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
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RATIONE ET  
EXPERIENTIA  
FOEDERANTVR



INSTAVR MAG PI

OF THE  
ADVANCEMENT AND  
PROFICIENCE OF LEARNING  
or the  
PARTITIONS OF SCIENCES  
ix Books

Written in Latin by the (Most Eminent  
Illustrious & Famous LORD)  
FRANCIS BACON  
Baron of Verulam Vicont S<sup>t</sup> Alban  
Counsilour of Estate and Lord  
Chancellor of England.

by Interpreted  
GILBERT WATS.

OXONIUM

CANTABRIGIA

MONITI

ME LIORA

I Partit Scientiarum

II Novu Organum

III Hist: Naturalis

SCIENTIAE

Scola Intellectus IV

Anticipa Philosophia 2<sup>a</sup> V

Phia 2<sup>a</sup> seu Scientia Activa VI

PHILOSOPHIA

Multi pertransibunt & augetur Scientia.


OXFORD.

Printed by Leon: Lichfield,  
Printer to the University, for  
Rob: Young, & Ed: Forrest.  
c16c XL

HISTORIA  
MEMORIA  
RATIO  
PHILOSOPHIA



NATURALIS  
NATVRA  
DEVS  
DIVINA





SACRATISSIMO D<sup>N</sup>O NOSTRO

CAROLO

DEI GRATIA MAG. BRITANNIÆ  
FRANCIÆ ET HIBERNIÆ REGI.  
TERRÆ MARISQ. POTENTISSIMO  
PRINCIPI. OCEANI BRITANNICI  
AD QUATUOR MUNDI PLAGAS  
DISPARTITI IMPERATORI. D<sup>N</sup>O  
VIRGINIÆ ET VASTORUM  
TERRITORIORUM ADJACENTIUM  
ET DISPERSARUM INSULARUM  
IN OCEANO OCCIDENTALI.

CHRISTIANÆ FIDEI DEFENSORI  
PACIS INSTAURATORI PUB.  
SECURITATIS AUCTORI  
PIO FEL. AUG.

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ÆC--NON

SUB SUI NUMINIS  
INFLUENTIA AC CLIENTELA  
DUOBUS MAX. MUNDI LUMINARIBUS  
PERPETUIS SAPIENTIÆ FLAMMIS  
CERTISS. SCIENTIARUM CYNOSURIS  
UTRISQ. ANGLIÆ ACADEMIIS  
INFIMVS HVMILLIMVS  
VERULAMII INTERPRES  
HANC PRIMAM INSTAURATIONIS  
MAGNÆ PARTEM

D. Æ. C. Q.

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TO THE  
PRINCE  
OF GREAT BRITAIN &  
FRANCE AND IRELAND  
THE GROWING GLORY  
of a Future Age.



THE sacrifice of my Devotions in the Dedication of these Labours (*excellent PRINCE*) had gone a more humble way of Ambition, than through the hands of Kings and Princes, could I afterwards have justified such humiliations. But the Tenure of this work is a Title-Royall, which no laps of time nor alteration of language can reverse. In the Originall entitled to a King; so continued in the Translation, and so in a direct line descends upon *Your Highnesse*, as a part of a Royall Patrimony, which I durst not alienate by a lower inscription. The Author is *Sir Francis Bacon*, a name well known in the European world; a learned man, happily the learnedst, that ever lived, since the decay

of the Grecian and Romane Empires; when learning was at a high pitch; and which rise and fell with those Monarchies; for Scepters and Sciences have the same revolutions, the same periods. In the vast spaces of time between those and these last Ages, Philosophy hath bin, as it were in a slumber, for many centuries of years. For after the Christian faith grew up, the most writers betook themselves to Theology, and some mistaking the right limits of Faith and Reason, fell fowle upon Aristotle and other Philosophers, as Patriarches of Erefy, which were the Patrons of Reason. Somewhat awaked from this slumber she was, by the Arabian writers, the Schoole-Doctors and Spanish Interpreters, made more active by the Chimique Philosophers, but never perfectly recovered untill the daies of this Author, who is the first that ever joynd Rationall & Experimentall Philosophy in a regular correspondence; which before was either a subtlety of words, or a confusion of matter. He after he had survaied all the Records of Antiquity, after the volumnes of men, betook himselfe to the study of the volumne of the world; and having conquerd what ever books posselt (his spacious spirit not thus bounded) set upon the Kingdome of Nature, and carried

ed that victory very farre, and which was more than those victories, himfelfe being mortall, left fuch lawes behind him, as may fuffice to fubdue the reft, if Princes encourage men, and men be not wanting to themfelves. This attempt of his was favour'd by the ftarres of his Nativiey. For it was his felicity to live in the times of two *Great Patrons of Learning*, K. JAMES Your Highneffe Grandfather of bleffed memory, and Your Royall Father now Raigning; and it was their glory that he lived in their times; and will be the eternall honour of this Nation, that the *Greatest Kings* and the *Greatest Philofopher* met together in one age, in one Iland. By the favour of *his Prince*, who well knew the valew of Learning and Learned men, he was raifed to the higheft dignities in the Civile ftate; and by his own happie Genius, to the higheft degree in the ftate of learning; which was the greater wonder of the two; being fuch incompatible perfections, and divided, enough to fill up the fphere of the greateft abilities alive. Yet with great applaufe he acted both thefe high parts, of the greateft Scholler and the greateft States-man of his time: and fo quit himfelfe in both, as one and the fame Perfon, in tide and merit, became Lord Keeper of the Great feale of England, and of the

Great Seale of Nature both at once, which is a mystery beyond the comprehension of his own times, and a miracle requires a great measure of faith in Posterity, to believe it. This is the Author I here present unto *Your Highnesse*, this his worke, which by the powerfull influence of Your favour shall prosper, and, it may be, be quickned to the regeneration of another Phoenix out of his ashes, to adorne your World: for it is only the benigne aspect & irradiation of *Princes*, that inspires the Globe of learning, and makes Arts, and sciences grow up and flourish. Heaven bleffe *Your Highnesse* with blessings on the right hand and on the left, and make You Heire of all the virtues of your Royall Progenitors, that the Honour of Princes begun in them, may be continued in Your person; and that a future age may be so blessed in You, as the present is in Your Royall Father, *the Glory of Kings and their Admiration.*

YOUR HIGHNESSE

*most Humbly devoted*

GILBERT WATS.



# FAVOVRABLE READER.



*HE intended Apologetique, for the Instauration of Sciences, and the justification of this Author, which should have bin prefix'd this work, as a preparation thereto; is not publisht. Motives to this resolution, were diverse, whereof some are very concerning. Apologetiques for such Authors and such enterprises are intertain'd with jealousies, as if they threatned an innovation in the state of Learning; by reversing the judgements of Antiquity, and the Placits of the Moderne; and by bringing in, a new Primum Mobile, into the Intellectuall Globe of Sciences, to the subversion of the Arts received. But these are groundlesse fears, fancied by such, who either understand not the intention of this attempt; or, engag'd in a Professory way, suspect their profit and reputation to be in danger, if such designs should take effect. Our Author protests against such daring vanities, the raising of any new sect, upon the ruins of Antiquity; and every where endeavours to improve the labours of Ancient and Moderne writers,*  
and

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TO THE READER.

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and so must he doe who defends him, if he understands the business he goes about. The point is not, touching what is already done; nor of the abilities of the Agents; nor of the capacity of their instruments; which could not be undertaken without emulous comparisons, both of Persons, Actions, and Things: but the point is touching propagation & Advancement of Knowledges, the improvement, and not the conservation only, of the Patrimony of our Ancestors: and that by opening to the understanding a different way, than hath bin known to former Ages; and clearing that glasse to the letting in of a more plentiful light. The waies and ends of these two knowledges ( I meane of what we have, and of what we may have ) thus different; and the principles upon which they proceed so divers; both may consist without contradictions and confutations; or the invasions upon their distinguished rights: & so the propagation of Knowledge, by the assistance, of the Father of Lights, may be pursued, with the reservation of the honour of Ancient and Moderne Authors, and the Arts in use, which respecting the end whereto they were instituted, Disputation, Redargution and the like, are very conducent, and in their way of perfection highly exalted. And this is the first motive of deliberating the publication of my Apologetique, the difficulty of the business. Another is this. The times into which we are fallen, are learned Times, as ever were since the Grecian Philosophers, and, their seconds, the Arabian writers, which also through the great advantages, of the experiments of later Ages, and the directions of Antiquity, in many particulars have out-gon their predecessors; so as he that dare adventure, as, some doe, to intrude unstudied thoughts upon so learned an age as this is, neither reverences the age as he ought, nor wisely consults his own reputation with Posterity. And as the Times are learned, so (which too frequently falls out ) somewhat confident. Great wits, and which have fortified their conceptions by books and study, are strongly prepossessed with almost impregnable anticipations; and not so easily induced, as more unconcerned and disengaged natures are; to know or unknow any thing, that either should be farther inquired into, or should be forgotten. And much within these two orbs our Apology moves; in discovery of  
igno-

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TO THE READER.

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*Ignorance & of Error; of what we know not, and of what we should not know. For certainly much knowledge remains yet conceal'd, and the way to this discovery is by forgoing many unprofitable subtleties; and by a learn'd ignorance falling off from many airy speculations, to the solid simplicity of the Ancients. Were we to compose a Panegyrique in praise of the perfections of the learning of our daies, which indeed merits such a sacrifice, the labour were but halfe what it is, for laudatory hymnes seldome come out of season, they need no preparations, and what might be wanting in the waight of speech, would be supplied by an aptitude to accept and believe. But in the businesse in hand, the mind of man, the principall subject to be wrought upon, and her speculations, both which we so admire, are so immur'd and blockt up with corrupt notions, either from the placits of Philosophers, the depraved lawes of Demonstration, or from inherent qualities in the generall nature of man, or individuate temperature of particulars; that nothing can be done untill these be convinced; at least, subjected to examination: which is another motive that staies me upon the Land. An other Reason, (which is the last I will trouble the Reader withall is this. Time the measure of all our Actions, without whose assistance our best conceptions are Abortives, by the intercurrente of other engagements (which I might have dispenc'd withall, had I rightly understood the servile tenure of secular contracts) hath surpriz'd me. I conceive, which I pronounce with some passion, that a Scholler for his studies, had bin the master of his own howres; but he that trafiques with the world shall finde it otherwise. Time which I presum'd I could command, and stay as I doe my watch, hath commanded me. And these diversions were seconded (Humane Reader) by a sad Accident. It pleased God in the heat of my attendance on this businesse, to take away, by one of the terrors of mortality, the Stone, my deare brother S<sup>r</sup> RICHARD SCOT, servant to the most Eminent Lord the Lo. Deputy Generall of Ireland; beloved of his deare Lord to the latest minute of life; honour'd with his presence to the farthest confines of mortality; and there, by his Noble Piety, deliver'd up, with as much solemnity, as a Kingdome could conferre, unto the im-*

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TO THE READER.

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mortality of another world. This deadly shaft passing through him, so wounded me, that I my selfe was arriv'd within few paces of the land of darknesse. In his silent Marble, the best part of that small portion of joy I had in the World; but all my hopes, are entomb'd. This pensive casualty so took me off from books and businesse, as for some months after, I could relish no thoughts but what were mingled with the contemplations of mortality. Sic fugit interea fugit irrevocabile tempus. These were the impediments to my Apologetique; which (if what is done be accepted) shall be prefix'd the NOV. ORG. For of this Translation this is the first part (Reader) if it please thee, if it please thee not, the last. But before I take my leave, here are some tacite objections, which I would meet halfe way, and so weaken their approaches, lest they fall too heavy upon me. The first is, touching the Division of the first book into Chapters, contrary to the mind of the Author, and the intention of the work. This exception may be thus satisfied, that profit is to be preferred before artificiall contrivance, where both cannot so conveniently be had, and to this end, discretion to be followed before rule. Were the Author now alive and his vast Designes going on, this alteration had been somewhat bold: but the inimitable Architect now dead, having perfected little more then the outward Courts, as it were, of his magnificent Instauration; and the whole summe of Sciences, and the stock of Arts in present possession, not able to defray the charges of finishing this Fabrique, I thought fit, by compartitions and distributions into severall roomes, to improve what we have, to our best advantage, so it might be done without prejudice to the Authors procedure, and apt coherence, which I hope it is: Having respect herein rather to accommodation than decoration; for Houses (as our Author saies) are built to live in and not to look on, and therefore use to be preferred before uniformity. Another Exception may be made against the draught of the Platforme into Analytique tables, which seems somewhat pedantique and against that common rule Artis est dissimulare Artem. To this I answer thus. Order and dependance is as it were, the soule of the World, of the Works of Nature and Art, and that which

keeps

keeps them united, without which all would fall asunder and become like the first Chaos before the production of light. And of all Methods that ever were, at least that ever came to our hands, our Authors is the most naturall and most dependent. For Truth, as it reflects on us, is a congruent conformity of the Intellect to the Object; and of the different faculties thereof, to the difference of things: wherefore the truest Partition of humane learning, is that, which hath reference to humane faculties; when the Intellectuall Globe, and the Globe of the World, intermixe their beams and irradiations in a direct line of projection, to the Generation of Sciences. This our Author hath perform'd to admiration; and in this gone beyond all Antiquity, yet upon their grounds; wherein he can never be out-gone, unlesse followed, by Posterity. The Ancients indeed, were men of most profound speculations, but in the delivery of themselves, somewhat involv'd, as appears by Plotinus, Proclus, Trismegistus and others; and many of Platoes Schoole writ Dialogue-wise, which is no doctrinal way. As for Aristotle, his precepts touching method (if any such book was written) they are perisht; saving where he scatters such rules here and there, which should have been silenced, and are not so well followed by himselfe. And for the Methods of the Modernes, Ramus and others, by the improvement of German writers, impair'd; they knit the limmes of knowledge to soone; have bedwarfed Sciences, and are become an Art (as learned Hooker expressees it) which teaches the way of Speedy discourse, and restrains the mind of man, that it may not waxe over-wise. The Excellency therefore of our Authors Partitions, induced me to these delineations, for their use only, who have not the leasure, or patience to observe it according to the merit; that by this Anatomy, the junctures and arteries, as it were, of this great body might more visibly appeare. An other objection is, touching the Allegations in the Margin, contrary to the solemne custome of Antiquity, and the most of graver Authors. For this I had these reasons. It pleased our Author, thoe he was himselfe a living fountain of knowledge, and had a wealthy stock of his own, yet to tast of other waters, and to borrow from Antiquity, and to

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TO THE READER.

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acknowledge such borrowings, He thus naming his Authors, I thought fit to note them. And as he was a man of a most elevated phansie and choice conceptions; so was he in the selection of his Authors, and the passages he pleas'd to make use of: and it is worth the labour to know with whom such great wits use to converse; to point to the Mines where they digge their Ore; and to the shadowes where they repose at noone. And as his selection of Authors was very choice, so was his application of their sayings, very curious; and in a strain beyond the vulgar reach. Places out of Sacred Scriptures are so explicated, so applied, as you may search all the Commenters that are extant, and not finde the like expositions, as you shall finde in him. As for humane Authors he betters his borrowings from them, teaching the allegations out of them, a sense above the meaning of him that lent it him; and which he repaies too with double interest for what he borrowed. These considerations invited me to Marginall Citations. These Reasons set apart, I cannot approve this weake ambition; and doe, not without censure, read Moderne Authors prostitute to humane allegations; as if the Truth they deliver, were to be tried by voices; or having lost its primitive Innocence, must be cover'd with these fig-leaves; or as if the Authors themselves were afraid that it should make an escape out of their text, if it were not beset in the Margin with Authorities as with a watch. The last exception is, touching the Prefaces, and other Introductions prefix'd this worke, that make the Gates and Entries so wide, as they seem to invite the City to run away. This is thus answer'd. It must be remembred that this worke in the Designe was very spacious; and is in the performance of what is done so ample, that when the second and third Parts shall be added, as added they will be, the Porches and Ingresses, in the judgement of any good Architect, are proportionable enough. And if our Authors rule hold, that every faire Fabrique should have three Courts; a greene Court; a second Court more garnisht, and a third to make a square with the Front; then have you here this Epistle as the mean Court; Judgements upon this Author living and dead, as the middle Court; and the Authors own excellent Preface to confront with the work it selfe. Now

I should, say something touching Translation; and as it is mine. The very Action is somewhat obnoxious to censure, being of the nature of those, the failing whereof may disgrace more, than the carrying of it through, credit the undertaker. But, besides the conscience of the deed done; for other ends I could not have; (the Author now dead, and alive mihi nec injuriis nec beneficiis notus) and that to be a Translator is more than to be an Author, some such as there be; and that it is no such mean office, to bear a light before a Lord Chancellor of England: I should excuse it, were the example mine: so, writes learned Savil; so, eloquent Sandys; so, Malvezzi's Noble Interpreter; with whom conferred I am lesse than a shadow: So, many able and eminent names of France and Italy, and other Nations; So the Ancients of former ages and of all Arguments. But if any be so solemne, so severe, and of such primitive tastes, they can away with no waters, which come not from the spring-head; nor endure to drink of Tiber, that passes through Thames; They may give over here, if they so please, and proceed no farther. This interpretation was not meant for such fastidious palates, and yet, it may be, for as distinguishing as theirs are. Now if this very action be thus liable to exception, much more must my performance be. Certainly books by Translation commonly take wind in the effusion; and for strength fall short of their Originals; as reflexed beams are weaker than direct: but then it must be understood of Originals, truly so. For if a Writer deliver himselfe out of his Native language, I see not why a Translator rendring him in it, may not come neare him: and in this case, the Author himselfe is the Interpreter, being he translates his own thoughts, which originally speak his mother tongue. Yet for all this, Errors I know there are, and some lapses, which require a Connivence; and a Reader hath this advantage, that he may stay upon one period, as long as an Interpreter did on one page; besides his peculiar Genius to some studied passages. Some Errors (passing but a transient eye upon what is done) I see already; and could note them; but I would not willingly gratify some kind of Readers so farre. They that are Iudicious and ingenious too (for I would have no Readers that

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TO THE READER.

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have not these two ingredients in their compositions, thoe sometimes I name but one, which I would then, should be predominant) will in their judgements find them, and in their mercy pardon them. As for Sophists and Satyrists, a degenerate Race of men, that sit upon the lives and learning of all that write; who resolv'd to do nothing themselves, may with more security censure others: and them too, who, as Learned DON deciphers them, forbid not bookes, but men; damning what ever such a name, hath, or shall write: they are things below the merit of my indignation; objects of Scorne, which a litle slighted, and not inflamed by opposition, or countenanced to a reply by confutation, will within a while, of themselves, extinguish, and vanish: like some dispersed roving winds, which without encounter are dispirited and die. And it concernes me, Courteous Reader, to put on such a confidence as this; for being I am likely to appeare in mine own person, as I doe now in the Person of another; to be too tender-fronted were to invite injuries, and to prostitute such unseasonable modesty to abuse. He that will to sea, must look for some cloudy daies; and to be too scrupulous or Ceremonious touching Times or Persons, is the bane of businesse and of all well-meant endeavours: according to that of Solomon, Qui observat ventum non seminat, & qui considerat Nubes, nunquam metet.



TESTIMONIES  
CONSECRATE TO THE  
MERITS OF THE  
INCOMPARABLE PHILOSOPHER  
S<sup>R</sup> FRANCIS BACON  
BY SOME OF THE BEST-LEARND  
OF THIS INSTANT AGE.

**A**lthough *severe Inquisitors of truth*, and such who, by their learned Labours, stand upon pub. Record in the approv'd Archives of Eternity, may, in an humble distance, lay claim and title to that sacred Prerogative -- *Ego autem ab homine Testimonium non Capto, ipsa enim Opera que facio testantur de me*,-- yet because such *Great Authors*, in their high flight, are so lessen'd in the aire of unfrequented contemplations; & take such unbeaten waies, as they become the *weak wonder* of common Capacities, accusom'd to populare opinions, and authoriz'd Errors: and in this admiring Ignorance, the *prejudicate objects* of Emulation, Envy, Jealousies, and such like impotent passions: It seems, in a sort, necessary, that the way be clear'd before such writers; and that they enter the Theatre, as well with the suffrage of *voice*, to gaine upon the *will*, as with the strength of *Reason*, to convince the *Vnderstanding*.

Wherefore, not so much for the honor of this Author,

(though that is intended too) as for the aid of some anticipate Readers, not yet manumitted from a servile believe, to the liberty of their own judgements, (such J mean, as are yet under the minority of an implicate faith) J thought good to deliver this imperfect list of *Deponents*, which the precipitancy of this Edition, would not permit to fill up with some other *Great Names*, both of this Kingdome, and of forrain Nations. What is wanting here to the accomplishment of this *Catalogue*; Time, the Parent of Truth, shall Consummate.

LE SIEUR MAUGARS Counsiler and secretary to the K. of France, in the Epist. to his Translation of a Part of this Work, gives our Author this Testimony.

*Amongst whom every one knows that S<sup>r</sup> FRANCIS BACON, by many degrees off, holds the first rank, both for the vivacity of his Spirit; eminency of his Learning, Elegancy of his stile. J have Studied with diligence all his writings; and presume I may doe a performance of some merit and acceptation, in presenting to my Countrey his Books of the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, a Work hath not bin seen in our Language. This is the Book which I have caused to passe the Seas; not as the Gold of the Indies, to cherish vice, and corrupt our Manners; but as a soveraigne Plant of singular virtue, to cure the wounds, which ignorance and Pedantisme have given humane sciences:*

M<sup>r</sup> PEIRRE D'AMBOIS S<sup>r</sup> DE LA MAGDELAINE In his just and elegant discourse upon the life of our Author, delivers his censure thus.

*Judgement and Memory never met in any man in that height and measure they met in him; so as in short time he became Master of all those Knowledges which are learnt in Schooles.*

A page after; *But as he ever valedwed himselfe, rather borne for other men, than himselfe; now that he could not, for want of imployment, any longer endow the publique with his Active perfections; he was desirous at least to become profitable*

in a Contemplative way, by his writings and by his books, monuments certainly meriting, to find entertainment in all the Libraries of the world, and which deserve to be ranged with the fairest works of Antiquity.

The same noble French-man in his Advertisement to our Auctors Nat. History thus expresses him,

For this Naturall History, where the quality of Metalls, the Nature of Elements, the Causes of Generation, and Corruption, the divers actions of Bodies one upon another, and such like impressions, are discoursed with such life and light, that he may seem to have learn'd his knowledge even in the Schoole of the First Man. And though hercin he may be thought to have pass'd upon the breaches of Aristotle, Pliny, and Cardan; yet notwithstanding he borrows nothing from them: as if he had a designe to make it appeare, that those great men, have not so entirely possess'd themselves of this subject, but that there remains much to be discover'd. For my part, thoe it be farre from my intention, to raise the reputation of this Author upon the ruins of Antiquity; yet I think it may be avouched upon the grounds of reason, that in this present Argument he hath some advantage of them: being that the most of the Ancients which have written of things Natural, have satisfied themselves in reporting things, as the information of others have given them intelligence; and not considering, that oftentimes that which is deliver'd them for History, is farre esloign'd from all verity; they have chosen rather, by reasons to confirme the resolutions of another, than to make an exact enquiry and discovery themselves. But Mon<sup>r</sup> BACON not relying upon the meer word and credit of such as went before him, will have Experience joyn'd with Reason; and examines the receiv'd principles of the Schooles, by the effects of Nature; the speculations of the Intellectuall Globe, by the operations of the Corporale. By this means he hath found out so many rare secrets, whereof he hath bequeath'd us the invention; and made many axioms acknowledged for false, which hether-to have gon current amongst Philosophers, and have bin held inviolable.

## JUDGEMENTS UPON

TOB. ADAMI, In his Preface to the REALIS PHILOSOPHIA, of that excellent Philosopher CAMPANELLA (who lives to enjoy that Fame, which many eminent for their learning, rarely possesse after death) speaks his opiniõ thus.

*We erect no sect, establish no Placits of Eresie, but endeavour to transcribe universale and ever-veritable Philosophy out of the Ancient Originall Copy of the world: not according to variable and disputable speculations, but according to the Condueture of sense and irrefragable depositions of the Architect himselfe, whose hand in works, dissents not from his word in writing. And if the GREAT INSTAURATION of the deep-mineing Philosopher, FRA. BACON LO. VERULAM Chancellor of England, a work of high expectation, and most worthy, as of Consideration, so of assistance, be brought to perfection, it will perchance appeare, that we pursue the same ends, seeing we tread the same foot-steps intraceing, and as it were, hounding nature, by Sense and Experience, &c.*

S<sup>r</sup> TOB. MATHEWS, In his Epist. to the Duke of Florence prefixt his Italicque Translation of my LO. BACON'S *Essaies*, amongst other Elogies deciphers him thus.

S<sup>r</sup> AUSTEN, *said of his illegitimate sonne* Horrõ mihi erat illud ingenium, and truly I have known a great number whom I much valed, many whom I admire, but none who hath so astonisht me, and as it were, ravisht my senses, to see so many and so great parts, which in other men were wont to be incompatible, united, and that in an eminent degree in one sole Person. I know not whether this truth will find easy beliefe, that there can be found a man beyond the Alpes, of a most ready wit; most faithfull memory; most profound Iudgement; of a most rich and apt expression; universall in all kinds of knowledge, as in part may be seen by that rare incomparable piece, the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, which future Ages shall render in different languages: But be the faith of other Nations what it will in this point, the matter I report is so well understood in England, that every man knowes & acknowledges as much, nay hath bin an eye and care witnesse thereof; nor if I should

*should expatiate upon this subject should I be held a flatterer, but rather a suffragan to truth, &c.*

M<sup>r</sup> GEORGE SANDYS In his excellent Commentaries on his inimitable Translation of the stately METAMORPHOSIS, rendred, in an equall felicity of expression, to the Eternall fires of that *sweet tongu'd Roman*, often cites the judgement of our Author, from whose sentence he never appeals, but rather adores as an Oracle; and in an ingenious acknowledgement of assistance from him, thus delivers him to posterity.

*Of Moderne writers I have receiv'd the greatest light from Geraldus, Pontanus, Ficinus, Vives, Comes, Scaliger, Sabinus, and the CROWNE of the later the VICOUNT OF S<sup>t</sup> ALBANS; assisted, thoe lesse constantly, by other Authors, almost of all Ages and Arguments. Having bin true to my first purpose, in making choice for the most part, of those interpretations, which either beare the stamp of Antiquity, or receive estimation from the honor of the Author.*

MARIN MERSENNE An able man, but a declar'd adversary to our Authors designe (whose Arguments I shall encountre in my Apologetique for the *Instaur. of Sciences*) in his Bookes of the VERITY OF SCIENCES against the *Sceptiques* and *Pyrrhonians Lib. 1. Cap. xvi.* acknowledges thus much, which coming from an Adversary is therefore more valid.

VERULAM, seems to have no other intention in his NEW METHOD, then to establish the VERITY OF SCIENCES; wherefore you must not anticipate, as granted, that he makes for you, or that he is of your opinion; he confesses we know little, but he subverts not the Authority of Sense and of Reason; no, he labours to find out proper and proportionable instruments, whereby to Conduct the understanding to the knowledge of Nature and her effects.

The Authors Centure upon himselfe.

*For in my judgement, it is a matter which concernes not only the Benefit of others; but our own Reputation also; that no man imagine that we have projected in our minds some slight superficial notion of these Designes; and that they are of the nature of those things, which we could Desire, and which we accept only at good wishes. For they are such as without question, are within the power and possibility of men to compassse, unlesse they be wanting to themselves; and hereof, we for our parts, have certain and evident demonstration; for we come not hether, as Augures, to measure Countries in our mind, for Divination, but as Captaines, to invade them for a conquest.*

His answer to some Tacite Objections.

*I doe foresee that many of those things which I shall register as DEFICIENTS will incurre divers censures; as that some parts of this enterprize were done long agoe, and are now extant; Others, that they tast of curiosity & promise no great fruit; Others, that they are impossible to be compassed by humane industries. For the two first, let the particulars speak for themselves. For the last touching impossibilities, I determine thus. All those things are to be held possible and performeable which may be accomplisht by some person, thoe not by every one; and which may be done by the united labours of many, thoe not by any one apart, and which may be effected in a succession of Ages, thoe not in the same Age; and in brieffe which may be finisht by the care and charge of the pub., thoe not by the abilities and industry of private persons. If for all this there be any, who would rather take to himselfe that of Solomon, Dicit Piger Leo est in via, than that of Virgil Possunt quia posse videntur --- it is enough for me, if my labours may be esteemed as votes yet the better sort of wishes: for as it askes some knowledge to demand a Question not impertinent; so it requires some understanding, to make a wish not absurd. Proem. lib. 2.*

IN HONOREM  
ILLVSTRISSIMI DNI  
FRANCISCI  
DE VERVLAMIO  
Vice-Comitis S<sup>TI</sup> ALBANI

POST EDITAM AB EO  
INSTAUR. MAG.

**Q**uis iste tandem? non enim vultu ambulat  
Quotidiano. Nescis Ignare? audies,  
Dux Notionum; veritatis Pontifex;  
Inductionis Dominus; & Verulamii;  
Rerum Magister unicus, at non Artium:  
Profunditatis Pinus; atq; Elegantiæ:  
Naturæ Aruspex intimus: Philosophiæ  
Ærarium: Sequester Experienciæ,  
Speculationisq;: Æquitatis Signifer:  
Scientiarum sub pupillari statu  
Degentium olim Emancipator: luminis  
Promus: Fugator Idolùm, atq; Nubium:  
Collega Solis: Quidra Certitudinis:  
Sophismatum Mastix: Brutus Literarius:  
Authoritatis exuens Tyrannidem:  
Rationis & sensus stupendus Arbiter;  
Repumicator Mentis: Atlas Physicus,  
Alcide succumbente STAGIRITICO:  
Columba Noæ, que in vetustis Artibus  
Nullum locum, requiemve Cernens, præstiti:  
Ad se suamq; Matris Arcam regredi.  
Subtilitatis terebrâ; Temporis nepos  
Ex veritate matre: Mellis Alveus:

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JUDGEMENTS UPON


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*Mundiq; & Animarum, sacerdos unicus:  
Securis Errorum : inq; Natalibus  
Granum sinapè, acre aliis, Crescens sibi.  
O me prope Lassum, Juvate Posterì.*

GEOR. HERBERT Orat. Pub.  
in Academ. Cantab.



MANES



# MANES VERVLAMIANI

S I V E  
IN OBITUM  
INCOMPARABILIS  
FRANCISCI  
DE VERVLAMIO, &c.  
EPICEDIA.



INCLYTA Academia CANTABRIGIENSIS, cujus felicitas fuit, viro ad salutem scientiarum nato, primas sapientiæ mammas prebere; ac Philosophum, post occasum Græciæ, maximum, orbi dare: super funus Alumni sui Lacrymas effudit, doctas ac duraturas mæstitias. Ex hoc integro Musarum fonte, modica hæc sed facunda fluenta, collegit *interpretæ*; ut quod, viventi, seculum dederat decus, gliscente adhuc invidiâ; & morienti dedisse constaret, cessante nunc adulatione. Reliqua sui nominis æternitati consecranda, continuatâ seculorum serie ad ultimas usq; mundi favillas, rependet posteritas: Quis supremam suis laudibus manum imponet, novit tantum, *Fundator ille, ac simul everfor Seculorum.*

**A** Dhuc superbis insolente purpurâ  
 Feretri rapinis Inclytos in tot viros  
 Sterile Tribunal? cilicio dicas diem,  
 Saccumq; totam facito luxuriam fori.  
 A Themide libra nec geratur pensilis,  
 Sed urna, pręgravis urna Verulamii.  
 Expendat. Eben! Ephorus baud lancę premit,  
 Sed Areopagus, nec minor tantus sophos,  
 Quā Porticus brachata, Nam vester, Icholę,  
 Gemiscit axis, tanta dum moles ruit.  
 Orbis soluta cardo litterarii,  
 Ubi studio coluit togam & trabeam pari.  
 Qualis per umbras Ditis Euridice vagans  
 Palpare gestiit Orphęum, quali Orphęus,  
 Saliente tandem (vix prius crissā) Styge,  
 Alite fibras lyrę titillavit manu,  
 Talis plicata Philologan enigmati  
 Petiit Baconum vindicem, tali manu  
 Lactata cristas extulit Philosophia:  
 Humiq; soccis reptitantem Comicis  
 Non proprio Ardelionibus molimine  
 Sarfit, sed Instauravit. Hinc politius  
 Surgit cothurno celsiore, & Organo  
 Stagirita virbius reviviscit Novo.

Calpen superbo Abylámq; vincit remige  
 Phębi Columbus, artibus novis, Novum  
 Daturus Orbem; promovet conamina  
 Juvenilis ardor, usq; ad invidiam trucem  
 Fati minacis. Quis Senex vel Hannibal,  
 Oculi superstitis timens caliginem,  
 Signis Suburram ventilat victricibus?  
 Quis Milo inultus quercubus bilem movet,  
 Senectatauro gibba cüm gravior premit?  
 Dum noster Heros traderet scientias  
 Æternitati, prorsus expeditior  
 Sui sepulchri comperitur artifex.  
 Placida videtur Ecstasis speculatio,

Quâ mens tueri volucris Jdeas boni  
 In lacteos properat Olympi tramites:  
 His immoratur sedibus Domestica,  
 Peregrina propriis. Redit. Ioculariter  
 Fugax; vagatur rursus, & rursus redit.  
 Furtiva tandem serio, se subtrahit  
 Totam, gementi, morbido cadaveri  
 Sic desuescit anima, sic jubet mori.

Agite lugubres Musæ, & à Libani jugis  
 Cumulate thura Sydis in pyram illius  
 Scintillet omne, scelus sit accendi rogam  
 Regum Prometheo culinari foco.  
 Et si qua fortè ludat in cineres sacros  
 Aura petulantior, fugamq; suadeat,  
 Tunc flete; lachrymis in amplexu ruent  
 Globuli sequaces. Denuò fundamine  
 Ergastuli everso radicitus tui  
 Evehere fœlix anima, Iacobum pete,  
 Ostende, & illuc civicam fidem sequi.  
 & Tripode juris, dictites oracula  
 Themidos alumnis. Sic (Beati cœlites)  
 Astræa pristino fruatur vindice,  
 Vel cum Bacono rursus Astræam date.

**A**udax exemplum quò Mens humana feratur,  
 Et Sæcli vindex ingeniose tui;  
 Dum senio macras recoquis fœliciter artes,  
 Subtrahis & prisco libera colla iugo;  
 Quo descendenda modo veniunt tua funera? quales  
 Exposcunt lacrymas, quid sibi fata volunt?  
 An timuit Natura parens ne nuda jaceret,  
 Detraxit vestem dum tua dextera sacram?  
 Ignotiq; oculis rerum patuere Recessu,  
 Fugit & aspectum Rimula nulla tuum?

*An verò, Antiquis olim data Sponsa Mariti,  
 Conjugis amplexum respuit illa novi?  
 An tandem damnosa piis atq; invida captis,  
 Corripuit vitæ fila (trahenda) tuæ?  
 Archim. Sic ultra vitreum Siculus ne pergeret orbem  
 Privati cecidit militis ense Senex.  
 Tuq; tuos manes ideò (Francisce) tulisti,  
 Ne, non tentandum, perficeretur opus.*

*S*unt qui defuncti vivant in marmore, & ævum  
 Annos credant postibus omne suum:  
 Ære micant alii, aut fulvo spectantur in auro,  
 Et, dum se ludunt, ludere fata putant.  
 Altera pars hominum, numeros à prole superstes,  
 Cum Niobe magnos temnit iniqua Deos.  
 At tua cælatis hæret nec Fama Columnis,  
 Nec tumulo legitur, Siste viator iter:  
 Si qua Patrem proles referat, non corporis illa est,  
 Sed quasi de cerebro nata Minerva Jovis.  
 Præ tibi virtus monumenta perennia præstat,  
 Altera, nec citius corruiitura, Libri:  
 Tertia Nobilitas, ducant jam fata triumphos,  
 Quæ (Francisce) tui nil nisi corpus habent.  
 Utraq; pars melior, Mens & bona Fama supersunt,  
 Non tanti ut redimas vile cadaver habes.

T. Vincent. T. C.

*M*usæ fundite nunc aquas perennes  
 In Threnos, Lacrymâsq; Apollo fundas  
 Quas vel Castalium tenet Fluentum:  
 Nam Letho neq; convenire tanto  
 Possint nenia parva, nec coronent  
 Immensa hæc modica sepulchra guttæ:  
 Nervus ingenii, Medulla suadæ  
 Dicendiq; Tagus, reconditarum

Et gemma pretiosa *Literarum*,  
 Fatis concidit, (heu trinum Sororum  
 Dura stamina) Nobilis Baconus.  
 O quam te memorem Baconesumme  
 Nostro carmine! & illa gloriosa  
 Cunctorum monumenta seculorum,  
 Excusa ingenio tuo, & Minervâ!  
 Quam doctis, elegantibus, profundis,  
 Instauratio Magna, plena rebus!  
 Quanto lumine teneas Sophorum  
 Dissellit veterum tenebricosas  
 Ex chao procreans novam *oophor*:  
 Sic ipse Deus inditum sepulchro  
 Corpus restituet manu potenti:  
 Ergo non moreris (Bacone) nam te  
 A morte, & tenebris, & a sepulchro,  
 Instauratio Magna vindicabit.

R. C. T. C.

**P** Arcite: Noster amat facunda silentia luctus,  
 Postquam obiit solus dicere qui potuit:  
 Dicere, quæ stupeat Procerum generosa corona  
 Nexaq; sollicitis solvere fura reis.  
 Vastum opus. At nostras etiam Verulamius artes  
 INSTAURAT veteres, condit & ille novas.  
 Non qua majores: Penitus verum ille recessus  
 NATURÆ, audaci provocat ingenio.  
 Ast Ea, siste gradum, serisq; nepotibus, (inquit,)  
 Linque quod inventum sæcla minora juvet.  
 Sit satis, his sese quod nobilitata Inventis,  
 Jactent ingenio tempora nostra tuo.  
 Est aliquid, quo mox ventura superbiat ætas;  
 Est, soli notum quod decet esse mihi:  
 Sit tua laus, pulchros Corpus duxisse per artus,  
 Integra cui nemo reddere membra queat:

C

Sic

Sicopus artificem infectum commendat Apellem,  
 Cum pingit reliquam nulla manus Venerem.  
 Dixit, & indulgens cæco Natura furori,  
 Præsecuit vitæ Filium Operisq; simul.  
 At Tu, qui pendentem audes detexere telam,  
 Solus quem condant hæc monumenta scies.

H. T. Coll. Trin. Socius.

**D**um moriens tantam nostris Verulamius Heros  
 Tristitiam Musis, luminaq; uda facit:  
 Credimus heu nullum fieri post fata beatum,  
 Credimus & Samium desipuisse senem.  
 Scilicet hic miseris, sælix nequit esse, Camænis,  
 Nec se quàm Musas plus amat iste suas.  
 At luctantem animam Clotho imperiosa coëgit  
 Ad cælum, in vitos traxit in astra pedes.  
 Ergone Phœbeias jacuisse putabimus artes?  
 Atq; herbas Clarii nil valuisse Dei?  
 Phœbus idem potuit, nec virtus absfuit herbis,  
 Hunc artem atq; illas vim retinere putes:  
 At Phœbum (ut metuit ne Rex foret iste Camænis)  
 Rivali medicam crede negasse manum.  
 Hinc dolor est, quod cum Phœbo Verulamius Heros  
 Major erat reliquis, hac foret arte minor.  
 Vos tamen ô, tantum Manes atq; Umbra, Camæna,  
 Et pœnè inferni pallida turba Jovis,  
 Si spiratis adhuc, & non lusistis ocellos,  
 Sed neq; post illum vos superesse putem:  
 Si vos ergo aliquis de morte reduxerit Orpheo,  
 Istaq; non aciem fallit imago meam:  
 Discite nunc gemitus, & lamentabile carmen,  
 Ex oculis vestris lacryma multa fluat.  
 En quam multa fluit? veras agnosco Camænas  
 Et lacrymas, Helicon vix satis unus erit,  
 Deucalionæis & qui non mersus in undis

Pernassus (mirum est) hisce latebit aquis.  
 Scilicet hic perit, per quem vos vivitis, & qui  
 Multâ Pierias nutrit arte Deas.  
 Vidit ut hic artes nullâ radice retentas,  
 Languere ut summo semina sparsa soli;  
 Crescere Pegaseas docuit, velut Hasta Quirini  
 Crevit, et exiguo tempore Laurus erat.  
 Ergo Heliconiadas docuit cum crescere divas.  
 Diminuent hujus secula nulla decus.  
 Nec ferre ulterius generosi pectoris æstus  
 Contemptum potuit, Diva Minerva, tuum.  
 Restituit calamus solitum divinus honorem,  
 Dispulit & nubes alter Apollo tuas.

Dispulit & tenebras sed quas obfusca vetustas,  
 Temporis & prisce lippas senecta tulit;  
 Atq; alias methodos sacrum instauravit acumen,  
 Gnosiaq; eripuit, sed sua flâ dedit.  
 Scilicet antiquos sapientum vulgus in ævo  
 Tam claros oculos non habuisse liquet;  
 Hi velut Eo surgens de littore Phœbus,  
 Hic velut in mediâ fulget Apollo die:  
 Hi veluti Typhistentarunt equora primum,  
 At vix deseruit littora prima ratis,  
 Pleiadas hic Hyadasq; atq; omnia sidera noscens;  
 Syrtes, atq; tuos, improba Sylla, canes;  
 Scit quod vitandum est, quo dirigat equore navem;  
 Certius & cursum nautica monstrat acus:  
 Infantes illi Musas, hic gignit adultas,  
 Mortales illi, gignit atq; iste Deas.  
 Palmam ideo reliquis Magna Instauratio libri  
 Abstulit, & cedunt squalida turba sophi.  
 Et vestita novo Pallas modo prodit amictu,  
 Anguis depositis ut nitet exuviis.  
 Sic Phœnix cineres spectat modo nata paternos,  
 Æsonis & rediit prima juvenia senis.  
 Instaurata suos & sic Verulamia muros

*Ja&at, & antiquum sperat ab inde decus.*

*Sed quanta effulgent plus quam mortalis ocelli  
Lumina, dum regni mystica sacra canat?  
Dum sic natura leges, arcanaq; Regum,  
Tanquam à secretis esset utrisque, canat:  
Dum canat Henricum, qui Rex, idemq; Sacerdos,  
Connubio stabili junxit utramq; Rosam.*

*At qui hæc sunt nostris longè majora Camænis,  
Non hæc infœlix Granta, sed Aula sciat:  
Sed cum Granta labris admoverit ubera tantis  
Ius habet in laudes (maxime Alumne) tuas.  
Ius habet, ut mæstos lacrymis extingueret ignes,  
Possit ut è medio diripuisse rogo.  
At nostræ tibi nulla ferant encomia Musæ,  
Ipse canis, laudes & canis inde tuas.  
Nos tamen & laudes, quâ possumus arte, canemus,  
Si tamen ars desit, laus erit iste dolor.*

Tho. Randolph. T.C.

**S***ic cadit Aonii rarissima Gloria cœtus?  
Et placet Aoniis credere semen agris?  
Frangantur Calami, disrumpanturq; libelli,  
Hoc possint tetrica si modo jure Dex.  
Heu quæ lingua silet, quæ jam facundia cessat,  
Quò fugit ingenii Nectar & Escatui?  
Quomodo Musarum nobis contingit Alumnis  
Ut caderet nostri præses Apollo chori?  
Si nil cura, fides, labor, aut vigilantia possint,  
Siq; feret rapidas, de tribus una, manus;  
Cur nos multi brevi nobis proponimus ævo?  
Cur putri excutimus scripta sepulta situ?  
Scilicet ut dignos aliorum à Morte labores  
Dum rapimus, nos Mors in sua jura trahat.*

*Quid*


*Quid tamen in cassum nil proficientia fundo  
 Verba? quis optabit te reticente, loqui?  
 Nemo tuam spargat vislis fragrantibus urnam,  
 Nectibi Pyramidum mole sepulchra locet;  
 Nam tua conservant operosa volumina famam,  
 Hoc satis, hæc prohibent te monumenta mori.*

Williams.

**O**Rdine sequeretur descriptio Tumuli VERULAMIANI, monumentum Nobiliss. MUTISII, in honorem domini sui constructum; quâ pietate, & dignitatem Patroni sui, quem (quod rari faciunt, etiam post cineres Coluit) consuluit; Patriæ suæ opprobrium diluit, sibi nomen condidit. Busta hæc nondum invisit Interpres, sed invisurus: Interim Lector tua cura Commoda, & abi in rem tuam.

*Crescit occulto velut Arbor ævo  
 Fama BACONI.* —————







# FRANCISCVS

BARO DE VERVLAMIO

Vice-Comes SANCTI ALBANI.

ALMÆ MATRI  
INCLYTÆ ACAD.  
CANTABRIGIENSI. S.

**D**Ebita Filii qualia possum perfolvo; quod vero facio, idem & vos hortor, ut AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM strenuè incumbatis: & in Animi modestia libertatem ingenii retineatis. Neq; talentum à veteribus concredutum in sudario reponatis. Affuerit proculdubio

INCLYTÆ  
ACADEMIÆ  
OXONIENSI. S.

**Q**VM ALMÆ MATRI meæ inclytæ ACADEMIÆ CANTABRIGIENSI Scripserim, deessem sanè officio, si simile Amoris pignus forori ejus non deferrem. Sicut autem eos hortatus sum, ita & vos hortor ut SCIENTIARUM AUGMENTIS strenuè incumbatis, & veterum

cul-dubiò & affulserit Divi-  
ni Luminis Gratia, si humili-  
atâ & submissâ RELIGIO-  
NI PHILOSOPHIA cla-  
vibus sensûs legitimè & dex-  
trè utamini: & amoto omni con-  
tradictionis studio, Quisq; cum  
alio, ac si ipse secum dispu-  
tet, *Valete.*

veterum labores, neq; nihil, neq;  
omnia esse putetis; sed vires eti-  
am p̄oprias modeste perpenden-  
tes, subinde tamen experiamini,  
omnia cedent quam optimè; si  
Arma non alii in alios vertatis  
sed junctis copiis in Naturâ rerû  
impressionē faciatis, sufficit quip-  
pe illa Honori & Victoriæ, *Valete.*






FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM  
CONSULTED THUS,

AND THUS CONCLVDED  
WITH HIMSELFE; THE PUB-  
LICATIION WHEREOF HE  
CONCEIV'D DID CONCERNE  
THE PRESENT AND  
FUTURE AGE.

**S**EEING it was manifestly known unto His Lordship, that humane understanding creates it selfe much trouble; nor makes an apt and sober use of such Aides, as are within the Command of Man; from whence infinite ignorance of Things; and from the ignorance of Things, innumerable disadvantages; his opinion was, that with all our industry we should endeavour, if happily t<sup>h</sup>at same *COMMERCE OF THE MIND AND OF THINGS* (than which a greater blessing can hardly be found on Earth, certainly of earthly Felicities,) *might by any means be entirely restored; at least brought to termes of neerer correspondance.* But that Errors, which have prevailed, and prevaile would for ever, one after another, (if the mind were left free to it self) should rectify themselves, either by the imbred pow-

er of the understanding, or by the aides and assistances of Logick, there was no hope at all; because that the Primitive Notions of Things, which the mind with a too facile and supine attractive faculty receives in; treasures up and accumulates, from which all the rest are derived; are unsound, confused, and rashly abstracted from things. The like luxuriant vanity and inconstancy there is in the second and sequent Notions, whence it comes to passe, that all that human Reason which we employ, as touching the Inquisition of Things, is not well digested and built; but like some magnificent Pile without foundation. For whilest men admire and celebrate the counterfeit forces of the mind; hir true powers which might be raised (were right directions administered, and she taught to become obsequious to things, and not impotently to insult over them) they passe by and loose. This one way remaineth that the businesse be wholly reattempted with better preparations; & that there be throughout, *AN, INSTAURATION, OF SCIENCES AND ARTS*, and of all Human Learning rais'd from solid foundations. And this though it may seeme in a sort an infinit enterprize, and above mortall abilities, yet the same will be found more sound and advised, than those performances which hetherto have bin atchieved: for in this there is some issue; but in the endeavours now undertaken about Sciences, a perpetuall wheeling, Agitation and Circle. Neither is he ignorant how unfrequented this *Experience*

ence is, how difficile and incredible to perswade a beliefe, yet he thought not to desert the designe, nor himselfe, but to try and set upon the way, which alone is pervious and penetrable to the mind of Man. For it is better to give a beginning to a thing which may once come to an end, than with an eternall contention & studie to be enwrapt in those mazes which are endlesse. And the waies of Contemplation for most part resemble those celebrated waies of Action; the one, at the first entrance hard and difficult, ends in an open plain; the other at first sight ready and easy, leads into by-waies and downfalls: And being he was uncertain when such considerations should hereafter come into any mans mind, induced especially from this argument, that there hath none hetherto appear'd, who hath applied his mind to such cogitations, he resolv'd to publish, seperatly, the *First parts* as they could be perfected. Neither is this an ambitious but sollicitous festination; that if in the mean space he should depart this mortall station; there might yet remain a designation and destination of the thing he comprehended in his mind; and withall some Demonstration of his sincere and propense affection to promote the good of Mankind. Truly he esteem'd other ambition whatsoever, inferior to the businesse he had in hand: For either the matter in consultation, and thus farre prosecuted, is nothing; or so much as the conscience of the merit it selfe, ought to give him contentment without seeking a recompence from abroad.





FRANCIS LO: VERVLAM  
HIS GREAT INSTAURATION.

THE PREFACE.

Of the STATE OF LEARNING, that it is not PROSPEROUS, nor greatly ADVANCED; and that a farre different way, than hath bin known to former Ages, must be opened, to mans understanding; and other Aides procured; that the *Mind* may practise her owne power upon the *nature of things*.

**I** seemes to me, that men neither understand the Estate they possesse, nor their Abilities to purchase; but of the one to presume more; of the other, lesse, than indeed they should. So it comes to passe, that over-prizing the Arts received, they make no further Inquiry; or undervaluing themselves, more than in equity they ought, they expend their Abilities upon matters of slight consequence, never once making experiment of those things which conduce to the summe of the busnesse. Wherefore, Sciences also have, as it were, their Fatall Columnes; being men are not excited

ted, either out of Desire, or Hope, to penetrate farther. And seeing the Opinion of Wealth is one of the chief causes of want, and that out of a confidence of what we possess in present, true assistances are despised for the future, it is expedient, nay altogether necessary, that the excessive Reverence and Admiration conceived of those Sciences, which hetherto have bin found out, should in the Front and Entrance of this work, (and that roundly and undissemblingly) by some wholesome premonition, be taken off, lest their Copie and Vtility be too much Magnified and Celebrated. For he that survaies with diligence all the variety of Books, wherein Arts and Sciences triumph, shall every where finde infinite repetitions of the same matter; for manner of Delivery diverse, but for Invention stale and preoccupied; so as what at first view seem'd numerous, after examination taken, are found much abated. § As for Profit I may confidently avouch it, that the wisdom we have extracted, chiefly from the Grecians, seems to be a Child-hood of Knowledge, and to participate that which is proper to children, namely, that it is apt for talk, but impotent and immature for propagation: for it is of Controversies rank and fertile, but of works barren and fruitlesse. So that the Fable and fiction of Scylla, seemes to be a lively Image of the state of Learning, as now it is, which for the upper parts had the face and countenance of a comely Virgin, but was from the wombe downward circled, and enwrapt with barking Monsters, So the Sciences wherein we are trained up, contain in them certain Generalities

Speci-

*specious and plausible, but when you descend unto particulars, as to the Parts of Generation, expecting solid effects, and substantiall operations, then Contentions and Barking Altercations arise, wherein they close, and which supply the place of a fruitfull wombe.*

§ *Again, if these kinds of Sciences were not altogether a meere livelesse Thing, methinkes it should not have falne out, which now for many Ages hath continued, that they should thus stand at a stay, in a manner immoveable in their first Footings, without any Augmentation wort by the Race of Mankind, in such a dull Improficiency, that not only Assertion remaines Assertion, but Question rests still Question, which by Disputes is not determined, but fixt and cherisht: and all Tradition and Succession of Discipline delivered from hand to hand, presents and exhibits the Persons of Teacher and Schollar, not of Inventor or of one should adde something of note to what is invented.*

§ *But in Arts Mechanicall we see the contrary hath come to passe, which as if they were inspired by the vitall breath and prolifigque influence of a thriving Aire, are daily Propagated and Perfected, and which in their first Autors appeared, for the most part rude and even burthensome and Formelesse, have afterward acquir'd new-refind virtues and a certain apt Propriety and usefull Accommodation, so infinitely fruitfull, that sooner may mens studies and desires languish, and change, than these Sciences arrive at their full height and perfection.*

§ *Contrariwise Philosophy, and Sciences Intellectuall, like Statues are ador'd and celebrated,*

ted, but nothing Advanc't; nay commonly of most vigor in their first Autor, and by Time Degenerate and become embas'd. For since the time men became devoted and, as Pedary Senators, resigned over to the Placits and Definitions of one, they doe not adde any Amplitude to Sciences, but are wholly taken up in a servile duty of Polishing or Protecting certain Autors. § And let no man here alleage, that Sciences growing up by degrees, have at length arrived to a just period or perfect Stature, and so (as having filled up the just spaces of Augmentation) have settled and fixt themselves in the workes of some few Autors; and now that nothing more accomplisht can be found out, there remaines no more to doe, but that the Sciences already extant be improved, and adorned. Indeede it could be wisht that the state of Learning were thus prosperous; but the very truth is, these mancipations and servile resignations of Sciences, is nothing else but a peccant humor, bred out of a dareing lust and confidence in some few, and a languishing sloth and Pusillanimity in the rest. For when Sciences (for some parts it may be) have bin tilled and laboured with diligence, then perchance hath there risen up some bold-undertaking wit, for Compendious brevity of Method popolare, and plausible, who in shew hath constituted a Science, but indeed depraved the Labours of the Ancients: Yet these Abridgements finde acceptation with Posterity, for the expedite use of such a work, and to avoid the trouble and impatience of a new Inquiry. § And if any stand upon Consent now inveterate, as the Judgement

ment, and test of Time, let him know he builds upon a very deceivable and infirme Foundation. Nor is it, for most part, so revealed unto us, what in Arts and Sciences hath bin discovered and brought to light in diverse ages, and different Regions of the world; much lesse what hath bin experimented, and seriously laboured by particular Persons in priuate; For neither the Birthes, nor the Abortions of Time have bin Registered. § Nor is Consent it self, nor the long continuation thereof, with such reverence be adored, for however there may be many kindes of States in Civile Government; yet the State of Sciences is but one, w'ich alwayes was, and so will continue, Populare, and with the People the Disciplines most in request are either Euguacious and Poiemicall, or Specious and Frivolous, namely such as either illaqueate or allure the Assent. Wherefore without question, the great st wits in every age have bin over-borne, & in a sort tyrannized over, whilst men of Capacity and Comprehension about the vulgare, yet consulting their own Credit and Reputation, have submitted themselves to the over-swaying Judgment of Time and Multitude. Therefore if in any Time or Place, more profound Contemplations have perchance emerged and revealed themselves, they have bin forthwith tost and extinguisht by the Windes and Tempests of Populare opinions: so that Time like a River carries down to us that which is light and blowen up; but sinks and drownes that which is waighty and solid. § Nay the very same Autors, who have usurpt a kind of Dictature in Sciences, and with such confi-

dence past censure upon matters in doubt, have yet (the heat once over) in the lucide Intervalles, from these peremptory fits of Assèveration, changed their note and betaken themselves to complaints, upon the subtlety of Nature; the secret Recesses of Truth; the Obscurity of Things; the Implication of Causes; the Infirmitie of Mans Discerning Power: Yet nothing the more modest for all this, seeing they chuse rather to charge the Fault upon the common condition of Man and Nature, than to acknowledge any Personall deficiency in themselves. Yea it is a thing usuall with them, that what they cannot compassse by Art, their way applied, to conclude the same impossible to be attained by the same Art: and yet for all this, Art must not be condemned, being she is to examine and judge; wherefore the aime and intention of such accusations is only this, That Ignorance may be delivered frō Ignominy. § So likewise what is already commended unto us and intertained betbert, is for most part such a kind of Knowledge, as is full of Words and Questions; but barren of Works and reall Improvement; for Augmentation backward and heartlesse; pretending perfection in the whole, but ill-filled up in the Parts; for choice Populare, and of the Autors themselves suspected, and therefore fortified and countenanced by artificiois evasions. § And the Persons who have entertained a designe to make triall themselves and to give some Advancement to Sciences, and to Propagate their bounds, even these Autors durst not make an open departure from the Common received opinions; nor visite the Head-springs of nature,

*Nature, but take themselves to have done a great matter, and to have gained much upon the Age, if they may but interlace, or annex any thing of their own, providently considering with themselves, that by these middle courses, they may both conserve the modesty of Assenting; and the liberty of Adding. But whilest they thus cautelously conforme themselves to Opinions and Customes, these Plausible moderations, redound to the great prejudice and detriment of Learning. For at once to Admire and goe beyond Autors, are habits seldome compatible: but it comes to passe here after the manner of Waters, which will not ascend higher than the levell of the first spring-head, from whence they descended; wherefore such writers amend many things, but promote litle or nothing, making a Proficiency in Melioration, not in Augmentation.*

§ *Neither hath there bin wanting undertaking Spirits, who with a more resolute confidence, presuming nothing yet done, take themselves to be the men, must rectify All; and imploying the strenght of their wits in crying down, and reversing all former judgements, have made passage to themselves and their own Placits, whose busy Clamor, hath not much advanced Knowledge, since their aime and intention hath bin, not to enlarge the bounds of Philosophy and Arts, by a sincere and solid Enquiry; but only to change the Placits, and translate the Empire of Opinions, and settle it upon themselves, with litle advantage to Learning, seeing amongst opposite Errors, the Causes of Erring are commonly the same.*

§ *And*

if any unconcerned natures, not mancipate to others, or their own opinions, but affecting liberty, have bin so farre animat'd, as to desire that others together with themselves, would make farther Inquiry; these surely have meant well, but performed litle; for they seem to have proceeded upon probable grounds only, being wheeled about in a vertiginous maze of Arguments, and by a promiscuous licence of Inquiry, have indeed loosned the summes of severe Inquisition: nor hath any of all these with a just patience, and sufficient expectation attended the Operations of nature, and the successes of Experience. § Some again have embarqu'd themselves in the Sea of Experiments, and become almost Mechanicall, but in the Experience it selfe, they have practis'd a roving manner of Inquiry, which they doe not in a regular course constantly pursue. § Nay many propound to themselves, certain petty Taskes, taking themselves to have accomplish'd a great performancce, if they can but extract some one Invention by a manage as poore as impertitent; for none rightly and successfully search the nature of any thing to the life in the Thing it selfe; but after a painfull and diligent variation of Experiments, not breaking off there, proceeds on, finding still emergent matter of farther Discovery. § And it is an Error of speciall note, that the industry bestowed in Experiments, hath presently, upon the first accesse into the Businessse, by a too forward and unseasonable Desire, seised upon some design'd operation; I mean sought after, Fructifera non Lucifera, Experiments of use and not Experiments

riments of Light and Discovery: not imitating the  
 divine method which created the first day Light only,  
 and allowe it one entire Day, producing no Materi-  
 ate work the same day, but descended to their Creation  
 the daies following. § As for those who have given  
 the preeminence unto Logique, and are of opinion that  
 the surest Guards for Sciences must be procur'd from  
 thence, they have truly and wisely discerned, that the  
 mind of man, and Intellective Faculty left unto it self,  
 may deservedly be suspect'd. But the remedy is too  
 weak for the disease, and is it self not exempt from  
 Distemperature; for the Logique in force, though  
 it may be rightly accommodat'd unto matters Civile  
 and Populare Sciences, which consist in Discourse  
 and Opinion, yet it comes farre short of penetrating  
 the subtlety of Nature; and undertaking more than it  
 can master, seemes rather to stablisch and fixe Errors  
 than to open a way to Truth. § Wherefore to  
 recollect what hath bin said, it seemes that neither In-  
 formation from others, nor mens own Inquiries  
 touching Sciences, hath hetherto successfully shined  
 forth, especially seeing there is so litle certainty in De-  
 monstration and Infalibility of Experiments, thus  
 farre discovered. And the Fabrique of the Universe  
 to the contemplative eye of the Mind, for the frame  
 thereof is like some Labyrinth or intricate Maze,  
 where so many doubtfull passages, such deceivable re-  
 semblances, of Things and Signes, such oblique and  
 serpentine windings and implicite knots of Nature  
 every where present themselves, as confounds the un-  
 derstanding.

derstanding. And withall, we must continually make our way, through the woods of Experiences, and particular Natures, by the uncertain Light of Sense, sometimes shining sometimes shadowed: yea and the guides, which (as hath bin toucht) offer their assistance, they likewise are entangled, and help to make up the number of Errors and of those that erre. In matters of such perplext difficulty, there is no relying upon the Iudgement of men from their own abilities; or upon the Casuall Felicity of Particular events; for neither the capacity of Man, how excellent soever; nor the chance of Experience, never so often iterated and essayed, is of force to conquer these mysteries: we must march by line and leuell, and all the way, even from the first perception of Senses, must be secured, and fortified by a certain Rule, and constant Method of proceeding. § Yet are not these things so to be understood, as if, in so many Ages, and so much Industry, nothing at all hath bin performed to purpose; nor is there any cause why it should repent us of the Discoveries already made; for certainly the Ancients, in those Speculations which consist in strength of wit, and abstract meditation, have approved themselves men of admirable comprehensions: But as in the Art of Navigation, the men of former Ages, directing their course by observation of starres only, could edge along the coast of the known Continent, and it may be, crosse some narrow Seas or the Mediteranean; but before the Ocean could be thus commanded, and the Regions of the new world discovered, it was requisite that the use of the Mariners needle, as a more  
sure

sure and certain guide should be first found out; even so what discoveries soever have bin hetherto made in Arts and Sciences, they are of that quality, as might have bin brought to light by Practice, Meditation, Observation and Discourse, as things neerer the senses, and for most part, under the command of common Notions, but before we can make our approaches, to the remote and hidden secrets of Nature, it is necessarily requisite, that a better and more perfect use, and pratique-operation of the Mind and understanding Faculty be introduc't. § As for us, surely we, (vanquish't with an immortal love of Truth) have expos'd our selves to doubtfull, difficult, and desert Pathes; and by the protection and assistance of the Divine power, have borne up and encouraged our selves, against the violent Assaults and prepared Armies, as it were, of Opinions, and against our own private and inward hesitations and scruples, and against the cloudes and darknesse of Nature, and euery where flying fancies; that so we might procure the present and future Age more safe and sound Judications and Impressions of Truth. If in this high and arduous attempt, we have made any Proficiencie, surely by no other means have we cleered our selves a way, than by a sincere and just humiliation of the spirit of Man, to the lawes and operations of Nature. For all they that went before us, who applied themselves to the finding out of Arts, casting a transient eye upon Things, examples, and experience, have presently (as if Invention were nothing else but a meere Agitation of Braine) invoked

in a manner their own spirits, to divine and utter Oracles unto them: but we being chastly and perpetually conversant with the operations of Nature, divorce not the Intellect from the Object farther than that the Images and beams of things (as in sense) may meet and concentrate; by which manner of proceeding, there is not much left to the strength and excellency of wit. The same submission of spirit we have practised in discovery, we have followed in Delivery: Nor have we endeavour'd to set off our selves with Glory, or draw a Majesty upon our inventions, either by Triumphs of Confutations, or Depositions of Antiquity; or an usurpation of Authority; or the vaile of Obscurity, which are Arts he may easily find out, whose study is not so much the Profit of others, as Applause to himselfe. I say we neither have practised, nor goe we about, by force or fraud to circumvent mens Judgements, but conduct them to the things themselves, and to the league and confederacy of Twings, that they may see what they have, what they reprehend, what they adde and contribute to the Publique. And if we have bin too credulous, or too dormant, and not so intentive upon the matter, or languisht in the way, or broken off the thread of the Inquiry, yet notwithstanding we present things after such a manner open and naked, that our Errors may be detected and separated before they can spread themselves, or insinuate their Contagion into the masse of Sciences; and after such a Method as the continuation of our labours, is a matter facile and expedite. By this means we presume we have establisht for ever, a true and legitimate

giti mate Marriage, between the Empiricall and Rationall faculty; *whose fastidious and unfortunate Divorce and Separation, hath troubled and disordered the whole Race and Generation of Man-kind.* § *And seeing these performances are not within the compasse of our meere naturall Power and command, we doe beere, in the Accessse to this work,* Powre forth humblest and most ardent supplications to God the Father, God the Word, God the Spirit, that they being mindfull of the Miseries of Mankind, and of the Pilgrimage of this life, wherein we weare out few & evill daies, they would vouchsafe to endow mankind, by my hand with new Donatives. And moreover, we humbly pray, that Humane knowledges, may no way impeach, or prejudice Divine Truths; nor that from the disclosing of the waies of sense, and the letting in of a more plentifull Naturall Light, any mists of Incredulity or clouds of Darknesse arise in our minds, touching Divine Mysteries; but rather that from a purified Intellect, purged from Fancies and Vanity, and yet yeilded and absolutely rendred up to Divine oracles; the tributes of Faith may be rendred to Faith. In the last place, that the venome of knowledge infused by the Serpent, whereby the mind of man is swelled and blown up, being voided; we may not be too aspireingly wise, or above sobriety, but that we may improve and propagate Verity in Charity. § *Now we have performed our vovves to heaven, converting our selves to men, we admonish them somethings that are Profitable, and*

*request of them some things that are equall. First we admonish (which thing we have also prayed for,) that we keep human Reason within due Limits in matters Divine, and Sense within compasse: For sense like the Sunne, opens and reveales the face of the Terrestriall Globe, but shuts up and conceales the face of the Celestiall. Again, that men beware that in flight from this error, they fall not upon a contrary extreme, of too much abasing Naturall Power, which certainly will come to passe, if they once entertain a conceit, that there are some secrets of nature seperate and exempt, as it were by iniunction, from Humane Inquisition. For it was not that pure and immaculate Naturall knowledge, by the light whereof Adam gave names unto the Creatures, according to the propriety of their natures, which gave the first motion and occasion to the Fall, but it was that proud and Imperative Appetite of Morall knowledge, defining the lawes and limits of Good and Evill, with an intent in man to revolt from God, and to give lawes unto himselfe, which was indeed the proiect of the Primitive Temptation. For, of the knowledges which contemplate the works of Nature, the holy Philosopher hath said expressely; that the glory of God is to conceale a thing, but the glory of the King is to find it out: as if the Divine Nature, according to the innocent and sweet play of children, which hide themselves to the end they may be found, took delight to hide his works, to the end they might be found out; and of his indulgence and goodnesse to man-kind, had chosen the*

*soule*

Philos. Iud.

Prov. 25.

*Soule of man to be his Play-fellow in this game. § In summe, I would advise all in generall, that they would take into serious consideration the true and Genuine ends of knowledge; that they seek it not either for Pleasure; or Contention; or contempt of others; or for Profit; or Fame; or for Honor, and Promotion; or such like adulterate or inferior ends: but for the merit and emolument of Life; and that they regulate and perfect the same in charity: For the desire of Power, was the Fall of Angels, the desire of knowledge, the fall of Man; but in charity there is no excessse, neither men nor Angels ever incurred danger by it. § The Requests we make are these; (To say nothing of our selves touching the matter in hand) we Request thus much, That men would not think of it as an opinion; but as a work, and take it for Truth, that our aime, and end is not to lay the foundation of a Sect or Placit, but of Humane Profit and Proficiencie. § Again, that respecting their own Benefit, and putting off Partialities and Prejudices, they would all contribute in one for the publique Good: and that being freed and fortified by our Preparations and Aids, against the Errors and Impediments of the waies, they likewise may come in, and bear a part in the burden, and inherit a portion of the Labours that yet remaine behind. § Moreover that they cheere up themselves, and conceive well of the enterprize; and not figure unto themselves a conceit and fancy, that this Our Instauration is a matter infinite, and beyond the power and compasse of Mortality; seeing it is in truth the right and*

*legitimate end and period of Infinite Error; and not un-  
mindfull of Mortality, and Humane Condition, being  
it doth not promise that the Designe may be accom-  
plisht within the Revolution of an Age only, but deli-  
vers it over to Posterity to Perfect. In a word, it  
seeks not Sciences arrogantly in the cells of mans  
wit, but submissively in the greater world: And  
commonly, Empty things are vast and boundlesse,  
but Solids are contracted and determined within a  
narrow compasse. § To conclude, we thought  
good to make it our last suit, (lest peradventure  
through the difficulty of the Attempt, any should be-  
come unequall Judges of our Labours) that men see to  
it, how they doe, from that which we must of necessity  
lay down as a ground (if we will be true to our own  
ends) assume a liberty to censure, and passe sentence up-  
on our Labours, seeing we reject all this premature and  
Anticipated humane Reason, rashly and too sudden-  
ly departed from Things, (as touching the Inquisiti-  
on of Nature) as a thing various, disordered and ill-  
built: Neither in equity can it be required of us, to  
stand to the Iudgement of that Reason, which stands  
it selfe, at the barre of Iudicature.*

THE



THE DISTRIBUTION OF  
THE WORK INTO  
SIX PARTS.

P. I. PARTITIONES SCIENTIARVM, OR *a summary Survey and partition of Sciences.*

P. II. NOVVM ORGANVM, OR *True Directions for the Interpretation of Nature.*

P. III. PHÆNOMENA VNIVERSI, OR *History Naturall and Experimentall, for the building up Philosophy.*

P. IV. SCALA INTELLECTVS, OR *the Intellectual Sphere rectified to the Globe of the World.*

P. V. PRODROMI, OR *The Anticipations of second Philosophy emergent upon Practice.*

P. VI. SECUNDA PHILOSOPHIA, OR *Active Philosophy, from intimate Converse with Nature.*

THE ARGUMENT OF THE  
SEVERALL PARTS.



*I* is one point of the Designe we have in hand, that every thing be delivered with all possible Plainesse and Perspicuity: for the nakednesse of the Mind, as once of the Body, is

the companion of Innocence and Simplicity. *First therefore, the order and Distribution of the work, with the reason thereof, must be made manifest. The Parts of the work are, by us, assigned SIX.*

P. I. ¶ The First Part exhibits the summe or universall description of that Learning and Knowledges in the possession whereof, men have hetherto bin estated. *For we thought good to make some stay even upon Sciences received, and that, for this consideration, that we might give more advantage to the Perfection of ancient knowledges, and to the introduction of new: For we are carried, in some degree, with an equall temper of Desire, both to improve the labours of the Ancients, and to make farther progresse. And this makes for the faith and sincerity of our meaning, according to that of the wise, The unlearned Man receives not the words of knowledge, unlesse you first interpret unto him the conceptions of his heart: Wherefore we will not neglect to side along (as it were in passage) the Coasts of accepted Sciences and Arts, and to import thether, somethings usefull and profitable.*

Prov. 18. § *Nevertheless we adjoyne such Partitions of Sciences, as comprehend, not only such things that are found out and observed already, but such also as are thereto pertaining & have bin hetherto pretermis'd. For there are found in the Intellectuall Globe, as in the Terrestriall, soyles improved and Deserts. Wherefore let it not seem strange, if now and then we make a departure from the usuall Divisions, and forsake the beaten path of some Partitions: for Addition*

whilest

whilest it varies the whole, of necessity varies the parts and the Sections thereof: and the accepted Divisions, are accommodated only to the accepted summe of Sciences, as it is now cast up. § Concerning those Parts, which we shall note as Pretermitted, we will so regulate our selves, as to set down more than the naked Titles, or brief Arguments of DEFICIENTS. For where we deliver up any thing as a DESIDERATE, so it be a matter of merit; and the reason thereof may seem somewhat obscure; so as, upon good consideration, we may doubt, that we shall not be so easily conceived what we intend, or what the contemplation is we comprehend in our mind, and in our meditation: there it shall ever be our precise care, to annex either precepts, for the performing of such a work; or a Part of the Work it self, performed by us already, for Example to the whole; that so we may in every Particular, either by Operation or Information, promote the businesse. For in my judgement, it is a matter which concernes not only the Benefit of others, but our own Reputation also; that no man imagine that we have projected in our minds some slight superficiall notion of these Designes; and that they are of the nature of those things, which we could Desire, and which we accept only as good wishes. For they are such as without question, are within the power and possibility of men to compassse, unlesse they be wanting to themselves; and hereof, we for our parts, have certain and evident demonstration; for we come not hether, as Augures, to measure Countries in our mind, for Divination; but as Captaines, to invade them

them, for a conquest. And this is the First part of our works.

P. II. ¶ Thus having passed over Ancient Sciences, in the next place, we enable human Intellect to saile through. Wherefore to the Second Part is designed the Doctrine touching a more sound, and perfect use of Reason, in the inquiry of Things, and the true assistances of the understanding; that hereby (so farre as the condition of humanity and mortality will suffer) the Intellect, may be elevated; and amplified with a faculty, capable to conquer the dark, and deeper secrets of Nature. And the Art, we here set downe, which we are wont to call, *The INTERPRETATION OF NATURE*, is a kind of Logique, though very much, and exceeding different. That vulgare Logique professes the Preparation and Contrivance of aides and forces for the understanding, herein they conspire, but it cleerely differs from the Populare, specially in three things, namely, in the end, in the order of Demonstrating, and, in the first disclosures to Inquiry. § For the End propounded in this our Science is, that there may be found out not Arguments, but Arts; not things Consentaneous to Principles, but even Principles themselves; not probable reasons, but designations and indications of works; wherefore from a different intention followes a different effect: for there, an Adversary is distressed and vanquisht by Disputation, here by nature, the thing done. § And with this End accords the nature and order of their Demonstrations: For in vulgare Logique, almost all the paines is employed about

*bout Syllogisme: as for Induction, the Dialectiques seem scarce ever to have taken it into any serious consideration, slightly passing it over, and hastning to the formes of Disputeing. But we reject Demonstration by Syllogisme, for that it proceeds confusedly, and lets nature escape our hands. For though no man call into doubt, but that what are coincident in a middle terme, are in themselves coincident, (which is a kind of Mathematique Certitude) yet here lies the Fallax, that Syllogisme consists of Propositions, Propositions of words, and words are the tokens and marks of things. Now if these same notions of the the mind, (which are, as it were, the soule of words, and the Basis of this mannr of structure, and fabrique) be rudely and rashly divorc'd from things, and roveing; not perfectly defin'd and limited, and also many other waies vicious; all falls to ruine. Wherefore we reject Syllogisme, not only in regard of Principles (for which nor doe they make use of it) but in respect also of Middle Propositions, which indeed Syllogisme, however, inferrs and brings forth; but barren of operations and remote from practise; and in relation to the Active Part of Sciences, altogether incompctent. Although therefore we may leave to Syllogisme, and such celebrated and applauded Demonstrations, a jurisdiction over Arts Populare and Opinable (for in this kind we move nothing) yet for the nature of Things; we every where as well in Minor, as Maior Propositions, make use of Inductions: for we take Induction to be that Forme of Demonstration, which supports sense; presses nature*

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and is instanced in works, and in a sort mingled therewith. Wherefore the order also of Demonstration is altogether inverted. For hetherto the businesse used to be thus managed; from sense, and some few Particulars, suddenly to fly up to the highest Generalls, as to fixt Poles, about which Disputations may be turned; from which the rest of intermediate Axioms may be derived. A way compendious indeed, but precipitate; and to nature impervious; but for Disputations ready, and accommodate. But according to our method, Axioms are raised by a sequent continuity & graduat dependancy, so as there is no seising upon the highest Generalls, but in the last place; and those highest Generalls in quality not notionals; but well terminated, and such as nature acknowledges to be truly neere allied unto her; and which cleave to the individuall intrinsiques of things. § But touching the forme it selfe of Induction and Iudgement made by it, we undertake a mighty work. For the Forme, whereof Logicians speak, which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a childish thing, and concludes upon admittance; is exposed to perill from a contradictory instance; lookes only upon commune operations, and is in the issue endlesse. But to the knowledges of Induction, such a Forme is required, as may solve and separate experience; and by due exclusion and rejection necessarily conclude. And if that publique and populare Iudgement of Dialectiques, be so laborious and bath exercised so many and so great wits; how much greater paines ought we take in this other; which not only out of the secret closets of the

mind,

mind, but out of the very entrails of nature is extracted? Nor is this all, for we more firmly settle, and solidate the foundation of Sciences, and take the first rise of our inquiry deeper than hitherto hath bin attempted; submitting to examinations those Principles, which vulgare Logick taketh up on the credit of another. For the Dialectiques borrow, as it were, from all other Sciences, the Principles of Sciences; again adore the prime Notions of the mind, lastly rest satisfied with the immediat informations of sense rightly disposed. But our judgement is this, that true Logique should visite every particular Province of Sciences, with greater command than their principles possess, and that those same putative Principles be enforced to give an account, and be liable to examination, untill such time as their validity and tenure cleerly appeared. And as touching the Prime Notions of the intellect, there is nothing of those, (the understanding left at liberty to it selfe) hath congested, but matter to be suspected, nor any way warrantable, unless it be summon'd, and submit it selfe to a new Court of Judicature, and that sentence passe according thereto. Moreover we many waies sift and sound the information of sense it selfe, for the Sences deceive, yet withall they indicate their Errors: but Errors are at hand, Indications to be sought for a farre off. § The guilt of Sense is of two sorts, either it destitutes us, or else it deceives us. For first, there are many things which escape the cognizance of sense, even when it is well disposed, and no way impedit: either by reason of the subtilty of the entire body, or the minutnesse of the

parts thereof, or the distance of place, or the slownesse, and likewise swiftnesse of motion; or the familiar converse with the object, or some other causes. Again, nor where sense truly apprehends its object, are her precepts so very firme: for the testimony and information of sense, is ever from the Analogy of Man, and not from the Analogy of the World; and it is an error of dangerous consequence to assert, that sense is the measure of things. Wherefore to encounter these inconveniences, we have with painfull and faithfull service every where sought out, and collected assistances, that Supplements to Deficients; to Variations, Rectifications, may be ministred. Nor doe we undertake this so much by instruments, as by experiments; for the subtilty of Experiments, is farre greater than of sense it selfe, though assisted with exact instruments; we mean such experiments, which to the intention of the thing inquired, are skilfully according to Art invented and accommodated. Wherefore we doe not attribute much to the immediat and particular perception of sense; but we bring the matter to this issue, that sense may judge only of the experiment; the experiment of the thing. We conceive therefore, that of sense, (from which all knowledge in things naturall must be derived, unlesse we mean wilfully to goe a witlese way to worke) we are become the religious Pontifs; and the not inexperienced interpreters of her Oracles; so as others may seem in outward profession; but we in deed and action, to protect and honor sense. And of this kind are they which we prepare, for the light of Nature, the actuating, and immis-

immiffion thereof; which of themfelves were fufficient, were human Intellect equall, and a fmooth in-anticipated Table. But when the minds of men are after fuch ftrange waies befieged, that for to admit the true beams of things, a fincere and polifht Area is wanting; it concerns us, of neceffity to bethink our felves, of feeking out fome remedy for this diftemperature. The **IDOLAES**, wherewith the mind is preoccupate are either Attracted, or Innate. *Attracted* have flid into mens minds, either by the Practices and Sects of Philofophers; or by depraved lawes of Demonftrations. But the *Innate* inhere in the nature of the Intellect, which is found to be farre more liable to error, than fense. For however men may please themfelves, and be ravifht into admiration, and almoft adoration of the mind of man, this is moft certain: as an inequall looking-glaffe, changes the raies of objects, according to its own figure, and cutting; even fo the mind, when it fuffers imprefion from things by fense, in encogitating and difcharging her notions, doth not fo faithfully infinuate and incorporate her nature, with the nature of things. And thofe two firft kinds of **IDOLAES** can very hardly; but thofe latter, by no means be extirpate. It remains only that they be difclofed; and that fame treacherous faculty of the mind be noted and convinced; left from the unfound complection of the mind, upon the extermination of ancient, perchance new shootes of Errors fpring up in their place; and the bufineffe be brought only to this iffue, that errors be not extinguifht, but changed: but that on the contrary, now at laft, it be

*for ever decreed and ratified, that the intellect cannot make a judgement but by Induction, and by a legitimate forme thereof. Wherefore the Doctrine of purifying the understanding, that it may become receptive of truth, is perfected by three Reprehensions: Reprehension of Philosophy; Reprehension of Demonstrations; and Reprehension of Native humane Reason. These explicated, and then the case cleared, what the nature of things, what the nature of the mind is capable off; we presume (the Divine goodnesse being President at the Rites) that we have prepared and adorned, the Bride-chamber of the Mind and of the universe. Now may the vote of the Marriage-song be, that from this coniunction, Human Aides, and a Race of Inventions may be procreated, as may in some part vanquish and subdue mans miseries and necessities. And this is the second Part of the Work.*

P. III. ¶ *But our purpose is not only to point out and munitie the way; but to enterprize it: Wherefore the third Part of the work compriseth, PHÆNOMENA VNIVERSI, as to say, all kind of Experience, and Naturall History, of such kind as may be fundamentall for the building up of Naturall Philosophy. For neither can any exact way of Demonstration or Forme of interpreting Nature, both guard and support the mind from error and lapse, and withall present and minister matter for knowledge. But they who proposed to themselves not to proceed by Conjectures and Divinations, but to find out, and to know, whose end and aime*

is not to contrive *Fictions and Fables*, but to search with diligence into the nature of, and, as it were, anatomize, this true world, must derive all from the very things themselves. Nor can the substitution and compensation of wit, or meditation, or Argumentation suffice to this travaile, inquisition, and mundane perambulation; no not if all the wits in the world should meet together. Wherefore we must either take a right course, or desert the businesse for ever: and to this day the matter hath bin so managed, that it is no marvaile, if nature hath not disclosed hir selfe. For first, defective and fallacious information of sense; negligent, inequall, and as it were, casuall observation; vain Tradition and from idle report; Practise, intent on the work, and servile; experimentall attempt, ignorant, dull, wild, and broken; lastly slight and poore Naturall History; have towards the raising of Philosophy, congested most depraved matter for the understanding. After this, preposterous subtilty of arguing, and ventilation, hath essayed a late remedy to things plainly desperate; which doth not any way recover the businesse, or seperate errors.

§ Wherefore there is no hope of greater advancement and progresse, but in the Restauration of Sciences. And the commencements hereto must, by all means, be derived from Naturall History; and that too, of a new kind and provision: for to no purpose you polish the Glasse, if images be wanting: not only faithfull guards must be procured, but apt matter prepared. And this our History, as our Logick, differs from that in use, in many particulars: in the end or office, in the Masse  
and

and Congeries, than in the subtilty, also in choice, and in constitution in reference to those things that follow. § For first we propound such a Naturall History, as doth not so much either please for the variety of things, or profit for present improvement of Experiments, as it doth disperse a light to the invention of causes; and gives, as it were, the first milke to the nourishing up of Philosophy. For though we principally pursue operation, and the Active part of Sciences; yet we attend the due season of Harvest; nor goe about to reap the green bearb or the blade. For we know well that Axioms rightly invented, draw after them the whole troupe of Operations; and not sparsedly but plentifully exhibit works. But we utterly condemne and renounce, as Atalantæes Apple which retards the Race, that unseasonable and childish humor of acceleratingly pledges of new works. And this is the Duty of our Naturall History. § As for the Masse, we Compile a History, not only of Nature at Liberty, and in Course; I mean, when without compulsion she glides gently along, and accomplishes her own work: (as is the History of the Heavens, Meteors, Earth and Sea; of Minerals, Plants, Animals;) but much rather of Nature straightned and vext, when by the provocations of Art, and the ministry of Man, she is put out of her commune road, distressed and wrought. Wherefore, all the experiments of Arts Mechanicall; all of the Operative part of Liberall; all of many Practicall, not yet conspired into a peculiar Art (so farre as any discovery may be had, and so farre as is conducent to our intention) we

will

will set down at large. So likewise (not to dissemble the matter) nothing regarding mens pride and bravades, we bestow more paines, and place more assurance in this Part than in that other, being the nature of things, more discloses hirselve in the vexation of Art; than when it is at its own liberty. § Nor doe we present the History of Substances only, but also we have taken it as a part of our diligence, to prepare a seperate history of their virtues; we mean, such as in nature may be accounted Cardinall, and wherein the Primordials of nature are expressly constituted; as matter invested with her Primitive qualities and appetites; as dense, rare, hot, cold, consistent, fluid, ponderous, light, and others not a few. § For indeed, to speak of subtility, we search out with choice diligence, a kind of Experiments, farre more subtile and simple than those commonly met with. For we educe and extract many out of darknesse, which had never come into any mans mind to investigate, save his who proceeds by a certain and constant path, to the invention of causes: whereas in themselves they are of no great use, that it is cleerely evident, that they were not sought after, for themselves, but that they have directly the same reference to things and works, that the Letters of the Alphabet have to speech and words; which, though single by themselves, they are unprofitable, yet are they the Elements of all Language. § And in the choice of Reports and Experiments, we presume that we have given in better security, than they who hetherto have bin conversant in Naturall Phi-

Plut. de Ed.  
P. ex Plat.  
de Rep.

lofophy: for we admit nothing but by oculate faith, at  
 leſt evident prooffe, and that after moſt ſevere enquiry:  
 ſo as nothing is reported hightned to the abuſive credit  
 of a miracle; but what we relate are chaſt and immacu-  
 late from Fables and Vanity. So alſo all thoſe recei-  
 ved and ventilated current fictions and lies, which by a  
 ſtrange neglect, have for many ages bin countenanced  
 and are become inveterate; we doe by name proſcribe,  
 and precisely note, that they may be no longer prejudi-  
 ciall to Sciences. For what one wiſely obſerves, that  
 Fables, Superſtitions, and idle Stories, which nurſes  
 inſtill into young-children, doe in good earneſt de-  
 prave their minds: ſo the ſame reaſon moved us, to be  
 ſo religious and carefull, leſt at the entrance, where we  
 handle and take the charge of the Infancy, as it were,  
 of Philoſophy, under naturall Hiſtory, ſhe ſhould be  
 initiated in any vanity. § But in every new and  
 ſomewhat more ſubtile experiment, in our opinion,  
 certain and tryed, we yet apertly adjoyne the manner of  
 the experiment we have practiſed; that after it is made  
 apparent what the ſucceſſe of every particular was with  
 us, men might ſee the error which might lurke and  
 cleave thereto, and be awaked to prooffes, if any ſuch be,  
 more exact and ſecure. § In briefe, we every where  
 ſparſedly inſert monitions and ſcruples and conjectures;  
 ejecting and interdicting, as it were, by a ſacred adjura-  
 tion and exorcisme, all Phantaſmes. § Laſtly be-  
 ing it is a thing moſt liquid unto us, how exceedingly  
 Experience and Hiſtory diſperſe the beams of the ſight  
 of humane Intellect, and how hard a matter it is, ſpeci-  
 ally

ally to minds tender and preoccupate, at first entrance, to become familiar with nature; we therefore many times adde our own observations, as certain first conversions and inclinations, and as it were, Aspects of History to Philosophy; to the end that they may be both pledges to men, that they shall not ever be detained in the waves of History; as also that when they are once arrived to the operation of the understanding, all may be in a more preparednesse. And by this kind of Naturall History, as here we describe, we suppose that there may be a secure and easy accesse unto Nature; and solid and prepared matter presented unto the Understanding.

¶ Now we have both fortified and environed P. IV. the understanding with faithfull Auxiliaries and forces, and by a strict Muster raised a compleat Army of Divine works, there seemes nothing remaining but that we set upon Philosophy it selfe. But in so difficile and dubious an enterprize, there are some particulars, which seem necessarily to be interposed partly for instruction, partly for present use. § Of these the first is, that the examples of Inquisition and of Invention, be propounded according to our rule and method represented in particular subjects; chiefly making choice of such subjects, which amongst other things to be enquired, are the most noble, and in mutuall relation, most Adverse, that there may not want an example in every kind. Nor doe we speak of those examples, which for illustration sake, are annexed to every particular precept and rule, (for we have sufficiently quit

our selves hereof in the Second Part of the Work,) but we mean directly the Types and Platformes which may present as it were, to the eye, the whole Procedure of the mind, and the continued Fabrick and order of Invention, in certain selected subjects; and they various and of remarke. For it came into our mind, that in Mathematiques, the frame standing, the Demonstration inferred is facile and perspicuous; on the contrary, without this accomodation and dependency, all seems involved, and more subtile than indeed they be. Wherefore to examples of this sort we asigne the Fourth Part of our work; which indeed is nothing else, but a particular, and explicite application of the Second Part.

P. V. ¶ But the fifth Part is added only for a time, and paid as interest untill the Principall be raised. For we are not so precipitantly bent upon the end, as too slightly to passe over what we casually meet with by the way. Wherefore the Fift Part of the Work, is composed of such things as we have, or found out, or experimented, or superadded; nor yet doe we performe this, by the reasons and rules of Interpretation, but by the same application of the understanding, which others in enquiry and invention use to practise. For seeing from our perpetuall converse with nature, we hope greater matters from our meditations, than we can promise to our selves from the strength of our own wit, these observations may be as tents pitched in the way, into which the mind, in pusuit of more certain Collections, may turne in, and for a while repose hir selfe. Yet in  
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the mean, we promise not to engage our selves upon the credit of those Observations; because they are not found out, nor tried by the right forme of Interpretation.

§ And there is no cause why any should distast or intertain a jealousy, at that suspension of Iudgement in knowledge, which asserts not absolutely, that nothing can be known; but that nothing, without a certain order and a certain method, can be known; and yet withall, layes downe for use and ease, certain degrees of certitude, untill the mind be fixt upon the explication of causes. For neither those very Schooles of Philosophers, who downe-right maintained Acataleptie or Incomprehensibility, have bin inferior to those, who usurp a liberty of pronouncing sentence: but they provided not, assistances to the sense, and understanding, as we have done, but utterly took away all credit and authority, which is a farre different case and almost opposite.

Academ.  
Vet. Nov.

Dogmat.

¶ Now the sixth Part. of our Work, whereto the rest are subservient and ministrant, doth altogether disclose, and propound that Philosophy, which is educed, and constituted out of such a legitimate sincere and severe enquiry, as we have already taught and prepared. But to consummate and perfect this last Part, is a thing exalted above our strength, and beyond our hopes. We have given it, as we trust, not contemptible beginnings; the prosperous successe of mankind shall give it issue; and peradventure such, as men, in this present state of mind and employments, can not easily conceive and Comprehend. And the case con-

P. VI.

*cernes not contemplative felicity alone, but indeed mens affaires and fortunes, and all the power of works: For Man, Natures minister and interpreter, doeth, and understands so much, as he hath by Operation or Contemplation observed of Natures Order; nor can know or doe any more: For neither can any forces unloose and break asunder the chain of Causes; nor is nature otherwise, than by obedience unto it, vanquisht. Wherefore these two main Intentions, Human Sciences, and Human Potencies, are indeed in the same point coincident: and the frustration of works, for most part, falls out from the ignorance of Causes. § But herein the summe and perfection of all consists, if a man, never taking off the eye of his mind from the things themselves, thoroughly imprint their images to the life. For God defend, that we should publish the ayery dreams of our own Fancy, for the reall Ideas of the World! But rather may he be so graciously propitious unto us, that we may write the Apocalyps, and true vision of the impressions and signets of the Creator, upon the Creature!*

Wherefore thou, O Father, who hast conferred visible Light as the Primitiæ on the Creature; and breathed into the face of Man Intellectuall Light, as the accomplishment of thy works; protect and conduct this Work, which issueing from thy Goodnesse, returnes to thy Glory! Thou, after thou hadst survayd the works thy hands had wrought, saw that all was exceeding Good, and hast rested: but Man survaying the works his hands had wrought

wrought, saw that all was vanity and vexation of Spirit, and found no Rest: Wherefore if we labour with diligence, and vigilance in Thy works, thou wilt make us Participants of thy Vision, and of thy Sabbath. We humbly supplicate, that we may be of this resolution, and inspired with this mind; and that thou wouldest be pleased to endow human Race, with new Donatives by our hands; and the hands of others, in whom thou shalt implant the same  
S P I R I T.



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THE GENERALL ARGVMENT  
OF THE IX. BOOKS.

**L** I B. I. Is Proemiall to the Instauration of Sciences.  
§ Reports the DISCREDITS of LEARNING.  
§ The DIGNITY of LEARNING.

**L** I B. II. Declares the ADVANCEMENT of  
LEARNING. § Instrumentall. § Essentiall, in  
the Partition of Sciences, into, HISTORY. § POESY.  
§ PHILOS. § Partit. of HIST. § POESY.

**L** I B. III. Partitions of PHILOSOPHY, into  
§ SUMMARY. § SPECIALL, into DI-  
VINE. § NATURALL. § HUMANE. § Par-  
titions of NATURALL PHILOSOPHY.

**L** I B. IV. Partitions of HUMANE PHILOSO-  
PHY into § PHILOSOPHY of HUMANI-  
TY. § CIVILE. § Partitions of the PHILOSO-  
PHY of HUMANITY.

**L** I B. V. Partitions of SCIENCES, from the Use  
and Objects of the MIND, into § LOGICK,  
§ ETHICK. § Of LOGICK into INVENTION.  
§ JUDGEMENT. § MEMORY. § TRADITION.

**L**<sup>IB.</sup> VI. Partitions of **TRADITION** or **ELOCUTION** into the **ORGAN** of **SPEECH**.  
 § **METHOD** of **SPEECH**. § **ILLUSTRATION** of **SPEECH**.

**L**<sup>IB.</sup> VII. Partitions of **ETHICK** or **MORALE KNOWLEDGE**, into the **Doctrin** of the **PLATFORME** of **GOOD**. § Of the **CULTVRE** of the **MIND**.

**L**<sup>IB.</sup> VIII. Partitions of **CIVILE KNOWLEDGE**, into the **Doctrin** of **CONVERSATION**. § Of **NEGOTIATION**. § Of **GOVERNMENT** of **STATES**.

**L**<sup>IB.</sup> IX. Partitions of **THEOLOGY** omitted, **DEFICIENTS** Three. § **I.** **THE RIGHT USE** OF **HUMAN REASON** in **DIVINITY**.  
 § **II.** **THE DEGREES OF UNITY** IN **THE CITY OF GOD**. § **III.** **THE EMANATIONS** OF **SS. SCRIPTURE**.

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THE ARGUMENT OF  
THE CHAPTERS OF THE  
First Booke.

CHAP. I.

**T**HE Consecration of this Work unto the most Learned of Princes K. JAMES. § Who in high, but just conceptions is here admired. § The Distribution into the Dignity and Proficiency of Learning. I. Discredits of Learning from the objections of Divines; That the aspiring unto Knowledge was the first Sinne. That Learning is infinite and full of anxiety. That Learning inclines the Mind to Heresy and Atheisme. II. The Solution. Originall Guilt was not in the Quantity, but in the Quality of Knowledge. § The Corrective hereof, Charity. III. Against Infinitie, Anxiety, and Seducement of Knowledge, Three preservatives. § That it instruct us our Mortality. § That it give us content. § That it soare not too high. § And so Philosophy leads the Mind by the Linkes of Second Causes unto the First.

## CAP. II.

- i. Discredits cast upon Learning from the objections of Politiques; That Learning softens Mens natures and makes them unfit for Exercise of Armes. That Learning perverts mens minds for matter of Government. Other particular indispositions pretended. II. The solution; Learning makes not men unapt for Armes. III. Learning inables men for Civile affaires. IV. Particular seducement, imputed to Learning: As curious incertainty. § Pertinacious Regularity. § Misleading Book-Presidents. § Retired slothfulness. § Relaxation of Discipline; are rather cured than caused by Learning.

## CAP. III.

- i. Discredits of Learning from Learned mens Fortunes; Manners; Nature of studies. II. Derogations derived from Fortune are these; Scarcity of Means. § Privatensse of life. § Meanness of imployment. III. From their Manners these, too Regular for the times. § Too sensible of the good of others; and too neglective of their own. § A defailance in applying themselves to Persons of Quality. § A Failing in some lesser Ceremonies of demeanure. § Grosse Flattery practised by some Learned men. § Instanced, in  
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*the Moderne Dedication of Bookes. § Discreet Morigeration allowed.*

CAP. IV.

- I. Distempers of Learning from Learned mens studies, are of three sorts; Phantasticall Learnings; Contentious Learning; Delicate Learning. II. Delicate Learning a curiosity in words, through profuseness of speech. § Decent expression commended. § Affected brevity censured. III Contentious Learning, a curiosity in matter, through Novelty of Termes or stridtnesse of Positions. § A vanity either in Matter; or in Method. IV. Phantasticall Learning hath two branches, Imposture; Credulity. § Credulity a Belief of History; or a Beliefe of Art; or Opinion: and that either Reall, in the Art it selfe. § Or Personall in the Author of such an Art or Science.

CAP. V.

*Peccant Humors in Learning.* I. Extreme affection to two extremes; Antiquity: Novelty. II. A distrust that any thing New, should now be found out. III. That of all Sects and Opinions, the best hath still prevailed. IV. An over-early reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods. V. A neglect of PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHY. VI. A Di-

vorce of the Intellect from the Object. VII. A contagion of Knowledge in Generall, from Particular inclinations and tempers. VIII. An impatience of suspense; hast to positive assertion. IX. A Magistrall manner of Tradition of Knowledge. X. Aime of Writers, Illustration, not Propagation of Knowledge. XI. End of Studies, Curiosity, Pleasure, Profit, Preferment &c.

## CAP. VI.

The Dignity of Learning from Divine Arguments and Testimonies. I. From Gods Wisdome. § Angels of Illumination. § The first Light. § The first Sabbath. § Mans imployment in the Garden. § Abels contemplation. § The Invention of Musique. § Confusion of Tongues. II. The excellent Learning of Moses. § Job. § Salomon. § Christ. § S<sup>c</sup> Paul. § The Ancient Doctors of the Church. § Learning exalts the Mind to the Celebration of Gods glory; and is a preservative against Error and unbelieve.

## CAP. VII.

The Dignity of Learning from human Arguments and Testimonies. I. Naturall Inventors of new Arts, for the Commodity of Mans life, consecrated as Gods. II. Politicall, Civile Estates and Affaires advanced by Learning. § The best and the happiest

piest times under Learned Princes and others.  
 § Exemplified in six continued succeeding Emperors from the death of Domitian. III. Military: The Concurrence of Armes and Learning. § Exemplified in Alexander the Great. § Julius Caesar the Dictator. § Xenophon the Philosopher.

## CAP. VIII.

The Merit of Learning, from the influence it hath upon Morall virtues. § Learning a Sovereign remedy for all the diseases of the Mind. § The dominion thereof greater than any Temporall Power, being a Power over Reason and Beliefe. § Learning gives Fortunes, Honours and Delights, excelling all other as the soule the sense. § Durable monuments of Fame. § A prospect of the Immortality of a future world.



## THE SECOND BOOK.

## THE PROEM.

**T**He Advancement of Learning commended to the Care of Kings. I. The Acts thereof in generall three, Reward, Direction, Assistance. II In speciall, about three Objects, Places, Books, Persons. § In Places foure Circumstances, Buildings, Revenues, Priviledges, Lawes of Discipline. § In  
 Books

*Books two, Libraries, good Editions. § In Persons two, Readers of Sciences extant, Inquiries into Parts non-extant. III. Deficients in the Acts of Advancement, six, want of Foundations for Arts at large. § Meanness of Salary to Readers. § Want of allowance for experiments. § Preposterous Institutions: unadvised practises in Academicall studies. § Want of Intelligence between the Universities of Europe. § Want of Enquirers into the Defects of Arts. § The Authors particular designe. § Modest defence.*

## CAP. I.

*I. An Universall Partition of Human Learning into, § History. II. Poesy. III. Philosophy. § This Partition is drawn from the three Intellective Faculties; Memory; Imagination; Reason. § The same distribution is agreeable unto Divine Learning.*

## CAP. II.

*I. The Partition of History, into Naturall, and Civile. (Ecclesiasticall, and Literary comprehended under Civile.) II. The Partition of Naturall History, into the History of Generations. III. Of Preter-Generations. IV. Of Arts.*

## CAP. III.

- i. A Second Partition of *Naturall History* from the Use and End thereof, into *Narrative*; and *Inductive*. And that the most noble end of *Naturall History* is, that it *Minister and Conduce* to the building up of *Philosophy*; which end, *Inductive History* respecteth. ii. The Partition of the *History of Generations*, into the *History of the Heavens*; *The History of the Meteors*; *The History of the Earth, and Sea*; *The History of Massive Bodies*, or of the greater *Collegiats*; *The History of Kinds*, or of the *Lesser Collegiats*.

## CAP. IV.

- i. The Partition of *History Civile*, into *Ecclesiasticall and Literary*; and (which retaines the generall name) *Civile*. ii. *Literary Deficient*. § *Precepts how to compile it*.

## CAP. V.

*Of the Dignity and Difficulty of  
Civile History.*

## CAP. VI.

*The first Partition of Civile History, into § Memorials. § Antiquities. § Perfect History.*

## CAP. VII.

*The Partition of Perfect History, into Chronicles of Times; Lives of Persons; Relation of Acts. § The explication of the History of Lives. § Of Relations.*

## CAP. VIII.

*The Partition of the History of Times; into universall and particular History. The advantages and disadvantages of both.*

## CAP. IX.

*The Second Partition of the History of Times, into Annals, and Journals.*

## CAP. X.

*A Second Partition of Speciall-Civile History in History Simple and Mixt.*

CAP.

## CAP. XI.

*I. The Partition of Ecclesiasticall History, into the Generall History of the Church. II. History of Prophecy. III. History of Providence.*

## CAP. XII.

*The Appendices of History Conversant about the words of Men, as History it selfe about Mens Acts. The partition of them into Speeches; Letters; and Apophthegmes.*

## CAP. XIII.

*The Second Principall part of Human Learning, Poesy. I. The Partition of Poesy into Narrative. II. Drammaticall. III. Parabolicall. § Three Examples of Parabolicall Poesy propounded. IV. Naturall. V. Politicall. VI. Morall.*



## THE THIRD BOOK.

## CAP. I.

*I. The Partition of Sciences into Theology and Philosophy. II. The Partition of Philosophy, into three Knowledges; of God, of Nature, of Man,*

III. *The Constitution of Philosophia Prima, as the Commune Parent of All.*

CAP. II.

*Of Naturall Theology. § Of the Knowledge of Angels and Spirits, an Appendix thereof.*

CAP. III.

*The Partition of Naturall Philosophy into Speculative and Operative. § These two both in the Intention of the Writer, and Body of the Treatise, sought to be separate.*

CAP. IV.

i. *The Partition of Speculative Science concerning Nature, into Physique speciall; and Metaphysique; whereof Physique inquires the Efficient Cause and the Matter: Metaphysique the Finall cause of the Forme. II. The Partition of Physique into the knowledges of the Principles of things, of the Fabrique of things or of the World; and of the variety of things. III. The Partition of Physique respecting the variety of Things, into the Doctrine of Concretes, and into the Doctrine of Abstracts The Partition of Concretes, is the same with the Distribution of Naturall History. IV. The Partition of the*

of the Doctrine of Abstracts, into the knowledge of the Schemes of Matter; and into the knowledge of Motions. V. Two Appendices of Speculative Physique, Naturall Problems; And the Placits of Ancient Philosophers. VI. The Partition of Metaphysique, into the Doctrine of Formes; and into the Doctrine of Finall Causes.

## CAP. V.

I. The Partition of Operative Knowledge concerning Nature, into Mechanique, and Magique: respondent to the Parts of Speculative knowledge; Mechanique to Physique; Magique to Metaphysique. § A purging of the word *Magia*. II. Two Appendices to Operative knowledge: An Inventory of the estate of Man. § A Catalogue of Poly-  
 crests; or things of multifarious use.

## CAP. VI.

Of the great Appendix of Naturall Philosophy, as well Speculative as Operative; *Mathematique* knowledge: and that it ought to be placed rather amongst Appendices, than amongst substantiall Sciences. § The Partition of *Mathematiques* into Pure, and Mixt.



## THE FOURTH BOOK.

### CHAP. I.

- I. **T**He Partition of the Knowledge of Man, into the Philosophy of Humanity, and Civile.
- § The partition of the knowledge of Humanity, into the knowledge touching the Body of Man; and into the knowledge touching the Soule of Man.
- II. The constitution of a generall knowledge, touching the Nature and Estate of Man. § The partition of the knowledge concerning the Estate of Man, into the knowledge touching the Person of Man; and into the knowledge touching the League of Soule and Body. § The partition of the knowledge touching the Person of Man, into the knowledge of Mans miseries. § And of Mans prerogatives. III. The partition of the knowledge touching the League, into the knowledge of Judications, § And of Impressions. § The assignement of Physiognomy. § And of Interpretation of Naturall Dreams: unto the Doctrine of Judications.

### CHAP. II.

- I. The partition of the knowledge respecting the Body of Man, into Art Medicinall. § Cosmetique. § Athletique. § And Voluptuary. II. The parti-

on of Medicine, into three duties. § *Conservation of Health.* III. *Cure of Diseases.* IV. *And Prolongation of life: and that the last Part, Prolongation of life, should be separate from the other two.*

## CAP. III.

- I. *The partition of Human Philosophy touching the soule, into the knowledge of the Inspired Essence; and into the knowledge of the sensible, or traduced soule.* § *The second partition of the same Philosophy, into the knowledge of the Substance and Faculties of the Soule. And into the knowledge of the Use, and Objects of the Faculties.* II. *Two Appendices of the knowledge, concerning the Faculties of the soule, the knowledge of Naturall Divination. § And the knowledge of Fascination.* III. *The Distribution of the Faculties of the sensible soule, into Motion, and Sense.*



## THE FIFTH BOOK.

## CAP. I.

- I. **T**HE partition of the knowledge which respecteth the use and objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man; into *Logique; and Ethique.* II. *The Division of Logique, into the Arts of Invention, of Judgement; of Memory; and of Tradition.*

CAP.

## CAP. II.

- i. *The partition of the Art of Invention, into the Inventive of Arts, and of Arguments. § The former of these which is the more eminent, is Deficient.*
- ii. *The partition of the Inventive Art of Arts, into Literate Experience. § And a New Organ.*
- iii. *Adelineation of Literate Experience.*

## CAP. III.

- i. *The partition of the Inventive Art of Arguments, into Promptuary, or Places of Preparation: And Topique, or Places of Suggestion. ii. The partition of Topiques, into Generall, § And Particular Topiques. iii. An Example of Particular Topique in the Inquiry, De Gravi & Levi.*

## CAP. IV.

- i. *The partition of the Art of Judging, into Judgement by Induction, § And by Syllogisme. Of the first a Collection is made in the Novum Organum. § The first partition of Judgement by Syllogisme into Reduction, Direct, and Inverst. § The second partition thereof, into Analytique Art, and the knowledge of Elenches. ii. The division of the knowledge of Elenches, into Elenches of Sophismes, § Into Elenches of Interpretation of Termes, § And into Elenches of Images or Idolaes. iii. The division of Idolaes, § Into Impression from the generall*

rall nature of Man, or *Idola Tribus*. § Into Impressions from the Individuall temper of Particulars, or *Idola Specus*. § Into Impressions by words and Communicative nature, or *Idola Fori*. W. An Appendix to the Art of Judging; namely of the Analogy of Demonstration according to the nature of the Subject.

## CAP. V.

- I. The Partition of Art Retentive, or of Memory, into the knowledge of the Helps of Memory. § And the Knowledge of Memory it selfe. II. The Division of the Doctrine of Memory, into Prenotion; and Embleme.

## THE SIXTH BOOK.

## CAP. I.

- I. THE Partition of the Art of Tradition, into the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech. The Doctrine of the Method of Speech, and the Doctrine of the Illustration of Speech. § The partition of the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech, into the knowledge of the Notes of things; of Speaking, and of Writing: Of which the two last constitute Grammer, and the Partitions thereof. § The Partition of the knowledge of the Notes of Things, into Hieroglyphiques, and into Characters Reall. II. A second Partition of Grammer into Literary; and Philosophicall.

III. The aggregation of Poesy referring to Measure, to the knowledge of Speech. § An aggregation of the knowledge of Ciphers to the knowledge of Scripture.

## CAP. II.

I The Doctrine of the Method of Speech is assigned a substantiall and Principall Part of Traditive knowledge: it is stiled the Wisdome of Delivery. II The divers kinds of Methods are enumerated; their Profits and Disprofits annext. § The Parts of Method.

## CAP. III.

I. The Grounds and Office of Rhetorique. II. Three Appendices which appertain only to the preparatory Part. The Colours of Good and Evill, as well simple as compared. III. The Anti-theta of Things. IV. Lesser stiles or usuall Formes of Speech.

## CAP. IV.

I Two generall Appendices of Traditive knowledge Art Criticall. II. And Pedagogicall.



## THE SEVENTH BOOK.

## CAP. I.

I. **T**He Partition of Morall Philosophy, into the knowledge of the Exemplar, or Platforme; and

and into the *Georgiques* or Culture of the *Mind*.  
 § The division of the *Exemplar* (namely of *Good*)  
 into *Good Simple*, and *Good Compared*. II. The  
*Partition of Good Simple*, into *Individuall Good*,  
 and *Good of Communion*.

## CAP. II.

- I. The *Partition of Individuall or Private Good*, in-  
 to *Good Active*; and *Good Passive*. II. The *Par-*  
*tition of Passive Good*, into *Conservative Good*; and  
*Perfective Good*. III. The *Partition of the Good*  
*of Communion*, into *Generall*. § And into *Respective*  
*Duties*.

## CAP. III.

- I. The *Partition of the Doctrine of the Culture of the*  
*Mind*, into the *knowledge of the Characters of the*  
*Mind*. II. *Of the Affections*. III. *Of the Reme-*  
*dies and Cures thereof*. IV. *An Appendix to the*  
*same Doctrine touching the Congruity between the*  
*Good of the Mind*, and the *Good of the Body*.



## THE EIGHT BOOK.

## CHAP. I.

THE *Partition of Civile knowledge*, § Into the  
*knowledge of Conversation*. § The *knowledge*  
*of Negotiation*. § And the *knowledge of Empire or*  
*State-Government*. hh 2 CAP.

## CAP. II.

I. *The Partition of the knowledge of Negotiation into the knowledge of dispersed Occasions.* II. *And into the knowledge of the Advancement of life.*  
 § *Examples of the knowledge of scattered Occasions from some of Solomons Parables.* § *Precepts concerning the Advancement of Fortune.*

## CAP. III.

*The Partition of the Art of Empiry or Goverment is omitted, only accesse is made to two Deficients.* I. *The knowledge of enlarging the Bounds of Empire.* II. *And the knowledge of universall Iustice, or of the Fountains of Law.*



## THE NINTH BOOK.

## CAP. I.

*The Partitions of inspired Theology are omitted, only way is made unto three Desiderats.* I. *The knowledge of the right Use of Human Reason in matters Divine.* II. *The knowledge of the degrees of unity in the City of God.* III. *The Emanations of SS. Scripture.*

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FRANCICI DE  
VERVLAMIO  
ARCHITECTVRA  
*SCIENTIARVM.*

THE GENERALE  
IDEA AND PROIECT  
OF THE  
LO. VERVLAM'S  
INSTAVRATIO MAGNA.

Represented in the  
PLATFORM OF THE  
DESIGNE OF THE  
I PART *thereof,*

As it was Conceav'd in the mind of the Author  
and is expressed in the Modell  
*of the VVork.*

DEUS OMNIA  
IN MENSURA, ET NUMERO, ET ORDINE,  
DISPOSUIT.

THE HISTORY OF

THE REVOLUTION OF

1776

IN

THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY

JOHN ADAMS

ESQ.

Author of

THE DEFENCE OF THE

RIGHTS OF THE

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION

AND

OF THE


REVOLUTION

IN THE YEAR 1776

1789

The Emanation of SCIENCES, from the Intellectual Faculties of MEMORY IMAGINATION REASON.

From these --- *J*




Inspir'd Divinity is here separat from Philosophy: yet Reason receives the signet of Faith } DEFICIENTS { Use of Reason in Divinity. }  
 { Degrees of unity in Religion. } --- IX.  
 { Derivations fro Scripture. }

The Preparation to these Books, is populare, not Acroamaticque: Relates the Prerogatives & Derrigations of Learning. --- LIB. I.



# THE PLATFORME OF THE DESIGNE


## LIB. I. THE DIGNITY OF LEARNING.






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LIB. III. THE PARTITION OF KNOWLEDGES IN GENERALL INTO




THE PLATFORME

LIB. IV. THE PARTITION OF HUMANE KNOWLEDGE, OR THE KNOWLEDGE OF HUMANITY.




LIB. V. THE PARTITION OF THE VSE  
AND OBJECTS OF THE FACULTIES  
OF THE MIND, INTO






OF THE DESIGNE.

LIB. VII. THE PARTITION OF MORALL KNOWLEDGE, INTO THE



THE PLATFORME

LIB. VIII. THE PARTITION OF CIVILE KNOWLEDGE INTO





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# FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM VICOVNT S<sup>r</sup> ALBAN,

OF THE  
DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
OF LEARNING.

THE FIRST BOOK.

CHAP. I.

*The Consecration of this work unto the most learned of PRINCES, KING JAMES; who in high, but just conceptions, is here admired. § The Distribution, into the DIGNITY and the PROFICIENCY of LEARNING. I. Discredits of Learning, from the objections of Divines: That the aspiring unto knowledge was the first sinne. That Learning is a thing infinite, and full of anxiety. That knowledge inclines the Mind to Heresy and Atheisme. II. The solution: Originall Guilt was not in the Quantity, but in the Quality of Knowledge. § The Corrective hereof, Charity. III. Against Infinity, Anxiety, and seducements of Sciences; three preservatives: That we forget not our Mortality. § That Learning give us content. § That it soare not too high. § And so Philosophy leads the mind, by the Links of second Causes, unto the First.*



HERE were, under the Old Law (Excellent KING) both *Free-will Offerings*, and *Daily Sacrifices*; the one proceeding upon ordinary observance; the other upon a Devout Cheerfulnesse. Certainly, in my opinion, some such kind of Homage belongs to **KINGS** from their servants, namely, that every one should tender, not only Tributes of his Duty, but Presents of affection

Affection. In the former of these, I hope, I shall not be wanting; for the latter I was in suspense what I should most principally undertake, and in conclusion I thought it more respective to make choice of some oblation, which might referre, rather to the propriety and excellency of Your individuall person, than to the businesse of Your Crowne and State.

9 Representing Your Majesty, as my duty is, many times unto my mind, (leaving aside the other parts whether of Your Vertue, or of Your Fortune,) I have been possess'd with extream wonder, when I consider the excellency of those vertues and faculties in You, which the Philosophers call intellectuall; the capacity of Your mind comprehending so many and so great Notions; the faithfulness of Your memory; the swiftnesse of Your apprehension; the penetration of Your judgement; the order and facility of Your elocution. In truth *Plato's* opinion sometimes comes into my mind, which maintaines, *That knowledge is nothing else but remembrance, and that the mind of man by nature knowes all things, once redimed and restored to her own native light, which the cloudy vault, or gloomy Tabernacle of the body had overspread with darknesse.* For certainly the best and clearest instance for this assertion shines in Your Majesty, whose mind is so ready to take flame from the least occasion presented, or the least spark of anothers knowledge delivered. Wherefore as the sacred, Scripture saith of the wisest King, *That his heart was as the sands of the sea:* which though it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest portions; so hath God given Your Majesty a composition of understanding exceeding admirable, being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and neverthelesse, to apprehend the least, and not to suffer them to escape Your observation: whereas it should seem very difficult, or rather an impossibility in nature, for the same instrument to make it selfe fit for great and small works. And for Your gift of Speech, I call to mind what *Cornelius Tacitus* saith of *Augustus Caesar*, *Augusto* (saith he) *prompta ac profuens, quæ de-*

In *Phædo.*

1. *Reg. 4.*

*Annal. 13.*

*seret*

*ceret principem, eloquentia fuit.* In truth if we note it well, speech that is *Elaborate*, or *Affectate*, or *Imitating*, although otherwise excellent, hath somewhat servile in it and holding of the subject; but Your Majesties manner of speech is indeed Prince-like, flowing as from a fountaine, and yet streaming and branching it selfe into natures order, full of facility and felicity, *Imitating none, & Inimitable of any.* And as in Your Civill estate, respecting as well Your Kingdome as Your Court, there appeareth to be an Emulation and Contention of Your Majesties Vertue with Your Fortune, namely excellent Morall endowments with a fortunate Regiment; a Pious and Patient expectation when time was, of Your greater fortune, with a prosperous and seasonable possession of what was expected; a Holy observation of the lawes of Marriage, with a blessed and happy fruit of Marriage in a most faire Progeny; a Godly propension and most befeeming a Christian Prince to Peace, with a fortunate concurrence of the like inclination in Your neighbour Princes: so likewise in Your intellectuall abilities, there seemeth to be no lesse Contention and Emulation, if we compare Your Majesties gifts of Nature with the rich treasury of multiplicious Erudition and the knowledge of many Arts. Neither is it easy to finde any KING since Christs time, which may be compared with Your Majesty for variety and improvement of all kind of learning Divine and Humane; let who will revolve and perule the succession of Kings and Emperours, and he shall finde this judgement is truly made. For indeed it seemeth much in Kings, if by the compendious extraction of other mens wits and Labours, they can take hold of knowledge, or attain any superficiall ornaments or shewes of learning; or if they countenance and preferre learned men; but for a King and a King borne to drink indeed the true fountains of Learning, nay to be himselfe a fountaine of Learning, is almost a Miracle. And this also is an accessse to Your Majesty, that in the same closet of your Mind, there are treasured up as well Divine and Sacred Literature, as Prophane and Humane; so that Your Majesty

stands invested with that triplicity of Glory, which was ascribed to that famous *Hermes Trismegistus*, *The Power of a King*; *The Illumination of a Priest*; *The Learning of a Philosopher*. Wherefore since in these glorious attributes of Learning, so inherent and individuall in Your Person, Your Majesty so farre excells all other Kings, it is very meet that such rare endowments of Nature and Art should be celebrated, not only in the fame and admiration of the present time, or in the light of History conveyed over to Posterity, but be engraven in some solid worke, which both may expresse the power of a great King, and bear a Character or Signature of so excellent a learned King. Now (to returne to our intended purpose) I concluded with my selfe that I could not make to Your Majesty a better oblation, then of some Treatise tending to that end.

