alternative, arrangements with the Department of Energy would have to be made for use of a DOF land disposal site. If the Navy were to choose sea disposal as a preferred alternative, the Navy would have to apply to the Environmental Protection Agency for a permit under the Marine, Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. A fact sheet on these Navy preliminary studies is provided as enclosure (1). Question 3. (a) What efforts has the Navy made to locate the nuclear reactor from the submarine, SEAWOLF? Answer 3(a). The first reactor in the USS SEAWOLF was a liquid metal interme- diate range power reactor and was not a breeder reactor. Although the original reactor plant operated satisfactorily for approximately two years, it was replaced with a pressurized water reactor because the liquid metal type of reactor plant was determined to be unsuited for continued submarine application. The weight savings that had been sought in using the more compact liquid metal design was lost due to the need for additional shielding. With a water-cooled reactor the reactor compart- ment can be entered to make repairs immediately after the reactor is shut down. With a liquid metal plant there is a considerable delay time which was considered undesirable for a warship which might suffer battle damage requiring immediate repair. There was also a fire hazard with liquid sodium which can react with water creating an additional hazard in a submarine application. The reactor was designed by the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. General Elec- tric was the primary manufacturer. The USS SEAWOLF reactor plant was disposed of at sea. On April 18, 1959 the radioactive reactor vessel and reactor plant components from the sodium-cooled nuclear reactor plant in the submarine SEAWOLF were placed on a barge, escorted by the U.S. Coast Guard to a disposal site in the Atlantic Ocean 120 miles off the East Coast of the U.S. and sunk in 9,000 feet of water at latitude 38°30’N and longitude 72°06’'W. The expended nuclear fuel was not disposed of at sea but was shipped to special Government facilities for processing in the same manner as for other expended nuclear fuel. The disposal was conducted at a site approved for sea disposal of radioactive waste by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. This disposal site was used by other organizations for a number of years for radioactive waste as noted in a report issued by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (Ocean Dumping, A National Policy, October 1970). The radioactivity was sealed within the heavy steel reactor vessel for disposal. The radioactivity was restricted from release not only because it was located inside the reactor vessel but because it was further contained as an integral part of the corrosion resistant stainless steel internal reactor vessel structure. A release into the surrounding area would be expected to occur only due to corrosion of both the reactor vessel followed by slower corrosion of the stainless steel. Furthermore, the products of corrosion of the steel are primarily solid rust-like materials which are extremely insoluble in sea water and therefore tend to remain attached to the metal surfaces or remain locally on the bottom sediments. The total amount of radioactiv- ity was approximately 33,000 curies, which in the twenty-one years since disposal, has decayed to less than one tenth this quantity, essentially all cobalt 60. In view of the above, the radioactivity should remain within the SEAWOLF reactor vessel while it decays away and no significant effect on the marine environ- ment is expected. However, the Navy has been interested in locating the SEAWOLF disposal barge and conducting radiological monitoring to provide direct verification 581 of the inherently low radioactivity release characteristics over a period of more than two decades. Thus the Navy has attempted tolocate the SEAWOLF reactor vessel disposal barge using the state of the art search capabilities within the Navy. This work was carried out primarily in 1979 during which approximately 27 days of at sea search effort resulted in searching an area of approximately 36 square miles centered on the recorded disposal location. The search of this area initially detected numerous objects with the potential of being the barge. However, photo- graphic examination of most of these indicated they were only large rocks or rock outcropings present in the disposal area. Thus the barge has not been located. Question 3. (b) Please provide for the Subcommittee any information which you may have available which would allow us to assess, in general, the potential impacts of nuclear submarine reactors on the marine environment. Answer 3(b). As indicated in the answer to question 3(a), no significant effect on the marine environment from the SEAWOLF disposal barge is expected. Informa- tion to assess, in general, the potential and actual impacts on the marine eviron- ment of nuclear submarine reactors is contained in an annual Navy report issued by the Navy. This report is included each year in Congressional testimony and published in the hearing record. This report shows that operation of the more than 100 Navy nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities has had no significant effect on the radioactivity of the marine environment. More specifically, this report also provides pertinent information on the environ- mental effect of the accidental sinking of two U.S. Naval nuclear-powered subma- rines. The submarine THRESHER sank 10 April 1963, 100 miles from land in water 8,500 feet deep at latitude 41°45’N and longitude 65°00’W. The submarine SCORPI- ON sank between 21 and 27 May 1968, 400 miles southwest of the Azores in more than 10,000 feet of water. Radiation measurements, water samples, bottom sediment samples and debris collected from the area where THRESHER sank were analyzed for radioactivity shortly after the sinking and again in 1965 by various laboratories with highly sensitive equipment. Similarly, sea water and bottom sediment samples taken near SCORPION’s hull were analyzed for radioactivity. None of these samples showed radioactivity above naturally occurring background levels, and none showed evi- dence of radioactivity released from either THRESHER or SCORPION. In 1977, followup samples of water, sediment, marine life and debris were collect- ed from the immediate THRESHER debris areas. In 1979, followup samples of water, sediment, marine life and debris were collected from the immediate SCORPI- ON debris areas. None of these samples showed any evidence of release of radioac- tivity from the reactor fuel elements in either THRESHER or SCORPION. Howev- er, cobalt 60 released from both THRESHER and SCORPION coolant systems was detectable at low levels in sediment samples from localized areas which were not sampled during the original surveys. The cobalt 60 radioactivity in these sediment samples was small compared to naturally occurring radioactivity. Cobalt 60 was not detectable in the samples of water, marine life or debris. Thus, the THRESHER and SCORPION have not had a significant effect on the radioactivity in the environ- ment. In this connection it should be noted the absence of significant environmental effect for both the THRESHER and SCORPION exists even though both were lost in a catastrophic manner with nuclear fuel installed. Should future sea disposal of nuclear submarines be carried out, the nuclear fuel would be removed in all cases and the submarine placed on the sea bottom in a controlled manner to enhance compartment and system integrity. Enclosure (1) DISPOSAL OF DECOMMISSIONED NAVAL NUCLEAR REACTOR PLANTS The U.S. Navy is currently conducting preliminary studies of alternatives for the ultimate disposal of the defueled nuclear reactor plants of decommissioned nuclear- powered submarines. Three submarines, the TRITON, HALIBUT, and NAUTILUS, have been decommissioned and have been in protective storage since 1967, 1976, and 1979, respectively. The measures used to prepare these ships for protective storage ensure that no radiological concern exists either to Navy personnel, shipyard em- ployees, or the general public. en a ship is decommissioned, the nuclear fuel is removed and handled accord- ing to established procedures for treatment of such material. With removal of the fuel the uranium and fission products are also removed since they are contained within the fuel. However, after the fuel has been removed, portions of the reactor plant are still radioactive as a result of the operation of the nuclear reactor and 582 therefore must be disposed of in a manner which will have a negligible impact on the environment. The radioactive material exists primarily as an integral part of the metal forming the reactor plant components. The radioactivity was created by neutron irradiation of the iron and alloying elements in the metal components. The predominant radioactive isotope present is cobalt 60, which decays by a factor of two every 5.3 years. The only mechanism for release of the radioactivity to the environ- ment is through corrosion of the metal. One alternative for disposal is to place decommissioned nuclear-powered ships in long term protective storage at a shipyard. While this alternative does allow the radioactive material to decay under controlled conditions without release to the environment, other alternatives may be more desirable for ultimate disposal. Two practical alternatives for the ultimate disposal of radioactive nuclear reactor plants are under preliminary study by the Navy. One alternative is to bury the subma- rine’s reactor compartment which houses the defueled reactor plant at an existing Federal land disposal site. The other alternative is to place the entire ship, after removal of the nuclear fuel, on the deep ocean bottom at a site considered accept- able for such disposal. Either of these alternatives would be carried out so as to provide containment and isolation of the radioactive material in the reactor plant from human activities. : The land disposal alternative, if it were selected, would be implemented at an approved Federal waste disposal site. This option would take advantage of the containment provided by the submarine’s reactor