§ The summe and Argument hereof, will consist of *two Parts*: *In the Former*, which is more slight and popular (yet may not be past over) we shall entreat of the *excellency of Knowledge and Learning*, through all the parts thereof; and likewise of the *merit of those who have worthily and wisely imployed and placed their bounties and industries in the Augmentation, and Propagation thereof*. *In the latter Part* (which is the main and summe of this worke) I shall propound and set down what in this kind hath bin embraced, undertaken and accomplisht hitherto, for the *Advancement of Learning*: and again briefly touch at such particulars as seem Deficient in this enterprize; to the end that though I dare not presume positively to separate and select what I would chiefly commend unto Your Majesty; yet by representing many and different observations, I may excite Your Princely cogitations to visit the peculiar treasures of Your own mind, and thence to extract what is most conducent to the *amplifying and enlarging of the bounds of Arts and Knowledges*; agreeable to Your Magnanimity and Wildome.

I In the entrance to the *former Part*, to cleere the way, and as it were, to make silence, to have the testimonies concerning

cerning the *Dignity* of Learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacite objections, I think good first to deliver Learning from the *Discredits* and *Disgraces* which *Ignorance* hath cast upon it, but *Ignorance* severally disguised, appearing and discovering it self sometime in the *zeale of Divines*; sometimes in the *arrogancy of Politiques*, and sometimes in the *errors of Learned men themselves*. I heare the former sort say, *That Knowledge is of the nature and number of those things, which are to be accepted with great Limitation and Caution; That the aspiring to overmuch knowledge, was the originall temptation and sinne, whereupon ensued the Fall of Man; And that even at this day Knowledge hath somewhat of the Serpent in it, and therefore where it entreth into a man, it makes him swell, Scientia inflat; That Solomon gives a* 1 Cor. 8. *censure, That there is no end of making Bookes, and that much reading is a wearinesse to the flesh; and againe in another* Eccles. 12. *place, That in spacious knowledge there is much contristation, & that he that encreaseth knowledge, encreaseth anxiety; That* Eccles. 1. *S. Paul gives a caveat, That we be not spoild through vain Philosophy; And that experience demonstrates how the Lear-* Colos. 2. *nedst men have been Arch-heretiques; How Learned times have been inclined to Atheisme; and how the Contemplation of second Causes, doth derogate from the Authority of the first.*

II To discover then the error and ignorance of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, any man may see plainly that these men doe not observe and consider, That it was not that *Pure and Primitive Knowledge of Nature*, by the light whereof man did give names to other Creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according to their *Proprieties*, which gave the occasion to the Fall; but it was that proud knowledge of *Good and Evil*, with an intent to shake of God and to give Law unto himselfe. Neither is it any *Quantity of Knowledge*, how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much lesse extend the soule of man

but God, and the contemplation of God: therefore *Solomon* speaking of the two Principall senses of Inquisition, the Eye and the Eare, affirms *That the Eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the Eare with hearing;* and if there be no fulnesse, then is the Continent greater then the Content. So of Knowledge it selfe & the Mind of Man, whereto the Sences are but Reporters, he defines like wise in the words plac't after the Calendar or Ephemerides which he makes of the diversity of times and seasons for all Actions and Pur-

Eccles. 1. poses, concluding thus, *God hath made all things Beautifull and Decent in the true returne of their seasons; also he hath plac'd the world in mans heart, yet cannot man finde out the worke which God worketh from the beginning unto the end:* By which wordes he declares, not obscurely, that God hath framed the Mind of Man, as a Mirror or Glasse capable of the Image of the universall world, and as joyfull to receive the impressions thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in the beholding, the variety of things and the vicissitude of times, but raised also to finde out and to discern the inviolable lawes and the infallible decrees of Nature. And although he seem to insinuate that the supreme or summary law of Nature, which he calleth *the worke which God worketh from the beginning to the end,* is not possible to be found out by man, yet that doth not derogate from the Capacity of the Mind, but may be referred to the impediments of knowledge, as the shortnesse of life, the ill conjunction of labours deprav'd, and unfaithfull Tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand; and many other inconveniences wherewith the condition of man is ensnared and involv'd. For that no parcell of the world is denied to mans inquiry, or invention he cleerly declares in another place,

Eccles. 3. 11. Prov. 20. where he saith, *The spirit of a man is as the Lamp of God where-with he searcheth the inwards of all secrets.* ¶ If then such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger at all from the *Proportion* or *Quantity* of knowledge how large soever, lest it should make it swell or outcompasse it selfe, but meerly in the *Quality*, which being

in

in Quantity more or lesse, if it be taken without the true Corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of malignity, or venome full of flatuous symptoms. This Antidote, or Corrective spice, the mixture whereof tempers knowledge and makes it so soveraigne is *Charity*, which the Apostle immediately addes in the former clause, saying, *Knowledge blowes i. Cor. 8: up, but Charity builds up*; Not unlike to that which he delivers in an other place, *If I spake (saith he) with the tongues of i. Cor. 13: Men and Angels and had not Charity, it were but as à tinkling Cymball*: Not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongus of Men and Angels, but because if it be sever'd from *Charity*, and not referr'd to the publique good of Mankind, it rather exhibites a vaine and empty glory, then any substantiall and solid fruit.

III As for that Censure of *Salomon*, concerning the *excesse of writing and reading Bookes, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from Knowledge*, and that admonition of *S. Paul*, that we be not seduced by *vain Philosophy*; if those places be rightly understood, they doe very excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby humane knowledge is confin'd and circumscribed, yet so as without any such contracting and coarctation, it may comprehend all the universall nature of things. These limitations are three: *The first that we doe not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our Mortality. The second, that we make application of our knowledge, to give our selves repose and contentment and not distast or repining. The third, that we doe not presume by the contemplations of nature, to attaine the Mysteries of God.* § For as touching the first, *Salomon* doth excellently expound himselfe in the same Book, *I saw well, saith he, that knowledge recedes as Eccles. 2: farre from ignorance as light doth from darknesse; and that the wise mans eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the foole roundeth about in darknesse, but withall I learned that the same mortality involves them both.*

§ For the second, certain it is no anxiety, or perturbation of mind relulteth from knowledge, otherwise then meere-ly by accident: For all knowledge and wonder (which is  
the

the seed of knowledge, is an impression of pleasure in it selfe; but when we fall to framing conclusions out of our knowledge which obliquely applied to our particular purposes, either minister weak feares or vast desires, then there growes that vexation and trouble of Mind, whereof we speake: for then knowledge is no more *Lumen siccum*, as *Heraclitus* the *Profound* would have it, *Lumen siccum optima anima*, but it becomes *Lumen madidum*, or *maceratum*, being steeped and infused in the humors of the affections.

§ *The third rule* deserves a litle to be stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over: For if any man shall think by view and enquiry into these sensible and materiall things, to attain that light whereby he may reveale unto himselfe the nature and will of God, then indeed, *is he spoild through vain Philosophy*. For the contemplation of the creatures, having regard to the creatures themselves, produceth Knowledge, but having regard to God, wonder only, which is a broken Knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly said by one of *Philo. Iud. de Somniis.* *Plato's schoole*, *That the sense of man carries a resemblance with the sunne, which opens and reveales the terrestriall Globe, but conceales and seales up the starres and celestiall Globe:* so doth the sense discover naturall things, but it darkens and shuts up divine. And hence it hath proceeded, that some of the chosen ranke of the more Learned have faln into Heresy, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity, by the waxen wings of the senses.

§ As for the conceit of those who are of opinion that *too much knowledge should encline the mind to Atheisme, and that the ignorance of the second Causes, should be, as it were, a Midwife to our Piety towards the first.* I would willingly charge these in the language of *Iob*, *Will you lye for God as one man doth for another to gratify him?* For certain it is that God works nothing in nature according to ordinary course but by second causes, and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is meere imposture, under colour of Piety to God, and nothing else but to offer unto the Author of Truth the unclean sacrifice of a Lye. But farther, it is an assured truth and

and a conclusion of Experience, That a litle or superficiall  
 tast of *Philosophy*, may perchance incline the Mind of Man  
 to *Atheisme*; but a full draught thereof brings the mind back  
 againe to Religion. For in the entrance of *Philosophy*, when  
 the second causes, which are next unto the senses, doe offer  
 themselves to the mind of Man, and the mind it selfe cleaves  
 unto them and dwells there, an oblivion of the highest cause  
 may creep in, but when a man passeth on farther and be-  
 holds the dependency, continuation and confederacy of  
 causes, and the workes of Providence, than according to the  
 allegory of the Poets, he will easily believe that the *highest*  
*linke of Natures chaine must needs be tyed to the foot of Iupiters*  
*chaire*. To close in a word, let no man upon a weak conceit  
 of sobriety or ill applied moderation, thinke or maintaine  
 that a man can search too farre, or be too well studied in the  
 Book of Gods word, or in the Booke of Gods workes; *Divinity* or  
*Philosophy*; but rather let men awake themselves and cheere-  
 fully endeavour, and pursue an endlesse progresse or profici-  
 ency in both: only let them beware lest they apply Know-  
 ledge to *swelling*, not to *charity*; to *ostentation* not to *use*: and  
 againe, that they doe not unwisely mingle and confound  
 these distinct Learnings of *Theology* and *Philosophy*, and their  
 severall waters together.

Homer:  
Iliad. 9.



## CAP. II.

I Discredits of Learning from the objections of Politiques, *That Learning softens mens natures, and makes men unfit for the exercise of Armes. That it perverts mens dispositions for Matter of Government. & Other particular indispositions pretended.*

II. The Solution. *Learning makes not men unapt for Armes.*

III. *Learning enables men for Civil affaires.* IIII. Particular seducements imputed to Learning, As, *Curious Vncertainty, & Pertinacious Regularity, & Misleading Presidents, & Retired slothfulness, & Relaxation of Discipline;* Are all rather Cured then Caused by Learning.

**N**OW let us descend to the Dilgraces whereby Politiques defame Learning; They be these, *That Learning doth soften mens manners, & makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of Armes: That it doth marre and pervert mens dispositions for matter of Government and Policy; which the study of Arts makes either too Curious by vanity of Reading; Or too peremptory by the strict rigor of Rules; Or too overweening by reason of the greatnesse of examples; Or too incompatible with the times, by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; Or at least it doth divert and alienate mens minds from businesse and Action, instilling into them a love of leasure and privatenesse.*

& *And that it doth bring into States a relaxation of Discipline, whilest every man is more ready to argue then obey.* Out of this conceit Cato surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever liv'd, when Carneades the Philosopher came in Embassage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock about him being allured with the sweetnesse and majesty of his eloquence; gave counsell in open senate; *that they should give him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should infect and inchant the mindes of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and customes of the State.* This same conceit, or humor mov'd Virgil, preferring the honour of his country, before the reputation of his own Profession, to make a kind of seperation

Plato in M.  
Cato.

on

on between the *Arts of Policy*, and the *Arts of Literature*, challenging the one to the *Romanes*, yeelding the other to the *Grecians*, in the verses so much renowned,

*Tu regere imperio populos Romane memento,  
Hæc tibi erunt Artes ---*

Virgil.  
Æn. 6.

And we see that *Anytus* the accuser of *Socrates*, laid it as an article of charge and accusation against him, that he did with the variety and power of his discourses and disputation, embase in the minds of young-men, the Aucturity and Reverence of the Lawes and Customes of their countrey; and that he did professe a pernicious and dangerous Science, wherein, who ever was instructed, might make the worse matter seem the better, and to suppress Truth by force of Eloquence.

Plato. Apol:  
Socratis.

II But these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of Gravity, then any lyncerity of truth: For experience doth witness that the selfe-same persons, and the selfe-same times, have flourishd in the *glory of Armes and Learning*. As for men, we may instance in that noble paire of Emperors *Alexander the Great*, and *Iulius Cesar the Dictator*; the one was *Aristotle's* scholler in Philosophy; the other *Cicer's* Rivall in eloquence. But if any man had rather call for Schollers that have become great Generalls, then Generalls that were great Schollers, let him take *Epaminondas* the Theban, or *Xenophon* the Athenian; whereof, the one was the first that abated the power of *Sparta*, and the other was the first that made way to the overthrow of the *Monarchy of Persia*. And this conjunction of *Armes and Letters*, is yet more visible in times then in persons, by how much an age is a greater object then a man: For the selfe-same times with the *Egyptians*, *Assyrians*, *Persians*, *Grecians*, and *Romanes*, that are most renowned for *Armes*, are likewise most admired for *Learning*; so that the gravest Auctors and Philosophers, the greatest Captaines and Governors have lived in the same Ages. Neither indeed can it otherwile be, for as in man the ripeness of the strength of the body and the minde comes much about one age, save that the strength

of the body comes somewhat the more early; So in states, the glory of Armes, and *Learning* (whereof the one correspondeth to the body, the other to the soule of man) have a concurrence, or a neere sequence of Time.

III Now for *matter of Policy and Government*, that *Learning* should rather be an *impediment*, then an *adiument* thereunto is a thing very improbable. We all confesse that it is an unadvised Act to commit a naturall body, and the cure of Health, to *Emperique Physitians*, who commonly have a few receipts which seem to them to be universall Remedies, whereupon they are confident and adventurous, when yet they neither know the causes of Diseases, nor the complexions of Patients, nor the perill of Symptomes, nor the Method of Cures. We see it a like error in those, who for expedition of their causes, and suites rely upon petty Advocates and Lawyers, which are only men of Practice, and not grounded in their bookes, who are many times easily surpriz'd, when a new case falls out besides the common Roade of their experience: so by like reason it cannot but be a matter of doubtfull consequence, if states be managed by *Empirique States-men*. On the contrary it is almost without instance, that ever any Government was disastrous, that was in the hand of Learned Governours. For howsoever it hath bin ordinary with Politique men to extenuate, and disable Learned men by the name of Pedants, yet History, which is the mistresse of Truth makes it appeare in many particulars, that the government of Princes in minority, hath farre excelled the Government of Princes of mature age, even for that reason which Politiques seeke to traduce, which is that by that occasion the State hath bin in the hands of Pedants. Who knowes not that for the first five years so much magnified during the minority of *Nero*, the Burden of the state was in the hands of *Seneca* a Pedant? So likewise *Gordianus* the yonger owes the ten years applauded goverment to *Mistheus* a Pedant. And with the like happinesse *Alexander Severus* govern'd the state in his minority, in which space women rul'd all, but by the advice  
and

and councill of preceptors, and teachers. Nay let a man look into the Government of the *Bishop of Rome*, as by name, into the government of *Pius Quintus*, or *Sextus Quintus* in our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but as *Pedanticall Friers*; and he shall finde, that such *Popes* doe greater things, and proceed upon truer principles, than those which have ascended to the Papacy from an education, and breeding, in affaires of estate and Courts of Princes. For though men bred in learning are perchance, not so quick, and nimble in apprehending occasions, and accommodating for the present to points of convenience, which the Italians call *RAGIONI DI STATO*, the very name whereof *Pius Quintus* could not heare with patience, but was wont to say, *that they were the inventions of wicked men, and repugnant to religion, and the morall virtues*; yet in this there is made ample recompence, that they are perfect and ready, in the safe and plain way of Religion, Justice, Honesty, and the Morall virtues; which way, they that constantly keep and persue, shall no more need those other Remedies, then a sound body need Physique. And besides the space of one mans life can not furnish presidents enough to direct the event of but one mans life. For as it hapneth sometimes that the great Grand-child, Nephew, or *Pro-nephew* resembleth the Grandfather, or great Grandfather more then the Father; so many times it comes to passe, that the occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples, then with those of later, or immediat times. Lastly the wit of one man can no more countervaille the latitude of Learning, than one mans meanes can hold way with a common purse.

IV And were it granted that those *seducements* and *indispositions* imputed to Learning, by Politicks, were of any force and validity; yet it must be remembered with all, that *Learning* ministreth in every of them; greater strength of medicin or remedy, then it offereth cause of *indisposition* or *infirmity*. For if that *Learning* by a secret influence, and operation makes the mind *irresolute and perplext*, yet certainly by plain precept it teacheth how to unwind

the thoughts, how farre to deliberate, when to resolve, yea it shewes how to protract, and carry things in suspense without prejudice till they resolve

§ Be it likewise granted that *Learning makes the minds of men more peremptory and inflexible*, yet withall it teacheth what things are in their nature demonstrative, and what are conjecturall, and propounds as well, the use of distinctions, and exceptions, as the stability of rules and principles.

§ Be it againe, that *learning misleades and wresteth mens mindes, whether by disproportion, or dissimilitude of examples*, I know not, yet I know well that it unfoldeth, and laies open as well the force of circumstances, as the errors of comparisons, and the cautions of applications; so that in all these it doth more rectify mens mindes, then pervert them. And these remedies *Learning* doth every way convey and insinuate by the quick penetration, and forcible variety of examples. Let a man look into the errors of *Clement the VII*, so lively described by *Guicciardine*, who served under him; or into the errors and waverings of *Cicero*, painted to the life by his own penfill, in *his Epistles to Atticus*, and he will fly a pace from being inconstant and irresolute in his designs. Let him look into the errors of *Phocion*, and he will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him read the fable of *Jxion*, and it will dispell vaporious hopes and such like fumes and clouds. Let him behold *Cato the Second*, and he will never be one of the *Antipodes*, to tread opposite to the present world.

§ Now for the conceit, *That learning should be a friend to sloth, and should orespread the mind with a sweet slumber of repose and retirednesse*, it were a strange thing, if that which accustometh the minde to a perpetuall agitation, should be the *Patronesse to slothfulnesse*: whereas contrariwise it may be truly affirmed, that no kinde of men love businesse for it selfe, but those that are *Learned*; for other Persons love affaires and businesse for the *Profit*, as hirelings the worke, for the wages; others for *Honor*, for while they are in Action, they live in the eyes of men and refresh their reputation, which  
otherwise

otherwise would weare; others for *Power* and the *Priviledges of Fortune*, that they may pleasure their friends, and displeasure their foes; others that they may *exercise some faculties wherein they take a pride*, and in this imagination, entertaine their thoughts in a good humor and pleasing conceit towards themselves; others *to advance other ends*: so that as it is said of untrue valours, that some mens valours are in the eyes of those that look on, so the industry and courage of these men seemes to aime at this, that others may applaud them, or they hugge themselves in the contemplation of their own delignements: only *Larned men* love businesse and imployment, as actions agreeable to nature, and no lesse healthfull to the mind than exercise is to the body; taking pleasure in the Action it selfe, and not in the purchase: so that, of all men living, they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any businesse, which can replenish and detaine the mind according to the dignity thereof. And if there be found some laborious in reading and study, and yet idle in businesse, and action, this growes not from learning, but from some weaknesse or softnesse of body or minde, such as *Seneca* speaks of, *Quidam* (saith he) *tam sunt umbratiles ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est*. Well may it be, that such a point of a mans nature may make him give himselfe to learning, but it is not learning that breeds, or implants any such point in his nature. But if any man notwithstanding resolutely maintaineth, that *Learning takes up too much time which might otherwise be better employed*; I answer, that no man can be so straitned and oppressed with businesse, and an active course of life, but may have many vacant times of leasure, whilest he expects the returnes and tydes of businesse, except he be either of a very dull temper and of no dispatch; or ambitious (litle to his credit and reputation) to meddle and ingage himselfe in imployment of all natures and matters above his reach. It remaineth therefore to be enquired, in what matter, and how, those spaces and times of Leasure, should be filled up and spent; whether in pleasures or study; sensuality; or contemplation

Controv.  
lib. 4. Proe.

Plut. in De- most. plation, as was well answered by *Demosthenes* to *Æschines*, a man given to pleasure, who when he told him by way of reproach, *that his orations did smell of the Lampe*, Indeed (said *Demosthenes*) *there is great difference between the things that You and I doe by lampe-light*: Wherefore let no man feare lest learning should *expulse businesse*; nay rather it will keepe and defend the possessions of the minde, against idlenesse and pleasure, which otherwise, at unawares, may enter, to the prejudice both of *Businesse* and *Learning*.

¶ Againe, whereas they object, *That learning should undermine the reverence of Lawes and Government*, it is a meere calumny without all shadow of truth: For to say that a blind obedience should be a surer obligation then an ocular duty, is all one as to say, that a blind man may tread surer by a guide, then a seeing man can with the use of a light and his eyes. Nay it is without all controversie that *Learning* doth make the mind of man, gentle, ductile, maniable and pliant to government; whereas *ignorance* makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous; which the *Records* of time doe cleerely manifest, considering that the most unlearned, rude and barbarous times have bin most subject to seditions, tumults and changes. As for the judgement of *Cato the Censor*, he was well punished for his *blasphemy against learning*: For when he was past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme desire to goe to the schoole againe, and to *learne the greek tongue*; which doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the *Grecian Learning* was rather an affected gravity, than the inward sense of his own opinion. As for *Virgil's verses*, though it pleased him to brave the world in takeing to the *Romanes* the *Art of Empire*, and leaving to others all other *Arts*, as popular and servile; yet so much is manifest, that the *Romans* never ascended to that *hight of Empire*, till the time they had ascended to the *hight of Arts*. For in the time of the two first *Cæsars*, Persons most perfect in the State-principles of Government, there lived contemporaries, *the best Poet, Virgilius Maro; The best Historiographer, Titus Livius; the best Antiquary, Marcus Varro; the best*

Plut. in M.  
Cato.

or second Orator Marcus Cicero, without question the chiefest, every one in their severall faculty, that to the memory of man are known. Lastly, as for the *accusation of Socrates*, only this I say, The time must be remembred when it was prosecuted, namely under the *thirty Tyrants*, of all mortalls the bloodiest, basest and most unworthy of Government: which revolution of State & Time was no sooner over, but *Socrates*, whom they had made a Person Criminall, was made a Person Heroicall, and his Memory accumulate with all honours divine and humane, and those Discourses of his, which were than termed Corrupting of Manners, were after celebrated by all Posterity for most soveraigne medicines of Mind and Manners. And let this serve for answer to *Politiques*, which in their humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations upon Learning, which redargution neverthelesse, save that we know not whether our labours may extend to other ages, seems not so needfull for the present, seeing the aspect and favour of two most learned Princes (*Queene ELIZABETH & Your Majesty*, being as *Castor and Pollux, Lucida Sidera*, starres of a most benigne influence) hath wrought in us of Britaine, *so much love and reverence towards Learning.*



## C A P. III.

I *Discredits of Learning from Learned mens Fortunes, Manners, Nature of studies.* II. In their Fortunes *scarcity of Meanes,* & *Obscurity of life.* & *Meaneſſe of Imployment.* III. In their Manners, *Too Regular for the times,* & *Too sensible of the good of others, and neglective of their own.* & *They faile in applying themselves to Particular Persons.* & *They faile in some points of Behaviour.* & *Grosse Flattery practis'd by some Learned;* & *Instanced in the Moderne Dedication of Bookes.* & *Discreet Morigeration allowed.*

I **N**ow come we to the third sort of Discredit or Diminution of Credit, that redoundes upon Learning from learned men themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest. It is derived either from *their*  
*Fortune*

*Fortune*, or from *their Manners*, or from *the Nature of their studies*; whereof the first is not in their power; the second is not to the point; so as the third alone seemeth properly to fall into enquiry: but because we are not in hand with the true value of things, but with popular estimation, it will not be amisse to insinuate somewhat also of the two former.

II The Derogations therefore, or Diminutions of Credit which grow to Learning *from the fortune of Learned men*, are taken either from their *Poverty and scarcity of Meanes*; or from their *obscure and private course of Life*; or from the *meanness of imployment wherein they are conversant*.

§ As concerning *Want*, and that usually is the case of Learned men, that they are *poore*, and commonly begin with little and grow not rich so fast as other men, which convert their labours chiefly to lucre and encrease; it were good to leave the common Place in Commendation of *Poverty* to some *Frier Mendicant* to handle, (if by their leaves I may be so bold) to whom much was attributed by *Macchiavell* in this point, when he said, *that the Kingdome of the clergie had bin long before at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the Poverty of Friers and Monkes, had not borne out the scandalls of the superfluties and excesses of Bishops and Prælates*: so a man might say that the felicity and magnificence of Princes and great Persons, had long since turned to Barbarisme and Rudenesse, if the *Poverty of Learning* had not kept up civility and honor of life. But without such advantages of hunting after the praise thereof, it is worthy observation, what a sacred and reverend thing *Poverty of Fortune* was, for some ages in the Roman State, which yet was a State without Paradoxes: For thus saith *Titus Livius* in his introduction, *Either my affection to the worke I have undertaken deceaves me, or there was never State more great, more religious, more richly furnish't with good presidents, nor which avarice and riot conquered so late, nor where so great reverence to Poverty and Parcimony continued so long*. So likewise after the State of *Rome* was now degenerate, we read that when

*Cesar*

Dell. Hist.  
Fior. lib. 1.

Præf. lib. 1.

*Cæsar* the Dictator took upon him a Restauration of the collapsed state, one of his *confidents* gave him this counsell, That of all Points the most summary to such a designement, as he went about, was by all meanes to take away the estimation of wealth, For (saith he) *these and all other evils, together with the reputation of money shall cease, if neither publique Offices nor any other Dignity, which commonly are so coveted, were exposed to sale.* To conclude this point, as it was truly said that *Rubor est virtutis Color*, though sometimes it come from vice, so you may truly say, *Paupertas est virtutis fortuna*, though sometimes it may proceed from misgovernment and improvidence. Surely this is *Solomons* Censure, *Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons*, and Precept, *Buy the truth and sell it not*; So wisdome and knowledge judging it right and equall that meanes should be employed to get Learning, and not Learning be applied to gather up meanes.

Orat. ad C.  
Cæsar.  
Salust. im-  
putata.

Laert. in  
Diog. Cyn.

Prov. 28.  
Prov. 23. 27

¶ To what purpose should we speake of the *privatenesse and obscurenesse of life*, which is objected to learned men? It is a Theme so common and so frequently handled by all, to extoll *Leasure and retirednesse*, not taxed with *sen- tuality and sloth*, before a *Civile and Active* life; for *safety, liberty, sweetnesse, dignity, or at least freedome from indignities*, as no man handles this subject, but handles it well: such a consonancy it hath to mens conceptions in the expressing; and to mens consent in the allowing. This only I will adde, that *Learned men forgotten in States*, are like the Images of *Cassius and Brutus* in the funeralls of *Iunia*, of which, not to be represented as others were, *Tacitus* saith, *Eo ipso præfulgebant quod non visebantur.*

Annal. 3.

§ For *Meannesse of employment assigned to Learned men*, that which is most traduced to contempt is, That the government of *childhood and youth* is commonly allotted to them, the contempt of which age is transferred upon the *Preceptors or Tutors*. But how unjust this traducement is, if you will reduce things from popularity of opinion, to measure of reason, may appeare, in that we see men are more carefull what they put into new vessels, then into a

Joel. 2.

vessell season'd; and more curious what mould they lay about a young plant, then a plant corroborate: So as it is manifest that the weakest termes and times of all things, use to have the best applications and helps. Harken, if you please, to the Hebrew Rabbins, *Your young men shall see visions, your old men shall dreame dreame*; from this Text they collect, that youth is the worthier age, by so much as Revelation is more cleare by visions, then by dreames. And it is worth the noting that however *Pedants* have bin the derision and scorne of *Theaters*, as the Apes of *Tyranny*, and that the moderne looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of *Schoolmasters* and *Tutors*; yet it hath bin an ancient complaint drawn down from the best and wisest times, even to our age, that States were too busie with their *Laws* and too negligent in point of *Education*. Which excellent part of Ancient Discipline hath bin in some sort revived of late times by the *Colledges of the Iesuits*, whose paines and diligence when I consider, as well in the culture of knowledge, as information of manners, the saying of *Agefilaw* touching *Pharnabazus* comes into my mind, *Talis cum sis utinam noster esses*. And thus much concerning the discredit drawn from the *Fortunes and Condition of Learned men*.

Plut. in Agefil.

III As touching the *Manners of Learned men*, it is a thing belonging rather to their individuall Persons, than their studies and point of learning: No doubt there is found among them, as in all other Professions, and Conditions of life, men of all temperatures, as well bad as good, but yet so, as it is not without truth that is said, *abire studia in mores*; and that Learning and Studies, unlesse they fall upon very depraved dispositions, have an influence and operation upon the manners of those that are conversant in them, to reforme nature and change it to the better.

§ But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part, can not finde any disgrace to learning can proceed from the *Manners of Learned men, adherent unto them as they are Learned*; unlesse peradventure it be a fault (which was the supposed fault of *Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca,*

neca,

neca, and many more) that because the times they read of, are commonly better, than the times they live in; and the duties taught, better then the duties practised; they contend too farre, to reduce the corruption of manners to the honesty of precepts, and prescripts, of a too great hight, and to impose the Lawes of ancient severity upon dissolute times: and yet they have Caveats enow touching this austeritie out of their own Springs: For Solon, when he was asked, *Whether he had given his Citizens the best Lawes? the best* (said he) *of such as they would receive.* So Plato, finding that his own heart could not agree with the corrupt manners of his Country, refused to beare place or office, saying, *That a mans Country is to be used as his Parents were, that is, with perswasion and not with violence, by entreating and not by contesting:* And Cæsars counsellor put in the same caveat, saying, *non ad vetera instituta revocans que jam pridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt:* And Cicero notes this error directly in Cato the second, writing to his friend Atticus, *Cato optime sentit sed nocet interdum Reipub. loquitur enim tanquam in Repub. Platonis, non tanquam in face Romuli.* The same Cicero doth excuse and espound the Philosophers for going too farre, and being too exact in their Prescripts, *These same Præceptors and Teachers,* (saith he) *seem to have stretched out the line and limits of Duties somewhat beyond the naturall bounds, that when we had laboured to reach the highest point of Perfection, we might rest where it was meet: and yet himselfe might say, Monitis sum minor ipse meis; for he stumbled at the same stone, though in not so extreme a degree.*

Another fault which perchance not undeservedly is objected against Learned men, is this, *that they have preferr'd the honour and profit of their Countrey, and Masters before their own fortunes and safeties.* So Demosthenes to his Athenians, *My Counsellors* (saith he) *if you please to note it, are not such whereby I should grow great amongst you, you become little amongst the Grecians; but they be of that nature as are sometimes not good for me to give, but are alwaies good for you to follow.* So Seneca after he had consecrated that *Quinquennium Neronis*

Plut. in Solon.

In vita. in epist. alibi.

Orat. ad C. Cæs. Salut. ad scripta.

Ad Attic. lib. 2. ep. 1.

Pro L. Murræna.

Oratio de Corona.

to the eternall glory of Learned Governors, held on his honest and loyall course of Good and Free Counsell, after his Master grev extremely corrupt to his great perill and at last to his ruine. Neither can it be otherwise conceived; for Learning endues mens minds with a true sense of the frailty of their Persons; the Casualty of fortune; the Dignity of the soule; and their vocation: which when they think of, they can by no meanes perswade themselves that any *advancement of their own fortunes*, can be set down as a true and worthy end of their being and ordainment. Wherefore they so live, as ever ready to give their account to God, and to their Masters under God, whether they be Kings or States they serve, in this stile of words, *Ecce tibi Lucrifeci*, and not in that *Ecce mihi Lucrifeci*. But the corrupter sort of Politiques, that have not their mindes instituted and establish't in the true apprehension of Duties, and the contemplation of good in the universality, *referre all things to themselves*, as if they were the *worlds Center*, and that the *concurrence of all lines should touch in them and their fortunes*; never careing in all tempests, what becomes of the Ship, so they may retire and save them selves in the Cock-boate of their own fortune. On the contrary, they that feele the waight of Duty, and understand the limits of selfe love; use to make good their places, and duties, though with perill: and if they chance to stand safe in seditions and alterations of times and Government, it is rather to be attributed to the reverence which honesty even wresteth from adversaries, than any *versatile or temporizing advantage in their own carriage*. But for this point of tender sense, and fast obligation of duty, which without doubt Learning doth implant in the minde, however it may be taxed and amerced by Fortune; and be despised by Politiques in the depth of their corrupt principles, as a weake and improvident virtue, yet it will receive an open allowance, so as in this matter there needs the lesse disproofe or excusation.

9 Another fault there is incident to Learned men, which may sooner be excused than denied, namely this; *That they*

they doe not easily apply and accommodate themselves to persons with whom they negotiate and live: which want of exact application ariseth from two causes, *The first is, the largeness and greatness of their minds, which can hardly stoope and be confined within the observation of the nature and custome of one person.* It is the speech of a Lover, not of a wise man, *Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.* Nevertheless I shall yeeld that he that cannot contract the light of his mind, as he doth the eye of his body, as well as disperse and dilate it, wants a great faculty for an active course of Life. *The second cause is the honesty and integrity of their nature,* which argueth no inhabilitie in them, but a choise upon judgement; for the true and just limits of observance towards any person, extend no farther, then so to understand his inclination and disposition, as to converse with him without offence; or to be able, if occasion be offered, to give him faithfull counsell, and yet to stand upon reasonable guard & caution, in respect of our selves: but to be speculative into others, and to feele out a mans disposition, to the end to know how to worke him, winde him and governe him at pleasure; is not the part of an ingenious nature, but rather of a heart double and cloven; which, as in friendship, it is want of integrity; so towards Princes and Superiors it is want of Duty. For the Custome of the *Levant*, whereby it was accounted a hainous offence, to gaze and fixe their eyes upon Princes, is indeed, in the outward ceremony, barbarous, but good in the morall; for it becomes not Subjects by bent and inquisitive observations, to penetrate into the *hearts of Kings*, which Prov. 25: the Scripture hath declared to be, *inscrutable.*

§ There is yet another fault with which I will conclude this Part, which is often noted in Learned men, namely, *that in small and outward matters of behaviour and carriage* (as in countenance, gesture, march, ordinary discourse, and the like) *they doe many times faile to observe decency and discretion;* so as the vulgar sort of capacities make a judgement of them in greater matters, by that which they finde wanting in small and ordinary points of Action. But  
this

Plut. in  
Themist.Plato  
Conv.

this prejudication doth oftentimes deceive them: nay let them know, they have their answer from *Themistocles*, who being invited to touch a lute, said, arrogantly enough, being applied to himselfe, but pertinently to the purpose in hand, *That he could not, indeed, fiddle, but he knew how to make a small Towne, a great State.* And there are, no doubt, many well seen in the Arts of Government, and Policy, which are to seeke in ordinary conversation and punctuall occasions. I referre such scoffers to the Elogie *Alcibiades* gave of his Master *Socrates*, whom he compar'd to the *Gallipots of the Apothecaries*, which on the outside were drawne with *Apes, Owles, and Antiques*, but contained within precious liquors and soveraigne confections; acknowledging that to vulgar capacity and popular report, he was not without some superficiall levities, and deformities, but was inwardly replenisht with excellent powers and virtues. And so much touching the Point of *Manners of learned men.*

De Merc.  
conduct.

§ In the meantime I thought good to advertise, that I have no purpose to give allowance to some *base and unworthy Conditions of some Professours*, whereby they have discredited both Themselves and Learning: such were those *trencher Philosophers*, which in the later age of the Roman state, were usually in the howses of Great Persons, whom not improperly you may call *solemne Parasites*: of which kinde *Lucian* makes a merry description of the Philosopher, that the great Lady took to ride with her in the Coach, and would needs have him carry her litle Dogge *Melitau*, which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, the page scoffing said, *I doubt our Philosopher of a Stoick will turne Cynique.* But above all the rest, the grosse and palpable flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits and pens, turning as *Du Bartus* saith *Hecuba* into *Helena*, and *Faustina* into *Lucretia*, hath diminishd the prize and estimation of Learning.

§ Neither is the *Moderne Dedication of Bookes to Patrons to be Commended*, for that Bookes, such as are worthy the name of Bookes, ought to have no *Patron* but *Truth* and *Reason.*

*Reason.* The custome of the Ancients was better, who were wont to *dedicate their writings only to private and equall friends*, or to entitle the Bookes with the names of such friends; or if they Dedicated their Books to Kings or Great Persons, it was to some such as the Argument of the Book was fit and proper for. These and the like Courses may deserve rather reprehension than defence.

§ Nor say I this, as if I condemned the *Morigeration and application of Learned men, to men in fortune and place*; for the answer was good that *Aristippus* made to one that askt him in mockery, *How it came to passe that Philosophers were followers of Rich men, and not Rich-men of Philosophers?* He answered soberly and yet sharply, *That it was because Philosophers knew well what they had need of, but Rich mē did not.* Of like nature was the answer which the same Philosopher made when having a Petition to *Dionysius* and no care givento him, *he fell downe at his feet in manner of a worshipper, whereupon Dionysius staid and gave him the hearing, and granted it:* but a litle after, some person tender of the honour and credit of Philosophy, *reproved Aristippus that he would offer the Profession of Philosophy such an indignity as for a private suite to fall to a Tyrants feet? to whom he relied;* *That was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius that had his eares in his feet.* Neither was it accounted weaknesse, but a discretion in him that would not dispute his best with *Adrianus Caesar*, excusing the fact, *That it was reason to yeeld to him that commanded thirty Legions:* These and such like applications and stoopings of Learned men below the termes of Gravity, at the command of necessity or the advantage of occasion, cannot be condemned; for though they may seeme, at first sight, somewhat base and servile, yet in a judgement truly made, they are to be accounted *submissions to the Occasion* and not to the *Person*.



## CAP. IV.

I. *Distempers of Learning from Learned mens studies, are of three sorts. Phantasticall Learning, Contentious Learning, Delicate Learning. II. Delicate Learning, a Curiosity in words through Profusenesse of speech. § Decent expression commended. § Affectèd Brevity censured. III. Contentious Learning, a Curiosity in matter, through the novelty of termes, or strictnesse of Positions. § A vanity either in Matter or in Method. IV. Phantasticall Learning hath two branches, Imposture, Credulity. § Credulity is a beliefe of History. § Or a beliefe of Art or Opinion, and that either Reall in the Art it selfe. § Or Personall in the Auctor of such an Art, or Science.*

**L**ET US NOW proceed to those *Errors, and Vanities, which have intervned amongst the studies of Learned men, and therewith are intermingled;* which is the principall point and proper to the present Argument; wherein my purpose is not to patronize errors, but by a Censure and separation of the errors, to sift out that which is sound and solid, and to deliver the same from aspersion. For we see it is the manner of men, especially of envious persons, to scandalize, and deprave that which retains the State and Virtue, by takeing advantage upon that which is corrupt and degenerate; as the Heathens in the Primitive Church us'd to blemish and taint the Christians, with the faults and corruptions of Heretiques: Neverthelesse I have no meaning to make any exact animadversion of the *Errors, and Impediments in matters of Learning,* which are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak of such as doe fall under a common and popular observation, and known, or at least, which recede not farre of therefrom.

I. I finde therefore chiefly three vanities, and vacuities in Learning, which have given occasion to the reproach and disgrace thereof. For *those things* are esteemed *vaine* which are either *false, or frivolous;* namely, wherein there is, either no truth, or no use: *those Persons* we esteeme *vaine,* which are either *Credulous* in things false, or *Curious* in things of li-  
tle

cle use. And *Curiosity* is either in *matter* or in *words*; that is when either labour is spent in *vaine matters*, or time is wasted in the delicacy of *fine words*: so that it is agreeable as well to true reason as approved experience, to set down three distempers of Learning; The first is *Phantasticall Learning*; The second *Contentious Learning*; The third *Painted and Delicate Learning*: or thus, *vaine Imaginations*, *vaine Altercations*, *vaine Affectations*. And with the Last I will beginne.

II. This Distemper seated in the *superfluity and profuseness of speech* (though in times past by turnes, it was in some price) about *Luthers* time, got up mightily into credit, and estimation. The heat and efficacy of Preaching, to winne and draw on the people, began chiefly about that time to flourish; and this required a popular kind of expression. This was furthered by the Enmity and Opposition conceived in that same age against the *Scholemen*; whose writings were altogether in a differing stile and forme of expression; taking liberty to coine and frame new and rude termes of Art, without any regard to the pureness and elegancy of speech, so they might avoid circuit of words, and deliver their sense and conceptions, in a precise exact expression: and so it came to passe a litle after, that a greater care was taken for Words, than Matter; and many affected rather Comptness of stile; a round and clean Period; the sweet falling of the clauses; and illustrations by Tropes and Figures; than the waight of Matter, soundness of Argument, life of Invention, or depth of Judgement. Then sprang up the *flowing and watery veine of Osorius*, the Portugall Bishop, to be in price and request: Then did *Sturmius* spend such infinite and curious paines upon *Cicero* the Orator, and *Hemogines* the Rhetorician. Then did our *Carre* and *Ascham* in their Lectures and Writings almost Deifie *Cicero*, and *Demosthenes*, and allure young Students to that polisht and flourishing kinde of Learning. Then did *Erasmus* take occasion to make that scoffing kinde of Echo, *Decem annos consumpsi in Legendo Cicerone*, to which the

Echo answered, *One, Afine*. Than grew the Learning of the Schoolemen to be utterly despised, as rude and barbarous. In summe, the whole inclination and bent of those times was, rather about *Copie* than *Waight*. Here we see the first *Distemper of Learning*, when, as we have said, *men study Words and not Matter*. Whereof though J have represented examples of late times only, yet such vanities have bin accepted, in some degree or other, in ancient times, and will be so hereafter. Now it is not possible but that this should have an operation to discredit and debase the reputation of Learning, even with vulgar capacities; when they see Learned mens Workes, like the first letter of a Patent, which though it be limmed and set out with large florishes, yet it is but a letter. And it seemes to me that *Pigmaliions frenzie* is a good Embleme and Portraicture of this vanity; for what are words but the Images of matter, and except they be animated with the spirit of reason, to fall in Love with them, is all one as to fall in love with a Picture.

§ But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned to illustrate and polish the obscurity and roughnesse of Philosophy, with the *splendor of wordes* and *sensible elocution*, For hereof we have great examples in *Xenophon*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, *Plutarque*, and even in *Plato* himselfe; and the use hereof is great: For though to the severe inquisition of Truth, and the deep progresse into Philosophy, it is some hinderance, because it is too early satisfactory unto the mind, and quencheth the thirst and desire of farther search; yet if a man be to have any use of such knowledge in Civill occasions (of *Conference*, *Counsell*, *Perswasion*, *Discourse*, and the like) he shall finde all that he desireth prepar'd and set out to his hand in those Auctors. But the excesse of this is so justly contemptible, that, as *Hercules*, when he saw the Image of *Adonis*, *Venus minion*, in the Temple, said, *Nil facies*; so there is none of *Hercules* followers in Learning, I mean, the more industrious and severe inquirers into Truth, but will despise those *Delicacies* and *Affectations*, as indeed capable of no Divinenesse.

§ Little better is that kind of stile (yet neither is that altogether exempt from vanity) which neer about the same time succeeded this Copy and *superfluity of speech*. The labour here is altogether, *That words may be aculeate, sentences concise, and the whole contexture of the speech and discourse, rather rounding into it selfe, than spread and dilated*: So that it comes to passe by this Artifice, that every passage seemes more witty and waighy than indeed it is. Such a stile as this we finde more excesively in *Seneca*; more moderately in *Tacitus* and *Plinius Secundus*; and of late it hath bin very pleasing unto the eares of our time. And this kind of expression hath found such acceptance with meaner capacities, as to be a dignity and ornament to Learning; neverthelesse, by the more exact judgements, it hath bin deservedly despised, and may be set down as a *distemper of Learning*, seeing it is nothing else but a hunting after words, and fine placing of them. And thus much of the first *Disease or Distemper of Learning*.

III Now followes the distemper *setled in Matter*, which we set down as a *second disease of Learning*, & have designed it by the name of *Contentious subtiltie*; and this is in nature somewhat worse than that whereof we spake even now. For as the substance of Matter, is better than the beauty of wordes; so on the contrary, *vanity of Matter* is more odious than *vanity of words*. Wherein it seemeth that the reprehension of *S. Paul* was not only proper for those times, but Propheticall for the times following; and not only respective to Divinity, but extensive to all knowledge, *Devita* 1. Tim. 6; 20 *prophanas vocum novitates*: For in these words he assigns two Markes and Badges of suspected and falsified science; The first is the *Novelty and Strangenesse of Termes*; The other, the *strictnesse of Positions*; which of necessity induce opposition and so *Alterations* and *Questions*. Certainly like as many substances in nature, which are solid and entire, doe many times putrifie and corrupt into wormes; so good and sound Knowledge doth often putrifie and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholsome, and (as I may

terme them) *vermiculate* Questions, which seem indeed to have a kind of Motion and Quicknesse in them, and yet they are unfound and hollow, and of no solid use. This kind of *Degenerate Learning* corrupting it selfe, did chiefly raigne amongst the *Schoolemen*; who having a bundance of Leisure, sharpe, and strong wits, and small variety of reading, (for their wits were shut up within the writing of a few Auctors, chiefly *Aristotle*, their Dictator, as their Persons were shut up in the cells of Monasteries and Colledges) and for most part ignorant of the History either of Nature, or of Time did out of no great Quantity of Matter, but infinite agitation of their Wit and Phancy, as of the spindle, spinne out unto us those laborious webbes of Learning, which are extant in their Bookes. For the Wit and Mind of Man, if it worke upon Matter, by contemplating Nature and the Works of God, worketh according to the stuffe, and is limited thereby; but if it worketh upon it selfe, as the spider workes his webbe, then it is endlesse, and brings forth *Cobwebs of Learning*, indeed admirable for finenesse of thred and worke but of no Substance and Profit.

§ This same unprofitable *subtlety* or *Curiosity*, is of two sorts; and it is discerned either in the subject and Matter it selfe, such as is fruitlesse *Speculation* or *Controversy*, whereof there are no small number, both in Divinity and Philosophy; Or in the *Manner* and *Method of handling*, which amongst Schoolemen was this; Vpon every Position or Assertion they framed objections, then solutions of those objections, which solutions, for the most part, were only distinctions, whereas indeed, the strength of all sciences, like the *Old mans Fagot*, consisteth not in every stick a sunder, but in them all together united in the bonde. For the *Harmony of sciences*, that is when each part supports the other, is and ought to be the true and briefe way of confutation and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections: but on the other side, if you draw out every Axiome, as the sticks of a Fagot, one by one, you may easily quarrell with them, and bend and break them at your pleasure. So that as it was said

Æsop. Fab  
Plut. Mor.

said of *Seneca*, *verborum Minutiis rerum frangit pondera*, Fabius  
 may truly be said of the Schoolemen, *Questionum Minutiis* Inlit. X.  
*scientiarum frangunt pondera*. For were it not better for a  
 man, in a faire roome to let up one great light, or branching  
 candlestick of lights, whereby all may be seene at once, than  
 to goe up and dovyne with a small watch candle into every  
 corner? And such is their *Method*, that resteth not so much  
 upon evidence of Truth proved by Arguments, Auctorities,  
 Similitudes and Examples, as upon particular Confutations,  
 and Solutions of every scruple, cavillation, and objection;  
 thus breeding question upon question, even as in the for-  
 mer resemblance, *when you carry the light into one corner,*  
*you darken the rest*. So that the *fable* of *Scylla* seemes to be  
 a lively image of this kinde of Philosophy or knowledge,  
 which for the upper part had the shape of a comely virgin,  
 but below, *Candida succincta m latrantibus inguina monstris*; Virg. Buc.  
Ecl. 6.  
 So you shall finde some generalities of the Schoolemen,  
 faire and well proportioned, and invented to some good  
 purpose; but than when you descend to distinctions and de-  
 cisions, in steed of a fruitfull wombe for the use and bene-  
 fite of mans life, they end in monstrous and barkeing *Que-*  
*stions*. Wherefore it is no marvaile, if this quality of Know-  
 ledge fall under, even popular contempt, the people being  
 apt to contemne Truth upon occasion of Controversies, and  
 altercations; and to think they are all out of their way,  
 which never meet and agree among themselves; and when  
 they see the digladiations of Learned men, about matters of  
 no use or moment, they easily fall upon that judgement of  
*Dionysius* of *Syracusa*, *verba ista sunt senum otiosorum*. Not- Laertius in  
Plato.  
 withstanding it is most certain, that if the Schoolemen, to  
 their great thirst of Truth, and unwearied travaile of wit,  
 had joynd variety, and vniversality of reading, and contem-  
 plation, they had certainly proved excellent lights to the  
 great *advancement of all Arts and Sciences*. And thus much  
 of the second Disease of Learning.

IV For the third Disease of Learning which concernes  
*Deceit or Untruth*, it is of all the rest the foulest, as that  
 which

which doth destroy the Nature and essentiall forme of Knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of Truth. For the *Truth of Being*, and the *Truth of Knowing* are all one, differing no more than the direct beame, and the beame reflexed. This vice therefore brancheth it selfe into two sorts *Imposture* and *Credulity*; the one deceives, the other is deceived; which although they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of Cunning, and the other of Simplicity; yet for the most part they doe concurre, for as the verse noteth,

Horat. Epi.

*Per contatorem fugite nam garrulus idem est:*

Intimating that an *Inquisitive man is a Pratter*; so upon the like reason, a *Credulous man is a deceaver*. As we see it in Fame & Rumors, that he that will easily believe Rumors, will as easily augment Rumors; which *Tacitus* wisely notes in these words, *Fingunt simul creduntq;*; such affinity there is between a propensity to *Deceive* and a facility to *Believe*.

Tacit. Hist.  
l. i.

§ This *facility of Crediting* and accepting all things; though weakly authorized, is of two kindes, according to the nature of the Matter handled, for it is either *believe of History*, or (as the Lawyers speak) *matter of Fact*, or *matter of Opinion*. In the former kinde, we see with what losse and detriment of Credit and Reputation, this error hath distain'd and embas'd much of the *Ecclesiasticall History*, which hath too easily received and registred Reports and Narrations of Miracles wrought by Martyrs, Hermites, or Monkes of the Delert, Anchorites, and other holy men; and of their Reliques, Sepulchers, Chappells, Images and Shrines. So in *Naturall History*, we see many things have bin rashly, and with litle choice or judgement received and registred, as may appeare in the writings of *Plinius*, *Cardanus*, *Albertus*, and diverse of the *Arabians*, which are every where fraught with forged and fabulous Reports, and those not only uncertaine and untried; but notoriously untrue and manifestly convicted, to the great derogation of *Naturall Philosophy* with grave and sober men. Wherein in truth the wisdom and integrity of *Aristotle* doth excellently appear,

that

that having made so diligent and exquisite a *history of living Creatures*, hath mingled it so sparingly with any vaine or fained matter; but hath rather cast all *Prodigious Reports*, De Mirab; Aufcult. which he thought worthy the recording into one *commentary*, wisely discerning that matter of manifest Truth (which might be the experimentall groundworke whereupon Philolophy and Sciences were to be built) ought not unadvisedly, to be mingled with matter of doubtfull faith: and yet again things rare and strange, which to many seem incredible, are not wholly to be suppressed or denied to be recorded to Posterity.

§ But that other *Facility of Credit*, which is yeilded; not to *History* and *Reports*, but to *Arts* and *Opinions*, is likewise of two sorts; either when too much beliefe is attributed to *Arts* themselves, or to certain *Auctors* in any Art. The sciences themselves, which hold more of the fancy and of beliefe, then of Reason and Demonstration, are chiefly three *Astrologie*, *Naturall Magique*, and *Alchimie*; of which sciences neverthelesse the end and pretences are noble; For *Astrologie* professeth to discover the influence and domination of the superior Globe, over the inferior: *Magique* proposeth to it selfe to call and reduce Naturall Philosophy from variety of speculations, to the magnitude of workes: *Alchimie* undertakes to make a separation and extraction of all heterogeneous and unlike parts of bodies, which in mixture of Nature are Implicate and Incorporate; and to refine and depurate bodies themselves; that are distained and soiled; to set at liberty such as are bound and imprisoned; and to bring to perfection such as are unripe. But the derivations and progressions, which are presumed to conduce to these ends; both in the Theorie and in the Practile of these Arts, are full of Errors and Vanity. Nor is the Tradition and manner of Delivery for most part ingenious and without suspicion; but vail'd over and munited with deviles and impostures. Yet surely to *Alchimie* this right is due, that it may truly be compared to the Husbandman whereof *Æsopè* makes the Fable, that when he died, told his sonnes he had left unto them a great

*masse of Gold buried under ground in his Vine-yard, but did not remember the particular place where it was hidden; who when they had with Spades turnd up all the Vine-yard; gold indeed they found none; but by reason of their stirring and digging the Mold about the Rootes of their Vines, they had a great Vintage the year following: so the painfull search and stirre of Alchimists to make Gold, hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitfull experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature, as the use of mans life.*

§ *As for the overmuch Credit that hath bin given to Auctors in Sciences, whom they have invested with the power of Dictators, that their words should stand, and not of Consuls to give advice; the dammage is infinite that Sciences have received thereby, as a Principall cause that hath kept them low at a stay, and that they have lien heartlesse, without any notable Growth or Advancement. For hence it hath come to passe, that in Arts Mechanicall, the first deviser commeth short, & time supplies and perfects the rest; but in Sciences, the first Author goeth farthest, and time looseth and corrupteth. So we see Artillery, Saileing, Printing, were imperfect, formelesse, and grossely managed at first, but in progresse of time accommodated and refined: But contrariwise the Philosophy and Sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hypocrates, Euclide, Archimede, were of most vigor in their Auctors, and in processe of time, became rather degenerate and embased, and lost much of their lustre; whereof the reason is no other, but that in Arts Mechanicall, many wits and industries have contributed in one, in liberall Arts and Sciences, many wits and industries have bin spent about, and yeilded to the art of some one; whom (notwithstanding many times) his sectators have rather depraved than illustrated. For as water will not ascend higher then the levell of the first Spring-head, from whence it descendeth; so knowledge derived from Aristotle, will never rise higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And therefore although the position be good, *Oportet discentem credere*, yet it must be coupled with this, *Oportet jam edoctum iudicio suo uti*. For Disciples owe unto Masters, only a temporary*

porary believe, and a suspension of their judgement, untill they be fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation of their liberty, and a perpetuall captivity of their judgements. Therefore, to conclude this point, J will say no more but this, *Let great Auctors so have their due, as we do not derogate from Time, which is the Auctor of Auctors and Parent of Truth.*



## CAP. V.

Peccant Humors in Learning. I. *Extream affection to two extremes, Antiquity, Novelty.* II. *A distrust, that any thing New, should now be found out.* III. *That of all Sects and Opinions, the best hath still prevailed.* IIII. *An over early reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods.* V. *A neglect of PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHY.* VI. *A Divorce of the Intellect from the Object.* VII. *Infection of Knowledge in generall from individuall inclinations.* VIII. *An impatience of Doubt, hast to Assertion.* IX. *A Magistrall manner of Tradition of Knowledge.* X. *Aime of writers, Illustration, not Propagation of Knowledge.* XI. *End of studies, Curiosity, Pleasures, Profit, Preferments, &c.*

**H**us have we at length gone over the three Distempers or Diseases of Learning; besides the which, there are other, rather peccant Humors, than confirmed Diseases, which neverthelesse are not so secret and intricate, but that they fall under a popular sense and reprehension, and therefore are not to be passed over.

I. The first of these is an *extreme affection of two extremities, Antiquity and Novelty*; wherein the daughters of Time, doe take after the Father; for as Time devoureth his children, so these, one of them seeketh to depresse the other; while *Antiquity* envieth there should be *new Additions*; and *Novelty* can not be content to adde things *recent*, but it must deface and reject the *old*. Surely the advice of the Prophet is the true direction in this case, *state super vias antiquas & vide* Jerem: 6. 16 *de te quenam sit via recta & bona & ambulate in ea.* *Antiquity* deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stay a while, and stand thereupon, and look about to discover which is the best way; but when the discovery is well ta-

ken, than not to rest there, but cheerefully to make progression. Indeed to speak truly, *Antiquitas seculi, Juventus Mundi*, Certainly our times are the Ancient times, when the world is now Ancient, and not those which we count Ancient, *ordine retrogrado*, by a computation backward from our own times.

II An other error induced by the former is, a *suspition and diffidence*, that any thing should be now to be found out, which the world should have mist and past over so long time: as if the same objection might be made to Time, wherewith *Lucian* reproacheth *Iupiter*, and other the Heathen Gods, *For he wonders that they begot so many children in old time, and begot none in his time?* and askes in scoffing manner, *whether they were now become Septuagenary, or whether the Law Papiæ, made against old mens mariages, had restrained them?* So it seemes men doubt least time is become past children and generation. Nay rather the levity and inconstancy of mens judgements, is hence plainly discovered, which untill a matter be done, wonder it can be done. So *Alexander's* expedition into *Asia* was prejudg'd as a vast and impossible enterprize; yet afterwards it pleased *Livie*, so to slight it as to say of *Alexander*, *Nil aliud quam bene ausus est vana contemnere*: The same hapned unto *Columbus* in the westerne Navigation. But in intellectuall matters it is much more common, as may be seen in many propositions in *Euclide*, which till they be demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but being Demonstrates, our minde accepteth of them by a kind of Recognisance or Retraction, (as the Lawyers speak) as if we had understood and knowne them before.

III An other error which hath some affinity with the former is, a conceit That all sects and ancient opinions, after they have bin discussed and ventilated; the best still prevail'd and suppress the rest. Wherefore they think that if a man should begin the labour of a new search and examination, he must needs light upon somewhat formerly rejected, and after rejection, lost, and brought into oblivion: as if the *multitude*, or the wisest, to gratify the *multitude*, were not more ready

to

to give passage to that which is populare and superficially, than to that which is substantiall and profound. *For Time* seemeth to be of the nature of a River, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is waighty and solid.

IV Another error of divers nature from the former is, *The overearly and Peremptory reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods; which once done, commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation.* For as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, doe seldome grow to a farther stature: so knowledge while it is disperst into *Aphorismes*, and *Observations*, may grow and shoot up; but once inclosed and comprehended in Methods, it may perchance be farther polisht and illustrate, and accommodated for use and practise, but it increaseth no more in bulke and substance.

V Another error which doth succeed that which we last noted, is, *That after distribution of Particular Arts and Sciences into their severall places, many men have presently abandoned the universall notion of things, or Philosophia Prima, which is a deadly enemy to all Progression.* Prospects are made from Turrets and high places; and it is impoſsible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the flat and levell of the same science, and ascend not as into a watch-Tower to a higher science.

VI Another error hath proceeded *from too great a reverence and a kind of Adoration of the mind and understanding of man, by means whereof men have withdrawn themselves, too much, from the contemplation of Nature, and the observations of experience; and have tumbled up and downe in their own speculations and conceits; but of these surpassing Opinators, and (if I may so speak) Intellectualists, (which are notwithstanding, taken for the most sublime & divine Philosophers) Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying, Men seek truth in their own litle world,*

N.L.

*and not in the great common world, for they disdain the Alphabet of nature, and Primer-Book of the Divine works; which if they did not, they might perchance by degrees and leasure, after the knowledge of simple letters, and spelling*

of Syllables, come at last, to read perfectly the Text and Volume of the Creatures. But they, contrariwise, by continual meditation and agitation of wit, urge, and as it were invoke their own Spirits to divine and give *Oracles* unto them, whereby they are deservedly and pleasingly deluded.

VII Another Error that hath some connexion with this latter, is, *That men doe oftentimes imbue and infect their meditations and doctrines with the infusions of some Opinions, and conceptions of their own, which they have most admired; or some sciences to which they have most applied and consecrated themselves, giving all things a Dye and Tincture, though very deceivable, from these favorite studies.* So hath *Plato* intermingled his Philosophy with Theology; *Aristotle* with Logique; The second Schoole of *Plato*, *Proclus* and the rest, with the Mathematicues. These Arts had a kind of *Primo-geniture* with them, which they would still be kissing and making much of, as their first borne tonnes. But the *Alchimists* have forged a new Philosophy out of the Fire and Furnace; and *Gilbert* our Countrey-man, hath extracted another Philosophy out of a Load-stone. So *Cicero*, when reciting the severall opinions of the nature of the soule, he found a Musitian that held the soule was but a harmony, saith pleasantly,

*Tusc. lib. 1. Hic ab arte sua non recessit:* But of these errors *Aristotle* saith aptly and wisely, *Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant.*  
*De Gen. & Cor. lib. 1. & alibi.*

VIII Another error is, *An impatience of Doubt, and an unadvised hast to Assertion without due and mature suspension of the judgement:* For the two waies of contemplation are not unlike the two waies of Action, commonly spoken of by the Ancients; of which the one was a plaine and smooth way in the beginning, but in the end impasible; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while faire and even; so is it in contemplations, if a man will begin in certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he can be content to begin with doubts, and have patience a while, he shall end in certainties.

IX The like error discovereth it selfe in the manner of  
*Tradition*

*Tradition and Delivery of knowledge, which is, for the most part, imperious and magistrall, not ingenious and faithfull; so contrived, as may rather command our assent, than stand to examination.* It is true that in compendious Treatises designed for Practice, that Forme of writing may be retained; but in a just and compleat handling of knowledge, both extremes are to be avoided, as well the veine of *Velleius* the Epicurean, who fear'd nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything; as that of *Socrates* and the *Academie*, leaving all things in doubt and uncertainty: Rather men should affect candor and sincerity, propounding things with more or lesse asseveration, as they stand in their judgement proved, more or lesse.

Cic. de Nat.  
Dier. lib. 1.

X Other errors there are *in the scope that men propound to themselves whereunto they bend their endeavours and studies:* For whereas the most devout Leaders and noted Professors of Learning, ought chiefly to propound to themselves to make some notable addition to the science they professe; contrariwise, they convert their labours to aspire to certain second prizes, as to be a *profound interpreter*, or *commentator*; a sharp and strong champion or *Defendor*; a *Methodicall compounder* or *Abridger*: so the *Revenewes* and *Tributes* of Sciences come to be improved, but not the *Patrimony* and *Inheritance*.

XI But the greatest error of all the rest is, *the mistaking or misplacing the last and farthest end of knowledge:* For many have entred into a desire of Learning and Knowledge, some upon an imbred and restless *Curiosity*; others to entertaine their mindes with variety and *delight*; others for *ornament and reputation*; others for *contradiction* and victory in dispute; others for *Lucre* and living; few to improve the gift of reason given them from God, to the benefite and use of men. As if there were sought in knowledge, a *couch*, whereupon to rest a restless and searching spirit, or a *Tarrasse* for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and downe in at liberty unrestrained; or some high and eminent *Tower of State*, from which a proud and ambitious mind, may haue a Prospect,

or

or a *Fort* and commanding ground for strife and contenti-  
 on; or a *shop* for profit and sale; and not rather a *rich store-  
 house and Armorie* for the glory of the Creator of all things,  
 and the reliefe of mans estate. For this is that which indeed  
 would dignify and exalt Learning; if contemplation and  
 Action were more neerely and straitly, than hitherto they  
 have bin conjoyn'd and united together: which combina-  
 tion, certainly would be like unto that conjunction of the  
 two highest Planets, when Saturne which hath the Domi-  
 nion over rest and contemplations, conspires with *Iupiter*  
 the Lord of Civill society and Action. Howbeit I doe not  
 mean when I speak of use and Action, Professory or Lucre-  
 tive Learning, for I am not ignorant how much that diverts  
 and interrumpeth the *Progression and advancement of know-  
 ledge*, like indeed the *Golden apple*, thrown before *Atalanta*,  
 which while she goes aside and stoopeth to take up, the race  
 is hindred, *Declinat cursus aurum q̄ volubile tollit.*

Ovid. Met.  
 10.

Neither is it my meaning, as was spoken of *Socrates*, to call  
 Philosophy down from heaven, to converse upon the earth;  
 that is to lay *Naturall Philosophy* aside, and to celebrate only  
*Morall Philosophy* and *Policy*. But as Heaven and Earth doe  
 conspire and contribute, to the use and benefit of the life of  
 Man; so indeed this should be the end of *both Philosophies*;  
 that vain speculations, and what ever is empty and barren,  
 being rejected; that which is solid and fruitfull may be pre-  
 served and augmented; that so Knowledge, may not be a  
 Courtezane for Pleasure, or as a bond-woman for gaine; but  
 as a spouse for generation, fruit and honest solace.

§ Now me thinks I have described and opened, as by a  
 kind of Dissection, those *Peccant Humors*; or at least, the  
 Principall of them, *which have not only given impediment  
 to the Proficiency of Learning, but have given also occasion  
 to the traducement thereof*. Wherein if I have come too  
 neere the quick, it must be remembered, *Fidelia vulnera a-  
 mantis, dolosa oscula malignantis*: however this surely I think  
 I have gain'd, that I ought to be the better believed, concern-  
 ing the *Commendations of Learning* in that which followes,  
 because

Psal. 141.

because I have proceeded so freely concerning censure, in that which went before. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a *Laudative of Learning*, or to make a *Hymne to the Muses*; though I am of opinion, that it is long since their Rites were duely celebrated: but my intent is, without varnish or amplification, to take the just waight and to balance the *Dignity of Knowledge* in the scales with other things; and to search out the true valewes thereof, *from testimonies Divine and Humane*.



## CAP: VI:

The Dignity of Learning from Divine Arguments and Testimonies. I. From Gods wisdom. § Angels of Illumination. § The first Light and first Sabbath. § Mans employment in the Garden. § Abels contemplative life. § The invention of Musique. § Confusion of Tongues. II. The excellent Learning of Moses. § Iob. § Salomon. § Christ. § S. Paule. § The Ancient Doctors of the Church. § Learning exalts the Minde to the Celebration of Gods glory: and is a Preservative against Error and Vnbeliefe.

I. irst therefore let us seeke the Dignity of Knowledge, in the Arch-Type or first Platforme, which is in the *Attributes*, and in the *Acts of God*, as farre as they are revealed to man, and may be observed with sobriety. Wherein we may not seeke it by the name of *Learning*; for all *Learning* is Knowledge acquired, and no knowledge in God is *acquired*, but *Originall*: and therefore we must look for it by another name, that is *wisdom* or *sapience*, as the sacred Scriptures call it. It is so than; In the *works of the Creation*, we see a double emanation of Divine virtue from God; whereof the one is refer'd to *Power*, the o- Gen. 1. ther to *Wisdom*; that is chiefly exprest in making the *Masse* and substance of the *Matter*; this in disposing the beauty of the *Forme*. This being supposed it is to be observed, that for any thing which appears in the *History of the Creation*, the confused *Masse* and *Matter of Heaven and Earth* was made in a moment of Time; yet the *Order* and *Disposition*

of that *Chaos* or *Masse*, was the work of six daies: such a note of difference it pleased God to put upon the workes of *Power*, and the workes of *Wisdome*; wherewith concures, that in the Creation of the *Matter*; It is not recorded that God said *Let there be Heaven and Earth*, as it is said of the works following; but simply and actually, *God made Heaven and Earth*: so that the *Matter* seemes to be as a *Manufacture*, but the *Forme* carries the stile of a *Law* or *Decree*.

§ Let us proceed from *God* to *Angels* or *Spirits*, whose nature in order of Dignity is next Gods. We see, so farre as credit is to be given to the Celestiall Hierarchy, set forth under the name of *Dionysius Areopagita*, that in the order of Angells, the first place or degree is given to the *Seraphim*, that is, *Angels of Love*: the second to the *Cherubim*, that is, *Angels of Illumination*: the third, and so following, Places to *Thrones*, *Principalities* and the rest, which are Angels of Power and Ministry. So as from this order and distribution, it appears, that *the Angels of Knowledge and Illumination, are placed before the Angels of Office and Domination*.

§ To descend from *Spirits* and *Intellectuall Formes*, to *Sensible* and *Materiall Formes*; we read that *the first of Created formes was Light*; which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and Corporall things, to knowledge in *Spirits* and *Jncorporall things*. So in the distribution of *Daies*, we see the *day* wherein God did rest and contemplate his own workes, was blest above all the *daies* wherein the *Fabrick* of the *Universe* was Created and Disposed.

§ After the Creation was finisht, we read that *Man was plac't in the Garden to worke therein*; which work so appointed to him, could be no other than the *work of Contemplation*, that is, the end hereof was not for necessity, but for delight and exercise without vexation or trouble: For there being than no reluctance of the Creature, no sweat of the brow; mans imployment must of consequence have bin matter of *delight* and *contemplation*, not of *Labour and Worke*. Againe, the first Acts that man perform'd in *Paradise*, comprehended the two summary parts of *knowledge*; those were the *view of*  
*Creatures;*

*Creatures, and the imposition of names.* For the knowledge which introduc't the Fall, it was (as we have toucht before) not the *Naturall Knowledge concerning the Creatures*, but the *Morall Knowledge of Good and Evill*, where the supposition was, that *Gods Commandements or Prohibitions were not the Originalls of Good and Evill, but that they had other beginnings*, which man aspir'd to know, to the end to make a totall defection from God, and to depend wholly upon himselfe, and his Free-will.

§ To passe to the first event or occurrence after the Fall of Man, we see (as the Scriptures have infinite Mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the story or letter) *an image of the two States, the Contemplative and Active, figur'd in the Persons of Abel and Cain*, and in their Professions and Primitive trades of life; whereof the one was a Sheapheard, who by reason of his leasure, rest in a place, and free view of Heaven, *is a lively image of a Contemplative life*; the other a Husbandman, that is, a man toild and tired with working; and his countenance fixt upon the earth: *where we may see the favour and Election of God went to the Sheapheard and not to the tiller of Ground.*

§ So in the age before the Flood, the holy Records (with in those few Memorials which are there entred and registred, touching the occurrences of that age) have vouchsafed to mention and honor *Inventors of Musique and works in Mettals.*

§ In the next Age after the flood, the great judgements of God upon the ambition of Man was the *Confusion of Tongues*, whereby the open trade and intercourse of Learning and Knowledge was chiefly embraced.

II. Let us descend to *Moses the Law-giver & Gods first Notarie*, he is adorn'd in Scripture with this commendation, *That he was seen in all the Learning of the Egyptians*; which Nation, we know, was one of the most ancient Schooles of the world; for so *Plato* brings in the *Ægyptian Priest* saying unto *Solon*, *You Grecians are ever children, you have no knowledge of Antiquity nor Antiquity of Knowledge.* Let us take

a view of the *Ceremoniall Law of Moses*, and we shall finde (besides the prefiguration of Christ, the Badge or Difference of the people of God, from the profane Race of the world; the exercise and impressi<sup>o</sup>n of obedience, and other sacred uses and fruits of the same Law) that some of the most learned Rabbins, have travelled profitably and profoundly in the same, intently to observe and extract, sometimes a *Naturall*, sometimes a *Morall sence of the Ceremonies and Ordinances*: For example, where it is said of the Leprosy, *If the whitenesse have over-spread the flesh, the Patient may passe abroad for clean; but if there be any whole flesh remaining, he is to be sentenced unclean, and to be separated at the discretion of the Priest.* From this Law one of them collects a Principle in Nature; *That Putrifaction is more contagious before maturity then after*: Another raiseth a Morall instruction; *That men ore-spread with vice, doe not so much corrupt publique Manners, as those that are halfe evill and but in part only.* So that from this and other like places in that Law, there is to be found, besides Theologicall sence, much aspersi<sup>o</sup>n of Philosophy.

§ So likewise that *excellent Book of Job*, if it be revolved with diligence, it will be found full and pregnant with the secrets of *Naturall Philosophy*; as for example, of *Cosmography* and the roundnesse of the Earth in that place, *Qui extendit Aquilonem super vacuum, & appendit Terram super nihilum*, where the Pensilenesse of the Earth; the Pole of the North; and the Finitenesse or convexity of Heaven, are manifestly touched. Again, of *Astronomy and Constellations*, in those words, *Spiritus ejus ornavit Cælos, & obstetricante manu eius educus est colubertortuosus*: And in another place, *Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose the bands of Orion?* where the setled and immoveable configuration of the first starres, ever standing at equall distance, is with great elegance described. So in another Place, *Which maketh Arcturus, Orion and Pleiades and the secret chambers of the South.* Where he again points at the depression of the Southern Pole, designing it by the name of *the secrets of the South*, because the Southern starres are not seen upon our Hemispher. Matter  
of

of Generation of living Creatures, *Hast thou not powred me out like milke, and condensed me like Curds?* Matter of Minerals, *Surely there is a Mine for Silver, and a place wherein Gold is fined; Iron is digged up out of compacted dust, and Brasse extracted from stone dissolved in the furnace,* and so forward in the same chapter.

§ So likewise in the person of *Solomon the King*, we see the endowments of wisdom, both in his *Petition* and *Gods assent thereunto*, preferred before all terrene and temporall felicity. By virtue of which Donative and Grant, *Solomon* being singularly furnisht and enabled, not only writ those excellent *Parables* or *Aphorismes* concerning Divine and Morall Philosophy; but also compiled a *Naturall History* of all verdure or vegetables *From the Cedar upon the Mountain, to the Mosse upon the Wall*; which is but the rudiment of a plant, between putrification and an Herbe; and also of all things that breath or move. Nay the same *Solomon the King*, although he excell'd in treasure and the magnificence of Building; of Shipping, and Navigation, of Service and Attendance, of Fame & Reputation, and the like train of Glory; yet of this rich harvest and confluence of Glory, he reaps and makes claim to himselfe of nothing; but only the Honor of the Inquisition; and Invention of Truth; for so he saith expresly, *The Glory of God is to conceale a thing, but the Glory of a King is to find it out.* As if according to that innocent and affectionate play of Children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide his works, to the end to have them found out; and as if Kings could not obtain a greater Honour, then to be Gods play-fellowes in that game; specially considering the great command they have of wits and means; whereby the investigation of all things may be perfected.

§ Neither did the dispensation of God varie in the times after our Saviour came into the world; *For our Saviour himselfe did first shew his power to subdue Ignorance, by his conference with the Doctors of the Law, and the Priests in the Temple*, before he shewed his power to subdue Nature, by his great and so many Miracles. *And the coming of the Holy*

*Ghost, was chiefly figur'd and exprest in the similitude and guift of Tongues, which are the vehicula scientiæ.*

¶ So in the election of *those instruments which it pleased God to use in the Plantation of the Faith*, at the first he employed persons altogether Unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration from the holy Spirit; whereby more evidently he might declare his immediat and divine working, and might abase all humane Wisdome and Knowledge: Yet nevertheless that counsell of his in this respect was no looner perform'd, but in the next vicissitude and succession of time he sent his divine Truth into the world, waited on with other Learning, as with servants and hand-maids; therefore we see *S. Pauls pen, (who was only learned amongst the Apostles)* was chiefly imployed by God, in the Scriptures of the new Testament..

Act. Apost.  
12.

Epist. ad  
Iambli.

P. Diac. l. 3.  
Parag. 33.

¶ So again we know, *that many of the Ancient Bishops and Doctors of the Church were excellently read and studied in all the Learning of the Heathen*; in so much that the Edict of the *Emperour Iulian, whereby it was interdicted unto Christians to be admitted into Schooles, or exercises of Learning*, was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious Engine and Machination against the Christian Faith, than were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors. Neither could the emulation and jealousy of *Gregory the First*, (otherwise an excellent man) *who designed to extinguish and obliterate Heathen Auctors and Antiquity*, ever obtain the opinion of Piety and Devotion amongst holy men. But contrariwise it was the Christian Church, which amidst the inundations of the Scythians from the North-west; and the Saracens from the East, did preserve in the sacred Lap and Bosome thereof the *pretious reliques of Heathen Learning*, which otherwise had utterly perisht and bin extinguisht. And of late in our age we may likewise see the *Jesuites*, who partly in themselves, and partly by emulation and provocation of Adversaries, *have much quickned and strenghtned the state of Learning*; we see, I say, what notable services they have done, and what helps they have brought in, to the repairing and establishing of the Roman Sea.

¶ Where-

§ Wherefore to conclude this Part, there are two principall Duties & Services besides ornament and illustration, which human Learning doth performe to Faith and Religion: *The one, because they are effectually incitements to the exaltation and celebration of the Glory of God:* for as the Psalmes, Psal. XIX. and other Scriptures, doe often invite us to the contemplation, and publication of the magnificent and wonderfull works of God; so if we should rest only in the outward forme, as they first offer themselves unto our senses; we should doe the like injury to the Majesty of God, as if we should judge of the store and wealth of some excellent Jeweller, by that only, which is set out towards the street in his shop. *The other, because they minister a singular help and preservative against unbeliefe, and errors:* Mat. 22. 29. *You erre, not knowing the Scriptures nor the Power of God.* Where he layes before us, two books or volumnes to study, if we will be secur'd from errors: First the *volumne of Scriptures*, which reveale the will of God; than the *volumne of Creatures*, which expresse his power; whereof the latter is as a key to the former, not only opening our understanding to conceive the true sense of Scriptures, by the generall rules of Reason and Lawes of speech; but besides, chiefly opening our beliefe, in drawing us unto a due meditation of the omnipotency of God; the characters whereof are chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. Thus much for *Divine Testimonies and Evidences*, concerning the true Dignity and value of Learning:

CAP.



## C A P. VII.

*The Dignity of Learning from humane Arguments and Testimonies.*

I. *Naturall Inventours of New Arts for the Commodities of Mans life, consecrated as Gods.* II. *Politically, Civill Estates and affaires advanced by Learning.* § *The best and happiest times under Learned Princes and others.* § *Exemplified in the immediat succeeding Emperors, from the death of Domitian.* III. *Military, The concurrence of Armes and Learning.* § *Exemplified in Alexander the Great.* § *Iulius Cæsar the Dictator.* § *Xenophon the Philosopher.*

**A**S for *Humane Testimonies and Arguments*, it is so large a field, as in a discourse of this compendious nature and brevity, it is fit rather to use choice, than to imbrace the variety of them.

I. First therefore in the degrees of Honor amongst the Heathens, it was the highest, to attain to a Veneration and Adoration as a God; this indeed to the Christians is as the forbidden fruit; but we speak now separately of Humane Testimony. Therefore, (as we were saying) with the Heathens, that which the Grecians call *Apotheosis*; and the Latines *Relatio inter Divos*; was the supreme Honour which man could attribute unto Man: specially, when it was given, not by a formall Decree or Act of Estate, (as it was used amongst the Roman Emperors,) but freely by the assent of Men and inward beliefe. Of which high Honour there was a certain degree and middle terme: For there were reckoned above *Humane Honours*, *Honours Heroicall*; and *Divine*; in the Distribution whereof, Antiquity observed this order. Founders of States; Lawgivers; Extirpers of Tyrants; Fathers of their Country, and other eminent Persons in Civile Merit, were honour'd with the title of *Worthies* only, or *Demi-Gods*; such as were *Thesew*, *Minos*, *Romulus*; and the like: on the other side such as were *Inventors and Authors of new Arts*; and such as *endowed mans life with new Commodities*; and *accessions were ever consecrated among the Greater and Entire*

Herodia. l. 4  
Dio. Reliqui.

the Gods; which hapned to *Ceres, Bacchus, Mercury, Apollo,* and others, which indeed was done justly and upon sound judgement: For the *merits of the former*, are commonly confined within the circle of an Age, or a Nation, and are not unlike seasonable and favoring showers, which though they be profitable and desirable, yet serve but for that season only wherein they fall, and for a Latitude of ground which they water: *but the benefices of the latter*, like the influences of the Sunne, and the heavenly bodies, are for time, permanent, for place, universall: those again are commonly mixt with strife and perturbation; but these have the true character of Divine presence, and come in *Aura leni* without noise or agitation.

II. Neither certainly is the *Merit of Learning in Civile affaires, and in repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the other which relieve mans necessities, which arise from Nature.* And this kind of merit was lively set forth in that fained relation of *Orpheus Theatre*, Philost. in Orph. where all beasts and birds assembled, which forgetting their proper naturall appetites of Prey, of Game, of Quarrell, stood all sociably and lovingly together, listning unto the Aires and accords of the harpe; the sound whereof no sooner ceated, or was drown'd by some lowder noise, but every beast returned to his own nature. In which Fable is elegantly described, the nature and condition of men, who are tossed and disordered with sundry savage and unreclaim'd desires, of Profit, of Lust, of Revenge; which yet as long as they give eare to precepts, to the perswasion of Religion, Lawes, and Magistrates, eloquently and sweetly coucht in Bookes, to Sermons and Haranges; so long is society and peace maintaind, but if these instruments be silent, or that seditions and tumults make them not audible, all things dissolve and fall back into Anarchy and Confusion.

§ But this appeareth more manifestly, *when Kings or Persons of Authority under them, or other Governors in States, are endowed with Learning:* For although he might be thought partiall to his own profession that said *Than should People or States* Plato de Rep. 5.

*States be happy when either Kings were Philosophers or Philosophers Kings; yet so much is verified by experience, that under wise and Learned Princes and Governors of State, there hath bin ever the best and happiest times. For howsoever Kings may have their errors and imperfections; that is, be liable to Passions and depraved customes, like other me, yet if they be illuminated by Learning, they have certain anticipate notions of Religion, Policy, and Morality, which preserve and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses, whispering evermore in their eares, when Councillors, and Servants stand mute and silent. So likewise Senators and Councillors which be Learned, doe proceed upon more safe and substantiall principles, than Councillors which are only men of experience: Those seeing dangers a farre off, and repulsing them betimes; whereas these are wise only neere at hand, seeing nothing, but what is imminent and ready to fall upon them, and than trust to the agility of their wit, in the point of dangers, to ward and avoid them.*

§ Which felicity of times under *Learned Princes* (to keep still the law of brevity by using the most selected and eminent examples) doth best appear, in the Age which passed from the death of *Domitianus* the Emperor, untill the raigne of *Commodus*, comprehending a succession of sixe Princes, all Learned, or singular favourers and advancers of Learning, and of all ages (if we regard temporall happinesse) the most flourishing that ever Rome saw, which was then the Modell and Epitome of the world: A matter revealed and prefigur'd unto *Domitian* in a dream, the night before he was slaine, for he seem'd to see

Suet. in  
Dom parag  
23.

*grown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold; which Divination came indeed accordingly to passe, in those golden times which succeeded; of which we will make some particular, but brief commemoration. Nerva was a Learned Prince, an inward acquaintance, and even a Disciple to Apollonius the Pythagorean; who also almost expired in a verse of Homers,*

*Nerva mihi*  
*Dion. l. 68.*

*Telis Phæbetuis, lachrimas ulciscere nostras.*

*Plin. Pan.*

*Trajan* was for his Person not Learned, but an admirer of

Learn-

Learning, and a munificent benefactor to the Learned, a Founder of Libraries, and in whose Court (though a warlike Prince) as is recorded, Professors and Preceptors were of most credit and estimation. *Adrian* was the most curious man that lived, and the insatiable inquirer of ail variety and secrets. *Antoninus* had the patient and subtle wit of a Schoole-man, in so much as he was called *Cymini-Sector*, a Carver, or a divider of Cummin-seed: And of the *Divi fratres*, *Lucius Commodus* was delighted with a softer kind of Learning; and *Marcus* was surnam'd the *Philosopher*. These Princes as they excel'd the rest in Learning, so they excel'd them likewise in virtue and goodnesse. *Nerva* was a most mild Emperour, and who (if he had done nothing else) gave *Trajan* to the World. *Trajan*, of all that raign'd, for the Arts, both of Peace and Warre, was most famous and renowned: the same Prince enlarged the bounds of the Empire; the same temperately confin'd the Limits and Power thereof; he was also a great Builder in so much as *Constantine* the Great, in emulation was wont to call him, *Parietaria*, Wall-Flower, because his name was carved upon so many walls. *Adrian* was Times rivall for the victory of perpetuity, for by his care and munificence in every kind, he repaired the decacies and ruines of Time. *ANTONINUS*, as by name, so nature, a man exceeding *Pious*; for his nature and inbred goodnesse, was beloved and most acceptable to men of all sorts and degrees; whose raigne, though it was long, yet was it peacefull and happy. *Lucius Commodus* (exceeded indeed by his brother) excel'd many of the Emperours for goodnesse. *Marcus* formed by nature to be the pattern and Platforme of virtue, against whom that *Iester* in the banquet of the Gods had nothing to object, or carpe at, save his patience towards the humors of his wife. So in this continued sequence of sixe Princes, a man may see the happy fruits of Learning in Sovereignty, Painted forth in the greatest Table of the world.

III. Neither hath Learning an influence or operation upon Civill merit and the Arts of Peace only, but likewise it hath no lesse Power and Efficacy in Martiall and Military

virtue, as may notably be represented in the examples of *Alexander* the Great; and *Iulius Cæsar* the *Dictator*, mention'd, by the way before, but now in fit place to be resumed; of whose *Military virtues and Acts in warre*, there needs no note or recitall, having bin the wonders of the world in that kind; but, of *their affection and propension towards Learning, and peculiar perfection therein*, it will not be impertinent to say some thing.

§ *Alexander* was bred and taught under *Aristotle*, (certainly a great Philosopher) who dedicated diverse of his Books of *Philosophy* unto him: he was attended with *Calisthenes*, and diverse other Learned persons that followed him in Campe, and were his perpetuall associates, in all his Travailles and Conquests. *What Price and Estimation he had Learning in*, doth notably appear in many particulars; as in the envy he expressed towards *Achille's* great fortune, in this, *That he had so good a Trumpet of his Actions & provelse as Homers verses*. In the judgement he gave touching the *precious Cabinet of Darius*, which was found amongst the rest of the spoiles; whereof, when question was mov'd, what thing was worthy to be put into it, and one said one thing, another, another, *he gave sentence for Homers works*. His reprehensorie letter to *Aristotle*, after he had set forth his *Book of Nature*, wherein he expostulates with him, for publishing the secrets or mysteries of *Philosophy*, and gave him to understand, *That himselfe esteemed it more to excell others in Learning and Knowledge, than in Power and Empire*. There are many other particulars to this purpose. *But how excellently his mind was endowed with Learning*, doth appear, or rather shine in all his *Speeches and answers*, full of knowledg & wisdom; whereof though the Remaines be small, yet you shal find deeply impressed in them, the foot-steps of all sciences in *Moral knowledge*; Let the *speech of Alexander* be observed touching *Diogenes*, & see (if yee please) if it tend not to the true estate of one of the greatest questions in morall *Philosophy*? *Whether the enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of them, be the greater happinesse*. For when he saw *Diogenes* contented

with

Plut. in  
Alexand.

Plut. ut  
supra.

Ut supra.

with so little, turning to those that stood about him, that mock't at the Cyniques condition, he said, *If I were not Alexander, I could wish to be Diogenes.* But Seneca, in this comparison, prefers *Diogenes*, when he saith, *Plus erat quod Diogenes nollit accipere, quam quod Alexander posset dare,* There were more things which *Diogenes* would have refused, than those were which *Alexander* could have given. In *Naturall knowledge*, observe that speech that was usuall with him, *That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep, and Lust:* which speech, in truth, is extracted out of the depth of *Naturall Philosophy*, tasting rather of the conception of an *Aristotle*, or a *Democritus*, than an *Alexander*; seeing as well the indigence, as redundance of nature, design'd by these two Acts, are, as it were, the inward witness and the earnest of Death. In *Poesy*, let that speech be observed, when upon the bleeding of his woundes, he called unto him one of his Flatterers, that was wont to ascribe unto him divine honor; look (saith he) *this is the blood of a man, not such liquor as Homer speaks of, which ranne from Venus hand, when it was pierced by Diomedes:* with this speech checking both the *Poets*, and his flatterers, and himselfe. In *Logique* observe that reprehension of *Dialectique Fallacies*, in repelling and retorting Arguments, in that saying of his wherein he takes up *Cassander*, confuteing the informers against his father *Antipater*. For when *Alexander* hapned to say, *Doe you think these men would come so farre to complain, except they had just cause?* *Cassander* answered, *Yea, that was it that made them thus bold, because they hoped the length of the way would dead the discovery of the aspersi-on;* See (saith the King) *the subtlety of Aristotle wresting the matter both waies, Pro and Contra.* Yet the same Art which he reprehended in another, he knew well how to use himselfe, when occasion required, to serve his own turne. For so it fell out that *Calisthenes*, (to whom he bare a secret grudge, because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration) being mov'd, at a banquet, by some of those that sate at table with him, that for entertainment sake (being he was an eloquent man) he would take upon him some

Plutarch.  
ut supra.

Theme, at his own choice, to discourse upon, which *Calisthenes* did, and chusing the Praises of the Macedonian Nation, performed the same with the great applause of all that heard him: whereupon *Alexander*, nothing pleased, said, *That upon a good subject it was easy for any man to be eloquent*, but turne, said he, your stile, and let us hear what you can say against us. *Calisthenes* undertook the charge, and performed it, with that sting & life, that *Alexander* was faine to interrupt him, saying; *An ill mind also as well as a good cause might infuse eloquence. For Rhetorique, whereto Tropes and Ornaments appertaine; see an elegant use of Metaphor, wherewith he taxed Antipater, who was an Imperious and Tyrannous Governor. For when one of Antipaters friends commended him to Alexander for his moderation, and that he did not degenerate, as other Lief-tenants did, into the Persian Pride, in using Purple, but kept the ancient Macedon habit, But Antipater (saith Alexander) is all Purple within.* So likewise that other Metaphor is excellent; when *Parmenio* came unto him in the plain of *Arbella*, and shewed him the innumerable multitude of enemies which viewed in the night, represented, by the infinite number of lights, a new Firmament of Starres; and thereupon advised him to assaile them by night, *I will not, said Alexander, steale a victory.* For matter of Policy, weigh that grave and wise distinction, which all ages have imbraced, whereby he differenced his two chief friends, *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, when he said, *That the one loved Alexander, and the other loved the King*, Describing a Difference of great import, amongst even the most faithfull servants of Kings, *that some in sincere affection love their Persons, others in duty love their Crowne.* Observe how excellently he could tax an error, ordinary with Counsellors of Princes, who many times give counsell, according to the modell of their own mind and fortune, and not of their Masters. For when *Darius* had made great offers to *Alexander*: *I, said Parmenio, would accept these conditions, if I were as Alexander: said Alexander, surely so would I, were I as Parmenio.* Lastly, weigh that quick and acute re-

Plutarch.  
Dict. Not.

Plut. in A-  
lexan.

Vt supra.

Plut. in  
Alex.

ply

ply, which he made to his friends asking him, *what he would reserve for himselfe giving away so many and great gifts?* Hope, said he; as one who well knew that when all accounts are cast up aright, *Hope* is the true portion and inheritance of all that resolve upon great enterprizes. This was *Iulius Caesar's* portion when he went into *Gaul*, all his estate being exhausted by profuse Largesses. This was likewise the portion of that noble Prince, howsoever transported with Ambition, *Henry Duke of Guise*, of whom it was usually said, *That he was the greatest usurer in all France, because that all his wealth was in names, and that he had turned his whole estate into obligations.* But the admiration of *this Prince* whilst I represent him to my selfe, not as *Alexander the Great*, but as *Aristotles Scholler*, hath perchance carried me too farre.

Vt supra.

S. FRAN.  
BACON,  
Apol.

§ As for *Iulius Caesar the excellency of his Learning*, needs not to be argued, either from his education, or his company, or his answers; For this, in a high degree, doth declare it selfe in his own writings, and works, whereof some are extant, some unfortunately perisht. For first, there is left unto us *that excellent History of his own warres, which he entituled only a COMMENTARY*; wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid waight of matter; and lively images of Actions and Persons, exprest in the greatest propriety of words, and perspicuity of Narration, that ever was. Which endowments, that they were not infused by nature, but acquired by *Precepts and instructions of Learning*, is well witnessed by that work of his entituled *DE ANALOGIA*, which was nothing else but a *Grammaticall Philosophy*, wherein he did labour, to make this, *vox ad Placitum*, to become *vox ad Licitum*, and to reduce custome of speech, to congruity of speech; that words, which are the images of things, might accord with the things themselves, and not stand to the Arbitrement of the vulgar. So likewise we have by his edict, *a reformed computation of the year*, correspondent to the course of the Sunne; which evidently shewes, that he accounted it his equall glory, to finde out the lawes, of the starres in heaven; as to give lawes to men on earth. So in that Book of his

Cic. de clao  
Orat.  
Cic. de O-  
rat. l. 3.  
Suet. in Iul.Suet. in  
parag. 56.

Parag. 56.

Suet. in  
parag. 40.

his

Plut. in  
Cæsar.

his entitled ANTI-CATO; it doth easily appear, that he did aspire, as well to victory of wit, as victory of warre, undertaking therein a Conflict against the greatest Champion with the Penne, that then lived, *Cicero the Oratour*. Againe in his Book of APOPHTHEGMES, which he collected, we see he esteemed it more honour, to make himselfe but a paire of Tables, or Codicills, wherein to register the wise and grave sayings of others; then if his own words were halloved as Oracles, as many vain Princes by custome of Flattery, delight to doe. But if I should report diverse of his *Speeches*, as I did in *Alexander*, they are truly such, as

Eccles. 13.

*Verba Sapientum sunt tanquam aculei, & tanquam clavi in altum defixi.* wherefore I will here only propound three, not so admirable for elegancy, as for vigor and efficacy: As first, it is reason he be thought a *maister of words*, that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army: the occasion was this; The *Romans*, when their Generalls did speak in their Army, did use the word, *Milites*, when the Magistrates spake to the people, they did use the word, *Quirites*: *Cæsars* souldiers were in a tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cassed, not that they so ment, but by expostulation thereof, to draw *Cæsar* to other conditions; He, nothing daunted and resolute, after some silence began thus,

Suet. in Jul.  
§ 70.

*Ego, Quirites*, which word did admit them already cased; wherewith the souldiers were so surprized, and so amazed; as they would not suffer him to goe on in his speech; and relinquishing their demands of *Dismission*, made it now their earnest suit, that the name of *Milites*, might be again restored them. *The second speech* was thus; *Cæsar* did extremely affect the name of *King*; therefore some were set on, as he passed by, in popular acclamation to salute him *King*: he finding the crie weak and poore, put off the matter with a jest, as if they had mist his sur-name, *Non Rex sum*, (saith he) *sed Cæsar*; indeed such a speech as if it be exactly searcht, the life and fulnesse of it can scarce be exprest. For first it pretended a refusall of the name, but yet not serious. again, it did carry with it an infinite confidence, and magnanimity;

Suet. § 79.

nimity;

nimity; as if the Appellation *Cæsar*, had bin a more eminent Title, than the name of King; which hath come to passe, and remaineth so till this day. But, that which most made for him, this speech by an excellent contrivance, advanced his own purpose; for it did closely insinuate; that the Senate and People of Rome, did strive with him about a vaine shadow, a name only, (for he had the power of a King already) and for such a name, whereof mean families were invested; for the Sur-name *Rex*, was the title of many families; as we also have the like in our Dialect. The last speech, which I will mention in this place, was this; When *Cæsar*, after the warre was declared; did possesse himselfe of the City of Rome, and had broke open the inner *Treasury*, to take the mony there stored up, for the service of the warre, *Metellus*, for that time Tribune, withstood him; to whom *Cæsar*, If Plut. in Cæsar. *thou dost persist, (saith he) thou art dead;* presently taking himselfe up, he added, *Young man, it is harder for me to speak this, than to doe it; Adolescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere quam facere;* A speech compounded of the greatest terror, and the greatest clemency, that could proceed out of the mouth of man. But, to pursue *Cæsar's* Abilities in this kind no farther, it is evident, that he knew well *his own perfection in Learning*, as appears, when some spake, what a strange resolution it was in *Lucius Scylla* to resigne his *Dictature*; he scoffing at him, answered, *That Scylla could not skill of Letters; and* Suet. in m. §. 77. *therefore knew not how to Dictate.*

§ Now it were time to leave this point touching the strict concurrence of *Military* virtue and *Learning*, (for what example in this kind, can come with any grace; after *Alexander* and *Cæsar*?) were it not that I am transported with the height and rarenesse of one other particular instance, as that which did so suddenly passe from scorne to wonder; and it is of *Xenophon the Philosopher*, who went from *Socrates* Xen. Hist. de Exp. Cyri. schoole into *Asia* with *Cyrus* the younger, in his expedition against King *Artaxerxes*. This *Xenophon*, at that time was very young, and never had seen the warres before; neither had than, any command in the Army, but only followed

Hist. de  
Cy. Ex. l. 2.

the warre as a voluntary, for the love and conversation of *Proxenus* his friend. He was by chance present when *Falinus* came in message from the great King, to the Grecians, after that *Cyrus* was slain in the field, and the Grecians, a handfull of men, having lost their Generall, left to themselves in the midst of the Provinces of Persia, cut off from their Country by the interception of many miles, and of very great and deep rivers. The Message did import that they should deliver up their Armes, and submit themselves to the Kings mercy: to which message before publique answer was made, diverse of the Army, conferr'd familiarly with *Falinus*, amongst whom *Xenophon* hapned to say thus, why, (said he) *Falinus* we have now but these two things left, our Armes and our Virtue, if we yeeld up our Armes, how shall we make use of our virtue? whereto *Falinus* smiling said, If I be not deceived Young Gentleman you are an Athenian, and study Philosophy, and it is pretty that you say, but you are much abused, if you think your Virtue can withstand the Kings Power; here was the scorne, the wonder followeth. This young Scholler or Philosopher, after all the Captaines and Commanders were murdered by treason, conducted ten thousand Foot, through the heart of all the Kings high Countreys, from Babilon to Grecia, in despite of all the Kings forces; to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in time succeeding, to make invasion upon the Persian Monarchy and to subvert it. Which indeed soone after, *Jason* the Thessalian conceiv'd and design'd; *Agefilau* the Spartane attempted and commenced; *Alexander* the Macedonian at last atchieved, all being stirred up, by this brave leading Act of that young Scholler.

CAP.

## CAP. VIII.

The Merit of Learning from the influence it hath upon Morall Virtues. § *Learning a soveraigne remedy for all the diseases of the Mind.* § *The Dominion thereof greater than any Temporall Power, being a Power over Reason and Beliefe.* § *Learning gives Fortunes, Honours, Delights excelling all others, as the soule the sense.* § *Durable Monuments of Fame.* § *A Prospect of the immortality of a future world.*

**T**O proceed now, from Imperiall and Military virtue, to Morall, and that which is the Virtue of Private men, First that of the Poet is a most certain truth, *Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter Artes*  
*Emollit mores nec finit esse feros.*

Ovid. de  
Pont.

For Learning doth reclaime mens minds from Wildenesse and Barbarisme; but inded, the accent had need be put upon *Fideliter*; for a superficiall confused knowledge doth rather work a contrary effect. I say, *Learning takes away levity, temerity, and insolency*, whilest it suggests all dangers and doubts, together with the thing it selfe; ballanceth the weight of reasons and arguments on both sides; turnes back the first offers and *placits* of the mind as suspect, and teacheth it to take a tried and examin'd way: *The same doth extirpate vain and excessive admiration*, which is the root of all weak advisement. For we *admire* things, either because they are *New*, or because they are *Great*: As for *novelty*, no man that wades in Learning and the contemplation of things throughly, but hath this printed in his heart, *Nihil novi sub sole*: neither can any man much marvaile at the *play of Puppets*, that thrusts but his head behind the curtain; and adviseth well of the organs and wires that causeth the motion. As for *Magnitude*, as *Alexander the Great*, after he was used to great Battles, and conquests in *Asia*; when at any time he received Letters out of *Greece*, of some fights and services there, which were undertaken commonly for some Bridge, or a Fort, or at most for the besiege of some City;

was wont to say, *It seemed to him that he was advertised of the Battles of Homers Frogs and Mice*: So certainly, if a man meditate upon the world and the Fabrick thereof; to him the Globe of the Earth, with men marching upon it, (the Divinenesse of soules excepted) will not seem much other, than a *Hillock of Ants* whereof some creep, and run up and down with their Corne, others with their Egges, others empty; all about a little heap of Dust.

Sen. Nat. Q  
lib. 1. pref.

§ Againe, Learning takes away, or, at least, mitigates the fear of death, and adverse Fortune; which is one of the greatest impediments to Virtue or Manners. For if a mans mind be seasoned and imbued with the contemplation of Mortality, and the corruptible nature of things, he will, in his apprehension, concur with *Epietetus*, who going forth one day saw a woman weeping for her Pitcher of Earth; and going forth the next day saw another woman weeping for her sonne, said, *Heri vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori*: Ther efore *Virgil* did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of the caule and the conquest of Feares together, as concomitants:

Enchir. c.  
33. Arr. 1. 3.  
e. 24.

*Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas  
Quiq; metus omnes & inexorabile fatum,  
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumq; Acherontis avari.*

Geor. 2.

It were too long to goe over the particular Remedies, which Learning doth minister to all the diseases of the Mind; sometimes purging the ill Humors, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes exciting appetite, often healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like. Therefore I will conclude with that, which seemes to be the summe of all, which is, *that Learning so disposeth and inclineth the minde, as that it is never wholly settled and fixt in the defects thereof, but ever awakes it selfe and breaths after a Growth and Perfection*: For the unlearn'd man knowes not what it is to descend into himselfe, or to call himselfe to account, or what a sweet life it is sensibly to feele that he is every day better. If he chance to have any good parts, he will still be boasting these; and every where expose them to the full

Plat. Alcib.  
Porph.  
in Stob.  
Sen. Ept.  
Plur. Mor.

full view; and it may be use them dexterously to his own advantage and reputation; but not much improve or encrease them. Againe, what faults soever he hath, he wil use art and industry to hide and colour them, but not to amend them; like an ill Mower that movves on still and never whets his sythe: Contrariwise, *a learned man doth not only imploy his mind and exercise his good parts, but continually reformes himselfe, and makes Progression in virtue*: Nay to say all in a word. Certaine it is, that *Veritas & Bonitas differ but as the seale and the Print; for goodnesse is Truth's impressiō*; and on the contrary the stormes and tempests of Vice and Passions breake from the Clouds of *error and falshood*.

II From Morality, let us passe on to matter of power and commandment, and consider whether there be any sovereignty or empirie comparable to that wherewith Learning invests and crownes mans nature? We see the Dignity of commanding, is according to the dignity of the commanded: Commandment over Beasts and Cattle, such as Heardmen and Shepherds have, is a thing contemptible; Commandment over children, such as School-masters and Tutors have, is a matter of small honour; commandment over slaves, is a disparagement, rather than an honour; neither is the commandment of Tyrants much better, over a servile People, dismantled of their Spirits and generosity of mind; therefore it was ever helde that honours in free Monarchies and Commonwealths had a sweetnesse more than in Tyrannies; because a command over the willing is more honourable than over the forced and compelled: Wherefore *Virgil*, when hee would out of the highest straine of his Art expresse the best of Humane honours, that he would attribute to *Cesar*, he doth it in these words,

—— *Per Populos dat jura, viamq̄ affectat Olympo.*

Georg. 4.

But the Commandment of knowledge is farre higher than the Commandment over the will, though free, and not enslaved and vassal'd: For it is a Dominion over Reason, Beliefe, and the Understanding, which is the highest part of man, and gives Law to the will it selfe: For without Question there is no power on

earth, which advanceth and lets up a Throne, and, as it were, a *Chaire of estate*, in the soules of men and their Cogitations, Assents, and Beliefe, *but Knowledge and Learning*: And therefore we see, the detestable and extreme pleasure that *Arch-Heretiques, false Prophets, and Impostors* are ravish't, and transported withall, when once they find that they begin to have a Dominion, and Superiority over the faith and consciences of men; indeed so great, as hee that hath once tasted it, it is seldome seen that any persecution or torture can make them relinquish this Sovereignty: But as this is that which the Divine Auctor of the Revelation calls, *The depth or profoundnesse of Satan*; so on the contrary, the just and lawfull Sovereignty over mens minds, establish't by the cleer evidence, and sweet commendation of Truth, approacheth certainly neerest to the similitude of the Divine Rule.

Apoc. 2.  
24.

§ *As for Fortunes and Honours, the munificence of Learning doth not so enrich and adorne whole Kingdomes and Commonwealths, as it doth not likewise amplifie and advance the Fortunes and Estates of particular persons*: For it is an ancient observation, that *Homer hath given more men their living, than either Sylla or Caesar, or Augustus ever did*, notwithstanding their great Largeesses, such infinite donatives, and distributions of so much land. No doubt, it is hard to say, whether Armes or Learning have advanced greater numbers: But if wee speake of Sovereignty, we see, *that if Armes have carried away the Kingdome, yet Learning hath borne away the Priesthood*, which ever hath bin in some competition with Empire.

§ *Againe, If you contemplate the Pleasure and Delight of Knowledge and Learning, assuredly it farre surpasses all other pleasure*: For what? Shall, perchance, the pleasures of the Affections so farre excell the pleasures of the senses, as a happy obtaining of a desire, doth a song or a dinner; and must not by the same degrees of consequence, the pleasure of the Intellect transcend those of the Affections? In all other pleasures there is a finite satiety, and after they grow a litle stale, their flower and verdure vades and departs; whereby we are instructed, that they were not indeed pure and sincere pleasures

pleasures, but shadowes and deceits of *Pleasures*; and that it was the Novelty which pleas'd, and not the Quality: therefore voluptuous men often turne Friers, and the declining age of ambitious Princes is commonly more sad and besieged with Melancholy; *But of Knowledge there is no satiety*; but vicissitude, perpetually and interchangeably, returning of fruition and appetite; so that the good of this delight must needs be simple, without Accident or Fallacy. Neither is that *Pleasure* of small efficacy and contentment in the mind of man, which the Poet *Lucretius* describeth elegantly, *Swave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis, &c.* It is a view of delight (saith he) to stand or walke upon the shore, and to see a ship tost with tempest upon the sea: a pleasure to stand in the window of a Castle, and to see two Battailles joyne upon a plaine: but it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man, by Learning to be settled and fortified in the Tower of Truth, and from thence to behold the errors and wandrings of other men below.

De Rer.  
Nat. lib. 2.

§ Lastly leaving the vulgar arguments, that by Learning man excels man: in that wherein man excels beasts; that by the help of Learning, man ascends in his understanding, even to the heavens, whether in body he can not come, and the like; let us conclude this discourse concerning the dignity of knowledge and Learning, with that good, whereunto mans nature doth most aspire, *Immortality and continuance*. For to this tendeth generation, raising of houses and Families, Buildings, Foundations, Monuments, Fame, and in effect the summe and height of humane desires. *But we see how farre the monuments of wit and Learning, are more durable than the Monuments of materiate Memorials and Manufactures*. Have not the verses of *Homer* continued xxv Centuries of years and above, without the losse of a syllable, or letter: during which time, infinite number of Places, Temples, Castles, Citties, have bin decayed or bin demolish't. The Pictures and Statues of *Cyrus, Alexander, Cesar*, no nor of the Kings and Princes of much later years, by no means possible are now recoverable; for the Originals worne away with age, are perish't; and the Copies daily loose of the life  
and

and Primitive resemblance; *But the images of mens wits, remain unmaimed in books for ever, exempt from the injuries of time, because capable of perpetuall renovation.* Neither can they properly be called Images, because, in their way, they generate still and cast their seeds in the mindes of men; raising and procreating infinite Actions and Opinions in succeeding ages. So that if the invention of a ship, was thought so noble and wonderfull, which transports Riches and Merchandice from Place to Place; and consociats the most remote regions in participation of their fruits and commodities; *how much more are letters to be magnified, which as ships, passing through the vast sea of time, counite the remotest ages of Wits and Inventions in mutuall Trafique and Correspondency?*

§ Furthermore, we see some of the Philosophers which were most immersed in the senses and least divine, and which peremptorily denied the immortality of the soule, yet convicted by the power of truth came to this point, *That whatsoever Motions and Acts the spirit of man could performe without the Organ of the body, it was probable that those remained after death;* such as were the motions of the understanding, but not of the affections; *so immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem to them to be.* But we, illuminated with divine Revelation, disclaiming these rudiments and delusions of the senses, know that not only the mind, but the affections purified; not only the soule, but the body shall be advanced in its time to immortality. But it must be remembred, both now and at other times, as the nature of the point may require, that in the proofes, of the dignity of Knowledge and Learning, I did at the beginning separate Divine Testimonies, from Humane; which method I have constantly pursued and so handled them both apart. Although all this be true, neverthelesse I doe not take upon me, neither can I hope to obtaine by any Perorations, or pleadings of this case touching Learning, to reverse the judgement either of *Æsops Cock, that preferred the Barly-corne before the Gemme;* or of *Midas, that being chosen Judge between Apollo, President of the Muses, and Pan President of Sheep,*  
judg'd

judg'd for plenty; or of *Paris*, that judg'd for *Pleasure* and Eurip. in  
 love, against wildome and power; or of *Agrippina's* choice, Troad.  
*Occidat matrem modo imperet!* preferring empire with any Tac. An.  
 condition never so detestable; or of *Ulysses*, *qui vetulam præ-* XIV.  
*tulit immortalitati*; being indeed figures of those that preferre  
 custome before all excellency; and a number of the like po-  
 pular judgements: for these things must continue as they  
 have bin, but so will that also continue, whereupon Learn-  
 ing hath ever relied as on a firme foundation which

can never be shaken: *Justificata est*  
*sapientia à Filiis suis.*

Mat. XI,

D

CAP.



The first part of the document  
is devoted to a description of the  
method used for the investigation  
and the results obtained. The  
second part contains a discussion  
of the results and a comparison  
with the results of other  
investigations. The third part  
contains the conclusions of the  
investigation.



THE SECOND BOOK OF  
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM  
VICOUNT ST ALBAN.

OF THE  
DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

THE PROEM.

*The Advancement of Learning commended unto the care of Kings.*

I. The Acts thereof in generall, three, *Reward, Direction, Assistance.* II. In speciall, about three objects, *Places, Bookes, Persons.* § In places four Circumstances, *Buildings, Revenewes, Priviledges, Lawes of Discipline.* § In Books two, *Libraries, good Editions.* § In Persons two, *Readers of Sciences Extant, Inquirers into Parts non-extant.* III. Defects in these Acts of Advancement, six, *Want of Foundations for Arts at large.* § *Meannesse of Salary unto Professors.* § *Want of Allowance for Experiments.* § *Preposterous institutions, and unadvised practices in Academi-  
sall studies.* § *Want of Intelligence between the Vniversities of Europe.* § *Want of Inquiries into the Deficients of Arts.* § *The Authors Designe.* § *Ingenuous Desence.*

**I**T might seem to have more convenience, although it come often otherwise to passe, (Excellent KING,) that those that are fruitful in their Generations, and have, this way, a fore-sight of their own immortality in their Descendants, should above all men living, be carefull of the estate of future times, unto which they can not but know that they must at last transmit their deereft Pledges. Q. ELIZABETH was a sojourner in the

world, in respect of her unmarried life, rather than an inhabitant: she hath indeed adorned her own time, and many waies enricht it; but in truth, to Your Majesty, whom God hath blest with so much Royall Issue worthy to perpetuate you for ever; whose youthfull and fruitfull Bed, doth yet promise more children; it is very proper, not only to irradiate, as you doe, your own times, but also to extend your Cares to those Acts which succeeding Ages may cherish, and Eternity it selfe behold: Amongst which, if my affection to Learning doe not transport me, there is none more worthy, or more noble, *than the endowment of the world with sound and fruitfull Advancements of Learning*: For why should we erect unto our selves some few Authors, to stand like *Hercules Columnnes*, beyond which there should be no discovery of knowledge; seeing we have *your Majesty*, as a bright and benigne starre, to conduct and prosper us in this Navigation.

I. To returne therefore unto our purpose, let us now waigh and consider with our selves, what hitherto hath bin performed, what pretermitted by Princes and others, for the *Propagation of Learning*: And this we will pursue closely and distinctly, in an Active and Masculine Expression, no where digressing, nothing dilateing. Let this ground therefore be laid, which every one may grant, that the greatest and most difficult works are overcome, either by the *Amplitude of Reward*, or by the *wisdome and soundnesse of Direction*, or by *conjunction of Labours*; whereof the first, *encourageth our endeavours*; the second, *takes away Error and Confusion*; the third, *supplies the frailty of Man*. But the Principall amongst these three, is the *wisdome and soundnesse of Direction*, that is, a Delineation and Demonstration of a right and easy way to accomplish any enterprize: *Claudus enim, as the saying is, in via antevertit Cursorem extrà viam*; and Solomon aptly to the purpose, *If the Iron be blunt and he doe not whet the edge, then must he put too more strength; but wisdome is profitable to Direction*: By which words he insinuateth, that *a wise election of the Mean, doth more efficaciously conduce to the perfecting*

Eccles. 10.

10.

perfecting (if any enterprize, than any enforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am pressed to speak, for that (not derogating from the Honor of those who have any way deserved well of Learning) I see and observe, that many of their works and Acts, are rather matter of Magnificence and Memory of their own names, than of Progression and Proficiency of Learning; and have rather encreased the number of Learned men, than much promoted the Augmentation of Learning.

II. The Works or Acts pertaining to the Propagation of Learning, are conversant about three objects; about the Places of Learning; about the Bookes; and about the Persons of Learned men. For as water, whether falling from the Dew of Heaven, or rising from the Springs of the earth, is easily scattered and lost in the ground, except it be collected into some receptacles, where it may by union and Congregation into one body comfort and sustain it selfe; for that purpose the industry of man hath invented Conduits, Cisternes, and Pooles, and beautified them with diverse accomplishments, as well of Magnificence and State, as of Use and Necessity: so this most excellent liquor of Knowledge, whether it distill from a divine inspiration; or spring from the senses, would soone perish and vanish, if it were not conserved in Bookes, Traditions, Conferences, and in Places purposely designed to that end; as Universities, Colledges, Schooles, where it may have fixt Stations and Power and Ability of uniteing and improveing it selfe.

§ And first, the workes which concerne the Seates of the Muses, are foure, Foundations of Howses; Endowments with Revenewes; Grant of Priviledges; Institutions, and Statutes for Government; all which chiefly conduce to privatenesse and quietnesse of life, and a discharge from cares and troubles, much like the Stations Virgil describeth for the Hiveing of Bees,

*Principio Sedes Apibus statioq; petenda,  
Quo neq; sit ventis aditus, &c.*

Geor. 4.

§ But the workes touching Bookes are chiefly two: First  
Libraries

*Libraries*, wherein, as in famous Shrines, the Reliques of the Ancient Saints, full of virtue, are reposed. Secondly, *new Editions of Auctors, with corrected impressions; more faithfull Translations, more profitable Glosses, more diligent Annotations;* with the like traine, furnisht and adorned.

§ Furthermore, the works pertaining to the *Persons of Learned men*, besides the *Advancing and Countenancing of them* in generall, are likewise two; the *Remuneration and Designation of Readers*, in *Arts and Sciences already extant and known*; and the *Remuneration and Designation of writers concerning those parts of Knowledge, which hetherto have not bin sufficiently till'd and labour'd*. These breiefely are the works and Acts, wherein the Merit of many renowned Princes and other illustrious Persons, hath bin famed, *towards the state of Learning*. As for particular Commemoration, of any that hath well deserved of Learning, when I think thereof, that of *Cicero* comes into my mind, which was a motive unto him after his returne from banishment to give generall thanks, *Difficile non aliquem; ingratum, quenquam præterire*: Let us rather, according to the advice of Scripture, *Look unto the part of the race which is before us, then look back unto that which is already attained*.

Cic. Orat.  
post redit.

Epist. ad  
Phil. 3.

Liv. lib. 2.  
v. c. 260.  
Æsop. Fab.