compartment which would form an outer disposal container of high strength and durability. Furthermore, the radio- activity is contained within the metal walls of the defueled reactor plant located within the reactor compartment. The general approach would be for the reactor compartment to be removed from the remainder of the ship and all reactor com- partment openings sealed. The compartment would then be moved by barge and moving equipment to an approved burial site and buried. Radiation levels associated with the entire operation would meet all Department of Transportation, Environ- mental Protection Agency, and Department of Energy requirements for disposal of low-level radioactivity. The potential effect on the environment from the land disposal alternative is expected to be extremely low and only a small fraction of normal background radiation exposure. Land area use would be small. This alterna- tive would be in compliance with existing regulations, for radioactive waste ship- ment and disposal, and no new regulations would be required. The second alternative under preliminary study for ultimate disposal is to place the entire submarine at a site in a deep part of the ocean where there is virtually no likelihood of its being disturbed by human activities, seismic action, or ocean movement. There is little biological activity in the deep oceans. The currents near the sea floor of such a site would be very low, and the sea floor itself would be very stable if the area is sufficiently deep and remote from the known locations of seismic and volcanic instability. Previous research in the deep oceans has identified the existence of several such areas that have little potential for other activities useful to humans. The concept would be to tow the defueled ship to a, selected disposal site, flood it, and place it on the ocean floor. Preliminary information indicates that the submarine would be intact after landing on the bottom and that the reactor plant and containment would remain intact. Corrosion of the metal of the hull and the reactor plant would then be the only way that the radioactivity would be released. This is a very slow process because of the low temperature at great ocean depths and the use of corrosion-resistant metals in key parts of the reactor plant. During the time required for the corrosion process, a significant reduction in the radioactivity would result because of normal radioactive decay. For example, in 50 years the total cobalt 60 radioactivity in the reactor plant would be reduced by a factor of about 1000. | The potential! disposal site would be determined in conjunction with the USS. Environmental Protection Agency, complying with requirements established by that ‘agency in consideration of U.S. and international laws and treaties. Studies of ocean geophysics, chemistry, currents, and biology are being conducted to describe the characteristics of the deep ocean which would provide maximum isolation and to _ develop information on methods for predicting the behavior of materials in the deep | oceans. The Navy has spent appproximately one million dollars to date in research to explore important factors related to the possible disposal at sea option. Most of the expenditures have been for oceanographic surveys of several general deep ocean areas to determine characteristics which would affect the prediction of effects on humans or the environment and verification of corrosion characteristics in such areas. It is expected that approximately one million dollars more may be needed to complete this research. / 583 While the United States has not been disposing of radioactive material in the oceans during the last decade, several Western European countries have been disposing of radioactive waste into the Eastern Atlantic Ocean for several years under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Energy Agency (former European Nuclear Energy Agency). These disposals have been conducted in accordance with existing international treaties and are considered by the responsible international authori- ties to have no adverse effects on humans or the environment. The material dis- posed of in the European operations was composed of various kinds of low-level radioactive wastes encased in concrete inside metal drums. Due to the containment and unique character of the radioactivity being an integral part of corrosion resist- ant materials the environmental protection for the reactor plant of a decommis- sioned submarine is inherently better. Preliminary estimates have been made that the radiation exposure to humans would be much less than the exposure due to natural background radiation. The assistance of Department of Energy laboratories and its subcontractors per- forming specific tasks in the area of oceanographic sciences has been obtained to evaluate the technical considerations involved. In addition, the Environmental Pro- tection Agency has been informed of the preliminary work being conducted to evaluate the alternatives for ultimate disposal of the reactor plants from decommis- sioned submarines. 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