III. First therefore, amongst so many *Colledges of Europe*, excellently founded, I finde strange, *that they are all destinated to certain Professions and none Dedicated to Free and Universall studies of Arts and Sciences*: For he that judgeth, that all Learning should be referred to ule and Action, judgeth well; but yet it is easy this way to fall into the error taxt in the Ancient Fable, in which, *the other parts of the Body entered an Action against the stomach, because it neither perform'd the office of Motion, as the Limbes doe; nor of sense, as the head doth*; but yet all this while it is the stomach, that concocteth, converteth, and distributeth nourishment into the rest of the body: So if any man think *Philosophy and universall contemplations a vaine and idle study*, he doth not consider that all Professions and Arts from thence derive their sappe and strength. And surely I am perswaded that this hath bin a  
great

great cause why the happy progression of Learning hitherto hath bin retarded; because these Fundamentals have bin studied but only in passage, and deeper draughts have not bin taken thereof: For if you will have a Tree bear more fruit than it hath used to doe, it is not any thing you can doe to the boughes, but it is the stirring of the earth about the root, and the application of new mould, or you doe nothing. Neither is it to be pass'd over in silence, that this dedicating of Colledges and Societies, only to the use of Professory Learning, hath, not only, bin an enemy to the growth of Sciences; but hath redounded likewise to the prejudice of States and Governments: For hence it commonly falls out that Princes, when they would make choice of Ministers fit for the Affaires of State, finde about them such a marveilous solitude of able men; because there is no education Collegiate design'd to this end, where such as are fram'd and fitted by nature thereto, might give themselves chiefly to *Histories, Moderne Languages, Books and discourses of Policy*, that so they might come more able and better furnisht to service of State.

§ And because *Founders of Colledges doe Plant, and Founders of Lecturers doe water*, it followeth now in order to speak of the Defects which are in publique Lectures; the smallnesse of stipends (especially with us) assigned to *Teachers of Arts or of Professions*: For it doth much import to the *Progression and Proficiency of Sciences*, that Readers in every kinde be chosen out of the ablest and most sufficient men; as those that are ordained, not for transitory use, but for to maintaine and propagate the seeds of Sciences for future Ages; This cannot be, except the Rewards and Conditions be appointed such, as may sufficiently content the most eminent man in that Art, so as he can be willing to spend his whole Age in that function and never desire to Practise. Wherefore that *Sciences may flourish, Davids Military Law* should be observed, *That those that staid with the Carriage* 1 Sam. 30, 24 *should have equall parts with those that were in the Action*; else will the Carriages be ill attended. So Readers in Sciences are, as it were, Protectors and Guardians of the Provision of Learning,

Learning, whence the Action and services of Sciences may be furnish't. Wherefore it is reason that the *Salaries of Speculative men, should be equall to the gaines of Active men*; otherwise if allowances to Fathers of Sciences be not in a competent degree ample and condigne, it will come to passe,

Virg. Geor.

*Ut Patrem invalidi referent jejunia Nati.*

3.

§ Now I will note another *Defect*, wherein some Alchymist should be called unto for help; for this Sect of Men advise Students to sell their Bookes and to build Fornaces; to quit *Minerva* and the Muses, as Barren Virgins, and to apply themselves to *Vulcane*. Yet certainly it must be confest, that unto the depth of *Contemplation*, and the fruit of *Operative Studies* in many Sciences, especially *Naturall Philosophy*, and *Physique*; Bookes are not the only *subsidiary Instruments*, wherein the Munificence of men, hath not bin altogether wanting; for we see *Spheres, Globes, Astrolabes, Maps*, and the like, have bin provided, and with industry invented, as Helps to *Astronomy* and *Cosmography*; as well as Bookes. We see likewise some places dedicated to the study of *Physique*, to have *Gardens for the inspection and observation of simples* of all sorts; and to be auctorized the use of *Dead Bodies for Anatomy-Lectures*. But those doe respect but a few things; in the generality set it down for Truth, *That there can hardly be made any maine Proficiency in the disclosing of the secrets of Nature, unlesse there be liberall Allowance for Experiments; whether of Vulcan or of Dædalus; I mean of Furnace, or of Engine, or any other kind*: And therefore as *Secretaries and Spialls of State*, are allowed to bring in Bills for their diligence in the inquiry and discovery of *New Occurrences and Secrets in Forraigne Estates*; so you must allow *Intelligencers and Spialls of Nature their Bills of Expences*; else you shall never be advertised of many things most worthy to be known. For if *Alexander* made such a liberall *Asignation of Treasure unto Aristotle*, for *Hunters, Fowlers, Fishers*, and the like, that he might compile a *History of living Creatures*; certainly much more is their merit, who wander not in wild forrests of Nature, but make themselves a way through the *Labyrinths of Arts*.

§ Another

§ Another Defect to be observed by us (indeed of great import) is, *A neglect, in those which are Governours in Universities, of Consultation; and in Princes and superior Persons, of visitation; to this end, that it may with all diligence be considered and consulted of, whether the Readings, Disputations and other Scholasticall exercises, anciently instituted, will be good to continue, or rather to antiquate and substitute others more effectually:* For amongst Your Majesties most wise maxims, I find this, *That in all usages and Præsidents, the times be considered wherein they first began; which if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateh from the Authority of the usage and leaves it for suspect.* Therefore in as much as the usages and orders of Universities, were for most part derived from times more obscure and unlearned than our own, it is the more reason that they be re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two for examples sake, in things that seem most obvious and familiar. *It is an usual practice (but in my opinion somewhat preposterous) that Scholars in the Universities, are too early entred in Logique and Rhetorique; Arts indeed fitter for Graduates than Children and Novices.* For these two (if the matter be well weighed) are in the number of the gravest Sciences, being the *Arts of Arts, the one for Judgement, the other for Ornament.* So likewise they contain Rules and Directions, either for the Disposition or Illustration of any subject or materiall Circumstance thereof; and therefore for mindes empty and unfraught with matter, & which have not as yet gathered that which *Cicero* calls *Silva* and *Supellex*, that is stufte and variety of things; to begin with those Arts, (as if one would learn to weigh, or measure, or paint the wind) doth work but this effect, that the virtue and strength of these Arts, which are great and Universall, are almost made contemptible, and have degenerated either into *Childish Sophistry* or *ridiculous Affectation*; or at least have bin embas'd in their reputation. And farther, the untimely and unripe accession to these Arts, hath drawn on by necessary consequence; a watery and superficially delivery and handling thereof, as is fitted indeed to the capacities of Children. Another instance which I will set

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downe as an Error now grown inveterate, long agoe in the Universities, and it is this; *That in Scholasticall exercises, there useth to be a divorce, very prejudiciou, between Invention and Memory: for there the most of their speeches are either, altogether premeditate, so as they are uttered in the very precise forme of words they were conceived in, and nothing left to invention; or meereley extemporall, so as very litle is left to Memory; Whereas in Life and Action, there is very litle use of either of these apart, but rather of their intermixture; that is, of notes or memorialls, and of extemporall speech: So as by this course, exercises are not accommodate to practice, nor the Image answereth to the Life: And it is ever a true rule in exercises, that all, as neere as may be, should represent those things which in common course of life use to be practised; otherwise they will pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is plainly discovered, when Schollars come to the Practice of their Professions, or other Actions of Civile life, which when they set into, this defect, whereof we speak, is soon found out by themselves, but sooner by others. But this part, touching the amendment of the Institutions of the Vniversities, I will conclude, with the clause of Caesars letter to Oppius, *Hoc quæadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt & multa reperiri possunt, de iis rebus, rogo vos, ut cogitationem suscipiatis.**

Cic. Epist.  
Ad Att. lib.  
IX.

§ Another Defect which I note, ascends a litle higher than the precedent: *For as the progresion of Learning consisteth much in the wise Government and Institution of Universities in particular; so it would be more advanced, if the Vniversities in generall, dispersed through all Europe, were united in a neerer conjunction and correspondance by mutuall Intelligence. For there are, as we see, many Orders and Societies, which, though they be divided under severall Sovereignities & spacious Territories, yet they doe contract and maintaine a Society and a kind of Fraternity one with another; in so much that they have their Provincials and Generalls, to whom all the rest yeeld obedience. And surely as nature creates Brother-hoods in Families; and Arts Mechanicall contract Brother-hoods*

*ther-hoods in Communalities; the Anointment of God super-induceth a brother-hood in Kings and Bishops; Vowes and Canonickall rules unite a Brotherhood in Orders. in like manner there cannot but intervene a Noble and Generous Fraternity between men by Learning and Illuminations; reflecting upon that relation which is attributed to God, who himselfe is called, The Father of Illuminations or Lights.*

Iac. i.

§ Lastly, this I find fault with, which I somewhat toucht upon before, *that there hath not bin, or very rarely bin, any publique designation of able men, who might write or make inquiry of such parts of Learning as have not bin hitherto sufficiently laboured and subdued. Vnto which point it will be very available, if there were erected a kind of visitation of Learning; and a Cense or Estimate taken, what parts of Learning are rich and well improved; what poore and destitute: For the opinion of Plenty is amongst the Causes of want; and the multitude of Bookes makes a shew rather of superfluity, than penury. Which surcharge, neverthelesse, if a man would make a right judgement, is not remedied by suppressing or extinguishing bookes heretofore written, but by publishing good new bookes, which may be of such a right kind, That, as the*

Exod. 7.

*Serpent of Moses may devour the Serpents of the Enchanters.*

§ The Remedies of these defects now enumerate, except the last, and of the last also, in respect of the Active part thereof, which is the *Designation of writers*, are *opera Basilica*, towards which the endeavours and industry of a private man, are commonly but as an Image in a crosse way, which may point at the way, but cannot goe it: But the *speculative part*, which pertaineth to the examination of knowledges, namely; *what is Deficient in every particular Science*, is open to the industry of a private man. Wherefore my Designement is to attempt a generall and faithfull perambulation and visitation of Learning; specially with a diligent and exact enquiry, what parts thereof lye fresh and wast, and are not yet improved and converted to use by the industry of men; to the end that such a plot made, and recorded to memory may minister light both to publique Designations, and the voluntary labours of private

endeavours. Wherein neverthelesse my purpose is, at this time, to note only *Omissions and Deficiencies*, and not to make redargution of *Errors and Oversights*: For it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanur'd, and another thing, to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.

§ In the undertaking and handling of which worke I am not ignorant what a businesse I move, and what a difficult province I sustaine, and also, how unequall my abilities are unto my will: yet I have a good hope, that if my extreme love to Learning carry me too farre, I may obtaine the excuse of affection, for that, it is *not granted to man, To love and to bewise*. I know well that I must leave the same liberty of judgement to others, that I use my selfe; and, in truth, I shall be indifferently glad, to accept from others, as to impart that duty of humanity; *Nam qui erranti comiter monstrant viam, &c.* I doe fore-see likewise that many of those things which I shall enter and register as *Omissions and Deficients*, will incurre diverse censures; as, that some parts of this enterprise were done long-agoe and now are extant; *others*, that they tast of curiosity, and promise no great fruit; *others*, that they are too difficult and impossible to be compassed by humane industries. For the two first, let the particulars speak for themselves: For the last, touching *impossibility*, I determine thus; All those things are to be held possible and performeable, which may be accomplisht by some person though not by every one; and which may be done by the united labours of many, though not by any one apart; and which may be effected in a succession of ages, though not in the same age; and in brieve, which may be finisht by the publique care and charge, though not by the ability and industry of particular persons. If, notwithstanding, there be any man who would rather take to himselfe that of *Solomon*, *Dicit Piger Leo est in via*, than that of *Virgil*


*Possunt quia posse videntur*: It is enough to me, if my labours may be esteemed as votes, and the better sort of wishes: for as it asketh some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent; so it requireth some sense to make a wish not absurd.

CAP. I.

Cic. Offic. 1  
ex Ennio.

Prov. 22.

Æn. 5.



## CAP. I.

- I. *An universall Partition of Humane Learning, into, § History.*  
 II. *Poesy.* III. *Philosophy.* § *This Partition is taken from the*  
*triplicity of Intellective Faculties: Memory: Imagination: Reason.*  
 § *The same Partition is appropriate to Divine Learning.*

I. **H**at is the truest Partition of humane Learning, which hath reference to the *three Faculties* of Mans soule, which is the seat of Learning. *History* is referred to *Memory*, *Poesy* to the *Imagination*, *Philosophy* to *Reason*. By *Poesy*, in this place, we understand nothing else, but *feigned History*, or *Fables*. As for *Verse*, that is only a stile of expression, and pertaines to the *Art of Elocution*, of which in due place.

§ *History* is properly of *Individualls* circumscribed within time and place: for although *Naturall History* seeme to be conversant about *universall Natures*; yet this so falls out because of the promiscuous similitude in things *Naturall* comprehended under one kind; so that if you know one, you know all of that species. But if any where there be found *Individualls*, which in their kind are either singular, as the *Sun*, and the *Moone*; or which doe notably digresse, from their kinde, as *Monsters*; these are as aptly handled in *Naturall History*, as particular men are in *Civile History*. All these are referred unto *Memory*.

II. *Poesy*, in that sense we have expounded it, is like-wise of *Individualls*, fancied to the similitude of those things which in true *History* are recorded, yet so as often it exceeds measure; and those things which in Nature would never meet, nor come to passe, *Poesy* composeth and introduceth at pleasure, even as *Painting* doth: which indeed is the work of the *Imagination*.

III. *Philosophy* dismisseth *Individualls* and comprehendeth, not the first Impressions, but the abstract *Motions*

thereof, and conversant in compounding and dividing them according to the law of Nature and of the things themselves: And this is wholly the office and operation of *Reason*.

§ And that this *Distribution* is truly made, he shall easily conceive that hath recourse to the Originalls of Intelle-tualls. Individualls only strike the sense, which is the port or entrance of the understanding. The Images or Impres-sions of those Individualls accepted from the *sense*, are fixt in the *Memory*, and at first enter into it entire, in the same manner they were met: afterwards the *understanding* rumi-nates upon them and refines them, which than it doth ei-ther meerey *review*; or in a wanton delight counterfeit and *resemble*; or by compounding and dividing digest and endue them. So it is cleerly manifest, that from these three foun-taines of *Memory*, of *Imagination* and of *Reason*, there are these three Emanations, of *History*, of *Poesy*, and of *Philoso-phy*, and that there can be no other nor no more: for *History* and *Experience*, we take for one and the same, as we doe *Phi-losophy* and *Sciences*.

§ Neither doe we think any other Partition than this is requisite to *Divine Learning*. Indeed the informations of *Oracle* and of *Sense* be diverse; both in the matter and man-ner of Conveying, but the spirit of Man is the same, the Cells and Receptacles thereof the very same. For it comes to passe here, as if diverse Liquors, and that by diverse Funnells, should be receiv'd into one and the same vessell. Where-fore *Theology* also consists either of *Sacred History*; of *Para-bles*, which are a kind of *Divine Poesy*; or of *Precepts* and *Doctrines*, as an *eternall Philosophy*. As for that part which seemes supernumerary, which is *Prophecy*, that is a branch of *History*: however *Divine History* hath that prerogative over *Humane*, that the Narration may be before the Fact as well as after.



## C A P. II.

I. The Partition of History into *Naturall and Civile* (*Ecclesiasticall and Literary comprehended under Civill.*) II. The Partition of *Naturall History, into the History of Generations.* III. *Præter-Generations.* IV. *Of Arts.*

I.  History is either *Naturall or Civile*: in *Naturall* the operations of Nature are recorded; in *Civill* the Actions of men. In both these without question, the Divine workings are translucent, but more conspicuous in *Acts Civill*; in so much as they constitute a peculiar kind of History, which we usually stile *Sacred or Ecclesiasticall*: And in truth to us such seemes the Dignity of Learning and of Arts to be, that there ought to be reserv'd a *Particular History* for them apart from the rest; which yet we understand to be comprehended, as *Ecclesiastique History* also is, under *History Civile*.

II. The Partition of *Naturall History* we shall raise out of the state and condition of *Nature* hirselfe, which is found subject to a triple state, and under a three-fold regiment: For *Nature is either Free and displaying her selfe in her ordinary course*; as in the Heavens, living Creatures, Plants, and the Universall furniture of the world; or *put out of her usuall course and depos'd from her state, by the pravities and insolencies of contumacious Matter, and the violence of Impediments*, as in Monsters: or lastly she is *Comprest and fashioned, and as it were new cast*, as in Artificiall Operations: Let therefore the partition of *Naturall History*, be made into the *History of Generations*; of *Præter-Generations*, and of *Arts*; whereof the last we use to call *History Mechanicall, or Experimentall*. The first of these handles the *Liberty of Nature*; the second the *Errors*; the third the *Bandes* thereof. And we are the rather induced to assigne the *History of Arts*, as a branch of *Naturall History*, because an opinion hath long time

time gone currant, as if *Art* were some different thing from *Nature*, and *Artificiall* from *Naturall*. From this mistake this inconvenience arises, that many writers of *Naturall History* think they have quit themselves sufficiently, if they have compiled a *History of Creatures*, or of *Plants*, or of *Mineralls*; the experiments of *Mechanicall Arts* pass over in silence. But there is yet a more subtile deceit which secretly steales into the mindes of Men, namely, that *Art* should be reputed a kind of *Additament* only to *Nature*, whose virtue is this, that it can indeed either perfect *Nature inchoate*, or *repaire it when it is decayed*, or *set it at liberty from impediments*; but not quite alter, transmute, or shake it in the foundations: which erroneous conceit hath brought in a too hasty despaire upon mens enterprises. But on the contrary, this certain truth should be thoroughly settled in the minds of men, *That Artificialls differ not from Naturalls in Forme and Essence*; but in the *Efficient* only; for man hath no power over *Nature* save only in her *Motion*; that is, to mingle or put together *Naturall* bodies, and to separate or put them asunder; wherefore where there is *Apposition and Seperation of Bodies*, *Naturall conjoyning* (as they terme it) *Active with Passive*, man may doe all things; this not done, he can doe nothing. Nor is it materiall so things be managed in a right order, for the production of such an effect, whether this be done by the *Art of Man* or without the *Art of Man*. Gold is sometimes digested and purged from crudities and impurities, by fire; sometimes found pure in small sands, *Nature* performing her own worke. So the *Raine-Bow* is formed of a dewy cloude in the *Aire* above; form'd also by aspersions of water by us below. Therefore *Nature* commandeth all, and these three are her substitute Administrators, *The course of Nature*; *the Expatiation of Nature and Art*; or *the Cooperation of Man with Nature in particulars*. Wherefore it is very proportionable that these three be comprized in *Naturall History*, which *C. Plinius* for most part performed, who alone comprehended *Naturall History* according to the dignity thereof; but what he thus comprehended he hath not handled

handled as was meet, nay rather foulely abused.

III. The first of these is extant in some good perfection: *The two latter are handled so weakly and so unprofitably, that they may be referr'd to the list of DEFICIENTS.* For you shall find no sufficient and competent collection of those works of Nature which have a Digression and Deflection from the ordinary course of Generations, Productions and Motions; whether they be the singularities of certain Countries and Places, or the strange events of times; or the wit of chance, or the effects of latent proprieties; or *Monodicals of Nature* in their kinde. It is true, there are a number of Bookes more than enough, full fraught with fabulous Experiments, forged Secrets, and frivolous Impostures, for pleasure and strangeness; but a substantiall and severe *Collection of Heteroclitics*, and of the *wonders of Nature*, diligently examined and faithfully described, *this, I say, I finde not*, especially with due rejection, and, as it were, publique proscription of untruths and fables, which have got up into credit. For as the matter is now carried, if any untruths touching Nature be once on foot and celebrated (whether it be the Reverence of Antiquity, that can thus farre countenance them; or that it is a trouble to call them unto a re-examination; or that they are held to be rare ornaments of speech, for similitudes and comparisons) they are never after exterminate and called in. The use of this work honour'd with a President in *Aristotle*, is nothing lesse than to give contentment to curious and vaine wits, as the manner of *Mirabilaries* and the *spreaders of invented Prodigies* is to doe; but for two reasons serious and grave; the one to correct the partiality of Axioms, which are commonly grounded upon common and popular examples; the other because from the *wonders of Nature*, a faire and open passage is made to the *wonders of Art*. For the busines in this matter is no more than by quick sent to trace out the footings of nature in hir willfull wanderings; that so afterward you may be able at your pleasure, to lead or force her to the same place and postures againe.

§ Neither doe I give in precept that superstitious Nar-

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rations of Sorceries, Witch-crafts, Inchantments, Dreams, Divinations, and the like, where there is cleere evidence of the fact and deed done, be altogether excluded from this *History of Marvailles*. For it is not yet known, in what cases and how farre, effects attributed to superstition, doe participate of Naturall Causes; and therefore, howloever the use and practice of these Arts, in my opinion, is justly to be condemned; yet from the speculation and consideration of them, (if they be closely pursued) we may attaine a profitable direction; not only for the right discerning of offences in this kind of guilty persons; but for the farther discloseing of the secrets of Nature. Neither surely ought a man to make scruple of entring and penetrating the vaults and recesses of these Arts, that propoeth to himselfe only the inquisition of *Truth*, as your Majesty hath confirmed in your own example: For you have with the two clear and quick-sighted eyes of *Religion and Naturall Philosophy*, so wisely and thoroughly enlightned these *shadows*, that you have proved your selfe most like the *Sunne* which passeth through polluted places, yet is not distained. But this I would admonish, that these *Narrations* which have mixture with *Superstition*, be sorted by themselves, and not be mingled with the *Narrations*, which are purely and sincerely Naturall. As for the *Narrations* touching the *Prodigies* and *Miracles* of *Religions*, they are either not true, or no way Naturall, and therefore pertaine not to *Naturall History*.

K. JAMES  
his Demology.

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IV. For History of Nature, wrought and subdued by the hand, which we are wont to call *Mechanicall*, I finde indeed some collections made of Agriculture, and likewise of many *Manuall Arts*; but commonly (which in this kind of knowledge is a great detriment) with a neglect and rejection of *Experiments familiar and vulgar*; which yet, to the *interpretation of Nature*, doe as much, if not more, conduce, than Experiments of a higher quality. But it is esteemed a kind of dishonour and aspersion unto Learning, if learned men should, upon occasion perchance, descend to the Inquiry or Observation of *Matters Mechanicall*, except they be reputed

reputed for *Secrets of Art, or Rarities, or Subtleties*. Which humor of vaine and supercilious arrogance, *Plato* justly derideth, where he brings in *Hippias* a vaunting Sophist disputing with *Socrates* a severe and solid inquisitor of Truth; where the subject being of Beauty, *Socrates* after his wandering and loose manner of disputeing, brought in first an example of a faire Virgin, than of a faire Horse, than of a faire Pot well glaz'd; at this last instance *Hippias* somewhat In Hipp. Major. mov'd said; *Were it not for curtesy sake I should disdain to dispute with any that alleaged such base and sordid instances;* to whom *Socrates*, *You have reason and it becomes you well, being a man so trimme in your vestments, and so neat in your shooes;* and so goes on in an Irony. And certainly this may be averr'd for truth, that they be not the highest instances, that give the best and surest information. This is not unaptly exprest in the Tale, so common, of the Philosopher, *That while he gaz'd upward to the starres fell into the water:* for if he had lookt Laert. in Thalete. down, he might have seen the starres in the water; but looking up to heaven he could not see the water in the starres. In like manner it often comes to passe that small and mean things conduce more to the discovery of great matters, than great things to the discovery of small matters; and therefore *Aristotle* notes well, *that the Nature of everything is best* Pol. lib. 1. *seen in his smallest Portions.* For that cause he inquires the Nature of a Common-wealth, first in a Family and the simple conjugations of Society, Man and Wife; Parents and Children; Master and Servant, which are in every cottage. So likewise the Nature of this great City of the world, and the Policy thereof, must be sought in every first Concordances and least Portions of things. So we see that secret of Nature (estimed one of the great mysteries) of the turning of Iron toucht with a Loadstone towards the Poles, was found out in needles of Iron, not in barres of Iron.

§ But if my judgement be of any waight, I am wholly of this mind, that the use of *Mechanicall History*, to the raising of *Naturall Philosophy*, is of all other the most radicall and fundamentall; such *Naturall Philosophy*, I understand

as doth not vanish into the fumes of subtile and sublime speculations, but such as shall be effectually operative to the support and assistance of the incommodities of mans life: For it will not only help for the present, by connecting and transferring the observations of one Art, into the use of others, which must needs come to passe, when the experiences of diverse Arts shall fall into the consideration and observation of one man, but farther it will give a more clear illumination, than hitherto hath shined forth, for the searching out of the causes of things, and the deducing of Axioms. For like as you can never well know and prove the disposition of another man, unlesse you provoke him; nor *Proteus* ever changed shapes, untill he was straitned and held fast with cordes; so nature provoked and vexed by Art, doth more cleerely appear, than when she is left free to hir selfe. But before we dismiss this part of *Naturall History*, which we call *Mechanicall* and *Experimentall*, this must be added; That the body of such a *History*, must be built not only of *Mechanicall Arts themselves*, but the operative part of *Liberall sciences*, as also many practices not yet grown up into Art, that nothing profitable may be omitted, which availes to the information of the understanding. And so this is the first Partition of *Naturall History*.

CAP.

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## CAP. III.

- I. The Second Partion of *Naturall History*, from the use and end thereof into *Narrative and Inductive*. And that the most noble end of *Naturall History* is, that it minister and conduce to the building up of *Philosophy*: which end *Inductive History* respecteth.
- II. The partition of the *History of Generations* into the *History of the Heavens*. *The History of the Meteors*. *The History of the Earth and Sea*. *The History of Massive Bodies, or of the greater Corporations*. *The History of Kindes, or of the lesser Corporations*.

I.  *Naturall History*, as in respect of the subject it is of three sorts, as we observed before; so in respect of the use, of two: for it is applied, either for the knowledge of things themselves recorded in *History*; or as the Primitive matter of *Philosophy*. The former of these, which either for the pleasure of the Narrations is delightful, or for the practice of experiments is usefull, and for such pleasure or profits sake is pursued, is of farre inferior quality, compared with that which is the Materialls and Provision of a true and just induction, and gives the first suck to *Philosophy*, wherefore let us again divide *Naturall History*, into *History Narrative*, and *INDUCTIVE*; this latter we report as DEFICIENT. Nor doe the great names of Ancient Philosophers, or the mighty volumes of Moderne writers so astonish my sense; for I know very well that *Naturall History*, is already extant, ample for the masse, for variety delightful, and often curious for the diligence: but if you take from thence *Fables* and *Antiquity* and *Allegations of Authors*, and *vain Controversies*, *Philosophy* and *Ornaments*, which are accommodate to *Table-talke*, or the *night-discourses* of Learned men, than will the sequel, for the *INSTAURATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY*, come to no great matter: And to speak truth this is farre short of the variety which we intend. For first those two parts of *Naturall History*, whereof we have spoken, *The History of Prater-generations*, and of *Arts*, matters

of great consequence, are there *Deficient*: than in that third generall Part mentioned before, namely of *Generations*, of five parts thereof, the *Naturall History* extant gives satisfaction only to one.

II. For the *History of Generations* hath Five subordinate Parts; The first is of *Celestiall Bodies* which comprehends the PHAENOMENA sincere, and not dogmatiz'd into any peremptory assertions: The second of *Meteors* with the *Comets*, and of the *Regions*, as they call them, of the *Aire*; neither is there extant any History concerning *Comets*, *Fiery Meteors*, *Windes*, *Raine*, *Tempests* and the rest, of any valew: The third is of the *Earth and of the Water* (as they are integrall parts of the world) of *Mountaines*, of *Rivers*, of *Tydes*, of *Sands*, of *Woods*, as also of the *Figure* of the continents, as they are stretcht forth: in all these particulars the Inquiries and Observations are rather *Naturall*, than *Cosmographicall*: Fourthly, touching the *generall Masses of Matter*, which we stile the *Greater Collegiats*, commonly called the *Elements*: Neither are there found any narrations touching *Fire*, *Aire*, *Water*, and of their Natures, Motions, Workings, Impressions, which make up any complete Body. The fift and the last Part is of the *Perfect and exact Collections*, which we entitle the *lesser Collegiats*, commonly called *Kindes* or *Specificques*. In this last part only the industry of writers hath appeared, yet so as was prodigally wasted in superfluous matter, swelling with the outward descriptions of liveing Creatures, or of Plants and such like; than enrich with solid and diligent observations, which in *naturall History* should every where be annex and interserted. And to speak in a word, all the *naturall History* we have, as well in regard of the Inquisition, as of the Collection, is no way proportionable in reference, to that end whereof we speak, namely the *Raiseing and advancing of Philosophy*: Wherefore we pronounce *Inductive History Deficient*. And thus farre of *naturall History*.



## CAP. IV.

I. The Partition of *Civill History*, into *Ecclesiasticall and Literary*, and, which retains the generall name, *Civile*. II. *Literary Deficient*. § *Precepts how to compile it.*

I.  *Civile History*, in our Judgement, is rightly divided into three kindes; first into *Sacred or Ecclesiasticall*; then into that which retains the generall name *Civile*; lastly into that of *Learning and Arts*. We will begin with that kinde we set down last, because the other are extant, but this I thought good to report as DEFICIENT; it is the HISTORY OF LEARNING. And surely the *History of the world* destitute of this, may be thought not unlike the statue of *Polyphemus*, with his eye out, that part of the Image being wanting, which doth most shew the nature and spirit of the Person. And though we set downe this as *Deficient*, yet we are not ignorant, that in divers particular sciences of *Juris-consults*, *Mathematicians*, *Rhetoricians*, *Philosophers*, there are made some slight Memorials and small relations of *Sects*, *Schooles*, *Books*, *Authors* and such like successions of sciences. There are likewise extant, some weak and barren discourses touching the *Inventors of Arts and Usages*; but a Iust and Generall HISTORY OF LEARNING, we avouch that none hetherto hath bin publisht. Wherefore we will propound the Argument; the way how to contrive it, and the use thereof. \*

II. *The Argument is nothing else but a recitall from all Times, what Knowledges and Arts, in what Ages and Climates of the world have florisht.* Let there be made a commemoration of their *Antiquities*, *Progresses* and *Peragations*, through diverse parts of the world: (for Sciences shift and remove, as people doe,) Againe of their *Declensions*, *Oblivions*, and *Instaurations*. Let there likewise be observations taken through all *Arts*, of the *occasion and originall of their Invention*

tion; of their *Manner of delivery*, and the discipline of their managings, *Course of study* and exercises. Let there also be added the *Sects* then on foot; and the *more famous controversies* which busied and exercised Learned men; the Scandalls and reproches to which they lay open; the Lauds and Honours wherewith they were gract. Let there be noted the *Chiefest Authors*, the *best Bookes*, *Schools*, *SucceSSIONS*, *Universities*, *Societies*, *Colledges*, *Orders*, and whatsoever else belongs to the State of Learning. But above all, let this be observed (which is the Grace and Spirit of *Civile History*,) that the Causes and Consultations be Connexed, with the events: namely, that *the nature of Countries and People be recorded*, *the dispositions apt and able; or inept and inable for diverse disciplines*; *the Occurrences of time Adverse, or Propitious to Learning*; *the zeales and mixtures of Religions*, *the Discountenances, and favours of Lawes*; and lastly, *the eminent virtues and sway of Persons of note, for the promoteing of Learning*; and *the like*. But our advise is, that all these points be so handled, that time be not wasted in praise and censure of particulars; after the manner of *Critiques*; but that things be plainly and historically related, and our own judgements very sparingly interposed.

§ *As for the manner of compileing such a History*, we doe especially admonish thus much; that *the Matter and Provision thereof, be drawn, not only from Histories and Critiques; but also that through every century of years or lesser Intervalls, by a continued sequence of time, deduced from the highest antiquity; the best Bookes written within thise distinguisht spaces of time, be consulted with*; that from a tast and observation of the argument, stile and method thereof, and not a through perusal, for that were an infinite work, *the learned spirit of that age, as by a kind of charme, may be awakt and rais'd up from the dead*.

§ *As touching the use of this Work*, it is design'd to this end; not, that the Honour and State of Learning usher'd in by so many Images and Ghosts of the Learned, should be celebrated; or that for the earnest affection we bear to Learning;

ing, we desire, even to a curiosity, to enquire, and know, and to conserve whatsoever to the state of Learning may any way appertain; but chiefly, for a more serious and grave purpose. It is, in few words this, *For that such a Narration, as we have described, in our opinion, may much conferre to the wisdom and judgement of Learned men, in the use and administration of Learning: and that the passions and perturbations; the vices and virtues; as well about Intellectuall matters, as Civile, may be observed; and the best Presidents for practise may be deduced therefrom.* For it is not Saint Austines, nor Saint Ambrose workes, (as we suppose) that will make so wise a Bishop or a Divine, as *Ecclesiasticall story* throughly read and observed: which without question may befall Learned men from the History of Learning. For whatsoever is not munited and sustained by Examples and Records, is exposed to imprudency and ruine. Thus much of the *History of Learning.*



## C A P. V.

*Of the Dignity. § And Difficulty of Civile History.*

**C**ivile History properly so called comes now to be handled; The *Dignity and Authority* whereof, is very eminent among secular writings: For upon the credit of *this History*, the examples of our Ancestors; the vicissitudes of Affaires; the grounds of Civile Prudence; and the Name and Fame of men depend.

§ But the *Difficulty is as great as the Dignity*; for to draw back the mind in writing, to the contemplation of matters long agoe passed; and thus, as it were, to make it aged; to search out with diligence; and to deliver with faith and freedome; and with the life and height of expression; to represent unto the eyes, the changes of times; the characters of Persons; the incertainties of Counsils; the Conveyances of

Actions (as of waters,) the subtilities of Pretentions, the secrets of State, is a taske of great paines and judgement; especially seeing Ancient reports, are subject to incertainty; Moderne liable to danger. Wherefore the errors are many which attend *Civile History*; whilest some write poore and popular Relations, the very reproach of History; others patch up, in a rash hast, and unequall contexture, particular Reports, and briefe Memorials; others slightly runne over the heads of actions done; others on the contrary pursue every triviall Circumstance, nothing belonging to the summe and issue of things; some out of a too partiall indulgence to their own wit, take confidence to faine many things; but others adde and imprint upon affaires the Image, not so much of their own wit, as of their affections; mindfull rather of their own parts, than to become Religious deponents for truth; others every where interlace such Politique observations, as they most fancy; and seeking occasion of digression for ostentation, too slightly break off the contexture of the discourse; others for want of moderation and judgement, over doe things, by the prolixity of their speeches, Haranges or other performances; so as it is sufficiently manifest, that in the writings of men, *there is not any kind more rare than a just History, and in all points complete and perfect.* But our purpose at this present is, to set down a partition of knowledge, *for the observation of parts omitted, and not a censure of parts erroneus.* Now we will proceed to the *Partitions of Civile History*, and those of diverse sorts; for the particular kindes will be lesse intangled, if diverse partitions be propounded; than if one partition by diverse members, be curiously drawn out.

## CAP. VI.

The first Partition of Civile History, into § *Memorials*,  
§ *Antiquities*. § *And Perfect History*.

**C**ivile History is of three kinds, not unfitly to be compared to the three sorts of Pictures or Images: for of Pictures and Images we see, some are unperfect and unfinisht; others perfect; and others decayed and defaced with Age. In like manner we will divide *Civile History*, which is the Image of Actions and Times, into three kindes, agreeable to those of Pictures; namely, *Memorials*; *Perfect History*; and *Antiquities*. *Memorials* are *Histories unfinisht*, or the first and rough draughts of History: *Antiquities*, are *Histories defaced*, or the Remaines of History, which have casually escaped the shipwreck of Time.

§ *Memorials* or *Preparations to History*, are of two sorts, whereof one may be termed *Commentaries*; the other *Registers*. *Commentaries* set downe a naked Continuance and Connexion of Actions and Events, without the Causes and Pre-texts of Businesse; the beginings and Motives thereof; also the Counsels and Speeches, and other preparations of Actions: For this is the true nature of *Commentaries*, though *Cesar* in modesty mixt with greatnesse, did for his pleasure apply the name of *Commentaries*, to the best History that is extant. But *Registers* are of two sorts, for either they comprehend the titles of Matter & Persons in a continuation of Times, such as are *Calendars* and *Cronologies*: or *Solemnities of Acts*, of which kind are the Edicts of Princes; the Decrees of Counsils; the Proceedings of Iudgements; Publique Orations; Letters or Estate and the like; without the Contexture or Continued thred of the *Narration*.

§ *Antiquities*, or the *Remaines of Histories*, are as we said, *tanquam Tabula Naufragii*, when industrious and un-

derstanding persons (the memory of Things being decayed and almost overwhelmed with oblivion) by a constant and scrupulous diligence, out of Geneologies, Calendars, Inscriptions, Monuments, Coines, Proper-names, and stiles; Etymologies of words, Proverbs, Traditions, Archives, and Instruments, as well publique as private; Fragments of stories, scattered passages of Books that concerne not History; out of all these I say, or some of them, they recover and save somewhat from the Deluge of Time. Certainly a painefull work, but acceptable to all sorts of Men, and attended with a kind of Reverence, and indeed worthy (all Fabulous Originals of Nations defac'd, and extinguisht) to be substituted in the roome of such counterfeit stufte: but yet of the lesse Authority, because what is prostitute to the license of private designes, looses the honour of publique regard. In these kinds of *Imperfect Histories*, I designe no Deficiencie, seeing they are *tanquam imperfectè mista*, so as such Defects are but their nature. As for *Epitomes the corruptions, certainly, and the Moathes of Histories*, we would have them banisht (where in we concurre with many of most sound judgement) as those that have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent Histories; and wrought them into base and unprofitable dreggs.



## CAP. VII.

The Partition of Perfect History, into *Chronicles of Times; Lives of Persons; Relations of Acts.* § The Explication, of the *History of Lives.*  
 § *Of Relations.*



*I*ust or *Perfect History*, is of three kinds, according to the nature of the object which it propounds to represent; for it either represents a portion of Time; or some memorable Person; or some Famous Act: The first we call *Chronicles* or *Annals*; the

the second *Lives*; the third *Relations*. Of these, *Chronicles* seem to excell, for Celebrity and Name; *Lives*, for profit and examples; *Relations*, for sincerity and verity. For *Chronicles*, represent the magnitude of publique Actions, and the externe faces of Men, as they regard the publique, and involve in silence smaller Passages, which pertaine either to Matter or Men. And seeing it is the workmanship of God alone, to hang the greatest waight upon the smallest wyers; it comes many times to passe, that such a History pursueing only the greater occurrences, rather sets forth the Pompe and Solennity; than the true resorts, and the intrinseque contextures of businesse. And although it doth adde and intermixe the Counsils themselves; yet affecting greatnesse, it doth besprinkle mens actions with more solemnenesse and wisdome, than indeed is in them; that a Satyre may be a truer table of a Mans life, than many such Histories. Contrariwise; *Lives*, if they be well written with diligence and judgement (for we doe not speak of *Elogies* and such slight commemorations) although they propound unto themselves some particular person, in whom Actions, as well commune as solemne; small as great; private as publique, have a composition and commixture; yet, certainly, they exhibite more lively and faithfull Narrations of Matters; and which you may more safely and successfully transferre into example. But speciall *Relations of Actions*, such as are the warres of *Peloponesus*; the Expedition of *Cyrus*; the Conspiracy of *Cataline*, and the like, ought to be attired with a more pure and syncere Candor of Truth than the *Perfect Histories of Times*; because in them may be chosen an Argument more particular and comprehensible; and of that quality, as good notice and certitude, and full information, may be had thereof: whereas, on the contrary, the *story of Time* (specially more ancient than the age of the writer) doth often faile in the memory of things, and containeth blank spaces, which the wit and conjecture of the writer (confidently enough) useth to seize upon and fill up. Yet this which we say, touching the sincerity of *Relations*, must be understood with reservation, for indeed

it must be confessed (since all mortall good laboureth of imperfection, and conveniences with disconveniences are usually connext) that such kind of *Relations*, specially if they be published about the times of things done; seeing very often they are written with passion or partiality, of all other narrations, are deservedly most suspected. But again, together with this inconvenience, this remedy groweth up; that these same *Relations*, being they are not set out by one side only, but through faction and partiary, affections are commonly published by some or other on both sides; they doe by this means open and hedge in a middle way between extremes to truth: and after the heat of passions is over, they become, to a good and wise writer of History, not the worst matter and seedes of a perfect History.

§ As touching those points which seem *deficient* in these three kinds of History, without doubt there are many particular Histories (of such I speak as may be had) of some dignity or mediocrity, which have bin hetherto passed by, to the great detriment of the honor and fame of such Kingdomes and States, to which they were due, which would be too tedious here to observe. But leaving the stories of forreigne Nations, to the care of Forreigne Persons, lest I should become *Curiosus in aliena Reipub.* I cannot faile to represent unto Your Majesty the indignity and unworthinesse of the *History of England*, as it now is, in the main continuation thereof, as also the partiality and obliquity of that of *Scotland*, in the latest and largest author thereof: supposing that it would be honour to Your Majesty, and a work acceptable with Posterity, if this Iland of *Great Britany*, as it is now joyned in a Monarchy for the Ages to come, so were joyned in one History for the times past, after the manner of the sacred History, which draweth down the story of the Ten Tribes, and of the two Tribes as Twinnes together. And if it shall seem that the waight of the work; (which certainly is great and difficult) may make it lesse exactly, according to the worthinesse thereof, performed; behold an excellent period of much smaller compasse of time,

asto the story of *England*; that is to say, from the uniting of the *Roses* to the uniting of the Kingdomes; a space of time, which in my judgment containes more variety of rare events, than in like number of successions ever was knowne in an Hereditary Kingdome. For it begins with the mixt Title to a Crowne, partly by might partly by right: An entry by Armes; an establishment by marriage; so there followed times answerable to these beginings; like waves after a great tempest, retaining their swellings and agitations, but without extremity of storme; but well past through by the wisdom of the Pilot, *being one of the most sufficient Kings of all his Predecessors.* Then followed a King whose Actions conducted rather by rashnesse, than counsil, had much intermixture with the affaires of Europe; ballancing and inclining them according as they swayed; In whose time began that *great Alteration in the Ecclesiasticall State*; such as every sildome comes upon the Stage. Then followed the Raighn of a Minor; then an Offer of an Usurpation, though it was very short, *like a Fever for a day.* Then the Raighn of a woman matcht with a Forraigner: Againe, of a woman that liv'd solitary and unmarried. And the close of all was this happy and glorious event; that is, that this Iland divided from all the world, should be united in it selfe; by which that ancient Oracle given to *Aeneas*, which presaged rest unto him; *Antiquam exquirite Matrem*; should be fulfill'd upon the most noble Nations of England & Scotland, now united in that name of *Britannia, their ancient Mother*; as a Pledge and Token of the Period and Conclusion, now found of all Wandrings and Peregrination. *So that as massive bodies once shaken, feele certaine Trepidations before they fixe and settle;* so it seemes probable, that by the Providence of God, it hath come to passe, *That this Monarchy, before it should settle and be establish't in your Maiesty and your Royal Progeny,* (in which I hope it is firme fixt for ever) *it should undergoe so many changes, and vicissitudes, as prelusions of future Stability.*

HEN. VII.

HEN. VIII

ED. VI.

MARIA  
ELISA.

Virg. Æn. 3

Iacobus R.  
Carolus R.

§ As for *Lives*, when I think thereon, I doe find strange that these our Times have so litle knowne, and acknowledged

ledged their owne virtues; *being there is so sildome any Memorials or Records of the lives of those who have bin eminent in our Times.* For although Kings and such as have absolute soveraignty, may be few; and Princes in free Commonwealths (so many States being collected into Monarchies,) are not many; yet however, there hath not bin wanting excellent men (though living under Kings,) that have deserv'd better, than an incertain and wandering Fame of their memories; or some barren & naked Elogie. For herein the invention of one of the late Poets, whereby he hath well enriched the ancient Fiction, is not inelegant: *Hee faines that at the end of the Thread of every mans life, there was a Medall or Tablet, whereon the name of the Dead was stamp't; and that time waited upon the sheeres of the fatall Sister, and as soone as the Thread was cut, caught the Medalls, and carrying them away; a litle after threw them out of his Bosome into the River Lethe. And that about the Bank there were many Birds flying up and downe, that would get the Medals; and after they had carried them in their beakes a litle while, soon after, through negligence suffered them to fall into the River. Amongst these Birds there were a few swannes found, which if they got a Medall with a name, they used to carry it to a certaine Temple consecrate to Immortality. But such swannes are rare in our Age: And although many men more mortall in their vigilancies and studies, than in their bodies, despite the Memory of their Name, as if it were fume or ayre, *Animæ nil magnæ laudis egentēs*: namely whose Philosophy and severity springs from that roote, *Non prius laudes contempsum quam laudanda facere descevimus.* Yet that wil not with us, prejudicate Salomon's Iudgment, *The memory of the Iust is with Benediction; but the name of the wicked shall putrisie:* The one perpetually flourishes; the other either instantly departs into Oblivion; or dissolves into an ill Odor. And therefore in that stile and forme of speaking, which is very well brought in use, attributed to the Dead, of *Happy Memory*; of *Pious Memory*; of *Blessed Memory*; we seeme to acknowledge that which Cicero alleageth; borrowing it from*

Plin. Iun.  
alicubi in  
Epist.

Prov. 10.

from *Demosthenes*, *Bonam Famam propriam esse possessionem defunctorum*; which possession I cannot but note that in our age it lies much wast and neglected.

§ *As concerning Relations* it could be in truth, wish, that there were a greater diligence taken therein: For there is no Action more eminent, that hath not some able Pen to attend it, which may take and transcribe it. And because it is a Quality not common to all men to write a *Perfect History* to the Life and Dignity thereof; (as may well appear by the small number, even of mean Writers in that kind) yet if particular Actions were but by a tolerable Pen reported, as they passe, it might be hoped that in some after Age, Writers might arise, that might compile a *Perfect History* by the helpe an assistance of such *Notes*: For such *Collections* might be as a *Nursery Garden*, whereby to Plant a faire and stately Garden, when time should serve.



### CAP. VIII

The Partition of the *History of Times*, into *History Universal*, and *Particular*. The *Advantages* and *Disadvantages* of both.

**T**HE *History of Times* is either *Universal*, or *Particular*: This comprehends the affaires of some *Kingdome*, or *State*; or *Nation*: That the affaires of the whole world. Neither have there bin wanting those, who would seeme to have composed a *History of the world*, even from the Birth thereof; presenting a miscellany of matter and compends of *Reports for History*. Others have bin confident that they might comprize, as in a *Perfect History*, the Acts of their owne times, memorable throughout the world; which was certainly a generous attempt, and of singular use. For the actions, and negotiations of men, are not so divorced through the division of *Kingdomes*, and *Countries*; but that they have many coincident *Connexions*: wherefore it is of great import to behold the fates, and affaires destinate to one age

or time drawne, as it were and delineate in one *Table*. For it falls out that many writings not to be dispised (such as are they whereof we spake before, *Relations*) which perchance otherwise would perish; nor often come to the *Presse*; or at least the chiefe heads thereof might be incorporated into the body of such a *Generall History*, and by this meanes be fixed and preserved. Yet notwithstanding if a man well waigh the matter, he shall perceive that the Lawes of a *Just History* are so severe and strict, as they can hardly be observ'd in such a vastnesse of Argument; so that the Majesty of *History* is rather minisht, than amplified by the greatnesse of the Bulk. For it comes to passe that he, who every where pursueth such variety of matter; the precise strictnesse of Information by degrees slackned; and his owne diligence dispersed in so many things, weakned in all,) takes up popular Reports and Rumors; and from *Relations* not so authentique, or some other such like slight stufte, compiles a *History*. Moreover he is forced (lest the worke should grow too voluminous) purposely to passe over many occurrences worth the relating; and many times to fall upon the way of Epitomes and abridgments. There is yet another danger of no small importance which such a worke is liable unto, which is directly opposed to the profitable use of *Universall History*; for as *Generall History* preserves some *Relations* with it may be, otherwise would be lost; so contrarywise many times it extinguishes other fruitfull *Narrations* which otherwise would have lived through *Breviaries*, which are ever accepted in the world.

## CAP. IX.

An other Partition of the History of Times into Annals and Iournals.

**T**HE Partition of the History of Time is likewise well made into *Annals*; and *Iournals*: Which Division though it derive the names from the *Period of Times*, yet pertaines also to the choice of *Businesse*. For *Tacitus* saith well, when falling upon the mention of the magnificence of certaine structures, presently he addes; *Ex dignitate Populi Ro. repertum esse, res illustres, Annalibus; Talia, Diurnis urbis Actis mandare*: Applying to *Annals*; Matters of State; to *Diaries*, Acts and Accidents of a meaner nature. And in my judgment a Discipline of Heraldry would be to purpose in the disposing of the merits of Books; as of the merits of Persons. For as nothing doth more derogate from Civile Affaires, than the confusion of Orders and Degrees; so it doth not a litle embase the authority of a grave *History*, to intermingle matters of triviall consequence, with matters of State; such as are Triumphs, and Ceremonies; Shews, and Pageants, and the like. And surely it could be wisht that this distinction would come into Custome. In our Times *Iournals* are in use only in Navigations, and Expeditions of warre. Amongst the Ancients it was a point of Honour to Princes to have the Acts of their Court refer'd to *Iournals*. Which we see was preserv'd in the raign of *Abasuerus* King of *Persia*, who when he could not take rest call'd for the *Chronicles*; wherein hee reviewed the Treason of the Eunuces past in his owne time. But in the *Diaries* of *Alexander* the Great, such small Particularities were contained; that if he chanc'd but to sleepe at the Table, it was Registered. For neither have *Annals* only compriz'd grave matters, and *Iournals* only light; but all were promiscuously, & cursorily taken in *Diaries*; whether of greater, or of lesser Importance.

Annal. 13.

Lib. Estab.  
Cap. 6.

Plutarch  
Symp. 1.



## C A P. X̄.

*A Second Partition of History Civile, into Simple, and Mixt.  
 § Cosmographic & mixt History.*



THE last Partition of *Civile History* may be this. *History Simple, and Mixt.* The *Commune Mixtures* are two, the one from *Civile Knowledge*; the other specially from *Naturall*. For there is a kind of writing introduc'd by some, to set down their Relations, not continued according to the Series of the *History*; but pickt out, according to the choice of the Author, which he after re-examines, and ruminates upon; and taking occasion from those selected pieces, discourses of *Civile Matters*. Which kind of *Ruminated History*, we doe exceeding well allow of; so such a Writer doe it indeed, and professe himselfe so to doe. But for a man resolutely writeing a *Just History*, every where to ingest *Politique inter-laceings*; and so to break off the thread of the *story*, is unseasonable and tedious. For although every wise *History* be full, and as it were impregnate with *Politically Precepts and Counsils*; yet the Writer himselfe should not be his own *Mid-wife* at the delivery.

§ *Cosmography* likewise is a *mixt-History*, for it hath from *Naturall History*, the Regions themselves, and their site and commodities; from *Civile History*, Habitations, Regiments and Manners; from the *Mathematiques*, Climates, and the Configurations of the Heavens, under which the Coasts and Quarters of the World doe lye. In which kind of *History* or *Knowledge*, we have cause to Congratulate our Times; for the world in this our age, hath throughlights made in it, after a wonderfull manner. The Ancients certainly had knowledge of the *Zones*, and of the *Anti-podes*.

Virg.  
 Geor. I. *(Nescis ubi Primus Equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,  
 Illic sera Rubens accendit Lumina vesper)*

and

and rather by Demonstrations than by Travels. But for some small keele to emulate Heaven it selfe; and to Circle the whole Globe of the Earth, with a more oblique and winding Course, than the Heavens doe; this is the glory and prerogative of our Age. So that these Times may justly bear in their *word*, not only *Plus ultra*, whereas the Ancients used *non ultra*; and also *imitabile fulmen*, for the Ancients *non imitabile fulmen*.

*Demens qui Nimbos & non imitabile Fulmen.*

Vug. En. 6

But likewise that which exceeds all admiration *imitabile Calum*, our voyages, to whom it hath bin often granted to wheele and roole about the whole compasse of the Earth, after the manner of Heavenly Bodies. And this excellent felicity in Nauticall Art, and environing the world, may plant also an expectation of farther, PROFICIENCIES AND AUGMENTATIONS OF SCIENCES; Ipecially seeing it seems to be decreed by the divine Counsell, that these two should be Cox-vals, for so the Prophet *Daniel* speaking of the latter times foretells, *Plurimi pertransibunt & augebitur Scientia*: as if Cap. 12. 4 the through Passage, or Perlustration of the World, and the various propagation of knowledge were appointed to be in the same Ages; as we see it is already performed in great part; seeing our times doe not much give place for Learning to the former two *Periods*, or *Returns* of Learning; the one of the *Gracians*; the other of the *Romans*; and in some kinds farre exceed them.



## CAP. XI.

I. The Partition of *Ecclesiasticall History*, into the *Generall History of the Church*. II. *History of Prophecy*. III. *History of Providence*.

**H**istory Ecclesiasticall falls under the same division commonly with *Civile History*; for there are *Ecclesiasticall Chronicles*; there are *Lives of Fathers*; there are *Relations of Synods*, and the like, pertaining to the *Church*. In proper expression this kind of History is divided, into the *History of the Church by a generall name*; *History of Prophecy*; and *History of Providence*. The first recordeth the times and different state of the *Church Militant*; whether she flote as the *Arke in the Deluge*; or sojourne as the *Arke in the Wildernesse*; or be at rest as the *Arke in the Temple*; that is, the State of the *Church in Persecution*; in *Remove*; and in *Peace*. In this Part I find no *Deficiency*; but rather more things abound therein, than are wanting; only this I could wish, that the virtue and syncerity of the Narrations were answerable to the greatnesse of the Masse.

II The Second Part which is the *History of Prophecie*, consisteth of two Relatives; the *Prophecie it selfe*; and the *accomplishment thereof*. wherefore the designe of this worke ought to be, that every *Prophecy of Scripture* be sorted with the truth of the event; and that throughout all the ages of the world; both for Confirmation of Faith; as also to plant a Discipline; & skill in the Interpretation of *Prophecies*, which are not yet accomplisht. But in this work, that latitude must be allowed which is proper, and familiar unto *Divine Prophecies*; that their accomplishments may be both perpetuall and punctual. For they resemble the nature of their Auctor to whom one day is as a thousand yeares, and a thousand yeares are but as one day: And though the fulnesse, and height of their complement be many times assigned to some certaine age,

or

or certaine point of time; yet they have neverthelesse many staires and scales of Accomplishment throughout diverse Ages of the world. This worke I set down as DEFICIENT; but it is of that nature as must be handled with great wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.

III The third Part which is the *History of Providence* hath fallen indeed upon the Pens of many pious Writers, but not without siding of Partiarities; and it is imployed in the observation of that divine Correspondence which often interveneth betweene Gods revealed Will, and his secret Will. For though the Counsils, and Iudgments of God be so obscure, that they are *inscrutable to the Naturall man*; yea many times withdraw themselves even from *their eyes*, that look out of the Tabernacle: Yet sometimes by turns it pleaseth the Divine wisdom for the Confirmation of *this*; and Confutation of those which are *as without God in the world*; to propose them to be seen written in such Capitall Letters, that, as the Prophet speaketh, *Every one that runnes by, may read them*; that is, *that men meerly Sensuall, and Carnall; who make hast to pass over those divine Iudgments; and never fixe their cogitations upon them; yet though they are upon the speed, and intend nothing lesse; they are urg'd to acknowledge them*. Such as are late, and unlooked for Iudgments; unhop'd for Deliverances suddenly shining forth; the divine Counsils, passing through such Serpentine windings, and wonderful mazes of things; at length manifestly disintangling, and clearing themselves. which serve not only for the Consolation of the minds of the Faithfull; but for the Astonishment and Conviction of the Consciences of the Wicked:


\*

i Cor. 2.

Ad Ephes.  
2.

Habac. 2. 2.

CAP.



## CAP. XII.

The Appendices of *History* *Conversant* about the words of *Men*; as *History* it selfe about the *Deeds*: The Partition thereof into, *Orations*.  
 § *Letters*. § *And Apophthegmes*.



Ut not the *Deeds* only, but the *Words* also of *Men*, should be retained in *Memory*. It is true that sometimes *Words* are inserted into the *History* it selfe, so farre as they conduce to a more perspicuous, and solemne *Delivery* of *Deeds*. But the *sayings* and *words* of *men*, are preserved properly in *Books* of, *Orations*; *Epistles*; and *Apophthegmes*. And certainly the *Orations*, of wise men made touching buisinesse, and matters of grave and deepe importance, much conduce, both to the knowledge of things themselves; and to *Elocution*.


§ But yet greater *Instructions* for *Civile Prudence*, are from the *Letters* of *great Personages*, touching the *Affaires* of *State*. And of the *words* of *men*, there is nothing more sound and excellent, than are *Letters*; for they are more *naturall* than *Orations*; more *advised* than *sodaine Conferences*. The same *Letters*, when they are continued according to the sequelle of times (as is observed in those sent by *Embassadors*, *Governours* of *Provinces*, and other *Ministers* of *Estate*) are without *Question* of all other the most *precious provision* for *History*.

§ Neither are *Apophthegmes* only for *delight*, and *ornament*; but for *reall Buisinesse*; and *Civile V sages*, for they are, as he said, *Secures aut mucrones verborum*, which by their sharpe edge cut and penetrate the knots of *Matters* and *Buisinesse*: And *Occasions* runne round in a *Ring*; and what was once profitable, may againe be practis'd; and againe be effectually, whether a man speake them, as *ancient*; or make them his own. Neither can it be doubted but that is useful in *Civile negotiations*, which <sup>a</sup> *Cæsar* himselfe hath honour'd

<sup>a</sup> Cic. Epist. Fam. L. IX.

<sup>a</sup> Etiam & in Inclite Heroz.

by his own example; it is pittie his book is lost, seeing what we have in this kind, seems to be collected with litle choice. *Thus much of History*, namely of that part of Learning, which answereth to one of the Cells, or Domicils of the understanding, which is, *Memory*.



## CAP. XIII.

*The Second Principall Part of Human Learning Poesy; I. The Partition of Poesy into Narrative. II. Drammaticall. III. And Parabolicall. & Three Examples of Parabolicall Poesy propounded. IV. Naturall. V. Politicall. VI. Morall.*

**N**OW let us proceed to *Poesy*. *Poesy* is a kind of Learning in words restrained; in matter loose and licenc'd, so that it is referred, as we said at first, to the *Imagination*, which useth to devile, and contrive, unequall and unlawfull Matches and divorces of things. And *Poesy*, as hath bin noted, is taken in a double sense; as it respects *Words*; or as it respects *Matter*. In the *first sense*, it is a kind of Character of Speech; for *Verses*, is a kind of *Stile* and *Forme* of *Elocution*, and pertaines not to *Matter*; for a *true Narration* may be composed in *Verses*; and a *Faigned*, in *Prose*. In the *latter sense*, we have already determined it, a *Principall member of Learning*, and have placed it next unto *History*; seeing it is nothing else than *Imitation of History at pleasure*. Wherefore searching and pursuing in our *Partition* the true veins of Learning; and in many points, not giving place to custome, and the *receaved Divisions*; we have dismissed *Satyres*, and *Elegies*, and *Epigrammes*, and *Odes*, and the like, and referred them to *Philosophy* and *Arts of Speech*. Under the name of *Poesy*, we treat only of *History Faigned at Pleasure*.

I. The truest *Partition of Poesy*, and most appropriate, besides those *Divisions* common to it with *History* (for there

there are *fain'd Chronicles, fain'd Lives, and fain'd Relations*) is this, that it is either *Narrative, or Representative, or Allusive*. *Narrative* is a meere imitation of *History*, that in a manner it deceives us; but that often it extolls matters above beliefe. *Drammaticall or Representative, is as it were, a visible History*; for it sets out the Image of things, as if they were Present; and *History*, as if they were Past. *Parabolicall or Allusive is History with the Type, which brings downe the Images of the understanding to the Objects of Sense*.

§ As for *Narrative Poesy*, or if you please *Heroicall* (so you understand it of the *Matter*, not of the *Verse*) it seems to be raised altogether from a noble foundation; which makes much for the Dignity of mans Nature. For seeing this sensible world, is in dignity inferior to the soule of Man; *Poesy* seems to endow Humane Nature with that which *History* denies; and to give satisfaction to the Mind, with, at least, the shadow of things, where the substance cannot be had. For if the matter be throughly considered; a strong Argument may be drawn from *Poesy*, that a more stately greatnesse of things; a more Perfect Order; and a more beautifull variety delights the soule of Man, than any way can be found in Nature, since the Fall. Wherefore seeing the Acts and events, which are the subject of true *History*, are not of that amplitude, as to content the mind of Man; *Poesy* is ready at hand to faine *Acts* more *Heroicall*. Because true *History* reports the successes of businesse, not proportionable to the merit of Virtues and Vices; *Poesy* corrects it, and presents events and Fortunes according to desert, and according to the Law of Providence: because true *History*, through the frequent satiety and similitude of Things, workes a distast and misprision in the mind of Man; *Poesy* cheereth and refreshes the soule; chanting things rare, and various, and full of vicissitudes. So as *Poesy* serveth and conferreth to Delectation, Magnanimity, and Morality; and therefore it may seem deservedly to have some Participation of Divinenesse; because it doth raise the mind, and exalt the spirit with high raptures, by proportioning the shewes of things

things to the desires of the mind; and not submitting the mind to things, as *Reason* and *History* doe. And by these allurements, and congruities, whereby it cherisheth the soule of man; joyned also with consort of *Musique*, whereby it may more sweetly insinuate it selfe, it hath wonne such accessse, that it hath bin in estimation even in rude times, and Barbarous Nations, when other Learning stood excluded.

II. *Drammaticall, or Representative Poesy, which brings the World upon the stage*, is of excellent use, if it were not abused. For the Instructions, and Corruptions of the *Stage*, may be great; but the corruptions in this kind abound; the Discipline is altogether neglected in our times. For although in moderne Commonwealths, *Stage-plaies* be but esteemed a sport or pastime, unlesse it draw from the *Satyre*, and be mordant; yet the care of the Ancients was, that it should instruct the minds of men unto virtue. Nay, wise men and great Philosophers, have accounted it, as the *Archer*, or musicall *Bow* of the *Mind*. And certainly it is most true, and as it were, a secret of nature, *that the minds of men are more patent to affections, and impressions, Congregate, than solitary.*

III. But *Poesy Allusive, or Parabolicall, excells the rest, and seemeth to be a sacred and venerable thing; especially seeing Religion it selfe hath allowed it in a work of that nature, and by it, trafiques divine commodities with men.* But even *this* also hath bin contaminate by the levity and indulgence of mens wits about *Allegories*. And it is of ambiguous use, and applied to contrary ends. For it serves for *Obscuration*; and it serveth also for *Illustration*: in this it seems there was sought a way how to teach; in that an Art how to conceale. And this way of teaching which conduceth to *Illustration*, was much in use in the Ancient times: for when the Inventions and conclusions of human reason, (which are now common and vulgar) were in those ages strange and unusuall; the understandings of men were not so capable of that subtilty, unlesse such discourses, by resemblances and examples, were brought downe to sense. Wherefore in those first ages all

Liv. Hist.  
lib. 2.

were full of *Fables*, and of *Parables*, and of *Ænigmaes*, and of *Similitudes* of all sorts. Hence the *Symboles* of *Pythagoras*; the *Ænigmaes* of *Sphynx*; and the *Fables* of *Æsop*; and the like. So the *Apophthegmes* of the Ancient sages, were likewise expressed by *similitudes*. So *Menenius Agrippa*, amongst the Romans, a Nation in that age not learned, repressed a sedition by a Fable. And as *Hieroglyphiques* were before letters; so *Parables* were before Arguments. So even at this day, and ever, there is, and hath bin much life, and vigor in *Parables*; becaule Arguments cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit. There is another use of *Parabolicall Poesy*, opposite to the former, which tendeth to the folding up of those things; the dignity whereof, deserves to be retired, and distinguished, as with a drawn Curtain: That is when the secrets and mysteries of Religion, Policy, and Philosophy are veiled, and invested with *Fables*, and *Parables*. But whether there be any mysticall sense couched under the ancient *Fables* of the Poets, may admit some doubt: and indeed for our part we incline to this opinion, as to think, that there was an infused mystery in many of the ancient *Fables* of the Poets. Neither doth it move us that these matters are left commonly to Schoole-boys, and Grammarians, and so are imbased, that we should therefore make a slight judgement upon them: but contrariwise because it is cleere that the writings which recite those *Fables* of all the writings of men, next to sacred writ, are the most ancient; and that the *Fables* themselves, are farre more ancient than they (being they are alleadged by those writers, not as excogitated by them, but as credited & recepted before) they seem to be like a fine-delicate Aire blowen up and downe by a more Ancient Nation, and by derivation from them to have chanc'd into the Pipes of the Grecians; & to have become their Des-cant; And because that whatsoever hath hetherto bin undertaken for interpretation of these *Parables*, namely by unskilfull men, not learned beyond common places, give us no satisfaction at all; we thought good to referre Philosophy according to ancient *Parables*, in the number of DEFICIENTS.

✱

And

§ And we will annex an example or two of this work: not that the matter perhaps is of such moment: but to maintain the purpose of our designe. That is this; that if any portion of these works which we report as *Deficient*, chance to be more obscure than ordinary; that we alwaies propose, either Precepts, or Examples, for the perfecting of that work; lest perchance some should imagine, that our conceit hath only comprehended some light notions of them; and that we like Augures, only measure Countries in our mind, but know not how to set one foot forward thither. As for any other part defective in *Poesy*, we find none; nay rather, *Poesy* being a plant coming, as it were, from the lust of a rank soile, without any certain seed, it hath sprung up, and spread abroad above all other kind of Learning. But now we will propound examples, in number only three, one from things *Naturall*; one from *Politicall*; & one from *Morall*.

*The first example of Philosophy, according to Ancient Parables in things Naturall. Of the Universe, according to the Fable of Pan.*

IV. The Originall of *Pan*, the Ancients leave doubtfull; for some say that he was the *Sonne of Mercury*, others attribute unto him a farre different beginning: For they affirme that all *Penelopes* suitors had to doe with her, and from this promiscuous Act *Pan* descended, a common offspring to them all. There is a third conceit of his birth, not to be passed over: for some report that he was the sonne of *Iupiter* and *Hybris*, which signifies contumelie. But however begotten, the *Parcæ*, they say, were his sisters, who dwelt in a cave under ground; but *Pan* remained in the open Aire. The figure and forme, Antiquity represented him by, was this. He had on his head a paire of Hornes, rising in a sharp, acuminate to heaven; his body shagged, and hairie; his beard very long; his shape biformed; above like a man, below like a beast; finish't with the feet of a Goat. He bare these ensignes of Jurisdiction; in his left hand a pipe of seaven Reeds; in his right a sheepe hooke or a staffe, at the upper end croo-

Hom. Hym;  
Herod. Eur.

ked or inflexed: he was clad with a Mantle made of a Leopards skinne. *The dignities* and offices attributed unto him were these; that he was the God of Hunters; of Shepherds; and of all Rurall Inhabitants: Lo. President of Mountaines; and next to *Mercury*, the Embassador of the Gods. *Moreover* he was accounted the leader, and commander of the Nymphs; which were alwaies wont to dance the Rounds, and frisk about him: his train were the Satyres, and the old Sileni: He had power also to strike men with terrors, and those especially vaine, and superstitious, which are termed *Panique fears*. *His Acts* recorded are not many; the chiefest was, that he challenged Cupid at wrestling, in which conflict he had the foile; caught *Typhon* the Gyant in a net, and held him fast. *Moreover* when *Ceres* being sad and vext for the Rape of *Proserpina*, had hid her selfe, and that all the Gods took paines by dispersing themselves severall wayes to find her out; it was only *Pans* good fortune, as he was hunting, to light on her, and to give the first intelligence where she was. *He presumed* also to put it to the triall who was the better Musitian he or Apollo, and by the judgement of *Midas* was preferred; for which judgement, *Midas* had a paire of Asses eares secretly impied to his head. Of the Love-tricks of *Pan*, there is nothing reported, or at least not much; a thing to be wondred at, especially being among a troope of Gods so profusely amorous. This also is said of him, that he loved the Nymph *Eccho* whom he took to wife; and one pretty wench more called *Syrinx*, towards whom *Cupid* (in an angry revengefull humour because so audaciously he had challenged him at wrestling) inflamed his desire. *So he* is reported once to have sollicitated the Moon apart into the high Woods. *Moreover* hee had no issue (which is a marvell also seeing the Gods specially those of the male-kind were very Generative) only he was the reputed Father of a litle Girle called *Iambe*, that with many pretty tales was wont to make strangers merry; and some thought that she was begotten of his wife *Eccho*. The Parable seemeth to be this.

Cic. Epist.  
ad Act. l. 5.

Claud. de  
R. Profer.

Ovid. Met.  
XI,

§ *Pan* as the very name imports represents, or layeth open the world, or the world of things. Concerning his Originall there are only two opinions that goe for Currant. For either he came of *Mercury*, that is the *Word of God*, which the holy Scriptures, without all Controversy, affirme; and the Philosophers such as were the more Divine saw; or else from the confused seeds of things. For some of the Philosophers held, that the Seeds and Principles of Nature, were even in the substance infinite, hence the opinion, of *Similarity Parts primordially*, was brought in; which *Anaxagoras* either invented, or celebrated. Some more acutely, and soberly think it sufficient to salve the variety of Nature, if seeds, the same in substance, be only diversified in forme and figure; certaine and definite; and placed the rest in the inclosure, and bosome of the seeds. From this spring, the opinion of *Atomes* is derived, which *Democritus* maintain'd; and *Leucippus* found out. But others though they affirm only one Principle of Nature (*Thales* water; *Anaximenes* Air; *Heraclitus* Fire) yet they have defined that Principle, which is one in Act, to be various and dispensible in power; as that wherein the seeds of all naturall essences lie hidden: They who have introduced the first Matter every way disaray'd, and unformed, and indifferent to any forme (as *Plato* and *Aristotle* did) came to a farre nearer, and naturall resemblance of the Figure of the *Parable*. For they conceiv'd the Matter as a common Courtezan; and the Forms as Suitors. So as all the Opinions touching the beginnings of things come to this point, and may be reduc'd to this distribution, that the world took beginning either from *Mercury*; or from *Penelope*; and all his Suitors. The third conceit of *Pans* Originall is such, as it seemes that the Grecians either by intercourse with the *Aegyptians*; or one way or other, had heard something of the Hebrew mysteries. For it points to the state of the World not considered in the absolute production; but as it stood after the fall of *Adam*, expos'd and made subject to Death and Corruption: For in that state it was, and remains to this day; the off-spring of God, and of Sin, or *Contumely*: For the

Laert. in  
Anaxag.Laert. in  
vitis eorū;Laert. in  
vitis.In *Timaeo*  
phys. I.

Gen.

like

Gen. 3. sinne of *Adam* was a kind of Contumely, when *hee would be like God*. And therefore all these three Narrations concerning the manner of of *Pans* Birth, may seem true; if they be rightly distinguish'd according to things and times. For this *Pan*, as we now behold and comprehend it, took beginning from the word of God, by the means of confuted matter, which yet was the work of God, and the entrance of Prevarication, and through it of corruption.

§ The *Destinies* may well be thought the sisters of *Pan*, or *Nature*: for the beginnings, and continuances, and dissolutions; the Depressions also, and eminencies, and labours, and felicities of things; and whatsoever conditions of a particular Nature, are called *Fates* or *Destinies*: which yet unlesse it be in some noble individuate subject, as a Man, a City, or a Nation, commonly are not acknowledged. But *Pan*, that is, the *Nature of things*, is the cause of these severall states, and qualities in every particular; so as in respect of Individualls, the *Chaine* of nature, and the thred of the *Destinies*, is the same. Moreover the Ancients fained, that *Pan* ever lived in the open Aire; but the *PARCÆ*, or *Destinies*, in a mighty subterraneous Cave; from whence with an infinite swiftnesse they flew to men: because the nature and common face of the *Universe* is apert, and visible; but the individuall *Fates* of Particulars are secret, swift, and sodain. But if *Fate* be taken in a more generall acception, as to signify the more notable only, and not every common event; yet in that sense also, the signification is correspondent to the universall state of things; seeing from the order of *Nature*, there is nothing so small which comes to passe without a Cause; and nothing so absolutely great, as to be independent; so that the very Fabrique of *Nature* comprehendeth in the lappe and bosome thereof, every event, small or great; and by a constant rule discloseth them in due season. Wherefore no marvell if the *PARCÆ* be brought in as the legitimate Sisters of *Pan*: For *Fortune* is the daughter of the foolish vulgar; and found favour only with the more unsound Philosophers. Certainly the words  
of

of Epicurus favour lesse of Dotage than of prophanenesse where he saith; *Præstare credere fabulam Deorum, quam Fatum asserere*, As if any thing in the frame of nature could be like an Iland, which is separate from the connexion of the cōtinent. But *Epicurus* (as it is evident from his owne words) accommodating, and subjecting his *Naturall Philosophy* to his *Morall*; would heare of no opinion which might presse and sting the conscience; or any way discomfite, and trouble that, *Euthymia*, or *Tranquility of mind*, which hee had receiv'd from *Democritus*. Wherefore being more indulgent to the delusions of his owne fancies, than patient of truth; he hath fairely cast off the yōak, and abandon'd as well the *Necessity of Fate*, as the *Feare of the Gods*. And thus much concerning the Fraternity of *Pan* with the *Destinies*.

Senec.  
in Epist.

§ *Hornes* are attributed unto the *World*, broad at the root, sharpe at the top; the nature of all things being like a *Pyramis* lessening upwards. For *Individuals* in which the Base of nature is spread out; being infinite, are collected into *Species*, which are many also; *Species* againe rise up into *Generalls*; and these ascending are contracted into more *Universall Generalities*; so that at length, nature may seeme to close in a *unity*; which is signified by the *Pyramidal Figure of Pans Hornes*. Neither is it to be wonder'd at, that *Pan* toucheth heaven with his *horns*; seeing the transcendentals of *Nature*, or *Universall Ideas*, doe in some sort reach things *Divine*. Wherefore *Homers famous Chaine of Naturall Causes*, tyed to the foot of *Iupiters Chaire*, was celebrated. And it is plain, that no man conversant in *Metaphysique*; & those things which in *Nature* are *Eternall*, and *immoveable*; and that hath never so little withdrawne his mind from the fluid ruine of sublunary things, which doth not at the same instant fall upon *Naturall Theologie*: so direct and compendious a passage it is, from the top of the *Pyramis*, to *Matters Divine*.

Iliad, IX.

§ The body of *Nature* is elegantly and lively drawne *Hairy*, representing the beames of things; for beames are, as it were, the haire or bristles of nature; and every Creature is

P

more

more or lesse Beamy; which is most apparant in the faculty of seeing; and no lesse in every magnetique virtue, and operation upon distance; for whatloever worketh upon any thing upon Distance, that may rightly be said to dart forth rayes. Moreover *Pans beard* is said to be exceeding long, because the beames or influences of the Heavens; and specially of the Sunne, doe operate, and pierce farthest of all, so that not only the surface, but the inward bowels of the earth have bin turn'd; subduc'd; and impregnate, with the masculine Spirit of the heavenly influence. And the forme of *Pans beard* is the more elegant; because the *Sun* when his higher part, is shadowed with a Cloud, his beams break out in the lower; and so appears to the eye as if he were *bearded*.

§ Nature also is most expressively set forth with a *bi-formed Body*; in reference to the Differences betweene superior and inferior bodies. For the one part, by reason of their beauty; and equability; and constancy of motion; and dominion over the earth; and earthly things; is aptly set out by the shape of man: And the other part in respect of their perturbations; and irregular motions; and that they are for most part cōmanded by the Celestiall; may be well fitted with the figure of a *bruit beast*. Againe this same *bi-formed* description of his *body*, pertaines to the participation of the species or kind; for no species of Nature, seemes to be simple; but, as it were participating and compounded of two, Essentiall Ingredients. For Man hath something of a Beast: a Beast something of a Plant: a Plant something of an inanimate Body: and all Natural things are indeed *bi-formed*; and compounded of a superior and inferior kind.

§ It is a witty Allegory that same, of the *feet of the Goat*; by reason of the upward tending motions of Terrestiall bodies towards the regions of the aire; and of the heaven; where also they become pensile; and from thence are rather forc'd downe, than fall downe. For the Goat is a mounting Animal, that loves to be hanging upon rocks, and precipices, & steep hills: And this is done also in a wonderfull manner,  
even

even by those things which are destinated to this inferior Globe; as may manifestly appear, in *Cloudes* and *Meteors*. And it was not without the grounds of reason, that *Gilbert*, De Magn. who hath written a painfull and an experimentall work, touching a *Loadstone*, cast in this doubt, *Whether or no ponderous bodies, after a great distance, and long discontinuance from the earth, may not put off their motion towards the inferior Globe?*

§ The two ensignes which *Pan* bears in his hands, doe point, the one at *Harmony*, the other at *Empirie*: for the *Pipe of seven Reeds*, doth evidently demonstrate the consent and *Harmony*; or discordant concord of Nature, which is caused by the motion of the seaven wandring starres: for there are no other Errors, or manifest *Expatiations* in heaven, save those of the seaven Planets; which being intermingled, and moderated with the equality of the fixed starres; and their perpetuall and invariable distance one from the other, may maintaine and excite both the constancy in specificall; and the fluency of individuall Natures. If there be any lesser Planets which are not conspicuous; or any greater Mutation in heaven (as in many superlunary Comets) they seem but like Pipes, either altogether mute, or only streperous for a time, because their influence either doth not stream down so low as to us; or doth not long interrupt the *Harmony* of the *seaven Pipes of Pan*. And that *Staffe of Empirie*, may be excellently applied to the order of Nature, which is partly right, partly crooked. And this staffe or rodde is especially crooked at the upper end; because all the works of Divine Providence are commonly fetcht about by circuits, and windings; so that one thing may seem to be done, and yet indeed a clean contrary brought to passe; as *the selling of Ioseph into Ægypt*, and the like. Besides in all wise humane Gen. 45. Government, they that sit at the helme, doe more happily bring their purposes about, and insinuate more easily things fit for the people, by pretexts, and oblique courses; than by downe-right dealing. Nay (which perchance may seem very strange) in things meereley naturall, you may sooner

deceive nature, than force her; so improper, and selfe-impeaching are open direct proceedings; whereas on the other side, an oblique and an insinuating way, gently glides along, and compasseth the intended effect.

§ *Pans Cloak or Mantle*, is ingeniously faigned to be the *Skin of a Leopard*, because it is full of spots: so the Heavens are spotted with starres; the Sea with Ilands; the Land with flowers; and every particular creature also, is for most part garnished with diverse colours about the superficies; which is, as it were a Mantle unto it.

§ The office of *Pan* could be by nothing so conceived; and exprest to the life, as by faigning him to be the *God of Hunters*; for every naturall Action, and so by consequence, motion and progression, is nothing else but a *Hunting*. Arts and Sciences have their works; and humane Counsils their ends, which they earnestly *hunt* after. All naturall things have either their food, as a *Prey*; or their pleasure, as a recreation; which they seek for; and that in a quick-discursive, and discerning way.

Virg. B. 2.

*Torva leæna Lupum sequitur, Lupus ipse Capellum,  
Florentem Cythisum sequitur lasciva Capella.*

§ *Pan* is also said to be the God of the *Country Swaines*; because men of this condition lead lives more agreeable unto Nature, than those that live in the Citties and Courts of Princes; where Nature by too much Art is corrupted: so as the saying of the Poet (though in the sense of love) may be here verified: --- *Pars minima est ipsa puella sui.*

Mart. Ep.

§ *Pan* was held to be *Lo. President of the Mountaines*; because in high Mountaines and Hills, *Nature* laies hir selfe most open, and is most displaid to the view and contemplation of men.

§ Whereas *Pan* is said to be (*next unto Mercury*) the *Messenger* of the Gods; there is in that a Divine Mystery contained; because, next unto the word of God, the *Image* of the world proclaimes the Divine power and wisdome; as records the sacred Poet, *The Heavens proclaime the Glory of God, and the vast Expansion reports the works of his hands.*

Plal. 19.

§ The

§ The *Nymphs*, that is the Soules of living things, give great delight to *Pan*: for the soules of the living are the Mitions of the World. The *Conduēt* of these *Nymphs* is with great reason attributed to *Pan*, because these *Nymphs*, or Soules of the liveing, doe follow their naturall disposition, as their guides; and with infinite variety every one of them after the fashion of his country, doth leap and dance with uncessant motion about hir. *Wherefore one of the Moderne* N. L. very ingeniously hath reduced all the power of the Soule into Motion; noting the misprision, and preeipitancy of some of the ancients; who fixing their eyes and thoughts with unadvised hast, upon Memory; Imagination, and Reason, have past over the *Cogitative faculty* untoucht; which hath a chiefe part in the order of conception. For he that calleth a thing into his mind, whether by impression or recordation, *cogitateth* and *considereth*; and he that imploiyeth the faculty of his phansie also *cogitateth*; and he that reasoneth doth in like manner *cogitate* or advise: and to be briefe, the Soule of man, whether admonisht by sense, or left to her own liberty; whether in functions of the Intellect, or of the affections and of the will, dances to the musicall aires of the *cogitations*; which is that *tripudiation* of the *Nymphs*.

§ The *Satyres*, and *Sileni*, are perpetuall followers of *Pan*, that is old age and youth: for of all naturall things, there is a lively, jocund, and (as I may say) a danceing age; and a dull, flegmatique age: the carriages and dispositions of both which ages, may peradventure seeme, to a man which seriously observes them, as ridiculous and deformed, as those of the *Satyres*, or of the *Sileni*.

§ Touching the *Terrors* which *Pan* is said to be the *Author* of, there may be made a wise instruction; namely, that *Nature* hath implanted in every living thing, a kind of care and feare, tending to the preservation of its own life, and being; and to the repelling and shunning of all hurtfull encounters. And yet *Nature* knows not how to keepe a mean, but alwaies intermixeth vaine and empty fears, with such as are discreet and profitable; so that all things (if their insides might be

Laert. in  
Epicur.

seen) would appear full of *Panique frights*; but specially Men; and above all other men, the people which are wonderfully travailed and tossed with superstition; specially in hard, and formidable, and adverse times; which indeed is nothing else but a *Panique terror*. Nor doth this superstition raigne only in the vulgar; but from popular opinions, breaks out some times upon wise men; as Divinely Epicurus (if the rest of his discourses touching the Gods, had bin conformable to this rule) *Non Deos vulgi negare prophanum; sed vulgi opiniones diis applicare prophanum.*

§ Concerning the *audacity of Pan*; and his *combate upon challenge with Cupid*; the meaning of it is, that matter wants not inclination, and desire, to the relapsing and dissolution of the World into the old *Chaos*; if his malice and violence were not restrained and kept in order, by the prepotent concord of things; signified by *Cupid*, or the *God of Love*. And therefore it fell out well for man, by the fatall contexture of the world; or rather the great goodnesse of the Divine Providence, that *Pan* was found too weak, and overcome. To the same effect may be interpreted, his *catching of Typhon in a net*. for howsoever there may sometimes happen vast, and unwonted tumors (as the name of *Typhon* imports) either in the Sea, or in the Ayre, or in the Earth; yet nature doth intangle in an intricate toile, and curbe and restraine as it were with a chaine of Adamant the excesses and insolencies of these kind of Bodies.

§ Astouching the *finding out of Ceres*, attributed to this God, and that as he was hunting and thought little of it, which none of the other Gods could doe, though they did nothing else but leek him, and that with diligence; it gives us this true and grave admonition; that is, *that men doe not expect the invention of things necessary for life and manners, from abstract Philosophies, as from the greater Gods; though they should apply themselves to no other study; but only from Pan, that is, from discreet experience, and from the universall observation of the things of the World; where oftentimes by chance (and as it were going a hunting) such inventions are lighted upon.*

for

For the most profitable inventions, are the off-spring of experience; and, as it were, certaine Donatives distributed to men by chance.

§ His contestation with *Apollo* about *Musique*; and the event thereof, contains a whollome instruction, which may serve to restraine mens reasons, and judgments, with the reines of sobriety, from boasting and glorying in their gifts. For there seemes to be a two-fold *Harmony* or *Musique*; the one of Divine Wisdome; the other of Humane Reason; for, to humane judgment, and as it were, the care of mortalls; the administration, of the world; and of Creatures therein; and the more secret judgments of God, found somewhat hard and harsh: Which rude ignorance, albeit it be well proclaim'd by Asses eares; yet notwithstanding these eares are secret, and doe not openly appeare; neither is it perceived, or noted as a Deformity by the Vulgar.

Addas & in-  
cōpar. San-  
disij cōmēt.  
ad Ovid.  
Mer. XI.

§ Lastly it is not to be wondered at, that there is nothing attributed unto *Pan* concerning *Loves*, but only of the marriage with *Eccho*; for the world doth enjoy it selfe, and in it selfe all things else. Now he that loves would enjoy something, but where there is enough, there is no place left to desire. Wherefore there can be no wanton love in *Pan*, or the *World*, nor desire to obtaine any thing, (seeing it is contented with it selfe) but only *Speeches*; which (if plaine) are pronounced by the Nymph *Eccho*, a thing not substantiall, but only vocall; if more accurate by *Syringa*; that is, when *words* and *voices* are regulate by certaine numbers; Poeticall, or O-ratoricall, as by musicall measures. It is an excellent invention that amongst *speeches*, and *voices*, only *Eccho* should be taken in marriage by the *World*; for that alone is true *Philosophy*, which doth faithfully render the very words of the world; and which is written, no otherwise, than the world doth dictate; and is nothing else than the image and reflection thereof; and addeth nothing of its owne, but only iterates, and resounds.

§ And whereas *Pan* is reported to have called the Moone aside into a high-shadowed wood; seemes to appertaine to the convention

convention betweene sense and heavenly, or divine things: For the case of *Endymion*, and *Pan* are different; the *Moone* of hir owne accord came downe to *Endymion*, as hee was asleep: For that *Divine illuminations* oftentimes gently slide into the understanding, cast asleepe, and retired from the senses; but if they be called, and sent for by *Sence*, as by *Pan*; than they present no other light than that,

*Quale sub incertam lunam] ub luce malignâ  
Est iter in sylvis.----*

*It belongs also to the sufficiency, and perfection of the world, that it begets no issue*: For the world doth generate in respect of its parts; but in respect of the whole, how can it generate, seeing there is no body beyond the bounds of the *Vniverse*? As for that *Girl* *Iambe*, father'd upon *Pan*, certainly it is a wise adjection to the fable; for by *hir* are represented those vaine and idle *Paradoxes* concerning the nature of things, which have been frequent in all ages, and have filled the world with novelties, for the matter, fruitles; spurious for the Race; by their garrulity, sometimes pleasant; sometimes tedious and unseasonable.

An other example of Philosophy according to Ancient Parables  
in Politiques, of *Warre*, according to the  
Fable of *Perseus*.

*V* *Perseus* a Prince of the East is reported to have bin im-  
ployed by *Pallas* for the destroying of *Medusa*, who was very  
infestious to the western parts of the world, about the ut-  
most Coasts of *Hiberia*. A Monster huge and fierce, of an as-  
pect so dire and horrid, that with hir very looks she turn'd  
men into stones: Of all the *Gorgons* this *Medusa* alone was  
mortall, the rest not subject to death. *Perseus* therefore pre-  
paring himselfe for this noble enterprise, had Armes, and  
guifts bestowed on him by three of the Gods: *Mercury* gave  
him wings fitted for his feet not his armes; *Pluto* a helmet;  
*Pallas* a shield, and a Looking-Glasse. Notwithstanding al-  
though he was thus well furnisht, he went not directly to  
*Medusa*, but turned into the *Gree*, which by the Mothers  
side

Hered. Po-  
lym. Ovid.  
Met. 4.

Paus.  
Strab.

side were sisters to the *Gorgons*. These *Gree* from their birth were hoary-headed, resembling old women. They had but one only *eye*, and one *tooth* among them all; both which as they had occasion to goe abroad, they were wont in course to take with them, and at their returne to lay them downe againe. This *Eye* and *Tooth* they lent to *Perseus*: so finding himsele completely appointed for the Action designed, with winged speed he marches towards *Medusa*. *Hir* he found sleeping; yet durst not venture himsele a front to hir aspect, if she should chance to awake; but turning his head aside, beholding her by reflection in *Pallas* Mirror, and so directing his blow, cut of hir head; from whose blood gushing out, instantly there emerged *Pegasus* the flyeing Horse. *Hir* head thus smitten off, *Perseus* transferres and inserts into *Pallas* shield; which yet retained this virtue, that whosoever lookt upon it, as one blasted or Plannet-struck, he should sodainly become senselesse.

§ This Fable seems to be devised for direction to the preparation, and order that is to be observed in making of warre. And first the undertaking of any warre ought to be as a commision from *Pallas*; certainly not from *Jenus*, (as the Trojan warre was) or some such slight motive; because the Designes of Warre, ought to be grounded upon solid Counsils. Than for the choice of warre, for the nature and quality thereof, the Fable propounds three grave and wholesome Precepts. The first is, that a Prince doe not much trouble himsele about the conquest of neighbour Nations: nor is the way of enlarging a Patrimony, and an Empire, the same; for in the augmentation of private possessions, the vicinity of Territories is to be considered; but in the amplification of publique Dominions, the occasion and facility of makeing warre, and the fruit to be expected, ought to be instead of propinquity. Therefore *Perseus*, though an Easterne Prince, makes the expedition of his warre a farre off, even in the remotest parts of the Western World. There is a notable president of this Case, in the different manner of warring, practised by two Kings, the Father and the Sonne, *Phi-*

Sandys  
Comment.  
in Ovid.  
Met. 4.  
Renovard.

Plut. in A-  
lex. Id. de  
Fort. Alex.

*lip* and *Alexander*. For *Philip* warred upon Borderers only, and added to the Empire some few Citties, and that not without great contention and danger; who many times, but especially in a Theban warre, was brought into extreme hazard: But *Alexander* carried the Actions of his warre a farre off; and with a prosperous boldnesse undertook an expedition against the *Persian*; conquered infinite Nations; tired, rather with travile, than warre. This point is farther cleered in the propagation of the *Roman Empire*, what time their conquests towards the West scarce reacht beyond *Liguria*, did yet in the *East*, bring all the provinces as farre as the mountaine *Taurus*, within the compasse of their Armes and command. So *Charles* the eight, King of France, finding the warre of Brittain (which afterward was compounded by marriage) not so feafable, pursued his enterprize upon *Naples*, which he accomplisht with wonderfull facility and felicity. Certainly warres made upon Nations farre off, have this advantage, that they are to fight with those who are not practised in the discipline and Armes of the Aggressor: but in a warre made upon Borderers, the case is otherwise. Besides the preparation for such an expedition is commonly better appointed; and the terror to the enemy from such a bold and confident enterprize, the greater. Neither can there usuallly be made, by the enemy to whom the warre is brought so farre off, any retaliation or reciprocall invasion; which in a warre upon borderers often falls out. But the chief point is, that in subdueing a neighbour state, the election of advantages is brought to a straight; but in a forraigne expedition, a man may turne the race of the warre at pleasure, thether, where military discipline is most weakned; or the strength of the Nation much wasted and worne; or Civile discords are seasonably on foot; or such like opportunities present themselves.

Hist. Fran.  
Serres alii.

Cic. 1. de  
Off.  
Bacon de  
jure Belli  
cont. Hist.

§ The second precept is, that the motives of warre be just; and Religious; and Honourable, and Plausible: for that begets alacrity, as well in the Souldiers that fight, as in the people that afford pay: it drawes on and procureth aides; and hath many

many other advantages besides. Amongst the just grounds of warre, that is most favorable, which is undertaken for the extirpation of Tyrans; under whom the people loose their courage, and are cast downe without heart and vigor, *as in the sight of Medusa*: which kind of heroick Acts, procured *Hercules* a divinity amongst the Gods. certainly it was a point of Religion amongst the Romans, with valour and speed, to aid and succour their confederates and allies, that were any way distressed. So just vindictive warres have for most part bin prosperous; so the warre against *Brutus* and *Cassius*, for the revenge of *Cæsars* death; of *Severus* for the death of *Pertinax*; of *Junius Brutus* for the revenge of the death of *Lucretia*: and in a word, whosoever relieve and revenge the calamities and injuries of men, beare arms under *Perseus*.

Ovid. Met.  
IX. Sandi-  
fii Com-  
ment.

Tacit.  
Herodian  
&c.

§ *The third precept is, that in the undertaking of any warre, a true estimate of the forces be taken; and that it be rightly waighed whether the enterprize may be compact and accomplished; lest vast and endlesse designs be pursued. For amongst the Gorgons, by which warre is represented, Perseus wisely undertook hir only, that was mortall, and did not set his mind upon impossibilities. Thus farre the fable instructs touching those things that fall in deliberation, about the undertaking of a warre; the rest pertaine to the warre it selfe.*

Fra. Bacon  
ut supra.

§ *In warre those three gifts of the Gods doe most availe, so as commonly they governe, and lead fortune after them: for Perseus received speed, from Mercury; concealing of his Counsils, from Orcus; and Providence from Pallas. Neither is it without an Allegorie, and that most prudent, that those wings of speed in dispatch of affaires (for quicknesse in warre is of speciall importance) were fastned unto his heeles, and not unto his Arme-holes; to his feet, and not to his shoulders; because celerity is required, not so much in the first aggressions and preparations; as in the pursuit and the succours that second the first assaults: for there is no errors in warre more frequent, than that prosecution, and subsidiary forces, shall to answer the alacrity of the first on-*

sets. Now the *Helmet of Pluto*, which hath power to make men invisible, is plaine in the Morall: for the *secreting of Counsils* next to *Celerity*, is of great moment in warre; whereof *Celerity* it selfe is a great part; for *speed*, prevents the disclosure of Counsils. It pertains to *Pluto's Helmet*, that there be one generall of the Army in warre, invested with absolute authority; for consultations communicated with many, partake more of the *Plumes of Mars*, than of the *Helmet of Pluto*. To the same purpose are various Pretensions, and doubtfull designations, and emissary reports; which either cast a cloud over mens eyes, or turne them another way, and place the true aimes of Counsils in the darke: for diligent and diffident Cautions touching letters, Ambassadors, Rebels, and many such like Provitoes, adorne and begirt the *Helmet of Pluto*. But it importeth no lesse, to discover the Counsils of the enemy than to conceale their owne: wherefore to the *Helmet of Pluto*, we must joyne the *Looking-glasse of Pallas*, whereby the strength, the weaknesse, the secret abettors, the divisions and factions, the proceedings and Counsils of the enemy may be discerned and disclosed. And because the casualties of warre are such, as we must not put too much confidence, either in the concealeing our own designs, or the dissecreting the designs of the enemy; or in celerity it selfe; we must especially take the *shield of Pallas*, that is of *Providence*; that so, as litle as may be, be left to fortune. Hetherto belong the sending out of espialls, the fortification of camps, (which in the Military discipline of this latter age, is almost grown out of use: for the camps of the Romans were strengthened as if it had bin a Citty, against all adverse events of warre) a settled and well ordered Army, not trusting too much to the light Bands, or to the troops of horsemen; and whatsoever appertaines to a substantiall and advised Defensive warre: seeing in warres the *shield of Pallas* prevails more than the *sword of Mars*.

§ But *Perseus* albeit he was sufficiently furnisht with forces and courage, yet was he to doe one thing of speciall importance, before he enterprized the Action; and that was

to have some *intelligence with the Gree*. These *Gree* are *treasons*, which may be termed the *sisters of Warre*; not descended of the same stock, but farre unlike in nobility of Birth: so *warres* are *Generous and Heroicall*; but *Treasons* *base and ignoble*. Their description is elegant, for they are said to be gray headed, and like old women from their birth; by reason that Traitors are continually vext with cares and trepidations. But all their strength, before the break out into open Rebellions, consists either in an *Eye*, or in a *Tooth*, for every faction alienated from any state, hath an *evil eye*; and *bites*. Besides, this *Eye and Tooth* is, as it were, common; for whatsoever they can learne or know, runs from hand to hand amongst them. And as concerning the *Tooth*, they doe all bite alike, and cast the same scandals; so that hear one, and you hear all. *Perseus* therefore was to deale with these *Gree*, and to engage their assistance for the loan of their *Eye and Tooth*: their *Eye* for *Discoveries*; their *Tooth* for the *swing and spreading of Rumors*; and the stirring up of envy; and the troubling of the mindes of men. *After all things are well, and preparedly disposed for warre*; that is first of all to be taken into consideration, which *Perseus* did, that *Medusa may be found a sleep*: for a wise Captain ever assaults the enemy unprepared; and when he is most secure. *Lastly in the very action and heat of warre*, the looking into *Pallas Glasse*, is to be put in practise: for most men, before it come to the push, can with diligence and circumspection dive into, and discern the state and designs of the enemies; but in the very point of danger, either are amazed with fear; or in a rash mood fronting dangers too directly, precipitate themselves into them; mindfull of victory; but forgetfull of evasion, and retrete. Yet neither of these should be practised, but they should look with a reversed countenance into *Pallas Mirror*; that so the stroak may be rightly directed, without either terror or fury.

§ After the Warre was finisht, and the victory wonne; there followed two Effects; *The procreation and raising of Pegasus*; which evidently denotes Fame, that flying through

the world proclaimes victory ; and makes the remaines of that warre easy and feafable. *The fecond is the bearing of Medufa's head in his fhield*; becaufe there is no kind of defence for excellency comparable to this: For one famous and memorable Act prosperoufly enterpriz'd and atchieved, strikes the Spirit of infurrection in an enemy, into an amazing terror; and blasts envy hir selfe into an astonishment and wonder.

The third Example of Philosophy according to Ancient Parables in *Morality. Of Paffion according to the Fable of Dionysus.*

Orph. in Hym. Ov. Met. 3. Eurip in Bacc. Nonn. in Dion.

VI *They say that Semele Iupiters Minion*, having bound hir Paramour, by an inviolable oath, to grant hir one request which she would aske, desir'd that he would accompany hir in the same form, wherein he came in to *Juno*: So she perisht with lightning. But the *Infant* which she bare in hir Wombe, *Iupiter* the Father took out, and sowed it in his thigh till the months were accomplisht, that it should be borne. *This burden* made *Iupiter* somewhat to limpe; wherefore the child, because it vext and pinched *Iupiter*, while it was in his flank, was called *Dionysus*. *Being borne* hee was committed to *Proserpina* for some yeares to be nurs't; and being growne up, he had such a maiden face, as that a man could hardly judge whether it were a boy, or a girle. *He was dead also*, and buried for a time, but afterwards revived. *Being but a youth* he invented the planting & dressing of vines; the making and use of wine; for which becomming famous and renowned, he subjugated the world even to the utmost bounds of *India*. *He rode in a Chariot drawne with Tygers*. There danced about him certaine deformed *Hobgoblins* called *Cobali*; *Acratus* and others; yea, even the *Muses* also were some of his followers. *Hee took to wife Ariadne*, forsaken and left by *Theseus*. *The tree sacred unto him was the Ivy*. He was held the *Inventor* and *Institu<sup>r</sup>or* of sacrifices and Ceremonies, but such as were frantique and full of corruptions

ons and cruelties. *He had likewise power to strike men with madnesse:* For it is reported that at the Celebration of his *Orgyes*, two famous Worthies, *Pentheus* and *Orpheus*, were torne in pieces by certaine mad-enraged women; the one because he got upon a tree, out of a curiosity to behold their Ceremonies in these Sacrifices; the other because he plaid sweetly and cunningly upon the harpe. *And for the Gestes of this God, they are in a manner the same with Jupiters.*

Paus: in  
Bœot.

Eurip: in  
Bac.

§ *There is such excellent Morality coucht in this fable, as Morall Philosophy affords not better. For under the Person of Bacchus is described the nature of Passion; or of Affections and Perturbations of the mind. First therefore touching the birth and parentage of Passion; the beginning of all Passion, though never so hurtfull, is nothing else than good Apparent: For as the Mother of virtue is good-Existent; so the Mother of Passion is good Apparent. The one of these (under which Person, the soule of man is represented) is Jupiters lawfull wife, the other his Concubine: which yet affecteth the honour of Inno, as Semele did. Passion is conceiv'd in an unlawfull desire, rashly granted, before rightly understood, and judged: And after when it begins to grow fervent, the Mother of it, which is the Nature and Species of Good, by too much inflammation is destroyed, and perisheth. The proceeding of Passion from the first conception thereof is after this manner: It is nourisht and concealed by the mind of man (which is the Parent of Passion,) Ipecially in the inferior part of the mind, as in the thigh; and so vexeth, and pulleth, and depreffeth the mind; as those good determinations and actions, are much hindered and lamed thereby: but when it comes to be confirmed by consent and habit; and breakes out into Act, that it hath now, as it were fulfill'd the months, and is brought forth and born; first for a while it is brought up by Proserpina; that is, it seeks corners and secret places, and lurks as it were, underground, untill the rains of shame and fear laid aside, and boldnesse comming on; it either assumes the pretext of some virtue, or becomes altogether impudent and shamelesse. And it is most true that every vehement Passion is of*

V. Cōment  
in Ovid.

Met. 3.  
G. Sandijs.  
Renovard.

*a doubtfull sexe; being masculine in the first motion, but feminine in prosequation. It is an excellent fiction, that of dead Bacchus reviving; for Passions doe sometimes seeme to be in a dead sleepe, and extinct; but we must not trust them, no though they were buried. For let there be but matter and opportunity offer'd, they rise againe.*

§ *The invention of the Vine is a wise Parable; for every affection is very quick and witty in finding out that which nourisheth, and cherisheth it; and of all things knowne to men, wine is most powerfull and efficacious to excite and inflame Passions; of what kind soever; as being in a sort a common incentive to them all.*

§ *Againe Affection or Passion is elegantly set downe to be a subduer of Nations, and an undertaker of infinite expeditions: For desire never rests content with what it possesseth; but with an infinite and unsatiable appetite still covets more, & hearkens after a new purchase.*

§ *So Tygers STABLE by Affections; and draw their Chariot: For since the time that Affection began to ride in a Coach; and to goe no more a foot; and to captivate Reason; and to lead hir away in triumph; it grows cruel, unmanegeable, and fierce, against whatsoever withstands or opposeth it.*

§ *And it is a pretty devise, that those ridiculous Demons, are brought in dancing about Bacchus Chariot: For every vehement affection doth cause in the eyes; face; and gesture, undecent and subleeming, apeish, and deformed motions; so that they who in any kind of Passion, (as in anger, arrogance; or love) seem glorious and brave in their owne eyes; doe appeare to others mishapen, and ridiculous.*

§ *The Muses are seen in the Company of Passion: and there is almost no affection so depraved and vile, which is not soothed by some kind of Learning: And herein the indulgence and arrogancy of Wits doth exceedingly derogate from the Majesty of the Muses; that whereas they should be the Leaders and Ancient-bearers of life; they are become the foot-pages; and buffoones to lusts and vanity.*

§ *Againe where Bacchus is said to have engaged his Affections*

*Actions on hir that was abandoned and reiected by another:* it is an Allegory of speciall regard; for it is most certain, that *Passion* ever seekes and sues for that which experience hath relinquisht, and they all know, who have paid deare for serving and obeying their *Lusts*; that whether it be honor, or riches, or delight, or glory, or knowledge, or any thing else, which they seeke after; they pursue things cast off, and by diverse men in all ages after experience had utterly rejected and repudiate.

§ *Neither is it without a Mystery, that the Ivy was sacred to Bacchus;* the application holds two waies: *First*, in that the *Ivy* remaines green in Winter; *Secondly*, in that it creeps along, imbraceth, and advanceth it selfe over so many diverse bodies, as trees, walls, and edifices. *Touching the first*, every *Passion* doth through renitence and prohibition, and as it were, by an *Anti-peristasis*, (like the *Ivy* through the cold of winter) grow fresh and lively. *Secondly*, every predominant affection in mans soule, like the *Ivy*, doth compass and confine all human Actions and Consils; neither can you finde any thing so immaculate and inconcern'd, which affections have not tainted and clinched as it were with their tendrells.

§ *Neither is it a wonder, that superstitious ceremonies were attributed unto Bacchus,* seeing every giddy-headed humor keeps, in a manner, Revell-rout in false Religions; so that the pollutions and distempers of heretiques, exceed the *Bachanalls* of the Heathens; and whose superstitions have bin no lesse barbarous; than vile and loathsome. *Nor is it a wonder that Madnesse is thought to be sent by Bacchus,* seeing every affection in the Excesse thereof, is a kind of *short fury*; and if it grow vehement and become habituell; it commonly concludes in *Madnesse*.

§ *Concerning the rending and dismembriing of Pentheus and Orpheus, in the celebration of the Orgies of Bacchus,* the Parable is plain. For every prevalent affection is outrageous against two things; whereof the one is *Curious enquiry* into it, the other *free and wholsome admonition*. Nor will it availe, though that

*inquiry* was only to contemplate and to behold, as it were going up into a tree, without any malignity of mind; nor againe, though that *admonition* was given with much art and sweetnesse; but howsoever, the *Orgies* of *Bacchus*; can not endure either *Pentheus* or *Orpheus*.

§ *Lastly that confusion of the Persons of Jupiter and Bacchus*, may be well transferred to a Parable; seeing noble and famous Acts, and remarkable and glorious merits, doe sometimes proceed from virtue and well ordered reason, and magnanimity; and sometimes from a secret affection, and a hidden passion; howsoever both the one and the other, so affect the renowne of Fame, and Glory; that a man can hardly distinguish between the Acts of *Bacchus*; and the Gestes of *Jupiter*.

But we stay too long in the *Theatre*; let us now passe on to the *Pallace of the Mind*; the *entrance* whereof we are to approach with more veneration, and attention.





THE THIRD BOOK OF  
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM  
VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE  
DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

- I. *The Partition of Sciences, into Theology and Philosophy.*  
 II. *The Partition of Philosophy into three Knowledges. Of God; of Nature; of Man.* III. *The Constitution of Philosophia Prima, or Summary Philosophy; as the Commune Parent of all.*



**A**L *History* (Excellent KING) treads upon the Earth, and performs the office of a Guide, rather than of a light; and *Poesy* is, as it were the Dream of Knowledge; a sweet pleasing thing, full of variations; and would be thought to be somewhat inspired with Divine Rapture; which Dreams likewise pretend: but now it is time for me to awake, and to raise my selfe from the Earth, cutting the liquid Aire of *Philosophy*, and *Sciences*.

I *Knowledge is like waters; some waters descend from the Heavens, some spring from the Earth; so the Primary Partition of Sciences, is to be derived from their fountaines; some are seated above; some are heere beneath. For all knowledge*

proceeds from a two fold information; *either from Divine inspiration, or from externall Sence*; As for that knowledge which is infused by instruction; that is Cumulative, not Originall; as it is in waters, which besides the Head-springs, are encreated by the reception of other Rivers that fall into them. *Wherefore we will divide Sciences, into Theology; and Philosophy*; by *Theology* we understand *Inspired or Sacred Divinity*, not *Naturall*, of which we are to speake anon. But this *Inspired Theology*, we reserve for the last place, that we may close up this work with it; seeing it is the Port and Saboath of all Humane Contemplations.

II. *The Obiect of Philosophy is of three sorts; GOD; NATURE; MAN*: so likewise there is a *Triple Beam of Things*; for *Nature darts upon the understanding with a direct Beame*; *God because of the inequality of the mediu, which is the Creature, with a refract beame*; and *man represented and exhibited to himselfe, with a beam reflex*. Wherefore Philosophy may fitly be divided into three knowledges; the *knowledge of God*; the *knowledge of Nature*; and the *knowledge of Man*.

III. And because the Partition of Sciences are not like severall lines that meet in one angle; but rather like branches of trees that meet in one stemme, which stemme for some dimension and space is entire and continued, before it break, and part it selfe into armes and boughes; therefore the nature of the subject requires, before we pursue the parts of the former distribution, to erect and constitute *one universall Science*, which may be the mother of the rest; and that in the progresse of Sciences, a Portion, as it were, of the common high-way may be kept, before we come where the waies part and divide themselves. *This Science we stile Primitive Philosophy or Sapience*, which by the Ancients was defin'd to be, *The Science of things divine and human*. To this *Science* none of the rest is opposed, being it is differenced from other knowledges, rather in the limits of latitude, than in the things and subject; that is, handling only the tops of things. Whether I should report this as *DEFICIENT*, I stand doubtfull, yet I think I very well may. For I find a  
cer-

certain kind of Rhapsody, and confus'd masse of knowledge, namely of *Naturall Theology*; of *Logique*; of particular parts of *Naturall Philosophy* (as of the Principles of Nature, and of the soule) composited and compiled; and by the height of termes (from men who love to admire themselves) advanced, and exalted, as it were, to the verticall point of Sciences. But we, without any such stately loftinesse, would only have thus much, *That there might be design'd a certain Science that should be the receptacle of all such Axioms, as fall not within the compasse of any speciall part of Philosophy; but are more common to them all, or most of them.*

§ That there are many of this kind needs not to be doubted. For example, *Si inaequalibus equalia addas, omnia erunt inaequalia*; is a rule in the *Mathematiques*: and the same holds in the *Ethiques* concerning *Attributive Justice*; for in *Justice Expletive*, the reason of equitie requires, *That equal Portion be given to unequal Persons; but in Attributive, unlesse unequal be distributed unto unequal, it is a great injustice. Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, & inter se conveniunt*; is likewise a rule taken from the *Mathematiques*; but so potent in *Logique* also, as all *Syllogismes* are built upon it. *Natura se potissimum prodit in minimis*, is a rule in *Naturall Philosophy* so prevalent, that it hath produced *Democritus Atomes*; yet hath *Aristotle* made good use of it in his *Politiques*, where he raiseth his contemplations of a *Citty or State*, from the Principles of a *Family*. *Omnia mutantur nil interit*; is also a maxime in *Naturall Philosophy* thus expressed, that the *Quantum* of Nature is neither diminisht nor augmented: The same is applied to *Naturall Theology* thus varied; *That they are the workes of the same Omnipotence, to make nothing somewhat; and to make somewhat nothing*; which the *Scriptures* likewise testify; *I have found by experience that all the works of God doe pe severe for ever: nothing can be put unto them, nor any thing taken from them. Interitus rei arcetur per reductionem eius ad Principia*, is a rule in *Naturall Philosophy*; the same holds also in the *Politiques* (as *Macchiavell* hath wisely observed) because the means which must specially preserve

Euclid.  
El. lib. 1.

Eclid. El.  
Arist.

Arist. de  
Part. Animal  
1.

Polit. 1.

Eccles 3.

Disc. sopra  
la. 1. Dec.  
di liu. lib. 3.

States from ruine, are commonly nothing else than a reformation, and a reduction of them to their Ancient customes.

Avicenna  
Hippoc. Epid.

*Putredo serpens magis contagiosa est quam matura*; is a ground in Naturall Philosophy; the same is an excellent Maxime in Morall Philosophy; because professedly wicked, and desperately impious persons, doe not corrupt publique manners so much, as they doe, who seeme to have some soundnesse and goodnesse in them; and are diseased but in part.

Arist. alibi.

*Quod conservativum est formae maioris, id activitate potentius*; is a ground in Naturall Philosophy: for it makes for the conservation of the fabrique of the universe; that the chaine and contexture of nature, be not cut asunder or broken; and that there be not *vacuum*, as they call it, or *empty discontinuity* in the world; and that heavy bodies should be congregate and assembled to the massy pile of the earth, makes for the conservation of the Region of grosse and compacted natures: wherefore the first and universall motion commands, and subdues, the latter and more particular. *The same rule* holds in the *Politiques*, for those things which conduce to the conservation of the whole *Body Politique* in its entire nature and essence, are more potent, than those things are, which make only for the well-fare and existence of Particular members, in a State or Civile Government. *So the same rule* takes place in Theologie; for amongst Theologicall virtues, *Charity*, a virtue most communicative excels all the rest.

Arist. Meteor. I.  
Problem 9. II.

*Augetur vis agentis per anti-peristasin contrarii*: is a rule in Naturall Philosophy; the same works wonders in Civile states, for all faction is vehemently moved, and incensed at the rising of a contrary faction. *Tonus discors in concordem*

V. Boet. de Musica. &c.

*actutum desinens, concentum commendat*: To fall suddenly from a *Discord upon a Concord commends the Aire*: is a rule in Musique: the like effect it worketh in Morality, and the Affections. That *Trope of Musique*, to fall or slide softly, from the close or cadence (as they call it) when it seemed even to touch it, is common with the Trope of Rhetorique, of *deceiving expectation*. The Quavering upon a stop in Musique, gives the same delight to the eare; that the playing of light upon

upon the water, or the sparkling of a Diamond gives to the eye.

---*Splendet tremulo sub lumine Pontus.*

Virg. Æn. 7

*Organa sensuum cum Organis reflectionum conveniunt*: This hath place in *Perspective Art*; for the eye is like to a Glasse, or to waters: and in *Acoustique Art*; for the Instrument of hearing is like to the straits and winding within a Cave. These few instances may suffice for examples. And indeed the Persian Magique, so much celebrated, consists chiefly in this; to observe the correspondency in the *Architectures, and Fabriques of things Natural, & of things Civile*. Neither are all these whereof we have spoken, and others of like nature *meere Similitudes* only, as men of narrow observation perchance may conceive; but one and the very same footsteps, and seales of Nature, printed upon severall subjects or matters. This kind of *Science*, hath not bin hither too seriously handled: You may peradventure find in the Writings comming from the pens of the profounder sort of wits, Axiomes of this kind, thinly and sparledly inserted, for the use and explication of the Argument which they have in hand; but a complete body of such *Maximes, which have a Primitive and Summary force and efficacy in all Sciences, none yet have composed*; being notwithstanding a matter of such consequence, as doth notably conduce to the unity of Nature; which we conceive to be the office and use of *Philosophia Prima*.

§ There is also an other Part of this, *Primitive Philosophy*, which, if you respect *termes*, is Ancient; but, if the *matter* which we designe, is new, and of an other kind; and it is an Inquiry concerning the *Accessory Conditions of Entities*, which we may call *Transcendents*; as *Multitude, Paucity, Similitude, Diversity, Possible, and Impossible; Entity, Non-Entity*; and the like. For being *Transcendents* doe not properly fall within the compasse of *Naturall Philosophy*; and that *Dialecticall* dissertation about them is rather accommodated to the *Formes of Argumentation*; than the *Nature of things*; it is very convenient that this *Contemplation*, wherein there is so much dignity and profit, should not be altogether deserted; but find at least some roome in the *Partitions of Sciences*:

ces: but this we understand to be perform'd farre after an other manner, than usually it hath bin handled. For example no man who hath treated of *Paucity* or *Multitude*, hath endeavour'd to give a reason, *Why some things in Nature are and may be so numerous and large; others so few and litle!* For certainly it cannot be, that there should be in nature as great store of Gold, as of Iron; as great plenty of Roses, as of Grasse; as great variety of determin'd and specificque Natures, as of imperfects, and non-specificates. So none in handling *Similitude* and *Diversity*, hath sufficiently discovered the Cause, why betwixt diverse species there should, as it were perpetually, be interposed, *Participle sof Nature*, which are of a doubtfull kind and reference; as *Mosse* betwixt Putrefaction, and a Plant: *Fishes* which adhere and move not, betwixt a Plant and a living Creature: *Rats*, and *Mise*, and other vermine between living Creatures generated of Putrefaction, and of seed: *Bats* or *Flitter-mise* between Birds and Beasts; *Flying Fishes*, now commonly knowne, between Fowles and Fish: *Sea-Calfes* between Fishes and four-footed Beasts; and the like. Neither hath any made diligent inquiry of the Reason how it should come to passe, *being like delights to unite to like*, that Iron drawes not Iron, as the Loadstone doth; nor Gold allures and attracts unto it Gold, as it doth Quick-silver. Concerning these and the like adjuncts of things, there is, in the common Dilceptation about *Transcendents* a deepe silence: *For men have pursued Niceties of Termes, and not subtleties of things*. Wherefore we would have this *Primitive Philosophy* to containe a substantiall and solid inquiry of these *Transcendents*, or *Adventitious Conditions of Entities*, according to the Lawes of *Nature*, and not according to the Lawes of *Words*. So much touching *Primitive Philosophy*, or *Sapience*, which we have justly refer'd to the Catalogue

\* OF DEFICIENTS.

## CAP. II.

OF *Naturall Theologie*. § *Of the Knowledge of Angels, and of Spirits; which are an Appendix thereof.*



THE *Commune Parent* of Sciences being first placed in its proper throne like unto *Berecynthia* which had so much heavenly Issue.

*Omnes Cœlicolæ, omnes super a alta tenentes.*

Virg. *Æn.* 6

We may returne to the former Division of the three Philosophies, *Divine; Naturall; and Humane.*

I For *Naturall Theology*, is truly called *Divine Philosophy*. And this is defined to be a Knowledge, or rather a spark and rudiment of that Knowledge concerning God; such as may be had by the light of Nature; and the Contemplation of the Creature: which Knowledge may be truly termed *Divine* in respect of the Object; and *Naturall* in respect of the Light. The Bounds of this Knowledge are truly set forth, that they may extend to the Confutation and Conviction of Atheisme; the Information of the Law of Nature; but may not be drawne out to the Confirmation of Religion. *Therefore there was never Miracle wrought by God to convert an Atheist, because the light of Nature might have led him to confesse a God; but Miracles are designed to convert Idolaters, and the Superstitious, who have acknowledged a Deity, but erred in his Adoration; because no light of Nature extends to declare the will and true Worship of God.* For as workes doe shew forth the power and skill of the workman, but not his Image: So the workes of God, doe shew the Omnipotency and Wisdome of the Maker; but no way expresse his Image. And in this the Heathen opinion differs from the sacred Truth: For they defined the world to be the Image of God; man the Image of the World; but Sacred Scriptures never vouchsafed the world that honour, as any where to be stiled the Image of God, but only, *the*

Plal. 8.

Gen. 1.

S

image

*mage of God.* Wherefore, that there is a God; that hee raines and rules the world; that he is most potent, wise, and provident: that he is a Rewarder, a Revenger; that he is to be adored; may be demonstrated and evinced even from his workes: and many wonderfull secrets touching his attributes, and much more touching his Regiment and dispensation over the world, may likewise with sobriety be extracted, and manifested out of the same workes; and is an Argument hath bin profitably handled by diverse. *But out of the contemplation of Nature, and out of the Principles of Human Reason, to discourse, or earnestly to urge a point touching the Mysteries of faith; and againe, to be curiously speculative into thole secrets; to ventilate them; and to be inquisitive into the manner of the Mystery, is, in my judgement not safe: Da Fidei quæ Fidei sunt.* For the Heathens themselves conclude as much, in that excellent and divine Fable of the golden Chaine, *That Men and Gods were not able to draw Iupiter down to the Earth; but contrariwise Iupiter was able to draw them up to Heaven.* Wherefore he laboureth in vaine, who shall attempt to draw downe heavenly Mysteries to our reason; it rather becomes us to raise and advance our reason to the adored Throne of Divine Truth. *And in this part of Naturall Theology, I am so farre from noteing any deficiency, as I rather finde an excessse; which to observe I have somewhat digressed, because of the extreme prejudice, which both Religion and Philosophy have received thereby; as that which will fashion and forge a hereticall Religion, and an imaginary and fabulous Philosophy.*

§ *But as concerning the nature of Angels and Spirits, the matter is otherwise to be conceived; which neither is inscrutable, nor interdicted; to which knowledge, from the affinity it hath with mans soule, there is a passage opened.*

Coloss. 2.

The Scripture indeed commands, *let no man deceive you with sublime discourse touching the worship of Angels, pressing into that he knowes not; yet notwithstanding if you observe well that precept, you shall finde there only two things forbidden; namely Adoration of Angels, such as is due to God; and*

*Phantasti-*

*Phantasticall Opinions of them*, either by extolling them above the degree of a creature; or to extoll a mans knowledge of them farther than he hath warrantable ground. But the sober enquiry touching them, which by the gradations of things corporall, may ascend to the nature of them; or which may be seen in the Soule of Man, as in a Looking-glasse, is in no wise restrained. *The same may be concluded of impure and revolted spirits*; the conversing with them, and the imployment of them, is prohibited; much more any veneration towards them; but the Contemplation or Science of their Nature; their Power; their Illusions; not only from places of sacred Scripture, but from reason or experience; is a principall part of Spirituall wildome. For so the Apostle saith, *we are not ignorant of his Stratagems*. And it is no more 2. Cor. 2. unlawfull to enquire, in naturall Theology, the nature of *evill Spirits*; than to enquire the nature of Poysons in Physique, or of vices in the Ethiques. But this part of Science touching *Angels* and degenerate spirits, I cannot note as *Deficient*; for many have imployed their pens in it: Rather most of the writers in this kind may be argued either of vanity, or superstition, or of unprofitable subtlety.

## CAP. III.

*The Partition of Naturall Philosophy into Speculative; and Operative. ¶ And that these two, both in the intention of the writer; and in the body of the Treatise, should be separated.*

**L**eaving therefore *Naturall Theology* (to which we have attributed the enquiry of *Spirits*, as an Appendix) we may proceed to the second Part, namely that of *Nature*, or *Naturall Philosophy*. Democritus saith Laert. Senec. excellently, *That the knowledge concerning Nature, lies hid in certain deep Mines and Caves*. And it is somewhat to the purpose

Paracel.  
de Philof.  
fagaci.

pose, that the Alchimists doe so much inculcate, *That vulcan is a second Nature, and perfects that compendiously which Nature useth to effect by ambages and length of time:* why then may we not divide Philosophy into two parts; the *Mine, and the Fornace;* and make two professions, or occupations of *Naturall Philosophers;* *Pyoners* or workers in the mine; and *Smythes,* or refiners? Certainly however we may seem to be conceited, and to speak in jest; yet we doe best allow of a division in that kind, if it be proposed in more familiar and Scholasticall termes, namely, that the *knowledge of Nature,* be divided into *the Inquisition of Causes;* and the *Production of Effects;* Speculative, and Operative; the one searcheth the bowels of Nature; the other fashions Nature, as it were, upon the Anvile.

§ Now although I know very well with what a strict band, causes and effects are united; so as the explication of them, must in a sort be coupled and conjoynd: yet because all solid and fruitfull Naturall knowledge hath a double, and that distinct, scale or ladder; *Ascendent and Descendent;* From *Experiments to Axioms,* and from *Axioms to new Experiments.* I judge it most requisite, that these two parts, *Speculative* and *Operative,* be separate, both in the intention of the writer, and the Body of the Treatise.

CAP.



## C A P. IV.

I. *The Partition of the Speculative knowledge of Nature into Physique speciall, and Metaphysique: Whereof Physique enquires the Efficient Cause, and the Matter: Metaphysique the finall Cause and the Forme.* II. *The Partition of Physique, into the knowledges of the Principles of Things; of the Fabrique of Things, or of the World; And of the variety of Things.* III. *The Partition, of Physique, touching the variety of things, into the Doctrine of Concretes; and into the Doctrine of Abstracts. The Partition of the knowledge of Concretes, is referred over to the same Partition which Naturall History Comprehends.* IV. *The Partition of the knowledge of Abstracts, into the knowledge of the Schemes of Matter; and into the knowledge of Motions.* V. *Two Appendices of Speculative Physique; Naturall Problems: And the Placits of Ancient Philosophers.* VI. *The Partition of Metaphysique, into the Doctrine of Formes; And into the Doctrine of Finall Causes.*

I. **T**Hat part of *Naturall Philosophy* which is *Speculative and Theoricall*, we think convenient to divide into *Physique speciall; and Metaphysique*. And in this Partition I desire it may be conceiv'd, that we use the word *Metaphysique* in a differing sense from that, that is received. And here it seemes to fall out not unfitly to advertise in generall of our purpose and meaning touching the use of words, and Termes of Art. *And it is this*, that as well in this word *Metaphysique* now delivered, as in other termes of Art, wheresoever our conceptions and notions are new, and differ from the received; yet with much reverence, we retaine the *Ancient termes*. For being we hope, that the method it selfe, and a perspicuous explication of the Matter which we labour to annexe, may redime us from an incongruous conception of the words we use, we are otherwise zealous (so farre as we can without prejudice of Truth and Sciences) to depart as litle as may be, from the opinions and expressions of Antiquity. And herein I cannot but marvaile at the confidence of *Aristotle*, who possesseth with a

spirit of contradiction; and denouncing warre against all Antiquity, not only usurpt a licence to coine new termes of Arts at pleasure; but hath endeavoured to deface and extinguish all ancient wisdom. In so much as he never names any ancient Auctors; or makes any mention of their opinions, but to reprehend their Persons; or to redargue their Placits, and opinions. Certainly if he affected glory, and drawing disciples after him, he took the right course: For the same comes to passe in the asserting and receiving a Philosophicall Truth, that doth in a Divine Truth; *veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; si quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis.* But from this divine Aphorisme, if we consider whom specially it hath designed (namely Antichrist the greatest Impostor of all times) we may collect, *that the coming in a mans own name, without any regard of Antiquity, or (if I may so speak) of Paternity, is no good Augurie of Truth, however it be joyned with the fortune and successe of an eum recipietis. But for Aristotle, certainly an excellent man, and of an admirable profound wit, I should easily be induced to believe, that he learned this ambition of his Scholler, whom perhaps he did emulate: that if one conquered all Nations; the other would conquer all Opinions, and raise to himselfe a kind of Monarchy in contemplations.* Although it may so fall out, that he may at some mens hands that are of a bitter disposition, and biting language, get a like title, as his Scholler did;

Lucan l. 10.

*Fælix terrarum Prædo, non utile Mundo**Editus exemplum. ----- So*

*Fælix Doctrinæ Prædo &c.* But to us on the other side that doe desire so much as lies in the power of our penne, to contract a league and commerce between Ancient & Moderne knowledges; our judgement stands firme, *to keep way with Antiquity, usq; ad Aras;* and to retaine the Ancient termes, though sometimes we alter their Sence, and Definitions: according to the moderate and approved manner of Innovation, in Civile Government; where the state of things being changed, yet the solemnity of words, and stiles is observed which Tacitus notes; *Eadem Magistratum vocabula.*

Annal. 1.

§ To

§ To returne therefore to the acception of the word *Metaphysique*, in our sence. It appears by that which hath bin already said, that we distinguish *Primitive Philosophy*, from *Metaphysique*, which heretofore hath bin confounded and taken for the same thing. The one we have set downe as a *commune Parent of all Sciences*; the other, as a portion of *Naturall Philosophy*. We have assign'd Common and Promiscuous *Axioms of Sciences*, to *Primitive Philosophy*. Likewise all *Relative and Adventive condicions and Characters of Essences*, which we have named *Transcendents*; as *Multitude, Paucity, Identity, Diversity, Possible Impossible*, and such like; we have attributed to the same, only with this Proviso, that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not Logically. But we have referred the inquiry concerning *God, Unity, Bonity, Angels, Spirits*, to *Naturall Theology*. Wherefore now it may rightly be demanded, what after all this is remaining to *Metaphysique*! certainly beyond nature, nothing; but of nature it selfe the most excellent part. And indeed without prejudice to Truth, we may thus farre concurre with the opinion and concept of Antiquity; that *Physique* only handleth that which is inherent in matter, and is moveable; *Metaphysique* things more abstracted and fixt. Againethat *Physique* supposeth existence only and Motion; and naturall Necessity: but *Metaphysique* the Mind also; the Idea or platforme. For to this point perchance the matter comes, whereof we shall discourse. But we will propound this difference, (leaving aside the sublimity of speech) perspicuously and familiarly. We have divided *Naturall Philosophy* into the Inquisition of causes, and the production of effects. The inquiry of causes we have referred to the Theoricall part of *Philosophy*; which we have divided into *Physique and Metaphysique*: wherefore by necessary consequence the true difference of these two Theories, must be taken from the nature of the Causes which they enquire; so without all obscurity or circuit, *Physique* is that which enquires of the *efficient cause*; and of the *Matter*; *Metaphysique*, that which enquires of the *Forme and end*.

*Physique*

II *Physique* therefore comprehends Causes variable and incertaine, and according to the nature of the subject moveable and changing, and attaines not a fixt constancy of Causes.

*Limus ut hic durefcit, & hæc ut cera liquefcit*

Virg. Æn. 8

*Vno eodemque igni*-----

Fire is cause of induration, but respective to clay; Fire is cause of colliquation, but respective to waxe. We will divide *Physique* into three Knowledges: For Nature is either united and collected into one; or diffused and distributed: Nature is collected into one either in respect of the *common Seeds and Principles of all things*; or in respect of the *entire, totall Fabrique of the universe*. This union of Nature hath brought forth two Parts of *Physique*, one of the *Principles of Things*; the other of the *Fabrique of the Universe*, or of the World; which we use to call the Doctrines of *Summes* or *Totalls*. The third Knowledge which handles Nature *diffused, or scattered*, exhibites *all the variety of things*, & the lesser *Summes* or *Totalls*. Wherefore from these contemplations it is plainly manifest, that there are three Knowledges touching *Naturall Philosophy*, of the *Principles of things; of the world; or of the Fabrique of thing*. Of Nature *multiplicious or sparsed*; which last Part, (as we have said) containes all the variety of things; and is, as it werethe first Glosse, or Paraphase touching the INTERPRETATION OF NATVRE Of these three Parts, none is wholly DEFICIENT; but in what truth and Perfection they are handled, I make not now my judgment.

III But we will again divide *Physique distinctively sorted*, or of the *variety of things*, into two Parts; into *Physique of concrets*; and into *Physique of Abstracts*: or into *Physique of Creatures*; and into *Physique of Natures*. The one (to use the termes of Logique) inquires of *Substances* with all the variety of their Adjuncts; the other of *Accidents*, or Adjuncts through all the variety of substances. For example, if the inquiry be of a *Lion*, or of an *Oak*, these are supported by many and diverse Accidents: Contrariwise if the inquiry be made of *Heate*, or *Heavinessse*, these are in many distinct substances.

And

And seeing all *Physique* or *Naturall Philosophy* is situate in a middle terme, betweene *Naturall History* and *Metaphysique*; the first part (if you observe it well) comes neerer to *Naturall History*; the later part neerer to *Metaphysique*; *Concret Physique* hath the same division which *Naturall History* hath; so that it is a knowledge either concerning the *Heavens*; or concerning *Meteors*; or concerning the *Globe of the earth and Sea*; or concerning the *greater Collegiates*, which they call the *Elements*; or concerning the *lesser Collegiates*, or *natures specificque*; so likewise concerning *Pretergenerations*; and concerning *Mechaniques*. For in all these *Naturall History* inquires and reports the fact it selfe; but *Physique* the Causes likewise; but you must conceive this of fluid, not fixt Causes, that is, of matter and of the efficient.

§ Amongst these Portions of *Physique*, that Part is altogether maimed and imperfect which enquires of *Cælestiall bodies*; which notwithstanding, for the excellency of the Subject, ought to be taken into speciall consideration: For *Astronomy* it is indeed not without some probability and use grounded upon the *Phænomena*, but it is vulgar, base, and no way solid: But *Astrology* in many Circumstances hath no ground at all. In truth *Astronomy* presents such a sacrifice to Mans understanding, as once *Prometheus* did, when he went about to cozen *Jupiter*; for instead of a true, substantiall *Oxe*, he presented the hide of a great and faire *Oxe* stuf, and set out with straw, leaves, and *Osier* twigs; so in like manner *Astronomy* exhibiteth the extrinsique Parts of *Cælestiall Bodies*, (namely the Number, Situation, Motion, and Periods of the starres) as the *Hide of Heaven*; faire and artificially contrived into *Systemes*, and *Schemes*: but the Entrals are wanting; that is, *Physicall reasons*, out of which (adjoyning *Astronomical Hypotheses*) the Theory should be extracted, not such grounds and suppositions as should only save the *Phænomena* (of which kind a number may be wittily devised) but such as propound the substance, motion and influx of the *Heavens*, as they they truly are in nature. For those *Dogmaes* and *Paradoxes* are almost vanisht, & long agoe exploded;

*Raptus i. mo-  
bitis. Soliditas  
celi. Motus re-  
mutenti. Poli  
adversi. Epy-  
cli. Excent.  
Motus Terra  
diurna: &c.*

*Hypothesi-  
s imaginaria.*

*wide digress.*

ded, namely, the *Rapture of the First Mover*: and the *Solidity of Heaven* (*starres being there fixt as nailes in the Arched Roofe of a Parlour*). And other opinions, not much better, as, that *there are diverse Poles of the Zodiack, and of the world; that there is a second moveable of Renitency, contrary to the rapture of the first Moveable; that all parts of the firmament are turned about by perfect circles; that there are Eccentriques and Epicycles, to save the constancy of Motion by perfect circles; that the Moone hath no force or influence upon a body superior to it, and the like.* And the absurdity of these suppositions, hath cast men upon that opinions of the *Diurnall Motion of the Earth; an opinion which we can demonstrate to be most false.* But scarce any man can be found, who hath made enquiry of the *Naturall Causes of the substance of the heavens, as well Stellare, as Inter-stellare; so of the swiftnesse and slownesse of heavenly bodies, refer'd one to another; also of the various incitation of Motion in the same Planet; likewise of the perpetuated course of Motion from East to West, and the contrary: Lastly of Progressions, stations and Retrogradations, of the Elevation and Declination of Motions, by the Apogée, or middle point; and Perigée or lowest point of heauen; so of the oblique windings of Motions, either by flexuow Spires, weaving and unweaving themselves, as they make their approach or recessse from the Tropiques; or by serpentine sinuations, which they call Dragons, so of the fixt Poles of Rotations or wheeling motions, why they should be placed in such a point of the heavens, rather than in any other; so of the alligation of some Planets at a certain distance from the Sunne: I say an inquiry of this kind, hath scarce bin attempted, save that some labour hath bin taken therein, only in Mathematicall observations and Demonstrations. But these observations only shew how wittily all these motions may be contrived, and cleered from opposition; not how they may truly subsist in Nature; and represent only seeming Motions, and their fictitious Fabrique, and framed at pleasure; not their causes, and the reall truth of Things. & herefore *Astronomie*, such as now it is made, may well be counted in the number of *Mathematicall Arts*, not without great diminution of the Dignity thereof, seeing it*

ought

ought rather (if it would maintaine its own right) be constituted a branch, & that most principall of Naturall Philosophy. For who ever shall reject *the fained Divorces of superlunary and sublunary bodies*; and shall intentively observe the appetencies of Matter, and the most universall Passions, (which in either Globe are exceeding Potent, and transverberate the universall nature of things) he shall receive cleere information concerning celestiall matters from the things seen here with us: and contrariwise from those motions which are practised in heaven; he shall learne many observations which now are latent, touching the motions of bodies here below: not only so farre as these inferiour motions are moderated by superiour, but in regard they have a mutuall intercourse by passions common to them both. Wherefore this part of *Astronomie* which is naturall we set downe as DEFICIENT. And this we will call *Living Astronomy*, to distinguish it from *Promethew Oxe* stufte with straw, which was an Oxe in outward shape only.

✱

§ But *Astrologie* is corrupted with much superstition, so as there is hardly to be found any sound part therein. Yet in our judgement it should rather be purged, than clean cast away. But if any contend that this science is not grounded upon reason, and Physicall contemplations, but in blind experience, and the observation of many Ages; and therefore reject a triall by naturall Arguments (which the Chaldee Astrologers boasted) he may by the same reason revoke Auguries, Divination, and Predictions from beasts entralls, and swallow downe all kind of Fables; for all these superstitious vanities were avoucht, as the Dictates of long experience, and of Discipline delivered over by tradition. But we doe both accept *Astrologie*, as a Portion of Naturall Philosophy; and yet attribute unto it no more credit, than reason and the evidence of Particulars doe evince; setting aside superstitions and fictions. And that we may a litle more seriously consider the matter.

§ First what a vaine fancy is this, that every Planet should raigne for certain houres by turne, so as in the space of twentyfour hours, they should resume their Dominions thrice over, three su-

*per numerary howers reserved?* Yet this conceit brought forth unto us the Division of the week, a computation very ancient, and generally received, as from the interchangeable course of daies most manifestly it appears; when in the beginning of the day immediatly succeeding, the fourth Planet from the Planet of the first day, enters upon his Government; by reason of the three supernumerary howres, whereof we have spoken.

¶ *Again we are confident to reject, as an idle fiction, the doctrine of Genethliacall Positures of the heavens, to precise points of time; with the Distribution of the Howses;* those same darlings in Astrologie, which have made such madde work in the Heavens; nor can I sufficiently wonder that many excellent men, and for Astrology of Principall note, should ground themselves upon so slight reasons, to avouch such opinions. For they say, seeing that experience it selfe discovers as much, that *Solstices, Æquinoctialls, new Moone, full Moones,* and the like *greater revolutions* of starres, doe manifestly and notably work upon naturall Bodies; it must needs be, that the more exact, and subtile aspect and posture of the starres, should produce effects more exquisite and occult. But they should first except the Sunnes operations by manifest heat; and likewise, the magnetique influence of the Moone, upon the *increase of Tides every halfe Moone* (for the daily Fluxe and Reflux of the Sea, is another thing;) But these set aside; the other powers of the Planets upon naturall bodies (so farre as they are confirmed by experience) is slender and weak; and, which they shall finde, latent in the *greater Revolutions*. Wherefore they should rather argue the other way, namely, that seeing thole *greater Revolutions*, have so small influence, *those exact and minute differences of Positures* have no force at all.

¶ *Thirdly, Those Fatalities, that the hower of Nativity or conception governs the Birth; The hower of inception, the fortune of the thing begunne; the hower of Question, the fortune of the thing enquired; and, in a word, the science of Nativities, Elections, Questions, and such like levities; in our judgement, have no certainty*

certainty or solidity in them; and may by naturall reasons be plainly redargued and evinced. The point to be spoken of rather, is, what that is which we retaine and allow of in Astrologie; and in that which we doe allow, what is deficient? for, for this end, that is, for the observation of *Deficients*, we undertook this work; not intending (as we have often said) matter of censure. And indeed amongst the receiv'd parts of *Astrologie*, the Doctrines of *Revolutions* wee judge to have more soundnesse in them, than the rest. But it may be to good purpose, to set downe and prescribe certain Rules, by the scale and square whereof, *Astrologicall* Observations may be examined; that what is fruitfull may be retain'd; what is frivolous rejected.

§ *The first Precept* may be that whereof we have admonisht already; *let the greater Revolutions be retained; the lesser Horoscopes and Houses casseer'd*. Those like Great Ordinance may discharge their influences, at a spacious remotenesse; these like small Bowes, are for a short distance, and carry not their forces farre. *The second rule is; That the operation of the Heavens workes not on all bodies; but only upon the more tender and penetrable; such as are Humors, Aer, Spirits: but here we except the Operations of the heate of the Sun, and of the Heavens, which without question pierce even to Metals, and many subterraneous Bodies. The third rule is; that the Operation of the Heavens extends rather to the Masse of things and Nature in grosse; than unto individuall essences, and particularities; yet obliquely it reacheth to many Individualls, namely, those Individuates which of the same species are most Passible, and are like soft waxe: even as when a Pestilentiall aire seizeth on bodies more open and lesse resistant; and passeth by Bodies more compact and strong. The fourth rule is, somewhat like the precedent; That the Operation of the Heavens hath its influxe and dominion not in points and narrow minutes of times, but in greater spaces. Therefore Prognostications of the temperatures of the yeare may be true; but upon particular daies, are worthily accounted vaine and idle. The last rule, (which by the more wise Astrologers hath*

bin ever imbraced) is, *That there is no fatall necessity in the Starres, but that they doe incline rather, than enforce*. Wee adde this moreover (wherein we plainly take part with *Astrology*, if it were rectified) and which we know to be most certaine: *That Celestiall bodies have other influences besides heate and light*: which influences are of force according to the Rules we have prescribed, and no otherwise: But these lie hidde in the profound Parts of Naturall Philosophy, and require a larger dissertation. Wherefore we think good (that which we have said being rightly conceived) to set downe, *Astrologie* agreeable to our Principles, amongst DEFICIENTS, and as we have named *Astronomie* grounded upon naturall reasons, *Living Astronomie*, so we think fit to call *Astrologie* ascertain'd upon the same reasons, *Sound Astrologie*. As for the right way how to frame and make this Art, although what we have said, doth not a litle conduce thereto, yet according to our manner, we will adde a few more observations which shall cleerly propound, out of what materialls it should be collected, and to what end it should be referred.

§ *First, let the knowledge touching the Commixtures of Beames be receiv'd into sound Astrologie*, that is of Conjunctions, and of Oppositions, and the rest of the constellations, or Aspects of Planets, one on an other. Also we assigne to this part concerning the Commixtures of Beams, the passing of the Planets through the signes of the Zodiaque, and Position under the same signes: For the location of a Planet under any signe, is a kind of Conjunction of the same Planet with the Starres of the signes: Moreover as Conjunctions, so likewise Oppositions and other Constellations of Planets towards the Starres of the signes, are to be noted, which hitherto hath not perfectly bin accomplisht. *But the interchangeable Commixtures of the Rayes of the fixt starres, are indeed profitable to the Contemplation of the Fabrique of the world; and of the Nature of the Regions lying under them; but not unto Predictions, because these Aspects are ever the same.*

Secondly

§ Secondly, let there be taken into *Astrologie* the *accessions* of every particular Planet neerer to the *Perpendicular*, and *Recessions* from it according to the *Climates* of *Regions*. For all the Planets as well as the Sun, have their *summers*, their *winters*, wherein they dart downe more forcible, or more feeble rays, according to their posture in respect of the *Perpendicular*. For without question, the *Moone* in *Leo* works more forcibly upon naturall bodies here below, than when she is in *Pisces*: Not because the *Moone* placed in *Leo*, hath reference to the *Heart*, and under *Pisces* respects the *Feet*, (as the vulgar *Fable* goes), for their *Elevation* towards the *Perpendicular* and *Approximation* towards the greater *starres*, just after the same manner as the *Sun*.

§ Thirdly, let the *Apogæa*, and *Perigæa* of the Planets be received with due inquiry, to what the vigor of a Planet appertaines in respect of himselfe, and to what in his vicinity to us. For a Planet in his *Apogæa*, or exaltation is more cheerfull, and active; but in his *Perigæa* or declension more communicative. So the *Sun* in his *Elevation* when hee enters the *Tropick* of *Cancer* is in heate more recollected and vigorous; but when he falls off from the *Meridian*, as in *Capricorne*, hee is more faint, yet more dispersed in his influence. For in his *Ascension*, he is not only neerer to the fixed *starres*; but his beams then falling at more equall and right angles; become more united; and by a direct resultance from the earth intermixe, and so reduplicate their force; whereas in his declension, they are oblique, & therefore feeble and errant in reflection. Wherefore with the *Inhabitants* under the *Equator*, the heat is more intense; than it is with *Northern* *Confiners*, where the *Sun* daily keeps his circuit neer about the *Horizon*. But yet in this *Perigean* motion, the *Sun*'s beams are more communicative, though lesse active; because departing from the point of their incidence in the rebound, their reflection is oblique and dispersed. This enquiry touching the projection of beames in a right or oblique line, would be made with diligence, for it concernes all the influences of the heavens upon terrene bodies; the generall

Interpret  
additane;

‘ constitution of the yeare; the diverse temperatures of the  
 ‘ aire in the five Zones; the complexion of different Climates  
 ‘ and the like.

§ Fourthly to be briefe, *let there be taken in all the remain-  
 ing Accidents of the motion of Planets; as what are the Accelera-  
 tions, Retardations, Progresses, Stations, Retrogradations, of eve-  
 ry one of them in their course, what their distance from the  
 Sunne, their Combustions, Encrease, and Diminutions of Light,  
 Eclipses, and whatsoever else of this nature? For all these  
 cause, that the Beames of the Planets doe work more strong-  
 ly, or more weakly, and after diverse waies and distinct  
 virtues: And these foure observations, belong to the Radia-  
 tions of starres.*

§ Fifthly, let there be received in, whatsoever may any  
 way, open and disclose the natures of starres *Errant* or *Fixt*,  
 in their proper essence and activity, as what is their *Magni-  
 tude*; of what *collour* and *aspect*; what *Scintillation* and *Vi-  
 bration* of light; what *Situation* towards the *Poles* or *Æqui-  
 noctiall*; what *Asterismes*; which are more *mingled* with o-  
 ther starres; which are more *solitarie*; which are *superior*,  
 which *inferior*; which of the fixt starres are within the lines  
 and course of the Sunne and Planets (namely within the  
 Zodiaque) which without; which of the Planets is *more  
 swift*; which *more slow*; which may *move in the Eccliptique line*;  
 which may *expatiate in latitude* from it; what Planet may  
 be *retrograde*, which *not*; what Planet may be at any distance  
 from the Sunne, which is tied to attend the Sunne; which  
 moves swifter in *Apogéo*, which in *Perigéo*; to conclude the  
 Irregularities of *Mars*; the expatiations of *Venus*; the won-  
 derfull Labours or Passions, which are often found in the  
*Sunne*, and in *Venus*, and the like?

§ Last of all, let there be taken into *Astrologie*, even  
 from tradition the Particular Natures, and Inclination of  
 Planets, as also of fixt starres; which seeing they are delive-  
 red over with such an universall consent; they are not light-  
 ly to be rejected; but where they crosse the grounds and rea-  
 sons of naturall Principles. And of such observations as  
 these

these, *sound Astrologie* is compiled; and according to these only, should the Schemes and configurations of Heaven, be composed and interpreted. *Sound Astrologie* is likewise applied and referred with more confidence to *Predictions*; to *Elections*, with more *Caution*, within due limits to both. *Predictions* may be made of future *Comets*, which as we conjecture may be foretold; and of all sorts of *Meteors*; of *Deluges*, *Draughts*; *Heates*; *Conglaciations*; *Earth-quakes*; ore flowing of *waters*; breaking out of *Fires*; *Windes*; great *Raines*; divers *Tempests*; and strange seasons of the *Yeare*; *Pestilences*, *Epidemicall diseases*; *Plenty*, and dearth of *Graine*; *Warres*, *Seditious*, *Sects*, *Plantations* of new *Colonies*; lastly of all commotions and greater *Innovations*, either in *Nature*, or in *State-Goverment*: so these predictions may be drawn downe (though not with like certainty) to more *speciall occurrences*, and perchance to *singularities*; if the generall inclinations of such times and seasons, being first discovered and found out, these be applied by a sharpe piercing judgement *Philosophicall* or *Politically*, to speciall or more particular events, which may be most subject to such *Accidents*. As for example, a man shall find out from a foresight of the seasons of the yeare, such temperatures of weather, as are propitious or pernicious rather to *Olives*, than to *Vines*; rather to *Phthiſiques*, and ulcerations of the *Longues*, than to *Hepaticques* and obstructions of the *liver*; more to the inhabitants of high and mountainous; than low and champagne *Countries*; more to *Monkes*, than *Courtiers*, by reason of their different kind of diet. Or if one from the knowledge he hath of the influence, the *Heavens* have over the *Spirits* of men, should find out a man to be of such a complexion and disposition; to affect or distast rather the people than *Princes*; rather learned and curious, than courageous and warlike dispositions; rather sensuall and voluptuous, than active and politique natures. Such instances as these are infinite, but (as we have said) they require not onely that generall knowledge, taken from the *ſtarres*, which are *Active*; but also a particular knowledge of *Subjects* which

are Palsive. Nor are *Elections* altogether to be rejected but more sparingly to be credited, than *Predictions*. For we see in Planting and in Sowing and in Grafting, that the observation of the *age* of the *Moone* is a matter, not altogether vaine and frivolous. But these *Elections*, are by our rules more restrained than *Predictions*: and this must ever be observed, that *Elections* are of force, in such cases alone, where both the *Influxe* of the Heavens is such, as doth not sodainly passe over; and likewise the *Action* of *Inferiour Bodies* such, as is not presently perfected: for neither the *Encreases* of the *Moone*, nor of the Planets are accomplisht in an instant: but *Punctuality* of time, is by all means to be rejected. There are found many of the like precise observations (which a man would hardly believe) in *Elections* about Civile affaires. But if any man in this case shall except against us, saying, that we have indeed made some remonstrance out of what this *reformed Astrologie* should be deduced; and likewise to what it may with profit be referred: but the manner how it is to be deduced, we have given no precept at all; he should not deale equally with us, to exact at our hands the Art it selfe, which we never promised, nor purposed to handle. Yet notwithstanding touching such a point of Demand, thus much we will admonish; that there are only foure means, which may prepare the way to this knowledge. *First by Experiments future; then by Experiments past; againe by Tradition; last of all by naturall Reasons.* Now for *future Experiments*, to what end should we speak much of them? seeing to make up a competent number of Instances, so many ages are requisite, as it were, but lost labour, to think to comprehend it? *As for Experiments past*, they indeed are within the compasse and reach of men, although it is a matter will require much labour, and much leasure to accomplish. For *Astrologians* (if they be not wanting to their Profesion) may make a collection from the faithfull reports of History, of all greater contingences; as *Inundations, Pestilences, Warres, Seditions*, and (if the state so require) *the deaths of Kings*: and may contemplate the *situation of the*

*Heavens,*

*Heavens*, not according to the subtletie of *Figures*; but according to those generall rules which we have already set downe; to know in what postures the Heavens were, at those times, when such effects came to passe; that so were there is a cleere, and evident consent, and concurrence of events; there a probable rule of *Prediction* may be inferred. *As for Traditions*, they ought to be so examined and sifted, that such as manifestly oppugne *Physicall Reasons*, should be discarded; but such as well consent, should be valide even of their own authority. *Lastly, as for Physicall or Naturall reasons*, they are the aptest for this inquiry; which make inquiry of the Catholique and more universall inclinations and Passions of Matter; and of the simple and genuine motions of Bodies; for by these wings we safely soare and mount up to those celestiallyl materiate substances. Thus much concerning *Astrologia sana*.

§ *There is another Portion of Astrological Frenzie* (besides those figmets which we have noted at the begining) which is wont to be seperate from *Astrologie*, and to be transferred into *Celestiall Magique*, as they call it. This hath purchased a strange Gloss, from the working fansie of mans wit; namely *That a benevolent situation or Aspect of starres, may be taken in scales and signet-rings (be it of Mettalls or of any Gemme, capable of such impressiō) which may arrest the felicity of that hower, which otherwise would swiftly passe away, and as it were, fixe it being volatilus.* As the Poet passionately complains of this so noble Art, among the Ancients, now long agoe buried in oblivion.

C. Agrip.  
de Occult.  
Ph. 1.

*Annulus infuso non vivit mirus Olympo,  
Non magis ingentes humili sub lumine Phæbos  
Fert Gemma, aut Celso divulgatas cardine lunas.*

N. L.

Indeed the Church of Rome hath imbraced the *Reliques of Saints*, and their virtues, (for in Divine and immateriate things, the fluxe of time hath no power to abate the force and efficacy,) but that the *Reliques of Heaven* should be so lodged, as that the hower which is past, and, as it were, dead, should revive and be continued; is a meere superstiti-

on, and in posture. Wherefore let us let goe these idle fancies unlesse the Muses be grown doting old wives.

IV. *Abstract Physique in our judgement, may very well be divided into two Parts, into the Doctrine of the Schemes of Matter; and into the doctrine of Appetites or Motions.* We will runne them both over briefly, from whence the delineations of the true Physique of Abstracts may be drawen. The Schemes of Matter are; *Dense, Rare; Grave, Light; Hot, Cold; Tangible, Pneumatique; Volatile, Fixt; Determinate, Fluid; Humid, Drie; Fat, Crude; Hard, Soft; Fragile, Tenfile; Porous, United; Spirituous, Languid; Simple, Composite; Absolute, imperfectly Mixt; Fibrous and full of veines, of a simple Posture or equall; Similare Dissimilare; Specificate Non-specificate; Organicall Inorganicall; Animate Inanimate.* Neither doe we extend the figurations of Matter any farther, for *Sensible and Insensible; Rationall and Irrationall*, we referre to the knowledge of Man.

§ *Appetites and Motions, are of two sorts; either motions simple, which containe in them the Roots of all naturall Actions; but yet according to the Schemes and habitudes of Matter: or Motions composited and Producted; from which last, the received Philosophy of the Times (which comprehends litle of the body of Nature) takes its begining. But such Compound Motions (as Generation Corruption, and the rest) should be taken for the Summes and Products of simple Motions; rather than for Primitive Motions. Motions simple, are motions of Antitypie, commonly called Motion opposing Penetration of Dimensions; Motion of Connexion, or Continuity, which they call, Motion to avoid vacuity; Motion of Liberty, least there should be any compression or extension preternaturall; Motion into a new sphaere, or to Rarefaction and Condensation; Motion of a second connexion, or a motion least there should be a solution of continuity; Motion of greater Congregation, or to the Masse of their connaturalls, which is commonly called Naturall Motion; Motion of lesser Congregation, usually stiled, Motion of Sympathy and of Antipathy; Motion Dissonent, or that parts may be rightly placed*

in the whole, *Motion of Assimilation*, or of Multiplication of its Nature upon an other; *Motion of Excitation*, where the more noble and vigorous agent awaketh, and stirres up Motion latent and dormant in an other; *Motion of the Seale or of Impression*, that is, Operation without Communication of Substance; *Motion Regall*, or a Cohibition of other Motions from a Motion Predominant; *Motion without Termination*, or Spontaneous Rotation; *Motion of Trepidation*, or of Contraction & Dilatation of Bodies placed betwixt things good for them, and obnoxious to them; *lastly Motion of Rest or abhorrency of Motion*, which is the Cause of many things. Of this kind are *simple Motions* which truly issue forth out of the inward bowels of Nature; which complicate, continue, interchang'd repress'd, repeated, and many waies aggregated, doe constitute those *Composite Motions* or *Summes* of Motions, which are receiv'd, and such other of the same kind. *The Summes of Motions* are those Celebrated Motions, *Generation; Corruption; Augmentation; Diminution; Alterations; and Lation; so Mixtion; Separation; Version.*

§ *There remains only as Appendices of Physique, the Measures of Motions; of what efficacy the Quantity, or Dose of Nature is? What distance can doe, which is called, not unproperly, the orbe of Virtue or Activity? What incitation, or Tardity, can effect? What a long or short delay? what the force or rebatement of a thing? What the instigation of Peristastie or circummambient inclosure? And these are the naturall and genuine Parts of true naturall Philosophy, touching Abstracts For in the figurations, or Schemes of Matter; in Motions simple; In summes or Agregations of Motions; and in Measures of Motions, the Physique of Abstracts is accomplisht.* As for voluntary Motion in Animals; Motion in the Actions of Senles; *Motion of the Imagination; of the Appetite, and of the will; Motion of the mind; of the discerning facultie, or Practique Iudgment; and of the Intellectuals*, we referre over to their proper Knowledges. *Yet thus much againe we advertise, that all these Particulars we have delivered, are no farther to be handled in Physique, than the enquiry of their Matter and Efficient; for*

according to their Formes and Ends they are revised and re-examined in *Metaphysique*.

Aristot.  
Probl.

̄ We will here annexe two notable *Appendices*, which have reference not so much to the Matter, as to the Manner of Inquiry; *Naturall Problemes*; and *Placits of Ancient Philosophers*. The first is the *Appendix of multiplied or sparsed Nature*; the second of *Nature united or of summes*. Both these belong to a grave and circumspect moving of doubts, which is no meane Part of Knowledge: For *Problemes* comprehend *Particular Dubitations*; *Placits*, generall; about *Principles* and the *Fabrique*. Of *Problemes* there is an excellent example in the writing of *Aristotle*; which kind of worke certainly deserv'd not only to have bin celebrated by Posterity; but by their labours to have bin continued; seeing new *doubts* arise daily. But in this point Caution is to be taken, and that of great Importance. The recording and proposing of *Doubts* hath in it a two-fold use: *One*, that it munites and fortifies Philosophy against errors; when that which is not altogether so cleere and evident is not defin'd and avouched, (lest error should beget error) but a judgment upon it is suspended, and is not definitive. *The other* that the entrie of *Doubts*, and recording of them, are so many Sponges which continually suck and draw in unto them an increase and improvement of Knowledge; whereby it comes to passe that those things, which without the suggestion of *Doubts* had bin slightly, and without observation passed over, are by occasion of such *Dubitations*, more seriously and attentively considered. But these two utilities scarce recompence one discommodity, which unlesse it be carefully lookt unto, insinuateth it selfe; namely, *That a Doubt once acknowledged as justly made, and become, as it were authentique; presently stirres up defendants both waies; who in like manner commend over the same liberty of doubting to Posteritie; so that men bend and apply their wits, rather to keepe a doubt still on foot, than to determine and solve it.* Instances of this case we have every where, both in *Iurisconsults*; and in *Students* in the *Universities*; who if they have once entertain'd a *Doubt*, it goes

goes ever after authoriz'd for a *Doubt*, assuming unto themselves a Priviledge as well of *Dubitation*, as of *Affertion*: Whereas the right use of Reason is, to make things doubtfull certaine; and not to call things certaine, into doubt. Wherefore I report as Deficient a *Calendar of Dubitations*, or *Problemes* in Nature, and approve the undertaking of such a worke, as a profitable paines; so care be had, that as knowledge daily grows up, (which certainly will come to passe if men hearken unto us) such *Doubts* as be cleerly discuft, and brought to resolution, be raced out of the *Catalogue of Problemes*. To this *Calendar*, I would have another annex no lesse usefull: For seeing that in all Enquiries, there be found these three sorts of things; things manifestly true; Doubtfull; manifestly false; It would be a very profitable course to adjoyne to the *Calendar of Doubts*, and *Non-liquets*; a *Calendar of Falshoods*, and of popular *Errors*, now passing unargued in *Naturall History*, and in *Opinions*; that Sciences be no longer distemper'd and embas'd by them.

§ As for the *Placits of Ancient philosophers*, as were those of *Pythagoras*, *Philolaus*, *Xenophon*, *Anaxagoras*, *Parmenides*, *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, & others, (which men use disdainfully to runne over) it will not be amisse to cast our eyes with more reverence upon them. For although *Aristotle* after the manner of the race of the *Ottomans*, thought he could not safely raigne, unlesse he made away all his Brethren; yet to those who seriously propound to themselves the inquisition and illustration of *Truth*, and not *Dominion* or *Magistrality*, it can not but seeme a matter of great profit, to see at once before them, the severall opinions of severall Auctors touching the *Natures of things*. Neither is this for any great hope conceiv'd that a more exact truth can any waybe expected from these or from the like *Theories*. For as the same *Phoenomena*; the same *Calculations* are satisfied upon the *Astronomicall Principles* both of *Ptolomy* and *Copernicus*: So the popular experience we imbrace; and the ordinary view and face of things, may apply it self to many severall *Theories*; where-  
as a right investigation of truth requires another manner  
of

\*

Aristot.

of severity and speculation. For as *Aristotle* saith elegantly,  
 Phys. 1. *That Children at first indeed call all men Fathers, and women Mothers, but afterwards they distinguish them both*: So certainly experience in Childhood, will call every *Philosophy, Mother*; but when it comes to ripeness, it will discern the true Mother. In the meane time it is good to read over diverse *Philosophies*, as diverse Glosses upon Nature; whereof it may be one in one place; another in another; is more corrected. Therefore I could wish a collection made, but with diligence and judgment, *De Antiquis Philosophiis*, out of the lives of Ancient Philosophers; out of the Parcels of *Plutarch* of their *Placits*; out of the Citations of *Plato*; out of the Confutations of *Aristotle*; out of a sparsed mention found in other Bookes as well of Christians, as of Heathens, (as out of *Lactantius, Philo, Philostratus*, and the rest): For I doe not yet see extant a worke of this Nature. But here I must give warning that this be done distinctly, so as the *Philosophies*, every one severdly, be composed and continued, and not collected by titles and handfulls, as hath bin done by *Plutarch*. For every *Philosophy* while it is entire in the whole peece, supports it selfe; and the opinions maintained therein, give light, strength, and credence mutually yone to the other; whereas if they be simple and broken, it will sound more strange and dissonant.

Tacit. In truth when I read in *Tacitus* the Actions of *Nero*, or of *Claudius* invested with Circumstances of Times, Persons, and Inducements: I find them not so strange, but that they may be true: but when I read the same Actions in *Suetonius*

Sueton. *Tranquillus*, represented by titles and common places, and not in order of Time, they seeme monstrous and altogether incredible: So is *Philosophy* when it is propounded entire, & when it is sliced and articulated into fragments. Neither doe I exclude out of this *Calendar of the Placits, or Sects of Philosophy*, the Theories and opinions of later times, as that of *Theophrastus Paracelsus* eloquently reduced into a body & Harmony of *Philosophy* by *Severinus* the Dane, or of *Telefius of Cosenza*, who reviving the *Philosophy* of *Parmenides* hath turn'd the weapons of the *Peripatetiques* upon themselves, or  
 of

of *Patricius* the *Venetian*; who hath sublimated the fumes of the *Platonists*; or of *Gilbert* our Countryman, who hath restored to light the opinions of *Philolaus*; or of any other whatsoever, if he be of merit. And because the volumes of these Auctors are wholly extant, there may be abridgements made only of them, and so annex, by way of reference to the rest. And thus much of *Naturall Philosophy*, and the *Appendices* thereof.

VI. *As for Metaphysique, we have assigned unto it, the inquiry of Formall and Finall causes; which application, as to Formes, may seem to be nugatory and void.* For an opinion hath prevailed, and is grown inveterate, that the essentiall *Formes* and true Differences of things, can by no diligence of Man be found out. Which opinion in the meane, gives and grants us thus much; that the *Invention of Formes*, is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought; if it be possible they may be found. And as for Possibility of *Invention*, there are some faint-hearted discoverers, who when they see nothing but Aire and Water, think there is no farther Land. But it is manifest that *Plato*, a man of an elevated wit, and who beheld all things as from a high cliffe, in his doctrine of *Ideas*, did discry, that *formes were the true object of knowledge, however he lost the reall fruit of this most true opinion, by contemplating and apprehending Formes, as absolutely abstract from matters; and not confined and determined by matter: whereupon it came to passe that he turned himselfe to Theologicall speculations, which infected and distained all his Naturall Philosophy.* But if we keep a watchfull, and a severe eye upon *Action and Use*, it will not be difficult, to trace and find out what are the *Formes*; the disclosure whereof would wonderfully enrich and make happy the estate of man. For the *Formes of substances*, (man only except of whom it is said, *Formavit hominem de limo terræ, & spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ*; not as off all other kinds, *Producatur aqua, producat terra*) I lay the species of creatures, as they are now multiplied by compounding and transplanting, are so perplex and complicate, as it is either altogether

gether lost labour to make enquiry of them, or the inquisition thereof, such as may be had, should be suspended for a time, and when the *Formes* of nature, in hir more simple existence are rightly sought and found out, then to be determin'd and let downe. For, as it were not a thing easie, nor any way usefull, *to seeke the Forme of that sound, which makes a word*; being that words through composition and transposition of letters are infinite: *but to enquire the Forme of sound, which expresseth some simple letter* (namely with what collision, with what application of the instruments of voice it is made) is a thing comprehensible and easie, *which forme of letters once known, presently leads us to the forme of words*. In the same manner to enquire the Forme of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold, nay of water, of Ayre is a vaine pursuit; but to enquire the *Formes of Dense, Rare; Hot, Cold; Heavy, Light; Tangible Pneumatique; Volatile, Fixt*; and the like, both of *Figurations* and of *Motions*; whereof the most of them we have enumerated when we handled *Physique*, and are wont to call them, *Formes of the first ranke or order*; and which (as the letters of the Alphabet) are not so many in number, & yet build up and support the *essences and Formes* of all substances. and this is that very point which we aime at, and endeavour to compasse; and which constitutes and defines that Part of *Metaphysique*, whereof we now enquire. Nor doth this so prejudicate or hinder, but that *Physique* may consider the same Natures also (as hath bin said) but only according to the fluid and mutable causes. *For example*, if the cause of *whiteneffe* in *Snow* or in *Froth* be inquired, it is well rendred, *that it is the subtile intermixture of Aire with water*. But this is farre from being the *Forme of whiteneffe*; being that aire intermixt with the dust, or powder of Glasse, or Chrystall, doth likewise produce *whiteneffe*, as well as if it were mingled with water; but this is the efficient cause only, which is no other than *vehiculum Formæ*. But if the inquiry be made in *Metaphysique*, you shall finde some such rule as this, *That two diaphanous bodies being intermixt, their optique Portions in a simple order, or equally placed, doe determine*

termine and constitute whiteneſſe. This part of *Metaphyſique* I finde deficient: and no marvaile becauſe by the courſe of inquiring, which hitherto hath bin practiſed, the *Formes of things*, will never appeare while the world endures. The root of this error, as of all other, is this, that men in their contemplations of nature are accuſtomed to make too timely a departure, and too remote a reſſe from experience and particulars; and have yielded and reſigned themſelves wholly over to the fumes of their own fancies, and populare *Argumentations*. But the uſe of this part of *Metaphyſique*, which I report as deficient, is of the reſt the moſt excellent in two reſpects:

§ *Fiſt*, becauſe it is the duty and peculiar virtue of all Sciences, to abridge (as much as the conception of truth will permit) the ambages and long circuits of Experience, and ſo to apply a remedy to the ancient complaint of *vita brevis, Hipp. ars longa*. And this is excellently performed, by collecting and <sup>Hipp. Apher.</sup> uniting the *Axioms of Sciences*, into more generall heads and conceptions; which may be agreeable to all Individualls. For Sciences, are the *Pyramides* ſupported by *History*; and experience, as their only and true *Baſis*; and ſo the *Baſis of Naturall Philoſophy* is *Naturall Hiſtory*; the *ſtage next the Baſis* is *Phyſique*; the *ſtage next the verticall point* is *Metaphyſique*: as for the *Cone* and *verticall point* it ſelſe (*opus quod operatur Deus à principio* <sup>Eccleſ. 3.</sup> *uſq; ad finem*; the *ſummary law of Nature*) we doe juſtly doubt whether mans inquiry can attaine unto it. But theſe three be the true *ſtages of Sciences*; and are, to men ſwelled up with their own knowledge, and a dareing insolence, to invade Heaven, like the three hills of the *Giants*.

*Ter ſunt Conati impnerere Pelio Oſſam,*

*Scilicet atq; Oſſe frond: ſum involvere Olympum.*

*Virg. Geor. 1.*

But to thoſe that diſabling themſelves, and diſcharging their pride, referre all to the glory of God, they are the three acclamations *Sancte, Sancte, Sancte*: for God is holy in the multitude <sup>Apoc. 4.</sup> of his works, Holy in the order of them, Holy in the union. And therefore the ſpeculation was excellent in *Parmenides* and *Plato*; although but a ſpeculation in them, *That all things by* <sup>In Parm.</sup> *ſcales did aſcend to unity*. So then, that ſcience is the worthieſt,

est, which least chargeth mans understanding with multiplicity; and it is evident, that that is *Metaphysique*, as that which principally speculates *those simple Formes of things*; (which we have stiled *Formes of the first degree* or order) which though they be few in number, yet in their commensurations and Co-ordinations, they make all kindes of variety.

Plat. in  
Phæd. Cic.  
de Fin. 2.  
Tulc. 4.

§ The Second respect which innobles this part of *Metaphysique* touching *Formes*, is, that of all other sciences, it doth most enfranchise, and set at liberty the Power of Man; and brings it forth into a most ample and open field to exercise in For *Physique* directs mans labour and diligence through narrow and restrained wayes, imitating the flexious courses of ordinary Nature; But *late undiq; sapientibus via*, to *sapience* (which was anciently defined to be, *Rerum divinarum & humanarum scientia*) there is ever copie and variety of means. For *Physicall* causes give light and occasion to new inventions in *simili materia*; but whosoever knowes any *Forme*, knows also the *utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter*; and so is lesse restrained and tied in operation, either to the Basis of the *matter*, or to the condition of the *Efficient*; which kinde of knowledge, though in a more divine sence, *Solomon* elegantly describes,

Prov. iv.

*Non arctabuntur gressus tui, & Currens non habebis offendiculum*; his meaning is, that the waies of *sapience*, are not liable to streights, nor perplexities.

§ The *secoud part of Metaphysique*, is the inquiry of *Finall causes*; which we note not as omitted, but as misplaced: for the inquiry of them usually is made amongst the *Physiques*, and not in the *Metaphysiques*. And yet if this were a fault in *order* only, I should not much stand upon it; for *order* is a matter of *Illustration*, and pertaines not to the substance of *Sciences*: but this inversion of *order*, hath caused a notable *deficience*, and brought a great decay upon *Philosophy*. For the handling of *Finall Causes* in the *Physiques*, hath intercepted and banisht the inquiry of *Physicall Causes*; and hath given men occasion to rest satisfied in such specious,

and

and umbratious Causes; and not thorowly to urge and presse the inquiry of *Reall and truly Physicall Causes*. For this I find done not only by *Plato*, who ever Ancereth upon that Shoare; but also by *Aristotle*; *Galen*, and others, who usually likewise fall upon these Flats. For to say, *That the eye-lids furnisht with hairs are for a quick-set & fence to fortifie the sight: or that the firmnesse of skinnes, and hides of living Creatures, is to repell the extremities of heate and cold: or that Bones are ordained by Nature for Columes and Beames whereupon the frame of the Body is to be built: or that Trees shoot forth leaves to shadow and protect the fruit from the Sunne and the wind: or that the Clouds are ingendred above, to water the earth below: or that the earth is close-compact and solid, that it may be a Station and Mansion for living Creatures,* is properly inquired in *Metaphysique*; but in *Physique* they are impertinent. Nay, (to pursue this point) such discoursing Causes as these, like the *Remoraes* (as the *fiction* goes) adhering to shippes, stay and slugge the sayling, and the *Progresse of Sciences*, that they could not hold on their Course, and advance forward to further Discoveries: And now long agoe it is so brought to passe that the search of *Physicall Causes*, thus neglected, are decayed and passed over in silence. And therefore the *Naturall Philosophy* of *Democritus*, and some others, who removed God and a Mind from the frame of things; and attributed the structure of the world to infinite Preludiums, and Essayes (which by one name they term'd *Fate* or *Fortune*; and have assigned the Causes of Particulars to the necessity of Matter, without intermixture of *Finall Causes*) seemeth to us (so farre as we can conjecture from the Fragments and Remaines of their Philosophy) in respect of *Physicall Causes*, to have bin farre more solid, and to have penetrated more profoundly into Nature; than that of *Aristotle* and *Plato*: for this reason alone that those *Ancient Philosophers* never wastted time in *finall Causes*; but these perpetually presse and inculcate them. And in this point *Aristotle* is more to blame than *Plato*, seeing he hath omitted the fountaine of all *finall Causes*, *God*; and in the place of *God* substituted *Nature*; and hath imbraced *finall Causes* rather as a lover of

Aristot.  
Probl.

*Logique*, than an adorer of Divinity. Nor doe we therefore speake thus much, because those *finall Causes* are not true and very worthy the enquiry in *Metaphysique Speculations*; but because while they fallie out, and breake in upon the Possessions of *Physicall Causes*, they doe unhappily depopulate and wast that Province: For otherwise if they keepe themselves within their precincts and borders, they are extremely deceiv'd who ever think that there is an enmitie or repugnancy between *them* and *Physicall Causes*. For the cause render'd, *That the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of the sight*, doth not indeed impugne that other Cause; *That pilositie is incident to Orifices of Moisture,*

Virg. Buc.

*Muscosi Fontes &c.*-----

Nor the Cause render'd *that the firmnesse of Hides in Beasts is for armor against the injuries of extreme weather*, doth impugne that other Cause; *That that firmnesse is caused by the contraction of Pores in the outward parts of the body through cold, and depredation of Ayre*; and so of the rest: both causes excellently conspiring, save that, the one declares an intention, the other a consequence only. Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from divine *Providence*; but rather wonderfully confirmes and exalts it. *For as in Civile Actions* that Politique wisdom will be more deep, and admired, if a man can use the service of other men to his owne ends and desires; and yet never acquaint them with his purpose (so as they shall doe what he would they should doe, and yet not understand what they doe); then if he should impart his Counsils to those he employes: So the wisdom of God shines more wonderfully, when Nature intends one thing, and *Providence* draws forth another; then if the Characters of *Divine Providence* were imprest upon every particular habitude and motion of Nature. Surely *Aristotle* after he had swelled up Nature with *Finall Causes*; *Naturam nihil frustra facere; sui que voti semper esse compotem (si impedimenta abessent)*; and had set downe many such tending to that purpose, had no further need of God: but *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, when they publisht and celebrated their *Atomes*; were thus farre

De Cælo.  
lib. I & lib.  
de part. a.  
nimal.

farre by the more subtile wits listned unto with Patience: but when they would avouch that the Fabrique and Contexture of all things in Nature, knit and united it selfe without a *Mind*, from a fortuitous Concourse of those *Atomes*, they were entertain'd with Laughter by all. So that *Physicall Causes* are so farre from withdrawing mens minds from *God* and *Providence*; as rather contrariwise those Philosophers which were most exercised in contriving those *Atomes*, found no end and issue of their travaile, untill they had resolved all at last into *God*, and *Providence*. Thus much of *Metaphysique*, a part whereof touching *Finall Causes* I deny not to have bin handled both in the *Physiques*, and *Metaphysiques*; in these truly, in those improperly; for the inconvenience hath ensued thereupon.



### C A P. V.

- I The Partition of the Operative Knowledge of Nature into *Mechanike* and *Magique*: Respondent to the Parts of Speculative Knowledge; *Mechanike* to *Physique*; *Magique* to *Metaphysique*.  
 § A purging of the word *Magin*. II. Two Appendices to Operative Knowledge, *An Inventory of the Estate of man*. § *A Catalogue of Polychrests*, or things of multifarious use.

I **T**HE Operative Knowledge of Nature wee will likewise divide into two Parts; and that from a kind of Necessitie. For this *Division* is subordinate to the former *Division* of *Speculative Knowledge*; for *Physique*, and the Enquiry of *Efficient* and *Materiall Causes*; produces *Mechanike*: but *Metaphysique*, and the enquiry of *Formes* produces *Magique*: As for *Finall Causes* the enquiry is barren, and as a *Virgin consecrate to God* brings forth nothing. Nor are we ignorant that there is a *Mechanicall Knowledge* which is meerly *empirical*, and *operarie*, not depending on *Physique*; but this we have referr'd to *Naturall History*, and separate it from *Naturall Philosophy*: Speaking here only  
 of

of that *Mechanicall* Knowledge which is connext with *Causes Physicall*. But yet there falls out a certaine *Mechanicall*, or Experimentall Knowledge which neither is altogether *Operative*, nor yet properly reaches so high as speculative *Philosophy*. For all the Inventions of Operations which have come to mens Knowledge, either have fallen out by casuall insidence; and afterwards deliver'd from hand to hand; or were sought out by a purposed experiment. Those which have bin found out by intentionall experiment; they have bin disclosed either by the light of *Causes*, and *Axiomes*; or found out by extending, or transferring, or compounding former inventions; which is a matter more sagacious and witty, than Philosophicall. And this part which by no means we despise we shall briefly touch hereafter, when we shall treat of *Literate Experience* amongst the Parts of *Logique*. As for the *Mechanique* now in hand, *Aristotle* hath handled it promiscuouly; *Hero in spiritalibus*; as likewise *Georgius Agricola* a moderne Writer very diligently in his *Mineralls*; and many others in particular Treatises on that subject; so as I have nothing to say of *Deficients* in this kind; but that the *Promiscuous Mechanicalls of Aristotle*, ought to have bin with more diligence continued, by the pens of recent Writers; especially with choice of such experimentals, of which either the Causes are more obscure, or the Effects more noble. But they who insist upon these doe as it were only coast along the shoare, *Premendo littus iniquum*. For in my judgment there can hardly be any radicall alteration, or novation in Nature; either by any fortuitous adventures; or by essayes of Experiments; or from the light of Physicall Causes; but only through the invention of *Formes*. Therefore if we have set downe that part of *Metaphysique* as *Deficient*, which entreateth of *Forms*; it follows that *Natural Magique* also, which is a Relative unto it, is likewise *Defective*.

✻

§ But it seemes requisite in this place that the word *Magia*, accepted for a long time in the worse part, be restored to the ancient and honourable sence. *Magia*, amongst the *Persians*, was taken for a sublime sapience, and a Science of the

the Harmony and concert of universalls in Nature; so those three *Easterne Kings* which came to adore *Christ*, are stiled by the name of *Magi*: and we understand it in that sense, as to be, a Science which deduceth the knowledge of hidden formes to strange and wonderfull effects & operations; and as it is commonly said, by joyning *Actives* with *Passives*, which discloseth the great wonders of Nature. As for the *Naturall Magique*, (which flies abroad in many mens bookes) containing certain credulous and superstitious traditions, and observations of *Sympathies*, and *Antipathies*, and of hidden and specificque proprieties, with some experiments commonly frivolous; strange, rather for the art of conveyance and disguise, than the thing it selfe; surely he shall not much erre, who shall say, that this kind of magique, is as farre differing in truth of Nature, from such a knowledge as we require; as the Bookes of the Gestes of *Arthur* of Brittain, or of *Hugh* of *Burdeaux*, differs from *Cesars* Commentaries, in truth of story. For it is manifest, that *Cesar* did greater things *de vero*, then they durst faine of their *Heroes*; but he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of Learning, the Fable of *Ixion* was a figure; who projecting with himselfe to enjoy *Juno* the Goddesse of Power, had copulation with a cloude, of which he begot *Centaures* and *Chimeraes*. So whoever are carried away with a frantique and impotent passion, and vaporious conceit to those things which only, through the fumes and clouds of Imagination, they fancy to themselves to see, in stead of substantiall operations; they are deliverd of nothing but ayrie hopes, and certain deformed and monstrous apparitions. The operation and effect of this superficiall, and degenerous *Naturall Magique* upon Men, is like some soporiferous drugges, which procure sleep; and withall exhale into the fancy, merry and pleasant dreams in sleepe. First it casts mans understanding into a sleep, still chanting and suggesting specificque proprieties, and secret virtues; and sent downe, as it were, from heaven, to be delivered, and to be learned only by auricular traditions; whence it comes to passe, that men are no more

stirred up and awaked to search with diligence, and to force out the true causes; but sit downe satisfied with these frivolous and credulous opinions: and then it instilles an infinite number of pleasing fictions, in the manner of dreams, and such as one would most wish to be true. And it is worth the paines to note, that in these Sciences which hold so much of *imagination* (as are that *adulterate Magique*, whereof we now speak, *Alchymie*, *Astronomie* and the like) the meanes and Theorie are ever more monstrous, than the end and pretences. *The turning of Silver or Quick-silver or any other mettall into Gold*, is a hard thing to believe: yet it is a thing farre more probable, to a man well skilled, and experimented in the natures of waight; yellow Colour, malleable and extensible; as also fixt and volatile: and likewise to one who hath exactly searcht into the first seeds and menstruous Purgings of Mineralls; that Gold by an industrious and curious wit, may, at last, be produced; than that a few graines of *Elixir*, or of the powder of Production, should be of force, in a few Minutes, to turne Metalls into Gold, by the activity of the same *Elixir*; which is able to perfect nature, and to deliver it from all impediments. *So the retarding of Age*, or the restoreing of some degree of youth, doth not easily purchase a believe: yet it is farre more likely to a man that knowes perfectly the nature of *Arefaction*, and the depredations of the spirits, upon the solide parts of the body; and hath thoroughly observed the nature of Assimilation, and of Alimentation; either more perfect or more peccant; also the nature of the spirits and of the Flame (as it were) of the body, assigned sometimes to consume, sometimes to repaire; may by diets, Bathings, Anointings, proper Medicines, and accommodate motions, and the like, *prolong life*; or renew some degrees of youth, or vivacity: then that this should be effected, by a few drops or scruples of *some precious Liquor or Quintessence*. *Againethat Fates may be drawne from the starres*, men will not sodainly, and easily assent unto; but these, that the houre of Nativity (which oftentimes through many naturall accidents, is either accelerated or differed) should governe

verne the fortune of the whole life; or that the houre of Question is co-fatall with the thing it selfe which is sought, you will say are meere impostures. But such a rash impotency and intemperance, doth possesse and infatuate the whole race of man; that they doe not only presume upon, and promise to themselves what is repugnant in nature to be performed; but also, are confident that they are able to conquer even at their pleasure, and that by way of recreation, the most difficult passages of nature, without trouble or travaile. *And of Magique* thus much; the name whereof we have vindicated from reproach, and separated the true and noble kind from the base and counterfeit.


II. *Of this operative part of Nature there are two Appendices*, both of much importance. *The first is, that there be made an Inventory of the estate of Man*; in which there should be taken and compendiously cast up, the summe of all the wealth and fortunes of men (whether they arise from the fruits and revenewes of nature, or of Art) which are now extant, and whereof men are already possesse; adding such inventions, as is manifest have bin in times past celebrated, but are now perisht. To this end and purpose, that he who addresseth himselfe to the search of new Inventions, may not be arrested in his inquest; nor wast time and study in those things which are already invented, and are now extant. *And this Inventory* will be more artificiall, and more serviceable, if you adde those things which in populare conceit are reputed *impossible*; and together with them couple such inventions, as are neere in degree to *impossibles*, and yet are extant; that the one may set an edge on mans enquiry; the other may in a sort direct it: and that from these *Optatives*, and *Potentials*, mans *Actives* may be more readily conducted.

§ *The second is, that there be made a Calendare of those experiments*, which are *polychrests* things of a multifarious use, & most universall consequence; & which conduce and direct to the *Invention* of other *experiments*. For example, the artificiall experiment of *conglaciation of water by Ice with black salt*,

\*  
INVEN-  
TARIUM  
OPVM  
HVMA-  
NARVM.

\*  
CATALOGVS  
POLYCHRESTORVM.

pertaines to infinite purposes and essays; for this discloseth the secret and abstruse manner of condensation, than which nothing is more commodious for man. *As for Fire*, that is a ready and known Agent for *Rarefaction*; but the mystery of *Condensation*, is not yet fully discovered: and it makes much for the abridgement of invention, if *Polychrests* of this nature were collected into a particular Catalogue.



## CAP. VI.

*Of the Great Appendix of Naturall Philosophy, Speculative, as Operative; Mathematicke knowledge, and that it ought rather to be Placed amongst Appendices, than amongst substantiall Sciences.*  
 § *The Partition of Mathematicques into Pure and Mixt.*

Metaph. I.  
& IX.



*Aristotle* saith well, *Physique and Mathematicke*, ingender *Practicall or Mechanicall* knowledge: Wherefore now we have handled, both the *speculative* and *operative* part of the *knowledge of Nature*; order requires that we speak of *Mathematicke*, which is an auxiliary science to them both. For in the received Philosophy, *Mathematicke* is annexed, as a third part to *Physique and Metaphysique*; but it seems to us, who have undertaken to reexamine, and Till over againe these things, (if we had designed this as a substantive and principall science) more agreeable both in respect of the nature of the thing, and the light of order, to place it as a branch of *Metaphysique*. For *Quantity*, which is the subject of *Mathematicke Science*, applied to Matter, is the Dose, as it were, of Nature, and productive of a number of effects in things Naturall; and therefore is to be reckoned in the number of *essentiall Formes*. For the Power of *Figure, and Number*, seemed to be of such force amongst the Ancient Philosophers, that *Democritus* placed the seeds of the variety of things, principally, in the *Figures of Atomes*; and *Pythagoras* asserted, the Natures of things, to be constituted of

*Numbers*

Laert. in  
Dem.

Iamb. de  
vita Pyth.  
I. I.

*Numbers.* In the meane, this is true, that of Naturall *Formes*, (as we understand *Formes*) *Quantity* is of all most abstracted and separable from Matter: which was the reason why it hath bin more painefully laboured, and more exactly inquired by men, then any other *Forme* whatsoever, which are all more immersed in Matter. For being it is the nature of Man (certainly to the great prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the open *Fields of Generalls*; rather than in the *Woods and Inclosures of Particulars*; there was nothing found more acceptable and delightfull, than the *Mathematiques*; wherein that appetite of expatiating and meditating might be satisfied. And though all this be true, yet to us, who provide not only for truth and order, but likewise for the use and profit of men; it seemed at last better, to designe *Mathematiques*; being they are of such efficacy, both in *Physiques* and in *Metaphysiques*, and in *Mechaniques*, and in *Magique*; as the *Appendices* and auxiliary forces of them all: which in a sort we are compelled to doe, for the wantonnesse and arrogancy of *Mathematicians*, who could be content that *this Science*, might even command and over-rule *Physique*. For it is come to passe, by what fate I know not, that *Mathematique* and *Logique*, which should carry themselves as hand-maides to *Physique*; boasting their certainty above it, take upon them a command and Dominion. But we doe not so much stand upon the ranke, & dignity of this science; let us consider the thing it selfe.

§ *Mathematiques* are either *Pure*, or *Mixt.* to *Pure Mathematiques*, those sciences are referred, which handle *Quantity* altogether abstracted from Matter, and *Physicall Axioms*. They are two, *Geometry*, and *Arithmetique*; the one handling *Quantity* continued; the other *dissevered*. Which two Arts have indeed bin inquired into, with subtiltie and industry; but neither to the labours of *Euclide* in *Geometry*, hath there bin any thing of any worth added by *Posterity*, in so many centuries of years since he florisht; nor hath the *Doctrine of Solides*, for the use and excellency of the knowledge, bin la-

boured and advanced by writers Ancient or Moderne. And in *Arithmetique* there hath not bin found out apt and sufficient variety of compendious waies for *supputations*, especially about *Progressions*; whereof there is great use in the *Physiques*. Nor is the *Algebra, or Art of Equation* well perfected; but that *Pythagoricall* and *Mysticall Arithmetique*, which is begunne to be revived out of *Proclus*, and some Remaines of *Euclide*, is a spacious field of Speculation: *For such is the nature of Man, that if it be not able to comprehend solids, it wasts it selfe in unprofitable niceties.*

§ *Mixt Mathematicque*, hath for subject *Axioms*, and *Portions of Physique*; and considers *Quantity*, as it is auxiliary to enlighten, demonstrate, and actuate them. For many Parts of Nature can never be with sufficient subtlety comprehended, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity; nor accommodated to use with sufficient dexterity and certainty, without the Aide, and intervening of the *Mathematiques*. Of which sort are *Perspective, Musique, Astronomie, Cosmographie, Architecture, Ingenarie*, and divers others. But in *Mixt Mathematicques*, I can now report no entire portions *Deficient*; I rather make this prediction, that there will be more kindes of them invented by Posterity, if men be not wanting to themselves. For as *Physicall knowledge* daily growes up, and new *Actions of nature* are disclosed; there will be a necessity of new *Mathematique inventions*; and so at last more *Mixt Mathematicques* will be contrived. *And now we have passed through the knowledge of Nature, and have noted the Deficients therein.* Wherein if we have departed from the Ancient and received opinions, and thereby have moved contradiction; for our part, as we affect not to dissent, so we purpose not to contend. If it be truth,

*Non Canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvæ;*

The voice of nature will crie it up, though the voice of man should crie it downe. And as *Alexander Borgia* was wont to say, of the Expedition of the *French* for *Naples*, that they came with chaulke in their hands to marke up their Lodgings, and

not

Virg. Bucol.

Vid. Hist. Gal.

*not with weapons to fight; so we like better, that entry of truth, which comes peaceably, where the Mindes of men, capable to lodge so great a guest, are signed, as it were, with chalke; than that which comes with Pugnacity, and forceth it selfe away by contentions and controversies. Wherefore having finisht two parts of Philosophy, concerning God, and concerning Nature; the third remaines concerning Man.*



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THE





THE FOVRTH BOOK OF  
 FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM  
 VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE  
 DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
 OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I The Partition of the Knowledge of Man into the Philosophy of Humanitie, and Civile. § The Partition of the Knowledge of Humanitie into the Knowledge touching the Body of Man; and into the Knowledge touching the Soule of Man. II. The Constitution of a generall Knowledge of the Nature or of the State of man. § The Division of the Knowledge of the State of Man into the Knowledge of the Person of Man; and of the League of the Mind, and the Body. § The Division of the Knowledge of Mans Person, into the Knowledge of Mans Miseries. § And of his Prerogatives. III The Division of the Knowledge of the League, into the Knowledge of Indications. § And of Impressions. § The Assignment of Physiognomy. § And of the Interpretation of Naturall Dreams, to the Knowledges of Indications.

**I**F any Man (*Excellent King*) shall assault, or wound me for any of those *Precepts* I have delivered, or shall hereafter deliver (besides that I should be safe being under the Protection of *Your Majestie*) let him know, that he doth that which is against the Custome and Law of Armes: For I am a Trumpeter  
 Z only,

only, I doe not begin the *fight*; perchance one of thole of whom *Homer* ſe.

Hom. II. 4.

Καίριτε κήρυκες, διὸς Ἄγγελοι, ἢ δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

For theſe even between Mortall and enraged enemies paſt to and fro ever inviolated. Nor doth our Trumpet ſummon, and incourage men to teare and rend one another with contradictions; and in a Civile rage to beare armes, and wage warre againſt themſelves; but rather, a peace concluded between them, they may with joynt forces direct their ſtrength againſt *Nature hir ſelfe*; and take hir high Towers, and diſmantle hir fortified Holds; and thus enlarge the Borders of mans Dominion, ſo farre as Almighty God of his goodneſſe ſhall permit.

Plat. in Alcib. I.

Cic. de LL. lib. I.

Sen. Epist. § 89.

Cicero de Orat.

I Now let us come to that Knowledge, whereunto the Ancient Oracle directeth us, which is *the knowledge of our ſelves*: which deſerves the more accurate handling by how much it toucheth us more neerly. *This knowledge is to man the end and terme of Knowledges; but of Nature hir ſelfe, a portion only.* And generally let this be a rule, that all Diviſions of Knowledges be ſo accepted and applied, *As may rather deſigne forth and diſtinguiſh Sciences into Parts; than cut and pull them aſunder into pieces; that ſo the continuance and entireneſſe of Knowledges may ever be preſerved.* For the contrary Practice hath made particular Sciences to become barren, ſhallow, and erroneous; while they have not bin nourisht, maintain'd and rectified from the common Fountaine, and Nurcery. So we ſee *Cicero* the Oratour complained of *Socrates*, and his Schoole; *That he was the firſt that ſeparated Philoſophy and Rhetorique*; whereupon Rhetorique became a verball, and an empty Art. And it is alſo evident, that the opinion of *Copernicus*, touching *the Rotation of the Earth* (which now is maintain'd) becauſe it is not repugnant to the *Phænomena*, cannot be revinc'd by *Aſtronomicall Principles*; yet by the Principles of *Naturall Philoſophy*, truly applied, it may. So we ſee alſo that the *Science of Medicine*, if it be deſtituted and forſaken of *Naturall Philoſophy*, it is not much better than *Empiricall Practice*.

§ This being laid as a ground, let us proceed to the Knowledge of man. This hath two parts: For it either considereth man *segregate*, or *distributively*; or *congregate*, and in *societie*: the one we call *Philosophy of Humanity*; the other *Philosophy Civile*. The *Philosophy of Humanity*, or *Humane*, consisteth of the same Parts, whereof man himselfe consisteth; that is of knowledges which respect the *Body*; and of knowledges which respect the *Mind*.

¶ But before we pursue particular Distributions, let us constitute; One generall Knowledge of the Nature and State of man: For indeed it is very fit that this Knowledge be emancipate, and made a knowledge by it selfe. It is compos'd of those *Sympathies* and *Concordances* commune between the *Body* and the *Mind*.

§ Againe, this Knowledge of the Nature and State of man may be distributed into two Parts; attributing to the one the *undivided Nature of man*; to the other the *Combination between the Mind and the Body*: The first of these we will call the *knowledge of the Person of man*; the second the *knowledge of the League*: And it is plaine that all these severall Branches of Knowledge, being they are common and commixt, could not be assigned to that first Division, of Knowledges, conversant about the *Body*; and of Knowledges conversant about the *Mind*.

§ The Knowledge concerning the Person of man, comprehends specially two things; namely the *Contemplations of the Miseries of Mankind*; and of the *Prerogatives, or Excellencies of the same*. But the *bemoaning of mans miseries* has bin elegantly and copiously set forth by many in the writings, as well of *Philosophers*, as *Divines*. And it is both a pleasant and a profitable Contemplation.

§ As for that other touching *Mans Prerogatives*, it is a point may well be set downe among *DEFICIENTS*. *Pindar* when he would extoll *Hiero*, speakes (as usually he doth) most elegantly, *That he cropt off the tops, or summities of all virtues*. For I suppose it would much conduce to the *Magnanimity*, and *Honour of Man*; if a Collection were made

✱  
TRIVMPHI  
HOMINIS,  
SIVE DE  
SVMMITA.  
TIBVS NA-  
TVRÆ HV-  
MANÆ.

In Olymp.

of the *Vltimities* ( as the Schooles speake ) or *Summities* ( as *Pindar* ) of *Humane Nature* , principally out of the faithfull reports of *History*: That as ; *What is the last and highest pitch, to which mans Nature of it selfe hath ever reach't in all the Perfections both of Body and Mind* . What a strange ability was that which is reported of *Cæsar*, that he could dictate at once to five Secretaries? So the Exercitations of the Ancient Rhetoricians, *Protagoras* ; *Gorgias* ; likewise of Philosophers; *Calisthenes* ; *Possidonius*, *Carneades*; who were able to discourse extempore upon any Subject *Pro* and *Con*, with fluency and elegancy of expression , doe much enoble the Powers of mans wit and naturall endowments. And that which *Cicero* reports of his Master *Archias* is litle for use, but perchance great for Ostentation and Faculties ; that he was able upon the sudden to alleadge a great number of excellent verses pertinent to the purpose of such Discourses as were then in hand . It is a singular commendation to that faculty of the Mind , the *Memory*; that *Cyrus* or *Scipio* could call so many thousands of men by their Particular Names. But the Trophies of Morall virtues, are no lesse famous than those of intellectuall virtues. What a great example of patience doth that comon story of *Anaxarchus* present unto our thoughts, who put to the Rack and Torture, bit out his own tongue, the hoped Instrument of some Discovery , and spit it in the Tyran's face? Nor is that inferior for tolerance though much for the merit & dignity, ( which fell out in our time ) of a certaine Burgundian , who had committed a Murder upon the Person of the Prince of Orange) this slave being scourged with iron whips; and his flesh torn with burning Pincers gave not so much as a groane; howbeit when a broken piece of the Scaffold fell by chance upon the head of one that stood by, the scorcht-stigmatiz'd varlet , laught; even in the midst of his torments, who a litle before wept at the cutting off of his curled haire . In like manner the serenity and security of Mind hath appeared wonderfull in many even at the instant approaches of Death; as that of a Centurion recorded by *Tacitus* ; who being commanded by the executioner

Suet.in Iul.

Plat.in Hip  
in Arist.Quin.Inst.3  
Laert.in vit.Philostr.in  
Ep. alii.Pro Archia  
Poeta.Xenop.  
Cyrop. 5.  
Quintil.  
Inst. XI.

Laert.

Meteran.  
Hist. bel.  
I. XI.

Annal. 15.

executioner to stretch forth his neck valiantly. *I would* (saith he) *thou wouldst strike as valiantly*. But *John Duke* of Saxonie when the cōmission was brought him, as he was playing at chefts, wherein his death was commanded the next day, call'd to one that stood by, and smiling, said; *See, whether I have not the better hand of this game*; He (pointing towards him with whom he plaid) *will boast when I am dead, that he was the fairer of set*. And our *More*, Chancellour of England, when the day before he was to die, a Barber came unto him (sent for this end, lest perchance the grave and reverend sight of his long haire might move compassion in the People, and asked him whether it was his pleasure to have his haire cut) he refused, and turning to the Barber; *The King* (said he) *is at suit with me for my head, and untill that Controversie be ended I meane to bestow no cost upon it*. And the same Person at the very point of Death, after he had laid his head upon the fatall Block raiseth up himselfe a litle agen; and having a faire large Beard gently removed it, saying, *Yet I hope this hath not offended the King*. But not to insist too long upon this point, it is evident what we meane, namely, that *the wonders of Humane Nature, and the ultimate Powers, and virtues as well of Mind as of Body, should be collected into a Volume, which might serve as a Kalendar of Humane Triumphs*. For a worke of this Nature we approve the purpose, and Designe of *Valerius Maximus*, and *C. Plinius*; but it could be wisht they had us'd more choice and Diligence.

Hist.  
Germ.

Vita. Mori.

III *As touching the knowledge of the league, or mutuall Alliance between the body and the Mind; that may be distributed into two Parts. For as all leagues and Amities consist of mutuall intelligence, and mutuall offices; so this league of Mind and Body, is in like manner comprised in these two circumstances; that is, to describe How these two, namely, the Mind and the body, disclose one the other; and how one worketh upon the other, by discovery or Indication; and by Impression. The former of these (namely a description what discovery may be made of the Mind, from the habit of the Body, or of the Body from the Accidents of the Mind) hath begotten unto us*

two Arts, both of prediction, whereof the one is honoured with the Inquiry of *Aristotle*; and the other of *Hippocrates*. And although the moderne times, have polluted these Arts with superstitious and Phantasticall mixtures, yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have both a solid ground in nature, and a profitable use in life.

§ *The first is Physiognomy, which discovers the dispositions of the mind, by the lineaments of the Body. The second is the exposition of Naturall dreams, which discovereth the State and Disposition of the Body, from the Passions and Motions of the mind.*

\*  
PHYSI-  
OGNOMI-  
A COR-  
PORIS IN  
MOTV.  
IACOBUS  
R.

In the Former of these, I note a DEFICIENCE: for *Aristotle* hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the Postures of the Body, while it is at Rest; but not the Gestures of the Body when it is in Motion; which are no lesse comprehensible by Art, and of Greater use. For the lineaments of the Body, doe disclose the Inclinations and Proclivities of the Mind in generall; but the Motions and Gestures of the face and Parts, doe not only so, but further declare the Accesses, and Seasons, and Prognostiques of the present disposition, and of the will. For, to use your Majesties most apt and elegant expression, *The tongue speaks to the eare, but the gesture speaks to the eye.* And therefore a number of old subtile and craftie Persons, whose eyes doe dwell upon the faces and fashions of Men, doe well know this observation; and can turne it to their owne advantage, as being a great part of their ability and wisdom. Neither indeed can it be denied, but that this is a great discovery of dissimulation in an other, and a great direction, for the election of seasons, and opportunities of approaching to persons; which is not the meanest part of Civile Prudence. And let no man think that such a dexterity, may somewhat availe, in respect of some Particular persons, but cannot be comprehended under rule: for we all laugh and weepe, and blush, and bend the brow much after the same manner; and so for most part it is in other more subtile motions. As for *Chiromancy*, it is a meere imposture.

§ *And as touching the exposition of Dreames; it is a subject handled in some mens writings, but soild with many idle vanities*

vanities; only thus much for the present I doe Insinuate, that this knowledge of *interpreting Dreams*, wants the support of a solid Base; and that foundation is this, *where the same effect is wrought, by an inward cause, that useth to be wrought by an outward; that externe Act is transformed into a Dreame.* The surcharge of the stomach from a grosse vapour, and from the poise of some outward waight, are a like; wherefore they that labour of the *Night-mare* doe dreame, that a waight is put upon them, with a great preparation of circumstances. The fluctuation or pensility of the Bowells, from the agitation of the waves in the sea, and from the winde gathered about the *Diaphragma*, are a like: therefore such as are troubled with the *Hypocondriaque* wind, doe often dream of Navigations, and agitations upon the waters. There are an infinite number of such like instances.

§ The other branch of the *knowledge of the league* (which we have called *Impression*) hath not as yet bin collected into Art, but hath sometimes intervned among other Treatises sparsedly, and as in passage only. It hath the same Antistrophe with the former: for the consideration is double; *either how, and how farre the humors and temperament of the body, doe alter or worke upon the mind? Or againe, How and how farre, the Passions and apprehensions of the mind doe alter or work upon the Body.* The former of these we see sometimes handled in the Art of Physique; but the same hath by strange waies insinuated it selfe into Religion. For the Physitian prescribes Remedies to cure the Maladies of the mind; as in the cures of Frenzies and Melancholy: they doe also administer Physique to exhilarate the Mind; to munite and strengthen the heart, and so to increase the courage, to sharpen and clarify the wits, to corroborate the Memory, and the like. But Dietes, and choice of meats, and drinks, and other observances touching the Body, in the sect of the *Pythagoreans*; in the Heresie of the *Manichees*, and in the law of *Mahomet* doe exceed all measure. So likewise the ordinances of the Ceremoniall Law, *interdicting the eating of the bloud;* Deut. 12, *the Fat;* and *distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean,* so farre

farre as they are for meat, are many and strict. Nay the Christian faith it selfe, though cleere and syncere from all clouds of ceremonies; yet retains the use of Fastings; Abstinences; and other observances, which tend to the maceration and humiliation of the Body; as things not meerey Figurative; but also Fruitfull. The root and life of all such prescripts as these, (besides the Ceremony it selfe, and the practise of Canonically obedience,) consists in this whereof we speak, namely, *that there may be a mutuall sufferance and humiliation of the soule with the Body.* And if any man of weaker judgement doe conceive, that these impressions of the Body upon the Mind, doe either question the immortality, or derogate from the loveraignty of the soule over the Body; to an easy doubt, an easy answer is sufficient. Let him take these instances; *either from an Infant in the Mothers wombe, which is compatible with the Accidents and Symptomes of the mother, and yet separable in its season, from the Body of the Mother:* Or from Monarques, who though they have absolute power, are some-times inclined by the sway of their Servants; yet without subjection of their Persons or diminution of their Power.

§ Now as for the reciprocall part, the operations of the soule, and of the Effects and Passions thereof upon the Body; that also hath found a place in Medicine. For all wise Physitians doe ever consider and handle, *Accidentia Animi*, as a matter of great moment, for their Cures; and which are of great force to further or hinder all other Remedies. But there is another observation pertinent to this subject, which hath bin very sparingly inquired into; and nothing to the depth and dignity of the thing; that is, (setting aside the affections) *how farre the Imagination of the Mind, or a thought deeply fixt, and exalted as it were, into a believe, is of Power to alter the Body of the Imaginant?* For though it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followes not that it hath the same degree of power to help: No more indeed, than if a man should conclude that because their be pestilent Aires able sodainly to kill a man in health; therefore there should be Sovereigne Aires, able

able suddenly to cure a man in sicknesse. *This Inquisition* Laert. in V. would certainly be of excellent use, but as *Socrates* said, it needs a *Delian Diver*, being couered with darknesse and obscurity. *Againe*, of all these Knowledges, *de Fædere*; or of the *Concordances between the Mind and the Body*, there is no part more necessary than the disquisition of the *Seates and Domiciles*, which the severall faculties of the mind doe take and occupate in the Body, and the Organes thereof. Which kind of knowledge hath not wanted Sectators, but what is found in many such Writers is either controverted, or slightly inquired; and would be searcht into with more diligence and perspicacity. For the opinion introduced by *Plato* placing the understanding in the braine, as in a high Tower; *Animosity* Plat. in Timæo. (which he unjustly calleth *Anger*) being it is neerer to Tumor and Pride) in the *Heart*; *Concupiscence* and *sensuality* in the *Liver*, deserves not altogether to be despised; nor yet too hastily embrac't. So the placing of the *Intellectuall Faculties*; *Imagination*; *Reason*; *Memory*; according to the ventricles of the Braine, is not without error. Thus have we explicated the Knowledge touching the *individed nature of man*, as also touching the *League of the Body and the Mind*. Arist. de Gen. Anim. 4. Gal. de plac. Plat.



## C A P. II.

I The Partition of the Knowledge respecting the Body of Man, into *Art Medicinall. 9. Cosmetique. 9. Athletique. 6. And Voluptuary.* II. The Partition of Medicine, into three Duties. 9 *Conservation of Health.* III. *Cure of Diseases.* IIII. *And Prolongation of Life:* And that the last Part, *Prolongation of Life*, should be separate from the other two.

I  HE Knowledge that concernes Mans Body, is divided, as the Good of Mans Body is divided, unto which it is referr'd. The Good of Mans Body, is of foure kinds; *Health*; *Forme, or Beauty*; *Strength*; *Pleasure*. Wherefore there are so many *Sciences*; *Medicine*, or the *Art of Cure*; *Cosmetique*, or the *Art of Decoration*; *Athletique*, or the

*Art of Activity, and Art Voluptuary, which Tacitus calls Eru-  
ditus Luxus.*

Homer.  
Hym. Pau-  
san. alii.

§ *Medicine* is a noble Art; and according to the Poets descended of a most generous race; for they have brought in *Apollo*, as the chiefe God of Medicine, to whom they have assigned *Æsculapius* for his sonne; a God too, and a Professor of *Physique*: *Because in things naturall the Sunne is the Auctor, and Fountaine of Life; the Physitian the Conserver of Nature; and as it were a second Spring of Life.* But the greatest glory to *Physique* is from the workes of our Saviour, who was a Physitian both of Soule and Body: And as he made the Soule the peculiar object of his heavenly Doctrine, so he design'd the body the proper subject of his miracles. For we never read of any miracles done by him respecting Honour, or Wealth, (besides that one when Tribute was to be given to *Cesar*), but only respecting the Body of man; or to preserve, or to sustaine, or to cure it.

Paramiri.  
lib. 4.  
Rob. Flud.  
passim.

§ *The Subject of Medicine* (namely *mans Body*) is of all other things which nature hath brought forth most capable of remedy; but then that remedy is most capable of Error: For the same subtilty, and variety of the subject, as it affords great possibility of Cure, so it gives great facility to error. Wherefore as that Art (such as now it is) may well be reckon'd amongst Arts conjecturall; so the enquiry thereof may be placed in the number of the most difficult, and exactest Arts. Neither yet are we so senselesse, as to imagine with *Paracelsus*, and the Alchymists; *That there are to be found in mans Body certaine Correspondences, and Parallels to all the variety of specifike Natures in the world* (as *Starres*, *Minerals*, and the rest) as they foolishly fancy and Mythologize; straining, but very impertinently, that embleme of the Ancients, *That man was Microcosmus, an abstract, or modell of the whole world*, to countenance their fabulous, and fictitious invention. Yet notwithstanding this is an evident truth, (which we were about to say) *that amongst all Bodies Naturall, there is not found any so multipliciously compounded as the Body of man.* For we see *Hearbes*, and *Plants*, are nourished by earth and  
water;

water; Beasts by Hearbes and Fruicts: But man by the flesh of living Creatures; as Beasts, Birds, Fish; and also of Hearbes, Graines, Fruicts, luice, and diverse Liquors; not without manifold commixtures, seasoning, and, Preparation of these Bodies before they come to be mans meate, and aliment. Adde hereunto, that Beasts have a more simple order of life, and lesse change of affections to worke upon their Bodies, and they commonly working one way; whereas man in his Mansions, exercises, Passions, sleepe, and vigilancies is subject to infinite vicissitudes of changes. So that it is most evident that of all other naturall substances, the Body of man is the most fermentated, compounded, and incorporated Masse. The soule, on the other side, is the simplest of substances, as it is well exprest; --- *Purumq; relinquit*

*Æthereum sensum, atq; Aurai simplicis ignem.*

Virg. Æn.  
6.

So that it is no marvaile though the soule so placed, enjoy no rest, according to that Principle, *Motus rerum extrâ locum est rapidus, placidus in loco*: But to the purpose, this various and subtle composition and fabrique of mans body, hath made it, as a curious and exquisite instrument, easy to be distemper'd; therefore the Poets did well to conjoyne *Musique, and Medicine in Apollo*; because the *Genius of both these Arts is almost the same*; and the office of a Physitian consisteth meere-ly in this, to know how to tune, and finger this Lyre of mans body, that the Harmony may not become discordant & harsh. So then this inconstancy, and variety of the subject, hath made the Art more conjecturall: And the Art being so conjecturall had given more large scope, not only to error, but even to imposture. For almost all other Arts and Sciences are judg'd by their power and operation; and not by their successse and worke. The Lawyer is judg'd by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the Cause; the Master in the Ship approves his art, by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage. But the Physitian; and perhaps the Politique hardly have any proper particular Acts, whereby they may make a cleer demonstration of their Art and abilities; but beare away honour or disgrace principally from the event which is ever an une-

Arist. Phys.  
& de. cal.

Panfan. in  
Eliacis.  
Ov. Met. 1.

*quall iudicature.* For who can tell if a Patient dye or recover; or if a State be preserved or ruin'd; whether it be by Art or Accident? Therefore it often falls out, that the impostor beares away the Prize, virtue the Censure. Nay the weaknesse and credulity of men is such, *As they often preferre a Montebank, or Witch, before a Learn'd Physitian.* Therefore the Poets were cleer and quick-sighted when they made *Æsculapius* and *Circe*, Brother and Sister, both children of the Sun, as in the Verses; of *Æsculapius* the Suns Son,

Virg. Æn. 7 *Ille repertorem Medicinæ talis, & Artis,  
Fulmine Phæbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas;*

And likewise of *Circe* the Sunnes Daughter,

Ibid. *Dives inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos  
Assiduo resonat cantu: tectisq; superbis  
Vrit odoratam nocturna in lumina Cedrum.*

For in all times in the reputation and opinion of the Multitude, Witches, and old Women, and Impostors, have bin rivall Competitors with Physitians; and have even contended with them for the fame of Cures. And what I pray yee followes? Even this, that Physitians say to themselves, as *Salomon* expresseth it upon a higher occasion, *If it befalls to me, as it befalls to the foole, why should I labour to be more wise?* And therefore I cannot much blame Physitians, if they use commonly to intend some other Art, or Practise, which they fancy more than their Profession: For you shall have of them Poets; Antiquaries; Critiques; Rhetoricians; Politiques; Divines; & in these Arts better seen, than in their own profession. Nor doth this come to passe, as I suppose, because (as a certaine Declaimor against sciences objects against Physitians) they have ever Conversant before their eyes such loathsome and sad Spectacles, that they must needs retire their minds from these objects, to some other contemplations; for as they are men, *Nihil Humani a se alienum putent;* but for this reason, whereof we now speake; namely, that they find, *that Mediocrity, and excellency in their Art, maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their Persons or Fortunes.* For the vexations of sicknesse; the sweetnesse of life; the

Agrip. de  
van. scien.

the flattery of hope; the commendation of friends; make men to depend upon Physicians with all their defects: But if a man seriously waigh the matter, these things rather rebound to the imputation of Physicians, than their excusation: who should not for these prejudices cast away hope; but encrease their pains and diligence. For whosoever pleaseth to excite and awake his observation, and a litle look about him, shall easily deprehend even from common and familiar examples, what a command and sovereignty the subletie and sharpnesse of the understanding hath over the variety either of matter, or of the forme of things. *Nothing more variable than mens faces* and countenances; yet the memory retaines the infinite distinctions of them: Nay a Painter with a few shells of Collours; the benefit of his eye; the habit of his Imagination; and the steadinesse of his hand; can imitate, and draw with his pencill all faces that are, have bin, or ever shall be; if they were brought before him: *Nothing more variable than mans voice*; yet we can easily discern their differences in every particular person; nay you shall have a Buffone, or a Pantomimus will render and expresse to the life, as many as he pleaseth. *Nothing more variable than articulate sounds of words*; yet men have found away to reduce them to a few letters of the Alphabet. And this is most certaine, that it is not the insufficiency, or incapacity of mans mind; but rather the remote standing, or placing of the object that breeds these Mazes, and Incomprehensions. For as the sense a-farre off is full of mistaking; but within due distance erres not much; so it is in the understanding. For men use commonly to take a Prospect of Nature, as from some high Turret, and to view hir a-farre off; and are too much taken up with generalities, whereas if they would vouchsafe to descend and approach neerer to Particulars; and more exactly and considerately look into things themselves, there might be made a more true & profitable discovery & comprehension. Now the remedy of this error, is not alone this, to quicken or strengthen the Organ; but withall to goe neerer to the object; And therefore there is no doubt but if Physicians, letting Generalities goe, for a while, and suspending their at-

cent thereto, would make their approaches to Nature; they might become Masters of that Art, whereof the Poet speaks,

Ovid. R. A.  
l. 2.

*Et quoniam variant morbi variabimus Artes;  
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.*

Which they ought the rather endeavour because the Philosophies themselves, upon the which Physitians, whether they be Methodists or Chymists doe rely (*for Medicine not grounded upon Philosophy is a weak thing*) are indeed very slight & superficiall. Wherefore if too wide Generalities, though true, have this defect, that they doe not well bring men home to Action; certainly there is greater danger in those Generalls, which are in themselves false, and instead of directing to truth, mislead the mind into the by-paths of Error.

§ *Medicine therefore* (as we have seene) hitherto hath bin such, as hath bin more professed, than laboured; and yet more laboured than advanced; seeing the paines bestowed thereon, hath bin rather in circle, than in progression. *For I find much Iteration but small Addition in Writers of that Facultie.*

II We will divide it into three Parts, which we will call the three Duties thereof: *The first is Conservation of health, the second the Cure of Diseases; the third Prolongation of Life.*

§ But for this last duty, Physitians seeme not to have acknowledg'd it as any principall part of their Art; but have (ignorantly enough) mingled and confounded it as one and the same with the other two. *For they suppose, that if Diseases be repelled before they seize upon the body; or be cured after they have surpriz'd the body; that Prolongation of Life must naturally follow.* Which though it be so, without all question, yet they doe not so exactly consider; that these two offices of *Conservation* and *Curation*, only pertain to diseases; and to such *Prolongation of Life* alone, which is abbreviated & intercepted by diseases: *But to draw out the thread of Life, and to prorogue Death, for a season which silently steales upon us, by naturall resolution, and the Atrophie of*  
Age

Age; is an argument that no Physitian hath handled it according to the Merit of the Subject *Neither let that scruple trouble the minds of Men, as if this thing committed to the dispensation of Fate, and the divine providence, were now by us first repealed and commended, to the charge and office of Art:* For without doubt Providence doth dispose and determine all kind of deaths whatsoever, whether they come of violence, or from diseases, or from the Course of Age; and yet doth not therefore exclude Preventions and Remedies: For Art and human industry doe not command and rule Fate, and nature; but serve and administer unto them. *But* of this part we shall speak anon; thus much in the meane by way of anticipation, least any should unskilfully confound this *third office* of Medicine, with the two former, which usually hitherto hath bin done.

§ *As for the duty of preservation of Health*, the first duty of the three, many have written thereof, as in other points very impertinently, so (in our judgement) in this particular; in attributing too much to the quality of meats, and too little to the quantity thereof: and in the quantity it selfe, they have discoursed like Morall Philosophers, excelsively praising Mediocrity; whereas both *fasting* changed to custome, and *full feeding*, to which a man hath inured himselfe, are better *regiments of health*, than those *Mediocrities* which commonly enervate Nature, and make hir slothfull, and impatient, if need should be, of any extremity, excesse or indigence. And for the divers kindes of *Exercise*, which much conduce to the *conservation of health*, none of that profession hath well distinguisht or observed; whereas there is hardly found any disposition to a disease, which may not be corrected by some kind of exercise proper to such an infirmity. As bowling is good against the weaknesse of the Reines, shooteing against the obstruction of the Longes; walking and upright deport of the body, against the crudities of the stomach; and for other diseases other exercitations. But seeing this part touching *the conservation of health*, hath bin in every point after a sort handled, it is not our purpose to pursue lesser deficiencies.

As

III. *As concerning the cures of Diseases;* that is a Part of Medicine, whereon much labour hath bin bestowed, but with small profit. It comprehendeth in it the *knowledge of Diseases*, to which mans body is subject, together with the *Causes, Symptomes, and Cures* thereof. In this second Duty of Medicine, many things are *deficient*; of these we will propound a few, which are more remarkable, which to enumerate without precise order or Method, we suppose sufficient.

\*  
NARRA-  
TIONES  
MEDICI-  
NALES.

§ *The first is the discontinuance*, of that profitable and accurate diligence of Hippocrates, whose custome was to set downe a *Narrative* of the speciall cases of his patients, what the Medicament, what the event. Therefore having so proper and notable a precedent from him, who was accounted the Father of the Art, we shall not need to alleage any example forraine, fetcht from other Arts, as from the wisdom of the lawyers, with whom nothing is more usuall, than to set downe and enter more notable cases, and new decisions, whereby they may the better furnish and direct themselves for the definition of future cases. *Wherefore I finde this continuation of Medicinall Reports deficient*, specially digested into one entire Body, with diligence and judgement; which yet I understand not to be made so ample, as to extend to every common case that daily falls out (for that were an infinite worke and to small purpose) nor yet so reserved and contracted as to admit none, but Prodigies, and wonders; as many have done: for many things are new in the *manner* and circumstances of the thing; which are not *new* in the *kinde*; and he that shall give his mind to observe, shall finde many things even in matters vulgar worthy observation.

\*  
ANATO-  
MIA  
COMPA-  
RATA.

§ So in *Disquisitions Anatomicall*, the manner is, that those parts which pertaine in generall to Mans Body, are most diligently enquired and observed even to a curiosity, and that in every least file: *but as touching the variety which is found in diverse bodies, there the diligence of Physitions failes*. And therefore I grant that *simple Anatomy* hath bin most cleerely

cleerely handled; but COMPARATIVE ANATOMIE, I define to be deficient. For men have made a good enquiry into all the parts, and into their consistencies, figures, and collocations: but the diverse figure, condition, and posture of those parts in diverse men, they have not so well observed. The reason of this omission I suppose is no other than this, that the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of one or two Anatomies; but the later, being COMPARATIVE and Casuall, must arise from the attentive and exact observation of many *Disections*: and the first is a matter, wherein learned Professors in their Lectures, & the presse of Spectators standing about them, may vaunt themselves; but the second kind of *Anatomie*, is a severe knowledge, which must be acquired by a retired speculation, and a long experience. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but that the Figure and Structure of the inward parts is very little inferior, for variety and lineaments, to the outward members; and that Hearts and Livers and Ventricles are as different in men, as are either their Foreheads, or Noses, or Eares.

§ And in these differences of inward parts, there are often found the *Causes continent* of many diseases; which Physicians not observing, doe sometime accuse the Humors which are not delinquent, the fault being in the very Mechanique Frame of some part. In the cure of which Diseases, to apply *Alterative Medicines*, is to no purpose (because the part peccant is incapable of such alteration,) but the matter must be mended, and accommodated, or palliated by a precept Diet and familiar Medicines. So likewise to COMPARATIVE ANATOMY appertaine accurate observations, as well of all kind of humors, as of the footsteps and impressions of diseases in diverse bodies dissected: for the Humors, in Anatomies are commonly past by, as if they were superfluous Purgaments and Excrements; whereas it is a point very usefull and necessary, to note of what nature and of how various kinds there be of different humors (not relieing herein too much upon the received divisions,) which sometimes may be found in the body of Man; and in what Cavi-

ties and Receptacles, every humor useth for most part to lodge and nestle, and with what advantage or prejudice, and the like. In like manner the *foot-steps* and *Impressions of Diseases*, and the lesions and devastations of the inward parts by them, are to be observed with diligence in diverse *Anatomies*; as imposthumes, ulcerations, solutions of continuity, putrefactions, corrosions, consumptions, luxations, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, tumors; together with all preternaturall excrescencies, found in mans body (as stones, carnosities, wens, wormes, and the like;) I say all these, and such other, should be with great diligence inquired, and digested by that *COMPARATIVE ANATOMY*, whereof we speak, and the experiments of many Physitians collected and collated together. *But this variety of Accidents*, is by Anatomists, either handled perfunctorily, or else past over in silence.

De Re Medica.

§ *Touching that other Defect in Anatomie, (namely that it hath not been used to be practised upon living Bodies,)* to what end should we speak of it? for this is an odious and an inhumane experiment, and by *Celsus* justly condemned: yet notwithstanding, that observation of the Ancients is true, That many Pores, Passages and Pertusions, which are more subtile than the rest, appeare not in *Anatomicall dissections*, because they are shut and latent in *Dead Bodies*; whereas they are open and manifest in *LIVE*. Wherefore to consult both for use and humanity, this *Anatomia vivorum*, is not altogether to be relinquishd, or referred (as *Celsus* did) to the call inspections of surgions, seeing this may well be performed, being diverted upon the *Dissection of Beasts alive*, which, notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts with mans, may sufficiently satisfie this enquiry, being done with judgement.

\*  
DE CVRATIONE  
MORBORVM  
HABITORVM  
PRO INSANABILIBVS.

§ *Likewise in their Inquiry of Diseases*, they finde many *diseases* which they decerne and judge to be incurable; some, from the first accessse of the disease, others, after such a certain period: so that the *Proscriptions of L. Scylla*, and the *Triumvirs*, was nothing to the *Proscriptions of Physitians* by which,  
by

by their most unjust Edicts; they deliver over so many men to death; whereof numbers doe escape with lesse difficulty, than they did in the Roman Proscriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to set downe among DEFICIENTS a work of the cures of Diseases held incurable; that so some excellent and Generous Professors in that faculty, may be awakt and stirred up, to set this work (so farre as the latent operations of Nature, by mans industry, may be disclosed) seeing this very sentence of Pronouncing Diseases to be incurable, enacts a law, as it were, for sloath and negligence, and redeemes ignorance from Discredit and Infamy.

§ Nay farther, to insist a little upon this Point, I estimate it the office of a Physitian, not only to restore health, but to mitigate dolors, and torments of Diseases; and not only when such mitigation of paine, as of a dangerous symptome, may make and conduce to recovery; but even when all hope of recovery being gone, it may serve to make a faire and easie passage out of life. For it is no small felicity, which *Augustus Caesar* was wont to wish to himselfe, that same EUTHANASIA; which was also noted in the Death of *Antonius Pius*, who seemed not so much to dye, as to be cast into a sweet and deep sleep. And it is written of *Epicurus*, that he procured this same easy departure unto himselfe; for after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his stomacke and senses with a large draught, and ingurgitation of wine, whereupon the Epigram was made -- *hinc Stygius ebrius hausit aquas*, Sueton. in Aug. He took away by these draughts of wine, the bitter tast of the Stygian water. Laert. in Epicuro. But in our times Physitians make a kind of scruple and nicity of it, to stay with a patient after the disease is past hope of cure; whereas in my judgement, if they would not be wanting to their profession, and to humanity it selfe, they ought both to enquire the skill, and to give the attendance for the facilitating and asswaging of the paines and Agonies of Death at their departure. And this part, the inquiry de EUTHANASIA EXTERIORI, (which we so call to distinguish it from that *Euthanasia*, or sweet-calme Dyeing, procured by a due preparation of the soule) we referre to the number of DEFICIENTS.

\*  
DE MEDI-  
CINIS AV-  
THENTI-  
CIS.

§ So in the Cures of Diseases, I finde generally this Deficiency; that the Physitians of the time, though they doe not impertinently pursue the generall intentions and scope of Cures; yet for particular Receipts, which by a kind of propriety respect the cures of Ipecificall diseases; either they doe not well know them, or they doe not religiously observe them. For the Physitians have frustrated and taken away the fruit of Traditions, and approved experience, by their *Magistralities*; in adding and taking out, and changing ingredients of Receipts at their pleasure, and almost after the manner of Apothecaries, putting in *Quid pro Quo*; commanding so presumptuously over Medicine, as the Medicine can no longer command the disease. For except *Treacle*, and *Mithridatum*, and of late *Dioscordium*; and the confection of *Alkermes*, and a few more Medicines; they commonly tye themselves to no receipts severely and strictly. For the confections of sale, which are in the shoppes, they are in readinesse rather for generall purposes, than accommodate and proper for particular cures; for they doe not exactly referre to any disease in speciall; but generally to the opening of obstructions, comforting concoction, altering Distemperatures. And this is the cause why *Empyriques* and *Old woemen* are more happy many times in their Cures, than Learned Physitians; because they are faithfull, and scrupulous in keeping themselves to the confection and composition of approved Medicines. I remember that a Physitian with us here in England, famous for practice, in religion halfe Jew, and almost an Arabian for his course of study wont to say, *your European Physitians are indeed Learned men, but they know not the Particular Cures of Diseases*: and the same person used to jest, but unreverently, saying, *That our Physitians were like Bishops, they had the Keyes of binding and loosing, and nothing else*. But to speake the truth in earnest; in our opinion it would be a matter of good consequence, if some Physitians of Note for Learning and Practice, would compile a worke of Probations, and experimented Medicines for the cure of Particular Diseases: For that any  
man

man, induced by some specious reason, should be of opinion, that it is the part of a learned Physitian (respecting the complexions of Patients, their Age; the season of the yeare, Customes and the like, rather to accommodate his Medicines as occasions suggest, than to insist upon some certain Prescripts, is a deceiveable assertion, and which attributes too little to experience, too much to judgment. *Certainly* as in the state of Rome they were the men most usefull, and of the best composition, which either being Consuls favoured the People, or being Tribunes inclined to the Senate: So in the matter we now handle, they be the best Physitians, which either in their great Learning, doe much vauelw the Traditions of Experience; or being famous for Practice, despise not Methods and Generalities of Art. *As for qualifications* of Medicines (if at any time that be expedient) they are rather to be practis'd upon the Differents of Physique, than incorporated into the Receipt, wherein nothing should be innovated without apparent necessity. *Wherefore this Part which handleth Authentique and Positive Medicines,* we report as DEFICIENT: but it is a matter not to be attempted or undertaken without a sharpe and piercing judgment, and as it were, in a Synod of select Physitians.

§ Also in the *Preparations of Medicines* I doe find it strange (specially considering how *Minerall Medicines* have bin so extolled and celebrated by Chymists; and that they are safer for the outward than inward Parts) *that no man hitherto hath endeavoured by Art to imitate Naturall Bathes, and Medicinable Fountaines;* and yet it is confessed that *those Bathes and Fountaines* receive their vertues from minerall veines through which they passe: and for manifest prooffe hereof mans industry knows well how to discern and distinguish from what kind of Mineralls such waters receive their tinctures; as whether from Sulphur; Vitriol; Steele, or the like: *which naturall tinctures of waters,* if it may be reduced to compositions of Art, it would be in mans power, both to make more kinds of them as occasion required; and to command, at pleasure, the temperament thereof. *Therefore this Part of the*

IMITATIO  
TIO  
THER-  
MARVM  
NATV-  
RALIVM.

*imitation of Nature in Artificiall Bathes* (a thing without question both profitable and easy to be done we take to be DEFICIENT.

\*

FILVM  
MEDICINALE.

§ *But lest I should pursue Particulars more precisely, than is agreeable to our intention, or to the proportion of this Treatise; I will close and conclude this Part with a note of one Deficiency more, which seems to us to be of great consequence; which is, that the Prescripts in use are too compendious to effect any notable or difficult cure. For in our judgment it is a more vain and flattering, than true opinion, to think that any Medicine can be so sovereign, or so happy, as that the simple use thereof should be of force sufficient for some great cure. It were a strange speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice deeply rooted and inveterate. Certainly it is farre otherwise: But it is order, Pursuit, sequence, Artificiall interchange, that are potent and mighty in nature: Which although they require more exact judgment in prescribing; and more precise obedience in observing, yet this is amply recompenced in the greatnesse of effects. And although a man would think, by the daily diligence of Physitians, their Visitations, Sessions, and Prescriptions, which they performe to the sick; that they did painfully pursue the Cure; and goe on in a certaine course: Yet let a man exactly look into their prescripts, and ministrations, he shall find many of them full of wavering, inconstancy, and every dayes devises; and such as came into their minds without any certaine, or advised course of Cure. For they should even from the beginning, after they have made a full and perfect discovery of the disease, meditate and resolve upon an orderly sequence of Cure; and not without important reasons depart therefrom. And let Physitians know for certaine, that (for example) three perchance, or foure receipts, are rightly prescribed for the Cure of some great disease; which taken in due order, and in due spaces of time performe the Cure; which if they were taken single, or by themselves alone; or if the Course were inverted, or the intervalls of time not observed, would be hurtfull. Nor is it yet our meaning that every scrupulous and*

and superstitious way of Cure in estimation should be the best ; no more than that every strait way is the way to Heaven , but that the way should be right as well as strait and difficult . *And this Part* which we will call *Filum Medicinale* we set downe as *Deficient* . So these are the Parts which in the *Knowledge of Medicine* , touching the cure of Diseases, are *desiderate* , save that there remaines yet one part more of more use than all the other , which is here wanting, *A true and Active naturall Philosophie, upon which the science of Medicine should be built* : but that belongs not to this Treatise.

III *The third part of Medicine* we have set down to be that of the *Prolongation of Life*, which is a part new and *Deficient* , and the most noble of all: For if any such thing may be found out, *Medicine* shall not be practis'd only in the impurities of Cures, nor shall Physicians be honour'd only for Necessity, but for a guift, the greatest of earthly Donations that could be conferr'd on mortality, whereof men, next under God, may be the Dispensers and Administrators . *For although the world to a Christian man, travailing to the land of Promise, be as it were a wildernesse, yet that our (shoes and vestments ( that is our Body, which is as a converture to the soule,) be lesse worne away while we sojourne in this wildernesse, is to be estimed a gift comming from the divine goodnesse.* Now because this is one of the choicest parts of Phisique , and that we have set it downe amongst *Deficients*, we will after our accustomed manner give some Admonitions, Indications, and Precepts thereof.

§ *First we advertise*, that of Writers in this Argument there is none extant that hath found out any thing of worth, that I may not say, any thing found touching this subject. *Indeed Aristotle* hath left unto posterity a small briefe Commentarie of this matter ; wherein there is some acutenesse, which he would have to be all can be said , as his manner is : But the more recent Writers have written so idley , and superstitiously upon the point, that the Argument it selfe, through their vanity, is reputed vaine and senselesse.

DE PRO-  
LON-  
GANDO  
CVRRI-  
CVLO  
VITÆ.

De longi-  
tud. &  
Brev. vit.

§ *Secondly*

\* Arabian  
Plums.

§ *Secondly, we advertise, that the intentions of Physicians touching this Argument are nothing worth: and that they rather lead men away from the point, than direct them unto it. For they discourse that Death is a destitution of Heate and Moisture, and therefore naturall heate should be comforted and radical moisture cherish'd, as if it were a matter to be effected by Broaths, or Lettuces, & Mallows, or \* Iujubs, or fine Wafer-cakes or else with hot Spices, generous wine, or the Spirits of wine, or chymicall oyles; all which doe rather hurt, than helpe.*

§ *Thirdly, we admonish men that they cease to trifle, and that they be not so credulous as to think that such a great worke as this is, to retard and turne back the course of Nature, may be brought to perfection by a morning draught, or the use of some precious Receipt; no not with Aurum Potabile, or the substances of Pearles, or such like toys; but that they take it for a grounded truth, that the Prolongation of Life, is a great work, and which consists in many kinds of Receipts, and of an orderly course and connexion of them: And let no man be so stupid as to believe, that what never yet was done, can be now effected, but by meanes yet never attempted.*

§ *Fourthly we admonish men that they rightly observe and distinguish touching those Receipts which conduce to a healthfull life, and those which conferre to a long life. For there are many things which exhilarate the Spirits, strengthé the active powers of nature, repell diseases, which yet subduct from the summe of life, and without sicknesse accelerate aged Atrophie. And there are other receipts which conduce to the Prolongation of life, and the retardation of the Atrophie of old-age; but yet are not us'd without hazard of health: So that they who use these remedies for the prorogation of life, must likewise provide against such inconveniences as upon their usage may unexpectedly fall out. And thus much by way of Admonition.*

§ *As for Indications, the image, or Idea we have conceiv'd in our mind hereof, is this; Things are conserv'd and*  
continued

Continued two wayes; either in their owne Identitie, or by *Reparation*. In their proper Identitie, as a Flie or an Ant in Amber; a flower, an apple or wood in Conservatories of Snow; a dead corps in Balsame. By *Reparation*, as in Flame, and Mechanique. He that goes about the worke of *Prolongation of Life*, must put in practice both these kinds, (for disunited, their strength is weakned) and *Mans body* must be conserv'd after the same manner *inanimate Bodies* are conserved; and againe, as *Flame* is conserved; and lastly, even as *Mechaniques* are conserved. *Wherefore there are three intentions for the Prolongation of Life; the Retardation of Consumption; the Integrity of the Reparation; and the Renovation of that which begun to decay and grow old.* *Consumption* is caus'd by two *Depredations*, *Depredation of innate Spirit*; and *Depredation of ambient Aire*. The resistance of both is two-fold, either when the *Agents* (that is, the luc and moistures of the Body) become lesse *Predatory*; or the *Patients* are made lesse depredable. The *Spirit* is made lesse *Predatory*, if either it be condensed in substance, as in the use of Opiates, and nitrous application, and in contristations; or be *diminished in Quantity*, as in spare Pythagoricall or Monasticall Diets: or is sweetened and *refreshed with motion*, as in ease and tranquility. *Ambient Aire* is made lesse *Predatory*, either when it is *lesse heated with the beames of the Sunne*, as in colder countries; in Caves, in Hills, and in the Pillars or Stations of Anchorites; or when it is repell'd from the Body as in dens-close skin; in the Plumage of birds, and the use of oyle and unguents without Aromaticke Ingredients. The *juyce* and succulencies of the Body, are made lesse depredable, if either they be made more indurate, or more *dewy*, and *oily*: Indurate as in *austere course Diet*; in a life accustomed to cold, by strong exercises; by *certaine Minerall Bathes*. Roscide or dewy, as in the use of sweet meats and abstinence from meats, salt and acide; but especially in such a mixture of drinks, as is of parts very tenuious and subtle, and yet without all acrimony or tartnesse. *Reparation is done by Aliments*; and Alimentation is promoted foure wayes: *By the Concoction of the inward Parts*

for the sending forth of the nourishment; as in *Confortatives* of the Principall Bowells; by *excitation of the outward parts* for the attraction of nourishment, as in *due exercises* and frictions; and some kind of unctions and appropriate Bathes; by *preparation of the Aliment it selfe*; that it may more easily insinuate it selfe, and in a sort anticipate Digestions, as in diverse and artificiall kinds of *seasoning meat, mingling drinke, leavening bread*, and reducing the virtues of all these three into one; by *comforting the last act of Assimilation*, as in *seasonable sleep*, and outward or *Topique Applications: the Renovation of that which began to waxe old*, is performed two waies, either by *inteneration of the habit of the body it selfe*, as in the use of suppleing or softning applications by Bathes, emplasters and unctions, of such quality as may soak or insinuate into the part, but not extract from it; or by *expurgation of the old moisture, and substitution of new moisture*, as in *seasonable and often purging; letting of blood; attenuating Diets*, which restore the Flower of the Body, and so much for *Jndications*.

§ *As for Precepts*, although many of them may be deduced from the *Jndications*, yet we thought good to set downe three of the most principall. *First* we give in *Precept* that the *Prolongation of life*, must be expected from a prescript set Diet, rather than from any familiar regiment of Foode, or the excellency of particular receipts: for whatsoever are of such virtue as they are able to make nature *retrograde*, are commonly more strong and Potent to *alter*, than that they can be compounded together in any medicine, much lesse be intermingled in familiar foode. It remaines therefore that such receipts be administred regularly, and successively and at set appointed times, returning in certain courses.

§ *Our second Precept is, that the Prolongation of life be expected, rather from working upon spirits, and from a malacissation or inteneration of Parts, than from any kinds of aliment or order of Diet.* For seeing the Body of Man and the Frame thereof (leaving aside outward accidents) three waies becomes Passive, namely *from the spirits; from the parts; and from aliments;*  
the

the way of *Prolongation of life* by means of aliment is a long way about, and that by many ambages and circuits; but the waies by working upon the spirits, and upon the parts, are more compendious and sooner brings us to the end desired; because the spirits are sodainly moved, both from vapours and passions, which work strangely upon them: and the Parts, by Bathes, unguents or emplasters, which in like manner make way by sodaine impressions.

§ *Our third Precept is, that Malaciffation or inteneration of Parts by outward Topiques, must be performed by applications consubstantiall, Penetrating, and Sringent.* Consubstantiall are Willingly entertained with a kindly embrace, and properly intenerate and supple; *Penetrating* and insinuating remedies are the Defferents, as it were, of Malaciffant and mollifying qualities, and convey more easily and impressedly the virtue thereof; and doe themselves somewhat expand and open the Parts. *Restrings* keep in the virtue of them both, and for a time fixe it, and also cohibite and represses perspiration; which is a thing repugnant to *malaciffation or suppleing*, because it sends forth the moisture; wherefore by these three (but disposed in order, and succeeding, then intermixt) the matter is effected. *In the mean* we give this caveat, that it is not the intention of *Malaciffation* by outward topiques to nourish Parts; but only to render them more capable of nourishment: for whatsoever is more drie, is lesse Active to assimilate. And thus much of the *Prolongation of life*, which is a third part newly assigned to Medicine.

§ *Come we now to Cosmetique medicaments, or the Art of Decoration;* which hath indeed, parts Civile, and parts effeminate. For cleanness, and the *civile beauty* of the Body was ever esteemed to proceed from a modesty of behaviour, and a due reverence *in the first place* towards God, whose creatures we are, then towards society, wherein we live; and then towards our selves, whom we ought no lesse, nay much more to revere, than we doe any others. *But that Adulterate decoration by Painting and Cerusse,* it is well worthy of the imperfections which attend it; being neither fine  
 C c 2 enough

enough to deceive, nor handsome to please, nor safe and wholesome to use. And it is a wonder that this corrupt custome of *painting*, hath so long escaped penall lawes, both of the Church and of the state; which yet have bin very severe against the excessive vanity of Apparell, and the effeminate trimming of haire. *We read indeed of Iesabell that she painted her face; but of Esther and Judith, noe such matter is reported.*

§ *Let us proceed to Athletique*, which we take in a somewhat more large sence than usuallly it is. For to this we referre any point of *Ability*, whereunto the body of man may be brought, or any aptitude thereto, whether it be of *Activity* or of *Patience*: whereof *Activity* hath two parts, *strength* and *swiftnesse*; and *patience* likewise hath two parts, *Indurance* of *Naturall wants*, and *Fortitude* in *torments*. Of all these we see many times notable Instances in the practise of *Tumblers*; in the hard fare of some *Salvages*; in the wonderfull strength of *Lunatiques*; and in the constancy of many in the midst of exquisite torments. Nay if there be any other faculty, which falls not within (as in those that Dive, that obtain a strange power of containing *Respiration*, and the like) we referre it to this part. And that such things may sometimes be done, is most certain: but the *Philosophy* and enquiry of causes touching them, is commonly neglected; for this reason as we suppose, because men are perswaded, that such maisteries and commands over *Nature*, are obtained either by a peculiar imbred aptnesse of some men, which falls not within the rules of discipline; or from a continuall custome from childhood, which rather is commanded than taught. Which though it be not altogether so true, yet to what end should we note any *Deficiency*? for the *Olympique games* are down long since, and a mediocrity in these things is enough for use; but an excellency in them serveth commonly but for *Mercenary ostentation*.


§ *In the last place we come to Arts of Pleasure*: They, as the senses to which they referre are of two kinds; *Painting* delights the eye, especially, with an infinite number of such

Arts

Arts appertaining to Magnificence about Buildings; Gardens; Garments; Vessels; Cups; Gemmes, and the like. *Musique delights the eare*, which is set out with such variety and preparation of Voices; Aires, and Instruments. In ancient time water-Instruments were esteemed the chiefe Organs of that Art which now are almost growne out of use. *These Arts belonging to the eye and the eare* are principally above the rest accounted *Liberall*; these *two senses* are more chaste; the sciences thereof more learned, as having in their traine the *Mathematique Art* as their Handmaid: So the one is referr'd to Memory and Demonstrations; the other unto Manners, and the Passions of the Mind. The delight of the other senses and the Arts about which they are conversant, are in lesse reputation and credit, as drawing neerer to sensuality than magnificence. Unguents; Odors; Dainties; Delicious fare, and incitements to Lust; need rather a Censor to repress them; than a Doctor to instruct them. And it is well observed by some, *That while States and Commonwealths have bin in their growth and rising, Arts military have flourish'd; when they have bin settled and stood at a height, Arts liberall, and drawing to their declension and ruine, Arts voluptuarie*. And it is to be fear'd that this age of the world being somewhat upon the descent of the wheele, inclines to *Arts voluptuarie*: Wherefore we passe them over. With *Arts voluptuarie*, I couple *Practices Iocularie*; for the deceiving of the senses, may be set downe as one of the delights of the senses.

§ And now we have gone through the Knowledges concerning the *Body of man*. (*Physique; Cosmetique; Athletique, and Voluptuarie*) we admonish this much by the way; that seeing so many things fall into consideration about the *Body of man*, as *Parts; Humours; Functions; Faculties; Accidents*, & seeing (if we could aptly doe it) an entire Body should be made touching the *Body of man*, which might comprehend all these (like to that of *the knowledge of the Soule*, whereof we shall speake anon) notwithstanding lest Arts should be too much multiplied, or the ancient Limits of Arts transpos'd, more than need must; we receive into the *Body of Medi-*

cine, the knowledge of the Parts of mans Body, of Functions, of Humours, of Respiration, of Sleepe, of Generation, of the fruit of the Wombe, of Gestation in the Wombe; of Growth; of the flower of Age; of whit Haires; of Impinguation, and the like; although they doe not properly pertaine to those three duties of Conservation of Health; Cure of Diseases; Prolongation of Life. But because mans body is every way the Subject of Medicine. As for voluntarie motion, and sense, we referre them to the knowledge concerning the Soule; as two principall Parts thereof. And so we conclude the knowledge which concernes mans Body, which is but the Tabernacle of the Soule.



### CAP. III.

I The Partition of *Humane Philosophie* concerning the *Mind*, into the knowledge of the inspired *Essence*; & into the knowledge of the sensible, or produced *Soule*. §. A second Partition of the same *Philosophie*, into the knowledge of the *Substance* and *Faculties* of the *Soule*, and the knowledge of the use and *Objects* of the *Faculties*. II. Two Appendices of the *Knowledge* concerning the *Faculties* of the *Soule*. §. The knowledge of *Naturall Divination*; §. And the knowledge of *Fascination*. III. The *Distribution* of the *Faculties* of the *sensible Soule*. § Into *Motion*; and § into *Sense*.

I  OW let us proceed to the *Knowledge* which concerns the *Mind* or *Soule* of man, out of the treasures whereof all other *Knowledges* are extracted. It hath two *Parts*, the one entreateth of the *Reasonable Soule*, which is a thing *Divine*; the other of the *unreasonable Soule*, which is common to us with *Beasts*. We have noted a litle before (where we speake of *Formes*, ) those two different *Emanations* of *Soules*, which in the first *Creation* of them both, offer themselves unto our view, that is, that one hath it's originall from the *Breath* of *God*; the other from the *Matrices* of the *Elements*; for of the *Primitive Emanation* of the *Rational Soule*, thus speakes the *Scripture*, *Deus formavit hominem de limo terræ, & spiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitæ*: But the  
 Gen. 2. Generation

Generation of the unreasonable Soule, or of Beasts, was accomplished by these words; *Producat Aqua, Producat Terra:* And this irracionall Soule, as it is in man, is the Instrument only to the *Reasonable Soule*; and hath the same originall in us, that it hath in Beasts; namely, *from the slime of the earth*; for it is not said *God form'd the Body of man, of the slime of the Earth, but God formed man*, that is the whole man that *Spiraculum* excepted. Wherefore we will stile that part of the generall knowledge concerning *mans soule*, the knowledge of the *spiracle, or inspired substance*, and the other Part, the knowledge of the *Sensible or Product Soule*. And seeing that hitherto we handle Philosophie only (placing *sacred Theologie* in the close of this worke) we would not have borrowed this Partition from *Divinity*, if it had not here concurr'd with the Principles of *Philosophie*. *There are many and great Pre-ellencies of the soule of man, above the soules of beasts*, evident unto those who philosophize even according to sense: And wheresoever the concurrent Characters of such great excellencies are found, there should ever, upon good reason, be made a *specificque Difference*. Wherefore we doe not altogether so well allow the Philosophers promiscuous, and confuse Discourses touching the *Functions of the Soule*; as if the *Soule of man was differenced gradually, rather than specifically, from the soule of Beasts*; no otherwise than the Sun amongst the Starres, or Gold amongst Metals.

§ *There remaines another partition also to be annexed to the knowledge in Generall concerning the soule or mind of man, before we speake at large of the kinds: For what we shall speake of the species hereafter, comprehendeth both the partitions, as well that which we have let downe already, as this which we now shall propound. Wherefore the second Partition may be, into the knowledge concerning the Substance and Faculties of the Soule; and into the knowledge concerning the use and objects of the Faculties.*

§ This two-fold Partition of the Soule thus premis'd, let us now come unto the species or kinds. The knowledge of the *Spiraculum, or inspired Essence*, as that concerning the  
 substance

Animæ  
Origo  
Myfteriū.

Subſtance of the Reasonable Soule, comprehends theſe Inquiries touching the Nature thereof; as whether, *it be Native, or Adrentive; Separable, or Inſeparable; Mortall, or Immortall; how farre it is tied to the Lawes of Matter, how farre, not, and the like?* What other points ſoever there are of this kind, although they may be more diligently, and ſoundly inquired even in Philoſophie, than hitherto they have bin; yet for all this, in our opinion, they muſt be bound over at laſt, unto Religion, there to be determined and defined; for otherwiſe they ſtill lye open to many errors and illuſions of ſenſe. For ſeeing that the ſubſtance of the Soule was not deduced and extracted in hir Creation from the Maſſe of Heaven and Earth, but immediatly inſpired from God; and ſeeing the Lawes of Heaven and Earth are the proper ſubjects of Philoſophie; how can the knowledge of the ſubſtance of the Reasonable Soule be derived or fetch't from Philoſophy? But it muſt be drawne from the ſame inſpiration from whence the ſubſtance thereof firſt flowed.

✱  
DE SVB-  
STANTIA  
ANIMÆ  
SENSIBILIS

Teles. de  
Rer. Nat.  
lib. 5.  
Donius.

§ The Knowledge of the ſenſible or produced Soule, as touching the ſubſtance thereof is truly enquired into; but this inquiry ſeemes to us to be DEFICIENT: For what makes theſe termes of *Actus Vltimus*; and *Forma Corporis*; and ſuch like wilde logicall Universalities, to the knowledge of the Soules ſubſtance? For the ſenſible Soule, or the ſoule of Beaſts, muſt needs be granted, to be a Corporall ſubſtance attenuated by heate and made Inviſible: I ſay, a thinne gentle gale of wind ſwell'd and blowne up from ſome flamy and airy Nature, indeed with the ſoftneſſe of Aire to receive impreſſion, and with the vigor of fire to embrace action; now iſhed partly by an oily, partly by a watery ſubſtance; ſpread over the Body; reſiding (in perfect Creatures) chiefly in the head; running through the nerves, reſreſht and repair'd by the ſpirituouſ blood of the Arteries; as Bernardinus Teleſius, and his Scholler, Auguſtinus Donius in ſome points, not altogether unprofitably, have delivered it. Let there be therefore made a more diligent inquiry touching this knowledge, and the rather for that this point, not well underſtood hath brought forth ſuperſtitious and very

contagious opinions, and most vilely abasing; the Dignity of the soule of man; of Transmigration of soules out of one Body into another; and Lustrations of soules by Periods of yeares; and finally of the too neere affinity in every point of the soule of man, with the soules of beasts. This soule in Beasts is a principal soule, whereof the body of Beasts is the Organ; but in man this soule is it selfe an Organ of the Soule Rationall, and may rather be called by the appellation of a Spirit, than of a Soule. And thus much of the substance of the Soule.

§ The Faculties of the Soule are well knowne, to be, Understanding; Reason; Imagination; Memory; Appetite; Will, and all those Powers, about which the Sciences of Logique and Ethique are conversant. But in the knowledge concerning the soule, the Originall of these Faculties ought to be handled, and that Physically, as they are connaturall with the Soule, and adhere to it: Only their uses and objects are designed to other Arts. And in this Part (in our opinion) there hath bin no extraordinary performance hetherto, although we doe not report it as Deficient.

¶ This Part touching the Faculties of the Soule hath two Appendices, which as they have bin handled have rather presented us with smoake, than any lucide flames of truth; one of these is the Knowledge of Naturall Divination; the other of Fascination.

§ Divination hath bin anciently and fitly divided into two Parts; Artificiall and Naturall. Artificiall by arguing from the Indication of signes, collectes a Prediction: Naturall from the intermall Divination of the mind without the assistance of signes, makes a Presage. Artificiall is of two sorts; one argueth from Causes; the other from Experiments only, by a blind way of Auctoritie; which later is for the most part superstitious, such as was the Heathen Discipline upon the inspection of the Intrals of Beasts; the flight of Birds, and the like: So the solemne Astrologie of the Chaldeans was litle better. Both the kinds of Artificiall Divination are distributed amongst diverse Sciences. The Astrologer hath his Predictions from the situation of the starres; the Physitian

Salust. in  
Tugurth.

hath his *Predictions*, of the approach of Death; of Recovery; of ensuing Symptomes of Diseases; from Vrines; Pulses; aspect of Patients, and the like. The Politique hath his *Predictions*; *O urbem venalem & citò perituram, si emptorem invenerit*, The truth of which *Prophecie* staid not long, being first accomplisht in *Sylla*, after in *Cesar*. Wherefore Predictions of this Nature are not pertinent to the present purpose, but are to be referred over to their proper Arts. But the *Divination Naturall*, which springeth from the internall Power of the Soule, is that which we now speak of. *This is of two sorts, the one Native, the other by Influxion*. *Native* is grounded upon this supposition, *that the mind when it is withdrawne and collected into it selfe, and not diffused into Organs of the Body, hath from the naturall Power of its owne Essence, some Prenotion of things future*. And this appeares most in sleepe; Extasies; Propinquity of Death; more rare, in waking, or when the Body is healthfull and strong. And this state of the mind is commonly procured and furthered by abstinencies, and those observancies which doe most of all retire the *Mind* unto it selfe from the practique functions of the *Body*; that thus re-  
 • dim'd from the incombrances of exterior ingagements, it may possesse and enjoy its ovne Nature. But *Divination by Influxion* is grounded upon another supposition, *That the Mind as a Mirror or Glasse should take a secondary kind of Illumination from the fore-knowledge of God and Spirits, unto which the same State and Regiment of the Body which was to the first, doth likewise conduce*. For the same sequestration of the mind causeth it more severely to imploy its owne Essence; and makes it more susceptible of *Divine Influxions*: save that the soule, in *Divinations by Influxion* is rapt with a kind of fervency and impatiency, as it were of the Deitie, wherewith it is possesst, which the Ancients noted by the name of *sacred Fury*; but in *Native Divination*, the mind is enfranchis'd and neerer to a repose rather, and an immunity from labour.

§ *Fascination is the Power and intensive Act of the Imagination upon the Bodie of another, ( for of the Power of the Imagination upon the Body of the imaginant, we have spoken*

ken

ken before). In this kind the *school*e of *Paracelsus*, and the Disciples of pretended *Naturall Magique*, have bin so intemperate, as they have only not equall'd the force and apprehension of the *Imagination*, with the power of *miracle-working faith*. Others, drawing neerer to the similitude of truth, when they had more intently considered the secret energies and impressions of things; the Irradiations of the senses; the transmissions of cogitations from Body to Body; the conveyances of *Magnetique* virtues; came to be of opinion, that much more might such Impressions; Informations; and Communications be made, from spirit to spirit; being that a spirit of all other things is more powerfull and strong to worke, and more soft and penetrable to suffer: whence the conceits have growne, made almost popular, of the Mastering spirit; of men ominous and unlucky; of the strokes of love and envy; and of others of like Nature. Incident unto this, is the enquiry, *How the Imagination may be intended and fortified?* For if the *Imagination* fortified be of such great power, then it is materiall to know by what waies it may be exalted, and made greater than it selfe? And here comes in crookedly, and as dangerously, a Palliation and Defence of a great part of *Ceremoniall Magique*. For it may be a specious pretence that Ceremonies; Characters; Charmes; Gesticulations; Amulets, and the like, *doe worke not by any tacite or sacramentall contract with evill spirits; but serve only to strengthen and exalt the imagination of him that useth them; even as the use of Images in religion hath prevail'd for the fixing of mens minds in the Contemplation of things, and the raising of the devotion of them that Pray.* But for my owne judgment, if it be admitted, that the force of *Imagination* is so Potent, and that Ceremonies exalt and fortifie that Power, and be it granted, that Ceremonies are used sincerely to that intention, & as a Physicall Remedy, without the least thought of inviting the assistance of Spirits by them; yet, for all this, I should hold them unlawfull, because they impugne and contradict that divine Edict pass'd upon man for sinne, *In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum*. For this kind of *Magique*

Par. In  
Param.Crollij  
Præf.

Gen 31.

propounds those noble fruits, (which God hath set forth to be bought at the price of Labour) to be purchas'd by a few easy and sloathfull observances.

III There remaine two knowledges, which referre specially to the *Faculties of the inferiour or sensible Soule*, as those which doe most Communicate with corporall Organs; the one is of *Voluntary Motion*, the other of *sense and sensibility*.

\*  
DE NIXI-  
BVSSPIRI-  
TUS IN  
MOTV  
VOLVN-  
TARIO.

§ In the former of these the Inquiry hath bin very superficiall, and one entire part almost quite left out. For concerning the office and apt fabrique of the Nerves and Muscles, and of other parts requisite to *this Motion*, and which part of the Body rests whilest another is moved, and that the Governour and Chariot-driver, as it were, of this *Motion*, is the *Imagination*; so as dismissing the *Image* to which the *Motion* was caried, the *Motion* it selfe is presently intercepted and arrested (as when we walke, if an other serious and fixed thought come into our mind, we presently stand still) and many other such subtleties not to be slighted, have now long agoe come into Observation and Enquiry. *And how Compressions, and Dilatations, and Agitations of the Spirit* (which without question is the Spring of *Motion*) should incline, excite, and enforce the corporall and ponderous Masse of the Parts, *hath not yet bin enquired into*, and handled with diligence; and no marvaile, seeing the sensible soule it selfe hath bin hitherto taken for an *entelechie*, or *selfe moving Facultie*, and some Function, rather than a Substance. But now it is knowne to be a corporall and materiate Substance; it is necessary to be enquired, by what efforts such a pusill and a thin-soft aire should put in motion, such solid and hard bodies. Therefore seeing this part is DEFICIENT let enquiry be made thereof.

§ *But of sense and sensibility* there hath bin made a farre more plentifull and diligent enquiry, both in Generall Treatises about them, and in Particular Sciences; as in *Perspective*, and *Musique*; how truly, is not to our purpose to deliver. Wherefore we cannot let them downe as DEFICIENTS;

Not-

Notwithstanding there are two noble and remarkable Parts, which in this knowledge we assigne to be DEFICIENT; the one concerning the difference of Perception and Sense; the other concerning the Forme of Light.

§ As for the Difference between Perception and Sense, Philosophers should in their writings *de sensu & sensibili* have premis'd a solid and sound discovery thereof, as a matter Fundamentall. For we see that there is a manifest power of Perception even in all Bodies Naturall; and a kind of Election to embrace that which is any way allied in nature, and favourable to them; and to fly what is adverse and forraine. Neither doe we meane of more subtile Perceptions only, as when the Loadstone draws unto it Iron; Flame leapes to Bituminous Mould; one Buble of water neere another Buble, closeth and incorporates with it; Rayes glance from a white object; the body of a living Creature assimilates that which is good for it, excerneth what is unprofitable; a peece of sponge even when it is rais'd above the surface of the water, sucks in water, expells ayre, and the like. For to what end should we enumerate such instances, seeing no body plac'd neere to another, changeth the other, or is changed of it, unlesse a reciprocall Perception precede the operation. Every Body hath a Perception of the Pores & Passages by which it insinuates it selfe; it feeles the invasion of another Body, to which it yeeldeth; it perceives the remove of another Body, by which it was detained; when it recovers it selfe, it perceives the divulsion of its continuance, which for a time resisteth; and in a word Perception is diffused through the whole body of Nature. Aire doth so exactly Sense Hot and Cold, that the Perception thereof is farre more subtile than mans Touch, which yet is taken for the discerning Rule of Hot and Cold. Two faults therefore are found concerning this knowledge; that men have for most part past it over toucht, & unhandled; which notwithstanding is a most noble speculation. The other is that they who perchance have addicted their minds to this contemplation, have in the heat of this Pursuit gone too farre, and attributed Sense to all

\*  
DE DIFFE-  
RENTIA  
PERCEP-  
TIONIS  
ET SENSVS

Campanel-  
la alij,

*Virg. En. 3* dies, that it is almost a piacular crime to pull off a bow from a Tree, lest it should groane and complaine as Polydore did. But they should explore with diligence the difference of Perception and Sense, not only in comparing of Sensibles with Insensibles according to the entire body (as of Plants, and living Creatures) but also to observe in the sensible Body, what should be the cause that so many Actions should be discharg'd, and that without any Sense at all? Why Aliments are digested, egested: Humors and succulent moystures caried upwards and downwards; the Heart and Pulse beate; the Guts as so many Shops, or Worke-houles should every one accomplish his proper worke, and yet all these and many such like are performed without Sense? But men have not with sufficient enquiry searcht or found out of what Nature the Action of Sense is; and what kind of Body; what delay; what Conduplication of impression are required to this, that pain or pleasure should follow? To close this point they doe seem to be altogether ignorant of the difference betwixt simple Perception and sense; how farre Perception may be made without sense? Nor is this Enquiry a Controversie of words, but a matter of great and important moment. Wherefore let there be made a better inquiry of this knowledge, as of a matter very profitable, and of manifold use. Considering also that the ignorance of some of the Ancient Philosophers touching this matter, so farre obscured the light of reason, as that they thought, *there was without any difference, a Soule infused into all Bodies*; nor did they conceive how Motion, with a discerning instinct, could be made without Sense; or Sense exist without a Soule.

✱  
RADIX  
PERSPE-  
CTIVÆ  
SIVE DE  
FORMA  
LVGIS.

§ As for the Form of Light, that there hath not bin made a due enquiry thereof (specially seeing men have so painfully imploy'd their Studies in the *Perspectives*) may well be censur'd as a strange oversight. For neither in the *Perspectives*, nor elsewhere, is there any thing inquired concerning Light, of any worth or waight: The Radiations of it are handled, the Originalls not: But the placing of *Perspectives* amongst the *Mathematiques* hath begotten this defect; and others  
of

of like nature ; because men have made a too early departure from *Physiques* . So on the other side the handling of *Light* and the Causes thereof, in *Physiques* is commonly superstitious , as of a thing of a middle nature betwixt things naturall, and Divine; in so much as some of *Platoes* School have introduced *Light* as a thing more ancient than *Matter* it selfe: For when the empty Space was spread abroad they affirm'd , in a vaine imagination that it was first fill'd with *Light*, and afterwards with a *Body*; whereas Holy writ sets downe plainly *the Masse of Heaven and Earth to be a darke Chaos before the Creation of Light*. But what are handled Physically and according to sense of this subject, presently descendeth to *Radiations* ; so as there is very litle Philosophicall enquiry extant touching this point . And men ought to submit their Contemplations a while, and to enquire what is common to all *Lucid Bodies*, as of the *Forme of Light* : For what an immense difference of *Body* is there ( if they may be considered according to their dignity ) betwixt the Sun and rotten wood, or the putrid scales of Fish? They should likewise make enquiry, what should be the Cause why some things take fire, and once thoroughly heated cast forth a *Light*; others not? Iron, Metals, Stones, Glasse, Wood, Oyle; Tallow by fire, either cast forth a *Flame* , or at least grow *Red* : But *Water* and *Aire* heated with the fury of the hottest Flames to the highest degree they are capeable of, acquire no such light, nor cast forth any Splendor . If any man think, it therefore thus comes to passe , because it is the propertie of fire to give light ; but *Water* and *Aire* are utter enemies to *Fire*; sure he was never rowed with Oares in a dark night upon salt waters, and in a hot season; where he might have seen small drops of water rebounding from the clashing of the Oares, to sparkle and cast forth a *light* : Which is likewise seen in the fervent froath of the Sea which they call the *Sea-longs* . And what affinitie with flame and fired matter have the *Cicindula*, the *Luciola*, and the *Indian Fly*, which cast a light over a whole arched Roome; or the eyes of certaine living Creatures in the dark ; and sugar , as it is

Ficin. Card  
de Cusa.

Gen. i.

grated

grated or broken; or the sweat of a horse hard ridden, in a foultry night; and many more? *Nay many have understood so little in this point, as many have thought the sparkes from a flint to be attrited Aire.* But when the Aire is not fired with heate, and apparantly *conceives Light*, how comes it to passe, that Owles and Cats, and many other Creatures see in the night? *So that it must needs be (seeing vision cannot be conveyed without light) that there is a native and inbred light in Aire, although very feeble and weake; yet such as may be proportionated to the Opticke Beames of such Creatures, and may suffice them for sight.* But the cause of this evill, as of many more, that men have not drawn forth the *common Formes of things Naturall*, from *Particular Instances*; which is that we have let downe as the proper subject of *Metaphysique*; which is it selfe a part of *Physique*, or of the knowledge of *Nature*. Therefore let there be enquiry made of the *Forme and Originalls of Light*, and in the meane, it may be placed among **DEFICIENTS**. And thus much of the *Knowledge concerning the substance of the Soule, Rationall, and Sensible*, with their *Faculties*, and of the *Appendices of the same Knowledge*.




THE FIFTH BOOK OF  
 FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM  
 VICOUNT ST ALBAN.

OF THE  
 DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
 OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I The Partition of the Knowledge, which respecteth the Use, and Objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man, into Logique; and Ethique. II. The Division of Logique into the Arts, of Invention; of Iudgment; of Memorie; and of Tradition.



HE Knowledge respecting the understanding of Man (Excellent King) and that other respecting his Will, are, as it were, Twinnes by Birth: For the Puritie of Illumination; and the Libertie of will began together, fell together: Nor is there in the Vniversall Nature of things so intimate a Sympathy, as that of Truth and Goodnesse. The more shame for Learned Men, if they be for Knowledge like winged Angels; for base Desires, they be like Serpents which crawl in the Dust, carrying indeed about them Mindes like a Mirror or Glasse; but menstruous and distain'd.

¶ We come now to the Knowledge which respecteth the use and objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man. This hath two

F

Parts,

Parts, and they well knowne, and by generall consent received, *Logique and Ethique*: Save that we have a litle before set at liberty *Civile Knowledge*, which commonly was taken in as a Part of *Ethique*; and have made it an entire *Knowledge of man congregate or in societie*; handling here *only man segregate*. *Logique* intreateth of the *understanding and Reason*; *Ethique* of the *Will; Appetite; and Affections*; the one produceth *Decrees*; the other *Actions*. It is true that the *Imagination* in both Provinces, *Judiciall and Ministeriall*, performes the Office of an Agent or Nuncius, or common Attourney. For *Sense* sends over all sorts of Ideas unto the *Imagination*, upon which, *Reason* afterwards sits in Judgment: And *Reason* interchangeably sends over selected and approved Ideas to the *Imagination*, before the Decree can be acted. For *Imagination* ever precedes voluntary motion and incites it; so that *Imagination* is a common reciprocall Instrument to both: Saying that this *Ianus* is bifronted, and turnes faces: For the face towards *Reason* hath the Print of *Truth*; but the face towards *Action* hath the Print of *Goodnesse*: which neverthelesse are faces ---- *Quales decet esse sororum*.

Ovid. Met.

Neither is the *Imagination* a meer and simple Messenger, but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small Auctoritie besides the duty of the message. For it is well said by *Aristotle*, *That the mind hath over the Body that command which the Lord hath over a bond-man; but the Reason hath over the Imagination that command which a Magistrate hath over a free Citizen*, who may come also to rule in his turne. For we see that in matters of *Faith & Religion*, the *Imagination* mounts, and is elevated above *Reason*; not that *Divine Illumination* resideth in the *Imagination*; (nay rather in the high Tower of the mind, and understanding) but, *as in virtues Divine, grace makes use of the motions of the will; so in Illuminations Divine, grace makes use of the Imagination*. Which is the Cause that *Religion* sought ever an access, and way to the *Mind*, by *Similitudes; Types; Parables; Visions; Dreames*. Again it is

Polit. 1.

small Dominion the *Imagination* hath in persuasions, insinuated by the power of *Eloquence*: For where the minds


of

of men are gently intreated inflamed, and any way forcibly wonne by the smooth Artifice of Speech, all this is done by exalting the *Imagination*, which growing hot and impatient not only triumphes over *Reason*; but in a sort offers violence unto it; partly by blinding, partly by extimulating it. Nevertheless I see no reason why we should depart from the former Division: For the *Imagination* commonly doth not produce Sciences; for *Poesy* which hath ever bin attributed to the *Imagination*, is to be esteemed rather a play of the wit, than a knowledge. As for the power of the *Imagination in things Naturall*, we have assigned that, a litle before, to the *Doctrina de Anima*. And for the affinity it hath with *Rhetorique*, we think it fit to referre it to the Art it selfe whereof we shall intreate hereafter.

§ This Part of humane Philosophy which is Rationall or respecting *Logique*, is to the tast and Palate of many wits, not so delightfull; and seemeth nothing else but a net and snare of thorny subtletie. For as it is truly said *that knowledge is animi Pabulum*; so in the nature of mens appetites, and election of this foode, most men are of the tast and stomach of the Israelites in the Desert, that would fain have turned *ad ollas Carnium*, and were weary of *Manna*; which though it were Celestiall, yet seemed it lesse nutritive and comfortable. So generally those *Knowledges* relish best, that have an infusion somewhat more esculent of flesh in them; such as are *Civile History*; *Morality*; *Policy*, about the which mens Affections; Praises; Fortunes doe turne, and are conversant: But this same *lumen siccum*, doth parch and offend most mens watry and soft natures. But if we would measure & valew things according to their proper worth, *Rationall Sciences are the keyes of all other Arts*; and as the Hand is the Instrument of Instruments; the Mind, the Forme of Formes; so these knowledges are to be esteemed the Art of Arts. Neither doe they direct only; but likewise strengthen and confirme; as the use and habit of shooting, doth not only enable to shoot a neerer shoot; but also to draw a stronger Bow.

II Arts Logicall or intellectuall are foure in number, divided

ded according to the ends whereunto they are referred: For mans labour in *Rationall Knowledges* is, either to *invent* that which is sought; or to *judge* what is invented; or to *retaine* that which is judg'd; or to *deliver over* that which is Retained: So as there must needs be so many *Rationall Sciences*; Art of Inquiry, or *Invention*; Art of Examination or judgment; Art of Custody or *Memory*; and Art of *Elocution* or *Tradition*; whereof we will speake, of every particular apart.



## CAP. II.

I The Partition of the Art of Invention into the Inventive of Arts: and of Arguments. §. The former of these, which is the more eminent is *Deficient*. II. The Division of the Inventive Art of Arts, into *literate Experience*. §. And a *New Organ*. III. A *Delineation of Experience Literate*.

I  Invention is of two kinds, much differing; the one of Arts and Sciences; the other of Arguments and Speeches. The former of these I report to be wholly DEFICIENT, which seemes to me to be such a *Deficiency*, as if in the making of an Inventory touching the estate of a *Defunct*, it should be set downe, of ready money nothing: For as money will fetch all other commodities; so all other Arts are purchas'd by this Art. And as the west Indies had never bin discovered, if the use of the *Mariners Needle* had not first bin discovered, though those Regions be vast, the *Versor* is a small Motion: So it cannot be found strange, if in the discovery and advancement of Arts, there hath not bin made greater Progression, seeing the Art of Invention and *Perlustration* hetherto was unknown.

§ That this part of knowledge is wanting stands plainly confessed. For first *Logique* doth not profess, nay not pretend to Invent either Arts *Mechanicall*, or Arts (as they call them) *Liberall*; nor to elicit the *Operations* of the one, or the *Axioms* of the other; but speakes to men as it were in *Passage*, and so

\*  
EXPERI-  
ENTIA LI-  
TERATA,  
SIVE VE-  
NATIO  
PANIS.

to leaves them with this instruction, *cuiq; sua arte credendum.* Artis Mo. tal. I.  
*Celsus* a wise man, as well as a Physician (though it be the custome of all men to be copious in the commendation of their owne Profession) acknowledgeth it gravely and ingeniously, speaking of the Emphyricall and Dogmaticall Sects of Physicians, *That Medicines and Cures were first found out,* De Re Medica.  
*and then after the Reasons and Causes were discovered: not the other way, that the Causes first extracted from the nature of things gave light to the invention of Remedies.* But *Plato* often notes it, *That Particulars are infinite; againe that the highest Generalities give no sufficient Direction; and that the Pyth of all Sciences, whereby the Arts-man is distinguish't from the Inexpert, consisteth in middle Propositions, which experience hath delivered and taught in every Particular Science.* And therefore we see that they which discourse of the first *Inventors of things, and the Originalls of Sciences,* have celebrated rather *Chance* than *Art;* and have brought in *Beasts; Birds; Fishes; Serpents,* rather than *Men,* as the first *Doctors of Sciences.*

In Timæo. Phileb. alibi.

*Dictamnum Genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida,  
 Pulveribus Cælem folijs & flore comantem  
 Purpureo, non illa feris incognita Capris  
 Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæserè sagittæ.*

Virg. Æn. 12.

So that it was no marvaile (the manner of Antiquitie being for to consecrate *Inventors* of things profitable) that the *Egyptians,* an ancient Nation, to whom many *Arts* owe their first *Beginnings,* had their *Temples* full of the *Idols* of *Brutes,* but almost empty of the *Idols* of *men,*

*Omnigenumq; Deum monstra & Latrator Anubis,  
 Contra Neptunum, & Venerem, contraq; Minervam &c.*

Vir. Æn. 8.

And if you like better, from the Tradition of the *Grecians,* to ascribe the *first invention of Arts to men;* yet you cannot say that *Prometheus* applied his contemplation on set purpose to the invention of *Fire;* or that when he first stroake the flint he expected sparkes; but that he fell upon this experiment by chance, and as they say *---furtum Jovi fecisse;* so as for the *Invention of Arts* we are more beholding to a wild *Goat* for *Chirurgery;* or to a *Nightingale* for *modulations*

Ovid. Horat. &c.

Pamirollus  
Rer. Mem.  
Pa. 2. ons of Musique; to the *Ibis* for Clysteres; to a Potlid that  
flew open for Artillerie; and to say in a word to *Chance*  
or any thing else more than to *Logique*. Neither is the forme  
of *Invention* which Virgil describes, much other,

Virg. G. I. *Et variis usus meditando extunderet Artes*  
*Paulatim----*

For here is no other method of *Invention* propounded, than  
that which brute Beasts are capable of, and often put in  
ure; which is a most intentive sollicitude about some one thing and  
a perpetuall practice thereof; which the necessity of their Conser-  
vation imposeth upon such Creatures; for Cicero saith very truly,  
Oratio. pro  
L. Cor. Bal-  
bo. *usus uni rei deditus, & naturam & artem sæpe vincit*, There-  
fore if it be said of men

*Labor omnia vincit*

Virg. G. I. *Improbis, & duris urgens in rebus egestas.*

It is likewise said of Beasts,

Perf. Prol. *Quis expedivit Psittaco suum* καίπε?

Who taught the Raven in a drough to throw Pebbles into  
a hollow tree where by chance she spied water, that the wa-  
ter might rise so as shee might come to it? Who taught the  
Plin. Nat. H Bee to layle thorow such a vast sea of Aire, to the Flowers  
in the Fields; and to find the way so farre off to hir Hive a-  
gaine? Who taught the Ant to bite every grain of Corne that  
shee burieth in hir hill, lest it should take root and grow, and  
so delude hir hope? And if you observe in Virgils verse, the  
word *extundere*, which imports the *Difficulty*, and the word  
*Paulatim*, which imports the *slownesse*? we are where we  
were even amongst the *Ægyptian Gods*, seeing hetherto men  
have made litle use of the facultie of *Reason*, none at all of  
the *duty of Art* for the *discovery of Inventions*.

§ Secondly if this which we affirme, be well conside-  
red, it is demonstrated by the *Forme of Induction* which Lo-  
gique propounds, namely by that *Forme of inference*, where-  
by the Principles of Sciences are found out and proved;  
which, as it is now framed, is utterly vitious and incompe-  
tent, and so farre from perfecting nature that it rather per-  
verts and distorts it. For he that shall exactly observe how  
this

this *Aethereall Dew of Sciences*; like unto that the Poet speaks of *Aerei mellis (Caelestia dona,*  
 is gather'd (seeing that even Sciences themselves are extracted out of particular examples, partly Naturall, partly Artificiall; or from the flowers of the field, and Garden) I shall find that the mind of his owne nature, and imbred disposition doth more ingeniously, and with better Invention, Act an *Induction*, than Logicians describe it. For from a *nude enumeration of Particulars* (as Logicians use to doe) without an Instance Contradictory, is a vitious Conclusion; nor doth such an *Induction* inferre more than a probable Conjecture. For who will take upon him, when the Particulars which a man knowes, and which he hath mention'd, appeare only on one side, there may not lurke some Particular which is altogether repugnant? As if *Samuell* should have rested in those sons of *Isby* which were brought before him in the house; and should not have sought *David* which was absent in the field. And this *Forme of Induction* (to say plainly the truth) is so grosse and palpable, that it might seeme incredible, that such acute and subtile wits as have exerciz'd their meditations in these things, could have obtruded it upon the world; but that they hasted to Theories, and Dogmaticalls, and from a kind of pride and elation of mind despited *Particulars*, specially any long stay upon them. For they have used these examples and Particular Instances, but as *Sergeants, and whiffers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and roome for their opinions; and never advis'd with them from the beginning; that so a legitimate and mature deliberation, concerning the truth of things, might be made.* Certainly it is a thing hath touch'd my mind with a pious, and religious wonder, to see the same steps leading to error, trodden in divine and humane enquiries. For as in the apprehending of divine truth, men cannot endure to become as a child; so in the apprehending of humane truth, for men, come to yeares, yet to read, and repeate, the first Elements of *Inductions*, as if they were still children; is reputed a poore and contemptible employment.

§ Thirdly if it be granted, that the *Principles* of Sciences may be rightly inferr'd from the *Induction*, which they use, or from sense and experience; yet neverthelesse; certaine it is, that inferior *Axioms*, cannot rightly and safely be deduced, by *Syllogisme* from them, in things of nature, which participate of matter. For in *Syllogisme* there is a reduction of Propositions to *Principles* by middle Propositions. And this Forme, whether for *Invention*, or for *Prooffe*, in Sciences Popular, as *Ethiques*; *Politiques*; *Lawes*, and the like takes place; yea, and in Divinity; seeing it hath pleased God of his goodnesse to accommodate himselfe to mans capacitie: but in Naturall Philosophy where nature should be convinc'd and vanquish't by deeds, and not an Adversary, by Argument; truth plainly escapes our hands: *because that the subtlety of the operations of Nature, is farre greater than the subtlety of words.* So that the *Syllogisme* thus failing, there is every way need of helpe and service, of true and rectified *Induction*, as well for the more generall Principles, as inferior Propositions. For *Syllogismes* consist of Propositions, Propositions of words, words are the currant tokens or markes of the Notions of things; wherefore *if these Notions (which are the soules of words)* be grossely, and variably abstracted from things, the whole building falls. Neither is it the laborious examination either of Consequences, Arguments, or the verity of Propositions, that can ever repaire that ruine; being the error is, as the Physitians speake, in the *first Digestion*; which is not rectified by the sequent functions of Nature. And therefore it was not without great and evident Cause, that many of the Philosophers, and of them, some of singular note, became *Academiques*; and *Sceptiques*; which took away all *certainty of knowledge* or of *Comprehensions*; and denyed that the knowledge of man extended further than appearance and probability. It is true that some are of opinion, that *Socrates*, when he put off certainty of science from himselfe, did this but by a forme of *Irony*, & *scientiam di Simulando simulasse*; that is that by renouncing those things which he manifestly knew, he might be reputed to know even that which

which he knew not; neither in the later Academy which Cicero imbraced was this opinion of *Acatalepsie* held so sincerely: For all those which excell'd for eloquence, commonly made choice of this Sect, as fitter to give glory to their copious speech, and variable discourse both wayes; which was the cause they turn'd aside from that straight way by which they should have gone on to truth, to pleasant walks made for delight and pastime. *Notwithstanding* it appears that there were many scatter'd in both Academies, the old and new (much more among the *Sceptiques*) that held this *Acatalepsie* in simplicitie and integritie: But here was their chiefe error, that they charged the *Perceptions* of the *Senses*, whereby they did extirpate and pluck up Sciences by the roots. For the senses although they many times destitute, and deceive men, yet assisted by much industry they may be sufficient for Sciences; and that not so much by the helpe of *Instruments* (though these are in some sort usefull) as of experiments of the same kind, which may produce more subtile objects, than, for the facultie of sense, are by sense comprehensible. And they ought rather to have charged the defects in this kind upon the errors, and contumacie of the mind, which refuseth to be pliant and morigerous to the Nature of things; and to crooked demonstrations and rules of arguing and concluding, ill set downe and propounded from the *Perception of Sense*. This we speake not to disable the mind of man; or that the businesse should be abandoned; but that apt and proper assistances may be acquired; and applied to the understanding, whereby men may subdue the difficulties of things, and the obscurity of Nature. *For no man hath such a steadinesse of hand by nature or Practise, that he can draw a straight line or make a perfect circle with his hand at liberty, which yet is easily done by rule or compasse.* This is that very businesse which we goe about and with great paines endeavour that the mind by the helpe of Art might be able to equall Nature; and that there might be found out an Art of Discovery, or Direction, which might disclose, and bring to light other Arts, and their Axiomes and Workes.

This upon good ground wee report DEFICIENT.

\*  
EXPERI-  
ENTIA LI-  
TERARIA  
five VENA-  
TIO PANIS

II This Art of *Discovery* (for so we will call it) hath two parts; for either the Indication is made from *Experiments to Experiments*; or from *Experiments to Axioms*; which may likewise designe *new Experiments*; whereof the former we will term, *Experientia Literata*, the later *Interpretatio Natura*, or *Novum Organum*. Indeed the former (as we have touched heretofore) is not properly to be taken for an *Art*, or a part of Philosophy, but a kind of *sagacity*; wherefore we sometimes call it *Venatio Panis*, borrowing the name from the Fable. *But as a man may goe on his way after a three-fold manner; either when himselfe feeles out his way in the darke; or being weak-fighted is led by the hand of another; or else when he directs his footing by a light*: So when a man essayes all kind of *Experiments* without sequence or method that is a meere palpation; but when he proceeds by direction and order in *Experiments*, it is as if he were led by the hand; and this is it which we understand by *Literate Experience*: For the *light it selfe* which was the third way is to be derived from the *Interpretation of Nature*, or the *New Organum*.

III. *Literate Experience, or the Hunting of Pan* shews the diverse wayes of making *Experiments*: This (seeing wee have set it downe as DEFICIENT, and that it is a matter not altogether so plaine and perspicuous) we will according to our manner and designe give some light touches and shadowes of it. The manner of *making Experiment* chiefly proceeds; either by *variation of the experiment*; or by *Production of the Experiment*; or by *translation of the Experiment*; or by *inversion of the Experiment*; or by *compulsion of the Experiment*; or by *Application of the Experiment*; or by *Copulation of the Experiment*; or else by the *lots and chance of the Experiment*. And all these are limited without the termes of any *Axiome of Invention*: For that other part of the *New Organ* takes up and containeth in it all *Transition of Experiments into Axioms*; or of *Axioms into Experiments*:

§ *Variation of Experience* is first practis'd upon *Matter*; that is when the *Experiment* in things already knowne commonly

monly adheareth to such a *kind of matter*; and now it is tried in other things of like kind, as the *making of Papyr* is only tried in linnen, & not in silk, (unlesse perchance amongst the Chineses; nor yet in stufes intermixt with haire and bristles, of which is made that which we call chame-lot; nor yet in woolen, cotton, and skins, although these three last seeme to be more Heterogeneous, and so rather may become usefull mingled, than separate: So insition in fruit-Trees, is practis'd, but rarely tried in Trees-wild; although it is affirm'd that an Elme grafted upon an Elme, will produce wonderfull shades of leaves. Insition likewise in flowers is very rare, though now the Experiment begins to be made upon musk-Roses, which are successfullly inoculate upon common Roses. So we place the *variation in the Part of a thing amongst the variations in Matter*. For we see a scion, or young slip grafted upon the trunk of a tree, to shoot forth more prosperously, than if it had bin set in earth: And why, in like manner, should not the seed of an Onion inserted into the head of another Onion while it is green, germinate more happily than if it had bin sowed in the bare earth? And here the *Root* is varied for the *Trunk*, that the thing may seeme to be a kind of insition in the root. *Secondly, the variation of an Experiment may be made in the efficient*: The *beames of the Sun* through burning-Glasses are so fortified, and intended to such a degree of heate, that they are able to set on flame any matter, which is apt easily to conceive fire: Now whether *may the beames of the Moone*, by the same Glasses be actuated by some weake degrees of warmth; that we may see whether all heavenly Bodies be hot in power? So *bright and radiant heates* are exalted by Glasses: Whether are *gloomy and opaque heates* (as of stones and metals, before they be made burning hot by the force of fire) subject to the same impression; or are they rather in this some portions of light? So Amber, and Iet, or an Agat, chaffed draw unto them straw; whether warmed at the fire will they doe the like? *Thirdly, the variation of an Experiment may be made in Quantity*, concerning which a very diligent care is to be taken being it

is encompassed with many errors. For men are of opinion that if the *Quantity* be augmented and multiplied, the *virtue* is proportionably augmented and multiplied; and this commonly is with them a *Postulatum*, and a supposed truth, as if the matter were a *Mathematicall* certitude, which is utterly untrue. *A globe of Lead, or a pound in waight* let fall from a *Tower*; say it descends to the earth in the space of ten *Pulses*; whether will a *Globe of two pound waight* (in which that force of *Motion*, which they call *Naturall*, should be doubled,) light upon the earth in the space of five *Pulses*? But that *Globe* shall come downe almost in an equall space of time with this, and shall not be accelerated according to the measure of *Quantity*. So (imagine,) one dragme of *Sulphur* mingled with halfe a pound of *Steele*, it will make it fluid and liquid; Will therefore an ounce of *Sulphur* suffice to the dissolving of foure pounds of *Steele*? But that followes not; For it is certaine that the obstinacy of the matter in the *Patient* is more encreas'd by *Quantity*, than the *Activity* of the *virtue* in the *Agent*. Besides, too much, as well a too litle frustrates the effect: For in the excoctions and depurations of *Metalls* it is a familiar error, that to advance excoction, they augment the heate of the *Fornace*, or the *Quantity of the Iniection*; but if these exceed due proportion, they hinder the operation; because through their force and acrimony, they turne much of the pure *Metall* into fumes, and carry it away; so as there is a losse in the *Metall*; and the masse which remains through the emission of the *Spitits* becomes more obstinate and indurate. Men should therefore remember the mockery of *Æsopes* hufwife, who conceited that by doubling hir measure of *Barley*, hir *Hen* would daily lay hir two egges; But the *Hen* grew fat and laid none. It is not altogether safe to rely upon any *Naturall* experiment, before prooffe be made both in a lesser, and greater *Quantity*.

Æsop. Fab.

§ *Production of an Experiment is of two sorts, Repetition and Extension; namely when the Experiment either is iterated, or driven to a kind of subtiltie. Example of Repetition may be this; the spirit of wine is made of wine once distilled, and it is much*

much more quick and strong than wine it selfe; will likewise the spirit it selfe of wine distilled, or sublimated, proportionably exceed it selfe in strength? *But Repetition* also is not without deceit; for neither doth the second exaltation equal the excessse of the first; and many times by *iteration of the Experiment* after a certaine state, and height of operation, Nature is so farre from a further progression, as she rather falls into a relapse. Wherefore the *experiment* must be made with Caution and judgment. So *Quicksilver* in linnen, or else in the midst of moulten Lead when it begins to grow cold the *Quicksilver* inserted is stupified, and is no longer fluid; Will the same *Quicksilver* if it be often so practis'd upon, become so fixt as to be made malleable? The example of extension may be this, *water placed upwards*, and made pensile; and by a long neb of a glasse dipt in wine, mixt with water, will unmingle, the water from the wine, the wine leasurely ascending, and setling in the top; the water descending, and setling in the bottome: Now as wine and water which are two diverse bodies are separate by this devise; may the more subtile parts of wine in like manner, which is an entire body, be separate from the more grosse, that so there may be a distillation, as it were, by weight; and that there may be found floating in the top, a substance neerer to the spirit of wine, but perchance more delicate? So the Load-stone draweth Iron solid, and entire, unto it; will a piece of a Load-stone, plunged into dissolv'd parcels and fragments of Iron, allure the Iron unto it, and cover it selfe with it? So *the versor of a Mariners needle* applies it selfe to the Poles of the world: Doth it doe this after the same manner, and upon the same consequence whereby Celestiall Bodies move? Namely if you should place the Needle in a contrary posture, that is, in the South-point, and there stay it a while, and then cease your forcing it, and leave it to it selfe; would this *Needle* turne it selfe perchance to the North; and chuse rather to wheele about by the West into its desired-naturall site, than by the East? So *gold imbibeth* *Quicksilver* which is contiguous to it; doth the gold ingulfe, and suck up this

Quicksilver into it selfe without extension of its substance, that it becomes a Masse more ponderous than gold it selfe? *So some mens subminister helps to their memories* by setting up Images and Pictures of Persons in certaine roomes; would they attaine the same end, if (setting aside such Images) they should effigiate to themselves an Idea of their gestures and habits. And thus much of the PoDUCTION of an experiment.

§ *The translation of an experiment is three-fold, either from Nature, or chance into Art; or from Art, or one Practice into another; or from a part of some Art, into a diverse part of the same Art. Of Translation from Nature, or chance into Art, there are innumerable examples; for that almost all Mechanicall Arts owe their originalls from slender beginnings presented by Nature or Chance. It is a receiv'd Proverb, That Grapes comforted with Grapes sooner come to maturity: Which from the Nature of mutuall assistance and friendship grew popular. But our makers of Cyder, which is a wine of Apples, doe well imitate this: For they provide that they be not stamp't or prest, before, by being cast into heapes for a time, they mature by mutuall contact; whereby the acidity and tartnesse of the liquor is corrected. So the imitation of Artificiall Rain-bowes by the spisse aspersions of litle drops, is by an easy derivation from naturall Rain-bowes composed of a dewy Cloud. So the manner of distilling might be taken either from above, as from showers or dew; or from that homely experiment of Drops adhearing to Covers put upon Pots of*

Pancirollus  
par. 2.

*boyling water. And a man would have bin affeard to have imitated Thunder and Lightning, if the Potlid of that chymique Monke had not by being tost up into the ayre, instructed him. But the more plentifull this experiment is of examples, the fewer we need to produce. And if men would be at leasure to employ their studies in the inquiry of things profitable; they should view attentively, by degrees and of set purpose all the workmanship, and the particular workings of Nature; and perpetually, and thoroughly meditate with themselves, which of those may be transferr'd to Arts, For Nature is the*

*Mirror,*

*Mirror of Art* : And the experiments are as many which may be translated from Art into Art ; or from one Practice into another, though this is not so much in use: For nature every way is obvious to all men ; but Arts appropriate to particular Professors , are only knowne to them . *Spectacles* are invented to helpe a weake sight ; might there be contrived a instrument which fastned to the eare, might helpe such as are thicke of hearing? So *embalming* , and *hony conserve dead Corps* ; might not some of those ingredients be transferr'd into a medicine , which might be usefull to bodies alive? So the practice of Seales upon wax; cements for walls, and upon Lead is ancient; but this invention shewed the way to Impression upon Paper, or the Art of Printing. So in the Art of Cookerie salt seasons flesh, and that better in Winter, than in Summer : Might not this be profitably translated to Bathes and their temperament, as occasion shall require, either to impresse some good moisture, or extract some peccant humor. So salt in the new-found experiment of *Artificiall Conglaciations* is found to have great power to condense. Might not this be transferr'd to the condensation of Metalls; seeing it is knowne long since that strong-waters being composited of some kinds of salts, have a power to deject and precipitate small sands of Gold out of certaine Metalls , not so dense and compact as Gold? So *painting revives the memorie of a thing, by the Image of a Picture* : Is not this traduced into an Art , which they call *the Art of Memorie* ? Let this in generall serve for admonition ; that nothing can so much conduce to the drawing downe, as it were, from heaven, a whole showre of new and profitable Inventions, as this, that the experiments of many Mechanique Arts, may come to the knowledge of one man, or some few, who by mutuall conference may whet and sharpen one another ; that so by this which we call *Translation of Experiments*, Arts may nourish, and, as it were, by a commixture, and communication of Rayes, inflame one the other. For although the rationall way by an artificiall *Organum*, promise farre greater matters; yet neverthelesse this *sagacitie by literate experience*, may

may in the meane project and scatter to the benefit of man (as missive Donatives amongst the Ancients) many rudiments to knowledge, which may be had at hand. *There remains the Translation of a Part of Art into another part diverse from it,* which little differs from the *Translation of Art into Art*: But because many *Arts* exercise great spaces, so as they may very well sustaine a *Translation* within the limits of their owne operations; we thought good to annex this kind of *Translation*; specially seeing it is in some Arts of very great import. For it maketh much to the advancement and amplification of the Art of Physique; if the *Experiments* of that part of Medicine concerning the *Cures of Diseases*, be transferr'd to those Parts concerning the *Regiment of Health*, and the *Prolongation of Life*. For if some excellent *Opiate* be of that force and virtue, as to repress and asswage the raging inflammation of the spirits, in a pestilentiall Fever; let no man question, but that a like receipt by a due proportioned Dose made familiar, may in some degree put back and retard inflammation which growes and creepes upon us by age. Thus much for the *Translation of Experiments*.

§ *Inversion of Experiment* is, when the contrary to that which is by *Experiment* manifest, is tried: For example, *Heat by Glasses is intended*; is cold so too? So *Heate* when it diffuseth it selfe is yet rather caried upwards: Is cold likewise in diffusing it selfe caried rather downwards? For instance, take a small Barre of Iron, and heate it on one end, then set it upright, (that end which is heated placed downwards) laying your hand upon the end, it will presently burne your hand; but now inverse the Barre, placing the hot part upwards, and your hand upon the part which is downwards, and you shall not feele the heate so soone by many Pulses: Whether or no if the Barre was heated all over, and one end should be moistned with snow, or with a sponge dipt in cold water; if the snow or sponge were applied to the part which is upward, would (I say) the cold sooner pierce downward, than if the snow or sponge placed at the lower end, the cold would shoote upward. So the *Beams of the Sun* rebound

rebound from a white, upon a black are congregate : Whether are shadowes also dispersed upon white , and united upon black? The Experiment we see made in a dark room, the light being let in thorow a narrow chinck only, where the Images of things which are without, are taken upon white Paper, not upon black . So a veine is opened in the fore-head for the Megrin, or Head-ach. Must also the Hemicraine be scarified for the Soda; or the paine of the head in generall? So much for the *Inversion of Experiment*.

§ *Compulsion of Experiment*, is when Experiment is urged, and extended to annihilation, or privation of the vertue. For in other kinds of hunting, the game is only taken, but in this kill'd. Example of *Compulsion* is this; *The Loadstone drawes Iron*, inforce therefore the Iron, or vexes the Loadstone, so, as the vertue of attraction be stifled or expir'd : As, suppose the Loadstone were burnt or macerate in strong-waters, whether will it forgoe, or abate its vertue? Contrariwise if *Steele*, or Iron be reduced in *Crocum Martis*, or into prepar'd steel, as they call it; or be dissolved in *Aqua-fortis*; will the Loadstone still allure them? Again, *the Loadstone* draws Iron through all interpos'd Bodies that we know, as Gold; Silver; Glasse, &c. Fixe therefore some medium upon it (if it may be) that may intercept, and arrest its vertue. Make a triall of Quicksilver; of Oyle; Gummes; a burning coale; and the like, which yet have not bin experimented. *So there have bin brought in of late, certaine Perspectives* which multiply after a strange manner the minutest visibles: Presse the use of them, either upon small objects, as they may not be able to worke upon; or upon so vast, as they may be confounded in working: As whether they can cleerly discover those moates in Urin, which otherwaies could not be discern'd? Whether in Jewells, every way pure and spotlesse, they can make the graines and imperceptible clouds to become visible? *Whether* can they expose to view the moates in the Sunn ( which are untruely charged upon *Democritus* for his Atomes, and the Principles of Nature) as if they were great Bodies? Can they so distinguish to the sight the grosser dust made of Cerusse,

Hippoc. E-  
pist. Laert.  
in vita Plin.  
Lib. 30.

and Vermillion, that the small' graines may appeare; here the red, there the white? *Againe, can they multiply greater Figures* (imagine a face; an eye, or so) to the same bignesse they can a flea, or a litle worme? *Can they make a piece of Cypres, or Cobweb-Lawne appeare* lo full of holes, as if it were a Net? *But we stay* the lesse upon the *Compulsions of Experiments* becaute commonly they fall not within the limits of literate experience; but are rather referr'd to *Causes*; and *Axioms*; and the *New Organum*. For wheresoever there is a Negative; Privative; or exclusive facultie; there is already somelight given to the *Invention of Formes*. Thus farre of the *Compulsion of Experiment*.

§ *Application of Experiment is nothing else than a witty Translation of it to some other profitable Experiment*. Example may be this; All Bodies have their owne dimensions, and their owne weights: Gold is of greater weight, of lesse dimension, than Silver; Water than Wine. From this is traduced a profitable Experiment; that from a just weight and measure being taken, you may know how much Silver hath bin mixt with Gold; how much Water with Wine; which was that celebrated *Ευρημα* of Archimedes. So flesh sooner putrifies in some Cellers, than it doth in others. It will be of use to make application of this *Experiment* to the finding out of Aires, more or lesse healthfull, for habitation; namely, there where flesh is longest preserv'd from putrefaction. The same may be applied to the discovery of healthfull, or pestilentiall seasons of the yeare. *But there* are innumerable examples of this Nature: Only let men awake, and perpetually fixe their eyes, one while, on the nature of things; another while, on the application of them to the use and service of mankind. So much concerning the *Application of Experiment*.

§ *Copulation of Experiment is the Linkes and Chaines of Application; when as things, single, and separate had bin to litle use, are, (connexed) of force and efficacy*. For example, you desire to have late Roses or fruit, this is effected if you pull off the more early buds when they are newly knotted; the same is done

done, if you lay the roots bare untill the spring be well come on, and expose them unto the open Aire; but it will take the better, if you joyne both these practises of putting back germination. So Ice and Nitre doe much conduce to refrigeration; but commixt together much more. But this Experiment is cleere of it selfe, notwithstanding here may covertly a fallacy lie hid, (as there may in all other effects, and conclusions where Axioms are wanting) if the *Copulation* be made of things which worke after a different, and as it were, repugnant manner. And so much for *Copulation of Experiment*,

§ *There remaine the Chances, or Fortunes of Experiment. This is altogether an irrational, & as it were, a passionate manner of experimenting, when you have a mind to try a conclusion not for that any reason, or other Experiment induceth you to it; but only because the like was never attempted before. Yet I doe not know whether or no, in this kind, there may not lie hid some secret of great use, if you trie nature every way. For the wonders of Nature commonly lie out of the high roade, and beaten paths; so as the very absurdity of an attempt may sometimes be prosperous. But if reason goe along with this practice; that is, that it is evident that such an Experiment was never yet tried; and yet there is great reason why it should be attempted; then it is a choice Experiment, and searcheth the very bosome of Nature. For example: In the operation of fire upon some Naturall Body, one or other of these effects hitherto ever comes to passe; as that either something flies out, (as flame and fume in ordinary burning fewell) or at least there is made a locall separation of Parts, and that for some distance; as in Distillation where the lees settle, the vapours, after they have play'd about, are gathered into receptacles: But no man ever yet made triall of an Imprison'd Distillation, for so we may call it: And it seemes very probable, that if the force of heat immur'd within the Cloisters of a body, doe such great matters, and worke such alterations; and yet without losse, or manumission to the Body; that then this Proteus of matter, fetter'd as it were, with Manacles.*

cles, may in time be forced to many transformations, if so be, that the heat be so temper'd; and intermutually chang'd, that the vessels be not broken. *For this* operation is like that of the wombe, where the heat workes without emission, or separation of any part of the Body, save that in the Matrix, there is conjoyn'd Alimentation; but for version, the thing is the same. These are the *fortunes, or adventures of Experiment*. In the meane, we give this advise, touching Experiments of this Nature, that no man be discouraged, or confounded if the *Experiments* which he puts in practice answer not his expectation: *For what succeeds pleaseth more, but what succeeds not, many times informes no lesse*. And this ought ever to be remembered (which we often presse) that *Experimenta Lucifera* Experiments of Light, & discovery, ought for a time to be much more enquired after, than *Experimenta fructifera* Experiments of use and practice. And thus much of *Literate Experience*, which (as we have said before) is rather a sagacity, and a hunting sent, than a Science.

§ Now for the *Novum Organum*, we say nothing, nor give any fore-tast thereof; being we have projected in our minds, by the assistance of the Divine favour, to make a perfect entire work of that subject; seeing it is a matter of higher consequence, than all the rest.

## CAP. III.

- I The Partition of the Inventive Art of Arguments, into Promptuary, or Places of Preparation; and Topique, or Places of Suggestion.  
 II. The Division of Topique Art into Generall. 9. And Particular Topiques. III. In example of Particular Topique in the Inquiry De Gravi & Levi.



*Invention of Arguments, is not properly an Invention; for to Invent is to discover things unknowne, and not to recover, or recall that which is knowne already. The Use and Office of this kind of Invention seemes to be no other, than out of the Masse of Knowledge, congested, and stored up in the Mind, readily to produce, that which may be pertinent to the Matter, and Question propounded. For he that is litle or nothing acquainted before hand with the Subject in question, Topiques of Invention will litle advantage him: On the contrary he that hath Provision at home which may be applied to the purpose, even without Art & Places of Invention, will at length, (though not so readily and aptly) find out and produce Arguments. So that this kind of Invention (as we have said) is not properly Invention, but only a Reduction into Memory, or suggestion with Application. But because custome & consent hath authoriz'd the word, it may in some sort be called Invention. For it may be as wel accompted a chase, or finding of a Deere, which is made within an inclosed Park; as that within a Forrest at large. But setting aside curiosity of words it may appeare that the scope and end of this kind of Invention, is a certaine promptitude, and expedite use of our Knowledge; rather than any encrease, or Amplification thereof.*

*I To procure this ready Provision for discourse, there are two waies; either that it may be designed and pointed out, as it were, by an Index, under what Heads the matter is to be sought; and this is that we call Topique: Or else that Arguments may be be-*

fore hand framed, and stored up, about such things as are frequently incident, and come into disceptation; and this we will call *promptuarie Art, or of Preparation*. This later scarcely deserveth to be called a *Part of Knowledge*, seeing it rather consisteth in diligence, than any artificiall erudition. And in this part *Aristotle* doth wittily indeed, but hurtfully deride the *Sophists* neare his time, saying; *They did as if one that professed the Art of shoo-making, should not teach how to make up a shooe; but only exhibite in a readinesse a number of shooes, of all fashions and sizes*. But yet a man might here reply, that if a *Shoemaker* should have no shooes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he would be but a poore man, and weakly custumed. But our *Saviour* speaking of *Divine knowledge*, saith farre otherwise; *Every Scribe instructed for the Kingdom of heaven, is like a good householder that bringeth forth both new and old store*. And we see the ancient *Writers of Rhetorique* doe give it in *Precept*, *That Pleaders should have diverse common Places prepared long before hand, and handled, and illustrated both waies; for example, For the sense and equity of Law against the words, and letter of Law; and on the contrary*. And *Cicero* himselfe being broken unto it by great experience, delivers it plainly; *That an Orator if he be diligent and sedulous, may have in effect premeditate, and handled, whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speake of; so that in the Pleading of the Cause it selfe he shall have no need to insert any new or sodaine matter, besides new names, and some individuall Circumstances*. But the paines and diligence of *Demosthenes* went so farre, that in regard of the great force that the entrance and accessse into a Cause hath to make a good Impression upon the Minds of Auditors, he thought it worth his labour to frame, and to have in readinesse a number of *Prefaces* for *Orations* and *Speeches*. And these *Presidents, & Authorities*, may deservedly overwaigh *Aristotles* Opinion, that would advise us change a *Wardrope* for a *paire of Sheares*. Therefore this part of knowlede touching *Promptuarie Preparation*, was not to be omitted, where of for this place this is sufficient. And seeing it is common

De Repr.  
Soph. lib. 2.  
c. 9. s. ult.

Mat. 13.

Cic. de O-  
rat.

Ad Attic.  
Lib. XVI.  
EP. VI.

Ejus 65 Ex-  
ordia, si ejus

to both *Logique* and *Rhetorique*, we thought good here amongst *Logiques*, only in Passage, to touch it; referring over a more ample handling of it to *Rhetorique*.

¶ The other Part of *Invention*, which is *Topique*, we will divide into *Generall* and *Particular Topique*. *Generall* is that which is diligently and copiously handled in *Logique*, or *rationall knowledge*; as it were needlesse to stay upon the explication thereof. Yet thus much we thought meet to admonish by the way; that this *Topique* is of use, not only in argumentations, when we come to dispute with another; but in meditations also, when we reason and debate matters within our selves. Neither doe these places serve only for *suggestion*, or *admonition*, what we ought to *affirme* or *assert*; but also what we ought to *inquire* and *demand*. And a facultie of wise interrogating, is halfe a knowledge; for *Plato* saith well, *Whosoever seekes, comprehends that he seekes for, in generall notion, else how shall he know it, when he hath found it? And therefore the larger and more certaine our anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is our search.* The same places therefore, which will conduce to search the mind of our inward conceptions, and understanding; and to draw forth the knowledge there stored up; will also helpe us to produce knowledge from without. So as if a man of Learning, and understanding be in presence, we might be able, aptly and wisely to propound a Question thereof; and likewise profitably select and peruse Auctors and Books, or parts of Books, which might teach and informe us of those points we enquire.

In Meno-  
ne.

§ But *Particular Topiques* doe much more conduce to the Purpose we speake of; and is to be accompted a thing of farre greater use. There hath bin indeed some slight mention made hereof, by some Writers; but it hath not yet bin handled fully, and according to the dignity of the Subject. But to let passe that humour and pride, which hath raigned too long in Schools, which is, to pursue with infinite subtiltie, things that are within their command; but never to touch at things any whit removed; we doe receive and embrace *Particular Topique* as a matter of great use, that is, *Places of Enquiry, and Invention,*

\*  
TOPICÆ  
PARTICV-  
LARES.

*Invention, appropriate to Particular Subjects and Sciences; and these Places are certaine mixtures of Logique, and the proper matter of Particular Sciences. For he is but a weake man, and of narrow capacity, who conceives that the Art of finding out Sciences may be found out, propounded, and perfected, at once, even in their first conception; and presently be set downe, and practised in some worke. But let men know for certaine, That solid and true Arts of Invention doe shoote up, & come to maturity with the Inventions themselves. So as when a man first enters upon the search of a knowledge, he may have many profitable Precepts of Invention; but after he hath made farther progresse in the knowledge it selfe, he may, and must excogitate new Precepts of Invention, which may lead him more prosperously to further Discoveries. For this kind of Pursuite is like a going upon a Plaine and open Champion; for after we have gone a part of the way; we have not only gained this, that we are now neerer to our journeyes end; but we gaine the better sight of that part of the way, which remaines. So every degree of Proceeding in Sciences, having past over that which is left behind, gives a better prospect to that which followes. And because we set downe this Part of Topique as DEFICIENT, we will annex an example thereof.*

III *A Particular Topique, or the Articles of Enquiry*  
*de GRAVI & LEVI.*

**L** *Et it be enquired what Bodies those are which are susceptible of the Motion of Gravity; what of Levity; and whether there be any of a midle and indifferent Nature?*

2 *After an absolute Inquiry de Gravi & Levi; proceed to comparative Inquiry; as of Ponderous Bodies, which doth weigh more, which lesse, in the same dimension? so of Light Bodies, which are more speedily caried upward, which more slowly?*

3 *Let it be inquired, what the Quantum of a Body may contribute, and effect towards the Motion of Gravitie. But this, at first sight, may seeme a superfluous Inquiry, because the computation of Motion must follow the Computation of*  
*Quantity;*

*Quantity*: But the matter is otherwile; for although the *Quantity* in the skales doe compensate the *weight* of the Body it selfe, (the force of the Body every way meeting by repercussion, or by resistance, of the Basins, or of the Beame) yet where there is but small resistance (as in the falling downe of a body thorow the Aire) the *Quantity* of a body litle availes to the *incitation of the descent*; seeing two Balls of Lead, one of twenty, the other, of one pound waight, fall to the earth almost in an equall space of time.

4 *Let it be inquired*, whether the *Quantity* of a Body may be so increased as that the *Motion of Gravitie* may be utterly depofed and cast off; as in the Globe of the earth, which is pensile, and falls not? Whether may there be other massive substances, so great, as may sustaine themselves? For V. DIGRES.  
*Locall Descent to the Centre of the Earth, is a meere fiction*; and every great Masse abhorres all Locall Motion, unlesse it be overrul'd by another more predominant Appetite.

5 *Let it be inquired*, what the *resistance* of a Body interposing, or incountring may doe, or actuate towards the managing of the *Motion of Gravitie*: For a Body descending, either penetrates and cutteth the Body occurrent; or is arrested by it: If it Penetrates, then there is *Penetration*; or with weaker resistance, as in Aire, or with more strong, as in Water: If it be staid, it is staid either by a resistance *unequall*, where there is a *Pr. gravitation*; as if wood should be put upon wax; or *equall*, as if water should be put upon water, or wood upon wood of the same kind: which the Schooles, in a vaine apprehension call the *non-Ponderation of a body within its owne Spheare*. All these doe vary the *Motion of Gravitie*; for heavy substances are otherwaies moved in skales, otherwise in falling downe; nay otherwise (which may seem strange) in Ballances hanging in the Aire, otherwise in Ballances immersed in water; otherwise in falling down thorow water; otherwise in swimming, or transportation upon water.

6 *Let it be inquired*, what the *Figure* of a body descending may, or doth worke, to the moderating of the *Motion of Gravitie*, as a broad *Figure* with tenuity; a cubique *Figure*;

H h

long;

long; round; Pyramidale; when they turne; when they remaine in the same Posture, wherein they were deliver'd.

7 *Let inquiry be made*, of that which the *Continuance* and *Progression* of a *Fall* or *Descent*, may, and doth worke to this effect, that it may be caried with a greater incitation and force; and with what proportion, and how farre that Incitation will carry? For the Ancients, upon a slight contemplation, were of opinion, *that because that was a naturall Motion,*  
7. DIGRES. *it would continually be augmented, and improv'd.*

8 *Let Inquiry be made* of that which *Distance* and *Proximitie* of a *Body descending from the earth*, may, and doth worke to this end, that it may fall more speedily, more slowly, or else not at all, (if so be that it be without the Orbe of  
De Magn. *Activity of the terrene Globe*, which was *Gilberts* opinion): as likewise what the *immersion* of a *Body descending more in the deepe of the earth*; or the placing thereof *neerer to the superficies of the earth*, may produce? For these kindes of Postures vary the motiō, as they experience that work in Mines.

9 *Let there be Enquiry made* of that which the difference of Bodies, by which Motion of Gravitie is diffused, and communicated, can doe and doth: And whether it may equally be communicated by Bodies soft, and Porose; as by hard and solid: As if the Beame of the Ballance be on one side of the tongue wood, on the other side silver, (though they be reduced to the same waight) whether doth it not beget a variation in the Skales? In like manner, whether Metall put upon Wooll, or upon a blown bladder waigh the same, it would doe, if laid in the bottome of the Skale?

10 *Let there be Enquiry made* what the distance of a Body from the levell-Poise; that is the, quick, or late perception of the incumbent, or of depression, can doe or doth: As in a Ballance where one part of the beame is longer (though of the same waight) whether this doth sway the Ballance? Or in crooked Pipes, where certainly the longer part will draw the water, although the shorter part, made more capacious, may containe a greater waight of water.

11 *Let there be Enquiry made* of that which the intermixture

mixture or Copulation of a light body with a waighty, may doe to the raising of the *waight* of a Body, as in the poise of Living Creatures, and Dead?

12 *Let Enquiry be made of the secret ascensions, and descensions of the parts more light and more waighty in one, and the same entire Body. Whereby there may be made oftentimes exact separations; as in the separation of wine and water, in the Ascension of the flower of milk, and the like.*

13 *Let it be Enquired what is the line and direction of the Motion of Gravitie; and how farre it may follow either the centre of the earth, that is the masse of the earth; or the centre of the Body it selfe; that is, the contention and driving on of the parts thereof; for those Centres are profitable in demonstration, but of no use in Nature.*

14 *Let it be inquired touching the Comparison of the Motion of Gravitie, with other Motions; what Motions it masters; to what it yeelds? As in the Motion, which they call, *violent*, which is repressd and bridled for a time, as when a farre greater waight of Iron is drawne up by a small Load-stone, the Motion of *Gravitie* gives place to the Motion of *Sympathy*.*

15 *Let Enquiry be made of the Motion of Aire, whether it be caried upwards, or be collaterall and indifferent? Which is a hard thing to find out, but by some exquisite Experiments: for the glittering apparition of Aire in the bottome of water, is rather by the percussion of water, than by the Motion of Aire; being the same emication may be made in wood. But Aire mingled with Aire discovers no *Experiment*; because Aire in Aire exhibites Levity no lesse, than water in water doth Gravity: But in a bubble drawne over with the inclosure of a thin skin, it staves for a time.*

16 *Let it be Inquired what is the Terme of Levitie, for sure their meaning (who made the Centre of the earth, the Centre of *Gravitie*) is not, that the ultimate convexity of heaven should be the stint and limits of *Levitie*: Or rather, that as ponderous Bodies seeme to be so farre caried, that there they may cast Anchor as at a fixt Piller, so light Bodies are so*

farre caried, that they may begin to wheele about, and come to a *motion without termination?*

17 *Let Enquiry be made,* why vapours and exhalations should be caried as high as the *middle Region* of the Aire (as they call it); seeing they are somewhat a grosse substance, and the beames of the Sunne by turnes (as in the night) cease their Operation.

18 *Let Enquiry be made of the Conduct of the Motion of Flame upwards;* which is the more abstruse, because *Flame* expires every moment; save perchance in the imbracement of greater *Flames*: For *Flames* separated & broken off from their continuation, last not long.

19 *Let Enquiry be made of the ascendent Motion of the Actirity of Heate,* as when the Heat of red-hot Iron affecteth rather to mount upwards, than to move downwards? *The example* therefore of *Particular Topique* may be made in this manner; in the meane, what we have begun to advise, we doe agen admonish, which is, that men vary their *Particular Topiques* so, as after further Progression made by *Inquiry*, they doe substitute one, and after that another *Topique*, if ever they desire to reach the top of Sciences. As for us, we attribute so much to *Particular Topiques*, as we doe designe to make a Particular Worke of them upon some Subjects in Nature, which are more observeable, and more obscure; *For we are Commanders of Questions, not so of things.* And thus much of *Invention*.

## CAP. IV.

*I*The Partition of the Art of Iudging, into Iudgment by Induction. §. And by Syllogisme. Of the first a Collection is made in the New Organ. §. The first Partition of Iudgment by Syllogisme into Reduction, Direct, and Inverst. §. The second Partition thereof, into Analytique Art: and the Knowledge of Elenchs. II. The Division of the Knowledge of Elenchs, into Elenchs of Sophismes. §. Into Elenchs of Interpretation of Termes. §. And into Elenchs of Images, or Idolaes. III. The Division of Idolaes. §. Into Impressions from the Generall Nature of Man, or Idola Tribus. §. Into Impressions from the Individuall temper of Particulars, or Idola Specus. §. into Impressions by Words, and Communicative Nature, or Idola Fori. IV. An Appendix of the Art of Iudging, namely of the Analogie of Demonstration according to the Nature of the Subject.

**L**ET us now passe to Iudgment, or the Art of Iudging, which handleth the Nature of Prooves, or Demonstrations. And in this Art of Iudging (as also generally it is accepted) a Conclusion is inferred, either by Induction, or else by Syllogisme: For Enthymemes, and Examples are only the abridgements of these two. As for Iudgment that it is by Induction we need nothing doubt. For by one and the same Operation of the Mind, that which is sought, is both found and Iudged. Neither is the thing perfected by any meane, but immediately after the same manner, for most part, as it is in Sense: For Sense, in hir Primarie objects, doth at once seize upon the species of an object, and consent to the truth thereof. But it is otherwise in Syllogisme, the Proove whereof is not Immediate, but perfected by a Mean; and therefore the Invention of the Medium is one thing; and the Iudgment of the consequence of Argument, is another. For the mind first discourseth, afterwards rests satisfied. But a vitious forme of Induction we utterly disclaime; a Legitimate Forme we referre over to the New Organ. Therefore enough in this place, of Iudgment by Induction.

De Animal.  
Motions.

§ For that other *Judgment by Syllogisme*, to what purpose is it to speake, seeing this is by the subtle files of mens wits almost worne away, and reduced into many minute peeces? And no marvell being it is a thing hath such Sympathie with mans understanding. For the mind of man doth wonderfully endeavour, and extremely covet this, that it may not be persfle; but that it may light upon something fixt, and immoveable, on which as on a firmament it may support it selfe in its swift motions and disquisitions. Surely, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, That in all motion of Bodies there is some point quiescent; and very elegantly expoundeth the Ancient Fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heavens from falling; to be meant of the Poles of the World, whereupon the Conversion is accomplisht. In like manner men doe earnestly seek to have some Atlas, or Axeltree of their Cogitations within themselves, which may in some measure moderate the fluctuations, and wheelings of the understanding, fearing it may be, the falling of their heaven. Therefore men have hastned too fast to set downe Principles of Sciences, about which all the varietie of Disputations might turne without perill of ruine or Subversion. In truth not knowing that he who too early layes hold on certainties, will conclude in ambiguities; and he that seasonably suspends his Judgment, shall attaine to Certainties.

§ So then it is manifest, that this *Art of Judging by Syllogisme* is nothing elle, but the reduction of Propositions to Principles, by middle termes; and Principles are understood to be agreed of by all, and are exempt from Argument. But the invention of middle termes is permitted to the free sagacity, & pursuit of mens wits. This *Reduction* is of two kinds, *Direct*, and *Inverted*. *Direct* is, when the Proposition is reduced to the Principle, which is call'd *Probation Ostensive*. *Inverted* is, when the Contradictorie of the Proposition is reduced to the Contradictorie of the Principle; which they terme a *Probation from incongruities, or an absurdity*. The number also of middleterms, or their scale is diminished or increased, as they are remov'd from the Principle of the Proposition.

§ These

§ These grounds laid, we will divide the Art of Judgment (as for most part generally it is) into *Analytique Art*; and the *Doctrine of Elenchs*; the one giveth Direction; the other Caution. For *Analytique* setteth downe the true formes of Consequences of Arguments; by a variation, and deflection, from which, the Conclusion is deprehended to be erroneous; and this part containes in it a kind of *Elench*, or Redargution. For, as it is said, *Rectum est sui index est, et obliqui.* V. Euclid. & Cōment. Notwithstanding it is the safest way to set downe *Elenchs* as Monitors, whereby *Fallacies*, which otherwise might inſnare the Judgment, may be more easily detected. In the *Analytique* Part we find nothing DEFICIENT, which rather is loaden'd with superfluities, than any way is wanting in accessions.

¶ The Knowledge of *Elenchs* we divide into three Parts: *Elenchs of Sophismes*; *Elenchs of Interpretation*; and *Elenchs of Images or Idôlaes*. The *Doctrine of Elenchs of Sophismes* is very usefull; for although the more grosse sort of *Fallacies* is (as *Seneca* makes the comparison very well;) *But as the feates of Juglers which though we know not how they are done; yet we know well it is not as it seemes to be.* Yet the more subtile sort of *Sophismes* doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth in good earnest abuse his Judgment. Epist. 45.

§ This Part concerning the *Elenchs of Sophismes* is excellently handled by *Aristotle* in *Precept*; but more excellently by *Plato* in example, not only in the Person of the Ancient *Sophists*; *Gorgias*; *Hippias*; *Protagoras*, and *Euthidemus*, and the rest; but even in the Person of *Socrates* himselfe, who professing to affirme nothing, but to infirme whatsoever others avouch, hath exactly expressed all the formes of *Objections*, *Fallacies*, and *Redargutions*. Wherefore in this part we have nothing DEFICIENT. But this, in the meane time, is to be noted, that though we make the ingenuous and principall use of this Knowledge to consist in this, *That Sophismes may be redargued*; yet it is manifest, that the degenerate and corrupt use thereof, is employ'd to contrive, and impose, captions and Contradictions, by these *Sophismes*; which passeth for a great *Facultie*.

*cultie, and no doubt is of great advantage. Though the difference was elegantly made by one betwixt an Orator, and a Sophist, That the one is as the Grey-Hound, which hath his advantage in the race; the other as the Hare which hath his advantage in the turne.*

§ Now follow *Elenchi Hermenia*, for so we will call them, borrowing the Word, rather than the Sense, from *Aristotle*. And here let us call to mens memorie what we have said before; (when we handled *Primitive Philosophie*) of *transcendent, and adventitious Conditions, or Adjuncts of Entitie*, they be *Majoritie, Minoritie, Much, Little; Prioritie, Posterioritie; Identitie, Diversitie, Power, Act; Habit, Privation, Totality, Partialitie; Activitie, Passivitie; Motion, Quietude; Entity, Non-Entity*, and the like. But specially let men remember, and observe the different *Contemplations* of these *Properties*, which is, that they may be inquired, either *Physically*, or *Logically*. The *Physicall* handling of these *adherent Qualities* we have assigned to *Primitive Philosophie*. The *Logicall* remaineth, & that is the very thing which we here stile *Doctrinam de Elenchis Hermenia*, the *Knowledge of the Elenches of Interpretation*. This indeed is a sound & materiall *Portion* of *Knowledge*: For these *Comune and general Notions* have this *Nature*, that in all *disputations* they every where *intervene*, so as if they be not by a *carefull Iudgment* accurately distinguished at first; they may wonderfully *overcloud* the whole light of *Disputations*; and even bring the case to that *passage*, that the *Disputations* shall be resolved into a *skirmish* of words. For *Æquivocations*, and *erronious acception of words* (specially of this *Nature*) are the *Sophismes of Sophismes*. Wherefore it seemeth better to constitute a *Treatise* of them apart, than to receive them into *Prime Philosophie*, I meane *Metaphysique*; or to annexe them as a part of *Analytiques*, which *Aristotle* very *confusedly* hath done. And we have given it a name from the nature and Use; for the right use is plainly *Redargution*, and *Caution* about the *acception of words*. Nay that Part of *Predicaments* touching *Cautions*, of not *confounding*, and *transposing* the termes of *Definitions* and *Divisions*, if it were rightly instituted,

tuted, would be of singular use, in our judgment, and might fitly be referred hether. And thus much of the *Elenchs of Interpretation*.

III *As for the Elenchs of Images or Idolaes; certainly Idolaes are the profoundest Fallacies of the mind of man. Nor doe they deceive in Particulars, as the rest doe; casting a Cloud, and spreading snares over the Iudgment; but apertly from a corrupt, and crookedly-set predisposition of the mind; which doth, as it were, wrest and infect all the anticipations of the understanding. For the mind of man (drawn over, and clouded with the sable Pavillion of the Body) is so farre from being like a smooth, equall, and cleere Glasse, which might sincerely take and reflect the beames of things, according to their true incidence; that it is rather like an enchanted Glasse, full of Superstitions, Apparitions, and Impostures.*

§ *Idolaes are imposed upon the understanding, either by the universall Nature of man in generall. Or from the individual Nature of Particulars; or by words, or nature Communicative. The first sort of Images we wont to call, Idola Tribûs; the second, Idola Specûs; the third, Idola Fori. There is also a fourth kind, which we call, Idola Theatri; and is introduced by depraved Theories or Philosophies, and perverse Lawes of Demonstrations; but this kind may be denied and put off, wherefore we passe it over for the present. But the other doe plainly besiege the mind, nor can they ever be quite removed, or extirpated. Therefore let none expect any Analytique Art in these; but the knowledge of Elenchs concerning these Idolaes is a Primarie Knowledge. Nor (to speake truth) can this Knowledge of Idolaes be reduced into Art; but only by a contemplative wisdom, we may be instructed to beware of them. As for a just and more subtile Treatise thereof, we referre that to the *Novum Organum*, touching upon them in a generality in this place.*

§ *Idola Tribûs is thus exemplified, The Nature of the mind of man is more affected with Affirmatives and Actives, than with Negatives and Privatives; whereas in a just and regular course it should present it selfe equall to both. But the mind of*

\*  
ELENCHI  
IDOLO-  
RVM.

NOV. OR.  
LIB. I.  
APH. LXI.  
ad LXIX.

NOV. OR.  
LIB. I.  
Aph. XLV;  
ad LIII.  
exclusive.

man, if a thing have once bin existent, and held good, receives a deeper Impression thereof, than if the same things, farre more often faild and fell out otherwise; which is the roote, as it were, of all superstition and vaine Credulity. So *that he answered well to him that shewed him the great number of Pictures of such as had scaped Shipwrack, and had paid their vowes; and being prest with this Interrogative, Whether he did not now confesse the Divinity of Neptune? return'd this counter-question by way of answer, yea, but where are they painted, that are drowned?* And there is the same reason of all such like Superstitions, as in Astrologie; Dreames; Divinations, and the rest. Another Instance is this, *The Spirit of man being it selfe of an equall and uniforme Substance, doth presuppose, and faine a greater equality, and uniformitie in Nature, than in truth there is.* Hence that fiction of the Mathematicians, *that in the heavenly Bodies all is moved by perfect Circles; rejecting spirall Lines:* so it comes to passe that whereas there are many things in Nature, as it were *Monodica*, and full of imparity; yet the conceipts of men still faine and frame unto themselves, *Relatives; Parallels, and Conjugates.* For upon this ground, *the Element of Fire and its Orbe is brought in to keepe square with the other three, Earth, Water, Aire.* The *Chymiques* have set out a fanaticall Squadron of the word, faining by a most vaine conceipt, in those their foure Elements (*Heaven, Aire, Water, and Earth*) there are found to every one parallel and conforme species. *The third Example* hath some affinitie with the former, *That man is, as it were, the common measure and mirror, or glasse of Nature;* for it is not credible (if all Particulars were scann'd and noted) what a troupe of *Fictions* and *Idolae* the reduction of the operations of Nature, to the similitude of humane Actions, hath brought into *Philosophie*; I say this very fansie, *that it should be thought that Nature doth the same things that man doth.* Neither are these much better than the Heresie of the *Anthrôpomorphites*, bred in the Cells and solitude of grosse and ignorant Monkes, or the Opinion of *Epicurus* answerable to the same in Heathenisme, who supposed God to be of Hu-

mane

Cic. de N.  
D. lib. V.

V. DIGRES.

Elem. Ig-  
nis vide  
Digress.

Paracel.  
Fludde  
passim.

Epiphan.  
lib. 3. Ni-  
ceph. Hist.  
Ecl. lib. I I

mane shape. But *Velleius* the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with starres and lights, as if he had bin an *Ædilis*; one that should have set forth some magnificent shewes or playes: for if that great Workman had conform'd himselfe to the imitation of an *Ædilis*, he would have cast the starres into some pleasant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the curious roofs of Palaces, whereas one can scarce find in such an infinite number of starres a Posture in square, or Triangle, or right-Line. *So different a harmony there is betweene the Spirit of man; and the Spirit of the world.*

§ *Idola Specūs are derived from the Individuall Complexion of every Particular in respect of Mind, and of Body, as also from Education; Custome; and Fortuitous Events, which befall every man. For it is an excellent embleme that of Plato's Cave; for certainly (to let goe the exquisite subtiltie of that Parable) if a man were continued from his Childhood unto mature Age in a Grot, or a dark and subterraneous Cave, and then should come sodainly abroad, and should behold this stately Canopie of heaven, and the Furniture of the World; without doubt he would have many strange and absurd imaginations come into his mind, and people his braine. So in like manner we live in the view of heaven; yet our Spirits are inclosed in the Caves of our Bodies; Complexions, and Customs, which must needs minister unto us infinite images of errors, and vain Opinions, if they doe so seldome, & for so short a space appear above ground, out of their holes; and doe not continually live under the Contemplation of Nature, as in the open Aire. That Parable of *Heracitus* doth well suite with this embleme of *Plato's Cave*, that men seek Sciences in their owne proper World, and not in the greater World.*

NOV. OR.

LIB. I.

Aph. LIII

ad LIX.

Plat. de

Rep. VII.

N. L.

NOV. OR.

LIB. I.

Aph. LIX.

ad LXI.

§ But *Idola Fori* are most troublesome, which out of a tacite stipulation amongst men, touching the imposition of words, and names, have insinuated themselves into the understanding. Words commonly are imposed according to the capacity of the People; and distinguish things by such differences, as the

Vulgar are capeable off; and when a more precise conception, and a more diligent observation would discern, and separate things better; the noise of popular words confounds and interrupts them. And that which is the remedy to this inconvenience (namely *Definitions*) in many points is not a remedy sufficient for the disease; because the *Definitions* themselves consist of words, and words beget words. For although we presume that we are masters of our words, and expressions; and it is soon said, *loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes*; and that words of Art, which are of authority only with the Learn'd, may seeme to give some satisfaction to this defect; and that the *Definitions* whereof we have spoken, premised, and presupposed in Arts according to the wisdom of the Mathematicians, may be of force to correct the depraved acceptations of words; yet all this secures us not from the cheating slights and charms of words, which many waies abuse us, and offer violence to the understanding; and after the manner of the Tartars Bow, doe shoot back upon the judgment from whence they came. Wherefore this disease must have a new kind of remedy, and of more efficacy. But we doe now touch these in passage briefly, in the meane time reporting this Knowledge which we will call, *the Great Elenchs*, or the Doctrine of *Idolaes*, *Native* and adventuall of the mind of man, to be DEFICIENT. But we referre a just Treatise thereof to the *Novum Organum*.

\*  
DE ANA-  
LOGIA  
DEMON-  
STRATI-  
ONVM.  
Eth. Lib. I.

IV There remains one part of *Judgment* of great excellency, which likewise we set downe as DEFICIENT. For indeed *Aristotle* noteth the thing, but no where pursueth the manner of acquiring it. The Subject of this point is this, *The different kind of Demonstrations, and Prooves, to different kind of Matter and Subjects*; so that this Doctrine containeth the *Indications of Indications*. For *Aristotle* advileth well, *That we may not require Demonstrations from Orators, or Perswasions from Mathematicians*; so that if you mistake in the kind of Proove, the judicature cannot be upright and perfect. And seeing there are foure kinds of *Demonstrations* either by *immediate*

*mediate Consent, and commune Notions; or by Induction; or by Syllogisme; or by that which Aristotle calls Demonstration in orbe, or in Circle, (that is not from the more known notions, but down right); every of these Demonstrations hath certaine Subjects, and matter of Sciences, wherein respectively they have chiefeft use; other Subjects from which respectively they ought to be excluded. For a rigor and curiosity in requiring too severe proofes in some things; much more a facilitie and remission in resting satisfied in slighter Proofes, are to be numbered amongst those prejudices, which have bin the greatest Causes of detriment, and impediment to Sciences. Thus much concerning the Art of Iudging.*



## CAP. V.

I The Partition of *Art Retentive, or of Memorie, into the Knowledge of the Helpes of Memorie. § and the Knowledge of the Memorie it selfe.* II. The Division of the *Doctrine of Memorie into Pronotion. § and Embleme.*

I  *E will divide the Art of Retaining, or of Custodie, into two Knowledges; that is, into the Knowledge of the Helpes of Memorie, and the Knowledge of the Memory it selfe. Assistant to Memory is writing; and it must by all means be noted, that Memory of it selfe, without this support, would be too weake for prolix and acurate matters; wherein it could no way recover, or recall it selfe, but by Scripture. And this subsidiary second, is also of most speciall use in Inductive Philosophy, and the Interpretation of Nature. For a man may as well perfect, and summe up the Computations of an Ephemerides by meere Memory; as comprehend the Interpretation of Nature by meditations, and the nude, and native strength of Memory; unlesse the same Memory be assisted by Tables, and Indices provided for that Purpose. But to let goe the Interpretation of Nature, which is a new Knowledge; there scarcely can be a thing more usefull even to ancient,*

and popular Sciences, than a solid, and good *Aide to Memory*; that is, a substantiall and Learned *Digest of Common places*. Neither am I ignorant, that the referring of those things we read, or learne, into *Common-Places*, is imputed by some as a *Prejudice to Learning*; as causing a retardation of Reading, and a slothfull relaxation to *Memory*. But because it is a Counterfeit thing in Knowledge, to be forward and pregnant, unlesse you be withall deepe and full; I hold that the diligences, and paines in collecting *Common-Places*, is of great use and certainty in studying; as that which Subministers Copie to *Invention*; and contracteth the sight of Iudgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the *Methods and Syntagmes of Common-Places*, which we have seene, there is none that is of any worth; for that in their *Titles*, they meerly represent the face, rather of a Schoole, than of the world; exhibiting *Vulgar and Pedanticall Divisions*, and not such as any way penetrate the *Marrow and Pith of things*.

§ As for *Memory* it selfe; that in my Iudgment hetherto hath bin loosely, and weakly inquired into. There is indeed an Art extant of it; but we are certaine that there may be had both better Precepts for the confirming and increasing *Memory*, than that Art comprehendeth; and a better Practice of that Art may be set downe, than that which is receiv'd. Neither doe we doubt (if any man have a mind to abuse this Art to ostentation) but that many wonderfull and prodigious matters may be performed by it. But for use (as it is now managed) it is a barren thing. Yet this in the meane time we doe not tax it withall, that it doth supplant, or surcharge *Naturall Memory* (as commonly is objected) but that it is not dexterously applied to lend assistance to *Memory* in businesse, and serious occasions. And we have learned this (it may be from our practised Course in a civile calling) that whatsoever makes ostentation of Art, and gives no assurance of use, we esteeme as nothing worth. For to repeate on the sodaine a great number of names or words, upon once hearing, in the same order they were delivered; or to powre forth a number of verses upon any argument *ex tempore*;

or to taxe every thing that falls out in some satyricall simile; or the turning of every thing to a jest; or the eluding of every thing by a contradiction or cavill; and the like; whereof in the faculties of the mind there is a great store; and such as by wit and practice may be exalted to a great degree of wonder. All these and the like, we make no more estimation of, than we doe of the agilities, and tricks of Tumblers; Buffones, & Iuglers. For they are almost all one thing, seeing these abuse the Powers of the Body, these the Powers of the mind; and perchance they may have some strangeness in them; but little or no worthinesse.


II *This Art of Memory* is built upon two Intentions, *Prenotion* and *Emblem*. we call *Prenotion* a *Precision of endlesse investigation*; for when a man would recall any thing to *Memory*, if he have no *Prenotion* or *Preception* of that he seeketh, he searcheth indeed, and taketh paines, rounding this way and that way, as in a maze of infinitie. But if he have any certaine *Prenotion*, presently that which is infinite is discharged & cut off; and the questing of the *Memory* is brought within a more narrow compasse; as in the hunting of a Falow Deere within the Parke. Therefore it is evident, that *Method helps the Memory*; for *Prenotion* suggesteth that it must agree with order. So verses are sooner gotten by heart than Prose; for if a man make a doubtfull stand at a word, *Prenotion* prompts him that the word which agrees with the verse, must be of such a Nature. And this *Prenotion* is the first part of *Artificiall Memory*. For in *Memory Artificiall* we have places digested & provided before hand: But we make *Images extempore*, according as the present shall require. But *Prenotion* doth admonish that the *Image* must be such as hath some resemblance with the *Place*; this is that which awaketh, and in some sort muniteth the *Memory* in the chase of what we seeke.

§ *Embleme deduceth Conceptions Intellectuall to Images sensible, and that which is sensible, more forcibly strikes the Memory, and is more easily imprinted, than that which is Intellectuall*. So we see that even the *Memory* of Beasts is stirr'd up by

a *sensible* object, not by an *Intellectuall*. So you will more easily remember the *Image* of a Hunts-man pursuing the Hare, or of an Apothecary setting in order his Boxes, or of a Pedant making a speech, or of a boy reciting verses by heart, or of a lester acting upon a stage, than the *Notions of Invention; Disposition; Elocution; Memory; Action*. There are other things that pertain to the *helpe of Memory* (as we said even now) but the *Art* which now is in use consists of these two Intentions now set downe. To pursue the *Particular Defects* of Arts, would be to depart from our intended Purpose. Wherefore let thus much suffice for the Art of *Retaining*, or of *Custodie*. Now we descend in order to the fourth member of *Logique*, which handles *Tradition* and *Elocution*.

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THE



THE SIXTH BOOK OF  
FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM  
VICOUNT S<sup>t</sup> ALBAN.

OF THE  
DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I The Partition of the Art of Tradition into the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech. The Doctrine of the Method of Speech; And the Doctrine of the Illustration of Speech. § The Partition of the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech; into the Knowledge of the Notes of things; of Speaking; and of Writing; of which the two last constitute Grammar, and the Partitions thereof. §. The Partition of the Knowledge of the Notes of things; into Hieroglyphiques; And into Characters Reall. II. A second Partition of Grammar, into Literarie; and Philosophicall. III. An Aggregation of Poesie, referring  
to Measure, unto the Knowledge of Speech. An Aggregation of the Knowledge of Cyphers to the Knowledge of Writing.

**C**ERTAINLY any man may assume the liberty (Excellent King) if he be so humour'd, to jest and laugh at himselfe, or his owne Projects. Who then knowes whether this worke of ours be not perchance a Transcript out of an Ancient Booke found amongst the Books of that famous Library of S. *Liv. 2. c. 7. des faits & dictz du bon Pantagr.* For, a Catalogue whereof M. Fra. Rabelais hath collected? For there a Book is found entituled FORMICARIUM ARTI-

UM ; wee have indeed accumulated a litle heape of *small Dust* ; and laid up many *Graines of Arts and Sciences* therein, whereto Ants may creepe, and there repose a while, and so betake themselves to new labours . Nay the wisest of Kings sends the slothfull , of what ranke or qualitie soever, unto the Ants ; and those we define to be slothfull , whose only care is to live upon the maine stock, but not to improve it by sowing the Ground of Sciences over againe, and reaping a new Harvest.

Prov. 6.

I Now let us come unto the Art of Delivery, or of Expressing, and Transferring those things which are Invented ; Iudged, and laid up in the Memory ; which, by a generall name , we will terme Tradition. This comprehendeth in it all Arts touching Words , & Speeches ; for though Reason be, as it were, the Soule of Speech , yet in the manner of handling, Reason and Speech should be separate, even as the Soule and the Body are . We will divide these Traditive Sciences into three Parts ; into the Knowledge concerning the Organ of Speech ; into the Knowledge concerning the Method of Speech ; and into the Knowledge concerning the Illustration or Ornament of Speech.

De Interpret.

§ The Knowledge concerning the Organ of Speech generally receiv'd , which is also called Grammer, hath two Parts ; the one of Speech ; the other of Writing . For Aristotle saith well, *Words are the Images of Cogitations ; letters are the Images of words* ; we will assigne both to Grammer. But to derive the matter somewhat higher before we come to Grammer, and the parts thereof now set downe ; we must speake of the Organ of Tradition in generall . For there seemes to be other Traditive Emanations besides Words and Letters . For this is certaine whatsoever may be distinguisht into differences, sufficient for number , to expresse the variety of Notions ( so those differences be perceptible to sense ) may be the Convoy of the Cogitations from man to man . For we see Nations of different Language to trade with one the other, well enough to serve their turne, by Gestures. Nay in the Practice of many, that have bin dumbe and deafe from their birth, and otherwise were ingenious , we have seen strange Dialogues held between them, and their friends, who have learn'd

learn'd their Gestures. Moreover it is now generally knowne that in in China, and the Provinces of the high Levant, there are at this day in use, certaine *Reall*, and not *Nominall Characters*; that is, such as expresse neither *Letters*, nor *Words*; but *Things*, and *Notions*: in so much that many Countries that understand not one an others Language, but consenting in such kind of *Characters* (which are more generally receiv'd amongst them) can communicate one with another by such *Figures* written; so as every Country can read and deliver in his owne native tongue, the meaning of any Book written with these *Characters*.

§ *Notes* therefore of things, which without the helpe and mediation of *Words* signifie *Things*, are of two sorts; whereof the first sort is significant of *Congruitie*; the other *ad placitum*. Of the former sort are *Hieroglyphiques* and *Gestures*; of the later are those which we call *Characters Reall*. The use of *Hieroglyphiques* is very ancient, and had in a kind of Veneration; especially amongst the *Aegyptians*, one of the most Ancient Nations: So that *Hieroglyphiques* seem to have bin a *first-borne writing*, and elder than the *Elements of Letters*; unlesse, it may be, the *Letters of the Ebrews*. As for *Gestures* they are, as it were, *Transitory Hieroglyphiques*. For as words pronounced vanish, *writings* remaine; so *Hieroglyphiques* expressed by *Gestures*, are transient, but *Painted*, permanent. As when *Periander* being consulted with, how to preserve a Tyranny, bid the Messenger stand still, and he walking in a Garden, *tept all the highest Flowers*; signifying the cutting of, and the keeping low of the Nobility; did as well make use of a *Hieroglyphique*, as if he had drawne the same upon Paper. This in the meane is plain, that *Hieroglyphiques* and *Gestures* ever have some similitude with the thing signified, and are kind of *Emblemes*; wherefore we have named them the *Notes of things from Congruitie*. But *Characters Reall* have nothing of Embleme in them; but are plainly dumbe and dead Figures, as the *Elements of Letters* are; and only devised *ad Placitum*, and confirmed by *Custom*, as by a tacite agreement. And it is manifest also that there must needs be

\*  
DE NO-  
TIS RE-  
RVM.

Herodot.  
Laert.

a vast number of them for writing; at least so many as there are Radicall words. Wherefore this portion of Knowledge concerning the Organ of Speech, which is of the Notes of Things, we report as DEFICIENT. And though it may seeme of no great use, considering that Words & writings by Letters are the most apt Organs of Tradition; yet we thought good to make mention of it here, as of a knowledge not to be despised. For we here handle, as it were, the Coynes of things Intellectuall, and it will not be amisse to know, that as Money may be made of other matter besides Gold and Silver; so there may be stamped other Notes of things besides Words and Letters.

II Let us proceed to Grammer; this doth beare the office as it were, of an *Vsher* to other Sciences; a place not very honourable, yet very necessary, especially seeing that in our age Sciences are chiefly drawne from Learned Languages, and not from Mother-tongues. Nor is the dignity thereof to be esteemed meane, seeing it supplies the place of an Antidote, against that *Malediction* of the *Confusion of Tongues*. Surely the Industry of man striveth to restore, and redintegrate himselfe in those Benedictions, which by his guilt he forfeited; and by all other Arts, armes and strengthens himselfe against that first generall Curse of the *Sterility of the earth*, and the eating of his bread in the sweat of his browes. But against that second Curse, which was the *Confusion of Tongues*, he calls in the assistance of Grammer. The use hereof in some Mother-tongues is indeed very small; in forraine tongues more large; but most ample in such tongues, as have ceased to be vulgar, and are perpetuated only in Books.

§ We will divide Grammer into two sorts, whereof the one is *Literary*; the other *Philosophicall*. The one is meerly applied to Languages, that they may be more speedily learned; or more correctedly and purely spoken. The other in a sort doth minister, and is subservient to *Philosophie*. In this later part which is *Philosophicall*, we find that *Cesar* writ Books *DE ANALOGIA*; and it is a question whether those Books handled this *Philosophicall Grammer* whereof we speake? Our opinion is that there was not any high and subtile mat-

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Suet. in Jul.  
\*  
GRAMMA-  
TICA  
PHILOSOPHANS.

ter in them, but only that they deliver'd Precepts of a pure and perfect speech, not depraved by popular Custome; nor corrupted and polluted by over-curious affectation; in which kind *Cesar* excell'd. *Notwithstanding*, admonish't by such a worke, we have conceiv'd and comprehended in our mind, a kind of Grammer, that may diligently enquire, not the *Analogie of words* one with another, but the *Analogie* between Words and Things, or Reason; besides that *Interpretation of Nature*, which is subordinate to *Logique*. Surely Words are the *foot-steps of Reason*; and foot-steps doe give some indications of the Body; wherefore we will give some generall description of this. And first we doe not allow that curious inquiry which *Plato* an excellent man pursued, touching the *imposition* and *originall Etymology of names*. In Cratyl.  
 conceiving it, as if words had not bin imposed at first, ad *Placitum*; but were significantly derived and deduced from a certaine reason and intendment. Certainly an elegant and pliant speculation, which might be aptly fain'd and made square to the purpose; and by reason it seemeth to search the secrets of Antiquity, in some kind reverend. But yet sparingly mixt with truth, and without fruit. *But without* question that would be a most excellent kind of Grammer (as we suppose) if some man throughly instructed in many Languages, as well *Learned*, as *Mother-tongues*, should write a Treatise of the diverse Proprieties of Languages; shewing in what points every particular Language did excell; and in what points it was DEFICIENT. For so Tongues might be enricht and perfected by mutuall intertrafique one with another; and a most faire Image of speech (like the *Venus of Apelles*); and a goodly patterne for the true expression of the inward sense of the mind, might be drawne from every part which is excellent in every Language. And withall no slight Conjectures, but such as were well worth the observation, might be taken (which a man perchance would litle think) touching the naturall dispositions and customes of People, and Nations, even from their Languages. For I willingly give eare to *Cicero* noting that the Grecians have not a word which may

De Orat.  
lib. 2.

expresse this Latine word, *ſneptum*, because (ſaith he) *this vice was ſo familiar to the Grecians, that they did not ſo much as acknowledge themſelves guilty thereof.* Certainly a Censure worthy a Roman gravity. And what may that inferre, that the Grecians uſed ſuch a Liberty in compoſition of words, contrarywiſe the Romans were in this point ſevere? Surely a man may plainly collect that the Grecians were more fit to ſtudy Arts; the Romans to manage affaires of ſtate. For diſtinctions of Arts, for moſt part, require compoſition of words; but matters and buſineſſe, ſimple words. *But the Ebrewes ſo ſhunne Compoſition, that they make choice rather to ſtraine a Metaphor too farre, than to bring in a Compoſition.* Nay they uſe ſo few words, and ſo unmingled, that a man may plainly perceive by their Tongue, that they were a Nazarite People, and ſeparate from other Nations. *And is not that worthy obſervation (though it may ſerve to abate our high concept of our owne times) that Ancient Languages were more full of Declenſions, Caſes, Conjugations, Tenſes, and the like; the moderne commonly deſtitute of theſe, doe looſely deliver themſelves in many expreſſions by Prepoſitions, and auxiliary verbes.* Certainly a man may eaſily conjecture (however we may pleaſe our ſelves) that the wits of former times were farre more acute and ſubtile than ours are. There are an infinite number of obſervations of this kind which might make up a juſt Volume. Wherefore it will not be amiſſe to diſtinguiſh *Grammar Philoſophicall*, from *meere and literary Grammar*, and to ſet it downe as DEFICIENT. Vnto *Grammar* alſo belongs the conſideration of all *Accidents* of words; ſuch as are *Measure*; *Sound*; *Accent*; but thoſe firſt infancies of ſimple Letters (as, with what Percuſſion of the Tongue, with what opening of the mouth; with what drawing of the lips, with what ſtraining of the throat; the ſound of every Particular Letter is to be made) belongs not unto *Grammar*; but is a Portion of the *knowledge of ſounds*, to be handled *under ſenſe and ſenſibility*. *Grammaticall ſound*, whereof we ſpeake, belongs only to ſweetneſſe & harſhneſſe of ſounds; of which ſome are common; for there is no Tongue but in  
some

Some sort shunnes the too much overture of concurrent Vowels, and the asperities of concurrent Consonants. There are other respective sounds which are pleasing, or unpleasing to the eare, according to the temper of diverse Nations. *The Greeke Tongue* is full of Diphthonges; the *Latine* is farre more sparing; the *Spanish Tongue* hates small-sounding Letters, and presently changeth them into Letters of a middle tone; the *Tongues* derived from the *Gothes* delight in Aspirates; there are innumerable of this nature, but perchance these are more than enough.

III *But the measure of words* hath brought us forth an immense body of Art, namely *Poesie*; not in respect of the matter (of which we have spoken before) but in respect of stile and the forme of words, as *Metre* or *Verse*; touching which the Art is very small and briefe, but the accesse of examples large and infinite. Neither ought that Art (which the *Grammarians* call *Profodia*) to be only restrain'd to the kinds and measures of *Verse*; for there are Precepts to be annext, what kind of *Verse* best fitteth every matter or subject. The *Ancients* applied *Heroicall Verse* to *Histories* and *Laudatories*; *Elegies* to *Lamentations*; *Jambiques* to *Invectives*; *Lyriques* to *Songs* and *Hymnes*. And this wisdom of the *Ancients* is not wanting in the *Poets* of later Ages in *Mother-tongues*; only this is to be reprehended, that some of them too studious of *Antiquity* have endeavoured to draw *moderne Languages* to *Ancient Measures* (as *Heroique*; *Elegiaque*; *Saphique*, and the rest) which the *fabrique* and *composition* of those Languages, will not beare; and withall is no lesse harsh unto the eare. In matters of this Nature the judgment of sense is to be preferr'd before precepts of Art, as he saith,

-----*Cæna Fercula nostra*

*Mallem Convivis quam placuisse Cocis.*

Mart. Ep. 9

Nor is *this Art*, but the abuse of Art, seeing it doth not perfect, but perverts Nature. As for *Poesie* (whether we speake of *Fables*

*Fables, or Metre*) it is, as we have said before, as a *Luxuriant Herb* brought forth without seed, and springs up from the strength and ranknesse of the soyle. Wherefore it runs along every where, and is so amply spread, as it were a superfluous labour to be curious of any DEFICIENTS therein; the care therefore for this is taken already.

§ *As for Accents of Words*, there is no need, that wee speake of so small a matter; unlesse, perchance, some may think it worth the noting, that there hath bin exact observation made of the *Accents of Words*, but not of the *Accents of Sentences*; yet this, for most part, is the generall Custome of all men, that in the close of a Period they let fall their voice, in a demand they raise it, and many such like usages.

§ *As for writing*, that is perform'd either by the vulgar Alphabet, which is every where receiv'd; or by a secret and private Alphabet, which men agree upon between themselves, which they call *Cyphers*. But the *Vulgar Orthography* hath brought forth unto us a Controversie, and Question, namely, *Whether words should be written as they are spoken, or rather after the usuall manner*. But this kind of writing, which seemes to be reformed, which is, *that writing should be consonant to speaking*, is a branch of unprofitable subtelties; for *Pronunciation* it selfe every day encreases and alters the fashion; and the derivation of words, especially from forrain Languages, are utterly defac'd and extinguisht. In briefe, seeing *writing*, according to the receiv'd Custome, doth no way prejudice the *manner of speaking*, to what end should this innovation be brought in?

§ *Wherefore let us come to CYPHARS*. Their kinds are many, as *Cyphars simple*; *Cyphars intermixt with Nulloes*, or non-significant Characters; *Cyphars of double Letters under one Character*; *Wheele-Cyphars*; *Kay-Cyphars*; *Cyphars of words*; *Others*. But the virtues of them whereby they are to be preferr'd are Three; *That they be ready, and not laborious to write*; *That they be sure, and lie not open to Deciphering*; *And lastly, if it*  
be

be possible, that they may be managed without suspicion. For if Letters Missive fall into their hands, that have some command and authority over those that write, or over those to whom they were written; though the Cypher it selfe bee sure and impossible to be decypher'd, yet the matter is liable to examination and question; unlesse the Cypher be such, as may be voide of all suspicion, or may elude all examination. As for the shifting off examination, there is ready prepared a new and profitable invention to this purpose; which, seeing it is easily procured, to what end should we report it, as Deficient. The invention is this: That you have two sorts of Alphabets, one of true Letters, the other of Non-significants; and that you likewise fould up two Letters; one which may carrie the secret, another such as is probable the Writer might send, yet without perill. Now if the Messenger be strictly examined concerning the Cypher, let him present the Alphabet of Non-significants for true Letters, but the Alphabet of true Letters for Non-significants: by this Art the examiner falling upon the exterior Letter, and finding it probable, shall suspect nothing of the interior Letter. But that jealousies may be taken away, we will annexe an other invention, which, in truth, we devised in our youth, when we were at Paris: and is a thing that yet seemeth to us not worthy to be lost. It containeth the highest degree of Cypher, which is to signifie omnia per omnia, yet so as the Writing infolding, may beare a quintuple proportion to the Writing infolded; no other condition or restriction whatsoever is required. It shall be performed thus: First let all the Letters of the Alphabet, by transposition, be resolved into two Letters onely; for the transposition of two Letters by five placements will be sufficient for 32. Differences, much more for 24. which is the number of the Alphabet. The example of such an Alphabet is on this wise.

*An Example of a Bi-literarie Alphabet.*

*A*    *B*    *C*    *D*    *E*    *F*  
*Aaaaa* *aaaab.* *aaaba.* *aaabb.* *aabaa.* *aabab.*  
*G*    *H*    *I*    *K*    *L*    *M*  
*aabba* *aabbb* *abaaa.* *abaab.* *ababa.* *ababb.*  
*N*    *O*    *P*    *Q*    *R*    *S*  
*abbaa.* *abbab.* *abbba* . *abbbb.* *baaaa.* *baaab.*  
*T*    *V*    *W*    *X*    *Y*    *Z*  
*baaba.* *baabb.* *babaa* . *babab.* *babba.* *babbb.*

Neither is it a small matter these Cypher-Characters have, and may performe: For by this *Art* a way is opened, whereby a man may expresse and signifie the intentions of his minde, at any distance of place, by objects which may be presented to the eye, and accommodated to the eare: provided those objects be capable of a twofold difference onely; as by Bells, by Trumpets, by Lights and Torches, by the report of Muskets, and any instruments of like nature. But to pursue our enterprise, when you addresse your selfe to write, resolve your inward-infolded Letter into this *Bi-literarie Alphabet*. Say the *interiour Letter* be

*Fuge.*

*Example of Solution.*

*F.*    *V.*    *G.*    *F*  
*Aabab.* *baabb.* *aabba.* *aabaa.*

Together

Together with this, you must have ready at hand a *Bi-formed Alphabet*, which may represent all the *Letters* of the *Common Alphabet*, as well *Capitall Letters* as the *Smaller Characters* in a double forme, as may fit every mans occasion.

*An Example of a Bi-formed Alphabet.*

a. b.  
 { A A a. a. B. B. b. b. C. C. c. c. D. D. d. d.

a. b.  
 { E. E. e. e. F. F. f. f. G. G. g. g. H. H. h. h.

a. b.  
 { I. I. i. i. K. K. k. k. L. L. l. l. M. M. m. m.

a. b. a.  
 { N. N. n. n. O. O. o. o. P. P. p. p. Q. Q. q. q. R.

b. a. b.  
 { R. r. r. S. S. s. s. T. T. t. t. V. V. v. v. u. u.

a. b.  
 { W. W. w. w. X. X. x. x. Y. Y. y. y. Z. Z. z. z.

Now to the interiour letter, which is Biliterate, you shall fit a biformented exteriour letter, which shall answer the other, letter for letter, and afterwards set it downe. Let the exteriour example be,

*Manere te volo, donec venero.*

*An Example of Accommodation.*

*F*      *V*      *G*      *F*  
*a ab ab.b aa b b.aa b ba.aa baa.*  
*Manere te volo donec venero*

We have annex likewise a more ample example of the cypher of writing *omnia per omnia*: An interiour letter, which to expresse, we have made choice of a Spartan letter sent once in a *Scytale* or round cypher'd staffe.

*Perditae Res. Mindarus cecidit. Milites  
 esuriunt. Neque hinc nos extricare, neque  
 sic diutiùs manere possumus.*

An exteriour letter, taken out of the first Epistle of *Cicero*, wherein a Spartan Letter is involved.

Ego omni officio, ac potius pietate erga te. caeteris satisfacio omnibus: Mihi ipse nunquam satisfacio. Tanta est enim magnitudo tuorum erga me meritorum, ut quoniam tu, nisi perfecta re, de me non conquiesci; ego, quia non idem in tua causa efficio, vitam mihi esse acerbam putem. In causa haec sunt: Ammonius Regis Legatus aperte pecunia nos oppugnat. Res agitur per eosdem creditores, per quos, cum tu aderas, agebatur. Regis causa, si qui sunt, qui velint, qui pauci sunt, omnes ad Pompeium rem deferri volunt. Senatus Religionis calumniam, non religione, sed malevolentia, et illius Regiae largitionis invidia comprobatur. &c.

*The knowledge of Cyphering*, hath drawne on with it a knowledge relative unto it, which is the knowledge of *Discyphering*, or of *Discreting Cyphers*, though a man were utterly ignorant of the *Alphabet* of the *Cypher*, and the *Capitulations* of secrecy past between the Parties. *Certainly* it is an Art which requires great paines and a good witt and is (as the other was) consecrate to the Counsels of Princes : yet notwithstanding by diligent prevision it may be made unprofitable, though, as things are, it be of great use. For if good and faithfull *Cyphers* were invented & practised, many of them would delude and forestall all the Cunning of the *Decypherer*, which yet are very apt and easie to be read or written : but the rawnesse and unskilfulnesse of Secretaries, and Clarks in the Courts of Princes, is such, that many times the greatest matters are Committed to futile and weake *Cyphers*. But it may be, that in the enumeration, and, as it were, taxation of Arts, some may thinke that we goe about to make a great Muster-rowle of Sciences, that the multiplication of them may be more admired, when their number perchance may be displayed, but their forces in so short a Treatise can hardly be tried. *But for our parts* wee doe faithfully pursue our purpose, and in making this *Globe of Sciences*, we would not omitt the lesser and remoter Ilands. *Neither* have we (in our opinion) touched these Arts perfunctorily, though cursorily; but with a piercing stile extracted the marrow and pith of them out of a masse of matter. The judgement hereof we referre to those who are most able to judge of these Arts. *For seeing it is the fashion of many who would be thought to know much, that every where making ostentation of words and outward termes of Arts, they become a wonder to the ignorant, but a derision to those that are Masters of those Arts: we hope that our Labours shall have a contrarie successe, which is, that they may arrest the judgment of every one who is best vers'd in every particular Art; and be undervalued by the rest. As for those Arts which may seeme to bee of inferior ranke and order, if any man thinke wee attribute too much unto them; Let him looke about him and hee shall see that there bee many of speciall note and great account in their*

their owne Countrie, who when they come to the chiefe City or seat of the Estate, are but of mean ranke and scarcely regarded: so it is no marvaile if these sleighter *Arts*, placed by the Principall and supreme *Sciences*, seeme pettie things; yet to those that have chosen to spend their labours and studies in them, they seeme great and excellent matters. And thus much of the *Organ of Speech*.



## CAP. II.

1. The Doctrine touching the *Method of Speech* is assigned a *substantiall and principall part of Traditive knowledge*: It is entituled, *The wisdome of Deliverie*.
2. The divers kindes of *Methods* are enumerated: their *Profits and Disprofits* are annexed.
3. The *parts of Method* two.

I.  *Et us now come to the doctrine concerning the Method of Speech*: This hath bin handled as a part of *Logick*, so it hath found a place in *Rhetoricke* by the name of *Disposition*. But the placing of it as a part of the *Traine of other Arts*, hath bin the cause that many things which referre unto it, and are usefull to be knowne, are pretermis'd: wherefore we thought good, to constitute a *substantiall and principall Doctrine* touching *Method*, which by a generall name we call the *wisdome of Tradition*. The *kinds of Method*, seeing they are divers, we will rather reckon them up, then divide them. But for one onely *Method*, and continued *Dichotomies* we neede not speake much of them; for it was a little *Cloude of knowledge* which was soon dispersed. Certainly a *triviall invention*, and an *infinite prejudice to Sciences*; for these *Dichotomies*, when they would wrest all things to the *Lawes of their Method*, and whatsoever doth not aptly fall within those *Dichotomies* they would either omitt or bow contrarie to their *naturall inclination*; they bring it so to passe, that the *Kernels and Graines of Sciences* leape out, and they claspe and inclose

*inclose onely the drie and emptie huskes : So this kinde of Method brings forth fruitlesse Compendis , destroyes the substance of Sciences.*

II. Wherefore let the first difference of *Method* be set downe, to be either *Magistrall* or *Initiative* : neither do wee so understand the word *Initiative* , as if *this* should lay the ground-worke , the *other* raise the perfect building of *Sciences* ; but in a farre different sense , (borrowing the word from sacred Ceremonies ) wee call that *Initiative Method* , which discloseth and unvailles the Mysteries of Knowledges : For *Magistrall* teacheth , *Initiative* insinuateth : *Magistrall* requires our beliefe to what is delivered , but *Initiative* that it may rather be submitted to examination. The one delivers popular *Sciences* fit for Learners ; the other *Sciences* as to the *Somes* of *Science* : In summe , the one is referred to the use of *Sciences* as they now are ; the other to their continuation , and further propagation. The latter of these , seemes to bee a deserted and an inclosed path. For Knowledges are now delivered , as if both Teacher and Scholler sought to lay claime to errour , as upon contract. For hee that teacheth , teacheth in such a manner as may best bee beleaved , not as may bee best examined : and hee that learneth , desires rather present satisfaction , then to expect a just and stayed enquirie ; and rather not to doubt , then not to erre : So as both the Master , out of a desire of glorie , is watchfull , that hee betray not the weaknesse of his knowledge ; and the Scholler , out of an averse disposition to labour , will not try his owne strength. But Knowledge , which is delivered as a thread to bee spunne on , ought to bee intimated (if it were possible) into the minde of another , in the same method wherein it was at first invented. And surely this may bee done in knowledge acquired by *Induction* : But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge , which wee use , a man cannot easily say by what course of study hee came to the knowledge hee hath obtained. But yet certainly more or lesse a man may revisite his owne Knowledge , and measure over againe the

foot.

†  
TRADITIO  
LAMPADIS,  
SIVE ME-  
THODUS  
AD FILIOS.

footsteps of his *Knowledge*, and of his consent; and by this meanes so transplante *Science* into the mind of another, as it grew in his owne. For it is in *Arts*, as it is in *Plants*; if you meane to use the *Plant*, it is no matter for the *Roots*; but if you would remove into another soyle, than it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips. So the *Delivery* of *Knowledge*, as it is now used, doth present unto us faire *Bodies* indeed of *Sciences*, but without the *Roots*; good, doubtlesse for the *Carpenter*, but not for the *Planter*. But if you will have *Sciences* grow, you need not be so sollicitous for the *Bodies*; apply all your care that the *Roots* may be taken up sound, and entire, with some litle earth cleaving to them. Of which kind of *Delivery*, the *Method* of the *Mathematiques* in that subject, hath some shadow, but generally I see it neither put in ure, nor put in *Inquisition*; and therefore number it amongst *DEFICIENTS*; and we will call it *Traditionem Lampadis*, the *Delivery* of the *Lampe*, or the *Method* bequeathed to the *sonnes* of *Sapience*.

§ Another diversity of *Method* followeth, in the intention like the former, but for most part contrary in the issue. In this both these *Methods* agree, that they separate the vulgar *Auditors* from the select; here they differ, that the former introduceth a more open way of *Delivery* than is usuall; the other (of which we shall now speake) a more reserved & secret. Let therefore the distinction of them be this, that the one is an *Exotericall* or revealed; the other an *Acroamaticall*, or concealed *Method*. For the same difference the *Ancients* specially observed in publishing *Books*, the same we will transerre to the manner it selfe of *Delivery*. So the *Acroamatique Method* was in use with the *Writers* of former Ages, and wisely, and with judgment applied; but that *Acroamatique* and *Ænigmatique* kind of expression is disgraced in these later times, by many who have made it as a dubious and false light, for the vent of their counterfeit merchandice. But the pretence thereof seemeth to be this, that by the intricate envelopings of *Delivery*, the *Prophane* *Vulgar* may be removed from the secrets of *Sciences*; and they only ad-

mitted, which had either acquired the interpretation of Parables by Tradition from their Teachers; or by the sharpness and subtlety of their own wit could pierce the veil.

§ *Another diversity of Method* follows, of great consequence to Sciences, which is when Sciences are delivered by way of *Aphorisme*, or *Methods*. For it is a thing worthy to be precisely noted, that it hath bin often taken into Custome, that men out of a few Axiomes and Observations upon any Subject, have made a compleat and solemne Art, filling it with some discourses of wit, illustrating it with examples, and knitting it together by some *Method*. But that other way of *Delivery* by *Aphorismes*, brings with it many advantages, whereto *Delivery* by *Method* doth not approach. For first it tries the Writer whether he be superficial or solid in knowledge. For *Aphorismes* except they should be altogether ridiculous, cannot be made but out of the pyth and heart of Sciences: For Illustration and Excussion are cut off; variety of examples is cut off; Deduction and Connexion are cut off; Description of Practice is cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the *Aphorismes*, but a good quantity of observations. And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write *Aphorismes*, who is not copiously furnish'd, and solidly grounded. But in *Methods*,

-----*Tantum series, juncturaq̄, pollet:*

*Tantum de medio sumptis accedit Honoris.*

Horat. de  
Art. P.

As oftentimes they make a great shew of (I know not what) singular Art, which if they were disjoyned, separated, and laid open, would come to litle or nothing. Secondly *Methodicall Delivery* is more fit to win consent or believe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carry a shew of *Demonstration in orbe* or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore doe more satisfy the understanding; but being that Actions in common course of life are dispersed, and not orderly digested, they doe best agree with dispersed Directions. Lastly *Aphorismes* representing certaine Portions only, and as it were fragments of Sciences, invite others to contribute, and add something; whereas *Methodicall Delivery*

*very*

very carrying shew of a totall & perfect Knowledge forth-  
with secureth men as if they were at the furthest.

§ An other diversity of Method followes, which is likewise of great waight, which is when *Sciences* are delivered either by *Affertions* with their *Proofes* annex; or by *Questions* together with their *Determinations*. The later kind whereof if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicious to the progression of *Sciences*, as it is to the fortunes and proceedings of an Army, to goe about to besiege every litle Fort or Hold. For if the field be kept, and the summe of the enterprize with diligence pursued, those smaller places will come in of themselves. Yet this I cannot deny, that it is not alway safe to leave any great, and fortified towne at his back. *In like manner the use of Confutations* in the Delivery of *Sciences* ought to be very sparing, and to serve only to remove and breake strong Preoccupations and Prejudgments of mens minds, and not to excite and provoke *smaller Doubts*.

§ Another diversity of Method followeth which is that the Method be accommodated to the purposed matter which is to be handled. For there is a great difference in Delivery of the *Mathematiques*, which are of knowledges the most abstracted and most simple; and the *Politiques* which are the most immersed and compounded: Neither can an *uniformity of Method* (as we have observ'd already) be fitly sorted with *multi-formity of Matter*; and therefore as we have allowed *Particular Topiques* for *Invention*; so we would likewise in some measure have *Particular Methods* for *Tradition*.

§ Another diversity of Method followeth, with judgment to be practis'd in the Delivery of *Sciences*; and it is directed according to the light of *Informations*, and *anticipations*, of the Knowledge to be delivered, infused, and impressed in the minds of the Learners. For that Knowledge which is new and forraine to mens minds, is to be delivered in an other forme than that which by long-receiv'd, and imbibed opinions is naturalized and made familiar: And therefore *Aristotle* when hethinks to taxe *Democritus* doth in truth com-

mend him, where he saith, *If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes &c.* Charging it as a defect upon *Democritus* that he was too copious in *Comparisons*. But those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, have nothing else to doe but to dispute and prove. Whereas on the contrary those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; first, that what they produce may be conceiv'd; then, that they be proved. So that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to *Similitudes* and *Translations*, whereby they may insinuate themselves into mens capacities. Therefore we see in the infancy of Learning, in rude times, when those Comprehensions which are now Vulgar and triviall, were then new and unheard of; the world was full of *Parables* and *Similitudes*; for otherwise men would have passed over without mark or due attention, or else rejected for *Paradoxes*, that which was propounded. For it is a rule of *Traditive Art*, That whatsoever Science is not consonant to *Anticipations* or *Presuppositions*, must pray in ayd of *Similitudes* and *Comparisons*. And thus much of the diverse sorts of Methods, namely such as have not heretofore bin noted by others. As for those other *Methods*, *Analytique*; *Systatique*; *Dieritique*; *Cryptique*; *Homericall*, and the like; they have bin well invented and distributed; nor doe we see any cause why we should dwell upon them.

III But these are the kinds of Method; the Parts are two; the one of the *Disposition* of a whole worke, or of the *Argument* of some Book; the other of the *Limitation* of Propositions. For there belongs to *Architecture* not only the frame of the whole Building; but likewise the forme and figure of the *Columnes*; *Beames*, and the like; and *Method* is as it were the *Architecture* of Sciences. And herein *Ramus* merited better a great deale in reviving those excellent Rules  $\text{καθ' ὅλα πρῶτον, πάντος, καὶ αὐτῶ}$ ; than in obtruding one only *Method* and *Dichotomie*. But it falls out, I know not by what fate, that of humane things (according as the Poets often faigne) the most precious have the most pernicious *Keepers*. Certainly diligent endeavours about the ranke and file of Propositions, cast him upon

upon those *Epitomes* and *Shallows of Sciences*; for he had need set out in a lucky houre, and to goe on by the conduct of a happy Genius, that attempts to make *Axiomes of Sciences Convertible*; and yet withall not make them *Circular*, or returning into themselves; notwithstanding we deny not, but that *Ramus* intention in this kind was profitable. *There remains yet two Limitations of Propositions*, besides that they may be made *Convertible*; the one touching the *Extension*; the other touching the *Production* of them. Surely Knowledge have, if a man marke it well two other dimensions besides *Profunditie*; namely *Latitude* and *Longitude*. For *Profunditie* is refer'd to the Truth and Reality of them; and these make them solid. As for the other two, *Latitude* may be taken and reckoned of Science into Science; *Longitude* may be accepted and understood from the highest generall Proposition, to the lowest particular in the same science. The one comprehends the bounds and true limits of Sciences, that Propositions may be properly, not promiscuously handled; and that all Repetition; Excursion, & Confusion may be avoided: the other gives rule how farre, and to what degree of Particularitie, Propositions of sciences may be deduced. Certainly there is no doubt but somewhat must be left to use and Practice; for we ought to avoid the precise error of *Antoninus Pius*, that we be not *Cumini sectores in Scientijs*, *Mincers of Commis in sciences*; nor that we multiply divisions to the lowest Particularity. Wherefore how we should moderate our selves in this point, is well worth the inquiry. For we see too remote Generalities unlesse they be drawne downe, doe litle informe, nay rather expose Knowledge to the scorn of Practicall men; and are no more ayding to Practice, than an *Ortelius Univerfall Mappe* is to direct the way between *London* and *York*. Surely the better sort of Rules have not unfitly bin compared to Glasses of Steele, wherein you may see the Images of things, but first they must be filed and burnisht: so Rules and Precepts doe then help, after they have bin laboured and polisht by Practice; but if those Rules may be made cleere and ChrySTALLINE a-

Dion. in  
Anton. P.

fore-hand, it would be the more excellent, because they would lesse stand in need of diligence, labour, and exercise after. *And thus much of the Knowledge of Method*, which we have named the *Wisdom* of *Delivery*. Nor can we here permit that many more vain-glorious, than learned have laboured about a *Method*, which is not worthy the name of a lawfull *Method*, seeing it is rather a *Method of Imposture*, which yet to some vaporous, and vain-boasting natures, without doubt hath bin most acceptable. This *Method* doth so sprinkle drops of any Knowledge, that any halfe-learned Clark may with a litle superficially Knowledge make a glorious shew. Such was the *Art* of *Lullius*; such the *Typocemie* drawne by many; which were nothing else but a heap and masse of words of all Arts, to give men countenance; that those which have the termes of Art, might be thought to understand the Arts themselves. Which kind of Collections are like a Frippers or Brokers shop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.

Lullius.



## CAP. III.

I The Grounds and Duty of Rhetorique. II. Three Appendices of Rhetorique which appertaine only to the Preparatorie Part. The Colours of Good and Evil, as well simple as Compared. III. The An-titheta of things. IV. Lesser Stiles, or usuall Formes of Speech.

**N**OW come we to the Knowledge which concerneth the Illustration of Speech; it is that which is called Rhetorique, or Art of Eloquence; a Science certainly both excellent in it selfe, and by Authors excellently well laboured. But Eloquence, if a man value things truly, is without doubt inferior to Wisdom. For we see how farre this leaves that behind, in those words of God to Moses, when he disabled himselfe for that service imposed upon him, for want of this Facultie; *There is Aaron, he shall be thy Speaker, thou shalt be to him as God.* Yet in profit and popular estimate, Wisdom gives place

Exod. 7.

place to *Eloquence* for so *Salomon*, *Sapiens corde appellatur prudens; sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet*; signifying not obscurely that profoundness of *Wisdom* will help a man to fame & admiration; but that it is *Eloquence* which prevails in business and an active Life. And as to the labouring and culture of this Art, the Emulation of *Aristotle* with the *Rhetoricians* of his time, and the earnest and vehement diligence of *Cicero*, labouring with all might to raise & enoble that Art, joynd with long Experience, hath made them in their Books written of this Art to exceed themselves. Again, the excellent examples of *Eloquence* in the *Orations* of *Demosthenes*, and *Cicero*, added to the subtlety and diligence of Precepts, have doubled the Progression in this Art. Wherefore the DEFICIENTS which we find in this Art, will be rather in some Collections, which may as Hand-maids attend the Art, than in the Rules and the use of the Art it selfe. For even then when we made mention of a *Promptuarie Knowledge* in *Logique*, we engaged our selves by Promise, to exhibite examples at large thereof in *Rhetorique*.

̄ Notwithstanding that we may stirre up and subdue the earth a litle, about the Roots of this Science, as our manner is to doe in the rest; surely *Rhetorique* is sub-servient to the *Imagination*, as *Logique* is to the *Vnderstanding*. And the office and duty of *Rhetorique* (if a man well weigh the matter) is no other, then to apply and commend the *Dictates of Reason* to the *Imagination*, for the better moveing of the appetite and will. For we see the government of Reason is disquieted, and assailed three waies, either by *Illaqueation* of *Sophismes*, which pertaines to *Logique*; or by the deceits of words, which pertaines to *Rhetorique*; or by the violence of *Passions*, which pertaines to *Morality*; And as in negociation with others, a man may be wrought and overcome either by cunning, or by *Importunity*, or by *vehemency*, so in that inward negociation which we practise within our selves, either we are undermined by the *Fallacies of Arguments*; or sollicited and disquieted by the assiduity of impressions and observations; or shaken and transported by the assault of affections & *Passions*.

But

But yet the state of mans nature is not so unfortunate, as that those *Powers* and *Arts* should have force to disturbe *Reason*, and not to establish and advance it; nay rather much more doe they conduce to this effect, than to the contrary. For the end of *Logique*, is to teach a forme of Arguments, to secure Reason and not to entrap it; so the end of *Morality* is to compose the *Affections*, that they may fight for Reason; and not that they may invade it; the end likewise of *Rhetorique*, is to fill the *Imagination* with observations and resemblances, which may second Reason, and not oppresse and betray it: for these abuses of *Arts* come in but *ex obliquo* for prevention, not for practise. And therefore it was great injustice in *Plato* (though springing out of a just hatred to the *Rhetoricians* of his time) to place *Rhetorique* amongst *Arts voluptuary*, resembling it to *Cookery*, that did marre wholesome meats, and help unwholsome by the abuse of variety of sawces and seasonings, to the pleasure of the tast. But be it farre away, that speech should not be much more conversant in adorning that which is faire and honest, than in colouring that which is foule and evill. for this is every where at hand; and there is no man but speaks more honestly than he can doe or think. Indeed it was excellently noted by *Thucydides*, that some such thing as this, used to be objected to *Cleon*, that because he used to hold the bad side in causes he pleaded, therefore he was ever inveighing against *Eloquence*, and *good speech*, for he knew no man could speak faire of things sordid and base, but in things honest it was an easy matter to be *eloquent*. *Plato* saith elegantly (though the saying be now popular) *That virtue if she could be seene, would move great love and affection*: but *Rhetorique* paints out virtue and goodnesse to the life, and makes them in a sort conspicuous: For seeing they can not be shewed to sense in corporall shape, the next degree is by the faire attire of words, to shew them to the *Imagination*, so farre as may be in a lively representation: for the custome of the *Stoiques* was deservedly derided by *Cicero*, who labour'd to thrust virtue upon men, by concise and sharpe sentences and conclusions, which

In Gorg.

In Menon.

Tusc. Q.  
lib. 2.

which have no sympathy with the Imagination and will. Again if the *Affections* themselves were brought into order, and so reclaim'd from exorbitant courses, as to be pliant and obedient to *Reason*, it were true, there should be no great use of Perswasions and insinuations, which might give access to the mind; but it would be enough if things were nakedly and simply proposed and proved: but on the contrary, the *Affections* make such revolts, and raise up such mutinies and seditions (according to that

--- *video meliora Proboque*

Ovid, Met.

*Deteriora sequor* } ---

7.

That *Reason* would be forcibly led away into servitude and captivity, if the persuasion of *Eloquence* did not practise, and winne the Imagination from the *Affections* part, and contract a league between *Reason* and *Imagination* against *Affections*. For it must be noted that the *Affections* themselves are ever carried to a good Apparent, and, in this respect, have somewhat common with *Reason*: but herein they differ; *that the affections behold Principally Good in Present, Reason beholds a farre off even that which is future, and in summe.* And therefore seeing things in present sight doe more strongly fill the *Imagination*; *Reason* commonly yeelds and is vanquisht: but after that by *Eloquence* and the force of Perswasion, things *future* and *remote* are proposed, and beheld, as if they were actually present; then upon the falling off of the *Imagination* to take part with *Reason*, *Reason* prevails. *Let us* conclude therefore, that *Rhetorique*, can no more be charged with the colouring and adorning of the worle part, than *Logique*, with the setting out and suborning of Sophismes: for who knowes not that the doctrine of contraries are the same, though they be opposite in use. Again, *Logique* differs from *Rhetorique*; not only in this, that the one (as commonly is said) *is like the Fist, the other like the Palme*; that is, one handleth things closely, the other at large: but much more in this, that *Logique* considereth *Reason* in its Naturalls; *Rhetorique*, as it is planted in vulgar opinion. Therefore *Aristotle* doth wisely place *Rhetorique*

*Fist*

between *Logique* on the one side, and *Ethique* with *Civile Knowledge*, on the other: as participating of both. For the Proofes and Demonstrations of *Logique*, are to all men indifferent and the same; but the Proofes and persuasions of *Rhetorique*, must be varied according to the Auditors; that a man, like a skilfull Musitian accommodating himselfe to different eares, may become ----

\*  
PRVDEN-  
TIA SER-  
MONIS  
PRIVATI  
tion and variation of speech (if a man desire indeed the Perfection and height thereof) ought to be so farre extended, that if the same things should be spoken to severall persons, he should speak to them all respectively, and severall waies. Though it is certain that the greatest Orators many times may want this *Politique and Active Part of Eloquence in private speech*; whilest by the observing the grace, and Elegant formes of Expression, they loose that *voluble application, & characters of speech*, which in discretion they should have used towards particular persons. Surely it will not be amisse to recommend this whereof we now speak, to a new *Inquiry*, and to call it by name **THE WISDOME OF PRIVATE SPEECH**, and to referre it to *Deficients*; a thing certainly which the more seriously a man shall think on, the more highly he shall vallow; and whether this kind of *Prudence* should be placed between *Rhetorique* and the *Politiques*, is a matter of no great consequence.

§ Now let us descend to the *Deficients* in this Art, which (as we have said before) are of such nature as may by esteemed rather *Appendices*, than *Portions of the Art* it selfe; and pertaine all to the *Promptuary* part of *Rhetorique*.

\*  
COLO-  
RES BO-  
NI ET  
MALI.  
In Top.  
II. First we doe not find that any man hath well pursued or supplied the Wisdome and the diligence also of *Aristotle*: for he began to make a collection of the *Popular signes and Colours of Good and Evill in appearance*, both simple and comparative, which are, indeed, the *Sophismes of Rhetorique*: they are of excellent use, specially referred to businesse, and the *wisdome of Private speech*. But the labours of *Aristotle* concerning these Colours, is three waies *Defective*; First that

that there being many, he recites very few. *Secondly* because their *Elenches* or *Reprehensions* are not annext. *Thirdly* that he conceiv'd but in part the use of them, for their use is not more for Probation, then for impressi<sup>o</sup>n and raising the affections. For many *Formes of speaking* are equall in *signification*, which are different in *impression*: for that which is sharp pierceth more forcibly, than that which is flat, though the strength of the percussio<sup>n</sup> be the same. Surely there is no man but will be a litle more raised by hearing it said, *Your enimies will triumph in this*

*Hoc Jthacus velit & magno mercentur Atreide,*

Virg. Æn.

Then if it should be merely thus rendred, *This will be to your*<sup>2</sup> *disadvantage*; wherefore the *sharpe-edged*, and *quick-pointed* *speeches* are not to be despis'd. And being we report this part as DEFICIENT, we will according to our custome confirme it by examples, for precepts have not sufficiently illustrated the Point.

## EXAMPLES OF THE COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVILL, BOTH SIMPLE AND COMPARATIVE.

### The COLOUR.

1 *What men Praise and Celebrate, is Good; what they  
Dispraise, and Reprehend is Evill.*

### THE REPREHENSION.

**T**His Colour deceives foure waies; either through *Ignorance*, or through *Fraude*, or out of *Partialities* and *Faction*; or out of the *naturall disposition* of such as *Praise* or *Dispraise*. Out of *Ignorance*; for what's the judgement of the common People to the triall and definition of *Good* and *Evill*? *Phocion* discern'd better, who when the People gave Plutar. in him an unusuall applause, demanded *whether he had not per-* vita. *vance some way or other done amisse*? Out of *Fraude* & *circumventive cunning*, for *Praisers* and *Dispraisers* many times

Horat. lib.  
2. Epl.  
Prov. 20.

doe but aime at their own ends, and doe not think all they say *Laudat venaleis qui vult extrudere merces,*  
So, *It is naught, it is naught saith the Buyer, and when he is gone he vaunteth.*---- Through *Factions*; for it is plaine that men are wont to extoll their own side, beyond the modest bounds of desert, but to depresse those of the contrary part below their demerit. *Through an inbred disposition*; for some men are by nature made and moulded to servile Flattery; others on the other side are by nature Sower and Cenforious; so as in their commendations, or vituperations they are only indulgent to their own humors, litle or nothing sollicitous of truth.

#### THE COLOUR.

2 *What drawes Commendation even from an enemy, is a great Good, What moves Reprehension even from a Friend, is a Great Evill.*

The *Colour* seems to be built upon this foundation; that whatsoever we speak against our will, and contrary to the affection and propension of our own mind, it is easily believed, that the force of truth wrested the same from us.

#### THE REPREHENSION.

**T**His *Colour* deceives through the Art and Subtilty both of Enimies and Friends: for Enimies doe sometimes ascribe *Praises*, not unwillingly, nor as urg'd from the force of truth: but yet selecting such points of *Praise*, as may create envy and danger to their Enimies. wherefore a superstitious conceit went currant amongst the Grecians as they believed, *that he who was praised by another maliciously, and to his hurt, should have a push rise upon his nose.* Againe it deceives, because enimies sometimes attribute *Praises*, as certain briefe prefaces, that so they may more freely and spitefully traduce afterwards. On the other side this *Colour* deceives through the slight and cunning of friends; for their custome is sometimes to acknowledge and lay open the infirmities of

of their Friends, not out of a tender conscience from the impression of truth, but making choice of such imperfections, as may least prejudice the reputation, or provoke the indignation of their friends; as if in all other points they were excellent men. *Againe it deceives*, because friends ute their Reprehensions (as we have observed enemies doe their praises) as certain short introductions, that they may expatiate more amply in their commendations afterwards.

## THE COLOVR.

3 *Whose Privation is Good, that same is Evill; Whose Privation is Evill, that same is Good.*

## THE REPREHENSION.

**T**His Colour deceives two waies; either by reason of the *Comparison* of Good and Evill; or by reason of the *Succession* of Good to Good, or of Evill to Evill. By reason of *Comparison*, if it were Good for man kind to be *deprived* of the eating of Acornes, it followes not that such food was *Evill*, but that Mast was *Good*; Corne *Better*; Neither if it were *Evill* for the state of *Sicilie* to be deprived of *Dionysius* the Elder; doth it follow that the same *Dionysius* was a *Good* Prince; but that he was *lesse evill* than *Dionysius* the younger. By reason of *Succession*; for the *Privation* of some *Good*, doth not alwaies give place to *Evill*; but sometimes to a *Greater Good*; as when the *Flower* falleth, fruit *succeedeth*. Nor doth the *Privation* of some *Evill* alwaies yeeld place to *Good*, but sometimes to a *greater Evill*; for *Clodius* an enemy being taken away, *Milo* withall forfeited a faire harvest of *Glory*.

## THE COLOVR.

4 *That which drawes neere to Good or Evill, the same is likewise Good or Evill: But that which is remov'd from Good is Evill; from Evill, is Good.*

Such commonly is the internall condition of things, that things of like quality and consenting in nature, consent

likewise in place, and are as it were quartered together, but such things as are contrary and distant in nature, are also severed and disjoyned in place; in regard that all things desire to approach things symbolizing with them; to exterminate and chase away their contraries.

THE REPREHENSION.

**B**Ut the *Colour* deceives three waies; First in respect of *Destitution*; Secondly in respect of *Obscuration*; Thirdly in respect of *Protection*. In regard of *Destitution*, it comes to passe that those things, which in their kind are most ample and doe most excell, doe (as much as may be) ingrosse all to themselves, and leave that which is next them destitute and pined; wherefore you shall never finde thriving shootes or under-wood neere great spread Trees: so he said well --- *Divitis servi maxime servi*; --- and the division was pleasant of him that compared the lower train of Attendants in the Courts of Princes, to *Fasting-daies* which were next to *Holy-daies*, but otherwaies were the leanest daies in all the week. In regard of *Obscuration* for this is the quality of things in their nature excellent and predominant, that though they doe not extenuate and impoverish the substance of things adjoyning to them, yet they darken and shadow them: And this the Astronomers observe of the Sunne that it is good by aspect, but evill by conjunction and approximation. In regard of *Protection*; for things approach and congregate not only for consort and similitude of nature; but even that which is evill (especially in Civile matters) approacheth to good for concealment and *Protection*; so wicked persons betake themselves to the sanctuary of the Gods, and vice it selfe assumes the shape and shadow of virtue.

*Sape latet vitium proximitate boni.*

So on the other side *Good* drawes neere to *Evill*, not for society but for conversion and reformation of it into *Good*; and therefore Physitians are more conversant with the sick than the sound; and it was objected to our Saviour *that he conversed with Publicans and sinners.*

## THE COLOUR.

5 *That side to which all other Parties and Sects unanimously conferre second voices after every Particular hath asserted a Primacy to it selfe, seems to be justly preferr'd before the rest: for every sect may be presum'd to usurpe the first place, out of Passion and Partiality; but to yeeld the second Place, out of truth and merit.*

So Cicero went about to prove the Sect of Academiques, which suspended all asseveration for to be the best of all Philolophies; for (saith he) aske a Stoique which sect is better Cicero.  
Q. A. then other, he will preferre his own before the rest: Then aske him which approacheth next in dignity, he will confesse the Academique, so deale with an Epicure that will scant endure the Stoique to be in sight of him, so soone as he hath placed himselfe in the chiefe roome, he will place the Academique next him. So if a place were void, and a Prince should examine competitors severally, whom next themselves they would specially commend, it were like that the most second voices would concurre upon the ablest man.

## THE REPREHENSION.

**T**He fallax of this Colour is in respect of Envy: for men are accustomed after themselves, and their own faction, to incline and bend unto them, which of all the rest are the softest and weakest, and are least in their way in delpight and derogation of them who have most insulted over them, and have held them hardest to it.

## THE COLOUR.

6 *That whose excellency, and supereminency is better, the same is every way better.*

Appertaining to this are the usuall formes; Let us not wander in generalities, Let us compare Particular with Particular.

## THE REPREHENSION.

THIS *Apparence* seems to be of strength, and rather *Logicall*, than *Rhetoricall*: yet is it very often a *fallax*. First because many things are casual, which if they escape, prove excellent; so that in kind they are inferior, because they are so subject to peril, and to perish before they come to perfection; but in the *Individuall* more noble. Of this sort is the *Blossome of March*, whereof the French Proverb goes

*Burgeon de Mars, Enfants de Paris,  
Si un eschappe bien vaut dix.*

So that the *Blossome of May* generally is better than the *Blossome of March*, and yet in particular the best *Blossome of March* is better than the best *Blossome of May*. Secondly it deceives, because the nature of things in *some kinds, or species*, is to be more *equall*, in some kinds more *inequall*: as it hath bin observed that warmer climates produce generally more acute wits; but in Northerne climates the wits of chief surpass the acutest wits of hotter Regions. So in many Armies if the matter should be tried by duell between particular champions singled out, perchance the victory should goe on the one side; if it be tried by the grosse, it would goe on the other side: for *excellencies*, and *eminencies* goe, as it were, by chance, but kinds are governed by nature and Art. So likewise generally mettall is more precious than stone, and yet a *Diamond* is more precious than *Gold*.

## THE COLOUR.

- 7 That which keeps the matter entire in our own hands, is Good; that which leaves no passage open for retrait, is Evill: for not to be able to come off is a kind of impotency, but the Power of disengaging our selves is good.

Hereof *Æsop* framed the Fable of the two Frogs, that consulted together in the time of Drouth (when many places they had repaired to were drie) what was now at last to be done; the first said *let us goe downe into a deep well, for it is*

*Æsop.*

*not*

not like the water would faile there; to whom the other replied, yea, but if it doe faile, how shall we get up againe? The ground of this colour is, that humane actions are so uncertaine and exposed to perills, as that seemeth to be the best course, which bath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this perswasion the Formes are, you shall wholly engage and oblige your selfe, non tantum quantum voles sumes ex fortuna, you shall not be your own carver, nor keep the matter in your own hands, &c.

## THE REPREHENSION.

THE Fallax of this Colour is first, because in humane Actions fortune urgeth us at length to decree, and to resolve upon somewhat: for as he saith elegantly, *not to resolve, is to resolve*; so that many times a suspension of a finall decision engageth and implicates us in more necessities, than if we had determin'd of somewhat. And this disease of the mind is like that of covetous men translated from the desire of retaining wealth, to the desire of retaining Free will and Power: for the Covetous man will enjoy nothing, least he should subtract from the totall; and this kinde of *Sceptique* will execute nothing, that all things may be entire and indifferent to him. Secondly it deceives because necessity, and this same *jacta est alea*, awakens the powers of the Mind, and puts the spures to any enterprife; as he saith, *Ceteris pares, necessitate certè superiores estis*.

## THE COLOUR.

8 What a man hath contracted through his own Default, is a greater Evill; what is imposed from without, is a lesse Evill.

The reason hereof, is, because the sting and remorse of the Mind accusing it selfe, doubles all adversity; contrariwise the recording inwardly that a man is cleere and free from fault, and just imputation, doth much attemper outward calamities. Wherefore the Poets doe exceedingly aggravate those passionate Lamentations, as fore-runners to desperation; when a man accuseth and tortures himselfe.

Virg. Æn.  
12.

*Se causam clamat, crimenq̄, caputq̄, malorum.*

Contrariwise the conscience of Innocence and good deserving, doth mollify and mitigate the calamities of worthy persons. Besides when the evill comes from without, cast upon us by others, a man hath whereof he may justly and freely complaine, whereby his griefes may evaporate and not stifle the heart: for what comes from the injuries of men, we are wont to take indignation at, and to meditate revenge, or else to implore, or expect, that the divine Nemesis, and Retribution, may take hold on the Authors of our hurt, or if it be inflicted from Fortune, yet there is left a kind of expostulation against the Divine Powers,

Virg. Buc.

*Atq̄, Deos atq̄, Astra vocat Crudelia Mater.*

But on the other side where the evill is derived from a mans own fault, there the grieffe strikes inward, and does more deeply wound and pierce the heart.

#### THE REPREHENSION.

Demost.  
orat.

**T**He Fallax of this Colour is, first in respect of Hope, which is a great Antidote against Evills: for the reformation of a fault is many times in our own power, but the amendment of fortune is not. Wherefore in many of his Orations Demosthenes saith thus to the People of Athens: That which having regard to the time past, is the worst point and Circumstance of all the rest; that as to the time to come, is the best: what is that? Even this, that by your sloth, irresolution, and misgoverment, your affaires are grown to this declination and Decay; for had you used and ordered your means and forces to the best, and done your parts every way to the full, and notwithstanding your matters should have gone backward in this point as they doe, there had bin no hope left of recovery or reputaton for hereafter; but since it hath bin only by your own errors chiefly, you may have good assurance, that those errors amended, you may againe recover the honour of your former state: So Epictetus speaking of the Degrees of the Tranquillity of mind, saith the worst state of man is to accuse externe things; Better then that to accuse a mans selfe; and best of all to accuse neither. Secondly this colour deceives

Epictet.  
Cap. 10.

in respect of *that pride* which is implanted in the minds of men, whereby they are with much adoe induced to an acknowledgement of their own personall errors; but that they may shift off this acknowledgement, they can suffer with farre greater patience such *evills*, as they have by their own oversights drawn upon themselves. For as we see it comes to passe that when a fault is committed, and it is not yet known who is the delinquent, men make much adoe, grow hot and impatient above measure upon the matter: but after, if it appeare to be done by a sonne, or by a wife, or by a neere friend, then it is light made of, and presently all is quiet: so is it when any thing falls out ill, the blame whereof must needs light upon our selves. And this is commonly seen to come to passe in women, who if they have done any thing unfortunately against their Parents or friends consents, what ill soever betide them upon it, yet you shall see them seldome complaine, but set a good face on it.

## THE COLOUR.

- 9 *The Degree of Privation seems greater than the Degree of Diminution; and againe, the Degree of Inception, seems greater than the Degree of Increase.*

It is a position in the Mathematicques; *that there is no proportion between somewhat and nothing: therefore the Degrees of Nullity and Quiddity, seeme larger, than the Degrees of Increase and Decrease.* As to a Monoculus, it is more to loose one eye, than to a man that hath two eyes: so if one have diverse children, it is more grieffe to him to loose the last surviving sonne, than all the rest. And therefore *Sibylla* when she had burnt her two first *Books*, doubled the prise of the *Third*, because the losse of that had bin *gradus privationis*, and not *Diminutionis*. Agell.lib.1  
No.Ar.

## THE REPREHENSION.

**T**He *Fallax* of this *Colour* is reprehended; *first in those things, the use and service whereof resteth in sufficiency, or*

competency, that is in a determinate Quantity. As if a man be bound upon penalty to pay a summe of mony at an appointed day, it would be more to him to want one Noble, than if, (supposing he could not tell where to be furnisht with this one Noble) ten Nobles more were wanting. So in the decay of a mans estate, the degree of Debt which first breaks the stock, and casts him behind, seems a greater damage, then the last Degree, when he proves nothing worth. And hereof the common *Formes* are *Sera in fundo Parsimonia: and as good never a whit, as never the better, &c.* Secondly this Colour deceives in respect of that Principle in Nature, *Corruptio unius, Generatio alterius:* so that the degree of ultimate Privation, doth many times lesse disadvantage, because it gives the cause, and sets the wits aworke to some new course. Which is the cause that *Demosthenes* often complains before the people of Athens, That the conditions imposed by Philip, and accepted by them, being neither profitable nor honorable, were but aliments of their sloath and weaknesse, that it were much better they were taken away; for by this means their industries might be awaked to find out better remedies and stronger resolutions. We knew a Physitian was wont to say pleasantly and yet sharply to delicate Dames, when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any Physique; he would tell them, *your only way is to be sick indeed, for then you will be glad to take any medicine.* So further, this Degree of Privation, or of the highest period of want, serveth not only to stirre up industry, but also to command patience. As for the Second branch of this Colour, it depends upon the same reason, which is the degrees of *Quiddity and Nullity;* hence grew the common Place of extolling the *begining* of every thing.

*Dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet.*

This made the Astrologers so idle as to make a judgement upon a mans nature and Destiny, from the moment or point of constellation in his Nativity, or Conception.

## THE REPREHENSION.

**T**His Colour first deceives, because in many things, the first inceptions are nothing else than what Epicurus termes them in his Philosophy, *TENTAMENTA*, that is imperfect Offers, and Essaies, which vanish and come to no substance without iteration and improvement. Wherefore in this case the second degree seems the worthier, and more potent than the First: as the Body-horse in the Cart that drawes more than the foremost. And it is a common saying, and not without good sense, *The second blow is that which makes the fray*: for the first, it may be, would have vanished without farther harme: and therefore *Primum Malo Principium dedit, sed posterius modum abstulit*. Secondly this colour deceives in respect of the dignity of Perseverance, which consists in the Progression, and not in the Aggression. For chance, or instinct of Nature, may cause inception; but settled affection and judgement makes the continuance. Thirdly, this Colour deceives in such things which have a naturall course and inclination contrary to an Inception, so that the first Inception is perpetually evacuated, unlesse the force and faculty be continued. As in those common formes it is said *Non progredi est Regredi*, and *Qui non proficit deficit*, as in running against the hill; Rowing against the streame; for if it be with the Hill or with the Streame, then the degree of Inception is more than all the rest. Againe this Colour is not only extended to the Degree of Inception, which is from Power to Act, compar'd with the Degree, which is from Act to increment; but also is to be understood of the degree which is from Impotency to power, compared with the Degree which is from power to Act: for the Degree from Impotency to Potency, seems greater, than from Power to Act.

## THE COLOUR.

**IO** That which is referred to Truth, is more than that which is referred to opinion. The manner and Proove of that which pertaines to Opinion, is this; that a man would never have done it, if he thought it should be sepulchred in secrecy and oblivion.

So the Epicures lay to the Stoiques, *Felicity placed in virtue*, that it is like the *Felicity* of a Player, who if he were left of his Auditors, and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance; therefore they call virtue our of a spitefull emulation *Bonum Theatrale*. But it is otherwise of Riches whereof the Poet saith

Horat.

---- *Populus me sibilat: at mihi plaudo.*

Likewise of *Pleasure*,

---- *Grata sub imo*

*Gaudia Corde premens, vultu simulante pudorem.*

#### THE REPREHENSION.

THE *Fallax* of this *Colour* is somewhat subtle; though the answer to the exemple alleaged be ready; for neither is virtue chosen *propter Auram Popularem*; seeing that also is given in Precept, *That a man should above all things, and persons, revere himselfe*; so that a *Good man* is the same in solitude which he is in the *Theater*; though perchance virtue will be more strong by glory and fame, as heat is increased by reflection. But this denies the supposition, but doth not redargue the *Fallax*. The *Reprehension* is this. Be it granted that virtue (especially such as is joyned with labour and conflict) would not be chosen but for hir concomitants, *Fame* and *Opinion*; yet it followes not that an *Appetite* and chiefe *Motive* to virtue, should not be reall, and for it selfe; for *Fame* may be only *causa impulsiva*, or *sine qua non*, and not a cause *Constituent* or *Efficient*. For exemple, if there were two *Horses*, whereof the one would performe with good *Speed*, without the *spurre*; but the other with the *spurre* would farre exceed, the performance of the former; this latter (I suppose) will bear away the prize, and be judg'd to be the better *Horse*; and it will not move any man of sound judgement to say, *Tush the life of this Horse, is but in the spurre*: for seeing the ordinary instrument of *Horsmanship* is the *spurre*, and that it is no matter of impediment or burden; the *Horse* is not to be lesse accounted of, which will not doe well without the *spurre*: nor is that other which

with-

without the spurre will doe great matters, therefore to be reckoned the better, but the more delicate. So in like manner, *Glory and Honour are the Goades and spurres to virtue*; and though virtue would somewhat languish without them, yet since they be alwaies at hand to attend virtue, even when they are not invited; there is no impeachment but that virtue may be desired for it selfe; and therefore the Position, *That the note of a thing chosen for Opinion and not for Truth, is this; That if a man thought that what he doth, should never come to light, he would never have done it;* is reprehended.

### The COLOUR.

11 *What is purchased by our own industry and virtue, is a greater Good; what is derived upon us, from the benefit of others, or from the indulgence of Fortune, is a lesser Good.*

The reasons are these: *First in respect of future Hope, because in the favour of others, or the good windes of fortune, we have no state or certainty; in our own endeavours or abilities we have.* So when they have procured us one good fortune, we have the same instruments ready for a new purchase; nay by custome and successe, stronger than before. *Secondly because these Properties which we enjoy by the benefite of others, we are debtors to others for them; whereas what we derive from our selves, brings no burden with it, nor drawes upon us an obligation to another.* Againe, if the Divine Providence conferre a favour upon us, it importunes a kind of Retribution towards the goodnesse of God, which stings ungracious and wicked men; whereas in that other kind of happinesse, that of the Prophet commonly falls out, *They rejoyce and triumph; they sacrifice unto their net, and burne incence unto their drag.* Hab. 1. *Thirdly because,* that which cometh unto us without our own abilities, yeeldeth not that commendation and reputation. For Actions of great Felicity draw wonder, not praise; as Cicero said to *Cesar, Quae miremur habemus, quae laudemus expectamus.* Pro. M. Marcel. *Fourthly, because the purchases of our own industry are joyned commonly with labour and strife, which makes*

makes the fruition of our desires more pleasant, as saith Solomon, *Suavis cibus à venatu.*

### THE REPREHENSION.

**B**UT there are foure *Contre-Colors*, which incline the case to the contrary Part, and may be as Reprehensions to the former *Colours*. First because *Felicity* seems to be a seale and character of Divine favour; and accordingly begets both confidence and alacrity in our selves; and respect and authority from others: And this *Felicity* comprehends many casualties, whereunto the power and providence of a man can not aspire. As when *Cæsar* encouraging the Sailer, said *Cæsarem portas & fortunam ejus*; but if he had said, *Cæsarem portas & virtutem ejus*, it had bin a cold comfort against a tempest. Secondly because that such things as proceed from virtue and industry, are imitable, and feisable by others to be practised; whereas *Felicity* is a thing inimitable, and a Prerogative of some few singular persons. Wherefore we generally see, that things of Nature are preferd before things of Art, because they be inimitable: for what is imitable is in effect Prostitute and common. Thirdly the *Revenues of Felicity*, seeme to be no purchase of our own, but a Donative from others: but what is acquired by our own proper virtue, is, as it were, bought at a price. whereupon *Plutarch* saith elegantly of the Arts of *Timoleon*, a man of all men most fortunate, compared with the Acts of *Agefilau* and *Epaminondas* who lived in the same Age, That they were like *Homers verses*, which as they excell'd in other points, so they seem'd to have an easy native slide in them, and to be conducted by a happy *Genius*. Fourthly because what falls out beyond hope and expectation, insinuates it selfe more sweetly, and with greater delight, into the minds of men; but this can not be incident to those things, which proceed from our own care and compasse.

Suet. in  
Iul.

In Timol.

### THE COLOUR.

12 'What consists of many and divided parts, is greater than  
'that which consists of few Parts, and is more entire, for  
all

*all things considered by parts seem greater: wherefore both  
 ' plurality of parts hath a shew of Magnitude; and the same  
 ' Plurality works more strongly, if it be presented unto us  
 ' without order; for it induceth a resemblance of Infinity, and  
 ' hinders comprehension.*

This Colour seems a *Fallax*, at first sight very palpable: for not the *Plurality of Parts* alone, but the *Majority*, may make the totall Greater; yet neverthelesse the *Colour* many times carries the imagination away; yea it deceives sense. For it seems to the eye, a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, so as nothing intercurrer which may break the sight; then in such a coast or quarter, where there are Trees and Buildings, and other markes, which may measure and Divide the space. So when a great Monied-man hath divided and distributed his chests and baggs into severall and distinct roomes, he seemeth to himselfe richer than he was. Therefore a way to *Amplify* any thing, is to *break* it into *many Parts*, and to handle every part severally by it selfe. And this againe will more fill the imagination, if it be done promiscuously and without order; for *confusion* raiseth an opinion of multitude; so what are presented and propounded in *order*, both seem to be more finite, and demonstrate, that nothing is left out, but all is there: whereas on the contrary, whatsoever things are represented confusedly, are not only thought to be more numerous in themselves; but they leave a suspicion that more might be said than is expressed.

#### THE REPREHENSION.

**T**He *Fallax* of this Colour is. *First when a man doth over-conceive, or prejudicate of the greatnesse of any thing, comprehending it beyond the true limits of Magnitude; for then the breaking of it will make it seem lesse, and rectify that false opinion, and present the object in its native verity, and not with amplification.* Wherefore if a man be in sicknesse or in paine, the time will seem longer to him without a Clock or an

Hover-glasse, then if it were measured with them: for if the wearilomenesse, and vexation of a disease, make the time seeme longer then in truth it is; yet the computation of time reformes that mistake, and makes it shorter than that erroneous opinion conceived it to be. So in a dead Plaine (whereof even now we gave a contrary instance) it sometimes falls out; for though at first the eye preconceiv'd the way shorter, because it was undivided, yet if upon this supposition, an opinion possesse the imagination of a farre shorter space of ground then it proves to be, the frustrating of that vaine conceit, makes it seem longer than the truth. Therefore if any man desire to humor and second the false opinion of another, touching the *greatnesse* of any thing, let him beware of distributions, and breaking it in severall considerations, but let him out of hand extoll the matter entire, and in the grosse. *Secondly this Colour deceives when the Distribution is distracted or scattered, or is not presented intire, or doth not at once object it selfe to the sight.* Therefore if flowers in a Garden be divided into severall bedds, they will shew more than if they were all growing in one bed; so the Beds be within a plot that they be the object of view at once; otherwile, union is of mote force in this case than scattered distribution. Therefore their Revenues seem greater, whose Lands and Livings lye together in one shire; for if they were disperled, they would not fall so easily within notice and comprehension. *Thirdly this Colour deceives in respect of the dignity of unity above multitude; for all composition is a sure mark of deficiency, in particularities severally considered, which thus pieces out one thing with the addition of another.* *Et quæ non profunt singula multa juvant.*

Luk. 10.  
Æsop.

And therefore *Mary* had chosen the better part; *Martha*, *Martha, attendis ad plurima, unum sufficit.* Here upon *Æsop*, framed the fable of the *Fox* and the *Cat*. *The Fox bragged what a number of shifts and devices he had to get from the Hounds; the Cat said she had but one only way to trust to, which was this; she had a poore slender faculty in climbing up a Tree: which yet in proof was a surer guard then all Vulpones policies & stratagems;*

*gems*, whereof the proverb grew, *multa novit Vulpes, sed Felis unum magnum*, the Fox knowes many practises, but the Cat one speciall; one that will help at a dead lift. And in the Morall of this Fable it comes likewise to passe, *that a potent and faithfull friend, is a surer card at a pinch, then all the Plots and Policies of a mans own wit.*

And these shall suffice for example: we have an infinite number more of *Colours*, of this nature, which we collected in our youth; but without their *Illustrations* and *Reprehensious*, which at this time we have no leasure to perfect and digest; wherefore we thought it incongruous to expose those *Colours* naked, without their *Illustrations*, seeing these other come abroad attired. Yet thus much in the mean we admonish, that this branch of knowledge, in our judgement, whatsoever it may seem, is of no contemptible consequence, but a matter of high price and use, as that which participates both of *Primitive*, *Philosophy*, of *Policy*, and of *Rhetorique*. Thus much of Popular markes, or of the *Colours of Good and Evil in apparance*, as well *simple as comparative*.

III. A second collection which appertaines to a ready *Provision*, or *Preparatory store*, is that which *Cicero* intimates (as we have noted before in *Logique*) where he gives it in precept, that we have *Common-places* in ready preparation argued and handled *Pro* and *Contra*; such as are *For the words and letters of Law; for the sence and mind of Law*, and the like. And we extend this Precept to other things also; as that it may be applied, not only to *Judiciall Formes*; but to *Deliberative* and *Demonstrative* also. Generally this is it we would have done; namely, that we have all *Places*, whereof there is more frequent use (*whether we respect Probations and Confutations; or Perswasions and Disswasions; or Praises and Vituperations;*) studied and meditated before-hand, and the same extoll'd and depressed by the highest straines of wit and invention; and perversely wrested, as it were, of purpose utterly beyond Truth. And in our opinion the manner of this *Collection*, as well for use as for brevity, would be the best of such *common-places*, and seeds of severall

\*  
ANTI-  
THETA  
RERVM.  
Cicero.

Sen. Con-  
tro.

Arguments were abridg'd and cast up into some briefe and acute sentences, as into skaines or bottomes of Thread to be drawn out, and unwinded into larger Discourses as occasion should be presented. A *collection of this nature* we find in *Seneca*, but in suppositions only or Cases. Of this sort (in regard we have many ready prepared) we thought good to set down some of them for example; These we call *Antitheta Rerum*.

## EXAMPLES OF THE ANTITHETA.

### NOBILITY. I.

Pro.

**T**hey whose virtue is altogether deriv'd from the stock; these not only have not a will, but want a power to be wicked.

Nobility is a Garland of Bayes, wherewith time Crownes men.

We reverence Antiquity even in dead Monuments, how much more in living.

If you regard not the honour of an ancient House? Then what difference will there be between the Race of Men, and the Race of Beasts?

Nobility removes virtue from Envy; recommends it to Grace and Favour.

Contra.

**N**obility seldome springs from Virtue; Virtue more seldome from Nobility.

Nobles by birth more often use the intercession of their Ancestors for Pardon; than their suffrage for Honors.

The industry of new riseing men is oftentimes such, as Nobles compar'd with them are but Statues.

Nobles by blood, look too often back in the course; which is the quality of an ill Racer.

Beauty

## BEAUTY. II.

Pro.

Deformed persons commonly have their revenge of Nature.

Virtue is nothing else but inward Beauty; and Beauty nothing else but an outward virtue.

Deformed Persons seek to rescue themselves from scorne, by malice and boldnesse.

Beauty makes virtues shine, vices blusb.

Contra

Virtue is like a rich stone, best plain set.

What a faire vestment is to a deformed body, the same is a comely Body to a deformed Mind.

They usually are of no great parts, whom Beauty commendeth, or moveth.

## YOUTH. III.

Pro.

Our first cogitations, and the counsils of Youth stream more divinely.

Old men are more wise for themselves, then they are for others and the Repub.

If it could be made visible, Old age doth more deform the mind then the Body.

Old men fear all things save the Gods.

Contra-

Youth is the field of Repentance.

There is in Youth an imbred disestime of the Authority of Age, that every one may grow wise at his own Perill.

Those counsils to which Time was not call'd, Time will not ratify.

In old men Venus is changed into the Graces.

## HEALTH. IV.

Pro.

The regard of Health makes the mind humble, and obsequious to the Body.

Contra.

Often to recover health, is often to grow young againe.

*A sound body is the Soules Host, but a sickly her Jalousy.*

*Nothing so promotes the summe of Businesse, as a prosperous state of Body; but on the contrary, a sickly constitution makes too many Holy-Daies.*

*Indisposition of Health is a common excuse, hither we fly even when we are well.*

*Health unites the Soule and the body in too strict a league.*

*The Couch hath govern'd mighty Empires; and the Litter mighty Armies.*

### WIFE and CHILDREN.

#### Pro.

*Charity to the Commonwealth, begins at a private Family.*

*Wife and Children are a kind of Discipline of Humanity; but unmarried men are cruell and hard-hearted.*

*Single life and a Childlesse state, are good for nothing but for flight.*

*He that procreates no Children, sacrificeth to Death.*

*They that are happy in all other things, are commonly unfortunate in their Children: least being men they should approach too neere to a condition Divine.*

#### Contra.

*He that hath Wife and Children, hath given Hostages to Fortune.*

*Generation and issue are Human Acts; Creation and its works are Acts Divine.*

*Issue is the Eternity of Beasts; Fame, merit, and wholesome Precepts, the eternity of Men.*

*Oeconomical respects many times supplant Political Duties.*

*To some natures the Fortune of Priamus is acceptable; who surviv'd his whole Posterity.*

### RICHES. VI.

#### Pro.

*They despise Riches, that despise of them.*

*An envy conceiv'd against Riches, hath extolled virtue to a Deity.*

#### Contra.

*Of great Riches, there is either a Custody, or a dispensation, or a fame; but no solid Use.*

*Whilest*

Whilest Philosophers call in doubt whether all things are to be referr'd to virtue, or Pleasure; survey the instruments of them both.

Virtue, by means of Riches, is converted into a common good.

All other kinds of Good have a Provincially Command, only Riches a Generall.

Doe you not see what fained Prises are set upon litle stones, and such kind of Rarities, that there may be some use made of great Riches?

Many, whilest they have entertain'd an opinion that all things might be bought with their mony; have in this conceit, first sold themselves.

I can not call Riches better then the Baggage of virtue; for they are both necessary to virtue, and yet combersome, hindering the March.

Riches are a good Handmaid, but the worst Maistresse.

## HONOURS. VII.

### Pro.

Honours are not the suffrage of Tyranns, but of Divine Providence.

Honours make both virtues and vices conspicuous; therefore those they excite, these they repress.

No man can tell what proficience he hath made in the Race of virtue, unlesse Honours afford him an open field.

The motion of virtue as of other things, is violent to its place, calme in its place; and the place of virtue is honour.

### Contra.

Whilest we seek Honours, we loose liberty.

Honours commonly give men a Power over those things, wherein the best condition is, not to will; the next not to Can,

The staires to Honours are steep, the standing slippery, the regresse a downefall.

They that are in great place had need to borrow other mens opinions, to think themselves happy.

## Pro.

*It is a great blessing to enjoy Happinesse; but to have the power to Conferre it on others, is farre greater.*

*Kings are rather like starres, than men; for they have a powerfull influxe upon all men, and upon times themselves.*

*To resist Gods-vicegerents, is not only the Guilt of Treason, but a kind of Theomachie.*

## Contra.

*What a miserable state is it, to have a few things to desire, infinite things to feare?*

*Princes are like heavenly bodies, which have much veneration, but no rest.*

*None of Humane condition is admitted to the Banquet of the Gods, but to his reproach.*

## PRAISE, REPUTATION. IX.

## Pro.

*Praises are the reflexed Beams of virtue.*

*That Praise is an Honour which comes from voices freely conferr'd.*

*Many states conferre Honours; but Praises are every where the Attributes of Liberty.*

*The voice of the people hath some divinenesse in it; else how should so many men agree to be of one mind?*

*You need not wonder if the communalty speak more truly than the Nobility; for they speak more safely.*

## Contra.

*Fame is a better Nuncio, than a Iudge.*

*What hath a good man to doe with the dull approbation of the vulgar?*

*Fame like a River bears up things light and swolne; drowns things waighty and solid.*

*The lowest virtues draw praise from the common people; the middle virtues work in the Astonishment, or Admiration; but of the highest virtues they have no sence or perceiving at all.*

*Praise proceeds more out of a bravery than out of merit; & happens rather to vaine and windy persons, then to persons substantiall and solid.*

Nature

## NATURE X.

## Pro.

*The Progressse of Custome is Arithmetically; of Nature Geometrically.*

*As lawes are to Custome in Civile states, so is Nature to custome in every particular Person,*

*Custome against Nature is a kind of Tyranny, and is quickly and upon light occasion suppressed.*

## Contra.

*Mens thoughts are according to nature; their words according to precept; but their deeds according to custome.*

*Nature is a kind of Pedant; Custome a Magistrate.*

## FORTUNE XI.

## Pro.

*Overt and apparent virtues bring forth praise; secret and hidden virtues bring forth fortune.*

*Virtues of duty bring forth praise; virtues of Ability bring forth fortune.*

*The way of Fortune is like the milken way in the skie; which is a meeting or knot of certain small obscure virtues without a name.*

*Fortune is to be honour'd and respected, and it be but for hir daughters confidence and Reputation.*

## Contra.

*The folly of one man, is the Fortune of another.*

*In Fortune this I may chiefly commend, that being she makes no election, she gives no protection.*

*Men of place and quality while they decline the Envy of their own virtues; have bin found among the worshippers of Fortune.*

## LIFE. XII.

Pro.

*It is a foolish and preposterous affection, to love the Accessories of life, more then life it selfe.*

*A full course is better then a short; a faire advantage to all things, yea even to virtue.*

*Without a good spacious compasse of life, we can neither fully perfect, nor learne, nor repent.*

Contra.

*The Philosophers, whilest they raise so great preparations against Death, have made it but appear more terrible.*

*Men fear Death because they know it not; as Children fear the Darke.*

*You can finde no Passion in the mind of man so weak, which if it be but a litle prest, masters not the feare of death.*

*To be willing to die, not only a valiant man, or a miserable man may, or a wise; but even a fastidious man, and a coward may doe as much.*

## SUPERSTITION. XIII.

Pro.

*They that erre out of a wellment zeale, may not be approved, but yet may be beloved.*

*Mediocrities are due to Morall virtues; extremities to divine.*

*A superstitious man is a religious Formalist.*

*I should sooner believe all the Fabulous wonders of any Religion, than that this universall Frame was built without a Deity.*

Contra.

*As it addes deformity unto an Ape, to be so like a man, so the similitude of superstition to Religion, makes it more deform'd.*

*Look how odious Affectation is in matters Civile; so hateful is superstition, in matters Divine.*

*It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is reproachfull unto him.*

It

*It is not the Schoole of Epicurus, but the Porch of the Stoiques that hath perturbed ancient States.*

*It cannot come into the mind of man to be a meere Atheist in Opiuious; but your great Hypocrites are the true Atheists, who are ever handling holy things, but never revere them.*

## PRIDE. XIV.

Pro.

*Pride is even with vices incompatible: And as poison is expelled by poison, so many vices are by Pride.*

*A soft nature becomes guilty of the crimes of others; but a proud spirit only of his own.*

*Pride if it ascend from contempt of others to a contempt of it selfe, at last is chang'd into Philosophy.*

Contra

*Pride is the insinuating Irie to virtues, and all good Qualities.*

*All other vices are only contrary to virtues, Pride alone is contagious.*

*Pride wants the best condition of vices, that is, concealment.*

*A proud man while he despiseth others, prejudiceth himself.*

## INGRATITUDE. XV.

Pro.

*The guilt of ingratitude is nothing else but a too precise consideration and inquisition into the cause of a benefit con-ferr'd.*

*Whilest we endeavour to be gratefull to others, we neither performe justice to others, nor reserve liberty to our selves.*

Contra.

*The crime of Ingratitude is not to be repressed by punishments, but to be referred over to the Furies.*

*The obligations of benefits are more strict than of Duties, wherefore he that is unthankfull is unjust and any thing*

Where the valuation of a Benefit is uncertaine, therethe lesse thank is due.

Such is mans condition; no man is borne to so high a fortune, but that he is a debtor to the retribution both of Private thanks, and personall revenge.

### ENVY. XVI.

Pro.

It is naturall for a man to hate the reproach of his Fortune.

Envy in a state is a wholsome Ostracisme.

Contra-

Envy never makes Holy-Day.

Nothing but death reconciles Envy to virtue.

Envy doth put virtue to it, as Juno did Hercules.

### INCONTINENCE XVII.

Pro.

Chastity may thank Jealously that she is become a virtue.

He had need be endewed with much Gravity, that makes the sports of Venus any matter of Earnest.

Why doe you place either a spare diet, or a shew of Honesty, or the Daughter of Pride, amongst the virtues?

Of loves, as of wild-foule, there is no property; but the right is past over with the possession.

Contra

Incontinence is one of Circes worst transformations.

An unchast liver hath utterly lost a reverence to himselfe, which is the bridle of all vice.

They that with Paris, make beauty their wish, loose, as he did, Wisdome and Honour.

Alexander fell upon no popular truth, when he said, that sleep and lust were the earnestes of Death.

### CRUELTY. XVIII.

Pro.

No virtue is so often guilty as clemency.

Contra.

He that delights in blood, is either a wild beast or a Fury.

Cruelty

*Cruelty if it proceed from revenge, it is justice; if from Perill it is wisdom.*

*He that shewes mercy to his enemy, denies it to himselfe.*

*Phlebotomy is not more necessary in the Body Naturall, than it is in the body Politique.*

*Cruelty to a Good man, seems to be but a Fable, and some Tragickall fiction.*

## VAIN-GLORY. XIX.

Pro.

*He that seeks his own praise, withall seeks the profit of others.*

*He that is so reserv'd, as to regard nothing that is forraine; it may be suspected, that he will account publique affaires, forraine impertinencies.*

*Such Dispositions as have a commixture of Levity in them; more easily undertake a Publique charge.*

Contra.

*Vaine-glorious persons are alwaies factious, Lyars, Inconstant, over-doing.*

*Thraiso is Gnathoes prey. It is a shame for a Lover to make suit to the hand-maid; but Praise is virtues hand-maid.*

## JUSTICE. XX.

Pro.

*Kingdomes and States are only the Appendices of Iustice: for if Justice otherwise could be executed, there would be no need of them.*

*It is the effect of Iustice, that man is to man a God, and not a Wolfe.*

*Though Justice can not extirpate vice; yet it repreßeth it*

Contra.

*If this be to be just, not to doe to another what you would not have done to your selfe; then is mercy Iustice.*

*If we must give every one his due, then surely pardon to Humanity.*

*What tell you me of equity when to a wise man all things are unequall?*

from doing hurt.

Doe but consider what the condition of the guilty was in the Roman State; and then say justice is not for the Re-publique.

The common Justice of States is as a Philosopher in Court; that is, it makes only for a reverentiall respect of such as bear Rule.

### FORTITUDE. XXI.

Pro.

Nothing but feare is terrible. There is nothing solid in pleasure, nor assur'd in virtue, where fear disquiets.

He that confronts dangers with open eyes, that he may receive the charge; marketh how to avoid the same.

All other virtues, free us from the Dominion of vice; only Fortitude from the Dominion of Fortune.

Contra.

That's a goodly virtue to be willing to dye, so you may be sure to kill.

That's a goodly virtue sure, which even drunkennesse may induce.

He that is prodigall of his own life, will not spare the life of an other.

Fortitude is a virtue of the Iron Age.

### TEMPERANCE. XXII.

Pro.

To Abstaine & to Sustaine, are virtues proceeding commonly from the same habit.

Vniformities, concords, and Measures of motions, are things celestially, and the characters of Eternity.

Temperance as wholesome coldes, centerate and streng-

Contra.

I like not these negative virtues; for they argue Innocence not Merit.

That mind languisheth which is not sometimes spirited by excessse.

I like those virtues which induce the vivacity of Action, and not the dulnesse of Passion.

When

then the forces of the Mind.

Too exquisite and wandring senses, had need of Narcotiques; and so likewise wandring affections.

When you set downe the equal temper of the mind, you set downe but few; nam pauperis est numerare pecus.

These Stoicisms (not to use that so you may not desire; not to desire that so you may not feare) are the resolutions of pusillanimous and distrustfull natures.

### CONSTANCY. XXIII.

Pro.

Contra.

Constancy is the foundation of virtue.

He is a miserable man that hath no perception of his future state, what it shall or may be.

Seeing mans judgement is so weak, as that he cannot be constant to things; let him at least be true to himselfe, and to his own designes.

Constancy gives reputation even to vice.

If to the Inconstancy of fortune we adde also, the inconstancy of mind, in what mazes of darknesse doe we live!

Fortune is like Proteus, if you persist, she returnes to her true shape.

Constancy like a sullen-selfe-will'd Porteresse, drives away many fruitfull informations.

There is good reason that Constancy should patiently endure crosses, for commonly she causeth them.

The shortest folly is the best.

## MAGNANIMITY. XXIV.

Pro.

When once the mind hath propounded to it selfe honourable ends; then not only virtues, but even the divine powers are ready to second.

Virtues springing from Habit or precept, are vulgar; but from the end heroicall.

Contra.

Magnanimity is a virtue Poeticall.

## KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION. XXV.

Pro.

That delight only is according to Nature, whereof there is no satiety.

The sweetest prospect is that, which looks into the errors of others, in the vale below.

How pleasing and profitable a thing is it, to have the orbs of the mind concentric, with the orbs of the World.

All depraved affections are false valuations; but goodnesse and Truth are ever the same.

Contra.

A contemplative life is a specious sloth.

To think well is little better, then to dream well.

The divine providence regards the world; though thy country.

A right Politique procreates Contemplations.

## LEARNING. XXVI.

Pro.

If there were Books written of the smallest matters; there would hardly be any use of experience.

Contra.

In Schooles men learne to believe.

What Art did yet ever teach the seasonable use of Art?

Reading

*Reading is a converse with the wise; Action for the most part a commerce with fooles.*

*Those sciences are not to be reputed altogether unprofitable, that are of no use; if they sharpen the wits, and marshall our conceptions.*

*To be wise from Precept and from experience, are two contrary habits, so as he that is accustomed to the one, is unapt for the other.*

*There is many times a vain use of Art, least there should be no use.*

*This commonly is the humor of all Schollers, that they are wont to acknowledge all they know, but not to learne what they know not.*

## PROMPTITUDE. XXVII.

Pro.

*That is not seasonable wisdom which is not quick and nimble.*

*He that quickly erres, quickly reformes his error.*

*He that is wise upon deliberation, and not upon present occasion, performes no great matter.*

Contra

*That wisdom is not farre fetcht, nor deeply grounded which is ready at hand.*

*Wisdom, as a vestment, that is lightest which is readiest.*

*Age doth not ripen their wisdom, whose Counsils deliberation doth not ripen.*

*What is suddenly invented suddenly vanisheth, soon ripe soon rotten.*

## Silence in matters of Secrecy. XXVIII.

Pro.

*From a silent man, nothing is conceal'd; for all is there safely laid up.*

*He that easily talks what*

Contra.

*Alteration of Customes placeth the mind in the darke, and makes men goe invisible.*

*he knowes, will also talke what he knowes not.*

*Mysteries are due to secrecies.*

*Secrecy is the virtue of a confessor.*

*From a silent man all things are conceal'd, because all is repai'd with silence.*

*A close man is next to an unknown man.*

### FACILITY. XXIX.

Pro.

*I like the man that is pliant to anothers inclination, but yet reserves his judgement from flattery.*

*He that is flexible comes neerest the nature of Gold.*

Contra.

*Facility is a weak privation of judgement.*

*The good offices of facile natures seem debts; their denialls, injuries.*

*He owes the thanks to himselfe, that obtaines anything of a Facile-natur'd man.*

*All difficulties presse upon a too accessible and yeelding nature; for he ingages himselfe in all.*

*Facile natures seldome come off with credit.*

### POPULARITY. XXX.

Pro.

*The same things commonly please wise men, but it is also a point of wisdom; to humor the changeable disposition of fooles.*

*To honour the people is to be honoured.*

*Men in place usually stand*

Contra.

*He whose nature rightly sorts with fooles, may himselfe be suspected.*

*He that hath the Art to please the people; commonly hath the power to raise the people.*

*No termes of moderation takes place with the vulgar.*

*in awe, not of one man, but the multitude.*

*To fawne on the people, is the lowest degree of Flattery.*

## LOQUACITY. XXXI.

Pro.

Contra.

*Silence argues a man to be jealous; either of others, or of himselfe.*

*Silence addes grace, and authority to a mans words.*

*Restraint of liberty in what kind soever, is an unhappy case; but the worst of all is that of silence.*

*Silence like a kindly sleep, refresheth wisdom, & settles the judgement.*

*Silence is the Fermentation of our thoughts.*

*Silence is the virtue of fooles; where he said truly to a silent man, If you be wise you are a Foole; if you be a Foole you are wise.*

*Silence is the stile of wisdom.*

*Silence is a candidate for Truth.*

*Silence like night is fit for Treacheries.*

*Cogitations are like waters, most wholsome in the running streame.*

*Silence is a kind of solitude.*

*He that is silent, prostitutes himselfe to censure.*

*Silence neither dischargeth it selfe of evill thoughts, nor contributes any good.*

## DISSIMULATION. XXXII.

Pro.

Contra.

*Dissimulation is a compendious wisdom.*

*When we cannot think according to the verity of things; yet at least let us speak according as we think.*

*We are not tied to say the same, but to intend the same.*

*Whose shallow capacities cōpre-*

R 1 2

Naked-

*Nakednesse even in the Mind is uncomely.*

*Disimulation is both a Grace and a Guard.*

*Disimulation is the fence of counsils.*

*Some through their too apert faire dealing become a prey.*

*He that carries all things with an open franknesse, deceives, as he that somewhat dissembles: for many either doe not comprehend him, or doe not believe him.*

*Open dealing is nothing else, but a weaknesse of mind.*

*hend not the Arts of State; in them, a habit of dissimulation goes for wisdom.*

*He that Dissembles, deprives himselfe of one of the most principall instruments for Action which is believe.*

*Disimulation invites Dissimulation.*

*A dissembler is not exempt from bondage.*

### BOLDNESSE. XXXIII.

Pro.

*A shamefac'd sutor teaches the way how to be denied.*

*What Action is to an Orator, the same is boldnesse to a Politique; the first, the second, the third virtue.*

*I love him that confesseth his modesty, but I cannot endure him that accuseth it.*

*A confidence in carriage soonest unites affections.*

*I like a reserved countenance. and an open speech.*

Contra.

*Boldnesse is the verger to folly.*

*Impudence is good for nothing but for Imposture.*

*Confidence is the fooles Emprise, and the wise mans buffone.*

*Boldnesse is a kind of Dulnesse of sence, together with a perverseness of the will.*

### Ceremonies, Puntos, Affectation. XXXIV.

Pro.

*A comely moderation of Counte-*

Contra.

*What can be a more deformed spectacle*

*Countenance and Gesture, is the true seasoning of virtue.*

*If we observe the vulgar in the use of words, why not in habit and Gesture?*

*He that keeps not a decorum in smaller matters, and in his daily customs, though he be a great man, yet set it down for truth, that such a personage is wise, but at certain seasons.*

*Virtue and wisdom, without all points of respect and complement, are like forraine languages, they are not understood by the common people.*

*He that apprehends not the meaning of the common people, neither by a congruous application, nor yet by observation, is of all men most senselesse.*

*Puntoes and ceremonies are the translation of virtue into a mother tongue.*

*spectacle, than to transerre the sence into our common course of life?*

*Faire ingenious behaviour winnes grace and favour; but affectation and art procures hatred.*

*Better a painted face and crisped haire; then painted and crisped manners.*

*He cannot comprehend great matters, who breaks his mind to small observations.*

*Affectation is the shining Putrefaction of ingenuity.*

J E A S T S. XXXV.

Pro.

*A conceit is the altar of an Orator.*

*He that mingles modest mirth in all his commerce with others, reserves a freedome of mind.*

*It is a matter more politique, then a man would think, smoothly to passe from jest to earnest,*

Contra

*What man despiseth not those that hunt after these deformities and concinnities.*

*To put off the importance of businesse with a jest, is a base slight of wit.*

*Then judge of a jest, when you have done laughing.*

*Merrily conceited men, sel-*  
*dome*

and from earnest to jest.

A witty conceit is oftentimes a convoy of a Truth; which otherwise could not so handsomely have bin feried over,

dome penetrate farther than the superficies of things; which is the point where the jest lies.

To put a jest, as a matter of moment upon serious affaires, is a childish Levity.

### LOVE. XXXVI.

#### Pro.

Doe you not see how all men seek themselves; but a lover only findes himselfe.

There is no better government of the mind, then from the command of some powerfull affection.

He that is wise, let him pursue some desire or other; for he that doth not affect some one thing in chiefe, unto him all things are distastfull and tedious.

Why should not that which is one, rest in unity?

#### Contra.

The stage is much behold-  
ing to love; the life of man nothing.

There is nothing hath so many names as love; for it is a thing either so foolish, that it knowes not it selfe, or so base that it must needs disguise it selfe under a counterfeit habit.

I like not such natures as are only intent upon one thing.

Love is a poore-narrow contemplation.

### FRIENDSHIP. XXXVII.

#### Pro.

Friendship accomplisheth the samethings that Fortitude doth; but more sweetly.

Friendship is a pleasant sauce to any temporall happiness.

The worst solitude is to be destitute of sincere friendship.

#### Contra.

Who contracts strict leagues of Amity, drawes upon himselfe new engagements.

It is a note of a weak spirit, to divide fortune.

*It is a just punishment for false-hearted dispositions, to be deprived of friendship.*

## FLATTERY. XXXVIII.

Pro.

*Flattery proceeds more out of custome then out of Malice.*

*It was ever a forme of civility due to Great Persons, by praising them to instruct them.*

Contra.

*Flattery is the stile of Servants.*

*Flattery is the cement of vice.*

*Flattery is that kind of fowling, which deceives Birds by resemblance of voice.*

*The deformity of flattery is Comickall, but the damage Tragickall.*

*To give wholsome counsil, is a taske most difficult.*

## REVENGE. XXXIX.

Pro.

*Private Revenge is a kind of wild Iustice.*

*He that returnes wrong for wrong, violates the Law, not the Person.*

*The fear of private revenge is a profitable restraint, for lawes are too often asleep.*

Contra.

*He that does a wrong is the beginner of a quarrell; but he that retaliates, takes away all means of ending it.*

*Revenge by how much the more naturall, by so much the more to be repressed.*

*He that is inclinable to retribute a wrong, is behind-hand perchance in time, but not in will.*

Innovati-

## INNOVATION. XL.

## Pro.

Every medicine is an innovation.

He that will not apply new remedies, must expect new diseases.

Time is the greatest innovator; why then may we not imitate time.

Ancient presidents are inconformable, recent, corrupt, and degenerate.

Let simple and contentious persons, square their actions, according to examples.

As those that first bring honour into their Family, are commonly more worthy than most that succeed.

So the Innovation of things for the most part excels those things which are done out of Imitation.

A forward retention of Customs, is as turbulent a thing as Innovation.

Seeing that things of their own course alter to the worse, if they be not by counsell altered to the better, what shall be the end of Evil.

The servants of custome, are the scorne of Time.

## Contra.

New Births are deformed things.

No author is accepted untill time haue authoriz'd him.

All novelty is with injury, for it defaceth the present state of things.

Those things which custome hath confirmed, if they be not profitable, yet they are conformable and piece well together.

What Novator followes the example of time, which insinuates innovations so quietly, as is scarce perceptible to sence.

Whatsoever comes unlooked for, is the lesse acceptable to him whom it helps, and the more troublesome to him whom it hurts.

## DELAY. XLI.

Pro.

Fortune selleth many things to the hasty; which she gives to the slow and deliberate.

Whilest we make too much hast to surprize the beginnings and onsets of things, we claspe shadows.

Whilest things are at a doubtfull stand, we must waigh them; when they incline we may fall a work.

It is good to commit the beginning of Actions to Argus, with his hundred eyes; the ends to Briareus, with his hundred hands.

Contra.

Occasion turnes the handle of the Bottle first, to be received; and after the belly.

Occasion, like Sibylla, diminisheth the commodity, but enhanseth the Price.

Celerity is the helmet of Pluto.

Those things which are seasonably undertaken, are performed with judgement; but what are put off too long, are compass'd with trouble and by ambages.

## PREPARATION. XLII.

Pro.

He that attempts a great matter with small means; fancies to himselfe the advantage of opportunity, that he may not despaire.

With slender provision we buy wit not fortune.

Contra.

The first occasion of action, is the best point of Preparation.

Let no man think to fetter fortune, with the chaines of his preparation.

The alteration of Preparation, and Action, are politique Arts; but the separation of them is a vaporous conceit, and unprosperous.

Great Preparation is a prodigall both of time and businesse.

## To Encountre first Assaults. XLIII.

Pro.

*More dangers deceive us by fraud, then overcome us by force.*

*It is lesse trouble to meete danger by early remedies, then to watch and ward the approaches and progresse thereof.*

*A danger is no more light, if it once seem light.*

Contra.

*He teacheth danger to come on, who over-early addresseth himselfe against danger; and fixeth it by application of a remedy.*

*In the redresse of dangers, lighter dangers fall off of themselves.*

*It is better to deale with a few authentique and approv'd remedies; then to venture upon a world of unexperienc'd particular receipts.*

## VIOLENT CONSILS. XLIV.

Pro.

*Those that affect a milde and gentle kind of Prudence; to them the augmentation of an evill, is a wholsome remedy.*

*That necessity which resolves upon desperate courses; commonly goes through with them.*

Contra.

*Every violent remedy is pregnant of a new evill.*

*No man gives violent advice, but out of fury or feare.*

## SUSPICION. XLV.

Pro.

*Diffidence is the nerves of wisdom; but suspicion a remedy for the joynts.*

*That sincerity is justly suspected, which suspicion weakens,*

Contra.

*Suspicion breaks the bond of faith.*

*The distemper of suspicion, is a kind of Civile Madnesse.*

*akens,*

kens or overthrows.

*Suspicion defeats an inconstant integrity; but confirms a strong and resolute.*

The words of Law. XLVI.

Pro.

*It is no exposition, but a divination, which departs from the letter.*

*When there is made a departure from the letter of Law; the judge, of an interpreter, becomes a Law-giver.*

Contra.

*Out of all the words in the generality, such a sense must be extracted, as may expound the mind of every particular passage.*

*The worst tyranny, is Law upon the rack.*

For witnesses against Arguments. XLVII.

Pro.

*He that relies upon Arguments, defines according to the pleader, not according to the cause.*

*He that gives credit rather to Arguments, than witnesses; must with all trust more to wit, than sense.*

*It were a safe way to believe Arguments of Reason, if men were not guilty of Absurdities against Reason.*

*Arguments brought against Testimonies accomplish thus much; that the case seems strange, but not that it seems true.*

Contra.

*If proofs by witnesses, are to be prefer'd before Proofs from Reason, then there needs no more ado, but that the Judge be not deafe.*

*Arguments are an Antidote against the poison of Testimonies.*

*Those kind of Proofs are most safely believed, which do most seldome lye.*

Now these *Antitheta* which we have propounded, are not perchance so much worth; but being they were prepared and collected by us long agoe, we were loath the diligence of our youth should perish: specially seeing they are (if one exactly consider them) *seeds*, and not *Flowers*. But herein they doe plainly breath a youthly heate, in that they are so plentifull in the *morall* or *Demonstrative* kind, so thinne and sparing in the *Deliberative* and *Judiciale*.

\*  
FORMV-  
LÆ MI-  
NORES.

IV. A third collection which pertaines to *Preparatory store* or *Provision* and is DEFICIENT is that which we think fit to call FORMULÆ MINORES *Lesser Formes* or *Stiles of Speech*. And these are (as it were) the Portals Posterne-dores; outer Roome, Back roomes, Passages of speech, and the Like; which indifferently may serve for all subjects. Such are *Prefaces*, *Conclusions*, *Digressions*, *Transitions*, *Promises*, *Excusations*, and many of like nature. For as in *Building* there is great Pleasure and use in the well-casting of the *Frontispieces*, *staire-cases*, *doores*, *windowves*, *entries*, *passages*, and the like: so in *speech* of the *accessory conveyances* and *interposures*, be decently and skilfully contrived and placed, they are of speciall ornament and effect, to the whole structure of the *speech*. Of these *Formuls*, we will propose an exruple or two, and stay no longer upon them. For although they be matters of no small use, yet because we adde nothing here of our own, but describe the naked *Formes* only, out of *Dcmosthenes* or *Cicero*, or some other select Author, they may seem a more triviall and common observation, than that we should wast much time therein.

### EXAMPLES OF MINOR FORMES.

A Conclusion of a speech Deliberative.

“So wee may both redime the Fault which is Passed, and  
with the same diligence provide against future Inconveniencies.

The



is the manner of many Critiques, when they fall upon a passage which they doe not understand, presently to presume a fault in the copy. As in that place in *Tacitus*, when a certain Colony in the open Senate, claimed the priviledge of an *Asylum*, *Tacitus* reports that the reasons they prefer'd were not much favour'd by the Emperour and the Lords of the Senate; wherefore the Embassadors mistrusting the issue of the businesse, gave a round summe of mony to *Titus Vinus*, that he would mediate their cause, and take upon him the protection of their liberties; by this means their petition was heard and granted; *Tum dignitas & antiquitas Coloniae valuit* saith *Tacitus*, as if the arguments that seemed light before, were now made waighty, through bribes, and corruption. But one of the Critiques, a man of no obscure note, hath expunged the word *Tum*, and in stead thereof, put in *Tantum*. And by this perverse custome of Critiques, it comes to passe (as one wisely noteth) *that the most corrected copies, are commonly the least correct*. Nay (to speak truth) unlesse the Critiques be well skill'd in the knowledges, handled in the Books which they set forth, their diligence is with perill, and prejudice. Secondly there appertaines to the Critique Art, the Exposition, and Explication of Auētors, by commentaries, Scholies, Notes, Spicilegies, and the like. In labours of this kind, that worst disease of Critiques hath ceas'd on many; that they blanch and wave many obscurer passages; and such as are plaine and perspicuous, those they dwell and expatiate upon, even to a fastidious tediousnesse; and it is not so much intended, that the Auētor may be illuminated, as that the Critique may take occasion hereby to glorify himselfe, in his multiplicious and various learning. It could be especially wished (although this point belongs to Tradition in chiefe, and not to Appendices) that the writer which handles obscure and noble Arguments, should annexe his own explications; that neither the text it selfe may be broken off, by Digressions and Explications; and that the Annotations may not depart from the mind and intention of the writer. Some such thing we conceive of *Theon* upon

*Euclid.*

*Euclid. Thirdly it belongs to Critique Art (from whence it derives the name) to interpose a brieve censure and judgement of the Auētors which they publish, and to compare and valew them with other Auētors upon the same subject: That by such a censure the Learned and studious, may be both advertis'd of the choice of Books; and come better provided to the perusing of them. This last duty is, as it were, the Chaire of the Critiques, which many great and famous men in our age have ennobled; greater surely in our judgement, than for the model of Critiques.*

II. *For Pedanticall knowledge, it were loon said, consult the Schooles of the Iesuites, for there is nothing for the use and practice better then their Precepts: but we will according to our manner, as it were, gleaning a few eares, give some few advertisements. We doe by all means approve a Collegiat education and Institution of Childhood and Youth; not in private houses, nor only under Schoolemasters. There is in Colledges a greater emulation of Youth towards their equals; besides, there is the sight and countenance of Grave men, which seems to command modesty; and fashions and moulds tender minds, even from their first growth to the same Patterne: in some there are many other utilities of Collegiat Education.*

§ *For the order and manner of Discipline, this I would principally advile; that Youth beware of compends and abridgements, and too forward maturation of knowledge, which makes men bold and confident; and rather wants great proceeding, than causeth it.*

§ *Further there is an indulgence to be given to the liberty and vent of nature in particulars, as if there be any which performs such taskes as the discipline of the place requires; and yet withall steales some howers to bestow on other studies, to which he hath a naturall propensity; such a disposition by no means should be checkt or restrain'd.*

§ *Againe, it will be worth the paines diligently to observe (which perchance hether to hath not bin noted) that there are two waies, and they as it were, reflexively opposite*

site of training up of wits, and of exercising and preparing them. The one begins with the more easy precepts, and by degrees leads us to the more difficult; the other at first commands and presseth more difficult practises, which when they are conquered, the other sweetly yeeld and are won with ease. For it is one Method to practise swimming by bladders which lift up, and an other Method to practise dauncing with heavy shooes, which presse down the Body; and it is not easy to expresse, how much a wise intermixture of these Methods, conduceth to the advanceing of the faculties, both of Mind and of the Body.

§ So the Application and Election of studies according to the propriety of wits, which are instructed, is a matter of singular use and judgement; a true and perfit discovery whereof, Schoolemasters and Tutors owe to the Parents of Children, from whom they may expect such informations, that so they may the better advise upon the particular course of life, unto which they would designe, and dedicate their sonnes. But this also is to be exactly observed, that not only exceeding great progresion may be made in those studies, to which a man is swayed by a naturall proclivity; but also that there may be found, in studies properly selected for that purpose, cures and remedies to promote such kind of knowledge, to the impressions whereof, a man may, by some imperfection of nature, be most unapt and insufficient. As for example, if a man be Bird-witted, that is, quickly carried away, and hath not the patient faculty of attention; the *Mathematiques* gives a remedy thereunto, wherein, if the wit be caught away but for a moment, the demonstration is new to beginne.

§ So of exercises in course of teaching, there is matter of great consequence: but there is a point herethat hath bin noted of few, that there should be of exercises, not only a wise institution, but also a wise intermission. It hath bin excellently observed by Cicero, That in exercises it often falls out, that men practise as well their faults, as their faculties; so that an ill habit is sometimes gotten, and insinuates it selfe together with a Good; wherefore it is a lafer way to break off exercises, and after

to fall to them againe, than incessantly to pursue and presse them. *But of these enough.* Certainly these things at first view seem no such solemne and grave matters, yet are they in the issue found efficacious and usefull. *For as in Plants,* the wronging or cherishing of them while they are Young, is that, that is most important to their thriving or miscarrying: or as the immense greatnesse of the state of Rome, is by some deservedly attributed to the virtue and wisdom of those *six Kings,* which were as Tutors and Foster-fathers of that state in the Infancy thereof: so surely the culture and manurance of minds in young and tender years, hath such a forcible operation (though unseen and not obvious to every mans observation) which neither length of time, or assiduity and contention of Labour in riper age afterwards, can any way countervaile. And it is not amisse to observe how small and mean faculties, if they fall into Great men, or upon Great matters, doe sometimes work Great and important effects. *Hereof we will set downe a memorable example,* which we the rather note, because the Jesuites themselves seem not to despise this kind of Discipline; in our opinion upon sound judgement, and it is a matter, which if it be made professory, is ignominious, if disciplinary, one of the best qualities: *We mean Action upon the stage; as that which strengthens memory, moderates the tone and emphasis of voice, and Pronunciation; composes the countenance and gesture to a Decorum, procures good assurance, and likewise inureth Youth to the faces of Men.* The example shall be taken out of *Tacitus,* of one *Vibulenus,* who had bin sometimes an Actor upon the stage, but at that time a common souldier in the Pannonian Garrisons. This fellow upon the death of Augustus had rais'd a mutiny, so that *Blæsus* the Livetenant, committed some of the mutiners to Prison; but the souldiers by violent impression brake open the Prisons, and set them at liberty; & *Vibulenus* about to make a Tribunitiall speech before the Souldiers, began in this manner, “You have gi-  
 “ven light and life, to these poore innocent wretches; but  
 “who restores my brother to me, or life unto my brother,  
 T t that

“that was sent hether in message from the Legions of Ger-  
 “many, to treat of the common cause, and he hath mur-  
 “thered him this last night by some of his Fencers, that he  
 “hath about him for his executioners upon souldiers. An-  
 “swer *Blasius*, where hast thou thrown his body? the most  
 “mortall enemies, doe not deny buriall: when I have per-  
 “formed my last duties unto the corpes with kisses, with  
 “tears, command me to be slaine besides him; so that these  
 “my fellowes for our good meaning, and our true hearts  
 “to the Legions, may have leave to bury us. With which  
 speech, he put the Army into such an infinite fury and a-  
 maze, that if it had not incontinently appeared, that there  
 was no such matter, and that he never had any brother; the  
 Souldiers would hardly have spared the Lievetenants life;  
 for he played it merely, as if it had bin some interlude upon  
 the Stage.


§ Now we are come to a period of our Treatise con-  
 cerning *Rationall knowledges*; wherein if we have sometimes  
 departed from the *receiv'd partitions*, yet let no man think  
 that we disallow all those *Partitions* which we have not u-  
 sed: for there is a double necessity imposed upon us, of al-  
 tering the *Divisions*; *The one because these two, namely to sort  
 together those things which are next in nature, and to cast into one  
 Pile those things which are next in use, are in their end and pur-  
 pose altogiter differing.* For example; A Secretary of a Prince  
 or of Estate, so digests his Papers, without doubt, in his stu-  
 dy, as he may sort together things of like nature, as *Treaties*  
 apart, *Instructions* apart, *Forraine letters*, *Domestique let-  
 ters*, all apart by themselves; on the contrary in some parti-  
 cular Cabinet, he sorts together those that he were like to  
 use together, though of severall nature: so in this generall  
*Cabinet of knowledge*, we were to set downe *Partitions* ac-  
 cording to the nature of things themselves; whereas if any  
 particular science were to be handled, we should have re-  
 spected the divisions fittest for use and practice. *The other  
 reason of changing the Division is, because the adjection of Defi-  
 cients to Sciences; and the reduction of them into an intire Body,*  
 did

*did by consequence, alter the Partition of the Sciences themselves.*  
For admit the Arts which are extant (for demonstratiō sake)  
be in number 15. and the Deficients superadded make up  
the number 20. I say that the Parts of 15. are not the parts of  
20, for the parts of 15. are 3. and 5. but the parts of 20,  
are 2. 4. 5. and 10. so is it plaine thele could  
not otherwise be. And so much  
of *Logicall Sciences.*

T t 2

THE







THE SEVENTH BOOK OF  
**FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM**  
 VICOUNT ST ALBAN.

OF THE  
 DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
 OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

- I The Partition of Morale knowledge, into the Doctrine of Exemplar, or Platforme; and into the Georgiques or Culture of the Mind. § The Division of the Platforme of Good, into Good Simple, and Good Compar'd. II. The Division of Good simple, into Individuall Good, and Good of Communion.

 EE are now come (Excellent KING) unto Morale knowledge, which respecteth and handleth the will of Man: Right Reason governes the will, Good Apparent seduceth it; the Incentives of the will are the Affections, the Organs and voluntary Motions, are hir Ministers; of this faculty Salomon saith, Above all Prov. iv. keepings, keep thy Heart; for out of it issue, the actions of life. In handling of this Science, those which have written thereof, seem to me to have done, as if a man that professed the Art of writing, should only exhibite faire copies of Alphabets and letters joyned, without giving any precepts for the carriage of the hand and framing of the Characters: so have they propounded unto us good and faire examples and draughts,

or accurate portraitures of *Good, Virtue, Duties, Felicity*, as the true objects and scopes of *mans Will and Desires*: but how to take a just levell at *these marks* (excellent indeed and by them well set downe) that is, by what precepts and directions, the *Mind* may be subdued and framed, to pursue and attaine *them*; either they passe it over altogether, or performe it slightly and unprofitably. It is not the disputeing that *Morall virtues are in the mind of Man by habit, and not by Nature*; or formally distinguishing between *Generous spirits and the obscure vulgar*; that *those are wonne by the waight of Reasons*; *these by reward and Punishment*; or the witty precept, that *to rectify the mind of man, it must like a staffe, be bowed the contrary way to its inclination*; and the like glances, scattered here and there. These and the like are farre short of being a just excuse of the deficiency of that thing, which now we seeke. The reason of this neglect I suppose to be, that hidden Rock, whereupon so many Barks of Knowledges have runne and bin cast away; which is, that writers despise to be conversant in ordinary and common matters; which are neither subtile enough for Disputation; nor flourishing enough for Ornament. Verily it cannot easily be expressed, what calamity this thing we now speak of hath brought upon Sciences; that out of an imbred Pride and vaine-glory, men have made choice of such subjects of Discourse, and of such a manner & method of handling, as may commend rather their own wit, than consult the Readers profit. Seneca saith excellently, *Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum facit cupiditatem, sed sui*. For writings should be such, as should make men in love with the Lessons, and not with the Teachers. Therefore they take a right course, which can openly avouch the same of their Counsils, which Demosthenes once did, and can conclude with this clause, *which if you put in execution, you shall not only commend the Orator for the instant, but your selves likewise, not long after, in a more prosperous state of your affaires*. As for my selfe (Excellent KING) to speak the truth of my selfe, I have often wittingly and willingly neglected the glory of mine own Name, and Learning, (if any such thing be) both in the works I now publish, and in those

Aristot.  
Eth. lib. 2.

In Epist.

Demost.  
Orat.

I contrive for hereafter; whilst I study to advance the good and profit of mankind. And I, that have deserv'd, perchance, to be an Architect in Philosophy and Sciences, am made a Work-man and a Labourer, and at length anything else whatsoever; seeing I sustaine and work out my selfe, many things that must needs be done; and others out of a naturall disdain shift off and refuse to doe. But, (to returne to the matter) which we were about to say, Philosophers in Morall Science, have chosen to themselves a resplendent and lustrous masse of matter; wherein they may most glorify themselves, for sharpnesse of wit, or strength of Eloquence: but such precepts as specially conduce to practice, because they cannot be so set out, and invested with the ornaments of speech; they have in a manner pass'd over in silence. Neither needed men of so excellent parts, to have despaired of a fortune like that, which the Poet *Virgil*, had the confidence to promise to himselfe, and indeed obtaind; who got as much glory of Eloquence, Wit, and Learning, in the expressing of the observations of husbandry; as in describing the Heroicall Acts of *Aeneas*.

*Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere, magnum;  
Quam sit, & angustis his addere rebus honorem.*

Geor. 3.

And surely if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leasure, that which men may read at leasure; but really to instruct and be a subsidiary to Active life; these GEORGIQUES OF MANS MIND, ought to be had in as great esteeme with men, as those heroicall portraitures of Virtue, Goodnesse, and Felicity, wherein so much labour and cost hath bin bestowed.

I. We will therefore divide *Morall Philosophy*, into two maine and Principall Knowledges; the one concerning the Exemplar or Image of Good; the other concerning, the Regiment and Culture of the Mind, which we are wont to call, the GEORGIQUES OF THE MIND: that describes the Nature of Good; this prescribes rules; how to subdue and accommodate the mind of Man thereunto.

§ The Doctrine touching the Platforme; which respects and describes the Nature of Good, considers Good either Simple

ple or Compared, I say either the kinds of Good, or the Degrees of Good. In the latter of these, those infinite Disputations and Speculations touching the supreme degree of Good, which they terme Felicity, Beatitude, the highest good, (the Doctrines of which were the Heathens Divinity) are by the Christian Faith, taken away and discharged. For as Aristotle saith, *That Young men may be happy, but not otherwise, but by hope*; so must we all, being so taught by Christian Faith, acknowledge our selves to be but children and in our Minority; and think of no other felicity, than that which is in hope of the future world. Freed therefore by happy fate from this doctrine, which was the Heathens Heaven (wherein without doubt, they attributed a higher elevation of mans Nature, than it was capeable of; for we see in what a height of stile Seneca writes, *verè Magnum habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei*) we may certainly with lesse losse of sobriety and Truth, receive for most part; the rest of their inquiries concerning the doctrine of the Platforme. As concerning the Nature of Good Positive and Simple, surely they have set it out in beautifull colours and drawne it to the life, upon excellent Tables; representing with exact diligence to the eye, the Formes, Postures, Kinds, Affinities, Parts, Subjects, Provinces, Actions, Administrations of virtues and Duties. Nor doe they so leave the pursuit; for they have commended and insinuated all these into the spirit of man, with great quicknesse and vivacity of Arguments, and sweetnesse, and beauty of Perswasions; yea and fortified and intrenched the same (as much as discourses can doe) against corrupt and popolare opinions and invasions. As touching the nature of comparative good, they have also well handled that, in setting downe that triplicite Order of Good, in comparing contemplative life with Active; in distinguishing between virtue with reluctance, and virtue settled by security and confirmed: in the conflict and encounter, between honesty and profit; in the ballancing of virtue with virtue, to see which preponderates other; and the like. So as this part touching the Platforme; I finde excellently laboured, and that the ancients herein have shewed themselves

selves admirable men: yet so as the pious and painfull diligence of Divines, being practis'd in *Duties, Morall virtues, Cases of Conscience, and circumscriptions of sinne*, have farre out-gone the Philosophers. *Notwithstanding* ( to returne to the Philosophers) if before they had addrest'd themselves to the popular and reciv'd notions of *Virtue, Vice, Paine, Pleasure*, and the rest; they had stayd a litle longer and had searched the *Rootes of Good and Evill, and the strings of those Rootes*; they had given in my judgement a great light unto all which might fall into enquirie afterwards: especially if they had consulted as well with the *Nature of things, as with the Axioms of Morallitie*, they had made their Doctrines lesse prolix, and more profounde: which being by them eyther altogether omitted, or very confusedly handled, wee will briefly reexamine and endeavour to open and cleare the Springs of *Morall habits*, before we come unto the doctrine of the *Culture or Manurance of the Minde*, which we set downe as DEFICIENT.

II. There is imbred and imprinted in every thing an appetite to a *duple Nature of Good*: the *One as every thing is a Totall or Substantive in it selfe*; the other as it is a *part or membre of some greater Totall*: and this latter is more excellent and potent than the other, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more ample forme. The first may be called *Individuall or selfe-Good*; the latter the *Good of Communion*. Iron in a particular Sympathie moves to the *Loadstone*, but yet if it exceed a certaine Quantitie, it forsakes those affections, and like a good Citizen & a true Patriot moves to the *Earth*, which is the Region and Country of its connaturalls. To proceed a litle further; *Dense and Massie Bodies* move to the earth, to the great Congregation of *close-compacted Bodies*; yet rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, and that there should be, as they call it, a *Vacuum*; these Bodies will move upwards, forsaking their dutie to the *Earth*, that they may performe the generall duty they owe unto the *World*. So it is ever seen that the *Conservation of the more generall and publique forme*, commands and governs the lesser and

more particular *Appetites and Inclinations*. But this Prerogative of the *Good of Communion*, is especially engraven upon Man, if he degenerate not, according to that memorable speech of *Pompeius Magnus*, who being in Commission for purveyance for a Famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemence and instance by his friends that hee would not hazard himselfe to Sea in an extremitie of weather, he answered only this, *Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam.* So as the love of life which in every Individuall Creature is so predominant an affection, could not out-balance his love and loyaltie to the state. But why doe we dwell upon this Point? There was never extant in any age of the world, either Philosophy, or Sect, or Religion, or Law, or Discipline, which hath so highly exalted the *Good of Communion* and depressed *Good private and particulare*, as the *Holy Christian Faith*; whereby it cleerely appears, that it was one and the same God that gave the Christian Law to Men, who gave those Lawes of Nature to Creatures of inferior order. Wherefore we read that many of the elect Saints of God have rather wished themselves anathematiz'd and raz'd out of the *Book of Life* than that their brethren should not attain salvation; provoked through an extasie of Charitie and an infinite feeling of the *Good of Communion*. This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine many of the profoundest Controversies in *Morall Philosophie*. For first, it decideth the Question touching the preferment of the *Contemplative or Active life*; and that against the opinion of *Aristotle*: for all the reasons which he brings for the *Contemplative*, respect a *private Good*, and the pleasure and dignitie of an Individual only; in which respects (no question) a *Contemplative life* hath the preheminance. For the *Contemplative life* is not much unlike to that comparison to which *Pythagoras* made for the gracing and magnifying of *Philosophie and Contemplation*; who being askt by *Hiero* what he was, answered; "That if *Hiero* were ever at the *Olympian Games*, he knew the manner that some came to trie their fortunes for the prizes; and some came as Merchants to utter their commodities

S<sup>t</sup> Paul  
Rom. ix.

Iamb. in  
vita.

“ medities; and some came to make good cheere, to be merry, and  
 “ to meet with their friends, and some came to look on, and that hee  
 “ was one of them that came to look on. But men must know  
 that in this Theatre of Mans life, it is reserved onley for God  
 and Angels, to be Lookers on. Neither surely could it have  
 bin that any doubt, touching this point, should ever have  
 bin rais'd in the Church (notwithstanding that saying was  
 frequent in many mens Mouths, *Pretiosa in oculis Domini* Psal. cxvi.  
*mors sanctorum ejus*: by which place they use to exalt their  
*Civile Death* and the Lavves of a Monastique and Regulare  
 course of life;) but upon this defence, *that the Monasticall life*  
*is not simply Contemplative*; but is altogether conversant in  
*Ecclesiastique Duties*, such as are incessant Prayer; Sacrifices  
 of Vowes performed to God; the writing also, in such great  
 leasure, Theologicall Books for the propagation of the  
 knowledge of the *Divine Law*, as *Moses* did when he abode Exod. xxiii.  
 so many daies in the *retir'd secrecie of the Mount*. And so we  
 see *Enoch* the seventh from *Adam*, who seemes to be the first  
 founder of a *Contemplative life*, (for he is said to have walked Gen. v.  
*with God*) yet endowed the Church with a Book of Pro-  
 phecie, which is also cited by *S<sup>t</sup> Jude*. But as for a *meere Con-* In Epist.  
*templative life*, and terminated in it selfe, which casteth no  
 Beames of heat or light upon humane society; assuredly Di-  
 vinity knowes it not. It decides also the Question contro-  
 verted with such heat between the Schooles of *Zeno* and  
*Socrates*, on the one side, who placed Felicitie in Virtue sim-  
 ple or attended, which hath a great share in the *Duties of life*;  
 and on the other side other Sects and Professions, as the  
 Schooles of the *Cirenaiques* and *Epicureans*, who placed it in  
 pleasure; and made Virtue, (as it is used in some Comœdies,  
 where the Mistresse and the Maid change habits) to be but  
 as a hand-maid, without which Pleasure cannot be well  
 waited and attended upon; as also that other, as it were, re-  
 formed Schoole of *Epicurus*, which asserted *Felicity* to be Laert. in  
 nothing else than a Tranquilitie and Serenitie of Minde free vita.  
 and void of all Perturbations; as if they would have depo-  
 sed *Jupiter* from his Throne and restored *Saturne* with the

Golden Age, when there was no Summer nor Winter, nor Spring nor Autumn, but all after one Aire and Season. Lastly, the exploded Schoole of *Pyrrho* and *Herillus*, which placed Felicity in the utter extinction and extirpation of all the scruples and disputes of the mind, making no fixt and constant nature of Good, and Evill, but estimating Actions Good or Evill, as they proceed from the Mind in a cleere and resolute motion; or contrariwise with averfation and reluctance. Which opinion notwithstanding hath revived in the Eresy of the *Anabaptists*, who measur'd all things according to the Motions & Instincts of the spirit, and the constancy, or wavering of Beliefe. But it is manifest that all this we have recited, tends to private repose and complacency of Mind, and no way to the Point of *Society*, and the *Good of Communion*. Again, it censures also the Philosophy of *Epietetus*, who laies downe this presupposition; *That felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance*; as if it were not a thing much more happy, to be distributed and frustrated of a good successe in worthy and generous intentions and ends, which concerne the *Publique Good*, than to obtaine all that we can wish to our selves, in those things which referre to our *Private Fortune*. As *Consalvo* shewing his Souldiers *Naples*, bravely protested, *That he had rather runne himselfe upon certaine ruine with one foot forward, than to have his life secur'd for long, by one foot of retreat*. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader and commander hath sign'd, who hath affirm'd, *That a good conscience is a continuall feast*; by which words is plainly signified, *that a Mind Conscious of good Intentions, however succeeding, affords more solid and sincere joy, and to nature more agreeable, than all that provision wherewith man may be furnisht either for the fruition of his desires, or the repose of his Mind*. It censureth likewise that abuse of Philosophy, which grew generall about the time of *Epietetus*, which was, that *Philosophy* was converted into a professory kind of life, and as it were into an Occupation or Art; as if the purpose of *Philosophy*

Epiet. En-  
chir.  
Arrian.  
Lib. 1.

Prov. xv.

sophy, was not to repress and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes and occasions of them; and therefore to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end; introducing indeed such a kind of health of mind, as was that of *Herodicus* in body, whereof Aristotle makes mention, which was, *that he did nothing all his life long but intend his health*, and therefore abstaind from infinite number of things, being amerc'd by the fruition of his body: whereas if men referre themselves to duties of society, that health of Body is principally to be desired, which may best endure and overcome all alterations and extremities: so likewise that mind is properly sound and strong, which can breake through the most and greatest temptations and perturbations. So as *Diogenes* seems to have spoken well, who commends those powers of the Mind, *which were able not warily to abstaine but valiantly to sustaine*, and which could refraine the violent encounter of the Mind, even in the steepest Precipices, and which could give unto the Mind (which is commended in well-broken horses) the shortest stoppe and turne. Lastly, it censures the tendernesse and the want of Morigerous application, noted in some of the most ancient and reverend Philosophers, that did retire too easily from Civile businesse, that they might discharge themselves of all indignities and perturbations, and so might live, in their opinion, more unstained, and as it were, sanctified persons; whereas the resolution of a man truly morall, ought to be such, as the same *Consalvo* required in a souldier, which is that his Honour should be woven *è Tela Crassiore*, and not so fine as that every thing should catch in it, and teare it.

Αἰέτι  
 Αἰέτι  
 Summa  
 Stoic.  
 Philos.



## CAP. II.

- I. The Partition of *Particular or private Good*, into *Good Active*, and *Good Passive*. II. The Division of *Good Passive*, into *Conservative Good*, and *Perfective Good*. III. The Division of the *Good of Communion* into *Generall and Respective Duties*.

I.  Herefore let us now resume and prosecute first *Private or Particulare Good*: we will divide it into *Good Active* and *Good Passive*, for this difference of *Good* (not unlike surely to those Appellations, which amongst the Romans, were familiar in their Household Termes of *Promus* and *Condu*) is found impres'd in the whole course of Nature: but chiefly discloseth it selfe in the two severall Appetites of Creatures; the one of *Conserving and fortifying* themselves; the other of *multiplying and dilating* themselves; and this latter which is *Active*, and as it were, the *Promus* seems to be the more powerfull and the more worthy; but the former which is *Passive*, and, as it were, the *Condu*, may be taken as inferior and lesse worthy. For in the universal frame of Nature, the Heavenly nature is chiefly the *Agent*; the Terrestriall nature the *Patient*: so in the Pleasures of living Creatures, the pleasure of Generation is greater, then that of Nutrition: and in the divine Oracles it is pronounced, *Beatius esse dare quam accipere*. Nay farther, in the common course of life, there is no mans spirit so soft and effeminate, but estimates the effecting, and bringing to some issue that which he hath fixt in his desire; more than any sensuality or pleasure. And certainly this preheminance of *Active Good*, is infinitely exalted from the consideration of our humane condition, that it is mortal, and also exposed to the stroak of Fortune: for if there could be obtained, a licence of perpetuity and certainty in humane Pleasures, their price would be advanced, for their security and continuance. And in as much as we see, that the summe of all comes

comes to this, *Magni aestimamus mori tardius; Et ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum Diei*: it is no wonder if with all contention of Spirit, we pursue those things, which are secur'd and exempt from the injuries and affronts of time; and these things can be nothing else but only our *deeds*, as it is said, *opera eorum sequuntur eos.*

Apoc. xiv.

§ There is likewise another preheminance of *Good Active* of import, implanted in, and supported by that affection, which cleaves close to mans nature, as an individuate companion; which is the *love of Novelty and Variety*. And this *Affection* in the pleasures of the senses (which are the very principall part of *Passive Good*) is exceeding narrow and hath no great latitude: *Do not think (saith Seneca) how often you have acted over the same things, Meat, Sleep, Mirth, we runne round in this circle, to be willing to dye; not only a valiant, or a wretched, or a wise man may, but even a fastidious and nice nature may.* But in the Enterprises, Purposes and Pursuits of our life, there is much variety, whereof we are sensible in our inceptions, progressions, rests, recoiles, to redintegrate our forces, approaches, attainings and the like; so as it was very well said, *vita sine Proposito languida & vaga est:* which indifferently befalls both to the wise and unwise, as saith *Solomon, A light-brain'd man, seeks to satisfy his fancy, and intermixeth himselfe in all things.* Nay we see likewise, that many great Princes, who may have at command whatsoever can delight the Senses, notwithstanding many times, have procured to themselves poore desires, and set their hearts upon toies; (as *Nero, in playing upon the Harpe; Commodus in playing at Fence; Antoninus in driving Chariots,* and others taken up with other delights) which to them were more acceptable than all the affluence of sensual Pleasures: *so much greater refreshing and contentment it is, to goe forward in Action, than to stand at a stay in fruition.* This, in the mean, is to be somewhat more diligently noted; that this *Active individual Good*, altogether differs from the *good of Society*, thoe oftentimes they are coincident; for althoe that *Particular Active Good*, doth many times breed, and bring forth

Sen. alicubi

Sen in Ep.

Prov.

forth

forth *Acts of Beneficence*, which is a *virtue of Communion*; yet here's the difference, that those Acts are by most men performed, not with intention to benefit and make happy others, but meerey in a private respect to themselves, & their own power and amplification. This best appears when *Good Active* lights upon a subject which is contrary to the *Good of Communion*: for that Gigantive state of minde which possesseth the troublers of the world (such as was *L. Sylla*, and infinite others, thoe in a far smaller Modell) who seeme to endeavour this, to have all men happy or unhappy as they were their Friends or Enimies, and that the world might beare their stamp and be formd to their humours (which is the true *Theomachie*;) this I say, aspires to *Active Particulare Good*, at least in appearance, altho it doth most of all recede from the *Good of Societie*.

II. But we will divide *Passive Good* into *Good Conservative* and *Good Perfective*. For there is implanted in every thing a triple Appetite in respect of *Private or Particular Good*; the first of *preserving or continuing it selfe*; the second of *advancing and perfecting it selfe*; the third of *multiplying and extending it selfe*: but this last Appetite is referr'd to *Active Good*, whereof we spake even now. There remaine therefore the two other kindes of *Good*, of which the *Perfective* excells; for it is lesse to conserve a thing in its naturall state, but greater to advance the same thing to a higher nature; for there are found through all Essences some nobler natures, to the dignity and excellency whereof inferiour natures doe aspire, as to their originals and Springs. So concerning Men, the Poet doth not impertinently describe,

Virg. Æn. 6

*Ignem est Ollis vigor & Cælestis Origo;*

Mans assumption or approach to a divine or Angelicall Nature is the perfection of his Forme; a depraved and preposterous imitation of which *Perfective Good*, is the destruction of humane life and a violent Tempest which beares downe and ruines all, that is, while men instead of a formal and essential advancement are carried in a blinde Ambition to an Advancement onely Locall. For as those which are sick

sick and finde no Remedie, doe tumble up and downe and change place, as if by a remove Locall, they could obtaine a remove internall, and shift of their disease. So it is in Ambition that men being possess'd, and led away with a false resemblance of exalting their nature, purchase nothing else but an eminence and celsitude of *Place*.

§ But *Good Conservative* is no other then *the reception and fruition of things agreeable to our Nature*; and this *Good* tho it bee most simple and Native; yet seemes it to be of all other kinds of *Good* the softest and lowest. And this *Good* also admits a difference, which hath neither bin well judg'd of, nor well inquired; for the *Good of Fruition*, or (as it is commonly called) the dignitie and commendation of *delightful Good*, is placed either in the *Sincerity of the Fruition*, or in the *quicknesse and vigor* of it; whereof the one is superinduced by *Equality*; the other by *Variety* and *Viciscitude*: the one having a lesse mixture of *Evill*; the other a more strong and lively impressiion of *Good*. But of these, *whether is the greater Good*, is a question controverted; But *whether a mans nature may be capable of both at once*, is a question not inquired.

§ As touching that whereof a Question is rais'd: a Controversie began to be debated between *Socrates* and a *Sophist*; *Socrates* affirm'd; *That Felicitie was placed in a constant Peace and Tranquility of minde*; but the *Sophist* in this, *That a man desire much, and enjoy much*. And so they fell from Arguments to ill words; the *Sophists* saying *that Socrates Felicity was the Felicity of a block or stone*; *Socrates* on the other side, *That the Sophists Felicitie was the Felicitie of one that had the Itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch*. And both these opinions doe not want their supports; for to *Socrates* opinion assents even the Schoole of *Epicurus* which deemes not but that *Virtue* beareth a great part in *Felicitie*; and if so, *Certaine it is, that Virtue hath more use in cleering Perturbations, then in compassing desires*. The *Sophists* opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of; namely that *Good Perfective is greater than Good Preservative, because the obtaining of things desired, seemes by degrees to perfit nature; which*

Plato in  
Gorg.

though it doe not doe it indeed, yet the very motion it selfe in circle hath a shew of Progressive Motion.

§ But the second Question, (whether humane nature may not at once retaine, both the tranquillitie of Minde and the active vigor of fruition) decided the true way makes the former idle and superfluous. For doe we not often see that some men are so fram'd and compos'd by nature, as they are extremely affected with pleasures while they are present; and yet are not greatly troubled at the leaving or losse of them. So as the Philosophicall consequence, *Non uti, ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas*, seemes to be the resolution of a poore and diffident spirit. Surely most of the Doctrines of Philosophers seeme to be somewhat more fearefull & cautionary, then the nature of things requireth; as when they encrease the feare of death by curing it: for when they would have a mans whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, how can it be that that enimie should not seeme wonderfull terrible, against whom there is no end of preparing? better saith the Poet thoe a Heathen,

*Qui spacium vite extremum, inter munera ponat.*

*Natura.*

So have the Philosophers sought to make the Minde in all things uniforme and Harmonicall, by not breaking them to contrary Motions and extremes. The reason whereof I suppose to have bin, because they dedicated themselves to a private course of life; exempt & free from active imploiments and observances to others. But let men rather imitate the wisdom of Jewellers, who, if perchance, there be in the Gemme a Cloud or an Ice, which may so be ground forth, as it abate not the stone too much, they help it, otherwise they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure *Serentie* of minde as they destroy not *Magnanimitie*. Thus much of *Particulare Good*.

III. Now therefore after we have spoken of *Selfe-good* (which also we use to call *Good Particular, Private, Individuall*, let us resume the *Good of Communion*, which respecteth *Society*, This is commonly termed by the name of *Duty*, because

because the terme of *Duty*, is more proper to a mind well fram'd and dispos'd towards others; the terme of *Virtue*, to a mind well form'd and compos'd in it selfe. But this part at first sight may seeme to pertaine to *Science Civile*, or *Politique*, but not if it be well observed; for it concernes the Regiment and Government of every man over himselfe, and not over others. *And as in Architecture*, it is one thing, to frame the Posts, Beams, and other parts of an Edifice, and to prepare them for the use of building; and another thing, to fit and joyne the same parts together: and as in Mechanicalls, the direction how to frame, and make an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of erecting, moving, and setting it on work: So the doctrine of the conjugation of men, in a *Citty or Society*, differs from that which makes them conformed, and well affected to the weale of such a *Society*.

§ This Part of Duties is likewise distributed into two portions, whereof the one respects the *common duty of every man*; the other *the speciall and respective Duties*, of every man in his profession, vocation, state, person, and place. The first of these, hath bin well laboured, and diligently explicated by the Ancients and others, as hath bin said: the other we find to have bin sparsedly handled, althoe not digested into an entire body of a *Science*; which manner of dispersed kind of writing, we doe not dislike; howbeit in our judgement, to have written of this Argument by parts, were farre better. For who is endewed with so much perspicacity and confidence, as that he can take upon him to discourse, and make a judgement skilfully, and to the life, of the *peculiar and respective duties*, of every particular order, condition and profession? *And the treatises which are not seasond with experience, but are drawne only from a generall and Scholasticall notion of things, are touching such matters, for most part, idle and fruitlesse discourses.* For althoe sometimes a looker on may see more then a gamester; and there be a common proverbe, more arrogant than sound, proceeding from the cenlure of the vulgar, touching the actions of Princes,

*That the vale best discovereth the Hills; yet it could be especially wished, that none would intermeddle or engage themselves in subjects of this nature, but only such as are well experienc'd and practis'd in the particular customes of men.*

*Cic. Lib. 2. For the labours and vigilancies of speculative men, in Active de Oratore. Matters, doe seem to men of experience, little better than the discourses of Phormio of the warres, seemed to Hanniball, which esteemed them but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanies them, which write books of matters pertaining to their own profession, and Art, which is, that they magnify and extoll them in excessse.*

*K. JAMES. § In which kind of Books, it were a crime Piacular, not to mention, Honoris causa, Your Majesties excellent work touching the DORON. duty of a King: for this writing hath accumulated and congested BASIL. within it many treasures as well open as secret of Divinity, Morality, and Policy, with great aspersions of all other Arts; and it is in my opinion one of the most sound and healthfull writings that I have read. It doth not float with the heat of Invention, nor freeze and sleepe with the coldnesse of negligence: it is not now taken with a wheeling dizziness, so to confound and loose it selfe in its order; nor is it distracted and discontinued by digressions, as those discourses are; which by a winding expatiation, fetch in and enclose matter that speaks nothing to the purpose; nor is it corrupted, with the cheating Arts of Rhetoricall perfumes and paintings, who chuse rather to please the Reader, than to satisfy the nature of the Argument. But chiefly that work hath life and spirit, as Body and Bulke, as excellently agreeing with truth, and most apt for use and action: and likewise clearly exempt from that vice noted even now, (which if it were tolerable in any, certainly, it were so in KINGS, and in a writing concerning Regal Majesty) namely, that it doth not excessively and invidiously exalt the Crowne and Dignity of Kings. For Your Majesty hath not described a King of Persia or Assyria, radiant, and shining in extreme Pompe and Glory; but really, a Moses or a David, Pastors of the People. Neither can I ever loose out of my remembrance, a Speech, which Your Majesty, in the sacred*

*sacred Spirit, wherewith you are endowed to governe Your people, delivered in a great cause of Iudicature, which was, That Kings* IACOB. R. dictum memorab.  
 *rul'd by the Lawes of their Kingdomes, as God did by the Lawes of Nature; and ought as rarely to put in use that their prerogative, which transcends Lawes, as we see God put in use his power of working Miracles. And yet notwithstanding in that other book, written by Your Majesty, of a free* DE LIB MONAR.  
 *Monarchy, You give all men to understand, that Your Majesty, knows and comprehends the Plenitude of the Power of Kings, and the Ultimities (as the Schooles speak) of Regall Rights; as well as the circle and bounds of their Office, and Royall Duty. Wherefore I have presumed, to alleage that book written by Your Majesty, as a prime and most eminent example of Tractates, concerning speciall and Respective Duties. Of which Book, what I have now said, I should in truth have said as much, if it had bin written by any King a thousand years since. Neither doth that kind of nice Decency move me, whereby commonly it is prescribed not to praise in presence, so those Praises exceed not measure; or be attributed unreasonably or upon no occasion presented. Surely Cicero in that excellent oration Pro M. Marcello studies nothing else, but to exhibite a faire Table drawne by singular Art, of Cesars virtues, thoe that Oration was made to his face; which likewise Plinius secundus did to Trajan. Now let us resume our intended purpose.*

§ There belongs farther to this part, touching the *Respective Duties of vocations and particular Professions*, and other knowledge, as it were, *Relative and Opposite* unto the former, concerning the *Fraudes, Cautels, Impostures, and vices of every Profession*: For Corruptions and Vices, are opposed to Duties and Virtues. Nor are these *Depravations* altogether silenced in many writings and Tractates; but for most part, these are noted only upon the By, and that by way of Digression: but how? rather in a Satyre and Cynically after *Lucians* manner, than seriously and gravely, for men have rather sought by wit to traduce, and to expose to

Icorne that which is usefull and sound, in Arts and Professions; than to sever that which is good and wholesome, from that which is corrupt and vicious. But *Solomon* saith excellently; *A scorner seeks wisdom and findes it not; but knowledge is easy unto him that understands:* for he that comes to seek after knowledge, with a mind to scorne, and censure; shall be sure to find matter for his humor, but no matter for his instruction. And certainly a grave and wise Treatise of this argument, whereof we now speak, and that with sincerity and integrity, seemeth worthy to be reckoned one of the best fortifications of virtue and honesty, that can be planted. For as the *Fable* goes of the *Basiliske*, that if he see a man first, the man dies; but if a man see him first, the *Basiliske* dies; so it is with *Fraudes*, *Impostures*, and evill Arts; if a man discover them first, they loose their power of doing hurt; but if they prevent, then, and not otherwise, they endanger. So that we are much beholding to *Machiavill*, and such writers, who discover apertly and plainly, what men use to doe, not what men ought to doe: for it is not possible to joyne the *wisdom of the Serpent*, with the *Innocency of the Dove*, except a man know exactly the nature of evill it selfe; for without this skill, virtue lies open and unfencd; nay a sincere and honest man, can doe no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, unlesse he know all the coverts and profundities of *Malice*. For men of corrupt minds and deprav'd judgements, presuppose, that honesty growes out of the weaknesse of Nature, and simplicity of Manners, and only out of a beliefe given to Preachers and Schoole-Masters; as likewise to Books; *Morall Precepts*; and popular opinions: so that unlesse you can make them plainly to perceive, that their deprav'd and corrupt Principles, and crooked Rules, are as deeply sounded, and as plainly discovered, by those who exhort and admonish them, as they are to themselves, they despise all the integrity of *Morall Practices* or *Precepts*; according to that admirable Oracle of *Solomon*, *Non recipit stultus verba prudentia, nisi ea dixeris, quae versantur in corde ejus.* But this part concern-

Prov. 18. 2

2. A fool hath no  
 understanding  
 heart may discover it

concern-

concerning *Respective Cautels and viets*; we place in the number of DEFICIENTS, and will call it by the name of SATYRA SERIA, or of a Treatise *De Interioribus Rerum*. So to this kind of knowledge, touching *Respective Duties*, doe also appertaine the *Naturall Duties* between Husband and wife, Parents and Children, Master and Servant: so likewise the lawes of Friendship and Gratitude; as also the Civile bonds of Corporations, Companies, Colledges, Neighbour-hood and the like. But it must ever be presupposed, that they are here handled, not as parts of *Civile society* (for that is referr'd to the Politiques) but as to the framing and predisposing of the Minds of Particular persons, to the maintaining of those *Bonds of Society*.

§ But the Knowledge concerning the Good of Communion or of Society, even as that of Good Individuall, doth handle Good not *simple alone*, but also *comparatively*; whereunto belongs the waighing of Duties between Person and Person; Case and Case; Private and Publique; between time Present and Future: as we may see in the severe and cruell proceeding of L. Brutus against his own Sonnes, which by the most was extoll'd to the heavens; yet another said

*Infelix utcunq; ferent ea fata Min res.*

The same we may see in that supper unto which M. Brutus, and C. Cassius were invited, for there when there was a question shrewdly cast forth, *Whether it was lawfull to kill a Tyranne?* on purpose to feele the minds of the company, touching a conspiracy intended against *Cesars* life; the guests were divided in opinion; some said it was directly lawfull, *for that servitude was the extreme of Evills*; Others were of a contrary mind, *for that Tyranny was not so great a misery as Civile warre*; a third sort, as if they had issued out of the Schoole of Epicurus, avouched; *That it was an unworthy thing, that wise men should hazard their lives and States for Fooles*. But there are many Cases touching *comparative Duties*, amongst which, that of all other is the most frequent; *Whether a man ought to swerve from the rule of Justice, for the safety of his Country, or some such notable Goods to enjue afterward?*

Liv. Hist.  
lib. 2.  
Florus Hist.  
lib. 1.

Plutar. in  
M. Bruto.

ward? Touching which case Jason of *Theffalie* was wont to say, *Aliqua sunt injustè facienda ut multa justè fieri possint*, but the Reply is ready, *Auctorem presentis justitiae habes, sponsorem futurae non habes*: Men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine Providence. And thus touching the *Exemplar*, or of the description of *Good*.



### CAP. III.

- I. The Partition of the Doctrine of the Culture of the Mind, into the Knowledge of the Characters of the Mind. II. Of the Affections or Passions. III. And of the Remedies or Cures. IIII. An Appendix of the same Doctrine, touching the Congruity between the Good of the Mind, and the Good of the Body.

**N**OW that we have spoken in a Philosophical sense of the fruit of Life, it remains that we speak of the Culture of the Mind, which is due unto it, without which the former part seems nothing else, than an Image or Statue, beautifull to contemplate, but destitute of Life and Motion; to which opinion, *Aristotle* himselfe subscribes in these plain words, *Wherefore it is necessary to speak of virtue, both what it is, and from what it proceeds: for it would be to little purpose, to know virtue, and to be ignorant of the manner and means how to compasse it. Concerning virtue therefore inquiry must be made, not only of what kind it is, but by what wayes it may be acquired: for we desire both these, the knowledge of the thing it selfe, and the fruition thereof; but this cannot be effected, unlesse we know of what materialls it is compounded, and how to procure the same*: In such full words, and with such iteration doth he inculcate this Part; which yet notwithstanding himselfe pursues not. This likewise is the very same which *Cicero* attributes to *Cato* the Younger, as a great commendation, which was, that he had applyed himselfe to Philosophy, *Non disputandi causa, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi*. And althoe through the negligence of the times wherein

Mag. Moral.  
lib. I.

Pro. L. Mu-  
ran.

wherein we live, few hold any consultation diligently, to manure and till the Mind, and frame their course of life (according to some Rule; according to that of *Seneca*, *De par-* De Brev. vita.  
*tibus ritae quisque deliberat, de summa nemo*; so as this part may seem superfluous,) yet this moves us not, so as to leave it untouched, but rather we conclude with that Aphorisme Aphor. 1. 2.  
of *Hippocrates*, *They who are sick of a dangerous disease, and feele no paine, are distempered in their understanding*: Such men need medicine, not only to asswage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said that the *Cure of mens minds*, belongs to sacred Divinity, it is most truly said; but yet why may not *Morall Philosophy* be accepted into the traine of *Theology*, as a wise servant and a faithfull handmaid, ready at all commands to doe her service? For as it is in the *Psalme*, *That the eyes of the Hand-maid, look perpetually* Psal. 122.  
*towards the Mistresse*; and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion and care of the Hand-maid; so ought *Morall Philosophy* to give all due observance to Divinity, and to be obsequious to hir Precepts; yet so, as it may yeeld of it selfe, within its own limits, many sound and profitable directions. *This Part therefore*, when I seriously consider the excellency thereof, I can not but find exceeding strange, that it is not yet reduced into a *Body of Knowledge*. Wherefore seeing we have reported it as DEFICIENT, we will after our manner give some Adumbrations thereof.

I. *First therefore*, in this as in all things which are Practicall, we ought to cast up our account, *what is in our power*, GEORGI- CA ANI- MI, five de cultura Morum.  
*and what not: for the one may be dealt with by way of Alteration; the other by way of Application only.* The Husband-man cannot command either the nature of the Earth, or the seasons of the weather; no more can the Physitian the natural temper or constitution of the Patient or the variety of Accidents. Now in the *Culture of the mind of man*, and the cure of the Diseases thereof; three things fall into consideration: *The diverse Characters of Dispositions; the Affections; and the Remedies.* As in curing the Body three things are propounded, the *Complexion or Constitution of the Patient; the Disease; and the Cure*;

*Cure*; and of these three, the last only is in our power, the two former are not. Yet even in those things which are not in our power, no lesse diligent inquiry is to be made thereof, then in those which are subject to our power; for a distinct and exact knowledge of them, is to be laid as a ground-work to the *knowledge of the Remedies*; that they may be more aptly and successively applied; for neither can a garment be well fitted to the Body, unlesse you first take the measure of the Body.

§ *Wherefore* the first article of this knowledge of the *Culture of the Mind*, shall be conversant about the *diverse Characters of mens natures or dispositions*. Neither doe we here speak of those common Proclivities to virtues and vices; or Perturbations and passions: but of those which are more intrinsique and radicall. Surely for this part of knowledge, I doe much wonder that it should be, for most part, so neglected or slightly past over, by writers Moral and Political; considering it casts such resplendent beams upon both those kinds of knowledges. In the Traditions of *Astrology*, the natures & dispositions of men, are not without some colour of truth, distinguisht from the Prædominancies of Planets; as that some are by nature made and proportioned for *contemplation*; others for *matters Civile*; others for *Warre*; others for *Advancement*; others for *Pleasure*; others for *Arts*; others for changeable course of life. So among the Poets, Heroicall, Satyricall, Tragedians, Comedians, you shall finde every where, the Images of wits, althoe commonly with excessse and beyond the bounds of Truth. Nay this same Argument of the *divers Characters of Nature*, is one of those subjects, wherein the common discourses of men, (which very seldome, yet sometimes falls out) are more wise then Books. But the best provision and collection for such a treatise, ought to be fetcht from the observations of the wisest sort of Historians; not only from Elogies and Panegyriques, which commonly follow the death of a Person; but much more from the entire body of a History, so often as such a personage doth, as it were, enter upon the stage. For this inter-woven Image, seems to be a more lively description

tion, than the censure of an Elogy; such as is that in *T. Livius, of Africanus*, and of *Cato the Elder*; in *Tacitus of Tiberius, Claudius and Nero*; in *Herodian, of Septimius Severus*; in *Philip de Commines, of Lewis the XI. K. of France*; in *Fra. Guicciardine, of Ferdinand King of Spaine*; *Maximilian the Emperour*; *Leo and Clemens, Bishops of Rome*. For those writers fixing their eyes continually on the Images of these Persons, whom they made choice of to decipher, and purtrait, seldome mention their Acts and Atchievements, but withall, insert something touching their nature and dispositions; so likewise many *Relations, touching the Conclaves of Popes*, which we have met withall, represent good *Characters, and lively impressions*, of the naturall dispositions of *Cardinals*; as the letters of *Ambassadors*, set forth the nature and manners of *Counsilors to Princes*. Wherefore let there be a full, and perfect collection made of this argument, whereof we have spoken, which certainly is fertile and copious. *Neither would we*, that those *Characters in the Ethiques* (as it is with *Historians, Poets, and in common speech*;) should be accepted as perfit politique Images; but rather as the first draughts and rude lineaments of those Images, which compounded and commixt, constitute any resemblances whatsoever; how many and of what sort they may be; and how they are connext and subordinate one with another: that there may be made, as it were, an artificiall and accurate dissection of naturès and dispositions; and a discovery of the secree inclinations of Individual tempers; and that from a knowledge thereof, precepts of cure may be more pertinently prescribed.

§ And not only the *Characters of dispositions*, impressed by nature, should be received into this Tractate, but those also which are imposed upon the mind, from Sex, Age, Region, Health, Beauty, and the like: as also those from externè fortune, as of *Princes, Nobles, obscure Persons; Rich, Poore, Private persons, Prosperous, Miserable, and the like*. For we see *Plautus* makes it a wonder to see an old man Beneficent, *Benignitas quidem huius, oppidò ut adolescentuli est*: Mil. Glo.

and *S. Paule*, commanding that the severity of discipline, should be used to the *Cretans*, (*rebuke them sharply*) accuseth the nature of that Nation from a Poet; *Cretenses semper mendaces, mala bestia, ventres pigri*. *Salust* notes this in the nature of Kings, that it is usuall with them to desire contradictory; *Plerunq; Regia voluntates ut vehementes sunt; sic mobiles, saepeq; ipsa sibi adversa*. *Tacitus* observes that Honours and advancements, oftner change mens natures to the worse, than to the better, *Solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius*. *Pindarus* makes an observation, that great and *Sodom's* fortune for most part, loosens and dissinues mens minds; *sunt, qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt*: so the *Psalme* sheweth, that it is more easy to keep a measure and temperament, in a modest consistency; than in the increate of Fortune, *If Riches increase set not your heart upon them*. These observations and the like, I deny not, but are touched a litle by *Aristotle*, as in passage, in his *Rhetoriques*; as likewise in the writings of others dispersedly by the way; but they were never yet incorporated into *Morall Philosophy*, to which they doe principally appertaine; no lesse certainly, than the handling of the diversity of grounds and moulds, doth to *Agriculture*; or the handling of the diversity of complexions and constitutions of the body, doth to *Medicine*. The same must be observed here, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of *Empiriques*, which minister the same medicines to all Patients, of what constitution soever.

II. After the knowledge of *Characters* followes the knowledge of *Affections* and *Passions*, which are as the *Diseases of the Mind*, as hath bin said. For as the Ancient Politiques in Populare States were wont to say, *That the people were like the Sea, and the Orators like the windes*; because as the *Sea* would of it selfe be calme and quiet, if the *winds* did not move and trouble it; so the *People* of their nature would be peaceable and tractable, if the *seditionous Orators* did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be truly affirmed, that *mans mind* in the nature thereof, would be temperate

perate and staid, if the *affections* as windes, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here againe I finde it strange, that *Aristotle*, who writ so many books of *Ethiques*, should never in them, handle the *Affections*, as an essentiall member of *Ethiques*; and yet in the *Rhetoriques* where they are considered but Collaterally, and in a second degree (that is so farre as they may be rais'd and moved by speech) he findes place for them, (in which place notwithstanding, for such an abridgement, he discourseth acutely and well,) for his disputations about *pleasure and paine*, no way satisfy this inquiry; no more than he that should write only of *light* and *lightening*, could be said, to have written of the nature of *particular Colours*; for *Pleasure* and *Paine*, are to the particular affections, as *light* is to *Colours*. Better travailes the *Stoiques* have taken in this argument, as farre as may be conjectured from such Remaines as are extant; but yet such as consisted rather in curiosity of Definitions, than any full and ample descriptions. So likewise I find some elegant Bookes of some *affections*, as of *Anger*, of *tendernesse*, of *countenance*, and some few other. But to speak the truth, the best Doctors of *this knowledge* are the Poets, and writers of Histories, where we may finde painted and dissected to the life, how affections are to be stirred up and kindled; how still'd and laid a sleep; how againe contain'd and refrain'd, that they break not forth into Act? likewise how they disclose themselves thoe repressed and secreted? what operations they produce? what turnes they take? how they are enwrapt one within another? how they fight and encounter one with another? and other the like Particularities. Amongst the which, this last is of speciall use in Morale and Civile matters, *How I say, to set Affection against Affection; and by the helpe of one to master and reclaime another?* After the manner of Hunters and Fowlers, who hunt Beast with Beast; and fly Bird with Bird; which percase of themselves without the assistance of Bruit Creatures, a man could not so easily recover. Nay farther, upon this foundation, is erected that excellent and universall use in matters

Civile of *Premium* and *Pæna*, which are the *Pillars of Civile States*, seeing those *predominant Affections* of *Feare* and *Hope* doe bridle & suppress all other exorbitant *Affections*. Again, as in government of States, it is sometimes necessary to confront and bridle one Faction with another; so it is in the inward *Government of the Minde*.

III Now come we to those Points which are *within our own commande*, and have force and operation upon the mind, and also affect, dispose, and manage the *Will* and *Appetite*; and therefore are of great force to alter the manners. In which part the Philosophers ought to have made a painfull and diligent *Inquirie* touching the *Power and Energie of Custome, Exercise, Habit, Education, Conversation, Friendship, Praise, Reprehension, Exhortation, Fame, Laws, Books, Studies*, and other points of like nature. *These are they* which have the sway and dominion in *Moralitie*; from these Agents the mind suffereth and is disposed; of these, as of Ingredients, receipts are compounded, which conduce to the conservation and recovery of the Health and good estate of the Minde as far as may bee performed by Humane Remedies. Of which number we will select one or two whereupon wee will a litle insist as an example to the rest. We will therefore insinuate a few points *touching Custome and Habit*.

Moral. Nicom. lib. 2. That opinion of *Aristotle* seemeth to me to favour of negligence and a narrow Contemplation, where he asserts--*that those Actions which are naturall can not be changd by custome*; using for example--*that if a stone be throwne a thousand times up, it will not learne to ascend of its own accord: Moreover, that by often seeing or hearing, we doe not learne to heare or see the better*: for though this principle be true in some things wherein Nature is Peremptory (the reasons whereof wee cannot now stand to discusse) yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature according to a *Latitude* admits *intention* and *remission*. He might see that a straight glove by often drawing on, is made wider; and that a wand by use and continuance is bowed contrary to its naturall bent in the growth, and soone after staves in the same posture, that the voice

Voice by exercizing it becomes louder and stronger; that heat and cold are better endur'd by custome; and many instances of like kinde. Which two latter examples have a neerer resemblance and come neerer to the point, than those he there alleadgeth. But however this case be determin'd, by how much the more true it is; *that both Virtues and Vices consist in habit*; he ought, by so much the more, to have endeavour'd, to have so prescrib'd rules *how such habits might be acquired, or remov'd*: for there may be many Precepts made of the wise ordering of the *Exercises of the Minde*, no lesse then of the *Exercises of the Body*; whereof wee will recite a few.

§ *The first shall be; that we beware even at first of higher or smaller taskes, than the nature of the businesse requires, or our leisure or abilities permit*: For if too great a taske be impos'd, in a meane diffident nature, you blunt the edge of cheerefulness and blast their hopes; in a nature full of Confidence, you breed an opinion whereby a man promiseth to himselfe more than he is able to performe; which drawes on sloath and security; and in both those temperatures, it will come to passe that the experiment doth not satisfie the expectation; which ever discourageth and confounds the minde: but if the Tasks be too weake and easie, in the lumme of proceeding there is a losse and prejudice.

§ *A second shall be; that to the practising of any facultie, whereby a habit may be superinduced, two Seasons are chiefly to be observed, the one when the minde is best disposed to a businesse; the other when it is worst*: that by the one, we may be well forwards on our way; by the latter, we may by a strenuous contention worke out the knots and stonds of the minde; which makes midle times to passe with more ease and pleasure.

§ *A third Precept shall be that which Aristotle mentions by the way, which is to beare ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclin'd, so it be without vice.* Like as when we rowe against the streame; or when wee make a crooked wand straight by bending it the contrary way.

Moral. Nicom. lib. 2.

§ The Fourth Precept is grounded upon that Axiome which is most true. That the minde is brought to any thing, with more sweetnesse and happinesse, if that whereunto we pretend, bee not principal in the intention of the Doer; but be overcome, as it were, doing somewhat else; because the instinct of nature is such a freedome as hates necessity and compulsive commands. Many other rules there are which might profitably be prescribed touching the Direction of Custome: for Custome, if it be wisely and skilfully induced, proves (as it is commonly said) another nature; but being conducted absurdly and by chance, it is only the Ape of Nature; which imitates nothing to the life, but in a foolish deformity onely.

Moral. Nicom. Lib. I.

§ So if we should speake of Bookes and Studies, and of their power and influence upon Manners; are there not divers Precepts and fruitfull Directions appertaining thereunto? Hath not one of the Fathers in great indignation called *Poesie vinum Demonum*; being indeed it begets many Temptations, Lusts, and vaine Opinions? It is not a wise opinion of Aristotle and worthy to be regarded: That young men are no fit auditors of Morall Philosophy, because the boyling heat of their affections, is not yet settled, nor attemperd with Time and Experience. And to speake truth, doth it not hereof come that those excellent Books and Discourses of ancient Writers, (whereby they have perswaded unto virtue most effectually, representing as well her stately Majestie to the eyes of the world, as exposing to Scorne, popular Opinions in disgrace of Virtue, attired as it were, in their Parasite Coats) are of so litle effect towards honesty of life and the reformation of corrupt Manners; because they use not to be read and revolvd by men mature in yeeres and judgement; but are left and confin'd onely to Boyes and Beginners. But is it not true also that young men are much lesse fit Auditors of Policie than Morallitie, till they have bin throughly season'd with Religion and the knowledge of Manners and Duties; lest their judgements be corrupted and made apt to think that there are no Moral differences true and solid of things; but that all is to be valued according to a utilitie and fortune. As the Poet saith,

*Prosperum*

*Prosperum & felix scelus virtus vocatur.*

Juvenal.  
Sat. 13.

And againe,

*Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic Diadema.*

But the Poets seeme to speak this Satyrically, and in indignation; be it so, yet many Books of Policie doe suppose the same seriously and positively: for so it pleased *Machiavell* to say, *That if Caesar had bin overthrowne hee would have bin more odious than ever was Catiline*; as if there had bin no difference but in fortune onely, between a very fury composed of Lust and Blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) in the world. By this we see how necessary it is, for men to drink deeply *Pious and Morall knowledges*, before they tast *Politique*; for that they who are bred up in the Courts of Princes from tender yeeres, and in affaires of state, commonly never attaine an inward and syncere Probitie of Manners; how much further of from honestie, if to this fire of corrupt education there be administred the fewell of corrupt Books? Againe, even in Morall instructions themselves, or at least in some of them is there not a Caution likewise to be given, lest they make men too Precise, Arrogant, and Incompatible; according to that of *Cicero* touching *M. Cato*, *These Divine and excellent qualities which we see are his own proper endowments, but such as are sometimes deficient in him, are all deriv'd from Teachers and not from Nature.* There are many other Axioms touching those properties and effects which Studies and Books doe instill into the mindes of men: for it is true that he saith, *abeunt studia in mores*; which may likewise be affirm'd of those other points touching *Companie*; *Fame*, the *Lawes of our Countrey*, and the rest which a litle before we recited. But there is a kinde of *Culture of the Minde* which seemes yet more acurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground, *That the mindes of all Mortals are at some certaine times in a more perfect state; at other times in a more depraved state.* The purpose therefore and direction of this *Culture* is, that those good seasons may be cherish'd, & the evill crost, and expunged out of the Kalender. The fixation of good Times is procured by two meanes, by *vowes* or at

Pro L. Mu-  
rana.

Least *most constant Resolutions* of the Mind; and by *Observances and exercises*, which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in her devoir and continuall obedience. The *obliteration of evill Times* may be in like manner perfected two waies; by some kind of *Redemption or expiation of that which is past*; and by a *new course of life*, as it were, *turning over a clean leafe*. But this part seems wholly to appertaine to Religion, and Justly, considering that true and genuine *Morale Philosophy*, as was said, supplies the place of a Hand-maid only to *Divinity*. wherefore we will conclude this part of the *Culture of the Mind*, with that remedy which of all other meanes is the most compendious and summary; and againe the most noble and effectuall, to the reducing of the mind to virtue, and the placing of it in a state next to perfection: and this is, *That we make choice of, and propound to our selves, right ends of life and Actions, and agreeing to virtue; which yet must be such as may be in a reasonable sort within our compasse to attaine*. For if these two things be suppos'd, *that the ends of Actions be Honest and Good; and that the Resolution of the mind, for the pursuing and obtaining them, be fixt, constant, and true unto such ends*; it will follow that the mind shall forthwith transforme and mould it selfe into all virtues at once. And this indeed is an operation, which resembleth the *work of nature*, whereas other courses whereof we have spoken, are like the *work of the hand*. For as when a Carver cuts and graves an Image, he shapes only that part whereupon he works, and not the rest; as if he be fashioning the Face, the rest of the Body is a rude and formelesse stone still, till such time as he come to it: but contrariwise, when *Nature* makes a Flower or *Living Creature*, she ingenders and brings forth rudiments of all the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtues by *habite*, while a man practiseth *Temperance*, he doth not profit much to *Fortitude* and the like; but when we wholly dedicate and devote our selves to good and honest ends, look what virtue soever *such ends* commends and commands, our mind unto, we shall find our selves already invested and predif-

predisposited with a kind of hability and propension to pursue and expresse the same. And this may be that *State of Mind* which is excellently described by *Aristotle*, and expressed with the character, not of *virtue*, but a kind of *Divinity*, his words are these; *And with IMMANITY, we may not unaptly cowntre-balance, that ability which is above humanity; HEROICK OR DIVINE VIRTUE: and a litle after, for as Savage Creatures are incapable of Vice or Virtue; so is the Deity: but this state is a thing higher than virtue; that, somewhat else than vice.* Indeed *Plinius Secundus*, from the licence of Heathen magniloquence, set forth the virtue of *Trajane*, not as an imitation, but as a patterne too divine, when he saith, *That men need to make no other praies to the Gods, but that they would continue as good and as gracious Lords to them, as Trajane had bin.* But these are the prophane and unhallowed Aires of Heathens, who apprehend shadowes greater then the Body: but true Religion, and the Holy Christian Faith, laies hold on the substance it selfe, imprinting upon mens Minds *Charity*, which is most properly called, *The bond of perfection*; because it comprehends and fastens all virtues together. Surely it is elegantly said by *Menander* of *vaine Love*, which is but a counterfeit imitation of *Divine Love*, *Amor melior sophista levo, ad humanam vitam*; by which words he insinuates, *that good and decent carriage, is better learn'd from Love, then from a Sophist, or an inept Tutor*; whom hee calls *Left-handed*, because with all his tedious Rules and Precepts, he cannot forme a man so dexterously, and with that facility to valu himselfe, and governe himselfe, as *Love* can doe. So certainly, if a mans mind be truly inflamed with the *heat of Charity*, he shall be exalted to a greater degree of Perfection, then by all the *Doctrine of Morality*, which, indeed, is but a *Sophist* in comparison of the other. Nay farther as *Xenophon* observed truly, *That all other affecti- ons thoe they raise the Mind, yet they distort and disorder it by their extasies and excesses; but only love doth at the same instant, dilate and compose the mind.* So all other humane excellencies, which we admire; thoe they advance nature, yet they

Moral. Nicom. lib. 7.

Paneg.

Colos. 3.

De Inst. Cyri.

- are subject to *excesse*; only *Charity* admits no *excesse*. So we see the Angels while they aspired to be like God in power, prevaricated and fell, *I will ascend above the altitude of the cloudes, I will be like the most high*. So man, while he aspired to be like God in Knowledge, digressed and fell: *ye shall be like Gods knowing Good and Evil*: but by aspiring to a similitude of Gods *Goodnesse* or *Love*, neither Man nor Angell ever was endangered, nor shall be endangered. Nay we are invited to this imitation *Blesse them that curse you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; that you may be the sonnes of your father which is in Heaven: for he makes his Sunne to rise on the Evil and on the Good; and sends Raine upon the just, and upon the unjust*. So in the first Platforme of the Divine Nature, the Heathen Religion placeth Gods attributes thus, *Optimus Maximus*; and sacred Scripture speaks thus, *Miseri-cordia ejus, supra omnia opera ejus*.

§ Wherefore we have now concluded this part of *Morall knowledge* concerning the *Culture and Regiment of the Mind*; wherein if any from a contemplation of the Portions thereof, which we have strictly enumerated, doth judge that our labour is only this, *to Collect and Digest, into an Art or Science, that which hath bin pretermitted by other writers, as matter of common sense and experience, and of themselves cleere and perspicuous; let him freely enjoy his judgement*: yet in the meane let him be pleased to remember what we premonisht at first, that our purpose was not to pursue the flourish and beauty of things; but their use and verity. Likewise let him a while ponder in his mind that invention of the Ancient Parable, touching the *two gates of sleepe*.

Virg. Æn.  
6.

*Sunt geminae somni Porta, quarum altera fertur  
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris;  
Alter a candenti perfecta nitens Elephanto  
Sed falsa ad Cælum mittunt insomnia Manes.*

A gate of *Ivory* is indeed very stately, but true Dreams passe through the *Gate of Horne*.

IV. By way of supplement that observation about *Morall Knowledge*, may be set downe, which is, *that there is a kind*

*kind of relation and Conformity between the Good of the mind, and the Good of the Body. For as the Good of the Body consists as hath bin said, of Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure; So the Good of the Mind, if we consider it according to the Axioms and Precepts of Morale Knowledge, we shall perceive tend to this point, to make the mind sound, and discharg'd from Perturbation; Beautifull and graced with the ornaments of true Decency; strong to all duties of life; Lastly not stupid, but retaining an active and lively sence of Pleasure and honest Recreation. But these foure, as in the Body, so in the mind, seldome meet altogither. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage; who yet notwithstanding are infested with perturbations, and whose manners are litle season'd with elegancy and Beauty of Behaviour, in their doings: some againe, have an Elegancy and finenesse of cariage, which have neither soundnesse of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency in their doings: some have honest Minds, purified from the staine of Guilt, which yet can neither become themselves, nor manage businesse: others which perchance are capable of all these three Qualities, but possess with a sullen humor of Stoical sadnesse, and stupidity, they practise virtuous Actions, but enjoy neither themselves, nor the fruit of their good Parts: and if it chance that of these foure two or three sometimes meet, yet a concurrence of all foure very seldome falls out. And now we have concluded that Principall member of Humane Philosophy, which considers Man, as he consists of Body and Soule; but yet, as he is segregate and separate from society.*

Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is arranged in several paragraphs and is difficult to decipher due to its low contrast and orientation.

And now we have  
a number of human beings  
who are not only  
but also



THE EIGHTH BOOK OF  
**FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM**  
 VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE  
 DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
 OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

I. *The Partition of Civile knowledge into the Knowledge of  
 Conversation; the Knowledge of Negotiation;  
 and the Knowledge of Empire, or  
 of State Government.*



Here is an ancient Relation (Excellent KING) of a solemne Convention of many Philosophers before the Ambassador of a forraine Prince, and how that every one according to their severall abilities made demonstration of their wisdome; that so the Ambassador might have matter of report touching the admired wisdome of the Grecians: But amongst these, one there was, as the storie goes, that stood still and utter'd nothing in the assemblie, insomuch as the Ambassador turning to him should say: *And what is your guift, that I may report it?* To whom the Philosopher, Report (saith he) *unto your King, that you found one amongst the Grecians that knew how to hold his peace:* and indeed J had forgotten in this compend

Plutar. in  
 Moral.

compend of *Arts* to interfert the *Art of Silence*; which notwithstanding (because it is DEFICIENT) I will teach by mine own example. For seeing the order and contexture of matter hath brought me at length to this point, that I must now a litle after handle the *Art of Emptre*; and being I write to so *Great a King*, which is so perfect a Master in this science, wherein he hath bin trained up even from his infancy; nor can I be altogether unmindfull, what place I hold under your Majestie; I thought it would best become me in this point to approve my selfe unto your Majestie, by *Silences*, rather than by *Writing*. Cicero makes mention not only of an *Art*, but of a kinde of *Eloquence* found in *Silence*: for after he had commemorated in an *Epistle to Atticus* many conferences which had interchangeably past between him and another, he writeth thus, *In this place I have borrowed somewhat from your Eloquence, for I have held my peace.* And Pindar to whom it is peculiar suddenly to strike, as it were, with a divine Scepter, the mindes of men, by rare short sentence, darts forth some such saying as this, *Interdum magis afficiunt non dicta quam dicta*: wherefore I have resolv'd in this part to be *Silent*, or which is next to *Silence*, to be very briefe. But before I come to the *Arts of Empire*, some things by way of Preoccupation are to be set downe concerning other *Portions of Civile Doctrine*.

§ *Civile Science* is conversant about a subject which of all other is most immers'd in matter, and therefore very difficultly reduced unto *Axioms*: yet there are many circumstances which help this difficultie: for first, as Cato the Censor was wont to say of his Romans: *That they were like Sheepe, a man were better drive a flock of them, then one of them; for in a Flock, if you could get but some few to goe right, you shall have all the rest follow of their own accord*: So in this respect indeed, the *Dutie of Moralitie* is somewhat more difficult then that of *Policy*. Secondly *Moralitie* propounds to it selfe that the Minde be imbued and furnisht with *Internal Goodnesse*; but *Civile Knowledge* requires no more, but *Goodnesse externall* onely, for this as respecting society, sufficeth. Wherefore

Ad Atticū.

Pindar.

Plutar. in  
M. Catone.

Wherefore it often comes to passe that the Government is Good, the Times Bad: for in sacred story the saying is often repeated, speaking of Good and Godly Kings, *And yet the People directed not their hearts to the Lord God of their Fathers*; wherefore in this respect also the parts of Ethique are more austere and difficult. *Thirdly, States* have this nature, that like great Engines they are slowly moved, and not without great paines; whence it comes that they are not so easily put out of frame; *For as in Agypt* the seven good yeares upheld the seven bad; so in States, the good government and Lawes of Precedent times cause that the errors of succeeding times, doe not so quickly supplant and ruine: but the Decrees and Customes of particular persons, are more suddenly subverted. And this likewise doth charge Moralitie, but easeth Policy.

I. *Civile Knowledge* hath three parts, according to the three summarie Actions of Society; *The Doctrine of Conversation; the Doctrine of Negotiation; and the Doctrine of Empire or Republicques*. For there are three sorts of Good, which men seek to procure to themselves from civile Society; *comfort against solitude, Assistance in buisnesse, and Protection against Injuries*: and these be three wisdomes distinct one from the other, and often times disjoyn'd; *Wisdome in Conversation; Wisdome in Negotiation, & Wisdome in Gubernation*.

§ *As for Conversation*, certainly it ought not to be affected, but much lesse despised; seeing a wise moderation thereof, hath both an honour, and grace of Manners in it selfe, and a powerfull influence for the apt manage of Bu-  
sinesse, as well Publique, as Private. *For as Action in an Orator*, is so much respected, (thoe it be but an outward quality) that it is preferr'd before those other Parts which seeme more grave and intrinseque; so *Conversation & the government thereof*, in a man of a Civile Practique life ( however it consisteth in outward ceremonies ) finds, if not the chiefest, yet certainly a very eminent place. Of what speciall importment the very *Countenance* is, and the composure thereof, the Poet insinuat where he saith,

*Nec vultu destrue verba tuo.*

A man may cancell and utterly betray the force of his words, with his *Countenance*. Nay the *Deeds* as well as *Words* may likewise be destroyed by the *Countenance*, if we may believe *Cicero*, who when he would commend to his Brother *Affabilitie* towards the Provincials said, that it did not chiefly consist in this to give easie accessse unto his Person, unlesse likewise he received them courteously even with his *Countenance*; *Nil interest habere ostium, apertum, vultum, clausum*: It is nothing wonne, to admit men with an open dore, and to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see *Atticus* before the first interview between *Cæsar* and *Cicero*, the warre depending did diligently and seriously advise *Cicero* by a letter touching the composing and ordering of his *countenance* and *gesture*. And if the government of the *Face* and *Countenance* alone be of such effect, how much more is that of familiar *speech* & other *earriage* appertaining to *Conversation*. And indeed the summe and abridgement of the *Grace* and *Elegancy* of *Behaviour*, is for most part comprized in this, that we measure in a just ballance and maintaine both our own *Honour* and the *Reputation* of others. The true Module whereof *T. Livius* hath well expressed (thoe intended to an other purpose) in the Character of a Person, *Least* (saith he) *I should seem either arrogant or obnoxious, wher eof the one is the humor of a man that forgets the libertie of another; the other of a man that forgets the liberty of himselfe*. But on the other side if *Urbanity* and outward *Elegancy* of *Behaviour* be intended too much, they passe into a deformed & counterfeit *Affectation*. *Quid enim deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre. To Act a mans life*. But though they fall not by insensible degrees into that vicious extreme; yet too much time is consumed in these small matters; and the mind by studying them is too much depress'd and broken. And therefore as *Tutors* and *Preceptors* use to advise young *Students* in *Universities*, too much addicted to keep company; by saying, *Amicos esse fures temporis*: so certainly this same continuall intention of the minde upon the comelineffe of *Behaviour*, is a great theefe

De Petit.  
ConsulatûsLib. XII.  
Epist. ad  
Att.

Livius.

to more solemn Meditations. *Again*, such as are so exactly accomplisht in *Urbanitie*, and seeme, as it were, form'd by nature for this quality alone, are commonly of such a disposition, as please themselves in this one habit onely, and seldom aspire to higher and more solide virtues: whereas on the contrary, those that are conscious to themselves of a Defect this way, seek *Comelineffe* by *Reputation*; for where *Reputation* is, almost every thing becommeth; but where *that* is not, it must be supplied by *Puntoes & Complement*. *Again*, there is no greater or more frequent impediment of Action than an overcurious observance of *Decency* & of that other ceremony attending on it, which is a too scrupulous *Election of time & opportunities*: for *Solomon* saith excellently, *qui observat ventū non seminat, & qui considerat nubes nunquā metet*: We must make opportunity oftner then finde it. To conclude, this *comely grace* of *Behaviour* is, as it were, the Garment of the Minde, and therefore must have the conditions of a Garment: for first it ought to be such as is in fashion; againe, it ought not to be too curious or costly, than it ought to be so shaped as to set forth any good making of the mind, and to supply and hide any deformity; lastly and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or so to restraints the spirit, as to repress and hinder the motion thereof in business. But this part of *Civile knowledge* touching *Conversation*, hath bin indeed elegantly handled, nor can it any way be reported as *Deficient*.

Eccles. 11.



## CAP. II.

I. The Partition of the *Doctrine of Negotiation* into the knowledge of dispersed Occasions. II. And into the Knowledge of the *Advancement of life*. § Examples of the knowledge of Scatter'd Occasions from some of Solomons Parables. § Precepts touching the *Advancement of fortune*.

**T**He knowledge touching *Negotiation*, we will divide into a knowledge concerning *Scatter'd Occasions*; and the Knowledge concerning the *Advancement of Life*; whereof the one comprehends all the variety of *Businesse*, and is, as it were, the *Secretary* of a *Practique* course of life; the other onely seleçts and suggests such observations as appertaine to the *advancing of a Mans proper fortune*, which may be to every man as intimate and reserved *Table-Books*, and *Memorials* of their *Affaires*.

§ But before we descend to the Particular kinds, wee will speak something by way of Preface, in generall, touching the *The knowledge of Negotiation*. *The knowledge of Negotiation* no man hath handled hetherto according to the dignity of the Subject; to the great derogation of Learning, & the Professors of Learning: for fró this root springeth that note of *Dullnesse* which hath defamed the Learned, which is; *That there is no great concurrence betweene Learning and Practique wisdom*. For, if a man observe it well, of the three *wisdomes* which we have set downe to pertaine to *Civile life*, that of *Conversation* is by learned men for the most part despised as a servile thing and an enemie to *Meditation*. As for that *wisdom* concerning *Government*, Learned men acquit themselves well, when they are called to the manage of *Civile Affaires* in state; but that is a *Promotion* which happeneth to few. Concerning the *WISDOME OF BUSINESSE* (whereof we now speak) wherein mans life is most conversant; there be no Books at all written of it except

cept a handfull or two of some few *Civile Advertisements*, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this Subject. For if there were Books extant of this Argument, as of other: I doubt not, but Learned men with meane experience would farre excell men of long experience without Learning; and *out-shoot them* (as they say) *in their own Bowe*. Neither is there any cause why we should feare least the Matter of this *Knowledge* should be so various, that it could not fall under Precepts, for it is much narrower than the *Science of Government*, which notwithstanding we see is exactly labour'd, and subdued. Of this kinde of *Wisdome*, it seemes there have bin some Professors amongst the *Romans* in their best and wisest times. For *Cicero* reports that it was in use a litle before his time for Senators, that had the the name and opinion for wise and experienced men (the *Coruncanii*, *Curii*, *Laelii*, and others) to walke at certaine houres in the *Forum*, where they might give accessse and audience to the Citizens, and might be consulted withall; not onely touching point of *Law*, but of all sorts of *Businesse*; as of the *Marriage of a Daughter*; or of the *bringing up of a Sonne*; or of a *Purchase*, of a *Bargaine*, of an *Accusation*, *Defence*; and every other occasion incident to mans life. By this it plainly appeares, that there is a *Wisdome of giving Counsil and Advise* even in Private Businesse; arising out of an universall insight into the Affaires of the World; which is used indeed upon particular Causes, but is gathered by generall observation of Causes of like nature. For so we see in the Book which *Q. Cicero* writeth unto his Brother, *De Petitione Consulatus* (being the onely Booke of Particular Businesse, that I know written by the Ancients) althoe it concerned specially an Action then on foot, yet it containes in it many Politique Axiomes, which prescribe not only temporarie use, but a perpetual direction in the case of Popular Elections. And in this kinde nothing is extant which may any way be compar'd with those Aphorismes which *Solomon the King* set forth, of whom the Scriptures testifie, *That his Heart was as the Sands of the Sea*: For as the Sands of the Sea do incompassse all the utmost bounds of the

Cicero.

Q. Cicero  
de Petitione  
Consul.

1. Reg. iv.

world; so his wisdom comprehended all matters, as well humane, as divine. In these *Aphorismes* you shall cleerly discover, beside those precepts which are more divine, many most excellent Civile precepts and advertisements, springing out of the profound secrets of *wisdom*, and flowing over into a large field of variety. Now because we report as DEFICIENT, *the Doctrine touching dispersed occasions*, (which is a first portion of *the knowledge of Businesse*) we will, after our manner, stay a while upon it, and propound an example thereof, taken out of those *Aphorismes*, or *Parables* of *Solomon*. Neither is there in our judgement, any cause of just reprehension, for that we draw from writers of sacred Scripture, something to a political sense; for I am verily of opinion, that if those *Commentaries of the same Solomon were now extant concerning Nature* (wherein he hath written of all *Vegetables*, *From the Moss upon the wall, to the Cedar of Libanus; and of living creatures*) it were not unlawful to expound them according to a naturall sense; the same liberty we may take in the *Politiques*.

AMANV-  
ENSIS  
VITÆ, si-  
vè de occa-  
sionibus  
Sparfis.

AN EXAMPLE OF A PORTION OF  
the Doctrine concerning DISPERSED  
OCCASIONS, from some  
*Parables of Solomon.*

THE PARABLE.

Prov. xv. 1.

I. *A soft Answer appeaseth Wrath.*

THE EXPLICATION.

If the wrath of a Prince or of a great Person be kindled against thee, and it be now thy turne to speak, *Solomon* gives in precept two points; one is, *that an answer be made*; the other, *that the same be soft*. The First contains three precepts; *First that you beware of a sad, and sullen silence*: for that either charges the fault wholly upon your selfe, as if you had nothing to say for your selfe; or closely appeacheth your Master

ster of some injustice, as if his ears were not open to a just Defence. *Secondly that you beware of delaying and putting off a Businesse,* and that you crave not a longer day to give in your defence: for this procrastination, either insinuates the same prejudice the former did, (which is that your Lord and Master is led away with too much passion and partiality) and plainly betraies, that you are devising some cunning and counterfeit Apology, seeing you have no present answer ready. Wherefore it is ever the best course to say something instantly in your own defence, according as the occasion of the present businesse shall administer. *Thirdly that by all means, an answer be made;* an answer (I say) not a meere confession or a meere submission, but yet not without some sprinklings of an Apology and excuse let fall here and there; nor is it safe to beare your selfe otherwise, unlesse you have to deale with very generous and noble dispositions; which are very rare. *It follows in the second place,* that the answer made, be soft and temperate; and not harsh and peremptory.

## THE PARABLE.

- II. *A wise Servant shall have command over a reproachfull Sonne, and shall divide the Inheritance among the brethren.* Prov. xvii. 2

## THE EXPLICATION.

**I**N all troubled and disagreeing Families, there ever ariseth up some servant or gentle friend, powerfull with both sides; which may moderate, and compound the differences of the Family; to whom, in that respect, the whole house and the master himselfe are engag'd and beholding. *This Servant,* if he aime only, at his own ends, cherishes and aggravates the Divisions of a Family; but if he be sincerely faithfull, and upright, certainly he deserves much; so, as to be reckon'd as one of the brethren; or at least, to receive a Fiduciary Administration of the inheritance.

## THE PARABLE.

PROV. XXIX. 9. III *If a wise man contests with a Foole, whet her he be in anger, or in jest, there is no quiet.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

WE are often admonisht to *avoid unequall commerce;* in this sense, *not to contend with our Betters;* but it is a no lesse profitable instruction, which *Solomon* here sets downe, *Not to undertake a worthlesse person;* for such a businesse is usuallly concluded upon termes of disadvantage; for to overcome is no victory, but to be conquer'd a foule disgrace: and it is all one in the heat of this engagement, whether we deale by way of jesting, or by way of disdain and scorne; for howsoever we change Copy, we are embas'd and made the lighter thereby; nor shall we handsomely come off with credit. *But* the worst inconvenience of all is, when the Person with whom we contend (as *Solomon* speaks) hath somewhat of the *Foole* in him; that is, if he be witlesse and wilfull; have some heart, no braine.

## THE PARABLE.

ECCLES. VII. 21. IV. *Lend not an Eare to all words that are spoken, lest perchance thou hearst thy servant curse thee.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

IT is a matter almost beyond beliefe, what disturbance is created by *unprofitable curiosity*, about those things which concerne our personall interest: that is, when we make a too scrupulous enquiry after such secrets; which once disclosed and found out, doe but cause molestation of mind, and nothing conduce to the advancing of our designs. *For first there followes vexation and disquietnesse of Mind;* being that

that all humane affaires are full of faithlesnesse and ingratitude; so as if there could be procured some enchanted glasse wherein we might behold the hatred, and whatsoever malice is any way raised up against us; it were better for us that such a glasse, were forthwith throwne away and broken. For *slanders* of this nature, are like the impotent murmures of Leaves on Trees, and in short time vanish. Secondly, *this Curiosity fills the mind with ungrounded jealousies*, which is a capitall enemy to Counsils, and renders them inconstant and involv'd. Thirdly, *the same curiosity doth oftentimes fixe evils, which of themselves would fly away*. For it is a dangerous matter for to provoke mens consciences, who if they think themselves undiscover'd, are easily chang'd to the better; but if once they perceive themselves dismaskt, they drive out one mischief with an other. Wherefore it was deservedly judg'd, a point of great wisdom in *Pompeius Magnus*, that he instantly burnt all *Sertorius* papers unperus'd by himselve; or permitted to be so by others. Plutar. in Pomp.

## THE PARABLE.

V. *Thy Poverty shall come as a Travellour,* Prov. vi. 11.  
*and thy Want as an armed Man.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**I**N this Parable, it is elegantly described how the shipwrack of Fortunes falls upon Prodigalls, & on such as are carelesse of their Estates; for Debt & Diminution of stock, comes upon them at first by insensible degrees, with soft-silent paces, like a Traveller, and is hardly perceived; but soone after *necessity invades him like an armed man*, that is, with so strong and potent an armè, as there is no more resistance to be made; so it was said by the Ancients, *that of all things necessity was the strongest*. Wherefore we must prevent the Travellour; and be well provided against the armed Man.

## THE PARABLE.

Prov. ix. 7. VI. *He that instructs a scorner, procures to himselfe a reproach; and he that reprehends a wicked man, procures to himselfe a staine.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

Mat. 7.

**T**His Parable agrees with our Saviours precept, *That we cast not our Pearles before swine.* In this Parable the Actions of *Instruction*, & of *Reprehension* are distinguisht, as also the Actions of a *scorner*, and of a *wicked person*. Lastly that which is retaliated, is differenced. For in the former part, lost labour is return'd; in the latter, a staine and dishonour is repaid. For when a man teacheth and instructeth a *scorner*, first the time thus imployed is cast away, and then others also deride his paines, as a fruitlesse designe, and a labour ill placed; Last of all, the scorner himselfe despiseth the knowledge which he hath learned. But the matter is transacted with greater danger in the *reprehension of the wicked*; because a wicked nature, not only gives no eare to advise, but turnes head against his *Reprehender*, now made odious unto him; whom he either wounds presently with contumelies; or traduces afterwards to others.

## THE PARABLE.

Prov. x. 1. VII. *A wise Sonne is the gladnesse of his Father; but a foolish Sonne is the sadnesse of his Mother.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He joyes and griefes domesticall of *Father* and *Mother* touching their Childre, are here distinguisht: for a wise and well-govern'd Sonne, is chiefly a comfort, to the *Father*, who knowes the value of virtue, better than the *Mother*, and therefore more rejoyceth at the towardlinesse of his *Sonne* inclinable to goodnesse: yea and it may be his education

cation of him, that he hath brought him up so well; and implanted in his tender years, the Civility of manners, by precepts and example, is a joy unto him. *On the other side*, the Mother is more griev'd, and discomforted at the calamity of a Sonne, both because the affection of a Mother is more soft and tender; as also perchance, being conscious of hir too much indulgence, she hath tainted and corrupted his tender years.

## THE PARABLE.

VIII. *The memory of the Just is blest; but the name of the wicked shall putrify.* Prov. x. 7.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**H**ere is distinguisht the *Fame* of good men and of evil; such as commonly falls out after Death: for the *Name* of good men, after envy is extinguisht, (which cropt the blossom of their *Fame*, while they were alive) presently shootes up and flourisheth; and their *Praises* daily encrease in strength and vigor: but for wicked men (though their *Fame* through the partiall favour of Friends, and of men of their own faction last for a short time) a detestation of their *Name* springs up, and at last their transient glory exhales in infamy, and expires in a filthy and noisome odor.

## THE PARABLE.

IX. *He that troubles his own house shall inherit the winde.* Prov. xi. 29.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**A** Very profitable admonition touching *Discord and Domestique Breaches*. Many promise to themselves great matters, by the *dissentions of Wives*; or the *Disinheriting of Sonnes*; or the often *changing of Servants*; as if the *Tranquillity of mind*; or the administration of their *Affaires*

were by this means advanced, and should become more prosperous unto them. But commonly *their hopes turne to winde*; for those alterations; for most part, succeed ill, and those *Perturbers of their owne house*, often times meet with many vexations, and ingratitude from *them*, whom (passing by others) they adopted and loved: Nay by this means they draw upon their Persons ill Reports, and doubtfull rumors. For it is well noted of *Cicero, Omnem famam a Domesticis emanare*. Both these evils, *Salomon* excellently expresses by the *inheritance of winds*: for the *Frustrating of Expectation*; and the *raising of Rumors*, are rightly compared to *Winds*.

De Pet.  
Consul.

THE PARABLE.

Eccles. vii X. *Better is the end of a speech, than the Beginning thereof.*

THE EXPLICATION.

**T**His Parable taxeth, and reformes a frequent error committed, not only by them which chiefly, *study words*; but even by the more wise and grave. The error is this, *that men are more solicitous of the ingresse and entrance of their speech; than of the close and issue: and more exactly meditate the Exordiums and Prefaces; than the conclusions of speeches*. But they should neither neglect those, and yet have these about them, as the more material parts, ready prepar'd and digested; considering with themselves, and so farre, as may be, fore-casting in their minds, what may be the issue of speech and conference at last; and businesse thereby may be promoted and matured. Yet this is not all; for you must not only *study Epilogues, and conclusions of speeches, which may be pertinent to businesse; but also regard must be taken of such speeches, as may aptly and pleasantly be cast in, at the very instant of your departure, althoe they have no reference at all to the businesse in hand*. I knew two Counsilors, Personages of high ranke, and wise men; and on whom the charge

charge of State-affaires did then principally depend; whose common, and, to them, peculiar custome it was, that so often as they were to negotiate with their Princes about their own affaires; never to close their conference with any matter referring to that businesse; but ever seek diversions, either by way of jest; or by somewhat, that was delightfull to heare; and so, as the Adage renders it, *wash over at the conclusion of all, their Sea-water discourses, with fresh fountaine water.* And this usage was one of their chiefe Arts.

## THE PARABLE

XI. *As dead Flies cause the best oyntment, to send forth an ill Odor; so doth a litle folly him that is in reputation for wisdom and honour.* Eccles. x. 1.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He case of Men remarkable for eminent gifts, is very unhappy and miserable (as the Parable excellently notes,) because their errors, be they never so small find no remission. But as in a pure Diamond every least grain, or litle cloud, strikes the eye, and affects it with a kind of trouble; which upon a more grosse Diamond would hardly be discerned: even so in men of eminent parts, the least infirmities are presently spied, talked of, and more deeply censur'd; which in men of more meane and obscure gifts, and ranke, would either altogether passe without notice, or easily procure pardon. Therefore a litle Folly in a very wise man; and a small offence in a very honest man; and a slight indecency of manners, in a man of Courtly and Elegant behaviour; much derogates from their fame and reputation. So that it is not the worst course for eminent persons, to mingle some absurdities (so it may be done without guilt) in their Actions; that they may retaine a kind of liberty to themselves, and confound the characters of smaller defects.

## THE PARABLE.

PROV. XXIX. 8

XII. *Scornfull men insnare a Citty, but  
Wise men divert wrath.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**I**T may seem strange, that *Solomon* in the description of men, made, as it were, and by nature fram'd to the ruine and destruction of a state, hath chosen the character; *not of a proud and insolent man; not of a tyrannicall and cruell nature; not of a rash and violent man; not of an impious and wicked person; not of a seditious and turbulent spirit; not of an incontinent and sensuall inclination; not of a foolish and unable Person; but of a Scorners.* But this is a judgement, worthy the wisdome of that King, who best knew the grounds of the conservation, or everision of a state. For there is not commonly a like Plague to Kingdomes and Commonwealths, than if Counsilors of Princes, or Senators, and such as sit at the helme of Government, are by nature *Scorners*. For such persons, that they may win the reputation of undanted states-men, doe ever extenuate the greatnesse of dangers; and insult over those that valed dangers, according to the true waight; as timorous and faint-hearted natures. They *scoffe* at all mature delayes, and meditated debateings of matters by consultation, and deliberation; as a thing too much tasting of an oratory-veine; and full of tediousnesse; and nothing conducing to the summe and issues of Businesse. *As for Fame*, at which the counsils of Princes should especially leuell, they contemne it, *as the spittle of the vulgar*, and a thing will quickly be blown over. *The powre* and Authority of Lawes, they respect no more, than as cobwebbs, which should not insnare matters of greater consequence: *Counsils* and Precautions, foreseeing events a farre off, they reject, as meere dreams and Melancholy apprehensions: *men seriously wise*, and well seen in the world, and of great resolution and Council, they defame with

with gibes and jeasts: *in a word*, they doe at once prejudice, and weaken the whole foundation of Civile government; which is the more to be looked into, because the Action is performed by secret fraude, and not open force; and is a practise not so suspected, as it demerites.

## THE PARABLE.

XIII. *A Prince that lends a willing eare to lies,  
his servants are all wicked.*

PROV. XXIX. 12.

## THE EXPLICATION.

WHEN a Prince, is of such a temper as to lend an easy and credulous eare, without due examination, to De-tractors and Sycophants, there breaths a pestilentiaall ayre from the Kings side; which corrupts & infects all his servants. Some feele out the feares and jealousies of a Prince; and aggravate the same with fain'd reports: Others awake the furies of envy, especially against the best deserving in the state: Others seek to wash away their own guilt, and the stains of a foule conscience, by defaming others: Others give saile to the Honours and wishes of their friends, by traduceing, and debasering the merit of their competitors: Others compose Fabulous enterludes against their enemies, and concurrents, as if they were upon the stage; and infinite such like. And these are the Arts of such servants to Princes, as are of a vile and base nature. But they that are of a more honest disposition, and better civilz'd; when they perceive their innocence to be no safe sanctuary (in that their Prince knowes not how to distinguish between truth and falsehood) they put off morall honesty, and gather in the Court-windes; and are therewith, carried about in a servile manner. For as Tacitus saith of Claudius. *There is no safety with that Prince, into whose head all things are conveyed, as it were, by infusion and direction from others.* And Commine's very well, *It is better to be servant to a Prince, whose jealousies have no end, then to a Prince, whose Credulity hath no meane.*

Aliud sonã  
Aunal. xii.Histoire de  
Commynes.

THE

## THE PARABLE.

PROV. XII. <sup>10</sup> XIV. *A Just man is mercifull to the life of his Beast;  
but the mercies of the wicked are cruell.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**Here is implanted in man by nature, a noble and excellent Affection of *Piety and compassion*, which extends it selfe even to bruit creatures, that are by divine ordination subject to *his* command: and this *Compassion* hath some Analogy with that of a Prince towards his subjects. Nay farther, it is most certaine, that the more noble the mind is, the more compalsionate it is; for contracted & degenerate minds, think these things nothing to pertaine to them; but the Mind, which is a nobler portion of the world, is affected in the grosse out of community. Wherefore we see that there were under the old Law, many precepts, not so meerey Ceremoniall, as *Institutions of Mercy*; such as was that of *not eating flesh with the blood thereof*, and the like: even in the sect of the *Esseans* and *Pythagoreans*, they altogither abstain'd from *eating Flesh*; which to this day is observed by an inviolate superstition, by many of the Easterne people under the Mogol. Nay the Turkes, (both by Descent and Discipline a cruell and bloody Nation) yet bestow almes upon Bruit Creatures; and cannot endure to see the vexation and torture of any live thing. But least, what we have said, should perchance seem to maintaine all kinds of *Mercy*; *Salomon* upon sound advice annexeth, *That the Mercies of the wicked are cruell*: These *mercies*, are, when leud and wicked persons, are spar'd from being cut off by the sword of justice; this kind of *Mercy* is more *Cruell*, than *Cruelty* it selfe: for *Cruelty* is extended in practise on particulars; but this kind of *Mercy*, by a grant of impunity, armes and subornes the whole band of impious men against the innocent.

## THE PARABLE.

XV. *A Foole utters all his minde, but a wise-man reserves somewhat for hereafter.* Prov. xxix. 11.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable (it seemes) especially corrects; *not the Futility* of vaine Persons, which easily utter, as well what may be spoken, as what should be secreted: *not the bold roveing language* of such as without all discretion and judgement flie upon all men and matters: *Not Garrulity*, whereby they fill others even to a surfet: *but another vice*, more close and retired; namely *the Government of speech*, of all adventures the least prudent and politique, which is, *when a man so manages his speech in private conference, as whatsoever is in his mind, which he conceives any way pertinent to the purpose and matter in hand, out it must, at once, as it were, in one breath, and in a set continued discourse*: this is that which doth much prejudice Businesse. *For first, a discontinued speech*, broken off by interlocutions, and instill'd by parts, penetrates deeper, than a *settled continued speech*; because that in a continued Discourse, the weight of Matters is not precisely and distinctly taken, nor by some convenient rests sufferd to fixe; but Reason drives out Reason before it be fully settled in the Comprehension of the Hearers. *Secondly* there is no man of so powerfull and happy a Delivery of himselfe, as at the first onset & encountre of his speech, he is able so to strike him dumbe and speechlesse, with whom he discourseth; but that the other will make some interchangeable reply, and peradventure object something: and then it may fall out, that what should have been reserv'd for refutation & replication, by this unadvised anticipation beeing disclosed and tasted before-hand, looseth its strength and grace. *Thirdly* if a man discharge not all at once what might be said, but deliver himselfe by *Parcells*, now one thing, anon casting in an other, he shall gather from the

lookes and answers of him with whom he discourfes, how every particular Passage affectes him, and in what fort they find acceptation; fo as what is yet remaining to be fpoken, he may with greater Caution either felect, or filence.

## THE PARABLE.

Ecclef. x. XVI. *If the Difpleafure of a Great Man rife up againft thee, forfake not thy Place; for pliant demeanure pacifies great Offences.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable gives in Précept, how a man ought to demean himfelfe, having incurr'd the wrath and difpleafure of his Prince. The Précept hath two branches. *First that he relinquifh not his place; Secondly, that with caution and diligence he attend the Cure, as in cafe of fome dangerous difeafe.* For men are wont after they perceive their Princes difpleafure againft them, to retire themfelves from the execution of their charge and office; *partly* out of an impatience of difgrace; *partly* left they fhould revive the wound by beeing in the Prefence; *partly* that Princes may fee their sorrow and humility; *nay* *sometimes* to refigne up the Places and Dignities they held, into the hands of the Prince. But Solomon cenfures this way of Cure, as prejudicious and hurtfull; and that upon a very good ground. *For firft this courfe doth too much noife abroad the difgrace it felfe; fo as enemies and envious become more confident to hurt, and friends more fearfull to help him. Secondly it comes to paffe that the wrath of the Prince, which perchance if it had not bin publifht, would have died of it felfe, is now become more fixt; and having once made way to his ruine, is carried on to his utter fubverfion. Lastly, this retiring tafts fomewhat of a malignant humor, and of one fallen out with the times; which cumulates the evill of Indignation, to the evill of fufpicion:*

*suspicion.* Now the precepts for cure are these. *First, above all things let him take heed that he seem not insensible, or not so affected, as in duty he ought to be, for the Princes displeasure, through a stupidity or stubbornesse of mind: that is, that he compose his countenance, not to a sullen and contumacious sadnesse; but to a grave and modest pensivenesse; and in all matters of imployment, that he shew himselfe lesse pleasant, and cheerefull then he was wont to be; and it will promote his case to use the assistance and mediation of some friend, unto the Prince, which may seasonably insinuate, with what feeling griefe he is inwardly afflicted. Secondly let him carefully avoide all, even the least occasions whereby the matter that gave the first cause to the indignation, might be reviv'd; or the Prince take occasion to be againe displeas'd with him, or to rebuke him for any thing, before others. Thirdly, let him with all diligence seeke out all occasions wherein his service may be acceptable to his Prince; that he may shew both a prompt affection to redime his fore-past offence; and that his Prince may understand what a good servant he may chance to be deprived of, if he thus cast him off. Fourthly, that by a wise art of Policy, he either lay the fault it selfe upon others; or insinuate, that it was committed with no ill intention; or make remonstrance of their Malice, who accused him to the King, and aggravated the matter above demerit. Last of all, let him be every way circumspect and intent upon the Cure.*

## THE PARABLE.

**xvii.** *The First in his own cause is Iust, than comes the other Party and inquires into him.*

Prov.  
xviii. 17.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He first information in any cause, if it a litle fixe it selfe in the mind of the Judge, takes deep root, and wholly seasons and prepossesseth it; so as it can hardly be taken out, unlesse some manifest falshood be found in the matter of Information; or some cunning dealing, in exhibiting

and laying open the same. For a bare and simple defence, thoe it be just and more waighy, hardly compensates the prejudice of the first information; or is of force of it selfe to reduce the scales of Justice, once swayd downe, to an equall waite. *Wherefore* it is the safest course both for the Judge, that nothing touching the proofes and merit, of the cause, be intimated before-hand untill both parties be heard together; and the best for the Defendant, if he perceiv the Judge preoccupied; to labour principally in this (so farre as the quality of the cause will admit) to discover some cunning shift and fraudulent dealing practised by the adverse party to the abuse of the Iudge.

## THE PARABLE.

Prov. xxix. 21. XVIII. *He that delicately brings up his servant from a child, shall finde him contumacious in the end.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

Machia.  
Discorso  
sopra Liv.

**P**rinces and Masters, from the Counsil of Solomon, must keep a mean in the dispensation of their Grace and Favour towards Servants. The meane is threefold; First, that Servants be promoted by degrees and not by faults. Secondly, that they be now and then accustomed to repulses: Thirdly (which Machiavell well adviseth) that they have ever in sight before them something whetherto they may farther aspire. For unlesse these courses be taken in the raising of servants, Princes shall beare away from their servants, instead of a thankfull acknowledgement and dutifull observances, nothing but *disrespect and contumacy*: for from sodaine promotion ariseth insolency; from a continued atchievement of their desires, an impatience of Repulle: if the accomplishment of wishes be wanting; alacrity and industry will likewise be wanting.

## THE PARABLE.

**XIX.** *Seest thou a man of Dispatch in his Businesse; Prov. xxii. 29 he shall stand before Kings, he shall not be ranked amongst mean men.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**A**Mongst the qualities which Princes doe chiefly respect and require in the choice of their servants, *celerity and alacrity in the Dispatch of Businesse, is above all the rest, most acceptable.* Men of profound Wisdom are suspected by Kings, as men too speculative and penetrating, and such as are able by the strength of wit, as with an engine, to turne and winde their Masters, beyond their comprehension and against their inclination. *Popular natures* are spighted as those that stand in the light of Kings, and draw the eyes of the people upon themselves. *Men of courage,* are commonly taken for turbulent spirits, and dareing, more than is meet. *Honest men* and of an impartiall upright conversation, are esteemed too stiffe and stoicall; nor so pliable as they should be to the whole pleasure of those on whom they depend. *To conclude,* there is not any other good quality, which presents not some shadow, where-with the minds of Kings may not be offended; *only quicknesse of Dispatch in the execution of commands, hath nothing in it which may not please.* Againe, the motions of the minds of Kings are swift and impatient of delay; for they think they can doe all things; onely this is wanting, *that it be done out of hand;* wherefore above all other qualities, *celerity is to them most acceptable.*

## THE PARABLE.

**XX.** *I saw all the living which walke under the sun, Eccles. iv. 15 with the succeeding young Prince, that shall rise up in his stead.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He parable notes the vanitie of men who are wont to presse and flock about the designed successors of Princes: The root of this vanity is that Frenzie, implanted by nature in the mindes of men, which is, that they too extremely affect their own projected hopes. For the man is rarely found that is not more delighted with the contemplation of his future Hopes, then with the fruition of what he possesseth. So further, Novelty is pleasing to mans nature, and earnestly desired. Now in a successour to a Prince these two concur, Hope and Novelty. The Parable expresth the same which was long agoe utter'd, first by Pompeius to Sylla, after by Tiberius touching Macro; *Plures adorare solem Orientem quam Occidentem*. Yet notwithstanding Princes in present possession, are not much mov'd with this fond humour; nor make any great matter of it, as neither Sylla nor Tiberius did; but rather smile at the levity of men, & doe not stand to fight with Dreames; for Hope (as he said) is but the Dreame of a man awake.

Tacit.  
Annal. 6.  
Plutar. in  
Pomp.

## THE PARABLE.

Eccles. ix. X X I.  
14. 15.

*There was a litle Citie, and man'd but by a few; and there was a mighty King that drew his army to it, and erected Bulwarks against it, and intrench't it round. Now there was found within the walls a poore wise man, and he by his wisdom rais'd the siege, but none remembred that same poore-man.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable describeth the depraved and malignant nature of Men. In extremity and straits they commonly flie for sanctuary to men of wisdom and power, whom before they dispis'd; but so soon as the storme is gone, they become unthankfull creatures to their conservers. *Machiavell*

rell not without reason propounds a Question, *whether should be more ingratefull to well deserving Persons, the Prince or the People?* But in the meane he taxeth them both of Ingratitude. Notwithstanding, this vile dealing ariseth not from the ingratitude of the Prince or People alone; but oft-times there is added to these *the envy of the Nobilitie*, who in secret repine at the event, though happy and prosperous; because it proceeded not from themselves: wherefore they extenuate the merit of the Act and deresse the Author.

Discorso  
sopra Liv.  
Lib. 1.

## THE PARABLE.

**XXII.** *The way of the slothfull is a Hedge of Thornes.* Prov. 15. 19

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable expresseth most elegantly, *that sloth proves laborious in the end*: For a diligent and sedulous preparation effects this, that the foot doth not strike it selfe against any impediment, but that the way is levell'd before it be gone. But he that is slothfull and puts off all to the last point of Execution, it must needs follow, that continually, and at every step he passes as it were thorow Briars and Brambles, which ever and anone entangle and detaine him. The same observation may be made upon the governing of a Family, wherein if there be a care and providence taken, all goes on cheerefully and with a willing alacritie, without noyse or tumult: but if these fore-casts be wanting when some greater occasions unexpectedly fall out, all matters throng in to be dispatched at once; the servants brawle; the whole house rings.

## THE PARABLE.

**XXIII.** *He that respects Persons in judgement doth not well; for that man will forsake the truth even for a peece of Bread.* Prov. 28. 21

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable most wisely noteth that in a Judge, *Facility of Department is more pernicious then the corruption of Bribes*: for all persons doe not give Bribes; but there is hardly any cause wherein somewhat may not be found, that may incline the minde of the Judge, if *Respect of Persons* lead him. For one shall be respected as a Countrey-man; another as an ill-tongu'd man; another as a rich man; another as a Favorite; another as commended by a Friend; and to conclude, all is full of iniquity where *respect of Persons beares rule*; and for a very slight matter, as it were, *for a peece of Bread*, Judgement is perverted.

## THE PARABLE.

Prov.

XXVIII. 3.

**XXIV.** *A poore man that by extortion oppresseth the poore, is like a land-floud that causes famine.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**His Parable was by the Ancients exprest & shadowed forth, under the Fable of the *two Horse-leeches*, the full and the hungry: for *Oppression comming from the Poore and necessitous persons, is farre more heavy than the oppression caused by the full and Rich, because it is such, as seekes out all Arts of Exaction, and all angles for money.* This kinde of Oppression was wont also to be resembled to *sponges*, which being dry suck in strongly; not so, being moyst. The *Parable* comprehends in it a fruitfull Instruction, both to Princes, that they commit not the government of Provinces, or offices of charge to indigent and indebted persons; as also to the people that they suffer not their Kings to be distressed with too much want.

THE

## THE PARABLE.

XXV. *A just man falling before the wicked, is a troubled Fountaine and a corrupted Spring.* Prov. xxv. 25

## THE EXPLICATION.

THE Parable gives it in Precept, *that States and Republicques must above all things beware of an unjust and infamous sentence, in any cause of grave importance, and exemplar in the face of the world; specially where the guilty is not quitted, but the Innocent is condemned.* For Injuries ravageing among private persons doe indeed trouble, and pollute the waters of Justice, yet as in the smaller streames; but unjust Judgements, such as we have spoken of, from which examples are derived, infect & distaine the very Fountaines of Justice: for when the Courts of Justice side with Injustice, the state of things is turned, as into a publique Robberie, and it manifestly comes to passe, *ut Homo Homini sit Lupus.*

## THE PARABLE.

XXVI. *Make no friendship with an angry man, nor walke thou with a Furious Man.* Prov. xxii. 24

## THE EXPLICATION.

BY how much the more devoutly the Lawes of Friendship amongst good men, are to be kept and observed, by so much the more it stands us upon to use all Caution, even at first in a prudent election of Friends. *In like manner the disposition and humours of Friends, so far as concernes our personall interest, should by all meanes be dispensed withall: but when they impose a necessity upon us, what quality of Persons wee must put on, and sustaine, it is a very hard case and an unreasonable condition of Friendship.* Wherefore according to Salomons Precept, it principally conduceth to Peace, and Safety in the course of this world, *that we intermingle not our affaires*

*with Cholerique natures, and such as easily provoke and undertake Quarrels and Debates; for such kinde of Friends will daily espouse us to Factions and Contentions; that we must of necessity be forced to break off all termes of Friendship; or else be wanting to our own personall safety.*

## THE PARABLE.

XXVII. *He that conceales a fault seekes Friendship; but he that repeats a matter, separates united Friends.*

Prov. xvii. 9.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He way to arbitrate differences, and to reconcile affections is of two sorts. *The one begins by an Amnesty & passing over that which is past. The other, from a Repetition of wrongs, interlaceing Apologies and Excusations.* For I remember the speech of a very wise Person, & a great States-man which was to this effect. *Hee that deales about a Treaty of Peace, without any recapitulation of the termes of Difference, and falling out; he rather deludes mens mindes with the sweetnesse of an Agreement, than compounds the differences, by equity and moderation of Right.* But *Salomon, a wiser man than he, is of a contrary opinion, approves Amnesty, and prohibites Repetition: for in Repetition, there are these inconveniences, for that it is, as it were, unguis in ulcere, the nayle in the ulcer; as also there is a danger of breeding a new Quarrell, for the Parties at difference will never accord upon the termes of their falling out. And lastly, for that in the issue, it brings the matter to Apologies: but both the one and the other Partie, would seeme rather to remit an offence, than to admit of an excusation.*

## THE PARABLE.

XXVIII *In every good worke there shall be abundance; but where words doe abound, there commonly is want.*

Prov. xiv. 23.

THE

## THE EXPLICATION.

**I**N this Parable Solomon separates the fruit of the Labour of the Tongue, and of the labour of the Hands; as if wealth were the Revenues of the one, want the Revenues of the other. For it commonly comes to passe, that they that talke much, boast many things, and promise great matters; receive no emolument from the things whereof they discourse: nay rather such natures for most part are no way industrious, and diligent at work; but only feed and fill themselves with words, as with winde. Certainly as saith the Poet

----- *Qui silet est firmus* -----

for he that is conscious to himselfe of Proficiency in his indeavours, applaudes himselfe inwardly, and holds his peace; but on the contrary, he that is guilty to himselfe of hunting after vaine glory, talkes many things, and reports wonders to others.

## THE PARABLE.

**XXIX.** *Open Reprekenſion is better than  
secret Affection.*

Prov.  
XXVII. 5.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable reprehends the soft nature of Friends, which will not use the Priviledge of friendship, in admonishing their Friends with freedome and confidence, as well of their errors as of their dangers. *For what shall I doe? (will such a tenderhearted friend say) or which way shall I turne my selfe? I love him as dearly as any man can doe; and if any misfortune should befall him, I could willingly impawne my owne person for his redemption; but I know his disposition, if I deale freely with him, I shall offend him, at least make him sadde, and yet doe no good; and I shall sooner estrange him from my friendship, than reclaime him, or withdraw him from those courses, which he hath fixt and resolved upon in his mind.* Such a friend as this, Solomon here reprehends, as weak and worthlesse; and that a man may reap more profit from a manifest Enemy, than

from such an effeminate Friend: for he may perchance heare that by way of reproach from an Enemy, which thorow too much indulgence was but faintly whisper'd by a friend.

## THE PARABLE.

XXX. *A wise man is wary of his waies; a cunning Foole seekes evasions.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**Here be two sorts of wisdom; the one true and sound, the other counterfeit and false, which Solomon doubts not to entitle by the name of Folly. He that applies himselfe to the former, takes heed to his way and footing, foreseeing dangers, and studying remedies; using the assistance of Good men, muniting himselfe against the invasions of the wicked; wary in his entrance and engagement upon a businesse, not unprepar'd of a retraite and how to come off; attent upon advantages, couragious against encounters; with infinite other circumstances, which respect the government of his waies and Actions. But that other kind of wisdom, is altogether made up of fallacies and cunning devices, and wholly relies upon circumventing of others, and casting them according to the forme of their own mould. This wisdom the Parable deservedly rejects, not only as Wicked, but also as Foolish. For first it is not in the number of those things which are in our own power; nor is it directed by any constant Rule; but new stratagems must every day be contrived, the old failing and growing out of use. Secondly, he that is once attainted with the fame and opinion of a cunning crafty Companion, hath deprived himselfe of a principall Instrument for the manage of his affaires, and a practicall life, that is, *Trust*; and so he shall finde by experience all things to goe CROSSE to his desires. To conclude, these Arts and Shifts, howsoever they promise faire, and much please such as practise them; yet are they many times frustrated. Which Tacitus hath well observed, *Confilia Callida & audacia, expectatione leta; tractatu dura; eventu tristia.*

Tacit.

THE

## THE PARABLE.

XXXI. *Be not too precisely Righteous; nor make thy selfe too excessively wise; why shouldst thou unseasonably sacrifice thy safety?* Eccl. vii. 16

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T** Here are Times (saith Tacitus) wherein too great virtues Tacit. Hist. I. are exposed to certaine ruine. And this fate befalls men eminent for virtue or Justice, sometime suddainly, sometimes fore-seene a farre off: and if these excellent parts be seconded by the accessse of *wisdome*, that is, that they are wary and watchfull over their own safety, than they gaine thus much, that their ruine comes sodainly, altogether by secret and obscure Counsils; whereby both envy may be avoided, and Destruction assaile them unprovided. As for that *Nimium*, which is set downe in the Parable, (in as much as they are not the words of some Periander but of *Solomon*, who now and then notes the evils in mans life, but never commands them) it must be understood, not of virtue it selfe, in which there is no *Nimium* or excessive extremity, but of a vaine and invidious Affectation and ostentation thereof. A point somewhat resembling this, Tacitus insinuates in a passage touching *Lepidus*, setting it downe as a Miracle, that he had never bin the Author of any servile sentence, and yet had stood safe in so cruell, and bloody times. Annal. iv. This thought (saith he) many times comes into my mind, whether these things are governed by Fate; or it lies also in our own Power to steere an even course void of Danger and Indignity, between servile Flattery and sullen Contumacy.

## THE PARABLE.

XXXII. *Give occasion to a wiseman and his wisdom will be increased.* Prov. IX.

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable distinguishes betweene that wisdom which is growne, and ripened into true Habit; and that which swimmes onely in the Braine and conceit, or is boasted in speech, but hath not taken deep root. For the one upon occasion presented, wherein it may be exercis'd, is instantly quickned, prepared, and dilated, so as it seemes greater than it selfe: but the other which before occasion was quick and active, now occasion is given, becomes amaz'd and confused, that even he who presumed the possession thereof, begins to call into doubt whether the preconceptions of such wisdom were not meere Dreames, and empty speculations.

## THE PARABLE.

Prov.  
xxvii. 14.

**XXXIII.** *He that praiseth his friend aloud, rising early, it shall be to him no better than a curse.*

## THE EXPLICATION.

**M**oderate and seasonable Praises, and utter'd upon occasion, much conduce both to mens Fame and Fortunes; but immoderate, streporous, and unseasonably powr'd out, profit nothing; nay rather from the sense of this Parable they doe much prejudice. For first, they manifestly betray themselves to proceed either from too extreme Affection, or from a too studied Affectation, to the end that him whom they have thus praised, they may by false acclamations demerit rather to themselves; than by just attributes adorn his person. Secondly, sparing and modest Praises, commonly invite such as are present to adde something of their own to the commendations; Contrariwise profuse and immodest Praises, invite the hearers to detract and take away something. Thirdly, (which is the principall point) too much magnifying a man stirres up envy towards him; seeing all immoderate Praises seeme to be a Reproach to others, who merit no lesse.

THE

## THE PARABLE.

XXXIV. *As Faces shine in waters, so mens hearts  
are manifest to the wise.* Prov. XXVII. 19

## THE EXPLICATION.

**T**He Parable distinguisheth between the Hearts of wise-men and of other Men; compareing those to waters or Glasses, which receive and represent the formes and Images of things; whereas the other are like to Earth, or rude stone, wherein nothing is reflected. And the more aptly is the mind of a wise-man compar'd to a Glasse or Mirror; because in a Glasse his own Image may be seen together with the Images of others; which the eyes cannot doe of themselves without a Glasse. Now if the mind of a wise man be so capable, as to observe and comprehend, such an infinite diversity of Natures and Customes, it remaines to be endeavour'd, that it may become no lesse various in the Application, than it is in the Representation,

*Qui sapit, in numeris Moribus aptus erit.*

Ovid. de  
A. A.

**T**Hus have we staid perchance somewhat longer upon these *Parables of Solomon*, thã is agreeable to the proportiõ of an example, being carried away thus farre for the Dignity both of the matter it selfe, and of the Auctor. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrewes, but it is generally to be found in the wise-men of ancient times; that if any mans observation light upon any thing that was good and beneficiall to the cõmon practique course of life, he would reduce and contract it into some *short sentence* or *Parable*, or else *some Fable*. But for *Fables* (as we have noted elsewhere) they were in times past *Vicegerents*, and *supplements* <sup>Lib. 2. cap. 13.</sup> of *Exemples*; now that the times abound with *History*, the aime is more right and Active, when the Marke is alive. But the forme of writing which best agrees with so variable and univerversall an Argument (as is the handling of *negotiations*

Discorso in  
Liv.

tions and scatter'd Occasions) that would be of all other the fittest which Machiavell made choice of, for the handling of matters of Policy and Government; namely by Observations or Discourses, as they terme them, upon History and Examples. For knowledge drawn freshly, and, as it were in our view, out of Particulars, knowes the way best to Particulars againe; and it hath much greater life for Practise, when the Discourse or Disceptation attends upon the Example, than when the Example attends upon the Disceptation: for here not only Order but substance is respected. For when the Example is set downe as the Ground of the Disputation, it useth to be propounded with the preparation of circumstances, which may sometimes controule the discourse thereupon made; sometimes supply it; so it may be in place of a patterne for imitation and practise: whereas on the contrary, examples alleaged for the Disputations sake, are cited succinctly and simply, and as bond-men waite, in a servile aspect, upon the commands of the Discourse. But this difference is not amisse to be observed, that as Histories of Times afford the best matter for Discourses upon Politiques, such as are those of Machiavell; So the Histories of lives, are the best Instructions for discourse of Businesse, because they comprise all variety of Occasions and Negotiations, as well great as small.

§ Nay there is a ground of Discourse for Precepts touching Businesse, more accomodate than both those sorts of History; which is, when Discourses are made upon Letters, but such as are wise and serious, as those of Cicero ad Atticum, and others. For letters usually represent Businesse more particularly, & more to the life, than either Chronicles or Lives. Thus have we spoken both of the Matter and Forme of the first portion of the Knowledge touching Negotiation, which handles dispersed Occasions, which we deliver up upon the accompts of DEFICIENTS.

\*  
FABER  
FORTV-  
NÆ, five  
de Ambitu  
vitæ.

II. There is also another portion of the same Knowledge, which differeth as much from that other, whereof we have spoken as *sapere*, and *sibi sapere*: for the one seems to move as it were from the centre to the circumference; the other as

it

it were, from the circumference to the centre. For there is a wisdom of giving Counsil unto others; and there is a wisdom of forecasting for his own fortunes; and these doe sometimes meet, but more often sever. For many are exceeding wise in their own waies, which yet are weak for administration of civil affaires, or giving of Counsil; like the *Ant*, which is a wise creature for it selfe, but very hurtfull for the Garden. This wisdom the Romanes, thoe excellent Patriots, did take much knowledge of; whereupon the Comickall Poet saith, *Certainly the Mould of a wise mans Fortune is in his own hands*; yea it grew into an Adage among them ----- *Faber quisque Fortune proprie* -----; And *Livy* attributes the same virtue to *Cato Major*. *In this man there were such great abilities of wit and understanding, that into what climate soever his nativity had cast him, he seemd to be able to command a fortune.* This kind of wisdom, if it be profest and openly declar'd, hath ever bin thought not only impolitique, but an unlucky and ominous thing: as it was observed in *Timotheus the Athenian*, who after he had done many excellent services to the honour and utility of the state, and was to give an account of his government to the people, as the manner was, concluded every particular with this clause, *and in this, Fortune had no part*: but it fell out that he never prosper'd in any thing he took in hand afterwards. *This is in truth too high and favouring of extreme arrogance, aspiring to the same point of Pride which Ezechiel records of Pharaoh, Dicis fluvius est meus, & ego feci me ipsum*; or of that which another Prophet speaks, *They exult and offer sacrifices to their net, and burne incense to their snare.* or of that which the Poet expresseth of *Mezentius* a Despiser of the Gods.

*Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod missile libro,  
Nunc adsint. -----*

Finally *Iulius Cesar*, never, to my remembrance, be-  
traid the impotency of his hidden thoughts, so much as in  
a speech of like nature; for when the *Augur* gave him in-  
formation that the entrailles were not prosperous, he closely  
murmur'd to himselfe *Erunt latiora cum volo*, which saying

Plaut. in  
Trin.  
Cic. in Par.  
Salust. ad  
Cæs.  
Lib. I.  
Dec. IV.

Plutar.  
in Sylla.

Ezech. 29.

Habac. I.

Virg. Æn.  
10.

Suet. in  
Iulto.

of his preceded not long before the misfortune of his death. *But this extremity of Confidence*, (as we have said) as it is an unhallowed thing, so was it ever unblest. And therefore they that were great Politiques indeed, and truly wise, thought it their safest course, ever to ascribe their successes to their Felicity; and not to their skill and virtue. So *Sylla* surnam'd himselfe *Felix*, not *Magnus*; and *Cesar* (more advisedly than before) saith to the *Pilot*, *Casarem vehis, & fortunam ejus*. But yet neverthelesse these Positions; *Faber Quisque Fortunæ suæ. Sapiens dominabitur Astris. In via virtuti nulla est via*, and the like; if they be understood and applied rather as spurres to industry, than as stirrups to insolency; and rather to beget in men courage and constancy of Resolutions, than Arrogancy and ostentation; are deservedly accounted sound and healthfull; and (no question) have bin ever imprinted in the greatest Minds, so sensibly, as sometimes they can scarce dissemble such cogitations. For we see *Augustus Caesar* (who compared with his uncle, was rather diverse, than inferior, but certainly a person more staid and solemne) when he died, desired of his friends that stood about his Bed, *that when he expired they would give him a Plaudite*; as if he were conscient to himselfe, that he had plaid his part well upon the stage. This portion also of knowledge is to be summ'd up amongst DEFICIENTS; not but that it hath bin usurped and frequented in Practise, farre more excessively than is fitting; but because books concerning this Argument are silent. Wherefore according to our custome, as we did in the former; we will set downe some heads or passages of it; and we will call it *Fabrum Fortunæ*, or as we have said, ----- *Doctrinam de Ambitu vitæ*. -----

Wherein, at the first view, I may seem to handle a new and strange Argument, in teaching men how they may be *raisers and makers of their own fortune*; a doctrine certainly to which every man will willingly yeeld himselfe a Disciple, till he thoroughly conceives the difficulty thereof. For the conditions are neither lighter, or fewer, or lesse difficult to the Purchase of Fortune, than to the purchase of virtue; and it is as hard

Plut. in  
I. Caf.

Suet. in  
August.

hard and severe a Thing to be a true *Politique*, as to be truly *Morall*. But the handling hereof concernes learning greatly, both in *Honour* and in *Substance*. For it is a principall point which neerely concernes the *Honour of Learning*, that *Pragmatique* men may know, that *Learning is not like some small Bird, as the Larke, that can mount and sing, and please hir selfe, and nothing else; but that she holds as well of the Hauke, that can soare aloft, and after that when she sees hir time can stoop and ceitze upon her Prey*. Againe this kind of *wisdome* much respects the *Perfection of Learning*; because it is the right rule of a perfect enquiry, that *nothing be found in the Globe of Matter, that hath not a Parallel in the Christalline Gl. be, or the Intellect*. That is, that there be not any thing in Being and Action, that should not be drawne and collected into contemplation and *Doctrin*e. Neither doth learning otherwise admire or esteime *this Architecture of Fortune*, than as a worke of an inferior kinde: for no mans proper fortune, can be a retribution any way worthy the donation of his *Essence* and Being granted him from God; nay it often comes to passe, that men of excellent gifts abandon their Fortunes willingly, that their minds may be vacant for more sublime respects: yet neverthelesse *Fortune*, as an Organ of virtue and merit, deserves likewise hir *Speculation* and *Doctrin*e.

§ Unto this knowledge appertaine precepts, some *summary* and Principall; some *spars'd* and *various*. Precepts *Summary* are conversant about the true knowledge *both of others; and of himselfe*. The first Precept, wherein the principall point of the *knowledge of Others* doth consist, may be determined this; that we procure to our selves, so farre as may be, *that window* which *Momus* once required. He, when he Plato de Rep. saw in the frame of Mans heart, so many *Angles* and *Recesses*. found fault that there was not a window, through which a man might look into those *obscure and crooked windings*. This window we shall obtaine, if with all diligent circumspection we purchase and procure unto our selves good information touching particular Persons, with whom we negotiate

and have to deale; as also of their natures, their desires, their ends, their customes, their Helps and Advantages, whereby they are chiefly supported and are powerfull; and againe, of their weakneses and disadvantages, and where they lye most open and are obnoxious; of their Friends, Factions, Patrons and Dependancies; and againe of their Opposites, Enviars, Competitors; as also their Moods, Times, and Criticall seasons of easy Access.

Virg. Æn.  
IV.

*Sola viri molles Additus, & tempora noris.*

Lastly the Principles and Rules which they have set downe to themselves; and the like. And this information must be taken not only of *Persons*, but of Particular Actions also which are on Foote, from time to time, and as it were hott upon the Anvile, how they are conducted and succeed; by whose futherances they are favour'd, by whom oppos'd, of what weight and moment they are, and what consequence they inferre; and the like. For the *knowledge of present Actions* is not only materiall in it selfe, but hath this advantage also, as without it the *knowledge of Persons* will be very deceitfull and erroneous: for *Men* change with the *Actions*; and while they are implicated in Actions, engaged and environed with busines they are one; when they returne to their Nature they are another. These *Informations* touching *Particulars*, respecting as well *Persons* as *Actions* are, as the *Minor Propositions* in every *Active Syllogisme*; for no verity or excellency of *Observations* or *Axiomes* (whereof the *Major Propositions Politique* are made) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistakeing in the *Minor Proposition*. And that such knowledge may be compassed, *Salomon* is our surety, who saith ----- *Counsell in the Heart of a Man is like a deepe water, but a wise man will draw it out.* ----- And although the knowledge it selfe fall not under Precept, because it is of Individualls, yet instructions for the deduceing of it may with profit be set downe.

Prov. xx.

The *knowledge of Men* six wayes may be disclosed and drawne out; by their *Faces* and *Countenances*, by *Words*, by *Deeds*, by their *Nature*, by their *Ends*, and by the *Relations*  
of

of others. As for the *Vifage* and *Countenance*, let not the ancient Adage move us ----- *Fronti nulla Fides*; ----- for though Iuv. Sat. 11. this laying may not amiffe be meant of the outward and generale compofure of the *Countenance* and *Gefure*, yet there are certaine fubtile motions and labours of the *Eyes*, *Face*, *Lookes*, and *Gefure*, whereby as *Q. Cicero* elegantly faith, is unlockt and open'd, ----- *Ianua quædam animi* ----- the *gate of the minde*. Who more clofe then *Tiberius Cæfar*? But *Tacitus*, noteing the Character and different manner of fpeaking, which *Tiberius* us'd in commending in the Senate the great fervices done by *Germanicus* and *Drufus*; of the commendations given of *Germanicus* he faith thus ----- *Magis in fpeciem verbis adornata, quam ut penitus sentire crederetur*; Annal. 1. of the commendations given of *Drufus* thus, ---- *Paucioribus; fed intentior, & fidâ oratione*. Again *Tacitus* noteing the fame *Tiberius* at other times fomewhat more cleare and legible Saith ---- *Quin ipfe compositus aliâs & velut <sup>a</sup> eluctantium verborum; folutius promptiusq; loquebatur quoties subveniret*. ---- Annal. 1v. <sup>a</sup> Or. & velut elector anxius. Certainly there can hardly be found any Artificer of *Disfimulation* fo cunning and excellent, or a *Countenance* fo forced, or as he faith --- *vultus juffus* --- fo commanded, that can fever from an artificiois and fained fpeech, thefe Notes; but that the fpeech is either more *flight* and *careleffe*, or more *fet* and *Formall*; or more *Tedious* and *Wandring*; or more *Drye* and *Reluctant*, than ufuall.

§ As for *Mens words* they are (as *Phyfitians* fay of *waters*) full of flattery and uncertainty; yet thefe counterfeit Colours are two wayes excellently discover'd; namely when *words* are uttered either upon the *fodaine*, or elfe in *Paffion*. So *Tiberius* being fodainly moved, and lomewhat incens'd upon a ftinging fpeech of *Agrippina*, came a ftep forth of his imbred difsimulation. --- *Thefe words*, faith *Tacitus*, Annal. xiv. heard by *Tiberius* drew from his darke-couvert Breaft --- *such words as he us'd feldome to let fall*; and takeing her up *sharpely*, told her her own in a *Greeke verfe*. --- *That ſhe was therefore hurt becaufe ſhe did not raigne*. Therefore the Poet doth not improperly call ſuch *Paffions* --- *Tortures* --- becaufe they urge

men to confesse and betray their secrets,

Hor. Epist.

*Vino tortus & Ira.* ——— Experience indeed

x.

shewes that there are few men so true to themselves, and so letted in their Resolves, but that sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon intimate good will to a Friend, sometimes upon weaknesse and trouble of mind, that can no longer hold out under the weight of griefes; some times from some other Affection or Passi- on, they reveale and communicate their inward Thoughts: but above all it sounds the mind to the bottome, and search- eth it to the quick, when Simulation is put to it by a coun- ter-Dissimulation according to the proverb of Spaine *Di Mentira, y sacaras verdad, Tell a lye and finde a Truth.*

§ Neither are *Deeds* thoe they be the surest pledges of mens minds, altogether to be trusted without a diligent and judicious consideration of their *Magnitude* and *Nature*: For the saying is most true, *That fraude erects it selfe a countre- mure of credit in smaller matters, that it may cheat with better Advantage afterwards.* The Italian thinks himselfe upon the *Crosse with the Crier*, and upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest caule: for small favours, they doe but lull men a sleepe, both as to *Caution*, and as to *Industry*, and are rightly called by Demosthenes *Alimenta socordiae*. Againe we may plainly see the false and inconstant propriety and nature of some *Deeds*, even of such as are accounted *Benefits*, from that particular which *Mutianus* practis'd upon *Antonius primus*, who upon that hollow and unfaithfull reconcile- ment made between them, advanced many of the Friends of *Antonius* and bestowed upon them *Tribuneships*, and *Cap- taineships liberally*: by this subtle pretence of *Demerit*, he did not strengthen, but altogether disarme and desolate *An- tonius*, and winne from him his *Dependances*, and made them his own creatures.

Demost.

Tacitus  
Hist. iv.

§ But the surest key, to unlock the minds of Men, con- sists in searching and disclosing either their *Natures* and *dispo- sitions*, or their *ends* and *intentions*. And certainly the wea- kest

kest and simplest sort of men are best interpreted by their *Natures*; but the wisest and more reserved are best expounded by their *Ends*. For it was wisely and pleasantly said (thoe in my judgement very untruly) by a *Nuntio* of the Popes, returning from a certain Nation, where he served as *Leidger*, whose opinion being askt, touching the appointment of one to goe in his place, gave Counsil, *that in any case his Ho: would not send one too wise, because saith he, no wise man would ever imagine, what they in that countrey were like to doe.* Certainly it is a frequent error, and very familiar with wise men, to measure other men, by the Module of their own abilities; and therefore often shoote over the marke, supposing men to project and designe to themselves deeper ends, and to practise more subtile Arts, and compass realces, than indeed ever came into their heads, which the Italian Proverbe elegantly noteth, saying

*Dì Denàri, dì Sènno, e dì Féde*

*C'n'è Mánco ché non Créde.*

*There is commonly lesse Mony, lesse Wisdome, and lesse good Faith than men doe accompt upon.* Wherefore if we be to deale with men of a meane and shallow capacity, because they doe many things absurdly, the conjecture must be taken rather from the proclivity of their *Natures*, than the designes of their *ends*. Furthermore *Princes* (but upon a farre other reason) are best interpreted by their *Natures*; and *private persons* by their *ends*. For *Princes* being at the toppe of humane Desires, they have, for the most part, no particular ends propounded to themselves whereto they aspire, specially with vehemency and perseverance; *by the site and distance of which ends*, a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their *Actions*, and *Desires*; which is one of the chiefe causes *that their Hearts* (as the Scripture pronounceth) *are inscrutable.* But *private persons* are like Travellers which intently goe on aiming at some *end* in their journey, where they may stay and rest; so that a man may make a probable conjecture and presage upon them, what they would, or would not *Doe*: for if any thing conduce unto their

their ends, it is probable they will put the same in execution; but if it crosse their designes, they will not. *Neither* is the information touching the diversity of mens ends and natures, to be taken only *simply*, but *comparatively* also, as namely *what affection and humor have the predominancy and command of the rest?* So we see, when *Tigellinus* saw himselfe outstript by *Petronius Turpilianus* in administering and suggesting pleasures to *Neroes* humor, --- *Metus ejus rimatur* --- *Annal. xiv* saith *Tacitus*, he wrought upon *Neroes* Feares, and by this meanes brake the necke of his Concurrent.

§ *As for the knowing of mens minds at second hand from Reports of other*, it shall suffice to touch it briefly. *Weaknesses and faults you shall best learne from Enimies; virtues and abilities, from friends; Customs and times, from servants; cogitations and opinions, from intimate confidants, with whom you frequently and familiarly discourse.* Popular fame is light, and the judgement of superiors uncertaine; for before such, men are more maskt; --- *Verior Fama è Domesticis emanat* ---

Q. Cic. de  
Pet. Con.

But to all this part of enquiry, the most compendious way resteth in three things- *First*, to have generall acquaintance and inwardnesse with those which have most lookt into the world, and are well versd both in men and matters; but especially to endeavour to have privacy and conversation with some particular friends, who according to the diversity of Businesse and Persons, are able to give us solid information, and good intelligence of all passages. *Secondly*, to keep a *discreet temper* and *mediocrity*, both in liberty of speech and *Taciturnity*; more frequently useing liberty, but *secrecy* where it imports. *For liberty of speech invites and provokes others to use the same liberty to us againe; and so brings much to a mans knowledge; but silence induceth trust and inwardnesse, so as men love to lay up their secrets with us as in a closet.* *Thirdly*, We must by degrees acquire the *Habit of a watchfull and present wit*, so as in every conference and Action we may both *promote the maine matter in hand, and yet observe other circumstances that may be incident upon the Bye.* For as *Epietetus* gives it in precept, a Philosopher in every

every particular Action, should say thus to himselfe, *I will* Epiſt. Enchir.  
*doe this also and yet goe on in my course*. So a *Politique* in every particular occurrence should make this account, and resolution with himselfe; *And I will doe this likewise and yet learne something that may be of use hereafter*. And therefore they who are of such a heavy wit and narrow comprehension, as to overdoe one particular, and are wholly taken up with the businesse in hand; and doe not so much as thinke of any matters which intervене (a weaknesse that *Montaigne* Essays. confesses in himselfe) such indeed are the best instruments of Princes and of state; but faile in point of their own *Fortune*. But in the meane, above all things caution must be taken, *that we have a good stay and hold of our selves, by representing a too active forwardnesse of disposition*; least that this knowing much, doe not draw us on to much meddling; for nothing is more unfortunate, than light and rash intermedling in many matters. So that this variety of knowledge of *Persons and Actions*, which we give in precept to be procured, tends in conclusion to this; to make a judicious choice both of those *Actions* we undertake, and of those *Persons* whose advice and assistance we use, that so we may know how to conduct our affaires with more dexterity and safety.

§ After the knowledge of others followes the knowledge of our selves; for no lesse diligence, rather more is to be taken in a true and exact understanding of our own *Persons*; than of the *Persons of others*; for the Oracle, *Nosce Teiſum*, is not only a rule of universall Prudence, but hath a speciall place in *Politiques*; for as *S. James* excellently puts us in minde, *that* Iacob. 1.  
*he that viewes his Face in a Glasse, yet instantly forgets what a one he was*; so that there is need of a very frequent inspection. The same holds also in Civile Affaires; but there are indeed divers *Glasses*; for the *Divine Glasse* in which we must look our selves, is the word of God; but the *Politique Glasse* is nothing else but the state of the world and times wherein we live. *Wherefore* a man ought to take an exact examination, and an impartiall view (not such as useth to be taken by one too much in love with himselfe) of his own abilities, *virtues*

tues and supports; as likewise of his own defects, Inhabilities, and Impediments; so making his accounts, that he ever estimate *these* with the most, *those* rather with the least; and from this view and examination, these points following come into consideration.

¶ *The first Consideration should be, how a mans individual constitution and moral temper sorts with the general state of the times; which if they be found agreeable, then he may give himself more scope and liberty and use his own nature; but if there be any antipathy and dissonancy then in the whole course of his life hee should carry himselfe more close retired, and reserved. So did Tiberius* who being conscient of his own temper not well sorting with his times was never seene at publique Plaies, and came not into the Senate in twelve of his last yeares: whereas on the contrary *Augustus* lived ever in mens eyes, which also *Tacitus* observes: *Alia Tiberio Morum via*; the same reason too was to secure his person from danger.

Annal. 1.

¶ *The second Consideration should be how a mans nature sorts with the Professions and courses of life which are in use & esteem, and whereof he is to make his choice; that so if he have not yet determined what race to run, or what course of life to take, he may chuse that which is most fit and agreeable to his naturall disposition; but if he be engaged already in a condition of life, to which by nature he is not so fitted, let him make a departure at the first opportunity and take another Profession. This we see was done by Valentine Borgia that was design'd by his father to a Sacerdottall profession, which, obeying the bent of his own nature, he quitted soon after, and applied himselfe to a Military course of life; tho as equally unworthy the dignity of a Prince as of a Priest, seeing the pestilent Man hath dishonoured both.*

¶ *The third Consideration should be how a man may be valued, and may deport himselfe as he is compar'd with his equals & Rivals, whom it is likely he may have competitors and Concurrents in his Fortune, and that he take that course of life wherein there is the greatest solitude of able men; and himselfe like to be most eminent. Thus Iulius Caesar did, who at first was an O-*

ratour

ratour or Pleader, and was chiefe conversant in the gowne-Arts of Peace; but when he saw *Cicero*, *Hortensius*, and *Catulus* to excell in the glory of Eloquence, and no man eminent for the warres but *Pompeius*, he forsook his course and bidding a long fare-well to a Civile and Popular Greatnesse, transferd his designes to the warres and to a Martiall Greatnesse; by which mean he ascended to the top of soveraignty.

*The fourth Consideration may be, that in the choice of friends and inward dependances, a man consult his own nature and disposition, and proceed according to the composition of his own temper; for different constitutions require different kinds of friends to complie withall; to some men, solemnne and silent natures, to others bold and boasting humours are acceptable; and many of like sort. Certainly it is worth the observation, to see of what disposition the friends and followers of Julius Caesar were, (as Antonius, Hirtius, Pansa, Oppius, Balbus, Dolabella, Pollio, the rest,) these were wont to sweare it à vivente Cesare moriar; bearing an infinite affection to Caesar, but towards all others disdainfull and arrogant, and they were men in publique Businesse active and effectuall, in fame and reputation not so solemnne and celebrated.*

*The fifth Consideration may be that a man take heed how hee guide himselfe by Examples, and that he doe not fondly affect the Imitation of others; as if that which is pervious to others, must needs be as patent to him, never considering with himselfe what difference perhaps there is betwixt his and their natures and carriages, whom he hath chosen for his pattern and example. This was manifestly Pompeius error, who, as Cicero reports it, was wont often to say *Sylla potuit, Ego non potero?* wherein hee was much abused, the nature and proceedings of himselfe, and *Sylla* being the unlikeliest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemnne, reverencing Lawes, directing all to Majestie and Fame; and therefore the lesse effectuall and powerfull to goe thorough with his designes. There are more Precepts of this nature, but these shall suffice for example to the rest.*

§ *Nor is the well understanding, and discerning of a mans*

*selfe sufficient, but he must consult with himselfe upon a way how he may aptly and wisely open and reveale himselfe, and in summe become flexible and moulded to the severall formes & impressions of occasions. As for the Revealing of a mans selfe, we see nothing more usuall, than for the lesse able man to make the greater shew. Wherefore it is a great advantage to good parts, if a man can by a kinde of Art and Grace set forth himselfe to others, by aptly revealing (so it be done without distrust or arrogance) his virtues, Merits, and Fortune; and on the contrary by covering artificially his weaknesses, defects, misfortunes and disgraces; staying upon those, & as it were, turning them to the light; sliding from these and lessening them by an apt exposition, and the like. Wherefore Tacitus saith of Mucianus, who was the wisest man and the greatest Politique of his time, *Omnia quæ dixerat feceratq; Arte quâdã ostentator.* This setting forth of a mans selfe requires indeed some Art, least it turne tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as some kinde of *Ostentation*, tho it be to the first degree of vanity seems rather a vice in the *Ethiques*, than in the *Politiques*. For as it is usuall said of *Slander*, *Audaçter calumniare, semper aliquid heret.* So it may be said of *Ostentation* (unlesse it be in a grosse manner deform'd and ridiculous) *Audaçter te vendita, semper aliquid heret;* it will stick certainly with the more ignorant and inferiour sort of men, tho the more wise and solemne smile at it, and despise it. Wherefore the *Estimation* wonne with many, shall countervaille the *Disdaine* of a few. But if this *Ostentation* of a mans selfe, whereof we speak be carried with decency and discretion; for example, if it make shew of a native candor and imbred ingenuity; or if it be assum'd at times, when other Perils approach (as in Military persons in time of warre,) or at times when others are most envied; or if words which respect a mans own *Praise*, seem to fall from him in a carelesse passage, as intending something else, without dwelling too long upon them, or being too serious; or if a man so grace himselfe, as with equall freedom, he forbears not to tax & jest at himselfe; or in summe, if he doe this not of his own accord, but as urg'd & provokt by*

Hist.  
alicubi.

by the insolencies and contumelies of others; it doth greatly adde to a mans Reputation. *And surely* not a few more solid than windy natures, (and therefore want the Art of bearing up sayle in the heighth of the winds;) suffer for their moderation, not without some prejudice, and disadvantage to their reputation and merit. *But for these* Flourishes and enhancements of virtue, however some of weake judgments, and perchance too leverely Morall, may disallow, no man will deny this, but that we should endeavour at least, that virtue thorow carelesse negligence be not disvalued, and imbased under the just price. *This diminution* of the value, and abating the price in estimating Virtue, is wont to fall out three waies *First* when a man offers and obtrudes himselfe and service in matters of imployment not call'd nor sent for; such prompt offices as these are reputed well rewarded, if they be not refused. *Secondly* when a man in the beginning and first on-set of an imployment, too much abuses his own forces & abilities, when that which should have bin performed by degrees, he lavisseth out all at once; which in matters well managed, winnes early grace and commendation, but in the end induceth satietie. *Thirdly* when a man is too sodainly sensible, and too inconsiderately transported with the fruit of his virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour conferr'd upon him; and is too much affected and delighted therewith: of this point there is a wise Avilo. *Beware least you seeme unacquainted with great matters, that are thus pleas'd with small, as if they were great.*

§ *But the covering of Defects is of no lesse importance, than a wise and dexterous ostentation of virtues. Defects are conceal'd and secreted by a threefold industry, and as it were under three coverts, Caution, Colour, and Confidence. Caution* is that, when we doe wisely avoid to be put upon those things for which we are not proper; whereas cōtrariwise bold & undertaking spirits will easily engage themselves without judgement, in matters wherein they are not seen, and so publish and proclaime all their imperfections. *Colour* is when we doe warily and wisely prepare and make way, to have a favourable

and commodious construction made of our faults and wants; as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose than is generally conceiv'd: for of the Coverts of Faults the Poet saith well,

Ovid. *Sape latet vitium proximitate Boni.*

Wherefore if we perceive a *Defect* in our selves, our endeavour must be to borrow and put on the *Person* and *Colour* of the next bordering *Virtue*, wherewith it may be shadowed and secreted. For instance, he that is *Dull*, must pretend *Gravity*; he that is a *Coward*, *mildnesse*, and so the rest. And it will advantage, to frame some probable cause, and to give it out and spread it abroad, that induced us to dissemble our abilities and not doe our best; that so making a *Virtue of Necessitie*, what was not in our *power*, may seem not to have bin in our *will* to doe. As for *Confidence*, it is indeed an impudent, but the surest and most effectually remedy; namely that a man professe himselfe to despise and set at naught, what in truth he cannot attaine; according to the Principle of wise Merchants, with whom it is familiar to raise the price of their own Commodities, and to beat downe the price of others. But there is another kinde of *Confidence* farre more impudent than this, which is to *face out a mans own Defects*, -- to boast them and obtrude them upon Opinion; as if he conceiv'd that he was best in those things, wherein hee most fayles; and to help that againe, that the Deception put upon others may come off more roundly, he may faine, that he hath least opinion of himselfe in those things, wherein he is best. Like as we see it commonly in Poets; for a Poet reciting his verses, if you except against any verse, you shall presently heare him reply, *And for this verse it cost me more labour than the rest*; and than he will bring you some other verse, & seem to disable and suspect that rather, and aske your judgment of it, which yet he knowes to be the best in the number, and not liable to exception. But above all, in this *Helping a mans selfe in his carriage*, namely, that a man may set the fairest glosse upon himselfe before others, and right himselfe in all points, nothing, in my opinion, availes more, than that

a man doe not dismantle himselfe and expose his person to scorne and injurie by his too much Goodnesse and Facility of Nature; but rather in all things shew some sparkles and edge of a free and generous spirit, that carries with it as well a sting, as Honey. Which kinde of fortified carriage together with a prompt and prepared resolution to vindicate a mans selfe from scorne, is imposed upon some by accident and a kinde of an inevitable necessity, for somewhat inherent in their person or fortune; as we see it in Deformed Persons and Bastards, and in Persons any way disgrac'd; so that such natures, if they have any good parts, commonly they succeed with good felicity.

§ As for the declaring of a Mans selfe, that is a far different thing from *Ostentation* or the *Revealing of a Mans selfe*, whereof we spake even now; for it referres not to Mens abilities or weaknesses, but to the *Particular Actions* of life; in which point, nothing is more *Politique*, than to observe a wise and discreet mediocrity in the disclosing or secreting the inward intentions and meanings of the *Minde touching particular Actions*. For althoe depth of secrecy and concealing of Counsils, and that manner of managing Businesse when men set things awork by dark, and as the French stiles it, *Sourdes Menées, sourd Arts, & close Carriages*, be a thing both prosperous and admirable; yet many times it comes to passe, as the saying is, *That Dissimulation begets errors, and illaqueates the Dissembler himselfe*. For we see the ablest men, and greatest *Politiques* that ever were have made no scruple of it, openly to professe, freely and without dissimulation, the ends they ayme at: so *L. Sylla* made a kinde of profession, *That he wisht all men happy or unhappy as they stood his friends or enimies*: So *Cæsar* when he went first into *Gaule* confidently profest, *That he had rather be first in an obscure village, than second at Rome*: the same *Cæsar* when the warre was now begun did not play the dissembler, if we observe what *Cicero* reports of him; the other (meaning of *Cæsar*) refuseth not, *nay in a sort desires, that, as matters stand, he may so be called Tyrant*. So wee may see in a letter of *Cicero's* to *Atticus*, how far from a *Dissembler*

Plutar. in  
Sylla.

Plutar. in  
I. Cæf.

Ad Att.  
Lib. x. E. 4.

Cic. ad  
Attic.

Hist. 2.

Sal. apud  
Sueton. lib.  
de cl. GramAnnal.  
libris.

sembler Augustus Cæsar was, who in his very entrance into Affairs, while he was a darling to the Senate, yet in his Haranges & Speeches to the People was wont to swear after this manner, *Ita parentis honores consequi liceat*, which was no less than the Tyranny; save that to help the matter a little, he would with all stretch forth his hand to a statua of *Julius Cæsars*, which was erected in the *Roftra*: and men laugh and applauded, and wondred and discoursed thus amongst themselves, *what means this? What a young man have we here?* and yet thought he meant no hurt, he did so candidely and ingenuously speake what he meant. And all these, we have nam'd, were prosperous: Whereas on the other side, *Pompeius* who tended to the same ends, but by more umbragious and obscure waies (as *Tacitus* saith of him *Occultor non melior*, a censure wherein *Salust* concurs, *Ore probo, Animo in verecundo*.) made it his designe, and endeavoured by infinite engines, that deeply hideing his boundlesse desires and ambition, he might in the meane space cast the state into an Anarchy and confusion, whereby the state must necessarily cast it selfe into his armes for protection, and so the soveraigne Power be put upon him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it, (as he thought,) to that point, when he was chosen *Consul* alone, as never any was; yet he could make no great matter of it; because those, that without question would have cooperated with him understood him not; so that he was faine in the end, to goe the beaten and common track of getting Armes into his hands, by colour of opposing himselfe against Cæsar: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate are those Counsils which are cover'd with deepe *Disimulation*; whereof it seems *Tacitus* made the same judgement, when he makes the *Arts of Simulation*, a prudence of an inferior forme, in regard of true *Policy*, attributing the one to *Augustus*, the other to *Tiberius*; for speaking of *Livia* he saith thus, *That she sorted well with the Arts of her husband, and Disimulation of her sonne.*

§ As touching the bending and moulding of the Minde; it must indeed by all possible means be endeavoured that the mind

be made pliant and obedient to occasions and opportunities, and that it be not any way stiffe and renitent to them: for nothing hinders the effecting of Businesse, and the making of mens fortunes so much as this: *Idem manebat neq; idem decebat*, that is, when men are where they were, and follow their own bent when occasions are turn'd. Therefore Livy, when he brings in Cato Major, as the expertest Architect of his fortune, very well annexes this, that he had, *versatile ingenium*, and thereof it comes, that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and cannot make departure, have for most part more dignity then felicity. But in some it is nature to be viscos and invrapt and not easy to turne: in others it is custome, that is almost a nature and a conceit, which easily steals into mens minds, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe, that they ought to change such courses, as they have found good and prosperous by farther experience. For Machiavell notes wisely in *Fabius Maximus*, How he would have bin temporizing. still according to his old biasse, when the nature of the warre was altered and required bolt pursuit. In some others the same weaknesse proceeds for want of penetration in their judgement, when men doe not in time discern the Periods of things and Actions, but come in too late after the occasion is escaped. Such an oversight as this, Demosthenes reprehends in the People of Athens, saying they were like countrey fellows playing in a Fenceschoole, that if they have a blow, than they remove their weapons to that ward and not before. Againe in others this comes to passe, because they are loath to loose the labour, in that way, they have enter'd into, nor doe they know how to make a retrait, but rather intertaine a conceit, that by perseverance they shall bring about occasions to their owne plie. But from what root or cause soever this viscosity and restiveness of mind proceeds, it is a thing most prejudicial both to a mans affaires and fortunes; and nothing is more politique, than to make the wheele of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheelles of Fortune. Thus much of the two summary precepts touching the *Architecture of Fortune*. Precepts

Discors  
supra Liv.

Orat. in  
Philip. I.

Scattered are many, but we will only select a few to serve as examples to the rest.

§ The first Precept is, that this Architect of his own fortune rightly use his Rule, that is, that he inure his minde to judge of the Proportion and valure of things; as they conduce more or lesse to his own fortune and ends; and that he intend the same substantially, and not superficially. For it is strange but most true, that there are many, whose Logick part of Minde (if I may so terme it) is good; but the Mathematical part nothing worth; that is, who can well and soundly judge of the consequences; but very unskilfully of the prizes of things. Hence it comes to passe, that some fall in love and into admiration with the private and secret accessse to Princes; others with popular fame and applaule, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but matters of envy, perill, and impediment: others measure things, according to the labour and difficulty spent about them, thinking that if they be ever moveing, they must needs advance and proceed; as *Cesar* said in a despising manner of *Cato Uticensis*, when he describes how laborious, assiduous and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, *Omnia (saith he) magno studio agebat*. Hence likewise it comes to passe, that men often abuse themselves, who if they use the favour and furtherance of some great and honourable Person, they promise themselves all prosperous successe; whereas the truth is, that, not the greatest, but the aptest instruments, soonest, and more happily accomplish a worke. And for the true direction of the Mathematicall Square of the Mind; it is worth the paines especially to know, and have it set downe, what ought first to be resolved upon for the building and advanceing of a mans fortune: what next, and so forward?

§ In the first place I set downe, the Amendment of the mind; for by taking away and smoothing the impediments, and rubbes of the Minde, you shall sooner open a way to fortune, than by the assistance of Fortune, take away the impediments of the Mind. In the second place I set downe wealth and  
 Meanes,

*Means*, which perchance most men would have placed first, because of the generall use it bears towards all variety of occasions; but that opinion I may condemne with like reason, as *Machiavell* in another case not much unlike; for whereas the old saying was; that *Monies were the sinewes of warre*, he on the contrary affirmed, that *there were no other sinewes of warres, save the sinewes of valiant mens armes*. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not *Monies* that is the sinewes of *Fortune*, but the sinewes rather and abilities of the Mind, Wit, Courage, Audacity, Resolution, Moderation, Industry, and the like. In the third place, I set downe *Fame and Reputation*, and the rather because they have certaine tides and times, which if you doe not take in their due season, are seldome recovered, it being a very hard matter to play an after game of *Reputation*. In the last place I set downe *Honours*, to which certainly there is a more easy accessse made by any of the other three, much more by all united; than if you begin with *Honours* and so proceed to the rest. But as it is of speciall consequence, to observe the order and priority of things; so is it of little lesse import, to observe the order and priority of *Time*; the preposterous placing whereof, is one of the communest errors; while men flye unto their ends, when they should intend their beginnings; and whilst we sodainly ceize upon the highest matters, we rashly passe over what lies in the midst; but it is a good precept, *Quod nunc instat agamus*.

Discorsi  
in T. Livio  
lib. 2.

The second Precept is, that upon a greatnesse and Confidence of Mind, we doe not engage our forces in too arduous matters, which we cannot so well conquer; nor that we rowe against the stream. For as touching mens Fortune, the counsil is excellent.

----- *Fatis accede Deisque* -----

Let us looke about us on every side, and observe where things are open, where shut and obstructed; where easy, where difficile, to be compassed; and that we doe not overstraine and misemploy our strength where the way is not passable, for this will preserve us from foile, not occupy us too much about one matter; we shall win an opinion of

Moderation; offend few; and lastly, make a shew of a perpetuall felicity in all we undertake; whilst those things which peradventure would of their own accord have come to passe, shall be attributed to their providence & industrie.

*The third Precept* may seeme to have some repugnancy with that former immediatly going before; though it be well understood, there is none at all. *The Precept is this; that we doe not alwaies expect occasions, but sometimes provoke them, and lead the way unto them,* which is that which Demosthenes intimates in high termes. For as it is a received principle that a Generall should lead the Armie; so wise and understanding men should conduct and command matters, and such things should be done as they saw fit to be done; and that they should not be forc'd to pursue and build only upon events. For if we diligently consider it we shall observe two differing kindes of sufficiency in managing affaires and handling businesse; for some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot and excogitate nothing; some are all for Plots, which they can well urge and pursue, but cannot accommodate & take in: Either of which abilities is maimed, and imperfect without the other.

*A fourth Precept is, not to imbrace any matters which doe occupie too great a quantitie of time; but to have that verse ever sounding in our eares.*

*Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus.*

*And the cause why those who addiect themselves to professions of burden and the like, as Lawyers, Orators, painfull Divines, writers of Books, and the like, are not commonly so politique in contriving and promoting their own fortunes, is no other then this; that they want time which is otherwise imployed, to informe themselves of Particulars; and to wait upon occasions, and to devise & project designes which may conduce to the making of their fortune.* Nay further, in the Courts of Princes and in states, you shall have those that are exceeding powerfull and expert how to advance their own Fortune, and to invade the Fortune of others, which undergoe no publique charge, but are continually practized in that whereof we speake, *The Advancement of Life.*

*A Fifth Precept is, to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine.* Which certainly we may doe, if we discreetly mingle and interlace our businesse of all sorts. For the minde should in every particular action be so disposed and prepared; and our intentions so subdued, and subordinated one under another; as if we cannot have that we seek in the best degree, yet we may have it in a second, or at least in a third: but if we can get no footing nor any consistency at all in any part of a thing we desire; than we may turne the paines we have taken upon some other end, then that whereto it was designed: but if we cannot make any thing of it for the present, at least we may extract something out of it that may stand us instead for the time to come; but if we can derive no solid effect or substance from it, neither for the present nor for the future; let us yet endeavour to winne some good opinion and reputation by it; and the like: ever exacting accoumpts of our selves, whereby it may appeare that we have reapt somewhat more or lesse from every particular Action and Counsil; never suffering our selves to be cast down and dispirited, like men amaz'd and confused, if perchance we faile in the principal scope of our intentions. For nothing is more prejudicious to a Politique, than to be wholly and solely taken up with one thing; for he that doth so, looleth infinite occasions which doe intervene upon the by; and which perhaps are more proper and propitious for somewhat that may be of use hereafter; than for those things we urge for the present: and therefore we must be perfect in that Rule, *Hæc oportet facere & illa non omittere.*

Epict.  
Ench.

*A sixth Precept is, that we engage not our selves too peremptorily in any thing though it seeme not at first sight, liable to accident; but that we ever have either an open window to fly out at, or a secret posterne way to retire by.*

*A seventh Precept is, that ancient Rule of Bias; so it be construed not to any point of Perfidiousnesse; but to caution and moderation. So loue a man as yet thou mayst become an enimie, so hate a man as yet thou mayst become his Friend; for it utterly betrayes and frustrates all utility, for a man to em-*

barque himfelfe too farre in unfortunate friendships; unquiet and troublesome spleenes, or childish and humorous *Æmulations*.

Plura velis?  
V. Cardani  
Proxen five  
Arcana Pol:  
ô quàm  
Arcana!

*These ſhall ſuffice for examples touching the knowledge of the Advancement of Life*: yet I would have it remembred, that theſe adumbrations which we have drawne and ſet downe as *Deficients*, are farre from compleat Tractates of them, but only that they are as litle peeces and edgings for patternes, whereby a judgement may be made of the whole web. Againe we are not ſo weake and fooliſh as to avouch that *Fortunes* are not to be obtained without all this adoe; for we know well they come tumbling into ſome mens laps, and a numbred obtaine good *fortunes* onely with diligence and aſſiduity (with ſome litle caution intermingled) in a plaine way, without any great or painfull Art. But as *Cicero* when he ſets down the Idea of a perfect Orator, doth not mean that every Pleader ſhould be or can be ſuch: and againe as in the deſcription of a Prince or a Courtier, by ſuch as have handled thoſe ſubjects; the Mould is made according to the perfection of the Art, and not according to common practice: the ſame vve have performed in the inſtruction of a *Politique* man; J mean *Politique for his owne Fortune*. And likewise take this advertiſement along vvith you. That the Precepts vvhich vve have choſen & ſet down, are all of that kinde vvhich may be counted and called *Bonæ Artes*. As for *Evill Arts*, if a man vvould yeeld himſelfe a diſciple to *Machiavell* vvho gives it in precept, *That a man needs not much care for virtue it ſelfe, but for the appearance onely thereof in the eyes of the world, becauſe the fame and credit of virtue is a help, but the uſe of it a cumber*; vvho in another place gives this rule: That a *Politique* man lay this as a foundation of his Practice wiſdome, *that he preſuppoſe that men are not rightly & ſafely to be wrought upon (&) bowed to the bent of our wils, otherwiſe than by feare; (&) therefore let him endeavour by all meanes poſſible to have every man obnoxious, low (&) in ſtreights*. So as *Machiavells* Politician ſeems to be vvhat the Italians call *il ſeminatore d'élle ſpine*; or if any vvould imbrace that

Principle

Libro  
del Pren.

Principle which *Cicero* cites, *Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercidant*; as the *Trium-viri* told the lives of their friends, for the deaths of their enemies. Or if a man would be an imitator of *L. Catilina* to become an incendiarie and a perturber of states to the end he may better fish in droumy waters, and unwrap his fortunes; *I* (saith he) *if once a fire ceize upon my Fortune, will extinguish it not with water but with ruine*; or if any one would convert to his use that of *Lyfander*, who was wont to say, *That children are to be deceived with Comfits, and men with Othes*. With other such corrupt and pernicious Positions of the same impressiõ, whereof (as in all other things, there are more in number, than of the good & sound. If any (I say) be delighted with such contagious and polluted wildome, I deny not but with these dispensations from all the lawes of charity and integrity, wholly enslaved to the pressing of his own *Fortunes*, he may be more speedy and compendious *in the promoting of his Fortune*: but it is in life, as it is in waies, the shortest way is commonly the fowlest; and surely the fairer way is not much about. *But it is so far from the minde and purpose of this Discourse that men should apply themselves to these corrupt and crooked Arts, that rather indeed (if they be in their own power and are able to beare and sustaine themselves; and be not carried away with the whirlewinde and tempest of Ambition) they ought in the pursuit of Fortune to set before their eyes, not onely that general Map of the world, That all things are vanity and vexation of spirit; but also that more particular card and direction, That Being, without well-Being, is a curse; & the greater Being, the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickednesse most punished in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently,*

*Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro talibus ausis  
Præmia posse reor solvi? Pulcherrima præmium*

*Virg.  
Æn. 9.*

*Dii Moresq; dabunt vestri.* ———

And so on the contrary he speakes as truly of the wicked  
— atq; eum ulciscetur mores sui. ——— Nay further the race of  
Mortality, whilst their working heads every way tosse and  
diffuse

diffuse their thoughts how they may best forecast and consult *their advancement in the world*, ought, in the midst of these heats, and eager pursuits, to look up to the divine judgement, and the eternall providence, which oftentimes subverts and brings to nothing the plots of the wicked, and their evill counsils, thoe never so profound; according to

Psal. vii. that of sacred scripture, *He conceiv'd wicked thoughts, travel'd great with mischief, and shall bring forth delusive vanity.* Nay though men should refrain themselves from injuries and evill Arts; *yet this incessant and Saboathlesse aspiring to the steep height of Fortune, paies not the tribute of our time due unto God, who (as we may see) demands and sets apart for himselfe a Tenth of our substance and a Seaventh of our time.* For it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a groveling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent; an opposition which even Heathens could see and censure. *Atq; affigit humo divina particulam Aura.*

Horat. ser. 2. And if any man should herein flatter himselfe, that he resolves to imploy his Fortune well though he should obtaine it ill; as was wont to be said of *Augustus Caesar* and *Septimius Severus*, *That either they should never have bin borne, or else they should never have died,* they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatnesse; and so much good when they were establisht; let him take this with him, that such compensation of evill by goods, may be allowed after the Fact, but is deservedly condemn'd in the purpose. *Lastly,* it will not be amisse for us, in that swift and hot race towards our fortune, to coole our selves a litle, with that elegant conceit of the Emperour *Charles the V.* in his instructions to his sonne, *That Fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed she is the farther off,* but this last remedy is for those whose tast, from some distemper of the mind, is corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation, which is as a corner-stone of Divinity and Philosophy, wherein they almost joyne close by the same assertion of *what should be first sought;* for Divinity commands,


Mat. vi. *First seek the Kingdome of God and all these things shall be superadded*

peradded unto you; and Philosophy commands somewhat like this; *Seek first the goods of the mind, and the rest shall be supplied, or no way prejudiced by their absence.* And although this foundation laid by man is sometimes placed upon the sands, as we may see in *M. Brutus*, who in the last scene of his life, brake forth into that speech,

*Te Colui virtus ut Rem, ast Tu Nomen inane es:*

Yet the same foundation laid by the hand of heaven, is firmly settled upon a Rock. *And here we conclude the knowledge of the Advancement of Life; and withall the generall knowledge of Negotiations.*

DION Lib.  
XLVII. ex  
Postâ vet.



### CAP. III.

The Partitions of the *Art of Empire or Government* are omitted; only access is made to two DEFICIENTS. I *The knowledge of enlarging the Bounds of Empire.* II. *And the knowledge of universall Justice; or of the Fountains of Law.*

I.  Come now to the *Art of Empire*, or the knowledge of *Civile Government*; under which *Household Government* is comprehended, as a *Family* is under a *City*. In this part, as I said before, I have commanded my selfe silence: yet notwithstanding I may not so disable my selfe; but that I could discourse of this part also, perchance not impertinently, nor unprofitably; as one practised by long experience; and by your Majesties most indulgent favours, and no merit of mine owne, raised by the degrees of office and honours, to the highest Dignity in the state; and have borne that office for foure years; and which is more, have bin accustomed to Your Majesties commands and conferences, for the continued space of eighteene years together, (which even of the dullest mould might fashion and produce a States-man) who have spent much time amongst other knowledges, in *Histories* and *lawes*. *All which I report to posterity, not out of any arro-*

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gant ostentation; but because I presume it makes something to the honour and Dignity of learning; that a man borne for letters more than any thing else, and forcibly carried away, I know not by what fate, against the bent of his own Genius, to a Civile active course of life, should yet be advanc't to so high and honourable charges in the state, and that under so wise a King. But if my times of leisure shall bring forth hereafter any thing touching the wisdom of Government, and state matters, it will be perchance an Abortive, or an after-Birth. In the mean space now that all sciences are distributed and ranged, as it were, into their true Formes; least such an eminent place as this should remaine empty, I have judg'd it fit to note as DEFICIENTS two Portions only of Civile knowledge, which pertaine, not to the Secrets of Empire, but are of a more open and publique nature; and, according to our custome, to propound examples thereof. Seeing the Arts of Government, comprehend three sorts of Politique Duties; First that a Kingdome or State be conserved; Secondly that it may become happy and flourishing; Thirdly that it may be amplified and the bounds thereof propagated and extended. Of these duties the two first are for most part by many, excellently well handled; but the third is past over in silence; wherefore we will set this downe in the number of Deficients, and according to our manner propole examples thereof; calling this part of Civile knowledge *Consulem Paludatum*, or a knowledge of the enlarging the Bounds of Empire.

\*  
E X A M P L E

CONSV  
PALV.  
DATVS,  
five de  
proferen-  
dis Impe-  
rii finibus.

OF A SUMMARY TREATISE  
touching the enlarging of the Bounds  
of EMPIRE.

**T**He speech of *Themistocles*, taken to himselfe, was indeed somewhat uncivile and haughty; but if it had been applied to others and at large, certainly it may seem to comprehend in it a wise observation and a grave  
censure.

cenſure. Deſired at a Feaſt to touch a lute, he ſaid *He could not Fidle, but yet he could make a ſmall Towne a great City:* Plutar. in Them.

Theſe words drawne to a Politique ſenſe doe excellently expreſſe and diſtinguiſh two differing Abilities, in thoſe that deale in buſineſſe of Eſtate. For if a true ſurvey be taken of all Counſilors and States-men that ever were, and others promoted to publique charge, there will be found (though very rarely) thoſe which can make a *ſmall State great, and yet cannot fidle*, as on the other ſide there will be found a great many, *that are very cunning upon the Citterne or Lute, (that is in Court-Trifles) but yet are ſo farre from being able to make a ſmall State, Great; as their guiſt lies another way, to bring a Great and Flouriſhing Eſtate to ruine and decay.* And certainly thoſe degenerate Arts and ſhifts, whereby many Counſilors and Governors gaine both favour with their Maifters, and eſtimation with the vulgar, deſerve no better name than *Fidling*; being things rather pleaſing for the time, and gracefull to the profeſſors themſelves, than tending to the *weale and advancement of the State*, which they ſerve. There are alſo (no doubt) *Counſilors and Governors*, not to be deſpiſed, which may be held ſufficient men, and equall to their charge; able to manage Affaires, and to *keepe them from precipicies and manifelt inconveniences*, which nevertheless are farre from the Ability to *raiſe and amplify an Eſtate*. But be the workmen what they may be, let us caſt our eyes upon the worke, that is, *what is the true greatneſſe of Kingdomes and Eſtates, and by what means it may be obtained?* An argument fit for great Princes to have perpetually in their hand, and diligently to meditate; to the end that neither by overmeaſuring their Forces, they looſe themſelves in vaine and too difficile enterpriſes; nor on the other ſide undervaluing them, they deſcend to fearfull and puſillanimous Counſils. *The Greatneſſe of an Eſtate in Bulke and Territory, doth fall under meaſure; the Greatneſſe of Financies and Revenue doth fall under computation.* The number of Cittizens and the Pole may be taken by Muſters; and the multitude and greatneſſe of Citties and Townes, by Cardes and

Mapps. But yet there is not any thing amongst Civile Affaires, more subject to error, than a true and intrinseque valuation, concerning the Power and Forces of an Estate. *The Kingdome of Heaven is compar'd not to an Acorne or Nut; but to a Grain of Mustard-seed, which is one of the least Graines, but hath in it a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread.* So are there Kingdomes and States in compasse and territory very great, and yet not so apt to enlarge their Bounds or Command; and some on the other side that have but a small dimension of stemme, and yet apt to be the Foundations of great Monarchies.

I *Walled Townes; stored Arcenalls and Armories, goodly Races of Horse, Chariots of warre, Elephants, Ordinance, Artillery, and the like; all this is but a sheep in a Lions skin, except the Breed and Disposition of the people be stout & war-like.* Nay number it selfe in Armies imports not much, where the people is of a faint & weak courage: for, as *Virgil* saith, *It never troubles a Wolfe, how many the sheep be.* The Army of the Persians in the Plaines of *Arbela*, was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the Commanders in *Alexanders Armie*; who came to him therefore, and wisht him to set upon them by *Night*, but he answered, *I will not Pilfer the victory*; and the Defeat by that courageous assurance was the more easie. When *Tigranes* the *Armevian*, being encamped upon a hill with an Armie of 400000 Men, discovered the Army of the *Romans* being not above 14000 marching towards him, he made himselfe merry with it & said; *yonder men are too many for an Ambassage, and too few for a Fight*: but before the sunne set he found them enow to give him the chale with infinite slaughter. Many are the examples of the great odds between number & courage. First then a man may rightly make a judgement and set it downe for a sure and certaine truth, that the principall point of all other which respects the *Greatnes of any Kingdome or State* is to have a RACE of *Military men*. And that is a more trite than true saying, *That Money is the Sinewes of Warre*; where the sinewes of mens armes in base and effeminate people are fay-

ling:

B. Ecl 7.

Plutar. in  
Alex.Plut. in  
Lucul.Macch.  
Discors.  
sopra Livio  
lib. 2.

ling: for *Solon* said well to *Crasus* (when in ostentation hee shewed him his gold) *Sir, if any other come that hath any better from than you, he will be master of all this Gold.* Therefore Plut. in Solonc. let any Prince or State think soberly of their Forces, except their *Militia* of Natives be of Good and Valiant Souldiers: and let Princes on the other side that have Subjects of stout and Martiall disposition, know their own strength, unlesse they be otherwile wanting to themselves. As for Mercenary Forces (which is the help in this case where native forces fayle) all times are full of examples whereby it manifestly appears; that whatsoever State or Prince doth rest upon them, *he may spread his Feathers for a time beyond the compasse of his nest; but he will mew them soone after.*

2 *The blessing of Iudah and Issachar will never meet. That the same Tribe or Nation should be both the Lions whelp, and the Ass between Bardens;* Gen. XLIX. neither will it be that a people overlaid with Taxes, should ever become Valiant, and Martiall. It is true that Taxes levied by publique consent of the estate doe depresse and abate mens courage lesse, as a man may plainly see in the Tributes of the Low. coutries, which they call *Excizes*; and in some degree in those contributions which they call *Subsidies* in England. For you must note that we speak now of the Heart and not of the Purse; so that altho the same Tribute conferr'd by consent or imposed by command, be all one to the purse, yet it works diversly upon the courage: Therefore set down this too as a Principle, *That no People overcharg'd with Tribute is fit for Empire.*

3 *Let States and kingdomes that ayme at Greatnesse by all meanes take heed how the Nobility, and Grandies, and those which we call Gentle-men, multiply too fast; for that makes the common subject grow to be a Peasant and Base swaine driven out of heart, and in effect nothing elle but the Noble mans Bond-slaves and Labourers. Even as you may see in Coppice wood, If you leave your studdles too thick, you shall never have cleane underwood, but shrubs and bushes:* So in a countrey if the Nobility be too many the Commons will be base and heartlesse, and you will bring it to that, that not

the hundredth Pole will be fit for an Helmet; especially as to the *Infantry*, which is the nerve of an Army; & so there will be great Population and litle strength. This which I speak off hath been in no Nation more cleerely confirm'd than in the examples of *England* and *France*, whereof *England*, thoe farre inferior in Territory & Population, hath bin neverthelesse alwaies an overmatch in Armes; in regard the middle-people of *England* make good Souldiers, which the Peasants of *France* doe not. And herein the devise of

Histor.  
HEN. VII.

HENRY THE VII KING OF ENGLAND (whereof I have spoken largely in the History of his life) was profound and admirable, in making Farmes and Houses of Husbandry of a standard; that is maintain'd with such a Proportion of land unto them, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and to keep the Plough in the hands of the Owners, or at least usu-fructuary, and not hirelings & Mercenaries; and thus a Countrey shall merit that Character whereby *Virgil* expresses ancient *Italy*,

En. I.

*Terra potens Armis atq; ubere Gleba.*

Neither is that state which is almost peculiar to *England*, (and for any thing I know, hardly to be found any where else, except it be perhaps in *Poland*) to be passed over; I meane the state of Free-servants and Attendants upon Noble-men and Gentle-men; of which sort, even they of inferior condition, doe no waies yeeld unto the *Teomanry*, for *Infantry*. And therefore out of all question the Magnificence and that Hospitable splendor, the Household servants, and great Retinues of Noble-men and Gentle-men receiv'd into custome in *England*, doth much conduce unto *Martiall Greatnesse*: whereas on the other side, the close, reserved and contracted living of Noble-men, causeth a Penury of *Military Forces*.

4 By all means it is to be procured, that the Trunck of *Nebuchadnezzars Tree of Monarchy*, be great enough to beare the Branches and the Boughes; that is, that the number of *Naturall Subjects* to the Crowne or State, beare a sufficient proportion for the over-topping the stronger subjects. Therefore

fore all States that are liberal of *Naturalization* towards *strangers*, are fit for the *Greatnesse of Empire*. For it is a vaine opinion to think that a handfull of people, can with the greatest courage and Policy in the world, keep and repress under the lawes of Empire, too large and spacious extent of *Dominion*; this may hold for a time, but it will faile sodainly. The Spartans were a spareing and nice People in point of *Naturalization*, whereby while they kept their compasse, they stood firme and assured; but when they began to spread and to enlarge their Dominion, and that their boughs, multiplied by strangers, were becomen too great for the stemme of the Spartans, they became a wind-fall upon the sodaine. Never any State was in this point so open to receive strangers into their Body, as were the Romanes; therefore their Fortune seconded their wise institution, for they grew to the greatest Monarchy in the world. Their manner was to grant *Naturalization* (which they called *Ius Civitatis*) and to grant it in the highest degree; that is, not only *Ius Com-*  
*mercii*, *Ius Connubii*, *Ius Hereditatis*; but also *Ius Suffragii*, and *Ius Petitionis sive Honorum*; and this not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families, yea to Citties, and sometimes to whole Nations. Adde to this, their custome of *Plantation of Colonies*, whereby the *Romane Plants* were removed into the soile of other Nations: and putting both constitutions together, you will say, *that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world; but it was the world that spread upon the Romanes*; which was the securest way of *Enlarging the Bounds of Empire*. I have marvailed sometimes at *Spaine*, how they claspe and governe so large Dominions, with so few naturall *Spaniards*: but surely the whole compasse of *Spaine*, is a very great body of a Tree; being it containes farre more ample Territories; than Rome or Sparta at their first riseings. And besides, thoe the *Spaniards* have not had that useage to *Naturalize* liberally; yet they have that which is next to it, that is, *To employ, almost indifferently, all Nations in their Militia of Ordinary souldiers*; yea and sometimes they conferre their highest commands of warre, upon Cap-  
Exempla  
apud Cic.  
pro L. C.  
Bal.
taines

taines that are no naturall Spaniards: nay it seemes, not long agoe, they have begun to grow sensible of this want of Natives, and to seek a Remedy, as appears by the *Pragmaticall Sanction* publisht this yeare.

5 *It is most Certaine that sedentary and within-dooore Mechanicall Arts; and Delicate Manufactures* (that require rather the Finger, than the Arme,) *have in their nature a contrariety to a Military Disposition.* And generally all warlike People are a litle idle, and love danger better than travaile: neither must they be too much broken of it, if we will have their spirits preserv'd in vigor. Therefore it was great advantage in the ancient states of *Sparta, Athens, Rome,* and others, that they had the use, not of *Free-men,* but of *Slaves,* which commonly did rid those *Manufactures*: but the use of *Slaves* since the receiving of the *Christian Law,* is, in greatest part abolisht. That which comes neere to this custome, is to leave those Arts chiefly to strangers, which for that purpose are to be allured, or at least the more easily to be received. The *vulgar Natives* should consist of three sorts of men; that is, of *Tillers of Ground; Free-servants,* and *Handy-craftsmen* of strong and Manly Arts, as *Smithes, Mafons, Carpenters, &c.* not reckoning professed Souldiers.

Liv. lib. i.  
v. c. 37.

6 *But above all, for the Greatnesse of Empire,* it imports most, that a Nation doe professe *Armes* as their glory, Principall study, and chiefest Honor. For the things which we formerly have spoken of, are but *Habilitations* towards *Armes;* and to what purpose is *Habilitation* without endeavour to produce it into *Act?* *Romulus,* after his death, (as they report or faigne) sent a present to the *Romans,* that above all they should intend *Armes;* and than they should prove the greatest Empire of the World. The whole *Fabrique* of the State of *Sparta,* was, industriously (thoe not so wisely) compos'd and built to that scope and end. The *Persians* and *Macedonians* had the same useage, but not so constant and lasting. The *Britans, Galls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, Normans,* for a flash of time gave themselves chiefly to *Armes.* The *Turkes* not a litle instigated thereto by their  
Law;

Law, retaine the same *discipline* at this day, (thoe as it is now practised) with great declination of their *Militia*. Of Christian Europe they that retaine and professe it, are in effect only the *Spaniards*. But it is so liquid and manifest, *that every man profiteth most, in that he most intendeth*, that it needs not to be stood upon. It is enough to point at it; *That no Nation which doth not professe Armes, and practise Military Arts, making it their principal study and occupation, may ever hope to have any notable greatnesse of Empire, fall into their mouthes:* and on the other side, it is a most certaine Oracle of time, *That those Nations that have continued long in the profession and study of Armes (as the Romanes & Turkes principally have done, for the propagation of Empire, work wonders.* Nay those that have flourish'd for the glory of Armes, but for the space only of one age; have commonly attain'd *that Greatnesse of Dominion*, in that one age, which maintained them long after, when their profession and exercise of Armes hath growen to decay.

7 *Incident to this Precept is, for a state to have such lawes and Customes which may readily reach forth unto them just occasions, or at least pretences of taking Armes.* For there is that apprehension of Justice imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon *warres* (whereof so many calamities doe ensue) but upon some, at the least specious grounds and Quarrells. The Turke hath at hand for cause of warre the Propagation of his law and sect; a quarrell that he may alwaies command. The Romans thoe they esteemed the *extending of the Limits of their Empire*, to be great honour to their Generals, when it was done; yet for that cause alone, to *Propagate their bounds*, they never undertook a warre. Therefore let a nation that pretends to *Greatnesse*, & aspires to *Empire*, have this condition, that they have a quick and lively sense of any wrongs either upon Borderers, Merchants or publique Ministers; and that they sit not too long upon the first provocation. *Again* let them be prest, and Active to send Aides and Succors to their Allies and confederates; as it ever was with the Romans: in so much, as if

a hostile invasion were made upon a confederate, which also had leagues Defensive with other states, and the same implored their aides severally; the Romanes would ever be the formost; and leave it to no other to have the Honour of the Assistance. *As for the warres which were anciently made for a kinde of conformity, or tacite correspondency of Estates, I doe not see upon what law they are grounded. Such were the warres undertaken by the Romanes, for the liberty of Grecia: such were those of the Lacedemonians and Athenians, to set up or pull downe Democracies and Oligarchies: such are the warres made sometimes by States and Princes, under pretence of protecting Forraine subjects, and freeing them from Tyranny and oppression, and the like. Let it suffice for the present point that it be concluded, That no Estate expect to be Great, that is not instantly awake, upon any just occasion of Arming.*

8 *No body can be healthfull without exercise, neither Naturall Body nor Politique: and certainly to a Kingdome or Estate a just and honourable warre is in place of a wholsome exercise. A Civile warre indeed, is like the heat of a Fever; but a Forraine is like the heat of Exercise, and serves to keep the body in health: for in a slothfull and drowsie Peace, both courages will effeminate, & Manners corrupt. But howsoever it be for the Happinesse of any Estate, without all question, for Greatnesse, it maketh, to be still for the most part in Armes: and a veterane Army (thoe it be a chargeable Businesse) alwaies on foot, is that which commonly gives the Law, or at least the Reputation amongst all neighbour states. This is notably to be seen in Spaine, which had in one part or other a veterane Army almost continually, now by the space of sixe-score years.*

9 *To be Master of the Sea, is an Abridgement of a Monarchy, Cicero writing to Atticus of Pompeius his preparation against Caesar saith; Consilium Pompeii, planè Themistocleum est; putat enim, qui Mari potitur, eum Rerum potiri. And without doubt Pompey had tired out and broken Caesar, if upon a vaine confidence he had not left that way. We see*  
from

Vide fis  
Cl. Seldeni  
Mare clauf.

from many examples the great effects of *Battailes by Sea*: The Battaile of *Aëtium* decided the Empire of the world: the Battaile of *Lepanto* put a ring in the nose of the Turke: *Certainly* it hath often fallen out that *Sea-fights* have bin final to the warre; but this is when Princes or States have set up their Rest upon those Battails. Thus much is without all doubt, *that he that commands the Sea, is at great liberty; and may take as much and as litle of the warre as he will: whereas on the Contrary, those that be strongest by Land, are many times neverthelesse in great straights.* But at this day and with us of *Europe*, the vantage of strength at Sea (*which is indeed one of the principall Dowries of this Kingdome of Great Brittain*) is in the summe of Affaires of great import: both because most of the Kingdomes of *Europe*, ate not meerey Inland, but girt with the Sea most part of their compasse, and because the Treasures and wealth of both Indies, seems in great part but an Accessarie to the command of the Seas.

10 *The warres of latter Ages seem to be made in the darke, in respect of the Glory and Honor which reflected upon Military men from the warres in ancient times.* We have now perchance, for Martial encouragement some degrees and Orders of Chivalry, which neverthelesse are conferred promiscuously upon Souldiers, and no Souldiers; and some Pedegrees of Families perhaps upon Scutchions; and some publique Hospitals for emerited and maim'd Souldiers, and such like things. But in Ancient times, the *Trophy* erected upon the place of the victory; the Funerall Laudatives and stately Monuments for those that died in the warres; Civique Crownes and military Garlands awarded to particular persons; the stile of Emperor, which the Greatest Kings of the world after, borrowed from commanders in warre; the solemne Triumphs of the Generals upon their returne, after the warres were prosperously ended; the great Donatives and Largeesses upon the disbanding of the Armies: these I say were matters so many and great, and of such glorious lustre and blaze in the eyes of the world, as were able to create a Fire in the most frozen breasts, and to

inflame them to warre. *But above all, that of the Triumph* amongst the Romanes, was not a matter of meere Pompe, or some vaine spectacle of pageants; but one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever was: for it contain'd in it three things, *Honor and Glory to the Generalls; Riches to the Treasury out of the spoiles; and Donatives to the Army.* But the *Honors of Triumph* perhaps were not fit for Monarchies, except it be in the person of the King himselfe, or of the Kings sonnes; as it came to passe in the times of the *Roman Emperors*, who did impropriate the *Honor of Triumph* to themselves; and their sonnes; for such warres as they did atchieve in Person, and left only by way of indulgence, *Gariments and Triumphall Ensignes* to the Generalls.

Mat. VI.

§ *But to conclude these discourses, There is no man* (as sacred Scripture testifies) *that by care taking can adde a cubite to his Stature*, in this litle Modul of a Mans body; but in the great Frame of *Kingdomes and Common-wealths*, it is in the Power of Princes and estates, to adde Amplitude and Greatnesse to their *Kingdomes*. For by introducing such ordinances, constitutions and customes, as we have now propounded, and others of like nature with these, they may sow *Greatnesse* to posterity and future Ages. But these Counsils are seldome taken into consideration by Princes; but the Matter is commonly left to fortune to take its chance.

§ *And thus much* for the points that for the present, have offered themselves to our consideration touching *the Enlarging of the Limits of a State or Kingdome*. But to what end is this contemplation, seeing of all Imperiall Sovereignties in this world, the *Romane Monarchy* (as it is believed) was to be the last? but that, being true to our own Designe, nor any where declining out of the way (in as much as, *the Amplification of a Kingdome* was, amongst the three Politique Duties, the third) we could not altogether passe it over untoucht. *There remains* now another DEFICIENT of the two we have set downe, that is, *of Univerfall Justice, or the Fountaines of Law.*

11 All they which have written of Lawes have handled that Argument either as Philosophers, or as Lawyers, & none as Statelmen. *As for Philosophers* they propound many things goodly for discourse, but remote from use. *For the Lawyers* they are mancipated and wholly devoted every one to the lawes of the state where they live, or to the Placits of the *Emperial or Pontifical Lawes*, and cannot use impartial and sincere judgement; but discourse as out of Gyves & Fetters. *Certainly* this kinde of knowledge pertaines properly to *Statemen*; who can best discern what humane society is capeable of; what make for the weale of the publique; what naturall equity is; what the law of Nations, the custome of Countries, the divers and different formes of states and Republicques, and therefore are able to decerne & judge of Lawes, from the Principles, both of natural Equity and Policy. *Wherefore* the businesse in hand is, to have recourse unto, and make enquiry of the *Fountaines of Justice*, and of *Publique utility*, and in every part of Law to represent a *kind of character and Idea of that which is just*; by which generall mark and direction he that shall intend his minde & studies that way, may try and examine the *severall lawes of particular kingdomes and estates*; and from thence endeavour an emendation. *Wherefore* after our accustomed manner we will, in *one Title* propound an example thereof.

## EXAMPLE

## OF A TREATISE TOUCHING VNI-

*versal Justice, or the Fountaines of Law, in one*

*Title, by way of APHORISME.*

## THE PROEM.

## APHORISME. I.

**I**N Civil society either Law or Power prevails; for there is a Power which pretends Law, and some Law tast's rather of Might, then Right. *Wherefore* there is a threefold Fountaine of Injustice; Meere Power; Cunning Illaqueation under colour of Law; and the Harshnesse of Law it selfe.

## APHORISME II.

*The force and efficacy of Private Right is this. He that doth a wrong, by the Fact, receives Profit or Pleasure; by the Example, incurreth Prejudice and Perill: others are not Partners with him in his Profit or Pleasure; but they take themselves interessed in the Example; and therefore easily combine and accord together to secure themselves by Lawes, least Injuries by turnes ceize upon every particular. But if thorough the corrupt humour of the times, and the generality of guilt, it fall out, that to the greater number and the more Potent, danger is rather created then avoided, by such a Law; Faction disannuls that Law, which often comes to passe.*

## APHORISME III.

*Private Right is under the Protection of Publique Law: for Lawes are for the People; Magistrates for Lawes; & the authority of Magistrates depends upon the Majesty of Empire, and the forme of Policy; & upon Lawes Fundamental: wherefore if this Part be sound & healthfull, Lawes will be to good purpose; if otherwise, there will be litle security in them.*

## APHORISME IV.

*Yet notwithstanding, the end of Publique Law is not only to be a Guardian to Private Right, least that should any way be violated; or to repress Injuries: but it is extended also unto Religion, & Armes and Discipline, and Ornaments, & Wealth, & finally to all things which any way conduce unto the prosperous estate of a Common-wealth.*

## APHORISME V.

*For the End and Ayme at which Lawes should level, and whereto they should direct their Decrees and Sanctions, is no other then this, That the People may live happily: This will be brought*

*brought to passe, if they be rightly train'd up in Piety and Religion; if they be Honest for Morall conversation; secur'd by Armes against forraine enemies; Munitcd by Lawes, against seditions, and private wrongs; Obedient to Government and Magistrates; Rich and Flourishing in Forces and wealth: but the Instruments and sinewes of all Blessings are Lawes.*

## APHORISME. VI.

*And this end the best Lawes attaine; but many Lawes misse this marke: for there is a great difference, and a wide distance in the comparative vature and virtue of Lawes; for some Lawes are excellent; some of a middle temper; others altogether corrupt. We will exhibite according to the measure of our judgement, some certaine Lawes (as it were) of Lawes, whereby information may be taken, what in all Lawes is well or ill set downe, and Establishd.*

## APHORISME. VII.

*But before we descend to the Body of Lawes in Particular; we will briefly touch the merit and Dignities of Lawes in general. A Law may be held good, that is Certaine in the intimation; Just in the Precept; Profitable in the Execution; Agreeing with the Forme of Government in the present state; and begetting virtue in those that live under them.*

## TITLE. I.

OF THE FIRST DIGNITY OF  
Lawes, that they be CERTAINE.

## APHORISME. VIII.

**C**ERTAINTY is so Essentiall to a Law, as without it a Law cannot be Just; Si enim incertam vocem det Tuba, quis se parabit ad Bellum? So if the Law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himselfe to obey? A Law than ought to  
give

*give warning before it strike: and it is a good Rule, That is the best Law which gives least liberty to the Arbitrage of the Iudge; which is that, the CERTAINTY thereof effecteth.*

## APHORISME. IX.

INCERTAINTY of Lawes is of two sorts; one where no Law is prescribed; the other, when a Law is difficile and darke: we must therefore first speak of Causes omitted in the Law; that in these likewise there may be found some Rule of CERTAINTY.

OF CASES OMITTED  
IN LAW.

## APHORISME. X.

**T**He narrow compasse of mans wisdom, cannot comprehend all cases which time hath found out; and therefore Cases omitted, and new doe often present themselves. In these cases there is applied a threefold remedy, or supplement; either by a proceeding upon like Cases, or by the use of Examples thoe they be not grown up into Law; or by Iuridictions, which award according to the Arbitrement of some Good Man, and according to sound judgement; whether they be Courts Prætorian or of Equity, or Courts Cenforian or of Penalty.

OF PROCEEDING UPON LIKE  
Presidents; and of the Extensions of  
LAWES.

## APHORISME. XI.

**I**N Cases omitted, the Rule of Law is to be deduced from Cases of like nature; but with Caution and Judgement. Touching which these Rules following are to be observed. Let Reason be fruitfull; Custome be Barren, and not breed Cases. Wherefore whatsoever is accepted against the Sence and Reason of a Law; or else where the Reason thereof is not apparent

*rant, the same must not be drawne into consequence.*

## APHORISME. XII.

*A singular Publique Good doth necessarily introduce Cases Pretermitted. Wherefore when a Law doth notably and extraordinarily respect and procure the Profit and advantage of a State, Let the interpretation be ample and extensive.*

## APHORISME. XIII.

*It is a hard Case to torture Lawes, that they may torture Men. We would not therefore that Lawes Penal, much lesse Capital, should be extended to new Offences: yet if it be an old Crime, and known to the Lawes, but the Prosequeution thereof falls upon a new Case, not fore-seen by the Lawes; we must by all means depart from the Placits of Law, rather than that offences passe unpunisht.*

## APHORISME. XIV.

*In those statutes, which the Common Law (specially concerning cases frequently incident, and are of long continuance) doth absolutely repeale; We like not the proceeding by similitude, unto cases omitted: for when a State hath for a long time wanted a whole Law, and that, in Cases exprest, there is no great danger if the cases omitted expect a remedy by a new statute.*

## APHORISME. XV.

*Such Constitutions as were manifestly, the Lawes of Time, and sprung up from emergent Occasion, then prevailing in the Common-wealth, the state of times once changed, they are reverenc'd enough if they may conserve their authority, within the limits of their own proper cases: and it were preposterous any way to extend and apply them to Cases omitted.*

## APHORISME. XVI.

*There can be no Sequele of a Sequele, but the extention must be arrested within the limits of immediate Cases: otherwise we fall by degrees upon unressembling Cases; and the subtlety of wit will be of more force, than the Authority of Law.*

## APHORISME. XVII.

*In Lawes and Statutes of a compendious stile, extention may be made more freely; but in those Lawes which are punctuall in the enumeration of Cases Particular, more warily: for as exception strengthens the force of a Law, in Cases not excepted; so enumeration weakens it, in Cases not enumerated.*

## APHORISME. XVIII.

*An Explanatory statute dammes up the streames of a Former statute; neither is the extention received afterward, in the one or the other: for there is no super-extention can be made by a Judge, where once an extention hath begunne to be made by a Law.*

## APHORISME. XIX.

*The Forme of words and Acts of Court, doth not admit an Extention upon like Cases; for that looseth the nature of Formality, which departs from Custome to Arbitrement: and the introduction of new Cases imbafeth the Majesty of the old.*

## APHORISME. XX.

*Extention of Law is aptly applied unto Cases Post-nate, which were not existent in nature, when the Law was enacted: for where the case could not be exprest, because there were none such extant; a Case omitted is accepted for a Case exprest, if the reason be the same.*

*So for Extention of Lawes in Cases omist let these Rules suffice*

*suffice.* Now we must speak of the use of Examples.

OF PRESIDENTS AND  
the use thereof.

APHORISME. XXI.

**N**ow it followes we speak of Examples, from which Right is inferr'd, where Law is deficient: as for Custome, which is a kind of Law; and for Presidents which by frequent Practise are growne into Custome, as into a Tacite Law; we will speak in due place. But now we speak of Examples or Presidents, which rarely and sparsedly fall out; and are not yet growne up to the strength of a Law; namely when, and with what caution a Rule of Law is to be derived from them, where Law is Deficient.

APHORISME. XXII.

Presidents must be derived from Good and Moderate; and not from Bloody, Factionous, or Dissolute Times: for Examples fetcht from such times, are a Bastard issue, and doe rather Corrupt, than Instruct.

APHORISME. XXIII.

In Examples the more Moderne, are to be reputed the more safe: for that which was but lately done, and no inconvenience ensued thereon, why may it not be done againe? Yet neverthelesse Recent Examples are of lesse Authority: and if perchance it so fall out, that a Reformation must be made, Moderne Presidents tast more of their own Times, than of right Reason.

APHORISME. XXXVI.

But more Ancient Presidents must be received with caution,

*and choice: for the Revolution of an Age altereth many things; so as what may seem Ancient for Time, the same through perturbation, and Inconformity to the present Age, may be altogether New: wherefore the examples of a middle time are best, or of such an Age as best sorts with the Present times; which now and than the Time further off better represents, than the Time close at hand.*

## APHORISME. XXV.

*Keep your selfe within, or rather on this side the limits of an Example, and by no means surpasse those bounds: for where there is no Rule of Law, all ought to be intertain'd with jealousy: wherefore heere; as in obscure cases, follow that which is least doubtfull.*

## APHORISME. XXVI.

*Beware of Fragments and Compendes of Examples; and view the Example entire and every particular passage thereof: for if it be uncivile and unreasonable before a perfect comprehension of the whole Law, to make a judgement upon a Part, or Paragraph thereof; much more should this rule hold in Examples; which unlesse they be very square and proper, are of doubtfull use and application.*

## APHORISME. XXVII.

*In Examples it imports very much thorough what hands they have past, and have bin transacted; for if they have gone currant with Clerks only and Ministers, of Iustice from the course of some Courts, without any notice taken thereof by superior Counsilors; or with the Maister of Errors, the People, they are to be rejected and litle esteemed of: but if they have bin such precise Presidents to Counsilors of Estate, Judges or Principall Courts, as that it must needs be, that they have bin strengthened by the tacite approbation at least of Iudges; they carry the more Reverence with them.*

## APHORISME XXVIII.

Presidents that have bin publisht, however lesse practised, which being debated and ventilated by mens discourses and disceptations have yet stood out unargued; are of greater Authority; but such as have remaind, buried, as it were, in Closets and Archives, are of lesse: for Examples like waters are most wholsome in the running streame.

## APHORISME. XXIX.

Examples that referre to Lawes, we would not have them drawn from writers of History, but from publique Acts, and more diligent Traditions: for it is an infelicity familiar even with the best Historians, that they passe over Lawes and Iudiciall proceedings too slightly: and if perhaps they have used some diligence therein, yet they vary much from Authentique Constitutions.

## APHORISME XXX.

In Example, which a contemporary Age, or a time neereſt unto it hath repeal'd, should not easily be taken up againe, thoe the like case should afterwards ensue: nor makes it so much for an Example, that men have sometimes used it; as it makes against an example that, upon experience, they have now relinquisht it.

## APHORISME. XXXI.

Examples are admitted into Counsils; but doe in like manner prescribe or command; therefore let them be so moderated, that the Authority of the time past, may be bowed and plied to the practise of the Time present. And thus much concerning information from Presidents where Law is Deficient. Now followes that we speak of Courts Prætorian and Censorian; Courts of Equity, and of Justice.

OF COURTS PRÆTORIAN  
AND CENSORIAN.

APHORISME. XXXII.

**L** *Et there be Courts and Iurifdictions, which may define according to the Arbitrement of some Good man, and according to sound judgement for the Law (as is observ'd before) cannot provide for all Cases; but is fitted to such occurrences as commonly fall out; and Time (as was said by the Ancients) is a most wise Thing, and daily the Auctor and Inventor of new Cases.*

APHORISME. XXXIII.

*New cases fall out both in Matters Criminal, which have need of Penalty, and in Matters Civile, which have need of Reliefe: the Courts which respect the Former, we call Censorian; which respect the latter, Prætorian.*

APHORISME. XXXIV.

*Let the Censorian Courts of Justice, have jurisdiction and Power not only of punishing new offences; but also of increasing Penalties assigned by the Lawes for old crimes, if the cases be heynous, and enormous, so, they be not Capitall: for a Notorious guilt, as it were, a New Case.*

APHORISME. XXXV.

*In like manner, let Prætorian Courts of Equity, have power to qualify the Rigor of Law; as also of supplying the Defects of Law: for if a Remedy ought to be extended to him whom the Law hath past by; much more to him whom it hath wounded.*

APHORISME. XXXVI.

*Let these Censorian and Prætorian Courts be by all means*  
*limited*

*limited within Cases Heinous and extraordinary; & not invade ordinary Jurisdictions; least peradventure the matter extend to the supplantation, rather than the supplement of Law.*

## APHORISME. XXXVII.

*Let these Jurisdictions recide only in the Highest Courts of Judicature, and not be communicated to Courts inferior: For the Power of extending, or supplying, or Moderating Lawes, little differs from the Power of Makeing them.*

## APHORISME. XXXVIII.

*But let not these Courts be assigned over to one man, but consist of Many: Nor let the Decrees thereof issue forth with silence, but let the Iudges alleage Reasons of their sentence, and that openly in the Audience of the Court; that what is free in the Power, may yet in the fame and reputation be confined.*

## APHORISME XXXIX.

*Let there be no Rubriques of blood; neither Define of Capitall crimes in what Court soever, but from a known and certaine Law; for God himselfe first denounced Death, afterwards inflicted it. Nor is any man to be put to death, but he that knew before hand, that he sinned against his own life.*

## APHORISME. XXXX.

*In Courts of Censure, give way to a third Triall, that a necessity be not imposed upon Iudges of absolving or of condemning, but that they may pronounce a Non liquet, so in like manner, let Lawes Censorian, not only be a Penalty, but an Infamy, that is, which may not inflict a punishment, but either end in admonition; or else chastise the delinquent with some light touch of Ignominy, and as it were, a blushing shame.*

## APHORISME. XLII.

*In Censorian Courts let the first aggressions, and the middle Acts of Great offences, and wicked attempts be punisht; yea although they were never perfectly accomplisht: and let that be the chiefest use of those Courts; seeing it appertaines to severity, to punish the first approaches of wicked enterprizes; and to Mercy to intercept the perpetration of them by correcting middle Acts.*

## APHORISME. XLIII.

*Speciall regard must be taken, that in Pretorian Courts, such Cases be not countenanc'd, which the Law hath not so much pre-termitted, as slighted as Frivolous; or, as odious, judg'd unworthy redresse.*

## APHORISME XLIII.

*Above all it most imports the Certainty of Lawes, that Courts of Equity doe not so swell and overflow their banks, as under pretense of mitigating the Rigor of Lawes, they doe dissect or relaxe the strength and sinewes thereof, by drawing all to Arbitrement.*

## APHORISME. XLIV.

*Let not Pretorian Courts have Power to Decree against expresse statute, under any pretence of equity: for if this should be permitted, a Law-interpreter would become a Law-maker; and all matters should depend upon Arbitrement.*

## APHORISME. XLV.

*Some are of opinion, that the Iurisdiction of Defining according to Equity and Conscience; and that other, which proceeds according to strickt Law; should be deputed to the same Courts; but others say to severall: by all means let there be a separation of Courts; for there will be no Distinction of Cases, where  
there*

*there is commixtion or jurisdictions; but you shall have Arbitrement incroach upon: and at last, swallow up Law.*

## APHORISME. XLVI.

*The Tables of the Pretors amongst the Romans came in use upon good ground: in these the Pretor set downe and publisht afore hand, by what forme of Law he would execute Judicature. After the same example, Judges in Pretorian Courts, should propound certaine Rules to themselves (so farre as may be) and openly publish them: for that is the best Law, which gives least liberty to the Judge; he the best Judge that takes least liberty to himselfe. But of these Courts we shall speak more at large, when we come to the Title De Judiciis; we now speak of them in passage only, so farre as they cleere and supply that which is omitted by the Law.*

OF THE REFLECTIVE ASPECT OR  
REFERENCE of Lawes one to another.

## APHORISME. XLVII.

**T***Here is likewise another kinde of Supplement of Cases omitted, when one Law falleth upon another, and withall drawes with it Cases pretermitted. This comes to passe in Lawes or Statutes, which (as the usuall expression is) looke back or reflect one upon another. Lawes of this nature, are rarely and with great Caution to be alleag'd: for we like it not, to see a too Fac'd Ianus in Lawes.*

## APHORISME. XLVIII.

*He that goes about to elude and circumvent the words and sentence of Law by Fraude and captious fallacies, deserves in like manner to be himselfe insnar'd by a succeeding Law: wherefore in case of subtile shifts and sinister devises, it is very meet that Lawes should looke back upon and mutually support one another, that he who studies evasions, and everfion of Lawes*

Present, may yet stand in awe of future Lawes.

APHORISME. XLIX.

Lawes which strengthen and establish the true intentions of Records and Instruments, against the Defects of Formes and Solemnities, doe rightly comprehend matters Past: for the greatest inconvenience in a law that referres back, is, that it disturbeth: But these confirmatory Lawes, respect the peace and settling of those cases, which are transacted and determin'd; yet we must take heed that cases already adjudg'd, be not revert or violated.

APHORISME. L.

We must be very carefull that, not those Lawes alone, be thought to respect things past, which invalide cases already decided; but those also which prohibite and restrain future cases necessarily connext with matters past. As for example, if a Law should interdict some kind of Trades-men the vent of their commodities for hereafter: the letter of this Law is for the future; but the sense and meaning takes hold of the time past; for now it is not warrantable for such persons to get their liveing this way.

APHORISME. LI.

Every Declaratory Law althoe there be no mention of time past, yet by the force of the Declaration, it is by all means to be extended to matters past: for the Interpretation doth not then begin to be in force, when it is declared; but is made contemporary with the Law it selfe. Wherefore never enact declaratory Lawes, but in case where Lawes may in equity referre and looke back one upon another. And here we have done with that part which handles the INCERTITUDE OF LAWES, where no Law is found. It remaines, we now speake of that other part, namely where there is a Law extant, but such a one as is PERPLEXT and OBSCURE.

OF THE OBSCURITY  
OF LAWES.

APHORISME. LII.

**O**bscurity of Lawes springs from foure causes: either from the excessive accumulation of Lawes, specially wherethere is a mixture of Obsolete Lawes: Or from an ambiguous, or not so perspicuous and dilucide description of Lawes: or from the manner of expounding Law, either altogether neglected, or not rightly pursued: or lastly from contradiction and incertainty of judgements.

OF THE EXCESSIVE ACCUMU-  
LATION OF LAWES.

APHORISME. LIII.

**T**He Prophet saith, *Pluct super eos Laqueos*, now there are no worse snares than the snares of Lawes, specially Penall; if they be immense for number; and through the alterations of times unprofitable; they doe not present a torch, but spread a net to our Feet.

APHORISME. LIV.

There are two wayes in use of making a new statute; the one establisheth and strengthens the Former statute about the same ject; and then addes and changes somethings: the other abrogates and cancels what was Decreed before, and substitutes de integro, a new and uniforme Law. The latter way we approve: for by the former way Decrees become complicate and perplex; yet what is undertaken is indeed pursued, but the Body of Law is in the meane time corrupted. But certainly the more diligence is required in the latter, where the Deliberation is of the Law it selfe; that is, the Decrees heretofore made, are to be

*searched into and duely waighed and examin'd, before the Law be publiht: but the chiefe point is, that by this means the Harmony of Lawes is notably advanced for the future.*

## APHORISME. LV.

*It was a custome in the state of Athens, to delegate fixe persons, for to revise and examine every yeare the Contrary-Titles of Law, which they called Anti-nomies; and such as could not be reconciled, were propounded to the People, that some certainty might be defined touching them. After this example, let such in every state, as have the Power of making Lawes, review Anti-nomies every third or fifth yeare, or as they see cause. And these may be first searcht into, and prepar'd by committees assigned thereto, and after that exhibited to Assemblies; that somewhat shall be approv'd, may by suffrages be establisht and settled.*

## APHORISME. LVI.

*And let there not be too scrupulow and anxious paines taken in reconciling Contrary-Titles of Law, and of Salvng (as they terme it) all points by subtle and studied Distinctions. For this is the webbe of wit; and however it may carry a shew of Modesty and Reverence, yet it is to be reckoned in the number of things Prejudicial; as being that which makes the whole body of Law ill-sorted and incoherent. It were farre better that the worst Titles were cancel'd, and the rest stand in force.*

## APHORISME. LVII.

*Obsolete Lawes and such as are growne out of use, as well as Anti-nomies, should be propounded by delegates, as a part of their charge to berepeal'd: for seeing expresse Statute cannot regularly be voided by Disuse; it falls out that through a Disestimation of Obsolete Lawes, the authority of the rest is somewhat embas'd; and Mezentius Torture ensues; that Lawes alive are killed with the embracements of Lawes dead: but above all beware of a Gangrene in Lawes.*

## APHORISME LVIII.

So likewise for Obsolete Lawes and Statutes, and such as are not lately publisht; let the Pretorian Courts have power, in the mean space, to define contrary to them: for although it hath been said not impertinently, no man ought to make himselfe wiser than the Lawes; yet this may be understood of Lawes, when they are awake, not when they are asleepe. On the other side, let not the more recent Statutes, which are found prejudiciall to the Law-Publique, be in the Power of the Judges; but in the Power of Kings and Counsilors of Estate, and Supreme authorities for Redresse, by suspending their execution through edicts and Acts; untill Parliamentary Courts, and such High Assemblies meet againe, which have Power to abrogate them; Lest the safety of the Common-wealth should in the meanwhile, be endangerd.

## OF NEW DIGESTS OF LAWE.

## APHORISME LIX.

**B**Ut if Lawes accumulated upon Lawes, swell into such vast volumes, or be obnoxious to such confusion, that it is expedient to revise them anew, and to reduce them into a sound and solide body; intend it by all means; and let such a work be reputed an Heroicall noble work; and let the Auctors of such a work, be rightly and deservedly ranckt, in the number of the Founders and Restorers of Law.

## APHORISME LX.

This Purging of Lawes, and the contrivving of a new Digest is firewaies accomplisht. First let Obsolete Lawes, which Iustinian termes, old Fables be left out. Secondly let the most approved of Anti-nomies be received; the contrary abolisht. Thirdly, let all Coincident Lawes, or Lawes which import the same, and are nothing else but repetitions of the same thing, be expung'd, and some one, the most perfect among them, retain'd

*in stead of all the rest: Fourthly if there be any Lawes which determine nothing, but only propound Questions, and so leave them undecided, let these likewise be casseer'd. Lastly let Lawes too wordy and too prolix be abridged into a more narrow Compasse.*

## APHORISME. LXI.

*And it will import very much for use, to compose and sort apart in a new Digest of Lawes, Law recepted for Common Law, which in regard of their beginning are time out of mind; and on the other side statutes superadded from time to time: seeing in the delivery of a Juridicall sentence, the interpretation of Common Law, and Statute-Lawes in many points is not the same. This Trebonianus did in the Digests and Code.*

## APHORISME LXII.

*But in this Regeneration and new structure of Lawes, retaine precisely the words and the Text of the Ancient Lawes and of the Books of Law; thoe it must needs fall out that such a collection must be made by centoes & smaller Portions: then sort them in order. For althoe this might have bin performed more aptly, and (if you respect right reason) more truly, by a New Text, than by such a consarcination; yet in Lawes, not so much the stile and description; as Authority, and the Patron thereof, Antiquity, are to be regarded: otherwise such a work, might seem a scholastique businesse, and method, rather than a body of commanding Lawes.*

## APHORISME. LXIII.

*In this New Digest of Lawes, upon good advisement a caveat hath bin put in; that the Ancient volumes of Law should not be utterly extinguisht, and perish in oblivion; but should at least remaine in Libraries; thoe the common and promiscuous use thereof might be retain'd. For in Cases of waighty consequence, it will not be amisse to consult and look into the mutations and continuations of Lawes past: and indeed it is usuall to sprinkle Moderne*

*derne matters with Antiquity. And this new corps of Law, must be confirmed only by such, who in every state have the power of making Lawes; lest perchance under colour of Digesting Ancient Lawes, new Lawes, under hand be conveyed in.*

## APHORISME. LXIV.

*It could be wisht that this Instauration of Lawes, might fall out, and be undertaken in such times, as, for learning and experience, excell those more Ancient times, whose Acts and Deeds they recognize: which fell out otherwise in the works of Iustinian. For it is a great unhappinesse, when the works of the Ancient, are maimed and recompiled by the judgement and choice of a lesse wise and Learned Age: but oft times that is necessary which is not the best.*

Thus much be spoken of the OBSCURITY of LAWES, arising from the excessive and confused accumulation thereof. Now let us speak of the dark & DOUBTFULL DESCRIPTION of them.

## OF THE PERPLEXT AND OBSCURE DESCRIPTION OF LAWES.

## APHORISME LXV.

**O**bscure Description of Lawes arises either from the Loquacity or Verbosity of them, or againe from extreme Brevity; or from the Preamble of a Law repugnant with the Body of a Law.

## APHORISME. LXVI.

*It followes that we now speak of the Obscurity of Law, arising from a corrupt and crooked description thereof. The Loquacity and Prolixity, which hath bin used in setting downe Lawes we dislike: neither doth such a writer any way compasse what he desires, and labours for; but rather the quite contrary. For while a man endeavours to pursue and expresse every Particular*

cular case in apt and proper termes, *hoping to gaine more Certitude thereby; contrariwise it falls out that through many words, multitude of Questions are ingendred; so as a more sound and solid interpretation of Law, according to the genuine sense and mind thereof, is much intercepted through the noise of words.*

## APHORISME. LXVII.

*And yet notwithstanding a too Concise and affected Brevity for Majesties sake, or as more Imperiall, is not therefore to be approved, specially in these times; least Law become perchance, a Lesbian Rule. Wherefore a midle temperd stile is to be embraced; and a generality of words well stated to be sought out; which though it doe not so thoroughly pursue cases comprehended, yet it excludes cases not comprehended cleerely enough.*

## APHORISME. LXVIII.

*Yet in ordinary and Politique Lawes and Edicts, wherein for most part no man adviseth with his Counsil, but trusteth to his owne judgement, all should be more amply explicated and pointed out, as it were, with the finger, even to the meanest capacity.*

## APHORISME. LXIX.

*So neither should we allow of Preambles to Lawes, which amongst the ancients were held impertinencies, and which introduce Disputeing and not commanding Lawes, if we could well away with ancient customes. But these Prefaces commonly (as the times are now) are necessarily prefixt, not so much for explication of Law, as for perswasion that such a Law may passe in the solemne meeting of a State; and againe to give satisfaction to the communitie. Yet so farre as possible may be, let Prologues, be avoided and the Law begin with a command.*

## APHORISME. LXX.

*The Mind and Meaning of a Law, though sometimes it may be drawn not improperly from Prefaces and Preambles (as they*  
*terme*

termethem,) yet the latitude and extention thereof, must not be fetcht fromthence. For a Preamble by way of example, sometimes fetcheth in laies hold upon some of the most plausible & most specious passages; when yet the Law compriseth many more: or on the contrary, the Law restraines and limits many Cases, the reason of which limitations to insert in the Preface were superfluous. Wherefore the dimension and latitude of a Law must be taken from the Body of a Law: for a Preamble often falls either short, or over.

## APHORISME. LXXI.

And there is a very vicious manner of Recording of Lawes, that is, when the case at which the Law aimeth, is expressed at large in the preamble, afterward from the force of the word (The like) or some such terme of relation, the Body of a Law is reverst into the Preamble; so as the Preamble is inserted and incorporated into the Law it selfe; which is an obscure and not so safe a course; because the same diligence useth not to be taken in Pondering and examining the words of a Preamble, as there useth to be done in the Body of a Law it selfe. This part touching the Incertainty of Lawes proceeding from an ill Description of them we shall handle more at large hereafter, when we come to treat of the Interpretation of Lawes. Thus much of the obscure Description of Lawes. Now let us speake of the waies of expounding Lawes.

OF THE DIVERS WAIES OF  
expounding Law and solving Doubts.

## APHORISME. LXXII.

The waies of Expounding Law and solving Doubts, are five. For this is done either by Court Rolls and Records; or by Authentique writs; or by subsidiary books; or by Prelections; or by Responses and Resolutions of wise men. All these if they be well instituted and set downe, will be singular helps at hand against the obscurity of Lawes.

OF THE REPORTING OF  
JUDGEMENTS.

APHORISME. LXXIII.

**A**bove all, let the Iudgements delivered in higher, and Principall Courts of Iudicature, and in matters of grave importance; specially Dubious, and which have some Difficulty and Newnesse in them, be taken with faith and diligence. For Decrees are the Anchors of Law, as Lawes are of the Republicque.

APHORISME. LXXIV.

The manner of collecting such Judgements and Reporting them, let be this. Register the case precisely, the Iudgements exactly; annexe the Reasons of the Judgements alleadged by the Judges; mingle not Authorities of Cases brought for example with Cases Principal. As for Perorations of Pleaders, unlesse there be something in them very remarkable, passe them over with silence.

APHORISME. LXXV.

The Persons which should Collect these Iudgements, Let them be of the order and ranke of the Learnedst Advocates, and let them receive a liberall Remuneration from the State. Let not the Iudges themselves medle, at all, with these Reports; least perchance, devoted to their owne opinions, and supported by their owne Authority, they transcend the limits of a Reporter.

APHORISME. LXXVI.

Digest these Iudgements according to the order and continuation of time, not according to Method and Titles: for writings of this nature are, as it were, the Histories and Reports

ports of Lawes; nor doe the Decrees alone, but their times also, give light to a wise Iudge.

## OF AUTHENTIQUE WRITERS.

### APHORISME. LXXVII.

**L** Et the Body of Law be built only upon the Lawes themselves, which constitute the common Law; next of Decrees or Statutes; in the third place of Iudgements enrolled; besides these, either let there be no other Authentiques at all, or spareingly entertain'd.

### APHORISME. LXXVIII.

Nothing so much imports Certainty of Lawes (of which we now discourse) as that Authentique writings, be confined within moderate bounds; and that the excessive multitude of Authors and Doctors of the Lawes; whereby the mind and sentence of Lawes are distracted; the Iudge confounded; proceedings are made immortal; and the Advocate himselfe, despairing to read over and conquer so many Books, betakes himselfe to Abridgements; be discarded. It may be some good glosse, and some few of Classique writers, or rather some small parcell of few writers, may be received for Authentiques. Yet of the rest, some use may be made in Libraries, where Iudges or Advocates, may as occasion is offered read their Discourses: but in causes to be pleaded, let them not be permitted to be brought, and alleaged in the Court; nor grow up into authority.

## OF AUXILIARY BOOKS.

### APHORISME. LXXIX.

**L** Et not the knowledge and practise of Law be destituted, but rather well provided of Auxiliary Books. They

are in generall fixe sorts, Institutes; of the signification of words; of the Rules of Law; Ancient Records; Abridgements; Formes of Pleading.

## APHORISME LXXX

*Young Students, and Novices are to be enterd by Institutes, that they may the more profoundly and orderly draw and take in the knowledge and Difficulties of the Lawes. Compose these Institutes after a cleere and perspicuous manner. In these elementary books runne over the whole Private Law, not passing by some Titles, and dwelling too long upon others; but briefly touching something in all; that so coming to read through the whole body of Lawes, nothing may be presented altogether strange; but what hath bin tasted, and preconceiv'd by some slight notion. Touch not the Publique Law in Institutes, but let that be deduced from the Fountaines of themselves.*

## APHORISME. LXXXI.

*Compile a Commentary upon the Termes of Law: Be not too curious and tedious in the explication thereof; and of rendring their sense; for the scope here, is not exactly to seeke out the Definition of words, but such explications only, as may cleere the passage to the reading of the Books of Law. Digest not this Treatise by the letters of the Alphabet: leave that to some Index; but let such words as import the same thing be sorted together; that in the comprehension of the sense, one may administer help unto the other.*

## APHORISME. LXXXII.

*A sound and well-labour'd Treatise of the Diverse Rules of Law, conduceth (if any thing doth) to the Certainty of Lawes. A worke worthy the Penne of the greatest wits, and wisest Jurists. Nor doe we approve what is extant in this kind. And not only noted and common Rules, are to be collected, but also others more subtile, and abstruse, which may be abstracted out of the Harmo-*

ny of Lawes, and Iudged Cases; such as are sometimes found in the best Rubriques; and these are the generall Dictates of Reason, and the Ballast, as it were of Law.

## APHORISME. LXXXIII.

*But all Decrees and Placits of Law, must not be taken for Rules, as is wont to be, absurdly enough: for if this should be admitted, then so many Lawes, so many Rules; for a Law is nothing else, then a commanding Rule. But accept those for Rules which cleave to the very Forme of Iustice, from whence for most part the same Rules are commonly found through the Civile Lawes of Different States; unlesse perhaps they vary for the reference to the Formes of Publique Governments.*

## APHORISME. LXXXIV.

*After the Rule is delivered in a briefe and substantiall comprehension of words; let there be, for explication, annex examples, and most cleere and luculent Decisions of Cases; Distinctions and exceptions for limitations; Points concurrent in sense, for Amplification, of the same Rule.*

## APHORISME. LXXXV.

*It is well given in Precept, that a Law should not be drawne from Rules; but the Rule from the Law in force. Neither is a Prooffe to be taken from the words of a Rule; as if it were a Text of Law: for a Rule (as the sea-mans needle doth the Poles) indicates only, not Determines Law.*

## APHORISME. LXXXVI.

*Besides the Body of Law, it will availe also, to survey the Antiquities or ancient Records of Lawes, whose Authority thoe it be vanisht, yet their Reverence remaines, still. And let the writings and Iudgements concerning Lawes, be received for the Antiquities of Laws, which in time preceded the Body of Lawes; whether they were publisht or not: for these must not be Lost. Therefore out of these Records select what ever is most use-*

*full (for there will be found much vaine and frivolous matter in them) and digest them into one volume; Lest old fables (as Trebonianus calls them) be mixt with the Lawes themselves.*

## APHORISME. LXXXVII.

*And it much imports the Practique part of Lawes, that the whole Law be Digested into Places and Titles, whereto a man may haue (as occasion shall be given) a sodaine recourse, as to a furnisht Promptuary for present practise. These Books of Abridgements, both reduce into Order what was dispersed, and abreviate what was diffused and Prolixe in Law. But caution must be taken that these Breviaries, make not men prompt for the Practique part, and slothfull for the knowledge it selfe: for their proper use and office is this, that by them the Law may be tilled over againe, and not thoroughly learned. And these Summaries must by all meanes be collected with great diligence, faith, and judgement, lest they commit Fellony against the Law.*

## APHORISME. LXXXVIII.

*Make a Collection of the diverse Formes of Pleading in eye-kinde: for this conduceth much to the Practique Part: and Certainly these Formes doe discover the Oracles, and secret Mysteries of Lawes: for there are many things which lye hidden in Lawes; But in Formes of Pleading, they are better and more largely displayed; -- like the Fist to the Palme.*

## OF RESPONSES AND RESOLUTIONS OF DOUBTS.

## APHORISME. LXXXIX.

**S***ome Course must be taken for the Cutting off and satisfying Particular Doubts which emerge from time to time: for it is a hard case that they which desire to secure themselves from error, should finde no guide to the way: but that present Busineses should be hazarded; and there should bee no meanes to know the Law before*

*before the matter be dispatcht.*

APHORISME. XC.

*That the Resolutions of the Wise, given to Clients touching point of Law, whether by Advocates or Professors should be of such authority, that it may not be lawfull for the Judge to depart from their opinion, we cannot approve. Let Law be derived from Iyorne Iudges.*

APHORISME. XCI.

*To Feele and sound Iudgements by fained Causes and Persons, that by this meanes, men might find out what the Course and proceeding of Law will be, we approve not: for it dishonoureth the Majesty of Lawes, and is to be accounted a kind of prevarication or double dealing; and it is a foule sight to see places of Iudicature to borrow any thing from the stage.*

APHORISME. XCII.

*Wherefore let, as well the Decrees, as the answers and Counsils proceed from the Judges alone: those of suits depending; these of difficult points of Law, in the general. Require not these Decisions, whether in causes private or publique; from the Judges themselves, (for this were to make the Judge an Advocate) but of the Prince, or of the State. From these let the order be directed unto the Judges: and let the Judges thus authorized, heare the reasons on both sides; both of the Advocates or of the Committees, deputed by the parties to whom the matter appertaineth; or of them assigned by the Judges themselves; if necessity so require: and waighing the Cause, let them deliver the Law upon the case and declare it. Let these verdicts and counsils, be recorded and notified amongst Cases adjudged, and be of equall authority.*

## OF PRELECTIONS.

## APHORISME. XCIII.

**L** *Et the Lectures of Law, and the exercises of those that ad-  
dresse themselves to the studies of Law, be so instituted and  
ordered, that all may tend rather to the laying asleepe, than  
the awakeing of Questions and Controversies in Law. For (as  
the matter is now carried) a Schoole is set up, and open amongst  
all, to be multiplying of Altercations and Questions in Law;  
as if their aime was only to make ostentation of wit. And this is  
an old disease, for even amongst the Ancients, it was, as it were, a  
glory, by Sects and Factions, to cherish rather than extinguish  
many questions concerning Law. Provide against this in-  
convenience.*

OF THE INSTABILITY OF  
IUDGEMENTS!

## APHORISME. XCIV.

**I** *Vdgements become incertaine, either through immature  
and too precipitate proceeding to sentence; or through  
Emulation of Courts; or through ill and unskilfull re-  
gistring of Iudgements; or because there is a too easy and ex-  
pedite way open of Reversing and Rescinding them. Where-  
fore it must be provided, that Iudgements issue forth not without  
a staid deliberation had aforehand; and that Courts beare a  
Reverent respect to one another; and that Decrees be drawne  
up faithfully and wisely; and that the way to repeale Iudge-  
ments be narrow, rockie and strewed, as it were, with sharpe  
stones.*

## APHORISME. XCV.

*If a Iudgement have been awarded upon a Case in any Prin-  
cipall Court; and the like case, intervene in another Court; proceed  
not to sentence before the matter be advised upon in some so-  
lemne*

lemene Assemble of Iudges: for if Iudgements awarded must needs be repeal'd, yet let them be interred with Honor.

## APHORISME. XCVI.

For Courts to be at debate and variance about Iurisdiccions is a humane frailty; and the more because this intemperance, through a misprision and vaine conceit (that it is the part of a stout resolute Iudge to enlarge the priviledges of the Court) is openly countenanced and spur'd on, whereas it hath need of the Bridle. But that out of this heat of stomach, Courts should so easily reverse on both sides Iudgements awarded, which nothing pertaine to Iurisdiction, is an insufferable evill, which by all meens should be repres'd and punish't; by Kings or Counsils of State, or the forme of Government. For it is a President of the worst example, That Courts, that should distribute Peace, should themselves practise Duells.

## APHORISME. XCVII.

Let there not be a too easy and free passage made to the Repealing of Iudgements by Appellations, and writs of Error, or Reexamination, and the like. It is maintained by some, that a Suit may be brought into a Higher Court, as entire and untried, the Iudgement past upon it, set aside and absolutely suspended: others are of opinion that the Iudgement it selfe may stand in force, but the execution thereof may be staid: neither of these is to be allowed, unlesse the Courts wherein the Iudgement was awarded, were of a base and inferior order: but rather that both the Iudgement stand, and that the execution thereof goe on; so a Caveat be put in by the Defendant for Damages and charges if the Iudgement should be reverse't.

**B**Ut this Title touching the Certainty of Lawes shall suffice for a president to the rest of a \* DIGEST, which we with care & diligence endeavour to contrive. And now have we concluded Civile Knowledge (so farre as we thought fit to entreat thereof) and together with it Humane

\* DIGESTUM. Juris Anglicani; SACRVM INSTITVTIA TEMPLVM; Opus sane Regium; sed nondum conditum; quod Tuo seculo, EXCELLENTISSIME PRINCIPVM, INSTAURANDUM: TVI NOMINIS & Eternitatis, consecrandum referatur.

*Philosophy*, as also with *Humane Philosophy*; *Philosophy in Generall*. Wherefore being now at length at some pause, and lookeing back into that we have past through; this our writeing seems to us not much unlike those sounds and Preludes, which *Musitians* make while they are tuning their *Instruments*; which is harsh and unpleasing to heare, but yet is a cause why the *Musique* is sweeter afterwards. So have we bin content to imploy our paines in tuning the *Instrument of the Muses*, and to set it unto a true Harmony, that afterwards they may play who have better hands. Surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which *Learning* seems to have made hir *third Circuit* to Men; and withall diligently behold, with what various supplies and supports being furnisht, she hath made her visitation; as are, the *height and vivacity* of *many wits* in this our Age; the *excellent monuments of Ancient writers*, which as so many great lights shine before us; the *Art of Printing*, which communicates Books with a liberall hand to men of all fortunes; the *travel* of *some of the Ocean* and of the world, opened on all parts, whereby multitudes of experiments unknown to the Ancients have bin disclosed; and *Naturall History*, by the accessse of an infinite Masse advanced: the *leisure* wherewith the Kingdomes and States of Europe every where abound, not imploying men so generally in *Civile Businesses*, as the States of *Gracia* did in respect of their *Popularity*; or as the state of the Romans did in respect of their *Monarchy*: the *Peace* which at this present *Brittanny*, *Spaine*, *Italy*, as also at this instant *France* and many other Countries enjoy: The *Consumption & Exinanition* of all that can be imagined or said in *controversies of Religion*, which now so long time have taken up so many wits, and diverted them from the studies of *other Sciences*: the *Elevation and Perfection of Your Majesties Learning*, about whom (as the Birds about the *Phœnix*) whole vollies of wits flock and assemble: Lastly the *inseparable property* which attends time it selfe, which is, *ever more and more to disclose Truth*: when we think I say, on these advantages; we cannot but be raised to this


this Perswasion, that this *third period of Learning*, will farre surpass those two former of the *Græcian and Roman Learning*. Onely if men will but well and wisely know their owne strength and their own weaknesse both; and take, one from the other, *light of Inventions*, and not *Fire-brands of contradiction*; and esteeme of the Inquisition of Truth, as a noble entreprize, and not as a delight or ornament; and imploy wealth and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar & of popular estimation.

*As for my Labours*, if any man shall please himselfe or others in the reprehension of them, certainly they shall cause me put up that ancient request, but of great patience, *verbera sed Audi, let men reprehend as they please, so they observe and waigh what is spoken*. Verily the Appeale is lawfull (though, it may be, for this matter, not so needfull) if it be made *from the first cogitations of men unto the second; and from the neerer times, to the times farther off*.

Now let us come unto the *Learning*, which those two ancient *Periods of time* were not so blest as to know, I mean SACRED AND DIVINELY INSPIRED THEOLOGY, *the Noblest Saboath and Port of all mens Labors and Peregrinations*.

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THE NINTH BOOK OF  
**FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM**  
 VICOUNT St ALBAN.

OF THE  
 DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT  
 OF LEARNING.

To the KING.

CAP. I.

*The Partitions of Inspired Divinity are omitted, only acceſſe is made to three DEFICIENTS. I. The Doctrine of the right uſe of Humane Reason in matters Divine. II The Doctrine of the Degrees of Vnity in the City of God, III And the Emanations of SS. Scriptures.*



And now (*moſt excellent King*) we have with a ſmal Barque, ſuch as we were able to ſet out, ſail'd about the univerſal circumference, as well *of the old as the new*, WORLD OF SCIENCES, with how prosperous windes and courſe, we leave to Poſterity to Judge. What remaines, but that, having accompliſht our Deſignes, we ſhould pay our vowes? But there reſts yet behinde SACRED-INSPIRED-DIVINITY; whereof if we ſhould proceed to intreat, we ſhould depart out of the *Pinnacle of Human Reason*, and goe into the *ſhip of the Church*, which muſt alone be governed by a *Divine ſea-needle* to direct her courſe aright: for the *ſtarres of Philoſophy* which hetherro ſhined forth unto us, and were our chiefe guide, here faile us: it were then meet, we kept ſil-

lence in this sacred subject. Wherefore we shall omit the *just Partitions of this knowledge*; yet notwithstanding somewhat we will cast into this treasury, by way of good wishes according to the proportion of our slender hability. This we doe the rather because we finde no coast or space of ground in the whole *Body of Divinity* lying vacant and untilled; so diligent have men been, either in sowing of *Good seed*, or *sowing of Tares*.

§ Wherefore we will propound three Appendices of *Theology* treating, not of the matter *informed of by Divinity*, or to be *informed off*; but only of the *manner of information*: neither will we annexe examples, or set downe precepts concerning these Tractates, as our manner was to doe in the rest; that we referre to *Divines*; for these are (as hath been said) *like meere vows only*.

\*  
SO<sup>o</sup>RON  
five de le-  
gitimo usu  
RATIO-  
NIS huma-  
nae in DI-  
VINIS.  
Gen. 18.

I. *The Prerogative of God* Comprehends the whole man; and is extended as well to the *Reason*, as to the *will of Man*; that is, that man renounce himselfe wholly, and draw neere unto God: wherefore as we are to *obay his law*, thoe we finde a reluctation in our *will*; so we are to *believe his word* thoe we finde a reluctation in our *Reason*: for if we believe only that which is agreeable unto our *Reason*, we give assent to the *Matter*, not to the *Auctor*; which is no more than we would doe towards a suspected and discredited witnesse: but *that Faith which was accounted unto Abraham for Righteousnesse*, was of such a point, as whereat *Sarah laughed*, who therein was an Image of *Naturall Reason*. By how much therefore any *Divine Mystery* is more discondant, and incredible; by so much the more Honour is given to God in *Believing*, and the victory of our *Faith* is made more noble: Nay even sinners by how much the more they are surcharg'd in conscience, & yet repose a trust in the mercies of God for their salvation, by this doe more honour God, *for all desperation is a reproach of the Deity*. Nay farther (if we truly consider the point) it is an Act more great and high to *believe*, than to *know*, as we now *know*: for in *knowledge* mans mind suffers from *sense*, which results from

from things materiate; but in *Beliefe* the Spirit suffers from Spirit, which is the worthier Agent: the case is otherwise in the *State of Glory*, for then *Faith shall cease, & we shall know* I. Cor. xiii. *as we are knowne.* Wherefore we may conclude, that *Sacred Theology* is grounded on, and must be deduced from the *Oracles of God*; & not from the *light of Nature*, or the *Dictates of Reason*: for it is written, *The Heavens declare the Glory of God*, but we never finde it written *The Heavens declare the will of God*: of the *will of God*, it is said, *Ad legem & Testimonia, si non fecerint secundum illud, &c.* This holds not only in those *Great Mysteries* concerning the *Deity*, the *Creation*, the *Redemption*, but appertaines also to a more perfect interpretation of the *Law Morall*, *Love your Enimies; doe good to them that hate you &c. that you may be the children of your heavenly Father, who commands the raine to fall upon the just and unjust*, which words certainly deserve that applause, *Nec vox hominem sonat*: For it is a voice beyond the light of Nature. So likewise we see the *Heathen Poets* especially, when they fall upon a passion, doe still expostulate with *Laws and Moralities* (which yet are farre more free and indulgent than *divine Lawes*) as if in a kind of malignity, they were repugnant to the liberty of nature,

----- *Et quod natura remittit*

*Invida jura negant* -----

Plutar. in  
Alex. M

So said *Dendamis* the *Indian*, unto *Alexanders Messengers*, *That he had heard somewhat of the name of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise-men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men; but they had one fault, which was, that they had in too great Reverence and veneration, an imaginary thing they called LAW AND MANNERS.* So it must be confest, that a great part of the *Law Morall* is of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: yet notwithstanding, that men are said to have, even from the *Light and Law of Nature*, some notions and conceits of *virtue, vice, justice, injury, good and evill*, is most true and certaine. Yet we must understand that this *light of Nature* is used in two severall senses; *first*, as it springs from sense, *Induction*, *Reason*,  
Argu-

Arguments, according to the *Laws of Heaven and Earth*; Secondly, as it is imprinted and shines upon the Spirit of Man by an inward instinct according to the *Law of Conscience*, which is a sparke, and, as it were, the Remaines of a Pristine and Primitive Purity: in which latter sense principally, the soule is participant of some light to behold and discern the perfection of the *Morall Law*; which light is not altogether so cleare, but such as in some measure rather reprehends *vices*, than fully informes us concerning Duties: So then the *Religion* as well *Morall* as *Mysticall* depends upon *Divine Revelation*.

V. Doctis  
Hookerum  
de LL. Eccl.  
Politia l. 3.  
§ VIII. IX.  
l. 1. § VIII  
IX.

Rom. xli.

§ The use, notwithstanding, of *Humane Reason* in matters *spirituall*, is, without question, manifold, very spacious, and generall; and it is not for nothing that the Apostle calls Religion, *our reasonable service of God*, Let it be remembred that the shadowes and Figures of the old Law, were full of *Reason* and *signification*, much differing from the ceremonies of Idolatry and magique, which were surde and mute; oftentimes instructing nothing, no not so much as insinuating any thing. *The Christian Faith* especially, as in all things, so in this is eminent, and deserves highly to be magnified, that it holds a golden *Mediocrity* touching the use of *Reason* and *Disputation*, which is the offspring of *Reason*; between the *Law of the Heathen* and the *Law of Mahomet*, which have imbraced the two extremes; for the Religion of the *Heathen*, had no constant beliefe or confesion; on the contrary in the Religion of *Mahomet*, all *Disputation* was interdicted: so as one hath the very face of wandring and multifarious error; the other of cunning and cautelous imposture; whereas the *Holy Christian Faith* doth both admit and reject *Disputation*, but according to due bounds.

§ The use of *humane Reason* in matter pertaining to Religion is of two sorts, the one in the *explication and conception of the Mystery*; the other in *Illations and Inferences derived from thence*. As touching the *Explication of Mysteries*, we see that God vouchsafeth to descend to the weaknesse of our capacity, so expressing and unfolding his *Mysteries* as they may

may best be comprehended by us; and *inoculating as it were*, his Revelations, upon the Conceptions and Notions of our Reason; and so applying his inspirations to open our understanding, as the forme of the key is fitted to the ward of the lock. In which respect notwithstanding, we ought not to be wanting to our selves; for seeing God himselfe makes use of the faculty and function of Reason in his *Illuminations*; we ought also every way to imploy and improve the same, whereby we may become more capeable to receive and draw in such holy *Mysteriēs*: with this caution, that the mind for its Module be dilated to the amplitude of the Mysteriēs; and not the mysteriēs be streightned and girt into the narrow compasse of the Mind.

§ *As for Illations* we ought to know that there is allowed us a *use of Reason* and Argument, in regard of *Mysteriēs*, secondary and Respective; not Primitive and Absolute: for after the *Articles and Principles of Religion*, are placed in their seats, so as they stand altogether exempt from the examination of Reason, it is then indeed permitted unto us to make derivations & inferences from them, according to the Analogie of them. *In things Natural* this holds not; for both the Principles are liable to examination, by *Induction* I mean, thoe not by *Sylogisme*; and the same Principles have no repugnancy with Reason, but that the first and midle Propositions, may be derived from the same fountaine. But it is otherwise in the *Doctrine of Religion*, where the first propositions are their own supporters and subsistent by themselves; and again, they are not regulate by that Reason, which inferreth consequent propositions. Nor holdeth this in Religion alone, but also in other Sciences both of greater and smaller nature; namely *Where the Primarie Propositions are Placita not Posita*; because in these also the use of Reason cannot be absolute. For instance we see in Games, as Chesse, or the like, that the first Draughts and Lawes of the Play are meere positive & *ad placitum*, which must absolutely be accepted and not disputed; but that thereupon you may win the Game, and with the best advantage

*tage manage your play, is a thing artificial and Rational. So it is likewise in Humane Lawes, wherein there be many Maximes (as they stile them) that is, meere Placita Juris, grounded more upon Authority than Reason; neither come they into dilceptation: but what is most just, not absolutely but relatively, (that is from the Analogie of these maximes) that indeed is Rational, and affords a large field of Disputation. Such therefore is that secondary Reason, which hath place in sacred Theologie that is, which is grounded upon the Placits of God.*

§ And as there is a double use of humane Reason in matters Divine; so in the same use there is a double excesse; the one where there is made a more curious enquiry into the manner of the Mystery, than is befeeming; the other when equall Authority is attributed to Derivations, which is to Principles. For both he, may seem to be Nicodemus Disciple, who pertinaciously enquires *How can a man be borne when he is old?* and he in no wise can be accounted Pauls Disciple, which may not sometimes interlace his instructions with *Ego non Dominus*, or that, *According to my Iudgement*; for to many Illations that stile is well applied: wherefore to my understanding it would be a wholesome and very profitable course, if there were a sober and diligent Tractate compiled, which as a kind of *Divine Dialectique* might give directions, concerning the true limits and use of Reason in matters Divine; which would be a kind of *Opiate Medicine*, not only to quiet and lay asleepe the vanity of Aery speculations, wherewith the Schooles sometime labour; but likewise not a little calme and mitigate the furies and rage of Controversies, which raise sideings and factions in the Church. A Treatise of this nature we set downe as *Deficient*, and terme it *SOPHRON* or the right use of Humane Reason in matters Divine.

\*  
IRENÆ-  
VS, five de  
Gradibus  
unitatis in  
Civitate  
Dei.  
Luc. c. IX.

II It imports exceedingly the Peace of the Church, that the *League of Christians*, prescribed by our Saviour in those two clauses which seem to crosse one the other, were well and clearely expounded; whereof the one defines thus, *He that is not with us is against us*, the other thus,

He

*He that is not against us is with us.* From those two severall Luc. xi.  
 assertions it plainly appears, *that there are some Articles*  
*wherein whosoever dissenteth, is to be held as not comprehended*  
*in the league: and there are other Articles, wherein a man may*  
*dissent, and yet the league be kept entire.* For the bounds of  
 Christian community are set downe, *One Faith, one Bap-* Ephes. iv.  
*tisme; and not, one Rite, one Opinion.* We see likewise the  
 Coat of our Saviour *was entire without seame;* but the gar- Ioan. xix.  
 ment of the Church *was of divers Colours.* The *Chaffe* must Pt. xiv.  
 be sever'd from the corne in the eare; but the *Tares* may  
 not presently be pull'd up from the Corne in the Field.  
 When Moses saw an Egyptian fighting with an Israelite,  
 he did not say, why strive you? but drew his sword and  
 slew the Egyptian; but when he saw two Israelites fight,  
 though it could not possible be that both parties had a  
 just cause; yet he thus bespeaks them both, *You are Bre-* Exod. ix.  
*thren, why strive you?* Wherefore if these things be well ob-  
 served, it will be found a matter of great moment and use  
 to define what, and of what latitude those points are,  
 which disincorporate men from the body of the Church,  
 and cast them out and quite casseere them from the com-  
 munion and fellowship of the faithfull. And if any think  
 that this hath bin done now long agoe, let him seriously  
 consider with what syncerity, and moderation the same  
 hath bin perform'd. In the mean space it is very likely,  
 that he that makes mention of *Peace*, shall bear away that  
 answer *Jehu* gave to the Messengers, *Is it PEACE Jehu?* 1 Reg. ix.  
*What hast thou to doe with PEACE? turne and follow me.* *Peace*  
 is not the matter that many seek after, but Parties and side-  
 ing: Notwithstanding we thought good to set downe a-  
 mongst DEFICIENTS, as a wholesome and profitable work  
 a Treatise touching THE DEGREES OF UNITY IN  
 THE CITY OF GOD.

III Seeing the Parts of sacred Scripture touching the VTRES  
*Information of Theology,* are such and so great; let us speci- COELE-  
 ally consider the Interpretation thereof; nor doe we here STES,  
 speak of the *Authority of interpreting them,* which is sive Eman-  
 establish'd atione  
Scriptura-  
rum.

establisht by the consent of the Church, but of the *manner of Interpreting*. This is of two sorts, *Methodicall*; and *Solute*, or at large: for this divine water, which infinitely excels that of *Jacobs well*, is drawn forth and deliver'd much after the same manner as *Naturall waters* use to be out of wells; for these at the first draught are either receiv'd into *Cisternes*, and so may be convey'd and diriv'd by many Pipes for publique and private use; or is powred forth immediatly in Buckets and vessells, to be us'd out of hand, as occasion requires.

§ Now this former *Methodicall manner* hath at length brought forth unto us *Scholasticall Theologie*, whereby *Divinity* hath bin collected into an *Art*, as into a *Cisterne*, and the streames of *Axioms* and *Positions*, distributed from thence into all parts.

§ But in *solute Manner of Interpreting*, two extreame intervene; the one *presupposeth* such a perfection in *Scriptures*, as that all *Philosophie* ought to be fetcht and diriv'd from those *sacred fountains*; as if all other *Philosophy* were an *unhallowed and Heathenish thing*. This distemperature hath prevaild especially in the Schoole of *Paracelsus*, and some others; the source and spring whereof flow'd from the *Rabbins* and *Cabalists*. But these men have not attain'd their purpose; nor doe they give honour (as they pretend) to *Scriptures*, but rather embase and distaine them. For to seeke a *materiate Heaven*, and Earth in the word of God, whereof it is said *Heaven and Earth shall passe, but my word shall not passe*, is indeed to pursue *Temporarie things* amongst eternall: for as to seek *Divinity* in *Philosophy*, is as if you would seek the living amongst the Dead; so on the other side to seek *Philosophy* in *Divinity*, is all one as to seek the Dead amongst the living.

§ The other *manner of Interpreting*, which we set downe as an excesse, seems at first sight sober and chaste; yet notwithstanding it both dishonoureth *Scriptures*, and is a great prejudice and detriment to the Church; and it is, to speak in a word, when *Divinely-inspir'd Scriptures* are expounded

*expounded after the same manner that humane writings are.* For it must be remembered, that there are two points known to God the Author of Scripture, which mans nature cannot comprehend; that is, *The secrets of the Heart; and the succession of times.* Wherefore seeing the Precepts and Dictates of Scriptures were written and *directed to the Heart and Thoughts of men,* and comprehend the vicissitudes of all Ages, with an eternall and certain fore-sight of all Heresies, *Contradictions;* differing and mutable estates of the Church, as well in generall, as of the Elect in speciall; they are to be interpreted according to the Latitude and the proper sense of the place, and respectively toward that present occasion whereupon the words were utter'd; or in precise congruity from the Context of the precedent and subsequent words; or in contemplation of the principall scope of the place; but so as we conceive them to comprehend, not only totally or collectively, but distributively, even in clauses and in every word, infinite springs and streams of Doctrine to water every part of the Church and the spirits of the Faithfull. For it hath bin excellently observed that the Answers of *our Saviour,* to many of the questions which were propounded to him, seem not to the purpose, but as it were, impertinent to the state of the question demanded. The Reasons hereof are two: the one, that being he knew the *thoughts* of those that propounded the Questions, not from their words, as we men use to doe, but immediatly and of himselfe, he made answer to their *thoughts* not to their *words.* The other Reason is, that he spak not only to them that were then present, but to us also who now live, and to men of every Age and place to whom the Gospell should be preacht: which sense in many places of Scripture must take place.

§ These thus briefly toucht and fore-tasted, come we now to that Treatise which we report as *Deficient.* There are found indeed amongst *Theologicall writings* too many books of *Controversies,* an infinite masse of that Divinity which we call *Positive,* as *Common-places,* *Particular*

*Treatises; Cases of Conscience; Sermons; Homilies, and many Prolix Commentaries upon the Books of Scripture: but the Forme of writing Deficient is this, namely a succinct and sound Collection, and that with judgement, of Annotations and observations upon particular Texts of Scripture, not dilateing into common-places; or chafeing after Controversies; or reduceing them into method of Art: but which be altogether scatterd and Naturall, a thing indeed now and then exprest in more learned Sermons, which for most part vanish; but which as yet, is not collected into Books that should be transmitted to Posterity. Certainly as wines which at first pressing run gently, yeeld a more pleasant tast, than those where the wine-presse is hard wrought; because those somewhat relish of the stone and skinne of the Grape; so those observations are most wholsome and sweet, which flow from Scriptures gently exprest, and naturally expounded, and are not wrested or drawn aside to common-places or Controversies; such a Treatise we will name *The Emanations of Scripture.**

§ Thus have we made as it were, a *small Globe of the Intellectuall world*; as faithfully as we could, together with a designation and description of those parts which I find not constantly occupate, or not well converted by the Industry and labours of men. In which work if I have any where receded from the opinion of the Ancients, I desire that Posterity would so judge of my intentions, as that this was done with a mind of further *Progression*, and *Proficiency in melius*; and not out of a humour of *Innovation*, or *Transmigration in aliud*: for I could not be true and constant to my selfe, or the Argument which I have in hand, if I had not resolvedly determin'd, *To adde to the inventions of others*, so farre as I was able. And I am as willing, and as sincerely wish that later ages may goe beyond me hereafter, as I have endeavoured to goe beyond others now. And how faithfully I have dealt in this Businesse may appeare evē by this, that I have propounded my opinions every where naked & unarm'd, not seeking to prejudicate the liberty

Liberty of others by the pugnacity of confutations. For  
 in any thing which I have well set downe, I am in good  
 hope that it will come so to passe, that if in the first reading  
 a scruple or objection be mov'd, in the second reading an  
 answer will be ready made; and in those things wherein  
 I have chanc't to erre, I am sure I have not prejudiced the  
 right by litigious arguments, which commonly are of this  
 nature, *that they procure Authority to error, and derogate from  
 Good inventions; for from Dubitation Error acquires Honour,  
 Truth suffers repulse.* And now I call to mind an Answer  
 Themistocles made, who, when an Ambassador in a set  
 speech had boasted great matters of a small Village, takes  
 him up thus, *Friend your words would require a Citty.* Surely  
 I suppose it may be justly objected to me, that *my words re-*  
*quire an Age,* a whole Age perchance to prove them, and  
 many Ages to perfect them. Notwithstanding seeing the  
 greatest matters are owing unto their Principles, it is  
 enough to me that I have *Sowen unto Posterity and the im-*  
*mortal God,* whose divine Majesty I humbly implore  
 through his sonne and our Saviour, that he would vouch-  
 safe graciously to accept these and such like sacrifices  
*of Humane understanding seasond with Re-*  
*ligion as with salt, and incensed*  
*to his Glory.*

Plur. in  
vita.

THE END.





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
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## ERRATA.


**T**He correction of *Textual Errors* (Courteous Reader) is a work of time, and that hath taken wing. The more faults thou findest, the larger field is presented to thy humanity to practise in. Be indulgent in thy censure, and remember that *Error*, whether *Manual* or *Mental*, is an inheritance, descending upon us, from the *first of our Race*. What he said of men, may be laid of Books,

---*Vitiis nullus sine nascitur, optimus ille est*  
*Qui minimis urgetur*, ---

## MARGINAL CORRECTIONS.

**P**Ag 18. for Del. Hist. Fior. read. Discors sopra Liv. pag. 40. for Psal. 141. read Prov. 27. p. 81. \* Errores Naturæ, &c. p. 82. \* Vincula Naturæ, &c. p. 85. \* Hiltoria Induct. p. 87. Oculus Polyph. p. 109. \* Sapientia veterum. p. 132. \* Philosophia prima. p. 150. \* Astrologia viva. \* Astrologia sana, p. 185. \* Problemata Naturalia. p. 159. \* Placita Philos. The starre in the margent points to the laps and to the recovery. Where thou meetest with Vid. Digressi. pag. 146. 241. &c. *deleatur*, for the Interpreters Digressions are not published. p. 470. read Alcoran Azoara: 5.





## LECTORI ACADEMICO S.

**C**erte Philosophia Naturalis omnium Scientiarum nobilissima est, Certissima ac amplissima, utpote suo ambitu Complectens volumen illud magnum & admirandum Operum Dei ac Creaturarum; eorumq; varietatem, Constantiam ac ornatum. CATALOGUS vero iste, qui Capita & summa Rerum Continet, omnium qui unquam prodire, perfectissimus est, maxime ordinatus ac definitus: ad imaginem mundi compositus ac Rerum; non intellectus & Speculationum, quarum non est ordo, numerus, neq; finis. CATALOGUS revera ad mensuram universi & experimentorum ita accommodatus, ut naturam in natura quærat, eamq; in omnes ejus formas mutatam constringat, omnesq; ejus status comprehendat; libertatem, errores, vincula; in speciebus suis, in monstris, in mechanicis. Deniq; INDEX est incompatibilis, ac summo judicio elaboratus. Ad sylvam & suppellectilem Historiarum Naturalium Colligendam, nullus uberior; ad, sic collectam, in locos Com. & proprias classes digerendam, nullus Concinnior; ad, sic digestam, memoriter retinendam, nullus efficacior unquam extitit; vel humano ingenio ac industria excogitari potest. Interpres sic cogitavit? quod Juventuti Academicæ ac veritatis amantibus notum fieri, ipsorum interesse putavit. Erunt fortassis Pedarii Senatores, qui, modernis methodis adsuæti, aliam sententiam ferent; atque ferant aliam; Sed justificata est sapientia à filiis suis.



# CATALOGVS

## HISTORIARUM

### PARTICVLARVM.

#### *secundum Capita:*

1.  Historia Cœlestium; sive Astronomica.
2. Historia configurationis Cœli & partium ejus, versis Terram & partes ejus; sive Cosmographica.
3. Historia Cometarum.
4. Historia Meteororum ignitorum.
5. Historia Fulgurum, Fluminum, Tonitruum, & Coruscationum.
6. Historia Ventorum, & Flatuum repentinorum, & Undulationum Aeris.
7. Historia Iridum.
8. Historia Nubium, prout supernè conspiciuntur.
9. Historia Expansionis Cœruleæ, Crepusculi, plurium Solium, plurium Lunarum, Halonum, Colorum variorum Solis & Lunæ; atq; omnis varietatis Cœlestium ad aspectum, quæ fit ratione Medii.
10. Historia Pluviarum Ordinariarum, Procellosarum, & Prodigosarum; etiam Cataractarum (quas vocant) Cœli, & similium.
11. Historia Grandinis, Nivis, Gelu, Pruina, Nebulæ, Rosis, & similium.
12. Historia omnium aliorum Cadentium sive Descendentium ex alto, & supernè generatorum.
13. Historia Senituum in alto (si modò sint aliqui) præter Tonitrua.
14. Historia Aeris, in Toto, sive in Configuratione Mundi
15. Historia Tempestatum, sive Temperamentorum Anni, tam secundum variationes Regionum, quàm secundum accidentia Temporum, & periodos Annorum; Diluviorum, Ferverum, Siccitatum, & similium.
16. Historia Terræ & Maris; Figura & Ambitus ipsorum, & Configurationis ipsorum inter se, atq; Exporectionis ipsorum in latum aut angustum; Insularum Terræ in Mari, Sinuum Maris, & Lacuum salsonum in Terrâ, Isthmorum, Promontoriorum.
17. Historia Motuum (si qui sint) globi Terræ & Maris; & ex quibus Experimentis illi colligi possint.
18. Historia Motuum majorum & Perturbationum in Terrâ & Mari, nempe Terræ Motuum & Tremorum & Hiatum, Insularum de novo enascentium, Insularum fluctuantium, Abruptionum Terrarum per ingressum Maris, Invasionum & Illuvionum, & contra Desertionum Maris; Eruptionum ignium è terrâ, Eruptionum subitanearum Aquarum è Terrâ, & similium.
19. Historia Geographica Naturalis, Montium, Vallium, Sylvarum, Plantierum, Arenarum, Paludum, Lacuum, Fluviorum, Torrentium, Fontium, & omnis diversitatis scaturiginis ipsorum, & similia: missis Gentibus, Provinciis, Urbibus, & hujusmodi Civilibus.
20. Historia Fluxuum & Refluxuum Maris, Euryonum, Undulationum & Motuum Maris aliorum.

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## Catalogus Historiarum Particularium,

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21. Historia cæterorum Accidentium Maris; Salsuginis ejus, Colorum diversorum, Profunditatis: & Rupium, Montium, & Vallium submarinarum, & similibum.

### *Sequuntur Historie Massarum majorum.*

22. **H**istoria Flammæ, & Ignitorum.
23. **H**istoria Aeris, in substantiâ, non in configuratione.
24. Historia Aquæ, in Substantiâ, non in Configuratione.
25. Historia Terræ & diversitatis ejus, in Substantiâ, non in Configuratione.

### *Sequuntur Historie Specierum.*

26. **H**istoria Metallorum perfectorum, Auri, Argenti; & Minerarum, Venarum, Marcasitarû eorundem: Operaria quoque in Mineris ipsorum.
27. Historia Argenti Vivi.
28. Historia Fossilium, veluti Vitrioli, & Sulphuris, &c.
29. Historia Gemmarum, veluti Adamantis, Rubini, &c.
30. Historia Lapidum; ut Marmoris, Lapidis Lydii, Silicis, &c.
31. Historia Magnetis.
32. Historia Corporum Miscellaneorum, quæ nec sunt Fossilia prorsus, nec Vegetabilia; ut Saliû, Succini, Ambra-griseæ, &c.
33. Historia Chymica circa Metalla & Mineralia.
34. Historia Plantarum, Arborum, Fruticum, Herbarum: & Partium eorum, Radicum, Caulium, Ligni, Foliorum, Florum, Fructuum, Seminum, Lachrymarum, &c.
35. Historia Chymica circa Vegetabilia.
36. Historia Piscium, & partium ac Generationis ipsorum.
37. Historia Volatilium, & Partium ac Generationis ipsorum.
38. Historia Quadrupedum, & Partium ac Generationis ipsorum.
39. Historia Serpentum, Vermium, Muscarum, & cæterorum Insectorum; & partium ac generationis ipsorum.
40. Historia Chymica circa ea quæ sumuntur ab Animalibus.

### *Sequuntur Historie Hominis.*

41. **H**istoria Figuræ, & Membrorum externorum Hominis, Staturæ, Compagis, Vultûs, & Lineamentorum; eorumq; varietatis secundum Gentes & Climata, aut alias minores Differentias.
42. Historia Physiognomica super ipsa.
43. Historia Anatomica, sive Membrorum internorum Hominis; & varietatis ipsorum, quatenus invenitur in ipsâ naturali Compage & Structurâ, & non tantum quoad Morbos & Accidentia præternaturalia.
44. Historia partium similium Hominis; ut Carnis, Ossium, Membrarum, &c.
45. Historia Humorum in Homine; Sanguinis, Bilis, Spermatis, &c.
46. Historia Excrementorum; Sputi, Urinarum, Sudorum, Sedorum, Capillorum, Pilorum, Rediviarum, Unguium, & similibum.
47. Historia Facultatum; Attractionis, Digestionis, Retentionis, Expulsionis, Sanguificationis, Assimilationis alimentorum in membra, Versionis Sanguinis & Floris ejus in Spiritum, &c.
48. Historia Motuum Naturalium & Involuntariorum; ut Motus Cordis, Mo-

## *secundum Capita.*

- tus Pulsuum, Sternutationis, Motus Pulmonum, Motus Erectionis Vir-  
gæ, &c.
49. Historia Motuum mixtorum ex Naturalibus & voluntariis; veluti Respirationis, Tussis, Urinationis, Sedis, &c.
  50. Historia Motuum Voluntariorum; ut Instrumentorum ad voces articulatas; ut Motuum Oculorum, Lingue, Faucium, Manuum, Digitorum; Deglutitionis, &c.
  51. Historia Somni & Infomniorum.
  52. Historia divertorum Habituum Corporis; Pinguis, Macilenti; Complexionum, (quas vocant,) &c.
  53. Historia Generationis Hominum.
  54. Historia Conceptionis, Vivificationis, Gestationis in utero, Partus, &c.
  55. Historia Alimentationis Hominis, atq; omnis Edulii & Potabilis, atq; omnis Dietæ; & Varietatis ipsorum secundum Gentes aut minores differentias.
  56. Historia Augmentationis & Incrementi Corporis in Toto & Partibus ipsius.
  57. Historia Decursus Ætatis; Infantia, Pueritia, Juventutis, Senectutis, Longævitas, Brevitatis Vitæ, & similia, secundum Gentes & minores differentias.
  58. Historia Vitæ & Mortis.
  59. Historia Medicinalis Morborum, & Symptomatum & Signorum eorundem.
  60. Historia Medicinalis, Curæ, & Remediorum. & Liberationum à Morbis.
  61. Historia Medicinalis eorum quæ conservant Corpus & Sanitatem.
  62. Historia Medicinalis eorum quæ pertinent ad Formam & Decus Corporis, &c.
  63. Historia Medicinalis eorum quæ corpus alterant, & pertinent ad Regimen Alterativum.
  64. Historia Pharmacopolaris.
  65. Historia Chirurgica.
  66. Historia Chymica circa Medicinas.
  67. Historia Visus & visibilium, sive Optica.
  68. Historia Picturæ, Sculptoria, Plastica, &c.
  69. Historia Auditus & Sonorum.
  70. Historia Musica.
  71. Historia Olfactus, & Odorum.
  72. Historia Gustus & Saporum.
  73. Historia Tactus, & ejus Objectorum.
  74. Historia Veneris, ut speciei Tactus.
  75. Historia Dolorum corporeorum, ut speciei Tactus.
  76. Historia Voluptatis & Doloris in genere.
  77. Historia Affectuum; ut Iræ, Amoris, Verecundiæ, &c.
  78. Historia Facultatum Intellectualium; Cogitativæ, Phantasie, Discursus; Memoriz &c.
  79. Historia Divinationum Naturalium.
  80. Historia Diagnosionum, sive Diacrisium occultarum Naturalium.
  81. Historia Coquinaria; & Artium subservientium, veluti Macellaria, Aviarum &c.
  82. Historia Pistoria, & Panificiorum; & Artium subservientium, ut Molendinaria, &c.
  83. Historia Vinaria.
  84. Historia Cellaria, & diversorum generum Potus.

*Catalogus Historiarum Particularium,*

85. Historia Bellariorum & Confecturarum.
86. Historia Mellis.
87. Historia Sacchari.
88. Historia Lacticiniorum.
89. Historia Balneatoria, & Vnguentaria.
90. Historia Miscellanea circa curam corporis; Tonforum, Odoratorum, &c.
91. Historia Auri-fabrilis, & Artium subservientium.
92. Historia Lanificiorum, & Artium subservientium.
93. Historia Opificiorum è Serico & Bombyce, & Artium subservientium.
94. Historia Opificiorum ex Lino, Cannabio, Gossipio, Setis, & aliis Filaceis; & Artium subservientium.
95. Historia Plumificiorum.
96. Historia Textoria, & Artium subservientium.
97. Historia Tinctoria.
98. Historia Coriaria, Alutaria; & Artium subservientium.
99. Historia Culcitraria & Plumaria.
100. Historia Ferri-Fabrilis.
101. Historia Latomiæ sive Lapidarum.
102. Historia Lateraria, & Tegularia.
103. Historia Figularis.
104. Historia Cæmentaria, & Crustaria.
105. Historia Ligni-fabrilis.
106. Historia Plumbaria.
107. Historia Vitri & omnium Vitreorum, & Vitriaria.
108. Historia Architecturæ in genere.
109. Historia Plaustraria, Rhedaria, Lesticaria, &c.
110. Historia Typographica, Libraria, Scriptoria, Sigillatoria; Atramenti, Cælamæ, Papyri, Membranz, &c.
111. Historia Cera.
112. Historia Viminaria.
113. Historia Storearia, & Opificiorum ex Stramine, Scirpis, & similibus.
114. Historia Lotricaria, Scoparia, &c.
115. Historia Agriculturæ, Pascuaræ, Cultûs Sylvarum, &c.
116. Historia Hortulana.
117. Historia Piscatoria.
118. Historia Venationis & Aucupii.
119. Historia Rei Bellicæ, & Artium subservientium; ut Armamentaria, Arcuaria, Sagittaria, Sclopetaria, Tormentaria, Balistaria, Machinaria, &c.
120. Historia Rei Nauticæ, & Practicarum, & Artium subservientium.
121. Historia Athletica, & omnis generis Exercitationum Hominis.
122. Historia Rei Equestris.
123. Historia Ludorum omnis generis.
124. Historia Præstigatorum & Circulatorum.
125. Historia Miscellanea diversarum Materiarum Artificialium; ut Esmaltæ, Porcellanz, complurium Cæmentorum, &c.
126. Historia Salium.
127. Historia Miscellanea diversarum Machinarum, & Motuum.
128. Historia Miscellanea Experimentorum Vulgarium, quæ non coaluerunt in Artem.

*Etiam Mathematicarum purarum Historia conscribenda sunt, licet sine potius Observationes quam Experimenta.*

129. Historia naturarum & potestatum Numerorum.

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secundum Capita.

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130. Historia naturarum & potestatum Figurarum.

**N**on abs re fuerit admonere, quod, cum necesse sit multa ex Experimentis sub duobus Titulis vel pluribus cadere, (veluti Historia Plantarum, & Historia Artis Hortulanae multa habebunt ferè communia) commodior sit inquisitio per Artes, Dispositio verò per Corpora. Parùm enim nobis cura est de Artibus ipsis Mechanicis, sed tantùm de iis quae afferunt ad instruendam Philosophiam. Verùm hac è re natâ meliùs regentur.

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FINIS.

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
R i i

TYPOG.



*Typographus Lectori.*

**V**NA aut alterâ Paginâ vacante in damnum Bibliopola, ad implendam areolam inanem, Nobiliff. Authoris Liſſeras, ſuo Collegio miſſas ac propriâ manu munitas, ſubjungere viſum eſt. Quòd vivit Chartula hæc peritura, id noſtrum munus eſt; Tuum Lector, ſi vigeat. Succincta pagina eſt, ſed ſolida: & excellentium virorum, etiam Reliquiæ conſervandæ. *Vale.*



FRA. DE VERVLAMIO

Vice-Comes SANCTI ALBANI.

PERCELEBRI COLLEGIO SANCTÆ  
ET INDIVIDVÆ TRINITATIS  
IN CANTABRIGIA S.

**R**Es omnes earumq; progressus initiis suis de-  
bentur: Itaq; cum initia Scientiarum è  
Fontibus vestris hauserim, incrementa ip-  
sarum vobis rependenda existimaui. Spero itidem fo-  
re, ut hæc nostra apud vos tanquam in Solo nativo Fe-  
licius succrescant. Quamobrem & vos hortor, ut sal-  
vâ animi modestia, & erga veteres reverentiâ, ipsi  
quoq; Scientiarum Augmentis non desitis: verum  
ut post volumina sacra verbi Dei & Scripturarum,  
secundo loco volumen illud magnum operum Dei &  
Creaturarum, strenuè, & præ omnibus libris, qui pro  
Commentariis tantum haberi debent, evolvatis.  
Valete.



Excudebat Oxonii

LEONARDVS LICHFIELD

Primarius ACADEMIÆ

Typographus.

---

Impensis ROBERTI YOUNG,  
& EDVARDI FORREST.

Anno Salutis,

M. DC. XXXX.













